

North Korea, Representation, and Armament: An Investigation into the Politics of
Missile Defense

by

Nicholas Chlumecky
Bachelor of Arts, Bishop's University, 2015

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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This thesis examines how corporations use North Korea's media portrayal to profit. By gaining government contracts to develop weapons and missile defense systems, companies such as Lockheed Martin make billions of dollars. The thesis will examine how this is accomplished in three stages: first, by examining how soft power is generated and used to build a consensus. Then, government usage of soft power to rationalize North Korea as a threat is discussed. Finally, how corporations profit from government-authorized weapons programs will be detailed. The thesis will incorporate theory based off of the ideas of Joseph Nye, as well as geopolitical concepts promulgated by Michael Hardt.

Table of Contents

Supervisory Committee	ii
Abstract	iii
Table of Contents	iv
List of Tables	v
Acknowledgments	vi
Chapter 1	1
Theoretical Background: Human Rights as Soft Power	2
Theoretical Background: Empire and “Power to the Edge”	9
Chapter Information	18
Final Remarks	20
Chapter 2	22
Introduction	22
“The Only True Ideals”	25
Too Heinous Not to Act	30
Media as the Third Tier of Empire	38
Chapter 3	49
General Defense: Arms and Deployment	51
Missile Defense: Beginnings and Events of the Clinton Administration	55
Events of the Bush Administration	62
The Obama Administration	67
Trump Administration	71
Conclusion	74
Chapter 4	76
Primary Beneficiaries	77
Lockheed Martin, THAAD, and Aegis	82
Boeing and the Ground Based Midcourse Defense	89
Secondary Beneficiaries	92
Raytheon and Radar Components	93
Northrop Grumman	99
Other Secondary Beneficiaries	101
Closing Thoughts	104
Conclusion	105
Bibliography	110

List of Tables

Table 1	3
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Chapter 1

Introduction, Theory, and Structure

The goal of the thesis will be to demonstrate how North Korea's portrayal in media is used by corporations to advance profits via government spending. Government reactions to concern over North Korea means that companies frequently are given large weapons contracts. The process is contained within three different aspects: First, media generates soft power and builds a consensus among the population. Governments use this consensus to legitimize weapons development programs. Corporations are then handed the task of realizing these programs, and as a result profit massively.

The ability of media to influence the public and thus public policy has been demonstrated constantly throughout history. William Randolph Hearst's papers are frequently cited as a contributing factor to America's willingness to fight the Spanish-American War in 1898.¹ North Korea is no exception. Nearly all of the public's information on North Korea originates from media sources. As a result, North Korea, perhaps more than any other nation, is entirely understood by the American public through media portrayals. Such portrayals are almost universally negative.

The US government has used these negative portrayals, and the resulting public concern, to legitimize weapons development. The threat of North Korea is frequently cited as a rationale for developing missile defense systems. Missile threat analyses have consistently included North Korea as a main emerging threat to American national

¹ David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, Bonny Lin, *Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), 57-58

security and were instrumental in securing funding for several missile defense programs such as THAAD.

The government's programs then require assistance to turn an idea into a finished product. Corporations are thus contracted to ensure that programs take a physical form. Weapons contracts are frequently in the billions, as equipment, research, and testing for complex weapons systems often requires a large amount of overhead, and companies still expect to turn a profit from business.

The force allowing such a process to occur is known as "soft power". With soft power, governments can convince others to take an action, rather than forcing him. People will naturally follow a course of action because they believe it to be desirable. But what exactly is soft power? To best understand the concept, one must examine the work of Joseph Nye.

Theoretical Background: Human Rights as Soft Power

Published in 2004, Joseph Nye's *Soft Power* was written with special attention paid towards the Bush administration and US policy in Iraq. Nye believed that while the war had been a good demonstration of American military power, the US had damaged its international standing and thus its ability to "win the peace" compared to "winning the war".² Instead of hurting the international position of the US, Nye wanted the Bush administration to focus on soft power to improve its image.

The politics of image is a large component of the modern world, with much based on "competition for attractiveness, legitimacy and credibility. The ability to share

² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (PublicAffairs, 2009), xi-xii

information – and be believed – becomes an important source of attraction and power.”³

Soft power is the key to the competition. Nye firsts contrasts soft power with “hard power”, which can be defined as military strength and economic strength, and “[resting] on inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’)”.⁴ Soft power instead relies on image and perception:

But sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs. The indirect way to get what you want has sometimes been called ‘the second face of power.’ A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries - admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness - want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power - getting others to want the outcomes that you want - co-opts people rather than coerces them.⁵

Nye further outlines the specifics of these aspects of power in a table.⁶

Table 1

	Behaviors	Primary Currencies	Government Policies
Military Power	Coercion Deterrence Protection	Threats Force	Coercive Diplomacy War Alliance
Economic Power	Inducement Coercion	Payments Sanctions	Aid Bribes Sanctions
Soft Power	Attraction Agenda Setting	Values Culture Policies Institutions	Public Diplomacy Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy

Nye also believes that soft power will become more important given how drastically the information revolution has changed communications: while military and economic power

³ *Ibid*, 31

⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (PublicAffairs, 2009), 5

⁵ *ibid*

⁶ *Ibid*, 31

will remain important, technology is still improving and spreading. For instance, the US makes up a twentieth of the world population, but over half the world's internet users.⁷ Nye believes that this dominant role could easily be displaced by the Asian cyber-community. At the same time, new virtual networks/communities will spread across national borders, forming coalitions of citizens. Thanks to changes in the political game, soft power will become more important than ever.

Three primary resources advance soft power: culture (when it attracts citizens), government policies (when perceived as having legitimate/moral authority), and political values (when a nation lives up to them).⁸ The first, culture, makes up the set of values and practices creating meaning within society (what is beautiful, what is repugnant, what is exciting, etc.), represented in various forms such as literature, education, and mass entertainment. Culture such as the one surrounding America promotes universal values and interests that others share, hence, it gains more adherents than narrower ones do.

Government policy also affects perceptions abroad in a multitude of ways. The most obvious is foreign policy. The Carter administration, for example, promoted democratic and human rights ideals during the 1970s, and when supporters of these ideals came to power in Argentina in the 1990s, they often supported American foreign policy while American policy was eroded when the US did not support the Argentinian government during an economic crisis and allowed it to financially collapse.⁹ Domestic policy also influences this. For example, South Africa and Rhodesia's apartheid governments isolated themselves on the international scene for several decades.

⁷ *Ibid*, 30

⁸ *Ibid*, 11

⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 13-14

Following government policy is the third point, political values. When a nation is perceived as failing to live up to the standards it claims to hold, it loses the respect of citizens and thus soft power. Conversely, when it is viewed as upholding what it stands for, a government is more respected, and thus gains soft power. Legitimacy through political values is not without historical precedent. In China, for example, the passing of one imperial dynasty to the next was said by Confucian beliefs to coincide with the passing of the “mandate of heaven,” where the rulers had strayed from proper Confucian thought and thus lost the right to govern. Later, the USSR would paint themselves as having superior values compared to capitalist nations during the Cold War, giving rise to notable *tu quoque* arguments such as, “Well, in your country, you lynch blacks.”¹⁰

The combination of all three (culture, government policies, political values) as soft power serves to coopt people into supporting the policies of governments. For North Korea, soft power (mainly through the appeal of universal and American values) becomes a form of pressure in an attempt to force change.¹¹ NGOs and governments are the primary wielders, utilizing human rights/ethics predicated on the conception of universality to condemn or single out governments. Where do these ideas of human rights originate from? More importantly, are they truly what they claim to be?

While one can show human rights as a concept descending from documents such as the Code of Hammurabi, the Bible, and other religious documents, the human rights advocated in the modern era are frequently traced to Europe during The Enlightenment:

¹⁰ Vaclav Havel, “On Dialectical Metaphysics,” *Modern Drama*, vol 23 issue 1 (1980), 10

¹¹ It is important to note that the ultimate goal of the thesis is not to claim that conceptions of human rights are “wrong”, or a form of imposition by stronger nations on weaker ones, but that government use of human rights ultimately plays into the hands of the military-industrial complex.

writers like John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Montesquieu all formulated ideas on the rights of man and the social contract, which in turn influenced the American and French revolutions and their concepts of freedoms.¹² Such concepts include the right to representation, the right to property, right to trade, etc. While the explicit linking of all human rights to European ideals (the right to exist, or the right to food are found across the globe throughout history¹³) is impossible, many significant ones trace themselves back to Europe.

Charles Beitz goes further and suggests that human rights in their current form are not best understood through naturalistic or agreement theories, but instead posits what he terms a “practical” conception (based off of examining human rights in practice and then theorizing from it) where human rights exist to protect “urgent individual interests against certain predictable dangers to which they are vulnerable under typical circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of states.”¹⁴ Beitz’s concept explains why states are expected to uphold rights within their territory. If states fail to do so, the international community and other states pressure those in violation. Intervention may also be attempted, but only if it is beneficial to the intervening states, and only in the realm of human rights. Such a structure first emerged with the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations.

Special attention should be paid to the fact that human rights were frequently a rationale for colonialism: by bringing civilization to non-European nations, it was

¹² “A Short History of Human Rights,” University of Minnesota, accessed May 29th, 2016, <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-history.htm>.

¹³ *The Idea of Human Rights*, 203-204

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 109

believed that the world and humanity in general would be improved. Writing critically in 1926, observer Charles Sherrill noted:

“Much has been said and written of the White Man’s Burden - of our race’s duty to extend our civilization over territory belonging to the yellow or red or black men so as to better the condition of these aborigines. But is that true? Who shall decide whether such a change really benefits those peoples - they or we? Has not the time come to make frank admission that the “White Man’s Burden” is after all only a smug phrase coined to cover exploitation of weaker races for the benefit of the white one?”¹⁵

Sherrill’s words still seem relevant today in the context of NGOs worldwide: they adapt the role of moral arbiters, and pressure those who do not follow these morals.

Thanks to the historic link between human rights and property rights¹⁶, NGOs are also in position to advocate for a market economy and can place pressure on nations that

¹⁵ Charles H. Sherrill, “The White Man’s Burden,” *The North American Review* Vol. 223 no. 830 (1926), 65

¹⁶ Of these various rights coming out of Europe, several have important aspects warranting further discussion. The first concerns ideas of property rights. The conception of property has been critical in the development of human rights, with the Magna Carta, the first constitutional document in British history, dealing with property rights:

“(4) The guardian of the land of an heir who is under age shall take from it only reasonable revenues, customary dues, and feudal services. He shall do this without destruction or damage to men or property... (9) Neither we nor our officials will seize any land or rent in payment of a debt, so long as the debtor has movable goods sufficient to discharge the debt... (16) No man shall be forced to perform more service for a knight’s ‘fee’, or other free holding of land, than is due from it.”

The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution also invokes property as a right, protecting against unlawful search and seizure. The “Declaration of the Rights of Man” from the French Revolution similarly states: “Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.”¹⁶ Property was then included as a universal right in the UN’s “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, which noted that everyone had the right to “own property alone as well as in association with others” as well as the right to not be “arbitrarily deprived of [their] property”.

It also bears mentioning that property rights have often been used in efforts to expand colonial and imperial power, especially during the 1800s. Several wars resulting in occupation and incorporation into the colonial empire of Britain were declared due to economic reasons. One notable example of this is the First Opium War: English merchants had been importing opium into China, and during efforts to stifle trade and use of the product, Chinese officials seized 2 million pounds’ worth of opium. The British declared war shortly afterwards due to the assault on their subjects as well as for what they felt were violations of freedom of trade. In the resulting Treaty of Nanking, it was declared that British subjects would be allowed to reside “without molestation or restraint” in five cities *specifically* for the purpose of commercial activities. At the same time, these five cities were opened to foreign trade and Hong Kong was transferred over to British control completely in order to aid trading and shipping.

do not conform to these viewpoints while conferring legitimacy on those that do. In summation, property rights have an inextricable link to human rights, and when organizations advance human rights they also (whether intentionally or unintentionally) advance the idea of market economy and the property rights that go alongside that.

The UN asserting that human rights are “universal” (e.g. the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights¹⁷) is also misleading. Beitz critiques the conception of universality himself, noting that:

...human rights are supposed to be “universal” but it is not clear that this can be true of the human rights of international practice in any non-vacuous way. Sometimes the concern about “universality” is a worry about whether all of the values embodied in human rights doctrine can be seen as important for everyone, regardless of their associational and cultural ties. At the same time, outside agents who act to protect or advance human rights in a society where they are violated will almost certainly bear costs they would not bear otherwise. The concern about “universality” might arise as a worry about whether there is an adequate justification for imposing these costs. So an account of the “universality” of human rights must work from two perspectives—that of the supposed beneficiaries of political action justified by human rights and that of those who are called upon to act. In view of the beneficiary-centeredness of so much popular discourse about human rights, it is particularly important not to lose sight of the second perspective. The broader the normative scope of human rights doctrine becomes, the more puzzling it seems what such an account would be like.¹⁸

Non-Western nations also challenge the term “universal”, primarily because much of human rights comes from the European and American experience. Some documents such as the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam are eloquent on this point. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation signed the document into force in 1990, with member states at the time including African nations such as Uganda and Morocco, and

¹⁷ Accessed June 22nd, 2017 <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>

¹⁸ Beitz, *The Idea of Human Rights*, 45

Asian nations including Brunei and Indonesia.¹⁹ Although the document in question is modeled after the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the significant difference between the two is that the Cairo Declaration heavily utilizes Islamic conceptions of rights. For example, the document states in its first article: “All human beings form one family whose members are united by their subordination to Allah and descent from Adam.”²⁰ Other specific examples include defining marriage as between a man and a woman as stated in Article 5, and that all rights and freedoms in the declaration are subject to Shariah law as stated in Article 24. Although similar to the UN’s declaration, Islamic nations felt they needed to make a declaration that codified cultural differences. It demonstrates that, while the UN’s definition of human rights may be widespread, it is not applicable as a universal standard.

Theoretical Background: Empire and “Power to the Edge”

Human rights have gained their massive role within soft power in today’s global politics as a result of the emergence of a new world order. Here, non-governmental actors play bigger roles by virtue of what Nye calls an “information revolution”. This “revolution”, primarily in the telecommunications world, has created a world in which the speed of information transmission is faster and easier than ever before. More people than ever have access to communications networks, which allows for information replication at little to no cost. Because of this massive but still growing network, it becomes harder to control information, but much easier to spread it. NGOs and other

¹⁹ “Final Communiqué,” Organization of Islamic Cooperation, accessed March 20th, 2017, <http://www1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/19/19%20icfm-final-en.htm>.

²⁰ “Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,” University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, accessed July 13th, 2016, <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instreet/cairodeclaration.html>.

non-government actors have stepped in as the primary interpreters and propagators of information in an increasingly accessible globe.

NGOs are only one part of the world system in the information age. Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri expand on Nye's concepts to outline their view of the current world system, which they call the empire.²¹ Hardt and Negri believe that Nye himself best describes the structure of the empire best in *Soft Power*. In an excerpt, Nye outlines the full structure as a multi-level pyramid:

On the top board of classical interstate military issues, the United States is likely to remain the only superpower for years to come, and it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony. However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is already multipolar. The United States cannot obtain the outcomes it wants on trade, antitrust, or financial regulation issues without the agreement of the European Union (EU), Japan, and others. It makes little sense to call this distribution "American hegemony." And on the bottom board of transnational issues, power is widely distributed and chaotically organized among state and nonstate actors. It makes no sense at all to call this a "unipolar world" or an "American empire".²²

At the top of this pyramid (the first tier) is the United States. With the largest military in the world, as well as a massive source of culture (via music and film, among other areas), no other nation can reliably be said to have the same impact on the world.

Below the main powers are multinational corporations and nation-states existing in "local, territorialized organizations" such as ASEAN, in part due to their bargaining with corporations and redistribution of income according to the needs within their territory.²³ The primary benefactors of the pressure applied to North Korea are

²¹ Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth*, 275-276

²² Nye, Jr., *Soft Power*, 4

²³ *ibid*

corporations which profit off of defense industry, such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Hyundai Rotem, who all have large government contracts to develop various weapon systems. Other companies then benefit from the various requirements necessary to help complete a working model, such as Raytheon, who build the radar units necessary for Lockheed Martin's THAAD missile defense systems.

The third and bottom tier of the pyramid consists of popular interest groups in the global power scheme. Although nation-states have a hand in this area, an equally important role is played by media, religion, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).²⁴ Such groups serve to organize citizens into political units, expressing their wills and desires while serving as a counterweight to interests of nations and corporate groups.

The most important of these NGOs to the tier are those that seek to represent universal values such as peace, human rights, etc., such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The bottom line for such organizations is protecting "life", whether it be from war, starvation, disaster, so on. It is no accident that basing fundamentals on such an all-encompassing ideal has led to their position of primacy among other NGOs.

The third tier is where soft power comes into effect, as civil society is much better at advancing ideology than government, a problem Nye himself explores in the paper "The Information Revolution and Soft Power". In this, Nye notes that governments such as China cannot compete with the United States due to their limited development of civil society:

²⁴ *ibid*, 312-313

China does not yet have global cultural industries on the scale of Hollywood, and its universities are not yet the equal of America's, but more important, it lacks the many non-governmental organizations that generate much of America's soft power. Chinese officials seem to think that soft power is generated primarily by government policies and public diplomacy, but much of America's soft power is generated by its civil society rather than its government... Great powers try to use culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their advantage, but it is not an easy sell when it is inconsistent with their domestic realities."²⁵

As such, civil society's place as the tier of this world order is made all the more important as it often creates and advances ideology in ways that governments are either ineffective or incapable of generating themselves.

Special mention must be given to the United Nations, as it takes a unique place as an organization that represents national interests and the interests of the dispossessed at the same time. The UN is one of the most powerful humanitarian organizations, in no small part due to its funding and widespread influence. In the 2012-2013 budget, the UN was allocated 5.152 billion dollars to be divided between the various programs and missions it was undertaking.²⁶ For comparison, Amnesty International raised 61 million dollars in 2014.²⁷ As such, the UN has considerable influence at its disposal.

The UN and North Korea have had a contentious relationship since the formation of the UN; one of the first major actions the UN undertook was to condemn, and then vote to intervene in, the Korean war. Neither North nor South Korea, however, were even a member state in the UN until 1991, when the Security Council finally recommended

²⁵ Joseph Nye, Jr., "The Information Revolution and Soft Power," *Current History* 113 (January 2014), 19-22

²⁶ "Regular Budget 2012-2013," United Nations, accessed May 17th, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/hq/dm/pdfs/oppba/Regular%20Budget.pdf>.

²⁷ "Amnesty International," NGO Monitor, accessed May 17th, 2016, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngos/amnesty_international/.

both states gain membership of the general assembly.²⁸ Since that point, a litany of issues has constantly pushed North Korea to the front of the UN agenda. Ranging from the widespread famines of the 1990s to the constant attempts to first prevent, and now limit, the nuclear ambitions of the Kim Jong-Il and Kim Jong-Un regimes, the United Nations has frequently had its hands full dealing with North Korea. The UN has published five major Security Council resolutions aimed at restricting North Korea's capacity for nuclear proliferation along with other economic penalties in and after 2006.²⁹

All of these resolutions generally deal with the same principle: condemning North Korea for testing a nuclear device, telling them to abandon their program, and then putting a variety of restrictions in place. For example, in Resolution 1718, all UN member states were ordered to prevent the "sale, supply, or transfer" of three separate types of items: general military weaponry (such as tanks, helicopters, or missile systems)³⁰, technology related to nuclear proliferation, and luxury goods.

The UN also uses extremely specific language within these same resolutions. Generally, UN resolutions involve statements beginning with an operative clause, e.g. "*Calls* for the immediate cessation of hostilities" or "*Endorses* the solution proposed by Angola." In the North Korean sanction resolutions, the UN uses a large number of verbs that convey the failure of North Korea to maintain the expected standards of

²⁸ "Admission of New Members to the United Nations," United Nations, accessed March 20th, 2017, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/38/IMG/NR059638.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁹ "UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea," Arms Control Association, accessed May 29th, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

³⁰ "Letter dated 13 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," United Nations Security Council, accessed May 29th, 2016, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/NKOREA%20S2006%20814.PDF>.

morals/ethics: the most frequent of these are “deplores”, “condemns”, “demands” as well as “demands further”, and “decides”, e.g. “*Demands* that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile.”³¹ The usage of these verbs suggests that the UN is positioning itself as a greater moral authority, and thus has the capacity to make such judgements.

Taken together, these three levels constitute the world system in the information age, regulating each other and contributing to the overall stability of “empire” as outlined by Hardt and Negri. Some may note that their theory sounds similar to the Wallerstein “world-systems” theory, which also prominently features a world interconnected by ideology and trade. What separates the two?

Hardt and Negri address the supposed similarity themselves in the book *Empire*. While admitting that on the surface level both may appear to come to the same conclusion, they cite two primary differences between the two: historical significance of the current situation, and structural interpretations. While world-systems theory views the current global linkage as simply another in a series of cyclic phases of economic expansion across territory³², Hardt and Negri believe that the current order represents a shift from the previous logic of organization. Instead of globalization being merely a fact of life, it has legal ramifications that help solidify a single overarching political power. The differences in structural interpretations refer to world-system theory’s view that, in global economic connections, there is a center (the main source of power and

³¹ “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,” Arms Control Association, accessed May 29th, 2016.

³² Hardt, Negri, *Empire*, 9, “Other theorists are reluctant to recognize a major shift in global power relations because they see that the dominant capitalist nation-states have continued to exercise imperialist domination over the other nations and regions of the globe. From this perspective, the contemporary tendencies towards Empire would represent not a fundamentally new phenomenon but simply a perfecting of imperialism.”

information/trade flow, dominates the others), a semi-periphery (a mix of frontier and core organization, mediating both and generating change)³³, and a periphery (the least powerful in the system, can be compared to “the third world”).³⁴ Hardt and Negri disagree with this interpretation because of the geographical divisions that the world-system theory uses: they claim that such a conception can no longer truly grasp global distributions of production, accumulation, and so forth. Nations such as Brazil can have high levels of technological production existing alongside sweatshop labor. As stated in *Empire*:

This is not to say that the United States and Brazil, Britain and India are now identical territories in terms of capitalist production and circulation, but rather that between them are no differences of nature, only differences of degree. The various nations and regions contain different proportions of what was thought of as First World and Third, center and periphery, North and South. The geography of uneven development and the lines of division and hierarchy will no longer be found along stable national or international boundaries, but in fluid infra- and supranational borders.³⁵

Apart from world-systems theory, the authors also distance themselves from other theorists who view the current global order as a continuation of the previous systems of imperialism and colonialism. Hardt and Negri argue that the problem with this idea is that in these systems, different nations were often in competition with each other. The German Empire, for example, had several clashes with France over who would control Morocco in the lead up to the First World War. *Empire* instead posits that in the current system, instead of competition between several powers, there is simply one general power that “overdetermines” all others and structures them under a single “notion of

³³ Christopher Chase-Dunn, Thomas D. Hall, *Rise and Demise: Comparing World Systems*

³⁴

³⁵ Hardt, Negri, *Empire*, 335.

right”, where morality and ethics are the primary rationale or justification for action. As the authors put it: “This is really the point of departure for our study of Empire: a new notion of right, or rather, a new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts.”³⁶

How, then, does North Korea fit into this pyramid? What relevance does the country have to the problem at hand? In the case of North Korea, exceptionalism. North Korea, by virtue of its status outside of the global hegemony, will always be a possible threat or new market for the global hegemon. It presents a conundrum and an opportunity for all three tiers: an ethical code contrary to that of North American and European civil society due to a basis in communism, and an opportunity for citizens to rally around an issue and “save” a disenfranchised group, bringing them the benefits of Western ideology. A persistent security and thus existential threat to Empire due to possession of missiles and nuclear weapons, but a possibility to legitimize military expansion (especially in troop placement and missile defense) and justification as a protector of moral values by standing opposed to the North Korean threat. A destabilizing effect on global market mechanism, but an encouragement to spending and financial movement in order to resolve the problem and add new consumers, as well as profiting in the interim on military programs. North Korea thus finds itself an unwitting agent of the new order.

Additionally, the work of Bruce Cumings is an influence on the thesis. In his work *North Korea: Another Country*, Cumings discusses the regime’s origins and its

³⁶ Hardt, Negri, *Empire*, 9

relationships with the United States. Frequently, the subject of media and North Korea's presentation is brought forth. In his preface, Cumings notes:

Judging from our media, North Korea is the country every American loves to hate – beginning with President George W. Bush, who made it a charter member of his “axis of evil” and hoped to “topple” it. CNN never fails to introduce a story of the North using film clips of soldiers goose-stepping through Pyongyang. It is led by Kim Jong Il [dictator at the time], diagnosed by the well-known expert Greta van Susteren to be “insane or diabolical.” The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) says it possesses one or two nuclear weapons, along with chemical and biological “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and long-range missiles capable of delivering anything from atomic bombs to the smallpox virus along the American West Coast. “What we don't know is even worse,” or so we are told. A mimetic American commentary unites diverse opinion on one point: this place is a rogue-terrorist-communist-Stalinist-totalitarian-Oriental nightmare, America's most loathed and feared “Other.” The real mark of our continuous crises with the North, however, is the deafening absence of any contrary argument; the one remaining self-proclaimed top-to-bottom alternative to neoliberalism and globalization is anathema to everyone, progressives as well.³⁷

Cumings not only discusses the same problem of blanket media representation as the thesis, but he notes, similar to Hardt and Negri, how North Korea is positioned as the “other”, outside of the monolithic neoliberal system that dominates public discourse in the United States and its allies today. This thesis will take the same critical look at how media has influenced Western interaction with North Korea towards one of constant fear and concerns of warfare.

Given the focus on civil society, government policy, and business interests, the content examined will differ in each chapter. With regards to civil society, there are two primary areas of focus: NGOs, such as Amnesty International, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, etc., and media organizations, such as Fox News or NBC. Organizations such as these produce writings on North Korea that serve as examples of

³⁷ Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York: The New Press, 2004), viii

American culture, and thus soft power. Such documents also serve as a means to reinforce or spread soft power and are thus useful in demonstrating how political consensus on North Korea comes about, especially since almost all information on North Korea available to the general public originates from news media or NGOs.

Since the US government is the initiator behind missile defense programs, examining government-published information on missile defense and North Korea is necessary. The documents examined primarily consist of government reports on missile threats to the USA, and yearly budgetary or fiscal reports. The former is important as it demonstrates how governments tie North Korea to missile defense justification, and the latter shows where governments invest in missile defense. Budget documents often include small explanations or references for spending, so they are also useful in this capacity as well.

Finally, a large amount of government contract information will be used to show which companies benefit from government programs. These contracts are sourced primarily through the Department of Defense Contracts website section, or the Department of Defense archival website if they are older. Press releases from corporations are also used if they include financial information or contract requirements not given in the Department of Defense releases.

Chapter Information

Chapters two, three, and four will all focus on a major aspect of the links between soft power and the missile defense. These chapters have three focuses: outlining the major facets of how soft power is generated and used to build a consensus, examining

government usage of that soft power to rationalize North Korea as a threat, and then discussing how corporations profit from government development of missile defense.

In chapter two, the primary focus will be upon human rights, and how the UN and NGOs utilize them to isolate North Korea and build a consensus around a form of action. Some of the main focuses in the chapter will be the UN report on human rights in North Korea, due to its extensive grounding in conceptions of human rights, and media reports, which serve to illustrate how the ideals of American soft power are spread. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and their ideas for creating a “free North Korea” are noted, as well as the similarity with which the UN and the media have acted in accordance with their objectives: informing the public of the atrocities of North Korea, and mobilizing the public to support action against North Korea.

The collective support of the public in favor of action against North Korea is then utilized by the government to help legitimize defense programs. The government’s citing of North Korea to help advance weapons and missile defense programs is thus the subject of the third chapter. Here, missile defense will be the primary focus of analysis, as North Korea appears much more frequently and directly than justifications for conventional weapons. Missile defense will be examined chronologically, starting from the beginnings in the Reagan administration through the Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump presidencies. Important milestones with regard to North Korea are discussed in depth, such as the Rumsfeld commission, which helped missile defense maintain relevance after the fall of the Soviet Union, and which specifically cited North Korea as a reason to develop missile defense. Budget documents are also examined, as they not only provide further

explanations/justifications with regards to missile defense, but also give some financial insight into development.

The theme of finances is continued in chapter four, where the focus is turned to corporations that benefit from government military programs. Again, the primary discussion revolves around missile defense, but conventional weapons programs, such as the South Korean military's weapon acquisitions, are examined in brief. Missile defense is divided into two sections: primary benefactors and secondary benefactors. Primary benefactors are corporations responsible for developing missile systems overall, while secondary benefactors contribute a part to the system. Companies such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman are examined. Financial details of their work with the government are the primary focus of discussion, with contract information from the Department of Defense forming the bulk of the sources.

Finally, the fifth and last chapter will serve as a short conclusion, reiterating important points and ensuring the reader understands how all the information is tied together as a whole.

Final Remarks

The lack of knowledge on North Korea has created a situation where North Korea appears to the average citizen as the "bogeyman" of the world: inscrutable, alien, and most importantly, a threat. The work within this thesis is important as it discusses the effects of this perception: mobilization of resources to further military industry. The influence of the military-industrial complex on the lives of everyday people touches areas

not commonly understood as influencing military production, as evidenced by issues of North Korean human rights being turned into billion-dollar missile defense contracts.

News media, and the appeal of culture, are critical in shaping the thoughts and opinion of people around the world. American values of freedom, democracy, and equality are concepts most people would consider positive, but these same values are being utilized to isolate competing ones, and ultimately help reinforce the military-industrial complex by justifying protecting nations sharing similar values, such as South Korea and Japan.

Ultimately, North Korea has been deemed a threat and an outsider to the ideological norm in the world. Whether or not it truly represents a threat is irrelevant, both in the scope of this research and to the companies that earn money from it. The thesis ultimately simply hopes to demonstrate that human rights, as understood and accepted by individuals in North America, can still be utilized to justify the production of weapons of war, and allow massive profit to those who produce such weapons.

Chapter 2

“Civilization” versus “Barbarism”: Selling the North Korean Narrative

Introduction

This chapter will examine how human rights are utilized by the United States and its allies (in the form of “empire”) to isolate and contain North Korea. The various elements that make up empire (states, multinational corporations, and NGOs/civil society) all are attempting to bring North Korea under their control. The methods and rationale behind their attempts to interfere vary, but their usage of human rights as a justification to do so is a common link between them. These methods only work, however, due to two factors: the first, that the majority of individuals internationally believe in a specific definition of human rights, and the second, that North Korea is in violation of these principles. The manner in which this consensus is built will be demonstrated in the chapter.

A consensus is impossible without successful exportation of similar viewpoints. To do so, NGOs, think tanks, and media all help to synthesize these beliefs and then make them widely consumed. These groups constitute the third tier of Empire. While they may not always be in agreement with states (first tier) or multinational corporations (second tier), they ultimately help justify said states/corporations’ actions. In the case of North Korea, they accomplish this through creating and then disseminating knowledge on genocide, forced labor, and other human rights violations. The result is the bottom-tier serving as the foundation for Empire, especially significant considering the speed of information due to modern communications technology.

One such organization within the third tier is the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, which describes itself as a “bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to providing strategic insights and policy solutions to help decision-makers chart a course toward a better world” while focusing on “defense and security; regional study; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and trade to global development and economic integration.”¹ Notable figures such as Joseph Nye Jr. and Henry Kissinger have an affiliation with CSIS.² As a result of this extensive staffing by former high-ranking government employees, CSIS is an organization that has closer ties with the US government than many others of similar function can claim.

Due to their broad scope and focus on security and a “better world”, North Korea frequently appears in their research. One report is simply titled “A Free North Korea”. Written in 2012 and discussing the succession of Kim Jong-un to the post of Supreme Leader, the document argues that the US and South Korea must re-examine their policy towards North Korea, as otherwise they “...will continue the past patterns of unrelenting development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, improvement of ballistic missile and SOF capabilities, deterioration of human rights conditions for the general North Korean public, and a failed economy.”³ It then suggests that the primary goal of the US should be creating a “free Korea”. A three-point plan outlines the goal:

¹ “About Us,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed July 26th, 2016, <https://www.csis.org/about-us>.

² “Board of Trustees,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed May 8th, 2017, <https://www.csis.org/about-us/board-trustees>.

³ General Walter L. Sharp, “A Free North Korea,” *Korea Chair Platform* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 21st, 2012), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/120221_KoreaPlatformGenSharp.pdf.

- International organizations such as the UN must make it clear that the regime will be held accountable for human rights violations and Security Council violations.
- Strengthening the US-South Korean alliance through “every possible avenue”. This includes increasing the number of stationed, rotational, and exercise troops, as well as the creation of a military free trade agreement to allow for easier exchange and procurement of equipment.
- South Korea, the US, and ideally China must begin discussions on what a “free North Korea would look like”. This would include the shape of the government, US troop positionings, population rights, and refugee control.⁴

The report concludes by saying that North Korea “will not change on its own” and that the US and South Korea must help “force and support the change that is needed.”⁵

These points all touch on the previously mentioned military and international corporation tiers, but the most pertinent to the discussion here are the aspects relating to moral/ideological pressure on North Korea. As discussed in the previous chapter, human rights and accusations of violations thereof are the main vehicle through which to apply said pressure. “A Free North Korea” serves as a demonstration of an organization utilizing human rights to mobilize people and apply pressure. CSIS is, of course, not the only group to do so: the North Korea Strategy Center, a defector led Korean organization

⁴ *Ibid*, 2-3

⁵ *ibid*

that “[envisions] a free, open, and unified Korea”⁶ lists “Raising Awareness” as the first of its strategies for promoting action on North Korea.⁷

Returning to the realm of “A Free North Korea”, CSIS also notes that international organizations such as the UN must get involved, which makes sense given the UN’s anointed position as the final arbiter on the international scene and a protector of human rights. Support from the UN thus legitimizes these concerns as well as putting more resources towards the goal of pressure. The UN’s intergovernmental makeup then connects states to this goal, allowing them to further their own ends. Hence, this chapter will begin with the discussion on the UN.

“The Only True Ideals”

North Korea is itself present at the UN, even though the majority of the time it finds itself at odds with other members and the international public at large. Its presence opens itself up to direct criticism, as well as the expectation that it will follow various UN treaties on human rights and security. Why, then, would a government willingly participate in an organization at its apparent detriment? This is because non-membership is a worse alternative.

There are previous instances historically of non-membership or non-participation backfiring on a UN member. Perhaps the most notable example involves the Soviet Union’s role in the UN intervention in the Korean War. During voting on Security

⁶ “Welcome to the North Korea Strategy Center (NKSC)’s website!,” North Korea Strategy Center, accessed May 25th, 2017, <http://en.nksc.co.kr/welcome-message/>.

⁷ “NKSC’s Vision, Mission, and Strategies,” North Korea Strategy Center, accessed May 25th, 2017, <http://en.nksc.co.kr/nksc-history-mission-and-vision/>.

Council Resolution 83 and 84 in 1950, resolutions that affirmed the UN's commitment to South Korea and created a US led military coalition force which would fight in Korea⁸, the USSR was absent from voting due to a protest over the recognition of the People's Republic of China.⁹ Their absence resulted in both resolutions passing and eventually forced the Chinese army to intervene after the coalition force nearly completely occupied North Korea. By refusing to participate in voting, the USSR missed an opportunity to stop an intervention in the Korean War, ultimately sabotaging not only their interests but those of their allies as well. While North Korea may not itself be a Security Council member, the ability to be able to attempt to manipulate policy from within the UN is worth more than the possibility of having a decision made without input.

Of course, with membership comes the previously mentioned criticisms and other miscellaneous pressures, applying to any nation supporting North Korea in a type of "guilt by association". China, and less so Russia since the dissolution of the USSR, have supported the North Korean government historically due to the common link of communism in their governments. Both these nations have experienced similar pariah status in previous years due to the political aspect of the Cold War, where a binary between Western democracy and communist dictatorship meant that China and the USSR were frequently politically isolated from NATO nations and their allies. Preventing communist influence from spreading at all costs became US policy during the Truman administration, and proxy wars such as the conflict in Vietnam originated as a result.¹⁰

⁸ "Resolution of 27 June 1950," United Nations, accessed June 3rd, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/84%281950%29.

⁹ "Security Council," *International Organization* vol. 4 no. 2 (May 1950): 266-268.

¹⁰ Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on Containment," *Foreign Affairs* vol 73 no 3 (May-June 1994): 117-118

On top of these combative ideological differences with members, the language in the UN's founding documents itself allows the application of pressure. In the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is stated in article 17 that "(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."¹¹ The declaration's wording, specifically dealing with owning property "alone", is a de facto endorsement of free market economics and thus builds a rationale to oppose communism into the foundation of the UN.

Language such as that in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other various documents created by the UN have been used in the past against China and the USSR and are now used against North Korea. Having only gained membership in 1991¹², North Korea was not privy to the creation of many treaties or declarations, and the UN has used this absence to its advantage when critiquing the policies of North Korea. In the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea was found failing to uphold binding legal obligations that were "voluntarily assumed" as a UN member, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Both covenants were ratified in 1966 by the general assembly, and entered into force in 1976, a decade and a half before North Korea was allowed entry. In addition, both have the same type of language previously used against China and the USSR, mainly from wording in

¹¹ "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations, Accessed April 20th, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>.

¹² "Admission of New Members to the United Nations," United Nations, accessed March 20th, 2017, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/38/IMG/NR059638.pdf?OpenElement>.

the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights, which again de facto endorses a style of market economics.

While the various UN covenants serve one purpose of pressuring communist states, they also form a part of a broader framework of documents and structuring that give the UN the perception of ultimate arbiter of moral behavior, superseding all others. Previous attempts were made to create a similar organization, most notable being the League of Nations following the First World War. The creation of the UN in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War by the victorious powers (the US, the UK, and the USSR) also contributed to the appearance of power. By establishing legitimacy, documents that claim to represent a totality, such as the previously mentioned covenants and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, become accepted as fact. But creating similar documents is futile if the UN cannot maintain this position of supremacy. As a result, the UN also must ensure that individuals believe and accept this role, and education and pressure are utilized.

The UN itself has stated its intentions to use these methods to help tighten the pressure on North Korea. In the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, John Sifton, the Asia Advocacy Director for Human Rights Watch, stated:

“However, the UN Security Council has many rotating members. They have new members since the last debate happened. Educating not just the elite diplomats at the UN mission in New York, but the people of those countries, is an important task.

For example, Malaysia is on the UN Security Council this year. It also happens to be hosting the East Asia Summit and ASEAN summit later this year. While its leader is quite embattled right now, the fact of the matter is this is a country which is on the world stage this year and will be on the Security Council for the next few

years. It is very important that they are in favor of these debates [surrounding North Korea]. A certain amount of education of the Malaysian people or politicians in Kuala Lumpur is important. Spain and New Zealand are on the Security Council now. We lost Australia, which was a huge champion on these issues last year. It would be great if New Zealand could somehow be shamed into matching its neighbor's zeal for this issue. Angola is now on. That is a problematic situation. Angola's human rights situation is quite bad. Its diplomats can perhaps be brought along. Jordan is still there. All these countries on the Security Council need to be convinced."¹³

The writer's advocacy for bringing nations around presupposes the idea that the UN is the ultimate moral organization, and that for the UN to be successful, members must share its values. The idea of reproducing beliefs through education and pressuring nations to adapt are also on display regarding the member states they want to target. Malaysia is presented as a nation that is ignorant of what "proper ideas" are and can be taught to believe in them if they are exposed to the ideas and convinced of them. Spain and New Zealand, on the other hand, are thought of as nations already educated. Their populace already supports many of the ideals the UN represents. The aspect of pressure demonstrated: shame. By shaming nations on the international scene, pressure is applied for them to change and improve their image. Pressure through guilt is how nations already reproducing these ideals are brought in line on issues such as North Korea, as politicians feel pressure from their citizens to uphold these beliefs.

Thanks to this continuing positioning as a morally supreme organization, the UN is thus able to pass moral judgement on North Korea and its allies. As is the case previously, these come forth in UN documents: in this instance, North Korea is condemned in the aforementioned Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights through

¹³ "Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (report presented for the United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, February 7th, 2014): 23

moral characterization of witnesses, stated as having come forward and provided information “in ways that often required a significant degree of courage.”¹⁴ Witnesses continue to be characterized positively throughout the report, while the North Korean and Chinese states are immediately described as having refused invitations to participate. By immediately contrasting the witnesses with the states, the report creates a binary and implicates them as immoral, allowing the policies pursued against these nations to appear more acceptable and further pressuring them to accept the UN’s decision. While demonizing North Korea for their intimidation of witnesses and failure to adhere to standards, the UN hopes to go further by characterizing the situation in North Korea as genocide.

Too Heinous Not to Act

Since the end of the Second World War, genocide has been viewed as one of the most heinous crimes possible. As a result, the UN created its own definition of genocide in 1948, and deeming a conflict genocide is one of the most dramatic ways to draw attention to it. The conflict in Darfur, for example, gained widespread media attention thanks to campaigns from organizations such as Save Darfur, with one observer calling it “arguably the largest international social movement since anti-apartheid.” Save Darfur’s activities were a contributing factor in the US government’s decision in 2004 to deem the conflict a genocide and refer the case to the International Criminal Court.¹⁵ Similarly, accusations of genocide in the Yugoslav Wars prompted NATO bombing of Serbia in the

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 4

¹⁵ David Lanz, “Save Darfur: A Movement and Its Discontents,” *African Affairs* 108, no. 433 (October 2009): 669

1990s. The relationship of genocide to media attention has not gone unnoticed by those NGOs who are concerned with North Korea.

CSIS has raised the issue of genocide in an attempt to raise the level of urgency around North Korea, most notably in a conference paper entitled “North Korean Human Rights: The Road Ahead”. Hosted in May 2015, the conference was convened a year after the release of the UN report on Human Rights in North Korea to discuss the goal of the international community “...to carry forward the momentum created by the commission report and subsequent UN actions”.¹⁶ Attendees believed that it was important to “keep the public eye on the human rights issue... evaporation of attention might then allow policy to fall into that traditional trap of trading off progress on high-politics issues (e.g., denuclearization) for low-politics ones like human rights.”¹⁷ Two panels bear special significance due to their commentary on previous NGO literature and future possibilities dealing with North Korea: Victor Cha’s panel entitled “UN COI Report in Perspective”; and, Greg Scarlatoiu’s “What is the Road Ahead?”

In Cha’s panel, Michael Kirby, the chair of the UN commission on North Korea, speaks in some depth about the process undergone by the UN report in researching its findings and what he felt went well and what did not in assembling the report. Kirby makes several statements that highlight both the nature of Empire and demonstrates attempts to pressure North Korea. One that harkens back to Hardt/Negri is his assertion that the report “...was done with a very large part from civil society. They appointed three people who happened to be from different parts of the world and from different cultures.

¹⁶ *North Korean Human Rights: The Road Ahead*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed August 2nd, 2016, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korean-human-rights>.

¹⁷ *ibid*

We got on well and we worked hard together.”¹⁸ Kirby’s comments show the flattening of culture: it no longer matters where individuals originate from since they all tend to share the same values. The report’s praise, as well as its ability to operate after assembling with people of such diverse backgrounds, helps to demonstrate such claims made in *Empire* in a practical manner.

Following Kirby’s praise of the multicultural composition of the commission, he proceeds to discuss some of the problems that he felt had arisen with the report. One of the more interesting complaints made by Kirby was that of the definition of genocide:

“The definition of genocide came up in our report. A disappointment was that it is a very narrow definition. It is a 1948 definition. It was not wide enough for us to find genocide, and we did not. If we were ever in doubt on this report, we did not make a finding. This is a prudent, conservative, cautious report, but there was plenty of material on which to make strong findings.”¹⁹

There is an implication that the UN would prefer the changing of the definition of genocide as to make it applicable to North Korea. Mentioning the age of the definition of genocide by the speaker implies that the report’s writers believe that the definition is outdated and needs updating, but no solution is offered on this point. This implies that, while not officially deeming the situation in North Korea as genocide, the UN wanted to define it as such. Due to the heavy connotations of the term, doing so would grant the UN more support for intervention from the global sphere. The same tactic was successful in prior cases, such as the previously mentioned Darfur conflict and the Yugoslav wars.

¹⁸ *North Korean Human Rights: The Road Ahead* ed. Victor Cha, Marie DuMond (Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2015), 12, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/150528_Ch_NorthKoreanHumanRights_Web.pdf.

¹⁹ *ibid*

Kirby concludes his discussion by highlighting the moral necessity of affecting change in North Korea:

“The bottom line is we have not an assurance that what we have done in our report has even gotten to the people of North Korea. How do we get it to them? How do we get change on the ground? That is what we should be concentrating on for the road ahead.

My teacher of international law, when I was at law school, was Professor Julius Stone. He would often remind us of what the Talmud scholars would teach. They taught: It is not given to any generation to achieve the righting of all the wrongs of this world. But it is not our privilege to fail to try. We must try to right the wrongs. The wrongs of North Korea demand our attention, and they have to be changed. We know it. They know it. The obligation of us today is to chart the road ahead.”²⁰

Again, it is worth highlighting the fact that North Korea is referred to as being “wrong”, painting the situation as black and white. North Korea is breaking standards, and the US and the rest of the international community postured against North Korea is upholding them. This is a neocolonialist attitude: forcing North Korea to adopt the UN’s definition of human rights. Claiming that it is an “obligation” to help change North Korea is also another manner of attempting to rally support to the cause via guilt, with the implication that if one fails to meet an obligation they have failed the international community.

Slavery is another criticism leveled by NGOs in an attempt to raise awareness and increase pressure on North Korea. This charge brought forth by the Asan Institute, who self-describe as an independent think tank focused on “...policy-relevant research to foster domestic, regional, and international environments conducive to peace and stability

²⁰ *North Korean Human Rights: The Road Ahead*, 12

on the Korean Peninsula, as well as Korean reunification.”²¹ Its existence is relatively recent, only founded in 2008 in Seoul by a member of the Korean parliament.

Similar to CSIS, the Asan Institute has released their own analysis of the UN report on human rights within North Korea. In a 2015 seminar entitled “Beyond the UN COI Report on Human RIghts in North Korea”, they argue that the UN’s focus on human rights did not cover the entirety of individuals who were suffering from abuses at the hands of the North Korean state. The Asan Institute’s report mainly focuses on the usage of North Korean citizens as forced labor in North Korean nuclear facilities, as well as by other nations overseas for construction, actions equated to slavery by the analysts. They note among other things that work is not voluntary in character, debt bondage occurs, and there is no monitoring of work conditions by authorities.²² North Korea is not the only nation critiqued in this report, however, as the analysts found that other countries were utilizing the forced laborers from North Korea for their own economic benefit. The report implicates Russia, China, and Kuwait as the nations which employ the highest number of laborers; others listed include Angola, Poland, and Malaysia, who are all criticized in part for using forced labor, and in part for association with North Korea and thus human rights violations.

While North Korea and others earn criticism for forced labor, the report also considers the application of forced labor for nuclear purposes. Since North Korea is

²¹ “About the Asan Institute,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, accessed July 18th, 2016, <http://en.asaninst.org/about/about-the-asan-institute/>.

²² Sin Chang-Hoon, Go Myong-Hyun, “Beyond the UN COI Report On Human Rights in DPRK” (paper presented at *Slavery and Labor: Beyond the UN Report on Human Rights in North Korea* for The Korea Society, Washington, District of Columbia, November 24th, 2014): 24

utilizing this forced labor to enhance their nuclear program, the report claims a different response is necessary:

The international community can no longer focus on North Korea's nuclear program while ignoring its human rights abuses. The United States, European Union, and United Nations have long sought to separate human rights from North Korea's illicit activities and its nuclear weapons program. However, the defector testimonies included in this report demonstrate that North Korea itself does not make such a distinction. In conjunction with the UN COI Report, this report clearly demonstrates that human rights abuses go hand in hand with North Korea's nuclear activities.²³

They conclude that what has been a security issue until now should be reconstituted as a human rights issue for moral reasons, with the expectation that this will help to create more movement towards pressuring North Korea. What, then, is the next logical step? The report concludes that since engagement has failed, forcible regime change is too risky, and maintaining the status quo is unlikely to make change, a new sanctions program must be put into place. They cite the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, a document passed in the midst of fears of Iranian nuclear development and terrorism sponsorship in the Syrian conflict by the US Congress, as a good example to follow due to its targeting of specific individuals and institutions for travel bans and asset freezing.

At the same time as targeting what amounts to the entire North Korean government, the report also recommends ensuring that North Korea cannot profit from their labor force. Accomplishing this goal would involve ensuring payment goes to

²³ Shin, Go, "Beyond the UN COI Report", 35

workers rather than the North Korean government and implementing good working standards. Otherwise:

If the concerned countries fail to observe these conditions, the proposed international sanctions regime should draft a list of individuals and entities that make use of North Korean workers and penalize them accordingly. The purpose of this proposal is not to hinder North Korea's economic development, but rather to ensure that the gains of labor are given to the rightful owners, and that workers are given basic international standards of safety and dignity.²⁴

By the conclusion of the report, slavery has gone from a human rights violation to a rationale to shut off the North Korean government from operating effectively outside of its borders, pressure anyone who might use their resources (mostly their main allies, China and Russia) and turn a security issue into a moral issue.

While slavery and genocide are particularly headline-grabbing accusations, such accusations are also used to indict the North Korean government's treatment of its populace as a whole. Such tactics appear in Amnesty International publications, which garner attention with experiences of individuals within North Korea. Amnesty International is a well-known NGO to many, thanks to its popular status (the group refers to its webpage as "Everything you need to know about human rights") as well as its ability to market itself. Many US high schools have official student clubs associated with the group. The organization also attempts to engage individuals by asking them to write letters to the nations in question that are involved with specific human rights abuses.

Jeong San-Un in 2010 is one such individual that Amnesty has tried to bring attention to. San-Un was an elderly man whom the organization believed had been

²⁴ Shin, Go, "Beyond the UN COI Report", 41

detained in a prison camp after being forcibly returned to North Korea by Chinese officials. The organization requested that individuals write to the North Korean government to call on them to release San-Un immediately, and also urge that he have access to all medical treatment and food that he needed.²⁵ Other times multiple specific persons will be included in a document, such as the 58 prisoners detailed in “North Korea: New Information About Political Prisoners.” The report focused specifically on a Japanese couple who were suspected of having been detained by the government following their move to North Korea, and a North Korean engineer who was believed to have disappeared following cessation of contact with his Russian wife. All others listed were those believed to have been held at a detention center in Sungho township.²⁶ In all these cases Amnesty demanded the North Korean government to provide confirmation of the whereabouts of the missing individuals as well as explain the rationale for their detention.

Of course, Amnesty has also published documents similar to those of CSIS and the Asan Institute, where more general problems are discussed in relation to the North Korean government. They differ, however, in that Amnesty rarely offers solutions to the problems they identify, but instead look to other governments or organizations to solve them. For instance, in “North Korea: Torture, Death Penalty, and Abductions”, the organization discusses the three topics listed in the document’s title, giving specific mention to various abduction victims from the past. At the end of the document, there is a section of recommendations for North Korea to enact, which include improving

²⁵ “North Korea: Elderly prisoner's life at risk in North Korea: Jeong Sang-un,” Amnesty International, accessed August 19th 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa24/006/2010/en/>.

²⁶ “North Korea: New Information About Political Prisoners,” Amnesty International, accessed May 11th, 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa24/005/1994/en/>.

conditions in prisons and labor camps, stopping ill-treatment of prisoners, ending public/secret executions and taking steps towards ending the death penalty, and making public condemnations against abductions of foreign nationals while releasing information and allowing those detained to leave North Korea if they wish.²⁷ No methods of implementing their suggestions are given. Amnesty's style of simply demanding change is also found in their response to the UN commission on human rights in North Korea²⁸ as well as their discussion on the implementation of recommendations²⁹.

Amnesty actually offer solutions sometimes but, when they do so, it often mirrors the recommendations that national (the US) or supranational (the UN) interests put forward. All solutions recommended are either previous actions that the US/UN have taken or suggested, or a statement saying that a national government or international organization must address the problem. The implication is that, while structured to be more accessible than other NGOs and involving the general populace more, Amnesty International is, in actuality, reaffirming the conclusions of other organizations that have vested interests in a specific interpretation of rights and their methods of implementation.

Media as the Third Tier of Empire

All the assertions and information from NGOs are ineffectual without informed citizens. Here, the media play a critical role in educating the general populace and

²⁷ "North Korea: Torture, death penalty and abductions - Information sheet," Amnesty International, accessed March 21st, 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa24/003/2009/en/>.

²⁸ "North Korea: Amnesty International's written statement to the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council," Amnesty International, accessed March 21st, 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa24/003/2014/en/>.

²⁹ "North Korea: Implementing recommendations to improve human rights: Open letter," Amnesty International, accessed March 21st, 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa24/007/2010/en/>.

bringing them to the side of NGOs, and thus the side of empire. After all, without approval from the majority of citizens, containment of fringe states such as North Korea cannot go forward and the global order cannot continue to self-perpetuate. NGOs, of course, are aware of this and have taken steps to accomplish just that.

The previously mentioned “A Free North Korea” report published by CSIS incorporates aspects of the media as an important part of their plan to pressure North Korea. They advocate two specific needs for this to be successful:

- Creation of a “Strategic Communications Plan” in order to increase access to information in North Korea and inform the populace. A variety of stratagems are proposed, including conditioning donations to North Korea to get information in, supporting propaganda operations in South Korea, and increasing distribution of TVs and radios. Spreading information is characterized as the most important of the goals, as it helps to get “the truth” into North Korea and is characterized as having a more lasting impact than a nuclear agreement.
- Holding North Korea accountable “in the eyes of the world”, achieved through reporting the rhetoric and actions of North Korea in international news outlets, noting that human rights violations and weapons capabilities “must be widely publicized, creating outrage and demand for change from all corners of the world.”

A significant aspect of this report highlights the necessity of the media in raising awareness of North Korea via the American and South Korean presidential elections.³⁰

But how is the media going about this?

The main focus of the media currently is the weapons capabilities of North Korea. Consider the news agency Thomson Reuters and the headlines that it has run previously regarding North Korea. One, running in 2012, is “Isolated North Korea says its rockets can hit U.S. mainland.”³¹ This sentence has two key aspects. The first, that North Korea is “isolated”. The reader is conveyed images of North Korea as rogue, acting alone, cornered, and against majority opinion. The other, more critical one, is that North Korea is capable of striking at the continental United States. The implication behind this is that North Korea could, if it chose to, attack the US, but this is driven home by the descriptor of “isolated”, as it makes North Korea seem irrational and thus more likely to make illogical decisions such as attacking the US. It boils down to the politics of fear: by creating a fear that North Korea could do something with their weapons, it motivates the populace to support action against North Korea.

This article is far from the only one that Reuters has published that utilizes the same tactics of fear. Others in this vein include “Japanese demand for nuclear shelters, purifiers surges as North Korea tension mounts”³², and “North Korea puts army on alert, warns U.S. of ‘horrible disaster’”³³ Similar news agencies such as CNN and Fox News

³⁰ General Sharp, “A Free North Korea,” 2

³¹ Reuters Staff, “Isolated North Korea says its rockets can hit U.S. mainland,” *Reuters*, October 8th, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/korea-north-idUSL3E8L91JE20121009>.

³² Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japanese demand for nuclear shelters, purifiers surges as North Korea tension mounts,” *Reuters*, April 24th, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-japan-shelter-idUSKBN17Q0U6>.

³³ Reuters Staff, “North Korea puts army on alert, warns U.S. of ‘horrible disaster’,” *Reuters*, October 7th, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/korea-north-idUSL4N0HX3JT20131007>.

pursue the same line of headline writing: “North Korea’s diplomacy: does the rouge state have any friends left?”³⁴, “North Korea unleashing new threats against US”³⁵, and “North Korea propaganda video shows missile attack destroying US city.”³⁶

It goes without saying that titles are only a preliminary way of conditioning the reader. The content of articles is naturally more important in getting a message across. One such article that bears mention is one published by CNN, entitled “Could tensions turn into war in North Korea?”³⁷ The title already creates a sense of fear. In the article itself, North Korea is portrayed as dangerous and war is made out to be an event that could easily happen:

Analysts fear the situation is a tinderbox that could be set off by a small spark. “The real question now is somebody going to make a stupid mistake, because some kind of minor escalation could get out of hand,” said Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. “It’s not so dangerous that I’m not going to go to (South) Korea in three weeks. But it is a dangerous situation that could get out of hand,” said Bennett.³⁸

Characterizing the tensions as such is noteworthy, as, while it assures the reader that a war is not imminent, it still informs them that the situation is dangerous and needs to be dealt with. The phrase “stupid mistake” is also important, as coupled with the previous

³⁴ Ben Westcott, “North Korea’s diplomacy: Does the rogue state have any friends left?,” *CNN*, March 9th, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/09/asia/north-korea-diplomacy/index.html>.

³⁵ “North Korea unleashing new threats against US,” *Fox News*, April 19th, 2017, <http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2017/04/19/north-korea-unleashing-new-threats-against-us.html>.

³⁶ “North Korea propaganda video shows missile attack destroying US city,” *Fox News*, April 19th, 2017, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/04/19/north-korea-propaganda-video-shows-missile-attack-destroying-us-city.html>.

³⁷ Joshua Berlinger and Brad Lendon, “The North Korea rhetoric is angry – but is conflict closer?,” *CNN*, April 26th, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/26/asia/north-korea-chance-of-war/> NOTE: the article’s original title was changed in an update later that day to the one currently being used.

³⁸ *ibid*

characterizations of North Korea as an irrational party: the idea is already ingrained in the reader that North Korea would be more likely to make such a mistake.

Aside from the descriptions of North Korea as illogical, the article also highlights the concern of citizens more immediately affected by the threat:

The ongoing spat has left North Korea's neighbors preparing for the worst. Japan held their first evacuation drills last month and has put out guidance on what to do in the event of an attack. Americans in South Korea practiced evacuating the country in case of an attack last year.³⁹

The revelation that citizens are actually preparing for a possible attack helps increase the perceived urgency of the problem.

Another conservative publication, the National Review, has also played up similar concerns to its readers in its articles. One such article is “Nukes + Nuttiness = Neanderthal Deterrence.”⁴⁰ The article opens with the line “Acting crazy has worked for rogue regimes, but Western appeasement is not a long-term solution,” setting the tone for the rest of the article to argue for more intervention and what form it will take. The author compares North Korea to other states that have pursued nuclear weapons, such as Iraq, Libya, Iran, and Pakistan, but puts North Korea in a different frame because:

...no one has played the game better than the two Kim Jongs of North Korea. The result is that Pyongyang has gained billions in bribe money, international attention and concern, and free publicity, despite starving its own people and becoming the hated pariah of Asia.

³⁹ Berlinger, Lendon, “The North Korean rhetoric is angry – but is conflict closer?”

⁴⁰ Victor Davis Hanson, “Nukes + Nuttiness = Neanderthal Deterrence,” *The National Review*, April 25th, 2017 <http://www.global.nationalreview.com/article/447013/madmen-nukes-deter-western-actions-north-korea>.

Certainly, comparably sized Asian countries such as Sri Lanka or Malaysia do not warrant the world's focus or largesse by quietly tending to their own business. Under the rules of nuttiness and nuclearized blackmail, quiet non-nuclear states who play by the rules are ignored, and rogues who don't are courted and bribed. Outlaw leaders see such brinkmanship as the pathway to family enrichment and prolonged tenure.

There are still a few ways to break this dangerous cycle, but they all are predicated on two assumptions: the immediate remedies are quite dangerous, and yet the status quo is not sustainable and even more existentially dangerous in the long term.⁴¹

Again, descriptors such as "outlaw state" create the image of a government in violation of norms and alone against the world. The article also makes it clear that, while a solution is difficult and risky, it is still necessary compared to the alternative of doing nothing. Six aspects of this are detailed:

- Third Parties – appealing to China's self-interest and negotiating with them to increase pressure on North Korea
- Sanctions – argues that while sanctions may seem ineffective, they take a long time to work well, and thus can never be lifted until North Korea is incapable of wielding nuclear weapons
- Deterrence – since offensive deterrence is not very effective (North Korea is more concerned with causing as much damage as possible if attacked) then *defensive* deterrence needs to be focused, primarily on anti-missile defense.
- Degrees of Madness – having war hawks in government can help to apply pressure, as long as they have individuals who can mitigate some of their views

⁴¹ Hanson, "Nukes + Nuttiness = Neanderthal Deterrence."

surrounding them. Curtis Lemay, the architect of strategic bombing campaigns in the Second World War, is cited as an example.

- Allied Cohesion – ensure that all allies in the region (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia) are all on the same page and form a united front against North Korea.
- Brinkmanship – pressuring China to act by saying that since China did not act decisively to stop nuclearization in North Korea, the US will not act or possibly aid Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan if they sought to gain access to nuclear arms.

The effect is twofold: the measures that have already been taken are defended (sanctions), and the adoption of further military and diplomatic methods of pressure are advocated, while still shying away from arguing for outright military intervention. The final sentence aptly wraps up this idea:

In sum, when a nutty nuclear or would-be nuclear state goes too far in its various extortions and is seen as an immediate existential threat, then long-term dangers become short-term crises and override short-term appeasement.⁴²

The Huffington Post, on the opposite end of the political spectrum as a left-leaning publication, has also written to convince its readers of the threat from North Korea. One such article is “Why North Korea’s Nuclear Threat Must Be Taken More

⁴² Hanson, “Nukes + Nuttiness = Neanderthal Deterrence.”

Seriously Than Ever”. The article labels the situation in North Korea an approaching catastrophe, noting:

North Korea may already have as many 20 nuclear warheads that are small enough to be carried on its Nodong (or Rodong-1) medium-range missiles that can reach these bases. And the Trump administration seems to not want to risk the lives of American soldiers by assuming that North Korea doesn't already have this nuclear capability.

The cost of that mistake would be the lives of not just 80,000 American military personnel but also countless South Korean and Japanese lives as well. In fact, a North Korean nuclear attack, which will likely develop into war, can be expected to create a humanitarian, environmental and economic catastrophe that will set back the international community.⁴³

The military aspect is played up much more in the vein of humanitarian concern in contrast to the previously discussed articles; a larger appeal to emotions (if a mistake is made, countless will die) and the environment and humanitarian ideals are presented as being more important than economic. The article also uses this humanitarian threat to justify American presence in North Korea:

As such, the American military personnel and the superior equipment, aircraft and ships that they operate provide the South with a better chance of avoiding defeat should war break out.

Pyongyang's intention in using nuclear weapons would be to destroy these American bases to remove the advantage they give to South Korea's national

⁴³ Graham Ong-Webb, “Why North Korea’s Nuclear Threat Must Be Taken More Seriously Than Ever,” *The Huffington Post*, April 27th, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-north-koreas-nuclear-threat-must-be-taken-more_us_5901e1c2e4b00acb75f18506.

defense. This is why the threat of nuclear use, especially by a more brazen regime under Kim Jong-Un, needs to be taken very seriously.⁴⁴

America is characterized as the only thing standing between South Korea and annihilation from North Korea, implying they must maintain a military presence. As a result, the military alliance is shifted from a strategic issue to a humanitarian one via the logic of preventing North Korea from being able to threaten innocents. This allows for the portrayal of opponents to the military alliance as betraying humanitarian ideals.

A similar sentiment is expressed by the Canadian branch of the Huffington Post. In an article entitled “North Korea: A Humanitarian Crisis Decades in the Making”, the author again plays on the emotions of the reader. This article makes specific detailed references to the United Nations report on North Korea awhile discussing the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the brother of Kim Jong-un:

This assassination does achieve something though, it draws attention to North Korea and how brutal its regime is. If this is the regard with which the leader's own family is treated, how must its regular citizens be treated?

The answer is heartbreaking albeit unsurprising. In February 2014 the UN Human Rights Council presented the report on its investigation on human rights in North Korea. The findings are not for the fainthearted or weak stomached. Conclusions include that the North Korean regime has systematically violated human rights including freedom of thought, expression and religion; freedom from discrimination; freedom of movement and residence; and the right to food. The State was also found to have committed crimes against humanity including "extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation."

⁴⁴ Ong-Webb, “Why North Korea’s Nuclear Threat Must Be Taken More Seriously Than Ever.”

There is no system of law or legal recourse, individuals have no right to the basic freedoms which we take for granted, there are no protections for women, children, or minorities. The DPRK uses the control of food and the threat of violence, indefinite imprisonment (including three generations of families for "crimes" committed by one individual), and death (often in the form of public executions) as a means of control. Children are brainwashed from an early age to never question the regime. Defectors from North Korea tell of how they would try to suppress questions or thoughts about their conditions as they believed that the Supreme Leader would be able to tell what was in their minds.⁴⁵

The portrayal of the assassination as useful directly mirrors the opinion of CSIS, who, as stated earlier, believe a main focal point should be “holding North Korea accountable in the eyes of the world.”

Similar to mirroring the ideas of CSIS, the article repeats the conclusions the UN reached. Lines like “individuals have no right to the basic freedoms we take for granted” create an “us vs them” mentality, as well as emphasizing how these individuals *deserve* to be given these freedoms. A call to action is the final verdict:

But these must not be obstacles to freeing the Korean people from one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Through inaction we are implicated. Through apathy we are condemned. History will not judge the DPRK regime kindly, but what of us who allowed it to stay in power for so long?⁴⁶

In conclusion, civil society, ostensibly working for the general populace, frequently plays into the hands of national and transnational governments’ interests in the name of moral concern. While often advocating for causes that may not be in government

⁴⁵ Harith Chaudhary, “North Korea: A Humanitarian Crisis Decades In The Making,” *The Huffington Post Canada*, March 16th, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/harith-chaudhary/north-korea-crisis_b_15365354.html.

⁴⁶ Chaudhary, “North Korea: A Humanitarian Crisis Decades In The Making.”

interests, in the case of North Korea, civil society frequently supports ideas that require the participation of military and business. As a result, military and business interests become accepted as necessary for the protection and advancement of human rights.

Chapter 3

North Korea and Government Weapons Development

This chapter will examine how governments use North Korea as a rationale for expanding military programs. While historically these were tied to conventional weapons such as troop deployments, missile defense programs have recently become the primary beneficiaries, repeatedly using North Korea to push development since the 1990s. With the approval of the public thanks to media and NGO narratives, these programs face less scrutiny, and gain acceptance much more easily. Irrespective of North Korea's status as a threat, its status as a primary motivator for program expansion is clear.

American troops have been stationed in South Korea for over 70 years following Japan's surrender to the Allies in 1945. From that point on, the United States has continued to base troops and supply South Korea with weapons technology both to contain communism and protect a valuable market. The justification for such deployments is politically based in a historical alliance, but is publicly couched in moral language. The primary rationale comes from the concept of "responsibility to protect", referred to by the acronym R2P. This is a UN principle involving the prevention of genocide, and can be summed up in three parts:

- The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;

- The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;

- The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.¹

The first point serves as a blanket justification for army spending and deployments: since North Korea has been found by the UN as committing crimes against humanity, the US and South Korea can defend their spending as protecting their population.

The third point is also critical, as it gives the green light for intervention based on moral responsibility alone if a state is found to be failing to protect its citizens. The UN Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide states that “The duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and foremost with the State, but the international community has a role that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference...”² Thus, in the CSIS report, Jung-Hyun Cho raises the point that since the UN report on North Korea had clearly indicated failure to protect its citizens from crimes against humanity, actions beyond sanctions or referral to the International Criminal Court could be taken (with specific mention of the intervention in Libya). Cho also claims that since the North Koreans had failed in their obligations, civil society had to mobilize and intervene in some capacity. The mention of military intervention in Libya and the notion

¹ “The Responsibility to Protect,” Office of The Special Adviser on The Prevention of Genocide, accessed March 29th, 2017, <http://accountability.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2016/11/Office-of-The-Special-Adviser-on-The-Prevention-of-Genocide.pdf>.

² *ibid*

that nations had an obligation to intervene implies that members of NGOs and the third tier of “empire” hope to pressure governments into intervention; in the context of the military, increased spending on equipment and munitions results.

General Defense: Arms and Deployment

American deployment within South Korea is itself only possible due to the threat of North Korea. While originally based in containment theory, the rationale for American presence has changed to one of ensuring peace, as evidenced by the United States Forces Korea’s (USFK) proclaimed mission:

Our mission is to deter aggression and if necessary, defend the Republic of Korea (ROK) to maintain stability in Northeast Asia. The Service Members of the United States and the Republic of Korea have stood together for more than 60 years maintaining the Armistice and setting the conditions for stability and prosperity in the Republic of Korea. As a result, the Republic of Korea has flourished since the end of the Korean War and is now a respected, successful, and thriving democracy.³

A presence to “maintain stability” and to create a “thriving democracy” fits in with the moral justifications discussed in the previous chapter and the UN’s responsibility to protect doctrine, although USFK’s statement omits the fact that South Korea was under military rule until 1992. Regardless, the longstanding alliance (based on upholding democratic principles) between the US and South Korea means that the 8th US Army and the 7th US Air Force are both stationed as component commands within Korea.⁴ To maintain the fighting capability of these units, they must constantly be supplied with equipment. Ranging from clothes and fuel to weapons and ammunition, large quantities

³ “About,” United States Forces Korea, accessed November 1st, 2017, <http://www.usfk.mil/About/>.

⁴ *ibid*

of material need to be requisitioned in order to ensure the military forces are at fighting capacity.

US and South Korean forces face an army built more for quantity than quality and what the North Koreans term “two-front war”, where “unconventional [guerrilla] warfare” and special operations are utilized in concert with conventional warfare.⁵ In 2000, the North Korean army was estimated to have one million active soldiers, 4000 tanks/assault guns, and 1700 aircraft.⁶ While these numbers may appear impressive, they conceal the fact that a vast majority of North Korean equipment is extremely outdated by modern standards. Most of the tanks in active service are T-54s or T-59s (the Chinese variant), originally introduced into the Soviet armed forces in 1949.⁷ The USSR ceased using T-54s in armored units in the 1970s. Rearguard units also use T-34s and SU-100 assault guns, vehicles which were phased out shortly after the Second World War ended in 1945. The North Korean Navy has no vessel any larger than a destroyer⁸, cannot guard North Korean waters beyond 12 nautical miles⁹, and has limited ability to operate at night and in rough weather.¹⁰ 90% of the aircraft in the Korean People’s Air Force are dated from the 1950s and 1960s, with the newest aircraft (the Mig-29) imported in 1992. Even then, only 16 in total are available.

⁵ Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., *Shield of the Great Leader* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 10

⁶ *Ibid*, 57, 61, 123

⁷ Malcom Chalmers, Lutz Unterseher, “Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets.” *International Security* 13, no. 1 (Summer, 1988): 9

⁸ Bermudez Jr., *Shield of the Great Leader*, 106

⁹ *Ibid*, 93

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 92

Meanwhile, the United States utilizes the M1 Abrams, a tank that has been upgraded as recently as 2011, as the main tank. Congress allocated \$114 million for 12 new tanks in 2013, meaning each of the upgraded units costs approximately \$9.5 million.¹¹ The 7th Air Force utilizes F-16C fighter jets originally procured in 1988, giving American air forces the ability to use precision targeting equipment for low altitude and nighttime missions.¹² The US 7th fleet, based in Japan¹³, includes the USS Ronald Reagan, a nuclear-powered carrier, as a component of their strike force.¹⁴ In every area of conventional arms, the North Korean military is completely outmatched. As a result of tensions with North Korea, South Korea (and more recently Japan) invest heavily into defense. South Korea ranked 10th in global arms importers in 2016¹⁵, and both South Korea and Japan spend a comparable amount on defense to nations such as Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.¹⁶

Considering the near-antique state of North Korean equipment, the decision to continue to invest in either new equipment (by South Korea) or continued procurement

¹¹ Stew Magnuson, "Over Army Objections, Industry and Congress to Keep Abrams Tank Production 'Hot'", *National Defense*, October 1st, 2013, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2013/10/1/2013october-over-army-objections-industry-and-congress-partner-to-keep-abrams-tank-production-hot>.

¹² "36th Fighter Squadron," Osan Air Base, published August 29th, 2012, <http://www.osan.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/404677/36th-fighter-squadron/>.

¹³ "History," Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, accessed November 3rd, 2017, <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/Subs-and-Squadrons/>.

¹⁴ "The United States Seventh Fleet," U.S. 7th Fleet, accessed November 3rd, 2017, <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/Portals/8/documents/7thFleetTwoPagerFactsheet.pdf?ver=2016-01-27-061248-087>.

¹⁵ *SIPRI Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 20, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB16-Summary-ENG.pdf>

¹⁶ "Military expenditure by country, in constant (2015) US\$ m., 1988-2016," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed November 3rd, 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf>.

(by the United States) is done by taking advantage of public opinion against North Korea. The South Korean main battle tank, the K2, has a litany of high tech capabilities (such as being able to launch a parachute bomb, an autoloading main gun capable of 15 rounds a minute, and a massive sensor package) that bring it to a cost of 8.8 million USD.¹⁷ Compared to the T-55, the tank overmatches its opponent in every conceivable way other than cost. The funding for equipment such as the K2 is justified in no small part due to the media attention surrounding North Korea. Concurrently, it is unlikely that the copious spending on arms will help to resolve the situation on the Korean peninsula. Steve Bannon, the former chief strategist of the Trump administration, stated in an interview on the subject:

There's no military solution [to North Korea's nuclear threats], forget it. Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that ten million people in Seoul don't die in the first 30 minutes from conventional weapons, I don't know what you're talking about, there's no military solution here, they got us.¹⁸ With an estimated 8000 guns pointed at South Korea's capital¹⁹, it is extremely unlikely that any military solution to North Korea is achievable without significant human and material cost, raising the implication that the military spending is ultimately inconsequential.

While conventional arms are still produced with North Korea in mind, American military concerns have shifted from ground forces to missile capabilities. As a result, missile defense platforms were justified and funding was set aside to ensure their

¹⁷ Andrew Tarantola, "Korea's Black Panther Battle Tank Shoots Parachute Bombs," *Gizmodo*, January 13th, 2015, <http://gizmodo.com/koreas-black-panther-battle-tank-shoots-parachute-bombs-1676079831>.

¹⁸ Robert Kuttner, "Steve Bannon, Unrepentant," *The American Prospect*, August 16th, 2017, <http://prospect.org/article/steve-bannon-unrepentant>.

¹⁹ Mark Bowden, "How to Deal With North Korea," *The Atlantic*, July/August 2017 issue, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-worst-problem-on-earth/528717/>.

development and procurement. While North Korea is not the only nation targeted by the reports and intelligence advocating missile defense, it has been one central to the development justifications.

Missile Defense: Beginnings and Events of the Clinton Administration

The newest and most frequently discussed technological advance linked to North Korea is missile defense systems. With constant attention being drawn to North Korean missile capabilities, the military has advanced several missile defense systems, proclaiming them necessary to defend against any possible North Korean strike. As a result, North Korea has become a central aspect in government publications which advocate missile defense.

The concept of missile defense first broke into the American mainstream with the Strategic Defense Initiative, formed after Reagan's challenge in 1983 to "give us the means of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."²⁰ Quickly christened "Star Wars" by the media due to several proposals utilizing directed-energy weapons such as X-rays or particle beams²¹, the program would eventually be reformed under the Clinton administration as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).²² Under the BMDO, missile defense would come back into the mainstream thanks to the publication of three studies.

Two of these studies were conducted by the CIA in the early-mid 90s to assess missile threats to the US. One, published in 1993, considered North Korea capable of developing an ICBM within 10-15 years, but unlikely to do so as low resources and

²⁰ Gerold Yonas, "The Strategic Defense Initiative," *Daedalus* 114, no.2 (Spring, 1985): 73

²¹ *Ibid*, 75

²² David Raikow, "SDIO Changes Its Letterhead to BMDO," *Arms Control Today* 23, no. 5 (June 1993): 31

competing demands in the military meant little attention was paid to missile development.²³ The other, published in 1996, noted that nations such as China and India had taken 20 and 15 years respectively to develop ICBMs and both had much larger resources at their disposal. The report concluded that at least 15 years would pass before countries such as North Korea and Iran constituted a missile threat to the United States.²⁴

Both CIA reports were superseded in relevance by the third. “The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States”, henceforth referred to as the “Rumsfeld Commission” after its chair Donald Rumsfeld, was mandated in 1997 by Congress to “assess the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States.”²⁵ Released in 1999, the commission discussed advances made in missile technology and accumulation among states that could pose a threat to American interests, and explored how these advancements were possible. Assessing multiple nations (including North Korea), four main conclusions were brought forth:

- Efforts to develop ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads are a growing threat to the mainland US as well as its forces and those of its allies.

While they would not be as accurate or reliable as US-based systems, they could still cause major destruction. A nation deciding it wished to attain missile

²³ *Prospects for the Worldwide Development of Ballistic Missile Threats to the Continental United States* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), <https://fas.org/irp/threat/nie9317.htm>.

²⁴ *Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), <https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/oca961908.htm>.

²⁵ “Charter and Organization” in *Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States* (Washington: United States Congress, 1998), <https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/charter.htm>.

capability could do so within five years, with a possibility the US would be unaware of such a decision.

- The threat to the US is “broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports.”
- The ability of American intelligence services to provide accurate assessments of missile threats has deteriorated, and needs to be improved.
- Warning times of new missile deployments which pose a threat are shrinking to the point that the US may have little to no warning beforehand of a program reaching operational capacity.

Based on the findings, the commission recommended that the US review and revise its “analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment” to reflect an environment where there may be little to no warning.²⁶

While Russia and China, the two historical missile threats to the US, are detailed in the commission, primary concern was directed towards nations with emerging programs nations, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. North Korea is made out to be the principal threat of these three, as their missile development program is viewed as the closest to producing an operational missile capable of striking at American cities. Additionally, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and their ability to develop missiles with a high amount of secrecy, is said to increase the urgency of the problem. Proliferation, where nations assist one another in acquiring technology, is another issue where North Korea arises: Iran, for example, is noted as heavily reliant on foreign missile

²⁶ “Charter and Organization”

technology from Russia and North Korea. A warning is given on the dangers of collaboration, and the central role North Korea plays:

...there are other countries--some of which are themselves parties to various non-proliferation agreements and treaties--that either have acquired ballistic missile or WMD capabilities or are working hard to do so. North Korea, Iran and Iraq, as well as India and Pakistan, are at the forefront of this group. They now have increased incentives to cooperate with one another. They have extensive access to technology, information and expertise from developed countries such as Russia and China. They also have access through commercial and other channels in the West, including the United States. Through this trade and their own indigenous efforts, these second-tier powers are on the verge of being able to provide to one another, if they have not already done so, the capabilities needed to develop long-range ballistic missiles.²⁷

The commission frames North Korea as a prime threat, but only proposes a vague solution calling for an update of protocols and practices. The real impact of the commission comes from its *de facto* advocacy for missile defense programs.

A year prior to the unclassified release of the Rumsfeld Commission's findings (the classified version was made available to congressmen in 1998), the head of the House of Representative's National Security Committee, Floyd Spence, released a National Security Report to serve as a brief for the commission. In it, the ramifications of the commission's findings are laid out, both in the main text and a personal note from Spence himself. Within the primary text, the first point of discussion is the status of ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the incorporation of it within national missile defense (NMD). At the time of writing, the Soviet Union had dissolved and the concern of nuclear missile attack had diminished, acknowledged in the report itself as having changed the direction for NMD to "defending against a limited strike resulting from an

²⁷ "Charter and Organization"

accidental or unauthorized launch, or from the actions of a rogue state.”²⁸ The Clinton administration’s belief that a missile threat is not likely is noted, and the refusal to fund NMD or procure items necessary for a nationwide deployment is attributed to this belief. The Rumsfeld commissions’ findings are immediately put in counterpoint to the Clinton administration’s stance, with the section detailing said findings even titled “Enter the Rumsfeld Commission.”

Similarly, the personal note finds the same conclusions and goes further in its call for action:

I believe it is safe to say that the unanimous and bipartisan conclusions reached by the Commission indicate that the intelligence community and, therefore, policymakers may be seriously underestimating and miscalculating the threat to all Americans posed by ballistic missiles.

Consistent with its mandate, the Commission assessed the ballistic missile threat, and reported the most serious national security warning the American people have received since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the conclusions reached by the Commission suggest that the ballistic missile threat to the United States is a serious one today, not somewhere in the future, and is rapidly growing. In addition, the report contains an especially disturbing conclusion that ballistic missile threats will likely manifest themselves sooner than we think, leaving little time or ability for the Nation to respond...

The Commission members have performed an invaluable service by speaking forcefully and with one voice about the seriousness of the ballistic missile threats facing America. I continue to believe that the American people have been lulled into a false sense of security since the end of the Cold War and hope that the Commission’s report will serve as a wakeup call for all Americans, who must realize that the world remains a dangerous place.²⁹

The Rumsfeld Commission thus served as a de facto justification for the expansion of the NMD program, with North Korea serving as the main impetus. Other intelligence

²⁸ Floyd Spence, “Unveiling the Ballistic Missile Threat: The Ramifications of the Rumsfeld Report,” *National Security Report* (Washington: Floyd Spence, August 1998), <https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/nsr2-4rumsfeldreport.pdf>.

²⁹ Floyd Spence, “From the Chairman...,” *National Security Report* (Washington: Floyd Spence, August 1998), <https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/nsr2-4rumsfeldreport.pdf>

analyses published around the same time, such as the National Intelligence Council's "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015", released in 2001³⁰, are less in depth but reach similar conclusions. In all three of these reports, North Korea played a critical role in justifying development and deployment.

It is important to note that the authors of the Rumsfeld commission were not neutral parties. Rumsfeld had served as national chair of Republican Bob Dole's 1996 presidential campaign.³¹ Missile defense was a key policy point, and Dole pledged to "deploy an effective national missile defense system which will keep Americans free from nuclear intimidation and reduce the incentive of rogue regimes to acquire weapons of mass destruction."³²

Similarly, Rumsfeld was a signatory on an open letter published in 1998 by the Project for the New American Century, which called on the Clinton administration to oust Saddam Hussein and implement regime change in Iraq.³³ Two others involved with the commission, Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott, had ties to defense industries: Gingrich had a major Lockheed facility located near his district, and Lott had a Star Wars laser program move to his state.³⁴ When the Rumsfeld Commission released its final report, it argued that missile defense was not only necessary, but that Iraq posed a threat to American interests through missile based weapons.

³⁰ *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015* (Washington: National Intelligence Council, December 2001), <https://fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat-2015.htm>

³¹ AmericaLive, "Donald Rumsfeld Biography," *CNN*, November 22nd, 2010, <http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-521030>.

³² "Where Bob Dole Stands on Missile Defense," Dole/Kemp Online Campaign, accessed June 4th, 2017, <http://www.dolekemp96.org/agenda/issues/missile.htm>.

³³ Maria Ryan, *Neoconservatism and the New American Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 103

³⁴ William D. Hartung, "Reagan Redux: The Enduring Myth of Star Wars," *World Policy Journal* 15, no. 3 (Fall, 1998): 21dd

The various connections by advocates and authors of the commission are important to note, as it demonstrates the political nature of the commission and its results. The corporations linked to the commission were able to directly profit from the results published, and the nature of the conclusions meant that North Korea was elevated not only as a threat, but one that could grow larger without warning, and one that could assist other enemies.

Despite the various conflicts of interests, the commission's findings were accepted, almost single-handedly reversing the political trend in missile defense during the 90s. Before its publication, missile defense funding was an extremely divisive topic, with the Reagan SDI program itself only passing after heavy debate. In 1997, the Senate introduced a National Missile Defense Act, which never passed and barely cleared a vote by the Committee on Armed Services.³⁵ However, in 1999, after the Rumsfeld Commission's findings were published, a National Missile Defense Act passed the Senate by a 97-3 vote.³⁶ The act itself is only about half of a page long, but served as an official confirmation of a missile program, stating:

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.³⁷

³⁵ Strom Thurmond, *National Missile Defense Act of 1997* (Washington: United States Senate, April 30th, 1997) <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/105th-congress/senate-report/15/1?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22National+Missile+Defense%22%5D%7D>.

³⁶ "Senate backs missile defense system: 97-3 vote marks big shift for Democrats," *CNN*, March 17th, 1999, <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/17/missile.defense/>.

³⁷ 106th Congress, *National Missile Defense Act of 1999* (Washington: United States Congress, July 22nd, 1999), <https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ38/PLAW-106publ38.pdf>.

While the system was officially announced, the Clinton administration chose to defer the decision to deploy such a system to the upcoming Bush administration. A year previous, Boeing was given a contract to develop a National Missile Defense program (what would later become GMD)³⁸, and in 2000, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense program (THAAD) received official program initiation. These programs would become the main defense systems funded by the US government.³⁹

Events of the Bush Administration

As the dust settled from the Rumsfeld Commission and its after-effects, President Clinton's term ran out and George W. Bush was elected to the presidency. Clinton's

³⁸ "Boeing Wins \$1.6 Billion-Dollar Contract From DoD's Joint Program Office To Act As Lead System Integrator for National Missile Defense Program", *Boeing*, April 30th, 1998, <http://boeing.mediaroom.com/1998-04-30-Boeing-Wins-1.6-Billion-Dollar-Contract-From-DoDs-Joint-Program-Office-To-Act-As-Lead-System-Integrator-for-National-Missile-Defense-Program>.

³⁹ Three programs make up the core of American missile defense: the aforementioned THAAD and GMD programs, and the Aegis defense system. All three are designed to target missiles in different stages of flight: THAAD is designed to destroy missiles in the terminal phase, where missiles re-enter the atmosphere and are in the final stages of approaching their target. The GMD system targets missiles that are in the midcourse phase. Here, missiles are outside of the atmosphere and coasting towards their target. Aegis focuses more on short and medium range missiles, but also targets them within the terminal phase. THAAD, the US Army's program, had already been in development for nearly a decade by the time of the Rumsfeld Commission and its first tests had been undertaken in 1995. Having failed every test before the commission gave its final report, concerns about the future viability of THAAD were raised, but the program was able to continue and as of 2016 five batteries were deployed, with a sixth waiting for the delivery of the system radar. The THAAD system is designed to be mobile, effective against all types of ballistic missile, and able to hit targets in and outside the atmosphere, in contrast to the Patriot missile system, which can only function within.

The GMD system, on the other hand, has only recently broken into the mainstream news cycle, with the first successful test of the program involving a physical intercept coming on May 30th, 2017. GMD differs from THAAD in the threat counter: while THAAD is capable of countering shorter range missiles, GMD is only effective against targets outside of the Earth's atmosphere, meaning the primary threat countered are long range or intercontinental ballistic missiles. The US military has deployed 36 interceptors in Alaska and California. The Aegis BMD system is backed by the US Navy, and is designed primarily to operate as a ship-based defense system (although it has been adapted for land use as Aegis Ashore). The system primarily engages short and medium range missiles, but is also capable of tracking long range missiles in coordination with other defense systems. In 2014, there were 33 ships in the US and Japanese navies equipped with the system, with eventual plans to have more than 100 forward deployed ships.

indecision on national missile defense was replaced by the Bush administration's determination to expand military programs. Several moves were made to further this agenda. One of the most significant was the United States withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Russia. Originally signed in 1972 with the USSR, the ABM put an agreement to limit anti-ballistic missile systems, with the rationale that "effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."⁴⁰ But as the Bush administration entered office, it was made clear that removing the constraints of the ABM was a top priority. In May 2001, President Bush gave a speech discussing the need to move on:

We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace. This new framework must encourage still further cuts in nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies. We can, and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over.⁴¹

The September 11th attacks created the atmosphere needed for the Bush administration to follow through on such rhetoric. Two months following the attacks, Bush announced to the world that the US would withdraw from the ABM, citing terrorism and rogue nations:

⁴⁰ "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," October 3rd, 1972, <https://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abm2.htm>.

⁴¹ George W. Bush, "Remarks at the National Defense University" (speech, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, May 1st, 2001), The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45568>.

I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.

The 1972 ABM treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at a much different time, in a vastly different world. One of the signatories, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. And neither does the hostility that once led both our countries to keep thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, pointed at each other. The grim theory was that neither side would launch a nuclear attack because it knew the other would respond, thereby destroying both.

Today, as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other, or other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.

We know that the terrorists, and some of those who support them, seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile. And we must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses against those attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.⁴²

The “rogue states” that Bush referred to were clear references to the ones named within the Rumsfeld Commission, including North Korea. The implicit would be made explicit in the 2002 State of the Union Address, when Bush first coined the term “axis of evil” for a group of states including North Korea:

Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens...

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

⁴² George W. Bush, “President Discusses National Missile Defense” (speech, Washington, DC, December 13th, 2001), U.S. Department of State, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/6847.htm>.

We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. (Applause.) And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.

We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.⁴³

Bush then went on to announce “the largest increase in defense spending in two decades” for the upcoming fiscal year.⁴⁴ The final budget saw overall an increase in the Department of Defense’s funding by nearly 38.3 billion dollars.

The 2003 budget also had more language on the expansion of missile defense. In the 2002 fiscal year budget, only one line mentioned missile defense: “In addition to offensive forces, the President has established the deployment of effective missile defenses as a top Administration policy.”⁴⁵ Meanwhile, in the 2003 budget, there are multiple references throughout the section on Department of Defense that either specifically mention missile defense or related programs. A separate box notes that successful flight tests of missile defense systems had occurred, and that the Department of Defense had plans to aggressively pursue “exploration and testing” of missile technologies and deploy them as soon as they were “proven ready”.⁴⁶ Several pages later, the section “Transforming Our Armed Forces” includes various areas marked for

⁴³ George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address” (speech, Washington, DC, January 29th, 2002), The White House, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

⁴⁴ “Bush presents a \$2.1 trillion wartime budget,” *CNN*, February 5th, 2002, <http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/02/04/bush.budget/>.

⁴⁵ *Fiscal Year 2002: Budget* (Washington: Office of Management and Budget, 2001), 20, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2002-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2002-BUD.pdf>.

⁴⁶ *Fiscal Year 2003: Budget* (Washington: Office of Management and Budget, 2002), 89 <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2003-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2003-BUD.pdf>

investment and improvement. One of these is missile defense: “In addition, DoD will invest \$7.8 billion in ballistic missile defense with the objective of developing the capability to defend the forces and territories of the United States, its allies, and friends against ballistic missile threats.” The budget also announced plans to invest in “space-based radar and space control systems, which enhance our surveillance capabilities and our capabilities to collect and utilize information from space.”⁴⁷ Expansion in space-based radar and other surveillance platforms is crucial for missile defense: space surveillance is the fastest way through which missile launches can be detected. Without proper advance knowledge, the system is rendered useless. Thus, while the technologies contained within the category of space may not be indicated as missile defense, they are a core component.⁴⁸

The Bush administration would maintain its stance on missile defense up until the end of the second term, publishing various factsheets advocating missile defense. One in 2003 reiterated the same rationales given by the Bush administration previously, discussing the changing face of the world as a result of the September 11th attacks and terrorist states.⁴⁹ Interestingly, a 2007 factsheet made no mention of North Korea, instead primarily focusing on missile defense within Europe from Iranian threats,⁵⁰ most likely

⁴⁷ *Fiscal Year 2003: Budget*, 93, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2003-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2003-BUD.pdf>.

⁴⁸ It should be noted that attempts to develop space-based missile defense have continued, although they have not been nearly as successful or noteworthy. The most significant example would be the Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), which was sponsored by the Missile Defense Agency and had contributions from NASA. While mostly featuring a sensor array, it originally was intended to also test the viability of satellite based kill vehicles. Following controversy after the revelation of the additional kill vehicle payload, they were removed.

⁴⁹ “National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet,” The White House, May 30th, 2003, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030520-15.html>.

⁵⁰ “Fact Sheet: Defending America and Its Allies Against Ballistic Missile Attack,” The White House, October 23rd, 2007, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071023-5.html>.

resulting from controversy over revelations involving the Iranian nuclear program at the time.⁵¹

North Korea was integral in all the expansions that the Bush administration put forward. While it was not always directly mentioned by name (“rogue states” being a blanket term including North Korea and others), North Korea was always directly related to developments in missile defense. While the terrorist attacks of September 11th may have been the initial context for budget expansion, the inclusion of programs such as space-based radar and other missile defense technologies makes it clear that North Korea was the impetus for the final proposals.

The Obama Administration

The primary difference in missile defense policy between the Obama administration and the Bush administration was the shift from production justification to deployment justification. While the immediate emphasis continued to be on Iran, as per several Obama administration speeches and announcements⁵², North Korea was still viewed as a high priority threat, and slowly came back as the central focus. In 2009, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center released an analysis titled “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat”. The report discussed types of missiles, and examined different developments that each nation had made regarding the various types. North Korea is one

⁵¹ *Resolution 1737* (New York: The United Nations Security Council, December 27th, 2006), 1-9, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1737\(2006\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1737(2006)).

⁵² “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile Defense” (speech, Washington, DC, September 17th, 2009), The White House, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-strengthening-missile-defense-europe>.

of the nations mentioned in the various sections, starting from the key findings, where it is stated:

North Korea is continuing to develop the TD-2 that could reach the United States with a nuclear payload if developed as an ICBM. An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a new short-range, solid-propellant ballistic missile are also being developed.⁵³

North Korean progress is detailed in much more depth in the Medium and International Range Ballistic Missile sections, where the report notes that North Korea had attempted to place a satellite into orbit with a rocket that could be converted for military purposes, as well as developing a missile which could be used to target the United States proper.

North Korea is also listed as an exporter of ballistic missile systems. The report concludes that:

Ballistic and cruise missiles, with their relatively low operating costs, their potential to penetrate defense systems, and their value as a symbol of national power, will continue to be the offensive weapons of choice for many nations. As such, they are threats that must be carefully considered in future military planning and operations.⁵⁴

A year later, the Department of Defense missile defense review in 2010 noted that North Korea was attempting to develop the Taepodong II, an intercontinental ballistic missile, while still constituting a short-range missile threat to US forces. A positive assessment of US missile defense capacities is given, but is counterbalanced with the report's assertion that "the threat is inherently unpredictable and requires that the U.S.

⁵³ *Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat* (Ohio: National Air and Space Intelligence Center, June, 2009), 3, <https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/NASIC2009.pdf>.

⁵⁴ *Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat*, 31

be well hedged against future developments.”⁵⁵ The conclusion is that continued investment in missile technology is necessary as the US only has limited protection.

American policy and priorities going forward are also outlined in five points.

Only three of these are truly important to understanding Obama administration decisions:

- Defend the Homeland against limited ballistic missile attack
- Defend against regional threats to US forces, allies, partners
- Develop flexible capabilities that can adapt as threats change⁵⁶

The third point is related to the simultaneous development of multiple systems, which had been ongoing for more than a decade prior to the report, such as THAAD and GMD. However, the first two have formed the majority of missile defense discussion, as development reached a point where deployment was possible. North Korea was central to advancing all three of these policy points, as most media attention involving missile defense focused on North Korea.

Missile battery deployment has the most obvious connections to North Korea, with most deployments coming directly after media attention involving missile tests. THAAD missile defense batteries, activated during the Obama administration, are the primary beneficiaries of the attention. The first unit was activated in 2008, to allow for training on the equipment for full field usage.⁵⁷ Hawaii had begun receiving equipment in

⁵⁵ *Ballistic Missile Defense Review* (Washington: Department of Defense, February 2nd, 2010), 4
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/BMDR/BMDR_101_MASTER_2_Feb.pdf.

⁵⁶ *ibid*, 5

⁵⁷ PRNewswire, “First Battery of THAAD Weapon System Activated at Fort Bliss,” *Lockheed Martin*, May 28th, 2008, <http://news.lockheedmartin.com/2008-05-28-First-Battery-of-THAAD-Weapon-System-Activated-at-Fort-Bliss>.

2006⁵⁸, but it was not until 2009 that then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered activation of the Hawaii battery. The activation came on the heels of a series of North Korean tests. First, a nuclear device was tested in early 2009.⁵⁹ Following that, rumors emerged that North Korea was planning on conducting a missile test. The THAAD battery in Hawaii was thus activated in response to the missile test rumors. Two years later in 2011, the battery was moved closer to the Asian mainland when a transfer to Guam was announced. Within the Department of Defense press release, North Korea was specifically cited as the motivation behind the decision, alongside protecting US forces stationed in Guam.⁶⁰ A year later, more units were ordered from Lockheed Martin.⁶¹

North Korea was also central to Obama-era expansion of the missile defense program, as evidenced by a statement given in 2013 by then-Director of the Missile Defense Agency Vice Admiral James D. Syring. Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Syring stated:

The threat continues to grow as our potential adversaries are acquiring a greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their range and making them more complex, survivable, reliable, and accurate. The missile defense mission is becoming more challenging as potential adversaries incorporate BMD countermeasures. Space-launch activities in Iran and North Korea involve multistage systems that serve to further the development of ballistic missile technology for longer-range systems including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technologies and systems. As the Director for National Intelligence recently stated, “Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small 3 satellites, and

⁵⁸ “THAAD Equipment Arrives in Hawaii,” *Missile Defense Agency*, October 18th, 2006, <https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/06fyi0085.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test,” *The New York Times*, May 24th, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/25nuke.html?mcubz=2>.

⁶⁰ American Forces Press Service, “DoD to Deploy Ballistic Missile Defense System to Guam,” *U.S. Department of Defense*, April 3rd, 2013, archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119687.

⁶¹ “Lockheed Martin Receives \$150 Million Contract To Produce THAAD Weapon System Equipment For The U.S. Army,” *Lockheed Martin*, August 15th, 2012, <http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2012/august/mfc-081512-lm-receives150million.html>.

we grow increasingly concerned that these technical steps . . . provide Tehran with the means and motivation to develop larger space-launch vehicles and longer-range missiles, including an ICBM.” In addition to the Taepo Dong 2 SLV/ICBM, North Korea is developing a road-mobile ICBM and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable of reaching Guam, the Aleutian Islands, and potentially Hawaii.⁶²

North Korea colored the objectives of the Missile Defense Agency, shifting them towards “support for the warfighter”, meaning improving performance of existing equipment and systems, but also delivering more interceptors for the various systems in field use. An investment in new technologies such as solid-state lasers was also requested. North Korea thus again found itself a central component of the military’s rationales for missile defense expansion.

Trump Administration

In the Trump Presidency, missile defense remains a priority (one of Trump’s campaign promises was to make the military be “so big and so strong and so great” that “nobody’s going to mess with us.”⁶³), and North Korea remains the primary motivator for development and procurement. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which operates under the authority of the Department of Defense, features on its website a section entitled “The Threat”. Here, the importance of North Korea as a possible enemy to the US is outlined:

North Korea has expanded the size and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces — from close-range ballistic missiles to ICBMs — and has conducted an unprecedented level of nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches since 2016,

⁶² Vice Admiral James D. Syring, “Statement Before the Senate Armed Forces Committee and the Strategic Forces Subcommittee” (statement given to Congress, Washington, DC, May 9th, 2013), Missile Defense Agency, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_syring_050913_SASC.PDF.

⁶³ Jenna Johnson, “Here are 76 of Donald Trump’s many campaign promises,” *The Washington Post*, January 22nd, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/01/22/here-are-76-of-donald-trumps-many-campaign-promises/>

including its fourth and fifth nuclear tests, as well as its short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, long-range, and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. In February 2016, Pyongyang launched a TD-2 SLV from a west coast testing facility. The technology involved in a satellite launch would be applicable to North Korea's other long-range missile programs. In addition to the Taepo Dong 2 SLV/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has paraded the two road-mobile ICBMs which, if successfully developed, would likely be capable of reaching much of the continental United States.

Over the past year, North Korea conducted an aggressive testing campaign, launching at least seven Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), with a range greater than 3,000 kilometers. North Korea tested a new SLBM capability in 2015 and again in 2016. In February 2017 North Korea publicized the launch of a new solid-propellant missile that appeared to be a land-based variant of its SLBM. The missile was launched from a canister carried on a previously unseen tracked launcher.

Today, North Korea fields hundreds of Scud and No Dong missiles that can reach U.S. forces forward deployed to the Republic of Korea and Japan. Over the past months the regime conducted a multitude no-notice Scud and No Dong missile tests from a variety of locations throughout North Korea. This included a simultaneous, salvo launch of MRBMs.⁶⁴

The threat assessment makes it clear that the North Korean threat is not only persistent but current. The emphasis on the number of missiles possessed by North Korea also heightens the urgency of addressing the issue.

Similarly, a new threat assessment was released in 2017 examining the ballistic and cruise missile threat. While the report primarily focuses on detailing several types of missiles rather than discussing specific nations, each missile type discussed (SRBM, ICBM, etc.) is linked to countries pursuing them. North Korea is the first nation mentioned in the key findings section of the report:

North Korea has been developing the road-mobile Hwasong-13 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for several years and in October 2015 unveiled the Hwasong-14, a new road-mobile ICBM. The Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which placed a satellite in orbit for the first time in December 2012, placed a second satellite in orbit in February 2016. Flight testing of the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) intermediate-

⁶⁴ "The Threat," Missile Defense Agency, accessed November 5th, 2017, <https://www.mda.mil/system/threat.html>

range ballistic missile (IRBM) began in April 2016 with multiple failures. Several new solid-propellant missiles including a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) are also being developed. In April 2017, North Korea also commenced flight testing of a new liquid-propellant IRBM, the Hwasong-12.⁶⁵

The report details North Korean developments for each type of missile, from creating a native version of the SCUD, to developing ICBMs capable of reaching the US and missiles capable of being launched from a submarine. While North Korea is not the only nation mentioned in the report (Russia, China, and Iran also feature) it is still discussed as a threat to US forces and thus becomes a reason to develop missile defense platforms.

The MDA has revealed its budget requests for the upcoming 2018 fiscal year, discussing procurement and additional research that are believed necessary. \$379 million USD in additional funding was requested in order to increase the scope of missile defense in the US, bringing the total funding to just under \$8 billion USD.⁶⁶ The funds are split into different areas, including National Defense, Regional Defense, Space, and New Developments, justified as necessary to “preserve homeland and regional missile defense priorities and [invest] in advanced technology development and future capabilities to counter the proliferation of increasingly complex threats.”⁶⁷ The THAAD and GMD programs are the primary benefactors, with THAAD receiving \$451.6 million alone for procurement of additional equipment, additional development, testing, and maintenance add around \$350 million more. GMD would receive \$828.1 million for development and

⁶⁵ *Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat* (Wright-Patterson AFB: Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, June 2017), 2, <https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/bm-2017.pdf>.

⁶⁶ *Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Budget Estimates* (Missile Defense Agency, May 15th, 2017), 1, <https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy18.pdf>

⁶⁷ *ibid*

expansion, with \$465.5 million requested for development of better interceptors, and nearly \$500 million requested for development of radars necessary to utilize the system. The budget proposal also declares intentions to develop UAV-borne laser defense, high power lasers, and a multi-object kill vehicle.⁶⁸

Conclusion

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea, among other nations, has been frequently cited as a missile threat to the United States, lending credence to the government's decision to invest in missile defense. As a result, several programs, such as THAAD and GMD, have received authorization and been developed over the previous decades. In every intelligence analysis of threats to the US, North Korea was mentioned, often as a threat more imminent than other nations. As a result, American government administrations have continuously invested into new technology, while at the same time strategically deploying resources to contain North Korea. Such investments and deployments are achievable because of the media pressure described in the previous chapter. These investments are also maintained over governments of different political leanings, rather than being significantly altered when a different President is elected.

It is also important to restate the impact that the Rumsfeld Commission had on missile defense development within the US. Not only did it contradict previous reports that downplayed the threat posed by North Korea, but it helped ensure that all three of the major US missile defense programs were given official activation. All reports following

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 2-10

the Rumsfeld Commission have followed the same format of organization, as well as reaffirming its conclusions.

The issue for government then becomes: how are missile defense programs realized? This is where corporate interests step in. With the government providing capital, corporations develop missile defense systems to the required specifications. They are the ultimate beneficiaries of the media attention and government programs, and billions of dollars in profits come from missile defense.

Chapter 4

Weapons Developers and Profits

In his final speech as President, Eisenhower noted the vast role the military had come to play in society:

We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.

Now this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet, we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved. So is the very structure of our society.¹

Although Eisenhower was speaking more than 50 years ago, his words still hold weight, as American corporations (and corporations within other nations) command vast sums of money for their services. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that in 2014, the global arms trade was worth nearly \$100 billion USD total², and likely to be higher. With North Korea demanding attention on the geopolitical scene, defense corporations are ready to profit from government reactions to North Korea.

The military's successful use of North Korea to help justify programs means that corporations are tasked with developing weapon systems, and then paid for their services. This chapter will examine the various corporations that have extensive ties to the

¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Farewell Address to the American People* (speech, Washington, DC, January 17th, 1961), The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12086>.

² "Financial value of the global arms trade," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed November 20th, 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/financial-value-global-arms-trade>. Note that the site claims this to be only a rough estimate, as nations such as the United Kingdom or China either release limited data or none at all.

conventional arms and the missile defense industry. Ranging from Lockheed Martin and their development of the THAAD and Aegis systems to General Electric supplying turboshaft engines for aircraft, a litany of corporations all have connections and investments to the arms industry surrounding the North Korean threat, and all have profited handsomely. The Government Accountability Office estimated in 2004 that from 1985 to that point, the US had spent \$85 billion USD on ballistic missile defense, and would spend \$66.5 billion more just through 2011. The corporations examined will be divided into two categories: primary beneficiaries, those who directly profit from government contracts, and secondary beneficiaries, those who supply materials needed to ensure the primary beneficiaries can deliver their product, i.e. a subcontractor. Some corporations qualify as both primary and secondary because of work on multiple systems.

Primary Beneficiaries

Primary benefactors here are defined, as previously stated, as corporations that directly provide a finished product, whether it be a firearm, airplane, or other complete system. Companies such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, or Hyundai Rotem, all make final deliveries on products and can fit this definition. Primary focus is given to missile defense, but traditional arms (weapons utilized by the Army, Navy, and Air Force to destroy ground or air targets other than missiles) should also be considered. Weapons under the scope of the definition include guns, munitions, explosives, tanks, aircraft, etc.

For a military to be effective, the average soldier requires clothing, food, shelter, training, and military equipment such as the standard issue M4 Carbine³ and M9 pistol as sidearm⁴, and grenades, or other possible mission equipment such as body armor or anti-tank equipment. An NBC investigation in 2002 estimated the cost of just equipping a new soldier to be \$4700. When recruitment, training, pay, moving expenses, ammo, and support staff were included, the cost ballooned to nearly \$45,000. The article further estimated that training an officer was \$340,000.⁵

NBC also estimates that 37,500 soldiers are on the front line as a part of USFK.⁶ If every single one of the 37,500 were basic GIs, the cost of equipping and training the force would be approximately 1.69 billion dollars. If 10% of these soldiers are assumed to be officers, the cost increases to 2.962 billion dollars. The sum is only to train and equip the soldier once – equipment such as aircraft, naval vessels, tanks, etc. bring additional costs.

Given the extreme costs behind training and supply, arms manufacturers rake in profits. For instance, Colt Defense is the primary manufacturer of the M4 carbine standard issue to US soldiers stationed in South Korea. At an estimated \$1500 per gun, and assuming all 37,500 soldiers are given an M4, the total comes out to \$56.25 million

³ *Weapons Systems 2011* (Arlington: ASA (ALT), 2011), 290, <https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh2011/wsh2011.pdf>.

⁴ *Pistol Procurement: Allegations on Army Selection of Beretta 9-mm. as DOD Standard Sidearm* (Washington: United States General Accounting Office, June 16th, 1986), 1, <http://archive.gao.gov/d4t4/130439.pdf>.

⁵ Diana Olick, “An army of one carries a high price,” *NBC News*, October 21st, 2001, <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3072945/t/army-one-carries-high-price/>.

⁶ Corky Seimaszko, “Meet the Americans on the Front Line If North Korea Goes to War,” *NBC News*, April 15th, 2017, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/meet-american-soldiers-front-line-if-north-korea-goes-war-n746681>.

USD. While this may appear to be a large amount, it pales in comparison to other income received for conventional weapons. The K2 Black Panther, a main battle tank of the South Korean army, is estimated to cost \$6.9 million USD a unit. With a total of 206 tanks either produced or in the process of delivery by 2016, an estimated \$1.4 billion USD would have been spent by the government purchasing them from Hyundai Rotem. On top of these expenditures, the South Korean government is believed to have spent nearly \$2 billion USD in development costs before orders were submitted.⁷

The South Korean Air Force, like many other national branches, utilizes American-produced aircraft as the core of its equipment. As a result, corporations such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin have made tremendous profits from sales to South Korea. Between 1990 and 2016, South Korea purchased 140 F-16s, 61 F-15Es, and 4 Boeing 733 AEW&C surveillance craft. In total, these purchases cost the Korean government nearly 10 billion USD. Additionally, 57 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were purchased from Sikorsky with an estimated price of 1.25 billion USD.⁸ Japan made similar purchases of aircraft through this period, with delivery of 213 F-15Cs being completed in 1999, and 42 F-35 aircraft ordered in 2012 at a total estimated cost of 16.37 billion USD.

Similarly, the South Korean Army uses equipment based on American designs. The K1 tank is based on the M1 Abrams, and the M48 Patton is only now being phased out of service by the previously mentioned K2 Black Panther. The K1, like the K2, is

⁷ “Military to deploy more K-2 main battle tanks by 2017,” *The Korea Times*, November 19th, 2014, http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/11/113_168460.html.

⁸ *Trade Register 1997-2016* (created November 12th, 2017), distributed by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php. Cost of UH-60s is based off US Department of Defense budgetary data.

manufactured by Hyundai Rotem, who have constructed at least 1000 tanks for South Korea since its introduction into the armed forces.⁹ Each tank carries an estimated price tag of 3.48 million USD per unit¹⁰. Additionally, South Korea has conducted arms deals with Turkey to help develop a semi-indigenous tank based on technology developed for the K2 tank, totaling out to 400 million USD¹¹.

The South Korean Navy, while less prestigious than the other branches of the armed forces due to the limited nature of the North Korean Navy, still has invested large sums of money into equipment. One of the newer purchases is the *Chang Bogo* class attack submarine. Originally built in Germany as the Type 209, South Korea purchased nine of the submarines for its navy.¹² It has also agreed to build and sell two of the type to Indonesia (with a third being constructed by Indonesia itself) for a total of 1.1 billion USD.¹³ Based on these figures, the total cost for the *Chang Bogo* class can be estimated at around 3.3 billion. Another submarine project, the KSS-2, gave a contract to produce six submarines to Hyundai Heavy Industries, with three others being produced by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering. The estimated cost for the project is 5.25 billion USD.¹⁴ A further project, the KSS-3, has resulted in another contract for Daewoo

⁹ *ibid.* Different numbers have been given but none were considered as reputable as SIPRI's data.

¹⁰ "Type 88 K1 Main Battle Tank," Federation of American Scientists, last updated July 5th, 1999, <https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/type-88-mbt.htm>. Estimate is based off of potential arms deal with Malaysia.

¹¹ Jung Sung-ki, "Korea Inks \$400 Million Tank Deal With Turkey," *The Korea Times*, July 30th, 2008, http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/07/113_28433.html.

¹² Jung Sung-ki, "Korea to make \$1.1 bil. sub sale to Indonesia," *The Korea Times*, October 11th, 2010, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2011/10/123_96458.html.

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ "Turkey Orders Type 214 Submarines," *Military Technology* 33, issue 8 (2009): 93. Estimate based off cost for Turkey to produce six of the same type.

Shipbuilding, valued at 1.56 billion USD for two submarines, with up to nine to be constructed in the future.¹⁵

It is worth noting that the conventional weapons trade surrounding the Korean peninsula is not unique from other regions. Several of the weapons, such as the F-35, or the basis for the K1 tank, the M1 Abrams, were designed as weapons for the US military to be able to use in a general capacity, rather than with a specific eye towards North Korea. Many countries produce or purchase military equipment without having an obvious military threat in the region or bordering them, such as South Africa, Italy, and Brazil. The difference in the case of North Korea is that South Korea's entire arms industry (South Korea, as mentioned in the previous chapter, ranks 10th in the world in terms of arms exporters) is justified vis a vis the threat of North Korean aggression. Were North Korea not a threat, it is highly unlikely that South Korea would invest as heavily into defense.

However, missile defense is unique in that North Korea has always been a major component of justifying development and purchase of equipment, not just in South Korea, but in the United States. Corporations who manage to secure a deal in missile defense have thus profited massively from fear of a North Korean strike. Two American companies stand out for their massive government contracts to develop missile defense platforms: Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Combined with their contracts to produce aircraft, it is no coincidence that both aerospace giants are listed by the Stockholm

¹⁵ AMI International Inc., "DSME Awarded Contract for First Two KSS-3 Submarines," *Sea Power* 56, issue 4 (April 2013): 86.

International Peace Research Institute as the two most profitable defense companies in the world.¹⁶

Lockheed Martin, THAAD, and Aegis

Aerospace firm Lockheed Martin produces aircraft, electronics, and other defense systems for the US government. Slightly over 9% of the government's total contract payments in 2016 were made to Lockheed Martin, over \$43 billion USD.¹⁷ Part of the reason for such a large comparative percentage is Lockheed's status as the primary missile defense contractor for the US military, producing both the THAAD system for land use and the Aegis system for naval use (although it has been adapted for land use as Aegis Ashore). Both have reached the stage where they are combat ready, and South Korea deployed THAAD systems midway through 2017.¹⁸ Japan, on the other hand, has installed the Aegis system on four Kongo-class destroyers, while internal reports have recommended adoption of THAAD.¹⁹ Both acquisitions were made primarily with an eye

¹⁶ Aude Fleurant, Sam Perlo-Freeman, Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, Noel Kelly, *The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies, 2015* (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2016), 3.

¹⁷ *Top 100 Contractors Report, Fiscal Year 2016*, distributed by the Federal Procurement Data System, https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/reports/62-top-100-contractors-report.

¹⁸ Anna Fifield, "U.S. starts 'swiftly' installing controversial antimissile battery in South Korea," *The Washington Post*, April 26th, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-military-starts-installing-controversial-anti-missile-battery-in-south-korea/2017/04/25/3efe2fba-2a2a-11e7-86b7-5d31b5fdc114_story.html.

¹⁹ Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger, Takashi Kawakami, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001): 28-30, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1374.html.

for North Korea.²⁰ The US government has plans to expand its THAAD launcher count to 44 by the end of 2017.²¹

As is custom with military programs, both THAAD and Aegis have had a long development process, spanning multiple decades before reaching their current state. THAAD has been in development since the late 1980s, after the beginning of US investigation into a “hit-to-kill” projectile capable of replacing blast and fragmentation type warheads, due to advances in target guidance systems.²² Initially developed by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Lockheed Martin was the primary contractor during the initial phase, as part of a four-year demonstration and value contract running from 1992 to 1996.²³ Cost estimates for the program in 1996 totaled 16.7 billion USD to develop and acquire THAAD.²⁴

Lockheed would continue to be the primary beneficiary of THAAD when an engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract worth 4 billion was awarded in the year 2000.²⁵ A proposal to move THAAD to the EMD stage had actually

²⁰ “Japan plans installation of land-based Aegis missile defense system amid North Korea threats,” *The Japan Times*, August 17th, 2017, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/17/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-plans-installation-land-based-aegis-missile-defense-system-amid-north-korea-threats/>.

²¹ Robert Burns, “Leery of N. Korea, U.S. plans 1st test to shoot down intercontinental-range missile,” *USA Today*, May 29th, 2017, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/05/29/leery-north-korea-us-plans-first-test-icbm-intercept/102284770/>.

²² Steven M. Buc, *Development of a Hit-to-Kill Guidance Algorithm for Kinetic Energy Weapons* (Arlington: System Planning Corporation, September 1988): 1, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a279085.pdf>.

²³ James W. Atkinson, “The Theater High Altitude Area Defense Program: An Interim Examination of its Acquisition Strategy” (Master’s diss., Naval Postgraduate School, 1996), 6.

²⁴ *Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues Concerning Acquisition of THAAD Prototype System* (Washington: General Accounting Office, July 9th, 1996): 1, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA311147>.

²⁵ Staff, “Lockheed Martin in \$4 billion THAAD contract,” *Aerospace Daily & Defense Report*, June 29th, 2000, <http://aviationweek.com/awin/lockheed-martin-4-billion-thaad-contract>. While the entire article is locked, it still has the essential information, namely that Lockheed was given a 4 billion contract for THAAD, and that it occurred in the year 2000.

been tabled and rejected in 1999 due to various issues with tests and management within Lockheed, but pressure and management changes by the company resulted in the Department of Defense acquiescing and granting the contract.²⁶ Around the same time, cost estimates began to grow for THAAD. The Bush administration increased estimates for funds needed by 68% for each year when it first proposed its budgets²⁷, and total program cost estimates increased to 23 billion.²⁸

When THAAD finally entered production in 2007, Lockheed was again given the reins to produce the system, and was given a 619 million USD contract to produce the first units for the US Army. A total of six batteries have been produced for the US government, with a seventh under contract.²⁹ At an estimated 800 million USD per battery, Lockheed stands to make a total of 5.6 billion USD simply off production deals with the US.³⁰ Additionally, a 528 million USD deal was also made in 2015 to produce further interceptors by the Missile Defense Agency, as the number of active units fielded by the United States increased.³¹

²⁶ Robert Shuey, *Theater Missile Defense: Issues for Congress* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, July 30th, 2001): 6

²⁷ Shuey, *Theater Missile Defense*, 7

²⁸ Dr. Helen Caldicott, *The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush's Military-Industrial Complex* (New York: The New Press, 2002), 91

²⁹ "Elements: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)," Missile Defense Agency, accessed November 15th, 2017, <https://mda.mil/system/taad.html>.

³⁰ Matthew Rocco, "Lockheed Martin's \$800M THAAD missile defense system put to the test," *Fox Business*, July 11th, 2017, <http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/07/11/lockheed-martins-800m-thaad-missile-defense-system-put-to-test.html>.

³¹ "Lockheed Martin Receives \$528 Million THAAD Missile-Defense Contract," *Lockheed Martin*, January 4th, 2016, <http://lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2016/january/mfc-010416-lockheed-martin-receives-528-million-THAAD-contract.html>.

However, Lockheed's involvement is not limited simply to producing the equipment needed. The United States has also signed Lockheed to various contracts involving field support and further development of the THAAD system. In 2010, Lockheed signed a field support contract worth an initial 25.7 million USD, but with yearly extension options through 2019 that give the contract a maximum value of 435 million USD.³² This ceiling was raised in 2017 to 561 million USD by the Missile Defense Agency.³³ A follow-on development contract for five years, made in 2012 and worth 66 million USD, has also been awarded.

Lockheed has also reached deals with other nations to supply THAAD equipment. In 2011, the United Arab Emirates reached an agreement on a production contract with Lockheed. Confirmed in 2012 as a total of 138 launchers³⁴, the contract was worth 1.96 billion USD.³⁵ Saudi Arabi has also recently emerged as a potential buyer for the system. In October 2017, the US State Department announced it had approved the sale of THAAD launchers, interceptors, radars, and fire control systems to Saudi Arabia. The

³² "Lockheed Martin Receives \$25.7 Million THAAD Field Support Contract," *Lockheed Martin*, April 22nd, 2010, <http://lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2010/april/LockheedMartinReceives257.html>.

³³ Stephen Carlson, "Lockheed Martin receives new THAAD contract," *UPI*, May 19th, 2017, <https://www.upi.com/Lockheed-Martin-receives-new-THAAD-contract/7071495207534/>.

³⁴ Walter Hickey, "We're Now Selling The Most Advanced Missile System To This Islamic State," *Business Insider*, June 6th, 2012, <http://www.businessinsider.com/lockheed-martin-sells-thaad-missile-system-to-uae-2012-6>.

³⁵ "Lockheed Martin Receives \$1.96 Billion THAAD Production Contract For The United Arab Emirates," *Lockheed Martin*, December 30th, 2011, <http://lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2011/december/1230-thaad-uae.html>.

contract also includes electrical and maintenance units, trailers, and other miscellaneous items needed to operate the system. The contract is estimated at 15 billion USD.³⁶

THAAD has proven itself to be one of the most profitable of Lockheed's weapons ventures. With long term investments in the program by the United States government, and foreign buyers now taking interest in the system, Lockheed stands to make at least 20 billion dollars, and likely billions more. North Korea's role in ensuring that the program reached production status was paramount, and now Lockheed gains profit from regions that face minimal to no threat from North Korea, as well as maintain income from the US as it strives to keep THAAD maintained and operational.

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD), unlike THAAD, was not designed as a standalone missile defense system, but is instead part of the Aegis Combat System, an integrated weapons defense system used on naval vessels since 1983.³⁷ The system is the US Navy's version of THAAD, and has also been developed and produced primarily by Lockheed Martin. Following testing of the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile in the 1990s, the Navy began exploring options to expand the Aegis Combat System to "utilize kinetic kill vehicles" similar to those that were being developed for THAAD. The program was initiated in 1996 as the Navy Theater Wide program, but appears to have changed its name to Aegis BMD at some point before the year 2003.³⁸ It was in the year

³⁶ Richard Tomkins, "Saudi Arabia buy of THAAD missile defense systems in pipeline," *UPI*, October 6th, 2017, <https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2017/10/06/Saudi-Arabia-buy-of-THAAD-missile-defense-systems-in-pipeline/4561507318475/?spt=slh&or=1>.

³⁷ Ronald O'Rourke, *Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense – Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, December 22nd, 2009), 3-4. Since the original Aegis Combat System's development was not concerned with ballistic missile defense, its development will not be explored in depth.

³⁸ This is possibly related to the apparent cancellation of the Navy Theater Wide program in December 2001 after it was revealed the program was more than 57% over budget. However, given that the Government

2003 that Lockheed would get its first production contract: Block 2004. Designed to upgrade ships to enable detection of ballistic missiles, the contract was worth approximately 813 million USD.³⁹ A year later, it was estimated the program had cost a total of 3.67 billion USD since its inception.⁴⁰ Additional contracts to continue development of the Aegis system through “Block” upgrades (Block 2006/08 and 2010/12/14) would be given in 2007 and 2009, for 979 million USD⁴¹ and an initial 1.034 billion USD.⁴² However, the latter contract, due to modifications and extensions by the US government, has risen in total value to 2.5 billion USD.⁴³

In terms of foreign buyers, Japan is the only active user of Aegis BMD, although South Korea has made plans to acquire the system. Lockheed first signed a contract with Japan to upgrade a ship in 2005, where a Kongo-class destroyer was equipped with BMD capabilities for 124 million USD. Two further contracts were reached in 2007, worth 33 million⁴⁴ and 40 million⁴⁵, respectively. Japan also upgraded several Atago-class ships,

Accountability Office and Arms Control Daily both indicate in documentation between 2003-04 that Aegis BMD is “formerly known as Navy Theater Wide”, I have chosen to assume that the program was not truly cancelled, but either renamed or reshuffled to a different area given both programs have the exact same mission objective – midcourse missile defense against short to intermediate range ballistic missiles, utilizing the Aegis Combat System infrastructure.

³⁹ “October 10th, 2003,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 16th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=2616>.

⁴⁰ *Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Programs in 2004* (Washington: Government Accountability Office, March 2005), 36

⁴¹ “February 27, 2007,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 16th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=3461>.

⁴² “October 21st, 2009,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 16th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4144>

⁴³ “Contracts,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published May 19th, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1188022/>.

⁴⁴ “July 25th, 2007,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 17th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=3566>.

⁴⁵ “December 28th, 2007,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 17th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=3676>.

with two contracts signed in 2013^{46,47} and another in 2014⁴⁸, for a total investment of approximately 148 million USD. The most recent deal made is one involving the US, Japanese, and South Korean governments to produce Aegis BMD sets for ships, worth a total of 490 million USD, that will give South Korea Aegis BMD capabilities.⁴⁹ Support contracts for Japan signed during this period amount to approximately 210 million USD.⁵⁰

Alongside the naval system, Lockheed has also adapted Aegis into a land based platform, called “Aegis Ashore”. A system has already been deployed in Romania, and plans are underway for a second system to come online in Poland by 2018. Due to the lower scale of the program compared to the naval elements, comparatively little has been invested by the US government into acquiring the system. There are only a few contracts made with Lockheed, one in 2011⁵¹, and one in 2016⁵², and together both are worth about 172 million USD.

⁴⁶ “March 29th, 2013,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 17th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5008>.

⁴⁷ “April 11th, 2013,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 17th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5017>.

⁴⁸ “September 30th, 2014,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 17th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5387>.

⁴⁹ “Contracts,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published August 12th, 2016, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/913538/>.

⁵⁰ “September 29th, 2011,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 17th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4633>. “September 30th, 2014,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 17th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5387>.

⁵¹ “June 10th, 2011,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 17th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4554>.

⁵² “Contracts,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published August 9th, 2016, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/909301/>.

While Aegis may not be as lucrative of a program as THAAD has proven to be, Lockheed has still utilized North Korea to produce an additional weapons system. The \$2.5 billion contract for Aegis is one of the largest single government contracts running, and with the sales to South Korea and Japan, Lockheed will make at least another billion dollars. Both foreign buyers are primarily concerned with utilizing the system to defend against North Korea. The large amount of funding also comes at a time when North Korea has moved their missile production focus to intercontinental missiles, meaning that the Aegis program's focus on short and medium range missiles, mounted on a naval platform, becomes less and less pertinent to the interests of the US. Aegis, more than any other program, benefits from political pressure and the appearance of countering a threat.

Boeing and the Ground Based Midcourse Defense

Boeing, like Lockheed, is a major American aerospace company, and is one of the most dominant civilian airliner manufacturers. Also similar to Lockheed, Boeing has done extensive defense work for the American government throughout its history, such as designing bomber aircraft during the Second World War. With Lockheed being the first in terms of total contract value with the US government, Boeing is the second, with 5.6% or nearly 26.5 billion USD obligated to be paid to Boeing in 2016.⁵³ Part of this income is derived from the third major US missile defense program, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, or GMD. GMD's role differs from that of Aegis and THAAD in that it is expected to destroy missiles while they are still in space (the midcourse phase). As a

⁵³ *Top 100 Contractors Report, Fiscal Year 2016*

result, it is not capable of dealing with shorter range missiles, and focuses exclusively on long and intercontinental ballistic missiles.⁵⁴

GMD's origins lie in the Clinton administration's National Missile Defense program. The first exploration into a missile defense architecture similar to the form GMD has taken on can be found in an exploratory paper done by the RAND Corporation, investigating the feasibility of using modified Minutemen ICBMs as a missile interceptor.⁵⁵ That same year, National Missile Defense was upgraded to a development/deployment stage, with tests taking place by 1999 and deployment as early as 2003. Funding at the time was initially around 250-275 million USD a year, but Congress approved increasing this amount by 100 million to ensure program success and timeliness.⁵⁶ Official government paperwork on initial contract awards are unclear⁵⁷, but December of 2000 Boeing is listed as having signed contract HQ0006-01-C-0001 with the Missile Defense Agency for 383 million USD.⁵⁸ Since 2000, Boeing's contract has continuously been modified for additional spending, with announced Block programs

⁵⁴ "Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System," Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project, accessed October 30th, 2017, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/>

⁵⁵ "The Minutemen National Missile Defense Option", RAND Corporation, originally published 1997, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB47/index1.html.

⁵⁶ *1997 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense* (Arlington: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, October 1st, 1997), 3-1

⁵⁷ There are various contradictory reports as to which contracts have been awarded to Boeing regarding GMD. The Department of Defense contract for 2003 is the earliest available one locatable that is officially announced, but it is cited as a contract modification for HQ0006-01-C-0001. The Federal Procurement Data System lists this contract as first opening in December 2000, but the Department of Defense lists no contracts awarded to Boeing on that day or the days surrounding it. Given a Los Angeles Times article in September of 2016 noting that the New York Times had to sue the Missile Defense Agency under the Freedom of Information Act to receive bonuses paid to Boeing regarding GMD, it is possible that these contracts are intentionally left off the Department of Defense website given the initial stage.

⁵⁸ "HQ000601C0001," Federal Procurement Data System, accessed November 27th, 2017, <https://www.fpds.gov/common/jsp/LaunchWebPage.jsp?command=execute&requestid=83679580&version=1.5>.

coming in 2003⁵⁹ and 2008⁶⁰, each worth 823 million and 398 million USD, respectively. Continuous modifications to the initial contract means that Boeing has collected an estimated 18.7 billion USD in total.⁶¹

Additionally, Boeing signed a Development and Sustainment contract with the Missile Defense Agency in 2011 for additional development, testing, training, refurbishment, and other duties, worth a total of 3.48 billion USD.⁶² The contract was originally supposed to only last through December 2018. However, given recent failures of the original kill vehicle in testing⁶³, the Missile Defense Agency has given Boeing an additional 1 billion to develop a new kill vehicle, with an expected completion date of June 2022.⁶⁴ A recent Los Angeles Times article also brought to light bonuses paid by the government to Boeing involving GMD contracts. Initially blocked by Boeing and the Missile Defense Agency on the grounds it would expose valuable technical information,

⁵⁹ “November 3rd, 2003,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 19th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=2630>.

⁶⁰ “December 30th, 2008,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 19th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=3933>.

⁶¹ “DOD Missile Defense Agency -> The Boeing Company,” GovTribe, accessed November 19th, 2017, <https://govtribe.com/contract/award/hq000601c0001?page=1>. The contracts listed in this database match with the list the Federal Procurement Data System gives for contract modifications, and simply lists the cumulative value.

⁶² “December 30th, 2011,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 19th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4695>.

⁶³ David Willman, “A test of America’s homeland missile defense system found a problem. Why did the Pentagon call it a success?,” *The Los Angeles Times*, July 6th, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-missile-defense/>.

⁶⁴ “Contracts,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published May 22nd, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1189661/>.

a lawsuit eventually forced the government to disclose that it had paid Boeing 1.959 billion in award fees, incentive cost fees, and performance fees.⁶⁵

Like Lockheed Martin, Boeing has profited immensely from its missile defense projects. GMD is interesting in that it has received less attention compared to THAAD and Aegis. In contrast to GMD, both have lined up foreign buyers and are deployed elsewhere besides the United States. That aside, the necessity of redevelopment of various components of GMD means that Boeing stands to profit handsomely from the program for the foreseeable future.

Secondary Beneficiaries

Although Lockheed and Boeing are both making tens of billions of dollars from missile defense, they both require assistance to fulfill their contracts. Supplies must be requisitioned, certain areas need to be subcontracted out, or the system requires an element necessitating the expertise of another company. Companies involved in missile defense under these conditions are thus classified here as secondary beneficiaries of missile defense. Some companies, such as Raytheon, are not the major contractor with the government for missile defense, but are significantly involved with the programs. Others, such as Northrop Grumman, do not play as major a role as other subcontractors but still provide a vital component to the entire system. Finally, there are companies that fulfill secondary aspects in programs while being the primary contractor for others. Lockheed Martin fits this description. All these companies, while not appearing as much

⁶⁵ David Willman, "A flawed missile defense system generates \$2 billion in bonuses for Boeing," *The Los Angeles Times*, September 2nd, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-boeing-bonuses/>.

in media due to their secondary status, are still involved and thus profit from missile defense spending.

Due to the frequent status of these companies as subcontractors, there will be points where costs incurred by a corporation purchasing or outsourcing are impossible to measure. Generally, discussing situations such as these is avoided but when the element represents a significant aspect of the system (Raytheon's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, for example), a brief overview is unavoidable.

Raytheon and Radar Components

Raytheon has been one of the most significant companies in the American defense industry thanks to its extensive design and production of radar and missiles, as well as the Patriot missile system. Their previous experience with other missile defense systems as well as their production of radar and missile elements has resulted in Raytheon's continued involvement as a subcontractor for development and production. All three systems previously discussed feature elements that are designed and produced by Raytheon.

With regards to THAAD, Raytheon's primary contribution is the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system, or AN/TPY-2. The system forms the tracking element of THAAD, enabling it to classify targets as well as guide interceptor missiles to destroy the target.⁶⁶ The first contract that Raytheon received for the

⁶⁶ Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2)," Raytheon, accessed November 21st, 2017, <https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/antpy2/>.

AN/TPY-2 was in 2003, when the Missile Defense Agency contracted the company to develop a radar for a ballistic missile defense system, to “begin fielding an initial missile defense capacity.” The total value of the contract including options was 800 million dollars.⁶⁷ Based on delivery totals by 2010, an estimated six radars were covered under this contact. In 2007, an additional 212 million was given to provide a single radar unit.⁶⁸ Later that same year, a contract for developing the AN/TPY-2’s capabilities further and performing maintenance was signed, which had a value of 304 million.⁶⁹

Three years would pass before Raytheon signed a contract to deliver an eighth radar, valued at 190 million.⁷⁰ The next year, 2011, Raytheon would make around 1.235 billion dollars from the AN/TPY-2 alone. First, an indefinite delivery/indefinite quality contract was signed to maintain software on X-band radars, as well as testing and development.⁷¹ Two more radars were also purchased for a value of 363.9 million.⁷² Finally, with the sale of THAAD equipment to the UAE, Raytheon received 582.5

⁶⁷ “April 4th, 2003,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=2485>.

⁶⁸ PRNewswire, “Raytheon Awarded \$212 Million Contract for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Radar,” *Raytheon*, February 15th, 2017 <http://investor.raytheon.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=84193&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=963688&highlight=>.

⁶⁹ PRNewswire, “Raytheon Awarded \$304 Million for Ballistic Missile Defense System Upgrades,” *Raytheon*, July 11th, 2007, <http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=800>.

⁷⁰ PRNewswire, “Missile Defense Agency Selects Raytheon to Provide New Missile Defense Radar: \$190 Million Award for Eighth AN/TPY-2 Radar,” *Raytheon*, October 27th, 2010, <http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1682>.

⁷¹ “November 1st, 2011,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4655>.

⁷² PRNewswire, “Raytheon Awarded Contract for \$363.9 Million for Two Radars: AN/TPY-2 is the World’s Most Advanced Multi-Functional, X-band Radar,” *Raytheon*, December 30th, 2011, <http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2007>.

million USD to supply radars and support.⁷³ The last radar bought, the 12th total, was purchased in 2013, for 172.68 million.⁷⁴

Raytheon has also been contracted several times to maintain and support the AN/TPY-2. Such contracts are usually valued between 20 and 50 million dollars. Starting from 2010, the cumulative value of Raytheon's support contracts (including those involving the UAE) totals approximately 286.4 million dollars.⁷⁵ However, this total does not include the most recent support contract, dated October 31st, 2017, which provides support both for the AN/TPY-2 and other radars. Running through 2020, the contract has an initial value of 1.252 billion USD, but may run as high as 1.5 billion.⁷⁶

In terms of the Aegis BMD system, Raytheon is responsible for the missiles used to intercept and destroy targets, classified as Standard Missiles, or SMs. Three are utilized currently by Aegis, SM-2, SM-3, and SM-6, with the newer missiles bearing the

⁷³ PRNewswire, "Raytheon Receives \$582.5 million for Radars and Services in THAAD Deal to UAE: UAE Becomes <http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2006>.

⁷⁴ "December 17th, 2013," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5186>.

⁷⁵ "March 17th, 2010," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4239>. "August 25th, 2010," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4352>. "September 1st, 2010," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4358>. "November 10th, 2010," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4406>. "April 7th, 2011," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4508>. "July 17th, 2013," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5087>. "December 19th, 2013," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5188>. "September 2nd, 2014," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 21th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5365>.

⁷⁶ "Contracts," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published October 27th, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1356245/>.

higher numeric designation.⁷⁷ Of the three missiles, SM-3 is designed specifically to counter ballistic missiles in the system, while the other two are intended for use against air targets, including anti-ship cruise missiles, but mainly focusing on targets such as aircraft and drones.⁷⁸ Development of the SM-3 is currently moving towards the block II modification being deployed by 2018.⁷⁹

Raytheon had already made at least 881 million USD from the SM-3's development and testing before deployment was even achieved, when the Missile Defense Agency awarded a contract to "continue development and flight test of STANDARD Missile-3 (SM-3) Block I and IA".⁸⁰ The first missiles would be delivered to the Navy slightly over a year later.⁸¹ In 2006, Raytheon was given an additional development contract for the SM-3 with an estimated value of 424 million.⁸² Several months later, they were then contracted to build 29 missiles of the Block IA type for approximately 266 million USD.⁸³

⁷⁷ "Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense," Missile Threat: CSIS Defense Project, accessed November 2nd, 2017, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/aegis/>.

⁷⁸ Ronald O'Rourke, *Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, November 9th, 2017), 3-5 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf>.

⁷⁹ "SM-3 Interceptor," Raytheon, accessed November 22nd, 2017, <https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/sm-3/>.

⁸⁰ "August 15th, 2003," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 22nd, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=2578>.

⁸¹ "Missile Defense Agency Receives First Sea-Based Interceptor Missile," *defense-aerospace.com*, October 22nd, 2004, http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/47641/production-sm_3-missiles-delivered-to-mda-%28oct.-25%29.html.

⁸² "May 26th, 2006", Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 22nd, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=3249>.

⁸³ "August 16th, 2006," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 22nd, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=3309>.

In the last few years alone, Raytheon has made several billion dollars from the SM-3 and its variants. The first of these contracts was awarded in December of 2015, when the Department of Defense announced that Raytheon would be given a contract not-to-exceed 543 million USD to produce 17 SM-3 Block IIA missiles.⁸⁴ Ten days after the announcement, another was released, modifying an April 2015 undefinitized⁸⁵ contract for 540 million and increasing it to 2.35 billion dollars, in exchange for 52 Block IB missiles.⁸⁶ Two more contracts have been signed since 2015, one valued at 523 million in 2016⁸⁷ and the other at 614 million in 2017.⁸⁸

Finally, Raytheon has also contributed to the GMD program with development of the Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX) and the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) utilized in the interceptors (GBI) for GMD. AN-TPY2 radars are also utilized in the system. SBX is intended to be an advanced and extremely powerful form of X-based radar. In testimony to Congress, SBX was described as “so capable that, if it were sitting in Chesapeake Bay, it could detect a baseball-sized object over San Francisco.”⁸⁹ The radar

⁸⁴ “Contracts,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published December 8th, 2015, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/633402/>.

⁸⁵ Undefinitized is defined as “Any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the action.”

⁸⁶ “Contracts,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published December 18th, 2015, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/637451/>.

⁸⁷ “Contracts,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published August 2nd, 2016, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/885939/>.

⁸⁸ “Contracts,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published August 28th, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1292624/>.

⁸⁹ *Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering speaks before Defense Subcommittee* (speech, Washington, DC, May 11th, 2005), DocumentCloud, <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1699182-lieutenant-general-henry-a-obering-speaks-before.html#document/p7/a210840>. Sourced from the Los Angeles Times.

is emplaced on a modified oil drilling platform, allowing it to remain in place at sea and housing crew.⁹⁰

SBX is different from other elements that Raytheon has produced since the effort has generally been regarded as a failure. SBX has been downgraded from operational status to limited test support and operational standby as of 2012 by the Missile Defense Agency.⁹¹ The radar has performed sub-optimally in tests of the GMD system. Additionally, while the SBX was intended to be stationed at a specially prepared area in Alaska, it has never been based there. Instead, it has usually been based at Hawaii, or out at sea for testing. The Los Angeles Times estimates that nearly 2.2 billion USD has been spent on SBX, despite its numerous failures and limited status. Despite the lack of success, however, the MDA is reportedly seeking to construct a similar radar in Alaska, at a cost of 1 billion.⁹²

The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle's cost to the taxpayer and benefit to Raytheon is difficult to estimate, due to lack of data available pinpointing the specific cost of the EKV component. However, at least a billion dollars has been spent by the government simply to redesign the EKV due to failures within the system. In May of 2017, a contract was awarded to Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon to work together to develop a

⁹⁰ "X Band Radar (XBR): World's Largest X-band Radar," Raytheon, accessed November 24th, 2017, <https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/xbr/>.

⁹¹ *Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 President's Budget Submission: February 2012* (Washington: Missile Defense Agency, February 2012), volume 2A, 633, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2013/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/Missile_Defense_Agency_PB_2013_1.pdf.

⁹² David Willman, "The Pentagon's \$10-billion bet gone bad," *Los Angeles Times*, April 5th, 2015, <http://graphics.latimes.com/missile-defense/>.

Redesigned Kill Vehicle for the GMD system.⁹³ Considering that this was a modification to a previous contract which brought the total value of the contract over 5 billion, it is likely that Raytheon stands to make, as is the case with their other programs, a fair amount of money.

Raytheon's status as the largest radar and missile producer in the US means that it will almost certainly continue to be a major player in missile defense.

Northrop Grumman

Similar to Raytheon, Northrop Grumman's contribution to missile defense programs involves surveillance aspects. Instead of radar systems, however, Northrop Grumman contributes to satellite based systems used for early warning of missile launches. Two programs fall into this category: the Defense Support Program, and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System. The former has been in place for several decades (the first satellite was launched in the 1970s⁹⁴), while the latter is intended to replace older systems (including the former). Northrop Grumman has also developed the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS)

Not all the DSP satellites were constructed and launched under Northrop Grumman's tenure, as before 2002 TRW Inc. was responsible for the program. However, following a takeover of TRW, Northrop Grumman assumed control of TRW's aerospace

⁹³ "Contracts," Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published May 22nd, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1189661/>.

⁹⁴ "Defense Support Program Satellites," About Us, U.S. Air Force, published November 23rd, 2015, <http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104611/defense-support-program-satellites/>.

holdings, including the construction of DSP satellites.⁹⁵ For instance, in 2006, two contract modifications for a contract originally signed by TRW⁹⁶ were given, totaling approximately 81 million.⁹⁷ Additional support contracts to the present have netted Northrop Grumman a total of 173.6 million.⁹⁸

The Space Tracking and Surveillance System has only just begun to be deployed, Northrop having launched only two satellites in the system so far.⁹⁹ However, billions of dollars have already been received with regards to development and maintenance. Only one main contract has been modified and updated by the government, with the most recent modification coming in February 2017. 19 million dollars were added to a previous contract for support for the STSS, but total funds committed on that one contract are nearly 1.9 billion dollars.¹⁰⁰ The current contract modification runs through March 2018, so the contract will more than likely increase in value at a future date.

⁹⁵ “TRW agrees to be acquired by Northrop Grumman,” *CBC News*, July 1st, 2002, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/trw-agrees-to-be-acquired-by-northrop-grumman-1.319780>.

⁹⁶ “September 28th, 2001,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 23rd, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=2113>.

⁹⁷ “September 21st, 2006,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 23rd, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=3343>. “September 29th, 2006,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 23rd, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=3350>.

⁹⁸ “DSP Satellites: Supporting America’s Early-Warning System,” *Defense Industry Daily*, accessed November 23rd, 2017, <https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/dsp-satellites-supporting-americas-earlywarning-system-02650/>.

⁹⁹ “Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS),” Capabilities, Northrop Grumman, accessed November 24th, 2017, <http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/STSS/Pages/default.aspx>.

¹⁰⁰ “Contracts,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, published February 10th, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1080326/>.

Northrop's J-STARS is designed to operate on an aircraft (designated the E-8), and uses a multi-mode radar to track and classify ground targets.¹⁰¹ These functions, apart from providing close air support against conventional armed forces such as vehicles, can also be utilized to locate ground-based missile launchers.¹⁰² The Air Force estimates that each unit has cost 244.4 million dollars, and states that 26 units are in service.¹⁰³ In total, the J-STARS program acquisition alone has cost 6.35 billion dollars. Other sources have estimated the total cost of the program to be as high as 11 billion dollars.¹⁰⁴

Northrop Grumman's contributions to missile defense may seem limited, but thanks to their technical specificity, several billions of dollars have been earned in the last two decades from projects that most Americans would not recognize. Although upgrades of the J-STARS aircraft have been put on hold, and the DSP is slowly being phased out, profits are essentially guaranteed given that DSP's replacement, the STSS, has only launched two satellites so far while the DSP had nearly 30.

Other Secondary Beneficiaries

It is difficult to ascertain the exact monetary benefit of companies that provide raw materials or minutia, as, unlike government contracts, corporations do not usually make public the financial aspects of deals or purchases. Some companies involved with missile defense in a minor or roundabout capacity have made their involvement and

¹⁰¹ "E-8C Joint Stars," About Us, U.S. Air Force, published September 23rd, 2015, <http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104507/e-8c-joint-stars/>.

¹⁰² Dr. Caldicott, *The New Nuclear Danger*, 90.

¹⁰³ U.S. Air Force, "E-8C Joint Stars."

¹⁰⁴ Dr. Caldicott, *The New Nuclear Danger*, 90.

profit known. Ranging from construction to testing assistance, these companies do not make the substantial profits that the previously discussed ones do, but are still profiting from the field.

KBR, Inc. (formerly Kellogg Brown & Root) were awarded a construction contract in 2013 to help construct Aegis Ashore facilities in Romania. Worth 134.1 million USD¹⁰⁵, KBR assisted in building foundations for SM-3 launchers, a communications equipment pad, and storage tanks, among other duties. Other companies involved in the Romania site include SC Glacial PROD SRL, from Romania, and Exelis Systems Corporation, from the US.¹⁰⁶

Orbital ATK has produced ballistic missiles for the purposes of testing American missile defense systems. In 2016, the Missile Defense Agency awarded Orbital a contract with a firm value of 182 million and options worth up to 400 million to construct medium-range ballistic missiles for testing purposes.¹⁰⁷ The company also provides the thruster component of the Standard Missile – 3.¹⁰⁸

In August of 2010, five companies were given contracts by the Missile Defense Agency to assist with and provide advisory to Engineering and Test directories in the

¹⁰⁵ “July 10th, 2013,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 27th, 2015, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=5082>.

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Mission Romania, “U.S. Government Awards Contract for Construction of Facilities at Missile Defense Site in Deveselu,” *U.S. Embassy in Romania*, July 15th, 2013, <https://ro.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-awards-contract-for-construction-of-facilities-at-missile-defense-site-in-deveselu/>.

¹⁰⁷ “Orbital ATK Awarded Major Contract for Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Target Rockets,” *Orbital ATK*, August 3rd, 2016, <https://www.orbitalatk.com/News-Room/release.asp?prid=176>.

¹⁰⁸ *Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM): Dual-pulse Rocket Motor with Thrust Vector Control and Integral Hybrid Attitude Control System* (Elkton: Orbital ATK, September 22nd, 2015), 1, https://www.orbitalatk.com/defense-systems/missile-products/tsrm/docs/TSRM_data_sheet_APPROVED_15-MDA-8411%20092215.pdf.

Missile Defense Agency. These five companies, one small business and four “large” businesses as defined by the MDA, were ERC, Inc., Madison Research Corporation, Computer Sciences Corporation, General Dynamics Information Technologies, and Sparta, Inc. All contracts were given a “not to exceed” ceiling of 1.6 billion dollars.¹⁰⁹

Other miscellaneous companies that have been contracted to work with the Missile Defense Agency include Booz Allen Hamilton, ALATEC Inc., ManTech International Corporation, EMC Inc., MacAulay-Brown Inc., and MEI Corporation. All of these companies were contracted either in “full and open” status or as a “small business set-aside” by the Engineering and Support Services office of the MDA, MiDAESS.¹¹⁰ These companies were hired for various duties including “management support”, “engineering and technical advisory”, and “security and program protection”.

Given the inherent complex nature of missile defense, from procurement of raw materials to coding of technologies used in guidance and monitoring systems, it is natural that a plethora of contractors would be involved throughout the process. Although there are obviously many other companies that have made millions from the Missile Defense Agency alone, exploring the specifics of each one would be a time-consuming endeavor and simply add more examples into an already weighty list.

¹⁰⁹ “August 30th, 2010,” Contracts, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed November 27th, 2017, <http://archive.defense.gov/Contracts/Contract.aspx?ContractID=4355>

¹¹⁰ *MiDAESS Awards* (Washington: Missile Defense Agency), 1-2, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/osbp_MiDAESS_Updates.pdf.

Closing Thoughts

Missile defense (and conventional arms) have been, and undoubtedly will continue to be, an extremely profitable business because of the emergence of North Korea as a possible threat. So much so that, in fact, shares have risen in defense stocks and major defense contractors have examined acquiring smaller companies to increase profits.¹¹¹ The majority of material discussed here is simply financial and contractual nature. While this may appear dry, it is important to note the sheer amount of money surrounding missile defense and conventional arms. Given the Trump administration's campaign promises to strengthen the military, it is not a matter of if, but when, more funding is allocated to missile defense and programs in order to either update, develop and produce them, while, some will never reach production. In all events, someone will be there to profit.

¹¹¹ Steve Mollman, "For US defense contractors, North Korean hostilities are good for business," *Quartz*, September 20th, 2017, <https://qz.com/1081146/north-korea-hostilities-boost-us-defense-contractors-like-orbital-atk-nyseoa-and-aerojet-rocketdyne-ajrd/>.

Conclusion

On December 22nd, 2017, *Foreign Policy* posed a question to readers: “Will North Korea Blow Up the Winter Olympics?” Authors Tom Z. Collina and Catherine Killough argued that the timing of military exercises and growing tensions on the Korean peninsula could result in an attack on the Winter Olympics by missile or other means.¹ Earlier in the month, *Newsweek* published an article noting that US Senator Lindsey Graham had expressed his desire for the Pentagon to move US dependents outside of South Korea in case of conflict.²

Meanwhile, on December 19th, 2017, news media across the world broke the story that Saudi Arabia had intercepted a ballistic missile fired at its capital by Houthi forces. Utilizing missile defense equipment supplied by the United States, Saudi Arabia was able to bring down a Scud missile intended to strike at a royal palace in Riyadh.³ Saudi Arabia may wish to thank North Korea for ensuring the shutdown, as headlines such as the one run by *Foreign Policy* have directly contributed to the US putting a massive amount of funding into missile defense development. This interplay between media concern/ethical values, military development, and the resulting profits has been what this thesis’ research has sought to illustrate in depth.

Unless a dramatic shift occurs regarding North Korea and the rest of the world, it is fair to assume that the general trend of media attention and military spending will

¹ Tom Z. Collina, Catherine Killough, “Will North Korea Blow Up the Winter Olympics?,” *Foreign Policy*, December 22nd, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/22/will-north-korea-blow-up-the-winter-olympics/>.

² John Haltiwanger, “Is War With North Korea Coming? U.S. Military Families Should Leave Korean Peninsula, Top Senator Says,” *Newsweek*, December 4th, 2017, <http://www.newsweek.com/war-north-korea-coming-us-military-families-should-leave-korean-peninsula-top-730041>.

³ Kareem Fahim, “Saudi Arabia says it intercepted ballistic missile fired from Yemen,” *The Washington Post*, December 19th, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/saudi-arabia-says-it-intercepts-ballistic-missile-fired-from-yemen/2017/12/19/6617d5ba-e4b0-11e7-833f-155031558ff4_story.html?utm_term=.f652fcd8a02a.

continue. The majority do not have access to intelligence reports or high-level diplomatic writings; their only source of information is from NGOs and news media. As a result, the reports of human rights violations and threats against the US are the only information that the majority will reliably see, coloring their opinion towards the views expressed by the authors of such reports. These citizens then express their concern to government, whether it be for more humanitarian concern, or more military security.

Governments respond to this concern primarily through military means. This does not mean direct military action against North Korea. Instead, using public support, governments legitimize military weapons programs. North Korea is frequently cited in missile defense reports as a nation that could not only strike the United States, but could assist other nations in gaining the capability to launch ballistic missiles as well. The American government has developed several missile defense programs, all of which received new contracts after major government studies into the North Korean ballistic missile threat.

Lockheed Martin and Boeing were the primary beneficiaries of the government's new contracts. Working to develop three systems (THAAD, Aegis, and GMD), both companies were able to secure billions of dollars in profits by developing the systems for the government. Lockheed Martin and Boeing were far from the only benefactors of government spending. Other companies, ranging from Raytheon and Northrop Grumman to less known ones such as Orbital ATK all profit by supplying secondary aspects of missile defense systems, such as radar, satellites, or missiles for testing.

The government thus serves as the crucial link between public ethics and corporate income. By agitating for action against North Korea, the public has induced

governments to spend money on rendering North Korean power impotent. Since North Korea's primary mechanism for gaining attention and legitimacy on the world stage is through hard power in the form of the military and ballistic missiles, missile defense was developed, both to protect the US from North Korea (among other nations) and to help neutralize the leverage of North Korea.

The usage of human rights to back military spending is not a new phenomenon. Nations have intervened on ethical grounds in conflicts many times in the past, from the USA sending troops to Korea and Vietnam to prevent the spread of communism, to the colonial systems mentioned in the first chapter. North Korea is also not the only nation in modern times to be used in this fashion: Iran, Iraq, and China are all mentioned in reports which discuss the North Korean missile threat. The Soviet Union was used to justify massive spending during the Cold War

Even if, someday, North Korea is no longer viewed as a threat (whether by unification, invasion, or other means), it is likely that another nation will emerge as a new threat. The thesis could have examined the dialogue surrounding the US invasion of Iraq, or fears over Iran gaining nuclear capacity. North Korea is one of many nations that could fit the role of a threat. Its significance lies in the frequency with which it is cited as a threat, and the length of time with which it has been used. The fact that North Korea has also achieved nuclear capabilities, unlike Iraq or Libya, also sets them apart from comparable situations.

For all the bluster and fear about war, the fact hidden at the center is that no parties surrounding North Korea want large-scale conflict. North Korea no doubt understands that were it to try to fight the US and its allies, the regime would end. The

US, on the other hand, faces the reality that a war would devastate South Korea, and that given the outcome of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the public would not support military action on a large scale. Both, instead, benefit from the current situation. The North Korean government is able to legitimize itself by saying the US presents an existential threat to the North Korean people, while US government and corporations can authorize funding, bringing economic benefits without being heavily scrutinized as they would be if there was less tension.

The research contained is not meant to discredit the ideas of human rights, nor to claim that they are simply a tool utilized by governments to expand the military. Instead, what it tries to demonstrate is that there are various forces in government and business that utilize human rights to advance their own interests. Exploitation of human rights for self-interest is simply an unintended consequence of these beliefs.

The world we live in currently is by no means unipolar. Ethnic and religious divisions have risen over the last 20 years with events such as the European migrant crisis or the emergence of the Islamic State in the former Levant. The current situation is not what US-led global civil society strives for. The ultimate goal of the US may be found in Francis Fukuyama's speculation on the meaning of the fall of the Soviet Union:

The triumph of the West, of the Western *idea*, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. In the past decade, there have been unmistakable changes in the intellectual climate of the world's two largest communist countries, and the beginnings of significant reform movements in both. But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics and it can be seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants' markets and color television sets now omnipresent throughout China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.⁴

American values still hold the dominant position in the hearts and minds of citizens across the globe. North Korea is one of the few remaining areas where American values are not admired, but shunned (at least by the government). North Korea's outcast status means it will continue to be the focus of media attention and military development, taking place in the nexus described in these past pages. A different "bogeyman" will arise when North Korea is gone. Activists will find different issues to raise, governments will create different programs. But for now, North Korea is, paradoxically, needed by America.

⁴ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest* 16 (Summer, 1989): 3-4

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