A History of the Development and Organization of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II

by

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ABSTRACT

This M.A. thesis examines the development of the first centralized intelligence service in the United States during World War II, the Office of Strategic Services or OSS. From the beginning, the Research and Analysis branch was the 'brain' of OSS and recruited many of its personnel from America's finest universities, who then applied the methods of modern scholarship to intelligence issues in an unprecedented way. As well, OSS combined a variety of functions in a single organization which enabled it, and therefore the United States, to react quickly to situations in a fast moving global conflict. The development of OSS was impeded by the continuous argument and wrangling of the various agencies that had been responsible for intelligence matters up to 1941. In spite of these difficulties as well as setbacks and failures, the OSS evolved into an innovative organization that made a valuable contribution to the Allied war effort.
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Dedication

To my family, especially my parents, for their unconditional love and support. As well, this M.A. thesis has been completed during commemorations for the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, and so I would also like to dedicate this work to my grandfather, great-grandfather, and all those who have risked or given their lives in war in the service of Canada.
Chapter 1: Introduction and Historiography

The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged – All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprises of this kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned & promising a favourable issue.

George Washington, letter to Colonel Elias Dayton. July 26, 1777.¹

The purpose of this M.A. thesis is to examine the development of the first centralized and coordinated intelligence service in the United States, namely the Office of Strategic Services or OSS during World War II. Special attention will be given to the often overlooked Research and Analysis (R&A) branch and the intelligence reports they produced from 1941 – 1945, as well as internal government and military documents that detail the formation and evolution of this organization. From the beginning, R&A was the 'brain' of OSS, and it recruited many of its personnel from America's finest universities, who then applied the methods of modern scholarship to intelligence issues in an unprecedented way. As well, OSS combined a wide variety of functions in a single organization, which enabled it, and therefore the United States, to react quickly to situations in a fast moving global conflict. In spite of many difficulties as well as setbacks and failures, the Office of Strategic Services evolved into an innovative organization that made a valuable contribution to the American war effort from 1941 to 1945.

It is a paradox of history that it was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that effectively brought the United States into the war against Germany, and that the U.S. and Britain agreed to focus first on Europe and then the Pacific. Since the United States first focused its attention on Germany, this thesis will focus on OSS activities against
Germany in the European Theatre of Operations. America's first centralized intelligence service was established during World War II, one and a half years after Germany invaded Poland in 1939, and ten years after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. At this point, the United States was not a belligerent, and was pursuing isolationist neutrality while surreptitiously favouring Britain and its allies.

From June 18, 1941 until July 11, 1942, America's first intelligence organization was called the Office of the Coordinator of Information or COI. In July 1942 the COI was officially reorganized and transformed into the new Office of Strategic Services or OSS, which functioned through the end of the war in August 1945. On September 20, 1945, the OSS was dissolved and its component parts divided between the military and the State Department. On January 22, 1946 a new entity called the Central Intelligence Group was created with the Director of Central Intelligence or DCI at its head. Finally, on July 27, 1947 many of the dispersed components of OSS were effectively reconstituted under the DCI and Central Intelligence Group and the sum total was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency or CIA. Because of this history, the Office of Strategic Services is regarded as being the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency.

By the time World War II ended in August 1945, the activities of OSS had included various kinds of intelligence gathering and analysis, espionage, counter intelligence, propaganda, commandos, and support of partisans and guerillas. However, a crucial area of intelligence was never placed under the domain of OSS. This was 'SIGINT' or signals intelligence, which refers to intercepting and decoding various kinds of electronic communications and transmissions. This meant that, for security reasons, OSS and its R&A branch did not have direct access to 'Ultra' or 'Magic', two of the
Allies’ most valuable sources of intelligence during World War II.* Despite this shortcoming, the OSS was still an innovative organization. It was made up mostly of civilians drafted into the service of their country in a quasi-military agency during a time of war. They were given military ranks, but there was considerable flexibility about who wore a uniform and exactly when they wore it. The organization itself took on the character of its creator and director, William J. Donovan, a highly decorated World War I hero whose battlefield exploits had earned him the rank of colonel and the nickname ‘Wild Bill’ from the men under his command. William Donovan was a confirmed anti-isolationist and believed as early as 1940 that the war was going to become a global conflict. As Director of OSS, Donovan was also given the military rank of Major General to allow him to hold his own when dealing with other military agencies.

Although the precursor to OSS, the Coordinator of Information, was created in July 1941, it was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 which provided the catalyst for development of centralized intelligence and research and analysis in the United States. Part of the reason that Pearl Harbor was viewed as a tragedy was the fact that all of the information pointing to an imminent Japanese attack had been available to American leadership in 1941, including top secret Japanese communications. However, this information remained dispersed, untranslated, and unanalyzed among different U.S. military and government bureaucracies, and therefore no effective warning was given to the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. Pearl Harbor provoked a general public outcry and a resolve among American leadership that this should never

* “Ultra” was the name given to intelligence that came from secret German communications encoded using the “Enigma” encryption machine, which had been successfully cracked by Britain, France, and Poland. “Magic” was the name given to intelligence that came from secret Japanese communications encoded using the “Purple” encryption machine, which had been successfully cracked by the Americans.
be allowed to happen again. William Donovan had a devout belief in the need for a permanent centralized intelligence and secret operations organization for the U.S., a belief which was only reinforced after the fiasco of Pearl Harbor. Well before this, he had decided that the United States should enter the war on Britain’s side against the Axis, and he was instrumental in establishing the Lend Lease program to Britain’s advantage in March 1941. Secondary sources seem unanimous in their assertion that ‘Wild Bill’ imparted OSS with his “anything is possible, gung-ho attitude”, and that Donovan and the people in his organization were determined to prove not only that they were useful, but that they were indispensable to America.

As an organization, OSS was a military or corporate style hierarchy, with the Director of Strategic Services (William Donovan) at its head. The Director was supported by a central administration of assistant directors, special assistants and representatives, executive officers and theater of operations officers, secretariat, registry, general counsel, and inspector’s offices. Also included in the central administration was a special relations office, a board of review, an operation and plans officer, and the planning group. The technical branches which made it possible for OSS to perform its unique functions included the personnel office, internal security, communications, special funds, research and development, medical services, field photographic, and visual presentation. Training schools, headquarters detachments, and naval command were also part of the technical branches. The various everyday service functions of OSS were grouped under the Deputy Director of Services: budget and procedures, finance, procurement and supply, transportation, office services, and reproduction. Covert and commando operations and ‘strategic services’ were grouped under the Deputy Director of
Psychological Warfare Operations (changed to Strategic Services Operations in late 1943) and included special operations, operational groups and operational groups command, morale operations, the maritime unit, special projects office, and field experimental unit. Intelligence functions were grouped under the Deputy Director of the Intelligence Service and included research and analysis (R&A), secret intelligence (SI), counter-espionage (X-2), foreign nationalities (FN), and radio intelligence, documents and censorship (CD). The Deputy Director of the Intelligence Service reported to the Director, William Donovan, and was also a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) under the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy Director coordinated the activities of the different intelligence branches and also facilitated cooperation and acted as liaison with the JIC, other branches of OSS, and outside agencies. The Branch Chief of Research and Analysis reported to the Deputy Director of the Intelligence Service. The work of R&A was controlled by the Branch Chief and the Projects Committee, which was directly responsible to the Chief and had representatives from all divisions within R&A.

The Research and Analysis branch was one of the first components of the Coordinator of Information that was created in 1941 and it survived intact during the reorganization into OSS in 1942. James Phinney Baxter III, authority on American military and diplomatic history, was placed in charge of the branch at the beginning, but had to withdraw because of ill health. William L. Langer (Coolidge Professor of History at Harvard) headed the Research and Analysis branch as Chief by late 1942, and it was comprised of some of the greatest American (and émigré) intellects available in government, industry, academics, and the sciences. In addition to William Langer, by the
end of the war, R&A’s staff had included names such as: Edward S. Mason, Sherman Kent, Crane Brinton, Carl Schorske, Walt W. Rostow, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Gordon Craig, Franklin Ford, Walter Levy, Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, Bertold Brecht, Hans Kohn, Hajo Holborn, Felix Gilbert, Eugene Fodor, Beatrice Braude, Helen Fisher, Vera Sondamirskya Dunham, Janet Burns, Priscilla Redfield Roe, and Cora Dubois. The diverse backgrounds of R&A’s members meant that their personal biases and political sympathies literally ranged from staunch Republican conservative to Marxists and communists. As well, some businessmen were recruited who would have been partners or competitors (or both) of the Germans, Italians, and Japanese in the world of business. By the end of the war, over 900 persons worked for R&A at all levels including “a women’s army corps of typists, secretaries, and filing clerks” without whom OSS and the U.S. Army as a whole would have ground to a halt.

R&A was organized along interdisciplinary lines, with historians, economists, sociologists, political scientists, and nutritionists working side by side in four different sections divided by geographic area: Europe – Africa, USSR, Far East, and Latin America. These four geographic divisions were each in turn split into political, geographic, and economic subdivisions. These were all supported by maps and photography divisions, as well as divisions for biographical and pictorial records, references, and periodicals. R&A made a point of having people fluent in all of the languages they could possibly need during the war, since their geographic divisions covered the whole world (as did the war itself). For example, a typical R&A report regarding German occupied Europe would utilize German, French, Portuguese, Finnish, and Polish sources. Although it was based in Washington, R&A also had field offices in
New York and San Francisco, as well as “outposts” in Honolulu, London, Stockholm, Moscow, Istanbul, Algiers, Cairo, New Delhi, and Chungking, and access to virtually all reports from OSS operatives in the field. During the war, OSS R&A produced hundreds of reports on a bewildering range of topics and countries. In the case of Germany, for example: German tank production; the age distribution of German military casualties; social stratification in Germany; and the significance of reductions in German rations were among the many topics that were examined in detail. By the end of the war, R&A had basically realized the original intent behind its creation: that it should be the “brain” or “head” of this intelligence and covert operations agency and adapt the methods of modern scholarship to the analysis of information and production of strategic intelligence.

The rest of this chapter will provide a historiographical survey for this Master’s thesis dissertation in history, focusing on the development of centralized intelligence in the United States during World War II. Developments in American intelligence did not, of course, take place in a vacuum, and therefore the discussion will include Britain and Canada where applicable. This section will focus on the critical evaluation of a number of major published sources in the field of ‘intelligence studies,’ looking ahead to the declassified intelligence and other internal government documents that have been used as primary sources for this M.A thesis, while considering the theoretical and methodological issues that accompany historical research and writing in this field.

‘Intelligence’ and ‘intelligence studies’ are catch — all terms for a huge assortment of often disparate elements and topics: signals intelligence, espionage and double agents, research and analysis, economic intelligence and industrial espionage, science and
technology, spy gadgets and secret weapons, secret international diplomacy, counter-intelligence, strategic camouflage and deception, propaganda, guerillas / insurgents, and covert action. Books on 'intelligence' can cover any or all of these topics, and range in style and quality from anecdotal personal memoirs, to official government sanctioned histories or reproductions of documents, to scholarly works by eminent historians, to works of outright fantasy by unqualified amateurs. Interest in intelligence studies among historians and the general public has increased steadily since World War II, and especially over the past 25 years. Part of the allure is the fact that so many aspects of this area of historical research are 'shadowy and secretive,' which conversely means that there have been, and continue to be, significant obstacles to scholarly work in this field.

It is evident that the 'Cold War' that took place between the United States / NATO and the Soviet Union / Warsaw Pact up until 1990 complicated the issues of secrecy and declassification, and thereby ensured that many World War II intelligence documents would remain inaccessible for a much longer time than was really warranted. Different historians have observed that many issues and conflicts were effectively 'frozen in time' when the Cold War began, which caused governments to maintain a high level of secrecy with regards to any and all intelligence documents. In many ways, a "culture of secrecy" came to predominate in matters relating to intelligence after the Second World War.5 For historians wanting to do research in this field, such government attitudes towards secrecy could be very frustrating, if not always humorous. Regarding the government's policy towards MI5 (domestic) and MI6 (foreign) intelligence, a British commentator wrote that:

It can have ludicrous effects. One was the refusal to acknowledge that we had any 'secret services' at all: MI5 and MI6 had no official existence. Questions about them in parliament were ignored; writing to them was like sending messages to Father
Christmas; they operated from invisible headquarters: shoddy office blocks in London, blanks on the Ordnance Survey Map. The contrast here with Russia is obvious. Everyone there was aware of the KGB, its headquarters were a landmark in Moscow, and people shuddered as they hurried by. Millions must have passed M15's old registry in Curzon Street without a tremor. We just did not know it was there.6

It should hardly be surprising, therefore, if governments are somewhat reticent about releasing documents related to intelligence, or about facilitating the work of historians in the national archives when their stated research aim is intelligence or espionage.

The official history of *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, in five volumes, was first published in 1979: 34 years after the end of World War II.7 The first three volumes (including one double volume) cover “Influence on Strategy and Operations,” vol. IV covers “Security and Counter-intelligence,” and vol. V covers “Strategic Deception and Camouflage.” It was authored by a team of historians under the leadership of F.H. Hinsley, who was at the time “President of St. John’s College and Professor of the History of International Relations in the University of Cambridge.” Esteemed military historian Michael Howard is given lead accreditation for volume V, on “Strategic Deception and Camouflage.” This official history was commissioned by the British government, and they employed prominent civilian historians from prestigious universities who were given “unrestricted access to records.” As F.H. Hinsley says in the introduction to the five volumes, “No considered account of the relationship between intelligence and strategic and operational decisions has hitherto been possible, for no such account could be drawn up except by authors with unrestricted access to intelligence records and other archives... No restriction has been placed on us.” Hinsley continues that, “regarding domestic files which are unlikely ever to be opened... in their case, our text must be accepted as being the only evidence of their contents that can be made public.”8 The contribution that the chronological narrative of
this official history makes to our understanding of OSS and Allied intelligence is essentially factual. It is also of necessity brief and general when discussing issues of organization or the functioning of research and analysis in Britain, given the huge amount of material that is covered in these five volumes. Obviously, OSS is not the main focus in this book, and therefore is mentioned only when they figure in the narrative about British intelligence. However, it does demonstrate the way that Britain organized its intelligence functions differently than the United States, with a number of distinct and separate entities that were responsible for specific activities.

Historians writing an official history are given access to records that are not readily available to other researchers. This is especially true for records relating to intelligence, since these are potentially sensitive and are often subject to secrecy regulations for long periods of time, such as the British Official Secrets Act “30, 50, and 100 Year” secrecy rule on intelligence records. For many years, British files relating to Ultra were deemed too sensitive to be released, since Ultra employed modern technology that was still being used against the USSR during the cold war. It was partly for this reason that the history of *British Intelligence in the Second World War* was not published until 1979. As well, the history that was finally published is full of codenames and pseudonyms for both field operatives and administrative officials, some of which are defined in the text, but many of which are not.

The writing of any official history, and especially one focusing on intelligence and government secrets, is going to be affected by political issues. The writing process involves considerable ‘give and take’ between what can and cannot be said in the book that will finally be produced. Any historian, no matter how prominent or well –
published, can be pressured by their employers, especially if it is the government or the military. As readers, we are not able to see the process of writing an official history; we are only able to see the finished product. Official histories, in general, attempt to be 'omniscient' and provide the 'definitive' work on a given subject. Obviously, they are commissioned and paid for by a government, and the historians are commissioned and paid for as contractors. Consequently the government in question will exert (both intentionally and unintentionally) influence, control, and pressure on the authors they have commissioned, and one must be aware of this fact at all times when reading an official history. Some of these histories are restricted after being written, and simply not released to the public, such as the history of British Security Coordination (BSC) in North America, which was written in 1945 but suppressed until 1998.

Some official histories, such as J.E. Edmonds' history of British military operations during World War I, are themselves almost a primary source because of the author's unrestricted access to classified records and documents, such as personnel files and internal reports. As an historian, Edmonds also enjoyed the privileged position of having been a participant in the events he was writing about, since he was a staff officer to General Sir Douglas Haig during the war. Similarly, F. H. Hinsley and his team appear to have had unrestricted access to Britain's classified intelligence documents concerning World War II. One final issue that should be considered is the question of whether or not the authors listed on the title page of an official history, such as British Intelligence in the Second World War, are really the authors who have done the research and writing for the project. For example, F.H. Hinsley likely delegated responsibilities during the research and writing process, giving the more tedious and mundane work to
junior historians. Official histories are often written using a committee or collective arrangement following "the Stacey Method" of writing. This basically involves a team of historians, each of whom works on a particular topic or section, which they then submit to the chief or head historian who distills the work down to the essentials that will then be published as the 'official history.'

All of the preceding comments regarding official histories on intelligence apply to Kermit Roosevelt's *War Report of the O.S.S.* on the activities of the Office of Strategic Services during WWII, which was completed in 1947 and printed in 1949, but then withheld from public consumption until 1975 for security reasons. Kermit Roosevelt (grandson of Theodore Roosevelt) was engaged as chief historian and directed the organization and preparation of the report by the staff of the Strategic Services Unit's History Project for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Immediately following the title page is a signed one-page introduction by William J. Donovan, the creator and former head of COI/OSS, who states that, "this War Report presents a well-rounded study of the first comprehensive organization for intelligence and unorthodox warfare in the history of the United States." Donovan also asserts here that the "importance of OSS lies not only in its role in hastening military victory, but also in the development of the concept of unorthodox warfare." However, since this is an official history it cannot be expected to be overly critical, raise difficult questions, point out failures, or reveal anything that could reflect negatively on the United States government or military.

When it was finally published in 1976, the *War Report of the O.S.S.* carried a notification inside the front cover stating that, "Although stamped Top Secret, classified passages of this document have been deleted in order to release segregable portions, by
authority of 006687, 17 July 1975.” The table of contents lists 200 pages worth of exhibits or appendices at the end of the text, such as a reproduction of the order that created the position of the Coordinator of Information and copies of letters from Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt, but these do not actually appear in the 1976 edition. In the discussion of the “Special Funds section” of COI / OSS, long paragraphs have been deleted, leaving conspicuous blank gaps in the text.\(^\text{12}\) The Special Funds section was responsible for funding the secret activities of COI / OSS through un-vouchered funds from the President and Congress, as well as for procuring foreign currencies. This is a chronological narrative and the contribution it makes to our understanding is essentially factual. Unfortunately, it is also brief and general when discussing issues of organization or the functioning of research and analysis, given the huge amount of material that is covered in this one volume. For example, a group of R&A researchers that is of central interest to this M.A thesis, the Enemy Objectives Unit which is covered in Chapter 3, is actually discussed in just one paragraph in the entire book.\(^\text{13}\) However, *War Report of the O.S.S* does offer a first hand or internal description of OSS R&A, the underlying concept behind it, the way it was organized, and its unclassified sources and methods.

Fortunately, aspiring historians of intelligence have some scholarly works to use as a starting point which have critically evaluated the huge expanse of available primary sources and secondary literature in this area of history of the Second World War. This includes three annotated bibliographies which, taken together, discuss nearly all of the ‘major players’ in this field. Douglas Charles’ *American, British, and Canadian Intelligence Links: A Critical Annotated Bibliography* obviously focuses on the unique links between these three English speaking countries. In the larger context, he argues that
the current scholarly base of intelligence studies combined with “increasing access to primary source material, makes broader and more sophisticated studies possible.”

Alexander Cochran, Jr.’s *MAGIC, ULTRA, and the Second World War: Literature, Sources, and Outlook* examines what he and others consider “the greatest hole in the historiography of the Second World War, the intelligence gap.” Cochran suggests ways that historians can progress in efforts to revise World War II historiography to reflect the importance of Magic and Ultra and intelligence more generally, such as being open to all potential evidence, both positive and negative, as well as making an effort to ensure journal reviews of new books on intelligence. Jürgen Rohwer’s *Signal Intelligence and World War II: The Unfolding Story* makes use of his fluency in German, Polish, Russian and English. He evaluates and criticizes authors based on whether they have adequately considered the role of intelligence in decision making and estimates of enemy intentions, as well as whether they have understood the technical and organizational premises for acquiring and analyzing intelligence. All three of these articles are extremely useful for navigating through the myriad of books, articles and primary sources that are currently available in ‘intelligence studies.’ Cochran, Charles, and Rohwer’s articles also offer valuable insights into some of the larger issues that must be considered when working with the primary sources for intelligence and World War II. Although they do not specifically focus on OSS, these three articles have been particularly helpful for the writing of this chapter.

The wide ranging topic of Allied signals intelligence, or ‘SIGINT,’ has received a substantial amount of attention in historical literature. This includes Ultra and Magic, the British Admiralty’s ‘Y-service’ and high frequency direction finding or HF / DF,
the Government Code and Cipher School (GC & CS) and Bletchley Park, as well as the American Black Chamber and subsequent American cryptanalysis that broke the Japanese diplomatic code *Purple*. Information and documents relating to Magic have been readily available to historians since the end of World War II. This is due in large part to the fact that discussion of the Magic program was included, and Magic documents entered into evidence, during the United States Congressional Investigation into the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1946 after the war was over.\(^\text{18}\) By contrast, Ultra and some other Allied successes in signals intelligence were closely guarded secrets for many years after the end of the Second World War, since those technologies were still being used against the Soviets. However, as many of the people involved in these projects began to enter their old age and write their memoirs, the details started to leak out.

In the case of Ultra, German submariners and historians of the U-boat campaign had speculated for years previously that the Allies had broken the Enigma encryption system and had been intercepting and decoding radio communications from U- boats. This was the only explanation they could see for the precise destruction of the German surface supply system, and later the U- boats themselves, during the war. Certain ‘popular histories’ and personal memoirs such as *Room 3603* by H. Montgomery Hyde and *Room 39: Naval Intelligence in Action, 1939 – 1945* by Donald McLachlan hinted at the existence of the Ultra program in their discussions of espionage and intelligence during World War II.\(^\text{19}\) Finally, in 1967 Polish military historian Wladislaw Kozaczuk published a small booklet claiming that Polish cryptanalysts had broken the German Enigma encryption in 1932. This claim was largely ignored until 1973, when retired
chief of French military intelligence Gustave Bertrand published his own book describing his role in a co-operative effort between France and Poland to break into Enigma.20

Subsequently, the British government felt the need to present a "more balanced" picture of how Enigma was broken, and former security chief for the Ultra program Frederick Winterbotham was permitted to publish his own book *The Ultra Secret* in 1975, although even he was denied access to government documents on the subject.21 Up until this point, literally thousands of people had been "keeping the Ultra secret" since the end of World War II, and this required the cooperation of historians in the West.22 Military historian Ronald Lewin was the first "outsider" that was able to publish on the Ultra program. Lewin's book *Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story* was released in 1978 and became very popular, selling many copies to a wide public audience.23 It was at this time that signals intelligence generally and Ultra specifically became the subject of academic conferences and symposiums. Consequently, many authors, like David Kahn, who had published books prior to this were able to go back and revise their work to include information and evidence about Ultra that they had not been allowed to mention earlier. This corresponded with the release of a number of Ultra documents by the British government, as well as the publication of the official history of *British Intelligence in the Second World War* in 1979.

David Kahn's *The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing*, a hefty tome at over 1100 pages, has become a classic reference manual on 'cryptology' or the combined science of cryptography and cryptanalysis," despite being published while Ultra was still

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*Cryptography is the methods by which a message is rendered unintelligible to outsiders through transforming the original text by substitution or transposition of its letters, which results in a cryptogram. Cryptanalysis is the process by which persons who do not possess the cryptographic "key" try to decode a cryptogram." David Kahn. *The Codebreakers*, xiii – xiv.
officially a secret. Kahn was then able to go back and update his book after the secrecy on Ultra was lifted.\textsuperscript{24} Ronald Lewin achieved considerable notoriety from his best selling *Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story.* He participated in many of the conferences on Ultra in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and published other pieces on Ultra, including “A Signal - Intelligence War” in the *Journal of Contemporary History.*\textsuperscript{25} Ralph Bennett worked for four years as a senior producer of Ultra intelligence at Bletchley Park during World War II, and has since become one of the acknowledged experts on the history of Ultra during the war. His collected academic papers have been published as *Intelligence Investigations: How Ultra Changed History.*\textsuperscript{26} Whether it is personal memoirs by participants in the events, or historians offering scholarly analysis, or even occasionally a combination of these two approaches, all of these works help us to understand just how vital Ultra was to the Allied victory, and the reasons for the secrecy surrounding the program. They also help us to understand the kind of information that was being denied to OSS R&A, and thereby help us to comprehend the potentially crippling disadvantage that R&A was forced to work with from the moment of its inception.

Carl Boyd has taken the history of Magic during World War II as his subject, and specifically the intelligence that came by way of “Hitler’s Japanese confidant,” the Imperial ambassador to Germany, general Oshima Hiroshi.\textsuperscript{27} There is also now a substantial history of the influence of Magic on the war in the Pacific in the form of personal reminiscences of retired American servicemen and intelligence officers. In the early 1990’s, historians such as Ronald Spector, Edward Drea, and John Winton added their high quality scholarship to our understanding of the influence of Magic in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{28} David Kahn discusses some of the more notable Magic successes in
Codebreakers, such as the assassination of Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, while Roberta Wohlstetter discusses the failure by the Americans to make use of Magic to warn the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. This topic was of course covered in Hearings of the United States Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack as well as the five volumes of The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor, released by the U.S. Department of Defense. As is the case with books on Ultra, these various works illustrate and explain just how valuable Magic intelligence really was. These works also help us to understand the critical importance of the information that was being denied to OSS R&A, and thereby help us to understand the incredible disadvantage that R&A was forced to work with throughout the war, since OSS’s opponents in the U.S. military steadfastly refused to let OSS personnel in on the secret, even beyond the end of the war.

Christopher Andrew is one of the leading British historians on the history of intelligence agencies and intelligence studies more generally. He has written a number of books and journal articles, including Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community as well as editing and contributing to the brief but very valuable Codebreaking and Signals Intelligence. He has also written a book that is highly relevant to this M.A. thesis, the very useful For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush. For the two presidents who were so intimately connected to the history of OSS, the book has two chapters on Franklin Roosevelt and one on Harry Truman, as well as informative chapters which describe intelligence during early American history. In For the President's Eyes Only, Andrew argues that the ‘intelligence community’ has always had great influence
over presidents, and that the presidency and the intelligence community have each influenced how the other has developed since 1776 in the United States. Andrew also has lots of information about rivalries between different agencies responsible for U.S. intelligence and their opposition to a new organization during World War II, especially one like OSS which in its original conception was answerable only to the President.

The journal *Intelligence and National Security* is representative of the general interest in intelligence studies that has developed since the 1970's. Its chief editors are Christopher Andrew, in Britain, and Michael Handel in the United States. The assistant editors are Britain’s Nicholas Hiley and Canada’s own Wesley K. Wark, and the editorial advisory board includes Ralph Bennett, F.H. Hinsley, Samuel P. Huntington, David Kahn, Ernest May, and Jürgen Rohwer. There is also the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, which was established in 1986, and seems to have a large number of ex-intelligence services people on its editorial board. The editor-in-chief is Richard Valcourt of the American Military University, and they can boast of the services of David Kahn on their editorial advisory board. Wesley K. Wark of the University of Toronto has made many important contributions to the study of intelligence, especially *The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933 – 1939*. Wark examines the attitudes of the British intelligence services as they moved rapidly from confusion about Hitler and the Nazis’ intentions to inflating estimates of German capabilities. Overall, he finds that the British intelligence services were fragmented and uncoordinated and no better than their American counterparts at working together. Another important book on the adversarial competition in intelligence before World War II is *Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two*
World Wars, edited by Ernest May, which actually covers the major powers up to 1941. This collection of essays is intended to demonstrate how understanding the use of intelligence in decision making can actually bring a new perspective to historical events that have already been extensively written about.

High quality writing on the history of COI and OSS can be found in Bradley F. Smith’s The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the CIA. Smith focuses on the factors that made Donovan and contemporaries believe in the value of “shadow warfare,” the organization’s choice of certain kinds of subversive activities over others, the successes that OSS had during the war, and the ways in which veterans of the OSS directly contributed to the creation of the CIA. Smith argues that OSS did not develop according to a clearly defined plan by Donovan, but was a product of the situation and fast moving events it was born into. Ultimately, Donovan and the OSS could not find the “magic wand” they were looking for that would either win the war or dispense for the need of traditional military forces. Barry Katz’s Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942 – 1945 argues that it was R&A more than secret agents who “laid the foundations for modern intelligence work,” even if R&A was under-utilized during the war. However, he believes that R&A’s biggest legacy is actually interdisciplinary cooperation at American universities since World War II, rather than anything to do with the CIA. Katz’s two objectives in his study are to analyze the manner in which academic scholarship was adapted by American and European born scholars to the demands of war, and then to follow the careers of individual scholars as they were de-mobilized and returned to the life of academia. Smith and Katz’s books have been very useful to this author. John Ranelagh’s The Agency: The Rise and Decline
of the CIA has also been fairly useful. His aim is to chronicle the creation of the CIA as a
“victory of the governing elite” and a unique vehicle to civilian advancement which had
to fight both real and bureaucratic wars as part of a mission to protect America from its
enemies.\textsuperscript{39} Although it has a wealth of factual information, \textit{The Agency} offers what turns
out to be a rather forgiving and pro-American view of the history of OSS and the CIA.
In Ranelagh’s own words, “The story of the CIA is the story of an American secret... in
its moments of achievement as well as condemnation, the agency... was a faithful
instrument of the most decent and perhaps the simplest of the great powers.”\textsuperscript{40}

A considerable number of the books shelved in the section of the library devoted
to intelligence history are biographies, autobiographies, and personal memoirs and
reminiscences of participants in Second World War intelligence. Major figures such as
William Donovan of OSS and the head of British intelligence Sir Stewart Menzies are
covered in this literature, but so are lower-level field operatives.\textsuperscript{41} A large number of
these books do not have any kind of notes or references, making them problematic for an
historian to use in an academic paper. Some authors, like F.W. Winterbotham, were
prevented from doing any kind of notations by government secrecy regulations. Many of
these books are self-adulatory and rather sensational in their approach, and this goes
hand in hand with an absence of academic notations and bibliographies. \textit{A Man Called
Intrepid}, about the head of British Security Coordination in the United States, the “Silent
Canadian” William Stephenson, is usually singled out for criticism in this regard.\textsuperscript{42}
Others, such as a biography of the American cryptologist who broke the Japanese Purple
code, Colonel William F. Friedman, are very reasonable in tone and approach. \textit{The Man
Who Broke Purple} offers an abundance of interesting details, but lacks any type of
reference notes or bibliography at all, making this book and others like it problematic to use as a source in academic writings. Interestingly, Herbert Yardley, former head of the American Black Chamber, published a book in 1931 after that office was disbanded. His book was so detailed and revealing that the Japanese were made aware of the need to change their communications ciphers, which thereby made Yardley persona non grata in Washington, D.C. Whether of good quality or of poor quality, books written by or about the people in Allied intelligence services offer us the unique perspective of individuals who were actually there and lived through it, and provide ‘insider information’ that no outside chronicler can. However, some of these books, like A Man Called Intrepid, have helped to create a ‘bad reputation’ for the literature of intelligence, which is often blamed for indulging in myth making and inaccuracy. This is unfortunate, because it means more serious and scholarly works can be ‘tarred by the same brush’ and ignored by the larger discipline of history.

Some writers and historians have enjoyed ‘semi–official’ status, or at least privileged access to restricted documents. This includes Thomas F. Troy’s Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency and two books by Nigel West: MI5: British Security Operations, 1909 – 45 and MI6: British Security Intelligence Service Operations, 1909 – 45. The authors’ privileged status in relation to the government must therefore be remembered at all times when using these books, since they will basically be biased or partisan in favour of the intelligence services they are writing about. A benefit of privileged access is that books like these can actually contain a wealth of rare and unique photos, diagrams, and copies of handwritten notes, as is the case with Donovan and the CIA. Unfortunately, a large amount of the available literature
on intelligence clearly does not meet the standards of acceptability for today’s university
students. For example, John Patrick Quirk’s Readings On: The Intelligence Community
(of the United States) is supposedly aimed at college and university level students. Quirk
says, “It is designed to correspond to the Intelligence Survey courses that are presently
being offered on many of the nation’s campuses.”46 However, the book contains a
number of glaring inaccuracies, beginning with the introductory chapter: “Hitler, some
experts theorize, was but months away from mass producing atomic bombs that could be
delivered by missiles able to hit New York and jet airplanes that could drop bombs on
Allied armies in England, France, and Russia.”47 These and other similarly fantastic
claims are typical for many of the amateurs writing in the field of intelligence studies.

An intelligence topic that has not received sufficient coverage in academic works
in English is that of German, Russian, and Japanese intelligence and counter –
intelligence during World War II, since there are still many unanswered questions about
their intelligence successes and failures during the war. Jürgen Rohwer raises this issue
in his essay, and provides interested readers with some places to start, using his
impressive command of English, German, Polish, and Russian.48 Academic work on
Soviet intelligence was obviously limited in the West during the years of the ‘cold war,’
and Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky’s book KGB: The Inside Story of Its
Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev seems the most authoritative.49 However,
there is voluminous work on German secret intelligence, although the most reliable
overall seems to be David Kahn’s Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World
War II.50 It should be remembered that the Cold War and the partition of Germany into
East and West created obstacles to scholarship. As well, the most valuable documents to
historians would have been destroyed in the huge bonfires of secret papers that burned in Germany in the spring of 1945 before Allied and Soviet armies arrived. Works in English concerning Japanese intelligence still seem to be lacking and are largely limited to Richard Deacon’s *Kempei Tai: A History of the Japanese Secret Service* and Michael Barnhart’s essay “Japanese Intelligence before the Second World War: ‘Best Case’ Analysis” in Ernest May’s *Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars*.51

Douglas Charles accurately points out with rueful irony that, “because it is overshadowed by American and British intelligence cooperation, Canadian intelligence links are usually discussed tangentially.”52 *A Man Called Intrepid* has long been discredited for its sensational and inaccurate claims regarding William Stephenson and British Security Coordination, but the book must be remembered for the role it has played in creating a Canadian “James Bond” myth. Fortunately, there are more accurate and balanced writings on Canada’s involvement in intelligence during World War II available today. At the very least, scholars can be grateful that *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940 – 45* was finally made available after 43 years of being restricted, although as an official history it certainly cannot be considered an unbiased account.53 Although the idea of a training camp for SOE and OSS agents on the shores of Lake Ontario sounds sensational, we actually have a balanced study of it in *Camp X: SOE and the American Connection*.54 The book details one of the ways in which the Allies made use of Canada’s famous ‘wide – open spaces’ for special training and weapons programs far from the enemy’s prying eyes. *The Ties that Bind* examines intelligence cooperation among the English – speaking countries of
Britain, Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, based on their common origins and cultural heritage in the British Empire.\textsuperscript{55} Canada is also included within the British context of \textit{Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances from 1914 to the Cold War}, although this is quite a wide ranging book in the number of countries that it covers with its unique focus on friends spying on each other.\textsuperscript{56}

There have been some new works published over the last five years before the writing of this M.A. thesis. In addition to his previous works on intelligence, Richard Aldrich examines American and British cooperation but also disagreement and competition with each other in Asia and the Pacific in his book \textit{Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service}.\textsuperscript{57} He argues that these allies’ difficulties revolved around irreconcilable visions of the post-war world, since Britain intended to reclaim its colonies while America was promising them independence. Aldrich also has an excellent book which looks at American and British cooperation and their ‘special relationship’ at the end of World War II and into the Cold War called \textit{The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence}.\textsuperscript{58} He argues that military leaders in Britain and the United States developed their Cold War views of the Soviets while World War II was still far from over. He also examines the role of secret services as instruments of policy for Britain and the United States. In both of these books, Aldrich offers many useful insights into the unique problems associated with working in intelligence studies. Joseph Persico covers the events and issues surrounding the formation and activities of OSS in \textit{Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage}, asserting that President Roosevelt built espionage and intelligence gathering into the structure of American government well before Pearl
Harbor. Persico paints Roosevelt as a ‘spymaster’ of sorts whose use (or poor use) of intelligence shaped the war as well as the peace at the end of the Second World War. However, some reviewers feel that Persico has relied too much on secondary sources, anecdotal evidence, and speculation.

Thomas Powers has given us the very timely and appropriate *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda*, which is a collection of essays and book reviews that Powers wrote for the *New York Review of Books*. In essays that span 25 years of his journalistic career, Powers examines how secret intelligence is gathered, evaluated, and used to make policy decisions in the United States. Powers also questions the proper role of secret intelligence in the policy debates of a democratic society, and whether or not the CIA can meet the challenge of defending America from terrorism in the 21st century. Fortunately, English speaking historians now have the translation of Christof Mauch’s excellent *The Shadow War against Hitler: The covert operations of America’s wartime secret intelligence service*. It is of primary interest to this M.A. thesis since it covers the formation of OSS and its role in the war against Germany. Mauch believes that it is impossible to reconstruct the secret offensive against Nazi Germany without looking at the sum total of diverse activities engaged in by OSS. He presents an overview of the projects, operations, and goals of the organization, as well as a comprehensive investigation of all of its major functions. Mauch argues that the OSS as a whole spent as much time trying to ensure its longevity as it did trying to win the war, and that this was especially true of William Donovan. It is to be hoped that the high quality of some of these recent works on intelligence bodes well for future scholarship.
This chapter was designed to present a critical survey of some of the major and more notable works available in the field of intelligence studies as it relates to American centralized intelligence in World War II, although the selection presented here is by no means exhaustive. Any study on intelligence historiography must also include a consideration of the theoretical and methodological issues that accompany research in this field, such as 'secrecy' regulations and primary sources. The historiography of intelligence is unique because there is no "clear linear evolution," since secondary studies are often published before official histories or primary sources are publicly released.62 The prospect of large chronological gaps in the archival records and continuous wrangling with government officials over 'red tape' and access to the anonymously written primary sources can make some scholars reluctant to approach intelligence studies.63 Despite these obstacles, an immense quantity of writing has been produced on intelligence-related topics since the 1970's and they range in quality from excellent and well-researched, to amateurish and unbelievable. Official histories have been published and government documents declassified steadily throughout that same time-period. Presently, the amount and variety of secondary literature and primary sources available on 'intelligence' is nothing short of amazing.

The terms 'intelligence' and 'intelligence studies' encompass a truly bewildering assortment of topics: signals intelligence, espionage and double agents, research and analysis, economic intelligence and industrial espionage, science and technology, spy gadgets and secret weapons, secret international diplomacy, counter-intelligence, strategic camouflage and deception, propaganda, guerillas / insurgents, and covert action. Despite the vagaries of definition, the study of intelligence organizations is very
important, not just for military history, but for history in general. It is the task of the historian to try and ascertain what their influence or effect on important decisions may have been. The process of centralization in intelligence; the work of the research and analysis department in an intelligence organization; the importance of logistical issues in strategic intelligence; and Canada’s role in facilitating Anglo-American World War II intelligence cooperation have not received adequate attention in historiography to date. Although there is currently a wide selection of writings available, there is clearly room for more works of balanced historical scholarship in the field of intelligence studies as we begin the 21st century.

Accordingly, the following chapters will focus on the process of centralization, the work of the R&A branch of OSS, and logistical issues within the overall picture of strategic intelligence in WWII. Chapter 2 will focus on issues surrounding intelligence studies in general, such as what might be called a “culture of secrecy” that surrounds intelligence and security services and the problems this presents for historians in the form of classified documents, restricted access and similar obstacles. There are also special problems and issues regarding the provenance of documents used in intelligence studies which will be considered. The various types of intelligence will be discussed: secret as opposed to ‘open source’ information; tactical as compared to strategic analysis; long term and short term projections; and generally what is meant by terms like ‘signals intelligence’ and ‘human intelligence.’ Two different sets of declassified American records have been used in this study, from OSS and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the differences between them will be explained. In this chapter, OSS intelligence reports
will be assessed for their value to historians, in addition to questioning what can be learned from these documents.

Chapter 3 will examine the continuous argument and wrangling over the limits and functions of the OSS, which took the form of rivalries over jurisdiction, "turf battles", and a general lack of information sharing and cooperation. The key players in all of this were: the President, the Army, the Navy, the Bureau of Economic Warfare, the Office of War Information, the FBI, and the State Department. After addressing the problems of provenance in Chapter 2, this chapter will examine the evolution of OSS as evidenced in the Joint Chiefs of Staff documents and changes in the R&A reports that they produced from 1941 - 1945. Lastly, an example of OSS Research and Analysis in action will be looked at: air targeting and the bombing campaign over Germany, which was arguably some of the most important work done by OSS during World War II. This was an example of success for OSS in spite of difficulties and opposition.

Chapter 4 will explore the response of a nation state to a major crisis: a sudden and huge need for intelligence in time of war. What was unique to the United States? Obviously, various aspects of American history have been distinctive: democracy, pluralism, lack of centralization, distrust of authority and standing armies, and America's frontier and 'wild west' experience. The lack of focus on centralization and coordination of intelligence will also be addressed, as well as the question of why attention has been lacking. This chapter will also explore what is important about studying structures and organizations, and the development thereof during a time of war. Finally, the dissolution of OSS in 1945 will be discussed, as well as the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group in 1946 and then the National Security
Council and the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. The legacy or role of OSS in the CIA will also be considered, as well as the possible legacy of OSS R&A and whether there has been any continuity in American intelligence operations since 1945.

The United States emerged from the Second World War with an intelligence system in which the problems of co-ordination and jurisdiction had not been completely resolved. The structure of the post-war American intelligence system was established during the Second World War, and under the unique conditions which prevailed at that time. Examining the development and work of the Research and Analysis branch illustrates that in spite of difficulties, setbacks and various failures, the OSS evolved into an innovative organization that made a valuable contribution to the Allied war effort from 1941 to 1945.

3 Katz, 21, 24.
4 Katz, 2.
8 Hinsley, vii and viii.
11 Roosevelt, vi.
12 Roosevelt, 143 – 155.
13 Roosevelt, 177 – 78.
14 Charles, 262.
16 Cochran, 90.


35 Smith, xvi, 419.


37 Katz, xlix.


39 Ranelagh, 714.


John Patrick Quirk, Readings On: The Intelligence Community (Guilford, CT: Foreign Intelligence Press, 1988), 2.

Quirk, 17.

Rohwer, 939 – 951.


Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).


Charles, 259.

Cochran, 89.
Chapter 2: Sources and Method

This thesis is devoting special attention to the often overlooked Research and Analysis (R&A) branch of OSS and the intelligence reports they produced from 1941 – 1945, as well as internal government and military documents that detail the formation and evolution of this organization. It has been well documented that the creation and growth of OSS was impeded by the continuous argument and wrangling of the various agencies that had been responsible for intelligence matters up to 1941. From the start, R&A was the 'brain' of OSS, and it recruited many of its staff from America's finest universities, who then applied the methods of modern scholarship to intelligence issues in an unparalleled way. As well, OSS combined a wide variety of functions in a single organization, which enabled OSS, and therefore the United States, to react quickly to situations in a fast moving global conflict. Examining the development and work of the Research and Analysis branch shows that in spite of difficulties, setbacks and various failures, the OSS evolved into an innovative organization that made an important contribution to the Allied war effort from 1941 – 45. This chapter will examine sources and method for this thesis, and discuss the unique aspects of intelligence studies more generally.

Intelligence services, espionage, codes and ciphers, clandestine operations, and elaborate deceptions are all part of what might be called a ‘culture of secrecy.’ This is a different usage than that coined by David Vincent, who used it to refer to how the intelligence services and the cultural practice of ‘secrecy’ function in Britain, but the term is useful for the discussion in this thesis.¹ Here, the ‘culture of secrecy’ is used to capture
the idea that in order to be successful, many of the activities of an intelligence service need to remain hidden from general knowledge. This often means that nearly everything surrounding an intelligence organization is shrouded in secrecy: the activities, plans, personnel, methods, and even physical location of their offices can be secret. Code names, pseudonyms, aliases, and false identities are the norm. Governments deny their activities, claim ignorance, or simply have ‘no comment.’ Documents and papers are intentionally vague and anonymous and are frequently burned or otherwise destroyed after being used. Many of the dramatic successes and failures of intelligence organizations can remain totally unknown to the general populace. People who retire or otherwise leave an intelligence service are still expected to keep quiet about their work or face a variety of consequences. Most average people would find this incessant demand for ‘secrecy’ strange and quite unusual, but it is the everyday norm for those who work in an intelligence service. In this way, it is fair to say that intelligence services exist and operate within a ‘culture of secrecy.’

A satisfactory thesis in intelligence studies should include a consideration of the unique theoretical and methodological issues that accompany historical research in this field, such as ‘secrecy’ regulations and the problems with the provenance of primary sources. The historiography of intelligence is unique because secondary sources are often published before official histories or primary sources are publicly released. The staggered and unpredictable availability of these different sources is outside the normal kind of chronological order that many historians have come to expect in their discipline. A field of study known for large chronological gaps in the archival records and continuous wrangling with government officials over ‘red tape’ and access to the
anonymous primary sources can make some historians reluctant to devote their time to intelligence studies.

Knowing the provenance of sources, in the context of their creation, allows a historian to give a more sensitive reading of the documents being discussed. Establishing the provenance of primary sources or documents that have been produced by a branch of any government is always a problem. These types of documents are created for a specific purpose, with a certain agenda, and are full of assumptions and biases. The issue of how to read and interpret documents that have been created by a government agency that is geared towards operating in secrecy presents unique problems for historians working in the area of intelligence studies. At all levels of such an agency, orders and directives are frequently verbal and intentionally not committed to paper. This point is crucial and its importance cannot be overstated. Other correspondence and documents are commonly destroyed after being used or read by their intended recipient. Many of the documents that are available to a historian and are not restricted as ‘top secret’ are frequently full of code names and pseudonyms that are never properly identified.

Overall, these kinds of document present a unique challenge for the historian; however, we can still use them and learn interesting things from them despite the problems surrounding their provenance. Through a sensitive reading and examination of the documents, we may be able to learn things that the authors and their employers did not intend us to know. However, historians must be aware at all times that the particular pages they are looking at are situated within vast collections of documents that have as a whole been presented in a manner that can only be called ‘controlled’ or ‘manipulated.’
In many ways, the limits and parameters of what a historian can learn have already been considered and established by the authorities before that historian even starts working.

In his book about the “hidden hand”, which he defines as intelligence services’ “operations to influence the world by unseen methods”, Richard Aldrich has a number of useful insights that have a direct bearing on this discussion. Government records that reach the public realm have been placed there by the authorities after deliberate choices and decisions which are intended to further the government’s own goals. Therefore, the release of declassified documents is not always the sign of commitment to the democratic openness of the archives: releasing this material can actually be a method of disguising a larger program of “information management.” Although the British government saves only 2% of its documents for the archives and burns the rest, Aldrich says that the volume of documents is still so large that historians cannot cover all of it. He points out that the huge volume of material distracts most historians from a more important issue: the selection and destruction of government records, which he feels they do not adequately consider, let alone challenge. As a result, the most important documents a historian would want to examine disappear down the ‘Orwellian memory hole’ without being seen by anyone. The power of ‘omission’ to create distortions of the truth should not be underestimated.

Richard Aldrich also points out that studying the history of intelligence services is unique because the subjects being researched have both created the evidence and then carefully controlled its presentation. This allows for a government to stage manage the way the history of its secret affairs appear to the world. For example, the American and British governments have clearly had a preference for releasing certain types of material,
such as documents that present a heroic image of their wartime secret service activities as a justified response to the totalitarian regimes of Hitler or Stalin. In the ‘digital age,’ the American and British governments can even use the release of literally millions of pages of declassified documents combined with a focus on sensational topics (i.e., the assassination of John F. Kennedy) as intentional “diversions” for a general public that never tires of stories about espionage, conspiracy, and secret intrigues. But Aldrich does realize what should be obvious: that “secret services are worthless if they do not keep themselves hidden.” Despite this (or perhaps because of it), there are always researchers that are trying to uncover government secrets, and many of these researchers consider it to be their sacred and scholastic duty to do so. As a result, Aldrich warns us, the relationship between secret services and historians who want to study them will always be “adversarial.” However, he correctly maintains that “[t]o understand the inner thoughts and purposes of those at the highest level, it is essential to consider the work of secret services.”

There are many different types of intelligence, and so a brief description of them is in order. The word ‘intelligence’ can be used to mean raw and unprocessed data or information, but it can also be used to mean the end product of a long process of collecting and analyzing information. In these terms, the OSS would be both a producer and a consumer of intelligence, but the President would only be a consumer of intelligence. The raw information or intelligence can be ‘secret’ in origin, which would imply that it had been handed over from the inside or discovered by the methods of those on the outside. But this raw information can also be what is called ‘open source’ which means that it is publicly or freely available to anyone, and these sources include foreign
and domestic technical and business journals, foreign newspapers, foreign language radio broadcasts, and the observations of Foreign Service personnel. People as sources of information or intelligence are called 'human intelligence' or 'HUMINT' in the jargon of secret services and intelligence studies. This basically refers to the spies, informers, and secret agents that have been part of human history dating back to ancient times, although it also includes the mundane, such as the observations of people who have travelled recently. Some writers will make a distinction between 'political intelligence' which has its origins in or bearing on political and diplomatic matters, and 'military intelligence' which is relevant to or procured by the armed services for the conduct of military operations. However, this distinction is rather arbitrary and does not capture the reality of the situation, which is much harder to define and place in neat categories. Politicians can make decisions based on 'military intelligence,' and military leaders can make decisions based on 'political intelligence,' and so the difference is not always obvious.

The interception and decoding of various kinds of electronic communications and transmissions is called 'signals intelligence' or 'SIGINT.' During World War II this included both Ultra and Magic, which were the source of some of the Allies' most important intelligence during the war, as well as high frequency direction finding or HF/DF, which helped to defeat the German U-boats. Intelligence and information of any origin is useless if it is not analyzed and considered by qualified persons, and so analysis is a crucial component of 'producing' intelligence. There is a difference between tactical analysis and strategic analysis of intelligence. Tactical analysis focuses on the 'smaller picture' of methods, tools, and weapons, while strategic analysis focuses on the 'larger picture' of motivation, goals, and planning. The difference between long term and short
term analysis of intelligence is fairly obvious, in that long term analysis would focus on long term plans and issues for the future, while short term analysis would focus on immediate, ‘time sensitive’ issues. Also included under the rubric of ‘intelligence’ without actually being about information gathering is ‘shadow warfare,’ or unconventional and irregular warfare. This includes psychological warfare, propaganda and morale subverting operations, sabotage, support of guerrillas and partisans, commando operations, deception and camouflage, counter – intelligence and counter – espionage.

The U.S. government released a sizable portion of the actual intelligence documents for World War II on microfilm in 1977, the O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports. The use of microfilm gave historians everywhere access to many of the documents, but the historians also had to try and find what they were looking for by themselves from amongst literally thousands of pages of documents. For example, Germany and Its Occupied Territories During World War II fills nineteen reels of microfilm, and Germany alone takes up six of those reels. Each reel of microfilm contains at least two dozen intelligence reports, and individual reports range from just three pages to over six hundred pages long. OSS R&A produced a similar amount of documents on Japan and the USSR for the same time period, as well as reports on Italy, China, Africa and Latin America. It is important to point out that OSS produced intelligence reports on the USSR throughout the time that the Soviet Union was officially an ally of the United States and Britain. Therefore, there is a huge amount of material that exists which needs to be sorted through. Numerous interesting discoveries are likely ‘just waiting to be found’ and are simply camouflaged by the sheer number of files
available on microfilm. A survey of the bibliographies of the secondary sources consulted for this paper confirms that the documents on these series of microfilms do not seem to have been widely used by historians in the 25 years since they were first made available.

Despite making such a vast amount of intelligence records available, an historian should not think for even a moment that these represent all of the records of American intelligence for WWII. In the official history *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, F.W. Hinsley, Michael Howard and their team at least were able to look at the top secret British files for domestic or ‘homeland’ security during World War II, hence Hinsley’s assertion in the introduction that, “in their case, our text must be accepted as being the only evidence of their contents that can be made public.”

It can be assumed that the Americans simply did not release any documents that were deemed to be too sensitive or secret. The COI / OSS intelligence reports on microfilm are presented in an organized and numbered sequence, however it is obvious that this is for the sake of order and coherence in this University Publications project with its guide by Paul Kesaris. It would be foolish to think that the documents that appear on these microfilms, and the numbered order in which they appear, represent the totality of documents produced by American intelligence in World War II. Therefore, one must consider the possibility that these documents were censored, vetted, edited, or revised before publication in 1977. Although no longer deemed sensitive to national security when they were declassified, these records may still have been edited for public relations reasons before being released. Potentially sensational or embarrassing material, for example, may have been omitted, and files that could have reflected negatively on
American leadership either during or since World War II may have been deleted or altered. However, if censorship has taken place in *O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports*, then it must have been of entire reports or sections, since the individual reports examined for this essay do not have 'blacked out' passages or missing pages.

These basic comments and arguments hold true for *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1 (1942 – 1945) Strategic Issues* and their accompanying guide by Paul Kesaris and Robert Lester, which was published in 1983.\(^\text{10}\) Documents pertaining to OSS are contained in *Reels X and XI: Propaganda and Unconventional Warfare*. These are a different kind of records, since they reflect the internal processes surrounding the formation and functioning of the OSS. These documents include: minutes of committee meetings, memoranda, proposed directives and directives, statements of function, personal letters, working agreements, requests for personnel, and field manuals. Despite being vetted before being released, these documents still provide clear evidence of the amount of opposition and disagreement surrounding the creation of OSS. They show that Army intelligence and Navy intelligence were fiercely opposed to any encroachment on their spheres of jurisdiction, while certain Admirals and Generals were convinced that this new organization had no value and could even ruin some of their military operations.

It is also interesting to compare intelligence reports from *O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports* with documents from *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1 (1942 – 1945) Strategic Issues* to see whether there is a correlation between the disagreements taking place over the OSS and its functions and limits, with the style and presentation of the intelligence reports OSS was producing at the same time.
Some types of intelligence documents did not even survive the end of the war, since top secret documents like those relating to Ultra or Magic were usually prefaced by the order to 'Burn after Reading,' and an intelligence officer or commander's headquarters often had an incinerator for this purpose. Ultra and Magic documents that did survive the war and are accessible to historians generally take the form of anonymous single pages that are dense with technical jargon and carry a plain title of "MAGIC" or "ULTRA" at the top. Not surprisingly, documents relating to Ultra or Magic do not appear in *O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, part IV: Germany and Its Occupied Territories During World War II* nor do any of the intelligence reports examined for this thesis contain any reference to "Magic" or "Ultra." It is a difficult task for an historian to try and discern whether or not intelligence like Ultra or Magic has influenced the decision-making of Allied political and military leaders, or even if it has been used at all. The issue of classified documents and censorship, vetting or destruction clearly complicates a historian's work in the field of intelligence studies. However, it is important to apply 'Occam's Razor' to these problems: 'the simplest explanation is probably the right one.' Consequently an historian would be well advised not to look for 'conspiracy theories' where they do not exist. As well, governments always seem to keep 'secrets' and controlling or withholding information is a form of power that government bureaucrats seem to enjoy exercising. Sometimes, it seems that 'secrecy' is also influenced by considerations of convenience, since it may be more convenient to simply let groups of records remain 'classified' rather than going through the process of sorting out which ones can be released and which ones have to remain secret or be destroyed. Despite these limitations, at the beginning of the 21st century it seems that there are an
abundance of original documents available as primary sources that have been published, or that can be accessed by visiting government archives.

Although all of the documents used in this study were created by U.S. military agencies during a time of war, there are important differences between these two kinds of documents. The reports in *O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, part IV* were actually produced by OSS R&A during the war, using all of the methods and sources that are described in secondary sources about OSS. By contrast, documents in *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1* are mostly about the OSS, although there are some letters and memos written by William Donovan and also some operational field manuals. The documents from Donovan are bureaucratic paperwork and part of the continuous argument over the limits and functions of OSS. The field manuals were produced by OSS, but they are basically 'how – to’ guides that were to be used by troops and operatives far from OSS training schools. Chapter 3 will briefly compare *O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, part IV* with the *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1* since there is a general correlation between the disagreements that were taking place over the OSS and its functions and limits, and changes in the presentation and style of the intelligence reports OSS was producing at the same time.

The intelligence reports from the *O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports* are not addressed to any person or organization, and one must have recourse to secondary sources to know whom they were written for. It is not possible to discern from the documents whether each report had a single author or a collective thereof, nor any of the names or credentials of those authors, since this information has been intentionally withheld to protect their identities. Therefore, one must also
completely rely on secondary sources to find out who, at least generally, authored these reports. One must also have recourse to supplementary information to know what the larger historical context of these reports is, and what their inherent biases are likely to be. These reports were internal documents written for President Franklin D. Roosevelt (commander-in-chief of the armed forces) as well as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff of Britain and the United States. Certain reports or guides were also geared for distribution in the Armed Services. Although these were officially the intended recipients of these intelligence reports, in practice they had a much wider circulation. Historian Bradley Smith asserts that the reports came to be highly valued during the war, and in the years afterward, the maps, charts, and reports of OSS R&A were discovered in the files of everyone from the U.S. State Department, to British S.I.S., to the Soviet N.K.V.D. (precursor to the K.G.B.).\textsuperscript{13} Winston Churchill supposedly preferred OSS R&A maps above all others.\textsuperscript{14}

These reports provide insight into the methods and results of research and analysis used by American intelligence during the war. The reports offer carefully considered estimates of Germany's 'position' or situation in regards to certain key raw materials that had become essential to modern warfare by the beginning of World War II. These include coal and steel, steel-hardening alloys, petroleum products, and rubber.\textsuperscript{15} Other sections of the reports focus on transportation strain as it related to Germany's economy and expanded territories, provide information on new economic structures of the "Nazi New Order" in Europe, and offer an overall estimate of the relative economic strength of German controlled Europe.\textsuperscript{16} The reports also contain detailed information about Germany's leading banks and corporations, along with information about Germany's
control of continental industries. They also demonstrate an understanding of ‘grand strategy’ and an appreciation for the developing concept of ‘global strategy’. This appreciation of the global aspect of strategy is evident in the topics of focus for these earliest reports (oil, rubber, steel alloys, rail transportation) and the frequent reference in text and figures to “percent of world output controlled by Germany.” These reports identify resource and infrastructure issues that would prove decisive for Germany in a war of attrition and total industrial production. Oil and petroleum (particularly lubricants and diesel fuel), rubber, steel alloys (nickel and tungsten), and rail transport were all identified as issues that could become critical problems for Germany if it were engaged in a prolonged military struggle and strictly confined to its territorial limits of early 1942.

A particularly interesting aspect of these reports as a source is being able to see the way that OSS R&A pieced together fragments and pieces of information into ‘the big picture’ on particular questions. For example: R&A was able to deduce the acute shortage of German steel-hardening alloys from the extreme lengths that their agents were willing to go to in Portugal to acquire wolframite (a source of tungsten). OSS R&A received a number of reports: high prices were allegedly paid by Germans for decrepit Portuguese wolframite mines, the price per tonne of wolframite in Portugal had become inflated, and there was a sudden shortage of Portuguese agricultural labourers since it had become more lucrative for them to collect chunks of wolframite on rural hillsides. The OSS combined this information from sources in Portugal with other data on imports and exports to Germany before 1939 to conclude (accurately) that steel-hardening alloys like tungsten were a critical issue for the Germans. It is also very interesting to see, in the footnotes of some of the reports, the diverse sources of
information that the R&A made use of. The American embassies and consulates in Germany, Switzerland, and Portugal; military attachés and commercial legations; business and trade records; and overseas agents and informants were just some of the sources of information for OSS R&A. The division also utilized data from British intelligence organizations, as well as reports from the U.S. Army Air Force and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Even some of the largest American corporations, such as Standard Oil of New Jersey and Texas Oil Company supplied information to OSS, as did regular government institutions like the U.S. Bureau of Mines.

The researchers of R&A branch excelled in the use of 'open source' intelligence. An example of one of their successes was that they were able to accurately estimate the numbers of German military casualties on the Eastern Front, including age distribution and number of officers killed, by monitoring the obituaries in German local newspapers. The OSS made impressive efforts to collect this 'open source' information: they obtained cabled digests of the European press made by the British in Stockholm, Berne, and Istanbul, and had their own operators microfilm a large part of the continental European press and several hundred scientific journals. In one instance, OSS R&A formed a picture of growing shortages of diesel and lubricating oils by combining reports that diesel engines were being replaced by water turbines in areas of Switzerland in order to send them to Germany, and that marine diesels in occupied Belgium were ordered to be similarly converted by Berlin. As well, R&A had received reports that German river barges and boats were being converted from diesel oil to producer gas, and also that a German law requiring the collection and reprocessing of old oil was expanded to allow no exceptions. In the case of railway transportation, OSS
R&A compiled empirical evidence in the form of reports of strange or unusual incidents that suggested a strain on rail transportation. These included reports of: coal accumulating at pitheads in Upper Silesia due to scarcity of freight cars; lack of steam coal at Baltic Sea ports because of rail bottlenecks; reduced deliveries from Germany to Italy and Switzerland by rail; competition between shippers of sugar beets and coal shippers for open rail cars; and passenger travel by rail in German coal producing regions temporarily requiring a permit and being forbidden for journeys of less than 150 km.27

The R&A intelligence reports were not infallible, however, and the researchers actually made a number of mistakes. Barry Katz has pointed out that from the beginning R&A wrongly assumed that the German economy had gone into total mobilization for war, and were constantly surprised by the capacity of the Germans to keep their overall production levels rising until almost the end of the war, a valid criticism which is confirmed by examining the OSS R&A intelligence reports.28 In July 1942, R&A reported that measures taken in Germany to strengthen their economy “undoubtedly reflect a considerable degree of economic strain. If successfully carried out, it is probable that little slack will remain in the German economy.”29 Regarding the appointment of Albert Speer as “economic dictator” in 1943, R&A stated that the move was “a consequence of a steadily deteriorating economy which is suffering heavily from defeats in the field, from aerial bombardment, and from the loss of economic resources.” Going further on Speer’s re-organized ministry, R&A unwisely declared that “It is, of course, impossible for the new organization to increase arms production.”30 And an OSS R&A report from October 1943 wrongly asserted that overall, “Germany’s military production can hardly be greater now than in 1942, and may be less.”31 As well, the researchers of
R&A incorrectly assumed that 'standardization' was the overarching theme of the Third Reich, and asserted that "Tank assembly and engine works were standardized" in order to simplify the problems of production, production machinery, and of servicing.\textsuperscript{32} In fact, military historians regularly comment on the bewildering number of different kinds of tanks and armoured vehicles that Germany had produced by the end of the war, and that the U.S. Army was far more standardized with its one simple tank, the 'Sherman.' R&A also dramatically overestimated the number of combat airplanes Germany possessed, arriving at the huge figure of 12,000 for May 1941, just prior to the invasion of Russia, while the real figure was closer to 3,000 German planes.\textsuperscript{33} OSS R&A was also partly fooled by the myth of the "Alpine Redoubt / Stronghold" where it was widely believed that thousands of fanatical Nazis would dig in for a bloody last stand in the Alps of Bavaria and Austria in spring 1945. At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSS R&A produced several reports on the subject, including background on German 'pre-Fascist' activities that followed World War I, and projections for clandestine and underground Nazi activities after surrender.\textsuperscript{34} It is also important to remember that R&A researchers did not have access to Magic and Ultra during the war, and therefore were 'left out of the loop' for some of the most important intelligence the Allies possessed during the war.

Although this thesis has focused predominantly on issues related to industry and economics, other interesting things did turn up while searching through these reels of microfilm. For instance, \textit{O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports}, Reel XI 2. "The Political Attitude of German Catholic Bishops," from September 1943, lacks any title page and carries a hand written notation at the top of the first page which
states “Not Approved For Distribution.” There is no indication as to the official reason for this, which leaves the matter open to the speculation of historians. The report states that the German Bishops were not united in their resistance to the Nazis, and that they would not be especially cooperative with the Allies after Germany’s surrender. The bishops’ resistance to the Nazi regime was “purely religious opposition” and not political, since the bishops were only responding to the Nazis’ persecution of the Catholic Church in Germany after 1933. The report states that many bishops were still ardent nationalists of distinctly conservative background who praised German soldiers in their sermons as “defenders of Christianity against Bolshevism” and were often silent on the subject of the Germany’s war crimes in occupied countries. However, there is no way to know from the documents as they are presented why exactly this report was not approved for distribution.

Different things can be learned from the Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1 (1942 – 1945) Strategic Issues Reels X and XI: Propaganda and Unconventional Warfare which reflect the internal processes surrounding the formation and functioning of the OSS. These documents include: minutes of committee meetings, memoranda, proposed directives and directives, statements of function, personal letters, working agreements, requests for personnel, and OSS operational field manuals. Despite being vetted before being released, these documents still provide abundant evidence of the amount of opposition and disagreement that surrounded the creation of OSS. They show that the Military Intelligence Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence were fiercely opposed to any encroachment on their spheres of jurisdiction. General George Strong of Military Intelligence was convinced that “Donovan’s organization” had no value and
could even ruin some of the Allies’ military operations. Although no longer deemed sensitive to national security when they were declassified, these records may still have been edited for public relations reasons before being released. Potentially sensational or embarrassing material, for example, may have been omitted, and files that could have reflected negatively on American leadership either during or since World War II may have been deleted or altered. With these documents, it seems obvious that the limits and parameters of what a historian can learn have already been considered and established by the authorities before the historian even starts working. The important thing is to be aware of these issues, but not to get carried away with speculation about government conspiracies. Joseph Persico wisely points out that “dramatically scripted conspiracies provide high theatre, while the truth is often messy, random, illogical, and even dull.” Depending on who is reading them, the *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Part 1* could be all of those things, although many historians will actually find them to be quite interesting.

The most valuable thing about these documents is that they provide a window into the process and debate involving some of the key figures like William Donovan and General Strong but also lesser known persons who played important roles in the process. One of the many interesting things to see in these documents is just how many revisions the JCS policy statement on the functions of the OSS went through from July 1942 until April 1943, after all of the interested parties had had their say. Disagreement was so great that on November 23, 1942 the Joint Chiefs were presented with a hefty 57 page package consisting of 13 enclosures. These enclosures included the report of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee detailing its member’s inability to reach an agreement
on the functions of OSS along with the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion of the OSS representative; multiple letters and proposals from Donovan; the proposal of the Military Intelligence Division; and a report from the Joint Intelligence Committee.39 The fledgling organization could only have been trying to assuage fears when the OSS representative told the other members of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee “This agency, therefore, has a status distinct and separate from that of the Army and Navy, though it serves with them the common cause... OSS does not encroach upon the Army or Navy or any other government agency.”40 The directive for the operation of the OSS had to go through a number of redrafts in order to please all parties concerned. Anyone who has worked as part of a committee will recognize the type of jargon used by the Joint Planning Staff as they tried to come to an agreement on the functions of OSS regarding sabotage and guerilla warfare: “After discussion, THE COMMITTEE: (a) Appointed a subcommittee... to revise paragraphs 1C and D of the subject paper relating to control and liaison, and to reword paragraph 2F to conform to the aforementioned revision, and (b) Deferred action pending the revision by the subcommittee.”41 Chapter 3 will contain further examples of this disagreement found in the records on microfilm.

In a different way, the Strategic Services- Special Operations Field Manual, Provisional Basic Field Manual, and Operational Groups Field Manual all provide a unique window into the training and preparation of military or OSS operatives. These manuals cover sabotage, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, direct contact with and support of underground resistance groups, promotion of and engagement in guerilla activities, and other covert operations.42 They seem to be exact copies of originals, and so they give the opportunity for historians to look at what young recruits and operatives...
would themselves have been reading as they prepared to go to war behind enemy lines. However, it is chilling to read some of the methods of ‘shadow warfare’ that are advocated in these OSS field manuals.

Obviously, the United States was one of the ‘Allied’ countries ostensibly fighting for democracy and human rights, and had previously disdained ‘un-gentlemanly dirty tricks.’ However, these training manuals recommend exploiting potential vulnerabilities of the enemy by inflaming or inciting “Racial, religious and social differences and hatreds between populations” to create chaos and disorder in enemy territories. These methods were to be applied not only in the ‘home country’ of the enemy (i.e. - Germany or Japan), but also in enemy controlled territory and neutral countries. OSS took the view that ‘sabotage’ included all secret physical activity which destroyed or impaired the effectiveness of enemy resources and personnel. Implicitly, this included the assassination of leading individuals, which was described as being part of “political and public sabotage.” In the Special Operations Field Manual, political and public sabotage is defined as “the liquidation [i.e. - assassination] or physical harassment of political and administrative leaders and physical interference with their effectiveness, the demoralization or terrorization of the population by physical means, and physical attacks on collaborationists” and further, “liquidation, capture, delays, interferences, and physical attacks on personnel.” Donovan and OSS clearly believed that ‘the ends justified the means’ in the fight to defeat the Axis powers, and some critics would argue that these attitudes were passed on to the CIA of the Cold War.

Although the issues of censorship and manipulation of the Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1 are a problem, there are still valuable things that can be learned
from these documents. Despite the problems of provenance, and despite the inevitable silence in the documentary record, these documents provide evidence of the growing scope of OSS activities. They also show the problems OSS faced in trying to define its jurisdictional boundaries, as well as the problems that arose in its relationships with the Army, the Navy, the State Department and other intelligence agencies. The documents from these reels of microfilm demonstrate that the definition of intelligence was itself changing and expanding at the same time that the war was going on and OSS was being established. It appears that the mandate of OSS was far-reaching, especially in General William Donovan's mind. The Strategic Services training manuals suggest that OSS had a very wide-ranging mandate and that this organization was trying to do much more than just gather intelligence. In light of this, it can hardly be surprising that OSS had jurisdictional conflicts with much older and better established branches of the U.S. armed services. Careful examination of declassified government documents on the development and work of the Research and Analysis branch shows that despite difficulties, setbacks and failures, the OSS evolved into an innovative organization that made a valuable contribution to the Allied war effort from 1941 to 1945.

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3 Aldrich, 6.
4 Aldrich, 5.
5 Aldrich, 8.
6 Aldrich, 8.
17 Table "Estimated 1940 Production of German Controlled Countries," in OSS IX 2. "The German Military and Economic Position," December 12, 1941, Mineral Position A: Survey; and also the various tables in Mineral Position B: Steel- Hardening Alloys.
20 Ibid, 5, 8- 11, 22.


36 Ibid., 9.

37 JCS XI frame 266, Memo from General George Strong (Military Intelligence Division) to Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 29, 1942.


39 JCS XI frame 309 – 10, JCS Functions of the Office of Strategic Services, November 23, 1942.


41 JCS XI frame 290, JCS Directive for Operation of the Office of Strategic Services, August 8, 1942.


Chapter 3: Development and Achievements

This chapter will look at the administrative and operational role of OSS, and the difficulty OSS encountered in defining its jurisdiction and its relationships with other agencies and branches of the armed forces. What can only be called ‘turf battles’ arose because OSS was not the only agency responsible for intelligence at this time, and the very definition of ‘intelligence’ was also widening to include many functions. In its original concept, OSS was intended to combine a number of different functions in one organization, which would enable OSS and the United States to react quickly to situations in a fast moving global conflict. From the outset, R&A was the intellectual centre of OSS, and it recruited many of its personnel from the country’s leading universities, who then applied the methods of modern scholarship to intelligence issues in a unique and highly effective way. The work of R&A demonstrates this, and it will be examined further in this chapter.

It would be incorrect to say that the United States did not have any experience at all with intelligence or espionage prior to 1941. In fact, various presidents dating all the way back to George Washington (as both general and president) made use of espionage and intelligence. Some, such as Washington, attached great importance to it, while many others ignored it entirely. But there was nothing permanent or centralized, even through all of America’s early conflicts: the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War and the Spanish – American War. During World War I, Woodrow Wilson did not fully appreciate the need for a centralized intelligence service until the end of the war, after an extensive campaign of espionage and sabotage by German agents.
in the U.S. The great irony is that the most effective intelligence agency in the United States during World War I was actually British foreign intelligence MI1c, precursor to MI6 or SIS. However, the U.S. did establish its first centralized SIGINT division during the war, the Army’s MI-8 code and cipher unit. After the war, its staff became the first American peace time signals intelligence agency, the Cypher Bureau otherwise known as the ‘Black Chamber’.12

The ‘Black Chamber’ survived until 1929 when it was disbanded by then Secretary of State Henry Stimson, in an episode which generated his famous quote, “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.”3 Still, there were a myriad of U.S. agencies responsible for intelligence before July 1941: the Military Intelligence Division (MID or G-2), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, the Customs Service, the Secret Service, the Immigration Service, the Federal Communications Service, and the Treasury’s Foreign Funds Control Unit.4 The Army and Navy each had their own SIGINT office, but they were very competitive and cooperated only reluctantly.5 All of these agencies could justifiably claim some kind of jurisdiction over intelligence, since at the bare minimum each of these agencies needed accurate information in order to do their jobs effectively. However, none of these agencies was a centralized organization devoted primarily to intelligence, espionage, and security that housed a multiplicity of functions under one roof. When Admiral John Godfrey, director of British naval intelligence visited the United States in May of 1941, he found Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence, and the FBI to be jealous and competitive, and cooperation between them “virtually nonexistent.” His final verdict
when he reported back to the Royal Navy was blunt: "There is no U.S. Secret Intelligence Service."6

The Americans looked to the British for help as COI was established, and this increased dramatically after December 1941. The Americans were lagging far behind the Germans, Japanese, Soviets, and the British after Pearl Harbor, since the U.S. had no coordinated intelligence office or activities before July 1941. The German secret intelligence organizations (like the Abwehr, S.D. / S.S., and Berlin N.W.7) had all become active abroad in the years following Nazi seizure of power in 1933.7 Britain's MI5 and MI6 had also been active throughout the 1930's, and therefore, the Americans were truly latecomers to the world of espionage, intelligence, and secret operations in 1941.8 Accordingly, the COI had to rely on British intelligence for certain information, and in order to make up for lost time, the Americans often emulated the British in technique or organizational style. The U.S. even had to use British personnel, in the form of instructors to train secret agents and special operations. The Americans, British, and Canadians cooperated in running a training school on the shore of Lake Ontario, near Whitby Ontario, where they could prepare their operatives for war away from prying eyes.9

By the end of the First World War the groundwork had been laid for what was to become the ‘special relationship’ between the English speaking United States and Britain. This trans-Atlantic relationship took shape and developed during World War II and has endured, albeit with a number of changes, until the present. This special relationship was very close in matters of intelligence, and the British played a major role in the development of a centralized intelligence agency in the United States. In order to
conduct the free exchange of intelligence between the U.S. and the U.K., wealthy
Canadian businessman and former MI6 employee Sir William Stephenson set up the
offices of British Security Coordination in New York in 1940.\textsuperscript{10} His job actually
revolved around trying to convince American leaders to enter the war on Britain’s side.
In 1940, the British government volunteered to bring William Donovan to Europe, all
expenses paid, to make a grand tour to see the resistance that was being put up against
Nazi Germany. It was hoped that as President Roosevelt’s unofficial emissary, Donovan
could be impressed of the urgency that the United States join the war at Britain’s side.
They were not immediately successful, although they brought him on a second trip in
early 1941, and thereafter he was instrumental in helping to establish the Lend Lease
agreement that benefited the British so greatly beginning March 11, 1941.

Some of the methods used by the British to convince Roosevelt and the
Americans of the need to join the war against Hitler were not entirely honest. For
instance, they were not averse to playing up the danger of a ‘Nazi Fifth Column’ of
agents and saboteurs in the United States without any body of evidence to prove it.
Roosevelt and others were very receptive to these arguments after witnessing the damage
done by German agents in America during World War I, and then witnessing the
stunning fall of France in 1940 which had been followed by paranoid speculation about
the role of a ‘Nazi Fifth Column’ in the German invasion. These concerns helped to
influence President Roosevelt to create the Office of the Coordinator of Information in
June 1941. The British were even willing to use an outright forgery. William
Stephenson’s British Security Coordination office in New York created a map written in
German showing South America divided up into overseas colonies of the German Reich,
and then passed it along to Roosevelt as top secret intelligence they had captured. In October of 1941, Roosevelt used it in a speech to the American people encouraging them to support going to war against Germany, although some historians suggest he knew it was fake and used it anyway because it served his purposes. Privately, he had supported going to war against Germany since 1939.¹¹

President Franklin D. Roosevelt had his own part to play in the lack of unity and agreement surrounding the formation of OSS. Roosevelt was apparently fascinated with the ‘romance’ of espionage and secret agents, but had not much real interest in the more important and practical aspects of intelligence. Roosevelt’s idea of espionage was very informal, and more akin to a secret society or elite fraternity for what Joseph Persico calls “gentleman amateurs.” He apparently liked to think himself as a sort of ‘spymaster,’ and before the war employed his wealthy young friend Vincent Astor to report back to him as he cruised the South Pacific on his yacht. He also enlisted other well placed friends in “the Club,” whose reports and meetings with Roosevelt were equal parts gossip and intelligence. During the war, Washington journalist John Franklin Carter ran a secretive yet small and informal spy ring for the President that included quietly bringing Nazi defector Ernst “Putzi” Hanfstaengl to the U.S. to provide Roosevelt with insider information on Hitler’s personality and private life. Persico also describes a President whose management style was ‘divide and rule’ and who personally was secretive and guarded, never giving any of his subordinates the whole picture.¹² A prime example of this was that William Donovan, the chief of secret intelligence appointed by Roosevelt, was not given access to America’s most important secret intelligence, Magic and Ultra.¹³ But Christof Mauch argues that the limited interest that Roosevelt expressed in Magic,
Ultra, and the best of the OSS R&A reports suggests that he may not have fully understood the true value of these kinds of intelligence.\textsuperscript{14}

When the COI was established in the summer of 1941, it reported directly to the President and its functions included propaganda, collecting data for economic warfare, and psychological warfare. During the reorganization of COI into OSS during 1942, it was placed under the control of War Department, supporting the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). At this time, propaganda was officially designated as the work of the Office of War Information (OWI), economic warfare was made the domain of the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), and psychological warfare was given to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In practice, OSS engaged in whatever activities were needed to achieve their objectives. OSS R&A frequently ignored the agreement it had worked out with the Board of Economic Warfare regarding the collection and sharing of economic and industrial intelligence, and OSS also engaged in 'black' propaganda and various psychological warfare tactics whenever it was felt to be necessary. In original concept, and in practice, OSS was an agency that effectively 'filled in the gaps,' performing functions that other agencies either could not or would not do. In a letter to Brig. General William B. Smith in March 1942, Donovan pointed out that the British had six separate large organizations to carry out all of the functions that his one much smaller organization covered. Always concerned with selling the merits of his organization, he ended his letter by asserting "I think it is safe to say that by having these closely allied operations tied together as one weapon under an order signed by the President as Commander- in-Chief, there has been obtained an Economy of Force, a vital principle in warfare."\textsuperscript{15}
However, at no time, from its inception in 1941 to its dissolution in 1945, did OSS have any control over or access to top secret SIGINT such as Magic and Ultra, which were the Allies' two biggest intelligence coups of the war. Although being excluded in this way did not prevent OSS from achieving some real successes during the war, this factor did limit OSS and prevent it from being more successful than it was. This is particularly true for the scholars of R&A, who were basically 'out of the loop' regarding important SIGINT information that would have had a direct bearing on their intelligence reports. Donovan complained to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee that much of their work had been "carried on under difficulties – difficulties arising from inability to get all of the essential data... We have been handicapped by our inability to get adequate disclosure of military and naval intelligence... Of operational intelligence – for example, cable and radio intercepts or air reconnaissance photographs – virtually nothing has been made available to us, though much of it would be of vital importance even for so – called 'background studies,' to say nothing of topographical studies or analyses of enemy capabilities."16

There were many groups and individuals who were not happy about the new organization President Roosevelt had created in June of 1941 and then reorganized in June 1942. Not insignificantly this included FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover, with whom Donovan clashed a number of times over who had jurisdiction over counter – espionage in the United States and the Western Hemisphere. Opponents also included Roosevelt's Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy, and the Assistant Chief of the Army's Military Intelligence Division (and the guardian of 'Magic') General George Strong. The JCS records provide ample evidence of the disagreement that surrounded first the
establishment of OSS, and then the definition of its limits and functions. At a Liaison Committee meeting on June 3, 1942, just ten days before COI was transformed into OSS by Presidential order, representatives of the State Department, Army Intelligence, and Navy Intelligence were still not convinced that an expansion of the foreign activities of COI / OSS were either desirable or necessary. The representative of the State Department, Mr. Welles, actually referred to “Colonel Donovan’s organization” as a “headache.” Welles questioned whether the expansion of COI / OSS foreign activities was “necessary from the standpoint of the Army and Navy or whether the enlargement of the activities of Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division would not be more desirable from the standpoint of our three departments.” He frankly told the assembled Admirals, Generals, and military officers that unless they wanted the new OSS’s foreign activities to be expanded, he felt that “it should not be done.”

Later, in a June 1942 memo to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs which politely “suggested” yet firmly insisted upon measures to control the new OSS, General George Strong of the Military Intelligence Division complained that:

Possibly the most annoying feature of the former COI, and one which might have proved a serious impediment to our war effort if not controlled, was the initiation of projects quite un-coordinated with military plans but which required assistance from agencies of the Army and Navy, and which were put into operation without the knowledge or approval of the planning agencies of the War and Navy Departments.

William Donovan constantly had to justify the existence of his new organization, and defend it from having pieces of it broken off, such as the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications. Donovan argued in a letter to Brigadier General Walter Smith in July 1942 that it should be kept as part of the OSS because “(a) the Office of Strategic Services is specifically directed to collect intelligence, (b) the work of the Committee is to a very large extent the collection of printed intelligence, and
(c) connection with the Office of Strategic Services would make possible greater security for the operations of the Committee and thereby facilitate the use of its services by the Army and Navy.\(^{20}\)

In October 1942, the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it had been “found impossible to reach an agreement on the functions of the Office of Strategic Services because a basic difference in the conception of those functions” existed between Donovan and the other members of the Committee.\(^{21}\) Donovan did not directly participate in JPWC discussions on the functions of OSS in order, as he said, to “avoid any personal controversy.”\(^{22}\) However, in his letter to the other members of the JPWC, he was stark and intransigent in his assessment of the deadlock: “It appears no agreement can be reached on this question. OSS cannot recede from its position, and it is apparent that the other members of the Committee will not recede from their positions.”\(^{23}\) The “basic difference in the conception” of the functions of OSS within the JPWC centred on the question of whether OSS was to be an agency on par with the other intelligence agencies like the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Division, the FBI, etc. Essentially, Army and Navy Intelligence wanted to have control over the new organization: the details of the operations of OSS, both planning and administrative; the ability to restrict the contact of OSS personnel with those of the Army or Navy or any other agency; and the authority to set procedures for planning and operations in OSS branches. They wanted definite limits on the functions of OSS and a mechanism to make sure all of its plans were first approved by the Joint Chiefs.\(^{24}\) William Donovan and his people, not surprisingly, held the opposite opinion. They wanted a more general directive and greater leeway for the Director and personnel
of OSS to carry out their functions, with no restrictions on contact with other agencies. In general, Donovan wanted maximum flexibility for himself and his new organization.\textsuperscript{25} Although General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, issued a directive on militarization of the OSS that was largely favourable to the organization on October 11, 1942, heated argument over the functions of OSS continued until at least April 1943.\textsuperscript{26}

The Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral E.J. King, stated bluntly that he considered a proposed wide-ranging directive on the functions of OSS to be “unsatisfactory—even dangerous—unless it includes a clear definition of ‘psychological warfare.’” While he could accept that OSS’s mandate included espionage, in his view, espionage was not psychological warfare, and further he doubted that those expected to follow this directive would be able to understand what it was intended to convey. He also argued that while counter-espionage in enemy occupied or controlled territory might be a job for OSS, it was not in his opinion ‘psychological warfare.’\textsuperscript{27} Admiral King also argued that OSS operations and military operations should always be coordinated and controlled by military authorities, even if they might be related to so-called ‘psychological warfare.’ He identified one paragraph in the directive that could have been interpreted to permit “uninvestigated civilians” to have access to all secret information and plans. Without such permission, the terms of the paragraph could not have been carried out. The Admiral pointed out that “this paragraph again emphasizes the absolute necessity of specific terminology in a directive of this sort.” He insisted that great care be exercised in establishing contact with foreign nationality groups in the United States for the recruitment of agents and resistance fighters. Because of the necessity of checking their backgrounds with the authorities, he
believed this procedure would introduce many difficulties and produce "undesirable situations." In closing, he stated unequivocally that "the 'military program for psychological warfare' should be specifically defined" as it pertained to the functions of OSS.28

It is easy to see why more traditional elements in the military felt that Donovan and the OSS really were complicating their work by trying to 'get into everything.' For example, in the case of special weapons and gadgets the OSS needed for its operatives, Donovan wanted OSS to both design and produce these items. The military rejected this, believing that the responsibilities of the Office of Research and Development of the OSS should be limited to that of prescribing the military characteristics for special weapons required for their use. Once these characteristics had been established, the development of these devices would be undertaken by the existing development agencies of the various Supply Services of the U.S. military.29 A memo from the Joint Staff Planners pointed out that "It is manifest that if these Supply Services are capable of carrying on the development work for the Army as a whole that they are necessarily adequately provided for the relatively small amount of development work required by the O.S.S."30

Leaving aside the endless disagreement over the scope and limits of OSS activities, and focusing just on intelligence gathering and Research and Analysis, William Donovan argued that the executive order which established the Coordinator of Information in July 1941 envisaged the necessity in a 'total war' of collecting all information and data bearing on a particular subject or problem, and analyzing a great variety of intelligence in order to secure an over-all picture of a given military situation. The President and other American leaders had realized that in modern war much more
than orthodox military or naval intelligence was required for the successful conduct of
operations and formulation of strategy. However, Donovan also had to argue
defensively that it was never the intention of his organization in any way to determine the
strategy or the tactical decisions of the war. He pointed out that the sole purpose of the
Research and Analysis Branch from the outset was to serve as a support to the military
effort, to relieve the Army and Navy of the task of time-consuming research, and to
furnish the military authorities with reports and estimates that would be based upon the
assembling of all information available in the United States or among their allies. OSS
R&A summaries would represent reasoned opinion resting on expert knowledge of all
aspects of a particular subject. The original plan to reinforce their staff with a number of
military, naval, and air specialists was intended to enable the Research and Analysis
Branch to conduct the basic research necessary for joint planning and conduct of
operations.

Numerous military officers said that the Research and Analysis Branch, whatever
its competence in the political, economic, and psychological fields, was not qualified to
appraise military or naval intelligence. Donovan disagreed, and argued that in modern
war the traditional distinctions between political, economic, and military data had
become blurred. Enemy armament production, or military transportation, were not
isolated atoms but were aspects of the total economic picture, which in turn reflected
man-power problems, administrative machinery and the general state of morale.
Donovan said to his opponents in the Army and Navy that in the OSS "we respect the
knowledge of professional military and naval men in their own province, and ask only
that they accept the aid of professionals, trained in other fields as being equally
indispensable." He was also prepared to admit that OSS had a marked deficiency in its intelligence service; he needed a group of army, navy, and air officers to supplement the works of the civilian experts and to give the combined work what Donovan called "the military impress." Even when basic agreement was achieved between the different branches of the military, the secretaries of the Joint Chiefs noted that cooperation would also be required by the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Treasury Department before the directive of the functions of OSS could be made fully effective. However, opposition and resistance to OSS did not end when the 'war of memos' was fought to a stalemate. It continued until OSS was finally disbanded in September 1945.

It is interesting to examine the change and progression of OSS R&A that is evidenced in the changes of style and presentation of the reports that they produced from 1941-1945. The earliest COI reports provide evidence of the lack of organizational coherency and order within the COI and OSS that has been suggested by the JCS documents and commented upon in the secondary literature. This lack of order is exhibited in the divergence of stylistic form between the different reports. For example, Mineral Position C: Petroleum, from The German Military and Economic Position of December 1941 is meticulously footnoted, while Oil and German Strategy from March 1942 has no footnotes whatsoever. Font style and size, spacing, and margin size are basically different in each report, as are title pages. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that since the COI was still in its infancy in late 1941/early 1942, there was then no authoritative style for the reports which were being written by a number of different authors. As well, these authors came from a very diverse background:
scientists, historians, psychologists, industrialists, etc. They would each have had a professional writing style that they brought into their R&A work, since they were all effectively drafted into the fledgling organization and apparently worked with considerable independence and autonomy.

By the middle of 1943, and until the end of the war in 1945, R&A reports achieved basic uniformity. Footnotes, font, type size, spacing and margins all became standardized in a utilitarian and straightforward way, using what was most commonly available on U.S. government typewriters of the day. Title pages were also standardized, with each carrying the report’s title as well as its unique number, such as "R&A #1253," since there was such a proliferation of these reports and studies that they had to use a system to keep track of them. However, even in October 1943 there were exceptions, such as *The Effect of Allied Bombing Program on German Air Position*, which has the appearance, type font, etc. of a newspaper or book, and was not produced on a simple typewriter. In fact, OSS was constantly expanding outwardly and reorganizing itself internally during its short life. This meant that OSS by its very nature was prone to disorder and lack of coherency, even without confusion or obstacles being created by its bureaucratic opponents in the Army and Navy. In general, this fits the pattern that can be seen in the JCS documents. Although there was always opposition to OSS, uniformity in the presentation of R&A reports became more noticeable at the time when the ‘war of memos’ started to calm down and the functions of OSS were relatively stabilized in the middle of 1943.

What does not change overall from 1941 to 1945 is the way that the reports are written. The OSS reports are written in a cautious and carefully considered manner, and
they seem thoroughly detailed and scholarly. A noticeable feature of the reports is their strict reliance on empirical evidence in the form of eye-witness accounts and verifiable proof. Equally, R&A routinely declines to make predictions or speculations about what “could” happen in Germany, such as when the German nickel situation “might” become critical. However, these aspects of the intelligence reports likely made them a more accurate and valuable source of information for their audience at the time that they were written. Although R&A was in many ways a groundbreaking interdisciplinary venture, it was established by a historian, and then led by a historian during the war, and there were a large number of historians working in R&A. It would not be surprising if the methods of the discipline as they stood in the 1940’s should come to influence the way that OSS R&A worked. At this time, Leopold von Ranke’s traditional method of “rigorous objectivity, critical examination of original documents, banishment of all philosophical predispositions, and assumption that the past is a unified field and that history is a unified process” guided William Langer and the other directors of R&A.

Commentators also describe the 1940’s as being the heyday of ‘scientific positivism’ or the idea that you could apply the methods of science to almost anything, from sewing to research, in order to improve how it was done. All of this meant that OSS R&A developed its own rigorous standards and unique writing style. Richard Hartshorne, chief of the editorial board of R&A, was blunt and told his subordinates that “Intelligence reports find their literary merit in terseness and clarity rather than in expressive description... Proust, Joyce, or Gertrude Stein would all be equally out of place.” Years later, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. could recall being instructed that “There should be no personal pronouns, no wisecracks, no slang or clichés, and care should be
taken about the use of colour words such as 'reactionary,' 'progressive,' 'left or right,' etc. As well, verbs such as 'should,' 'ought,' and 'must' were not to be used. From the beginning, R&A was derided by many in the military as "the Chairborne Division," or "a collection of librarians" as part of "OSS - Oh So Social" who did not have to suffer any of the hardships of war. But by the end of the war, even the toughest critics of OSS had to admit that R&A had provided a very valuable service to Allied armed forces. An investigator appointed by President Roosevelt in 1945 to look into OSS and its activities offered a damming report in which he recommended disbanding OSS completely as soon as possible – except R&A, which he felt should be "salvaged" and had done "an outstanding job." Regarding R&A, William Donovan said in 1942 with his typical showman's flourish that "historians, political scientists, economists, psychologists, geographers, and anthropologists were selected. It is no exaggeration to say that never in the history of this country has so well-trained and competent a staff of social scientists been put at the full time disposal of the government." He was speaking only of military and intelligence issues, since academics of different disciplines had been employed by the American government previously under Franklin Roosevelt's 'New Deal' program, and earlier in the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

One area of success was in 'air targeting' or helping the U.S. Air Force to establish targets for what was evolving into their strategic 'precision' bombing campaign. In the simplest terms, for American bombers to be effective, they needed to know where to drop their bombs so as to disrupt the German war effort. In theory, it was believed that if key areas of weakness in Germany's economic infrastructure could be identified and attacked, it would hasten Allied victory. The American leadership recognized that the
British policy of 'area' or 'carpet' bombing was not effective, and also that new technology in the form of accurate bomb sights and longer range airplanes should allow for exact targeting of specific locations and even daylight raids. This would mean, for example, targeting the Krupp tank factory in the town of Essen instead of bombing all of Essen, which was not only intended to maximize the returns on the expenditure of materials (fuel, bombs, airplanes) but more importantly minimize the risk that American pilots were exposed to. But even with longer range airplanes, the latest optical bomb sights, and eventual Allied dominance of European skies the Air Force leadership realized that they needed very detailed information if these bombing raids were to be successful.

In the early days of the COI / OSS organization, R&A supposedly did not even realize their larger significance or who their most promising and important "customers" might be.\textsuperscript{44} This was demonstrated in March 1942, when the U.S. Army Air Force inquired as to whether R&A could form a team of analysts to do targeting research. Ironically, the COI managerial board rebuffed the Air Force's inquiry on the grounds that they felt that R&A "already had too much work to do."\textsuperscript{45} It was even rumoured that the economists working in the R&A Europe – Africa section would turn down assignments they felt were not intellectually stimulating enough.\textsuperscript{46} By March 1943, however, a sizable percentage of the work R&A did for the military was actually air targeting, and it could be argued that this is where its real wartime significance lay. Intelligence reports from \textit{O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, part IV: Germany and Its Occupied Territories During World War II} demonstrate that as early as December 1941, R&A appeared to have comprehensive knowledge of the locations where vital war
materials were being produced in Germany. Specifically, this included weapons and munitions, tanks, armoured vehicles, airplanes, engines and machine parts, as well as critically important synthetic rubber and synthetic petroleum. The reports also provide detailed information about the areas that supplied or produced Germany's energy and fuels, as well as fuel consumption estimates for both the military and civilian society.

The accuracy and detail of some of the information in these reports is particularly interesting when one considers that the Coordinator of Information and its Research and Analysis division did not exist before June 1941. However, from the beginning R&A wrongly assumed that the German economy had gone into total mobilization for war, and they were constantly surprised by the capacity of the Germans to keep their overall production levels rising until almost the very end.

At first, this air targeting began in an informal way, but in September 1942 the OSS helped to create the Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU) as part of their London Outpost, located in the American Embassy. It was comprised almost exclusively of young economists, the sort who had initially refused to serve “either under or with historians or political scientists,” and so in this they finally got their wish. It was first headed by Chandler Morse, then by Charles Kindleberger, and it included some names that were known then, or have become known since: Carl Kaysen, Walt W. Rostow, William Salant, Harold Barnett, Paul Sweezy and Edward Mayer. Because of the demands of both the war and their own standards of empirical research they were obliged to venture out of purely abstract reasoning and formulas and make visits to synthetic oil plants or ball bearing factories in order to truly understand how industry figured in modern ‘total’ war. They consumed technical manuals, U.S. Army field reports, P.O.W. interrogation
transcripts, and more from the vast array of information that OSS had obtained. They also learned the techniques of photographic interpretation in order to make use of the evolving field of aerial photo reconnaissance, which allowed them to both find new targets and also assess bombing damage after raids in order to refine their ongoing work. All of this allowed EOU a small but nonetheless amazing victory over their British counterparts when they deduced that the RAF was continuing to target an airplane factory in Bremen that the Germans had secretly moved to Marienburg. Unfortunately, intelligence reports from the EOU are not included in O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, part IV: Germany and Its Occupied Territories During World War II and this author was also unable to obtain a copy of the war report of OSS R&A in London. Some OSS intelligence reports carry the name of the “Economics Division” and at least one has the name “Economic Capabilities Division,” but the Enemy Objectives Unit does not appear on these reels of microfilm.

According to a memo by William Donovan in 1942, from the outset U.S. Army Air Force intelligence (A-2) took the view that it should gather all information bearing on objectives and targets from whatever agencies possessed such data. In practice, the Research and Analysis Branch, as well as the Enemy Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare, did some of this work for Air Force intelligence. Donovan noted that “We have been repeatedly asked by A-2 for further studies, but have been deterred by the unwillingness of the Bureau of the Budget to grant necessary increases in staff.” In the intervening time, both the Enemy Branch of BEW and the Economics Division of OSS brought together data and made studies of the location, production, and capacity of enemy industrial installations. The Economics Division of OSS went farther, attempting
to relate such data to consumption rates of various raw materials and finished armaments, and to the magnitude and intensity of military operations. At the insistence of the Bureau of the Budget, which feared duplication in this field, an informal working agreement was concluded in July 1942 between the Enemy Branch of BEW and the Economics Division of OSS. The effect of this agreement was to divide the field of target intelligence between the two organizations, BEW to be responsible for work on industrial objectives, and OSS to abstain from this particular type of study excepting for evaluations of bombing policy. Donovan pointed out that “this agreement was not regarded on the side of OSS as anything more than its title—informal working agreement—implies. It was concluded simply to meet a then existing conflict of effort.”

Apparently, one of the most persistent and difficult problems for the Research and Analysis Branch was actually its relationship with the Board of Economic Warfare. In its Office of Economic Warfare Analysis, the Board of Economic Warfare had a staff of economists, designed originally as a fact-finding group to serve the operating sections (Office of Exports, Office of Imports) of that agency. From the existence of economic research staffs in both the Board of Economic Warfare and the OSS, it was then argued that one of these groups was superfluous, and that the Economics Division of the Research and Analysis Branch should be merged with the staff of the Board of Economic Warfare, which thereafter would perform all research in that field. William Donovan flatly rejected this, stating that “this argument is fallacious, and any suggestion that the O.S.S. could perform its functions without having its own, specially selected economic staff is untenable.” Donovan believed that economic factors loom so large in modern warfare that they must be constantly considered.
was concerned, he believed that professional economists who had been trained to handle information with an eye to its military value would be indispensable. Furthermore, the Economics Division, grouped as it was with the eight regional sections and the Geography and Psychology Divisions of the Research and Analysis Branch would be able to integrate its work with the findings of specialists in related fields and thereby arrive at more accurate conclusions.57

As far as Donovan and OSS were concerned, an “informal working agreement” with the Board of Economic Warfare did not alter the fact that its Economics Division was fully competent to do work on industrial objectives; and neither did it eliminate the consideration that a good deal of target work was actually of a non-economic character. Donovan believed that OSS R&A, with its interdisciplinary approach, was especially well equipped to perform this type of target study.58 By October 1942, the Research and Analysis Branch in London was already doing much of the objective work for the U.S. Eighth Air Force. Technically that work was an operation of the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy, on which the OSS and the Board of Economic Warfare were both represented. In practice, the Enemy Objectives Unit of the Economic Warfare Division was first headed by Chandler Morse, Assistant Director of the Economics Division of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, and then replaced by Charles Kindleberger, while the staff of that unit consisted almost entirely of OSS Research and Analysis representatives.59

At the beginning of their work, the Enemy Objectives Unit produced a series of almost 300 reports that methodically catalogued in great detail industrial and infrastructure targets throughout German controlled Europe.60 The economists then
moved from individual targets to working out what they called "target systems" based on quantitative analysis, ratios, and mathematics to arrive upon a simplified formula of "How much harm can be inflicted on the enemy per unit cost to us?"\textsuperscript{61} Although this author is not an expert in economic theory or mathematics, it seems that the most important part of their methods was that they knew in detail the locations of industrial targets and combined this with deductive reasoning, logical analysis, and an understanding of the importance of economics, industry, and infrastructure in the new age of warfare. Although General Eisenhower initially went with a different bombing plan, it rapidly became clear that EOU had correctly identified that the best way to disrupt German forces on D-Day in June 1944 was to make precision strikes on bridges and railway line junctions, and so this was put into practice by the U.S. Army Air Force. However the more important objective for EOU was oil: they believed that destroying Germany's oil production was the key to victory and that no other target system held "such great promise for hastening Germany's defeat."\textsuperscript{62} They were proved correct when this objective was absorbed into the U.S. Army Air Force's overall strategy in 1944 after it was proven effective in the field. Christof Mauch relates that German 'economic dictator' Albert Speer felt that attacks on the oil industry crippled German armaments production beginning in 1944, and the U.S. Army Air Force recommended that Charles Kindleberger and Walt Rostow receive medals for the contribution they had made to the overall success of D-Day.\textsuperscript{63}

Of larger importance is the fact that the scholars who were members of the Enemy Objectives Unit contributed to what has become known as the 'philosophy of air power' through strategic bombing, which has lasted until today.\textsuperscript{64} Harvard historian Franklin
Ford is a veteran of OSS R&A and has said that he believes that this kind of air targeting was one of the most important contributions that OSS made to the Allied war effort. In the end, it seems that even the military could not help but be impressed with the contribution this “bunch of librarians” had made to the overall success of their military plans and the defeat of the Axis powers. The arguments and hostility that surrounded the formation of OSS were potentially crippling to the whole organization. However, the scholars recruited to the R&A branch kept working despite the higher level disagreements and managed to produce some excellent work and were often correct in the estimates and analyses that they gave. As the scope of OSS operations expanded, the problem of jurisdictional boundaries became more and not less pronounced; nevertheless, the organizational issues did not impair the work or weaken the contribution of the energetic and talented R&A branch of OSS which made a valuable contribution to the Allied war effort from 1941 to 1945.

2 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 62.
3 Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Laguna Hills: Aegean Park Press, n.d.). This is a reproduction of the 1931 original, circa 1980.
5 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, 104.
Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 96.
16 JCS XI frame 345, Memo from William Donovan to Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, October 31, 1942.
17 JCS XI frame 253, State Department Representative Mr. Welles, Minutes of Meeting of the Liaison Committee, June 3, 1942.
18 JCS XI frame 254, Ibid.
19 JCS XI frame 266, Memo from General George Strong (Military Intelligence Division) to Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 29, 1942.
20 JCS XI frame 273, Letter from William Donovan to Brigadier General Walter B. Smith, July 14, 1942.
21 JCS XI frame 313, Memo from Joint Psychological Warfare Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, n.d.
22 JCS XI frame 323, Letter from William Donovan to Joint Psychological Warfare Committee November 16, 1942.
23 JCS XI frame 323, Ibid.
24 JCS XI frames 281 – 82, Proposed Directive for the Operation of the Office of Strategic Services, Note by the Secretaries, August 1, 1942.
25 JCS XI frames 281 – 82, Ibid.
26 JCS XI frames 233 – 34, Memo from General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of U.S. Army to Secretary of Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 11, 1942.
27 JCS XI frames 377-78, Memo by Admiral E.J. King, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, December 22, 1942.
28 JCS XI frames 377-78, Ibid.
29 JCS XI frame 416, Memo from Joint Staff Planners re: Functions of OSS, January 22, 1943.
30 JCS XI frame 416, Ibid.
31 JCS XI frame 343, Memo from William Donovan to Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, October 31, 1942.
32 JCS XI frame 344, Ibid.
33 JCS XI frame 346, Ibid.
34 JCS XI frame 367, Note by the Joint Secretariat re: Functions of OSS, December 7, 1942.
39 Katz, 16.
40 Katz, 17.
41 Katz, xii.
42 Mauch, 14.
43 JCS XI frame 344, Memo from William Donovan to Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, October 31, 1942.
45 Smith, 124.
46 Katz, 102.
47 Maps: Producers of A.F.V.’s (Armoured Fighting Vehicles) and Engines; Producers of Steel and Armaments; Producers of Gears, Brakes, and Clutches; and Producers of Ball-Bearings and Friction Linings; all from Appendix B, OSS IX 2. “The German Military and Economic Position,” December 12, 1941; also OSS IX 8. “Greater Germany: Economic Estimate,” March 5, 1942.
50 Katz, 22, 102.
51 Katz, 115.
52 Katz, 119, 117; and Mauch, 96.
54 JCS XI frame 348, Memo from William Donovan to Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, October 31, 1942.
55 JCS XI frame 349, Ibid; also JCS XI frames 75-77, Informal Agreement between the working staffs of the Enemy Branch, Board of Economic Warfare and the Economics Division, Office of Strategic Services, September 21, 1942.
56 JCS XI frame 346, Memo from William Donovan to Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, October 31, 1942.
57 JCS XI frame 346, Ibid.
58 JCS XI frame 349, Ibid.
59 JCS XI frame 349, Ibid.
60 Katz, 115.
61 Katz, 117.
62 Katz, 120.
63 Mauch, 104.
64 Katz, 122.
65 Mauch, 105.
Chapter 4: Evaluation and Assessment

While other writers have tended to overlook the Research and Analysis (R&A) branch of OSS, this thesis has devoted special attention to OSS R&A and the intelligence reports they produced from 1941 – 1945, as well as internal government and military documents that detail the formation and evolution of this organization. It has been well documented that the development of OSS was impeded by the continuous argument and wrangling of the various agencies that had been responsible for intelligence matters up to 1941. An examination of the development and work of the Research and Analysis branch shows that in spite of difficulties, setbacks and other failures, the OSS evolved into an innovative organization that made a valuable contribution to the Allied war effort from 1941 – 45. This chapter will evaluate and assess what has been learned from examining the primary sources and secondary literature. This chapter will also include reflections and considerations on the history and issues that have been raised in this study.

Although it was no secret that the rest of the world was at war, or that the agendas of the United States and the Axis powers were not compatible, America was thrown into a crisis in December 1941: it was faced with a sudden and huge need for intelligence in a time of war. Unlike all of the other major players in the conflict, the U.S. did not really have any centralized intelligence organization when the Pearl Harbor attack happened on December 7, 1941, since the Coordinator of Information was still in its infancy. And although not everyone understood it at the time, the United States was also faced with a new kind of war: total war on a global scale. Every nation state in the world would respond to this kind of crisis in its own unique way, dependent on its individual history.
and circumstances, and the United States was no exception. The American response was
to try and make up for lost time by throwing money, men, and resources at the problem in
a country where those commodities can seem almost limitless. The Americans dove into
the problem with zeal, and tried to do as much as possible, as quickly as possible in as
many different areas as possible through the use of ‘American ingenuity.’ They also
leaned heavily on their allies, the British, for explanation of and instruction in the finer
points of ‘shadow warfare.’

There were a number of features in American history, society and politics up to
1941 that may have helped to shape the development of its intelligence services:
democracy; pluralism; independence; de-centralization; suspicion of authority and
standing armies; the frontier and ‘wild west’ experience. The founders of the American
Constitution were committed to high idealism and sought to distance themselves not just
physically, but also philosophically from the monarchies and autocratic regimes of
Britain and Europe. Military expenditures, standing armies, espionage, and secret police
were viewed as some of the worst excesses of the old regimes they wanted to leave
behind. As a result, there seems to have always been problems regarding co-operation,
co-ordination, and information sharing amongst different agencies or parts of the
government bureaucracy and in particular the agencies responsible for intelligence.
Ironically, strong beliefs in pluralism and democracy may have complicated these matters
by encouraging multiple voices and agendas, which has resulted in a corresponding lack
of direction or focus. There also seems to be a very long lived suspicion and
ambivalence in American politics about espionage, surveillance, intelligence, and related
issues. This has produced a tension and internal debate over the need for, and proper
place of, domestic and foreign intelligence and espionage in the United States. As well, the frontier and 'wild west' experience in American history seems to have loaned what can only be called a 'cowboy mentality' to its secret services, and also a view of the world as being wide open and untamed with no rules. And the creator and leader of OSS, William Donovan, was known by the cowboy style nickname 'Wild Bill.' But the frontier experience has also helped to create a sense of fierce independence that appears to contribute to many Americans' resentment of any kind of surveillance or interference in their personal lives by their government. Ultimately, all of this has combined to help shape the development of internal and external security and intelligence systems in the United States.

Many historians refer to the United States before entering the war in 1941 as being a 'sleeping giant,' in that it had the untapped potential in human and material resources to become a major power, if not a super power. In certain ways, this was also true for its intelligence service, because in 1941 there were immense and untapped resources that could be mobilized to these ends. After the United States entered the war officially, COI/OSS was able to recruit for its R&A branch from every university and government bureau in the country, while Donovan's direct connection to President Roosevelt meant that OSS was able to draw upon the White House's special 'unvouchered funds,' which would have given many the impression that OSS had unlimited money to spend. The United States' embassies and consulates all over the world combined with the number of American companies operating outside North America gave OSS operatives the ability to go anywhere in the world with a plausible cover story. The U.S. also had immigrant and émigré communities to draw upon, which
meant that OSS could send agents behind enemy lines who already spoke the language, knew the culture, and perhaps had even lived in the area before.

While secret agents have received plenty of attention from historians and other writers, studying the structure and organization of intelligence services and the way these develop during a time of war have received much less attention. This is unfortunate, because it is only by looking at the way the American intelligence agency was created and developed that we can hope to understand what it is and how it operates now. This is also the only way to understand its relationships and interactions with other agencies in the government and the military. Studying structures and organization is also the best way to try and answer questions involving 'why?' – Why does today’s intelligence agency operate in the way that it does? Why are communications and cooperation between intelligence and security agencies so difficult? Stories about secret agents may be exciting, but the individual operative in the field is meaningless without the larger organization that they are part of, and the exploits of individual spies cannot be understood in isolation from the organization that they are working for. Studying structure and organization can also help to explain how goals are established and influence exerted by the President and other elements of American leadership on the intelligence service. This type of examination can also help to explain how decisions are made by the directors and management of the intelligence agency by showing the channels that communications have to go through within the organization and between it and other branches of government. If there are any problems within an intelligence agency, or if there are major mistakes that have been made, it would seem that one of the
best ways to make corrections and ensure that mistakes are not repeated is to examine the history of the structures and organization of that agency.

In general, there has simply been a lack of attention to the history of centralization and coordination of intelligence in the United States. Spies, espionage and exotic technology like V-2 weapons or jet airplanes in the Second World War have all received lots of attention from historical writers of all levels of ability since these topics are photogenic or exciting. Some of these topics, such as 'James Bond'- style adventures behind enemy lines, more appropriately belong to the realm of the creative writing department rather than that of history. Considerably less focus is placed on the more practical and less sensational aspects of intelligence, such as the long process of centralization, the work of the research and analysis department, or the way that certain logistical issues can prove crucial to an overarching military strategy. Studying 'centralized intelligence' and how it developed during World War II is actually a very complicated proposition. An adequate flow chart diagram illustrating how American intelligence functioned, as well as how it evolved, between 1939 and 1945 would have to be very complex. In theory, an ideal diagram would require a spider - like three dimensional structure to capture the nuances of organizational development as well as internal communications and feedback. The 20th century witnessed an extensive development in centralized and coordinated intelligence as an integral part of a modern state's war - making power and also its defensive capabilities against attack, and this has been intimately linked to the rise of the 'national security state' since World War II. The scholarly study of intelligence agencies and strategic intelligence is important, not just for military history, but for history more generally, insofar as it can shed light on how or why
certain decisions were made or policies were enacted during wartime. It is the task of the historian to try and ascertain what influence intelligence agencies and strategic intelligence may have had on the decision making process for Allied leaders.

The huge number of records on microfilm may have been a factor working against more extensive use by other historians of the documents examined in this study. For example, *O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, part IV: Germany and Its Occupied Territories During World War II* fill nineteen reels of microfilm. Individual reports on these reels range from just three pages to over six hundred pages long. Like the proverbial 'needle in a haystack,' it seems possible that there is a large amount of interesting information waiting to be discovered in the other reels of this series, as well as the *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1 (1942 – 1945) Strategic Issues*, and that these discoveries are camouflaged only by the sheer number of files to be sorted through. However there are a number of inherent biases which *O.S.S. / State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, part IV: Germany and Its Occupied Territories During World War II* contain that a historian must bear in mind when reading them. Most importantly, the whole of OSS was created and directed by William J. Donovan, who by all accounts imbued the new organization with his character and attitudes. A reader should therefore assume that the authors of these intelligence reports are, in effect, 'selling' three things. The first is that America should be involved in the war on Britain's side because the conflict is becoming global and American interests are threatened. Secondly, these authors are out to convince their readers that America needs a permanent, centralized intelligence organization to deal with this situation and future contingencies. And the third thing being 'sold' is the idea
that detailed intelligence about the enemy is necessary to win a war and defend the United States in the modern world. All of this is, of course, in the context of the failure of American intelligence to prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor. In this context, it is worth noting that Donovan was willing to exaggerate the danger and exploit fears of a ‘Nazi Fifth Column’ in the U.S. in order to press for the establishment of a central intelligence agency in 1941. Donovan was similarly willing to exaggerate concerns in late 1944 and early 1945 about an ‘Alpine Stronghold / Redoubt’ and an underground Nazi guerrilla movement in postwar Germany in order to press his agenda of having a permanent and centralized intelligence agency.¹

The creation of the CIA that we have with us today was by no means assured in 1945 as World War II came to a close. After a devastating war and revelations of the astonishing crimes committed by the Nazis, Harry S. Truman frequently stated that he was absolutely against the idea of an “American Gestapo” when he assumed the office of President after Roosevelt’s sudden death in April 1945.² Truman’s inexact usage of the word ‘Gestapo’ was of less importance than the fact that he definitely associated OSS with his vague notion of what he was sure he did not want in his government. William Donovan wrote a well thought out memorandum listing the reasons for having a post war centralized intelligence service which was lost in the confusion of the end of the war and the death of Roosevelt. Truman and Donovan apparently did not think much of each other, and at the very least they were quite different men who could not ‘see eye to eye.’³ Therefore, it required very little for the arguments of OSS’s long term opponents to convince Truman to get rid of it, and the fate of the organization was probably sealed when he read the harsh and damning report written by one of Roosevelt’s aides after
secretly investigating all OSS activities. On September 20, 1945 President Truman signed the order which dissolved OSS and sent the Research and Analysis branch as an intact unit to the State Department. However, Cold War conceptions of the Soviets and belief in the need to contain them had been firmly accepted by Western military leaders as early as 1943. Tensions and distrust between the Russians and Americans escalated rapidly after the war had officially ended, even as Truman was dissolving OSS.

During this time, the Americans debated the idea of melding their War and Navy Departments into one centralized entity. This was inspired partly by the dismay that President Truman and other American leaders felt when they saw how fast their relationship with the Russians deteriorated after Germany had been defeated. Many started to believe that Stalin was an evil dictator commensurate with Hitler, and that a U.S.S.R. armed with the new atomic bomb and instigating communist revolutions worldwide would be a mortal threat to the United States. In light of this, President Truman created a new entity on January 22, 1946 called the Central Intelligence Group and placed at its head the Director of Central Intelligence or DCI, who reported to the National Intelligence Authority, and all of whom were to advise the President. Ironically, Truman had vindicated the idea that William Donovan had been arguing for from the very beginning: that a permanent, peace time central intelligence agency was necessary for the security of the United States. Under the pressure of rising Cold War tensions with the Soviets and media coverage of the Senate investigations into the intelligence failure of Pearl Harbor, the National Security Act came into effect on July 26, 1947. It created the Department of Defense which unified control of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and it also created the National Security Council which was to supervise the new Central
Intelligence Agency. As the head of the CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence would be appointed by and report directly to the President. The R&A branch was taken out of the State Department and made a part of the CIA, effectively establishing a line of continuity from the formation of COI R&A in 1941 to the formation of the CIA in 1947 and lasting until the present.

According to Dr. Ray Cline, who served in OSS R&A and later became a deputy director for intelligence at the CIA, valuable legacies of the OSS wartime experience have been passed to the CIA and have endured until today, such as a respect for scholarship and learning, and:

Donovan’s belief in the value of bringing able people from all walks of life into intelligence work. He lifted intelligence out of its military rut, where it had little prestige and little dynamism, and made it a career for adventurous, broad-minded civilians. This tradition carried down to the CIA, which regularly recruited some of the most able graduates from U.S. universities to learn the intelligence business.6

There seem to be a number of other legacies that the OSS left to the CIA which have survived until the present, although different readers will have their own opinion as to what is positive and what is negative in those legacies. A major legacy created by the OSS experience in World War II was a paradigm shift in the United States, and in American political discourse.7 A number of things that had been contemptuously regarded as “un-American” before the war came to be accepted as normal methods of doing business amongst nation—states during peace and war. This included the idea of a permanent espionage and intelligence agency in the United States, but also the use of ‘dirty tricks’ such as covert and subversive ‘black’ propaganda aimed at the enemy, as well as covert actions like “public and political sabotage.” Another legacy left to the CIA by OSS is the practice of having two major functions, intelligence collection and special operations, under the same roof. This is different than many other countries, which
typically separate these two major functions into different organizations. Indeed, the very idea of a nominally centralized intelligence agency in the United States, where a single organization manages and coordinates a wide range of different activities related to intelligence and espionage, is a legacy passed from the OSS on to the CIA. While difficult to quantify or prove academically, it seems that the attitudes that William ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan imparted to OSS (i.e. - adventurous, interventionist, confident, willing to try anything) are a distinctive legacy that has been passed on to the CIA. But it also seems possible that these attitudes have led to a fascination with outrageous schemes, secret weapons and spy gadgets, as well as a willingness to disregard the sovereignty and laws of other countries.

After examining the history of the Office of Strategic Services, its Research and Analysis branch, and their influence on what became the CIA, George Washington’s straightforward advice which he gave to one of his subordinates in 1777 seems as relevant today as it was then. Whether we like it or not, having good intelligence was a necessity during the Second World War and is a necessity for the leaders of any nation state in the 21st century. In order to be successful, a substantial amount of intelligence work probably does need to take place in secret. And ironically, intelligence operations that cannot even maintain their own secrecy are almost certain to fail, no matter how excellent the theory and planning behind them may be. It should also be obvious that obtaining good strategic or military intelligence requires the use of the intellect as well as critical and original thinking. Therefore, it would make sense if the government and the military hired, promoted, and encouraged people who possess such qualities. Unfortunately, it seems that overly bureaucratic and rigid thinking combined with the
concern of political and military leaders to protect their careers has frequently led to the opposite policy being followed over the years.

As originally conceived, R&A was the ‘brain’ to the larger ‘body’ of OSS, and it recruited many of its personnel from America's most famous universities, who then applied the methods of modern scholarship to intelligence issues in an unprecedented and highly effective way. As well, OSS combined a wide variety of functions in a single organization, which enabled it and the United States, to react quickly to situations in a fast moving global conflict. In spite of problems, opposition, and various failures, the OSS evolved into an innovative organization that made an important contribution to the Allied war effort from 1941 – 45.

4 Mauch, 14; and Ranelagh, 98f.
6 Ranelagh, 86.
7 Mauch, 217.
Conclusion

Many readers will have noticed a distinct parallel between the events of 1941 to 1945, and the events of 2001 to 2005 following the “9/11” attacks. In both cases, a surprise attack on American soil led to great hue and cry, Congressional and Senate Inquiries and Investigations, and an angry general consensus that the United States could have and should have been better prepared, and that such an attack was preventable should never have been allowed to happen. In both cases, a surprise attack plunged an unprepared United States into a wider global conflict. Both of these surprise attacks also led to finger pointing and denials of wrongdoing or failure amongst the agencies that had been responsible for intelligence, as well as immediate argument and wrangling by those same agencies about any encroachment on their jurisdiction and activities by a new agency that could be created as a result of the fallout. In both situations American governments responded by expanding their overall intelligence capacity in ways that made jurisdictional problems inevitable; and in both situations they responded by seeking a new infusion of highly qualified personnel. The results in the more recent situation cannot yet be known; the results of the changes made during the Second World War are easier to discern. However, it is not within the scope of this M.A. thesis to thoroughly discuss these complicated issues. Rather, it would be a more appropriate subject for further writings either by this author, or by others who have become interested by the preceding discussion.

Although the issues of censorship and manipulation of the primary sources used for this thesis, the Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1 and the O.S.S. / State...
Department Intelligence and Research Reports, part IV are a problem, there are still valuable things that can be learned from these documents. Although there are significant issues regarding provenance and large silences in the documentary record, these primary sources demonstrate the growth and development of the Office of Strategic Services during the war. They also show the challenges OSS faced in trying to define its jurisdictional boundaries, as well as the difficulties that arose in its relationships with the Army, the Navy, the State Department and other intelligence agencies. The various documents from these reels of microfilm also demonstrate that the definition of intelligence was itself changing and expanding at the same time that the war was going on and OSS was being established. It appears that the mandate of OSS was far-reaching, especially in General William Donovan's mind, and that he and his people clearly believed that 'the ends justified the means' in the fight to defeat the Axis powers. The Strategic Services training manuals suggest that OSS had a very wide-ranging mandate and that this organization was trying to do much more than just gather intelligence. In light of all of this, it can hardly be surprising that OSS had jurisdictional conflicts with much older and better established branches of the U.S. armed services.

In the larger context of the war as a whole, OSS R&A scholars who were members of the Enemy Objectives Unit contributed to what has become known as the 'philosophy of air power' through strategic bombing, which has lasted until today. Historians and veterans of OSS R&A have said that this kind of air targeting was one of the most important contributions that OSS made to the Allied war effort. In the end, it seems that even the military could not help but be impressed with the contribution that the "bunch of librarians" from OSS R&A had made to the overall success of their
military plans and the defeat of the Axis powers. The arguments and hostility that surrounded the formation of OSS were potentially crippling to the whole organization. However, the scholars recruited to the R&A branch kept working despite the higher level disagreements and managed to produce some excellent work and were often correct in the estimates and analyses that they gave. As the scope of OSS operations expanded, the problem of jurisdictional boundaries actually became more pronounced, rather than lessening as one might expect. However, the bureaucratic and organizational issues did not interfere with the work of the energetic and talented R&A branch of OSS or weaken their contribution to the war effort.

From June 18, 1941 until July 11, 1942, the United States' first intelligence organization was called the Office of the Coordinator of Information or COI. In July 1942 the COI was officially reorganized and transformed into the new Office of Strategic Services or OSS, which functioned through the end of the war in August 1945. By the time World War II ended, the activities of OSS included various kinds of intelligence gathering and analysis, espionage, counter intelligence, subversive propaganda, commandos, and support of partisans and guerillas. On September 20, 1945, the OSS was dissolved and some of its component parts divided between the military and the State Department. On January 22, 1946 a new entity called the Central Intelligence Group was created with the Director of Central Intelligence or DCI at its head. Finally, on July 27, 1947 many of the dispersed components of OSS were effectively reconstituted under the DCI and Central Intelligence Group, and the sum total was renamed the Central Intelligence Agency or CIA. Because of this history, the Office of Strategic Services is typically regarded as being the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency. However,
the U.S. emerged from the Second World War with an intelligence system in which the problems of co-ordination and jurisdiction had not been completely resolved. The structure of the post-war American intelligence system was established during the Second World War, and under the unique conditions which prevailed at that time.

The purpose of this M.A. thesis has been to examine the development of the Office of Strategic Services; the first centralized and coordinated intelligence service in the United States established during World War II. Although it was the Japanese who attacked Pearl Harbor, this effectively brought the United States into the war against Germany, and the U.S. and Britain agreed to focus first on Europe and then the Pacific. Since American leaders, including President Roosevelt and William Donovan, viewed a war with Japan in the Pacific as "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time," the priority of their intelligence activities was against Germany and Hitler.¹ In light of these facts, this thesis has focused on OSS activities against Germany in the European Theatre of Operations. Special focus has been given to the Research and Analysis branch and the intelligence reports they produced from 1941 to 1945 because its work tells us a great deal about OSS as a whole, and because its role and its personnel deserve to be better known. As well, internal military bureaucracy documents from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which detail the formation and evolution of OSS were examined in order to understand the larger context of disagreement and opposition that surrounded the organization from the moment it was created.

The development and work of the Research and Analysis branch shows that the Office of Strategic Services made a valuable contribution to the Allied war effort from 1941 – 45. Secondary sources always seem to agree on the fact that R&A was
innovative, and also that it was of central importance to the workings of OSS, although this is often very briefly mentioned before the authors move on to their main focus. Similarly, secondary sources usually agree that combining multiple functions in a single organization was an American innovation that was not followed by Britain, Germany, or any other country. Again, most authors mention this briefly, and then move on to discussing commandos, secret agents, etc. But a closer, more sustained, look at R&A reveals just how indispensable it was to the development and success of the OSS, which made it possible for this new organization to contribute to the overall Allied victory in the Second World War.

Two factors led to innovation, which in turn led to success for OSS. From the beginning, R&A was the 'brain' of OSS, and it recruited many of its personnel from America's finest universities, who then applied the methods of academic scholarship to intelligence issues in an unprecedented way. As well, OSS combined a wide variety of functions in a single organization, which enabled OSS, and therefore the United States, to react quickly to situations in a fast moving global conflict. This was because it was more efficient and effective to have a single organization, which facilitated communication and information sharing between different branches that would have otherwise been bureaucratically separated. For example: a secret agent obtains valuable data behind enemy lines; his superior forwards it to R&A, who add it to a study they are currently preparing; the fruits of R&A's labours are then passed along and inform the planning of commando operations to strike behind enemy lines. In Britain during the Second World War, the same scenario would have required the coordination of at least three separate organizations. In original concept, and in practice, OSS was an agency that effectively
'filled in the gaps,' performing functions that other agencies either could not or would not do.

The brief existence of OSS was impeded by the continuous argument and wrangling of the various agencies that had been responsible for intelligence matters up to 1941. In spite of many difficulties as well as setbacks and failures, the Office of Strategic Services evolved into an innovative organization that made a valuable contribution to the American war effort from 1941 to 1945. The Research and Analysis branch played a significant role in these wartime successes, and this helped to ensure the survival of the R&A branch as a unit, as well as the survival of their scholarly approach to research and analysis work in a permanent centralized intelligence agency which has lasted in the United States from 1947 until today.

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