dc.contributor.author |
Hiebert, Melissa
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2015-09-01T22:42:28Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2015-09-01T22:42:28Z |
|
dc.date.copyright |
2015 |
en_US |
dc.date.issued |
2015-09-01 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/1828/6647 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
The central doctrine of sufficientarianism is that there is a certain threshold below which people are said to be objectively "badly-off," and that providing benefits to people who fall into this category has a special moral urgency. A big part of sufficientarianism's success as a theory, then, relies on the ability to define the threshold in a manner that is non-arbitrary and that justifies a large difference in moral consideration between people who are on opposite sides of the threshold. This thesis examines some attempts to define such a threshold, and eventually concludes that no such threshold is available to us. However, while sufficientarianism may not work as a theory, sufficiency thresholds remain useful due to their practical ability to give useful instruction to policy makers in order to assist in resource distribution and the promotion of social justice. |
en_US |
dc.language |
English |
eng |
dc.language.iso |
en |
en_US |
dc.rights |
Available to the World Wide Web |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Sufficientarianism |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Moral Philosophy |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Distributive Justice |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Global Ethics |
en_US |
dc.title |
Is Sufficientarianism Sufficient? Prospects for the Sufficiency Threshold |
en_US |
dc.type |
Thesis |
en_US |
dc.contributor.supervisor |
Woodcock, Scott Frederick |
|
dc.degree.department |
Department of Philosophy |
en_US |
dc.degree.level |
Master of Arts M.A. |
en_US |
dc.description.scholarlevel |
Graduate |
en_US |