

**Transnational Civil Society and the Dynamics of Alliance-Building:
Managing Inter-Group Conflicts among Socio-Economic Organizations**

by

Janel Elizabeth Smith
B.A., University of Toronto, 2004

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the potential and emerging roles of the Social Economy at the level of global governance by examining how transnational civil society (TCS) has organized in an attempt to influence global policy-making. One of this study's principal aims is to glean insights into the dynamics of civil society coalitions, gaining a better understanding of how they combine the collective knowledge, resources and strengths of members and drawing out some of the "best practices" and challenges inherent in past civil society alliances. This study seeks to explore the complex nature of the relationships that exist among civil society actors and the unique challenges such groups face in forming partnerships by examining these relationships through the lens of Inter-Group Conflict Theory. A Case Study of one TCS partnership, the Make Poverty History (MPH) campaign, is conducted and an Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis of MPH is carried out.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The beginning of the 21st century has been experienced through faster means of (tele)communication, trade and the movements of peoples across the globe connecting people and places in ways never before imagined. Against this backdrop a vast range of new political, economic and social actors have emerged and continue to flourish giving rise to unique patterns of transnational, or “global”, communication, networking and mobilization as they seek to influence the scope and direction of global politics and events. This has been accompanied by the (re)emergence of multiple threats to *human security*,¹ ranging from international terrorism to “global” climate change and the rapid spread of new diseases. We live in a period characterized by the pervasiveness of both inter and intra-state conflict, persistent abject poverty, increasing “global” economic inequalities and the growing resurgence of national, cultural and religious fundamentalisms. Furthermore, the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States has seen an intensification of state-centric unilateralism, the (re)establishment of the “security state” and the increased integration of civil-military responses to political-humanitarian crises.

Within this increasingly complex international environment, the recent rise of interest in alternative forms of governance and economic organization, such as the Social Economy² (SE), can be traced to the perceived failure of existing “global” political and economic institutions to provide minimum acceptable levels of political, economic and social well-being to people around the globe. In part this trend is due to the necessity of finding ways to address human needs that are not currently being fulfilled, but it is also caused by the existence of new opportunities for engagement with policymakers at all levels of governance. Increasingly,

¹ See: <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.php> for more information on the concept of human security.

² For a more detailed discussion and definition of the Social Economy see What is the Social Economy? below.

policies are “forged at supranational levels, either within inter-governmental bodies – such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank ... To influence policy it is now necessary, rather than merely prudent, to act at those international levels and coordinate advocacy across relevant countries”, (Clark 2003, 1). A number of theorists now argue that international institutions (IIs), such as the United Nations (UN), Group of Eight (G8) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have become outdated and are ill-equipped to effectively address the myriad of complex issues currently confronting the international system (Carin & Smith 2004; English 2005; Slaughter 2004; Zürn 2004). Within this context, transnational (global) networks³ and coalitions⁴ of non-state actors often referred to collectively as transnational or “global” civil society has risen up as an increasingly important actor in seeking to address some of the contemporary challenges associated with governing at the “global” level.

One of the central purposes of this study is to begin to investigate the potential and emerging roles of the Social Economy at the level of global governance by examining how transnational civil society (TCS) has organized in an attempt to influence global policy-making. To date, many approaches to the study of TCS have been driven more by a normative desire to “carve out” a space for civil society in international policy-making fora and to garner support for the issues and principles advocated by the civil society actors than by critical analyses of the complex relationships that exist between civil society actors themselves. This study, therefore, seeks to explore the nature of the relationships that exist among civil society actors and the

³ Networks describe the intersections and interconnections “weaving” or “linking” a collection of autonomous organizations together that behave as a singular larger entity in certain areas using social mechanisms for coordination and control. Networks can be structured both “vertically” and “horizontally”.

⁴ Coalitions are understood as the “union” or “grouping together” of autonomous “like-minded” groups into a larger whole, perhaps diverse in geographic location, structure, outputs, process, composition, size, overarching objectives/mandate/area of focus etc., that choose to join together in support of the achievement of a specific set of goals, commitments and outcomes.

unique challenges such groups face in forming partnerships and alliances⁵ by examining these relationships through the lens of Alternative Dispute Resolution and, more specifically, Inter-Group Conflict Theory.

Specifically, this research proceeds by conducting a case study analysis of a multi-stakeholder, transnational civil society partnership, the Make Poverty History (MPH) campaign, with regard to exploring what it can tell us about the nature of transnational civil society and alliance-building.⁶ This study looks to develop a deeper knowledge of the factors that are particularly relevant in the organizational design, coordination and governance of civil society partnerships as well as document several “best-practices” drawn from the case study. This work addresses the question of *how* stronger relationships between members of civil society alliances⁷ might be developed that will enable TCS partnerships to more effectively confront newly (re)emerging challenges of the 21st century. It does this by interviewing several central coordinators of the campaign, analyzing print documents produced by MPH and evaluating MPH against a number of variables that influence the outbreak of inter-group conflicts⁸. This includes an investigation of the processes, if any, that were in place within the partnership to help mitigate and manage internal conflicts. Due to the fact that the central coordinators of MPH were located in the United Kingdom (UK), a detailed consideration and analysis of the ability of members

⁵ The terms civil society alliances and partnerships are used interchangeably within the scope of the study to describe the more formal establishment and agreement of networks and coalitions to work together in order to actively achieve a particular set of aims and objectives and that agree to the “pooling” of resources, skills and expertise.

⁶ Within the study the term transnational civil society (TCS) is used to denote the activities of multinational civil society actors who seek to engage in international advocacy and activism. The term global civil society (GCS) is also commonly used to refer to civil society at the level of international policy-making. The term TCS is preferred within the scope of this study because it encompasses civil society actors operating at both the “global” and “local” level and, thus, enables a consideration of activism that takes place at the two levels of analysis that both affects and is affected by decisions taken nationally and within international policy-making arenas.

⁷ For a more detailed definition of civil society in the context of the study see the section below called: Who is Transnational Civil Society?

⁸ Inter-group conflict and Inter-Group Conflict Theory are explored in greater depth in Chapter 3: Approaches to Framing the Research.

from the “South” to effectively participate and achieve more equitable representation within transnational partnerships is not provided.

1.1 What is Alternative Dispute Resolution?

Fundamentally, the term Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is used to describe the field of dispute (conflict)⁹ resolution (management) that focuses on resolving conflict through a wide variety of processes other than litigation (Goss 1995, 2). Over the past half century interest in the study of alternative methods of dispute resolution has grown enormously. Today entire academic programs and disciplines are directed toward the study of conflict management and dispute resolution and a multitude of creative alternative methods for resolving and studying conflict exist. While authors in the field differ with regard to where they locate the exact origins of ADR, they all agree that its beginnings are closely connected to a perceived need to reform aspects of the judicial system. These perspectives range from viewpoints that see an interest in ADR growing out of initial attempts to engage in labor mediation and arbitration in the early 20th century to the legal reform movement of the 1960s in the United States that sought to improve the efficiency and costliness of the courts and offer alternatives to the judicial system (Mayer 2004, 159; Goss 1995, 2).

As a concept, conflict has been defined and understood in a number of ways according to various schools of thought, although those who study and practice conflict resolution do not necessarily “fit” into or even wholly subscribe to these schools. They are useful, however, for beginning to think about the multitude of different perspectives that exist on conflict. The Functional school sees conflict as largely serving a social function or purpose. Situationalists see

⁹ Some authors differentiate between the terms conflict and dispute. They see disputes as manifest conflicts in which the issues in conflict are identified, the parties known and the particularities of the conflict understood by those involved (See: Chicanot and Sloan 2003 for more). For the purposes of this study, however, the terms conflict and dispute are used interchangeably to refer to conflicts that are latent, emerging and manifest.

conflict as being caused by certain conditions that generate incompatible goals and values among different parties. Meanwhile, the Interactionists believe conflict to be largely interactive, based in the interactions of interdependent people(s) who perceive their goals incompatible. Finally, Objectivists assert that if certain events, behaviors and situations exist then conflict will inevitably ensue regardless of what people might think (Tidwell 1998, 32-34).

Many “sources” of conflict have also been identified in the literature. These can be loosely grouped together around three “levels” or “dimensions” of conflict: material-structural, communicative-relational and symbolic (LeBaron 2003, 111) and include a number of “sources” such as data, interests, procedures, values, relationships, roles and communication among others (Moore 2003, 64-65; Isenhardt and Spangle 2000, 14-15). There is also a number of conflict “styles” that people adopt in responding to conflict. The following five are the most commonly cited ways that people and groups approach conflict: avoidance, accommodation, compromise, competition and collaboration (Chicanot and Sloan 2003; Isenhardt and Spangle 2000).

Inter-group conflict examines a number of factors that influence the interactions and the ability of different groups to work together in a variety of settings. This includes exploring the role of power dynamics, inter-cultural factors, different belief systems, political and economic views/motivations and access to resources on how groups work together, communicate, make decisions and determine policy. Inter-Group Conflict Theory states that when handled constructively inter-group differences can be a rich and dynamic environment for learning, creativity and positive change to take place. At worst, however, these differences manifest into intractable and often violent disputes. Given the high costs of competitive and antagonistic inter-

group interactions, it is important to search for ways to better understand, and more effectively manage and resolve inter-group conflict.¹⁰

1.2 Who is Transnational Civil Society?

Transnational Civil Society, as it is referred to throughout this study, is understood to encompass both “global” and “local” actors, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), interest groups, unions, protestors/demonstrators, religious/faith groups, co-operatives, voluntary associations and individual citizens. According to The London School of Economics Global Civil Society (GCS) Yearbook it is “the sphere of ideas, values, organisations, networks, and individuals located primarily outside the institutional complexes of family, market, and state, and beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies”, (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2003). Some general characteristics of transnational civil society can be delineated from the above statement so that TCS can be understood to comprise organizations **(1)** whose primary purpose is not profit accumulation, **(2)** that operate autonomously and outside the confines of the private and public sectors and **(3)** that transgress political, social and economic boundaries and geographic borders.

Despite these broad categories, however, Sherri Torjman argues that “there is no clear statement as to what ‘civil society’ actually means”, (Torjman 1997, 1). According to Torjman, “a civil society interprets very broadly the concept of resources to include – but move well beyond – the notion of public dollars. Second, a civil society encourages the creation of partnerships and collaborative working arrangements to achieve its objectives. Finally, a civil society understands the connection between the dots; it addresses issues in an holistic and integrated way”, (Torjman 1997, 1). Transnational civil society can, thus, be further defined by **(4)** the principles of inclusiveness, participatory and collaborative governance mechanisms, **(5)**

¹⁰ Inter-group Conflict Theory is explored in greater depth in Chapter 3: Approaches to Framing the Research.

the notion of the delivery and provision of public goods and (6) a belief in the interconnectedness of the issues and issue-areas in which it addresses.

This vision of TCS is connected to the Social Economy through its emphasis on the “interrelationships among various aspects of human well-being. The satisfaction of economic needs requires a strong social base which promotes social well-being: the satisfaction of social needs, in turn, requires a solid economic base”, (Torjman 1997, 10). This involves the activities of multiple stakeholders from diverse national and cultural backgrounds specifically representing the “North” and the “South” as well as the “local” and the “global” and affecting individuals and groups at all levels of governance. Accordingly, TCS is well placed to deliver some of the central goals and objectives of the Social Economy as a framework for governance and socio-economic development and enterprise.

1.3 What is the Social Economy (SE)?

The Social Economy has been variously defined in the literature. In this study the SE is defined in terms of a “third sector” as “that spectrum of activity located between the public and private sector It is economic activity which has social impact, and as such embodies the principle of placing social viability on a par with economic viability, social sustainability being equal to economic sustainability and the two being interdependent”, (Mullen and Cox 2000). It is unique in that “although organizations in the social economy are engaged in economic activity, they are distinguished from those in the other two sectors by the emphasis on their social mission”, (Mook, Quarter and Richmond 2007, 4). The Social Economy comprises a range of different organizational entities from the community, voluntary and social sectors. These groups “share a common aim of seeking to meet needs and pursue mutual or public interests without focusing on return of capital”, (Macneil and Ward 2005, 1). This includes, but is not limited to,

cooperatives, credit unions, micro-credit and “grass-roots” enterprises, non-profit organizations, civil society and social movements, mutuals and the ethical financing and purchasing movement (Starr 2006; Lans 2005; Macneil and Ward 2005; Ninacs 2002). The Social Economy is, therefore, one means of conceptualizing and framing the activities of TCS as it proposes alternative models of governance, economic enterprise and development to those currently expressed by dominant neo-liberal paradigms.

The idea of a social economy that functions alongside a private market economy and government is not a new phenomenon. In fact, the “ancient” origins of the SE can be traced back to Egyptian corporations, the funds for the ritual organization of funeral services in Greece and the Roman colleges of craftsmen and later to the 9th century Germanic and Anglo-Saxon guilds and the 11th century confraternities (Moulaert and Ailenei 2005, 2039). The emergence of modern-day conceptions of the Social Economy, however, lie in the 19th century appearance of collective forms of organization and enterprise such as the historic birth of the worker’s movement and the co-operative and mutualist movements (Neamtan 2002, 3).¹¹ As a multifaceted concept, the SE continues to both shape and be shaped by changing political, social and economic conditions around the globe. Therefore, much like the nature of the international environment in which global policy-making currently takes place, the study of socio-economic groups and partnerships in the context of global governance is a complex, dynamic and evolving process.

In their work, Frank Moulaert and Oana Ailenei trace the recent (re)emergence of interest in the study of the Social Economy to a contemporary “period of crisis” in which the Social Economy is viewed as a way to respond to “the alienation and non-satisfaction of needs by the

¹¹ For a detailed overview of the evolution of the SE see: Moulaert and Ailenei 2005; Bouchard et al 2006; Monzón Campos 1997.

traditional private sector or the public sector in times of socioeconomic crisis”, (Moulaert and Ailenei 2005, 2041). Particularly since the second World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil in February 2002, where the Social Economy and Solidarity were central themes, the SE has received increased attention globally as a movement and vision of alternative globalization and governance (Neamtan 2002, 2). At its most fundamental level, the SE is based in creating new strategies that are more just, equitable and responsive to the broader needs of society and not solely a privileged minority. It is the “rise of an alternative economy” that is “composed of co-operatives and NGOs working on small projects for community economic development, ethical business initiatives ... ethical financing and new co-operative forms of finance such as multi-stakeholder co-operatives”, (Lans 2005, 5). This roots the Social Economy in principles of participation, empowerment and individual and collective responsibility.

At the level of global governance the Social Economy can be viewed as representing a kind of third “space”, “sector” or “system”, a sphere of activity that is separate from the market and government, yet encompasses traits of each, in which social and human concerns are placed at the centre of theory and practice. Indeed, some of the central or foundational principles and structural elements of the SE outlined in the literature clearly emphasize its independence from both the state and market economy. These include: **(1)** that the objectives of the SE are to serve its members and the community rather than to accumulate profit, **(2)** that the SE functions autonomously, **(3)** that it is based in, and works to uphold, democratic decision-making and governance and **(4)** that its activities are committed to empowerment, participation and collective responsibility (Neamtan 2002, 3).

At the transnational level these foundational principles of the SE can also be extended to **(1)** the exclusion of “for-profit” multinational corporations and IIs such as the UN, G8, IMF or

World Bank and (2) the inclusion of services and activities that address “social need”, particularly that of marginalized, excluded and “at risk” groups, at all levels of governance and located in all parts of the globe. Viewed through this lens, transnational civil society partnerships represent one of the “global” Social Economy’s principal actors in carrying out the overarching vision of the SE. This situates the activities of MPH firmly within the scope of the Social Economy and highlights this study’s significance not only with regard to transnational civil society alliances but also with respect to other socio-economic forms of partnership.

Ultimately, in the context of studying TCS, the label of the Social Economy is used to denote the socio-political *and* socio-economic impacts of the activities of the members and organizations that comprise TCS. It is a “bridging concept for organizations that have social objectives or generate some economic value through the services they provide and purchases that they undertake. The term *social economy* puts up front the economic value of social organizations – that they produce and market services, employ people, may own valuable assets, and generate social value”, (Mook, Quarter and Richmond 2007, 17). It challenges the dominant discourse that equates “economic” activity with purely the private (market) sector through its assertion that actors of the Social Economy contribute “capital” and other inputs both directly and indirectly toward the achievement of socio-political well-being and the realization of objectives that have political, social and economic resonance. The SE is a movement of “social transformation ... a movement of strategy and of action, aimed at deployment into the heart of a mixed economy that combines the activities of the market, the State and civil society. ... we aim to support local, collective enterprise, while at the same time attacking certain ‘inherent truths’ and ‘inevitable realities’ of the neo-liberal economy”, (Neamtan 2002, 4). The SE is, therefore, about the integration of social, political and economic (both formal and informal) issues in which

its actors, including TCS, work to uphold and “defend” collective interests and participatory (democratic) governance and seek to build alternative models for social, political and economic development.

1.4 Why is this Study Significant?

Despite the fact that transnational civil society is a central actor of the Social Economy, this area of inquiry remains largely under-explored in the literature on the SE. This study is significant not only in its contribution to the literature that exists on TCS, but also in the development of a deeper understanding of the place of TCS within the SE and for this study’s potential to increase the visibility and potential influence of the SE in global governance. It further adds to the existing body of knowledge regarding the building of transnational alliances and linkages within the Social Economy. This research also represents an important and original addition to the literature on TCS partnerships and alliance-building through its interdisciplinary focus and unique framework of analysis in which to study the complex dynamics of TCS partnerships.

There is currently relatively little literature that explores TCS through the lens of ADR and its potential to enhance collaboration and cohesion-building among members of TCS alliances through conflict analysis, management and transformation. Using the framework of Inter-Group Conflict Theory, an exploration of the processes involved in transnational civil society alliance-building can be conducted and a better understanding of how to comprehend and manage these inter-group interactions can be developed. The documentation of several of the “best-practices” of existing transnational partnerships can be utilized by TCS in future efforts to build partnerships and engage policy-makers at the “local” and “global” level.

To date, there is a shortage of in-depth, critical analyses that focus specifically on the dynamics of transnational civil society and alliance-building. Instead, the majority of studies concentrate on the ability of civil society to engage in dialogue with IIs, to achieve goals and objectives through action and advocacy and on TCS as a concept rather than the questions of transnational solidarity and alliance-building (McFarlane 2006; Kiely 2005; Florini and Simmons 2000).¹² In fact, “relatively few analysts have looked at the networks linking civil society organizations across territorial boundaries”, (Florini and Simmons 2000, 4). The ways in which civil society has attempted to increase its presence in numerous international fora, through consultation, accreditation, active campaigning, lobbying and shadow reporting has been well documented. Likewise, much of the existing body of research “examines how activists develop and promote ideas and international norms to change the policies and practices of governments, intergovernmental organizations, corporations, and civil society”, (Price 2003, 583). What has been less-well examined, however, is the internal dynamics taking place within the organizational forms that TCS adopts in order to create various alliances.

There are numerous examples where civil society has proactively worked to consolidate itself via the formation of transnational networks, forums, coalitions and consortiums. Through these groupings, members of civil society have worked to increase their legitimacy, influence and access to the international system with varied success. These civil society linkages vary in size, geographic location, and length of membership, organizational lifespan, resources, complexity and objectives but are characterized by their common commitment to work together and collaborate in order to achieve specific goals and objectives.

¹² Some noteworthy examples of researchers who have addressed this topic include: DeMars 2005; Tarrow 2005; Price 2003; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002; Florini 2001.

Several key factors currently impede civil society's ability to integrate and consolidate on a wider, systematic and global scale. Among these are challenges relating to representation, legitimacy, accountability, leadership and decision-making. For example, the sheer number and diversity of civil society organizations, persistent "local"/"global" disparities, and concerns over the use of "celebrity" creates significant obstacles to collaboration that often overwhelms the capacity of civil society to form partnerships (Demars 2005; Price 2003). Moreover, while there is an abundance of literature devoted toward the subject of for-profit mergers and acquisitions, far less attention has been dedicated to the study of organizational and governance issues that are specific to civil society partnerships and other socio-economic forms of alliance-building.

On the one hand such entities must strive to meet many of the operational and structural goals of for-profit organizations, such as enhancing efficiency and effectiveness, output or performance maximization, maintaining legitimacy and a sense of cohesiveness. They also face many of the for-profit sector's challenges including inter-organizational competitiveness, resource and power imbalances, enhancing or obtaining "market" share, adapting to change, providing procedural transparency, accountability and ethical management. On the other hand, unlike profit-oriented businesses, alliances among socio-economic organizations must balance aspirations such as goal achievement against the necessity of upholding the foundational principles upon which these alliances are based. This results in a set of unique challenges in building and sustaining socio-economic partnerships. There is a need to enter into greater exploration of the internal dynamics and operational mechanisms of civil society partnerships and to provide a more detailed and comprehensive picture of the factors that both make possible and inhibit TCS from building stronger alliances. Such a framework can, ultimately, be used by

TCS and other Social Economy partnerships in the future to overcome internal disputes and develop cohesive agendas for action.

In terms of this study's specific significance to the case study, Make Poverty History (MPH), the research adds depth to previously commissioned studies that have sought to evaluate the coalition across a number of different aspects both external and internal to the campaign.¹³ Most notably, the *Make Poverty History 2005 Campaign Evaluation* by Firetail Limited devotes an entire section toward "Internal ways of working" as well as outlines several "Lessons Learned". The *Evaluation* does allude several times to "internal tensions", "processes and structures that hindered effective decision-making", "failure to resolve tension" and that "disagreements were avoided or not effectively dealt with", (Martin, Culey and Evans 2005, 67-81). Ultimately, however, it provides more of an overall survey of what factors coalition members felt influenced and impacted the effectiveness and outcomes of the campaign, rather than a detailed and specific analysis of tensions that arose within the campaign and the variables that influenced and instigated conflict. By taking as its primary area of focus those aspects of the campaign that specifically led to the outbreak of inter-group conflicts, this study is able to delve deeply into the internal dynamics of MPH and offer recommendations and processes for managing and resolving conflict more effectively in future TCS alliances.

1.5 What are the Objectives of this Study?

As mentioned, one of this study's principal aims is to draw together key insights into the dynamics of alliance-building among transnational civil society partnerships. The research also endeavors to gain a better understanding of how such entities combine the collective knowledge, resources and strengths of members as well as draw out some of the complexities and challenges inherent in a variety of models of civil society aggregation. This includes an examination of the

¹³ To read some of these evaluations visit: <http://www.bond.org.uk/campaign/mph.htm>

different characteristics that civil society partnerships exhibit in terms of decision-making and organizational structure, developing leadership and governance mechanisms, and consolidating the diverse knowledge, viewpoints, resources, identities, ideologies and values of members. Specific reference is made to any explicit (formal) or implicit (informal) dispute resolution and conflict management mechanisms that are used within the civil society partnership under investigation that assist in mitigating internal conflicts. Finally, the research makes recommendations regarding the use of several dispute resolution processes and how factors that led to the emergence of inter-group conflicts might be managed more effectively in the future.

The outcomes of this study include: **(1)** developing a framework from which to gain a better understanding of the challenges and barriers experienced by TCS partnerships in working to achieve a “voice” for TCS in international institutions, **(2)** advancing research on TCS and socio-economic alliance-building, **(3)** highlighting and promoting the utility of Dispute Resolution as a framework of analysis, which enables an exploration of structural, communicative-relational and symbolic dynamics of TCS and other socio-economic partnerships and **(4)** elucidating the role of dispute resolution processes in enhancing collaboration and cohesion-building among members of civil society partnerships through conflict analysis, management and transformation.

1.6 What Assumptions are made in the Research?

Several assumptions were made at the outset of this study that helped to frame and define the scope of the research. These are assumptions about **(1)** the nature of the international environment in which TCS operates, **(2)** the ontological and epistemological basis for acquiring knowledge and conducting research and **(3)** the ability of Dispute Resolution to contribute positively to our understanding of transnational civil society partnerships. Regarding the nature

of the global policy-making environment, three central arguments are made that act as “drivers” of the research and help build the foundation upon which to engage in this study. These are: (1) that the processes commonly referred to as “globalization” are accelerating, (2) that IIs in their current form have largely failed to provide adequate levels of well-being to peoples around the globe and (3) that TCS has, and continues to, grow both in terms of the number of actors that comprise it and its impact on global governance. Each of these foundational arguments is examined in more significant detail in Chapter 2.

In terms of the ontological and epistemological attitudes toward knowledge that are adopted in this study, *Social Constructivism* best describes the views adopted with regard to acquiring knowledge and conducting research. That is, the philosophical claims about knowledge and the theoretical framework of Inter-Group Conflict Theory used in this study denote a way of understanding the world that asserts that “reality” and meaning-making are not solely the products of “knowing” an objective world but are based more in social interactions and socially constructed ways of making meaning. It is, therefore, assumed that the outbreak of conflict within groups is rooted largely in human interaction, the different belief systems, ways of “knowing” and (mis)perceptions humans hold as well as social, political, economic, cultural and historical factors that impact on these interactions. Chapter 3 explores approaches to framing the research, the theoretical constructs and assumptions about knowledge that I make throughout this study.

Finally, it is assumed that insights into the complexities, challenges and “best practices” of TCS partnerships can be developed by conducting an Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis. It is believed that the different conflict variables used to measure and evaluate the case study are pertinent to the experiences of members and will help to draw out alliance-building

dynamics among the groups that might otherwise be overlooked or under-explored using another framework of analysis. I further assume that in choosing to engage in this study that the research findings and assessment will be useful and constructive in aiding members of transnational civil society to organize, overcome internal disputes and develop cohesive social-change initiatives in the future. It is this assumption that is the central notion framing, defining and driving the scope of the research forward.

1.7 How is this Study Organized?

This study proceeds by adopting a (Social) Constructivist and Inter-Group Conflict Theory approach to the study of TCS partnerships and the dynamics of alliance-building. Qualitative methods of inquiry are used as the methodological tools in which to carry out this study and a Case Study method is adopted. An Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis of MPH is conducted. This analysis involves interrogating the case study through the lens of Inter-Group Conflict Theory, in order to examine the dynamics taking place within the case study, to draw out “best practices” and to develop a set of key considerations and recommendations for future TCS partnerships. Using Inter-Group Conflict Theory enables a range of different factors that influence the outbreak of conflict as well as a number of types of conflict to be brought into the case study analysis. This includes: identity-based conflict (LeBaron 2003; Redekop 2002; Rothman and Olson 2001; Lederach 1997) and organizational theory and structurally-based conflict (Jesse and Williams 2005; Eagly, Baron and Hamilton 2004; Hodge, Anthony and Gales 2003; Hogg and Terry 2001).

Subsequent chapters of this study are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of literature on TCS partnerships and presents a rationale for undertaking this study that forms the foundation for inquiry. Chapter 3 delineates a conceptual theoretical framework for

approaching this research. The framework is then applied in Chapter 4 to describe the specific methodology, the strategies of inquiry and methods of data collection that inform this research. The specific process used for collecting the research data and a framework for analyzing the data collected are provided in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis of Make Poverty History is carried out using the framework outlined in Chapter 5. Chapter 7 offers several “best practices”, or recommendations, based on the results of the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis of MPH that may enable future TCS alliances and other socio-economic partnerships to more effectively mitigate, manage and resolve inter-group conflicts.

Chapter 2: A Review of Literature Building the Foundation for Inquiry

The purpose of this chapter is to address some of the principal issues and central concepts found in the literature surrounding TCS and alliance-building. It is intended to provide an interdisciplinary perspective into some of the ways that TCS has been investigated in order to set out the rationale for this study and build the foundation for inquiry. Based on this foundation the argument is put forth for the importance and necessity of exploring alternative socio-economic and political mechanisms for global governance to those currently expressed under “neo-liberal” and state-centric paradigms. A range of literature from a wide variety of disciplines has been surveyed in order to provide a meta-level analysis of the literature and call attention to some of the contrasting and complementary perspectives and viewpoints that currently exist in the field of research. Specifically, the review of literature focuses on: (1) the impacts of accelerated globalization, (2) the “crisis of legitimacy” in IIs, (3) the rise of TCS, (4) factors influencing the agency of TCS and (5) the organizational structures adopted by TCS.

2.1 Accelerated Globalization:

In 1962 Marshall McLuhan first coined the term the “global village” writing that “the new electronic interdependence recreates the world in the image of a global village”, (McLuhan, 1962). In many ways today we now occupy the “global village” that McLuhan prophesized would come into existence almost half a century ago. At the beginning of the 21st century rapid changes in areas such as trade, technology and communication have connected humans to events occurring all across the globe. Human beings have become increasingly (inter)connected by the forces of what has commonly been called *globalization*. Regarding globalization’s impacts and influence on global governance, David Held and Anthony McGrew write that “any discussion of

global governance must start with an understanding of the changing fabric of international society. Woven into this are the complex processes known as globalization”, (Held and McGrew 2002, 1). Therefore, in order to fully comprehend and understand the implications of the processes associated with accelerated globalization on governing at the global level, we must begin with a consideration of the debates surrounding contemporary globalization.

A multitude of perspectives on globalization currently exist, as theorists have sought to develop frameworks that comprehend, capture, and account for, the economic, social and political dynamics of globalization. Attempting to come to a definitive characterization of contemporary “global” processes has proven difficult however. Many dominant globalization frameworks share certain commonalities in terms of their overarching premises, yet differ in the specificity of the factors in which they choose to focus their analyses. Some scholars point to the homogenizing effects of particular “global” processes that they see causing a decline in the relevance and authority of the nation-state (Strange 2003) and the “Westernization” of contemporary society (O’Loughlin, Staeheli and Greenberg, 2004). Others posit that a series of increasingly interconnected networks have been produced by a compression of past space-time constraints that are the result of new technologies, which position technological innovations at the center of transnational networks, connecting the component parts into a complex system (Castells 1996). Similarly, Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert Keohane define contemporary globalization in terms of the “thickness of globalism – the density of networks of interdependence” in which these “relationships of interdependence intersect more deeply at more points”, (Nye Jr. and Keohane 2004, 195).

Ultimately then, regardless of whether they view contemporary globalization as an outcome of “modernity”, not yet fully realized, or simply as a continuation of modernization

(Scholte 2005; Nye Jr. and Keohane 2004; Giddens 2003; Beck 2002; Held and McGrew 2002), today, most globalization theorists account for some degree of “transnational” or “global” interconnectedness and interdependence that spans transnational distances and spaces. Jan Aart Scholte writes that “if conceived as the growth of transplanetary – and more specifically supraterritorial – spaces, then globalization has unfolded mainly since the mid-twentieth century. Although transworld relations are not entirely novel, the pace and scale of their expansion has become qualitatively greater over the past five decades”, (Scholte 2005, 101). Therefore, although globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon, most authors agree that the scope and pace of processes associated with globalization have intensified over the last half century and are continuing to grow exponentially at an unprecedented rate of acceleration.

While many theorists agree that globalization is a multidimensional process that does not necessarily imply universality or equity, they remain pre-occupied with events occurring at the “macro” or “global” level of analysis at the expense of a consideration of “micro”, “local” level issues. Thus, despite the fact that these theoretical frameworks conceptualize globalization in diverse ways, they are bound together by their common exclusion of the “local”. Likewise, those who do attempt to question what is exclusively “global” about globalization through the notion of “glocalization”, the interaction and mutual reinforcement of the “local” and the “global”, often overlook how “global” processes tend to “overwhelm the local”, (Ritzer 2004, xiii). Contemporary accelerated forms of globalization are thus as much about an internal, “in-here” set of processes as they are about external, “out-there” phenomena. It influences the most “intimate and personal aspects of our lives. The debate about family values, for example, that is going on in many countries might seem far removed from globalising influences. It isn’t.

Traditional family systems are becoming transformed, or are under strain in many parts of the world, particularly as women stake claim to greater equality”, (Giddens 2002, 12).

These internal-external debates are further complicated in sites of “public-private” exchange and changes in the character of the economic landscape that has resulted in the “feminization of migration” and the establishment of “transcontinental female networks”, (Hochschild 2003, 17 and 20). Theorists who support this line of thinking argue that traditional accounts of “global” migration tend to obscure and overlook the historical and social contexts of colonialism and imperialism upon which current global migratory flows are playing out that have privileged colonizer over colonized, “First World/North” over “Third World/South”. These theorists posit that inequalities follow racial, gender and class-based lines, enabling women (primarily from the global “North”), for example, who have gained access to the formal economy to buy the domestic services of other women in order to meet both their “productive” responsibilities in the formal sector and “reproductive” responsibilities in the informal sector (Gottfield 2004; Hochschild 2003).

Such omissions fail to develop a comprehensive picture of the breadth and scope of globalization processes through their emphasis on the disjuncture and separateness of the “global” and the “local”, external and internal as opposed to focusing on the (inter)linkages between the categories and concepts. Moreover, there is a tendency to think about the world and “global” economic, political and social systems as inevitably “globalizing” and evolving, a view that sees globalization as a singular entity or process that must be “managed” and “controlled” (Held and McGrew 2003; Giddens 2002).

The protests against international institutions such as, the UN, G8, IMF and the World Bank can be seen as direct evidence of mass discontent with the ways that contemporary

accelerated forms of globalization are playing out. Indeed, anti-globalization movements are often associated with the rise of a “transnational” or “global” civil society. As Held notes “in the last few years mass protests have confronted the summits of all of the major global and regional organizations, including those of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the G8 (the G7 plus Russia), the European Union and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). These have often been led by what has been called the global anti-capitalist or the anti-globalization movement”, (Held 2004, 2). Ultimately, while most agree that globalization generates a degree of increasing interconnectedness, it does not automatically result in the creation of a common set of experiences, beliefs or values. Accelerated globalization has, however, left almost no one and nowhere untouched by its reach and continues with increasing immediacy to raise questions over how such “global” phenomena are, and should be, governed.

2.2 The “Crisis of Legitimacy” in International Institutions (IIs):

The causes and consequences of today’s concerns often involve a set of highly complex and interrelated factors, necessitating a fundamental re-consideration of the traditional role and purpose of international institutions. A central tenet of this system lies in the paradox between a general consensus on the increasing complexity of “global” issues, on the one hand, and the deadlock that persists over how best to confront these new concerns on the other. These “contemporary debates underline profound disagreements on two core issues: (1) who should govern at the international level and how: and (2) what they should govern”, (Woods 2002, 26). The increasing number and diversity of institutions, actors and issues that are “global” in cause and effect have significantly altered the configuration and degree of state power and authority causing global governance to become an increasingly more complex and volatile process.

Critics of the current international system and the ways in which contemporary global processes are playing out across the globe have also accused international institutions of structuring their operations in ways that most benefit their affluent members and non-governmental partners, namely business (Baker and Chandler 2005; Woods 2002).

Cumulatively, this has come to be known as the “crisis of legitimacy” in international institutions. John English writes that:

The system of global governance is under serious challenge. The UN, the G7/8, the IMF and the World Bank are but a handful of the organizations contributing to what has become a crisis of legitimacy for an international system that appears ill-suited for timely, innovative and effective solutions to contemporary global challenges. Moreover, it is a system that made sense mainly for the post-Second World War era, but sixty years later seems ill-equipped for bridging the growing political and economic divides between North and South and accommodating the needs of the big, emergent markets (English 2005).

For their part, Lester Salamon, Helmut Anheier and Associates term this phenomenon a “widespread ‘crisis of the state’ that has been underway for two decades or more in virtually every part of the world”, (Salamon, Anheier and Associates 1999, 4). They continue that this “crisis” has “manifested itself in a serious questioning of traditional social welfare policies in much of the developed North, in disappointments over the progress of state-led development in significant parts of the developing South, in the collapse of the experiment in state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe”, (Salamon, Anheier and Associates 1999, 4).

Evidence of a “crisis of legitimacy” can also be seen in the increase in the direct public action campaigns that have been launched in and around meetings of major international institutions (Carin and Smith 2005; Held 2004). There are a number of different theories that seek to account for the current challenges and criticisms facing international institutions.

According to Held, challenges to the administration of “global” governance stem from the development of two “regulatory gaps” that weaken political institutions. The first is a jurisdictional gap, “which is the discrepancy between national, separate units of policy-making

and a regionalized and globalized world, giving rise to the problem of externalities such as market volatility or the degradation of the global commons, the problem of who is responsible for them and how they can be held to account”, (Held 2004, 90). The second is an incentive gap that describes “the challenge posed by the fact that, in the absence of any supranational entity to regulate the supply of global public goods, many states and non-state actors will seek to free ride and/or lack sufficient motivation to find durable solutions to pressing transnational problems”, (Held 2004, 90).

Power imbalances and resource inequalities are also viewed by theorists as prominent factors driving the “crisis of legitimacy” forward. These challenges are rooted in deficits of accountability, representation and regulation and expressed by “the inability of these agencies to mount collective problem-solving solutions faced with disagreement over means, objectives, costs and so on”, (Held 2004, 95). For his part Johan Galtung argues that these challenges are related to the “unacceptability” of states to function as the only major actors in a global democracy. He writes that “the sum of state democracies is not necessarily global democracy: the world system is still feudal/hierarchic-anarchic with excess military and political power being held by the ‘big powers’”, (Galtung 2000, 145). In many cases the challenges in the relationships between state and non-state actors and developed and developing countries are both quantitative and qualitative. Therefore, simply “having a seat at the negotiating table does not ensure effective representation. For even if there is parity of formal representation, it is often the case that developed countries have large delegations equipped with extensive negotiating and technical expertise, while poorer developing countries often depend on one-person delegations”, (Held 2004, 96).

Despite the formal rules and regulations of many international institutions that give the appearance of democratic governance and structural equality, in practice many of these organizations fail to live up to and abide by the rules and regulations that they have adopted. In the WTO, for example, despite the fact that consensus decision-making and majority voting are preferred on paper, in actual practice “negotiations are organized strategically by the more economically powerful countries Unfortunately, Green Room tactics have continued as Third World government negotiators are overwhelmed by the array of lawyers representing the United States, Europe, and others G-8 powers in the multiple negotiations that make up the WTO’s ongoing agenda”, (Dawkins 2003, 37). In order to be considered “legitimate” in the future, international institutions must seek to find ways to be more representative and accountable to the members involved in them. In addition, there must be arrangements in place to engage in more open and transparent dialogue and consultation, taking into account significant power imbalances that are the result of structural inequalities.

Perhaps the most evident recent challenge to the “legitimacy” of IIs has been posed by the events of September 11th (9/11) and the ensuing “War on Terror” that has followed in its wake. Critics have pointed to the decision of the US to preemptively launch an attack on Iraq in February 2003 without the consent of the UN as evidence of the “erosion” of the international governance order and the symbolic “breakdown” of governance within the United Nations which it represented (Falk 2005; Held 2005; Kaldor 2005). In the aftermath of 9/11 the international policy-making community could have decided “it was important that no single power or group should act as judge, jury and executioner. They could have decided that global hotspots like the Israeli/Palestinian conflict which feed global terrorism should be the main priority for coordinated international efforts”, (Held 2005, 18). Instead, “they have systematically failed to

decide any of these things. Since 9/11, the world has become more polarized, international law has become weaker, and the systematic political failings of the Washington Consensus have been compounded by the triumphs of new Washington security doctrines”, (Held 2005, 18). The events surrounding 9/11 point convincingly to the need to reconsider the existing structures, practices and responses of IIs to contemporary global concerns and the challenges associated with setting both international and national-level security agendas.

2.3 The Rise of TCS:

Recent decades have witnessed an unprecedented rise in the impact and prevalence of transnational civil society organizations that seek to influence policy and incite change in international institutions. These “forces from global civil society have tackled both the legitimacy and efficiency gaps found in the embedded international system head-on ... these groups criticize the institutions for not meeting the demands that are made of them with respect to rapid, substantive and equitable action by the people on the ground”, (Cooper and English 2005, 2). Through consultation, accreditation, active campaigning, lobbying, norms-creation, protest and shadow reporting civil society has attempted to increase its presence and influence in numerous international fora. Despite the diversity of ways in which TCS is comprehended and the variety of partnerships that TCS adopts, there are several common features, or reasons, provided in the literature as to why we should be interested in TCS. These include: **(1)** the growing recognition of the importance of civil society, **(2)** the unique organizational characteristics TCS exhibits, separating it from “for-profit” sector enterprise, **(3)** the increasing tendency of civil society to work with non-traditional partners, **(4)** a rise in the questioning of its supposed advantages and **(5)** the increasing “transnationality” of civil society operations and

alliances (Clark 2003; Lister 2003; Florini 2000; Salamon, Anheier and Associates 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

In recent decades scholars from a number of fields of international research have devoted greater attention toward extending theories of international relations and global governance to take account of the proliferation of civil society movements and the involvement of these actors in multiple tiers of governance at the local, national and international level (Clark 2003, 2000; Lister 2003; Florini 2000; Salamon, Anheier and Associates 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998). It has now become commonplace to speak of the imminent or recent birth of a transnational civil society that will challenge the “undemocratic” practices of international governmental organizations such as the UN, WTO, IMF, World Bank and G8 (DeMars 2005; Salamon, Sokolowski & Associates 2004; Taylor 2004; Clark 2003; Kaldor 2003; Price 2003; Florini 1999).

The term was first taken up by the social movements that developed after 1968 that were concerned with issues of peace, women’s and human rights and the environment (Falk 2005, 71). In the 1990s this notion of an emerging TCS took on a new dimension with the emergence of transnational networks of civil society actors who came together not only around particular issues but also gathered at international events and meetings in a show of transnational solidarity. Anthony Giddens notes that in “late 1998, the anti-globalisation movement had barely got going. Since that date, many thousands of demonstrators opposing globalisation have taken to the streets, in cities ranging from Seattle to Buenos Aires, Gothenburg and Genoa”, (Giddens 2002, xi). This framing, or positing, of TCS as an evolving reality can be understood as a means of describing the intensification of long-term trends that are giving rise to the greater prominence of TCS actors and activities. It also involves prescribing a global future of increasingly active and

effective transnational forms of civil society association and action. Therefore, even though the notion of TCS is not entirely a new phenomenon, the recent rise of TCS in terms of sheer numbers, its presence at international policy-making fora and its use of global policy as a platform for advocacy has caused it to occupy a significant space in recent literature addressing international governance in the 21st century.

In part these perceived advantages are due to the unique organizational characteristics that civil society groups possess that separates them from “for-profit” enterprise. According to Falk, TCS refers to that “field of action and thought occupied by individual and collective citizen initiatives of a voluntary, non-profit character both within states and transnationally”, (Falk 2000, 163). They are “responses, in part at least, to certain globalizing tendencies that are perceived to be partially or totally adverse. At present, most of the global provocation is associated directly or indirectly with market forces and the discipline of regional and global capital”, (Falk 2000, 163). In particular, this includes that civil society is institutionally separate from the state and for-profit business, it is not-profit distributing, it does not return profits to a set of “owners” and that it is primarily voluntary in the sense that membership in civil society is not legally required nor do many actors involved receive monetary compensation for their time and contribution (Salamon, Anheier and Associates 1999, 3-4). TCS is, thus, viewed as working to revolutionize the environment and structures in which global governance takes place through demands for the development of more equitable and accountable political, economic and social policy and greater participation and transparency in governance.

Some scholars argue that we are currently witnessing “nothing less than a historical reversal of the post-Westphalian trend to increasingly concentrate power in the hands of states; so much in fact that ‘increasingly, NGOs are able to push around even the largest governments’”,

(Baker and Chandler 2005, 3). From this perspective the emergence and evolution of TCS is viewed as an outcome of global events and processes that both enable and incite the activities of civil society. This roots TCS in both “globalization from above” as well as “globalization from below” and locates its strength in the intersectionalities and networks that have formed between “global” and “locally”-based civil society actors enabling them to bring pressure to bear on local and national governments as well as global governance regimes. More recently “a rather different community of NGOs is now also becoming increasingly involved in the debate and implementation of global governance. More ‘locally based’ NGOs, predominantly in developing countries, are being drawn into the fray. These groups claim to represent local constituencies”, (Woods 2002, 28). Activities taking place within “globalization from below” are intended to “challenge and transform the negative features of globalization-from-above, both by providing alternative ideological and political space to that currently occupied by market-oriented and statist outlooks and by offering resistances to the excesses and distortions that can be properly attributed to economic and cultural globalization in its current phase”, (Falk 2000, 164). By acting and drawing on networks at both the “global” and “local” levels civil society actors seek to make evident on an international scale government corruption, the absence of governmental capacity, accountability and transparency mechanisms, and their inability or unwillingness to deliver key services and assistance to those in need.

Among scholars studying the phenomenon of a TCS it is also seen as creating a space for political emancipation and participation, therefore, functioning as both an outcome *and* as an agent of global interconnectedness. Kaldor writes that “whether we are talking about isolated dissidents in repressive regimes, landless labourers in Central America or Asia ... or third world debt ... what has changed are the opportunities for linking up with other like-minded groups in

different parts of the world, and for addressing demands not just to the state but to global institutions and other states”, (Kaldor 2003, 2). TCS plays a role “in monitoring global governance, analysing and reporting on issues as diverse as the Chemical Weapons Treaty, negotiations on global climate change, world trade, and the actions of the IMF and World Bank. In doing so, these transnational NGOs open up information, debate and criticism which can play an important role in holding both private and governmental sectors to account”, (Woods 2002, 27). TCS expands the sphere of active public engagement at both the “local” and “global” level, resulting in an enhanced sense of self-awareness and organization outside of formal political processes.

The events of 9/11, however, (re)created political, economic and social realities that further complicate the emergence and evolution of TCS. On the one hand, the presence of millions marching against the Iraq War in hundreds of cities and towns around the world on 15 February 2003 represented the ability of a networked TCS to bring together diverse peoples around a common vision on an unprecedented scale. However, the failure of this public outpouring to dissuade the actions of the US and prevent the war suggests “both the robust reality of global civil society, and its current weaknesses as a challenge to geopolitical prerogatives at least in the area of war and peace. At minimum these developments, complicated and still taking shape, call our attention to the changing role of global civil society under differing world conditions”, (Falk 2005, 76). Similarly, Omar G. Encarnación argues that the events surrounding 9/11 have paradoxically signaled both a simultaneous surge and retraction in TCS. He writes that:

at first glance, these tragic events appear to have been a boon for many segments of civil society. Church attendance, for one, rose significantly in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, as Americans and others turned to religious institutions for solace in the midst of chaos and help in comprehending the incomprehensible. ... The long-term picture for civil society both at home and abroad, however, is less sanguine. Arguably, the most notable impact of 9/11 in connection with the decline of civil society is the

dramatic manner in which this event has resuscitated government, historically civil society's principal nemesis (Encarnación 2003).

In the end, despite the challenges associated with the (re)emergence of state-centricity and the prevalence of a security agenda in light of the events associated with September 11th the idea of a TCS still seems as relevant as ever. It is also clear, however, that the global political environment has changed and will continue to change in the foreseeable future as global processes accelerate and intensify in ways that are both enabling and disabling to TCS.

2.4 Factors Influencing the Agency of TCS:

In evaluating TCS partnerships a number of factors have been found to influence their success and ability to effectively carry out their mandate. The factors examined in the literature can be grouped into the following issue-areas: **(1)** Legitimacy and Credibility, **(2)** Leadership, Inclusiveness and Decision-making, **(3)** The Role and Importance of Social Capital, **(4)** Funding, and **(5)** The Role of Information and Information Technology (IT) (Richter, Berking and Müller-Schmid 2006; Chandler 2005; Kaldor 2005; Muck 2004; Clark 2003; Florini 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

One area that has been found to impact the success and proliferation of TCS is the general perception among the public that TCS offers greater legitimacy and credibility and is somehow more accountable and representative to its constituents than government and international institutions (Richter, Berking and Müller-Schmid 2006; Chandler 2005; Kaldor 2005; Florini 2000). Ann Florini asserts that the recent growth of civil society “reflects the fact that over the past few decades, the whole idea of civil society has taken on greater legitimacy among the general public in most parts of the world, leading not only to acceptance of its right to speak but also to an ever-larger pool of potential recruits”, (Florini 2000, 219). She continues that “there are several bases on which transnational civil society claims the right to do what it

does. The most common are superior knowledge, delegation, and representativeness. Knowledge claims appear in many of the case studies”, (Florini 2000, 233).

TCS actors gain credibility by being perceived of as providers of trustworthy knowledge and alternate sources of more reliable information than that provided by “self-interested” government and big business. With respect to credibility, Clark asserts that “many CSO networks gain credibility because of internal discipline, enforcing high standards of governance and ethics on their members”, (Clark 2003, 17). Similarly, Keck and Sikkink write that “information flows in advocacy networks provide not only facts but testimony – stories told by people whose lives have been affected. Moreover, activists interpret facts and testimony, usually framing issues simply, in terms of right and wrong, because their purpose is to persuade people and stimulate them to act”, (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). They continue, however, that “to be credible, the information produced by networks must be reliable and well documented. To gain attention, the information must be timely and dramatic. Sometimes these multiple goals of information politics conflict, but both credibility and drama seem to be essential components of a strategy aimed at persuading publics and policymakers to change their minds”, (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). Therefore, to a certain extent the success of TCS alliances depends on their perceived legitimacy and credibility and their ability to mobilize and affect public opinion.

The literature addressing issues of accountability and representation broadly connects these elements to the larger objective of a group’s (or alliance’s) ability to confer legitimacy. Florini writes that “perhaps the trickiest basis for claiming legitimacy is representativeness. This is, after all, the basis of legitimacy of elected governments, which are expected to comply with widely recognized standards for holding free, fair, and regular elections to ensure that government officials who fail to represent the wishes of their constituents can be removed by

those constituents”, (Florini 2000, 234). One of the central issues with respect to representation and accountability in TCS, however, is the question of measurement. Laurie Mook, Jack Quarter and Betty Jane Richmond call attention to both (1) the unique challenges of accurately measuring accountability, whether socio-economic, non-profit enterprises are meeting their economic, social and political objectives and (2) the relative absence of methods and literature that address this topic (Mook, Quarter and Richmond 2002). They propose the use of the concept “social accounting” in order to better measure the contribution and ability of various socio-economic groups, including civil society, to live up to its stated values and provide a means of measuring accountability.

The topics of leadership, inclusiveness and decision-making are addressed in the literature with respect to the types of relational, or inter-relational, connections and structures that link various actors of TCS alliances together (Clark 2003; Melucci 1996). It is leadership that promotes the pursuit of goals, develops strategies and leads in formulating an identity for the alliance. In order to be effective in influencing policy, TCS alliances “need clear and strong leadership ensuring concerted advocacy. These needs can be contradictory. Strong leadership is often resented by member CSOs [Civil Society Organizations], who may feel eclipsed. The latter may prefer their networks to share information and coordinate activities, but not *direct* anything”, (Clark 2003, 19). Strong leadership must, therefore, be balanced by decision-making procedures that are endorsed by members, are considered equitable and foster a sense of inclusiveness. Clark highlights seven principles of decision-making delineated by Amnesty International (2000) that most TCS alliances should subscribe to in order to satisfy these conditions. The seven factors are: “empowerment; participation/inclusion; transparency; accountability; cohesion; effectiveness; and direction/prioritization”, (Clark 2003, 19).

Ultimately, “leaders are the agents of mobilization of a movement and the promoters of its organizational structure. Therefore they are more than ordinary members exposed to the risk of having to pay high costs for their commitment ... leadership is a rare commodity, and its creation and further development depend on the operational conditions of the movement”, (Melucci 1996, 335).

Social capital is understood as the norms of civic and civil engagement that foster collective action (Prakash and Selle 2004). The evidence emerging from the literature that connects it to the success or failure of TCS partnerships indicates that alliances with an active and engaged membership that possess high levels of internal trust, reciprocity and social solidarity are able to overcome collective action problems (Muck 2004; Prakash and Selle 2004; Restakis and Lindquist 2001; Putnam 1996). The rationale behind the integration of TCS with respect to enhancing social capital follows the logic “that an extensive network of horizontal civic associations can foster norms of trust and communal reciprocity. These norms of reciprocity allow a community to overcome collective action problems and in turn, generate better economic and political outcomes”, (Muck 2004, 321). In the best of circumstances, “civil society is believed to be a wellspring of trust – of social capital – that can be mobilized to solve problems that communities face. It is this willingness to work together, to balance collective and individual interests, that is said to make governments and other institutions solve collective needs”, (O’Loughlin, Staeheli and Greenberg 2004, 17).

In terms of financing TCS alliances there are a number of different types and sources of funding. These can “loosely” be grouped into three broad categories: **(1)** private giving, including donations from individuals and corporations and grants from foundations, **(2)** government subsidy, including outright grants (direct government subsidies given to civil society

groups in support of their programs), contract (payments made by public agencies for services delivered to eligible recipients of certain government programs) and reimbursements (payments to eligible recipients of government programs who purchase services) and (3) inter-sectoral transfers of funds, usually from “Northern” organizations to partners in the “South” and can be unconditional or conditional (Wang 2006; Keane 2005; Florini 2000). Regarding the role of IT in TCS alliances, in recent years the transfer of information and enhanced communication among TCS alliances via a range of information technology vehicles has grown significantly. Originally, “working mainly on the grass-roots level, NGOs have taken advantage of the emerging ICT [information and communication technology] revolution to form networks of similarly minded NGOs all over the world”, (Hedley 2002, 21). Furthermore, “provided that there is *some* Internet connection, information can be passed along. ... In other words, not all people need to have direct access to the Internet in order to benefit from it. Because of this, international NGO networks have become effective global clearing-houses of information on all aspects of development throughout the world”, (Hedley 2002, 22). This has facilitated a dense web of exchange, aided principally by the internet but also greater access to telephone and fax communication. These technologies have enhanced the ability of TCS alliances to use information as a tool to influence public opinion and policy makers through greater access to information and the means to disseminate it more broadly (Florini 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

As the study of TCS has gained in popularity, there has also been an increased questioning of its supposed advantages. There currently exist several key factors impeding civil society’s ability to integrate and consolidate on a wider, systematic and global scale. Analyses of TCS have emphasized the multifaceted nature of the challenges that civil society faces, ranging

from (1) “North”/“South”, “global”/“local” relations and (2) questions of legitimacy, accountability and representation to (3) internal power imbalances and (4) financing campaigns and movements (McFarlane 2006; Richter, Berking and Müller-Schmid 2006; DeMars 2005; Kiely 2005; Clark 2003; Encarnación 2003; Lister 2003; Price 2003; Hudock 1999).

There are many politics surrounding the issue of “North”/“South”, “global”/“local” relations between TCS alliances. One area where significant debate has arisen has to do with arguments that civil society is inherently a “Western” or “Northern” idea and, therefore, irrelevant to the needs and aspirations of people in the “South” (Kiely 2005; Lister 2003; Hudock 1999). In this sense TCS can be seen as both “oppressive” and “exploitive” in claiming to represent the “voices” of people around the globe. “North”/“South”, “global”/“local” differences can be “macro-political, due to very different analysis of these issues, or micro-political, concerning the governance, culture, and leadership of the network. They can also be meso-political, concerning the structure of civil society”, (Clark 2003, 26). Therefore, issues surrounding “North”/“South”, “global”/“local” relations complicate the politics of forming alliances among TCS.

While perceptions of TCS legitimacy and credibility are considered strengths of TCS alliances, they are also a source of significant challenge for TCS groups seeking to form partnerships with other organizations. One challenge in creating solidarity within TCS alliances involves a consideration of the multitude of underlying motivations that groups may have for becoming involved in an alliance and whose motives get prioritized or vocalized within the alliance (Richter, Berking and Müller-Schmid 2006; Kiely 2005). Telling, too, is the onslaught of criticism that has been leveled against NGOs, which in the eyes of many are the principal actors of civil society. A recent “flurry of studies accuses them of fostering the very ills they are

meant to alleviate: authoritarian behavior, corruption, and lack of accountability. In light of this sorry state of affairs, many who once embraced civil society as a new paradigm of doing politics and conceptualizing a democratic society have begun to distance themselves from the concept”, (Encarnación 2003).

Furthermore, few TCS alliances have developed accountability mechanisms. Many practitioners are concerned that, while professionalization of TCSNs [Transnational Civil Society Networks] can enhance advocacy effectiveness, this may be at the expense of widening gaps between national – and local-level activists, and between activists at national and international levels”, (Clark 2003, 18). Another related challenge is the lack of obvious means for holding TCS accountable. Florini explains: “governments that fail to represent their citizens can be voted out of office in democracies, or overturned. ... This is a real problem, but one that is easily, and frequently, exaggerated. All civil society advocacy stands or falls on the persuasiveness of the information it provides”, (Florini 2000, 234).

Finally, with regard to representation, issues surrounding who is represented within TCS alliances play a part in bringing about accusations of TCS illegitimacy. Generally speaking, “contentions about the illegitimacy of transnational civil society focus on allegations that the coalitions claim to be representing the poor and downtrodden of the world, largely in the South, but are made up primarily of the relatively wealthy and educated and espouse Northern, not global, values”, (Florini 2000, 234). As a result, challenges arise with regard to the perceptions and beliefs held about who and what is represented by TCS as well as the implicit and/or explicit power imbalances that may underlie and perpetuate these assumptions.

The literature on power relations calls attention to the challenges of managing TCS partnerships due to resource differentials between members and the limits of TCS’s ability to

influence the policies adopted by states and international institutions (Hedley 2002; Florini 2000; Hudock 1999). Knowledge, ideas, discourses, politics, and practices within TCS partnerships are constituted and sustained through conditions, dynamics and relations of power and control. Therefore, “groups that possess in relative abundance attributes and resources deemed crucial and valuable to social systems, and who consequently have the capacity or ability for control, may overtly institutionalize their power by deploying control mechanisms, strategies, procedures, and systems that regulate activity and behavior within predictable, desirable limits”, (Hedley 2002, 76). Internal power balances within TCS alliances are, thus, significantly impacted by resource inequalities.

According to conventional wisdom, funding does not constitute a problem for civil society, however, in practice this is not the case. It is widely believed that charitable contributions from such sources as foundation grants, corporate gifts, and individual giving are “so plentiful in Western countries that they can not only sustain civil society at home, but also support the growth of civil society in other parts of the world. Hence, civil society has no need to turn to funding sources that could compromise its organizational autonomy. Unfortunately, this pervasive myth has no factual base”, (Wang 2006, 4). Currently, “the way most NGOs seek and receive resources from their external environments subjects them to external control and leaves them unable to contribute to the process of civil society development by empowering people to voice their own needs and to make claims on government to meet those needs”, (Hudock 1999, 2). Furthermore, project funding and administrative requirements tend to be for the short-term and require onerous reporting of expenditures and results. This can overwhelm the capacity of civil society groups and alliances as they are forced to spend their time accounting for and

reporting on the use of funds, rather than working to achieve goals and objectives (Mook, Quarter and Richmond 2002; Hudock 1999).

2.5 Organizational Structures Adopted by TCS:

TCS is comprised of a number of different organizations at the local, national and international level. Though the specific individuals and groups included in a conception of TCS varies according to different authors, the actors that have been included under the rubric of TCS in the past has ranged from sports teams and clubs, neighborhood and community associations, churches and other faith-based groups to professional groupings and unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and mass public protest and social movements (Kaldor 2003; Clark 2003; Lister 2003; Florini 2000; Salamon, Anheier and Associates 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). John Clark writes that “civil society comprises organizations (that may or may not have legal recognition) and less tangible institutions such as neighborliness, clan loyalty, or the tradition of free speech. ... Civil society also includes new organizational forms such as the ‘dot causes’ – the web-mediated associations to promote specific political interests”, (Clark 2003, 93).

Other methods of defining civil society have been based on “categorizing” or “classifying” groups according to whom they serve and the means by which they attempt to achieve goals and objectives. First, this includes groups that are “primarily member-serving organizations, including sports clubs, choral societies, business and professional associations, labor unions, and mutual-aid and cooperative organizations”, (Wang 2006, 9). A second category is “public-serving organizations, including a variety of funding intermediaries and a wide range of educational organizations, service providers, social welfare agencies, and advocacy groups. These organizations are mostly established to provide services for people who are not their members”, (Wang 2006, 9). Yet another way that civil society has been classified is by those

organizations that seek to engage in dialogue and are invited to work with government and international institutions and, conversely, those that operate externally and/or aim to dismantle them (Richter, Berking and Müller-Schmid 2006, 14). Civil society groups have, therefore, been defined according to their organizational “form”, the type of service(s) they provide and the scope and focus of their work and advocacy.

With regard to building alliances, a number of authors have focused on developing a picture of the factors that both influence and impact the decision of TCS organizations to consolidate. Eric Schragge describes the benefits of forming TCS alliances writing that “even if the primary mandate of an organization is service provision or development, it does not mean that there is no space to participate in other activities. The most effective way to do this is through participation in alliances ... Alliances contribute to the creation of a base of social power and have the potential of allowing individual organizations to go beyond their specific interests and problems to raise common concerns”, (Schragge 2003, 136). According to Jane Arsenault three central factors seem to inspire civil society organizations to consider consolidation. These are: **(1)** where survival as an autonomous unit is in doubt and an organization’s leadership wishes to see all or some of its activities survive, **(2)** the organization’s leadership sees an opportunity to build dominance or leadership in a particular area and **(3)** the organization needs additional resources to pursue an opportunity or maintain/increase a commitment (Arsenault 1998, 4). Other factors of consideration in the decision to consolidate and/or integrate activities includes cost-effectiveness, trust, an evaluation of outcomes or enhanced productivity, quality assurance, investments in information technology, a history of collaboration, social impact, an increased dependence on funding, adaptability and outreach (Arsenault 1998; McLaughlin 1998).

Models of Transnational (Global) Aggregation:

There has been some preliminary work that attempts to develop classification systems for civil society aggregation based upon structure, operational environment, function and area of policy focus (Tarrow 2005; Clark 2003; Maxwell 2003; Florini 2000; Arsenault 1998). For the most part, however, this area of inquiry remains under-explored in the literature. In part this is “because there is no easy, one-size-fits-all measure for determining which of the thousands of clamoring voices are pursuing noble goals No one model serves for all of transnational civil society, just as no one model serves for all of the private sector”, (Florini 2000, 237). In his work, Clark characterizes a number of forms of TCS organization based upon a number of variables including modes of decision-making, leadership, communication, governance (transparency, accountability, representation), motivations for participation, nature of outside partnerships and fixity or clarity of strategies formed (Clark 2003, 5-6). He describes three broad forms that define the spectrum of TCS aggregation, each of which can be subdivided: international civil society organizations (CSOs), CSO networks and social movements (Clark 2003, 4-5). Similarly, Simon Maxwell has catalogued different groupings of civil society by “naming” different models of organization according to structural and operational qualities they possess (Maxwell 2003, 1-3). For his part, Sidney Tarrow has developed a typology of transnational coalitions (Tarrow 2005, 166-179).

What is clear from the literature is that TCS has adopted a variety of organizational forms. At one extreme, TCS groups are composed of complex, “top-down” (vertical) and formal governance processes, membership is closed or restricted to “like” members and a set of focused, results-oriented objectives are established. At the other end of the spectrum are “like-minded” groups, connected through “loose”, informal and horizontal governance structures and broad, dialogue-oriented mandates intended to enhance relationships, facilitate the flow of information

and increase inter-linkages among members. Accordingly, these organizations range from (1) singular organizations managed by international boards and executive bodies, to (2) “matrix” or “franchise” organizations with chapters in multiple countries, to more amorphous structures such as (3) multi-stakeholder networks, (4) transnational coalitions, (5) social movements, and (6) social forums (Clark 2003; Maxwell 2003; Florini and Simmons 2000; Borgatti 2001).

In singular models the structure of decision-making and governance tends to be highly centralized and vertical (hierarchical). Major decisions are reached at the highest levels of management in international boards or executive bodies. Policies are implemented by global secretariats or head-offices, there is a global hierarchy of leadership and staff accountability. Accountability measures are clearly defined up the “chain-of-command”, though they can be “vague” or limited solely to key stakeholders or clients, therefore, sacrificing the overall transparency of the organization (Clark 2003, 6). Maxwell terms these types of groups the “Microsoft” model of organization in that all of its members are “exactly the same”, (Maxwell 2003, 2). Ultimately, Maxwell rejects the efficacy of this model on both intellectual and moral grounds, questioning the authority, effectiveness and legitimacy of such an entity. He writes that it “would be a very bad model for us because that kind of hegemonic, dominating, monopolist of ideas is probably a bad idea intellectually”, (Maxwell 2003, 2).

Organizations following Maxwell’s next model, the “Franchise”, essentially function like a “matrix” network, composed of a number of essentially identical or homogenous “nodes” who each hold more-or-less equal decision-making power (Maxwell 2003, 2). They are characterized by a number of international chapters that are “locally” owned and linked together by a set of common operational rules, objectives and/or services provided by the organization (Florini and Simmons 2000). Stephen Borgatti defines these networks as “a collection of autonomous firms

or units that behave as a single larger entity”, (Borgatti 2001). Furthermore, he notes that “matrix” structures tend to facilitate the efficient use of resources, knowledge and expertise at the cost of potentially increasing power conflicts and impeding decision-making (Borgatti 1996). All “Franchises” essentially look and function in the same way and deliver identical services/products. Governance and decision-making structures are cooperative but clearly defined. These organizations are committed to achieving the same overarching goals and agree to operate in the same way in order to achieve them, thereby, sacrificing some degree of autonomy to the centralized functions of the “Franchise”, (Maxwell 2003; Borgatti 1996).

Multi-stakeholder Networks are “loose” alliances made up of a diverse grouping of “like-minded” but autonomous members. They provide a focal point for knowledge-sharing, common interest representation, global institution-building and engagement (Florini 2000; Florini and Simmons 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998). These networks “may have international boards and secretariats, but most power and implementation capacity remains with the CSO members”, (Clark 2003, 4). Networks can be single-purpose, “as in a particular development project or policy negotiation, or multipurpose, perhaps involving a wide collection of government agencies or campaigning objectives”, (McFarlane 2006, 37). International CSO networks are generally defined through negotiation or dialogue among members, horizontal and cooperative-based structures with multiple leadership by a small grouping of core activists or members (Clark 2003, 5-6).

Transnational coalitions are similar to transnational networks. Tarrow differentiates them, however, writing that “the concept of networks is useful for mapping where the potential for coalition formation will be found, but if networks can be either purposive, structural, or both, we need a more precise term to help us to understand when purposive connections will form, under

what circumstances they endure, and when they cohere into sustained social movements”, (Tarrow 2005, 164). Coalitions can form around both short and long-term threats and/or opportunities. In Tarrow’s typology there are four principal forms of transnational coalition-building. The most basic type are **(1)** instrumental coalitions, the combination of short-term cooperation with low levels of member involvement. Groups come together around similar interests or commonalities of purpose but drift apart or maintain only minimum ties after the issue that brought them together has ended. **(2)** Event coalitions are also short term in duration but involve a higher degree of member involvement with the potential for future collaboration. **(3)** Federated coalitions combine low involvement of their members, as their central commitments remain with their individual organizations, with longer term collaboration. Finally, **(4)** campaign coalitions combine high intensity of involvement with long-term cooperation. Generally, they form around a single or single group of issues that are expected to be long-term in duration to meet the goals and objectives of the coalition (Tarrow 2005, 167-168).

Social Movements are “amorphous and fluid groupings of activists, CSOs and supporters in which the bonds are common grievances or convictions, and shared goals for societal and policy change (rather than structure). They connect people with causes through developing communities of interest around shared conditions”, (Clark 2003, 4). Transnational Social Movements are a subset of social movements operating across two or more states (Smith 1997, 42). Transnationally, social movements are “not just for sharing ideas and building solidarity but also for forging collective energy and a globally coherent strategy around shared social change goals”, (Clark 2003, 5). These social movements can be ad-hoc or formal in their structure, they are generally characterized by high transparency and tend to support reflecting rather than

representing a mass public mood, opinion or perception (Clark 2003; Smith 1997; Smith, Chatfield and Panucco 1997).

Another form of TCS organization is Social Forums. Characterized by their plurality and diversity, “social forums” are unique in that they are intended to be both non-deliberative and non-policy oriented. Social Forums develop “loose” or broad-based operational synergies and thematic activities but do not possess a defined set of concise policy objectives or campaign goals. They are almost entirely dialogue-oriented, encouraging its members to share their diverse and wide-ranging views that will inform an overarching joint culture or vision for the group. They focus on facilitating decentralized coordination and networking among members (Clark 2003, 6). The social forums “are meant to be an experiment in democratic form, but the lack of structure too often allows old left leaders to grab the limelight and give the impression of speaking ‘on behalf of’ the participants”, (Anheier, Kaldor and Glasius, 2004).

Networks and Coalitions: The Building Blocks of Civil Society Alliances

William DeMars writes that at the most fundamental level networks “begin to form when NGOs *share any common partners*”, (DeMars 2005, 50). He continues, however, that at the more “abstract”, transnational level, “networks can be analyzed as a distinct organizational form possessing extraordinary capacities for innovating tactics, managing risk, gathering information, and an ability ‘to flow around physical barriers and across legal or geographical boundaries’”, (DeMars 2005, 51). Similarly, Sidney Tarrow, Margaret Levy and Gillian Murphy define coalitions as “collaborative, means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational entities to pool resources in order to effect change”, (Tarrow 2005, 164). Transnational civil society networks and coalitions, therefore, possess both a structural and purposive function.

Transnational networks are one of the most prominent forms of civil society organization explored in the literature. Many civil society groups “are evolving from hierarchic or unitary structures, where the identity of the CSO at the national level is paramount, towards network modes in which topic specialists from different countries collaborate in opportunistic alliances with counterparts in other countries”, (Clark 2003, 2). Indeed, in recent decades the opportunities for networking and coalition-building on a transnational scale have increased dramatically. For example, “cheaper air travel and new electronic communication technologies speed information flows and simplify personal contact among activists”, (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 14). At the core of transnational network and coalition activity is the production, exchange, and strategic use of information, intensifying the interactions between many non-state actors (Carin and Smith 2005; Tarrow 2005; Clark 2003; Florini 2000; Florini and Simmons 2000).

In essence, networks and coalitions are, therefore, also communicative structures. They are generally characterized by some degree of commonality of purpose, high value content and informational exchange (Hedley 2002; Held and McGrew 2002; Florini 2000; Florini and Simmons 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Tarrow outlines five sets of factors that have significant bearing on when coalitions will form and endure: **(1)** framing – can coalition members frame the issue around which they form so as to define a common interest and compatible set of tactics, **(2)** trust – do their representatives see each other as trustworthy, **(3)** credible commitments – can each one make their commitments credible to the other prospective members of the coalition, **(4)** management of difference – can they resolve tensions due to differences in goals, strategies, culture, ideology, and organizational structure and **(5)** selective incentives – can they ensure that their organizations will benefit from their cooperation (Tarrow 2005, 165).

Jackie Smith and Joe Bandy also write that “how a coalition defines its aims affects its prospects for maintaining internal unity and for having influence on policy. ... Similarly, the definition of a coalition’s identity has strong impacts on its development. When members see themselves as sharing a common identity, their solidarity and motivation to work together is enhanced”, (Smith and Bandy 2005, 10). Just as they require trust, networks and coalitions also help to build trust by establishing relationships among members that then create greater incentives to work together to achieve common ends. These relationships involve regular exchange of “information about their own activities and develop databases of best practices”, (Slaughter 2005, 283). These conditions are “essential for long-term cooperation” and are the basis for building TCS alliances and partnerships (Slaughter 2005, 283).

Transnational networks and coalitions “do much more than force governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and corporations to talk about specific issues, however. They influence those discussions, shape the agreements that result and monitor whether and how well parties are complying with the terms”, (Florini 2000, 212). Voices “that are suppressed in their own societies may find that networks can project and amplify their concerns into an international arena, which in turn can echo back into their own countries”, (Chandler 2005, 158). In other words, through international links these groups can create political spaces for their voices. In their work Keck and Sikkink highlight the importance of local and national-level groups strategically using information in order to mobilize international allies who can bring external pressure to bear on states from the outside. They term this “leverage politics” or the “boomerang strategy” and argue that “by leveraging more powerful institutions, weak groups gain influence far beyond their ability to influence state practices directly”, (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Florini asserts that transnational networks and coalitions are particularly good at getting

what might otherwise be neglected issues onto the agendas of national governments and international institutions through advocacy and the wide dispersal of information to the mass public (Florini 2000, 211). In part, “the growth of these networks is a response to the overload and politicization of multilateral bodies, but it is also an outcome of the growing technical complexity of global policy issues and the communications revolution”, (Held and McGrew 2002, 11). In these ways transnational networks and coalitions form the foundational “building blocks” of TCS alliances and partnerships.

This chapter has reviewed some of the central issues and concepts in the literature on TCS. The review of literature set out the rationale for this study and helped build the foundation for inquiry by emphasizing the importance of developing better and deeper understandings of the internal dynamics of TCS. The review was structured around five central sections: **(1)** the impacts of accelerated globalization, **(2)** the “crisis of legitimacy” in IIs, **(3)** the rise of TCS, **(4)** factors in TCS agency and **(5)** organizational structures of TCS. The subsequent chapter lays out the approaches adopted in this study to framing the research including the theoretical constructs and assumptions about knowledge.

Chapter 3: Approaches to Framing the Research Theoretical Constructs & Assumptions about Knowledge

The research proceeds by embracing a theoretical perspective that is emergent and designed to address specific issues that are relevant to the experiences of members of MPH. The research is undertaken with the aim of improving and transforming the strategies, practices and knowledge of the environments within which TCS partnerships operate. It adopts a qualitative approach to conducting research that assumes that the intellectual basis for acquiring knowledge is to some degree rooted in the ways that we “make meaning” through our interactions with others and negotiated through the social, historical, political and cultural lenses that operate on our lives.

The theoretical perspective used to frame the research is *Inter-Group Conflict Theory*. Inter-group conflict is expressed in multiple forms and permeates through aspects of society at all levels, in every society. In an organizational setting, poor communication and inter-departmental differences can lead to low morale, poor performance and reduced productivity or can stimulate new structures and processes to form. In communities, diversity between social, ethnic, racial and religious groups is often expressed as racism, discrimination or social activism. At the societal level, high-intensity intractable conflict between groups can result in the outbreak of war, which engages both “global” and “local” communities and can lead to international activism.

The ontological and epistemological attitudes toward knowledge adopted in this study are *Social Constructivist*. The philosophical claims about knowledge and the theoretical dispute resolution framework adopted, thus, denote a way of looking at and interpreting the world – a way of observing, measuring and understanding “reality” – that holds that one’s conception of

“reality” is based more in social interactions and socially constructed meaning systems than in the existence of an objective and singularly knowable world. Meaning-making is therefore subjective, operating through the processes of interaction between individuals and groups. The sites where conflicts occur are seen to be those in which the strategies and mechanisms for making meaning and processes for understanding the world differ among interacting and interconnected groups.

3.1 Constructivist Knowledge Claims:

What is Constructivist Research?

Constructivism encompasses a broad range of research activities including research design, planning, theorizing, learning and development of the research framework. Furthermore, constructivism adopts a subjective epistemological stance on knowledge production, meaning-making and the nature of “reality”. The constructivist paradigm “assumes a relativist ontology (there are multiple realities), a subjectivist epistemology (knower and subject create understandings), and a naturalistic (in the natural world) set of methodological procedures”, (Denzin and Linken 1998, 27). Michael Quinn Patton suggests that constructivism is about “constructing knowledge about reality” and not “constructing reality itself”, (Patton 2002, 96). The terms constructivist and constructivism “are terms that routinely appear in the lexicon of social science methodologists and philosophers” to describe the overarching approach of constructivism and “proponents of these persuasions share the goal of understanding the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it”, (Schwandt 1998, 221). This approach to framing research is concerned with “matters of knowing” and “matters of being” over specific methodological considerations (Schwandt 1998, 222).

Unlike some other philosophical assumptions about knowledge, such as participatory/advocacy based knowledge claims, constructivism places greater weight on understanding the multiple ways and perspectives through which research problems can be understood than on empowerment and realizing action-oriented outcomes (Creswell 2003, 6). Within the context of this study, this approach enables me to engage with issues of social justice, power and governance and the way that variables such as identity, ideology and cultural dynamics interact in a socio-economic and political context to impact how research participants construct knowledge about the settings within which they practice.

Goals & Objectives of Constructivism:

Among the goals and objectives of constructivism are: (1) to utilize participants views, “voices” and ways of making meaning, (2) to develop “deeper” levels of understanding through research and (3) to generate, or further contribute, to a theory or set of theoretical assumptions (Potts and Brown 2005; Creswell 2003; Patton 2002; Schwandt 1998). One of the central goals of constructivist research is to “rely as much as possible on the participants’ views of the situation being studied”, (Creswell 2003, 8). The central research question(s) or problem(s) in constructivist approaches are generally “broad” and “general” so that the participants can construct the meaning of a situation from their own perspective (Creswell 2003, 8). This goal of utilizing participant views is also found among the objectives of anti-oppressive research in that it seeks not to discover a “truth” but to look for meaning, understanding and the power to change (Potts and Brown 2005, 261). Similarly, Patton adds that in cases where the constructivist researcher is “operating from a social justice framework”, they may assign added weight “to the perspectives of those with less power and privilege in order to ‘give voice’ to the disenfranchised, the underprivileged, the poor, and others outside the mainstream”, (Patton 2002,

98). It is the various means of utilizing the views of participants and studying the ways that they make meaning that become the organizational foci of the constructivist's research. Consequently, these factors also contribute to the development of "deeper" levels of understanding and the generation of new, more nuanced theories on the specific individuals, group(s), organization(s) and community(ies) of interest to the researcher.

In terms of developing deeper levels of understanding the constructivist researcher attempts to capture the different perspectives of research participant(s) through open-ended interviews and observation and then examines the implications of these perspectives but does not assert which perspectives are more right or true (Patton 2002, 98). The challenge for the constructivist researcher, then, is not to "arrive at an accurate and comprehensive description of 'the real' readymade world. ... Rather, cognition is reconceptualized as the advancement of understanding", (Schwandt 1998, 239). Therefore, the act of theory generation is itself an inter-relational and interpretive act of construction on the part of the researcher, which does not produce a definitive theory or set of theories based on the results of the research, but instead further develops one of a number of possible theoretical frameworks that helps to explain and understand the findings of the research.

A Typology of Constructivist Thinking:

In his analysis of constructivism, Thomas A. Schwandt delineates four types or categories of constructivist thinking that form a conceptual typology for investigating constructivist theory and practice. These are: (1) "everyday" constructivism, (2) radical constructivism, (3) social constructivism and (4) feminist standpoint epistemologies (Schwandt 1998, 237-242).

Concerning social constructivism, specifically, Schwandt writes that "the notion that an observable and objective world exists is challenged on the basis that knowledge of the world is

created through shared inter-subjectivity among individuals (and/or groups) and social constructions of meaning and knowledge are determined based on this process of interactive meaning-making”, (Schwandt 1998, 240). The term is predicated on the notion that “‘the terms by which the world is understood are social artifacts, products of historically situated interchanges among people.’ Knowledge is one of the many coordinated activities of individuals and as such is subject to the same processes that characterize human interaction (e.g., communication, negotiation, conflict, rhetorics)”, (Schwandt 1998, 240). It operates under the assumption that individuals and groups “seek understanding of the world in which they live and work” and “develop subjective meanings of their experiences – meanings directed toward certain objects or things” that are “varied and multiple”, (Creswell 2003, 8). These meanings are shaped by a variety of elements that impact one’s attitudes and beliefs including culture, religious affiliation, historical experiences, personal and political views, economic position and place of privilege. The focus is, ultimately, on “the collective generation of meaning as shaped by conventions of language and other social processes”, (Schwandt 1998, 240). Thus, “constructivist researchers often address the ‘processes’ of interaction among individuals. They also focus on the specific contexts in which people live and work in order to understand the historical and cultural settings of the participants”, (Creswell 2003, 8). Among Schwandt’s typology of constructivist thought, social constructivism is the approach that most closely corresponds to the philosophical assumptions about knowledge that are made in my research.

Ultimately, constructivist researchers are idealists, “that is they assume that what is real is a construction in the minds of individuals. It is also pluralist and relativist; there are multiple, often conflicting, constructions, and all (at least potentially) are meaningful”, (Schwandt 1998, 243). Constructivists, ultimately, assert that what we assume to be “real” is really the product of

complicated constructions and ways of making meaning and organizing observable physical phenomenon in a comprehensible fashion.

3.2 Embracing Constructivism in the Research:

The literature on constructivism asserts that in adopting a constructivist perspective we assume that knowledge is: (1) one truth among many possible truths, (2) experiential, (3) relational and (4) is produced through the interactions of people with their environments, including biases, privileges and power dynamics (Potts and Brown 2005, 261; Winslade and Monk 2000, 37). Constructivism begins from the premise that the “human world is different from the natural, physical world and, therefore, must be studied differently ... the world of human perceptions is not real in an absolute sense, as the sun is real, but is ‘made up’ and shaped by cultural and linguistic constructs”, (Patton 2002, 96). Constructivists are committed to the notion that reality is pluralistic, that truth and knowledge are inherently subjective and the result of perspective-taking, not realizable through the discovery of some objective “real world” that exists independently of human thought and activity (Schwandt 1998, 236).

The constructivist researcher “believes that to understand this world of meaning one must interpret it. The inquirer must elucidate the process of meaning construction and clarify what and how meanings are embodied in the language and actions of social actors”, (Schwandt 1998, 222). Consequently, when we embrace this perspective to conduct research we must reflect upon our own sense of self (identity), history, and our relations with others, unpacking assumptions and patterns of thinking and recognizing their effects on the way that we interpret our research findings (Potts and Brown 2005, 263). Constructivist researchers, therefore, “focus on the specific contexts in which people live and work in order to understand the historical and cultural settings of the participants. Researchers recognize that their own background shapes their

interpretation, and they ‘position themselves’ in the research to acknowledge how their interpretation flows from their personal, cultural, and historical experiences”, (Creswell 2003, 8-9).

In their work, Sandra Kirby and Kate McKenna ask us to consider how we account for what we know, what we consider knowledge and what are the consequences of the ways in which this knowledge is re-produced (Kirby and McKenna 1989, 20). Linda Tuhiwai Smith also addresses similar themes when she writes that often “what makes ideas ‘real’ is the system of knowledge, the formations of culture, and the relations of power in which these concepts are located”, (Smith 1999, 48). This underscores the vital importance of situating ourselves in relation to our strategies and methods of inquiry.

3.3 Situating Myself:

In adopting a constructivist approach to research, I must acknowledge the impact of my personal beliefs and cultural background on the way that I understand, evaluate and analyze the data collected throughout my research. I identify myself as a white Canadian woman of non-denominational faith with British, Irish and Scottish ancestry and as a graduate student educated in International Relations and Dispute Resolution in a “Western” academic environment. From a young age I have been aware through an exposure to travel and to different cultures that the world is larger than the immediate surroundings of my home and my community. I believe that this awareness has influenced my interest in and decision to study international affairs. Having come from a place of some privilege, however, I did not become aware of the negative dimensions of difference, which manifest themselves in forms of racism, prejudice, segregation and discrimination, until I was old enough to study the many legacies of these injustices in school. My strong desire to “make a difference” through my work has drawn me toward areas of

study that have a strong social justice component and are change-oriented and transformative. I tend to think about things from a “macro”-level perspective, focusing on how individual and seemingly independent issues are inter-related and fit together in a larger overarching framework. I am, therefore, comfortable working with complexity and exploring socio-economic and political interconnections and relationships between individuals and groups.

The practice of Dispute Resolution often involves embracing complexity to recognize that a plurality of perspectives about a particular conflict may exist depending on one’s historical, cultural, social and political location. As a Masters student in Dispute Resolution, I have been encouraged to question theories that claim to present absolute truths about the world and critically examine models that propose that events occur in a linear fashion in isolation from other events. I, therefore, take the position that there exists no one-fits-all worldview in which to account for events taking place around the globe and, furthermore, that human actions are interconnected by their very nature. Mary Clark uses the metaphor of *Indra’s Net* to promote the idea “of connectedness, of inter-acting, interdependent entities, whether they be human bodies, an economy or other social arrangement, an ecosystem, or a galaxy. Within each entity, the parts are likewise interdependent, and it is their reciprocal interactions that keep the whole universe functioning”, (Clark 2002, 9).

From this perspective, as we become increasingly interconnected by the processes of globalization, events can no longer be viewed in isolation from each other, being contained to specific geographic areas or groups, but like the *Indra’s Net* gestalt are expressed within a larger interconnected network. This framework focuses on the intersections between the “local”/“global”, “public”/“private” and “formal”/“informal” in a socio-economic and political

context and emphasizes the potentially vital role of the “Social Economy” and, thus, also civil society in the international policy-making environment.

Ultimately, it is implied from the “Situating Myself” section above that my background and biases have led me, in this instance, to approach this study and to interpret events, actions and experiences analytically and descriptively. This also has implications for how I choose to approach conflict, in this case through the lens of Inter-Group Conflict Theory, and my decision to use Dispute Resolution Analysis as an analytic, rather than primarily outcome (action)-oriented tool in which to “construct” a picture of the internal dynamics and processes taking place within the case study.

3.4 Developing the Theoretical Framework – Inter-group Conflict Theory:

What is Inter-Group Conflict Theory?

One of the overarching objectives of Dispute Resolution and Conflict Analysis as a field of theoretical inquiry and practice is to explore the fundamental processes involved in conflicts and develop a better understanding of how to comprehend, manage and resolve conflicts more effectively (Deutsch 2000, 6). The philosophical attitudes one adopts toward knowledge and human nature and the assumptions they make about conflict have “profound implications for how conflict is handled. Embedded within each account of conflict are sets of assumptions on the nature of human action and motivation”, (Tidwell 1998, 30). For the purposes of this research, I have adopted Social Constructivism as the philosophical attitude toward knowledge and Inter-Group Conflict Theory as the principal theoretical lens through which a Dispute Resolution Analysis is carried out and the internal dynamics shaping the case study are analyzed and evaluated. Inter-Group Conflict Theory offers one (though not the only) useful framework for organizing one’s thinking about the social, political, economic, cultural and historical factors that

influence the interactions of TCS alliance members. It is also valuable in exploring the processes by which conflicts are addressed within partnerships and how these affect the internal dynamics of the groups and shape the processes of alliance-building.

Ronald Fisher defines Inter-Group Conflict Theory as the “domain of intergroup relations, that is, interactions among individuals that occur in terms of their group identification. Intergroup relations are concerned with all manner of relationship among groups, including both cooperative and competitive interaction as well as constructive intergroup conflict”, (Fisher 2003, 166). Inter-group dynamics affect a wide variety of inter-group relations as well as the activities and actions of the members of the groups that are interacting. These range from leadership and decision-making outcomes, to how group’s communicate with, respect and value each other and decide whether to work together cooperatively and collaboratively or antagonistically and competitively. Fisher continues that although many inter-group relationships take place in more or less cooperative settings of interaction, where this does not occur “around incompatible goals and activities” and where “the parties work to control or frustrate each other adversarially and antagonistically, the scene is set for destructive intergroup conflict”, (Fisher 2003, 166-167).

In essence, Inter-group Conflict Theory asserts that conflict between groups is based not only on misperceptions and/or misunderstandings, but also in “differences between groups in terms of social power, access to resources, important life values, or other significant incompatibilities”, (Fisher 2003, 167). One important question driving research that uses this theoretical construct, thus, becomes: How can people who have both “real” and perceived differences become better trained to more effectively manage and resolve inter-group conflicts constructively, cooperatively and collaboratively? Inter-group Conflict Theory asserts that by

examining sources of inter-group conflict at multiple levels of analysis a better picture of the dynamics of the inter-group process can be developed making the process more amenable to conflict resolution and management.

Sources of Inter-group Conflict:

There are a number of sources of inter-group conflict that are identified in the Dispute Resolution literature. Generally speaking, these can be separated into three levels of analysis: **(1)** structural, **(2)** communicative-relational and **(3)** symbolic. Specifically this includes: **(1)** power-based differences, **(2)** the structural arrangement(s) of the organization in which the inter-group activity takes place, **(3)** social cognitive factors, such as representative-inclusiveness or in-group/out-group differentiation, **(4)** mistrust, **(5)** miscommunications and genuine dialogue deficits, **(6)** different ways of making meaning, **(7)** basic needs, including individual and group identity needs and **(8)** collaborative versus competitive conflict orientations (Coleman 2000; Deutsch 2000; Fisher 2000; Isenhardt and Spangle 2000; Mayer 2000; Lederach 1997).

From the social constructivist perspective adopted in the research, one root cause of inter-group conflict is based in the different ways that people make or construct meanings based on their interactions with others and mediated through the historical, political, cultural and social lenses that they use to interpret and understand the world. As different groups come into contact and engage with one another they are forced to (re)negotiate their subjectively held beliefs and meaning systems through a process of interaction with others whose backgrounds may be very different from their own. Conflict often occurs during this process of interaction and (re)negotiation. Thus, “sources of conflict are typically exacerbated by the subjective processes individuals employ in seeing and interpreting the world, and in how groups function in the face of differences and perceived threat”, (Fisher 2003, 167).

Morton Deutsch writes that in inter-group conflict “whether the participants in a conflict have a cooperative orientation or a competitive one is decisive in determining its course and outcomes”, (Deutsch 2000, 21). A dispute resolution analysis that uses Inter-Group Conflict Theory as its primary theoretical paradigm is, therefore, concerned with “understanding the processes involved in cooperation and competition, their effects, and the factors that contribute to developing a cooperative or competitive relationship”, (Deutsch 2000, 21-22). Understanding cooperative and competitive conflict orientations is further linked to (1) the interdependence or compatibility of goals and expected outcomes between actors or groups, and (2) the type(s) of inter-action(s) that take place between actors (groups). Inter-Group Conflict Theory predicts that greater interdependence and compatibility of goals and expectations is more likely to result in positive types of inter-actions between actors during inter-group processes leading to more effective communication, a willingness to enhance each other’s power and a sense of shared beliefs and goals. It also predicts that this type of interdependence has a greater likelihood of leading groups to address conflicts with other groups in a more collaborative and cooperative manner.

A third group of factors influencing the outbreak of inter-group conflicts are power-based differences. As a theoretical concept, the notion of power is often thought of as abstract and ambiguous, even though its consequences are actual and tangible. Power conflicts occur “when each group wishes to maximize its influence and control in the relationship with the other”, (Fisher 2003, 169). Similarly, Bernard Mayer asserts that “power is variously defined as the ability to act, to influence an outcome, to get something to happen, or to overcome resistance. For the purpose of understanding the dynamics of conflict, power may be defined as the ability to get one’s needs met and to further one’s goals”, (Mayer 2000, 50). The influence of power in

inter-group conflicts has both an interactive and contextual dimension. Mayer writes that power “can be understood only in context. ... we must understand the environment in which people are exerting this power and the forces with which they are interacting”, (Mayer 2000, 51).

An explanation of needs-based factors, which often result in the formation of individual and group identities, involves a consideration of the degree to which basic needs are frustrated or satisfied in inter-group interactions. Basic needs refer not only to basic human needs required for survival, but also include needs such as “the need for security, identity, recognition of identity, freedom, distributive justice, and participation. Identity groups are seen as the primary vehicle through which these necessities are expressed and satisfied, thus leading to intergroup conflict if one group’s basic needs are frustrated or denied”, (Fisher 2003, 170). It has been argued that the most violent, destructive and intractable inter-group conflicts related to identity are those that are racial, religious, ethnic and cultural in scope. These types of conflicts are “by nature lodged in long-standing relationships. In other words, they are ‘protracted’ or ‘intractable’”, (Lederach 1997, 14). They are also “characterized by deep-rooted and long-standing animosities that are reinforced by high levels of violence and direct experiences of atrocities”, (Lederach 1997, 18). It should be recognized, however, that multiple identity groups often exist within organizations, community groups and civil-society alliances where these groups come together and form around some kind of overarching social identity, vision or set of goals.

A fifth category pertains to social cognitive factors of representative-inclusiveness that can lead to in-group and out-group differentiation. Fisher writes that “the simple perceptual act of group categorization in a minimally competitive context sets in motion a process of group differentiation with resulting in-group favoritism”, (Fisher 2003, 170). This includes processes of determining who is represented and included (or excluded) within certain groups as well as

group categorization along ethnic, cultural, social class, sexuality, ability, age and gender lines and is largely based on the assumptions and expectations we hold regarding the characteristics that the types of people who “belong” to these groups exhibit.

The sixth source of inter-group conflict is related to the role of miscommunication and genuine-dialogue deficits. All communication takes place within a specific framework or context, “to understand the meaning of any communication, it is necessary to be aware of the visible and invisible contexts in which it takes place”, (Cloke and Goldsmith 2000, 12). The different ways in which groups communicate and the level of their awareness of the different contexts in which their communication takes place impacts the likelihood that miscommunications will occur. Similarly, Daniel Yankelovich notes that efforts to engage in genuine-dialogue can fail for a variety of reasons. These range from an unwillingness to engage with other groups due to a history of mistrust, hate and violence, differences in goals and objectives and hierarchical arrangements that alter the incentives of groups or persons to attempt to understand the motivations and intentions of others (Yankelovich 1999, 16-17). This results in a “genuine-dialogue deficit”, which can incite and/or encourage the outbreak of conflict around differences in values, interests, status, political, cultural and religious beliefs, professional backgrounds, ethnicity and language.

Finally, structure, culture and leadership dynamics also influence how inter-group conflicts are expressed and managed. The degree of *cohesiveness* maintained between the groups through structural and organizational aspects of the inter-group interaction has important implications for the way that conflicts are addressed, managed and ultimately resolved when they arise. Fisher defines cohesiveness as the “shared sense of attraction to the group and motivation to remain in it”, (Fisher 2003, 172). Cohesiveness, therefore, has significant consequences for the

long-term success and continuation of the inter-group relationship. Cohesiveness has also been cited as the main factor behind the phenomenon of “groupthink”. Groupthink “is characterized by symptoms showing overestimation of the group’s power and morality, close-mindedness, and severe pressure toward uniformity. ... lack of impartial leadership is also an important condition of groupthink, in that directive leadership that is committed to a particular direction or decision tends to influence cohesive groups toward concurrence seeking”, (Fisher 2003, 173). Ultimately, the interconnectedness between, and prevalence of, the different sources of inter-group conflict within partnerships has significant implications for the likely success and continuation of an alliance as well as the types of processes put forward for managing and resolving conflicts.

3.5 Measuring & Evaluating the Case Study – A Dispute Resolution Analysis:

In this study an Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis is conducted. In essence a Dispute Resolution Analysis is “a framework for understanding conflict” that functions as an “organizing lens that brings conflict into better focus”, (Mayer 2000, 4). It can help us to better understand the nature of a conflict(s) as well as the dynamics underlying that conflict. Dispute Resolution Analyses have both an analysis and intervention (or management/resolution) component, though the degree to which both are addressed varies depending on the study and the nature of one’s research focus. They seek to develop a better understanding of the dynamics underlying a particular conflict(s) and put forward a set of processes that might enable either those in conflict or an outside third party (e.g., a mediator or facilitator) to more effectively intervene in, manage and/or resolve the conflict(s).

Developing a better understanding of the dynamics and designing mechanisms in which to more effectively engage in a specific conflict or type of conflict, however, “requires specific knowledge about the conflicting parties, their social contexts, their aspirations, their conflict

orientations, the social norms, and so on”, (Deutsch 2000, 30). Dispute Resolution Analyses are, therefore, not intended to function as a “rulebook” for how to approach and engage every conflict. Instead they represent a broad, intellectual framework for understanding the processes taking place in specific conflict situations and how one might effectively intervene or take action to bring about more collaborative, cooperative and constructive outcomes to conflict.

In this study, the case study is measured and evaluated primarily through the lens of **(1)** Inter-Group Conflict Theory. The Analysis is supplemented by a consideration of relevant aspects of **(2)** Organizational Theory and **(3)** Identity-Based Conflict, which are utilized to enhance the overall analysis of the alliance-building dynamics taking place within the partnership. This enables several different interdisciplinary perspectives to be presented and a multiplicity of analytical standpoints to be considered so that a rich and detailed picture of the partnership can be developed. The Analysis is, therefore, important in drawing out the complexities and challenges inherent in building TCS alliances and in identifying “best practices” and key considerations for future efforts at TCS alliance-building. Some of the central questions that are explored in the Analysis with respect to internal dynamics include: **(1)** What was/were the initial factor(s) in the formation of the partnership? **(2)** How did the partnership function at different levels of analysis (structural, communicative-relational, symbolic)? **(3)** What were the specific processes that were used in determining the partnership’s objectives and policy goals? **(4)** What were the sources of financing for the activities undertaken by the alliance and what resources are available to aid it in carrying out its activities? **(5)** How were conflicts managed and resolved within the partnership? **(6)** What were some of the common themes, challenges and strategies for integrating the diverse “voices” of group members in collaborative dialogue, decision-making and determining policy? and **(7)** What dominant internal dynamics

emerge which suggest “best practices” that partnerships can adopt in order to effectively organize in the future?

For the purposes of this study, a measurement of the relative degrees of success of the partnership is not based foremost in how effective it was in advocacting and lobbying government and IIs to adopt its specific goals and objectives, but is rooted in how effective the partnership was in mitigating and managing internal conflict, while maintaining inter-group cohesiveness. Ultimately, the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis does not imply homogenization although many members of an alliance from distinct groups may share similar political, social or national identities or that the partners must relinquish some portion of the beliefs, views and interests held by their individual groups or those they represent. It does, however, imply an approach that seeks to identify and make known both substantive and deeper-level inter-group differences that help to incite conflict and to propose a set of processes or mechanisms that works to develop a mosaic of integrated civil society groups, cooperating interdependently for mutual benefit.

3.6 The Role of Organizational Theory in the Inter-Group Conflict Analysis:

Broadly speaking, the foundation of Organizational Theory is based on the assumption that the more people understand about how organizations operate, the more they will come to understand how to operate efficiently and effectively (Hodge, Anthony and Gales 2003, 1). In terms of connecting Organizational Theory to an analysis of inter-group conflict, the utility of Organizational Theory rests in its ability to draw out specific structural and operational aspects of organizations¹⁴ and the way in which these factors impact the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization. Organizations are “sites where matters of difference increasingly are apparent

¹⁴ Organizations are defined as two or more people working together cooperatively within identifiable boundaries to realize a common goal or set of objectives (Hodge, Anthony and Gales 2003, 10) and as “identifiable social systems of interacting individuals pursuing multiple objectives through coordinated acts and relationships”, (Allen 2004, 15).

and important, because members of different social identity groups are likely to frequently interact. ... Power dynamics drive the communication processes that constitute organizations, as different groups strive to serve their own interests and to control symbolic and discursive resources”, (Allen 2004, 16). Some of the relevant areas of focus in Organizational Theory are: power structures, the nature of organizational leadership, decision-making mechanisms and how members of organizations communicate (Hodge, Anthony and Gales 2003; Hall 1991).

In Organizational Theory, organizations are often understood in terms of how the organization’s component parts (e.g., divisions, departments and units) form an overarching system, and a model of the organization is developed “by focusing on the structure and relationships or interdependence among parts of the organization”, (Hodge, Anthony and Gales 2003, 12). In terms of the case study, developing an understanding of the structure and interdependence between members of the partnership is considered critical to carrying out an effective Dispute Resolution Analysis.

Organizational factors “influence decision making in organizations. ... important decisions about future organizational directions and policies are also strongly affected by organizational factors. Decisions are strongly influenced by the power of the individuals making the decisions. Power, in turn, is the result of occupying an organizational position”, (Hall 1991, 35). This emphasizes the influence of organizational *structure* and *design* on a host of other factors that affect the likelihood of conflicts arising as well as how conflicts are likely to be dealt with. Organizational structure refers to the ways in which an organization divides and coordinates the tasks to be completed within the organization, while organizational design describes the process of setting up the organization (Hodge, Anthony and Gales 2003; Wood

2001; Hall 1991). Together these variables define how relationships and interactions are organized among members of the organization.

In the literature, organizational *structure* and *design* are also analyzed with respect to a number of descriptive categories of which three are central to the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis. These are: **(1)** the *formal* (official rules, procedures and channels of communication explicitly authorized by the organization through its structure) and *informal* (the political nature of the organization and communication links that evolve from people working in the organization) *complexity of organization*, **(2)** the *vertical* (the division of work by level of authority, hierarchy or chain of command) and *horizontal* (the division of tasks and subtasks to be completed at the same organizational level) *differentiation* of tasks and **(3)** the *centralized* (hierarchical distribution of power with decision-making authority vested in top management) and *decentralized* (horizontal distribution of power and decision-making authority vested or dispersed among multiple employees) *integration* of tasks, activities and decision-making (Hodge, Anthony and Gales 2003; Hogg and Terry 2001; Hall 1991).

Regarding the potential for the outbreak of conflict, Richard Hall identifies four bases of conflict in organizations. These are: **(1)** functional conflict induced by various subsystems within the organization, **(2)** rivalry or hostility between similar groups in the organization, **(3)** hierarchical conflict stemming from interest group struggles over organizational rewards such as status, prestige and resources and **(4)** conflicts resulting from imperfect communication groups in the organization (Hall 1991, 127-128). Thus, the use of Organizational Theory enhances the overall inter-group analysis in terms of evaluating MPH with respect to specific aspects of its structure and design and highlighting the impact of these variables on the internal dynamics shaping processes of alliance-building.

3.7 The Influence of Identity-based Conflict in the Inter-Group Conflict Analysis:

In recent years the study of identity-based conflict has increased in prevalence as a means of redressing the ineffectiveness of traditional methods of conflict resolution to deal with protracted social conflicts. Analyses of identity-based conflict focus on examining identity-based needs, that is, an individual or group's need to "preserve a sense of who they are and what their place in the world is", (Mayer 2000, 19). The identities one holds are a conception of the self in relation to others, they can derive from membership in a social group, and these social group identities are themselves tightly linked to cultural, ethnic, worldview and religious factors. Michelle LeBaron writes that our identities are "not fixed or fluid. They are not equal in influence but come into prominence depending on a variety of contextual, personal, and cultural factors", (LeBaron 2003, 94). Given the transnational nature of the research, identity-based conflict can help to more fully develop an understanding of how identity-related factors influence the internal dynamics of the alliance.

According to Mayer, it is useful to think about identity-based conflict from the perspective of four identity needs: the need for (1) meaning, (2) community, (3) intimacy and (4) autonomy (Mayer 2000, 19-22). Mayer, ultimately, concludes that "some conflicts cannot be solved without addressing identity-based needs. These disputes are often not amenable to a negotiation process. They usually require an incremental process of change in which people, groups, or organizations gradually achieve a different level of understanding and a better ability to communicate", (Mayer 2000, 21). Thus, by developing a more in-depth understanding of the particular identities and identity needs of group members that impact their relationships with one another, more effective mechanisms for managing and resolving inter-group conflicts can be put forth.

This has significant implications for the Dispute Resolution Analysis in terms of developing not only a better understanding of how different identity-based factors cause internal conflicts, but also what messages are received by group members about conflict – how to approach, understand, manage and resolve conflict – based upon the different identity groups to which group members belong. This chapter has addressed the philosophical (Social Constructivist) and theoretical (Inter-Group Conflict Theory) dimensions of the research. The subsequent chapter is devoted to examining the strategies of inquiry and methods of data collection and analysis that will ultimately inform the Dispute Resolution Analysis.

Chapter 4: Methodology **Strategies of Inquiry and Methods of Data Collection**

This chapter builds upon the approaches to framing the research explored in Chapter 3 by linking “theory to practice” in my investigation into the inter-group dynamics of transnational civil society alliances. The knowledge claims and theoretical perspectives that were presented in Chapter 3 are connected to strategies of inquiry that inform the specific methods of data collection used throughout the research. Two strategies of inquiry are utilized: **(1) Case Study** and **(2) Narrative Research (Inquiry)**. The dominant strategy of inquiry that frames the research is Case Study. It shapes the overarching structure and format of the research. Narrative Inquiry lays the groundwork or basis upon which the Case Study is constructed. It impacts the way that the data collected is organized and represented as well as influences how it is interpreted. An overview of the methods of data collection follows the account of the strategies of inquiry. The principal methods of data collection utilized are **(1) Semi Structured Interviewing** and **(2) Narrative Analysis**. Finally, the process of classifying and categorizing the data collected using a coding scheme is outlined.

4.1 Strategies of Inquiry - Case Study:

The literature emphasizes the unique and demanding nature of engaging in case study research as it requires the researcher to use a number of different methods of data collection so that an accurate picture or description of a particular event, group or individual experience can be developed. John W. Creswell states that case studies “involve a detailed description of the setting or individuals, followed by an analysis of the data for themes or issues”, (Creswell 2003, 191). Robert E. Stake writes that in case study research “there is an emphasis on uniqueness, and that implies knowledge of others that the case is different from, but the first emphasis is on

understanding the case itself”, (Stake 1995, 7-8). In his work, Bruce Berg also emphasizes the importance of developing a comprehensive and multidimensional method for gathering in-depth information in case study research. He writes that “case study methods involve systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how it operates or functions”, (Berg 1998, 212).

Why Use Case Study:

There are multiple uses and purposes for adopting the case study method of inquiry. They include: **(1)** underscoring the complexity of the cases of research focus, **(2)** a desire to better understand a particular case or factors that are intrinsic to that case, **(3)** to examine insights into particular issues surrounding a case(s) or to refine theory pertaining to the type of case(s) investigated and **(4)** to elaborate on and further theorize about some larger grouping or collection of cases (Berg 1998; Stake 1995; Yin 1994). The utility of case study research often emerges in situations where the researcher wishes to better understand complex social phenomena and to highlight the complexity of individual cases or situations. Yin writes that “case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context”, (Yin 1994, 1). Case study “is expected to catch the complexity of a single case. ... We study a case when it itself is of very special interest. We look for the detail of interaction with its contexts”, (Stake 1995, xi). Furthermore, a case study analysis enables the “investigation to remain holistic” and for meaningful characteristics of “real life” events to be described. It investigates causal processes in their natural environment or in their “real” or “actual” context (Stake 1995, 24). Therefore, case studies “are extremely effective in providing opportunities to

learn how theories and research findings apply to actual situations”, (Braithwaite and Wood 2000, 11).

Both Stake (1995) and Berg (1998) also suggest that researchers have several different purposes for undertaking case studies, depending on what type of research they are interested in collecting. They classify case studies based upon whether they are *intrinsic*, *instrumental* or *collective* in scope and focus. *Intrinsic* case studies are used when a researcher desires to better understand a particular case or characteristics of the case study subject(s) that are *intrinsic* to that case. Berg writes that “it is not undertaken primarily because it represents other cases or because it illustrates some particular trait, characteristic, or problem. Rather, it is because of its very uniqueness or its ordinariness that this case becomes interesting”, (Berg 1998, 216). *Instrumental* case studies are utilized to examine insights into particular issues surrounding a case(s) or to refine theory pertaining to the type of case(s) under investigation (Stake 1995, 3). *Collective* case studies, involve the extensive study of several instrumental case studies to elaborate on and further theorize about some larger collection of cases (Berg 1998, 217). In a broad sense, then, the overarching purpose of case study research is to provide a detailed analysis of a particular case(s), drawing particular attention to the case’s complexity in order to gain a better understanding of factors that relate to the specific case, type of case(s) or a larger collection of cases.

Organizing Case Study Research:

Due to the wealth of information and data that is generally collected in case study research, in order to develop an accurate and detailed picture of what is happening within the particular case under investigation, developing a comprehensible means of organizing and classifying data is extremely important. This can be accomplished by sorting types of evidence

(often through coding) and maintaining a case study database (from which the final write-up on the case study will be written following analysis of the material) (Gillham 2000, 20). The need for multiple sources of evidence (e.g., document analysis, archival research, interviewing, and participant observation) in case study research is rooted in the fact that “the basic way of presenting a case study report is a narrative following the logic and chronology of your investigation. ... the case study researcher, who is seeking to recreate the context and sequence of evidence in a way that enables the reader to see and understand the meaning of what is recounted, has to use a more overtly narrative format”, (Gillham 2000, 22). Thus, the ability to present the case study’s findings in a logical and legible manner largely rests on the ability to maintain organized and detailed records at each stage of the case study process.

In terms of linking data to theory and developing criteria in which to interpret findings, one approach found in the literature is through the use of “pattern-matching”. “Pattern Matching” was first described by Donald Campbell in 1975, as a means of connecting several “pieces” of data collected from the same case to a theoretical proposition (Yin 1994, 25). It essentially involves comparing an empirically-based pattern with a predicted one; if the patterns coincide with the results this can help to strengthen the internal validity of the case study. For case studies, this theory-development stage of the research design is essential, whether the ensuing case study’s central purpose is to develop, test or revise theory. According to Robert Yin:

the complete research design embodies a ‘theory’ of what is being studied. This theory should by no means be considered with the formality of grand theory in social science, nor are you being asked to be a masterful theoretician. Rather, the simple goal is to have a sufficient blueprint for your study, and this requires theoretical propositions. Thus, the complete research design will provide surprisingly strong guidance in determining what data to collect and the strategies for analyzing the data. For this reason, theory development prior to the collection of any case study data is an essential step in doing case studies (Yin 1994, 28).

Ultimately, case studies are unique and demanding strategies of inquiry in which the researcher explores a program, event or specific practice of one or more individuals or groups in significant detail.

4.2 Applying Case Study to the Research:

The literature outlines numerous applications of case study to research. Yin suggests five applications of case studies: **(1)** to explain the causal links between real-life events, phenomena and interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental strategies, **(2)** to describe an intervention and the real-life context in which it occurred, **(3)** to illustrate certain topics within an evaluation, **(4)** to explore those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes and **(5)** that the study may be more of a meta-evaluation – a study of an evaluation study (Yin 1994, 15).

Similarly, Gillham argues that case study research enables the researcher to: **(1)** carry out investigations where the use of other methods such as experiments are not practicable to get at the kind of “in-depth” data necessary to develop an understanding of the research problem, **(2)** to investigate a situation where little is known about what is going on, **(3)** to explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more “controlled” approaches, **(4)** to get beneath the “surface” level of a group or organization, **(5)** to view the case from the “inside-out”, from the perspective of those involved and **(6)** to carry out research into the processes leading to results rather than into the meaning of the results themselves (Gillham 2000, 11).

In addition, Berg asserts that it is the versatility inherent in the case study approach that enables it to be applied in a wide range of different kinds of research. He writes that “the approach of case studies varies significantly from general field studies or from the interview of a single individual or group. Case studies may focus on a single individual, a group, or an entire

community. This approach may employ a number of data technologies such as life histories, documents, oral histories, in-depth interviews, and participant observation”, (Berg 1998, 212). Berg continues that “case studies, like any other research procedure, require that the investigator clearly articulate what areas have been investigated, and through what means. ... If the investigator’s findings and analysis were correct, subsequent research will corroborate this”, (Berg 1998, 217-218). Gillham also writes that “if every kind of evidence agrees then you have simple, confirmatory triangulation”, (Gillham 2000, 30). The practice of triangulating the research, through the use of multiple sources of data collection and evaluation, can, thus, aid in developing detailed knowledge and awareness of the internal dynamics of inter-group interaction taking place within the case study.

Case study is a useful means of assessing, in-depth, the current processes that are in place and the contributions (if applicable) of MPH members to deal with conflicts that emerged within the alliance. Case study is used in this study: **(1)** to explain the causal links between real-life events, phenomena and interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental strategies to get at the kind of “in-depth” information desired, **(2)** to illustrate certain topics within an evaluation, **(3)** to investigate a situation where little is known, or little research has been conducted, about what is going on, **(4)** to get beneath the “surface” level of a group(s) and **(5)** to view the case from the “inside-out”, from the perspective of those involved (Gillham 2000; Berg 1998; Yin 1994). A multi-faceted approach to collecting and analyzing data is used: **(1)** semi-structured interviews, **(2)** collection of print documents produced by MPH and **(3)** narrative analysis. This information is compiled and used to generate an account of inter-group dynamics of the case study. The data is evaluated through **(1)** *inter-group* conflict, **(2)** *organizational*

theory and (3) *identity-based* factors. The analysis and evaluation are used to explore what processes can be developed to help enable TCS to build stronger partnerships in the future.

An organizational profile is first developed for MPH. This includes a descriptive “backgrounder” outlining the history of MPH, how it came to be formed, its primary objectives and/or goals and its formal organizational structure. This overview sets the context for the Narrative Analysis of the data that follows. The results of the coding process (See: A Note on Coding below) that takes place during the Narrative Analysis of the interviews and print documents collected aids in generating a detailed rendering of information about people, events and activities, decision-making processes and structural factors within the alliance that are relevant to this study. The Dispute Resolution Analysis further enables an in-depth account of MPH to be distilled.

4.3 Strategies of Inquiry - Narrative Research:

Narrative Research is described in the literature as an experientially-based, “problem-solving” form of inquiry in which the researcher examines the lives of individuals and/or groups (communities) by asking the research participant(s) to express “stories” (narratives) about their lives. Narrative is a specific organizing tool by which people organize and represent their experience in, and knowledge about, events taking place around the world (Cortazzi 1993, 1). It is premised on the notion that by examining competing narratives in conflict or “problem” situations they can become less intractable, so that researchers are better able to devise strategies to tackle complex “problems” (Cortazzi 1993, 102). Therefore, as a research and analytical tool, narrative is used to investigate opposing or conflicting narratives (“stories”) between individuals and/or groups by examining their content, value-structure and functioning as a means of exploring possible strategies for creating new, more collaborative joint-narratives.

Why Conduct Narrative Research?

Two broad categories of “reasons” can be loosely grouped together from an analysis of the narrative literature in order to formulate an answer to the question of “why conduct narrative research?” These are: (1) to gain further insight into individual and group cultures¹⁵ and views on social reality and (2) to recast competing or contested narratives in a manner that makes them more amenable to resolution or the creation of more collaborative joint-narratives (Patton 2002; Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach and Zilber 1998; Roe 1998; Cortazzi 1993; Riessman 1993).

Narrative research is an effective tool in which to gain insights into individual and group cultures and the views of their members regarding the nature of social reality(ies). They are often considered invaluable assets in engaging in complex research that is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. As a methodological approach, the narrative researcher “examines the informant’s story and analyzes how it is put together, the linguistic and cultural resources it draws on, and how it persuades a listener of authenticity. Analysis in narrative studies opens up the forms of telling about experience, not simply the content to which language refers. We ask, why was the story told *that way*?” (Riessman 1993, 2). Ultimately, one of the central underlying premises of narrative research is that “by studying oral accounts of personal experience we can examine the tellers’ representations and explanations of experience”, (Cortazzi 1993, 1-2). It enables “deeper” underlying structural issues and power imbalances to be addressed in complex conflict or “problem” situations through the “defamiliarizing” and “decontextualizing” of narratives in which “the givenness of [opposing views on] reality, power and politics are indirectly addressed”, (Roe 1998, 14). Narrative is, thus, a powerful means of developing an in-

¹⁵ Cultures, in this sense, are defined as the patterns of behavior and symbolic beliefs about the world held by various organizations, groups and institutions (Cortazzi 1993, 100).

depth understanding of a particular individual or group's perception of their experiences in the world and in revealing power dynamics and other social inequalities.

A second rationale for conducting narrative research is based on arguments that narrative research enables the researcher to recast competing or contested narratives in a manner that increases the likelihood that a successful resolution to the research "problem" can be reached. This includes analyzing what the "stories" of research participants reveal at a "deeper" level of analysis and investigating the dynamics underlying the different narratives told by research participants. By conducting narrative research, researchers are able to search for commonalities that might be capitalized upon in order to interrogate difference and encourage greater collaborative and cooperative resolution to research "problems". This is accomplished through an interpretive analysis of "in-depth interview transcripts, life history narratives, historical memoirs, and creative nonfiction", (Patton 2002, 115).

Narrative research also contains a transformative element in which barriers to communication, decision-making and "problem-solving" are viewed as opportunities, not roadblocks, for resolving and answering complex research "problems" and questions. Catherine Riessman writes that because narratives are based on the assertion that meaning is fluid and contextual, conducting narrative research enables the "stories" of research participants to be recast so that the "voices" of minorities, oppressed and disempowered individuals and groups can be given increased weight and heightened importance in the final write-up of the research (Riessman 1993, 15). Emery Roe describes this recasting in terms of isolating "non-stories" or "counter-narratives" that do not conform to the dominant narratives told to the researcher by the research participant(s) and re-defining the two sets of narratives to create a new "metanarrative" (a joint-narrative). He writes that metanarratives enable "the analyst to cast the controversy and

its opposing parties in a different less familiar context than the parties typically see themselves in. The primary effect of a narrative policy analysis is to “defamiliarize and decontextualize what the opposing parties take to be the givens of their differences into another story completely, the metanarrative”, (Roe 1998, 14). Narrative research, thus, works to provide insights into individual and group cultures with a view to “transforming” unequal and imbalanced power relations by recasting competing or contested narratives in a manner that makes them more amenable to resolution.

Organizing Narrative Research:

Riessman argues that the focus of analysis in narrative research often emerges or becomes clearer as one reviews the data collected multiple times. She writes that in narrative research where data is jointly produced, “as investigators interact with subjects, analytic ideas change ... features of the discourse often ‘jump out,’ stimulated by prior theoretical interests and ‘fore-structures’ of interpretation”, (Riessman 1993, 57). In organizing narrative research it is important to maintain a degree of flexibility and open-mindedness in composing the narrative research report and in determining how to frame the specific narrative accounts.

In order to avoid the tendency to read narrative data simply for content, and the “equally dangerous tendency to read it as evidence for a prior theory”, Riessman recommends beginning with the structure of the narrative. She asks the researcher to consider: “How is it organized? Why does an informant develop her tale *this* way in conversation with *this* listener? ... The strategy privileges the teller’s experience, but interpretation cannot be avoided. Individuals’ narratives are situated in particular interactions but also in social, cultural, and institutional discourses, which must be brought to bear to interpret them. ... It is essential, in my view, to open up these interpretive issues for readers to see”, (Riessman 1993, 61).

Other writers on narrative research have also developed conceptual frameworks and procedures for organizing and classifying narrative data. In organizing and conducting a Narrative Policy Analysis (NPA) Roe proceeds by a four-step analysis (Roe 1998, 3-4). Step I starts from a working definition of a “story” and involves the gathering of documents and the identifying of those narratives that conform to a “story” and describe aspects of the research participant’s experience relating to the research questions under investigation.¹⁶ In Step I “dominant narratives” are also identified by searching for common “stories” and commonalities in the narratives told by research participants. The second step in the NPA is to search for other narratives that differ or run-counter to the dominant narratives (“stories”) identified in Step I. These become the “counter-narratives” or “counter-stories” in the Narrative Policy Analysis. In both Step I and Step II the narratives are coded based upon a classification system of the characteristics or factors that the different narratives exhibit (See: A Note on Coding below).

Step III involves a comparison and compilation of the different sets of “stories” in order to “retell” the narrative experiences of the research participants as a narrative chronology and generate a “metanarrative(s)” or “collaborative narrative(s)”.¹⁷ The “metanarrative(s)” is important in both drawing attention to points of conflict in the narratives as well as in reconstructing and recasting the narratives in a way that enables each of the narrative “stories” told by the research participants to be reflected in a “new” joint (meta or collaborative) narrative. Finally, in Step IV the “metanarrative(s)” is interrogated through a particular theoretical lens, or set of theoretical assumptions, to determine what types of processes could be implemented or

¹⁶ Roe identifies two types of stories; ‘scenarios’ with beginnings, middles, and ends and ‘arguments’ with premises and conclusions (Roe 1998, 3). The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines stories as: “**a:** an account of incidents or events, **b:** a statement regarding the facts pertinent to a situation in question, **c:** anecdote *especially:* an amusing one” (<http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=stories>).

¹⁷ A narrative chronology need not necessarily be organized chronologically according to a linear way of re-telling events as a conventional story with a beginning, middle and end. Narrative chronologies can also be expressed as non-linear, fragmented “plots”, which construe significance and meaning for a narrative out of a scattered series of events (Boje 2001).

utilized to help resolve the research “problem(s)” and make conflicts more amenable to effective resolution and management. There is, ultimately, no one way to organize narratives in order to develop a deeper understanding of the experiences of the research participant(s), while exploring possible strategies for creating new, more collaborative joint-narratives.

4.4 Narrative Research as a Foundation for Case Study:

According to Dawn O. Braithwaite and Julia T. Wood the assumption of the case study method that “knowledge can be gained from detailed accounts of people, situations, and events”, is also “fundamental to narrative theory”, (Braithwaite and Wood 2000, 9). They continue that narratives are “carefully constructed accounts, or explanations, of human action. They give us insight into why certain things happened and not others, and why characters did some things and not others”, (Braithwaite and Wood 2000, 9). Roe argues that “narrative analytical approaches ... allow one to reformulate increasingly intractable policy problems in ways that then make more amenable to the conventional policy analytical approaches”, (Roe 1998, 1). According to Roe, a “key practical insight” in narrative research and NPA is that “stories [policy narratives] commonly used in describing and analyzing policy issues are a force in themselves, and must be considered explicitly in assessing policy options”, (Roe 1998, 2). Thus, narrative research, like case study, is an inherently interdisciplinary strategy of inquiry, which advocates pluralism, relativism and subjectivity by virtue of the fact that it takes as its object of principal investigation the story(ies) and experience(s) of its subjects (Riessman 1993, 1).

Similarly, Creswell writes that narrative research proceeds from a study of the lives of individuals and asks them to provide and share stories about their lives (Creswell 2003, 15). Although the principal means of narrative data collection is through the acquisition of the “stories” of the research participant(s), Amia Lieblich et al argue that narrative data “can be

collected as a story ... or in a different manner (field notes of an anthropologist who writes up his or her observations as a narrative or in personal letters). It can be the object of the research or a means for the study of another question”, (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach and Zilber 1998, 2-3).

As a strategy of inquiry, narrative research is used in a variety of disciplines, ranging from the medical sciences, psychology and sociology to anthropology, policy, education and dispute (conflict) resolution. Specifically, in many sociological, anthropological and dispute resolution oriented pursuits, “narrative is used to represent the character or lifestyle of specific subgroups in society, defined by their gender, race, religion, and so on. From a social, cultural, or ethnic point of view, these social groups frequently are discriminated-against minorities whose narratives express their unheard voices”, (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach and Zilber 1998, 4-5). This is further reflected by Braithwaite and Wood who write that “many narratives are told from one person’s point of view, so our insight into the account is shaped by that subjective point of view”, (Braithwaite and Wood 2000, 9). They further note, however, that “other narratives are told from more than one character’s point of view and we gain insight into different, sometimes conflicting, outlooks on what is happening and what an event means”, (Braithwaite and Wood 2000, 9). This is highly pertinent to a dispute resolution analysis that uses narrative as one methodological tool as it points the researcher toward what may be important areas of conflict in the given study that warrant further investigation by the researcher.

Most often narrative is used as an effective strategy of inquiry for subjective and interpretive research. It asserts that “meaning is ambiguous because it arises out of a process of interaction between people: self, teller, listener and recorder, analyst, and reader. Although the goal may be to tell the whole truth, our narratives about others’ narratives are our worldly creations”, (Riessman 1993, 15). When we engage in narrative “we gain understanding of how

the narrator or character(s) sees the world. Because narratives reflect these specific points of view, they have the power to increase our understanding of multiple perspectives and some of the reasons for them”, (Braithwaite and Wood 2000, 9-10). This emphasis on the use of storytelling and experiential learning also connects narrative to constructivist approaches to conducting research. Riessman writes that “story telling, to put the argument simply, is what we do with our research materials and what informants do with us. The story metaphor emphasizes that we create order, construct texts in particular contexts”, (Riessman 1993, 1). It reminds us that even while acting in the capacity of “authority” as researcher we are often engaged in work that is highly inter-relational, in which both researcher and the research participant(s) are considered “authorities”. The data is influenced by the “interaction of the interviewer and the interviewee as well as other contextual factors”, (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach and Zilber 1998, 9). It is “constructed, creatively authored, rhetorical, replete with assumptions, and interpretive”, (Riessman 1993, 5). Interpretation is, therefore, an inherent element of narrative research as events and experiences are presented from both the specific viewpoint of the research participant(s) and the researcher.

4.5 Methods of Data Collection:

Semi-structured Interviewing and Narrative Analysis are used as the primary methods in which the data is collected and research carried out. These are supplemented by the collection of print documents (e.g., archival data, conference reports, newspaper articles and press releases etc.) that aid in the development of the organizational profile of MPH. The interviews are utilized as a means of acquiring and collecting data relevant to this study’s central research questions. The collection of print documents also helps in this regard. The Narrative Analysis component gives context to the data collected, organizing and classifying the information in

order to draw out the implications of what the data reveals and make recommendations through the Dispute Resolution Analysis.

4.6 Semi-Structured Interviews:

While there has been general consensus around the definition of an interview as a “conversation with a purpose” whose purpose “is to gather information”, there has been far less agreement about the manner in which an interview should be conducted (Berg 1998, 57).

Specific types of interviews range from standardized (formal or structured), to non-standardized (informal and unstructured) and semi-standardized (focused and semi-structured). Steinar Kvale writes that in qualitative, semi-structured interviews “the researcher listens to what people themselves tell about their lived world, hears them express their views and opinions in their own words, learns about their views on their work situation and family life, their dreams and hopes”, (Kvale 1996, 1).

The interviews conducted in my study are semi-structured and open-ended to allow research participants to describe in their own words their experience of being a member of the case study as well as identify the particular successes and challenges that they believe were faced within the TCS alliance. Interview transcripts are coded during the narrative analysis component of the research according to a specific set of variables related to Inter-Group Conflict Theory, Organizational Theory and Identity Conflict. Ted Palys writes that open-ended interviews are an appropriate and effective type of interview when “the researcher is interested in hearing respondents’ opinions in their own words, particularly in exploratory research, where the researcher isn’t entirely clear about what range of responses might be anticipated”, (Palys 2003, 176). Creswell also asserts that semi-structured interviews are particularly appropriate in studies that adopt constructivism as a philosophical assumption about how knowledge is acquired. He

writes that “the participants can construct the meaning of a situation, a meaning typically forged in discussions or interactions with other persons. ... The researcher’s intent, then, is to make sense of (or interpret) the meanings others have about the world”, (Creswell 2003, 8-9).

Semi-structured interviews involve “the implementation of a number of predetermined questions and/or special topics. These questions are typically asked of each interviewee in a systematic and consistent order, but the interviewers are allowed freedom to digress; that is, the interviewers are permitted (in fact expected) to probe far beyond the answers to their prepared and standardized questions”, (Berg 1998, 61). The researcher strives to “understand themes of the lived daily world from the subject’s own perspectives. The structure of the research interview comes close to an everyday conversation, but as a professional interview it involves a specific approach and technique of questioning. ... It is conducted according to an interview guide that focuses on certain themes and that may include suggested questions”, (Kvale 1996, 27).

According to the literature, certain guiding principles underlie the strategy of semi-structured interviewing (Palys 2003; Berg 1998). First, it is important to structure interview questions in the “language” of the interviewees, that is, questions must be formulated in words that are familiar and accessible to the persons being interviewed. Second, questions must be asked in such a manner as to provide the necessary information to interviewees and motivate them to answer questions as completely and honestly as possible (e.g., through the use of prompts, “open” and probing questions). Third, the types of questions that are asked should be structured in such a way as to reflect awareness that individuals approach and understand the world in different ways. This can be accomplished through the use of unscheduled probes during the interview that enable the interviewer to follow-up with the interviewee(s) in varied ways in response to their answers to particular questions and elicit further information that is based in the

way that the interviewee approaches the world (Berg 1998, 61-62). Thus, the use of semi-structured and open-ended interviews enables the “language” and “voices” of the research participants to be used throughout this study.

4.7 Narrative Analysis:

Narrative Analysis is used in this study to enable me to search for commonalities that might be capitalized upon in order to interrogate difference and encourage greater collaboration and cooperation among the members of the case study. Using narrative methods of analysis, I can consider the social, political and historical locations of the members of MPH and begin to develop a picture of the particular cultures of these groups. I use narrative analysis as a method for examining the impact and influence of variables such as power, resources, ideologies, interests, expectations-objectives and worldviews that emerge from the narratives collected. Transcripts from the interviews with MPH as well as print documents relating to MPH, such as minutes from meetings, newspapers, journal articles, press releases and websites are examined. Textual documents represent data that is thoughtful and that coalitions have devoted significant attention to in terms of wording (Creswell 2003, 186-187). The use of narrative analysis highlights the inter-relational and interpretive nature of the work and the recognition that multiple “authorities” exist (both researcher and research participants) whose knowledge must be considered in order to portray a rich and insightful picture of the dynamics within the case study.

4.8 A Note on Coding:

The process of classifying and categorizing data using a coding scheme involves a “consideration of what to count and what to analyze, the nature of *levels and units of analysis*, and how to effectively employ *coding*”, (Berg 1998, 223). Coding is used to aid a researcher in developing a set of relevant categories of analysis based on an examination of the data collected

for its *manifest content*, those elements that are physically present and countable, and/or its *latent content*, the underlying symbolism and meanings of the physically available data (Berg 1998, 225). The categories into which content is ultimately coded varies according to the nature of the data collected and the particularities of the methods used to collect that data (e.g., open or closed interviews, standardized surveys, transcripts and minutes of meetings, historical or official documents, experiments etc.). The development of a coding scheme often begins, however, through the process of *open coding*.

A.L. Strauss proposes four basic guidelines to proceed by when conducting an open coding of data. These are: **(1)** ask the data a specific and consistent set of questions, **(2)** analyze the data minutely, **(3)** frequently interrupt the coding to write a theoretical note and **(4)** never assume the analytical relevance of any traditional variables such as age, sex, and social class until the data shows it to be relevant to the study (Strauss 1987, 30). Concerning the first guideline, Berg asserts that during an initial sorting of the data researchers should continually ask themselves what study the data is pertinent to: What is the tone of the narratives? Does the data correspond to the study's original purpose or have other unanticipated goals and results emerged from the data collected? (Berg 1998, 236). In *analyzing the data minutely*, Strauss emphasizes the importance of generating a multitude of categories for potential analysis that can later be grouped together and more systematically coded (Strauss 1987, 30). The third directive in Strauss's four-guideline process is relatively self-explanatory in the sense that it is generally good practice to make note of ideas, concepts, and hypotheses as they arise when coding so that they are not forgotten and can later be linked to other similar themes. Regarding the fourth guideline, Strauss writes that all variables must "earn their way" into the study and, thus, even though a researcher might speculate that any given variable will be analytically relevant, if the

data collected fails to support this assumption the researcher must be prepared to be flexible in their analysis of the results (Strauss 1987, 32). In coding the data in this study, the majority of the codes used to categorize the data reflect topics that are relevant to Inter-Group Dispute Resolution. Some of the likely types of codes include: structure (formal, informal etc.), power relations, decision-making, leadership, accountability, legitimacy, representation, identity, and worldview.

This chapter has explored the strategies of inquiry and methods of data collection that are used throughout this research. The strategies of inquiry are **(1) Case Study** and **(2) Narrative Research**. The principal methods of data collection are **(1) Semi Structured Interviewing** and **(2) Narrative Analysis**. A document analysis of print documents produced by MPH is also used on a supplementary basis. Finally, the Coding process for classifying and categorizing the data collected throughout this study was summarized. An overview of the actual process of data collection as it pertains specifically to this study is the focus of attention in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Data Collection and Analysis

The Framework for an Inter-group Dispute Resolution Evaluation and Analysis

5.1 Data Collection:

Multiple sources of data were collected in order to conduct an evaluation and analysis of the inter-group conflict dynamics taking place within the case study. The data was collected through: **(1)** qualitative, semi-structured interviews with key informant members of the case study and **(2)** the collection of print materials produced by MPH (including press releases, minutes from meetings, member lists, evaluation reports and exposés, Terms of Reference (TORs) and coalition websites). Particular attention was be paid to structural, communicative-relational and symbolic variables that are important indicators in evaluating and analyzing the types of inter-group, organizational and identity conflicts that arose within the case study. The data analysis of the case study was triangulated through **(1)** the development of an organizational profile, **(2)** a coding of the data and **(3)** a narrative analysis that was carried out in order to organize the material for the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis.

All of the individuals who participated in this study did so on a voluntary basis after reading the consent form and being made aware of the scope, focus and intended goals of the project. Furthermore, all of the participants can be considered “experts” in their field of civil society activity, research and advocacy. They are “experts” because they have been directly involved in the case study (and possibly several other civil society partnerships) in an organizational, managerial, decision-making or leadership role. The participants also have substantial familiarity with, and experience in, conducting and producing their own research projects and reports. Participants were initially chosen based on those individuals who were a member of the Make Poverty History Coordination Team and, therefore, had worked intensively

on the campaign and had detailed, first-hand knowledge of events that took place and issues that arose within it. All of the potential participants were contacted using publicly available information such as website contact lists, business cards given directly to the researcher by the participants in past meetings and through referrals from individuals who were affiliated with members of the coalition.

A series of semi-structured, qualitative and open-ended interviews were conducted with members of the MPH Coordination Team over a period of two months from April to May 2007.¹⁸ Potential research participants were initially contacted by phone and/or email and the scope and focus of the research was outlined to all potential participants. Letters of Consent were also emailed to all potential participants. Participants who replied and expressed interest in the study were then followed up with by phone to try and schedule an interview. The Letters of Consent were signed and returned (either by fax or mail) by the participants or the participants gave their verbal consent before the interviews began. All of the interviews were conducted by phone, with the interviewer using Skype.¹⁹ The interviews were audio-recorded using PowerGramo²⁰ software and transcribed by myself after the interview was completed. Interviews took approximately 30 minutes to 1 hour depending on the length and detail of the answers that were provided by participants.

The interview participants were asked to share their insights, opinions, viewpoints and thoughts in response to a series of open-ended interview questions. The interview questions were crafted so as to inquire into structural, communicative-relational and symbolic-level aspects of

¹⁸ For a sample list of interview questions that participants were asked see Appendix A– Sample Interview Questions at the end of the study.

¹⁹ Skype is a software program that enables users to make telephone calls from their computer to other Skype users free of charge, or to landlines and cell phones for a fee.

²⁰ PowerGramo is a free Skype audio recorder. Recording begins automatically when the call begins. Recordings can be removed after recording if desired, saved separately as files and re-played using audio-listening equipment and software.

the inter-group process that influence and impact the emergence of inter-group conflicts (as outlined in Chapter 3– Approaches to Framing the Research). In keeping with the narrative element of this study the research participants were encouraged to discuss what they believed to be the most relevant issues with regard to the broad areas that the interview questions addressed. Further emphasis was placed on research participants describing in their own words their experience of being a member of MPH as well as identifying successes and challenges that they believed were faced within the case study. Research participants were also instructed at the beginning of the interviews to “feel free” to bring up other areas of consideration or issues that arose during the inter-group process that they believed factored into or influenced the outbreak of conflicts. At the end of the interviews participants were again asked whether there were areas or issues that had not been discussed during the interview that they believed were pertinent to this study. Participants were asked to share only what they felt comfortable in sharing. Often the interviews took on a conversational tone and not all of the questions listed in the sample list of interview questions were asked as participants directly or indirectly referred to them in their comments and recollection of events.

In terms of the document analysis, a variety of print documents produced directly by MPH were examined for the types of issues that arose, different opinions and viewpoints held and areas where conflicts occurred among members. The document analysis acted as a further supplement to the interviews conducted and further enabled me to obtain a sense of the “voices” of the case study coalition members for the Dispute Resolution Analysis. Print documents were obtained either directly from the research participants or indirectly through publicly available materials found during internet searches and on websites associated with the case study. The G8 Archives housed in the John W. Graham Library at the University of Toronto were also

consulted as they contained multiple documents related to MPH's campaign advocacy and activities around the G8 Summit in Gleneagles.

There are limits to confidentiality in this study due to the small sample size of participants (17 possible participants in total) and the fact that the participants are likely to know one another. Nevertheless, issues of anonymity and confidentiality were particularly important ethical considerations throughout the research. Several precautions were taken to increase the degree of confidentiality and anonymity of the data presented. For example, the individual names of research participants are not included anywhere in the research and efforts are made throughout this study to exclude any identifying information (i.e., gender, race, culture, religious and organizational affiliation and nationality) that might be attributable to specific members of the campaign. Access to the data at all times during this study was restricted to me, my supervisor and my research committee.

In an attempt to mitigate any biases or preferences that I could unintentionally apply to any of the research participants, once the interviews were transcribed and statements from the print documents collected any identifiable markings were removed before coding the materials. It should be noted, however, that gender considerations were taken into account in this study in terms of possible gender-based differences in experience and perspective as an equal number of men and women were interviewed. As this study aimed to develop a deeper understanding of the inter-group dynamics taking place within the organizing, coordination and governance bodies of the campaign and as the central coordinating bodies of the campaign were based in the United Kingdom (UK), all of the interviewees were from the UK.

5.2 Data Analysis:

With regard to the analysis of the data, an organizational profile was first developed for the case study. This took the form of a descriptive “backgrounder” outlining the general history of MPH, how it came to be formed, its primary goals and objectives and its formal organizational structure and characteristics of the coalition. This overview set the context for the narrative analysis of the data that followed.

In the initial step of the narrative analysis the data collected was organized by reading through the interview transcripts and print materials and organizing the narratives expressed in the data according to specific levels of analysis (structural, communicative-relational and symbolic) and variables or “themes” that indicated and/or pertained to particular sources of inter-group, organizational and identity-related conflict. These became the principal categories of analysis or “codes” upon which the subsequent coding system was based. This analysis of the data collected provided information about the kinds of decision-making structures, organizational processes, events, activities and issues that led to the outbreak of inter-group conflicts among alliance members. It involved an interpretive analysis of the interview transcripts and print documents to begin to consider the impact and influence of the various structural, communicative-relational and symbolic level “themes” expressed in the data on the types of conflicts that arose within the partnership. In total, the interview transcripts and print materials were coded during three separate readings of the data according to the principal categories of analysis (codes) that were developed. These categories/codes are **(1)** power dynamics (including structural factors), **(2)** representative-inclusiveness, **(3)** trust, **(4)** genuine dialogue and communication, **(5)** identity(ies), ideology(ies) and values and **(6)** expected outcomes.²¹

²¹ A more detailed description of each of the categories of analysis/codes is provided in the section: Developing the Framework for the Data Analysis.

As noted, the coding of the interview transcripts and supplementary print documents was conducted three times during the data analysis. The coding and organizing of the data into a narrative analysis loosely followed the four step process delineated by Roe for conducting a Narrative Policy Analysis (NPA) (Roe 1998 and 1994, 3-4). During the initial reading of the data, the material (both the interview transcripts and print data documents) that was coded with respect to describing aspects of MPH or a coalition member's experience relating to one or more of the inter-group dispute resolution variables identified became the "narratives of interest". This includes an analysis of relevant aspects of organizational theory and identity-based conflict. These helped to shape and structure the narrative analysis of the data. In the second reading the separate statements were re-coded or additional codes were noted as appropriate. The third reading of the documents consisted of reviewing the data with particular attention toward identifying overarching narrative "themes" and the specific codes (inter-group conflict variables) that emerged most often in the data. These represented the "dominant narratives" in this study. Any "counter-narratives" or statements that differed with respect to expressing an opposing or dissimilar view to the dominant narratives and views of the research participants were also noted at this stage of data collection.

Both the dominant and counter-narratives expressed in the data are considered in the Inter-Group Conflict Analysis. This represents the "metanarrative" or "collaborative narrative" outlined in Roe's work on NPA. The "collaborative narratives" generated were interrogated through the lens of inter-group dispute resolution so that an overall picture of the internal dynamics of the partnership could be developed. Interrelationships between the categories of analysis were also noted at this stage and examined in the conflict evaluation and analysis. The

section below delineates the framework for conducting the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis.

5.3 Developing the Framework for the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis:

The following framework for the data analysis is intended to assess and evaluate the case study civil society partnership, MPH, as an example of (1) a multi-stakeholder coalition and transnational network and (2) the Social Economy operating at the level of global governance. This involves using an Inter-group Dispute Resolution Analysis and interrogating the case study against *structural*, *communicative-relational* and *symbolic* factors or levels of analysis that help to frame the sources of inter-group conflict that were found to have impacted the emergence of conflicts in the case study during the coding process and narrative analysis. These include: (1) *structural factors*: balancing power inequalities and representative-inclusiveness of participation; (2) *communicative-relational factors*: enabling trust building and genuine dialogue and communication; and (3) *symbolic factors*: addressing conflicting identities, ideologies and values and the expected outcomes of participants in the inter-group process.

A Note on Structural, Relational and Symbolic Factors:

Structural Factors:

Peter Senge maintains that the challenge to collaborative governance within a contemporary global environment is to move power and participation away from the top. He writes that “in an increasingly dynamic, interdependent, and unpredictable world, it is simply no longer possible for anyone to ‘figure it all out at the top.’ The old model, ‘the top thinks and the local acts,’ must now give way to integrated thinking and acting at all levels”, (Senge 1990, 30). Addressing imbalances of power (including structural and organizational factors) and

representative-inclusiveness are, therefore, fundamental to an analysis of transnational alliance-building among civil society.

- **Power Imbalances:**

An analysis of *power* focuses “on how particular discourses and narratives make some things important and others insignificant, how they include some participants and exclude or marginalize others”, (Fischer 2006, 25). This involves examining how specific power imbalances are upheld, contested or transformed, and asks “whether mutual and open-ended democratic deliberation can take place despite the existence of asymmetries of power and expertise that arise with the presence and participation of political elites”, (Button and Mattson 1999, 614). Michel Foucault’s conception of discourses as the relationship between power and knowledge (expertise) helps to elaborate on how “asymmetries” of power and expertise function to produce certain kinds of social and political spaces that include certain groups, beliefs and ideas while excluding others. In Foucault’s opinion, no power relation can exist without an associated foundation of accepted knowledge and, likewise, that there is no knowledge without an existing power relation that brings that knowledge into being (Arac 1988, 184). This interplay between power and knowledge reveals the vital importance of carefully considering **(1)** what kinds of issues are deliberated within civil society partnerships and **(2)** whose knowledge (expertise) is considered most highly as a means of determining who is, ultimately, wielding power and responsible for making policy decisions within alliances.

Regarding the issue of *who* is responsible for decision-making, Peter T. Coleman writes that power imbalances “may begin with our images but persist through the structures and institutions of a society. Thus, power in any given situation must be understood in its historical context”, (Coleman 2000, 119). This emphasis on the historical highlights the influence of the

“decisions and actions, justices and injustices experienced by those who came before us” (Coleman 2000, 119) and the impact of factors such as class, race, gender and education on the (re)production of power relations in any inter-group context. Coleman asserts that “even the most powerful people are powerless under certain conditions. In these situations, it is the norms, roles, policies, structures, and cultures that are also responsible for power differences”, (Coleman 2000, 124). According to Mayer two general categories of power can be identified: structural and personal. Structural power “is lodged in the situation, the objective resources people bring to a conflict, the legal and political realities within which the conflict occurs, the formal authority they have Personal power has to do with individual characteristics, such as determination, knowledge, wits, courage, and communication skills”, (Mayer 2000, 54). Formal authority, the authority given by an institution, by a set of laws or policies, or by virtue of one’s position in a structure (e.g., leadership) is also a relevant type of power in which differences or imbalances can be both an important source and factor in inter-group conflict (Mayer 2000, 55-56). These perspectives push us to look beyond simply surface manifestations of power and to focus on how power relations operate at a deeper level, in the structural, operational and ideological frameworks and layers of a coalition or alliance.

- **Representative-Inclusiveness:**

The issue of *representative-inclusiveness* involves an assessment of the method by which groups are chosen to participate in inter-group processes as well as an appraisal of whose interests and concerns get vocalized. Theorizing on the legitimacy of *who* determines what *representation* and *inclusion* mean in the inter-group context is an important consideration as put simply, in a public policy context an active and informed civil society can transfer “power from the policy experts, out-of-touch politicians, and distant bureaucrats to the public”, (Campbell

2005, 691). Kelly Campbell writes that “engagement and participation as a location for identity construction and/or transformation is contingent upon a vigilant watch over those who might utilize the process for manipulation. ... for this reason public administrators must be cognizant of issues of power and control that arise when facilitating interactions between and engaging with citizens”, (Campbell 2005, 700).

In *Collaborative Approaches to Resolving Conflict*, Myra Isenhardt and Michael Spangle also connect in-group/out-group differentiation and the phenomenon of ethnocentrism to whose views get represented and included in groups or partnerships. They write that “this factor explains a group’s tendency to favor group perceptions, values, and aspirations, and to derogate these factors in other groups”, (Isenhardt and Spangle 2000, 21). This connects issues of power and representative-inclusiveness to one another as the (re)production of power dynamics within inter-group relations impacts whose voice(s) are represented and included in policy-making and, thus, the overarching structure of the inter-group partnerships under investigation.

Communicative-Relational Factors:

The relationship between *trust and communication* and the ability to carry out strong partnerships are direct and interrelated. Roy J. Lewicki and Carolyn Wiethoff describe the relationship between trust and communication: “most people think of trust as the ‘glue’ that holds a relationship together. If individuals or groups trust each other, they can work through conflict relatively easily. If they don’t trust each other, conflict often becomes destructive ... moreover, the parties no longer believe what the other says, nor believe that the other will follow through on commitments and proposed actions”, (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000, 86).

- **Trust**

Trust has been defined as “an individuals belief in, and willingness to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another”, (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000, 87). Thus, the belief in a commonality of purpose between group members, in terms of both dedication toward, and shared expectations of, outcomes, is a vital aspect in building trust within and among groups. Lewicki and Wiethoff write that a belief in this commonality of purpose “is likely to strengthen the overall trust between the parties and enhance the ability of the relationship to withstand conflict ... if the parties perceive themselves as having strong common goals, values, and identities, they are motivated to sustain the relationship”, (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000, 102).

This places the concept of trust firmly within a conception of social capital that in turn sees social capital as a vital component in bringing about successful inter-group alliances. Sanjeev Prakash and Per Selle write that “social capital is generally understood to mean the social structures and networks necessary for sustaining collective action, the supposed normative contents of these structures (such as trustworthiness and reciprocal relations) as well as – frequently – the outcome of collective action achieved through social structures”, (Prakash and Selle 2004, 18). High levels of trust are, therefore, integral to fostering social capital within inter-group processes and in enhancing the outputs that members produce and deliver and commitment that members have toward the process of collective action itself.

- **Genuine Dialogue & Communication**

A second closely related relational factor is the issue of enabling *genuine dialogue* and *effective communication* to take place between diverse actors in what are often tense and oppositional environments. Without genuine dialogue the capacity to develop a sense of relational empathy and understanding for the concerns of others are significantly diminished. Kenneth Cissna and Rob Anderson write that “dialogue emerges as an issue concerning the

quality of relationship between or among two or more people and of the communicative acts that create and sustain that relationship”, (Cissna and Anderson 1994, 15). Conflict occurs in and around dialogue and communication, however, because individuals perceive and interpret language and non-verbal communication in ways that are consistent with their own attitudes, values and beliefs.

The situation can become even more challenging when the parties involved use and interpret verbal and non-verbal communication through different cultural, ethnic and class-based lenses. John S. Dryzek writes that “taking difference seriously means attending to different identities and the different kinds of communication that accompany them, refusing to erase them in the name of a unitary public reason. ... The possibility for deliberation is retained to the extent that reflective interchange is possible across the boundaries of different discourses”, (Dryzek 2001, 660). Similarly, Daniel Yankelovich asserts that there are two central purposes for engaging in dialogue: “to strengthen personal relationships and to solve problems”, (Yankelovich 1999, 12). Communication and miscommunication can, thus, be seen as the physical manifestations of deeper symbolic-level factors that may be in conflict such as identity, ideology and values.

Symbolic Factors:

In describing her tri-dimensional framework for interrogating conflict Michelle LeBaron writes that, “the symbolic dimension shows us the importance of identity and meaning-making as they relate to face, face saving, perceptions, cultural starting points, and worldviews in conflict”, (LeBaron 2003, 112). At the symbolic level of analysis in inter-group conflict, the *identities* (where meaning is determined and made), *ideologies* and *values* (what has meaning) as well as

the *expected outcomes* (how that meaning plays out) of individuals and groups factor significantly into their ability to effectively engage in sustainable and successful partnerships.

- **Identity, Ideology and Values**

Joseph P. Folger and Robert A. Baruch Bush base their analysis of ideology on two factors: how ideology is (1) conceived of and (2) constructed in everyday discourse. They state that, first, ideologies are the “organizing frameworks that people use to view, interpret and judge their surrounding world. Although ideologies are often held as cognitive values or expectations, they are acquired and expressed through social phenomena; people learn (and recreate) ideologies through participation in groups and relationships”, (Folger and Bush 1994, 7). Second, they write that “people’s discursive choices create important social consequences. The choices people make in constructing messages, responding to others’ actions, or deciding when or whether to speak, influence expectations and behavior”, (Folger and Bush 1994, 8).

According to *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1980), “ideology does have significant effects but these are primarily on the dominant rather than the subordinate class. What has been important for the stability of capitalism is the coherence of the dominant class itself, and ideology has played a major role in securing this”, (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1990, 2). Although referring to capitalism, Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan Turner’s argument is relevant to a discussion of civil society partnerships and alliance-building. It suggests that a partnership’s success in applying pressure to government and/or international institutions to adopt certain policies and in garnering popular support from the public for the alliance’s objectives rests in part on its ability to develop and maintain coherent and cohesive inter-group ideologies.

Values, like ideology, are the deep-level beliefs we hold about the kinds of behaviors that are both acceptable and unacceptable and those aspects of life which we hold most important. Richard Kinnier describes values as the “concepts or beliefs, about desirable end states or behaviours, that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and are ordered by relative importance”, (Kinnier 2001, 19). The concept of identity is used to refer to one’s awareness of the unique characteristics and factors that form their and other’s individual and social selves. Generally speaking, two types of identity are referred to: (1) individual/personal identity and (2) social/group identity. One’s individual/personal identity describes “characteristics that denote specific attributes of a person, such as psychological traits, feelings of competence, bodily features, intellectual interests, personal tastes, and so on”, (Northrup 1989, 65). At the individual/personal level, these features are one’s individualistic, core characteristics that are central to one’s sense of self and uniqueness.

Social/group identity, on the other hand, is “an integrated theoretical perspective on the relationship between self-concept and group behavior, which contains a number of distinct but compatible and dynamically interrelated conceptual components”, (Hogg and Terry 2001, 2). In essence social/group identity describes a “social category (e.g., nationality, political affiliation, organization, work group) within which one falls, and to which one feels one belongs, provides a definition of who one is in terms of the defining characteristics of the category – a self-definition that is part of the self-concept”, (Hogg and Terry 2001, 3). Social Identity Theory (SIT) describes the human tendency to “label self and others based on individual and group identity. This theory contends that members of social identity groups constantly compare their group with others, and they tend to ‘seek positive distinctiveness for one’s own group’”, (Allen 2004, 13). Groups, thus, tend to project simplified and inaccurate beliefs and characteristics onto other

groups, creating negative stereotypes that are then applied to all members of these groups indiscriminately through the process of social identity formation (Fisher 2003, 171). Terrell Northrup writes that “events which threaten to invalidate the core sense of identity will elicit defensive responses aimed at avoiding psychic and/or physical annihilation”, (Northrup 1989, 64). In inter-group partnerships different individual/personal and social/group identities that members bring into the partnership are, thus, often root sources of conflict. These identities get expressed in the range of different and conflicting desired outcomes, goals and objectives and attitudes toward advocacy and action that are vocalized by members.

- **Expected Outcomes**

Regarding *expected outcomes*, Fischer asks us to consider: “What are their [the participants] thoughts and beliefs about what is really going on in the space and how they strategically orient themselves to these understandings? Beyond official statements of intentions to participate, what do people want to gain, what are their expectations, and how do they perceive the costs and benefits associated with the activity?” (Fischer 2006, 26). These can include anything from expectations of tangible outcomes such as monetary gain and changes in policy or legislation to intangible gains such as empowerment, recognition and the enhancement of goodwill and satisfaction. Deutsch explains that “people’s goals may be linked for various reasons. Thus, positive interdependence can result from people liking one another, being rewarded in terms of their joint-achievement, needing to share a resource ... Similarly, with regard to negative interdependence, it can result from people disliking one another; or from being rewarded in such a way that the more the other gets of the reward, the less one gets, and so on”, (Deutsch 2000, 22-23).

It should also be recognized that “different definitions of the situation lead to different expectations ... As a result, it is argued that the different expectations (explicit and implicit) that any one group has in any communication context can seriously effect its/their communication with another group which does not share the same expectations”, (Furnham 1986, 112). Therefore, differences in expectations and expected outcomes can lead to inter-group conflicts through communication breakdowns and misperceptions between group members.

Consequently, a consideration of the *structural*, *relational* and *symbolic* factors that are prevalent in inter-group conflicts are useful tools for evaluating the kinds of organizational models and governance mechanisms that are adopted and fostered during the process of transnational civil society alliance-building. These conflict factors are applicable to a wide cross-section of different models of political, economic and social organizing and are, therefore, useful in evaluating socio-economic organizations and comparing these entities to other types of organizational enterprise.

Chapter 6: Case Study Analysis
Make Poverty History – “A Multi-stakeholder Coalition & Transnational Network”

6.1 The Make Poverty History Campaign – An Organizational Profile:

Make Poverty History (MPH) was a multi-stakeholder, transnational campaign that represented the concerted effort of a wide cross section of approximately 540 charities, non-profits, civil society networks, trade unions, faith groups and celebrities dedicated to ending world poverty and united by a common objective to work toward “making poverty history”.²² The MPH campaign was also linked to the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP)²³, which targeted 2005 as a key year of action to end poverty and whose coordinated “global” efforts were established at the 2005 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Naidoo 2005). The MPH campaign was officially launched in January 2005 for one year only. However, prior to 2005, civil society groups had already begun to discuss their belief that 2005 presented a series of exceptional international opportunities to push international institutions to implement concrete policies to bring about an end to abject poverty. Among these opportunities was the fact that the G8 Summit was taking place in Gleneagles Scotland, the UK held the Presidency of the European Union, the United Nations planned a review of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the World Trade Organisation Ministerial meeting was being held in Hong Kong.

With regard to the structural and governance framework of MPH, the campaign can effectively be described as both a coalition and a network. The campaign represented extended versions of what Tarrow terms “event” and “campaign” coalitions (Tarrow 2005). MPH was characterized by high member autonomy, but also a high degree of involvement among members and was representative of many facets of civil society, ranging from school and faith groups to

²² A full list of MPH members is available at: <http://www.makepovertyhistory.org/whoweare/members-a.shtml>.

²³ For more information on GCAP and its work see: <http://www.whiteband.org/about-gcap/what-is-gcap>.

trade unions, international development and aid organisations and local or “grassroots” campaigners. These groups joined together under the banner of MPH, jointly subscribing to a set of specific objectives having recognized points of commonality and shared visions for collective action. Furthermore, even though the campaign was limited in its duration (one year), the groundwork for potential future collaboration between members was laid.

Structurally speaking, the campaign was also organized to function as a transnational network. It brought together a collection of autonomous groups to behave as a single larger entity using social mechanisms for coordination and control to achieve a specific set of goals and objectives (Borgatti 2001). Its “transnationality” is illustrated by the fact that the campaign was able to attract membership across social, political and geographic boundaries in order to facilitate relationship building and enhanced goal achievement, the efficient use of members’ resources, increased innovation and information transfer and a mutual set of goals and objectives (DeMars 2005, 51).²⁴ Thus, from a structural and governance perspective the campaign possessed elements of both networks and coalitions.

The campaign’s principal objectives were fourfold: **(1) More and Better Aid:** MPH called for donors to immediately deliver at least \$50 billion more in aid per year and set a binding timetable for spending 0.7% of national income on aid. Aid must also be made to work more effectively for poor people, **(2) Debt:** MPH called for the “unpayable” debts of the world’s poorest countries to be cancelled in full, by fair and transparent means, **(3) Trade:** MPH called for: (a) Action to ensure that governments, particularly in poor countries, can choose the best solutions to end poverty and protect the environment, (b) an end to the export and other subsidies

²⁴ While approximately two-thirds of the members of MPH were international NGOs, the campaign did consist of 45 trade and student unions, 47 faith groups, 62 domestic sector voluntary organizations, 26 development education organizations, and a number of not-for-profit businesses, research institutions, funding and media organizations (Martin, Culey and Evans 2005, 16).

that damage the livelihoods of poor rural communities around the world and (c) laws that stop big business profiting at the expense of people and the environment, (4) HIV/Aids: MPH called for commitment to universal access to HIV & AIDS treatment by 2010 and replenishment of the Global Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria (2005: The Year of Make Poverty History). Six months after the launch of the coalition an estimated 87% of the population in the United Kingdom had heard about the campaign (2005: The Year of Make Poverty History). The campaign was symbolized by a white MPH band worn on wrists, tied to lampposts, trees and statues and draped across buildings and landmarks including London's St Paul's Cathedral and Edinburgh's castle during the G8 Summit.

MPH was officially disbanded at the end of 2005 and it was decided that the core campaign networks involved in the coalition (the Trade Justice Movement, Jubilee Debt Campaign, Stop Aids, UK Aid Network, BOND and the Trade Unions Network) would continue to campaign and lead the way forward in their respective areas, coordinating together when necessary (Make Poverty History - FAQ). Some groups continue to actively use the term "make poverty history" in reference to general aims and objectives. However, the official slogan of the campaign, "Make Poverty History", can only be used when referring to the outcomes of the campaign and the policy events that took place throughout 2005.²⁵

6.2 Evaluation & Analysis:

• Power

With regard to the influence of power imbalances (including structural/organizational aspects of power) within MPH, the members of the coalition made concerted efforts throughout the campaign to de-centralize power structures and balance power dynamics among member

²⁵ For detailed information about the terms in which the MPH slogan can be used and for how the efforts of the campaign continue after the official disbanding of MPH see: <http://www.bond.org.uk/campaign/faq.htm>.

organizations, groups and individuals. There were also attempts to empower members through the types of structural and governance models that were adopted by the campaign. Various power imbalances did persist, however, with regard to the impact of resource differentials, inter-organizational competition, conceptual versus actual power and celebrity presence.

One area where efforts to de-centralize power across the member groups of the campaign is illustrated by the decision of MPH members not to establish a strong secretariat, which would be responsible for directing and overseeing the strategic administrative decisions of the coalition. As one campaign member stated, “the decision not to have a very strong secretariat had been very clearly endorsed after the first meeting of the wider assembly, and there was no enthusiasm for a strong secretariat . . . , there was a happy consensus that wasn’t what we needed”. In part this decision was driven by the perceived challenges and shortcomings associated with the Jubilee 2000 campaign of which many of the members of MPH had been affiliated.²⁶ One research participant explained the rationale stating that:

In 2000 there was a big campaign in the UK, which was Jubilee 2000, and lots of the organizations, all of the organizations, [that] were involved in Make Poverty History, at least the big ones, were involved in Jubilee 2000, and I think the model for that was a different one where they had a very strong secretariat and it didn’t really work out, as I understand and people were quite aware of that and really didn’t want to repeat that kind of model, and so they went for a more flexible, sort of fluid model which meant that there was no secretariat.

Instead it was determined that the campaign, broadly speaking, would be structured to function as an “event” and “campaign” coalition and semi-horizontal network.

MPH was designed so as to have a central “hub”²⁷ that was charged with the overarching coordination of the campaign’s activities across a number of “nodes”²⁸ that were

²⁶ Some of the perceived challenges and shortcomings of Jubilee 2000 include accusations of unaccountability due to the existence of a strong centralized secretariat responsible for decision-making, “North”/“South” imbalances and that the central actors were large city-based NGOs (See: www.jubileesouth.net and Collins, Gariyo and Burdon 2001, 135 – 148).

²⁷ Hubs are the connecting elements in a network that link different nodes to one another. Hubs act as a convergence point for the dissemination of information and communication between component parts of the network.

responsible for developing policy and actions for the campaign to adopt in specific issue-areas. In order to prevent the “hub” from obtaining too much power and influence over the direction of the campaign, an Assembly of member groups that acted like a Board of Directors was struck whose “job” it was to “ratify or not ratify or question or cross-examine the decisions of the Coordination Team, essentially the strategies that we employed”. Specifically, the structure of MPH consisted of: **(1)** a Coordination Team of 17 members, formed through a mixture of appointment and election that acted as the “hub” of the network,²⁹ **(2)** a number of Working Groups, the “nodes” of the network composed of “issue-area” experts with a liaison member from the Coordination Team,³⁰ **(3)** the Assembly, which was self-selected from among the 540 civil society organizations that comprised MPH and, lastly, **(4)** the general public who showed support for the MPH campaign by wearing white bands and participating in, and organizing their own, marches, rallies and public events held throughout 2005.

To maintain communication linkages between the “hub” and the “nodes” “each Working Group had a Coordination Team link whose job it was to sit in on the Working Group meetings, report back to the Coordination Team anything the Working Group was thinking of doing, or was being asked to do, that could have strategic implications for the position of the coalition”. However, in keeping with the de-centralization of decision-making power within the campaign, the Assembly met in-person, “every six weeks or two months”, to discuss the actions that the Coordination Team was taking. It should be noted that although the decision to base the campaign “centrally” in the UK appears to have been taken with the unique opportunities that 2005 presented in the UK for action to make poverty history in mind, it did prevent members

²⁸ A node describes a component part or network element of the overall network structure. Nodes provide specific network related functions for the network. Different nodes are connected to each other principally through hubs.

²⁹ For a list of Coordination Team members see Appendix B – Members of the Coordination Team.

³⁰ For a list of Working Groups and Chairs see Appendix C – Working Groups.

from the “South” and other-less well resourced groups from participating centrally in the campaign’s coordination. Furthermore, the decentralized nature of the campaign’s structure did lead to conflicts between the Assembly and Coordination Team and among the wider membership of the Assembly in seeking to hold the Coordination Team “accountable”. With regard to the Assembly, a research participant commented that “there was disagreement in that group or between that group and the Coordination Team on occasion”.

The de-centralized structure of MPH created challenges with regard to the organizational principles of coordination and division of labor across the coalition. Coordination is “one basic idea underlying the concept of organization” premised on the “idea of coordination of effort in the service of mutual help”, (Schein 1988, 13). The notion of coordination functions on the belief that individuals and groups can achieve more together than they can singularly and it is the underlying basis, or principle, on which MPH was founded. However, the concept of coordination for “mutual help” carries with it certain challenges related to managing and overseeing the actions of multiple stakeholders and actors in a de-centralized structure. One research participant noted regarding the large size of the Coordination Team compared to a standard management team that this “implied that obviously it was much more difficult to coordinate because there was more work on the administrative side”. Similarly, another research participant commented that “the package was quite familiar management issues that you get if you are on say a management team, but coming much more thick and fast than it would be in any other organization that I have ever worked in and also a much larger group”. Coordinating across the members of the Coordination Team was, thus, one structural challenge for MPH.

Closely related to the challenge of coordination was the question of effective and efficient division of labor (differentiation) across the campaign. The idea behind division of labor

is that “goals can best be achieved if different people do different things in a coordinated fashion”, (Schein 1988, 13). Differentiation can occur vertically (into increasing levels of hierarchy) and horizontally (into an increasing number of distinct positions at the same level) (Hodge, Anthony and Gales 2003, 33). In describing the horizontal differentiation of tasks across MPH, a coalition member remarked that “I think that we probably had a slightly cumbersome structure, we had a lot of Working Groups and sometimes I felt that it was probably too many”. The division of labor was a second challenge associated with efforts to diffuse power across the coalition through decentralization.

Additional evidence of attempts to de-centralize power can be seen with regard to individual leadership of the campaign. Although Richard Bennett was appointed Chair of the Coordination Team, “we were always very clear with the public media and others that he was Chair of the Committee and not leader of the mobilization, again because of the deep nervousness people had from the overhang of Jubilee 2000 but we were very clear that he was Chair of our Committee but the leadership of the campaign came from the Team”. A Support to the Chair Working Group was also established in order to further maintain the credibility of the campaign as a relatively horizontal structure in terms of the distribution of power. It was determined that there:

had to be something in between to fill the Coordination Team that couldn't meet every time there needed to be a decision and Richard as Chair of the Committee turning in through a kind of lack of support into a default leader of the mobilization because there are always day to day decisions that require executive leadership so that that burden didn't fall on him too heavily and obviously so that he didn't by default mutate into a centralized strong character in a centralized secretariat, there was a Support to the Chair set up that sat somewhere between him as Chair and Coordination Team as overall leadership.

Therefore, attempts were made to ensure that no one individual or group could hold majority power and leadership over the direction of the coalition.

In practice, however, vertical power imbalances did exist in terms of determining the principal policy objectives of the campaign. Indeed, the “choosing of the three subjects, aid, trade and debt, was largely down to a negotiation between the big NGOs [non-governmental organizations], so when I say the big NGOs, I mean Oxfam, Action Aid, CAFOD, Christian Aid and Save the Children, possibly one or two others, but essentially those were the guys calling the shots”. In part, this was due to inter-organizational competition among member groups of the campaign that worked across similar policy areas and at the same policy levels. In the words of one research participant, “the main source of the debate and conflict wasn’t actually between local groups and national agencies it was between national agencies of different sizes”. This inter-organizational competitiveness caused power conflicts among national agencies of different sizes that compete not only over national-level policy platforms but for the attention and support (both monetary and non-monetary) of the public and government.

There were, thus, clear power conflicts within the coalition in terms of the impact of resource differentials. A research participant commented that “it was also clear that some of the big organizations would effectively do their own thing, or do things in the way, you know if the organization was putting thousands of pounds into an event they were likely to actually feel they had the responsibility to make it happen”. Of the approximately £1,000,000 that comprised the central budget of the campaign, only 76 of the 540 member organizations contributed to the budget and only 11 of these groups made contributions over £10,000 and with the exception of one they were all large NGOs (Martin, Culey and Evans 2005, 75). Although there was no formal weighting of decision-making power within the coalition, some of the larger agencies who put more funding and resources toward the campaign were able to control and direct what happened within the coalition.

The research participants did differ somewhat, however, in terms of the impact that they felt resource differentials played in exerting influence over the campaign and the degree to which they viewed this power as a negative. One member of MPH expressed their view that “the bigger agencies were more involved because they had the capacity to be involved ... I don’t think the financial issue was one because at the end of the day no one contributed one-hundred thousand pounds or anything nothing like that”. Another more critical perspective, however, cited structural inequalities, both external and internal to the campaign, as a central factor in creating power imbalances and conflicts over decision-making. They stated that:

I think there were other points in the year where different agencies, if the Working Groups or Coordination Team had a kind of consensus, they were still willing to do their own thing and ignore the consensus, [there] wasn’t kind of a management, discussion structure that could go with that, [if they] came to the meeting and heard something and did something else all they had to was face the people at the next meeting and say sorry that was what we did, well there was a bit of that happening.

On a more positive note, another research participant commented that “it was an absolute joy to watch [groups like] Oxfam International and their level of professionalism and coherence in being able to mobilize lobbyists in different countries, it was a phenomenally impressive operation”. They continued that “the reality of the situation was that the agencies with money obviously had huge weight in the decisions that were to be made and rightly so because it was their donors whose money was going to be spent and they were also defensible to their own donors”. In the end, this appears to have resulted in a “loose” consensus among coalition members that those organizations that could contribute more toward the coalition in terms of resources would have more input into some of the events that were held and the general direction of the campaign. This was justified on the basis that they were accountable to their constituent members who had provided the donations that comprised the bulk of the coalition’s financial base.

Moreover, while these resource-based power imbalances did influence the types of policies that were adopted by the campaign, smaller, less well-resourced groups were also able to wield a different kind of power in order to have their voices heard within the coalition. Debt, for example, became one of the central issue areas on the coalition's agenda due to "some very effective advocacy from local groups and the Jubilee Debt Campaign, during the first few meetings of the Coordination Team". In part this "effective advocacy" came from the ability of smaller groups to enhance their power in the campaign by networking with other organizations with similar goals and interests.

One member of the coalition put to their Board "the view that we had to look for a wider coalition because if we tried to use 2005 as a vehicle for debt we would simply end up being in competition with the trade justice network trying to use it as a vehicle for trade and the result of that is that we would probably lose and debt would become a minor issue". They continued that they were "convinced that the only way there would be progress on debt as far as the campaign was concerned was for us to be part of a wider coalition". Smaller groups, therefore, achieved influence and were able to push for the inclusion of policy issues that they collectively deemed important through effective advocacy and networking with similar organizations.

The outbreak of inter-group conflicts as a result of internal power imbalances were also mitigated with regard to whose knowledge and expertise was considered relevant to the campaign. One research participant alluded to this point noting that "once we decided ... the main policy platforms for the campaign, then a lot more power went over to those networks. Obviously, because the trade justice movement then led on the policy area of trade ... the Jubilee debt campaign picked up most of the policy stuff on debt". Therefore, while the decision as to which issues would be the focus of policy change and advocacy within MPH "was very much in

the hands” of the larger agencies, “the way that the details was handed out was much more diffuse and was done through those networks that represented those different interests”.

Similarly, the Working Groups were given “relative freedom” to determine the actions of the campaign in the areas that they were responsible for developing policy. In the words of one member, “obviously the Working Groups had a fair degree of flexibility, but they would have to come back to the Coordination Team with their own strategy that we would then look at and critique and eventually sign off on ... so at any one time the ... strategic elements of the campaign were held within the Coordination Team although it didn’t always work perfectly, far from it in fact”. Thus, while the objectives and strategy of the coalition were set by the Coordination Team, the implementation of that strategy was charged to the Working Groups and networks that it was believed had the knowledge and expertise to effectively address specific policy and operational issues.

While this was “intended to be an empowering process for the Working Groups”, some of the groups got frustrated with the sometimes slow, relatively bureaucratic and sometimes ad-hoc process of distributing resources and adopting policy decisions. One coalition member who was Chairing one of the Working Groups noted that “there were just sort of basic decisions that we couldn’t take we felt we needed a ... coordinator because the agencies were just not providing enough ... resources for us to be able to make the most of opportunities and do what was being asked”. Another research participant concluded: “inevitably again because of the way it was, a wide number of disparate organizations and people trying to work together in quite an ad hoc way of working, that sometimes delivered and sometimes didn’t ... and different people got differently fed up”. Power was, thus, relatively diffused among the membership of the campaign due to effective networking among smaller groups and through recognition of the

knowledge (expertise) of specific group members (i.e., the Working Groups and advocacy networks), but in practice this did not always function smoothly or efficiently.

Moreover, despite this recognition of expertise “some of the Working Groups got extremely de-motivated because they felt that they discussed things at nausea and came to ... lengthy negotiated agreements and then discovered at the next meeting that if the people with the real power and the money hadn’t accepted them they just simply hadn’t been actioned and something else had happened”. This sentiment was also echoed by members in a consideration of the fact that it was the founding organizations of MPH in 2004 who were responsible for the timing and decision to terminate the campaign at the end of 2005. Many of the local activists and people who had given their time voluntarily to the campaign “felt that at the end of the year that was taken away from them, because it was only going to exist for one year and that they had no say in that process”. As one member noted “it was the local activists who said we have put all our efforts into this for three years and we don’t want to give up now ... and then they’re told they can’t use the phrase Make Poverty History because it has now passed and it has now finished, and I was think it was quite horrible for them to swallow really”. All of the members of MPH could continue to use the MPH name “but only with reference to the fact that the campaign was located in 2005 and only with reference to the core issues of aid, trade, debt and HIV/AIDS”. This was to “ensure” that there was “no appearance of the ongoing existence of a coalition”.³¹ Therefore, despite efforts to de-centralize power within certain elements of the campaign, there were clear discrepancies in terms of where the actual decision-making power rested within the coalition.

³¹ Although some members of MPH did attempt to lobby for the decision to terminate MPH at the end of 2005 to be reconsidered, the decision was not revisited. The decision that the coalition would come together for the year 2005 only is outlined in the July 2004 *Founding 2005 Mobilisation Statement* produced for internal use by MPH.

A final area that is worth considering in an evaluation of power dynamics within MPH is the impact and influence of celebrities on the coalition as the campaign was particularly well linked to celebrities. Among the members of MPH interviewed for this study, the “celebrity factor” was mentioned as a significant force in contributing to power imbalances within the coalition for a number of reasons. The first involves the belief among coalition members that they could do little to influence the decisions that celebrities, specifically Bono and Bob Geldof, made as they were not members of the campaign. According to one research participant, “what created some tension was not that anybody felt that it was not desirable to be on the front page of all the papers and to capture the public imagination ... but the tensions came because people felt his [Bob Geldof’s] announcement and revelation came too late, came too late for the agencies who had been involved in the planning of the rallies for a very long time to change track”.³²

Closely related to this point was the inability of MPH to fully appreciate and predict the power of celebrities. Upon reflection, a research participant offered the opinion: “I think at the beginning of the year we just assumed that they would be broadly on our side ... By the end of the G8, ... I certainly thought we had grossly underestimated their role and their power”. Moreover, it was recognized that “we didn’t really have a strategy to deal with them and even if we did have a strategy to deal with them it may have been ineffective, because they are the people that the media recognized them as spokespeople for the campaign generally”. The statement brings to light a third aspect of celebrity power, the indirect power and influence of the phenomenon of “celebrity presence”. This involves the reciprocal cycle of attention and “power”

³² This comment refers to the fact that Bob Geldof announced that he would organize a number of benefit concerts (Live 8) in the G8 countries and South Africa in support of the aims of MPH. However, he announced that the concerts would be held on 2 July 2005, the same day that MPH planned to hold their major protest rally in Edinburgh. Some members of MPH felt that this announcement came too late for MPH to change the scheduled rally and was made without consideration of the fact that the rally had been planned in advance of the concerts.

garnered by celebrities via mass media, which both drives and is driven by the interest and fascination of the general public with “celebrity”.

Among some of the research participants this “celebrity influence” was also termed the “media issue” and the outcome(s) associated with the “celebrity element”. One member of MPH commented on the role that the media played with respect to the relative absence of choice in the responses that MPH could take to Bono and Bob Geldof’s announcement that they were going to hold the Live 8 concerts. They explained that “in a way the media coverage would have gone to them [Bono and Bob Geldof] completely if we had completely disassociated with them”.

Another research participant concurred stating: “I think there was a celebrity element here, in that were they just other political actors we would have been much stronger in defending our ground but because they were celebrities and people knew them ... somehow we kowtowed to them a bit more than we should have and we didn’t, we weren’t, robust enough in our defense of what we wanted”. Ultimately, the impact of the media’s coverage of the celebrities that supported the campaign combined with the “celebrity element” created power imbalances between certain celebrities and MPH that played a part in bringing about internal conflicts within the campaign over how to manage the “celebrity influence”.

- **Representative-Inclusiveness**

Broadly speaking, the MPH campaign exhibited a high degree of representation and inclusion in its membership. MPH was comprised of a wide range of both large, international and national organizations and smaller, “locally”-based groups. This included charities, non-profits, civil society networks, unions, community groups and faith groups. One of “the thing’s that has been relatively remarked about this mobilization was that people were very aware that 550 organizations were a part of it by the end. By the time Make Poverty History ended people

knew that it was the biggest coalition of development organizations that had ever come together”. Furthermore, despite the fact that the central coordination bodies of MPH were UK-based and comprised predominantly of large, international NGOs, logistically speaking, other groups around the world were able to join onto the coalition, forming their own campaigns and using MPH as central “hub” for coordination, knowledge-sharing and joint-action.

Foremost, this took place over the web using IT that linked MPH to other networks through the Global Campaign to Action Against Poverty (GCAP). One coalition member described this inclusiveness stating that “MPH was part of a network of other platforms on top of that, that were set up that year, through the GCAP”. The initial “roots of Make Poverty History”, however, “go back to 2003 when two NGOs were called together, I believe by Oxfam and perhaps one other group ... to discuss what NGOs in the UK, and civil society generally, was going to do in the lead up to the G8”. Furthermore, the fact that smaller “local” groups were able to organize their own events and campaigns, linking to MPH as a means of attracting increased attention to, and support for, their campaigns does represent a step forward in terms of addressing “global”/“local” imbalances and enabling “local” groups to represent themselves.

The initial discussion among “a number of key agencies” then brought in a “wider set of groups”. This occurred through a “series of both formal and informal meetings” between various groups inside the development sector. As one research participant recalled: “Basically a group of organizations got together I think at the beginning of 2004 and by the summer they had decided that they were going to do a big event in Edinburgh and so on ... I think by the summer they were about 60 organizations”. The first time that the “sector as a sector sat done together to talk about what those opportunities might be” was at a “general meeting that was held I believe in the Mother’s Union at Westminster ... some of the agencies who had been thinking about this longer

presented that there were all these opportunities coming up and what we might be able to do with them and asked if people would be interested in forming a kind of ... coalition". Thus, the initial interests vocalized during the campaign's formation were those held by some of the "key agencies", or large UK-based development organizations, though the campaign eventually grew to be inclusive of a number of different voices concerned with bringing about an end to poverty.

Similarly, with regard to the process of structuring the campaign, MPH displayed elements of representative-inclusiveness through recognition and engagement with a number of already existing networks. From early on there was the "sense that this should be a coalition ... the agencies that came together at that very first meeting were very clear that the Coordination Team and the ethos of the spirit of the movement should be mindful of the fact that there were already coalitions that were functioning in the field, that had good ways of working, that were achieving results, that had mobilized and inspired the public". Deriving from a sense of recognition of the expertise of various other networks this spirit of inclusiveness also carried over into the formation of the Coordination Team. On this subject one research participant stated that:

When they [the initial 60 organizations] came to form the Coordination team and organize for Make Poverty History they agreed that there should be three core coalitions within the wider coalition but because trade and debt already existed that was pretty easy. There was also a UK aid network which was pretty embryonic but that got included to give it a kind of balance and then for various internal political reasons the HIV/Aids coalition was included, and the trade unions was seen as being a core group as well. So it was really kind of, yah I mean poverty was the right word, it was about compromises and getting as many people on board and trying to making sure that the thing held together.

Generally speaking, the process of setting up the Coordination Team and determining who it would include was undertaken in a relatively consultative and democratic manner. As a coalition member explained "it was kind of like a democratic process". Likewise, another research participant commented that the bringing together of a "wider set of groups ... then led to a process, which ended up electing and appointing, by a mixture of election and appointment, of

both, the Coordination Team”.³³ Therefore, there was an attempt to enable a range of different interests, concerns and viewpoints to be heard within the Coordination Team.

Set against this “democratic process”, however, there is evidence that suggests that the practice of determining the membership of the Coordination Team was not entirely democratic. Groups were also appointed and/or “co-opted into it [the Coordination Team]. Those were Bond and the three themed networks, which were the trade justice movement, the jubilee debt campaign, the stop aids campaign, and also the unions TUC, (trade unions congress), they were also co-opted into the Coordination Team because people thought that they were needed”. One research participant explained that in forming the Coordination Team:

there was the classic problem with coalitions, which is how do you make something which is seen to be open, relatively democratic, listening to people who are involved, and yet actually involving the key players who will deliver what needs to be delivered. So the way that it was done was to have the core coalitions included and then put the remaining places up for a vote from the organizations that had joined MPH at the beginning.

In essence, the issue was principally, “how do you make sure that Oxfam, Save the Children and so on are involved because it would be suicidal if six key organizations weren’t involved in the coordination then it would be massively not helping the delivery of what we needed”.

Also interesting, in terms of the overall inclusiveness of MPH, is the fact that by the time that the coalition had grown to be more than 500 members the Coordination Team had already been chosen.³⁴ Therefore, inevitably in some respects the campaign was not able to be fully representative of its membership, at least at the level of the Coordination Team. According to a member “when that vote was taken ... for who would be on the Coordination Team I think there was about 40-50 organizations. Twelve months later there was 550 organizations, and the

³³ According to the revised January 2005 internal Terms of Reference for MPH, the Coordination Team consisted of 4 appointed Networks (Jubilee Debt Campaign, Trade Justice Movement, BOND and Stop AIDS Campaign), 10 members elected by the Assembly and 3 co-opted members (Trades Union Congress, Scottish MPH and GCAP).

³⁴ The Coordination Team was chosen by an Assembly of 40 MPH members early on in the campaign before it grew to over 500. This has led to criticisms that the Coordination Team was unrepresentative of the larger membership (Martin, Culey and Evans 2005, 78).

timescale was such that there was no point in repeating the vote”. Moreover, “what people have lost sight of over time is that at the beginning there was a very small number of organizations that decided the policy platform and then invited other people to sign up if they agreed that there should be a campaign ... so once the policy parameters were set then other people couldn’t amend them if they joined 8 months later”. The formation of the Coordination Team, thus, implies that a “balance” was struck within the campaign in attempting to be inclusive of a wide range of groups, on the one hand, while being cognizant of time constraints and the issue of how to involve the most influential players on the other.

This is also true of the process of determining who would be a member of the various Working Groups. Within the Coordination Team it was decided that “we should have Working Groups that looked at function rather than area ... what it was decided that the Working Groups could usefully do was coordinate between people who shared the same discipline, but across different organizations with different policy identities. So it was decided that media specialists should meet together, campaigning specialists should meet together”. In this way the Working Groups were structured to be inclusive of groups with similar skills yet that held different ideologies, while also focusing on specific issues-areas and involving experts in those issue-areas respectively. This was not an all together inclusive process as the Working Groups were premised on the involvement of individuals and groups with particular sets of skills and knowledge. Most “member organizations, or the ones that could, would send people, for example, there was a media Working Group and so in member organizations the media officer would be sent to the media group to contribute in that way ... and there was a policy and lobbying group which included of course people who work on policy and lobbying”. The fact that not all of the groups involved in the coalition could afford to contribute one or more of their

staff members to participate in one of the Working Groups raises questions over the extent to which the decisions of the Working Groups reflected the number and diversity of the viewpoints that existed within the wider coalition.

Finally, research participants also commented that they felt that the degree of representative-inclusiveness and public support for MPH imbued the campaign with a significant amount of legitimacy and credibility. As one member noted, “we didn’t particularly feel that our legitimacy came from the fact that we were part of civil society and, therefore, we were answerable to every other part of civil society, we felt our legitimacy came from the fact that we had by that point mobilized billions of people”. Furthermore, with regard to “public support”, one coalition member expressed their view that, “I think the key difference for me between this and everything that came before was the total popularism in its DNA ... so from the very beginning there was a respect and understanding of the British public and I think that campaigns who want to emulate our success should be aiming to adopt that level of respect for the public”. In the end the coalition did exhibit a high degree of representative-inclusiveness through its commitment to strong public representation and inclusive membership across a wide range of organizations and networks. However, the process of forming the Coordination Team and Working Groups did not fully reflect the representative-inclusive principles of democracy and participation and was a source of inter-group tension within the campaign.

- **Trust**

A central way in which a sense of trust and a “commonality of purpose” were fostered among coalition members was through regular face-to-face meetings between representatives of the groups involved in the campaign. The Assembly met together every six to eight weeks and the “Coordination Team met up every two weeks except for in the run up to the G8, probably for

about two months before the G8 we met every week for half a day”. In addition, “every month or so, or was it six weeks, I can’t remember, we had an away day, so we had a whole day together, we actually met quite a lot ... also a number of subgroups, who met by phone or physically throughout the year”. The intensity of face-to-face meetings among members of the campaign, however, did limit the ability of smaller organizations to fully participate. As one research participant explained: “It did take up a lot of people’s time, the bigger organizations can usually spare one person but obviously the smaller ones couldn’t really give up what they were doing”. Although it should be noted that the inability of certain groups to participate to the same extent as others did lead to the perpetuation of certain power dynamics within MPH, these face-to-face meetings did help to build a sense of trust and partnership across the campaign.

Further evidence of an attempt to build sustainable relationships and a sense of rapport among members can be found in the level of commitment of members of the Coordination Team who met regularly in person and “also met by phone if we had to” in order to determine, and coordinate, the activities of the campaign. Furthermore, it was felt among some members of the coalition that the very legitimacy and credibility of MPH “was drawn from the fact that we could claim with credibility to be voicing the demands and dreams of billions of people”. Indeed, the belief that the campaign was “rooted in respect for ordinary people” was cited as a hallmark of the success of the campaign in earning the “trust” of the public.

Significant challenges in building and sustaining trust among coalition members did arise with regard to the relationship between the Coordination Team and some of the Working Groups. One example of this challenge can be seen in issues that arose over the Live 8 concerts. This was because members of the Coordination Team “were given privately and were sworn to secrecy the information that Live 8 was being planned and there was then a long period, it

seemed like a lifetime, I think it was six to eight weeks that we were privy to that information but nobody else was supposed to know about it”. In effect, this “meant that the whole planning for the day that Make Poverty History was doing for July 2 in Edinburgh was effectively put on hold because we couldn’t continue the planning until we knew what was happening with Live 8”. Moreover, the “really difficult thing was that we couldn’t tell anyone in the various groups that were doing the work why we couldn’t give them the go ahead to go ahead and they got incredibly frustrated ... actually the Coordination Team lost the confidence of large numbers who were involved in different aspects because they just thought they were being messed about”.

Research participants further mentioned concerns for the campaign’s legitimacy, credibility and representation as “we were very consciously representing local activists who wanted to know ... do we get trains to Edinburgh, do we bring people in coaches, what are the arrangements, and day after day was passing by and we couldn’t tell them”. Ultimately, although the events surrounding the announcement of Live 8 did create challenges in terms of building and maintaining levels of trust, the frequency of face-to-face meetings within MPH contributed to fostering the social structures and networks necessary for sustaining collective action and facilitating trust among members.

- **Genuine Dialogue & Communication**

During the MPH campaign communication links between members were primarily fostered through the establishment of consultative decision-making fora. The origins of these communication linkages were driven by questions both of process, (such as the means by which strategic communication should proceed) and substance, (specifically, determining the coalition’s key outcomes and objectives). As stated by one coalition member, “my memory of it was that there were a lot of discussions about process so there would be, how are we going to set

up this new group that we need to set up, how's it going to work, ... then there would be discussions about our membership, ... when do we want to have our big mobilizations what are the key moments of the year, how do we make them work". Once the campaign commenced attempts continued to facilitate a setting in which genuine dialogue could take place that allowed for the inclusion of diverse perspectives regarding what actions and policies should be adopted within the coalition. Members of the Coordination Team "always tried to make time once we got started in 2005, we put aside time to discuss political dynamics of what was going on around these issues, where we were, what we needed to do tactically". Thus, from the beginning an effort was made to create a communicative setting that enabled space for deliberative and reflective dialogue to take place among members of MPH.

Communication and dialogue did not entirely take place within an open, deliberative forum, however, as vertical chains of communication were established through which certain messages were conveyed "downwards" to members of the coalition. First, regarding the formation of the Working Groups, the Coordination Team "had people with relative seniority inside their organizations who were able to commit the resources of their organization, ... the Coordination Team was able to meet for a couple months to work out what the shape of it should be and then tell staff lower down in the organizations that they should be attending the meetings of the Working Groups". Therefore, the "Working Groups didn't spring up organically, the Working Groups were decided upon and deliberately formed and then staffed ... with the consent of senior level managers who were able to tell their staff that they really ought to be going to these Working Groups that they themselves had decided should be set up". This not only impacted the sense of ownership and control over the Working Groups by those who were

members, but also negatively affected power balances and the democratic processes of the campaign.

Second, vertical communication chains also existed between the Coordination Team and the Working Groups once the Working Groups were operational. With regard to these chains of communication, one research participant declared that “basically that was the model that they chose so that the Coordination Team would sort of give directly to those groups [the Working Groups] and the groups would report back and at least for the main Working Groups there was one member of the Coordination Team who was sort of the link to that group”. Often these communication chains rested on power structures or imbalances that existed between members.

It should be noted, however, that chains of communication between the various Working Groups and the Coordination Team did help to foster strong communication links across different segments of the coalition. The structure of the coalition was such that it created “quite a complex matrix of trying to keep in touch with other different groups. If the media group was being asked to help to do the publicity for the event in Edinburgh it needed to know what the details about the event in Edinburgh were, and then of course you’d have people saying well if you want to make the most of that from the media you ought to be doing X rather than Y”. Thus, to a large degree the decision to have a Coordination Team member act as a liaison between the Working Groups and the Coordination Team was taken with the notion in mind that “the Coordination Team was simply trying to make sure that there was the right coordination between the various Working Groups”.

Other power-based (vertical) chains of communication also existed in the coalition. This includes the ways that dialogue took place between members of civil society, celebrities and the G8 leaders at the G8 Summit. One research participant described this process in the context of

the summit stating: “There was a peculiar moment at Gleneagles when I went with two or three others at Gleneagles to talk to Richard Curtis who was then going back to the main part of Gleneagles where the Presidents and Prime Ministers were talking to Geldof”. They continued that:

there was partly a discussion about you know, you’ve got the angle from Geldof and Richard Curtis, that were reporting back that they were working hard to persuade Presidents and leaders to do things that they don’t really want to do, so if they do it you’ve got to give them some credit otherwise they’ll wonder why on earth they, why on earth they bothered. Our perspective was that we set out at the beginning of the year what needs to be done to make poverty history, and if they don’t do it we need to say thanks for what you have done but there’s still more needed, and I can understand exactly both points of view.

These chains of communication between members of MPH, celebrities and G8 leaders clearly reveal imbalances with regard to the lack of direct access of members of MPH to the G8 leaders and, thus, also the relative inability of MPH to directly influence the types of policies that were adopted by G8 leaders.

With regard to the type(s) of communication and dialogue that took place between the Coordination Team and celebrities present at the G8 Summit, several of the research participants commented that although lines of communication did exist, in large part these existed informally and only between certain coalition members that were well linked to the celebrities. For example, in the case of Richard Curtis and Comic Relief, “those guys were very well linked to Bob Geldof and his people”. Once Live 8 was officially announced, “we had several meetings with Bob Geldof and there were meetings with Richard Curtis. First we tried to get him to change the date and when we realized that he wasn’t going to change the date we tried to get him to accommodate us in various ways, not that he was particularly listening, but ... there was lines of communication open”.

This raises questions regarding the extent to which opportunities existed for the reflective interchange and relationship-building necessary for genuine dialogue to take place between

coalition members and celebrities associated with the campaign. Not all of the coalition members interviewed, however, agreed on the extent to which efforts to engage celebrities were unproductive and unfruitful. One research participant commented that “to be fair I had a long conversation with Geldof ... and he was insistent that he understood what Make Poverty History was asking for ... and that he was working hard to get statements made at Gleneagles ... and I think that’s true”. Therefore, there was general agreement among the research participants that there were means of communication and a general consensus that these means of communication were not always “open” to all members or that they were conducive to creating an environment in which genuine dialogue could take place. MPH members expressed somewhat different views, though, regarding the usefulness and effectiveness of the utilization of more informal chains of communication to engage in policy discussion with key actors and leaders.

There has also been some debate regarding the degree of genuine dialogue that took place at certain times during the campaign between representatives of government and MPH. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, however, this questioning has not been directed entirely toward government’s action toward MPH, but also brought up with respect to MPH’s relations with government. As one participant commented, “I think ... in terms of our relations with the government that we could have been a bit more honest with them. I think they claimed to be very surprised when in Gleneagles we were more critical of the G8 than they expected us to be and I think that was partly because we were probably nice, the people doing the lobbying of the government ... probably nicer to those people that they should have been”. They continued: “I think they [the lobbyists] gave the impression that we were basically going to do what the government wanted ... and we basically didn’t do that. In the governments view ... we let them down, I don’t think for a moment that we did let them down but I think we could have been

much clearer about when we were going to hit them, over what and under what circumstances”. This failure to clearly communicate the position of MPH to government is considered by some members of the coalition to have negatively affected the levels of genuine dialogue that took place between the two parties over the course of the campaign. Ultimately, communication within MPH centrally took place within two types of communication structures: horizontal and vertical. These structures both facilitated open-communication and genuine dialogue and impeded it via vertical chains of communication and the channels that were chosen to convey certain messages to external actors and stakeholders, including government.

- **Identity, Ideology and Values**

Differences in social/group and individual/personal identity(ies), ideology(ies) and values among members of MPH were frequently brought up by research participants as a source of tension and conflict within the coalition. These differences were expressed through the various social behaviors and actions exhibited by coalition members during the campaign. Regarding the collective social/group, or inter-group, identity(ies) of the campaign, two specific issue areas were linked by research participants to inter-group conflicts. The first is linked to levels of commitment among coalition members to work with one another to achieve goals and maintain cohesiveness within the campaign without compromising their group’s sense of identity and its ideology(ies) and values. The second concerns member attitudes and beliefs in relation to the role(s) of celebrity.

In terms of the position of coalition members toward maintaining campaign cohesiveness, one research participant noted that differences arose between organizations in terms of “how much they were willing to compromise in order to work together”. This reflects trade-offs inherent in establishing inter-group processes to achieve agreed upon goals and objectives that

do not also compromise a sense of identity(ies) among members. Coalition members who worked, or had worked, with government in the past “were really worried about compromising their position, by putting them into a message that might be too critical or would have compromised their relationship with government. On the other side, the more radical ones didn’t want to be seen as compromising on what they had been pushing on for years with their supporters”. One research participant concluded that these “sets of people weren’t going to agree readily on policy demands or political tactics so those things had to be worked out and had to be thrashed out”. Differences in the commitment of members toward maintaining campaign cohesiveness and their willingness to engage with and/or be “critical” of government and IIs were, therefore, expressions of the different group identities, ideologies and values of members that sometimes manifested themselves in inter-group conflicts.

Moreover, there was a perceived “danger” among some coalition members “of government trying to co-opt the campaign because in a way they [the G8 leaders] went to the G8 saying that they were putting international development on the agenda and Africa on the agenda and Tony Blair had launched the Commission for Africa. It was for them a lot of good opportunities for pushing on their own personal agendas”. In part, these concerns reflect the different ideological perspectives of the groups involved in MPH regarding the importance they placed on maintaining inter-group cohesiveness. They also highlight the delicate balance that individuals and groups attempted to strike between upholding their individual/personal and social/group identities, ideologies and values and preserving the cohesion and collective identity of the campaign. These choices have important ramifications for the success of inter-group partnerships in not only realizing the goals and objectives of the partnership, but also with regard to the types of conflicts that emerge within inter-group partnerships.

Thus, in MPH the different individual/personal and social/group identities that members brought into the partnership impacted the ideological stances they adopted, values they expressed, behavioral choices they made and actions they took that often resulted in inter-group conflicts. Several of the research participants referred to the emergence of social/group identity-related conflicts in their discussion of the temporary withdrawal from the Coordination Team of one of its members, the World Development Movement. Among the reasons given by participants as possible explanations for the withdrawal were related to differences in the identity(ies), ideology(ies) and values of the World Development Movement and those that were being reflected in the decisions of the Coordination Team. These include “issues of compromise and tactics that were being used” by the Team and coalition, generally, as well as “serious political differences” between groups like the World Development Movement “who were on the left [of the political spectrum] if you like” and “groups like Comic Relief and to some extent Oxfam who were seen as being more on the right”. This was another way in which different inter-group identities and values were expressed and became sites of conflict in the campaign.

Differences in ideology between members of MPH were also conveyed through accusations that the coalition “sold out” to the interests of government and the G8 as well as in levels of inter-group competitiveness between coalition members. According to a research participant, “there was a small group on the left, who, not particularly on the Coordination Team, but outside it who tried to at various times ambush the campaign basically saying it had sold out in different ways”. There is also some evidence that indicates that inter-group competitiveness, in terms of the ideological stance adopted by some members toward others in the development sector, could have been another source of inter-group conflict.

As one research participant commented, “if you asked people what they learned from Jubilee 2000, organizations learned that if you create coalitions that have such an impact, the important brand name gets so much attention, then you create something that potentially becomes a competitor, that was why they set out very clearly to organize MPH in a way that it could not continue and become a competitive brand name”. In the end, however, the decision to end the campaign resulted in “quite a bitter final meeting of MPH. ... it was the local activists who said we have put all our efforts into this for three years and we don’t want to give up now ... and then they’re told they can’t use the phrase MPH because it has now passed and it has now finished, and I was think it was quite horrible for them to swallow really”. Ultimately, one of the central reasons for inter-group conflicts at the ideological and identity-level can be found in differences in the willingness of group members to retain the cohesiveness of the campaign by working together and by engaging with members of government and IIs.

The second major area where identity, ideology and value-related inter-group conflicts occurred was over the issue of celebrity involvement in, and endorsement of, the campaign. According to the research participants, there was some “disquiet and debate about whether some of the very populist aims and endorsement that the campaign used from the very beginning ... might alienate some of our more traditional activist base”. This was because some members “felt quite compromised being linked to Make Poverty History because of that celebrity issue was one again that people felt different degrees of uneasiness about what was happening”. In some respects this “crystallized the whole tension there was within the Make Poverty History movement ... about the celebrity involvement. As you can probably imagine there were some who said we’ve got to do our thing, and actually they’re unhelpful, they cloud the issues, they

don't know the issues well enough, they represent us without being accountable to us we ought to just go ahead and do what we need to do".

Another source of tension with regard to differences of belief over the role(s) of celebrity can be found in the influence and impact of the media on the campaign. The "reality was that once it [Live 8] was announced ... the media interest in Make Poverty History grew exponentially, and it was because in the media's eyes Live 8 was all part of Make Poverty History and there was no point in us trying to explain, well actually its Bob Geldof and he has nothing to do with us and that he has been a real pain in the neck". Therefore, even though some members of the campaign were "discomforted by endorsement by celebrities that they didn't feel had a long history of engagement on the issues", the coalition "at the same time ... kind of got along with it" due in large part to the enhanced attention that the media brought to the campaign after Live 8 was announced.

Furthermore, in the aftermath of the G8 Summit, there was considerable discontent among MPH members over the possibility of being associated with some of the comments made by the celebrities, particularly Bob Geldof, at the post-summit press conference. The tension over the issue of celebrity "exploded again when after the G8 at Gleneagles Geldof announced that they [the G8 leaders] had done a really good job and the Coordination Team had been spending hours trying to work out what we wanted to say and the message that we wanted to give and of course Geldof wasn't subject to any of that process". Similarly, another research participant reflected that "I think after the G8 there was quite a lot of ill feeling to be honest between most members of the Coordination Team and the way that particularly Bob Geldof had reacted at the joint press conference at the G8 ... I think he realized and certainly his people have said to us since then that he made something of a technical or tactical error in saying that there was a 10/10

on aid and things”. This reflects ideological and identity-related differences that were occurring not only within the campaign but also between MPH and influential celebrities, most notably Bob Geldof.

Not all MPH members held a negative opinion of the involvement of celebrities, however, and some spoke quite favorably of the heightened attention, impact and influence that celebrities were able to bring to the campaign. In one research participant’s opinion, the “celebrity endorsement was to my mind absolutely critical to the campaign’s success. It was what got us into the tabloids and it was when the campaign was regularly featured in the tabloids that the government was most nervous”. Regardless of the personal views and beliefs of the research participants concerning celebrity endorsement of the campaign, all of the research participants did admit to the increased media attention and coverage of the campaign that celebrities were able to provide.

Finally, differences of belief regarding the role(s) of celebrity in the campaign also extended to debates over issues of celebrity identity, ideology(ies) and values. Several of the research participants mentioned the distinction that they made, and that they believed the Coordination Team in general made, between the identities and ideological motivations of various celebrities involved in the campaign. A distinction was also made between those celebrities that were sought out to endorse the campaign and those that operated independently, albeit with links to MPH. As one research participant noted, “I think that there has to be quite a firm distinction drawn and I think most people involved in the mobilization and the media and certainly the government would draw this distinction between celebrity endorsement in general and the role of Bono and Bob”. Similarly, another research participant commented that “one of the interesting discussion points ... was the extent to which ... there are clearly two kinds of

celebrities. There was first off Bono and Bob Geldof who know about the issues, have a long term commitment to the issues, have an expertise on the issues ... and they are in a different category to the other celebrities who came on board and did various things that they can do". For example, "Claudia Scheiffer fronted a press conference for us but nobody assumed Claudia was an expert on debt for Africa". Bono and Bob Geldof were, thus, thought to be in a "different category to the other celebrities" by most of the research participants, although coalition members had varied responses as to what they believed to be the ideological and identity-related factors that set Bono and Bob Geldof apart from other celebrities.

These perspectives ranged from a positive view that saw the involvement of Bono and Bob Geldof as motivated by philanthropic concern and as a key factor in the success of the campaign to more skeptical standpoints that asserted that their actions might be more closely aligned with their own personal ideologies and sense of self-importance as celebrities. The more positive perspective can be seen in the statement of one research participant who attributed some of the success of the campaign to "Bob's unparalleled reach and history with the British public on the issues". They asserted that Bono and Bob Geldof "recruited a lot of people involved in the campaign" and that "actually, Bono and Bob Geldof's long public activism and engagement on the issues created the political climate in which MPH could be a success".

According to a more skeptical observer, however, "by the end of the G8 ... I certainly thought we had grossly underestimated their role and their power and also underestimated the degree to which they were going to go off message ... to deliver something entirely different actually, they weren't working for our objectives they had their own objectives". Yet another research participant described the reaction of some of the members of MPH to Bob Geldof's announcement of Live 8 as feeling as though they were "giving in to one man's egotistic process

that was not going to be helpful, not helpful in the long run”. Therefore, differing views on the identity, ideology(ies) and values of the celebrities involved, particularly the manner and motivations of Bono and Bob Geldof’s engagement with MPH and the campaign’s objectives helped to fuel inter-group conflicts within the campaign.

Throughout the campaign, differences in social/group identity(ies), ideology(ies) and values among MPH members were cited as a source of conflict within the coalition. Interestingly, however, none of the research participants brought up or discussed at any great length the influence of culture, ethnicity or gender on bringing about inter-group conflict. While it is possible that these factors did not play a significant role in identity-related conflicts that arose within the coalition, it is also conceivable that these factors manifested themselves in other ways such as through miscommunication or power imbalances. The symbolic-level conflicts that were discussed by members of MPH, however, were reflected in the behaviors and actions of coalition members. These include: member willingness to work together and with government and leaders of the G8 to maintain campaign cohesiveness, how “critical” coalition members desired the responses of MPH to be toward government and G8 policy, vocalized political platforms and attitudes concerning the role(s) and identity(ies) of celebrity.

- **Expected Outcomes**

For the most part, differences or disagreements over specific expected outcomes of the campaign appear not to have played a significant role in the emergence of inter-group conflicts within the coalition. What does appear to have been a key factor in causing disputes among members was the manner in which the campaign sought to achieve its central goals and objectives and the different ideological perspectives held by coalition members. When asked about how the goals, areas of foci and outcomes of the coalition were determined, the research

participants generally agreed that the origins, despite existing power imbalances, did rest on a general consensus and discussion among the development and non-profit community in the UK. They agreed that 2005 presented “a whole set of different opportunities” for action. Most notably this included the fact that “the G8 was due to be back to back in Britain in 2005”, and that Britain held “the Chairship of the European Union”.

Therefore, there began to be a significant amount of discussion about what, broadly speaking, should be the focus of a campaign. According to one member of the coalition “there began to be conversations about how organizations could work together as they had with Jubilee 2000 before the 1998 G8 in Britain to maximize this particular opportunity for anti-poverty campaigning”. Furthermore, “there was some hint from the British government that became very explicit further down the line that they were going to focus on Africa, the organizations appeared that the focus they wanted to pursue was poverty, globally, rather than just Africa, that was why it was Make Poverty History as opposed to Make Poverty in Africa History”. There was some debate, however, in terms of the specific issue-areas that should form the central foundation of the outcomes that the campaign would seek to achieve. Early on some of the organizations who were involved in MPH “recognized that they needed to have, or they wanted to have, a broader focus than just debt. There were some who argued very strongly that it should just be a trade focus, obviously the ones in the trade justice network particularly argued for that. There were others who thought that for the general public and the government there were issues about aid flows and resources”. Campaign members were, thus, relatively “alike” in terms of their perception of the opportunities that existed for strategic action in 2005 and oriented themselves to the best of their ability so as to maximize the benefits for their cause(s) and organization(s) associated with being a part of the campaign.

Another area related to expected outcomes has to do not so much with the specific objectives of the coalition, but with its overarching vision and expected achievements as a campaign to make poverty history. The campaign did a relatively good job of generating a shared vision and joint goals for the coalition that were outlined in detail in the coalition's manifesto. Alliance members, therefore, had a clear sense of what the campaign stood for and what were the expected outcomes both in terms of policy and as a coalition, though this does not imply that conflicts among members did not arise with regard to these issue-areas. Furthermore, from the "very beginning it was cited that the campaign if it was going to achieve more than any other development campaign in the past would need to do things different need to access mainstream commercial television audience and need to access a main tabloid press, human interest press and women's magazines and so on". It was, thus, recognized that members would, generally speaking, need to consent to strategically orienting themselves toward some degree of connection to mainstream media in order to achieve the overarching outcomes of the coalition as a campaign to end poverty and "achieve more than any other development campaign". As discussed in the section above, it was here where inter-group conflicts and disagreement over the campaign's orientation and manner in which it achieved its strategic goals as well as the costs associated with membership in the campaign became prevalent.

The above sections have dealt with variables that influenced and impacted the emergence and manifestation of inter-group conflicts within Make Poverty History. These included structural, relational and symbolic factors as well as those addressed in the literature on Organizational Theory and Identity-based Conflicts. The inter-group conflict variables explored were: power, representative-inclusiveness, trust, communication and genuine dialogue, identity(ies), ideology(ies) and values and expected outcomes. The subsequent section examines

the dispute resolution mechanisms and processes that were implemented to manage and resolve conflicts that arose within the campaign.

6.3 Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Utilized:

For the most part, informal dispute resolution processes were used to address the types of inter-group tensions and conflicts that arose within MPH. More formal dispute resolution mechanisms were also utilized within the coalition, although they were not necessarily referred to as such, in an attempt to help mitigate inter-group conflicts in ways that were in line with the “spirit” and ethos of the campaign. Among the dispute resolution strategies and styles employed by the coalition were: problem-solving negotiation and compromise, consensus-building, voting, caucusing and mediation and facilitation.³⁵

Problem-solving based negotiation and compromise were two mechanisms used by coalition members to manage and resolve inter-group conflict. These strategies and styles of conflict resolution were employed for a variety of different types of inter-group conflicts, both substantive and symbolic. According to one member, “there was you know problem solving, trouble shooting, sometimes the Chair of one of the Working Groups resigned or there would be a big fight in another one, you know those type of things, we would have to trouble shoot those kinds of things”. Decisions with regard to how “combative” the campaign should be, “where are we going to allocate our budget”, how to “resolve a difference in tone or opinion between different Working Groups” were among the issues that MPH attempted to manage through negotiation and compromise.

Reflecting on the outcomes of these types of negotiations, a research participant commented: “we worked through a lot of the issues and we came to compromises and we did business with each other and it was functional at that level”. Problem-solving negotiation

³⁵ See Appendix D for a glossary of Dispute Resolution mechanisms and strategies described in this study.

consists of using negotiation tactics that are “designed to identify and exploit opportunities for problem-solving and joint gain”, (Gifford 1989, 17). Generally speaking, however, problem-solving negotiation fosters an accommodative working environment and relationship between individuals and/or groups and it may not result in an outcome that fully satisfies the interests of all those involved in the negotiation. This is because problem-solving negotiations are often inherently compromising as they imply “an exchange of concessions on different issues” (Gifford 1989, 23) and, therefore, that the individuals/groups involved have sacrificed some of their interests in order to reach a solution. Furthermore, because disputants bargain over a perceived ideal outcome through an “exchange of concessions” problem-solving negotiations can become lengthy processes, giving way to inefficiencies (Fisher and Ury 1991, 4), and fail to provide the most satisfying solutions by not looking past perceived ideal outcomes to deeper-level interests motivating disputants.

Inter-group conflicts within the coalition were also managed using consensus-building and consensus-based decision-making. Consensus-building was used within the Coordination Team and among the Working Groups to try and reach unanimous agreement on issues regarding policy and orientation or direction of the campaign. Consensus-based decision-making was used to resolve a number of conflicts, ranging from high-level symbolic disagreements over policy and policy responses to substantive issues such as branding and advertising, fundraising elements and “whether or not things like when Bob Geldof announced his concert should we move our demonstration”.

A research participant described their experience with the consensus-building process saying that “I think it was a lot of discussions ..., for example in Edinburgh we had to decide on a response to the G8 and obviously that was done in advance, ... and it just took a long time to

agree on each word, ... it was really a lot of time discussing and agreeing on basically a single word until most people sort of could live with it". Similarly, with regard to the time investment required to engage in consensus-building another coalition member commented that "of course there were discussions and it took more time. It was slower as well, so the reaction time, things got done later than we would have wanted, in terms of for example, advertising or media work because it was more difficult to agree because of course it takes longer to consult with everyone". Research participants expressed frustration over the widespread use of consensus-based decision-making as it was thought to be too long and, ultimately, ineffectual in resolving certain conflicts. They "found the style of the coalition slightly too aiming for consensus when it wasn't always possible and I think that maybe sometimes that took up too much time and when we knew actually we were going to have to take a vote". This suggests that, generally speaking, the principle of consensus was valued above efficiency within the coalition. It also indicates that for the sake of upholding the appearance of democratic and participatory decision-making sometimes consensus-building was used when it might not have been the most effective and efficient dispute resolution mechanism to manage the inter-group conflicts that arose during the campaign.

When consensus could not be reached among coalition members, voting was also utilized, but on a far less regular basis than efforts to build consensus. As one member explained, "there were votes, by and large we had a debate that was oriented at consensus, but when it was clear that was not going to emerge there were votes". Voting was, therefore, utilized as a kind of last resort or final alternative to make decisions and solve conflicts. When asked about the use of voting as a dispute resolution and decision-making tool another research participant explained that:

sometimes we would take a vote but very rarely actually. You know, I would be much more for you know getting into the vote more quickly if you could see that people were stuck in their positions and couldn't move, because in a sense then it's easier rather than talking about compromise sometimes it's easier to let them lose and move on and as I say that did happen sometimes. I don't think it happened in the Working Groups very much, I think it was more likely to happen in the Coordination Team, but voting was certainly a tool that we used some of the time.

Even though it was used sparingly, voting was a cause for concern among some members of MPH with regard to the fairness and equity of the use of voting as a tool for decision-making and resolution of conflicts within the campaign. One respondent noted that "what was interesting about this [the use of voting] was that it was so clearly from the beginning not a straight representative democracy of votes between equals because it couldn't be because the resource differential was so massive between members". The reasons for this were twofold. On the one hand, inequalities existed in terms of representation between larger organizations that could afford to devote a representative from their organization to serve on MPH full-time and smaller groups that could not. On the other hand, as discussed above, there were also imbalances in terms of power due to resource differentials and, thus, who had de facto control over decisions made concerning the campaign. These two factors created certain biases and "weighted" the votes in favor of the larger, better resourced members of the campaign.

Caucusing was a third dispute resolution mechanism utilized by the coalition during meetings of the Coordination Team and Working Groups. The decision to invoke a caucus was primarily in the hands of the Chair(s) of the Coordination Team and the Working Groups. Interestingly, with regard to the previously noted general inclination of the campaign to place participation and consensus-building above efficiency, concerns over time commitment and efficiency were the most prominent reasons raised by research participants for calling a caucus. When conflicts arose between certain members of the Coordination Team or within a Working Group that appeared to be intractable or where disputants remained "stuck" in their positions, a

caucus might be called and the “Chair, would ... try to have conversation in between meetings”. The “Chair of the group would try and facilitate discussions between the disagreeing members and maybe take them out of the room, maybe not depending on his/her judgment ... and sometimes it would mean setting up a separate sub-group that would have to meet to thrash things out in private so as not to take up all the time of the 15 people in the room”. Caucusing was, thus, one tool for resolving inter-group conflicts between members of MPH that was established and implemented on the basis of a consideration of the voluntary time investment that was being demanded of the members of the Coordination Team and Working Groups.

As processes for resolving inter-group conflicts, facilitation and mediation were used rather “loosely” or informally, with facilitation appearing to be favored above mediation. Broadly speaking, however, it appears that, for the most part, principles of both facilitation and mediation were used interchangeably or alongside one another within the campaign. As they were used on an informal basis that is without officially hiring a “neutral” third party outside of the campaign to facilitate and/or mediate the disputes, it does not appear that any formal distinction was made between when one process was specifically being used and not the other.³⁶ Thus, for the purposes of the analysis a distinction is made on the basis of “loose” indicators that may suggest when facilitation was being used as opposed to mediation.³⁷ These include: the size of the group involved in the dispute, the likely intensity of the conflict, the degree of emphasis on group process and the complexity of the issues. However, since these differences are subtle, it might be most straightforward for the reader to conceive of the two mechanisms as being jointly

³⁶ It should be noted that although none of the research participants indicated that any of the members of MPH who took on the role of facilitator or mediator had any formal training, it was mentioned that those member groups who had experience facilitating and/or mediating disputes within their own organizations did take on an advisory role with regard to the use of these dispute resolution processes in MPH.

³⁷ See: Isenhardt and Spangle 2000, 108 for an overview of indicators that can be used to distinguish between facilitated and mediated dispute resolution processes.

applied throughout the campaign for the purposes of enhancing longer-term communication processes among disputants and to help the parties involved come to decisions and resolve conflicts through dialogue.

One area where it seems likely that facilitation was used was in disputes that arose among the Assembly and between the Assembly and the Coordination Team. This is because: **(1)** the size of the group was extremely large (540 organizations, although in practice not all Assembly members attended meetings), **(2)** there was a high degree of complexity over the issues and how best to manage them and **(3)** there was a strong emphasis on group process and creating consensus. With regard to the Assembly a coalition member commented that:

there was disagreements in that group or between that group and the Coordination Team, ... and we had to manage that differently ... we used I think quite sophisticated techniques, of which those organizations that had large memberships and local groups so Bond, Christian Aid, CAFOD, that are quite expert at managing those situations because they have to do it within their own organizations, managing these different very complex and sometimes very emotional disagreements they might have within their own organizations, ... those organizations are based on memberships and groups and they were able to advise us and we could let them sort of really guide us in terms of how to play this big set piece, that deals with the Assembly.

The term “facilitator” was also directly used with regard to the process of making decisions within the Assembly. For each decision that was required to be made in an Assembly meeting “a member of the Coordination Team will introduce the background and content of the proposals; the facilitator will then invite those who have asked to make contributions or raise issues to do so, and will facilitate discussion on these”. Facilitation was, thus, the term coined for the process of decision-making within the Assembly.

Where it appears mediation was used was in smaller group settings, such as disputes that took place within the Coordination Team and Working Groups, where **(1)** the intensity of the conflict might be higher due to greater personal knowledge of one another and the groups they represented, **(2)** the issues were more well-defined as the scale was smaller and **(3)** the types of issue-areas that these groups addressed were clearly laid out. As one research participant

commented, “if it was a policy dispute it would have been in the group that I chaired the policy and lobbying group, ... and if it was specific to subject ... like debt, it would have been thrashed out by Jubilee Debt campaign”. Ultimately, as the distinguishing indicators remain vague between the two mechanisms it is most useful to recognize that the guiding principles and characteristics of both processes were considered by members of the coalition and attempts were made to include them in the operative and strategic functions of the campaign.

This chapter has provided an Inter-Group Conflict Analysis of Make Poverty History. An “Organizational Profile” of MPH was first presented that included a consideration of some of the structural and organizational characteristics of the campaign, defining it, ultimately, as both a multi-stakeholder “event” and “campaign” coalition and as a transnational network. Second, the Analysis evaluated MPH against a number of structural, communicative-relational and symbolic factors that were drawn from a theoretical reflection on Inter-Group Conflict Theory as principal factors in influencing and impacting the outbreak of inter-group conflicts. These were: power, representative-inclusiveness, trust, genuine dialogue and communication, ideology(ies), identity(ies) and values and expected outcomes. The final section of this chapter explored the dispute resolution mechanisms, including conflict strategies and styles, which were used by MPH in an attempt to manage and resolve conflicts. Attention will be turned in Chapter 7 toward the development of several “best practices” based on the experience of MPH and to offering dispute resolution processes and recommendations that can be utilized by TCS (and other socio-economic) partnerships in the future to better manage and resolve inter-group conflict.

Chapter 7: Building “Best Practices” Managing and Resolving Inter-Group Conflicts – Process and Design Recommendations

This chapter seeks to develop a set of “best practices” for TCS partnerships by considering some of the successes and challenges that occurred within MPH with regard to the structural, communicative-relational and symbolic factors explored in the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis in Chapter 6. The chapter makes recommendations with regard to strategies and dispute resolution mechanisms that can be implemented by TCS (and other socio-economic) alliances in the future to better manage and resolve inter-group conflicts, taking into account the unique features and characteristics of these types of alliances. The “best practices” that are drawn from the case study analysis of MPH are:

(1) Effective Coordination: Differentiation and de-centralization should be undertaken in ways that facilitate coordination through conflict resolution/management and efficiency,

- Establish conflict resolution /management departments and/or individuals to work with parties in conflict to resolve inter-group conflicts within the alliance,

(2) Integration: Structures should be in place that enable and encourage all of the elements of an alliance to work toward commonly agreed upon goals,

- Keep policy objectives and messages broad enough to encourage a wide range of membership,
- Create inclusive policy platforms to avoid inter-sectoral competition,

(3) Balancing Power Imbalances: Ensure that all members have a relatively adequate basis of power in which to engage in policy and decision-making,

- De-centralize the structural and organizational elements of the campaign,
- Consider trade-offs of implementing centralized (vertical) and de-centralized (horizontal) leadership,
- Think of power as jointly-developed and interactional. Focus on developing shared objectives and the mutual enhancement of power in order to work more effectively together to achieve joint goals,
- Determine when it is (and is not) possible to balance power imbalances and adopt policies and processes that guard against the undue influence of structural forms of power,

(4) Using Creativity: To resist high-power tactics and widen representative-inclusiveness develop inter-group and single-group strategies,

- Inter-group: set up procedures to discourage intimidation, browbeating, unequal access to information and create opportunities for less-powerful groups to network with other low-power groups,
- Single-group: generate a Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) to help guard against making an agreement that you should reject and to help you make the most of the assets you have so that any agreement you reach will satisfy your interests as well as possible,

(5) Foster Identification-Based Trust (IBT): In order to reduce the frequency of inter-group conflicts as well as manage inter-group conflict more effectively when it does occur,

- Create an interactive environment in which groups are more likely to see a compatibility of values and goals and form positive emotional attachments to one another,
- Restore trust by exchanging information about perceived trust violations and reaffirm the commitment of members to a high IBT relationship,

(6) “Good” Communication: Is a central and critical component in alliance-building and in the success of inter-group dispute resolution processes, particularly those that are heavily communication dependent,

- Subscribe to the seven “attitudinal principles” that form the basis of “good” communication,
- Use reframing,

(7) Networking: Take steps to establish formal and informal networks of interaction both within an alliance and outside it with other groups and alliances,

- Abide by conditions critical to the success and survivability of networks: compatibility, resources, social capital, access to information and taking steps toward enabling a favorable socio-political environment,

(8) Generating Genuine Dialogue: The impact that engaging in genuine dialogue has on enhancing levels of trust, cohesiveness and commitment to working toward the realization of an alliance’s goals and objectives,

- Embrace the 8 characteristics of genuine dialogue to increase the probability that genuine dialogue will ensue, improve the quality of relationships between alliance members and reduce the likelihood that intractable inter-group conflicts will arise,

(9) Develop Personal and Collective Identity Orientations: Alliances should create a collective (social/group) sense of identity, but members should also get to know one another as individuals,

- Search for commonalities in terms of the individual (personal)-level values and characteristics of alliance members so that jointly-held beliefs can be emphasized over collective identity differences that ignite inter-group conflict,
- relationships among members should facilitate the creation of a collective inter-group (social) identity that enhances the will to uphold the cohesiveness of the campaign,
- Generate joint vision statements and manifestos, through reflection, building on commonalities and creating an overarching joint vision for an alliance,

- Follow the four preconditions necessary to bring about a relational identity orientation,
- Consider whether a transformative approach to conflict that focuses on recognition and empowerment is an appropriate orientation toward managing conflict within an alliance.

The “best practices” outlined above are described in greater detail as they relate to MPH, TCS and other socio-economic alliances in the sections below.

7.1 Structural Considerations:

At the structural level, the development of “best practices” for TCS involves a consideration of how alliances can influence and impact the types of power relations that exist within TCS partnerships. Among these are factors that encourage the organizational health of an alliance, including effective coordination and integration. Effective coordination across differentiated and de-centralized organizational structures is the first “best practice” that can be drawn from the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis. In TCS alliances differentiation and de-centralization should be undertaken in ways that facilitate coordination through conflict resolution/management and efficiency. As noted in Chapter 6, MPH experienced challenges with regard to each of these factors. Conflicts emerged between as well as within the Coordination Team, Working Groups and Assembly. In terms of efficiency, coalition members also commented that the division of labor, or differentiation, in the campaign impeded efficiency.

Research participants did note, however, that despite structural challenges related to coordination and differentiation, they could not foresee another way that the campaign could have been structured and still have retained its diverse membership. In fact the coalition’s de-centralized structure was cited as “a reason why the coalition stayed together, because it would have been really difficult if everything was centralized. It would have been much more difficult to agree on everything because the coalition was so big, with such different organizations”. It is

here that dispute resolution practitioners, processes and skills can be particularly useful in helping groups to effectively coordinate activities within a de-centralized structure. According to Richard Hall, “conflict resolution has been found to be a major contribution to coordination”, (Hall 1991, 237). This is because of the ability of dispute resolution practitioners and mechanisms to enhance process efficiency and increase the capacity of groups to work together more effectively.

Dispute Resolution “in this setting thus becomes a process whereby the parties thrash out their differences in the open with the assistance of integrators who understand both their positions”, (Hall 1991, 59). To some extent the Chairs of the Working Groups and Coordination Team did play this role through caucusing and engaging in mediation and facilitation with conflicting parties. Hall asserts that “the highly differentiated and effective organization thus anticipates conflict and establishes integrating (conflict-resolving) departments and individuals whose primary purpose is to work with the departments in (inherent) conflict”, (Hall 1991, 59). Therefore, in alliances that are characterized by participatory and collaborative governance where a de-centralized structure and horizontal division of tasks are viewed as imperative to upholding the “ethos” and cohesiveness of the partnership, conflict resolution processes devoted to this task can help to enhance coordination.

A second “best practice” closely related to coordination is integration. Integration involves effectively “integrating”, or joining together, members of an alliance so that individuals and groups are working toward the achievement of commonly agreed to goals and objectives. Edgar Schein writes that in organizations “if different parts are doing different things, some integrative function is needed to ensure that all elements are working toward some commonly agreed-upon goals”, (Schein 1988, 14-15). Hodge, Anthony and Gale also write that “at the same

time an organization differentiates itself, it must also integrate the activities, tasks, and sets of tasks performed throughout the organization into a coordinated whole”, (Hodge, Anthony and Gale 2003, 38). MPH was able to be effective at enabling groups to come together around the central objectives of the campaign by creating a joint vision for the campaign and policy messages that were “quite general. ... a good umbrella for different organizations to insert their own work, so in a way they could come in their own way and use the message as an umbrella to their specific messages”. Another research participant noted that “the factors that made it [MPH] work to the extent it did, the name MPH was genius, it simply does what it says on the pin, it was a phrase that was easy and obvious that could be picked up and made sense as far as explanation, tremendously important”. The broad scope of MPH’s policy objectives, therefore, helped to integrate members by bringing them together to collectively work toward commonly agreed to goals.

Another integration related outcome of the “general” policy platforms developed by MPH was that to a certain extent it prevented competition from arising between different sectors of the development community by creating an advocacy environment that was inclusive of a number of different policy areas. One research participant explained: “because the focus was on poverty and tried to incorporate all the issues within that it prevented there being a divisive or competitive issue I mean that’s the problem now, the debt campaign effectively has to fight for attention with the aid campaign, trade, climate change, it becomes a very disparate competitive situation”. Thus, with regard to integration, MPH sought to establish structures that would enable alliance members to work together to achieve common goals by creating broad and inclusive policy objectives and messages that both encouraged a wide diversity of members and avoided instigating inter-sectoral competitiveness among different groups.

A third power-related “best practice” involves efforts to ensure that coalition members had a relatively adequate basis of power in which to engage in decision-making through the decentralized structure of the campaign and the decision not to have one centralized leadership body. With regard to the influence of power Mayer suggests that “instead of thinking that people need an equivalent or equality of power, we might more usefully think that people need an adequate basis of power to participate effectively in conflict. They require enough power to resist any solution that fundamentally violates their interests”, (Mayer 2000, 52). This is not meant to imply that those with “an adequate power base” should always be able to “win” or favorably influence a conflict, but rather that they can engage in conflict and decision making with the possibility of being genuinely influential and effective. According to this perspective, power is seen as both interactional and integrative (“power-with”) and empowered and independent (“power to”) in that an increase in one person’s or group’s power does not necessarily diminish another’s as it would if power were distributional or in limited supply. Moreover, an emphasis is placed on shared objectives and the mutual enhancement of power in order to work more effectively together to achieve joint goals. Power is, thus, envisioned as “jointly developed, coactive, and noncoercive ... as having ‘power to’ or ‘power from’, in the sense that one has enough power to achieve one’s objectives without being unduly constrained by someone or something else”, (Coleman 2000, 111). In MPH concerted efforts were made through the decentralized organizational structure of the coalition to enable members to possess a relatively “adequate power base” in which to participate in policy decisions.

The decision to diffuse leadership responsibilities across the Coordination Team and to a certain extent the Working Groups and Assembly also suggests that steps were taken to ensure that members had an opportunity to genuinely influence the direction of the campaign. Mayer

asserts that “most people in leadership positions have some power based on their formal authority and some based on their personal influence. Formal authority is a form of structural power”, (Mayer 2000, 55). Despite the de-centralization of “formal authority” within the campaign, other features of structural power, such as resource differentials, “global”/“local” imbalances and the influence of “celebrity” did factor into creating imbalanced power relationships.

In the case of the influence of “celebrity”, both “formal authority” and a “perception of power” played a part in establishing and maintaining power imbalances. Mayer contends that “the beliefs people have about their power and that of others are often as important as the power itself”, (Mayer 2000, 58). If “others believe that a person has considerable resources or significant connections with powerful people, that belief alone can enhance the person’s power. People’s ability to modify the perceptions that others have about their power is therefore itself a source of power”, (Mayer 2000, 58). Within MPH, the real and perceived resources, connections and influence of the most visible celebrities supporting the campaign were such that it was not possible to “manage” them or balance power imbalances between them and MPH. In this case, it can be argued that it is most advantageous to the campaign as a whole not to expel valuable resources attempting to “manage” celebrities, but rather to direct resources elsewhere toward power imbalances that are balanceable and work with celebrities to the extent that the campaign deems it to be advantageous and strategic to the campaign’s goals. Therefore, the most effective “practice” drawn from the case study of MPH with regard to “celebrity” influence is to determine when it is, and is not, possible to balance power imbalances and to adopt policies accordingly.

When alliance members do believe that it is possible to influence power imbalances, it is important for low-power groups to find innovative ways of resisting high-power tactics. Therefore, a fourth “best practice” is to utilize creativity to diffuse power imbalances horizontally across partnerships so that resolutions to conflict can be arrived at in a manner that is satisfactory to all parties. Coleman notes that “overwhelming evidence seems to indicate that the powerful tend to like power, use it, justify having it, and attempt to keep it”, (Coleman 2000, 124). In inter-group conflict “high power holders and members of high-power groups (HPGs) often neglect to analyze – as well as underestimate – the power of low power holders and members of low-power groups (LPGs). Additionally, they usually attempt to dominate the relationship, to use pressure tactics, to offer few concessions, to have high aspirations and to use contentious tactics”, (Coleman 2000, 125). Often this results in the perpetuation of existing power dynamics and influences whose “voices” get heard within partnerships.

Mayer asserts that “as a general rule, conflict resolution systems and practitioners are more likely to be able to affect differentials rooted in personal power rather than structure. For example, mediators can set up procedures to discourage intimidation, browbeating, unequal access to information and so forth, but they can do little to change the fundamental resources available to each side”, (Mayer 2000, 54). In terms of MPH opportunities existed for, smaller, low-power groups to utilize and exploit attributes of their personal power to their advantage in order to enhance their decision-making power. This was achieved through relatively “open” communication channels across the coalition and various efforts to build a sense of cohesiveness among coalition members that allowed for effective networking among low-power groups. Thus, less powerful groups “can often increase their power by improving access to information and by developing effective associations with others”, (Mayer 2000, 58). In the end, a combination of

strategies is needed to alter both structural and personal types of power imbalances within partnerships and alliances.

There are also strategies that individual groups can use in inter-group settings, however, to enhance their individual power among alliance members. Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton assert that “in response to power, the most any method of negotiation can do is to meet two objectives: first, to protect you against making an agreement you should reject and second, to help you make the most of the assets you do have so that any agreement you reach will satisfy your interests as well as possible”, (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991, 97). In order to meet these objectives it is important to think about what alternatives exist to proposals already on the table, to be creative in generating new, imaginative and mutually beneficial proposals, to be aware of the importance placed by both sides on maintaining existing relations and to define one’s authority as a representative of their respective group (Darling 1998, 38-39).

One strategy that can aid in protecting one’s group from entering into an unfavorable agreement and help them to make the most of the resources at their disposal is to develop their Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). A BATNA is “the standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured. That is the only standard which can protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept”, (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991, 100). Within an alliance, even if individual groups have no real intention of leaving the alliance or not agreeing to a negotiated outcome, if others perceive that they might leave the alliance or hold up decision-making indefinitely this can be a powerful source of power. Thus, forming and acknowledging one’s BATNA is an effective tool or strategy for individual groups to utilize in order to leverage their power within partnerships.

There are three distinct steps in formulating a BATNA: “(1) inventing a list of actions you might conceivably take if no agreement is reached; (2) improving some of the more promising ideas and converting them into practical alternatives; and (3) selecting, tentatively, the one alternative that seems best”, (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991, 103). In inter-group contexts where some groups are more powerful than others, if individual groups are aware of their BATNA they can “challenge the dominant power inter-relation” that exists between members of an alliance (Chicanot and Sloan 2003, 68). As a result power does not necessarily physically transfer from one group to another, but the power relationship between the groups is altered by those less powerful developing strategies in which to leverage the power and resources that they do have and to protect themselves against agreements or outcomes that are not in their best interests.

7.2 Communicative-Relational Recommendations:

At the communicative-relational level, “best practices” must be put forward with regard to how alliances can facilitate trust, “good” communication and genuine dialogue among members of the partnership. A fifth “best practice” is, thus, to facilitate the growth of identification-based trust (IBT) in order to reduce the likelihood of inter-group conflicts arising as well as manage inter-group conflict more effectively when it does occur. The relationship between “conflict and trust is an obvious one. Most people think of trust as the ‘glue’ that holds a relationship together. If individuals or groups trust each other, they can work through conflict relatively easily. If they don’t trust each other, conflict often becomes destructive, and resolution is more difficult”, (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000, 86). Levels of trust and social capital in any partnership are relevant to the effective management of internal conflicts and play a central role in building and strengthening relations among members. This type of relational trust has been

termed “identification-based trust” (IBT) (Isenhart and Spangle 2000; Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000). IBT “exists because the parties can effectively understand and appreciate one another’s wants. This mutual understanding is developed to the point that each person can effectively act for the other”, (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000, 89). It “is defined as confident positive expectations regarding another’s conduct. It is grounded in perceived compatibility of values, common goals, and positive emotional attachment to the other”, (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000, 93). In MPH, the commitment of members to participate in the process and to communicate with one another via face-to-face meetings, by phone and the internet contributed positively to building and strengthening relations among members conducive to fostering IBT.

Research “indicates that trust is enhanced if the parties spend time sharing personal values, perceptions, motives, and goals. ... In general, parties should engage in processes that permit them to share common interests, common goals and objectives, similar reactions to common situations, situations where they stand for the same values and principles, thereby demonstrating integrity”, (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000, 97). Thus, if members of an alliance perceive that they have common goals, values and purposes, the levels of overall trust are likely to be higher. This is directly connected to fostering social capital in alliances in that the perception of a commonality of purpose helps to establish the necessary “networks of horizontal civic associations” that create “norms of trust and communal reciprocity” to overcome “collective action problems and in turn, generate better economic and political outcomes”, (Muck 2004, 321). Trust is also an important factor in successfully using collaborative mechanisms, such as mediation, facilitation and consensus-building to resolve conflict (Isenhart and Spangle 2000, 23). Consequently, higher levels of trust and social capital among members of

an alliance will help to enhance the overall strength of relationships and reinforce the ability of the alliance to withstand inter-group conflict.

In cases where trust is violated, as in the example of the Coordination Team losing the confidence of some members of MPH over issues pertaining to knowledge of Live 8, certain steps can be taken in an attempt to restore trust. In their work Lewicki and Wiethoff outline a two-stage process for restoring levels of IBT. First, “the parties exchange information about the perceived trust violation. They attempt to identify and understand the act that was perceived as a violation. ... In the second communication stage, the parties reaffirm their commitment to a high IBT relationship. They may affirm similar interests, goals, and actions and explicitly recommit to the relationship”, (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000, 100). These types of trust-restoration actions are appropriate in alliances that are characterized by a highly invested membership that is motivated by a strong sense of will and belief in the necessity of maintaining the cohesiveness of the partnership in order to achieve goals and objectives.

The language we use to describe and communicate an event, action or feeling to others can exacerbate or alleviate inter-group conflict. Therefore, “good” communication is a sixth “best practice” in building TCS and other transnational socio-economic partnerships. “Good” communication is a central and critical component in the success of dispute resolution processes, particularly those such as consensus-building that are heavily communication dependent. Consensus-building is one dispute resolution process that both relies on “good communication” and helps to maximize opportunities for strengthening communication among members of an alliance as its success depends “on the ability of all participants to communicate, negotiate, solve problems and keep working towards agreement”, (Goss 1995 11). Laying the basis for “good” communication through consultation and collaborative dialogue can help to establish the trust

and communication linkages necessary to engage in consensus-building, collective action and advocacy as well as enable more “efficient” conflict management mechanisms, such as voting, to be utilized when appropriate.

Among the “attitudinal principles” that form the basis of “good” communication are: **(1)** genuinely caring about what others have to say as this genuineness will get communicated to others, **(2)** recognizing that there is always new information to learn from a communication, **(3)** focusing attention, energy, listening and articulating skills on the communication to facilitate respect between parties, **(4)** working together with all parties to make complex communication successful, recalling that effective communication is both interactive and iterative, **(5)** remembering that communication is different from persuasion and evaluation, there may not be one “right” answer, **(6)** practicing patience and tolerance for people’s difficulty in communicating and **(7)** bearing in mind that the most effective communication occurs when people are genuine and natural (Mayer 2000, 121-122). It is important to remember that “good” communication alone will not solve inter-group conflict if other structural and symbolic-level conditions are not present or favorable. When the attitudinal principles that facilitate “good” communication are practiced, however, the trust and social capital necessary to employ a wide range of conflict management and resolution processes, successfully, can be more easily established, nourished and sustained.

Reframing is another conflict resolution tool that can facilitate the development of strong communication links and assists in the process of consensus-building. As a process, reframing involves “changing the way a thought is presented so that it maintains its fundamental meaning but is more likely to support resolution efforts. Successive reframing comes into play because complex conflicts or issues cannot easily be effectively reframed in one clever effort. Instead the

process requires multiple efforts ... until disputants begin to see greater potential for resolution”, (Mayer 2000, 132). There are many levels or types of reframing. At the “detoxification level, reframing is essentially about changing the verbal presentation of an idea, concern, proposal, or question so that the party’s essential interest is still expressed but unproductive language, emotion, position taking, and accusations are removed”, (Mayer 2000, 134). In “definitional reframing the focus is on redefining the issue or conflict so that the resolution process can be more integrative. ... The key is to incorporate the essential needs or concerns of all the parties in a common problem statement or suggestion”, (Mayer 2000, 135). Finally, “metaphoric reframing attempts to find a new or altered metaphor for describing a situation or concept, thus changing the way in which it is viewed”, (Mayer 2000, 136). By using one or more of these types of reframing in combination, areas of disagreement between alliance members can be made more amenable to collaborative dialogue, consensus-building and conflict resolution.

In their work Jamie Chicanot and Gordon Sloan outline a number of steps in the reframing process in order to call attention to underlying commonalities, interests and/or issues that may not have been raised by those directly involved in dialogue and/or conflict. These are: **(1)** listen to statements communicated carefully and begin to brainstorm what might be the underlying interests in these statements, **(2)** reflect the statement with a restatement or a paraphrase and **(3)** reframe the negative or accusatory aspects of the statement by giving the statement a future focus and naming the underlying interest(s), while avoiding dictating or prescribing how the interest(s) should be met (Chicanot and Sloan 2003, 63). Ultimately, reframing aims to establish a process that enables individuals and groups to communicate with one another in ways that foster strong communication links, strengthen relationships and help build consensus around issues under dispute.

Another “best practice” with regard to communication is the importance of networking and linking to organizations that are both internal and external to the alliance. In inter-group partnerships communication linkages connect members together through formal and informal networks of interaction. Formal networks “provide the order necessary for organizations to operate. They define lines of upward communication (subordinates to superiors; providing feedback, reporting results), downward communication (superiors to subordinates; giving orders, establishing policies), and horizontal communication (peer to peer; coordinating among departments)”, (Wood, 2001, 243). An informal communication network, on the other hand, is “more difficult to describe because it is not formally defined and not based on fixed organizational roles. Friendships, alliances, enmities, and casual conversations may be part of the informal network through which information flows”, (Wood 2001, 243).

A number of conditions have been put forth that impact the success and survivability of networks. These include: **(1)** compatibility, that members function together cohesively, while also meeting the goals of the organizations and groups they represent, **(2)** resources and social capital, the availability of resources and ability to generate joint funds, creative ideas, expertise, contacts and access to information and **(3)** the socio-political environment that a network exists in, which helps determine whether it will be successful in reaching consensus (Khator and Brunson 2001, 157-158). Within MPH both vertical and horizontal communication “chains” helped connect members to one another and coordinated activities between various groups, thus, building cohesiveness, generating creativity and ensuring that those with the relevant expertise participated in the campaign through the appropriate networks. However, some critiques of the coalition focused on the socio-political environment in which communication took place that prevented some members of MPH from accessing information, particularly with regard to

external actors such as celebrities. One member of the coalition also commented that “while there were some agencies inside who were very well networked internationally ... MPH as a unit was not, so MPH as a coalition ... did not fulfill its international obligations particularly effectively on reflection”. Therefore, the capacity of an alliance and its members to network, both formally and informally, with one another and with actors outside of the campaign has implications for its ability to remain cohesive.

An eighth “best practice” pertains to the impact that engaging in genuine dialogue has on enhancing levels of trust, cohesiveness and commitment to working toward the realization of an alliance’s goals and objectives. Yankelovich writes that “every day countless dialogues – formal and informal, brief and prolonged, between strangers and between people intimate with each other – take place in a variety of settings and circumstances. Many, perhaps most, fail. But those that succeed transform people’s relationships to one another, sometimes in ways that seem almost magical”, (Yankelovich 1999, 12). From this perspective, dialogue is seen as a process of building, sustaining and transforming relationships.

In their work Kenneth Cissna and Rob Anderson outline 8 characteristics that they believe are essential to fostering the kind of genuine dialogue that is capable of sustaining and transforming relationships. These are: **(1)** immediacy of presence – this involves being available and focusing on the “organic” achievement of outcomes through dialogue rather than using dialogue as a means to orchestrate specific outcomes, **(2)** emergent unanticipated consequences – this implies that dialogue produces communication that cannot fully be anticipated, **(3)** recognition of “strange otherness” – genuine dialogue results when participants do not assume that they know the other’s thoughts, feelings and intentions, **(4)** collaborative orientation – dialogue is characterized by high levels of concern and respect for one’s self and others, **(5)**

vulnerability – participants expose their ideas to scrutiny from others, open themselves up to others ideas and the possibility of being changed from the encounter, (6) mutual implication – implies that dialogue is an interpretive, interdependent and relational act, (7) temporal flow – participants consider that dialogue emerges from a past, exists in the present and prefigures an open future and (8) genuineness and authenticity – the participants do not deliberately hide their thoughts and feelings (Cissna and Anderson 1994, 13-15). By embracing these 8 characteristics when engaging in dialogue, alliance members can increase the probability that genuine dialogue will ensue, improve the quality of their relationships and reduce the likelihood that unproductive or intractable inter-group conflicts will arise. Therefore, inter-group partnerships can facilitate the better management and resolution of inter-group conflict as well as enhance cohesiveness and the willingness or commitment of members to work together toward the realization of goals and objectives.

7.3 Symbolic Factors

Concerning the development of “best practices” at the symbolic level, alliance members should develop both collective and personal identity orientations, facilitate the creation of a superordinate group identity and/or a relational identity orientation and use transformative approaches to conflict when appropriate. Alliances should create a collective (social/group) sense of identity, but also get to know one another as individuals. Terrell Northrup asserts that “‘identity’ plays a major role in the conduct of any conflictual relationship, particularly in intractable conflicts, since threats to identity may cause or escalate conflict”, (Northrup 1989, 55). Interventions that focus on how to manage and resolve identity-based conflicts have often “implicitly focused on personal and collective identity orientations. They emphasize the role of individuals perceiving themselves and each other at the *individual* level of analysis (e.g., in terms

of their individual traits) in reducing the salience of the *collective* identities such as ethnicity”, (Hogg and Terry 2001, 54).

In inter-group alliances, while it is important for members to collaboratively create a collective (social/group) sense of identity and set of values and ideologies, in order to maintain the cohesiveness and distinctiveness of the partnership, it is also vital that members get to know one another as individuals. This includes searching for commonalities in terms of the individual (personal)-level values and characteristics of alliance members so that jointly-held beliefs and traits can be emphasized over collective identity differences that can ignite inter-group conflicts. Separating individual/personal ideologies and values from those of the group they represent can be particularly difficult, however, in TCS alliances. One possible reason for this lies in the fact that, unlike in for-profit organizations and alliances, in civil society groups people’s individual/personal identities and beliefs are often intimately connected to the social/group identity of the organization to which they are a member. Thus, individual/personal identity conflicts may be grouped together with social/group identity conflicts in a discussion among members of a TCS alliance of the identity-related conflicts that arose within a partnership.

Considering the identity(ies) of alliance members at the individual/personal level can also help to deconstruct collective identity associations that have been made with regard to associating a member of another organization solely with the characteristics or values of that group. Even though the nature of civil society alliances and other forms of socio-economic partnership is such that individual/personal identity(ies) tend to be intimately intertwined with the social/group identity(ies) of the organization to which they belong, it is highly unlikely that every individual/personal value held by each member is represented within the social/group identity(ies). The types of existing communication structures and levels of trust and social capital

that are present within partnerships can play a part here in managing and resolving identity-related differences and conflicts. This is because through “good” communication participants in inter-group processes can discover that they share similar outlooks and beliefs on certain issues outside of those that they may not agree on. These commonalities can be fostered and nurtured to help build personal, rather than solely professional relationships among alliance members. In turn, this can then help alliance members to build a collective inter-group (social) identity and foster a stronger sense of will to uphold the cohesiveness of the campaign. Termed “recategorization”, this process involves invoking “a superordinate group identity on the assumption that subgroup distinctions will be replaced by a common intergroup collective identity”, (Hogg and Terry 2001, 56). Therefore, “good” communication and developing a sense of both social/group and individual/personal identities, can increase an alliance’s ability to successfully manage and resolve symbolic-level differences and conflicts that may arise between members.

Establishing a collective social/group identity can also help to mitigate tensions caused by differences in expected outcomes among alliance members. With respect to expected outcomes “there is now substantial evidence from a variety of sources pointing to the fact that people in different groups – for a variety of reasons – have different definitions (expectations, goals) of social situations”, (Furnham 1986, 110). Differences in expectations, expected outcomes and definitions of a social, political and/or economic setting within partnerships can result in the emergence of conflicts among groups that do not share the same expectations (Furnham 1986, 112). The process of establishing a sense of collective social/group identity within alliances provides a platform or foundation in which to discuss expected outcomes and where different individuals and groups locate themselves and the partnership within various

social, political and/or economic spaces. By reflecting on the expectations, goals and mission statements of the different groups involved in an alliance, group members and/or a third-party Dispute Resolution practitioner can generate joint vision statements and manifestos, such as that developed by MPH, building on commonalities and creating an overarching joint vision for the alliance. This is an effective way in which to begin to form a collective sense of identity and a common set of expected outcomes within the alliance.

The development of a “relational identity orientation” can reduce inter-group tensions created by different social/group and individual/personal identities held among alliance members by laying the foundation in which to establish alternative collective identities. Michael Hogg and Deborah Terry define relational identity formation as a type of cooperative interdependence between individuals and groups whereby the other’s well-being enhances one’s own (Hogg and Terry 2001, 54). They argue that four central preconditions assist in promoting the development of a relational identity orientation. Regarding the first, “*acquaintance potential* ‘refers to the opportunity provided by a situation for participants to get to know and understand each other’”, (Hogg and Terry 2001, 54-55). The second precondition, *cooperative interdependence*, is “the existence of give-and-take interactions based on mutual concern as well as interpersonal support and acceptance”, (Hogg and Terry 2001, 55). With respect to *equal status*, Hogg and Terry write that “perceiving the other as an equal, which is promoted by creating collective identities, may be more crucial than completely equal status between groups as a precondition of effective contact”, (Hogg and Terry 2001, 56). Finally, *institutional support* is the fourth precondition. This is because it “influences the motivations and goals of participants, it can increase or decrease the effectiveness of the intergroup contact. ... Institutional support may be necessary to ensure that, first, meaningful and cooperative contact occurs and, second, norms reinforce rather

than undermine the other-oriented nature of such contact”, (Hogg and Terry 2001, 56). These four preconditions can help to bring about a relational identity in inter-group alliances that encourages cooperation, collaboration and perspective taking rather than individual group gains and inter-group competition.

Bringing about a “relational identity orientation” can also be facilitated through transformative approaches to conflict that seek to strengthen an individual or group’s capacity to deal with conflict as well as their capacity to experience, express concern and relate to others, especially others who differ from oneself or one’s group. From this perspective, “disputes that emerge from people’s substantive concerns, dissatisfactions, and interpersonal or relational tensions can be seen, not as problems, but as opportunities for human growth and transformation”, (Folger and Bush 1994, 15). Specifically, from a transformative orientation, identity, ideology and value-related conflicts are viewed as opportunities for deep-level change, development and/or transformation through the dual principles of **(1)** empowerment and **(2)** recognition. Empowerment “involves realizing and strengthening one’s capacity as an individual for encountering and grappling with adverse circumstances and problems of all kinds”, (Folger and Bush 1994, 15-16). Empowerment “is achieved when disputing parties experience a strengthened awareness of their own self-worth and their own ability to deal with whatever difficulties they face Recognition is achieved when, given some degree of empowerment, disputing parties experience an expanded willingness to acknowledge and be responsive to other parties’ situations and common human qualities”, (Folger and Bush 1994, 84-85). The transformative view of conflict is similar to a relational approach and is particularly appropriate for addressing inter-group conflicts in that it “goes beyond individual psychology and focuses on the creation of shared meaning during the interpersonal encounter”, (Broome 1993, 98). This

provides a basis for developing a sense of shared understanding and meaning between alliance members to collectively search for ways to resolve and manage inter-group conflicts that produce satisfactory outcomes for all involved.

In terms of the role that third parties or those acting as a mediator or facilitator can play in helping to manage and resolve conflicts, “in keeping empowerment central in the process, mediators actively clarify parties’ available choices at all key junctures and they encourage parties to deliberate among options. Throughout the process, mediators identify and display opportunities for parties to make choices and they ask parties to acknowledge that their choices are the basis for agreement-making”, (Folger and Bush 1994, 17). Furthermore,

in keeping recognition central, mediators actively explore the potential that one party’s statements hold for the other’s insight. ... Within a transformative approach mediators not only reinterpret, translate, or reframe parties’ statements and viewpoints but, in doing so, they ask parties to acknowledge the value of such reformulations ... Parties are allowed the possibility of exploring issues that cannot be readily addressed as problems. Issues of identity and relationship can be as important as more tangible substantive outcomes (Folger and Bush 1994, 18).

Within MPH, consensus-building, mediation and facilitation were used foremost to try collaboratively to come to a resolution to symbolic level disputes. Ample evidence exists that indicates that efforts were made within the various governance structures of the campaign to enable individuals and groups to have the opportunity to express the “sometimes very emotional” views, opinions and perspectives that they and the organization they represented held.

There is some data, however, that suggests that these dispute resolution processes may have been used in some instances more to uphold the appearance that the coalition practiced “open” and participatory policy-making, rather than to deal “transformatively” with deeper symbolic factors. Regarding consensus-building, some coalition members expressed frustration at the length of time commitment necessary to undertake such a process. Similar considerations should also be kept in mind by TCS and other socio-economic partnerships in the future when

deciding whether or not to choose to practice aspects of a transformative orientation toward conflict as these processes tend to be time consuming and may not be the most appropriate strategies when time constraints are an issue. Furthermore, alliance members may be less-willing to invest the time required to engage in transformative dispute resolution processes if campaigns are for a fixed duration (i.e. “event coalitions”) as opposed to longer term alliances. Ultimately, identity, ideology and value conflicts create opportunities for recognition and empowerment to take place. In the end, though, it is up to those involved in conflict, whether aided by a dispute resolution practitioner or not, to determine what orientation toward conflict is the most appropriate to adopt given the specific constraints of the setting in which the conflict occurs.

Having taken into account the structural, communicative-relational and symbolic factors that were explored in the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis conducted in Chapter 6 this chapter has endeavored to make recommendations regarding dispute resolution mechanisms, strategies and processes that can be implemented by future TCS and other socio-economic alliances. The final chapter draws together insights from the Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis and the “best practices” developed in this chapter and connects them to the central questions that the research has sought to address and areas of focus that framed the scope of this study. It further considers several limitations of this study and proposes prospects for future research.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

One of the central purposes of this study was to investigate and begin to delineate some of the ways in which socio-economic organizations are emerging as increasingly influential actors in global governance by exploring how TCS has built alliances in an attempt to influence global policy-making. This study sought to explore the complex linkages in the relationships between civil society actors and the unique challenges that these groups face in forming partnerships by examining these relationships through the lens of Inter-Group Dispute Resolution. These include challenges related to structure, operation, leadership, consolidating the knowledge, views, beliefs and interests of group members and practicing ethical and equitable governance.

On the one hand, transnational socio-economic actors, like TCS, are distinct from government, IIs and for-profit groups in that **(1)** their primary purpose is to serve members and communities of interest, not to accumulate profits, **(2)** they operate autonomously of the private and public sectors, **(3)** they seek to uphold principles of inclusiveness, participatory and collaborative governance, **(4)** they believe in the notion of public goods and **(5)** they work to address “social need”, particularly that of marginalized, excluded and “at risk” groups, at all levels of governance and located in all parts of the globe. On the other hand, socio-economic groups must strive to meet many of the operational and structural goals of for-profits and face many of the for-profit sector’s challenges including inter-organizational competitiveness, resource and power imbalances, enhancing or obtaining “market” share, adapting to change, providing procedural transparency, accountability and ethical management. This results in a set of unique challenges and ethical considerations in building effective and sustainable socio-economic partnerships, particularly with regard to managing and resolving inter-group conflicts.

Inter-Group Conflict Theory was the theoretical construct used to frame the research and Social Constructivism was adopted as a way of observing, measuring and understanding the nature of social “reality”. The research was carried out by conducting a case study analysis of the Make Poverty History (MPH) campaign, a multi-stakeholder coalition and transnational network. Methods of data collection used were (1) semi-structured interviewing, (2) collection of print documents and (3) narrative analysis. This study sought to enhance awareness of the internal dynamics impacting the design, governance and, ultimately, effectiveness of TCS alliances.

Notwithstanding the fact that TCS is seen to be expanding internationally and that other forms of socio-economic activity are increasingly becoming transnational, inquiry into the internal dynamics of TCS alliances and partnerships remains largely under-explored in the literature and, therefore, represents an important area of inquiry. Moreover, few studies have sought to explore in depth the increasing transnational dimensions of, and opportunities for, socio-economic enterprise and activity in light of accelerated forms of globalization, the current “crisis” of legitimacy in IIs and the “growth” of one of its actors, TCS. Civil society, itself, has also been relatively overlooked in the literature on the Social Economy.

In Chapter 6 an Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis of MPH was conducted. This study analyzed and evaluated MPH against a number of structural, communicative-relational and symbolic level variables and sources of conflict that influence the emergence of inter-group conflicts. This included an investigation of the dispute resolution processes that were in place within MPH to manage and resolve internal conflicts. In Chapter 7 several “best-practices” were drawn from the analysis of MPH and dispute resolution processes and strategies put forward that might be utilized in future efforts at TCS, and other forms of transnational socio-economic, alliance-building.

8.1 Connecting Findings to the Study's Principal Objectives and Central Questions:

As mentioned, one of this study's principal aims was to draw together key insights into the dynamics of alliance-building among TCS partnerships by using Inter-Group Conflict Theory and Inter-Group Dispute Resolution Analysis. The research endeavored to gain a better understanding of how such entities combine the collective knowledge, resources and strengths of members as well as draw out some of the complexities and challenges inherent in a variety of models of civil society organizing and alliance-building. It did this by conducting interviews with several members of the central coordinating body of MPH, the Coordination Team.

The outcomes of this study included: **(1)** developing a framework from which to gain a better understanding of the challenges and barriers experienced by TCS partnerships in working to achieve a "voice" for TCS in international institutions, **(2)** highlighting and promoting the utility of ADR as a framework of analysis, which enables an exploration of structural, communicative-relational and symbolic dynamics of TCS and other socio-economic partnerships, **(3)** elucidating the role of dispute resolution processes in enhancing collaboration and cohesion-building among members of civil society partnerships through conflict analysis, management and transformation, and **(4)** advancing research on TCS and socio-economic alliance-building.

Using Inter-Group Conflict Theory and ADR to examine the dynamics of inter-group interaction and alliance-building resulted in the development of one framework from which to gain a better understanding of the challenges and experiences of members of TCS partnerships at the structural, communicative-relational and symbolic levels of analysis. It provided valuable insights into a range of factors and the ways in which they impacted inter-group interactions and relationships within MPH. These ranged from leadership and decision-making outcomes, to how

groups communicate with, respect and value each other and decide whether to work together cooperatively and collaboratively or antagonistically and competitively. The framework of analysis was organized and presented in this study so that each level of analysis and the different sources of inter-group conflict pertaining to them were addressed independently of one another, though interconnections were noted between the different sources of conflict, where two or more were found to influence the emergence of a conflict. It should be noted that in this particular study the specific sources of inter-group conflict (or conflict factors) used to analyze the case study were drawn from the results of the coding process and, therefore, do not represent an exhaustive list or catalogue of all of the possible “types” of variables that can influence the emergence of inter-group conflicts within alliances.

This study also elucidated the role of dispute resolution processes, and Inter-Group Conflict Theory, in enhancing collaboration and cohesion-building among members of civil society partnerships through conflict analysis, management and transformation. Inter-Group Conflict Theory asserts that by examining sources of inter-group conflict at multiple levels of analysis a better picture of the dynamics of inter-group processes can be developed making the process more amenable to conflict resolution and management. Inter-Group Conflict Theory further maintains that when handled constructively inter-group differences can be a rich and dynamic environment for learning, creativity and positive change to take place. At worst, however, these differences manifest into intractable and often violent disputes. Given the high costs of competitive and antagonistic inter-group interactions it is important to search for ways to better understand, and more effectively manage and resolve inter-group conflict. The use of ADR and Inter-Group Conflict Theory helped to clarify some of the underlying causes and factors behind points of conflict within the alliance, but also called attention to areas where MPH

was particularly successful and creative in establishing structural, decision-making and dispute resolution processes that helped to maintain cohesiveness within the alliance. Together, these provided the basis in which to draw out “best practices” and highlighted areas that might be important to look at more extensively in future research. Thus, this study suggests that there is a significant role for dispute resolution processes to play in enhancing collaboration, cohesion-building and effectiveness among members of TCS partnerships through conflict analysis, management and transformation.

With respect to advancing research on alliance-building among TCS and delineating ways for “minority” partner members to more effectively participate within such partnerships, the “best practices” derived from this study offer multiple strategies, tools and mechanisms that can be used by all partners to balance inequalities and build stronger alliances. These “best practices” were: **(1)** effective coordination, **(2)** integration, **(3)** balancing power imbalances, **(4)** using creativity, **(5)** foster Identification-Based Trust (IBT), **(6)** “good” communication, **(7)** networking, **(8)** generating genuine dialogue, and **(9)** develop personal and collective identity orientations. There were also specific “best practices” and recommendations directed at empowering and enabling “minority” alliance members to play a more equitable part in alliances. Specifically regarding “minority” partners, **(1)** ADR procedures can be implemented to discourage intimidation, browbeating and unequal access to information, **(2)** individual departments and/or individuals (e.g., mediators, facilitators, negotiators) can be created with a specific focus and purpose on resolving disputes, **(3)** de-centralized structures can be put in place to create opportunities for less-powerful groups to network with other low-power groups, **(4)** single-groups can generate their BATNA to protect groups against making an agreement they should reject, **(5)** utilize conditions critical to the survivability of networks to create an

environment conducive to effective networking and linking to organizations within and outside the alliance and (6) by considering whether the use of transformative approaches to conflict are appropriate for the alliance. Other socio-economic forms of partnership, characterized by the defining principles of TCS and the Social Economy delineated in Chapter 1, may also find that the “best practices” are useful and effective in mitigating and managing inter-group conflicts within their partnerships, though further research is required in this area before more conclusive results can be drawn.

Ultimately, while it is important to consider how the findings of the research connect to and satisfy the central questions for inquiry and overarching aims of this study, it is perhaps most vital to explore some of the limitations to the current study with respect to how these might inform and shape subsequent studies into the dynamics of TCS alliances. A consideration of limitations in the current body of work can also suggest where future studies that seek to further establish ADR and Inter-Group Conflict Theory as a framework of analysis for studying inter-group processes might focus their attention.

8.2 Limitations of this Study:

There are several “limitations” to this study in its current form that both warrant and suggest areas of consideration for future research. The first limitation in this study pertains to the methodological choice to use narrative analysis and open-ended, semi-structured interviewing in order to express and reflect the “voices” of the research participants in the research findings and Dispute Resolution Analysis. These methods of data collection are intended to ground the research in the narratives and experiences of research participants as conveyed by them as they are considered “experts” in their fields of practice and are the most closely connected to the issues and events that resulted in inter-group conflicts within the alliance. As such, however,

these methods of data collection do not permit the use of directive questioning and attempt to limit inference by the researcher. This creates the potential for certain issues that may have influenced the emergence of inter-group conflicts to be overlooked in this study. For example, specific issue areas, such as gender or ethnicity, could not be inquired into directly during the interviews since they were not brought up and discussed by research participants. While the fact that research participants did not discuss certain issue areas in their narrative “stories” of events could imply that these did not play a part in instigating inter-group conflicts, there is no way to conclusively determine what part these factors may have played. Therefore, this potential omission of influential factors from the analysis is a first limitation in this study’s findings.

Furthermore, the nature of case study research is such that it enables a detailed and in-depth picture or understanding of a particular “case” or study to be developed. While, case study provides invaluable insights into the specific issues surrounding the case under investigation and enables theory on this issue-area to be refined, it does not produce results that are immediately comparative in scope or necessarily applicable across other similar disciplines and “cases”. Thus, case study research requires that multiple cases be conducted and compared, as in collective case studies, before any cross-findings and conclusions can be drawn. In the context of this study, due to the single “case” nature of case study, some issue-areas that have been found in other similar studies to influence conflicts and relations between civil society groups, such as “North”/“South” relations, were not able to be included in the scope of this study as the central operational and structural elements of the campaign were based in the UK. Furthermore, as a result of time constraints on the part of both myself and the research participants, all of the members of the MPH Coordination Team were not able to participate in this study. While the print data collected acted as a supplement to the interviews and the interviews that were conducted are thought to

represent an adequate cross-section and sample of the views of the Coordination Team it must be noted that not all of the views of all members are included in this study. Subsequent research is, therefore, required to determine more decisively the extent to which this study's specific findings reflect the views of "Southern" and "local" MPH members outside of the central coordination bodies and can be generalized across other TCS alliances, in particular, non-civil society forms of transnational socio-economic partnership.

A third limitation of this study is the inability to build upon and utilize an already existing, rich body of literature that addresses both the role of ADR in managing and resolving inter-group conflicts among civil society partnerships and the internal dynamics and interactions of TCS alliances as this does not exist. This study, therefore, sought to develop an initial catalogue or survey of a number of different sources of inter-group conflicts that emerged from the analysis of MPH, but was unable to focus on one aspect or area of conflict. The framework developed is useful in beginning to delineate a typology and framework of analysis for the types of conflict factors that influence inter-group conflicts although a study and measurement of the magnitude or intensity of these sources of conflict has yet to be carried out. There also exists no previously developed list of dispute resolution interventions, strategies and mechanisms to put forward in making recommendations as to how to better manage and resolve inter-group conflicts among TCS. As a result, several creative and different strategies were able to be put forward. However, these require "testing" and assessment before their value, usefulness and significance can be known. This consideration of the limitations in the current literature, however, does point toward some areas where future studies that seek to further establish ADR and Inter-Group Conflict Theory as a framework of analysis for studying inter-group processes might focus their attention.

8.3 Areas for Future Research:

As there exist relatively few studies that explore TCS through the lens of ADR and that focus specifically on developing deeper understandings of the complex dynamics influencing alliance-building among TCS there are numerous areas for future inquiry and research. This includes undertaking studies that focus on a single source of conflict (e.g., power), area of conflict (e.g., identity) or level of analysis (e.g., structural, communicative-relational or symbolic factors) or on developing ways to measure and, ultimately, determine which specific sources of conflict most impact the emergence of inter-group conflicts among TCS partnerships. These types of studies could also aid in assessing, designing and recommending what types of dispute resolution mechanisms, processes and interventions will be most effective in managing and resolving conflicts among TCS alliances.

Subsequent research could also be comparative or “meta”-level in scope. This includes, in the first instance, studies that investigate a cross-section of different TCS alliances around a particular issue-area or in a specific context of global governance to further “test” the validity and applicability of this study’s findings and to suggest areas of common challenge across similar types of TCS alliances. From a “meta”-level perspective, work could be undertaken to develop a typology of different types of TCS alliances and the “kinds” of inter-group conflicts that arise within them. Likewise, another comparative and “meta”-level study could search for commonalities and differences between TCS alliances and other socio-economic partnerships at the transnational level.

Evaluative studies are another area of potential future research with regard to exploring TCS alliances and partnerships through the lens of ADR. One study could seek to expand the scope of this work to investigate the “North”/“South” dimensions of MPH by interviewing

alliance members from the “South” who were outside the central coordination bodies to obtain their perceptions of the campaign. Such studies could also seek to understand whether correlations can be drawn between certain types of TCS partnerships and/or the internal dynamics that characterize them and levels of success (or failure) in realizing goals and objectives and/or influencing IIs and government to adopt certain policies. Further study is also required to develop a deeper understanding of how TCS alliances evaluate their own “success” with respect to alliance-building. Studies that seek to assess and evaluate levels of “healthy” versus “unhealthy” inter-group conflicts within TCS alliances and which types of “healthy” inter-group conflicts lead to positive change, transformation and successful policy development within alliances would also be particularly useful.

Finally, interdisciplinary scholars and researchers also need to address current shortcomings in the literature pertaining to TCS and the dynamics of alliance-building among TCS groups. While there is an abundance of literature that is directed toward the study of for-profit mergers and acquisitions, far less attention has been dedicated to the study of organizational and governance issues that are specific to civil society and socio-economic partnerships, particularly at the level of transnational alliance-building. Similarly, much of the existing body of research on TCS explores how activists and groups promote, challenge, engage with and advocate for the adoption of ideas and international norms directed toward altering the policies and practices of governments, intergovernmental institutions and corporations, and civil society. Therefore, there is a need to develop greater understandings of the dynamics taking place within TCS alliances so that ways can be developed to enable them to direct more of their attention outward on achieving policy goals and less on maintaining and sustaining partnerships.

Ultimately, this study has asserted that Alternative Dispute Resolution is one framework of analysis in which to begin to investigate and gain insights into the dynamics of alliance-building within TCS and other forms of socio-economic partnership. It suggests that ADR and Inter-Group Conflict Theory both offer and illuminate a number of processes, tools and strategies that alliances can utilize to facilitate opposing policy positions and worldviews, balance inequalities and build consensus through collaboration. These mechanisms can help TCS alliances to build stronger, more sustainable and effective partnerships, which they can then use to articulate their “voices” in international policy-making milieu and exert pressure on IIs to implement concrete social-change initiatives. The practice of Dispute Resolution is, therefore, viewed not as a means to an end but as a means to a beginning.

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Appendix A – Sample Interview Questions

The following list of questions represents a sample of *potential* questions only. Depending on interviewee responses all questions may not have been required in order to satisfy the primary research questions driving the thesis.

Please state your name and position within **X** organization, and explain what is/are your role(s) and responsibilities within **X** organization.

Interview Question (IQ):

1. Please describe the process by which MPH was formed.
 - 1.1 What were the primary factors and activities and who was involved in its creation?
 - 1.2 What was your experience in participating in this process and becoming a member of MPH?

Interview Question (IQ):

2. What do you believe were the primary objectives and goals of the coalition?
 - 2.1 Please explain how MPH's primary objectives and policy goals were determined.
 - 2.2 Who was involved in the decision-making process by which decisions were reached within the coalition?

Interview Question (IQ):

3. What were the role(s) of celebrities and their activities within the coalition?
 - 3.1 What are your views on the involvement of celebrities in civil society coalitions and campaigns more generally?

Interview Question (IQ):

4. Please describe the means by which MPH was financed.
 - 4.1 Can you comment on the nature of the resources available to aid MPH in carrying out its activities? (Prompts include: where financing for the activities undertaken by the coalition came from; who financed activities; external vs. internal funding sources?)
 - 4.2 Do you believe that the issue of *resource strength* impacted decision-making processes and who was appointed to leadership positions within MPH?

Interview Question (IQ):

5. What do you believe were some of the central challenges to integrating MPH members, in terms of differences in culture, language, beliefs, goals, resources/wealth, in dialogue, decision-making and determining policy?
 - 5.1 What are/were some of the “best practices” and strategies that were adopted by the coalition in order to address these challenges?

Interview Question (IQ):

6. How were conflicts, disagreements and disputes between coalition members addressed within the coalition? (Prompts include: elaborate on formal/informal, hierarchical/horizontal, absence of mechanisms/processes/procedures)

Appendix B – Members of the Coordination Team

Glen Tarman, Trade Justice Movement
Steve Tibbett, ActionAid
Andy Atkins, Tearfund
Martin Drewry, Christian Aid
Adrian Lovett, OXFAM
Alison Marshal, CAFOD
Matt Philips, Save the Children
Stephen Rand, Jubilee Debt Campaign
Amanda Horton Mastin, Comic Relief
Mary Cullen, NIDOS
Kirsty McNeill, Stop Aids Campaign
Nick Singler, UNISON
Sam Gurney, TUC
Richard Bennett, BOND (Chair)
Olawale Opayinka, 3E Foundation
Benedict Southworth, World Development Movement
Kel Currah, World Vision

CT members who left the Team:

Ashok Sinha, Jubilee Debt Campaign (left in May 05)
Meredith Alexander, People & Planet (left in June 05)
Beth Tegg, Comic Relief (Left in March 05)
Alison Fenney, CAFOD (left in June 05)

Appendix C – Working Groups

Policy and Lobbying:

Chair: Sarah Kline, Oxfam

Liaison with MPH Coordination Team: Matt Phillips, Save the Children + Steve Tibbett

Media and Messaging:

Chair: Martha Clarke, CAFOD

Liaison with MPH Coordination Team: Alison Fenney CAFOD, (Steve Tibbett, ActionAid, in her absence) + Stephen Rand, Jubilee Debt Campaign

G8 Working Group:

Chair: Kirsty McNeill, Stop Aids Campaign

Liaison with MPH Coordination Team: Kirsty McNeill

MAC Working Group:

Chair and CT link: Adrian Lovett, Oxfam

Liaison with MPH Coordination Team: Adrian Lovett, Oxfam

Outreach Working Group:

Chair: Rotating

Liaison with MPH Coordination Team: Olawale Opayinka, 3E Foundation

New Media Working Group:

Chair: Rotating

Liaison with MPH Coordination Team: Glen Tarman, TJM

Celebrities Working Group:

Chair: Rotating

Contact: Claire Lewis, Oxfam

Liaison with MPH Coordination Team: N/A

Children and Schools Working Group:

Chair: Rotating

Contact: Helen Young, Development Education Association

Liaison with MPH Coordination Team: Meredith Alexander, People and Planet

Youth Working Group:

Chair: Rotating

Contact: Annie Kirke, Tearfund

Churches Working Group:

Chair: Rotating

Liaison with MPH Coordination Team: Alison Fenney, CAFOD

Appendix D – Glossary of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms & Strategies

Caucusing: is a term used to describe the process of separating disputing parties and meeting with each disputant individually outside of the joint dispute resolution mechanism (i.e., mediation) being used to manage or solve the conflict. The decision as to whether caucusing may be used during a Dispute Resolution process is generally made at the beginning of the process. A caucus may be called for a number of reasons including: to reduce tensions between the disputants, to attempt to move parties away from positional stances, to weigh the acceptability of options, to clarify interests and/or goals, to interrupt a stalemate and to allow venting and/or “cooling down” of emotions (Isenhardt and Spangle 2000, 85).

Compromise: is a strategy or style of addressing conflict that displays a combination of assertive and cooperative characteristics. It “aims to split the difference, exchange concessions to reach an agreement or find some middle ground – the idea is to partially satisfy the needs and concerns of all sides”, (Chicanot and Sloan 2003, 9).

Consensus-Building: is generally used to describe multi-stakeholder (multi-party) interest-based dispute resolution processes. It is concerned with participatory decision-making and is a process principally of reaching unanimity among the parties involved. Consensus-building “involves a good faith effort to meet the interests of all stakeholders. Consensus has been reached when everyone agrees they can live with whatever is proposed after every effort has been made to meet the interests of all stakeholding parties”, (Susskind 1999, 6).

Facilitation: is a process where a third party helps to facilitate, guide and manage a group discussion among disputants to help them focus on and resolve issues that are in dispute. Facilitation and mediation are related mechanisms and frequently overlap in terms of expectations, skills utilized and role of the third party. There are some subtle differences, however, between the two processes. These include: that facilitation is generally used for large group settings (12-200), while mediation is used for smaller groups (2-20), facilitation addresses more complex/unclear issues and mediation focuses on clear/more defined issues, the level of conflict in which facilitation is used are for low to moderate levels whereas mediation is used for moderate to high and there is a high emphasis on group processes in facilitation but not necessarily in mediation (Isenhardt and Spangle 2000, 108).

Mediation: is one of the oldest and most well-known forms of Dispute Resolution. It is a process of facilitated or assisted negotiation (third-party) in which “outcomes are consensual, rather than imposed”, (Picard 1998, 21). One of the defining features of mediation is that the power to make decisions and determine solutions is in the hands of the disputants rather than the third-party mediator. (See Facilitation above for several central characteristics of mediation).

Problem-Solving Negotiation: is a problem-solving process that involves two or more individuals/groups that is voluntarily in nature. Individuals/groups come together to discuss their differences and attempt to reach shared or common decisions and solutions to their mutual concerns. Negotiation is “a back and forth communication between two or more parties” without the influence of an outside third-party (Darling 1998, 20).

Voting: is a method of decision-making where a group or groups attempt to gauge the opinion of the group as a whole. It is usually used as a final step following discussions or debates to come to a decision regarding an issue or issues that have been in dispute.