On Virtue, Value, and Epistemic Normativity

Abstract

Virtue epistemology is epistemological evaluation that gives ‘intellectual virtue’ a primary consideration in its analysis. This thesis is about how two types of virtue epistemology are related to each other, and how when taken broadly as a whole, virtue epistemology has theoretical and practical benefits for epistemic and epistemological evaluation. I begin by way of a quick historical review, and define epistemology as the study of good or bad ways of grasping reality. Part One is then devoted to describing the ‘virtue’ part of virtue epistemology. I posit a broad view of virtue: that human excellences come in the form of cognitive faculties and character traits. What binds them is a meta-epistemological commitment that epistemological analysis should focus on the whole of the person, which includes how the person relates to the environment, other persons, and importantly the values of the whole person. In Part Two, I take a closer look of how the various conceptions of intellectual virtue are different, specifically with an examination of epistemic value. In Part Three, I take up an objection levelled by the Epistemic Anti-Realist that is a call for concern for intellectual virtues, and epistemological evaluation on the whole.