What makes pain unique? : a critique of representationalism about pain in service of perceptualism

Abstract

The goal of this thesis is to defend non-representationalist perceptualism about pain against the challenges brought to it by Murat Aydede. These challenges are intended to apply to both a strong version of representationalism and general perceptualism about pain, however I maintain that they are less effective when aimed at the latter. In the interest of pulling apart these two views, I suggest that a more comprehensive theory of introspection than what is currently being used in the debate should be given. This thesis is an attempt to put forward such a view in service of the perceptual theorist. Once an alternative theory of introspection is given, several of the challenges that target perceptualism are avoided. Additionally I argue that the version of representationalism developed by Michael Tye is undermined by his explanation of pain’s negative affect. Consequently, I claim that one need not endorse representationalist commitments in order to maintain the attractive tenets of perceptualism.