At the limit of the modern system of states: Border and boundary practices in Cyprus

by

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B.A., University of Victoria, 2004

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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This thesis takes the position that it is not clear that the aspirations and assumptions expressed by theories of international relations predicated on the narrative about the emergence of mature sovereign nation states acting within a system of such states offers a particularly helpful guide to political practices concerning boundaries and borders that are identified on the ground. This is especially the case if we pay attention to the specific practices of bordering in Cyprus. Through a reading of various sites of limitation and excess of Cypriot sovereignty – in relation to the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, the modern system involving Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, the United Nations and the European Union, ongoing complexities such as British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) and the ethnically mixed village of Pyla/Pile – this thesis investigates the consequences and considers the implications, both theoretical and actual, that arise in Cyprus.
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Introduction

Many obvious but nevertheless crucial problems arise in any attempt to tell a narrative about complex and contested histories. In Cyprus a very complicated layering of the historical record has been made even more contentious as a consequence of multi-ethnic immigration, colonial exchanges, powerful nationalisms and claims to sovereign statehood that have resulted in failed bi-communalism, international intervention and territorial occupation. The conventions of the modern international system of states nevertheless affirm a much more straightforward story in which Cyprus is accorded official recognition and inclusion as a singular state within an order of similar states: the Republic of Cyprus.

As a sovereign state Cyprus is awarded authority over its territorial jurisdiction – in this specific instance the geography of the island. Cyprus is popularly known for the presence of a self-declared country – the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – occupying the northern half of the island. The presence of Turkish troops in the north further frustrates and reinforces the sovereignty of Cyprus, as that which they are positioned against. The conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots that is most often used to express and explain the division of the island suggests that the strength of nationalisms and the diversity of ethnic heritage renders Cyprus inadequate to contain these irreconcilable forces. In this way, the story told about Cyprus is that of an either/or scenario – Either the island is representative of one country and Greek and Turk are somehow reconciled

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1 Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as variants including Greece and Turkey, Greek and Turk, the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Pyla and Pile, and so on are used throughout this thesis. I have ordered the nouns according to the population groups on the island, in which there are approximately 800,000 Greek Cypriots and 300,000 Turkish Cypriots. I have chosen to stay consistent with this order as to avoid any unintended inference.
within a bi-cultural state, or the island is home to two not yet determined countries. As will be explored throughout this thesis through an investigation of border and boundary politics in Cyprus, the dichotomization of the so-called Cyprus conflict into that of either one or two sovereignties does not go far enough to explain the numerous practices and perspectives that exceed this explanation. As a result, the formula used to determine modern statehood does not adequately describe the situation in Cyprus.

As in so many other places, the historical narrative about Cyprus expressed in the conventions of a modern international order has run into many difficulties. This is not simply a matter of the persistent conflict that has kept UN peacekeeping forces on the island for half a century, but also of the boundaries that define Cyprus as an actor within an international order that subjects it to UN intervention. In contrast to the clear straight-line boundaries assumed by the conventions of international relations, the boundaries of Cyprus are both multiple and overlapping.

Some of these boundaries are observable as geographic borders and the territorial limits of institutional authority such as the UN boundary, which is in itself a geographical zone and also that which distinguishes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and foreign military establishments. Some are more elusive, even conceptual, involving ethnic and national identities as well as ideological and ethical norms. Even the boundaries of the broader Greek and Turkish regionalisms that have shaped so many aspects of Cypriot life are more complex and contested than the conventional international narratives assume.

Cyprus certainly does host conflicting articulations of statehood, cast in terms of a sharp boundary between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, respectively. These articulations are nevertheless
at odds with multiple boundary practices that may be identified in Cyprus. Such practices, in fact, seriously undermine the official story of what Cyprus is and must be. This is particularly so in relation to the constitutionally protected British Sovereign Bases Areas (SBAs), the internationally monitored United Nations buffer zone, the spheres of European Union inclusion and exclusion, and a broad array of processes that include cross-border flows of people and goods, inter-ethnic cooperation and memberships in supranational regimes. The discrepancy between the expectations of the international system and the specific forms of boundary and practices of bordering that may be identified in the complex political site we simply call Cyprus is the primary concern of this thesis.

In Cyprus, instances of both limitation and excess contribute towards an interesting analysis of the degree to which the accepted, dominant internationalist discourse is able to speak about the world in its image. This discourse (re)produces a collection of states, each possessing sovereign power inside their boundaries while, at the same time, this sovereignty is simultaneously authorized through its recognition by the collection of states of which it is a part. State-centric theories of political life dominate the modern world order and the modern individual political imagination. Limits and excesses of state sovereignty are difficult to articulate in the language created through and for a particular kind of politics.

At this point, some historical perspective is in order – keeping in mind that the contested character of the appropriate historical perspective is part of the problem to be examined here.
A Brief Account of Cyprus

The island of Cyprus has long and multiple histories. The supposed birthplace of Aphrodite, goddess of love, beauty and passion, and the third largest island in the Mediterranean, it was home to Bronze Age Mycenaean civilizations dating back to 1600 B.C.E. The landscape of Cyprus has been shaped by waves of settlement from the thirteenth century B.C.E. when ‘Sea People,’ many Greek soldiers, the victors of the Trojan Wars, migrated and settled on Cyprus. In the sixth century B.C.E, Cyprus was conquered by Egypt, Persia, Egypt again and finally Rome. After the partition of the Roman Empire in 395 C.E., Cyprus became part of the Byzantine Empire, which had its capital at Constantinople. Cyprus was first controlled by a Western European power when Richard, King of England captured the island during the Third Crusade in 1191. This lasted until England was defeated by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, when Cyprus then fell under Ottoman rule. Throughout the next few centuries Cyprus experienced an influx of Turkish settlers. Eventually the Ottoman Empire ceded control, though not sovereignty, to Britain in 1878, in exchange for support against Russia. By then, Cyprus had become strategically important to the British Empire because of its position in the Eastern Mediterranean and its proximity to the Suez Canal. It was formally annexed by Britain in 1914, and remained a colonial mandate until independence in 1960.

Cypriot independence from Britain was formalized 16 August 1960. The withdrawal of colonial rule and the shift to self-government within a bi-communal state established majority and minority populations based on ethnicity: Greek or Turkish. In an effort to deter Greek and Turkish Cypriots from civil strife and ethnic partition, and to maintain the integrity of the island as one country, the new constitution contained provisions for
majority-minority cooperation and co-governance. From its inception, the bi-communal government was constrained by its division into two equal decision-making bodies. Predictably, each side continually rejected proposals made by the other and the government stalled. In 1963, then-President Archbishop Makarios issued a 13-point reform proposal intended to end the stalemate. However, the proposal removed several minority veto rights and qualitatively diminished the participation and protection that had been accorded to the Turkish Cypriot minority at independence. The Turkish faction of the government rejected the amendments and withdrew from their seats in the House of Representatives in protest. In the following months and years, ethnic breakdown and bi-communal violence raged in Cyprus and constitutional provisions that guaranteed minority representation were left incomplete after the abdication of Turkish Cypriot representatives from their government seats. Turkish Cypriot communities were no longer represented in the now-Greek Cypriot government and their security on the island was fragile.

At its conception the post-colonial Cypriot constitution attempted to unite the two ethnic groups through bi-communalism and common rule. However, the document and its optimism were insufficient to contain the diversity of Greek and Turkish Cypriots within the government and the country or to quell both passive and aggressive attempts to divide them. Rather than represent a collaboration of Greek and Turk in Cyprus, the document was drafted elsewhere and was insensitive to the depth of social cleavages in the country. At the same time, external influences from Greece, Turkey and other international interests interfered with the functions of democracy internally.
In addition to the difficulties created through the imposition of a common citizenship defined by no more than a common constitution, the demands and expectations placed on Cyprus by third parties further curtailed and strained any efforts toward unity. The constitutionally entrenched intention of cooperation among Greek and Turkish Cypriots failed to reflect or produce a unified citizenry or common interests among the majority of elected representatives. Within a few years of independence Cyprus’ minority government had only limited control over the island as a whole and was obviously failing. What happened next has become a matter of deeply contested narratives.

The bi-communal government was unable to deal with the realities unfolding on the island and, in 1964, the United Nations drew a cease fire line in green pencil that would come to be known as the Green Line. The Green Line became impassable after 15 July 1974, when the Cypriot military, at the hands of the junta then controlling Athens, overthrew the Republic’s President. After the outbreak of violence on both sides of the conflict, Turkey sent troops to the aid of Turkish Cypriots in the north and contributed towards the occupation of approximately one-third of the island that now comprises the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The TRNC declared its independence in 1983 and employs the UN Green Line as its southern border with the Republic of Cyprus.

An Internationalist Account of the Development of the Modern International

It is through something like this brief narrative that Cyprus has been made to emerge from a pre-modern history of consecutive, conquering empires into the temporal and spatial logic of the modern international political order. Presented in contrast to an insecure era of warring empires and a subordinate position as a colonial possession,
Cyprus’s attainment of statehood in 1960 expresses its entry into full maturity within the modern international political order.

In the general form of this account, the feudal era and the period of fragmented rule over geographically unspecified territories prior to the fifteenth century are understood to have preceded the rise of large unitary states that hold extensive control over distinct territories. Initiated by the gradual development of Western Europe’s centralized institutions from the fifteenth century, this modern nation-state is fixed both as the central concept in the study of politics and the dominant political actor. All apparently uninhabited and informally controlled areas of the world have been parceled into such nation-states so that the entirety of the world’s land mass is divided into about 200 distinct and competing jurisdictions, each the preserve of state institutions with supreme political authority within well defined territories. Such states are further recognized as sets of institutions possessing the authority to govern the population. Such institutions may include centralized armed forces, a civil service, a state bureaucracy, courts of law, a police force, and so on. Much of this narrative converges on something close to Max Weber’s paradigmatic account of the modern nation-state as a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. In other versions of this narrative, emphasis is placed on the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia for supposedly affirming the centrality of the claim to sovereignty based on the two principles of territoriality and domestic jurisdiction.

In the specific case of Cyprus, it is the key date of 1960 that marks Cypriot independence and the culmination of shifting geographies and warring kingdoms and Cyprus’ transition into the mature world of the international system. It mapped a clear
territorial demarcation around the fledgling country. No longer was the island an addendum to foreign territories. In order to secure a modern Cyprus in the modern international order competing imperial claims were reconciled and the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey signed the *Treaty of Establishment of Cyprus*, pledging to respect and defend the sovereignty of Cyprus. As with all other states in the international system, Cyprus was defined on the basis of territoriality and sovereignty and, as a specifically liberal state, the rule of law, democracy and human rights.

In principle, the establishment of sovereignty in Cyprus put an end to conflicting sub-national ethnicities, Greek and Turkish, through the introduction of the Cypriot citizen. Within the new bi-communal representative system of government both Greeks and Turks were guaranteed participation and political protections. This is, of course, a variation of the more general narrative that is usually applied to the processes of decolonization and self-determination that transformed a largely European system of states to a more universal international system in the mid-twentieth century.

The bi-ethnic government quickly collapsed, nationalisms flared, the country was divided, and Turkish troops occupied the northern section of the island. Given the interpretive force of the principle of self-determination, responses to these difficulties range from attempts to create two distinct and equally sovereign states (the option that has generally been considered illegal under international law due to the initial violation by Turkish occupation) to attempts to recreate a unitary sovereign state. These differences have generated processes of separation, in the form of the Green Line between north and south and various positions insisting that such divisions can be overcome through peacekeeping procedures of various kinds.
On the whole, the international community has preferred the option of unity, but the option for separation would be equally consistent with the general account of a modern form of politics organized within distinct sovereign jurisdictions. That is, the discourse employed to describe the current political climate in Cyprus expresses a general aspiration for a form of politics expressed by the modern state and the system that is organizing such states. It is this aspiration that is expressed in the dominant theories of international relations.

Whether analyzed from an internationalist perspective, in which the illegal occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkey and separatists is a violation of Cypriot sovereignty, or from a separatist perspective in which the rightful claim to independent nationhood and self-determined autonomy made by the TRNC is blocked by the international regime, the Cypriot case is told in modern terms, both stories are congruent with the international system of states, and therefore either involve two rival ethnic groups within one country, or two, as yet unequal nation-states. Regardless of which version of this story is promoted, in both cases there are several sites in Cyprus in which these stories are unable to contain the practices and processes that occur within. As a result, these stories are unable to sufficiently describe the situation in Cyprus.

**Limits and Excesses**

Popular narratives about Cyprus try to contain the story and indeed the country to one of two competing sovereignties within an established order. For this to be possible, Cyprus is readily explained through the language of modernity as a sovereign liberal state. In the next chapter, I will outline the official terms of inclusion and exclusion in the international system as they are evident in its formal organizations and principles. In
order to analyze the congruency of Cyprus within internationalist discourse, an exegesis of the processes, norms, structures and theories of sovereignty in the modern state system is helpful for understanding the ways that borders have been framed in very specific ways and in relation to specific ideals of community and authority.

In the four-chapter analysis that follows, I will examine the practices of bordering in Cyprus in four sites. The first site is concerned with the establishment of the sovereign Cypriot state: a detailed history of the empires that competed over and around the island of Cyprus and those that contributed directly to the ethnic, linguistic, religious and national identities that both bond and divide the Cypriot people is relevant to a contemporary reading of Cyprus. An account of this history, as well as the larger global climate at the time of Cypriot independence, and a reading of the Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee signed between Cyprus, Britain, Greece and Turkey, contextualize the political realities that determined the country.

Through this history an analysis of the condition and character of Cypriot sovereignty will be offered, as it is defined in and through the sovereign authority and negation of other states and nationalisms. This chapter presents Cyprus as an example of the limit of the modern international order’s ability to account for and prescribe a singular condition of sovereignty. As a rupture within the logic of internationalist discourse, the creation and performance of the Cypriot state offer intriguing lines of analysis. I will argue that the creation and inclusion of the Cypriot state within the modern international both falls short of and exceeds the official story of sovereignty within the state and the system of states.

I will then, in chapter three, examine the United Nations Green Line as a boundary site between north and south Cyprus and between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus in order to interrogate official positions that claim the buffer zone is a non-politicized, neutral space. My analysis will suggest that the presence of the Green Line in Cyprus contributes to the production of two separate Cypriot spaces, geographically distinguishing the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus while officially recognizing only one. Even as the official position of the United Nations, like that of the international community of states, recognizes only one sovereign country and thus promotes the reunion of the island under a single structure of Cypriot government, I will suggest that the physical reality of the Green Line produces a set of boundary practices that complicate and contradict this story. As a result, I will suggest that the Green Line negates and affirms seemingly contradictory political claims. Such an observation highlights contradictions between internationalist theory and practice, and examples of the inadequacy of internationalist discourse to contain the world in its image.

As a third site of investigation I will examine, in chapter 4, the two British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) that are remarkable and exceptional spaces through which to interrogate the limits of the exercise of Cypriot sovereignty. My analysis of the British SBAs follows two distinct yet compounded and compounding instances of sovereign limitation and excess. First, the Sovereign Base Areas complicate the ground upon which Cypriot sovereign claims are made. Britain’s ongoing involvement in Cyprus, and the extent to which the former imperial power can exert its will over Cyprus, is incompatible with the internationalist narrative of distinct territorial sovereign states, and complicates the internal coherence of an international system that validates and indeed necessitates such claims. I will employ the presence of British SBAs in Cyprus, the restriction of
Cypriot sovereignty, and the corresponding expansiveness of British sovereignty in Cyprus to challenge internationalist claims that the modern era of equal sovereign states is both ontologically and temporally distinguishable from a past era of empires, as well as the assertion that Cyprus is an equal, sovereign state in relation to its former colonial ruler. British SBAs and Britain’s expansive power in Cyprus are exemplary of the contemporary influence of hegemonic powers in former colonial states and their ‘(neo) imperial’ influences blur the line between then and now.

Second, through an investigation of British SBAs in Cyprus, and following some observations by Barry Hindess (2005), I will argue that both the temporal and ontological continuity between empire and state can be refined and presented in such a way to resist recent claims of “empire” such as those presented by Hardt and Negri. Theories of ‘empire’ like those of Hardt and Negri assert that the contemporary political era involves novel systems of decentralized power that are no longer reliant on territorial boundaries and, further, that there has been a discernable break between the modern international and what such theories consider to be a previous imperial order comprised of more and less hegemonic states. This investigation is relevant to thinking through the ubiquitous binary promoted in internationalist discourse; that national borders are either present or absent, when the practices of bordering on the ground are indicative of much more complicated and overlapping boundaries. To accept a theory of ‘empire’ in which territorial borders are somehow eclipsed by trans- and supra-national powers overlooks the degree to which territorial claims and jurisdictions are foundational to modern forms of inclusion and exclusion, to citizenship and to access institutions, both national and international. The relevance of territorial claims to state and sovereignty are crucial within the modern
international and I will seek to establish that they are, in fact, prerequisites to membership in institutions and organizations that are presented as trans- or supra-national.

In the final chapter I will challenge prevailing assumptions about the singularly oppositional relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots through a reading of the ethnically mixed village of Pyla, in Greek or Pile, in Turkish. Situated within the Green Line, on the boundary zone distinguishing north and south, Pyle/Pile complicates dominant political expectations that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together in peace. Contrary to prevailing international presentations and the ‘official’ positions taken by the governments of both the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriots do live together in Pyla/Pile, with some unexpected results. Observations made in Pyla/Pile confront and complicate binary representations of Greek and Turkish in Cyprus through multiple, historical and imperial associations that pre-date and, in some instances trump Greek and Turkish ethnic identities. Rather than ignoring or overcoming the dichotomy of Greek-Turkish ethnic identity, the villagers of Pyla/Pile perform unique and effective practices of identity and belonging that offer extraordinary perspectives and alternative ‘solutions’ to dominant portrayals of the Cypriot “conflict” within the logic of the modern system.
Chapter 1

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

International Relations Theory

International relations theory refers to the study of associations among states in the international system and includes the roles of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (MNCs). In international relations theory popular discourse recognizes two modes of investigation: normative and positive. Normative investigation seeks to explain and affirm the way things should or ought to be, how values are ascribed, and how norms such as good and bad, right and wrong are attributed. From Aristotle through to Immanuel Kant the tradition of practical reason assumes that normative statements are both rational and defensible. In contrast, logical positivism assumes that normative statements are expressions of opinion and/or emotion and are without rational content. Positivism seeks to be a method of study to describe how things are. Positivists are reluctant to acknowledge the possible normative foundation of any experiential ‘reality’ and that such a mode of inquiry does, in fact, assume a particular reality. International relations theory can be accused of privileging a reality in which states, individuals, and the international are accepted as observable characteristics of modernity, rather than as beneficiaries of normative superiority.

The modern international accepts sovereignty as a rational concept referring to supreme political, legal and military authority within a territory, with no equals internally or superiors externally. Sovereignty, as a juridical concept, fixes and normalizes the state’s
domination over social, economic and cultural conditions through a set of political processes and practices that aim to provide its validity and present it as both participatory and necessary. International relations discourse struggles to articulate cases of sovereign limit or excess. In the sense that the concept of sovereignty is supreme and indivisible, moments of rupture in which sovereignty is impeded or overwhelmed are not easily accounted for in internationalist terms.

Within international relations theory, the acceptance of certain concepts as ontologically superior to their alternatives, or even unrivalled, intimates the influential role played by discourse in the shaping of the contemporary international and the theory that seeks to explain and investigate it. By way of introduction to a more specific reading of Cyprus in the modern international order, a brief exposition of some dominant institutions and concepts may assist in orienting further analysis.

**International Institutions and Organizations**

The United Nations (UN) (1945) was designed to facilitate international cooperation in areas of law, human rights and economics. The UN replaced the League of Nations, formerly initiated in 1919, that was thought to have lacked a sufficient decision making body and to have failed to prevent the Second World War. Improving upon the perceived weakness of the League of Nations, the United Nations is comprised of two bodies, the General Assembly, in which all member states have equal dialogue, debate and decision making capabilities, and the Security Council, a smaller body consisting of the dominant world powers in 1945, the victors of WWII or their successor states; the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the People’s Republic of China, which
replaced the Republic of China, and Russia, which replaced the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

The former expresses a formal commitment to equality and freedom while the latter expresses a more ‘practical’
wisdom that order requires recourse to vertical principles of organization…necessary for maintaining ‘international
order. (Walker, 2005, 4).

The developmental story told about the international system prior to 1945 attributes the
Second World War to the competition and anarchy of sovereign states on account of the
absence of a higher order of authority that could ensure mutual security, by militarism if
required. Thus, the necessity of the hierarchical United Nations is told in realist terms
with a liberal solution: stability among equal, autonomous states is only possible as long
as some states are more, or differently, equal and autonomous than others. The
similarities between a conventional realist reading of the international system – in which
anarchy intimates warfare thus resulting in the necessity of interconnected systems of
alliance and opposition – and the dominant liberal interpretation – in which the desirable
collaboration of peoples and states results in and takes advantage of a mutual peace –
imply that the theoretical divide that is advanced by and through internationalist
discourse obscures the temporal relationship between these two allegedly incompatible
perspectives. Instead, if one examines the necessary preconditions for a prolific
acceptance of liberalism in the modern international that include historical tragedies such
as international warfare accounted for by a realist reading of the world, such theories are
far more a progressive continuum of the same principles through changing external
circumstances than of substantially oppositional claims about the world.
In order to resolve the potential quagmire and impotency of an utterly democratic international association, the United Nations initiated a higher order Security Council to deal with issues of international security. The Security Council has been criticized both for being unrepresentative of the contemporary geo-political world (assuming it ever was) and for its own inability to build consensus and take action in times of national or international crisis due to the polarization of member states (notably the US and China and/or Russia) and the lack of military capability. While each member state of the Security Council enjoys veto power over the others and over the decisions of the General Assembly collectively, the UN retains the principles of sovereign statehood at its foundation, wherein the international organization is legitimated by and through the consent and participation of all member states. As such, the UN has no actual military authority or the prerogative to initiate military activity. Even diplomatic negotiations and economic embargos rely on the cooperation and recognition of the international community.

The European Union (EU) is an intergovernmental body comprised of 27 member states (2010). The EU has evolved from a trade body established after the economic devastation of the First and Second World Wars into an economic, socio-cultural and governmental partnership. Many aspects of the Union existed in predecessor agreements that originated in 1951 with the Treaty of Paris and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), signed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany with a limited duration of 50 years. In 1957 the same six countries established the European Economic Community, later known as the European
Community (1967), which remains to this day and is now one of the three pillars of the contemporary European Union.

As member states of the EU, countries retain their formal sovereignty and participate voluntarily, substantiated by their decision to join. Independent officials represent nation-states in the Union, elected regionally and therefore not always reflective of states’ domestic political climates or agendas. Designed to facilitate an open and common market, the EU enables the free movement of goods and peoples within the included countries. The international law of the EU, known in its entirety as the European _acquis_, takes precedence over domestic law and is effective regionally, yet also operates in a sphere distinct from, and that does not diminish the authority of, national law.

The pragmatic economic agenda of the EU is complicated by and has great bearing on social and political conventions in member and candidate states. European Union integration theory has developed a sophisticated literature involved in the processes of assimilation, the pros and cons of cultural adaptation, the characteristic nature and desires of Europe, and the very definition of Europe itself. In 2000, the EU launched a 7-year cultural program aimed at proliferating diverse cultural phenomenon and investigating distinctly “European” cultural possibilities. The EU is also a topic of inquiry for scholars as it encompasses numerous disciplines including economic, social, legal and political, and its goals, criteria, membership and identity are all topics of ongoing dialogues and debates.

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2 In a conversation about Cyprus and Turkey, it is especially relevant to note recent comments made by Pope Benedict the XIV in which he used his office to declare that Europe is a Christian land. Such ideas intimate interesting, overlapping and contradictory limits, among other things, of “Europe”: geographic, social, economic, legal, ideological, etc… and get at the assumptions, paradoxes and conceptual dilemmas of limits themselves.
Official sovereignty discourse is well versed in the linguistic and phenomenological capabilities of the modern state and the system of states to which it belongs. This discourse includes narratives about states that lie side-by-side, delineated by straight, thin lines. Sovereignty and statehood reside on both sides of the line and are, in principle, defined relative to that which they are not. Much recent European integration theory is conceptualized through a dichotomized lens of the state and the system of states in which borders are either present or absent. The European Union has been theorized as an international regime, operating with the power of collective sovereignties that are somehow pooled while not diminishing the strength of their source so that each state that contributes an element of its sovereignty to a body larger than itself is neither depleted by nor subordinate to the power it helps to create. In a sense, this might be most coherently conceptualized as a set of realms, statist and supra-statist jurisdictions, each operating supremely and uncontestedly as though the other does not act in the same moment, at least until certain conditions are reached. The supra-state institution operates in and through the same logic as the sovereign state but as though on different radar frequencies or spatio-temporal realities.

**The Modern States System: Cyprus as a Modern State**

The modern state and the system of states that derives from and constitutes it affirm a claim about clear and distinct boundaries that distinguish formally differentiated territorial states. The emergence of such states and the international system as the prevailing political order is considered to have been effective in ending the period of religious competition for socio-political control throughout the imperial era. The ostensibly ‘secular’ rule of territorial states reduced the political significance of broad
based religious struggles and subsumed religious authority under the banner of the nation-state where it retained its influence but could not directly interfere with the formal structure or processes of state power.

The world system that had once privileged empires was shifting towards a novel international in which ontologically sovereign states were defined through a marriage of nation and territory, under the singular authority of law. The international came into being, conceptually and logically in the same moment as its components, as the legitimate sovereignty of each state was derived from its recognition by the rest, and the authority of the system to recognize was derived from the sovereign power of each. In order to recognize and interrogate a state as a site of political interest the state cannot be divorced from the system of which it is part. In order to think about a state in both moments, as a sovereign territorial power and as both a contributor and a beneficiary of sovereign power somehow made collective, we are required to conceptualize that a thing is always more than that which it claims or aims to represent.

Two theoretical lines of analysis that underlie and inform an investigation of the state and the contemporary state system are evident. First, the problem of the modern international: the paradox of how the international is and must be a system of sovereign states without working out the problem of how something can be both sovereign and yet also a constituting part of the system from which its sovereignty is derived and recognized. The co-constitution of the state and the state system, the reliance that each has on the other, both theoretically and practically, equally authorizes the condition of one in order to validate its own authority to authorize the condition of the other.
Secondly, while internationalist discourse privileged conditions of self-determination and autonomy as qualitative characteristics for recognition as a nation-state and for inclusion in the modern state system, such conditions alone are not sufficient for inclusion. In addition, and without compromise, recognition of sovereignty by the system of states is necessary to bring a state into the condition of sovereign statehood. The will or self-determination of a ‘people’, and their movement for independent sovereign rule is not adequate to satisfy conditions necessary for inclusion, as is often suggested after the fact and as is observable in numerous contemporary contexts. The significance of this observation is to note that while the narrative favoured by internationalist discourse presents the state and state sovereignty as the ‘natural’ result of a nation-state emerging within visible and defendable borders – comprised of particular internal conditions that may include notions of social contract and the rule of law, among others – such conditions alone do not secure sovereign distinction or inclusion in the international order, or access to the rights and freedoms attributed to such states within the system. Rather than the result of nationalist struggle, sovereign statehood is achieved by the external recognition of the system as a whole. This is to say, a sovereign state is not a sovereign state without recognition of the system that requires it, and others like it, in order to exist. In the Cypriot example this observation is useful in reading both the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in the absence of a collective independence movement and the ongoing denial of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in spite of their declaration of statehood.

The primary logical contradiction of state/state system sovereignty is that the absolute power of the state exists on the condition of its recognition by other such states that are
codified in the system of states of which it is a member. The co-constitutive paradox of sovereign state and state system authority is thus required to legitimate the dominion of its power though means other than those it creates itself. As Jens Bartelson argues,

Either sovereignty is taken to be a given and essential property of the state that constitutes its unitary and indivisible character; in this case, the inside takes on an ontological priority in relation to the outside; the existence of the international proper is dependent on the internal sovereignty of states. Or, conversely, internal sovereignty is contingent upon something structurally prior to it, something that is transposed to a higher level in the course of state consolidation. Here sovereignty grows out of absence, and the inside is constituted from the outside. (Bartelson, 1995a, 44)

The logical necessity of co-constitution between state and system in the modern international exposes an internal paradox that can prove problematic when one attempts to read the state/state-system through generally accepted claims of sovereignty and authority. Theories of international relations that frame the state/state-system problem as an irreconcilable either-or have difficulty accounting for the co-constitutive sovereignty of states and the state system. Rather than examine this paradox and investigate the tension that connects the state and the international; temporally, epistemologically and ontologically, the tendency of much contemporary international theory and practice is to leave this question and its implications unexamined.

Cyprus can be read through several narratives. As a (one-time) colonial possession, Cyprus is understandable as a point of leverage between great powers: Byzantine, Ottoman and British. As a modern state, Cyprus is understandable as an equal, sovereign state in a system of other such states, a member of the UN General Assembly. As a
member of the European Union, Cyprus has been reinterpreted as a point of leverage between differently structured global powers and is understandable as a challenge to the prevailing ontology of modernity, even as a participant in a “post-modern” political order as will be explored in a later chapter. While each of these three presentations can be rendered coherent, in contemporary terms internationalist discourse encourages a dichotomized interpretation in which only one, or another, can be ‘true’ at any given time. One implication of this monological injunction is that we are encouraged to think of borders – both spatial and temporal – as fixed, definitive lines within which sovereignty is uncontested and beyond which sovereignties are negotiated through their combined authority. As will be examined in detail below, a reading of Cyprus would be incomplete without an analysis of numerous systems that operate in tandem over the island. An interesting moment occurs when the monological ontology of sovereignty and the experiences of both supra- and sub-systems are caught in an instance of co-constitution and what might at first appear to be a mere jumble of irreconcilable systems might in fact be a carefully orchestrated ensemble of systems.

The discursive logic of the modern international tells a story about the island of Cyprus as one indivisible state; representative of a Cypriot population and recognized internationally as a member of the system of states. As will become clear in the following chapters, the official discourse that aims to tell simple stories predicated on an account of borders as mere or passive straight lines is unable to constrain the complexities and contradictions that comprise the Cypriot political experience. The logic of the modern international invests only the delineations of spatially and territorially contained geographic states with the authority possessed by borders, and, as in so many other
places, is insufficient to articulate, understand or even identify the implications of the numerous sub and supra national boundaries that contextualize Cypriot political life.

International recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign state provides the normative pre-condition for admittance in regimes such as the United Nations. Simultaneously the authority of the international system to recognize the sovereignty of member states is derived from the metaphorical ‘pooling’ of sovereignties as they are combined to authorize inter-state institutions. Conversely, the authority of international regimes is derived from the participation and cooperation of member states that combine to legitimate the collective. Seemingly contradictory, the state and the system of states occur in co-constitutive space-time such that neither is subtractible from the condition of possibility of the other.

When reflecting upon the collaborative relationship between the historical Westphalian origins and the agreements that bound freedoms by authorizing their condition of possibility within the structure of a bordered territory – as will be explored more in the following chapter – and the relationship between the state and the state system, we begin to see the ways in with the “modern” era mimics the relationship between Empire and Principalities in the “pre-modern” era: from a contemporary perspective, both involve a reading of the past through the ontological assumptions of the present.

The ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin the modern international require and (re)produce a history of pre-modern, geo-political realms from which sovereign states and the corresponding system of states evolved. As products of rational, socio-political maturity at the domestic level and as evidence of internal consent, states are necessitated by the modern condition.
Through an investigation of the condition of sovereignty in Cyprus since its independence in and through its relations with sub- and supra-state entities I will begin my analysis by contesting the assertion that the contemporary international is somehow ‘post-colonial’, as if to suggest that the condition of external control produced through former systems of direct rule no longer exist. Cyprus is a remarkable site through which to challenge the logic and assumption of such claims, and to identify the means through which the global order and hegemonic powers continue to exert influence and determination over domestic politics around the globe, as well shape and define the parameters of international participation.

**The Establishment of ‘Independent’ Cyprus**

The decline of the imperial era was the result of numerous and widespread social and economic factors globally. In the case of Cyprus, the shift from British rule was instigated by a relative decline in the militaristic and economic dominance of the United Kingdom in the international system generally, as well as the waning economic and administrative advantages to maintaining direct colonial control. By the mid-20th century the costs of supporting British governance in Cyprus and maintaining infrastructure on the island grew burdensome. In a changing international system, the inauguration of former colonies into international regimes was proving effective for maintaining indirect influence, and, as we will see in the Cypriot example, from its position as former imperial ruler, Britain would have extensive influence over the specificities of independent Cyprus.
As in so many other places, British policy shifts – from direct administration to the establishment of self-governed states – resulted in the “independence of Britain from Cyprus” (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005, 67). The establishment of independent Cyprus was of great significance to the balance of power between Greece and Turkey, as well as between both Greece and Turkey with respect to the United Kingdom.

In the 1950s, the climate was ripe in Cyprus for independence from British rule, but not necessarily prepared for the inauguration of the Republic of Cyprus. Rather than identifying with a Cypriot national identity, long, bloody and often rival imperial histories had polarized Greeks and Turks in Cyprus along complex and ancient ethnic lineages, Byzantine and Ottoman.

Both Greeks and Turks sought union with their ‘mother countries’ and demanded separation from the other. Greeks in Cyprus predominantly identified as members of a larger Greek nation and sought the union of Cyprus with Greece, known as enosis in Greek. Turks in Cyprus primarily identified with Turkish nationalism and sought partition from Greek Cyprus and national union with Turkey or taksim in Turkish. (Hunt, 1986)

The prospect of establishing Cyprus as an independent state involved the United Kingdom in the delicacy of Graeco-Turkish relations over the island, as well as in an international context. Over the course of two international conferences (Zurich & London, 1959), the constitutional future of Cyprus was carefully negotiated between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. Even though the United Kingdom had sovereign authority over Cyprus, ignoring the demands of Greece and/or Turkey could have
jeopardized the future autonomy of the island and affected the British holdings that were to be retained through the establishment of the country.

The first conference to negotiate Cypriot independence was held at Zurich (11, February 1959) and intended to forge an agreement between Greece and Turkey. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey were able to come to mutually acceptable terms over the future of the island and a formal agreement was reached (Hunt, 1986). The Zurich conference was successful in getting both Greece and Turkey to abandon plans of enosis and taksim and support an independent Cyprus. The agreements made at this preliminary conference were “considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus” even though there were no representatives from Cyprus in attendance.³

The second conference held at London one week later (19 February, 1959) brought the agreement made between Greece and Turkey “for consideration by the British Government, which was willing, indeed eager, to accept any formula agreeable to Athens and Ankara” (Hunt, 1986, 44). Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United Kingdom signed the treaties of Cypriot independence in Nicosia in August 1960. These treaties “gave legal force to the basis of the Greek-Turkish agreement which was the renunciation of enosis on the one hand and of partition (taksim) on the other” and determined “the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two independent States), be prohibited”⁴ (Hunt, 1986, 44) “The United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey were named ‘guarantors’ and each

³ http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Treaties%20-1959-60.htm
⁴ http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Treaties%20-1959-60.htm
pledged to ensure the liberal democratic principles enshrined in the Cypriot Treaty of Establishment” (1960).⁵

The result of these negotiations was a complicated bi-communal constitution with far-reaching minority protections.⁶ Turkish Cypriots were guaranteed one-third of seats in the House of Representatives, as well as the post of the Vice Presidency, the second highest office in the Republic. The President and Vice President were to be elected from among their ethnic Members in the House of Representatives, rather than from the House as a whole. Both the Greek Cypriot President – to be determined by majority vote – and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President were accorded the power of veto and both held the authority to return bills to the House. The passing of legislation required support from two separate majorities. Although never achieved by the short-lived bi-communal government, the constitution also mandated that 30% of public service positions be reserved for Turkish Cypriots and for the establishment and protection of separate, semi-autonomous Turkish municipalities, among many other policies.

While from one perspective the codification of extensive minority protections can be seen to enforce the security of the country as a whole, the inclusion of strict sub-national structures and systems of ethnic reservation worked against governmental cooperation. In 1963, President Archbishop Makarios wrote to the governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey about the state of political discourse in Cyprus:

⁵ http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/Introduction.html Article 2 of the Cypriot Constitution states: Her Majesty’s Government, as parties to the Treaty of Guarantee, are guarantors, together with Greece and Turkey, of the provisions of the Basic Articles of the Constitution. Articles of the Constitution guarantee the protection of fundamental human rights, the interests of smaller religious groups, and protections for members of the public services.

⁶ http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Treaties%20-1959-60.htm
One of the consequences of the difficulties created by certain constitutional provisions is to prevent the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from co-operating in a spirit of understanding and friendship, to undermine the relations between them and cause them to draw further apart instead of closer together, to the detriment of the well being of the people of Cyprus as a whole.\(^7\)

While the constitution intended to foster inter-ethnic governance and cooperation, the reality of politics in Cyprus were divided along ethnic lines. The equal veto power of the President and the Vice President mired the government and made progressive or effective rule all but impossible.

Later in 1963, President Makarios wrote again to the Prime Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to garner support for amending the constitution and asserted:

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\text{that the intention of those who drew up the Agreement at Zurich was to create an independent State, in which the interests of the Turkish Community were safeguarded, but it could not have been their intention that the smooth functioning and development of the country should be prejudiced or thwarted as has in fact been the case.}^8
\]

As a result, Makarios issued thirteen amendments to the constitution, ostensibly drafted to facilitate successful governance. The amendments fundamentally altered the spirit of the 1959 Agreements and included the abolishment of the Presidential and Vice Presidential rights of veto, the necessity of separate majority support for enactment of Laws by the House of Representatives, the correction of reserved positions for ethnic minorities in public service to population quotas and so on. (Hunt, 1986)

\(^7\) http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/13_points.htm

\(^8\) http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/13_points.htm
Between 1964 and 1973 conditions in Cyprus worsened: ethnic violence intensified and internal cohesion among Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalist groups increased. In 1964 the United Nations, at the behest of the United Kingdom and Cyprus, which was a member state since September 1960, established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to prevent further ethnic fighting and external interference in the sovereignty of Cyprus.

In some senses Cypriot sovereignty has been limited since its inception: empowered and assured by recognition of its ‘mother countries’ the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. The ground upon which Cypriot sovereignty is proclaimed is unsteady: Cyprus was constitutionally determined through negotiations at which Cypriot representatives were only nominally included: the bi-cameral constitution remains unfulfilled and the island has been occupied by foreign forces for over 40 years.
CHAPTER 2

STATES AND EMPIRES

The numerous transfers of Cyprus between imperial powers before its independence situate the island within a long and complicated history. Modern interpretations view this history as a linear, progressive journey from one system of organization to another – as global political systems shifted from empires to countries in recent centuries. However, through an account of the complex imperial histories that played out in and over Cyprus this chapter investigates the assumption that one political system was eclipsed as another was birthed. Instead it is my assertion that the relationships between different authorities in Cyprus are indicative of ongoing vertical relations among countries, rather than of equal horizontal sovereignties as suggested by dominant distinctions of modernity.

Offering first an exploration of Cyprus’s imperial history in order to situate the island within competing world powers, this chapter will then set up the theoretical underpinnings of modern international relations theory that strive to reconcile the state system while temporally distancing the present era from a previous imperial system. Using the contributions of critical IR theorists, I intend to challenge the modernizing narrative of IR theory and its ability to contain the practices of inclusion and exclusion occurring in Cyprus. Finally, the categories and normative structure employed in contemporary international relations offered at the end of this chapter will serve as a departure point for the rest of this thesis and its reading of Cyprus as an expression of the problem of the limits of IR theory.
An Historical Interlude

Beginning in the third century BCE the influences of ancient Greece started to spread across the Mediterranean and much of Asia. The proliferation of Greek language and culture worked to unify vast tracts of land. From a contemporary perspective ancient Greece has long been considered the origin of Western civilization. In the same moment that Greece is established as the center of Western culture cultures and civilizations not originating in ancient Greece are subsequently “non-Western”. The introduction of the origin of Western civilization also introduces that which is not Greek, not Western and thus not civilized. Associations between West and East, Greek and Turkish, Christianity and Islam, Byzantine and Ottoman began over two thousand years ago and have resulted in long lasting perspectives and influences in the Mediterranean region and around the world.

These historical relationships, as well as their continued influence in modern socio-political thought are most often excluded from interpretations of the contemporary situation in Cyprus. Modern conventions attempt to explain Greek and Turkish Cypriots simply as rivalling sub-populations of a modern state. To do so overlooks the degree to which Greek and Turk in Cyprus are contemporary expressions of ancient global powers and cultural realities.

Both contemporary states – Greece and Turkey – emanate from ancient ideals and distinctions that continue to shape the national and individual identities. Reading the development of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus through these imperial histories this analysis will contextualize the modern states within a particular and principled history, one preoccupied with the hegemonic global powers that disciplined their development.
To begin somewhat arbitrarily in the fourth and third centuries BCE, while within Greece proper the city-state was in decline and the majority of its men were lost to careers of necessity in trade and the military, Greek culture dominated both the Mediterranean region and the cultural era. (Langer, 1940) Under the rule of Philip of Macedon and his infamous son Alexander, the art, language and philosophy of Greece spread widely across Southern Europe and much of Asia. Later, during the reign of Alexander in the third century BCE the empire extended as far east as the Indus Valley and Greek cities were established throughout Asia, Persia, Egypt and the fringes of India. (Langer, 1940) Much of the region was consolidated under Greek authority and the economy of the Mediterranean was stimulated, advancing new technologies in the fields of navigation and communication. Greek became the *lingua franca* and was spoken natively in the southern Balkans, the Greek islands, and the ancient and Hellenistic Greek colonies of Western Asia and Northern Africa. (Langer, 1940)

Starting with the unifying export of Greek language and culture across the Mediterranean region in the third century BCE and continuing under the rule established by Constantine in the early third century CE and the powerful addition of Catholicism, Greek influence dominated. Under Constantine the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire was moved to the new city of Constantinople in 330 CE – built upon the remains of Byzantium.9 In the sixth century CE the imperial agenda of the Eastern Roman Empire under Justinian was “directed towards the establishment of the absolute power of the emperor and toward the revival of a universal, Christian Roman Empire.” (Langer, 1940, 172)

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9 The term ‘Byzantine’ came into use only in contemporary times to refer to the Empire and to its ancient foundations and archaeological history (Langer, 1940)
During the zenith of the Byzantine Empire during the tenth and eleventh centuries its territories spanned from Italy to Mesopotamia and its capital at Constantinople was the cultural, artistic and economic center of the Mediterranean world. (Langer, 1940) “Byzantine influence in this period permeated the entire Mediterranean world, Moslem as well as Christian.” (Langer, 1940, 181) The establishment of Greek language, culture and Christian religion throughout the region would come to have a great impact on the establishment, evolution and eventual decline of the Ottoman Empire.

The rise of the Ottoman Empire and the corresponding decline of the Byzantine are historically consolidated by the fall of Constantinople in 1453. For centuries leading up to this date the Byzantine Empire had faced territorial and political challenges while Turkish cities were established across Anatolia since the late fourteenth century. Rather than confront and reject the cultural norms established during the previous era, the emerging Ottoman Empire maintained the diversity of cultural life through its recognition and organization of millets – religious communities “characterized by the religious autonomy of different groups rather than ethnic ties or language”. (Gol, 2005, 124)

This way the empire allowed religious diversity “between Muslim (Turks, Kurds, Arabs) and non-Muslim millets (Christians – Greeks and Armenians – and Jews) of the Empire but [there was] no official differentiation among the Muslim millets by ethnicity or language”. (Gol, 2005, 124)

This distinction is significant in the sense that far-reaching, non-ethnic communities spanned across large geographies within the Empire and overlapped other similarly identified communities without the necessitation of war for exclusive control of land. The co-existence of autonomous religious communities within a territory contrasts with the
conventions of the modern state system, in which there can be only one authority over a
given territory.

The modern nation state as it is understood today arose from the decline of imperial
control and the fragmentation of communities within larger territories. In the Ottoman
Empire fragmentation began when religious communities began to create and identify
with political identities and associations. While modern state analysis sometimes attempts
to discover pre-existing ‘nations’ based on ethnicity or language within a declining
empire, in the case of the Ottoman Empire the majority of communities within it were
internally determined by religious affiliation rather than a shared sense of ethnicity or
nationalism. (Gol, 2005) However, the eventual rise of nationalism in the Ottoman
Empire originated in autonomous, non-Muslim millets. Christian churches within these
communities used religious sentiment and identity deliberately to create Serbian, Greek,
Bulgarian, and Armenian national movements; “however, Muslim millets did not have
similar means to develop a separate nationalism since there is no institutional equivalent
of the church in Islam”. (Gol, 2005, 124)

Non-Muslim nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire continued to grow during the 1800s
with the introduction of the printing press and other technological developments.
Originally used to create and disseminate religious pamphlets, the printing press
increased the currency of linguistic community and identity. (Gol, 2005) With the rise of
such channels, previously non-politicized millets began to rally around growing
nationalist sentiment. External influences from Western Europe including the French
Revolution and Enlightenment values spread east and bolstered nationalist groups within
the Ottoman Empire by the nineteenth century. (Gol, 2005) Even while the Ottoman
Empire struggled to maintain control with centuries of modernization and the incorporation of lessons learned from Europe, the Empire was unable to quell the strength of the movements growing within. In the 1820’s the power of the Ottoman Empire was declining as Greek nationalism thrived and the Greek cause began to draw support from Western Europe.

The cultural and political appropriation of romanticized ancient Greek philosophical, political and artistic contributions by the West began to influence art and culture in Europe. Among the most well-known were artists like Shelley and Byron, who attached rising “Enlightenment” values to a particular understanding of pre-modern Greece. (Langer, 1940)

In this version, Greece and Greeks were appropriated as a foundation of Western culture. With the amelioration of ancient Greece and its inclusion in the history and development of European culture, Greece was stripped of its Byzantine, Eastern Orthodox, religious and cultural histories. This reading of the ancient Greek world, and its inclusion in the contemporary European imagination has continued to influence international identification and allegiances and foreshadows the current politics of belonging performed in the European Union through the exclusion of Turkey and Turkish Cyprus.

In addition to Western European support during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Revolution also had support from Russia, as a contingent of Greek families from throughout the region were aligned with, or members of, the Russian army or the Orthodox Church. (Langer, 1940) The Greek revolt against the Empire instigated a harsh and brutal exchange of ethnic cleansing as minority peoples were extinguished from both
Greek and Turk dominated areas and both groups committed massive massacres.

(Langer, 1940) Before the end of the Greek War of Independence, the Ottoman Empire was further beleaguered by joint French, British and Russian support for Greece, and settlement was signed at the Treaty of London (1826) at which the three powers threatened to use their naval strength against the Turks which, along with Russian incursions, resulted in the independence of Greece. (Langer, 1940)

The contemporary nationalisms, Greek and Turkish, defined in part geographically, as well as through strategic inclusion/exclusion in international and regional affiliations, did not exist prior to the 1800s. (Gol, 2005) Technical and industrial advances, political and social inequity and the rise of linguistic identities all contributed to the advent of minority ‘nations’ – Greek, Balkan, Armenian – within the formerly stable, multi-religious, ethnic, and lingual Ottoman Empire. This shift and the incorporation of such nationalisms into the international arena forged the west-east, European-other, Christian-Islamic, developed-underdeveloped divide that has long since distinguished Greece and Turkey, with consequences for Cyprus.

The beginning of the twentieth century saw the rise of the Young Turks in both the Ottoman Empire and across the Turkish diaspora of the Middle East and Europe. Rather than a single political party, the Young Turk movement is characterized as sharing a progressive political ideology. (Shaw, 1977) The era between 1908 and 1918 deepened, accelerated, and polarized the major views… Ottomanism and nationalism, liberalism and conservatism, Islamism and Turkism, democracy and autocracy, centralization and decentralization – all to the point where the empire might well have blown up had this not been accomplished by the event of World War I. (Shaw, 1977, 273)
Following the independence wars fought by Greece and the Balkan states and throughout the First World War era, Armenians – supported by Russia – struggled against persecution and to establish an autonomous state. The Ottoman Empire responded with the large-scale “pacification”, or genocide, of hundreds of thousands of Armenians. (Trumpener, 1984) The Empire had dissolved into fractured nationalisms.

On another front during the same period occurred the event that “more than any other, stimulated the Turkish War of Independence: the Greek invasion of Anatolia”. (Shaw, 1977, 342) On May 14, 1919, an entire Greek division was brought into the Turkish harbour of Izmir by a fleet of warships from the United Kingdom, the United States and France. (Shaw, 1977) The action was sanctioned by the Mondros Armistice (1918), which allowed the western powers “to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies”. (Shaw, 1977, 342) The result was general mayhem and massacre of the Turkish population there. “Greek mobs roamed the street looting and killing, with those Turks who escaped being arrested by the Allied authorities”. (Shaw, 1977, 342) The Empire entered the war, in 1919, and was eventually defeated as part of the Ottoman-German alliance: following its defeat, the Allied powers dissolved the Ottoman Empire through the Treaty of Sevres (1920) yet the Turkish War of Independence necessitated the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which settled the Anatolian region of the former Ottoman Empire and established the modern Turkish state.

After years of warfare, demilitarization and the eventual restoration of Turkish sovereignty, “a separate agreement between Greece and Turkey arranged for a compulsory exchange of populations, involving about 1.3 million Greeks and a half-million Turks in all”. (Shaw, 1977, 368)
While the First World War resulted in the establishment of contemporary Greece and Turkey, the bloody incursions, ethnic persecutions and violent population exchanges that displaced people of both ‘nationalities’ from their traditional and historic geographies vastly complicate the simple borders that are suggested by the boundaries of their modern states. And, while European imperialism continued through the inter-war period, by the time of the Second World War, global colonial attitudes and realities were shifting. In the context of the restructuring of the world’s great powers and the comprehensive shift away from direct colonial rule, the independence of Cyprus would be decided.

Cyprus remained a possession of the Ottoman Empire until control was transferred to the United Kingdom in 1878 in exchange for British support against Russia and the promise of internal reforms in the Turkish Empire that included the protection of Christian communities. (Woodhouse, 1986) “The official annexation of the island by Britain in 1914, and the recognition of that annexation by Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), stimulated the belief among the Greeks that enosis would not be long delayed.” (Woodhouse, 1986, 84) Interestingly, and with significance regarding the role played by Greece in independent Cyprus, only Turkey was signatory to the transfer of Cyprus to British sovereignty, not Greece. Later, when enosis seemed unlikely, Greece “resorted to non-cooperation in Cyprus, and eventually to violence” in 1931. (Woodhouse, 1986, 84) In 1915, war between Bulgaria and Serbia brought Britain and France into the Balkans in support of Serbia, along with Italy and Russia. “The Allies made great efforts to induce Greece to join, England offering them the island of Cyprus (Oct. 16) but this offer too was rejected.” (Langer, 1940, 927)
The Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires were dismantled through the course of WWI and by the end of the Second World War, the European Empires were much diminished; the United States, outspokenly anti-colonial due to its relatively late arrival and lack of colonial possessions was rising as a global power, and much of the colonial world struggled for autonomy. World powers were being restructured: Europe was no longer dominant and the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics emerged as potential and rival superpowers. (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958) “In terms of power, therefore, the Second World War may be said to have had a clarifying effect: the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from it superpowers in a category by themselves that far outdistanced all others.” (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958, 599)

The Treaty of Brussels was signed in 1948 and ratified a fifty-year alliance between the Benelux countries; Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg and Britain and France, “the main purpose of which was the provision of automatic assistance in the event of aggression against one of the participants in Europe.” (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958, 620) The unification of Europe in this period secured both an internally European alliance that foreshadowed the European Community, as well as strengthened Europe against the USSR, which benefited its alliance with and support for the United States.

Concerns about the future of both Greece and Turkey prompted the U.S. and the Western European powers to draw both countries into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the time the Atlantic Treaty consolidated the Western countries and their allies against the communist threat posed by the USSR and the NATO treaty had intentions of strengthening fledgling or unstable capitalist democracies, such as Greece and Turkey, against the Soviet threat. (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958) “The Russian
interest in the Middle East was most intense along the Soviet borders, in Turkey and Iran, and also in Greece… It was as early as 1945, with the European war still unfinished, that Russia launched a strong diplomatic attack against Turkey,” and it was with the Anglo-American support that Turkey was able to withstand. (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958, 608-9)

Greece became a battleground of oppositional Russian and Western forces and it was Britain that was primarily responsible for restoring order there after the Greek resistance movement joined with Russian Communist influences. It was of fundamental importance to Britain to keep Greece. If the country fell to Communist rule, its combined force with Russia could overpower Turkey from the west as Russia expanded south. (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958) As British power waned in the late 1940s, American influence increased and the United States – through then President Truman – became more directly involved in maintaining Greece and Turkey. After requesting and being granted a $400,000,000 budget from Congress for Greece and Turkey, the Truman Doctrine “was unmistakable notice, to the world at large, and to the Soviet state in particular, that the United States would use its endeavours to contain further Russian expansion. (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958, 610) While the United States was already deeply involved with both Greece and Turkey under the terms of the Truman Doctrine, the US was not engaged in the issue of Cypriot independence.

As a colonial possession, Cyprus was considered a British issue. (Laipson, 1986) “The primary US interest was in limiting the issue’s damage to NATO, and averting escalating the tension between Greece and Turkey.” (Laipson, 1986, 57) The United States supported the independence of Cyprus and offered $20 million in aid for the first three years in order to stabilize:
a bulwark against communism, development of a strong economy, democratic institutions, and a pro-western orientation; unrestricted US use of the communication facilities on the island; and maintenance of the British Sovereign Base Areas for access for friendly western nations. (Laipson, 1986, 58)

In this context, the American alliance with Britain and France was limited by the reality that the two European countries were among the largest imperial powers. “The struggle for emancipation was, in addition, also complicated and confused by the fact that it took place in the context of the Russo-American competition.” (Albrecht-Carrie, 1958, 648) Russia was able to capitalize on the polarity of East and West, garnering support by encouraging nationalism as opposed to imperialism in newly independent states. WWII had the effect of removing French control from North Africa, leaving Britain with the responsibility of maintaining some level of influence in the Middle East. “The Egyptian insistence on complete British withdrawal, even from the remaining base of Suez, supported by the Arab League and by sympathy from America, led to the accomplishment of that end in 1957.” (Albrecht, 1958, 653)

American interests in Cyprus were heavily influenced by global circumstances, by how to manage the Soviet threat, protect American interests from Middle Eastern instability, secure both Greece and Turkey against Soviet expansion and accommodate regional and global priorities. (Laipson, 1986) Rather than strictly concerned with Cyprus, American policy towards the island has been reflective of the relationships between the United States and Britain, Greece and Turkey. (Laipson, 1986) The role of the United States and the context of the Cold War era contributed to the complexity of the Cypriot question after the Second World War.
As a result of heavy losses in the Second World War and economic challenges domestically, Britain was increasingly strained in its colonies abroad. Britain’s interest in Cyprus, which was essentially strategic, grew rather than diminished with time. It was probably more important in the post-colonial era than it ever was under colonial rule. (Woodhouse, 1986, 85) Within the British Empire, Cyprus had not been a highly important site until after 1954, with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty that ended the occupation of Egypt. Until that time British interests in the control of the Suez Canal had been assured by their position in Egypt, but then, for the first time, their position in Cyprus became of strategic significance. (Woodhouse, 1986) The security of the canal as both a shipping route to India and later for access to Middle Eastern oil vested the United Kingdom’s interests in the Mediterranean. Cyprus was used strategically as a place d’armes the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt was launched from the island in 1956 “aimed at overthrowing President Nasser and restoring control of the Suez Canal”. (Woodhouse, 1986, 87) Yet, “whereas in 1945 Britain controlled the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East from Cyrenaica to Iraq, excluding only Turkey, by 1957 the whole area had been lost to British influence except only Cyprus.” (Woodhouse, 1986, 87).

**Sovereign States**

In internationalist discourse there is a general assertion that the contemporary era of modern states can be distinguished from a previous era of empires. Contemporary concepts including sovereignty, non-intervention, self-determination and territoriality are claimed by ‘modernity’ and presented in juxtaposition to ‘pre-modern’ imperial orders in which control over land and populations is considered to have been unstable,
unpredictable, and contestable through warfare and occupation. The emergence of modern states from the anarchical beginnings of realms, kingdoms and empires is employed in internationalist discourse to signify the maturity and rationality of a modern political subject in a modern political state in a modern state system. Rather than simply pre-date the modern international, the pre-modern is required in order to contrast, and thus validate the modern order against a much more insecure and threatening past. Theoretically, both Hobbes and Kant succeed in telling a story about how the world is, and must be, by generating a progressive history sufficiently determinant to deem the existing world order as both beneficial and necessary. It is this story that underpins international relations theory and the modern state/state system logic.

In order to advance the claim of sovereign, modern states and to secure the modern era as an unrivalled political order, the modern system requires a ‘break’ – ontological, epistemological and temporal – from a pre-modern anarchy, through rational development, into the full maturity of the modern international. This break is thought to lie in the end of the imperial era, beginning with the Peace of Westphalia and concluding with the large-scale (though not complete) relinquishment of colonial holdings throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The shift from direct imperial rule to the establishment of dozens of new states and the increasing ‘self-rule’ of peoples previously controlled by foreign regimes changed the formation of much of the global order over the last few hundred years. However, in opposition to the generally accepted narrative in which a modern state/state system has replaced a pre-modern imperial era, I will interrogate the presumed ‘break’ between the two eras and their respective conditions. I will suggest, rather, that the observable shift of
global governance since the close of the imperial era is very much limited to the structures of power and the means of control rather than indicative of a substantive change in global power relations. Whereas former colonies were no longer ruled directly by implanted foreign institutions, fledgling states were initiated into international political and economic regimes already dominated by hegemonic powers, for a shift in form without a corresponding shift in function.

Throughout this thesis I will use the establishment of Cyprus as a case study to suggest that the ‘independence’ awarded to states at the close of the imperial era was always conditioned and limited by the modern international order – into and through which such new states emerged. Moreover, beginning with a reading of the imperial history in the region, I aim to demonstrate the integral influences of hegemonic imperial powers on the modern state system. Such an observation intends to problematize the ‘break’ between the eras and analyze the continuities between them.

The modern state system is commonly considered to have its origins in the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, which refers to a pair of treaties that ended two European wars and created new terms of conciliation between the Holy Roman Empire, France and Sweden. The Peace of Westphalia is considered remarkable in that it contributes towards the contemporary international relations paradigm that is premised on three key principles: first, the sovereignty of states and each state’s fundamental right to self-determination; second, the formal equality of states within the system; and, third, non-intervention of states in the internal affairs of others. In the modern political order these three conditions comprise the theoretical foundation for the modern state and system of states.
In the same sense that Hobbes and Kant are successful in telling stories about the rationality and maturity of political subjects and their ‘progress’ into the modern state, modern internationalist discourse is successful in reading and presenting the past in such a way that the present appears as both a natural and necessary progression. The modern international has been successful in interpreting and applying the Westphalian era in accordance with its own design. While each of the three principles associated with the Peace of Westphalia – sovereignty, equality, and non-intervention – can be read in and through internationalist discourse and in modern international institutions including the United Nations, at the time of writing (1648) each had a particular and limited relevance that is often under-examined and overly-generalized in contemporary interpretations of the historical period.

During the seventeenth century, in the struggle between imperial control and growing popular unrest, religious freedom in the German Principalities was of growing significance. Prior to the signing of the treaties of Westphalia, many wars were fought for freedom of religion. The principle interpreted as ‘sovereignty’ as it is ubiquitously understood today then referred specifically to the ability and right of states (and German Principalities) to determine their own hegemonic religion and to give rights to minority religions within their jurisdictions. This particular sense of ‘independence’ was established in the intention of creating stability and maintaining control in the region. The related principles of equality and non-intervention were intended to guarantee such rights and the supremacy of domestic law within borders, free from the imposition of a distant and disconnected kingdom. But all three principles were, from their inception, bound by the limitations of imperial and hierarchical realities. The freedoms awarded to states
within the Empire served to maintain and bolster imperial superiority, not diminish it. For example, both Sweden and France maintained the right to intervene in affairs of the Holy Roman Empire and the ‘freedoms’ of the Principalities were bound by the external supremacy of the Empire’s constitution. (Langer, 1940)

Rather than sovereign in the modern sense, the German Principalities held territorial jurisdiction and maintained the prerogative to enter agreements with external parties while remaining within the realm of the Empire: sovereignty did not entail principles of equality or uniformity between powers as it does in the contemporary sense. Scholars like Osiander (2001) challenge the qualitative sovereignty attributed to the popularly accepted interpretation of the Peace of Westphalia and the assertion that there has been a discontinuity between the ancient imperial, papal or hierarchical era and a modern era of sovereign states. Such contributions suggest that the official recognition of the Principalities or states did not signify the reduced authority of the Holy Roman Empire, but rather that the Empire was the constitution that bound the autonomous Principalities. (Osiander, 2001)

In short, the “accepted IR narrative about Westphalia is a myth”. (Osiander, 2001, 264) Insofar as internationalist theory predicates modernity on the emergence of sovereignty, it is arguable that such a discourse “theorizes against the backdrop of a past that is largely imaginary” and that no foundation is to be found in the time of the Treaties of Westphalia. (Osiander, 2001. 251) Instead, nineteenth and twentieth century readings invest a modern ideology of sovereignty into the relationships among the seventeenth century European powers, “imbued with the ideal of the nation-state,” identifying statist ambitions with the emerging minor powers. As has been suggested in recent work on the
subject, the relations between states, Principalities and the Roman Empire involved levels of independence exercisable within the established authority of the Empire. In this arrangement, while remaining conscious of the risks involved in the tendency to read the past through the ontological assumptions of the present, the performances between the states, Principalities and the Empire appear as predecessors to modern co-constitutive state/state system sovereignty and the exercisable independence of states within the established authority of the international system. Rather than signify a ‘break’ between an imperial era and a modern state system, this reading of the Westphalian treaties is more indicative of the paradoxical relationships between the sum and its parts, as Empire and Principalities in the past, and the modern international and states in the present.

According to Bartelson (1995a), three popular narratives are employed to establish the origins of sovereignty as the organizing principle of the international order; the Renaissance hypothesis, in which the modern international has roots in the affairs of the city-states of Renaissance Italy, the Westphalian hypothesis, in which the modern international formed through the mutual recognition of European states and the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Modernity hypothesis, in which the modern international formed after the rise of the nation-state as the dominant political unit and the spread of popular sovereignty. Even through only a cursory consideration of the contemporary international one can recognize the implications of each of these three hypotheses for aspects of the modern international; interconnectedness and dialogue amongst city-states, mutual recognition and respect of political authority and jurisdiction, and the proliferation of nativity and citizenship as the accepted realm of political activity.
CHAPTER 3

THE GREEN LINE

The Establishment of the UN Buffer Zone in Cyprus

The boundary that separates north and south Cyprus was created as a result of the escalation of civil violence and the collapse of the bi-communal government in the early 1960s. The provisions for Greek-Turkish Cypriot equality that had been enshrined in the constitution and in the formal composition of government were unsuccessful in promoting a common Cypriot political interest. While the constitution intended to foster a shared Cypriot identity and promote both Greek and Turkish interests in Cyprus, the reality of a bi-communal government was political deadlock. In 1963, President Makarios instituted a set of reforms that, from one perspective, intended to end the stalemate of minority-majority politics and, from another, “deprived the Turkish Cypriots of vital safeguards to their security and of an effective voice in the affairs of the Republic”. (Crawshaw, 1986, 2)

By mid-1964 the Zurich settlement was dead for all practical purposes. The Treaty of Guarantee had proved useless. The Turkish Cypriots maintained that the Makarios Government by its unilateral violation of the treaties had ceased to exist as a legal government and refused to accept its authority. The Cyprus Government no longer felt bound by the Zurich Agreements and outlawed the Turkish Cypriots as rebels. (Crawshaw, 1986, 4)

In the following weeks and months violence increased: Turkish Cypriots were attacked in Nicosia by “Greek Cypriot irregulars, aided by the police” and Turkish troops readied
themselves inside Cyprus. (Crawshaw, 1986, 2) Both sides expanded their militaristic posturing and Turkish Cypriots withdrew into guarded enclaves that were routinely harassed by Greek Cypriot police. (Crawshaw, 1986)

Of Cyprus’s protectorate states – as named in the 1960 constitution – neither Greece nor Britain sent observers or peacekeepers to Cyprus until 1964. “The United Nations (UN) began sending a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to Cyprus from 1964 but, even so, the situation grew even worse.” (Diez, 2002, 1) In 1964 UNFICYP forces drew a line, in green pencil, across a map of the island, designating a ceasefire boundary. The original line of demarcation signified two distinct zones within the country, as well as within the Cypriot capital of Nicosia.

Despite UN presence, within a decade, in 1974, the elected Cypriot government was overthrown by a coup supported politically and militarily by Greece, itself ruled at the time by a military junta that was interested in the union of Greece and Cyprus under Greek rule. Large proportions of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities condemned the Greek interference in Cyprus and appealed to the international community to intervene and to uphold the democratic integrity of the Cypriot state. Nevertheless, while still officially recognizing the legitimacy of the now-exiled elected president Makarios, the governments of both Britain and Greece met with and engaged in diplomatic dialogue with the post-coup appointed president, thus preserving international recognition of the sovereignty of Cyprus.10

10 It would seem that, while not completely reconciled with domestic or international law, “states tend to recognize those who hold effective power within a state as its legitimate government, however that power has been obtained or is currently exercised”. (Hindess, 2005, 245) This observation holds true in the uninterrupted relations between Britain, Greece (and indeed the rest of the international community) and post-coup Cyprus, and thus indicates that the interests of Britain, Greece, et. al. in Cyprus were not compromised by the coup or by the imposition of an undemocratic government. As such, the independence of Cyprus and the underlying agendas of its ‘protectorates’ are revealed more as political wrangling and
After the dissolution of the short-lived coup, Turkish Cypriot forces advanced to the Green Line under “operation Attila,” securing northern Cyprus and, as such, the boundary has also been known as the Attila Line. By 16 August 1974 “Cyprus was partitioned by the Attila line which ran from Xeros to Famagusta bringing nearly 40 percent of the Republic under Turkish control”. (Crawshaw, 1986, 10) The United Nations fortified the buffer zone to secure the southern Republic of Cyprus from Turkish troops. After the violence and destabilization of 1974, the UNFICYP mandate was expanded to supervise ceasefire lines, to monitor the buffer zone and to undertake humanitarian projects.

The United Nations Green Line is 300 km (187 miles) long and divides the northern 37% of Cyprus, inhabited mostly by Turks and Turkish Cypriots from the southern Republic of Cyprus, predominantly inhabited by Greek Cypriots. The most recent UNFICYP statistics dated 29, February 2008, number UNFICYP personnel on the island at 938: 872 troops and 66 police, supported by 38 international civilian personnel and 109 local staff.

The ethnic division of the country and the decade of civil war that preceded it resulted in the displacement of roughly 200,000 Greek Cypriot living in the north who fled to the south and approximately 60,000 Turkish Cypriots who abandoned their homes in the south to seek security in the north. After a 30-year ban on crossings, over the last

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11 http://www.unficyp.org/History/history.htm
13 http://www.unficyp.org/History/history.htm
several years crossing points between north and south were first opened in 2003. More recently, the TRNC authorized a crossing at the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia, an infamous site of official governmental, international and non-governmental negotiations and regional peacemaking conferences in Cyprus as well as a Ledra Street crossing that opened in 2008. There are now six official crossings (2010) with plans for more currently under negotiation.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{The Green Line: In Law and In Fact}

According to international standards, the entire island of Cyprus falls under the sovereign rule of the Republic of Cyprus. By this definition, or \textit{de jure} – the rightful (or recognized) entitlement or claim – the authority of the internationally recognized legitimate government of Cyprus is the sole political authority on the island. However, \textit{de facto} – of and in fact, whether by right or not – the land north of the Green Line is outside and beyond the legal authority of the Republic. As a result, the sovereignty of Cyprus – its rights and responsibilities, its political, legal, administrative and economic prerogatives – are suspended over the northern part of the island. Whether or not the government of the Republic should want to enforce its authority in the north, the presence of the U.N. Green Line makes the extension of Cypriot rule impossible. As a physical boundary the Green Line acts to limit the exercise of Cypriot sovereignty, regardless of its “official” neutrality. As a representation of the limit of Cypriot sovereignty on the island, the Green Line is effectively a border between north and south Cyprus and, as a result, marks the line of inclusion within which the Republic of Cyprus and its population

\textsuperscript{14} http://www.unficyp.org/History/history.htm
are beneficiaries of institutions such as the United Nations. As a formally equal, modern state, the Republic of Cyprus is granted all the rights and responsibilities determined by its membership. At the same time as it is defining the limit of Cypriot sovereignty, the Green Line is also demarcating its outside – resulting in the corresponding exclusion of the TRNC – its government, geography and people.

The Green Line is politically significant in sophisticated and complicated ways. As a border between north and south Cyprus, its meanings, both officially and practically, are engaged differently on each side. From the north, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus asserts the Green Line as its border – a distinction of its sovereignty and statehood. From the south, the Republic of Cyprus views the Green Line as an international intervention and as the boundary of occupation and illegal succession. Beginning with a brief exposition of the official positions taken by governments on both sides of the Green Line, this chapter will explore the multiple performances of the boundary, as well as its diverse meanings as both an internal border within Cyprus and as a demarcation of statehood as viewed from the north. Beyond the perspectives of the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC, the Green Line is also a United Nations protectorate area, as well as an international and regional boundary from the perspective of the European Union.

Officially, according to both the logic and the mandate of the United Nations, the Green Line is a neutral, non-politicized space. In this chapter I aim to explore the Green Line as it contributes to two distinct political spaces, while simultaneously and officially recognizing only the southern Republic of Cyprus. I am interested in the ways that the international prerogative and official terms of inclusion and exclusion determined by
sovereign recognition overlook or ignore the physical and experiential consequences of such a boundary on the ground. The international community, the UN and the Republic of Cyprus all either ignore or reject the implications that the boundary has in designating political spaces on both sides.

Through this analysis I will suggest that the Green Line produces a set of boundary practices that simultaneously supports and refuses seemingly and officially incompatible terms. In light of such contradictory observations in practice, I further intend to use this observation to draw into question the coherence of internationalist discourse as concerns this subject.

The ‘official’ story of the Green Line in Cyprus, as told through the international logic and institutions that established it, contends that a boundary zone can be politically neutral. This suggestion overlooks the myriad of meanings that are observable through the Green Line as a performance of political space. The endorsed positions held by both regimes are affirmed and contradicted, although not always in the ways one might expect.

**The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)**

From the official position of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the onset of Greek-Turkish communal violence during and after Cyprus’ independence validates their claim for sovereignty. The government of the TRNC contends that its claim of territorial sovereignty and declaration of statehood (1983) was necessitated by the Greek sponsored coup of 1974: the failure of Cyprus’s guarantor states to defend the Turkish minority and the country’s democratic institutions provide the rationale for a Turkish Cypriot ethnic struggle. (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2002)
The Cyprus conflict reflects the inability of Cyprus to contain nationalisms and diverse articulations of Cypriot identity; the construction of the TRNC is predicated on Turkish Cypriot identity, not as a minority in a multi-ethnic or multi-national Cyprus, but as a majority in the Turkish Republic. (Diez, 2002, 4) To strengthen the TRNC demand for autonomy the government claims that the primordial ethnic incompatibility of Greek and Turkish Cypriots necessitates their separation. (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002) By explaining the division of Cyprus as an ethnic incompatibility rather than as competing sovereignties – which would be illegal according to the constitution of Cyprus as well as illegitimate in the international political arena – the hard-line TRNC refuses any attempts at reconciliation.

The TRNC insists that Turkish Cypriot security and integrity rely upon a sovereign state. Numerical majoritarianism is an accepted feature of socio-political hegemony, as well as a clear feature of modernity’s nation-state building processes. (Anderson, 2001, 39) The TRNC further claims that there has never been any such thing as a Cypriot identity without a Greek-Turk ethnic distinction and that the Green Line – as a border of the TRNC – has ‘solved’ the conflict. (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002)

Without internationally recognized statehood the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is ineligible for membership in international systems. As a consequence, the inhabitants of northern Cyprus are unable to influence avenues of democratic representation and inclusion either domestically (within Cyprus) or internationally. Lacking legitimate sovereignty the TRNC borrows and pools Turkish sovereignty. At stake in the Green Line for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is national sovereignty, justified by ethnic discrimination. From this perspective the Cyprus conflict is international rather
than internal and, as an inter-ethnic incompatibility, peace is only possible by full division and a two-state solution.

The Republic of Cyprus

The Republic of Cyprus interprets the Green Line as a symbol of Turkish transgression against its territorial sovereignty. The Republic of Cyprus does not recognize the break away attempt of Turkish Cypriots or the self-declared TRNC. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus contends that the UN Green Line is a temporary boundary and cease fire line. With the support and authority of international legitimacy, the Republic of Cyprus insists that it is the only legal Cypriot state and that the northerners are illegitimate, stateless, occupying Turks – awaiting reunion with the Republic or repatriation to Turkey.

The presence of the Green Line in Cyprus and the ongoing security offered by UN monitoring on the island have implications for Cypriot sovereignty. Keeping in mind that sovereignty assumes and enforces a single, unrivalled authority, the ongoing UN contribution to peace and security suggest that Cyprus alone is inadequate to maintain sovereign control. This is especially the case considering after all attempts to restore peace on the island had failed, the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Cyprus requested urgent action by the Security Council to establish a buffer zone and bring a return to regulative order in Cyprus. Even though – or perhaps because the government of the Republic of Cyprus asked for international intervention – the country’s sovereignty was preserved and strengthened through new memberships in international organizations – all while under observation and monitoring by UN Peacekeepers.

The Green Line buffers the ‘legitimate’ Republic from Turkish occupation and, in this sense, its membership in the UN and other international organizations. The international community’s interference in Cyprus that works to protect the Republic of Cyprus affirms its formal statehood, even while complicating the grounds on which such sovereignty is evaluated.

The international community of states – as represented in the United Nations – and the logic of the state system support the sole authority of the Republic of Cyprus over the island. Drawing support from this recognition the Republic of Cyprus reproduces its sovereign authority in the contention that any recognition of the TRNC – its government, population or economy – by the UN or the EU constitutes a violation of “the sovereignty exercised by one of its member states.” (Papadopolous, 2004) Investigating the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign state, in light of obvious limitations on its actual status and authority also has implications for the international communities with which it holds membership. An analysis of the UN boundary zone in Cyprus can be read through the logic of the United Nations and the European Union, respectively. As the following analysis will detail, the Green Line represents the limit of the legitimate Cypriot state and its sovereign authority, albeit in different ways.

**The “Official” Story: The United Nations**

Officially, and according to the United Nations, the Green Line that separates the Republic of Cyprus from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a UN monitored buffer zone that was necessitated by the outbreak of violence in the decades following Cypriot independence from British control in 1960. Internationally, the Green Line reflects the attempted separation of Turkish Cypriots supported by Turkey, and is a
temporary barrier between the two Cypriot communities. The Green Line continues to separate Greek and Turkish Cypriots and since 1983 marks the southern border of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Green Line in Cyprus has come to represent far more than a neutral or non-politicized boundary between antagonistic communities. The legal and theoretical principles symbolized in the UN Green Line identify only one sovereign state and promote reunification of the island. The United Nations does not recognize the claims of statehood made by the TRNC and has issued economic embargos against the region in support and recognition of the validity of the Republic of Cyprus.

Even while the official line depoliticizes the Green Line it effectively divides the island state into two territorial spaces; it divides the Cypriot population, it harnesses the flows of Cypriot trade and it presents administrative and legislative impediments to the Cypriot government. Yet, through the logic of its establishment and that of the international logic that created it, the Green Line evades the theoretical underpinnings that prescribe singular, superior sovereign authorities and their respective insoluble territories. That is to say, whereas the official story of the Green Line describes it as a temporary monitoring force between rival Cypriot sub-populations, the Green Line produces sets of practices and procedures that complicate the official story through the production of multiple geographies within the formally accepted Cypriot state.

The existence of the Green Line on the ground in Cyprus produces two geographical territories and limits the ability of any sovereign power to exert itself across the line while officially affirming only one. An investigation of the practices that occur around the Green Line raise questions about the possibility of a 30-year militarized boundary to
remain politically neutral: it is unlikely that a boundary of such significance and duration
could avoid becoming a site vested with political significance for both sides. Officially
the boundary set by the UN affirms only one Cypriot state and recognizes its territorial
authority as encompassing the entire island but the implications of an internal boundary
in Cyprus are exponentially more complicated.

Although the Green Line officially affirms one sovereign Cypriot state governed by the
Republic of Cyprus, the Line established a de facto boundary between the Cypriot state
ruled by legitimate authority and international recognition and an exceptional region,
excluded from participation in the Cypriot state and the rights and responsibilities secured
by the state for its inhabitants. In lieu of Cypriot membership, which provides the criteria
for inclusion in the international political and economic systems, Turkish Cypriots in the
north are either actual or de facto supporters of the nascent Turkish Cypriot state. Its lack
of international recognition excludes the TRNC from international politics and
economics; at the behest of Cyprus and Greece, the TRNC is under United Nations
sanctions on international trade leaving the region dependent on trade and support from
Turkey and humanitarian aid from the UN. As a result, the infrastructure and economy of
the northern Cypriot territory is impoverished, lacking in industry, production and export
opportunities. Seeking employment and opportunity, scores of Turkish Cypriots routinely
enter the Republic of Cyprus illegally, where their labour is exploited as they are forced
to work without visas, employment standards or union protections. The penalty for
crossing the boundary illegally or being caught working in the south without proper
papers can include fines and imprisonment.
In 2004 a plan to reconcile the two Cypriot communities, spearheaded by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (hereafter the Annan Plan), was rejected in bi-communal referenda. Contrary to popular portrayal of Turkish Cypriots as extreme separatists and contrary to the position of the TRNC regime, the northern Cypriot population voted in support of the Plan. Unsatisfied with ongoing exclusion from international systems, Turkish Cypriots favoured the Plan that was designed to foster reunification of the island, re-establishment of a bi-communal government in Nicosia, and accession of the country, as a whole, into the European Union. The government of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was staunchly opposed to the Plan and remains committed to partition. The TRNC regime and steadfast sovereigntist supporters campaigned against the Plan but were defeated by the popular vote. Even though a democratic majority of Cypriots in the north voted in support of the Plan they were defeated first by the TRNC regime’s rejection of the referendum results and later by the popular vote of predominantly Greek Cypriots in the south.

In the southern Republic of Cyprus the ruling regime launched a campaign similar to that of the TRNC opposed to reconciliation on the grounds that the Annan Plan favoured Turkish Cypriots and offered excessive minority concessions and protections. In the Republic of Cyprus both the ruling government and the popular vote were opposed to reunification under the provisions of the Annan Plan.

One consequence of the rejection of the Plan by the TRNC regime, the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the popular vote in the Republic of Cyprus overpowered the popular vote in northern Cyprus and effectively twice excluded Turkish Cypriots. The exclusion of Turkish Cypriots in the north was achieved first by the power of the TRNC
ruling regime and then again by the southern Republic of Cyprus. The results of the bi-
communal referenda raises problems for the ‘official’ stories told both in and about
Cyprus, in which Turks are popularly thought to support separatism and reject the south
and the international system. The exclusion of Turkish Cypriots from the Cypriot state –
against their vote – and exclusion from the organizations in which it holds membership as
well as the simultaneous and ongoing denial of TRNC statehood, and thus alternate
avenues of international inclusion for the population in the north raises important and
interesting questions about the perceived secession of the north and the ongoing
exclusion of its people and territory. In this example, the Green Line is far more than a
neutral zone, marking the limit of sovereign and citizenship rights as they are preformed
in the south and suspended in the north.

It has been suggested that the north Cypriot regime demonstrates an “excess” of
sovereignty in its overt productions of nationalism through patriotic displays and
holidays. (Navaro-Yashin, 2005) Combined with the TRNC’s rejection of the popular
vote for reunification, such an analysis of excess portrays the Cypriot ‘Green Line’ as the
southern edge of a virtual internment camp of Turkish Cypriots. This narrative about the
character of the TRNC leadership locates its origins in a terror regime that grew out of
the Turkish Resistance Organization (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati or TMT) and as one that
employs practices of terror against its people in the establishment and preservation of the
northern regime. (Navaro-Yashin, 2005) Given the disparate results of the 2004 referenda
in the north between the population and the official regime position, it is possible to
challenge the legitimacy and sovereign claim of the TRNC on these grounds and suggest
that it is unable to satisfy the responsibilities it has to represent its citizens. In an account
of state sovereignty in the logic of the modern international, this analysis exhibits a limit of Turkish-Cypriot sovereignty.

However, while this analysis may be useful towards a more developed understanding of the relationship between the people and the regime of the TRNC it stops short of connecting TRNC governmental inadequacy to its international context. The absence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’s legitimacy as reflected in the Annan Plan referendum: its inability to provide its citizens with freedoms of mobility and access to economic markets, are presented as internal or domestic failures. Yet, once this deficiency in located within an international context the contradiction of the condition of possibility of Turkish Cypriot sovereignty emerges. Rather than reading the Green Line as the limit of political potential for a Turkish Cypriot state and its internal condition as proof of its incompetence, the conceptual and physical boundaries that surround northern Cyprus represent the isolation of a self-declared state without international recognition and the possible confinement of a population brought into being by international rejection of the state that claims to support it.

The Green Line produces a paradox through its official support of a single sovereign state and its actual presence that both illuminates the limits of the Republic of Cyprus and also affirms the existence of a northern Republic by forming its border and contributing to practices of inclusion and exclusion through which the north and the Turkish Cypriot are made identifiable against that which they are not. Reading the Green Line through the United Nations affirms and negates claims of statehood as they are articulated and understood in the modern state system.
Interpretations: The European Union

In spite of the division of the country and the failure of the Annan Plan for reunification, Cyprus was accepted to the European Union in May 2004. Considering that both the government and the population of the Republic of Cyprus voted against reconciliation with the north – a gesture that is incommensurable with the expectations of the international community in general and the UN in particular, and even though the popular majority of the north voted favourably for the plan demonstrating a gesture of accommodation of international expectations and a desire to cooperate with international institutions – the consequences of the referenda and the admission of the country to the EU are somewhat inexplicable.

Under the provisions of the law and discourse of the international relations that constitute the modern system the Republic of Cyprus is recognized as the single legal sovereign authority in Cyprus. For this reason the entire island was granted EU accession under one bid – in spite of its division and the absence of Cypriot rule in the north. Since sovereignty as a condition is a precondition for inclusion in the EU, the legal rights and authority of the European Union that are in effect *de jure* over the whole island are also suspended *de facto* in the areas that are exceptional to Cypriot sovereignty, thus omitting the northern region. The lacunae between law and experience that are observable in both the establishment and political history of Cyprus contribute interesting and complicated models upon which contemporary articulations of nation-statehood and membership are presented. The limited application of EU jurisdiction in Cyprus works to affirm both the state, as the necessary precondition to international membership, and the EU, as a collection of sovereign powers able to determine the normative measure of sovereignty.
The admission of a divided Cyprus to the European Union has implications for both Cypriot republics.

Prior to admittance to the EU in 2004 Cyprus met the economic and development criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, which is a component requirement for entry, but was still negotiating political and legal issues. According to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, European Union membership requires, among other things, “that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights”. The accession of Cyprus to the Union while ethnically divided, internally occupied and monitored by the United Nations, having failed to agree on the Annan Plan and occupied by Turkey in the north makes evident the exception that was made either in the obligation of Cyprus to meet the criteria, or in the Union’s evaluation of these conditions in Cyprus.

Borrowing from the historical promotion of ancient Greece as a precursor to Western civilization, prior to Cyprus’ accession the European Commission issued an *avis* regarding Cypriot EU membership in which history “constructs Cyprus as being located at the very fount of European culture and civilization and as having beyond all doubt a European identity and character.” (Diez, 2002, 147) The Green Line then stands as a barrier between that determined to be an inherently European Greek community and the non-European Turk. This prerogative privileges an imagined or ameliorated history and European investment in Greek philosophy and political origins and vests responsibility for adaptation in the Turkish Cypriot community, ignoring the results and implications of the Annan Plan referenda.
Europe’s desire to absorb its periphery – in this case Turkey or the Turk – requires erasing differences among states. EU enlargement involves a set of processes of assimilation designed to facilitate a commonality of economic and political structures. Through Cyprus’s accession to the EU, the complicated and conflictual overlapping identities of Turkish and Greek Cypriots are reduced to European and non-European. The recognized legitimate sovereignty of southern Cyprus and its membership in the EU brings the population in its entirety – through the condition of sovereign belonging – into the modern European order. Yet, while legally included as a right of native citizenship, Turkish Cypriots are excluded through the absence of Cypriot sovereignty in northern Cyprus, even after voting for reunification and being refused by the Republic of Cyprus. From the perspective of the northern Turkish Cypriot, rather than a precondition for membership and thus grant inclusion in international organizations, tacit international recognition of the self-declared TRNC through the observation of the limit of Cypriot sovereignty occurs in the same moment that the Turkish Cypriot is unable to access citizenship rights in any state.

Since the opening of border crossings beginning in 2003, mobility restrictions in Cyprus have eased somewhat. Monitored by the UN, citizens of the EU – including the Republic of Cyprus – are now permitted to cross the Green Line boundary freely, but Turkish Cypriots still require official papers, which are difficult to access considering that the passports issued by the TRNC are invalid everywhere but Turkey and that official papers are required to gain entry to the Republic of Cyprus where such official papers are issued.
In a favourable interpretation of the Cypriot government and its grounds for inclusion in light of the rejection of the Annan Plan, as a colonial territory their institutions were exposed to European adaptation prior to EU inclusion. With respect to Turkey vis à vis the EU, the Green Line – as a border of Europe – is a space of division between systems and structures characteristic of European congruency and those that perpetuate an adversarial politico-legal reality. (Holmes, 2000) The international relations and political economy perspectives that support the immersion of state markets into regional regimes such as the EU emphasize the possible relationship between increasingly open market flows and the increased liberties connected to democratic capitalist states. In this reading, satisfying EU requirements for entry involves adopting equivalent legal-juridical order, democracy, free movement and other personal freedoms. Relevant theories of integration predict a related increase in political representation and inclusion for minorities and the increased likelihood of Cypriot reunion once elementary political rights and freedoms are established. (Holmes, 2000) Support for such theories can be extrapolated from the referenda of 2004 in which Turkish Cypriots voted to join the country and the Union in order to access political and economic benefits. As long as the north is closed to trade beyond that with Turkey, the TRNC and its inhabitants are isolated from the larger market and the liberal reforms that are thought to accompany/precipitate democratic capitalism.

Sovereign statehood is privileged in the modern international as the requisite criterion for inclusion. In this context the multiple and multifarious borders of Cyprus are distilled to a binary inside-outside distinction situated in the Green Line and based on international recognition of Cypriot sovereignty regardless of its empirical impotency or
porousness. A similar logic suggests that complicated minority politics could be more easily negotiated within states through citizenship rights and party politics. The ascension of a divided Cyprus to the EU is presented as a ‘solution driven’ approach to ending the bi-ethnic struggle and one that intends to reduce the necessity of the UN monitored Green Line, reuniting the majority and minority Cypriot nationalisms through an over-arching, shared European identity. This approach intends to “qualify sovereignty and diminish the importance of internal territorial borders” and yet has not, since 2004, brought an end to the ethnic and territorial division of Cyprus. (Diez, 2002a, 4)

International relations discourse presents the European Union as a solution to multiple and complicated internal issues related to boundaries and nations within states. Moreover, dissident and successive nation-building movements are pacified through involvement and membership in the overarching European community, in which there are many stateless and disparate minority groups within and across member states.16 Through EU membership the inter-ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is obscured in a larger regional or international context. Whereas “the EU treaty (TEU) explicitly states that EU citizenship will not replace, but supplement member states’ national citizenship”, inclusion of a divided Cyprus attempts to forge a unifying Cypriot national citizenship through a shared European identity rather than a common Cypriot one. (Diez, 2002a, 9)

The government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus rejects EU membership as a solution to the ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Rather, the 1974 establishment of the Green Line and the division of Greek and Turkish Cyprus is promoted as a solution to the previous internal division via permanent separation and partition. The TRNC regime

16 Compare Belfast Agreement, 1998
premises such claims on the theory of Greek and Turkish ethnic incompatibility and
argues that bi-communalism and peace for Greek and Turkish people in a united Cyprus
is impossible. This portrayal is buoyed by the lack of evidence of an historic common
Cypriot identity. A history of multiethnic migration and the long era of imperial rule over
the island contribute towards the persuasiveness of friend-enemy readings of cocoonal
ethnic groupings within cities and villages in Cyprus and support the TRNC’s claim. In
this view and in the TRNC’s official literature, the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ ceased to exist
in 1963 when then-president Makarios introduced his 13-point proposal to end the bi-
communal political deadlock.

From this position taken by the Turkish Cypriot regime, any ‘solution’ which
compromises the sovereignty of the TRNC in order to reaffirm or strengthen that of the
Greek Cypriot regime reflects Greek hegemony and persecution of the Turkish minority
and the risks posed to Turkish minority status within a bi-communal Cypriot state by
Greek aspirations for enosis. As long as the ruling authority in the Republic of Cyprus
intends to unite the multi-ethnic island with heavily-populated Greece, the status and
survival of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish minority protections and representations are
impossible. From this perspective, the incorporation of Cyprus into the EU in light of the
ongoing internal division and Turkish Cypriot dissent signifies the “achievement of
enosis by the backdoor”, which endangers both the security and sovereignty of Turkish
Cypriots in Cyprus. (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002, 85)

In response to Turkey’s vested interest in northern Cyprus and support for the TRNC
regime, the European Union and the Republic of Cyprus are able to exert an extra
measure of influence by way of Turkey’s bid for European Union membership. In the
history of the European Union to date, no country that has been accepted to begin accession talks has ever been refused entry or failed to meet the union’s criteria for membership. However, speculation circulates around Turkey’s willingness and ability to meet the EU’s requirements. Turkey’s support for the TRNC includes an economic boycott of Cyprus, which is increasingly difficult to maintain in light of attempts to satisfy EU economic and trade requirements. As a prerequisite of entry, an accession country has an obligation to open trade with the established European Community, without exception. Demands for Turkey to open air and sea ports to Cyprus have immediate significance for its chances of accession, and failure to satisfy them threatens the likelihood of Turkey’s success.

Turkish compliance with international and European Union demands to open ports and markets to trade with Cyprus would implicitly signify Turkey’s political recognition of Cyprus, and would soon be followed by trade and customs agreements and the more explicit recognition to which Turkey is vehemently opposed. Turkey’s ability to support the sovereign independence of the TRNC would be vastly diminished once the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus had been acknowledged and engaged through diplomacy and trade. If the TRNC is also pressured to open its ports to trade with Cyprus, and has lost the sole support of Turkey, its hold over any political control would be severely reduced. If Turkey’s bid for EU succession necessitates economic compliance and political recognition of Cyprus, the island would most likely be reunited under terms set by the southern, predominantly Greek Cypriot government with EU support.

Such a reunion would benefit the democratic majoritarianism of the predominantly Greek south, to the detriment of the politically and institutionally compromised Turkish
Cypriot northerners. Cypriot reunion through economic and political compliance and integration into the EU would not include the minority protections that were set out in the Annan Plan or other conditions which benefit northern, Turkish Cypriot residents. Such political conditions and inclusions had been the motivation for Turkish Cypriot cooperation in the Annan Plan through its negotiations and the related referendum prior to EU membership. As a result of the political implications of Turkey’s possible accession to the EU, extremist factions of the TRNC act as pressure groups against the Turkish government and increase the risk to human security in northern Cyprus.

Since Turkey is the only state to recognize the breakaway TRNC, its embargo against Cyprus is of paramount symbolic and practical concern. By refusing trade and exchange with Cyprus, Turkey refuses to recognize its sovereign status or its authority over the island. Turkey wants the Republic of Cyprus and the international community to recognize the self-declared Turkish Cypriot state and the Green Line as its southern boundary. However, in refusing to recognize Cyprus, Turkey participates in the international paradigm in which state sovereignty is legitimated and strengthened in and through international recognition. While Turkey hopes to limit or curtail the scope of Cypriot sovereignty, it is very much a participant in the modern international politics of recognition that serve to strengthen the authorizing capacity of the system of states.

In its bid for European Union membership Turkey is under increased pressure to enter agreements and honour policies that accommodate trade among EU member states. Turkey is now caught between its support for northern Cyprus and the self-declared sovereignty of the TRNC and its own bid for EU membership. In the context of the modern international, any recognition of Cyprus would symbolically destroy Turkey’s
support of the TRNC. The moment of recognition of the sovereign authority of Cyprus would simultaneously invalidate the sovereign claims of the TRNC.

Once the Republic of Cyprus is acknowledged by Turkey as a state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would only be interpretable as an illegal succession movement in violation of the Treaty of Establishment and would result in Turkey’s own troops in northern Cyprus to be interpreted as an occupying force, in violation of international law. To avoid the loss of symbolic and logical legitimacy while maintaining its EU negotiations, Turkey is attempting to exchange its recognition of Cyprus for the international community’s recognition of the TRNC. Cyprus and its supporters have established an international embargo against the breakaway state and succeeded in stalling and reducing international aid to northern Cyprus on the grounds of illegal occupation and succession. Turkey is now offering to open one seaport and one airport to trade with Cyprus in exchange for the opening of two northern Cypriot airports to international trade.\(^{17}\)

If such an unlikely deal were accepted, the European community would, in fact, re-shape and re-define the sovereign borders of Cyprus, accepting the TRNC as an international regional member, in however limited a sense. Such an outcome could be coherently told in international relations discourse within the changing story of states and inter-state boundaries contained to the dichotomous reading of nation-state borders as either present or absent in light of the rise of participating regions in the Union. But such an outcome would also exemplify the paradox of a system of states, the sovereignty of

\(^{17}\) http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=6155
each legitimated through recognition by the system that the sovereignty of each, once pooled, authorizes.

Cypriot sovereign authority is more influential on the international stage than it is within its officially demarcated territory. While the southern regime cannot exert much influence north of the Green Line, nor effectively restrict trade flows and human exchanges across the line, through channels of international relations Cyprus is able to articulate demands on other states that accentuate its sovereign status. In an attempt to influence the sovereign potential of the TRNC, the government of Cyprus has employed its international equal member status against the TRNC by interfering with UN aid to north Cyprus, stalling distribution and reducing the total amount given to the fledgling nation by half. Through the exercise of its international influence Cyprus reifies its position as both an independent state and a member of the international community in contrast to the unrecognized TRNC and accesses its eligibility to both contribute to ‘pools’ of sovereign authority and to make demands through the authority of its sovereign investment.

Whether or not categorical distinctions such as modern and postmodern can or should be attached to the UN and EU respectively, it seems apparent that the two institutions are informed by related, perhaps co-constituting, yet distinguishable processes. The practice of shaping the forms of inclusion-exclusion through which Europe is being reconstituted has shifted: whereas civilization expressed in self-determined territorial nation-states was once privileged and employed as an indicator of qualified inclusion, as evidenced in bodies such as the United Nations, it would seem that territorial statehood can now be established as a result of inclusion on some other grounds as we saw in Cyprus, while
modern state sovereignty remains the official qualifier. European integrationism is able to absorb the ‘problem’ between two contesting sovereignties into a regional settlement, achievable by mutual accommodation and compromise, yet only one state can be recognized. In contrast, the international sphere comprised of equal sovereign states, more akin to the constitutive logic of the UN, continues to reject the northern enclave as a violation of Cypriot sovereignty and is less able to ideologically accommodate the north as a ‘Turkish Cypriot state’.

The Republic of Cyprus can be seen to straddle two different ontological realities. Since the decline of the ‘imperial era’, the system of equal, sovereign states has been promoted as that which replaced an earlier system of hegemonic powers and colonial mandates. This chapter has sought to destabilize this claim by identifying the ways in which the conditions of more and less powerful countries with more and less powerful allegiances were drawn forward under formally changing systems without fundamentally altering the hierarchical relationships between powers. In the ‘modern’ era of states, what were once known as colonies and ruled directly from Europe are now formally equal, though now perhaps politically, socially, and/or economically less developed states. In the Cypriot example, the island – as a country – is a member of the United Nations, which is involved in monitoring the illegal, breakaway northern faction. As a modern state Cyprus is indivisible and the international community respects its sovereignty over the island, even in light of the external support and international embargoes required to exclude the TRNC and Turkish Cypriots. The vertical relationships that exist between formally equal states allow the pooled sovereignty in the international order to monitor the sovereignty of a member state and exclude the self-declared TRNC.
In another sense, popular political discourse advances theories wherein the ‘modern’ era of sovereign states has been recently eclipsed by a ‘post-modern’ system of global relations and the disconnection of economic and political power from particular territories. With its privileging of regional as opposed to state authority and territories, it is possible to consider the European Union as such a post modern actor. However, this chapter has also attempted to undermine the coherency of these claims by identifying the ongoing dependency of power and authority on territorial geographic sites and states, as well as the performances of bordering which authorize inclusion and exclusion.

While the official story about the Green Line in Cyprus simplifies its significance through its singular reading of Cyprus, the performance of the boundary zone produces a complex set of political practices. The gap between the formal or ‘official’ story of the ‘neutral’ Green Line and the processes of inclusion and exclusion that it enables destabilize the modern claim that borders are clear, external boundaries.

As its complicated relationships with the UN – as a modern organization – and the EU – as a ‘post modern’ organization – have demonstrated, Cyprus can be understood as both a modern state and a region of Europe. This observation gets at the schism between a state and a post modern sense of ‘empire’ that is so often purported to signify different political eras. While this is not an unusual occurrence, for a state to be a member of both state-based and regional organizations, the assumed differences between them begins to shift and blur when more than one ontology is read through the same site.
Chapter 4

British Sovereign Base Areas

British Sovereign Base Areas are a remarkable lens through which to examine the performances, as well as the limitations and excesses of multiple state and non-state jurisdictions in Cyprus. While the bases themselves offer an array of interesting ways in which to analyze the exercise of sovereignty in Cyprus, they are also indicative of exercises of sovereign power emanating from distant geographies. The multifarious implications of external sovereignties operating within the borders of Cyprus involve human populations, as access to citizenship is both affirmed and denied in interesting ways inside the British boundaries in Cyprus, as well as the foundation of Cyprus’s claim of sovereignty as it attempts to reconcile its limited jurisdiction within its borders. Reading the SBAs in Cyprus presents more than one opportunity to apply a theoretical lens through which to make sense of seemingly non-sensical displays of sovereignty. SBAs in Cyprus carry over British power and authority within the officially recognized sovereignty of Cyprus, inferring the ongoing relationship between the former mandate and its colonial master. The continuous power-relations that exist between Britain and Cyprus – expressed in the establishment and condition of the SBAs – refute the notion that the imperial era that preceded modernity ended with the emergence of formal equality and Cypriot independence.

This chapter will thus investigate the sovereign claims and performances of the state of Cyprus, as well as the external powers that set limits on such claims. Through this investigation I will suggest that the border and boundary practices produced in and
around British SBAs in Cyprus raise serious questions of the official stories that attempt to explain the British bases through simple narratives. On this basis I will argue that two ubiquitous stories told about the contemporary era – one, that there has been a ‘break’ since the end of the imperial era that marks the epoch of modern states and the system of states, and two, that the so-called ‘postmodern’ era is evidenced in something popularly called ‘Empire’, which is distinguishable from the ‘modern’ era that preceded it – attempt to diminish the continuity between the conditions and that, “while not entirely false… are one-sided” (Hindess, 2005, 242).

**Accounting for British Sovereign Bases Areas in Cyprus**

Since Cyprus attained independence in 1960 the United Kingdom has retained two Sovereign Base Areas on the island: Akrotiri, also known as Western Sovereign Base Area (WSBA) and Dhekelia, Eastern Sovereign Base Area (ESBA). Together the territories occupy 98 square miles, 47.5 at Akrotiri and 50.5 at Dhekelia for a combined total of 3% of Cyprus’ official territory. While the new Cypriot state was amenable to the UK retaining a military presence on the island, a heated debate preceded the instantiation of the British Sovereign Base Areas. For the government of Cyprus, the most important factor was that the total area of the bases must remain under 100 square miles. The territorial restriction – as well as British concession to a Cypriot condition – was believed to contain British influence and reduce the significance of both Britain and the bases for the newly independent Cypriot state. While these negotiations were eventually successful in restricting the British Sovereign Base Areas to 99 square miles, I

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18 The version of political theory is advanced by Hardt and Negri in which the modern era of states is considered imperial and the post modern condition is characterised as Empire.

19 [http://www.sba.mod.uk/web_pages/admin_background.htm](http://www.sba.mod.uk/web_pages/admin_background.htm)
think that the actual power of the United Kingdom in Cyprus far exceeds its superficial, politico-geographic limitations. (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005)

As was presented in the preceding chapter, the only official, legitimate, governing order that is imbued with the sovereign power of international recognition in Cyprus is that of the Republic of Cyprus – founded in 1960 and currently presiding over the southern, predominantly Greek portion of the island. In the terms used in the popularly discussed “Cyprus conflict”, the singular political authority of the Republic of Cyprus is presented and reified in contrast to bids for Turkish Cypriot succession and the Turkish occupation of the north. When confined to the terms of internationalist discourse, this story is simple: modern states are clear territorial entities delineated by clear borders from other similar states. In this narrative, Turkish Cypriot resistance to Cypriot sovereignty violates the sovereign integrity of the Cypriot state as well as the international regulatory law and order through which the state and the state system are made possible and accordingly authorized. Turkish Cyprus challenges Cypriot sovereignty via claims to a portion of its territory and a demand for autonomy. The Turkish Cypriot challenge to Cyprus is officially articulated and criticized in terms that are congruent with those of the modern state and international state system and seek an outcome that would reproduce the territorial sovereignty achieved by the Republic of Cyprus and be coherent within the international community. Most of the time, discourse regarding the challenges posed to Cypriot sovereignty are contained to the Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot dichotomy. However, once we expand the scope of analysis, a different, more nuanced challenge is offered in the manner in which British SBAs under UK sovereignty remain on the island.
British SBAs in Cyprus and the claims to sovereignty that they empower and demand require complex interrogation. Even while falling within the accepted territory of Cyprus the British bases are exempt from the legal authority of the Cypriot state and remain under the administration of the British Ministry of Defence.

As an island, Cyprus provides a clear and physically uncomplicated picture of a single territorial state delineated by its naturally present external water boundaries. British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus are spaces that appear much like foreign embassies, spaces in which the jurisdiction of the geographically ‘natural’ country is transferred to another state power. However, in two respects British SBAs in Cyprus are unable to be considered as embassies: first, the spaces that comprise the SBAs were never formally part of Cyprus and thus were never transferred from Cyprus to the United Kingdom: having been secured in the country’s Treaties of Guarantee and Establishment, British control of the SBAs was legally enshrined prior to the independence of Cyprus and passed from the British Empire to the British military with the legal recognition, but not sovereign authorization, of Cyprus. And secondly, due to the condition of their establishment, unlike embassies the SBAs are not “conditional on the receiving state’s continuing consent”. (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005, 70)

Rather than the transfer of the sites from Cyprus to the United Kingdom, in the establishment of independent Cyprus the British Empire failed to transfer sovereignty of the two sites to the new state. The assertion that imperial British control over Cyprus ended with its independence in 1960 is challenged by the fact that the United Kingdom continues to hold land, the 98 square miles of SBAs, additional Retained Sites and Installations, and have the authority to expand their control at their own discretion.
Furthermore, the strangeness of the British presence and authority in Cyprus is confounded by the practices of inclusion and exclusion performed in and around the SBAs.

Compounding the aberration that excludes the territorial space occupied by SBAs from Cypriot governance and authority is the realization that 60% of the geography that comprises the British SBAs is farmland privately owed by Cypriots. As a result, the property and associated rights of land-owning Cypriots fall outside the scope of Cyprus and are contained within the British military establishment.

Told in internationalist terms, the story is simple: Sovereign Base Areas are British territorial entities delineated by clear borders within Cyprus. Premised by and authorized in and through the logic of sovereignty, such pockets of a state, in this case the United Kingdom, can co-exist autonomously within another state, in this case, Cyprus. Sovereign British sites within Cyprus can function without officially diminishing the sovereign jurisdiction of the Cypriot state. In other words, through the discourse of the modern international, the logic of sovereignty, defined by equal recognition of clear, territorial limits, is somehow able to reconcile the presence of British SBAs in Cyprus, while in official and essential conflict with the claims of the TRNC and Cyprus’ rejection of them.

The actual practices of bordering in and around British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus are much more complicated than the official stories. The instantiation of Cyprus and the terms of Cypriot constitutionalism conceal and obscure complex and
contradictory arrangements between Cyprus and the United Kingdom in a manner that has profound relevance for an analysis of sovereign authority in Cyprus. An exegesis of the multiple contesting authorities that are performed around British SBAs requires an analysis of the Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee concerning Cyprus and the London and Zurich conferences that preceded them and contributed to the foundation of the Constitution of Cyprus.

The conventions of much international relations theory suggest that national borders are present and secure representations of sovereign territorial states. They also tend to entertain the possibility of an impending disappearance of state borders and the transcendence of national territories by regional or global interests. Such conventions dictate an either-or dichotomy that attempts to constrain analyses of state and state system to either the former notion of equal, sovereign states or the latter notion of a supranational order in which a higher order of governance has superseded the relevance of national territories.

The dichotomized theory of the state and the system of states in an era of increasingly interconnected economies, societies and polities has generated a discourse that reads the contemporary international as indicative of the decline of the nation-state and the destabilization of the state as sole political actor. Scholars struggle to work out the empirical, normative and theoretical possibilities for the territorial state in light of the increasing relevance and autonomy of non-governmental, sub and supra national organizations, international labour and market demands, and the ebbs and flows within and across multiple spheres of influence.
The expansion of inter-sub- and supra-national orders, along with changing relationships between territory, borders, trade, power, and law have produced a discourse in which an era dominated by supreme, sovereign states has been superseded with something else. In light of a perceived shift in the character of sovereignty, and especially in light of a decline in the power and control of nation-states in the face of “a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule” the necessity of the state, and the authority of its borders have been problematized. (Hardt and Negri, 2000, xii)

In their analysis, reading forward from perceived contemporary conditions, Hardt and Negri use the term “imperial” to refer to a modern era of states and state system, premised on the principles of territory and sovereignty. Conversely, the term “Empire” is used to define a ‘post-modern’ era: a global order characterized by a decentralization of power and a deterritorialization of the apparatus of rule “that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers”. (Hardt and Negri, 2005, xii)

Following Hindess, (2005) the suggested break between a previous era of nation-states and a contemporary era of Empire glosses the intricate relationship between and the continuity of the two systems. Rather than refuse the analysis of Empire put forward in recent literature like that of Hardt and Negri, the argument that I pick up from Hindess seeks to flesh out and complement the examination through an investigation of the “fundamental continuity between the conditions”. (Hindess, 2005, 242)

In addition, the practices of inclusion/exclusion in the British SBAs in Cyprus offer interesting opportunities to consider the limits and excesses of state sovereignty, as well as the usefulness of some popularly accepted notions of exceptionalism for a discussion
about Cyprus. Investigating what is going on in the SBAs in Cyprus and the exchanges of sovereign authority that enable them offers an opportunity to consider different ways of conceptualizing notions of exception. Similarly to theories of Empire, prevailing accounts of sovereign exception can be applied to the SBAs in interesting ways, but struggle to explain them or the practices that produce them.

The effects of inclusion/exclusion over different domains of the SBAs and the legal and sovereign exceptions declared within them produce multiple and multidimensional spaces of exception, some of which result in exclusion while others do not, as well as identifying ways in which some exclusions produce disadvantages, while others do not.

Theories of Exception

Carl Schmitt is credited with coining the theory that the sovereign is he who decides on the exception. In the original context, Schmitt was primarily concerned with the ability of the sovereign to declare a state of emergency and introduce martial law.21 The prerogative of the sovereign to decide on the exception assumes a normal regulative order, hegemony of the rule of law and a functional authority. Under the declaration of a state of exception the rights that are regularly accessible to citizens through legal channels are withheld over a particular person(s) or space(s), rather than abrogated in a more general and final sense. (Schmitt, 1985) The rule of law must continue to exist as an artefact of sovereign power and the norm against which the exception is evaluated, as well as to determine the return to normal order. However, particular circumstances of sovereign exception observable in Cyprus challenge the singular interpretation that

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21 This conception is in line with the version of a state of emergency that was instituted in Nazi Germany to revoke the citizenship rights of many German people. By removing citizenship the German regime was able to disregard the rights regularly attributed to inhabitants of the state in order to act beyond law without breaking the law, at least domestically.
sovereign authority declares all exceptions to sovereign order. In recent years, a resurgence of theories of exception and exceptionalism has increased a tendency towards classifying all paradoxical and problematic sites in states and in state-system theory as examples of ‘exception’ initiated via some sort of declaration, or perceived declaration by something like a sovereign.

Whereas Schmitt was preoccupied with ensuring that a healthy democracy be imbued with the necessary ration of dictatorship to ensure control, more recent exception theories attempt to hold states accountable - via the conception of a responsible sovereign – for the incomplete or insufficient performance of regulative order, for the suspension or absence of law and for the vulnerability of those abandoned to a conversely anarchical environment.

Giorgio Agamben has reintroduced theories of exception and generated an analysis in which the exercise of sovereign rule is suspended over a particular person or site – most often in Agamben’s work, the camp (Agamben, 1998). While this work and earlier theories such as that offered by Schmitt draw from the same well, the differences between them are pivotal to a discussion of sovereign exception. In the case offered by Schmitt, regulatory legal order was suspended through a state of emergency, so that access to legal rights was issued at the discretion of the regime, enacting the ultimate dictatorial power of the sovereign (Schmitt, 1985). In contrast, in the Agambian sense, the performance of regulative order is withheld over a particular space, thus inferring either the impotence or indifference of the perceived sovereign rather than a general state of exception where rights are then re-issued according to a classification of inclusion and exclusion (Agamben, 1998).
Neither of these two perspectives offer a comprehensive interpretation of exceptionalism in Cyprus, but both contribute towards a reading of the multiple, overlapping and contradictory sites that appear within and between sovereign powers on the island. Alongside an investigation into the performances of sovereignty in Cyprus and a consideration of Cyprus as a sovereign state is an opportunity to consider which sovereignty is being limited and which is excessive. Unlike the clear state-based story of defined borders, Cyprus exemplifies the messiness that is present in the actual workings of sovereignty in the international system and the trouble that modern theories of sovereignty and exceptionalism have in explaining them.

**SBAs: Exception to Cypriot Sovereignty**

The United Kingdom maintains military institutions on the island that present challenges to Cypriot sovereignty but unlike the Turkish Cypriot claim to sovereign autonomy they seek to exist simultaneously with and without challenging the sovereign Cypriot state. At least theoretically, this claim is fundamentally incongruent with the official international relations story concerning state sovereignty in which there is a single authority over a given territory.

At the time of the establishment of Cyprus in 1960 the United Kingdom “did not transfer sovereignty over two areas: the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area.” (Constantinou & Richmond, 2005, 69) The retention of sovereign spaces in Cyprus by the United Kingdom was possible due to the particular political climate at the time of Cypriot independence. Rather than the result of a determined anti-colonial movement, the independence of Cyprus was a product of a changing geopolitical reality at the end of the colonial era, the waning economic ability of the United
Kingdom to hold and administer colonial possessions directly and the shift to indirect international political and economic influence over former colonies.

In the absence of a common Cypriot independence movement, and in order to preserve British influence while easing financial and bureaucratic responsibilities, the Cypriot Treaty of Establishment officially codified a non-existing unified Cypriot ‘nation’ through the prohibition of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms. Under the law of the new Cypriot state, both the union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis) and the partition of Turkish Cyprus and union with Turkey (taksim) were forbidden.\(^\text{22}\) It was determined by Cyprus’s ‘protectorate’ countries; the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, that Cyprus would be established as a bi-communal compromise between the three competing foreign interests and

that the United Kingdom would maintain permanent military presence on the island in Sovereign Base Areas [as] had been agreed at the London Conference on Cyprus (19 February, 1959), which incorporated the Basic Structure agreed at the Zurich Conference between the UK and the two “motherlands”, Greece and Turkey (not the Cypriots: who participated in the London, but not the Zurich Conference.) (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005, 82)

As a colony, Cyprus had no sovereign rights prior to the Treaties that established its independence and thus only its tacit consent was required as authorization for its constitution. Even if not unique among former colonies that have been determined as states by more powerful states rather than by internal nationalist demands, the terms and

\(^\text{22}\) [http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/try-guarantee.html](http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/try-guarantee.html) See Treaty of Guarantee, Articles I and II. 16 August, 1960
conditions of Cyprus’s constitution are interesting. Article II of an extremely brief, three-typed-page Treaty of Establishment states

*The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise the island of Cyprus, together with the islands lying off its coast with the exception of the two areas defined in Annex A to this Treaty, which areas shall remain under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.*

And under Article III of the Treaty of Guarantee Cyprus, Greece and Turkey agree to “*respect areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty*”.

Through its negotiation of an independent Cyprus the United Kingdom ensured its ongoing sovereign authority over particular sites in Cyprus. Other than the brief reference to British sovereign spaces in the Articles quoted above, British post-colonial, ongoing imperial control of Cyprus was left out of the main text of the Cypriot Treaty of Establishment. The terms and scope of British sovereign power are instead carefully detailed in the oft-overlooked annexes, a set of highly technical texts “rarely examined but for the expert civil servant and lawyer”, which number over seventy pages. (Constantinou & Richmond, 2005, 69)

While the annexes are treated as an appendage falling outside the scope of the main text, their status is ensured in Article 11 of the Treaty of Establishment, which states, “*The Annexes to this Treaty shall have force and effect as integral parts of the Treaty*”. The exclusion of the terms concerning the Sovereign Base Areas from the main text of the Treaties and from the public analysis and debate that preceded the entrenchment of the Treaty, foreshadow in legal theory the actual, physical exclusion of the SBA sites

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from the territory and sovereignty of Cyprus. In other words, the physical exclusion of the SBAs from the territorial jurisdiction of Cyprus mirrors the omission of the legislation that produces and empowers them from public scrutiny and widespread knowledge. As a result, the Treaties of Guarantee and Establishment appear uncomplicated and the retention of the SBAs, in both theory and practice, is most often omitted from general public awareness or debate.

The restriction of the British territories to less than 100 square miles was a symbolic if significant victory for the early Cypriot government. The attempt to limit the bases quantitatively was overwhelmed by the scope of the bases qualitatively. Article II of the Cypriot Treaty of Establishment ushers in the virtually unlimited expansive power of the United Kingdom in Cyprus. It states first (1) “The Republic of Cyprus shall accord the United Kingdom the rights set forth in Annex B to this Treaty” and then (2)

_The Republic of Cyprus shall cooperate fully with the United Kingdom to ensure the security and effective operation of the military bases situated in the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, and the full enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights conferred by this Treaty._

Beyond the number of square miles that would be exempt from Cypriot sovereignty, “there was little debate on what the effective operation of the bases meant, whether this had local governance implications or aimed at Britain’s diminishing regional interests”. (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005, 66)

While very little academic attention has been given to the issue of British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, Constantinou and Richmond, in their recent article “The Long Mile of Empire,” detail the expansive scope of the United Kingdom as evidence of
former colonial and powerful state powers, colluding with local leaders in new countries for the benefit of both. Constantinou and Richmond assert that the instantiation of Cyprus complete with SBAs is a “simulation thus operated on two fronts: on the Cyprus front, the faking of sovereign independence, and on the UK front, the faking of Britannia’s rule and global relevance”.

At a time when imperial powers were waning and the United Kingdom was feeling the pressure of maintaining direct colonial control of Cyprus, the ability to maintain overseas military installations bolstered their international holdings. In addition to physical control over the SBAs, British influence over Cyprus is fortified by the “discretionary rights”24 of the British military also enshrined in the Treaty Appendices. In order to maintain the “effective operation”25 of the SBAs the British government ensured its military’s unrestricted power in the Cypriot constitution. British military discretionary power extended to operations that occurred beyond the limited scope awarded by 99 square miles. (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005) Among the “discretionary” holdings in Cyprus are, in brief – roads and ports to assist in the movement of troops on or off the island and to and from the United Kingdom, airspaces and airports for military aircraft and the installation and dismantlement of lights and other navigational aids as would aid or inhibit their operation. (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005) The power of British sovereignty in Cyprus as guaranteed in Cypriot founding documents is so great that in very few instances is the United Kingdom even required to ‘notify’ the Cypriot.

24 This is the language used in the Cypriot Treaty of Guarantee, 16 August, 1960.
http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/try-guarantee.htm
25 ibid
government before it can operationalize British sovereign control over Cypriot sites. In most instances notification is merely a formality, if necessary at all.

In addition to expansive, discretionary power, beyond the 99 square miles allotted to Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, Annex B of the Treaty of Establishment enshrines British control over spaces that are officially referred to as “British Retained Sites and Installations”. “Ironically, though perhaps not surprisingly, these sites and installations are roughly the areas that the British government originally asked to be included as part of the Sovereign Base Areas”, but that were omitted from the original 99 square miles. (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005, 70) In the Treaty these spaces are considered separately from the SBAs – they are “formally under Republic of Cyprus sovereignty, but the exercise of that sovereignty has been permanently suspended”. (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005, 70) While the Cypriot administration hailed the containment of the base areas to less than 100 square miles as a victory for the newly independent Cypriot state, the qualitative exceptions that are empowered through British discretionary control and operational sovereignty over Retained Sites and Installations reveal the degree to which Cypriot sovereignty was curtailed from its inception.

**SBAs: Exception to British Sovereignty**

Rather than little pockets of the United Kingdom inside Cyprus the SBAs are not colonies, they are military installations. Rather than fall under the responsibility and jurisdiction of the British government, as would an embassy or a colony, the British Ministry of Defence administers the British SBAs. Unlike any other post-colonial, sovereign areas held by the United Kingdom, the SBAs in Cyprus are retained as military bases, not colonial territories and therefore report to the Ministry of Defence in London.
As military installations, SBAs have “no formal connection with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or the British High Commission in Nicosia, although there are close informal links with both offices on policy matters”.26 The geography of the SBAs intended to include the major, pre-existing British military bases and exclude Cypriot towns and villages. However, approximately 7000 Cypriots currently live inside the SBAs. (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005) British military personnel and administration do not have the mandate or the authority to replace the functions generally expected of a government system and neither demand responsibilities nor ensure rights of the Cypriots living within the British Sovereign Base Areas. As military establishments, the British SBAs have no civilian police force or civil justice system and are monitored instead by British military police.

Cypriots living inside British SBAs form an exceptional category of citizen. Both Greek and Turkish, the Cypriots who live within the base areas are excepted from the Cypriot law and administration of the Republic of Cyprus. Since the sovereign power of Cyprus is not effective over the SBAs, the people living in those spaces find themselves outside the scope of their countries’ legal order.

In a bizarre twist, Cypriot citizens living within the British SBAs are also excluded from the law and administration of the United Kingdom. Even though the SBAs are under the rule of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, they are military establishments in a former colony and legal rights and responsibilities are not conferred to Cypriots living within them.

26 http://www.sba.mod.uk/web_pages/admin_background.htm
Instead of Cypriot or British rule, civilians living inside the British Sovereign Base Areas are ruled by the “Laws of the Colony of Cyprus” – the laws used by Britain throughout the period of colonial rule and that pre-date Cypriot independence. This remarkable exclusion is exemplary of the ability of a hegemonic state power and a former colonial power to mutate general, modern spatial and temporal principles and sovereign relationships. This further exemplifies the extraordinary capacity of the United Kingdom to hold the Cypriot spaces, through the Ministry of Defence, in suspended time – governing them by the law of a colony that no longer exists and removing the necessity of recognizing the independence of the Cypriot state that surrounds them.

In previous chapters I have suggested that, whereas the modern international system hypothesizes an ontological and temporal break between the imperial, pre-sovereign world and the modern era of sovereign states, historical accounts of a pre-modern age might rather involve a reading of the past through the modern episteme in a manner that necessitates a distinction between now and then. The establishment of Cyprus, complete with British Sovereign Base Areas, simultaneously affirms the claims of two ontologically disparate systems: the modern international and the pre-modern imperial, which was “thought to possess no sovereign states of the European kind (Schmitt 1950, 1996).” (Hindess, 2005, 246)

The presence and condition of SBAs in Cyprus refute the suggestion that there has been a drastic discontinuity between eras, imperial-modern or imperial-empire, depending on your preference. In either sense, the SBAs represent and confirm the hierarchical character of the international system. Whether understood as a colony under direct control or as a formally equal modern state, imperial power relations and an
episteme of progressive developmentalism underwrite the reality of Cyprus. In their paper “The Long Mile of Empire,” Constantinou and Richmond observe that during the ethnic violence of the 1960s and 70s, Turkish and Greek Cypriots used the British SBAs as refuges from the instability of Cyprus. In this sense, the United Kingdom was successful in modeling the full development of a mature liberal state: the presence of SBAs in Cyprus is synonymous with the presence of the United Kingdom in Cyprus and thus of the hegemony of fully functioning liberalism in Cyprus. 27

British SBAs in Cyprus are not uniform Cartesian spaces: because of their expansive qualities they are not easily mapped and their various features refuse to perform a singular vertical or horizontal legal-geographic representation. Where one law should apply, it does not; where citizenship should follow from nativity, it does not. The SBAs in Cyprus are neither coherent nor homogeneous political sites. While geographically within Cyprus, they are recognized as spaces exceptional from Cypriot sovereignty.

More intriguingly, SBAs present numerous other exceptions to and from British sovereignty. While the exceptions described above identify complications to Cyprus’s claim to sovereignty through a description of ongoing neo-colonial British control, the examples that follow challenge the simplicity with which narratives promote a ‘post-modern’ socio-political phenomenon known as “Empire”.

In his recent chapter, “Citizenship and Empire” (2005), Barry Hindess observed that the increasingly ubiquitous notion of “Empire”, that of an emerging global order in the

27 It is interesting to note that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus doesn’t challenge the United Kingdom’s presence on the island, nor does it demand the release of Turkish Cypriot villages that are within the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot acceptance of British sovereignty over Turkish Cypriots in this sense results in the implicit recognition of British sovereignty. This political order can be read as Turkish Cypriot and Turkish recognition of hegemony and hierarchy in the international system as well as their deference to such power.
manner popularized by Hardt and Negri (*Empire*, 2000), is believed to rest on two central assertions: “on the one hand, Empire does not rely on territorial boundaries and the insistence, on the other, that there is a radical discontinuity between our present condition and the earlier imperial world order”. (Hindess, 2005, 241) In this sense Hindess, employing the contributions of Hardt and Negri, contrasts ‘Empire’ to “the earlier European imperialism, which rested on the territorial boundaries ‘defined by the modern system of nation-states’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000, xii)” (Hindess, 2005, 241). In light of the ongoing relationship between Britain and Cyprus and the hierarchical nature of their respective sovereignties, it is difficult to comprehend claims that any era ends and is replaced with a new order or that the significance of power derived from territoriality has been in any significant way diminished.

As has been previously discussed, since the admittance of Cyprus to the European Union in 2004 the application of the laws – the rights and responsibilities – of EU citizenship have been legally in effect over the entire island but are suspended over the northern section. A similar condition exists wherein the EU acquis is in effect throughout the United Kingdom, as it is a member state and its citizens enjoy the rights and responsibilities of the European Union; however, while the United Kingdom’s access to the European Union is granted on the condition of British sovereignty, the British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, including the parts of Cyprus that would otherwise be geographically within the recognized sovereign jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus and thus within the jurisdiction of the European Union, are excluded from EU membership. On the grounds of Cypriot citizenship, Cyprus has attained EU citizenship.

28 Whereas most international relations discourse and the rest of my analysis refer to the pre-state era as imperial, Hardt and Negri employ the term ‘imperial’ to refer to the condition otherwise discussed as the modern state/state system.
for the Cypriots who reside in SBAs. Yet, perplexingly, these rights are only attainable outside of the British held spaces. Unlike any other British over-seas territory, residents of SBAs in Cyprus are not eligible for British citizenship.

The sovereign authority of the United Kingdom has used its influence in the international European arena and declared a state of exception over the SBAs in Cyprus, withholding regularly administered rights. Thus, Sovereign Base Areas exemplify the United Kingdom’s influence over efforts to spatialize and de-spatialize regulations of inclusion and exclusion in the European Union. This influence, as well as the spaces of exception that result, affect human populations and geographies and produce some obvious exclusions that are disadvantageous for the Cypriot people living within who are unable to access state law (Cypriot) or international law (EU) while living in sites that predate either and should, somewhat technically, provide access to both.

In addition to the disadvantage of this exceptional quality for Cypriots in SBAs, there are a number of other effects to consider. Cypriot communities in SBAs are under a sovereign authority evident only in the ways in which they are an exception to its rights and responsibilities. Cypriots in SBAs constitute an exception to British sovereign authority while they continue to fall under the either suspended or unacknowledged Cypriot or Turkish citizenships, while living within British jurisdictions in sovereign Cyprus. Since British military police - rather than the government of either the United Kingdom or Cyprus – oversee the SBAs, administrative and civil responsibilities of the Cypriot citizens are lessened and space is made for unconventional relationships with the Cypriots and British residents, trade laws, farming practices etc. From this perspective Cypriots living in British Sovereign Areas may enjoy more freedom and flexibility in
practice than do their counterparts living under the law and administration of the Republic of Cyprus. For British citizens in Cyprus the exceptional spaces are advantageous in the way that they allow for unconventional relationships between the United Kingdom and the citizen population of external territories and the domestic and international laws that generally regulate such circumstances.

In effect, a sovereign authority rules over Cypriot communities inside the British SBAs only in the ways in which such authority is suspended and access to the rights and responsibilities associated with citizenship are denied. The British claim that the SBAs, as military bases, can be excluded from the sovereign rule of their country brings into question the logical possibility of removing the military, as a force designed in the interests of the sovereignty and territoriality of the United Kingdom, from the sovereignty that created it and through which it is authorized as a legitimate force.

The influence of the United Kingdom over ‘laws’ of time and space, and premises and logics of modernity have numerous and significant implications for both the excluded in Cyprus and the coherence of the modern international in a more general sense. In two distinct senses the British bases operate far beyond the 99 square miles designated under the terms of the Treaty of Establishment. In one sense, in addition to their geographical size, the expansive scope of British authority in Cyprus is exemplary of the limited, aesthetic or imagined state of Cypriot sovereignty. Extending from the exception to Cypriot sovereignty, the condition of British sovereignty in the SBAs in Cyprus presents a second, exponentially more complex exception to sovereign order with a myriad of interconnected implications. Thus, in another sense, the exception of British SBAs in Cyprus from the regulative order of both the laws of the United Kingdom and the
European Union, of which the United Kingdom is a member, comprise a double exception of these inside/outside spaces. An intriguing set of principles occur in suspended time and space within and between Cyprus, the United Kingdom, the European Union and the modern international in which not all exceptions are exclusions and in which what appears as a disadvantage at first glance can hold a myriad of advantages from multiple, simultaneous and overlapping perspectives.

In an Agambian sense, an argument could be made that the northern section of Cyprus is an exceptional site to the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus (although it was not the Republic of Cyprus that declared the exception, and the TRNC is not a sovereign power according to the international community). In contrast, the SBAs in Cyprus might, at first glance, appear to qualify as exceptions in the Schmittian sense, since access to legal order and rights has been suspended; but, once again, the exception was not declared by the Republic of Cyprus and, furthermore, is not a generalized state of exception throughout the country or over a particular people or group of people but is a particular site of foreign occupation excluded from Cypriot sovereign jurisdiction.

If Schmitt insists that the sovereign is he who decides upon the exception, in the Cypriot case the sovereign is multi-dimensional and authorized by dubiously compatible claims. The suggestion that Cyprus is the sovereign that decides upon the exception is negated by the presence of foreign powers. Therefore the insistence that the state system is comprised of equal, autonomous members is undermined by the conditions through which former colonial powers have contributed to the development of such states and the reality that only after the legal terms of establishment are determined externally can any state be considered sovereign. In the case of Cyprus, the fundamental theories through
which Cyprus was established are contradicted by the performance of hegemonic power on the island.

The ongoing recognition of Cypriot sovereignty by the international community renders it legitimate, regardless of the degree to which it is able to exercise authority within its borders. As a result Cyprus’s sovereign legitimacy enjoys a higher currency in the international arena than the domestic. For example, as a UN and EU member state Cyprus is able to assert influence over the treatment of Turkey and the TRNC by the international community and can reduce and restrict aid to the north of the island while it is unable to control trade violations along its own internal boundary as goods and people are smuggled into and out of the Republic of Cyprus.

In the sense that states are formally equal, autonomous sovereign territorial entities that combine as members of a system that privileges these principles as criteria for recognition and inclusion, “it may be admitted that there is a certain incongruity between the claims formalized in the principle and the untidy processes of everyday politics”. (Walker, 1990, 161) In fact, such an observation may underestimate the degree to which the formalized principle in Cyprus may be obscured or concealed through the influence of external powers: post-colonial, international, imperial and nationalistic pressures all contribute to determine the degree to which a state can be thought to advance and defend a self-determined political reality. Complicated in Cyprus by the absence of a common identity or self-determination movement, it is increasingly difficult to determine by what criteria Cyprus could be considered a sovereign state.

The British SBAs in Cyprus do not challenge Cypriot sovereignty in modern terms as would imply an overt threat to the state, but rather, draw into question the possibility that
‘sovereignty,’ defined as uncontested authority, could exist while limited or curtailed by an external power. At stake in this question is the coherence of an international system ordered and authorized by sovereign, indivisible principles that can be ignored or transcended by other ‘equal’ states without obliterating existing sovereign claims and the legitimacy of the system. Not only are SBAs in Cyprus exemplary of this contradiction, they are also evidence of the untidiness of overlapping practices that determine and are determined by different though connected systems of power and organization.

The implications of this jumble of systems that are evident in SBAs in Cyprus involve sets of practices; domestic and international with links to contemporarily dominant truth claims. While contemporary political life privileges the state as the primary actor and citizenship as the legitimate avenue towards participation, the system of legal inclusion/exclusion in SBAs in Cyprus challenges the supremacy of this largely uncontested claim. Further, assumptions about the relationships between time and space and the inviolability of linear, singular authority is undermined by the duration of colonial law within a sovereign, modern state. While geo-political realities in British SBAs in Cyprus are at odds with accepted and hegemonic notions of contemporary political epistemes, the system functions in a manner in which its internal inconsistencies and external incongruences are not sufficient to interfere with its function. While the exceptions within and between states pose both logical and theoretical problems, the system of states – the state as a political actor premised on a set of characteristic principles – continue to exercise paramountcy in the modern international.
Chapter 5

Living in the Border

Pyla/Pile

The de facto border that distinguishes north and south Cyprus imparts a myriad of inferences and implications: its size, which ranges from only a few meters in depth in the shared capital of Nicosia, to a several kilometer expanse near the eastern coast, raises the question, ‘who owns the border when it is more than a thin line?’ (Papadakis, 2005, 213) In the Cypriot case, the space inside the boundary that dissects the island is – in different ways – beyond and outside the assumed jurisdictions of both the Republic of Cyprus and the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

On the northern front, the TRNC maintains a makeshift border on the edge of the UN Green Line, and declares it as the limit of its self-declared state. However, the Turkish Cypriot regime continues to participate in productions of identity and belonging inside the buffer zone and employs the practices of membership that occur within towards their sovereign claims. While the Green Line is beyond the territory claimed by the TRNC, the northern regime politicizes the processes that occur there for its own ends.

As a result of its official status in the south and reinforced through its internationally supported claim of sovereignty over the entire island, the Republic of Cyprus has official jurisdiction over the land that comprises the Green Line. The Republic of Cyprus is administratively responsible for Cypriot civilians who live inside the Green Line – be they Greek or Turkish Cypriots. Since the breakdown of the Cypriot political system and the peacekeeping mandate of the United Nations temporary authority over the space that
constitutes the Green Line has been transferred to the UN and the boundary zone is monitored by international Peacekeepers.

More than a contested or excepted territory that forms a buffer zone between Cypriot communities, the significance of the Green Line as a site of political interest is amplified by the presence of a single remaining ethnically mixed village. More than an uninhabited no man’s land fought over between two socio-political spaces – the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC – the Green Line is also home to approximately 800 Greek Cypriots and 400 Turkish Cypriots who live in a bi-communal village and navigate extraordinary Cypriot identities. (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002, 89) The village of Pyla – in Greek, and Pile – in Turkish, both affirms and contradicts official narratives about the character of divided Cyprus and members of both ethnic groups perform practices of membership and belonging that define them in multiple and seemingly irreconcilable ways. This is not to suggest that dominant Greek and Turkish Cypriot political divisions are not at work in Pyla/Pile – they most certainly are – but to illustrate that there are other grounds for inclusion and exclusion in Pyla/Pile that are both contradictory to the expected dichotomy and that exceed it.

When read through the prevailing discourse of both the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the village of Pyla/Pile is anomalous. Its physical situation, nestled closely to the Dhekelia British Sovereign Base Area and fortuitously overseen by UN Peacekeepers has helped to insure it against the ravages of ethnic cleansing that swept the island in the early 1960s during the collapse of the bi-communal government, and again after the arrival of Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriot partition of the north in the early 1970s. The bi-communal village has withstood external entitlement
declared by both Greek and Turkish Cyprus. While both Cypriot regimes recognize the UN zone and (temporarily in the case of the Republic of Cyprus) draw their borders on the outside of the Green Line, both the Green Line and Pyla/Pile remain contestable sites in the sense that, “even in the case of a thin line, one side could always claim part of the line itself” and both refuse to relinquish their stake. As an example of a contested space between sovereign claims, the Green Line illuminates the way that “boundaries acquired their power, as sites of dispute that could ignite and amplify conflict” (Papadakis, 2005, 213).

**Liminality**

Anthropologist Yiannis Papadakis (2000) describes Pyla/Pile as a liminal space, its name meaning ‘gate’ in both Greek and Turkish. Prior to signifying a crossing between Greek and Turkish Cyprus, the name of the village is an historic reference to its location between two hills that draw apart to form the mouth of a great and fertile plain. (Papadakis, 2000) Pyla/Pile is a gateway in many senses; between Greek Cyprus and Turkish Cyprus, between Greece and Turkey, between Europe and its other, between ancient Byzantine and Ottoman empires, between ‘legitimate’ sovereignty and occupation, between legal economic trade and illegal smuggling, and so on. In each instance Pyla/Pile constitutes a geographic and ethnographic boundary area between diverse and often competing ideologies – and their edges testify to their duality.

In the sense that contemporary discourse constitutes and interprets the international arena as one of formally equal, sovereign states, the village of Pyla/Pile can be considered a liminal space that occurs on the margins of two distinct units, north and south, that are polarized and cast as divergent factors as well as antagonistic sovereign
claims. An analysis of the village in these terms – as a margin of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, or of the Republic of Cyprus and the occupying Turkish faction – unearths competing nationalisms that are performed in the intricate and unique system of local politics in Pyla/Pile. The play of national and ethnic identity in Pyla/Pile is exceptional to the prescribed and expected us/them depiction that is ubiquitous in Cypriot politics. As a result, reading Pyla/Pile as a site in which two distinguishable systems are thought to intersect introduces a set of practices that define a third (fourth, fifth… ad infinitum) way of being in Cyprus, those that operate beyond the prescribed scope of the official dichotomized stories.

Since the Republic of Cyprus officially advocated for the reunion of the island and the return to bi-communal government, the government’s position on the Pyla/Pile question is one of “peaceful coexistence”. To be consistent and to support the official goal of a single political Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot regime must publicly encourage the potential for civil harmony between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and their possible future happiness in a single Cypriot republic. However, while this prerogative might operate at levels of diplomacy and negotiation, for most Greek Cypriots the popular attitude towards Pyla/Pile is one of suspicion. Prevalent media attention and government involvement in Pyla/Pile focus on occurrences of smuggling and on the arrests made in the area, depicting the village as a dangerous and threatening place. (Papadakis, 2000, 100)

Since it is within the Green Line, the village is outside the economic zones of both the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC. As a result, goods from the north imported from Turkey and beyond are brought into the village and sold at prices far below those in the
south where markets and trade conform to international and European norms. The Greek Cypriot government has established checkpoints on the roads leading south out of the border village used to search for goods bought illegally in Pyla/Pile.

The embargo affects tourism to the village, and thus the economic prosperity of its members, since visitors are routinely stopped, jailed and have their purchases seized by the police of the Republic of Cyprus. These circumstances, while arguably the creation of the southern republic, lend to the air of distrust that surrounds the village and increase the interpretation of a mixed community as unstable and unpredictable for both Greek Cypriots and foreign visitors.

While enforcing customs and import laws are the reasonable prerogative of the Cypriot regime, the restrictions are controversial not only because they inhibit trade in Pyla/Pile but also because the laws are not posted and therefore people are not aware that they are violating a law when they buy goods to take back to the Republic of Cyprus. (Papadakis, 2005) Indeed, tourists are scarcely aware that they have left the Republic and so don’t think to consider import or customs restrictions.

While officially validating the possibility of peace in Pyla/Pile, until both the bi-ethnic village and the rest of the island are reconciled under the authority of the Republic of Cyprus, the Cypriot regime is invested in presenting the unofficial union of Greek and Turk in Pyla/Pile as the great unknown, dangerous and unpredictable, a zone beyond the reach of criminal law, civil order or even legal clarity. (Papadakis, 2005)

In Turkish Cyprus the media and the government disseminate the belief that Pyla/Pile represents the unpeaceful coexistence of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot portrayals of Pyla/Pile focuses on the harsh and prejudicial attitude taken by Greek
In a manner very similar to that of the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is invested in discouraging the possibility of peace and security for Turkish Cypriots in Greek Cypriot-controlled areas. Since the TRNC regime bases its demands for autonomy on ethnic incommensurability, it refutes ethnic cooperation among Greeks and Turks and portrays Pyla/Pile as unsafe for Turkish Cypriots. As a result, its Turkish Cypriot inhabitants are often depicted as traitorous to the national, Turkish separatist cause in order to explain peace in the village. The Turkish Cypriot media highlights instances of confrontation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Pyla/Pile and between Turkish Cypriots and the Republic of Cyprus to portray danger and prejudice. The official position of the TRNC is invested in maintaining the conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots as the basis for their autonomy. The community in Pyla/Pile is presented as under the constant surveillance of the Cypriot state and as suffering under its economic embargo.

At least two comparable units between which duality can be measured are necessary for a conception of liminality. The assumption required to read Pyla/Pile as a liminal space involves accepting the binary relationship between the Greek-Turkish (or European-Non-European, Byzantine-Ottoman, and so on) from which sides, and thus a middle, are drawn. As a site of liminality – and as expected – Pyla/Pile contributes performances of internally cohesive and externally antagonistic ethnic allegiances. Yet, village life necessitates complex systems of coexistence that underpin the living in

Pyla/Pile; cultural norms, economic exchanges and social cooperation far exceed the official dichotomization and antagonism of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

**Location**

Pyla/Pile is a relevant site of investigation in ways other than as a periphery between Greek and Turkish Cyprus. While Pyla/Pile occurs in the space where the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus push up against each other, it is also identifiable by a margin that surrounds it, separating it from the republics on either side and which contains exceptional community values and a knowledge of ethnic balance and co-existence that are internal to the mixed village. Contrary to the official communal positions of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, both Greek and Turkish villagers hold communal values and ideas about mutual interests.

Rather than align along predominantly ethnic lines, during times of conflict Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Pyla/Pile cooperated to preserve their homes and community, to resist internal displacement and to prevent further ethnic violence. During the disintegration of the Cypriot government in the early 1960s there was widespread violence and Greek Cypriot soldiers and vigilantes came to Pyla/Pile to remove Turkish settlers. Rather than collude with the Greek Cypriot forces, ethnically Greek inhabitants of Pyla/Pile hid their Turkish neighbours and refused the Greek Cypriot forces. (Papadakis, 2000) Similarly, during the uprisings of the 1970s and the occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkish troops, the Turkish Pileliler refused to allow Turkish and...
Turkish Cypriot militias to displace the Greek Pyliotes. (Papadakis, 2000)\textsuperscript{30} Instead of falling along ethnic lines or identifying with rival claims of statehood, the attitudes and actions of people in Pyla/Pile exceed the dichotomized expectations of Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities and get at the gulf between the official stories and the experiences of people in their communities.

There is, in international relations discourse, a list of categories in which *political* trumps as the reigning monarch – as that which allows, informs and reproduces all other related categories and their conditions of possibility. Such other categories typically include social, cultural and economic and so on.

The logic of the modern state and the corresponding system of states has no language with which to speak of political exceptionalism that is not its own creation. Hannah Arendt observed that during the ethnic disintegration of Germany under Nazi rule, the Jews recognized the racial discrimination they faced as a social problem, and only their enemy – the German state – regarded the Jewish “problem” as a political one. (Arendt, 1996) The distinction between a political and a social realm such as that identified by Arendt, might gloss the possibility that what is political might be confused or conflated with a particular, accepted notion of the political and render it difficult to recognize or incorporate the significance of political practices that occur in places other than where we expect to find them. In other words, the ‘social’ realm, of which Arendt speaks, exists only in relation to a specific conception of that which is ‘political’. The definition and isolation of such categories have dominated the study and practice of so called social sciences and have been influential in the determination of the scope of ‘political life’.

\textsuperscript{30} Henceforth Pyliotes will refer to Greek Cypriot inhabitants and Pileliler will refer to Turkish Cypriot inhabitants. (Papadakis, 2000, 2005)
In Pyla/Pile the domain of the political is defined and performed from the outside, through official channels and along state sanctioned lines that promote the sovereign supremacy of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot state, respectively – and each in opposition to the other. The Greek/Turkish dichotomy shows up in all state-certified representations of Pyla/Pile. Yet, it is my contention that the performances and practices of those other categories in Pyla/Pile – the social, cultural and economic – challenge both the definition of and the domain of that which is considered exclusively political. As the following three-part analysis will explore, when the ground of the political in Pyla/Pile is challenged, a number of sets of practices, otherwise excluded from this type of consideration, emerge. Only by limiting the definition of political in this sense does Pyla/Pile adhere to dominant expectations and the modern logic of the state system.

To think about the village of Pyla/Pile as a political location, rather than as an anomaly to two other political locations, shifts the dominance of the rival ethnicities and sovereign claims in Cyprus and sets at the locus of inquiry a site of civil and communitarian political engagements that complicate the prevailing portrayal of divided Cyprus. Reading the instances of political life in Pyla/Pile challenges the dominant discourse that seeks to contain the Cyprus ‘conflict’ to one of competing ethnic nationalisms and reveals the possibilities for political life that exceed official interpretation. Reading first the economic, then the cultural and then the social realms in Pyla/Pile, this chapter will investigate the sets of practices that constitute political life in the village.

**Economics**

“In principle, a city is outside the order of sovereignty, in the sense that it transcends the realm or the state in which it is located and gathers people in, regardless of what the
ostensibly “sovereign” authorities say they want.” (Magnusson, 2006, 6) In practice, the village of Pyla/Pile is excepted from the sovereign authority of Cyprus and administered by the United Nations, due to its location inside the Green Line. As a result, administration of Pyla/Pile is divided between the Republic of Cyprus, which is responsible for infrastructure and services, and the United Nations, which provides Peacekeepers. While the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus makes claims to both the boundary and the village, it also determines its boundary on the northern edge of the Green Line. Within the boundary and within Pyla/Pile, UN Peacekeepers replace national or municipal police. However, due to their specific mandate and limited enforcement capabilities, they only monitor basic security issues related to ethnic conflict. As a result, civil infractions and bylaw violations are unregulated. This jurisdictional exception in Pyla/Pile contributes towards the anomalous character of the community: the community falls under an exclusion to the Cypriot state without being included in any commensurate system of law or order. There are numerous ways that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Pyla/Pile employ the absence of an administrative system to their advantage. While the examples below describe ways that Pyliotes and Pileliler benefit from their unique situation, they also reveal ways that the expected dichotomy between Greek and Turk is strategically employed.

Turkish Pileliler capitalize on the absence of local administrative security and border control in Pyla/Pile by accessing otherwise inaccessible government services from the Republic of Cyprus. As villagers under the Republic of Cyprus, Pileliler qualify for services such as farming subsidies and access to official identification documents that are inaccessible to most Turkish Cypriots. However, as Turkish Cypriots, Pileliler refuse to
pay the southern republic for municipal services such as electricity or garbage collection. Authorized by the official position of the TRNC, any Turkish acknowledgement of the authority of the Republic of Cyprus would lend credibility to a regime that Turkish Cypriots ideologically refuse. Therefore, Pileliler are able to contend that they are unable to pay for services at risk of legitimating the Republic. Greek Pyliotes also use the unique situation in their village and the absence of local law enforcement to their advantage by tapping in to their Turkish neighbours’ unpaid electricity. Pyliotes are not contesting the Greek Cypriot regime, yet are complicit with their Turkish neighbours: as Pileliler offer a political explanation for refusing to pay for services, the Pyliotes are arguably guilty where the Pileliler are not, given their uncontested acknowledgement of and membership in the Cypriot state. (Papadakis, 2005)

Performing the internationally determined and enforced limit of the state, the Green Line attempts to restrict the movement of goods and people across the boundary between the legitimate Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC. However, unlike elsewhere on the island where the border is strictly guarded the trade flows that seep through the international embargo find few obstacles in Pyla/Pile. As previously mentioned, since the partition of the northern section of the island and the occupation by Turkish troops in the early 1970s, the Republic of Cyprus has instituted a trade embargo against the TRNC. Due to the international recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by only Turkey, the self-declared nation-state is under an international embargo and enjoys trade benefits with only Turkey.

In violation of the Republic of Cyprus’ embargo against the TRNC, Greek Pyliotes operate seafood restaurants in Pyla/Pile that cater to Greek Cypriot tourists and that offer
fish illegally\textsuperscript{31} procured from north of the Green Line for bargain prices. Rather than acknowledge their economic collusion with the TRNC regime, Greek Cypriots rationalize their business practices through an inventive political interpretation in which the entire island and its resources are the legitimate possessions of the Republic of Cyprus and only temporarily and illegitimately occupied by Turkish Cypriots and Turks. (Papadakis, 2005) On this ground Greek Pyliotes contend that no nationalist allegiance or economic law is violated.

Conjuring ancient images obtained from Greece, and as Aristotle so aptly observed, the realm of the oikos, that of the economy – the household and the means of familial sustenance – is distinguishable from the official political institutions and the authorities that aim to impose their order in Pyla/Pile. The possibilities made available by the articulation of this distinction involve the separation of that which is defined as political from the rest of the world. The complicated processes and ways of living in Pyla/Pile that engage political practices in the management of the home and family suggest there has always been a world underneath the discourse, neither contained nor limited by it.

Even though both Greek and Turkish Cyprus claim the village, both present Pyla/Pile as an aberration because it contradicts their respective nationalist theories and the corresponding refutation of the other. The official position of the government of the Republic of Cyprus is that the north is an illegally occupied space and to engage in any trade practices with Turkish Cypriots from the north would lend credibility and economic benefit to an illegitimate regime. The Republic of Cyprus contends that the island should be reunited under renegotiated terms and with one central government. However, while

\textsuperscript{31} According to the Republic of Cyprus
Pyla/Pile would seem to provide appropriate evidence to support the Greek Cypriot aim of reconciliation, Pyliotes are cast as unpatriotic and traitorous to the national cause for their collusion with Pileliler prior to reunification. While fish restaurants catering to Greek Cypriots and the sale of inexpensive import goods from the north continue in Pyla/Pile, the official and popular stance of Greek Cypriots is that cross-boundary trade is “an act of illegal smuggling and national treachery”. (Papadakis, 2005, 216) Rather than portray Pyliotes and Pileliler as living examples of the compatibility and cooperation that can reunite Greek and Turkish Cyprus, in Greek Cypriot discourse the Pyliote is depicted as disloyal and aberrant by the politically right-leaning media of the Republic. The use of nationalism and ethnicity as grounds for inclusion/exclusion by the Greek Republic of Cyprus is contradictory to the endorsed party line of one-state reunification.

The collusion of Pileliler and Pyliotes in defiance of the trade embargo is also of concern for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus “given their claims that the two peoples could never live together or cooperate”. (Papadakis, 2005, 217) The Turkish Cypriot position is firmly rooted in a contention of ethnic incommensurability. Rather than advance a nationalist agenda for partition and independence, the Turkish Cypriot regime bases their demands for an autonomous state on the perceived inherent antagonism between the Byzantine and Ottoman peoples. The official and dominant Turkish Cypriot position utilizes the collapse of the bi-communal government due to the revocation of minority rights to support its argument of ethnic. In this narrative the Cyprus “conflict” was solved in 1974 with the establishment of the Green Line and the simultaneous creation of a separate Turkish Cypriot state. All that remains in this opinion is international recognition of the sovereignty of the TRNC. Media accounts in northern
Cyprus depict the cross-boundary trade in Pyla/Pile as crimes against the state and Pileliler are accused of “selling out their national soul for money”. (Papadakis, 2005, 216) Moreover, Turks in the north are economically isolated by the international embargo and are thus more likely to view the Pileliler collusion with Greek Cypriots as unfair and unpatriotic: the cross-boundary trade enjoyed by Pileliler and Pyliotes and the comparative economic prosperity of Pyla/Pile contribute to division ad animosity within the Turkish Cypriot population.

Society

In Pyla/Pile, the scope of the political is determined through dominant nationalisms, officially dichotomized as Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriots. However, the “contested character of the space of being political” as it moves through organic, municipal, national and imperial flows of social activism and identity are particularly observable in the bi-ethnic village of Pyla/Pile. (Isin, 2002, 111)

In a study by anthropologist Yiannis Papadakis (2005), social conditions in Pyla/Pile suggest that norms of neighbourliness and egalitarianism heavily influence processes of identity and membership in both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Pyla/Pile. As a Greek Cypriot scholar, Papadakis was approached first by Pyliotes who expressed their concern that he was a foreign Turk moving to the village. While the Pyliotes warmly accepted Papadakis on finding that he was in fact a Greek Cypriot they accompanied him on a tour of Pyla/Pile that was complete with description of all the ‘good’ Turkish neighbours. (Papadakis, 2005) While ethnicity is still the primary identifier among villagers in Pyla/Pile, it is also revealed as a somewhat superficial indicator, more valued
are the ethical and moral characteristics that cross ethnic lines and define neighbourliness and community values. (Papadakis, 2005)

During the time Papadakis spent in Pyla/Pile, he unearthed many subtle contradictions to and excesses of the official narrative based on a Greek-Turkish dichotomy in the practices of inclusion/exclusion that comprise civic life in the village. Rather than expect or request Papadakis’ partisan participation based on his Greek ethnicity, Greek Cypriot Pyliotes suggested to Papadakis that his value as both a neighbour and a Greek would be measured by his balanced patronage of both Pyliote and Pileliler establishments. (Papadakis, 2005) It turned out that the less aligned he was with a Greek or Turkish ethnic group and the less partisan he was in his alliances the more Papadakis was accepted as a virtuous Greek and valued community member by both Pyliotes and Pileliler alike. (Papadakis, 2005)

Dominant theories of alterity suggest that the antagonism between concrete groups necessitates representative, democratic majority rule in which minority protections are constitutionally defined and promoted. (Abizadeh, 2005) In this sense, the ‘minority’ status of non-majority groups is enshrined as a feature of multicultural or multinational culture and crystallizes the unequal relationship between a majority and its other(s). The processes of identity and belonging that arise from the unique social conditions in Pyla/Pile challenge the polarization that is generally expected between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. More akin to a Derridean notion of différance, the politics and practices of inclusion/exclusion in Pyla/Pile are more intricate than Greek/Turk and conceptions of the ‘other’ are shifting, multiple and internal to the observer. Rather than remain committed to partisan allegiances, both Pyliote and Pileliler communities privilege values
of civility, cooperation and respect as the basis for group membership and identification. (Papadakis, 2005)

One such practice of identity creation and inclusion/exclusion that occurs in Pyla/Pile delineates a comparably moderate, left leaning, younger generation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, respectively, from their more staunchly politically aligned, right wing parents and grandparents. Unlike previous generations of Cypriots, younger Pyliotes and Pileliler are more often aligned by communitarian interests and cooperative values than by Greek and Turkish nationalisms. (Papadakis, 2005) In spite of the extreme nationalisms that are played out along Greek and Turkish Cypriot lines, a modern, politically left-wing Turkish-Greek allegiance exists in the village. Young Pileliler take advantage of the extreme nationalism of their elders by mocking the Turkish soccer team loudly in the village cafés to the embarrassment of older, more patriotic Turkish Cypriots in hope of driving them away. Such performances of solidarity against nationalist division occur in both Greek and Turkish communities and seek to diminish the ethnic polarity between the communities. (Papadakis, 2005)

In this sense, the politics of Pyla/Pile have succeeded where those of the Republic of Cyprus have failed: in an attempt to discourage discord and create Cypriot unity the flag of the Republic of Cyprus was designed to be politically neutral.

No blue and red, the colours of the Greek and Turkish flag. No symbols of religion such as a cross or a crescent moon. Instead it was a yellowish map of Cyprus after the colour of copper, with a green bay laurel, drawing on the neutrality of nature rather than the potentially divisive symbols of Greek and Turkish cultures and religions. (Papadakis, 1997, 2)
While perhaps intended as a depoliticized rendition of Cyprus identity, since the division of the island the Republic of Cyprus has continued to exploit the political implications of the flag – those of the island forming one country – in order to reiterate its sovereign claim over the entire island. The TRNC has used similar imagery for political purposes on their official state website. Depicting the same geographical outline of the island, TRNC images animate only the north using the Green Line boundary while leaving the south blank articulating the Turkish Cypriot demand for partition and the presence of a political unit in northern Cyprus.

The politics of flag-waving have proven a major site of nationalist antagonism in Pyla/Pile, which has been significant enough to warrant UN instituted bylaws. The UN restrictions specifically monitor the flying of flags of the Republic of Cyprus and of the TRNC. Flags of other countries can be raised without issue, with the exception of the Greek and the Turkish – “one each of which is allowed to fly constantly at the two local primary schools, and in the rest of the village for only six days every year, three for each side on commemorations.” (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002, 91)

_Culture_

Beyond the expected Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot divide both Pyliotes and Pileliler are staunchly aligned with ancient imperial and ethnic lineages. Whereas the dominant political dichotomy presented in Cyprus would expect Pyliotes and Pileliler to align with the Greek Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, respectively, public demonstrations reveal much more complicated cultural nationalisms. Pyliotes/Pileliler much more deeply identify with ancient empires and their ‘mother countries’ than they do with the sovereign claims advanced by north and south Cyprus.
Exceeding national identification with a Greek or a Turkish Cypriot state, both the Greek and the Turkish dialect spoken in Pyla/Pile use a semantic term to refer to Greece or Turkey that translates as “motherland”: *mitera partidha* in Greek and *ana-vatan* in Turkish. Further, both Greece and Turkey have special terms with which they refer to Cyprus, *I mikri mas partidha*, or “our small land” in Greek and *yavru-vatan*, or “baby-land” in Turkish, reflecting primary allegiances to their perceived homelands. In this sense Pyla/Pile is a site in which Greek and Turkish aspirations of *enosis* and *taksim* are expressly promoted – even though both the union of Cyprus with Greece or of the TRNC with Turkey are violations of international expectations and are not publicly or officially endorsed by either regime.

Pyliotes identify with and invest their Greek nationalism in the ancient Kingdom of Macedon under the banner of which Alexander the Great unified the Greek empire and ruled most of the Greek-known world in the 3rd century B.C.E. In honour of this Hellenist accomplishment, the right-wing Greek café in Pyla/Pile (that caters exclusively to the Greek Cypriot community) is named *Macedonia* in tribute to the ancient kingdom and adorned in nationalist paraphernalia. The café was so named during a time of international demonstration by Greece opposing a fledgling country from the former Yugoslavia that wanted to call itself the Republic of Macedon. Greece was outraged by the self-identification of the former Yugoslav nation with the ancient Macedonian lineage and refuses any shared heritage. Internationally, the Greek protests were successful and the country has modified their country’s name to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedon to distinguish them ethnically from Hellenistic ancestry. In this case Greece used its formally equal (but more
fully developed) sovereign authority and established contribution to the international order to garner the support of the United Nations and insist that the Republic of Macedon to attach the politically and ethnically significant ‘Former Yugoslav’ prefix to its seat in the UN. (Papadakis, 2005)

In 1992 the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedon (FYROM) unveiled their new national flag to the further infuriation of Greece. (Papadakis, 2005) The flag was a reproduction of the ancient Vergina Sun, the symbol under which Alexander the Great unified the Macedonian Empire, which is popularly thought to signify the ‘birth’ of the Greek nation. (Papadakis, 2005) Somewhat ironically, despite Greek identification with the empire, while the contemporary Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is geographically within the ancient realm, the earlier Macedonian Empire excluded most of contemporary Greece, which fell further to the south than the empire’s control. Drawing from the international dispute, while Café Macedonia polarizes Greeks and their ‘other’ in Pyla/Pile, the object of their refutation is not specifically either Pileliler or Turkish Cypriots, but non-Greeks in general.

While the modern international system attempts to contain the Cyprus ‘conflict’ to one of competing sovereign claims, the political history of the Cypriot state has not been successful in either eclipsing or encompassing the ancient, ethnic, imperial nationalisms of the island. Sites of political identification in Pyla/Pile complicate the dualist state-base claims officially advanced by both Cypriots regimes.

**The Character of (Non)Modern Exceptionalism?**

Attempts to normalize the communal conditions in Pyla/Pile run into problems when we consider the difference between a state and a city – or in this case a village. If we
conceptualize Pyla/Pile as a series of connectors – an immanent, organic, fluid bunch of complicated and interwoven links within and between which multiple exchanges are performed – the goal sought by Derrida, that of Cities of Refuge, seeks to infuse the city with the sovereign condition of the state. (Derrida, 2001) If such theories seek to stabilize and make static the condition of the city – to legalize, institutionalize and dogmatize the flows of exchange that characterize it in its particulars – then the fixedness, the rigidity and the enforceability of power would mimic or reproduce the sovereign power of the state.

One primary assumption of the nation-state is that there must be one over-arching identity within a country to which all inhabitants adhere to and employ as their avenue to the state and its structure of power — state citizenship in the contemporary era. Once a person claims their citizenship there are democratic processes through which the citizen can make demands for their sub-ordinate second; third, fourth etc. associated identities often, but not limited to, ethnic, religious, gender-based or socio-economic positions. In contrast to the demand for an over-arching entity of belonging is the observation in Pyla/Pile that primary identities can ebb and expand: from individual, to community, town, trade, religion or continent. When Derrida asks for recognition of the City and new, as yet unimagined forms of sovereign power, he may have confused politics with a particular conception of it. (Magnusson, 2006) In terms of reproducing sovereignty in a different geographical and political unit, there is no reason to expect an outcome different than that evidenced in the play of state sovereignty.

Attempts to normalize and universalize the performance of political activity within the singular, static concept of citizen are reproductions of the sovereign logic that informs the
state and replicates its desire to isolate and fix the means, processes and ends of its power. Such a logic has no language with which to speak of its limitations and excesses, of ruptures and fluid communication and activity produced in the course of human life. Spontaneous flows and exchanges threaten the totalitarian logic of sovereignty and so are (politically) placed elsewhere. Yet, the outside of sovereign order must bear strong resemblances to that which it is not, and thus epitomize the absence of juridical rule.

Such theories of exception are built in the image of sovereignty and function as completely as its mirrored opposite, as part of the structure of power itself. The site of exception, whether its the camp or the body of the refugee, represents the full power of the sovereign in its included exclusion, the negative space of the sovereign itself. (Agamben, 1998) Categorically, this is the realm of the political, with the necessary included exclusion to map the full internal and internal-external realms, omitting nothing and leaving space for no other telling: in this story there is no outside. (Walker, 1993)

The inability of official discourse to articulate the experiences that occur within and between the multiple boundaries of Pyla/Pile offer a glimpse of the disconnection between the way the modern international must be – the stories that constitute, define and limit it – and the way the world is in multi-faceted relationships between people(s) and groups. Ways of being political other than those dominated by state-citizenship emerge organically, of necessity, or of convenience in areas of life that are unregulated by sovereign political power or are extraneous to its processes. Not unlike seismic tension and rupture, alternative practices and orders rise and fall as they become necessary and insofar as they are useful.
Pyla/Pile demonstrates the political connectivities that flow through realms that are officially considered social, economic and/or cultural, in terms other than those of state citizenship. Processes of individual and group identity are constituted amidst complex memberships and contradictory values. In the contemporary era, such complicated identities are expected. But, when examined against the backdrop of antagonistic nationalisms, Pyliotes and Pileliler shed light on the excesses and limitations of sovereign power, of the co-constitution of nation-state-territory and the ill-fit of state citizenship over the multiple ways of knowing and engaging that dominate political practices in Pyla/Pile. An analysis of Pyla/Pile makes evident its condition of possibility; while the UN had no hand in the formation of the bi-ethnic village, and the villagers themselves contributed towards their shared survival, one is left to wonder of the possibilities that exist for Pyla/Pile after the eventual withdraw of the UN: the village will find itself on one or the other side of at least one border.
Conclusions

Cyprus provides a useful example with which to survey the degree to which the language and logic of the modern international struggle to explain limitations and excesses of state sovereignty. Understanding Cyprus as a modern state involves accepting it as an equal, independent member of the international community, with supreme authority within its borders. As this thesis has demonstrated, there are numerous grounds upon which Cyprus’ status as a state of this kind can be challenged. More than an anomaly within the international system, Cyprus is an example of the limitations and excesses that exist within an order that theoretically refuses them.

Pulling the thread of a state – in this case Cyprus – from the system of states of which it is a part works to unravel and reveal the co-constitutive relationship that enables them, as each is both proof of and dependent on the existence of the other. Asking questions about how a thing can pre-exist the condition that is required for its existence leads to an investigation of the systems and structures of global order that preceded the modern era of states. In order to think about modern states as they are contemporarily understood we are required to consider the imperial powers that were involved in the creation of both the state and the modern international that both informs and is created by it.

As a result, there is a tendency to accept a theory of eras, in which historical periods are defined both temporarily and ontologically. The difficulty involved in a theory of political eras is that characters and systems of order are carried over from one to another. While there are most certainly ways in which the pre-modern, imperial era can be
distinguished from the practices of an era of modern states, the differences between them reflect changing dynamics and conditions without proving an ontological distinction.

The evolution of Cyprus from a colony to a country in the contexts of its regional and imperial histories and through negotiations between modern representations of imperial powers suggest that an internationalist discourse promoting a temporal and ontological ‘break’ between the imperial era and the modern might overstate the degree to which a rupture has occurred. This paper has intended to demonstrate that ‘modernity’ – as it is understood in relevant discourse – is authorized by a particular reading of the past. Rather than the dissolution of empires as a causal factor in the therefore necessary development of sovereign states, this story involves the decline of empires and the shift from direct colonial rule to the indirect administration of new countries coinciding with the development of international organizations and regimes that were largely able to contain any qualitative shifts of power or influence.

The Zurich and London conferences that preceded the establishment of independent Cyprus and the ongoing involvement of external powers over the island complicate its claims of modern statehood – in which conditions of recognizable authority over a particular territory constitute sovereignty.

The developmental logic that buttresses the modern system of states incorporates and indeed requires the inequality of ‘less developed’ states within a formally equal system. The inequities involved in formal equality are a necessary condition of the modern system. The end of the imperial era brought with it the beginning of an international organization – first in the League of Nations. Whereas states were considered formally equal, as required by a mutually recognized concept of sovereignty, the fledgling order
was ineffective due to a excess of equality. A similar condition existed in Cyprus, in the relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the bi-communal House of Representatives. Equal power between the communities resulted in political deadlock. The solution in the international order was the creation of the United Nations, a formally equal General Assembly with a very unequal Security Council to break the deadlock and make for effective decision making. In Cyprus the solution was governmental collapse and partition of the island. However, the impotency of actual qualitative equality has not been significant enough to warrant removing the assumption of equality from the international order, nor from related national processes of governance. The logical contradiction of more and less equal states is resolved through the ever-present possibility of political maturity of ‘underdeveloped’ states. Relationships between more and less equal states is reminiscent of the pre-state, imperial system in which underdeveloped sites were ruled by more developed powers.

The official story told about Cyprus in the dominant language of the modern international system contends that the island forms the sovereign Cypriot state and that the north is illegally occupied by Turkish Cypriots, with Turkish support. In contrast to the position taken by the TRNC, the international system interprets the self-declared Turkish state as a rival nation – rather than as an incompatible ethnicity. In the logic of the modern system the state is sufficient to contain multiple minority identities, and even nations, under the unifying banner of citizen. In Cyprus, historical and constitutional factors contributed towards the inadequacy of the Cypriot state and a Cypriot identity to contain Greek and Turkish antagonisms. Even while the Cypriot state has been divided
and monitored by a UN zone for decades, the international system continues to engage the Cypriot “conflict” as an internal matter.

There are ways in which the story in Cyprus can be read through rival sovereignties – Greek and Turkish – that are reinforced by internationalist attempts to reunite the country, like that of the UN Annan Plan. State-based approaches to Cyprus are confined to two oppositional interpretations of Cyprus: simply put, either a one or two state solution. The Green Line in Cyprus is a significant site for the production of a two-state concept, in that its physical existence generates a border, and such two distinct political spaces, even though it officially refutes one. The political implications of the Green Line are manifested in the self-declared TRNC that employs the Green Line as its border. While the UN and the states it represents refute the existence of the TRNC, they directly contribute to its condition of possibility. Boundaries in Cyprus are open to multiple readings that put into question the conventional accounts of what Cyprus must be as an international actor, and thus what it means to think about Cyprus as a site of conflict that might be solved by specifically international forms of peacekeeping and political action.

While this logic works in the international state system and its institutions like the UN, it fails to account for a myriad of identities, systems, communities, laws, jurisdictions and possibilities that occur in ways other than the Greek-Turk, or Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot dichotomy. In this sense, the practices and performances that create spheres of inclusion and exclusion in Cyprus are far more complicated than is presented in the simplified presentation of a state, even a divided one. This thesis has aimed to exemplify these practices and performances and consider their implications for the Cypriot state and the state/state system logic that sustains it.
While the retention of British military bases in Cyprus alone is sufficient to question the character of Cypriot sovereignty, the SBAs are also sites in which complex inclusions and exclusions are performed. Since Cyprus accepted British sovereignty over SBAs the Cypriots that live in those spaces are outside of the administrative, legal and democratic practices of their state government. As a result of Cypriots living inside British sovereign spaces in Cyprus, the SBAs bring into being a category of people who’s Cypriot citizenship rights are suspended by a sovereign of a foreign country. These practices in Cyprus are incompatible with the official story about citizenship and sovereignty, as well as the accepted condition of exceptionalism. Inclusions and exclusions in SBAs are complex and interwoven and have the affect of problematizing several central tenets of the logic of the modern international. In a similar sense as that in which the condition of Cypriot sovereignty continues to exist through the acknowledgement of the international system regardless of challenges to its logical claim, the international system continues to be authorized through processes of participation, while its claims are demonstrably more complicated than the official story suggests. In this way, the accepted co-constitution of the state and the state system is more necessary than the logical or consistent performance of either.

The rival sovereign claims that produce a Republic of Cyprus and a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are both playing within the accepted terms of the modern system. Whether solved through a one or two state solution, the dichotomized Cypriot ‘conflict’ plays by modern rules, in which both articulate claims to territorial sovereignty. While both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot factions tell this story in us-them, Greek-Turk terms, there are numerous sites and conditions in Cyprus of other identities. Cypriots
forming inter-ethnic allegiances and asserting rival imperial histories challenge the modern concept of citizen that tried, and failed, in bi-communal Cyprus and continues to be asserted by both the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC. One implication of identities and practices of belonging that are alternative to that of a ‘citizen’ observed in Cyprus are the correlating alternative sites of political life. Alternative ways and places of being political in Cyprus signify the difficulty the logic of the modern international has describing conditions that occur beyond its definition.

Once the condition of sovereign borders, authority and performance have been problematized, and the singular political identity of citizen has been challenged, the I-am-because-I-say-I-am character of the modern state and the modern state system is revealed. No less powerful for their lack of logical coherence, modern constructs and assumptions define and determine the possibilities of political life – and, as a result, of all life. While official stories are imbued with the power of the official, there remain multiple, overlapping, complex sites in which the political is so many ways other than what it is supposed to be.
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