The Spirit of Empiricism?: An Analysis of Empiricism as a Stance

Abstract

In The Empirical Stance Bas van Fraassen sets out to uncover the spirit of empiricism: “what is empiricism, and what it could be, if it is to be a viable philosophy today?” (2002, p. 31). In answer to this question van Fraassen rejects the canonical characterization of empiricism as a philosophical position established on a thesis (such as all knowledge comes from sense experience), and argues that we must endorse empiricism as a philosophical position established in a stance. But what the empirical stance is or entails exactly, van Fraassen has failed to make clear. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and philosophically evaluate empiricism as a stance. In light of my analysis, however, I will argue that van Fraassen has not provided a concrete characterization of stance empiricism (or indeed stances in general), and that the concept remains problematically vague. In Chapter, 1 I begin with a review and analysis of The Empirical Stance. I discuss van Fraassen’s arguments against the canonical characterization of empiricism, as well as the initial sketch of what stance empiricism is or entails provided by van Fraassen. Furthermore, I offer what I see as the clearest characterization of stance empiricism that can be seen form the initial sketch van Fraassen has provided: that the empirical stance is an epistemic strategy, with a commitment to empirical inquiry. In Chapter 2, I refute a prominent critique which has been made against van Fraassen’s ‘stance-ism’ – that stances are problematically relative. This critique is particularly problematic for stance empiricism as it compromises two of van Fraassen’s proposed characteristics of empiricism. In the remaining chapters I argue that stance empiricism is a problematically vague concept. In Chapter 3, I argue that it is not entirely clear what role experience, and the empirical, is to play in the empirical stance. In Chapter 4, I discuss two characterizations of stances which are similar to that which I draw at the end of Chapter 1. I go on to argue that in light of van Fraassen’s response to such characterizations we can see that they are inadequate in being able to fully encapsulate the concept of a stance. In Chapter 5, I conclude by arguing that for stance empiricism (and indeed any stance) to be a coherent position it must be limited to something in terms of being definable by some necessary beliefs. Furthermore, I offer a potential objection to my thesis – that for van Fraassen vagueness is a nonissue; I rebut this objection by arguing that even by van Fraassen’s own lights stances are problematically vague.