The Radical Liberal Interculturalism Triad:
Toward Retrieving Liberalism From White Domination

by

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Bachelor of Education, University of Victoria, 2012

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Issues relating to diversity and pluralism permeate both social and political discourses in Canada. Of particular interest to this thesis are those issues raised when the demands of ethno-cultural diversity fail to converge with prescriptive objectives to promote said diversity within a democratic liberal state. In this way, this thesis scrutinizes the prescriptive intentions of Canadian multiculturalism and the ways in which it functions to conceal and protect White-European cultural and political dominance in Canadian society.

So proposed, this thesis argues for a robust reorientation of liberalism through the normative starting point of non-ideal theory. Likewise, I will show that a radical liberal interculturalism triad, consisting of interculturalism, asymmetrical reciprocity and rectificatory justice can upend the misleading framework of mainstream liberal social contract theory. Hence, I move away from ideal theory’s tendency to exclude, or at least marginalize, the actual state of affairs, by (1) subverting the taken-for-granted neutrality of the liberal individual; (2) jettisoning the misrepresented truths of ideal theory; (3) exposing the hegemonic practices of multiculturalism; and (4) illustrating the racial foundations of mainstream liberalism. In sum, this thesis claims that the radically liberal interculturalism triad offers a viable path toward dislodging the sites of White cultural and epistemological domination that lies just beneath the misleading facade of Canada’s official multiculturalism.
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INTRODUCTION

Contextual considerations

Issues concerning the integration of ethno-cultural groups into the larger liberal polity continue to dominate socio-political discourses in Canada. Despite the sanguine rhetoric of Canada’s utopic multicultural mosaic, questions remain about to what extent the liberal polity should accommodate and support the demands of minority populations and more broadly ethno-cultural diversity itself. Despite myriad conceptions of nation and pluralism in the polity, Canadian policy and discourse tends to bend toward actions that preserve racial or ethno-cultural privilege in society for the majority white population. In consequence, a tension exists in the Canadian polity between the purported aspirations of the state to promote pluralism on the one hand and the tendency to preserve normative unifying frameworks on the other, which effectively uphold dominance. Thus Canada, like other western liberal democracies, is compelled to face up to, or overcome difficult challenges to the way the liberal polity balances calls for pluralism with social cohesion. Correspondingly, the legitimacy of liberal claims about pluralism in Canada are increasingly salient and call into question whether state policies are genuine attempts to integrate immigrants, ethno cultural minorities and dominant cultural groups. The question then is: are Canadian policies of ethno-cultural integration well suited to provide equal access to life chances for all citizens? Or does Canada’s commitment to official multiculturalism merely help conceal the reality of a polity that is stratified according to race and ethno-cultural identity? Put differently, is the Canadian narrative of multicultural integration merely a guise used to obfuscate the reality of a society which is systemically structured to maintain unequal access and hoard opportunities for peoples of European descent?
In this thesis I argue that a more comprehensive perspective on what constitutes pluralism is better served by jettisoning the fundamentally flawed set of policies known as official multiculturalism. By employing some of the theoretical tools devised by Charles Mills, I engage in critical, philosophical, and theoretical analysis and in the end make a case for the rejection of liberal multiculturalism *qua* Canadian official multiculturalism on the grounds it conceals white dominance behind a veneer of equal opportunity and reasonable pluralism. That is, by exposing the mechanisms of dominance embedded in Canadian multicultural policy, it will become clear that beyond the veneer of celebrating diversity and trumpeting Canada’s love for ‘ethnic’ cuisine, clothing and music, the notion of Canada as a white man’s society is a stable one under the current system. In like manner this thesis argues that multiculturalism as a function of mainstream liberalism actually reifies difference and arbitrarily establishes cultural markers of recognition. At the same time, by reinforcing notions of culture and race as genetically determined, multiculturalism treats racial and ethno-cultural identity as given; race and ethno-cultural identity are treated as inherently unchanging. In what follows then, I argue that Canadian multicultural policy, far from disrupting the legacy of colonialism and white dominance, actually serves to maintain and normalize it.

Furthermore, I explore the disparity between government-led rhetorical claims linking Canadian multiculturalism to ethno-cultural accommodation and the notion that multiculturalism actually co-opts Canadians in the maintenance of Eurocentric dominance. In this way, the rhetoric is internalized by white Canadians as well as non-whites, making the state discourses of open-mindedness easy to propagate; that is, without substantively dislodging inequality or decentring the hegemonic discourses that
normalize white dominance, multiculturalism repackages Canada as a racial utopia—a reality which has earned Canada the erroneous reputation of an international model of ethno-cultural integration. On balance, Canadian multicultural policy works as a smokescreen; in supplanting *de jure* white domination without dislodging the *de facto* white privilege embedded in Canadian government and socio-political institutions, multiculturalism and the panoply of measures introduced to mitigate ethno-cultural tensions in the wake of the 1960s bequeathed a state *modus operandi* and a polity heavily encumbered by systemic inequality, an underlying racial hierarchy, and a system of unequal access determined by race and ethno-cultural identity.

In short, I argue that multiculturalism allows white Canadians to believe that differential white privilege and domination, and the need to correct for it, is non-existent. In simple terms, Canadian multicultural policies constitute little more than a hand wave to diversity, and inasmuch as such frameworks leave oppressive power relations intact, they equally acquiesce to, solidify, and maintain European cultural and political dominance.

Let me turn now to providing some context in regards to the evolution of Canadian diversity policy. Up to the present time the world continues to experience transformative demographic shifts as the consequence of globalization, technological advancement and international trade. Consequentially, nations like Canada face real questions about how the polity integrates newcomers with those who are already within the national borders. For Dwight Boyd (1996) this increase of migrants from nations and cultures, that were historically deemed as undesirable, forces the Canadian state and the polity to face up to, or overcome a putatively liberal challenge he calls the dilemma of
diversity. Simply stated, the dilemma of diversity is the tension that occurs when liberal states are compelled to choose between: (1) on the one hand, erecting policy which strengthens societal cohesion but fails to embrace the reasonableness of other moral and cultural interpretations thus, denying reasonable pluralism; or (2) adopting positions which embrace reasonable pluralism but accepts that sweeping moral valuations “undercut prescriptive leverage that could apply across the diversity” (p.616).

This dilemma of diversity materializes when on the one hand, the liberal state accepts that cultural diversity is an established fact of the polity and, on the other; acknowledges that within this diversity there exists different and presumably opposing cultural values and moral principles. To assert then that individuals and groups must treat one another in terms of unifying moral principles, while simultaneously denying that there is a common moral point of view, is for Boyd an unworkable line of argumentation. In extrapolating from Boyd, authentically reasonable pluralism then is not contingent on States’ arbitrary prescriptions nor is it constitutive of shallow celebratory paradigms which valorise externally visible features like celebrations of clothing; art, food, or music. Rather it is about “the fundamental ideals, standards, and principles that prescriptively (and prospectively) anchor a particular point of view about how humans ought to conduct themselves in this world, and especially toward each other” (Boyd, 1996, p. 623). As will be elucidated further, multicultural policy does not grip reasonable pluralism in this way; it contrastingly seeks unifying moral values, which in consequence, conceals white domination and hence oppresses non-whites.

The central argument I will advance then is: Canadian policy effectively projects an image of pluralism through a theoretical lens that views the Canadian polity as ideal
behind the veneer of liberal respectability. Furthermore, though Canada has declared an acceptance of difference and diversity, it will become clear that a considerable gap remains between rhetoric and reality; Canadian policy in brief is a collection of hegemonic maintenance strategies which obscures a deep-seated dominance entrenched in the polity. Hence, the need for acknowledgement of Canada’s system of racially determined unequal access is apparent.

Let me turn now to the theoretical transformation that I argue must accompany the schedule of policy reforms that I will advocate for in the forthcoming chapters. To say nothing of the theoretical shifts needed if the polity is to become more pluralistic would render this text impotent. With this in mind, it is imperative to discuss Canadian liberalism and Canadian political philosophy in general as comporting with the standard Anglo-American narrative, which articulates the view that the mere acknowledgment of morally equal and politically neutral persons is foundational to modern political theories. Having made the point, however, it is also abundantly clear to anyone paying closer attention or to those Canadians who cannot pass for, appear as, or identify with whiteness that this mainstream liberal narrative of normative equalization is either illusory or quite simply false. That is to say, Canadian history indicates that since colonial times it has not been the case that non-whites were seen as morally, legally or politically equal. The point I am making is that in order to diminish the cyclical consolidation of white domination, Canada must move beyond and reject the purportedly neutral apparatus of liberal multiculturalism, which in viewing the polity as ideal and adopting an ideal normative starting point, employs theoretical framings which effectively wipe out a history of racial
oppression and asks non-whites to part with their grievances in the name of liberal principles and in view of liberal progress.

In simple terms, notwithstanding one’s position on the effectiveness of multiculturalism in Canada, it is hard to deny the fact that Canadian multicultural reforms have always been thought of, legislated by, and carried out by white parliamentarians, lawmakers and bureaucrats. What is more, multiculturalism has done little, if anything substantive to address past injustices—especially in regards to First Peoples of Canada. Unsurprisingly, the plausible deniability of white domination provided by multicultural policy derives its purchase from the egalitarian promises enshrined in the Canadian constitution, which allows Canadian whites to resist and reject calls for addressing injustice from a position of qualified credibility. Put another way, by pointing to multiculturalism as a moral trump card, Canadian whites can deny their privilege with relative comfort.

By examining multicultural policy the text will show that transformative changes are necessary for Canadian pluralism to have any credibility in its claims. Equally important is the dire need for Canadian liberal discourse and theory to shift. That is, before tackling issues of dominance, Canadians must come to terms with the reality that liberalism and its associated offshoots like multiculturalism are foundationally tied to a racially partitioned set of norms. Thus, this thesis argues that repositioning Canadian liberalism through the normative starting point of non-ideal theory will move the polity closer to achieving genuine pluralism. To clarify: both ideal and non-ideal theory involve the employment of moral ideals, and posit ways of arriving at justice according to certain situations; the juxtaposition then does not pit moral approaches against amoral ones.
Instead, the theoretical divergence lies in the way in which liberal theory is normatively centred. That is, whereas ideal theory envisages a perfectly just social cartography and works from a normative core of liberal neutrality and assumed symmetry, non-ideal theory conversely begins with a social cartography which resembles the imperfect societies that are replete in the actual world.

At this point I now to turn to the work of John Rawls; perceived by many as the central figure of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, Rawlsian liberal theory illustrates the socio-political and normative assumptions that the ideal theory frameworks operate from and which foreclose on and negate the possibility of redress for crimes of colonialism. That is to say ideal theory catastrophically misconstrues what ought to drive liberalism’s normative priorities. For Rawls, the notion of society as “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” is the only tenable theoretical starting-point. What is more Rawlsian ideal theory is not merely contingent on sanitizing the history of European settler colonialism, but more importantly its foundational assumptions rule out the very possibility of such a just world. Framed in this way, Mills writes “the problem does not inhere in exploration of the ideal…the problem is the exploration of the ideal as an end in itself without ever turning to the question of what is morally required in the context of the radically deviant non-ideal actuality” (p.118). Thus by diverting attention from actually existing injustice, ideal theory codifies dominance by maintaining the status quo. Evidently Rawls prioritised ideal theory for what he deemed sound reasons: “the reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems that we are faced with in everyday life.” (Rawls, 1999, p.8)
Non-ideal theory then identifies particular socio-political problems in non-ideal circumstances and then develops strategies on how best to adjudicate rectificatory justice RJ. Roberts (2002) elucidates what is meant by RJ in the following claim:

rectificatory justice is that form of justice employed as a means of addressing those situations that arise when the requirements of a just system of distributive justice have broken down. (p. 58-59)

RJ then concerns a polity’s commitment to acknowledging wrongs and attempting to cultivate trust by setting them right. RJ is not necessarily contingent on a redistribution of resources. Despite a wide array of arguments in the literature to the contrary, RJ does not require reparations. What RJ requires is an acknowledgement on the part of a perpetrator of injustice that a breach of justice has been committed and resulted in an injury to an individual or group. RJ is a principled approach that holds the core values of: redress, reconciliation, and acknowledgement and does not necessitate reparations. How then does non-ideal theory align with RJ? In contrast to ideal theory, which aims at mapping a perfectly just society, non-ideal theory recognizes the actual non-ideal state of affairs and devises ways to adjudicate what measures of RJ ought to be implanted in societies that are unjust. In the end, Rawls’s focus is almost exclusively on the former aim.

In what follows I expose multiculturalism’s inadequate policy agenda and propose a tripartite prescription that includes an enhanced model of interculturalism as a viable alternative. Moreover, interculturalism’s focus is on the integration of all persons into a socio-political collectivity; instead of clinging to the maintenance of diversity as a central aim, interculturalism emphasizes the processes and interactions, which connect and identify individuals and groups in relation to each other. Simply put, interculturalism is a
pragmatic program; it promotes a pluralistic polity but avoids the hegemonic tendencies of assimilationist republican models—examples include the American melting pot or France’s policy of strict republicanism—and the centrifugal conventions of Canadian multiculturalism. For Waddington et al. (2012) interculturalism contrasts with multiculturalism insofar as it “considers the acceptance of difference, mutual respect, and cultural rapprochement to be conditions facilitating convergence towards a common societal culture” which differs from multiculturalism, which “promotes diversity as an inherent social value.” (p. 11) In addition, this thesis makes additional prescriptive recommendations with the intent of retrieving liberalism from its fundamentally white dominated epistemology and ideological discourses. In this way, I argue for theoretical and policy commitments to the acknowledgement of the asymmetrical nature of reciprocity in all social relations. What is more, by re-imagining a liberal normative core based on non-ideal theory’s commitment to RJ this thesis outlines a superior model for the liberal polity: the radically liberal intercultural triad. Overall the aim of this thesis is twofold: (1) to expose liberal contractarianism’s complicity in both historical and contemporaneous white domination over non-whites; and (2) to revive liberalism by offering a superior philosophical framing of liberal values which applies to all persons and engenders trust and conciliation across difference. In this way, this thesis posits a socially normative project combining premises from social contract theory, principles of liberalism and liberal pluralism and provides a philosophical prescriptive for redressing social injustice. Hence, I make a putatively radical case for a vastly reorganized and re-conceptualized form of liberalism. Drawing from Iris Marion Young’s conception of asymmetrical reciprocity I argue that if pluralism is to be achieved, the assumption of
equality and political symmetry must be jettisoned. Similarly, the radical liberal interculturalism triad draws from an intercultural model of interaction and encourages dialogue between individuals and groups from vastly different ethno-cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage, on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. Finally, the rLIT seeks to explain the historical and contemporaneous omissions and oversights that liberal contractarianism is too often guilty of by steadfastly committing to RJ in policy, theory and national narratives.

Another task of this project is to elucidate a crucial gap in the literature which reveals that measures of corrective or rectificatory forms of justice are markedly absent from both proponents and opponents of the current state of affairs. In response, I argue that commitments –both officially and attitudinally– to fundamental rectificatory measures for past injustices are indispensable in rescuing liberalism from white domination.

So why then is this project committed to reworking liberalism rather than doing something entirely different? That is, if liberalism and liberal contractarianism are linked to racial exclusion, white dominance and oppression, does the persistence of liberal contractarianism merely ensure the persistence of oppression and obfuscation? As previously stated, liberalism is globally dominant; the intellectual inheritance and hegemony of liberal contractarianism amongst policy-makers and political theorists indicates that it will endure and thus I argue for a retrieval of liberalism which takes a better account of the plurality of the polity and extends its schedule of rights to all persons white and non-white. Put another way, although the liberal contract tradition is imperfect, it can still do useful theoretical work if it is appropriately amended to rectify
mainstream liberalism’s failure to recognize the existence of domination. As Mills (2012) argues:

the sources of [liberal] complicity (with domination) are, in my opinion, primarily external rather than internal. A progressive liberalism can be retrieved once we recognize that its dominant exclusionary incarnations have been shaped by the group interests and group experiences of a particular class/gender/racially privileged demographic subset rather than by any immanent conceptual and normative logic of the ideology itself (p. 305-323).

Arguably liberal norms and ideals are universally appealing in the abstract: freedom, equality, individual rights, social justice are sound ideals; however, this schedule of rights and the liberal normative core generally has been circumscribed to exclusively benefit the dominant group. Yet despite liberalism’s historical failures I argue the correct response is not to jettison these sound liberal ideals but rather to discard the illusory social ontology of white dominance that obfuscates the socio-political forces that determine said ideals' exclusionary application.

In short, retrieving liberalism vis-à-vis the rLIT provides a superior social cartography and generates the philosophical space for a liberalism that is inclusive.

**Cartography of Canadian multicultural origins**

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s October 8, 1971 policy declaration, asserted to Canadians that “although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other.” (Trudeau, 1971, p. 8845) It was this announcement that officially marked the formal re-articulation of Canada’s social contract. Purportedly aiming to make Canadian society more inclusive, the Trudeau government devised policy to make Canada a more welcoming place for immigrants—albeit, the vast majority of them coming from white European nations. Moreover, this
seemingly watershed ideological moment was based on the idea that myriad cultural understandings and ethnic identities within Canada should be accepted, tolerated and legally protected by legislation and public policy.

Broadly conceived, multiculturalism aims to deliver all citizens the equality of opportunity and the equal access of life chances irrespective of one’s racial, ethnic, or cultural identity (Foster, 2014, p. 350). For many Canadians including Trudeau, multiculturalism was a new beginning; it promised a nation of liberal individuals participating in a ‘just society’. Accordingly, through Trudeau’s conceptual lens, multiculturalism and national unity were mutually supportive; the multicultural moment signified a check on the manifest social, cultural, and political dominance by the two charter nations, the French and the English. Yet this proposition is problematic for many reasons. One glaring oversight in such a statement comes from the premise of two founding nations, which is a heavily contested one. Illustrating this Kymlicka points out that insofar as Canada’s historical development involved the federation of three distinct national groups English, French and Aboriginals (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 12) the notion of two founding groups is highly suspect. Equally, designating Aboriginal peoples as a unified group overlooks the great diversity within North America’s indigenous population. Nevertheless, Kymlicka suggests that this constitutional process of incorporation and confederation, though involuntary, defined and protected these groups in a series of enshrined documents. To this end, multiculturalism signified a shift away from the constitutionally safeguarded, state sanctioned socio-political dominance by the French-speaking and English-speaking societies. (Kymlicka, 2011, p. 285)
Official multiculturalism then offered a fresh start; in the wake of the turbulent 1960s, which saw the liberalization of white settler nations like Canada, it represented a new Canada premised on the liberal commitment to a polity of ‘cooperative mutual advantage’ and allowed the federal government to recognize and appease a growing number of peoples who fell outside of the two dominant ‘founding’ European groups. In brief, the period of the middle twentieth century marked the shift of the idea of Canada as an overtly whites only nation to a multicultural nation. Correspondingly, Canada’s immigration laws abandoned provisions that permitted only white newcomers and implemented a ‘merit-based’ point system—points refers to the suitability of immigrants judged against Canadian economic development needs and an individual’s education, job skills, language spoken; the point system marked a major change insofar as it allowed for the Canadian ethnic landscape to draw potential immigrants from non-European countries.

Yet, the rhetorical claims linked to accommodation and tolerance, which accompany a feeling of reverence for multiculturalism, are misleading. That is to say, multiculturalism actually co-opts all Canadians in the machinery of white domination which maintains Eurocentric hegemony and makes the state discourses of open-mindedness easy to propagate. That is, without substantively dislodging inequality or decentring the hegemonic discourses that normalize white domination, multiculturalism repackages Canada as a racial utopia—a reality which has earned Canada the erroneous reputation of a robust racism-free meritocratic democracy. As a means of policing the limits of Canadian national identity and preserving racialized and ethno-cultural norms of access to life chances, multiculturalism effectively orders members of different social
groups hierarchically. Contrarily, the mythical imagery of Canada as non-racist and free of oppression persists inside and outside of Canadian society with veritable strength. The convergence of self-congratulation and international praise are illustrative of a kind of national mythology that conceals more than it reveals. The corollary of illusions about Canada’s history aids in the construction of epistemic traditions, which, organized by white domination, and maintained vis-à-vis historical misrepresentations, successfully evade critical reflections on the topics of institutional and systemic racism. Through purposefully placing 'culture' as its principal object, multiculturalism avoids addressing issues about race, and the panoply of other socially constructed hegemonic utilities used by the modern liberal state.

Of particular interest to this thesis are those issues raised when the demands of ethno-cultural diversity fail to converge with prescriptive objectives to promote said diversity within a democratic liberal state. In this way, this thesis scrutinizes the prescriptive intentions of Canadian multiculturalism and the ways in which it functions to conceal and protect White-European cultural and political dominance in Canadian society. In particular, I emphasize the structural patterns of racialized injustice and exclusion, which remain active in Canada despite formal commitments to official multiculturalism. Throughout this project, then, I argue that on-going forms of racialized inequality are often masked (and sustained) by these idealized liberal claims of multiculturalism, which cast liberal standards of value and personhood as symmetrical or neutral, rather than culturally particular and ultimately injurious to exploited and excluded non-white others. What is more, the text shows that Canadian multiculturalism has been essentially about ‘race’ since its inception in 1971.
Why this project?

Much like liberal contract theory avoids race, effectively denying its existence by failing to mention it, multicultural theory is constitutively evasive, which, in turn, operates to deny, manipulate, or obscure the salience of contemporary racism by dispensing with discussions of race altogether. Put another way, insofar as multiculturalism emphasizes the cultural identity of racial minority groups, it effectively engages in rebranding/sanitizing the historical injustices of race and racism. Mills points out the actual terms of socio-political relations that mainstream social contract theory (ideal theory) obfuscates:

…inequality is the actual social norm obtaining for the majority. The evasive conceptual assimilation of the status of white women and non-whites to the status of white men that is embedded in the mainstream contract, [buries] the distinctive problems the former groups face… (Mills, 2007, p. 100).

Insofar as liberalism and social contract theory are interdependent, and multiculturalism is a liberal outgrowth, this thesis investigates the complex levels of hierarchical abstraction from which liberal theory operates and which has not been studied in the Canadian context.

In order to achieve this aim, I draw from Mills’ “racial contract” which establishes a theoretical critique of the misrepresentative set of assumptions that conventional social contract theory communicates. For instance, Mills contends that the ideally just society insulates theorists from the need to address current and past injustices; within this framework distributive justice as such begins with the assumption of equality and avoids the necessity of considering that inequality is ubiquitous rather than anomalous and hence
rectificatory/corrective justice cannot be ignored. In this way, the non-ideal theory of the racial contract (or what he later re-names the domination contract) originates from a more accurate position that what Rawls’ view of justice presumes, which in turn, provides a better-equipped method for tackling issues of injustice in practical terms.

The theoretical marginalization of ethnicity and race in ideal theory invites mistrust and criticism as it concomitantly offers the normative promise of universal equality, while fundamentally and systematically denying this equality to non-whites. To be clear, throughout Mills’ work he refers to contractarianism in both the normative and also in the descriptive senses; in this context, the normative refers to claims about what society ought to look like or the desired social ontology of a given social system, rather than what society currently looks like or the existing social ontology of society. In this sense, rather than doing the work strictly speaking, of making positive truth claims, the normative iterations of the social contract relate to moral valuations and value judgments; normative theorizations seek to prescribe the ‘good’ and the ‘right’ rather than the factual’ or ‘the correct’.

In brief, using non-ideal theory to “generate judgments about social justice and injustice” is doing normative work. When Mills “explain[s] the actual genesis of the society and the state, the way society is structured, the way the government functions, and people’s moral psychology,” non-ideal theory shifts into descriptive analysis. For Mills, in moving to a system of RJ which acknowledges the legacy of colonialism and the persistence of unequal access, the liberal polity must jettison the “innocuous methodological decision to focus on [an ordered state of affairs]… where white people are exempted from dealing with the legacy of white supremacy in our actual society.”
More to the point, I will show that non-ideal theory’s accurate sketch of the socio-political cartography of white domination creates space for the emancipatory reach of equality to gain full flowering. Contrarily, ideal theory is effectively impotent in tackling the very necessary task of rectificatory justice; in this way mainstream constructarianism assumes the very thing that needs to be substantively addressed. (Mills & Pateman, 2007, p. 104) What constructarianism offers then is “a mystified and idealized story of the creation of the modern world, which denies the centrality of racial subordination to its genesis” (p.104).

Official multiculturalism unremittingly fortifies the conventional hierarchy of mainstream liberalism and the social contract tradition. That is to say, as a corollary of liberalism, multiculturalism is premised on contractarian ideals whereby whites foist their cultural superiority onto cultural Others who, despite the flowery rhetoric of neutrality and equality, are subject to systemic intervention and management of terms which are always dictated by white interests.

In simple terms, Canadian liberalism is heavily entrenched in practices of White domination. Though western democracies like Canada have declared an acceptance of difference and diversity, it will become clear that a considerable gap remains between rhetoric and reality; western democracies tend to construct hegemonic maintenance strategies, which conceal the imbricated domination behind the banner of ‘pluralism’. Hence a robust reorientation of liberalism through the normative starting point of non-ideal theory would give Canadian society a superior chance at achieving genuine, if reasonable pluralism.
I will argue that in place of multiculturalism, the intercultural model is better suited to overcome the dilemma of diversity for myriad reasons including its focus on culture as an expression of personal identity that is dynamic and open. Whereas multiculturalism has tended to ghettoize and segregate, interculturalism, as a strategic policy of intervention, restores social capital by inviting all persons into dialogue—a dialogue connected to a certain duty as a citizen. Interculturalism by contrast, changes the focus: the conceptual lens moves away from the static fixed point of essentialism imbued in multiculturalism to a much more peripatetic and dynamic process centred on interaction and dialogue. Notwithstanding its many theoretical advantages to multiculturalism, interculturalism does lack a normative framework of rectificatory justice. Thus, this thesis bridges the conceptual, normative and prescriptive gaps of interculturalism and weaves conceptual commitments to asymmetrical reciprocity, pedagogical and jurisprudential measures of RJ into the socio-political and institutional fabric of the Canadian polity.

In what follows, I argue that liberal articulations of multiculturalism promote a normative core based on the empty promises of universal access and equality of opportunity while fundamentally denying both to non-whites. What is at issue then is the exposure of mainstream liberal contract theory qua Canadian official multiculturalism as an exclusionary and unscrupulous policy deployed by the dominant social group—white-European Canadians—to subordinate ethno-cultural and racial 'Others' under the pretexts of equal opportunity and ethno-cultural pluralism.

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1 By pedagogical I mean the rLIT commits to correcting the historical record both in terms of heritage and in terms of pedagogical or curricular narratives that currently sanitize Canada’s repugnant history and colonial legacy.
Significance of the Problem

When discussing diversity of liberal nations like Canada it is instructive to reflect on the demographic diversification that continues to occur in formerly whites-only settler nations. That is to say, looking at the numbers of non-whites in Canada’s population that have steadily risen since multiculturalism’s inception, gives added cause for a fundamental re-evaluation of purported pluralist programs that were posited and passed into law when the nation’s demographic composition was still overwhelmingly white.

According to statistics Canada, by 2017, the “visible minority” population of Canada will reach 7.1 million, comprising roughly 20% of all Canadians. (Statcan.gc.ca, 2008) Further, a recently circulated Statistics Canada study estimated that, by 2031, “visible minorities” will represent between 29% and 32% of the total Canadian population. (Statcan.gc.ca, 2008) Similarly, whereas the 1901 Census shows that merely 25 ethnic groups existed in Canada, the contemporaneous figure show 200. Equally, whilst Canadian immigration from European countries accounted for 75% of all Canadian immigrants in 1966, newcomers from European nations made up merely 16% by 2010. (Statcan.gc.ca, 2008)

While Canadian multiculturalism detracts from de jure white domination, its abysmal failure in eroding systems of domination indicates a more sinister raison d’être: to obfuscate the relations of power upon which difference is constructed. Thus, as a hegemonic discourse with white domination at its foundational core, multiculturalism allows for the widespread telling of a sanitized revision of Canada’s history, which effectively exonerates its dominant groups. Hence, multiculturalism aids in the construction of epistemic traditions which, organized by white domination and
maintained vis-à-vis historical misrepresentations, successfully evade critical reflections on the topics of institutional and systemic racism.

In short, decades after it was implemented multiculturalism is little more than a canard, a comforting fable about the Canadian racial utopia where all persons are included and have equal access to life chances. That is to say, multiculturalism’s preoccupation with the superficial features of difference gives the impression of pluralism while in reality providing a smoke screen for evading critical reflections on a host of social justice issues such as institutional ethno-cultural discrimination and systemic racism. Put another way, through purposefully placing 'culture' as its principal object, multiculturalism avoids addressing issues about race, and the panoply of other socially constructed hegemonic utilities used by the modern liberal state.

Mills argues “by looking at the actual historically dominant moral/political consciousness and the actual historically dominant moral/political ideals, we are better enabled to prescribe for society than by starting from historical abstractions.” Moreover, Canadian multicultural politics which reduces itself to superficial recognition in the absence of cogent measures to address historical injustice are destined to change very little in a system of domination that is deeply embedded in the Canadian social and political fabric. Moreover, multiculturalism as a liberal doctrine is inadequate; what is needed is what Mills describes as a “race-confronting rather than race-evading, liberalism” (Mills, 2007, p. 16) It is the exposure of both mainstream liberalism—aligned with Rawls—as a philosophy dedicated to maintaining white dominance, and multiculturalism’s hegemony which perpetuates white dominance that is important if real social change is to occur. The problem with multiculturalism then is not in the
contractarian convention *per se* but instead in the taken for granted assumptions about
Canadian ethno cultural relations and the ways in which liberalism historically sees
prevailing knowledge systems as apolitical which in turn, reinforces dominance and
diminishes the chance for corrective or rectificatory justice.

Consider now what Mills calls the epistemology of white ignorance as a
paramount concern and one that makes this project and projects like it significant. That is
to say, inasmuch as jettisoning multiculturalism is not a premise unique to this text,
placing importance on both exposing dominance and tearing down its structural obstacles
for social change is a proposition scantly addressed in the literature outside of thinkers
like Mills and Pateman.

**Roadmap**

This thesis is arranged in three parts. Ultimately chapter one provides the
theoretical support of pertinent literature about race, multiculturalism and the whiteness
of liberalism while providing an expedient analysis of official multiculturalism in the
context of its ontological position within a complex hierarchy of liberal theory. The
chapter also introduces the notion of domination and the forms of white domination that
are intimately linked to liberal traditions and contractarianism. Drawing from the work
of Dwight Boyd I explain his heuristic device termed the “dilemma of diversity”. For
Boyd, the dilemma of diversity articulates the intense pressure that liberal states face
when the official acceptance of the fact of “reasonable moral pluralism” is married to the
state’s need to root policy in prescriptive intentions to promote cultural diversity. Next, I
offer an expository evaluation of the leading liberal multicultural theorist Will Kymlicka.
Through exposition and evaluation, I interpret Kymlicka’s contribution to multicultural
theory. To be sure, minority rights for Kymlicka are not meant to merely convey a collection of theoretically abstract propositions through the lens of an ideally-constructed thought experiment; rather, Kymlicka seeks to prescribe practical mechanisms for the realization of liberal rights for real-life national or ethnic minorities. Likewise, Kymlicka prioritizes this liberal schedule of rights for minority groups and vigorously argues that such rights are in addition to the universal rights that all persons are afforded as individuals with a shared humanity. Thus elucidated, the argument advanced in Kymlicka’s work enshrines multiculturalism and group differentiated rights as a guarantor of individual autonomy; in a word, Kymlicka makes the case that liberal autonomy is married to the free choices that culture provides. After an expository treatment of Kymlicka, I evaluate his claims and conclude that Kymlicka’s fusion of multicultural citizenship is what Boyd refers to as “dominance concealed through diversity.” That is to say, by insisting that liberal culture places paramount value on individual choice, he is essentially arguing that all cultures ‘liberalize’. Moreover, in asserting that cultural liberalization is desirable, Kymlicka undermines ‘illiberal’ cultures and therefore, leaves many of his claims for genuine and reasonable pluralism found wanting.

The expository and evaluative voices advanced in this chapter work through some of Will Kymlicka’s major theoretical works and in the end I argue that the foundational assumptions in Kymlicka that guide his perspective on multiculturalism make his theory of minority rights inadequate for dealing with the dilemma of diversity. That is, insofar as Kymlicka argues that all groups and individuals ought to communicate their culture in identifiably liberal ways and that justice for minority groups is tied to their becoming
liberal, Kymlicka is morally prescribing that everyone ought to treat each other according to liberal principles which, in turn, will support and maintain cultural diversity. Nevertheless, Boyd points out that multiculturalism is premised on denying the fact of a dominant culture or a moral point of view common to all cultures, this means that Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights amounts to being a sort of unifying ideal meant to reach everyone who might be subjected to his liberal prescriptive. In this way, I argue that despite advancing a cogent challenge to liberalism’s commitment to atomistic individualism and demanding special treatment for minority groups, his theoretical multiculturalism is based on the flawed conception that recognition is limited to those who fit within a particular liberal understanding of culture, hence denying reasonable pluralism while simultaneously purporting to uphold it. The chapter ends with a summative expository review of Charles Mills’ work on retrieving liberalism from the historically white-dominated and epistemologically racialized liberalism that he reveals as still dominant today; the position thus contends that racial liberalism underwrites the modern social contract. The expository work that the racial contract does then is to reconstruct the social contract as “a non-ideal contract” which is “a contract of group domination.

Chapter two offers an evaluative treatment of John Rawls. I draw primarily from *A Theory of Justice* and occasionally consult *Political Liberalism* in order to expose the white theoretical lens from which ideal theory and distributive justice is surmised. Put simply, chapter two articulates the conceptual, ontological and socio-institutional inadequacies of distributive justice within the gamut of Rawlsian liberal theory. That is to say, I contextualize Rawlsian liberalism in regards to its philosophical whiteness and
point out the glaring omissions that substantiate such a claim. Further, this chapter takes up the concepts from chapter 1 and develops the philosophical work each level of theoretical abstraction does and how it achieves the aims I have set out. The second chapter also lays the groundwork for my larger claim: in order to retrieve liberalism from its discourse entrenched in white dominance it is necessary to adopt socio-political perspectives that champion RJ over distributive justice. What is more, I argue against the erroneous claims of liberal neutrality and promote instead a philosophy that engenders a wide spread understanding of asymmetrical reciprocity.

Chapter three is where I concretize my central claims and I introduce the tripartite radical liberal interculturalism as a viable alternative to multiculturalism’s shortcomings. In brief, I discuss the ways in which a radically liberal interculturalism triad does a much better job of overcoming the dilemma of diversity and the ways in which it provides a comprehensive method for a marked reduction in domination in Canadian society.

This chapter therefore draws from the theorists discussed throughout the thesis as the backdrop for my theoretical approach. In addition, I introduce leading scholars of interculturalism, asymmetrical reciprocity and the contextualized redress of corrective or RJ in order to substantiate my suggested plan to supplant the status quo of liberal multicultural domination. Put another way, the radical Liberal Interculturalism Triad or racial LIT approach is better suited to overcome the challenges of the dilemma of diversity and the structural demands for democratic justice. The radical LIT also bears the promise of a transformative effect of epistemic traditions and of rectifying injustices vis-à-vis correcting the sanitized historical record shaped by white ignorance and the false narratives of Canadian heritage.
For Mills, “the classic apparatus of social contract theory, which conceptualizes the polity as inclusive, is founded on the consent of undifferentiated atomic individuals, and equally concerned about the welfare and rights of all its diverse members.” (Mills, 2001, p.74) Hence the chapter will further demonstrate that the theoretical significance of liberalism reconceived could register the history of, and on-going reality of racial domination.” (p.74)

In sum this study scrutinizes the conceptual flaws of Canadian multiculturalism and creates the theoretical space for a liberalism that extends its principles to all persons white and non-white. In this way, this thesis posits a socially normative project combining premises from social contract theory, principles of liberalism and liberal pluralism and provides a philosophical prescription for redressing social injustice.

**The method of this project: how will it be done?**

Though a majority of western democracies have declared an acceptance of difference and diversity, it will become clear that a considerable gap remains between rhetoric and reality; western democracies tend to construct hegemonic maintenance strategies which conceal the imbricated domination behind the banner of ‘pluralism’. Hence a robust reorientation of liberalism through the normative starting point of non-ideal theory gives Canadian society a real chance at achieving genuine or at the very least an improved pluralism.

In subverting the taken-for-granted neutrality of the liberal individual, represented truths of ideal theory, and pervading hegemonic practices of multiculturalism and racial liberalism more broadly, I will dislodge the sites of white cultural and epistemological domination that Boyd warns are just beyond the misleading veneer of purported
multicultural pluralism. Filling a crucial gap in the literature, which reveals that measures of corrective or rectificatory forms of justice are markedly absent from both proponents and opponents of the current state of affairs, I argue that commitments – both officially and attitudinally – to fundamental rectificatory measures for past injustices are indispensable in rescuing liberalism from white domination. Moreover, after providing social and historical contextualization of Canadian ethno-cultural relations, I argue that the reprehensibility of Canada’s colonial history necessitates more than merely wiping the slate clean and starting anew. That is to say, in order to diminish the cycle of cyclical consolidation of white domination, Canada must move beyond and reject the neutral apparatus of liberal multiculturalism, which in idealizing the normative starting point, wipes out a history of racial oppression and asks non-whites to part with their grievances in the name of liberal principles.

**Basic Limitations/constraints and omissions**

Before moving on, it is important to consider some matters of omission. That is to say, I have made choices and assumptions about the literature based on the aims of the thesis and the conceptual framings from which I view the world. Hence, a few short points of clarification are necessary: firstly, while the analysis lays a broad foundation for discussions about the problems with multiculturalism and commitments to liberal pluralism, it does not explore in any depth the ways in which gender; gender performance, class and intersectional performativity are entangled in Canadian policy and epistemologies of white domination. Secondly, the text does not explore the ways in which people of various epistemological traditions discuss related discourses, nor does it review, compare, or contrast Canadian policy with the whiteness of nationalist discourses.
of other white settler/colonized nations. Finally, although I pay some cursory attention to Québec because of its adherence to intercultural policy, I do not pay specific attention to charter group relations within the province of Quebec or between it and the rest of Canada, nor do I address the myriad vicissitudes of Quebecois nationalism. That is not to diminish the importance of any of these topics; rather they are simply beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, in elucidating the ubiquity of whiteness in Canadian policy and the impact of epistemologies of white domination on commitments to liberal pluralism, the approach is distinctly philosophical. By using rhetorical devices in the abstract, the text does not address particular micro-social issues such as individual racism or racialized attitudes in the everyday context; instead the thesis targets the macro-issue of white domination as a socio-political system, which is deeply rooted and influential to all things in Canada.

**Significance to the author**

As a first generation Canadian and a man of mixed ethno-cultural identity the issues of ethno-cultural diversity, race and pluralism are of immense importance to me on a personal level. As such, my Mother is from Cape Town South Africa where during Apartheid, the racialized categorisation of individuals according to the pigment of their skin, determined their access to resources, socioeconomic status and ultimately personhood.

In general, Apartheid South Africa utilized four racial classifications — Asian, Black, Coloured, and White. Officially, “Coloured” refers to any person of “mixed-blood” and includes the offspring of as well as descendants from Black-White, Black-Asian, White-Asian, and Black-Coloured unions. In this way, coloured people occupied
an in-between status. Many coloured people profited from a closer association with the white dominant group that resulted in attaining better access to employment, adequate education, and better housing prospects when compared to black people. Hence insofar as the Apartheid regime apportioned privilege and power on the basis of gradations of skin colour: racialized privilege was deeply embedded into Coloured people’s perceptions of identity, morality and social being.

The story of my Mother’s arrival to Canada was first told to me at age seven. That is, my Mother’s family entered Canada with views about race and racial identifications that reflected the socio-political system in South Africa and that conflicted with the more rigid constructions of race they encountered in rural Ontario. Similar to the American style racial binary system, the racial identification my Mother encountered was based on black/white distinctions. What is more, the story of my Mother’s arrival to Canada demonstrated how race and racial meaning shifted from country to country. That is to say, a Coloured person who embodied the privilege of not being black in South Africa, ceased to be categorized this way in Canada. It follows that the racial stratification my Mother encountered in Canada was built on a more rigid binary system of classification which meant that my mother’s family came to be viewed as black, a category they actively distanced themselves from in their country of origin.

Let me now briefly address my own ethno-cultural identity. For me, the cultural influences of being half British and half South African but also first generation Canadian are somewhat unique. As such, my identity has been called into question throughout my life simply because I do not fit neatly into any discernible racial category. Likewise, since my childhood the questions: “What are you?” or “Where are you from?” have been put
me innumerable times. Hence, this project comports with a broader exploration into my own ethno-cultural identity and what that means in present-day Canadian society.
CHAPTER ONE: AN EXPOSITORY TREATMENT OF RACIAL
LIBERALISM AND MULTICULTURAL THEORY

Few contentious issues have elicited such a mélange of contrasting outlooks and
juxtaposing political objectives as policy of multiculturalism. Specifically, Canadian
multiculturalism purports to uphold the prominence of individual liberty while
acknowledging that this freedom is only legitimate insofar as it is embraced in the public
sphere and protected by the state. To this end, the state’s prescriptive actions should aim
to alleviate at least some of the prospective shortcomings that would otherwise occur in a
social system mired in legacies of domination, colonialism, slavery, and whiteness as a
prerequisite for naturalization. Nevertheless, as Boyd (1996), Pateman (1988) and Sandel
(1984) suggest that notwithstanding liberalism’s fundamental commitments to
egalitarianism, impartiality, and value pluralism, its notion of what counts as reasonable
diversity is constructed and codified along liberal ideological guidelines and hence
carries a liberal partiality from the outset of the debate. In short, critics of liberal
multiculturalism contend that liberal recognition of minority groups is limited to the
terms set by liberals—that is, those who benefit materially and/or ideologically from liberalism.

Liberalism is used throughout this thesis to stand for the intellectual tradition
associated with Locke, Kant, Mill and Rawls. That is to say, liberalism is the modern
ideological framework that stands for individualism, egalitarianism and moral
universalism. More concretely, liberalism derives its normative core from a commitment
to equal citizenship, political neutrality, and symmetrical reciprocity.
Liberal multiculturalism is an extension of liberal ideology, thus let me turn now to a synopsis of the ideological principles that lie at the core of liberalism. Despite myriad interpretations of liberalism, the following core beliefs and assumptions underlie much of liberal theory: a concentration of rights and freedoms on distinct individuals; a normative focus on freedom, universality, liberty and justice; and a dedication to viewing persons as politically neutral and morally equal. In abstract terms, liberalism is the modern ideological framework developed out of the Enlightenment that stands for individualism, egalitarianism, and moral universalism. (Mills, 2007 & 2013) More concretely, liberalism derives its normative core from a commitment to equal citizenship, political neutrality, and symmetrical reciprocity. The liberal polity purports to oppose ascribing differential or preferential treatment according to superficial characteristics or group affiliations. On the surface then, liberal socio-political ontologies occupy an obligatory space as a principal condition of a fair polity; liberalism holds individual equality as the central vehicle for the pursuit of social justice.

In this thesis, diversity will be broadly referred to as the existence of different cultures, values, and traditions within the same state, social structure or socio-political system. The demographic fact of plurality is plainly observable in the liberal state. Nevertheless, census information alone provides relatively limited information about the dynamics of ethno-cultural relations; merely acknowledging cultural diversity offers little insight into the challenges that liberal immigrant societies seem to face in perpetuity. Put another way, modern liberal democracies are continually challenged with how best to mediate, prescribe, and negotiate what social membership means for individuals and the multiplicity of groups that individuals recognize as constitutive of their identity. What is
more, the fact of diversity comes with an inherent tension; that is, a society must negotiate and delimit the boundaries of competing obligations.

This chapter is an examination of liberalism, the liberal dilemma of diversity and the whiteness of contractarian theoretical frameworks. Expository treatments of Charles Mills, Dwight Boyd and other liberal cultural theorists in combination with critical scholarship on multiculturalism, critical whiteness discourses, and the components of the radical liberal interculturalism triad are explained. This chapter then provides the place from which research into a new liberal pluralism would begin. In addition, the text describes multiculturalism as a discourse of white domination. Using both expository and evaluative voices, the text challenges the legitimacy of liberal commitments to pluralism and raises the spectre of multiculturalism as a contract that is nominally inclusive but is actually authored by people who appear or are racialized as white, for whites and in the interests of whites at the peril of non-white Others in Canada. This section also introduces whiteness as a problematic concept and describes the nature of dominance and the forms of white domination that are intimately linked to liberal traditions and contractarianism.

The Dilemma of Diversity

For well-established reasons related to European conquest, colonization, and immigration, white settler nations are comprised of myriad ethno cultural groups and individuals. In consequence of increasing levels of diversity and cultural difference, western democracies like Canada are compelled to face up to, or overcome a putatively liberal challenge that Dwight Boyd (1996) calls the “dilemma of diversity”. According to Boyd (1996, p. 614), the “dilemma of diversity” arises out of the “perceived need for
some perspective that can provide legitimating, normative leverage across this diversity in the face of practical questions requiring common action” (p. 614). Moreover this conflict emerges when on the one hand, the polity acknowledges the fact of ethno-cultural diversity, while on the other, acknowledges that within this diversity there will always be incongruous or contradictory cultural values and moral principles that exist amongst different groups. Thus to prescribe or promote policy that indicates how individuals and groups ought to treat one another according to a schedule of accepted moral principles, while at the same time denying that there is a unifying common moral point of view, is for Boyd a position hard to hold onto. To this end, Boyd cautions against baseless relativism and further argues that there is no "prescriptive leverage that could apply across the diversity,” (p. 616) that is also compatible with reasonable pluralism. Put another way, moral values that reach across the polity and grasp all diverse peoples within it do not respect or embrace the notion that other values are also reasonable; instead moral prescriptions that bridge across diversity effectively encourage the expectation that ethno-cultural minorities will fit into the dominant moral view. Further, Boyd’s dilemma descriptively illustrates the sort of perspective needed for claims of pluralism to have legitimacy by elucidating how many initiatives of the liberal state are thinly veiled programs for maintaining dominance. In addition, Boyd argues that contemporary claims of liberal pluralism protect the prescriptive preferences of the dominant view and preserve the status quo. For Boyd, liberal programs, which impart unifying, or universal institutions aimed at social cohesion are not pluralistic, rather they achieve a solidity or social cohesion at the cost of diversity. (1996, p. 628)
Without providing a blueprint for a more legitimate pluralism, Boyd advocates for the substitution of universal prescriptions in favour of cultivating constructivist institutions. What is more, Boyd advocates for the polity to consider comprehensive communication and interchange as critical components in circumnavigating this conundrum. In the same way, Boyd suggests that the processes that allow for shared conceptualizations of value positions are critical to supplant the veiled dominance already alluded to (1996, p.628).

As will be elucidated, multicultural policy is one such prescriptive mechanism that fails to meet both horns of the dilemma. That is to say, multiculturalism does not grip reasonable pluralism as it seeks unifying moral values, which in consequence, conceals white domination and hence oppresses non-whites. What is more, Boyd claims:

if one affirms both sides, one is in the position of both morally prescribing that individuals and groups ought to treat each other in certain ways according to preferred moral principles or ideals and denying, through the acceptance of the fact of reasonable pluralism, that there is a moral point of view common to all cultures that would make this prescription meaningful and binding for anyone, regardless of where they are located within the diversity (p. 616)

Simply put, Boyd proclaims that plurality presents a plethora of political and social paradoxes in any society that attempts to sincerely endorse the “perceived need to morally ground prescriptive intentions to promote cultural diversity within a democratic society that it is impossible to accept reasonable pluralism and create a unifying moral point that binds all along a spectrum of diversity.” For Boyd, western democratic states must comprehend the notion that ‘equally reasonable people may reasonably hold onto fundamentally different doctrines’ for the “dilemma of diversity” to be appreciated in its fullest sense.
Diversity has thus been co-opted by the dominant culture, and so located within the given structures of the normative order. As such, Boyd points out that many of the contemporary diversity management strategies that western liberal democracies employ either fall squarely on, or encompass a hybrid of, strategies that obscure their intent and thus undermine reasonable pluralism by concealing dominance and calling it by another name.

Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: a theory of minority rights or thinly veiled dominance under the banner of pluralism?

Will Kymlicka is perhaps the foremost social theorist and philosopher on issues of liberal multiculturalism in pluralist liberal societies. As such Kymlicka suggests that "multiculturalism has won the day" (Kymlicka 1999, p.113; cf. 1998, p.144; 2001, 32), but nevertheless over the past few decades his calculation has become hard to hold on to. Accordingly, the first part of this chapter contextualizes the nature of an apparent decline in multiculturalism.

Within the framework Kymlicka establishes throughout his scholarship, minority rights are not meant to merely convey a collection of theoretically abstract propositions through the lens of an ideally-constructed thought experiment; rather, Kymlicka seeks to prescribe practical mechanisms for the realization of liberal rights for real-life national or ethnic minorities.

Influentially, Kymlicka presents a liberal defence of multiculturalism that is advanced through a fusion of culturalism with liberalism: rugged individualism coordinated with differentiated group rights. For Kymlicka culture provides the capacity for liberal freedom; he writes: “it’s only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them,
and intelligently examine their value” (1989, p.165). In simple terms, Kymlicka refers to his position as liberal culturalism and indicates that the individual choices people make as to what constitutes the good life is constitutive of cultural beliefs which, in turn, shape and condition the value placed on these conceptions (p.120). In this view it follows that in order to make beliefs intelligible, individuals must generate their intelligibility through the meaning making systems that are constructed and inscribed vis-à-vis culture, history, and language. Therefore, Kymlicka argues that the only avenue to provide individuals autonomy and the liberty to choose is what he calls a “societal culture”—societal culture refers to a body of meaning that incorporates cultural conventions, cultural history, traditions which align with the set of social apparatuses, practices and institutions that make up a culture within a given society. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 75-104)

For Kymlicka dominance is a sort of given; inasmuch as minority cultural rights are favourable, it is perfectly legitimate for dominant groups to promote their cultural understandings vis-à-vis socio-institutional state apparatuses of nation building. Further, Kymlicka observes a type of liberal freedom which is impossible to achieve without attaining societal culture (1995). Kymlicka focuses on this "societal culture” which is described specifically as: "a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres."(1995, p.75) In his own words, Kymlicka places societal culture as the harbinger of freedom in a liberal polity. He states: “... freedom involves making choices among various options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 83).
To this end, societal culture for Kymlicka is divided conceptually between national minorities, who are entitled to cultural recognition, and immigrants, or poly-ethnic groups who in contrast to national minorities cannot claim the same legitimacy in calls for cultural recognition—insofar as they forfeited any rights to legitimately claiming cultural recognition when they chose to leave their nation of origin. Kymlicka suggests that despite speaking a common language and accepting an assemblage of daily-routinized social conventions of the liberal state, poly-ethnic groups are again not entitled to cultural maintenance, because they lack institutional legitimacy and territorial concentration. Put another way, by virtue of immigrating into an already existing cultural framework, poly-ethnic minority groups are required to live within the contours set out by the already dominant social order (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 95-96). As Chandran Kukathas (1992) argues, Kymlicka’s theory in a sense both “grants cultural minorities too much recognition and gives them too little…too much insofar as liberal equality does not appear to sanction special rights, and gives them too little insofar as regarding choice or autonomy as the fundamental liberal commitment disregards the interests of cultural communities which do not value the individuals freedom to choose” (Kukathas, 1992, p. 105-139)

In Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989) Kymlicka defines cultural membership as a primary good that must be protected so as to ensure the preservation and maintenance of cultural diversity. Nevertheless, in Multicultural Citizenship (1995) Kymlicka allows for certain contingencies and stresses that not all cultures warrant complete preservation in all of their features. Accordingly he stresses the requirement for ethnic groups, specifically immigrants, to adhere to liberal principles as he describes
them. (1995, p. 170) In the end Kymlicka asserts that so long as immigrants know they are expected to liberalize before immigrating, it is entirely appropriate for the polity to compel them to act in certain ways which honour and facilitate the practice of liberal principles.

In *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethno cultural Relations in Canada* (1998) Kymlicka shifts his understanding of culture somewhat, as he seems to recognize the reality of myriad hybrid and intersectional identities, emerging from the increase of inter-ethnic and cross-cultural relationships and marriages. Nevertheless while acknowledging the fact of multiplicity or intersectional cultural identity; he does not move any closer to explaining how his theory of group-differentiated rights is capable of accommodating individuals and groups that do not neatly fit into categories which are more or less stable. That is, Kymlicka’s theory offers a schedule of liberal rights to groups that are homogeneous and can be clearly defined and distinguished from other groups. According to Kymlicka’s conceptual framework, cultural identity is indered with a certain essence, which cannot well address the cultural fluidity of the present-day; the malleability of cultural understandings, which are fashioned and reshaped through global mass communications, migration, and the adoption of multiple ethno-cultural identities. Though Kymlicka avoids using race directly throughout his scholarly work, his views on culture and ethnic group affiliations are articulated in essentialist terms. Essentialism then describes a particular view of identity – ethnic, cultural, gendered, religious etc. – conceiving of the superficial, physical or cultural traits as natural or given; essentialist claims reject ideas of socially constructed identities and argue that ethno-racial or cultural groups are characterized by an ‘essence’.
Tariq Modood summarizes a common criticism of multicultural perspectives like Kymlicka’s, which suggests that essentialist ideas put forward in many multicultural discourses erroneously impart meaning on ‘cultures’ or ‘groups’ that do not exist in the ways the policy presupposes:

It is said that the positing of minority or immigrant cultures, which need to be respected, defended, publicly supported and so on, appeals to the view that cultures are discrete, frozen in time, impervious to external influences, homogeneous and without internal dissent…group membership falsely implies the existence of some shared…essence. (Modood, 2007 p.89).

Nancy Fraser specifically argues that Kymlicka’s views on minority rights, which he claims are to ensure the capability for minority groups to attain societal culture and to successfully integrate (1989, p. 87-89; 2002; 2013), rely theoretically on a framework of ethno-cultural essentialism. She (2001) points out that this line of thought is anachronistic as it asserts permanence in a world that is increasingly shaped by perpetual change. In her words:

[by] enjoining the elaboration and display of authentic, self-affirming and self-generated collective identities, it [the identity liberal culturist model] puts moral pressure on individual members to conform to group culture. The result is often to impose a single, drastically simplified group identity, which denies the complexity of people’s lives, the multiplicity of their identifications and the cross pulls of their various affiliations (Fraser, 2001, p.24)

All though I do find myself agreeing with much of the essentialist critique of Kymlicka’s work, he does answer the essentialist critique in an essay titled "The Essentialist Critique of Multiculturalism: Theories, Policies, Ethos" Kymlicka (2014). He writes:

I believe that this post-multiculturalist critique of essentialism is itself guilty of reification. According to critics, multiculturalism reifies ethnic groups as unified agents who speak and act with one unified voice. I would argue that this critique itself involves a reification of multiculturalism, treating it as if it is a single unified force that walks and
talks out there in the world… [in]sofar as I can tell, they do not cite a single example of a group- differentiated right that liberal multiculturalists endorse that they would reject on essentialist (or other) grounds. (Kymlicka, 2014, p. 17)

In discussing the fact of plurality in the liberal polity and how states respond to the “dilemma of diversity”, the primary goal for most diversity management strategies is integration. Thus, I turn now to the application of several different conceptions of integration that are strewn across the theoretic multicultural landscape. First, as a preliminary exercise, I will quickly clarify the ambiguities and confusions that might mistakenly lead one to assume that integration has a unitary conceptualization. It follows that integration has many different meanings for many different people. For Harle (1998) it is the sense of a “shared political fate that is at the heart of the term integration.”(Harle, 1998, p.228) Elizabeth Anderson (2013) argues that integration is a complex set of processes, conditions, and interpersonal interactions in the actual non-ideal world. Further, for Anderson integration consists “in full inclusion of social groups on terms of equality across all of the main institutions of social life…” (Anderson, 2013, p.3) Integration from this view involves “intergroup dialogue, coalition-building and negotiation.”(p.3) What is more, integration is often used across disciplinary boundaries and employed as an umbrella term to describe numerous diversity management strategies and theoretical frameworks. For instance, assimilation is an example of an idealized integration strategy whereby the state implements measures and policies which place the onus on non-dominant citizens to fit into the larger polity. Assimilation in this way requires the ‘Other’ to integrate into the dominant culture. Consequently, integration by assimilation is a one-way process: non-dominant individuals and groups are expected and encouraged to conform to the majority culture. Assimilation perspectives place the
dominant culture at their normative core and make it the aspirational metric by which everyone else’s level of integration is measured.

Conversely the United Nations Millennium Foundation takes a vastly different view and states that integration is:

a dynamic and principled process of promoting the values, relations and institutions that enables all people to participate in social, economic, cultural and political life on the basis of equality of rights, equity and dignity.

Correspondingly Frith (2003) describes integration as an observable expression of the polity’s shared citizenship values: accommodation of differences, promotion of plurality and community-based mutual respect. The initiation of inclusive institutions, the promotion of political processes, and the participation of poly-ethnic persons in those processes, are for Frith (2003) the quintessential indicators of integration in Canada. (p.1)

For Anderson (2010), the imperative of comprehensive integration in social life protects the polity from deficiencies in deliberation, accountability, and the production and maintenance of illegitimate socio-political hierarchies. What is more, Anderson insists that the problems of ghettoization and enclavism are the products of the polity’s lack of public discussion and deliberation in all institutions and prescribes integration as the remedy. Consider now that Kymlicka (1998, p 28) conceptualizes integration as, “the extent to which immigrants and their descendants integrate into an existing societal culture and come to view their life-chances as tied up with participation in the range of social institutions, based on a common language, which define that societal culture”.

Interestingly, it seems that if the point of integration is to generate the socio-political space whereby institutional and interpersonal contact between ethno-racial minorities and
majority groups is greatly increased, multiculturalism would seemingly encourage minorities to integrate by assimilation, making minority cultures susceptible to erosion thereby reducing cultural particularity.

Relatedly, Kymlicka (1995) posits cultural recognition and identity as constitutive coefficients present in all persons who provide the foundations for free choice and individual autonomy. Nevertheless, in characterizing persons according to fixed traits which operate as signifiers or badges indicating group membership, the rights he argues for in order to reduce the deficit of access to the good life that exists between dominant and non-dominant groups is contingent on a degree of ontological permanence that in his view should be codified. Yet if the preservation of diversity is a primary goal of Kymlicka’s work, he overlooks the likelihood of eroding that which makes a group distinct by requiring that distinctiveness to fit within the limits set by liberal constraints—thereby reducing said distinctiveness. That is to say, if in satisfying the requirements of liberalization formerly illiberal groups fail to preserve their cultural distinctiveness, it seems that the liberalizing process and the steadfast support of societal culture as the vehicle for spreading freedom is illustrative of the type of unifying prescription which tacitly expects ethno-cultural minorities to adopt the dominant culture’s moral point of view and hence only meets one side of Boyd’s “dilemma of diversity”.

Another criticism of Kymlicka comes from Benhabib who problematizes the way he presents the notion of culture itself. That is, Benhabib contends that culture conflates with publicly accepted group affiliations. Citing Kymlicka’s peculiar framing of societal culture, Benhabib buttresses this claim by providing the example of the British. That is, for Benhabib, Britain is both a nation and a society; Britain is also organized as a state,
yet there is no British societal culture in Kymlicka's sense (Benhabib 2002, p. 60). Hence, Benhabib advances a convincing argument about Kymlicka’s commitment to institutionalized cultural constructions and exposes his theoretical selectivity, which is at odds with how culture actually exists in the world. For Benhabib then, the characteristics of culture are a mélange of competing and contested narratives that convey myriad meanings and values that overlap with other cultures and in the process of interacting co-construct new cultural meanings. Moreover, from this perspective there can never be one solitary culture; there is never merely one system of beliefs, signifiers, symbols and practices that pervade across diversity in the way that Kymlicka suggests. (Benhabib 2002, p. 60)

Another problematic component in Kymlicka’s lexicon is his interpretation of the nation. For Kymlicka (1998) nations have ‘historical societies, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and societal culture.’ (p.132) Challenging Kymlicka’s conceptualization of what constitutes a nation, Andreas Wimmer (2008) argues that Kymlicka is guilty of conflating the concept of nation with nationalism and makes the two concepts mutually inclusive. For Wimmer, Kymlicka either does not consider, or simply ignores the prospect that individual members of a particular cultural group may have different ideas of cultural membership and equally may subscribe to divergent ideologies. For instance Wimmer (2008, p. 257) argues,

There is no space for considering and understanding the politics of ethnic representation. Thus, situations where ‘minority representatives’ indeed represent the lived aspirations, cultural idioms and political projects of a large majority of that minority cannot be distinguished from a situation where such leaders stand for little other than their own political
ambition, which might be openly rejected by, the very ‘people’ these leaders claim to represent.

In fairness to Kymlicka, Wimmer’s critique completely overlooks Kymlicka’s argument in *Multicultural Citizenship* where he argues that “internal restrictions” are illegitimate whereas “external protections” are legitimate.” Whereas the former are intended to protect the group from the undermining consequences of internal dissent (e.g., the decision of individual members to disavow cultural customs), the latter are intended to protect the group from the impact of external decisions (e.g., political decisions of the larger society). (p. 35) Kymlicka in fact speaks directly to Wimmer’s assertion. He writes:

> the claim that communities have interests independently of their members is relevant to internal restrictions. . . . But it cannot explain external restrictions--that is, why some rights are unequally distributed between groups, why the members of one group have claims against the members of another group. The idea that groups are prior to individuals, even if true, cannot by itself explain this asymmetry between groups (p.47)

In the end, Winner’s critique is erroneous; however, by differentiating external protections from internal restrictions, and then endorsing the former while rejecting the latter, Kymlicka does seem to evade the issue of how best to address the problem of “illiberal minority groups”. The problem thus elucidated, if Kymlicka’s framework is an integrationist liberal model, leaving those groups who are decidedly illiberal or cannot liberalize seems to be at odds with his purportedly integrationist aims.

Overall, Kymlicka’s robust endorsement of the ‘societal culture’ seems to suggest that insofar as liberal states are justified in promoting and maintaining the dominant societal culture, other ethno-cultural claims that are replete throughout the liberal polity do not have the same legitimacy to challenge this course of action.
Kymlicka also seems to prop up liberal state practices in “nation building” which for him inculcate social norms and values, and, in turn, help social functionality and social cohesion (1995, p. 122). Contrary to many of his liberal contemporaries, Kymlicka breaks with the conventional notion that the state is a neutral actor, which plays a minimal role in issues concerning constitutional law and property rights. In this way, Kymlicka affords the liberal state significant latitude in regards to state-sanctioned policies, which seek to shape and sustain the socio-political and institutional dominance over the liberal *zeitgeist.*

Though *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995) is an ardent endorsement of multiculturalism—as Kymlicka conceives of it—its normative core and philosophical underpinnings are aligned with dominance and social conformity. By stratifying immigrants and alien cultures according to either how liberal they are or, their potential capacity to liberalize, the tacit proposition that conceives of immigrant epistemologies and ontological framings as inferior emboldens his claims that the dominant liberal polity is the metric to measure the values of other cultures. Differently stated, Kymlicka’s work ostensibly carries the expectation that illiberal cultures ought to eventually ‘liberalize’—an imposition that he sees as legitimate provided that it occurs incrementally. Further still, despite his major aim of providing a framework of group-differentiated rights that could act as a potential ballast against the over use of benign neglect or the overreach of dominant groups, Kymlicka’s recurring assumption that most ethno-cultural groups subscribe to liberal principles or could learn to do so, weakens many of his claims regarding universal human rights to culture and the cultural contexts of which he argues are intimately linked to the pursuit of individual freedom and autonomy.
For Kymlicka then, immigrants or, poly-ethnic groups are reduced to a narrative of luck; that is to say, ethno cultural groups access to life chances, attaining the good life, or more broadly their potential for succeeding in a new nation hinges on their ability to integrate into the dominant culture. What is more, Kymlicka does not directly address whether or not immigrant populations actually want to integrate according to a liberally defined model in which success is evaluated by the dominant culture.

Ultimately the argument contends that insofar as immigrants have chosen to participate in the liberal polity, they have no legitimate or credible claim for the maintenance of their culture. Certainly many immigrant groups see their integration as desirable, but it is not clear whether this is in consequence of an overwhelming expectation on the part of the dominant group for minorities to integrate or other socio-political factors related to belonging and/or survival in a new land.

That ethnic and racial classifications are discursive and socio-politically constructed is a widely held and well-defended epistemic thought. Yet, the more official multiculturalism enables majority and minority groups to come into contact by promoting social cohesion and tolerance, the more it ostensibly encourages the expectation of assimilation. Moreover, considering Kymlicka’s prominence within the academy for his scholarship on multiculturalism, it is perhaps alarming that so much of his theoretical foundations rely on essentialist conceptions of culture and rigid classifications that demarcate the boundaries of ethno-cultural group membership. Ultimately the contradictory views regarding culture replete throughout Kymlicka's work undermine his theoretical viability. For instance, Kymlicka insists a well-formed societal culture is constitutive of the liberal process of value formation; he asserts that culture has clearly
definable and distinguishable markers that indicate membership. Yet Kymlicka also describes culture as mutable, revisable and allows people capacious latitude to navigate and adopt new cultures. Nonetheless, Kymlicka contends that so-called societal cultures have constancy throughout history, have constancy across peoples and can be clearly distinguished vis-à-vis evidently defined symbols. As Carens suggests, Kymlicka’s societal culture “homogenizes culture, obscuring the multiplicity of our cultural inheritances and the complex ways in which they shape our contexts of choice.” (2000, p. 56).

Simply put, the essentialist assumptions about ethno-cultural groups effectively buttresses Kymlicka’s veiled advocacy for assimilation and majority-group dominance. As such, by naturalizing difference and placing liberalism as the only reasonable ideological paradigm, Kymlicka’s hegemonic liberalism is exemplary of the type of mainstream liberal theory that I seek to dislodge.

**Liberalism, race and multiculturalism: Mills on white dominance and the racial contract**

Charles W. Mills demonstrates how the peculiar and largely ignored “contract" has manifested the current socio-political system of European domination. In this way, Mills outlines how the racial contract influences white moral theory and how this racialized system is foisted on non-whites through ideological conditioning, epistemic privilege, and violence. His book *The Racial Contract* in short argues that the polity in which liberal democracies participate is foundationally white dominated. Moreover, for Mills liberalism has always been, and continues to be a racial liberalism in which constitutive elements of personhood, the schedules of rights that persons enjoy, and government responsibilities to protect such rights have all been racialized. The central
premise throughout Mills’ work on liberalism and social contract theory is that despite their nominal promotion of egalitarianism, they effectively operate as an agreement among whites to subordinate non-whites to strictly benefit white people. Accordingly, insofar as the academy is almost completely silent about the racialized nature of historical liberalism and the social contract, this silence for Mills operates as a mechanism to perpetuate white domination over non-whites. In what follows, I employ the work of Mills to show that liberalism has grown up along race and racism and therefore it is culpable in maintaining white dominance in the liberal and multicultural polity. Once a broader context of theoretical culpability is established it will become clear that in terms of levels of theory the ontology of ‘race’ as it relates to liberalism is firmly intertwined and mutually supportive historically.

Let me first offer a definition of ‘race’; race is a socially constructed and discursive device with origins that are historically situated and specific to the modern period. Modernity in this sense refers to the enlightenment systems of meaning, thinking and reason that did not occur before the seventeenth century and which motivated the struggle for popular sovereignty over feudal absolutism. For the most part, what is meant here when I refer to modernity or the modern period is the chronological period of the last couple of centuries before and including the present. In the modern world then, a strict adherence to reason, systems of categorization and bureaucracy are also tacit affirmations of a broader conception of modernity. Race then is a product of the modern adherence to systems of categorization and as such slots people into groups according to superficial differences and links said differences with social and cultural assumptions that are often nefariously linked with inferiority. ‘Race’ then relates to social and behavioural
assumptions that are erroneously linked to phenotypical characteristics. Racialization then, refers largely to the making of race; in this process of racing or racializing, the socio-political and institutional processes that give expression to forms of racial and ethno-racial categorization are concretized and reified. Race and being raced or racialized is a comportment of an ascendant level of abstraction that is part of the modern socio-political ideology of whiteness. Racism then is essentially a social feature that identifies social significance by classifying people into essential/immutable racial groups based on real or imagined traits.

Supposing then, that these concepts as I have laid them out are accepted as useful interpretive tools, how then are race, racism and the social contract interconnected mechanisms that operate to maintain white dominance? According to Mills (1997; 2007; 2011; 2014) in contrast to the mainstream liberal social contract construed as an equal agreement among neutral citizens with terms that are mutually advantageous, the racial contract is an exclusionary deal agreed upon by white European persons to restrict, delimit and demarcate the liberties of non-white sub-persons. In this way, Mills posits the actual social contract as a mechanism of domination that serves to maximize the liberty of some at the great expense of others. Mills describes the conditions of the actual liberal contract in chapter 2 of the Racial Contract, where he writes: “The terms of the racial contract mean that non-white sub personhood is enshrined simultaneously with white personhood” (Mills, 1997, p. 55).

In Mills’ view white domination (or white supremacy as he consistently terms it) is a global socio-political system. Illustrating this point, Mills suggests that white supremacy as a theoretical concept carries explanatory weight insofar as it ensures the
broad syntheses of a number of phenomena that are integrated vis-à-vis the systemic, systematic and institutional modes of domination that whites perpetuates throughout the world. Further, Mills compartmentalizes white domination into the following separate but complementary layers of hegemony: juridico-political, economic, cultural, cognitive, somatic and metaphysical. White supremacy then, is not merely a set of ideas that motivates the oppression of non-whites; instead, white dominance is entangled in a web of “complex of ideas, values, and attitudes” which, in turn, maintain an “institutionalized politico-economic structure for which the ideas are an ideological accompaniment” (Mills, 1997, p.99). For Mills, “the Racial Contract establishes a racial polity, a racial state, and a racial juridical system, where the status of whites and non-whites is clearly demarcated, whether by custom or law” and the domination of whites over non-whites is manifested and maintained through an overarching socio-political and socio-institutional system of hegemonic white privilege (Mills, 1997, p. 13).

If one thinks in terms of liberalism’s theoretical origins, it is widely understood that liberalism and contractarianism are mutually supporting. Thus, insofar as the mainstream social contract “prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance… [it] produc[es] the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made (Mills, 1997, p.32). Defined concisely, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief (Stanford, 2005). So given that epistemology is the study of how one knows and ignorance is a condition of not knowing, epistemology would seem to have nothing to do with ignorance. On the contrary, Mills shows that the collective un-knowing of racial inequality is a purposeful ignorance that shapes mainstream epistemology, thus without a
re-signing of the Racial Contract, white domination perpetuated through ignorance and complicity will persist. In sum, in arguing that an epistemology of white ignorance must have critical purchase if ignoring injustice is ever to cease, Mills (1997) states:

> [r]acism and racially structured discrimination have not been deviations from the norm; they have been the norm, not merely in the sense of de facto statistical distribution patterns but, as I emphasized at the start, in the sense of being formally codified, written down and proclaimed as such. From this perspective, the Racial Contract has underwritten the social contract, so that duties, rights, and liberties have routinely been assigned on a racially differentiated basis… [i]n other words, [white people] will experience genuine cognitive difficulties in recognizing certain behaviour patterns as racist, so that quite apart from questions of motivation and bad faith they will be morally handicapped simply from the conceptual point of view to seeing and doing the right thing. As I emphasized at the start, the Racial Contract prescribes, as a condition for membership in the polity, an epistemology of ignorance (p. 93).

For Mills, white ignorance is a certain configuration of civic and comprehensive cognitive dissonances (which are psychologically and socially functional), creating the caustic circumstances in which whites are constantly incapable of comprehending the global system they themselves created. (Mills, 1997, p.18)

Furthermore, Mills argues “by looking at the actual historically dominant moral/political consciousness and the actual historically dominant moral/political ideals, we are better enabled to prescribe for society than by starting from ahistorical abstractions.” Furthermore, Canadian multicultural politics that reduces itself to a mere hand wave of acknowledging oppression in the absence of measures to address historical injustice will necessarily be a politics that changes very little. Moreover, multiculturalism as a liberal doctrine is inadequate; what is needed is what Mills describes as a “race-confronting rather than race-evading, liberalism.” (Mills, 2007, p. 16) Likewise, in order to retrieve liberalism from its modus operandi that ignores racial subordination and
perpetuates White dominance, Mills contends that a comprehensive re-mapping of socio-political territory currently occupied by the liberal epistemology of ignorance is a necessary precondition for reformulating an epistemology that renders genuine knowledge.

The Racial Contract has three central and overarching themes: (1) white domination is global; (2) white domination is a political system; and (3) as a system of domination, the racial contract is illustrative of the white privilege that is contracted/agreed upon among whites (Mills, 1997). Conceptualizing white domination as a global political system, Mills discards the claimed neutrality of social actors littered throughout the classical works of social contract theory (see Hobbes 1651; Locke 1690; Rawls 1971; Rousseau 1762), surmising instead that both in descriptive and normative terms, the racial contract is foundational to Western hegemony and broadly the structure of Western society.

In brief, for Mills, using non-ideal theory to “generate judgments about social justice and injustice” is doing normative work. When Mills “explain[s] the actual genesis of the society and the state, the way society is structured, the way the government functions, and people’s moral psychology,” non-ideal theory shifts into descriptive analysis. Further Mills argues that, “if we separate the normative core of white domination and take measures to apply RJ to the system of racial oppression,” the compulsory next step then is to jettison the “innocuous methodological decision to focus on [an ordered state of affairs]… where white people are exempted from dealing with the legacy of white supremacy in our actual society.”
In his article “Multiculturalism as/and/or anti-racism” Mills argues that “the most important political system of recent global history—the system of domination by which white people have historically ruled over and, in certain ways, continue to rule over non-white people—is not seen as a political system at all” (2007b, p.9). What is more, Mills argues that from the classical liberals of Mill, Locke and Kant, to the 20th century political philosophy of Rawls, liberalism has been racial and overwhelmingly white dominated. For example, in an article titled “Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls”, Mills illustrates Rawls’ complicity in maintaining white domination in theories of justice. He writes:

nowhere in the two thousand pages on justice penned over five decades by the American philosopher most celebrated for his work on social justice is the most important American post-war measure of corrective racial justice—affirmative action—ever mentioned.

As Mills cogently articulates, the present and historical fact of racism raises a range of issues about justice that are elided by Rawls’s theory of justice as well as by other liberal texts. Taking aim at the whiteness of liberalism and western philosophy more broadly, Mills argues that the ways in which white philosophers remain defensive of mainstream theories of justice that ignore, dismiss or repel the reality of the racial contract is by cultivating and codifying an epistemology of systemic ignorance that skirts the recognition of non-whites as full persons. Unlike traditional critical race thinkers however, Mills argues that liberalism should not be jettisoned; rather, he firmly argues that liberalism, in a rearticulated form that is contingent on being morally responsive to society’s recognition of white privilege as a global system of domination, and as the racial project of the past 500 years, is the best possible system for achieving human parity.
In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawlsian ideal theory begins with normatively positioning itself “as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (Rawls, 1999, p. 4). Hence, the point of departure for Rawls does not take into account historical injustices; simply put, the original position starts from ground zero. That is, Rawls invents what he calls “the original position” and carries out a purely prescriptive hypothetical thought experiment which takes no account of history and essentially wipes the slate clean. For Mills (1997; 2007a), the Rawlsian “original position” reveals the ways in which liberal theorists complacently disregard the social or political context of individuals, which in turn, denies the present and historical fact of racism. In this way, Mills writes that *A Theory of Justice* presupposes:

a society with no history of racial (or any other kind of) injustice. So all we need is appropriate antidiscrimination legislation to make sure that this injustice does not enter the basic structure. But not only would this produce a racism-free polity, it would produce a race-free polity (Mills, 2009, p.179).

Mills is thus arguing that ideal theory and mainstream liberalism are guilty of sanitizing the historical injustices whose legacy remains important in shaping the contemporary liberal polity. In the following passage, Mills exposes the way liberal theory obscures issues of race and racial justice by erasing them from theory altogether. He writes:

[but] how can this ideal ideal\(^2\)—a society not merely without a past history of racism but without races themselves—serve to adjudicate the merits of competing policies aimed at correcting for a long history of white supremacy manifest in Native American expropriation, African slavery, residential and educational segregation, large differentials in income and huge differentials in wealth, non-white underrepresentation in high-prestige occupations and overrepresentation in the prison system, contested national narratives and cultural representations, widespread

\(^2\) in a trivial sense “ideal” theory is, or could interpreted as, all normative moral theory (at least to normative ethics as against meta-ethics); hence, for Mills the “ideal ideal” is meant to elucidate the way in which ideal theory relies on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual (Mills, 2009, p.168).
white evasion and bad faith on issues of their racial privilege, and a corresponding hostile white backlash against (what remains of) those mild corrective measures already implemented? (Mills, 2009, p.180).

In employing Mills’ analysis on ideal theory to Canadian society, I will argue later in this thesis that the reprehensibility of Canada’s colonial history necessitates more than merely wiping the slate clean and starting anew. That is to say, in order to diminish the cycle of cyclical consolidation of white domination Canada must move beyond and reject the neutral apparatus of liberal multiculturalism, which in idealizing the normative starting point, wipes out a history of racial oppression and asks non-whites to part with their grievances in the name of liberal principles. For instance, notwithstanding one’s position on the effectiveness of multiculturalism in Canada, it is hard to deny the fact that Canadian multicultural reforms have always been thought of, legislated by, and carried out by white parliamentarians, lawmakers and bureaucrats. What is more, multiculturalism has done little, if anything substantive, to address past injustices—especially in regards to First Peoples of Canada. Unsurprisingly, the plausible deniability of white domination provided by multicultural policy derives its purchase from the egalitarian promises enshrined in the Canadian constitution, and so allows Canadian whites to resist and reject calls for addressing injustice from a position of qualified credibility. That is to say, by pointing to multiculturalism as their trump card, whites can deny their privilege with relative comfort and ease.

Charles Mills’ usage of non-ideal theory is appealing because it establishes a normative critique of liberalism in combination with a descriptive account of race. In opposition to ideal theory, which by drawing on an ideally just society as the theoretical starting point, obfuscates actual social systems, Mills argues that the abstracted pre-social
individual of ideal theory, which continues to be intertwined with liberalism, is deficient because it avoids race, and either ignores, or denies the legacy of white domination. That is to say, from the broadest level of abstraction of normative ideal theory, to the more practical descriptive analysis that liberal defences of multiculturalism rely on, a comprehensive convention centred on circumventing the repugnant legacy of white domination evidences the tacit (sometimes overt) agreement of liberalism to “a partitioned social ontology”. If Mills’ analysis is correct, such inequality, and its enduring legacy of injustice, ought to be at the forefront of debates regarding diversity in the liberal polity, since according to liberal values all liberal theorists should be committed to the non-racial moral equality of all. It follows then that the expunging, and de-racializing of what Mills terms racial liberalism ought to top the list of priorities for all liberal thinkers.

Yet the necessity for such a re-articulation of liberalism has been neither adequately acknowledged nor acted upon. Thus, in making the case for a more radical form of liberalism, the following section introduces a framework that challenges prevailing perspectives defended within liberal theory and mainstream policy debates making the case for a theoretically radical and conceptually revisionist liberalism. As such, I turn now to an expository treatment of three theoretical frameworks. That is, I conclude this chapter with the introduction of interculturalism, asymmetrical reciprocity, and rectificatory justice– the three conceptual framings that I synthesize and triangulate in the concluding chapter. In simple terms, the following sections outline the individual components of the radical liberal interculturalism triad for achieving a more pluralistic Canadian polity.
**Interculturalism**

The relationship between multiculturalism and notions of what constitutes identity has been problematic on many different levels. Since its inception, multiculturalism has comported with a racialized debate whereby identities are bounded to visible differences, and in which all superficial, if distinctive phenotypical features are treated as the sole determinant of identity (Cantle, 2012, p.47) For Cantle, globalization and what he terms “super diversity”—a level and kind of diversity unprecedented within a particular society or locality—are calling the sustainability of this constrained debate into question. In response, the concept of interculturalism involves the conscious construction of a culture of openness which effectively jettisons the identity politics and enclavism/ghettoization that results from the notion of “otherness”. (p.47-48) As Gerard Bouchard (2011) contends, interculturalism is well suited to make the future of the liberal polity a cohesive one because it achieves a certain balance between divergent “principles, values, and expectations with the aim to unite “majorities and minorities, continuity and diversity, identity and rights, reminders of the past and visions of the future.”(p. 461) Another key component of interculturalism is its acknowledgement of the sociological asymmetry of political dialogue; which is to say that interculturalism recognizes that the values, beliefs, and practices that immigrants bring with them and those of the “dominant cultural space into which they have moved do not carry equal weight.” (Maxwell et al., 2012, p. 438) Ultimately, interculturalism contrasts with mainstream liberalism’s disingenuous suppositions of neutrality and symmetry and challenges multiculturalism’s strict advocacy of abstract cultural egalitarianism vis-à-vis the conceptualization of intercultural relations.
In his book *Interculturalism: the new era of cohesion and diversity* (2012, p.89) Ted Cantle argues that despite a number of similarities that multiculturalism and interculturalism share, there are important fundamental differences relating to how each paradigm views identity and culture that make interculturalism a superior model for sociopolitical integration. In a later work Cantle (2013) argues that although multiculturalism was “[an] appropriate response to the intolerant and racist attitudes and behaviors of the early stages of multicultural societies,” it perpetuated the ethno-cultural or racial enclaves that exist in Canada today. Providing a set of political criteria, Cantle outlines the following intercultural commitments: (1) support for distinctive cultural heritage, on iterative and dynamic basis; (2) anti-discrimination legislation, supported by experiential learning to address causes of discrimination and incitement of hatred; (3) the promotion of equal opportunities and positive action across differences; (4) the building of positive relations for race, ethnicity, age, disability, sexual orientation and other forms of difference; (5) majority/minority focus within and between minorities; together with diasporas, national and international dimensions; (6) the promotion of ‘belonging’ and values of diversity; and (7) formal and informal citizenship and cohesion learning programs. Of these criteria, the fifth one—the principled stance on a majority/minority focus—is especially interesting. Whilst, multiculturalism claims to celebrate diversity by negating the idea that Canada has no dominant or majority culture, this is a false premise which actually helps market multiculturalism as a business that peddles superficial diversity while maintaining socio-political dominance for French and English groups. Interculturalism in contrast does not avoid admitting the notion that there is a majority culture and seeks to preserve it and the existing cultures in Canada while also creating the
space for the co-construction of new cultural understandings. The primary focus of interculturalism then is, on cross-cultural connectedness, not merely segregated co-existence in Canadian society (Ghorayshi, 2010, p. 101). In this way, interculturalism promotes interaction and dialogue which, for Meer and Modood (2011) engenders a stronger collective investment from citizens. Whether one is a newcomer, identifies as aboriginal or is descended from white European settlers, interculturalism is “more committed to a stronger sense of the whole.”(2001, p. 18)

Another key aspect of intercultural theory is the endorsement of the view that ethnic classification and racialization are not products of any verifiable, inherently objective, or absolute facts; rather, such identity categories shift in meaning over time and space. Similarly, variability and evolution of identities such as ethnicity and race and how people self-identify within these classification systems is not a new occurrence, and interculturalism is cognizant of this. Finally, in contrast to multiculturalism, this is premised on allowing diverse cultures to co-exist as separate entities, which in a sense results in the reinforcing of differences and the codification of separateness, interculturalism builds from a society of openness and advocates for persons to engage in negotiation. Likewise, interculturalism seeks to cultivate the collaboration of cultures and the on-going co-construction of the meaning of citizenship and national identity. These intercultural interactions and exchanges, in turn, provide the space for genuine integration, which will shift the liberal polity in terms of interpersonal and institutional arrangements.
Iris Marion Young: Asymmetrical Reciprocity

For Iris Marion Young “we cannot understand others’ experiences by imagining ourselves in their place or in terms of symmetrical reciprocity” (1997, p. iv). Young surmises that the asymmetry that arises from people’s different experiences, histories and social positions is a vital concept in engaging in genuine pluralistic discourses. Simply put, Young suggests that assumptions about symmetry obscure differences and particularities; as such, the social position and experiences of others can be denigrated if one subscribes to that view. Moreover, for Young, it is ontologically untenable to adopt the perspectives of those in social positions with which they are related in social structures and interaction insofar as being someone else even for just a moment is impossible. As Young contends, when the assumption of symmetrical reciprocity takes the form of privileged people projecting their assumptions of how less privileged persons perceive the world, what is often produced are stereotypical representations “…which the privileged [use to] reinforce a complementary image of themselves” (p.iv). In sum, Young aims for a distinct, even fragile dialogic understanding and emphasizes the “wonder,” of this type of communication, which in her view generates amazement or surprise rather than recognition.

For Waddington et al. (2012, p. 9) the interaction that comports with intercultural dialogue necessitates the acknowledgement that the liberal polity consists of power dynamics that are asymmetrical. Thus elucidated, asymmetrical reciprocity will always persist between on the one hand newcomers, who are responsible for integrating and adapting, and on the other existing naturalized citizens, whose responsibilities include: aiding newcomers in the integration process, learning about and engaging with their cultural understandings so as to expedite social inclusion. Hence it is this balanced but
asymmetrical reciprocity of adjustment, interactions, and compromise between the existing citizenry and those of new arrivals that is far superior to the erroneous assumptions about symmetrical relations that mainstream liberal theory often repeats. (p.5)

Rectificatory justice: multiculturalism and the pitfalls of distributive justice

The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory is connected to the distinction between distributive and rectificatory justice, a distinction first observed by Aristotle in Book V of *Nicomachean Ethics*. For Aristotle, distributive justice deals with the “distribution of honours or wealth or anything else that can be divided among members of a community who share a political system.” Rectification in transactions deals with two types of interpersonal transactions. On the one hand it affords a correction connected to the unjust consequences of transactions that are mutually voluntary – for instance commerce or trade. Whereas on the other hand, Aristotle also proposed that rectification of involuntary transactions, where the lack of a victim’s consent to the transaction whether in the case of wrongdoers inflicting injury in secret such as: theft, adultery, poisoning, pimping, slave-deception, treachery, false witness or those in which wrongdoers inflict injury vis-à-vis coercion or force such as: assault, imprisonment, murder, plunder, mutilation, slander, insult. In extrapolating from Aristotle’s list a justifiable claim that RJ need apply to crimes against humanity and gross human rights violations is hard to refute. For instance Aristotle writes:

…in the case also in which one has received and the other has inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other been slain, the suffering and the action has been unequally distributed: but the judge tries to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the assailant
… therefore RJ will be the intermediate between the loss and gain (Aristotle, 1980).

For Aristotle then, the differences between distributive and RJ are important. Distributive justice focuses on the distribution of rights, freedoms, and goods to rational, morally neutral, and egalitarian individuals and says little about correcting for historical or enduring injustice. RJ on the other hand implores society to deal with injustice by necessitating those who gained unfair advantage to face up to losses they perpetrated; the overarching objective thus is for those persons to perceive these indemnities to persons like themselves. Insofar as RJ seeks to correct a wrong, it is not achieved by merely, distributing the goods and services that of a deeply unequal and unfair system.

How, then, does the racial origins of liberalism and the whiteness of contractarianism impact the socio-political order of today? How can a re-imagined theory of justice help liberalism confront and/or overcome its racial legacy? Mills & Pateman (2007, p.99) suggest that any project aiming to morally reconstruct the polity—to better reflect a more just society—must commit to enforcing mechanisms of RJ. That is to say, taking for granted that the legacy of a racist past persists in the present day which, in turn, has resulted in inherited systemic unfair advantages for white people, and members of other races have inherited systemic unfair disadvantages, then something must change to account for this injustice. And yet over forty years after the publication of *A Theory of Justice* and the critical absence of racial justice, and the questions such an absence should foster about the possibility of “whiteness” playing a central role in avoiding the issue speaks both to the continuing demographic and theoretical whiteness of liberalism and the steadfast refusal of liberal theorists to see it as such.
Simply stated, RJ seeks to construct a collection of certain memories and correct for a collective consciousness of events which are otherwise obscured by official histories as defined by dominant groups. It can be appreciated then that *rectificatory redistribution or justice* for subordinated groups is egregiously under-discussed and suffers from a theoretical gap in the literature. Yet liberal theory habitually circumnavigates dealing with historical and enduring injustices and instead asserts that all liberal citizens are equal.

In the absence of RJ and a comprehensive commitment to admitting, owning and correcting for historical injustices Canada’s colonial past, white dominance will persist. That is, the fraught history of Canadian settler colonialism must be acknowledged and rectified if a genuinely pluralistic future is to be reconciled. In this way, a macro framing must forcefully shape rectification: acknowledgment, apology, remembering, social support and guarantees of prevention. So proposed, RJ sends a dignifying message to victims and perpetrators, as well as to society. The scope of RJ also prescribes the institutional implementation of restitution: compensatory, and corrective measures aimed at reducing domination and acknowledging the asymmetrical relations of western liberal society. The fact that RJ is to date alien to the concerns of mainstream liberal theory is indicative of what Mills (2010) describes as a socio-political system of white dominance which liberalism co-constructs. In sum, distributive justice is normatively inadequate and practically untenable in bringing about a just socio-political order.

More to the point, rectificatory or corrective justice views the present socio-political cartography as rife with domination and creates space for the emancipatory reach that could realize some semblance of equality. Further, in committing to RJ the
polity can move past the many inadequacies of distributive justice that make it effectively impotent in tackling the very necessary task of correcting historical injustice. Likewise, inasmuch as distributive justice deals with the processes and structures that move the distribution of already existing economic benefits and burdens in societies, the presentism of its normative core binds mainstream contractarianism to “in a sense assuming the very thing that needs to be substantively addressed” (Mills & Pateman, 2007, p. 104). What mainstream liberal contractarianism offers vis-à-vis distributive justice then is “a mystified and idealized story of the creation of the modern world, which denies the centrality of racial subordination to its genesis.” (p.104)

In no small measure the participation of the state and the citizenry in the systematic oppression and discrimination against First Nations people in Canada endures in the present day, hence RJ contends that the obligation of the state and the citizenry in today’s Canada is to acknowledge and attempt to repair such injuries.

The prima facie case for ascribing white settler nations culpability for the wholesale oppression of Canadian First Nations people is, that if the enduring impacts of cultural and proprietary expropriation, genocide, *The Indian Act*, and a societal suprastructure that operates to maintain white dominance continue to determine who gets access to life chances in the Canadian polity, then society is obliged to repair such injuries. That is to say, if Canada truly strives for a polity that engenders pluralism and permits authentic integration of myriad ethno cultural groups and individuals, RJ must be a requisite policy and theoretical commitment.

In sum, mainstream/orthodox contractarianism, far from being methodologically neutral, in fact “embeds within its framework a substantive and deeply wrong vision of
the polity as consensual and non-oppressive.” (Mills, 2009, p. 182) Thus by retrieving
contractarianism and adopting a radical liberalism—which commits to rectificatory
measures of social justice— the elimination of oppression becomes central to normative
exercises which shape liberal policy.
CHAPTER TWO: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

People have wrestled with political and moral considerations in regards to a social contract at least since Classical Antiquity. That is, whether envisaged as an agreement between people and their sovereign ruler, or amongst people themselves, or some hybrid of both, the contract device has for a long time helped to articulate the relationship of persons and the social arrangements in which they live (Hampton, 2009, p.478).

Inversely, the recognizable social contract that persists, both heuristically and discursively, in the contemporary liberal polity was initially popularized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Likewise, contractarianism gained significant political influence in the modern period and is intimately linked to the American and French revolutions. In simple terms, proponents of the contractarian philosophical model argue for the resolution of moral and political problems by positing the perspectives of hypothetical rational persons and then supposing what these persons would collectively agree to, or, otherwise, what said persons would ostensibly be unreasonable to reject, in arranging the socio-institutional and political aspects of society.

The notion that the contract device remains a pervasive and important part of the liberal polity is crucial to many of the claims being advanced in this text; nevertheless it might be suggested that, in today’s globalized world the social contract framework is from a bygone age, is of little practical use and that social and political theory should displace it for some other more useful approach. Nevertheless as I hope to have portrayed in previous parts of this text, I claim that such a determination overlooks the pervasiveness of contractarianism in contemporary discourses—both within the academy
and beyond. What is more, as liberal contractarian theory dominates the theoretical landscape, the notions that often underpin higher levels of philosophical abstraction are taken-for-granted. Further, the social contract often makes up the cumulative foundational and accepted wisdom that liberal citizens and policy makers consequentially rely on to conceive of appropriate institutions aimed at improving the functionality of society.

If one is not convinced that contractarian ideas underwrite the major ideas that persist in the liberal polity, surely contract theory’s persistence is substantiated, at least in part, by liberalism’s global dominance as a political ideology and system of governance. From the outer regions of the former Soviet Union to the Western coast of Canada, the dominant political ideology and government structure resembles a system that commits to the unalienable rights for citizens living in a society of other similarly interested and morally equal citizens. Further, normative justifications of the existing western polity as well as normative objections and critiques to the existing state of affairs overwhelmingly use a liberal framework. The point is thus; inasmuch as liberalism dominates the socio-political theoretical landscape, liberal conceptual framings equally have to come to dominate the overarching frameworks, which motivate policy and more broadly the Western political agenda itself.

Taking for granted that the existence of liberalism’s globally hegemony is an acceptable premise; it is reasonable then to suggest that eminent liberal theorists are important drivers of epistemology and of public discourse–both within the academy and in the broader polity. Illustrative of the link between theory and discourse is the notion that the primary task of political philosophy since the publication of John Rawls’ *A
Theory of Justice has been to articulate a set of ideal prescriptions rather than endeavouring to advance comprehensive and descriptive accounts of the existing non-ideal state of affairs. That is, with the publication of *A Theory of Justice* in 1971, liberalism strengthened its grip upon the field of normative political theory. That is, liberalism is the most recognized and utilized ideological framework, which seeks to explain and adjudicate claims about how things ought to be, how to value them, what constitutes the good, and that which is characteristic of the right. Further, ideal theory has become the primary orientation for theorizing how liberal societies ought to be structured. In the same way, Rawls’ work continues to a theoretical foundation for developing the principles of a just society. Likewise, for liberal political theorists interested in the fair distribution of “goods” and the determination of the “right” *A Theory of Justice* is the canonical text that liberal theorists look to.³

The transformative aspect of Rawls’ normative theory is the way in which it jettisons the normative state of nature clause of previous liberal thinkers and supplanting it with the ‘original position’. For Rawls then, the task of deciding how to regulate society, participants or contractors must focus on points of contact, which represent the ‘overlapping consensus’ and as such, part with any individual contingencies. In this way, by hiding biases away behind a “veil of ignorance,” the terms of the contract are rendered unbiased.

³ For Rawls and Rawlsian liberals a person’s “good” is that which is needed for the successful execution of a rational long-term plan of life given reasonably favourable circumstances. That is to say, “goods” are those things that are desirable, if achievable in said circumstances; these include: liberty, opportunity, income, wealth, and self-respect. Further, Rawls describes the good as "the satisfaction of rational desire." (p. 92-93) Each person has his or her own plan of life - what is good may vary. The right in contrast, is that which is fair in accordance with the principles of justice and follows from the conditions in the “original position”. As Rawls explains: “whereas the principles of justice (and the principles of right generally) are those that would be chosen in the original position, the principles of rational choice and the criteria of deliberative rationality are not chosen at all.” (p. 44)
One of Rawls’s chief aims was to differentiate his theory from the utilitarian ideas that dominated the traditional liberal contract literature (Gutmann, 1980, pp. 141-155). Utilitarianism had invited much criticism in the early and middle part of the 20th century, but primarily on grounds that it rendered counter-intuitive premises (Petit, 2005, p.158). Rawls extended the analysis of utilitarianism and argued against its core assumption that, in his words, ‘a society is properly arranged when its institutions maximize the net balance of satisfaction’. (Rawls, 1971, p. 24) This assumption, he argued, was “founded on an inappropriate conception of how individuals relate to one another in a polity – on an inadequate political ontology.” (Rawls in Petit, 2005, p. 159) The principle of utilitarianism conveys the premise that happiness ought to be maximised regardless of the means. From the Benthamite utilitarian perspective, whenever presented with a choice, the solution is always measured against the metric: which choice results in the greatest utility; i.e., that which provides the most happiness to the majority ought to be the correct choice – is the best path toward justice (Gutmann, 1980, pp. 25-6). What is more, Immanuel Kant heavily inspired Rawls. In contrast to utilitarianism, Kantian deontology commits to categorical duty and forbids sacrificing a principle in order to arrive at a certain end (Fitzpatrick, 2008, p. 58). What is more, utilitarianism has long been criticized for its impoverished and impersonal morality throughout the academy. Rawls thus disputes the notion that utilitarianism is an adequate method for providing justice, and hence aims to cultivate a revised social contract theory, making the necessary alterations in which he finds to be the most moral and equitable a just society (Kymlicka, 1988, p. 174). Rawls’ theory is, in this way, heavily influenced by the deontology of Kant and when he asserts as much by describing his theory of “justice as fairness” as not a
doctrine of new ideas, but based on ideas already firmly imbued in the classical literature of the liberal tradition. However, his version seeks to lift the contract to a “higher order of abstraction” than the liberal social contract tradition, with the explicit aim of making the principles clearer and more universally applicable (Rawls, 1971, pp. viii, 3).

**Rawls, race and omission: an expository review of Rawls and whiteness of Rawlsian liberalism**

Tersely stated, by using the analytical tools of political philosophy to address important contemporary issues of justice, Rawls’s conceptual framework is arguably the *lingua franca* of contemporary liberal theory and as such, qualifies analysis of his work as an imperative initial step in illustrating the conceptual whiteness of liberalism, liberal multiculturalism and ultimately mainstream philosophy. Therefore in what follows I scrutinize Rawls’s work on social justice and explain that the conspicuous omissions of white domination and racial injustice within the Rawlsian gamut are not conditional but intrinsically linked to the ideological core of mainstream liberalism and liberal contract theory—and the myriad ways in which white ethno-cultural privilege and dominance shapes and structures the work of white liberalism and the liberal polity in general. Moreover, I argue that the failure of Rawls to address the apparently racialized disparity of access to life chances and the unequal power relations that privilege whites, and which govern human relationships in liberal society, leaves Rawlsian conceptualizations of justice simply left wanting.

Let me begin appropriately then with an expository review of Rawls’s canonical text: *A Theory of Justice* (1971). It is through this canonical text that I point out the taken-for-granted assumptions that are constitutively constructed through Rawlsian liberalism
and the whiteness of the conceptual lens from which he views the world. First then I articulate a point of clarification: despite being bereft of racial considerations and dominance generally, the large point here is that, inasmuch Rawls is a central thinker of the social contract tradition his failure to address racialized dominance or to undertake non-ideal theory—in combination with a host of factual presuppositions about neutrality and equality—actually functions to obfuscate or repudiate the criticality of white dominance. To illustrate this point Dwight Boyd (2004) describes the consternation he felt when he learned reading a paper written by Charles Mills of the “morally suspicious ignorance” of A Theory of Justice and its omission of all things racial. He writes:

I was morally shaken, to learn from reading a paper by Charles Mills (1994) that in A Theory of Justice (1971) John Rawls mentions only the slavery of antiquity, and simply ignores—in a book about justice in reasonably developed democratic societies—the particular and horrendous fact of slavery in the USA. (p. 9)

Such egregious vacancies broadly implicate liberalism as a primary player in Eurocentrism and hegemonic whiteness. Eurocentrism in this way refers to: practices and conventions, whether cognizant or otherwise, of emphasizing European (and, more generally, Western) concerns, culture and values at the expense of other cultural understandings that fall outside of white European ways of knowing.

The focus of A Theory of Justice (1971) is expressed through an array of thoughts that are teleologically ill-suited for prescriptive work in the actual social cartography of unjust societies—societies which are unfortunately replete throughout the actual world; hence once it becomes clear that ideal theory has limited utility for addressing non-ideal issues of justice it will be appreciated that it has an equally limited capacity for tackling issues of racialized injustice and white dominance that remain ubiquitous in many liberal
states. Likewise, despite a doxastic doctrine outlining the normative aspects of socio-political life, Rawls is conspicuously quiet on racialized power and white dominance. Making this point, Mills describes Rawls’ work as especially illustrative of the general depravity of mainstream liberal theory on issues of white domination and tackling the foundations of race, racialization and structured racial inequality (Mills, 1998, p.98).

Further, Rawls is, according to Mills, emblematic of a longstanding liberal tradition that fails to acknowledge the ubiquity of white domination and by the same token largely avoids the work of considering strategies to address the deep seeded and structuralized ethno-cultural and racial inequality which is shaped by and perpetuated through liberal mechanisms of white privilege and white social-cultural dominance in liberal society.

The substance of Rawls’ two principles of justice makes up the normative core of liberal commitments to fairness and distributive justice. Further, Rawls asserts that insofar as one can circumvent bias and maintain objectivity then the work of theory is to posit how justice ought to look in a normative and ideal society; a “well ordered society” for Rawls is a polity in which reasonable persons agree to the same schedule of justice principles which, in turn, make up the foundation of laws and public social institutions. Hence, in Rawls’ view the foundation of an ideal polity is one where members agree to a schedule of “goods” and “rights” that principally governs sociality and drives the contractarian idea of “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage”. For Rawls, any person has an individual plan for one’s life –what the good constitutes may vary. The right nonetheless is the work of the social contract, in other words, “the right” is the same for everyone, influenced by the "veil of ignorance." Rawls equates the concept of the right as being fair.
As already mentioned, Rawls’s contractarianism depicts a revised social contract bereft of a “state of nature”; that is by supplanting the descriptive pre-social state, Rawls posits an exclusively normative/hypothetical thought-experiment at the centre of his project. To this end, Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice* attempts to articulate abstracted and idealized judgments about justice rather than offering a descriptive historical account about the origins of human society. To illustrate this Rawls communicates what he deems as the constitutive elements of justice:

the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be established. This way of regarding the principles of justice I shall call justice as fairness (p. 5).

Put simply, when deprived of certain information about oneself and society, the principles of justice are the work of disinterested moral actors. A key aspect of Rawls’ thought experiment ensured that participating persons or contractors are bereft of social location and other socio-political information. The veil of ignorance is thus employed in order to facilitate the necessary social consciousness for participants to select “principles of justice…defining a perfectly just society, given favourable conditions ... [within a doctrine] of strict compliance” (Rawls, 1971, p. 308-309). So elucidated, *A Theory of Justice* depicts an ideal society governed by principle of justice, that for Rawls any rational person would choose in a state of relative ignorance about their social position and economic well being. Furthermore, Rawls’ rearticulated formulation of the social contract envisages the principles of justice for a just society contingent on participants
operating in a state of moral equality. That is, the Rawlsian thought experiment necessarily delimits participants from any knowledge of their identity, self-interest, or group embeddedness. Further, behind what Rawls terms the “veil of ignorance” participants choose principles of justice that will govern the socio-institutional structure of an ideal society; by putting personal bias, social status and prejudices aside, Rawls asserts that any reasonable person would arrive at an agreed upon aggregate set of justice principles which, in turn, would extend justice as fairness to the entire society. The premise is elucidated: if reasonable people are deprived of knowing their talents, social status, and conceptions of the good life—which is the set of beliefs about how “[a person] should lead her life, about what makes her life worthwhile” (p. 5), persons will arrive at a common view of justice that is suitable for the individual as well as the collective.

Let me pause a moment and look beyond the promising Rawlsian theoretical architecture. Although Rawls seeks to map out the principles of justice for liberal society, his positive contributions to the pursuit of social justice are, at least in part, offset by the fact the text is remiss in facing up to, or addressing the insalubrious and unrelenting problems of European-white ethno-cultural dominance and racial inequality. Put simply, Rawls’s work on justice relies on an overarching framework of thought and a method of reasoning which effectively assumes away and so negates historical injustice and Eurocentric domination. That is to say, by insisting on ideal theory Rawls denies the ontological place from which normative reasoning would begin to address issues of racial disparity and ethno-cultural dominance.

The point I am making here is that there is a noticeable gap in the literature insofar as there is a limited amount of scholarship that seeks to contextualize Rawlsian
liberalism in regards to its philosophical whiteness. That is, there is little attention paid to the noticeable omissions replete in Rawls’ work related to ethno-cultural and racial justice. Further, this chapter does the philosophical work of explaining how in abstracting away non-ideal realities and insisting on ideal theory, Rawls and the mainstream liberal social contract more generally, obfuscates the inherent whiteness imbued in the liberal philosophical architecture. Thus, this thesis moves to help fill this gap by arguing that in order to retrieve liberalism from its discourse of entrenched white dominance, it is necessary to employ non-ideal theory that begins with efforts to diagnose the problems and injustices in the world and then attempt to develop strategies to overcome them.

**Rawls, the social contract and Canadian multiculturalism**

How then Rawls’ work is specifically germane to this particular project? To elucidate this critical point of contact, it is instructive to consider the similarities of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s ‘Just Society’, which Cecil Foster argues, both laid the foundation for Canadian multiculturalism and closely resembled the ‘difference principle’ (Foster, 2014, p. 53). Rawls describes the difference principle as ‘a strongly egalitarian conception’, and elucidates the position by describing a two person society in which both are equal: ‘No matter how much either person’s situation is improved, there is no gain from the standpoint of the difference principle unless the other also gains (Rawls, 1971, p. 76). In this way, Canada’s multicultural covenant resembles such an agreement insofar as it is nominally based on *de jure* egalitarianism and so assumes that contractors are both voluntary and neutral. Likewise Rawlsian ideal theory seems to inform Canadian multicultural theory, inasmuch as both paradigms operate to deny, manipulate, or discredit the salience of contemporary racism by dispensing with discussions of race altogether (Mills, 1997). Put another way, insofar as
multiculturalism emphasizes cultural identity of racial minority groups, it effectively engages in rebranding/sanitizing the historical injustices of race and racism. Likewise, the actual socio-political relations that exist in the western polity are obscured by the mainstream social contract theory (ideal theory); in short, contract theory obfuscates a fundamental truth:

…inequality is the actual social norm obtaining for the majority. The evasive conceptual assimilation of the status of white women and non-whites to the status of white men that is embedded in the mainstream contract, [buries] the distinctive problems the former groups face… (Mills, 2007, p. 100).

In brief, the argument I want to advance here is that theorizing about justice at the level of what Rawls terms ideal theory— the conceptual framework that proposes a perfectly just society as the metric by which actual societies are measured — is fundamentally defective. Similarly, I argue for a radical re-articulation of liberal contractarianism executed through the conceptual framings of non-ideal theory. Moreover, insofar as liberalism and social contract theory are interdependent, and multiculturalism is a liberal outgrowth, the prescription I am promoting works to transform the complex levels of hierarchical abstraction from which liberal theory operates. To that end, liberalism and its constituent hierarchy of abstractions must begin to recognize a more representative social ontology, which places emphasis on conceptualizing justice as the relative absence of oppression and the marked degeneration of socio-political domination. Put succinctly, liberalism and multiculturalism operate as mechanisms of Eurocentric white dominance, which, in turn, govern the unequal socio-institutional and political power relations in Canadian society. Thus, the argument I am advancing here is liberal theorists and Canadian policy makers ought to embrace non-ideal theory and its more accurate sketch of the socio-political cartography of white domination in order to create the necessary space for the
emancipatory reach of equality to gain full-flowering. Rather than being, at present, effectively impotent in tackling the very necessary task of rectificatory justice, for Mills mainstream contractarianism “assum[es]the very thing that needs to be substantively addressed.” (Mills & Pateman, 2007, p. 104) What Rawlsian ideal theory offers then is “a mystified and idealized story of the creation of the modern world, which denies the centrality of racial subordination to its genesis.”(Mills & Pateman, 2007, p.104)

Insofar as a perfect society would be bereft of oppression and ethno-cultural dominance, its normative implications are seemingly irrelevant when dealing with problems that exist in actual societies. An indispensable prerequisite for Rawls’ brand of justice is thus to abstract away the contextual, the situational, the circumstantial and the socio-institutional considerations that arise when application into policy is considered and instead focus on, the idea of a ‘well-ordered society’. In this sense, Rawls abstracts away the imperative issues of justice that exist in the present polity.

**Two principles of Justice**

The two overarching principles that are emphasized in Rawls’ work are:

1) Liberty in which all persons have an equal right a system of equal basic liberties well matched with an analogous structure of liberty for all citizens; and 2) the principle of wealth as fairness in which social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. A corollary of the wealth principle is the difference principle: in order for any change to be accepted as an improvement, it must help the least advantaged representative person. That is, in capping off the hypothetical Rawlsian
social contract the difference principle is a kind of correction clause which states that: unequal socioeconomic expectations are just if such conditions advance the opportunities of the least-advantaged person in the polity. For Rawls then, the only credible moral defence that a polity’s privileged persons can employ in regards to enjoying their socioeconomic advantages is the notion that the absence of said advantages would create a state of affairs where the least advantaged would be even worse off. In sum, the difference principle states that those who possess talents and other unearned endowments do not merit any greater claim to collectively created social goods unless the use of said endowments contribute to a higher standard of living for the collective—with emphasis on the least advantaged person. (Rawls, 1971, p.98)

The whiteness of the original position

In a *Theory of Justice* Rawls prioritizes idealization and argues that it is the only viable method for achieving social change. For Rawls then, ideal theory offers a representative metric from which justice is normatively evaluated. The pervading principle for Rawls regarding justice as fairness is that rational persons from an original position of fairness will make universal judgments pertaining to the good and the right. To this end, Rawls contends that those who are “fairly situated with respect to one another can agree if they can agree to anything at all”(p.244); however, his universalist perception of persons as neutrally invested and equal is illustrative of how the original position is contingent on a European white middle class male conceptual framing; that is, inasmuch as the original position produces principles of justice that conform to a white man’s existing presuppositions, the decisions about justice taken from such a position will be necessarily shaped by those judgments (Anderson, 2010, p.14). In the end, the
original position is seemingly unconcerned with how it is that persons actually comport themselves; instead the original position creates the situational and normative spaces from which, white Eurocentric principles of justice can rise.

**The imperative of non-ideal theory and rectificatory justice**

As Mills (1997) cogently articulates, the present and historical fact of racism raises a range of issues about justice that are altogether elided by Rawls’s theory of justice as well as by other liberal texts. It is this pattern of obfuscation replete throughout Rawls’ work that necessitates non-ideal theory, which seeks to adjudicate what rectificatory measures of justice are required to correct unjust societies, rather than distributive measures which deals with norms and principles for the distribution of goods in society. (Mills, 2013, p. 11) Hence, in order to retrieve liberalism from its *modus operandi* that ignores racial subordination and perpetuates white dominance, a comprehensive re-mapping of the liberal epistemology of ignorance is a necessary precondition for reformulating an epistemology that renders genuine knowledge.

According to Mills (2007) a vital component of any project aiming to morally reconstruct the polity—to better reflect a more just society—necessitates socio-institutional measures and political mechanisms of rectificatory justice. RJ is that form of justice implemented as a means of addressing those situations that occur when a just system of distributive justice does not suffice in undoing unfair disadvantage. Though the overall aim of RJ is remedial, as its guiding principle is to remedy these situations, its specific aim is to take an unjust situation and correct it. RJ implores society to deal with injuries and losses by compelling those who gained unfair advantage to face up to the consequent damages which occurred in exchange for said advantage; the overarching
objective thus is for those persons to perceive these indemnities as executed on persons like themselves—that is, to humanize the subject by placing the dominant person in a place where they can exhibit empathy toward the dominated. Other measures of RJ are confrontation and compensation, two frameworks which would likely mobilize opponents and galvanize political will to yield any process toward a shared responsibility for colonialism’s racialized and unjust history; a colonial history that is intimately interrelated to liberalism. A central pillar of RJ is to commemorate and recognize a collection of memories and then correct for the collective amnesia and false consciousness of events, which are, “otherwise obscured by official histories and ‘common sense’ as defined by dominant groups”.

There are a few simple reasons to evaluate justice, diversity, and liberal societies from non-ideal theory—from a critical analysis of injustice in the actual state of affairs as opposed to working from an idealized picture of society. According to Anderson (2014) non-ideal theory begins with acknowledging injustices in our world, analyses and evaluates their origins, deliberates on the evidence as to what could dismantle said origins, and then prescribes policies or strategies of improvement that are within the capacities and resources of the polity today. Non-ideal theory sets the idealized abstractions aside and commits to theoretical work which has practicable paths from present world problems to those more ideal worlds. The focus of non-ideal theory is hence on what we can and should do, given the actual injustice and non-ideal circumstances that people live in today. That is say, in order to reach a just polity, normative work must parse the rationales for why people mistreat one another and ways
that institutions may redirect human conduct to avoid such mistreatment. Put another way, Elizabeth Anderson suggests:

A system of principles that would produce a just world if they regulated the conduct of perfectly rational and just persons will not do when we ask human beings, with all our limitations and flaws to follow them (Anderson, 2010, p. 4).

The point being advanced here is: that ideal theory, insofar as it works from a “well ordered society” fails to render substantive prescriptions on issues of justice for the actual non-ideal circumstances of liberal states and the non-ideal situations that liberal citizens live in. In particular, ethno-cultural/racial exclusions and systematic white domination are—by definition—omitted from an ideal society, hence ideal theory is incapable of providing a point of reference from which white domination and racial exclusion in actual societies can be evaluated. Further, since ideal theory makes race and white domination unintelligible—that is to say the existence of racial exclusion and domination is untenable in an ideally just society—it fails to offer an ontological framework needed to comprehend contemporary claims of racial exclusion and the persistence of white domination as a socio-political system. What is more, insofar as ideal theory necessitates a race-less, cultureless, and classless “original position”, it obfuscates the reality of racial injustice and by making whites blind to domination and its consequent advantages, which shape ethno-cultural and racial injustice. In other words, Anderson (2010) argues:

…when we assess whether a society is deviating from ideal justice, we still assess it from the standpoint of representative positions in the ideally just society. Since no racial positions exist in the ideal society, they do not define a standpoint from which to assess racially unjust societies. Hence, ideal theories that make race invisible fail to supply the conceptual framework needed to recognize and understand contemporary racial injustice. The principled colour blindness of ideal theory is epistemologically disabling: it makes us blind to the existence of race-based injustice. (p. 6)
What then substantiates my claim that the liberal social contract is imbued with white privilege and operates to preserve Eurocentric white domination? Firstly, the historical record is clear: the original contract theorists from Locke to Kant held virulently racist views and espoused either implicit or explicit exclusions as to who counted as a human subject and as such who could be deemed worthy of equal rights. As Losordo (2013) argues, the writings of Locke, Kant, Franklin, and Smith, were married to, and tangled in, “a process of systematic expropriation and practical genocide first of the Irish and then of the Indians...” he goes on to directly name liberal theorists as major forces of legitimation for ‘black enslavement and the black slave trade’ (p.20). Further still, Losordo claims: “the rise of liberalism and the spread of the commodity of slavery based on race were born out of a twin birth.” Yet I anticipate an obvious riposte to this claim which is: those overtly racial and explicitly exclusionary kinds of liberal ideals have been long stricken from any so-called credible theoretical apparatus; which is to say, no contemporary theorist worth mentioning would in present-day espouse the vitriol that was acceptable in the early modern period. Therefore, if the liberal contract was historically white and it defined egalitarianism as a strictly white framework, as Mills and others claim, then surely the contemporary contract has corrected for—at least in theory—the capriciously colour-coded nature of historical liberalism and its shameful past.

Taking for granted that the abovementioned objection is a valid one, it does not alleviate liberalism from its role in codifying white dominance. Instead, the discussion merely brings me to a second and, in my estimation, a more insidious variety of white domination that is replete throughout the liberal polity. This deeper variety of white domination embedded in the contractarian *modus operandi* stems from what Riley
describes as the “political volunteerism” of the social contract which, in defining the
terms of the construction of the polity represents a moral causality that inheres in the fact
that the contract presupposes moral equality, symmetrical reciprocity and political
neutrality as given and then subsequently asks what kind of society would be constructed
by equal persons. In sum, Rawls is in essence asserting that inasmuch as the polity is
consensual and reciprocally advantageous, cases of racial exclusion are aberrations, since
the contract originated to include all persons with equal consideration (Mills, 2007,
p.234). Hence, the contract, in assuming the equality of all contractors, fails to ever
consider the grievances of those who historically were not included in the contract
apparatus—namely, non-whites. That is to say, beneath the surface of the Rawlsian
contract and, notwithstanding the original position’s hand wave to fairness, the nature of
depriving prior knowledge to participants in a normative exercise, also effectively
abstracts away, or contravenes claims for acknowledging, articulating and correcting for
the non-ideal.

Further, by idealizing and abstracting away the contextual considerations of
institutional domination, structural manipulation, historical subjugation, or ethno-cultural
oppression that non-whites have endured and continue to bear the weight of, Rawls forms
an explicitly normative and tacitly descriptive ontology of persons located in a stratified
social hierarchy of various kinds. It is precisely this disregarding of whiteness,
domination and race in his normative theory and in his more implicit descriptive
theorization that cleanses the shameful history of the modern world which, in turn,
obscures the significance of white racial domination and the centrality of liberalism as a
primary mechanism that shaped it.
Contrary to the Rawlsian overtures, which are normatively misleading and descriptively misguided, the actual political structure of the liberal polity is racially exclusionary and characteristically white dominated. Thus elucidated, Mills speaks about Rawls’s Eurocentrism in the following passage:

The Eurocentrism [of Rawls] is not the (relatively) innocent one of genealogy (which does not necessarily foreclose subversive creative development) but a systematic ignoring of the experience of the non-white political subject, ubiquitously manifest in the “whiteness” of Rawls’s perspectives on time and space, his tacit conceptions of the populations he is speaking about and to, and his assumptions about how best to frame their narrative. (Mills, 2009, p.173-174)

That is to say, insofar as the contract normatively models consent and not coercion and the aim is to map the social ideal polity instead of trying to theorize how to ideally correct for the non-ideal, it means that Rawls and the gamut of Rawlsian liberalism is located conceptually within a theoretical framework aimed at issues concerning white populations and not the historically marginalized non-whites. The mainstream contract is therefore not equal and far from neutral and in fact imbues within its normative core a fundamentally inaccurate image of the liberal polity as consensual and non-oppressive. In this way, contrary to the Rawlsian lens, liberal contractarians must make dominance and oppression the principal concerns, which would necessitate locating justice and its normative theoretical conception within a framework of non-ideal theory. The normative project thus would cease to exist as a collection of competing conceptions of the perfect society, but, rather, the negotiation of competing strategies for rectifying historical and contemporary social injustice (Mills, 2005, p.167).

Indeed, like Mills I advocate for liberalism’s retention but not through the obfuscating lens of ideal theory. Rather, the use of non-ideal theory which explicitly
pursues the identification of, and redress for injustices —both past and present—and offers recommendations for change from this critical starting point. Contrariwise, ideal theory maps out the perfectly just society and necessarily overlooks, ignores or negates the problems of race and white domination of which real people deal with in real societies; it looks to a model based on justice in an ideally just society instead of probing the means to eradicating actual injustice. So interpreted, the Rawlsian theoretical gamut is culpable in executing a liberalism of white dominance that evades the facts of Eurocentric white exploitation of non-whites and broadly liberalisms role in widespread oppression.

In order to reconcile the legitimate aspirations that underlie ethno-cultural pluralism, and I argue that we need to shift the focus towards an approach, which I call the radical liberal interculturalism triad. Hence chapter three re-examines the main features of this thesis and its theoretical approach. That is to say, an intercultural model of liberal pluralism, which commits to the acknowledgement of asymmetrical reciprocity and the contextualized redress of corrective or rectificatory justice, I argue offers considerable promise and will generate a transformative effect of epistemic traditions and in rectifying injustices that have been traditionally avoided in Canadian history.
CHAPTER THREE: THE RADICAL LIT (rLIT)

To this point this thesis has been primarily in expository mode. The work of this chapter then, is to shift to argumentative mode and to articulate a superior framework for arriving at an authentically plural liberal polity.

In what follows, I introduce the radical liberal interculturalism triad or rLIT as a superior model to multiculturalism. With the support of the exposition in the antecedent chapters, I argue that white domination is strengthened by multiculturalism insofar as it fails to address the legacy of colonialism and the persistent injustices that past wrongs continue to perpetuate. Thus, the rLIT posits a genuine pluralism and recommends transformative changes to the polity through the conceptual framework of interculturalism, commitments to RJ and asymmetrical reciprocity. The rLIT in brief emerges as: 1) a more authentically pluralistic device through the triangulation of the superior interaction and participation of citizens in a common society that interculturalism promises—rather than cultural differences as such merely co-existing without meaningful interaction; 2) an acknowledgement of past injustices and their influence on the present polity, which I claim advances the liberal theory of justice; and 3) lastly makes the acknowledgement of asymmetrical power dynamics in social institutions and the very context that shapes liberal social ontology.

The chapter then shows the multitude of ways the radical LIT does a better job of exposing the specific processes of domination and subordination that are conspicuous in their absence within the liberal and multicultural frameworks of philosophy while also facing up to both horns of Dwight Boyd’s dilemma of diversity. Likewise, in replacing a
false liberal neutrality with an emphasis on conceiving of relationships as shaped by
history and power, the radical LIT promotes the kind of dynamic interaction and
exchange that interculturalism promises without making some of the mistakes that liberal
multiculturalism makes in its silences about white domination and the ways in which
liberalism has been historically racialized, Eurocentric and White dominated.

**The rLIT Anticipated**

This chapter takes the work from the previous expository chapters and bridges
any conceptual, normative, and prescriptive gaps. Likewise, the chapter elucidates how
the radical liberal framework of interculturalism tied to asymmetrical reciprocity in
pedagogical and jurisprudential measures of RJ can begin a systematic unravelling of
white domination and the corollary of liberal problems related to liberal neutrality,
assumed political symmetry, and the whiteness of contractarianism.

What is more, I will illustrate that in subverting the taken-for-granted neutrality of
the liberal individual, represented truths of ideal theory, and pervading hegemonic
practices of multiculturalism, racial liberalism more broadly will dislodge the sites of
white cultural and epistemological domination that were presented in chapter one and
which Boyd warns are behind the misleading veneer of purported multicultural pluralism.

After I explain what each component of the radical LIT offers to the overall aim
of this normative project, I lay out the prescriptive model as a unified conceptual framing,
which I claim is well suited for a retrieval of liberalism from its historical marriage with
white domination. Thus, I offer a fundamentally philosophical interrogation, and

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*By this I mean correcting the historical record both in terms of correcting popular perceptions of events and
in terms of pedagogical or curricular narratives that currently sanitize the repugnant aspects of Canada’s
history including most especially its colonial legacy.*
rejection, of liberal articulations of multiculturalism and propose an alternative model of pluralism based on interculturalism— which encompasses an amplified model for the integration of diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds by engaging all persons in a participatory, open-ended, ongoing project of co-operatively constructing the culture of the nation. In making the case for a more radical form of liberalism articulated through interculturalism, asymmetrical reciprocity and rectificatory justice, I challenge prevailing perspectives of the value of multiculturalism defended within liberal theory and mainstream policy debates.

This chapter aims to establish a theoretically radical and conceptually revisionist liberalism which triangulates interculturalism, RJ and the recognition of socio-political asymmetry in the polity so as to reduce domination. This is not an argument from ideal theory, rather as a theory that seeks to explain and potentially overcome the problems of racial and ethno-cultural injustice, the radical- liberal intercultural triad is by definition starting from a position that is not ideal. This so-called radical-liberal intercultural theoretical triad overcomes the inadequacies of multiculturalism by accounting for and making corrections to the social contract apparatus, and acknowledging the asymmetrical nature of society and engaging all persons in intercultural dialogue, which recaptures liberal commitments from white domination.

I will further demonstrate that the theoretical significance of liberalism reconceived in this way provides a greater impact than merely an improved version of a racialized system. That is to say, in the absence of real transformative changes both in theory and in policy motivation the polity will be mostly unchanged. Illustrating this point, Mills (2007) argues: “liberal models of the polity such as classic social contract
theory need to be re-conceptualized so as to register the history and ongoing reality of racial domination” (p.74). Further, philosophers working under the current lens of tacitly accepting white dominance are destined to make partial and biased assumptions which manifest in other ways not alleviated by cursorily accepting non-whites into the liberal idea of what a "person" is. Specifically, without major shifts in the liberal theoretical underpinnings that motivate policy decisions and socio-political discourses generally, the work of philosophers will continue to perpetuate operational, methodological and ontological presuppositions that view justice for white people as central. That is to say, insofar as these presuppositions exist in their theoretical framings currently, even after race and the history of colonialism has been nominally sanitized, the racial biases suffused in such assumptions remain and permeate the rest of their philosophy as well.

So how, given this background theoretical story, do I plan on addressing the gap in the literature regarding race and its major role in liberal theory? Let me first suggest that in terms of corrective or rectificatory forms of justice, liberal theory is conspicuously vacuous. Thus in advocating for a retrieval of liberalism, I argue that making commitments –both officially and attitudinally– to fundamental rectificatory measures for past injustices is indispensable. In consequence, by supplanting the dubious policies of multiculturalism, the radical triad of liberal interculturalism apprehends liberal theory from its racialized and white dominated ontology. The central aim of this chapter is to expose the conceptual flaws of Canadian multiculturalism and create the theoretical space for a liberalism that extends its principles to all persons white and non-white.

In what follows I articulate the superior theoretical components of interculturalism in comparison to multiculturalism while also making the case that
interculturalism by itself is not sufficient to reduce white domination and ethno-cultural inequality. Moreover, the argument being advanced here is that while interculturalism resolves the insular patterns of understanding and behaviour that multiculturalism gives rise to; it fails to adequately address the need for rectificatory or corrective justice.

This chapter concludes this socially normative project with a prescriptive and argumentative agenda and synthesizes premises from social contract theory, principles of liberalism and liberal pluralism which in the end provides a cogent philosophical prescriptive framework for redressing social and political injustices perpetuated for racial and ethno-cultural reasons.

Before I move on let me suggest that the rLIT is not a utopian vision; that is, the superior framework I am arguing for is by no means a panacea, nor is it a perfect theoretical or practical solution to the dilemma of diversity. By identifying its own limitations I am hoping to advance pluralism by welcoming discussions across diversity so as to bolster the chances of the Canadian polity becoming a more inclusive and authentically pluralistic socio-political space. It is, perhaps, naive to think that a model in which acknowledging past injustice, developing democratic intercourse based on asymmetrical reciprocity and adopting interculturalism (and all that comes with it) would necessarily eradicate European white dominance in Canadian institutions and the polity at large. Nevertheless, it is the work of theory and philosophical analysis to point to a direction where the polity could achieve a more equitable and non-oppressive reality and hence the rLIT offers a more comprehensive and superior model for pluralism which attempts to overcome the shortcomings of current policy.
Non-Ideal Theory and The rLIT

The rLIT is grounded in non-ideal theory and as such starts with a diagnosis of a social problem. To this end, the rLIT explores the ways in which the Canadian polity is demarcated along ethno-cultural and racial lines in regards to access to life chances. In chapters 1 and 2 the text relied heavily on Charles Mills and established a normative critique of liberalism in combination with a descriptive account of race. That is to say, from the broadest level of abstraction of normative ideal theory, to the more practical descriptive analysis that liberal defences of multiculturalism rely on, a comprehensive convention centred on circumventing the repugnant legacy of white domination is needed. In sum, the radical LIT makes the necessary reforms to the polity to allow for the retention of liberalism while jettisoning the mainstream tendencies that sanitize its history and which, if left unfettered, will continue maintaining white dominance.

Interculturalism

Before I explain how interculturalism is superior to multiculturalism and the ways it triangulates with the other components of the rLIT, let me quickly run through some of the myriad points of contact between multiculturalism and interculturalism. First, interculturalism and multiculturalism both theoretically accept that heterogeneity and ethno-cultural diversity are intrinsic features of the liberal polity. In a similar way, interculturalism and multiculturalism both advocate for the state to play a central role vis-à-vis government intervention aimed at reducing potential barriers for said integration. What is more, both advocate for the reasonable accommodation of cultural and religious practices and endorse the buttressing of a certain civic capacity that enables immigrants and ethno-cultural minorities to participate in public life. In like manner, both are
committed theoretically and in terms of policy to codifying their central aims by ensconcing them in constitutional documents. Thus elucidated, both interculturalism and multiculturalism communicate policy that necessarily bolsters liberties by grounding them in the legal system, which, in turn, affords the citizenry a schedule of rights from which to articulate a procedure for public decision-making. Both frameworks uphold commitments to the accommodation of cultural and religious conventions and support the full participation of all persons in public institutions: for instance a Sikh police officer is encouraged to wear a turban if he so chooses. (Maxwell et al., 2012, p. 5) Likewise, to ensure society wide civic participation, interculturalism and multiculturalism encourage policies that help increase the level of representation of ethnic minorities in bureaucracy, government, and other areas of public life (e.g. affirmative action policies). Additionally, at the level of government, both paradigms factor in diversity and cultural differences when devising in and implementing public policy and public programs. Both Interculturalism and Multiculturalism hold cultural diversity to be an essential feature of society and view it as a vital source of social, cultural, and even economic capital. Neither framework opposes the recognition of cultural heritage or identity. Both reject the melting pot or republican-style assimilationist tendencies of French and American immigration policies. Moreover both frameworks involve the implementation of state interventions that ease the path for immigrants to successfully integrate. Finally, both policy frameworks support public outreach and anti-racism initiatives, which aim to augment ethno-cultural acceptance.

A study by Fleras and Elliott (2002) found that multiculturalism policy at the federal level has some inherent differences with respect to interculturalism. In short,
multiculturalism seeks to remove barriers to immigrant integration through the recognition of all Canadians as equal with full rights and equal access to life chances regardless of their ethnic or cultural background. Fleras and Elliot (2002) go on to argue that this perspective refuses to acknowledge an official Canadian majority culture and hence adopts the notion that all ethno-cultural groups are equal in status within a bilingual nation. In consequence, the study elucidates how the cultural hegemony of English Canadians is veiled or somehow hidden but nevertheless still sets the standard for all other ethno-cultural groups to aspire to and be assimilated by.

There is an emerging body of work that deals with interculturalism which demonstrates in a number of socio-political ways that multiculturalism, despite its lofty aims, has failed to offer the genuine liberal pluralism that its mandate and rhetoric promise. Perhaps the most significant distinguishing feature of interculturalism in comparison to multiculturalism and other diversity or pluralism strategies then is its commitment to integrating persons from myriad ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds into an open-ended, continuous project of collectively co-creating the national culture of a liberal democratic state. In this way, interculturalism’s few key features include: the recognition of socio-political asymmetry between majority and minority populations; the integration of new citizens as part of a process for co-constructing a common societal culture; mutual understanding across difference; and prioritizing contact and interpersonal relations between different ethno-cultural groups and individuals.

Interculturalism provides a viable solution to the tension that liberal nations face when the liberal state engages in policy that intends on managing cultural differences. It
follows that by rethinking the foundation upon which apparatuses of social integration are envisaged, interculturalism shifts from obscuring the notion of a majority or dominant culture and seeks to both uphold the rights for the majority to thrive in combination with commitments to minority integration. Hence, unlike how multiculturalism denies that Canada has a dominant or majority culture and instead argues that all cultures are equal, interculturalism does not shy away the development and maintenance of a majority culture—taking into account their numerical advantage in population, their foundational history, and established traditions. Interculturalism also commits to the integration of minorities and places paramount importance on the state’s ability to adjudicate between majorities and minorities by advocating for ethno-cultural interaction, and negotiation that compliments ethno-cultural diversity, without compromising the enduring cultural identity of dominant group. (Bouchard, 2001, p. 440)

To establish the integrity of interculturalism and make the case for its superiority in comparison to current Canadian policy, I begin with the notion that in its normative core, interculturalism is aligned with non-ideal theory. Insofar as it starts with a diagnosis of a social problem in the actual world, interculturalism emphasizes the theoretical weaknesses and responds to the decades of state-mandated multicultural policy. The key-organizing trope of interculturalism that separates it from other integration or diversity management strategies is its focus on the interaction between people from different cultures and national backgrounds—a component that multiculturalism almost completely circumvents. To facilitate this interaction, interculturalism adds the sub-components: dialogue, sociological asymmetry, and the moral contract.
Dialogue here means: the process of constructing a common culture which occurs through encounters, democratic interaction, and exchange between citizens of various cultural origins and values perspectives. (Maxwell et al., 2012, p. 6) Interculturalism in this way views difference through mutual respect and cultural rapprochement which are avenues toward coming together for the construction of a common societal culture. (p.6)

In stark contrast to multiculturalism, which purports to uphold an abstract cultural egalitarianism, interculturalism supports commitments to asymmetrical reciprocity by promoting the idea that polity requires the citizenry to acknowledge responsibilities that are responsive to the asymmetrical social locations that persons occupy. That is, whether one is a newly arrived migrant or a well-established member of the dominant culture, interculturalism does not shy away from acknowledging the asymmetry of relations that exist in the real world. For instance, inasmuch as immigrants are urged to integrate and adapt to their surroundings, well-established citizens are expected to aid in the integrations process by engaging with and learning about their cultures. The co-construction that interculturalism encourages makes all citizens adjust their practices in order to cultivate social inclusion. The moral contract then is the society wide development of clear citizenship duties and guidelines on socialization.

It follows then, that by identifying and implementing means by which to encourage cultural groups to enter into a national dialogue, interculturalism replaces nationalist attachment — the orthodox centre of the duties of citizenship and obligations to one’s society according to one nationalist model — with a “commitment to a collective political project” (Maxwell et al., 2012, p. 437).
After elucidating the problems with the current system, interculturalism then seeks a causal explanation of the problem to determine what ought to be done in response. (Anderson, 2010, p.22) As such, interculturalism starts with a robust critique of multiculturalism and exposes its failure to promote communication between people from diverse ethno-cultural and national backgrounds. To vindicate liberal society from a history of western categorization of people vis-à-vis static or fixed notions of ethnicity, race, culture, and nationality, interculturalism first asks how people identify themselves and then works with that conception from a position of understanding and with the aim of co-constructing new cultural understandings.

Ultimately, interculturalism contrasts with multiculturalism and more broadly mainstream liberalism’s disingenuous suppositions of neutrality and symmetry by adopting asymmetrical reciprocity, which challenges multiculturalism’s strict advocacy of abstract cultural egalitarianism. In addition, to avoid reducing interculturalism to a series of banal interactions, or communication between cultural entities that do little to impact the multicultural zeitgeist, I stress the importance for social actors to share an interest, a venture, or some other common project in which collaboration is the vehicle for successful integration. It follows then that the minimum requirements for intercultural interaction are that the interaction is voluntary; that the interaction is between/among either individuals or groups of diverse identities; and that those participating in said interaction share a project, but diverge in terms of religious affiliation, ethno-cultural membership, language or nationality.

Interculturalism views culture not as self-contained, static or neatly defined, nor does it view difference as an objective fact; rather, it maintains that cultures are the
outcomes of on-going negotiations with the social and political world. As Schnapper (1986) argues, cultures are fluid products of constant “negotiations through which a horizon is established, an identity that can only be defined as a continuous creation.”(p. 151) A key feature of the interculturalist vision of culture that differs from other integrationist models is its advocacy of a co-constructed and common culture; a common and dynamic sense civic or national identity that is rooted in, yet unique to, original cultural identities. From this view, it is an unavoidable fact that minority and majority cultures will adopt cultural understandings from one another and, given its demographic and socio-institutional advantages; the majority culture will inevitably enjoy an asymmetrical power advantage in such interactions. An openness to change, evolve or transform, to merge unfamiliar cultural qualities, is thus incumbent on the majority cultural group if the polity is to circumvent absorbing its minorities and turning into an assimilationist state, or so alienating said minorities that they become disenfranchised and retreat to enclaves full of palpable resentment. Correspondingly, insofar as interculturalism recognizes the notion that identities are socially constructed, it subscribes to the well established and widely held view, in the academy and outside it, that identity markers – like race or ethnicity – are of menial analytical value and actually lack scientific validity. That is to say, taking into account that social customs that exist in the liberal polity are not innately derived, but rather they are socio-politically constructed and contextually dependent, interculturalism treats cultural differences as important additives to the collective liberal project of co-constructing the national culture.

In addition, Maxwell et al. (2012) argue for pluralist societies to adopt intercultural systems of governance because it bounds the state to respect difference
while enshrining participatory citizenship as a socio-political expectation across the
policy. Fundamentally interculturalism instructs people to look at themselves in relation
to others, to reflect on the social and cultural conditions in which they live, develop and
are shaped, and to improve themselves accordingly.

**Asymmetrical Reciprocity**

Simply put, the assumptions about symmetry obscure differences and
particularities; as such, the social position and experiences of others can be denigrated.
Moreover, for Young, it is ontologically untenable to adopt the perspectives of those in
social positions with which they are related in social structures and interaction. This
chapter then argues for an intercultural model, which commits to acknowledging
asymmetrical reciprocity in the polity and for a systematic reorganization of said polity
through the conceptual prism of non-ideal theory.

Conceived as the imaginative ability to assume the viewpoint or location of
others, absolute reciprocity, when directed outwards behind the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance to others and of one’s own social location, removes difference and removes
context in important processes of judgment and moral decision-making. Once persons are
regarded as generalized, abstracted and rational agents, the loss of both plurality and
pluralism is the direct consequence. (Huntington, 1998, p.296) Moreover, if identity is a
priori evacuated of key contributing factors and divested of meaning, the epistemic
relevance—which is to say, the relevance of what is considered a justified belief—and
even the intelligibility of said reciprocity is forthrightly hard to hold onto.
The ideas of symmetry and neutrality assert that people can take on the perspectives and positions of others because, in the very least, while people are not the same, they are made and shaped in a similar way. Thus, from the perspective of liberal reciprocity, the similarity of liberal subjects allows for people to replace one another and assume the social location and moral position of someone else. Most problematic about this conceptualization is the projection of sameness onto people at the grave expense of their differences. Admittedly people who have different experiences and hold divergent social positions are not so “Other” that they can find no commonalities or overlapping moral qualities; in fact many people stand in multivalent relations with one another and share many points of contact. Nevertheless, it is nonsensical to suggest that similarities and points of contact with another person make relations between people symmetrical. Thus the perspectives, standpoints, and overall ontological lenses people view the world through cannot be somehow suspended in order to take on, or adopt the perspectives of another. In the very least this raises questions about the practicality of assuming another’s location so as to mediate their relation to your location or self. (Young, 1997 p. 348)

Further, Young argues that rooting respect in a manufactured state of symmetry or reversibility can only obscure difference. The intersection of oneself and another by assuming their social location is for Young an “ontological impossibility” meaning, to assume the perspectives of others whose relations to the social structure cannot be magically paused and interactions somehow shut off is a false errand.

Rectificatory Justice

How, then, does the racial origins of liberalism and the whiteness of contrarianism impact the socio-political order of today? To answer this question I
turn to a discussion on justice and what justice means. In no small measure the participation of the state and the citizenry in the systematic oppression and discrimination against First Nations people in Canada endures in the present day; hence RJ contends that the obligation of the state and the citizenry in today’s Canada is to acknowledge and attempt to repair such injuries. The *prima facie* case for ascribing white settler nation’s culpability for the wholesale oppression of Canadian First Nations people is compelling. Hence, if Canada truly strives for a polity which engenders pluralism and permits authentic integration of myriad ethno cultural groups and individuals, RJ must be a requisite policy and theoretical commitment.

Let me now address one of the more difficult premises of RJ: the idea that historical injustices of a nation implicate the present national community, thus assigning it responsibility for the redress of injuries incurred in antecedent generations. Similarly, notwithstanding the cacophony of dissenting voices on this premise, if one is to accept this premise, how then does the nation decide which injustices to acknowledge and remember? Likewise, which past injustices most need redress? Perhaps it is helpful to turn to some instances of rectificatory measures taken to redress and repair injuries whereby the state accepted its responsibility and implemented measures to acknowledge and redress. One important example of this was Germany's post–World War II monetary compensation package sent to Israel acknowledging and paying restitution for the Nazi genocide against European Jews. Another measure of rectification that is historically prevalent was the apology and the payment of restitution to Japanese families by the
Canadian government for their incarceration and internment following the hysteria that overwhelmed the polity after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941.

Although these measures are considerable signs of progress, the deluge of grievances that remains unaddressed dwarfs those that have been symbolically attended to. The claim I am making here then is, that colonialism, Eurocentric and racist immigration practices and systemic ethno-cultural discrimination which shaped, codified, and reproduced the white privilege and unequal access to life chances in Canada march on. In the aftermath of European settlers encroaching on Native lands and the transition to a point system of immigration which removed its hitherto whites-only title, the enduring injustice suffered by First Nations, African descendants and non-white immigrants continues to shape the Canadian liberal polity. Waxing and waning in terms of media or public attention, the white dominance and violence intrinsic to the social relations that continue to shape Canadian nationhood must be acknowledged, repaired and reconciled before any claims of a pluralistic liberal polity can carry even a modicum of legitimacy.

In short, acknowledging enduring injustices and recognizing the structures which operate to maintain dominance, requires a collective political responsibility for the liberal polity to implement policy and discourse reforms committed to rectificatory justice. Further, this responsibility is met only when those injured by historical injustices attain the necessary circumstances which provide the capacity for achieving a semblance of socio-political agency; that is, an agency that is free of the spectre of white dominance and that genuinely permits all peoples to fully and equitably access life chances in Canada. (Spinner-Halev, 2007, p. 540) To the degree that said responsibility goes
unaddressed and the structural oppression of white dominance persists behind a veil of multicultural benevolence, the responsibility to reform, redress and work toward a truly just polity becomes instead a legacy that those who created, or were complicit in, a system of white dominance that is passed on to future generations of the national community.

For Mills (2014), liberal theory is the primary force behind the Western liberal polity’s reticence in dealing with the rectification of past injustice. He writes:

The very fact that the deep and flagrant racial injustice that has been central to modern world history is so un-discussed in the Rawls literature brings home how White this whole discourse is. It is the normative discourse of the non-enslaved, the non-expropriated, and the non-victims of genocide—the discourse of the racially privileged Euro- and White settler population, whose normative temporality need pay no attention in determining questions of justice to a deeply non-ideal (non-admitted, non-mapped, non-theorized, and thus non-existent) past that has been altered not metaphysically but representationally, gated out of their moral consideration. (Mills, 2014, p. 40)

For Spinner-Halev (2007) the pressing concern of any mandate for rectification is choosing whose grievances should be heard and what injuries should be redressed. In his view, the “enduring injustice” is of historical origin and endures, which is to say it “continues to the present day” (p.575); He continues:

an enduring injustice endures over time and often over space as well. What makes an enduring injustice particularly perplexing is how difficult it is to repair. This difficulty is rooted in the solutions offered to injustice by most versions of liberal justice, which typically focus on individual rights and modest redistribution of resources. (p.575)

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to articulate the merits and weaknesses of each proponent and opponent of RJ. The aim of this section instead is to argue that in the absence of acknowledgement and corollary reform to the system of white dominance that
exists in the Canadian polity, any system of diversity management or purportedly liberal pluralism will struggle for legitimacy. That is to say, if egalitarianism is merely a false promise and the nature of this inequality is deeply entrenched in historical and enduring injustice, it is at least logical to suggest corrective measures to ensure equal access is warranted, if not compulsory. In other words, without sufficient redress and reconciliation with past historical injustices, the polity will continue to live out their legacy, which, in turn, will further entrench the Canadian socio-political system in white dominance.

Finally, because of the disturbing history of race, colonialism and white dominance, Mills suggest that rectificatory measures require an application of somewhat illiberal reforms, but reforms that are—at least debatably—consistent with liberal values. In this way, the basic platform for rectification could contain the following corrective measures: 1) government acknowledgement of historical injustice and its role in, and unwillingness to curb the unfair treatment of non-whites by maintaining public apologies and assuming responsibility as a matter of public record; 2) the payment of financial reparations to overcome the enduring inequality of unfair white material advantage; 3) revision and retelling of Canadian historical narratives to counter Eurocentric histories; and 4) legislating or at least debating placing constraints on some freedom of expression vis-à-vis discourses which create anti-immigrant and anti-First Nations sentiment which, ultimately lead to the pervasive stigmatizing representations of non-whites in Canada. (Mills, 2008, p. 8)

My argument about RJ is based on the idea that, in order to reform the Canadian polity that despite the ostensible aims of multicultural policy is replete with oppression and domination, the state must commit to exploring the origins of contemporary
injustices. In previous chapters I have argued that a racially squalid Canadian past characterized by government policy which centred on white domination and openly racist domestic and immigration policy shifted in the 1970s to a system of diversity management that on the surface promised to ensure all Canadian citizens equal access to life chances but nonetheless failed to jettison the tacit assumption of European white dominance. In view of this premise, I want to argue that in order to move toward a more genuinely pluralistic liberal Canadian polity, the state and the citizenry must work to acknowledge injustices that are rooted in the past, and which continue into the present day is a requisite component to ensure state legitimacy.

Before I delve into the crux of the argument, though, I have to discuss a peculiar trend in the literature; that is, the avoidance of past injustice and how to rectify persistent injustice theoretically among philosophers who write about multiculturalism, diversity and pluralism. The idea that past injustice is an issue that contemporary society should understand is often merely asserted or simply assumed without sufficient contextualization. It is not hard to understand why persistent injustice and domination are often avoided: they are issues of particularly bewildering substance. That is to say, issues of persistent or lasting injustice and domination are ultimately problematic and very hard to repair. Beyond these general observations, I argue that it is the foundations of mainstream liberalism and the solutions liberal theory offer that make the pursuit of rectification such a difficult proposition. That is, the typical focus in liberalism on distributive justice has a narrow mandate of preserving individual rights and perhaps ensuring a modest redistribution of resources. (Mills, 2014, p.39) Yet in cases of egregious past injustices that carry impacts that persist today such as: matters of exile,
land expropriation, and acknowledgement of the past, mainstream liberal justice offers insufficient remedy.

In order for any liberal polity to enjoy full legitimacy the shared political community must first acknowledge that the persistence of injustice that is rooted in the past requires the polity to reach beyond mainstream liberal solutions. In this way, whereas multiculturalism relies on the ideal theoretical presupposition that the state is legitimate, I argue that insofar as Canadian policy is reliant on mechanisms of ethno-cultural dominance and white privilege, the current state cannot be fully legitimate. Hence, in proposing a model that is better equipped at facing up to the dilemma of diversity, I argue it must first provide a framework for governance that passes this test of legitimacy and as such RJ is compulsory to this task.

In the end the major aim of the (rLIT) is to get the dominant group in the liberal polity to acknowledge the persistence of white dominance and injustices wrought from the past, and that a considerable shift in the zeitgeist must occur to rectify this problem. Acknowledgement is thus the point of departure for rectifying the persistence of ethno-cultural injustice and similarly the commitment to RJ is a requisite part of any system that seeks a more genuine agenda for integration and pluralism insofar as it seeks a level of legitimacy for the state that mainstream liberalism and multiculturalism can never enjoy.

The rLIT

In the summer of 2007, Charles Taylor and Gerard Bouchard held televised public consultations across Quebec and, in May 2008 released a final report, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation that articulated the intercultural model both
theoretically and in policy terms. The report elucidated a number of cogent points but also showed one potential weakness of intercultural policy if it stands alone. That is, its lack of RJ measures makes it susceptible to alienating groups who continue to voice grievances and endure injuries of past and present injustices. That is to say, without redress and rectification interculturalism alone rests on a platform imbued with the potential for grievous knowledge silences that could ostensibly create the same culture of white ignorance and the corollary of systemic complicity in the dominance of whites over non-whites. (Mills, 1997;2007;2009). As Schaefl & Godlewska (2014) contend:

The fact that Bouchard and Taylor considered it politically acceptable to omit Aboriginal issues and people from the discussion on reasonable accommodation demonstrates the mutually reinforcing nature of personal and collective ignorance. Bouchard and Taylor were certainly correct in their estimation of political expediency: the vast majority of people who submitted to the Commission apparently had no issue with the problematic premises of the Commission’s mandate and indeed took advantage of the Commissioner’s disregard of Aboriginal presence to present arguments for their own indigeneity and right to belong in Quebec. (p.120)

Bouchard and Taylor’s decision to exclude First Nations issues from their report and the public debate speaks to the unwillingness for public officials, political philosophers and the public in general to face up to the injustices of the past. In their own words, Bouchard and Taylor suggest:

…we are not contemplating reconsidering in any way whatsoever the political and legal status of the aboriginal peoples. Once again, the Quebec National Assembly has recognized the existence of the 11 nations living within Quebec’s borders and their specific rights. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 also recognizes the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of these peoples. The relationship between the aboriginal peoples and Quebec is a nation-to-nation relationship. Such being the case, given that accommodation practices stem very broadly from the right to equality, it might have seemed logical to include in our field of study the situation of the aboriginal
communities, but we were compelled to decide otherwise. The topic falls outside the purview of our mandate, even very broadly interpreted. (Bouchard and Taylor, 2007, p.4)

For Schaefli and Godlewska (2014, p. 120-121) the wilful ignorance that intercultural policy engenders about First Nations people suggests a trend, whereby “sophisticated and readily justifiable social action, works to maintain unequally occupied rhetorical and material space.” This is a primary example as to why interculturalism must be synthesized with rectification on order to achieve genuine legitimacy and pluralism for society. According to Mahrouse (2010) Quebec’s intercultural policies de-historicized the discourse on racialized groups and, similarly have obscured the fact that Quebecois nationalism and special-status within Canada have always been at odds with the historical grievances of First Nations people. Thus, interculturalism in practice is not without its problems when it stands alone. In this way, if Mahrouse is correct and interculturalism in Quebec actively cleanses the historical record rather than rectifying the injustices that plague it, then the necessity of state commitments to democratic and asymmetrical reciprocity bolstered by juridical, pedagogical and socio-political RJ are evidently needed. That is to say, if the liberal polity aims to achieve pluralism and jettison ethno-cultural dominance then interculturalism is insufficient, by itself, in preventing society from re-inscribing another version of Eurocentric contractarianism under a different illusory banner.

So what then makes the rLIT theoretically radical? How is the rLIT conceptually revisionist and also normatively liberal? First, the rLIT is theoretically radical because it supplants the unrepresentative ideal theory with non-ideal theory. That is to say, the rLIT sees an ideal target as the end game or the goal, but recognizes that a much different path
is compulsory if the polity is to determine how to reach that goal. What is more, insofar as non-ideal theory departs from the premise that normative theory ought to deal with problems in the real world in order to determine how the ideal may be achieved, the rLIT focuses on the problem of the inadequacy of multiculturalism, and then seeks to account for, and makes corrections to, the social contract apparatus, with the ultimate aim of retrieving liberal theory from white domination. Secondly, the theoretical significance of liberalism reconceived is that it provides a system of genuine pluralism, redress and reconciliation and affords measures to combat a decline into a marginally improved version of a racialized system. Hence, the rLIT does not waver in its liberal foundations; rather it attempts to extend to all persons the promises that liberalism has traditionally reserved for whites only.

Ultimately, the rLIT offers in place of multiculturalism an intercultural model augmented by asymmetrical reciprocity and RJ that amounts to a robust liberal framework that is better suited to overcome the dilemma of diversity—I will explain how the rLIT is superior in facing up to the dilemma in the upcoming pages. With interculturalism at the heart of the tripartite model, its strategic policy of intervention restores social cohesion and social capital by inviting all persons into dialogue—a dialogue connected to a certain duty as a citizen. Interculturalism, in short, changes the focus: the conceptual lens moves away from the static fixed point of essentialism imbued in multiculturalism to a much more peripatetic and dynamic process, one that results from interaction and dialogue. Why then is the sum of the tripartite stronger that its parts? Put simply, interculturalism lacks a major constitutive element that I argue must be at the core of any genuinely pluralistic integration model: a normative framework of RJ. Thus, for
interculturalism to achieve the aim of forging an on-going collective project that co-
constructs the national culture, the polity must first come to grips with the enduring
injustices of the past. Because interculturalism seems to avoid explicitly dealing with
enduring injustices, it falls short of genuine pluralism. In addition, the interplay of
enduring injustice and the perceived illegitimacy of the government is undoubtedly where
the history of the injustice and the rectification of injuries self-evidently matters (Spinner-
Halev, 2012, p. 121)

Liberal democratic societies in the modern world do not unavoidably forget the
past, but the challenge of asymmetrical collective narratives often ensures that the past is
shaped or sanitized to be remembered in a certain way. As Spinner-Halev (2012) argues
“[t]he dominant community may focus less on the past than the victims of
enduring injustice, and perhaps more importantly, it will focus on the past in different
ways.” (p.122)

For Young (1990) liberal framings that countenance the false promise of
symmetry are tools of reification, individualism, and pattern orientation that serve to
obfuscate important issues of domination and oppression. Notwithstanding
interculturalism’s current commitment to sociological asymmetry (Waddington et al.,
2012 p.9-13), I argue that the scope of asymmetrical recognition must be broadened
beyond just the interactions of newcomers and naturalized citizens in order to incorporate
a politics that reflects on all aspects of institutional organization, public action, social
practices and habits, and cultural meanings (Young, 1990, p. 9). What is more,
asymmetrical reciprocity exposes the problematic processes that depoliticize public
policy formation, thus moving toward a truly democratic decision-making path is
inexorably linked to public participation in policy discussions. In this way combining the expectations that interculturalism has built into its *modus operandi* with an expanded commitment to asymmetrical reciprocity creates the necessary socio-political space for the path Young describes. In this sense, the rLIT takes up asymmetrical reciprocity in a way that has broad socio-political reach—a reach that interculturalism lacks if it stands alone. That is to say, by acknowledging the asymmetrical reciprocity between subjects, groups, citizens and the state, the rLIT is not bound to the dichotomization of newcomer/naturalized citizen that is easily extrapolated from intercultural theory alone. In sum, asymmetrical reciprocity implores the polity to recognize that while there may be many parallels and points of contact between subjects, each social location, theoretical position and political perspective goes beyond their possibility to imagine or imitate. Thus in order to understand difference, interaction and dialogue cannot be exercises of contrived projected understandings. The criterion of understanding difference requires that intercultural understanding be advanced through actual dialogical experiences and relations. In Young’s words, the notion of empathy or “projecting ones idea of the other whereby one vicariously assumes (or projects) the experiences, outlooks, beliefs, and capabilities of the other leads to stereotypical perceptions,” (p.349) which she equates to an exercise in imposing predispositions about the “Other”. It follows that such an imposition negates the possibility of genuine cultural learning or dialogue across difference.

Inasmuch as Young’s asymmetrical reciprocity elucidates the facile nature of mainstream liberalism’s claims that all persons in the polity are neutral and interact with one another in symmetrically reciprocal ways, I argue that merely inverting this idea is
inadequate if providing a more authentically pluralistic socio-political discourse is the principal aim. Asymmetrical reciprocity in isolation recognizes the imbalance of power between newcomers and established citizens of the polity but is not met with intercultural development strategies to curb such power imbalances. In this way as an individual construct the asymmetrical reciprocity that stands alone has the potential to polarize. That is to say, by acknowledging that the values beliefs and practices of newcomers do not hold the same weight as those of the dominant society there exists right from the start, the rLIT will overcome an inherent inequality if said acknowledgement is not bolstered by systems informed by RJ and intercultural dialogue. To overcome the limitations of asymmetrical reciprocity, I defend the need for interculturalism and the interaction imbued within it. As the foundation for a liberal discourse, one that is authentically attentive to and accommodating of diversity, interculturalism advocates for persons to engage in negotiation and seeks to cultivate the cultural interaction in an on-going co-construction of the meaning of citizenship and national identity. These intercultural interactions and exchanges, in turn, generate a capacious potential for genuine integration, which will shift the liberal polity in terms of interpersonal and institutional arrangements.

Put another way, regardless of the merits of interculturalism and its theoretical framings, the nation has a moral and arguably liberal duty to locate the crimes of colonialism, conquest and European land/cultural appropriation as interdependent on mainstream whiteness and liberalism; that is to say, inasmuch as these atrocities were integral to what becoming white meant in the early modern period and to the origins of liberalism itself, then these atrocities are also constitutive of what “being white” in
Canada continues to mean. That is to say, as long as enduring injustices are explained away by liberals, sanitized, revised or completely ignored by state-sanctioned education and ultimately erased from Canadian collective memory they will continue to represent white ignorance and liberal complicity in maintaining white dominance over non-whites.

Intercultural dialogue is untenable in the absence of a shared political space where participants are free to articulate their views, beliefs, biases and affiliations. Similarly, in order for people to feel fully protected and to feel that their views will be heard by the polity and its constitutive institutions, dialogue that is authentically transformative hinges on trust. Hence, I argue that the acknowledgement of the legacy of ethno cultural and racial injustice is necessary for building trust between the dominant group and groups whose ethno-cultural grievances are often intertwined with the bloody histories from which they are derived.

As I discussed in chapter 2, Charles Mills has dedicated much of his career to filling the gap between liberal theory and its racialized history with cogent analysis so as to retrieve liberalism from white dominance. As such, Mills contends, “the classic apparatus of social contract theory, which conceptualizes the polity as inclusive, founded on the consent of undifferentiated atomic individuals, and [is] equally concerned about the welfare and rights of all its diverse members…need[s] to be re-conceptualized so as to register the history and ongoing reality of racial domination” (Mills, 2001, p. 74).

By taking up Mills’ mantle in the Canadian context this thesis has shown that despite a wealth of material on the one hand challenging the value of, or on the other hand defending the merits rooted in, official multiculturalism remains and contain
fundamental flaws which operate as mechanisms to maintain white dominance. The critical gap in the literature indicates a dire need for measures of corrective or rectificatory forms of justice. Thus, I argue that the polity ought to make commitments – both officially and attitudinally– to fundamental rectificatory measures for past injustices; an indispensable reform measure if liberalism is to be revived and retrieved from the scourge of white domination.

In order to move toward a more pluralistic polity, the Canadian state as well as the citizenry must commit to RJ vis-à-vis the acknowledgement of historical injustices that persist and which impact access to life chances in present-day Canada. Further, in order to pursue a polity which seeks an intercultural process of engagement with all Canadian communities, the state must invite affected groups and individuals to articulate their grievances. To this end, the eventual aim is to co-construct a more accurate picture of the past, thus removing some of the mistrust that the aggrieved feel while simultaneously elucidating the ways in which persistent injustices have deep roots that are entrenched in the shared space that is the Canadian polity.

In spite of this I argue that a commitment to RJ must also have an acute awareness of the difficulties of resolving such injustices. Because trust is inexorably interconnected with any interaction that reaches across diversity, the aim of the rLIT is to communicate and engage in ethno cultural dialogue between and within groups. What does RJ provide that interculturalism cannot provide independently? In simple terms RJ provides the necessary mechanism for ensuring the highest level of legitimacy for governments. As such, with acknowledgement built into state policy, the process of creating national narratives cannot occur prior to dialogue with communities outside the dominant group.
That is to say, rectifying the way in which liberalism assumes neutrality and symmetry is achieved by re-examining historical and persistent injustices vis-à-vis communication with those who continue to suffer from a legacy of discrimination, colonialism and racialized inequality. What is more, I argue that with these crucial initial steps the polity is better equipped to both theoretically work toward, and practically implement policy to achieve the intentions of interculturalism. In the end, despite the superior theoretical underpinnings that interculturalism has over multiculturalism, in the absence of rectification and asymmetrical reciprocity, its location within mainstream liberalism makes it vulnerable to the same mechanisms that maintain dominance.

The balance between the development and maintenance of majority cultures—taking into account their numerical advantage in population, their foundational history and traditions—and the integration of minorities—taking into account their liberal rights—is fundamental to intercultural theory. As such, interculturalism is a framework, which places paramount importance on the state’s ability to adjudicate between majorities and minorities by advocating for ethno-cultural interaction, and negotiation that complements ethno-cultural diversity, without compromising the enduring cultural identity of dominant group. Nevertheless, for those minority groups who continue to suffer from a legacy of colonialism, oppression and enduring injustice, the likelihood of engaging with the State in a relationship of trust and negotiation is decidedly weak. Accordingly, inasmuch as interculturalism relies on the State and its institutions, it also relies on the polity and on the citizenry in everyday life; hence in the absence of rectificatory measures, interculturalism will experience diminishing returns as the victims of injustice continue to feel distrust and hopelessness. Further, without RJ victims of persistent injustice are
required to accept an improved policy apparatus under the purview of a government and political structure that engenders distrust, anguish, anger, and futility. Put succinctly, the notion that mainstream liberal justice can deliver the promises of interculturalism under the same conditions and without transformative changes in consciousness and social structure is hard to hold onto. That is to say, in the absence of rectification, acknowledgement and re-articulation of historical narratives, the state cannot alleviate the endurance of ethno cultural injustice and hence cannot build from a foundation of trust and legitimacy. That said, in order for state policy to be fully legitimate, all citizens must, at least in part, trust that state and government policy and institutions function to protect their interests. In this way, I argue that in order for state policies of integration and pluralism to work, all citizens must feel like they belong to the polity and are not secondary to the dominant majority. The point I am making here is that in order for all citizens to feel a part of the polity, the acknowledgment of injustices that are rooted in the past, and which continue into the present day must at least be pursued. Before I further develop this argument let me first discuss a peculiar trend in the literature; that is, the avoidance of issues about historical injustice and how to rectify the myriad negative impacts that said injustices continue to have on marginalized groups in the present Canadian polity. The fact that RJ is alien to the concerns of mainstream liberal theory is indicative of Canada’s socio-political system of white dominance that multiculturalism co-constructs. It is not hard then to understand why persistent injustice and domination are often avoided: they are issues of particularly bewildering substance. That is to say, issues of persistent or lasting injustice and domination are ultimately very hard to repair. Nevertheless, I argue that it is the foundations of mainstream liberalism and the solutions
liberal theory offer that make the pursuit of rectification such a difficult proposition. Moreover, distributive justice is narrowly defined as having twofold purposes: (1) preserving individual rights and (2) ensuring a modest redistribution of resources. Thus, in matters of exile, land expropriation, and acknowledgement of the past, distributive justice is insufficient. The argument I am advancing here is in order to avoid slipping into a reform agenda that despite genuinely pluralistic aims ultimately lacks legitimacy, a commitment by the state and subsequently by the shared political community to acknowledge the persistence of injustice that is rooted in the Canadian past is compulsory.

In the end the major aim is to get the dominant group in the liberal polity to acknowledge the persistence of white dominance and injustices wrought from the past, and that a considerable shift to the zeitgeist must occur to rectify this problem. Acknowledgement is thus the point of departure for rectifying the persistence of ethno-cultural injustice.

Substantive discussions and genuinely meaningful dialogue concerning justice, citizenship and pluralism necessitate the cultivation of trusting relationships. Relations of trust, however, are untenable in the absence of a political space where participants can voice their biases, affiliations and potential for partiality and feel protected and heard. The point I am making here is the prospect of genuinely pluralistic relations hinges on the acknowledgement of injustice, recognition of ethno-cultural grievances and the often intertwined and bloody histories from which they are derived. In this way, commitments to asymmetrical reciprocity are not just bolstered by RJ, they in fact concretize them.
The Dilemma Of Diversity Revisited

How then does the radical liberal intercultural triad more adequately address Dwight Boyd’s dilemma of diversity? Inasmuch as Boyd’s dilemma illustrates the sort of perspective needed for claims of pluralism to have legitimacy his work also affords the political space for sharing views across difference. (1996, p.628) Boyd generates some critical demands that amount to the minimum criteria if the polity is to meet the demands of the dilemma of diversity. They are: (1) attention to, and public recognition of this attention to, the degree to which claims on public goods and political space can be shared across differences in the citizenry; and (2) the recognition of just how much public policy can work across pluralism. (1996, p. 628) As such, I argue that the rLIT meets these demands and moves toward creating a genuinely pluralistic polity in the following ways: (1) the rLIT’s commitment to a brand of intercultural dialogue that weaves interculturalism’s demands for participatory citizenship and cultural constructivism with the broadest conception of asymmetrical reciprocity which combine to create a shared political space where democratic institutions implement public policy processes that work across pluralism; additionally,(2) the rLIT ensures a high level of trust, social capital and state legitimacy through a socio-political backbone of RJ. That is, RJ demonstrates that claims on public goods can work across diversity by inviting all views into the public domain under the protection of historical rectification and intercultural participation. What is more, when Boyd discusses differential power and providing the ability and opportunity to voice those views (Boyd 1996, p.628) he seems to anticipate the perspectives of asymmetrical reciprocity. In the end, Boyd describes the value of difference that comports with overcoming the dilemma of diversity.
Whilst the rLIT approach to cultural diversity does not miraculously resolve the dilemma Boyd identifies, it does help us formulate a hypothetically acceptable way of approaching the ethno-cultural challenges of the present day. In the search for a genuinely pluralistic social prescription, the rLIT acknowledges that all cultural practices are socially constructed and contingent, but not in an arbitrary way and thus commits to state intervention that is transparent and forthcoming in its aim to promote civic responsibility. The dilemma of diversity suggests that the tension between accepting diversity and accepting values that grip most or all members of the public reveals that the kind of perspective needed is one that requires, facilitates, and works through its exposure and performative critique of forms of inequality of voice within that reciprocity. (1996, p.628) Accordingly, the rLIT’s commitments to dialogue, asymmetrical reciprocity and RJ not only critique inequality and injustice, but seek to overcome their insidiousness by reforming the national narrative so as to incorporate RJ into how citizens see the past and how this vision is intrinsically linked to present-day perceptions of justice. Moreover, the rLIT is the kind of prescriptive that is well suited to face up to the dilemma of diversity.

Boyd’s democratic reciprocity allows for the exchange of reasonable views across difference and ensures the socio-political space for “reciprocal intelligibility, and inclusive interchange” (1996, p. 628), which is forcefully met by the rLIT’s commitment to dialogue and intercultural interaction. Boyd also argues that the announcement or recognition of just how public policy will reach across diversity and impact the lives of the citizenry is of paramount importance. Put simply, if policy aims are transparent it “forc[es] identification of real perspectives on diversity, beyond surface
By this Boyd is clearly and effectively taking at aim at those assimilationist policies which masquerade as pluralism but are intended to maintain and codify dominance. This for Boyd is especially important because it will require that discourse and dialogue across differences that “keep[s] differential power at bay by providing — the ability and opportunity to voice those views” (Boyd 1996, p.628). The differential power that Boyd describes is met by the rLIT’s commitment to asymmetrical reciprocity and also interculturalism’s primary focus on cross-cultural connectedness.

Let me conclude by re-visiting the two horns of the dilemma. It follows that Boyd’s point of departure is:

the tension between accepting the fact that cultural diversity constitutes an established aspect of contemporary democratic society and accepting the requirement that prescriptive claims that are located in the general public domain...must grip (at least most) members of that public, wherever they are located within that diversity, if the claims are to have legitimacy (1996, p.611).

The dilemma of diversity is thus defined when the acceptance of reasonable pluralism is conjoined with a perceived need for the polity to prescribe policy that that can provide “legitimating, normative leverage across this diversity in the face of practical questions requiring common action.” (p.614) The conundrum thus creates the un-tenability of the polity that both morally prescribes “that individuals and groups ought to treat each other in certain ways according to preferred moral principles or ideals” while concomitantly (and paradoxically) embracing reasonable pluralism: a position that effectively denies that there is a “moral point of view common to all cultures that would make this prescription meaningful and binding for anyone, regardless of where they are located within
the diversity." (p.616) In sum, Boyd compels the liberal polity to look inward and entertain the notion that finding moral values that reach across the polity does not respect the reasonableness of plurality nor of pluralism, it in fact perpetuates dominance vis-à-vis the *de facto* expectation of diversity to conform to the dominant moral view.

In the end Boyd suggests those diversity policies that, contrary to their purported aims, eventuate in strengthening the mechanisms of dominance are not neutral failures “they are not politically innocent. By failing to face the dilemma squarely, [these] perspectives ultimately leave the prescriptive preferences of the dominant view in control. In effect, the perspectives themselves function to support the dominance.” (Boyd, 1996, p.644) As a strategic tripartite policy of intervention, the rLIT addresses Boyd’s concerns and restores social cohesion and social capital by inviting all persons into dialogue that is connected to a certain duty as a citizen and to a modicum of legitimacy that the liberal State does not currently have.
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Introduction


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Chapter 1


**Chapter 2**


**Chapter 3**


