Abstract

This thesis explores the security agenda through a racialized feminist lens. It examines the epistemological and ontological adequacy (or inadequacy) of traditional approaches to security in international relations in the face of a changing global reality. Through empirical case studies of South Korea and Afghanistan, the value of feminist insights in achieving individual security is brought to bear.
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Introduction

The move into the twenty-first century has been accompanied by a shift from traditional threats to global security such as the arms race and nuclear war, to just as insidious but more pervasive threats, many of which imperil individuals across multiple states and societies. A recent report issued by The Centre for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland states that about twenty percent of all states in the year 2005 are at high risk of internal civil war or state failure as a result of governmental collapse.\(^1\) Spillover effects from these crises as well as the emergence of transnational struggles in a multitude of forms – from terrorist acts and humanitarian crises, to cross-border grassroots and non-governmental organization (NGO) coalition building – are indicative of the changing nature of global society and the transformation of the international system. Contrary to the inter-state security dilemmas that have dominated the international system and remained the principal concern for scholars since the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century, shifts in the world are creating the need for alternative practices and different analytical categories and theoretical approaches. The proliferation of indiscriminate weapons, egregious human rights violations that occur within and across the borders of sovereign states, environmental degradation through the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the destruction of renewable ones; these are just a few examples of imminent threats that have transnational implications and challenge the ideological and practical traditional security tools of the past.

\(^1\) "High Risk of War, Governmental Collapse in 20% of Nations", Newswise, University of Maryland, College Park, 2005, http://www.newswise.com/p/articles/view/512221/
In concert with this change has been a greater realization of who the most likely and most gravely affected victims are in face of these threats to security. "Where it was once the purview of male soldiers who fought enemy forces on battlefields quite separate from people’s homes" explain Giles and Hyndman, "contemporary conflict blurs such distinctions, rendering civilian women, men, and children its main casualties." Civilian casualties are not just potential by-products of the conduct of wars – they are purposefully targeted, and the majority of them are women and children. Women make up the world’s most marginalized and insecure citizens and they experience security and insecurity in very different ways from men.

Women’s bodies have been besieged by tactics of systematic rape. The ethnic conflict that unfolded in Bosnia, for example, is one case among many which provides evidence of the prolific and calculated execution of mass rape in rape camps, rapes committed by prison guards and in refugee camps, public rapes to humiliate and denigrate a community or ethnicity, etc. Wartime rape throughout Central and Latin America in the 1980’s by government soldiers indicates another trend of sexual assault of women by purveyors of the state and individuals who supposedly protect and ensure civilian security. In wartime, it is not only internal militaries which can be a threat to their own population, but also state allies (as Katherine Moon argues regarding US support for military prostitution in Korea) and even peacekeepers.

Women everywhere are more economically vulnerable, earning less income,

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owning less property, performing more work that is undervalued, and reaping a disproportionate amount of the burdens as a result of cuts to social spending. Women's economic insecurities are marked by a gendered division of labor that results in the disproportionate representation of women in "low-skilled and low-waged menial service" at the bottom rung of the socioeconomic scale. The global economy has gendered effects that can be devastating for women's lives: women are forced to migrate, to work as prostitutes, and even to sell their children (and in extreme documented cases in severely impoverished countries, even their own organs and body parts) in attempt to secure their own or their families' survival. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, export-processing zones predominantly employ women because they are believed to be "docile" and their work "unskilled" and therefore are dismissed as "cheap labor"\(^5\), or, as Cynthia Enloe insightfully re-names, as "cheapened labor"\(^6\). The global capitalist development and mobility of wealthy corporations has rendered women's economic security even more unstable. For example, when South Korean women working in sneaker factories began to form unions like the Korean Women Workers Association (KWWA) in reaction to sexual assaults in the workplace, poor working conditions and unfair wages, the sneaker company, in this case Nike, began shutting down factories in South Korea and moving operations to primarily authoritarian countries. The governments of

developing countries are essentially being told that “if women can be kept hard at work, low-paid, and unorganized they can serve as a magnet for foreign investors”.

Women are made insecure by the military on several levels: externally in times of warfare and even in times of peace, as a result of the intimate connection between the military and society in numerous countries, and internally as a result of the masculinity (and subordinated and de-legitimized femininity) that is embedded in its culture. Exorbitant military spending often means that state resources are purchasing arms as they simultaneously cut social spending. Militarization and militarism - the difference being that one refers to a social process characterized by the proliferation of social structures and practices that rely on the military and the other is an ideology or worldview respectively - have repeatedly been linked to entrenched gendered hierarchies by feminists who argue that the underlying patriarchy is complicit in societal violence against women and their subordination. As I mentioned above, it is often the state forces that are the perpetrators of sexual and physical violence. If we consider cases such as the 1994 Rwanda genocide or the present internal conflict in Sudan between the government and armed militia, it becomes apparent that the state and its purveyors can be no longer recognized as the guarantor and protector of the security of its citizens – they are too often the perpetrator of insecurities.

Security for women in the “Third World” is even more abysmal. The above report lists the areas at greatest risk of civil war or state failure as the Sub-Saharan

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7 Ibid., p49.
8 I place the term “Third World” in quotation marks to denote its’ contested nature; Defined generally as underdeveloped or developing countries and referring mostly to the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin American, I will explore the term more in depth in Chapter 2.
Africa and the Muslim world; the countries currently facing humanitarian crises and armed conflict, such as Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia, are Third World countries. In addition to the vulnerabilities mentioned above, women in these countries are often already malnourished, are responsible for several dependents (sometimes as the sole parent as is the case for widows who have lost their husbands in armed conflict), and are more vulnerable to environmental threats as they often rely directly on the land to feed their family. They face political insecurities in countries that often have failed or failing legal and judicial system, and they are economically insecure, often because the ruling regime prioritizes military spending or their own personal wealth over social welfare and the basic needs of its citizens. Employment is often exploitive and dangerous. Lack of healthcare facilities or the inability to reach them means that these women are at greater risk of illness and death from health problems that often require a simple solution; Reproductive healthcare is the best example of this failure: The world’s lesser developed nations often have exorbitantly high infant and maternal mortality rates. If security for women in a patriarchal world, in the words of Christine Sylvester “is always partial...elusive and mundane”9, then for women in the Third World security is but a mirage. In addition, not only are these women forbidden from having a voice in their own country, they are often perceived as little more than powerless, homogenous, victims in the international community. Serious political and analytical implications result from not only ignoring women’s voices but denying their diversity and their potential power; Their own security is endangered.

Theoretically, changes have also been occurring in the field of international relations (IR). New critical approaches have called into question the empiricist epistemology in international relations that has implicitly relied on positivist assumptions. The result has been to open up space for critical self reflection of the discipline and new methodologies that may be better able to deal with the continuing transformations in the global polity. At the outset I want to emphasize that above terms such as “positivism” are defined in multiple ways, and therefore it is important that I clarify how I am intending to use them. “Positivism” explains Smith, “is a methodological view that combines naturalism (in either its strong (ontological and methodological) or its weak (methodological) sense), and a belief in regularities”.10 Although the term is equated by some with behaviouralism, and by others in a methodological way, in international relations positivism has primarily been seen as an epistemology (about knowledge and knowing; “how it is we might know something about the world”11), and predominantly as an empiricist epistemology. Empiricism is the view that only observable things and facts justify belief and thus the methodological position of positivism is grounded in knowledge of the world which can only be explained by observation. As I will argue in the following Chapter, the limitations of positivism has had severe consequences regarding what is determined as knowledge; as Smith maintains, the empiricist epistemology of positivism is significant because it has governed “what could be studied because it has determined what kinds of things exist in international relations”.12

10 Smith, Steve. “Positivism and Beyond” in International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, 3rd Ed., Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi (Eds.), Allyn & Bacon, 1999, p42.
11 Ibid., p48.
Post-positivist theories represent a move away from the belief that knowledge must be directly observable (and testable) in order to be true and thus can loosely be defined by their rejection of positivist assumptions. They also represent a shift from the explanatory character of most positivist theories (meaning, in general, that the world is viewed as external to theorizations of it) to constitutive theories which view theory as an active element in the construction of the world. There are a number of different post-positivist approaches, each of which question positivist assumptions but in very different ways. The power of feminist analysis, for example lies largely in the critique it is making of the epistemological and methodological foundations of IR theory and how it influences and in fact reifies patriarchal structures. What kind of security can there ever be for women if the "knowing" mind is a male mind? What kind of security can there ever be for Third World women if the "knowing" mind is a white Western mind? Its power also lies in its ability to reveal the danger inherent in the explanatory nature of mainstream theory and instead recognizes that dominant modes of thinking are translated into practice. Infrastructures that result in women’s insubordination, such as the military, are not inevitable but are constructed via ways of knowing. Postmodernism’s value similarly lies in its analysis of the knowledge and practice relationship, or rather between the mutually reinforcing power/knowledge relationships. As Steve Smith explains, “power is implicated in all knowledge systems, such that notions like reason or truth are the products of specific historical

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circumstances". Academic discourse and even epistemology are dependent upon underlying power structures, and according to feminist postmodernists, those power relations are hierarchically gendered. Silences, then, are not traditional, cultural, or natural – they are deliberate, constructed, and then normalized.

It is not only epistemological changes that have opened space for new theorizations of international relations, changes in the world have shed a new light on the inadequacy of realist ontology for theorizing about global politics and security. Ontology, defined in philosophical terms as a systematic account of existence (or in the words of Smith, "what is the world like and what is its furniture?"\(^{15}\)) is inextricably linked to epistemology: while our understanding of the world and ways of knowing and gaining knowledge are changing, so is the world itself changing. My claim is that, although the transformations in reality have rendered old (realist) theorizations inadequate indicating that it is ontology which drives epistemology, I am also suggesting that theory is constitutive and epistemology is intrinsically important because it determines what knowledge can be accepted: "Thus, just as epistemology is important in determining what can be accepted ontologically, so ontology affects what we accept epistemologically".\(^{16}\) I recognize that such a position is problematic particularly when a goal in my research is to explore the "realities" and lived experiences of women. However, I want to clarify that I do not believe that understanding the true ‘reality’ of another individual or of the international system at large is ever possible, but that there is value in recognizing this and utilizing this

\(^{14}\) Smith, Steve. "Positivism and Beyond" in International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, 3rd Ed., Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi (Eds.), Allyn & Bacon, 1999, p48.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p43.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., p43.
realization to get closer to another’s ‘reality’ in order to more adequately theorize. Throughout the thesis, there will be indications, through references to other scholars, that epistemology drives ontology, or vice versa, however it is my position that the human security agenda is driven by both factors.

According to Eric. M. Blanchard, traditional IR theory is not equipped to handle new security challenges, however progress can be made by acknowledging its androcentric framework and allowing for an inclusion of women’s voices: “In a rapidly changing, post-9/11 world, feminist voices must be heard if the international system is to achieve a more comprehensive security in the face of terror networks, technowar, and mounting civilian casualties”.17 Women’s voices remain hidden from international politics and the field of IR. The consequence is not only that women’s security is compromised, but also the discipline of IR and international politics in its entirety is ignoring a crucial body of experience that would allow for greater exploration of the causes behind insecurities and a realization of the preconceptions that constitute the subject. Jean Bethke Elshtain proposes that “tending to the inclusion of feminist themes makes a contribution to more robust thinking across the board about the complex world of women, men, the state, and war”.18 This is particularly crucial as the main threats to international peace and security are quickly changing and the affects of these threats are increasingly affecting innocent civilians while the discipline continues to rely on a non-existent monolithic state to achieve security.

What is the problem with traditional security – which focuses on national security as the central problematic and emphasizes the state as a singular and the dominant actor - empirically and theoretically? How does unearthing this problem help us understand contemporary dilemmas in world politics? What normative changes have occurred that have led to a broadening of the definition of security to include individuals? How does human security (meaning in general the safety of individuals from threat as well as the bearing of means needed to live a dignified life - these terms will be further unpacked in the following chapters) help deal with the problems that have emerged as a result of global transformations? Kenneth Waltz, for example, took people out of the equation through realist assumptions regarding the structure of the international system and the role of states – as unitary actors – within that system – what does human security contribute by putting people back in?

Human security, however, might only take us so far. In the struggle to help create greater individual security identities matter. Security for the individual is contingent upon identity, for example race and gender, and if these characteristics are not taken account of, adequate security is unattainable. Yet, within even the most critical theorizations of security, individuals remain on the periphery, or even beyond sight of the periphery. Once we open Pandora’s Box, it becomes apparent that a lot has been ignored: What are the implications of class and economic status in security endeavors? Religion? Geopolitical location? In fact, could we go so far to include age in this theorization? Sexual persuasion? My claim is that whilst human security does indeed offer us a valuable new tool in IR as a constructive approach to tackling global
insecurity that operates in a very different epistemological and ontological position from traditional security studies, it does not go far enough, or as far as it claims.

This thesis examines the changing nature of the study of security, from traditional conceptions that rely on realist agendas and positivist theoretical frameworks to the new departure from state centered constructs to the growing salience of security concerns of the individual, paramount in the human security agenda. This is accomplished by tracing the historical and political events that have shaped these transformations. In doing so, it is able to not only reveal the empirical changes that raised the need for new approaches to security, but also the theoretical developments that called into question traditional methodologies and unlocked the epistemological barriers that constrain knowledge and practice creating space for critical security studies. The thesis confronts realist assumptions from within this space using feminist and post-modern theory that reveals the knowledge/power structures that have ignored women and rendered them insecure. After exploring the human security paradigm, whether or not women are adequately incorporated as “individuals” in human security concerns is in question.

The thesis then proceeds to new contentions within feminist literature which focuses on the experience of women in the Third World. There is enormous potential value in embarking on such an analysis; postcolonial and Third World feminism does not directly engage with IR, and as we already know women in general have been largely absent from the discipline. Through a feminist post-modern analysis, the knowledge claims of traditional security studies can be examined; have IR “truths” accounted for the most insecure women in the world? Engaging with Third World
and Postcolonial feminism, the thesis then examines the historical gap that has prevailed between the knowledge production of third-world women’s security by first world feminists and the actual experience of third-world women (i.e. have feminist critiques of security accounted for the most insecure women in the world?).

It is my contention that theory is not external to reality; knowledge production has serious consequences for people’s lives. The best way to explore this connection is to move from the theoretical analysis to lived experiences through illustrative examples in order to better understand women’s insecurity. Ideally this would include extensive field research, however in the confines of this project, this thesis has relied on an array of pre-existing literature to construct an analysis. These case studies are critical in demonstrating the profound connection between the production of knowledge and political practice.

In Chapter 3 I use South Korea to explore the disconnect between national security and human security, that is, to illustrate how security can be defined as a double-edged sword: the very same institutions and objectives that are utilized to achieve or maintain the security of the state often result in facilitating the insecurity of individuals. When we explore the case of South Korea the dichotomy between a government’s desire to secure the state and the ability to achieve human security is bared: Attempts to achieve state security through societal militarization has had the adverse effect of decreasing the security of women.

In Chapter 4 I embark on a critical analysis of the current political situation in Afghanistan. In this case study I look at the pervading insecurity of women which manifests in the form of inequality, violence, prohibition from political and civil
participation, and dominant perceptions of inferiority. In addition, I attempt to reveal how attempts by the international community to assist with the post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in the region have largely failed to incorporate women. Third World women are often regarded as victims, and therefore their voices are often neglected as an intrinsic and valuable component of the reconstruction process. Misrepresentations of Afghan women along with dominant Western perceptions of their victimization are resulting in policies and remedies that are appear to be falling short of improving the security of women and may be in fact facilitating their future insecurity.

The value in utilizing case studies is two-fold: First, by presenting illustrative examples I am attempting to accomplish just that – practical explorations in which I can apply my theoretical hypotheses to actual examples. This not only clarifies the concepts I am analyzing it also more clearly reveals the practical implications and applications of IR and feminist theorizing. Second, the nature of the examples I chose allows for a more critical investigation into the questions I am asking. That is, by choosing two very different countries with distinct histories, political processes, at different stages of their development, and with very distinct contemporary political situations, the application of my analysis is proven to be widespread and pervasive, as I so claim it to be. Human security is often presented as a term that only applies to Third World countries in the middle of, for example, an ethnic war or a rebel insurgency. South Korea in contrast is considered a developed democracy that rates high on the human development index. Afghanistan, on the other hand, is one of the poorest countries in the world. In addition, as a result of the recent democratic

\[19\] Ibid., p8.
political changes that have occurred in South Korea since the end of the Cold War, the security of women in the nation is rarely thought to be of concern. In Afghanistan however, the plight of women, although historically ignored by the international community, has recently been thrown into the spotlight as one of the worst in the world and has in fact been presented to the international community for justification of a US-led invasion. What does security (or insecurity) look like for women in these countries? How does the theoretical disconnect between national security and human security manifest in practice? Are insecurities exacerbated by armed conflict in a Third World country where security is already elusive? I hope to demonstrate that human security is in scarce supply in many areas around the globe and not just in the most often cited examples of developing nations. I also hope to discover and then present how these insecurities manifest in institutions and actions and then how they affect the women in these countries. Both case studies attempt to show how gendered and racialized structures of power are embedded in institutions and processes.

Security studies, including the traditional spheres and for the most part more contemporary schools of thought that have broadened the concept in many other means, have failed to adequately incorporate questions of gender into the discipline. Critical security discourse has “invoked, but not engaged” feminist scholarship and gender analysis. Human security literature has, in turn, managed to relegate women and gender analysis to the periphery of the debate, to a footnote within the scholarship, inadvertently professing its fulfillment through what should be understood as an implicit inclusion within the broad mandate of the field.
If, as feminists have been revealing, war, the military, peace-building, reconstruction, and development are all gendered in particular ways, fraught with gendered decisions, conducted in gendered ways, recounted with gendered perspectives, and lived by gendered identities, than the insecurity women experience is also therefore gendered. Even international aid organizations are institutionally gendered and fraught with internal politics of masculinity and femininity.\(^{20}\) By donning our “gendered glasses” we have a better chance of seeing the causes of women’s insecurity’s and the working’s of power that are complicit in the gendered hierarchies that breed them.

How can we be sure, however, that our gendered lenses won’t cause us to see gender everywhere to the exclusion of other key dynamics, such as race or class? It is this shortcoming, I believe, that has weakened some of the most valuable and groundbreaking critiques of the security literature from the feminist camp. The lamentably diminutive amount of what I classify as “feminist security theory” is bounded by this very problem: contemporary feminist critiques of security are not only in short supply but are insufficient. Despite the remarkable inroads such scholarship has made not only within the security agenda but within feminist literature, these critiques still operate, for the most part, in a Western first world feminist perspective. This is problematic because if the goal of the human security agenda, even as understood in its broadest form, is to be realized, the reality of what this truly requires must be acknowledged and understood. That is, in order to beget a more secure world for women, we must understand or attempt to understand to the best of our abilities what security means for these women. What are the conditions

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p240.
that create insecurities and how are they different from those in the West? Just as it would be considered absurd to use the same tools that are used to fix your car as to perform surgery, it is incongruous to use the same theoretical or policy tools for every security dilemma, in every nation, for every individual.

In short, the focused problem of this thesis is the lack of attention given to the individual in the field of international relations and in the international political community. It addresses this with regards to the changing nature of the security challenges we face which have helped shed light on the reasons behind this lack of attention and how it is generated, the implications of it, and the ways in which it is reproduced. In order to effectively explore this problem on its most basic level, multiple traditionally disaffected realms must be traversed and threaded together and a whole gamut of questions must be posed without necessarily offering up any definite answers. First, the thesis addresses the ontological and epistemological practices that ground IR, which is primarily built on traditional/realist assumptions, and are similarly infused within security studies. This analysis leads us to the most promising and most recent development in security studies, “Human Security”. Utilizing feminist tools that have played an instrumental role historically in seeking out the individual (or exclusively women I will argue), the individuals’ invisibility throughout the history of IR and security studies begins to be revealed. This tool then enables us to see the limitations of human security as a way of “doing” security analysis: despite its claim to focus on the individual, this assumption is invalidated when it becomes exposed that women are continually ignored.
It is at this point, however, that a shift occurs when in attempting to address the central problem of the individual using feminist tools, the thesis uncovers a limitation within the tools themselves: feminist theorizing has in fact been largely founded upon race and class based principles that focus on one type of woman and her subordination within IR theory and international politics. This realization is uncovered by using Third World feminist and post-colonial feminist tools and it reveals that even feminist critiques of security, though valuable, are not always sufficient. Finally, I make two attempts at what an analysis that takes into account the individual might look like through the case studies of South Korea and Afghanistan; this undertaking reveals however, not only the sorts of questions that must be asked but also how difficult they may prove to answer. And while the proposed value in using case studies is primarily to show the importance of the theorizing we are undertaking in its relationship to international political practice, they also demonstrate the difficulties in trying to deal with gender and race issues in the international realm.

This is a big project. I acknowledge that in taking on the challenge I am attempting to tackle I face many obstacles and may in fact be raising more questions than answers. I also acknowledge that there is a need for this investigation but also many difficulties that arise in attempting to carry it out. The case studies are one such example: there is immeasurable value in illustrating the need to take into account women’s experiences in, for example, post-war Afghanistan or in the South Korean army, but this does not easily lead to any easy plan of action. Every woman’s experience is different and everyone has a different idea of what should be done. Revealing the way in which institutions, practices and knowledge structures are
gendered similarly does not necessarily tell us how to “un-gender” them. I want to clarify that my motivation in writing this thesis, therefore, is not in attempt to offer up a book of answers or a single plan of action to bring the individual to the forefront of international politics. Rather it is to ask the questions that help create a space where such answers or plans might be debated and discussed. It is within this space that the individual has a chance in international politics.
Chapter 1

1.1 Ontological and epistemological foundations of traditional security studies

To open this chapter with what is becoming somewhat of a common assertion among post-positivist theorists in international theory, such as “the world is becoming increasingly complex” or, “with the recent transformations in the global polity”, or even “in a post-cold war world the international community is facing new and distinct challenges”, reads as a bit cliché. If such lines of reasoning appear common, however, it is for good reason: despite the “transformations” that have resulted in new challenges and complexities, international theory for the most part, remains stagnant ideologically, analytically, and, I would argue, purposefully.

The growing body of divergent reflectivist theories (classified generally as approaches that reject at least one key assumption of rationalist accounts – represented by the very narrow ‘neo-neo synthesis’ of neo-realism and neo-liberalism both of which share assumptions about the state and assumptions about the correct methods to study them) has brought to bear on attempts to understand the world an exposure of positivism’s inadequacies, and, not only the limitations that have resulted within the field but the implications they have in practice when old methodological and ideological tools are used in an altered international system. Zalewski and Enloe explain that such impediments to understanding international politics are particularly problematic when “ideological commitment is linked with a limited epistemological understanding of the construction of reality”, ultimately rendering any “new tools”
irrelevant or of very little significance. International security is at the center of this critical dilemma. Events in the international system have made more visible the need for new frameworks for thinking about security. My claim is that traditional IR theory and the workings of the contemporary international system upon which it is developed is failing as a result of the continued reliance on traditional security frameworks, built on positivist epistemologies and enduring on a constrained ontology.

My goal in this chapter is thus threefold: First, to reveal the actors, assumptions, and problems that have preoccupied international relations, and more specifically security studies, over its seventy-year history through an empirical analysis of the transformations that have occurred in the world. By tracing the evolution of the dominant paradigms in this manner, I hope to demonstrate that security paradigms do not exist in a theoretical vacuum, but in fact emerge out of historical and political events which affect the changing phases of dominant conceptions in IR. This approach will thus also help substantiate what I believe is a close connection between theory and practice, or knowledge and action. As I progress through the chapter it becomes apparent how notions of human security evolved through the course of events and in conjunction with a theoretical move away from the positivism of traditional IR theory towards a post-positivist epistemology. My second objective is to present the new human security paradigm and the theoretical and empirical transformations that necessitate a security agenda that is more respectful of the human condition. Finally, I will introduce the feminist critique that

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21 Zalewski, Marysia and Cynthia Enloe. "Questions about Identity in International Relations" in International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, 3rd Ed., Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi (Eds.), Allyn & Bacon, 1999, p301.
follows in the next chapter by calling into question both traditional and human security approaches on the empirical and theoretical grounds in which they securitize, or rather do not securitize individuals in the contemporary international system. While human security attempts to put individuals at the forefront of the security equation, it only takes us so far; despite the claim that individuals matter, human security falls short of acknowledging the importance of identities. I will specifically be focusing on feminist critiques of security in Chapter 2 that argue that women are missing.

At the outset I want to emphasize the importance of critical analysis in the discussion that follows. Appeals to authority that emerge from science have played and continue to play an important role in determining the empiricism that has dominated the epistemological and ontological foundations of IR and security studies. Traditional IR theory is really inadequate in that it doesn’t prioritize ideas. The power of feminist analysis lies predominantly in its move into postpositivism – one of the most valuable critiques contemporary feminists are making is that of the epistemology and methodology of IR theory and the influence it has had by reinforcing patriarchal structures. This reaction unearths yet another fundamental relationship as well as a particular realm of enquiry: What is the relationship between theory and practice? As Smith reveals in a prominent essay within which, through comprehensive reflection on the ‘self-images’ which have dominated debates in IR theory, he illuminates a dichotomy in IR theory between social reality or international practice and ‘reason’ or theoretical understanding: “The connection is that the ways in which international theory has been categorized, and the debates within it presented,
fail to acknowledge the link between social practice and the constitution of social knowledge".22

Invoking a series of critiques by various feminist and human security scholars on traditional IR theory requires that we peer into the history of international thought and IR theory looking specifically to uncover not only the main divisions and dominant views, but how this history has influenced knowledge, international practices, and legitimization of patterns of domination and subordination. Employing Foucault’s genealogical method outlined in his later works23 Smith reveals that adopting this approach to international theory results in a shift of social inquiry from “what” questions to “how” questions. That is, how has the history of IR thought created and perpetuated hierarchically categorized views and understandings of what constitutes knowledge and international practice?

What do the self-images of international theory tell us? What are the silences, identities and discontinuities submerged within the dominant discourses of international theory? Does the practice of international politics tell us more about international theory than the dominant debates within international theory can tell us about international politics?...What do the self-images tell us about the social practice of international theory? Whose interests get represented in international theory? Whose interests and identities are ignored and silenced and seen as irrelevant? Above all, why is international theory?24

With a few exceptions, the discipline has been largely explanatory when in fact, international theory is directly implicated in social reality: “Our rationalization

of the international is itself constitutive of that practice”. By making this claim I am, of course, situating myself within a broad grouping of post-positivist writers whose work is largely constitutive, or, in the words of Robert Keohane, reflective, but is far from unified. In fact, it is the varied epistemologies of post-positive approaches which have led some scholars to suggest that although they are influential within the field in that they offer an alternative to traditional international approaches, it is unlikely that they will represent a substantial alternative to the pervasiveness of positivist and thus explanatory theory. For example, in spite of the differences within and between them, most critical theorists and post-modernists would fall under this broad category, as well as scientific realists, however disputes within this camp negate the possibility of a singular post-positivist approach.

Some feminists, namely feminist standpoint epistemologists, would also be grouped under the broad heading of constitutive theory. Theories, Zalewski and Enloe point out, do “not take place after the fact. Theories, instead, play a large part in constructing and defining what the facts are”. It is worth noting here that Smith, Zaleweski, and Enloe all share a similar position in that they are suggesting that theory is prior to practice; that epistemology is prior to and drives ontology. As was indicated in the Introduction, this appears at variance to my basic claim that it is changing realities that are rendering epistemology and the practices that follow problematic. However, the questions I am asking remain similar to their post-

25 Ibid., 3.
27 See George, 1994; Ashley, 1987; Walker, 1993; DerDerian, 1987; Campbell, 1992
28 See Wendt, 1987; Dessler, 1989
29 See Keohane, 1991; Tickner, 1992
positivist critiques of the ability to conceptualize reality, (For example, whose reality?) and as I mentioned in the introduction, I believe that both epistemological and ontological factors are significant. As Zalewski explains, it is the reaction to the above feminist insights that reveal a further and perhaps more challenging obstacle to post-positivist, or more specifically reflectivist approaches: constitutive feminists have been largely ignored in international theory. The connection here lies in the privileging of “positivism-as-methodology” and “positivism-as-epistemology” in IR theory that persists and thus results in exceedingly restricted ontological possibilities within the field. The fundamental danger that arises when one means of acquiring knowledge and one method of the study of existence is privileged to the extent that it becomes de facto knowledge, or “common sense”, is that other ways of thinking about international theory are made invisible. The entire subject matter becomes determined by what is deemed the appropriate epistemology. A distinct and totalizing realm of inquiry silences the views that exist beyond this domain. When this dominant approach then fails to acknowledge the link between theory and practice, vast areas of social reality remain obscured as well. What, or rather why, the silences of international theory?

A useful way of analyzing the changes that have occurred in IR as a discipline is by contextualizing the evolution of scholarship within the realm of change in the global polity – an approach that has proved valuable in such inquiries as Hollis and

32 Smith, Steve. “Positivism and Beyond” in International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, 3rd Ed., Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi (Eds.), Allyn & Bacon, 1999, p50.
Smith’s well-known “Growth of a Discipline”. Theory does not operate in a vacuum, separate from reality – it emerges and transforms in conjunction with internal and external pressures. Thus by analyzing disciplinary evolution through political and historical events we are better able to understand where and why traditional security emerged and how the human security agenda evolved through a course of events and began taking shape. This process simultaneously reveals the silences that have resulted from the generalization of insecurity over time. “Silences,” proclaims Smith “are the loudest voices.” By uncovering which realities have dominated over others, which methods of enquiry have dominated, and which voices have dominated, the subordinated and silenced voices become more audible.

Because the ontology and ideology of mainstream international relations theorists, including realists, pluralists, and structuralists, restricts their picture of the international in particular ways, so is their epistemology constrained. The theoretical limitations are complicit in the structural limitations of what is deemed important in international relations, or what is worthy of theorizing. That is, epistemology has structured the conditions for ontology (and vice versa). The positivist understanding of the world and reality which underpin most of international relations theory is the central criticism of post-positivists who claim that mainstream IR theorists are “locked into a problematic way of understanding theory and reality which inhibits their ability or even desire to widen or change their existing agendas for international relations theory”.

Hollis and Smiths exploration into the growth of IR as a discipline is valuable because it traces the schools of thought, inclusive of their assumptions, methods, and historical and political events from its ideological beginnings through realism, behaviouralism, transnationalism and interdependence theories, and neo-realism. In a later essay, Smith acknowledges several problems with this characterization of the development of international theory by dividing up the history of the discipline into “Great Debates” or “Waves”: First, such accounts can mistakenly give the impression, through a chronology of accounts, of the progressive development of international theory. This version not only suggests a clear-cut evolution of theory, it also silences the diverse and opposing interpretations that continuously challenged that which is presented as the singular approach; “it is as if all realists suddenly realized the folly of their ways, renounced their sins and converted to the new theory immediately”. Second, it places an inordinate amount of importance on the periods of transition, for example, the great debate between idealism and realism. In reality, explains Smith, these were not so much debates as “a series of statements of faith, with political or sociological factors determining which voice was heard”. A third problem is that these paradigms are not in themselves as united as this version implies. Hollis and Smith themselves call attention to this dilemma, stating: “ideas can never be packaged so conveniently”.

Nonetheless, such an approach is valuable as an initial starting point for uncovering the emergence of traditional security studies. In addition, within this

37 Ibid., p17.
38 Hollis and Smith. Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p17.
an approach we can incorporate pertinent categorizations which Smith identifies as self-images of the discipline, namely 'State-Centrism versus Transnationalism', 'the Post-Positivist Debate', and 'Constitutive versus Explanatory Theory'. 39 I would also like to acknowledge that any attempt to thoroughly trace the events of history and a recounting of the dominant approaches or phases in international theory could only, in the context of this chapter, be adequate at best. Therefore, to maximize the space available and provide maximum analysis of those areas most pertinent to my argument, I have chosen to focus primarily on the approaches that I believe have most affected the changing concepts of security. Thus, for example, while Idealism became dominant immediately after the emergence of IR as a separate field in the aftermath of the First World War, I will provide only a brief overview of this first approach to studying IR in order provide a preface to realism.

The legacy of the First World War almost entirely shaped the emergence of IR which took the predominant form of idealism. The widespread public perception in its aftermath was that not only had it been an undesired war from both sides which thus resulted in senseless deaths, it was also an indication that conflicts could no longer be resolved by means of military force. More importantly, politicians and scholars determined that the war resulted largely from misunderstandings between leaders, a lack of democratic accountability of states, and a set of processes that had been uncontrollable. 40 Historian Carr depicts the founding of the discipline as emerging out of the devastation of World War I and manifesting as a search for methods to prevent the reoccurrence of such destruction. The origins of the discipline thus reflect this

intellectual and political environment, taking on a normative, prescriptive character; namely, that "such a war must never happen again" and that IR must reduce misunderstanding by preventing the domination of 'sinister interests' domestically and develop mediation processes and organizational structures internationally. Thus, assuming that individuals are rational beings and that war is an irrational method for resolving conflict, what is needed (and what should occupy the focus of the discipline) is the outlawing of war and the establishment of mechanisms, such as the League of Nations and an International police force, which would ensure this.41

However, with the outbreak of World War II came disillusionment with the hopes that had been placed in the League and 'mistaken idealism: "Realism enters the field far behind utopianism and by way of reaction from it"42. Thus, moralism, legalism, and the so-called 'idealist' tradition which followed the First World War were deemed dangerous because, realists claimed, "conflict was inevitable: the best way to assure the security of states is therefore to prepare for war".43 Realism then is best understood as a revolt against this normative understanding of the international ignited by the events that followed in the 1930's which, in the words of Carr, "clearly revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis for a science of international politics, and made it possible for the first time to embark on serious critical and analytical thought about international problems".44 Allowing "wishing" to prevail over "thinking" argued Carr, idealism was unable to explain the unfolding of events since 1930. International relations is a science, he claimed, which required a

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41 Hollis and Smith. Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p17-20.
“dispassionate focus on the root of the problem”, and hence a move away from its normative roots, in order to accurately analyze the cause and consequences of facts of reality.\(^{45}\) Citing Machiavelli as evidence that realism is in fact a “well-established way of thinking about the world”, Carr carved out three principles from his writings, namely: that history occurs in a sequence of cause and effect relationships that require analytical evaluation; that theory is created by practice and not vice versa, and; that morality is the product of power. Carr thus criticized the utopianism after the First World War as a product of vested interest in the status quo of those states in power. This contention is particularly significant because, as we shall discover, such a claim is similar to contemporary contentions about realism today; the prescriptions offered by realism, some have argued, were “particularly well suited to America’s rise to become the global hegemon”.\(^{46}\)

It is important to note that there is not however a ‘unified’ theory of realism; realism has been categorized into several types by period, theme, and other distinguishing feature. For example, Machiavelli and his modern compatriot Carr have been categorized as historical or practical realists. Hans J. Morgenthau, probably the most influential theorist in the realist camp, is worth emphasizing here not only because of its vast influence in the field but also because it introduced and began the solidification of a particular epistemology that would come to dominate the field. Arguing, as Carr did, in his widely cited textbook *Politics Among Nations* that international relations deals with what is and not what should be, Morgenthau proposed an ‘elevation’ of the discipline to a science; a Realist scientific

\(^{45}\) Hollis and Smith. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, p21-22.  
approach.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, positivism emerged as the only ‘credible’ way of analyzing events in the international system, grounded in the view that empirical testing of propositions of hypothesis against evidence of facts was the only way to analyze events that occur because of underlying forces that determine behaviour.\textsuperscript{48}

Morgenthau based his theory of realism on six principles which I will briefly outline here because I would like to return to them in the form of a feminist critique in Chapter 2. Additionally, it is beneficial to pay particular attention to Morgenthau’s Realist theory because it lays the epistemological and ontological foundations not only for national security paradigms but for the notion of power politics that shape the lenses of leading theorists and policy-makers to the present. First, politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature. Combined with the assumption that humans are rational actors, this implies that international relations can be explained by distinguishing between truth and opinion; “between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by the prejudice of wishful thinking”.\textsuperscript{49} Second, interest, defined as power, determines the actions of states and the individuals who run them, thus invalidating ethical considerations or concern with motives or ideological preferences. Third, because the nature of power and the form it takes varies according to environment, interest is objective and thus the key concept that serves as the “universal starting point” to

\textsuperscript{47} Note: Smith notes that in some of Morgenthau’s other works he does not always advocate a scientific approach, however, because Politics Among Nations is his most established work which etched him into the history of the discipline and because within it he is regarded as the leading thinker of the scientific method, it is reasonable in the context of this chapter to refer to his work which has so profoundly affected the field.

\textsuperscript{48} Hollis and Smith, The Growth of a Discipline, p23.

explaining international events, the “perennial component of politics”.\textsuperscript{50} Fourth, the same moral principles that may guide an individual’s actions cannot be applied to the state whose primary objective is national survival: “Realism maintains that universal moral principle cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formation”.\textsuperscript{51} In connection with this is the fifth principle which proclaims a lack of a shared morality among all states; behaviour of states can best be explained in terms of power and power relationships – moral language invoked by state is often only to serve their underlying interests. Finally, because interest is defined in terms of power, power is key, and therefore political considerations reign paramount above moral, economic, and religious considerations.

As I mentioned above, there are varieties of realism that comprise the realist cannon, and Morgenthau’s reduction of international politics to a struggle for power rooted in human nature is but one variant, nonetheless a paramount one. Rousseau and Waltz are representative of a different camp of structural realism (also referred to as neo-realists) which cites the structure of the anarchic international system, not human nature, as fostering an environment highly susceptible to conflict and war.\textsuperscript{52} Finally, out of Thomas Hobbes’ \textit{Leviathan} and the more contemporary work \textit{The Anarchical Society} by Hedley Bull has emerged what some have classified as Liberal Realism. Here it is believed that although the anarchical system suggests a state of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Hollis and Smith, \textit{The Growth of a Discipline}, p26
\item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Note: It is worth noting, however, that as Dunne points out, assumptions about human nature and the self interested state often get unintentionally “smuggled” into theories of contemporary structural realists.
\end{itemize}
"permanent cold war", rules of sovereignty and non-intervention can transform this into an anarchical society where states can coexist. 53

It is important to acknowledge that, as Walker has, “there is no single tradition of political realism, but rather a knot of historically constituted tensions, contradictions and evasions”. 54 Despite the lack of coherence among the different variants of realism, there are basic elements that form the backbone of all realist thinking and which allow us to analyze a composite realism, and, as we will see, understand the foundations of traditional security. 55

Kal J. Holsti presents a useful method for analyzing the ontology of theoretical frameworks by setting out actors, problems, and processes as guiding parameters and I will adapt his paradigm to the realist ontology here. 56 For realists, states are the primary actors (“For realist, states are the only actors which really ‘count’”). 57, viewed as both unitary and rational, which coexist with other sovereign states in an anarchic system, struggling for power in a zero-sum competition and only somewhat governed by the principle of non-intervention. The pre-eminent problem or goal for states in the international system is survival – a concept inherently tied up in the notion of power and national interest: “States use the power they have to serve their interests or achieve their objectives... Put another way, states try to maximize the

55 Note: I must add that this can in no way be a fully comprehensive account of realism but do to the confines of this chapter must suffice as a brief. For more extensive reviews see the footnote references.
56 Holsti, Kal J. The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, Boston, Allen and Unwin.
57 Dunne, “Realism”, p115.
likelihood that they will achieve whatever objectives they have set”. Thus, national security is the predominant issue that tops states’ agendas.

Locked, as realists argue, in a self-help process as a result of distrust among states in an anarchical environment; states find themselves in a “security dilemma”: “The more one state arms to protect itself from other states, the more threatened these states become and the more prone they are to resort to arming themselves to protect their own national security interests”. The nuclear arms race of the cold war is a primary example of this dilemma which forces states to assume the worst of their sovereign counterparts, despite the possibility that arms accumulation is only for defensive purposes. Cooperation in such a system is difficult, therefore realists argue that what keeps states from constantly attacking one another and maintains a form of order in the system is the balance of power. While there is disagreement within the realist camps regarding whether this balance is inevitable or constructed, (the voluntarism-determinism debate) there is agreement in that it is a perpetually unstable condition, always on the verge of collapse, as illustrated in Rousseau’s famous stag hunt parable which exemplifies the predicament in coordinating short-term versus long term interests and individual interests versus those of the common good. This is an example of what scholars call “game theory” – “an approach to determining rational choice or optimum strategy under conditions of uncertainty”, and the realist

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59 Ibid., p69.
60 “Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of each will be satisfied by the fifth part of the stag, so they ‘agree’ to co-operate in a project to trap one. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so, as a hare comes within reach, one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His immediate interest prevails over consideration for his fellows.” See Waltz, K. Man, the State and War, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959, p167-168.
interpretation or analytical assumption is that states, interested in serving first and foremost their narrow self-interest will be concerned with relative over absolute gains.  

The debate about how best to achieve national security has thus emerged directly out of this realist ontology, and situating the ontology of traditional security studies within historical and political events, it is easy to understand how it emerged. The arms race during the Cold War, for instance, seemed to further justify realists' advice to accumulate and increase power and military capacity in order to ensure the survival of the state within this dangerous “anarchical” world. In fact it is possible that, as Stanley Hoffman claims, realism was “nothing but a rationalization of cold war politics”.  

Why the disciplinary turn to positivism after the Second World War? As I have shown above, one of the principal explanations for the emergence of a scientific approach was the desire, prompted by scholars such as Morgenthau, to elevate the study of international relations to a science after the disillusionment that followed the idealism or “wishful thinking” of the post-war era. Hollis and Smith identify additional historically specific factors, claiming “The time was ripe for an approach that promised to apply methods of natural science to the international environment”. For instance, it was during this period that the US began to emerge as a major power and avowing that they must contain Soviet expansion and they turned to political academics as justification for combating the Soviets.  

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61 Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, p70.  
63 Ibid., p24.  
64 Ibid.
choice theory models became tools for attempting to predict and control behaviour in the anarchical international system. In addition, science was held in high esteem after the advances it had provided in nature – "so why could not scientific method help it control international society?". It is also interesting to note that most of the early Realists were European immigrants who shared not only a desire to explain the occurrences that had destroyed so many of their livelihoods but also a common intellectual tradition.

It is worth expanding on the positivist epistemological foundation of realism; not only because understanding methodology is so fundamental to understanding any theory in IR, particularly realism, but also because realism has been criticized extensively on its positivist roots. Smith offers a useful definition of positivism as a view of how to create knowledge that relies on the following assumptions: 1) Belief in the unity of science – the same methodologies of the natural sciences apply in the non-scientific world; 2) Facts are neutral and must be distinguished from values in theory; 3) There are 'regularities' in the social world, as in the natural world, that can be 'discovered' using similar methods, and; 4) Truth of statements can be determined only by appealing to these neutral facts, i.e. an empiricist epistemology. This view of the construction of knowledge has dominated international relations since its inception and, as we shall see, it is the rejection of these assumptions that has constituted much of the recent debate in the discipline.

65 Ibid.
According to Tickner, the ‘depersonalization’ that results in the discipline from borrowing methodologies from the sciences is epitomized in the subfield of national security studies. Privileging the state and military procurement as the only defense in an international system of endemic and inevitable violence, “security” was defined as “the pursuit of power conducted by statesmen strictly guided by considerations of national interest and unimpeded by moral deliberations”. Looking briefly at the definitions often used in security theory substantiates the point Tickner is making: Paul Huth and Bruce Russett define deterrence as “a game of strategic interaction, in which a “rational” opponent assesses the potential costs and benefits of its actions based upon expectations regarding the likely behaviour of its adversary”. Using variables to predict military success and equations to help correlate data becomes particularly significant when understood in relation to the underlying assumptions embedded in these models, as well as the absence of incalculable “subjective” factors. The emergence of Strategic Studies as a subfield of IR provides another revealing example; here the focus is built on military strategy, or as Barry Buzan defines it as “the use of force within and between states”, in which the “essence” of strategy is defined as the use as well as the threat of force. The subject builds upon primary assumptions of global anarchy and balance of power relations between political entities comprised mostly of states. The result, according to these features, is conflicts of interest between entities which occur with such regularity and

67 Blanchard, “Gender”, p1291.
magnitude, says Buzan that “the threat of force is an unavoidable and constant feature of their existence”.\(^\text{70}\) Notions of power maximization and ‘self-help’ illustrate the realist perception of human nature and thus security: because men are “self-seeking, politically ambitious, and not always rational”, mutual cooperation under international anarchy cannot be relied upon for national security. Therefore, individual states must rely on themselves even at the risk of compromising the interests of the system as a whole.\(^\text{71}\)

Realism has been challenged in a variety of ways and on multiple fronts. In the 1970’s another approach, transnationalism, began to question the dominance of the state with a new vigor.\(^\text{72}\) Realisms restricted focus on “political conflict and power politics” was called into question following the decline of the Cold War by what can be called the ‘interdependence’ school.\(^\text{73}\) As economic concerns began to overtake the dominance of the near and perceived danger of an outbreak of military war, some scholars began to illuminate the need for more attention regarding economic interdependence. The traditional approach, it was argued, could not assist in resolving economic conflicts between “advanced capitalist states” where military war seemed dubious.\(^\text{74}\) Both transnationalism and interdependence challenged realist assumptions on three points: the state as the singular actor view was deemed false when considering the burgeoning affect of multinational corporations and revolutionary groups on international politics; the boundaries between domestic and international

\(^{70}\) Ibid., p6.


\(^{72}\) Note: The challenge to the state-centric outlook of Realism was not a new one: calls for a working class opposition in the First World War and questioning of the ability of the state to protect its people during the rise of nuclear weapons both challenged its supposed dominance.

\(^{73}\) Tickner. “Engendered Insecurities”, p12. 

\(^{74}\) Ibid.
politics were becoming increasingly blurred as a result of economic integration, calling into question realisms reliance on sovereignty for the state-as-actor model, and; economic factors rather than military issues were increasingly becoming the predominant influence in international politics. Of course, there have been substantial scholarly rebuttals which claim that the state still dominates in international relations, and this remains one of the most notorious debates that persist in the discipline.

I have already briefly mentioned the challenge to realism posed by a more systemic or structural account of international relations by neo-realists. It is important to acknowledge, however, that during the 1980's and 1990's the prevailing debate was between neo-realists and neo-liberalists, or what Smith terms the “neo-neo debate”. The basic element of this extensive and on-going debate revolves around issues of relative versus absolute gains, the possibility of international co-operation, and the role of institutions. However, I am more interested in the similarities in both of these camps more so than their differences; as Smith explains, “the neo-neo debate is in fact a very narrow one”. This is namely because, despite their opposing positions on the above issues, the two theories look at the same problems and use the same methodologies. Neo-realist and neo-liberal assumptions, along with the aforementioned theories which challenged realism all rely on a positivist epistemology and therefore comprise a rationalist and explanatory position in

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77 Note: This is a necessarily brief summary, for more information on this debate see Baldwin, D. (ed.) *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.
78 Smith “New Approaches”, p171.
international theory. While I do not want to minimize the differences between the different camps that have comprised the inter-paradigm debate or the so-called 'great debates' for most of the disciplines history, or the differences within the neo-neo debate which still dominates in the US, the shared assumptions exclude many important questions and pivotal features of the contemporary international system which are vital to questions of security. It is to some of these reflectivist challenges to the traditional security paradigm, which are part of what Lapid defines as 'a post-positivist era'\textsuperscript{79} that we will soon explore.

As we know, after the Second World War realism became the dominant school of thought and national security which focused on interstate conflict defined the discipline. Just as the ontology of national security is more easily understood when contextualized in the historical and political events that directly affected the disciplinary evolution, so too are its challengers. New frameworks of analysis have evolved from scholars attempting to broaden the concept of security to include a variety of threats beyond the military dimensions of Cold War security policies. These proposals did not emerge from nowhere; changes had occurred in the international arena in the aftermath of the Cold War that had begun to call into question the dominance of the state. In fact, as early as 1945, Carr called attention to the inability of the nation-state to assure the military or economic well-being of its citizens and called for a 'pooled' or common security.\textsuperscript{80} As we already know, such visions did not remain for long with the onset of a cold war between superpowers that


were in a way “legitimized” by the realist ideology and the national security paradigm.

However, the questioning of the validity of a realist agenda privileging notions of power and order began to infiltrate the discipline, even during the cold war period; for example, its almost exclusively Western focus began to be revealed by scholars such as Hedley Bull, yet in the midst of a superpower arms race, any consideration of issues outside the political/military arena was deemed ‘low politics’ and not part of the national security agenda. Ironically, by the 1980’s, the very same weapons which had been justified as a means to guaranteeing the security of the nation-state began to increase feelings of insecurity among citizens: “To those critical of realist strategic thinking,” explains Tickner, “the military security of the state seemed synonymous with the insecurity of individuals held hostage to nuclear deterrence”.

It was in this period of uncertainty as the nuclear arms race abated with the demise of the Soviet Union that a re-analysis of the realist paradigm and its national security agenda led to an emerging dialogue on security issues and created space for a broadening of the agenda as well as a questioning of its epistemological foundations.

As we saw earlier, neo-realists attributed national ‘insecurity’ to the structure of the international system, thus, at the end of the cold war although many saw the opportunity for greater cooperation between states many also maintained that it is inhibited by the problems of cheating and relative-gains. There are other neo-realists, however, who began to express a more optimistic view of the cooperation between

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states. Contingent realists, for example, accept much of the assumptions of neo-realism but argue that national security is in fact contingent upon whether or not a state perceives its interests to be best served by cooperation.\textsuperscript{82} Barry Buzan is another example of a self-proclaimed neo-realist who argues that a ‘mature anarchy’ is emerging in which states are coming to recognize the value of cooperation in the international system and that “self-referenced security policies, whatever their jingoistic attractions, are ultimately self defeating”.\textsuperscript{83} Buzan’s calls for a shift from a focus on national security to international security where security communities are established and warranted, his supporters have argued, by the Treaty of Rome and creation of the EU in Western Europe.

Other, more ‘liberal’ approaches to contemporary international security have emerged, including (but not exclusively): liberal institutionalism, which stresses the importance of international institutions in helping to achieve cooperation between states; what has come to be known as the ‘democratic peace theory’, which essentially attributes the characteristics of democratic governments with ‘peace-prone’ states, and; collective security proponents who argue that despite past failures, such as the League, functioning collective security systems are possible and fundamental to combating the self-help “spirals of hostility” that result in war.\textsuperscript{84}

In spite of the multitude of approaches which challenge the ideas of national security from various perspectives, in recent years there has been acknowledgement

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by some scholars that these theories are all in fact similar in character in that they rely on an “uncontested set of positivist assumptions”. These scholars have proposed that perhaps it is epistemology which drives ontology: an extremely valuable incite, as mentioned above in references to Smith and Enloe that open up space for new conceptualizations of security and IR. New “critical” approaches, such as critical theorists, post-structuralists, post-modernists, and some feminists, reject the positivist assumptions of the discipline on the following fundamental grounds: First, empiricist methodology which relies on direct observation is in fact very narrow and limiting and excludes significant factors which are essentially ‘unobservable’. Empiricism thus “allows us to know very little about only a very restricted amount of ‘reality’”. The second limitation of empiricism which stems from the first is that it prohibits us from contemplating the causes of events, restricting enquiry to prediction without explanation, or “what we might expect to happen, but not why it happens”. Finally, objective knowledge is unfeasible. Even “pure”, observable facts are subject to individual interpretation affected by prior assumptions; “There are, therefore, no brute facts, no facts without interpretation, and interpretation always involves theory”. There are of course significant differences between various “post-positivist” approaches, and these limitations represent general objections from critical approaches to international theory.

These new approaches have had the ultimate effect of revealing what is at risk in the discipline in which positivism is “the implicit ‘gold standard’”. Epistemology is

85 Smith, “Positivism and Beyond”, p38.
86 Ibid., p43.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., p44.
fundamentally important because it in essence determines what international theory is: “not simply what can be known but also what is sensible to talk about or suggest”.\textsuperscript{89} Smith provides an excellent example of this danger by citing the response by traditional theorists to such new approaches: in order to determine the validity of critical approaches, it was argued, they must be evaluated on their “testability” or be banished to the periphery of the discipline – that they be judged precisely by the criteria that critical theorists are in fact rejecting! Additionally, as I mentioned earlier, the link between theory and practice means there is much at risk in limiting enquiry:

Theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons...epistemology matters, and the stakes are far more considerable than at first sight seem to be the case.\textsuperscript{90}

Thus, the post-positivist era has much to contribute to the discipline, particularly in the face of post-cold war changes that have altered the international system. Smith outlines five alternatives in the post-positivist camp which represent promising alternatives to positivism and its epistemological foundation, namely scientific realism, critical theory (in the Frankfurt School sense), feminist standpoint epistemology, and post modernist epistemology. Although each of these is individually significant and offer fundamental objections to the empiricism that has dominated the discipline, I am most concerned with the space that post-positivist theories have opened up for ways of thinking about international security. Positivism’s “epistemological assumptions have had enormous ontological

\textsuperscript{89} Smith, “Positivism and Beyond”, p39.  
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p40.
consequences”\textsuperscript{91}, and so to have post-positivist accounts which, although comprised of distinct epistemologies, allowed for alternative interpretations of global reality and a re-conceptualization of security.

1.2 From the state to the individual: the emergence of a Human Security Agenda

The structural features that influenced and, according to Ronnie D. Lipshutz, constrained the dimensions of security through policy mechanisms and practice during the Cold War are no longer in existence. However, a multitude of sovereign nation-states divided by territorial boundaries still exist and thus “the essential security function” of self-defense and war still remain, and so Lipshutz poses the question: “Why, then should we bother to revise security?”\textsuperscript{92} In order to explore reasoning behind the move of new schools of thought, we must re-investigate the concept of security by asking some critical questions and by challenging the definitional boundaries which can constrain or widen our analysis. First, what is being secured, or security from what? Lipshutz declares that this question remains an obscurity throughout most of mainstream traditional security literature; “Is the international system being secured? The nation-state? The “West?” Societies? Cultures? No one seems sure.”\textsuperscript{93} Security by whom and achieved through what means?\textsuperscript{94} What are the conditions that constitute security and can full security ever be achieved? Is complete security truly desirable? I will not attempt to answer all of

\textsuperscript{91} Smith, “Positivism and Beyond”, p52.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, p1.
these questions, rather my goal is to reveal the contested nature of the subject and hopefully provide insight into the limitations constraining traditional security theories and the broadening of the definition that has been illuminated by current debates and new approaches.

Presumably one of the most significant enquiries critically relevant for our purposes here is “security for whom?” Who is it that is being secured by security policies? The traditional response of “the state” has been increasingly susceptible to critical analyses advocating a wider definition of security. Realism’s reliance on the state has been the principal contention of new and diverse schools of thought which have begun questioning the capability of the state to provide security for its own citizens: “Realism, the dominant approach to international relations scholarship”, asserts Simon Dalby of the Institute of International Relations for the University of British Columbia, “has been challenged by analyses concerned to emphasize both the limited capabilities of states in many important spheres of physical activity and the dangers of defining the relative success of a state as the most important political priority of practitioners of national security”.

Realists of course, maintain that the state still is and will continue to be into the foreseeable future the primary actor in the international system and will continue to operate in a manner which prioritizes its national interest. The salience of empirical epistemology and its ontological consequences are revealed here: realists cite the empirical historical record as an indication that the interstate conflict and national security rivalries that have characterized the past will carry on into the future. Ideas

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95 Ibid.
like those of collective security or more communitarian norms are dismissed by the belief that there has been no “paradigmatic shift” with the demise of a world superpower and state will remain the mainstay of the security agenda. However, new schools of thought are challenging this assumption, arguing that although the state may have necessarily dominated security concerns in the past, new trends in world politics, including primarily the process of globalization, have generated new risks to security that necessitates new approaches to manage them: “The traditional focus on national or state security (and sovereignty) no longer reflects the radical changes that are taking place.” 97

What are some of these changes? As I have indicated, a theoretical shift occurred in the last two decades that have called into question the discourse and epistemological foundations of traditional security paradigms. Additionally, changes in the global politic pose a critical challenge to traditional approaches and Hampson et al. outline seven of these factors that indicate the need to shift focus and help explain the reasoning behind critical scholars who have: First, the widespread growth of democracy since the end of the Cold War, including in previously violent countries where the international community have imported democratic systems, has been congruous with the increase in accountable judicial and legal systems that are beginning to prioritize human rights and the rule of law. Second, a growing convergence on human rights has developed at the regional and global level through legal norms, principles, precedents, and values and reinforced by regimes such as the UN, the International Criminal Court, and International Criminal Tribunals. These regimes have begun to recognize that human rights are directly connected to security

and broad economic, social, and political issues. Third, the emergence of ‘middle
powers’ is changing the dynamics of international politics and playing a large role in
strengthening this convergence through international institutions and advancing
human rights norms. Fourth, economic globalization and the rapid velocity at which it
is occurring is impacting relations between states and affecting the security of
individuals and nations. Although there is much debate as to whether this is having
positive or negative effects on world income, the distribution of wealth, and the
impact on the world’s poorest people, it is hard to dispute that economic integration is
having monumental political and social effects, erecting challenges to national and
individual security. Fifth, non-governmental organizations as well as social and
political movements have raised awareness of the affects of armed conflict and other
political agendas (such as the distribution of arms, the development of weapons of
mass destruction) on individuals and societies, and particularly the most vulnerable
and gravely impacted groups. Through campaigns and transnational organizing, non-
governmental groups have been able to begin holding governments accountable for
their actions and initiate international agreements, as was the case in the example of
the international campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines which resulted in the
successful attainment of a new anti-personnel landmines treaty. Sixth, the tremendous
spread of the media, or what is often referred to as the ‘CNN effect’, and the growth
of the internet has allowed images of conflicts, humanitarian and environmental
disasters, and injustice and suffering to reach millions of viewers all over the world.
Albeit sometimes with misinformation or fabricated events, the media has brought
international politics into peoples living rooms in real time along with a renewed
sense of urgency and a potent effectiveness. Finally, the nature of international conflict has changed since the proxy wars of the Cold War have abated and new conflicts have emerged often from within internally divided states. Environmental conflicts, ethnic genocide, and religious confrontations are just some of the new battles which are exploding while simultaneously inciting a renewed understanding of the multitude of factors that play a role in fueling conflict and violence. In particular, state failure and violent state sanctioned regimes have resulted in social, economic, and political injustices that call into question the role of the state as a security provider.98

This is the argument emerging particularly from within the growing discourse around ‘human security’. International order depends not only on the viability of states but also on the security of individuals and groups within the emerging global society: “State security is essential but does not necessarily ensure the safety of individuals and communities. No longer can state security be limited to protecting borders, institutions, values, and people from external aggressive or adversarial designs”.99 This argument by Ogata and Cels illuminates the drive towards a widening of the security agenda from its state-centered outlook and towards the emergence of a “human security” conception. The concept, as Lloyd Axworthy reveals, is not a new one: “The idea that the protection of people is at least as important as the sovereignty of states has achieved increasing recognition as a

principle of international relations since the end of the Cold War". The central document which served to provide an often cited and commonly referred to definition is the United Nations Human Development Report 1994 (UNDP) which argued that "the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives". Distinguishing human security as not a concern with weapons but rather a concern for with "human life and dignity", the report outlined seven main mutually reinforcing components: 1) economic security; 2) food security; 3) health security; 4) environmental security; 5) personal security; 6) community security, and 7) political security. In addition, the Report exposed various multi-dimensional threats or challenges to the security of individuals which arise not necessarily from interstate military aggression and have cross-border, trans-national consequences. These include a burgeoning growth in population, (a primary source of a multitude of other problems) economic disparities, environmental degradation, migration pressures and refugee issues principally affecting developing countries, drug trafficking, and international terrorism. These various elements included in the definition of human security and the extensive understanding of the various and far-reaching threats are indicative of a shift from state-centered and territorial security to individual/people’s/or comprehensive security.

Hampson categorizes this conception put forth by the UNDP’s Development Report as the ‘Sustainable Human Development’ approach; an enlarged concept of security which stresses non-military threats that have arisen largely from human-

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101 Hampson, Madness in the Multitude, p30.
102 Ibid.
103 Hampson, Madness in the Multitude, p31-31.
induced problems many of which stem from socio-economic inequalities and an absence of social justice.\textsuperscript{104} Calling for a move "from security through armaments to security through sustainable development"\textsuperscript{105}, the approach argues that human security is the result of effective and successful development processes and calls for a redistribution of global wealth and for prevention strategies in attempt to alleviate and eventually eliminate the root causes of conflict. Hampson contrasts this approach with two other views of human security which are identified by alternate understandings of what constitutes the greatest threat and what the most effective and efficient strategies and instruments are for combating these threats. What Hampson identifies as the 'Rights and Rule of Law' approach is anchored in the rule of law and treaty-based solutions to problems of human security: This approach "seeks to strengthen normative legal frameworks at both the international and regional levels while also deepening and strengthening human rights law and legal judicial systems at the national level, i.e., within the nation-state".\textsuperscript{106} Built upon a framework relying on international institutions, rights-based proponents hinge on processes of co-optation, sanctioning and shaming as strategies and instruments to entrench human rights norms. The third approach Hampson identifies is what he calls the 'Safety of Peoples' or humanitarian conception, a view that more narrowly focuses on the security of individuals during times of conflict and war. Sometimes recognized as 'freedom from fear', this conception regards war as a prime threat to human security and in drawing distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, believes in the protection of individuals from violent threats when they are wounded or harmed. However, these

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p28.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p31.
\textsuperscript{106} Hampson, p17.
advocates also understand the need to “go beyond the provision of emergency and humanitarian relief in war-torn societies and conflict settings by addressing the underlying causes of conflict and violence.”

Thus, this approach looks to the strengthening of international institutional mechanisms regarding military intervention, conduct of warfare and treatment of prisoners of war, humanitarian and emergency assistance, peace building, and conflict prevention as strategies and instruments in achieving human security.

Despite their differences, these approaches share a mutual point of reference: the ‘object’ of security in these approaches is the individual rather than nation-state, and the belief that security and international order can be achieved only by securing the needs and interests of the individual remains paramount. As Hampson argues, “This personalization of security entails a recognition that the interests of individual human beings are distinct from, and might even conflict with those of states”. The importance of distancing our analyses of security away from the traditional state-centered approach is illustrated clearly in Tow and Trood’s essay “Linkages Between Traditional Security and Human Security”, within which they argue that there exist “compelling and urgent reasons for revising traditional security approaches”. Principally, they argue, the increase in complex humanitarian emergencies and internal conflicts defy traditional reliance on military capabilities, sovereignty, and policies of non-interference. Ethnic and religious conflicts, intra-state genocide, and

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108 Ibid., p24-25.
109 Ibid., p37.
unbounded terrorist attacks have become the dominating features of contemporary security issues, and one's that state-centered security mechanisms cannot effectively resolve. This is directly related to their second contention, the insensitivity of traditional approaches to cultural differences and notions of ethnocentricity, thus resulting in a huge ignorance regarding the underlying causes of conflict and state fragmentation, occurrences which are often infused with misunderstood conceptions of socio-ethnic divisions. In concert with this, they question the continued relevancy of traditional approaches on the premise that they were unable to predict the end of the Cold War and now their applicability to modern issues remain questionable. 111 “Conflicts still rage in our time”, they conclude “but they have little resemblance to the wars we had been preparing to fight over the past half-century and relate less to state interests or ideologies than to people’s identities, histories, and resources”. 112 Human security represents a vital shift to a focus on security of people, argues Axworthy, a shift that encompasses new and roots-based approaches and initiatives in order to solve a complex array of problems and protect individuals at risk. 113

These new and varied conceptions which explore the extensive meanings and changing nature of security are not without their critics. It has been argued, for example, that by broadening the agenda we are essentially endangering the field by “threatening, ‘to destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise

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112 Ibid., p24.
113 Axworthy, “Freedom From Fear”.
solutions to any of these important problems”. This attempt to limit or “narrow” the debate suggests that there is a danger in widening the focus that distracts security studies from real and serious threats. Tow and Trood reveal some potential challenges to the human security agenda. First they imply parallels between the language of human security and that of utopianists or universalists of E.H, Carr’s time: a concern arises regarding ‘otherness’ and nationalism in security perception. They also suggest complications which arise from problematizing the state while simultaneously retaining the need for organizing principles: “i.e. if not the state, into what?” There is also the consideration that history is being interpreted prematurely, that is, that assumptions that problems of power balancing and military deterrence have disappeared may be unfounded. Some critics purport that this individual-based approach not only renders the task of understanding security needs of the individual extremely difficult, translating these needs into effective and successful policymaking become even more so.

However, it is imperative that we acknowledge the interests of those in control of power structures in maintaining those constructions: “Broadening the security agenda is itself a threat to elites”, argue Hoogensen and Rottem, and the expansion of the security dynamic allows for a diverse articulation from voices which may be in opposition to their purposes.116 This perspective is made increasingly visible from contentions of Southern, or ‘non-Western’ states: “From the perspective of the South, the Northern definition of security was seen as synonymous with the preservation of

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US hegemony, the security of the West, and the interests of international capitalism. From a Southern perspective then, international security has been largely ethnocentric, focusing on external attack and superpower interests when in the South the greatest threats emerge from within the state. In addition, the preoccupation with military threats has discounted other security issues, such as economic security, that are often a greater threat to the survival of Southern populations. In fact, argues Tickner, “it is militarization itself which is becoming the greatest threat to security”; directly through the arming of populations in which the North has been directly implicated, as well as indirectly, for example through the negative effect of military expenditures on economic growth. The link between militarization and increasing the insecurity of the most vulnerable people will be explored in depth by looking at a particular case study in Chapter 3.

Thus, despite the critics, Hoogensen and Rottem proclaim, “As we begin to develop more concrete methods of understanding security needs, the human security approach can be strengthened and provide policy direction.” The ultimate and rhetorical question then ends up being, “do we take on this task, or accept state-oriented security as the only legitimate articulation because the parameters are conveniently narrow and manageable?”

18 Ibid., p180.
19 Ibid., p2.
20 Ibid., p4.
Chapter 2

If we believe that a definition of security must be conceptualized through a people-centered approach that transcends state boundaries and focuses on the individual, then we must acknowledge the extent to which individual identities are implicated in their own insecurity. Feminist perspectives have been especially valuable in revealing the hierarchical boundaries that are complicit in disproportionately affecting the security of certain people. Feminist standpoint theory and feminist post-modernism has contradicted assumptions found in rationalism and empiricism that the "knower" is irrelevant with abundant evidence that "the knowing mind of traditional epistemology is axiomatically a male mind".\textsuperscript{121} "Whose knowledge" then becomes the fundamental concern that allows us to see the production of knowledge and its processes as having concerned itself with only half the population, excluding and marginalizing women and their security concerns.

By uncovering the greater economic, environmental, and physical threats to women’s security all over the globe, feminists have exposed what is at stake in the maintenance of relations of gender inequality. In this next Chapter I will engage with some of these feminist analyses by uncovering the gendered nature of international relations and calling for a reformulation of the security paradigm which takes into account unequal gender systems that compromise the security of all individuals.

The focus on women’s insecurities has revealed that hierarchical social relations and political identities render not just women, but all individuals, more

\textsuperscript{121} Smith, "Positivism and Beyond", p47.
insecure. As we shall see, individual security has been contingent not just on gender hierarchies but racial, ethnic and class hierarchies as well. Thus, from a gendered critique of security I will proceed to a post-colonial, “Third World” feminist analysis to show the multitude of dimensions of security that can only be revealed through an examination of insecurities in such a context. In doing so I hope to turn realist assumptions on their head; the experiences of third world women are far from irrelevant to international politics. Identity is intrinsically tied to notions of power, security, and politics. A comprehensive definition of security must include an understanding of unequal social relations and the partiality of security provision on the basis of gender, race, class, and other categories – when we have this the individual may begin to materialize as one not only worth considering in the international system, but indispensable.

2.1 Feminist thought on the evolution of the security paradigm

The nation state... is no longer able to deal with an increasingly pluralistic array of problems ranging from economic interdependence to environmental degradation. Could feminist theory make a contribution to international relations theory by constructing an alternative, feminist perspective on international politics that might help us to search for more appropriate solutions?122

For the most part, “women have been hidden from international relations”.123

International relations theory, global politics, and more specifically security studies all emerge from what Rebecca Grant calls the foundations of an archetypal male

experience. The gendered nature of realism is most succinctly and pointedly illustrated by a stag-hunt parable in Kenneth Waltz' classic text, 'Man, The State, and War', in which the security dilemma is illustrated by the male hunters scavenging for food - relying on realist assumptions which ignore women and render unproblematic the absence of the experience of women. (This parable will be further explored below.) When Waltz states that “Without an understanding of man’s nature, one is often told, there can be no theory of politics”, he does not mean to include women within the general category of ‘man’. How might the parable be different if it traversed beyond a universal worldview based on the experiences of certain men, and included the experiences of women? Male experience is equated with human experience, and thus men’s issues and experiences become privileged. The state system has always been hierarchically gendered and international politics is such a “thoroughly masculinized sphere of activity” proclaims J. Ann Tickner, that “women’s voices are considered inauthentic”.

According to Grant who looks at the history of women’s discrimination within the discipline of IR, women have been entirely left out of any discussion on the operation of international politics: “Men, states and wars were the bases of theory, not women”. Even more elucidating is that the gender bias that permeates Western political thought has remained a non-issue for most theorists in international relations.

The result, says Grant is that “gender (not to mention women) appears to be an irrelevant question”. Only recently has world politics met with a new and invigorating critique which privileges demands for a gendered perspective. In the words of R.B.J. Walker, feminist voices are beginning to be accounted for in “what has been one of the most gender-blind, indeed crudely patriarchal, of all institutionalized forms of contemporary social and political analysis”. And yet the overall effect of feminist approaches on the mainstream discipline has been disappointingly minute and their acknowledgment by other critical approaches to international relations almost nonexistent. Even among most critics of realist and traditional security approaches gender as a category of analysis has been largely ignored. This absence in the most progressive critiques of IR theory, says Tickner illuminates a serious deficiency in theorizing about global politics:

Scholars concerned with structural violence have paid little attention to how women are affected by global politics or the workings of the world economy, nor to the fact that hierarchical gender relations are interrelated with other forms of domination that they do address.

Why is there this almost complete lack of dialogue and how, if possible, should feminists attempt to engage with mainstream international relations thinkers? What effect does this scholarly disconnect have in practice? Tickner demonstrates a common encounter between feminist scholars and international relations theorists. Following the feminists’ presentation of a gendered critique of IR or a proposal of the huge gains to be had by including a gendered perspective, the result is a barrage of

incessant questions demanding: “What does this talk have to do with solving ‘real-world’ problems such as Bosnia, Northern Ireland or nuclear proliferation? Why does gender have anything to do with explaining the behaviour of states in the international system? Isn’t IR a gender neutral discipline?” The general position appears to be one of disparagement toward the presenter and her ideas clouded in an inability to comprehend where the connection lies between these two fields. What does any of this have to do with international politics?

In an attempt to break through this disciplinary resistance I hope to uncover some of the dominant reasoning behind why such an obstruction to successful dialogue persists and rejoin the central query of why this is an issue at all for mainstream thinkers of IR theory. To obtain a better understanding and arrive at a promising space in relation to this quandary, it is pivotal that the central grounding of feminists claims is established. After all “those who do not ‘see’ the field as gendered also cannot ‘see’ the significance of feminist lenses and analyses”. How is it that international relations theory and specifically security studies rest on archetypal male experience and thus exclude women?

Before moving forward it would be beneficial to ensure our understanding of concepts such as gender, masculinity, and fixed binary oppositions are clarified and fathomable. When the word gender is used in contemporary feminist literature, it generally refers not to biological differences between males and females that customarily have ascribed the differences between men and women, but to socially constructed concepts. Tickner defines the term as referring to a set of “culturally

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131 Tickner. “Engendered Insecurities” p4-5.
shaped and defined characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity” which vary across time and place.133 Central to this characterization is an understanding that historically and cross culturally, gender differences have denoted an unequal and hierarchical relationship between women and men. Through these constructed gender differences notions of power emerge which play a vital role in the creation of social inequalities that have consumed history. Joan Scott explains how relationships of power are understood through ‘normative concepts’ of gendered constructs: in western culture these ideas materialize as “fixed binary oppositions that categorically assert the meaning of masculine and feminine and hence legitimize a set of unequal social relationships”.134

The oppression of women has been perpetuated and propagated by the justification of binary distinctions that have bounded our discernment of gender differences in western culture. For example, masculinity has by and large been associated with characteristics such as ‘objective’, ‘reason’, ‘self’, and ‘public’ while the opposite characteristics are typically associated with femininity, those of ‘subjective’, ‘emotion’, ‘other’, and ‘private’ respectively. As Tickner reveals, these constructed dichotomies have had the result of sustaining attitudes which equate maleness and femaleness with disparate and often opposing attributes: “Socially constructed gender differences are based on socially sanctioned, unequal relationships between men and women that reinforce compliance with men’s stated superiority.”135

It is important to acknowledge that the culturally dominant stereotypes associated with masculinity do not describe most men, just as the assumptions tied to notions of femininity often don’t correspond to the female sex. However, this constructed ideal or ‘hegemonic masculinity’ expounded through its distinction from femininity “sustains patriarchal authority” argues Tickner “and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order”. This analysis reveals another pertinent reality which I mentioned in Chapter 1: there is a direct and enduring connection between theory and practice, that is, the privileging of masculinity that exists in the discipline plays out in political and social structures. This privileging of masculine characteristics, says Scott, must be challenged: “We must analyze the way these binary oppositions operate in different contexts and, rather than accepting them as fixed, seek to displace their hierarchical construction”. Understanding these dichotomies is particularly pertinent to the field of IR. Mainstream IR theory and international politics has always been gendered in that they exclude women’s experiences and privilege the issues and spheres which emerge from men’s roles in the public, political domain. “The construction of hierarchical binary oppositions”, argues Tickner “has been central to theorizing about international relations”: historically relegated to the private and irrelevant sphere, women’s voices have been typically viewed as disconnected from and inconsequential to the field. This realization becomes increasingly perturbing when we uncover the almost complete lack of acknowledgement regarding these gender hierarchies within the discipline of IR. In fact, says Tickner “We seldom realize we think in these terms, however; in

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137 Ibid., p8.
138 Ibid., p19.
most fields of knowledge we have become accustomed to equating what is human with what is masculine\textsuperscript{139}.

Tickner cites the reason that the field of IR is now only beginning to be scrutinized from feminist perspectives analyzing gender is because the field is “so thoroughly masculinized that the workings of these hierarchical gender relations are hidden”\textsuperscript{140}. I hope to uncover in the following analyses the ways in which the mainstream theories and the traditional discipline of IR have been socially constructed to privilege notions of masculinity. Gender hierarchies are embedded deeply within its history and throughout even more recent developments within the field. It is only by uncovering these systemic biases and systems of domination that we can begin to challenge them and progress towards a transformation of the discipline and increase security for women and men across the globe.

What started as a practice of placing a lower value on the female role in politics became a means of excluding - intentionally or by tradition - many of the alternative perspectives of human values and behaviour. The female gender role was not considered as a basis for analyzing international relations\textsuperscript{141}.

The development of the discipline of IR has played a central and significant role in cementing the gender dichotomies that privilege the experiences of men. In her article “Security and Sovereign States”, V. Spike Peterson offers an effective and informative historical overview of gender dynamics in state formation and the resulting impediments to theorizing the international polity. Peterson begins with the early formation of the state and the Athenian polis; although patriarchal traditions and

\textsuperscript{139} Tickner. “Engendered Insecurities”, p6.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, p8.
\textsuperscript{141} Grant, “The Quagmire”, p87.
customs existed prior, state formation allowed for the institutionalization of
differential power relations which privilege masculinity: “The exploitation of women
as a ‘sex/gender class’ is here backed by the coercive power of the state, and the
reproduction of gender hierarchies is ensured through a reconfiguration of
legitimating ideologies”.142 The transition from independent kin-based communities
to the early formation of centralized and organized states corresponded with a shift
away from indistinguishable zones of production and towards a separation of the
private and public. In kin-based societies, there is no distinction between ‘domestic’
or ‘economic’ spheres: claims to authority and property are multiple and varied. With
the “institutionalization of centralized authority” however, the public/political sphere
became differentiated from the domestic sphere of the private household within
which women were rendered more vulnerable and dependent. A woman’s identity
became synonymous with reproduction in this new “household sphere” and sexuality
became regulated by the state as women were transformed from equal claimants of
property to property themselves. Peterson equates this transition with devastating
consequences for women that then become “naturalized” and embedded in early
states prior to modern state formation, generally the analytical starting point for IR
scholars.143

Exploring the Athenian polis, states Peterson, is crucial in order to obtain an
accurate context of Athenian texts which continue to have significant influence on
scholars today. Athenian texts were monumental in reformulating individual and

Seriously?”, in Gendered States: Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory, ed. V. Spike
Peterson. © Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., p.32.
143 Ibid., p33-35.
collective identities, establishing a centralization of authority, fastening and sustaining coercive power, solidifying constructions of the private/public dichotomy, politics, and security, and above all institutionalizing the "legitimation of structural violence".  

The Athenian polis exemplifies the gendered pattern of state making: altered property and authority relations (women losing prior claims to property on their own behalf, becoming merely transmitters of property and lifelong dependents); fragmentation of kin-corporate subsistence/domestic re/production units (formation of the oikos/household as basic socioeconomic unit. Distinct from "sphere" of collective decision making; gender and class divisions of labor); institutionalized militarism (celebrating a reconfigured "masculinity"); and transformed ideologies (elaborating and privileging masculinist cosmologies and world views that subordinate that which is marked feminine).

As citizenship began to become codified and property relations regulated, women were excluded and consigned to the private sphere of the household under the authority and domination of a husband, brother, or male guardian. The tremendous effects of barring women from the public realm are visible when we account for Aristotle's equation of political action with the 'highest good'. Women were defined wholly by their "essential function" of reproduction and their capacity for rational thought was considered "underdeveloped and inferior in comparison with those of men." The ruling of the irrational 'soul' over the rational element of reproduction was, according to Aristotle, biologically determined and natural:

The male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principal, of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men

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144 Ibid., p33.  
145 Peterson, "Security", p35  
and animals..., the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is
better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under
the rule of a master.\textsuperscript{47}

In fact, even in the essential act of reproduction women were considered inferior as it
was the male who contributed the soul to the foetus; women simply provided the
physical womb. As women were not allowed to be citizens under this rubric, only
men participated in the 'public realm of politics' and only men could seek and
achieve the highest good; the necessary but inferior sphere of nature and reproduction
was prohibited from 'contaminating' this higher order. Thus, "a 'radical bifurcation'
of asymmetrical public and private spheres was the result"; a partition which
extended into ways of being and knowing.\textsuperscript{148}

Peterson continues to problematize the state as she moves to an analysis of
modern European centralization processes and state making, generally a reproduction
of the patterns looked at with regards to the Athenian polis. Vital to her analysis is an
understanding of the development of science, the rise of capitalism, and legitimization
processes via states 'enhanced infrastructural power'. This legitimization is a crucial
factor in the maintenance of state power through indirect violence; via ideological
control, the state becomes ultimately empowered: "...the location of power and
domination is mystified, systemic domination and its insecurities are obfuscated, the
contradictions of, for example, national security are masked, and possibilities of
resistance are profoundly altered."\textsuperscript{149} Power relations and the exclusive right to
enforce these relations are constituted and maintained by state formations. Thus, the
state becomes strategic in that it defines what legitimate violence is and is not, it is

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p22.
\textsuperscript{148} Peterson, "Security", p36-37.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p38.
the "centralized 'main organizer' of gendered power", and by way of policy
formation, education, law, and cultural forms it "institutionalizes and reproduces the
legitimation of social hierarchy".¹⁵⁰ This process was aided and abetted by the rise of
scientific reasoning which imbedded the identification of man with reason and its
supremacy over and exclusion of nature and thus women: "Man positioned himself"
explains Peterson, "in 'the world' as 'knower' and agent/subject, categorically
separated from woman as 'known' and object. This process effectively 'naturalized'
again the subordination of 'woman' as well as of 'nature'."¹⁵¹

The rise of the modern state can be equated with a "legitimation crisis"
occurring as a result of changing relations of power, ownership, and authority. It is
this transition to "absolute private property" and "public authority" Peterson argues,
within which the context of political theorising occurred. Locke's work must be
defined as "liberal patriarchalism": "Locke retains and "naturalizes" patriarchal
relations within the (now private) "family; he places limits on the absolutist rule of
fathers and husbands while reinforcing the rule of male over female as natural".¹⁵²
Not only did this reinforce the constructed division of politics and 'rationality' from
the private/household sphere, it naturalized the family rendering it separate from
history and politics and unable to be contested. Therefore, in addition to women being
excluded from politics, all 'natural'/household activities associated with this sphere
are excluded not only from the public realm of politics but also from a forum of
exploration and inquiry. This, she argues, effectively concealed the power relations
now embedded in the private domain and cloaked the gendered hierarchies in both

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p39.
¹⁵² Ibid., p41.
realms. Thus, Locke’s work can be viewed as contributing to the “erasure of actual history”\textsuperscript{153} The industrialization process entrenched even further unequal gender relations as productive labour became differentiated from the household and the economy was identified as a separate and masculine sphere. “The structural and ideological separation of “family, “economy”, and “politics””, explains Peterson “was clearly a gender-differentiated process with far-reaching consequences”.\textsuperscript{154} ‘Men’s work’ was differentiated from ‘women’s work’ which was deemed necessary, natural, and devalued. This separation resulted in a re-constitution of gendered dichotomies associating women and femininity with “care-taking, affective, responsible homemaker” characteristics, and man/masculinity with the image of “hard-working, responsible employee whose alienation at work was compensated by leisure at home”.\textsuperscript{155} By means of law, public policy, and influence over various social groups, the state then becomes inextricably linked to the manifestations of gendered hierarchies as it becomes the primary enforcer and authority of patriarchy.

Focusing on the authority of the state and the gendered constructs transmitted through it is crucial to our understanding of the gendered nature of international politics and IR theory. This is primarily because, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the dominant paradigm in IR which continues to influence the field today builds upon the state as its basic unit of analysis; a starting point from which traditional security analyses of sovereignty, war, and the military all hinge on.

As I have attempted to reveal, mainstream IR thought and traditional security studies are constructed out of the behaviour and lived experiences of men and are

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p41-42.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p43.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p43.
essentially defined in terms of “everything that is not female”. A privileging of masculinity has infused the gender power structures upon which rest realist assumptions and explanations: “International relations theories”, declares Tickner “privilege values associated with a socially constructed hegemonic masculinity”. The transfer of gender bias from Western political thought (including, as we’ve seen, in the construction of hierarchical gender identities as early as the creation of the Athenian polis), has been largely brushed aside to the periphery of scholarly debate and therefore has become embedded within the field effortlessly and unproblematically. This, argues Grant, has resulted in gender being cast as irrelevant to the field and through public/private distinctions “relegates women to a space outside politics”. Realist discourse has been constructed out of characteristics of rationality, public, power, and autonomy which have been positioned opposite from and valued above constructed images of femininity such as irrationality, private, and nature. In essence, “characteristics associated with femininity are considered a liability when dealing with the realities of international politics”. Moreover, the myths which inform realist assumptions have continued through neorealist critiques and national security discourse which infuse foreign policy-making: “No children are ever born, and nobody ever dies, in this constructed world. There are states, and they are what is.” Jean Bethke Elshtain offers a key critique to realism and this move to objective rationality, or what Blanchard describes as ‘hyperrationality’. The search

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157 Ibid., p131.
159 Tickner, “Man, the State, and War”, p41.
for scientific absolutionism had disastrous consequences for possibilities of gender analysis: "By reifying state behaviour, Elshtain argues, the realist narrative ignores human agency and identity".\textsuperscript{161}

Despite the variety of critics who question realism's tenets from a variety of fronts, questions of gender have been almost entirely disregarded. "Virtually no attention has been given to gender as a category of analysis"\textsuperscript{162}, argues Tickner, even though gender hierarchies are inextricably linked to systems of domination and violence and are inherently implicated within alternative perspectives normative scholars are investigating. Halliday suggests that the discipline has separated gender and international relations into two different spheres, and the result is a misinformed belief that IR is not affected by issues regarding women and vice versa:

To put it in simplistic terms, the assumption is that one can study the course of relations between states without reference to questions of gender. On the other hand, by neglecting the dimension of gender, international relations implicitly supports the thesis that international processes themselves are gender neutral; that is, that they have no effect on the position and role of women in society, and on the relative placement of women and men.\textsuperscript{163}

The reality, however, is that constructed gender hierarchies play a critical role in the evolution of the field, contemporary discourse, the role of women in society, and the security of women \textit{and} men.

Gender bias persists and goes unacknowledged in even the most modern of IR theory. Critical theorists and post-modernists, who dominate critiques of the state "repeat many of the habits of gender bias", says Grant largely because it is deeply ingrained in the classic texts and foundations of IR from which their revisions

\textsuperscript{161} Blanchard, “Gender”, p1293.
\textsuperscript{162} Tickner, “Engendered Insecurities”, p14.
\textsuperscript{163} Halliday, “Hidden from International Relations”, p158.
draw.\textsuperscript{164} Even Marxist analyses were built on the historical experiences men. In a particularly revealing essay "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: a Feminist Reformulation", Tickner reveals the exclusionary way of thinking pervasive in classic IR texts through a feminist reformulation of Morgenthau's principles of political realism which I introduced in Chapter 1. First, Tickner questions the supposed objectivity of "laws of human nature" by pointing out that in IR these laws have been built on masculine characteristics, views, and assumptions and therefore are partial. She calls for a dynamic objectivity to better represent the masculine and feminine elements of human nature. Tickner challenges the notion that interest is always defined in terms of power, and instead suggests that "national interest is multidimensional and contextually contingent" and in the contemporary zero sum solutions of strategic discourse are dangerously inadequate. The assumption of power as objective and universally valid is discarded: "Power as domination and control privileges masculinity and ignores the possibility of collective empowerment".\textsuperscript{165}

Tickner reveals a feminist rejection of the separation of moral command from political action and a search for common moralities (not universal moralities) that can assist in decreasing conflict and building cooperation. Finally, the so-called autonomy of the political sphere is exposed as a construct that "excludes the concerns and contributions of women".\textsuperscript{166} In sum, because Morgenthau's principles rest on assumptions of human nature that rely on the experiences of man and privilege masculinity, argues Tickner, they represent an incomplete and partial picture of

\textsuperscript{164} Grant, "Sources of Gender Bias", p19.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
international relations. This sort of critique denotes an essential step in moving forward by demonstrating the masculine bias embedded in classic texts from which contemporary theorists continue to draw from, and consequently, the gender bias that infuses IR theory and practice. Adding a feminist perspective, argues Tickner is an essential step in progressing towards “an un-gendered or human science of international politics which is sensitive to, but goes beyond, both masculine and feminine perspectives”.  

Although realist assumptions have been challenged on many fronts by numerous approaches, gender has rarely been included in these critiques. “Realism”, concludes Tickner “as well as the approaches of many of its critics, has constructed worldviews based on the behaviour of only half of humanity”.  

Traditional notions of security and formulations of the state as “protector of women” are particularly problematic. Likening the state to a “protection racket” in which harmful hierarchies are reproduced while masquerading as a means for security, Peterson argues that the state constructs women as “the objects of masculinist social control”. This is perpetuated by the state directly as well as through ideological constructs. In this masculinized sphere, “just who is being secured by security policies”? The security concerns of the state are unlikely to represent the concerns of its population or benefit its citizens. “Women”, argue Hoogensen and Rottem are predominantly “the most insecure, disadvantaged and marginalized” and their security needs and lived experiences are distinct from those of men. In fact, it is largely women’s

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167 Ibid., p36-37.
169 Blanchard, “Gender”, p1297.
170 Ibid., p1290.
marginalization under the normalization of gendered power structures of patriarchy that has rendered women insecure. The construction of identity, these authors argue, have been controlled by constructions of patriarchy which assure the invisibility of gender in this identity equation. The result: “Patriarchy creates the Universal Man upon whom we develop our assumptions about security”.\textsuperscript{171} Without exposing and challenging the state and the unequal gender relations it is founded upon we will only fail in our attempts to understand contemporary challenges to the security of men and women.

“Gender and gender research have not been adequately engaged by the security studies literature.”\textsuperscript{172} Security studies, including the traditional spheres and for the most part more contemporary schools of thought which have broadened the concept in many other means, have failed to adequately incorporate questions of gender into the discipline. Critical security discourse, argues Blanchard has “invoked, but not engaged” feminist scholarship and gender analysis, and “even approaches that imagined societal sectors of security have yet to take gender seriously”.\textsuperscript{173} Although the broadening of the concept which has occurred after the end of the cold war is regarded positively by most contemporary feminists, even from within human security studies there is a critical void regarding gendered analysis. A re-evaluation of security politics undertaken in concert with a reformulation of IR must transcend the socially constructed barriers erected through gender hierarchies. By including women in the discourse of human security we broaden our knowledge base and enable the field to consider new avenues in resolving insecurities.

\textsuperscript{171} Hoogensen and Rottem, “Feminism and Security?”, p11.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p2.
\textsuperscript{173} Blanchard, “Gender, International Relations”, p1292.
Recognizing gender as a significant dimension of identity and security opens the door to non-state-based views of security and aptly illustrates how identity shapes individual and collective security needs. Gender analyses reveal the structures that neutralize identity through assumptions of the Universal Man. Removing these structural dimensions allow us to hear and respond to the identities within.\textsuperscript{174}

Security for women, to use the words of Christine Sylvester, "is always partial....elusive and mundane"\textsuperscript{175}, and is a continual process or struggle in which "women must act as agents in the provision of their own security".\textsuperscript{176} A complete understanding of individual security must incorporate an understanding of the importance of social relations and an analysis of the gendered hierarchies that are implicated in constructs of the state, wars, and the military.

Any attempt to move forward and reformulate the discipline must not only reveal the gender constructs imbedded in the field and challenge the unequal social relations that negatively affect the security of the individual and the state, it must also attempt to understand why engagements between feminists and other IR theorist have more often then not not failed. Why the perpetual misunderstandings?

One of the biggest barriers to reformulating the discipline is the inability or refusal of mainstream scholarship to engage with feminism and gender bias; what Hoogensen and Rottem call the "so what" obstruction.\textsuperscript{177} Grant proposes several key constraints in the traditions of IR which have prohibited feminists' perspectives from establishing a stronghold within the field. First of all, early formulation of IR theory drew upon the more abundant areas of political theory, history, law and philosophy,

\textsuperscript{174} Hoogensen and Rottem, \textit{Feminism and Security}? p2.
\textsuperscript{176} Tickner, "You Just Don't Understand", p624.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., p13.
all of which were significantly encumbered by gender bias. As we explored in our discussion of early state formation and the Athenian polis, a separation of public/private spheres was embedded early on, having the immeasurable consequence of excluding women from political action: "Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Hegel, and others consciously assigned the citizen's role to the male".\textsuperscript{178} The result of failing to problematize the gender bias adopted from Western political thought, explains Eric M. Blanchard, author of "Gender, International Relations, and Feminist Security Theory", was that the issue of gender in general became irrelevant within the field.\textsuperscript{179} For example, Blanshard looks to Grant's analysis of Hobbes and Rousseau to reveal how IR completely ignores gender relations and thus fails to acknowledge any bias as problematic: an IR rendering of Hobbes' transition from the brutish man in state of nature to society lacks any reference to gender relations and how it affects or is affected by this transition.; an analysis of Rousseau's famous stag hunt, a prominent reference for security dilemmas, "ignores the familial relations that control the hunter's defection from the hunting circle".\textsuperscript{180}

The emphasis on war and security, although crucial for aiding the differentiation of IR from other fields, was a principal factor contributing to the exclusion of women from the field and a privileging of masculinity. Emerging out of the public/private dichotomy in which only men could participate in the political and fight in wars, women and feminist enquiry were barricaded from entry into this domain early on. Attempting to understand why actors in society behaved in certain ways and attempting to recognize certain patterns in order to predict the actions of say

\textsuperscript{178} Grant, "The Quagmire", p86-87.  
\textsuperscript{179} Blanchard, "Gender", p1293.  
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
actors were theoretical considerations that equated political actors with men. "It was easy", claims Grant “to retain the male gender archetype proffered by political theory".\textsuperscript{181} Probably the most significant factor which contributed to the gender bias within the field, however, was its inability to discern and grapple with the binary oppositions facilitated by the use of gender roles as a basis for distinguishing between the public/private dichotomy. On the whole, a comprehension of the social relations and gendered hierarchies embedded within the state and which supported the international role of the state was neglected. This becomes extremely significant considering the separate moralities associated with the private, domestic figure and the public citizen to whom violence was deemed necessary. The social roles fabricated from gender, argues Grant, are complicit in these tenets: “Early international relations theory was ready to be analytical and prescriptive about politics among nations, but was not ready to explore the common basis for sanctioning war”.\textsuperscript{182}

However, argues Grant, it is insufficient to argue that the pre-existing intellectual traditions adopted by IR, the fields’ fixation on war and the national security of states, and the disregard for private/public constructions offers a complete picture of the absence of gendered analysis within the development of and contemporary theorizing within the field. Rather than simply “swallow and perpetuate a tradition of gender bias that they had learned from political theory and history” she declares, the discipline outright ignored and deemed irrelevant the feminist movements of the twentieth century: “They were not seen as part of a wider social

\textsuperscript{181} Grant, “The Quagmire”, p85.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p85.
and cultural fabric that might be influencing the international system”.

Although this dearth has been defended by some through claims that there was in fact no feminist analysis to consider in the early twentieth century, Grant counters this argument by providing evidence that in fact feminism and IR are ‘contemporaries’:

“They grew up together and were stimulated by some of the same events”.

The International Congress of Women and women’s voices and experiences in war and the peace movements, for example, were ignored by state-relations scholars and dismissed as irrelevant by the male agenda. So called ‘feminine’ characteristics were even labeled as “dangerous qualities in international affairs”.

Above all, even with the emergence of critical theory and ‘reflective’ work in the discipline, most theorists failed to include an analysis of women’s relationship with the state, the history of gender hierarchies within the field, or even a consideration of the relevance of constructed gender dichotomies. Essentially, declares Grant “the legacy of gender bias has gone largely undisturbed within international relations theory”.

J. Ann Tickner attempts to uncover the underlying reasons behind unsatisfactory engagements between scholars of both disciplines in her article “You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists”. By exploring the misunderstandings which occur both by feminists and IR scholars and exploring the theoretical divides, we can begin to move beyond the silence and miscommunication which prevents constructive engagement. Tickner chooses to focus on the comments and questions often presented by methodologically

183 Ibid., p84.
184 Ibid., p86.
185 Ibid., p87.
186 Grant, “The Quagmire”, p87.
conventional IR scholars (where the misunderstandings generally occur), recognizing that although there are distinct differences between the various approaches, "none of them has used gender as a category of analysis". First, Tickner cites a simple lack of understanding and perceived irrelevance to explain the continued refutation of feminism by the discipline. Second, the ontologies and epistemologies that contemporary feminist thought are built on differ significantly and at the most basic level from those of mainstream IR theory: "Since they grow out of ontology's that take individuals or groups embedded in and changed by social relations, such relationally defined feminist approaches do not fit comfortably within conventional levels of analysis theorizing or the state-centric and structural approaches which grow out of such theorizing". Third, declares Tickner, feminist theory and IR theory are informed by different normative concerns, and in IR the normative theories that have been established are built upon "literatures that have often diminished or excluded women". Finally, it is imperative not to forget the hierarchical power differentials infused within the debates between these disciplines:

Inequalities in power between mainstream and feminist IR allow for greater ignorance of feminist approaches on the part of the mainstream than is possible for feminists with respect to conventional IR, if they are to be accorded any legitimacy within the profession. Because of this power differential, feminists are suspicious of cooptation or attempts to label certain of their approaches as more compatible than others.

By delving deeper into contemporary notions of security and looking back on the development of the field through a gendered lens we will be able to achieve a

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188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid., p629.
191 Tickner, "You Just Don't Understand", p629.
greater understanding of the connections between women, gender, and international politics: “Reframing traditional constructs – states, sovereignty, political identity, security – through feminist lenses,” argues Peterson, is a preliminary and crucial step in revealing gendered constructs which emanate from the foundations of the discipline and the consequent implications of that gendering.192

It is time for feminist perspectives to permeate the boundaries and be transcended from the margins to the forefront of security agendas. Cynthia Enloe proclaims that it is through these analyses of constructed gender biases embedded within the discipline that feminists can begin to engage with mainstream IR and security scholars: “If we can expose their dependence on feminizing women, we can show that this world system is also dependent on artificial notions of masculinity: this seemingly overwhelming world system may be more fragile and open to radical change than we have been led to imagine”.193

Martin Wight believed, as Michael Howard put it, that international politics dealt with “the very fundamentals of life and death: with the beliefs, the habit structures which shape moral communities and for which it is considered appropriate to die – and worse, to kill. The implications of social roles based on gender are certainly part of that set of fundamental ideas.”194

The acceptance and serious consideration of new perspectives can lead to the consideration of new and alternative courses of action.195 The gender bias that permeates politics and international relations has had significant and unfortunate consequences: “The cost”, says Grant “has been a discipline unequipped to

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194 Grant, “The Quagmire”, p85.
comprehend the full range of causes that lie behind international events”.\textsuperscript{196} However, simply “adding” women to conventional theory and “implanting” women in foreign policy positions is far from adequate; what is required is a complete reformulation of the discipline, and according to Halliday, the greatest source of resistance will be a reluctance to accept this reorientation.\textsuperscript{197}

In the process of constructing a feminist epistemology, however, we must be cautious not to assume a universal female alternative; the experiences of women are varied and different agendas will result in different bases of knowledge. Herein lies one of the profound differences between a radicalized feminist epistemology and a Western one: what a feminist perspective can and should attempt to do, explains Grant, is “identify gender bias, and provide criteria for a research agenda that leads toward a better understanding of aspects of human behavior that have been marginalized in theories of security”.\textsuperscript{198} It must not only challenge the gender bias that persists in constructions of the state and IR theory, but also call into question assumptions about security and the experiences of women. As we shall see, women in South Korea experience security and lack thereof in very different ways from women in Afghanistan, and women in both these countries have different experiences form those in the West. Identities even within these constructed categorizations must be explored. Finally, a feminist epistemology must define itself in relation to other agendas of security as it attempts to communicate effectively.\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{196} Grant, “The Quagmire”, p87. \\
\textsuperscript{197} Halliday, “Hidden from International Relations, p166. \\
\textsuperscript{198} Grant, “The Quagmire”, p95. \\
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., p96.
By privileging the characteristics and conceptions of masculinity we are denying ourselves vast amounts of knowledge and lived experiences; the contribution of women's voices to world politics and global security has limitless potential. Knowledge informs policy formation, and by relying on assumptions built in the sphere of men's experience, argues Tickner, the options available to states becomes bounded and limited. In face of contemporary “unknowns”, this is a restriction that we can't afford: “Theoretical perspectives that depend on a broader range of human experience are important for men and women alike, as we seek new ways of thinking about our contemporary dilemmas”.

Understanding current insecurities and the relationship between structural violence and individual identities is impossible without a gendered analysis; “Radically rethinking security” argues Peterson, entails challenging the meaning of the term with regards to systems of hierarchy that reproduce and are reproduced by unequal gender identities. Structural violence is central to individual insecurity and cannot be considered without attention to the implication of gender in systems of domination: “...the achievement of peace, economic justice, and ecological sustainability is inseparable from overcoming social relations of domination and subordination; genuine security requires not only the absence of war but also the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations.” And after all, as Enloe suggests, the world system has been built on artificial notions of masculinity - it can be rebuilt.

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202 Tickner, “Towards a Nongendered Perspective”, p128.
203 Enloe, Bananas, p17.
2.2 We have only come so far: Moving towards a radical race feminist theory of security

If feminism is to be different, it must acknowledge the ideological and problematic significance of its own past. Instead of creating yet another grand tradition or a cumulative history of emancipation, neither of which can deal with our present problems, we need to be attentive to how the past enters differently into the consciousness of other historical periods and is further subdivided by a host of other factors including gender, caste, and class.204

The term ‘barracks community’ has been invoked by feminist theorists to describe the dominant conception of politics in traditional Western political literature; that is, as a public space that is defined as disconnected from and in opposition to anyone outside the constructed boundaries who could potentially threaten the so-called security that exists within.205 This representation can be similarly applied to what Steans refers to as the “masculine hostility of the female ‘Other’”,206 and it is the resulting construction of gender and its relationship to power that underpin the disconnection between women and security. I would now like to take this same conception of politics and apply it to contemporary feminist critiques of and the proposed alternate visions of security.

It was while formulating my ideas for the case studies on South Korea and Afghanistan, which are presented in the following chapters, that I began to feel an unnerving sense of inadequacy. Something was amiss. What this was, I eventually

came to realize, was that I was coming precariously close to repeating the same
critical error that so many feminist theorists and human security scholars before me
had made in the past and continue to make today. For instance, as I studied the
troubled history of Afghanistan and the gender-specific roles women have played, I
couldn’t help but contemplate as to whether the recommendations I was about to
courage were “foreign imports”.

Uma Narayan, a self-proclaimed “third world feminist” coined this term in a
discussion on the common misconception that Third World feminist issues are merely
imitations born out of “westernized” political agendas that have been imposed on
Third-World Women by “Western” feminists. “Non-Western” feminists are not
simply mimicking the ideas of western feminism, nor would women in these specific
cultural contexts necessarily fail to see or understand these agendas, she explains. Her
analysis is revealing: it reminds us that Third-World women have been engaged with
feminist issues, initiated feminist agendas, and enabled social change from within
their own cultural context. That “Indian feminism” for example, or in this case,
Afghani feminism or South Korean feminism, “is clearly a response to issues
specifically confronting many Indian women”.207 This reality is often overlooked not
only by Western feminists but also by Third World Women who criticize agendas
that have purportedly emerged out of, in the words of Katzenstein, a “Western,
bourgeois, modernist perspective”208. That these women have agency and are not
victims who must be “saved”, must be addressed.

207 Narayan, Uma. Disclocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism, New
208 Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod. “Organising Against Violence: Strategies of the Indian Feminist
Although, as Narayan explains, Third World feminist “issues” are hardly foreign imports, attempts to address those issues often are. I am not suggesting that Third World feminist are not attempting to address these problems, or that these foreign imports are given unrestricted access and stamps of approval by the importing country. By borrowing the phrase for this analogy I am also not suggesting that the importing country made any kind of deal or agreement, or that there is a cultural acceptance of these imports. (Although in some situations this may very well be the case). What I mean is that the majority of feminist theorizations that attempt to tackle Third World feminist issues and that then inform international policy-making originate in Westernized developed nations. (This is largely because policy-makers confer predominantly and almost exclusively with research organizations and individuals in the West.) The result is that these issues are often misrepresented and the proposed solutions are thus often inadequate. Despite the engagement of Third World Women with some of these same feminist issues, as well as others, despite their own often conflicting feminist agendas, and despite the social change these individuals and groups have already enabled, First World feminists and International agendas often practice and analyze within their own spheres that ironically enough, rarely include the very same women they are attempting to support. Logically then, I can’t help but be otherwise skeptical: Is the new human security agenda, or even, what I would identify as the feminist theorizations of security continuing to operate in a first world perspective, offering “foreign imported” solutions and strategies and if so, what are the repercussions?
In the words of Caren Kaplan, "Western feminists have conceptually refurbished rooms and staked out worlds in the name of women everywhere". The gains made by these feminists and the women's movement in general have undeniably been invaluable in what will continue to be a laborious process of chipping away at the existing gender hierarchies that oppress women in every aspect of their lives. Are these gains, however, confined to Western populations whose democratic political processes and judicial systems can incorporate changes into laws and have the means to enforce these laws? Have all women in these states been able to benefit equally from these gains or is there existing class, social, and racial barriers? What has been the effect of the feminist movement on women outside of these areas? How has feminist scholarship dealt with these women?

The questions I am raising and the following criticisms I am presenting here are not new or unheard of in feminist debate, however, they are entirely absent from security discourse and feminist critiques of security. In the context of the human security agenda, it is imperative that we analyze or in the very least consider the parameters that bound our knowledge — for instance, who is producing this knowledge and what are their methods for acquiring knowledge — and influence Western 'securitisations' of women in the Third World. As Western feminists continue to increasingly explore issues that affect women in developing or Third World countries, misrepresentations of practices, beliefs, and entire cultures become seriously problematic. A feminist security theory that then has the ability to inform

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210 Narayan, Dislocating Cultures, p43.
security policy becomes particularly dangerous if it operates in a first world feminist perspective. By allowing such questions to shape our analysis we begin to dissolve boundaries that confine traditionally accepted ways of knowing as well as ways of asking questions. In the words of Mohanty, "Our very conceptual maps are redrawn and transformed".  

The method I will use to pursue such an analysis is to explore the diminutive but laudable collection of existing literature on Third World and post-colonial feminism and apply it to my existing critique of security studies. I want to emphasize here that I am not attempting to construct a novel theory — although I hope that my analyses unearth the potential benefits of such a project — but rather to illuminate the inadequacies that currently pervade feminist security critiques and the potential danger such oversights pose. Two of the scholars I will draw from are Uma Narayan and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, both of whom take slightly different approaches but each of whom contributes notably in their field by providing constructive problematizations of feminist scholarship that are pivotal to my analysis.

There are several terms and phrases used frequently in this literature that I utilize that require clarification and that, as you will see, simply in our attempt to define them generate and elucidate key points of my analysis. The widely used expressions "Third World" and "Third World women" have always been inherently problematic and need to be addressed, particularly the conception of a singular "Third World". In the most general sense the expression has commonly come to represent the regions or countries of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the

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211 Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes, p3.
Caribbean, which shared a similar differentiation from the rest of the world. As Waylen explains, "Directly or indirectly they suffered the after-effects of colonization and they came late and on disadvantageous terms into the competitive world economy."

The enormous differences and variety between and within these regions, however, are not explicitly accounted for in this phrase, nor are the continuing developments (for example, what the World Bank has identified as an emerging "Fourth World" or the Newly Industrializing Countries comprised mostly of oil-rich states) that challenge the utility of such a conception. The increasing proliferation of Third and Fourth World people into Western nations has further dislocated such terminology from reality: Mohanty proposes the use of more accurate categorizations of "North/South" or "One-Third/Two-Third Worlds" which distance the terms from illusory geographical and ideological classifications. There is political value in the metaphorical formulation of North as "the pathways of transnational capital" (privileged realms) and of the South as "the marginalized poor" (economically and politically), irrespective of geographical boundaries. Similarly, One-Third/Two-Third is a more accurate categorization based on social minorities and majorities and thus, "it incorporates an analysis of power and agency that is crucial." Despite this, as Mohanty acknowledges, the colonial history that is so central to this analysis is not as punctuated in this new language as in the terms Western/Third World, or First World/Third World. For this reason, and simply as a matter of retaining clearly

\[213\] Ibid.
\[215\] Ibid., p.227.
understood terminology, I will be relying on the familiar language. The common predicament shared by these regions proves useful, as they did for Waylen and many other authors before me, as a way to categorize the subjects of my analysis while simultaneously acknowledging the important differences within this conception.216

Defining “Third World women” and “Third World feminisms” then is just as problematic. Images of, for example, the Philippina domestic worker, the sex worker in Thailand, or the young Indian sweatshop worker often correspond to the familiar locating of Third World women in a social category constructed by notions of poverty, underdevelopment, overpopulation, stifling cultural traditions, and undemocratic legal systems. There is a problem with relying on such definitional analyses based on so-called “objective” indicators, explains Mohanty: “Besides being normed on a white, Western (read progressive/modern)/non-Western (read backward/traditional) hierarchy, these analyses freeze third world women in time, space, and history.”217 This does not suggest the futility in using this classification (as we have already noted, there is an advantage in using a recognizable phrase that creates an analytical ease), but rather indicates a need to recognize the historical specificities of Third World women and the constantly shifting dynamics of their struggles and the feminisms that emerge in response to those struggles.218 Mohanty proposes several questions of definition in attempt to understand the shifting conceptual cartographies that we must be aware of in analyses of women, feminism, and the Third World:

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216 Ibid.
Who/what is the third world? Do third world women make up any kind of constituency? On what basis? Can we assume that third world women’s political struggles are necessarily “feminist”? How do we/they define feminism?219

Questions of context, such as considerations of the politics of production of knowledge, and who the producers of this knowledge are remain particularly important for our purposes here and we will be looking at this question deeper in the text that follows. Again, while it is impossible to represent all experiences, all varieties of struggles, and the “internally conflictual histories of third world women’s feminisms”220, such crude generalizations are useful to explore the connections of Third World women’s histories against a multitude of struggles. Mohanty proposes a useful way of conceptualizing such an analytical/political category through an “imagined community” of third world oppositional struggles”.221 This idea suggests the formation of unions or bonds that cross territorial, cultural, and otherwise external boundaries and facilitate a “horizontal comradeship” built on political struggles. That is, rather than defining Third World women in terms of color, biology, or even culture, it is their “common context of struggle” that designates a common constituency, a “viable oppositional alliance”.222

The term feminism is in itself as equally contested in the Third World context as it is in the Western context. It is a “multi-layered, transformational, political practice and ethics”.223 In the beginning of the 20th century, the idea of feminism was

219 Mohanty, “Introduction”, p2-3
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid., p7.
already influencing women’s movements in the Third World, declares Jayawardena:
“Early feminism in the Third World was one of the important force for social change
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries...”224 Peruvian women for example, explains
Maritza Villavicencio, used the term ‘feminist’ to describe who they are and who they
aspire to be.225 However, in many Third World contexts, particularly post-colonial
Third World contexts, feminism is considered a western concept and therefore Third
World feminists are often faced with a negative label of “Westernizaton”, resulting in
a de-legitimization by their own culture.226 What counts as “Westernization” and
what is considered “inappropriately Western” is, as Narayan explains, a continually
changing, fluid labeling that varies from time, place, community, generation, and
even social group.

Although what constitutes “inappropriate Westernization” is dynamic and
debated across and within particular societies, the accusations are often similar: Third
World feminist voices have been blamed for destroying tradition and culture; they are
dismissed as existing “outside” the national or cultural context; by their perceived
acquaintance with Westernization, these voices are considered “as “alien,” as
“foreign,” as “representing the views of Others,” and therefore as betrayers of their
country and traitors to the values within.227 Narayan calls on feminists to combat this
dismissal, exploiting such labeling as fearful resistance and anxiety, revealing the
duplicitous nature of those in power who which to preserve those cultural aspects that
are in their favor but are quick to abandon those that don’t: “We need to point out that

it often is a rhetorical device, predicated on double standards and bad faith, used to
smear selectively only those changes, those breaks with tradition, that those with the
authority to define “tradition” deplore.” 228 However, rather than insist that Third
World feminists are always right, or superior, or that their cultural assumptions are
always correct, Narayan stresses the importance of an open dialogue, rather than
ignorant rejection stemming from doubts regarding the authenticity of those voices.

The schisms which define contemporary feminism have in fact had a similar
effect on feminist voices. The exclusivity that has emerged out of a categorical
fanaticism that stresses division has resulted in the near immobilization of the
movement. This is not to say that feminism should be constructed in simple unity,
requiring shared meanings, explanations, or even politics. It does suggest, however,
the liability of each segment (radical feminists, socialist, feminists, Marxist feminist,
lesbian separatists, and women of colour) maintaining its own distinct and intentional
separate identity: “Each for itself is the only worthwhile feminism; others are ignored
except to be criticized.”229 Thus, a paradox exists between attempting to unite women
under a plural “we” and the exclusionary emphasis on difference. (We will return to
the idea of difference in the following pages)

This reveals another reason the notion of an “imagined community” is useful
is because alliance is not determined by colour, sex, or even culture, but is instead
constructed out of our political relationships to certain struggles (“the political links
we choose to make among and between struggles”230), then these imagined

228 Ibid., p29.
229 Delmar, Rosalind. “What is Feminism?” Herman, Anne and Abigail Stewart, eds. Theorizing
communities are therefore open to participation and adherence by women of any race, class, sex, nationality, and age. I think this is particularly important and worth emphasizing. The following analysis which includes a critique of Western feminist scholarship of the Third World is built almost entirely on scholarship by authors who identify themselves as Third World women. Where does that leave scholars such as myself? As I immerse myself in Third World and post-colonial feminist literature, written by women whose location seems to justify their position, how can I then authenticate my own discourse as a white, middle class, Canadian woman? And, where does that leave Third World feminist voices? Despite my apparent location, does my voice still project from the center, relegating the Third World feminist voices outside the circuits of power? How, as Narayan considered above, are their articulations received by their own cultures? These questions indicate a need to explore the discourse of difference and location and the historicized power constructs that dismiss an essentialized “common world of women”. Mohanty proposes this question: “How does location...determine and produce experience and difference as analytical categories in feminist cross cultural work?”

The challenging location for me as a writer is exemplary of the problematic politics of location, a complex articulation of difference which questions and deconstructs the “privilege of whiteness”, as proposed by such scholars as Rich and Kaplan. The term “politics of location” first emerged in Adrienne Rich’s essays of the 1980’s which explored the hegemonic use of the word “woman” in a context of

racism, elitism, and classism. In essence, Rich exposed stratifications in the marginalization of women; while white, Western women have been made marginal by men, she explains, these same women are in fact marginalizing other women. She calls for the “feminist movement of social change” to de-Westernize itself, that is, for “a politics of location in which white, Western feminists explore the meaning of “whiteness,” “recognizing our location, having to name the ground round we’re coming from, the conditions we have taken for granted.”

The value in this recognition is visible in the explosion of a discourse of “difference” that called into question the feminist perception of a “global feminism” based on a solitary vision of woman. It is also in the critical dialogue that followed. Kaplan, for example, suggests that the practice of a politics of location presents a quandary in that it unintentionally places white women in the center as it calls on these women to recognize the problem of location mapping. In an attempt to deconstruct the “common world of women” scenario, she explains, Rich inadvertently homogenizes the location of white, Western feminists. Michele Wallace takes this critique one step further by suggesting that despite the supposed de-centering of location theories, the “representatives” of such discourses are rarely from the margins; rather, it is the “insiders” (i.e. Rich) who are the “gatekeepers”, defining the inside and thereby keeping others out.

The idea that one can inadvertently subvert Black or Third World feminist analysis at the same time one claims and attempts to be championing and tending to it

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is valuable in that reminds us to be conscious and critically aware of our own position and its possible centrality. Bell Hooks, one of the most notable black feminists, looked to the conception of location politics to expand her own work on traversing boundaries and embracing multiple locations, points of view, and discourses. In fact, Hooks was so instrumental to feminism in exposing its racist nature, and thus invaluable in our exploration of difference, that a discussion of her contribution is of the essence. In her 1982 groundbreaking piece “Ain’t I a Woman”, Hooks exposed a nasty reality that had for the most part been ignored by feminist scholarship and the feminist movement in general: every women’s movement in America has been built on a racist foundation.

White women’s rights advocates were not fighting for the equality of women, explains Hooks, they were fighting for the equality of white women with white men. And it wasn’t simply that these self proclaimed feminists were ignoring white racial imperialism and their oppression of black women; white feminists had a vested interesting maintaining the hierarchy and actively perpetuated racism.

Racism is visible as having been a dominant force in the women’s rights movement, in the women’s club movement, and in the work arena. When women suffragists began advocating for their enfranchisement, for example, it was largely in response to the possibility that black men might be given the right to vote. White women reformers expressed anger over the maintenance of sexual hierarchies over racial hierarchies: “They admonished white men”, explains Hooks “not for their

sexism but for their willingness to allow sexism to overshadow racial alliances".238 In fact, at a 1903 National American Woman's Suffrage Convention in New Orleans, one suffragist campaigned for the white woman's vote because, she claimed, it "would insure immediate and durable white supremacy".239

Racism was a defining force in reform clubs and groups; white women club members were adamant that black women be excluded, and what is interesting is that according to Hooks, anti-black sentiment was more potent and pervasive among white women than white men. Hooks considers several explanations for such effort and energy that was expended purely in attempt to maintain the racial hierarchy, some of which I will mention here. White women, as a result of the internalized belief of the inherent superiority of whites, felt it was wrong that black people, in this case black men, improve their status by the vote while the status of white women remained unchanged; that "inferior 'niggers' should be granted the vote while ‘superior’ white women remained disenfranchised."240 Plus, if the extreme brutality and oppression suffered by black were brought to the forefront, it was believed that that would divert attention from the white women's plight. There are also beliefs that white women feared and had contempt for black women because they considered them sexual competition, a not so irrational idea considering the history of "white male sexual lust for black females".241 In addition, there was an overall association of black women with immorality and impurity; white women feared being tainted by "morally impure

238 Hooks, "Racism and Feminism", p127.
239 Ibid.
240 Hooks, "Racism and Feminism", p127.
241 Ibid, p130.
creatures". In the working world, it was an issue of competition for job and type of labor. As women’s rights activists fought for equal opportunity, the black woman was viewed as a threat to security and often white women refuse to work alongside them forcing labor segregation and abdominal conditions for the black woman laborer.

What is particularly striking of the racism that was endemic in the women’s rights movement, and is especially notable for our purposes, is the form that it took in feminist texts. Self-proclaimed feminist writers readily ignored even the existence of black women or they referred to them using racist language: the feminist movement was a white feminist movement, and the literature produced by feminist writers, declares Hooks, revealed that “...they had been socialized to accept and perpetuate racist ideology.” Even more significant is the fact that many of these works are considered classic, distinguished feminist texts, celebrated for their contribution to the movement. Betty Friedman’s The Feminist Mystique is one such example: “White feminists who claimed to be politically astute”, exclaims Hooks, “showed themselves to be unconscious of the way their use of language suggested they did not recognize the existence of black women.”

The seamless way in which the white woman’s experience was portrayed as every woman’s experience, and the ease with which white women dismissed the existence of black women and made their own experience representative amidst rhetoric of “us”, “sisterhood”, and “alliance”, and the unremitting way that they regarded women unlike themselves as Others, all of this is indicative of contemporary challenges in the international security agenda and feminist theorizations of security.

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243 Ibid., p137.
244 Hooks, “Racism and Feminism”, p139.
Not only does it indicate the need to critically examine what we read, and to consider the location of the author, it also stipulates the need for us as individuals to examine the location of our own theorizing.

There are a couple of other points in Hooks’ article that are worth mentioning. First, one of the effects of this racial discrimination of black women is that it instigated feelings of contempt and caused them to see white women as enemies. There is a significant parallel here with Narayan’s analysis of the Third World’s reaction to feminist voices; after the colonial oppression that many of these countries experienced, it seems justifiable that the feminist voices, which appear as manifestations of renewed Western imperialism, are regarded as enemies. “One such significant effect of the dominant “representations” of Western feminism” explains Mohanty, “is its conflation with imperialism in the eyes of particular Third World Women.” Additionally, Hooks demonstrates the centrality of class in the women’s movement and that despite the ubiquitous class privilege among these white women and despite that this was a fact that was disregarded, the movement was unquestionably class bound and this compounded the oppression of black women. Class privilege, explains Hooks, and the potential paths that creates, is one more factor that enabled white women to combat the oppression they faced because of their gender. Again, there is a compelling correlation with contemporary feminism: Western scholars are generally more likely to be heard and more likely to be listened to as a result of their perceived superiority over Third World scholars. Thus, while many writers, researchers, and policy-makers may in fact have the best intentions

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246 Hooks, “Racism and Feminism”, p139.
with regards to enabling the security of women in these regions, many do not. And those that are well intentioned may not be the best or most accurately informed. The reality is, however, that all of this rarely makes a difference because it is these scholars that are in the position to be heard; they possess the status, the connections, and the assumed authority. So once again, where does this leave third world women’s voices?

If we now return momentarily to Rich’s politics of location which, as we established above, “deconstructed hegemonic uses of the word “woman” within a context of U.S racism and elite or academic feminist practices”\(^{247}\), the “global sisterhood of women” appears to have metamorphosed into a form of “feminist cultural imperialism”\(^{248}\).

This brief look into the politics of location is significant because it reveals the importance of acknowledging difference while simultaneously indicating its problematic nature. “In an effort to deconstruct hegemonic, global universals, quite often theorists of “difference” have reinstituted hegemonies”.\(^{249}\) This is particularly what I, and feminist security thinkers must be wary about.

We need to move away from a picture of national and cultural contexts as sealed rooms, impervious to change, with a homogenous space “inside” them, inhabited by “authentic insiders” who all share a uniform and consistent account of their institutions and values. Third-World national and cultural contexts are as pervaded by plurality, dissension, and change, as are their “Western” counterparts. Both are often replete with unreflective and self-congratulatory views of their “culture” and “values” that disempower and marginalize the interests and concerns of many.

\(^{248}\) Ibid., p137.
\(^{249}\) Ibid., p148.
members of the national community, including women. \textsuperscript{250}

The challenge then for contemporary feminists and critical thinkers in IR and security is to confront and dissect traditional and assumed ways of knowing that portray the image of a global, transnational feminist movement while simultaneously dismissing Third World (or non-white, non-Western) women and feminisms as inconsequential and denying them equal standing. Situating gender above other forms of discrimination silences and renders invisible destructive power relations among women. This propagates a "de facto hegemonic identity that is white, heterosexual, and North American/western European". \textsuperscript{251} This also deciphers what is portrayed as an acknowledgement of difference as what in reality is pluralism, which Arblaster defines as "tolerance of, not acceptance of or, more important, engagement with difference". \textsuperscript{252} That is, pluralist logic recognizes and acknowledges the existence of multiple life-worlds but does not engage with or care for the differences within; this invariably results in a "hegemonic self-involvement" that maintains the center/periphery dichotomy, perpetuates the oppression and objectification of Third World women, and obliterates any potential progressions in combating gender hierarchies which endanger the security of women.

Narayan calls on us to acknowledge not only problems of \textit{exclusion} and marginalization that we have explored above, but also the problematic nature of \textit{inclusion}. It is not only by rendering invisible the modes of marginalization such as

\textsuperscript{250} Narayan, \textit{Dislocating Cultures}, p33.  
race and class of Third World or coloured women that inadequate feminist theories are formulated. It is also the manner in which women are included in theses theories that endanger feminist analysis. Narayan alludes specifically to what she defines as a Western misrepresentation of "Third-World women’s issues" to illustrate the common distorted understandings of Third World women, issues, cultures, and communities.\(^{253}\)

In a critical assessment of Mary Daly’s analysis on “Indian Suttee”, Narayan discusses how in her attempt to criticize the practice of sati and the “patriarchal scholarship” on sati, Daly inadvertently fails to historically contextualize the practice producing a sort of “erasing of history”.\(^{254}\) This constitutes a colonialist misrepresentation common in Western analyses that present Third World countries as “places without history”, and the women as victims of “unchanging traditions”. Not only does she elicit a skewed temporal frame, she also links the practice to all other problems that affect “Indian women”, past and present, without distinguishing the particular historical or geographical context in which they occurred. Contextual features such as religion and class are ignored thus implying that sati is prevalent across all castes, in every region, and by all communities, despite its limitations in reality. The result is a totalizing colonialist portrayal: “Daly’s representation of sati replicates a “colonialist stance” because it reproduces a Western tendency to portray Third-World contexts as dominated by the grip of “traditional practices” that insulate these contexts from the effects of historical change.”\(^{255}\)

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\(^{253}\) Narayan, *Dislocating Cultures*, p44-45.

\(^{254}\) Ibid., p46-47.

\(^{255}\) Narayan, *Dislocating Cultures*, p48-49.
These problems of misrepresentation are not atypical; in fact it is the ubiquitous nature of such analyses in other Western feminist representations, in Third World feminist representations of their own culture, and even by Third World women in the West that substantiates the importance of this discussion. The commonality however, is in the sharp contrast between how Western women and how Third World women are represented. For example, while there is now a great deal of caution practiced with regards to generalizing the "American woman" (largely as a result of scholarship by such authors as Hooks above), this same caution is rarely exercised with regards to the Third World woman. Also, issues in Third World communities are often hastily indicted as symptomatic of "Third World Culture" or "Third World Traditions"; that is, argues Narayan, problems are the "results of an imagined and unitary complex called "their Traditions/Religions/Cultures". This construction victimizes Third World women and often results in the discounting of particular issues because they are considered the result of Traditions/Religions/Cultures; or, what Lazreg refers to as a routine practice in Western literature that, for example, "appeals to religions as the cause of gender inequality". Finally, such representations rarely indicate the existence of any opposition to or history of contention around issues such as sati from within the Third World context. Thus by presenting such problematic issues as historically uncontested from within their own culture, Western feminists are degenerating Third World culture while simultaneously

256 Ibid., p50.
justifying its colonization and the oppression of its people. Mohanty exposes this in her analysis of feminist scholarship:

...the feminist writings I analyze here discursively colonize the material and historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the Third World, thereby producing/representing a composite, singular “Third World woman” – an image that appears arbitrarily constructed but nevertheless carries with it the authorizing signature of Western humanist discourse.

These assumptions are inexorably hazardous in a world that is dominated by Western scholarship, ideologies, and policies, and where this reality and its effects are not fully recognized and understood. This global hegemony of knowledge has critical implications for Western feminist scholarship that traverses beyond theory.

It is particularly vital that we discuss these problems of exclusion and inclusion not only because of the potential dangers they elicit in feminist theory, but because the relationship between theory and practice is so closely intertwined. That is, explains Narayan, they “not only generate inadequate feminist theories but also result in political agendas and public policies that fail to be adequately responsive to the interests of women from these marginalized groups.” Mohanty, in turn, argues that while Western feminist scholarship represents the production of knowledge, it is also a principally political practice; there is no “apolitical scholarship,” and the power of feminist scholarship as a mode of scholarly intervention, as a site for resistance, and as a foundation for political organizing is irrefutable. Herein lies

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260 Ibid., p21
261 Narayan, *Dislocating Cultures*, p44.
another example of the implications theoretical misrepresentations by Western feminists have in practice: the impediment it causes for the creation of “communities of resistance” or, as we mentioned above “imagined communities” based on political allegiance rather than race, class, or nationality. And, as Mohanty concurs, the formation of strategic coalitions across race, class, nationality, and even gender is an “urgent political necessity”.263

So where do we go from here? While scholars such as Hooks have made significant inroads with regards to the racist feminist theorizing and colonizing scholarship that dominated just a few decades ago, a hegemonic problematic persists that legitimates the centrality and superiority of the West. The production of knowledge is embedded in the multiple power structures that layer this marginalization of “non-Western” ideas, communities, politics, and identities over the marginalization of women. Regrettably, this has resulted in a feminist discourse that presents Third World women as “a homogenous, undifferentiated group leading truncated lives, victimized by the combined weight of their traditions, cultures, and beliefs, and “our” (Eurocentric) history.”264 The inevitable connection between theory and practice begets a dangerous reality when the ethnocentrism that inadvertently silences or fragments Third World women’s voices is examined in the context of a security and a human security agenda.

Zillah Eisenstein argues that western democratic theory has successfully appropriated all knowledge and experience in a manner that situates the West as the “home” of knowing and at the top of self-constructed hierarchies. Democracy, for

263 Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders, p18.
264 Ibid., p192.
example, is only regarded as legitimate when it takes the form of western individualism. “This power of naming”, explains Eisenstein “affects all viewing and seeing.” 265 Feminism exists exclusively in a Western democratic context – erasing the fact that women have fought for their freedom and challenged patriarchy “always, and everywhere.” 266 The challenge then resides not only in our ability to not only acknowledge the destructive hierarchies that persist between genders and within genders, but to engage with the economic, political, and cultural factors that are historically determined and implicit in our constructions of knowledge. “Feminisms” double bind is that it cannot speak ‘for’ other women, nor can it speak ‘without’ or ‘apart from’ other women.” 267

At this point it is worth reviewing my core argument and driving motivation of this thesis before moving into the illustrative examples that follow. This chapter although laden with details and a profusion of, some unanswerable, questions, has accomplished two overall goals: First, it has explored the history of the individual’s absence in IR through a feminist lens. Invoking a feminist approach to the mainstream discipline reveals the gender bias that permeates Western political thought and which then becomes integrated in political institutions and structures. More importantly, however, it reveals how knowledge is constructed and legitimated through avenues of power that benefit from the maintenance of those knowledge bases and structures of domination.

266 Ibid.
This has led us directly to a second realization: systems of hierarchy have traditionally inundated the feminist arena, limiting its effectiveness and discrediting some of its own claims. By invoking feminisms engagement with race and culture we are able to see how much of feminisms history has been built on hierarchical notions of the individual. What are the implications of these insights on an analysis of security? Unmistakably they reveal the patriarchal nature of the world and the discipline of IR and thus the different nature of security (or insecurity) for women. They also reveal how knowledge systems are inherently subjective to underlying power relations and power structures that normalize certain insecurities for certain individuals. The difficulty, then, in bringing the individual to the forefront of the security agenda becomes increasingly revealed, particularly when the foundations of feminism itself is revealed as having been built upon stratified notions of power. If feminist critiques of security have failed to account for the most insecure women in the world, then challenge for the human security agenda in its attempt to account for the individual is much larger than anticipated and requires much more thought and action than is currently being undertaken. I will now move forward and apply a feminist human security analysis to contemporary situations in order to demonstrate the relevance of scholarly concepts explored above to international political practice.
Chapter 3

Before moving into an analysis of South Korea and Afghanistan, I want to stress that one of my primary goals in engaging with the following case studies is to reveal the importance in understanding the value of feminist epistemology and ontology and its ability to contribute alternate visions and solutions to problems of security. Feminist responses to IR have both reacted to and affected shifting ontologies (questioning the adequacy of realist ontology in face of changes in the world and offering alternate ontologies in order to change the world) and have created space for alternative epistemologies ("Asking what it means to know, who may know, where knowers are located, and what the differences among them mean for the knowledges that result"). The following case studies illustrate the significance of both sets of factors, although the foci in the South Korean and Afghanistan cases engage predominantly with feminist ontology and epistemology respectively.

What would a feminist human security analysis look like? As we saw in the beginning of Chapter 2, feminists and critical security scholars disagree with the ontology of realist thought which views the primary actor in the international system as the monolithic state and the problematic as one of war and peace which hinges on the maintenance of national security. The dominant institution which remains central to this goal is the military, and as a result, has been at the center of critical analyses. Human security proponents argue that the analytical foci of traditional security scholars are not adequate; war is only part of the equation. There is an enormous

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human, social and institutional dilemma that must be examined which extends beyond
the military, including for example schools, police, economic and business structures.
Feminist critiques have taken us one step farther by exploring the relationship
between gender and the state and gender and the military; For example, “Feminist
theorists”, argues Anuradha Chenoy “have convincingly established the linkages
between militarism, masculinism, and patriarchy”.

It is only through a feminist critical security analysis that such claims can be
made; traditional security studies do not look inside the state and does not allow for
methods that would uncover the realities of civil society, nor would it allow for an
exploration into the relationship between the military and society. Indeed, as I
proposed in the introduction to this thesis, it is only within this reflectivist space that
has been created by feminists and critical security thinkers that we can examine the
state from the inside and question the motivations of policy makers and the resulting
effect on the individual. Methodological and political divides are being challenged by
feminists analyzing traditional conceptions of war, the military, and security. As
Hyndman and Giles explain, “Feminists are at the forefront of forging ways of
traversing such methodological and political divides. They seek to develop new
understandings of the gendering not only of militarization but also of
demilitarization”.

3.1 Human security, militarism, and the cultural role of women: A
feminist perspective on South Korea

269 Chenoy, Anuradha M. “Militarization, Conflict, and Women in South Asia”, in The Women and
270 Giles and Hyndman, “Introduction”, p.17.
South Korea presents an excellent case study for the exploration between the state and its national security goals and feminist contentions. In South Korea, the dominance of traditional realist thinking appears manifest in the attempts by the state realist would argue that the militarization of society is a national security tactic which seeks to ultimately protect the state against outside military attacks and ensure its survival. There is, however, no such thing as a monolithic state as realism suggests. South Korea is an example of a regime using the state to maintain dominance. Because this regime relies on the military within which patriarchy is entrenched, gendered hierarchies are honed to a new level as institutions and civil society become used by the states to further the goals of the state. State infrastructure materializes that subordinate women and dominant modes of thinking which prevail in the military are translated into practice in society. Patriarchy, it appears, comes in handy to service realist/statist goals.

Security, it appears, may be a double-edged sword: the same institutions and objectives that are utilized to achieve or maintain the security of a people may result in facilitating the insecurity of individuals. Drawing largely from empirical research and theoretical analyses accomplished by sociologist Seungsook Moon, I will explore the relationship of national security objectives or realist tactics of the South Korean state with the experiences of insecurity for women in that country. Located in one of the most militarized regions of the world, South Korea has almost always been threatened by powerful neighbors, and thus the military and its credo have had an enormous influence on South Korean society. In fact, I will argue, as

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other scholars have, that the military continues to be the most powerful institution in the country and one whose practices and values permeate virtually every aspect of daily life, from the educational system, to the workforce, to family life. Has the attempt to achieve state security through societal militarization resulted in decreasing the security of women?

3.2 The Militarization of South Korea

“Whole cultures can be militarized... Our cultural militarization makes war-waging seem like a comforting reconfirmation of our collective security, identity, and pride”.272

Traditionally, militaries have fulfilled two divergent roles: they have been the focal point of efforts to build national unity and patriotism, often in times of war and crisis, and have emerged as "modern corporations", designed to produce the required mechanisms to maximize efficiency in war. According to Davis, the effect the military has on women and their incorporation into it can vary significantly depending on which of these goals is the desire of the reigning power.273 In the case of South Korea, we will see that both of these goals were of equal political priority and the effects of the strategies utilized to accomplish them had distinct effects on women.

Korea’s history provides a rationale for the solidification of military culture in Korean society. Today, South Korea’s defense budget remains at around six percent of its entire GNP, a figure that is deemed by many as particularly excessive.

273 Yuval-Davis, “Gender, the Nationalist Imagination”, p. 172.
considering the country’s national resources and critically needed social services.\textsuperscript{274}

The zealous financial attention given to the military can be traced back as far as the period of Japanese colonization in which coercion and force was the modus operandi. Like other colonial occupiers, Japan ensured its power through the force of its armies and police; what predictably came to represent symbols of power and supremacy.\textsuperscript{275}

During United States Army Military Government rule (USAMG) from 1945 to 1948, the USAMG further augmented the influence of the military on South Korean society by creating the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea and the South Korean National Constabulary. Following the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the size of the military rapidly inflated and when the Korean War broke out in 1950 the military build-up progressed largely as a result of various forms of military aid supplied by the US at the height of the cold war. According to Moon, the expansion and modernization of the military that occurred during this time facilitated the emergence of Korea’s future military elites and the country over which they would reign: “These years, especially the 1970’s, were decisive to the spread of military values and practices in civilian social life.”\textsuperscript{276}

In order to understand societal militarization, however, there are numerous other factors that work in concert with military build-up which must be deconstructed in order to reveal the multiple and intersecting objectives that indicate the purposeful nature behind national security efforts. At the crux are the deliberate and calculated

\textsuperscript{276} Moon, “Gender”, p91.
efforts of the state and specific leaders to shape or alter public opinion. In South Korea, this was a role filled by the military regime of Park Chung-hee. Prior to Japanese colonial rule, Confucian tradition revered ‘men of the pen’ much more so than ‘men of the sword’. And despite the military build-up during Japanese occupation and The Korean War, neither of these periods resulted in a positive estimation of soldiering and the military. The heavy-handed rule of the oppressor resulted in a contempt of soldiers as well as a rational desire to escape conscription under colonial authorities. The innumerable casualties that resulted from the Korean War equated the military with the death of improperly trained civilians. Under the political leadership of Park’s government, negative perceptions of military service were altered and effective tactics were used to mobilize and garner support from the entire population for war preparation. “This mobilization”, declares Moon “had the effect of militarizing the larger society beyond the exclusive elite politics”.

Kim Eun-shil provides a useful insight to the militarization that occurred under Park’s political power through an analysis of the Korean modernization project and the role it played in shaping Korean identity as it exists today. The project (1961-1987) mobilized the nation by using memories of colonial rule and the Korean War to effectively “bind the citizenry into a single united collective”. Park used nationalist sentiment and the rivalry with North Korea to create robust solidarity “virtually on

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278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
280 Moon, “Gender”, p92.
During his regime of 'development dictatorship', Park introduced monthly civil-defense training, initiated a defense tax to pay for military loans from the US, and launched campaigns to obtain donations for a defense fund. Central to his plan of 'self-reliant defense' and its required mass mobilization was an aggressive and ruthless conscription policy and the long-term incorporation of civilians into the military through a Homeland Reserve Force and a Civil Defence Corps. This mobilization required not only massive material and institutional modifications but also ideational and symbolic transformations. As Moon explains, these mechanisms were all utilized in an effort to alter perceptions of the military and generate a 'sense of sacred duty' for soldiers: "Park's regime sanctified military service as the most patriotic duty of Korean (male) citizens." The Korean War succeeded in altering citizen perceptions as well as military tactics by utilizing capitalist resources to strengthen the physical prowess and mental will of Korean citizens.

The persistent threat posed by North Korea was very real: there was an invasion by the North in 1950, a failed assassination attempt of Park in 1975 that resulted in the death of his wife, and to this day the North maintains a standing army of over one million soldiers and proclaims to have nuclear capability. Facilitated by the Korean War and sustained by the escalation of the Cold War, South Korea's leaders undertook deliberate and aggressive efforts to establish positive attitudes regarding conscription and the military in general, and these efforts extended throughout most of society. Close collaboration between the government and the mass media resulted in successfully maintaining the fear of imminent military attack.

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282 Ibid., p.55.
283 Moon, "Gender", p.92.
from the North by aggrandizing real invasions and broadcasting contrived ones. In addition, the regime used the media in conjunction with real international events, such as the US’s abandonment of Taiwan and Vietnam, to justify the need to expand the national army. \(^{284}\) Schools were used to promulgate a “militarized patriotism” rivaling the North: new mandatory subjects on “defeating communism” were introduced, complete with state-approved textbooks \(^{285}\); elementary school students painted pictures of a divided Korea with proud soldiers standing at the border, and sang the national anthem everyday while saluting the flag; students learned of their ‘duty’ to “ceaselessly build a strong nation, which has a history of being vulnerable to outside invasion”. \(^{286}\) Even more interesting was the implicit incorporation of military practices in the school system. This included the inclusion of military drills into the core curricula for boys, training in nursing care for girls, and military review or parading. \(^{287}\)

Critical in establishing this ‘militarized patriotism’ in the South was the changes that were affected on the national economy and business corporations. One of the ways this was done was by punishing evaders of military service using economic measures. By legally punishing employers of military evaders and stripping them of state approvals for their businesses, Park’s regime successfully made military service a requirement for employment. In addition, argues Moon, “in a social milieu where men’s authority is based on their earning power, unemployment symbolized

\(^{284}\) Moon, “The Production”, p.92.  
\(^{286}\) Eun-shil, p.60-61.  
\(^{287}\) Moon, “Gender”, p.93.
the loss of their potential and actual status as family heads and threatened their sense of manliness.  

Today, the societal militarization that emerged during Park’s regime is clearly visible in the values and practices that have permeated the school system and business corporations in South Korea. The regulation of students’ appearance and behavior, the method of discipline, and the top-down approach of teaching all exemplify a type of “school militarization”. Students are taught that “each student is at war with other students as well as him or herself” and this military metaphor is often used not only by teachers and administrators but by the media as well. This method of disciplining students is also used in business corporations to regulate workers. The bureaucratic ranking system, ‘command mode’ of communication, and the common use of brute force as punishment illustrate the extensive absorption of military values and practices corporations. In fact, the only difference between the two argues Moon, is their specific goals: “For one it is profit and for the other it is war victory”, and even those often become scrambled.  

It is important not to completely overlook what have been considered the benefits of military mobilization to South Korea’s modernization project. As Eun-shil explains, it was the militarism and developmentalism of Park’s regime that facilitated the process of industrialization and the remarkable economic growth. Some scholars have also argued that military training “prepared rural men for proletarian
life”, teaching them the skills necessary to succeed in the growing cities. While in an economic sense the militarization that fuelled South Korea’s industrialization can be viewed as a success, one could go so far as to say that this road to economic development “caused ‘damage’ to the political and social aspects of modernization.”

Fundamentally, the efforts to secure the state through militarization had the paradoxical effect of decreasing the security of individuals and in this case, women in particular. As we will see in the following section, the aforementioned mechanisms in particular and the integration of military values into the nation’s political economy and business corporations in general, fuelled the gender hierarchies which undervalue and de-legitimize women in South Korean society.

3.3 Behind the barracks – A look inside the military

In looking at how the militarization of society occurred, what is significant for our purposes is how then the hegemonic masculinity, otherwise defined as the pervasive dominance of characteristics associated with maleness as the norm and as superior to those associated with femaleness, that saturates the military infiltrated society. In order to accomplish this we must first examine the hierarchically gendered nature of military structures and practices in South Korea as well as the inclusion (or proscribed exclusion) of women in the military.

The integration of women soldiers in the military commenced at the outbreak of the Korean War when a volunteer army of 500 women was created under the

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newly established Army Women’s Volunteer Education Centre. Although given basic military training to assist combat units, the role of these women was largely to counteract the dissemination of communist propaganda to the civilians. While this army was disbanded with the beginning of truce negotiations between North Korea and the US in 1951, in 1955 the Women’s Military Training Centre was founded.\textsuperscript{294} The use of women in the military at this time was primarily for typing, communication, clerical work, and during the war as propaganda personnel, TI & E (troop information and education), and POW investigators.\textsuperscript{295} In essence, the inclusion of women was thereby intended to “release male soldiers for combat duty”.\textsuperscript{296} Since 1990 when the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) was officially abolished in a definitive step towards women’s integration, the areas of active service in which women could now participate ranged from chemistry and transport to infantry and military police.\textsuperscript{297}

The history of including women in the military in times of war, as temporary replacements in personnel shortages, and as a result of women’s own demands for inclusion have contributed to a process of ‘normalization’ of female participation.\textsuperscript{298} Globally, the number of women participants in militaries and the areas in which they participate have been expanding considerably and South Korea is no exception. In November 1997 a woman colonel was promoted to regiment commander for the first time in the history of Korea’s armed forces. In October 1998, the first woman

\textsuperscript{296} Moon, “Beyond Equality”, p. 218.
\textsuperscript{297} Ibid.
commanding officer in an infantry division took post. Most recently, a woman was promoted to the rank of general for the first time in January 2002. The navy and air force began to accept women in their officers candidate schools (OCSs) in 2000, and after a lengthy implementation process, women were granted access to the service academies beginning with the Korea Air Force Academy (KAFA).

This increased inclusion of women in the military and the extension of their roles has logically generated a substantial amount of research, literature, and debate. The controversy ranges from military traditionalists to pacifist feminists, from radical to Marxist/socialist feminists, and from “feminist anti-militarists” to “feminist egalitarian militarists”. Questions of debate include: To what extent should women be allowed to “infiltrate” the military? Is there a natural and unalterable “conditio humana” that implies women are not fighters and therefore their inclusion in armed combat would limit the effectiveness of the military? Are women the “peaceful sex”, who will become militarized or victims of violent men in the army? Should military enrolment of women be used as an opportunity to alter the gendered hierarchies from within? (Sarah Ruddick, for example, calls for the inclusion of women in the army

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300 Ibid., p.734-736.

* As Yuval-Davis reminds us, it is always useful to be wary of statistics and acknowledge potential differences in their accumulation. Women have been incorporated in various ways and to different extents in militaries, however statistical comparisons between the numbers of women that have been incorporated do not always take this into account. For example, in Israel, the boundaries between what denoted a civil task and what denoted a military task were often blurred. “In other words, apparent changes in the number of women in the military could be just a side effect of a bureaucratic or ideological redefinition of the boundaries of the armed forces.”

as a method of to stop it from being “militaristic”). The highly polarized debate reflect fundamentally different ontology’s of IR that differ on the subject of human nature as the cause of gender differences, on the liberal view that the problem solely lies in the reforming of institutions, and on the processes that should be utilized in confronting such dilemmas.

Although there is not space in this thesis to completely unpack the extensive theoretical debates that comprise the expansive breadth of feminist literature between these different ontology’s, it is important to acknowledge that it is only by listening to this dialogue and acknowledging the various and often opposing approaches to gender analyses that we begin to understand the “full range of gendered militarization”. A brief look into some of the dominant perceptions will help to situate the controversy of the inclusion and increased participation in the military of South Korean women in a global and trans-cultural context. For example, the almost global exclusion of women from combat roles is often justified by the “physical inferiority” of females, a notion that according to Moon is “ideologically deployed to organize hierarchical relations along gender lines in the military”. In addition, it is significant that investigations into the effect women have on military effectiveness

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303 Yuval-Davis, p.188.
305 Note: This is not the case in Israel or other parts of the world where women are integrated in national liberation struggles; such integration does not, however, generally exclude a belief that women are inferior to men. See, for example, Klein, Uta. “War and Gender: What do We Learn From Israel”, p.148-154 and Mulinari, Diana. “Broken Dreams in Nicaragua” in *The Women and War Reader*, p.157-163.
are numerous cross-culturally while what is often left out is an examination of the effects the military has on women, family, and culture.\textsuperscript{307}

Even in the rare cases where supposedly formal equal access to the military exists (such as Israel), in reality the truth is much more discriminating and South Korea is no exception. Despite the increasing participation of women (today there are about twenty-one hundred women soldiers representing only 0.3 percent of the entire Korean army force.\textsuperscript{308}), the increased diversification of the duties servicewomen are trained to perform and an increased rate of promotion, gender discrimination tenaciously persists. The South Korean military, declares Moon, “remains a bastion of masculinized work”.\textsuperscript{309} First, there are many areas which remain off limits to women such as artillery, armor and chaplaincy. Most significant is the exclusion of women from units that perform in combat missions and the prohibition by law of participating in direct combat. Interestingly enough, even though in principle sexual discrimination is prohibited, the personal management guidelines of the armed forces simultaneously require that specific duties are not assigned to women. Women are generally posted in areas “specifically appropriate for women”.\textsuperscript{310} According to Moon, these realities indicate an organizing principle of gendered hierarchies which marginalize women and prevent them from reaching “the top” of the military hierarchy:

Women’s marginal presence as administrative assistants or non-combatant professional officers

\textsuperscript{307} Note: The exception to this is regarding the prevalence of sexual violence, harassment, and rape in the military, however, as I will reveal in this paper, even in reports and evaluations of these types of events, the focus is rarely on the security of the woman.

\textsuperscript{308} Moon. “Beyond Equality”, p.213.

\textsuperscript{309} Moon. “Beyond Equality”, p.214.

\textsuperscript{310} Hong. “Women in the South Korean Military”, p. 736.
affirms the persistent link between mandatory military service and combat-oriented masculinity. Men as a group have access to and control over the direct use of organized force, whereas women, even in the military, are systematically denied this avenue to power.  

Analyzing the exclusion of women from combat roles is elucidatory precisely because there is so much value given to combat and physical prowess in war; combat is a “key dimension in defining manhood and masculinity” and thus women’s exclusion reinforces the “men as protectors and women as protected” construction. I would like to delve further into the ideology of combat precisely because it is such a definitive part of the military and this is ubiquitous across militaries in other nations. The military is a machine that requires a multiplicity of divergent parts to work in unison in order for the machine to be effective. Soldiering is but one of those parts; managing personnel, administrative work, weaponry, etc. are all vital to the operation of the military. This is particularly the case as the nature of warfare continues to transform with the demise of the cold war that has resulted in changes in weaponry, technology, and changes in the most gravely affected victims: “With the modernization of the military, those supplying food, clothing, nursing, clerical and communication services, ammunition, and sexual services have all needed, at least to an extent, to establish formal relationships with the military.” Warfare technology has shifted the definition of combat to include the use of long range missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear weapons while simultaneously

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313 Yuval-Davis, “Gender, the Nationalist Imagination”, p.174.
rendering close range ground warfare as “rather archaic”.\textsuperscript{314} These technological innovations, argues Davis, have decreased the importance of physical strength in war and therefore made “biologistic rationalizations of women’s exclusion mostly obsolete”.\textsuperscript{315}

Despite this development, in the South Korean military it is these roles of armed combat that are especially valued and this is typified in the territorial “line defence” strategy employed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Considering North Korea’s advanced weapons technology, the conservative ideology that relies on “human collateral” and values “man on man” combat seems incongruous. Even if we disregard the evidence that face-to-face combat is a fading element of military action, the accessibility of smaller and lighter arms increasingly discredits the argument that physical strength is the reason women should be banned from participation.\textsuperscript{316}

However, it is this ideology combined with the underlying assumption that women cannot perform on the physical level men can and that they must in order to be “equal” that legitimates women’s devaluation in the military. “The hegemonic idea of soldiering and combat” explains Moon, “serves to construct women soldiers as inessential to the military, thereby justifying their marginalization and subsequent inequality in it”.\textsuperscript{317}

Another area where military policy manifests itself as gender bias (and gender bias which serves to essentialize feminine roles) is in basic regulations such as dress codes. Both the men and women must abide by strict dress codes, however, in

\textsuperscript{314} Moon, “Beyond Equality”, p.227.
\textsuperscript{315} Yuval-Davis, p. 188.
\textsuperscript{316} Nira, “Gender, the Nationalist Imagination”, p. 174.
\textsuperscript{317} Ibid., p.229.
warmer seasons the women are required to wear a skirt and pumps are mandatory year round. The only exception to this rule is during physical training. Additionally, women are told that their haircuts should not resemble a man’s crew cut and they are encouraged to wear makeup in order to “present a ‘pleasant’ appearance”\(^{318}\). Such attempts to retain the dichotomous construction of femininity and masculinity are reminiscent of similar efforts in Israel where women soldiers are taught how to apply makeup and how to behave as “an officer and a lady”\(^{319}\). According to Moon, such impractical regulations serve to “convert the sex difference into gendered control over the female body and sexuality”\(^{320}\). That is, they are a way the military can maintain hierarchical gender relations despite women’s inclusion in the military. By requiring such a dress code, the military preserves normative understandings of femininity as opposite to masculinity. “A woman’s soldier’s uniform” argues Moon, “is an unmistakable site for the alleviation of the military’s anxiety stemming from soldiering in the female body”\(^{321}\).

As these previous examples show, women’s inclusion in the military has not resulted in equal treatment or equal rights within this establishment: “women’s equal participation in war hardly constitutes female emancipation”\(^{322}\). It has however resulted in the direct control of women in a structure where the power relations are so embedded that resistance to this control is not only more difficult than in civilian life, but it can also be dangerous. When a woman in the military is sexually harassed, the

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\(^{322}\) Giles and Hyndman, “Introduction”, p.16.
perpetrator (who is usually her military ‘superior’) has a severely disproportionate amount of power over the woman because of his gender, job title, and rank. The woman is now left with very little recourse as a result of her subordinate position: requests for transfers must be approved by her aggressor who may also threaten her into silence. If she were to quit the military she would likely be prosecuted for insubordination or desertion. Through in-depth interviews conducted of commissioned officers (COs) and non-commissioned (NCOs) women officers in the South Korean army, Moon gives us a first hand look at the problem:

In fact, there are many incidents [of sexual violence]. But they [higher ranking officers] cover them up because revealing such accidents will cause big trouble... Victimized, some leave the army and others are quietly transferred. Some attempt to commit suicide. It’s a big problem that we’re not informed of this urgent issue.

Sexual harassment of female soldiers by male soldiers is a very common problem that exists in most militaries around the globe. Scholars have argued that sexual violence is “endemic to military culture”; not only do militaries around the world consider rape as “part of military life”, they also often support prostitution. (As is appallingly evident in the forced sexual slavery of “comfort women” in the extensive network of military brothels instituted across Asia by the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II) The act of rape during war is inherently gendered and several scholars have offered explanations for its widespread perpetration. One such analysis is particularly interesting for our purposes: Ruth Seifert argues that not only...

do military officers sanction rape because they participate in it themselves, but because “it promotes solidarity through male bonding”.326

Today, the international community has acted to make sexual violence against women in times of war a human rights abuse punishable in the International Criminal Court. However, the silence that surrounds incidents of sexual violence means that perpetrators often go unpunished and victims, often fearing rejection by their families and communities and feeling shame or responsibility for the violence, go unheard. This is illustrative of a common reality regarding gender in everyday discourse: gender is mentioned, as is the sex of particular actors, or supposedly revealing statistics regarding the increasing numbers of women in the military, but these factors are not analyzed. An excellent example of this damaging process is presented in Cynthia Cockburns’ analysis of the Columbine tragedy. Here she shows how the traditional perceptions of women and men and the constructed characteristics of femininity and masculinity are so embedded and normalized in society that they are not even taken into account when searching for an explanation. (For example, media analyses focused on the teen’s access to guns but failed to acknowledge the masculine cultures that foster gun ownership)327

The hierarchical and patriarchal structure of the military is evident at the most fundamental level. Basic facilities and amenities such as separate changing areas, rest quarters, and separate restrooms are often absent in the Korean military, a grievance often justified by the claim that women are an “insignificant minority” and are

"inessential" to the military. Interestingly, while in this case sexual difference is used to rationalize that women are burdensome and inconvenient and should therefore not be allowed in the military, in other instances this difference is exploited in an over-feminization that results from the normative gender role expectation created in larger society. Moon’s empirical study revealed that woman officers are often called upon for personal services such as greeting visitors and serving coffee. During ceremonies it is assumed that younger NCOs will “serve (male) generals” or sit next to them as they dine, “as though the women officers’ company was being provided as an extension of hospitality”. This type of practice is not unique to the Korean military. In Israel, for instance, one of the formal duties of the Women’s Corps is “in the areas of crystallizing the morale of the units and taking care of the soldiers of the units”. Such discriminatory practices serve to reinforce the perceived lower comparable worth of female soldiers and are a prime example of why women’s inclusion in the military can not be cited as evidence that women are achieving equality:

While some women may benefit from the educational or employment opportunities the military service provides, women’s increasing presence in the military does not change the institution’s fundamentally gendered structure, which at its core is coercive, hierarchical, and patriarchal. In fact, the increasing presence of women helps legitimize the institution by giving it an egalitarian façade.

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329 Ibid., p.233.
330 Yuval-Davis, “Gender, the Nationalist Imagination”, p.177.
As Cockburn explains, women’s active engagement in war does not lead to equality, nor do the “character, culture, and hierarchy of armed forces become more feminine because of women’s presence”.

Military training in general has traditionally been a gendered process: well-known slogans claiming the military will “make a man out of you” are indicative of the process of masculinization which simultaneously deprecates femininity. A male soldiers training has customarily been inundated with woman hating and homophobia; the threat of being labeled a ‘faggot’ or ‘girl’ (typically by a superior) is manifest in most areas of the service, and this appears to be true cross culturally. A comment made by Israeli Defence Force’s (IDF) Head of Doctrine Brigadier General Gershon HaCohen at a high school lecture in 1995 is revealing: “Men have always been warriors and women whores”. According to Enloe, the reason militaries have been so paramount in reproducing extreme gender dichotomies of masculinity and femininity is because they have been constructed in ways that need “men to act as ‘men,’ that is to be willing to kill and dies on the behalf of the state to prove their ‘manhood’” in order for the institution to sustain itself. In the same way, it is just as important that “women behave as the gender ‘women’” for this success, that is “women must be properly subservient to meet the needs of militaries and of the men who largely constitute them”. Consequently, the incorporation of women into the military has encountered reactions of fear, prejudice, and animosity. Despite the fact that women have long been an intrinsic part of its ability to function as a whole, and

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332 Cockburn, “The Continuum of Violence”, p.34-35.
333 Yuval-Davis, “Gender, the Nationalist Imagination”, p.177.
334 Ibid., p.176.
despite the fact that women remain concentrated, for the most part, in traditionally female areas such as clerical work and nursing, women are “threatening unless controlled and distinguished from male soldiers by an emphasis on their femininity” 336.

Historically, the military has been a hierarchical organization of men that glorifies characteristics associated with masculinity (such as brute force, austerity, stalwartness), and utilizes its constructed opposition to femininity to strengthen camaraderie, obedience, and effectiveness. The result has been resistance to women entering the military and the marginalization of women once they began to be admitted.

3.4 Making the connection

Even in the absence of war, men and women are differently situated in processes of militarization. By analyzing the military and the militarization of society through, what Peterson and Runyan call a “gender-sensitive lens”, we begin to see the gender dichotomies that are constructed and reproduced in society and lead to the characterization of women as peaceful, submissive, and “the weaker sex” in need of protection. 337 As Tickner reveals, these constructed dichotomies have had the result of sustaining attitudes which equate maleness and femaleness with disparate and often opposing attributes: “Socially constructed gender differences are based on

336 Yuval-Davis, “Gender, the Nationalist Imagination”, p. 176.
337 Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues, p.83.
socially sanctioned, unequal relationships between men and women that reinforce compliance with men’s stated superiority.\textsuperscript{338} It is important to acknowledge that the dominant stereotypes associated with masculinity do not describe most men just as the assumptions tied to notions of femininity often don’t correspond to the female sex. However, this constructed ideal or ‘hegemonic masculinity’ expounded through its distinction from femininity “sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order”.\textsuperscript{339} This privileging of masculine characteristics, says Scott, must be challenged: “We must analyze the way these binary oppositions operate in different contexts and, rather than accepting them as fixed, seek to displace their hierarchical construction”.\textsuperscript{340} The opposing constructions of “soldiers-mothers, protectors-protected, aggressive-passive, battlefront-home front, batterers-victims” equate masculinity with violence and aggression, and as we have seen in the case of South Korea, the military relies on these gendered divisions and thus plays a significant role in reproducing these notions of masculinity and femininity.\textsuperscript{341}

I have demonstrated the process by which the militarization of South Korean culture and society has taken place, and I have revealed how the link between military service and hegemonic masculinity is maintained. How then do the hierarchical gender relations perpetuated in the military contribute to the subordination of women

\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., p6.
\textsuperscript{340} Ibid., p8.
\textsuperscript{341} Peterson and Runyan, Global Gender Issues, p.83.
and decrease their personal security *outside* of the military and within the larger society?

Militaries are considered invaluable to the maintenance of national security, and in South Korea attempts to strengthen state security (primarily via North Korea) have resulted in the militarization of society and have thus been paramount in sustaining gender hierarchies that devalue notions of femininity. Establishing military service as a “male citizen’s duty” through mechanisms such as universal male conscription have resulted in women being systematically de-legitimized and regarded as secondary citizens:

Mandatory military service, as the major element of hegemonic masculinity, contributes to the modernization of women’s subordination by acting as a mechanism that essentializes and naturalizes gender differences, thus reinforcing the dichotomy of the masculine provider and the feminine housewife.\(^{342}\)

As described in the beginning of this Chapter, the measures implemented by Parks regime to discourage military evaders effectively made military service a requirement for employment and economic success; it became a “precondition of employment”. For example, job openings were often advertised as requiring the applicant to have completed military service – implying that women are not even eligible to apply.\(^{343}\) Male veterans were also entitled to advantages such as positions of seniority, benefits, and higher pay in both public and private corporations.\(^{344}\) This arrangement, what Moon calls the conversion of military service into economic benefits, has resulted in undemocratic gender discrimination by limiting women’s

\(^{343}\) Moon, “Gender”, p.95.
\(^{344}\) Moon, “The Production”, p.93.
participation and advancement in the labor market. It is important to recognize that these policies infringe not only on women’s right to equal participation in the workforce, but also on the rights of males who are unable to complete military service, for example, those with physical disabilities.\textsuperscript{345}

Specific mention of the military service extra points system will provide insight into the extent to which South Korea contributed to the production of biases towards women and social minorities in order to maintain a first-class army and therefore preserve national security. In spite of Park’s promotion of universal male conscription as “a male citizen’s duty” to ensure the security of their country, during industrialization a rising standard of living and an increasing demand for workers created tension between mandatory military service and the desire to increase one’s own economic position.\textsuperscript{346} To combat this, a form of “compensation” was implemented. By law, the thirty-seven year old system grants men “extra points” on public employment tests or interviews for previous military service, and though not a legal requirement, induces private companies to do the same.\textsuperscript{347} In essence, the system was utilized to maintain support for a dying conscription system, which, if dissolved, would likely threaten the strength of South Korea’s armed forces and thus its military position vis-à-vis North Korea.

The objections to this system have emerged largely as a result of the response by remarkable women’s organizations in South Korea which, in the last decade, culminated in a class action suit. Although the Court ruled that the extra points

\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., p.93-94.
\textsuperscript{346} Ibid., p.94.
system was unconstitutional in its violation of the right to equality, the clamor that followed is revealing: the public response, for the most part, was fear for the possible effect this would have on military strength and disdain for the women who undermined the national security of their nation. “These armed defenders of the nation and their supporters”, argues Moon “imagine national unity against the feminized Others who oppose the extra points system”. 348

Although the intention of the extra points system was not to discriminate against women but in fact to provide an economic incentive at a time when the economy was rapidly growing and the will to serve was waning largely as a result of the potential loss of income during time of service. At the same time, the threat of confrontation by North Korea was omnipresent and a shrinking army in the South was, in the eyes of the government, not an option. Nevertheless, what resulted was, in the words of Moon, “a sharp discrepancy between the constitutional guarantee of a universal right to work and the systematic de-legitimization of women within the Korean economy”. 349 The system is indicative of the extent to which masculine culture and practice pervades not only the military, but also business and the employment sector – not surprising considering the close connection between these two institutions that I have just revealed.

The military has been an “unacknowledged model” for the Korean chaebol (the business conglomerates that dominate the Korean economy), and first hand evidence supports the extremely similar nature of corporate life and military service, exemplified through the organizational structure, disciplinary practices, and company

348 Moon, “Imagining a Nation”, p.99.
or working life in general. This spread of military values and practices is widely acknowledged and has given rise to the critical term “kunsan munhwa” which means “military culture”. The chaebol has been central in forging a lifestyle that completely separates work from family, public from private. By creating long working days, locating corporate centers far from residential areas, and normalizing the extension of work into long evenings of “work-related play” the chaebol have instituted a physical and mental dichotomy between “the worker” and his wife and children. It has embedded the ideal that managerial work is a “masculine activity” and thus “rigidly dichotomized work from domesticity”.

While the chaebol may be culturally specific to South Korea, its “profound influence on the gendering of work and domesticity” does not appear to be far removed from corporate life in the West. In fact, state bureaucracies, international organizations, and even state and international security institutions are masculine in nature. That is, they “tend to be structured and to function according to norms of masculinity, and they do not have a gender neutral culture of their own”. Evidence of this lies in their hierarchical structure, competitive nature, top-down approach to leadership/management, and also in their apparent interest in preserving women’s subordinate economic and political roles. If the goal of the security agenda is to

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352 Ibid.
provide security to individuals, what is required then is a transformation of security institutions into organizations which can respond to the insecurities of all individuals.

It is important to consider the construction of male and female roles and the values conferred to each in traditional Korean society that emerged largely as a result of the influence of Confucianism. For example, it could be argued that women have traditionally been considered the more valuable sex as a result of their reproductive and nurturing roles, and that it is this inherent desire to protect the family line that has resulted in their over-protection, exclusion from physical combat roles, and enforced segregation to the household/private sphere. Men, in turn, are “dispensable” and “dispensable” and thus are relegated to roles which endanger their lives largely to protect the “women and children,” to use Cynthia Enloe’s expression. In modern day Korea, however, these traditionally constructed roles appear to have translated into patriarchal views that privilege men over women. “Korean government directives” illustrates Moon, “explicitly define a woman’s primary responsibility as facilitating her husband’s work ‘in society’, a principle internalized by many housewives”. What has resulted is a near universal view that men perform, and are entitled to exclusively perform, the “critical work of society”. Thus, the traditional dichotomous gender constructions that originally considered women as valuable and deserving of protection have been the foundation for contemporary Korean patriarchy, the “legal and emotional privileging of husbands over wives”.

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356 Ibid., p.8.
Military service has wrought the financial superiority of men and the de-legitimization of women simultaneously. Today, women’s employment is characterized largely by temporary work, low pay, low security, and very little chance of upward mobility. Economic privilege translates into power and authority; military service in South Korea thus translates into the maintenance of dominant notions of femininity and masculinity, and the perpetuation of hierarchical gender relations. In addition, the gender constructions that are embedded in the military are logically transmitted to those areas affected by societal militarization, namely the workforce, schools, and the household.

The hierarchical gender relations that are embedded in war, the military, and the state demarcate the insecurity of women across nations. There is a dialectical and mutually reinforcing relationship between militarization and patriarchy: “Gendered social relations encourage militarism,” explains Jennifer Turpin, “and militarism in turn relies on gendered social relations.” 357 It could be argued that this is simply a universal division of labor, an intrinsic assumption across all societies that men fight and woman bear and raise the young. But what is the reason for this division of labor? According to Cynthia Enloe, the conjecture must be exposed through an examination of its close relation to biological differences that are constructed within nationalist imaginations. 358 “While men have been constructed as naturally linked to warfare” explains Yuval-Davis, “women have been constructed as naturally linked to

peace". Where these constructions become problematic however, is when the sexual divisions of labor within the military and in societies of militarized states relate to nationalist projects in ways that threaten the security of women. It is these hierarchical gendered relations that are the foundation for a hegemonic masculinity that has been constructed in the military and methods of soldiering in South Korea, and if explored military institutions in other states we would likely face the same underlying elements. This analysis is crucial because it reveals how violence and the insecurity of women do not exist solely in the context of war and the military, but, as Cynthia Cockburn explains, as part of a “gendered continuum of violence” which is manifest in everyday life. Thus, we are not only attempting to reveal the maintenance of women’s oppression/inequality, we are also uncovering the process by which masculinity becomes reproduced in the military and society at large. When we look at the South Korean example through a critical security feminist lens, the dichotomy between attempts to achieve national security through militaristic means and achieving human security for individuals within the state is manifestly exposed. When military culture so entirely consumes a society, so too do the hierarchical gendered relations upon which militaries are built. Because militarism, which relies on gendered hierarchies for its continued survival, is so embedded in South Korean society and infiltrates most aspects of individuals’ lives, women are systematically

361 Ibid., p.171.
subordinated within a social system that relies on the nexus between militarism and hegemonic masculinity. This system which is comprised of both a material domain as well as a discursive domain persists ultimately because of issues of power that prevail in the international system.

There is a direct connection between the insecurity of women in relation to the military and other forms of subjugation and insecurity. Having explored some feminist critiques of the military in South Korea and the inadequacy of traditional securitizations of the state which fail to take into account the human, social, institutional and gender dimensions of security, it becomes apparent that gender is not the only identity that matters in achieving human security. In South Korea, issues of race and class, for example, are related specifically to issues of security and are factors that play mutually reinforcing roles with gendered hierarchies. Let's pause for a moment and consider the presence of a US military base in South Korea. Katherine Moon revealed the mutually reinforcing relationship between militarism and masculinity in South Korea which explored the effect of the presence of US military on women in the country. Using ethnographic research methods, Moon analyzed the prostitution camps which materialized around US military bases in the 1970's. Listening to the life stories of women who worked in these camps, she is able to make a connection between their situation and US-South Korean relations which hinged on national security. This example is but one of how South Korean security priorities of the state can manifest into insecurity for the individual. It is also, however, a useful illustration of the intersection between gender, race, and class – a relationship which

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post-colonial feminists, as I illustrated in the previous chapter, have endeavored to divulge. How does the relationship between the colonial history of South Korea and its current political position vis-à-vis the US intersect with the effect of a US military presence on South Korean women? How does the masculinity that pervades military culture play a role in the prostitution camps that were created around US military bases? It appears evident that not only are hierarchical gender relations part of the equation, so are racial hierarchies, colonial legacies, and class stratifications.

Regrettably, mainstream IR does not directly engage with postcolonial and third world feminism: methodologically, methods such as ethnography are rarely used in mainstream analysis; epistemologically, the divide is immense. As I indicated in the introduction to this thesis, IR theorists’ belief in the testability of hypotheses about war and security and its dominance in the field is at odds with feminists questioning of “claims about human intention built on models from the natural sciences and the claim to universality of knowledge based on the experiences of men, usually elite men”.

Issues of power deepen the divide, however, feminism and critical security studies share a reflectivist framework that indicates a real potential challenge to the perpetuation of dominant epistemologies and ontology’s. Bridging this divide will require a real focus on the individual and this will be less painful if feminists, critical security scholars, and ultimately conventional IR proponents agree to engage with post-colonial/Third World feminists. What is at stake in failing to recognize this connection between identity and security is the security of women?

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My claim is that once we open Pandora's Box, evidence of mutually reinforcing identities that have been almost entirely ignored by even critical thinkers in the field, are revealed as playing deterministic roles in the security of individuals. At stake is the lives that are even more at risk because of the realist doctrines that continue to influence the international community via state centered national security policies. While the security needs of women have broadened in ways that no longer can be realized by the traditional security tools of the past, nations within a complicit international community continue to rely on, in the words of Chenoy, "the old male-oriented and dominated militaristic approach". I would like to further explore this idea of the problematic nature of the traditional security policies of nation states and what is at stake for insecure individuals whose multiple and mutually reinforcing identities, namely gender, race, and class, renders them invisible. If, as I argued earlier, there is a close and endemic connection between knowledge production and practice, how do outdated and stagnant international theories threaten the security of individuals who are: a) women, b) from the Third World, and c) poor?

Chapter 4

4.1 Ignoring and victimizing the “Third World Woman”: A Barrier to peace-building and development

Throughout the world, the reconstruction of Afghanistan is seen as a litmus test for whether the universal values of human rights and development will help define the parameters of global security, or whether the narrow military interests of powerful States will predominate.366

If the international system is as realists construct it, than it is thus unsurprising that a US led coalition would use military means to attack a country “harboring terrorists” in order to preserve its own national security. It is also unsurprising that concerns of individual rights and security, never-mind women’s rights and security would be ignored in such an attack. Acknowledging this, would it not then be predictable that a government would attempt to justify such an attack via any means in order to gain approval from its citizens so as to maintain financial, emotional, and voting support for its actions? Such conclusions certainly seem to have logical justification in a traditional security analysis that constructs the state as the primary actor and national security as the sole objective – and many would agree that this is in fact the US government mentality which continues to persevere even after the end of the cold war. We would be seriously mistaken, however, in assuming that in the modern world the situation is this simple.

The situation in Afghanistan is an excellent example of the inadequacy of realism in contemporary world politics and the value in moving away from positivist approaches. Some post modernists, like Richard Ashley, have even argued that realism is in fact one of the central problems of international security. Realisms' discourse is one of power, alliances, and domination which encourages security competition and according to John Vasquez, produces an image of the world that helps to bring about war - it is this discourse that has dominated international politics in the past. Epistemologically, realism binds us to a fixed and knowable world that doesn’t allow for multiple interpretations, what post-modemists view as the “preposterous certainty of realism”. The danger is that alternative approaches to security are ruled out and, as I argued in Chapter 2, this single interpretation of global reality that projects a universal view has traditionally excluded many individuals, particularly women. Empirically, realism is “out of touch” with globalizing trends which challenge the state centric view of realism and render even the single and limiting framework and approach of traditional security as no longer rational. States are fractured by internal conflict fuelled often by religious, ethnic, and nationalistic divides rendering new forms of insecurity. Simultaneously, global inequality, poverty, environmental damage and in-sustainability, human rights abuses and the associated processes of globalization have altered the world politics and the international community: “It is now increasingly necessary to think of the security of

individuals and of groups within the emergent global society".  

There is much at stake in pursuing traditional security policies without considering these factors and how they affect the security of individuals; 9/11 is unfortunately only one among many examples which attest to this fact. It is to an empirical analysis of a country's people stuck in the crossfire between this radically altering world and the accompanying insecurities and the traditional security approach of the global hegemon that we now turn.

Who is being secured by security policies? Since the fall of the Taliban, women in Afghanistan have cited their own lack of security and the militarization of their country as their primary concern. It appears, according to Amnesty International, that "The international community and the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), led by President Hamid Karzai, have proved unable to protect women". Afghanistan is a critical test case in two crucial ways: First, with the recent adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on "Women, Peace and Security" in 2000 and following the military intervention by a US-led coalition in November 2001, Afghanistan will demonstrate whether the international commitments to gender equality in post conflict reconstruction and development are being implemented, and if they are even in reality serious considerations.

Second, a critical analysis of the security of women in Afghanistan provides the perfect opportunity to explore how existing misrepresentations of the Third World

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370 Ibid., p207.
affect Western security agendas, and vice versa, and the resulting effect of these agendas on the same women they supposedly aid. Under the guise of exporting democratization and achieving emancipation, the US-led “liberating” coalition have not only ignored women’s security, they have decreased their security. Even more troubling is that this was committed while justifying the invasion of Afghanistan to the American public as a mission to “save the women”. This proclamation is in and of itself illustrative of the Western ethnocentricity and the persisting colonialist stance that endangers Third World women’s security in a transnational world dominated by a US empire: “To position women’s rights as a rallying point for war paints politicians and the public at large into a corner...It’s a calculated exploitation of leftist concerns in order to suppress dissenting thought”.  

Through this case study, the obstacles facing the security agenda come to bear: 1) Traditional security definitions and policies that focus on the security of the state and territorial borders are no longer sufficient in the post cold war world; 2) Although an emerging human security agenda that takes the individual as its starting point is more appropriate in the face of such contemporary problems of transnational terrorism and intra-state conflict, women are often consigned to the periphery and thus their security is continually compromised – and when acknowledged, rarely engaged, and; 3) Third World women face a unique and disturbing predicament in the US-Eurocentric world we occupy in that white, Western, men retain almost complete control of the structures of domination that directly affect the security of Third World peoples.

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While there is a diverse range of security issues – as conceptualized in its broadest form – that affect women in Afghanistan, and insecurity has persisted in historically and geographically specific forms, I am focusing primarily on the problems particular to the postwar environment. That is, on the increase in insecurity in women’s day to day lives after the 2001 US intervention. Indeed, we would be mistaken to assume that women’s oppression and insecurity in the country is recent, or that the state of the country in general has not emerged from a complicated past. Prior to September 11th and prior to the Taliban, Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in the world. Decades of war and five years of draught, explains Winter, “bled dry an already highly anemic economy”.

Out of 90 developing countries, the UN’s 2001 Human Development Report ranks Afghanistan 89th on its Human Poverty Index. Additionally, the role and status of women in particular have long been debated and considered not only by the West but also by Middle Eastern women themselves as “oppressive”. Why, if women in Afghanistan have faced such insecurities prior to the recent war, why should I concentrate my analysis on the post war security issues? There are several reasons for this: First, women’s insecurity persists in times of peace and war, and in fact what determines “post war” in countries such as Afghanistan where women are continuously under attack, is often simply an intensification of the same problems that persisted before the war began; such definitions are inconsequential and quite arbitrary: “There is no abrupt cutoff

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374 Winter, “If Women Really Mattered”, p496.
line between war and postwar.”376 There is a continuity of violence and oppression that perseveres across time and space and to analyze the oppression of women in a singular construct irrespective of history is inadequate. “War, however,” explains Mojab “breeds more violence against women,”377 and in addition to the problems that existed before the war, physical, psychological, economic, and environmental effects will persist long after the international community’s attention is drawn somewhere else.378 A postwar analysis is thus particularly valuable in a world dominated by a global hegemon who chooses to wage unilateral interventions in the name of security and women’s rights. Like the case of South Korea we explored earlier, there is a dichotomy between attempts to achieve security (particularly as differently defined as the term is by various individuals) and the insecurity of women.

Second, postwar reconstruction, sustaining conflict resolution, and maintaining peace are all enormously challenging processes that cannot occur and be sustainable over the long run if the security of over half the population is in jeopardy. This is a critical time for security as the damages and wounds of war remain and communities must struggle with issues of displacement, economic and social reconstruction, justice, reconciliation, and foreign aid.379 In addition, the end of militias, terror and fighting is more often than not just a façade. As these efforts at reconstruction occur, it is often in an environment where governments have been

toppled, judicial systems have been left in question, and law enforcement has
disintegrated within the armed groups that infiltrate the communities. Thus, violence
continues often at the hands of former combatants and armed groups and often in the
absence of a criminal justice system or task force that can protect women. Current
president Hamid Karzai recently made a plea to the world “not to desert Afghanistan
after polls last September because it would need aid and security assistance for years
to come.” As we will see, it is often after the crisis is over that women face the
worst hardships, violence, and oppression and this is usually about the time when
they become invisible to the international community which loses interest in their
plight because “the war is over”.

Finally, with regards to recent developments in International Law and
women’s Human Rights, the timing of such analysis is ideal. I want to acknowledge,
first and foremost, that international human rights law has been has been criticized by
radical feminists on the grounds that they are built on racialized first world standards.
These claims are substantial in breadth and worth considering, however in the
confines of this chapter this acknowledgment must suffice as a precaution. As such,
assessing the extent to which legal commitments to human rights are being upheld are
not my sole measure, but one approach I utilize in order to compare the existing
international laws with the situation in Afghanistan.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security
adopted in 2000 embodies an International commitment to making gender a priority

380 “Don’t Abandon Us Now, Afghanistan Urges World”, Reuters, Alert Net, May 10, 2005,
in security measures, post conflict reconstruction, and peace processes. In 2003, the ATA ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), thereby committing to a legally binding international human rights treaty. The ATA has also ratified the newly established Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court which includes provisions for the protection of women and explicit reference to gendered crimes, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child among others. “By ratifying these international human rights treaties,” declares Amnesty International “Afghanistan has undertaken to guarantee that the rights they provide are afforded to women on a basis of equality with men and without discrimination.” The situation in Afghanistan thus provides the perfect grounds for analyzing the existing problems of enforcement and implementation of these legal provisions which are integral to security.

“Nowhere else has a war on women been illustrated so starkly as in Afghanistan,” and this is a war that has deep roots originating long before the US intervention and even rule by the Taliban. While I am focusing predominantly on the insecurities that persist after the US intervention, a bit of background information is required. Although there is not space here to include the extensive history of women’s oppression in Afghanistan that is optimal for this analysis, I feel a brief timeline will suffice in order to properly situate my argument in its context. As Brunet explains, “in order to fully recognize women’s rights and ensure a realistic

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381 “Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us”, p3.
382 “Afghanistan: No One Listen to Us”, p8.
mainstreaming of gender in Afghanistan, it is paramount to address the socio-political context of the conflict and current situation in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{384}

4.2 A long history of violence and insecurity

Afghanistan has been in almost a permanent state of war for over twenty years during which grave abuses of basic human rights against women and men have perpetrated with impunity. Women have been particularly affected in a multitude of ways and in every area of society from the endangerment of their physical security to the denial of political or civic participation.\textsuperscript{385} However, if we look at how women’s lives were defined historically, we discover that in concert with attempts at the modernization of Afghan society, the emancipation process of women had already begun as early as 1883 as part of the nationalist ideology of progressive change. In fact, explains Hans, “One of the earliest attempts at emancipation and social reform for women in the twentieth century took place in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{386}

It is significant that most of the changes that took place in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century were introduced by the rulers at that time who were men. Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan (1880-1901) and his son Amir Habibullah (1901-1919) suggested that women should be considered as full participants in society, allowed widowed women to remarry, and required the registration of all marriages.\textsuperscript{387} Under the rule of King

\textsuperscript{384} Brunet, “Women’s Rights in Afghanistan”, p3.
\textsuperscript{385} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{387} It is worth noting, however, that these changes were possibly made as part of attempts at political rather than solely for women’s emancipation; Habibullah also declared that “men were entitled to full control of their women.”
Amanullah (1919-1929), laws were initiated (and then established in 1923-24) that allowed women to attend school, work outside of the home, and to be seen in public unveiled. It was about this time that resistance to reforms regarding the rights of women began to emerge in the form of a rural Islamic opposition that forced Amanullah to flee when his attempts to transform gender relations did not halt. Following his forced removal, women's emancipation turned back several years and once again women were veiled and banned from schools and the public workforce until, under the ruler Daud (1953-63) critical progress was made including the attendance of women at Kabul University and the removal of the veil. Several years later women were granted legal rights under the constitution and began to occupy roles in education, government, and judiciary; Kubru Nurzai was appointed minister of public health, the first woman in the National Assembly.

Opposition by the tribal chiefs who had now been joined by the mullahs (Islamic religious leaders) began to augment, however, in an environment of sociopolitical reforms, and the Afghan resistant movement began to take shape. The Soviet invasion in 1979 in many ways represented the threshold that triggered the official organization of an opposition force in the form of the Mujahideen, an opposition in which, it is worth noting, women participated, supported, and were actively sought for their assistance in various forms. This does not, however, indicate that the Mujahideen intended to emancipate or contributed to the emancipation of women through their participation, on the contrary. Mujahideen forces, armed and trained largely by US forces, explains Tahmeena Faryal, "waged a brutal war against

388 Amanullah in fact made a plea to Britain for assistance, but in what would not be the only case of international policy negatively affecting women's security in Afghanistan, he was turned away.
women, using rape, torture, abduction, and forced marriage as their weapons” and many of these members are now part of the Taliban and Northern Alliance.\(^{390}\) During the time of Soviet occupation, modern weaponry provided by the Cold powers infiltrated fighting factions on every side.\(^{391}\) The society as it had previously existed completely collapsed as refugees flowed to the surrounding countries in desperate attempts to protect their families from the intensifying warfare. “Women,” states Hans “continued to be at the receiving end of a nation in conflict. Gang rapes, abductions, and other crime against women became common during the Mujahideen takeover.”\(^{392}\)

When the Taliban gained control of Kabul in 1996 and then proceeded to occupy 90 percent of Afghanistan territory\(^{393}\), it was a devastating turn in the struggle for women’s emancipation that had been building since the beginning of the century. Although at first it seemed as though the nation breathed a sigh of relief at the cessation of shootings, violence, robberies, and as they anticipated a reduction in the widespread corruption that existed under the Mujahideen. However, it was not long before people began to feel oppressed. The Taliban enforced ruthless decrees that affected women and men: Music and dance were banned, bath houses (hammams)

\(^{391}\) Hans reports that the contribution by the US alone was around $10 billion which went directly to the Mujahideen resistance/freedom fighters – which included Osama Bin Laden - as well as the Taliban who were gaining strength in refugee camps in Pakistan.
\(^{392}\) Hans, “Escaping Conflict”, p236.
were closed, and men were punished if their wives were heard laughing.\textsuperscript{394} The bans were more comprehensive and more devastating for women who were essentially banned from public space. For example, women were forbidden to leave their homes, a decree that was brutally enforced by a “Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” squad which Hans elaborates on in the following passage:

Punishment included a beating, imprisonment, or public stoning to death. Women had to shroud every inch of their body with the \textit{chadar} (or \textit{burqa}, as it is known in India and Pakistan). Schools were closed to females above the age of eight, and health facilities were out of bounds for most women, as unescorted women were not allowed into hospitals. Since female doctors were forbidden to work and male doctors either were prohibited from providing treatment to women or had to do so without touching them, few women were able to access health facilities. Work outside the home was not allowed. To venture outside, a woman needed a male escort...\textsuperscript{395}

Hans continues to reveal additional security implications of the Taliban’s’ policies, such as: the risk for land mine injuries and fatalities for women, as a result of their prohibition from school and landmine classes, as well as for boys whose schools were closed due to a lack of teachers (women were no longer allowed to work); the health problems that resulted from their exclusion from public baths; increased threat of sexual assault, physical attacks, and kidnapping, and; the multitude of dangers that exist while trying to flee their homes. Rules that have become well known in the West, such as the requirement that all women wear the burqa or “chadri”, were accompanied by lesser known punishments: women who were dressed


\textsuperscript{395} Hans, “Escaping Conflict”, p237.
“inappropriately” or showed their ankles, for example, were whipped in public. In essence, women’s bodies were central to the Taliban’s constructed image of the nation and thus became a site of conflict. “In maintaining the Afghan nation-state,” explains Hans “strategies of modernization and traditionalism have constituted a site of conflict where women became the symbols of the construction of the nation and its boundaries.”

Despite the insecurities women in Afghanistan have faced for years under repressive regimes, and despite attempts made by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, it wasn’t until the US intervention that the international community took notice. The US government repeatedly referred to the oppression of women as being of paramount concern, leaving the impression that they would indeed "liberate" these women and in a sense justifying their invasion to their populace. Then US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated: “The recovery of Afghanistan must entail the restoration of the rights of Afghan women. Indeed, it will not be possible without them. The rights of the women of Afghanistan will not be negotiable.” In reality, states a Report of Rights &Democracy’s Mission to Afghanistan from the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, “Women’s rights have been brought to the forefront by political leaders who have learned to use the women’s human rights discourse to justify their military interventions.”

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the US targeted the Taliban with a military offensive “Enduring Freedom” that, in concert with Northern

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398 “Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us”, p1.
Alliance efforts succeeded in gaining control of the capital city of Kabul and the Taliban’s headquarters in Kandahar, thus removing the Taliban from power after a 5 year reign. Following the Bonn Agreement on December 2001, an interim government was created and led by Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai who was hand-picked by the US government in an attempt to balance struggles for power with ethnic majorities. An emergency loya jirga (gathering of representatives or “grand council” in Pashtu – the traditional form of governance in Afghanistan in which delegates are chosen by tribal elders) convened in June 2002 under UN authority with 1575 delegates – 200 of which were women - which called for the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) to govern the country for the next 2 years. The process of formulating a new constitution began with the establishment of the Afghan Constitution Commission, and in December 2003 a meeting of the constitutional loya jirga convened which resulted in a new constitution and a new presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature. The recent national elections, the first since 1969, held on October 9, 2004 have resulted in the inauguration of Hamid Karzai as the nations President, albeit amid boycotts by the other candidates and charges of fraud. The cabinet is composed of a regional and ethnic mix of members from the ATA as well as Northern Alliance members.

These recent developments appear to indicate progress in the development of a new government. The emergency loya jirga which, through a two stage electoral process, selected a head of state and several ministers for the ATA prior to the 2004

elections who supposedly endeavored to select a representative group of ethnicities and religions as well as to reserve spots for women. Various human rights groups, however, have alleged that the process and the ELJ itself was flawed, tainted by “behind-the-scenes deals” and “widespread and systematic manipulation and intimidation by military commanders.”403 There have been multiple criticisms including complaints that: the US government played a role in these activities, to have “subverted the voting process”; complaints from delegates claiming to have received threats from warlords and fundamentalists, and; reports that the voting processes for the election of government personnel were “highly irregular.”404 In addition, a widely representative range of ethnic groups, including 2 women, gives the impression of a fair and inclusive government; this obscures the fact that the Northern Alliance maintains control over state structures and security apparatus’.405 It is also important to remember that women representatives do not necessarily represent the interests of women in – there have been speculations that the women “elected” as representatives of the government are simply symbolic and may in fact be members of insurgent factions or religious fundamentalist groups who are not there in attempts to represent women’s rights or security but simply to further the goals of their group. One of the most disturbing realities is that former Majahideen criminals were at the emergency assembly and sat on the transitional government as delegates. One woman delegate to the emergency Loya Jirga, Mahba Noor Zai from Kunduz, was cited as saying “We

403 “Afghanistan”, p3.
404 Ibid., p3.
405 Ibid., p3.
cannot speak out against the commanders or their ideas because we have to return to
our villages. Who will protect us then?" 406

Though formal hostilities have abated, the future looks to be marked by
instability, slow economic growth, weak governments, inadequate infrastructure,
inadequate social structures, and high susceptibility to future violence. 407 There is
currently a US military presence of about 18,300 troops who are primarily there to
hunt for remaining Taliban members and fight insurgents. A UN Peacekeeping force
from 37 countries called the International Security Assistance Force of about 8,400
has recently changed ownership from NATO to Eurocorps and operates primarily in
Kabul and the north. However, stability and security, Karzai has warned, remains
under persistent threat from insurgents. 408 The networks of power and armed groups
that have been established over the years will not disappear simply as a result of the
demolition of a physical base and thus will affect the country for years to come.

Military commanders, maintain control over parts of the country: "Bolstered by arms,
money, and support from the United States and neighboring governments, some
warlords maintain private armies and are reluctant to submit to the leadership of the
central administration. " 409 Civilians have been affected by recurrent fighting
involving bombs, rocket attacks, and individual and random attacks.

The extent of violence perpetrated against women and girls is severe.
Amnesty International has documented the widespread rape and other forms of sexual
violence by members of armed militias and former combatants, the abduction of

407 “Afghanistan, An Attempt to Understand the Chaos”, Zoller, Barbara, Ed. Crisis Watch, Fundacio
408 “Don’t Abandon us Now”, p1.
409 “Afghanistan” Freedom in the World.
women and girls, and the denial of basic human rights in the public and private
domain. Insecurity outside of Kabul persists largely because local village
commanders are part of private armed groups which control those regions, and
dozens of families have been forced to leave their communities in the highlands and
go to Kabul: "Women in Kabul feel safer because the peacekeeping troops protects
them from fundamentalists, but outside of Kabul women do not go outside. There is
no security," Explain Mamizha Naderi, the administrative director of Women for
Afghan Women (WAW).

Many of the same people who violated the rights of women in are now in
positions of power as local regional commanders an even in the central government.
"These are the same people who raped women," exclaims Naderi "everything they
could do against their human rights. Now they are in power and supplying the police
force. Everyone is afraid, not just women but men." A Human Rights Report, in
fact, cites one of the major problems contributing to continued human rights
violations as the US fraternizations with the Northern Alliance, essentially sheltering
an organization that is equally oppressive and dangerous as the Taliban:

The United States and the international community, as major power brokers in Afghanistan,
have put too little pressure on military leaders outside of Kabul to obey President Karzai's authority, to
uphold human rights standards or to relinquish power. Their continued funding, joint operations, and
fraternizing with warlords has sent, at best, mixed messages about their goals and intentions.

410 Heine, Katherine. "Prisoners in their own Homes", Reuters AlertNet, November 14 2003,
http://www.alertnet.org/
412 Heine, "Prisoners", p2.
The constitution itself has been criticized. The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), a group lobbying for the rights of Afghan women, has been working in concert with NGO’s and women representatives from all over the country to create an Afghan “Women’s Bill of Rights”. Including such provisions as the right to adequate health care, the right to equal pay in the workforce, the right to divorce, and mandatory education through to secondary school, the Constitutional Commission assured that these rights would be included in the draft constitution.413

Mamizha Naderi, the administrative director of Women for Afghan Women based in New York, declares that despite the good intentions, the way in which these rights have been laid out in the constitution have rendered them virtually useless. “They don’t want it to say ‘all people’ or ‘all human beings’ because in Afghanistan that means men and not women. Women are not considered on the same level as men.”414 Such details can be the difference between the realization of women’s rights and they can very easily be missed as a result of miscommunication between the West and Afghanistan. This is just one example that emphasizes the importance of including local women in the peace building and reconstruction process.

The US has applauded itself claiming that the Afghani people have been liberated, but what is the use of constitutional rights when women are too scared to leave their homes? “Regardless of what is being said in the constitution, the most important question is its implementation in society,” exclaims a Tahmeena Saryal, a member of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA). Has liberation truly occurred when changes are have only been made in Kabul, while

413 Note: excluding a request to make 18 the legal age for marriage.
rural areas remain fraught with violations against women’s rights?415 Hospitals have opened in some areas, but the conditions are appalling. The massive amount of weapons which flowed freely from the superpowers several years back mean that today carrying a weapon is the norm for most men. Girls are not able to attend school because of the very real danger of abduction or rape. Recent bombings of girl’s schools demonstrate the pervasive impact of insecurity, and several girls’ schools have even been burned down, demonstrating the threat to the provision for the realization of human rights.416 “It is better that women have a choice now,” says Saryal “but outside of Kabul people are scared to send their daughters to school because of security”.417 Without the opportunity to exercise it or the means to enforce it, choice and legal rights remain largely formalities.

One of the biggest problems contributing to the insecurity of women is the lack of a criminal justice system. Currently the system is so weak it is virtually powerless to protect women and ensure their security, and in fact is often the perpetrator of abuse and discrimination. Perpetrators of violence against women are not prosecuted, and reports of violence therefore are never made. Perpetrators of violence are free to commit violence with impunity and consider their actions as acceptable or, at least, un-punishable. Women who do seek legal recourse are unlikely to be heard or granted any sort of protection. “The criminal justice system will have to play a central role if women are to realize their rights in Afghanistan”.418

418 “Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us”, p2.
The gender specific nature of the insecurity affecting women in Afghanistan can be summarized in the following way: First, women are more vulnerable to violence and various forms of abuse which have been ignored by the new government and in many cases enforced by warlords. "Taliban brutality has been replaced by banditry and lawlessness." Systematic patterns of rape, abuse, and forced underage marriage have emerged that include the participation of members of the police and Afghan National Army. (ANA) In one reported incident, a woman detained at an ANA checkpoint was allegedly transferred as "a gift" to various commanders. In addition, Rights and Democracy, an International NGO supporting women's rights and peace building initiatives in Afghanistan with funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has received reports of women disappearing and an increase in the trafficking of women.

Second, this lack of security has had the effect of restricting the free movement of women thus inhibiting women’s equal opportunity to earn a living, obtain an education, access basic healthcare, and exercise their newfound "liberation". Although now legally permitted to work outside the home, Rights & Democracy observed very little indication that these rights were being exercised, noting few sightings of women working in the private sector and a distinct lack of employment opportunities. A high rate of unemployment means that women are still largely confined to their homes, their report states, as a result of "lack of security,

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420 "Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us", p20.
421 Ibid., p9.
warlordism, and the negative attitudes of family members regarding women’s participation in public life.”

The insecurity has also had a direct impact on the ability of women to participate in the political process thus compounding the problem insuring that women’s rights are included in the peace process. Women participants have been subject to physical threats, intimidation, and attacks on their personal security including women delegates to the Emergency Loya Jirga that was formed in June 2002. The ISAF and the ATA have thus far been unable to protect women who dare to vocally express their opinions on women’s rights. On the 28th of April, 2005, one woman who participated in a national day celebration was shot dead, and then on May 4, three women were found in the province of Baghlan who had been brutally raped then murdered and left with notes attached to their bodies warning women not to work for aid agencies or NGO’s. The incidents of this sort of violence is steadily increasing, often going unreported, and perpetrators go unpunished. It is also indicative of wide scale crackdowns on political activity which are attempting to prohibit the open discussion of political issues by political parties and individuals. According to Human Rights Watch, “Non-militarized and pro-democracy political parties find it difficult to campaign openly because of the security situation and pressure from military factions.”

\[423\] Ibid., p6.
It is important to note the direct connection and mutually reinforcing relationship between the right to participate in civil society and the right to education. Access to information concerning women’s rights is critical to securing those rights, and currently in Afghanistan significant barriers exist that prevent women from accessing information and thus from raising awareness. These include institutional barriers, lack of security, lack of communications and transportation infrastructure, illiteracy, economic circumstances, and dominant attitudes including perceptions by women of themselves as subordinate in status and worth. With regards to education, for example, even basic necessities such as infrastructure and operational facilities are an obstacle. As a result of Afghanistan’s violent history of the last several decades, it is estimated that over 30 percent of to 7,000 schools in Afghanistan had been severely damaged; less 40% reported having sanitary facilities and less than 50% had access to clean water. Although there have recently been an onslaught of positive reports of education following the large enrollment of Afghan children (up to 4 million throughout the country, and in Kabul 50% of the newly enrolled were girls) for the 2003 school year, Rights & Democracy states that the opportunity for primary education throughout the country is about 39% for boys and 3% for girls. Current government restrictions prohibit married women from attending high school and in 2004 there were reports of thousands of young women being forcibly pulled out of schools while other schools have been subject to threats and attacks by fundamentalist groups. “Education,” declares Rights & Democracy “enables women to make effective choices, participate in civil society and protect and actualize one’s interests.

426 “History of Afghanistan”.
427 “Afghanistan”.
As such, restricting women’s and girls’ right to education limits their capacity to
develop, understand and advocate for women’s human rights with Afghan society.”\textsuperscript{428}

Women are largely unaware of their rights under international law and Afghan
and Shari’ a law, and rarely have access to community decision making or
information. The notion of rights, explains Rights & Democracy, is not understood by
most Afghan women and the need for them to be educated about what they mean is
critical.\textsuperscript{429} This is compounded by a lack of available support and information
services for women.\textsuperscript{430} In addition, despite the legal restoration of the right to free
speech, assembly, and association, outside of Kabul a lack of monitoring and
enforcement have rendered these rights futile almost meaningless; there have been
numerous reports of violent violations in Heart including a police force that fire on a
peaceful demonstration at Kabul University in 2002 that resulted in the death of 3
students and the wounding of 20 others.\textsuperscript{431} Restrictions that result in women’s
inability to participate in civil society thus negatively impact on the ability of women
to work outside the home, get an education, or receive appropriate health services,
and vice versa: “It is essential for the eventual and long term reconstruction and
development of Afghanistan that civil and political rights not be analyzed in isolation
from economic, social, and cultural rights.”\textsuperscript{432} The long-term security of women is
doubly compromised by such restrictions.

The health of Afghan women is another such example of the interconnection
between access to information, civil and political rights, and social, economic, and

\textsuperscript{429} Ibid., p10.
\textsuperscript{430} “Afghanistan; No One Listens to Us”, p27.
\textsuperscript{431} “Afghanistan”.
\textsuperscript{432} Brunet, “Women’s Rights in Afghanistan”, p11.
cultural rights. According to a recent study by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), “women have an extraordinarily high risk of dying during pregnancy and childbirth.”[^1] Rights & Democracy has reported that Afghanistan’s maternal mortality rate is one of the worst in the world and that almost every day 50 women die from complications related to pregnancy that are easily preventable or treatable.[^2] These pregnancy-related deaths are largely avoidable and are mostly caused by the following factors: 1) Pregnancy at an extremely low age for women and girls; 2) excessive and continuous child bearing; 3) poor health and nutrition; 4) inaccessibility to healthcare services, and; 5) unsanitary and unhygienic conditions for women’s hospital wards.[^3] Saryal explains: “Hospitals are open, but they are dirty, filthy and there is not enough medicine.”[^4] This is compounded by the relegation of women to the private domain:

Third, the failure of the international community to respond to these violations of women’s rights contributes to their overall lack of security. Although reconstruction of the judicial system, law enforcement, and legal reforms are currently being undertaken with the support and financial backing of the international community, donors have demonstrated “an alarming lack of attention to the specific needs of women who come into contact with the justice system as well as to violence against women.”[^5] Reconstruction aid in general appears to be mostly talk: During the January 2002 talks in Tokyo, multiple governments committed US$4.5 billion in

[^4]: Heine, “Prisoners”, p.3.
[^5]: “Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us”, p.2.
reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. According to Winter, “only an infinitesimal proportion has to date dribbled through”.\textsuperscript{438} If this is an indication of the international community’s commitment to rebuilding the nation in general, then the prospect for assistance to women in specific is dismal. There has not been any concerted effort to employ a strategy to create a criminal justice system that has the capacity to protect the rights of women. The current International Security Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) has been unable to demonstrate that it considers women a priority, and does not operate outside of Kabul where the majority of abuses against women take place.\textsuperscript{439} There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between security and a justice system: without a functioning legal system, law enforcement, and judicial system, there can be no security, and without security there cannot be a functioning legal system. The international community has thus far failed to support the achievement of security for women and the protection of their basic human rights at a time when the opportunity exists.\textsuperscript{440}

Fourth, in some cases, international involvement may in fact be contributing to the abuse of women. There is currently a force of 18,300 under US command in Afghanistan and a separate 8,400 NATO force comprised of 37 countries that operates predominantly in the North. These troops and peacekeeping soldiers are not, however, always removed from the perpetration of violence themselves. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, 68 allegations of child rape had been made as of July 2004, including accounts of a child prostitution ring that was being run by a number of peacekeepers. The beating of a Somali teenager to death in March

\textsuperscript{438} Winter, “If Women Really Mattered”, p497.
\textsuperscript{440} Ibid.
1993 by two Canadian soldiers represents an overt example of racism that is not atypical in Western militaries. Peacekeepers often enter local populations that have been devastated by war and without gender sensitive training or screening or sufficient monitoring are liable to abuse the vulnerable state of women in children in the community. This, as we discussed earlier in Chapter 3, is indicative of a larger problem endemic in military mentality and the hierarchical gender relations that exist within its ranks. The peacekeeping objective of maintaining security of civilian populations can not be achieved if the root causes of these acts are not confronted.\textsuperscript{441}

\section*{4.3 The connection with international human rights law}

The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security passed on October 31, 2000 and is the first Resolution that focuses specifically on the gendered impacts of conflict and the particular nature of these impacts on women and girls, and the need to involve women in peace building processes. It calls for:

1. Protection of women and girls and respect for their rights;
2. Participation of women in peace processes;
3. Gender training for all involved in peacekeeping operations;
4. Gender mainstreaming in the reporting and implementation systems of the United Nations relating to conflict, peace and security.\textsuperscript{442}

The UN has increasingly been taking account of women’s unique situation in times of conflict through measures such as the 1974 Declaration on the Protection of Women

\textsuperscript{441} "Women, Peace and Security", p2.
\textsuperscript{442} "Fact Sheet: Understanding UN Security Council Resolution 1325", Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, www.peacebuild.ca
and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, gender sensitive provisions in the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC), The Fourth World Conference on Women, and several other Special Rapporteurs and Special Sessions. However, Resolution 1325 is particularly significant because it is a commitment made by the UN and Member states to work towards its implementation by taking specific actions regarding implementation that, if not complied with, can be held accountable by women’s organizations and peace groups.

The document itself is laudable. It recognizes that all UN missions and efforts in the areas of peacekeeping, peace-building, reconstruction, and conflict prevention have gendered components and require a gendered perspective. It urges parties to armed conflict to respect international law, carry out specific actions in order to protect women and girls from gender based violence, and to support and involve local women’s peace initiatives throughout the peacebuilding and reconstruction process. Pursuant to the adoption of the resolution, a study was carried out by the Secretary General on these gendered dimensions, including the role of women in peace-keeping and the ways in which women and girls are specifically affected by armed conflict. It drew on many different regional perspectives in order to ensure it was representative of a wide range of experiences, and explains in detail the judicial, legal, and law enforcement reforms that are required to implement the Resolution. Thus, “The

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444 “Fact Sheet”.
The international community’s involvement in Afghanistan is an important test case for seeing whether the will and resources to ensure such commitments are in fact implemented."446

On March 5, 2003, the ATA accomplished a major development when it ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) thus making a legally binding commitment to address women’s rights “in law and practice; in public, political, social and cultural life; as well as in personal status laws, education, health and work.”447 By agreeing to address women’s right’s, they have committed to undertaking specific measures to ensure non-discrimination and to modify social and cultural practices which are built on the superiority/inferiority of individuals based on gender. State parties to CEDAW are bound to “take comprehensive measures to combat violence against women, whether the perpetrators are family members, state officials, or members of armed groups,” and to “establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination.”448 The Convention outlines additional obligations including particular measures the state party must take in order to meet its obligation, including protective and support services, criminal sanctions for perpetrators of violence, the equality of men’s and women’s rights with

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446 "Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us", p3.
447 Ibid., p3.
448 "Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us", p8. See also CEDAW, Article 2, paragraph (a)-(g), and CEDAW, Article 5, paragraph (a).
regards to marriage and divorce, and particular protections for girls including the prohibition of underage marriage.449

Other human rights treaties that Afghanistan has ratified thus committing to agree to the principles set forth within and undertake measures in order to ensure their enforcement are the Rome Statue for the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) among others. Additionally, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action all mandate that states enact particular efforts to eliminate the discrimination of women and that these efforts remain under constant review to ensure their continued success. “International standards and declarations,” maintains Rights & Democracy “provide to the ATA an indispensable resource of measures to improve the status of women,”450 and remain so with the establishment of a new government from the recent 2004 election.

An analysis of Resolution 1325 as well as international standards and declarations are necessary because of the close and mutually reinforcing relationship between human rights and global and regional institutions, and human security. In fact, recognition of the close relationship between human rights and peace and security dates back to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which “not only ended the religious wars of Europe and formalized the principle of sovereignty, but also sought

449 Ibid., p9. See also General Recommendation 19, made at the 11th session of the Committee in 1992, paragraph 9 and 24; CEDAW, Article 16.
450 Ibid., p10.
to guarantee for religious minorities the right to practice their own religion.\textsuperscript{451} This linkage is reaffirmed in the Preamble and Article 1 of the UN Charter. Although, as we uncovered in Chapter 2, there are different understandings about how best to define and promote human security and the strategies and instruments that are best in attempts to achieve these goals, human rights law, international institutions, legal and judicial systems within the state, and normative legal frameworks at the international and national levels are undeniably of vital importance. The international codification of human rights that began with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 has since been followed by conventions and covenants – some of which are mentioned above – that have expanded on the meaning of these rights. In addition, various UN committees and commissions have been established in order to monitor compliance with treaties.\textsuperscript{452}

In addition to the efforts mentioned above to establish a “broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government” as set out in the Bonn Agreement, and the significant efforts by women in civil society and government to include women’s rights in the drafting of a new Afghan constitution, there has also been a considerable attempt at legal reform. In November 2002, the Judicial Reform Commission (JRC) was mandated under the Bonn Agreement to “rebuild the domestic legal system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law, and Afghan legal traditions.”\textsuperscript{453} In order to ensure that provisions for women’s rights are included, the JRC has consulted with the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (WoMA) which leads the Gender Advisory Group and is responsible for

\textsuperscript{451} Hampson, \textit{Madness in the Multitude}, p18-19.
\textsuperscript{452} Ibid., p22.
\textsuperscript{453} “Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us”, p4.
ensuring that the ATA addresses issues of women's rights and gender equality. In June of the same year, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was established to investigate and monitor human rights abuses and to ensure that access to information regarding human rights is available; included in their mandate are women's rights as one of its "priority areas." The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established in March 2002 to assist the ATA with the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, and to support MoWA in the area of women's rights. The primary donor for work on gender issues in Afghanistan has been the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

International law, international conventions, and regional laws are, however, in the absence of effective implementation mechanisms, worthless. And, in the case of Afghanistan it seems apparent that, in the words of one NGO operating in the country, that 1325 "lies dormant at the time when Afghanistan provides an opportunity for positive use of the principles of the resolution." The MoWA has, in turn, been criticized for its method of contribution to gender mainstreaming and international intervention on gender issues, its efforts having been characterized as "symbolic rather than substantial or strategic." The effectiveness of the UNAMA has been criticized for inadequate organization and ineffectual interventions; the post of Senior Gender Advisor, for instance, has been vacant since 2002. The ATA was also largely reliant on consultative groups, each lead by a donor country, which contributed to the reconstruction of the legal and judicial systems and human

454 Ibid., p5.
455 Ibid., p5.
456 "Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us", p5.
457 "Afghanistan: No One Listens to Us", p5.
Although the national process of reconstruction in conjunction with international support appears to be taking account of gender, the fundamental question is whether or not in practice women's rights which are critical to the success of Afghan's government and society, are in fact being realized:

> Despite the work of the Gender Advisory Group and the mechanism of consultative groups, it was reported that the ATA has so far failed to incorporate gender effectively into the national budget or the policy calculations of line ministries. Gender focal points appointed by the ATA in ministries have little authority to shape planning and policies.459

The UN human right's regime in general has been critiqued as being a largely promotional regime for human rights: “Its activities have rarely gone beyond the exchange of information, and its implementation and compliance mechanisms have generally tended to be weak.”460 States have, for the most part had to face little repercussion for human rights abuses as a result of the absences of effective compliance mechanisms. The recent creation of the ICC and war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are momentous developments in the international community’s ability to enforce compliance and prosecute the perpetrators of human rights abuses; however, the development of these legal instruments are still in their infancy and their success will depend on many factors, including international support and adequate funding. The factors listed above regarding the persisting insecurity in Afghanistan have compromised the effectiveness of 1325, CEDAW, and NGO’s.

458 Ibid., p5-6.
460 Hampson, Madness in the Multitude, p22.
4.4 “Us” versus “Them”?

And it’s really interesting to hear all this talk about saving Afghan women. Those of us who have been colonized know what this “saving” means. For a long time now, Afghan women, and the struggles that they were engaged in, were known here in the West. Afghan women became almost the poster child for women’s oppression in the Third World...But what did they become in the West? In the West they became nothing but poor victims of this bad, bad religion, and of these backward, backward men. The same old colonial construction. 461

The above passage was part of a speech given by Sunera Thobani in Canada after September 11th, and reaction that ensued in and of itself speaks volumes of the challenges faced by feminists in the international political community. 462 Her message, however, is profound. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I explored some of the claims of post-colonial and Third World feminists and called on the need for a racialized feminist approach to security. I have thus far primarily focused on how the US-led military coalition in Afghanistan has contributed to the perpetuation of women’s insecurities in Afghanistan and indicated the need for compliance with and enforcement of international human rights law, acknowledging its close connection with human security. What might an alternative feminist approach to the Afghanistan case study look like and what might it uncover?

Nahlo Abdo provides a revealing analysis in which racialized and genderized categorizations are brought to bear through what she calls an alternative or critical

462 Note: See “Introduction” in After Shock, p16.
feminist approach that deconstructs the actions of the US towards Afghanistan as “racist imperialism” and uncovers the resulting affects on Afghani women. US policies and practices, she argues, have taken the form of a renewed and reinvigorated “Eurocentric Orientalism” that is racist towards the Middle East and serves particular imperialistic interests. Although not a new phenomenon, “hate based attitudes towards the Third World” seems to have regained momentum in the US government, as evidenced by such warmongering discourse as “us” and “them”, “if you’re not with us, you’re against us”, and “The West and the Rest” for example. In fact, even the term “Middle East” is a constructed concept – the only commonality of these countries, argues Abdo, is being targeted for attack. She likens the language that has dominated US foreign policy talk since 9/11, such as proclaiming the beginning of a “crusade” for “smoking them out of their holes”, to that used in the Native genocide of North America. “Our civilization, freedom, democracy and ways of life” she explains, has been presented in conjunction with images of “their barbarism, inhumanity, low morality and style of life”.

This discourse has been constructed out of essentialized notion of one homogenous “other”, the other being all Middle Easterners, Arabs, Muslims and those who harbor them. In the West, there are several manifestations of Eurocentric Orientalism in practice: Reports of violent attacks on Arab men and women in the US and Canada began to manifest; Bill C36 became law in Canada which essentially tightened immigrant regulations for individuals attempting to enter the country who

463 Abdo, Nahla. “Eurocentrism, Orientalism, and Essentialism: Some Reflections on September 11 and Beyond”, in After Shock, p408.
464 Ibid.
465 Ibid., p410.
were from countries that “supported” terrorism; the media began to spout this discourse with veracity. The US fight against terrorism, which quickly led to the invasion of Afghanistan, “has crystallized all the ideological underpinnings of colonial and imperial policies towards the constructed other” argues Abdo.466

Interestingly enough, Abdo goes on to explore how such issues have manifested in the feminist movement. She illustrates the contested nature of the movement by revealing the various feminist responses to Thobani’s speech – many of whom were silenced or silencers. Much of feminist literature is embedded with a racialized epistemology that constructs the West as superior to the “Other”, the East, and this has permeated much of the gendered analyses of the Middle East. For some scholars, this was accompanied by a methodological shift from scientific objectivism to an approach that focused on people’s behaviour’s, characteristics, and beliefs. The focus on value-systems and cultural traits were far from value free, they were imbued with beliefs of Western superiority. “Eurocentric Orientalism” explains Abdo “…is a value-laden epistemology, which denigrates the Orient by homogenizing Arabs, Middle Easterners and Muslims and presenting them as an undifferentiated entity”. Arabs and Muslims were thus constructed as a subordinate other devoid of history and diversified identities.467 Value-laden assumptions then influence methodology, research sources, and the ultimate presentation of material. “For this reason”, explains Roded, it is important to return to the primary sources, to try to place data on women

467 Ibid., p419-421.
in the proper perspective, to search for alternative meanings, and to attempt to critically evaluate them".468

As I mentioned above, the power of feminist and critical analysis lies in their move towards post positivist approaches that open up spaces for alternate epistemologies and ontologies (which I believe are mutual driving forces of each other) and allowing the security agenda to move forward in ways that acknowledge the importance of identity. The implications of this are enormous for the situation in Afghanistan: “It is about turning Arab women from objects of research into subjects and real selves. By refusing to sensualize, sexualize or essentialize their subjects, Alternative Feminists recognize the diversity, dynamic and historical contextuality of the women they study, research, speak about, or represent”.469

How might we go about hearing Afghani women and what might they say? The irony in the Wests’ continuing quest for the “liberation of Afghani women” and feminists desire to expose the “oppressive nature of Afghani women’s lives” is that Afghani women themselves are the greatest source of information and action – women in Afghanistan have been debating their status for decades and have been creating organizations and coalitions for years. And, in the words of Winter, “The women have no lack of ideas”.470 For example, consider the woman’s conference held as an adjunct to the Loya Jirga on June 7, 8, and 9, 2002 organised by Negar, a Franco-Afghan women’s organization. The organisation’s close ties to the Karzai regime, while problematic on several fronts, allowed the conference to take place in Kabul where women expressed themselves through workshops and discussions. What

468 Roded, Women in Islam, p2.
emerged, above all, was the realization that these women mostly wanted to be heard. Additionally, contrary to many Western feminists, participants did not focus on male physical violence against women, or military assaults that continued to threaten their lives from factions within their country and external aggressors (this does not indicate that women have not been the subjects of violence, nor that they are not aware of its manifestations). The women instead focused the economic, cultural, and social violence that is threatening women’s lives on a daily basis, in the form of the lack of money and public transportation that limits their movement, the inability to pay rent or feed themselves and their children, the lack of access to water and health care, and the dangers of illiteracy which compound women’s survival on multiple fronts. They spoke of the social repercussions that women face who were married to Taliban fighters and now find themselves widowed or abandoned and are outcast from their families and societies, often with little children to look after. They spoke of the lack of employment and training for women, affordable housing, mandatory education, local clinics and basic sanitation services. “They were telling us: ‘Out children need to eat, need health care, need an education. We need to work: we need an education’.”

“They know what they need,” explains Winter “they have developed and costed projects. They are already working with women and children in the villages. But they have no money.” There are numerous Afghan NGO’s, including PARSA, Shuhada, and HAWCA which focus on women’s education, healthcare and income generation, and The Afghan Women’s Network, The Afghanistan Women’s Council

472 Ibid., p507.
(AWC), and the Afghan Women’s Education Centre (AWEC) which work in women’s rights advocacy and capacity building.\textsuperscript{473} Projects are often started up with funding from international aid agencies, but the funding usually dries up quickly and so to then the projects. “Donors must consult women across Afghanistan and their organizations to determine the needs of Afghan women.”\textsuperscript{474} The voices of Afghan women must inform the reconstruction and peace-building process, and to do that the international community needs not only to listen to their concerns but to enter a dialogue with national women’s NGO’s and their representatives. Local groups and individuals offer the only true expertise on what is required to achieve security and how to do it: “As for women who have mostly been identified as victims in the Afghan wars, reconstruction can be the road towards citizenry provided that funders facilitate networking by women’s organizations to challenge the traditional views about their capacity for governance and capacity building.”\textsuperscript{475}

I want to pause for a moment to consider the possibilities that emerge when we are willing approach Afghani women as subjects rather than objects, and listen to what they have to say by considering Hans’ particular project built on post-positivist methodology. By focusing her research around interviews of Afghan women that occurred between 1997 and 2001 who were displaced and have since found refuge in New Delhi, Hans is able to present insightful narratives and first person accounts of the experiences of individual women. For example, one woman who was widowed in the conflicts recounts how her life has changed, and in turn offers us a glimpse of her experience and her unique perspective of what this has meant for her:

\textsuperscript{473} Brunet, “Women’s Rights in Afghanistan”, p7.
\textsuperscript{474} “Afghanistan: No one Listens to Us”, p49.
\textsuperscript{475} Brunet, “Women’s Rights in Afghanistan”, p3-4.
Our families used to protect us. We were not open to sexual attack, and though the system of marrying our dead husbands’ brothers existed, we had physical security. We were looked after and never went hungry. But with the Taliban, the situation has changed. The community can no longer support us against the wishes of the state. The young are dying or are in the armed forces. Who will marry us? There is so much poverty, so our only option is to become prostitutes or beg.\(^{476}\)

Such a first hand account reveals particular insights that anyone who has not lived her life or had those experiences might not even consider. She acknowledges with precaution what Western feminists commonly refer to as an oppression of human rights, the custom of forced intermarriage within families, but then situates it in the context of the physical security in which it provided. She then reveals the crucial importance of a husband or male provider for women in Afghan society; a widow or an unmarried woman can still survive and does not become an outcast to society in the West, in Afghanistan however, a male provider can be the difference between life and death. Finally, the woman’s narrative is quite illuminating with regards to lack of options available to women in her position; there is a prevailing attitude in the West that looks down upon individuals who beg or sell their bodies, opinions often based on the idea that these women are “lazy”, or “immoral”, or even “smutty”. Such embedded beliefs are not easily dismissed when one conjures up the image of an Afghani beggar or prostitute. Such first person accounts are thus crucial in constructing a better understanding and common dialogue between cultures.

Hans also acknowledges certain challenges that limited the information she received and also contributed to the importance of her project at large. For instance, she contextualizes the women’s discussions in an environment, the refugee camp, in

which men are always present some of whom are often members of the fighting factions. "Thus," explains Hans "the discussions with the women were marked by apprehension, reserve, control, reticence, and above all a silence". As she points out, this silence is revealing and should be considered as telling as their narratives; women are often beaten, shamed, and generally forced into silence by men and nations. If women are silent, she asks, how do we understand their location and role within the nation? By acknowledging the contextual importance of their silence, we are better able to try to understand their experiences. She also recognizes the importance of understanding the prevailing mode of communication in which experiences are retold and histories are passed down. During these interviews she discovered that stories are passed down by word of mouth and thus are often absent from Western accounts of the politics in Afghanistan. Of some of the women she declares "They had so much to tell and so few people who wanted to listen to them."477

Narayan argues, as I revealed in Chapter 2, that the failure of mainstream Western feminists to include in their analysis of marginalized women an exploration into those women who are additionally marginalized due to their race, ethnicity, or class not only results in inadequate theories, but also results in "political agendas and public policies that fail to be adequately responsive to the interests of women from these marginalized groups."478 The direct relationship between theory and practice materializes in our analysis of Afghanistan in its current state of peace building and reconstruction in an environment where the mechanisms attempting to achieve these goals are dominated by the West. By advocating dialogue with Afghan women and

478 Narayan, Dislocating Cultures, p44.
organizations, I am not implying that Western feminists are “inauthentic”, or that all Third World feminists are more “authentic”. However as Narayan explains, Afghan women are more likely to understand the politics and underlying causes of issues within their own national context. In addition, their familiarity with their history and its role in the formation of aspects of their culture and traditions is particularly important in achieving long-term stability and security. Working together is politically crucial for both Western feminists and Third World feminists. A collaborative politics, however, will not be easy:

This requires, of course, willingness on the part of the Western feminists to struggle for “horizontal comradeship” and to let the “Oppressed Third-World Woman as Object of Rescue” yield to the Third-World feminist as intellectual collaborator and political ally on a wide range of issues that mark our common and fractured world.\(^{479}\)

This is a significant challenge particularly when not only Western powers that be but also when Western feminists do not even realize that Afghan feminists exist.

The implementation of international law similarly requires an engagement with Afghan women and a real attempt at understanding their individual and historically constructed lived realities: “If within the international community, Afghan women are only perceived as victims and not given visibility as active agents playing key roles in informal peace processes, lobbying for demilitarization and disarmament, there is little chance for implementation of Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan.”\(^{480}\) Another example of the limitless possibilities that exist once we, as an international community becomes aware of hierarchical gender and race relations

\(^{479}\) Ibid., p80.
\(^{480}\) Brunet, “Women’s Rights in Afghanistan”, p5.
that prohibit true advancement of human security, is presented in the recent Roundtables in Canada. In May and July 2002, a series of seven Roundtables were held all across Canada that, as part of Canada’s commitment to the UN Resolution 1325, created space for Afghan-Canadian women to voice their opinions regarding the future peace and security of Afghanistan. The discussions resulted in very specific recommendations for the Canadian government and the international community that spanned concerns, including specific elements required for physical and personal security, governmental justice and accountability, political participation, education, health, religion and culture, and economic empowerment and employment opportunities.481 The Roundtables explored the immediate physical and structural problems in Afghanistan, identifying, for example, specific steps to secure funding as well as the challenge of providing opportunities for women in such an insecure environment. In addition, they tackled common misrepresentations and cultural assumptions that manifest time and again in Western media, misinterpretation of the Muslim religion as a factor in cultural misunderstandings and gendered suppression, and the internal features that persist within the state that, like South Korea, defy traditional security assumptions of the state as protector against outside security threats. Security, the report on the Roundtable discussions states, is the fundamental barrier to women’s full participation in society and must be the foundation for rebuilding the country: “Only by mobilizing the energies and skills of the entire population, including women, can Afghanistan emerge from its current status”.482 By

utilizing the breadth of acknowledge in the Afghan-Canadian community, the
diaspora in Canada was given a voice by participating in the consultations helping to
stipulate objectives that are politically appropriate and culturally sensitive. Women
have a critical role to play in post conflict reconstruction and the international
community must empower these voices who are accustomed to being silenced and
ignored: “Since we are Afghan women, we know the pain of women in Afghanistan.
The voice of women in Afghanistan can’t be heard, but we can be their voice,
because we feel their pain. We can do this through these Roundtables. We can voice
their oppositions to our government in Canada”.\(^{483}\) (Mariam, Calgary)

\(^{483}\) Ibid., p6.
Conclusion

Many scholars in the field of IR have suggested that we need to give more attention to human security in all its aspects, in order to put traditional concerns about state security in proper context. In principle, this should lead to an understanding that security is gendered in particular ways, and hence that security of the individual can only be achieved by means that are sensitive to the ways in which men are women are differentially affected by the security dilemma (and respond differently to it). In addition, this focus on the individual should lead any gender sensitive analysis to also be sensitive to the multitude of unequal power relations that cross-cut those of gender – class, race, religion, culture – as well as the complexity of women’s historical differences and the need for creating analytical space for understanding women’s disparate struggles in history. In reality, however, neither of these assumptions is correct.

Despite the valuable contribution of feminist critiques to security studies, an understanding of individual security must incorporate an understanding of the importance of social relations and an analysis of the gendered, racial, and class hierarchies that are implicated in constructs of the state, wars, and peace-building. Thus, contemporary feminist critiques of security are inadequate in so far as they continue to operate in a Western, first world feminist perspective. Feminist scholarship, explains Chandra Talpade Mohanty “discursively colonize(s) the material and historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the Third World, thereby producing/representing a composite, singular “Third World woman” – an
image that appears arbitrarily constructed but nevertheless carries with it the
authorizing signature of Western humanist discourse. The oppressive
“victimization” of Third World women plays out not only in misrepresentation of
feminist scholarship but also in foreign policy that operates in the realm of a
Eurocentric history and a globally dominating Western hegemon.

Focusing on the ontological and epistemological issues feminism brings into
focus, largely by exposing the inadequacy of traditional theorizing about security, I
approached this topic with the goal of bringing several issues to bear: 1) Mainstream
traditional security perspectives are not entirely adequate to deal with the recent
transformations in the global polity that have resulted in the need to move from a
focus on the security of the state to a security of the individual; 2) The human security
approach has been instrumental in revealing this change and calling for new ways of
thinking and new strategies and instruments that are required in this new reality to
secure the individual; 3) There is a disconnect between national security and human
security in that attempts to achieve national security often result in decreasing human
security; 4) Women and gender analyses are often left out of security discourse and
security policy, even in the new human security agenda; 5) Feminist critiques of
security, though valuable, are not always sufficient; 6) There is a direct connection
between theory and practice, and; 7) Colonizing perspectives that oppress third world
women continue to infiltrate feminist theory and foreign policy.

These points are all intricately related to the fundamental dilemma in IR
security analyses: the individual is missing. What I’ve done throughout this thesis is

to reveal this reality and the consequences that result using tools that, albeit exceptionally revealing in some areas, proved to instigate more questions than I can currently answer. This is not, however, an unwelcome discovery. Querying within a post positivist space with a constitutive approach has allowed me to acknowledge the value in researching such a substantial project predominantly in search of the questions it raises regarding the next steps that must be undertaken and the resulting issues that must be considered.

The individual is missing – “so what?” We need to take this pronouncement and the dangerous implications in reality of it to a new level that seeks to tackle its materialization in foreign policy agendas and theoretical analyses in ways that will put it at the forefront. In other words, let’s focus on how we can realistically make the individual, not the state, the focus of theoretical and empirical analysis. For example, how can state leaders be shown that creating security for individuals within their own state borders is fundamental to the security of the state? How can foreign policy agendas incorporate the individual? How can IR move forward with the analyses that I am making above? How can feminism? The project I’ve embarked upon is far from over, despite the requisite “Conclusion” title above; the challenge ahead is to approach the challenges ahead from within this new space that questions the existing order and hierarchical systems of domination and subordinations and seeks out security for the individual through the pervading power imbalances that are implicit in both individual and state insecurity.
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