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Subjectivity, Bildung, Pedagogy: "Coming of Age" in Modernity

by

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B.A. University of Saskatchewan, 1986

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

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in the Department of English

We accept this dissertation as
conforming to the required standard

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ABSTRACT

Subjectivity, Bildung, Pedagogy: "Coming of Age" in Modernity is a trans-disciplinary study of the concept of subjective maturiation in the post-Enlightenment West. The study hinges on an historicization of the idea of Bildung, or coming of age, from its inception in the German Enlightenment, through its inflection in Nazism, to its contemporary resonances in literary, psychological and pedagogical discourses. In the first half of the study, I denaturalize the axiomatic view of subjective achievement as a natural process of the private and essential self by disclosing the ideological imbrication of Bildung with modernity's narrative of the progressive development and "emancipation" of liberal individualism.

Although Bildung pervades modern culture -- the Bildungswoman appears ubiquitous in literature and film -- I am less concerned with close readings than with the ways in which the critical discourse about the genre reproduces the ideology of Bildung. In this way, my study is more a meta-criticism about the institutions and discourses of English studies than it is in English studies. Thus, I take a conceptual approach to the genre by tracing the narrative of Bildung as an idea. I explore, furthermore, the entrenchment of the metanarrative of development in the normalizing discourses and institutions of psychology and pedagogy. The narrative of maturiation -- or the teleological development of full, adult subjectivity as unencumbered autonomy -- has normalized as universal and neutral what is in fact modeled on white, Eurocentric, male subjectivity, and, in doing so, has marginalized modernity's gendered, racial, and sexual others.

The education of the human race was one of the great promises of the European Enlightenment, a promise articulated in Bildung as pedagogy. The second half of the study engages with contemporary critical pedagogy to investigate the ways autonomous and disengaged individualism intersects with modern notions of disinterested knowledge to legitimize a pedagogy that reproduces relations of power in the university. I conclude by interrogating the notion of academic freedom, the debate over which in Canada embodies fundamental questions regarding modern pedagogy and the "crisis" in the university. Against the undertheorized, classic notion of academic freedom as negative freedom, I argue that a positive conception of freedom offers a way of theorizing academic freedom in terms other than that dictated by the possessive individualism of Bildung.

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CONTENTS

Title Page i
Abstract ii
Contents iii
Acknowledgments iv
Dedication v
Epigraph vi
Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Part One - Bildung and Modern Subjectivity 17
Chapter 2: The Modern Subject in Crisis 18
Chapter 3: The Bildungroman and the Idea of Bildung 72
Chapter 4: Bildung and the Logic of Fascism 105
Chapter 5: Bildung and Difference 120

Part Two - Bildung and Pedagogy 147
Chapter 6: “Well-Regulated Liberty”: The Paradox of Modern Pedagogy 148
Chapter 7: Bildung and the Resistance to Pedagogy 180
Chapter 8: Conclusion: Bildung and the Problem of (Academic) Freedom 214

Works Cited 238
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DEDICATION

For Andrew, with love.
The Enlightenment helped to free man from his past. In so doing, it failed to prevent the construction of new captivities in the future.

—Roy Porter, The Enlightenment
Chapter One
Introduction

*Modernity is the adulthood of the human race.*
—Garrett Green, "Modern Culture Comes of Age"

*What is at stake in our engagement with the problem of modernity at the theoretical level is essentially a description of the subject.*
—Anthony J. Cascardi, *The Subject of Modernity*

**Enlightenment and Bildung**

In the opening sentence of his 1784 essay, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?,"" Kant summarizes the era otherwise known as the "Age of Reason" as "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity" (54).¹ The Enlightenment metanarrative of maturation is generally understood to plot an "emancipatory" movement from reliance on external authorities to humanist self-reliance; it is, in Roy Porter's words, the narrative of "man's final coming of age" (1). "Man,"² for Kant — as for Porter — is synecdochally doubled; that is to say, the teleological aim of modernity's foundational narrative is emancipation both for each individual "man" and for universal humanity in general, or, to use the ideologically-loaded term, "Man." An individual man's coming of age is therefore the participation of that subject in universal "Man's" coming of age, or Enlightenment.

The concept man/Man — or modern subjectivity³ — that grounds and propels this narrative of Enlightenment is itself what Jean-François Lyotard would call a "grand récit," or metanarrative, of modernity.⁴ This foundational metanarrative, understood as natural and universal, describes the modern subject as self-centring and self-determining, and, in its fully realized or "mature" form, as replete, coherent, unifying, centred, rational, self-conscious, and radically autonomous. This guiding narrative emerges in large part from the eighteenth-century German discourse about Bildung, an idea about development or maturity and therefore about the achievement of subjectivity. The mature adult is an achieved subject.

The idea of Bildung has played a critical role in the constitution of modernity's
dominant ideologies and remains deeply embedded in contemporary human sciences in the West. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, the concept of Bildung came to pervade modern Western culture across three centuries: it “was perhaps the greatest idea of the eighteenth century,” it became an “atmosphere breathed” in humanist discourses of the nineteenth-century, and it “most clearly indicates the profound intellectual change that still causes us to experience the century of Goethe as contemporary” (10). Like the atmosphere, however, Bildung is so pervasive that it is not always easy to discern. All around us, it is barely noticed or acknowledged. From the mid-nineteenth century, the idea of Bildung became so deeply entrenched in the cultural unconscious in the modern West that the term “Bildung” itself fell out of explicit discursive currency. Yet it is all the more present by its very absence.

As I will argue in this study, the idea of Bildung is so endemic to discourses about the self as to be on the level of the self-evident, the taken for granted. Although contemporary discourses about subjectivity seldom circulate under the name Bildung, even in Germany, the ideas embodied by the German term have been absorbed throughout Europe and, through the processes of cultural imperialism and colonization, embedded in cultures throughout the industrialized West. That the term — and all it signifies — is just now creeping back into theoretical parlance (see references in Chapter Three below) suggests that the concept of man/Man it signifies is in deep crisis.

The disclosure of Bildung's pervasive and tenacious significance reveals much about how the modern West conceives of the self, or subject, and, since every conception of the self implies a particular understanding of freedom, an interrogation of the notion of Bildung can reveal much about how the modern West conceives of human freedom. The emancipatory narrative described by Bildung is disseminated both by fiction (the Bildungsroman) and by theory (especially in developmental psychology and pedagogy). The ideological imbrication of Bildung with the idea of the emancipation of the self which it grounds is the concern of the present study in its broadest terms. The idea of Bildung represents not only the subject as product, but also, and crucially, the process of subjective achievement. Bildung signifies an amalgam of discourses and practices, or rather, an “interdiscourse,” that naturalizes and normalizes a progressive maturation of an individual into a centered, coherent, and autonomous self, or what post-Enlightenment theory refers to as “the subject.” “The Subject,” writes Redfield, “comes into being as Bildung” (46). This secular-humanist subject continues to have deep resonances in the contemporary West that permeate cultural, pedagogical, psychological, and, ultimately, political discourses and institutions.

This study, which is divided into two major parts, pivots on a conceptual history of the
term *Bildung*. This history is, however, intended as more than simply a definition of the term. My purpose, rather, is a "historical epistemology," an attempt to expose the conditions out of which the term emerged and the cultural practices it made possible. Like Mary Poovey, in *A History of the Modern Fact*, I reject the notion of "the single well-defined idea and the obviously connected series of events" and pursue instead "the very gradual consolidation and recurrent interrogation of an epistemological unit whose existence is almost impossible to document" (xiii). The near "impossibility" of discovering *Bildung's* existence is what makes its documentation all the more urgent.⁷ According to Ian Hacking, historical epistemologies take the perspective that those "taken-for-granted notions that underlie our sense of good sense have intricate histories" (D14); these forgotten histories are unearthed so that the ideological grounds and the material conditions of their formation might be exposed and the axiomatic notions therefore denaturalized. Because the history of *Bildung* is so diffuse, I do not pretend to write a complete history of the term, or even imagine that one is possible. Instead, I trace one trajectory, however non-linear, of that history. My intention here, then, is to expose the historical conditions that have made the *Bildung*-subject possible and intelligible and therefore contest what is taken to be normal, natural, and inevitable about subjectivity.

The *Bildungsroman*, the great literary exemplar of man/Man, provides a fertile ground for exploring the roots of the modern subject increasingly being denaturalized in the postmodern interdiscourse. This narrated form of *Bildung* is also so pervasive as to be part of the atmosphere in the modern West. A standard literary model in undergraduate English, the *Bildungsroman* is a "classic" plot narrated repeatedly in literature, film, and the popular imagination. As the consummate pedagogical narrative, the *Bildungsroman* provides insight into the way modern power disciplines subjects and the mode of subjectivity that enables subjects to govern themselves. And recent counternarratives of the genre provide grounds for exploring the emerging ways of perceiving subjectivity counter to those normalizing forms that pathologize those who do not conform to *Bildung's* injunctions. Based on a historical epistemology that exposes *Bildung* as one of the central ideas that have made possible the modern subject, such counternarratives can stretch the limits of the thinkable. Although this study does not allow room for such an exploration, I hope it serves as a prolegomenon to further research by setting out some of the terms necessary to reading the *Bildungsroman* outside its conventional generic boundaries. Rather than focus on the classification of texts as *Bildungsromane*, I take a conceptual approach to the genre by tracing the narrative of *Bildung* as an idea. In this way, this study is more about English studies than it is in it. That is to say, it is less concerned with close readings of *Bildungsroman* texts, than it is with the discourse about the *Bildungsroman* and the idea of
*Bildung* which that discourse reproduces, deploys, and disseminates.

Part One of the study is concerned with modernity's concept of the subject, the persistence of the idea of "maturity" which attends it, and the historical grounding of that subject in the ideology of *Bildung*. I want to stress here that *Bildung* is not "merely" discursive, but also (since discourses are also practices) a practice insofar as it is materialized in the form of institutions (literary, pedagogical, psychological). The first section also lays the groundwork for Part Two's concern with the major practices of *Bildung* in pedagogy and with the idea of (academic) freedom which *Bildung* grounds and legitimizes.

**Historical Bildung**

In late eighteenth-century Germany, that which went under the name "*Bildung*" was exemplified by the great German contribution to the novel, the *Bildungsroman*. It was the literary sedimentation of modern subjectivity, and two centuries after its inception, it remains the best known story of *Bildung* or subjective "coming of age." This story so pervades Western culture as to be taken as natural and universal. A denaturalization of the plotting of the theme of *Bildung* in the literary (and cinematic) genre can, therefore, reveal much about the way in which Western culture plots subjective maturation and reinscribes that plot in psychological and pedagogical narratives.

Historically, the emergence of the *Bildungsroman* is coeval with other events generally taken to be definitive moments in the turn to modernity: the rise of the category of "literature," the emergence of the novel as a legitimate literary form, the reification of the individual as author, or the "author-function" (a sedimentation of the "subject"), the professional institutionalization of pedagogy, and, as Marc Redfield puts it, the rise of the category of "the aesthetic as the guarantor of social and subjective unity" (44 n.12). In investigating the terms of Enlightenment subjectivity, this study touches on all of these related events. Since the idea of *Bildung* as the mature or maturing self of Enlightenment ideals — or what I will call the "Bildung-subject" — is central to the particular historical conjuncture of these events, this study will be anchored in the idea of *Bildung*.

In fact, the historical redefinition of the term *Bildung* in mid to late eighteenth-century Germany marks one of the key paradigm shifts that defines the Enlightenment. The formerly religious term, as Todd Kontje points out in his study of the *Bildungsroman*, increasingly accrues a secular and humanist designation (*German* 1) and therefore is representative of that change from an authoritative basis in God to one in human consciousness, a critical juncture in the turn to modernity. For the original theorists of
*Bildung*, including Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, the concept describes not just the centred subject, but also the centring subject; that is, *Bildung* is the cultivated subject’s learned capacity to harmonize life’s diverse experiences through the new secular centre of the world, man/Man. The term comes to signify, in its broadest terms, the exemplary man of modernity, the “metaphysical force” of which cannot be overstated (Redfield 46). *Bildung*, as the subjective development of the centred and harmonious individual, becomes a microcosm of the metanarrative of modernity as a civilizing process.

One of the most important aspects of *Bildung* with which I am concerned is that its teleological aim is autonomous individuality. The teleological model of maturity toward which the exemplary Bildung-subject reaches is so closely linked to the modern ideal of autonomous individuality as to be almost synonymous with it. This ideal carries with it a body of values in which the modern West has deep ideological investments, including the way in which the individual subject is perceived in relation to the social. The word “man,” as Judith Butler points out, “[is] used by humanists to regard the individual in isolation from his or her social context” (“Bad Writer”). Maturity is figured as disengagement, as the determined separation of the self from others, as the radical demarcation of the individual by impermeable boundaries that guarantee the subject’s autonomy by marking the limits of freedom and responsibility.

**Narrating Bildung**

When literary critics pronounced Goethe’s 1795 *Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre* as exemplary of the idea of *Bildung*, the Bildungsroman was born. The Bildungsroman set in motion a definitive narrative of what it means to become a mature self, a narrative so powerful that it remains the quintessential plot of modern subjectivity. The genre — together with the critical tools for reading it — can be traced to Germany at the end of the eighteenth century, and it became one of the “major fictional types” of modern Western literature (Hirsch 300). The overwhelming prevalence of the subject inscribed by this narrative of maturation attests to modernity’s faith in teleological progress and its belief in the centered and rational coherence of individual selfhood. The subject of the Bildungsroman learns to be reconciled with society through a pedagogical process of subjectivation. The narrative of this realist genre naturalizes and normalizes the ideology of *Bildung*. What makes this narrative so powerful in its effects is that it has the distinction of being both quotidian and grand. That is, the axiomatic notion of individual self-formation partakes of the greater narrative of the civilizing project, the passage from savagery to civility, or
immaturity to maturity, which is the master narrative of modernity. The individual, or particular, is subsumed into identity with the great, universal plot so that each “man” becomes an exemplar of the Bildung ideal.

The story of the individual’s development from the incompleteness of immaturity to the plenitude of maturity is so ubiquitous in the West as to seem, like narrative in Roland Barthes’ view, “simply there, like life itself” (79). Because the Bildungsroman narrates the “human” and because the human claims to be its essence and significance, it is the humanist genre. In a rather circular argument — one not unusual in studies of the genre — Michael Beddow argues that there is a certain something in the novel that reflects something essentially human. The Bildungsroman, he says, exemplifies this noble and enduring something: “the novels all testify to a conviction that there is something about imaginative fiction, and something about authentic humanity, which makes the former an especially suitable medium of insight into the latter” (6). Such humanist values, rather uncritically asserted in the mainstream discourse on the genre, reproduce and naturalize the Bildung-subject and disavow its attendant ideologies.

The liberal-humanist presuppositions that legitimize the Bildung narrative are naturalized and normalized by the hidden embeddedness of the narrative in the everyday. The notion of mature adulthood as a progressive teleology of Bildung is generally supposed to be merely descriptive of something already there. It is supposed to capture an essential self, a self that somehow pre-exists efforts to define it.

Yet our definitions of human maturation conform to culturally constructed narrative trajectories. This is unsurprising given that, as many theorists of narrative point out, narratives provide conceptual frameworks in which we perceive ourselves in the world. The Bildungsroman, a narrative explicitly concerned with the development of subjectivity, is a particularly salient form of this framework. In fact, because of the very pervasiveness of the Bildungsroman narrative in both theory and fiction, Western culture tends to construe the everyday notion of maturation in terms of the genre’s narrative organization. As Heather Dubrow points out, “the Bildungsroman embodies presuppositions about when and how people mature and in turn encourages its reader to see that process of maturation in the terms the novel itself has established, even when he encounters it outside the novel” (4). Subjects tend to experience (and narrativize) life according to the ineluctable injunctions of the Bildungsroman. In his study of the genre, Michael Minden notes that, since its inception, the fit between the genre and life has been a concern not only of literary criticism, but also of the narrative itself: “one of the most persistent themes of the Bildungsroman is that the form of the novel and the form of a well-lived life, though not identical, are mutually confirming” (11). Because this ubiquitous theme has accrued the
status of the quotidian and "natural," it has obtained enormous governing power in modern Western culture.

The narrative of Bildung is not only institutionalized in the family, education, literature, and film, but it also pervades the contemporary "common sense" of the maturing self. This common sense subjectivity is acquired through the meaning-making process Jerome Bruner calls "folk psychology." We learn our cultural or folk psychology about the self early; since its vocabulary and grammar are so much a part of our language(s), we "learn it as we learn to use the very language we acquire" (Bruner, Acts 35). What Pierre Bourdieu refers to as "official language" controls the limits of possibility in any given social formation:

- official language, particularly the system of concepts by means of which the members of a given group provide themselves with a representation of their social relations ..., sanctions and imposes what it states, tacitly laying down the dividing line between the thinkable and the unthinkable, thereby contributing towards the maintenance of the symbolic order from which it draws its authority. (21)

The "official language" of Bildung determines and delimits how contemporary Western culture conceives of subjective development and maturity. The common-sense conception of the Bildung-subject, moreover, is increasingly legitimized — and guarded — by a discursive expertise of the self, most significantly in popular and professional psychology.

But, above all, Bildung's ideological force remains invisible (Gadamer's "atmosphere breathed") so that individuals freely consent to its demands; its subjects, that is, become self-regulating. In this sense, Bildung is exemplary of that modern method of social control analyzed and named in the 1930s by Antonio Gramsci, hegemony. Hegemony is the process through which subjects in the modern West are controlled not by coercion, but by self-governing consent. It is the dominance of the ruling classes, genders and races that operates in the multiplicity of everyday discourses and practices and that hides its operations in the quotidian innocence of the taken-for-granted. It does not coerce or suppress subjectivity; rather, it produces it. Subjectivation is, in fact, one of modern hegemony's most fundamental and insidious apparatuses. Autonomous individualism is the most basic tool of modern hegemonic power. In order for subjects to spontaneously consent to power in democratic, liberal systems its various apparatuses must function "invisibly." Because power in this formulation is diffuse, it is not always easy to detect, let alone resist. Such is the nature of hegemonic power that it is so entrenched so as to appear as "common sense," but it is none the less powerful for its silence and invisibility. Its silent work ensures that its subjects consent voluntarily to its demands. Bildung is central to this process. For the purposes of subjectivation, it is in the interests of the Bildung discourse to present itself as
anonymous, ahistorical, and disinterested.

While Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, which I will delineate in the next chapter, is crucial to this study. I want to stress here that, in my view, in Western democratic, capitalism, hegemony works by emphasizing the individual — supposed to be the basis of “freedom” — while simultaneously re-appropriating that very individualism to the demands of the hegemonic “we,” hence the “man/Man” terminology so central to modernity’s dominant humanist discourses. First, the subject is constituted according to a “possessive individualism” that disaffiliates people, or, as Terry Eagleton puts it, “abandons each subject to its own private space, [and] dissolves all positive bonds between them” (Aesthetics 22). Secondly (although this process is not chronological, but simultaneous), hegemony recuperates, or repossesses, the individuals according to a normalizing “universalism.” The process of Bildung, a major hegemonic apparatus in the West, exemplifies this constitution of individual subjectivity according to the imperatives of the specious universalism of Man.

While autonomous individualism, according to modern ideology, is supposed to be the antidote to power, it is, in fact, essential to the exercise of power in Western modernity. Michel Foucault argues that what is significant about the new political form of power that has developed since the sixteenth century is that it is recognized by everyone as state power: “most of the time, the state is envisioned as a kind of political power which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality” (213). While this is essentially true, the greatest error in assessing power is to disregard that a totalizing mode of power is also individualizing, to use Foucault’s terminology. What is significant about modern state power is that subjects, by their very individuality, are made subject to a universalizing state power:

I don’t think that we should consider the “modern state” as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but on the contrary as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. (214)

What is even more significant than this devolution of individualization, however, is that modern forms of power operate to hide the ideology of individualization so that the individual appears as that which escapes power. As I will argue in Chapter Two, the primary ideological apparatus of state power is to disavow the ideologies through which subjects submit to it. The imperatives of the hegemonic state construct the individual and hide the seams of that construction so that the ubiquitous man/Man narrative of Bildung
appears natural and universal.

**Denaturalizing Bildung**

This ubiquitous narrative of subjectivity has historical and ideological roots in the modern German discourse on *Bildung* that belie the “naturalness” of the concept. Embedded in the Enlightenment ideals that have come to pervade Western modernity, the idea of *Bildung* is supposed to represent the universal and transparent “law of human maturation” (Barney 360). The narrative is sustained by the binary pair, maturity/immaturity, an opposition that exemplifies what Foucault calls “dividing practices,” whereby the subject “is either divided inside himself or divided from others” in a process of “objectification which transform[s] human beings into subjects” (“Subject” 208).12 As Christie Kiefer points out, the notion of maturity depends on and reconfirms other Enlightenment binaries such as reason/emotion (15). The maturity/immaturity equation represents an ideological logic that has rationalized any number of modern atrocities, yet it also remains a banal, taken-for-granted, and “benign,” part of our everyday parlance in the West. Despite its particular historical determinants in *Aufklärung*, the universal imperatives of *Bildung*—and its narrativization in the *Bildungsroman*—are so widely diffused and deeply entrenched in the norms that regulate modern Western culture as to be on the level of the axiomatic.

In fact, the story of developmental maturation is so omnipresent that the *Bildungsroman* as a literary genre is seen to narrativize not only individual maturation, but also, synecdochally, modern humanity’s “coming of age” in general. The movement of the individual “man” exemplifies the movement of Enlightenment humanism’s “Man.” The development of the individual subject is representative of— and is contained by— the larger narrative of modernity’s master narrative of “maturation”: the “civilizing” or colonizing project. Atrocities arising from the colonial mentality are only the most obvious manifestation. The synecdochal metanarrative of maturation has become so naturalized and normalizing, in all its literary, psychological, and pedagogical manifestations, that it has amassed profoundly invisible hegemonic power. It is in this sense that the *Bildungsroman* operates as a *pedagogical* narrative, the “hidden curriculum” of culture disciplining modern subjectivity. As I hope to show, a denaturalization of this apparently “natural” and innocuous metanarrative discloses the egregious exclusionary gestures on which *Bildung* depends.

Mine is not the only study concerned with the *Bildungsroman* to surface at this time (Chapter Three delineates some of these other studies). Since the *Bildungsroman* is the Enlightenment meta-genre *par excellence*, it is no coincidence that it reemerges as a
problem at a time when the modern subject it legitimizes has come increasingly under attack by various post-Enlightenment discourses over the last thirty years or so.

One sense in which the genre is problematic relates precisely to its ubiquitousness. As I have pointed out, the maturation process, or Bildungsprozess, presents itself as if its story were universal. Earlier studies of the genre tended to see it as reflecting a given truth about a human essence. In his canonical 1930 definition of the genre, for example William Dilthey writes that “the Bildungsroman is distinguished from all previous biographical compositions [such as Fielding’s Tom Jones] in that it intentionally and artistically depicts that which is universally human in ... a life-course” (335). Modernity’s project of universalization of the naturalized “life-course” is one of the major issues at stake in posthumanist discourses. For example, the development of the universal and neutral subject, which the Bildungsroman is supposed to reflect, is exposed by postmodernism as a discursively produced, historically specific, white, European, male construct. However, while the release of heterogeneity in the postmodern and postcolonial West has precipitated a renewed interest in the problem of the subject and its narrativization, literary readings of the re-emerging genre have thus far paid scant attention to posthumanist critiques of subjectivity. While general theoretical treatises of subjectivity attempt to dismantle all that Bildung upholds, critical readings of the Bildungsroman tend to reinscribe the genre’s traditional humanist ideology. As Richard Barney puts it, “while Bildung remains suspect, ... its underlying premises have reinserted themselves” (361).

We can, however, read the maturation narratives otherwise. The recent explosion of the coming-of-age novel by women and by post-colonized writers calls for a redefinition of the genre. How might incursions into the otherwise white, male, European genre explode its generic boundaries from the inside? As Susan Fraiman points out in her recent book on the nineteenth-century female Bildungsroman (inscribed, as she points out, in female conduct books as well as in fiction), one of the ways in which the genre belies its claims to universal subjectivity is simply that it “has been defined in terms of works by, about, and appealing to men” (3). Especially since the publication of The Voyage In, edited by Elizabeth Abel, Marianne Hirsch and Elizabeth Langland in 1983 (itself a problematic text as I argue below), the “female Bildungsroman” has become a genre in its own right, with its own defining borders as well as its border disputes. Inserting “female” into the category “Bildungsroman” discloses the various ideological conditions that enable this otherwise male genre, and deconstructs that genre from within. Hence, attention to female coming-of-age narratives, even when those texts reproduce humanist ideology, have, however unwittingly, deconstructed the predominant view of the modern subject and suggested new ways of thinking about the mature or maturing self. Since they cannot be fully
accommodated by hegemony's assimilative logic, these texts dismantle it from the inside. In other words, these texts problematize the inside/outside binary: from inside the humanist hegemony, they offer (however inadvertently) ways of operating "outside" it.

Learning Bildung

The education of the human race was one of the great promises of the European Enlightenment,15 the corollary to and goal of which was human freedom. Freedom, for both man and Man— to use the historical locution— would be reached through an education to maturity.

"Bildung" means "education" in both broad and narrow senses, and nowhere is its trajectory more clearly laid out than in Western pedagogy. Although not always explicit, the concept of Bildung has been pivotal to the pedagogical practices of Western education at all levels. Another way to put this is to say that the schools provide a training in Bildung. It is a commonplace, in both technical and everyday pedagogical discourses, that a central mission of the Western education system is to guide subjects through to maturity.

Biographical Bildung and pedagogical Bildung are inseparable from the discourse of maturity. How maturity is defined, however, is rarely overtly stated, let alone questioned by these discourses. Its tenacity is taken to be proof of its self-evidence.

Because subjects in modern, liberal-democratic states are controlled not coercively, but by the supple operations of hegemony, they become self-governing. As normative laws become internalized and privatized, each subject functions as its own guardian. Thus, subjects "work by themselves," as Louis Althusser has famously put it,16 to reproduce the status quo. The ideology of maturity, especially as it is legitimized by the cult of expertise, helps to ensure that they will do so. It is no accident that the modern education system and the discourse of Bildung arise simultaneously; the school, together with its imperative to bring subjects to maturity, however, is merely one of the most visible sites of this hegemonic control. But does the subject as Bildung still hold such hegemonic sway in the schools? The recent hysteria of right-wing education "reformers" would indicate that counter-hegemonies pose a significant threat to the status quo. The recent "culture war" (as the education crisis is called in the US) is a battle over the ideology of Bildung, and, as I argue in Chapter Five, a crisis in what constitutes modern ("mature") subjectivity.

To the extent that culture provides training in subjectivity, culture itself is pedagogical.17 While my study of Bildung has implications for pedagogy in the narrow sense, I also use the term in a broader sense suggesting a general pedagogical apparatus that links knowledge, power, and subjectivity in intimate and profound ways, and that
configures social relations according to the regulatory demands of the immaturity/maturity equation. Indeed, the history of Bildung participates in a broader European elaboration of the modern understanding of culture, a participation that helps to account for the German term's semantic slide between “education” and “culture.” In *Intimacies of Postmodernity*, Zygmunt Bauman argues that with the birth of the modern intellectual in the eighteenth century arose the notion of culture as pedagogical, as a process of completing the otherwise “incomplete” (immature/childlike) subject through education. The axiomatic ideology of “culture,” he argues, “represents the world as consisting of human beings who are what they are taught” (3). Despite a proliferation of definitions of culture, the self-evident basis of every definition is “that narrative representing the world as man-made, guided by man-made values and norms and reproduced through the ongoing process of learning and teaching” (2). This emerging notion of culture was constructed in the Enlightenment, Bauman suggests, by organic intellectuals (in Gramsci’s sense) as a response to new political-economic realities. As self-enclosed communities broke up and were replaced by centralized, hegemonic power, culture came “abruptly into relief as a ‘mechanism’ — something to be designed, administered and monitored” (6). Diversity, in this view (and it was the view of the great universal colonizing project) was something amenable to pedagogy because it could be regulated. As Bauman puts it,

> locally administered ways of life were now constituted, from the perspective of universalistic ambitions, as retrograde and backward-looking, ... as imperfect, immature stages in an overall line of development toward a “true” and universal way of life, ... as otherwise resisting the ennobling influence of the truly human — [or] enlightened — order. (7-8)

The emerging concept of culture required a new kind of subject, a subject who could be “taught” and regulated in a process Bauman calls “humanization.” This is a subject, writes Bauman, “whose conduct is shaped by his/her knowledge, and whose knowledge is shaped by knowledge givers” (10), and, significantly, these new subjects are “flexible and malleable entities, ... objects of practice, of purposeful redirection” (10-11). Thus, Bildung signifies the cultural processes and practices which position subjects in pedagogical relation to power and knowledge; the educational system is only a particularly clear distillation of this pedagogy. According to Henry Giroux, an understanding of culture as pedagogical provides “a broader understanding of how knowledge is produced, identities shaped, and values articulated as a pedagogical practice that takes place in multiple sites outside the traditional institution of schooling” (*Disturbing* 22). Thus, even when I use
"pedagogy" in the usual, narrower sense, I intend at the same time to evoke its broader, cultural meaning. In this way, the current crisis in education provides a particularly trenchant example of the more general crisis of the modern subject.

In other words, the current crisis in education is, at bottom, a crisis in modern subjectivity. It reverberates not only in terms of the "everyday" or psychological self, but also as the powerful recent debates in literary theory attest, the literary self, the "subject" of the sentence and, by extension, the centered subject taken for granted in language generally and in literary narrative specifically. This crisis, most clearly evidenced by the conservative backlash in the West over the last two or three decades, has been brought about most conspicuously by the convergence of counternarratives exploding on the scene since the mid-1960s, not least of all by feminism, which has helped to decentre "man" by inserting "woman" into modernity's "Man."

As a narrative of emancipation, the teleological endpoint of the Bildungsprozess is supposed to be "freedom," a hallmark of the Western education system. In the final chapter of this study, therefore, I attempt to tie the preceding arguments together by bringing the question of the idea of individual freedom to the foreground. That is, not only does education signify freedom itself in democratic societies, but it claims to produce citizens who are capable of fulfilling their individual potentialities for freedom. It accomplishes this through the narrative of Bildung. By looking at the debate about academic freedom in Canada, I question education's claim to foster and produce freedom. Since (academic) freedom is conceptualized as a negative freedom with roots in the idea of Bildung, the critique of this notion of "freedom" has already been established by preceding chapters, but here I make an explicit argument against the reigning notion of (negative) academic freedom. Because education and the concomitant idea of academic freedom are so central to modernity's emancipatory project, this argument, has, by logical extension, implications in general for the notion of modern subjectivity and the political freedom it is supposed to guarantee.

NOTES

1Where some translators of Kant's essay render "Unmündigkeit" into English as "tutelage," I prefer its rendering, by Hans Reiss and others, as "maturity." James Schmidt, in a note to his translation of Kant's text, explains that the notion of Unmündigkeit is crucial to Kant's argument and that, while it certainly entails the notion, "tutelage" is too narrow. Both Schmidt (59) and Garrett Green point out that Unmündigkeit "is tied not only to age but also to gender" (Green 292). I discuss this below in Chapter Three. Kant's essay, "Was ist Aufklärung," originally appeared in the Berlinische Monatsschrift, a major
organ of Enlightenment discourse, in response to the editor's invitation to answer the question "what is Enlightenment?"

As I hope becomes clear below, my use of the gender exclusive "man" here is in no way careless or incidental.

As Chapter 2 below should make clear, by "modern subjectivity" I mean a particular view of subjectivity: the notion of consciousness inaugurated in the seventeenth century with René Descartes' split between mind and body, or reason and nature, clarified by humanist tenets such as the centrality of the human, individualism, experience, self-determination, self-knowledge and agency, and sanctified by the Enlightenment logic in which everything, including the human, can be finally located, delimited, and pinned down.

In The Postmodern Condition.

I use "self" and "subject" interchangeably throughout this study not because I am unaware of the semantic distance between the two terms, but, in fact, to dramatize the ideological speciousness of their difference. That is, I do not take "self" to be ontologically "pure"; it is not, as in traditional humanist assessments, the otherwise "innocent" a priori which subjectivation contaminates. Rather, I take it to be the bearer of the ideology that defines the self as a private interiority supposed to provide an inner centre that stabilizes and unifies the subject and to be free from the contamination of the public or the social (whether this social is positively or negatively perceived). The notion of the "self" as innocent justifies domination of that other, "subjectified" self; that is, no matter how battered my outer self, I retain this inner self or sanctum which can never be touched. I will consider this private/public differential in more detail in Chapter 2. Generally, I use the term "subject" when I want to draw attention to the subject as a critical category, to make explicit the notion of the "self" as ideologically produced. I use "subject" in the Foucauldian sense that problematizes this pure a priori form which is, in any case, a logical non-starter. "Subject" often implies "subject to," as in "subject to state governance"; thus, I retain this term in order to emphasize that, in hegemony, there is no outside. That is, by "subject" I mean that entity usually called the "self" which is taken to be an inviolable essence of stability and continuity, but which is a historical and ideological construct. I use the term "self," then, when I want to evoke, sometimes ironically, the supposed "innocence" of the unadulterated subject in its customary humanist sense.

The terminology when speaking of subjectivity is notoriously difficult. It inevitably raises the logical conundrum of presupposing the subject the axiomatic anterior status of which one wants to debunk. This is as true when applied to the terms "person," "individual," or "self," sometimes used as attempt to avoid the conundrum, but which, of course, reproduce it. The problem, if one takes the poststructuralist view that there is no pre-linguistic, "self" outside the language used to name it, is that you don't have anything until you name it, but as soon as you name it, you bring in a whole ideological discourse.

A similar confusion arises between the terms "subject" and "identity," sometimes uncritically conflated in contemporary writing. The distinction between the two terms, which I try to sustain, is nicely expressed by John Guillory. An undertheorized semantic slippage between "subject" and "identity" underlies the accommodational sleight-of-hand whereby radical theories of subjectivity since the 1960s have been "assimilated into American liberal pluralist discourse, [and] the problematic of the subject was more or less displaced by that of identity, or simply confused with that concept" (14). Guillory argues that identity or "identification" ... belongs to the process of subject formation as one of its
moments” (14). In a footnote, Guillory cites Laclau on this point: “The individual is not simply an identity within the structure but is transformed by it into a subject, and this requires acts of identification” (347 n. 22). Guillory asks, “Is it not one of the peculiarities of identity politics that it has everything to say about identity and little to say about identification as a moment in a process, a process which gives birth to the subject (always, of course, the subject-in-process)?” He adds that “it was of course never the project of theory to make the subject simply disappear but to make its claim to rational self-determination (its free affirmation of its identity) suspect” (348 n. 22).

6 In Language, Semantics and Ideology: Stating the Obvious, Michel Pêcheux defines “interdiscourse” as an imbrication of discourse(s), ideology, and subjectivity built on the work of Lacan and Althusser. Interdiscourse is a “complex whole of discursive formations” (185) that produce the subject; this “whole,” however, is uneven, flexible, and mutable. It represents a combination of the “preconstructed,” or the “always already there” of ideological interpellation” (115). These preconstructed discursive ideologies transverse one another: that is, they “cross[] and connect[]” (117) unevenly. Interdiscourse is mutable insofar as it includes the idea of hegemonic accommodation theorized similarly by Antonio Gramsci. That is, for Pêcheux, “interdiscourse is the locus for a perpetual ‘work’ of reconfiguration in which a discursive formation, as a function of the ideological interests that it represents, is led to absorb preconstructed elements produced outside it, linking them metonymically to its own elements by transverse-effects which incorporate them in the evidentness of a new meaning in which they are ‘welcomed’ and founded (on a new ground of evident truths that absorbs them)” (193 n.10).

7 Although she draws from Daston’s historical epistemology in the sciences, Poovey expands the term to include those knowledges that have shaped moral and socio-political subjects.

8 In his 1949 Hero with a Thousand Faces, Joseph Campbell examines the myths, folk tales and literature of many cultures and concludes that the initiation story that narrates a hero’s separation and attainment of autonomy is a universal “monomyth.”

9 My notion of denaturalization derives from the idea of naturalization usefully defined as an ideological practice by Terry Eagleton in Ideology: An Introduction: “like universalization, naturalization is part of the dehistoricizing thrust of ideology, its tacit denial that ideas and beliefs are specific to a particular time, place and social group” (59). In the present context, then, my point is to denaturalize, and therefore re-historicize, the idea of Bildung.

10 Andrew Bowie argues that “literature’ itself comes into existence in the period in question, because, prior to the growing dominance of non-theological conceptions of language in the second half of the eighteenth century, what it is that makes a particular text a ‘literary’ text is not necessarily an issue of any wider significance” (Romanticism 1). One of the main arguments Bowie makes in From Romanticism to Critical Theory, is that “the rise of ‘literature’ and the rise of philosophical aesthetics – of a new philosophical concern with understanding the nature of art – are inseparable phenomena, which are vitally connected to changes in conceptions of truth in modern thought” (1).

11 The historical coincidence of the category of the aesthetic and German philosophical discourse on subjectivity is similarly the subject of Andrew Bowie’s Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche. See also, Michael Minden, The German Bildungsroman: Incest and Inheritance, in which Bowie’s theory is applied to the early German Bildungsroman beginning with Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre as prototype.
Also, see Terry Eagleton's *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*.

12 "Dividing practices" is Foucault's term for those discourses that integrate and exclude according to binary thinking; his examples include "the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the 'good boys'" ("Subject" 208).

13 I use "posthumanist" rather than "anti-humanist" to suggest that there is no simple outside to the humanism being critiqued.

14 The dearth of postmodern or poststructuralist approaches to the genre is rather surprising given contemporary theory's concern with subjectivity. John Smith makes a similar point. Exceptions would include Smith's own essay, Evelyn Cobley's chapter on the *Bildungsroman* in *Representing War*, and the essays in the special issue of *Genre* 26 (Winter, 1993). In a section on poststructuralist and psychoanalytic readings in *The German Bildungsroman*, Todd Kontje lists a few texts, Smith's among them, that he would consider exceptions.

15 *The Education of the Human Race* by Lessing is a key document of the German Enlightenment.

16 In "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," page 169.

17 Ursula Kelly makes a similar point in her *Schooling Desire*, but she valorizes "desire" as pre-cultural against pedagogy as cultural.

18 Although, as Eugene Holland and Vassilis Lambropoulos point out, "from a theoretical viewpoint, it seems redundant to talk about the humanities in crisis, because the humanities has always faced crisis, indeed emerged as the managing of a particular crisis: the demise of the stratified theocentric feudal order," and, as they go on to say, the rise of the androcentric order or the idea of "man as Human." (3)
Part One

Bildung and Modern Subjectivity
Chapter Two
The Modern Subject in Crisis

*Know then thyself, presume not God to scan. The proper Study of Mankind is Man.*
—Alexander Pope, *An Essay on Man*; Epistle ii

*Lesson Number One — Become the Person You Are.*
—Body Shop advertising slogan, Fall 1999.

"The theory of the subject ... is at the heart of humanism"
—Michel Foucault, “Revolutionary”

A Permanent Critique of Ourselves

As the great literary exemplar of modern subjectivity, the *Bildungsroman* provides a fertile ground from which to explore those discourses denaturalized by postmodernism. The emergence of the genre (together with the critical discourse about it as a genre) coincides historically with the Enlightenment efforts to forge modern subjectivity. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault uses the term “episteme” to designate the “discursive regularities” that produce and demarcate historical epochs; as Michael Minden points out, Foucault’s “modern’ episteme begins at the same time as the composition of Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre” (13). Goethe’s model also corresponds to a whole nexus of modern cultural moments, the ideology of which the present study is concerned. It is not merely fortuitous that the *Bildungsroman* as a genre emerged from an intellectual milieu in which the question of subjectivity was so central; nor is it an accident that more recently, as modernity has come under scrutiny, there has been a second boom in the publication of novels of *Bildung*. It is important to emphasize here that *Bildungsromane* are not only the cultural products of periods of “intellectual instability,” as Susan Gohlman argues (19), but, more precisely, they are the products of intellectual instability regarding notions of subjectivity.

If we are to believe Kant’s “Enlightenment” essay, the autonomous, conscious, coherent and unifying subject is the very ground of modernity. Yet this subject is the product not the progenitor of modern discourses. The idea that subjectivity is an undetermined and ahistorical given is itself an historically determined notion, as postmodern psychologists John Shotter and Kenneth Gergen point out:

> if we now find ourselves experiencing ourselves as self-contained, self-controlled individuals, owing nothing to others for our nature as such, we need not presume that this is a fixed or “natural” state of affairs. Rather, it is a form of
historically dependent intelligibility requiring for its continued sustenance a set of shared understandings. It is a moment in a still ongoing historical process and may be reconstituted as understandings change. (x)

While we now take the modern experience of selfhood as natural, pre-given, and self-evident, this subjectivity is, as Foucault reminds us, a "recent invention": the modern subject is "a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge" (Order xxiii). This subject's arrival, ushered in by René Descartes at the dawn of European Enlightenment and consolidated during Enlightenment discourse in the eighteenth century, is entrenched by the end of that century, the cusp of modernity.

The foundation for Enlightenment's construction of the subject is laid in the seventeenth century when Descartes makes "cogito ergo sum" — individual human consciousness — the centre of ontological coherence and epistemological certainty. The Cartesian cogito marks a major shift in conceptions of subjectivity since it turns the subject inward to ground meaning and certainty in self-consciousness. Descartes' theory is therefore critical in the turn to modern secular humanism. Yet, as Bowie argues in Aesthetics and Subjectivity, Descartes is still ultimately dependent on a deity: while he introduces consciousness as the centre of human being, Descartes "relies upon God to guarantee the order of the universe" (1). For Descartes, God provides "the bridge back to the world outside self-consciousness" (Bowie 5). With the gradual loss of God as transcendental signifier during the eighteenth century comes an exploration of alternative sources of ontological meaning and epistemological grounding. Increasingly, the principle of autonomous, rational consciousness becomes the foundation of enlightened subjectivity. It is Kant who, at the end of the eighteenth century, "makes it the task of philosophy to describe the structure of our consciousness, without having recourse to a divinity whose order is already inherent in the world" (Bowie 1-2). It is with Kant, then, that the modern problematic of subjectivity is set in motion.

Kant's essay, "Was ist Aufklärung?" like other philosophical works of the German Enlightenment, is an engagement with a crisis. In it, he confronts what Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow refer to as "the problem of moral action and social bonds [that] must be faced anew once revealed religion and metaphysics have lost their authority" ("Maturity" 110). Kant's response to this problem is to make subjective consciousness the unifying centre of things. In other words, his purpose is to find a new legitimizing foundation for human morals and sociopolitical relations in the face of a radical process of humanist secularization.

What Foucault, in his essay, "What is Enlightenment?," finds significant about Kant's essay of the same name is that Kant confronts his own "contemporary reality" (34), a crisis
of modernity. Dreyfus and Rabinow explain that "in a modernity-crisis, a taken-for-granted understanding of reality ceases to function as a shared background in terms of which people can orient and justify their activity" ("Maturity" 117). In confronting the loss of the taken-for-granted, Kant assumes a modern "attitude" which Foucault describes as a "critical ontology of ourselves" ("Enlightenment" 47). As Eugene W. Holland and Vassilis Lambropoulos point out, it is a crisis of the subject that has, in fact, defined modernity since its inception:

the task of the humanities since ... the turn of the eighteenth century at least, has been to manage the affairs of the individual man as Human – as an independent self endowed with the universal quality of autonomous reason. And universal Man lives in a permanent crisis of identity, caught between the luminous promise of insight and Bildung, on the one hand, and the threat of ignorance and self-forgetfulness, on the other. (3)

Even though current theory is problematizing the Enlightenment's constitution of the self as an autonomous subject, the "thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment," as Foucault writes, is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements," but rather an "attitude" of a "permanent critique of ourselves" (42-43). This critique reached a major crisis point at the end of the eighteenth century, and our current posthumanist or postmodern questioning of modern subjectivity can be said to mark another such critical moment.

Since the mid-1960s or so, the West has experienced what William Spanos refers to as a posthumanist "knowledge explosion" (xxi) which, in its decentering of "man," has precipitated a new, critical modernity-crisis. For the increasingly heterogeneous and post-colonized West, the taken-for-granted understanding of subjectivity can no longer be assumed as a shared background. This crisis, which appears in a variety of manifestations but which can be summarized as postmodernism, or a "crisis of modernity," has, again, precipitated a resurgence of the Bildung from an, most notably, the "female" and the "postcolonial" Bildung, as well as a renewed critical discourse about the genre.

A Critical Ontology of Ourselves

Although the current, theoretical engagement with the term "subject" suggests a postmodern rejection of Descartes’ conception of the self as the centre of consciousness and willful action, the decentering of the Cartesian subject was already initiated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Marx and Freud are behind the two most significant challenges to the subject of consciousness sustaining Enlightenment ideals. The Marxist insight that the subject is determined by its historical conditions and not vice
versa represents a major shift in conceptions of subjectivity and is epitomized by the famous line from Marx and Engels' *The German Ideology*: “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life” (47). Here, consciousness is “decentered” such that it is no longer the centered ground and origin of human experience and activity; rather, it is seen as produced by human activity. As Eagleton remarks, Marx and Engels recognized the ideological register of the self-conscious subject: “[they saw that] to conceive of forms of consciousness as autonomous, magically absolved from social determinants, is to uncouple them from history and so convert them into a natural phenomenon” (*Ideology* 59). Marx’s achievement was to decentre consciousness by placing the subject in history.

In the early twentieth century, Freud contributed an equally powerful critique of the conscious subject with his concept of the unconscious. With psychoanalysis, the subject is no longer the self-transparent consciousness of *cogito ergo sum*, but rather the product of unconscious forces, thus lacking the coherent intentionality of straightforward human agency. These unconscious forces are, moreover, in conflict. Against the “serenely balanced subject,” Freud claims that “our drives are in contradiction with one another, our faculties in a state of permanent warfare, our fulfilsments fleeting and tainted” (Eagleton, *Aesthetic* 263). Freud, that is, gives us a multiple, unstable and contradicted subject.

But modern subjectivity was not totally dismantled by Marx and Freud. Echoing the language of Kant’s Enlightenment essay, Seyla Benhabib’s analysis of the Marxist and Freudian critiques shows that, however much they decentre the conscious subject, they remain tied to modernity’s project of subjective “enlightenment”:

The historical and psychoanalytic critique of the Cartesian ego sees the task of reflection neither as the withdrawal from the world nor as access to clarity and distinctness, but as the rendering conscious of those unconscious forces of history, society, and the psyche. Although generated by the subject, these necessarily escape its memory, control, and conduct. The goal of reflection is emancipation from self-incurred bondage. (“Epistemologies” 111)

Here, Benhabib draws attention to the association of individual enlightenment — or subjective “maturity” — with self-determination and transparent self-knowledge. The task of what Benhabib calls “reflection,” therefore, is still to negate or conquer false consciousness — *te nosce*, to “know thyself.” While they are in crucial ways precursory to posthumanist critiques of subjectivity, Marxism and Freudianism nevertheless sustain the emancipatory project as perceived in the European Enlightenment. The “one who knows” remains the humanist individual or autonomous “self” posed in opposition to society (as source of the unconscious and of ideological “false consciousness”).

Rather ironically, moreover, the institutions to which Marxism and Freudianism gave
rise entrenched a dualism of the subjective and the social which would work to reify autonomous individualism. Indeed, the disciplinarity of the social sciences newly emerging in the early twentieth century has had a more profound influence on humanist studies in general — and on the subject humanist discourses reproduce — than is generally acknowledged. These disciplines have relied on the concept of the humanist subject while simultaneously planting the seed for undermining it. While psychology — especially in its particular inflection as psychoanalysis — would become one of the chief disciplines for decentering the conscious subject, its early institutionalization worked to reproduce the centrality of the sovereign subject as individual (a centrality that remains implicit in psychological practice, if not always in theory): as Stuart Hall argues, “the dualism typical of Cartesian thought was institutionalized in the split in the social sciences between psychology and the other disciplines. The study of the individual and its mental processes became psychology’s special and privileged object of study” (605). The discipline of sociology that began to emerge about this time developed, in important ways, out of a Marxist tradition and in opposition to psychology. Psychology and sociology work to reify the separation between the individual and the social. Each of the two disciplines continues to secure its own disciplinary boundaries by setting itself antithetically against the other in terms of a self/social binary, an opposition that, by extension, affects the Humanities overall. This disciplinary divisiveness of self and society offers one of the strongest arguments for a radical inter- or trans-disciplinarity in education (a point to which I will return in Part Two).

While the institutionalization of sociology opened up the possibility of deconstructing Cartesian individualism and reconstituting it as a product of the social, it also reinforced the radical separation between individual and society. This separation is embedded, however, in a sociological theory that stakes its claims on a denial of that separation. The primary concept of subjectivity for sociology was and remains the “radically interactive view” of symbolic interactionists where “individuals are formed subjectively through their membership of, and participation in, wider social relationships” (Hall 605). According to this view, the individual and the social are mutually imbricated through the “‘internalizing’ of the outside in the subject, and ‘externalizing’ of the inside through action in the social world” (Hall 605). In this formulation, however, the subject as autonomous individual is reconfirmed, since the “internal” and “external” are posited binarily. “With its stable reciprocity between ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’” this model retains Descartes’ essential dualism, especially in its “tendency to construct the problem as a relation between two connected, but separate, entities: here, ‘the individual and society’” (Hall 605). In its “outsideness,” society is that otherness that confirms the identity of self-hood.
The individual retains an inviolable interiority and autonomy. This theory situates the problem of the subject as essentially a dualism of structure and agency: on the one hand, as part of a structure, the subject is determined by social rules, prohibitions, and relations; on the other hand, the individual as agent is essentially an interiority that possesses feelings and thoughts of its own, and has experiences that can be understood outside the social. In the former, the meaning of the subject is found in the social; in the latter, the true meaning lies in its interiority, however buried beneath social inscription it may be. In this way, sociological discourses that set out to problematize the self/society dualism, reproduce, albeit inadvertently, the essential binary opposition of the two. The problematizing of this individual/society pair becomes more radically posthumanist with the twentieth-century “linguistic turn.”

The Linguistic Subject

In literature and in literary criticism, the modern subject enjoys a privileged place. If the Humanities as a whole can be seen as an “assemblage of disciplines centering on the constitution and (re-)elaboration of autonomous subjectivity (Holland and Lambropoulos 6), then the English department is surely the spiritual centre of this assemblage. Certainly since the emergence of the novel, literature has been a trenchant site for the production and reinforcement of modern subjectivity. “The novel,” as Jonathan Rée puts it, “specializes in subjectivity” (206).

Narrative literature is grounded in the basic unit of the sentence. And, since the sentence (subject, predicate) is the basic unit of language, the subject of the sentence grounds and propels discourse. Yet, as poststructuralist theorists have shown over the last generation or so, language positions subjects, so that subjectivity is an effect of language rather than, as is commonly held, vice versa. Catherine Belsey explains:

> It is language which provides the possibility of subjectivity because it is language which enables the speaker to posit himself or herself as “I,” as the subject of a sentence. It is through language that people constitute themselves as subjects. Consciousness of self is possible only through contrast, differentiation: “I” cannot be conceived without the conception “non-I,” “you,” and dialogue, the fundamental condition of language, implies a reversible polarity between “I” and “you.” (Critical 59)

This grammatical “subject” is analogous to the subject of the narrative. “I” is a grammatical position in which the subject emerges. Most modern fiction makes the pronominal subject of the sentence (I, he, she) the protagonist of the narrative, the singular
centre of the fictional world. This is particularly so with the realist novel which, as Belsey points out, is the privileged mode of subjective centering. Defined in customarily humanist terms, realist literature is a story communicated from one subject to another; in this sense it is the exemplary fiction of what Belsey calls "expressive realism," the "theory that literature reflects the reality of experience as it is perceived by one (especially gifted) individual, who expresses it in a discourse which enables other individuals to recognize it as true" (Critical 7). In its valorization of the centred subject of consciousness, the realist novel — invented in the eighteenth century and consummated in the nineteenth — helped to ensure the sedimentation of the autonomous, self-present subject and its transparent representations of reality.

It is generally agreed that by the end of the eighteenth century, Europe had witnessed the rise of the category of the literary and of the aesthetic generally, a category that would guarantee the coherence and meaningful certainty of the modern, secular self.10 Roland Barthes, in his 1968 essay, "The Death of the Author," puts it this way:

The author is a modern character, no doubt produced by our society as it emerged from the Middle Ages, inflected by English empiricism, French rationalism, and the personal faith of the Reformation, thereby discovering the prestige of the individual, or, as we say more nobly, of the "human person." (49-50)

In an essay on the Bildungsroman, Martin Swales argues that the concept of individualism as guarantor of meaning and coherence emerging in eighteenth-century Europe was reflected in literature's changing narrative voice and its epistemological stance. The new, modern concept of subjectivity as individuality was a condition of possibility for the modern novel: "the breakthrough in sensibility that makes the novel possible in the eighteenth century has to do with a perception of the specific nature of experience, with the individuality and particularity of the vital criteria which determine significance and truthfulness ("Irony" 64-65). The novel privatizes experience and consolidates subjectivity as autonomous individualism so that the literary experience becomes interiorized and intimate. As Swales argues, "in respect of narrative forms, the eighteenth century witnesses the breakdown of a stable, public rhetoric in favor of a private language in which the narrator appeals to the reader's own experience as epistemological authority" ("Irony" 65). This private, interior language worked to centre experience and narrative in individual consciousness.11 The novel thus became the literary form of modern individualism.

Central to the workings of the literary as subjectivating apparatus is a valorization of the autonomous individual as author, or what Foucault, in his 1969 essay, "What is an Author?," calls the "author function," which emerged in the eighteenth century to replace the
notion of fiction as "polysemous" (119). The author is a category not confined to the literary, in other words, but rather a function more broadly representative of autonomous individualism as self-authoring subjectivity. Foucault elaborates: "since the eighteenth century, the author has played the role of the regulator of the fictive, a role quite characteristic of our era of industrial and bourgeois society, of individualism and private property" (119). The author function exemplifies modern individualism, and it dominates the literary into the twentieth century: "the image of literature to be found in contemporary culture is tyrannically centered on the author" (Barthes "Death" 50).

Since the mid-twentieth-century, this role of the author-subject has increasingly been denaturalized by such poststructuralist thinkers as Barthes, Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan who record the failure of modern subjectivity to provide ontological and epistemological certainty because, rather than controlling its discourse, it is itself constructed, they argue, in and by language, an indeterminate and unstable system. It is not surprising, therefore, that the denaturalization of the modern subject has perhaps been felt most acutely in English studies. Precisely because the category of the literary is so deeply invested in modern subjectivity, it is in English studies that the subject has been most rigorously problematized — and most jealously guarded.

It is in structuralist accounts of language that the notion of the “death of the author” has its roots. Poststructuralist theories of language and subjectivity are greatly indebted to the structural linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who points out in Course in General Linguistics that language is not private and individual, but rather it is a public and social system operating outside any individual instance of it. It is a system which denies or disregards human agency, yet it is one in which individuals assume (subject) positions. Language, in other words, is a system of signs (langue) which precedes any particular use of it (parole), so that language pre-exists the individual. Since the subject is not anterior to language, consciousness does not exist prior to or outside of its efforts to know (itself); it does not pre-exist the subject’s efforts to describe it. The semiotic insight which emerged from Saussurian linguistics that the subject is a position in language is best summarized by Emile Benveniste’s famous passage from his 1966 “Subjectivity in Language” where he echoes Marx but changes the major constituting element from economics to linguistics: “it is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject” (729).

But, as poststructuralist theory has shown, this subject, like signification, is never final, replete, or plenitudinous. Since, in language, signification is the product of a system of differences, there is no positive, fixed meaning. Derrida’s term “différance,” an aural pun playing on the French words for both difference and deferral, is crucial here. His position is influenced by de Saussure’s other major insight that the linguistic sign is arbitrary, that
there is no necessary link between the sign and the object it signifies. Since language, or discourse, for Derrida, is a product of differences, the meaning of any signifier is always and endlessly deferred along a chain of signifiers that never settles on a signified. Both diachronically and synchronically, then, meaning is slippery, elusive. There is no final identity between signifier and signified. For instance, the word "I" never finally coincides with the consciousness pronouncing it; the signified constantly slips from the signifier's grasp. Making the analogous link here between language and subjectivity, Stuart Hall writes: "meaning is inherently unstable: it aims for closure (identity), but it is constantly disrupted (by difference)" (609). Like the grammatical subject, the human subject is a structural event in a system of differences. Differance, for Derrida, is constitutive of both language and the subject; as he puts it in *Speech and Phenomena*, "the movement of difference is not something which occurs to a transcendental subject. It is what produces it" (82). Logocentrism is the privileging of the dual notions that language is the mimetic representation of the real world which precedes it and that there is a non-linguistic self prior to the enunciation of an "I." Derrida's phrase, the "metaphysics of presence," refers to the logocentric desire for closure, for subjective plenitude in consciousness and semantic plenitude in language.

This desire is attenuated in narrative trajectories. While the modern subject of the literary text is supposed to exemplify and guarantee the presence of the subject, Derridean poststructuralism has shown that this plenitude "never arrives" (to adapt the central metaphor in *The Post Card*). The desire for undifferentiated narrative coherence that would confirm the self as centre and origin of that meaning is always slipping and endlessly unfulfilled. "Writing constantly posits meaning but always in order to evaporate it" (54), as Barthes puts it in "The Death of the Author." The subject, therefore, is never fully available to consciousness, always radically irretrievable. Access to subjective consciousness is always mediated. The subject, then, is shown to be an ideological construct, a function of discourse or textuality, an attempt to refuse difference and arrest the free-play of language.

But to arrest that difference would be the subject's death. The endless deferral of that death is what propels the concatenation of narrative desire. In "That Obscure Object of Narrative," Angela S. Moger argues that

> meaning is to narrative as fulfillment is to desire; possession means death. Stories work by going through the motions of imparting information which they only promise but never really deliver. A story is a question to be pursued; if there is no enigma, no space to be traversed, there is no story. (135)

Presence, always apparently within reach, constantly evades the subject's grasp, yet the
narrative promise constantly tempts this grasping for the replete self.

Lacanian theory, with its analysis of the psycholinguistic constitution of the subject has gone some way to explain this desire for narrative plenitude and the subject it produces. Lacan's readings of Freud are crucial to the general decentering of the subject I am sketching here. In Jane Gallop's summary, "Lacan teaches that language speaks the subject, that the speaker is subjected to language rather than master of it" (Reading 43).

Lacan's debt to structuralist linguistics is announced by his famous dictum, "the unconscious is structured like a language." That is, Lacan holds that both the conscious and the unconscious are linguistically or discursively produced when the subject acquires language. And the subject is an inscription in that language. While Freud's unconscious was the site of an a priori to which psychoanalysis promised access, Lacan's unconscious is, like consciousness, constituted in language and therefore never fully graspable. As Kaja Silverman puts it, the mirror stage (the first step in the accession from the "imaginary" or pre-linguistic stage to the "Symbolic" or linguistic stage) is itself "only retrospectively realized — realized from a position within language, and within the symbolic" (161). Against Freud, Lacan sees the unconscious, or the "Imaginary," not as anterior and natural, but rather as constructed in language, in the Symbolic: "the unconscious is neither primordial nor instinctual; what it knows about the elementary is no more than the elements of the signifier" (Silverman 170). In other words, since the unconscious is the (retrospective) effect of the entry into language, into the Symbolic, it is linguistic. The perception of the unconscious as prelinguistic, therefore, is itself imaginary (hence, "the Imaginary"). The false image or "memory" of the self as whole and unified in the pre-Symbolic is a fantasy formed in the mirror stage." The fundamental alienation of the self as divided or fragmented (the split subject/object of the mirror reflection) is covered over by an imaginary and unstable identity. That is, the child, who is not yet coordinated, sees itself, or imagines it sees itself, reflected in the mirror (a reflection confirmed by the m/other) as whole and unified. This "image in which we first recognize ourselves is a misrecognition [méconnaissance]" (Mitchell 30). Thus, Lacan emphasizes that the concept of the self as unified and autonomous is a fiction. As Juliet Mitchell argues,

Lacan's account of subjectivity was always developed with reference to the idea of a fiction .... [The child's mirror] image is a fiction because it conceals, or freezes, the infant's lack of motor co-ordination and the fragmentation of its drives. (30)

But "fiction" here does not mean a "false" or artificial self as opposed to an "authentic" self; in fact, the fictional mirror stage is formative since it gives the child its first sense of self-recognition, of an identity, however illusory, in which it can find itself. As Lacan
argues in his lecture entitled “The mirror stage,” “the illusion of autonomy to which [the ego] entrusts itself” constitutes one of the premises underlying “the self-sufficiency of consciousness” (6). One’s sense of unity is therefore always fictional; it is always incomplete, precarious, always being sought and endlessly deferred.

The maintenance of this illusion of semantic and subjective plenitude depends on a constant suppression of difference (the other, the subject as also other/object). In signification, the radical arbitrariness of the relation between signifier and signified is suppressed so that adequate meaning can be communicated; and this adequation, taken to be plenitudinous, is guaranteed by the subject(s) of the communication in their apparent presentness. Regarding the idea of the adequation of meaning that secures the subject, Philip Rosen is worth quoting at length:15

Let us suppose, with Lacan, that the developing self-consciousness of the child comes terrified into signifying systematicity. What would such a developing self-consciousness seek there? What could a signifying system offer it? Presumably, there would have to be some reassurance against the central anxiety which psychoanalysis labels as castration. Therefore, at least from the subject’s perspective, signifying systems would have to include something at the service of coherent identity, of a security of self. This occurs on the level of meaning. The impression of a reassuringly adequate relation between signifier and signified and/or sign and referent is achieved in practice for the subject, despite the fact of the arbitrariness of the sign and the basis of language in what threatens the subject — difference. (162)

Any adequate instance of language use secures the subjective positions of speaking and listening subjects, argues Rosen, “insofar as an impression of delimitable meaning is achieved: I speak and you understand” (162). Here Rosen invokes the analogy between language and subjectivity by pointing out that, while “adequation is often described as a relation of substitutability between sign and referent or between signifier and signified,” the point here is that

it is precisely to the extent that the sign or signifier can be ... comprehended as adequate that the subject is safely positioned as such. This is because that adequation is an experience of guaranteed understanding and/or knowledge by the subject: it is I who comprehends, it is my capacities which are demonstrated in “sending” and “receiving” “communications.” (162)

In seeking the elusive self as stable identity, the subject must deny difference. That is, the principle of difference, as the very basis of signification, is denied or overlooked in the
search for coherence, and this coherence, as Rosen puts it is then “attributed to the very being of the subject.” In order for the subject to (mis)recognize itself as stable and coherent in language, it must “read ‘through’ the materiality of language as a structuring of differences and in spite of the latter find evidence of self-coherence” (163). Against heterogeneity and difference, the impression of stable and replete meaning is produced in signifying practices; this apparent coherence fixes the subject in a position of identity that halts the play of difference: narrative coherence therefore works constantly to produce (the illusion of) subjective plenitude.

The relationship between the desire for unified subjectivity and the desire for semantic fullness is analogous. This double plenitude is repeatedly promised, and constantly withheld, by the seductive pull of narrative and the grammatical subject position which grounds and propels it. As Hall puts it, “psychoanalytically, the reason why we continually search for ‘identity,’ constructing biographies which knit together the different parts of our divided selves into a unity, is to recapture [the] fantasized pleasure of fullness (plenitude)” (608). Narratives constantly attempt to recapture the story of the self. As the realist novel, par excellence, the Bildungsroman exemplifies this process. It plots what Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift refer to as the “Kantian-Cartesian” understanding of the subject, “in which self awareness is part of a continuing biography that tags each experience as belonging to a distinct self” (7). The constant confirmation of “self,” then, is achieved through the narrative trajectory of Bildung.

The Subject in Narrative

Narrative, according to Jean-François Lyotard, “is the quintessential form of customary knowledge” (19), and the exemplary modern narrative is the Bildungsroman. Indeed, for Lyotard, the founding moment of modernity’s liberal humanist subject, Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, is itself a Bildungsroman (29). Silverman points out that Descartes’ story of the discovery of cogito is pervaded by the first-person pronoun. While Descartes would take this “I” to be a spontaneous and mimetic reflection of the speaker’s identity, poststructuralists, following Benveniste’s semiotics, would argue that the trajectory of the I constructs the identity of the subject. Descartes’ exemplary story illustrates that the implicit subject — the I, or he, or she — which propels narrative is not simply universal, ahistorical, and given. It is, rather, a product of language and therefore of an historical interdiscourse, and, as such, is necessarily ideological. As the definitive story of the “coming of age,” the Bildungsroman exemplifies the (meta)narrative of modern subjectivity.
The meaning of Bildung or of maturity is itself mediated by narrative conventions and expectations. Psycholinguistic accounts of subjectivity posit the subject not as something which simply appears in narrative as the expression of an a priori, but rather as something continually positioned by narrative. Because the subject recognizes itself in narrative, it takes the narrative to be a natural reflection of itself. The ideology of recognition is hidden in that apparent self-reflection. Althusser uses psychoanalytic metaphors to describe discourse or ideology as the mirror in which a society “can recognize itself (but not know itself)” (Qtd. in Silverman 217); subjects recognize themselves in the stories they construct about themselves while perceiving those stories to be a spontaneous, mimetic representation of a discovered reality. Althusser’s mirror metaphor, writes Silverman, describes the process whereby the subject constantly rediscovers itself in the same ideological representations by means of which it first knew itself .... [it] does so transparently, without any consciousness that the images and narratives with which [it] identifies are historically and culturally specific. (217)

Thus, the subject perceives itself as anterior to the narratives by which it comes to “know” itself. As poststructuralist theorists have argued, however, the subject is not merely “discovered” as an entity occurring in time; nor does subjectivity consist merely of its persistence across time; rather the self is found through a narrative consistency that sustains subjective coherence and continuity. It is by situating them historically in terms of a logical narrative trajectory that the events that make up daily life come to have meaning and coherence. In Modernity and Self-Identity, Anthony Giddens argues that narrative is critical to making everyday experience meaningful and coherent: a person’s identity is not to be found in behaviour, nor — important though this is — in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going. The individual’s biography, if she is to maintain a regular interaction with others in the day to day world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into an ongoing “story” about the self. (54)

In semiotic parlance, then, the subject does not speak the narratives; rather, it is spoken by them.

It is through the structures of narrative that we make sense of our lives. Yet, J. Hillis Miller asks, “Why do we need the ‘same’ story over and over?” (70). Miller asks the question in order to emphasize that, while the contents of stories change, formal generic conventions remain the same, and it is this repetition we find pleasurable, irresistible. The form of the story compels the endless desire for meaning and the concomitant desire for the coherent subject position which signification incessantly promises. Miller goes on to ask, “Why do
we always need more stories?” (72). Is there no point at which we finally “recover,” or, in Freudian terminology, “re-find,” ourselves in narrative? In pursuing this question, Miller implicitly evokes the Bildungsroman as ubiquitous exemplar of the search for self-coherent subjectivity:

It would seem that once a man or woman has reached adulthood, with the help of all the narratives with which a growing youth is surrounded, he or she would then be fully assimilated into the culture, with a definite self and a definite role in society and therefore no more need for stories. (72)

In asking the question of narrative, Miller positions the reader as the subject in a Bildungsroman. His analogy points to the naturalization of the idea of Bildung. And he captures the heart of Bildung: the pedagogical purpose of its narrative — always analogous to psychoanalysis’ story of development — is to educate individuals as subjects fully assimilated to the status quo.

Miller recognizes, however, that, by virtue of its endless repetition, the narrative admits to its own inadequacy; it is somehow insufficient. The subject is endlessly deferred and the attempt to capture it in narrative is, therefore, indefinite. As he puts it, “we always need more stories because in some way they do not satisfy” (72). The subject produced in language, in narrative, never arrives; the desire for its arrival (as “imaginary” recovery of its loss) precipitates further narrativization. Since it does not exist apart from the discourses through which it emerges, the subject must be constantly reproduced through discourses — through psychology, literature, pedagogy, and other narratives of the self. Since the desire for discursive plenitude is endless, the subject must be constantly reconstructed.

The process of subjectivation is ceaseless because the “self” — as pure, unadulterated a priori — is not finally found in, or behind, or beneath the narrative; rather the narrative is the (finding of) self. In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre makes the oft-quoted argument that the human self comes to us through narrative. MacIntyre situates his thesis against that existentialist position taken by Sartre that to formulate a life in the form of narrative is to falsify that life. Sartre’s position has become, of course, commonplace: the current New Age movement, in fact, relies on it in its privileging of a “real” or authentic self buried beneath layers of cultural inscription. MacIntyre argues, conversely, that “the characterization of actions allegedly prior to any narrative form being imposed upon them will always turn out to be the presentation of what are plainly the disjointed parts of some possible narrative” (215). Narrative form makes content “intelligible”; in other words, for MacIntyre, insofar as form reflects content, narrative has a “natural” relation to life events. What I want to emphasize, however, is that the content is only known through the form.16
Narrative is not merely a more or less adequate reflection of the self; rather, narrative, or discourse, is the only access to the self; it makes the self intelligible. To alter the words of Fredric Jameson’s famous formulation of history as text, “the [subject] is inaccessible to us except in textual form.” Just as for Jameson a critical element of this statement is that despite poststructuralist views of language as constitutive, history does, by necessity, exist prior to its textualization, for MacIntyre, the narrated self “presupposes” personal identity, even if that personal identity cannot be elucidated outside narratives. For MacIntyre, in fact, the rift between the telling of a story and the living of that story is not so great. For him, living itself partakes of narrative logic. With Heather Dubrow, he would say that we live our lives as if they were narratives. We think life experiences in narrative form; we cannot, however, think or speak — or know — of the subject (its experience) outside its narrativization. That is, even if there were an essential self outside of the discourses through which it is constructed, we could not have access to it, we could not know it. The desire for the self, then, is a desire for (the end of) its narrativization, a desire enacted through the ceaseless telling of the story of the self.

It is in this context that the operations of narrative ideology can be disclosed. Silverman argues in Althusserian terms that the seductive syntax of narrative “sutures” individuals as subjects into the narrative such that they subject themselves “freely” to this subjection and believe themselves to be outside the ideology which has interpellated them. Narrative, in literature, film, psychology and so on, continually moves ahead from the (unspoken, absent) past in a signifying chain constantly securing individuals as subjects into its discourse, into the “fiction of anticipated totality” (Heath, Questions 15). The trajectory of the “I” through the narrative constructs the self identity of the subject. Because the subject is constructed in/by language, it is an effect of ideology. In Critical Practice, Catherine Belsey provides a succinct summation of subjectivity as an ideological effect: the modern subject, she writes, “is constructed in language and in discourse and, since the symbolic order in its discursive use is closely related to ideology, in ideology” (61). One of the major purposes of the ideology of the subject is to hide the sutures that secure the place of the subject in discourse so that the discourse appears to originate from the subject, and thus the subject appears self-generating and self-governing and thereby “free.” This formulation is crucial here since literary narrative is a central site for the production of subjects and therefore the production of the ideology of subjectivity. Belsey puts it this way:

If we accept Lacan’s analysis of the importance of language in the construction of the subject it becomes apparent that literature as one of the most persuasive uses of language may have an important influence on the ways in which people
grasp themselves and their relation to the real relations in which they live. (Critical 66)

Thus, fiction sutures the individual life into the position of the subject, a position that is naturalized and normalized by narrative. “We grasp our lives,” as Charles Taylor puts it, “in a narrative” (47). Our concepts of ourselves are inextricable from the narratives through which we come to know ourselves; our self-concepts, in other words, do not precede their representation or mediation. It is in narratives that we inscribe our desire for immediate subjectivity as semantic coherence and self-identity. In Teresa de Lauretis’ words,

subjectivity is engaged in the cogs of narrative and indeed constituted in the relation of narrative, meaning, and desire; so that the very work of narrativity is the engagement of the subject in certain positionalities of meaning and desire. (Alice 106)

Of course, “narrative” here applies not just to fiction, but also to those various discourses (scientific, philosophical, psychological, and so on) through which subjects are interpellated. These discourses are examples of what Foucault calls “technologies of the self” that have constituted the modern subject and legitimized modernity’s values. Thus, the task of Foucault’s “critical ontology of ourselves” is no longer to “know thyself,” but rather to “know, critically, the historical constituents of thyself.”

Modern Power and the Ideology of the Subject

It is through the apparently innocent stories of selfhood that the subject comes to be constituted, but these stories are never ideologically neutral. It is pertinent here to continue with Jameson’s example of the narrativization of history where he adds that history is only available to us when it “passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the political unconscious” (35; emphasis added). Located at particular historical and cultural junctures, narratives of selfhood reproduce particular ideologies of subjectivity. Indeed, lest the psycholinguistic process of subjectivation outlined in the preceding section is taken to be natural and ahistorical, and hence immutable, let me underscore here the social dimension of this discursively, and therefore ideologically, produced subject. If, in the pages that follow, the psychoanalytic pattern nevertheless provides a recurring motif, this is not to reduce subjectivity to a predictable Oedipal account as if this were the “discovery” of an inevitability, nor is it to reduce the subject to an interior, private matter, as if it were not the object of power. Rather, the psychoanalytical model should be understood in its cultural and historical context: the psychoanalytic story is as much a part of the modern
episteme—to use Foucault’s designation—as is the ideology of the Bildung-subject of which it partakes. Psychoanalysis belongs to the episteme of the age of subjectivity.

In fact, one of the effects of Lacan’s reworking of Freud is to situate subject formation in a linguistic context and therefore to allow models of subjectivity which take into account the social in a way that deconstructs the disciplinary opposition of psychology and sociology. The subject is inaugurated by a language—a social system—which precedes it. Since any social system is always an ongoing process structured by relations of power which are always mutable, constantly reworked and restructured, the subject is therefore never stable or coherent. Stephen Heath argues the point:

The construction of the subject is never finished, is interminable ... the individual is always entering, emerging as a subject in language. ... The individual is always a subject in society, the place of social and ideological formations. (Questions 126)

The emergence of the subject in the family is perhaps the clearest example of this process. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault shows that family structure in the modern West is modeled after other modern institutions, such as those of education, that regulate their members through subjection. It is through these institutions that subjects are normalized:

one day we should show how intrafamilial relations, essentially in the parents-children cell, have become “disciplined,” absorbing since the classical age external schemata, first educational and military, then medical, psychiatric, psychological, which have made the family the privileged locus of emergence for the disciplinary question of the normal and the abnormal. (Discipline 215–16)

In the modern West, the family, which, like education, health, and psychology is perceived as part of the “private” and therefore non-ideological domain, is a primary site for the ideological construction of the self.

Since the family is the site of the acquisition of a language which precedes it, it determines in advance the familial positions the subject will occupy. As Althusser puts it, “we know in advance that [the child] will bear its Father’s Name” (164). He points out that each individual is a subject “even before he is born,” since each is born into a family:

“before its birth, the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is ‘expected’ once it has been conceived” (“Ideology” 164-65). In this way, the family is a kind of language. In his essay “Freud and Lacan,” Althusser writes that the family is not a biological one, but is made up of “determinate ideological formations of kinship structures,” and the inauguration of the subject in the family is therefore an “historical-material” construction of a “pre-appointed” (194n) position. The family, then, is the ideal linguistic site for the
production of subjectivities.

Published in 1970, Althusser’s essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” remains central to contemporary theory’s reconceptualization of subjectivity as a discursive and ideological construct. Althusser follows a Marxist tradition in stressing that social relations and practices precede consciousness; that is, the institutionalization of normative ideologies ensures that consciousness is constituted according to hegemonic injunctions. Yet, in his use of Lacanian metaphors, Althusser opens the way for an understanding of subject formation that constructs a psychological as well as a social subject.

Since my reliance throughout this study on Althusser is essential but not always explicit, let me provide here a brief overview of his major terms. In his analysis of ideology, Althusser makes a distinction between repressive state apparatuses (RSAs) and ideological state apparatuses (ISAs). The RSAs are those visible representatives of ruling power (the government, the police, the courts, and so on); state power is mediated by the ISAs, where the ruling ideology is “realized” and reproduced through the “invisible” apparatuses of social institutions (religion, family, communications media [literature and the arts], and education). In his now famous formulation of ideology, Althusser states that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (153). The “category of the subject,” which is the “elementary ideological effect,” (161) determines that subjects imagine that their material practices in ideological apparatuses are manifestations of autonomous consciousness as origin of ideas and acts (157-59). Yet, “in reality,” consciousness is “spoken by” ideology; in other words, ideology “interpellates” individuals as subjects (160). Concrete individuals “spontaneously” respond to the ideological interpellation, or “hailing,” whereby they (mis)recognize themselves in the “obviousness” of subjectivity and are thereby “subjected” to its demand (160-61). Subjects are therefore complicit with their own subjection; they “freely” submit to it and “work by themselves” to reproduce it (169).

Althusserian theory opened up a new way of understanding ideology as productive or positive. There are, in fact, two extremes between which lie a wide variety of concepts of ideology. On the one hand is the view of ideology as “false consciousness,” as the direct reflection of the interests of the ruling class. This is the negative view of ideology. On the other hand is the positive view which deconstructs the usual binary opposition between freedom and coercion and sees ideology instead as productive, as “ideas in the active service of a class’s interests” (Eagleton Ideology 120). This view partakes of a broader Althusserian definition where all thought and discourse is interested, a view which, as Eagleton warns, can too easily slide into the ineffectual notion that “everything is ideological,” an extreme postmodern relativism which empties ideology of meaning.
Since the concept of ideology used in this study leans toward the latter, positive, definition, it is useful to clarify the term as I employ it here. As Eagleton remarks, ideology refers not to a direct reflection of power, but rather to strategies and discourses that promote and legitimize the interests of power. Yet it is critical to emphasize a distinction between hegemonic and non-hegemonic ideologies, because ideologies are material to the extent they are put into practice. By “practice” I do not mean to deny that language has material effects; rather, I want to stress, with Eagleton, that a statement cannot be assessed “in isolation from its discursive context” (Ideology 9). In other words, ideology is contained in discourse as the social context of language rather than in language as autonomous. Ideology is therefore a matter of what Eagleton calls “concrete discursive effects, rather than of signification as such” (Ideology 223). In this view, power is certainly everywhere, but it is nothing until it is put into practice. Ideology is the place where power and discourse meet, but, in any given power relation, its concrete effects are realized by those whose discursive practices are sovereign. As Eagleton puts it, “what is primarily ideological about [discursive statements] is the power-interests they serve and the political effects they generate” (Ideology 9). This is in line with the Foucauldian understanding of power as not simply a matter of oppression, but of a complex network of power relations pervading all levels of social life. This concept of power has demonstrated (in a way that has proven enormously valuable to feminism, for example) that politics do not exist in isolation from our everyday “personal” or “private” lives. Thus, it is important to note in terms of the present study that ideologies are not merely the rational expression of conscious and definitive programs; such a view, as Eagleton rightly points out, “misses the affective, unconscious, mythical or symbolic dimensions of ideology; the way it constitutes the subject’s lived, apparently spontaneous relations to a power-structure and comes to provide the invisible colour of daily life itself” (221). Ideology appears on the level of the everyday and is perhaps most powerful when it denies itself as such.

Although Pierre Bourdieu is concerned with subjectivity only indirectly in Outline of a Theory of Practice, he is pertinent to the present study since his purpose is to interrogate the apparatuses through which ideology functions in the everyday. Bourdieu shows that ideology does not always appear explicitly as coercive or oppressive power. Rather, it works silently on the level of the taken for granted, on the level of everyday life, or the "habitus." His notion of the habitus is a subtle variation of ideological constructivism in that it deconstructs the binary dilemma that opposes determinism and freedom: through the habitus, the structure which has produced it governs practice, not by the processes of a mechanical determinism, but through the mediation of the orientations and limits it assigns to the habitus’s operations of invention.
Ideology operates, that is, through the inculcation of quotidian habits or "dispositions," which generate particular ideological practices. Subjective inculcation involves what Bourdieu refers to as those "small, seemingly insignificant or merely circumstantial moments" (165) which, he argues, are synecdochal moments of the larger process of human subjectivation, moments which carry an inescapable "symbolic power" (165). Each apparently insignificant moment is a synecdoche signifying the larger ideology in which subjects are caught up, in which individuals learn to be subjects. Each pedagogical moment "evoke[s] the whole system of which it is a part" (94). It is in the habitus that the individual learns to be a subject. The habitus reveals itself in the minutia of everyday moments of cultural imbrication, or what Bourdieu calls "pedagogic actions." The pedagogy of the everyday ensures the reproduction of "normalcy":

The whole trick of pedagogic reason lies precisely in the way it extorts the essential while seeming to demand the insignificant: in obtaining the respect for form and forms of respect which constitute the most visible and at the same time the best-hidden (because most "natural") manifestation of submission to the established order, the incorporation of the arbitrary abolishes what Raymond Ruyer calls "lateral possibilities," that is, all the eccentricities and deviations which are the small change of madness. (94-95)

The habitus is thereby re-enforced by an "implicit pedagogy" (94) which maintains ideology's invisibility. As I argued in Chapter One, the subjectivation of individuals is a synecdoche for the larger Enlightenment project of human maturation, or what Bauman calls "humanization." The synecdochal moments of individual subjectivation are cumulative of a more general cultural unconscious. What Bourdieu calls "dispositions" operate in the (cultural) unconscious; they take on the appearance of second nature, so that they seem spontaneous and voluntary. The individual "man," to use the parlance I invoked in Chapter One, participates "naturally," as it were, in the everyday ideology of "Man."

Yet it is nevertheless crucial to distinguish as ideological those daily practices that have substantive political import. In one of his most useful formulations, Eagleton argues that "the force of the term ideology lies in its capacity to discriminate between those power struggles which are somehow central to a whole form of social life, and those which are not" (Ideology 8). Here, I stray somewhat from Eagleton's definition in that, since hegemonic ideologies are multiple, dynamic, and complex, they rationalize the interests not only of the dominant classes, but of the dominant races and gender as well. As Eagleton himself points out, ideology is not homogenous; rather, it is a complex phenomenon, marked by a "relational character; by the conflicting interests among which it
must ceaselessly negotiate" (222). There is, for example, no easy ideological agreement between the interests of feminist, anti-racist, and Marxist counter-hegemonies, so that the conflicts among ideologies to which Eagleton refers take place among them as well as against dominant ideologies.

What hegemonic ideologies in the modern West have in common, however, is an investment in the ideology of subjective individualism. Although, as Eagleton points out, ideology is "not reducible to the question of subjectivity," in modern political systems ideology is "subject-centred" (Ideology 223). He summarizes modern hegemony in terms that place the ideology of the subject at its centre:

[i]deology is] an organizing force which actively constitutes human subjects at the roots of their lived experience and seeks to equip them with forms of value and belief relevant to their specific social tasks and to the general reproduction of the social order. (Ideology 222-23)

Autonomous individualism is one of the most insidious effects of this subjectivation. The autonomy imperative (Foucault's "individualization") ensures that subjects will submit freely, and on their own, to the state. The autonomous individual is modernity's answer to the problem how to manage the bourgeois masses in large capitalist systems; as Eagleton comments in The Ideology of the Aesthetic, "the idea of autonomy — of a mode of being which is entirely self-regulating and self-determining — provides the middle class with just the ideological model of subjectivity it requires for its material operations" (9). The notion of the essential self, ultimately untouched by ideology, is the bond that connects subjects in a "universal humanity." In this view, "there exists a precious, universal, ‘innocent’ instance in which we can all recognize ourselves" (Copjec 30). Thus, individuals freely "subject" themselves to the illusion of self-determination and, rather than realizing they are "in" ideology, they experience the highly institutionalized ideology of individual autonomy as the exercise of their essential freedom. But, in fact, individualism is itself one of power's "prime effects," (98) as Foucault puts it in Power/Knowledge. The individual is not an a priori element against which power acts; rather, it is produced by and mutually imbricated with power:

the individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle. (Foucault, Power/Knowledge 98)

Yet power in modern Western hegemony is sustained by the ideology that the individual is that which eludes power. It is an ideology that relies on the tendency in liberal-humanist thinking to posit social life as a conflict between the negatively opposed concepts of
freedom and coercion. The subject, or “self,” in this thinking, is the transcendental signifier of freedom.

This reigning ideology — the backbone of sociopolitical modernity — ensures that subjects submit voluntarily to the injunctions of subjectivity. What is crucial to this ideology is that subjects not only be subjected, but that they believe themselves to be self-determining and therefore innocent of ideology. Following an Althusserian tradition, Michel Pêcheux calls this phenomenon “forgetting.” Subjects are so much “in” ideology that they “forget” they are a function of discourse and they therefore “misrecognize” themselves as authors in control of their discourses. In this way, subjects, believing themselves to be autonomous agents, reproduce the ideology that they are free of ideology. Bourdieu argues similarly that historical forgetting constitutes the “cultural unconscious” whereby subjects integrate with the objective conditions of the habitus: “the ‘unconscious’ is never anything other than the forgetting of history which history itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second natures of habitus” (78-79).

By “forgetting” they are produced by the habitus, subjects reproduce it:

- each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy nilly, is a producer and reproducer of objective meaning. Because his actions and words are the product of a modus operandi of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery, they contain an “objective intention” ... which always outruns his conscious intentions. (79)

Thus each subject itself reproduces the ideology by which it was constructed. When functioning optimally, this subject not only forgets its subjection, but it comes to experience that subjection as its very freedom: “the liberated subject is the one who has appropriated the law as the very principle of its own autonomy” (Eagleton Aesthetic 19). Ideology is that against which the subject’s very autonomy supposedly safeguards it.

Althusser explains the centrality of the ideology of autonomous individualism to modern forms of governance: through an “ideological ‘conceptual’ device,” a “subject [is] endowed with a consciousness in which he freely forms or freely recognizes ideas in which he believes” (Ideology 157). This subjective consciousness is felt to be the absolute ground of freedom itself: outside the public domain, it is outside of ideology. This, for Althusser, is the elementary ideological effect. This essential distinction between the public and the private allows modernity to interpellate subjects on the level of the private while allowing those subjects to believe their private “choices” are autonomous and free.

Because the modern subject voluntarily submits to the ideological strategies which constitute it, it becomes its own government. This internalization or privatization of hegemonic law is a key movement of subjectivation for the bourgeoisie of early
capitalism. As Nikolas Rose argues, not only has the ideological discourse of privacy “disguised and legitimated the authority of men in the household over both women and children,” but it has also “obliterated the extent to which the state actually shape[s] and control[s] relations in the intimate sphere for public, political ends” (Governing 124). In this way, the division between the public and the private is a key element in laissez-faire liberalism. The self-governing individual is crucial to the maintenance of hegemonic power, according to Eagleton:

...a shift from coercion to consent is implicit in the very material conditions of middle-class society. Since that society is composed of “free,” apparently autonomous individuals, each pursuing their own private interests, any centralized political supervision of these atomized subjects become considerably harder to sustain. Each of them must consequently become his or her own seat of self-government; each must “internalize” power, make it spontaneously their own and bear it around with them as a principle inseparable from their identities. (Ideology 116)

Thus, experiencing one’s private interiority as the ground zero of individual autonomy, the subject perceives its essential “self” to be always already free of society, law, and ideology. It is thus that the ISAs guarantee what Althusser calls the state’s “subtle everyday domination” (133) through the self-governance of individual subjects.

Hegemony, Pedagogy, and Self-Regulation

If subjects experience individual autonomy as freedom, what compels them to comply to social law?

Crucial to the shift to posthumanist ways of understanding the subject and power was the translation into English of Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks in 1971. Gramsci defines “hegemony” as the major form of power in post-industrial capitalist societies: instead of being coerced by a centralized and identifiable oppressor, the masses freely consent to the ruling powers which present their ideology as disinterested and natural. Hegemonic power is not easily discernible because it is invisibly diffused throughout the multitudinous discourses and practices of everyday life; it forms the “habitus.” It is a function of hegemony, argues Gramsci, that power is “mediated’ by the whole fabric of society” (12). He distills from this complex fabric two major “superstructural” levels: on the one hand, the political society or “the State” which exercises power through “direct domination” and “juridical” government, and, on the other hand, “civil society,’ that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’” (12). This latter level Gramsci calls
"hegemony," where power is "exercised throughout society" (12). Hegemonic power therefore appears private and natural, and its interests are disguised as common sense. Because of this invisibility, hegemony is, writes Gramsci, contained "within the husk of political society" (268) so that subjects become self-governing. Self-government takes the form of a complex and well-articulated civil society, in which the individual can govern himself without his self-government thereby entering into conflict with political society — but rather becoming its normal continuation, its organic complement. (268).

Hegemony wins consent from those it subjugates because it comes to encompass the unconscious, ineffable dimensions of everyday experience. In this way, Gramsci’s theory makes a major shift “from ideology as ‘systems of ideas’ to ideology as lived, habitual social practice” (115). Ideology is, in this regard, elastic and adaptable. A critical component of Gramsci’s theory is, in fact, that the legislators of hegemonic ideology accommodate would-be subversive elements by making concessions to them, and, in doing so, domesticate and disarm them while still offering them the illusion of autonomous freedom. This concept of hegemony’s diffuse, supple, and accommodational strategies has proven to be a foundational influence in analyses of power and the possibility of resistance in modern liberal-humanist societies.

The shaping and regulation of the subject occurs even in those areas that, in binary models of power (such as humanist Marxism), would appear to resist ideology. A post-humanist critique of power posits ideology as productive, not repressive, of subjectivity. Teresa de Lauretis demonstrates the insidious ineluctability of hegemonic power’s accommodational reach when she points out that the deconstruction of subjectivity also effects its construction; she argues, for example, that even while it resists oppressive representations of gender, feminism is itself a “technology” that produces the (gendered) subject: “the construction of gender ... goes on ... in the academy, in the intellectual community, in avant-garde artistic practices and radical theories, even, and indeed especially, in feminism” (3). There is no absolute outside to power. Hegemony is able to accommodate strategies of resistance without diluting its power. Indeed, counter-hegemonic forces are in part constitutive of the practices they resist. In the same way, there is no essential self that stands outside the (ideology of the) subject. The self does not resist the ideology of subjectivity; rather, it is constituted by that ideology. The self is thus caught in a web of cultural narratives — and counternarratives — that regulate it in accordance with hegemonic ideology. And, in Althusserian terminology, the hegemonic ideology of subjectivity ensures that individuals will work very well on their own to reproduce their
"selves."

The pedagogical model on which education in the modern West is built is a key ideological apparatus for compelling hegemonic consent. For Althusser, education is the preeminent ISA in the modern West and replaced the Church as the dominant ideological state apparatus "in mature capitalist social formations" (144).21 Education and the political ideological State apparatus ("i.e. the regime of parliamentary democracy combining universal suffrage and party struggle" [145]), are inextricable. Taken to be in fact a crucial component of the project of Enlightenment "emancipation," education is able to inculcate state rule so effectively because its ideology is invisible:

one ideological State apparatus certainly has the dominant role, although hardly anyone lends an ear to its music: it is so silent! This is the School. (146)

Education's emancipatory role covers over its ideological function.22 Yet, as Althusser sees it, it is through education that workers are streamed into various social positions and inculcated into the ideological values and beliefs appropriate to the roles they will play in class society. In other words, workers serve their "apprenticeships" in the various school levels; and these apprenticeships serve the interests of the hegemonic class. The Bildungsroman—often called the "education" or "apprenticeship" novel23—narrates this model of training for assimilation into a capitalist system. Whether in the strict sense of education, or the loose sense of culture as an "apprenticeship to life," Bildung is a ubiquitous and hegemonic narrative that has obtained the appearance of the natural.

Indeed, this appearance of naturalness or innocence is itself a key apparatus of education's ideology. The school's "reigning" ideological strategy, according to Althusser, is to represent itself as a "neutral environment purged of ideology" (148), an environment that, coupled with the family (the "natural" relation of parents and children), presents itself as part of the "private domain," outside the sociality of ideology and therefore autonomous and "free." It is no accident that this concept of education as it is generally perceived in modern liberal democracies arose concurrently with modernity's turn to hegemonic power.

Indeed, the hegemonic state, or "civil society," in modern societies, serves a pedagogical function. As Gramsci argues in The Prison Notebooks, the state, in all its cultural or "ethical" manifestations, serves an educative function:

every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes. The school as a positive adductive function, and the courts as
a repressive and negative educative function, are the most important State activities in this sense: but, in reality, a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities tend to the same end — initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes. (258)

Although I would argue, with Foucault, that the courts (or law) also perform a “positive” or productive educative function, Gramsci’s point is that it seems to modern minds natural that subjects are “developed,” or brought to full subjective maturity, by culture as pedagogy. The modern pedagogy of Bildung, in other words, apprentices subjects to the ideology of modern individualism.

Foucault’s work on subjectivity is also apposite here. His account of the subjection to subjectivity is not dissimilar to Althusser’s notion of subjective interpellation. While Althusser’s view, as Judith Butler argues, “remains implicitly constrained by a notion of a centralized state apparatus” (Psychic 6), symbolized for her by that singular authoritative voice of interpellation, Foucault sees power as radically decentralized, a complex web of intersecting discourses that constitute subjects from multiple directions at once. Against what he calls the “repressive hypothesis,” the notion that power is a repressive force, Foucault sets his thesis that power is enabling as well as disabling; it is productive of subjectivity in a positive sense. We tend to think of power configurations as an opposition between public and private, between the state and the self, but, in Foucauldian terms, power works through not against subjectivity. The subject is “disciplined,” or effected, by power in terms that posit ideology as a positive force:

The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an “ideological” representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called “discipline.” We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes,” it “represses,” it “censors,” it “abstracts,” it “masks,” it “conceals.” In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production. (Discipline 194)

It is not, for Foucault, as if an otherwise innocent a priori self were contaminated by an external subjection, but rather, this process of subjection is the subject. The subject is bound to its own subjection by its participation in power. Butler explains this nicely: “a power exerted on a subject, subjection is nevertheless a power assumed by the subject, an assumption that constitutes the instrument of that subject’s becoming” (Psychic 11).

Foucault’s term for this process plays on the dual meaning of the term “subject”: the “sujet” comes into being through a process of “assujetissement,” or “subjection.” In “The Subject
and Power," Foucault writes: "there are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience of self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to" (212). In the process of subjection, the two meanings cannot be extricated. The subject submits positively to its subjection and it does so voluntarily. Reading Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, where the prison is taken to be a metaphor for the signifying practices of the social at large, Butler puts it this way:

Foucault suggests that the prisoner is not regulated by an exterior relation of power, whereby an institution takes a pre-given individual as the target of its subordinating aims. On the contrary, the individual is formed or, rather, formulated through his discursively constituted "identity" as prisoner. Subjection is, literally, the making of a subject, the principle of regulation according to which a subject is formulated or produced. (*Psychic* 84)

Hence, rather than "subjection," I prefer the term "subjectivation" because it not only captures the dual meaning of "subject" as outlined by Foucault, but it also signifies the process as one not of crushing subjectivity, but of effecting or "activating" it as Butler emphasizes. In other words, subjectivation is not the contamination of a pure self by power, but rather the subject *is* the self: "the subject produced and the subject regulated or subordinated are one" (Butler, *Psychic* 84). While, for Freud, policing is a matter of imposed constraints, for Foucault, policing takes the form of sanctions and prohibitions internal to the subject; it is constitutive, not repressive of that subject. Furthermore, since the discourses and practices that produce subjectivity are multiple, the subject is itself multiple. The subject is interpellated from several directions at once, inserted into various and sometimes contradictory or conflicting subject positions. The subject internalizes these positions, takes them to be its own, and therefore works very well on its own, as Althusser would put it, to discipline itself, to conform to the norms which regulate it. By participating voluntarily, subjects legitimize the system that (re)produces them.

The mechanism by which subjects regulate their own subjectivation can be understood through Foucault's analysis of the turn to modern forms of power. Power devolved in the eighteenth century secular movement from the ecclesiastical to what he calls "pastoral power," which retains the forms of religious power, but which focuses on the individual. The new theology of subjective liberation posits a discrete and continuous self, a self controlled from within. Foucault adds that "this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets" ("Subject" 214). This focus on the inner self increasingly took the form of a technique of power which Foucault calls "an
individualizing “tactic” (“Subject” 215), which is mobilized as a “series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers” (“Subject 215). These institutions, or “technologies,” of the self constitute the modern narratives of subjectivity now deeply embedded throughout the West. It is important to bear in mind here that discourses other than the literary, including the scientific or objective, obey the injunctions of narrative logic. As such, they partake of a teleology that sees subject formation as progressive maturation, securing itself against all that is “immature.” In terms of the modern theology of self-hood, the desire of the maturation process is to achieve an autonomous and undetermined self outside of the cultural discourses which have constructed it.

Te nosce, modernity’s injunction to know oneself, is also a mechanism by which the subject regulates itself. That is, no longer governed by the absolutist rule of feudalism, or by the guiding hand of religious piety, subjects in modernity regulate themselves through self-knowledge. Buttressed by the Enlightenment model of scientific inquiry and objective truth, subjectivity, especially in the twentieth century, became an object of epistemological surveillance legitimized by an increasingly professionalized discourse on what the self, in its fully matured state, ought to be: “the birth and history of the knowledges of subjectivity and intersubjectivity are intrinsically bound up with programmes which, in order to govern subjects, have found that they need to know them” (Rose, Governing 5). Foucault analyzes the discourse on self-knowledge as a mode of inquiry through which objectification “transform[s] human beings into subjects (“Subject 208). It is to this process that we now turn.

The “Private” Self and Disciplinary Power

Our private lives are not outside power. The “inner” self is not exempt from the thesis that there is no outside to ideology. Indeed, the concept of self-hood in the modern West is state power’s fundamental apparatus for preserving hegemony and consent. In Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self, Nikolas Rose makes this point:

The self is a vital element in the networks of power that traverse modern societies. The regulatory apparatus of the modern state is not something imposed from outside upon individuals who have remained essentially untouched by it.

(213)

Rose argues that state regulation of subjectivity has generally occurred across history and cultures, but that, increasingly since the eighteenth century in the modern West, “the personal and subjective capacities of citizens have been incorporated into the scope and
aspirations of public powers” (1), so that every modern organization, such as the office, the hospital, the prison, the army, as well as institutions such as the family, the career, and education, involves the management of human subjects. And, increasingly an “expertise of subjectivity” (Rose 2), particularly in the therapeutic disciplines and professions, has objectified a psychically calculable subject. Especially since Freud problematized the family in the early part of this century, the family has become so intimately imbricated with other modern apparatuses of subjectivity that it functions as a locus for normalization of the self. Through medical, psychological, legal, narrative, and pedagogical discourses, experts of subjectivity define those ideals to which members of families aspire. Experts of the psyche, or “engineers of the human soul” (Rose 3), have naturalized, authorized, and institutionalized the normative ideas that shape and govern subjects — not least of which is the idea of developmental maturation. In other words, an essential apparatus in the modernization of subjects is an internalization and privatization of the norms that guarantee subjective conformity. A variety of psychological technologies ensures that subjects voluntarily discipline themselves. Modern forms of confession, for example, exemplify the valorization of interiority. The move from the church confessional to the psychiatrist’s couch exemplifies the modern West’s devolution of control from religious to psychological realms. Jacques Donzelot points out that what is significant about modern forms of confession is their link to professional psychology; “what is new and specifically effective,” he argues, “is the establishing of a process of circularity between the two practices of expertise and confession” (210). This circularity reinforces psychological interiority as a knowable, graspable space of individual self-hood. It is not so much confession itself that is significant here, but rather, as Christie Kiefer argues, the idea of confession, which “helped to bring our private thoughts and feelings to the center of our concept of who we are” (53). Central to that consciousness of the self is the notion of “maturity” or the plenitudinousness of a discrete and self-sufficient subjectivity. As Kiefer puts it, “the concept of moral self-awareness fostered by confession promotes the Western idea of the mature person as autonomous [and] internally coherent” (53). Through confession, subjects become their own government; the naturalization of discourses of selfhood such as “maturity” help to ensure that they will do so.

The modern subject is always in the process of reproducing, for itself, an “essential,” private self, a self that is critical to the functioning of hegemonic power in modern Western democracies. Rose refers to this modern strategy of controlling subjects as “governmentality,” a form of power that relies on the internalization of norms rather than on external pressure or coercion. The government of subjectivity is achieved not “through the growth of an omnipotent and omniscient central state whose agents institute a perpetual
surveillance and control over all its subjects" (Governing 213). Against the binary view of power as something from the outside imposed on what is properly inside, the outside and inside operate symbiotically so that the polarity loses any real semantic or political valence. Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* is a crucial document of this turn from binary notions of power, where he employs a prison system as metaphor for the emergence of modern power. Jeremy Bentham's late-eighteenth-century conception of the prison as panopticon represents an important turning point in the movement to modern forms of power, the movement from sovereign to disciplinary power. Foucault shows how a more humane—and humanist—approach to punishment relied on and (re)produced an emergent complex of technologies of the modern subject and its relation to power apparatuses. Bentham's panopticon was envisioned, as its name suggests, as a circular architecture of cells guarded by the gaze of a central watch-tower. Since the prisoners could always be seen, but would never know when they were being observed, they would learn to internalize the gaze, to police themselves; hence, "surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action" (201). The prisoners would take on the gaze of the guardian so that actual surveillance would become unnecessary. "Caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers" (201), the prisoners would become self-governing.

Foucault shows how even though it was not in fact often used, the panopticon stands as a model for a whole new set of emerging practices and attitudes. This modernization of power could be seen not only in prisons, but also in factories, army camps, schools, and, in the emerging field of "scientific psychology" (296). Foucault goes on to argue that another emblem of nineteenth-century penal system, the Mettray colony, a prison/school for young delinquents opened in 1840, was at once "cloister, prison, school, regiment" (293). At Mettray, power relations were marked out in now familiar pedagogical terms: "it was the first training college in pure discipline" (295); both guards and prisoners "were taught the art of power relations" (295). Under the gaze or "perpetual assessment" (294) of the teacher/guard, the student/criminal was seen as at once "a 'soul' to be known and a subjection to be maintained" (295). This new system of power based on the norm authorized the teacher/guards as "technicians of behaviour: engineers of conduct, orthopaedists of individuality" (294). Through the new pedagogical practices of self-surveillance, the "students" of the carceral system learned to be self-regulating. This new humanist mode of power operates positively to produces new kinds of subjects; it produces "bodies that [are] both docile and capable" (Foucault, *Discipline* 294). In Foucault's analysis, the individual as potentially liberated from power is no longer viable: in modern societies, power is not "in the hands of one person who can exercise it alone and totally over the others." Rather,
it's a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised. ... Power is ... a machinery that no one owns. (Power/Knowledge 156)

Subjects are thus caught up in a network of power that in its dispersal precludes any easy binary opposition. Because panoptic power is inside, and not just simply outside, and because it operates through pedagogical techniques that have been normalized, naturalized and legally sanctioned, modernity's subjects submit voluntarily to their own imprisonment by it.

The disciplinary technique underlying the modern management of self-hood, as Foucault argues, is not repression but *normalization*. Subjects become self-regulating by freely consenting to state-sanctioned norms perceived as individual choices. Panopticism, for Foucault, signals a whole gamut of modern technologies for the (self-) disciplining of subjects throughout modern society: “by location, confinement, surveillance, the perpetual supervision of behavior and tasks, in short, a whole technique of ‘management’ of which the prison was merely one manifestation or its transposition into the penal domain” ("On Power" 105). A mélange of modern discourses and institutions, increasingly naturalized, normalized, rationalized and professionalized, ensures that subjects are disciplined from multiple directions at once. These discourses act as “relays,” argues Rose, bringing the varied ambitions of political, scientific, philanthropic, and professional authorities into alignment with the ideas and aspirations of individuals, with the selves each of us want to be. (Governing 213)

That is, technologies of the self offer choices and pleasures across a whole range of options so that ideology appears to reflect free individual desires, and so that individuals work “by themselves” to reproduce the subjects they come to desire to be.

These technologies work through a pedagogy of the everyday. As Eagleton points out, in order for hegemonic ideology to appear to be “more than imposed illusions,” it must “mesh with its subjects' lived experience” (Ideology 15). In modern liberal democracies, ideology works *with* rather than *against* the subject. Eagleton rightly argues that ruling ideologies can actively shape the wants and desires of those subjected to them; but they must also engage significantly with the wants and desires that people already have, catching up genuine hopes and needs, reinflecting them in their own peculiar idiom, and feeding them back to their subjects in ways which render these ideologies plausible and attractive. (Ideology 14-15)

Subjects are willing to conform to their subjugation because of the rewards afforded by the technologies of subjectivation: technologies of subjectivation operate not through violation...
of the self, but by aligning political and economic goals with pleasures and needs in ways that are felt to be self-fulfilling. Bourdieu's idea of the *habitus* is relevant in this regard: the *habitus*, the everyday in which subjects are immersed, presents its demands on the subject as their own desires and actions. The *habitus* is functioning optimally when there is a seamless match between the objective world and the subjective experience of that world. Bourdieu elaborates:

> When, owing to the quasi-perfect fit between the objective structures and the internalized structures which results from the logic of simple reproduction, the established cosmological and political order is perceived not as arbitrary, i.e. as one possible order among others, but as a self-evident and natural order which goes without saying and therefore goes unquestioned, the agents' aspirations have the same limits as the objective conditions of which they are the product. (166)

Arbitrary power is rationalized and normalized in everyday terms familiar to its subjects so that they feel voluntarily compelled to do what the state demands of them. “Every established order,” Bourdieu writes, “tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the naturalization of its own arbitrariness” (164). It is in this correlation of the subjective and the objective that power is secured. The quotidian mechanisms that make up the *habitus* appear in the cultural unconscious as natural, spontaneous and voluntary, and therefore subjects work very well on their own to reproduce it.

**(Negative) Freedom and Autonomous Individualism**

Individualism has a history, but it is not the organic, progressive evolution of self-hood commonly held to be self-evident. The autonomous individual is “a creature of public theory, not only private experience” (Meyer 200). In other words, individualism is an ideology constructed by cultural discourses outside of which no essential individuality as such resides. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault argues that the panopticon is exemplary of those technologies that construct individuals; it represents a modernization process in which “the crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities” (201). While individualism is often taken to be the *sine qua non* of political systems, it is itself a political construct. The history of individualism is its institutionalization.

Yet the autonomous individual is privileged in modernity as freedom’s ground and
exemplar; it is valorized as a primal space of essential liberty. Technologies of the self work to construct the ideology of modern individualism to which subjects freely consent because that consent is constructed as the very exercise of autonomous freedom. This narrative is an apparatus of self-surveillance, of self-policing. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow, modernity, or Foucault’s “Age of Man,” begins with “the incredible and ultimately unworkable idea of a being who is sovereign precisely by virtue of being enslaved” (Beyond 30). This is modernity’s deepest contradiction.

The psychotherapeutic has increasingly become a major mechanism for the construction of modern individualism. Indeed, a virtual cult of the inner self has developed out of the twentieth-century obsession with “self-inspection, self-problematization, self-monitoring, and confession” (Rose Governing 11). Operating in accordance with the spirit, even the logic, of a free-market economy, these psychotherapeutic technologies are in keeping with the binary logic that opposes coercion and freedom. They produce subjectivities as commodities, the consumption of which is an exercise of the “freedom to choose.” In the modern parlance of subjectivity, the self at the centre – the interior or “core” self – is the free self; to exercise that freedom is to express the “true” self.

The rhetoric of “freedom of choice” emphasizes that modern forms of power draw on the Enlightenment’s equation of reason and freedom, an equation that makes the rational subject both source and beneficiary of autonomous freedom. While subjects are universally united (as “Man”) in their essential capacity to freely make reasoned choices, each (“man”) is unique in the “individual” choices made. The self as free agent in a market economy is modernity’s answer to the dilemma of the self:

> every aspect of life, like every commodity, is imbued with a self-referential meaning; every choice we make is an emblem of our identity, a mark of our individuality, each is a message to ourselves and others as to the sort of person we are, each casts a glow back, illuminating the self of he or she who consumes. (Rose, Governing 227)

To be or become a true self in the modern West, however, one is obliged, rather ironically, to exercise free choice. “The rights, powers, and value of the self are central institutions in the modern world” (205), says Meyer, and these institutions oblige the individual to take on the qualities that define modern individualism: “modern systems are organized so that individuals must choose, and must often give reasons for their choice in terms of the motives of the self” (205). This obligation to choose pertains not only to consumer products, but also to education, work, love object, the decision to have children, and so on. And increasingly, this obligation to choose applies to identity itself. This freedom to choose is inscribed, especially in consumer culture and its analogy to “life style” choices,
as the freedom to choose (one's self). The consuming subject is the autonomous self:

The norm of autonomy secretes, as its inevitable accompaniment, a constant and intense self-scrutiny, a continual evaluation of our personal experiences, emotions, and feelings in relation to images of satisfaction, the necessity to narrativize our lives in a vocabulary of interiority. The self that is liberated is obliged to live its life tied to the project of its own identity. (Rose, Governing 254).

Choosing confers or confirms one's very individualism as freedom. Kant's notion of "maturity" as freedom from external authorities becomes elaborated as the "[freedom] to choose in the name of ourselves and not in the name of our subordination to the authority of another" (Rose Inventing 193). Modernity's institutions of selfhood rationalize and legitimize one's choices by "available lists of reasons, motives, and aspirations that are equally institutionalized" (Meyer 205). Appearing as the autonomous creations of free individuals, modern institutions reflect and confirm individual freedom. If not in fact voluntary, institutions of subjectivity — psychology and pedagogy are trenchant examples — are adept at presenting their values as if they were consensual (which, in turn, garners consent). The "free choice" of the leisurely self, as opposed to the self of work and school and social obligation, is the ultimate marker of individual "freedom": elaborate structures for organizing "personal" life provide "outlets for the free experience of the proper self" (Meyer 205).

Modern subjects feel themselves obliged, ultimately, to "consume" or partake of that universal and "free" humanity to which liberal-humanist democracies entitle them. That is, modernity confers on subjects a "basic humanity," a sameness untouched by the contingencies of culture and history.^{28} It is this belief in sameness that makes difference secondary and derivative. As Joan Copjec argues, the modern democratic subject's "sense of its own 'radical innocence' has its most profound origins in [the] belief that there is a basic humanity unaltered by the diversity of the citizens who share in it" (30). The ultimate freedom possessed by the democratic citizen (Copjec's example is the American citizen, the archetype of liberal-humanist subjectivity) is a negative one. The "democratic subject," she writes, is "devoid of characteristics" (30):

If all our citizens can be said to be Americans this is not because we share any positive characteristics, but rather because we have all been given the right to shed these characteristics, to present ourselves as disembodied before the law. I divest myself of positive identity, therefore I am a citizen. This is the peculiar logic of democracy. (30)

Non-interference of the "right" to choose, of the right to individual identity, becomes the
ultimate signifier of universal freedom. Although they can purchase “different” identities, it is in their “freedom” to choose them that subjects confirm the basic humanity, or sameness, in which all share.

It is thus that subjects perceive themselves as autonomous: through the pleasures offered by consumption, subjects consume self-hood, and in consuming it they reproduce it. “The self,” as Rose argues, “is not merely enabled to choose, but obliged to construe a life in terms of its choices, its powers, and its values” (Governing 227). In consenting to the ideology of self-hood, subjects believe they exercise their freedom. In common political parlance, exercising one’s autonomy is figured as resistance to conformity, a cogent and seductive ideology. Ironically, however, it is in conforming to the dictates of subjectivity that subjects believe they are most authentically exercising their human autonomy. Rose expresses this contradiction nicely: “in making our subjectivity the principle of our personal lives, our ethical systems, and our political evaluations, [we believe] that we are, freely, choosing our freedom” (Governing 11). Indeed, in doing so, subjects believe they are exercising their very humanity. “Free choice,” that late twentieth-century buzzword of both liberal humanist politics and consumerist marketing, is the very bulwark of autonomous individualism.

The pervasiveness of “free choice” as the emblem of individual freedom in late modernity has, to evoke a particularly ironic example, found its way even into the ideology of work. Through the concept of “career,” work is codified not as a potential site of unfreedom but as a way of expressing freedom — an expression of individual autonomy. A whole apparatus has developed around the idea of the career as a search for meaning and self-realization; the individual can “freely” construct his or her identity through career choices. The career “path,” like the path of Bildung, is a kind of coming of age, a fulfillment of the plenitudinous self. In this way, the ideology of self-development is crucial to the operations of late capitalism. The notion of the freely choosing individual is the basis of both production and consumption, yet this subject perceives itself outside power — a notion not incidental to the machinations of modern power.

The modern expertise of the self, especially in the psycho-therapeutic discourses, distances the self from any imbrication with ideology or power; it provides a distance between the subject and the formal apparatuses of the state so that the subject is governed only indirectly. According to Bauman, one of the central elements of the move to modern power is a decline in the political influence of “organic intellectuals” and the rise of the professional “expert” (which he designates, respectively, as modern and postmodern). The seductive nature of hegemony renders the intellectual’s legitimating function redundant; experts, instead, help subjects govern themselves. The “unprecedented growth of ‘experts,’”
writes Bauman, is a “thoroughly modern phenomenon, transforming on a massive scale esoteric, minority knowledge into bureaucratic power” (Intimations 15). The expert is the modern legislator of subjectivation, yet experts act in the “interests” of the subject. The expertise of selfhood seduces subjects; it “achieves its effects,” as Rose puts it, “not through the threat of violence or constraint, but by way of the persuasion inherent in its truths, the anxieties stimulated by its norms, and the attraction exercised by the images of life and self it offers to us” (Governing 10). Chief among these images is that of the self as autonomous: subjects “submit freely” to the apparatuses that appear to protect their essential subjectivities from the restraining or oppressive powers of the state. Since individual human potential is perceived as outside historical and social determinants, the inviolability of the inner self ensures that subjects will believe themselves ultimately untouched by ideology. A laissez-faire economy is in keeping with the ideology of freely choosing monads in a therapeutic economy. Psychotherapeutics ensure that subjects function as the autonomous entities required by free-market capitalism.

It is through the supple operations of hegemony that the governing of the soul works invisibly. Despite his own cynical view, Rose insists that “the paranoid visions of some social analysts, who see in the expansion of the therapeutic a kind of extension of state surveillance and regulation throughout the social body, are profoundly misleading” (Governing 257). He argues, rather, that “the central feature of these new apparatuses and techniques is the decoupling they effect between the central powers and the regulation of the internal worlds of institutions, families, and individuals” (Governing 257). These apparatuses, he goes on to argue, operate not coercively, or even conspiratorially, as the paranoid like to imagine, but rather as the subtle accompaniment to the democratic and capitalist free market. They operate not even from the outside, but rather, from the “inside,” on the level of subjectivity. The imperative of liberty ensures that subjects work on their own to reproduce the ideology of autonomous individualism demanded by modern power.

Modern Power and The Psychological Sciences

The current metanarrative of self-hood is ordained by the institution of psychology. Both professional and popular psychology, especially since the early part of the twentieth century, have authorized and naturalized a language of interiority. Work on the self is the ultimate signifier of the exercise of freedom. Indeed, work on the self valorizes autonomous self-hood as its teleological goal. This is especially so in the “new age” self-help market, the ultimate cult of self-hood. “Achieving freedom,” as Rose contends in
Governing the Soul, "becomes a matter not of slogans nor of political revolution, but of slow, painstaking, and detailed work on our own subjective and personal realities, guided by an expert knowledge of the psyche" (253). Psychotherapeutic expertise is sought "when individuals feel unable to bear the obligations of selfhood, or when they are anguished by them" (227). The function of therapy, then, is to get subjects back on track; it is to "restore to individuals the capacity to function as autonomous beings in the contractual society of the self" (227-28). Through the psychotherapeutic, the individual rediscovers itself as an autonomous self, and it does so "freely." Subjects thereby become consumers of certain specific ways of knowing and being themselves, ways that are constructed and internalized as essential.

Although this language of the self came to the foreground in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its foundations were laid by the emergence, in the eighteenth century, of what Foucault, in Discipline and Punish, calls "the 'clinical' sciences" and, along with them, the "entry of the individual (and no longer the species) into the field of knowledge" (191). It is especially through the psychological sciences that the individual was constructed as "a describable, analysable object" (190). The psychological sciences provide a particularly trenchant instance of this modern mechanism of power. The calculations of subjectivity — psychology's "small techniques of notation, of registration, of constituting files, or arranging facts in columns and tables that are so familiar to us now" (190-91) — signify what Foucault calls the "sciences of man" (191).

The discourse of modern psychological sciences in the West was introduced primarily through Freud and other early psychologists. Freudian psychoanalysis brought familial relations into the normalizing domain; a concomitant rise of the bourgeoisie in modernity brought with it the modern family as a major locus for normalization. In his study of modern childhood and the family, The Policing of Families, Donzelot argues that the family has become a major site of governmentality. It inculcates those values essential to modern liberalism, such as privacy, patriarchy, the division of labour, and, perhaps most importantly, the pedagogical socialization of children in accordance with the principles of liberal humanist society and economy. Donzelot argues that psychoanalysis "made the family amenable to social requirements, a good conductor of relational norms" (209). Because psychoanalysis provides access to the family and legitimizes hegemonic control, it became a major site for the operations of modern power, a "vehicle for the softening of punishment, for the controlled 'freedom' of surveillance" (145). The surveillance of families allows subjects to be controlled from "within."

Throughout the twentieth century, this discourse of the psychological self became increasingly authorized by a language of science. Expertise acts as a legitimizing relay
between the "private" realm, such as the self and the family, and the government. The language of psychology has legitimized itself by adopting Enlightenment's valorization of the rational and "objective" discourses of science. As Poovey argues in *A History of the Modern Fact*, in discovering a subject appropriate to the emerging liberal governmentality and a market economy, the philosophers of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment forged the prototype for the subject that would become essential to modern psychology. Psychology emerged as a "scientific" and "rational" study of the inner human and, from the mid-nineteenth century on, was codified and institutionalized as the science of subjectivity. It became a practice that differentiated and legislated between the normal and the deviant. The "supervision of normality" (Foucault *Discipline* 296) is supported by a "scientificity" which sanctions it.

The growth of psychology as an authoritative science from the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century produced new technologies of self-hood. The psychology prevalent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a discourse of the hard sciences of normative measurement curves, of testing, statistics, and judgment. It was an era of subjective calculability and management in the field of psychology, of measuring normality and "deviance." There was an increasing disciplining and professionalization of psychology and the emergence of what Rose terms "psychometrics," which isolates the human subject as an object of measurement and control.

Psychology's isolation of the psyche privatizes subjectivity so that modern problems (unemployment, say, or criminality) are perceived as personal failures to normalize the self. These failures can now be measured and calculated. In this way, subjects are caught in a circularity of subjectivation which makes them self-normalizing. Donzelot puts it this way:

> The individual's resistance to norms, like that of the family, is thus no longer anything but an *internal* resistance to a process whose outcome can be a greater well-being for him and for it. The resistance to norms becomes a resistance to analysis, a purely negative and blind blockage in the way of one's own welfare. (211)

Ironically, then, the ideology of "free" and private individualism functions so that subjects are self-policing. Rose argues that in order to apprehend psychology's isolation and normalization of the psyche we must reverse the usual question posed about the relation between the social and the private, or what is usually conceived as power on the one hand and the individual on the other. Traditional analyses of power, that is, posit the individual as ultimately separate from power and ask to what extent society appears to "repress it or respect it" (*Governing* 4). But, since, in Eagleton's words, "autocratic power [has been]
replaced by the more gratifying compulsion of the subject's self-identity" (Aesthetic 23), we need instead to ask the question the other way around: "how has subjectivity itself become, in its different guises and conceptions, the measure of political systems and power relations?" (Rose, Governing 4). The crucial question, then, concerns not the way in which power represses the self, but rather the technologies through which power produces the self.

But this is not to say that these technologies produce an inauthentic subjectivity out of the raw material of an essential self, or an inviolable interiority. In The Psychic Life of Power, Butler proclaims her project as "thinking the theory of power together with a theory of the psyche" (3); her approach to this project is to problematize what she sees as Foucault's neglect of the psychological, or the "psychic," in his analysis of power. Although Foucault contends that "power not only produces the boundaries of a subject but pervades the interiority of that subject" (Butler, Psyche 89), Butler argues that he nevertheless tends to stabilize the subject's interiority as "soul" (85—90). Against the ontological dualism that opposes the political and the psychic, Butler argues that the "soul," or psyche, is not something that "incorporates" or "internalizes" norms, but rather is itself a product of normalization and regulation. Internality is itself an ideology produced by the internalization of the norm of the internal. In Butler's words, "the process of internalization fabricates the distinction between interior and exterior life" (19). The internal is not, as it is taken for granted to be, an essential site of the primal self, but rather is itself a space constructed by the technology of "internalization."

"Life-Course" Theory and Bildung

As posthumanist psychologists such as John Meyer point out, traditional developmental psychology, a narrative of the self rooted in "maturation theory," relies on the concept of an inviolable interiority. Their critique rests on the claim that the presuppositions of "life-course" theory — the science of the maturation process — are not natural and universal, but constructed by ideologically-bound interests. In his essay, "The Self and the Life-course," Meyer contends that the subject's sense of individualism, privacy, and a coherent narrative sense of the biographical self are highly institutionalized. He argues, first of all, that differentiated aspects of the legitimated Western self can be theoretically isolated:

there is the self as a center of sovereign and responsible motives and perceptions, the ultimate subject and object of rationalized society. But there is also the institutionalized life-course: The person as a member of rationalized society, carrying a legitimated résumé over time. (199)

In other words, these two sides are, respectively, the "core self" (primary, stable, centred,
petmanenc) and the “narrative self” (secondary, unstable, derivative, changing): the inner self and the social self. These two axes of modern subjectivity are not, as some scholars of psychology argue, essentially different and fundamentally at odds; rather, “both sides are reinforcing reflections of highly institutionalized aspects of individualism” (Meyer 199). In fact, in psychotherapeutic terms, to make the two sides coincide is to realize one’s “true” self. For example, the goal of “self-actualization” (seen in new-age psychology and the co-dependency movement) is to bring the two in line. The teleological aim of the narrative self, in other words, is to arrive at — to “discover” or “rediscover” — the core self. This core, or inner, self is commonly perceived as a lost childhood, a lost innocence often sought through the quest for the “inner child.” While Meyer admits that the dialectic between the two registers of self-hood marks a central contradiction in Western history (“politically, economically, and culturally, social action is to make social sense but it is also to spring from the subjective self and needs of the actor” [200]), he sees individualism as the defining and crucial crux of both.

As many contemporary theorists have noted, the individual is not only something on which psychology relies for its intelligibility, but the subject as autonomous individual is the very “object that psychology constructs” (Venn 123). The (meta)narrative of subjectivity produces rather than reflects the subject’s (or analysand’s) “case history.” In developmental, or “life-course,” psychology, the narrative of the subject — as progressive, teleological, self-determining, autonomous — is dictated by the guiding concept of maturation. In this way, although increasingly under attack by “postmodern” or “posthumanist” psychologies, Bildung is central to present-day psychotherapeutics. Indeed, as Minden notes, the psychoanalytic story obeys the narrative injunctions of Bildung: “although Freud, despite his literary style and culture, had a scientific view of what lay behind subjective partialness ..., the successful negotiation of the Oedipal stage is nevertheless a sort of Bildungsroman” (13). The Bildungsroman is a disciplinary narrative that operates ubiquitously in institutions outside the literary to discipline subjects. Narrativizations are perhaps most evident in the analytic therapies, in which the analyst seeks to order the fragments of utterances and events into a coherent story of a life, plotting a chronology, a logic, and a teleology. Paul Ricouer points out, in his essay “The Question of Proof in Freud’s Writings,” that the explanatory model of analytic method follows the “archetypes of storytelling which have been culturally developed and which rule our actual competence to follow new stories” (273). The “case history” exemplifies the process by which fragments of a life are “integrated in a narrative structure” (267). It is, in fact, the “criterion of narrativity,” Ricouer argues, that makes psychoanalysis coherent; lives that would otherwise appear “strange, disconnected, incomplete, and fragmented” are
submitted to a "narrative commitment" (267) that seeks to integrate the otherwise eccentric.

This narrativization places the subject firmly at its centre: it is, as Rose puts it, "a story that reveals the subject neither as an accidental participant in a jumbled series of random events, an innocent bystander, [nor] an extra in someone else's script, but as both author and actor of their own life" (Governing 247). It is the metanarrative of modernity's sovereign and autonomous self. As one of the meta-discourses for work on the self, life-course theory is a highly institutionalized narrative of chronological subjectivity. Organized around the "carefully sequenced age-graded systems of childrearing, education, work, and retirement," these systems obey a narrative logic; they are constructed, in Meyer's words, in order "to make sense of individual life as an orderly project" (200). The individual – and not its social context – is the basic unit driving the life-course narrative. Individuals orient themselves to the temporal and sequential imperative through biographies that give meaning to the present in terms of recollections of the past and anticipations of the future. This orientation is more than just a way of perceiving one's life; it is an active construction of that life, an act of self-narration that confers meaning and logic on otherwise incoherent events and experiences. The life-course is perceived as a trajectory, a developmental sequence of predictable events with an internal temporal logic; its institutionalized structure provides normative "reference points" (Meyer 210) for disciplining the self. It is psychology as a pedagogy of Bildung.

The promise that the narrativization of subjectivity holds out is the satisfaction of narrative resolution, the closure of plenitudinous self-hood. But, since life's contingencies can knock the story off track, individuals need repeatable, generic plots that can be self-administered. The purpose of such self-regulating plot-lines reaches beyond the therapeutic moment to install what Rose calls a "permanent hermeneutics of the self" (Governing 247), so that the techniques of self-therapy become a constant source of self-governance. In other words, "with the aid of experts," individuals "can act upon their bodies, their emotions, their beliefs, and their forms of conduct in order to transform themselves, in order to achieve autonomous selfhood" (Governing 247). The life-course narrative provides modern subjects with a script for the self-surveillance and self-regulation of autonomous individualism.

Psychology's life-course model, then, is a strikingly literary model. Like the Bildungsroman, it participates in a narrative structure in which the chronological and teleological stages of a life are seen as a coherent biography of a continuous self. Although the life-course model does not end its analysis with the achievement of "maturity" but continues into middle- and old-age, it takes maturity to be the pivotal moment, the
coming-of-age, where replete subjectivity is achieved. On either side of the maturity divide lie development on the one hand and aging on the other. Although this apex of maturity is largely taken to be universal and natural, it is, of course, historically and culturally relative. To make this point, David Featherman argues that one of the changes in human life-course brought on by the economic move from agriculture to industrial capital and labour and the corresponding move from filial and communal ties to the individual as independent worker and work to career was to “decrease the heterogeneity of life-course transitions, especially in the transition from youth to middle adulthood” (123). As a result, “development and aging ... are defined so as to [equate] one with growth and hierarchical differentiation and the other with senescent decline” (143). In the same way, as life-spans increase and as baby boomers age, “aging” has begun to produce new meaning and, by extension, to retrospectively alter the meaning of “maturity.” While many contemporary theorists recognize that life-span development is overdetermined and therefore subject to cultural and historical differences, the fundamental proto-narrative nevertheless remains axiomatic and ubiquitous in therapeutic discourses and practices. The presuppositions of these technologies, which permeate culture in the modern West, operate as disciplinary norms to which subjects consent and conform.

The life-course model takes into consideration both psychological and biological elements, so that the two become intimately linked.® Thus, psychological maturation is naturalized by its inscription on the body. Psychological maturity is seen to be attached to physical maturity in the same way that gender is seen to be “naturally” attached to the sexed body. Because the sequenced life-course system is based on chronological age and the maturation of the body, its sequential psychological stages come to be scientifically legitimized by biological determinism. As Valerie Walkerdine points out in her essay on developmental pedagogy, psychological maturation is understood to be a sequence of “innate tendencies' related to biologized natural development” (185). This naturalized coupling of the somatic and the psychological is a particularly efficient apparatus for disciplining Bildung-subjects.

Psychological maturation is most definitively and “naturally” inscribed on the body in terms of age. Bourdieu argues that age is chief among those arbitrary social classifications embedded in the habitus. The arbitrariness of these classifications is hidden so that subjects misrecognize their “naturalness” and freely consent to their imperatives. In this way, the power configurations of the social world appear natural and self-evident. This subjective experience of the habitus Bourdieu calls "doxa, so as to distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs” (164). Doxa is the experience of the world as the familiar,
the unquestioned, the taken for granted. The mythico-ritual system that constitutes the doxa — despite its appearance of naturalness — is a political system, argues Bourdieu, in that it reproduces the world as self-evident and produces subjective adherence to the classification apparatuses which constitute it. The doxa is reproduced, that is, by hierarchical classifications of, for example, sex, race, and class. Age stratification combines in complex ways with gender, race, and class to reproduce power relations that are legitimized by the evidence written on the body. This combination reproduces the social order "whose very functioning serves the interests of those occupying a dominant position in the social structure, the men of mature age" (165). But, for Bourdieu, the most striking — because most taken for granted as "natural" — classification is that of age:

> There is no need to insist on the function of legitimation of the division of labour and power between the sexes that is fulfilled by a mythico-ritual system entirely dominated by male values. It is perhaps less obvious that the social structuring of temporality which organizes representations and practices, most solemnly reaffirmed in the rites of passage, fulfills a political function by symbolically manipulating age limits, i.e. the boundaries which define age-groups, but also the limitations imposed at different ages. (165)

Age stratification, as Bourdieu goes on to argue, is represented and naturalized by its markings on the body. Complex social codes determine and reinforce age inscriptions:

> the mythico-ritual categories cut up the age continuum into discontinuous segments, constituted not biologically (like the physical signs of ageing) but socially, and marked by the symbolism of cosmetics and clothing, decorations, ornaments, and emblems, the tokens which express and underline the representations of the uses of the body that are legitimately associated with each socially defined age. (165)

The symbolic representation of age on the body makes age-stratification particularly intransigent: "the principles embodied in this way," argues Bourdieu, "are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness" (94). They become, that is, entrenched in the cultural unconscious so that "nothing seems more ineffable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and, therefore, more precious, than the values given body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy" (94). Representations of the chronological ages of life therefore rank as one of the primary instruments for the maintenance of the symbolic order.

The expertise of life-course psychology legitimizes age stratification. In their study of life-course theory's reliance on age classification, Karl Ulrich Mayer and Walter Müller
argue that "the sociology of age differentiation ... [has] provided the most direct access to the sociological study of the life-course. In fact, it has mostly been taken to be identical with it" (219). Laws and regulations are formulated according to normative age strata, creating the assumption "that legal age norms and policy age categories are merely an institutionalized expression of a primordial, socially defined age structure and, therefore, just another variant of a universal structural condition" (Mayer and Müller 220). This rationalization is enabled by "age reification" (White Riley 158) where chronological age is treated as causal and reflected in laws such as the legal voting age. In turn, the institutionalization of chronological age reinforces the "rightness" of age classification as it is written on the body. Mayer and Müller put this age reification into historical perspective, arguing that the applicability of legal age categories is to a significant extent a recent product of modernity's increasing emphasis on the individual as producer and consumer. By the late twentieth century, each life stage of development comes with what Meyer refers to as a "recipe" complete with measurements for the management of individuals. In an educational context, for example, the age-grading system is explicitly prescriptive and normative, age norms are a fundamental category in the highly institutionalized field of testing and assessment. A child is marked as "deviant" insofar as he or she strays from the norm, and classrooms are administered so as to maximize conformity to norms. Meyer rightly comments that the age-graded system runs in direct opposition to modern ideas of equality: much of it would be considered unconstitutional if it were based on any other basis than age, such as race or gender, for example (203). Yet the age-graded system is so naturalized that individuals use its norms to organize and narrate their own story lines. In both psychological and pedagogical practices, age-based development obeys the logic of narrative chronology and teleology; it normalizes individuals, according to Rose, "in terms of [an] axis of time — as 'normal,' 'advanced,' and 'retarded'" (Inventing 110). Chronological age stratification, furthermore, is linked in its narrative pattern to modernity's grand recit of teleological social progress, an ideology in which the individual, the basic unit of the Enlightenment narrative, obtains a sacred status. In its synecdochal links to Enlightenment's emancipatory project, the narrative of individual teleological maturation acquires the noble distinction of a grand and timeless pedagogical project.

Individualism, Developmental Psychology and Pedagogy

The age-based life-course model has roots in the socio-historical turn to modernity. In fact, its emergence coincides with what historian Philippe Ariès, in his famous 1962 study
of childhood, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life*, identifies as the emergence of the very concept of the child and the construction of childhood as an institution. In modern Western democracies, the rational-legal basis of those semi-autonomous institutions that regulate the economy, the family, labour, education, and so on is the individual who enters and leaves various institutions according to a stratified age system; compulsory schooling is the most instructive instance of this regulation. In *The Policing of Families*, Donzelot argues that the child and the family were central elements of modernity’s replacement of “coercion with education” (144) as the basis of social control. He argues that, in particular, the twentieth-century attention to the psyche in education is “a vehicle for the softening of punishment, for the controlled ‘freedom’ of surveillance” (145). The ideology of subjective maturation as the development of autonomous individuality takes its firmest hold under the surveillance of the schooling system. The age-graded system of subjective classification which the modern education system has institutionalized rationalizes most explicitly this idea of the progressive teleology of selfhood. In early modernity, as the industrial labour contract separated family and work, the hegemonic state compensated for the “weakened ability of the family to socialize, train, and control children” (Mayer and Müller 223). Through compulsory schooling, the control of subjects through education and its naturalized apparatuses of pedagogy soon became hegemony’s most valuable management strategy.

The school’s primary function became not just the management of individuals, but, moreover, the cultivation of *individualism*, the very cornerstone of modern democratic government. The secularization of the nation states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries required a notion of the individual as citizen, integrated with their citizenship through the formalized life-course. As the feudal system was dismantled to be replaced by nation states and their increasingly populated cities – not to mention the colonization of other countries with their unknown quantities – liberal democracy based on autonomous individualism was a means of controlling subjects no matter how large the population. Whether the state is comprised of ten thousand or a hundred thousand, writes Rousseau in *The Social Contract*, “each member, as being a subject, is regarded as an individual” (48) and is contracted as such to the authority of the state. By centralizing authority and thereby weakening affiliative relationships in the community, individuals were increasingly distinguished from their social contexts. The individual as producer/consumer, and not his or her familial or communal contexts, became the unit of economic, political, and social meaning. Rights and responsibilities were established based on the individual as worker and consumer who is brought to realization, or “matured,” through the school. Individuals thereby become depoliticized. Increasing individuation and its concomitant age-bound
institutional segmentation tend to divide society into temporary and apolitical groups made up of disembodied, autonomous monads. The increasingly institutionalized apparatus of individualism provides norms for its proper achievement of which age-based pedagogy is a chief and logical site of its enactment and rationalization.

The modern faith in science and the valorization of rationality have led to a search for a scientific pedagogy that could produce the forms of subjectivity required by liberal capitalism. This search has yielded most prominently a psychology that rationalizes curricula and pedagogy founded on "natural development." Rose argues:

psychometrics was joined by other normalized and normalizing visions of childhood, which appear softer and more benign but which have become, by this very token, more pervasive. The most powerful of these was the notion of development. (Governing 141)

The idea of development carries with it, of course, an authoritative ideology of progress and evolution. As Rose points out, the Darwinian science of evolutionary progress distinguished the human from the animal and paralleled human development and the Enlightenment principle of progress: "the development of the child appeared to repeat the stages of the cultural evolution of humans from primitive to civilized" (Governing 141). It is not accidental therefore that the notion of "the child" as an object of study in the nineteenth century arose concurrently with the prominence of evolutionary theories. Carolyn Steedman argues that "evolutionary theory ... was used by psychologists of the child-study movement," and that early child study made synecdochal links to the progress of humanity in general; it involved, she writes, "an inherent teleology, with the idea of progress being embedded in the idea of development: the child's developing body and mind could be understood as an embodiment of a more general historical progress" (79). In line with this thinking, the emerging discipline of scientific pedagogy relied on and perpetuated the civilized/primitive, developed/underdeveloped, mature/immature binary that informs the same idea of development in pedagogical method as in colonialist practices. Development in the pedagogical context — Bildung — became the ultimate expression of the noble Enlightenment concept of humanity's individual and cultural maturation.

It was perhaps inevitable that the science of human development would become attached to pedagogy. Walkerdine argues that what she calls the "psychology-pedagogy couple" operates under the obligations of development and "within a set of administrative apparatuses of regulation through normalization" (188). The sequencing rules of the age-graded system of progressive development remain particularly definitive in education. Developmental pedagogy, which Donzelot aptly calls "psycho-pedagogy" (192), inscribes power-knowledge relations based on a maturity/immaturity equation. As modernity's
chief technology of subjectivation, the school not only regulates and legislates the knowledge/non-knowledge divide, but it also orders maturity/immaturity as a “dividing practice”; that is, it defines the criteria proper to a “child” and to “maturity,” and regulates subjects according to their integration into or exclusion by those criteria. It determines how learning toward maturity should be managed, through the formal and institutionalized steps made up of some “twenty-odd age categories from kindergarten to the postdoctorate” (Meyer 201). The formal system is more informally linked to myriad other rules and regulations for the management of children and youth.

The life-course model operates according to the accommodational logic described by Gramsci as essential to hegemony. Meyer points out that the modern system of individualism he analyzes is “designed to generate a good deal of life satisfaction, and generally does so” (212). Yet, as he goes on to argue, those eccentric to the institutionalized life-course, the most outstanding group of which is women outside the labour market, especially stay-at-home mothers, threaten to expose the failures of the system. That is, because happiness and fulfillment, or “life satisfaction,” are based on individual passage through the life-course defined by autonomy, those whose lives are submerged in others tend to feel less satisfaction.41 When the fulfillments of the Bildung narrative are withheld, marginalized groups make demands on those life-course institutions that define its progress, demands legitimized by modernity’s metanarrative. Hegemony functions so that individuals who feel themselves to be denied the plot lines of Bildung make demands to be reintegrated. Instead of challenging hegemony, these demands, “often grounded in the diseases of the subjective self (the low self-esteem of members of off-track groups, for instance)” (212), further ordain and entrench it; they “push for the further elaboration of the statuses and tracks of the life-course institutions” (212). The hegemonic system is supple enough to accommodate them. For those otherwise off-track groups, special tracks of subjectivation are instituted that “link the group to a more or less standard life-course” (Meyer 213). These special tracks, or side-tracks, nevertheless follow well-established “sequencing rules that are accountable and that will produce regularization” (213). It is in this way that the self as a story-line becomes coherent and complete, and the individuals who are interpellated, or re-interpellated, by it submit very well on their own to its narrative pull.

The institutionalized story line of the psychological subject reinforces the pedagogical subject, especially in developmental-psychology discourses about education. In its institutionalization by education expertise, developmental psychology acts as an apparatus of surveillance and regulation. For example, the idea of a progressive life-course has influenced the prevalent practices of “child-centred” learning, where pedagogy, as
Walkerdine argues, "becomes the observation and recording of naturalized development" (185). While supposed to redress the blatant hierarchies of traditional pedagogical relations, child-centred pedagogy, in Walkerdine's insightful analysis, looks more like a particularly insidious form of surveillance, social regulation, and subjectivation. Central to the practices that constitute this pedagogy, Walkerdine lists "a system for the classification, observation, monitoring, promotion and facilitation of the development of a variety of aspects of individual psychological capacities," which, rather than a "reflection" of a supposedly natural age-based development, garners "the production of development as pedagogy" (162). Walkerdine's study demonstrates Foucault's contention that, while institutions such as education operate through an apparent seamlessness, or invisibility, its subjects are regulated through the "normalizing gaze" of surveillance, or visibility: "disciplinary power ... is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility" (Discipline 187).

As detailed above, Foucault's primary example of surveillance in the modern age is the Benthamite panopticon in which prisoners would be regulated not by direct coercion, but by constant surveillance. He argues that with the new disciplinary power represented by panopticism came new systems of surveillance — new techniques of controlling patients, soldiers, or students — such as marking, examining, and classifying. Indeed, the school examination epitomizes surveillance discipline. The "self-evident" naturalness, or invisibility, of these mechanisms ensures that subjects answer spontaneously to pedagogical interpellation. Rose provides a trenchant example of the normalizing gaze of developmental psychology in his Governing the Soul. He includes a photograph of Arnold Gesell, whose work in the mid-twentieth century delineates behavioural norms for chronological stages of child development, in his "laboratory." The image is of a mechanism not dissimilar in effect to Foucault's eighteenth-century panopticon; although, since the child under observation is in the centre of the apparatus and surrounded by observers, it is rather an inverse of the Benthamite panopticon. It provides a sharp illustration of the inside/outside conversion of subjectivation I have described. Inside, and at the very centre of the dome structure under bright spotlights, is seated a child being "tested" by Gesell, looking very much the expert complete with lab coat and clip-board. Outside the dome looking in are two other scientific observers, one of whom is taking notes, and a third person operating a movie camera (Dr. Gesell filmed all of his experiments), all of them focused intently on the child at the centre. Here, under the normalizing and rationalizing gaze of the psychological sciences, the child's development is being assessed, measured, and judged.

Development, and its maturity/immaturity economy, is one of modernity's key
apparatuses for ensuring the reproduction of hegemony's chief requirement, autonomous individualism. Walkerdine notes the irony here: "the apparatus of [developmental pedagogy] ensures that the child is produced as an object of the scientific and pedagogical gaze by means of the very mechanism which were intended to produce its liberation" (190). This is not to say that there have not been positive, even liberatory, outcomes to some of the practices of child-centred, developmental pedagogy, but these positive effects do not mean that the pedagogy or the child is free of ideology. Indeed, the normalizing ideology of autonomous individualism on which this pedagogy is based is increasingly being challenged, a point to which we will return in subsequent chapters.

What Rose refers to as “compulsory subjectivity” (Governing 200), then, is regulated to a great degree in modern Western democracies by education. While “life-course” or developmental psychology has reified the Bildung-subject in recent times, pedagogy as subjectivation has a long history. James Donald, whose Sentimental Education is influenced by Rose, argues that the modern apparatus of pedagogical subjectivity is inscribed in Rousseau’s 1762 Bildungsroman, Émile, which, along with Hans-Georg Gadamer and others, he situates as a precursor to Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister. Rousseau’s pedagogical treatise is in keeping with the guiding tenets of Enlightenment ideology. His student, like Kant’s, is paradoxically subject to an external authority that authorizes him to act as a “free” agent (6). Authority guides and regulates what is posited as a natural propensity to freedom based in the autonomous and rational individual. (Donzelot refers to this education model as “protected liberalism” [xxi].) Indeed, Rousseau’s story of the socialization of the citizen through education is the modern story of that process Althusser and Gramsci would identify as the free consent to hegemony. The modern school provides an invisible yet powerful link between the “private” individual and hegemonic state control. Donald argues that, for Rousseau, pedagogy’s project is to make the subject experience this link not as bondage, but as freedom:

The virtuous citizen is the one who experiences these bonds as his or her own desires, aspirations and guilt, and thus evinces the capacity for self-policing. The well-ordered modern polity is one that depends less on coercion than on this self-policing of free citizens, and so can claim the authority of virtue and nature. (7)

The rise of the bourgeoisie in modernity brought with it the modern family as a major locus for normalization in the form of the pedagogical. Rousseau’s Émile is an early and representative example of hegemonic power at work. The teacher, that is, forms the student into the kind of citizen required by the modern socio-economic system, and does so not through coercion, but through an “apprenticeship,” a kind of paternal friendship. This
relationship fosters Bildung. Émile, argues Stephen Heath, propagates an ideological mechanism

in which the educator as guide and friend respects the spontaneous unfolding of personality and responds to the natural stages of development in order to bring out the truth — the very nature — the child carries within him and so direct him to a self-sustaining autonomy that will allow him moral and intellectual independence as an adult. ("Childhood Times" 17)

Thus, with modern education emerges the idea of subject-formation or Bildung.

The institutionalization of the modern subject in pedagogy will be the focus of Part Two, but, first, in order to explore in more detail the particular inflection of the pedagogical subject, I will now turn to an epistemological history of the idea of Bildung.

NOTES

1 According to Michel Foucault, there are "two great discontinuities in the episteme of Western culture: the first inaugurates the Classical age (roughly half-way through the seventeenth century) and the second, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, marks the beginning of the modern age" (Order xxii).

2 See Julian Roberts' chapter on Kant in his German Philosophy.

3 This is similarly the point of Foucault's 1983 lecture published as "The Art of Telling the Truth" where he argues that Kant's question "What is Enlightenment" "bears on what this present actually is, it bears firstly on the determination of a certain element of the present that is to be recognized, to be distinguished, to be deciphered among all the others. What is it in the present that produces meaning now for philosophical reflection?" (87). In this way, contends Foucault, Kant's essay exemplifies the Aufklärung as a "very singular cultural process that became aware of itself by naming itself, by situating itself in relation to its past and future, and by designating the operations that it must carry out within its own present" (89).

4 Dreyfus and Rabinow point out that, for Foucault, the crisis of modernity is not a unique event in history: "modernity is not a specific historical event, but a historical conjuncture which has happened several times in our history, albeit with different form and content: for example, the breakdown of the traditional virtues in Athens at the time of Socrates and Aristophanes, the decline of the Hellenistic world, the end of metaphysics at the time of Kant. This breakdown results in a specific attitude toward reality which, to differentiate it from a subjective state, Foucault calls an ethos" (117).

5 In "Self-Authoring Subjects," Eagleton points out that eighteenth-century German philosophers were aware that the transcendental subject was a logical impossibility. They were "well aware of the paradox that to assert the transcendental 'I' or subject as the founding principle of reality, itself utterly undetermined and self-grounding, is to undo your own declaration at a stroke, since there can be no 'I' without differentiation, no ego without an Other or not-I. The subject as absolute is thus ruined as soon as it reflects" (43).
He points out too that later German philosophers, including Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Nietzsche, deconstructed the humanist subject. These thinkers undoubtedly were precursory to what are usually considered radically unique poststructuralist theories. What is new is that before de Saussure the problem was perceived as how to (re)install the subject as absolute consciousness and centre. In poststructuralism, the attempt is to remove the subject, for once and for all, from the centre.

The common sense notion of maturity remains closely tied to the idea of consciousness. In psychoanalysis one is mature to the degree one knows one's own unconscious forces (need, desires, motivations), and, as Christie W. Kiefer points out, to the extent to which one can control sexual and aggressive drives (80). Neuroses, of course, are figured as "immaturity."

On the individual-society dualism, see also Henriques, et al., Changing the Subject, especially 13-16.

The work of George Herbert Mead, on which Habermas builds his theory of communicative inter/action, is exemplary of this interactionist sociology. See, for example, Habermas, "The Unity of Reason," 421, and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 334.

Like "ego psychology," mainstream sociology tends to be conservative in its concern with the individual's accommodation to society's demands. Hall points out, for instance, that Talcott Parsons "studied the 'fit' or complementarity between 'the self' and the social system" (605). Similarly, it is the proper fit between the individual and the social with which much conventional Bildungsroman criticism is concerned.

The inextricable relationship between the rise of the category of the aesthetic and of the modern conception of subjectivity is explored by Andrew Bowie in Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche. See also Eagleton's The Ideology of the Aesthetic.

As Michael Minden among others points out, Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters was a revision of an earlier semi-autobiographical work referred to as the Theatralische Sendung, written between 1777 and 1786. This work was more dramatic, according to Minden, but in the second version, Wilhelm moves into the subjective centre of the novel. Thus, even within Goethe's career, the Bildungsroman represents a turn to a more subjective literature.

The modern subject is being problematized, if not disqualified, not only in cultural studies, philosophy, and English studies, but also, for example, in geography, sociology, psychology, nursing, and even the hard sciences. Trans-disciplinarity makes the question of the subject more complex. For example, in "What is a scientific author?" Steve Woolgar points out that after the Enlightenment, unlike in literature, the subject in science disappears in the name of the "objective truth" of scientific knowledge. In the emerging field of the "sociology of scientific knowledge," which has been influenced by poststructuralist theory, the author is being reinstated in an effort to acknowledge the situated subject at the centre of knowledge production. See also, for example, Aage Sorensen, Franze E. Weinert, and Lonnie R. Sherrod, Eds. Human Development and the Life Course: Multidisciplinary Perspectives; Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self; Julian Henriques, Wendy Hollway, Cathy Urwin, Couze Venn, and Valerie Walkerdine, Eds. Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity; Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift, Eds. Mapping the Subject: Geographies of Cultural Transformation; and Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore, eds. Feminisms and Critical Pedagogy.
It is this insight that underscores the persistent problem of terminology when addressing the question of subjectivity. In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” for example, Althusser posits an “individual” as his logical presupposition in order to give an account of the formation of the subject as an ideological construct, not an *a priori*. Yet, as Judith Butler points out, individuals “enjoy intelligibility only to the extent that they are, as it were, first established in language....It makes little sense to treat ‘the individual’ as an intelligible term if individuals are said to acquire their intelligibility by becoming subjects” (Psychic 11). Perhaps it is inevitable, then, as Butler goes on to say, that the story by which the subject is narrated will always be a logically circular one.

I am focusing here on one aspect of Lacan’s theory, the mirror stage, and leaving out, most significantly, the acquisition of language at the “Symbolic” stage and the Oedipus complex. For thorough readings of Lacan, see Belsey, Gallop, Mitchell, Silverman.

For an excellent overview of Lacan’s major ideas in terms of film theory, see Philip Rosen’s Introductory sections in *Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader*.

This is the point of Hayden White’s ground-breaking thesis that history appears in the form of stories. In *The Content of the Form* and elsewhere, he argues that history is mediated by literary tropes, such as metaphor and irony, and generic forms, such as Romance, Tragedy, and Comedy. Thus, White challenged the epistemological status of the discipline of history.


In fact, as Eagleton argues in *Ideology*, although Althusser “adopts the broader sense of ideology ..., his thinking about the topic ... is covertly constrained by an attention to the narrower sense of ideology as a dominant formation” (18).

For a useful selection of feminist applications of Foucault’s work, see *Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance*, edited by Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby.

Moments of “remembering,” which Freud would call slips of the tongue, are, for Bourdieu, witticisms giving evidence to the amnesia of the habitus. He explains: “if witticisms surprise their author no less than their audience and impress as much by their retrospective necessity as by their novelty, the reason is that the trouvaille appears as the simple unearthing, at once accidental and irresistible, of a buried possibility” (79).

In “The Rise of English,” Eagleton argues that in nineteenth-century England, it was the category of the literary, or rather its academic site, English studies, that came to replace religion as the nation’s primary apparatus for the pacification and control of its subject.

In her essay on child-centred pedagogy, Valerie Walkerdine observes that in
pedagogical theory after the world wars, individual child development was equated with freedom in binary opposition to coercion because of the latter’s association with Germany and fascism.


24 For Foucault, the prison is not just a metaphor of society; rather, it is a concrete example of modern disciplinary regimes.

25 Of course, as family configurations change (through feminism, access to planned parenthood and the acceptance of divorce) the family has become less important than its basic unit, the autonomous individual.

26 In an interview with Pierre Boncenne, Foucault makes explicit his analysis of the confessional as a form of power that produces (rather than represses) sexuality: “when one thinks that, since the twelfth century, all Western Catholics have been obliged to admit their sexuality, their sins against the flesh and all their sins in this area, committed in thought or deed, one can hardly say that the discourse on sexuality has been simply prohibited or repressed. ... I think that once again we are confronted by a phenomenon of exclusive valorization of a theme: power must be repressive; since power is bad, it can only be negative, etc. In these circumstances, to speak of one’s sexuality would necessarily be a liberation. However, it ... [is] much more complicated than that” (102).

27 Charles Taylor provides such a history in *Sources of the Self* (1989). See also anthropologist Louis Dumont’s *Essays on Individualism* (1986).

28 Indeed, Bauman argues that current notions of diversity posit difference as cultural. It is the story of “Europe suddenly opening its eyes to the diversity of cultural modes of life previously unnoticed or considered uninteresting, ... of differences as cultural differences, of variety as man-made and brought about by the teaching/learning process” (*Intimations* 3-4).


30 Indeed, in her essay “Initiation Stories: Narrative Structure and Career Planning,” Grace Ann Hovet describes a kind of career counseling that uses the literary model of the *Bildungsroman* as a narrative guide to the career trajectory. Her purpose is to argue that the “female *Bildungsroman*” such as Elizabeth Abel, *et al.*, define it in *The Voyage In*, serves as a “alternative” model for the career path.

31 I intend this in a similar, but broader, sense than that suggested by Rose. He argues that the consuming, rather than producing, self is the primary way of perceiving of the contemporary economic subject and that the “choosing self entails a new image of the productive subject” (103). As consuming subjects, we “make sense of our existence by exercising our freedom to choose in a market in which one simultaneously purchases products and services, and assembles, manages, and markets oneself” (102). I am applying this same kind of consumerist ideology not just to “lifestyles,” but also to the broader idea of “selfhood” in general, so that the individual “assembles, manages, and markets” its self according to the web of modern technologies of subjectivation.

32 See Kiefer, 144-46.

33 In their essay, “The State and the Structure of the Life Course,” Karl Ulrich Mayer and Walter Müller provide a standard definition of the life-course model: “In speaking of
the structure of the life course, we are referring to the fact that life is not a continuous flux
of undifferentiated time and experience, but that it consists of a sequence of phases which
are being constructed and perceived as different from each other in some important
respects by society as well as individual actors. By structure of the life course, we also
mean that the different phases are in most instances separated from each other by socially
significant events or normatively defined transitions” (224).

34 Mayer and Müller argue that, because of the radical separation of self and society,
too little attention is paid to the state’s role in analyses of the life course: “while the state
and its development figures prominently on the level of the larger society, individual lives
are being portrayed as if they were occurring in a stateless social structure” (217-18).

35 See Norman Holland’s Postmodern Psycholanalysis.

36 Minden goes on to say that “the Oedipus Complex is also, after all, the story of how
a middle-class European male can combine the love of the mother with succession to the
father without ultimately destructive rivalry or re-absorption into a pre-individuated state.
Just like the Bildungsroman, it is a highly precarious compromise which strives at the same
time to establish itself as a norm” (13).

37 Such would be the picaresque, whose plot structure Evelyn Cobley, in Representing
War: Form and Ideology in First World War Narrative, contrasts to the Bildungsroman.

38 As Nikolas Rose argues in both Governing the Soul and Inventing the Self: the work
of child psychologist, Arnold Gesell, at the Yale Psycho-Clinic which was founded in
1911, was crucial to the development of normalizing measurements of children’s
development. The Gesell Institute of Child Development Studies at Yale, over which
Gesell presided during the 1950s, remains a leading voice in normative developmental
psychology.

39 Against this reification, White Riley emphasizes the mutability of the aging process
according to changing social structures, including, for example, the dramatic increase in
life expectancy in modernity (154).

40 Ariès’ book was originally published in 1960 as L’Enfant et la vie familiale sous
l’ancien régime. See also Jacques Donzelot’s 1979 The Policing of Families and Rose’s
chapter, “The Young Citizen,” in Governing the Soul.

41 Carol Gilligan’s work is relevant here; see In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory
and Women’s Development (1982).

42 Emile, according to Allan Bloom’s introduction to the 1979 edition, is the first
Bildungsroman (6).
Chapter Three

The Bildungsroman and the Idea of Bildung

There are no ideas apart from their articulation.
—Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact

In the end [the hero] usually gets his girl and some sort of job, gets married and becomes a Philistine just like the others.
—Hegel (Quoted in Kontje, Private Lives)

The Rise of the Bildungsroman

While the Bildungsroman is a product of intellectual history in that it is the narrativization of the idea of Bildung, it is also a novel and belongs therefore to literary history. Although it is impossible to separate the literary exposition of Bildung from Bildung as an intellectual idea, it is nevertheless useful to look at the genre in terms of its emergence as a literary category. Its conventional generic boundaries, as well as infringements on those boundaries, disclose much about the idea of Bildung.

Critics generally agree that the canonization of the Bildungsroman began with the publication in Germany of Christian Friedrich von Blanckenburg’s Essay on the Novel in 1774. Although he does not use the term, “Bildungsroman,” Blanckenburg recognizes Christoph Wieland’s Agathon, published seven years earlier, as a new type of narrative. What is notable about this new narrative is its focus on subjective development. In his recent study of the Bildungsroman, Todd Kontje situates this moment as an originary one in the history of the genre: “by emphasizing Wieland’s concentration on the psychological development of one central protagonist, Blanckenburg identifies the beginning of a German novel tradition that will come to be called the Bildungsroman” (German 8). It would be nearly a half century before the term Bildungsroman was attached to this emerging literary form.

Although the term Bildung was prominent in German philosophical discourse throughout the eighteenth century, it was not attached to “roman” in literary parlance until 1819. As Fritz Martini has recently discovered, the term “Bildungsroman” was first employed in a series of lectures by a professor of rhetoric at Dorpat, Karl von Morgenstern, who explicitly applied the idea of Bildung to the development of the roman’s hero as well as to the reader (Hardin xiii-xiv). Already, here, in this first literary appearance, the Bildungsroman announces its pedagogical power. In one of his lectures, Morgenstern argues
that the genre could well be called the *Bildungsroman*, first and foremost because of its content, because it presents the hero's *Bildung* from its inception and continuation until a certain stage of completion; secondly, however, because precisely through this presentation it encourages the cultivation of the reader more fully than any other type of novel. (quoted in Martini 18)

Thus, in its original conception, the *Bildungsroman* was a literature of education in *Bildung*. Not only does this new type of literature introduce the notion of learning as personal growth, but also, and perhaps more importantly, narrative literature as a pedagogical tool for the reader's growth, or *Bildung*. It is to this historical juncture that can be traced the powerful modern idea of literature's pedagogical power. The narrative's pedagogical function on both content and formal axes of the text was to remain one of the major characteristics of the *Bildungsroman* even though the genre was not much discussed for yet another half century.

In fact, the literary term remained relatively obscure until the well-known Germanist Wilhelm Dilthey put it into circulation with his biography of Friedrich Schleiermacher in 1870 and gave it even greater currency with his widely published *Poetry and Experience* of 1906. The term is further ratified in 1920 with the publication of Georg Lukács' *Theory of the Novel*. Following Dilthey, Lukács confirms the generally accepted affirmative (or "utopian" [142]) ideology of the novel, arguing that "its theme is the reconciliation of the problematic individual, guided by his lived experience of the ideal, with concrete social reality" (132). For both Dilthey and Lukács, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* serves as a prototype, and, as Hartmut Steinecke among others argues, even before the term "*Bildungsroman*" is commonly used, Goethe's novel is pivotal to the debate about the idea of *Bildung* in nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Germany.²

*Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* marks a major point in the elaboration of *Bildung*, and, in *Bildungsroman* criticism, Goethe's novel remains the progenitor and model of the genre. It is important to note, moreover, that *Wilhelm Meisters* not only exemplifies the *Bildungsroman* in generic criticism, but it also signals a more general shift toward a modern understanding of the novel and of the literary. At the time of Goethe's writing, the novel as a form presented a problem to literary genre studies itself. Goethe's attempt was to introduce the novel – heretofore deemed a popular, if not vulgar, form – as a legitimate literary genre. According to Michael Minden, the novel "had to be assimilated into the established system of genres, but at the same time it posed a threat to the clarity and authority of that system, being itself heterogeneous in origin and content, and not easily
sanctioned by reference to antiquity" (20). Yet progressive thinkers of Weimar Classicism welcomed the form as representative of late Enlightenment ideals. "Whilst posing a distinct threat to traditional literary values," argues Minden, *Wilhelm Meisters* "repeatedly attracted comment and speculation because of the perspectives it opened on a more 'modern' form of literature" (20). It is generally agreed that the turn to imaginative prose as a valid genre brings with it a democratization of the literary (a democratization that coincides with the rise of the bourgeoisie). But much of the contemporaneous critical discussion about Goethe's novel concerned its generic eccentricity. It was the beginning of something new. Indeed, the discussion about the emerging genre can be situated as part of a broader discourse concerning the changing view of "man," or of subjectivity, a discourse which, for Foucault, remains the cultural "attitude" that distinguishes modernity. What was new about Goethe's novel, as Minden, among others, argues, is that subjectivity, marked by an "inner consistency of the individual" (21), becomes the novel's centre: "both Wilhelm's inner life and his understanding of it are placed before the reader as being of central importance" (21). Most importantly, however, thanks to Goethe, the subject at the centre of the novel is given an air of profundity, as Minden argues, and, despite the "informality" which the novel brought to the category of the literary at the end of the eighteenth century, the status of universality.

While *Bildung* and the *Bildungsroman* have localizable roots in the German Aufklärung, they are also certainly products of a more general European Enlightenment and the concomitant rise of the novel in the West. Although the idea of the *Bildungsroman* was circulating outside of Germany in the nineteenth century (Thomas Carlyle translated Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters* into English in 1824) and the term was applied retrospectively not only to *Wilhelm Meisters*, but also to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English and French novels, some of which predate the Goethean prototype (such as Rousseau's *Émile*, of 1762), the term itself was transposed into English most emphatically by Susanne Howe in 1930 with the publication of *Wilhelm Meisters and his English Kinsmen: Apprentices to Life*. As Fraiman argues, this text is a "landmark book" in the field, and subsequent studies "owe much to Howe — if not for their selection of texts, then for the principles underlying their selection" (4). Howe anglicizes the tradition of citing *Wilhelm Meisters* as prototype, and "lay[s] the groundwork for ensuing English claims to Goethe's legacy" (Fraiman 4). While critics such as Jerome Buckley extend Howe's paradigm to include mainstream English novelists such as Dickens, they also follow "Howe's precedent of deriving the form from Goethe and, reinforcing this derivation while heightening the genre's incantatory power in English-speaking circles" (Fraiman 9). These claims to German origins, circumscribed by the underlying concept of *Bildung*, continue to define the theoretical and ideological
dimensions of the genre.9

Much of the mainstream debate about the genre stems from the attempt to establish definitional boundaries that would account for both its roots in the German eighteenth century and its transposition both geographically to other nations, primarily England,10 and temporally through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Indeed, in Germany as elsewhere, the Bildungsroman, a genre said to be exemplified retrospectively by the nineteenth-century novel, was not much discussed until its twentieth-century institutionalization in an increasingly professionalized literary discipline, and, in fact, the genre did not see wide currency in English studies until the postwar period. More recent – and increasingly less marginalized – debates about the genre stem from attempts to establish boundaries that would account for both its conventional narrative of subjectivity and recent appropriations of that genre by women and by racial and ethnic minorities.11

Genre and the Bildungsroman

Since the movements between the centre and margin of the Bildungsroman describe the ideas that are essential to this study, I want to clarify my own invocation of the genre. This clarification is particularly important here since there is, perhaps, no genre whose conventional boundaries are so jealously guarded and audaciously contested as the Bildungsroman. Its custodians are in fact increasingly on the defensive as both feminist and postcolonial critics expand the generic outlines to include non-male, non-white, non-heterosexual texts. The fear is that, from both directions, the Bildungsroman as a genre can disappear, or become what Jeffrey L. Sammons calls a “phantom genre” (“Mystery” 239).

On the one hand, the genre can be stretched to the point that it loses all specificity; in this way it encompasses any novel that narrates human subjectivity and, in fact, becomes synonymous with the novel per se, or at least acts as the "conceptual horizon" against which the novel is assessed.12 This problem of criticism is neither incidental nor extraneous since it is the presumed theme of the narrative itself that bespeaks a universal relevance. That is, the Bildungsroman is seen as a universal genre in that it can be applied to any text that narrates the insertion of an individual into history. According to Richard Barney, for example, canonized critics of the genre maintain that what distinguishes it is its “ability to transcend specific socio-historical definition” (359). Since it supposedly “depicts that which is universally human” (359), “the Bildungsroman itself [is seen as] a generic ‘concrete universal’ (Hegel’s notion), since it is historically determined and universally applicable in representing the law of human maturation” (360). Thus, Bildung points to the paradox that positions modernity both as that historical moment which discovers the subject at the
centre, and that permanent horizon toward which the progressively maturing subject of culture reaches. The *Bildungsroman*, in this view, refers to any novel that places the maturation of individual human subjectivity at its centre and presents that theme as a universal law.

On the other hand, definitions of the genre by Germanists who want to emphasize its historical origins can become so rigorous and limiting that not even Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meisters* fits the criteria; here, the genre “shrinks” and, as Redfield puts it, “threatens to disappear altogether” (41). In this way, the term loses all relevance and purpose. Thus, from either side of these generic borderlines, the *Bildungsroman* can be said not to exist at all; yet in its nonexistence it is so “efficaciously present” (43), as Redfield puts it, that its problematic transcendental presence needs to be accounted for.14

Although genres are made meaningful and intelligible by their hermeneutical codes and conventions, it is important to bear in mind that, since these interpretive codes are constructed and institutionalized by a literary industry that can be situated in the nineteenth and twentieth-century West, the genres they define are by no means fixed or ahistorical. Thus, no text ever exemplifies its genre; the codes defining any genre are not exhausted by any particular example of it. According to Tzvetan Todorov, “every work modifies the sum of possible works, each new example alters the species” (*Fantastic 6*), so that no exemplar in practice ever reaches the theoretical ideal. With generic codes, adds Todorov, “we are dealing with a language of which every utterance is agrammatical at the moment of its performance” (*Fantastic 6*). Genre can be seen, then, as an interplay between theory and practice, between definitions of a genre and actual instances of it. In other words, genre is what Todorov calls a “double movement,” in which every text “is not only the product of a pre-existing combinatorial system[, but] ... also a transformation of that system” (*Fantastic 7*). There can be no structure without the deviations which corroborate it. In this way, genre is the ongoing and dynamic play between rules and their transgression. As Martin Swales puts it,

> the lifeblood of any genre must be the interrelationship of general expectation and specific praxis, of theoretic corpus and its palpable, individuated (that is, modified) realization in an actual work. (*German 11*)

While generic expectations are crucial to how a text is read (and written), these expectations are with each new instance challenged and modified, so that every text exceeds the boundaries of the genre to which it “belongs.” As these excesses become thinkable or legible, genres expand or shift in order to contain them.

Not only do the texts themselves change, but literary critics and other readers change the way they read and interpret texts according to their own historical and discursive
locations. The discourses which construct genres, and through which genres are read, are never "objective" and ideologically neutral. The canonization of texts and genres is an historical and cultural process since ideology determines the inclusions and exclusions which demarcate generic boundaries. In this way, genres are normalizing and regulating. The marginalization of female protagonists and female-authored texts by the *Bildungsroman* genre, for example, is not simply coincidental and extrinsic, but rather, defining and intrinsic. In fact, one of the questions the current study poses is what happens to the "universal" subject of the *Bildungsroman* when women, for example, trespass its generic borders.

Fraiman announces a similar question to be the central thesis of her *Unbecoming Women*. Her approach, however, differs fundamentally from mine on the theoretical question of (the *Bildungsroman* as) genre. While Fraiman wants to "jettison once and for all the notion of a ‘female Bildungsroman’ — by uncoupling these two terms to release our discussion of female developmental fiction from so much Goethean baggage" (13), I want, conversely, to preserve the term precisely in order to draw attention to the historical origins which, at least in part, establish the genre’s boundaries through an exclusion of difference, and therefore make an issue of the ideological conventions that disqualify women (and other “others”) and, in fact, determine generic incursions. When I do couple the terms “female” and “*Bildungsroman,*” however, I enclose them in quotation marks in order to draw attention to the contradiction, the impossibility of this coupling. But I retain the term in order to emphasize the historical sedimentation of the genre which cannot be detached from it, and to emphasize, in fact, that the “female *Bildungsroman*” works both inside and outside the generic paradigm. Since a history of criticism has canonized certain texts as the zero-degree intertexts to any novel concerned with the subject of *Bildung* (whether positively or negatively), the generic conventions cannot simply be ignored.15

In fact, it is by looking at these generic conventions through another lens that we can denaturalize them. Since the exclusion of certain narratives has enabled the generic boundaries of the *Bildungsroman* (and its hegemonic modern subject), it is crucial that counter-narratives be read against those very boundaries.16 If the female “novel of development” (as Fraiman prefers to call it) has nothing in common with the “male” *Bildungsroman* and remains entirely outside its borders, then the latter remains intact and its phallocentric lineaments unchallenged. A “deconstruction of the ‘master’ genre” (Lima 445) simply cannot take place outside the discourses that have constructed it. It can best be challenged, that is, through exploring its limits.

I find most useful, then, a definition of the genre that allows some flexibility without
over-generalizing the term and destroying its particular valence altogether. The generic boundaries I use here are similar to those delimited by Sammons in his essay "The Bildungsroman for Nonspecialists: An Attempt at a Clarification." Sammons holds first of all that "the Bildungsroman can be treated as an ideal type that does not necessarily have to be in contact with the German novel tradition" (41). However, Sammons' limiting criterion, with which I concur, is that the Bildungsroman "should have something to do with Bildung, that is, with the early bourgeois, humanistic concept of the shaping of the individual self from its innate potentialities through acculturation and social experience to the threshold of maturity" (41). Thus, while he expands the generic boundaries beyond Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters, Sammons "circumscribe[s] the applicability of the term by keeping it within its historical and especially its ideological limits" (41). These ideological limits can be seen in what Steinecke identifies as an important dictionary definition of the novel that appeared three years before Morgenstern's invention of the term "Bildungsroman," a definition which exerted great influence in the period. Using Wilhelm Meisters as exemplar, the unnamed author of the entry in the Brockhaus Conversations-Lexicon (1817) places the emerging view of the novel firmly in the ideological matrix of Aufklärung and its central concept of Bildung:

[The] ... life and fate of an individual from his birth to his completed Bildung, from which, however, the entire tree of humanity, in all its manifold branches in the beautiful time of its maturity and perfection, can be deduced — the apprenticeship of the disciple until he is raised to a master, that is the novel. (Qtd. in Steinecke 79)

This contact with the historical ideology of Bildung as a concept circumscribes the genre whether that contact is negative or positive, complicit or critical. As Swales argues, "even the nonfulfillment of consistently intimated expectation can, paradoxically, represent a validation of the genre by means of its controlled critique" (German 12). Despite Sammons, who contends that the Bildungsroman (that "phantom genre") — and, indeed, the concept of Bildung — died out by the end of the nineteenth century and therefore excludes twentieth-century satires of the genre, or "Antibildungsroman" (42), the concept of Bildung which underwrites the current prevalent notion of the "subject" remains pervasive in the modern industrialized West. In line with my conceptual approach to the Bildungsroman, I would include in the genre those novels which parody or critique the narrativization of that Bildung-subject.

The Bildungsroman became the preeminent story of the new problem of humanization in the modern West. The early stories of pedagogical socialization, such as Rousseau's Émile and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, "set in place," according to Donald, a definitive narrative
of what it is to be, and to become, a social actor” (7). It narrated the disjunction between individual capacities and social expectations and established the central problematic of the genre and one of the crucial problematics defining modernity in general terms: the tension between the “authenticity” of the self and the demands of society. It is in this way that the Bildungsroman tradition helped to construct the terms of modern subjectivity. From its beginnings, Donald argues, the Bildungsroman disseminated the categories of authenticity and convention, self and society, and creativity and compulsion, which produced the terms for a new mode of conduct, a new relations of the self to the self” (8). It is in terms of this binary tension, according to many critics of the genre, that the Bildungsroman can be assessed. The Bildungsroman tradition establishes the modern tension between the self and the social, a tension which Bildung is supposed to legitimize, if not reconcile.

What is most crucial in my use of “Bildungsroman” as a generic term, then, is that it remain attached to its philosophical and ideological roots in Aufklärung. That is, the term designates the literary representation of the pedagogical and philosophical discourse on subjectivity circulating not only in Germany, but throughout Europe, in the eighteenth century. “Humanism,” as Lukács contends, is “the fundamental attitude of this type of work” (135). Michael Minden, who argues for the establishment of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre as the progenitor of this generic designation, describes its Enlightenment origins nicely:

[Wilhelm Meisters] was basically an attempt to give aesthetic expression to the neo-humanist thought of Kant, Humboldt and Herder, to seek a literature both timeless and contemporary, and thereby to contribute a classical style and corpus to German culture. The Lehrjahre can be read as the culmination of the development of, and itself the expression of, a philosophical line of thought which established a specific, secular, organic, view of the connection between individual and world, articulated in the concept of the process of Bildung. (19)

It is therefore the idea of the Bildungsprozess as it appears in literary and other discourses, and not the generic limits of the Bildungsroman per se (which nevertheless reveal much about Bildung) that is a major concern of this present study.

Bildung and Enlightenment

The term “Bildung” refers throughout this study to the idea of the development of modern subjectivity as conceived in the European Enlightenment and emplotted in the
**Bildungsroman.** In this way, Bildung invokes the prevalent understanding of modern subjectivity in general which, though under attack by various postmodern discourses, remains prevalent today. I retain the German term (and italicize it)\(^{21}\) not to ahistoricize and globalize its specificity, but rather as a reminder precisely of modern subjectivity's historical and discursive constituents. Tracing the idea of Bildung (and its narrative trajectory in the Bildungsroman) provides a specific conceptual point of reference from which to grasp modernity's subject as described in the previous chapter.\(^{22}\) Here, then, I will outline a conceptual genealogy of the term as promulgated by the influential discourses of German modernity.\(^{23}\)

*Bildung* is difficult to translate into English: "formation," "cultivation" or "development" are the usual renderings.\(^{24}\) The prefix "self" is often attached to the English translation, as in W. H. Bruford's preferred designation, "self-cultivation," in a way that emphasizes a process of self-reflexive, conscious development. I prefer, however, the somewhat neglected term "maturation" since it evokes both the eighteenth-century German notion of "enlightened," self-conscious development and its correlative notion of the general maturation of society (as expressed, for example, by Kant), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the most common and ubiquitous twentieth-century term for the teleology of plenitudinous subjectivity. In other words, I think the term "maturation" admits of its ideological baggage, a baggage which the proliferation of synonyms seems an attempt to evade in an effort to capture an ideological "neutrality." In contemporary culture, the idea of "maturity," rife with ideological connotations, links diverse discourses and disciplines, including developmental psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology, women's and gender studies, pedagogy, literary theory and criticism, and so on, even (or perhaps especially) when the term itself is disavowed. The term "maturation," unlike, say, "development" which can be indefinite, also emphasizes Bildung's teleological purpose. The process of maturation ends, that is, in maturity. The term is therefore amenable to Bildung's grammatical status as a verbal-noun; as Dorothea von Mücke points out, the suffix *ung* "denotes both a state and a process" (162).\(^{25}\) I focus on the idea of *maturity* since the way in which maturity as an achieved state is defined determines retrospectively how maturation as a process will unfold. As Carol Gilligan rightly notes, challenging the common impression that a developmental theory is built like a pyramid from its base in infancy, [Piaget] points out that a conception of development instead hangs from its vertex of maturity, the point toward which progress is traced. Thus, a change in the definition of maturity does not simply alter the description of the highest stage but recasts the understanding of development, changing the entire account. (18-19)
The same process drives the *Bildungsroman* narrative; according to Coblely, the ending of the novel acts retrospectively to render coherent the narrative events: “whether the hero triumphs or is destroyed, teleology operates to make a ‘point’ by retrospectively imposing meaning on his education” (150). As I hope will become clear, this principle is at work in the process of maturation as it reaches toward the goal of the ideal subject of *Bildung*, or the “*Bildung*-subject.”

Although the idea of the *Bildung*-subject can be traced to Descartes’ cogito (in fact, Lyotard calls Descartes’ story itself a *Bildungsroman* [29]), the term proper is situated in the *Aufklärung*, especially in the idea of human “enlightenment.” As Kontje notes in his book, *The German Bildungsroman*, for Medieval mystics and eighteenth-century German Pietists, *Bildung* referred to God’s (re)formation of the fallen sinner back into harmony with the image of God (1).

For Weimar classicists — such as Goethe, Herder, Schiller, Humboldt, and Lessing — in the latter part of the century, in line with the more general Enlightenment movement, the term undergoes a significant secularization as the idea of harmonious unity with God as ideal is transmogrified into the idea of harmony within the individual. The exemplar model of *Bildung* can be traced to this religious basis; as Gadamer puts it “the rise of the word *Bildung* calls rather on the ancient mystical tradition, according to which man carries in his soul the image of God after whom he is fashioned and must cultivate it in himself” (12). Thus, a “man’s” ideal is no longer exemplified by God, but by “Man” himself. *Bildung* is the harmonization of “man” with “Man.” This shift in the meaning of *Bildung* itself is key to the shift that is the historical Enlightenment; in Gadamer’s words, “now *Bildung* is intimately associated with the idea of culture and designates primarily the properly human way of developing one’s natural talents and capacities” (11). This notion of culture as the active shaping of the human being is at the heart of the European Enlightenment. Here, too, it is important to retain a sense of what I have referred to as *Bildung’s* synecdochal resonance in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Indeed, for Humboldt, arguably the most important champion of secular *Bildung*, humanity’s development depends on individual maturation:

that on which the whole greatness of mankind ultimately depends – towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and of which especially those who wish to influence their fellow-men must never lose sight [is] individuality of energy and self-development. (17)

This synecdochal *Bildung* is narrativized in the *Bildungsroman*: the coming of age of the hero, or “man,” of the *Bildung* narrative represents the coming of age of Enlightenment “Man” in general. The *Bildungsroman* presents an ideal; as Lukács puts it:

The hero is picked out of an unlimited number of men who
share his aspirations, and is placed at the centre of the narrative only because his seeking and finding reveal the world's totality most clearly. (134)

The Bildungsheld represents all that is best about the subject constructed by the European Enlightenment.

Bauman argues, furthermore, that, as it becomes secularized, the term takes on a more definite pedagogical tenor. He points out that, during the eighteenth century, the emerging terms for "culture" — including the German Bildung — were "used in the public discourse as a name of an activity, of something some people were doing, or exhorted to do, to others — much as the farmer cultivated his plants to ennable the seeds and enrich the crop" (Intimations 8). In this emerging view, culture cultivates citizens; it teaches people to be proper subjects. Bildung was a pivotal concept in the work of Humboldt, who played a major role in the formation of the influential University of Berlin. According to Margareta Bertilsson, a central imperative of the Humboldtian vision was "to unify teaching/research with upbringing/formation (342); thus Bildung designates culture as a pedagogical or humanizing mission. The "new vision" of the social world, argues Bauman, is "constituted by the learning/teaching activity" (Intimations 9). Bauman is worth citing at length in this regard. The modern vision of culture, he argues, "is directed by three tacitly, yet axiomatically accepted premises":

First, human beings are essentially incomplete and not self-sufficient. Their humanization is a process taking place after birth, in the company of other human beings. The distinction between the inherited insufficiency and acquired completeness is conceptualized as the opposition between "biological" and "social" aspects of the "homo duplex," or between "nature" and nurture.

Second, humanization is essentially a learning process, split into the acquisition of knowledge and the taming, or repressing, of animal (and almost invariably antisocial) predispositions. The distinction between knowledge to be put in place of the natural predispositions, and the predispositions it is to replace, is often conceptualized as the opposition between "reason" and "passions," or between "social norms" and "instincts" or "drives."

Third, learning is just one side of the relation of which the other side is teaching. The completion of the humanization process, therefore, requires teachers and a system of — formal or informal — education. The educators hold the key to the continuous reproduction of cohabitation as a human society. (Intimations 3)

In this conceptualization of Bildung, then, humanization is a pedagogical process: "the
ideology of culture represents the world as consisting of human beings who are what they
are taught" (3). This understanding of culture as pedagogy — Bildung — produced the
concomitant idea of the individual as constructed through pedagogy. It produced, that is,
an entirely new notion of the subject "whose conduct is shaped by his/her knowledge, and
whose knowledge is shaped by knowledge givers" (Intimations 10). The humanization
process consists of both the acquisition of knowledge and the "taming" of instincts and
drives. These new citizens are amenable to, and provide the foundation for, new forms of
modern power. They are the subjects of Gramscian hegemony. The individual teleology of
self-formation is a micro-narrative that partakes of the modern master narrative of the
civilizing or "humanizing" project. As Bauman points out, the emerging pedagogical
subjects are "flexible and malleable entities, ... objects of practice, of purposeful
redirection" (10-11). Bildung is, in this sense, then, a pedagogical and disciplinary
apparatus, since it is seen, Bauman contends, as a process of "humanization," a notion that,
with its binary underpinnings in development/undeveloped, modernity/primitivism,
maturity/immaturity, has operated throughout modernity to justify missionary,
colonialist and imperialist practices. This conception of Bildung comes increasingly to be
understood as an interior process, as Gadamer, for example, points out. The idea that each
is responsible for his or her own cultural Bildung is in keeping with the main contention of
Kant's "Enlightenment" essay that autonomous self-reliance is the key to cultural maturity.

Bildung, furthermore, a central instance of the Enlightenment notion of progress. It
refers both to the pedagogical process of organic development and to its teleological end-
product. That is, the cultivation of a centered, coherent, and self-reflexive self is figured as
an organic process of maturation; for Herder, perhaps the greatest champion of the organic
metaphor, "all creatures strive ... to mature into that which they are destined to become"
(Kontje, German 2). Humboldt also employs organic metaphors to describe human growth
as a process of self-cultivation. He puts it this way: "whatever is to ripen in its soil and
expand into a fair maturity, must first have existed as the little germ" (23). This
organicism is central to the concept of Bildung according to Goethe, whose interest in the
natural sciences provided him with a metaphor in which human maturation is equated with
"the development of the seed to fruit according to innate genetic principles" (Kontje 3).
The Goethean notion of organicism is fundamental to the development of German
"Gestalt" psychology which remains a crucial element of practical psychology in the West
today. According to Mitchell Ash, the early concept of Gestalt was an element central to
the emerging idea of Bildung. The Bildungsprozess is a kind of Gestalt. Indeed, for Goethe,
"Gestalt" referred to the "self-actualizing wholeness of organic forms" (85). The first
principle of organicism is that the "functional role of an organism's parts is determined by
a law inherent in the whole," (85), a principle underlying Goethe's idea that the fully realized human being is the product of a process of auto-production or Bildung.

In Bildung, pedagogy is the organic cultivation of autonomous individuals. Kant employs an organic metaphor in Education where he argues that "all the natural endowments of mankind must be developed little by little out of man himself, through his own effort" (2-3):

take the auricula as an example. When raised from seed, the flowers are of the most varied colours. Nature has placed these manifold germs in the plant, and their development is only a question of proper sowing and planting. Thus it is with man. (9)

Thus, education, which for Kant must always include Bildung (1), cultivates human potential. The progressive development of "man" produces enlightened "Man." This synecdochal and ideological collapsing of "man" and "Man" is illustrated by Kant's logically redundant, but axiomatic tenet, "man can only become man by education" (Education 6). For Rousseau, too, education is an organic process through which subjects are produced: "plants are shaped by cultivation, and men by education" (Émile 38). As Jonathan Polster points out, Rousseau's pedagogical concern with an individual child in Émile was synecdochally transposed, in late-Enlightenment Germany, on to the whole of humanity. Kant's Education, for example, is a point-by-point reinscription of Rousseau's educational treatise in terms of society as a whole: "in the question of education," writes Kant, "is hidden the great secret of the perfection of human nature" (Qtd. in Polster 470).

The notion of Bildung as the education of "citizens," or modern subjects, was a major theme in Humboldt's formation of the University of Berlin. As he argues in The Limits of State Action, an essay written in 1791, seventeen years after the publication of Blackenburg's Essay on the Novel, Bildung is the key not only to individual human development but also, synecdochally, to human progress in general.

While Bildung designates a pedagogical or cultural process, it also signifies its mature product. Indeed, Gadamer argues that "in accordance with the frequent carry-over from becoming to being, Bildung ... describes more the result of this process of becoming than the process itself" (12). The aim of Bildung is to produce autonomous individualism; as Humboldt succinctly puts it, the object of education is "the development of the individual man" (52). It is important to note that the organic development of the subject is self-cultivation. In his extended organic metaphor, Humboldt contends that the ultimate goal of the maturing self is autonomy:

Now, whatever man receives externally, is only like the seed. It is his own active energy alone that can turn the most promising seed into a full and precious blessing for himself.
It is beneficial only to the extent that it is full of vital power and essentially individual. The highest ideal, therefore, of the co-existence of human beings, seems to me to consist in a union in which each strives to develop himself from his own inmost nature, and for his own sake. (19)

The centred and autonomous subject is the aim of Humboldt's pedagogical ideal. As Bill Readings argues, the philosophical idea of culture underlying the German idealists' idea of the university "is determined primarily in opposition to fragmentation" (61). This individual must be autonomous, unified, centred, and plenitudinous. The ultimate goal of Bildung's organic teleology is the harmonious self. In Humboldt's words,

the true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole. (16)

Humboldt's purpose, which has exerted great influence on modern Western education, was Bildungsharmonie: "man has it in his power to avoid ... one-sidedness, by attempting to unite the distinct and generally separately exercised faculties of his nature, by bringing [them] into spontaneous cooperation ... by harmoniously combining them" (16). The goal is the harmonization and centring of a man into "a single complete whole" (60) so that he fits unproblematically into the emerging socio-economic order. In this way, it is clear to what extent the Bildung-subject and its pedagogical machinery came to replace divine rule as the dominant form of social control.

Paradoxically, despite the organic analogies, what guarantees the human subject's self-determination is consciousness's radical dissociation from "nature." The idea of culture as that which separates human from nature is critical to the Enlightenment's construction of subjectivity. As an emerging secular society demanded an alternative locus of authority, an increasingly capitalist economy simultaneously required the self-regulating and autonomous subject. This secular shaping was posited in opposition to nature. Bildung is a cultural process; Gadamer, in fact, argues that this is precisely what distinguishes the term: "man is characterized by the break with the immediate and the natural that the intellectual, rational side of his nature demands of him" (13). Indeed, it is the universality of enlightened reason that guarantees the universality of Bildung. "Promotion to the universal," writes Gadamer, "covers the essential determination of human rationality as a whole" (13). Reason liberates the human from nature. As Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi puts it, reason is understood as that which distinguishes the free and "fully human" from the animal (the natural):

Insofar as man is affected by things outside him and he
views them in such a way that his awareness of himself disappears — to that extent he is acting according to a foreign drive and not according to his own. He allows himself to be determined, and he does not determine himself. He does what is demanded by other things and not what his own nature requires. And to that extent we say he is moved by passion and that he is only an animal. (193-94)

Thus, the “passions,” like tutelage, are “outside” that which is properly human, they are “other” and “foreign”; reason or rational consciousness (“awareness of himself”), which presumably occupies a privileged position inside, should actively dominate and subdue those things which are outside of or other to it. This notion of exclusionary autonomy, as Jacobi shows, is the first principle of “a civil society [which] is a human society and not an animal one” (194). Society, in this view, is an aggregation of autonomous, rational citizens, a collection of monadic individuals; it is human reason that makes modern civilization possible.

The pedagogical process of culture, or Bildung, is a movement away from nature, an immature or incomplete state, toward the rationality of culture guarantees completeness. The end-product, a fully mature subject, is the rational, epistemological, “cultured” subject. Maturity is therefore associated with reason, adulthood, consistency, stability, and self-sameness, and immaturity with the irrational, youthfulness, change, inconsistency, and multiplicity. As Readings argues, “the antinomy of nature and reason in Kant leaves the subject no choice: to arrive at reason is to destroy nature, to reach maturity is to forget childhood absolutely” (63). In their attempt to clarify the requirements of Bildung or self-formation and self-regulation, the eighteenth-century German philosophers took up the opposition between the authenticity of the natural self and the normalizing conventions of social institutions. In On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), written during the same decade as The Limits of State Action, Schiller retains Humboldt’s distinction between culture and nature, but argues that this split, which corresponds to the rift between rational and sensuous drives, can be mediated only by the aesthetic products of culture. Through the “harmonizing techniques of aesthetic response” (Donald 9), the otherwise fractured and unstable subject becomes unified and coherent. It is this organic-yet-cultural (i.e., aesthetic) capacity for self-determination and self-regulation that distinguishes the human from the animal. Schiller is typical in this regard: “for the animal, Bildung is simply what nature makes it, whereas human freedom turns Bildung into an achievement of the will” (Kontje 4). Similarly, Kant opens his Education by distinguishing human from animal on the grounds of human culture as pedagogy: “Man is the only being who needs education” (1).
The Aestheticization of Bildung

The modern concept of subjectivity coincides with the emerging valorization of the category of the aesthetic. Moreover, the idea of the aesthetic as a unifying force comes to be attached to the formation of the Bildung-subject itself. It is in terms of the aestheticism of the subject that the formation of the self from clay becomes another abiding metaphor for self-formation or Bildung. Raymond Geuss points out that “Bildung comes from Bild (sign, image) and so signifies the process of imposing an image or form on something, or the results of such a process” (154); thus, the term refers not only to humans in general, but also, more specifically, to art and artists, especially sculpture or sculptors, as Mücke shows. She clarifies the link between aesthetics and modern subjectivity when she points out that “[Bildung] is applied in the arts to the creative activity of the sculptor and poet and denotes the shaping poesis of a self-sufficient beautiful construct” (162). Bildung, then, is a process of the aestheticization of the self; the self as interiority is an entity “cultivated” or “formed” in and by culture. In an essay distinguishing the German terms “Kultur, Bildung,” and “Geist” as variants of “culture,” Geuss tells us that “Bilden, the verb from which Bildung is derived, can also be used in cases in which one person imposes a form on another, but increasingly Bildung as a noun comes to be used for processes of self-cultivation (and their result)” (154). Thus, the ultimate goal of self-creation through Bildung is the centred, coherent and whole subject as cultural object.

For Humboldt, the life devoted to Bildung is itself a work of art. The centring and harmonizing capacities of Bildung, he suggests, bring disparate external experiences in line with the internal organic whole of the self. Indeed, the idea of the self as aesthetic artefact is a means of dealing with the tension between the self and social norms. It is in this way that the notion of Bildung as the maturation of the individual in terms of social normativity becomes a major pedagogical foundation. This development describes the emergence of a strong idea of “culture,” and, indeed, of what Readings calls “the University of Culture.” Aesthetics would breach the chasm dividing the self and the social, or authenticity and normativity. It is, as Eagleton suggests in Ideology of the Aesthetic, the ideological bond that unites the self and the social or the individual and the universal. That is, the “dissociation of sensibility” produced by modern society “is healed ... through the harmonizing techniques of aesthetic response” (Donald 9). It is in this context that “literature” and culture” were established as authoritative aesthetic categories. They exemplify the humanizing process that is Bildung.

Among the philosophers of Bildung, Schiller was perhaps the chief proponent of
Bildung as an aesthetic process of self-cultivation. For him, beauty synthesizes the otherwise discordant elements of life and brings subjects harmoniously in line with the demands of the social: "Beauty alone," he writes, "brings harmony into society, because it establishes harmony in the individual" (138). Indeed, the aesthetic makes the synecdochal connection between the development of "man" and "Man" as a whole into the mature state of "freedom":

Totality of character must therefore be found in a people that is capable and worthy of exchanging the State of need for the State of freedom. (34; Schiller's emphasis)

The ideology of the subject as an aesthetic artefact became part of a discourse which operated to construct subjects as beings able and willing to assimilate diversity and contradiction to the centred wholeness of the "self."

Thus, the post-theological, Enlightenment subject assumes authority over itself: it takes on the task of shaping and governing itself, so that, in Althusser's parlance, it "works very well on its own" to internalize and reproduce hegemonic norms. In delineating the analogy between the individual subject and the aesthetic work so powerfully at work in German idealist philosophy, Eagleton puts it this way:

Like the work of art as defined by the discourse of aesthetics, the bourgeois subject is autonomous and self-determining, acknowledges no merely extrinsic law but instead, in some mysterious fashion, gives the law to itself. In doing so, the law becomes the form which shapes into harmonious unity the turbulent content of the subject's appetites and inclinations. The compulsion of autocratic power is replaced by the more gratifying compulsion of the subject's self-identity. (Aesthetic 23)

In Chapter Two, I pointed out that, as governance became less feudal and absolutist, hegemony emerged as the dominant style of governance in the West, a form of power that operates by consent and consensus. And this consent, as Eagleton argues, is carried out by an aestheticization of self-hood. Through the machinations of hegemony, the moral imperatives of the "good subject" become aestheticized, and "the subject itself is accordingly aestheticized, living with all the instinctual rightness of the artefact. Like the work of art, the human subject introjects the codes which govern it as the very source of its free autonomy" (Aesthetic 41). Humanity is shaped, therefore, not by God's hand, but, in keeping with the Enlightenment value of secular self-determination, by its own hand. "The more a man acts on his own" says Humboldt, "the more he develops himself" (40).

Indeed, Eagleton comments that for Schiller it is the aesthetic object that underlies human freedom, a freedom that distances the human from the animal, culture from nature:
“it is through a delight in ... beautiful appearance that ‘savage’ human beings first grope their labourious way upward from animal dependency on their environment to the freedom of the aesthetic” (Aesthetic 112). The passage from savagery to civility is a process of humanization. Herder similarly contends that what distinguishes human from animal is the human’s willful and rational self-creation. Mücke, reading Herder, puts it this way:

Man does not differ from the animal in the sense that some human faculties are more highly developed; rather, the totality of his organization differs from that of the animal. An animal is determined by instinct in the sense that the organization of its faculties is predetermined; man is free in the sense that the organization of his faculties is his own work: he has to construct himself as subject just as he has to construct the objects of his world. (166)

This Bildung-subject is self-determining: “man,” in Herder’s words, “becomes the purpose and telos of his own work” (Qtd. in Mücke 165; her Trans.). “Man” is modernity’s major aesthetic project. Self-determination is the aesthetic element that elevates the human from the animal. In Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment, Kant argues that the ideal of beauty is the privileged realm of the human because humanity is an end in itself:

that which has the purpose of its existence in itself, the human being, which can determine its own purposes by Reason...this human being alone, of all objects in the world, is capable of being an ideal of beauty, just as the humanity in his person, as intelligence, is alone capable of being an ideal of perfection. (117)

As Mücke argues, the Bildung-subject Herder constructs is narcissistic: “man’s faculties are organized and structured only with regard to themselves. In a self-reflective manner, he constitutes the totality of his otherwise diffused and disorganized faculties” (166). Thus, aestheticization operates to centre and harmonize subjectivity as autonomous artefact: an operation critical to the subject which is modernity’s legacy.

The ideological history of cultural Bildung is a politically conservative one. This conservatism reveals itself in the narrative of Bildung. “The principle of organization for [the Bildungroman] metanarrative,” as Cobley argues, “is a linear plot development whose teleological goal is the resolution of conflict and the integration of deviant behaviours into the social norm.” (119). As Minden argues, for example, Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister demonstrates a “studied indifference” (23) to the French Revolution which had taken place during its gestation; and, in fact, with its focus on the individual as the progenitor of freedom, narrates, according to Moretti, “how the French Revolution could have been avoided” (Way 64). Quiet reform and individual adaptation, not social revolution, was the acceptable form of change for the liberal humanist thinkers. Dennis Mahoney claims that
“liberal” Germans reassured conservative critics that the idea of Bildung would not foster revolution, but rather, in its moderate tendencies, would “work against the spread of revolutionary violence” (110). In his history of the genre, Kontje argues that each of the Weimar classicists “opposes the violence of the French Revolution with the concept of steady, organic growth” (4) and quotes Goethe: “in recent days France has become what Lutheranism was; it stifles tranquil Bildung (5). Indeed, for many contemporaneous thinkers, aesthetics replaces revolution. In On the Aesthetic Education of Humanity, Schiller argues, as Kontje puts it, that “Bildung through art renders political revolution unnecessary” (5); that is, in contemplation of harmonious works of art, Bildung “reconciles conflicting drives in human beings” (5). It is here that Bildung’s hegemonic power as a disciplinary apparatus of accommodational conservatism is disclosed—culture as Bildung is not the innocent or organic process its progenitors claim.

Bildung and Pedagogy

Ever since Karl Morgenstern’s first discussion in 1819 of Bildung’s articulation in the Bildungsroman, the novel’s pedagogical power has been emphasized. Morgenstern considered it critical that contemporaneous examples of the genre not only be concerned with the education of the novel’s hero, but also with the pedagogical trajectory of the reader. The reader would accompany the protagonist along the path of his or her development and learning. The ideal model, or “tutor,” of this educational process was the author. For Morgenstern, the reader’s education, as Fritz Martini shows, involved the “transformation[ ]” of the reader “reflected in the superior author as a whole person” (9). Morgenstern’s conception of the whole person – an ideal that had, according to Martini, a personal urgency for Morgenstern whose own psychological life “tended to diversity and fragmentation” (5) – was at the centre of his pedagogical theory. While “the idea of cultivation (Bildung) through a harmony of aesthetic, moral, rational, and scientific education had long been common property of Enlightenment thought,” writes Martini, for Morgenstern, this harmony of Bildung was best achieved through the synthesizing techniques of an aesthetic education. A pedagogy of Bildungsharmonie – “unifying divided talents and actions and infused with individualism” – would gradually replace scholarly achievement. For Morgenstern, the “orderly shaping of a life” (17), discovered in the best Bildungsromane, was an ideal blueprint for harmonious education. Insisting that “every good novel is, in the end, a Bildungsroman” (21), Morgenstern sought the pedagogical lessons exemplified in what he called the “general, purely human development” that the
best of the genre would both “portray and convey” (18–22). In this view, on both content and formal axes, Bildungsröme demonstrate great pedagogical force because they both thematize and perform a narrative of pedagogical development.

The meeting of the aesthetic and the pedagogical in the Bildungsröman is neither accidental nor incidental since the idea of Bildung, in large part, grew out of the German education reforms taking place during and after Morgenstern’s time, especially as articulated by educational theorists such as Herder and Humboldt. Mücke refers to this movement as the “aesthetic-pedagogic program” (7), and contends that Bildung, “an extremely loaded term” (162), remains extant in pedagogical discourses. As the Director of the Section for Culture and Education of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, Humboldt was the architect not only of the University of Berlin, a model for the emerging public university across the West, but also of the modern German education system in general, an important model for the education system in the West today. For him, the “grand, leading principle” of modern education is “the absolute and essential importance of human development” (51). The ideology produced by Humboldt’s influential discourse on educational Bildung has produced deep resonances which Ash refers to as the Mythos Humboldt – a mythos which, in terms of the exigencies of the late twentieth century, Ash sees as “hopelessly dysfunctional” (xii), yet, as contemporary theorists such as Lyotard argue, remains a potent pedagogical apparatus. Lyotard refers to Humboldt’s idea of the “spiritual and moral training of the nation” as the “Bildung-effect” (32), thereby drawing attention to the ideological weight carried by the concept since its inception. It is in the idea of education as essential to liberal democracy, that Bildung has had its deepest influence. As Sammons argues “the concept arises at the moment when German thought began to become preeminent in Western culture, and it came to be of great historical resonance, underlying, for example, the principle of liberal education in American education” (Sammons 41).

Today, pedagogical Bildung remains instilled in both implicit notions of culture and in explicit discourses on modern education systems. The transatlantic rendering of Humboldt’s Bildung was ensured by such powerfully influential discourses as Matthew Arnold’s Victorian proselytization of culture. Even later, an excellent summary of Humboldtian/Arnoldian Bildung became the ideological foundation of a mid-twentieth-century federal Canadian document on educational policy. The following passage comes from the 1951 report of the Massey-Lévesque Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, which advocated the curricular inclusion of aesthetics for the cultivation of fully-formed subjects, and was responsible, according to Joan Horsman, for the increase of the arts in post-secondary education in Canada from the mid-1960s onward:
Education is the progressive development of the individual in all his faculties, physical and intellectual, aesthetic and moral. As a result of the disciplined growth of the entire personality, the educated man shows a balanced development of all his powers; he has fully realized his human possibilities. (Horsman)

This passage is as clear a description of the Bildungsprozess as any found in literary definitions of the Bildungroman. This mid-twentieth-century outline of the educational process has changed little since the late eighteenth-century German articulations of Bildung. Although current documents might focus on more topical issues, Bildung is the ideological underpinning. As Lyotard argues, the influence of the Humboldtian university and its defining concept of Bildung on the “organization of higher education in the young countries of the world was to be considerable in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (32). (In my final chapter I will turn to the implications of this pedagogical Bildung for the contemporary Western university.)

As Western society moved toward secularization, the newly democratized category of literature emerged as the ideal pedagogical tool for cultural training in hegemony. Humboldt’s pedagogical Bildung is not confined to education in a narrow or “disinterested” (32) sense, as Lyotard puts it, but rather it is an ideological apparatus in that it “consists not only in the acquisition of learning by individuals, but also in the training of a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society” (33). Thus, Bildung is modernity’s ultimate disciplinary narrative. In The Limits of State Action, Humboldt proposes a kind of laissez faire approach to producing a Bildung-subject that would be self-governing:

it should always remain the ultimate object of the legislator – an object which a true knowledge of human nature will convince him is attainable only by granting the highest degree of freedom – to raise the culture of the citizen to such a point, that he may find every incentive to cooperation in the State’s designs, in the consciousness of the advantages which the political institution offers his own individual interest. (65)

As Foucault has noted, it is in knowing its subjects (“human nature”) that the state is able to create a hegemonic system in which individuals are able to recognize their own desires and interests and thereby govern themselves. For Humboldt, Bildung was central to this governing structure: in the newly emerging secular society, a universal subjectivation to Bildung adapts citizens to the demands of the new liberal economy.

The notion of Bildung in this broader sense as an education in subjectivity preoccupied late eighteenth-century Aufklärer: the subject is educated or disciplined in the dominant
ideology and is brought to an accommodation with the norms of Enlightenment’s humanist and “humanizing” project and its emerging liberal-democratic system of governance. Hence, “man” accedes to “Man.” As Eagleton writes, “it is through ‘Bildung,’ ... a programme of spiritual hegemony, that the bond between individual and universal is ceaselessly constituted” (Aesthetic 22). Since the eighteenth-century, in other words, the pedagogical aim of the cultural Bildungsprozess was, to borrow Redfield’s terminology, “to suture the subject to the Subject.”

Bildung is an example of what Foucault calls “technologies of the self” which discipline and normalize subjects. It is one of the most powerful, if disavowed, technologies of the modern self to have emerged from the Enlightenment. Lima summarizes this nicely when she writes, “the notion of Bildung, of an inner-determined self-development, can ... be traced in the narratives of freedom and equality, knowledge and progress circulating in the pedagogical and optimistic age of the Enlightenment” (437). The idea of the Bildung-subject as it remains inscribed (however silently) in pedagogy, literature, and other institutionalized discourses as well as in the common parlance on maturity, hails individuals who “recognize” themselves in its obviousness and naturalness. Bildung is an ideological state apparatus, the main purpose of which is to interpellate male, bourgeois subjects; Mücke refers to this regulative process as the “Bildungs-apparatus” (162). Thus, the individual submits to power, and it is in this way that “the dominant culture can elicit the individual’s own help in her oppression” (Lima 454). It is in this sense that I want to emphasize Bildung not as a force regulating the subject from without, a view that would invoke the inside/outside binary of the essential subject versus artificial society, but rather as a source of the contemporary form of self-regulation, a view that acknowledges the mutual and inextricable relation of the self and the social.

In Kant’s Education, the organic process of autonomous Bildung is at the same time a cultural or pedagogical process. Through education, one learns to recover what one is in essence: man can only become man by education. This rather paradoxical doubling of Bildung produces what Readings refers to as “the famous hermeneutic circle in which the rational state is supposed to educate humanity, but only an educated humanity can found that state” (63). It is education that brings about what the subject already “is.” According to Donald, “to be ‘man’ is to act freely. But to be able to act freely, to become what he already is in essence, ‘man’ has to go through a process of socialization” (4). Individual Bildung joins cultural Bildung. Donald adds that this process can be either “formalized as education or ... [appear as] the sentimental education of biographical experience [Bildungsroman]” (4). Individual freedom is, paradoxically, construed as submission to normative pedagogical demands. Kant was not unaware of the paradox, and puts the
problem this way: "How am I to develop [in students] the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?" He answers in terms that do not resolve the dilemma, but rather place it under the subtle control of a hidden authority:

I am to accustom my pupil to endure a restraint of his freedom, and at the same time I am to guide him to use his freedom aright. Without this all education is merely mechanical, and the child, when his education is over, will never be able to make a proper use of his freedom. (27)

The freedom acquired through the Bildungsprozess requires outside restraint. Human desire, therefore, must be controlled and redirected toward a regulated form of freedom. Autonomy is achieved, contradictorily, through discipline and policing; as Kant adds, "restraint is only laid upon [the student] that he may learn in time to use his liberty aright, and that his mind is being cultivated so that one day he may be free; that is, independent of the help of others" (28). Thus, according to Donald, liberty is "a form of conduct to be learned" (4). While Kant insists in his "Aufklärung" essay that true freedom is autonomous and self-sufficient, in Education it is a condition learned at the feet of the pedagogue. In short, "liberty is managed" (4).

Bildung and the Regulation of Freedom

One of the most cunning seductions of Bildung as self-regulation — and that which ultimately concerns this present study — is its promise of equality and freedom, of self-guaranteeing autonomy. Autonomous individualism, as its critics generally agree, is the crucial goal of modern subjectification. According to Sammons, for example, the concept of Bildung is "intensely bourgeois" since "it carries with it many assumptions about the autonomy and relative integrity of the self" (42). As I am positing it here, autonomy — and not reason, which helps to legitimize autonomy — is the definitive and guiding Enlightenment idea. Robert Pippin agrees: "the great, single modernity problem in the German tradition ... is 'autonomy'" (12). For eighteenth-century advocates of "enlightenment," reason goes hand-in-hand with autonomy; as Kant's short essay on Aufklärung contends, universal human reason must be cultivated in order to "free" humanity from immature dependency. Humboldt insists that human freedom and maturity must be defined by a radical autonomy: "men are not to unite themselves in order to forgo any portion of their individuality, but only to lessen the exclusiveness of their isolation" (32). A nice synopsis of the imbrication of reason, enlightenment, and autonomous self-determination that guarantees "humanization" is provided by Jacobi in his 1782 essay, "Something Lessing Said" (even though the point of the essay is to denounce the
Enlightenment valorization of reason):

Insofar as man is determined in and by himself — that is, insofar as he is capable of acting freely — to that extent he is motivated by reason, and to that extent he is fully human. Where there is no freedom, no self-determination, there is no humanity. (193)

Thus, autonomous subjectivity is equated with freedom itself. In Pippin’s view, this defining Enlightenment notion is an expression of the oldest classical philosophical ideal: “the possibility that human beings can regulate and evaluate their beliefs by rational self-reflection [and] that they can free themselves from interest, passion, tradition, prejudice” (12-13). The unencumbered exercise of one’s rationality promises autonomous self-regulation. Moreover, because reason is a given human attribute, this autonomous freedom is (potentially) universal: in Kant’s practical terms, its imperatives “ought to bind any rational agent” (Pippin 13). Reason, in self-reflective practice, is therefore the universal guarantor of autonomous freedom.

According to Lewis Hinchman, the axiomatic notion of autonomy which the modern West today has inherited is not simply identical with Kant’s concept of it. Indeed, Hinchman contends that where contemporary theorists of autonomy focus on the individual and his or her freedom to pursue whatever rules he or she wishes as long as they are subjectively self-determined (488), Kant “treated [autonomy] as a constraint, a rule of moral conduct that is ‘objective’ in the sense that it is what all rational beings would agree ought to be done” (488). Our contemporary understanding of autonomy combines Kant’s concept of mature autonomy grounded in universal human reason with what Hinchman, following Taylor, calls the “expressivist” movement exemplified by Goethe, Schiller, Herder and Humboldt who insist ideal subjectivity involves self-harmonization and self-direction. Bildung is, in some part, a Romantic attempt to avoid the extreme rationalism of Enlightenment reason. The idea of the Bildungsprozess, in fact, can be seen as an attempt to resolve the tension between the valorization of reason and Romantic ideas such as Rousseauist primitivism in a dialectic or harmonization that synthesizes human faculties and human experiences into a centred whole.

But, most importantly, these exponents of Bildung take unencumbered autonomy to be the teleological goal of development. This historical convergence of the idea of the self with autonomy, individuality, and self-regulation defines Bildung in its broadest terms. Maturity — for states as well as for individuals — is a shoring up of boundaries, a movement away from connectedness and mutual responsibility toward disaffiliated autonomy and self-sufficiency. Bildung, as the self-cultivation of autonomous individualism is the ultimate marker of “maturity,” indeed, of the “fully human” in general.
Women and Bildung

Despite its claim to universality, Bildung precludes women. Insofar as they are imbricated with the social, women are seen as inherently incapable of the individual autonomy that is prerequisite to both general and pedagogical Bildung. While its guardians posit Bildung as a universal value, it has been, explicitly or unwittingly, a gendered concept since its inception. In the late eighteenth century, the theory of Bildung was rhetorically posed as gender-neutral, but the presiding understandings of gender — those held, for example, by Humboldt — legitimized the exclusion of women. Humboldt argues that, while for a man, "the greater [his] freedom, the more self-reliant ... he becomes" (69), a woman’s natural imbrication with the social excludes her from the autonomous individuality that is essential to Bildung. Insofar as he pontificates on the place of women in a way representative of the contemporaneous thought of the day, he is worth quoting at length:

the female sex is most intimately dependent on the character of the family relations in a nation. Wholly exempt as she is from most outward occupations, and absorbed almost entirely only by those which leave the soul untouched — stronger in what she can be than in what she can do — more fully of expression in her serenity, than in her expressed perceptions — more richly endowed with all means of immediate, indefinable expression, a more delicate frame, a more moving eye, a more winning voice — destined rather, in her relations with others, to expect and receive, than to initiate — naturally weaker in herself, and yet, not on that account, but through loving admiration of strength and greatness in another, clinging more closely — ceaselessly striving in her union to experience and grasp what the other experiences, to form the other in her own being, and reproduce it moulded into new forms of creation — inspired at the same time with the courage which loving care and consciousness of strength infuse into the soul — not defiant but enduring — woman is, strictly speaking, nearer to the ideal of human nature than man. (30)

Here, however, although in some vague way closer to Bildung than man is, woman is trapped by a catch-22 that makes Bildung unattainable for her. He continues:

and whilst it is true that she more rarely reaches it, it may only be that it is more difficult to ascend by the steep, immediate path, than by the winding one. (30)

Thus, though closer to it in some elusive, abstract way despite their subordinate, dependent, passive role, women are precluded from Bildung by their very nature. Indeed, Humboldt feels his friend and colleague, Goethe, explains this female essence
"profoundly" in verse:

Man strives for freedom, woman still for order. (30)

Thus, not only do women lack the natural propensity to Bildung, they function as the obstacles men must conquer along their own paths to Bildung. Humboldt explicates Goethe's verse in terms of gendered access to Bildung: "while [man] strives to remove the external barriers which hinder his development, woman's careful hand draws the salutary inner limits within which alone the fullness of strength can be refined to proper ends" (30). As Bruford argues, this attitude persists throughout the nineteenth century; there is a general assumption that "the right to exist for one's own sake," one of Bildung's central tenets, "does not belong to women in the same measure as to men" (137).

Women, according to Humboldt, "are naturally passive, men active; men are rational, women imaginative" (Kontje German 6-7); thus, because women are associated not with freedom but rather with nature, they lack Bildung's essential prerequisite. However, recent genealogies of Bildung reveal a contradiction in the meaning of the term that helps to account for women's preclusion, a preclusion whose own contradiction Humboldt, in the long passage cited above, struggles to rationalize. While the goal of individual Bildung is emancipation, the Bildungsprozess paradoxically depends on an anterior human freedom. For example, while Humboldt argues that freedom is the goal of human development, he also presupposes freedom as a natural given of the essentially human. This notion of freedom is basically theorized as the freedom to act autonomously, or "the human ability to shape destiny" (Kontje German 4). Like Kant, Humboldt equates freedom with the unencumbered self: "whatever does not spring from a man's free choice, or is only the result of instruction and guidance, does not enter into his very being, but still remains alien to his true nature" (28). This binary contrast between external world and inner self forms the basis of Humboldt's liberal-humanist politics. It is through the unfettered exercise of independent free choice that humanity defines itself against social imbrication as mature and free. Indeed, Gadamer points out that, for Kant, Bildung "as such is an act of freedom by the acting subject" (11). In "What is Enlightenment?" autoproduction signifies the humanist "man's" primary instance of exercising and developing freedom. Bildung, therefore, is the key witness to autonomous human agency. Indeed, Kant argues that "for enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom" (55). For Humboldt, similarly, "freedom is the first and indispensable condition which the possibility of ... development presupposes" (16). The equation of individuality with freedom is the basis for the laissez-faire government he outlines in The Limits of State Action. Social imbrication signifies the loss of a man's self - and his freedom. And, as he has been at pains to argue, social intercourse is feminine, and, since the social is women's domain, women are not only
obstacles to male Bildung, but they are themselves excluded in advance from the freedom it promises.

Women's exclusion from education is thereby rationalized. In Education, Kant argues that the student can retrieve the organic freedom he is by nature given through the educational process. Thus, there would be little point in educating women since they do not naturally possess this potential for freedom. Unlike men, women are not naturally free since they are identified with nature, which is increasingly associated with the social imbrication against which (masculine) autonomy erects itself. And, since freedom, according to this circular logic, is the prerequisite to personal Bildung, women are precluded from the processes of personal development which underwrite modern maturity and the full or legitimate humanity it promises. Similarly, for Rousseau, women are, by their very nature, excluded in advance from Bildung. In “Sophy, Or Woman,” the final book of Émile, Rousseau provides Émile with his female counterpart: “Sophy should be as truly a woman as Émile a man, i.e., she must possess all those characters of her sex which are required to enable her to play her part in the physical and moral order” (321). Woman, asserts Rousseau, “is made to please and to be in subjection to man” (322). Inasmuch as Sophy is to be educated, it is to become a proper “helpmeet” to Émile.

Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), in part a response to Rousseau’s gendered pedagogy, is an attempt to claim for women access to Bildung in the same measure available to men. Wollstonecraft corrects Rousseau’s exclusion of women on the basis of their “natural” roles as mothers and helpmeets by attributing these roles instead to cultural construction. Women share the universal capacity to reason even if they have been denied the occasion to exercise it by a sexist socialization process. Given equal access to Bildung’s privileges, bourgeois women, as Donald puts it, would become citizens as enlightened, liberated and revolutionary as any man. Donald points out, however, that while Wollstonecraft “goes beyond Rousseau by stressing that the exercise of liberty is contingent on having the means and opportunities to pursue self-chosen ends as well as to fulfil social obligations,” at the same time, she leaves in place his gendered bifurcation of nature and culture and the freedom promised by escape from the feminine. She simply claims Bildung-subjectivity for women. Thus, the association of an unadulterated essence of autonomous individualism with human reason remains in place. The proper cultivation of this inherent human nature — now universalized to accommodate women — will produce a truer, more authentic woman. Here, Wollstonecraft reproduces the Enlightenment concept of freedom through pedagogy: like Kant’s “man,” “woman can only become woman by education” (Donald 11). Thus, by leaving in place the binary separation of cultural convention and individual authenticity, or the social and the self, this feminism perpetuates
the logic which excluded women in the first place.

The binary equation of the natural and the cultural has deeply ingrained gendered associations. In fact, modernity came to associate women with the natural, the familial, and therefore the social, and men with the cultural escape from that sociality. Denise Riley argues that during the nineteenth century the idea of the “social” is increasingly tied to the family and the domestic such that it becomes increasingly equated with women. As a result of this “feminizing of the amorphous social” (42), women are not only excluded from the autonomous individuality that guarantees men their freedom and equality, but the feminization of the social gives rise to the opposition *man versus society*. This gendered individual/society binary crystallizes and institutionalizes men’s autonomous individuality, and gradually “becomes the life-stuff of anthropology, sociology, social psychology – the problem of how the individual is in the world” (Riley 43). Increasingly associated with “the sex,” feminized sociality becomes equated with nature — the sexual, familial, domestic, interrelational — those murky domains from which mature “man” wants to escape because they interfere with a rigidly demarcated individualism. Women are representative, that is, of those “other things” that Jacobi opposes to rational self-determination: thus, the binaries on which Enlightenment values depend — not only individual/social, but also the concomitant polarities, culture/nature, active/passive, reason/imagination, human/animal, maturity/immaturity — are gendered oppositions which, through subordinating or excluding the secondary term, work to naturalize and normalize men’s privileged access to *Bildung*.

It is here, with the question of gender, that we return to the problem of *Bildung*’s exemplarity. The telos of *Bildung*, as Redfield argues, must always be phenomenally exemplified. Because of the inherent endlessness of *Bildung*, however, even its “exemplars” will never be quite adequate, will always “fall short of their own exemplarity” (50). Nevertheless, he argues, “certain subjects and states can, indeed must, become exemplary” (50). Despite the supposed universality of the theoretical ideal, its exemplars will always manifest at specific sites — in historically-situated practices of the *Bildungsprozess*. In other words, the neutrality and universality of *Bildung* is belied by its white, European, educated male exemplars. Redfield goes on to make the crucial point, therefore, that “the narrative of *Bildung* clearly has enormous political utility and is in fact inseparable not just from the rhetoric of class struggle and colonial administration in the nineteenth century, but more generally from the very thought of history itself” (51). The humanizing process, the progress from incompleteness to civility, immaturity to maturity, is the master narrative of modernity in which individual *Bildung* is subsumed. This metanarrative of exemplary development produces a normalizing and regulating ideology that privileges specific
practices of subjectivity. It relies on and reproduces an ideology that opposes the underdeveloped and the developed, the primitive and the civilized, immaturity and maturity and that "permits the 'native' or, mutatis mutandis, the working-class or feminine subject to be represented as incomplete rather than different — with the unstated proviso that these 'children' will also never grow up" (Redfield 25-26). And this ideology is realized in the institutional and everyday practices of society, including the family, the schools, the university, and popular culture; in short, wherever Bildung does its silent work.

Yet, as I will argue in more detail below, while women were not successfully incorporated into the Bildung tradition until the mid-twentieth century, the very attempt to include them initiated a process that would disclose the ideological boundaries that pre-empted their inclusion. It is the very disclosure of the boundaries, a deconstruction from within, that has put modern Bildung in jeopardy. It is to these ideological boundaries we turn in the next chapter. That is, in order to imagine another kind of Bildung in the modern counter-memory, it is first necessary to provide a more detailed reading of the lineaments of both the (male) Bildungsroman as literary genre and the idea which grounds it, the concept of Bildung.

NOTES

1 The Bildung of the reader is often the explicit intention of early "female Bildungsroman" as Eve Tavor Bannet points out in her essay on eighteenth-century female novelists, and as Susan Fraiman points out in her study of female conduct-books of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On the notion of the "apprenticeship of the reader" in general, see Dennis Mahoney.

2 In his essay, "The Novel and the Individual: The Significance of Goethe's Wilhelm Meister in the Debate about the Bildungsroman," Steinecke traces responses to Goethe's prototype to produce a genealogy of generic criticism.

3 See Minden, pages 20-21, for references to these assessments of the historically critical place of Goethe's novel, as well as his insightful analysis of the way in which this "sophisticated genre tussle" (20) is dramatized in Wilhelm Meisters itself.

4 Goethe's novel itself marks a site of social change. The democratization of the bourgeoisie is thematized in Wilhelm Meister, as many critics argue. A merchant's son becomes assimilated to the enlightened nobility at a time when in German society "the feudal nobility and the market place were moving closer together" (Minden 22).

5 It is this air of symbolic profundity, argues Minden, that makes Wilhelm Meister rather a dull read. Minden writes that in raising the novel to the rank of high art, Goethe "sacrificed social immediacy" (21) and therefore gave his text a "certain magisterial ironic vagueness which tends to obscure its own authority behind the veil of autonomous art" (21-22). It is in this combination of high and low that the novel gains, according to Minden, its "extraordinary and maybe unique capacity for mediating between the specific and the general" (22).
In Germany Christoph Martin Wieland's *Agathon* is a contender for the "original" exemplar (although, as John H. Smith puts it, "[Agathon] is generally placed in the limbo of Wilhelm Meister's 'prehistory'" [206]). Novels outside Germany commonly associated with the genre include Rousseau's *Émile* (1762), Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749), and Defoe's *Moll Flanders* (1722). The neglect of the eighteenth-century female-authored *Bildungsroman* is somewhat surprising; to my knowledge, the only relevant study in English is Eve Tavor Bannet's essay "Rewriting the Social Text: The Female Bildungsroman in Eighteenth-Century England." Bannet considers Clara Reeve's *The Progress of Romance* (1785), Maria Edgeworth's *Belinda* (1801), Fanny Burney's *Evelina* (1778) and *Cecilia* (1782), Charlotte Smith's *Emmeline* (1788), and Mary Hays' *The Memoirs of Emma Courtney* (1796).

Oddly, Kontje ignores Howe's influential work and attributes the introduction of the genre to the English-speaking world to a later and lesser known study, Roy Pascal's *The German Novel* (1956).

Although Howe derives the generic outlines from Wilhelm Meister, she argues that the genre did not originate with Goethe or even in Germany. She calls the *Bildungsroman* a "hybrid ... German-English" genre (11), and says it "was in no sense a German invention, but a German reshaping of eighteenth-century ideas current in Europe but well steeped in German atmosphere, and growing gradually into a fiction form particularly congenial to German taste. Nor was it a form original with Goethe in Germany, ... but with Goethe this idea of *Bildung* took an especially comprehensive sweep" (24).

For Michael Minden, the genre is defined by "variations on Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*" (1), and comes to an end with Thomas Mann's ironic version, *the Magic Mountain*.

In her influential essay, "The Novel of Formation as Genre," Marianne Hirsch positions the *Bildungsroman* as a broader European genre, but views the German and the English/French novels as two distinctive types. Various other critics compare German and English *Bildungsromane*, see, for example, Gunilla Kester and Franco Moretti.


*The Voyage In: Fictions of Female Development* (1983), edited by Elizabeth Abel, Marianne Hirsch, and Elizabeth Langland, is representative of the publishing boom on the "female *Bildungsroman*" during the 1970s and 80s; many other feminist texts of this period can be found in Laura Sue Fuderer's annotated bibliography, *The Female Bildungsroman in

12Maria Lima notes that “the Bildungsroman almost constitutes a way of seeing all novels since even those that are not Bildungsromane are perceived against this conceptual horizon when critics speak of a ‘failed initiation’ or of a ‘problematic formation’” (436). This certainly seems prevalent in undergraduate English where novels are often assessed according to the extent to which characters “learn from their experiences,” or “undergo psychological growth,” and so on.

13See Jeffrey L. Sammons, “The Mystery of the Missing Bildungsroman.”

14Most critics of the Bildungsroman frame their studies by posing this insistent problem of generic criteria, except Todd Kontje, who ends his introduction to *Private Lives* with the striking comment, “I will not rehearse the tired debate as to whether or not particular texts examined here ‘count’ as Bildungsroman. Obviously I think they do” (17). I find Kontje’s neglect of this problem the most glaring weakness in his two major critical works.

15The (impossible) rejection of genre is not, as commonly held, a postmodern gesture, but rather a modernist impulse in the romantic tradition of the avant-garde.

16This is Maria Helena Lima’s strategy in her essay on the “decolonizing” Bildungsroman. She remarks that “because genres ... impose their own shape on the reality they attempt to describe, the novel form itself may limit the kinds of subjectivity that can be constituted within its generic boundaries” (433). Yet she shows how those texts can play within and against their generic limits. It is precisely in their apparent conformity to generic conventions that postcolonial Bildungsromane draw attention to the conflict between the “self” and the “other” that is paradoxically inscribed as a representation of decolonization; she describes her work as “reconceptualizing the Bildungsroman as one of the twentieth-century symbolic forms of decolonization” (441-42).

17Annis Pratt and Barbara White argue that it is precisely the teleological and psychological development of the hero that distinguishes the Bildungsroman from the broader, more ahistorical genre, Entwicklungroman, and “it is this distinction which divides the male from the female novel of development: heroines experience ‘less a self-determined progression towards maturity than a regression from full participation in adult life.” The female novel of development is the story of “mere growth, mere physical passage from one age to the other without psychological development” (Qtd. in Fuderer 5, Pratt and White 36).

Martin Swales distinguishes the Bildungsroman from both the Entwicklungroman and the Erziehungsroman: “the Erziehungsroman is, unlike the Bildungsroman, explicitly (and narrowly) pedagogic in the sense that it is concerned with a certain set of values to be acquired, of lessons to be learned” (German 14); “the term Entwicklungroman is much more general, and it is one which carries less emotive and intellectual ballast than does the Bildungsroman .... Entwicklungroman, then, is a fairly neutral indicator of a certain kind of fictive organization, whereas Bildungsroman is a genre term that has both cultural and
philosophical resonance" (14).

18Swales' "controlled critique" is reminiscent of Linda Hutcheon's notion of "complicitous critique" which in no way undermines the concept of genre. In her formulation of a postmodern aesthetics of "complicitous critique," Hutcheon shows how critical postmodern art, acknowledging there is no outside to ideology, is simultaneously aware of its own complicity in hegemonic culture; see The Politics of Postmodernism, 9, 13, and passim.

19Dilthey also understands the genre as "a historical phenomenon whose time had passed" by the end of the nineteenth century (Hardin xiv). Hardin, conversely, includes those novels which play within the boundaries of the traditional Bildungsroman and argues, for example, that "The Magic Mountain demonstrates the longevity of the Bildungsroman as genre even though it is undeniably a self-conscious, sophisticated, ironic, parodistic, and hence a thoroughly modern novel" (xxii). Barney includes as Antibil dungromanian Mann's The Magic Mountain (1942), Hermann Hesse's Steppenwolf (1927), and Günter Grass's The Tin Drum (1959). He argues that these novels challenge the "presumptions concerning class and national normalcy often attached to the Bildungsroman tradition" (360).

20Indeed, it is in these terms that nationalist versions of the genre are often established. Donald, for example, argues that critics perceive two major strands of the novel: "the more conservative novels [usually English and German] stress the degree of success in the adaptation of the self to social norms" (8), and they tend to emphasize social integration and narrative closure (often ending in a marriage). The more "radical" and romantic novels (usually French) "value the possibility of personal change and transformation at the expense of the demands of the social. They celebrate youth over maturity, experiment over stability, freedom over happiness" (8). They also tend to avoid narrative closures that resolve tensions. In any case, all of the Bildungsroman pit the individual against the social.

21Some critics, such as Kontje, do not italicize the German term in order to flag its acceptance in English; but, in my view, this erroneously erases the term's historical and cultural origins.

22Indeed, for Sammons, in nineteenth-century Germany, "the Bildungsroman was not the dominant mode of the novel, but a peripheral, occasional, and usually imperfectly realized subgenre; as has been pointed out, it was the discussion of Bildung and the Bildungsroman that had a special place in Germany" ("Bildungsroman" 42-43).

23Genealogies of Bildung are provided by Bruford, Kontje, and Thomas. In Virtue and the Veil of Illusion, Dorothea von Mücke provides an implicit, but original and nuanced, genealogy of the term in relation to aesthetics and the changing theory of literature in eighteenth-century Germany. She argues that the transparency theory of art was being replaced by a mediation theory where Bildung mediates between the subject and its representation; she refers to Bildung as "a new type of 'interface,' or suture, between subjectivity and representations" (162).

24Mücke gives a list of possible translations: "formation, growth, foundation, constitution, organization, form, shape, physiognomy, structure, forming development, training, education, learning, schooling, culture, higher education, accomplishments, refinement, polish, and good breeding" (162). Of course, "education" is Bildung's other chief designation, but in present-day Germany this rendering connotes education only in the quotidian sense.

25In his etymology of the term, Raymond Geuss notes, too, that "Bildung can be used to refer either to a process of formation or to the form imparted in such a process" (154).
See also Gadamer 11.

See Lessing’s *The Education of the Human Race* (1770), Herder’s *Letters for the Furthering of Humanity* (1793–97), *On German Character and Art* (1733), and *Yet Another Philosophy of History for the Furthering of Humanity* (1774), and Humboldt’s *The Limits of State Action*.

The essay is also translated as *The Sphere and Duties of Government*.

She translates and interprets his essay, “Abhandlung ber den Ursprung der Sprache.”

See also Humboldt’s two treatises on gender difference: “On Sexual Difference and its Influence on Organic Nature” (1794) and “On Masculine and Feminine Form” (1795). Herder excludes women on other, but equally preclusive, grounds: as Mücke points out, Herder “asserts that only the male biped has the language-forming (sprachbildende) ability and thereby the power to establish the law .... Herder ‘naturalizes’ gender and excludes woman from the fundamental human faculty of reflection” (172).

Humboldt cites from Goethe’s *Torquato Tasso*, ii. 1.

Humboldt adds, condescendingly, that this difference spares woman “the sophistications which so often obscures truth” (30).

See also Nina Baym who argues that the myth of America canonized in American literature by critics coming out of a New Criticism tradition is a gendered myth of the masculine quest for the self; this myth, which presents itself as universal, is a gendered misogyny that gives autonomous individualism only to men and, in fact, makes women no more than an obstacle in his path. In the hands of canonized American male novelists and the critics who have canonized them, this gendered bifurcation of the myth also acquires a specifically nationalistic ethos, so that the quest for rugged autonomy is also an *American* quest.: “The myth narrates a confrontation of the American individual, the pure American self divorced from specific social circumstances, with the promise offered by the idea of America. This promise is the deeply romantic one that in this new land, untrammelled by history and social accident, a person will be able to achieve complete self-definition. ...The myth holds that, as something artificial and secondary to human nature, society exerts an unmitigatedly destructive pressure on individuality” (71).
Chapter Four

*Bildung* and the Logic of Fascism

*The ideology of the subject (which, perhaps, is no more than a pleonasm) is fascism.*
—Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Nazi Myth”

*Man is the ideology of dehumanization.*
—Theodor Adorno

The Politics of *Bildung*

While recent discourses have brought a critique of modernity to the foreground, it is erroneous to suppose that this critique is a postmodern prerogative. Rather than situate postmodernity as an absolute break from modernity, it is more pertinent, as Foucault argues, “to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of ‘countermodernity’” (“What is Enlightenment?” 39). Many of modernity’s dominant discourses have always been attended by discourses that counter them. The hegemonic narrative of *Bildung*, for example, has been accompanied since its inception by counternarratives which oppose—as well as enable—it.

One of the abiding criticisms of *Bildung* is that it emphasizes the cultivation of the individual at the expense of the social, and is therefore insufficiently politicized. In his essay, “Modern Culture Comes of Age,” Garrett Green describes how, in the same month that Kant’s Enlightenment essay was published, Johann Georg Hamann wrote a letter to a friend thanking him for sending Kant’s essay to him and critiquing it in a way that “anticipated, in sometimes uncanny ways, criticisms of the Enlightenment that were not generally recognized until long after his lifetime” (Green 291).

The purpose of Hamann’s “postmodern” polemic is to denaturalize and politicize Kant’s supposedly disinterested concept of maturity. Although Hamann recognizes that “immaturity” (*Unmündigkeit*) is intended as the crucial signifier in Kant’s phrase, “self-incurred immaturity,” he underscores instead the term “self-incurred” (*selbstverschuldet*) in order to demonstrate that, since *Unmündigkeit* literally means “being unable to speak on one’s own behalf” (Green 292), the immature are, contradictorily, “deprived of the right to speak for themselves, through their own fault” (Green 293, emphasis added). It is not merely the faulty logic, but also the modern ideology which Hamann means to denounce here.

Furthermore, Hamann ends his letter with what Green calls a “feminist twist” (298): “the self-incurred immaturity,” writes Hamann, “is just such a sneer as he makes at the whole
fair sex, and which my three daughters will not put up with” (Hamann 148). Since, for Kant, “the entire fair sex” (“Enlightenment” 54) lacks maturity – and even the potential for it – his coupling of personal culpability with the imposed politico-legal status of “immaturity” amounts to a “slander against women, who thus come to stand for all those deprived of a political voice” (Green 298). Thus, as Hamann’s letter points out, Kant’s notion of immaturity as an individually incurred weakness rather than as a social, and therefore political, condition makes the socially disenfranchised – the “immature” – individually responsible for their own political oppression.

In fact, at the same time that the idea of Bildung was being “universalized,” women in late-eighteenth-century Germany were explicitly denied access to the maturation process. As Robin May Schott points out, since women (like Jews and servants) were juridically disenfranchised, enlightenment, defined by Kant as Mündigkeit, was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to achieve. (In fact, Schott demonstrates that in some of his other texts Kant mocks women’s attempts to do so.) Drawing attention to “the legal context of the metaphor of maturity and immaturity” (Green 294), as Hamann and Schott do, reveals the political dimension accompanying Bildung since its inception; it reveals, in other words, that the “enlightenment,” or “maturation,” of the Bildung-subject is a highly political concept from the start. Never as innocent or disinterested as it wants to claim, Bildung, as Green puts it, is “implicated in a network of social and political forces” (Green 294). These critiques, both contemporaneous and more recent, begin to disclose what is sometimes referred to as the Enlightenment’s “dark side.”

Modernity’s “Dark Side”

The most trenchant critiques of the Enlightenment have been made in an effort to understand to what extent it enabled the ideologies of fascism that appeared in the early twentieth century. Such critiques are, to put it another way, an attempt to explain what is taken to be a derailment of modernity’s metanarrative of enlightened progress or cultural “maturation.” One of the chief foci of this questioning is the German Nazi movement before and during the Second World War. The problem of Nazism in relation to modernity as an ideology was first posed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in their 1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment written in exile at the end of the war. Their position, as Schmidt nicely summarizes it, is that

the Enlightenment’s attempt to free the world from the domination of mythology and superstition has fallen prey to a fatal dialectic in which Enlightenment itself reverts into mythology and fosters new forms of domination that are all the more insidious since they claim to be vindicated by
Horkheimer and Adorno expose the contradiction at the heart of Enlightenment ideology when they write that "Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant" (Qtd. in Schmidt 21; his translation). For Horkheimer and Adorno, it was the perverse mutation of Enlightenment reason to instrumental reason that lay the groundwork for the barbarism of the Holocaust.

During the 1960s, students on German campuses began to ask how the Nazi dictatorship, and the broad national support of that dictatorship, had been possible. Until then, as Hans-Joachim Meyer argues, the Holocaust was dismissed as an aberration: "in some mysterious way an uneducated man named Hitler and a small clique of clowns and criminals had got hold of Germany" (225). If the question of the Holocaust in broader terms was avoided by those so close to it, such avoidance is understandable since any examination might implicate all Germans—or, indeed, all of the modern West—in the ideologies that made Nazism possible. But students in the mid-60s, most of whom had no direct personal memories of the Holocaust, began to question the support of or collaboration with the Nazis, at least for a time, of many of their professors. Meyer encapsulates the increasingly unavoidable question of complicity when he asks, "who else than those who had been in prisons, concentrations camps, or in exile, could have the nerve to maintain that they were innocent?" (225). How was it possible that the wardens of the university, that very seat of enlightened reason, had acted so unreasonably? To what extent could it be said, therefore, that modernity had reached a crisis in Nazism? Was it rationalism's failure, or its logical apogee? In other words, the question is whether, as Jürgen Habermas has it, we are not yet finished with modernity's emancipatory project, as the Holocaust has demonstrated, or whether the Enlightenment project should be abandoned because it is always attended by its evil underside. Many commentators have recently argued that Nazi barbarism dramatized the fact that Enlightenment reason "is not the great demystifying force which will reveal and unmask ideology; rather, it is exactly the locus of ideology" (Docherty 8). For Bauman, Nazi ideology is not a betrayal of Enlightenment values; rather it is enabled by them, and, in his words, "fully in keeping with them" (Holocaust 8):

The unspoken terror permeating our collective memory of the Holocaust ... is the gnawing suspicion that the Holocaust could be more than an aberration, more than a deviation from an otherwise straight path of progress, more than a cancerous growth on the otherwise healthy body of the civilized society; that, in short, the Holocaust was not an
antithesis of modern civilization and everything (or so we like to think) it stands for. We suspect (even if we refuse to admit it) that the Holocaust could merely have uncovered another face of the same modern society shows other, so familiar, face we so admire. And that the two faces are perfectly comfortably attached to the same body. (Holocaust 7)

The question of Enlightenment’s relation to the Holocaust is one way of focusing the debate about the legitimacy of Enlightenment values in general. Analyses such as Bauman’s begin to denaturalize and politicize those modern values and discourses that have come to appear natural and disinterested.

**Bildung and Nazism**

A more unusual approach to this questioning of the Enlightenment attends specifically to the ideology of *Bildung* (which includes but does not single out rationalism). Critics weigh the ideology of modernity’s *Bildung* by tracing its genealogical path from the late eighteenth century through to the Third Reich. These commentators argue that the discourse of *Bildung* was eventually appropriated for Nazi ideology. As Swales puts it, *Bildung* “became part of the stock vocabulary of German conservatism on which Nazism was later to draw” (“Irony” 62). In their essay, “The Nazi Myth,” Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy similarly analyze the devolution of humanist *Bildung* to twentieth-century fascism. For them, in fact, *Bildung*’s politico-pedagogical currency in the modern West is critical to understanding Nazism. And understanding Nazism is critical to an understanding of the modern West. Yet they articulate this link cautiously: “Nazism does not sum up the West, nor represent its necessary finality” (312) Nor is the point here to lay blame at the feet of, say, Humboldt for “causing” Hitler. But, because Nazism was made possible by modernity and its defining discourses such as *Bildung*, neither is it possible, write Labarthe and Nancy, to “simply push [the Holocaust] aside as an aberration, still less as a past aberration” (312), imbricated as it is with ideological apparatuses that “belong[ ] profoundly to the mood or character of the West in general” (312). *Bildung*’s ideal of the mature, autonomous individual is central to this modern “mood.”

During the nineteenth century, individual *Bildung* became a synecdoche of the *Bildung* of the German *Volk*. Kontje argues in *The German Bildungsroman* that the view of *Bildung* as a process culminating in maturity and integration into society “lent itself to first nationalist and then fascist appropriation as the organic theory of the individual became the
model for the nation" (110). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, literary discourse contributed to the dissemination of the concept of Bildung, and, according to Kontje, it is literary criticism that produced and authorized the significant shift in the term’s ideological emphasis. He argues that, while the idea of Bildung contributed to the “shaping of a national identity” during the nineteenth century, “all too often academic analyses of the Bildungsroman became chauvinistic celebrations of German essence, a process that culminated in the fascist appropriation of the genre during the 1930s and 1940s” (x). Kontje shows how the fictional narrativization of Bildung gradually comes in Germany at this time to refer less to an organic maturity of the individual and more to the organic maturation of the nation state. Thus, Bildung increasingly comes to be appropriated as representing not the modern, enlightened self in its broadest European outlines, but rather a specifically German national essence. In The University in Ruins, Readings argues that the modern university was founded by the German idealists on the idea of a philosophical notion of culture formed “primarily in opposition to fragmentation” (61), and that the university would therefore “function as the glue for the emerging German nation-state” (61). Through the university, Bildung would function as a harmonizing balm: the university would, he argues “allow modernity to synthesize progress and unity [in Bildung], to direct the destructive aspect of modern innovation toward a higher social unity: the total nation-state” (61). This newly emerging representational status of Bildung “reached its nadir,” according to Kontje, “during the period of National Socialist rule” (41). Here, then, rather than merely a synecdochal extension of individual Bildung, national Bildung comes to mean the “incorporation of the individual into the communal whole” (42). Kontje outlines in some detail the work of three scholars of the Bildungsroman (and Entwicklungroman) appearing between 1937 and 1941, in which Nazi ideology is embraced, and demonstrates that the works condone nationalist, racist, and imperialist ideologies (41-42).

The very attempt to graft Bildung as autonomous individualism onto a nationalist agenda disclosed Bildung’s ideological duplicity. In The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation, an extensive genealogy of Bildung, W.H. Bruford explores the significance of Bildung to the “historical question of ‘the two Germanies’” (ix). He puts the question this way: “Was there ... perhaps some inherent defect from the beginning in ... ‘the culture of the inward man’ [Bildung] in Germany, and if so, how did it reveal itself before it was put to the supreme test in the Second and Third Reichs?” (ix). Like Kant’s contemporary, Hamann, Bruford believes that it is the valorization of individuality or the inward, detached self by Humboldt, for example (23-24) that directly links Bildung to Germany’s idea of “national individualism” (263), an idea that lays the foundation for the Nazi
regime. Bruford suggests there is, finally, “a possibly catastrophic result from the world of the German pre-occupation with ‘Bildung,' if it remains self-regarding and ‘uncommitted,' causing the individual to neglect his social ties with his immediate environment and the wider world” (207). Although “collective,” the Bildung of the nationalist agenda is modeled on an autonomous individualism that erects itself in negative terms against otherness, against alterity. Like Hamann, Bruford sees this individualistic Bildung as dangerously disavowing its political foundations and effects. It is with the purpose of tracing Bildung’s “catastrophic result” that Bruford concentrates in his last two chapters on Thomas Mann in whose career he maps a political conversion that sheds light on the ideological evolution of Bildung. “One aspect of [Bildung’s] neglect” of the social, writes Bruford, is a “disastrous indifference to politics which Thomas Mann was finally to condemn so strongly, after sharing it for over half of his life” (207). Indeed, for Mann, politicizing the concept reveals Bildung to be a condition of unfreedom. Following Mann, then, Bruford concludes that “there are not two Germanies, a bad and a good, but only one, whose best gifts turned through some devil’s art to evil” (263). Bruford holds that the Holocaust was not an abandonment or betrayal of humanist Bildung, but rather the flip-side of modernity which resides in Bildung.

This is similarly the point of Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust; significantly, however, Bauman would rephrase Bruford’s thesis to say there are not two modernity’s, a bad and a good, but only one, which authorizes Nazism as “a legitimate resident in the house of modernity” (17). Bauman, whose concern is with modernity’s valorization of reason, argues that the Holocaust was “a characteristically modern phenomena” (xiii). It was not, as Habermas would have it, an irrational aberration appearing out of nowhere in an otherwise rational modernity; it was not, argues Bauman, a “malady of our civilization,” but rather, it was in perfect keeping with the logic of modernity, its “horrifying, yet legitimate product” (xii). Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy agree: despite their cautions against a simple cause-and-effect determinism, they put their case boldly: “the ideology of the subject ... is fascism” (294). It is in this way that the history of National Socialism is in keeping with the rationality of modernity’s logic:

If ... we have a certain propensity to insist on this point, it is in reality because we wish, in the case of Nazism, to mark our suspicion and skepticism of the hasty, crude, and usually blind accusation of irrationality. There is, on the contrary, a logic of fascism. This also means that a certain logic is fascist, and that this logic is not wholly foreign to the general logic of rationality inherent in the metaphysics of the Subject.

(Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 294)

Indeed, the Nazi phenomenon is itself “relatively superficial and secondary” (291); it is
derivative of a broader project of modern subjectivity. The crucial point here is that the logic of the subject that was manifest in fascist Germany is not exclusive to Germany, but rather it is fundamental to the ideologies of Western modernity in general: the conditions that made it possible, as Bauman puts it, remain “ubiquitous and ‘normal!’” (Modernity xiv). It is the insistence that Nazism was a deviation from the norm of the ideology of modern subjectivity that helps to secure that norm. Moreover, the imputation of Nazi logic to something inherently German allows the rest of the Western world to exculpate itself and preserve its Enlightenment values. Bauman writes: “the exercise in focusing on the Germanness of the crime ... is simultaneously an exercise in exonerating everyone else, and particularly everything else” (Modernity xii). Here, Bauman emphasizes Enlightenment rationalism: by explaining the Holocaust as an irrational aberration in an otherwise rational civilization, the rest of the West can – by appealing to rationalism – absolve itself. Yet Bauman’s contention is that the Holocaust was driven by subjective rationalism itself. The specific ideology of the discourse of Bildung is even more revealing on this point; that is, since German ideologues themselves appropriated the idea of Bildung – a “German concept” – for a definition of a specifically German national essence, the rest of the West can deny its complicity and investment in the ideals and values of the Bildung-subject. Not only does this perspective itself participate in a certain racism, but it evades modernity’s most pressing intellectual task. As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy nicely put it, “an analysis of Nazism should never be conceived as a dossier of simple accusation, but rather as one element in a general deconstruction of the history in which our own provenance lies” (312). The modern idea of individual subjectivity belongs no more to Nazi Germany than it does to the West in general today.

So how was the idea of Bildung adopted by Nazi ideology? R. Hinton Thomas, who supplements Bruford’s genealogy of Bildung with his essay, “The Uses of Bildung,” addresses the curious doubleness of the Bildung ideal as signifying both the individual and the (German) state. In fact, it becomes clear in many commentaries on Bildung that, somewhat paradoxically, it is viewed as at once internal and private on the one hand and external and universal on the other hand. This double direction of Bildung exemplifies one of the central contradictions of modern humanist subjectivity: the “mature” subject is the autonomous centre of his or her own world, yet that self-centeredness participates in a universal ideal outside itself. For Thomas, it is this dual concept of Bildung that explains how, in Kontje’s words, “an eighteenth-century ideal [was transformed in the mid-twentieth century] into an intolerant ideology of chauvinism, nationalism, and militarism” (72). Thomas cites a passage from a document of National Socialism written by Ernst Krieck, Rector of Frankfurt University, in 1936:
Everything that comes into contact with me ... is inevitably, in accordance with the law of my inner being, absorbed, assimilated, changed or rejected. Only thereby does the individual (die Person) mature. The individual thus is and remains both the centre of his own worlds and the measure of all things, because he is what he is and cannot be otherwise .... Never, however, has the individual person the possibility of existing self-sufficiently or independently. (186)

"That is to say," writes Thomas, "‘personality’ is not fulfilled within itself but only through membership of a higher whole" (186). This paradox still obtains in the West today: each of us is unique in our private interiority, while, at the same time, we are united in our participation in the ideal of the rational subject. Each participates in the universal “we”: a noble belonging that the gender-exclusive term “Man” is supposed to invoke. In The Politics of Postmodernism, Linda Hutcheon notes that modern humanism holds a contradictory “view of the relation of the individual to the social whole” (13); that is, “the individual is unique and autonomous, yet also partakes of that general human essence, human nature” (13). An inherent capacity to reason, and the potential humanity it offers, unites us all. Unique in our individual differences, we are united in our rational sameness: “as contingent beings, we are all different, but as bearers of reason we are all the same” (Flax, Disputed Subjects 83). A supposedly universal reason subsumes the individual in a totality; reason is the link between a “man” and “Man.” Indeed, for Foucault, Enlightenment reason is one of modernity’s chief “technologies of the self”:

The main characteristic of our modern rationality ... is neither the constitution of the state, the coldest of all cold monsters, nor the rise of bourgeois individualism. .... the main characteristic of our political rationality is the fact that this integration of the individuals in a community or in a totality results from a constant correlation between an increasing individualization and the reinforcement of this totality. ("Political Technology" 161-62)

For modernity in the West, Bildung, and the Enlightenment ideas it embodies, functions as a major ideological suture – largely hidden – linking the individual and the totality. Eighteenth-century philosophers of Bildung slip seamlessly, and often unwittingly, from the individual to the universal.

This seamlessness is also written into the traditional German Bildungsroman and often appears to critics as a textual problem. It is this peculiarity in narratives of Bildung which Thomas confronts. He tracks the connection between individual and collective Bildung by emphasizing the historical “stress on the unfolding of innate qualities into the balance and harmony of ‘Persönlichkeit’” (177). “Personality,” he argues, “was a matter of the self in the first instance, but in the tradition of ‘Bildung’ it was also drawn outwards in idealistic
directions” (177). This outwardness had, he adds, a “strong ethical force, the goal of which, in the classical period, was ‘Humanität’” (177). It is these associations, writes Thomas, that “gave the concept of ‘Bildung’ its noble image and led it to epitomize for so many the most refined characteristics of German culture” (177). The Bildung-subject exemplifies the humanist ideal it finds manifested “universally” in the Enlightenment “Man.” Redfield argues that, in Germany, the state is the site of this humanist ideal: “the subject discovers the objective form of its own ideality in the State” (50). This ideality of noble Bildung eventually becomes appropriated and idealized by the National Socialism of the Hitler regime.

**Volk and Exclusion**

For Thomas, the main problem with Bildung is neither that it privileges individualism per se, nor that the individual is subsumed by nationhood, as Kontje contends, but rather that the ideology of autonomous individualism comes to be attached to the idea of the nation itself. Thus, he looks at the work of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historians and political theorists in whose work the idea of Bildung devolved from the individual to the nation. He assesses, for example, the use to which the “notorious” late nineteenth-century historian Heinrich Treitschke put the idea of Bildung. For Treitschke, individual Bildung, which is ultimately concerned with personal freedom, “takes us into the sphere of the state” so that “whatever you do in order to become purer, more mature, freer, you do for your “Volk.” (Qtd. in Thomas 180). The meaning of “Volk” here is crucial; it is not simply “people” or “nation,” but, modeled directly on the idea of personal Bildung as the organic maturation of innate potential, as described in the preceding chapter, it comes to suggest, more specifically, “the state as an organism, governed by its own inner laws of development, by virtue of which [it has] a destiny all its own to be lived out” (180). Thus, the individual self-cultivation of Bildung is extended to the nation so that nationalism is figured as the organic integrity of the Volk.

While hegemony requires the accommodation of the individual to the normative “we” or Volk, it is a “we” formed through exclusion. In order to maintain its self-sufficient coherence and centredness, the Volk, or what we might call Volk-Bildung, must exclude all that is other to it. In *Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*, Berel Lang argues that the Enlightenment concept of the individual that devolved to Nazi ideology brought with it the principle of exclusion:

The abstract, ahistorical self posited by the Enlightenment as an idea of humanity entails in its converse appearance the
implícadoa that historical difference (and all the more, an
historical definition of identity) will be suspect; the
principle of universal reason or judgment implies that the
grounds on which such distinctions are based may be –
should be – challenged: Not only can everyone be judged by
the one criterion, but the consequences of being included or
excluded by it are, in terms of the principle of
universalizability, without limits. (194-95)

This principle of exclusionary autonomy is linked both to individuals and to nations.
Common to both the Bildung-subject and the Bildung-state is an ideology of exclusionary
autonomy that is supposed to secure the integrity of each. From the start, writes Thomas,
Bildung “supplied the belief in an essence to be preserved and developed, and in a balance
and harmony demanding the exclusion of whatever might disturb it” (184). Thomas shows
how the exclusionary principle of autonomous individualism becomes attached to the
broader idea of the Volk: “the ‘personality’ – of the ‘Volk’ turned out to be the belief in
the exclusion of what was seen as incompatible with its inherent identity” (Thomas 180).
(Thomas adds here that the voice of the historian, Treitschke, was therefore, “among the
loudest in the anti-Semitic movement” [180].) Indeed, in Essays on Individualism, Dumont
describes the process by which the term völkisch, a variant on Volk, shifts semantically from
“people” or “culture,” to “race” (the National Socialist party called its newspaper “The
völkisch Observer”) and, finally, for Hitler, as evidenced in Mein Kampf, to racist anti-
semitism (165). “Volk” in Hitler’s hands is combined with what Dumont sees as another
key word, “Gemeinschaft,” or “community,” so that “National Socialist Germany
resound[s] with the word Volksgemeinschaft or ‘community of the people’ – but also ...
‘community of culture,’ and above all, for the Nazis, ‘of race’” (Dumont 163). The central
paradox here, of course, is that, through its semantic shift from the individual through the
state to the race, the emancipatory impulse of Bildung comes to serve the interests of one of
the twentieth-century’s most monstrous examples of exclusion in genocidal fascism.

The idea of Bildung as a synecdochal guarantor of a nation’s exclusionary plenitude is
relevant not only to Germany and the idea of “Volk.” The ideology of Bildung was
essential to European colonialism and the process of nationalism. Joshua Estey argues that
the nineteenth-century English Bildungroman was an apparatus for “domesticating the
potentially disruptive contradictions of modern nationalism” (143). The progressive
Bildung of an individual subject is a synecdoche standing for the mature integrity of a full-
fledged, or fully modern, nation. Nationalism, Estey argues, was one of “the most readily
available discursive material[s] for expressing the ‘maturity’ of a modern society” (143).
Furthermore, the nation’s maturation process is analogous to that of the subject: “adulthood
and nationhood function as mutually reinforcing versions of stable identity; they are fixed
states of being that give meaning to an otherwise chaotic set of personal and social transformations” (143). In terms of Bildung’s teleological drive to maturity, Estey argues that the “maturation of the protagonist and the modernization of the nation unfold as parallel narratives” (148). It is not just for Germany, then, that modern ideology drew an equation between the Bildung of the individual and the Bildung of the nation, an equation that, in Germany, was to produce such egregious results. Bildung’s mature/immature binary legitimates not only nationalist discourses and practices, but colonialist and even genocidal ones as well.

**Volk and Modern Pedagogy**

The idea of Volk exemplifies the modern operations of hegemony. Hegemony works by consent, and this consent, as I have stressed, is a pedagogical process: the individual “I” learns to belong to the hegemonic “we.” The idea of the integration of individual and society as expressed by the German Volk, however, is neither a specifically Nazi idea, nor yet a German one. The ideologies underlying German “Volk” are consonant with those ideas of Bildung which permeate modern models of pedagogy throughout the West. It is in perfect keeping with the principles of modern hegemony that National Socialism’s essentialist identity of the Volk became a racial one. As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue, the German desire for a sense of identity was decisive in the devolution of Bildung.10

In fact, the same ideology is deployed throughout Europe after the Second World War against the kind of totalitarian ideology represented by Nazism. This ideology is an integral part of what Donald, in *Sentimental Education*, calls the “machinery of democracy”: a flexible, tolerant, and accommodational pluralism that equates education and the “freedoms” offered by liberal-humanist democracy. As he points out, this pedagogical ideology is well expressed by the British critic, Herbert Read. During the Second World War, Read accepted an appointment at the University of London in order to develop his ideas about the importance of aesthetics to education. In *Education Through Art*, published in 1943, he asks “what is the purpose of education?*

An answer to this question is implied in a libertarian conception of democracy. The purpose of education can then only be to develop, at the same time as the uniqueness, the social consciousness or reciprocity of the individual. As a result of the infinite permutations of heredity, the individual will inevitably be unique, and this uniqueness, because it is something not possessed by anyone else, will be of value to the community. (5)

Through aesthetics, and like the aesthetic artefact, the human subject is constructed by a
pedagogical narrative of development. An aesthetic education, according to Read, is "the education of those senses upon which consciousness, and ultimately the intelligence and judgment of the human individual, are based" (7). Accordingly, schooling in the arts is essential to the pedagogical process of subjective development:

the general purpose of education is to foster the growth of what is individual in each human being, at the same time harmonizing the individuality thus educed (sic) with the organic unity of the social group to which the individual belongs.... in this process aesthetic education is fundamental.

(8)

Hence, through a pedagogical Bildung, the individual becomes an aesthetic artefact standing in for the integrity of the state — not unlike the German notion of the Volk.

Despite the notion of the individual as organically tied to the social whole, as Read, for example, sees it, the subject matures, in the first place, by marking itself off from others. As with the Volk, the first principle of Bildung is that the mature subject is defined by its demarcation from otherness. As Eagleton argues, "the bourgeois subject requires some Other to assure it that its powers are more than hallucinatory, yet such otherness is intolerable to it, and must be either expelled or introjected" ("Self-Authoring" 45). Thus, radical disconnection is valorized as autonomous freedom. The autonomous individual is at the heart of modern liberal democracy; it is a vision of atomistic subjectivity which Taylor defines as a view of society "as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfillment of ends which [are] primarily individual" (Philosophy 187). Crucial here, however, is that, in modern democracies, the atomistic subject is then taken up and repossessed by the dominant, hegemonic "whole." The subject is reclaimed by the Subject, to use Redfield's terms.

Despite claims to "autonomous freedom" made by liberal-humanist advocates of subjective atomism, the most efficient site for this hegemonic reclamation is, of course, the liberal-democratic education system. Again, this process is described quite explicitly by Read who sees education as a process of Bildung, although he doesn't actually use the term:

But uniqueness has no practical value in isolation. One of the most certain lessons of modern psychology and of recent historical experiences, is that education must be a process, not only of individuation, but also of integration, which is the reconciliation of individual uniqueness with social unity.

(5)

Here, Read might be describing the narrative of the Bildungsroman itself. Moreover, he goes on to describe the pedagogical process of integration using language that might be straight from German definitions of Volk:
From this point of view, the individual will be “good” in the degree that his individuality is realized within the organic wholeness of the community. His touch of colour contributes, however imperceptibly, to the beauty of the landscape — his note is a necessary, though unnoticed, element in the universal harmony. (5)

This harmonious integration of the individual citizen with the democratic state is not accomplished by a direct imposition or coercion by the state, but rather through what Donald calls a “psychological formula” according to which subjects freely consent, and which, because it is natural and organic, education should cultivate. What Donzelot calls the “psycho-pedagogical” program can, in this way, be assessed as a subtle apparatus of hegemonic control. The school is modernity’s dominant ideological apparatus for the inculcation of individuals to hegemonic law. The ubiquitous and supposedly disinterested notion of pedagogical maturation — as described so explicitly by Read — exemplifies this apparatus. Indeed, education should follow the teleological dictates of the narrative logic of Bildung. For Read, individuality reaches fulfillment through social integration; in this way, the mature individual and the democratic citizen are one and the same. Education, in this view, therefore, should be guided by the Bildung imperative, so that subjective individualism, inculcated through education, will produce self-regulating citizens willing and able to reconcile themselves to hegemonic law. In line with Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, “[Read] was far from alone during the inter-war period in believing that the guidance of individual autonomy, rather than coercion, would provide democracy’s bulwark against the ‘recent historical experiences’ of war and the rise of totalitarianism” (Donald 73). Ironically, however, it was in order to safeguard European modernity against fascist ideology that Read turned to those very ideas of pedagogical Bildung which lay behind the idea of the Volk and the ideologies which helped enable the Holocaust.

It is modernity’s most tragic contradiction that despite a general horror at the atrocities of Nazism, exclusion remains the prerequisite to the autonomous individualism held to be the basis of modern freedom and justice. The pedagogical Bildungsprozess is the (impossible) process of shoring up subjectivity, of making the subject absolute ground and self-determining author of itself. The Bildungsprozess marks its progress, its maturation, by its ability to exclude all that is other to it. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the Nazi death camps were the culmination of the “rage against all that is different” (Schmidt 24). It is, finally, this rage — the ideology of exclusion — to which we turn in the next chapter.
NOTES

1Hamann’s letter to Christian Jacob Kraus appears in English (Green’s translation) in Schmidt’s What is Enlightenment? Hamann is known for his “counter-Enlightenment” ideas, not least his assertion of the body and sexuality against Kant’s “pure” reason, and his conversion to Christianity (see Green’s essay as well as his annotations to Hamann’s letter in the same volume).

2According to Green, the common root of both Vormund (guardian or tutor) and Unmündigkeit is Mund or “mouth” so that the political or legal significance of Unmündigkeit is that those of minority age (and women) require a guardian to speak for them. As James Schmidt points out in his Preface to the What is Enlightenment? volume, “immaturity” is not quite satisfactory: “at the close of the eighteenth century, when John Richardson translated Kant’s famous definition of Enlightenment, ... the English ‘nonage’ provided him with the perfect term for capturing what Kant meant by Unmündigkeit. While we have kept ‘dotage,’ we no longer have ‘nonage,’ so the translator must beat a retreat to ‘immaturity’” (xii).

3This rethinking of modernity has been precipitated by world-historical events other than Second World War Nazism; see, for example, Evelyn Coblentz who argues that First World War narratives attest to “a serious loss of confidence in modernity” (5); she argues that "although the First World War did not initiate a shift in consciousness, it exemplifies more tellingly than any other event the ‘dark sides’ of the Enlightenment project” (5).

4Habermas’ thesis, put nicely by Schott, is that “the Enlightenment tradition is the only possible source of rational judgment in the face of the irrationality, prejudice, blind obedience to authority, and violence that characterized the darkest days of German history under Hitler” (471). For Habermas, Enlightenment secures the grounds for rationality that can restore modernity’s emancipatory project. (See, for example, his essay “Modernity versus Postmodernity” and “his book, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity).

For an indictment of the Enlightenment, see, besides Bauman, Berel Lang, whose Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide posits an “affiliative” relationship between Enlightenment principles and values and Nazi ideology. See also Louis Dumont’s Essays on Individualism (chapters 4 through 6) for an indictment of Enlightenment individualism in terms of the Holocaust.

5Kontje refers to literary critics Karl Robert Mandelkow, Charlotte Kehr, and Hans Heinrich Borcherdt.

6Bruford traces this genealogy from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century from Humboldt, Goethe, and Schleiermacher through Arthur Schopenhauer, Adalbert Stifter, and Friedrich Vischer to Nietzsche and Mann. I am glossing over some of their differences here and abstracting common ground. Bruford makes the important point, however, that, as the idea of Bildung was taken up by the German Romantics such as Schleiermacher and Schlegel, and, indeed, became their “party shibboleth” (76), its focus on individual development was extended to “extravagant” ideas about individual uniqueness (74-76). Indeed, in his Athenäum, Schlegel writes that “to become God, to be a man, to develop oneself are different expressions of the same thought” (Qtd. in Bruford 77). Nietzsche criticizes the failure of Bildung in the late nineteenth century, or what he saw as an attenuated Bildung, and, according to Bruford, “his idea of ‘Bildung’ was becoming rather a consciousness of what separated him, and intellectually superior people like him, from the general mass, and made them indispensable as leaders” (171).

7The question is also addressed by Louis Dumont in Essays on Individualism.
The "doubleness" of Bildung and therefore of the Bildungsroman is sometimes read by critics as erroneous or contradictory. Susan Fraiman, for example, is bothered by what she calls Lukács' "fantasy of communal rather than individual development" in Wilhelm Meister, and that "enlisting Goethe in his own rewriting of German national formation, Lukács once again assimilates Wilhelm Meister's narrative of individual formation to a larger, collective one." She comments further that in the hands of various critics, especially those of the English Bildungsroman, Goethe's novel "has been culled for a depiction of personal development that, while said to be representative of an age, nevertheless stresses the unique and private individual" (149 n.8).

In another context, Margery Fee writes: "a fundamental (and highly problematic) tenet of European romantic nationalist ideology is that ... national cultures develop through an organic process beginning with infancy and moving towards maturity. Once this enviable maturity is reached, the nation is ready to take an equal place in the ranks of the older cultures" (21).

Lacoue-Labarthe continues this argument in Heidegger, Art and Politics (1990); see especially the chapters "The Truth of the Political" and "The Fiction of the Political."
Chapter Five

*Bildung and Difference*

Women are not independent beings in civil affairs....Young men later mature and come fully of age, something that women never achieve.

— Immanuel Kant

One cannot ask the question of the crisis of modernity without raising the issue of sexual difference, or of gender.

—Rosi Braidotti, *Patterns of Dissonance*

*Bildung and Exclusion*

Let me reiterate that, although the evil underside of *Bildung* was to manifest in Nazi Germany, it is crucial to avoid the gesture of cultural self-exculpation that imputes Nazism to some essential Germanness. The ideology of exclusion that enabled the Nazi genocide is by no means exclusive to it. While it would be erroneous, furthermore, to equate Nazism with sexism, I want to stress in this chapter that some fundamental modern precepts, encompassed by *Bildung*, are common to both Nazi ideology and the phallocentric ideologies of modern misogyny.

The great colonizing project of universal cultural homogenization was provoked by modernity’s “rage against all that is different.” Indeed, a central project of education, the bedrock of modernization, was to homogenize humanity. The ideal of a *Bildung* humanity, in fact, transcends the merely contingent and interested; as Humboldt put it in *The Limits of State Action*, his treatise on *Bildung* individualism and *laissez faire* governance, just “as truth is never found conflicting with truth in the domain of intellect, so too in the region of morality there is no opposition between things really worthy of human nature” (32). For Kant, the disavowal of difference in the name of enlightened universal humanity is one of the very principles of modern education (*Bildung*). His universal categorical imperatives can be learned through a modern education system:

Under the present educational system man does not fully attain to the object of his being; for in what various ways men live! Uniformity can only result when all men act according to the same principles, which principles would have to become with them a second nature. (*Education* 9)

Kant views this unifying and homogenizing project itself as a universal and synecdochal one: the education of a man is the education of capital-M “Man.” The organic development
of the one is the perfection of the whole: "education ... shall develop man's natural gifts in their due proportion and in relation to their end, and thus advance the whole human race towards its destiny" (11). This goal is no less than human nature perfected in its universal realization by the "human race." It is thus that, in Redfield's terms, subjects accede to Subjectivity. Since "with education is involved the great secret of the perfection of human nature" (7), argues Kant, human nature will progressively become "worthy of the nature of man" (8). Through Bildung, each individual "man" accedes to "Man." The progressive development toward this ideal "opens out to us the prospect of a happier human race in the future" (8). Education is the key to this modern dream:

children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possibly improved condition of man in the future; that is, in a manner which is adapted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of the man. (14)

Indeed, the driving imperative of individual education is the "universal good" (15) of humanity perfected.

Despite its claims to universality, modernity's "idea of humanity" excludes women. As the epigraph from Kant, above, shows, for him, the education of the human race does not apply to women since women never fully come of age. Since education and emancipation are grounded in autonomy, it follows that women would be unfit for such noble pursuits. Helga Meise explains:

while the Enlightenment challenged the individual to "transform himself" so that he could move from a state of immaturity to one of full individuation, women were asked to pattern themselves after a universal model of femininity, one that limited women to the role of housewife, wife and mother. (203)

Insofar as women were perceived of as intersubjectively defined (in terms of their husbands, fathers, sons), they did not qualify for Enlightenment's universal autonomy imperative. While modernity's great emancipatory project, always supple and accommodating, would eventually extend to women, in Kant's day, the liberal independence of individual subjects required for the Bildung of the "human race" was unthinkable for women.

Modernity's "rage against all that is different" is particularly salient to the question of gender in regards to the idea of Bildung. Women's original exclusion from the discourse of Bildung has implications beyond that which can simply be overcome or "corrected" by inclusion. Exclusion is never so simple. Feminist theory has shown that the construction of modern liberalism's centered and "unencumbered self" (Benhabib and Cornell 10) necessitates the repression of heterogeneity that would otherwise threaten the subject's sense
of unity, and that therefore this subject relies on the very difference it seeks to exclude. In “Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious,” Jane Flax argues, furthermore, that a phallocentric logic of oedipalization haunts the history of Western philosophy. What she calls the “patriarchal unconscious” mobilizes strategies of containment against the threat of the heterogeneity that would confound autonomous self-coherence and its metaphysical projections. Difference must constantly be recontained in order to secure the principle of self-sameness that underlies individual autonomy. This principle operates on both micro- and macro-cosmic levels; that is, just as the modernization of Western culture requires/ed the colonization of other cultures, the modernization of the self requires the containment of difference.

Plotting the Bildungsroman

This principle of exclusion/containment is what drives the narrative trajectory of the traditional Bildungsroman. While in my conceptual approach to the genre, I want to stress the genealogy of Bildung as an idea, it is important to add that Bildung is itself always already a narrative. That is, against my own presentation of Bildung as seemingly prior to its “use” in the Bildungsroman, Bildung does not exist outside its narrativization (in both biographical and pedagogical stories), but only exists through it. In other words, Bildung is not only a thematic concept, but also a formal narrative trajectory.

It is useful here to invoke the basic narratological distinction between discours (discourse) and récit (histoire or the story) in narrative.² Paul Smith explains:

The récit ... can be described as the linear elements of a history, or as the basic set of events in a narrative's passage. Discours, on the other hand, is the logic of the story, the linguistic organizational parameters to which the material of the récit must be submitted. Thus the récit is produced within this logic that is called discours. Narratologists will claim further that the récit is only ever a fictional construct since the linear events of a history have no possible objective description: rather, they are wholly subservient to the logic of the discours. (93)

We order experience or events on the level of discourse, but that experience (the récit) is not prior to the discourse, but rather it is constructed by it. The subject is similarly constructed in narrative discourse. As Smith puts it, the distinction between discours and récit “reveals the submission of narrative to a controlling but often hidden 'subject’” (94). Narrative sutures conceal the subject, an apparatus that is particularly effective in realism: “the place where that 'subject' is most often hidden — where it thus appears most 'natural' —
is perhaps in an apparently straightforward chronology in which, say, historically [sic] data are tabulated into a sequence" (Smith 94). It is the work of the *discours* to suture the subject into the *récit* and to hide the seams of this suturing so that the *récit* — together with the subject — seems innocent, given. The *Bildungsroman* exemplifies this sequential, logical ordering. Indeed, Cобley makes this point by comparing the *Bildungsroman* to the picaresque which "has traditionally been treated as a primitive precursor to the novel proper" (120): the ordered, logical narrative of *Bildungsroman* is a containment of the non-coherence and instability of experience that is otherwise acknowledged by the episodic, non-teleological picaresque (120/145). The *Bildungsroman*, with its teleological and rational narrative logic, is, therefore, a particularly trenchant site for the construction of the modern *Bildung*-subject.

The novel of development constructs a particular kind of subject. William Dilthey's 1930 account of the *Bildungsprozess* emphasizes maturation as a teleological progression to non-contradictory self-sameness which, as MUCKE puts it, is synecdochally related "to the ideal of Humanität" (230). It is worth citing Dilthey's classic passage in full:

A lawlike development is considered in the individual's life; each of its levels has intrinsic value and is at the same time the basis for a higher level. Life's dissonances and conflicts appear as necessary transitions to be withstood by the individual on his way towards maturity and harmony. The [goal] is "personality" as a unified and permanent form of human existence. (Dilthey 336)

Following the logic of Hegelian *Aufhebung*, the *Bildungsroman* narrates the recuperation and reconciliation — the containment — of those "dissonances and conflicts" that would otherwise threaten the subject's unity and harmony. Thus, *Bildung* on the level of the *récit* is constructed by the *discours* as *Bildungsroman*. The thematic dimension of the genre, which explicitly excludes female *Bildung*, is reinforced by the formal, narrative dimension. In fact, the generic plot typically follows a trajectory of male oedipal desire that, despite *Bildung* 's accommodational contours, in fact, precludes the possibility of "female *Bildungroman*."

Classical *Bildungroman* — and the standard critical studies of them — canonize modernity's prevailing construct of *Bildung*-individuation by plotting the hero's maturation as a linear and autotelic process in which he need only shed his determinants in order to reveal an originary, unencumbered "true" self. His *Bildungsprozess* is an "education" in modern subjectivity. According to Randolph Shaffer, who outlines a "regulative type" of the genre, "the hero must be ... an active agent of his own development" (19). This self-determined consciousness is the key presupposition; the plot's other salient elements
follow from this premise: the hero’s teleological goal is to become “master” of himself through an “organic” process “in which he liberates himself from the bondage of false consciousness.” This organicism is causal and additive, concluding retrospectively in a coherent and unified self. Significantly, this accretive maturational process results in “a harmonious cultivation of a multifarious personality”; self-plenitude is therefore guaranteed by overcoming internal difference and contradiction. In keeping with Kant’s ideology of Bildung, as critiqued by Hamann, the source of any “failures” in the hero’s self-realization lies not in differential access to cultural injunctions, but in the hero’s own “weakness,” his inability to extricate himself from a sociality perceived as extraneous. In fact, failures prove the rule and reinforce the ideal (Shaffner 17-19). This plotting is taken to represent the progression of human maturation as universal.

Thus, “man” accedes to “Man.” Mücke points to the double register of the typical Bildung plot: “the Bildungsroman is an exemplary narrative of an individual vita. What makes it exemplary is that through the narrativization of the course of one life it artfully constructs what is relevant in ‘universally human’ terms” (230). Recent critics of the genre are generally in agreement that, as Redfield puts it, “one would be hard pressed to find another instance of a genre in which particularity and generality appear to mesh so thoroughly” (38). The transcendental signifier binding the specific and general is the Bildung-subject: “the Bildungsroman narrates the acculturation of a self – the integration of a particular “I” into the general subjectivity of a community, and thus, finally, into the universal subjectivity of humanity” (Redfield 38). Kontje, too, points out that, in Herder’s prosaic version of Bildung, just as the individual matures through an innate, organic process, so too do cultures; and “just as individual cultures move through an organic cycle, so too humankind as a whole progresses” (German 3). This synecdochal analogy is at the heart of Kant’s account of the Enlightenment: the movement from childhood to mature adulthood is a metaphor for human enlightenment, so that, in Green’s words, “modernity is the adulthood of the human race” (291).

This “universal” story is a misleading one, one that elides (or accommodates) those other stories (of women or non-whites, for example) that would confound its linear trajectory. It is, first of all, a gendered story. It is not simply that women are excluded from Bildung achievement, but rather that the narrative of Bildung-autonomy is itself a gendered process, even for men, that precludes women. Indeed, many of the struggles with which the hero must contend and obstacles which he must overcome in his quest for individuation are coded as “feminine.” Philosophy’s gendered distribution of the somatic and the rational are pivotal to the mapping of the normative Bildung. Women, insofar as they represent the body, the sensual, sex, are obstacles in the hero’s path to Bildung.5 As
Settembrini, the man of letters in Thomas Mann’s Bildungsroman, The Magic Mountain, comments, “nothing is more painful than to be prevented by our physical, our animal nature from being of service to reason” (245). Obstacles to self-determination which the hero must overcome are often either written on the body of the woman, sexual desire for whom the hero must transcend, or coded in the hero’s own body (for example, Hans Castorp’s illness in The Magic Mountain, or Philip’s club foot in Of Human Bondage).

In line with Denise Riley’s analysis of the modern feminization of the social which I delineated in Chapter Three, social determinism in the Bildungsroman is itself coded as feminine. According to Shaffner, “if [the hero’s] development arises wholly from outer-inducement, then he falls before the charge of a dangerous passivity” (Shaffner 19). Like Kant’s argument in his “Enlightenment” essay, the acknowledgment of “outer-inducements” – of sociality – is characterized as feminine weakness barring the path to maturity. For Shaffner, the first passivity, in the form of dependency, against which the hero, or Bildungsbild, must assert his autonomy, is often encoded as a pre-Symbolic bond with the mother. The hero must “escape” the bonds of the domestic, of the family, in order to achieve (masculine) independence. The mother, signifying social interrelationship, is in fact that which primarily threatens his autonomous individuality. His contradictory desire for and fear of the original maternal engulfment is then metonymically displaced onto other women. Subsequently, then, the hero employs strategies of containment to “free” himself from the bonds of desire, of the body. And, in classical oedipal fashion, once he has “mastered” desire through repression and/or exclusion, he erects himself against difference as monadic self-sufficiency and self-sameness.

Feminist evaluations of this psychoanalytic model have shown that the sameness/difference binary on which this identity is constructed is, furthermore, a gendered binary. In his “Enlightenment” essay, Kant articulates the paradigmatic model of modern subjectivity when he makes a synecdochal analogy between a man’s maturation and “mankind’s” maturation – a teleological movement from tutelage to enlightenment, from dependence to autonomy. In her essay, “Is Enlightenment Emancipatory?” (in Disputed Subjects), Flax analyzes the “gendering” of this binarily constructed subjectivity and, by extension, the gendering of modernity in general. First, she points out, Kant distinguishes between public (masculine) reason and private (feminine) reason. Secondly, he associates public or critical reason – that is, enlightened emancipation – with release from the bonds of private and domestic interrelationship. In this way, tutelage, or dependency, is feminized as that “dangerous passivity” which Shaffner argues the Bildungsroman hero must transcend. Like Kant, Shaffner universalizes the Bildungsprozess – the hero’s growth is a synecdoche for modernization itself. He makes a homology between personal and cultural
progress when he states that the *Bildungs Held’s* maturation is a microcosm of the
macrocosmic “goal of culture” (26). Finally, Shaffner writes, in typical fashion, that the
*Bildungsroman* inscribes “an archetypal conception of Man as the ultimate goal” (19). In
this sense, the *Bildungsroman*—together with its masculine hero—functions as an extravagant
trope for the Enlightenment metanarrative.

**Gender and Narrative**

The gendered equation of the sameness/difference ideology in Enlightenment thought does
not appear out of nowhere. Indeed, ever since Plato expelled poetry from his republic the
fully enlightened human has required the exclusion of difference. And difference has been
figured as madness, the poetic, the other, the feminine. In *Speculum of the Other Woman,*
Luce Irigaray reads Plato’s allegory of the cave to argue that difference must be contained
in order to secure the subject in quest of enlightened knowledge. The shadowy realm of the
cave, from which “man” must emancipate himself, is figured as the dark and shadowy
“hystera,” which is coded as feminine. The allegory of the cave in the *Republic*—the womb
and the preconscious which the light of emancipatory reason cannot penetrate—discloses, as
Flax puts it, “the fear of regression to that preverbal state where feelings, the needs of the
body and women (mothers) rule” (“Political” 257). The (male) quest for enlightened self-
hood has powerful ideological roots in this narrative of escape from the female realm.
Indeed, Domna Stanton interprets Irigaray thus: “in direct opposition to Freud ... she
declares the murder of the mother to be the foundation of Western culture and society.”
(160). That is, human enlightenment is figured as a movement away from heterogeneity
and interdependence (coded as feminine) toward homogeneity and autonomy (coded as
masculine). This quest becomes distilled and is made explicit by Enlightenment thought.
Replacing reliance on God or other external authorities with a humanist self-centred
consciousness, Enlightenment philosophy constructs modernity as a teleological movement
away from inter-dependence toward self-sufficient rationalism, or “maturity.” Free from
tutelage without, and from the bodily within, the rational subject of consciousness
progresses toward emancipated, unencumbered self-knowledge.

While modernity’s emphasis on rational and autonomous consciousness was challenged
by the Freudian notion of the unconscious, the psychoanalytic narrative also reinforced the
prevailing definition of plenitudinous subjectivity as (masculine) autonomy by defining
maturity as the achievement of separation and disengagement. In *Disputed Subjects,* Flax
maintains that this narrative “reveals psychoanalysts’ dependence on and complicity with
the metanarrative of Enlightenment” (99):
Psychoanalysts from Freud on have seemed to feel the need to develop teleological narratives of subjectivity. These narratives begin with the premise that there is a unitary substance (or potential) present from the beginning. Given "good enough" environmental conditions, this substance will unfold in definite, innate stages toward its "natural" end or purpose (adult maturity/health). (99)

In other words, Bildung. Although Flax does not study the novel, the psychoanalytic "plot" she describes here is strikingly akin to the Bildensroman narrative described by Dilthey, Shaffner and others. She goes on to say that

this approach obviously assumes that individual humans all share an essence with a common developmental pattern. This pattern is or should be rational, sequential, purposive, and additive. Naturalizing and universalizing this developmental history obscures its fictive qualities and prescriptive purposes. (99)

This fictive quality is, in fact, obscured by the "scientific" discourse of psychoanalysis: "the posited end becomes a given whose political and ethical components disappear behind the supposed neutrality or scientific nature of the 'description'" (99). The "story" told by psychoanalysis of the self's progress to maturity is not, as it pretends to be, simply descriptive – objective, disinterested, innocent – but rather is an ideological construction that regulates, homogenizes, and normalizes subjects. Thus, as I argued in Chapter Two, the subject constructed by psychology is, like the subject of the Bildensroman, not an a priori objectively described by the discourse, but rather a discursive effect produced by the discourse. Its discourse is shared with that of literary and pedagogical Bildung.

A recent focus on narrative in the discipline, in fact, undermines the notion that psychology is an objective science. In the introduction to a volume of essays entitled Narrative Psychology, the editor points out that "psychoanalysis deals with and in stories" (Sarbin xv). In developmental psychology in particular, as Kenneth Gergen and Mary Gergen argue in one of the defining essays in the collection, the structures of narrative are used to impose coherence and meaning on otherwise chaotic events (41). The authors add that, despite the longevity of some common narrative structures, their conventions are not ahistorical and cross-cultural, but vary across time and place (40). These learned narratives provide the framework for theories of human development. In Western culture, for example, the common narrative of maturation has as its "evaluative endpoint" an ideology of "adult rationality" (37) that determines retrospectively the kind of progressive, causal, and teleological narrative we can otherwise call the Bildungsprozess. Hence, psychoanalysis is not a disinterested science that stands outside of ideology to capture an essential psyche, but rather is itself caught up in cultural narratives and, in its own turn, reproduces those
narratives. As a narrative, it does not simply describe, but is, in Flax’s words, “disciplinary and normalizing” (100). The supposed scientific neutrality of the psychoanalytic narrative covers over the fact that it is first of all a story.

This narrative is, moreover, a gendered story. The central thrust of the plot is that proper maturation to full subjectivity is a process of demarcation against all that is coded feminine. The feminine, against which the self is secured, is represented most fundamentally by the mother, as Patricia Waugh points out: “subjecthood is understood as the achievement of separation, [and] maturity is seen to be reached when the dependent infant comes to regard its primary caretaker (nearly always a woman) as simply an object through which it defines its own identity and position in the world” (133). Through a defensive guarding of boundaries, the masculine self is maintained so that “separation and objectivity rather than relationship and connection become the markers of identity” (133). This exclusion of the feminine is not something invented by psychoanalysis. The “rage against difference” makes a particularly insidious appearance in modernity’s apparatus of subjective development (Bildung) and its gendered plot. Indeed, the notion of both individual and collective maturity as defined by Kant rests on a proliferation of mutually exclusive gendered dichotomies – tutelage/enlightenment, guardian/independence, domestic/public, community/individual, relationship/autonomy. Mature subjectivity is reached by repressing the first term in erecting the second. Thus, the discours of the Bildungsweg as it organizes the récit of human maturation (in both the Bildungsroman and in developmental psychology, for example) depends on the exclusion of the other, the “feminine.” Figured in this way, then, maturity is a masculine prerogative inaccessible to women.

Countermodernity, and the “Female Bildungsroman”

Yet, during the 1970s and 80s, female-authored maturation narratives along with feminist studies of the genre constituted a substantial publishing boom. In her recent annotated bibliography of the “female Bildungsroman,” Laura Sue Fuderer rightly points out that the “new or at least revised” version of this otherwise male genre, arises at this time as a “reflection of the contemporary feminist movement” (1/2). In fact, a pervasive, if not always explicit, subtext to much of this criticism is that the narrative of the individual heroine’s maturation is a synecdoche for a narrative of the “coming of age” of feminism itself. This story, not surprisingly, is often inscribed as an epiphanic awakening wherein the heroine discovers feminism or her own feminist sensibility through a crisis in consciousness. The enlightenment of the heroine stands as a trope for the feminist
enlightenment of female consciousness in general. Thus, during the apogee of second-wave feminism, not only were individual women telling their stories, but, for the first time in history, women were telling a collective story of their coming of age.

Critical publications on the "female Bildungsroman" dwindled in the mid to late 80s as the model of the Bildung-subject on which the generic plot depends came increasingly under attack from various postmodern quarters, including feminism itself. The liberal humanist subject to which women were finally gaining access was increasingly exposed as a culturally specific product: a white, Western, male construct rather than an ahistorical, neutral, and universal a priori. While the centered, rational, autonomous subject erected by Descartes in the seventeenth century and ratified in the eighteenth century as the foundation of progressive enlightenment was useful for second-wave feminism, this emancipatory Bildung-narrative soon proved to be problematic.

The posthumanist critique of modern subjectivity is often posed as a legitimation crisis for feminism precipitated by postmodernism. That is, the complexity of the problem of the subject for feminism is reduced by abstracting feminism and postmodernism as opposing discourses. The problem is then represented as one confronting feminism: how to retain the concept of a female identity on which its politics depend, while accounting for the anti-foundational insights of postmodernism. Formulating the problem this way, however, represses the fact that feminism, in its very disclosure of the homogeneous neutrality of the liberal humanist subject as not only gendered and interested, but as constructed against the feminine as other, is a major, if disregarded, constituent of postmodernity. But, what Rosi Braidotti ironically calls the “remarkable historical coincidence” (Dissonance 6) of the emergence of feminism and the decentering of humanist subjectivity can be looked at otherwise. That is, the very possibility of women as “subjects” (the return of the repressed) has deconstructed the exclusionary contours of Enlightenment’s subject from within.

In spite of itself, liberal-humanist feminism disrupted the very Enlightenment emancipatory project out of which it emerged and, in doing so, helped to precipitate postmodernity. I do not want to suggest here that women’s entry into the privileged circle of humanist subjectivity itself simply dismantled the presiding concept of the self — the humanist circle is much too supple and accommodating to allow that. In fact, I want to insist that, despite the struggles and sacrifices its emergence required and despite often powerful resistances to it, the rise of feminism as a cogent collective force in the twentieth century was a logical — perhaps inevitable — extension of the expansion of universal individual liberty held by the emancipatory goals of Enlightenment modernity. As Gramsci has so amply demonstrated, one of the key strategies of liberal humanism is to
disarm oppositional elements by making concessions to them, accommodating them and therefore reconciling the contradiction their difference would make. Instead, what I want to argue here is that while humanism's tolerant pluralism is elastic enough to allow women access to its subjectivity, women's demands to radically alter the contours of that subject once inside it, are more than can be contained by it. As Bauman argues in *Modernity and Ambivalence*, the totalizing strategies of modernity have unwittingly revealed differences and contradictions which it is increasingly less able to contain. This was always already a risk for the colonizing sovereign subject — an imminent threat against its own survival which constantly had to be contained. Its grip on its sovereignty was always, inherently tenuous (hence the sometimes egregious strategies of containment). The very entry of woman into the humanist category "man" (regardless of the ironies and problems of that move, and no matter what we think of it now) has worked to deconstruct the sovereign subject sustaining modernity (though the power of this deconstructive move, often pointed out by feminists, has been studiously ignored by postmodern theory overall.)

Unable to contain the multiple others which increasingly lay claim to its privileges, modernity's category of "universal man" is rendered no longer transparent, let alone thinkable in the same way. The very notion of (sexual) difference constantly threatens modernity's principle of self-sameness; once inside — uninvited — it undermines that homogeneity. As Braidotti puts it, "as soon as woman-matter begins to speak, the whole edifice of Western Reason begins to crumble" (*Dissonance* 255). Speaking from within this edifice, but resisting its phallocentric ideologies, feminism constitutes what Foucault calls an "attitude of countermodernity." Finally deconstructed from within by such countervailing "attitudes," modernity finds itself auto-deconstructing, engendering a cultural formation known generally as "postmodernity."

*(Post)Modernity and Resistance*

The "post" in postmodernity is often read as a signifier of its rejection of the foundational metanarratives of modernity: progress, the unified subject, the valorization of reason, the immediacy of reference, and so on. It is significant, however, that the term retains its root word, "modernity," since postmodernity is not simply independent of modernity. Rather, it represents another phase — though a momentous one — of modernity. It signifies, in other words, a critique of, perhaps even the endgame of, a larger moment which contains it. As Bauman cogently argues, postmodernity does not, of course, appear from some unspecified nowhere, but rather arises out of modernity's disaffection with its own delusions. In this sense, postmodernity is no more than modernity's own inevitable self-deconstruction.
Supposed to unveil ideology, modernity's critical reason is shown to have produced its own ideology. Having produced its own contradictions not only despite, but because of, its universalizing and homogenizing strategies, modernity is finally unable to contain those contradictions (Modernity 231-32). (Women's entry, via feminism, into the otherwise male contours of modern subjectivity is one of the self-deconstructive gestures that discloses these contradictions.) In postmodernity, these contradictions are foregrounded, revealing attitudes of countermodernity, or modern counter-memories. Anthony Caskardi argues along similar lines that

what we have come to call "postmodernism" may be understood in a dual sense: first, postmodernism represents the consequence of tendencies embedded within the paradigm of modernity; and second, postmodernism is the site of those transformations that remain open to us through a re-interpretation of the modern age. (14)

Postmodernity marks the late twentieth-century emergence of this countermodernity as a full-fledged critical inquiry; it makes thinkable what was unthinkable about modernity under the aegis of its master narratives. Central to this inquiry, of course, is the question of the normative subject upon which Enlightenment's narrative of emancipation is grounded. For postmodernism, the problem of the subject has become acute. The contradiction that its "inclusive" universality is enabled by exclusion stands revealed. Indeed, if, as the politics of Bildung shows, the rational subject can inform "fascist as well as emancipatory ends" (Docherty 13), then the rational subject of consciousness — modernity's primary apparatus of legitimation — is no longer adequate for contemporary resistance politics. It can no longer contain the contradictions whose exclusions make it possible.

So how does feminism — at once inside modernity relying on its emancipatory subject and outside it decentering that very subject — respond to this crisis it has helped bring about? It is faced with a logical conundrum: while feminism has been a major force in the general postmodern critique of modernity's first principles, it is also indebted to those Enlightenment principles and relies, at least traditionally, on them to sustain and legitimize its emancipatory project. In this way, feminism is an exemplary field from which to consider this posthumanist or postmodern crisis. As a politics and a practice, feminism demands a theory of agency, but the available terms of agentic subjectivity are those very terms which it has sought to deconstruct. While, on the one hand, feminism has exposed the phallocentric exclusionary and colonizing gestures that make the modern subject (including the feminist subject) possible, on the other hand, feminist discourses "clearly arise out of and are made possible by those of Enlightened modernity and its models of reason, justice and autonomous subjectivity as universal categories" (Waugh
And, as Eagleton rightfully points out—in a way that clearly illustrates the conundrum faced by “postmodern” resistant politics—we forget or disparage these early struggles at our political peril:

Those who have now been correctly programmed to reach for their decentred subjectivities at the mere mention of the dreaded phrase “liberal humanist” repress the courageous struggles of the early revolutionary bourgeoisie of the Enlightenment against the brutalities of feudal absolutism—struggles for which concepts of autonomy, self-determination, self-grounding and the rest were crucial political weapons. If we are able today to be critics of Enlightenment, it is Enlightenment which has empowered us to be so. (“Self-Authoring” 44-45)

The subject of emancipation instituted by the Enlightenment narrative frames feminist epistemology as both its ground and teleology. Yet feminism simultaneously resists that narrative, or essential elements of it. To put this in Foucauldian terms, power relations have produced feminism as much as they have made it necessary as a counterpractice. In **Gender Trouble**, Judith Butler argues that “the category of ‘women,’ the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought” (2). As interventions from Afro-American and other non-hegemonic feminisms have shown, to reassemble modernity’s subjective edifice for feminism would be to reproduce the exclusionary gestures which make it possible. In other words, by universalizing an essentialized female experience in the name of identity politics, feminism perpetuates the very problems it seeks to address by excluding the experiences of women of non-hegemonic races and classes, or, worse, by subsuming (colonizing) the heterogeneity of women in a homogeneity of a universalized Woman.

During the early 1980s, feminism was internally problematized as non-white feminists pointed out that by essentializing women’s experience, feminist identity politics reproduces the very problems it seeks to address. In order for feminism to avoid reproducing the kinds of oppression it has challenged, then, it needs to resist the seductive pull of Enlightenment’s emancipatory promise.

But here the question arises whether feminism can completely dispense with some model of the subject that would legitimize feminist political agency. From what stance does feminism conduct resistance? Can it reconceptualize agency without recapitulating to the humanist subject that makes agency thinkable? Since postmodern difference can become so endlessly dispersed as to result in a “vertiginous relativism” (Ross 547) of political indifference, feminism requires a foundation to ground what Benhabib refers to as a minimal criteria of value and justice (“Epistemologies” passim). This problem of the
category of a “female subject” for feminism remains one of the defining problematics of resistance politics today. The question of agency (for feminism) is a particularly acute one in terms of pedagogy – a major concern of this study – since pedagogy (like feminism) is an activity and not only a theory. It points to the problem of how to theorize a posthumanist pedagogy from a position inside humanist institutions. It demonstrates the difficulty (or impossibility?) of an outside to humanism that would legitimize a subject grounding a general theory of resistance.

Various postmodern feminists have pointed out, however, that the posthumanist “death of the subject” does not mean that subjectivity or agency is jettisoned altogether; rather, the subject is “decentered” so that it can account for differences rather than excluding them. But, as Flax notes, the prevalence of the Enlightenment model of subjective agency makes it difficult to imagine the subject outside its enabling parameters. In *Disputed Subjects*, Flax articulates the problem of theorizing models of subjectivity that would allow agency without reinstating modernity’s unitary, centered subject as autonomous individual:

Our abilities to imagine such subjectivities are impeded by the positing of false alternatives. Some postmodernists confine all talk about subjectivity to critiques of the split Cartesian rationalistic subject or of the unitary, authentic “true self.” On the other hand, critics of postmodernism and some postmodernists reduce all descriptions of a decentered subject to a fragmented one that lacks any agency or organization. None of these constructs are appealing or plausible. Their juxtaposition and the limits of the argument demonstrate how difficult it is to imagine subjectivity outside Enlightenment ideas of it. The unitary self and the fragmented one are simply mirror images; neither represents an alternative to the subjects Enlightenment discourses construct. (xii)

As I will argue below, the primary obstacle to imagining new models of subjectivity is the “radical break” notion of postmodernity’s emergence. That is, if postmodernity is envisaged as a complete break from modernity, then completely new forms of the subject will have to be imagined; as it stands, however, these new models tend to reverse and therefore simply mirror the old model and, in doing so, reinstate its primacy. This does not mean, however, that, as Habermas has it, the project of modernity is incomplete and that rationality can still sustain its emancipatory goals, but nor does a rejection of Enlightenment principles undermines feminism as a politics. Instead, the binary structure opposing postmodernity to modernity must be rejected in favour of a position that sees modernity as precipitating its own counternarratives. In this way, (feminist) subjectivity
can be considered not as a rejection of modernity's models, but rather as a repressed narrative already contained by modernity, but, a countervailing pressure, that, in postmodernity, threatens to exceed modernity.

This is the problem that frames my approach to the (female) *Bildungsroman* in its broadest outlines. Because the *Bildungsroman* is, as Bakhtin puts it, the story of "becoming" (20), it provides a fruitful site from which to investigate not only modernity's construction of the maturing self, but also those counter-narratives, or complicitous critiques that both operate inside modernity and are resistant to it.\(^{10}\) It is an opportunity to imagine models of subjectivity narrated in the (female) *Bildungsroman* in ways that have been repressed or excluded by modernity's master narratives, but are now made thinkable by postmodernity. Although such an investigation is beyond the scope of this study, I want to offer it as a theoretical stance from which "other" coming-of-age narratives might be read. To what extent might these counter-narratives offer other ways of conceiving of maturation or "becoming" that have otherwise been disqualified by the hegemonic discourse about the *Bildungsroman* and its subject? If the female maturation plot of the 1970s and 80s represented and reproduced the humanist subject of second-wave feminism, then counter-narratives of the *Bildungsroman* — made thinkable by postmodernism — will reveal feminist counter-narratives; or, to put it in a way that renounces the mimetic or reflectionist theory of literature just invoked, these counter-narratives will provide analogical models for rethinking feminism's identity crisis.

**Feminism and Bildung**

Feminist critics tend to accommodate women to the *Bildungsroman* genre in one of two general ways: either they assimilate female plots into the generic framework, or they re-figure female maturation by expanding generic boundaries according to women's unique maturation patterns. These two approaches roughly correspond to two feminist discourses currently in conflict which reveal two very different feminist attitudes toward modernity's emancipatory project: feminism of equality and feminism of difference.

According to the liberal humanist or "feminism of equality" position, women's exclusion from the public sphere, from equal opportunity and equal rights, is, in Flax's words, "merely contingent and therefore reversible" (87). Once these inequalities have been addressed, women can claim agency as the "Enlightenment promises of equality, justice and rationality will then be redeemed" (87). In this view, the Enlightenment values of reason, progress, and autonomous individualism are essential to feminist politics. Emancipation here is perceived in Kantian terms which, in Flax's words, posit "freedom
[as] the ability to determine self-consciously the course of one's life in conjunction with other similarly autonomous selves" (15). Like Habermas, these feminists believe that the Enlightenment project is incomplete and that it can be completed through the inclusion of the hitherto excluded. Feminists of equality — usually associated with "second-wave" feminism — therefore demand inclusion in the category of the autonomous individual, a category supposed to guarantee freedom and equality. Studies of the female maturation novel which represent this ideology read the heroine's plot according to generic conventions. Either the female versions have been heretofore simply excluded, or social conditions, until recently, have not allowed "authentic" versions to emerge. Elizabeth Abel, et al frame their 1983 critical anthology, *The Voyage In: Fictions of Female Development*, with this ideology. In their Introduction, the editors argue that

although the primary assumption underlying the *Bildungsroman* — the evolution of a coherent self — has come under attack in modernist and avant-garde fiction, this assumption remains cogent for women writers who now for the first time find themselves in a world increasingly responsive to their needs .... [as they move] actively into the public sphere. (13)

From this critical position, novels tend to be read according to a reflectionist aesthetic in which an accessible female "experience" is apprehended and its authenticity assessed. For Rita Felski, among others, the maturation plot is the paradigmatic genre of the last two decades as women writers reflect the liberations of a second-phase feminism. This liberal humanist notion that women need only accede to a supposedly universal autonomous *Bildung*-subject produces critical readings of "female *Bildungsromane*" that leave in place the ideal of the unencumbered self. Although various critics point out that women face different obstacles to achieving final *Bildung* or maturity, and thus alter thematic elements accordingly, the goal of a coherent subjectivity, emancipated according to self-realization, remains unchallenged. Toril Moi comments on the feminist use of the liberal-humanist subject "as the unified origin and undisputed master of its own projects":

Well suited to promote freedom and equality on terms dictated by the capitalist marketplace, this particular picture of subjectivity is at the center of patriarchal ideology in the twentieth century. Such notions of what a subject is tend to make the individual woman responsible for her own oppression. If she is oppressed, the liberal argument goes, it can only be because she has failed to liberate herself, that is to say, failed to demonstrate the rich individual sense of mastery prescribed by this kind of ideology. ("Am I" 58).

Indeed, with this kind of ideology defining the trajectory of *Bildung*, female protagonists
often "fail" to come of age in terms of the ideal.

The second way of integrating women's novels into the *Bildungsroman* tradition, which emerges from "feminism of difference," is in part an attempt to address this problem. In this view, Enlightenment values, especially deontological reason and monadic autonomy, are masculine values that exclude women. "Why," as Patricia Waugh asks, "is autonomy always emphasised as the goal of maturity? Why not emphasise equally the importance of maintaining connection and intersubjectivity?" (133). Rewriting the genre according to women's unique psychic development would seem the obvious corrective to the oedipal scenario of the male *Bildungsroman*. Against phallocentric privileging, some feminists use object-relations theory to posit the pre-oedipal as the defining moment of female maturation. They valorize a certain female connectedness and relational thinking understood to be a natural extension of the mother-daughter bond prior to the (false) consciousness imposed by the oedipal. The conventional *Bildungsprozess* is therefore altered so that female subjectivity is posited as an essence to be recovered rather than a potential to be realized. Object relations readings of the “female *Bildungsroman*” do not attempt to repress or deny the desire for regression. Indeed, they privilege a pre-oedipal intersubjectivity outside of and untouched by the Law of the Father.15 This approach, however, is problematic in that, in its effort to reject the ideology of exclusionary autonomy, it reinstates the woman in the role of difference or other (mother, lover). In other words, claiming feminine "connectedness" for women in contrast to masculine “autonomy” for men leaves in place the gendered polarities – worldly/domestic, subjective/intersubjective, autonomous-relational, individual/social – according to which women have been devalued and disenfranchised in the first place. Those binaries which excluded women from the Enlightenment *Bildungsprozess* as described above, for example, are simply inverted and, therefore, their ideology reinstated.

Although Flax does not study the *Bildungsroman*, her work as a feminist-psychoanalyst is useful to rethinking the maturation narrative insofar as she theorizes female subjectivity and intersubjectivity in ways that problematize modern psychoanalytic formulations. Although her work emerges from object-relations theory and practice, it is intersected by a Lacanian emphasis on language and posthumanist theories of discourse. Accordingly, Flax is uncomfortable with the mis-appropriation of some of her own work for "alternative subjectivities," which, she writes "tend to disregard attention to [the subject's] multiple determinants .... [and] ignore the aspects of development that are incomplete, nonlinear, conflicted and provisional" (*Disputed* 21). Flax rejects the deeply problematic essentialist and normative tendencies of some feminist object relations theory (or appropriations thereof) which she sees as dangerously complicit with Enlightenment values. Following
Norman Holland we might refer to Flax’s psychoanalytic approach as “postmodern”; “the beginning of the Postmodern phase,” Holland argues, “came with the dethroning of Oedipus” (299). This dethroning is initiated by Freud who, near the end of his career, pays increasing attention to the pre-oedipal. Object-relations theory picks up where Freud leaves off so that “Freud’s *intrapsychic* picture of the mind [gives] way to an *interpsychic* model” (301), argues Holland, in which the ego is not separate from others, but rather has a “permeable interface” with them (301). “Postmodern” object-relations, therefore, proposes not the “strengthened core ego” of American Ego Psychology (with which it is often erroneously equated), but rather theorizes what Holland calls the “decentered” ego. Flax criticizes an ahistorical model of female maturation that fails to consider mediation of the psychic structures by the discourses through which they have been produced and naturalized. While she nevertheless agrees that oedipalization is a powerful determinant of subjectivity in the West, she situates it not as natural or normal, but as one of the most tenacious social discourses through which subjectivity is inscribed. She contends, therefore, that feminism needs another site from which to decentre phallocentric models. She posits maturation neither simply as a strengthening and totalizing of the ego against unconscious forces, nor as a regression renouncing the Symbolic. This is not to deny that the “female *Bildungroman*” plays on the desire for pre-Symbolic regression, but this is not the only desire that structures development. Flax does not deny women a forward-moving maturation. In Constance Penley’s words, “[one] can want completion but one can also desire lack” (500). To put this differently, again, as de Lauretis writes, “one has an ego, after all, even when one is a woman” (141). Thus, subjectivity is posited as a dialogical negotiation between intersubjectivity and autonomy. For “postmodern psychoanalysis,” this oscillation is not registered simply on an essentialized psychic plane, but is always already discursively mediated.

**The Politics of Narrative**

John H. Smith makes this point in his essay, “Cultivating Gender: Sexual Difference, *Bildung*, and the *Bildungroman*.” For him, the narrative trajectory of the *Bildungroman* is figured as a movement not strictly from the pre-oedipal to the oedipal, but rather, in Lacanian terms, from the *oscillation* of the Imaginary to a repression of that movement in the Symbolic. In fact, for him, it is this narrative drive of the *Bildungroman* that distinguishes it from the *Entwicklungroman* and the *Erziehungroman*: “The narratives of the [latter] are determined by the general thematic unity of a hero’s growth or maturation, whereas [Bildungromane] display as a motor of their narration specific forces of desire,
control, and representation that propel the hero from Imaginary oscillation to Symbolic
grounding and repression” (217). Significantly, Smith takes as the starting point for his
psychoanalytic analysis Hegel’s reading of the Bildungsroman as a “general conflict between
inner and outer worlds, individual and social environment” (209). He goes on to analyze
Hegel’s discussion of Bildung in the Phenomenology, linking Hegel’s notion of Bildung
directly to Lacan’s theory of the subject: “the crucial ideas that Lacan borrowed and
reinterpreted from Hegel relate specifically to the dialectical moves of Bildung – namely
the dialectic of desire and the individual’s development into a world of structures of
representation” (212-13). This “socio-rhetorical” (211) process of Bildung is driven not by
need, but by desire. And this desire is a masculine drive propelling an oedipal narrative.
The phallocentrism of the Bildungsroman, therefore, is neither arbitrary nor incidental:

we can see, thanks to Lacan, that the individual engendered
by the process of Bildung is more than a neuter person, since
the [Bildungsheld] is not just developing into a social being
by mastering society’s language but adopting a male
position within the patriarchy. (215)

Smith goes on to argue that, given the “strict gender codification” of historical Bildung, the
term “female Bildungsroman” is “a contradiction in terms” (220). He adds that “the
relativization of the concept “Bildung” in terms of sexual difference ... ought to remind
critics of the difficulties of applying a supposedly ‘universal’ but in fact gender-coded
concept (and concomitant narrative structure) to both genders” (221). There is, he points
out, much in twentieth-century women’s writing (both literary and theoretical) that
“challenges the dominant developmental pattern that we call Bildung” (he cites The Voyage
In), and he bids critics attend to the “new narrative[s]” suggested in this body of work
rather than try to accommodate women in “inappropriate” male-gendered terms (221).
While Bildung was constructed as a universal imperative of modern hegemony, its
accommodational strategies disclosed its “neutral” lineaments as in fact gendered and
interested.

Despite recent romantic theories about the universal “humanity” of certain plots,
narratives are situated at particular historical junctures and are therefore deeply, and often
invisibly, ideological. In her “Spatialization: A Strategy for Reading Narrative,” Susan
Stanford Friedman politicizes the formal spatial/temporal coordinates of narrative
themselves. She defines narrative as “the representation of movement within the coordinates
of space and time” (12). From this definition of narrative in general, Friedman offers a
strategy for reading a text’s ideology: “we can read narrative by interpreting the text’s
horizontal and vertical narrative movements and intersections” (12). For example, the
vertical axis might interrupt the narrative axis of the text with “history,” which she
parallels with Fredric Jameson's notion of the "political unconscious," the "buried and repressed" narrative of class struggle" (17; Jameson 20) which leaves its mark or trace on the text's narrative. For Friedman (and emphatically not for Jameson who sees the class struggle as subsuming other political struggles), these political resonances that traverse the text might include interlocking narratives of race, gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, and so forth — stories, in other words, that reproduce, subvert, and otherwise engage with the dominant and marginalized cultural scripts of the social order. (17)

Friedman goes on to put this politicized narrative model in psychoanalytic terms to argue that the conscious (temporal axis) and unconscious (spatial axis) of the text "interact psychodynamically" (17). Semiotic narrative theory would similarly apply this psychoanalytic model to the dual impulses of narrative. Brooks, for example, "claims that all narratives are driven by the interplay of desire and resistance to its aims" (Cobley 128). In fact, in an interview included in Psychoanalysis and Storytelling, Brooks notes that "plots of Bildung ... seem to be either undermined by or somehow attached to the past so that no progress forward is entirely satisfactory" (120). Thus, the oscillation between desire and regression, not quite theorized by Swales in his assessment of the Bildungsroman as combining poetry and prose, is foregrounded. Brooks comments on the Bildungsroman in the context of a discussion of nostalgia as a "major mode of consciousness" in nineteenth-century literature. In terms echoing Hegel's nostalgia for the modern loss of the "poetic," Brooks explains: "paradise is always lost, it is always in a temporal relation of irretrievability .... The very notion of paradise is bound up with its loss" (120). What is lost is an imaginary plenitude. He adds that "the connection of memory and desire ... is partly one of memory of a form of satisfaction which is foreclosed to one, and not completely comprehensible, but nonetheless a feeling that there was once a greater plenitude, unity whatever" (120). This lost plenitude (poetry, the maternal bond, the unified self) is, therefore, that which propels narrative desire and that which impedes its progress.

This double register of narrative desire is implicit in Friedman's spatial/temporal model. Although Friedman denies any gendered analogy to her "psychodynamic" theory, she offers a politicized reading strategy that I think (intentionally or not) displaces the gendered ideology of the spatial/temporal binary. In other words, her approach offers a way of reading the (female) Bildungsroman that privileges neither the (feminized) pre-Symbolic spatial axis nor the (masculinized) Symbolic temporal axis. Rather, the narrative can be read as an oscillation between its "prosaic" and "poetic" poles.
This dialectic, it should be cautioned, is not a simple oscillation between a negative and a positive ontology. As Smith points out, Melanie Klein calls the pre-oedipal not a "stage," but rather a "position," because "it is not something 'overcome,' as if one merely 'grew out of the stage.' Rather, ... it becomes a 'trace' in us ... paradoxically present and not present" (213-14). Thus, the pre-Symbolic is a "position" or mythical "place," not a temporal moment in terms of which origins and teleologies can be established. Like Freud's "fort/da," the pre-Symbolic signals both presence and absence. Julia Kristeva's term for the pre-Symbolic as a textual register is le sémiotique. For Kristeva, the semiotic transgresses the symbolic order which otherwise gives the subject an illusion of presence. The semiotic or "chora" (like Irigaray's "hystera") is the space of poetic language that does not refer "to a signified object for a thetic consciousness" (133). Like Plato's "chora," it is "anterior to naming, to the One, to the father, and...[is] maternally connoted" (133). But the semiotic, for Kristeva, is even more elusive than Klein's "position" suggests: for Kristeva, it is a "disposition," which the OED defines as a "tendency" and, moreover, as referring to "the relative position of parts." For Kristeva, the semiotic is not in any simple way anterior to the symbolic; rather, it always accompanies it, it is both "pre-symbolic and trans-symbolic" (137) — "never one without the other" (138). Thus, regression and progression are not two temporally successive stages; rather, they are dialectical only in relation to each other; they are co-existent registers of a productive textual tension. There is no centered present moment toward which or away from which subjectivity is propelled.

Alternative readings might show, then, that the full presence of traditional Bildung is never yielded — the oscillation is a dialectic without sublation; Aufhebung is endlessly deferred, so that identity as harmonious self-sameness is constantly denied. This incessant slippage is that which a centered Bildung-subject must constantly (re)contain: that is, the contradiction between a desire for (a return to) the pre-oedipal and a forward-moving maturation must be resolved (by the reader if not by the text). For the decentered subject, however, regression and progression are a dynamic couplet always producing, but never finalizing, that absent presence.21

What I want to suggest is that feminist or alternative narratives of maturation deconstruct the conventional Bildungprozess. That is, they work within the conventions that represent a teleological movement toward a harmonious and centred self while simultaneously denying that possibility. They are not, in other words, "unsuccessful" Bildungsrmane; rather, they point to the difficulty or even impossibility of its striving. To paraphrase Lima's analysis of the colonized woman's Bildungsroman, in laying claim to a (European) male model, these women's texts both affirm the hegemonic sway of the conventional genre and, by transforming it, demonstrate the inadequacy or impossibility
of the Western male model (455). I want to point out, too, that this deconstruction demonstrates the inadequacy of this model not only for women. In this regard, my approach is similar to that taken by Susan Fraiman who, while acknowledging the “paradigm smashing” (147 n. 4) innovation of The Voyage In, argues that while Abel, et al “point out the insufficiency” of the genre, their “volume is mostly interested in identifying ‘distinctively female versions of the Bildungsroman’” (126). Against this, Fraiman claims she is less interested in appropriating the genre for women than in demonstrating the ways in which women “[engage] and struggle with the dominant paradigm” (126). My suggestion is similar: rather than accommodating women to the generic form for feminist purposes it is perhaps more useful to look at how the “dominant paradigm” might be deconstructed by female excursions into it. Against the teleology of a maturity opposed binarily to immaturity, to what extent is the narrative of human becoming, read through the lens of posthumanist conceptions of subjectivity, a continuous process, ongoing and with multiple beginnings and multiple trajectories without finality? A multicultural criticism would be open to recognizing these differences. The question to ask, therefore, is whether reading female narratives of maturation through a postmodern feminist lens tells a different story about subjective maturation.

Conclusion: (Female) Subjectivity

Each of the two feminist readings of the maturation plot schematized above as feminism of equality and feminism of difference can be seen as an attempt to contain the crisis of the Bildung-subject for feminism. Both are attempts, in other words, to “save the subject.”22 They are responses to the internal contradictions which Catherine Belsey argues “exert a pressure ... to seek new, non-contradictory subject-positions” (65). Belsey takes as a primary example the fact that

women as a group in our society are both produced and inhibited by contradictory discourses. Very broadly, they participate both in the liberal humanist discourse of freedom, self-determination and rationality and at the same time in the specifically feminine discourse offered by society of submission, relative inadequacy and irrational intuition. (65)

Attemps to integrate the feminine into the Bildungsroman in either of the directions Belsey describes simply reverse, and therefore reinscribe, the gendered binary that I have argued is already inscribed in modernity.

As suggested above, by “appropriating” the modern Bildung-subject of emancipation,
liberal humanist feminists enjoy the illusion of autonomous freedom; however, the
elasticity of modern humanist hegemony already allows the accommodation of women. As Braidotti contends in her essay, “The Subject in Feminism,” women can no longer be satisfied with the “crumbs of modernity” (164). Her argument is worth quoting at length here:

If emancipation means adapting to the standards, the measures, the values of a society that for centuries have been male-dominated, accepting unquestioningly the same material and symbolic values as the dominant group, then emancipation is not enough. We must rid of the simplistic idea that we can remedy centuries of exclusions and disqualification of women by their sudden state-sponsored integration into the labour force and also into symbolic institutions and systems of representations. Putting women in, allowing them a few odd seats in the previously segregated clubs is not enough. What is needed is for the newcomers to be able and to be entitled to redefine the rules of the game so as to make a difference and make that difference felt concretely. (164)

With Braidotti, I think feminism needs to “avoid the repetition of old models in the hands of new social actors” (164). As she emphasizes both here and in two full-length studies, the “crisis of the subject” need not be assessed in negative terms. Rather, the crisis can be assessed positively, “as the opening-up of new possibilities, new potentialities” (162). This challenge, she writes, “is a great chance for those, like women, who historically have been deprived of the right to self-determination: for them the crisis of the masculine rational subject can be a constructive positive moment” (162). In fact, feminism represents one of the major discourses that have brought this subject to crisis. Somewhat ironically, it is the very recuperative or integrationist gestures of hegemony that have enabled the disruption of the contours of the Bildung master narrative from within. The entrance of the object-other that would otherwise confirm the imperialist-phallocentric subject deconstruct that subject from within. It is against this constant threat of contamination that the imperialist and phallocentric subject attempts to secure itself. The return of the repressed is (always already) the subject’s undoing. Inclusion discloses those exclusions that make accommodational gestures possible. More specifically, the attempt to plot female maturation in terms already available undermines those very terms. Just as a liberal humanist feminism has contributed (in part unwittingly) to the crisis of the subject, the notion of a “female Bildungroman” perforce disrupts the Bildung-subject upon which the genre is constructed.

Yet, we must not be seduced by the complacency offered by humanism's
accommodational logic and the recuperative power of modernity’s grand narratives. While claims to female subjectivity according to available master narratives deconstruct the very ideologies that make those narratives intelligible, feminism must, at the same time, guard against the ideologies that are re-inscribed by any attempt to reconstitute a female subjectivity. This wariness would entail a questioning of the extent to which feminist discourse is itself caught up in the trajectory of the conventional Bildungsroman (meta)narrative. To what extent does “the story” feminism tells about itself reinscribe the modern narrative of the Bildung-subject, and participate, synecdochally, in the narrative of modernity’s “coming of age” in general? To what extent does feminism, by invoking the Enlightenment trajectory of mature subjective plenitude, reinstate the gestures which have excluded women and, by doing so, in fact, preclude the possibility of a “female subjectivity”?

My skepticism about the viability of modernity’s subject of emancipation is expressed by Foucault who, in “What is Enlightenment?,” doubts “whether we will ever reach mature adulthood” (49). Having deconstructed the ideologies on which this mature adulthood relies, feminism, as an attitude of counter-modernity, can perhaps construct female subjectivity only as an “anachronism,” to borrow from Gerardine Meaney, signified “through the order it transgresses” (82). In constructing female subjectivity within models already available, feminism at once re-constructs and de-constructs them. The female maturation plot, then, is neither absolutely inside nor outside the modernity by which the Bildungsroman plot has been produced. I would counter Habermas’ argument that we have not yet finished with the project of Enlightenment on the grounds that its centered, autonomous subject has contributed to a number of modern atrocities. Following Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy in their deconstruction of the ideology of the subject that legitimized Nazism, I would urge that “a comfortable security in the certitudes of morality and of democracy not only guarantees nothing, but exposes one to the risk of not seeing the arrival, or the return, of that whose possibility is not due to any simple accident of history” (312). Postmodern-feminist theories of the subject make thinkable counter-modernity’s theories of subjectivity and maturation already inscribed inside a hegemonic modernity. Positioning postmodernity not as an absolute break from modernity, but rather, in Foucault’s sense, as a counter-modernity against which modernity erected itself, enables an investigation of those contradictions whose exclusion made modernity possible, but whose return problematizes the legitimacy of oppositional politics and demands a postmodern political stance.

This stance, as I hope to show in what follows, is most urgent in those institutions where modernity’s inclusionary gestures are most insidiously reproduced and most evidently in
Part Two continues this investigation of modern subjectivity and its counternarratives by considering Bildung in the context of pedagogy and the notion of (academic) freedom.

NOTES

1 From "Von der Majorennität (Mündigkeit) und der Minorennität (Unmündigkeit)" (1791), cited in Helga Meise (her translation), page 203.

2 The distinction originates with Benveniste and is elaborated by Genette. Ross Chambers helpfully points out that discours refers to the text as narration and recit to the text as narrated.

3 For essays that foreground the relation between narrative form and ideology see the collection edited by James Phelan, Reading Narrative: Form, Ethics, Ideology. For essays on feminist narrative theory see Kathy Mezei’s recent collection, Ambiguous Discourse: Feminist Narratology and British Women Writers. Mezei provides a bibliography of feminist narratology.

4 For example, where he otherwise tends to focus on the formal narrative of the genre, James Hardin turns to the thematic to exclude some female critics’ attempts to expand the genre; regarding The Voyage In: Fictions of Female Development, he comments rather condescendingly that “the inclusion of essays on a variant of the novel of development, the lesbian coming-out story” [17] and on contemporary fairy tales revised so as to ‘reverse gender biases inherent in the tales’ [17] strains the link with the Bildungsroman to the breaking point and again provides an illustration of what I would argue is needlessly cavalier application of what, used with more care, could be a useful literary term” (xviii). Hardin’s general conclusions about feminist considerations of the genre are based on somewhat thin research. Indeed, it is rather surprising that Hardin devotes three pages of his introduction to the feminist discourse about the Bildungsroman, yet, other than The Voyage In, his references to this broad and complex discourse apparently come not directly from the sources themselves, but rather second-hand from annotations in Fuderer’s annotated bibliography of criticism on the female Bildungsroman.

5 W. H. Brufor points out that Schopenhauer believed that men’s sexual attraction to women impeded their path to Bildung perceived as masculine self-sufficiency (122).

6 Of Human Bondage is exemplary: throughout the narrative, Philip continually imagines that original bond he experiences as a child in his mother’s death-bed: “For no particular reason he remembered that cold morning when Emma had taken him out of bed and put him beside his mother …. he seemed to feel the warmth of his mother’s body against his and her arms around him. Suddenly, it seemed to him that his life was a dream, [as was] his mother’s death … and he would awake in the morning and be back again at home” (46).

7 It would be useful to compare these conversion narratives to the early eighteenth-century Pietist autobiographies by women, which, according to Kontje, “hold a pivotal position in the history of the German Bildungsroman” (Private 19). Kontje’s source, Volumn I of Johann Heinrich Reitz’s History of the Reborn (1691-1701) consists of thirty-three short autobiographies by women, almost all of which follow the same plot: “oppressed by an awareness of her sinfulness, each woman undergoes a conversion experience and concludes her narrative with a list of her newly won Christian beliefs” (Kontje, Private 20). These
might compare in interesting ways to the modern “novel of awakening.” See Susan J. Rosowksi and Bonnie Hoover Braendlin on feminist awakenings in, respectively, Kate Chopin’s *Awakening* and George Eliot’s *Middlemarch.*

8 He makes the same point in *The Ideology of the Aesthetic,* 8.

9 In “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse,” Chandra Talpade Mohanty applies Teresa de Lauretis’ distinction between “woman” — a cultural and ideological composite Other constructed through diverse representational discourses (scientific, literary, juridical, linguistic, cinematic, etc.) — and “women” — real, material subjects of their collective histories” (334) to her analysis of the colonialist discourse of a white, Eurocentric feminism that conflates “women” and “woman” to assume a universal category of “women as an already constituted, coherent group with identical interests and desires, regardless of class, ethnic or racial location or contradictions” (336-37). See de Lauretis, 5-6. On “woman” as a colonizing category, see also bell hooks’ *Talking Back* and Gayatri Spivak’s *In Other Worlds* (chapters 5 and 14).

10 While both nineteenth-century female-authored novels and recent “feminist” texts, on the one hand, and modernist male-authored texts, on the other, have been analyzed in terms of the *Bildungsroman,* to my knowledge, no full-length study has analyzed modernist women’s novels in this context.

11 There is, indeed, at least some partial truth to this: women have written some standard *Bildungsroman,* but, as critics point out, when the protagonist is female, the similarities end with the oedipal scenario. While women in nineteenth-century maturation novels might free themselves of the bonds of family, it is only to be recontained as a wife, as an object of male desire. Feminist critics point out socio-historical reasons for this: women simply did not have the same freedom to explore options other than fulfillment in marriage. Otherwise, if her own desire “problematises or threatens the male economy, she is killed off as in the famous stories of Emma Bovary and Anna Karenina” (Cobley 149), or more recently in the 1994 film *Thelma and Louise.*

12 The editors go on to say: “while emphasizing gender differences, our definition shares common ground with the presuppositions and generic features of the traditional *Bildungsroman:* belief in a coherent self (although not necessarily an autonomous one); faith in the possibility of development (although change may be frustrated, may occur at different stages and rates, and may be concealed in the narrative); insistence on a time span in which development occurs (although the time span may exist only in memory); and emphasis on social context (even as an adversary). Continuity, as well as significant difference, links our picture of developmental fiction to the conventions of the classic *Bildungsroman*” (14). Despite their parenthetical qualifiers, the plot of the female coming-of-age story remains fundamentally tied to the narrative imperatives of the conventional male *Bildungsroman.*

13 Such as Charlotte Goodman and Esther Labovitz; see also Fuderer’s bibliography.

14 Such approaches, in failing to challenge generic boundaries, leave themselves open to the attack made, for example, by Hardin in the introduction to his *Reflection and Action: Essays on the Bildungsroman,* that the attempt to incorporate women contaminates the purity of the genre.

15 For example, Annis Pratt and Barbara White, in “The Novel of Development” argue that “the woman’s initiation [is] less a self-determined progression toward maturity than a regression from full participation in adult life” (36).

16 Also, in its appropriation by American ego psychology with its conservative goal of
social assimilation, object relations would seem to be ideally suited to this realist genre in its most traditional manifestations. Like ego psychology, conventional readings of the Bildungsroman focus on the ego and consciousness rather than the id and the unconscious. They are concerned with ameliorating anxiety and sublating contradiction for the purpose of realizing what ego psychologists refer to as a strong “core” sense of self.

Yet, it is this “repression that makes expression possible” (220) writes Smith; thus there is an “impossibility of fulfillment at the root of Bildung” (220). As Smith rightly points out, “one need not assume per definitionem that a novel representing an individual’s tornness at the end of his search for ‘identity’ must be an ‘anti-Bildungsroman.’” Rather, it reveals a truer understanding of how Bildung is frustrating and frustrated” (22).

See also Smith’s The Spirit and Its Letter: Traces of Rhetoric in Hegel’s Philosophy of Bildung (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988).

In a subsequent version of her essay, included in Kathy Mezei’s Ambiguous Discourse, Friedman applies her reading strategy to Woolf’s The Voyage Out.

In a footnote she writes, “for my purposes here, I am not suggesting a masculine/feminine binary for time and space, as do Kristeva in ‘Women’s Time and de Lauretis in Alice Doesn’t (143)” (20 n.2).

That absent presence is often figured not as the mother, per se, but rather as home: as Marianne Hirsch argues, in the conventional Bildungsroman, “the place of the hero’s origin remains an ever-present reminder of purity and integrity” (301).

The phrase is borrowed from Zavarzadeh and Morton; they are referring to hegemonic accommodational strategies that, against the threat posed by radical critique, implement change so as to preserve hegemony. Their argument is made in terms of American curricula reforms: “the aim ... is to reorient the existing curriculum so that it can survive contemporary theory’s radical challenge to the curriculum’s enabling notion: the subject. These attempts at change work to preserve the ideological assumptions of the dominant curriculum in a new, more up-to-date form .... The desire for change, in other words, is the desire to save the subject” (11).
Part Two

Bildung and Pedagogy
Chapter Six

"Well-Regulated Liberty":
The Paradox of Modern Pedagogy

There is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom.
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile

Every relationship of "hegemony" is an educational relationship.
—Antonio Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks

Scholarship, I have found, is similar in several ways to raising children.
—Michiel Horn, Preface, Academic Freedom in Canada

Modern education in the West is the most obvious manifestation of Bildung. Insofar as it is charged with bringing subjects to "maturity," education operates to make them proper modern, bourgeois individuals. This is especially so in the Humanities, which, as the "heart and soul" of the university, is the rightful home of Bildung.1 It is, as Holland and Lambropoulos put it, "the principal social technology that has supported and (re)produced the individual as autonomous self in modernity" (5). Adulthood or maturity is commonly perceived as what neoconservatives Alan Charles Kors and Harvey A. Silvergate, in their recent diatribe against what they see as the scourge of "political correctness" in the contemporary university, refer to as an "emerging individuality" which it is education's responsibility to nurture (1). It is through education, therefore, that individuals learn to "work on their own" to reproduce the dominant ideologies and practices that hegemony has embedded in the ideology of modern subjectivity. Through education, that is, modern subjects become self-regulating. The discourse of "maturation," fundamental to the schooling apparatus, helps to ensure that they will do so.

The Enlightenment and Developmental Pedagogy

While "pedagogy," strictly defined, refers to "the science of teaching" (OED), the term opens up a vast discursive field concerned not only with cultural practices at large, as I argued above in Part One, but, more narrowly, with theories of teaching and learning. Here, "pedagogy" is taken in a dynamic sense to signify not only the relatively static categories of canon and curriculum, but also what Heather Murray calls "curriculum as activity" ("Canon" 238). "Activity" is key here: the focus is less on what it is we teach and learn than
on why and how we teach and learn it; in fact, it is concerned less with canon (or even
curriculum) and more with the ideologies that legitimate the practices of which the canon
and curricula are symptomatic. In other words, as a set of practices, pedagogy is inherently
political. I use the term here, following Murray's *Working in English*, in the sense of
pedagogy as "the most basic alignment of power and knowledge, effected in discipline-
specific ways" (155). Pedagogy in this sense is always imbricated with its historical,
cultural, and ideological locations. An explication given by Robert Con Davis provides a
useful, if permeable, framework for this political definition; there is, he writes,

no such thing as "pedagogy," a transcendental practice for the
appropriation and dissemination of "truth" existing outside
of history and socially derived conditions, but there is the
practice of what has actually been taught .... [Pedagogy] is
not a fixed entity but a social practice and a cultural
construct, a dynamic and unfinished ... activity — an
enactment-as-practice of ideology in culture. (264)

Contemporary critical pedagogies take Davis' definition as the starting point to an
historicization and denaturalization of the otherwise transcendent "givens" that constitute
modern teaching and learning in the human sciences. One of the most salient of these
assumptions is that humanism, together with its academic institutionalization, is itself
ideologically innocent. In "Why Pedagogy?," David Lusted insists on the word
"pedagogy," rather than "teaching," precisely in order to debunk this assumption. His view
of pedagogy is more concrete than Davis': it signals "the transformation of consciousness
that takes place in the intersection of ... the teacher, the learner and the knowledge they
together produce" (3). Patti Lather argues that Lusted's definition "denies the teacher as
neutral transmitter, the student as passive, and knowledge as immutable material to
impart" (15). Instead, the concept "pedagogy" draws attention to "the conditions and
means through which knowledge is produced" (15). This notion of pedagogy as
intersubjectively productive invokes postmodern and post-Marxist critiques of the abiding
humanist notion of knowledge as ideologically neutral.

The idea of the university as a politically-neutral arena for the "free" pursuit and
dissemination of knowledge is legitimized by this idea of authentic knowledge as
innocent of ideological interests. Eagleton argues cogently against this pervasive
assumption: "interests are constitutive of our knowledge, not just (as the Enlightenment
believed) obstacles in its path" (*Ideology* 132). In fact, in its apparent benignity,
Enlightenment humanism, as a metadiscourse of the democratic principles of neutrality,
plurality, and "free inquiry," is self-legitimating. Althusser's comments on ideology in
general are apposite here: "one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the
ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, ‘I am ideological’” (163-64). The hegemonic ideology transmitted through modern education sustains an “ontotheological” — onto (Greek), theo (medieval) logical (humanist) — teleology succinctly delineated by William V. Spanos in *The End of Education*:

since Plato’s allegory of the cave, but especially since the Roman appropriation of Greek thinking, the purpose of Western education (whatever its historically specific permutations) has been to lead Man (*exducere*) out of the darkness and depths of his fallen/temporal condition and into the universal light. (12)

Especially since the European Enlightenment, this “emancipatory” path from darkness to the light — or *Bildungsprozess* — has been exemplified by education. Certainly the prevalent liberal humanist thinking links democracy and education. Their supposed inextricable relation is the predominant rationale for compulsory education in the West.

The universalization of Western Enlightenment — and therefore of education — is an increasingly hegemonic and flexible project that has enabled and entitled the recuperation, co-optation, and suppression of difference. But, especially since the mid-1960s, the ontotheological ideology sustaining Western epistemology and the accommodational strategies of its pedagogical institutions has come increasingly under attack from diverse, but variously intersecting, discourses: feminist, neo-Marxist, Queer, post-colonialist, and poststructuralist. In confronting what Spanos calls “the hegemonic will to power informing various epistemological categories privileged by the discourse of Humanism” (“Uses” 13), these discursive disruptions have revealed the “disinterested” ideology of humanism, and its apotheosis in Enlightenment thought, to be in fact produced and constrained by specific, political interests. The legitimization of the Humanities by humanist imperatives and their rationalization by Enlightenment values can no longer be taken for granted.

**The Ideology of “Development”**

Thomas Docherty’s analysis of the Enlightenment tenet of “man/Man’s” development, or what Kant called “maturity,” points to the ideological relay between the Enlightenment emancipatory project, the colonial imperialism which it rationalized, and the humanist pedagogy (*Bildung*) which is the Western university’s legacy:

*Enlightenment proposed a demarcation between the “advanced” and the “underdeveloped”; and in this distinction the advanced feels itself to be legitimised in its activities of mastering, controlling, dominating and colonising what it stigmatises as the underdeveloped.* (18)
Colonization legitimizes itself by appealing to the supposedly “natural” and non-ideological notion of development, or “education,” and the maturity/immaturity binary which sustains it. The Arnoldian humanism embedded in Canadian Humanities, for example, is grounded in Bildung, or what Margery Fee calls the modern European tenet that “national cultures develop through an organic process beginning with infancy and moving toward maturity” (21). Of course, in this thinking, the older, European cultures have already reached maturity, and it is their cultural, or pedagogical, “responsibility” to impose Bildung on the colonized. “Once this enviable maturity is reached,” writes Fee, “the nation is ready to take an equal place in the ranks of the older cultures” (21). This colonialist attitude appeals to the same Bildung ideology upon which the modern novel and its narrative trajectory was founded. As Stephen Greenblatt points out in Marvelous Possessions, prior to European colonization, visitors to strange lands, especially when they didn’t speak the local language, experienced a sense of infantilization, but “in the case of the New World voyagers ... what is striking is that, though they are on foreign shores, the Europeans do not feel themselves infantilized; it is rather the natives whom they see as children in relation to European languages” (105). Western Europe’s sense of supremacy over the childlike “native” is buttressed by a belief in the superiority of the recently emergent ideology of “free” individualism contracted into a system of liberal democracy that requires the exclusion of interrelationship: “brother, sister, friend,” writes Franz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth, “these are the words outlawed by the colonialist bourgeoisie” (38). As Smaro Kamboureli points out, colonization, for Fanon, is not violent only in the usual sense, but also in the ideological or symbolic sense (Scandalous 117). It is, in Fanon’s words, a “violence which is just under the skin” (56) in which “the colonialist bourgeoisie ... hammered into the native’s mind the idea of a society of individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity, and whose only wealth is individual thought” (38). It is a pedagogical violence where the inferiority of the colonized is established in terms of the naturalized equation of underdeveloped/developed, child/adult, immaturity/maturity.

Colonization is, in this way, a narrative of Bildung. Both Mary Louise Pratt, in her essay “Travel Narrative and Imperialist Vision,” and Tzvetan Todorov, in The Morals of History, point out that the modern colonialist narrative does not merely “borrow” the developmental plot from pedagogical novels, but rather both genres partake of the same narrative logic and ideology, a narrative grounded in Bildung. Todorov points to a particularly lucid example of this in the work of Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, whom he describes as a pre-eminent apologist for colonialism. For Leroy-Beaulieu, not only is the colony feminine, but it is immature. Todorov quotes from De la colonisation chez les peuples
modernes of 1874 where, using as an analogy the maturing individual as synecdoche, Leroy-Beaulieu personifies the colonies and speaks of the "primitive, at times, childish populations" (50) who, through proper tutelage, become as "mature" as their colonizer or "tutor":

Algeria has left behind her first youth. Today she is a big, beautiful adolescent who has escaped childhood diseases, growth pangs, and who shows promise of a luxuriant youth and a productive age of maturity. (50)

Algeria, that is, has the potential to be an equal and fully-grown nation; it only needs the right disciplining, or what Bauman calls "humanizing." Leroy-Beaulieu takes the humanist stance in citing education as the key to bringing potentially equal elements to full maturity. Todorov recognizes that European colonialism and modern education share similar ideological underpinnings: "colonization ... exists in the social. [sic] order, just as not only reproduction, but also education, exist in the familial order" (49). The relationship between imperialist and colonized countries is therefore a pedagogical relationship that disciplines the latter by participating in the Enlightenment metanarrative of Bildung.

Post-Colonialism and Critical Pedagogy

Given the entrenchment of Bildung in the project of colonization, it is neither surprising nor insignificant that the discourse that goes under the name of "critical pedagogy" can be traced to the "Third World" educator and activist Paulo Freire. Central to postcolonial critiques of education influenced by Freire is the deconstruction of the hierarchical binaries regulating the Enlightenment thinking that propelled and legitimized colonization. Among the binaries corresponding to the advanced/underdeveloped opposition is that most central to Bildung: maturity/immaturity. And, of course, the guiding principle of the Enlightenment's larger emancipatory project is an end-oriented advancement, via disengaged reason, from ignorance (tutelage, dependency, immaturity) to knowledge (self-sufficiency, autonomy, maturity): a global, homogenizing, and, therefore, colonizing project.

But what modernity didn't realize, as Bauman argues, was that as it worked toward a rational and certain universality in its colonizing projects it "spawned ever more difference" (233). Thus, postmodernity is the disclosure of modernity's own self-deception; it is a kind of self-deconstruction, "bound to disclose itself even without outside help" (Bauman 233). As modernity "progressed," historical contingencies disseminated an "unrhythmic" heterogeneity the colonizing project could not contain. On
this point, it is worth picking up Docherty where we left off in the passage cited above:

It is ... important to Enlightenment and its legacy to maintain a structural sense of development .... But what Enlightenment mistakes about this process is that there may be a number of historical lineages, a number of “progressions” or directions in which history is flowing simultaneously: that history is not a singular line, but a network of forces which all proceed in their own directions, heterogeneously. That is, Enlightenment fails to see that instead of the rubric “advanced/underdeveloped” ... it is better to think that the world is simply lived at different speeds, in different times, in different places. In short, there is not one world ..., but rather many; all being lived at different rhythms, none of which need ever converge into harmony. (18)

Despite Bildung's “harmonizing” or homogenizing tendencies, these diverse “rhythms” or alternative knowledges have survived as counter-narratives against what Freire calls an “imposed culture of silence.” The repression of these knowledges was the impetus for the pedagogical theories Freire has put into practice since the early 1960s.

Central to Freire's pedagogy is the pivotal distinction he draws between “functional” literacy and critical literacy. While functional, or instrumental, literacy is legitimized by the notion of a neutral “pure” knowledge, Freirean analysis exposes it as a disciplinary mechanism of social control domesticating subjects to the dominant technocratic ideology. For example, as critics argue, programmes of “world literacy” developed by organizations such as UNESCO are often “confined to those countries and areas where there is evidence of progress and modernisation” (Bee 47); and, buttressed by sponsorship from neo-colonialist corporate interests, these programmes teach the skills adequate to serve the production and movement of global capital. Moreover, through functional literacy pedagogies, students internalize the norms and values required to consent to the reigning ideology. The object of Freire's pedagogy, as he argues in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), is to produce critical, not functional, citizens. Against the monological model of education that imposes knowledge from above on the ignorant below, Freire's model is a dialogical one whereby students become the agents of their own learning. Arguing that language learning is not a neutral acquisition of pure information, Freire emphasizes the material discursivity of language and therefore its ideolgical effects. His programme of consciousness-raising presupposes that language produces consciousness. Conscientização is Freire's term for the critical consciousness and critical praxis that leads to liberation; it “refers to learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality” (19). Against
prescribed curricula that decontextualize, disaffiliate, and devalue learners' experience in advance (as non-knowledge or ignorance), students learn to "name" and to value their own local knowledges. While colonizing pedagogies speak for the other "in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words" (76), speaking for him- or herself is a political act of self-empowerment: "in speaking their word ... men [sic], by naming the world, transform it" (77). In the context of their own generative knowledges, students acquire the critical tools to denaturalize imperialist master knowledges. Freire's principal contribution to critical pedagogy, then, is that knowledge is not neutral or disinterested, but rather, insofar as it is exchanged in specific historical and material contexts, imbricated with power.

Freire's attention to the dominant culture of silence that disenfranchises the subaltern, does not, however, presuppose a simple binary oppressor/oppressed notion of power. Indeed, as early as Pedagogy of the Oppressed, he articulates a model of power not unlike Gramsci's theory of hegemony and subjective consent; Freire writes: "one of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation is that oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge men's [sic] consciousness" (36). Coinciding with the importation of Freire's theories into North America in the late 1960s and early 1970s was, as outlined in Chapter Two, a "neo-Marxist" rejection of what Foucault calls the "repressive hypothesis." The significance of these re-evaluations for pedagogical theory is in the realignment of the Marxist economic base/superstructure model of production to an emphasis on the socio-cultural as the overdetermined site of the reproduction of ideology. The publication in 1971 of Gramsci's Prison Notebooks was particularly significant to the critical-pedagogy movement in that it showed that hegemonic power is not monolithic and finite, but rather an intricate and dynamic interplay of social-cultural forces in which all participate. The dominant group presents its ideology as disinterested and natural, and its operations appear benign, if not gratifying. As Eagleton puts it, "as long as the condition of being subjugated yields people even minimal gratification, then the understandable terrors and insecurities of an alternative will tend to bind them masochistically to that power" ("Self-Authoring" 49). Thus, hegemony offers some pleasures or "freedoms," so that subjects bind themselves more happily to a structure which itself goes unchallenged. Gramsci's theory, along with Althusser's "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," initiated a publishing boom on "reproductive" theories of education in the 1970s and 80s.

As pointed out above, for Althusser, education is "one of the essential forms of the ruling bourgeois ideology" (148). Indeed, while the Church was once the reigning "ideological state apparatus" ensuring state power through education, communication, and culture, the Enlightenment shift to a secular society meant that the educational apparatus
became the "dominant" ideological state apparatus in modern societies (144). This notion of liberty formed the basis of emerging political theories as well. In the eighteenth century, Rousseau's *Émile* provided a model for modern pedagogy, while his political treatise, *The Social Contract*, provided a corresponding definition of the emerging form of government later called hegemony. Rousseau speaks of this new form of government as one which is not graven on tablets of marble or brass, but on the hearts of the citizens. This forms the real constitution of the State, takes on every day new powers, when other laws decay or die out, restores them or takes their place, keeps a people in the ways it was meant to go, and insensibly replaces authority by the force of habit. (44)

This hegemony is built most powerfully in the West on a foundation of education; hence, the centrality of education to Rousseau's system. Ernst Cassirer comments that the liberal-democratic state conceived by Rousseau "does not simply address itself to already existing and given subjects of the will; rather its first aim is to create the sort of subjects to whom it can address its call" (62-63). It is from the time of Rousseau's writing that education becomes increasingly the dominant ideological state apparatus for the reproduction of subjectivity in the West.

Althusser's analysis, apposite to the socio-economic configurations of late capitalism, provided critical pedagogies with a model for critiquing the dynamic relations between state power and educational institutions, and their ideological reproduction of subjects. Theories of social and cultural reproduction in pedagogy influenced, for example, the important notion of "hidden curriculum" analyzed by educational theorists such as Bourdieu. "Hidden curriculum" describes not the stated curriculum transparently conveyed, but rather those values and norms transmitted implicitly through the everyday social relations and quotidian experiences of an axiomatic pedagogy. Through these invisible experiences, the student, as Henry Giroux puts it, "internalizes the cultural messages of the school not only via the latter's official discourse ..., but also through the messages embodied in the 'insignificant' practices of daily classroom life" (Theory 39). In other words, the school is where subjects are inculcated into the ways of what Bourdieu calls the "habitus": it is the site of "symbolic violence," where the "set of unspoken rules of what can be validly uttered or perceived within [any social field]" (Eagleton, *Ideology* 157) is learned. Symbolic violence is not explicitly violent and is not recognized as violent because it is perpetuated on the level of the everyday and legitimized, argues Bourdieu, in the habitus. It refers to "the gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such" (Outline 192). It operates invisibly on the level of the "cultural unconscious." Above all, what modern education in the West teaches through its hidden curriculum is the
“regulated distribution of cultural capital” (Eagleton *Ideology* 158). Because subjects freely consent to the liberal and democratic principle of education, the school becomes an efficient site for the reproduction of the principles of hierarchy and arbitrary dominance. Eagleton, following Bourdieu, puts it this way: “symbolic violence operates not so much by the teacher speaking ‘ideologically’ to the students, but by the teacher being perceived as in possession of an amount of ‘cultural capital’ which the student needs to acquire” (*Ideology* 157). “Higher” education, of course, produces that much more cultural capital. Thus, education exemplifies the apparatuses through which people internalize, spontaneously consent to, and reproduce hegemonic power. It is where individuals, in other words, learn to be self-regulating in respect to the prevailing unequal social relations.

These theories of ideological reproduction, moreover, point to the ways in which hegemony, as it operates in “democratic” institutions such as education, is readily able to accommodate potentially subversive elements according to liberal tolerance and pluralism. As Giroux puts it, the theories of educational reproduction prominent throughout the 1970s “performed the creditable task of undermining the mainstream assumptions that school curriculum was socially and politically neutral” (*Theory* 45) and of revealing that education’s ultimate function is to provide the ideological conditions “for the maintenance and reproduction of capitalist relations of production” (*Theory* 3-4). In this view, the underlying ideological condition is the liberal humanist subject who, through pedagogical apparatuses, reproduces the dominant order.

**Critical Pedagogy and Identity Politics**

The most significant rethinking of the subject of pedagogy has taken place from within discourses of identity politics. The debates in feminist pedagogy exemplify some of the major concerns of critical pedagogy in general. What is most notable about feminist pedagogy is its attempts, failed and successful, to put theoretical pedagogies into practice. This experimentation is owing not only to the fact that the emergence of women’s studies in the 1970s and 80s coincided historically with the emergence of critical pedagogy, but its emergence as a discipline itself exemplified the practice of an alternative curriculum and pedagogy. Not only did women’s studies redefine what could legitimately be considered an object of study, but it provoked questions about disciplinarity itself, about the canon and curriculum, and about epistemology broadly speaking. As a new, unformed discipline, women’s studies was open to new practices of teaching and learning. (The co-emergence of Cultural studies and pedagogical theory can perhaps also usefully be viewed in this way.) Most significantly, women’s studies
represented the academic institutionalization of feminism, that is, of politics.

Because the question of agency that stands at the intersection of theory and praxis is central to feminist pedagogy, it operates both inside and outside the tradition of critical pedagogy. That is, against the over-determined subject posited by reproductive theories of education, early feminist pedagogy found value in the Freirien notion of "voice" mobilized against "cultural silencing," but feminist pedagogical theorists soon found that critical pedagogy's gender blindness could not be "corrected" simply by adding difference to available versions of subjectivity and identity. In fact, this compensatory gesture itself disclosed the various material and ideological conditions of possibility not only of the universal man of humanism, but also of the universal "woman" asserted against it. The assertion of a female identity in 1970s feminist education theory has itself been internally differentiated by the intersections of race, class, and sexuality in critiques beginning in the early 1980s. As a result, the notions of "voice" and "emancipation" that sustained feminist pedagogical practices have increasingly been challenged. Posthumanist feminism has given rise, therefore, to poststructuralist feminist pedagogy, or what Lather calls "post-critical pedagogy." Indeed, in its attempts to work out a theory of agency while taking into account critiques of humanist subjectivity, feminist pedagogy, largely ignored by more general pedagogical theorists, offers some of the most theoretically self-critical, yet pragmatic, pedagogical theories. Much of this work has grown out of the dialogue and struggle, both inside and outside the discipline, over the notion of subjectivity on which Women's Studies' premises of resistance and critical agency have relied.

Recent responses to this post-critical problematic have emerged from theories of local identities and local narratives which follow from Lyotard's opposition to modernity's grand narratives in favour of small counter-narratives or petits récits. The petits récits does not simply replace theory's master narratives, but rather provokes and destabilizes their normative authority. For Freire, grand traditions of authority underlie what he calls the "banking" pedagogical method wherein the (knowledgeable) teacher "deposits" information to be stored by the (ignorant) student. He describes the monological educational relationship in terms reminiscent — not insignificantly — of the narrative model; traditional pedagogy involves, he writes, "a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students)" (57). In this model, he contends, "education is suffering from narration sickness" (57), and he argues that pedagogical narrative, in order to emancipate the voice of the disenfranchised, needs to become dialogical. Following Freire, Giroux argues in "Postmodernism as Border Pedagogy" that personal stories as pedagogical praxis are a means of building historical consciousness and of drawing
attention to the relationship between knowledge and power. Against “the tyranny that lies behind logocentric narratives [as] truths that appear to exist beyond criticism” (475), counter-narratives from the position of “border” identities in dialogue with cultural master narratives are political acts of consciousness-raising. The counter-narratives in writing by Black feminists, for example, “links the political and the pedagogical in the use of storytelling and so demonstrates the radical potential it assumes as a form of self and social empowerment” (477). If knowledge can no longer be legitimized as objective truth, as Lyotard argues, then story-telling appears to be the postmodern pedagogical method par excellence.

Ironically, however, one of the underlying ideologies sustaining the Enlightenment project is the coherent, transparent, and centred subject of consciousness on which the notion of the storyteller’s “voice” relies. The tendency in Cultural studies to privilege voice and experience as the spontaneous expressions of “authentic” selves can also be found in critical pedagogy. For example, Meaghan Morris criticizes what she sees as the valorization by certain Cultural Studies theorists of the voice of the “‘popular’ subject ‘supposed to know,’” (25) transparent and accessible to the theorist of the popular. The privileged voice of “the people” (23), the masses who consume culture, is supposed to provide immediate access to the common people’s truth, or, as Morris puts it, quoting Iain Chambers, to “popular epistemology” (23). This is not to wholly dismiss Cultural studies and critical pedagogy as hopelessly naive in their treatment of subjectivity, but, at least when they take ethnographic, rather than textual, approaches, there is often an endemic tendency to privilege an accessible humanist subject. Similarly, critical pedagogy’s valorization of voice in the classroom not only tends to assume transparent access to the cultural other, but also the appeal to the “authentic” voice of personal experience, often against its own best intentions, tends to depoliticize difference: as Chandra Talpade Mohanty puts it, “complex ethical and political issues are glossed over, and an ambiguous and more easily manageable ethos of the ‘personal’ and the ‘interpersonal’ takes their place” (“On Race” 153). She adds, too, that “the term intersubjectivity,” which is often privileged in critical pedagogy, “drawing as it does on a phenomenological humanism, brings with it difficult political problems” (163 n. 6). Although a politically effective and necessary tool in its time, the notion of “voice” is nevertheless an attempt to capture for women and other disenfranchised people an organic subject that, however inadvertently, resuscitates humanist ideology. Furthermore, as feminists of colour have pointed out, by universalizing, for example, an essentialized female voice of experience, a unifying metanarrative of Woman becomes normative. In this way, feminist identity politics perpetuates the very problems it seeks to address by excluding the experiences of women of non-hegemonic races and
classes, or, more precisely, by accommodating and therefore subsuming (colonizing) the heterogeneity of women in a homogeneity of a universalized Woman. As Mohanty, among others, points out, feminism’s ethnocentric humanism therefore reproduces the androcentrism of the Enlightenment in general.

The differences among women amplifies the question of the legitimacy for feminism of modern emancipatory politics and its subject. While the modern subject of emancipation was a condition of possibility for feminism and, despite its posthumanist deconstruction, continues to inspire it, to what extent does the emancipatory narrative, against its own ideals, itself prescribe repressive norms? The 1970s feminist slogan, “the personal is political,” illustrates the problem. At the time of its formulation, the slogan signified, rightly, that the oppression of women in traditional gender relations was not “merely” a domestic or private problem unworthy of serious public consideration. “The personal is political,” as Giroux puts it, was initially a powerful challenge to phallocentrism in that it offered women “the opportunity to insert themselves back into history” (“Resisting” 208). However, because the slogan was asserted as a mere reversal of that which it challenged, it remained inside, and therefore determined by, the frames of intelligibility it attempted to dismantle. As a result, the slogan has transferred responsibility for social contradictions onto individual women, who, according to the liberal logic of individual, rational self-determination, are expected to reconcile those contradictions. Mohanty similarly analyzes the slogan. She argues that, since the 1970s, the meaning of the phrase has been reversed to mean “the political is personal” (160). “In other words,” she writes,

all politics is collapsed into the personal, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and life-style stand in for political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legitimate form of political struggle. (“On Race” 160)

The logical extension of the idea of freedom as a demarcation of self-sufficient individualism is that politics is reduced to this private realm. Giroux argues that this emphasis is enervating: “the emphasis on the personal as a fundamental aspect of the political often results in highlighting the personal through a form of confessional politics that all but forgets how the political is constituted in social and cultural forms outside of one’s own experience” (“Resisting” 208). Freedom as located within each person as individual potentiality is available only to those who have access to a society’s advantages and privileges. For those with relatively less access, however, freedom as personal autonomy means individuals are responsible for the inequities which affect them (and, in the present neoconservative and anti-“political correctness” climate, they are chastised,
moreover, for “climbing on the victim bandwagon”). Rather than guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of all, the concept of individual autonomy as the originary self or “soul” of each protects the privileges of the few.

The ideology of autonomy, moreover, tends to be depoliticizing as it individualizes and privatizes what is properly political. For Bauman, the “privatization of all concerns,” in which contemporary society “interprets any extant and prospective social issue as private concern” (261), is in perfect keeping with post-industrial consumer society: not only does privatization keep a “consumer-oriented economy ... lubricated,” but, because “social mobility [is] privatized,” it neutralizes in advance any possible dissent (262). Furthermore, Bauman argues that the privatization of reconciling “ambivalence” — particularly salient to feminism — is, in fact, “experienced as freedom and a triumph of individual autonomy” (261). The experience of contradiction is taken to be the result of personal failure, and any “failure rebounds in guilt and shame, not in political protest” (261). The burgeoning psychology and self-help markets attest to an increasing emphasis on the personal and individual. The notions of “voice” and “the personal is political,” which once animated feminism, reinscribe the autonomous individual which is one of the modern metanarratives against which feminism stands.

Yet, in order to intervene politically and pedagogically, feminism needs a theory of agency. Modern subjectivity, inaugurated by Descartes’ cogito ergo sum and consolidated in the Enlightenment, is appealing because it enables individual agency. But what happens to that agency when the subject is constituted, not constituting, decentered not centred, and contradicted, not coherent? Indeed, for some feminists, anti-racists, postcolonial and queer theorists, the poststructuralist “death of man” is a strategy of containment against the emergent counter-narratives of the otherwise disenfranchised; it is “a remarkable historical coincidence” (Braidotti 6) in which the subject of emancipation is dismantled by poststructuralist theory just as non-hegemonic groups begin to accede to it. Henry Louis Gates articulates the problem this way:

while we readily accept, acknowledge, and partake of the critique of this [Western male] subject as transcendent, to deny us the process of exploring and reclaiming our subjectivity before we critique it is the critical version of the grandfather clause, the double privileging of categories that happen to be preconstituted. (105)

Gates’ dilemma shows that the question cannot be resolved with a simple either/or logic. Peggy Kamuf argues against a binary opposition between the political subject of women’s studies and the poststructuralist position that would reject that subjectivity:

Whether one speaks from inside about an end of man and the beginning of authentic non-sexist humanism, or from outside
about the end of humanism and the beginning of humanity's unthinkably other, it is finally the metaphor of inside and outside which dominates in one direction and the other. (46)

Kamuf adds that this binary logic of the inside/outside cannot be separated from the long list of ubiquitous oppositions defining modernity—such as self and other—and that "this list underwrites and is underwritten by gender opposition" (46). Considering other differences, as many feminist theorists have begun to do, is one way of disrupting this binary thinking, this either/or logic. And women, being in any case included in humanism's neutral and pluralist "Man" while being excluded according to their gender difference, should, as many feminists have pointed out, be particularly adept at holding this inside/outside position as a productive tension. Thus, against what many have rightly analyzed as a privileged deconstruction of subjectivity, feminists have used their inside/outside positionality to enable provisional claims to a "strategic essentialism," in which subject-positions are deployed in a movement Teresa de Lauretis describes as a "de-re-construction" of the subject (Technologies 24). That is, the subject is constructed in order to be theorized, but always provisionally and never essentially or permanently.

Other poststructuralist feminists, furthermore, offer ways of politicizing the personal without privatizing it. The petit, in other words, is assessed in terms of the grand récit of feminist politics. As Carmen Luke, among others, points out, despite its important emphasis on counternarratives or petits récits, feminism still needs to keep its political eye on its metanarrative:

We should regard with caution the consequences of the postmodernist denunciation of totalizing grand narratives, because such a move potentially subverts feminist efforts to critique those grand historical and contemporary systems of oppression of which local narratives are diverse variations on familiar themes (patriarchy, capitalism, imperialism, etc.).

(49)

The voices of individual women are crucial to assessing the impact of the grand political narratives on lives in a way that reasserts the narrative of feminism without demanding that individual women reconcile its contradictions.

It is pertinent here to return to Giroux who advocates the concept of voice—albeit cautiously—in his critical pedagogy. While the 1970's and 80's reproduction theories denaturalized the self-determining and coherent humanist subject, their notions of overdetermination simultaneously disqualified the possibility of agency. With his theory of voice, Giroux signals his debt to Freire's imperative that radical pedagogy enable critical agency. At the same time, he confronts the pitfalls of models available in the humanist master narrative of subjectivity. As he explains in his 1994 "Reading Texts,
Literacy, and Textual Authority," his is not an essentialist view of "voice":

The concept of voice, in the most radical sense, points to the ways in which one's voice as an elaboration of location, experience, and history constitutes forms of subjectivity that are multilayered, mobile, complex, and shifting. In poststructuralist terms, the category of voice can only be constituted in differences and .... [therefore] a radical theory of voice represents neither a unitary subject position unrelated to wider social formations nor the unique expression of the creative and unfettered bourgeois subject. (70)

While Magda Gere Lewis, in *Without a Word*, articulates a feminist pedagogy using personal experience, she avoids the traps of the privatization of the social by keeping in mind de Lauretis' 1984 definition of *experience* in *Alice Doesn't*, a re-thinking of the axiomatic that has been instrumental to the feminist re-articulation of subjectivity: she thinks of experience "not in the individualistic, idiosyncratic sense," but rather as "a process by which, for all social beings, subjectivity is constructed" (159). In her view, the "private" experience of subjectivity is a social, and thus political, phenomenon: through the process of subjectivation, "one places oneself or is placed in social reality, and so perceives and comprehends as subjective ... those relations — material, economic and interpersonal — which are in fact social and, in a larger perspective, historical" (159). Experience, therefore, is defined in poststructuralist terms as "an ongoing process by which subjectivity is constructed semiotically and historically" (182). De Lauretis does not deny the personal experience of unique individuals, but rather puts that experience in a textual context, and, in doing so, she deconstructs the usual binary opposition between external world and internal self. "Experience," she writes, can be understood "as a complex of habits resulting from the semiotic interaction of 'outer world' and 'inner world,' the continuous engagement of a self or subject in social reality" (182). De Lauretis' version of experience has provided poststructuralist feminism with a pivotal, if provisional, counter-narrative of (political) subjectivity.

Subjective and intersubjective experience, therefore, can be politicized only when it is understood as mediated, not as the direct apprehension of a stable and essential uniqueness. As Mohanty puts it, "while 'experience' is an enabling focus in the classroom, unless it is explicitly understood as historical, contingent, and the result of interpretation, it can coagulate into frozen, binary, psychologistic positions" ("On Race" 154). Since, historically, "human experience" has in fact been white, European, privileged, male experience, posthumanist and postcolonial theoretical work on race and gender has been crucial to the reformulation of the experience of identity. Because the questions of
subjectivity have been so important to racial, sexual, and feminist politics, in their efforts to articulate agency for anti-racist, queer, and feminist agency while taking into account the deconstruction of the supposedly neutral and universal humanist subject, these politicized new knowledges have provided a critical and revised articulation of the notion of the subject.

This subject is a political, not a personal, category. Not essentialized as an a priori “truth,” it is posed as a self-consciously constructed fiction. In Gender Trouble, Butler debunks some of the theoretical assumptions of identity politics in a way that is useful here. She takes an “antifoundationalist approach to a coalitional politics [that] assumes neither that ‘identity’ is a premise nor that the shape or meaning of a coalitional assemblage can be known prior to its achievement” (15). This theory of political affiliation allows for an articulation of differences into a common cause without suspending or subsuming those differences, where, as Angela Harris puts it, “wholeness and commonalty are acts of will and creativity, rather than passive discovery” (Qtd. in Giroux, “Resisting” 205). This political approach is an effective means of bracketing the problem of subjectivity for poststructuralist identity politics. Because, as de Lauretis argues, women want to tell their own stories at the same time that the notions of “author-ity and authorship ... [are] admittedly outmoded, patriarchal, and ethically compromised,” what we have “is a paradox which is not one – that is to say, we have a contradiction” (Technologies 113).

Against what Jameson calls “strategies of containment” (master narratives which seek to contain contradictions), de Lauretis posits feminist “strategies of coherence” (Technologies 114, emphasis added). Feminism can in this way posit a nominal subject for political purposes that leverages agency but which at the same time deconstructs the humanist ideology of modern subjectivity. That is, “as at once inside and outside the ideology of gender” (Technologies 114), women can (and do) negotiate between the inside and outside of dominant discourse, between complicity and subversion, in what Jane Gallop similarly refers to as a “double discourse” (Daughter’s 122).

Such strategies play on the precarious double status of essence nicely captured by L.M. Findlay: “essence is the galvanizing idiom of insurgency, but the lethal accomplice of hegemony” (“Retailing” 503). It is in the tenuous balance between two binary concepts where political subjectivity might provisionally and strategically be located. What Pêcheux calls “disidentification” may be one way of destabilizing that binary. Identification, as Pêcheux sees it, is that ideological process of subjectivation whereby the subject “forgets” it is a product of discourse and instead sees itself as the free and autonomous author of its own discourse. This forgetting, as Eagleton explains, is a misrecognition: “rather as the Lacanian infant identifies itself with its imaginary
reflection, so the speaking subject effects an identification with the discursive formation which dominates it" (*Ideology* 196). Displacing the complicity/resistance equation always already accommodated by the supple recuperative strategies of hegemony, disidentification refuses not only the affirmation of identification, but also the negation of counter-identification which is simply a "symmetrical inversion" which "serves ultimately to perpetuate" the ideology of identity (Macdonell 76). Like Hutcheon’s model of “complicitous critique” in terms of the postmodern text, disidentification on the level of the subject is neither the full and free consent of the “good subject,” nor the refusal of consent of the “bad subject”; rather, it is “an effect of working ‘on and against’ prevailing practices of ideological subjection” (Macdonell 39/40). It is here that feminism and other identity politics might ground – however nominally – political agency.

The Resistance to Humanism

So where does critical pedagogy locate a resistant subject, especially in institutions where the ideology of *Bildung* has such a stronghold? Recent pedagogical theorists such as Giroux and Spanos, influenced by Foucault’s notion that power is both constraining and enabling, make possible a postmodern theory of agency and praxis. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault argues that the social relations constituted by the discursive practices of any particular épistème, “define innumerable points of confrontation, forces of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power relations” (27). Thus, for example, rather than attempting to locate an outside to power, it is the specific intellectual’s task to struggle against power at the specific intersections at which he or she is located, as a site of local resistance. For Giroux, critical theorists must analyze power not as a structural totality, as the Althusserean social and cultural reproduction theorists do, but rather as a dynamic struggle, “taking the concepts of conflict and resistance as starting points for their analyses” (*Theory* 98). Because, as Foucault argues in “The Subject and Power,” “power only exists when it is put into action” (219), rather than abstracting and idealizing power, it is crucial to attend to the historical and material conditions that make possible manifestations of power and resistance. Accordingly, as Giroux argues, recent neo-Marxist pedagogical theories that employ a critical ethnography “demonstrate that the mechanisms of social and cultural reproduction are never complete and are always faced with partially realized elements of opposition” (*Theory* 100). Oppositional elements that cannot (or refuse to be) subsumed by the processes of hegemonic compromise signify critical historical ruptures that disclose ideological contradiction.
For Spanos, the significant historical moment in terms of the current crisis in the Humanities is the student protest movement of the Vietnam decade. Spanos argues that here he is responding to an omission by the reproduction theorists: "insofar as [they] focus inquiry on the inclusive site chosen by Althusser, they repeat his oversight – his abstracting of the historically specific occasion (the student uprisings in the late 1960s) that precipitated this oppositional discourse on education" (End 266 n. 14). Spanos expands Foucault's genealogical analyses of the "relationship between power and knowledge inscribed in the 'disinterested' and 'humane' discourse of post-Enlightenment 'liberal' society" (End 33) to the disciplinary mechanisms of the education system. He situates his critique of the discursive practices of humanism against the American educational reform movement which has attempted to repress the differential forces released by student resistance. This neoconservative movement partakes of a broader strengthening of the new right that has, as Guillory notes, brought about a crisis in liberal pluralism. Spanos focuses on the reforms initiated by the Harvard Core Curriculum Report of 1978 and subsequently reinforced by both conservative humanists such as William Bennett, Walter Jackson Bate, and Allan Bloom, as well as by liberal humanists such as Wayne Booth and Gerald Graff. While this reform movement rallies against the emergence of otherwise repressed minorities, under the guise of protecting "cultural literacy," as well as posthumanist challenges to the humanist epistemology legitimating "the classics of "Western Civilization,"" the "crisis" to which they react was precipitated by what Spanos assesses as the students' spontaneous refusal to be hegemonically accommodated.

The debates that have emerged from this crisis take place, especially in the United States, under the name of the "culture wars" (In Canada, a similar debate takes place under the name of "academic freedom," which I will discuss in Chapter 8.) The fervor of the right, represented by such publications as Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* and, in Canada, Peter Emberley's *Zero Tolerance*, is a clear sign that advocates of "cultural literacy" are on the defensive. The explosion of counter-hegemonic knowledges since the 1960s in the US has clearly posed a threat to axiomatic pedagogical ideology. It threatens to expose the values that sustain "cultural literacy" and the practices it legitimizes, as shown by the persistence of the new right in its attempt, for example, to preserve the Stanford course in Western Civilization. In general, the debates are fueled by two opposing perspectives of culture. Ursula Kelly provides a neat summary of these two perspectives: "for advocates of cultural literacy, culture includes the *rituals, traditions,* and *objects* selected by a dominant group as representative of its lifestyle, struggles, and *victories*" (16). Although often hostile to "unassimilable Others" (16), this position seeks to protect the privileged status quo even if it does sometimes require grudging
accommodation. This concept of culture is, in turn, as Guillory argues, a conflation of two meanings of the term "culture": in the sense of high cultural artefacts, on the one hand, and in the "ethnographic sense of common beliefs, behaviors, attitudes," on the other hand. And he contends that "the attempt to make the first sense of culture stand for the second names a certain project for the university" (40). The ideological conflation of these two terms is, in another register, the project of Bildung. A second way of assessing the term "culture," argues Kelly, is open to multicultural inclusions because it defines culture not as a sedimented collection of fixed, transparent, and self-affirming artefacts, but rather, as the "processes and practices by which the social relations that position a group ... are defined, contested, legitimized, and transformed" (Kelly 16). This position views the inevitable workings of power within culture not as something the self resists, but rather as constitutive of the "self."

This dynamic view of culture has, since the 1960s, posed an increasing threat to Bildung. Furthermore, instead of a single, linear historical text, this position sees cultural history, in Kelly's words, as "hypertextual" (16). For the defenders of "cultural literacy," conversely, history is more or less monological. History, therefore, is the selective memory which preserves hegemony and its artefacts, and forgets hegemony's counternarratives. A radical historicity that remembers these disruptions reveals the historical differentiation which humanism, in its metaphysical strategies, would otherwise subsume in Bildung. Spanos explains:

humanist inquiry is grounded in a metaphysics — a perception of the temporality of being (physis) from the end or from a superior position above (meta) — that either coerces or accommodates the differences that temporality disseminates. This anthropological metaphysics manifests itself in an analogous accommodational political practice whose coercions are concealed in the illusion of individual sovereignty. (End xv)

Thus, amnesiac erasure is a key hegemonic strategy: "to think meta-physically, as in fact humanists do, is to overlook, and thus to spatialize or structure, time, and eventually to forget the ontological differences time disseminates" (End xvi). The humanist strategies of containment that would colonize difference can be posed in Saussurian linguistic terms as a synchronic synthesis that colonizes diachronic difference. Hence, sameness or identity only exists by repressing or accommodating the differences that would otherwise disrupt synchronic, centred structures. With Spanos' recollection of the student uprisings, humanism is, to use Docherty's words, "contaminated by history" (24). This contamination would produce what Guillory refers to as

a rather different pedagogy, one that emphasizes historical
contextualization [and] would at the very least inhibit the assimilation of cultural works to the agenda of constituting a national culture, or the Western culture which is its ideological support. (43)

By re-historicizing the "forgotten" or colonized resistant knowledges which the events of the 1960s unleashed, Spanos theorizes a "decentered pedagogy" that would preclude humanist "accommodation and domestication of these differential knowledges by the institution in the name of pluralism or diversification" (xxii). And, by particularizing these disruptive moments of oppositional agency or disidentification, Spanos theorizes resistance without subsuming alterity in any homogenizing or de-differentiating model of (political) identity.

Detailing Bildung

Although a multiplicity of discourses constitutes the extant pedagogical subject, Bildung is chief among them. The subject of the "education novel," as the Bildungroman is often called, remains residual in modern paradigms of pedagogical purpose. Perhaps Raymond Polin, a contemporary advocate of Bildung, defines it best: "the very word education implies that to be educated is to be not only directed and guided, but also driven out of a condition of insufficiency and minority into adulthood" (39). Thus, Polin upholds an Enlightenment view of education that presumes human beings are incomplete and that their "humanization," to use Bauman's term, is a pedagogical process that plots maturation as the rejection of dependency, or interrelationship, in the teleological development of an autonomous self.

With radical autonomy posited as education's end, learning is figured as an abject dependence guided by the mature hand of authority, a pedagogical relation that appears axiomatic and natural. Although she doesn't name it as such, Linda Brodkey discovers pedagogical Bildung at work in contemporary education systems:

[the] discursive hegemony of teachers over students is usually posed and justified in developmental terms — as cognitive deficits, emotional or intellectual immaturity, ignorance, and most recently, cultural literacy — any one of which would legitimate asymmetrical relationships between its knowing subjects, teachers, and its unknowing subjects, students. (139)

Bildung, and the dividing practices of the maturity/immaturity equation legitimizes a paternalistic pedagogy that allows the control and regulation of the Many by the One. The Bildung plot homogenizes the otherwise heterogeneous student body so that it can be
disciplined. Indeed, for Spanos, in traditional pedagogy, “the most comprehensive and 
least visible binary opposition, that between age (maturity) and youth, does its silent 
disciplinary work in ‘speaking for’ a multiplicity of others.” (End 164). Although he does 
not use the term “Bildung,” Emberley invokes this pedagogical tradition when he argues 
that the chief purpose of university education is to “tame” — or control — youthful desire. 
Emberley’s vision is commensurate with Bauman’s premise that “humanization is 
essentially a learning process, split into the acquisition of knowledge and the taming, or 
repressing, of animal (and almost invariably antisocial) predispositions” (3). Commenting 
on the “metamorphosis” that undergraduates typically experience, a process that may be 
“hugely unsettling and distasteful” (53), Emberley avers that “it is precisely here that the 
university must exercise its most powerful responsibility, to tame and sublimate 
primordial longing” (53). Appealing directly to the maturity/immaturity equation, he 
goes on to delineate the pedagogical demand to colonize and shape desire in the name of 
what he vaguely, if frequently, calls “decency”:\footnote{18} the language of “empowerment” fails students. So much of 
the fault for the indecencies that erupt in university 
classrooms and residences lies with those who are happy to 
indulge their students to the maximum but then fail to take 
on the responsibility of maturing that newly released 
vitality and exuberance. When indifference to the need for 
guiding students on to maturity is justified by an appeal to 
“academic freedom” and the classroom is allowed to be a 
free-for-all, the scholarly culture has degenerated into a state 
of moral decay. (53)

In benign liberal fashion, Emberley is careful to say that it would be a mistake to suppress 
“student desire” or “wildness” (45); rather, desire should be sublimated and redirected to 
what he imagines as the “higher forms of freedom” (45). The pedagogical narrative of 
Bildung as emancipation or enlightenment is, therefore, a managed movement from 
dependence to independence. “True freedom,” Emberley writes, “is the maturation of 
instinct towards the higher satisfactions that come from the exercise of moral choice and 
intellectual independent-mindedness” (45).\footnote{19} Thus, Emberley propagates what Bauman 
writes is another major premise of modernity’s axiomatic notion of “culture” (as 
enumerated in Chapter Three, above):

humanization is essentially a learning process, split into the 
acquisition of knowledge and the taming, or repressing, of 
animal (and almost invariably antisocial) predispositions. 
The distinction between knowledge to be put in place of the 
natural predispositions, and the predispositions it is to 
replace, is often conceptualized as the opposition between 
“reason” and “passions,” or between “social norms” and
"instincts" or "drives." (Intimations 3)
The taming Bildungsprozess, so succinctly summarized by Emberley, interpellates subjects so that by the time they graduate they no longer need to be guided, but rather consent spontaneously in accordance with the dictates of self-regulating autonomy. This is successful Bildung. Authentic "freedom," then, is achieved through a teleological process delineated in terms of a binary equation of dependence/independence or immaturity/maturity, whose telos is a homogenized and stabilized student body.

The resistance movements of the Vietnam era drew attention to hegemony's suppression of difference in the name of autonomy or "maturity." In Spanos' words, the "resistant youth culture" of the 60s "disclosed students at large, however heterogeneous, to be a body of subjected subjects ... insofar as the end of ... a liberal education came to be seen as the colonization and pacification of youth's youthfulness" (End 199). By "youth" Spanos intends a Nietzschean "revolutionary energy," or untamed desire, which, for Emberley, it is the university's imperative to subsume and redirect. This notion is part of the Bildung ideology; in his essay on the history of the genre, Graham Murdock argues that the Bildungsroman substitutes the idea of youth for the idea of class. "Youth' becomes a dramatic embodiment of the 'dangerous classes,' a permanent reminder of the precarious balance between order and anarchy" (136). The lower classes are therefore associated with immaturity, and upward mobility is a struggle to maturity. In the name of a hierarchized maturity, "youthful" desire is demonized as other to the humanist individual grounding the dominant sociopolitical order.

Within the pedagogical scene, the youth/maturity binary of Bildung shapes epistemology itself. Both Fekete and Emberley, for example, take it as axiomatic that the authoritative legislation between knowledge and (threatening) non-knowledge is the professor's prerogative and duty. In these terms, then, the university can be said to exemplify what Spanos describes as "a postindustrial disciplinary society in which knowledge production has become the principle means of grading, normalizing, and pacifying its citizens, and enhancing the hegemony of the dominant culture" (End 56).

Hegemony, in other words, wants to recontain the threat posed by heterogeneity. It wants to accommodate, recuperate, and, therefore, domesticate or "tame" difference. Thus, the insidiously "inclusive" university of liberal humanism -- "gender-blind, colour-blind and studiously neutral" -- offers "equal access" to the metaphysical subject of the modern university. The myth of meritocracy prevailing in the university ensures that difference is accommodated, domesticated, and subsumed. Subordinate groups within the university freely consent to this accommodational strategy because of the illusion of equality it provides in its confirmation and reproduction of the autonomous, self-
regulating individual. Under these conditions, to lay claim to one's difference, especially one's embodied difference, would be to deny oneself entry into the hegemonic circle and the privileges it confers.

It is with the student protest movement of the late 1960s that the teleology of Bildung was derailed. According to Bill Readings, in The University in Ruins, “the ‘events’ [of the Vietnam decade] broke with a certain narrative of the University education as the individual experience of emancipation in the passage of a virtual student from ignorance to knowledge, from dependence to autonomy and competence” (144). Readings’ use of “virtual” here is intentional: he argues that the “students began by refusing the myth of ‘the student’ as a disembodied or virtual entity” (144). With the entry of the “student body” (Readings’ pun) came an increasing dispersal — in terms of gender, class, and ethnicity — of the homogeneous subject the liberal-humanist university wants to produce. “The eruption of the students,” writes Readings, “put an end to a certain idea of the University, insofar as the students were not seeking autonomy. Or to put it more bluntly, they did not identify autonomy with freedom” (144-45). In their demands for gendered, raced, and sexual recognition they confounded the Bildung narrative: the heteronomous and embodied subjectivity with which they identified disavowed Bildung’s teleological subjectivation to autonomous individualism and its master-apprentice pedagogy.

The derailment of Bildung poses an epistemological threat that has deep implications for the university and its apparatuses, such as “academic freedom,” and has precipitated what humanist and neo-conservatives alike lament as a “crisis” in the university. The “ruination” of the epistemological subject that grounds disinterested knowledge poses a threat to the self-identity of the guardians of the humanist tradition. As Readings argues, feminist and anti-racist critiques are “targeted by the old guard, because they remind them that no individual professor can embody the University, since that body would still be gendered and racially marked rather than universal” (10). In recent Canadian polemics polarizing academic freedom against equity (trivialized or demonized as “political correctness”), the idea of the subject as neutral, universal, and disinterested uncritically re-emerges. These attempts to salvage conventional epistemology are strategies of containment intended to preserve the disembodied subject of the humanist, Bildung tradition. John Fekete, for example, explicitly wants to efface the body. In Moral Panic: Biopolitics Rising, his hysterical polemic against equity policies and affirmative action in the Canadian university, he writes: “politics has historically begun where biological factors and the demands of the body give way to the common concerns of a cultural community, a body politic” (22). (As I will argue in the following chapter, the rhetoric of “common culture” used by the American educational reform movement falls rather flat in a country
such as Canada defined less by homogeneity than by heterogeneity.) The “subject” of the university is, traditionally, homogeneous and does not represent the heterogeneity that marks the wider society (or, in fact, the increasingly “inclusive” university), so that the differentiation of the pedagogical subject is conspicuous and threatening. While Fekete wants to deny difference, Emberly, in his more moderate, liberal-humanist anxiety, wants to accommodate it: regarding the future of the university, Emberly remarks that there “are only two options: the further fragmentation of its civil society or an attempt to reunite men and women, Caucasians and non-Caucasians, heterosexuals and homosexuals, at a level that transcends their differences” (254). The latter option is the “only means to preserve decency and common sense” (254). Yet, “common sense,” of course, has a history, and it is to this metaphysical tradition that Fekete and Emberley appeal in their efforts to save the homogeneous subject and thereby humanist epistemology and its pedagogical institutions.

“Freedom” and Modern Pedagogy

Rousseau’s Émile, which preceded Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister by a generation or so, is considered by some critics the first Bildungsroman. It delineates a model of education, emerging in Rousseau’s time and entrenched in ours, that corresponds with the configurations of modern power. That is, as Donald puts it, Rousseau’s pedagogical treatise most dramatically expresses the modern “paradox of individual freedom being achieved through the submission to pedagogic norms” (4). It is perhaps one of modernity’s deepest contradictions that regulated education has come to be seen as the path to freedom. In Education, Kant argues, too, that the student can recover his naturally given freedom through, paradoxically, the constraining process of education. Just as Kant’s man can recapture his “natural” freedom through education, so Rousseau’s Émile “should be educated in order to remain – or become – natural” (Donald 6). But this inbred freedom must, paradoxically, be regulated. For Rousseau, writes Polster, “the problems inherent in the production of autonomy are overshadowed by an obsession with control over the life of the child” (469).

For Rousseau, the Tutor is crucial to the regulation of the child’s “freedom.” Thus, Émile supports Bauman’s third premise that “culture” is pedagogical, that subjectivation, or “humanization,” requires the teacher: “learning is just one side of the relation of which the other side is teaching,” writes Bauman. “The completion of the humanization process, therefore, requires teachers and a system of – formal or informal – education” (Intimations 3). Rousseau advocated a kind of benevolent control of the student that would make him submit happily and spontaneously to the master’s will. The following passage from Émile
(from which I have taken an epigraph to this chapter) is a central and important tenet not only of modern education but also, by extension, the managed freedom that is key to modern cultural pedagogy broadly speaking. So close is Rousseau's theory of pedagogy to Gramsci's analysis of modern power that in this passage "pupil" could be replaced with "subject" to provide a succinct definition of hegemony in general:

Let [your pupil] always think he is master while you are really master. There is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is taken captive. Is not this poor child, without knowledge, strength, or wisdom, entirely at your mercy? Are you not master of his whole environment so far as it affects him? Cannot you make of him what you please? His work and play, his pleasure and pain, are they not, unknown to him, under your control? No doubt he ought only to do what he wants, but he ought to want to do nothing but what you want him to do. He should never take a step you have not foreseen, nor utter a word you could not foretell. (120)^*

Rousseau's counsel here might be addressed to a contemporary Western government as equally to an eighteenth-century pedagogue. In this, Rousseau's pedagogical theory supports and reproduces his political theory. His fundamental idea, as Cassirer puts it, is "to place the individual under a law that is universally binding, but this law is to be shaped in such a manner that every shadow of caprice and arbitrariness disappears from it" (62). This is the basis of modern hegemony as Gramsci assesses it. Cassirer, reading Rousseau, goes on:

We should learn to submit to the law of the community just as we submit to the law of nature; we are not to acquiesce in it as in an alien dictate but must follow it because we recognize its necessity. This is possible when — and only when — we understand that this law is of such a nature that we must assent to it freely when we assimilate its meaning and can absorb this meaning into our own will. (62)

As the Aufklärer knew, it is in education that hegemonic ideology is most effectively absorbed and assent to its demands most invisibly cultivated. Indeed, one of the underlying principles of modern education, as Aubrey Rosenberg, via Rousseau, comments, "is that [the student] be totally unaware that any educational process is going on. He must always have the feeling of being completely independent and free" (21). And, so, to reverse the equation, pedagogy became the model for the subjection of individuals to state law: "[the state] wishes to rule subjects only inasmuch as, in its every act, it also makes and educates them into citizens" (Cassirer 63). Thus, at the origins of modern pedagogy was embedded modern power's deepest contradiction: the subject, through its very governance, is "free."
Humboldt, too, propagated this contradiction, but he had a rather different solution for the problem of education than Rousseau’s and Kant’s “regulated freedom.” He argues, in *The Sphere and Duties of Government*, that “national education — or at least that which is organized or enforced by the State — is in many respects very questionable” (65). Although one of the great advocates of modern education and of “human development in its richest diversity,” Humboldt argued against public education since “it presupposes the selection and appointment of some one instructor, [who] must always promote a definite form of development, however careful to avoid such an error” (65). Humboldt’s rather unsatisfactory answer to this dilemma is a private education, “whose object is to develope the individual” (66), rather than a public one. The “free” development of individuality requires close and careful supervision, the objective of which is the compliance of the individual to hegemonic state demands:

> it cannot be denied that the happiest results, both as regards the State and the individual, flow from these relations between them, — that the citizen becomes spontaneously active in the State itself, in the form assigned him by his peculiar lot and circumstances. (66)

This compliance, for Humboldt, is the goal of the “freedom” that education cultivates.

It is in this way that subjects in hegemonic systems learn to regulate themselves. In his early account of this modern form of power based on pedagogy rather than coercion, Rousseau recognized that, given the right kind of disciplining, students — or subjects — would internalize power and learn to “work on their own” to submit to hegemonic demands and govern themselves:

> You cannot imagine how Emile can be docile at twenty? How differently we think! I cannot conceive how he could have been docile at ten, for what hold did I have on him at that age? It has taken fifteen years of care to contrive this hold for myself .... It is true that I leave the appearance of independence, but he was never better subjected to me: for now he is subjected because he wants to be. As long as I was unable to make myself master of his will, I remained master of his person; I was never a step away from him. Now I sometimes leave him to himself, because I govern him always. (322)

Rousseau’s notion that freedom must be cultivated and regulated through developmental education is echoed in Emberley’s recent *Zero Tolerance*. For Emberley, as for Rousseau, “freedom” is essential to the natural instincts, but these instincts must be “matured” and regulated by higher powers and in accordance with the demands of authority, or what he euphemistically calls “scholarly culture”:

> one of the great gifts of wisdom that experience brings, and
that the scholarly culture can supply without the risk of
direct experience, is that freedom is not immediate
instinctual response. Nor is freedom denunciation of
instinctual response. True freedom is the maturation of
instinct towards the higher satisfactions that come from the
exercise of moral choice and intellectual independent-
mindedness. Student desire left to its own devices, and not
invited to participate in the scholarly culture, will exploit
the dangers of the in-between time it has been allowed the
privilege of enjoying, and may become a powerfully
disruptive passion such as lust for domination. (45)

The danger of a freedom left to its own “immature” devices is clear, in Emberley’s view.
To adopt Rousseau’s words cited above, the “forms of freedom” must be preserved in the
regulation of students so that they believe themselves still to be free. Although he does not
cite Rousseau as his source here, Emberley does, in the same section, comment that “one
would wish that university legislators and administrators would read Rousseau’s Émile for
its sage insights into the shaping of a young person’s naturally irascible will” (54). In
Emberley’s view, students must be “invited” (not coerced) to join in the “scholarly culture”
that regulates them so that they experience “true freedom.” This is Bildung operating at its
most optimal, invisibly, in the form of Bourdieu’s “symbolic violence.”

And this violence is extant today in humanist discourses about “culture” in education.
One of the primary means of managing student freedom, for Emberley, is through
exposure to “scholarly culture,” represented by the Western canon of “enduring books and
works” (47). But, since even the universally “classic” texts might arouse those dangerous and
immature desires described above, it is here that the university must wield its pedagogical
authority; it “must exercise its most powerful responsibility, to tame and sublimate
primordial longing” (53). In other words, despite his valorization of the Great Works
canon, it is the pedagogical mediation of those texts, and not the “great books” themselves
that confer on students the “right ideas.”25 This is in perfect keeping with the concept of
Bildung as it circulated among the eighteenth-century Aufklärer; as Eagleton puts it “the
project of education is to show individuals the way to a new birth, converting their ‘first’
nature of appetites and desires to a second, spiritual one which will then become customary
to them” (Aesthetic 22). Emberley’s argument follows the Enlightenment philosophers’
notion that culture (Bildung) would “humanize” subjects so that they become “mature”
adequate to consent willingly and cheerfully to hegemonic rule.

Indeed, Emberley relies on eighteenth-century education theory to defend his position
against the threat posed by new post-colonial and feminist texts. He goes on to say that it
is the ideology of 1960s students and academics and their “lifting of all restraint” (45)
that has led to the current “indecency” in the universities. Moreover, new pedagogical
theories and practices emerging since the 60s have accelerated this "moral decay" (53). Thus, Emberley promotes regulation, but in terms Rousseau aptly calls "well-regulated liberty" (Emile 121), rather than by direct coercion. The fevered unrestraint of identity politics, or "political correctness," in the university would not be necessary, Emberley seems to be saying, if only students would read the great books; they don't need to be coerced as long as they understand the inherent value of the canon.

Students' freedom need only be well managed. The pedagogical apparatus controls and regulates student desire: a massive grading and testing system based on competency and conformity ensures that the student is under constant (self-)surveillance and comes to identify with the spectatorial position of that authority. This pedagogical relationship forms what Donald calls a "symbolic network" (7), based on "intersubjective bonds of union and love and respect" (7) (words which, not incidentally, Emberley uses unabashedly) so that the student, or subject, comes to "experience these bonds as his or her own desires, aspirations and guilt, and thus evinces the capacity for self-policing" (Donald 7). Thus, modern Bildung operates in pedagogy — both specifically in the institutions of formal education and more generally in the broader sense of culture at large — to manage subjectivities. This management is paradoxical: it "requires the definition of an external authority to which the child/citizen is subject, and yet which authorizes him to act as a free agent" (Donald 6). While in Émile this authority is (regulated) nature, and in Emberley's Zero Tolerance it is "scholarly culture," for both, it is the pedagogue who embodies that authority and who guides the students' obedience to the injunctions of modern "freedom."

Rousseau's pedagogical narrative paved the way not only for the Bildungsroman tradition, but also for the Bildung-subject which modern pedagogy, in particular, is charged with reproducing. Education is not only modern hegemony's dominant ideological state apparatus, but it is, moreover, a synecdochal analogy for modern culture as pedagogy broadly speaking. The Bildungsprozess — that ubiquitous modern story — is the exemplary narrative of this apparatus. The following chapter will look more closely at the contemporary derailment of Bildung by the politics of disidentification.
NOTES

1 This phrase comes from an essay in University Affairs on-line (April 2000) by David Bentley editor of Canadian Poetry.

2 It should be pointed out that Freire’s work is primarily concerned not with race (at least not explicitly so), but with class. For more detailed surveys of Freire’s work see Robert Mackie, ed., Literacy and Revolution: the Pedagogy of Paulo Freire, in Peter L. McLaren and Peter Leonard, eds., Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter, and Peter L. McLaren and Colin Lankshear, eds., Politics of Liberation: Paths From Freire.

3 In Theory and Resistance in Education, Henry Giroux also critiques the ideological grounding of programmes sponsored by UNESCO; he quotes from one of UNESCO’s publications whose ideology is explicit: “literacy programs should preferably be linked with economic priorities....[They] must impart not only reading and writing, but also professional and technical knowledge, thereby leading to a fuller participation of adults in economic life” (215; Giroux cites from UNESCO, “An Asian Model of Educational Development: Perspectives for 1965 - 1980” [Paris: UNESCO, 1966]). This ideology of “functional literacy” or instrumental knowledge applies not only to the so-called Third World: “functional literacy has become one of the primary goals of the back-to-basics orientation currently so prevalent in the United States” (215) and, it should be added, increasingly prevalent in Canada.

4 Freire’s pedagogy is reminiscent of Bakhtin’s notion of a dialogic narrative in which there is no dialectical synthesis and no final authority arresting the freplay of discourse and therefore validating final knowledge (see Bakhtin’s The Dialogical Imagination).

5 See, for example, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America; Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture; Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum.

6 Space does not permit here an explication of feminist practices of alternative pedagogies; instead see Barbara Ewell’s “Empowering Otherness,” which outlines the trajectory of feminist pedagogy, and collections edited by Frances A. Maher and Mary Kay Thompson Tetreault, by Margo Culley and Catherine Portugese, and by Susan L. Gabriel and Isaiah Smithson.

7 For a detailed genealogy of the relation of feminist pedagogy to critical or radical pedagogy which I am glossing over here, see Carmen Luke’s “Feminist Politics in Radical Pedagogy.” For feminist engagements with Freire, see the Introduction to Gendered Subjects by Margo Culley and Catherine Portugese, the essay by Maher in that volume, Kathleen Weiler’s “Freire and a Feminist Pedagogy of Difference” in Politics of Liberation edited by Peter L. McLaren and Colin Lankshear, and bell hooks’ Teaching to Transgress. For posthumanist-feminist critiques of critical pedagogy, see the essays in Feminism and Critical Pedagogy which the editors describe as “poststructuralist feminist.” The introduction, as well as essays by Luke, Gore, Elizabeth Ellsworth, Patti Lather, and Mimi Orner, are particularly useful in terms of critiques of the notions of voice, resistance, and empowerment central to critical pedagogy. See also the first section of The Education Feminist Reader edited by Lynda Stone. For a critique of the shortcomings of critical pedagogy and a pedagogy of “critical humanism,” see Greta Hofmann Nemiroff’s Reconstructing Education and Paula Treichler’s “Teaching Feminist Theory.”

8 Morris refers here to the work of John Fiske and Iain Chambers. See Zavarzadeh and Morton for an important distinction between the kind of
“experiential” Cultural Studies critiqued by Morris and what they call “critical cultural studies.” Instead of merely “giving” voice to experience and therefore “provid[ing] the bourgeois reader with the pleasure of contact with ‘difference,’” critical cultural studies, they argue, is “not a testimonial but an intervention”: it is “an articulation of the cultural real that will change the conditions which have blocked those voices from talking” ([Postmodernism] 8).

Similarly, Gayatri Spivak, in In Other Worlds, critiques what she calls the “positivistic” (204) tendency of the “(post)colonial intellectual” (202) to retrieve the essence of “the other” by positing a “definitive accessibility of subaltern consciousness” (204).

Spivak refers to this claim as a “strategic use of positivistic essentialism” (Other 205). Similarly, Diana Fuss claims a “nominal essence” as a “classificatory fiction” of the political subject of feminism.

See Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson, “Social Criticism without Philosophy.”

From Angela Harris, “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” (Stanford Law Review 42 [1990]).

Giroux cites Paul Willis’ Learning to Labor, Dick Hebdige’s Subculture: The Meaning of Style, and Philip Corrigan’ Schooling the Smash Street Kids in this context. Surprisingly, he does not cite any feminist critical ethnology in this context. See Jane Kenway and Helen Modra, “Feminist Pedagogy and Emancipatory Possibilities,” for a review of feminist pedagogical ethnography.

In The End of Education, Spanos cites among other examples the humanist ideology in Bennett’s Report as Chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities, “To Reclaim a Legacy” (1984), Bate’s essay, “The Crisis in English” (1982), Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (1987), and Graff’s Professing Literature (1987). Other significant texts of the conservative backlash include Alvin Kernan’s The Death of Literature (1990), Roger Kimball’s Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education (1990), and Dinish d’Souza’s Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (1991).

The phrase is E.D. Hirsch’s in Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know, in which he argues that a common body of knowledge and standards of excellence are minimal criteria to national unity and democracy in the US. See Heather Murray’s analysis in “From Canon to Curriculum.” Both Murray and John Guillory cite Hirsch’s text as a complex case that does not quite fit in with other texts of the neoconservative backlash in education.

Notably, while American defenders of liberal values of individual “merit” usually frame their defenses in jingoistic terms, often referring to the American Bill of Rights, Canadians tend to frame their defenses in universal, humanist terms.

As well as the Harvard Core Curriculum Report of 1978, another key moment in the American educational reform movement was the debate over the “Western civilization” curriculum at Stanford in 1988. William Bennett was by this time Secretary of Education and used the Stanford case to advocate his political views. The Stanford course was heir to a similar course instituted at Columbia in 1919 which, in turn, as Mary Louise Pratt notes, had a direct antecedent in a course with distinct Eurocentric and imperialist links: “a War Issues course instituted in 1918 at various universities, including Columbia. Its aim was ‘to educate recently conscripted American soldiers about to fight in France … to introduce [them] to the European heritage in whose defense they were soon to risk their lives.’ A new tie to Europe was constituted in relation to a national imperative” (“Humanities” 8).
Stanford debate, which stirred both local and national debate, especially during the winter of 1988-89, ended with reform being passed by the faculty senate with some substantial amendments. Pratt provides a full account in her essay, "Humanities for the Future: Reflections on the Western Culture Debate at Stanford."

18 Emberly's notion of "decency" is curious. Throughout Zero Tolerance, he appeals to decency as that which circumscribes academic freedom. The university, he writes, "tolerates difference but does so within a common recognition of the dictates of decency" (275). But there is a double standard at work in the notion: whereas, on the one hand, he cites a black lesbian's metaphorical reference to her own vaginal lips as an affront to decency (although he concedes that behind this indelicacy lies a legitimate and tolerable passion) (207), on the other hand, he belittles such student complaints as that, for example, against a professor who refers to women's breasts as "exuberant" and "Twiggy," and another professor who "ends his course with a slide show that concludes with a bikini-clad woman on a beach and the statement 'I like to end every course with a pretty sunset'" (242). Not only does Emberly not attempt to justify gratuitous comments about women's breasts or sophomoric slide shows in the classroom in terms of some underlying intellectual passion, he, in fact, dismisses the question by concluding, "in ordinary times, these kinds of statements would be seen as laughable or innocuous" (242).

Although he does not explicitly refer to sex, it is hard to avoid a prurient reading of Emberly's diction: "student desires," and "wildness," and their "instinct" toward the higher "satisfactions" and so on, not to mention the emphasis on purity, decency, and moral decay. Of course, the idea of the body and of sexuality as "immature" appears in many discourses, including the pedagogical, anthropological and psychological.

20 This phrase is cited from a Globe and Mail opinion piece written by Philip Resnick, professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia and diehard defender of the myth of the university's meritocracy. I use Resnick's own rhetoric against him because his "studiously" inadvertently draws attention to the fictionality of the supposedly intrinsic neutrality of the university's subject.

21 The phrase, "the myth of merit," can be attributed to Iris Marion Young, who makes a powerful argument in Justice and the Politics of Difference that "the idea of merit criteria that are objective and unbiased with respect to personal attributes is a version of the ideal of impartiality, and is just as impossible" (202). She argues that the principle of merit "is central to legitimating a hierarchical division of labor in a liberal democratic society" (200).

See, also, Readings' The University in Ruins and some of the essays in Stephen Richer and Lorna Weir's Beyond Political Correctness. In the introduction to their collection, Richer and Weir, in the context of problematizing the "false dichotomy of merit and affirmative action" (10) currently plaguing the Canadian university, argue that "merit discourse posits the socially unattached individual as subject" (10). See also the essay in the collection by Janice Drakich, Marilyn Taylor, and Jennifer Bankier, "Academic Freedom Is the Inclusive University," which reconceptualizes academic freedom in terms of the "inclusive university"; the authors argue that one of the "major limitations" of the abiding concept of academic freedom is "its emphasis on individual actions to the exclusion of attention to their context or social, institutional relationships" (121).

22 Fekete's demonization of so-called political correctness on Canadian campuses is notorious; Alan Charles Kors also provides a nice example of it in an interview in The Globe and Mail on the subject of his The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on
he compares so-called “political correctness” or “speech codes” with no less than the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Nazism, and McCarthyism. Kors co-authored his book with a lawyer, Harvey A. Silvergate, and argues that the consciously inclusive university is an “assault on freedom,” and, resorting to the tired rhetoric of “American” freedom, represents “crimes against essential American values.” It is not only American values that are affronted, however; it is the essential human: the price we pay for the “police state” that is the contemporary university is “the dignity and moral reality of the human soul” (D4).

23See Allan Bloom’s introduction to the 1979 edition (6).

24In a similar way, just as Rousseau’s pupil learns to want what pedagogical authority demands he submit to, women are taught to desire what patriarchal authority demands. According to Allan Bloom’s introduction, “Rousseau argues that woman rules man by submitting to his will and knowing how to make him will what she needs to submit to” (Introduction 25; and see Rousseau 359-60).

25In Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation, John Guillory makes the point that it is the ideological mediation of texts and not the texts themselves that right-wing advocates of the “traditional” canon have in mind, “for they are less interested finally in inquiring closely into historical complexities or discursive ambiguities than in making sure that students come away from their experience of reading great works with the right ideas” (356-57 In. 78).

26As David Cayley argues, “testing is but one example of the way in which the medium of schooling becomes the message. External testing says, you’re here to be sorted and classified, whatever the motto over the door may say” (46).
Chapter Seven

Bildung and the Resistance to Pedagogy

When I speak to you and talk about colleges and universities and so on, I don't have to define what those words mean.... I can take certain things for granted.

- E.D. Hirsch, Interview. The Education Debates, CBC Radio

Like the law, grammar is the same for everyone, except of course that it is not.

- John Guillory, Cultural Capital

Enlightenment came close to breathing its last breath during the sixties.

- Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind

What Goes Without Saying

Despite well-intentioned experiments to discover new, more progressive, even radical, pedagogies, education remains, at the turn of the century, haunted by the spectre of Bildung. In Bildung, modern pedagogy and epistemology work together to (re)produce sovereign and possessive individualism. As Findlay argues, behind the estrangement of scholarly theory and classroom practice "lies an image of student and professor as independent agents, each cultivating his or her own autonomy in elite institutions" ("Prairie" 421). The point of departure for putting new knowledges into practice in the classroom, then, is to rethink the pedagogical relationship according to the insights developed by posthumanist theories regarding modernity's construction of the Bildungs-subject.

The basic assumptions in the modern West about pedagogy and its institutions constitute forms of "symbolic violence." Symbolic violence is vested not so much in economic capital, but in cultural capital, which for Bourdieu, is directly linked to literacy. "Literacy" here is intended in a strongly political sense: it is not a simple matter of knowing how to read or write, but rather, as Guillory puts it, refers to "the entire system by which reading and writing are regulated as social practices in a given society" (77). For Bourdieu, then, literacy refers to "symbolic resources in religion, philosophy, art, and science" bolstered by their "instruments," reading and writing (Outline 187). The violence perpetrated, for example, by E.D. Hirsch's notion of "cultural literacy" is a cogent illustration of this power relationship. Cultural Literacy's effect - if not its intention - is not so much to "arm" or empower all Americans with a shared body of knowledge (a "national curriculum") as a
prerequisite to national democracy, as Hirsch claims, but rather to reinforce the hierarchies that legislate between knowledge and non-knowledge and to re-empower its custodians and legislators. As discussed in the preceding chapter, symbolic violence takes place in the "insignificant' practices of daily classroom life" (Eagleton, Ideology 157), so that modern education in the West teaches, above all, pedagogy, in a strong sense of the word. Cultural conservatives rely, first and foremost, on the ideological assumption that the conventional pedagogical relation is a natural one legitimized by a long tradition, one supported less by history than by nostalgia. Murray puts it this way: "[the pedagogical] lines of power are occluded or made to seem the natural order of things. Thus the pedagogic situation is constructed to allow the misrecognition of that construction" (Working 162). In these terms, then, the educational and cultural reform movement in the US can be assessed as an anxious attempt — unwitting or not — to resuscitate a threatened pedagogical "tradition." Conversely, what Spanos refers to as the "knowledge explosion" that has provoked educational and epistemological traditions since the 1960s challenges this pedagogical formula and, as I hope to show, constitutes a potentially destabilizing threat to educational orthodoxy.

Bourdieu's notion of "doxa" helps to clarify this point. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, he argues that there are three levels at work in the habitus: doxa, heterodoxy, and orthodoxy. "Doxa" is negatively derived from that which resists it, "heterodoxy," and from that which seeks to preserve it, "orthodoxy," and refers to the familiarity of the taken-for-granted. "It leaves unsaid," writes Bourdieu, "all that goes without saying" (18). Doxa describes the boundaries that demarcate common sense, marking the supposedly non-ideological spaces of daily living, those "private," interior spaces in which, for example, the "self" is supposed to find refuge from power. It encompasses everything that is taken to be essential in a society; "what is essential," writes Bourdieu "goes without saying because it comes without saying; the tradition is silent, not least about itself as a tradition" (168). Since it is silent and invisible, the doxa only emerges as such when it is challenged by heterodoxy or when its guardians seek to protect it from real or imagined heterodoxies in a new orthodoxy. In other words, when it becomes necessary to say what otherwise goes without saying, the structure declares itself to be in trouble. The enunciation of a heretofore unspoken ideology announces that ideology to be in crisis. As Eagleton puts it, "orthodoxy differs from doxa in that the guardians of tradition, of what goes without saying, are now compelled to speak in their own defence, and thus implicitly to present themselves as simply one possible position, among others" (Ideology 157). A crisis, then, whether viewed negatively from the right, or positively from the left, marks a cultural moment in which the erstwhile taken-for-granted, the doxa, must be legitimized. The analysis of this
phenomenon is especially germane in terms of what is referred to in current pedagogical discourse as a “crisis” in the Western university. The recent rhetoric of “cultural literacy,” “common culture,” and “standards of excellence” is only one sign of this crisis.

Education’s new, reactionary orthodoxies — described in the preceding chapter — attest that the heterodox knowledges of the last three decades represent a real challenge to the doxa of traditional epistemology, as well as to its attendant pedagogies. The conservative call for a new orthodoxy over the last ten or fifteen years indicates that the pedagogical doxa can no longer be taken for granted.

What grounds the pedagogical doxa, about which, at bottom, humanists are most defensive, is the modern Bildung-subject. Yet, it is the production of this fundamental subject that they deny: liberal-humanist practices presuppose the subject they construct. John Mowitt draws attention to humanist pedagogy’s paradoxical disavowal:

> when we teach our students about culture we cannot avoid also shaping their understanding of themselves as human beings. Can we justify telling them what is essential about their humanity is its transcendental character, at the very moment that we are engaged in the social construction of this self-understanding? (140)

While humanists posit subjective individualism as pre-given and determining, they also tend to deny constructivist insights about subjectivity in a “return” to what they nostalgically posit as tradition in order to, in fact, produce the kind of subjects that will be of service to late capitalism. Reactionary education policy is an acknowledgment, however inadvertent, that subjectivity is constructed by pedagogy. Simon Watney argues that we are currently “witnessing an increasing acknowledgment of the role that culture plays in the construction of ... identities, and it is the field of cultural production that is ever more subject to frankly political interventions” (168). These interventions demonstrate the threat that the politics of subjectivity poses to the doxa of cultural homogeneity. The new heterodox knowledges of feminism, posthumanism, anti-racist and queer theory pose a serious challenge to pedagogy’s legitimizing foundation.

In this chapter, I hope to show that what Linda Hutcheon calls the “de-doxification” of traditional, humanist pedagogy begins with a deconstruction of the humanist Bildung-subject on which it has been erected. This deconstruction, which began in earnest in the mid-1960s, has, despite itself, unleashed some dangerous orthodoxies of which those concerned with a multicultural, critical education are wary. I want to suggest that “theory,” especially as it has emerged in English studies, must remain tied to its political impulses in order to continue its destabilization and de-doxification of educational doxa and its legitimizing Bildung-subject. More importantly, theory urgently needs to be put into
practice in the classroom so that a critical pedagogy can be asserted against the homogenizing practices that reconfirm the humanist subject of pedagogical conservatism.

**Disrupting Humanism**

The differentiated subject in posthumanist discourses since the 60s has precipitated an increased visibility of reactionary forces against the “crisis” in the Humanities. No longer able to maintain spontaneous consent through pedagogical doxa, neoconservative forces, by “establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, orthodoxy” (Bourdieu *Outline 169), attempt to “restor[e] the normal state of innocence of doxa” (Bourdieu *Outline 169). Hence, the power configurations hidden in the naturalness of doxa are exposed as arbitrary. For Spanos, the student protest movement of the Vietnam decade was a refusal on the part of students to consent to the “massive complicity of the institutions of knowledge production with the military/industrial/legal complex” that legitimized American war efforts in Vietnam (*End 155*). Diane Macdonell similarly analyzes the “spontaneous” uprising of French students in May 1968 as exposing the complicity between power and knowledge and the ways in which modern education functions to preserve capitalist ideology. She points out, furthermore, that, as spontaneous practices of resistance, such events reconfigure available (Marxist) narratives of opposition (8-23, *passim*). The concomitant emergence of non-hegemonic, or heterodox, groups (blacks, women, Latin Americans) into the universities and their demands for a more representative curriculum otherwise trivialized as “interested” by the supposedly disinterested humanists, brought into view what Spanos calls the “logo- ethno- phallo-centric ideology” of educational hegemony or doxa (“Uses” 3). Spanos views the subsequent posthumanist knowledge explosion as an expression of what for the students was “intuitive”:

the failure of the protest movement in the 1960s to articulate the students’ reasons for struggling to ... realize the possibilities of a truly alternative curriculum ... emphasizes the imperative to theorize the implications for educational praxis that were by and large only intuitively understood in the tumultuous context of the Vietnam War. (“Uses” 11)

As the rupture marked by the posthumanist refusal to consent becomes re-theorized, and therefore visible, the strategies of containment in turn become overt and official. In Spanos’ American example, the humanist rhetoric of liberals such as Booth and Hirsch or of neo-conservatives such as Bate and Bloom becomes codified and entrenched by the official custodians of the knowledge industry (such as university administrators or officials of the American National Endowment for the Humanities).
In Canada, similar disciplinary strategies of containment, such as those defended by Fekete and Emberley, as outlined in the preceding chapter, become entrenched in official documents such as that published by the B.C. Ministry of Skills, Training, and Labour in 1995. This move from an accommodational to a repressive apparatus of power renders visible the otherwise invisible doxa of the hegemonic discourse; it signifies, as Spanos argues, a movement toward an “overt manifestation of the power hidden but always already ready to be activated within the ‘benign’ cultural discourses of hegemony” (End 160). The specious “disinterestedness” of humanist “free inquiry” is revealed to be in fact constrained by specific, political interests. Furthermore, the “innocence” of liberal humanism is challenged: “as a consequence of this fall into visibility, oppositional intellectuals are increasingly becoming aware of the complicity between liberal and conservative humanists — that the debates between them ... are obfuscatingly familial” (Spanos, End 217). But, it is at the moments of its most trenchant enunciation — in orthodoxy — that hegemony declares itself to be in crisis, and, thus, it is at such critical points that the dominant discourse is most vulnerable. It is at such moments, when master narratives become overt, that heterodox knowledges, or petit récit, can be effectively mobilized.

Canada has recently borne witness to the kind of neo-conservative backlash experienced in the U.S. as the education reform movement, a backlash increasingly realized in the corporatization and privatization of the university. Yet, as the contradictions of these new rhetorics are exposed (or rather, as they expose themselves), they disclose and precipitate alternative narratives. The recognition that the sovereign subject sustaining the hegemonic pedagogical narrative is a politically invested fiction suggests that it can be derailed by differential narratives. These alternative narratives, in turn, suggest new forms of knowledge. Given the multiplicity of knowledges released by 1960s’ heterodoxy, the problem of postmodern ethics becomes a problem of the legitimation of knowledge. As Docherty puts it, since knowledge can no longer be arbitrated by transcendental truths, “we begin to see a shift in emphasis away from what we could call scientific knowledge toward what should properly be considered as a form of narrative knowledge” (25). Thus, the kind of story-telling as pedagogical strategy advocated, for example, by Giroux supports Lyotard’s view that discourses cannot be legitimized by some master narrative outside them.

Canada offers a particularly fruitful ground from which to explore the difference alterity can make for pedagogy, since Canadians, as Hutcheon puts it, “might be said to have a firm suspicion of centralizing tendencies” (Canadian 3). Canadian space is not only literally and symbolically decentred by its vast geographical diversity, but it is also internally split according to its history of a double colonization (British colonialism and
American neo-colonialism). Furthermore, as Hutcheon goes on to say, “Canada can in some ways be defined as a country whose articulation of its national identity has sprung from regionalist impulses: the ex-centric forces of Québec, the Maritimes, the west. Its history is one of defining itself against centres” (Canadian 4). This decentred space defies efforts to pin down a homogenous Canadian identity. Kamboureli points out that, despite persistent attempts to “invent a homogenous Canadian identity” (Making 8), its “imaginary cohesiveness has already collapsed upon itself” (Making 12). This collapse marks [a new] beginning in Canadian multicultural history, the beginning of an attempt to understand how distinct identities can converge and dialogue with each other within Canada, how boundaries of difference must be repositioned — not in relation to the signs of “centre” and “margins” but in relation to new and productive alignments. (Making 12)

In this way, an increasing multiculturalism presents an opportunity to rethink pedagogy from sites of multiplicity and difference.

Disciplining Subjects

As Macdonell makes clear in Theories of Discourse, subjectivity and epistemology are intimately linked. This linkage informs and legitimizes modern pedagogies. The posthumanist thesis concerning the discursive and historically contingent production of knowledge has been one of the most deeply challenging of the new heterodoxies provoking the recent educational crisis. That the academic disciplines are not naturally-given epistemological “fields,” but rather discursively and arbitrarily produced categorizations is not the least of these contentions. The challenge to disciplinarity discourses has revealed the imbrication of epistemology with power. As Giroux argues, “holding [the] disciplines to be constructed under historically specific circumstances leads to the discovery that as these conditions have been surpassed the legitimacy of dominant forms of knowledge are in doubt” (“Resisting” 201). Humanist adherents of modern epistemology — its disciplines and its canons — are on the defensive against the thesis that knowledge is discursive and therefore ideological. Moreover, as custodians of epistemological doxa, they are defensive about the dominant knowledges their ideology seeks to safeguard. In Bourdieu’s words, “the construction of reality ... is a major dimension of political power” (Outline 165). The debate about the status of disciplinary master knowledges, then, is not merely “academic,” but rather is a struggle over power.

As Macdonell points out, “the problem [of modern epistemology] is idealist in that it supposes a subject or spiritual consciousness as the origin and justification of knowledge”
The "linguistic turn" taken by philosophical thought in this century has shaken the epistemological assurance that confirms the subject of consciousness over and against the object as other. Docherty uses a Platonic term to analyze the phenomenological process whereby the subject confirms itself in the apprehension of the other as object; he calls this "anamnesis," whereby "the consciousness never cognises the world as it is, but rather recognises the world as its own proper image and correlate." Like Pêcheux's "identification" or Spanos' "forgetting," anamnesis reproduces the stable subject and its familiar doxa.

Modernity's epistemological subject is reproduced by institutions of knowledge. These institutions, of course, are not outside relations of power. One of the clearest power/knowledge links is institutional disciplinarity. Academic specialization, professionalized and legitimized by the ideology of the individual as creator and "possessor" of plenitudinous knowledge, tends to reinforce the sedimentation of the disciplinary structures of knowledge. In turn, disciplinarity reproduces modern epistemological subjectivity. That is, it effects the anamnesis of subjective affirmation. As Spanos puts it, the academic division of labour fulfills a "disciplinary logic of division and mastery ... which constitute[s] the sovereign subject and the sovereign disciplines" (End 191). In other words, disciplinarity is one of the pedagogical strategies by which subjects are interpellated and regulated.

Recent interdisciplinary interventions, therefore, are an interrogation of the playing out of the relations of power/knowledge, and the subjects those relations produce. For example, the disciplinary divisiveness of the self and the society in psychology and sociology, which I described in Chapter Two, offers one of the most trenchant arguments for a radical interdisciplinarity. Whether projects are organized across disciplinary boundaries or from within individual departments (the latter which always risk privileging the "mastering" discipline), they open up the disciplines and their regulatory practices to destabilization. Interdisciplinarity, or better, transdisciplinarity, as Zavarzadeh and Morton argue, self-reflexively interrogates disciplinarity as "historico-political rather than merely logical"; and transdisciplinary practice "attempts not simply to accumulate knowledge but to ask what constitutes knowledge" ("Pedagogy" 9). Heterodox attention to disciplinary knowledge and curricula poses a radical challenge to deeply entrenched epistemological and pedagogical apparatuses that otherwise work to consolidate liberal-humanist subjectivity.

Transdisciplinarity — and the posthumanist "knowledge explosion" which precipitated it — poses a threat to an anamnesic epistemology that would guarantee centered consciousness. Defining "anagnorisí" as the "structure of recognition in which the Subject of
consciousness finds the comfort of Identity and self-sameness” (16) in the object as Other, Docherty points out that “knowledge itself — predicated upon a stable relation between Subject and Object of knowledge, a moment of anagnorisis or recognition producing the Identity of the Subject — has entered into crisis” (24). The humanist reform movement responds to this epistemological crisis by attempting, as Zavarzadeh and Morton put it, to “save the subject” (“Pedagogy” 11) of rational consciousness that would recentre hegemonic knowledge. Conversely, Docherty proposes a notion of the “dialogue,” which refuses the monological pedagogy denounced as the “banking” method by Paulo Freire. Docherty’s dialogue, which rejects a Habermasian model of consensus in favour of a Lyotardian model of “dissensus,” can be seen not as an intradisciplinary anamnesis, in which the subject would confirm itself as self-sameness, but rather a transdisciplinary and contestatory dialogue that recognizes subjective difference.

English Studies and Cultural Capital

In English studies, particularly, a Bildung-subject is entrenched by an epistemological tradition that upholds the literary as a category exemplifying essential humanness.” Not surprisingly, then, it is in English studies — where modern subjectivity is so deeply invested — that the disciplinary anamnesis of subjectivity has perhaps been most radically challenged. This challenge has, at the same time, provoked some of the most telling efforts to safeguard disciplinary doxa and the subjectivity it guarantees. The heterodox knowledge explosion since the 1960s (which Alice Jardine calls an “outburst of energy” [119]) has brought questions of disciplinarity to the fore. Such questions are particularly rife in the debate about the boundaries of English studies, whose disciplinary frames have been permeated by posthumanist theories, and of Cultural studies, whose emerging (anti)disciplinarity, to a large extent, has been effected by the explosion in theory and the problematization of literary studies. Poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theories of subject construction have destabilized the liberal-humanist subject that supports and sustains the self-same identity of disciplinary epistemology. Instead of reproducing an anamnesis of the subject, these new knowledges enable what Docherty refers to as “a cognition of the event of difference” (26, emphasis added). It is here, then, that the modern Bildung-subject has been most profoundly disrupted. However, let me add here that, while I take my examples from English and Cultural studies, the questions these examples address are analogous to broader pedagogical questions.

Within English studies, disciplinary disruptions chiefly take the form of challenges to canon and curriculum. However, the canonical debates over what texts we teach, rather than
the ideological framework in which those texts are organized and the pedagogical frameworks in which they are transmitted, tend to merely perpetuate the logic of disciplinary isolation, “with each person committed to its integrity and responsible for explication of one element of it” (Cain 256). Despite pluralist expansion of the canon, its curricular organization remains entrenched. In her English studies context, for example, Murray argues not only that “the superaddition of works, authors, and courses has left English programs fundamentally unaltered, albeit expanded,” but also that “the basic units of curricular and critical organization — ‘works,’ ‘authors,’ ‘periods’ — remain in place” (“Canon” 232). As William Cain suggests, the canon must be developed out of articulated strategies and goals, but debate about those goals themselves has been “sorely lacking” since “all of us intuitively ‘know’ (so we tell ourselves) the ends of English studies” (255). Curricular and disciplinary questions regarding pedagogy point in the direction of these more fundamental ends. As Guillory argues in *Cultural Capital*, while the focus of the current debate reveals too often a liberal pluralist concern with the inclusions and exclusions of the canon, the real problem is that the school and its curricula regulate access to cultural capital. The canon debate, in other words, is symptomatic, for it signifies “nothing less than a crisis in the form of cultural capital we call ‘literature’” (viii). At bottom, then, the real concern of the canon debates is the way in which curricular ideology regulates access to a society’s cultural capital.¹³ Guillory points out that the proper context for analyzing education is “the reproduction of the social order, with all its various inequities” (ix), and he goes on to say that

the particular authors who happen to be canonical have a minor role in this system of reproduction, but the far larger role belongs to the school itself, which regulates access to literary production by regulating access to literacy, to the practices of reading and writing. (ix)

What Bourdieu calls the “instruments” of literacy – reading and writing – confer linguistic and symbolic capital unequally. While the canon is, indeed, symptomatic of the organization of symbolic capital, focusing on its content distracts attention from the power configurations of pedagogy and curricula.

Recent attention to curriculum rather than to canon is instructive in this regard. As Heather Murray argues, curriculum studies is concerned not with the material itself, but rather with the “organization of that material .... [which] allows the maintenance of what is considered as knowledge in English and thus the maintenance of ‘English’ itself” (“Canon” 239). In this way, curriculum is concerned with the ways in which power/knowledge is unevenly distributed. Trans-disciplinarity, for example, tackles what Murray calls “curriculum as activity” rather than the rather more static question of the canon.¹⁴ Despite
classroom content, Bourdieu’s “hidden curriculum” enacts power relations; it is, writes Giroux, “a social and historical construction which links knowledge and power in very specific ways” (“Reading” 65). In defining what merits study, at what time, and for what “purposes,” curriculum constructs subjects and their relations in particular—that is, unequal—ways.

Pedagogy and the Canon Debates

The canon nevertheless represents the symbolic practices that legislate between knowledge and (its other) non-knowledge. As long as it represents the sedimentation of current curricular paradigms, the canon remains an important site of pedagogical discussion and intervention. It is in the canon debates that conservative and liberal ideologies are fought out, and, especially in the United States, most explicitly enunciated. Neo-conservative claims to “pure” and disinterested knowledges are strategies attempting to contain what is condemned as biased “interestedness” in the liberal-pluralist democratization of the canon. For the former, the canonical master narrative represents what M. H. Abrams, in 1957, bluntly described as “the beliefs and presuppositions of our common experience, common sense, and common moral consciousness” (28); and it excludes the non-literary (or monstrous) texts that are “too inadequately human” (28), or which, that is,

require our consent to positions so illiberal, or eccentric, or perverse that they incite counterbeliefs which inhibit the ungrudging “yes” that we grant to masterpieces. (28-29)

This “yes”—like the (in)voluntary affirmative with which we respond to ideological hailing in Althusser’s model of interpellation—is taken to be a recognition of our inevitable “human nature.” It is in such moments of anamnesis that subjects recognize and reproduce themselves. According to this view, subjective interpellation by Western culture’s artefacts may or may not be grudging, but it remains inevitable because the masterpieces speak to our “essential” being. Through this ineluctable recognition, subjectivity is confirmed in a kind of anagnorisis of the well-known (recognizable), universal “Man.” While we might be hard pressed to find current humanist rhetoric as categorical as Abrams’, its enunciation exemplifies the ubiquitous political unconscious of the canon. In fact, while couched in rather more liberal rhetoric, the Harvard Core Curriculum Report of 1978 (Rosovsky), which became the institutional rallying point for a “return to basics” in the United States, is equally explicit: “we assume that ... students will be exposed to a variety of critical approaches, but the primary purpose of the Core Literature courses is to show how great authors have contrived distinctive statements about
timeless and universal aspects of human experience” (Qtd. in Spanos, *End* 142). More recent, and perhaps more insidious, humanist rhetoric can be found in the hugely popular *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987) by Allan Bloom. As Guillory points out, the idea of a common, national culture, such as Bloom advocates, is the “most deluded assumption” of the canon debate (38). He argues that both those on the right and those on the left take the ideologically mystified position that there exists what liberal-progressive pedagogue James Kenneavy, not unlike his conservative colleagues, calls “the common language of humanity” (80).

Against the assumption that texts transparently represent and therefore directly transmit social identities, it is pedagogy — or the always ideological mediation of texts — and not the texts in themselves that “transmits” culture. In Guillory’s words, “what is transmitted by the school is, to be sure, a kind of culture; but it is the *culture of the school*” (38), with all its complex hierarchies of cultural capital. In *Cultural Capital*, Guillory’s aim is to re-historicize this assumption that the schools transparently confer on students the very best of humanity; “mistaking the class-based [bourgeois] sociolect for the language of ‘humanity’ is an Enlightenment dream,” writes Guillory, “from which the political subject is not meant to awaken” (80). In his essay “Systems of Education and Systems of Thought,” Bourdieu argues that the pedagogical mediation of “Western culture’s” texts is a training in Bildung-subjectivity:

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the system of patterns cultivated by the school, i.e.
academic culture (in the subjective sense of personal
cultivation or *Bildung* in German), is organized primarily by
reference to a system of works embodying that culture, by
which it is both supported and expressed. (“Systems” 352)
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It is the “reference” to the canon, then, and not the canon itself that produces subjects in particular ways. In the US, this subject is explicitly assimilated into a homogeneous, “common culture.” On this point, Guillory cites William Bennett, who, in “To Reclaim a Legacy,” writes that the great texts of the Western canon “are the glue that binds together our pluralistic nation. The fact that we as Americans — whether black or white, Asian or Hispanic, rich or poor — share these beliefs aligns us with other cultures of the Western tradition” (Bennett 21, Qtd. in Guillory 39). Perhaps it is only the arrogance of American right-wing education reformers that could unashamedly construe American culture as a kind of perfection or apogee of Western culture — of “humanity” in general. Guillory puts it this way:

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The extraordinary effects of confusing school culture with national culture are most conspicuous when the national culture is made to swallow whole the even larger fish called ‘Western culture,’ and in such a way as to produce an image
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of the American nation as the telos of Western cultural evolution. (39)

In Canada, Emberley's 1996 position is typical of a more liberal-humanist recuperative approach to the canon debates. He appeals not so much to a national culture, but to a "common humanity." It is this view that gives the canon an air of naturalness and permanence, of having been always there, a view that conceals the seams of the canon's historical and cultural construction, where texts appear not to have been selected, but rather "of having selected themselves" (Guillory 62). For Emberley, the extent to which a book appeals to "our universal condition" (41) dictates the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that make up the canon: "works which invoke a cosmos of meaning that can be elevated to the level of universality are those properly included in a refurbished, exclusive canon" (108). The popularity and positive critical reception of Emberley's book demonstrate the alarming degree to which the neo-conservative climate he represents prevails in Canada's academic community.

Against ahistorical ideas of universality and neutrality, liberal and critical academics since the 1960s' have attempted to represent in the canon those "counterbeliefs" excluded by the authority of the Euro-phallo- logo- hetero-centric and "high" cultural metatext. As Hutcheon points out, "the challenges to the 'traditional' Western canon are in fact enacting or working out democratic ideals of inclusion"("Loading" 373-74). Such inclusions have unquestionably reinvigorated the Humanities. For example, "exposing male privilege as the primary assumption of the claim to universality" (Ewell 44) spawned a refreshing new genre of literary criticism. It motivated what Elaine Showalter in The New Feminist Criticism (1985) describes as a "second phase of feminist criticism" in which feminists "discover[ed] that women writers had a literature of their own, whose historical and thematic coherence, as well as artistic importance, had been obscured by the patriarchal values that dominate our culture" (6).¹⁴ Racial and ethnic inclusions, too, have effected positive pedagogical and curricular re-thinking. Gates argues that because "history and its institutions are not just something we study, they're also something we live, and live through," to refuse revision out of fear of validating liberal-humanism "is to pay obeisance to the status quo, to the entrenched arsenal of sexual and racial authority" (104). He goes on to suggest that texts — and their pedagogical transmission or mediation — reproduce ideologies; if there is one thing posthumanist theory has shown, it is that discourses produce subjects. Thus, for Gates, to alter the content of a discourse is to produce subjects differently.

At the same time, re-canonization also reproduces the valorization of the text that confirms the coherent subject of traditional pedagogical method. The debate enacts not
only democratic ideals, as Hutcheon points out, but also an accommodational liberal-humanist pluralism, as Guillory points out. The "very logic of liberal humanism," he argues, forestalls theoretical approaches to the canon: "it suggests that the category of social identity is too important politically to yield any ground to theoretical arguments which might complicate the status of representation in literary texts" (10-11). The exclusion/inclusion arguments of the canon debate contradict a generation's worth of theoretical insight into representation and subjectivity. Such approaches assume that texts merely reflect rather than construct meaning. While feminist, anti-racist, and queer critiques have differentiated and democratized universal "Man" in order to make the canon more "representative," they have simultaneously reproduced and entrenched a mimetic model of textuality. In this sense, the canon is conceived as representative of constituencies; as Guillory argues, this model of representation "conceives the literary canon as a hypothetical image of social diversity, a kind of mirror in which social groups either see themselves, or do not see themselves, reflected" (7). Advocates of gender and racial inclusion invoke problematic notions of literature as the immediate reflection of cultures and people, whether dominant or marginal. Guillory writes:

the sense in which a canonical author represents a dominant social group, or a noncanonical author a socially defined minority, is continuous with the sense in which the work is perceived to be immediately expressive of the author's experience as a representative member of some social group.

This view of canonical inclusion assumes the valorization of the coherent subject that has been challenged by recent theory. These theoretical challenges, as Guillory rightly argues, have surprisingly coexisted in the present debate with an otherwise incompatible rhetoric of canonical revision in which it is precisely the fit between the author's social identity and his or her experience that is seen to determine canonical or noncanonical status. (10)

Canon reformation based in this kind of liberal pluralist thinking is vulnerable to recuperation as recent neoconservative reactions demonstrate. Another approach to the canon — a postmodern approach — is vital to a pedagogical revision of the canon.

Focusing the question not on the canon, but rather on the pedagogical processes of canonicity generates the question asked, for example, by Pierre Macherey: "what would the study of literature look like once the supposition that it consisted of fixed works — of texts, given and completed — was abandoned?" (Qtd. in Giroux, "Reading" 64). Perhaps the emphasis on content in English studies is itself partly responsible for the sedimentation of its disciplinary approach. Thus, Murray favours a critique of curriculum over canon, since the recent canon debates, she argues, may have reinforced a "tendency to text-
centricity" in English departments, and thereby "strengthened rather than weakened reliance on the individual text as the basic repository of meaning and value" ("Canon" 232). This tendency follows from the assumption that if we work on the canon the rest will follow, an assumption that valorizes the text by suggesting not only that, because the text is a self-evident reflection of human nature, curriculum will spontaneously emerge from it, but also that the proper knowledge will be conveyed to students by the proper texts. Indeed, the humanist notion of the text as immediate and transparent to an empirical subject is, as Giroux suggests, conventional pedagogical method: "knowledge "speaks" for itself and teaching is a matter of providing an occasion for the text to reveal itself" ("Liberal Arts" 122-23). Because the representational, mimetic model frames the way in which new texts are received, assimilated, and transmitted, the canon is equally capable of accommodating and thereby domesticating recanonization's radicalism. Text-centricity creates a situation where the critical potential of counter-hegemonic, or "deviant," texts is easily subsumed and accommodated to the humanist agenda by the assimilative gestures of a benign and eclectic pluralism. Spanos describes the process of canonical accommodation as a "disciplinary hermeneutics" in which "the disciplinary society includes ex-orbitant texts in the canon by overlooking or supervising their disruptive centrifugal eccentricities, by assimilating or reforming their differential force within the ever-expanding panoptic and centripetal framework of the tradition" (End 56). The established traditions of curricular organization are able to subsume the texts' radical potential. Although contemporary literary theory has deconstructed the privileging of authorship as coherent and accessible, of the transparency and immediacy of the intentional text and ahistoricity of signification, of the empiricism of the self-identical reading subject, English studies, despite itself, continues to valorize the text according to these unspoken criteria.

Yet, texts never come to us unmediated; they are always mediated by pedagogy. To posit a direct representational relation between social identities and canonization is, in Guillory's words, to "dehistoricize the forms of cultural capital" (60). Canonicity is, he writes, "not a property of the work itself but of its transmission, its relation to other works in a collocation of works – the syllabus in its institutional locus, the school" (55). In order to stress this point, Guillory quotes Walter Benjamin's famous passage that "there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism," but goes on to cite more of Benjamin: "and just as it is itself not free of barbarism, neither is the process of transmission by which it descends from one to another" (Guillory 55; Benjamin Illuminations, 256). The false view of education as the transparent transmission of culture is at the root of the humanist model of canonicity. The canon, rather, is the institutional remnant of the pedagogical distribution of cultural capital. And pedagogy, as Giroux puts
it, “functions as a cultural practice to produce rather than merely transmit knowledge” (“Liberal Arts” 122-23).

The demands for canonical and pedagogical change in the 1960s and 70s challenged the sovereignty of the liberal subject necessary to the power/knowledge apparatuses of capitalist hegemony. Against this challenge, the neo-conservative reform movement in the U.S. mobilized strategies of containment to “save the subject” by accommodating new, “socially relevant” contents not discordant with postindustrial, globally dispersed capitalism. “Diversity thrives,” as Bauman writes, “and the market-place thrives with it” (273). But this tolerance or accommodation of difference, as Zavarzadeh and Morton argue, “evade[s] the philosophical and political issues involved in decentering the humanist subject and graft[s] onto the existing pedagogical discourses a new set of discourses, thus adding fresh contradictions to the curriculum by tolerating the old side by side with the new” (“Pedagogy” 11-12). For example, as Abdul R. JanMohamed points out, being relatively tolerant and nourished by an ideology of righteous pluralism, humanists in the mid-1960s began to incorporate some Black literature into the canon, but without allowing these texts to challenge curricular ideology. Such strategies function to contain the differential forces that would disrupt what Spanos views as the “spatialized decorum” of the canon (End 142). The domestication of “essentially marginal, open-ended, and dislocating works” has been the fate of such “classics” as Don Quixote, Moby-Dick, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, and Ulysses” (143/56). The point, therefore, is not to wholly jettison the canon, but rather, as Findlay argues in “Inviting Archimedes Over,” to read it outside the frames that have contained its intelligibility: to decentre, not merely pluralize, it.

This approach problematizes canonicity, or the process of canonization, rather than “the canon” as object. According to Hutcheon, this problematic signals a “simultaneous need for and suspicion of canonizing” (369). Guillory asserts a powerful argument against the “identity politics” that have motivated the left side of the canon debate. For example, he argues that the reason more women authors have not been represented in the canon is not that their texts have been excluded from canonization, but rather that “women were routinely excluded from access to literacy” (15). While this is true, it is also true that even when women did write, their writing was in fact systematically excluded, or precluded, on the basis of criteria which were valued and established in advance based on literature written by men whose values and preoccupations mattered. It does not require Guillory’s hyperbolic claim that women were not excluded from the canon to challenge the notion that women’s experience would therefore be directly and transparently reflected in their literature. Guillory would not deny that a political situation has in fact existed in which educational institutions, including the schools, their pedagogies, and their canon (not to
mention the publishing industry), were dominated by men, but what he does appear to take for granted is that these men would be unbiased, that they would make canon selections based on texts' inherent and neutral merit (indeed, Guillory points out that the Jane Austen and George Eliot have long been canonized in order to provide evidence that women have been canonized, that some women passed muster). He argues furthermore that while some writers have been unjustly "forgotten" by the canon, 19 "what seems dubious in historical context is that such cases can be generally explained by invoking the categories of race, class, or gender as the immediate criteria of inclusion or exclusion" (16). Yet, history's political inequalities, gladly acknowledged by Guillory, would surely have affected the process of canonization. Guillory supports his conclusion with a Marxist insistence that race and gender are, for him, cultural or social and not political categories (13 and 347 n. 21). While race and gender are merely "social identities," class alone, for Guillory, is a political category. 20 His explanation for the exclusion of minority writers based on access to literacy or cultural capital is more satisfactory in terms of class, but less so in terms of race and gender: "the historical process of canon formation, even or especially at the moment of institutional judgment, is too complex to be reduced to determination by the single factor of the social identity of the author" (17). This is certainly a true statement, but he assumes here that the point of recanonization based on race and gender (though not class) is always a "simple" one of "representation." "Exclusion," he says, "should be defined not as exclusion from representation but from access to the means of cultural production" (18). Although he is right to argue that the canon debate should not be restricted to reception or consumption of texts, and to offer an historicized corrective of the debate by defining literacy as the access to the means of literary production, he seems to lose sight of his own point that the canon is also a question of "the systemic effects of the educational system in the determination of who writes and who reads, as well as what gets read, and in what contexts" (19). In other words, in his insistence that "exclusion" from the canon has less to do with representation than with historical access to literacy, he emphasizes "writing" or production and forgets about "reading" or reception in his own definition of literacy as "the systematic regulation of reading and writing" (18). If this notion of literacy asks not only the undeniably crucial questions "Who writes? and in "what social and institutional contexts?," but also "Who reads? What do they read? How do they read? In what social and institutional circumstances?" (18), then perhaps "representation" is a more complex problem than Guillory wants to admit here. What Guillory fails to emphasize here is that non-hegemonic texts might offer new ways of reading, new pedagogical strategies.

A postmodern approach to the problem of the canon that does not attempt to resolve
its contradictions provides a direction for re-animating the debate. Henry Louis Gates, as editor of the Norton Anthology of African-American Literature, is not unaware of the paradox that humanism is one of the conditions that make re-canonization possible. Gates’ experience editing the anthology sums up canonization’s double-bind: “this project has required me to negotiate a position between, on the one hand, William Bennett, who claims that black people can have no canon, no masterpieces, and, on the other hand, those on the critical left who wonder why we want to establish the existence of a canon, any canon, in the first place” (103). This dilemma is also illustrated by A Literature of Their Own, Elaine Showalter’s attempt to “rediscover” female “consciousness” by providing “a sense of collective identity” (11-12) through cataloguing female experience represented in women’s literature since the mid-nineteenth century. Showalter’s agenda reproduces, and is in fact made possible by, a mimetic model of the text and an empirical model of reading. It is also enabled, as Toril Moi’s reading in Sexual/Textual Politics shows, by a universalizing model of “female experience.” In fact, as Moi points out, Virginia Woolf is excluded because her work does not conform to the prescribed female experience:

“Showalter quotes Q. D. Leavis’s ‘cruelly accurate Scrutiny review’ [of Three Guineas] with approval, since ‘Leavis addressed herself to the question of female experience, making it clear that from her point of view, Woolf knew damn little about it’” (Moi 4). Thus, the “collective” sense of female consciousness informing Showalter’s inductive logic allows her to reach the rather absurd conclusion that, despite the fact that Woolf was female, the elitism in her texts prevents them from reflecting a valid female experience. Through empirically authorizing female experience in a universal “literature of their own,” this process of canonization depends on exclusions to sustain the same ideology that legitimizes its inclusions. But, with Showalter’s collection, it is a universalization of essentialized female experience that, in its agenda of inclusion, can exclude even an already canonized writer such as Woolf against which non-white and non-heterosexual women rightly rallied in the 1980s. In terms of the inclusion of women’s history and women’s texts into the humanist canon, Kamuf writes: “if feminist theory can be content to propose cosmetic modifications on the face of humanism and its institutions, will it have done anything more than reproduce the structure of woman’s exclusion in the same code which has been extended to include her?” (45). Thus, in order to legitimize the inclusion of (certain) women’s texts, a humanism which excluded women in the first place is ushered in again through the back door.

Yet — and here is the dilemma — Showalter’s text has proved a fruitful resource for students and teachers of literature by (white, Anglo) women. And some readings of the texts she canonized have contributed to feminist theory and practice that deconstruct the
phallogocentrism of humanist knowledge production. Moreover, the valuation of texts by women (as by other marginalized groups) contributed to the interrogation of the generic boundaries of the canon and expanded it to include, most significantly, autobiography and popular literature; as Ewell argues, these new genres, in turn, demand new critical strategies (50). And, of course, as Gates argues, such disruptions “change fundamentally ... the way in which any literary tradition is even conceived” (103). So that, despite its problems, re-canonization itself places the canon in crisis, a productive crisis in cultural capital that perhaps cannot ultimately be resolved by strategies of containment from either neo-conservative attempts to “save the subject” or from posthumanist anti-essentialism.

The Canon as Pedagogy

A more effective approach to the problem of the canonization is to assess the canon as a pedagogical tool. Like Murray’s privileging of curricula as a more productive notion than the static notion of the canon, Guillory offers the motif of the syllabus. In keeping with his focus on the school as the site for the institutional distribution of cultural capital, he emphasizes that the syllabus is an instrument of pedagogy. In Guillory’s analysis, the canon cannot be assessed as a concrete whole from which syllabi are drawn, but rather it is more usefully seen as an imaginary extension of the syllabi which describe it. The canon never appears as a totality as such; it is an amorphous imaginary constructed by and projected out of institutional curricula and syllabi. The canon is better seen not as an accessible and material entity, but rather as an effect of syllabi. The canon, for Guillory, has never existed as such in history; “it is much more historically accurate,” he argues, “to say that the syllabus posits the existence of the canon as its imaginary totality” (31). No list called “the canon” exists as a matter of fact; lists are only ever syllabi that are understood to be selected from an imaginary whole: “the items on the list,” writes Guillory, “are given a specious unity by reference to a whole from which they are supposed to be a representative selection” (33). It is the very idea of the canon as a totalized and ahistorical whole that valorizes the texts in it as “traditional” and “timeless” classics.2 The imaginary whole called “the canon” therefore recuperates and accommodates eccentric texts without altering the cultural capital which the idea of the canon projects. The imaginary “tradition” always subsumes difference and historical situatedness and posits a fraudulent homogeneity which the canon is supposed to embody. The canon is therefore supple in its borders, and it remains “the canon” no matter what texts its unity conceals. It cannot be simply done away with as if it were an unmediated and tangible whole; “changing the syllabus cannot mean in any historical context overthrowing the canon, because every construction of a syllabus
institutes once again the process of canon formation" (31). The syllabus is an always historically-situated and ideological construction; it is an ongoing event that takes place in institutional and pedagogical practices. Arguing that the canonical list has become fetishized as a list, Guillory rightly remarks that it is the form and not the content of the list that is “constitutive of that cultural capital called ‘cultural literacy’” (36).

Emphasizing curriculum or pedagogy rather than the canon, therefore, can forestall the urge to resolve the contradictions of (re)canonization, without denying that they exist. Curriculum studies interrogates pedagogy as a scene of cultural practices that produce and legitimize knowledges, and it can be most productive by drawing attention to the disagreements and struggles over the canon. Against the traditional pedagogical assumption that “schools and colleges have to resolve disagreements in order to teach effectively,” Gerald Graff recommends “teaching the conflicts” as a corrective to the “conflict avoidance” which evades the challenges disseminated by new, transdisciplinary knowledges and which reproduce disciplinary isolation (56/57).24 Readings calls for an even “more radical and uncomfortable dissensus ... for behind Graff’s laudable desire to displace the monologic authority of disciplinary discourse lies a desire for final consensus, the consensus that would permit the determination and transmission of ‘the conflict’ as a unified object of professorial discourse” (127). The pedagogical relationship is one of unequal power distribution where consensus is a legitimizing illusion. The notion of the University “community” as a site of (potential) consensus is chimerical. As Guillory argues,

literary culture in general, and the university in particular, are by no means structurally organized to express the consensus of a community; these social and institutional sites are complex hierarchies in which the position and privilege of judgment are objects of competitive struggles. (27)

Guillory rightly adds that “consensus is the pleasant ideological shift by which social determinations are mystified as ‘collective decisions’” (27). “Consensual” knowledge – monologically transmitted – is uncritical or anamnesic knowledge. To present the canon as if it were a result of consensus, a “common culture,” is to cover over the pedagogical and epistemo-logical struggles of its formation. Knowledge as unified object depends on and reproduces unified subjectivity, a Bildung-subjectivity that disavows difference. Transdisciplinary and dissensual knowledge, conversely, assumes differences cannot be subsumed under a singular, transcendent identity. Cleo H. Cherryholmes suggests a double pedagogical strategy: “not consensus, stability, and agreement, but conflict, instability, and disagreement, ... [in a] process of construction followed by deconstruction by construction...” (149). Like de Lauretis’ “de-re-construction” of subjectivity, attention to
the production, institutionalization, and dissemination of disciplinary knowledge prevents the canon from once more becoming stabilized and naturalized.

While this de-reconstruction is a valuable curricular strategy, despite Guillory’s warning against the tendency to privilege transparent representation, I think we must at the same time beware that the interrogation of the inclusionary and exclusionary gestures of the canonization process does not take the place of interrogating content. It is a necessary first step. While the curriculum debate needs to move beyond content, or what Guillory denounces as “the politics of the image” (7), “representation” nevertheless points toward a politics that suggests more than merely a mirror reflection of constituencies. The canon, like other educational apparatuses, is always mediated by pedagogical and cultural politics; in other words, it is symbolic of the historical power struggles of cultural capital. The text, therefore, can be the point of departure for the process of de-reconstruction, for, of course, the criticism devoted to the historical recovery of texts in the process of canon reformation has, at the same time, contributed to changes in curricular and pedagogical practices. Even Guillory, despite his wariness of the liberal pluralist assumptions behind recanonization, concedes that, as a powerful signifier of cultural capital, the canon is “at this moment a privileged site for raising questions about the educational system as a whole, ... because it is the site at which a ‘crisis’ of cultural capital (or the ‘humanities’) has occurred” (54).

Indeed, a pedagogical approach to the canon can be taken via textual theory. The paradoxical coexistence of liberal-pluralist recanonization, on the one hand, and a theorized challenge to humanist assumptions about the transparency of experience, on the other hand, exemplifies the kind of pedagogical blindness that can plague canon criticism. That is, the pedagogical practices that mediate the canon can be submitted to a deconstruction that discloses the politics of canonization. A theorized approach to the text, as Zavarzadeh and Morton suggest, “aim[s] at answering not only merely the conventional question of what a text means, but also the questions of how and, more importantly, why, it means” (Post/Modernity 220). These are pedagogical questions. They are questions, finally, about the exigencies of cultural capital. The canon debate can situate itself in relation to this postmodern perspective by putting into pedagogical practice theoretical insights about textuality, authorship, and reading, so that re-canonized texts are not simply recuperated by a flexible humanist pluralism.

Politics and the Resistance to Pedagogy

In Canada, the current “crisis” in post-secondary education renders a politico-pedagogical
self-consciousness increasingly urgent. The recent threat to Canada's commitment to a publicly-funded university provides occasion to assess modern pedagogy's tie to politics. Increasingly, the legitimized rationale of Enlightenment Bildung is reproduced in blatantly instrumentalist terms. As the economic crisis of the 1990s placed new demands of "accountability" on the university, and as extreme government funding cuts forced institutions to seek private and corporate funding, administrators on both government and institutional levels resorted to the rationalizing rhetoric of instrumentality. This rhetoric has also been used to rationalize dramatic increases in tuition fees where the student comes to be viewed as a consumer and tuition as "user fees," a view that became well entrenched through the financial constraints of the 90s. As this new rhetoric takes root in pedagogical and curricular practices, the "hidden" ideologies of educational apparatuses become increasingly visible. The current rhetoric of "excellence," for example, is "in keeping with the conservative idea that the mastery of techniques is equivalent to progress" (Aronowitz and Giroux 14). According to the logics of transnational capitalism, Enlightenment "progress" comes to signify the ability to compete in an international marketplace according to the imperatives of "excellence." An eight-part series in the Globe and Mail in 1995, entitled "Tough times in academe," demonstrates that not only is "excellence" key to the rhetoric of Canadian university administrators, but is assessed in terms of "global relevance." As modern ideology becomes entrenched in the realities of the twenty-first century, this new rhetoric suggests a flagrant and technocratic emphasis on "instrumental reason" and its value in a global economy.

Frank Davey's analysis of a document published in 1995 by the department of Skills, Training, and Labour in British Columbia shows how governments, in order to legitimize cutbacks, resort to a rhetoric of instrumental relevance that makes the link between labour and education explicit. Quoting from "Charting a Course: A Strategic Plan for the Future of British Columbia's College, Institute, and Agency System," Davey outlines the Ministry's concerns:

the Ministry is preoccupied with "more emphasis on relevance," "a better blend of the benefits of a traditional liberal education and vocationally-oriented skills," "greater input" by industry "into course and program development as well as greater involvement with faculty," with eliminating what it sees as "the historical gap between "education" and "training," and with education that meets "labour market demands." ("Report" 8)

This ideology reinstates a pedagogy Freire calls the banking method; in Davey's words, it marks "a shift from [the] current focus on helping students become producers of new knowledge toward one in which [educators] would train students to be repositories of
skills and techniques presently perceived to be valued by employers” (“Report” 10). As educational institutions become more market-driven, one of the policies responding to the demand for socio-economic “relevance” is the rampant “return-to-basics” projects of public school boards which, by extension, increase the demands for relevance in post-secondary Humanities. “Relevance” here means the extent to which the university produces workers in keeping with a changing economy. Enormous cuts to public funding and increasing reliance on private and industry funding in Canadian universities raise new sets of ethical questions about the autonomy of research and epistemological questions about “pure” versus instrumental knowledge. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that non-governmental funds are frequently earmarked for specific projects typically in the applied sciences and business. Given that Humanities departments therefore continue to rely on scarce public funding and increasing tuition fees, the demands for relevance and legitimacy are all the more exigent.

The economic crisis in the Canadian university has particular valency for Humanities departments where issues of relevance and accountability in an age of efficiency and instrumental knowledge are especially acute. These injunctions threaten to turn English departments, for example, into vocational institutions training students in the writing and reading — and even “critical” — skills useful to employers (in a way analogous to the “functional literacy” programmes critiqued by Freire). This example from English is more than just illustrative: the pedagogical exigencies the Humanities currently face are felt most keenly in that discipline where liberal humanism has its most powerful hold and its most precious investment.

But is instrumentalism the only alternative to liberal humanism? The problem of how to legitimate knowledge without, on the one hand, relying on a humanist, “high-cultural” tradition of literariness and, on the other hand, capitulating to the rhetorical demands of instrumental “excellence” is particularly vexing in the English department. Divided by the internal debate between the humanist study of literature for literature’s sake, on the one hand, and the posthumanist theory that would dismantle such belles lettres ideology, on the other, English departments find themselves caught in a (potentially productive) double bind in attempting to legitimize themselves. Spanos notes the irony that the Humanities’ “professional establishment..., no longer humanistic, nevertheless continues to legitimize its authority by appealing to the ideology of humanism” (“boundary 2” 174). But it is a strange version of humanism: caught within the binary logic of “pure” belles lettres knowledge on the one hand, and the “instrumental” knowledge that has legitimized the hard and social sciences on the other, Humanities departments legitimize themselves according to an instrumental version of belles lettres humanism. (The kind of analytic
thinking English departments require, for example, will prove useful, the argument goes, in any of the new communications fields.) As Brian Wall contends, as it is taught in the classroom, even posthumanist theory is assimilated, by humanist sleight of hand, into this belles-tristic framework. For what remains so seductive about the Humanities, particularly English studies, is, in Murray’s words, “a persistent ivory-towerism that sees literary studies as a haven in a heartless world” (Working 161). Despite theory, literariness retains a privileged currency in the university’s economy of cultural capital. The domestication of potentially interventionist theory coincides with the critical moment at which it most urgently needs to be put into practice.

The recent crisis threatens, therefore, to further breach the gap between the theory and practice of critical pedagogy. By making these contradictions visible, economic crises encourage institutional rethinking. However, they also foster a concomitant fear that implementing change might jeopardize what it is we already have. The custodians of tradition support and legislate in favour of the latter view. In the Humanities, this legislation fosters strategies of containment against the potential subversiveness of the posthumanist knowledges that would oppose them. The heterodoxy of theory, asserted against the traditional academic doxa, is producing a new orthodoxy so that “the guardians of tradition ... are now compelled to speak in their own defence” (Eagleton, Ideology 157). The taken-for-granted must explain itself. (And perhaps, as Gerald Graff puts it, “what really enrages middlebrow critics about the changes now taking place in the teaching of literature [is that] whereas these critics could once assume that their view of what constitutes proper literature and criticism would automatically be the official one, they now have to argue for their view like everybody else” [“Teach” 61].) An essential tenet of the neo-conservative orthodoxy is that “real” academic knowledge (Truth) is always apolitical. To the disingenuous claim of traditional humanists that there is an impartial, theory-free position, Douglas G. Atkins answers that “a theory is always at least implicit in every critical or pedagogical effort (perhaps never more so than when we deny, in the name of innocence and purity, that we have a theory)” (14). Despite arguments like Atkins’, as the external pressures on the Humanities have become publicized by mainstream media, anti-theoretical humanism garners public support since its “common sense” approach seems to promise a de-politicization of troublesome, or “irrelevant” departments or factions therein. Instead of mounting an attack on the specifics of anti-theoretical arguments, I think it is best to take their anxiety as a positive sign that opposition is still seen to be necessary, and that “the guardians of the familiar ways dare not let down their defenses” (Cain 275). But, as the economic crisis prompts a more offensive frontal attack on theory in the classroom, posthumanist critiques of pedagogy risk becoming more and more isolated
from praxis.

Yet this merely exacerbates a situation in which the theorists who would rally for change are already only minimally involved in the practice of critical pedagogy. This is not to perpetuate a false binary between discourse and practice, for, of course, academic scholarship is a discursive practice; the point, rather, is that these discourses circulate within an economy more or less isolated from classroom, especially undergraduate classroom, pedagogies. A gap between scholarship and pedagogy in general is frequently noted; the gap between theoretical scholarship and theorized pedagogy is, however, even wider. As Findlay argues, because of the increasingly prevalent opinion "that research is, in fact, more important than teaching," there resides in literary studies a "danger that ideological critique within the academy will continue to be nothing more than a harmless diversion from business as usual" ("Prairie" 421/428). Indeed, while "theory" in the Humanities seems recently to have acquired a privileged place in scholarly research and has even met with general acceptance as classroom content, it remains marginal to pedagogical practice. To a great extent, in fact, theory has already been accommodated and depoliticized. While theorists since the early 1970s have drawn attention to the unexamined assumptions that inform traditional pedagogy, their research, as Cain puts it, has "acquire[d] a momentum that has taken them away from pedagogical and critical realities" (248). Theorists who endorse change often isolate themselves from practice and leave administrative policy in the hands of the powers that be. For theory to have real effects in the university, it has to make its way into pedagogy and administration and from there challenge the very foundations of the institution. As Findlay remarked at the University of Victoria Humanities colloquium in 1997, faculty must stop thinking of administrative work — where they have the opportunity to practice critical self-governance — as an inconvenient interruption to their "own work." (Evidently missing the point, a faculty member in the audience responded by arguing that there is no point in participating in administrative work when, after tenure, one is no longer given "credit" for it.) In other words, as S.P. Mohanty puts it, theorists need to "de-etherealize the claims of theory" ("Radical" 155), and the pedagogical context offers the most efficacious site for this practice. What is needed in the classroom, then, is not more teaching of theory, but rather, in Murray's words, "theorized teaching" (Working 154). What is needed is a critical pedagogy, to be sure, but, more than that, a metacritical pedagogy, conscious and critical of its own motives, apparatuses, and operations.

Posthumanist theory provides the tools for a theorized pedagogy. As John Mowitt argues, "critical theory is capable of re-writing the social significance of the humanities and providing them with a self-understanding through which they can be defended from the
forces actually threatening them” (122). The resistance to new knowledges mounted by the neoconservative reform movement is, first of all, a resistance to theory. But, as the implementation of this resistance shows, it is not so much theory in the abstract that poses the threat, but theory as it would be put into practice. But the institutional hypostatization of theory which Murray analyzes in Working in English has resulted in what she calls, with a play on de Man, an “endemic resistance to pedagogy” (154). Despite the “privatization and isolation” (161) of the classroom, it is an intensely political arena. In order to understand the institutionalization of the power/knowledge configurations that reinforce and reproduce unequal subjective relations, and to resist the forces that would seek to resuscitate those relations, a theorized pedagogy must be de-etherealized and activated in the classroom.

From the perspective of the present study, it is, first of all, on the grounds of the theory of the subject that the prevailing practices of pedagogy can be – must be – re-theorized, for it is in everyday pedagogical practices that the dynamics of subjectivation are so deeply invested. The posthumanist critique situates the subject as historical, as constructed through the exclusions and inclusions that make up social life, or the habitus, including the classroom habitus, for what is crucial here is that a theorized pedagogy would take a self-reflexive, metacritical approach, for, regardless of theoretical content, an untheorized pedagogical process will merely reinforce pedagogical tradition and its subjective positions. It is the context, then, of pedagogy as activity, that is the content of cultural capital. As Murray argues, when theory is construed as the counter-culture of literary study..., then students are asked to cooperate in an all-round misrecognition of the operations of institutional and pedagogic power” (Working 165). Bildung, as I argued in Part One, is a guiding ideology of this construction, and modern pedagogy is a central apparatus for Bildung’s inculcation. It is through excavating Bildung’s textualization, then, that we can begin to decipher the ways in which pedagogy – in both its educational and more broadly cultural forms – creates the apparatuses through which individuals come to experience themselves as modern subjects. What is crucial about this excavation, then, is the process of uncovering Bildung so that the pedagogical doxa no longer goes without saying.

Pedagogy and the Text

Poststructuralist literary theory set in motion a whole series of denaturalizing and deconstructive projects that have affected all areas of the Humanities, and, as such, theory in English studies occupies a potentially advantageous position from which to approach pedagogical rethinking. Not only is it from the direction of the English department that a
sustained critique of modern subjectivity has been assembled and launched, but it is also in English studies that the subjectivity in question is so intricately imbricated. The current debates, precipitated by Bildung’s derailment, are concerned, at bottom, with liberal-humanist individualism. Zavarzadeh and Morton put it this way:

the contest over the structure and contents of the humanities curriculum has always been a struggle of various social classes and economic and political groups over the meaning of the social signs that intersect to form codes out of which the “individual” is constructed. ("Pedagogy" 1)

Within the Humanities, this contestation is centred in English studies, for that discipline has long been the bastion of subjective individualism. That is, as Murray contends, literary studies “is always at base ‘political,’ postulating a certain relationship of ‘individual’ to ‘society’ and a mediating role for literature and literary study in this” (Working 161). Yet, she warns,

as power is increasingly a matter of information control and symbolic manipulation, it is imperative to understand how education in language, literature, and ‘literacy’ is central to, rather than peripheral to, this process, and is more than a ‘humanizing’ force for technology and technological study. (Working 161)

As the place where subjects are “humanized” – the place of Bildung – English studies has much to reveal about the process of pedagogical subjectivation. It is precisely because literary studies is seen as “exempt” from the sordid day-to-day of business and politics and power, that “the social and socializing project of literary study has always been justified. Minds are formed through ‘soft’ disciplines and ‘subtle’ pedagogies” (Murray, Working 163). Indeed, it is as the university’s humanizing face that English studies conveys much pedagogical force. Its pedagogy conveys, that is, a high degree of cultural capital, and it is in this sense the cultural and ideological centre of the modern university, not its safe haven. It is the quintessence of cultural Bildung. Referring to Bourdieu’s reproductive model, Murray analyzes this situation as a surplus of pedagogic content in relation to knowledge or information content. She quotes from Bourdieu’s Reproduction in Education: “the relation of pedagogic communication can be maintained even when the information transmitted tends toward zero, as in ... some literary education” (Working 162; Bourdieu 21). Yet, not despite, but because the humanist subject is so deeply embedded in its discourses, English studies is opportunely placed to disclose the cultural capital its discipline distributes. It is here, then, that a comprehensive and powerful destabilization of the pedagogical subject, or Bildung, is thinkable.

It is propitious, perhaps above all, that English studies comes to theory via the text. On
the face of it, this may appear contradictory in light of my contention above that English studies’ text-centricity promotes a literary mimeticism that easily absorbs new or recovered texts into the canon, yet, at the same time, it is this very text-centricity that offers English studies its best intervention into humanist doxa. That is, theoretical explorations of textual semiotics make possible a politically viable critique of subjectivity.

There has, perhaps understandably, been some resistance to the postmodern reconceptualization of subjectivity. Many critiques have come from a critical pedagogy concerned with what is seen as a tendency in postmodernism to “textualize” or disembodied and depoliticize difference. In “Multiculturalism and the Postmodern Critique,” Peter McLaren poses an opposition between what he calls “resistance postmodernism” to the “ludic” postmodernism of Lyotard, Derrida, and Baudrillard, a false opposition which McLaren brackets for the sake of argument. Because ludic postmodernism “focuses on the fabulous combinatory potential of signs in the production of meaning and ... the continual playfulness of the signifier and the heterogeneity of difference” (198), its concern with heterogeneity is purely formal and non-political. Conversely, “resistance postmodernism brings to ludic critique a form of materialist intervention since it is not solely based on a textual theory of difference but rather on one that is social and historical” (199). He adds, following Teresa Ebert,38 that to emphasize textuality “is to ignore the social and historical dimensions of difference” (199), as if the social and historical were in some way accessible outside of their textualization. This assumption places historical and social subjects outside of discourse and ideology, and therefore plays right into the hands of those liberal humanists for whom freedom means to evade ideology and to recover an essential self homogenized and universalized as an elementary and general humanness - precisely that which McLaren is ostensibly disputing. An English studies semiotic view, however, understands that, since the subject, like history, comes to us through textualization, it is through the “textualization” of subjectivity that we can discern the lineaments of its construction. Such discernment entails a political historicization of the reproduction of subjectivity in literary studies and its canon. Belsey’s proposal in “Towards Cultural History” is pertinent in this regard. Starting from “the assumption that there is no special political pedagogical merit in severing all ties with the texts the institution of English has done its best to make its own,” she argues that, because

texts are available to be reread as the material for a history of meanings and values and practices in their radical discontinuity .... new work might be expected to come from the English department itself, and not just from somewhere else called, say, Cultural Studies. My project for English,
therefore, is not to abandon it but to move it – towards
cultural history. (552)

No grasp of the subject will ever be final, essential, or definitive because subjects are
always already mediated by the texts through which they are inscribed. Theory, via
English studies, demonstrates that there is no direct or immediate access to “the real” of
subjectivity. It is in terms of this suspension of essentialized subjectivity that English
studies can become a place where the gap between the theory and the practice of pedagogy
might be bridged.38

After Theory, Pedagogy

Economic crises in education, such as the one Canada has lately faced, both discourage
change insofar as they restrain the production and practices of new knowledges and
encourage change insofar as demands for accountability make visible the contradictions
that those new knowledges expose. As Davey suggests, official rationalizing rhetorics
precipitated by cuts to public funding over the last decade or so evolve into policies that
pre-empt the production of – let alone the academic practice of – new knowledges
(“Report” 10-11). Yet, as the contradictions of these rhetorics are exposed (or rather, as
they expose themselves), they inadvertently release counter-narratives. While to some
extent these alternative knowledges are recuperated by humanist inclusionary strategies,
they have at the same time exceeded those strategies, deconstructing from within the
colonizing gestures of Bildung’s humanist re-containment. The time is now propitious for
cconcerned Canadian academics to articulate these excessive knowledges in conferences, in
publications, and, above all, in the classroom. Furthermore, because of a lack of a stable
Canadian identity, Canada is in a unique position to put these knowledges into practice.
For example, Canada is – notwithstanding Emberley – in a better position to resist the
“common culture” ideology underlying the rhetoric of the American educational reform
movement. Thus, the heterogeneity of Canadian culture suggests the possibility of
narrating an imaginary community without subsuming the different “rhythms” that
colonization has – despite itself – disclosed. This heterogeneity, anxiously resisted on the
right by humanist strategies of containment, can be assessed as an opportunity to counter
Bildung. It is an opportunity to resist the resistance to critical pedagogy and to seek out
practical possibilities for unrecuperable pedagogical change severed from the academic
tradition of possessive individualism. Canada is in a position, then, to practice a
displacement of the usual theory/practice binary in a process which Spivak describes as
“the theory-practice of pedagogical practice-theory that would allow us constructively to
question privileged explanations even as explanations are generated” (Other Worlds 117). It is in the spirit of this kind of de-re-construction of pedagogical theory-practice that a new pedagogy might be imagined.

NOTES

1Bourdieu points out that the current crisis is not a unique event — nor is the worry over “excellence”: “as is suggested by a reading of the Mecno, the emergence of institutionalized education is accompanied by a crisis in diffuse education, which goes directly from practice to practice without passing through discourse. Excellence has ceased to exist once people start asking whether it can be taught, i.e. as soon as the objective confrontation of different styles of excellence makes it necessary to say what goes without saying, justify what is taken for granted, make an ought-to-be and an ought-to-do out of what had up to then been regarded as the only way to be and do; hence to apprehend what had formerly seemed to be part of the nature of things (phusei) as in fact based on the arbitrary institution of law (nomo).” (200 n. 20).

2For her concept of “de-doxification” in The Politics of Postmodernism, Hutcheon adapts Roland Barthes’ “notion of the ‘doxa’ as public opinion or the “Voice of Nature’ and consensus” (3) and argues that “postmodernism works to ‘de-doxify’ our cultural representations and their undeniable political import” (3).

3In his President’s Report in the December 1995 newsletter of the Association of Canadian College and University Teachers of English newsletter, Frank Davey analyzes the Ministry’s 1995 document, “Charting a Course: A Strategic Plan for the Future of British Columbia’s College, Institute, and Agency System.” I will return to Davey’s critique below. For an analysis of similar documents, see “English Studies versus the Humanities?,” where Jo-Ann Wallace examines the Alberta government’s “Adult Learning: Access Through Innovation,” and a University of Alberta 1994 response to funding cuts called “Quality First.”

4Guillory argues, too, that the liberal and conservative positions are not as opposed as they might like to think they are, especially in the canon debate: “The virtual agreement of the progressive and the reactionary participants in the canon debate about the relation between culture and value suggests that the positions of these antagonists are more complexly interrelated than a narrative of hegemony and resistance would imply. We will have to say rather that the two positions are mutually constitutive, and even more that they both fall well within the normative assumptions of American political culture, even within the normative principles of liberal pluralism” (22).

5Although as Guillory rightly notes, “it has not been sufficiently acknowledged how much the language of [canon] revision owes to a political culture which is specifically American” (4).

6For an introduction to the role of narrative in critical pedagogy, see Narrative in Teaching, Learning, and Research edited by Hunter McEwan and Kieran Egan.

7For an analysis of the traditional power hierarchies of the university disciplines, with Philosophy as the meta-narrative, or meta-discipline, see Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition.

8I am glossing over the distinction between interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity
which for Zavarzadeh and Morton is crucial. They argue that "the 'interdisciplinarity' of the
dominant curriculum is a version of the 'great books' teaching model and as such it is in
fact a mode of 'varidisciplinarity': a reinscription of 'pluralism' in the reigning curriculum ....
Transdisciplinarity, on the other hand, is aware of the status of knowledge as one of the
modes of the ideological construction of reality in any given discipline and thus through
its self-reflexivity attempts not simply to accumulate knowledge but to ask ... why and
how and by whose authority certain modes of understanding are certified as knowledge and
others as para-knowledge or non-knowledge" ("Pedagogy" 9). Spanos, who also favours
"transdisciplinarity," points out that, while even the Harvard Core Curriculum encourages
"interdisciplinarity," this is merely a pluralist accommodational strategy that fails to
challenge disciplinary logic and panopticism (End 144/191-92).

Habermas, with a Frankfurt School faith in the power of critical reason, proposes a theory
of "undistorted" consensus and "communicative action" (The Theory of Communicative
Action). Lyotard, who sees consensus as an imperialistic drive to arrest heterogeneity,
proposes instead a model of "dissensus" that would challenge consensual foreclosure (See
The Postmodern Condition, as well as Lyotard and Richard Rorty, "Discussion").

See Literary Theory: An Introduction where, in his genealogy of the rise of English
studies in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Terry Eagleton argues that literature and
literariness were ideological tools that promised to fulfill a "liberal 'humanizing"'
enterprise (26). For work on the development of English studies as a category in Canada,
see Davey, Margery Fee, Robin Harris, Pat Jasen and Heather Murray ("English Studies"
For a useful bibliography, see Heather Murray's "English Studies in Canada to 1945: A
Bibliographic Essay." See also: University of Toronto Quarterly (64:3 [summer, 1995])
edited by Heather Murray, and Henry Hubert's Harmonious Reflection. Archeologies of
disciplinary history in Canada are important, as Murray writes, so that we don't "rely
more than we already do on [educational] issues and theories formulated in a United
States context" ("Canon" 229).

Although Cultural studies often claims a non- or anti-disciplinarity, I argue, in
"Narrating the Subject: Cultural Studies and Postmodernism," that Cultural studies' disavowals of disciplinarity are in fact typically falsified by those very arguments, which
work precisely to police the emerging boundaries of Cultural studies. See also Ross
Leckie, who argues that the 1994 Cultural Studies in Canada Conference at the University
of Toronto produced two phenomena "that marked the territory of cultural studies": on the
one hand, tenured professors seemed to present, "originary histories" of Cultural studies
that signal an "implicit patrolling of the borders of cultural studies; on the other hand,
sessional and students presented "inscription[s] of spaces at the boundaries of cultural
studies" which "suggested an unease and even an open defiance of the potential hegemony of
cultural studies" (485). While appreciating the productive "anxiety over 'community'"
(486), Leckie argues that "the future of cultural studies depends on resisting a tendency to
theorize cultural studies in the abstract" (491). For more on the debate about the
disciplinarity of Cultural studies and about the disputed boundaries between English
studies and Cultural studies see the essays from the "Cultural Studies Now and in the
Future" conference (University of Illinois, 1990) collected in Cultural Studies, edited by
Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler. Papers from the 1994 "Cultural
Studies in Canada Conference" at the University of Toronto appear in University of
Toronto Quarterly special issues 64:4 (Fall 1995) and 65:1 (Spring 1996) edited by Linda
Hutcheon and Faye Pickrem.
12. Guillory is at pains to make the crucial point here that "access" [to literacy] should not be confused with the ideological notion of "opportunity" (350 n. 30). The notion of opportunity has, in liberal humanist thinking, come to suggest "providing individuals with the cultural capital necessary for 'success.' That notion is of course the cornerstone of American ideology, which employs a fiction of 'equal opportunity' as the ideological means of justifying a system in which some individuals fail and others succeed — through their own fault" (350 n. 30).

13. Murray defines "curriculum-as-activity" as "the area of private/public intersection where, as teachers, our personal, often isolated, classroom practices are brought into conjunction with the work of our colleagues" ("Canon" 238). She adds that, "because it allows us to operate creatively, critically, and collectively, curriculum seems to be the educational level where constructive change is most possible and our efforts are best expended" ("Canon" 238). Murray's essay, "From Canon to Curriculum," not only offers a persuasive argument about the need to focus on curriculum-as-activity rather than on canon, it is also an excellent source of the various terms and theorists of the curriculum debate.

14. By "insidious," I do not mean to suggest that Bloom's anti-theory, anti-difference, nostalgic, and patriarchal position is subtle. As Spanos points out, the final lines of Bloom's text bluntly declare his position: "Men may live more truly and fully in reading Plato and Shakespeare than at any other time, because then they are participating in essential being and are forgetting their accidental lives. The fact that this kind of humanity exists or existed...makes our imperfect humanity, which we can no longer bear, tolerable. The books in their objective beauty are still there, and we must help protect and cultivate the delicate tendrils reaching out toward them through the unfriendly soil of student' souls. Human nature, it seems, remains the same in our very altered circumstances because we still face the same problems, if in different guises, and have the distinctively human need to solve them, even though our awareness and forces have become enfeebled" (quoted in Spanos, End 225-26 n.29). As Henry Louis Gates points out (106), Bloom's racism is not very subtle either.

15. Guillory's solution to this problem of the right-wing "common culture" ideology is not a pluralist insertion of a multicultural canon; "the perceived monolith of Western culture has had to be contested by the assertion of an antithetical 'multiculturalism' as the basis of a politically progressive curriculum" (40). Yet, he argues, "the rather too neat polarization of these terms ['Western culture' and 'multiculturalism'] elides the question of what school culture really is, that is, what relation to culture is produced by the formal study of cultural artifacts" (40).

16. Of course, critiques of the canon were made — albeit sporadically — before the 1960s as Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's Own, for example, illustrates.

17. The essays on canonicity in the first section of Showalter's collection are fairly representative of this "second-phase" feminist canon criticism: they argue variously that the "apparently frivolous" study of literature by women will act as a "prescription" revitalizing what Heilbrun diagnoses as a case of the "doldrums" in English studies (Carolyn G. Heilbrun), that the canon of literary criticism should reflect the "explosive transformation of women's lives" in the 1970s (Sandra Gilbert), that because "interpretive strategies are learned, historically determined, and thereby necessarily gender inflected," reading strategies can be "relearned" so that women's literature can be situated "within its own unique and informing contexts of meaning and symbol (Annette Kolodny), that a patriarchal economy that has given men privileged access to publishing results in the
predominant critical canon being defined by masculine values which excludes women's writing in advance (Nina Baym), that this bias, which trivializes the "feminine" values expressed in literature as artless, can be corrected by rehistoricizing and re-valuing women's literary tradition (Jane Tompkins), and that, against attempts to erect a female, ghettoizing "counter-canon," the predominant values and aesthetics that have excluded women should be interrogated so that women's literature becomes "equally" a part of the "general" canon (Lillian S. Robinson). See Moi for a detailed poststructuralist critique of some of these arguments.

Guillory's word choice here is curious. His passive verbs gloss over the fact that it is people — politically engaged people — who have historically excluded others from the canon. Instead of the canon's custodians "excluding" certain writers, the excluded writers "have suffered an undeserved oblivion," and they have withstood "periods of obscurity" (16) as if their exclusion was merely happenstance.

This is similar to Fredric Jameson's Marxist position in The Political Unconscious, where he argues that the "privileged position" (296) of his argument transcends local politics. In his preface, he writes: Marxism is ... that "untranscendable horizon" that subsumes such apparently antagonistic or incommensurable critical operations, assigning them an undoubted sectoral validity within itself, and thus at once cancelling and preserving them (10). He thus "short-circuit[s] the false problem of the priority of the economic over the sexual, or of sexual oppression over that of social class" (100). Patriarchy is an "illustration" (100) of his notion of metasynchronic, overlapping modes of production: "sexism and the patriarchal are to be grasped as the sedimentation and the virulent survival of forms of alienation specific to the oldest mode of production of human history with its division of labor between men and women" (100-101). Although there are no other references to feminism in The Political Unconscious, there is one reference to women that is worth noting: In discussing Levi-Strauss' study of the Caduveo he writes that "[their] nascent hierarchy is ... the place of the emergence, if not of political power in the strict sense, then at least of relations of domination: the inferior status of women" (78). Woman's status, for Jameson, then, is not political, at least not "in the strict sense." He adds, apparently without irony, that the Caduveo's "exogamous exchange appears to function in a non-hierarchical, essentially egalitarian way" (78).

As Kamboureli writes in the introduction to her anthology of Canadian multicultural writers, the paradox of editing a "representative" collection is that "inclusion is synonymous with exclusion" (12). Guillory makes this point in reverse to support his assertion that gender and race are not properly historical categories for rethinking the canon. He takes the Marxist position that these are mystified, apolitical categories. He argues: "the canonization of novels written by women was ... conditional upon the legitimation of the novel form, the canonization of a popular genre" (24).

Guillory comments, too, that the canon of "great works" takes its texts out of cultural and historical context to make them embody the "right ideas": the study of "great works" has been reduced "to a shallow rehearsal of contextless ideas; such 'ideas' turn out unsurprisingly to be nothing more than the clichés of right-wing ideology" (50).

Although he refers to himself as a "leftist," Graff, seems to endorse leaving one's politics at home, not bringing them into the classroom: "I doubt whether the curriculum ... can or should become an extension of the politics of the left." Indeed, not only does Graff
avoid commitment to leftist politics, he in fact betrays a humanist (pluralist and tolerant) accommodational strategy of conflict avoidance when he adds ingenuously that, "the question not addressed by proponents of 'the pedagogy of the oppressed' such as Paulo Freire and Henry Giroux is what is to be done with those constituencies which do not happen to agree with them that social transformation is the primary goal of education" (64).

While my point here is similar, I would argue that the “crisis” (as it is perceived on the right) was indeed instigated by the 60s explosion in counter-hegemonic thought and not only by the decline in the market value of the Humanities and its cultural capital. Moreover, while Guillory says the “opening” of the canon to heretofore excluded texts is “welcome and necessary” (28), he never satisfactorily explains how this is so given his argument against textual representation as liberal-pluralist mystification.

Federal cash transfers to the provinces for post-secondary education, health and welfare (via the Canada Health and Social Transfer plan) were cut $6.6 billion between 1995 and 1998 (and federal research grants were cut by $100 million between 1996 and 1998) (Lewington A7). The cut-backs of the 90s decade allowed a neoconservative mood to take firm hold in all levels of education.

According to a 2001 article in the CAUT Bulletin, Canada’s average undergrad arts tuition fees rose 126% between 1990/91 and 2000/01 (“University and College”). Across the disciplines, yearly tuition fees in Canada doubled throughout the 1990s to an average of $2,333 in 1997 (Galt A10). Provinces justified extreme tuition increases in terms of recent cutbacks in federal transfer payments. According to a June, 1999 article in the CAUT Bulletin, between 1993 and 1998 total public funding of universities in Canada decreased by 13.3% (“Canada’s Universities”). The University of Toronto, for example, increased fees by 20% in 1996/97. In a sign of increased privatization, in 1996, then University of Toronto president, Robert Prichard, called for complete deregulation demanding that responsibility for tuition fees be taken out of the hands of the government and put into the hands of the institutions (see Lynne Ainsworth).

See Readings’ analysis of the rhetoric of “excellence” as in keeping with the university’s emerging corporate ideology.

Davey also discusses a document published by BC’s Centre for Curriculum and Professional Development in August 1995, suggestively entitled “Outcomes-Based Education.”

Insofar as contemporary theory has grown out of philology (loosely, from philology to structuralism to poststructuralism), this divisiveness can be seen as having marked English departments in Britain and the United States since their inception in the late nineteenth century in terms of the disagreements between belletristic humanism and scientific philology. Indeed, as Margery Fee argues, to the extent that the development of English studies as a discipline in Canada relied on Arnoldianism, this European discourse was “adapted for resistance” as a patriotic defence against the “domination of Canadian universities by non-Canadians” (21), which was partly a specific defence against the philological focus of American English studies.

Heather Murray, too, argues that we lack “a communicable vision of what a theorized literary study might do or what useful work it might perform. By default, and under pressure, we often fall back on traditional defences of humanistic study. Too, we are often ill-equipped, albeit willing, to critique our own practices, to locate areas for reform and
resistance, and to form liaisons within and without the academy" (158).

31 The 1997 York University strike, for example, produced positive, assertive results for the faculty association. As Bill Bruneau, in his editorial in the June, 1997 issue of the CAUT Bulletin, puts it, the York University Faculty Association was “precedent-setting” for Canadian universities in that it not only made demands about salaries and retirement packages, but also more positive or intentional demands concerning equity and academic governance.

32 As large departments, English studies are relatively safe. In fact, Jo-Ann Wallace argues that “the long-term effects, in a period of government cutbacks to university funding, of expanding the already elastic mandate of English departments to include ‘cultural studies’ in their curricula” is not primarily a threat to English. Rather, she worries that “in the easy slippage of a ‘literary into cultural studies’ paradigm [Easthope]..., the smaller disciplines (art history, film studies, philosophy, etc.) are threatened.” She wonders: “what might the erosion of the traditional humanities disciplines – accomplished, in part, through an appropriation of some of their most vital work into English-department-based cultural studies programs – mean in a recessionary economy?” (508).

33 Atkins argues that theoretical discourse is itself an anti-humanist practice; because theory is a practice of “both self-consciousness and self-criticism,” it therefore “allows the various theorists to see their own stance as interested, positional, and strategic rather than objective, natural, or true” (11).

34 For example, Julie Rak points out that, while during the 1970s and 80s most critical work on Canadian literature was devoted to historical research, pedagogical practice remained focused on thematic criticism.

35 Indeed, Murray notes that, positioned as it is in a “counter-discursive or institutionally uncontaminated” elite discourse of enlightened specialists, theory has in some sense “strengthened rather than challenged an entrenched disciplinary distribution of knowledge and power and especially [has] reinforced the appeal to charismatic authority by which this distribution is traditionally justified” (Working 154).

36 F.R. Leavis declares his purpose in Education and the University (1943) as partly to question whether “English [has] been justifying its recognized position as chief of the humanities and its key responsibility for education?” (33).


38 Indeed, Heather Murray goes so far as to suggest that pedagogical studies might become English studies’ common concern: “as scholarly work in English studies becomes increasingly specialized and increasingly divergent it is pedagogy which may provide an area of common conversation and shared concern” (“Canon” 240).
Chapter Eight

Conclusion: Bildung and the Problem of Academic Freedom

In the university, as throughout capitalist society, a commitment to freedom in the absence of an equally strong commitment to social justice carries with it the seeds of even greater injustice.


We should think of academic freedom as an invitation to give up on identity in the hope of understanding and perhaps even assuming more than one.

— Edward Said, “Identity, Authority, and Freedom”

Revolutions are about constructing the conditions in which it would be in principle possible to discover and determine what one might become, not just the conditions in which one might freely express what one already is.

— Eagleton, “Self-Authoring Subjects”

The theory of the subject is linked directly to prevailing relations of power and therefore to how freedom is imagined. In the modern West, the idea of Bildung leaves a powerful legacy of freedom as the achievement of a radically autonomous and disaffiliated self. This legacy is particularly trenchant in the modern university and in the fraught ideological notion that legitimizes pedagogical power relations, academic freedom.

As I hope the preceding chapters have shown, Bildung, or the mature, modern subject as autonomous individual, is not an a priori given, as modern hegemony presents it and as it is largely taken to be, but rather it is a cultural construct that plays a significant ideological role in culture, politics and daily life. In this final chapter, I want to take this idea into the political realm of the cultural and pedagogical debates currently taking place in the university, some of which, at least in Canada, take place in the name of academic freedom. Underlying the debates about academic freedom are questions concerning pedagogy, subjectivity, and the notion of freedom itself. The idea of Bildung is deeply embedded in these issues and an excavation of its ideological history in pedagogical narratives reveals a site from which to re-think the idea of academic freedom.

Containing (Academic) Freedom

In Canada, discussions about the crisis in the university have been sharply divided between academic freedom on the one hand and equity (dismissed as “political correctness”) on the other. Indeed, recent events in Canadian universities have polarized the debate such that no
real conversation is taking place between the two sides. The controversy is marked by an impassable divisiveness whose boundaries are made impermeable by the prevailing definition of academic freedom.

Let me attempt to make this problem concrete. Having been asked to speak on students and academic freedom at a national conference in Saskatoon in 1996, I arrived ready to contribute to the urgent effort to preserve, in these anxious times, the notion of academic freedom. The paper I'd written was framed by what I believe is this effort's primary imperative: to redefine academic freedom in light of what Spanos calls the posthumanist "knowledge explosion" represented by the academy's inclusion of feminist, anti-racist, and queer knowledges and by the insights of poststructuralism and postmodernism. I thought that the cranky demonization of these new knowledges by the paranoid conspiracy theory of John Fekete, or the more tolerant humanist containment of them by Peter Emberley, for example, could safely be ignored as conservative strategies to preserve the interests of the status quo, and that the conference could begin to consider how to define academic freedom for the multicultural and "inclusive" university. I was ready to offer my version of how (for students) a newly configured academic freedom might be defined and practiced. However, when Michiel Horn, an acknowledged authority on academic freedom in Canada, established the terms of the debate in his plenary address by listing the "political correctness" of "feminism and minorities" among the "threats" to academic freedom, it became clear that the new knowledges were not going to be allowed to confound the inviolable notion of academic freedom.

This is not to suggest that the conference disqualified any critique of the abiding concept of academic freedom: many of the papers challenged the liberal-humanist assumptions on which the concept rests. Rather, it revealed that what urgently needs to be considered is that, because the conventional concept of academic freedom as laid out by Horn cannot, by definition, be qualified, any critique of these assumptions would remain outside academic freedom's boundaries. In this way, the incident exemplifies the problem with academic freedom, broadly speaking. So imbricated is the concept with the idea of a proper academic or scholarly disposition per se, that to question academic freedom is to be, ipso facto, unacademic. One must be either for or against it: any scrutiny of its axioms is seen as invalidating its absolutism and therefore swiftly dismissed as its antithesis and enemy.

It seems to me deeply ironic that while one of the uncontested purposes of academic freedom is to foster the development of new knowledges those knowledges that would interrogate academic freedom from the inside are so vehemently resisted by its custodians. Yet, according to Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, given the "natural conservatism of
academics” (104), this resistance is the fate of all new knowledges, and, indeed, the problem which academic freedom should itself seek to directly address; she puts it this way:

Our dilemma is that, on the one hand, we want to assure academics and intellectuals freedom from external interference with their professional activities, while on the other hand, we want to avoid placing judgment in the hands of a self-perpetuating academic elite, which must form their judgments following existing standards of competence. This means that reforms or transformations of any kind, whether political or intellectual, are at an enormous disadvantage. The fate of the scientific innovator is the same as that of the political reformer or dissident: they are all judged by the theories they are attacking. (103)

When the theories being challenged are concerned with academic freedom itself, moreover, our dilemma is doubled. The custodians of academic freedom protect its boundaries by appealing, recursively, to the absolutism of academic freedom.²

Also ironic is the fact that these guardians read the recent controversy over the definition of academic freedom in Canada not as a sign that conventional academic freedom has failed, but rather as a sign that there is a conspiracy afoot to destroy our most basic “human rights.” A kind of “continuum argument”³ equates the extremes of wrongheaded attempts to legislate censorship such as the Ontario Zero Tolerance paper with a whole range of feminist and post-colonial academic knowledges. In this context, what is surprising is that those most vehement about the inherent value of academic freedom as a guarantee of the uninhibited cultivation of new ideas proceed as if the epistemological legitimation crisis engendered by the fruitful insights of posthumanist knowledges over the last thirty years or so had not taken place. Feminist, anti-racist, and queer theories most notably confound the invisible axioms of academic freedom in its conventional outlines. As Spanos remarks, “the current crisis in the university has, in fact, been precipitated in large part by the refusal of the institutional custodians of culture to examine the intellectual assumptions that inform their ‘disinterested’ inquiry, which is to say, to acknowledge the play of difference” (“Uses” 12). Heterogeneity defies the homogeneity of the Bildung-subject that grounds and legitimizes academic freedom and its epistemology. Hence, as Edward Said argues, the wielding of academic freedom is part of a sometimes “very hostile” (2) reaction to the “extraordinary, almost Copernican change in the general intellectual consciousness” (2) brought on by the explosion of new knowledges.⁴

Significantly, students are implicitly lumped in with these provocative new knowledges. The student body is positioned as the enemy of academic freedom not only
because the new fee-based university increases student demand for internal accountability, but also because, for the entrenched status quo, the students' heterogeneity, or what Readings calls their "embodiment" — along with their demands for recognition of their heterogeneity — represents the evils of "biopolitics" (to use Fekete's preferred term of derision) which fundamentally challenges academic freedom. In their multiple embodiment students constantly threaten to contaminate the unified, disembodied, Bildung-subject modern pedagogy seeks to construct and academic freedom to contain. While students are essential to pedagogy (without them there would be no school) they are, at the same time, an affront to the pedagogical project and must be constantly recontained, or "matured" as Emberley puts it.

Before proceeding to a reconsideration of an academic freedom that would include students, it is useful to examine the premises that legitimize their exclusion. The concept of academic freedom is woefully undertheorized. The situation has not much changed since John Searle pointed out in 1972 that it is "[surprising] to discover that there is a scarcity of recent theoretical discussion of the subject [of academic freedom]" (86). In fact, the academy takes it for granted: since its advocates "already know what academic freedom is, the problem is to defend it, not to analyze it or define it" (86). Champions of academic freedom typically do not define or argue their terms in the positive sense; instead, examples of academic repression and the failures of due process are catalogued, disapproval registered, and an axiological and absolute notion of academic freedom reasserted. The concept is defined negatively so that academic repression gives academic freedom its content. Indeed, like the "famous judge in the obscenity case who said he could not define obscenity but he knew it when he saw it[, most] academics would be hard pressed to define academic freedom, but they know violations of it when they see them" (Searle 86). Academic freedom itself requires no argument: one of those grand and noble Truths, it speaks for itself and needs no legitimation.

In fact, academic freedom appears not to be a fundamental principle, but rather a post-rationalization legitimizing the authority and autonomy of the intellectual. It is, recursively, its own best defense. Those who have the resources to act freely "benefit from a ready-made rationalization of their privileges: They are simply making use of their freedom" (Ollman 54). In this way, intellectual autonomy is not, as its advocates claim, a given of university culture, but rather something awarded to those invested with authority. It ratifies the achievement of pedagogical Bildung; as Guillory points out, "the traditional intellectual's self-identification seems to be equated in the professional imaginary with autonomy itself" ("Literary" 130), and academic freedom underwrites the epistemological and pedagogical authority vested in that autonomy.
Insofar as academic freedom is posited as a negative freedom of non-interference, it forms its own self-enclosed, hermetic system – to question it is to violate it. Because it takes absolute autonomy as its first principle, by definition, it cannot be qualified. Horn, for example, responds to the 1967 CAUT qualification that “the right to academic freedom carries with it the duty to use that freedom in a responsible way” (“Mildew” 460) with terse dismissal: “the word ‘responsibility’ allows a range of definitions, some of them hostile to freedom of expression” (“Mildew” 460). It could well be argued, of course, that the meaning of “freedom” is equally, if not more, semantically unstable, yet its enabling principles are taken for granted. Thus, in rather circular fashion, since the premise of autonomy on which academic freedom stands or falls is a self-legitimating first principle and therefore self-perpetuating, longevity seems to be academic freedom’s chief justification. The fact that definitions of academic freedom have remained more or less the same despite changes in the university is seen not as a failure of the concept demanding a redefinition of academic freedom, but rather as attesting to its self-evident and transcendent status.  

Negative And Positive (Academic) Freedom

When pressed to define what we mean by “freedom” we commonly add the preposition “to” or “from.” In terms of academic freedom, “freedom to” signifies the freedom to express one’s thoughts, beliefs, opinions, and “freedom from” signifies the freedom from the repression of those expressions. These definitions would intuitively appear to be two sides of the same coin. But what I want to emphasize here is that the difference is critical. For Isaiah Berlin, in his famous essay on political freedom, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” the concepts of “negative freedom” (freedom from) and “positive freedom” (freedom to), though often combined in a single system, are informed by fundamentally discrete premises. Distinguishing between them can help clarify what is at stake in efforts to preserve the prevailing concept of academic freedom.

Berlin defines negative freedom as non-interference: “liberty in this sense means liberty from; absence of interference beyond the shifting, but always recognizable, frontier” (127). This frontier delimits a “minimum area” inside which the individual is guaranteed absolute independence. Behind negative freedom lies the postulate that unfreedom is social (even if it takes the form of self-censorship, it is an internalization of social constraints), while freedom is a pure individual autonomy unhampered by servitude to or dependence on the social and spontaneously acting of its own volition.

While negative freedom believes freedom needs only be defended, positive freedom
believes it must be created. Positive freedom is concerned not with the question, “How far does government interfere with me?” but rather with the question, “who governs me?” (130). While, advocates of negative freedom, as Berlin puts it, “want to curb authority as such” (166), advocates of positive freedom, conversely, “want [authority] placed in their own hands” (166). Insisting, therefore, that we must distinguish between freedom itself and the conditions that make freedom possible, Berlin argues that “negative freedom is worth little without sufficient conditions for [its] active exercise” (lviii); positive freedom provides the opportunity for forging those conditions (130). In other words, one is not free simply because nothing stands in the way of one’s freedom. While negative freedom is concerned with circumscribing individual rights and liberties, positive freedom responds to a desire to participate in creating the conditions of freedom, and those conditions are articulated in a social context. Against the refusal of the intersubjective or interdiscursive, positive freedom finds its conditions of possibility in the realm of the social.8

While the demarcation between negative and positive freedom is not always definite and the two are often deeply imbricated, they are grounded in opposing theories of subjectivity. While negative freedom believes the self is discovered, positive freedom believes the “self” is constructed. Negative freedom imagines a primal self more or less buried under layers of false consciousness. While this view posits an atomistic, private, disaffiliated subject, positive freedom conceives of the subject as “something wider than the individual... as a social ‘whole’ of which the individual is an element or aspect” (Berlin 132). As Albrecht Wellmer puts it, the distinction between negative and positive freedom (which he prefers to call “individualist” and “communalist” theories) is fundamental at the anthropological and epistemological levels (227), for every theory of freedom presupposes a theory of the subject. Following Berlin, Wellmer argues that “individualist theories take isolated individuals, characterized by certain natural rights and a goal-oriented rationality, as their starting point: they try to construe political institutions ... as the result of a contract between autonomous individuals” (228). This individual is perhaps most succinctly expressed by Humboldt. In the context of advocating a laissez faire government in The Sphere and Duties of Government, he argues that government should provide only negative freedom: the “solicitude” of the state in any “positive” way, he says, is detrimental; it “hinders ... the development of Individuality” (35). Social engagement is a hindrance to freedom: “men are not to unite themselves together in order to forego any portion of their individuality, but only to lessen the exclusiveness of their isolation” (35-36). Freedom lies in disaffiliation: for Humboldt, social intercourse threatens individuals with the loss of self and hence of liberty. The apogee of this rugged individualism can be seen in the contemporary American system. The kind of negative freedom exemplified by
the American view of democracy and individual rights is grounded in the disaffiliated and disembodied self or what Joan Copjec calls the "belief that there is a basic humanity unaltered by the diversity of the citizens who share in it" (39). This deep and essential self, by participating in the universal characteristic of autonomous agency, is defined negatively. Copjec explains:

Democracy is the universal quantifier by which America — the "melting pot," the "nation of immigrants" — constitutes itself as a nation. If all our citizens can be said to be Americans, this is not because we share any positive characteristics, but rather because we have all been given the right to shed these characteristics, to present ourselves as disembodied before the law. I divest myself of my positive identity, therefore I am a citizen. This is the peculiar logic of democracy. (39)

In this view, the universally autonomous self is essential to democracy itself.

Against this radically autonomous view, communalist theories, as Wellmer argues, question whether the "notion of a human individual outside society, an individual who is not constituted as an individual by becoming socialized as a member of an intersubjective form of life, is an adequate starting point for political theory" (228). Although Wellmer's concern is with political freedom broadly speaking, the implications of these conceptions of the subject for academic freedom are clearly analogous, especially when compounded by the seductive notion of the university as an elite enclave that rises above society.

Negative freedom grounds an epistemology that assumes knowledge, like the individual, is autonomous. In this view, universal rationality, to which all subjects, as individuals, have access, guarantees knowledge's sovereignty. Truth, as academic freedom's transcendental signifier, is figured as disinterested and neutral; it is a stable product, free of the messy vicissitudes of the everyday and contingent. By extension, arguments defending the university as a "meritocracy" assume that the criteria of judgment are ideologically innocent. Like the autonomous subject of negative freedom, it shores itself up against any implication with the ideological — it is disengaged, disembedded, disaffiliated. The concept of academic freedom protects the binary logic that opposes ideological power and disinterested knowledge. As Foucault sees it, the university is part of a "whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests" (27). Power, therefore, is hidden in the "benign" practices of knowledge, including, or especially, in modern education. In terms of academic freedom, insofar as its defenders insist that truth and power, or knowledge and politics, are distinct, academic repression is seen as the distortion of the otherwise innocent truth. In this view,
(academic) freedom can be assessed only negatively.

What is perhaps most threatening to the conventional idea of academic freedom is the postmodern thesis that there is no transcendental or disinterested knowledge and therefore no autonomous, sovereign proprietor of that knowledge. Academic freedom accords a special place to the autonomous and enlightened intellectual where he or she, to follow the prevailing rhetoric, “pursues, teaches, and disseminates knowledge without interference.” In this sense, academic freedom safeguards knowledge in terms of the “possessive individualism” of negative freedom, which, according to Berlin,

is always represented as something good without qualification — always leading to the best possible consequences, always likely to promote my 'highest' self, always in harmony with the true laws of my own 'real' nature or those of my society and so on, ... at the cost of obscuring profound differences. (lvii)

The autonomous knowledge of academic freedom excludes or represses those embodied, intersubjective, socially-involved, “interested” knowledges that fail to conform to the neutrality of truth.

The heteronomous subject of positive freedom, conversely, takes knowledge to be discursively and intersubjectively produced. As outlined in the preceding chapter, the notion of disinterested knowledge and its guardianship by the university reached a crisis in the 1960s; Said explains:

Until the late 1960s, it was assumed by most people that what took place within university precincts was removed from any steady, or cooperative, or — in the worst case — collusive association with the world outside. Yet because the experience of war in Vietnam was so powerful, and because there was so much traffic between the academy and the institutions of government and power, the veil was rent, so to speak. (4)

“Academic freedom,” as Said argues, was the name given to the movement that has subsequently attempted to reclaim the myth of autonomous knowledge for the university. The current backlash buttresses itself against the new knowledges that emerged at this time by reference to a mythical tradition of disinterested knowledge as the rightful possession of an intellectual elite. The greatest achievement of post-humanist thought is that it deconstructs the binary logic that opposes truth and power: it exposes the ideology “that, on the one hand, power is always visible/repressive and distorts truth and, on the other, that truth is external to and the adversary of power” (Spanos End 179). Post-humanist linguistic theory showed that reason is not an *a priori* constituent of the subject; instead, reason and the rational subject are constructed by and in language. Against the view of the subject as
sovereign producer and proprietor of autonomous knowledges, the subject is seen as produced by, and simultaneously reproducing, the knowledges that discipline its subjectivity and its social relations; as Wellmer contends, “we cannot explain what rationality is except by referring to the intersubjectivity of forms of life which is prefigured in the intersubjectivity of the symbolic medium—language—through which forms of life are constituted” (229). In this view, intellectual freedom cannot be posited in terms of possessive individualism. Knowledge is produced and disseminated by individuals, to be sure, but always and only in the context of other subjects and the complex social contexts in which they are embedded (individualism itself is a product of the culture from which it derives). Thus, positive, or “communalist,” theories posit that individuals, “in their very individuality” are not autonomous, but rather “are constituted and, as it were, permeated by the culture traditions, and institutions of the society to which they belong” (Wellmer 228). Advocates of positive freedom would argue that, while every theory of freedom presupposes a theory of the subject, the ideology of freedom reproduces, in turn, that (presupposed) subject.

In times of spontaneous consent to hegemony, there is no felt need to practice positive freedom because autonomous individuals believe themselves to be already in possession of liberté. At times of crisis, freedom is explicitly invoked, but it is a negative freedom wielded against the repressive apparatus. Negative liberty, however, is not immune to the accommodational strategies of hegemony. Although Berlin did not use the term, he showed how hegemony recuperates or accommodates the practices of negative liberty, and his analysis therefore takes part in a more general posthumanist reconceptualization of subjectivity and its relation to power. In the following passage, Berlin’s parenthetical terms are analogous to Althusser’s ISAs while the terms outside the parentheses are analogous to his RSAs:

If the tyrant (or ‘hidden persuader’) manages to condition his subjects (or customers) into losing their original wishes and embrace (‘internalize’) the form of life he has invented for them, he will, on this definition, have succeeded in liberating them. He will, no doubt, have made them feel free. (139-40)

Indeed, Berlin’s notion of the internalization of the hegemonic “forms of life” is not dissimilar to Althusser’s central insight that, through interpellation by the ISAs, individuals are produced as subjects, that consciousness is “spoken by” ideology (160). Negative liberty is an ideological illusion that ensures hegemonic consent.

While negative freedom is idealistic insofar as, in John McGowan’s words, it “must involve the human creation of purposes not yet forged” (52), positive freedom involves a
pragmatic but dynamic process “in which the individual discovers and fulfills her complete potential [for freedom] within the framework offered by the social order” (51). Positive freedom is grounded not in an abstract theory of an essential self, but rather in the concrete negotiations of interrelationship. It is here that a rethinking of academic freedom for the inclusive university might begin. Quentin Skinner, in his 1987 essay on the idea of negative liberty, argues rightly that a critique of the assumption “that the only coherent idea of liberty is the negative one of being unconstrained” (194) is “long overdue” (193). No longer adequate, academic freedom needs to be reconfigured for the new university, and the place to begin this reconfiguration is in denaturalizing “negative freedom” and the autonomous Bildung-subject whose borders it is meant to safeguard. The post-humanist re-evaluation of power/knowledge provides a more critical means of theorizing academic freedom that resists Bildung. Against a negative theory of power, Foucault proffers a positive theory that sees power not simply as restricting or crushing freedom, but rather as producing its possibility. When asked in an interview how he reconciles his notion of power as diffuse and non-binary with his statement in Power/Knowledge that “where there is power, there is resistance,” Foucault argues thus:

> I am not positing a substance of resistance versus a substance of power. I am just saying: as soon as there is a power relation there is a possibility of resistance. We can never be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy. ("Power and Sex" 123)

It is therefore within power and not against it that the possibility of resistance as the exercise of positive freedom can be located. Positive academic freedom would account for the social relations in which epistemology and pedagogy are—or might be—practiced. “Justice,” as Peter McLaren puts it, “does not already exist simply because laws exist. Justice needs to be continually created, constantly struggled for” (“Multiculturalism” 201); academic freedom, in this view, is not simply asserted against repression, but must be constantly negotiated with responsibility and good will. Academic freedom would therefore be situated in institutional history, within a system of pedagogy and of education that serves particular social, cultural and political purposes. What these purposes are, and what they might be, determines the actual meaning of academic freedom and its value to the university’s constituents.

**Lernfreiheit and Bildung**

Typically, academic freedom is conceived in terms of the professor as the monological producer of knowledge. Indeed, it is usually considered not in terms of pedagogy at all,
but rather in terms of professorial research. So what, then, is academic freedom for students? Is it simply an abridged version of the professoriate’s academic freedom? Or does it require a different point of view? Considering academic freedom from students’ perspective raises interesting questions about epistemology and about what I am calling “negative” and “positive” notions of academic freedom. In terms of conventional conceptions of academic freedom, it is difficult to account for students at all, except insofar as they “benefit from the academic freedom of the faculty” (Ernest Van der Haag, Qtd. in Searle 95). When commentators do attempt to account for students, Lernfriheit (freedom to learn) is typically interpreted negatively to mean the freedom from interference of the learning process. Not only does this interpretation usually amount to no more than contentless rhetoric, but also, insofar as the corollary to Lernfriheit is Lehrfriheit (freedom to teach), the hierarchical and paternalistic status of the pedagogical relationship means that the freedom to teach can (and often does) trump the freedom to learn. The following is a typical rationalization for the limits of students’ academic freedom asserted by an American academic, John Passmore:

students’ commitment to university life is ... short-lived. Their experience, too, is limited. They are likely to be impressed by superficial brilliance, to suppose that they are being well taught when in fact they are being very badly taught, to be caught up by passing fashions, to be attracted to the fanatic or to anyone who promises simple solutions to the problems that properly worry them. All these considerations suggest that their judgment ought not to be allotted the same weight as the judgment of academics, especially in respect to the selection of teachers. (71-72)

Thus, academic freedom legislates between knowledge and its “other,” non-knowledge, or ignorance. When students don’t know what they want (to know), and are too distracted by the trendy to know what’s good for them (to know), they can hardly be allowed to exercise their freedom. Indeed, the repression of students’ academic freedom can sometimes come under the guise of the rightful exercise of the professor’s academic freedom: a freedom for the teacher to exercise his or her authorized, “disinterested” knowledge and trump the student’s illegitimate, “interested” (non)-knowledge. The following passage comes from Sidney Hook, diehard defender of the famous Stanford course in Western Civilization in 1988

students should be consulted on any matter that affects them, but the faculty, which confers their degrees, bears the ultimate responsibility for deciding what to teach them, how, and when. A faculty cannot surrender its authority to pressure groups inside or outside the university without stultification.
Thus, academic freedom is not a given of scholarly life, but rather something gradually eked out by hierarchical passage through the university. And the Bildungsprozess, based on a maturity/immaturity binary, legitimates the "naturalness" of this passage. As Malcolm Tight puts it, in the university, "democracy ... is shackled to the master-apprenticeship model" (116). Bildung reproduces the binary opposition teacher/student, maturity/youth, knowledge/ignorance that informs the humanist pedagogical tradition and the notion of academic freedom that provides its rationale. Evoking the history of the idea of Bildung, Spanos denounces the traditional relationship between the scholar-teacher and the student which in order to facilitate "deliverance" from the bondage of uncultivated passion puts the former in a privilege (supervisory) position over the latter. The essential — because "naturally" given — assumption informing the raison d'etre of the traditional humanist university, the repository of the mature fruits of civilizations, is that it constitutes a site offering the uncultivated or "ignorant" individual student an "opportunity" for "self-fulfillment. (End 199)

Thus, academic freedom is not, as its defenders insist, a neutral axiom of university culture, but rather an ideology protecting and reproducing unequal power relations.

Let me caution that I am far from advocating a homogeneous definition of academic freedom that would apply across the board. To the contrary, I want to argue that this is neither desirable nor possible. A pure and absolute conception of negative freedom "assumes equality in the conditions that permit people to use their freedom" (Ollman 53), and, since these conditions do not obtain in the university, since the practice of a universal academic freedom would confer differential freedoms and impose differential limits depending on one's place in the university's hierarchical configurations, academic freedom must be redefined accordingly. Moreover, we need to jettison the quantitative idea of more or less academic freedom, where tenure is the brass ring of intellectual autonomy, and every position there under has proportionately less right to academic freedom in relation to it. The ideal of academic freedom in these terms is useful only to the tenured professor and, given uneven power relations, can too easily become a tool of academic repression. Although even Horn writes that "pulling rank has no legitimate place in academic debate" (Academic 6) and that bullying or harassment are not justified by academic freedom (as Fekete would insist), the ways of power in the pedagogical relation can be subtle.

What I want to posit here, then, is a distinct arena where academic freedom might be
rethought. But I would hope too that this rethinking of the student's relation to academic freedom, this "thinking from below," as it were, has relevancy not only for students. In fact, since I want to conceptualize this freedom positively, and since, as McGowan puts it "individuals cannot have purposes apart from the social relations that constitute them" (52), it will necessarily be configured as an intersubjective and socially contextualized academic freedom. And, since positive freedom posits subjectivity as socially and discursively produced, any account of the particular inflections of a student academic freedom would have to account for the particular ways in which the student as subject is produced.

I think students still believe they are experiencing a kind of freedom precipitated by the heterogeneous energies released by the Vietnam decade. To recall Rousseau, the "forms of freedom" are preserved in the regulation of students so that they believe themselves to be free; thus, they experience "freedom" insofar as the humanist university has tolerated and accommodated their differences (disciplinarity, for example, allows work in feminism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, and so on without troubling the university's overriding Bildung narrative). But there is also, I think, a desire to release oppositional knowledge from its neutralization by hegemonic accommodational strategies. That is, as Readings argues — and as recent strategies of containment would attest — a desire to embody the differential subjectivities of the inclusive university. There is a growing refusal of consent, as evidenced, for example, by the recent attempts to define pedagogical "chilly climates." While the swift polarization of the chilly climate incident in the University of Victoria Political Science department is well known, its initial urge was a counter-hegemonic resistance to the subtle and quotidian repression of "alternative" knowledges. It was an exercise in positive (academic) freedom insofar as positive freedom allows for a critique of power as a positive or productive force. The project (at least initially) was defined in terms not of negative autonomy, but rather of positive heteronomy. It signified, in other words, an attempt to put the new knowledges of the "inclusive university" into practice.

Practicing Positive Freedom

The derailment of Bildung, especially in Humanities departments, has reoriented the very position of the Humanities — a new orientation no longer served by the traditional notion of academic freedom. Indeed, the resistance to Bildung has itself served to reorient the Humanities "away from the position of guardian of reason and servant of tradition, toward a more activist stance within society" (Holland and Lambropoulos 5). The derailment of Bildung has made the practice of positive freedom possible.
I want to suggest three ways in which a positive, or socially configured, counter-hegemonic academic freedom might be practiced by students epistemologically, politically, and pedagogically. And I want to emphasize that this freedom can only be practiced intersubjectively; in other words, the practice of academic freedom, or what I'd like to call "pedagogical freedom," is understood not as a scene of autonomy and authority, but rather, to borrow from Readings, as "a network of obligations" (19) that involves both students and teachers. This network constitutes what Bill Bruneau calls an "intentional community" ("Makings"), a university community that is "under constant reconstruction" or "continuous reformation to fit the high purpose that keeps people together" (E-mail). Within this community a sense of positive pedagogical purpose would provide the driving force that forges and sustains intentional communities.

First, in relation to the public sphere: students' freedom to make their own socially- and culturally-configured knowledges relevant, rather than repressing their knowledges in order to conform either to hegemonic knowledge or to instrumental relevancy, and to do so in their own time rather than in accordance with an age-based system of conformity and homogeneity.¹⁴

Secondly, on the administrative level: students' freedom to represent their interests beyond tokenism; this means representation on all committees: policy, graduate, library, and hiring committees, because the student body does know what it wants however self-censored or repressed its desires might be. That is, students require the freedom to authorize their own desires.

Lastly, on the departmental level, that is, pedagogically (and here the concomitant responsibilities of the teacher are clear): students should have the freedom to think critically. In this way, the definition of academic freedom could move away from the traditional, negative one of freedom from interference to a more positive definition such as that offered by Jim Turk, as quoted in a May 2001 article in the CAUT Bulletin: "the right to raise disturbing questions and provocative challenges to cherished beliefs of society and to engage in critical teaching and research." ("Academic"). Moreover, critical thinking can only fully take place in an atmosphere — to invoke that provocative term — of mutual respect and mutual recognition. Although his terms have a broader context, the following passage from Berlin is apposite to the recent controversies about classroom "climates" and "atmospheres" in Canadian universities:

What oppressed classes or nationalities, as a rule, demand is neither simply unhampered liberty of action for their members, nor, above everything, equality of social or economic opportunity, still less assignment of a place in a frictionless, organic state devised by the rational lawgiver.
What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition (of their class or nation, or colour or race) as an independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance with it (whether it is good or legitimate, or not), and not to be ruled, educated, guided, with however light a hand, as being not quite fully human and therefore not quite fully free. (156-157)

By “mutual respect,” then, I do not mean a weak, accommodational nod to “political correctness.” To foster critical thinking is by no means to filter out offense (Derrida’s “murderous perfidy of academic politeness”), but neither is it to advocate offensiveness. Although the Ontario Zero Tolerance paper’s attempt to legislate censorship was an affront to any notion of academic freedom, Fekete’s “right to offend” petition, a knee-jerk reaction to the paper, is irresponsible in the extreme. Of course, to some extent, Fekete uses hyperbole for rhetorical effect, yet the us/them binary opposition that informs his thinking is unmistakable: he sets the professors’ rights and freedoms over and against those of the students. “The lines,” to borrow from Ann Hartman, “have been sharply drawn: the right to freedom of speech versus the right not to be denigrated, threatened or harassed” (275). To consciously offend others, as Fekete advocates, is to refuse, in the name of “individual rights,” responsibility for the discursive authority the position of teacher affords. It is surely one of the basic premises of pedagogy that words have effects, and as Hartman points out, those who defend academic freedom “tend to trivialize this power” (275). For an educator to deny the material effects of language and to deny responsibility for these effects is, at best, disingenuous.

With (academic) freedom comes the challenge of responsibility. What is most urgently needed in this context is a recognition that in hegemonic systems, of which the school is exemplary, power is exercised silently on the level of the everyday. Therein the teacher occupies a powerful position. The professoriate, especially the tenured body, lays claim to significant cultural capital, and, according to Maria-Regina Kecht, “once we understand that cultural hegemony is decisive in the noncoercive maintenance of any sociopolitical system, we must recognize what great responsibility rests on us as teachers and critics” (7). It is only with negative freedom that academic freedom comes without responsibility to one’s intersubjective others. Pedagogy produces subjects; to deny the constitutive power of the pedagogical relationship is to refuse responsibility. This refusal is, above all, a strategy for shoring up the humanist subject of negative freedom: “autonomy, as freedom from obligation to others, holds out the impossible imagination of subjective self-identity: I will no longer be torn up, divided from myself by my responsibilities to others” (Readings 186). Indeed, it is perhaps one of modernity’s
definitive contradictions that the “maturity” towards which Bildung compels subjects is a version of irresponsible childishness. Since self-sustaining autonomy is the goal of education in Rousseau’s Émile, it is not surprising, as Stephen Heath points out, that Émile’s education “takes place ‘outside,’ in the country, beyond all social contact” (17). Bildung’s ideal, from the teacher’s or adult’s point of view, is the disengagement of early childhood (or of the childhood pre-Symbolic). As Heath argues,

the child is conceived as the very embodiment of the ideal and the reflection of some unchanging and inviolable value ... and the adult recognises childhood as ground and goal, the certainty of his or her own value, a freedom of self (both enjoyment of the desired ideal self and release from the constraints of the socially interactive and constrained adult self...). (18)

A childish “freedom,” then, which education is supposed to cultivate is, as it is for the noble savage, ultimately outside of and uncorrupted by the social. Childhood, in this Rousseauian model to which pedagogy still subscribes, is “a precious reality from which we are separated by adulthood and to which we turn back for some true identity, for which we yearn as our very essence” (17-18). Freedom, in this way, is an attempt to return to an imaginary lost innocence prior to the subject’s imbrication in the social and in a network of relations and responsibilities. Pedagogy, in this view, is charged with the (impossible) task of discovering the true essence of the subject as “inner child.” Freedom, therefore, is a version of negative freedom, a reactive escape from adult sociality and its inevitable responsibilities. Conversely, to accept responsibility for one’s others is to act positively from an embedded position of social and cultural adulthood. To assume responsibility for the effects of one’s discourse is not only to admit that one’s discourse is (always) ideological, but also to disqualify the autonomous individualism that is supposed to guarantee the disinterestedness of that discourse.

At the Saskatoon conference referred to above, Professor Brown closed his talk by regretting that “we now have to choose our words very carefully.” But is careful attention to language not a primary obligation of the teacher in even the most conventional notion of responsible scholarly method? Critical thinking certainly requires close attention to language. Teachers have a responsibility to choose their words carefully not only for the sake of those students who take offense to sexism, racism, homophobia and so on, but for the sake of those who don’t. If one of the functions of the university is to challenge received ideas, then the pedagogical apparatus is obligated to ensure that the university affords the freedom to do so for all its constituents. Spanos argues that a truly oppositional pedagogy would be comprised not only of a negative critique, but also of a “projective” phase: the exploration of differential energies,
This exploration does not mean creating a harmonious atmosphere free of conflict, as Fekete pretends to think, but rather an atmosphere where mutual respect for critical thought affords students the positive freedom to challenge whatever ideas might be presented in the classroom.

By "critical thinking," then, I mean not only the opportunity for students to think critically about hegemonic knowledges and an obligation to think critically about their own knowledges, but also an opportunity and an obligation to think critically about knowledge itself, about the ways in which hegemonic epistemology legislates what knowledge is proper to academic freedom. This kind of critical thinking about the institutionalization of knowledge is especially urgent during this time of increasing privatization, corporatization and casualization in the university. And this kind of self-conscious thinking does not have to wait until graduate studies to be applied retrospectively against knowledge already acquired; instead, it can become a habit, a habitual way of thinking throughout all school levels. In this regard, a passage from Richard Meisler’s anecdotal book on pedagogy, *Trying Freedom*, is fitting:

I have never met a teacher who did not believe in freedom for students. Elementary schoolteachers believe that freedom is appropriate in college and graduate school, for students will then have the background to use it well. College professors say that it is hopeless to give their students freedom, for it all must begin in kindergarten. If it does not start back there, students will never require the necessary habits. (79)

Critical thinking would include consideration of the ways that pedagogy, too, legislates academic freedom and repression, so that students, throughout their schooling, can unlearn the habitual passivity of hegemonic consent.

This critical thinking would draw attention, finally, to what Lusted calls “the invisibility of pedagogy in education” (2). That is, in rejecting the banking or transmission model that positions “the teacher as functionary ..., the learner as ‘empty vessel’ or passive respondent, [and] knowledge as immutable material to impart” (Lusted 3), it would instead foreground pedagogy as something constantly produced in the exchange between teacher and learner, a moment of transformation which each produces and in which each is responsible. To reverse our terms for a moment, the responsible practice of positive freedom in the classroom would involve what Kamboureli, citing Barbara Johnson, calls “negative pedagogy” (*Scandalous* 25), a pedagogy that disrupts the usual binary between
learner and teacher and acknowledges that "what we know may already be contaminated by what we do not know, and vice versa" (Scandalous 25). Responsibility, in this way, means not a progressivist position that "leads to teleological narratives" (Scandalous 25), but rather a recognition that pedagogy, like narrative, is endless. In Readings words, "we never really 'grow up,' never become fully autonomous and capable of cognitive determination. As a result, we can never settle our obligations to other people. There is no emancipation from our bonds to other people" (189). So, too, is pedagogical responsibility indeterminate and endless. What conventional pedagogy denies is that the teaching/learning process functions not by the parceling out of knowledge as product, but rather by its inability to fulfill the desire to know: it is a process perpetuated by the withholding rather than the transmission of knowledge. As Angela Moger argues, pedagogy "works by multiplying the enigmas (obstacles) rather than by eliminating them" (136). It is the constant denial of fulfillment which propels pedagogy as narrative: "if the immediate goal of teaching is the satisfaction of the quest for knowledge, it can also be said that its fundamental goal is the denial of that satisfaction in favor of the renewal of questing itself" (136). Like narrative, then, pedagogy would cease to exist were it to fulfill its obligation to impart knowledge, as the humanist proponents of academic freedom want to believe it does: "if it is true that pedagogy and narrative are subject to the same double bind which immobilizes desire – they must not perform the closure which it is definitionally their function to perform" (136). In Bildung, conversely, the learner's desire is "redirected" to higher purposes, as Emberley puts it, in accordance with hegemonic goals. The critical practice of a positive, pedagogical freedom, therefore, would not obscure the historical narrative of Bildung, otherwise taken to be natural and neutral, that produces the teacher/student relation as a power relation and knowledge as possessive individualism. It is here, with a consciousness of the pedagogical process – in the classroom, and not just in theory – that a truly critical pedagogy could be put into practice.

Pedagogical Freedom

While the strategies of a positive or "pedagogical" freedom I propose here are quite simple, their implementation requires a fundamental shift in thinking about subjectivity and agency. Throughout this study I have argued against the notion of a binary opposition to power. Yet, if power cannot be simply opposed, how do subjects resist it? How do they practice positive (pedagogical) freedom? If subjects are no more than the products of the culture in which they are caught up, how do they exercise agency? What I want to reiterate
here is that a concept of positive freedom allows for a theory of agency that doesn’t oppose freedom binarily to power. With positive freedom, resistance is possible in a way that it is not with negative freedom.

The categorization of freedom as negative and positive corresponds to what Eagleton summarizes as two basic views of ideology. In *Ideology: An Introduction*, he traces a distinction, “between the negative and the positive sense of ideology: ideology as thought which has become unstuck from reality, as opposed to ideology as ideas in the active service of a class’s interests” (120). In the first instance, ideology is taken to be “false consciousness”; that is, it assumes there is an autonomous and neutral “reality” unsullied by political partisanship – a clear and enlightened place wherein freedom can live. This is that taken-for-granted place Bourdieu calls the *doxa*. Ideology in the second sense assumes that no position is ever ideologically neutral, that ideologies are actively constructed in the interests of various groups, whether dominant or not, and that they cannot be legitimated by an objective or neutral appeal to truth. The myth of the autonomy of thought, in other words, is itself a powerful ideology. The dilemma, however, is a problem only when one tries to solve it from the perspective of negative ideology. Negative defenses or heterodoxies against what is perceived as immutable only reinforce the status quo and, in fact, produce new, tenacious orthodoxies. The problem becomes moot, however, when the ideology (or counter-ideology) is perceived in post-humanist, “positive” terms, as culturally constructed, historically contingent, and therefore mutable.

With this concept of ideology comes a way of perceiving subjectivity that is compatible with a model of positive freedom. While a notion of positive freedom rejects the disaffiliated individual of negative freedom and its *Bildungsprozess*, it does not simply “do away with” the individual. It does not simply reverse the priority of the individual and instead make the social the *a priori*, but rather suggests that the two are complexly and inextricably interwoven. The individual exists, but it is a constantly-produced, never-complete product of its social, cultural and political embeddedness. To view the “self” as radically separate from the social is to deny social agency except in terms of the social as an agglomeration of disaffiliated, monadic individuals.

A positive notion of human being re-affiliates subjects in their social contexts. Yet, while discourses and institutions determine subjectivity, subjects, in turn, act on those social institutions. The social and the individual are mutually imbricated and mutually influencing in unpredictable and inextricable ways. “The relationship,” argues Donald, “is neither a one-way determination, nor even a dialectic: it is characterized by oscillation, slippage and unpredictable transformations” (2). Although the subject is discursively produced, individual actors nevertheless have agency insofar at they synthesize the processes
of subjectivation and interpret who they are and formulate subjective configurations of
themselves in the world. Wellmer puts it this way:

The originary locus of freedom [is not] the isolated
individual, but a society that is the medium of
individuation through socialization; freedom would have to
be thought of as ultimately residing in the structures,
institutions, practices, and traditions of a larger social
whole. But since this larger social whole is what it is only
through being kept alive, “reproduced,” and interpreted by
the individuals who are part of it, individual and “public”
freedom now become inextricably intertwined. (229)

It is impossible to extricate the two as discrete entities. Donald’s view of culture as “a
polylogic field of forces” (2) is useful in this regard:

The domain of the social is instituted through the
dissemination of intersubjective terms of authority by, for
example, the apparatuses of government and education. At
the same time, it is in the negotiation, recombination and
bricolage of these structures that the identification of
subjectivity and the individuation of agency emerge
contiguously as boundaries. (2)

It is this deeply implicated mutuality between social identity and individual agency that
describes a constant and irresolvable struggle for each individual in modernity. This
struggle describes that which Bildung was always an attempt to address: the tension between
“technologies of adaptation” (Donald 4) and the impossibility of achieving a fit between
self and society. The Enlightenment origins of this modern dilemma are exemplified by
Rousseau’s notion of managed liberty. The Bildung self evades the responsibility of full
adult engagement through a maturation process that inscribes “freedom” as autonomous
disengagement. A deconstruction of the binary logic of self/society, however, makes
possible a way of theorizing freedom that is not so easily accommodated, and, moreover,
one that accepts mutual responsibility for those with whom each of us is pedagogically and
intentionally engaged.

With Foucault, I doubt “whether we will ever reach mature adulthood”
(“Enlightenment?” 49), if maturity is conceived in terms of autonomous, or negative,
freedom. Because freedom, in post-humanist positive terms, is not something that can ever
be realized in any full or final sense, the project of modernity is not something that can be
“completed.” Yet, we are not finished with the Enlightenment in the sense that we are still
casual as concerned with the problem of the self. The “thread that may connect us with the
Enlightenment,” as Foucault puts it, is that “critical ontology of ourselves” opened up by
Kant in the Aufklärung essay that put the narrative of Bildung – the progressive, teleological
subject, or man/Man – at the centre of the modern metanarrative of human and cultural
progress and emancipation. But the autonomous individual of modern hegemony has come under question not least because of modern atrocities that have been legitimized by it. As the recent academic freedom backlash and its attempt to save the subject attest, the emancipatory project has reached a crisis, too, in education, the site where the narrative of Bildung has its most deeply legitimized roots. The freedom to think critically about our "selves," therefore, is pedagogy's most pressing task.

NOTES

1 For a recent collection of essays which decries this very polarization and advocates equity initiatives that would question academic freedom's assumptions while not jettisoning it, see Stephen Richer and Lorna Weir's Beyond Political Correctness: Toward the Inclusive University. For a neo-conservative reaction against equity initiatives (affirmative action, sexual harassment policy, and so on) see Alan Charles Kors' and Harvey A. Silvergate's The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America's Campuses, the title of which bears witness to the conservatives' anxiety: the "shadow university" is the paranoid fantasy that imagines a conspiracy of progressives haunting America's campuses. John Fekete's Moral Panic: Biopolitics Rising is a Canadian instance of this paranoia. For a more liberal humanist attempt to delegitimate so-called political correctness in the Canadian university see Peter Emberley's Zero Tolerance.

2 Of course, this is not to suggest that basic academic freedom must be protected, as the recent David Healey case at the University of Toronto illustrates, but rather that recent internal resistance to the term demonstrates that it no longer serves the multicultural university which demands a more nuanced and complex definition of academic freedom.

3 I borrow this term from Fekete. Against his own disapprobation of the "continuum argument" of the Catherine MacKinnon variety, Fekete equates, under the umbrella term, "biopolitics," affirmative action and chilly climate reviews on campus with, for example, false rape charges, Lorena Bobbit's amputation of her husband's penis, and acquittals of women for crimes of violence.

4 Here, Said defines these new knowledges as he sees them: "universities have finally had to deal with non-Western societies, with the literature, history, and particular concerns of women, various nationalities, and minorities; and with unconventional hitherto untaught subjects such as popular culture, mass communication and film, and oral history. In addition, a whole slew of controversial political issues like race, gender, imperialism, war, and slavery have found their way into lectures and seminars" (2).

5 Most of Fekete's examples of academic repression concern students' violations of the professors' academic freedom which he positions as a kind of commodity in the professors' possession. He explicitly leverages authoritative power by censuring these students as irrational and immature. In fact, the enemies of academic freedom are both feminized and infantilized by Fekete. One of the students, for example, is involved in something "whose proper context is a conflict among her elders, being played out way over her head" (299). Ironically, two pages later he charges biopolitics with fostering "indulgent and dangerous infantilism" (301).

6 Horn cites from the Canadian Association of University Teachers Handbook (Ottawa:
To borrow from Gerald Graff in a slightly different context, since the new knowledges have denaturalized the assumptions held by defenders of traditional academic freedom, perhaps what "really enrages [them] is that...they now have to argue for their view like everybody else" (61).

In his original "Two Concept of Liberty" essay, Berlin appears to advocate in favour of positive freedom; as a liberal-humanist, however, he later retreated from this left-leaning position in subsequent defenses of the essay; see his Introduction to the 1969 Oxford edition.

As Berlin argues, for Kant, universal rationality bridges negative and positive freedom, for "when all men have been made rational, they will obey the rational laws of their own natures, which are one and the same in them all, and so be at once wholly law-abiding and wholly free" (154).

Wellmer takes Habermas' notion of "communicative rationality" to be exemplary of this communal notion of freedom. I would argue, however, that Habermas' analysis is problematized by its reliance on a false assumption that interlocutors have equal access to discourse and that there exists a space of "true" communication outside discursive power.

It is important to distinguish this kind of positive freedom, which Wellmer calls "communalism," from a kind of communalism advocated by the new right as a nostalgia for Eurocentric traditions and "family values." Even a more benign view of the self as situated in the social configurations of family and community has been a problem for feminists, as women have historically been constrained by social roles that have disempowered them. The affiliated subject of positive freedom does not deny this history, but rather, because it does not separate the individual from the social and from history, it seeks solutions not in a radical autonomy that would deny the social imbrication of subjects in their social milieu, but rather a re-construction of that social milieu and a re-negotiation of the individual's place in it.

Not having their work plagiarized by their teachers is often cited as the student's primary — or only — academic freedom; but I fail to see how this is a "freedom," and not rather the responsibility of the would-be plagiarizer.

The ongoing heated discussion in the US over the meaning of cultural "tradition" in the university curriculum versus what I refer to as "new knowledges" reached its nadir in the debates over the course in "Western Civilization" at Stanford University in 1988, a debate which remains a point of reference. See Mary Louise Pratt, "Humanities for the Future: Reflections on the Western Culture Debate at Stanford," and Paul Berman, Ed. Debating P.C.: The Controversy over Political Correctness on College Campuses.

As David Cayley puts it, compulsory schooling in the modern West has become one of the "great rituals of growing up" (42). A system of coming-of-age rituals, especially built around a system that grades students according to their chronological ages, such as the elaborate graduation ceremony as rite of passage, formalizes the conformity to a "rigidly defined...lock-step progress along a graded curriculum through which one advances as much by age as by achievement,...[a] universal mechanism" (42) profoundly at odds with the diversity of those participating in it. Learning does not occur in line with a chronological and physical maturation process the way the school would like it to; as Ted Sizer puts it, students "learn in profoundly and interestingly different ways. Their development intellectually is as mysterious and varies as their development physically"
236

15Fekete’s petition, which circulated at Trent and other Ontario universities, appealed to the academic freedom to “injure, by expression, anyone’s self-esteem...the right to express...racially, ethnically or sexually discriminatory ideas, opinions, or feelings...the right the use language in any traditional, quaint or dated manner” (Sangster and Zeleza, 140). To express, for example, one’s racist ideas is one thing, but to express them in order to “injure” someone, especially when the speaker is in a position of power, is surely another matter (and, of course, assumes, against Fekete’s own position, that discourse does have positive effects).

16Heath points out furthermore that it is significant that Émile et Sophie, which, begun immediately after Émile, would represent Émile’s confrontation with real social difficulties, was never finished (17).

17Deborah Meier points out that the schooling system in the modern West teaches an irresponsibility which is associated with the notion of “freedom”: “post World War II is the first generation of adolescents in the history of the world that were expected to be irresponsible. ... [We] have institutionalized the idea that just before you become a grown-up, you’re part of the most alienated and irresponsible subculture anyone could imagine creating. ... So we created this institution of the ... high school, which also isolated kids from adults. It’s an amazing thing that we did to ourselves, and then, of course, we complain about it. I think we’re very angry at adolescents because they have this freedom and irresponsibility which the rest of us don’t have” (39).

18Emberley, too, believes academic freedom should be qualified by academic responsibility, but not out of respect for others; rather, the academic has a responsibility to “preserve the horizon of good taste” which the university upholds, and to “speak and act with a refinement and maturity higher than the conduct permitted by law” (274).


20The notion that “everything is ideological” is, logically self-defeating in the sense that if everything is ideological, then nothing is substantially so and social hierarchy is thereby depoliticized (see Eagleton’s Ideology, pages 6-9). This dilemma is particularly vexatious for feminism, which, on the one hand, wants to assert a “positive” notion of ideology by showing that so-called “private” or everyday life (the doxa) is political while simultaneously arguing that sexism is unambiguously wrong, or that women need a theory of false consciousness (see also Gayatri Spivak). In The Politics of Postmodernism, Linda Hutcheon too confronts this problem, she argues that both feminism and postmodernism “try to avoid the bad faith of believing they can stand outside ideology, but both want to reclaim their right to contest the power of a dominant one, even if from a compromised position” (23).

21Meyer argues that “a pronounced right and obligation of the modern actor is to identify with highly abstract general collectivities, especially those that are the locus of legitimate rationalization. Terms abound: society, nation, state, mankind, the world, world society, the human community” (214). The humanist synecdochal self confirms the individual as monad: “the tendency to identify with universalistic collectivities is closely linked to the strong subjective self. In doing so, one is quick to see the self as similar to all others, operating under universal rules” (214). These humanist, apolitical “collectivities” are in sharp contrast to more politically motivated or simply more local and concrete,
positive and intentional collectivities.
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