Making, Remaking, and Unmaking of Collective Identities and Democratization: Democratic, Labour, and Women’s Movements in South Korea and Taiwan

by

Chong Su Kim
B.A., Hanyang University, Seoul, 2002
M.A., University of Victoria, Canada, 2011

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the Department of Political Science

© Chong Su Kim, 2018
University of Victoria

All rights reserved. This dissertation may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author.
Making, Remaking, and Unmaking of Collective Identities and Democratization: Democratic, Labour, and Women’s Movements in South Korea and Taiwan

by

Chong Su Kim
B.A., Hanyang University, Seoul, 2002
M.A., University of Victoria, Canada, 2011

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Matt James, Supervisor
Department of Political Science

Dr. Feng Xu, Departmental Member
Department of Political Science

Dr. Guoguang Wu, Departmental Member
Department of Political Science

Dr. William K. Carroll, Outside Member
Department of Sociology
Abstract

The present dissertation focuses on the role of collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements in democratic processes. Taiwan and South Korea took similar paths of rapid industrial development and democratic processes. Yet, democratization and democracy is understood as and linked closely with national-sovereignty in Taiwan but popular-sovereignty in South Korea. This study asks how differences in understanding democracy and in democratic practices are engendered and reproduced and what the role of collective identities of social movements in democratic processes is.

I answer these questions by exploring making, remaking, and unmaking of collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic, women's, and labour movements, and their role in democratization. I thereby show how Taiwanese and South Korean social movements differently contextualized the generalized and universal idea of democracy in democratization. First, I explore Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes as an ensemble of a form of political domination and socio-economic developmental alliances to show how they shaped identity fields or provided the potential for different collective identity construction.

Secondly, I analyze how Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements developed ethno-national Taiwanese identity and popular-class identity through repeatedly revising identity narratives based on collective memories along the pre-transitional, transitional, and stabilizing democratic processes.
Thirdly, by tracing the construction of the collective identities of women’s and labour movements and their interactions with democratic movements throughout the democratic processes, my discussion answers the question of how Taiwanese and South Korean women’s and labour movements attained similar achievements in women’s and labour rights despite different surrounding conditions. Women’s and labour movements’ interactions with democratic movements expanded democratization centred on political citizenship to social citizenship, but simultaneously revealed the limit of this contextualized democratic process through challenges from groups at the margin with different identities.

Fourthly, alignment, realignment, and de-alignment of collective identities are investigated in this study through comparing multiple social movements. The analysis of collective identities between social movements shows how they aligned and realigned their identities with those of other movements along the democratic processes while the within-movement analysis reveals how marginalized groups de-aligned their identities from those of mainstream movements.

With this multi-level, cross-movement, and longitudinal comparison the present study makes a significant contribution to the studies on social movements, collective identity, democratization, and comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea.
# Table of Contents

Supervisory Committee .................................................................................................. ii
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... iii
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. iii
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... viii
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... ix
Notes on Translations and Romanization ........................................................................... xi
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................ xii
Dedication ............................................................................................................................. xiv

## Chapter 1 Introduction

Research Questions ................................................................................................................. 9
Methodology, Data, and Periods .......................................................................................... 19
Plan of The Dissertation ....................................................................................................... 28

## Chapter 2 Democratization, Social Movements, and Collective Identities

Comparative Studies on Taiwan and South Korea ................................................................. 34
State, Civil Society, and Liberal Democracy ........................................................................ 34
Comparative Studies on Taiwanese and South Korean Social Movements ....................... 39
Democratization, Social Movements, and Collective Identities ........................................ 45
Democratization as Multiple Processes and Actors .............................................................. 46
Democratization and Social Movements ............................................................................ 51
Social Movements and Collective Identities ....................................................................... 58
Collective Identities as an Ensemble .................................................................................. 62

## Chapter 3 Taiwanese and South Korean Developmental Regimes

Two Collective Identities and Developmental Regimes ....................................................... 76
Two Collective Identities of Democratic Movements ........................................................... 76
Developmental Regimes and Preconditions ....................................................................... 78
Two Domination Forms of Developmental Regimes ............................................................ 81
Taiwanese Unipartism: The Party-state .............................................................................. 82
South Korean Antipartism: Military Regime ...................................................................... 89
The Nexus of Domination Form with Collective Identities .................................................. 97
Developmental Alliances in Taiwan and South Korea ........................................................ 101
Taiwanese Two dual structures: Interdependent Domination ............................................ 103
South Korean Military-Chaebol Alliance: Independent Domination ............................... 113
The Nexus of Developmental Alliances with Collective Identities .................................... 118
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 122

## Chapter 4 Collective Identities and Democratic Transition

Xiangtu and Minjok Literatures as a Prelude .................................................................... 129
Chapter 5 Women’s Movements in South Korea and Taiwan ............................................. 185
Women’s and Feminist Movements, and Collective Identity ............................................. 188
The Rise of Taiwanese and South Korean Women’s Movements ........................................ 191
The Rise of Taiwanese Women’s Movement: New Feminism ............................................. 193
The Rise of South Korean Women’s Movement: Women as Workers .................................. 198
Women’s Movements before Transition ........................................................................... 202
Taiwanese AM: Women’s Self-Consciousness and Harmonious Gender ............................. 203
South Korean AWEF: Women as Producers ........................................................................ 206
Women’s Movements in Transition ................................................................................ 210
Taiwanese Women’s Movement: From New Feminism to New Gender Relations .............. 211
South Korean Women’s Movements: Women Working at Homes and Factories ................ 214
Shifting Identities and Institutionalization of Taiwanese and South Korean Women’s Movements ................................................................................................................................. 217
Taiwanese Women’s Movement: Taiwanese Woman as Citizen ....................................... 218
South Korean Women’s Movement: Woman in general ...................................................... 222
From Woman to Women: Homogeneity and Heterogeneity of Women’s Movements ............. 227
Implosion of Taiwanese Women’s Movement: Conflicts around Gender, Sexual, and National Politics .......................................................................................................................... 228
Implosion of South Korean Women’s movement: Politics of Engagement versus Politics of Difference ......................................................................................................................... 233
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 238

Chapter 6 Labour Movements in South Korea and Taiwan ............................................. 244
Labour Movement and Collective Identity ........................................................................... 246
The Rise of Taiwanese and South Korean Labour Movements ........................................... 251
The Rise of Taiwanese Labour Movement: Political Identity of Meagre Class Consciousness .................................................................................................................................................. 252
The Rise of South Korean Labour Movement: Anti-political Identity of Excessive Class Consciousness .......................................................................................................................... 254
Democratic Transition and the Formation of Taiwanese and South Korean Independent Labour Movements .......................................................................................................................... 257
Democratic Transition and Taiwanese Pan-class and -political Labour Movement ............. 258
Democratic Transition and South Korean Class-oriented Labour Movement ..... 265
Taiwanese and South Korean Labour Movements and New Collective Identities in
Reconfigured Institutions........................................................................................................... 271
Taiwanese Labour Movement under the New Hegemonic Identity: Worker as
Citizen (*Gongmin*) or Workers as People (*Renmin*) ......................................................... 272
South Korean Labour Movement: Labour with the Nation .................................................... 283
The Establishment of National Confederation of Taiwanese and South Korean
Independent Labour Movement ................................................................................................... 289
Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU) ................................................................. 289
Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) ................................................................. 293
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 297

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 302

Glossary ...................................................................................................................................... 324
Historical Chronology ............................................................................................................... 331
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 342
Appendix ..................................................................................................................................... 403
In-Depth Interviews and Site Observations ............................................................................. 403
South Korea .............................................................................................................................. 403
Taiwan ........................................................................................................................................ 406
List of Tables

Table 3- 1 Composition of the KMT Central Standing Committee, 1952-1993........88
Table 3- 2 Martial Law, and Garrison and Emergency Decrees (1961-1981)........93
Table 3- 3 Domination Forms in South Korea and Taiwan..................................101
Table 3- 4 Prisoners of Conscience grouped in occupation.................................117
Table 4- 1 Production of Counter narratives in Taiwan and South Korea............137
Table 4- 2 Emergence of Democratic Movements in Taiwan and South Korea......151
Table 4- 3 Collective Memory, Identity, and Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea.................................................................179
Table 5- 1 South Korean (SK) and Taiwanese (TW) Women’s Movements in the 1970s..............................................................202
Table 5- 2 South Korean and Taiwanese Women’s Movements between 1980 and 1986........................................................................................................................................209
Table 5- 3 South Korean and Taiwanese Women’s Movements, 1987-early 1990s....216
Table 5- 4 South Korean and Taiwanese Women’s Movements, early 1990s-late 1990s........................................................................................................................................227
Table 5- 5 South Korean and Taiwanese Women’s Movements, late 1990s-2000....237
Table 6- 1 Trade Unions in Taiwan and South Korea.............................................250
Table 6- 2 Taiwanese and South Korean Labour Movements from 1980 to 1986....257
Table 6- 3 Taiwanese and South Korean Labour Movements, 1987 – early 1990s....271
Table 6- 4 Taiwanese and South Korean Labour Movements, early-1990s-mid-1990s.288
Table 6- 5 Independent Union Confederation in Taiwan and South Korea.................297
# List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Awakening Foundation (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO</td>
<td>Administered Mass Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWEF</td>
<td>Association for Women's Equality and Friendship (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAGE</td>
<td>Citizens' Alliance for the General Election (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALL</td>
<td>Committee of Action for Labor Legislation (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCEJ</td>
<td>Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRPM</td>
<td>Coalition for Democratic Reunification and the People’s Movement (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Chinese Federation of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISJD</td>
<td>Study of Justice and Development (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEU</td>
<td>Council of Large Enterprise Unions (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTU</td>
<td>Council of Occupational Trade Unions (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSWAS</td>
<td>Collective of Sex Workers and Supporters (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPWR</td>
<td>Taipei Commission for the Promotion of Women’s Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKTU</td>
<td>Council of Korean Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>Democratic Labour Party (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>Democratic Republican Party (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOI</td>
<td>Export-Oriented Industrialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPL</td>
<td>Eugenic Protection Law (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECF</td>
<td>Far Eastern Chemical Fibre (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKTU</td>
<td>Federation of Korean Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYEDP</td>
<td>Five Year Economic Development Plan (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHF</td>
<td>Garden of Hope (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLS</td>
<td>Great Labour Struggle (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCI</td>
<td>Heavy and Chemical Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICLE</td>
<td>Information Center of Labor Education (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFEM</td>
<td>Korean Federation for Environmental Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Chinese Nationalist Party (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCTU</td>
<td>Korea Confederation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNCW</td>
<td>Korean National Council of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWAU</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Associations United</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWL</td>
<td>Korean Women Link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWWA</td>
<td>Korean Women Workers’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Labour Party (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSATL</td>
<td>Legal Supporting Association for Taiwan Laborers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSL</td>
<td>Labour Standard Law (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMCDR</td>
<td>Minjung Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPO</td>
<td>Mass Political Organization (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>National Affairs Conference (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADR</td>
<td>National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLMO</td>
<td>National Council of Labour Movement Organizations (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTUR</td>
<td>National Council of Trade Union Representatives (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMFK</td>
<td>National Democratic Movement Federation of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFITU</td>
<td>National Federation of Independent Trade Unions (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>National Liberation (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>New Social Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>New Tide faction (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCIRR</td>
<td>Presidential Commission for Industrial Relations Reform (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>People’s Democracy (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSPD</td>
<td>People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Turkey’s Republican People's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATLM</td>
<td>Supporting Association for Taiwan Labor Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFWW</td>
<td>Solidarity Front of Women Workers (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLMA</td>
<td>Seoul Labour Movement Association (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNU</td>
<td>Seoul National University (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State-Owned Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWTU</td>
<td>Seoul Women’s Trade Union (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAPWR</td>
<td>Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women’s Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCTU</td>
<td>Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLALA</td>
<td>Taiwanese Legal Assistance for Labour Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLF</td>
<td>Taiwan Labor Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPWU</td>
<td>Taiwan Petroleum Workers’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIM</td>
<td>Urban Industrial Mission (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WID</td>
<td>Women in Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Workers’ Party (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPA</td>
<td>Women’s Policy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWA</td>
<td>Korean Workers’ Welfare Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YCD</td>
<td>Youth Corps for the Democratization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes on Translations and Romanization

Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations from the Chinese and Korean are my own.

All Chinese and Korean names and words are romanized according to the Hanyu Pinyin System and the Revised Romanization of Korean (Republic of Korea standard, Ministry of Culture and Tourism Notice No. 2000-8, 2000. 7.7), respectively. Exceptions are those names of historical figures and places that are well-known, such as Rhee, Syngman, Chiang, Kai-she, or Kaohsiung. Exceptions are also made for authors or people who use for their names English spellings other than above romanization systems.

Korean and Chinese names are written according to the usage in East Asia where surnames precede given names.
Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to have the opportunity to convey my appreciation to the numerous individuals and institutions to whom and to which I am greatly indebted. At first, I would like to thank my supervisor, Matt James, for his continued support and extensive guidance in the process of doing my research and writing this dissertation. His rigorous and constructive critique helped me sharpen my arguments and clarify my thesis. This dissertation would not have been possible without his lasting support and insightful guidance. I would like also to thank my wonderful committee members, Feng Xu, Guoguang Wu, and William K. Carroll, for providing keen insights and guidance during the development of this research. Their constructive critiques of my initial research proposal and comments on my dissertation draft helped me refine and enrich this dissertation. I am also very grateful to Jennifer Chun for acting as my external examiner, for carefully reading my dissertation draft, and for offering thoughtful comments.

I owe special thanks to those who supported me during the preparation for the field research to Taiwan and South Korea and during my stay there. Dr. Geo Sung Kim and priest Man Young Chung introduced their friends in Taiwan and South Korea who helped me conduct my research in Taiwan and South Korea. Dr. Yoonkyung Lee, an old friend of mine, provided invaluable advice and introduced her Taiwanese friends and students to me. Priest Dong Uk Koo and Gyeol Kim offered generous support for my accommodation in Taiwan. Dr. Ernie Ko introduced me prominent activists and social movement organizations. Dr. Hsin-Hsing Chen and Dr. Ming-Sho Ho supported my research in Taiwan by connecting me a number of excellent labour activists and scholars,
including themselves. Professor Yen-Lin Ku offered invaluable opportunities to interview with many outstanding feminists, including herself, and to observe impressive feminist meetings in Taiwan. Por-Yee Lin invited me to the meetings and solidary struggles between Taiwanese and South Korean workers in Taipei. Dr. Tae-soo Song and Han-Yong Choi introduced a number of excellent South Korean labour activists. During my field research in Taiwan and South Korea, I met many excellent social movement activists, scholars, and politicians. I thank all these people for their willingly sharing their experience and insights with me.

I could not have managed and survived this long journey without the generous financial support from the Government of Canada’s Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarships (Vanier CGS). My special gratefulness goes to the Department of Political Science at University of Victoria for the generous funding and various academic opportunities during my doctoral studies, to the faculty members who offered warm support and rigorous academic training, and to the kind and helpful office staffs.

Finally, yet importantly, I would like to thank my family for their continued support. I greatly thank Sung Hee Park for her love, understanding, and guidance. She was the person who saw my intellectual potential and encouraged me to return to the university. Without her tireless support and trust I could not have reached this stage. I thank Chorong Kim, my daughter, for her continuous support and encouragement which made me always happy. I also express my thanks for my late mother Soon Joo Kim and late father Sok Chon Kim. I know my parents would be most happy if they knew that I finally completed this project.
Dedication

For Sung Hee Park and

To the memory of my mother Soon Joo Kim and my father Sok Chon Kim
Chapter 1 Introduction

The places that the public perceive as static and frozen often convey dynamic and active meanings. Thirty years have passed since Taiwan’s and South Korea’s democratic transitions were set in motion in the late 1980s. In recent years, Taiwanese and South Korean societies have witnessed massive protests in different places. The Taiwanese “Sunflower Movement” began in March 2014 with the occupation of the Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan by hundreds of students opposed to the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party’s (Taiwan) (KMT) unilateral move to bypass the parliamentary review process for the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), which might have had a significant impact on Taiwan’s society. The three week-long occupation attracted public sympathy and ignited nationwide mass protest against the KMT. In South Korea, at the end of the October 2016 major cities’ plazas were occupied by tens of thousands peaceful protesters with candlelight protests against President Park, Geun-hye’s series of corruption scandals and constitutional violations. The nearly five-month-long “Candlelight Demonstration” saw sixteen million people take to the streets to demand President Park’s impeachment.

Taiwanese students held their protests at state institutions as their claims in the Sunflower Movement, like those of the Legislative Yuan, and as the representatives of a 1990 protest called Wild Lily student movement brought their grievances to then President Lee, Teng-hui at the presidential building. South Korean participants held their rallies in public plazas in the Candlelight Movement like citizens of a 1987 protest called the June Uprising held their protests in public plazas. Although the claims of the
Taiwanese and South Korean protesters were directed toward state institutions, these two recent events show differences in where Taiwan and South Korea democracy unfolded and how democracy was deployed.

Two snapshots of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements during the democratic transition would show more drastically different features of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic processes. In 1986, tens of thousands of South Korean students, workers, and activists stormed the opposition party’s rally for constitutional revision and turned the peaceful rally into a violent mass protest for a radical change, with slogans like “power to the people” and “enactment of people’s constitution.” They blurred the line between students and non-students and confronted established politics. In Taiwan 1991, tens of thousands of students held a peaceful demonstration for constitutional reform and set up a security line demarcating students and non-students in the fear that their “purity” might be contaminated by non-students and compromised by the oppositions party. These snapshots reveal the contrasting characteristics of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements, and their relations with the people, political parties, and the state.

How differences in understanding democracy and democratic practices are engendered and reproduced is one of the central questions of this research. The present study tries to answer this question by exploring the construction and reconstruction of collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic, women's, and labour movements and their role in democratization. This dissertation thereby aims to show how Taiwanese and South Korean social movements differently contextualized the generalized and universal idea of democracy in democratization. By contextualizing, I mean a process where active inhabitants in an unfolding space of events localise
generalized and universal ideas through local culture and conjunctural meanings.

Democracy has no transhistorical and translocal essence and there is no predetermined and transsocial women's and class interests and consciousness. This study explores the processes wherein Taiwanese and South Korean social movements contextualized democracy through construction and reconstruction of their collective identities. Through their identity work, they activated structural conditions of developmental regimes and conjunctural meanings of the democratic processes.

Collective identity is usually understood as a shared meaning of a collectivity that provides collectively negotiated understandings of the self and other and constrains or facilitates a certain interpretation of the surrounding environment and collective actions (Melucci, 1989). Connecting and juxtaposing democratic and identity processes is crucial for comprehending how democracy is understood and put into practice. It does not indirectly ask what stands above democratization as elite-led pact-making, behind democratization as an effect of past regime-types and institutions, or beneath democratization as a product of economic modernization; rather, it directly approaches democratic processes by exploring how active demos, women, and workers interpreted democracy and responded to the shifting democratic processes. Nor does it ask, as in a questionnaire, whether democracy is preferable and whether democratization is consolidated, but how democracy is understood and how democratization is put into practice by using collective identity as a lens and a map.

As will be seen in subsequent sections, Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements developed ethno-national Taiwanese consciousness and popular-class identity, respectively. They framed democratization as a process of ethno-national
sovereignty and popular sovereignty. In other words, sovereign right of the population in national sovereignty could be transferred through electoral processes to state institutions as state sovereignty. Yet, sovereign right is not completely transferrable through those processes to state institutions in popular sovereignty in which the final say still remains with the population. Taiwanese and South Korean women's and labour movements had to willingly or unwillingly respond to these democratic and identity process. In these processes, they align or disalign their collective identities with or from those of democratic movements whereby their gender and class interests are affected by a contextualized democratization.

Variations in the role and effects of different social movements in democratic processes are sought through a comparison of their: capability to maintain autonomy to exercise their power and build coalitions to extend their influence (Hassim, 2006; Molyneux, 2005; Sandoval, 1998), ability to actualise political opportunities (Boudreau, 2002; Oberschall, 1996; Schock, 2005), and capacity to produce and diffuse “symbolic interests” (W. A. Gamson, 2004) or new “cultural codes” (Melucci, 1989). Before comparing the variations, the present study inquires into what constrains and promotes such variations and how such variations are made in democratic processes: why do some social movements prefer associational linkages to independence and vice versa; what made some movements resort to non-disruptive political processes more than disruptive social mobilization and vice versa; and how do some movements promote ethno-centred discourses whereas others foster class-centric discourses. The present study aims to answer these questions by exploring differences in collective identities of social movements between Taiwan and South Korea in the democratic processes from the late
1970s to 2000. This study proceeds directly to democratization by focusing on its active inhabitants instead of hovering around the residual effects of developmental regimes, homogenized third wave democracy, or decontextualized civil society. I will discuss these issues further in the following sections in more detail.

This dissertation makes a significant contribution to the literature on social movements, collective identity, democratization, and comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea. First, it provides the first comprehensive comparative study on democratization and collective identities of social movements in Taiwan and South Korea. It offers a multilevel, longitudinal, inter-movement, and cross-national comparison between Taiwan and South Korea from the pre-transition to the post-transition.

Second, the present study deepens knowledge of the role of social movements in democratization by examining their collective identities and integrating them into the analysis of democratic processes. Although a number of interesting recent publications have dealt with the role of social movements in democratization, their analyses remain partial for they seek the emergence of social movements and their role in democratic processes outside of them instead of examining their internal dynamics.

Let me review two recent studies on the emergence and development of the South Korean democratic movement. One pertains with the emergence and development of the pre-transitional social movements of South Korea while the other is concerned with its post-transitional social movement culture. While studying on the protest dialectics between state repression and movement mobilization in the 1970s based on voluminous sources, Chang, Paul’s study (2015) is focused on the “impact of repression on social
movements” where the causal arrow flows from the state repression, not the other way around. Changes in mobilization is “primarily driven by the repression strategies” by the state (p. 12). Although Chang noticed a new trend, the diversification of social movements coupled with inter-movement alliance in the late-1970s, he associated it only “with increasing state repression” (p. 196), instead of interpreting it as their discursive and tactical innovation reflecting on the rapid rise of protest of popular classes. Kim, Sun-chul’s study (2016) focuses on “defiant institutionalization,” a particular feature of the post-transitional South Korean movement culture in which social movements are routinized but sustain their influence without cooptation. This defiant institutionalization, according to Kim, is attributable to the internal cohesion and autonomy of social movements. Kim sees the movement’s cohesion and autonomy as the unintended effects of the regime’s blockade against extra-institutional actors. Kim however thereby overlooks the internal process of social movements and their identity work and effects on the movement’s cohesion and autonomy.

Let me take a look at two comparative studies on Taiwanese and South Korean social movements. Lee, Yoonkyung (2011) succinctly summarizes that the dissimilar institutional configurations—Taiwanese incorporative and South Korean exclusionary labour regimes—produced different identities and interests in Taiwanese and South Korean workers and their variations in labour politics—Taiwanese partisan unionism and South Korean militant unionism. Their labour politics was further shaped by different relations between organized labour and the democratic institutions of established politics—Taiwanese workers’ partisan alliance of and South Korean workers’ weak links with established parties. Lee, however, does not delve into the internal dynamics of
labour movements and exclude the possibility that those differences could derive from their conscious enterprises and collective identities.

Liu, Hwa-jen (2006, 2012a, 2012b, 2015) offers a comparative perspective on Taiwanese and South Korean social movements during the democratic processes. Liu wrestles with the different timing of emergence of Taiwanese and South Korean environmental and labour movements—Taiwanese environmental and South Korean labour movements as the early-risers and Taiwanese labour and South Korean environmental movements as the spinoff late-comers—around the democratic processes. Liu explains that phenomenon through different intensities of institutional constraints on environmental and labour movements in each country and different power sources of those movements, i.e., material leverage of labour movement and ideational ideology of environmental movement. Liu, however, did not pay attention to the fact that the Taiwanese and South Korean early risers were respectively influenced by the place-based Taiwanese national identity and class-oriented minjung (literally people and mass) identity of democratic movements. Therefore Liu’s other crucial claim that the Taiwanese and South Korean late-comers are influenced simply by their early-risers is untenable for it overlooks the critical influence of democratic movements on the early-risers.

This study fills the gap of aforementioned studies by investigating collective identities and connecting them into the analysis of democratic processes.

Third, the present study enhances knowledge of making, remaking, and unmaking of collective identities of social movements in Taiwan and South Korea. There are a number of outstanding ethnographic studies on the formation of collective identities of social movements in democratic processes of Taiwan and South Korea. Lee, Namhee (2007)
excellently discusses the process of making *minjung* by students and intellectuals. Lee sees *minjung* more as discursive construct by intellectual *minjung* practioners than as a joint enterprise of diverse social movements under *minjung* umbrella. Therefore Lee does not focus on its practices, such as contentious and organizational repertoires, implemented by *minjung* movement groups and on the making, unmaking, and remaking of *minjung* in the democratic processes. Chuang, Ya-Chung’s anthropological study (2013) on Taiwanese democracy and social movements explores the shifting meanings of *bentu* (nativist, indigenous, or Taiwanese) identity, ranging from the discourse against the authoritarian émigré regime in pre-transition to that of nativist nation-building by the ruling elites or that of new social imagination by social movements in post-transition. Chang shows how *bentu* identity unfolded in particular in post-transition era but does not delve into how this identity was made and remade over the course of democratization. This dissertation shows the process of making, remaking, and unmaking of collective identities of social movements through the analysis of and their memory work and identity alignment, realignment, and de-alignment.

Fourth, this study brings a fresh insight into the collective identity research by showing its contextualization effects. In other words, it shows how social movements indigenize and historicize through their collective identities universal ideas and value, such as democracy and class and women’s interests.

Chun, Jennifer Jihye (2009) excellently demonstrates symbolic leverage of precarious workers left outside the legal protection through her comparative study on those in South Korean and the US. Chun shows collective identity is a contested arena and demonstrates through the redefinition of worker or “classification struggles” how
collective identity served as powerful tool to enhance rights of workers at the margin. Yet, Chun’s interest lies more in their winning recognition in the public sphere so that they influence the distribution of power and resources than the construction and reconstruction of their collective identity. Thus, Chun focuses on repertoires inherited from other actors and dramaturgical public display of grievances of workers lacking legal protection. Such a view draws on the assumption that relations between repertoires and their employment, and collective identities are weak and repertoires can determine or “revalue the identities” (p. 8). Yet, Charles Tilly and others noticed changes in repertoires of social movements coincided with changes of collective identities (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1993, 2002, 2005a, 2005b), “because new users….found the available tools inadequate to their problems…. fashioned new means of claim-making” (Tilly, 2010, p. 55). Collective identity of social movements serves as a lens framing and filtering values, ideas, and interests. The present study examines collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic, labour, and women’s movements and thereby show how they differently indigenized and historicized democracy, and class and gender identities and interests.

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Before I raise my research questions I should add one caveat. To compare democracy and democratization one must first define these concepts. Those who prioritise substantive democracy espouse a definitional strategy that offers concepts of democracy and democratization filled with a set of normative values, such as freedom, equality, justice, and inclusion (Bobbio, 1989; Cohen & Arato, 1994; Held, 1987). Those who emphasize
the procedures employ a definitional strategy that defines democracy and democratization based on a set of empirically identifiable institutions and their practices, like competitive elections and institutional checks and balances (Huntington, 1991; Schumpeter, 1976). Once adopted, such strategies are inattentive to different structures of feeling or experience underlying those normative values and standing behind those institutionalized practices, like freedom and justice for whom or competitive elections for what. Despite shared values and institutions, democracy and its realization are often differently understood and unfold, if concerned parties have different self-understandings, such as the people, one people, citizens, and the excluded or the marginalized.

For my field work, I conducted thirty seven in-depth interviews with Taiwanese and South Korean social movement activists and scholars to attain grounded and contextualized knowledge that is difficult to attain in official records and secondary sources. I have the impression that Taiwanese and South Korean interviewees showed different nuances in democracy and democratization. Taiwanese interviewees saw democracy and democratization more as national sovereignty¹ and political processes. Those with a pro-Chinese political orientation even described democratization as a disguised Taiwanization promoted by the then opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). A Taiwanese feminist states in the interview with this author:

I am very confused about it [democratization]. My friends and I often talk about what democratisation means to us…. partly we are entrapped in the

---
¹ It is usually assumed that there are four ethnic groups in Taiwan. The non-Han and native Malay-Polynesian people constitute less than two percent of the whole population. “Taiwanese” (bênsêngêng) often refers to two ethnic groups, Hoklo and Hakka, who migrated to and settled in Taiwan in the 17th century. The Hokkien make up 70 percent and the Hakka 14 percent. The mainlanders (waïshêngêng) are those who migrated with the KMT after 1945 account for 14 percent of the population. The Hoklo, Hakka, and mainlander are all Han Chinese.
process of democratization, which means mainly political elections and animosity between competitive candidates and political parties.

South Korean interviewees regarded democracy and democratization more as popular sovereignty and social processes. The Taiwanese interviewees perceived of democratic movement as a political movement, differentiating it from social movements. Political movement was often called old movement and equated with the opposition movement led by groups with established political orientation, whereas social movements were designated as a new social or new opposition movement. South Korean interviewees mainly viewed the democratic movement as a social rather than political movement. They assigned the term old social movement primarily to movements led by subaltern groups with class-orientation while new social movements referred to movements led by the middle class for class-less and interest-less public good.

The central questions the present study raises are how different collective identities of social movements emerged and what is their role in democratic processes. They are disaggregated into three sub-questions: how Taiwanese and South Korean social movements constructed different collective identities; how their collective identities affected democratization; and how dissimilar collective identities formed by democratic movements affected identity processes of other social movements and democratic processes. The main goal of this dissertation is to explore the variation in collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements and to show their effects on democracy and democratization.

Collective identity is a group of people’s shared and negotiated meaning about themselves and the surrounding world formed through their interactive and common
feelings, ideas, experiences, interests, and activities (Alvarez & Escobar, 1992c; Melucci, 1985, 1989, 1996; V. Taylor & Whittier, 1992). Constructing and maintaining collective identity is a generative process to form a social body that is constantly subject to a rereading of that body, renegotiation with others and the surrounding social world, and rearticulation of both. Thus, collective identity is the web of meanings interwoven by an agent’s understanding of the self, narration of structures, and the process of an agent’s negotiation with contending others. Collective identity of social movements is the process of constructing and managing a social force for social change that involves not only how groups of people understand themselves and the entities with which they are in contention, but also in which direction and how to change that world. It is the map that guides the path and how to read both agent and the multidimensional processes derived from their interaction with structures. Thus, studying different collective identities of two societies that experienced democratic transition will show two different landscapes’ socio-political changes.

Let me briefly discuss Taiwanese and South Korean democratic, labour, and women’s movements to show their different features. Both Taiwanese and South Korean social movements have been under profound stress. What they had in common was their confrontation of the Cold War, hostile division from and conflicts with mainland China and North Korea, severe repression by authoritarian regimes, and drastic socio-economic changes. Together, these conditions served as an excuse for authoritarian regimes to use force to maintain society’s internal unity and to mute dissident voices.

In the 1970s, Taiwanese and South Korean social movements began to challenge the KMT party-state and the military regime, respectively. The local Taiwanese
(benshengren) were excluded from national politics dominated by the émigré KMT, or mainlanders (waishengren). Opposition groups—often called dangwai, literally outside the party (KMT), and later turned into the DPP—increasingly challenged the monopolization of the national politics through combining democratization and ethnicization, promoted by the 1979 Kaohsiung incident, which was a triggering event for a new collective identity formation. The incident began when Taiwanese opposition movements, including the Formosa magazine group, organized a demonstration to commemorate World Human Rights Day, 10 December 1979, and to demand democracy. The demonstration turned into a violent clash between demonstrators and the police, with dozens of prominent opposition leaders arrested and convicted. In the 1980s, the Taiwanese opposition movement began to construct Taiwanese consciousness as its subjectivity where democracy and democratization was formulated in the sovereignty of the local Taiwanese for nation-building against the foreign KMT regime. Taiwanese consciousness, which was promoted by the dangwai/DPP, shows the ethno-national, institutional, and reform orientation against the KMT’s Chinese nation, their exclusion from national politics, and rebuilding of the status quo.

The South Korean democratic movement started to recognize the significant role of subaltern classes with their increasing protests and strikes, which were drastically politicized against the military regime in the late 1970s. Women workers’ strikes between 1978 and 1979 and mass revolts in Busan and Masan in 1979 led to the assassination of

---

2 Taiwan is often called Formosa, a name given by Portuguese sailors in the late16th century who found the Taiwan island “beautiful.” Formosa magazine was established in mid-1979 and published four issues before forcefully closed by the KMT. The magazine provoked Taiwanese identity against the émigré KMT regime. The magazine rapidly expanded its organizational bases and attracted numerous prominent oppositional intellectuals. The KMT regime assumed that the magazine was a disguise for masking preparations to launch an opposition party by dissident groups.
then President Park, Chung-hee in December 1979, to the Garrison Decree and the Kwangju uprising. Citizens of Kwangju, the capital city of the South Cholla province, took to the streets on 18 May 1980 to protest the Garrison Decree. Protesters were composed of diverse classes, including numerous subaltern classes: they occupied City Hall and “liberated” the whole city for ten days. The Kwangju uprising ended with the new military regime’s bloody repression. After the 1980 Kwangju massacre, the South Korean democratic movement constructed multi-class minjung (literally people and mass) identity. The democratic movement developed the multi-class minjung movement and framed democracy and democratization as popular sovereignty against the military regime. Minjung identity shows a popular-class, extra-institutional, and transformative orientation against the military regime based on its cooperation with large conglomerates against the exclusion of popular sectors and for the subversion of the status quo.

This variation of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements and their collective identities can be found in other sectoral movements. Both Taiwanese and South Korean women’s and labour movements achieved considerable and similar advancement in women’s rights and labour rights since democratization; however, the social movement scenes in Taiwan and South Korea were drastically different.

Representatives of the South Korean and Taiwanese national federation of independent trade unions—the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU)—first met in 1999 in Seoul, South Korea. Their first face-to-face encounter lacked the celebration of working-class

---

3 The KCTU was officially acknowledged in 1997 by the South Korean government whereas the TCTU attained its legal recognition in 2000 by then-new government led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which ended the more than five-decade one-party regime led by the KMT.
solidarity transcending national borders, hindered by little comprehension about one another: why were South Korean workers so interested in non-labour advocacy activities and why were Taiwanese workers not supportive of unification with socialist mainland China? Although they shared the significance of independent trade unions for the improvement of workers’ rights and interests, the meaning of their independence—of the ruling party, of established politics, of capital—differed, which affected their relations with other social movements and political parties. In 2000, the Taiwanese TCTU refused to participate in anti-nuclear and pro-environment march (TCTU, 2000b) and closely cooperated with the ruling DPP while the South Korean KCTU cooperated with other social movement organizations for non-labour social issues and kept their autonomy from established parties.

Different voices can also be heard from the South Korean and Taiwanese heralding the new beginnings of the women’s movements in the 1980s. In 1982, the foreword of the first issue of *Funu xinzhi* (literally women’s new knowledge, in English *Awakening Magazine*) emphasized women’s independent personality and self-awareness and their active role in advancing a new gender society and the development of the country (*Funu xinzhi*, 1982). The foreword did not mention relations between feminist and democratic movements or between emancipation and democratization. The South Korean Association for Women's Equality and Friendship’s (AWEF) mission statement was

---

4 The *Awakening Magazine* was founded in 1982 by Taiwanese feminist intellectuals and professionals. Before the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, magazines in Taiwan a typical tool used by opposition groups to get their voices heard and to avoid regime’s control (Y.-C. Lee, 1999, p. 97). Importantly, the Chinese title of *Awakening Magazine* is Women’s New Knowledge. The English title began to appear in the 13th issue. The nuance between the Chinese and English title is different. I revisit this issue below.

5 The AWEF was the first South Korean women’s movement organization to emerge in the 1980s. It claimed women’s emancipation and democratization. Its foundation was initiated primarily by intellectual women who were highly sympathetic to women workers. It is assumed that AWEF based its position on socialist feminism.
clearly against patriarchy and for gender equality as the goal of women’s movement in 1983. Yet, the statement warns of the “women’s movement…becoming middle-class women’s recreational activities” for South Korean women as “working women” are exploited and repressed by multiple systems and apparatuses. Women’s movement constitutes the “base for democracy oriented towards unification” (Yeoseongpyeong-uhoe, 1983, author’s translation). In 1983, Taiwanese feminists celebrated their first International Women’s Day by holding seminars on women’s health and gender equality education (Y.-C. Lee, 1983) whereas their South Korean counterparts claimed, in the first Women’s Conference in 1985, anti-imperialism, democratization of society, and democratic society with gender equality as the goals of the “righteous women’s movement.”

Taiwanese social movements actively used the state space and a flexible partisan alliance while their South Korean counterparts availed themselves of the non-institutional space and preferred coalition-building with other non-institutional actors or independent parties. The examples are not episodic events simply revealing two scenes that happened at one point in time; rather, they are expressions of different characteristics contrasting Taiwanese and South Korean social movements. If one considers the significant differences between Taiwan and South Korea in women’s representation in parliament6 and the influence of Confucian patriarchy on women,7 it is puzzling from the vantage point of the year 2000 that Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements attained

6 Taiwanese women account for more than 20 percent in the national legislative body in the post-transitional period while their Korean counterparts remained between approximately 5 percent and 15 percent.

7 While comparing patriarchy in East Asia, Sechiyama, Kaku (2013) contends that “other than on the Korean peninsula, Confucianism is not that useful as an explanatory variable” (p. 284). According to Sechiyama (1996, 2013), South Korean patriarchy put much more emphasis on motherhood than its Taiwanese counterpart. Family in Southern Chinese culture appears less patriarchal and more egalitarian in inter-gender and -sibling relationships than the Korean family (Sechiyama, 2013, pp. 180-181).
similar legislative and institutional achievements. In a similar vein, Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements achieved similar outcomes, for instance in union rights and workweek reduction, despite different industrial structures and party-union linkages. The answers to variations in industrial structures or political institutions between Taiwan and South Korea are at best partial responses to those questions of how different structural conditions brought about similar outcomes.

The present dissertation tries to answer the research questions by investigating the origin and development of different collective identities of social movements, their effects on democracy and role in democratization, their positive or negative transmogrification—i.e. their status change from hegemonic to marginal identities or vice versa—and interactions among national, popular, civil, gender, and class identities. To simplify, during the democratic transition, South Korean social movements constructed class-oriented multiclass collective identities while their Taiwanese counterparts developed collective identities that translated subethnic conflict into national issues. The two different collective identities forged in the democratic transition were further articulated with gendered and classed collective identities of women’s and labour movements, respectively. The investigation into the different collective identities and identity processes provides insights and keys to understanding the different paths of social movements, their contrasting characteristics, and their divergent effects on democracy and democratization in Taiwan and South Korea.

Taiwanese and South Korean social movements faced massive repression, which forced them to enter what social movement scholars call periods of abeyance, defined here as a period when movements retreat to their core base and focus on keeping
movement alive (V. Taylor, 1989). Social movements in the two countries underwent reorganization for survival, which revolved around the construction of new collective identities. The South Korean democratic movement constructed a radical multi-class minjung (people and mass) movement while its Taiwanese counterpart developed Taiwanese consciousness by transforming or elevating the provincial subethnic identity into a national identity against hegemonic Chinese consciousness. The democratic movements based on those collective identities interacted differently with political institutions and intervened into other movement identities in Taiwan and South Korea.

The exploration of collective identities of social movements is motivated by the assumption that troubling and/or persisting democracy cannot be fully understood from economic structures and political institutions if its demos, their self-conception, and their practices are disregarded. Collective identities provide not only routes to understanding the residual questions structural explanations exclude, but also fresh insights into those questions already answered by the latter. The difference in labour militancy between South Korea and Taiwan, for example, has previously been explained primarily with reference to different economic and political structures (Deyo, 1989; C.-L. Huang, 1999; Y. Lee, 2011; Sen & Koo, 1992). But these differences can be understood not solely as the pure effect of different structural factors but also, with added texture and richness, as an expression of collective identities’ characteristics, which shows how social actors interpret social fabric woven by structures and transform those structures based on their self-conception. Further, we can read rich socio-political textures of democracy and explore how its multiple avenues change in social movements’ internal development and their collective identities and interactions among identity discourses. For instance: why
South Korean social movements competed with political parties whereas Taiwanese counterparts maintained more friendly relationship with political institutions; why the Taiwanese labour movement focused on party-union links while their South Korean counterpart emphasized their own political independence; and why South Korean women’s movement was open to alliance building with other social actors whereas their Taiwanese counterpart was more reserved.

**METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND PERIODS**

The present dissertation adopts a comparative case study methodology. It intensively studies cases by drawing on detailed context-conscious and in-depth knowledge of the studied cases (Ragin, 1987, 2004). It compares two units that include multiple cases. The two units, Taiwan and South Korea, are most similar historically, economically, and politically. Historically, both were colonized by Japan in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries and their trajectories in the second half of the twentieth century bear more similarities than the preceding era. Economically, they undertook industrial development along with simultaneous and analogous processes: import substitution industrialization in the 1950s, export orientation industrialization after the 1960s, and industrial deepening in the 1970s. Politically, not long after decolonization, Taiwan and South Korea were incorporated into the United States’ sphere in the Cold War and presented as showcases against North Korea and mainland China. Taiwan’s authoritarian one-party-state and South Korea’s successive military regimes dominated, disciplined, and regularized each
society. Their democratization was set in motion in the late-1980s and the transition was peacefully implemented.  

Despite these similarities, they showed differences in understanding democracy, democratization, and democratic practices. This project explores the different Taiwanese and South Korean democratic processes through comparing collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements. This project investigates how the Taiwanese and South Korean social movements each contextualized the generalized and universal value and idea of democracy through the formation of different collective identities and how different collective self-understanding of social movements affected the democratic processes. To see how social movements influenced the democratic processes with their collective identities, this study not only involves cross-unit comparison, but also within-unit comparison. It compares collective identities of women’s and labour movements of Taiwan and South Korea, how they interacted with the democratic movements and the democratic processes, and how they contextualized generalized women’s interests and class consciousness throughout the democratic processes. This study synchronically and diachronically conducts cross- and within-unit comparison. This comparison of multiple cases within and across units fleshes out the

---

These similarities between two countries become more stunning when contrasted with their common dissimilarities with the West. Economically, their production was not promoted by consumption, as was the case in Western core Fordism, but by exports (Lipietz, 1987; Sum & Jessop, 2006) whereby the state took the leading role in place of the market. Politically, their authoritarian regimes prevailed over both economic and social relations. The state, at least before the democratic transition, was not “but a committee for…bourgeois” (Marx & Engels, 2001, p. 487). Their “too much government” during rapid industrialization was not seriously challenged by privileging market and distinguishing society from the state as in the West. Their industrial peace was not guaranteed by the self-regulating market or Keynesian welfare compromise but the neo-mercantile repression and threat. Further, neither was democratization in both countries triggered by or expanded after wars, or imposed from external forces (Therborn, 1977), nor was it set in motion by socio-economic or political crises in the third wave of democracy as in Southern and Eastern Europe and Latin America.
nexus between the characteristics of collective identities of social movements—representing boundary (e.g., ethnic or popular), source of power (e.g., autonomous or associational), and venue orientation (e.g., institutional or extra-institutional); and dynamics and contents of democratization—*tempos* of dynamics (e.g., drawn-out or rapid), ways of transition (e.g., negotiated or contentious), and primary arena (e.g., political or social).

This project employs multi-level and longitudinal approaches to show the complexity and linking of collective identity and democratization because an analysis of a single movement’s collective identity at a single level and one temporal point would not reveal its role in democracy and democratization. At the macro-level, it compares the role of Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes in shaping identity fields or providing the potential for different collective identity construction. The comparison at the meso-level shows how democratic movements actualized those potentials produced at the macro-level through the formation of collective identities, how they contextualized democracy, i.e. an operation rendering universal value contextually dependent, and affected the dynamics of democratization, and how they reconstructed collective identities along with the changing demands of democratic processes. The role of collective identities of democratic movements at the meso-level is analyzed in connection with the collective identity formation of women’s and labour movement organizations at the micro-level. Workers and women were the developmental regimes’

---

9 The meso-level refers here to a social movement that encompasses organizations dedicated to different issues and unites them under a unifying issues or master frame. It therefore involves McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) work, both the subordinate “social movement industry” composed of social movement organizations with similar goals and the superordinate “social movement sector” comprised of diverse social movement industries. The democratic movements in Taiwan and South Korea united diverse social movement organizations dedicated to different issues under the master frame of democracy and democratization.
primary targets to be mobilized, disciplined, and regulated for development. Democratic processes provided more institutional space in which Taiwanese and South Korean women’s and labour movements—based on their different collective identities and their interactions with collective identities formed in the democratic processes—responded proactively but differently. I focus on the relations between primary and sectoral identities and on the role of gender and class identity in promoting women’s and labour rights. Moreover, the longitudinal survey of pre-transitional, transitional, and post-transitional changes of collective identities of democratic, women’s, and labour movements was conducted to show how those collective identities influence the democratic processes. The longitudinal comparison demonstrates interactions between changes of collective identities and democratic processes.

My purpose is to demonstrate and to explore the interactions between democratic and identity processes and compare them between Taiwan and South Korea, which affected subsequent identity processes of labour and women’s movements and their class and gender politics to expand the narrow boundary of political democratization. This interaction will also reveal the limited representability of collective identities of mainstream women’s and labour movements and the limits of contextualized democracy.

This dissertation draws on two types of primary sources. Firstly, I conducted two field research trips in Taiwan and South Korea between 2014 and 2015. I conducted 37 one-to-one in-depth interviews with labour and women’s movement activists, scholars, and politicians with social movement backgrounds. Each interview lasted roughly one and a half hours. Interviews were conducted in an open-ended format in which the participants could express their opinions more freely than in a structured setting. Open-
ended and in-depth interviews, according to Rubin and Rubin (2005), allow researchers to approach and reconstruct unexplored and unexperienced events, extend their limited intellectual and emotional reach, and fill gaps absent in official records. The interviews involved various components, such as life histories, conceptual clarification, and elaboration of cases (democracy and democratic transition in Taiwan and South Korea), and theory elaboration (like collective identities). In general, interviewees were asked to give their biographical information; to describe their routes to joining social movements, introduction to their organizations, and their roles in social movements; to illustrate the development of social movements in which they were involved; to discuss interactions between democratic and other social movements and between movements relevant to the present research; and to portray the relation between established political parties and social movements.

Recruitment of interview participants drew on my research questions and interests focused on collective identities of democratic, labour, and women’s movements in Taiwan and South Korea. Before each field trip, I classified potential primary interviewees into two groups to provide information and insight critical to my research questions: labour and women’s movement activists directly or indirectly engaged in democratic movement between the 1980s and the early 1990s. Further, I added two more groups to my list of potential interviewees: activists-turned-to-politicians and social movement experts. The former can offer insight into the relations between established and extra-institutional politics while the latter can give comprehensive overviews of social movements in Taiwan and South Korea. Based on my readings of primary and secondary resources on Taiwanese and South Korean social movements, I created a list of
potential interviewees who could offer broader stories about processes surrounding democratization.

Interviewees in Taiwan and South Korea were primarily recruited using direct personal contacts and introductions from my former social movement colleagues who maintain broad connections with various social movement organizations. Potential interviewees based on my readings were recruited using these methods. Other interviewees were recruited using contacts recommended by interviewees or given upon my request, or on an ad hoc basis during site observations during my field research in Taiwan and South Korea. Interviewees recruited through these routes increased and enriched the knowledge and insights of my pre-field-trip research.

Interviews with South Korean participants (17) were held in Korean. South Korean interviewees were divided into four groups: women’s movement (8) (six with women’s labour movement experience); labour movement (8); activist-turned-politician (3); and social movement expert (1). Most South Korean interviewees had participated in social movements since the 1980s or 1990s. The South Korean women’s movement interviewees hold a college degree, except two who participated in the women’s labour movement in the 1970s, whereas “only” fifty percent of the interviewed labour activists hold a college degree.

Since I am not fluent in Mandarin, most interviews (16) were conducted in English in Taiwan, but four interviews were conducted with the help of Mandarin translators. Sometimes I communicated with participants with Chinese characters. The Taiwanese interviewees were classified into four groups: women’s movement (8, including three activists-turned-to-politicians); labour movement (10, including one activist-turned-to-
politician); activist-turned-politician (3); and social movement expert (2). Most Taiwanese interviewees participated in social movements since the 1980s or in the 1990s. All Taiwanese women’s movements interviewees have a post-graduate degree, whereas 70 percent of the interview participants of labour movement hold a college or a post-graduate degree. Detailed information of interviewees is to be found in Appendix.

The interviews offered grounded, contextualized, nuanced knowledge and insights unattainable from the readings and it was an inspiration to question the received perceptions. The interviews clarified the lived reality of social movements and thereby furthered my understanding of identity formation, internal processes of each social movement and interactions between movements, multilayered transition overlapped with processes, such as democratization, nation and state rebuilding, and liberalization, and the similarity and dissimilarity between South Korean and Taiwanese social movements. Interviews in particular helped me sharpen and improve my research questions and key concepts of this study, and guided me how to comprehend and interpret other sources.

The other type of primary sources is materials published or written by social movement organizations and activists, including periodicals, pamphlets, newsletters, reports, and memoires of movement participants. In particular, I collected materials relevant to my research, such as those produced by Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements in the 1970s and 1980s and by women’s and labour movements in the 1980s and 1990s. They provide rich and detailed information of discourses, claims, and strategies of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements, which allowed me to approach, understand, and interpret unprocessed voices of social actors. The primary
source readings are mainly concentrated on social movement organizations that played a crucial role in democratic, labour, or women’s movements in Taiwan and South Korea.

Regarding South Korea, social groups’ statements and publications from the 1970s were included to show the emergence of South Korean democratic movements. To investigate the formation of the minjung movement and the relation between democratic movements and other social movements, I reviewed the Minjungui sori (Minjung’s voice) and the Minjuhwau gi (The Road to Democratization) published in the 1980s by the Minjung Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (MMCDR) and the Youth Corps for the Democratization (YCD), respectively. I analyzed publications of South Korean women’s movement organizations, in particular their magazines, including those produced by the AWEF in the 1980s, the Korean Women Link (KWL), the Korean Women Workers’ Association (KWWA), and the Korean Women’s Associations United (KWAU) between the 1980s and the 1990s. I reviewed labour movement organizations’ pamphlets, statements, and newsletters that cover publications produced by the Korean Workers’ Welfare Association (KWWA) and the Seoul Labour Movement Association (SLMA) in the mid-1980s, the National Council of Labour Movement Organizations

10 The MMCDR was an umbrella organization of diverse social movements with strong minjung identity. It united and led democratic movements before the late 1980s. The YCD, founded in 1983, was the first movement organization to clearly spell out its anti-regime and democratic orientation. It served as a brokerage, providing activist pools, bridging different social movements, and circulating ideas and strategies for democratization.

11 The AWEF was the first South Korean feminist organization in the 1980s. The KWL and KWWA were founded in 1987. Although both organizations initially claimed to be for working women, the former has focused on middle class and white-collar women with more feminist identity whereas the latter has concentrated on working women in manufacturing and precarious sectors with more class identity. The KWAU was established as the first umbrella organization representing voices of the progressive women’s movement that actively participated in the democratic movement in the 1980s.
(NCLMO), the Council of Korean Trade Unions (CKTU), and the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{12}

For Taiwan, I reviewed \textit{dangwai} magazines, such as the Xiachao (China Tide) and \textit{Formosa} magazine published in the second half of the 1970s, for the emergence of oppositional movements and Taiwanese national identity discourse.\textsuperscript{13} To analyze the development of democratic movements and the formation of Taiwanese consciousness in the 1980s, various publications like magazines and pamphlets produced by competing \textit{dangwai} groups and human rights groups like the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR) were surveyed.\textsuperscript{14} To analyze the Taiwanese women’s movement, I investigated magazines and annual reports of women’s organizations, including the Awakening Foundation (AF) and Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women’s Rights (TAPWR), and memoires of activists.\textsuperscript{15} I examined labour groups’ magazines, reports, or memoires, in particular the Taiwan Labor Front (TLF), trade unions, and labour activists from the 1980s and the 1990s to analyze the development of Taiwan’s labour movement.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{12} The KWWA was the first labour movement organization composed of activists of the democratic trade union movement in the 1970s and students-turned-workers. The SLMA was founded in 1985. It was a radical labour group that attempted to politicize trade unions and initiated solitary strikes for political purposes. The NCLMO was an umbrella organization composed of non-union labour movement organizations. It served as a midwife for the CKTU by providing staffs, ideas, and networks. The CKTU was the first independent federation of trade unions consisting primarily of small- and medium-sized enterprises. It was soon transformed into the more moderate KCTU in 1995.

\textsuperscript{13} The Xiachao was led by intellectuals with socialist and Chinese identities, while the \textit{Formosa} magazine was organized by groups with the orientation of political mobilization and Taiwanese identity.

\textsuperscript{14} In the mid-1980s, competing \textit{dangwai} groups or factions published various magazines and debated political strategies and national identities. One of these factions, \textit{xinchaoliu} (new tide), began to actively intervene in social movements, such as environmental, human rights, labour, and peasant movements.

\textsuperscript{15} The AF was the first feminist organization in Taiwan in the 1980s. It began as a publishing house that issued Funu Xinzhi (new knowledge) as a magazine to raise awareness of women. It soon transformed into a foundation that initiated various campaigns for women’s rights and legislative activities. The TAPWR was the first women’s organization with Taiwanese identity in the 1990s.

\textsuperscript{16} The TLF was founded in 1984 as the first labour movement organization. Its leadership was the pro-independent \textit{xinchaoliu} faction of the \textit{dangwai} (later DPP). It was deeply involved in the birth of the Taiwanese independent labour movement since the late 1980s and 1990s.
The dissertation also relies on secondary sources, such as historical reviews of South Korean and Taiwanese social, labour, and women’s movements, pertinent ethnographic studies, and newspapers.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss the 1970s to show the emergence of developmental regimes, democratic movements, and women’s movements in Taiwan and South Korea, however, my research focuses primarily on the period from 1980 to 2000. As stated in the preceding sections, South Korean and Taiwanese social movements began to reorganize in 1980, have undergone transitions since the late 1980s, and reached their pinnacles of influence in the year 2000. This study period shows varieties of processes of democratization, collective identity, and power relations.

**PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION**

The present dissertation includes seven chapters. Chapter 2 will review studies on democratic processes, including transition, social movement approaches to democratization, and collective identities. The review first discusses comparative studies on Taiwanese and South Korean economic and political development and social movements. It raises the importance of focusing on social movement and their collective identities to understand democratization in Taiwan and South Korea. Then, I discuss democratic processes by exploring three generations of democratization literature. This review shows that democratic processes are multi-layered processes that involve multiple actors, which opens the possibility of variations in collective identity formation. Next, a review of social movement theories explores their contextual and theoretical limits and considers the possibilities that come with applying the collective identity approach to
democratization. The last section clarifies the concept of collective identity as an ensemble of structural conditions, quotidian and formative moments, identity work, and its implications for the present project.

Chapter 3 investigates South Korean and Taiwanese developmental regimes. It aims to show how they provided the potential for different collective identity construction and anatomizes the developmental regimes into domination form and developmental alliance. The chapter compares Taiwanese KMT party-state unipartism with South Korean military regime antipartism as two different domination forms. The chapter compares two Taiwanese dual structures—the political dual structure of mainlander-dominating national politics and Taiwanese-inhabiting local politics and economic dual structure of state-led public sectors and Taiwanese-led private sector with the South Korean military-chaebol (large conglomerates) coalition as developmental alliances. The discussion shows the variations in institutional stability, identity fields, and challenges to democratization in Taiwan and South Korea. The anatomy of the developmental regime as a complex of power and interest provides the material to understand the variations of collective identities between Taiwan and South Korea in venues (institutional/extra-institutional), boundary markers (ethno-national/popular-class), and genres of contention (moderate/disruptive).

Chapter 4 highlights the interactions between identity and democratic processes. The goal is to explain the origin and development of different collective identities in Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements and their role in democratic processes. Firstly, the chapter discusses the production of counter-narratives in Taiwanese and South Korean literary discourses and the emergence of democratic
movements as the political embodiment of these discourses. The chapter proceeds to analyze the construction and reconstruction of collective identities through collective memories along the different demands of pre-transition, transition, and stabilizing or post-transition phases of democratic processes. Then it discusses the shift in collective identities through excavating the origin myth in pre-transition, generating formative memory in transition, and reshaping collective memory in the stabilizing stage of democratization. The chapter shows how Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements constructed ethno-national and popular-class identities, how they influenced the dynamics of democratic processes, and how they are transformed.

I compare South Korean and Taiwanese labour and women’s movements in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Chapter 5 analyzes collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements from the pre-transition (beginning in the mid-1970s but primarily focused on the 1980s) to 2000. The chapter discusses the relations between collective identities of democratic movements and of women’s movements, their reconstruction and changes with the shifting democratic processes, and effects on women’s rights. Firstly, the chapter explores the emergence of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements in which the former was more individual, elite-centred, apolitical and the latter was more collective, subaltern-centred, political despite their commonality of identity discourse of women as human beings. The chapter proceeds to discuss shifting collective identities of women’s movements and their effects on gender politics and women’s rights between 1980 and 2000. The discussion compares pre-transitional and post-transitional collective identities between Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements, their role in gender politics, including legislation and women’s policy agencies, their effects on
alliance building with other groups and political parties, their relations with collective
ties of democratic movements and within those of other than mainstream women’s
movements. This chapter shows dynamic interaction between democracy and collective
identities, between primary and sectoral collective identities, and within those sectoral
identities.

Chapter 6 analyzes collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean labour
movements from the pre-transition (beginning in the 1980s) to 2000. I discuss relations
between collective identities of democratic and labour movements, their reconstruction
and changes with shifting democratic processes, and the effects on workers’ rights.
Firstly, however, the chapter compares collective identities of pre-transitional Taiwanese
and South Korean labour movements, showing that identity discourse of the Taiwanese
labour movement was couched in an ethno-national and political identity while that of its
South Korean counterpart was formulated in working-class and antipolitical identity. The
chapter then proceeds to analyze Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour
movements and the establishment of their independent national confederations from 1987
to 2000. The chapter then discusses how their different self-understanding affected their
organizational features, contentious repertoires, political alliances, and representability of
workers. This chapter shows the dynamic interaction between democracy and collective
identities, primary and sectoral collective identities, and within those sectoral identities.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the present study. It restates the dissertation’s
argument and briefly discusses the contribution and implications of the present study for
democracy, collective identity, and comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea.
Chapter 2 Democratization, Social Movements, and Collective Identities

To examine the construction of collective identities, their interaction with democratization, and the identity processes of social movements, I closely examine literatures addressing these thematic focal points of my analysis. As stated in the preceding chapter, the different interactions between democratization and collective identities of social movements generate dissimilar democratic and identity processes. The primary goal of this chapter is to clarify and propose collective identity as the key concept to explore democratic processes of Taiwan and South Korea by drawing on pertinent literatures dealing with democratic transitions, social movements, and collective identities.

To show the need for and possibility of social movements’ collective identities for understanding and explaining Taiwanese and South Korean democratic processes, the first section reviews comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea. Firstly, the discussion critically investigates three macro-discourses that have dominated Taiwanese and South Korean comparative studies: the state-centric developmental approach; unified civil society; and liberal democracy. The review then discusses comparative studies of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements, including women’s and labour movements. It shows why structural conditions, democratic processes, and collective identities of social movements must be combined.

The second section of this chapter reviews literatures on democratic processes, social movements, and collective identities. It begins with the historical development of
democratization studies since the 1980s. The historical survey of the transitional literature shows the analytic shift from transition with a single process of democratization dominated by institutional actors to the multi-layered and overdetermined processes co-determined by multiple actors, including but not exclusively, civil society actors. Its implication for the present study is that the different articulation of transitional layers generates dissimilar dynamics and different collective identities that contextualize the ostensibly universal idea of democracy.

Secondly, I investigate the limits and lessons of social movement theory to the study of democratic transitions. The investigation reveals that social movement theory to date has shown limited usefulness to explorations of multi-layered democratic processes and agential involvement due to its geographical focus primarily concentrated on the West, already democratized societies; its unpreparedness for exploring multi-layered transitions; and its interest is limited to policy changes thus excludes polity changes. Yet, the review also reveals the potential of social movement theory. Specifically, the political process approach emphasizes the interactive processes between structure and agent while cultural approach appreciates the role of collective identities both in political and symbolic processes.

Thirdly, I dig into the collective identity literature. The review of diverse social movement researchers’ studies of collective identity studies shows how the identity processes, including construction, maintenance, and decline of collective identity and interactions among various collective identities might be understood. And, it illustrates the collective identity formation under constant construction, the alignment among diverse collective identities, and the side effects of collective identities.
The last section clarifies the concept of collective identity used in this dissertation. I propose to see collective identity as a suture of the structural environment, quotidian, and formative moments, and identity work of social movements. Collective identity guides readers through these relational interactions to show how Taiwanese and South Korean social movements actualized potentials of different identity fields, conditioned by structural environments, and of conjunctural moments into different collective identities, how these divergent collective identities contextualized democracy and democratization, and how those primary identities, formed in the formative moments, interacted with gender and class identities in quotidian pre- and post-transitional periods and formative transitional moments.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA

State, Civil Society, and Liberal Democracy

Many comparative studies have been conducted on Taiwan and South Korea. Yet, comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea rarely explore collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements. Three macro-discourses have dominated the comparative studies: the state-centric developmental approach (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Robert Wade, 1988; R. Wade, 1990; Woo-Cumings, 1999); unified civil society (Alagappa, 2004; Armstrong, 2007; Hsiao, 1990; Koo, 1993a); and liberal democracy (Y.-h. Chu, Diamond, Nathan, & Shin, 2008; Huntington, 1991; Inoguchi & Carlson, 2006).
For decades East Asia has been the site of academic exploration of the state’s role in both economic and political development. This focus on state domination has not been limited in East Asia to territorial boundaries but extends to the scholarly imagination in which the state is often presented as a single independent variable in the process of the region’s modernization and represented as the start of the developmental causal chain. It is not strange that the bring-the-state-back-in project (P. B. Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985), which challenged the social-input-oriented functionalist approach, turns its attention to East Asian countries where scholars have considered the state as playing a pivotal role since the post-war era in taming backward societies and domesticating unregulated economic markets. The East Asian state served in the developmental state approach (Amsden, 1985, 1989; H.-J. Chang, 2003, 2006; P. B. Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982, 1987; R. Wade, 1990; Woo Cumings, 1999) as counterevidence, disproving neoclassical and dependency approaches (Haggard, 1990; Weiss & Hobson, 1995). The ontology of the state-centric approaches, however, minimizes the internal conflict inherent in society by assuming that the state embodies universal sovereignty internationally as well as domestically and by exorcizing gendered, classed, or ethnized antagonism that may challenge and problematize the state, allegedly representing the overarching “national interest.”

Secondly, the homogeneous and unified statist approaches give rise to other scholarly preoccupation with the unified and homogeneous civil society that challenges

---

1 The state-centric approaches also downplay the effects of external factors intervening in a society’s internal process. The fact that South Korea and Taiwan—massively “promote[d] by invitation” (Wallerstein, 1974) —stood for “symbolic showcases” during the Cold War (Grosfoguel, 2003) is in the state-centric approaches either omitted or depreciated for their replicability as a developmental model (H.-J. Chang, 2003, pp. 119-121).
the statist perspective by inverting it. The “autonomous” (Diamond, 1994), “assertive” (Y. Fan, 2004), “oppositional” (S. Kim, 2004), “demanding” (Hsiao, 1990), and “contentious” (Koo, 1993) civil society exactly mirrors the homogeneous image of the state. The image of homogeneous and contentious civil society in East Asia was reinforced by three extra-regional conjunctural factors— the rise of “new” social movements since the 1970s, the ironic revitalization of associative initiatives in response to neo-conservatism in the West since the 1980s, and the emergence of “civil society” and transitions of Eastern European socialist countries since the late 1980s (Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001, p. 2)—and the intra-regional wave of democratization.² Yet, this preoccupation sidelines the conflicts and oppressions within (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 179-180) and without (Chatterjee, 2001, 2004)³ civil society.

The images of the homogeneous and unified state and its mirror image of civil society ignore the transgressive and subversive activities initiated by non-state actors, the trans-boundary negotiations between the state and civil society, and conflicts and oppression within civil society. They only provide a panorama seen from the exalted state and civil society with “omnivisual power” (de Certeau, 1985) without showing the rich texture of socio-political processes down and within them. Civil society is neither entirely a “space of uncoerced human association” (Walzer, 2007, p. 115) nor purely autonomous (Cohen & Arato, 1994) and is as much a fractured and complex terrain as the state (Rai, 1996, pp. 14-17). Individuals or groups see, experience, or participate in democratization

² The non-democratic regimes in East and Southeast Asia were shattered between the mid-1980s and early 1990s by popular protests like those in: Philippines in 1986; South Korea in 1987; Burma and Indonesia in 1988; mainland China 1989; and Taiwan in 1990 (Wild Lily student movement).
³ While pondering the “popular politics in most of the world,” Chatterjee (2004) argues that civil society is the enclave consisting of groups of people or “citizens” distanced from the “population.” “Political society,” which stands for the latter, is a space of the governed and marginalized and excluded by “civil society” where only citizens enjoy civil freedom.
and democratic practices differently, depending on whether they conceive of themselves as a part, for instance, of nationalist, popular, civil, class, or gendered movements.

Thirdly, in addition to the state-centric and the unified civil society approaches, some research on East Asian democracy was tacitly based on the model of liberal democracy as the only democratic alternative to authoritarian regimes.4 The editors of recently published volumes on comparative studies of South Korean and Taiwanese democracy—*New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan* (Diamond & Shin, 2014) and *Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia* (T.-J. Cheng & Chu, 2017)—implicitly or explicitly presuppose liberal democracy as a given condition and as the basis for comparing democracies through survey data measuring individual perceptions on and attitudes toward democratic procedures and state institutions. Thus, the lack of liberal democratic elements is automatically presented as a challenge to the stabilization and maturity of South Korean and Taiwanese democracies.

This liberal democratic approach not only precludes plural and multiple versions of democracies by offering the liberal democracy “model” as a single and universal one, but also fails to ask how *demos* emerges and makes democracy. Instead, they only ask “How East Asians view democracy?” (Y.-h. Chu et al., 2008) or “How Asia votes?” (J. F.-s. Hsieh & Newman, 2002); in other words, they look only at the attitudes and behaviours of individual monads. The liberal democracy approach therefore assigns social movements only an ephemeral role, relevant only to a certain period of democratization.

---

4 David Held (2006) divides liberal democracy into two variants: the protective and the developmental. The protective variant is built on individual self-interest where democracy serves only as means for the protection of individuals through the creation of accountable institutions. The developmental variant is oriented toward development of active citizenry of which creation is a main goal of democracy (pp. 56-95). Democracy as discussed in Held’s (2006) volume is closer to the protective variant.
not to the whole process and a marginal status and confined only to the periphery of political institutions but not extended to its core. The institutional arenas are preferred and the institutional actors are prioritized, whereas the non-institutional actors and their transgressing practices, building counterpublics (Fraser, 1990), weaving submerged networks (Melucci, 1989), and generating counter-hegemonic discourses, are often marginalized or not recognized as democratic.

The three macro-discourses—state-centric, unified civil society, and liberal-democratic—have been inattentive to the deep movements beneath the state space, within civil society, and beyond procedural politics. Therefore, the primary focus of comparative studies has revolved around South Korean and Taiwanese structural macro-similarities or dissimilarities derived from macro-structures.

The macro similarities between Taiwan and South Korea led some Taiwanese and South Korean scholars to adopt the figurative simile of “intriguing” or “perfect twins” (S. Kim, 2000a, p. 287; H.-J. Liu, 2012b, p. 176, n. 2). Certainly, the macro similarities do not exclude variations. Differences in economic structures between Taiwan and South Korea have been employed as an independent variable to explain their variations in class composition and consciousness, social mobilization, and labour policy. Variations in

---

5 One of the most significant dissimilarities between the South Korean and the Taiwanese economic structure is the size of corporations. The South Korean economy has been grown by promoting large corporations, *chaebol*, while its Taiwanese counterpart has been promoted by the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). From this variation others can be derived: the Korean centralized and agglomerate vs. the Taiwanese decentralized and dispersed industrialization; the Korean more fulltime-proletariats vs. the Taiwanese semi-proletariats; the Korean worker’s social immobility vs. Taiwanese mobility towards petit-bourgeoisie; and thus the militant and confrontational Korean workers vs. moderate and non-confrontational Taiwanese workers (Buchanan & Nicholls, 2003; Y. W. Chu, 1998; Deyo, 1989; Koo, 2001; Minns & Tierney, 2003; Sen & Koo, 1992).

6 According to the literature suggesting political institutions as an independent variable, the relatively non-militant and partisan Taiwanese labour movement is attributable to the permissive and stable Taiwanese political institutions while their militant and independent South Korean counterpart to the relatively closed and instable Korean political institutions (C.-L. Huang, 1999; Y. Lee, 2011). Further, the reserved seats in Taiwan are viewed as the explanans for the better political representation of Taiwanese women than the South Korean (Clark & Clark, 2000).
political structures, such as the difference between the relatively closed and unstable Korean political institutions versus those of the relatively permissive and stable Taiwanese, have been adopted to explain, for instance, the presence or absence in mainstream institutions of specific groups like women and workers and their patterned political behaviours and preferred arenas. The problems or limits of those structural discourses are well known: they tend to regard agents as effects of structures and fail to be attentive to multi-dimensionality of socio-political processes; the state space is penetrable and negotiable and even mobilizable for instance by social groups against capitalist interests; relations and boundaries between the state and civil society are not invariably conflictual and un-crossable and civil society is not always harmonious within; and procedural democracy is often dependent upon extra-institutional processes. The questions are: how can multi-dimensional, socio-political processes be explored beyond structural determination and dig into the deep movements beneath the structural similarities; and, why the different understandings of democracy for those who have lived and been situated under similar structural conditions cannot be explained only by structural dissimilarities.

**Comparative Studies on Taiwanese and South Korean Social Movements**

In this section, I review comparative studies of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements. It is not easy to find comparative studies on Taiwanese and South Korean

---

6 According to the literature suggesting political institutions as an independent variable, the relatively non-militant and partisan Taiwanese labour movement is attributable to the permissive and stable Taiwanese political institutions while their militant and independent South Korean counterpart to the relatively closed and instable Korean political institutions (C.-L. Huang, 1999; Y. Lee, 2011). Further, the reserved seats in Taiwan are viewed as the explanans for the better political representation of Taiwanese women than the South Korean (Clark & Clark, 2000).
social movements. Some edited volumes—*East Asian Social Movements* (Broadbent & Brockman, 2011), *Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan* (Hsiao, 2006), *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia* (Alagappa, 2004), and *East Asia’s New Democracies: Deepening, reversal, non-liberal alternatives* (Y.-w. Chu & Wong, 2010)—introduce diverse individual social movements in each country but do not attempt to systematically compare Taiwanese and South Korean social movements.

There are several studies comparing sectoral movements between Taiwan and South Korea. I limit my review to two studies, a single case and a multiple movement comparison since they also cover the period of democratization. Kim, Sunhyuk (2000a) compares Taiwanese and South Korean environmental movements and their relation with democratization. Kim contends that there are differences in the timing of the emergence of Taiwanese and South Korean environmental movements, their attitudes towards the state, and relations with political parties—pre-transitional and post-transitional, congruent and confrontational, and independent and partisan environmental movements in Taiwan and South Korea, respectively. Although Kim suggests that those differences are linked to different democratic processes in Taiwan and South Korea, why and how the differences are produced is not specified. Identity discourses of environmental movements in South Korea and Taiwan were discussed only marginally.

As I reviewed earlier, Liu, Hwa-jen (2006) compares Taiwanese environmental and labour movements with their South Korean counterparts. Liu examines the different movement sequence—early risers and spin-off latecomers, and the variation of movement power, leverage of labour movement, and ideology of environmental movement in Taiwan and South Korea. The fact that in Taiwan the environmental
movement emerged earlier than the labour movement while the reverse occurred in South Korea is, according to Liu, affected by the different degrees of institutional constraints on each movement. Liu argues that the spinoff latecomers—Taiwanese labour and South Korean environmental movements—actively utilized early risers’ legacies, such as the Taiwan environmental movement’s alliance-seeking with the opposition party and South Korean labour movement’s militant autonomy. However, the analysis did not account for the democratic transition that happened in the period between the emergences of early risers and latecomers where Taiwanese consciousness and South Korean class-centric *minjung* identity played a significant role in early riser movements, i.e. Taiwanese environmental and South Korean labour movements.

These two comparative studies on Taiwanese and South Korean social movements recognize the significance of the timing in the movements’ emergence and differences in their alliance politics. They respectively acknowledge the role of democratization in the development of social movements and inter-movement interactions. Yet, they do not further investigate the role of collective identities of democratic and social movements in producing those commonalities and differences.

Regarding women’s movements, it is hard to find studies comparing Taiwanese and South Korean cases. If any, they offer only brief sketches of comparison or are limited to specific movements. Lee and Clark (2000) only briefly compare the cases in relation to women’s activism and political empowerment (representation). They contrast South Korean women’s relatively high activism and legislative achievement despite low political representation with Taiwanese women’s relatively high political representation and low legislative achievement. Jane Jaquette (2001), in a similar vein, notes that South
Korean women’s movement includes more confrontational activism than their Taiwanese counterparts and the latter’s higher political representation than the former. Cho, Soon-kyoung (1990) offers a more specific comparison focused on different women workers’ activism in Taiwan and South Korea under similar industrial restructuring processes. Cho contrasts militant women workers and working-class-oriented women’s movement in South Korea with non-militant women workers and middle-class-oriented women’s movement in Taiwan. These studies share the view that the South Korean women’s movement adopts relatively confrontational approaches while its Taiwanese counterpart employs relatively moderate stances. Yet, they do not specify how these differences were produced.

Compared with women’s movements, it is relatively easy to find studies comparing Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements. Several studies based on structural approaches that attribute workers’ activism to their structural positions in industrial relations. Frederic Deyo published one of the earliest comparative studies on East Asian industrial and labour relations, *Beneath the Miracle: Labor subordination in the new Asian industrialism* (1989). It was printed when workers’ collective actions had just begun in the late 1980s. As the book’s subtitle suggests, its primary focus was to discover commonalities, rather than differences: the workers’ impotence in acting collectively rather than their activism and mobilization. The demobilization of East Asian workers is explained through their economic structural position under pre-capitalist labour systems like patriarchal and paternalistic system, female-centric and labour-intensive industrialization with a high turnover ratio, and an immature labour community. Chu (1998), Sen and Koo (1992), and Shin (1990) explain the difference between the militant
South Korean labour movement and its moderate Taiwanese counterpart by pointing to agglomerated and centralized South Korean industrialization and Taiwan’s dispersed and decentralized industrialization, and by contrasting South Korea’s large-corporation-centric development with Taiwan’s small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME)-centered industrialization. They argue that the former conditions promoted working-class consciousness and militant workers in South Korea while the latter constrained the development of class-consciousness and produced compliant workers in Taiwan.

There are studies on Taiwan and South Korea labour movements that focus on state labour policies and political conditions. They explain the difference between South Korean militant and Taiwanese moderate labour movements with the South Korean military regime’s exclusionary labour policies and the Taiwanese party-state’s inclusionary policies (Buchanan & Nicholls, 2003; K.-y. Shin, 1990). In a similar vein, the non-militant Taiwanese labour movement is explained with the powerful presence of the party-state in state sectors and local political mechanisms in the private sector pre-empting workers’ collective actions while South Korean workers could develop a militant labour movement in the absence of a well-established political mechanism and the presence of militant extra-institutional actors (C.-L. Huang, 1999; J. Kim, 1993). Instead of seeing the South Korean and Taiwanese labour movements in their degrees of militancy, Lee, Yoonkyung (2011) contends that they inherited different legacies of authoritarian regimes, South Korean exclusionary and Taiwanese inclusionary labour politics, which generated variations with union alliance politics and mobilizing strategies and led to dissimilar union politics: South Korean militant unionism and Taiwanese partisan unionism.
These economic and political explanations share the view that Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements are moderate and militant, respectively. They provide useful insights into how different external conditions surrounded and affected Taiwanese and South Korean workers and their collective actions. Yet, they only pay marginal attention to how Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements interpreted those structural conditions, how they took different paths, and how they intervened into their surrounding environments: variations in collective actions and forms are considered as the effects of differences of economic and institutional factors. And, the collective identities of Taiwanese nationalist and South Korean class are mentioned but not further investigated to clarify how Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements actively formed those identities and their effects on collective actions of labour movements and politics.

The comparative studies on Taiwanese and South Korean social movements show the dominant effects of economic and political structures on the rise, forms, and actions of social movements. They also share the view that Taiwanese social movements are relatively moderate and more open to cooperation with established political parties while their South Korean counterparts are relatively militant and more cautious about political parties. These studies, however, do not explore the internal processes of social movements or acknowledge their active role in and interaction with democratization. Yet, “relational possibilities” are to be noted where state and oppositional actors mutually affect and form others’ identities (Boudreau, 2002). In particular, these relational interferences are heightened when power is at stake, such as “formative” or “organic moments” (Gramsci, 1971; Ringmar, 1996), including democratic transition.
Democratic processes under investigation in the present study involve “settled” or “unsettled” periods (Swidler, 1986), i.e. pre- and post-transitional settled periods and unsettled transitional moments. Collective actors perform “quiet” politics in settled periods and “noisy” politics in unsettled periods, construct new collective identities, mute or swallow other competing or sectoral identities, and even reshape dominant identities (Beissinger, 2002). Taiwanese and South Korean social movements emerged with the large cycle of democratic processes, which overlapped, intersected, and negotiated with other themes like nation, gender, class, or civil rights, including for instance human, consumer, environmental rights. The analysis of these democratic processes and social movements requires us to investigate how social movements underwent career paths over the course of democratization and how collective identities formed at the global level interact with those at the sectoral level.

In subsequent sections, I review literatures on democratic processes, social movements, and collective identity. The review will show how democratic processes are overdetermined by multiple processes and shaped by multiple actors, how these processes are contextualized by collective identities of social movements, how collective identities are formed, deployed, and aligned, and how collective identities can be applied to the present study.

DEMOCRATIZATION, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES
Democratization as Multiple Processes and Actors

The present study deals with processes of democratization over pre-transitional, transitional, and post-transitional eras. These processes include regime changes or the transition of modes of production and multiple confrontations. In this section, I discuss the preceding discourses or approaches on democratic processes. This is mainly a historical review of democratization discourses that changed and were modified in response to the historical events, including democratization in Southern European and Latin American countries since the mid-1970s, Eastern Europe since the late 1980s, and the Arab Spring since 2010. Democratization discourse gradually changed from a discourse of simple structural determinism to a discourse reflecting more complex factors. This historical survey raises the requirement to consider multiple actors, multifaceted processes, and multi-dimensional confrontations.

Discussions on democratic processes can be divided into structural and transitological approaches. The structural approaches emphasize relatively long-term structural factors while the transitological approaches focuses on short-term agential factors. Firstly, broadly speaking, the structural approaches can be disaggregated into economic-development-centric and class-based approaches. The first sets certain socio-economic conditions as prerequisites for democracy—as the “Lipset hypothesis” posits the more well-to-do a nation the greater the chances of sustaining democracy—and assumes positive relations between development and democracy (Barro, 1996; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Cutright, 1963; Helliwell, 1994; Lipset, 1959). The second structural approach emphasizes the role of social classes in democratization. Marx (2001) and Barrington Moore (1966), for instance, acknowledge the positive role of the
bourgeoisie in democratic processes while Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) recognize that of the working class. In the structural approaches, democratic transition is determined by long-term economic development or class structure—even class struggles for transition are the expression of the economic base. Yet, these structural approaches fail to recognize the dynamics of the transitional process.

Secondly, a series of democratic transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America since the mid-1970s disproved previously taken-for-granted structural assumptions. These changes produced a new discourse of democratization, called transitology, that challenges structural approaches. Transitology throws into sharp relief theagent- and contingent-less or static approach (*necessità* in a Machiavellian term) of structural approaches by magnifying the agential *virtù* of political elites and the contingent *fortuna* of transition (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pp. 4-5). This discourse is highly centred on the transitional process—not pre-transitional and stabilizing periods. It proffers the transitional process in a form of strategic game played primarily by incumbent and opposition elites.

That transitologists’ interests in democratization are mainly limited to the transitional pact among elites narrows the contents of democracy and its underlying norm to political

---

7 Leaning on Thomas Kuhn, O'Donnell et al. (1986) argue that the “normal science methodology” of the structural approaches is inadequate to the democratic transition and to the politics constantly in flux (p. 4).
8 Transition as a strategic game is elaborated in detail in Przeworski (1986, 1991). When the Latin American transitions enter the phase of consolidation, O'Donnell (1992) divided the transition into two-stage games, the first from the authoritarian regime and the second from the first transition to the establishment of democratic regime.
9 The games and their outcomes are predicated on the power relations of incumbent and opposition elites, which are disaggregated into several modalities: 1) the transition initiated by the incumbent elites; 2) that led by opposition elites; and 3) that resulted from their equilibrium. Each transitologist favours his/her own naming and assigns a different term to each typo. To illustrate, the typo 1) is named transformation by Huntington (1991), transaction by Mainwaring (1992), and pact by Karl and Schmitter (1991). The transition 2) is called replacement by Huntington (1991) and defeat by Mainwaring (1992). The typo 3) is named transplacement by Huntington (1991), extrication by Mainwaring (1992), and reform Karl and Schmitter (1991).
and institutional democracy (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 3; pp. 13-14). Its narrow
angle, focused on transition, fails to extend its vision to pre-transitional regime types and
their variant effects on democratization. Further, it presupposes democratization as a one-
dimensional process untainted by other processes, such as nation-building and
marketization, where it is developed linearly as an individual organism grows from the
immature opening (liberalization), pubertal transition, and mature consolidation. The last
important criticism is that although transitology emphasizes agency, its preoccupations
with elite pacts marginalize collective actors in democratization.\footnote{Collective actors are seen
as “always ephemeral” (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 55) and need to be docile
or, if necessary, defeated (Przeworski, 1979, p. 18; 1991, p. 12, n. 4).} For transitologists, the
centre of the democratic transition is reserved for individual elites in institutional politics,
where collective actors, such as class-oriented trade unions and radical groups are
marginalized and non-institutional and social spaces are disregarded (Adler & Webster,
1995; Collier & Mahoney, 1997). In sum, transitology based its arguments on the
observation of the wave of democratization between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s in
Southern Europe and Latin America, which does not permit a space for social movements
to be included and involved in democratization because it is based on the narrow
normative assumption of democracy, linear and homogeneous democratization, elites-
and pact-centred transition, and the exclusion of collective actors in democratization.

Thirdly, the waves of transitions in Eastern Europe since the late-1980s produced a
new discourse of democratization in contrast with the monofaceted democratization and
long-term structural and the short-term transitological approaches, conscious of
multifaceted democratization and medium-term previous regime types. The socialist
party-state regimes differed from Latin American and Southern European bureaucratic or
military authoritarian regimes in many ways, in particular relations among state-society, market, and inter-state relations. Democratic transitions in Eastern European countries were not a pure process and intertwined with marketization and often with state- or nation-rebuilding processes (Bunce, 1995b; Cirtautas & Mokrzycki, 1993; Hall, 1996, p. 22; Offe & Adler, 1991). Their transitions were not only not a pure process due to triple or multiple characteristics, but also impure because of the “intersecting” effects between those multiple characteristics (Bunce, 1999, p. 9). New phenomena surfaced in the Eastern European transitions that were absent or weak in Southern European and Latin American transitions. One new phenomenon is that the boundary between pacts among elites and popular mobilization was blurred in Eastern European transitions. The other is the different identity process in which the construction of the national identity was inseparably intertwined with democratization (Bunce, 1995a, 1995b).

Linz and Stepan (1996) in their work the Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation attempt to meet the new challenges by addressing questions raised from the Eastern European experiences. Linz and Stepan recognize the multiple democratization process, heterogeneous paths to democracy, and different post-transitional agenda based on the classification of different preceding regime types. With recognition of the variation in prior regime types and their different roles in democratization, the authors also acknowledge the active role of a “robust civil society” from the democratic transition to the deepening of democracy (p. 9). Linz and Stepan

---

11 The other significant differences are the territorial realignment, and property rights, and market (re)organization in the Eastern Europe, which were not a concern for the transitions between the mid-1970s and -1980s.

12 Linz and Stepn (1996) disaggregate non-democratic regimes into authoritarian, sultanistic, totalitarian, and post-totalitarian regimes. Linz put in the 1960s the authoritarian regime in between two poles of ideal regime types: democratic and totalitarian. The sultanistic and post-authoritarian types were added to the regime typology only in the 1990s.
(1996) view the role of civil society primarily to contribute to “[a]t best…destroy[ing] a non-democratic regime” (p. 8) for “the politics of anti-politics” of civil society is “dangerous for democratic politics” due to its being “parallel to state power;” civil society should be transformed into political society (pp. 270-273).

The role of civil society was newly evaluated with the Arab Spring, which was even designated as the “fourth wave” by some transition researchers (Diamond, 2011). The mass mobilizations and attendant regime changes, reform, or concessions in the Middle East and North Africa certainly give prominence civil society for democratization. The revival of civil society has been applauded by transitology and considered a friendly condition for liberal democracy (Stepan, 2014, p. 219). Yet, “in contrast to what transitologists believe,” civil society in the Arab Spring is rather conceived of playing rather passive role (Vairel, 2011, p. 33). Civil society in the Middle East and North Africa often serves as an instrument to display a democratic façade. The self-organizing voluntary civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the region, which have rapidly increased since the 1980s and 1990s regime crises, disempowered the collective actions of the dispossessed and underprivileged rather than empower them for regime change. Civil society organizations served as an extended arm of the state to regulate collective actors within the boundary of legal system and to discipline or marginalize unpredictable collective actions of the underprivileged subaltern classes against the regimes (Wiktorowicz, 2000). The massive revolts of the Arab Spring were not initiated by the limited liberal space inhabited by civil associations, but emerged from the contentious space generated by those excluded from and marginalized by the civil space, like the Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi who ignited the Tunisian mass
protest with his self-immolation in 2010, lumpen intelligentsia, and workers against neoliberal policies (Beinin, 2011; Beinin & Vairel, 2011; Cavatorta, 2012a, 2012b; Vairel, 2011). In contrast with the postulation of the Western civil society and recent transitological approaches, civil society shown in the Arab Spring was not emancipatory and pro-democratic but rather constraining and preventing subaltern collective actions.

The review here shows the gradual shift of democratization discourses. In opposition to structural determinism of democratization, transitology paid attention to the dynamic process of democratization. Yet, until recently it preserved their core elements for transition, the strategic game among elites for institutional arrangement framed by the teleological norm of liberal democracy. It precludes democratization that wears multiple hats with meta-democratic import, including the centrality of the national-identity- and nation-building, and initiated by non-elites in the non-institutional arena. Although transitologists recently recognized the positive role of civil society for democratic transition, they failed to recognize it also constrains the mobilization of other social groups.

**Democratization and Social Movements**

This section reviews how social movement approaches deal with democratic processes. The analysis focuses on the limit of social movement theories developed in the West in investigating democratic transitions in the non-West, the potential of the political opportunity approach for dynamic transitional processes, and on its limit in analysing pre- and post-transitional eras. Then, I review what cultural approaches try to fill the gap,
left by the political process approach, through raising the importance of collective identity.

With its focus on non-institutional actors and arenas, at first glance social movement theory (SMT) appears to fill the gap of those left behind and out by transitional approaches. Yet, the historiography of social movements has biasedly recorded and extensively studied events, cases, and activities of the Western hemisphere where democracy has evolved since centuries ago and established and thus transition and democratization belong already to the closed history of so-called actual liberal democracies in the West.

Social movements in the West are held to emerge and correspond with the formation of capitalism and state building. Working-class movements and bourgeois political movements formed in response to Western modernization. Both political process and cultural SMTs see the modernization process, in particular state building, as crucial to the rise of modern social movements in the West (Buechler, 2000; Johnston, 2011; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998b; Tarrow, 1996, 1998; Tilly, 1978, 1984; Touraine, 1981, 1985). This historical context of SMTs in the West constrains the investigation into a multilayered transitional process because as Charles Tilly (2005c) suggests “once democratization does occur, social movements … usually follow” (p. 56). Democratization promoted by social movements in Western or a “complex society” often implies these SMTs change democratic procedures and rules and intervene into decision-making processes without transformation (Melucci & Lyyra, 1998).

Notably, state building in the West coincided with repressive, disciplinary, and generative processes in relation to society and social movements. The early state-making
process in the West subdued and harnessed three prime premodern or early modern riots—tax-resistances, anti-conscription-rebels, and food-riots—to arm the state with the power of extraction, war-making, and policing (Tarrow, 2011, pp. 80-91; Tilly, 1975). It disciplined those rebels into tax-payers, soldiers, and urban inhabitants and simultaneously generated citizenship and the basis of interregional networks and activities. Moreover, the emergence of Western social movements also paralleled the regularization of social movements by regulating non-social-movements and episodic contentious disruptions like civil war and collective violence (McAdam et al., 2001), or “warring” and “ugly movements” (Tarrow, 2011). Thus, social movements in the West emerged “wherever the political system is democratic” (Touraine, 1981, p. 10) and “within institutional politics” (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998a, p. 5, emphasis original) where the state serves as an arena and a “ fulcrum” of social movements (Tarrow, 2011).

Changes in Western SMTs often implies policies, a reconfiguration of the state (Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003), or the shift from state-prince to the technocratic state (Touraine, 1981, p. 9), not regimes and polities or transitions.

Yet, certain SMTs’ approaches have shown the potential to investigate the dynamic process of democratization. With the new development of collective actions in the non-Western world, in particular since the 1980s, the political process approach has been increasingly occupied with the relations between democratization and social movements. Its primary focus and hitherto research on the West, which revolves around institutional changes and collective actions, are seemingly fit to the process of democratic transition. In particular, political opportunity structures are often built on a narrative similar to that of transitology (Della Porta, 2013, pp. 124-149; Rossi & Della Porta, 2009). Like
transitology, the political process approach embraces strategic calculations or miscalculations of actors at key points in expanded political possibility. While quoting Tocqueville’s description on the French Revolution, for example, Sidney Tarrow (2011) contends that political opportunities open or increase when the *ancien régime* seeks reform as Mikhail Gorbachev did since the mid-1980s (pp. 157-159). The regime’s reform, “erratic reformism,” or miscalculation (Oberschall, 1973, 1996) is accompanied by strategic calculations of various actors, including those within the regime, outsiders, and external regimes. The cost and benefit calculation in the political process approach is discussed in terms of opportunities and threats: Opportunities stand for the probability of success in undermining the regime’s ability to reward its followers and simultaneously reduce opponents’ costs for mobilization while threats refer to costs generated from collective actors’ actions or inactions (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001, pp. 182-183).

Since the late 1980s, the concept of political opportunity structures has traveled around the globe wherever social transitions and crises emerge. Many studies apply political opportunity structures to the non-democratic and -Western societies (Boudreau, 1996, 2002; Brockett, 1991, 1993; Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004; Osa & Corduneanu-Huci; Osa & Schock, 2007; Sandoval, 1998; Schock, 1999, 2005; Wright, 2001; Zdravomyslova, 1996). Independent of the conceptual imprecision of political opportunity structures (W. Gamson & Meyer, 1996, p. 275), their variables—political access, elite division, influential allies, and repression (McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998)—do not sufficiently reflect on the sharp differences between liberal democracy and non-
democracies despite some modifications.\textsuperscript{13} Secondly, political opportunities are useful to explain the emergence or demise of social movements but not helpful for the pre-transitional “abeyance structure” (V. Taylor, 1989) and post-transitional quotidian politics. Lastly, it does not provide a powerful tool for approaching culture, i.e. a set of created, negotiated, and shared meanings and practices that involves identity, ideology, discourse, ritual, norm, value, belief, among others. Changes in political structures can be translated into opportunities only through perceptions shared by collective actors. (Buechler, 1993, 2000; Goodwin & Jasper, 2004; Jasper, 1997, pp. 33-39; Melucci, 1989; Polletta, 2004). Therefore, the concept of political opportunities is not directly applicable to the present study, which explores social movements in non-democratic societies and their involvement in and evolvement along with pre- and post-transitional periods based on their collective identities.

As an alternative to the political process approach, since the mid-1980s social movement studies in Latin America began to adopt the SMT cultural approach. The wave of democratic transitions and frustration over both modernization and dependency or Marxist theories encouraged Latin American social movement students to engage with the cultural or constructivist approach. Although the transitologists’ elites-led pact-centred approach was empirically challenged by the active involvement of extra-institutional collective actors in the democratic transition, in the era of the return of democracy, these collective actors increasingly had to face the confrontation between the growing influence of established politics and the diminishing autonomy of social

\textsuperscript{13} Some researchers revised the variables of political opportunity structures to reflect the absence of free information flow and unrestrained public spheres under the non-Western and -democratic regime (Osa & Schock, 2007; Schock, 1999, 2005).
movements, the decreasing importance of disruptive politics and the increasing need for quotidian politics, and the dominating political culture of hegemonic politics and emerging cultural politics of counterhegemonic social movements (Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998; Alvarez & Escobar, 1992a, 1992b; Escobar, 1992; Jaquette, 1994).

For the present study, the cultural approach in Latin America raised at least two crucial issues for democratization: how to challenge the dominant political culture and how to reconstruct new subjectivities. Firstly, the “given” meaning of dominant political culture was questioned by the meaning and practices of emergent cultural politics of social movements: the “very right to have rights” was raised by marginalized groups; formal and institutional democracy was subject to constant democratization; and the discourse of development was contested (Dagnino, 1998; Escobar, 2011; Slater, 2008). Secondly, democratic transition opened new spaces and promoted pluralization of new collective identities. In the post-transition era, the pre-transitional epicentre, like the proletariat for the revolution, was decentred by multiple subjectivities. Even the single feminist identity was subject to its pluralization (Alvarez, 1998; Huiskamp, 2000). The united front from the pre-transitional social movements constantly waned whereas diverse groups formed, reformed, and transformed themselves, carving out new politico-cultural spaces and multiple public spheres based on new collective identities (Warren, 1998). Considering that the political opportunity approach, despite its usefulness in explaining movement emergence, provides only limited value for the exploration of social movements in abeyance and quotidian periods and cultural domain, the cultural or constructivist approach provides useful tools to investigate that arena and those periods. The constructivist approach articulates the micro-meaning production of individuals and
their self-understanding with macro-structural conditions (Escobar, 1992). It also opened the possibility to explore, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 137) suggest, both a single political space constructed by popular struggles based on popular identity, such as the pre-transitional anti-dictatorship movement, and plural political spaces shaped by democratic struggles based on plural subjectivities, such as previously marginalized and stigmatized groups.

In sum, the political process approach provides key insights: social movements arise in interactions with a structural condition in which an agent calculates costs and benefits and chooses strategies and repertoires. Yet, the cultural approach emphasizes that such calculations and choices can work only through cultural processes—interpreting events, generating meanings, constructing identities, sharing symbols, performing rituals, framing ideas, and so forth. Collective identity of social movements shows how agents interpret structural conditions and transform such an interpretation into collective identities and actions that range from the resignification of symbols and meanings to the change of polity. It bears both imprints of their surrounding context and serves as a filter to contextualize, rather than generalize, ideas and values like democracy to fit shared and imagined meanings of community. Studying collective identity allows one to examine social movements in their emergence and continuation and the transitional and pre- and post-transitional periods. In the following section, I review the historical development of collective identity approaches.
Social Movements and Collective Identities

This section reviews literature on collective identity of social movements. Firstly, it discusses Alberto Melucci’s proposed constructivist collective identity approach. Melucci saw collective identity as relational and a negotiating process instead of a fixed datum with essential characters. The section then proceeds to discuss collective identities of various social movements to show the constant boundary-shaping and negotiating process of identity formation, alignment of intersecting identities, emancipatory and oppressive features of collective identity, and expressive and instrumental identity deployment.

Collective identity of social movements began to be discussed with the emergence of the Western European “new” social movement approach that was even designated “identity-oriented” theory by some authors (Cohen, 1985). Its claimed “newness”—post-industrial society, politics of influence, and non-proletarian and multiple subjectivities—is articulated in and expressed through collective identities. Alain Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1989) contend that collective identity is neither rootless crowds of deviant individuals nor collectivity conditioned and assigned by structure, but rather the construction of self-reflective collective actors in “programed” or “complex” societies. Collective identities are constructed through the interplay between complex societies that put people under socializing pressure and individuals capable of recognizing, calculating, feeling, and negotiating with their environments.

Melucci (1988, 1996) raises the questions of who or collective identity, in contrast with preceding SMTs that ask why social movements emerge in the political process approach, and how they are established, survive, or decline in the resource mobilization approach. Collective identity does not refer to a datum, fact, or a fixed subjectivity;
rather, for Melucci, it stands for the constructing process of intersubjective “action systems” that operate in historically specific complex societies. Accordingly, collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientation of their actions as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their actions take place (Melucci, 1988, p. 34).

Although Melucci’s constructivist version of collective identity provides useful tools to explore the interactive process between agent and structure, it has limits in its direct application to the present study. Two critiques are worth mentioning. Firstly, Melucci’s constructivist view has been subject to the criticism of cultural reductionism (Bartholomew & Mayer, 1992; Carroll, 1997). Melucci (1985, 1989, 1996) contends that social “movements as messages” are no longer engaged in political content but in cultural codes and symbols. This cultural reductionism derives from Melucci’s deficient concept of complex societies and its lack of political economy (Carroll, 1997, p. 19). Secondly, Melucci claims that contemporary social movements in complex societies are more than political, i.e. post-political or meta-political (Melucci, 1985, p. 798, n. 15), but it is neither pre-political before the modern era nor political in the industrial era. This staged and again demarcated concept of social movements and collective identity prevents Melucci from comprehending collective actions he terms the “multipolar action system.”

---

14 Melucci’s cultural reductionism encourages the contrasting of equality with difference, have with be, and freedom from needs with freedom of needs in which the latter are substituted for the former in complex societies (Melucci, 1989, pp. 165-179). Yet, Charles Tilly (2002), Craig Calhoun (1994, 1995), and Roger Gould (1995) suggest collective identity has constituted a crucial part of labour movement in which identity and interest were coterminous and public politics was not separated from everyday politics of workers. Compared with other types of contentious politics it has always been significant for social movements in general for the development of citizenship and democracy in the West in the 19th century.

15 Melucci (1989) writes in the Nomads of the Present that contemporary social movements are both “pre-political” engaged in everyday life and meta-political not representable by the political (p. 72). The prefixes of pre and meta do not carry a temporal import like pre-political or “primitive” rebels led by peasants, unskilled labours, and the urban poor in pre-industrial era (Hobsbawn, 1971) or the reactive (not proactive) food riots or tax rebellions before 19th century (Tilly, 1978).
Melucci’s concept of collective identity has limited value for the present study for it is based on his research on Italian social movements in the face-to-face setting of submerged network in quotidian period for post-politics. To investigate the interaction between Taiwanese and South Korean democratization, collective identities, and their effects on social movements and democracy, collective identities should cross the pre- and post-transitional eras, involve authoritarian and democratic spaces, and occupy multiple arenas. The crucial questions to understand social movement collective identities—how collective identities are formed and maintained, the dimensions that constitute them, and their role in collective actions and social movements—are raised, interrogated, and answered primarily by studies on those movements, such as those led by women, ethnic-minorities, or socially discriminated groups that inextricably bear on identity and challenge it.

Against the backdrop of liberal democracy and capitalism, studies on Western women’s movements demonstrate that collective identities are multi-dimensional processes filled with constant boundary-shaping, consciousness building, and reciprocal negotiation with those identities in-side and out-side the boundary (Gerson & Peiss, 1985; V. Taylor & Whittier, 1992). Nevertheless, their studies are circumscribed by the female/male gender binary that paints collective identity or woman as a homogeneous entity. Multiracial, non-Western, and postcolonial feminists have challenged the gender-essentialism of the single disembodied and homogeneous body of Woman. They thereby raised the possibility of multiple oppression and hierarchies intersecting subjectivity and collective identity (Mohanty, 1991a, 1991b; Zinn & Dill, 1996). They expose how identity processes do not dwell on simple dynamics of the-self-and-the-other-production-
and-exclusion; rather, identity processes produce collective identity with multiplied subjectivities in which the flow of power can move toward transgressive or oppressive directions and take on subversive and/or submissive characters. The oppressed in one dimension can be simultaneously the oppressor in another dimension (Stockdill, 2001; Waite, 2001). Queer politics problematized the quasi-ethnic nature of the collective identities of women’s and gay and lesbian movements based on the binary mapping of social relations. It claims that rigid collective identity can serve as “the basis for oppression and the basis for political power” (J. Gamson, 1995, p. 391; 1997). Queerness reveals that even emancipatory rhetoric of collective identities involves constraining and oppressive towards others in-side and out-side their boundaries.

Studies on gay and lesbian movements push the relational and malleable aspects of collective identity further by showing that collective identities can be strategically deployed. Mary Bernstein (1997, 2008) shows how gay and lesbian movements strategically shift the dimensions of their collective identities depending on audiences and opponents. Gay and lesbian groups emphasize similarities with other groups in consultation with moderate parties while differences are asserted in the face of harsh opponents. The strategic deployment of collective identity blurs the hitherto long-held boundary between expressive and instrumental collective identities.

To summarize, collective identity is shared and negotiated meanings of collective self-understanding and the surrounding world bridge agent and structure. It is constructed and maintained in recurrent consultations and confrontations of the self where the structure of terrains is not only limited to the cultural sphere, but also involves economic, political, and social spheres. The apparent stability, unity, and homogeneity of a
collective identity is in fact in constant flux and under construction through boundary negotiation, exclusion, and production of others, internal policing for a collective identity that is in a ceaseless fight on two fronts against external others and internal identities. Collective identity is malleable because its positions are never accomplished and because its different dimensions can be strategically deployed depending on its contending parties and issues. Thus, its characteristics can be changed with changes in situations while sustaining its trans-situational salience. Finally, even the deconstruction of the boundary of transformative collective identity can have emancipatory effects on other collectivities.

In the following section, I clarify the concept of collective identity that I use to explore and to compare the interaction between South Korean and Taiwanese democratic and identity processes and the effects of the collective identities formed in democratization on other social movements and democracy.

**COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AS AN ENSEMBLE**

The notion of democratic transition implies spatio-temporal changes that divide the preceding pre-transitional era from the ensuing post-transitional era and generates new political terrains. As was seen above, democratic transitions have often been overdetermined by other processes like liberalization (including privatization), nation-building, or even globalization. These overdetermined processes produce more indeterminate dynamics of democratization than that of the unilinear and sequential development, as Marshall (1998) depicts, from civil to social rights in the West. Democratic transition is a formative moment and an encounter among structures, contingencies, and agents. It triggers and is triggered by the formation of collective
identities. These collective identities are composed of multiple selves, intersected and
crosscut by plural subjectivities, such as national, ethnic, popular, civil, class, and gender.
In the following section, first I assess different types of identities to show which
collective identities concern this study. Then, I define the concept of social movement
collective identity employed in the present study; propose seeing collective identity as an
ensemble of the structural environment, quotidian and formative moments, and identity
work; and clarify the implication of this conceptualization.

First and foremost, I shed light on the collective identity in the present study, which
differs from personal and social identities. Personal identity stands for “person’s traits,
characteristics and attributes, goals and values, and ways of being” that constitutes parts
of self-concept while the social is composed of one’s knowledge and feelings of, and
belief in, his/her role, membership, and relationship with other groups (Oyserman,
Elmore, & Smith, 2012, pp. 94-95). Although the former is linked to personal
idiosyncrasies and the latter is associated with one’s relationship and membership with
group and inter-group processes, both are individual characteristics and belief and
William Gamson (1992) argues, “is cultural;” that is, inscribed in and manifested through
publicly expressed and shared signs and symbols witnessed in diverse icons,
performances, and artefacts (p. 60).

Collective identities of social movements are quite similar to categorical identities.
Categorical identities, such as nation, class, and gender adopt “quasi-universalistic
standpoints” (C. J. Calhoun, 1995, p. 256) that often present themselves as existing prior
or posterior to and over or under social groups. Through transforming and extending
common traits and attributes into categories connecting and crossing diverse networks emerge as collective identities like “catnets” (category and network) (White, 1992, pp. 60-64). Here, collective identities of social movements are more than “imagined communities” built on disembodied categories, but rather palpable and tangible communities communicated, experienced, created, and shared through discourses, claims, banners, statements, rallies, and others.

The present study focuses on collective identities of social movements, which scholars designate under different names, such as movement identity (Jasper, 1997), oppositional consciousness (Mansbridge, 2001; Morris & Braine, 2001), participation identity (Gould, 1995), or political identity (Tilly, 2002). According to James Jasper (1997), movement identity differs from collective identity in general: the former exists at the sub-level of the latter and is constituted through the interaction between broad social culture and movement culture (pp. 86-87).

Some caveats are to be noted in the distinction between categorical and movement collective identities. The separation of movement identity from collective identity sometimes does not work well. Movement identity cannot be monopolized by social movements, for it is often appropriated by non-social-movement actors like general publics, political parties, or elites as seen in the popularity of feminists in the 1970s in the United States. If a collective identity of social movements becomes a public good, its overconsumption is ineluctable (D. A. Snow & McAdam, 2000, pp. 61-62). In such a case, the collective identity is overflowed with numerous meanings that cannot be controlled and subjected to reworking of the identity, including resignification and abandonment. Moreover, meanings of one collective identity can be shared by other
collective identities, such as the relation between the primary identity and secondary identities or that of intersectional identities.

Before providing the definition of collective identity for this study, let me summarise what I have discussed so far. The level of analysis of collective identity in this study is not individuals but involves face-to-face settings of submerged networks, organizational, and collective levels. Collective identity in this study pertains to that of social movements which however does not mean disembodied categorical community but rather embodied and palpable communities made, remade, experienced, and shared through movement’s discourses and practices. In the present study, collective identity of social movements refers to shared and negotiated meaning of collectivities that shapes them as a social force, empowers them, and serves as the basis of patterned practices and strategies.

In addition to the level of analysis of collective identity and its definition, we need to know what constitutes collective identity of social movements to understand how it is constructed, why it is subject to being made, remade, or unmade, what its effect on democratization is. I propose to see collective identity as an “articulation” or a “suture” (Hall, 1996, pp. 3-6) stitching the subject with the structural environment and quotidian and formative moments or conjunctural meanings through identity work. It implies that collective identity is not purely a discursive construct but rather a combined composite and product of spatial structures, temporal conjunctures, and subjective enterprises. To illustrate, as will be seen in chapter 5, South Korean women’s movement emerged with the rapid industrial deepening and the skyrocketing protests of women workers in the 1970s. South Korean women’s movement organizations developed collective identity of women as workers or producers for democratization and gender equality in the 1980s.
This pretransitional identity was soon transformed into the collective identity of “woman in general” in the face of in the post-transitional 1990s. In the face of democratic changes and rising sexual violence in the early 1990s, progressive women’s organizations extended women as producers to woman in general to cooperate conservative women’s organizations by emphasizing women’s shared experiences and by eliminating differences among women. The collective identity of woman in general soon confronted challenges from women of different identities and with interests that are hardly to be integrated into interests of homogenized woman. Women’s identities and interests are not fixed but subject to changes for they are composite and product of specific conditions, moments, and identity work.

Collective identity of social movements thus not only reflects past experiences, but also expresses the desires of collective actors. In democratic processes, the normative universal value attached to democracy is contextualized through collective identity of collective actors that bears their shared grievances and injustice derived from structural conditions. Collective actors form and re-form through their quotidian experiences and formative moments these shared grievances and injustice into shared definitions of collectivity.

Let me, therefore, elaborate on these three dimensions of collective identity: structural conditions, conjunctural meanings, and identity work. Structural conditions refer to those that promote or constrain, block or accelerate, or favour or disfavour identity building of collectivities. They produce identity fields, a configuration where identities compete with one another for their salience and where social actors collect and process resources to generate self-understanding and impart meanings to themselves or
others. For instance, European trade unions developed anticapitalistic, social integrative, and business unionism identities under dissimilar relations between market and society (Hyman, 2001). Likewise, African American women’s activists construct their collective identity more from a larger societal environment than only gender relations (Einwohner, Reger, & Myers, 2008, p. 9). The “virtual” structural conditions can be processed into “actual resources” (Sewell, 1992) and read into identity stories if narrated, i.e. incidents should be translated into events based on plots in which collective identities emerge, are transmogrified, and demise. Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes constitute structural environment in the present study. The Taiwanese developmental regime formed the identity field favourable for ethno-national identity while its South Korean counterpart generated the identity field promoting popular-class identity.

Secondly, quotidian and formative moments or conjunctural meanings refer to *tempos* that shape, activate, and inhabit collective identity. Collective identity lives through normal times and formative moments (Ringmar, 1996).

New social movement (NSM) and cultural approaches tend to emphasize normal times, daily life, and quotidian politics in submerged networks to organize “symbolic challenges to the dominant codes,” patterns, and representations. Collective identity is the symbol container for quotidian resistances. Collective identity in the NSM stands for meta-political activities (Melucci, 1989).

Political process approaches tend to underscore formative moments and political times. Formative moments or critical events activate or render “routine identities” into “political identities” (Tilly, 2002, 2005a) where ordinary identity and “oppositional culture” (Mansbridge, 2001) are transformed into “participation identity” (Gould, 1995).
and “oppositional consciousness” (Morris & Braine, 2001). New symbols, discourses, and narratives that constitute collective identity replace old ones in formative moments as “periods of symbolic hyper-inflation” (Ringmar, 1996), where conceptual terrains are remapped and a certain identity salience is activated. Unlike normal times, collective identity in formative moments is political, not pre- or meta-political.

Yet, collective identities in normal times involve the latent moments submerged in the fabric of everyday life and the visible moments of mobilization (Melucci, 1989, 1996) whereas “conformism and rule-following” are built into formative moments (Ringmar, 1996, p. 86). An ethnic identity or a marginal subaltern identity in normal times can claim for and occupy the status of the national identity or the unifying identity in formative moments. After these moments, however, this identity can lose its salience or again become provincialized, marginalized, or institutionalized. Collective identity that is formed in and reflect on a particular moment is subject to being remade or even being unmade under the new situation. with the change of tide. The present study explores both quotidian moments of pre- and post-transitional eras and formative or organic moments of democratic transition. It shows the making, remaking, and unmaking process of collective identity of democratic, labour, and women’s movements from the pre-transition to the post-transition.

Thirdly, identity work refers to the construction, maintenance, and transformation of collective identity (Einwohner et al., 2008; Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996; D. A. Snow & McAdam, 2000). The present dissertation primarily focuses on “oppositional identity work” of social movement organizations to subvert the dominant identity. It also includes “oppressive identity work” that presents other groups as flawed and lacking
some essential qualities (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996). Not only dominant, but also oppositional identities, willingly or unwillingly, produce oppression and reproduce immanent alterities or the “constitutive outside” (Mouffe, 1993), which are placed within the boundary of collective identity of social movements but are kept from being their constitutive inside. Identity work of social movements is the project of the political and politicization, i.e. altering us/them into friend/enemy. But, it simultaneously entails a process of depoliticization or making the relations of their collective identity with immanent alterities non-political or private and prevents the latter from establishing counter-counterpublics within counterpublics.

The present study analyzes the collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements and their relations with gender and class identities of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s and labour movements. It will show how collective identities of democratic, women’s, and labour movements interacted in pre-transitional, transitional, and post-transitional eras. It will further reveal how alignment and realignment of these identities produced constitutive others within these movements, such as Taiwanese sex workers’ and South Korean women workers’ movement, in conflict with the mainstream women’s movements or the overrepresented identity of workers in Taiwanese public enterprises and South Korean large corporations that underrepresents workers in private enterprises and precarious employment.

In this chapter, I explored comparative studies on Taiwanese and South Korean economic and institutional structures and social movements. The chapter reviewed democratization literature, the social movement approach to democratic processes, and the concept of collective identity. By placing democratization literatures into a historical
and geographical context, the review revealed how democratic processes involve multiple actors, multifaceted processes, and multi-dimensional confrontations. Then, the review on the relation between social movement approaches and democratization showed that the latter has seldom been examined by the former despite their nexus in political change. This occurs because social movement approaches have focused more on policy changes in democratized societies than on polity changes in non-democratic ones where democratization is often embroiled with dethroning military dictatorship, liberalizing the political and economic system, introducing multi-partism, or settling ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, the political process and cultural approaches provided useful insights that appreciate the interactive processes between structure and agent and the role of collective identity both in political and symbolic processes. The review on the collective identity literature highlights dynamic, relational, and multilayered identity processes.

Further, I reviewed literatures of comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea democratization, social movements, and collective identities. The review showed that macro-discourses, such as statist superstructure and economic base, have been prevalent in comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea, which assigned a marginal role or residual effects of those structural conditions to collective subjectivities. In the literature, democracy and its maturity in Taiwan and South Korea are discussed as things with criteria and templates are already given, without reference to how the active inhabitants understand and make democracy and discourses of democratization focused on institutional actors and processes and treated democratic processes as those untainted by other processes. This focus led the work to ignore extrastitutional actors and democratization as a multiple process and thus was not a ‘context-free’ and ‘context-
proof” process. Social movement approaches mainly revolve around changes in policy, institutional procedures, or the cultural domain, i.e. democratization without transformation.

Based on the literature review, I moved collective identity into the foreground of this research. I clarified the level of analysis of collective identity and provided its definition. To understand the construction of collective identity, its transformation, and effects on democratization, I analysed its constituting elements. I suggested viewing collective identity as an ensemble of three elements: spatial structures (structural environment), temporal conjunctures (democratic processes), and subjective enterprises (identity work). Firstly, seeing collective identity as a composite of these three elements means it is not merely a product of structure, an expression of primordial essence, or a construct of phantasmagorical discursive practices. Thus, collective actors are at the centre of the democratic process while connecting it with structural conditions as a backdrop or context of shared injustice and grievances. They are experienced in the quotidian period and formed in formative moments through the identity work of collective actors into a collective identity. Secondly, this collective identity bears the imprint of structural conditions interpreted as shared grievances of a collectivity and thereby contextualize democracy throughout the democratic process. This approach explores what stands behind universalized democratic values, generalized gender interests, and the disembodied working class with the construction and reconstruction of collective identities throughout the democratic processes. Thirdly, I can show the contents and confinements of democratization and its demos with this approach by investigating democratic processes along with identity processes and their mutual reinforcement.
To wrap up, this conceptualization of collective identity serves as a lens and a map to explore and to understand the differences between South Korean and Taiwanese developmental regimes, democratic transitions, collective identities forged in the democratic processes, career paths of these collective identities of democratic movements, and identity processes, including interidentity and inter-or infra-identity effects that show the limits of democratization. The analysis in the present study includes the identity fields facilitated by Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes, contextualization of democracy and democratization through identity narratives of democratic movements, the expansion of the dimension of political democratization, and identity relations among democratic, women’s, and labour movements and within these sectoral movements.

Chapter 3 compares the South Korean and Taiwanese developmental regimes as one of the structural environments of collective identity. I anatomize the developmental regimes into dominant institutions and socio-economic alliances that correspond with power and interest, respectively. By clarifying the differences in developmental regimes between Taiwan and South Korea, I provide the basis for understanding why popular-class collective identity emerged in South Korea and ethno-national identity in Taiwan.

---

16 The interidentity refers to effects between various collective identities of social movements like relations between national and class identities or between gender and class identities. The inter-identity implies borderland or cross-sected identity, such as African American women, women as workers, and a working-class identity intersected with a particular national identity.
Chapter 3 Taiwanese and South Korean Developmental Regimes

Political collective identity involves shared emotional and cognitive meanings of a group of people of themselves and their surrounding world based on boundary dividing “us” from “them” and public claims and engagement in political processes. The claims “we as people,” “we as women,” or “we as workers” might be quotidian collective identities but simultaneously political if they are involved in and activated by political processes for “all identities have a political side, actual or potential” (Tilly, 2005a, p. 61). The articulation of a group’s shared meanings and their insertion into the public arena and political processes are not freely chosen by movement’s entrepreneurs for every polity is involved through institutional and non-institutional measures in the formation and reinforcement of collective identities, such as nation, folk, or citizen.

Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes as structural conditions constrain, facilitate, and intervene into the enterprise of identity formation of social movements. The analysis of Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes and their implication for identity construction underlies the assumption that the formation of collective identities is neither a pure product of discursive construction nor of biological essentialism. I explore how Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes exerted effects on producing different fields, contexts, and backgrounds of collective identities formed by South Korean and Taiwanese democratic movements.

Since the 1980s, the democratic transition of the Taiwanese democratic movement constructed an ethno-national identity with system-reforming and institutional-arena
orientation while its South Korean counterpart forged popular-class *minjung* identity with anti-systemic and extra-institutional-arena orientation. The present chapter aims at showing how and which variations in Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes produced different foundations and material for the formation of those dissimilar collective identities. The two countries’ developmental regimes promoted different identity fields, which facilitate particular identity formation while constraining others. And, each developmental regime was conditioned by diverse historical and social forces and factors, and the materials and conditions the regime produced are only virtual, i.e. they are still a block, not yet a building-block of collective identity, and need to be used and actualized.

In this chapter, I analyze Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes as an ensemble of a domination form and development alliance. The Taiwanese developmental regime is divided into the KMT party-state as domination form and two dual structures—the political dual structure of mainlander-dominating national politics and Taiwanese-inhabiting local politics, and the economic dual structure of state-led public sectors and Taiwanese-led private sectors—as developmental alliances. The South Korean developmental regime can be disaggregated into the military regime as domination form and military-*chaebol* (large conglomerate) as developmental alliance.

To give a brief chapter overview, the Taiwanese party-state established stable political institutions likely to channel dissident voices into institutional venues with

---

1 Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) used the term “identity field” as an analytic setting of three different identities defined by the degrees of commitment of movement-related or movement-unrelated people: protagonists, antagonists, and uncommitted observers. “Identity field” here does not refer to its usage but implies a configuration in which diverse identities compete for their salience and social actors are inserted and entangled. For instance, an identity field may facilitate class identity while the other may promote a different identity category.
moderation, whereas the South Korean military regime produced unstable political institutions that compelled opposition forces to organize confrontational actions outside of established politics. As the Taiwanese developmental alliance was constructed along the dividing boundary between mainlanders and islanders, the South Korean military regime built the highly centralized and exclusive military-chaebol alliance at the cost of a large population. The South Korean developmental regime was constructed through anti-political de-institutionalization based on the military-chaebol alliance independent of other social forces while its Taiwanese counterpart established hypo-politicizing institutionalization, i.e., displacement of political opponents from national politics by assigning them only a subnational political space, on the grounds of interdependence between the dominating national politics and public industries and the dominated local politics and private sector. These differences raise de-KMTization/multi-partism and de-militarization/civilianization as the immediate and key challenges to or major front for democratization in Taiwan and South Korea, respectively.

I divide Chapter 3 into three sections. In section one, I provide a brief introduction to Taiwanese and South Korean collective identities of democratic movements and developmental regimes to help readers understand their subsequent sections. The second section deals with the Taiwanese party-state as unipartism and the South Korean military regime as antipartism, and their implications for collective identities. In the third section, I analyze the Taiwanese two dual structures and the South Korean military-chaebol alliance and their meanings for collective identities.
Two Collective Identities of Democratic Movements

I briefly introduce two different collective identities constructed in the Taiwanese and South Korean democratic processes: Taiwanese consciousness and South Korean minjung (people and mass). The detailed analysis of their construction will be performed in Chapter 4. For the present, I offer a brief outline of their key characteristics.

Taiwanese consciousness has developed since the late 1970s in opposition to the repressive KMT and spread rapidly in the 1980s. Shared beliefs and an ethos shows that Taiwan has its own culture and identity which makes it unlike the Chinese (M.-k. Chang, 2003; Hsiau, 2003a; Wachman, 1994; F.-c. Wang, 2008b). It is an identity discourse of a nationalistic “categorical identity” (C. Calhoun, 1995) connecting and organizing diverse groups of people into a homogeneous community. Taiwanese consciousness involves more than a self-other division for the claim for Taiwanese consciousness (against Chinese consciousness) entails a series of critical political questions, such as who are the rightful carriers of civil and political rights, is Taiwan a sovereign state, and how to see and deal with China or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (C.-J. Hsu, 2014, p. 87). Therefore, Taiwanese consciousness is laden with claims for both categorical and political orientation. Taiwanese consciousness first emerged as an anti-hegemonic

---

2 Scholars disagree over when Taiwanese consciousness or Taiwanese identity emerged. Some authors date it to the Japanese occupation of Taiwan (1895-1945) while others argue that it arose under the KMT rule after 1945. Certainly Japanese rule provided at least the initial conditions for the formation of Taiwanese consciousness for it transformed fragmented and localized society into a Japanese colony (M.-k. Chang, 2003). In fact, the term “Taiwanese” began to circulate around 1920 (Tu, 1996). Each period reveals different meanings of consciousness—the other of Taiwanese, for instance, under the Japanese rule was Japanese, not Chinese. My usage of Taiwanese consciousness is limited to that promoted and developed by opposition forces since the second half of the 1970s.
collective identity, but it turned hegemonic during the democratic transition, where the opposition movement was politically stabilized and native Taiwanese became mainstream in the KMT. Oppositional dangwai groups constructed an ethno-national Taiwanese identity articulated with democratization. They politicized social protests with national and partisan identity competition and inserted the ethno-national Taiwanese identity into other collective identities and politicized them. With the transition, women’s and labour movements confronted universal woman and worker and Taiwanese women and workers.

In South Korea, minjung as a collective identity emerged after the late 1970s in opposition to the repressive military regime. Minjung is a collective subjectivity against political repression and economic exploitation (Abelmann, 1996; J. J. Choi, 1993; Koo, 1993b; N. Lee, 2007) and a multi-class identity; its orientation is anti-systemic and extra-institutional. It emerged as a counter-hegemonic collective identity that the South Korean democratic movement used to build a multi-class coalition against the developmental alliance during the democratization process. The minjung movement that formed in the 1980s established a series of extra-institutional umbrella organizations that mobilized mass rallies against the military regimes and established political institutions. Instead of ascending to a hegemonic identity, minjung and minjung movement was deconstructed by new simin (burgher or citizen) movements with political democratization in 1987. Thus, the multi-class minjung identity grew vacant and marginalized with the rise of and in competition with sectoral movements with their own identity salience for woman, citizen, or worker.
Developmental Regimes and Preconditions

The present chapter investigates the effects of developmental regimes as structural conditions of the aforementioned features of two collective identities, the institutional-oriented and ethno-national-centric Taiwanese identity and the extra-institutional-oriented and popular-class-centric South Korean minjung identity. I use the term developmental regime instead of developmental state since the latter shows the state as a homogeneous and unified entity that generates structural effects and is sequestered from society (Mitchell, 1991). Besides, the developmental state approach reduces political, social, cultural aspects to a “growth-paradigm” (Boyd & Ngo, 2005). Developmental regime refers here to an ensemble of political institutions and social forces that sets development as its primary goal by subordinating non-developmental goals and enforcing it through forceful domination and cultural direction (Gramsci, 1971). Unlike the developmental state, the concept of developmental regime is not a closed and impervious entity but an arena vulnerable to changes and negotiations by internal and external forces and actors.

I disaggregate the developmental regime into domination form and developmental alliance. Domination form is defined as a form of political establishment organizing and tailoring political institutions and society for a developmental project that dresses particular interests with general or universal interests and formulates certain economic-corporate projects as national-popular projects (Jessop, 1990, 2002). Developmental alliance refers to a particular constellation of social forces that reproduces the domination form and developmental project. The investigation into Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes will show the surrounding conditions of identity fields for
different collective identity formations of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements. The domination form mainly pertains to the institutional types and stability and reveals characteristics of a social movement’s collective identity in relation to the choice of venue and mobilization—institutional or extra-institutional and electoral or non-electoral—while the developmental alliance is more concerned with features of identity salience, such as class, gender, nation, or religion. The analysis of developmental regimes will also show the potential political orientation of collective identities, such as political/system-reforming or anti-political/antisystemic. Furthermore, it will show the main challenges to democratization and its dynamics, such as whether democratization revolves around national sovereignty, multi-partism (or disembeddedness of unipartism), or demilitarization (civilianization) and whether its dynamics unfolds in negotiated or confrontational ways.

Developmental regimes impose, enforce, and implement their “hegemonic project;” the project of development. Developmental regimes repress and exclude interests and projects inconsistent with hegemonic projects while prioritizing and elevating those that are consistent. East Asians have been familiar with development as a concept involving the state’s intentional intervention into economic processes and welfare since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Heinz Arndt (1981) shows how the holistic concept of development in Hegel’s work—a process realizing the potential of a matter into an actualized form—was translated by Marx into the economic development of history. This intransitive economic development in the late 19th and early 20th centuries began to imply transitive development, i.e. development or exploitation of natural resources through human intervention, under imperialism. The concept of economic development was used
in the postwar era as a term nearly identical with economic growth. Yet, Arndt recognizes East Asian modernizers like Sun, Yat-sen as “interesting exceptions” (Arndt, 1981, p. 464) as they advocated already in the late 19th and early 20th centuries economic development and people’s welfare based on state intervention and cooperation with the West. Therefore, the Taiwanese and South Korean regimes easily appropriated the early vision of development. Yet, this general concept of development must be contextualized and simultaneously generalized to become the hegemonic project of the developmental regime.

The contextualization of development was implemented through the justification for the need to build up such institutional settings to pursue hegemonic projects while its generalization was conducted through the dismantlement of social forces and projects which may compete with and undermine the developmental regime. Firstly, development was contextualized through “the politics of survival” (Castells, 1992, 2010) or “revolutionary authority” (Johnson, 1999) that was superimposed over modernization. War, military threat, and security collectively constituted the corpus of development as a primary project of the developmental regime (Castells, 1992, 2010; Woo-Cumings, 1998; Zhu, 2002). The politics of survival “makes war the permanent basis of all the institutions of power” (M. Foucault, 2003, p. 295), which mobilized society for war “but never demobilized during peacetime” (Johnson, 1999, p. 41). The threat from and the confrontation with communist China and North Korea provided Taiwan and South Korea with the justification for authoritarian domination (Johnson, 1987).

Secondly, to generalize development requires the defeat of competing forces and projects. Since the late 1940s, the rise of communist China and North Korea has forced
Taiwanese and South Korean regimes to implement extensive land reforms that practically deprived the traditional landlord classes of their power and influence. Those reforms coincided with massive and bloody repressions against popular movements. The South Korean regime ruthlessly crushed strikes and popular uprisings in a civil-war like situation between 1948 and 1950, just before the Korean War. In Taiwan, citizens took to the streets on February 28, 1947 to protest public officials’ mistreatment of a street vendor selling cigarettes on the black market and bystanders the day before. The protests rapidly spread island-wide. In response, the KMT sent extra troops from the mainland and killed thousands of Taiwanese, in what was later called the 228 incident (ererba shijian). Thomas Gold (1986) claimed that the execution was implemented not indiscriminately but systemically for many of the killed were intellectuals and elites like lawyers, newspaper editors, teachers, land owners, and others (p. 51).

The aforementioned factors prepared the way for the establishment of Bonapartian (Marx, 2003a, 2003b) or Caeserian (Gramsci, 1971) developmental regimes in South Korea and Taiwan that behaved as if their hegemonic projects were carried out in the name of the general interest against particular interests of civil society.

TWO DOMINATION FORMS OF DEVELOPMENTAL REGIMES

In this section, I analyze Taiwanese and South Korean domination forms. Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes built up their dominating institutions along the different institutional architectures. Giovani Sartori (2005) points out that modern non-pluralistic political systems can be divided into unipartism and antipartism: Unipartism is mostly driven by party-state regimes and antipartism by military regimes (pp. 35-49).
Given Sartori’s schema, the Taiwanese domination form is like unipartism while its South Korean counterpart is closer to antipartism.

In the following section, I analyze Taiwanese and South Korean domination forms. This analysis anatomizes Taiwanese unipartism and South Korean antipartism into three elements: 1) origins and stability of these domination forms, whether derived from the revolutionary or non-revolutionary tradition and stable or unstable institutions; 2) their political manoeuvres, whether they performed hypo-politicizing or anti-politicizing politics against opposition forces; and 3) transformations of their institutional operations, whether changed from the hard regime to the soft regime or the reverse. Then I discuss the implication of these domination forms for collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements.

**Taiwanese Unipartism: The Party-state**

To understand Taiwanese unipartism, I explore the origin of the KMT party-state and its stability, political manoeuvre, and transformation in this section. Firstly, compared with the South Korean military regime, the Taiwanese developmental regime built up a far more stable domination form, the party-state. Its origin and stability derive from two sources. Firstly, the stability of the Taiwanese domination form can trace its roots to the mainland. The KMT and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan were transplanted from the mainland to the island.

The KMT party was formed in the early 20th century as a non-communist revolutionary party that built the party-state regime, just like the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Turkish Republican People’s Party (RPP). After its
defeat in the Chinese Civil War, the KMT lost its control over the mainland and in 1949 was forced to retreat to Taiwan where it was reconstructed as the ROC. More than one million people, who were the remnants of the ROC’s military forces and other civilians, including civil servants and economic and political elites, evacuated to Taiwan. They constituted the base of the KMT party-state in Taiwan. Even most parliamentarians—members of the National Assembly and Legislative and Control Yuan whose unlimited terms were guaranteed by the Temporary Provisions During the Period of Communist Rebellion (Temporary Provisions) in 1948—fled to Taiwan and ruled the local population and for four decades were not subject to re-election. The KMT superimposed the ROC upon Taiwan and thereby practically displaced Taiwan. The small island was overwhelmed by the enormous bureaucratized party originally established to rule continental China.

The second source of institutional stability bears on the establishment of the party-state (dangguo tizhi). The party-state contained enormous tension because it equates particular interests and constituents (party and its members) with the universal (state and citizen). Only if the party produces itself as “a duplication of the state” the two wholes can exist as one entity (Sartori, 2005, p. 40). The tension was reduced by the sinicized Leninist party principle, governing-the-state-through-the-party (yidangzhiguo) (Sun, 1986b, p. 96).5

---

3 The island population was only 6 million in 1949.
4 The primary function of the National Assembly before 1994 constitutional reform was to amend the Constitution and to elect and recall the president and vice president.
5 Sun Yat-sen (1986b) said in the opening address to the first national delegation meeting of the KMT in January 1924: “China is too chaotic. People are still immature. For citizens lack right political thought I claim for yidangzhiguo, governing-the-state through-the-party” (p. 96). Further, it is well known that Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the KMT, recast the KMT in 1924, modeled on the Russian Communist Party (Ch’ien, 1970, pp. 88-91; Jiang & Wu, 1992, pp. 76-78).
The tension was further lessened through the KMT “reform movement” (gaizao yundong) between 1949 and 1952. After the escape to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the KMT, rebuilt the party from the bottom up (Dickson, 1993; T.-f. Huang, 1996; Mattlin, 2011; Myers, 2009). The new KMT reinforced an ideological commitment to sanminzhuyi—which literally means three-people-doctrine (san-min-zhuyi), referring to minzu (nationalism), minquan (democracy), and minsheng (people’s livelihood), which Sun developed to modernize China. The new party reorganized and expanded its branches and cells from the central to the local and to various vocational groups⁶ and fortified the control over state institutions by building up party cells in parallel with government organizations including military.

The “reform movement” transformed the KMT party from a quasi-military organization incapacitated by corruption and factional strife during the Chinese Civil War into a “quasi-Leninist” party (T. Cheng, 1989; Meaney, 1992; Tsang, 1999)⁷ with a “Soviet body and Chinese mind” (Jen, 2004, p. 79). The hyphen in party-state does not stand for a link but rather a metonymic sign of replacement of the state by the party. The KMT was built and rebuilt along and into state- and nation-building. The emergence and invention of the modern ROC and Chinese nation were inseparably interconnected with the KMT that preceded the state and nation. The KMT presented the contiguous metonymic relation between the party and the state.

The origins and stability of the Taiwanese party-state have been discussed above to understand the Taiwanese domination form, unipartism. I now proceed to analyze the

---

⁶ The new KMT dramatically increased its membership from less than 50,000 in 1949 to more than 250,000 in 1952 (N.-t. Wu, 1987, p. 367).

⁷ Cheng, Tun-jen (1989) distinguishes the KMT—or its quasiness—from other Leninist parties in two ways: no support for either the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship or for socialist economy.
party-state’s political manoeuvre. The party-state performed politics of hypo-
 politicization towards Taiwan society. By “hypo-politicization”—perhaps better termed
“political displacement” of potential counterforces—I do not mean techniques or
practices to remove the political nature of actions like depoliticization, but those that
distract local populations from national political concerns and redirect them into sub-
national (provincial Taiwan) and supra-national (mainland China) politics.

The political manoeuvre of hypo-politicization of the party-state derives from the
fatung system, or the “legal fiction” to borrow from Linz and Stepan’s (1996, pp. 19-20,
n. 8), where the ROC is the sole legitimate sovereign state representing the whole China.
In other words, Taiwan is only a province and the local Taiwanese have no right to vote
for members of parliamentary bodies that represent the whole China and had been elected
before their evacuation to Taiwan. Taiwan was spatially displaced and temporarily
deterred since Taiwan cannot stand for itself due to the ROC’s imposition on Taiwanese
territory and its un-representability until the end of the ROC’s temporary stay in Taiwan.

The party-state undertook the role to transform the fictional illusions into objective
realities. It suspended constitutional civil and political rights of the local Taiwanese
through the Temporary Provisions and the Martial Law. It only permitted supra-national
politics, the recovery of the mainland China (fangongdalu) from the Communist Party of
China (CPC) and sub-national politics, Taiwan as a province. The founding of new
political parties for national politics was therefore deterred.8

8 The 1960 affair of Lei Chen, a liberal-democratic mainlander and the editor of the biweekly magazine Free
China Fortnightly, clearly reveals the KMT’s hypo-politicizing manoeuvre. In 1960, the KMT regime
arrested Lei Chen on a charge of his association with communists, but the underlying reason for his
imprisonment was that he planned jointly with other native Taiwanese to launch the Chinese Democratic
The hypo-politicizing manoeuvres were implemented through regime-affiliated corporatist organizations. The KMT penetrated into peak organizations of various social classes and groups like workers, managers, farmers, women, and youth, taming them through legal restrictions, financial controls, organizational or electoral interventions of their internal elections, and ideological indoctrination (Y.-h. Chu, 1994b, p. 101; Wakabayashi, 1992). To illustrate, the KMT was directly involved in labour issues (Deyo, 1989, pp. 115-118), which brought about de-mobilized and hypo-politicized “Tofu unions” (Hsiao, 1992, pp. 155-157).

I have thus far analyzed the party-state’s origin and stability and its political manoeuvres. I now explore its institutional transformation in interaction with other forces. The party-state was not isolated or impervious to other forces. In the 1960s, the KMT completed the edifice of the authoritarian unipartism; yet, also in the 1960s, political institutions for national politics, the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, confronted biological demise. The institutions’ number of vacant seats were growing on account of retirement or death of their members and not replenished, for free elections were not possible in “illegally occupied” mainland China and excluded according to the Temporary Provisions. Since the late 1960s, the KMT began to open, albeit limited, the arena of national politics by holding supplementary elections for the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan.

The decisive blow to the legal fiction came in 1971 with the reconciliation of two opposing powers: the PRC and the United States. The PRC was recognized by the United Nations (UN) as “the only lawful representatives of China” (United Nations, 1971). The
ROC’s legal fiction and the invented Chinese consciousness as the state identity became untenable unless other patchwork was undertaken.

Under authoritarian unipartism, the party-state imposed Chinese national identity through the combination of the legal fiction and sinicization, which justified the KMT’s repression of local identity and its elevation from the ethnic level to the national, i.e. a political community as sources of sovereignty expressed in the hyphenated nation-state (C. Calhoun, 1993). Yet, the emerging situation since the late-1960s exposed the unavailability of the population of the mainland China as the ROC’s sovereign sources and forced the KMT to reconsider the hitherto de-mobilizing and hypo-politicizing practices. Steps towards those directions necessitated that the KMT transform authoritarian unipartism into pragmatic unipartism.

According to Sartori (2005) and LaPalombara and Weiner (1966), differentiation of totalitarian, authoritarian, and pragmatic unipartism draws on two criteria: the degree of the ruling party’s ideological commitment and intensity and its relations with sub- and outer-groups. Regarding the first criterion, ideological relaxation of the KMT is to be witnessed in the increase in the party’s technocrats and the shift from recovery of the mainland to the development of the island. Since the late 1960s, the KMT transformed into a party led by technocrats like Lee, Teng-hui, who in 1988 became the first native Taiwanese president. Further, the KMT slowly moved from mainland recovery to island construction as seen in the Ten Development Projects in the 1970s that upgraded Taiwanese economy from labour-intensive industries to the capital-intensive (Gold, 1986, p. 92; p. 102).
The KMT’s second step was to change its relations with sub- and outer-groups. Firstly, the KMT gradually opened access to national politics, which had been dominated by mainlanders. The seats open to supplementary elections for the Legislative Yuan were slowly expanded nearly to 60 percent in 1989. Secondly, the KMT was forced to transforms itself through Taiwanization where the party opened its institutions and power centre to native Taiwanese as Table 3-1 illustrates. The KMT posts at the local level began to be increasingly occupied by the native Taiwanese—their ratio in district and county cadres increased by nearly 20 percent between the mid-1970s and 1980s (Dickson, 1996, pp. 50-56). Slowly the core of KMT power, the Central Standing Committee (CSC), was also subject to Taiwanization.

Table 3-1 Composition of the KMT Central Standing Committee, 1952-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Native Taiwanese (%)</th>
<th>Mainlander (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>10 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2 (9)</td>
<td>19 (91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9 (33)</td>
<td>18 (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16 (52)</td>
<td>15 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20 (57)</td>
<td>15 (43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Huang, Teh-fu (1996, pp. 119-120) and Hsu, Chien-Jung (2014, p. 54)

The KMT shift to pragmatic unipartism was at best the KMT’s attempt to sustain the party-state. This revision never intended to involve the reversal of the dominant identity process or de-sinicization. The KMT’s Taiwanization in the 1970s pertained more to its localization than to its indigenization and was cooptation of local elites rather than the KMT’s transformation.9

---

9 In December 2002 the former president Lee, Teng-hui selected by Chiang, Ching-kuo as his successor and succeeded him after his death in 1988, openly criticized the Chiang, Ching-kuo’s policy in the 1970s, specifically chuitaiqing, which refers to a policy recruiting KMT cadres among talented young Taiwanese and promoting them. Lee claimed chuitaiqing was just a policy of “alien regime” to “buy the hearts of people [Taiwanese] off.” Through the KMT regime’s indoctrination “Taiwanese became not only rootless but even soulless” (Apple Daily, 2002.12.24)
Nevertheless, the KMT’s reform or the revision without reversal increased the party-state’s vulnerability as the hegemonic domination form. Oppositional forces under pragmatic unipartism utilized the political space, however limited the opening, to establish an island-wide political network and challenge to the KMT party-state. The 1977 local elections\textsuperscript{10} clearly demonstrated the changed political scene where opposition forces coordinated island-wide electoral campaigns and could win nearly 30 percent of the vote. The semiotic shift of opposition forces adequately displays this change. Before the elections in 1977, opposition groups were often referred to as \textit{wudang} (no party), but after the elections they called themselves \textit{dangwai} (outside the party), which connotes that they were no longer a no-party but a quasi-party outside of the KMT.

In Taiwan, the hard authoritarian party-state in the 1950s and 1960s did not allow oppositional forces to develop “counterpublics” (Fraser, 1990) or “free spaces” (S. M. Evans & Boyte, 1986; Polletta, 1999) in which oppositional groups preserve their capacity, nurture their values, develop strategies, and promote the formation of collective identities. The gradual and managed opening of the political arena from local to national politics channelled the opposition to institutional politics under the practical unipartism of the 1970s.

\textbf{South Korean Antipartism: Military Regime}

Sartori (2005) differentiates the party-state from the antiparty state in which the dominant political form is mostly military regime and political stabilization is hindered by its antiparty doctrine. As I did in the preceding section, to clarify South Korean antipartism,

\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{10} In 1977, local elections were held simultaneously at several levels—provincial assembly, municipal executive, and municipal council.}


\end{footnote}
in this section I analyze the South Korean military regime’s origins, stability, political manoeuvre against social forces, and transformation of institutional operation.

Let me first discuss the origin and stability of the South Korean military regime. It dominated South Korean politics and society for nearly three decades prior to transition in 1987. Yet, compared with the Taiwanese party-state, the South Korean developmental regime built up a far less stable domination form, the military regime. The military regime’s instability can be seen in its origin and institutional design. The Park, Chung-hee military regime—which seized power through the military coup against the civilian government in 1961—initially did not emerge from revolutionary tradition and develop a coherent revolutionary program as did Sun, Yat-sen’s KMT. The South Korean military was not formed to lead revolution, but to contain revolutionary internal insurgencies, such as left-wing anti-regime activities and guerilla warfare between the 1945 decolonization and the 1950 Korean War.

Unlike the Western “old professionalism” that was apolitical and independent of subjective interests of certain civilian groups (Huntington, 1957), the South Korean military developed a “new professionalism,” as Stepan (1973) termed it, found in third world militaries supported by the United States after the 1950s and blurred the binary of the old professionalism, i.e. apolitical/independent professionals versus political/dependent praetorians\(^\text{11}\) (pp. 57-66). The first South Korean president Rhee,

\(^{11}\) The term praetorianism derives from the Roman Praetorian Guards, an armed force that intervened into politics by supporting or withdrawing their support for a particular Roman emperor. Their engagement in and domination over Roman politics is perceived of as corrupting the empire’s political processes. The modern usage of praetorianism indicates the involvement of the politicized military into political affairs and decision-making (Huntington, 1957; Nordlinger, 1977). Huntington (1968) argues that social mobilization and political activity tend to destabilize political institutions in praetorian society so that the military can serve as an institutional builder in a society with a simple social structure and meager political participation as seen in the general Park, Chung-hee’s 1961 coup and his foundation of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) in 1963 in South Korea (p. 217; pp. 258-261).
Syngman (1948-1960) skillfully manipulated and mobilized military factions for his own political power. The Korean War expanded the politicized military both in budget (more than 50 percent of the government spending) and in number, nearly six times from 1950 to 1956, while deepening its entanglement in politics.

In the 1961 coup, Park adopted rhetoric like the “elimination of corruptions,” the “reconstruction of national independent economy,” and “purging out old politicians” (H.-A. Kim, 2004, pp. 69-93; Kyunghyang Daily, 1961) borrowed from his international predecessors, such as Gamal Nasser of Egypt. The military regime’s rhetoric was also fraught with purification of corrupt politics and security against North Korean communism, but lacked a coherent hegemonic project as seen in the military coups of Turkey and Egypt.

The second source of institutional instability in the South Korean domination form pertains to unstable political institutions. South Korean military regimes constantly rendered political institutions unstable.12 The military regimes’ ruling parties emerged neither from the “old type” of electoral and parliamentary nor from the “modern” extra parliamentary (e.g. a party created by trade unions) as seen in Europe (Duverger, 1954, pp. xxiii-xxxvii). Ex-generals Park, Chung-hee and Chun, Doo-hwan who seized power by coups in 1961 and 1979, respectively, each political party legitimized their military rules: Park created the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) in 1963 and Chun the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) in 1981. Those parties were, however, primarily the

---

12 After the collapse of the First Republic (1948-1960) from mass demonstrations, the Second Republic (1960-1961) was overthrown by a coup headed by General Pak, Chung-hee; the Third Republic (1961-1972) established by General Park was replaced by Park’s autogolpe; and the Fourth Republic (1972-1979) collapsed after the assassination of Park and was replaced by a coup led by the General Chun, Doo-hwan who then created the Fifth Republic (1980-1987).
“party in government” and far from the “party governs” in taking and monopolizing the governing function based on electoral processes or post-electoral coalition-negotiation (Sartori, 2005, p. 17, emphasis original). In South Korea, the civil-military relation was never dominated by political parties in contrast with Taiwan where a quasi-Leninist party kept a tight grip on the military through ideological penetration, resource control, the commissar system, and other para-military organizations as happened in the former socialist countries (Huntington, 1957, pp. 90-97; Janowitz, 1977, p. 79; Nordlinger, 1977, pp. 15-18). Unlike the military regimes in Turkey and Mexico, which were “quasi-civilianized” (Finer, 1962) and retreated to their barracks, South Korean military regimes did not abandon the military as its prime source of power and rule.

The military and the state in South Korea lie in a synecdochical relationship. With the establishment of the military regime, the military, initially only a part of the state apparatus, absorbed the whole state. The state institutions’ centralized and militarized characteristics were strengthened by abandoning local government. The military elites held a firm grip on the executive and legislative bodies. Nearly half of the minister positions between 1964 and 1972 were occupied by former military elites (M.-n. Kim, 2004, p. 92, n. 14). Militarization, as the last instance, overshadowed and intervened into political operation. Despite the immediate take-off after the take-over and the move from the barracks to party headquarters, the South Korean military elites frequently and regularly mobilized military and para-military resources (e.g. the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, KCIA). When the regime encountered anti-regime oppositions, it did not hesitate to impose military measures, such as martial law, garrison decree, and emergency decrees, as Table 3-2 shows.
## Table 3-2 Martial Law, and Garrison and Emergency Decrees (1961-1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.16 coup d'état</td>
<td>Emergency Martial Law</td>
<td>1961.5.16-27</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>12 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Precautionary Martial Law</td>
<td>1961.5.27-1962.12.6</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>556 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Uprising</td>
<td>Emergency Martial Law</td>
<td>1964.6.3-7.29</td>
<td>Seoul (capital city)</td>
<td>57 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification of Japan-Korea Treaty</td>
<td>Garrison Decree</td>
<td>1965.8.20-26</td>
<td>Seoul (capital city)</td>
<td>7 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October Restoration Reforms</td>
<td>Emergency Martial Law</td>
<td>1972.10.17-12.13</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>57 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various anti-regime activities *</td>
<td>9 Emergency Decrees</td>
<td>1974.1.8-1979.12.8</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busan and Masan Uprising</td>
<td>Emergency Martial Law</td>
<td>1979.10.18-27</td>
<td>Busan (the second largest city)</td>
<td>9 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.26 coup d'état</td>
<td>Emergency Martial Law</td>
<td>1979.10.27-1980.5.17</td>
<td>Nationwide (except Jeju Island)</td>
<td>455 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980.5.17-10.17</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980.10.17-1981.1.24</td>
<td>Nationwide (except Jeju Island)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dong A Daily (1981) and * Korea Ministry of Government Legislation

To analyze South Korean antipartism as its domination form, I first discussed the origin and stability of the South Korean military regime and I turn to its political manoeuvre. The military regime performed politics of anti-politicization towards South Korean society. Unlike the political nationalism of the KMT party-state, which reproduced the legal fiction and hypopoliticization of the local population, the South Korean military regime promoted economic nationalism.

As will be seen below, the failure of the South Korean military regime’s quasi-civilianization compelled the regime to push further destabilization of political institutions and pursue anti-politics that tipped the nationalism to “economic nationalism” (H.-A. Kim, 2004) or “industrializing nationalism” (Moon & Jun, 2011). Economic
nationalism legitimized the indefinite deferral of democracy for the sake of economic development. In other words, what it pursued precluded the bourgeois political revolution through participation and instead included the industrial revolution through mobilization. Economic nationalism aimed at the “nation-building through export” (*suchul ipguk*) and “state-building through industry” (*gongyeop ipguk*). Therefore, under economic nationalism neither citizens nor publics nor Korean nation was produced: only “export soldiers” and “industrial warriors.”

The military regime’s economic nationalism in fact bypassed the formation of a politically homogeneous community. The adjective *chong* (meaning total, general, or all)—the most beloved modifier of the Park regime’s official slogans and indiscriminately applied to regime’s goals, such as “general mobilization,” “total unity,” or “all-out security” (J.-i. Kang, 2012, p. 48)—shows the regime’s assumption of how the society as a homogenous body was readily prepared for being interpellated by the economic nationalism. The regime bypassed the political institutions and directly proceeded and resorted to popular mobilization for its hegemonic project.

The military regime colonized the state institutions and its antipartism rendered political institutions inoperative. Yet, this colonization by the military regime was primarily limited to state institutions because unlike the Taiwanese party-state, the South Korean military regime lacked the massive personal, organizational, and financial resources to organize and manage corporatist organizations. Rather, the Park regime depended upon mass mobilization, like that of the New Village Movements.¹³ Those top-

¹³ The New Village Movement began as a rural development campaign mobilized by the regime after 1970. The campaign aimed at modernization of rural infrastructures, traditional values, and technical training. Yet, since the *yushin* regime (1972), the movement’s discursive focus was shifted to national restoration. The
down movements organized and mobilized society as if in quasi-war-time when politics and political institutions are suspended.

The third source of institutional instability of South Korean antipartism pertains to the changes of institutional operation. In the late 1960s, the South Korean military regime was subject to the transformation of its domination form. The South Korean military regime initially had to defend the coup’s legitimacy and the continued rule by military elites with limited decompression of politics at the central level. The establishment of a new civilian government or the Third Republic in 1963 required the military regime to strengthen its legitimacy through economic development and stabilization of political institutions. Park’s 1963 inaugural speech as a civilian president emphasized the “modernisation of the fatherland” (*chogukgeundaihwa*) and “the establishment of democratic political order” (*Kyunghyang Daily*, 1963a). For instance, the Five Year Economic Development Plan (FYEDP) was launched in 1962 while the requisites for party formation were strengthened and party nomination for the National Assembly election became mandatory for every candidate. The former created the foundation for the state-led economic development, rapid export-oriented industrialization (EOI), and the military-*chaebol* alliance whereas the latter gradually and barely began to stabilize party politics.

The quasi-civilianization of the military regime during the 1960s involved however the risk of returning to the military regime at any time. The president possessed enormous power without being checked by the legislative. Quasi-civilianization was broken in the early 1970s when the regime was confronted with the rapidly expanding opposition

---

Movement was expanded from rural areas to whole society. There were for instance Urban New Village Movement, Factory New Village Movement, and School New Village Movement.
forces that destabilized its political base and external changes and the détente between the PRC and the United States that undermined its political ideology of anti-communism. Unlike the KMT party-state’s shift from hard to soft authoritarianism in the 1970s, the Park regime took the reverse course, a shift from quasi-civilianized military regime to hyper-military.

Since the late-1960s, oppositional forces grew not only in opposition parties, but also within the ruling party when President Park attempted to amend the constitution in 1969 for his third term. The 1971 general assembly election results shocked the military regime because the ruling DRP could not defend its two-third seats in the parliament. Park mounted an autogolpe in October 1972. He dissolved the National Assembly, declared martial law, and announced the yushin (meaning restoration, a term borrowed from the Japanese Meiji Restoration) constitution. According to the yushin constitution, the president is: given unlimited power for life without checks from other institutions; elected by the National Conference for Unification instead of direct election by the people; and entitled to appoint one third of the National Assembly, to dissolve it, and to declare emergency measures. The yushin constitution brought about a highly centralized and militarized “quasi-wartime state” (H.-A. Kim, 2004, p. 140).

The political institutions in South Korea were gutted under the yushin regime, which closed the population’s political access to the power centre, destroyed existing consultative mechanism, and generally destabilized political institutions. Even the ruling DRP was sidelined. Politics under the yushin regime came to a halt through “ultra-politics” (Žižek, 2000), which destroy politics through the militarization of politics: politics as warfare (p. 190).
The periodic emergency decrees and executions of political dissidents did not destroy the opposition forces. In the late 1970s, the *yushin* regime encountered intensified protests led by diverse political and social groups, like students, politicians, and women workers and ended with the assassination of Park, Chung-hee by the chief of his formidable security apparatus, the KCIA, in October 1979.

The military regime’s quasi-civilianization in the 1960s widened the public sphere. Yet, the rapid growth of opposition movement forced the military regime to give up quasi-civilianization and more undertake hyper-militarization, which undermined the political institutions of electoral politics and party systems. Such a move rather promoted extra-parliamentary movements for democratization and free spaces, such as study groups in universities and churches, while shrinking institutional spaces.

**The Nexus of Domination Form with Collective Identities**

The preceding discussion on the Taiwanese party-state and the South Korean military regime shows significant differences in the pre-transitional domination forms between the two countries. I analyzed Taiwanese unipartism and South Korean antipartism by exploring differences in their origin and stability, political manoeuvre against social forces, and transformation of institutional operation. In this section, I will show how these three differences of domination forms produced conditions facilitating construction of different collective identities by democratic movements in Taiwan and South Korea. The origins and institutional stability of domination form created conditions pertaining to choices of venues and mobilizing strategies of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements’ collective identities. Political manoeuvres against oppositional forces are
related to politics of boundary control, i.e. hypo-politicizing or anti-politicizing others, and attendant to the formation of political or anti-political collective identities. The transformation of the institutional operation of domination forms demonstrates the main challenges to democratization.

Firstly, the KMT began as a non-communist revolutionary party that built the party-state regime, just as the Mexico’s PRI and Turkey’s RPP, while the South Korean military is the product of the Korean War, which lacked both a well-defined revolutionary idea and party organization. The KMT led the Chinese Civil War against the CPC to which the Cold War was appended as a postlude. The KMT party-state in Taiwan was more the product of the Chinese Civil War than that of the Cold War. Yet, the two Koreas were both products of the Cold War. The North Korean Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the South Korean Republic of Korea (ROK) were established in 1948. State institutions and political representation had to be organized from scratch in South Korea. State and political institutions were constantly subject to non-political processes and provided no institutional stability.

The origins of the two domination forms brought about different dynamics and effectiveness of political institutions. In Taiwan, political institutions were stabilized and utilized by the regime for the reproduction of its dominance and legitimacy and by the opposition for creating free spaces at the subnational level, like local elections. In contrast, they were unstable in South Korea and often sidelined by the regime to preserve its dominance and opposition forces activated the extra-institutional arena.

Secondly, Taiwanese and South Korean domination forms implemented hypo-politicizing and anti-politicizing operations against opposition forces. These operations
formed identity fields that facilitated different natures of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements’ collective identities.

Two bloody operations, the 228 incident in 1947 (see Chapter 4) and the subsequent White Terror under the Martial Law since 1949, represented the central KMT party-state less as a “settler state” (qianzhanzhe guojia) making the settled land settlers’ own home while sustaining independence from the mother state (Wakabayashi, 2000, pp. 258-262; Weitzer, 1990, pp. 24-28) than as a foreign regime (walai zhengquan) expelled from the mainland and conquering and colonizing the islanders for the mainland’s recovery (Z. Huang, 2010; Jacobs, 2013). These incidents sowed the seeds of ethno-politics and intermingled mainland politics with island politics. Island society was hypo-politicized, or its political displacement, and blockaded from national politics by those two operations through which politics descended to local autonomy and ascended beyond the island. The party-state practically substituted provincial island and supranational mainland politics for Taiwanese national politics. The construction of Taiwanese consciousness by the dangwai movement was a counter-operation against hypo-politicization to besiege the KMT-dominating national politics from the local.

The antipartism of the South Korean military regime militarized South Korean society. The yushin regime molded South Korean society, as Park, Chung-hee put it, into a “quasi-state of war…although actually not in a war” (Kyunghyang Daily, 1974). The real threat derived not from North Korea but from “absurd words and deeds” of the opposition movement. “National consensus and unity” became the primary goal of the yushin regime’s “security-first policy.” The Park regime emphasised that “social evil that impedes national consensus and unity is much more frightening than communists”
(Maeilgyeongje, 1976a). The regime transformed the society into a military base that “reconstructs whole territory into an industrialization zone, the whole industry into export industry, the whole national power into production power” (Maeilgyeongje, 1973). The militarization of society aimed at unified mobilization for economic development on which the regime based its legitimacy. The antipolitics destabilized political institutions. Instead of approaching mal-functioning political institutions, the democratic movement constructed minjung identity as a counteroperation against anti-politicization to activate the social forces under the quasi-war situation and to besiege the military-regime-led central politics from the marginalized social.

Thirdly, the transformation of Taiwanese and South Korean domination forms—from authoritarian unipartism to pragmatic party-state in Taiwan and from quasi-civilianized military regime to the hyper-militarized in South Korea—reveals how differently they institutionally operated in relation to the state and the primary challenge to democratization. The KMT blurred the border line between the party and the state. The party as the engine was built into state- and nation-building. The emergence and invention of the modern state and nation is inseparably interconnected with the revolutionary party and the party usually precedes the state and nation. The South Korean military primarily constituted only a part of the numerous state institutions and did not precede the state; rather, it was formed within the state for a specific purpose achieved through a specific logic, security through violence not governing through politics. Under the South Korean military regime, the part or the military, swallowed up the whole or the state. The military inflated its personnel, practices, organizations, ideologies to the state and imposed them on society.
The differences in relations between the domination forms and the states raise different key tasks for democratization in both countries. In Taiwan, democratization required disembedding the party from state institutions and processes at all levels. De-KMTization of the state—the separation of the KMT from the state and the introduction of multipartism—was the primary challenge to the democratization in Taiwan. In South Korea, democratic process demanded re-placement of the military back to its original place at the centralized level. Demilitarization of the state or its civilianization constituted the main object of democratization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-3 Domination Forms in South Korea and Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taiwanese Party-state (unipartism)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Genesis</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domination form and the state</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domination form and society</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stability and the change of the domination form</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEVELOPMENTAL ALLIANCES IN TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA**

To be sustained, the domination forms should forge alliances upon which they can rely and through which they can reproduce themselves and implement their hegemonic projects. The Taiwanese party-state and South Korean military regime removed political competitors, forged developmental projects combining security and development, and
built alliances around their domination forms. Developmental alliances under authoritarian domination forms render alliance-building in purely pluralistic ways—plurality of autonomous collective actors and their free competitions and unrestrained access to political institutions—and corporatist ways—the presence of social actors representing interests of certain sectors as monopolies and institutionalized arrangements between the state and those actors—unavailable and impractical.  

The Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes invented and inculcated development as supreme interests encompassing, subordinating, and representing interests of social groups within their societies. Development was presented and imposed as national-popular projects on the population that overrode competing projects. As I showed in the preceding sections, the Taiwanese party-state’s developmental project began at first with the aim to recover the mainland; since the late 1960s, however, the emphasis shifted to island development with limited opening of the national political arena. Both periods required the party-state to create a political alliance to legitimize the émigré regime and its constitutional fiction. The South Korean military regime’s developmental project began with the aim to displace corrupt government and to emplace “Korean style of democracy.” But since the late 1960s, the focus shifted to industrial development with strict closure of the institutional political arena. During the two

---

14 Yet, the absence of organizational autonomy of social actors and their unrestrained and competitive input into public institutions does not necessarily premise the presence of social actors representing interests of certain sectors as monopoly and of institutionalized arrangements between the state and those actors. Corporate structures—regardless of relative autonomous, horizontal, and cooperative “democratic corporatism” in democratic polity or relative non-autonomous, vertical, and command-type “state corporatism” in an authoritarian polity (Katzenstein, 1985; Schmitter, 1974)—were established under the initiative of developmental regimes where corporatist bodies and processes constituted a part of the dominant institutions as their tentacles. Therefore, corporate functions to represent and negotiate sectoral interests were rarely expected under the state-led corporate structure, especially for popular sectors as the term “corporatism without labor” (Pempel & Tsunekawa, 1979; West, 1987) reveals.
periods, the regime was compelled to generate an alliance to legitimize the militarization of state and society.

A developmental alliance implements those projects through the articulation of domination and direction. According to Gramsci (1971), domination “tends to ‘liquidate’ or to subjugate” “antagonistic groups” whereas direction “leads kindred and allied groups” and reduces the former’s conflict potential (p. 57). South Korean and Taiwanese developmental alliances reveal dissimilar interaction and articulation between domination and direction.

In this section, I analyze the Taiwanese two dual structures and South Korean military-chaebol alliance. The KMT party-state built a political dual (national and local) structure and an economic dual (public-private) structure along the ethno-national line, i.e. mainlanders dominate national politics and state-led upstream industries while local Taiwanese were assigned local politics and private downstream industries. The South Korean military regime established the highly-centralized alliance between military-chaebol, which deprived popular sectors of political and social rights. For Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements, in the 1980s these two alliances produced different raw material of identity work that was processed into an ethno-national Taiwanese identity and a popular-class South Korean minjung identity in democratic processes.

**Taiwanese Two dual structures: Interdependent Domination**

The edifice of the KMT party-state was built upon two pillars or two dual structures: the dual structure of national and non-national political elites (M.-t. Chen, 1996; Wakabayashi, 1992; N.-t. Wu, 1987) and the dual economic structure of public and
private sectors (J. Liu, 1991; R. Wade, 1990; N. Wu, 1991). Their construction derived from constraints built into the domination form, particularly the extended Civil War and émigré regime rather than from the intentional architectural design of the regime. Therefore, despite their different loci the two structures were interlocked. The two dual structures served as the basis for the domination of the KMT party-state before democratization and liberalization set in motion in the mid-1980s.

**Political Dual structure: National and Local**

The KMT party-state built a dual structure dividing politics into national and non-national politics. Before the mid-1980s, the ruling national and local elites inhabited different political loci and rarely shared their habitats. The ruling elites represented by the KMT’s Central Standing Committee prevailed in national politics and dominated local elites—most were landlords, gentry, or members of influential families in a county or city—whose political locus was fixed on cities and counties (Wakabayashi, 1992; N.-t. Wu, 1987). With the closure of national politics, the local elites’ arena was limited to local politics, which was significant for national politics on account of the KMT’s weak foothold in Taiwanese society.

Local elections were harnessed as a political device to address the unsteady foundation of the émigré party-state. They were appropriated by the KMT party-state in the service of its political vehicle, which offered a passageway recruiting native elites and distributing resources to coopt native populations. Local elections functioned as a binding agent between the formal party and informal native social forces and as a democratic façade by allowing native Taiwanese access to subnational politics (T. Cheng, 1989, p.
The opening of local politics in 1950 promoted the emergence of local factions\(^\text{15}\) (\textit{difang paixi}) in Taiwan, i.e. the rise of local factions was deeply intertwined with the political process of the KMT’s taking root in Taiwan (Bosco, 1994, pp. 120-123; Chao, 1989, p. 47; Gallin, 1968, pp. 385-391; Jacobs, 1980, pp. 114-115; Tien, 1989, p. 167; N.-t. Wu, 1987, pp. 221-224). Local factions in Taiwan before the mid-1980s showed organizationally a patron-client relationship.

Wu, Nai-the (1987) contends that features of Taiwanese clientelism are its dualism between national ruling elites and local elites, establishment and maintenance initiated by the KMT party-state, and society-scale (pp. 337-346). Firstly, before the mid-1980s, the mainlander dominated the national ruling groups while local elites were mainly composed of native Taiwanese. Secondly, the KMT party-state as a patron promoted local factions to ensure its rule over Taiwan. The KMT and local factions comfortably secured two-thirds of the popular vote and three-quarters of the seats in the Provincial Assembly, county magistrate, and city mayoral elections (Y.-h. Chu & Lin, 2001, pp. 115-116). The KMT permitted local elites to enjoy local monopolistic rights for economic activities, a variety of economic privileges like public contracts, speculation for urban planning, and special loans and credits, and even illegal economic activities (M.-t. Chen, 1996, pp. 176-177). Thirdly, the KMT stabilized its domination through quasi-institutionalization of pyramidal patron-client network. Nearly one-hundred local factions

\(^{15}\) Factions are conflict groups concerned with political power and spoils but are not corporate. They are organized and led by personalist leadership based on diverse principles but not primarily ideology or policy (Landé, 1977, p. xxxii; Nicholas, 1968, pp. 24-29).
were involved in local elections between the early-1950s and 2000 (Tien, 1996, p. 9; C.-I. Wu, 2001, p. 55).

The political dual structure produced hypo-politicizing effects on native Taiwanese before the late 1970s who could not find a pathway into national politics. While category-based organizations provide impersonal and interpersonal collective identity for their members and corporate organizations to offer the foundation for groupness and collective mobility, clientelist groups with their hierarchical, particularistic, dyadic, and individualistic features lack such horizontal and collective threads, which knit local politics together and develop trans-local politics. The dual structure of political elites forestalled the formation of trans-ethnic identity and deprived democratization of national politics of its mobilizing power against the regime pursuing “national interests.” The politics of the native Taiwanese were contained within the local spaces where they were prevented from sublimating local interests to national interests and thereby from establishing translocal or a national political machine, party. The electoral competitions at the subnational level revolved around interests and influence but not power to rule, govern, and change.

Clientelism based on the political dual structure began to change with the gradual opening of the national politics to local Taiwanese and with the rise of Taiwanese national identity in the 1980s. Although the KMT played a dominant role as patron over local factions, their relationship was mutually interdependent. Unlike the relationship of the party-state with its diverse corporatist organizations, local factions were given free space in which to develop local politics.
Politics of local factions was not just “local-level politics,” which is incomplete due to its dependence on the actors outside the local, i.e. on the national elites, but also “local politics” in which local public events are locally determined (Swartz, 1968, p. 1). The island-wide institutionalization of electoral patron-client relationships between the ruling national and local elites increased the bargaining power of the latter as an “equal partner” (Kau, 1996, p. 301) as the usual marriage between election and clientelism (Scott, 1972, p. 109). In the 1990s, local factions extended in cooperation with the first Taiwanese president Lee, Teng-hui the spatial scale of their operation and built translocal alliances (M.-t. Chen, 1996) that intervened into the national politics by enforcing ruling national elites to prioritize “Taiwan first” policy to KMT’s traditional reunification agenda (C.-l. Wu, 2001, p. 101).

To sum up, the dual structure of ruling national elites and local elites first deterred the formation of translocal identity and politics and disrupted the union of those identity and politics with democratization while it permitted the development of local politics and the establishment of political institutions at least at the local level. It is therefore obvious that alternative national politics should begin outside the local politics in order to develop a counter-national-identity against the KMT version of hegemonic Chinese identity while starting at the local level only where political institutions did work. To escape the hypo-politicization trap and political displacement, Taiwanese opposition groups were forced to establish a political institution carrying on and out alternative national politics, which had to begin at the local level where they were able or allowed to mobilize their resources. It is therefore no wonder that dangwai groups worked out a strategy beleaguering the KMT party-state from local politics in the 1980s.
**Economic Dual structure: Public and Private**

The other dual structure of the Taiwanese developmental alliance is the public-private industrial dualism. Liu, Jinqing (1991) claims that one of the key features of the Taiwanese economy is that public and quasipublic enterprises nearly monopolized major upstream and capital-intensive industries—such as heavy machinery, steel, petroleum, power, and shipbuilding—oriented to the domestic market while private SMEs oriented the downstream and labour-intensive industries—such as textiles, electronics, food, and chemicals—to external markets.¹⁶ In this dualist public-private structure (*gongsi liang yuan jiegou*), Liu (1991) argues that the KMT party-state constructed a vertical division of labour between public and private sectors where the public sector occupied upstream industries and supplied basic products to private downstream industries. Public corporations played crucial role in leading economy, for they were, as Wade (1990) contends, concentrated in the “commanding heights” of industries and served as policy instruments to influence private sectors with price, investment, and risk-taking policies (pp. 175-182).

The material base for the formation of public-private dual structure was derived from the party-state’s taking over of enormous colonial properties, which accounted for 90 percent of capital in postwar Taiwan (J. Liu, 1991, p. 25; Y. Wu, 2005, pp. 41-43; D. Xu, 1997, p. 401). Based on the nationalization of those inherited properties, the KMT party-state built huge monopolistic public and quasi-public sectors, including KMT party-

---

¹⁶ The domestic market is dominated by upstream public corporations and middlstream large private corporations whereas downstream SMEs are oriented to export market (Y. Wu, 2005, pp. 23-24).
enterprises\textsuperscript{17} and those funded and jointly owned by the government (Ngo, 2005, pp. 85-88). It constituted the firm basis for the KMT party-state to garner and generate political support as well as to steer its developmental course.

The political base for the economic dual structure derived from Sun, Yat-sen’s sanminzhuyi, in particular the principle of people’s livelihood (Gold, 1991, p. 48; J. Liu, 1991, p. 26; Y. Wu, 2005, p. 30). To solve the problem of the people’s livelihood, Sun, Yat-sen (1986a) emphasized that “China has not only to regulate private capital but also to develop national capital” which was formed through the development of state or public corporations in the strategically significant industries, including transportation, manufacturing, and mining enterprises (pp. 391-393).\textsuperscript{18} Sanminzhuyi provided justification for the formation and maintenance of ostensibly socialist-like state capitalism and the regulation of private capital. The party-state was vigilant with the emergence of large native private capital for they could threaten the regime’s dominance over Taiwanese society (T.-j. Cheng, 1991, p. 160; Y.-h. Chu, 1989, p. 666; P. B. Evans, 1995, p. 55).

The dual structure built two different socio-economic spheres that brought about dissimilar identity effects. Public sectors were under the tight control of the KMT party-state. The KMT and its affiliated organizations were omnipresent in state-owned enterprises. The KMT established a corporatist system at the national level that was like Japan’s “corporatism without labour” in which interests of capital are represented at the

\textsuperscript{17} KMT owned huge assets in a variety of fields ranging from mass media, petrochemicals, and construction to finance, which were managed by seven holding companies (D. Xu, 1997). According to a 1993 report of the KMT-owned Central Daily, the KMT’s total assets accounted for at least 6.2 percent of GDP and over 10 percent of the private enterprises (quoted in D. Xu, 1997, p. 400). Unlike public corporations, party enterprises were exempted from strict audit control by the Control Yuan because they were private, not public, enterprises.

\textsuperscript{18} William Kirby (1990) suggests that Sun’s idea was read by his successors as statist to nationalize upstream industries and create state capital (p. 125).
national level while those of workers were absent at the national level and reduced to and reproduced at the plant-level.

The corporatist system of the party-state primarily concerned the provision of legal frameworks and economic benefits for public enterprises. Trade unions were mainly organized in public enterprises where the regime gave workers benefits or rent in exchange for their political support or compliance with the regime (M.-s. Ho, 2010a; C.-L. Huang, 1999, pp. 169-172). Therefore, trade unions before the transition were considered by many observers as “transmission belts” for the quasi-Leninist party or “an instrument of party policy” (Minns & Tierney, 2003, p. 111; Tien, 1989, p. 45).

While the state’s intervention into labour affairs worked indirectly (Deyo, 1989, p. 111; Hsiao, 1992, pp. 156-157), the KMT was ubiquitous at trade unions’ national, local, and plant levels. Public sector trade unions and activities were entangled with the KMT (C.-c. Lin, 1992), which was not necessarily negative for workers. A Taiwanese worker said in the interview with this author:

It is not like suppression or repression by the KMT. It’s like you have a trade union and this represents you, care about workers. It’s the image of the caring about workers by the KMT…. There was no repression of the KMT.

Trade unions are subsidized by the KMT.

The KMT was diligent in politically mobilizing workers and reproducing their identity as Chinese in the public sectors. They were mobilized to be demobilized and politicized to be hypo-politicized. Meetings to study Sun, Yat-sen’s teachings were regularly held in public enterprises while their workers were often mobilized for anti-communist campaigns, urged to support soldiers, and forced to integrate work and
nonwork life as if factory life were family life (M.-s. Ho, 2010a, pp. 567-570; 2014b, pp. 74-78). What took place in public sectors in the dualistic structure was not just the state’s engagement in the “control of labor at the plant level” (C.-L. Huang, 1999, pp. 173-174) and workers’ habituation to “the role of labor aristocrats” (M.-s. Ho, 2014a, 2014b), but also the reproduction of Chinese national identity under the implicit ethnic division. Burawoy (1985) once wrote that state socialism characteristically fuses production politics with state politics (p. 158) but Taiwanese state capitalism fused production politics with nationalist politics in public sectors. National identity overrode and deterred the formation of other identities in public sectors.

As happened with politics at the national level, native Taiwanese were excluded from the upstream industries. The barriers of the dual structure, however, opened indigenous SMEs to a free space in the export market. Since the 1960s, the rapid growth of export and economic development were attributed to those private Taiwanese SMEs of which share in manufacturing exports reached three-fourths in 1982 (W. w. Chu, 1999, p. 10). The core of the Taiwanese EOI was composed of a myriad of connected subcontracting networks that vertically and horizontally linked SMEs—led by laoban (bosses of private enterprises)—with international buyers. Left outside the state space and unbridled by nationalist politics, these networks constructed identity fields unlike the loyal “Chinese.” The reproduction of EOI development was predicated upon the subcontracting networks that produced laoban, including would-be bosses. According to one calculation, one out of every thirty is a laoban in Taiwan, literally a “boss island”

---

19 The annual growth rate of Taiwanese GDP was 9.7 percent in the 1960s and 9.8 percent in the 1970s while that of exports during the same period was 26 percent and 29.5 percent, respectively. Exports accounted for only 8 percent of GDP in 1952 but it climbed to 30.4 percent in 1970 and 52.6 percent in 1980 (W. w. Chu, 2014, pp. 219-220).
(Numazaki, 1996, p. 299; Shieh, 1992). Shie, Guo-shyong (1992) named this phenomenon “spin-off” where wage workers (heishou, literally black hands) become their own bosses and make inroads into export markets along the unfolded subcontracting networks. Spin-off should bring forth “exit” effects instead of “voice,” for heishou endure low wages and poor working conditions to learn skills, collect resources for their future workshops, and eventually to leap up to laoban (Shieh, 1992, p. 215).

The networked labour processes, i.e. not confined to one workshop, rendered the work of heishou transient towards entrepreneurship and blurred the boundary between heishou and laoban (Niehoff, 1987; Stites, 1985). Under such conditions, the heishou became the “reserve army” for the laoban (Numazaki, 1996, p. 298). Workers who were hung up in the webs of the Taiwanese subcontract system developed neither loyal Chinese national identity nor class identity; rather, they constructed an identity that could both circumvent the party-state’s penetration and evade its repression.

The émigré KMT party-state’s two dual structures were the basic framework to survive, dominate, and direct. Chinese consciousness as national identity was constructed and reproduced at the national level politics and in upstream public sectors while the formation of counterhegemonic identities was deterred at local level politics and in downstream private sectors. The alliance between national and local elites and between public and private sectors was not built upon unilateral dominance of the former over the latter but upon their interdependence. Therefore, how they shaped relations was likely to be a form of negotiation rather than confrontation and to bring about reconstruction of the domination form and its hegemonic project instead of destruction.
South Korean alliances for development were quite straightforward compared with its Taiwanese counterpart. Cheng, Tun-jen (1991) contends that the underlying social structure of the South Korean developmental alliance was solid and unified while that of its Taiwanese counterpart was fluid and fragmented (pp. 158-159). In South Korea the Taiwanese two dualist structures were absent. The South Korean military regime’s intervention into the process of development was direct and deep and selective. The military regime was the prime decision-maker deciding who is entitled to receive financial resources and which industries are to be promoted. The military-chaebol nexus constituted the core of the developmental alliance. Unlike the Taiwanese émigré KMT party-state, the maintenance and reproduction of the South Korean regime drew neither on the clientelist political ties with local political elites nor on the corporatist ideological imposition of a fictitious nation on public sectors.

The military regime built military-chaebol alliance was highly centralized and economic alliance. It destabilized political institutions that may transform and channel social interests and public voices into political decisions and policies. The military-chaebol alliance or the “sword-won [South Korean currency] alliance” (T.-j. Cheng, 1991; Koo & Kim, 1992) precluded collectively organized interest formulations, such as corporatism and pluralism. The regime periodically mobilized the population through populist appeals, but it lacked both Taiwanese pre-emptive corporatism and Latin American corporatism with collective interest representation. The South Korean military regime integrated large capitalists in the alliance through clientelist ties. Although the purpose of these clientelist ties shared the same goal as the Taiwanese political dual
structure, i.e. the generation of political legitimacy, their means were economic performance rather than votes as was the case in Taiwan. The absence of political legitimacy and the instability of the political foundation forced the military regime to seek its legitimacy in economic performances.

The crucial moments of the growth of *chaebol* resulted from the regime’s political decisions. Before the mid-1950s, the term *chaebol* was used in South Korea to designate Japanese large conglomerates, *zaibatsu*. Yet, *chaebol* as a term designating large South Korean corporations began to gain currency but with a disparaging connotation in the late 1950s. Unlike Taiwan, nationalization of former Japanese-owned enterprises under Japanese colonial rule was rescinded and privatization was accelerated in South Korea. Nearly ninety percent of total values of seized Japanese enterprises were sold to South Koreans between 1953 and 1957 (National Archives of Korea, 2012, pp. 21-22). Since the mid-1950s, the *chaebol* began to denote business tycoons, such as the Samsung’s founder Lee, Byong-chol whose close connections with political elites enabled the company to receive preferential treatment in purchasing those enterprises and to receive US aid. The military regime had initially repressed the emerging *chaebols* during its junta period (1961-1963) to win popular support; however, it soon shifted its policy to cooptation, when it transformed into a quasi-civilization regime for *chaebols* served both

---

20 Those moments are at first the disposition of seized Japanese property and distribution of foreign aid goods and funds in the 1950s, the Vietnam War between mid-1960s and mid-1970s and the HCI investment and Middle-East Boom during the 1970s.

21 *Chaebol* is a word combining two Chinese characters, *chae* (wealth) and *bol* (clan). The same Chinese characters are used in South Korea, Japan (pronounced *zaibatsu*), and China (pronounced *caifa*) to indicate large conglomerates owned and controlled by a family or a group of families. South Korean *chaebol* took after Japanese *zaibatsu* in the Empire of Japan in that they formed monopolies in major industries and were deeply intertwined with political parties and affairs. In Taiwan, there is no such comparable family-owned and family-controlled conglomerates. Relatively similar types of enterprises are *quanxigyi* (related enterprise) in which different sizes and fields of firms are clustered around a group of people linked through diverse relationships not limited to family relationships (Fields, 1995).
as a pipeline for political funds and important subordinate partners for economic
development to justify military or quasi-military rule. It was reported that the collusion
between political elites and chaebols grew from case-by-case to more systemized (Dong-
A Daily, 1966).

In the face of severe economic problems, the military regimes desperately sought to
demonstrate their excellence in economic performances as a primary foundation for their
legitimacy, which drove them to swiftly abandon their anti-chaebol policy and move to
promote them (E. M. Kim, 1997; Koo & Kim, 1992). For instance, most SMEs were
excluded from the import tariff exemptions and more than two thirds of foreign
investments flowed into chaebols (Regnier, 1993, pp. 27-28).22

Chaebols expressed their readiness to serve the military regime already in the early
Byong-chol, the founder of Samsung and then-chair of the Federation of Korean
Industries (FKI), blatantly requested that the military regime abandon the agriculture first
policy and the promotion of SMEs; instead, he wanted the regime to foster large
corporations by channelling foreign loans and public investment capital to the
construction of large factories that would absorb the rural population and increase the
country’s GDP (Kyunghyang Daily, 1963b). Lee’s plans sent the regime a clear message
that it would fulfill two preconditions for development, the unlimited supply of low wage
labour force and of resources for chaebols, i.e. the sword-won alliance at the cost of
popular sectors. Military regimes adopted industrial policies that prioritized credit

22 SMEs accounted for 99.1 percent of the total number of enterprises, 78.1 percent of employees, and 66.3
percent of the production of added values in 1960, but those ratios dramatically decreased to 49.7 percent,
54.3 percent, and 36.2 percent in 1984 respectively (H.-K. Kim, 1988, pp. 21-22).
allocation, sectoral industrial policy, and inflationary finance. Such a selective and particularistic approach is starkly contrasted with the rather universalistic Taiwanese approach, such as fiscal incentives and strict control on inflation (T.-j. Cheng, 1991; Hattori & Sato, 1996; Scitovsky, 1985).

The sword-won alliance culminated in the third FYEDP starting in 1972, the first year of the yushin regime. With the third FYEDP aiming at export- and industrial-deepening, the regime initiated more aggressive sector- and firm-specific activism—expressed in the excessive capital investment into Heavy and Chemical Industries (HCI), including steel, shipbuilding, automobile, machinery, chemicals, and electronics, based on monetary and credit policy, which is considerably dependent on the regime’s discretionary power. The South Korean particularistic and selective policy called “big push,” is starkly contrasted with that of the KMT regime, which promoted light and high-skill light industry on the basis of fiscal incentives, or “mild push” (T.-j. Cheng, 1991; Dollar & Sokoloff, 1994; Haggard, 1998). The effects of the developmental alliance were obvious: one hundred chaebols received more than half the policy and general bank loans between 1972 and 1979 (Haggard & Moon, 1993, p. 79) and the ratio of fifty larges chaebols in GDP grew from 32 percent in 1973 to 49 percent in 1980 (Haggard & Moon, 1990, p. 218).

The sword-won alliance was established through the exclusion, repression, and exploitation of the wider population. Under quasi-civilian regime in the 1960s, primary protest participants were limited to political dissidents and students and the anti-government protests took the form of sporadic mass mobilisations. Yet, under the yushin
regime, anti-development-alliance began to be formed in which marginalized politicians and repressed intellectuals participated along with exploited subaltern groups.

Table 3- 4 Prisoners of Conscience grouped in occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students &amp; Youth</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>1,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers &amp; Peasants</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>242</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists &amp; Writers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Human Rights Committee National Council of Church in Korea (KNCC) (1987)

When quasi-civilianization turned into a fiasco in the late 1960s, the military regime was forced to re-build the developmental alliance, with the military-chaebol alliance replacing the lack of political legitimacy with economic performance. The military-chaebol alliance brought about rapid economic development, which spared the opposition movements a fine and complex narrative strategy to construct collective identity against the regime, but at the cost of the larger population. Park, Sun-ae, a former member of the Wonpoong union in the 1970s and the early 1980s, illustrated:

Repressions against our union more strengthened our organization than undermined it. They helped us unite, simultaneously recognize the wrongdoings jointly committed by the management and the government and raise our interest in politics…We know why Park, Chung-hee was assassinated and what happened in Kwangju [in 1980] (personal interview, Oct. 27, 2014).

The sword-won alliance generated a condition that facilitated the opposition movements to besiege the regime through a wide, multi-class coalition. The absence of political channels and the closure of the developmental alliance created a field where
claims for political rights and economic justice were likely to be directed to the same target and to be overlapped. As will be seen in the next section and Chapter 4, the wave of women workers’ struggles and urban riots in the late 1970s were the expression of the dissatisfaction of the wide population against the exclusionary sword-won alliance.

The Nexus of Developmental Alliances with Collective Identities

The preceding discussion on the Taiwanese two dual structures and the South Korean sword-won alliance shows significant differences in the pre-transitional developmental alliances between the two countries. Those differences can be seen at first in their different foundations for categorical identities, ethno-national or popular-class categories, and genres of contention and dynamics of democratization, negotiated, or confrontational contention and transition.

Firstly, Taiwanese and South Korean developmental alliances provided conditions of different categories of collective identity formation. The Taiwanese two dual structures were built along the mainlander-islander binary, which can be processed into ethno-national category of collective identities by opposition movements against the KMT version of the Chinese nation. In contrast, the South Korean military-chaebol alliance established a highly centralized exploitative machine. It sought its legitimacy in economic performance at the cost of the wider population and thereby destabilized political institutions, which was likely to be translatable into popular-class category of collective identities by democratic movement.

Local Taiwanese were hindered in accessing national politics and upstream industries dominated by mainlanders. They were prevented from building translocal
organizations beyond patron-client-based local factions while the development of working-class consciousness was forestalled in party-state-dominating public enterprises through pre-emptive incorporation of trade unions and local Taiwanese-led private enterprises through the weakening of interclass immobility from heishou (workers) to laoban (bosses)—wage workers’ existing class identity was formed by the still-not-existing and to-be-realized bosses’ identity. The South Korean developmental alliance built a hierarchical and exclusive coalition between the military and chaebols. It drove a growth-centred policy that offered privileged treatment of a handful of large conglomerates. It lacked both economic pre-emptive redistribution and a political safety valve to incorporate popular sectors. The closure from political participation and economic distribution made the regime’s intervention into popular sectors immediate and direct, even at the shop floor level (Koo, 2001, pp. 18-19), which also rendered the sword-won alliance highly visible to the public. Choi, Sun-young, who served as the former union leader of YH Corporation in 1979,²³ told her co-workers that even organizing a trade union in a factory was of high political import (personal interview, Nov. 06, 2014).

The formation of an ethno-national boundary was for Taiwanese democratic movements more likely to mobilize the local Taiwanese for democratization against the KMT party-state. The national level politics for sinicization constrained the ascent of local level politics: the native Taiwanese who lost the right to exercise influence over

²³ Between 9 and 11 August 1987 nearly two hundred women workers occupied headquarter of the then-opposition NDP to protest their employer’s business closure. When riot police stormed the building to disband workers, Kim, Gyeong-suk, a worker fell from the building and died. The YH union was one of the leading democratic unions in the 1970s and their occupation attracted national and international attention. It was perceived that the YH occupation precipitated the end of the yushin regime through the assassination of the President Park, Chung-hee by the chief of the KCIA on 26 October 1979.
national political institutions by the fictitiously imagined community outside the island. The possibility of forming other potentially competing identities, such as class identity, was hindered by the economic dual structure. When the overlap of political domination and economic exploitation was avoided, the ethno-national discourse appeared more likely for dangwai groups to mobilize against the KMT. In South Korea, drawing class-lines was more probable for organizing for democratization against the military-chaebol alliance. The alliance simply clustered the political and the economic into one project of the “modernization of the fatherland.” Antipolitics of the alliance involved the possibility that is likely to transform apolitical disturbances—like workers’ strikes at shop floors and the urban poor’s protests in slums and shanties—into political events through the immediate and direct intervention of the regime while the overlap of the political domination and economic exploitation dissolved the barriers between the genres of political freedom and economic justice.

Secondly, the Taiwanese and South Korean developmental alliances developed different boundary density of the developmental alliance, which influenced genres of internal or external boundary contention and dynamics of democratic transition. The boundary density of the developmental alliance refers to the degree of its permeability from and its independence of forces outside the alliance: the lower the alliance density, the more permeable and dependent on non-allied forces; the higher the density, the more the relation between the alliance and outsiders grow intense and confrontational. Differences in degrees of alliance density allow for particular configurations of identity fields that facilitate dispositions of collective identities as militant or non-militant. The interaction between the binary constituents of the Taiwanese two dual structures—
national/local elites and state-led upstream/Taiwanese-led downstream industries—unfolded interdependently often with negotiation while the South Korean developmental alliance was independent and confronting the dominated popular sectors outside the alliance.

Although in the Taiwanese two dual structures each binary—national and local, public and private—tightly policed its boundary, a transboundary of conversations and reciprocal negotiations existed because the dominant spheres depended upon the dominated. The boundary conversations and negotiations were unmistakably expressed through the mutual assimilation between the national and the local: the gradual opening of the national-level politics to the local populations through supplementary elections for legislative bodies and the Taiwanization of the KMT. As Chiang, Ching-kou’s 1987 remark “I am also a Taiwanese” revealed, such transboundary conversations and negotiations loosened the boundary patrol that hitherto continuously inscribed Chineseness as the peoplehood of the ROC on the surface of the upper structures. Democratization was the confluence of this negotiated transboundary move manifested in the rise of native Taiwanese within the KMT, in the ascendency of local factions to national politics (M.-t. Chen, 1996), and in the removal of obstacles to state-led industries (Y.-h. Chu, 1994a) after the second-half of the 1980s.

The South Korean military regime established the developmental alliance that monopolized political and economic resources. The military regime’s legitimacy was not attained through public political processes due to the instability of political institutions; rather, it was to be achieved through private economic processes inaccessible to public political processes. The South Korean alliance blocked boundary conversations and
negotiations with those outside the alliance, for its dominance was not dependent on politics that presupposed competitions, conversations, and negotiations. Not only were popular sectors excluded from the alliance and alienated from the resource allocation, but also politicians were not invited into the decision-making process. The South Korean developmental alliance constructed a closed system that destabilized political institutions and correspondingly compelled opposition movements to settle their claims outside the established institutions. The developmental alliance thereby created an environment in which opposition movements were more likely to select the claims with an anti-systemic and social orientation. Thus, the developmental alliance encouraged others to confront instead to converse with it. The counter-alliance between the minjung movement and the established opposition party eventually adopted extra-institutional mass street rallies to confront the military regime in the 1987 June Uprising.

CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed Taiwanese and South Korean developmental regimes and showed the nexus between these regimes and the identity fields they promoted. Firstly, I briefly introduced different features of Taiwanese and South Korean collective identities—Taiwanese consciousness and South Korean minjung—formed by democratic movements in their transitions. The Taiwanese democratic movement forged ethno-national Taiwanese identity with a system-reforming and institutional-politics orientation while its South Korean counterpart constructed class-centric minjung identity with anti-systemic and extra-institutional orientation. This chapter explored political and socio-economic
conditions of South Korean and Taiwanese developmental regimes, disaggregating them into domination form and developmental alliance.

The Taiwanese developmental regime was made up of unipartism and two dual structures. The émigré KMT imposed its gigantic party-state structure on Taiwan society and stabilized its domination. The juxtaposition of repression and reform, the 228 incident and land reform, reveals how and why the KMT party-state had to confront and negotiate with the local population and shows the contingent and necessary encounter between the deep domination form and interdependent alliance. Development increased from a marginal project to one that was national-popular and hegemonic brought about the interdependent dominance of national politics over the local and public industries to the private sectors.

The KMT party-state forced the local population to accept its pre-imagined community based on the fictitiousness disguising of the chasm between de jure and de facto sovereignty, which presupposed the hypo-politicization of the local population and its exclusion from national politics. When the UN deprived the ROC of its representation of China, the fiction the KMT pre-imagined and authored was proven to be a category-mistake that classified different nationhood space and state space into the ROC in Taiwan. Pragmatic unipartism emerged as a negotiator to fix that discord between de facto and de jure sovereign space lest a counter-hegemonic identity had been formed that would formulate counter-national-popular project. Stable political institutions and the gradual opening of the national politics and public industries to local politics and private industries smoothed the path for the transition and negotiation. These structural
conditions produced the identity field for the formation of Taiwanese consciousness with ethno-national, institution-oriented, and system-reforming features.

The South Korean developmental regime draws on the military regime and sword-won alliance. Its dominant institution, the military regime, lacked a revolutionary tradition, well-organized political party, and stable mass support. The military’s coercive and physical means were insufficient to generate and implement hegemonic project for it lacked consensual and moral grounds. The failure of quasi-civilianization compelled the military regime in the 1960s to marginalize political institutions and instead seek chaebol, its alliance partner in the economic realm. In contrast to the Taiwanese interdependent alliance, the sword-won alliance established independent and exclusive coalition, which reduced its legitimacy basis to economic performances. The performance-based and -oriented legitimacy resulted in the concentration and centralization of political power and economic resources in the hands of the developmental regime. It weakened public political institutions that could have channelled political voice and representation into established politics while strengthening chaebol, the private economic institutions.

The military regime’s antipolitics accelerated politicization of non-upper-classes excluded from the alliance and apolitical issues. The interactive escalation of antipolitics and politicization eventually drove the military regime to hyper-militarize society and to turn it into the quasi-war state against the anti-regime forces in the 1970s. The primary locus of political struggles was located outside the established politics where the borders between the political, economic, and social were blurred. These structural conditions
generated the identity field for the formation of the *minjung* identity with class-centric, extra-institution-oriented, and anti-systemic features.

So far, I focused on the political domination form and socio-economic alliance in South Korea and Taiwan. It primarily shows structural conditions for identity fields but does not reveal how those potential conditions were actualized into specific collective identity formation. In Chapter 4, I analyze how Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements processed and actualized the aforementioned virtual structural conditions and material into collective identities in the democratization process. I explore the generation of counterdiscourses and the emergence of democratic movements in Taiwan and South Korea. I then investigate how Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements retrieved and contemporized different collective memories and repeatedly reconstructed their collective identities depending on the different stages of democratization.
Chapter 4 Collective Identities and Democratic Transition

In the preceding chapter, through macrostructural comparison I showed the dissimilar natures of South Korean and Taiwanese developmental regimes and their different paths since the late 1960s. Particularly, the Taiwanese dominant institution, the KMT party-state, was transmogrified from authoritarian unipartism to the pragmatic unipartism in the late 1960s, whereas the South Korean regime metamorphosed from a quasi-civilianized military to hyper-militarized regime in the early 1970s. The variation in regime types or socio-economic structures is often attributable to the production of differences between South Korean and Taiwanese transitional dynamics—the South Korean transition was relatively short, dominated by disruptive and mass mobilization, and resulted from joint action between the elites in power and opposition groups while the Taiwanese transition was relative long, initiated by negotiation, and led by incumbent elites (T.-j. Cheng & Haggard, 1992; Huntington, 1991; Wakabayashi, 1997).

What I undertake in this chapter is to show that those differences of transitional dynamics in terms of intensity, length, forms, and leading forces are to be fully understood and explained only if shifts in collective identities are integrated into the analysis of transition. The purpose of this chapter is to show how South Korean and Taiwanese democratic movements narrated dissimilar macrostructural conditions, congealed them into different collective identities, and processed them into resources for the different transitions. Instead of focusing on identity-centred self-referential collective action, such as gay rights and separatist movements, I analyze interactive democratic and
identity processes by investigating collective identities of democratic movements and their shifting identities along with changing democratic processes. The present chapter shows that variations in collective identity construction and reconstruction produce different meanings and experiences of democratic and collective action processes. The role of the present chapter is less to analyze the different impacts of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements on democratization but more to explore which democratic transition was pursued and carried out through their identity and memory work and how their collective identities adapted the generalized value of democracy and democratic transition to their particular reality. The term “transition” itself is a narrative construct that defines changes within the shift of state institutions or modes of production. While reviewing the work of South Asian subaltern studies, Spivak (1988) argued that “the moment(s) of change,” unlike “this general definition [of] the great modes-of-production narrative,” should “be pluralized and plotted as confrontations rather than transition” (p. 197). In the democratic transition, plural confrontations often develop into a unifying front revolving around demands for democratization. Yet, this process and its meaning are affected by plural and mutually competing confrontations in which democracy serves as the common denominator running across multiple identities like partisan supporters, nationalists, feminists, unionists, and many others.

Identity work of social movements in democratization generally involves the generation of community of people as collective protagonists and mobilization to confront their antagonists and to transform the mundane status quo to momentous change. Democracy as the narrative initiator for this interpretive community does not necessarily mean an abstract ideal of universal principles but rather actual ideas and
practices cutting across plural confrontations, like democracy as national sovereignty, anti-corruption, transitional justice, or even marketization. The construction of collective identities in democratization is the process of contextualization of the universal value and ideal of democracy. Democratic movements construct collective identities not along the disembodied ideal of democracy but along the palpable ideas and practices of what is emotionally most appealing and strategically most effective. Hence their identity work cannot begin from scratch but must begin from tangible experiences and memories.

Democratic movements find their critical point of departure in questioning dominant discourses, official memories, hegemonic identities that pretend to be facts, unitary, and universal. Transition as confrontations emerges with the development of collective “counter-narratives” (Personal Narratives Group, 1989; Steinmetz, 1992) or “subversive stories” (Ewick & Silbey, 1995) that challenge the taken-for-granted discourses of counter-memories (Michel Foucault, 1984) that insert discontinuity and instability into the official memory and of contentious collective identities that present re-imagined community against the imposed collectivity.

South Korean and Taiwanese developmental regimes developed and mobilized developmental subjects for, along, and under their hegemonic projects of development. For those regimes, development does not only refer to changes of economy or survival strategy but also the project both being infused with élan and teleology. The Chinese nation in Taiwan and industrial soldiers in South Korea were designed to implement the regimes’ hegemonic projects. The KMT imposed its own version of Chineseness on local Taiwanese based on the metanarrative of modern Chinese nationalism as shared enterprises both by the CCP and the KMT (Callahan, 2012; Leibold, 2007, p. 156). It
provincialized, depoliticized, and displaced Taiwan. The South Korean military regimes produced disembodied mass as labour forces, such as industrial soldiers and export army, for industrial war through economic nationalism and developmental militarism. The popular sector was deprived of political and economic rights. Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea were inseparably intertwined with the challenge against those hegemonic identities sustained through dominant discourses and official memories.

I focus on the rise of South Korean and Taiwanese democratic movements and the construction and shift of their collective identities through counter-discourses and collective memories. The present chapter covers the period between the 1970s and the mid-1990s. Yet, I mainly focus on the era of the democratic transition from the 1980s to the early 1990s. I begin with the production of counter-narratives on new subjectivity against the South Korean and Taiwanese developmental regimes in the 1970s. I proceed to investigate development of democratic movements and their characteristics based on the analysis of the process of different collective identities and the movements’ attendant features in the 1980s. The last section explores interactions between transitional and identity processes based on the survey of collective memories. Before discussing the generalized and disembodied discourses of democracy and democratization and the effects of social movements on democratization, I explore and interrogate what stands behind those discourses and democratic movements.

**Xiangtu and Minjok Literatures as a Prelude**

With the change in the Taiwanese dominant unipartism to soft pragmatic unipartism and the South Korean quasi-civilianized military regime to hyper-militarism, opposition
forces began to develop new counter-narratives and new subjectivity against the hegemonic developmental subject. Interestingly, in the second-half of the 1970s similar literary discourses in South Korea and Taiwan emerged that undermined dominant discourses and paved the way for the construction of social movements’ new collective identities in the 1980s.

Changes of developmental regimes coincided with sweeping socio-political changes that generated an environment for “the third-world literature” (Jameson, 1986) where the split of the private and public is blurred, libidinal dynamics of individuals is not separated from political processes, and the story of private individual involves allegorization of the public society or “national allegories.” Taiwanese xiangtu and South Korean minjok literature showed that private lives and destinies of ordinary people from the rice fields to urban squatters to factories were inextricably interwoven into the regime’s hegemonic national project. Texts of the Taiwanese xiangtu (native soil) and South Korean minjok (nation) literatures brought to the foreground what had been so far suppressed as private, local, low, and marginalized. Ewick and Silbey (1995) argued that stories can be subversive when they generate the manifest nexus between the particular and the general instead of the former’s displacement in the latter. The xiangtu and minjok literatures challenged the public, national, high, and central meaning of the metanarratives of the developmental regimes’ hegemonic projects.

**Taiwanese Spatial Xiangtu Literature and Returning to the Reality**

Hypo-politicization or the political displacement of Taiwanese society draws upon fictitious sovereignty and fatung—the KMT is the sole legitimate ruler of the mainland
China represented by the ROC—which reduces Taiwan to a mere province of China or the ROC and justify the Temporary Provisions and Martial Law prohibiting new political parties (dangjin) and restricting newspapers (baojin).

The ROC’s expulsion from the UN in 1971 practically deprived Taiwan of its status of fictitious centre of the Chinese nation entitled with de jure Westphalian sovereignty. For the local population, de-provincializing Taiwan appeared to be the necessary step towards the hitherto closed national politics, which wittingly or unwittingly entails the provincialization of the official version of China and Chinese nation, i.e. dethroning China from the whole of Taiwan and making the former as one part of the latter.

The challenge to the dominant discourse began in the early 1970s. Proponents of xiangtu literature criticized then dominant literary modernism for its “art for art’s sake,” exile from the reality, and heavy Western-bias coinciding with ignorance of native Taiwanese culture (F. Chen, 2007, p. 34; Hsiau, 2003a, pp. 68-70; Z. Wang, 1992, p. 57). They put terms like “return,” “reality,” and “xiangtu” into wide circulation (Hsiau, 2003a, p. 69). Xiangtu refers to the land where people are born and live. Its meaning includes the abstract space and actual place. The main xiangtu literature debates (xiangtu wenxue lunzhan) emerged in 1977, a year of heightened confrontations through the successful mobilizations of dangwai groups both in the streets and in elections. Wang, Tuo (1977), a Taiwanese author and a dangwai activist, argued that what xiangtu literature reflects is people’s real life and desire and the social reality of diverse classes (including both producing classes and national bourgeois). Xiangtu served as a polysemous boundary-marker for it counterposes homeland to the modern West and small people to the KMT’s fictitious China or a handful of powerful politico-economic elites. Yet, the questions of
where those boundaries were to be drawn and where this social reality existed for those who wanted to return and inhabit split the *xiangtu* literature. The debates were in fact the “starting point of the identity question in Taiwanese society” (Z.-h. Lu, 1997).

The *xiangtu* debates were boiled down into two camps represented by two prominent leftist authors, Yeh, Shitao and Chen Yingzhen. Yeh (1977) argued that Taiwanese writers should hold Taiwan-centric views and strong “Taiwanese consciousness” (*Taiwan yishi*) to understand social reality, marked by the constant suffering from foreign colonial rulers and feudalism, and to be the “true representative” of the people. This Taiwanese consciousness was primarily made up of anti-imperialism and experiences of “national resistance.” Writers equipped with that consciousness based on “realism of a national style” produced the tradition of “Taiwanese *xiangtu* literature.” It was unclear whether Yeh’s (1977) “national” indicates the Chinese or Taiwanese, but he located it within local experiences of people and designated writings reflecting those experiences as “Taiwanese *xiangtu* literature.”

Chen (1977), a prominent mainland author, refuted Yeh’s argument asserting that the anti-imperialistic and anti-feudal realism of Taiwanese *xiangtu* literature had its root in the tradition of modern Chinese literature and was an integral part of China-oriented nationalism. The new literary development should therefore be understood as “Chinese Literature on Taiwan.” Yeh’s Taiwanese consciousness was nothing but a part of “Chinese consciousness;” for Chen, however, Yeh’s “cultural nationalism” that grew out of the native soil and was nurtured by local experiences appears to end in “separatism.”

Both Yeh and Chen shared a literary commitment to the real lives of working people and devalued the KMT version of Chinese nation that is past-and-there and not the
present-future-and-here. They also de-universalized and provincialized the KMT’s Chineseness. Yet, Yeh opposed the official Chinese nation by de-provincializing Taiwan and uplifting the localized community to the national while Chen found his alternative in modern Chinese nationalism positioned in the anti-imperial tradition of third world nationalism.

*xiangtu* literature deconstructed the KMT’s fictitious boundary of the Chinese nation and exposed the other side of development through committed realism. Yet, the *xiangtu* literature did not produce an alternatively imagined community. According to Hsiau, A-Chin (2003a, 2005), the reason was that limitation may lie in that *xiangtu* literature’s “return to the reality” was still played within the boundary of the Chinese nation that was not incompatible with the local identity. Further, the *xiangtu* debates simplified plural confrontations into the binary dominating-dominated conflicts laden with ethnic overtones, Taiwanese and Chinese. The identity narratives of *xiangtu* debates involved the danger of downplaying the conflicts produced by development and losing its critical realism and commitment to the reality (Tang, 2007, p. 65).

The discord between the disempowered real native soil (*xiangtu*) and the still powerful fictitious nation-state was unveiled. The accord between the local and the national can only be realized in the literary discourse through a political movement.

**South Korean Temporal Minjok Literature and Engagement in the Reality**

The Park, Chung-Hee military regime was confronted with massive protests in the mid-1960s because of the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and its former colonial ruler Japan in 1965. The declaration of an emergency decree was too late
to save Park’s lost reputation as a national hero and alleged national saviour. The regime traded its nationalist claims against the Japanese development funds, which served as resources for regime’s legitimacy and developmental alliance. However, the trade-off debunked the limit to top-down nationalism while opening a new way out for bottom-up nationalism.

In the xiangtu literature, its initial code of identity narratives is real and living space, as its literal meaning (native soil) implies, which provides the Taiwanese with a different history from the mainland and confers on them the legitimacy to insist on a new collective identity and for defying KMT’s Chinese identity. In minjok (nation) literature the primary code of identity narratives is its history narrated to preserve its continuity despite foreign rules and despotic domination. Therefore, the initial questions for minjok literature were not where but who and not how to return to the spatial reality but how to engage with the present reality.

As with the Taiwanese xiangtu, in the 1960s South Korean critical intellectuals challenged the dominant discourse with their critiques of literary modernism and its “pure literature” against which they proposed “literature of engagement.” The dominant meaning of minjok literature as anti-communist and anti-proletarian literature (Oh, 2011) was undermined in the late 1960s when critical intellectuals articulated literary realism with minjok literature in opposition to the Park regime’s top down economic nationalism.

The narrative of minjok literature emerged after the 1970s. Paik, Nak-chung (1975, 1978), one of the pioneers of minjok literature, argued that minjok literature is the historical product of “the very consciousness of national crisis.” The minjok literature narrative revised the familiar plot of the “formula story” (Loseke, 2011) or “canonical
story” (Polletta, 2009) of the nationalism of the colonized or biblical messianic narrative filled with themes of suffering, victim, death, and rebirth by adding the 1894 Peasant Revolt (Revolt) as the literature’s authentic origin (Paik, 1975, p. 38; Yeom, 1978, p. 41). The literature: proffered a collective agent for social change instead of emphasizing heroic individuals and sacrifices; narrated the armed revolt of peasants for economic reforms as the first bottom-up modernization, although they were eventually defeated by joint forces of the corrupt Chosun dynasty and imperialist Japan; constructed subaltern collectivity, instead of elites or messianic leaders, as the new modern subjectivity. And, it was argued that minjung is the substance of minjok and the minjok literature view is therefore required to draw upon the minjung’s view of history, the history of the subaltern or producing classes (Yeom, 1978, p. 37). This view does not look back through history but seeks to change the status quo. As Paik, Nak-chung (1975) argued, “the past traditions should be always preserved and transformed suitable to the substantial demands of minjung” (p. 35) and democratic movement would end up with naïve and liberal reform movement led by a handful of elites without the active participation of minjung (pp. 47-48).

Compared with xiangtu literature that devalued the KMT’s Chinese nationalism by proposing Taiwanese consciousness, the proponents of the minjok literature transvalued—subverting old values attached to a signifier and resignifying it by instilling it with new values—nation (minjok) and nationalism imposed by the military regime. Minjok literature exposed the emptiness of top-down or economic nationalism that served as an ideology for the sword-won alliance at the cost of popular sectors. It transvalued the dominant meaning of “minjok literature” (minjok munhak) as anti-proletarian literature
and as the museum of the dead tradition to the critical and resistant literature. The term *minjung* was also resignified by the *minjok* literature. *Minjung* was a neutral term widely circulated without any implication connoting anti-regime and -systemic resistance until the mid-1970s. Yet, the resignification of *minjung* deprived it of its semantic neutrality. The regime blamed its opponents for contaminating *minjung* with “impure ideology.” Paik, Nak-chung (1975) used *minjok* (national) consciousness and *minjung* consciousness interchangeably. Yeom, Mu-ung (1978) not only associated *minjung* with direct producers and subaltern classes, but also argued that *minjung* is the substance of *minjok* (nation) and the *minjok* literature view is therefore required to draw upon the *minjung*’s view of history (p. 37).

Increasingly, for the regime *minjung* became a taboo word that carried the import of an anti-military regime and anti-chaebol. In the late 1970s, the meaning of *minjung* was inverted and transvalued. To illustrate, a group of university students was charged with violation of emergency decrees for publicizing a statement simply entitled the “*Minjung Declaration*” in 1978 (Dong-A Daily, 1979). Student activists and intellectuals held solidary demonstrations for *minjung* and established night schools for workers, conducted research on labour issues, and migrated from campuses to factories to organize workers. Kim, Sunhuk (2000b) even called this *minjung*-drive of churches, students, and workers since the mid-1970s the “triple solidarity,” (pp. 60-61). Park, Chung-hee regime indiscriminately repressed opposition groups—ranging from political opponents, radical intellectuals, religious groups, workers, peasants, and others because in 1979, the last year of the yushin regime, opposition groups attempted to: raise *minjung*’s awareness, organize *minjung*, and mobilize *minjung* for a revolutionary uprising.
The minjok literature exposed the emptiness of top-down economic nationalism that served as the ideology for the sword-won alliance at the cost of popular sectors. It filled the emptied nation with minjung as the epicentre of new history. Minjok literary critics shared the view of minjung as the collective agent for alternative development and a counter force against elite-led politics. Its minjung-oriented narrative simplified plural confrontations into the binary dominating-dominated conflicts laden with class overtones.

Unlike xiangtu literature that facilitated politicization of the Taiwanese democratic movement, the minjok literary discourse, with its orientation toward subaltern classes and anti-established politics, promoted coalition politics of social movements and the subaltern-orientation of the South Korean democratic movement. In the next section, we will see the political and contentious expression of counter-narratives of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements, Taiwanese dangwai, and South Korean chaeya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter-narrative</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Motto</th>
<th>Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese Xiangtu</td>
<td>Spatial native soil</td>
<td>Return to reality</td>
<td>Taiwanese Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean Minjok</td>
<td>Temporal history</td>
<td>Engagement in reality</td>
<td>Classed minjung</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AND TRIGGERING EVENTS OF IDENTITY-BUILDING**

When identity work emerges out of “submerged network” of “pre-political” or “meta-political” claims (Melucci, 1989) and enters the political stage to change politics, identity and transition processes are not just not self-expressive and self-indulgent but “serious political business,” as Charles Tilly (2005a, p. 210) puts it. The Taiwanese and South Korean xiangtu and minjok literatures promoted the formation of ethno-national and popular-class collective identities. In the late 1970s, their discourses of collective
identities were promoted and radicalized by political conflicts between the KMT and opposition forces in Taiwan and a series of struggles of women workers against managements and the military regime in South Korea. New Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements emerged, which since the late 1970s began to forge new collective identities distinguished from and contraposed with those of hegemonic identities. The Taiwanese Kaohsiung incident (1979) and the South Korean Kwangju massacre (1980) served as rites of passage for Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements. Those incidents prompted, as will be seen below, their efforts to fashion collective identities attracting and mobilizing the wider population.

In this section, I analyze the emergence of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements. This analysis focuses on two opposition movements, Taiwanese dangwai (outside the party) and South Korean chaeya (in the field or out of office), and Kaohsiung and Kwangju incidents as two triggering events for forging collective identities. I explore different characteristics of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements of the 1970s, particularly their relationship with established politics. Then, I focus on how Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements promoted ethno-national-oriented and popular-class-centric identities, respectively, through an analysis of the Kaohsiung and Kwangju incidents.

**Taiwanese Dangwai Movement and Kaohsiung Incident**
Taiwanese Dangwai: Party without the Party Name

The KMT party-state legitimized its rule on Sun, Yat-sen’s three-stage roadmap to the revolution: 1) military rule against war-lords and for unification; 2) political tutelage as a liminal stage for education of people for the final stage; and 3) constitutional rule for democratic governance. The one-party rule corresponds with the second stage of political tutelage (xunzheng). “Dangwai wudang” (outside the party [the KMT] there is no party) reveals the political system in this liminal stage (Fung, 2006, p. 31).

The first postwar opposition movement for the establishment of a China Democratic Party designated itself wu dang (no party) and wu pai (non-partisan) in 1960 (Jacobs, 2012, p. 39, fn. 93; Rigger, 2001, p. 18). Literally understood, there exists neither a political party nor politics behind the term wu dang that gives up the formation of its own political territory against the KMT. Unlike wudang, dangwai (outside the party) manifested the existence of oppositional forces outside “the party” and facilitated the building of a unified political boundary: KMT and non-KMT. Dangwai was not popularized until self-styled dangwai people garnered considerable achievements in the 1977 local election where new generations joined their electoral campaigns in massive numbers (G.-x. Chen, 1978). Nevertheless, their composition was too complex and heterogeneous to exclude the pro-KMT “fake dangwai” (jia dangwai) (Z.-l. Wu, 1978) and to form a shared political position or “party spirit” (dangxing) (T. Wang, 1978a, p. 16). Until the late 1970s, dangwai was used interchangeably with wu pai (non-partisan) (T. Wang, 1978b, p. 14) and translated also as non-partisan in English (Jacobs, 1981). Therefore, these non-partisan dangwai “people” (renshi), still not a collectivity, failed to
generate sufficient conditions to unite different groups and to escape from the hypo-
politicization trap.

With international isolation in the early 1970s, dangwai advocated Taiwan’s own
history, language, and culture both in the Legislative Yuan and on the streets during
election campaigns (Hsiau, 2014a, pp. 197-199; Wakabayashi, 2008, p. 149). The KMT’s
linked political, social, and cultural marginalization of the local Taiwanese based on
provincial differences (shengji), i.e. waisheng (mainland) or bensheng (Taiwan), and
framed it as discrimination against local Taiwanese. *Twelve Prime Political
Developments*, the first comprehensive and coordinated dangwai platform published in
1978, was primarily focused on democratization (and welfare), such as the strict
compliance with the constitution, the re-election of all national parliamentarians, and the
end of Martial Law. The demands for the non-discrimination of those with the Taiwanese
provincial origin (shengji) and of their local language in public broadcasting was listed
only at the lowest of the twelve points.

*Dangwai* people’s claims for democratization remained within the boundary of the
constitution that still defined Taiwan merely as a province. They tried to form a political
force but failed to present a shared political and imagined community. Despite the
statement of Huang, Hsin-chieh, a leading dangwai figure, that authentic dangwai is
already “the party outside of the party” (*dangwai dang*) (Z.-l. Wu, 1978, p. 36), in the
1970s it lacked the “party spirit” to unify heterogeneous people and different political
views. The 1979 Kaohsiung incident was a triggering event for dangwai people to see or
construct the nexus between *ethnos* and *demos*. 
**Ethnos and Kaohsiung Incident**

The dangwai movement sought to forge counter-narratives to imagine a new community against the hegemonic identity: translocal networks to implement national politics and identity moments for the devaluation of the hegemonic identity and evaluation of a new identity.

*Dangwai* held diverse groups together, including local politicians like Huang, Hsin-chieh, Kang Ning-hsiang, intellectuals, KMT’s former “young talents” (*caijun*), Taiwanese small businessmen, and young church members. Magazines played a significant role in holding those diverse groups together, circulating counter-discourses despite their weak mass support, and transcending their parochial limit, and developing translocal political organizations and alternative identity. *Dangwai* groups launched a new magazine, the *Taiwan Political Review* (*Taiwan zhenglun*, henceforth *Review*) in 1975. It was the first opposition magazine initiated by local Taiwanese and published under the title of “Taiwan” (Jacobs, 2016, pp. 5-6; Wakabayashi, 1992, p. 192). Considering it published only five issues, it attained huge popularity. The *Review* sold more than fifty thousand copies with thousands of overseas subscribers (Cui-lian Chen, Wu, & Hu, 2013, p. 59). Its members were more deeply involved in local elections and vocal against the KMT compared with its preceding intellectual movement in the first half of the 1970s, such as the *Baodiao* Movement claiming China’s sovereign rights on Diaoyutai (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands against a United States and Japan 1970 agreement, and *The Intellectual* (*daxue*) magazine led by intellectuals, local businessmen, and young Taiwanese KMT members,¹ with influence limited to campus and intellectual

---

¹ Before Taiwan’s expulsion from the UN in 1971, the KMT government already failed to prove its repeatedly emphasized sovereign claim for the whole Chinese territory. When the United States reached agreement with
circles. The \textit{Review} was short lived but made pivotal contributions to the subsequent \textit{dangwai} movement by linking politics, democratization, and ethnic identity.

The \textit{Review} established two track politics, institutional politics, and the public sphere against \textit{dangjin} (prohibition of new political party) and \textit{baojin} (restriction of newspaper). Between the 1960 and 1980s, publishing magazines was a widely consumed repertoire of Taiwanese social movements to counter \textit{dangjin} and \textit{baojin} by using them. Lei, Chen was the first to challenge \textit{dangjin} and \textit{baojin} by using his magazine \textit{Free China Fortnightly} for the establishment of China Democratic Party in 1960. The \textit{Review} was both a counterpublic incubating counter-forces and counter-narratives and a contentious repertoire combining parliamentary politics, street rallies, and publications (W.-m. Liao, 2015). The \textit{Review} publicly heightened the ethnic discrimination of the local Taiwanese in public institutions and politics (N.-h. Kang, 1975; Yao, 1975). It was even claimed that Taiwanese constructed dissimilar civilization and identity with the Chinese (J.-h. Zhang, 1975).

The \textit{dangwai} groups, including former members of the \textit{Review}, founded the Taiwan \textit{Dangwai} Personages Electioneering Group to organize concerted electoral campaigns for the supplementary national parliamentary election in December 1978. During election preparation, the \textit{dangwai} developed into a political force with a translocal network and

\footnotesize{Japan to hand over the disputed Diaoyutai (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands, the KMT government’s unexpectedly irresolute attitude frustrated Taiwanese inside and outside Taiwan and unleashed a series of mass demonstrations first initiated by Chinese (including Taiwanese) students in the United States and Hong Kong and spread to universities in Taiwan in 1971. The Taiwanese Safeguard the Diaoyutai Islands Movement (\textit{Baodiao} movement) surfaced as a nationalist movement that for the first time since the 1960s stimulated political voices among campuses and intellectuals. Thousands of students took to the streets after April 1971 to protest the United States and Japan and for the defence of the Diaoyutai Islands. Students’ protests were promoted and closely intertwined with the new generation of intellectuals centred on \textit{The Intellectual} (\textit{daxue}) magazine that exercised crucial influence at least on campus (G. Chen, 1982; H.-f. Li, 1987, pp. 60-64).}
common campaign programs (Y.-r. Cai, 2003, pp. 30-41; H.-f. Li, 1987). The KMT aborted the scheduled election, however, under the pretext of US recognition of the PRC and de-recognition of the ROC. The cancellation of the 1978 election and US recognition of the PRC tipped the balance between the moderate group around Kang, Ning-hsing (Kang faction) and non-Kang faction towards the latter that took a radical, extra-institutional, and nationalist path.

Non-Kang faction members launched *Formosa Magazine (Formosa)* in August 1979. It was a crucial step to further politicize the dangwai movement. *Formosa* differed from the preceding democratic movement because of its participants’ identity dimension as a new generation, political identity dimension as a united political force, and national identity dimension as Taiwanese as the master of their own houses (*dangjia zuo zhu*). The launching statement of *Formosa* expresses these three identity dimensions: to promote the “political movement of the “new generation” “emancipated from any taboo and myth enchanted by the KMT.” This “new generation” “drink the milk of” and were raised by the Formosa island to which their future destiny was tied (H.-c. Huang, 1979).

Firstly, *Formosa* designated dangwai as a political movement of natality led by the “newborn generation” (*xinshengdai*). These newcomers of the returned-to-the-reality would bring about new things, events, and history to Taiwanese democracy. Their plot was simple: the young generation accounted for the majority of the population (*demos*) but was deprived of political rights while the old generation sat in the frozen national parliamentary organs for decades and already adults before the 1949 KMT retreat, monopolized political power.
Secondly, *Formosa* presented *dangwai* as a unified force. Each issue² involved sections of “*Dangwai’s Political Comments*” (*dangwai zhenglun*) and “*Dangwai Report*” (*dangwai baodao*) that presented *dangwai* with one political voice. *Formosa* organized tens of mass rallies and “service places” (*fuwuchu*) forming a political foundation throughout Taiwan. *Formosa* obviously aimed at the establishment of a political “party without the party name” (McDonald, 1980; Xin Taiwan yan jiu wen jiao ji jin hui, 1999, p. 186).

Thirdly although its identity claims still remained within the boundary of the Chinese nation, it detached Chinese identity as cultural identity from national identity that should be grounded on place-based identity, like the “new Taiwanese” whoever settled in Taiwan regardless of provincial origins (F.-s. Liu, 1979). Lu, Hsiu-lien, the pioneer of the Taiwanese women’s movements, shows the transitional perceptions of the *dangwai* movement. Lu argued that “to love Taiwan is to love China,” and that Taiwan has little choice but to openly declare the ROC’s independence and replace one China and two governments with two Chinas (quoted in Hsiau, 2003b).

The KMT’s tolerance of pragmatic unipartism ended in Kaohsiung on World Human Rights Day, December 10, 1979. *Formosa* initiated a public meeting for the commemoration of Human Rights Day, which turned into a violent conflict with police. Except for the moderate Kang faction, major figures of *dangwai* were arrested and imprisoned. Speeches at the meeting were delivered in local Taiwanese instead of Mandarin and revolved around the narrative that the Taiwanese had been repressed by others and currently by the KMT one-party dictatorship that deprived them of their

---

² *Formosa* was forced to be closed after publishing only four issues, but the circulation of the final issues reached nearly 150,000 copies (C.-J. Hsu, 2014, p. 88).

The Kaohsiung Incident was the awakening and triggering moment for the opposition movement, forcing the dangwai movement to redraw a new boundary, retell a new story, and reconstruct a new identity. And, the incident cleared ambivalences and ambiguities of collective identity and identity narrative of dangwai groups and encouraged them to transcend the boundary policed by the regime. Taiwanese consciousness rapidly rose with the Kaohsiung Incident that cleared obstacles for democratization with a Taiwanese face for the coming 1980s. This transcendence certainly involves not only the potential to go beyond the limit without, but also the danger to eliminate differences within. The expansion of the unitary political may incorporate and threaten the heterogeneous social. I will discuss the effects of the Kaohsiung incident on the collective identity of the Taiwanese democratic movement and the rise of Taiwanese consciousness as a new translocal and national identity in subsequent sections.

South Korean Chaeya and Kwangju Uprising

Chaeya: Being outside the Parliament

The South Korean military regime colonized the state institutions and its antipartism rendered political institutions irrelevant. Yet, this colonization was primarily limited to state institutions, for the South Korean military regime, compared with the Taiwanese
party-state, lacked massive personal, organizational, and financial resources and a reliable mass party that could penetrate and mobilize society coherently and regularly. The military regime’s antipartism and antipolitics did not depoliticize the South Korean society but rather politicized it.

South Korean opposition movements were often called *chaeya* in the 1970s and 1980s. *Chaeya* can be comparable with the Taiwanese *dangwai*. Yet, its activities were more concentrated on protest movement than on the formation of a political party. *Chaeya* usually refers to social groups composed of critical intellectuals (including professors, lawyers, and journalists), religious leaders, social movement activists, youth groups, and dissident politicians for democratization under authoritarianism (S. Kim, 2000b, pp. 58-76; C.-h. Lee, 1999; M.-L. Park, 2008). However, its meaning as an extra-parliamentary democratic movement is rare in its early usage.

In the 1950s, the term *chaeya* stood for a political party not in office (Kyunghyang Daily, 1952). After the April Revolution (1960) it involved groups of people without a party affiliation. In the late 1960s, when Park, Chung-hee abolished the third-term limitation of the presidency the action was met with fierce resistance both from opposition parties and extra-parliamentary groups (Dong-A Daily, 1969). With the marginalization of political parties and defunct political institutions under the *yushin* regime (1972-1979), *chaeya* attained its independent meaning from extra-parliamentary movements for democracy.

The discursive changes in the democratic movement of *chaeya* groups clearly reveals how struggles against the regime in the 1970s evolved and how new collective identities emerged. The *chaeya* movement founded a series of umbrella organizations revealing
changes to its understanding of democracy: The Association for the Defence of Democracy (1971) and the National Meeting for the Restoration of Democracy (1974). Before the 1972 *yushin* regime, the opposition groups termed their democratic struggles as the “defence” of democracy. Yet, under the hyper-authoritarian *yushin* regime in the mid-1970s, they defined their actions as “restoration” of democracy. The Defence and the Restoration founding statements focused primarily on the recovery of democratic procedures without demanding socio-economic democracy (Association for the Defence of Democracy, 1971; National Meeting for the Restoration of Democracy, 1974, pp. 5-6).

Paik, Nak-chung’s (1975) pungent criticism of those assumptions concerned how the “restoration of democracy” was misleading for it presupposes the quasi-civilian pre-
*yushin* regime as democratic and “restoration” as the final goal for democratization (pp. 47-48). Further, democratic society could not be realized if the question of working people was dealt with only in a vague or abstract way (p. 53).

In the mid-1970s, student movement organized anti-regime mass mobilizations that often led to the closing of campuses and even emergency decrees. And democratic union movement led by women workers attracted public attention through their strikes, sit-ins, and dramatic occupations of public institutions. Although the chaeya movement lacked sufficient resources for mass mobilization, it actively supported these political and economic struggles with its political, social, and religious networks. Unlike the dangwai movement that undertook the role of initiator with a political orientation, the chaeya movement played the role of broker between dissident politicians and extra-parliamentary subaltern groups before the Kwangju massacre in 1980. It was limited to organizational brokerage, bridging two or more previously unconnected individuals or groups, rather
than “intellectual brokerage” linking two or more previously unconnected ideas (Tilly, 2002, p. 157). Yet, the decreasing institutional access and the increasing subaltern and radical movements forced the chaeya movement increasingly to take the role of intellectual coordinator for “mesomobilization,” which carries structural and cultural integration of various groups (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992).

Minjung and Kwangju Uprising

The propagated images of “industrial soldiers” and “Ten Billion Dollar [export] Virgin” by developmental militarism and economic nationalism were increasingly questioned given the side effects of rapid industrialization. The 1970 self-immolation of garment worker Chun, Tae-II holding the Labor Standards Act booklet in his hand, challenged the elite-led democratic movement ignorant of the connection between political repression and economic exploitation. His self-immolation served as a narrative initiator and articulator bridging subaltern minjung with critical intellectuals for multi-class coalition and connecting political freedom with class struggles.

In the face of the hyper-militarization and the de facto closure of established politics, South Korean social movements expanded their extra-institutional actions that centred on subaltern classes. In the late 1960s, religious groups like Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) actively supported unionization of workers by providing training programs (Pak, 2005; Stentzel, 2006) that promoted the militant union movement led by women workers in the 1970s. Student activists and intellectuals reinforced their solidary activities with workers

---

3 South Korean exports exceeded $10 billion for the first time in 1978.
by raising the latter’s class consciousness in night schools for workers and through their migrating to factories to organise unions.

Compared with the Taiwanese dangwai movement, which prioritized magazines to organize intellectuals and political forces, the favoured organizational and contentious repertoires of the South Korean democratic movement in the 1970s were rallies and demonstrations focused on subaltern classes and extra-institutional venues. The scope of protests was steadily expanded from students to professionals, religious groups, peasants, and workers. Even opposition parties joined the chaeya organizations for democratization in the face of increasingly defunct established politics. In the early 1970s, minjung began to attain currency as an umbrella term for oppressed people. Then its meaning increasingly shifted to the collective agent with problem-solving ability in the mid-1970s (C.-I. Kim, 1987) with the rapid growth of labour disputes, which increased nearly fivefold between 1973 and 1979 (M.-H. Lee, 1994, p. 79).

South Korean opposition forces founded the National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification (NADR) in 1979. It embraced “Democracy” as a whole—not “defending” the present democracy and “restoring” the old—to be achieved through “Alliance.” The NADR’s (1979) founding statement for the first time placed in the joint democratic movement organizations, minjung as the counter force against the yushin regime, and proffered “parliamentary democracy and industrial democracy based on popular sovereignty” (emphasis added). Opposition movements, however, still lacked the capacity for intellectual brokerage and organizational coordination necessary for the diffusion of contentious ideas and networks, which would eventually enable the upward scale shifts of social movements (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, pp. 94-97).
The political institutions, such as parliament, political parties, and electoral processes, were *de facto* closed venues under the *yushin* regime, which limited available and effective “venue shopping” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 18). The extra-parliamentary arena was the venue available for the emerging *minjung* movement. Yet, the choice of a particular venue was also constrained by collective identities, for such a move reveals their public images, potential allies, and their goals (Pralle, 2003). The constitutive narrative of *minjung* prioritized extra-parliamentary venues for socio-economic democracy. *Minjung* as a community was to be achieved and realized in villages, factories, and streets but not in parliament.

The bottom-up protests of subaltern classes showed explosive energy against the military regime, rather than the top-down initiative led by opposition parties. Women workers politicized their struggles against the repression of unions and factory closures by staging public protests beyond factory walls in the second half of the 1970s. A series of women workers’ strikes reached their peak in YH workers’ occupation of the headquarters of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) (August 1979) that led to the death of a women worker. Kim, Young Sam, the then-leader of the NDP, was expelled from the legislature because of the party’s support for the women workers. His expulsion triggered massive protests in Busan and Masan (October 1979), his political hometown and cities filled with dense industrial complexes and agglomerations. A few days after those protests Park, Chung-Hee was assassinated.

What was deficient in the *minjung* narrative was not a plot, sequence, or character but a singular, modern, and triggering event that could complete the *minjung* narrative. It was the 1980 Kwangju uprising that bridged the gap for the *minjung* narrative. The
Kwangju uprising began on May 18 with a peaceful, anti-regime student demonstration that was bloodily repressed. When military forces began to fire on civilians on May 20, demonstrators armed themselves. They expelled the military forces from the city and liberated it. The autonomous Kwangju commune had begun (Na, 2001, pp. 479-480).

The rapid diffusion of protests was certainly spontaneous rather than well organized, but it must be noted that in Kwangju there were active social movements whose activists organized and participated in the Kwangju uprising. The urban poor movement and night schools for workers were organized by intellectuals. Their broad networks facilitated the uprising. With armed struggle against the South Korean military troops, workers massively participated in the citizen’s army (Katsiaficas, 2012, p. 174). However, it ended with the military’s massacre of hundreds of citizens. The Kwangju uprising was a perfect case for the minjung narrative: anti-systemic uprising based on the multiclass coalition of critical intellectuals and subaltern classes; and, minjung’s direct democracy during the week-long “liberation.” The Kwangju uprising was narrated as the meeting place of democracy and minjung. It transformed minjung as a concept into the minjung as a movement and history into present reality.

The Kwangju uprising was painted as a communist-controlled riot and public access to the events in Kwangju in 1980 was strictly forbidden. The prohibition to information rendered this event a fiercer battle ground for collective memory than the Taiwanese Kaohsiung incident whose trial was open to the public’s view.

| Table 4-5 Emergence of Democratic Movements in Taiwan and South Korea |
|------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| TW Dangwai             | Institutional   | Democratization by local Taiwanese              |
| SK Chaeya              | Extra-institutional | Democratization by subaltern classes            |
COLLECTIVE MEMORIES, IDENTITIES, AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Both South Korea and Taiwan witnessed upsurges of popular protest in the 1980s. It was an era of expanded liberalization followed by democratic transition in which the institutional order and symbols underwent radical transformation. One-party rule, the military regime, and authoritarianism were subject to reconfiguration.

The transition dynamics\(^4\) and characteristics differ significantly between Taiwan and South Korea. According to O’Donnell and Schmitter’s transitional schema (1986), South Korea took only three years to move from political liberalization to the founding election while the same process required a decade in Taiwan. The relatively short transition period in South Korea showed massive popular mobilization with the alliance between the militant *minjung* movement and the opposition NDP. The movement’s explosiveness and the radicality forced the incumbent elites and the NDP to reach a hasty agreement. After 1987 constitutional reform narrowly focused on the introduction of the direct presidential election, in December the incumbent elites won the first direct presidential election. The *minjung* movement sustained their militant struggle but was soon marginalized with growing repression, severe identity competition with the reform-oriented *simin* (burgher, literally city and mass) movement, and the emergence of the first civilian government.

Compared with South Korea, Taiwan’s transition was a drawn-out process. The stable political institutions under the party-state faced growing political and social

\(^4\) Transitologists articulate differences in transitional dynamics into typologies. South Korean transition falls into “reform” (Karl & Schmitter, 1991) and “transplacement” (Huntington, 1991), which is led by joint action by incumbent elites and opposition groups. Taiwanese transition is classified into “imposition” (Karl & Schmitter, 1991) and “transformation” (Huntington, 1991) in which the transition is initiated by the incumbent elites.
challenges from the *dangwai* opposition movement and grassroots protests in the second-half of the 1980s. With the founding of the DPP in 1986 and the subsequent lifting of Martial Law in 1987, the KMT-led one-party system began to shift to the multi-party system and to open the thus far closed national political space to local Taiwanese, which promoted competitions of national and partisan identities and politicization of popular protests and social forces. The extra-constitutional National Affairs Conference in 1990, when the KMT, DPP, and other experts participated in resolving transitional issues, channelled popular mobilization, like the 1990 Wild Lily student movement, into the institutional arena (M.-s. Ho, 2010b, pp. 10-13; Rigger, 1999, pp. 151-156). Popular protests subsided when institutional politics was opened to the public with the complete, not supplementary, re-election of the Legislative Yuan in 1992 and eventually the first direct presidential election in 1996.

Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements constructed Taiwanese consciousness and South Korean *minjung* to orchestrate cacophonous voices of diverse forces and channeled them into democratization. This section focuses on the construction of different collective identities through an analysis of their collective memories and identity narratives and their interactions with the democratic transition. The exploration of identity and memory work geared towards democratic processes will show the relational co-constructing identity and democratic processes, where one could read the characteristics of democratization through collective identities.

Challenging hegemonic identities begins often with questioning and confronting dominant and public collective memory or official history pretending to be facts, unitary, and universal. Collective memory constitutes the focal point of collective identity, for the
former provides liquid and malleable collective identity with solid durability or at least such an image that maintains its collectivity through time (Halbwachs, 1980, p. 85). A “real” community is therefore a “community of memory” that is continuously engaged in “retelling its story” (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985, p. 153).

Constructing collective memory is “constructing identity itself” (Megill, 2007, p. 47) for collective memory is built into the constitutive narrative of collective identity. Collective memory cannot be reduced to remembering and retrieving past events. Rather it is “contemporized memory” (J. Assmann, 1995), “active past” (Olick, 2007), or “reconstructing past” (Halbwachs, 1992) in the service of present needs and desires.

The relationship between the construction of collective memory and collective identity can be analyzed in a quantitative process; in other words, the extent to which the process from the creation of collective memory to its maintenance is interlocked with the process from unity-building of social movements to their continuity (Gongaware, 2003). This analysis shows the intertwined process of building collective memory and identity but does not explore how different characteristics of different collective identities are linked with memory work. Every collective memory retains its own use value that is suited to specific identity work and to specific groups. Even the same historical events and individuals are remembered and commemorated differently depending on particular needs and desires of the present (groups, time, generation) (Olick, 2003; Polletta, 2009; Schwartz, 1982). To construct collective identities, South Korean and Taiwanese democratic movements attended to different memory work. They retrieved an inventory of memories and reconstructed them for present purposes to forge new collective identities.
Below, I analyze how Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements constructed ethno-national Taiwanese identity and popular-class *minjung* identity in democratization and how they modified collective identities through the reconstruction of collective memories and identity discourses. I disaggregate democratization into three phases, the pre-transitional (before 1987), the transitional (between 1987 and the early 1990s), and the stabilizing (from the early to the mid-1990s). This periodization corresponds respectively to memory work in the production of origin myths of Taiwanese national identity and South Korean *minjung* identity, formative memories of those identities, and their modification.

The Taiwanese democratic movement summoned three different memories to reconstruct Taiwanese identity: the Japanese colonial rule period was reinterpreted to forge an origin myth of new Taiwanese identity; suppressed memories on the 228 Uprising were revived as a formative moment of the new collective identity; and the marginalized memory of aborigines was integrated to legitimate the new hegemonic identity. These invoked memories constructed as characteristics of the Taiwanese consciousness that co-opted or muted other identities. The South Korean democratic movement organized three dissimilar memories to reconstruct pre-transitional *minjung* and post-transitional *simin* identities: the unknown memory of the Revolt was excavated to forge an origin myth of new collective identity; suppressed memories on the Kwangju Uprising were retrieved to establish *minjung* identity; and the memories of *minjung* identity were disremembered to legitimize post-transitional *simin* identity.

In the subsequent subsections, I show how Taiwanese and South Korean social movements constructed collective identities through retrieving, contemporizing, and
reconstructing different collective memories along with the different phases of democratic processes.

**Collective Memories before Transition: Origin Myth**

Pre-transitional collective actions in Taiwan and South Korea show obvious differences in the degree of politicization and organization. From the Kaohsiung incident (1979) to the lifting of the Martial Law (1987), Taiwanese society witnessed waves of massive protests called “self-help” (zili jiujī) activities related to issues, such as pollution and workplace conflicts (Mau-kuei Chang, 2011; F.-c. Wang, 1996, 1999; J.-M. Wu, 1990). This period is often designated as prelude (M.-k. Chang, 1997), fermentation (M.-s. Ho, 2010b), or incubation (Shu, 2011), not as the beginning of social movements. Analyses of self-help activities view them as hypo-politicized collective actions. According to Wu, Jie-min (1990), self-help activities were apolitical or at least with less intervention by the dangwai movement; their agendas and venues were parochial; and their actions were segmented, i.e. either taking direct action towards proximate targets, such as local authorities and private companies, or seeking compensation or intervention from distant national authorities instead of attacking them. Dangwai groups attempted to construct an origin myth to politicize growing mass protests by reinterpreting colonial memories in a pro- or post-colonial way.

---

5 The number of popular protests reported were 651 cases between 1983 and 1985. It increased by 337 in 1986 and skyrocketed to 734 in 1987 (J.-M. Wu, 1990, p. 50).
From the Kwangju Uprising (1980) before the June Uprising (1987) mass protests rapidly increased in South Korea. Various sectoral movement organizations, such as farmers, students, workers, and women, emerged with the minjung movement orientation. The growing acceptance of minjung identity encouraged social movements to transcend small underground group micromobilization. They began to initiate multi-class solidarity actions and build quasi-party-type multi-issue organizations, like the Minjung Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (MMCDR), which had comprehensive platforms for socio-political transformation, organized unified anti-regime struggles, and cooperated and competed with opposition parties. Sectoral movements, such as those dedicated to human, labour, and women’s rights, showed pro-working-class orientation and accepted democratization as their master frame. They saw the root of their anti-systemic resistance and multi-class coalition in the Revolt.

**Taiwan: Reinterpretation of Colonial Memories as Origin Myth**

In the first half of the 1980s, Taiwan society witnessed heated “debates on Taiwanese consciousness” in which numerous magazines and intellectuals ranging from left to right, representing pro-Chinese or pro-Taiwanese views took part (M.-h. Shih, 1985). Proponents of Taiwanese consciousness presented Taiwan and its inhabitants as an independent and substantial community sharing common history in these debates. Yet, Chen, Yingchen (1985) argued that the claims for Taiwanese consciousness were a backward anti-Chinaism of a handful of petit bourgeois who equated mainlanders with

---

6 Popular protests rapidly increased in South Korean after 1984. There were 1,548 protests in 1984, 2,138 in 1985, 2,201 in 1986, and 12,957 in 1987. The proportion of violent protests climbed up from 56.7 percent in 1984 to 93.5 percent in 1986 but decreased to 52.6 percent in 1987 (N.-b. Kim, 2010).
the repressing and exploiting class while the Taiwanese were the repressed and exploited (pp. 35-36). Such a move offered nothing other than the hegemonic chauvinism of Hoklo Han Chinese middle class—the major ethnic group accounting for ca. 70 percent of the total population (G. Dai, 1985; Dai & Chen, 1985).

Proponents of Taiwanese consciousness rejected the hitherto taken-for-granted binary: China as the original, whole, superordinate, mature, and national category versus Taiwan as the derivative, part, subordinate, immature, and local subcategory. They did not seek a foundation for Taiwanese consciousness in the innate feeling and blood derived from the ancient Chinese nation, but in the acquired socio-economic development. Chen, Shuhong (1985) contends that foundation for the community “sharing weal and woe” was formed under Japanese rule, which developed into a “consciousness of Taiwan reality” based on “Taiwan substantiality.”

Dangwai memory work in the 1970s was focused on the Taiwanese struggles against the Japanese colonial rule where they identified anti-colonial traditions with their anti-KMT campaigns (Hsiau, 2003b, pp. 226-236). Yet, in the 1980s, memories of Japanese colonial rule were extended to modernization or whatever experiences differed from those of the mainland (Hsiau, 2014b; J. E. Taylor, 2005). In the early 1980s, Taiwanese historians affiliated with dangwai argued that Japanese colonial rule contributed to Taiwanese modernization, such as effective administration, sanitation, statistics, and infrastructure (Gao, 1983), which made furious pro-Chinese historians advocate for China’s crucial role in Taiwan’s modern development (G.-h. Dai, 1985). What is at stake in this historical narrative is that the Taiwanese have a shared historical origin and experiences detached and unlike the mainland’s.
The reinterpretation of Japanese colonial rule discursively generated the origin myth, socially constructed resistant, homogenous, and unified subject against the “foreign regime,” and politically drew a boundary separating those with pro-Chinese identity from the dangwai movement. The anti-KMT and pro-Chinese left China Tide (xiachao) group was marginalized from the dangwai movement in the debates on Taiwanese consciousness. Pro- or post-colonial re-memorialization ran parallel with de-sinicization (qu zhongguo hua) and the foundation of a proto-Taiwanese community. Colonial memories were contemporized initially to generate the foundation for resistant and exclusive community in the pre-transitional era.

**South Korea: Excavation of the Peasant Revolt as Origin Myth**

Memory work of South Korean social movements began with the re-evaluation of the 1894 Peasant Revolt (Revolt). The Revolt was first appropriated by the military regime. Park, Chung-hee identified with its leader and raised it to a revolution like the “516 Military Revolution” (Dong-A Daily, 1963). It was even argued that the yushin regime would complete the incomplete revolution of the Revolt (Kyunghyang Daily, 1973). With increasing protests against the hyper-militarized yushin regime in the 1970s, this discursive nexus was soon discarded due to the Revolt’s rebellious image. The minjok literature challenged this official interpretation and commemoration by excavating peasants as the central force of the Revolt.

Shin, Dong-yop, a prominent poet of minjok literature, in 1968 wrote an epic poem on the Revolt. His poem shows the main plot, event, and character of minjung narrative. The excavation of minjung from an unknown history was presented as if minjung, infused
with counterhegemonic subjectivity, wrote the coherent history of resistance and eventually led to the “day of glorious revolution.”

As the anthropologist Nancy Abelmann (1996) argues, the discourse of the Revolt was “strikingly present oriented” through the minjung movement (p. 27). It was the actual site of “mnemohistory” where the past haunts the present and the present reconstructs the past (J. Assmann, 1998, p. 9). The reconstruction of the Revolt was the South Korean democratic movement’s conscious narrative strategy. The other crucial reform movements led by the bourgeois in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were sidelined by the minjung movement. The Revolt began to be narrated as “peasant war” instead of the Donghak (Eastern learning) movement7 (W.-s. Lee, Kang, Chong, Song, & Paik, 1976), which was a religious movement widely supported by peasants. The Revolt was reconstructed as the birth moment of minjung and its origin myth. The collective consciousness of the minjung was formed through the Revolt (J. J. Choi, 1993, p. 16, fn. 6), which the democratic movement claimed to be the long-sought historical site where the proto-minjung and class-oriented multi-class coalition between critical intellectuals and subaltern classes were found.

The excavation of minjung was knitted with various modern events by the minjung movement. The biography of the self-immolated garment worker Chun, Tae-il—written by a former student activist, circulated as a samizdat in 1976, and published in 1978 in Japan (not in South Korea)—shows how the excavated memory of minjung is contemporized. It was known through his biography that Chun desperately wished to “have college friends” who may have helped him understand the Labour Standard Law.

---

7 Donghak is a religion syncretizing Confucian, Daoist, and even Christian thoughts. One of its key doctrines is “humans are heaven,” implying human dignity and equality.
In the biography, Chun’s closet friend carries the assumed name Kim, Gae Nam who was the most militant and radical leader of the Revolt. Immediately after the Kwangju Uprising, the Revolt was claimed as the root of the Uprising by the minjung movement. Subversive characteristics of the subaltern-led Revolt were revived after the 1980s through the participatory performances of traditional mask dance dramas and folk songs—their narratives are satirical expressed through a rebellious subaltern protagonist—in villages, factories, and campuses, in particular for the stimulation of protest actions like demonstrations and strikes.

**Democratic Transition and Formative Memories**

Around 1987, Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements developed collective identities with different characteristics. Taiwanese dangwai/DPP tried to break hypopoliticization—the closure of national politics from local Taiwanese—which led them to articulate a Taiwanese national identity claim with democratization. Dangwai groups, in particular the radical New Tide (xin chaoliu, NT) faction, developed extra-institutional mass mobilization after 1983. The NT faction began to intervene into social movements, such as for environment, peasant, human rights, and labour. Before the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, their involvement was mainly limited to individual rights and supportive roles, such as service centres. Yet, since 1987, the DPP accelerated “politicization of social movement” and “socialization of political movements” (M.-s. Ho, 2005, p. 406; S.-F. Lin, 2009, p. 233) to channel social forces into its political sources and to expand its

---

8 The New Tide faction was composed of the relatively younger generations. It was organized virtually in the Leninist style as a “party within a party,” with tight ideological and organizational disciplines (Arrigo, 1994, pp. 160-163).
social supports. Since 1987, the DPP established social movement and labour departments and intervened into social movement organizations, which caused conflicts within social movements over national and partisan identities. Individual movements intermittently organized specific issue-oriented conjunctural coalitions, such as pro-aboriginal rights and anti-nuclear, in which the DPP was often deeply involved. Yet, social movements did not build umbrella or peak organizations that coordinated sustained anti-KMT and democratic struggles. Social movement scholars Ho, Ming-sho explained:

During the transition, our civil society mobilisation was not that prominent compared to other transitional countries like South Korea, South Africa, or even Brazil. We have minority groups of social movements’ mobilisations. Main actor of the transition was opposition party. You can say that social mobilisation contributes only indirectly to the democratic opening (personal interview, Jan. 15, 2015)

The dangwai/DPP undertook the role, which promoted democratization via politicization of national identity. The 228 Uprising served as the formative memory that actualized the discursive origin myth and materialized Taiwanese identity against the hegemonic Chinese national identity.

South Korean social movements developed coalitions for democratization under the banner of minjung identity. Thousands of students entered factories to be workers, which served as a basis for multiclass coalition through horizontally transversing differences for minjung-led democratization. In 1985, chaeya groups launched the MMCDR, an umbrella organization for dozens of regional and sectoral social movement organizations for democratization. It put multiclass minjung identity at the centre of its discourse and
developed into a quasi-party organization that integrated and crosscut individual sectors and issues. The MMCDR, as a mesomobilization organization beyond micromobilization of individual organizations, initiated and coordinated nationwide democratic and subaltern movements. It cooperated and competed with the opposition party for public support for democratization. In June 1987, the MMCDR, in cooperation with the opposition party, mobilized millions of people for democratization, which led to constitutional reform and the direct presidential election of 1987. This actualization of the origin myth of the minjung identity was carried out through the revitalization of suppressed memories on the Kwangju Uprising. I will discuss this point in more detail in the following sections.

**Taiwan: the 228 Uprising as the Formative Memory**

On February 28, 1947, mass protests erupted in Taipei against public officials’ violence: they had maltreated a street vendor selling cigarettes on the black market and onlookers the day before. Under this immediate cause, however, lay rampant corruption and poor administration of the KMT-led provincial government, which helped mass protests rapidly spread island-wide. Yet, the KMT sent extra troops from the mainland and killed thousands of Taiwanese and the elimination of local leadership groups was thoroughly implemented (Gold, 1986, p. 51; Y.-x. Zhang, 2006, p. 85). Memories of the 228 incident (ererba shijian) were systematically repressed and erased from the official history. The KMT regime designated the 228 incident as “treason” and related documents were sealed from the public’s access before the transition (Y.-x. Zhang, 2006). According to Hsia, Chun-Hsiang’s study (2003) on media discourse, there were only 14 news articles dealing
with the 228 incident between 1948 and 1987, thus a period of “structural amnesia.” This imposed structural oblivion paralleled with the reproduction of China as the nation-state (guo), the superordinate, and the centre while reducing Taiwan to a province (sheng), the subordinate, and the peripheral.

The Taiwanese democratic movement brought the 228 Uprising (Uprising) into the 1980s, raising transitional and foundational questions. It raised the question of transitional justice, namely how to tackle the wrongdoings of preceding regimes with legal responses covering criminal, historical, reparatory, administrative, and constitutional justice (Teitel, 2000). It posed the question of foundational nation-rebuilding: how to form a new collective identity while eradicating the shadow of the past regime of truth.

In the second half of the 1980s, voices on the Uprising began to be heard in Taiwan. In February 1987, more than thirty organizations, including human rights groups, the Presbyterian Church, and the DPP locals formed the February 28 Peace Day Promotion Association (PDPA). It held public meetings to commemorate the Uprising and demanded the truth, rehabilitation, reparation, and enactment of a 228 peace day (TAHR, 1987b). The 228 incident began to be termed as “uprising” (Z. Lai, Myers, & Wei, 1991), narrated as the moment for a “categorical Taiwanese” (M.-k. Chang, 2003, p. 47) and the symbolic trauma for the birth of the Taiwanese (N.-t. Wu, 2008, pp. 52-58). They

---

9 One of the earliest occasions was the round table discussion on the Provincial Origin and Human Rights” held by the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR) in February 1986. A discussant from the mainlander perspective described the 228 Uprising as the trigger for sharpened provincial conflicts through the KMT regime’s discriminative practices claimed for the disclosure of related information to move forward and to reach inter-provincial harmony (TAHR, 1986).
interpreted the massacre as committed by the “coming-from-outside regime” (*wailai zhengquan*) and caused by ethnic conflicts (T.-L. Chen, 2008).

Chen, Yung-hsing’s narrative, the chairperson of the PDPA, shows the typical narrativization of the democratic movement’s collective memories of the Uprising: forty years ago, Taiwanese as the masters of the island demanded civil rights and full local autonomy but were massacred by the KMT; they are still denied democratic rights and have been forced into silence about the Uprising, which held them back from participating in politics; but Taiwanese do not need to listen to the Chinese, for Taiwan and the state belong to them (TAHR, 1987d).

Memories of the Uprising were retrieved and narrativized to fit into the transitional dynamics which, as Teitel (2000) suggests, begins with tragic events and switches to comical reconciliation or romantic redemption, where collective knowledge of past sufferings and of the self are turned into a necessary process towards the redemptive democratic transition (pp. 109-110).

Collective memories of the Uprising were processed into the iconic sign of democratization by linking them with other historical events. *Dangwai/DPP* narrated the Uprising in association with the 1972 US-PRC Shanghai communique acknowledging the one-China policy and with the 1980 murder of Lin, Yi-hsiung’s family members: Lin was then in jail due to his involvement in the Kaohsiung incident. Both incidents occurred on February 28 (ICHR, 1987; H.-L. Lu, 2014, p. 205; TAHR, 1987d, p. 6; Zheng, 1988, p. 11), which rendered the number *ererba* (228) as the iconic sign that marks the KMT as the brutal perpetrator, challenges hegemonic national identity, and raises democratization.
It is to be noted that contemporization of the repressed memories of the Uprising paralleled the terminological shift of ethnic groups (zuqun). Provincial differences or conflicts (shengji maodun) began to be termed by dangwai/DPP as discrimination and inequality between ethnic groups. Zuqun, or ethnic groups, was initially applied to disadvantaged aboriginal people (TAHR, 1987c, p. 4; F.-c. Wang, 2008a) then modified by “minority weak” (shaoshu ruoshi) (TAHR, 1987a). Yet, since 1987, zuqun was appropriated by native Taiwanese scholars and dangwai/DPP to signify ethnic differences even within Chinese—composed of mainlanders (waishengren) and two local Taiwanese groups, Hoklos and Hakkas—in Taiwan. In the early 1990s, zuquan primarily stood for “weak and disadvantaged” (ruoshi) ethnic or social groups without modification by “minority” (shaoshu). This semiotic shift reflected memories on the Uprising provided by opposition movements with crucial and rich sources to integrate rising social and political demands into an ethno-national identity discourse.

To articulate transitional justice and foundational nation-building, the democratic movement adopted peace (heping) as the main plot suturing the Uprising and the new Taiwan to come. They demanded the establishment of 228 Peace Day and Peace Park because they argued that peace was necessary for reconciliation between ethnic groups and to “the survival of this island” (Y.-h. Chen, 1987; TAHR, 1987b). Peace does not stand for what the KMT argues, namely that re-memorialization of the Uprising is a past-oriented “eye for an eye” “agitation” (Lee, Teng-hui, quoted in T.-L. Chen, 2008, p. 207) and politics of resentment. Such a peace can only be achieved through the formation of a new imagined community that mutes internal conflicts within “this island.” This new
community seeks the other no longer within the island but without the island: Remember February 28th, Don’t Become Chinese (Edmondson, 2002, p. 41).

Collective memories of the Uprising inscribed nation-rebuilding on the transition where the recategorization of identity boundary couched in a peace emplotment promoted peaceful democratization and accelerated the emergence of a new hegemonic collective identity. This memory negotiation was crystallized into a newly imagined community unburdened by the memories tainted by mainlanders’ “original sin” (yuanzui). The key members of the 288 Justice and Peace Movement and the NT faction actively campaigned for the “new state” and “new constitution.” Right after the 1995 official apology for the 228 incident, the then “first native” Taiwanese president Lee, Teng-hui (1999) approached or appropriated opposition movements’ discourses by proposing Taiwan-centred concepts, such as Taiwan’s national sovereignty and New Taiwanese integrating all ethnic groups. This move of the KMT’s comprehensive Taiwanization permitted the local factions to enter the national politics and local Taiwanese to form the mainstream within the party.

Reactivating the repressed memories began with the transition and peaked in the official apology for the 228 incident in 1995. Taiwanese consciousness and Taiwaneseess grew into hegemonic collective identity, substituting for Chinese consciousness and Chineseness over the course of the democratic transition. The new hegemonic identity still confronted two serious challenges. Firstly, there was wide-spread suspicions among non-Hoklo Han Chinese (mainlanders and Hakkas) and aborigines that Taiwanese nationalism or Hoklo chauvinism would threaten minority groups’ identities (K.-H. Chen, 2000a; Roy, 2003; Simon, 2011; F.-C. Wang, 2009). Secondly, forging a
new collective identity required more than outwards alterity production. It demanded simultaneous inwards solidification of that identity. I revisit these challenges when I discuss collective memories of Taiwanese aborigines.

**South Korea: the Kwangju Uprising as the Formative Memory**

Revitalising the suppressed memory of the Kwangju Uprising (Uprising) was the central identity work for South Korean social movements to prove the *minjung* as the imagined and real community. In the 1980s, the Uprising was the fiercest battlefield in popular memory. Kim, Dong-choon, a South Korean social movement expert and the former standing commissioner of the South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission, argued that the memory struggle around the Uprising was the driving force for the democratic movement in the 1980s and even to the mid-1990s (personal interview, Nov. 13, 2014). Protests against the Chun, Doo-hwan military regime (1980-1987) resumed two days after the defeat of the Kwangju citizen’s army and spread rapidly after September 1980.

Unlike the Taiwanese 228 Uprising, rediscovering the truth and suppressed memories of the Kwangju Uprising began less with transitional justice than transitional transformation in which truth was appropriated not in the service of reparation but for subversion. It aimed at rendering two indisputable official “facts” or discourses disputable: what happened (riot) and who did it (pro-North Korean communists). Disputing the first “fact” delegitimizes the Chun regime and legitimizes the Uprising as a democratic movement. The South Korean democratic movement’s demand for the truth about the Uprising lay not in rehabilitation and reparation but was aimed at the overthrow
of the Chun military regime as the “main perpetrator” (*wonhyung*) of the Kwangju massacre. Social movements before 1987 made their priority the struggle about the truth of the Kwangju massacre and the punishment of perpetrators.\(^{10}\)

Disputing the second “fact” was the severe frontal war between the official history and countermemories. The official nomenclature of the Uprising was the 517 Kwangju incident (517 Gwangju *satae*). The number 517 stands for May 17 when emergency martial law, after the assassination of Park, Chug-hee in 1979, was extended to the whole nation. The democratic movement initially accepted the official designation of the 517 Kwangju incident.\(^{11}\) Yet, it soon contested the factuality of the 517 Kwangju incident and after 1984 began to call it the 518 Kwangju *Minjung* Uprising. The difference between 517 and 518 is not only numerical but figurative and narrative. Those who remember the Kwangju incident as a rebellion think it occurred on May 17, 1980 while those who remember it as an uprising think it was initiated by *minjung* on May 18, 1980.

South Korean social movements pushed their claims further so that the participants in the Uprising were not merely innocent citizens but *minjung* and that armed rebels were led by direct producers like workers (Ahn, 2001; J.-e. Lee, 1999). Two seemingly irreconcilable story lines were knitted together: The Uprising was spontaneous but destined. The first comprehensive records of the Uprising in *Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age* (*Beyond*), argued that the Uprising was a “spontaneous response” but led by *minjung* as “the prime engine” (Hwang, 1985). The countermemory production

---

\(^{10}\) This struggle for the truth of the Kwangju massacre and the punishment of perpetrators continued to the mid-1990s, before the death sentence of two former presidents Chun, Doo-hwan and Roh, Tae-woo who were ex-generals and, in 1980, were in positions responsible for the massacre.

\(^{11}\) Perhaps the only exception was the statement published by a group of Seoul National University (SNU) students in 1981. This statement was published under the title of “*On the first anniversary of Kwangju Anti-Fascist Minjung Uprising*” where it was claimed for commemoration of the Uprising on May 18 (SNU Democratic Students, 1981).
of the Uprising by the minjung movement not only generated decertification of the official discourse on the Uprising, but also inserted discontinuity into the official history led by elites. The first nationwide intercampus coalition of student unions, the National Student League (1985), claimed that the century-long minjung movement history was embodied in the Uprising where subaltern classes played the pivotal role in cooperation with critical intellectuals for the city’s liberation.

Reviving the suppressed memories of the Uprising promoted discursively the construction of the counterhegemonic image of minjung identity and practically the establishment of an extra-institutional base for the democratic minjung movement. Firstly, the narrative of South Korean social movements constructed the counterhegemonic collective identity against the hegemonic identity of hyper-militaristic characteristics of the military regime’s empty economic nationalism. The transvaluation of what has been so far low, powerless, and marginal to high, powerful, and central contributed to the establishment of unified minjung identity. Secondly, South Korean social movements restructured their organizations to materialize the minjung idea of multi-class and transformative coalition. Small groups of students and intellectuals who sustained its counterpublics and free spaces underground during the unfavourable abeyance in the early 1980s began to openly organize meso-level organizations. Social movement organizations of farmers, workers, students, women, and many others emerged with clear minjung movement orientation. Since the mid-1980s, the chaeya movement’s role was no longer limited to organizational brokerage as it was in the 1970s but extended to intellectual brokerage that would initiate and coordinate nationwide democratic and subaltern movements.
The *minjung* movement emerged as an overarching term crosscutting social movements and as a competing force with the established politics of political parties through the reconstruction of collective memories of the Uprising. In May 1987, the MMCDR, along with the opposition NKPD, built the National Headquarters for Obtaining a Democratic Constitution, the largest coalition for democracy since the 1945 decolonization. It organized and led the June Uprising (1987) in which five million people took part. The nationwide demonstration barely subsided when the regime conceded the constitutional revision for the direct presidential election system. Yet, the democratization of 1987 mounted a serious challenge to the *minjung* identity.

The *minjung* identity as a composite always overflowed with diversified masses like peasants, women, and workers. The pre-transitional *minjung* movement was never questioned what would happen if each constituent of *minjung* attains its own subjectivity and if democratization takes place without transformation. Since the 1990s, the *minjung* movement encountered severe repression from the regime and competition from the reform-oriented *simin* movement,\(^{12}\) which will be discussed further below.

**Post-transition: Reshaping Identities through Modification of Memories**

With the stabilising democratization since the early 1990s, Taiwanese and South Korean social movements swiftly adapted to the opened political and social spaces, which paralleled with the increasing repressive and disciplinary measures against extra-institutional militancy. Taiwanese national identity grew into the new hegemonic identity with the rise of Taiwanese elites in the KMT and the increasing influence of the DPP.

---

\(^{12}\) Since the mid-1990s, those umbrella organizations launched the movement for the foundation of a class-oriented political party, which resulted in formation of the Democratic Labour Party in 2000.
Social movement organizations reinforced institutionalization of the civil rights of “new Taiwanese” citizens often in cooperation with the DPP. In this phase, the monolithic and homogenous national characteristics of the new Taiwanese identity, which mirrored the old Chinese identity, were modified the identities into internally more open and externally more closed than before, particularly toward the mainland. The integration of aborigines’ collective memories into the hegemonic identity provided multicultural and difference-conscious characteristics for the fledgling Taiwanese identity.

In the 1990s, South Korean social movements increasingly promoted the politics of engagement. The meaning of “engagement” in this era no longer referred to the engagement “in reality” or in real lives of minjung, as it had in the preceding decades; rather, it referred to real politics. Social movement organizations began to rapidly adopt or convert to an individual-centric and reform-oriented simin identity while the collective-centric and anti-systemic minjung movement was marginalized in this fierce identity competition. The new simin movement inherited from the minjung movement the quasi-party type organization dealing with comprehensive and cross-issue agendas for institutionalization of citizen rights. Thus, simin movement organizations cooperated and competed with political parties that still suffered from underdeveloped, unstable political institutions. Disremembering the minjung identity provided simin movements, which included not only new-social-movement-type environmental and human rights movements, but also previous minjung movement like women’s movement, with justification for its politics of engagement in stabilising procedural democracy.
Taiwan: Integrating Marginalized Aboriginal Memories

The Taiwanese aboriginal movement emerged in close cooperation with the democratic movement. In 1984, Aboriginal intellectuals founded the first social movement organization of Taiwanese aborigines, the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (ATA, literally Taiwan Aborigines’ Rights Promotion Association). Pro-independent and pro-dangwai Presbyterian Church Taiwan and the NT faction actively participated in the ATA. Before 1987, the ATA was a service centre focused on promoting individual rights of aborigines and providing legal and job counsels (ICHR, 1985). The DPP politicized the aboriginal movement with its publication of the Principles for Safeguarding the Multicultural Development in 1986 where it guaranteed the self-determination of aborigines, reserved areas, and their life space (C.-F. Shih, 2013). With the growing influence of the NT faction and its discourse of self-determination (M.-z. Xu, 1990, p. 149), the ATA changed its name from “Aborigines” (yuanzhu min) to “Aboriginal Nation” (yunzhu minzu) in 1987. The ATA (2000) claimed that aboriginal people are

---

13 An episode symbolically shows how different sources of collective memories are articulated and sutured into democratization by the opposition movement. A group of Taiwanese aborigines, in the support of the local DPP, destroyed the memorial statue of Wu Feng—a merchant of the Qing dynasty who allegedly sacrificed his life to dissuade Taiwanese aborigines from their hunting heads—in Chiayi city in 1988. His legend was reproduced through schoolbooks and generated a superior image of Chineseness and the necessity of aborigines’ assimilation. The next year, the DPP local group erected a temporary peace monument to commemorate the 228 Uprising designed by a former dangwai activist at the same spot where the statue used to be, the place where prominent local artists and politicians were executed during the 228 massacre in 1947 (Hetherington, 2017, p. 245; Simon, 2017).

14 The first collective activities initiated by Taiwanese aborigines was the foundation of Gao shan qing (Mountain Greenery) underground newspaper by indigenous students at National Taiwan University in 1983.

15 The ATA’s Chinese name derived from the English translation of “indigenous people.” At the general meeting for its foundation in 1983, participants initially proposed mountain compatriots (shan bao) as designated by the KMT. Yet, an anthropologist at the meeting introduced the English term “indigenous people” in Chinese yuanzhu minzu (aborigines). It was accepted by the participants and adopted for the Chinese name of the ATA (Alei, 2000).

16 The term ethnic groups or zuqun, which had been introduced to classify subgroups within Taiwanese aboriginal groups, was appropriated by opposition movements to expose the discrimination practiced by the mainland minority towards the Taiwanese majority (F.-c. Wang, 2008a). The concept of “four great ethnic groups” (si da zuqun), proposed by the Hakka DPP legislator Yeh, Chu-lan, began to gain wide currency in the early 1990s. The adjective “great” (da) was innovative: it was the new hegemonic Taiwanese identity to meet challenges. Aboriginal people, accounting for less than 2 percent of the total
not descendants of Chinese but the masters of Taiwan Island. It obviously shows its transformation from a service organization for individual rights to an advocacy organization for collective political rights. The ATA’s emergence accelerated a pan-ethnic movement (S.-C. Hsieh, 1994) that presented different aborigine groups as a unified and homogeneous unit.

The invitation of marginalized memories of aborigines to mainstream history serves as an alibi for the new Taiwanese identity (Rudolph, 2004). Integration of their memories could provide justification for the idea that Taiwan has roots in its own soil and history independent of and distinguished from mainland China. Reshaping collective memories calls for discovery of a new genesis of the imagined community and destigmatization of stigmatized memories.

The aboriginal movement reconstructed collective memories of aborigines in opposition to the KMT’s official history. Since 1984, it campaigned for the name rectification (zhengming) to promote destigmatization and aborigines’ agency.\(^\text{17}\) Taiwanese Aborigines were named as shanbao (mountain compatriots) or gaoshanzu (mountain folk) by Han-Chinese, the plain people (pindiren). The KMT’s assimilation policy was often called plainization equivalent to sinicization (S.-C. Hsieh, 1994, 1998). The aboriginal movement opposed the name shanbao for it carries on collective stigma that considers aborigines to be improved, civilized, and cured. Instead, they proposed a new term, yuanzhumin (aboriginals) or yuanzhuminzu (aboriginal nation), which is...
unburdened by the past tainted memories imposed by the KMT while integrating ethnically diverse aboriginal people (S.-C. Hsieh, 1994; Rudolph, 2006; Simon, 2011).

The KMT disturbed their name rectification movement by circulating other terminologies like first or early settlers (L.-h. Huang, 2005, p. 23), for self-determination of non-Chinese ethnic groups and decentring of Chineseness underlay the movement. The true intention of the name-rectification was the recognition of aborigines as a nation entitled to sovereign rights for their own culture, space, and self-determination (TAHR, 1991; M.-H. Wang, 2006). In 1994, the term yuanzhumin (aborigines) was officially recognized and replaced shanbo (mountain compatriots). The name rectification proved to be the symbolic battle ground for competing national identities where multicultural and civic characteristics were added to the rising Taiwanese identity.

The other campaign for destigmatization was de-idolization of Wu Feng. According to a mythicized story, Wu Feng was a Chinese official friendly to aborigines who taught them to stop practicing headhunting by sacrificing his life. His story was reproduced for decades through school education. Yet, its authenticity had been controversial for more than a decade. The Taiwan Provincial Documentary Commission argued that “his self-sacrifice to righteousness is, despite the lack of written records, beneficial for the interest of nation-state” (quoted in Wadan, 2000). The story was severely criticized by aboriginal

---

18 After 1988, the name rectification movement was followed by a series of mass mobilizations for the Return Our Land movement.
19 The name rectification movement preceded the movement of Taiwan zhengming, i.e. calling Taiwan not China but Taiwan, where public places and documents with China or Chinese names were replaced with Taiwan or Taiwanese ones.
20 It further promoted since the early 1990s the campaign for the abolishment of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (MATAC), which was established at the level of the national government in 1929 while aboriginal affairs were handled at the provincial (Taiwan) level (Allio, 1998; K.-h. Ku, 2005). This claim certainly challenges the Chinese national identity grounded in mainland China as the ahistorical MATAC exposed.
movements for it only serves as a memory vehicle to transport the stigmatized stereotype that aborigines are savage people to be disciplined and enlightened by the Chinese. Despite their protests, the Ministry of Education decided to retain the Wu Feng story in elementary schoolbooks for it showed “the necessary process of civilisation” (Icyang, 2000). The destruction of the Wu Feng statue of Chiayi in 1988 was evidence of aboriginal activists’ dissatisfaction with the incessant stigmatization of aboriginal peoples. With this eye-catching protest, the Wu Feng myth was soon removed from school textbooks and Wu Feng Township was renamed Alishan Township in 1989.

The shift from assimilation to recognition was accelerated and established since the mid-1990s. De-sinicization and the establishment of Taiwanese subjectivity was completed through the incorporation of marginalized aboriginal memories. It provided a perfect alibi for Taiwanese identity that declared their difference from the Chinese but also “new Taiwanese.”

**South Korea: Disremembering Militant Minjung Memories**

*Minjung* for revolutionary transformation turned into a burdensome mantle with the democratic transition. The multi-issue and multi-sectoral *minjung* movement grew empty when those of single-issue oriented movement sectors, which could voice their own claims without representation by *minjung*, started to leave the *minjung* movement.

A new collective identity *simin* rose rapidly after the 1987 June Uprising. *Simin* discourse was a clear “paradigm shift” and a “regime of discontinuity” (N. Lee, 2011). Social movement organizations adopted the term *simin undong* (citizen movement) for their participation in the campaign for a fair presidential election in December 1987. The
number of NGOs increased drastically between 1987 and the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{21} The so called “major” or influential civil society organizations (CSOs), such as Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) founded in 1989, Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) founded in 1993, and People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) founded in 1994, attracted wide media attention. The first civilian government led by president Kim, Yong-sam (1993-1997) accelerated de-militarization of politics and society and thereby facilitated the burgeoning of the \textit{simin} movement.

The construction of \textit{simin} coincided with mnemonic practices of disremembering as the primary memory processes for a new identity in the post-transition era. It does not place something into oblivion, but rather incorporates forgetting into the identity formation process and overwrites \textit{minjung} identity with \textit{simin} identity. In its 1989 mission statement, the CCEJ (1989), one of the first post-transitional \textit{simin} movement organizations, announced that \textit{simin} differs from the “alienated and repressed \textit{minjung}” and refers to those with “good will” for welfare society, “be they businessmen or middle class.” Unlike the \textit{minjung} narrative, the \textit{simin} narrative does not begin with the past but with the present. In the genealogy of \textit{simin}, the Revolt was omitted from its birth certificate. Fledgling CSOs argued that \textit{simin} began to emerge with the modern April Revolution (1960) led by students and urban inhabitants and were formed through the 1987 June Uprising (CCEJ, 1991). CSOs “express \textit{simin} as the subject” of the \textit{simin} movement “not only to show its difference from \textit{minjung} but also…to focus on those who took to the streets in June 1987” (CCEJ, 1989).

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{21}According to Kim and McNeal’s (2005) study, nearly 50 percent of 843 NGOs in 2000 were founded between 1987 and 1996. NGOs established from 1960 to 1986 account only for 18 percent.
Simin movement organizations or CSOs highlighted discontinuity between *simin* and *minjung* identities to legitimize disremembering *minjung*. There is no more transformation only reform; and no more streets and power but only parliament and influence. The PSPD declared that the venue for democracy was changed from tear-gas-filled streets to political stages and quotidian life. Simin movement activists who had been active in the pre-transitional *minjung* movement justified their conversion to the *simin* movement with international ruptures, democratic transition, and changes in venues and strategies. Unlike *minjung* that is to be awakened, *simin* or citizens was self-awakening or “having their eyes opened by themselves” (H.-r. You & Lee, 1988). In their founding statements, *simin* movement organizations replaced revolution and liberation of the *minjung* with individual “citizen sovereignty” and emphasized both social reform and self-reformation instead of social transformation (CCEJ, 1991; KFEM, 1993). *Simin* movement organizations nearly unanimously emphasized their engagement in the legislative process and the reconfigured state space. The number of citizen-initiated petitions for legislation increased from 37.7 cases on average by 1988 to 175 in 1992 and to 261 in 1996 (Hong, 2006, p. 117). They emphasized their autonomy from as much as their engagement in the state and established politics. Since the early 1990s, their politics of engagement gradually absorbed social movement organizations formerly affiliated with the *minjung* movement like women’s organizations.

The *simin* discourse deprived *minjung* of its contemporizing potential as the canon that presents the past in contrast to the archive that only preserves the past (A. Assmann, 2008, p. 98). It archives *minjung* but simultaneously strips it of its ability to be retrieved. It does not completely sever the *minjung* from the present where the centre is occupied by
the *simin* but does sideline the *minjung* to the marginalized present reserved for the “alienated and repressed” and the “neighbours physically, psychologically, and socially in need” (PSPD, 1994). In other words, the pre-transitional *minjung* movement is assigned to the past while post-transitional *minjung* movements are allocated to the outskirts of present subaltern movements, such as labour, peasant, and urban poor movements. The “major” CSOs consciously intended to take over the quasi-party role played by pre-transitional umbrella *minjung* movement organizations. The preparation committee for the establishment of the PSPD, for instance, defined the characteristics of the PSPD as “comprehensive” (multi-issue), political, and progressive *simin* movement organization (CSPS, 1994). In the early 1990s, the *simin* movement took the dominant position in South Korean social movements. The separation of the *simin* movement from that of *minjung* movements became obvious.\

Table 4-6 Collective Memory, Identity, and Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-transition (Origin myth)</th>
<th>Transition (Formative memory)</th>
<th>Post-transition (Reshaping memory)</th>
<th>Democratization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TW</td>
<td>Colonial memory</td>
<td>228 Uprising</td>
<td>Aboriginal memory</td>
<td>Political/DPP-led</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Chinese</td>
<td>National &amp; peaceful</td>
<td>New nation-state</td>
<td>National sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Peasant Revolt</td>
<td>Kwangju Uprising</td>
<td>From <em>minjung</em> to <em>simin</em></td>
<td>Social/movement-led</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subaltern subject</td>
<td>Popular &amp; disruptive</td>
<td>New citizen</td>
<td>Popular Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For instance, a discussant complained of the growing frequency of the use of *simin* instead of *minjung* in a symposium cosponsored by a 1992 Korean Political Science Association and Korean Sociology Association for the concept of *minjung* also involves the middle-class (G.-s. Lee, 1992). Yet, Kim, Jin-gyun, one of the early proponent of *minjung* concept, claimed a year later that the reform-oriented *simin* movement should cooperate with the class-oriented *minjung* movements (Ha, 1993).
CONCLUSION

This chapter explored and compared different identity and democratic processes. It showed how Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements met repression and limits imposed by developmental regimes and mobilized people against those regimes through construction and reconstruction of collective identities along the lines of democratic processes. The historical survey revealed that Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements began with the production of signs of literary discourses and materialized those signs into events by forming alternative subjecthood to hegemonic identities and shifting its boundaries in line with democratization.

Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements processed their structural conditions into resources for transition not as changes in the mode of production and institution but as confrontations, which were explicitly to be seen in their identity work. The present chapter showed that Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements developed different collective identities by retrieving, contemporizing, and reshaping collective memories whereby different characteristics of those identities were formed, such as ethno-national or popular-class, independent or associational, institutional or extra-institutional, or disruptive or non-disruptive. These collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements contextualized the disembodied universal idea of democracy, which was made fit to shared meanings of constructed communities, into the embodied democratic processes. Taiwanese democratic movement developed a collective identity of ethno-national characteristics and established-politics orientation in opposition to the hypo-politicization of local Taiwanese and their exclusion from national politics. South Korean democratic movement forged a collective identity of
popular-class and extra-institutional orientation against anti-politics and the closure of institutional politics toward popular sectors. Collective identities affected the understanding of democracy as: national sovereignty in Taiwan and popular sovereignty in South Korea; contentious types of democratic transition in a politically negotiated form in Taiwan and socially mobilized confrontational form in South Korea; the drawn-out negotiated transition in Taiwan between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s and rapid confrontational transition in South Korea in the late 1980s; the institutional approach led by Taiwanese dangwai/DPP and the extra-institutional oriented minjung movement; and the Taiwanese dangwai/DPP led democratic transition and the non-partisan minjung-movement-initiated transition in South Korea.

In this chapter, I explored the counter-narratives produced by Taiwanese xiangtu and South Korean minjok literatures. The xiangtu discourse challenged the KMT’s Chinese nationalism by proposing Taiwanese consciousness based on the spatial logic of Taiwan or Formosa island separated from the mainland while the South Korean minjok discourse undermined the military regime’s economic nationalism on the ground of the temporal logic of subaltern-led history against elite-centric history. These literary discourses were adopted by opposition movements to challenge South Korean and Taiwanese developmental regimes. The dangwai movement oriented itself to the institutional arena to break the mainland elites’ monopoly of national politics, where it increasingly articulated democratization with demands against discrimination along the provincial origin. The South Korean chaeya movement oriented itself to the extra-institutional arena in the face of malfunctioning political institutions, where it increasingly articulated democratization with demands of subaltern classes. The Kaohsiung incident and
Kwangju massacre served as triggering events that transformed thus far conceptual communities into those that were collectively imagined and lived. South Korean democratic movements embraced a class-oriented constitutive narrative of with limited and gradual effects on the recruitment amplification, conditioned by indigenous resources. Taiwanese social movements took up the ethno-national constitutive narratives that facilitates the recruitment process and sustains the extension of the community broader than their South Korean counterparts.

Collective memories that were hidden, repressed, and marginalized were invoked and constructed through various memory work for the present needs of opposition movements and democratization. Each memory was processed through different memory work along the development of democratic transition. Taiwanese democratic movement summoned colonial memory as origin myth before the transition. Taiwan’s colonial experience was unlike that of the mainland, which was narrated as the foundational conditions for the origin of Taiwanese consciousness. With the lifting of Martial Law, the democratic movement retrieved the 228 Uprising as the formative memory for the new Taiwanese identity. The 228 as the iconic symbol interwove different incidents of different historical timings with national identity and democratization. Peace as its main plot in the narrative of the 228 Uprising promoted peaceful transition with national identity shift. With the stabilization of democratization, collective memories of aborigines were mobilized and reconstructed to generate harmony among different ethnic groups in Taiwan and to establish a new subjectivity against the Chinese identity. Their name rectification movement reshaped the symbolic site of national identity of Taiwan. The recognition of aborigines as a collective nation provided the alibi for the new
hegemonic Taiwanese national identity. Despite the superficial fixity, the Taiwanese
democratic movement modified Taiwanese identity through memory work corresponding
with the shifting transitional process and its demands when the ethno-national identity
process worked through the democratic transition.

The South Korean democratic movement constructed its collective identities through
unearthing, reviving, and disremembering collective memories. It invoked different
collective memories depending on the present needs of the democratic movement and
transition. And, it refuted official history by excavating hidden memories of the Revolt
since the late 1970s and transformed them into the origin myth of the minjung as the
subaltern subject in opposition to the elite-led military regime. The South Korean
democratic movement reactivated the suppressed collective memories of the 1980
Kwangju massacre. This countermemory work delegitimized the imposed regime of truth
and served as the formative memory for the multi-class minjung identity. The
reinterpretation of the Kwangju Uprising promoted the rapid rise of the class-oriented
democratic minjung movement in the 1980s. With the stabilization of procedural
democracy, the anti-systemic, extra-institutional, and class-oriented minjung identity was
deconstructed by the simin identity discourse. Rapidly growing simin organizations
constructed simin as the new identity of the post-transitional social movements by
disremembering the pre-transitional minjung identity, where they differentiated the origin
of simin from minjung, underlined the discontinuity between them, and replaced the latter
by the former. Simin movement organizations forgot the all-encompassing, multi-issue
and cross-class, transformative, and pro-democracy minjung movement and instead
remembered only subaltern, class-oriented, revolutionary, and anti-authoritarian minjung
movements. *Simin* discourse provided burgeoning CSOs with the legitimacy to engage in the reconfigured state and established politics while retaining their autonomy.

Collective identities formed by democratic movements in the transition affected other sectoral movements, such as women’s and labour movements. In the subsequent two chapters, I will analyze the interaction of Taiwanese identity and *minjung/simin* identities with women’s and labour movements and their endeavours to expand political democratization. In the next chapter, I focus on how collective identities formed in the democratic processes interact with those of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements and the implications of collective identities on the two women’s movements’ choice of narrative, recruitment, venue, and coalition.
Chapter 5 Women’s Movements in South Korea and Taiwan

From the vantage point of 2000, Taiwanese and South Korean women achieved significant improvement in their legislative, administrative, and electoral political rights. Women's rights regarding their bodies were improved through laws on violence against women and in the family were promoted through the revision of family laws. Further women’s policy agencies (WPAs) were established and gender quotas were adopted. One question raised here is how Taiwanese and South Korean women could make such progress despite the long history of Confucian patriarchy and the “hypermansculine development” (Han & Ling, 1998; Ling, 1999, 2000) that subjugated women to developmental regimes and constrained their rights. Considering South Korean “women’s extremely low representation” in parliament, similar outcomes were however “confusing” for others (Clark & Lee, 2000, p. 188). They accounted for only about 3 percent of parliament from 1980 and 2000, whereas the ratio of their Taiwanese counterparts in the legislature was four to five times higher during the same period. The other question is how those similar outcomes could be understood despite different conditions for Taiwanese and South Korean women.

I try to answer these questions by investigating the internal processes of Taiwanese and South Korean women's movements and their collective identities, instead of focusing on their surrounding conditions. The construction, alignment, and deployment of collective identity define not only the women’s movement’s self-concept of women, but also their claims and organizational and contentious repertoires, which eventually
influence the dominant gender regime. Women's movements in both countries challenged
the masculine public sphere and changed masculine gender norms and practices with
different identities and strategies. A brief glimpse into Taiwan’s and South Korea’s
women’s organizations may provide the contrasting characteristics of their collective
identities. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Awakening Magazine (AM,
established in 1982), the first Taiwanese women’s movement organization in the 1980s,
developed the collective identity of woman based on gender binary where women as
human beings deserve the same rights as men enjoy while the South Korean AWEF
promoted working women’s identity. The AF emphasized women’s self-awareness and
independent personality while the AWEF emphasized breaking down political, social,
and economic inequality and women’s participation in democratization. The AF assumed
low profiles and non-partisan politics, whereas the AWEF employed disruptive,
contentious repertoires and actively cooperated with the democratic movement.

In this chapter, I explore the interactions of the Taiwanese and South Korean
women’s movements with democratic processes by using collective identities as a lens
and a map. Firstly, I analyze the women’s movement’s role in and interaction with
democratization by locating at the centre of this dynamic process their shifting identities
that connect their self-understanding with their interpretation of structures and desires to
change the status quo. Each section shows how women’s movements were engaged or
disengaged with democratic processes and how they transformed their identity discourses
to expand democratic space limited to political democratization.

Secondly, I show how different identities of women’s movements are embedded in
and expressed through their organizational forms, discourses, and repertoires in the
changing democratization in each country. Collective identities as cultural meanings of shared community are strategically deployable to persuade audiences or to dissuade the public from opposing their demands (Bernstein, 1997; Polletta & Jasper, 2001).

Thirdly, every collective identity has its “dividing line” (Hobsbawm, 1984a), such as class or gender line and its “dilemma” between empowerment and oppression (McGarry & Jasper, 2015). Woman and autonomy do not have an immovable and non-intersectible anchoring point. Depending on different spatio-temporal constellations, woman and autonomy may refer to different groups, relations, and contents. I explore the changes in boundaries of women’s movements, their association with or disassociation from other social and political forces, and the expression of this association or disassociation through interidentity (between movements) and intra-identity (within a movement) effects. This analysis shows the changes of coalition politics and partners of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements and their interactive transmogrification and attendant trade-offs.

The subsequent discussion is divided into six sections. In the first section, I briefly discuss the definition of women’s movement adopted here. The subsequent five sections revolve around the analysis of collective identities of women’s movements, their main activities and repertories, and their relations with other actors. In the second section, I analyze limiting conditions and the movement’s different responses epitomized in the Taiwanese New Feminism and South Korean minjung-oriented women’s identities in the 1970s. In the third section, I explore Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements before 1987 and how they developed middle- and working-class-oriented identities, respectively in different social movement fields; a configuration where women’s
organizations and their actions were intertwined with other social movements. The fourth section covers the immediate transition years between 1987 and the early 1990s. I analyze identity shifts of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements in the reconfigured state and democratising society. I focus on the emergence of the homogeneous gender identity of the Taiwanese women’s movement and the extended working women identity of its South Korean counterpart. The fifth section pertains to the period from the early 1990s to before the late 1990s. I investigate how the institutionalization of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements were linked with the articulation or disarticulation of their identities with those of democratic movements. I explore the role of shifting collective identities on legislative, administrative, and electoral politics of women’s movements. The sixth section is related to the period of the late 1990s. It examines challenges to homogeneous collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements that were deeply involved in state institutions in the name of state feminism in Taiwan and gender mainstreaming in South Korea. This section reviews their challenges and implosion to their homogeneous collective identity from women’s groups of different identities.

WOMEN’S AND FEMINIST MOVEMENTS, AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

Women’s movement is defined differently depending on the criteria and definitional boundaries. Based on gender interests as a criterion, Molyneux (1985, 2005) disaggregates activism of women’s movements into strategic interests that aim at eliminating women’s subordination and the existing gender order and practical interests that work toward addressing the immediate needs derived from the sexual divison of
labour and do not confront the predominant gender order. Similarly, Alvarez (1990) divides women’s collective activism into “feminist” movement corresponding with strategic interests and “feminine” movement standing for practical interests.

Even feminist movement challenging the predominating gender order is perceived as not homogeneous. Maternal feminism emphasizes women’s difference from men; egalitarian feminists pursues gender equality (Jaquette, 1994, 2001); inclusionary feminism focuses on the elimination of gender inequalities; transformative feminisms try to dismantle the structural basis of inequalities (Hassim, 2006); *independientes* insist on the autonomy of women’s movements; and *polfticas* are involved both in feminist organizations and non-feminist party or state institutions (Beckwith, 2000; Lievesley, 1996).

Although women’s movement and feminist movement are used interchangeably, they are conceptually and analytically different. Karen Beckwith (2000, 2007) places women’s movements between social and feminist movements, contending that women’s movements are those “where women are the major actors and leaders, who make gendered identity claims as the basis for the movement, and who organize explicitly as women” while feminist movements stand for those challenging patriarchy and other gender-based oppression (p. 314). In a similar vein, Ferree and Mueller (2004) argue that women’s movement refers to “an organizational strategy” mobilising women as a *constituency* to engender social change while feminist movement stands for “the goal of challenging and changing women’s subordination to men” (p. 577, emphasis original). Yet, the distinction between women’s and feminist movements is not rigid in the movement’s real political contexts. Feminists often struggle in coalition with popular
women’s organizations or the latter campaign for feminist causes, for oppression is multilayered and gender is intersected with other identities (Ferree & Mueller, 2004; Kaplan, 1982; Mohanty, 1991a; Zinn & Dill, 1996).

Women’s movements are often interwoven with national-liberation, democratic, urban poor, human rights, environmental, or other movements (Alvarez, 1990; Basu, 1995; Hassim, 2006; Jayawardena, 1986). The association of other social movements with women’s movement is in some cases rather structural; not in the sense of all-encompassing and ubiquitous but penetrated and deep-seated.

Ray’s (1999) comparison of women’s movements in Bombay and Calcutta shows how collective identities of other social movements affect and shape women’s movements and their agendas. Women’s movements in Calcutta concentrate on “practical interests,” such as literacy, employment, and democratic claims because of the dominance of the Communist Party of India and its class-oriented identity, whereas the absence of such a hegemonic identity permits those in Bombay to focus on women’s strategic interests and to establish autonomous feminist identities. Hellman (1987) also found that in Italy, unlike women’s movements in Italian cities with a weak workerist tradition such as Milan, women’s and feminist movements in the city with the longstanding “workerism” tradition like Turin are constrained by this working-class orientation where even their success is framed and evaluated by this tradition.

In a similar but different vein, the interplay between women’s and other social movements is in feminist movement termed as “double militancy,” women’s activism in and commitment to two political venues, with intersecting collective identities (Beckwith, 2000). It shows that the collective identities of women’s movements are engaged in
constant negotiations with other, general, or national social movements. Gendered oppression, women’s subordination to men, and the goals and success of women’s movements are not predetermined but to be contextualized in those multidimensional identity fields. Women’s movement constantly negotiates with other social movements through the alignment of their identities with those of others.

Building on above discussions, I focus on South Korean and Taiwanese feminist collective actions challenging women’s subordination and existing gender order within the context of women’s movements which are led by and composed of women as their core actors, and their mobilisation based on gender and sexual identity claims. They are directly or indirectly intertwined with general or democratic movements. That is feminist activities will be discussed in relation with women’s and democratic movements and their collective identities. Women’s organizations discussed in this chapter do not involve administered women’s organizations by authoritarian regime-affiliated groups. In South Korea, these groups are usually called progressive women’s movement in opposition to the regime-affiliated conservative one. Except for specific feminist ideas and organizations, in this chapter I term those collective actions as women’s movement.

THE RISE OF TAIWANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS

Before analysing the emergence of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements, it is worthwhile to discuss different ideological and institutional conditions Taiwanese and South Korean women encountered. Confucianism and South Korean military and Taiwanese one-party regimes significantly affected women’s condition. These
differences render the role of collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements more obvious in attaining similar achievements.

Confucianism in Taiwan serves as a supporting ideology for the KMT’s Chinese nationalism that produced homogenized modern Chinese women couched in traditional Confucian values. Confucianism in South Korea, in contrast, produced more hierarchical effects at the societal level than its Taiwanese counterpart (E. Friedman, 2003, p. 57; Gelb & Palley, 1994, p. 3; K. S. Kim, 1997, p. 100), where motherhood was emphasized as social reproducers, reinforcing women’s career interruption and men’s position in work. Its patriarchal and masculine characteristics were intensified by militarism. In Taiwan, however, Confucian patriarchy and masculinity was compromised by family traditions of South China—where women have more say than those in the North (Kung, 1983, pp. 21-22; Sechiyama, 2013)— and Sun, Yat-sen’s liberal feminism, which promoted the image of generalized Chinese women couched in the universal human being while fostering a homogenized identity of women (Y. Chang, 1997).¹ In contrast, militarism in South Korea produced overlapping effects of classed and gendered identities and reinforced traditional gender norms. It juxtaposed de-sexualized women for industrial production with their sexualized women for social reproduction. Universal and higher status was assigned to men while a particular and lower position was allocated to women. Therefore, Taiwanese women’s movement entered the 1980s claiming universalized and wide women’s own identity and focused on awareness raising while its

¹ Sun’s and his sanminzhuyi’s liberalism, however limited, promoted women’s rights under the framework of universal human rights (Y. Chang, 1997) while its socialist elements fostered institutional presence of women in the form of reserved seats through the adoption of political representation based on occupational and social groups, such as workers, peasants, and women, instead of founding solely on regional elections (C.-L. Huang, 2012). According to the 1946 Constitution, a certain proportion of seats, approximately 10 percent of local and national representative bodies, were reserved for women.
South Korean counterpart emphasized a more particular and narrow working-class women’s identity and understood women’s movement as part of the democratic movement. I explore this issue in the subsequent sections in more detail.

In this section, first I analyze the institutional environment that surrounded and constrained Taiwanese and South Korean women's movements before the 1980s. This analysis shows differences between the Taiwanese corporatist structure of women’s organizations based on the nationalist-centric binary discourse and the South Korean regime-affiliated women’s organizations grounded in class-based binary discourse. Then, I investigate the emergence of Taiwanese and South Korean women's movements, which both constructed collective identities claiming the equal status as human beings. Yet, the Taiwanese women’s movement was oriented to individuals and gender harmony and advocated women’s active involvement in the development to unfold women’s potential while its South Korean counterpart emphasized collective and classed aspects of women and were critical of the developmental discourse. The former was based on elite-led activities, whereas the latter underlined collective actions. I also show their different relationship with democratic movements. The Taiwanese women’s movement showed only individual and weak connection with the *dangwai* movement while its South Korean counterpart maintained collective and organic links with the *chaeya* movement.

**The Rise of Taiwanese Women’s Movement: New Feminism**
Corporatist Structure and “Chinese Women”

Before the emergence of Lu, Hsiu-lien’s “New Feminism” (Xin nuxing zhuyi) in the early 1970s, women’s issues were dominated by corporatist organizations in Taiwan. Like other one-party regimes, for example in the former socialist countries, the KMT party-state built women’s “administered mass organizations” (AMOs), which are formally civilian organizations but produced and regulated by the regime to carry out its policy (Kasza, 1995, p. 7). Three corporatist women’s organizations—the Taiwan Provincial Women’s Association (1946, Association), Chinese Women Anti-Communist League (1950, League), and the KMT’s Women’s Working Committee (1953, Committee)—infiltrated central and local state institutions and into every corner of society (D. Chang, 2009b, pp. 66-75; F.-I. Chen, 2000, p. 112). They constituted the basis for the party-state to mobilize women for anti-communism, the reconstruction of the ROC, and the reproduction of the traditional Confucian gender role, such as good-wife-and-wise-mother and harmonious (hexie) family (Takeuchi, 2010; Y. Wang, 1999, p. 20).

The corporatist organizations replaced women’s movement (funu yundong) and “rights” with “women’s work” (funu gongzuo) and “obligation,” for “movement” (meaning extra-institutional and resistant) is only temporal but “work” (meaning institutional and generative) is permanent (Chou & Chiang, 1989, p. 81; Ko, 2016; Takeuchi, 2010, p. 161). Firstly, this replacement implies that women’s movement for equal rights belongs to the past history of the mainland, for gender equality, including reserved seats for women, was guaranteed by the 1947 Constitution (Y.-I. Ku, 1989, pp. 13-14; Y.-I. Ku & Ko, 2008, p. 70). Secondly, women’s rights and interests are secondary
(ciyao) to and absorbed into those of the Chinese nation as in the KMT’s mainland period (D. Chang, 2009a, p. 15; Y. Chang, 1997).

The corporatist organizations painted an image of homogeneous Chinese women—ignorant of differences in provincial origin, class, age, and others—as a collective identity embedded into the Chinese nation. Chang, Yufen (1997) argues in an analysis of the dominant discourse of those corporatist organizations that they constructed Chinese women through binary discourses, which otherized women under the rule of Japan as oppressed and colonized; those under the PRC as anti-traditional; and those of Taiwan as unenlightened and passive. Here, the adjective Chinese stands both for inheriting and preserving orthodox tradition and for enlightening and modernising immature society. Thus, women of each phase can be depicted as anti-Chinese, un-Chinese, and pre-Chinese. Taiwanese women were represented as beneficiaries of health care and welfare, high Chinese culture, and enlightenment bestowed by Chinese women.

**New Feminism, the emergence of Taiwanese women’s movement**

It is widely recognized that the postwar Taiwanese women’s movement began in the early 1970s with Lu, Hsiu-lien. She worked as a government official, studied law at Harvard in the United States, and was elected vice-president under the Chen, Shui-bian government (2000-2008). Lu (1994, 2014) advocated women’s rights since the early 1970s by criticizing dominant androcentric views. Her speech on Women’s Day at the NTU in 1972 might be considered the starting point of the Taiwanese women’s movement where she appealed to the audience not to accept patriarchal stereotypes, such as men located outside and women inside the home (H.-L. Lu, 2014, pp. 50-51).
Lu published her influential book *New Feminism* in 1974. It highlighted three principles: autonomous personality preceding gender identity (first be a person, then man or woman); playing the proper (or assigned) gender and social role but resisting gendered privileges and discrimination; and the best use of one’s talent to develop one’s potential (H.-L. Lu, 1990; 1994, p. 297). The *New Feminism* emphasized individual autonomy and freedom and equality of women as human beings in contrast to the official discourse underlining their collectivity and subordination to the Chinese nation. The “new woman” or feminist were considered enlightening pioneers and elites, such as “decision-maker” or “inventor” (H.-L. Lu, 1990, p. 162).² Lu (1990) suggests that her new feminism was “human right movement rather than women’s rights movement.” (p. 161). Woman as a human being also referred to women as human resources (*renli ziyuan*) for the country and its development by utilising women’s potential and labour force (p. 151). This identity claim of woman as human beings and resources even located rape issues in the discourse of development where rape would indirectly “restrict women’s freedom of actions and also their employment…which could waste one-half of human resources” (p. 180).

The features of her new feminism are to be read in its name. Lu consciously adopted the term “new feminism” instead of new feminist movement. Lu found it difficult to sustain collective actions under the tight control of the party-statist corporatism. More importantly, the new feminism’s elite-orientation led Lu (1990) to prefer the term “-ism”³

---

² Lu, Hsiu-lien (1990) used the term *xin nuxing* (new woman) in her Chinese book *New Feminism* (*Xin nuxingzhuyi*) as the new subject for women’s movement. Yet, Lu (1994) replaced *xin nuxing* (new woman) with “feminist” in her English article “Women's Liberation: The Taiwanese Experience.”

³ New feminism as a “doctrine” borrows Sun, Yat-sen’s framework of *sanminzhuyi* composed of thought (of the times), belief (for gender equality), and power (for change) (H.-F. Hsieh, 2006).
to “movement.” She rejected the women’s rights movement as too narrow and women’s liberation movement as too radical. Like corporatist AMOs, she also “discarded [the term] movement…which is more a temporary enthusiasm of mass and cannot help but be blind without careful consideration” (p. 148). In fact, Lu describes her activities as “one-woman crusade” (H.-L. Lu, 1994, p. 289).4

The relationship between women’s and democratic movements are not obvious in her new feminism. Unlike women in the dangwai movement who considered gender issues subordinated to ethno-national/democratic questions and to the new nation-building and democratization (S.-C. Li, 2013), Lu (2014) thought that democratization and women’s movement were “two sides of the same coin” and interdependent (p. 64).

Despite Lu’s imprisonment due to her involvement in the Kaohsiung incident in 1979, the women’s movement and its identity was not incorporated into and subordinated to dangwai movement because her feminist activities and New Feminism emerged before the establishment of Taiwanese consciousness. As Lu (1994) stated, the nexus between democratic and women’s movements was weak (p. 302).5 In the late 1970s, Lu was more involved in the dangwai than the women’s movement.6

Lu’s New Feminism partially inherits Confucian and official discourses and mirrors the image they constructed in that gender identity couched into “higher” (human)

---

4 Lu’s activities set up the foundation for one of the important characteristics of subsequent women’s movements, wensueyuan (faculty of arts) type movement led by intellectuals with degrees in the faculty of arts and focused on public awareness-raising (Y.-g. Wang, 1999).

5 Ku, Yen-lin (1988), a feminist scholar and perhaps the first Taiwanese femocrat, holds a different view from that of Lu, Hsiu-lien in that women’s and democratic movement were closely correlated (p. 186). In the personal interview with this author, she stated that “in the 70s the political opposition became our alliance…we had close ties… I think any groups and individuals who are opposed to the establishment or potential friends with them” (personal interview, Jan. 19, 2015). Those statements may not oppose Lu’s view, if viewed from the perspective of whether the ties between the two movements are organic or individual.

6 Lu’s two publications, New Feminism in 1974 and Taiwan: Past and Future in 1979, reveal the disruption between her women’s and democratic movements. The latter book is filled with Taiwanese local history while the history of local women’s movement is absent in the former.
identity, gender division of labour in the public and private spheres, and a contribution to
development for modernization. Further, the “new woman” bears a resemblance to
Chinese women in the official discourse where they enlighten Taiwanese women.

The Rise of South Korean Women’s Movement: Women as Workers

Woman above Unfortunate Women

As Kasza (1995) showed in his comparative study on AMOs in non-democratic polities,
military regimes are less capable of organising the masses and managing AMOs than
one-party regimes, which are equipped with more institutional stability and resources.
Before the 1980s, women’s issues were primarily handled by regime-affiliated
organizations. Yet, unlike Taiwan, there was no corporatist women’s organization in
South Korea. The Korean National Council of Women (KNCW), founded in 1959,
played a role like AMOs. The KNCW is an umbrella organization for occupational
organizations composed of middle- and upper-class women. The KNCW, however, is
involved in both AMOs’ activities to implement government policy and interest groups to
influence the government, such as campaigns for the revision of family law in favour of
women. Nevertheless, it served as a quasi-agent of South Korean military regimes.

Women’s issues before the 1970s were treated as a part of labour force or concerned
with women’s attitudes and position in the family (Maelgyeongje, 1979). Because they
were formed in the 1970s during rapid industrialization, women’s issues revolved around
economic development with terms like “career woman,” “working woman,” “female
human resource” starting to have wide currency. Women’s rights were rarely discussed in
terms of gender relations but referred to the advancement of the status of women, which would release them from the shackles of traditional society and into the production sphere, as was assumed in the then dominant discourse on women in development (WID).\footnote{WID formulates development in economic terms while leaving intact the existing gender relations and effects of class, race, and culture on women (Elson, 1991; Mohanty, 1991b; Visvanathan, 1997).} The KNCW considered “women as the element of the economic development” while arguing that the “importance of women’s movement was recognized only after the discovery of its role in the accomplishment of economic goal and modernisation” (Maeilgyeongje, 1976b).

Compared with the dominant discourse of Taiwanese corporatist organizations, which was built along the national line between Chinese and non-Chinese women, the dominant discourse of South Korea on women was constructed around the binary discourse of (ordinary) woman versus “unfortunate” (bul-u in Korean, buyu in Chinese) women. The term unfortunate women served as a category separating ordinary women from those with low income and without “independence ability,” such as prostitutes, runaway women, and single mothers (Maeilgyeongje, 1975a), who had to be disciplined in order to be integrated into the labour force (Kyunghyang Daily, 1969; Maeilgyeongje, 1975b) where the KNCW would play the role of the “bridgehead for connecting woman with unfortunate women” (Maeilgyeongje, 1975a). Working women were otherized as a group lacking agency but to be helped to aid in industrial development.

**Women as Human Beings and Women Workers**

Around the mid-1970s, two different trends of South Korean women’s movement emerged. Firstly, a group of female intellectuals began to see women’s liberation within
the trend of world human rights movements. The *Declaration of Women as Human Beings (Declaration)*, drafted by a group of women intellectuals in 1975, was considered the first collective attempt to manifest a feminist viewpoint since the Korean War (Mi-Kyeong Chang, 2005; Hur, 2011; ParkLee, 2008). They declared “the goal of women’s movement is to further their humanization through the transformation of unequal institutions built on gender discrimination” and therefore differed from the “movement for the advancement of their status” as conservative women’s organizations affiliated with the regime. They further agreed that the women’s liberation movement aimed at gender equality based on gender difference and required a new subject with the aim of liberating women, establishing pressure groups of democratic citizens and serving as a messenger of a true minjung’s voice (I.-H. Park, 2009, pp. 153-155). The *Declaration* was a stepping stone to a new and progressive women’s movement.8

The second group was women workers. Export-oriented industrialization in South Korea rapidly increased female workers and their full-time proletarianization rather than the part-time proletariats of their Taiwanese counterparts whose relationship with their rural households were not untied (Gates, 1979; Koo, 2001; Sen & Koo, 1992). Female workers suffered from class-cum-sexual domination in factories where women’s subordination was materialized through male supervisors and male workers. Full-time proletarianization of women workers facilitated their extra-family activities offered by church groups. Religious groups like the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) and the Christian Academy provided training programs on labour rights and small group

---

8 Participants in the discussion meeting and training programs of the Christian Academy played a pivotal role in the establishment of the Korean Women’s Institute and the first women’s study course at Ewha Women’s University in 1977. Those participants also founded the Social Research Association in 1976, which organized various activities showing feminist consciousness, such as women’s cultural festival.
activities, including discussion and hobbies (Ogle, 1990). They trained more than ten thousands workers annually (I.-s. Kang, 2009, p. 24). Women workers who participated in those programs either democratized male-dominated company unions or founded new democratic unions (Park, Sunae, personal interview, Oct. 27, 2014; Choi, Sun-young, personal interview, Nov. 06, 2014). In 1976, those female union leaders founded the Workers’ Association for Women’s Liberation aimed at “the accomplishment of women’s liberation through labour movement” (Yeoseonghaebang nodongjagisuhoi, 1976). The participants consciously added “liberation,” a taboo word at that time, to the name of their organization and highlighted “workers” as the new subject (Y.-r. Shin, 2016). Its members initiated the foundation of the Korean Women Workers’ Association (KWWA) in 1987.

It is claimed that women workers’ labour movement lacked feminist and gender consciousness (S.-k. Cho, 1990; B.-S. Yoon, 2001). Yet, the rigid distinction between women’s strategic and practical interests (Molyneux, 1985) is not easily applicable to the class-cum-sexual factory regime where economic exploitation and sexual discrimination worked together. Further, women-led trade unions achieved demands, such as the ban on sexual assault and harassment, abandonment of compulsory retirement at marriage, and maternity leave (I.-s. Kang, 2009, pp. 34-35).

South Korean women’s movements led by intellectuals and women workers were closely linked with the democratic movement. Many participants of the Declaration were engaged in the chaeya movement and supported the women’s trade union movement. Intellectuals of the Declaration bridged those of women’s trade unions with the chaeya movement. The series of women workers’ struggles, which undermined the military
regime, were actively supported by women intellectuals and the *chaeya* movement.

Women’s movements, in particular the women’s labour movement, were one of the primary sources of the *minjung* movement and served as its midwife.

The new collective identities, women as human beings and as workers, rejected seeing women as a subordinated class to men while challenging the dominant discourse that considered working women as unfortunate and as an “element” to be mobilized for development.

Table 5-1 South Korean (SK) and Taiwanese (TW) Women’s Movements in the 1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Collective identities</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Relation with 1) the state; and 2) other actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TW</td>
<td>Lu, Hsiu-lien (New Feminism)</td>
<td>First be a person, then woman</td>
<td>1) non-cooperative  2) weak link with the <em>dangwai</em> movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Feminist intellectuals and women workers</td>
<td>Women as Human Beings / women workers</td>
<td>1) resistant  2) strong link with the <em>chaeya</em> movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS BEFORE TRANSITION**

In this section, I focus on Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements between 1980 and 1986, before the democratic transition. I explore how different collective identities between Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements engaged in discourses, repertoires, and alliance-building. My analysis includes the first and representative feminist organizations in the 1980s: the Taiwanese *Awakening Magazine* (AM) and South Korean AWEF. Their activities epitomize the contrasting features of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements in this era. Taiwanese intellectuals launched the AM for consciousness raising based on autonomous gender identity and assumed a low profile. In contrast, South Korean intellectuals and activists founded the
AWEF, which emphasized working women identity and adopted a disruptive approach. AM emphasized harmonious gender identity, recruited readers (not members), focused on awareness-raising, and maintained its autonomy from the democratic dangwai movement. The AWEF declared working women as the core agent for emancipation, recruited activist members, organized mass campaigns and rallies, and participated in the democratic chaeya movement. Taiwanese non-partisan politics, based on hypopoliticized gender identity and the South Korean partisan politics based on politicized working women identity, were formed in this period.

**Taiwanese AM: Women’s Self-Consciousness and Harmonious Gender**

The post-Kaohsiung Taiwanese women’s movements began with the establishment of the AM in 1982. Lu, Hsiu-lien’s imprisonment due to the Kaohsiung incident forced her supporters to keep their distance from politics and opposition movements. Lee, Yuan-chen and other feminists launched the AM to resume the women’s movement. The foreword in the first AM issue emphasized the necessity for women to find their “true self” and “independent personality” and to stand up for a new gender-equal society and the development of the country in cooperation with enlightened men (Funu xinzhi, 1982).

The different meanings between the AM’s Chinese and English titles reveal the careful strategy of Taiwanese feminists. The Chinese title refers to women’s new knowledge (funu xinzhi). Wu, Chia-li, one of the founding members of the AM, recalls: “Knowledge is acceptable for everybody…. That's why we decide to use this women's new knowledge instead of something like awakening (juexing) (personal interview, Jan.

---

9 “New knowledge” historically involved the connotation of the May Fourth Movement and New Culture Movement for modernizing and enlightening China against Imperial forces in the early twentieth century.
The English title Awakening, which was not added to the Chinese Funu xinzhi\(^{10}\) until its thirteenth issue in 1983,\(^{11}\) refers to “women’s self-consciousness” (nuxing zijue) that forms the basis to cultivate women’s autonomy to solve their own problems, participate in social issues, and develop their potential (Y.-C. Lee, 1986, p. 5). The addition of the English title shows a change in the AM’s emphasis, as Fan, Qing (2010) suggests, from moderate women’s development to their self-awareness.

The collective identity that AM assumed was grounded on humanitarian perspective. AM organized its activities under the first credo of Lu’s New Feminism, first be a person, then man or woman, “women’s movement is a branch of human rights movements” (Y.-C. Lee, 1986). “Women….deserve to enjoy human rights….Those universally recognized truth should be applied to women” (Funu xinzhi, 1985). Independent of differences among women, they were perceived to be a homogeneous group that deserves to claim human rights enjoyed by men. In contrast to other contemporary self-help activities in the 1980s before the lifting of Martial Law (1987), AM’s activities were grounded less on oppression and victimized experiences than on “harmonious gender” (liangxing hexie) identity (Bo, 1983; Y.-l. Ku, 1989, 1996; S. C. Lee, 2011, p. 50; Y.-C. Lee, 1984; Weng

\(^{10}\) There are various terms referring to woman in Chinese and Korean as well: nuxing or yeoseong (female sex), funu or bunyeo (married women + female), mizi or yeoja (female + child), and nuren or yeoyin (female + human), respectively in Chinese and Korean. According to Tani Barlow (1994, 2004), those terms functioned as catachreses, a metaphor without an adequate referent and with very real political effects and power. In China, Maoists resignified the traditionally kin-related funu in Confucian private sphere to funu as the state subject for revolution and modernization in public and family spheres, where it replaced also the term nuxing, a translated term of the Victorian gender binary paired with nanxing (male + sex). In Taiwan, funu is the representative signifier standing for women as seen in the translation of Women’s Day (Funu jie). Bunyeo (funu in Chinese) is an obsolete term in South Korea. Yeoseong (nuxing in Chinese) stands for the representative term for women in South Korea, as seen in the translation of Women’s Day (Yeoseongui nal). Women’s movement is usually translated into funu yundong in Taiwan, while yeoseong undong is designated to women’s movement in South Korea.

\(^{11}\) The English title Awakening was proposed by the other founding member Ku, Yen-lin, a feminist scholar and one of the first generation of women’s studies in Taiwan (Ku, Yen-lin, personal interview, Jan. 19, 2015).
& Fell, 2006, p. 151), which is represented by its main readership, middle-class homemakers.

This gender identity of AM was both expressive and instrumental in that it was adopted to reduce gender inequality and avoid political intervention from ruling and oppositional forces. As Ku, Yen-lin (1989) states: “While continuing to advocate gender equality, Awakening had to assume a low profile, concentrating its attention on women's issues only and remaining politically independent” (p. 22). Lee and her colleagues could take a low profile formulating a non-confrontational women’s voice by publishing a magazine. It helped them to avoid the regime’s direct intervention (Farris, 1994, p. 309; Y.-C. Lee, 1999, p. 97), which might be seen both as non-partisan politics and as compliance with the regime’s hypo-politici zation politics.

Like Molyneux’s ideal types of women’s movement authority to define its goals and actions (2005),12 the AM maintained its autonomy from other movements. AM’s associational linkage with other movements and mobilizable resources were weak. Gender identity was assumed to be an overarching boundary marker, which should not be compromised by other competing identities, such as the nation or democracy. Lee, Yuan-chen initiated autonomous women’s movements when she found that women’s needs were ignored in the xiangtu literature and democratic movement (Funu xinzhi, 1989, p. 21). A Taiwanese feminist stated in the interview with this author:

There is no grassroots mobilisation because women have such little resources. And the mainstream democratic movement in the old days don’t give a damn about women’s movement. You know all these other social

---

12 Maxine Molyneux (2005) differentiates three ideal types of women’s movement authority: independent (self-governing); associational (quasi-independent); and directed (dependent).
movement people, do they care about gender equality?.... I would say feminist movement in old days under authoritarianism...had a distance from the democratic movement but because democratic movement at that time was very male-oriented.

The AM group was regarded by some observers as “non-political” (fei zhengzhi), depolitical (qu zhengzhi), or non-partisan (wu dangpai) (D. Chang, 2009b; H.-t. Chang, 2006; Y. Fan, 2003, 2004; Weng & Fell, 2006). It performed non-partisan and hypo-politicized politics with a non-confrontational low profile to achieve gender rights.


**South Korean AWEF: Women as Producers**

Despite the new military regime’s harsh repression, South Korean women strengthened their collective actions. New women’s movement organizations increased rapidly like the Women’s Hotline for battered women (1983) and the Alternative Culture (1984) for the promotion of anti-patriarchal and pro-feminist culture. The first women’s organization that clearly spelled out women’s liberation as its goal was the AWEF, founded in 1983.
The AWEF claimed: “women’s freedom and equality depend purely on women themselves. We gathered here to eliminate political, social, and economic inequality on the basis of our will for democracy and reunification” (Yeoseongpyeong-uhoe, 1983).

The AWEF’s Korean name *Pyeong-woo-hoi* is rooted in the Korean feminist organization *Geun-woo-hui*, literally Sharon (Korean national flower)-friendship-association, established in 1927 under Japanese colonial rule. It was the first Korean progressive feminist and mass organization claiming gender and economic equality and incorporated into the national liberation movement against Japanese rule. The Korean name AWEF shows its class-orientation and involvement in political movement based on mass mobilization instead of elite-led initiatives.

The AWEF forged its identity of women as producers. It was based on the “particularity” South Korean women experienced, i.e. the shared experience of exploitation of their labour forces and their cooperation with other anti-regime movement for transformative changes (Yeoseongpyeong-uhoe, 1983, 1984a). *Gi cheung* (bottom stratum) women, in particular female workers were presented as the new subject. Their great potential was due to their placement in the most exploitative and oppressive conditions (Yeoseongpyeong-uhoe, 1984b).

The collective identity of the women’s movement, women as producers, rooted in its own history of women’s labour movement, helped the birth of *minjung* identity. Leaning again on Molyneux (2005), South Korean women’s movement promoted associational linkage with the *minjung* movement rather than maintain its autonomy. Women’s liberation and women’s gender interests were considered inseparable from political
democratization and social transformation. Jeong, Moo-Ja, the chairperson of the Korean Women Workers Association said:

In the 1980s, there was a widespread assumption that labour movement is the centre of the democratic movement... The emergence of the South Korean progressive women’s organizations began with the women workers’ struggles for rights to live. Social transformative movement, whether or not it is democratic, minjung, or reunifications movements, is entangled with women’s questions because socio-economic structure is founded on patriarchal structure (personal interview, Oct. 22, 2015).

The fact that the AWEF became a member of the Minjung Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (MMCDR) shows the then women’s movement put its associational links with the democratic movement above its autonomy.\(^\text{13}\)

Differences in collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements were brought into sharp relief through their collective actions. The harmonious gender identity of the Taiwanese women’s movement was expressed in low profile and hypo-politicized activities like awareness-raising and the EPL. The AWEF’s working women identity for transformative change was to be seen in its anti-statist discourses and activities. Firstly, the AWEF actively campaigned against discriminative labour policy against women like compulsory early retirement at marriage and supported

\(^{13}\) Before the democratic transition in 1987, South Korean women’s movement was entangled in fierce debates. One group, a relatively older generation supporting a dual-systems approach to socialist feminism, argued that women’s movement should maintain its autonomy and its subject should include all women due to their suffering under both patriarchal oppression and capitalist exploitation, while the other group, relatively younger but more traditionally Marxist feminists, viewed women’s movements as a sub-category of the minjung movement and working women as the core actor under the capitalist system (H.-j. Cho, 1994; J.-h. Cho, 2005; Y.-h. Kim, 2000). Despite their differences, the two groups shared the view that the women’s movement is part of the democratic movement and working women are its key actor.
women workers’ strikes. Secondly, the AWEF initiated the first Women’s Conference to celebrate the International Women’s Day under the title “Women’s movement working with nation, democracy, and minjung” (Yeoseongpyeong-uhoe, 1985), which contrasted with the Taiwanese AM. The latter focused in its first celebration of international Women’s Day on women’s development, health, and gender education, and sustained its autonomy from the democratic movement. Thirdly, the AWEF framed sexual assault against women as “sexual violence committed by the public power” (Jung, 2013, p. 14; S.-s. Shin, 2010, p. 891; KWAU, 1997) rather than the deprivation of women’s sovereign rights on their body, when female colleges students participating in an anti-regime rally and a student-turned-worker, Kwon, Insook, were sexually harassed and abused by the police.

Table 5-2 South Korean and Taiwanese Women’s Movements between 1980 and 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Collective identities</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Relation with 1) the state; and 2) other actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TW</td>
<td>Awakening Foundation (AF)</td>
<td>Harmonious gender identity</td>
<td>Raising public awareness and awakening</td>
<td>1) (active) non-confrontational 2) independent of the dangwai movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Association for Women's Equality and Friendship</td>
<td>Women as producer</td>
<td>Mobilizing women for democracy</td>
<td>1) anti-statist 2) organic cooperation with the chaeya movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 Women’s organizations supported Kwon, Insook, then a student-turned-worker and now a feminist scholar, who in 1986 publicly voiced her sexually abuse by a police officer during an arrest for her involvement in anti-regime activities. Kwon, Insook (1988a) identified herself as a “female worker” of gicheung (bottom stratum) minjung. She argued that it is insufficient to feel instinctive and emotional anger at the use of male sexual organ to repress legitimate claims of workers. People should have more rage against the murderous anti-labour regime than against the sexual torture (1988b, 1988c).
WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN TRANSITION

In this section, I analyze changes in the collective identities of women’s movements in the two countries from 1987 to the early 1990s. The accessibility of social movements to institutional venues and grassroots grew as the transition became irreversible. Yet, it is not necessarily favourable to social movements, for it may compromise their autonomy, accelerate their institutionalization, drain their resources, and shrink their support base in the expanded institutional space.

In these immediate transition years, Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements developed different collective identities, organizations, coalition politics, and relation with the state. Taiwanese organizations developed collective gender identity that integrated and bridged diverse women’s positions while South Korean progressive women’s organizations extended the scope of their working women identity to include the reproduction sphere. Non-membership foundation was favoured by Taiwanese women’s organizations, whereas their South Korean counterparts developed grassroots-oriented membership organizations. The Taiwanese women’s movement sustained its autonomy from the DPP and the rising Taiwanese identity. Its organizations built conjunctural coalitions to utilize the newly available state arena. For South Korean progressive women’s organizations, autonomy from the state was more relevant than from the democratic *minjung* movement. They established the KWAU as the ongoing and coherent umbrella for women’s empowerment rather than utilizing state sources or building conjunctural coalitions.
Taiwanese Women’s Movement: From New Feminism to New Gender Relations

In Taiwan’s post-Martial-Law era, the ostensibly impenetrable state was reconfigured into a contestable arena and the solid meaning of the political and public was rendered disputable. In cooperation with aboriginal, religious, and human rights groups, in January 1987, women’s organizations held their first mass street rally against child prostitution, which heralded a new era of the Taiwanese women’s movement.

Taiwanese women’s movement sustained gender loyalties of women’s activists from various groups and developed collective gender identity independent of the whirlwind of the changing hegemonic national identity. The New Femin-ism as an elite-led doctrine was increasingly replaced by women of diverse groups with the “new gender relation” (xin liangxing guanxi) (Chou & Chiang, 1989, p. 94) where women’s collective actions no longer remain within a handful of elites-led doctrine or ism but evolve into a movement that recognizes the diversity among women.

The anti-child prostitution rally produced, leaning on Whittier’s term (2004, pp. 533-541), “generative” and “spillover” effects within the Taiwanese women’s movement by creating new challenges, frames, and identities. New and diverse issue-oriented women’s organizations emerged to assist juvenile prostitutes, to empower homemakers for sustainable community, and to help sexually abused women. Despite this diversity of subjective positions of women’s organizations, they recognized the shared interests under the signifier of woman as a homogeneous autonomous identity were not intersected by other higher authority and identity. Unlike Taiwanese environmental, peasant, and labour movements of which identities were encroached by the Taiwanese identity (Y. Fan, 2003;
H.-J. Liu, 2006), the women’s movement sustained its autonomy. To illustrate, Lee, Yuan-chen, the founder of the AM, opposed the involvement of DPP members in the anti-child prostitution rally who hoped to use the gender issue for their partisan politics (Y.-l. Ku, 1989, p. 19, fn. 46).

Women’s movement organizations cooperated in various issues based on their homogeneous but diversified gender identity. The homogeneous gender binary based on middle- and upper class-oriented “femin-ism,” in opposition to the so far official “women’s work” for the mass population, encountered diversification of women’s identity in the post-Martial-Law era. The AM (Awakening Foundation since 1987) insisted on female-centred gender identity; the Homemakers’ Union disagreed. Regarding the attitudes towards men, the Progressive Women’s League cooperated with men while the Warm Life Association rejected it (F.-l. Chen, 2000, p. 116), i.e. “harmony between gender,” as the key feature of the pre-transitional collective identity lost its ability to unite and crosscut diverse women’s positions. The “diversification” reflecting women’s different subject positions did not necessarily imply “division” of the women’s movement (H.-t. Chang, 2006, p. 189). Although women’s movement organizations did not establish an ongoing and unified umbrella, they built loosely tied “conjunctural coalitions” (Alvarez, 1990, p. 237; E. J. Friedman, 2002) along with particular issues, such as campaigns against human trafficking or pornography, and women’s political participation or gender-conscious education. This women’s movement’s conjunctural but united “civil front” (minjian zhanxian) (H.-t. Chang, 2006, p. 134) lasted until the Women’s Solidarity Parade against Sexual Harassment in 1994. I will revisit this issue in a subsequent section.
The homogeneous gender identity based on diversified subject positions of women or on their different positions under the signifier of woman involved a shift in the target of the women’s movement. Instead of awareness-raising for middle-class women, women’s organizations widened and deepened gender politics, which were no longer hypo-politicized as in the pre-transitional era, so they tried to en-gender de-gendered institutions, such as gender-blind laws under a seemingly normative mantel and patriarchal public spheres. This shift required women’s organizations to mobilize more material and human resources and change their repertoires suitable to the new target.

The change of collective identity was witnessed in the diversification of organizational and contentious repertoires. Foundation as organizational repertoire was widely adopted to permit those with relative high cultural capital, such as intellectuals, to garner and distribute resources while grassroots-type organizations or service-providing centres were further employed by women groups engaged in environmental and community issues (H.-t. Chang, 2006, pp. 187-197; Y. Fan, 2003). Even the AM transformed itself into the Awakening Foundation (AF) to stabilize its resource mobilization (Wu, Chia-Li, personal interview, Jan. 30, 2015). The AF further established membership-based Awakening Associations in major cities to promote the participation of non-professional women for gender issues. Repertoires oriented to publics, such as signature campaigns, street rallies, public hearings, and especially legislative lobbying, were added to the inventory of those repertoires in the post-Martial-Law era.
**South Korean Women’s Movements: Women Working at Homes and Factories**

The 1987 June Uprising and Great Labour Struggle led to the end of the new military regime through the direct presidential election in December. Before the transition, women’s movement organizations represented themselves as a united front based on two solidary struggles for working women’s right to live and against sexual assaults on women by public power. Those organizations designated themselves as “progressive” (*jinbo*) women’s movement (Hur, 2011; Jones, 2006; Jung, 2013; S.-k. Kim & Kim, 2014; S.-y. Lee, 1999) to distinguish from government-affiliated conservative women’s organizations. In February 1987, the KWAU, founded as an umbrella for 21 organizations, actively participated in democratization as a part of the democratic coalition.

The progressive women’s movement maintained its pre-transitional collective identity of women as producer. The dominance of the *minjung* and working women identity hindered the development of other women’s identities. Yet, the widened contact surfaces between women’s movement organizations and women encouraged the former to embrace women outside the production sphere. The discussion on the value of domestic labour served as a discursive articulator, bridging women working in production and reproduction spheres since the late 1980s.¹⁵ It framed women working both in production and reproduction spheres while promoting women’s property rights in the family section for homemakers and child care for married female workers. Compared with Taiwan, where homemaker’s movement emerged before the transition, its South

---

¹⁵ Regarding debates on domestic labour, see Kim, Kyounghee (2007), Kim, Young-hee (1990), KWL (1989a, p. 3; 1989b, p. 3; 1989c, p. 17; 1989d, pp. 8-9; 1990a, p. 13; 1990b, p. 36), and KWWA (1989, pp. 4-5).
Korean counterpart began to develop only in the late 1980s. In fact, the KWAU established labour bureau in 1988 but homemaker’s bureau was set up only in 1992.

Women’s organizations spread rapidly around 1987. The KWWA was established by former union leaders and young students-turned-to-workers for women workers’ rights, including married workers (KWWA, 2009). The KWL was founded by feminists and young activists to organize women from various social strata. Compared with the Taiwanese conjunctural coalitions, the KWAU served as an umbrella of sustained coalition of progressive women’s organizations. It declared that the KWAU was the herb to expand the grassroots of women’s movement to: set its right course, reinforce its solidary unity, and participate in the democratic movement (W.-j. Lee, 1987). The founding statements of these organizations shared that women’s movement should be mass-based, working-women-centric, anti-regime-oriented, and pro-minjung movement.

The discourse of labour value theory, bridging producing and homemaking positions, channelled legal activities of women’s movement into production and reproduction areas. Compared with the legislative activities of the Taiwanese women’s movement that were concentrated on women’s bodies (anti-prostitution and pornography) and their rights (gender neutral education and political participation), the KWAU’s legislative activities were focused on women’s rights in production, like equal employment and women’s

---

16 Male activists dominating labour movement blamed the KWWA for splitting labour movement (Jeong, Muon Ja, personal interview, Oct. 22).
17 Themes of the Women’s Conference show the relationship between women’s and minjung movement: the national reality and women’s movement (1987); women for the national independence (1988); towards the new era of equal life (1989); equal labour and healthy motherhood (1990); and women for peaceful disarmament and reunification, and for local autonomy (1991).
18 This does not mean that issues of social reproduction were completely dismissed from the Taiwanese women’s movement’s agenda. The Bill for Gender Equality in Employment was drafted by lawyers from the Awakening Foundation in 1987 but passed only in 2001.
lifelong right to work, and for social reproduction, like infant and child care. Its activities against sexual violence and for women’s political participation were limited to cultural campaigns and seldom discussed until the early 1990s.

Working women as a collective identity with its anti-regime and pro-minjung orientation considerably affected the progressive women’s organizations in political, social, and legislative activities. They kept distance from the government despite the newly established WPA, Ministry of Political Affairs II (1988) responsible for women-related policy. In 1989, the KWAU joined the National Democratic Movement Federation of Korea, the umbrella organization for the minjung movement, which forced several moderate and feminist organizations to leave the KWAU. The KWAU focused more on regime critiques than gender critiques: the latter served for the former. Women’s “political empowerment” (jeongchi selyeoghwa) before 1991 was equated with their grassroots organization and mobilization for the minjung movement instead of women’s descriptive representation (KWAU, 1987a, p. 3; 1987b, p. 31; 1987c, p. 2).

Table 5-3 South Korean and Taiwanese Women’s Movements, 1987-early 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Collective identities</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Relation with 1) the state; and 2) other actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TW AF and diverse women’s</td>
<td>Homogeneous gender identity</td>
<td>Diversification of women’s organizations, legislative activities on women’s</td>
<td>1) tensional 2) independent and sporadic association with the DPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizations</td>
<td>with diversified subject positions</td>
<td>bodies and political participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK KWAU</td>
<td>Women as producer and reproducer</td>
<td>Grassroots organization, legislative activities on production and social</td>
<td>1) confrontational 2) part of the minjung movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reproduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SHIFTING IDENTITIES AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TAIWANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS

This section covers the period from the early 1990s before the late 1990s. Since the early 1990s, the democratic process became stable. In this era, institutionalization of women’s rights was promoted in legislative, administrative, and electoral politics in Taiwan and South Korea. Collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements showed similarity: women as a unified group with shared common interests. Yet, these similarities of institutionalization and collective identities derived from different sources and brought about different coalition politics.

Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements negotiated with the reconfigured state while extending homogeneous and shared gender identity through their narratives on violence against women. Their institutional reorientation paralleled with identity shifts. In Taiwan, it coincided with the change of hegemonic identity which facilitated Taiwanese women’s organizations to insert gender interests in legal processes. They intervened in the national identity reorientation to insert women’s rights with the discourse of state feminism. In South Korea, the radical minjung movement was marginalized by moderate social movements with simin (citizen or burgher) identity. Progressive women’s organizations broadened their collective identity from women as producer and reproducer to “woman in general” (yeoseong ilban). It entailed their alignment with the simin identity and detachment from the minjung movement. It facilitated their coalition politics with conservative women’s organizations for legislat ing women’s rights. Despite the institutionalization of the gender mainstreaming in 1995,
progressive women’s organizations’ relationship with the state was still limited until the late 1990s.

**Taiwanese Women’s Movement: Taiwanese Woman as Citizen**

Taiwanese democratization, which coincided with Taiwanization, was gradually stabilized in the early 1990s. The parliamentary institutions that had allowed only limited access of native Taiwanese were subject to the full re-election. Constitutional reform in 1991 reshaped the national identity that recognized the loss of the mainland and the ROC in Taiwan by limiting its governing space to the “free area,” i.e. Taiwan (Osagawara, 1998). Taiwanese women’s movement reinforced its gender identity in connection with women’s equal citizenship in the stabilizing democracy and changing national identity. Unlike the identity discourse of woman as human beings in the preceding decades, that of woman as citizen based on gender identity facilitated claims for institutionalization of women’s rights. Since the early 1990s challenges to masculinized state institutions and gender norms inscribed in laws stood out in their collective actions.

Firstly, future president (2000-2008) Chen, Shui-bian, as a candidate in 1994 for the DPP won the first public election for Mayor of Taipei after a campaign filled with provocative national identity issues. Feminists who helped him participated in his city administration. The former chair of the Taiwanese Feminist Scholars Association Liu, Yuxiu was the leading figure of those feminists pursued the Scandinavian style of state feminism (F.-M. Lin, 2008, 2010). In 1995, she advised Chen to establish the Taipei Commission for the Promotion of Women’s Rights (CPWR). The Taipei CPWR was the
first “WPA” (Mazur & McBride, 2008; Stetson & Mazur, 2010) to embrace agendas of women’s movements and furthering gender equality.

Liu, Yuxiu, in an interview in 1996 when the term “state feminism” was perhaps first introduced to Taiwan (Ding, 2000, p. 306), advocated state feminism to overturn the hitherto relation between the public and the private. To tread this path required women’s movement to create a consensus through alliance-building based on “universalism” (Q. Li & Hu, 1996) and seeking harmony instead of conflicts as non-state actors do, indifferent to any differences of class and political orientation. For Liu, the pragmatic principle for the consensus-building of universalism was “the Taiwanese” (Taiwanren), the new hegemonic national identity. In other words, the alliance between feminism and the state based on universalism as Taiwanese would provide women with their citizenship. Liu’s state feminism was a confluence of post-colonial projects that overturn the hypo-politicized traditional private and the political modern public; liberal feminism that sees the state as neutral, available in favour for women’s interests; and Nordic state feminism where the state actively shapes women-friendly policies and integrates feminists. The 1994 Taipei mayoral election, the establishment and proliferation of the CPWR to other cities and governmental bodies, and Liu’s state feminism show the mutual intervention of national and gender identities and the interaction between gender identity and the reconfigured state. State feminism provoked controversies among feminists for those with different national and partisan identities were wary of being captured by the Taiwanese state. Su, Chien-ling, the former chairperson of Awakening Foundation, stated:
State feminism was a very fundamental debate. Some people in Taiwan in the feminist groups take the Northern European model as a role model…They want the resource, the policy from the government to take care of people. For people who were on the other side, they say No. You work with the government too much, you become a part of them…I would say [state feminism was] one of the main divisions or debates (Ku, Yen-lin, personal interview, Jan. 30, 2015).

Next, to insert women’s interests into the constitutionalized new national identity, women’s organizations intervened into the constitution-remaking process. To facilitate the insertion of gender identity and interest, they adopted rights discourse that the discrimination of women both violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and hinders the development of the nation and family through the oppression of women’s potential. They issued the Women’s Charter for the stipulation of women’s rights in the constitution (Funu xinzhi, 1991, 1992; T.-w. Wang, 1997, pp. 246-251). The constitutional amendments in 1992 and 1994 adopted their stipulation: the state shall protect the dignity of women, safeguard their personal safety, eliminate sexual discrimination, and further substantive gender equality.

The series of constitutional amendments as a process of the national rebuilding and political reorientation coincided with Taiwan’s isolation from the international community and with the conflict with the PRC. The term “gender mainstreaming” (GM), which gained global currency after the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing Conference), was belatedly adopted in Taiwan only in early 2000 (Ku, Yen-lin, personal interview, Jan. 19, 2015). The Taiwanese women’s movement was
prevented from networking and keeping pace with the global women’s communities. The Taiwanese delegates, including Lu, Hsiu-lien and those of the AF, were denied entry to the Beijing Conference (Walden, 1995). It is no coincidence that the introduction of the term “state feminism” to Taiwan precedes that of the GM.

As seen in the previous section, one of the key characteristics of the post-Martial-Law era women’s movement was the conjunctural cooperation among women’s organizations (H.-t. Chang, 2006; Chou & Chiang, 1989). It was effective for lobbying women’s legal rights (Peng, 2012, pp. 21-22). The primary legislative activities of women’s organizations focused on women’s rights: 1) on their bodies; 2) within the private sphere; and 3) in public institutions.

Firstly, legislative activities for women’s sovereign rights on their bodies were promoted by tragic events, which were emplotted by women’s organizations into a narrative that wove victims with the resonance-evoking and sympathy-evoking human rights causes, and were thereby translated into legitimacy for legislative work: the cases of Teng, Ju-wen who killed her husband in 1994 for his repeated rapes and battery and Peng, Wan-ru, the director of the DPP’s Women’s Department, who was found raped and murdered in 1996. In 1994, women’s movement organizations drafted the Prevention of Domestic Violence Law and the Prevention of Sexual Assault Law. The rise in public awareness of the threatened safety and vulnerability of women forced the Legislative Yuan to swiftly pass those laws (H.-C. Hsieh & Chnag, 2005, p. 33).

Secondly, after 1990, women’s organizations cooperated in the revision of the family section of the Civil Code. Their campaign brought about the 1994 Supreme Court decision that declared the unconstitutionality of the article of the family section giving

Thirdly, besides administrative and legislative politics, women’s organizations actively campaigned for the improvement of women’s representation in electoral politics. They presented the joint platform to political parties to embrace women’s needs into their electoral manifestos (T.-w. Wang, 1997, pp. 236-237). They held workshops to promote women’s participation in elections and politics. Further, in the DPP Peng, Wan-ru introduced the one fourth gender quota of party nomination in 1996. After her death, the DPP accepted “Peng’s one fourth” that spilt over into local and national elections and the KMT (C.-L. Huang, 2005, 2015; Yu, 1999).

**South Korean Women’s Movement: Woman in general**

Since the early 1990s, South Korean social movements experienced fierce identity competitions between minjung and simin. The minjung movement was in sharp decline while citizen or simin movements, such as for environment and human rights, were on the rise. In the early 1990s, progressive women’s organizations adopted a new position, “separately but together,” toward the minjung movement (Jones, 2006, p. 68; S.-k. Kim & Kim, 2011, pp. 30-32; C.-s. Yoon, 2004, p. 57). Their discourse of women’s movement as the minjung movement was replaced with women’s movement and the minjung movement (KWWA, 1991, p. 2; 1992, pp. 24-27; KWAU, 1990; 1991a; 1992a, emphasis added; KWL, 1990a, p. 4). Progressive women’s organizations also shifted
their emphasis from women as producer and reproducer to “woman in general” (yeoseong ilban). This repositioning was motivated by the extended contact surfaces of the emerging women’s organizations with various women groups at the grassroots level. It encouraged progressive women’s organizations to search and construct an autonomous woman’s identity embracing diverse groups.

The women’s movement’s identity shift did not bring about drastic changes in its relations with the state for it only partially modified the anti-systemic position of the minjung movement. The Ministry of Political Affairs II (MOPA II), established in 1988, was the first South Korean WPA at the cabinet-level and recast to coordinate gender policy in 1990, but kept its distance from the women’s movement. Progressive women’s organizations criticized MOPA II for its lack of power to draft bills and resources and its patriarchal and developmental orientation maximizing the labour force of women as supplementary breadwinners (Byun, Ae-Kyung, Sun-Ju, & Hee-Young, 2011, p. 21; Ji, 1994). Unlike their Taiwanese counterpart, state feminism and femocrats were foreign to the South Korean women’s movement.

The Beijing Conference and the enactment of the Framework Act on Women’s Development (Framework) in 1995 served as a momentum for a new relationship between the progressive women’s organizations and the state. They prepared the Beijing Conference together with the WPAs and their conservative counterparts (Byun et al., 2011, pp. 414-415). The MOPA II initiated, in partial consultations with women’s organizations, the enactment of the Framework as a follow-up action to the Beijing Conference. The Framework was designed “to promote the equality between men and women in all the areas…by stipulating fundamental rules… of the state and local
governments for realization of equality between men and women under the constitution.”

The Framework stipulated the responsibility of the government to promote women’s participation in public institutions and its cooperation with women’s organizations. Yet, the implementation of the GM was delayed until the progressive women’s activists shifted their contentious politics to “engagement politics” and transmigrated as femocrats to the state arena in the late 1990s.

The typical organizational repertoire of the South Korean social movements is cross- and multi-issue organization and solidarity inherited from the minjung movement. A South Korean feminist explained the organisational features of women’s movement organizations in the 1990s:

There were really diverse departments in our organization for it wanted to organize women of every class and group. To attract various classes of women, a considerable number of departments, such as departments for blue collar, white collar, urban poor, and youth women, were established.

The KWAU is in fact a quasi-party for women’s rights and empowerment. It organized common interests of progressive women’s organizations and coordinated their legislative and electoral politics. The KWAU cooperated with conservative women’s organizations for women’s interests and built conjunctural gender coalitions with other social movements. Their ability to maintain stable unity and to build flexible coalitions enabled them to gain significant legal achievements despite very low descriptive representation of women in parliament.

---

19 To illustrate, the KWAU initiated the establishment of the national coalition for the enactment of the domestic violence prevention law in which more than twenty influential civil society (simin) movements organizations and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU).
In the preceding section, I discussed the achievements of the Taiwanese women’s movement in women’s rights on their bodies, within the private sphere, and within public institutions. Let me now explore what its South Korean counterpart did in those areas. Firstly, the KWAU’s quasi-party competency was grounded in the shared collective identity of woman in general that was initially constructed through the women’s shared experience of violence against women. It served as the narrative articulator that integrates diverse women groups into woman in general (J.-h. Cho, 2005). Since the early 1990s, violence against women was no longer perceived as repression inflicted by the state as it was in the 1980s. In a series of sexual violence and harassment cases in the early 1990s, women’s organizations jointly campaigned against sexual violence and harassment. This gender coalition based on the identity discourse of woman in general brought about numerous legal achievements, including the enactment of the Special Act on the Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Protection of Victims (1993) and the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Victim Protection acts (1996). The collective identity of progressive women’s movement was based less on exploitation under the developmental regime than violence under the masculinized public spheres and patriarchal gender norms against women. Yet, it must be noted that the discourse of women’s organizations for anti-violence against women was increasingly narrowed to anti-sexual-violence based on the sexual self-determination of individuals than the more comprehensive discourse against violence and abuse against women (S.-s. Shin, 2008). They did not directly

---

20 The Kim, Bu-nam and Kim, Bo-eun cases stirred public opinions in the early 1990s. Kim, Bu-nam, a thirty-one-year old housewife, suffered from a serious trauma after she was raped by her neighbour in her childhood. She killed that neighbour in 1991 when her two marriages life failed due to the trauma. In 1992, Kim, Bo-eun, a female college student, together with her boyfriend murdered her stepfather who had repeatedly raped her. In 1993, Woo, a research assistant at Seoul National University, asked women’s organization to help her lawsuit against Professor Shin. Woo claimed that she was fired because she refused his repeated sexual harassment. These cases played crucial role in legislation against sexual violence and harassment in the 1990s.
challenge the hegemonic gender regime producing gendered and structured violence against women and instead emphasized the brutality and cruelty of violence that required the aforementioned laws to be passed.

Secondly, compared with the Taiwanese women’s movement, South Korean progressive women’s organizations were not enthusiastically involved in the revision of the family sections. It is not only because those sections were substantially revised in 1989, but also because the reform movement was historically led by conservative women’s organizations. The KWAU (1989) demanded “the subject of the campaign should be changed from the handful of female intellectuals to the majority working women” and “the campaign should be the part of democratic movement.” Before the late-1990s, the revision of the family sections was not given priority by progressive women’s organizations. If anything, their emphasis was on gender equality within the family and recognition of the value of domestic labour (KWAU, 1992c, p. 10) instead of the deconstruction of Confucian patriarchy.

Thirdly, besides their campaigns for women’s rights on their bodies and within the private sphere, progressive women’s organizations carefully sought to find the middle way for women’s political empowerment without incorporation into established politics. With their still deep-seated grassroots and minjung orientation, they preferred “life politics” at the local level to “established politics” at the national level. The Women’s Conference’s themes between 1991 and 1995 were dedicated to women’s political empowerment with denotations to institutional politics, such as “20% of gender quota” and “election of women to the local council.” They cooperated with their conservative

Table 5-4 South Korean and Taiwanese Women’s Movements, early 1990s-late 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Collective identities</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Relation with 1) the state; and 2) other actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| TW    | Diverse women’s organizations                            | Woman as citizen (Taiwanese women)                       | Constitutional reform; legislation for women’s rights on their body, within family, and in politics | 1) active / corporatist involvement  
2) active cooperation with the DPP                                                      |
| SK    | KWAU in cooperation with conservative women’s movement  | Woman in general                                         | Framework act on women’s development; legislation for women’s rights on their body and in politics | 1) increased involvement  
2) gender coalitions with civil and labour movements                                   |

**FROM WOMAN TO WOMEN: HOMOGENEITY AND HETEROGENEITY OF WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS**

In the late 1990s, the homogenous gender identity tightened the alliance of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements with the state and their work within it in the form of state feminism and the GM. The institutionalization of women’s movement and their engagement with the state was accelerated. Yet, the homogenization of women’s interests and the compromise in the autonomy of women’s movement was due to their limited representability soon challenged by groups whose identities and interests differed from the mainstream women’s movement and were thus marginalized. In Taiwan, women’s groups sympathizing with the new macro Taiwanese identity promoted their institutional involvement more than their autonomy while homogeneous gender identity was questioned by those with the new micro sexual identities. The conflict around the abolition of licensed prostitution in Taipei imploded the so far united “civil front” of the
Taiwanese women’s movement into gender and sexual rights camps. This split was the expression of multilayered conflicts of national, gender, and sexual identities. In South Korea, members of the progressive women’s organizations transmigrated to the new “pro-women” government and institutionalized the GM. The institutionalization of women’s rights based on the identity of woman in general was challenged by women with different identity salience. Radical feminists challenged the homogeneous image of woman in general while newly organized women’s labour movement showed women’s interests are not identical. The exploration of the internal processes of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements shows the limit of institutionalized gender interests by revealing the limited representability of collective identities of mainstream women’s movements.

**Implosion of Taiwanese Women’s Movement: Conflicts around Gender, Sexual, and National Politics**

In the 1990s, Taiwan’s homogeneous gender identity as the transcendental principle beyond and independent of partisan interests and identities in the preceding decade began to be challenged and compromised. Taiwanese women’s movement confronted its implosion (*neibao*) around the mid-1990s. Activists with a Taiwanese orientation aligned their gender identity with the new national identity while others detached sexual identities and rights from the homogeneous gender identity.

Two seemingly discrete incidents in 1994 are important for understanding the Taiwanese women’s movements in the late 1990s. The first was the formation of the Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women's Rights (TAPWR) by young women
activists. The TAPWR (1994) differed from previous women’s organizations because it was “the first women’s organization emphasizing the local [bentu, native land] orientation and the power of organized action.” It spelled out its clear orientation toward a new national identity. Huang, Sue-ying, the former chair of the TAPWR, said:

We need a Taiwanese women’s association to fight for not only women’s issue but also for little bit more on the country, the assertion of Taiwanese...We are against patriarchal thinking...China as a big country, a big father. We don’t like that (personal interview, Feb. 03, 2015).

Moreover, it underlined the grassroots orientation. In the preparation phase, the TAPWR recognized the limited resources for women’s movement and the need to pioneer a new market (Y.-g. Wang, 1999, pp. 233-234), i.e. the grassroots community (shequ) instead of consciousness-raising of middle-class women. TAPWR’s double reorientation shows how the new generations of women’s movement faced the overlap of the national and the local to carve a new space.

TAPWR’s activities showed its more partisan politics and grassroots and non-elitist orientation than women’s movement organizations before the early 1990s (H.-t. Chang, 2006; Y. Fan, 2003; Y.-g. Wang, 1999). The localization efforts of TAPWR was demonstrated in its re-memorialization work of the forgotten private memories of Taiwanese women under Japanese colonial rule. As dangwai/DPP reevaluated Japanese colonial rule for the assertion of Taiwanese identity, TAPWR excavated the untold local women’s stories and filled the narrative gap of the hitherto Chinese-centered women’s history (Y.-g. Wang, 1999, p. 237). TAPWR hosted essay contests of “The Tales of a Hundred Grandmothers.” It forged a new women’s subjectivity bearing and carrying on
Taiwanese identity. It is to be contrasted with the Lee, Yuan-chen’s 1982 summary (1982) of the history of Chinese women’s movement before 1948 in which the history of Taiwanese women was omitted.

Further, the localized gender identity requires women’s movements to go down to the grassroots to mobilize popular voices while going up to political institutions to mobilize state resources. In cooperation with the Taipei city government, TAPWR conducted the gender-conscious education for students of high schools of which curricula had been strictly monitored by the party-state (Chuang, 2013, p. 58; TAPWR, 1998). The TAPWR intervened into institutional politics to promote local women’s health and welfare. The TAPWR urged the Taipei city government to expand child care facilities and subsidize child rearing for working women (TAPWR, 1998; Y.-g. Wang, 1999, p. 240).

The second incident began with the massive Women’s Solidarity Parade against Sexual Harassment (Parade). It demonstrated the united “civil front” (minjian zhanxian) of the Taiwanese women’s movement but simultaneously its split. Taiwanese public attention was drawn to the slogan of the sexual liberationist Josephine Ho during the Parade: I want sexual orgasm and don’t want sexual harassment. Ho (1994; 2007) argued that the sexual autonomy of women should not limited to a negative “no” but include positive sex emancipation. This friction turned into a full-scale and divisive clash around the issue of the abolition of licensed prostitution in Taipei between 1997 and 1998.

Women’s organizations against trafficking and juvenile prostitution petitioned the Taipei city government to ban licensed prostitution in 1996. Then Mayor Chen, Shui-bian declared, upon TAPWR’s advice, to abolish licensed prostitution in September 1997
It provoked controversies among the Taiwanese women’s movement, which was split into a gender-identity-based pro-abolition camp and a sexual-identity-based anti-abolition camp. Even the AF suffered from the “family catastrophe” (ji bian), the dismissal of its full-time staff members who supported issues like AIDS, homosexuality, and sex workers’ rights (Ni & Wang, 1997).

Pro-abolitionists argued that the sex industry reduces Taiwanese public sphere to public toilets (F.-M. Lin, 1998). Unconditional sex would lead to excessive commodification of women’s bodies rather than sexual liberation (S.-l. Huang, 1998; Y.-x. Liu, 1998). They emphasized that homogeneous gender identity is prior, public, social, and main while sexual identity is subsequent, intimate, individual, and subsidiary. Ku, Yen-lin (1997) contends that active sexual subjects and their awareness is unable to replace victims’ objective social situation. Gender identity is the underlying basis for women of different identities to cooperate. Lin, Fang-mei (2010) delineates the sexual liberation camp as a “para-site” appropriating the mainstream women’s movement as its host body. Conflicts around national and partisan identities underlay these inter-camp controversies between pro- and anti-abolitionists, respectively, based on gender and sexual identities.

When the “mainstream” feminists entered the state space as femocrats under state feminism, the sexual liberation camp was critical of their infantilizing of the public

\[\footnote{Chen met licensed prostitutes and other social movement organizations with unexpectedly strong and lasting protests that turned the spontaneous resistance of frustrated prostitutes, who demanded for right to live and two-year grace period, into a sex workers’ movement. Their continued protests attained public sympathy and affected negatively on Chen’s bid for a second term as Taipei’s mayor.} \]

\[\footnote{Although two decades have passed since this “family catastrophe,” all Taiwanese feminist interviewees who were active at that time were very hesitant and reserved about discussing what actually happened during the catastrophe.} \]
sphere as caring for a healthy society. The state was dressed with the image of protective mother, a new dominant subject amalgamated by the hegemonic national and gender identities (J. Ho, 2005, 2007). Sexual liberationists argued that gender identity represents only gentlewomen or “good women” (Kaweibo, 2001). They politicized intimate sexual rights through solidarity with groups of different identities, sex movement (xing yun) and workers’ movement (gong yun), for the unitary gender identity excludes sexual pluralities and marginalizes “bad women” or sex workers.

The conflict around licensed prostitution involved a more complicated confrontation of identities than the conflict between institutional gender and extra-institutional sexual politics, majority-targeting state feminism and minority-focused anti-statist feminism, or sexually “normal” and “abnormal” groups. Kaweibo (2001) argues that their conflict was related more to the imagination of Taiwan as a nation-state locked in its native land and of the transnational space under globalization. In a similar vein, Lin, Fang-mei (2010) and Chang and Chang (2011) contend that the controversies over licensed prostitution between gender politics and sex politics of women’s movements was in fact the conflict between the old and new oppositions.

The old opposition stands for those who participated in the dangwai movement against the KMT party-state. They shared the new Taiwanese national identity and the pro-DPP partisan identity. In contrast, the new opposition consists of groups, including sexual liberationists, left-wing female and male labour activists, postmodern cultural critics, and sexual minorities. The new opposition disagrees more with the DPP than with

---

23 A Taiwanese feminists in an interview with this author stated that the two camps participated in projects sponsored by the state and involved in state institutions. Therefore, the engagement in state is not the crucial difference between the two camps.
the KMT. They reject the old opposition’s nationally bounded identity as patriarchal, hetero-sexual, capitalist, and Taiwanese-chauvinistic (Mau-Kuei Chang & Chang, 2011; F.-M. Lin, 2010). The licensed prostitution was a vehicle through which gender, sexual, class, and national identities carry on their identity codes and discourses and realign their political forces in the post-transitional era.

**Implosion of South Korean Women’s movement: Politics of Engagement versus Politics of Difference**

Compared with the Taiwanese women’s organizations engaged in dealing with localizing politics with their gender or sexual politics, their South Korean counterparts wrestled with how to integrate the globalizing GM into their gender politics. With the Beijing Conference and the first power turnover in the opposition party in 1998, progressive women’s organizations reinforced institutionalizing the GM based on their collective identity of woman in general. Yet, they were exposed to the danger of compromises of and challenges to their autonomy. Their autonomy from other social movements and identity of woman in general was strengthened while their autonomy from the state was undermined with the institutionalization of the GM. Moreover, radical and subaltern women’s groups with different identities claimed their autonomy from the progressive women’s movement.

Before the late 1980s, progressive women’s organizations sustained their autonomy from established politics but retained a friendly relationship with the newly-elected President Kim, Dae-jung with whom the chaeya, including their first generation, had
cooperated for democratization since the 1970s.\textsuperscript{24} With the international and national changes after the late 1990s, progressive women’s organizations moved to the “politics of engagement.” Their emphasis shifted from their preceding local life politics to the global GM, and from their previous deepening grassroots base to expanding women’s institutional representation. This reorientation is to be seen in the heightened purity and homogeneity of their concept of woman in general. Chong, Hyun-baek (2017), the former chair of the KWAU, argued that in that era, “the progressive women’s movement was engaged in politics no longer as the anti-regime force of the 1980s but under the name of woman” (p. 11). As such, in their critiques of the government’s version of the Framework, they preferred “the interests of woman in general” to the “gender equality between man and woman” (KWAU, 1996).

The reorientation is to be seen in activities of the progressive women’s organizations. Marking the 10th anniversary of its founding in 1997, the KWAU (1998) declared the Years of Leap for Political and Economic Mainstreaming of Women (1997-1999) in which priorities were given to women’s heightened political presence in legislative and administrative bodies. Their primary tasks were how to intervene in institutional politics, reform and expand their access to the state. Members of the KWAU transmigrated into the state arena to institutionalize hitherto ghettoized gender politics, which heralded the beginning of the “era of institutionalisation” (Chong, 2017, p. 10).

Firstly, the Presidential Commission on Women’s Affairs (PCWA) was founded, which monitored and coordinated the GM at the national level. Moreover, progressive women’s organizations reinforced their coalitional work with their conservative

\textsuperscript{24} In fact, the first internal conflict that the KWAU encountered in 1987 was its endorsement of Kim, Dae-jung as the presidential candidate, which evoked fierce opposition of several member organizations.
counterparts and achieved the allocation of 50 percent of proportional representation seats to women in the parliament and the adoption of a 30 percent quota for women in ministerial advisory committees.

The institutionalization through politics of engagement and gender coalitions with conservative women’s organizations reinforced the marginalization of women’s social rights and depoliticization of feminist politics. Progressive women’s organizations could not effectively confront the feminization of precarious jobs and poverty driven by the neo-liberal “pro-women” government after the East Asian financial crisis in 1997. A women’s movement activist said in the interview with this author that the transmigration of women’s activists into institutional politics remained individual and did not tackle the ghettoization of women’s issues. Further, gender coalitions with conservative counterparts promoted women’s “autonomous rights” at the cost of the progressive women’s movement’s traditional focus on women’s social rights for which they had difficulty in persuading their conservative counterparts. Jung, Kyungja’s (2013) study on South Korean feminist organizations on sexual violence claims that state funding changed their organizational structure and priorities for more professional, medicalized, and service-providing activities while depoliticizing and degendering their feminist practices against sexual violence.

After the mid-1990s, younger generation of feminists, lesbians, disabled women, and precarious women workers suspected and challenged women as a homogeneous collective identity as perceived by the progressive women’s movement (S.-y. Kim, 2007, pp. 23-29). The re-emergence of working women identity was one of the different identity claims against the homogeneous woman in general. Precarious women workers
claimed their working women identity to emphasize their difference, not their commonality with woman in general.

Since the 1997 financial crisis, precarious women workers, excluded from male-dominating unions, began to organize women-only unions. Three women-only trade unions were founded in 1999. The Seoul Women’s Trade Union (SWTU) and other young feminists presented different voices against the KWAU while campaigning for the reform of maternity-related labour laws. The KWAU supported the strengthening of maternity protection in exchange of the abolishment of rules protecting women from night, overtime, and holiday work, for those rules were founded on the presupposition of inequality between men and women. The KWAU based its claim on its collective identity of woman in general as the overarching identity where maternity was one shared key marker separating them from men. Yet, the SWTU criticized the KWAU for the extension of maternity protection pertained only to women with full-time jobs, excluding most precarious women workers who still needed the protection of women from overexploitation (J. Chang, 2004; M.-K. Chang, 2004, p. 172; S.-y. Kim, 2007, pp. 27-29). Its position was based on precarious women workers’ experience that was not reducible to that of woman in general.

The political inclusion and empowerment of woman in general excluded and disempowered women at the periphery. The KWAU did not challenge the dominant idea of motherhood as social reproducer, which promotes women’s career interruption and sexual division of labour. Its idea of economic mainstreaming for the coexistence of

---

25 They were the SWTU, the KWTU, and the Korean Women's Confederation of Trade Union (KWCTU). The SWTU was founded as a feminist-oriented trade union initiated by former KWL members. The KWTU was organized by the KWWA and a nationwide organization. The KWCTU was an affiliated organization of the KCTU.
working and family life, based on the two-income earner model instead of the male breadwinner, did not promote women’s economic autonomy, but rather reinforced the double burden of women and drove them to low wage jobs after the 1997 financial crisis.

“Young” feminists differentiated themselves from the progressive and conservative women’s movement. In the era of institutionalization of gender politics, they saw no differences between the government-affiliated feminism of the conservative women’s movement and the engagement politics of the progressive women’s movement. They contended that progressiveness of the progressive women’s movement was disciplined by the state without challenging patriarchy in the state and mainstreaming gender did not undermine male-streamed policies. They questioned the homogeneous and unified gender denominator and advocates, instead, politics which seeks empowerment of women from specific and varying difference (Young, 1990). The engagement politics of the progressive women’s movement, according to radical feminists, does not represent women in general and progressive women’s organizations in fact stand only for those women with identities of non-disabled, heterosexual, mother, and wife (ChoLee, 2007).

Table 5-5 South Korean and Taiwanese Women’s Movements, late 1990s-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Collective identities</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Relations with 1) the state; and 2) other actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TW</td>
<td>Women’s organizations with different identities</td>
<td>Gender identity vs. sexual identity</td>
<td>State feminism; challenging homogeneous gender identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Women’s organizations with different identities</td>
<td>Woman in general vs. women of difference</td>
<td>Gender mainstreaming; challenging homogeneous gender interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I surveyed Taiwanese and South Korean women's movements from their cautious emergence to their stable institutionalization along with changes in the democratic processes. Their collective identities were the expression of their autonomy (bounded community) and empowerment (source of power). Over the course of democratization, the boundaries and *de facto* referents of their collective identities were extended to cluster diverse groups with different subject positions into homogeneous woman, where the meaning of their autonomy underwent significant changes from the independent power of superior forces to intervening power into other forces and from the preservation of their free spaces to the proliferation of women's spaces. The institutionalization of women's movements and their issues expanded women's habitats from the private spheres and civil society to public spheres and the state while this process exposed the limits of representability of mainstream women’s movements by women’s movements with different identities and interests.

In the 1970s, the Taiwanese women's movement began with the development of middle-class-oriented gender identity for the hypo-politicized autonomy from the party-statist corporatism and from the *dangwai* movement. The South Korean women's movement started with the working-women-centric identity for the politicized autonomy from the military regime and for the cooperation with the *chaeya* movement. Despite the similarity of collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements, with women as human beings, their variations are clearly expressed in individual-oriented, elite-centric, and non-associational Taiwanese new feminism and in
collectivity-oriented, subaltern-centric, and associational South Korean women’s movement.

In the 1980s, Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements constructed different collective identities that represented different women’s segments and interests. Taiwanese women’s movement constructed harmonious gender identity of women and maintained its autonomy from the dangwai and its Taiwanese identity while assuming a low profile without challenging the KMT’s hypo-politicizing operation. With the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, various issue-oriented women’s organizations emerged. They actively cooperated in gender issues through conjunctural coalitions based on homogenous gender identity with women’s diverse subject positions. A key characteristic of their organizational types was a foundation with no membership led by intellectuals and professionals who could use their cultural and social capital and access to the institutional space. With the democratic transition, the state was rendered a contestable arena available for their gender interests. The South Korean women’s movement forged working women’s identity as the part of the democratic minjung movement. Various issue-oriented women’s organizations emerged after the mid-1980s, beginning with small groups of activists but developed into grassroots membership organizations often with nationwide networks. The pre-transitional working women identity, specifically women of the producing classes, was reconstructed to include both women working at production and reproduction spheres. The KWAU was established as their ongoing national umbrella with the quasi-party feature, i.e. uniting women, representing their voices, raising women’s issues as national agendas. Progressive women’s organizations’ close
relationship with the extra-institutional *minjung* movement kept them from the state arena despite the democratic transition.

In the 1990s, the Taiwanese identity emerged as the new hegemonic national identity. The alignment of gender identity with the new national identity was expressed in the establishment of the first WPA in Taipei and the emergence of state feminism. The shared gender identity among women’s organizations promoted their cooperation for the institutionalization of women’s rights in the legislation regarding women’s body, private sphere, and public institutions. In post-transitional South Korea, the moderate *simin* identity, with its system-reforming orientation, was embraced by most social movement organizations instead of the *minjung* identity. Based on their new collective identity of woman in general, progressive women’s organizations built gender coalitions with the conservative women’s movement for women’s autonomous rights while sidelining their hitherto focus on women’s social rights. Gender coalitions promoted institutionalization of their gender politics despite their weak institutional presence.

In the late 1990s, the “mainstream” Taiwanese women’s movement reinforced the institutionalization of gender politics by articulating gender identity with the new hegemonic Taiwanese identity under the discourse of state feminism. Sexual rights groups refused to accept a homogenizing gender identity as a superior category transcending other women’s intersecting and plural identities. Their cooperation with Taipei sex workers against the abolition of licensed prostitution in the late 1990s was the expression of the articulation of their sexual identity and anti-Taiwanese-national-identity. In South Korea, after the Beijing Conference women’s movement reinforced the institutionalization of its gender politics based on the identity of woman in general. The
GM discursively precedes state feminism in South Korea in contrast to Taiwan. With the emergence of the “pro-women” neo-liberal government, members of progressive women’s organizations actively transmigrated into the state space and institutionalized the GM. Yet, precarious women workers and radical young feminists challenged the identity discourse of homogeneous woman in general and criticized progressive women’s organizations because they disregarded identities and interests other than those of woman in general without challenging the motherhood-centred and heterosexual gender regime.

Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements forged collective identity through shared feelings and reflecting on their experiences, analysing surrounding conditions, and calculating internal resources and external opportunities. The comparison shows that in the late 1990s, Taiwanese and South Korean women's movements attained, despite different surrounding conditions, similar achievements in women's rights on their body, in the family, and public institutions. Yet, their paths were very different. Melucci (1989) argued that collective actors define the self and its environment with the production of collective identity (p. 26). In their initial stage, both movements challenged dehumanized conditions oppressing women by claiming equal status of human beings. Yet, the Taiwanese women's movement underlined universal and individual features, woman as human beings, where it saw surrounding patriarchal environment partially oppressive and could be reformed instead of transformed. In contrast, South Korean women's movement emphasized particular and collective features like women as human beings, viewing the surrounding capitalist environment as totally oppressive to be transformed instead of reformed.
Since the 1980s, the Taiwanese women's movement’s modification of collective identities or identity discourses—harmonious gender identity, homogeneous gender identity with diversified subject positions, and woman as citizen in pre-transition, transition, and stabilizing periods, respectively—show the shift of self-concept of women and its claims and organizational and contentious repertoires, i.e. the change of its definition of the surrounding environment. Likewise, the South Korean women's movement modified its identity claims—women as producer, women as producer and reproducer, and woman in general in pre-transition, transition, and stabilizing periods, respectively—that demonstrate both the transmogrification of self-understanding and its changing demands and repertoires.

Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements expanded and deepened democracy and democratization, limited the political dimension (national or popular sovereignty) based on their identity claims. Simultaneously, the construction, alignment, and deployment of their collective identities revealed the limit of democracy and democratization through the challenges from groups of women with different identity salience in women’s movements. The homogenization and institutionalization of women’s rights excluded and underrepresented rights and interests of marginalized groups, often with intersected identities.

In Chapter 6, I explore Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements and their collective identities between the 1980s and 1990s. I analyze interactions between democratic and identity processes and their effects on collective identities of labour movements. Unlike women’s movements, labour movements in both countries emerged or re-emerged with the democratic transition. Their relationship with democratic
movements was quite different. The next chapter focuses on the interactive processes between collective identities of democratic movements and labour movements in Taiwan and South Korea.
Chapter 6 Labour Movements in South Korea and Taiwan

Labour movement, as a sustained collective action by workers and activists, is a late phenomenon in East Asia. Labour disputes rapidly increased in the mid-1980s with the transition in South Korea and Taiwan. They were not limited to individual and intermittent cases but formed a wave of collective struggles both in South Korea and Taiwan.

The present chapter analyzes South Korean and Taiwanese labour movements between 1980 and 2000. The dates were chosen because South Korean and Taiwanese democratic and labour movements were reorganized and set in motion around 1980 while 2000 was the year when two representative confederations of independent labour movements, the TCTU and the KCTU, made different political decisions: TCTU’s partisan support of the DPP and KCTU’s initiative for the foundation of the Democratic Labour Party (DLP). I review Chapter Four, in order to assist readers in understanding the surrounding conditions of South Korean and Taiwanese labour movements. The Taiwanese democratic movement processed conditions, produced by the KMT party-state grounded on the hierarchical divide of politics and economy, into the national (Chinese) and local (Taiwanese) structure as colonialization given the preceding foreign colonial regime did against the local Taiwanese. Its South Korean counterpart framed the military regime based on sword-won alliance led by a handful of elites as an anti-minjung regime under which popular subaltern minjung suffered. The South Korean democratic
movement forged popular-class *minjung* identity while its Taiwanese counterpart constructed ethno-national Taiwanese identity.

The present chapter analyzes interactions between labour and democratic movements and their effects on democratic processes. It traces the construction and reconstruction processes of the collective identities of labour movements along the democratic process. The purpose of this chapter is to show the differences in collective identities: their ideas, discourses, organizational repertoires, and alliance politics. With this analysis, the chapter demonstrates how labour movements brought about the improvement of workers’ rights and expanded democratization that was initially limited to political rights through the construction and reconstruction of their collective identities and their alignment with those of democratic movements. Thereby, the present chapter also reveals the limited representability of collective identities of mainstream labour movements.

I disaggregate this chapter into five sections. I discuss some caveats and terms to be noted and clarified in section one. In section two, I investigate the relations between the democratic and labour movements in Taiwan and South Korea in their embryonic stage before 1987—the year Martial Law was lifted in Taiwan and the June Uprising in South Korea. The rise of labour movement organizations shows their different constituents, organizational repertoires, and identity practices. I focus on the formation of Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements from 1987 to the early 1990s in section three. It shows how differently each movement understood and practised “independent” labour movement and how a specific version of collective identity took primacy over others within and without labour movements. The fourth section deals with labour movements under the expanded political institutions and economic liberalization from the
early 1990s to around the mid-1990s. I explore the internal debates of Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements and the reconstruction of their collective identities. In the fifth section, I compare two national confederations of Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements. This chapter explores variations of Taiwanese labour movements in militancy, alliance building, partisan politics, and relations with the state not from the approaches of economic and political structures external to them but from their internal processes by tracing changes of their collective identities. It shows how Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements embraced democratic movements, refashioned labour movement with their negotiation with democratic movements, and influenced democratization and expanded political democracy.

**LABOUR MOVEMENT AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY**

Labour movements emerged or re-emerged\(^1\) in Taiwan and South Korea in the 1980s. They had to travel through the democratic transition where opposition movements mobilized social and political forces under democratization as “master frame” (Benford & Snow, 2000; Carroll, 1997; D. Snow & Benford, 1992) or “unifying issue” (Ryan, 1992). Considering that collective class identities that are neither essential, nor purely constructed, nor purely determined by socio-economic places of workers (C. J. Calhoun, 1994; Hobsbawm, 1984b) are relational, they are shaped in relation with others, formed through social relations, and constructed in relational interaction with other forces

---

\(^1\) In the 1970s, South Korean trade unions primarily led by women workers organized militant collective actions against employers and the military regime. With the Kwangju massacre, this labour movement was violently subdued and discontinued by the new military regime in 1980. Its discontinuity was not only produced by physical repression of the regime, but also discursively reinforced by the new independent labour movement that defined collective actions of women workers in the 1970s as an economic interest-oriented “democratic trade union movement” but not as a labour movement. Re-emergence of labour movement implies its discontinuity in the South Korean case. I will revisit this issue in a later section.
Before proceeding further, I will clarify several caveats and terms.

Firstly, the making of Taiwanese and South Korean working class(es) took different paths from the early industrialized West. They experienced industrialization, democratization, and globalization within a short time span, which has three implications for the formation of working classes. First, unlike in the West, Taiwan and South Korea did not experience the long, staged, and linear process of working class formation from skilled artisans, to mass proletarianization of unskilled wage workers, to the expansion of precarious employment. Second, their making of the working class was fused with homogenization and differentiation of classes, such as workers of regular or irregular employment and organized or unorganized wage labourers. Third, unlike workers from the early industrialized countries, the political event that Taiwanese and South Korean workers experienced in the 1980s was democratization where ideas, repertoires, and discourses deeply influenced their labour movements. These three points imply that Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements could not seek initial resources to forge a collective identity from their inherited and bequeathed tradition but from elsewhere, to face a two-front war—unification and fragmentation—of making working classes, and to rework ideas, repertoires, and languages of democratization. Simply, they had to face

When Thompson (1968) wrote the *Making of English Working Class*, he adopted the singular “class” instead of plural “classes” in order to show class “as a relationship, and not as a thing” or a fixed structure (pp. 9-11). In Taiwan and South Korea, plural classes were not just a “descriptive” term indicating different crafts like tailors and weavers, as Thompson suggests, but a historical phenomenon that juxtaposed that of “unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness” (p. 9) with that separating working class into working classes.

The making of the working class in the early risers of industrialization was deeply influenced by and intertwined with the Second French Revolution of 1830 and its subsequent reworking in the 1830s and 1840s (Katznelson, 1986; Sewell Jr, 1986; Thompson, 1968). It provided ideas, repertoires, and discourses to workers who combined corporative traditions of artisans with the discourses of the Revolution and forged cross-trade solidarity, collective identity of producers in opposition to propertied bourgeois, and class-conscious labour movement (Sewell Jr, 1980, 1986).
difficulty in organization of workers, representability of the working-class, and intertwinements of labour and democratic movements.

Secondly, the labour movement in most Western scholarship is considered to be an old social movement in contrast to new ones (Buechler, 2000; Cohen, 1985; Habermas, 1981; Johnston, Larana, & Gusfield, 1994; Touraine, 1981) and a political movement in opposition to a metapolitical one (Melucci, 1985; Offe, 1985). Historically, Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements are not old but new and coextensive with the rise of “civil society” and other “new” social movements. In this study, it implies that Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements were interlocked with democratic processes and they had to fight both for particularistic industrial and universalistic political citizenship as the working class and citizens.

Thirdly, labour movement is not limited here to the “organizations and collective action of wage earners in the modern sectors, which have the purpose of promoting shared occupational goals” (Collier & Collier, 2002, p. 785). Labour movement is understood here as a “complex and multifaceted movement” (Wheeler, 2002, p. 200) and involves trade unions, workers’ associations, and, if applicable, its institutional presence.

Collective identity of labour movement refers here to the shared meaning and narrative that organizes workers through sustained construction of shared belonging and understanding of industrial workers in opposition to their adversary. Class identity and consciousness is the articulation of the subjective, projective dimension with the objective, experienced dimension. ¹ Taiwanese and South Korean non-unionist social

¹ Michael Mann (1973) proposed four main elements of class consciousness: identity; opposition; totality (the subjective acceptance of the previous two elements as objective reality); and the idea of alternative society (p. 13). Katzenelson’s four layers of class (1986) involves also the connection between surrounding
movement organizations, which had been directly or indirectly involved in
democratization, were engaged in and cooperated with trade unions. Schematically, the
construction of collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements
are the product of the articulation and negotiation between the projective vision of non-
unionist, political labour movement organizations, and the experienced grievances of
workers at their workplaces. Simply, the present study focuses on both trade unions and
non-union labour movement organizations.

Lastly, several terms must be clarified. Industrial union in Taiwan refers to an
individual enterprise union that is equivalent to the South Korean trade union. This
industrial union should not be confused with industrial unionism that represents workers
of an industry. Before 2010, there were two types of unions in Taiwan: the industrial and
occupational. The latter are founded on geographical bases and composed of craft
associations, including the self-employed. I also differentiate singular worker from plural
workers while discussing collective identity of labour movement, such as worker as
citizen and workers as people. Singular worker implies single, homogeneous working
class, whereas plural workers stand for multiple, heterogeneous working classes. In South
Korean cases, I distinguish worker (geunloja) from labour (nodongja), as used in South
Korea. Worker carries on passive import while labour bears on active producer with
agency.

The Table 6-1 can serve as a quick guide to overall trends and features of Taiwanese
and South Korean trade unions and labour disputes from 1986 to 2000. Firstly, both
Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements reached their pinnacle of union density

dimensions of capitalist structure and ways of life of workers and subjective dimensions of disposition and
collective action of workers.
and labour disputes between 1987 and 1989, a period marked by democratization.

Secondly, the union density is low in both countries, but South Korean union density is higher than Taiwan. Thirdly, unfortunately the data of labour disputes of both countries are incomparable because the Taiwan data does not distinguish between labour disputes and those without attendant action. Yet, South Korean figures for workers involved in disputes and workdays lost are higher than those of Taiwan, which implies that South Korean workers are more inclined to act collectively and militantly. In the following sections, I explore the reasons behind this empirical data and discuss Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements based on an analysis of their collective identities and identity discourses.

Table 6-1 Trade Unions in Taiwan and South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union Density (%)</td>
<td>Nr. of disputes</td>
<td>Nr. of workers involved</td>
<td>Nr. of workday lost</td>
<td>TCTU member (%)</td>
<td>Union Density (%)</td>
<td>Nr. of disputes</td>
<td>Nr. of workers involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>3,749</td>
<td>1,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>1,943</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7.01</td>
<td>2,061</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>2,271</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>2,659</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Disputes</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>5,860</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>8,026</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>280,000 (2.8%)</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources of union density of Taiwan: The Department of Labor Relation / the 1986 data from Chiu, Su-fen (2002)
Sources of union density of South Korean: Statistics Korea
1) Disputes with no accompanied actions are also included; 2) Numbers of workers involved in labour disputes (unit: thousand) ; 3) Workdays Lost due to labour disputes (unit: thousand); 4) TCTU stands for the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions; 5) Disputes lasted a day or more (unit: thousand); 6) KCTU stands for the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions; 7) Source: http://nodong.org/; 8) Source: Kuo, Chi-jen (1998, p. 8); and 9) Source: http://www.tctu.org.tw/

THE RISE OF TAIWANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN LABOUR MOVEMENTS

In this section, I investigate the contrasting identity development of the Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements between 1980 and 1987. The pre-transitional Taiwanese labour movement was promoted by dangwai groups. Their political Taiwanese consciousness pre-empted working-class consciousness. The democratic movement of dangwai groups politicized the labour movement and compromised the salience of working-class identity. In other words, Taiwanese democratic movement intervened into labour movement and framed class consciousness into anti-KMT struggles. In contrast, the South Korean labour movement sharpened the class aspect of multi-class minjung identity. The excessive or remarkably heavy working-class consciousness—the central role of transformative change should be assigned to the working class and other social movements should accept the leading role of working class—led to anti-systemic and anti-political movement.
The Rise of Taiwanese Labour Movement: Political Identity of Meagre Class Consciousness

The organization of trade unions in Taiwan was built along with the KMT party-state: Taiwanese workers are solely represented by the Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL), the only legitimate national peak federation. However, it was ridiculed as the “ten-thousand-year union” like a ten-thousand-year parliament, for its board members, elected before 1949, were never subject to re-election before the mid-1970s (X.-y. He, 1992; F.-y. Zhang, 2003). The political principle of fatung that recognizes pre-migrating mainland institutions as the sole legitimate authority for Taiwan also prevailed over trade unions.

The KMT party-state fostered the establishment of trade unions during the 1970s but was mainly limited to public enterprises, whereas the KMT dominated unions through vigorous recruitment of party members who accounted for more than 30 percent of union leaders (C.-c. Lin, 1992, p. 44). The KMT membership provided workers with more privileged career paths, which rather facilitated the translation of quotidian grievances among workers into anti-KMT mentality (M.-s. Ho, 2012, p. 190; 2014b). The quasi-corporatist system without representation of workers at the national and workshop levels demobilized and hypo-politicized workers as collective actors.

The Legal Supporting Association for Taiwan Laborers (LSATL) has been considered the first and also one of the most influential labour movement organizations that were founded in the 1980s (Y. Chiu, 2011a; Y.-w. Chu, 1996; Gray, 2014; M.-S. Ho, 2015; K.-K. Hsu, 2003; Y. Lee, 2011). LSATL was undergirded by the relative radical dangwai New Tide faction (Xinchaoliu, NT) and derived from fierce debates on collective identity and attendant political strategy. The NT initiated two frontal attacks
against both class-identity-centred and election-prioritizing groups. The NT raised pro-independent Taiwanese identity as cross-class collective identity against the working-class-centric, pro-unification China Tide (Xiachao) group. The NT, dedicated to mass mobilization, initiated another attack against dangwai politicians prioritizing electoral process (H. H. Chen, 2005; Chuang, 2013, p. 9; S.-F. Lin, 2009; Z.-h. Wang, 1989, p. 102). The NT subsumed social issues, including those of aborigines, farmers, workers, and the environment, by deploying an ethno-national identity against the KMT. To materialize this political discourse into social forces, the cross-class Taiwanese identity was translated and bundled into “mass” (qunzhong) instead of "voters" (xuanmin) (J.-M. Wu, 1990, p. 98). Despite and because of its insensitivity to differences within a collectivity, like class and gender, mass was employed as a practical concept to mobilize people as a difference-insensitive aggregate to collective actions. It was even argued that “the function of the parliament is instrumental in order to make the mass movement flourish” (Dao duli zhi lu bianji xiaozu, 1991). The NT established local groups like “social movement promoting groups” that organized grassroots activities both in electoral and non-electoral periods (C.-H. Liao, 2016). The NT encouraged the founding of LSATL, partly in cooperation with the China Tide group, to mobilize workers as a mass in industry.

LSATL was designed “to solve labour problems through free legal services” and “to raise labour awareness in order to enhance labour rights and interests” (D.-f. He, 1984). Its activities were constrained by Martial Law and remained low profile, such as a magazine publication and legal aids. When the NT reinforced its mass line, LSATL changed its initial role as a service provider for workers to a facilitator (xiezhuzhe)

The Taiwanese labour movement did not fully develop sustained collective actions and identity before 1987. Its work was initially limited to enlightening workers on their under-exercised legal rights. As Liu, Jin-xing, a LSATL member affiliated with the NT suggests, the “labour movement was practically inseparable from politics,” i.e. dangwai, in this initial stage (C.-h. Liu, 1994a, p. 27). The NT attempted to transform ethno-national Taiwanese identity against the KMT’s Chinese identity into an anti-KMT mass outside the ballot box. Political or partisan identity of the labour movement’s leading groups overrode and overshadowed class identity and consciousness.

**The Rise of South Korean Labour Movement: Anti-political Identity of Excessive Class Consciousness**

The South Korean democratic union movement in the 1970s revolved around the narrative of workers as human beings, which was dramatically voiced through the last words of the self-immolated Chun, Tae-il “We are not machine!” Worker as human beings challenged the hegemonic discourse of “economic nationalism” (H.-A. Kim, 2004) that objectified workers merely as “export soldiers” while uncovering workers’ human agency. The democratic union movement based on workers as human beings was
severely repressed by the Chun, Doo-hwan military regime in 1980 before forming an independent class-based labour movement.

The 1980 Kwangju uprising, narrated as a popular revolt led by subaltern classes and realized through minjung coalition by the post-Kwangju democratic movement, propagated the shared meaning of minjung to which various social movements belonged. Unlike the political and national Taiwanese consciousness adopted by the dangwai/DPP that led intellectuals to play the mediated role of the enlightener of workers, South Korean intellectuals in the democratic movement, who developed the anti-established-politics- and class-oriented minjung identity, transmogrified into workers. Their transmogrification as an identity practice was called jonjae igeon (transposition of the self). It was perceived a collective moral rite de passage, borrowing Turner’s term (1969), detaching intellectuals from their cultural and social realm and reincorporating them into a new identity. To organize workers and raise their class consciousness, students collectively entered factories to become workers themselves after the Kwangju uprising. George Ogle (1990) estimated the number of students-turned-workers three thousand or more by the mid-1980s (p. 99).

The foundation of the Korean Workers’ Welfare Association (WWA) in 1984 announced the new start of the 1980s labour movement. The WWA declared a “new beginning” to construct independent labour movement, overcome fragmented, individual union-centred movement, and reinforce cooperation with the democratic minjung movement (Workers’ Welfare Association, 1984, p. 1). Compared with the Taiwanese LSATL, the WWA consisted of labour activists and was more directly involved in union organizing and focused on labour law reforms. The WWA declined after 1985, when the
faction, critical of enterprise-based trade union identity of the 1970s, departed the WWA for radical class struggle.

The SLMA, composed of dismissed workers and students-turned-workers, was founded in 1985 and based on the idea of the non-union “mass political organization” (MPO) responsible for organizing workers at the regional level beyond individual factories (SLMA, 1985b, p. 6). The SLMA argued that “the labour movement in the 1980s proceeds from the workers-are-too-human-beings of the 1970s to the workers-are-too-master” (SLMA, 1985a). Worker as master was to be realized in the SLMA’s primary political campaign for Minjung and Democratic Constitution, which “guarantees political institutions led by labour-centric minjung” (SLMA, 1986). The discourse of worker as master underlined class consciousness beyond trade union identity (WWA, 1986; 1987b, p. 9). Political labour MPOs, such as SLMA, prevailed over trade unions. Struggles for a wage increase were led by an ad hoc committee outside the union and subordinated to political class struggles. Further, this identity claim highlights the leading role of the labour movement in the minjung movement. Labour MPOs in cooperation with the minjung movement organized rallies against the IMF/IBRD and for the radical Minjung Constitution in 1985. The SLMA was harshly repressed after the May 3 Incheon street rally (1986), where thirty thousand students and workers violently intervened into the opposition NKDP’s ceremony for constitutional reform by claiming “the Minjung and democratic constitution” and “power to the people.”

To sum up, the pre-transitional Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements show differences in their constituents, relations with democratic movements and states, and their practices. The Taiwanese labour movement was led primarily by politically
oppositional intellectuals. They shared *dangwai* groups’ Taiwanese consciousness, which refracted class identity. The Taiwanese labour movement held low profile activities, such as publication and legal consultations. In contrast, South Korean labour movement was initiated by labour activists composed of workers and intellectuals and pushed class characteristics of *minjung* identity to its limits and thereby constructed the identity of worker as master in which trade unions, wage increases, and the revision of labour laws should be subordinated to meta-unionist labour MPOs, political struggles, and the establishment of the *Minjung* constitution, respectively. Despite those differences, what the fledgling Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements shared before 1987 was their subordination to either the political movement based on Taiwanese national identity or the revolutionary *minjung* movement based on class identity.

Table 6-2 Taiwanese and South Korean Labour Movements from 1980 to 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Collective identities</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Relation with 1) the state; and 2) other actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TW LSATL</td>
<td>Taiwanese consciousness</td>
<td>Activities with low profile</td>
<td>1) (active) non-confrontational 2) tight connection with the <em>dangwai</em> movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK SLMA</td>
<td>Worker as master couched in <em>minjung</em> identity</td>
<td>Activities with high profile</td>
<td>1) anti-statist 2) organic cooperation with the <em>chaeya</em> movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND THE FORMATION OF TAIWANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN INDEPENDENT LABOUR MOVEMENTS**

In this section, I explore the formation of Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements and their collective identities since the 1987 democratic transition. Firstly, to see different characteristics of Taiwanese and South Korean labour
movements, I review Taiwanese and South Korean labour disputes in the initial stage of transition. Then, I discuss the formation of the Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements at three levels: trade unions; non-unionist organizations, including political party; and inter-firm federation. I then proceed to discuss the pan-class nature of the Taiwanese labour movement and classed nature of its South Korean counterpart. Tensions and conflicts revolving around those identities are also analyzed.

**Democratic Transition and Taiwanese Pan-class and -political Labour Movement**

The Taiwan NT incorporated popular demands and realigned them for all-encompassing anti-KMT struggle instead of adopting a strategy tailored to interests of a specific group of oppressed and marginalized people (ruoshi qunti). The social arena was perceived to be secondary (ciyao) to serving the primary political (zhuyao) arena (Lii, 2007, pp. 87-88; J.-M. Wu, 2002, p. 185). The rapid increase of self-help actions and lifting of Martial Law (1987), however, forced labour activists and opposition groups to reconsider their preceding role as a helper and workers to be helped.

Labour disputes since the mid-1980s changed in their quantity and quality. They increased from 891 in 1980 to 1,943 in 1989 while the number of workers involved in disputes grew nearly nine-fold. Most demands were concentrated, using Tilly’s term (1978), on “reactive” issues—dismissal and wage arrears—in the first-half of the 1980s, whereas “proactive” claims like year-end bonuses, payments for retirement-severance, and overtime work swept labour disputes in the second-half of the 1980s (J.-j. Chu, 2001, p. 459; Y.-w. Chu, 1996, p. 502; Dzeng, 1994). Son, Yu-lian, the secretary general of the
Taiwan Labor Front (the predecessor of the LSATL) and Lin, Tzu-wen, a former worker of Shin Hai Gas Corporation and the former chairperson of the Industrial Union Federation of Taipei, stated that workers quickly noticed both the limit of the Factory Law (enacted in 1928) where protection and benefits were limited to individual factories using mechanical power, and the potential of the LSL, which was based on the Factory Law. But, the LSL’s applicability involved industries, including using non-mechanical power, like public transportation services. Workers discursively articulated their demands with their endowed rights stipulated in the LSL (Lin, Tzu-wen, personal interview, Jan. 21, 2015; Son, Yu-lian, personal interview, Feb. 02, 2015).

This “fight for what the law offers” (shunfa douzheng) and “struggle by the law” (yifa kangzheng) justified labour protests through their reference to the law (Y.-c. Chen & Wong, 2002, p. 36; Shieh, 2008, p. 277), where the power of workers derived not just from their physical collective actions, but also from the law’s symbolic status that counteracted, at least ostensibly, vertical power imbalance between the employed and the employing. The law was thought to stand for the public manifestation of workers’ entitlement of horizontal economic citizenship. Workers actively used laws to achieve their entitled rights by taking collective vacations, convening general meetings, or doing go-slow in the place of illegal strikes. Their slogans, such as “Police, remain neutral!” “Workers abide the law, the management violates the law, and the authority did nothing,” showed their strategic use of the law to justify their claims.

Taiwanese workers began to organize independent labour unions through either launching new unions or reforming pre-existing ones. Union leadership changes were to be seen both in private enterprises and in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such as
petroleum, transport, and power supply. In 1988, more than a hundred independent unions emerged.

With the rapid rise of independent unions, the Taiwanese labour movement founded organizations beyond individual enterprise unions. The first sign was the foundation of the Workers’ Party (WP) in 1987. However, the WP soon divided because pro-independent and class-oriented China Tide intellectuals and radical independent union leaders were dissatisfied with the election-centric WP leadership. So, in March 1989 they founded their own Labour Party (LP), highlighting movement-centred working-class party and pro-unification. Both WP and LP failed to establish a working-class party represented in the parliament, which forced the labour movement to cooperate with established parties or continue with economic syndicalism in subsequent eras (W.-z. Yang, 2004).

The then newly founded DPP began to expand its sway over labour movement. The DPP established the Social Movement Department in May 1987. The NT postulated social movements to be the locomotive for Taiwan independence, which would be realized through the pan-class (fan jiaji) movement and realized both nation-building and democracy (Dao duli zhi lu bianji xiaozu, 1991; Xinchaoliu, 1989). The factional competitions with the election-oriented Formosa faction forced the NT to intervene into labour movement as it did in other social movements. Social movements should therefore be politicized for the political and economic reconstruction of Taiwan. Workers and other marginalized subaltern and middle classes were supposed to be the core agents in this

---

5 The New Tide faction was actively engaged with various social movement organizations, such as the LSATL, the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, and the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union, which were all founded between 1984 and 1987.
pan-class mass movement. With the establishment of the Labour Department (1989), the DPP actively intervened into workers' struggles for their year-end bonuses, payments for retirement-severance and overtime work, and incorporated militant workers into party organizations (A.-y. Huang, 2010, p. 238).

The pro-independent and pro-DPP LSATL took a different path from the WP and the LP by choosing not to found an independent working-class party. Its approach corresponded with the NT faction's pan-class mass movement. The LSATL transformed from a provider of legal aid for workers to the supporter of union organization in tandem with the NT’s narrative design juxtaposing Taiwan independence with mass movements. It was renamed the Supporting Association for Taiwan Labor Movement (SATLM) and established new divisions and regional offices (J.-h. Lai, 2012, pp. 72-73). The WP increased crisis awareness of LSATL, whether the latter lost its support among workers. It raised the organization of independent unions to its top priority (J.-h. Lai, 2012, p. 69; Laodongzhe, 1987c, 1987d). It intervened into the organizing process of the National Federation of Independent Trade Unions (NFITU) in May 1988. The NFITU was narrated as the emergence of true opposition movement, for the preceding opposition movement, such as dangwai and the WP, depended only on established politics without social basis. The foundation of the NFITU implied the true birth of labour movement and the rise of workers’ independence that had been compromised by political parties (Kuo, 1988). The WP was seen as a narrow class-centric party unable to win wide support of

---

6 NFITU was inaugurated by twelve independent unions with over 12,000 members. The NT faction, in particular, dominated NFITU. Members of the NT faction held the positions of chairman and director and chiefs of organization and training divisions (Wuo, 2010, p. 128).
Taiwanese workers while the DPP should have met such an issue through its conflict resolution between the working and middle classes (C.-C. Lin, 1988).

The NT faction’s narrative of “pan-class” movement blurred the boundaries of and articulated class, ethnicity, and anti-KMT feelings. Further, the faction argued that the “coming-from-outside regime” (wailai zhengquan) imposed the “coming-from-outside trade union” (wailai gonghui), CFL, on Taiwan workers and held them under its control (F.-y. Zhang, 2003). These coming-from-outside regimes and unions inevitably conflicted with the native Taiwan society and native independent unions, which should take the leading role for those alienated by the KMT. David Yang (2007) showed in his study on the nexus between class and ethnicity in Taiwan’s democratic transition that Taiwanese workers, disaffected with the party-state and attached to the Taiwanese identity, constituted the main body of passionate supporters for the opposition movement. Its rallies and campaigns were often filled with heishou (manual workers) showing their typical working class culture, speaking Taiwanese dialect, wearing sandals, and chewing betel nut (Y.-c. Chen & Wong, 2002, p. 22; Jacobs, 2012, p. 98; C.-h. Liu, 1994b; L. H.-m. Liu, 2011). The narrative intention of pan-class movement was to interweave working-class identity with Taiwanese identity and the workers’ anti-KMT feelings while retaining the support from the middle-class and SME employers without scaring them with class struggle. In this narrative design, labour disputes were likely to be appropriated by political disputes in the form of “pan-politicisation” (fan zhengzhifhua) (Y.-c. Chen & Wong, 2002, pp. 29-56; A.-y. Huang, 2010, p. 236) in which the KMT is seen as the prime evil to be subverted and class issues are subsumed by anti-KMT issues.
The rapid rise of the DPP and SATLM brought about conflicting effects on the identity formation of the newly emerging Taiwanese labour movement. At first, according to Hobsbawm (1984b), the most powerfully divisive forces in the working class come from nationalist movements where the objects and dividing line are at odds with class-centred movement (p. 57). The DPP’s new Taiwanese national identity and pro-DPP SATLM split the labour movement into pro-independent and pro-unification camps. The other was integrating and interfering effects that channelled labour disputes into anti-KMT struggles. Specifically, workers from independent unions were more likely to identify themselves politically with pro-DPP constituents in opposition to the KMT-controlled union leadership than with a working-class party. Their “independence” (zizhu) likely implied their autonomy from the KMT and referred to anti-KMT and pro-DPP (Y.-c. Chen & Wong, 2002, pp. 29-56; M.-s. Ho, 2014b, p. 190; 2015, p. 250; H.-l. Lai, 2010; T.-W. Lin, 2004, p. 97).

Two moments are central to the development of independent unions and their identities: the defeat of the strikes of the militant Far Eastern Chemical Fibre (FECF) union in 1989 and of the Keelung Bus Drivers’ union in 1992. Firstly, private enterprises trade unions, which initiated the birth of the independent labour movement of Taiwan, were severely damaged by the defeat of the 1989 FECF strike and further weakened by the increased factory closure and relocation to Southeast countries and mainland China. It

---

7 The FECF workers who voted overwhelmingly for the strike (1278 pros vs. 58 cons) in opposition to the union cadre's transfer were divided and defeated through the division of workers by the employer and the violent intervention of the local government and police (Zhao, 1996). The newly appointed Premier Hau, Pei-tsun, a former general and defence minister, instructed the strict security regulation against social unrest in 1990. Nearly 300 union leaders concentrated in private enterprises, such as Formosa Plastics and Tatung, were dismissed between 1988 and 1993 (Y. Chiu, 2011a; W.-z. Lee, 1989). The decisive blow to the independent unions was the defeat of the Keelung Bus Drivers’ union, which went on strike for better pay. The strike lasted nearly two months and was based on innovative tactics, like attracting family support and social sympathy, but workers were forced to return to work empty handed (M.-x. Lin, 1992).
brought about the change in movement leadership from the private enterprise unions to those of SOEs, which confronted after the late 1980s with the KMT’s privatization plan. It reinforced the anti-KMT and pro-DPP mentality that was furthered by KMT-led privatization while putting forward SOE workers as the typical representatives and prioritizing their interests over others.

Secondly, the Keelung Bus drivers’ strike revealed various limits to the existing order. At first, it exposed the limit of “the struggle by the law.” Workers were defeated despite staging their strike thoroughly within the boundary of the concerned labour laws (M.-x. Lin, 1992). The local and central apparatuses refused to punish the management’s illegal dismissal against the legitimately striking workers (Wuo, 1992, pp. 6-7). The other limit was the DPP. The Taipei county DPP government and its Bureau of Labor Affairs led by Kuo Chi-jen, a founding member of the LSATL, took ambiguous attitudes and did not thoroughly enforce the arbitration, which gave management enough time to destroy the union. The workers were disappointed even though they had sympathized with the dangwai/DPP in opposition to the KMT (S.-x. Chen, 2013, pp. 224-225). The strike also revealed the limit of the subordination of labour movement to the pan-politicizing anti-KMT struggle. The strike exposed how the KMT and DPP bore a close resemblance in their pro-capitalist attitudes. The strike served as an event to resignify the term “independence” of the KMT to that of institutional and capitalist politics. Controversies on new collective identities and independence within the Taiwanese labour movement will be the focus of subsequent sections.
Democratic Transition and South Korean Class-oriented Labour Movement

Right after the 1987 June Democratic Uprising, workers of the Hyundai Engine founded their trade union on July 5. It triggered the three-month-long nationwide labour disputes, narrated as the Great Labour Struggle (nodongja dae tuaeng, GLS). There were only 124 disputes before July 1987. Yet, between July and early September alone, 3,159 disputes were reported, nearly 65 percent of which were from large corporations (over 1,000 employees) (WWA, 1987a). More than 90 percent of the disputes were staged in violation of existing laws (MOA, 1988). The first comprehensive report on the GLS was published by the Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD) in September 1987. It was the CISJD’s third report, titled The July-August Labour’s’ Mass Struggle while its preceding second report was titled with The June Great Struggle for Democracy, which analyzed the June uprising; that is, the thousands disputes initially were considered neither “great” nor led by a single collective but by a mass. Yet, the term “Great Labour Struggle” began to emerge already in late 1987 and was widely circulated after 1988. Although the GLS was depicted as a single event, it was not the unified frontal attack of the working class amounting to systemic change, but the aggregation of spontaneous and uncoordinated actions concurrently exploded in thousands of factories. The aired grievances remained within each enterprise and did not derive from shared collective working-class consciousness.9

8 The first issue of the magazine Workers’ Friend (Nodongjau beot), for instance, in December published an article, the “Great Labour Struggle of the mid-1987.”
9 For instance, the list of the agreed 1987 collective bargain for the Hyundai Engine union, which was supposed to spark the Great Labour Struggle, included the attendance time, lunch price, liberalization of hair style, paid summer vacation, and provision of refreshment. The agenda on the bargaining table involved the abolishment of the graded year-end bonus, the payment of seniority allowances for female workers, a wage increase, and support for industrial disaster victims. The demands of the independent Association of Hyundai Group Unions to which twelve unions with 100,000 members belonged were similar to those of the Hyundai Engine union (Hyundai Engine Union, 1987).
The newly emerged independent unions soon began to historicize their thousands of individual disputes as a single “Great” event led by a single unitary subject, “Labour” (nodongja, working people) in contrast to the official term of the developmental regime for workers, geunloja (hard-working people). Workers participated in the GLS were influenced by its preceding June Uprising, as seen in their numerous claims of workplace democracy against despotic management. Kim, Jin-Suk, a labour activist who waged her 309-day aerial sit-in protest on top of 30 metre crane against massive dismissal of workers in 2011, recolled the event:

Workers who experienced the June Uprising on the streets wanted to realize democracy in their workplaces…Certainly, wages working conditions were improved but the direct and biggest achievement of the GLS, I think, was the direct election of union leadership…. The first thing they did after learning democracy was the establishment of democratic unions. The most significant change after the GLS was workers no longer felt small or intimidated in front of their supervisors (personal interview, Oct. 17, 2014).

Yet, their civil awakening was ex post facto narrated as collective class awakening. The image of workers spawned from the GLS was militant, masculine full-time workers in large manufacturing corporations, such as Hyundai chaebols, who mobilized in the tens of thousands in only a day and crushed the riot police with forklifts and graders during the GLS. This proliferated image of workers was glorified as the birth of a new subject of the new labour movement by militant unions of large corporations, radical activists, and labour scholars (Y.-g. Choi, Kim, Cho, & You, 2001; CISJD, 1987; Eom, 1994; Hyunjanobo, 1990; D.-C. Kim, 1995; Koo, 2001; B.-s. You, 2005).
Workers as labour, fashioned through the GLS, provided the image of activeness, militancy, and self-assertiveness: the collective identity that became the most extensively consumed product of those wage-earners who eagerly yearned for collective rights. The explosive self-identification as labour, “we are too labour” was to be heard even from workers of different professions, trades, and occupations, including those who had resisted the label of labour, such as bank employees, journalists, nurses, researchers, and teachers who voluntarily claimed to be labour (Hankyoreh, 1988; G.-s. Kim, 1988; M.-w. Lee, 1988; Min, 1988; Nodongjasinmun, 1988a).\textsuperscript{10} They made emotional and cultural investments into the collective of workers as labour. After 1987, labour songs and literature rapidly replaced those of minjung. One of the symbolic figures for militant workers, Lee, Gab-young (2009), a former chair of the Hyundai Heavy Industry union and the KCTU, recognized the importance of collective labour identity against capital by emphasizing adherence to an uncompromised collective will, uncrossed by other non-class identities, and wearing hairband and vest\textsuperscript{11} to show labour identity and representativeness towards both workers and managements.

Workers as labour were expressed in the form of the independent democratic union (Jajujeok minju nojo) movement. Unlike their Taiwanese counterparts of which independence pertained primarily to the distant power, i.e. anti-KMT in favour of the DPP, independence in the South Korean post-transitional labour movement initially referred to the proximate power, that is, workers’ autonomy from management and

\textsuperscript{10} Nurses have been perceived as an untainted occupation and called “white-robed angels” in South Korea, while teachers were a “sacred profession.” Therefore, the unionization of teachers, for instance, had to fight against and deconstruct such a widespread social respect and recognition to be reborn as labour.

\textsuperscript{11} Tying a red hairband and putting on the union vest are probably the primary cultural symbols for South Korean unionists and labour activists.
yellow unions affiliated with FKTU (Eom, 1994; Nodongjasinmun, 1988b, p. 182). For those workers democracy implied their bottom-up grassroots power against management-affiliated non-autonomous unions. Workers who ignited the GLS in chaebol corporations had organized “workplace organizations,” such as the Labour Council for Realisation of Democracy (H.-R. Cho, 2005; Gong, Ahn, & Kim, 2012; Jin, 2008).

The independent labour movement soon developed the horizontal and cross-factory solidarity since the late 1987. Firstly, twelve independent regional federations and thirteen federations of occupational unions—primarily white-collar workers from banks, health services, media, publishing, and schools—were launched between late 1987 and 1989. Secondly, in June 1988, non-union labour organizations formed the National Council of Labour Movement Organizations (NCLMO), which played a crucial role in the foundation of the umbrella organization of the minjung movement in 1989. The NCLMO was deeply involved in the organization of solidary struggles for the fledgling independent democratic union movement and in the foundation of regional and occupational federations by providing staff (B.-H. Lee, No, Oh, & Yin, 2001).

The scale jumping of the labour movement to the national confederation was accelerated by the cooperation of union federations and non-unionist labour movement organizations and by their nationwide joint campaigns for the reform of labour laws.\textsuperscript{12} The first national centre of independent unions, the CKTU, was founded in January 1990.\textsuperscript{13} The CKTU (1990) identified itself as a “new subject of South Korean trade

\textsuperscript{12} The campaign for the reform of labour laws was focused on legalizing multiple unionism allowing for the alternative national centre to the FKTU, permitting unionization rights for public servants and teachers, abandoning the prohibition of third party intervention, and sanctioning union political activity (Nodongjasinmun, 1988c, 1988d, 1988e, 1988f, 1988g).

\textsuperscript{13} The CKTU was composed of fourteen regional and two occupational federations with 456 unions with 170,000 members and accounted for 10 percent of unionized workers (W. Lee, 2005, p. 341).
unions for independent democratic labour movement,” which would “overcome the
conciliatory capital-labour relationship represented by the FKTU.” It declared that “on
the basis of the struggle for economic interests which could organize broadest
participations of workers,” it would cooperate with other social movements for the
reform of socio-economic structure and for political changes.

The CKTU inherited legacies of the pre-GLS labour movement and was more open
to cross-firm solidarity and political struggles than the two other independent federations,
the white-collar- centric Council of Occupational Trade Unions (COTU) and the chaebol-
centric Council of Large Enterprise Unions (CLEU). The CKTU was composed mainly
of SME unions of manufacturing industries. CKTU member unions led militant struggles
against dismissals and factory closures.

The CKTU was the organizational expression of the identity discourse of workers as
labour of the post-GLS independent labour movement. This discourse was formed in the
process of severe identity competitions where the pre-transitional minjung identity was
challenged by the post-transitional simin identity of social movements, like for the
environment and human rights. The room for the multi-class and anti-systemic minjung
identity was limited in the post-transitional era while the simin identity for public or
classless interest was inappropriate for the labour movement. Workers still suffered from
the lack of universal labour rights and had to struggle for particular class interests.

The CKTU is the expression of the ambivalent characteristics of the collective
identity, workers as labour, which involve system-subverting minjung and system-
reforming simin; political minjung and economic workers; multi-class-oriented minjung
and single-class-centric labour; and trade unionism and political labour movement. The
CKTU repeatedly juxtaposed the unions’ demands with claims against the regime and for socio-political reform. Its “Practical Principle for 1991 Joint Wage Increase Struggle,” for instance, listed three major claims: union-centric demands, such as wage increases; anti-regime struggles to protect the CKTU and labour citizenship; and reforms, including price stabilization, public housing through the nationalization, and the abolishment of national security law (Jeongugnodongjasinmun, 1991b).

To summarize, the democratic transition provided a new space for Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements by alleviating controls, but not by immediate opening-up of institutional resources. The labour movements negotiated with democratic movements to carve up and expand free space. Taiwanese workers began to articulate their grievances through the struggle “by the law” and “what the law offers.” The DPP, in particular the NT, intervened into the fledgling independent unions and injected its pan-class Taiwanese identity against the ruling KMT. The DPP’s penetration into the labour movement prevented workers from developing a powerful working-class party. Under the pan-class Taiwanese identity based on anti-KMT, the independence of the labour movement rather referred to the KMT not capital. In line with the NT’s mass line, the pro-DPP LSATL actively supported the establishment of independent unions and their interfirm organization, the NFITU, which were claimed to truly represent the workers’ voice in the place of the elite-led working-class party (Laodongzhe, 1987d). Yet, the pan-class anti-KMT and pro-DPP Taiwanese identity provoked strong backlash from groups with different identity salience, as will be seen in the next section.

In South Korea, workers staged strikes nation-wide, mostly in violation of the law, immediately after the June Uprising. These strikes were narrated as the GLS led by the
active class-oriented subject, “labour.” The identity claim of workers as labour was raised by wage-earners from different trades and occupations. The discourse of workers as labour inherited the radical multi-class *minjung* movement and competed with the class-less *simin* movements. The CKTU’s radical rhetoric, such as “Labour liberation” and “Down with the regime” coincided both with its labour-centric demands like wage increase to unite workers and with moderate socio-political reforms to win wide social support. The South Korean labour movement highlighted unions’ multi-class and social orientation to win wide social support than affiliating with established political parties. In the next section, I discuss tensions and divisions of Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements with regards to collective identities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Key</th>
<th>Collective identities</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Relation with 1) the state; and 2) other actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| TW         | SATLM  | Anti-KMT/pro-DPP pan-class identity | - Struggles by the law and what the law offers  
- Establishment of independent unions, inter-firm organizations, and political parties | 1) (active) non-confrontational  
2) tight connection with the DPP                                      |
| SK         | CKTU   | Workers as Labour           | - Struggles for the revision of labour laws  
- Establishment of independent unions and alternative national confederation | 1) Confrontational  
2) cooperation with the *minjung* movement and competition with the *simin* movement |

**TAIWANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN LABOUR MOVEMENTS AND NEW COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES IN RECONFIGURED INSTITUTIONS**

I analyze collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements from the early 1990s to around the mid-1990s. It is a critical period for
Taiwanese and South Korean labour movement in two senses. On the one hand, the effects of economic liberalization and globalization of multiple transition began to offset the political democratization. On the other hand, new collective identities of the independent labour movement were formed in response to the new situation. I analyze two competing labour movement organizations of Taiwan: the Taiwan Labor Front (TLF) and the Committee of Action for Labor Legislation (CALL). CALL was established in 1992 as a coalition of labour organizations, including the TLF for the revision of labour-related laws, but soon transformed into an independent group with its own position with the withdrawal of the TLF. They showed different orientations, constituents, practices, and politics. Their differences were grounded on their different perceptions of workers, whether workers were to be regarded as citizen (TLF) or subaltern people (CALL).

Regarding South Korea, I focus the internal debates of independent labour movement and the process of the emergence of its moderate collective identity, labour with the nation (or national people). The debates on the crisis of labour movement and militant unionism served as the rise of this new moderate identity discourse.

**Taiwanese Labour Movement under the New Hegemonic Identity: Worker as Citizen (Gongmin) or Workers as People (Renmin)**

Before exploring Taiwanese labour movement in the early 1990s, let me briefly review the shift of hegemonic national identity and two competing discourses of democracy.

---

14 The driving force behind the CALL was the Information Center of Labor Education (ICLE), often called Work Studio (Gongzuoshi). ICLE was established in 1988 and led by married couple Cheng, Tsun-chi and Hsia, Ling-ching.
Firstly, Taiwan society in the early 1990s witnessed the further expansion of the transition through the confluence of bottom-up democratization and top-down liberalization. The 1990 Wild Lily student movement claimed the complete opening of elective office, such as parliament and president, to democratic election and constitutional amendment. These claims were met and appropriated by the extra-constitutional National Affairs Conference (NAC) initiated by President Lee, Teng-hui with politicians, including those of the oppositional DPP, employers, and academics of various political orientations. Based on the NAC proposals, the first constitutional amendment in 1991 restored the constitutional order by abrogating the Temporary Provisions and thereby removed the rationale for the Civil War and the freeze of parliamentary elections at the national level. The other key amendment was the modification of the ROC’s territorial border and identity by recognizing the loss of the mainland and by limiting its governing space to Taiwan. It was \emph{de facto} redefinition of its sovereignty by limiting its population to Taiwan. It enabled the full re-election of parliamentary institutions and direct election of the president. The constitutional amendment, the rise of “native” Lee, Teng-hui, and expanded democratic institutions together show the transformation of anti-hegemonic Taiwanese consciousness to the hegemonic national identity and the simultaneous decline of the disruptive approach and institutionalization of an extra-parliamentary approach. The firmly established DPP channelled social forces into political struggles in which legislative and lobbying activities drastically increased that furthered institutionalization and professionalization of social movements (M.-s. Ho, 2010b; Lii, 2007). This political development, represented by constitutional amendment and institutional opening, fueled the other
round of conflicts between the pro- and anti-independence camps within the labour movement and reinforced its politicization with contrasting orientations, as to be seen below.

Secondly, the shift of national identity and politicization of collective actions precipitated controversies over oppositional discourses and practices within Taiwanese social movements. Firstly, those who supported Taiwan independence and were affiliated with the DPP assumed a homogeneous and unified civil society against the authoritarian KMT party-state, where social movements should be subordinated to the political movement for political democratization. They assumed that political democracy precedes social and economic democracies (C.-h. Liu, 1994b; W.-y. Zhou, 1994). The imagery of workers was formed in line with civil society theory through the fault line of the antagonism between citizen and the KMT state. Workers were entitled to rights as citizens (gongmin) or Taiwanese people (Taiwan renmin) and with industrial citizenship (gongye gongmin) in the “new state” (xin guojia). Those groups emphasized politicization and socialization of social movements to insert their voices into governmental and legislative processes and to attract the wider population through social issues like social welfare. Their efforts to politically organize the working-class under the conceptual and discursive umbrella of worker as citizen reshaped the political and legislative activities of the labour movement by aligning those activities with the hegemonic national identity. They actively involved electoral processes and cooperation with the DPP to legislate labour rights.

In contrast, those who named this discourse and practice as the “theory of civil society” (minjian shehui lun) and “old opposition movement” began to group together
under the denomination of the “theory of Popular Democracy” (*renmin minju*) and the new opposition movements (*xin fandui yundong*) in the early 1990s (Mau-Kuei Chang & Chang, 2011; H.-Y. Chen, 2006). The new opposition movements saw themselves as marginal (*bianyuan*) movement to contrast the pro-independent major political movement (dangwai/DPP) and the pro-unification minor class movement (LP). They recognized neither the fixed dichotomy between civil society and the state, nor the homogeneity of oppositional subjects, nor a transcendental principle like the anti-KMT as a unifying struggle. They emphasized the autonomy of social movements, the heterogeneity of oppressed people, constantly changing relations between the oppressed and the power bloc (H.-Y. Chen, 2006, pp. 64-76; K.-H. Chen, 2000b; Ning, 1991, pp. 29-55). They refused the reductionism of different social struggles into a unified political campaign. Workers were considered to constitute the people who are marginalized and underprivileged social forces as the subject of independent and equal alliance against the hegemonic bloc.

Below, I analyze two labour movement organizations, the TLF and the CALL, as representing and expressing the identity discourses of worker as citizen in the theory of civil society and workers as people in popular democracy.

**Worker as citizen: The Taiwan Labour Front and its Institutional Politics**

The pro-DPP SATLM renamed itself the Taiwan Labor Front (TLF) in May 1992. The TLF intervened into the labour movement as a producer to form the “subjective force of political social movement to lead social transformation” (Zhong, 1992).
The subsequent years were designated as the “period of politicisation of the TLF” (Laodongzhe, 2004). In the early 1990s, the TLF proposed labour movement’s “socialisation” (shehui hua) and “politicisation” (zhengzhi hua) in line with the NT faction’s socialization of political movement and politicization of social movements (Y. Chiu, 2011b). Socialization of the labour movement refers to the cooperation with other social actors for public goods, such as health insurance and anti-nuclear (Guo, 1994; Laodongzhe, 1993a) while politicization stands for the establishment of an independent working-class party (Ding, 1994; Ding & Chiu, 1994). The TLF’s discourses and practices were a realignment of working class identity attuned to the shift of the hegemonic national identity.

Cheng, Lu-lin (pen name Muyu) (1987), at the time one of the leading figures of the theory of civil society, suggested that under the KMT’s industrial domination through comprehensive and subtle control of individual enterprises, workers should begin with the organization of independent unions especially in large-scale enterprises to achieve their citizen rights (gongmin quan) and to undermine the party-state apparatus as the protector of capital accumulation. These struggles would lead labour movement to decommodification and welfare. In the 1990s, the TLF began to formulate labour issues through the discourse of rights and democracy and articulate them with the welfare state as seen in the 1991 Labour Charter (Laodongzhe, 1992b). The publication of the Labour Charter was an attempt to insert workers' voices into the process of the constitutional amendment as did other social movements, like women's movement.

The discourse of worker as citizen equates workers with Taiwanese or citizen as “citizen” was given in brackets after “worker” like “worker (citizen)” (Laodongzhe,
It justifies the due entitlement of citizenship of workers constituting most of Taiwan’s population and their struggle for social welfare and against plutocracy and privatization, which would only enrich the party-state capitalism. Thus, the TLF repeatedly contrasted popular “sovereign power” (zhu-quan) with the “gold power” (jin-quan). (Ding, 1995; Laodongzhe, 1992a; Zhong, 1992).

The TLF came up with a narrative strategy to solidify the identity of worker as citizen in four dimensions that can be seen in: 1) salience marker or activation code of boundary; 2) internal construction of representative identity; 3) external boundarization; and 4) practices. The first dimension of the TLF’s narrative strategy lies in its salience marker of anti-KMT. Anti-KMT struggles or panpoliticization and framing and channelling labour issues into partisan politics still played a more significant role for collective actions of workers for their citizenship than class-oriented politics. Chien, Hsi-chieh (1992a), a leading figure of the TLF in the 1990s, argued that the KMT ruled Taiwan as both the ruler and the largest corporation. It was the biggest beneficiary of privatization. Thus, class liberation of workers is possible only through their political struggles which are the purpose of their campaigns against money politics and for social welfare (C.-s. Lin, 1995). Different collective actions for anti-money politics, pro-welfare, and anti-privatization, for instance in the Slow-down Action for National Health Insurance in 1994 and Fury Night against Anti-money Politics in 1995, were clustered into anti-KMT struggles in favour of the DPP.

Regarding the second dimension, the TLF and its members were, in line with civil society theory, actively engaged in organizing independent unions at large corporations, concentrated on SOEs, to undermine the KMT. SOE workers formed groups, often called
“Labour Link” or “Labour Club,” and intentionally revealed their pro-DPP identity against KMT-affiliated union leadership (B. J. Chang, 2007; M.-s. Ho, 2003, 2012; A.-y. Huang, 2010, p. 234). In fact, worker as citizen was constructed as a variation on the Taiwanese identity modelled on workers from large SOEs whose interests thus overshadowed those of workers of SMEs or non-unionized workers. The “industrial democracy” was reduced to securing seats of workers on SOEs’ boards through direct election instead of the introduction of the co-decision-making system. This industrial democracy, however, was irrelevant to workers in private SMEs (Z.-j. Cai, 2003; K.-K. Hsu, 2003, p. 78; T.-W. Lin, 2004, p. 83; C.-h. Liu, 1995).

The third dimension of identity narrative pertains to external boundarization. The perception of worker as citizen, couched in the Taiwanese identity, blunted class consciousness while sharpening internal and external bounding and otherization. The TLF articulated its social democracy with distributive justice that was often framed by ethno-national discrimination of social welfare budgets. The KMT apportioned welfare resources biasedly to mainlander dominating “jun gong jiao” (soldiers, civil servants, and teachers) (Cheng-Liang Chen, 2010; M.-q. Zhou, 1994). Its advocacy of social democracy was therefore grounded on ethno-national discrimination instead of articulating class antagonism. Externally, worker as citizen was reinforced through othering mainland China. Liu, Chin-Hsin, one of the leading thinkers of the TLF in the 1990s and an expert on social welfare, contends:

Most of the big business in Taiwan start to cooperate, collaborate with China. They invest in China. All the jobs go into the mainland China.

Workers in Taiwan suffer. In that sense, I can see the class interest and the
independence movement start to go in the same way (personal interview, Feb. 09, 2015).

The inclusive civic discourse of worker as citizen was externally exclusive, in particular in relation to “mainland workers” (lu lao). The TLF opposed the import of mainland workers who would demand the “citizenship right and…undermine our national security” (Chien, 1992b; Laodongzhe, 1993b, 1994). Ho, Ming-sho (2014b) argues that Taiwanese worker’s class consciousness in the form of “quasi-class solidarity”, however weak, of reached its pinnacle between the late 1980s and 1990s. This period falls into the era of democratisation against the KMT and into the rapid rise of relocation of production facilities from Taiwan to the mainland China. With the recent rapid increasing opening of Taiwan towards China, Lin, Thung-hong, a labour scholar and also a former staff of the TLF and TCTU, stated that:

Identity shifts rapidly into the Taiwanese side. China, this one, very tricky and ironic China impact on Taiwan…. Working-class identity is now become stronger and also Taiwanese identity become stronger. They overlap (personal interview, Jan. 22, 2015).

The fourth dimension of the TLF’s identity narrative can be witnessed in its practices. The TLF focused on legislative politics in cooperation with the DPP. They prevented the KMT’s anti-labour initiative from constraining workers’ industrial citizenship for union organization and strike through the revision of the Settlement of Labour Disputes Law and the Labour Union Law in 1993. Further, the TLF campaigned for the reduction of the ratio of premiums paid by employees for national health insurance and the extended application of the LSL (M.-s. Ho, 2006, 2015).
The TLF’s close cooperation with the DPP sharpened division within the labour movement and the TLF. The CALL argued that the TLF became the “DPP’s vassal” when the TLF endorsed the pro-independent DPP in the 1994 local election. To this, the TLF rejoined that it supported the DPP because of its shared national identity and better lobbying effect. Further, it would be irresponsible to keep “workers (citizen)” from expressing their views on independence and unification (Loadongzhe, 1995). The TLF’s cooperation with the DPP further promoted the division within the TLF. When the TLF key leaders were recruited by the DPP in the 1990s (S.-x. Chen, 2013, pp. 226-227; W.-z. Yang, 2004), a group of activists supporting the formation of working-class party split from the TLF and formed a different group, called Red Light (named after its pamphlet) (Yebaihe guandian, 1995). Chiu, Yubin, one of the Red Light members, recalled that the DPP’s recruitment of the TLF’s key figures “seriously damaged the politicization of the labour movement” (personal interview, Feb. 04, 2015).

The TLF’s identity narrative of worker as citizen fostered generalization of a particular national and partisan identity and thereby limited its representability of the whole working class. It gave rise to a backlash from groups of different identities.

**Workers as people: the CALL and its quotidian politics**

When the Taiwanese Keelung Bus Drivers’ strike failed despite their “struggle by the law” in 1992, organizations, including the LP, the NFITU, and the TLF, launched the Action Committee for Three Laws and One Case.¹⁵ It soon renamed itself the CALL and

---

¹⁵ Three laws refer to the LSL, the Settlement of Labour Disputes Law, and the Labour Union Law. One case is the Keelung Bus Drivers’ strike. The Action Committee for Three Laws and One Case was modelled on the Labour March for Two Laws and One Case (the LSL and the Labour Union Law, and the Miaoli bus drivers’ strike). The Labour March was later formed into the Action Committee for Anti-evil-laws.
was transformed into a labour movement organization representing a particular labour politics, when the TLF withdrew from the CALL. The CALL adopted different national and labour politics, targets, and organizational approaches from the TLF.

In the CALL’s discourses, *renmin* or people are understood to be the “subject of independent and equal alliance of the marginalized social groups and movements against the hegemonic bloc” (Ning, 1991, p. 63). The theory of popular democracy insists on multiple subjects for multiple radical democracies for there might be domination even among opposition movements, such as anti-KMT struggles over social protests, male and organized unionists over female and unorganized workers, or heterosexual feminists over sex workers (S.-x. Chen, 2013; H.-l. Lai, 2010; F.-P. Wang, 2009; Wuo, 2010). Cheng, Tsun-chi (1993), one of the CALL’s founders, argued that working classes should not be engaged in the unification/independence and national identity issue but instead focus on their own issues. The prioritization of national identity would only replace internal “civil war” between the marginalized people and the hegemony bloc with the Chinese Civil War between the ROC and the PRC. The CALL’s political position is encapsulated in “equidistant diplomacy and equi-ratio alliance-building,” and “whoever suckles me is my mother.” It implies that the CALL not only maintains its autonomy from the unification/independence debate and from the blue (KMT) and green (DPP), but also pursues its own labour politics.

The CALL served as a network hub and articulator promoting the organization of private enterprise trade unions and resource poor groups while the TLF concentrated on relatively resource rich SOEs and white-collar workers. Unlike the TLF’s focus on anti-corporatization of the SOEs, CALL’s primary agendas were placed on campaigns for
solidarity against the factory-closure which severely affected workers in private SMEs after the late 1980s. It campaigned for the empowerment of socially marginalized groups, as to be seen its initiative for the Sex Workers’ movement, migrant workers, and the Solidarity Front of Women Workers (SFWW).

While the TLF’s activists were not directly involved in everyday activities of unions and were recruited to the DPP after a few years of work at the TLF, the CALL insisted on *dun dian*—a way of working, involving staying in a grassroots site to participate in practical work, conduct research, sum up experience—as its core value and practices of labour movement (H.-l. Lai, 2010; Tsai, 2013; Wuo, 2010). Its activists were directly engaged in and employed by grassroots trade unions and worked as “workers of workers” in which activists can have their actions and strategies examined not by their ideology but by the reality, to realize their self-transformation (S.-x. Chen, 2013, p. 218; Wuo, 2010, p. 272). Unlike macro party politics and practices, these quotidian politics and practices channelled the CALL's energy in the struggles for amending laws to the mobilization of grassroots trade unions rather than building an alliance with the DPP. It prepared to illustrate the “workers’ version” for the LSL revision through the direct participation of more than 500 workers rather than depending on experts (CALL, 1993).

The CALL has been criticized for its apolitical stance and economic syndicalism (H.-l. Lai, 2010, p. 63; Wuo, 2010, p. 273, fn. 3; W.-z. Yang, 2004). The CALL’s political neutrality was undermined when its leader Cheng, Tsun-chi joined the Taipei city government led by the KMT’s Ma, Ying-jeou in 1998. Compared with the discourse of worker as citizen, in the CALL’s approach, workers as people—employees threatened by factory closures, female workers dominated by their male counterparts, sex workers
stigmatized by heterosexual feminists, and migrant workers excluded by legal protection—are those who are not fully recognized as citizens but regarded pre- or sub-citizens. The CALL underlined not only the domain of universal right, but also the locus of life, which is more proximately and directly concerned with administrative politics responsible for a governmentalizing population than remotely and indirectly mediated through legislative politics.

**South Korean Labour Movement: Labour with the Nation**

Compared with the Taiwanese labour movement in the early 1990s, two differences are to be noted for the present section. Firstly, unlike a hegemonic identity shift in Taiwan, the South Korean labour movement encountered an intense identity competition with other social movements. It had to compete with the *simin* movements of which moderate campaigns for the public good attracted the media spotlight and were contrasted with the anti-systemic *minjung* movement and the class-interest-oriented labour movement. Secondly, unlike the initiative role of the non-union labour movement organizations, such as the TLF and the CALL in Taiwan, their South Korean counterparts began to be marginalized and the balance of power tipped toward trade unions with the foundation of the CKTU. In the following section, I primarily focus on shifting identities and debates in the trade union movements in South Korea.

The CKTU had been scarcely established when the state and capital reinforced discursive offensive and physical repression. The CKTU was marked out as the main villain undermining the “national economy” through “disturbing industrial peace [and] wage stabilization” (Dong-A Daily, 1990; Kyunghyang Daily, 1990). Dan, Byong-ho, the
former chair of the CKTU and its successor KCTU, stated that the CKTU repeatedly organized solidarity wildcat strikes to support independent unions suffering from repression by the state and management. These solidarity strikes, however, were in turn used by the regime as an excuse to repress the CKTU (personal interview, Nov. 17, 2014). Within a year, the number of member unions decreased nearly 50 percent (G.-h. Yang, 2011, p. 288). Less than a year since its foundation, a new move within the CKTU emerged that emphasized the labour movement working “with the nation” (kukmin, literally nation+people). The “CKTU could be firmly rooted in the nation, if labour movement represent not only the interests of workers but also those of the nation,” such as housing and welfare (Jeongugnodongjasinmun, 1991a; Jeonnohyeob, 1991). This new emphasis on labour’s interests synonymous with the nation surfaced in the crisis debates of the labour movement and the rise of the COTU and the CLEU.

The 1991-92 debates on the labour movement crisis foreshadowed subsequent controversies and factionalism of the independent labour movement. The mass line, represented by the national liberation (NL) group, emphasized: cooperation with other social movements; relative openness to institutional politics; recognition of the utility of tripartite system; and sympathy for social democracy. The class line, represented by people’s democracy (PD) group, emphasized: reinforcement of class-centric struggles for wage and collective bargaining; relative reservation about institutional politics; rejection of tripartite system; and sympathy for socialism.16

---

16 The NL and PD groups emerged since the second-half of the 1980s in student and minjung movement. The workplace organizations of workers, which was formed around the 1987 GLS to establish independent unions, began to embrace their political thoughts in the 1990s. Those workplace organizations of workers started to form national organizations since the second-half of the 1990s. The KCTU is supposed to be dominated by the competitions among three factions: Gukminpa (literally the national faction affiliated with NL); Hyunjangpa (workplace faction affiliated with PD); and Jungangpa (the centre faction positioned between the NL and PD). And, the Gukminpa holds numerically majority position in the KCTU.
The CKTU was confronted with critiques of its “militant unionism,” which stood up to capital and the state (and their interventions) with the adoption of direct actions and confrontational repertoires. The CKTU was blamed for the declining labour disputes, union membership, and the crisis of the labour movement. The critiques saw militant unionism as the expression of ideological dogma, economic syndicalism, and labour-centrism, which scared moderate unions, narrow down independent unions’ activities to economic interests at the enterprise level, and isolated labour movement from the public (J. J. Choi, 1992; S.-o. Park, 1992a). Critics of the militant unionism propose “social developmental labour movement,” going beyond the narrow economic struggles and embracing public issues (S.-o. Park, 1992a, 1992b).

In 1993, the CKTU, COTU, and unions of large corporations organized the National Council of Trade Union Representatives (NCTUR). The NCTUR expanded its demands to embrace broad, non-union-specific issues, such as housing, price, and anti-corruption. Kwon, Young-ghil (1993), one of the co-chairs of the NCTUR representing the COTU, claimed that “repeated struggles based on worker-centric idea led the isolation of unions in the West.” He suggested the “labour movement working with the nation” as an alternative to labour-centrism, which sublimes the class-struggle dogmatism advocating strikes as panacea, combines demands for wage increase with social reform, and cooperates with simin and grassroots movements. The subsequent development in the establishment of the KCTU took similar steps to those Kwon suggested.

Firstly, the NCTUR excluded political labour organizations from its membership. Non-union labour organizations, such as NCLMO, which had been involved in the labour

---

17 The number of labour disputes drastically decreased from 1,616 to 122 between 1989 and 1994. The union density went down from 19.8 percent to 14.5 percent during the same period.
movement after the 1980s, were marginalized in the union-centric NCTUR. Secondly, the proposal that the militant CKTU should be the driving force for the KCTU was replaced by a moderate proposal in which white-collar-worker-centric COTU and unions of large corporations should play a more significant role. Thirdly, regarding the scope of the new independent confederation KCTU, the moderate COTU’s proposal was accepted that broadens membership to embrace noncontentious unions outside the NCTUR. In November 1995, the KCTU was founded and Kwon, Young-ghil was elected its first chair with the slogan, “Labour movement with the nation,”18 which was reused in various ways, like “KCTU with the nation,” “labour with the nation,” “social reform with the nation,” “strikes with the nation,” “unions with the nation,” and others.

The discourse of labour with the nation is a refined move that modified the multi-class minjung identity to address the reconfigured post-transitional arena in which the anti-systemic, extra-institutional, and boundary-crossing characteristics of that older minjung identity attracted only a limited and often quite marginalized constituency. It transformed characteristics of the minjung identity into system-reforming, amphi-institutional, and boundary-preserving. Labour with the nation is not only an identity claim of self-assertive “I am who I am” but also that of self-unassertive “I am who I am not.” To put it differently, the authenticity of the author or labour movement is substantiated by its readers or the nation together. For instance, there are different ways to construct collective identity regarding boundarization: binarizing boundaries to reinforce antagonism, such as in modern national, class, and gender movements;

---

18 The name of the majority faction of the KCTU, Gukminpa (the national faction), originated from the Kwon, Young-ghil’s slogan for the election for the first president of the KCTU, “Labour movement with the nation.” Since then, the group, emphasizing “with the nation,” was called the national faction.
deconstructing boundaries to decentre fixed essence, such as in queer movement (J. Gamson, 1995, 1997); and refusing boundaries to affirm autonomous identity, such as in autonomous movement (Fominaya, 2015). Labour with the nation is a different move that juxtaposes the boundary of collective identity of labour with its outside audience to broaden the influence of labour movement. And, labour with the nation is the expression of workers as an economic and class actor of *minjung* and as a public and class-less actor of *simin*. That the KCTU participated in numerous non-labour conjunctural coalitions, such as for gender, human rights, anti-regime in parallel with its struggles for wage increase shows these ambivalent characteristics of its collective identity. Community- and consensus-building within the boundary was as critical for the KCTU, which defied the establishment of partisan alliance with established parties, as coalition building without the boundary.

To sum up, Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements reconstructed their collective identities in the face of conflicting effects of multiple political and economic transition. With the rise of the new hegemonic Taiwanese identity, labour movement groups sympathizing with pro-independent national and pro-DPP partisan identities saw worker as citizen in the new ROC on Taiwan. The discourse of worker as citizen underlay the primacy of the unified anti-KMT campaign rather than class struggles. They closely cooperated with the DPP to legalize and establish workers’ citizenship. Further, they actively involved in SOE unions, the stronghold of the KMT. The leadership of the resource-rich large SOE unions reinforced institutional politics of the labour movement. The other labour groups with non-national and anti-DPP identities insisted on the autonomy of the labour movement and refused the primacy of the political
movement over other social movements. Workers were perceived to be a part of subaltern “people.” Those labour groups focused on organizing workers of private SMEs and on extra-institutional politics. The interaction between Taiwanese labour and democratic movements in the democratic processes produced their identity alignment in which the former aligned its identity with the ethno-national Taiwanese identity of the latter instead of developing unified independent working-class identity and politics.

The South Korean labour movement forged the identity discourse of labour with the nation under severe repression and identity competition. This identity discourse was the negotiation between: class-oriented radical minjung and class-free moderate simin movements, multiclass-oriented minjung movement and labour-centric union movement, and extra-institution-oriented minjung movement and institution-oriented simin movements. What the South Korean labour movement encountered in the stabilizing period of democratization was less the superimposition of the identity of democratic movement on that of labour movement as occurred in Taiwan, but the juxtaposition of post-transitional simin identity with that of the labour movement. Unlike the ‘mainstream’ Taiwanese labour movement that claimed universal citizenship, worker as citizen, by aligning its identity with the emerging hegemonic Taiwanese identity, the South Korean labour movement had to struggle for its particular citizenship in competition with the universal citizenship of the simin movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Collective identities</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Relation with 1) the state; and 2) other actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TW TLF CALL</td>
<td>Worker as citizen - Workers as people</td>
<td>- Struggles for labour law revision and welfare, and anti-closure and -privatization</td>
<td>1) negotiation and confrontation 2) close cooperation with the DPP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TAIWANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN INDEPENDENT LABOUR MOVEMENT

South Korean and Taiwanese labour movement founded new national centres of independent trade unions. The South Korean KCTU and the Taiwanese TCTU dethroned the FKTU and the CFL from the sole national centres in 1997 and 2000, respectively. The multiple transition had conflicting effects. Political democratization opened the previously inaccessible institutions and resources while economic liberalization undermined their organizational foundation and accelerated internal heterogeneity of workers. I compare the Taiwanese TCTU and the South Korean KCTU as the empirical manifestation of independent labour movements. It will show the relations between democratic and labour movements and different characteristics of collective identities of labour movements in the two countries. I focus firstly on their internal development and secondly on their relations and interactions with the state and non-union groups.

Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU)

Around the mid-1990s, Taiwanese independent unions at the local level were actively engaged in the separation of industrial unions from occupational unions because the latter numerically constituted the majority and were considered to be controlled by the KMT.
Independent SOE unions began to seek cooperation at the national level in opposition to the KMT privatization plan. The rapid rise of the DPP both at the local and national levels offered independent unions favourable opportunities to establish local federations of industrial unions and to cooperate in solidarity struggles against privatization. Industrial unions of local federations and large public/private corporations launched the Preparatory Committee for the TCTU after late 1997 and officially launched in May 2000 (TCTU). The TCTU was immediately recognized by the then new DPP government.

The TCTU was a necessary step for the Taiwan labour movement to proceed from the intermittent issue-based and cadre-centric resistance to the sustained organization-based movement (Kuo, 1998). This advancement was to be achieved through active involvement in legislative activities to eliminate legacies of “the authoritarian government” and in “national political affairs” (TCTU, 2000a). The TCTU did not take conscious measures to change its organizational form so that it could promote unity among workers and embrace diverse types of unorganized workers. Further, the dominant profile of SOE unions in the TCTU geared its agenda-setting and decision-making process to their issues (Y.-R. Yang, 2014), such as “a halt on privatization and liberalization” (TCTU, 2000a) and to the state instead of capital.\(^\text{19}\) Even the term privatization was often replaced with corporatization that would only serve the KMT’s

\(^{19}\text{According to the TLF’s 1999 survey targeting leaders of 500 industrial unions of local federations and SOEs, privatization was ranked in the sixth place of ten answers to the survey questions “what is recently the most serious labour issue and is currently the most urgent problem to be solved?” The import of foreign workers, non-independence of unions, and unemployment were in first, second, and third place, respectively (Laodongzhe, 2000). Yet, interests of the SOE unions such as anti-privatization increasingly overwhelmed those priorities.}

Let me turn to the TCTU’s relations with the state and other non-union groups. The TLF was deeply involved in the TCTU. Its first chair was the director of the Taiwan Petroleum Workers’ Union’s (TPWU) Huang, Ching-hsian, the former chair of the TLF and affiliated with the NT. According to the TLF, the TCTU should “utilise the presidential election for its legal recognition,” serve as a “negotiation window with the state and the management,” and to “establish the negotiation mechanism” (Zhou & Hong, 1999, p. 6).

It was expected that the pre-transitional dangwai/DPP’s working-class mobilizing strategy depending on anti-KMT mentality would soon lose its impetus with regime change (H.-h. Chen, 2000). Such an expectation was proven hasty, for the TCTU did not consciously construct an alternative identity to worker as citizen, which was couched in the Taiwanese identity based on the anti-KMT as its boundary marker. The English naming process of the TCTU showed the discrepancy between its desired and real intention to be independent and to be Taiwanese. The TCTU’s (Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions) English name was based on the South Korean KCTU, instead of its literal translation of the National Confederation of Industrial Unions, to indirectly infer its militancy (M.-S. Ho, 2015, p. 256, fn. 5). Yet, unlike the indirect insinuation of class identity, the English TCTU directly reveals an expressive national identity “Taiwan.”

Pro-unification groups were dissatisfied with this English name and soon withdrew its support for the TCTU (Y. Chiu, 2015, p. 58).

---

20 The KCTU was internationally known as militant with its initiative for the general strike against the labour law reform for flexibilization in winter 1996-1997.
The regime change offered at the national level the status of the quasi-official union to the TCTU from an anti-hegemonic to a hegemonic identity. This “transposed” identity metamorphosed the TCTU from the marginalized outsider to “routinized” insider (L.-x. Wang, 2000) that can access established institutions and their resources. With the rise of resource-rich SOE unions, TCTU’s pragmatic institutional consultation and its institutionalization began to grow while the TLF gradually retreated from the TCTU. The separation of non-union organizations from the TCTU reinforced its march towards state institutions (M.-s. Ho, 2008; 2015, p. 257; T.-W. Lin, 2004, pp. 84-86).

The process of work-hour reduction in the LSL in 2000 explicitly revealed the anti-KMT identity of the TCTU. The TCTU was blamed for being “loyal to the party [DPP]” and “neglecting the will of workers” (K.-K. Hsu, 2003; R.-h. Liu, 2000) when the TCTU's president Huang, Ching-hsian expressed support for the DPP's proposal for a 44 work-hour per week instead of the KMT's version for 84 work-week per fortnight (T.-W. Lin, 2004). Although the TCTU joined the Big Coalition for 84 Work-hour, including the CLF, it was criticized for its passivity and inconsistency by other coalition participants. The TCTU was considered to intentionally hold a separate rally, instead of joint rally, in the fear of that the massive mobilization would hurt the DPP government. The TCTU slogans were couched in appealing tones of “we want 84” rather than the critical voices of the DPP, whereas it directed its criticism to the KMT-dominating Legislative Yuan rather than towards the DPP administration (K.-K. Hsu, 2003, pp. 49-50; X.-l. Wang, 2000). Ostensibly, the TCTU oscillated between working-class and national/partisan identities during the work-hour reduction debates. Yet, the TCTU as the product and representative of Taiwan independent labour unions did not change the boundary marker
of its anti-KMT identity as “independent.” The DPP’s political turnover reinforced the salience of this boundary marker, which provides the TCTU with hitherto inaccessible institutions and resources. Workers with different identity saliences, such as class, mainlander, pro-KMT, or anti-systemic characteristics, were obviously dissatisfied with the TCTU and wanted to resignify the “independent labour movement.”

**Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)**

The KCTU was founded in 1995 and driven by three different forces, the blue-collar-workers- and SME-centric CKTU, the white-collar-based COTU, and Union Councils of Hyundai and Daewoo groups. The KCTU aimed at political empowerment of workers, improvement of working conditions, consolidation of union power through the organization of industrial unionism, broad social reforms, and elimination of all kinds of discrimination (Minjunochong, 1995).

These aims were the expression of negotiation between the system-improving, institution-oriented, and class-less simin movement and the system-subverting, extra-institution-oriented, and class-centric minjung movement. For instance, political empowerment of workers shows that the KCTU’s ambition for political voice as the representative of progressive forces and its will to be present in established politics. Broad social reforms and anti-discrimination reflects the internal demands of the white-collar-centric COTU—reforms of media and healthcare were proposed by occupational federations of media workers, and health and medical workers—but at the same time formulated the KCTU’s intent externally to cooperate with the simin movement. Dan, Byong-ho said that as the chair of the KCTU he took the position of co-chair of more
than forty conjunctural coalitions to labour-related issues and non-labour, such as environmental and gender coalitions (personal interview, Nov. 17, 2014).

Unlike the SOE workers of the TCTU, the dominant profile of the KCTU is male and regular workers of white-collar jobs and heavy manufacturing industries in large corporations. The overrepresentation of the collective identity of those large corporations workers has negative impact on revitalization of labour movement. A former director of Policy-Planning Office of the KCTU, Lee, Sang Hak, claims:

The current limits of labour movement are directly linked with its way of redefining its identity…Unions of large corporations became selfish. The labour movement of the 1980s emphasized class and universal values. Yet, now the emphasis on those values by unions often remains mere lip service and we see the retreatment of radical identity and its fossilization (personal interview, Oct. 08 2014).

KCTU unions were often indifferent to irregular workers and to integrating them into unions (Minjunochong, 1996a). Na, Ji-hyun, the chair of Korean Women’s Trade Union (KWTU), contends that the KCTU has been passive in the articulation of the raise of minimum wage, a crucial issue for irregular workers, for their members receive more than the minimum (personal interview, Oct. 10, 2015). Yet, since 1997, the KCTU began to response to the crisis: by setting up the women’s federation within the KCTU in 1999; by supporting the regional-based “general unions” for workers with hyper-flexible employment contracts since 1999 (D.-o. Chang, 2009, 2012); and by launching a special
project to organize workers with irregular employment in 2000.\textsuperscript{21} However, those counter-measures were rather responsive than self-initiated. The foundation of women only unions outside the KCTU and the discrimination of irregular workers by its member unions revealed the growing challenge to the institutionalizing KTCU, which was once extra-institutional.

Let me turn to KCTU relations with the state and other non-union. The KCTU, as the organizational expression of labour with the nation, formed the autonomous force with system-reforming orientation. The KCTU sought how to approach both cooperative institutionalization and independent politicization of labour politics: “participate and struggle” in the tripartite Presidential Commission for Industrial Relations Reform (PCIRR) in May 1996 (Minjunchung, 1996b). When the ruling party railroaded the government version of the labour law revision for the worse—more lenient to flexibilization of labour force and more restrictive on labour rights than the PCIRR version—in the absence of opposition parties at the dawn of December 26, the KCTU immediately went on the general strike for two months and the FKTU joined in. The total union members and unions that participated in the general strike was nearly 3.9 million and 3,422, respectively. Unlike the 1987 GLS, the 1996-1997 general strike was deliberately pre-planned and spread across whole industries. It was not economic struggles but political ones; and not an \textit{ex post facto} narrative but a self-initiated collective awakening. The renewed bill did not involve crucial revisions in flexibilization of labour forces and in the improvement of labour rights. The general strike raised

\textsuperscript{21} The number of the organized irregular workers of the KCTU members were only 35,784 and in 2000 accounted for only for 5.8 percent of its membership. Their ratio increased to its current level of 24 percent in 2016.
questions for the KCTU of how to overcome the limit of the post-GLS labour movement. The KCTU tried to reinforce class representativeness through the establishment of industrial unionism and institutional presence through the foundation of class-oriented party.

Firstly, the KCTU accelerated industrial unionism that would address decreasing union density and increasing heterogeneity of working classes because of growing outsourcing, subcontracting, and precarious employment. The Chief Director of the Korean Contingent Workers’ Center, Lee, Nam-sin, contends:

South Korean union movement is generally infatuated with enterprise-based unionism that renders organized workers ignorant about extra-enterprise affairs and non-organized and irregular workers. An authentic industry-based unionism is inevitable….to recover class-oriented identity” (personal interview, Oct. 21 2014).

In 1997, KCTU unions began to launch industry-based unions, such as clerical and financial, media, and metal (Minjunochong, 1999).

Secondly, in March 1997, the KCTU prepared for the formation of an independent political force (Minjunochong, 1997). The KCTU launched the People’s Victory 21 (Victory 21) in cooperation with the umbrella organization of the minjung movement, the National Alliance for Democracy and Reunification (NADR), in September, and participated in the presidential election in December. The campaign of the Victory 21 was tailored to labour with the nation or “labour + alpha” as its slogans “People’s candidate.” In 2000, the KCTU founded the DLP in cooperation with the minjung
movement and participated in the 2000 general election.\textsuperscript{22} \textsuperscript{23} The DLP was an attempt to transform union identity and the extra-institutional single-level defensive politics of the labour movement to political identity and the amphi-institutional multi-level “generative politics” (Carroll, 2010; Williams, 2008).

The ambivalence of labour with the nation revealed the oscillation of the KCTU between the single labour modeled on the typical male regular worker of large enterprises and the multiple heterogeneous workers, between national consultative bargaining and all-out struggle, and between extra-institutional and institutional politics.

Table 6- 6 Independent Union Confederation in Taiwan and South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confederation</th>
<th>Constituents</th>
<th>Labour politics</th>
<th>Democratization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TW TCTU</td>
<td>Dominant SOE-workers identity Workers of private sectors marginalized</td>
<td>Cooperation with DPP</td>
<td>Reserved towards coalition with other social movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK KCTU</td>
<td>Dominant chaebol-workers identity Workers of SMEs marginalized</td>
<td>Independent politics</td>
<td>Open to coalition with other social movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONCLUSION**

Taiwanese and South Korean workers experienced radical and multiple social changes between 1980 and 2000, confronting fissures within before forming unity and solidarity.

The independent labour movement responded to those changes with the repeated reconstructions of collective identities. The fledgling Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements constructed dissimilar collective identities with different

\textsuperscript{22} In the 2000 general election, Kwon, Young-ghil, the presidential candidate for Victory 21, received 1.2 percent, the DLP received 1.2 percent, and the average of its 21 candidates was 13.1 percent (Minjunochong, 2000).

\textsuperscript{23} The DLP did not join the then influential Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Election (CAGE), composed of more than 500 simin movement organizations. The CAGE claimed to be politically independent from established politics and launched a nationwide campaign against corrupt politicians, while excluding subaltern minjung movement organizations, including the KCTU, due to their radicalism (S.-g. Shin, 2000).
interpretations of the conditions of developmental regimes and appropriating collective identities of democratic movements.

The Taiwanese independent labour movement’s career path was a process of constant negotiations of collective identities between democratic and labour movements. Taiwanese labour organizations adapted the ethno-national Taiwanese identity of democratic movement for the emergent independent labour movement that was couched in pan-class movement. The transposition of Taiwanese identity from the anti-hegemonic identity to hegemonic one was re-appropriated by the independent labour movement. The pro-independent and pro-DPP TLF actively cooperated with the DPP to improve workers’ citizenship in legislation and industry based on the discourse of worker as citizen in the “ROC in Taiwan.” Those who disagreed with the hegemonic Taiwanese identity constructed the new opposition movement and the discourse of workers as people that accentuated class and recognized a multiplicity of oppressed, exploited, and marginalized people. The TCTU could have served as the confluence of the national established politics of worker as citizen and the alternative classed sub-politics of workers as people. Yet, the TCTU prioritized national established politics and the dominant profile of SOE workers. It facilitated institutionalization of the labour movement at the cost of “independent” working-class politics and thereby neglected marginalized workers.

The South Korean independent labour movement in the pre-transitional era constructed the collective identity of worker as master with excessive class consciousness. It pursued radical anti-politics of the minjung movement that rendered both established politics and shop floor politics irrelevant. The South Korean independent
labour movement refashioned the discourse of worker as master to workers as labour with the democratic transition. The labour movement became independent of the pre-transitional multi-class, radical *minjung* movement but had to compete with the post-transitional class-less, moderate *simin* movements. The South Korean labour movement re-transformed the discourse of workers as labour into that of labour with the nation in the face of repeated repression, accelerated economic liberalization, and rising *simin* movements. The foundation of the KCTU was the organizational manifestation of the identity claim of labour with the nation while the 1996-1997 general strike was the expression of its practices. This discourse reveals that the South Korean labour movement formed an independent force but was dependent upon other social forces for it had “no recourse” to established politics. The KCTU with the discourse of labour with the nation was in a constant seesaw between incorporation and opposition.

The career path of collective identity of the Taiwanese independent labour movement shows its affiliating more with the new national consciousness than with class consciousness and seeking more partisan cooperation than self-empowerment to achieve while its South Korean counterpart sustained class consciousness in its collective identity and sought rather to reinforce the social-orientation of unions and independent political empowerment in the absence of reliable political partners in established politics.

In this chapter, I discussed how independent Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements improved labour rights and expanded democracy, limited to the political dimension, through construction, alignment, and deployment of different collective identities by tracing their internal processes over the course of democratic processes. The chapter showed how the rise of Taiwanese and South Korean labour movement thickly
intermingled with democratic movements and embraced their ideas, discourses, organizational repertoires, and alliance politics. Compared with the Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements that emerged before the 1980s, the influence of the democratic movements on labour movements was crucial.

Unlike the class consciousness formed by the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} labour movements in Europe, when societies were newly liberated from the feudal class order, the Taiwanese and South Korean workers and activists developed labour movements based on democratic consciousness. As democracy and democratization was contextualized through collective identities of democratic movements, Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements contextualized class identity and consciousness with democratic identity and consciousness. Taiwanese ethno-national identity and national sovereignty and South Korean popular-class identity and popular sovereignty were employed by Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements. They then proactively adapted those identity discourses to the construction of their own collective identities, constantly repairing the self-concept of workers and redefining their discourses and repertoires. Their collective identities affected militancy and non-militancy, openness to and reservation about solidarity with other social movements, extra-institutional and institutional orientation, and anti-partisan and partisan politics of South Korean and Taiwanese labour movements, respectively.

This chapter also showed the limits of “mainstream” Taiwan and South Korea labour movements by exploring their interidentity and inter-identity effects, i.e. identities between labour and democratic movements in the former and identities within labour movement in the latter. The chapter discussed how their limited representability of
working-classes derives from the collective identities built upon those of Taiwanese SOEs and of South Korean large chaebol corporations, respectively, against the KMT party-state and sword-won alliance. They marginalized the interests of workers in private enterprises in Taiwan and of SMEs and precarious employment in South Korea. The present chapter showed through interidentity and inter-identity effects that the representability of workers was expressed in the form of division in the Taiwanese labour movement because of the intervening effects of national and partisan identities of the dangwai/DPP while internalized in the South Korean labour movement due to the residual effects of popular-class identity of the minjung movement. The interidentity and inter-identity effects demonstrated the challenges to and limit of the contextualized class identity of Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements.

In the concluding chapter, I sum up the preceding chapters and the significance of the present study. The focus is both on how Taiwanese and South Korean social movement actors interpreted developmental regimes and contextualized democracy and democratization and how national, popular, gender, and class identities of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements aligned and intersected. In the end, I show how democratic and identity processes are intertwined in Taiwan and South Korea.
Conclusion

Initially I have begun this project only with a few vague ideas of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements and democratization which were acquired from my readings. Interviews provided me with keen insights into and detailed knowledge on Taiwanese and South Korean social movements and democratic processes. While conducting the interviews with Taiwanese and South Korean activists and experts, I noticed that the same signifiers, such as citizen, democracy, democratization, woman, and worker, often stand for different signifieds, depending on what kind of society, time period, or political position they belong to. They showed me how generalized and universal values, ideas, and interests are contextualized through collective identity in the democratic processes in Taiwan and South Korea. Knowledge and insights attained from the interviews helped me draft and sharpen my research questions and clarify key concepts of this study. They served as a key guide for me to understand and interpret my other primary source, publications produced by social movement organizations and activists, and secondary sources. Based on these sources I have focused on collective identities of social movements to bring into relief their role in producing differences in understanding, discourses, and practices of democracy between Taiwan and South Korea.

In this concluding chapter I at first recapitulate my main arguments; briefly summarise the contribution of this study to the literature on social movements, collective identity, democratization, and comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea; and offer its implications. Let me reiterate the main arguments and findings of this study. Firstly, I
have argued that collective identity of social movements is a shared and negotiated meaning of collectivities that shapes them as a social force, empowers them, and serves as the basis of patterned practices and strategies. It is neither purely an outcome of biological essentialism or of structural conditions nor purely an artefact of discursive construction: it is a relational construct. The formation of social movement collective identity is a process in which social movement actors as articulators produce interpretations of structural conditions, link them to people’s past experiences, and thereby process those conditions and experiences into shared meanings of a community and actively reconstruct the envisioned community’s future.

In Taiwan, the developmental regime was constructed by the KMT party-state based on political and economic dual structures while the South Korean developmental regime was built by the military regime supported by the sword-won alliance. Before the Taiwanese Kaohsiung (1979) and the South Korean Kwangju (1980) incidents, the repression of the KMT party-state was perceived and asserted by Taiwanese opposition groups primarily in terms of provincial discrimination against local Taiwanese or generational conflicts between old political elites and new generation. In South Korea, opposition forces focused on defence or restoration of limited procedural democracy before the hyper-militarizing yushin autogolpe (1972) against the military dictator instead of overthrowing the military regime through popular protests. With the Kaohsiung and Kwangju incidents as triggering events, Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements, respectively, started to frame democratization as ethno-national conflict in the place of provincial discrimination and as the establishment of democracy of people instead of restoring democracy. The Taiwanese democratic movement actualized the
potential conditions through the formation of collective identity with ethno-national, institutional, and system-reforming features while its South Korean counterpart also actualized those macro conditions with the construction of collective identity with class, extra-institutional, and anti-systemic characteristics. Taiwanese *xiangtu* and South Korean *minjok* literatures provided different templates for counter discourses materialized by Taiwanese *dangwai* and South Korean *chaeya* movements, respectively. The present study showed that collective identity is neither a pure effect of economic and institutional structures nor a sole product of discursive practices of a submerged network of like-minded social groups or generational cohort; rather, it is a relational construct of structural conditions, temporal conjuncture, and identity work such that it involves an analysis of structure, interpretation of events, and desire for change in democratic processes.

Secondly, I have shown how differently Taiwanese and South Korean social movements contextualized democracy as a universal value through collective identities. The generalized idea of democracy was localized through their collective identities that embedded local culture and meanings and displayed interpreted imprints of their surrounding context, fitted to shared and imagined meanings of community. They therefore contextualized the general idea of democracy through democratization and accelerated and facilitated mobilization of local population for democracy. Macro conditions shaped by the developmental regimes were contextualized by meso-level actors through the formation and deployment of collective identities in the democratic processes. Taiwanese and South Korean social movements confronted developmental regimes as macro-conditions, where democracy as a universal value and ideal was
contextualized through the generation and distribution of particular symbols, meanings, and narratives by social movements. Their collective identities were the condensed expression of the contextualized universal value of democracy to bring forth democratization in Taiwan and South Korea. The Taiwanese consciousness and identity projected by the Taiwanese democratic movement accentuated the national sovereignty dimension of democracy that would bring together disjointed statehood and nationhood while minjung identity forged by the South Korean democratic movement highlighted the popular sovereignty dimension of democracy that would replace objectified export soldiers with subjective minjung. Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements responded to the hypo-politicizing operation of the Taiwanese KMT party-state—political displacement of opposition at the national level politics by tying them to the subnational politics—and the anti-politicizing operation of the South Korean military regime—neutralisation of politics by destabilising political institutions and blocking public access to them—with the construction of the ethno-national Taiwanese identity and the multi-class South Korean minjung identity. Taiwanese dangwai groups formed the DPP in 1986 to break the KMT’s monopoly of national politics and tried to incorporate social movements for partisan mobilization with Taiwanese consciousness as the alternative to hegemonic Chinese identity. The South Korean minjung movement formed a multi-class umbrella organization in 1985 and competed and cooperated with the opposition party to organize popular protests for the June Uprising in 1987. Democracy was contextualized and filtered through the collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements as seen in the major challenges for democratization, de-KMTization for national sovereignty by local Taiwanese and
demilitarization for popular sovereignty by South Korean minjung. The contextualized democracy shown in Taiwanese national and South Korean popular sovereignty is evident in the late 1980s with the rise of the Taiwanese national identity in the place of a Chinese identity and the South Korean simin identity substituting for the minjung identity. In the early 1990s, the embracing of the emerging Taiwanese identity constructed by the dangwai/DPP was accelerated with constitutional reform in favour of a new Taiwanese national identity and the full re-election of parliamentary bodies while in South Korea, the burgeoning social movement organizations designated themselves as simin movement organizations equipped with comprehensive agendas like quasi-political-party exercised huge public and political influence.

To further illustrate contextualization effects of collective identity, both Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements before the transition viewed women as human beings. Yet Taiwanese women’s movement emphasised women are endowed with individual and socio-political rights that are enjoyed by men, while its South Korean counterpart placed its emphasis more on collective and socio-economic rights that are oppressed by the developmental regime. After the transition Taiwanese women’s movement developed collective identity of woman as Taiwanese citizen based on gender identity that unifies women of diverse subjective positions whereas its South Korean counterpart formed collective identity of woman in general that homogenise women by eliminating their differences. The differences of Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements in their legislative activities and associational politics reveal how women’s identities and interests are differently understood and practiced in Taiwan and South Korea.
Thirdly, besides the contextualization of democracy, I have shown how Taiwanese and South Korean social movements responded to different stages of democratization through identity and memory work. In the face of changing democratic processes social movements repeatedly modified their collective identities through rewriting the contents of identity narratives to maintain their shared communities and shifted power balance. Macro structural conditions were processed into collective identities by Taiwanese and South Korean meso-level democratic movement actors through the reconstruction of different collective memories constituting key building blocks of identity narratives. Collective memories served not only to tighten the porous boundary through shaping community of shared memories, but also tailored to the different demands in pre-transitional, transitional, and stabilizing stages of democratization. Collective memories influenced mobilizing rationales (nation in general or subaltern classes in particular), logics of transition (peace or confrontation), and stabilizing factors (difference-conscious multi-culture or individual-centric civic culture).

In the pre-transition, the Taiwanese democratic movement retrieved colonial memories in pro- and post-colonial ways to forge the origin myth of ethno-national Taiwanese identity while its South Korean counterpart reinterpreted the peasant Revolt in the 19th century to generate the origin myth of subaltern subject. In transition, the Taiwanese democratic movement located the formative memory of Taiwanese identity at the 228 Uprising and claimed it for the truth, rehabilitation, and peace, whereas its South Korean counterpart contemporized the Kwangju Uprising as the formative memory of multi-class minjung and demanded the truth, punishment, and overthrow of the military regime. In the stabilizing period, the stigmatized and marginalized memories of
Taiwanese aborigines were reshaped to provide the new hegemonic Taiwanese identity with multicultural and difference-conscious features in contrast with the supposedly monocultural and homogeneous Chinese identity while the pre-transitional South Korean *minjung* identity was disremembered and marginalized by post-transitional *simin* movement through the construction of an individual and reform-oriented *simin* identity. The identity and memory work of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements constructed different collective identities with dissimilar sources of communities and different action dynamics then modified them in line with the shifting stages of the democratic transition.

Fourth, in addition to promoting democratization by forging and deploying counter-identity and thereby questioning the legitimacy of dominant official identity, I have argued that Taiwanese and South Korean social movements furthered democratization through collective identities that informed the definition of needs and desires of collectivities, the selection of means and ways to accomplish those needs and desires, and filtering their actions. Taiwanese *dangwai/DPP* reinforced Taiwanese consciousness in the process of democratic transition. It replaced its preceding slogan of anti-dictatorship with anti-coming-from-outside-regime (*wailai zhengquan*), intervened into diverse social movements to appropriate and channeled their claims into national and partisan identities against the KMT, and promoted electoral and institutional politics throughout democratic processes. South Korean social movement organizations with *minjung* identity formed multi-class organizations and subordinated their sectoral demands under the master frame of democratization. With the democratic transition, they soon converted to social movements with *simin* identity. Despite their issue-specificity, such as environment or
women, *simin* movement organizations behaved like quasi-party groups and pressured political parties from the extra-institutional arena. The collective identities of microactors of Taiwanese and South Korean social movement groups are embedded in their claims, organizational and contentious repertoires, gender or class politics, and alliance-building. Identity discourses of democratic, women’s, and labour movements in Taiwan and South Korea demonstrated subjective interpretations of macro structural conditions. Not only was democracy contextualized, but also gender and class were contextualized through collective identities. The definition and interpretation of higher strategical and lower practical gender or class interests were not dictated by an *a priori* normative order but were repeatedly changed and negotiated by shifting collective identities of social movements.

If it is considered, for instance, that Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements carried out struggles “for what the law offers” and for *minjung* constitution, union independence of the KMT and of South Korean capital, and partisan and anti-partisan politics, it becomes obvious that the workers’ needs, union movements, and legislative and electoral approaches were differently defined and articulated through their collective identities. They are temporally different within a country and spatially different between two countries. The pre-transitional Taiwanese labour movement, with its meagre class consciousness struggles for what the law offers and by the law, differs from the post-transitional movement led by SOE unions focused on anti-privatization campaigns in cooperation with the opposition party. In contrast, the South Korean labour movement struggled based on its heavy working-class consciousness for the establishment of the radical *Minjung* constitutions in the pre-transitional era and campaigned on the grounds
of the identity of workers as labour for wage increases and against the regime in the post-transitional era.

The self-claim of “new woman,” feminists, or Taiwanese women redefined women’s needs, politics, and actions that are different from those of old woman, good wives, or Chinese women. Likewise, the identity claim of working women, feminists, and woman in general by South Korean women’s movements reshaped women’s needs, gender politics, and actions unlike those of industrial soldiers, wise mothers, or particular women. The elites-led pre-transitional Taiwanese women’s movement concentrated on awareness raising independent of the democratic movement whereas its South Korean counterpart campaigned for working women in association with the minjung movement. The post-transitional Taiwanese women’s movement with homogeneous gender identity promoted women’s rights on their body, family, and public and political spheres in cooperation with political parties while its South Korean counterpart, with its collective identity of woman in general, attained similar achievements but on the grounds of a gender coalition with conservative women’s groups and other simin and labour movements. Collective self-understanding was embedded and influenced both how to define those demands and interests and how to achieve and realize their demands and interests.

Fifth, I have argued that the construction and maintenance of a collective identity is a relational process in multi-identity fields where a social movement constantly aligns and realigns with and de-aligns from other collective identities to amplify its influence. Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements generated and deployed shared definitions of communities for democratization. They increasingly prevailed in multi-
organisational fields over the course of the democratic processes and produced contextualized opportunities that provided favourable conditions for those aligned with the collective identities of democratic movements.

Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements promoted and extended their collective identities as the primary identity to reinforce the united front against the Taiwanese KMT party-state and the South Korean military regime, respectively, by muting or incorporating other collective identities in the pre-transitional era. The identity alignment and realignment between democratic and women’s and labour movements promoted women’s rights through their articulation with democratic rights and institutionalization in democratization processes; however, this identity alignment prioritized and inflated particular collective identities of each group as its primary and representative identity that downplayed and erased differences among women and workers and confronted challenges by groups with different identities.

With the democratization and the resultant more opened political and social conditions, Taiwanese and South Korean women’s and labour movements contextualized gender and labour rights by aligning their collective identities with those of democratic movements to promote women’s and labour citizenship. This alignment of collective identities, however, brought about conflictual effects on social movements. The conflicts between the hegemonic national and marginal identities stand behind the controversies between women’s movements with gender and sexual identities and between labour groups with the identities of worker as citizen and workers as people in Taiwan. In South Korea, women’s and labour movements that were directly or indirectly linked with the democratic movement were criticized by groups of women and workers of different
identities because of the latter’s exclusion. There is a problem of representability of women’s and labour movements, which aligned their collective identities with those of democratic movements, that contextualized the generalized idea of democracy through their collective identities in democratic processes.

Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements attained remarkably similar achievements in women’s rights through the construction and reconstruction of different collective identities despite significantly different institutional and ideological conditions at the end of the 20th century. Before the transition, the Taiwanese women’s movement constructed harmonious gender identity around professional and middle-class women and kept low profiles in order to preserve its autonomy from political forces while its South Korean counterpart forged working women’s identity and assumed high profile under the banner of the democratic minjung movement. With the democratic transition and stabilization, Taiwanese and South Korean women’s movements realigned their collective identities with those of democratic movements, which promoted women’s rights based on a homogenized gender identity and woman in general as the representative identity of different women. The Taiwanese women’s movement aligned autonomous gender identity with the new Taiwanese identity and promoted institutionalization of women’s rights through state-feminism; its South Korean counterpart adopted the new simin identity by detaching itself from the minjung movement for politics of engagement based on the reconfigured collective identity of woman in general that accelerated the institutionalization of women’s rights through the GM and gender coalitions, in particular with conservative women’s organizations. This homogenized institutionalization of women’s rights in the post-transitional era confronted
challenges by women’s movements of different collective identities from that aligned identity for it enforced the sameness of woman that lacked dialogical features recognizing group differences and fostering intergroup communication.

As with women’s movements, both Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements reached remarkable improvement in workers’ rights, including their union rights based on legislative reforms through the construction and reconstruction of different collective identities despite significantly different institutional and ideological conditions at the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The Taiwanese labour movement confronted with two dual structures unfavourable for constructing class-conscious collective action developed a collective identity, which could offset its weak autonomy and foster its associative capacity open to coalition. In contrast, South Korean labour movement formed under the sword-\textit{won} developmental alliance a class-conscious collective identity, which could offset its weak associative capacity and promote its autonomy. Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements acted as a midwife and a conduit for the emergence or re-emergence of Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements. They actively intervened into labour movements to mobilize workers against the KMT party-state and the military regime while Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements adopted and appropriated the collective identities of democratic movements to promote their social rights. With the rise of the new Taiwanese national identity, the Taiwanese independent labour movement highlighted non-classed national and civil identity independent of the KMT party-state while closely cooperating with the pro-independent DPP. In contrast, with the rise of the class-less \textit{simin} identity, the South Korean independent labour movement that inherited the class-centric \textit{minjung} identity reinforced working-class
identity independent of established politics while closely cooperating with the marginalized *minjung* movement. The representability of the Taiwanese and South Korean independent labour movements was limited by the inflated identities of Taiwanese workers of SOEs and South Korean workers of large *chaebol* corporations, for the interests of the absolute majority of Taiwanese and South Korean workers—such as those employed in private and service sectors, migrated from other countries, employed with hyper-flexible conditions—were sidelined by these independent labour movements. The representative collective identity or overextension of a particular identity is indifferent to in-group-differences and underrepresents agendas and interests of deprivileged groups.

The present study makes an important contribution to the literature on comparative studies on Taiwan and South Korea, social movements, democratization, and collective identity. It improves and extends knowledge of that literature: by providing the first comprehensive comparative study on democratization and collective identities of social movements in Taiwan and South Korea; by offering detailed understanding for the role of social movements in democratization through the analysis combining collective identities with democratic processes; by showing making, remaking, and unmaking of collective identities of social movements; and by clarifying contextualization effects of collective identity.

The present study has at least three implications for democracy, collective identity of social movements, and the comparison between Taiwan and South Korea. Firstly, institutional or democratic consolidation is not an autogenetic process but parallels with the formation of *demos*. Instead of exploring transitional changes from the beneath-
infrastructure, from the behind-previous-regime-type, from the above-elites, this study directly approaches the transitional changes from those who want to bring about changes. I have shown that social movements in Taiwan and South Korea constantly recomposed collective subjectivities to carve up a new democratic space.

Instead of using surveys and comparing institutional stability, the present dissertation sees democracy and the democratic processes of Taiwan and South Korea by using collective identity of social movements as a lens and a map, i.e. through which one sees the reality, with which one seeks the locus of the reality, and in which one grasps the contour of the reality. Certainly, comparing surveys and institutions like previous regime types offer useful insights based on pre-generalized or generalizable sets of data in which contexts and agency are often marginalized and expunged, however. The findings of measured data and the institutions compared regarding democracy may be misleading if the term democracy is differently understood and practiced in the studied cases. Privatization, to illustrate, can be understood as a powerful tool for and as a crucial process towards democracy in the state under the one-party rule while it may be perceived as reinforced re-authoritarianization in the state under authoritarian rule based on business oligopoly. Understanding themselves as “one people” or “the people” brings about different transitional dynamics and democratic contents.

The Taiwanese democratic movement constructed ethno-national Taiwanese identity that drove democratization into a negotiated process towards national sovereignty while its South Korean counterpart forged popular-class minjung identity that rendered popular sovereignty relevant in the democratic transition through a contentious popular mobilization. Social movements are, as usually defined, processes of collective
enterprises, solidary goals, sustained networks, and contentious actions, which are organized and revolve around collective identities. Democracy as a universal value and democratization as its realization were contextualized, i.e. localizing generalized and universal ideas through local culture and conjunctural meanings, by the construction of different collective identities by Taiwanese and South Korean social movements. Collective identities of social movements help us understand not only how Taiwanese and South Korean democracy and democratization accentuated different aspects, but also how those identities affected to the generation of similar legislative and institutional achievements despite institutional and ideological differences between Taiwan and South Korea.

Taiwanese and South Korean women's and labour movements attained similar achievements during the democratic processes. Women's movements in the two societies, which emerged before the establishment of democratic movements in the 1980s, achieved remarkable improvement in women’s rights of their body, within family, and in politics. Taiwanese and South Korean labour movements that emerged and re-emerged with the democratic movements attained significant advancement in wage increases, workweek reduction, and union rights (Y. Lee, 2011). These rights were achieved through infra- and inter-nationally different movement strategies and contentious politics. The Taiwanese women's movement performed cross-partisan politics while sustaining its organizational autonomy whereas its South Korean counterpart employed associational politics with democratic movement, often compromising its organizational autonomy. Taiwanese labour movement espoused partisan alliance with the DPP through its associational linkage instead of retaining its independence while its South Korean counterpart assumed
rather non-partisan independence for labour rights than compromising it at the cost of its political and organizational autonomy. Adopting and performing these strategies and politics is conditioned and framed by collective identities, which constrain and facilitate the selection of frames, venues, repertoires, and alliances. Let me summarize and reinforce my arguments by returning to the questions I raised in Chapter One. In the introduction, I argued that the present dissertation can answer a couple of crucial questions from an angle unlike those of economic structures and political institutions, using collective identity as a lens and a map.

The first question I raised was why Taiwanese social movements maintained friendly relations with political institutions whereas their South Korean counterparts competed with political parties. As I have argued in Chapters 1 and 2, collective identity is an ensemble of structural conditions, conjunctural meanings, and identity work of social movements. The trace of structural conditions of the developmental regimes is carried by, conjunctural meanings of democratization embraced by, and identity work of oppositional movements is formed into collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements. Taiwanese consciousness was forged by dangwai/DPP to counter hypo-politicization—politically displacing oppositions and their containment at the sub-national level of politics—of the "coming-from-outside" KMT and to advance democratic forces to the national level politics. The identity narrative of Taiwanese opposition forces facilitated them to seek the presence in established politics to end the KMT's monopoly of the national level politics. In contrast, South Korean democratic movement fashioned multi-class minjung identity that prioritized extra-institutional venues for political institutions were unstable and ineffective under the military regime.
The South Korean *minjung* movement established multi-class umbrella organizations for popular mobilization in the place of associative and electoral politics.

The other question was why the Taiwanese labour movement focused on party-union links while their South Korean counterparts emphasize their own political independence. A brief glance at their collective identities provides an answer. As seen in the preceding sections, the Taiwanese labour movement constructed a collective identity filled less with class consciousness than with ethno-national consciousness, which was open to association with other opposition forces. The ethno-national overtone of the collective identity of Taiwanese labour movement was reinforced in the 1990s with the defeats of militant unions followed by the expanded opening of institutional arenas and toward the mainland. This identity discourse facilitated identity alignment with the *dangwai/DPP* throughout the democratic processes. In the 1990s, the partisan alliance promoted the reform of the Labour Standard Law and the legitimation of independent union federations. In contrast, in the 1980s the South Korean labour movement formed class-conscious identity developed from the militant women's labour movement in the 1970s. It was reinforced with the 1987 GLS narrated as the birth moment of a single working class *ex post facto*. This class-conscious identity discourse was furthered in the 1990s with the rapid rise of *chaebols* though liberalization and with conscious efforts to foster solidary struggles for the establishment of an independent national union centre. In the absence of supportive political parties, the South Korean labour movement fostered militant unionism and adopted independent union politics instead of associative politics. The general strike from 1996 and 1997, initiated by the KCTU, revealed relatively
autonomous capacity of the labour movement to improve union rights and frustrate hyper-flexibilization of job protection.

Another question I have raised was why Taiwanese women’s movements, unlike their South Korean counterparts, were reserved towards alliance building with other social actors. Taiwanese women's movement started before the establishment of dangwai groups and gave them a wide berth to avoid repression by the KMT regime. The movement constructed a harmonious and homogeneous gender identity to maintain a low profile, its autonomy, and to achieve gender rights by pursuing cross-partisan politics. In the 1990s, the Taiwanese women's movement, with this gender identity, advanced women's rights despite its weak grassroots base through its cross-partisan politics that facilitated the revision or enactment of constitutional articles, women’s sovereign rights within the family and on their body against harassment and violence, and gender quotas. Unlike Taiwan, South Korean women's movement constituted the basis of the democratic movement. Minjung identity was reinforced through women's labour movement in the 1970s. South Korean women's movement in the 1980s developed an identity discourse of women as producers derived from its predecessor. It was deeply involved in the democratic minjung movement and promoted women's rights in cooperation with other social movements to overcome its weak presence in political institutions. The progressive women’s movement expanded through the identity discourse of woman in general the gender coalition that joined a coalition with the conservative women’s movement. This associational and partisan politics—in particular in the late 1990s with the first turnover in power by the opposition party with which the South Korean women’s movement maintained associational linkage in democratic processes—promoted revision and
enactment of the Framework Act on Women’s Development, of women’s rights on their body against violence, in the workplace, in child rearing and within the family, and for gender quotas.

Secondly, this study has showed that democracy, woman’s interests, and class consciousness are localized, historicized through collective identities. Democratic and identity processes are deeply entangled and mutually embedded in Taiwan and South Korea. Taiwanese and South Korean democratic movements produced different identity fields or context that influences and is influenced by collective identities of other social movements.

Collective identities and interests of collectivities are not fixed but subject to constant recomposition which is closely linked with contextualization effects of collective identity. Instead of seeking an immovable and fixed self, the exploration of collective identities of Taiwanese and South Korean social movements in the democratic processes makes moving and changing collective selves visible. They embodied a disembodied and generalized idea of democracy in changing democratization whereby collective identities served as an action system actualizing communities imagined into those experienceable. Before measuring maturity or stability of democracy and defining woman’s interests or class consciousness, what is to be interrogated beforehand is which democracy, women, and workers are at stake.

Thirdly, in addition to the role of collective identity in democracy and democratization, the present dissertation highlighted the shifting interidentity and inter-identity relations: the former implies the interactional relation between identities, such as the relations between national or popular identity with civil, gender, and class identity;
the latter refers to an intra-actional borderland, hybridized, or intersectional identity, such as Taiwanese women, Taiwanese workers, women as workers, woman as citizen, and labour with the nation. The interidentity relations between national, popular, gender, and class are neither purely mutually exclusive, nor conflictual, nor unilaterally exploitative. Further the inter- or infra-identity relations of social movements are not only unilaterally oppositional but also can be oppressive.

Identity boundaries are neither barriers nor walls that secure insiders within and prevent outsiders from entering. Boundaries of collective identities are moving processes in which shared meanings are generated, interpretive communities are formed, and identity discourses are disseminated. Collective identities are not fixed and tightly patrolled. Their contents, status, and relations with outsiders shift constantly, which entails changes of their bounded communities.

Collective identities that dominate formative moments of social changes or the peak of protest cycles organize interidentity relations often through hierarchical clustering like superordinate and subordinate identities or primary and secondary identities. Yet, this hierarchical organization is challenged, renegotiated, transformed, or even deconstructed for various reasons, such as limited space, changed opportunities, emergence of new mobilizing issues, and balance shifts between those identities. The interidentity relation shows the characteristics of Taiwanese and South Korean democratization with ethno-national and popular class overtones, respectively, and identity fields as a configuration in which the identity discourses of democratic movements interact with and intervene into those of women’s and labour movements. The inter-identity relation exposes the limits of the contextualized democratization, excluding groups at the periphery and
identity fields as an arena where women’s and labour movement with hegemonic identities intra-act with those identities unlike the hegemonic ones and challenged by those groups at the margin.

Social movements form collective identities out of diverse sources. There is no pure national, ethnic, popular, civil, gender, or class boundary in identity building. Collective identities of social movements involve in multi-identity fields inter-identity features that are formed through mimicry (aborigines as a nation like Taiwan’s Han Chinese), amalgamation (worker as citizen in Taiwan and women as workers in South Korea), juxtaposition (labour with the nation in South Korea), or transvaluation (sex workers in Taiwan). Interidentity and inter-identity relation is struck and embraced not because it is not easy to assign social and political issues to a single movement or derives from the assigned liminal and in-between position of a group with those identities but because social movements try to expand their existing space or to carve up a new one.

Fourthly, in this study I have focused on Taiwanese and South Korean democratic, women’s, and labour movements, their interaction with developmental regimes, and their making of themselves and of democracy. It shows the possibility to find patterned relations between collective identities of democratic movement and those of other social movements in Taiwan and South Korea. It opens up a new potential to examine and compare other Taiwanese and South Korean social movements. It may be interesting to compare other idea-based and group-based Taiwanese and South Korean social movements like environmental, human rights, and student movements.

Taiwanese environmental movement fostered partisan linkage with the dangwai/DPP with anti-KMT discourses and promoted electoral politics in the 1980s and 1990s while
its South Korean counterpart understood itself as a part of *minjung* movement and developed anti-capitalist discourses and popular protests. Student and human rights movements in Taiwan and South Korea show similar development in democratic processes. Analysis of their internal processes based on collective identities could facilitate to understand their effects on democracy and their shared discourses, symbols, networks, and repertories. If we find similar patterns of identity formation, deployment, and alignment, we may have a clearer picture of the interaction between the developmental regime, democratization, and social movement in Taiwan and South Korea.
Glossary

228 Incident (*ererba shijian*)

It was an incident occurred on 28 February, 1947. Thousands of local Taiwanese took to the streets in a protest against the violence of the police who arrested a female street vendor selling black market cigarettes. Protesters took her arrest and ill-treatments by the police as an opportunity to protest against the poor and harsh rule by the KMT. The then-Taiwan Governor Chen, Yi brought extra military forces from the mainland, and they massacred tens of thousands of civilians. The bloody suppression entered into the collective memory of local Taiwanese and constituted the historical moment that produced the ethnic conflicts between *benshengren* and *waishengren*. The memory of the 228 incident was repressed by the KMT party-state. Only in 1992 the then-president Lee, Teng-hui publically apologised the massacre.

*Benshengren and Waishengren*

*Benshengren* and *Waishengren* are one of ethnic categorisations of Chinese in Taiwan. *Benshengren* (people from the local province) or Taiwanese often refers to people from Taiwan or those who inhabited in Taiwan before the end of the WWII while *Waishengren* (people from outside the province) or mainlander stands for those who migrated from China to Taiwan after 1945. The two groups are not homogeneous. Benshengren consists of Fukien Chinese (migrating from the southern part of Fukien Province, especially near the city of Amoy) and Hakka Chinese (migrating also from the southern Fukien, mostly from Kwangtung). Fukien Chinese are most populous group in Taiwan and account for
70% of the population. They often call themselves benshengren and designate the Hakka Chinese (15%) as guest people (kejiaren). Nearly 1.5 million Chinese migrated to Taiwan with the KMT’s defeat in the Civil War from various provinces of the mainland. They were all called waishengren (14%). The relationship between Benshengren and Waishengren constituted the major social cleavage that became more conflictual with the democratic transition

**Chaebol**

Large South Korean conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG. They were intentionally nurtured by the South Korean military regimes and were their major partner of the developmental alliance.

**Chaeya**

Social forces composed of critical intellectuals, standing for democratization against the South Korean military regimes. It emerged in the late 1960s in the struggle against the then-president Park, Chung-hee’s attempt to amend the constitution in order to abolish the third-term limitation of presidency. They established in cooperation with opposition parties the Struggle Committee against the Constitutional Amendment for a Third-term Presidency. Chaeya initiated democratic movements and later promoted the development of minjung movement.

**Collective Identity**
Collective identity of social movements means shared and negotiated meaning of collectivities that shapes them as a social force, empowers them, and serves as the basis of patterned practices and strategies. It is a relational construct of spatial structures (structural environment), temporal conjunctures (democratic processes), and subjective enterprises (identity work).

**Contextualization**

It refers to a process where active inhabitants in an unfolding space of events localise generalized and universal ideas through local culture and conjunctural meanings.

**Dangwai**

A term designated to the opposition groups against the KMT. *Dangwai* literally means “outside the party.” The KMT under the Martial Law prohibited the foundation of any political party. Therefore, anti-KMT intellectuals built networks to cooperate for local and supplementary electoral campaigns. The group began to form since the mid-1970s and led democratic movement in Taiwan. The *dangwai* networks eventually developed into the DPP in 1986.

**DPP**

An abbreviation of the Democratic Progressive Party founded in 1986. Before its foundation, the DPP existed as a loose network with anti-KMT and the self-determination of Taiwanese. It was the first and major opposition party with island-wide network in the 1980s. The DPP is more or less associated with Taiwanese consciousness and Taiwan
independence. The DPP became the ruling party in 2000 and thereby ended the more than half-century’s KMT party-state rule in Taiwan. It lost the presidential election in 2008 but returned to the government through the landslide victory in the 2016 presidential and general elections.

**Fatung**

A word stands for orthodoxy or the rule by constitution. According to the 1947 Constitution, the KMT defines the CCP and its activities as rebels and claim that the KMT is the sole legitimate ruler of the mainland China and the island Taiwan. Fatung served as an excuse for the extension of the Temporary Provisions During the Period of Communist Rebellion (Temporary Provisions) and the Martial Law and for the limits of political and civil rights of Taiwan. Fatung system reduces Taiwan mere to a province that has no access to national politics.

**Hypo-politicization**

It stands for the displacement of Taiwanese political opponents from national politics by assigning them only a subnational political space.

**KMT**

An abbreviation of the Chinese Nationalist Party. Sun, Yat-sen founded the Society for Regenerating China in 1894 in Hswaii. The Society is claimed to be the embryo of the KMT. It was claimed to be founded in 1894 by Sun, Yat-sen. The KMT was officially established in 1912 and changed its name from the Chinese Revolutionary Party to the
Nationalist Party in 1919. The KMT initially pursued bourgeois nationalist revolution before the leadership was changed to Chiang, Kai-shek after Sun’s death in 1925. Chiang, Kai-shek reoriented the KMT towards right-wing anti-communist party. After its defeat in the Chinese Civil War, the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949. The KMT was ruling party of the mainland between 1928 and 1949 and of Taiwan between 1945 and 2000.

**Laoban**

Boss or an independent owner of a small- and medium-sized private enterprise in Taiwan. Laoban is the agency of the Taiwanese export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). The reproduction of EOI development is predicated upon the subcontracting networks that produced or is produced by laoban including wana-be and would-be bosses along those unfolded chains of subcontracts. Wage works working for laoban is called heishou, literally meaning black or dirty hand. Heishou endure low wages and poor working conditions to learn skills, collect resources for their future workshops, and eventually to leap up to laoban. This spin-off phenomena are often described as an obstacle for the formation of working class consciousness.

**Minjung and simin**

A radical collective identity formed by democratic movements in the 1980s. It literally means people and mass. Originally, it refers to ordinary people but since the 1970s it gradually indicated those who politically repressed, economically exploited, and socially alienated subaltern groups. After the Kwangju Uprising in 1980 minjung stands for the radical multi-class subjectivity against the developmental regime and for socio-economic
democracy. Yet, after democratization, minjung and minjung movement were
deconstructed and marginalised by new middle-class led simin (burgher, literally city and
mass) movements. Simin is the posttransitional collective identity of South Korean social
movements. It is associated with the subjectivity of active individuals for social reform
and of which venue is no longer limited to extraparliamentary one but extended to the
parliamentary.

Sanminzhuyi (Sanminism)
Core tenets of Sun, Yat-sen’s idea and the official doctrine of the KMT and the ROC. It
is composed of three principles: nationalism, democratic rights, and people’s livelihood.
KMT’s saminism is only one version of the many.

Shengji (provincial origin) and zuqun (ethnic groups)
Provincial differences or conflicts (shengji maodun) between benshengren (people from
the local province) or Taiwanese and waishengren (people from outside the province) or
mainlander was a serious issue for democratization for national politics was dominated
by waishengren. This discriminative practice began to be termed ethnic conflicts and
politicalised by opposition movements in the 1980s. Since the lift of the Martial Law
(1987) zuqun was appropriated by native Taiwanese scholars and dangwai to signify that
there are ethnic differences even within Chinese—composed of mainlanders
(waishengren) and two local Taiwanese groups, Hoklos and Hakkas—in Taiwan.

Xunzheng
An intermediary government that is, according to Sun, Yat-sen, located between military and constitutional government. People are considered to be politically immature and to be educated and led by the revolutionary party in xunzheng as a preparation phase for the full constitutional government. The KMT justified its authoritarian rule based on xunzheng.

**Yushin regime**

The South Korean autogolpe led by the then-president Park, Chung-hee in October 1972. *yushin* literally refers to restoration. It was borrowed from the Japanese Meiji Restoration. With the *yushin* regime, Park practically gave up hitherto quasi-civilisation of the military rule and drove the society into a quasi-war state. He dissolved the National Assembly, declared the martial law, and announced the *yushin* constitution. According to the *yushin* constitution the president was given unlimited power for lifetime without being checked by other institutions: the president was elected by the National Conference for Unification (NCU) instead of being directly elected by the people and its chair was presided by the president; constitutional amendments proposed by the National assembly were to be approved by the NCU; the tenure limitation of the presidency was lifted; and the president was entitled to appoint one third of the National Assembly, to dissolve it, and to declare emergency measures.
# Historical Chronology

**South Korean and Taiwanese Political and Social Movements’ Events (1945-2000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum of the Allies, end of World War II, and liberation of Korea</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Allies award control of Taiwan to China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Establishment of Taiwan Provincial Women's Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Rebellion broke out against the misrule of the KMT. Tens of thousands of Taiwanese were killed (228 incident). Measures for Adjusting Labour Disputes limiting strikes and enforcing compulsory arbitration</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Rebellion broke out against the misrule of the KMT. Tens of thousands of Taiwanese were killed (228 incident). Measures for Adjusting Labour Disputes limiting strikes and enforcing compulsory arbitration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>The establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Workers’ Welfare Fund Law revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Martial law. KMT defeated in the Chinese civil war and evacuated to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1953</td>
<td>The Korean War</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Establishment of Chinese Women's Anti-Aggression League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event/Action</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event/Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Establishment of Taiwan Provincial Assembly</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Establishment of KMT’s Women's Working Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Trade Union Act</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Establishement of KMT’s Women’s Working Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Korea Church Women United</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Labor Insurance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Establishment of Korean National Council of Women (KNCW)</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Arrestment of <em>Free China Fortnightly</em> publisher Lei, Chen and his colleagues because of their attempt to found a political party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>April Revolution against president Rhee, Syngman’s rigged election</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Garrison decree issued in the Seoul area to repress student demonstration against South Korea-Japan Normalisation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Employment Security Act</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Military coup led by the general Park, Chung-Hee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Park elected as president</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Park elected as president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Martial law in Seoul area to repress student demonstration against South Korea-Japan talks for the normalization of relations</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Martial law in Seoul area to repress student demonstration against South Korea-Japan Normalisation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>South Korea-Japan Normalisation Treaty signed</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Export processing zone in Kaohsiung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1968 | Charter for National Education issued                                | 1969 | Demonstrations against the revision of the constitution for a Third-term Presidency  
Establishment of the Struggle Committee against the Constitutional Amendment for a Third-term Presidency  
Constitutional Amendment passed  
First supplementary elections for seats in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan. |
| 1970 | Chun, Tae-il, South Korean garment worker self-immolated against horrible working conditions in sweatshops and for observance of Labour Standard Law | 1971 | President Park reelected with a narrow margin  
Martial law in the Seoul area  
The state of national emergency declared  
Special Act for National Security limiting collective bargaining and industrial action  
ROC expelled from the UN |
| 1972 | New Village Movement launched  
Emergence of yushin regime | 1972 | Elections for supplementary members of National Assembly and Legislative Yuan, and for Provincial Assembly members and municipal executives  
Chinag, Ching-kou becomes premier  
Lu, Hsiu-lien started postwar women's movement in Taiwan. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Lu, Hsiu-lien’s New Feminism published</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Presidential Emergency Decrees Number 1, 2, 3, and 4 issued</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Presidential Emergency Decree Number 9 issued</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Declaration of Democratic National Salvation issued by chaeya group</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Massive student demonstrations for constitutional reform Family Law revised</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Dangwai group’s participation in Provincial Assembly elections and municipal executive election Chungli riots against allegedly ballot-rigging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>large student demonstrations in Seoul against the president Park Reelection of President Park by National Conference for Unification (NCU)</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Chiang Ching-kuo elected as president US’ derecognition of the ROC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Series of massive women workers’ strikes and female workers of the YH occupied the headquarters of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) Mass riots in Southern Busan and Masan cities Assassination of the President Park, Chung-hee Proclamation of a nationwide martial law</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Anti-KMT riot supported by Formosa magazine in Kaohsiung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Military coup led by the General Chun, Doo-hwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large student demonstrations in big cities including Seoul and Pusan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kwangju Uprising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Chun, Doo-hwan inaugurated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lu, Hsiu-lien sentenced to long prison term due to her involvement in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Kaohsiung incident</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Industrial Safety and Health Act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Feminist magazine <em>Awakening</em> launched</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective Agreement Law revised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Police withdrawn from university campuses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of Association for Women's Equality and Friendship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Korean Women's Development Institute (KWDI) by the government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of Youth Corps for the Democratization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Ruling Democratic Justice Party’s headquarters occupied by students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of Alternative Culture (feminist organization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of Women's Hotline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of Korean Council for Labor Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lee, Teng-hui became vice president of the ROC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eugenic Protection Law Revised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Taiwan Labor Legal Aid Association (later renamed as</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan Labor Front [TLF])</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor Standards law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1985 | General elections for the National Assembly  
Three People's Struggle Committee (nation, people, and democracy) formed by radical student activists  
Foundation of the Coalition for Democratic Reunification and the People's Movement.  
Daewoo Motors workers' strike, a first strike in chaebol-owned factories  
U.S. building in Seoul occupied by students claiming for public hearings on Kwangju  
First inter-factory solidary and political strikes in Guro area in Seoul since the Korean War |
| 1986 | Minimum Wage Act  
Mass demonstration in Incheon filled with slogans “anti-America,” “anti-imperialism,” and “down with dictatorship.” |
| 1986 | DPP founded  
Supplementary elections to Legislative Yuan and National Assembly  
Establishment of Warm Life Association for Women |
| 1987 | Establishment of Korean National Council of Women (KNCW), an umbrella organization of democratic women’s movements  
Foundation of Korean Women Workers Association (KWWA)  
June Uprising |
| 1987 | Martial law lifted  
Travel to mainland permitted  
Establishment of Awakening Foundation  
Equal Employment Bill drafted and proposed by women’s organisations  
Establishment of Council of Labor Affairs in government |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Great Labour Struggles between July and September</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Mass demonstration against inhuman and illegal trading of children under 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender-Equality Employment Law</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chiang Ching-kuo died and succeeded by Lee, Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Passage of a new constitution and first direct presidential election since yushin regime (1972-1979) held</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lee, Teng-hui elected as chairman of the KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roh, Tae-woo from the ruling party elected as president</td>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Garden of Hope Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strike by Taoyuan transport workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor Disputes Settlement Act revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Militant protests by famers against U.S. imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>National Coalition for a People's Democratic Movement formed</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Establishment of Homemakers1 Union and Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationwide independent teachers union formed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Law on the Organization of Civic Groups passed that permits new political parties and organisations to form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Korean Council of National Trade Unions to prepare for independent federation of democratic labor unions</td>
<td></td>
<td>DPP won 35% of votes in the national and local elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revision of the Labor Standards Act</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Violent student movement and labor strikes at Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) and Hyundai Heavy Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ)</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Alliance of Trade Unions (NATU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of Labor Rights Association (LRA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Workers’ Party (WP, laodongdang)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strike at the Far Eastern Textile Company crushed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Lee, Teng-hui elected as president of the ROC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Students’ occupation of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (Wild Lily student movement) and their meeting with the new president Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Affairs Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of Women zhi jian (Between Us), first lesbian organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First official report on the 228 incident</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of Production Line of Women Workers' Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Merger of the opposition Unification National Party and the ruling New Korea Party as the Unification National Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>First full Legislative Yuan election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Law on Sexual Violence against Women</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan Garrison Command abolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Young-sam elected as first civilian president</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Foundation of Workers’ Legislating Action Committee (CALL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Establishment of Korean Council of Trade Union Representatives</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Establishment of Women’s Studies Association of Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment Insurance Act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Employment Security Act (ESA) revised</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Foundation of Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women's Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of Korean Council of Citizens’ Movements</td>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Commission on the Promotion of Women’s Rights (CPWR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Committee on Women’s Affairs in the National Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td>in Taipei by mayor Chen, Shui-bian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation of People’s Solidarity for People’s Democracy (PSPD)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tenth Amendment to the Constitution (promotion of gender equality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Health Insurance Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Foundation of Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Missile crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment Insurance Act (EIA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lee, Teng-hui’s apology for victims of the 228 incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Law on Kwangju Uprising</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention of Child and Youth Prostitution Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First election for local autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Framework Act on Women’s Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Trial against former presidents, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Lee, Teng-hui elected as president in first direct, popular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General strike against new neoliberal labor law</td>
<td></td>
<td>presidential election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Feminist activist and Director of the Department of Women’s Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of the DPP, Peng Wan-Ru killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Financial crisis</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>28 February declared as a national holiday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Act on Protecting Dispatched Workers (APDW)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Family Section of the Civil Code revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of President's Special Committee on Women's Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention of Domestic Violence Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Foundation of Korean Women’s Trade Union (KWTU)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Criminal Law on Rape revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective of Sex Workers and Supporters (ririchun, COSWAS) founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Establishment of Civil Action for the 2000 General Election (CAGE) against corrupt politicians</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Establishment of TCTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Democratic Labor Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chen Shui-bian elected first non-KMT president and the pioneer of Taiwanese women’s movement Lu, Hsiu-lien became vice president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonprofit Organization Support Law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Law revised and gender quota system recommended</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Prospect (I). Seoul: Korean Women's Development Institute.

Cai, Y.-r. (2003). Huang Xin Jie yu zhan hou Taiwan minzhu yundong (Huang Xinjie and the Postwar Democratic Movement in Taiwan). (MA), Tunghai University, Taichung.


Chang, B. J. (2007). Gouying shiye gonghui zuzhi biange zhi yanjiu: yi Taiwan shiyou gonghui wei li (The study of organization changes of nations enterprises labor union: A case study of Petroleum Association of Taiwan). (MA), Chung Hwa University, Hsinchu.


Chang, M.-k. (2011). Taiwan zhengzhi minzhu hua yu "gongminshehui" de fazhan (Taiwan's political democratisation and development of "civil society"). In Y.-h. Chu (Ed.), Taiwan minzhu zhuangxing de jingyan yu qishi (Taiwan's Democratic Transition: Experience and Inspiration) (pp. 78-124). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.


Chao, Y.-m. (1989). Local Politics on Taiwan: Continuity and Change. Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle, 43-68.


Chen, H.-h. (2000). Guanyu minjindang shidai Taiwan gongyun de yixie xiangfa (Some Thoughts about Taiwan's Labour movement in the DPP era). *Zuoyi (The Left)*(6), 1-4.


Chen, S.-x. (2013). Ba ling jiu ling erqian yiji zhiqian he zhihou (80s, 90s, 2000s, and before and after). *Sixiang (Reflexion), 22*, 205-248.


Chen, Y. (1985). Xiangzhe geng kuanguang de lishi shiye (Toward a broader historical vision) *Taiwan yishi lunzhan xuanji (The Selection of the Essays on Taiwanese Complex and Chinese Complex)* (pp. 31-37): Taiwan Publishig Co.

Chen, Y.-h. (1987). Weishenme tuidong "ererba heping ri" cujin gongzuo? (Why do we promote the "February 28 Peace Day"?). *Taiwan Renquan (Taiwan Human Rights)* (8), 3-4.


Chiu, Y. (2011b). Zizhu gongyun zuzhi celue de lishi juxian (The Historical Limitation of the Organisational Strategy of Independent Labour Movement). In M.-s. Ho & X.-x. Lin (Eds.), *Shehui yundong de niandai: Wanjin ershi nianlai de Taiwan xingdong zhuyi (Era of social movements: Taiwan's activism in recent two decades)* (pp. 81-125). Taipei: Qunxue.


Chu, Y.-h. (1994b). Social protests and political democratization in Taiwan. In M. A. Rubinstein (Ed.), *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present* (pp. 99-113).


Dai, G.-h. (1985). Yanjiu Taiwan shi jingyan tan (Research on the experience of Taiwan history) *Taiwan lishi yishi wenti (On the Consciousness of Taiwan History)* (pp. 99-117): Taiwan Publishig Co.


Ding, Y.-y. (1994). Wei jieji zhengdang cuisheng (For the foundation of the working-class party). *Laodongzhe*(70), 3-5.

Ding, Y.-y. (1995). Zhe chang shengyan meiyou laogong de weizi (There is no place for workers in this feast). *Laodongzhe*(75), 3-5.
Ding, Y.-y., & Chiu, Y. (1994). Laogong yundong de shehuihua, zhengzhihua ji qita: guanyu Taiwan dangqian jieji yundong de yixie taolun (The socialization and the politicization of the labor movement, and others: Some Discussions on Taiwan's Current Class Movement). Yebaihe tongxun(6), 12-13.


Fan, Q. (2010). Taiwan josei undo no rekishi o furikaetsute (Looking back on the history of Taiwanese women's movement). In A. Nomura & S. Narita (Eds.), *Taiwan josei kenkyu no chosen (Challenge to Taiwan Women's Research)* (pp. 127-154): Jinbunshoin.


Gao, Y.-g. (1983). Goto Shinpei: Taiwan xiandaihua de dianji zhe (Goto Shinpei: the founder of Taiwan's modernization). *Shenggen*(8), 44-49.


Supporting Association for Taiwan Laborers). *Laodongzhe*(1).


Hsieh, S.-C. (1994). From shanbao to yuanzhumin: Taiwan aborigines in transition. In M. A. Rubinstein (Ed.), The Other Taiwan : 1945 to the present (pp. 404-419): M.E. Sharpe.


Huang, C.-L. (1999). Labor militancy and the neo-mercantilist development experience: South Korea and Taiwan in comparison: University of Chicago, Dept. of Political


Huang, L.-h. (2005). *Taiwan yuanzhuminzu yun dong de guo hui lu xian (Taiwan Indigenous Movement's Parliamentary Approach)*. (MA), National Chengchi University.


Jacobs, J. B. (1980). Local politics in a rural Chinese cultural setting: a field study of Mazu Township, Taiwan. Canberra, Australia: Contemporary China Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.


Jessop, B. (1990). *State theory: putting the Capitalist state in its place*. University Park,
Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.


Kang, N.-h. (1975). Ruhe cujin Taiwan de hexie (How to Promote Taiwan’s Harmony). *Taiwan Zhenglun (Taiwan Political Review)* (1), 4-6.


KFEM. (1993). Changlibseon-eonmun (Founding statement) [Press release]


Ku, Y.-l. (1997). Taiwan fuyun zuzhi zhong xingyu zhengzhi zhi zhuanbian (The transformation of sexual politics in women's movement organizations in Taiwan), Si yu yan (Thoughts and Words), 35(1), 87-118.


KWAU. (1989). Gajogbeob gaejeong-eul wihan gyeol-uimun (Resolution for the revision of the family law) [Press release]

KWAU. (1990). 4cha Jeong-gichonghoe bogoseo (Report to the fourth regular general meeting). Retrieved from
KWAU. (1991a). 5cha Jeong-gichonghoe bogoseo (Report to the fifth regular general meeting). Retrieved from


KWAU. (1992a). 6cha Jeong-gichonghoe bogoseo (Report to the sixth regular general meeting). Retrieved from


Laodongzhe. (1987c). Loazhihui juban laogong shengyuan dahui, jiemu neirong xinying (The LSATL held labour support meeting, the content of the programme was novel). Laodongzhe(14), 8.


Lee, Y. (2011). *Militants or partisans: Labor unions and democratic politics in Korea and*


Li, H.-f. (1987). *Taiwan minzhu yundong sishi nian (Forty Years of Taiwanese Democratic Movement)*. Taipei.


Liao, C.-H. (2016). *Xinchialixi yu bashi niandai Taiwan minzhu yundong (New Tide Faction and Taiwan Democratization in 1980s)*. (MA), National Taiwan University, Taipei.


de hudong guanxi (On the Subtle Interaction between Trade Unions and Political Parties). Laodongzhe(20), 1.


Lin, F.-M. (2008). Women’s Organizations and the Changing State/Society Relationship: Resistance, Co-option by the State, or Partnership? Taiwan in Comparative Perspective, 2, 47-64.


Minjunochong. (1996b, May. 01). 'Nosagwangye gaehyeog' ajig-eun bakkwingeos eobsda (Labor-management relationship reforms have not changed yet). *Minjunochong gigwanji chang-ganjunbiho (Preparation for publication of KCTU's organ)*, p. 3.

Minjunochong. (1997). 15dae daeseon-e minjugaehyeoghubo naegilo (Decided to field a democratic reform candidate in the 15th presidential election) [Press release]


Ning, Y.-b. (1991). *Taiwan de xin fandui yundong: xin minzhu zhi lu (Taiwan's New
Opposition Movement - The Road to New Democracy). Taipei: Tangshan.


Shih, M.-h. (1985). Taiwan yishi lunzhan xuanji (The Selection of the Essayes on Taiwanese Complex and Chinese Complex): Taiwan Publishig Co.


Shu, W. (2011). Taiwan "shehui yundong yanjiu" de lishi kaocha: yi xuewei lunwen ji xiangguan zhu zuowei hexin de chubu changshi (Historical survey on Taiwanese "social movements": dissertations and associated works as the core of the initial attempt). In M.-s. Ho & X.-x. Lin (Eds.), *Shehui yundong de niandai: Wanjin ershi nianlai de Taiwan xingdong zhuyi (Era of social movements: Taiwan's activism in recent two decades)* (pp. 449-519). Taipei: Qunxue.


Essays in cultural politics (pp. 197-221): Routledge.


Sun, Y.-s. (1986b). Zhongguo guomindang di yi yici quanguo daibiao da hui kaimu ce (The opening address for the first national congress of the KMT) Sun Zhong Shan Xuanji (Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen) (Vol. 9, pp. 95-99): Zhonghuashufang.


TAHR. (1987d). Wo men keyi yuanliang, que buke wu jiaodai: ererba shijian xueshu suotan hui (We can forgive but cannot do it without confession: the Academic symposium on the 228 incident). *Taiwan Renquan (Taiwan Human Rights)* (8), 5-34.


Tien, H.-m. (1996). Elections and Taiwan’s democratic development. In H.-m. Tien (Ed.), *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*.


Tsai, Y.-J. (2013). *Chengwei zuzhi zhe: Gongyun zuzhi zhe de zhiya yu yundong shijian (Becoming Organizers: Careers and Praxis of Labor Movement Organizers)*. (MA), National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung.


Wang, F.-c. (2008b). Zuqun zhengzhi yiti zai Taiwan minjuhua zhuanxing zhong de juese (The Role of Ethnic political issue in Taiwan's democratic transition). Taiwan Democracy Quarterly, 5(2), 89-140.


Wang, T. (1977). Shi "xianshi zhuyi" wenxue, bushi "xiangtu wenxue" (It is "Realism," not "xiangtu literature") Xianrenzhang zazhi, 1(2), 55-73.


Wang, Y.-g. (1999). Taiwan funu jiefang yundong shi (The History of Women's Liberation Movements in Taiwan). Taipei: Juliu.

Wang, Z. (1992). Lun Taiwan xiangtu wenxue lunzhan de qiying (On the causes of Taiwan


meeting for Labour Day) [Press release]

Workers' Welfare Association. (1986). 86. imgeum-insangtujaeng gyeong-gwajeongli
(Report on the 1986 wage increase struggles). Minju Nodong (Democratic Labour), 4-8.

nodongjau sori (The voice of the workers), 7.

Workers' Welfare Association. (1987b). Nodong-undong-ui baljeon-eul wihayeoo (For the

Wright, T. (2001). The perils of protest: State repression and student activism in China and
Taiwan. In K. J. O'Brien (Ed.), Harvard University Press (pp. 26-53): University of
Hawaii Press.

Wu, C.-l. (2001). Taiwan's local factions and American political machines in comparative

Social Protests in the Political Transition period: the 1980s in Taiwan). (MA),
National Taiwan University.

Wu, J.-M. (2002). Jiechu ke lao sai wei zi de mo zhoun fenxi dangqian shehui gaiye yundong
de kunjing (Disenchanting of Clausewitz's charm: analysis of the current dilemma
of the social reform movements). Taiwanese Sociology, 4, 159-198.

Wu, N. (1991). Taiwan jingji fazhan de ruogan wenti (A few questions on Taiwanese
Economic Developmen). In E. K. Chen, J. F. Williams, & Y.-s. Huang (Eds.),
Taiwan: Economy, society and history (pp. 40-52): Centre of Asian Studies,
University of Hong Kong.

Wu, N.-t. (1987). The politics of a regime patronage system: mobilization and control
within and authoritarian regime. University of Chicago.

National Trauma: Historical Memory of the February 28 Incident). Sxiang, 8, 39-70.

politics, and private enterprises in the making of Taiwan's economy, 1950-1985

Wu, Z.-l. (1978). Minzhu xuanju zhong de minzhu can hui ("Democracy Dinner Meetings"

is the state? Who is the people? A preliminary observation of the Keelung incident).
Wuo, Y.-I. (2010). *Yundong zai tafang: yige jijin zhishi fenzi de gongyun zizhuan* (Social movement is elsewhere: an autobiography of a radical intellectual in Taiwan labor movement). (PhD), The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong.


Yang, W.-z. (2004). Xuan hou Taiwan zuoyi de yaowu: Jianli gongren jieji de zhengzhi fanduipai (The priority of Taiwan's left-wing after the election: the establishment of a working-class political opposition). *Hongyanshu*(2).


Yao, J.-w. (1975). 186 bi 1 chayi....Gao pu kao hai yao lun sheng ji ma? (186:1....civil service test still to be discussed?). *Taiwan Zhenglun* (Taiwan Political Review)(2), 14-21.


Yeh, S. (1977). Taiwan Xiangtu wenxueshi daolun (Introduction to the History of Taiwan's Native SoilLiterature). *Xiachao, 2*(14), 68-75.


Appendix

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS AND SITE OBSERVATIONS

South Korea

I conducted 17 in-depth interviews in South Korea. The participants consisted of four groups: women’s movement (8, incl. women’s labour movement); labour movement (8); activist-turned-politician (3); and social movement expert (1). Each interview took one to two hours. The majority of the participants were personally contacted and recruited. Four of the participants were recruited by the snowballing method but personally contacted. All participants were involved in social movements since 1980s or 1990s, except for two people who have been active in labour movement since the late 1990s and after the 2000. They were interviewed due to how their cases could illustrate the currently acute but deep-rooted dual structure or polarisation of the labour market, which demonstrates the presence of the plural or multiple identities within the once homogeneous workers.

In the early stage, I attempted to closely adhere to my pre-made interview questions and guidelines. Over the course of the field research, I revised my interview tactics so that they were less structured and more interactive (a more open-ended form) than that of the early stage (a more semi-structured form). I let the interviewees express their views more freely. By changing my interview tactics, I wished to take the voices of the field and not to impose my pre-made propositional frame upon the participants.
The interviews involved various components: conceptual clarification and elaboration of cases (like democracy and transition); theory elaboration (like collective identities); and life histories. The interviews provided very useful knowledge and insights that were initially not well spelled out and clearly thematised during my drafting dissertation proposal: the limit of the 1987 transition and its relation to SMs; the question of representation in labour movement; the interactive process between industrial production and social reproduction and its relationship with two SMs; the infra- and inter-movement dynamics and changes; the structural complexity and cultural constructedness of the intersectionality and the (im)possibility of transversal politics; and the changes and/or diversifications of the collective cultural goods (narrativisation; memorialisation; and identity-formation) and the structural changes.

Table 1. In-depth Interviews in South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Clss.*</th>
<th>Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choi, Han-yong</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>Director of the organizing bureau of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choi, Sun-yong</td>
<td>ATP, WLM</td>
<td>Former chairperson of YH trade union, Former member of the National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan, Byeng-ho</td>
<td>ATP, LM</td>
<td>Former chairperson of the National Council of Trade Unions (NCTU) and the KCTU, Former member of the National Assembly, Chairperson of the Labor Education Center for Equal Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwang, Hyun-sook</td>
<td>WLM</td>
<td>Former chairperson of the Seoul chapter of the Korean Women Workers Association (KWWA), Chairperson of the Seoul working mothers’ support center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeong, Moon Ja</td>
<td>WM, WLM</td>
<td>Chairperson of the KWWA, Chairperson of Korean Women Association United (KWAU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim, Dong-Choon</td>
<td>SM expert</td>
<td>Professor at the Sungkonghoe University, Chairperson of the Democracy and Social Movements Institute (DaSM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim, Gyeng-yong</td>
<td>WM</td>
<td>Chairperson of the Geyngnam women’s association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim, Jeong-woo</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>The former head of the Ssangyong Motors labor union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kim, Jin Suk</td>
<td>LM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Lee, Nam-sin</td>
<td>LM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lee, Sang Hak</td>
<td>LM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Na, Ji-hyun</td>
<td>WLM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>NamYun, In-sun</td>
<td>ATP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WLM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>ParkBong, Chong-suk</td>
<td>WM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Park, Gae Hyun</td>
<td>LM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Park, Sunae</td>
<td>WLM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Woo, Moon-Sook</td>
<td>LM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* LM stands for labour movement, WM for women’s movement, WLM for women’s labour movement, and ATP for Activist-turned-politician

1. FKTU was formed in 1960 after the 5.16 military coup. Before the foundation of the KCTU it served as the only national trade union and was heavily criticised by workers for its incompetence and management-friendly attitude.

2. YH trade union was one of the leading trade unions representing 1970s women’s labour movement in South Korea. YH workers occupied headquarter of the opposition party in 1979 and one YH workers was killed by police’s disbanding operation, which led to the military regime crisis.

3. KWWA was founded in Mar. 1987, right before the democratic transition. It is the product of the joint efforts of the leaders of 1970s women’s labour movement and women student-turned-workers.

4. KWAU was launched in 1987, right before the democratic transition. It represents the democratic and liberal women’s movement.

5. Kim, Jin-suk climbed up in a ship-building crane Nr. 85 and protested for more than 300 days against massive layoffs under the name of the structural adjustment by Hanjin corporation. Her struggle attracted national and international attentions. South Korean citizens organised the “Bus of Hope” in support of her protest and figures like Noam Chomsky wrote a supporting letter to her and her supporters.

6. The Eland Workers Union was pioneering in that precarious workers gained their full membership in the trade union. The Eland union led over 500 days long strike against the massive dismissal of the precarious workers.
7. The KCTU was launched in Nov. 1995 as a leading force for the independent trade union movement legalised in 2000.

8. KWTU was established in Aug. 1999 in response to the rapid and wide-spread business practices of the female-first layoffs since the 1997 “East Asian Financial Crisis.” It has ten branches and 7,000 members (2009).

8. The Korean Womenlink was established in 1987, right before the democratic transition. It is often said that in the democratic and progressive women’s movements, KWWA represent the women workers while the Korean Womenlink does middle-class women.

9. Chun, Tae-il was a worker who did self-immolation while protesting the harsh working conditions in the Seoul Peace Market. His act moved and motivated numerous workers and students and had a significant effect on the rebirth of the South Korean labour movement.

Table 2. Site observations in South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Organised by</th>
<th>Time &amp; place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The National Care Workers' Festival</td>
<td>KWWA / KWTU /Korea Care Work Cooperative</td>
<td>18. Oct.2014 Guanghwamun Plaza</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taiwan

In Taiwan I conducted 20 in-depth interviews. The participants were comprised of four groups: women’s movement (8 including three activists-turned-to-politicians); labour movement (10 including one activist-turned-to-politician); activist-turned-politician (3); and social movement expert (2). Each interview had a length of approximately one and a half hours. Most participants were personally contacted and recruited.

The interviews were conducted in the open-ended format, allowing the participants to express their opinions more freely than in the structured and semi-structured interviews. The common interview questions were primarily limited to those on: their understanding of democratic movement; the role of social movements in democratisation;
the effects of collective identity on social movements; and the inter-movement relationship. Compared to the interviews with the South Korean participants, I asked the Taiwanese participants to provide more biographical pieces of information of them, in order to gain more grounded and contextualised information.

The interviews involved various components: conceptual clarification and elaboration of cases (like democracy and transition); theory elaboration (such as collective identities); life histories; particularity of the movements; and comparison with South Korean social movements. The interviews provided me with very useful information of the society, grounded and contextualise knowledge that is unattainable through readings, and native insights which guided my vague knowledge towards the living reality: the ethnic cleavage and construction of collective identity; the particularity of each social movement; the overlapped and overdetermined processes of democratisation (with re-building of nation-state, Taiwanisation or indigenisation, and privatisation); the interactive constructions between democratisation and cultural goods (memories, narratives, and identities); and similarity and dissimilarity between South Korean and Taiwanese social movements.

The interviews had limits at least in three aspects. First, most of the participants were interviewed in English, not in Mandarin, except four people. Second, the interviews were mainly concentrated on elites or intellectuals. All interview participants from women’s movements hold at least MA degree and above, which reflects the highly intellectual nature of Taiwanese women’s movements. Further, majority of the Taiwanese labour movements are also postgraduate grade holders, which shows the specific nature of the Taiwanese labour movements supported by labour rights organisations outside of trade
union organisations. Third, most of the participants from the women’s movements except one are members of the Awakening Foundation (AF). Despite the fact that the AF is the first feminist and most influential organisation for gender equality the interviews with women’s movement activists involve a bias. Fourth, the interviews with South Korean participants included several activists from women’s labour movements while those in Taiwan have no interviewees from the same sector.

Table 3. In-depth Interviews in Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Clss.</th>
<th>Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Anonymous</td>
<td>WM/ATP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Chen, Po-Chien</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>Activist of the Works at Taiwan Telecommunication Network Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Former Activist of the <a href="https://www.youthlaborunion.org">Youth Labor Union 95</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Former Deputy General Secretary of the <a href="https://www.cht.com.tw">Chunghwa Telecom Workers’ Union</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chen, Hsin-Hsing</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>Former Student Movement Activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Professor of the <a href="https://www.sis.shu.edu.tw">Graduate Institute for Social Transformation Studies at Shih Hsin University</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chi, Hsing</td>
<td>WM/ATP</td>
<td>Former Director of the <a href="https://www.awakening.org.tw">Awakening Foundation</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Former Chairperson of the Taipei Awakening Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Former Member of the National Assembly for the <a href="https://www.newparty.org.tw">New Party</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chiu, Yu-bin</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>Former Secretary General of the [Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant professor at the Department of Social Development at National Pingtung University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Gao, Ling-Guo</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>Chairperson of the Board of the Northern Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions of Passenger Transport Industry (臺灣汽車客運業工會聯合會)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ho, Ming-sho</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td><a href="https://sociology.ntu.edu.tw">Professor of the Department of Sociology at National Taiwan University (NTU)</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Huang, Chang-Ling</td>
<td>LM/WM</td>
<td>Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University Supervisor of the <a href="https://www.awakening.org.tw">Awakening Foundation</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chairperson of the <a href="https://www.twlink.org.tw">Taiwan Women's Link</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ku, Yenlin</td>
<td>WM</td>
<td>Former Chairperson of the <a href="https://www.awakening.org.tw">Awakening Foundation</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Luo, Huan-Zhen</td>
<td>LM Former Head of the Institute of Public Services and the Department of Social Services of Taipei City Professor at National Chiao-tung University Chairperson of the Board of the <strong>Taipei Water Department Workers Trade Union</strong> (台北自来水工會)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lee, Yuan-chen</td>
<td>WM Founder of the <strong>Awakening Foundation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Liu, Chin-Hsin</td>
<td>LM/ATP Former chairperson of the <strong>TLF</strong> Former Legislator of the <strong>DPP</strong> Former Member of the Council of Labor Affairs (upgraded into a Ministry, <strong>CLA</strong>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Lin, Por-Yee</td>
<td>LM Former activist of the <strong>Youth Labor Union 95</strong> (青年勞動九五聯盟) Unionist of the <strong>High School Education Trade Union</strong> (台灣高等教育產業工會)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Lin, Thung-Hong</td>
<td>LM Former activist of the <strong>Taiwan Labor Front (TLF)</strong> Assistant Research Fellow at Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Lin Tzu-wen</td>
<td>LM Former Chairperson of the Taipei Confederation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Son, Yu-Lian</td>
<td>LM Secretary General of the <strong>TLF</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Su, Chien-ling</td>
<td>WM Former Chairperson of the <strong>Awakening Foundation</strong> Former Chairperson of the Taiwan Equity Education Association Associate Professor at Ming Chuan University Center of General Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Wong, Lennon Ying-Dah</td>
<td>LM Former Director of Information/international relations/Labor Policy Research of the <strong>Chinese Federation of Labor</strong> (CFL, 中華民國全國總工會)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Wu, Chia-Li</td>
<td>WM Former director of the <strong>Awakening Foundation</strong> President of the <strong>Society of Taiwan Women in Science and Technology</strong> Member of <strong>Gender Equality Committee of the Executive Yuan</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*LM stands for labour movement, WM for women’s movement, WLM for women’s labour movement, and ATP for Activists-turned-politician
1. New Party was split from the KMT in opposition to the then-President Lee Teng-hui who drove the KMT into the direction of Taiwanisation or indigenisation and de facto Taiwan’s independence. Lee marginalised the so far mainstream party members who are pro-unification with China. They left the party and founded the New Party.
2. TCTU is Taiwan's first independent confederation of trade unions whose main members were those of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It was launched in 1997 but officially recognised in 2000 by the then-new DPP regime that wanted to counterbalance
the pro-KMT Chinese Federation of Labor (CFL) which has often served as electoral machine of the KMT. Anti-privatisation was one of its primary motivation for its foundation. TCTU was for long pro-DPP but recently it is moving towards pro-KMT.

3. DPP is the main opposition party, launched in 1986. They openly demanded the lift of the Martial Law, democracy, and Taiwan’s independence. Its foundation showed the first signal towards democratisation in Taiwan. DPP took the government power between 2000 and 2008.

4. The first Taiwanese feminist organisation which is still very active and influential both on feminist movements and gender policy of the Taiwanese government.

5. Youth Labor Union 95 is not a trade union but a NGO supporting young part time job workers

6. A trade union stands for university professors and (graduate) students working for TA and RA. Its founders are primarily composed of former labour movement activists who then studied further and became professors.

7. The first labour rights organisation in Taiwan. It was founded primarily by lawyers in 1984 before the lift of the Martial Law in 1987. TLF is usually considered as a pro-DPP and pro-Independence organisation.

8. The Taipei Confederation of Trade Unions was the first local federation of independent trade unions and it opened the way towards the foundation of nation-wide organised independent trade unions: Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU)

9. CFL had been the only legally and officially recognised confederation of trade unions before TCTU was recognised.

10. The Gender Equality Committee (GEC) was established in 2012. GEC is an expression and the product of the gender-mainstreaming published in the 1995 UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing.

Table 4. Site observations in Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Organised by</th>
<th>Time &amp; place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awakening Foundation’s Annual New Year Eve dinner</td>
<td>Awakening Foundation</td>
<td>23 Jan. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Femgsheng Restaurant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Meeting for Shih, Chih-Ching (a former feminist activist and novelist)</td>
<td>Taiwanese Feminists</td>
<td>18 Oct. 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guanghwamun Plaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation Meeting to supports South Korean Hydis Workers</td>
<td>Taiwan Network supporting Hydis workers</td>
<td>08 Feb. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Against Taiwanese capital withdrawal from the South Korean Hydis company)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Office of the Taiwan Labor Information Education Association (苦勞網)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Billion Rising (a carnivalesque dance party highlighting the exploitation of migrant workers and demanding the labour rights protection for the migrant domestic workers)</td>
<td>Migrant International - Taiwan Chapter and Migranteng Ilonggo</td>
<td>22 April. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taipei Main Station</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>