Constructing *Heimat* in the Ruhr Valley:
Assessing the Historical Significance of Krupp Company Housing
from its Origins through the National Socialist Era, 1855-1941

by

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ABSTRACT
As the central pillar of the Krupp steel firm’s much-publicized company welfare initiatives, employee housing has played a vital role in shaping Krupp’s corporate identity from 1855 to the present. The central objective of this dissertation is to examine and critically assess primary and secondary sources written about Krupp housing in order to determine its historical meaning and impact. Previous historical writings on Krupp have predominantly overlooked the fact that at the conclusion of World War One, Essen’s Friedrich Krupp A.G. was not only Germany’s largest steel producer and leading armaments manufacturer, but with over 12,000 units constructed also the nation’s largest private sector provider of housing. While Krupp’s integral involvement in the German war effort and the brutality of trench warfare would contribute to transforming its international reputation from the “Armoury of the German Empire” to “Merchants of Death”, domestic Heimatkultur [native culture] publications were heralding the company’s housing initiatives as blueprints for planning the post-war communities of returning soldiers. It is the fascinating dualism of the firm’s reputation as both agents of mass destruction and apparent social welfare innovator that provides the central impetus for this study.

This dissertation examines the social, economic, political and cultural forces that combined to define the historical significance of Krupp housing activities. Of particular interest in this regard was the role Germany’s largest industrial complex played in promoting cultural perceptions about German housing. More specifically, it depicts how Krupp’s extensive housing activities and marketing strategies influenced the early development of the German Kleinsiedlung form
during a period (1892-1941) that spanned the Wilhelmine, Weimar and National Socialist years. This study thus contributes another chapter to the growing scholarly literature on the history of the German Kleinsiedlung that Tilman Harlander has fittingly described as a “spezifisch deutsche Geschichte” [specifically German story]. Within this story Krupp’s company housing legacy represented a Sonderweg [a distinct path].

After having analyzed and thoroughly contextualized the wide range of historical writings on Krupp housing, I conclude that by 1918, three Krupp housing projects in particular — the Altenhof, Margarethenhöhe, and Heimaterde — represented highly influential and equally controversial working models of urban planning and social engineering. The most pronounced historical impact of Krupp’s housing was that it was not only portrayed but also interpreted as a very bold, large-scale intervention into alleviating the housing crisis long before this problem was directly addressed by the German state after World War One. Krupp not only possessed the initiative, but more importantly, the financial means to transform theory into practice. In particular for reformers of the political right, Krupp’s Sonderstellung [distinct status] in the German political economy, combined with the absence of labour militancy in the nation’s most heavily industrialized city, proved highly inspirational for their urban planning ideas. Between the final years of the Weimar Republic and the outbreak of the Second World War, this impact would reach unprecedented heights. When noted National Socialist ideologue Gottfried Feder published his blueprint for the ideal new cities of the Third Reich in Die Neue Stadt: Versuch der Begründung einer neuen Stadtplankunst aus der sozialen Struktur der Bevölkerung [The New City: An attempt at founding a new
planning artform out of the social structure of the population] (1939), he cited Krupp’s Margarethenhöhe and Heimaterde as „vorbildlich praktische Beispiele“ [exemplary practical examples] of „musterhaften Großsiedlungen“ [model large settlements].

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter One</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannon Kings and Social Visionaries: Tracing Krupp’s Corporate Identity (1851-1923)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Two</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chasing Ideals: The German Housing Reform Movement before 1919</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Three</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“We strive for the attainable...”: An Assessment of Krupp Housing Activities before 1930</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Four</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Monuments of Foresight” and “Cemeteries for the Living”: Supporters and Critics of Krupp Housing before 1919</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Five</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State in Control: Weimar Solutions to the German Housing Crisis</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Six</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krupp Housing in the National Socialist Years: An N.S.D.A.P. Musterbetrieb and its Mustersiedlungen</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To my family
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INTRODUCTION
The initial impetus for this dissertation derived from a 1996 Master of Arts thesis on the post-World War Two reconstruction of housing in the Ruhr River Valley entitled: “Zero Hour has come and Gone - Allied efforts to alleviate the Ruhr Housing Shortage from 1945 to 1949”. At the heart of this initial study was the concept of a German Stunde Null or a Zero Hour; a new beginning after the total collapse of the National Socialist regime as it applied to the re-construction of post-war German communities. In other words, it addressed the extent to which the state housing initiatives after 1945 represent a break or continuum with the policies and plans of the National Socialists. This meant not only trying to identify what exactly the N.S.D.A.P. housing policies were, but also establishing whether or not these were simply continuations of pre-1933 traditions. Predictably, the tidy “zero hour” construct became more and more blurred as the mounting research material eventually pushed the chronological scope of the study back well beyond even the first German State Housing Law of 1919. Inevitably, tracing the origins of housing traditions in the Ruhr Valley meant examining the unprecedented construction activities of Essen's Krupp Steel firm.

At first glance, the dominant trait of the National Socialist housing era was the complete absence of a clearly defined plan with which to alleviate the chronic shortage of housing that had existed in Germany since the First World War. Not surprisingly, the N.S.D.A.P. regime was not short in providing the electorate with rhetoric promising to resolve the housing crisis quickly. In one of his earliest speeches as the new chancellor in 1933, Adolf Hitler had personally guaranteed that every German worker would receive a house in which “he will feel like a lord
in his castle”. As Anna Teut has pointed out in her influential study *Architecture in the Third Reich*: “Nothing disappointed the petit bourgeois supporters of the National Socialists more than its inactivity in the housing sector.”

Characteristically, an actual blueprint for these ‘workers’ castles’ neither existed at the time Hitler made this statement, nor was one to be in place five years later when the German economy was geared towards the production of war matériel.

The following year, however, noted party ideologue Gottfried Feder completed three years of state sponsored research at the Technical University of Berlin and published his proposals for the ideal German cities of the future in *The New City – An attempt to create a new planning artform out of the social structure of the populace*. Containing elements of German medieval towns, garden cities and company housing planning precedents, Feder’s proposals intended to combine the best elements of rural and urban living to create the future National Socialist cities. Accordingly, this city was to be populated by no more than 20,000 inhabitants who were to be selected for their value to the National Socialist cause. These ‘chosen few’ were then to reside in a self-contained community, comprised of semi-detached homes with gardens. In this supposedly modern community all amenities would be provided -- schools, hospital, bank, grocer, pharmacy, barber, sports facilities etc. -- and were to be centered around the showpiece of this new urban form, the imposing “House of the N.S.D.A.P.” In theory, therefore, the inhabitants of Feder’s New City would never have to venture beyond the familiar confines of these self-contained surroundings to obtain all their basic necessities.
Unfortunately for Feder and the N.S.D.A.P., the outbreak of World War Two prevented his plans from being realized. A close reading of Feder’s exhaustive work, however, reveals that he believed these ideal Germany cities had already been built long before the publication of his study. Remarkably, in *The New City*, Feder actually credited the Krupp Steel Firm with having built “exemplary practical precedents” of “model large settlements” in the Margarethenhöhe and Heimaterde in the Ruhr city of Essen.

This important link between the history of Krupp company housing and Gottfried Feder has received little attention in German historical scholarship. There are, however, two notable exceptions: Roland Günter’s thought-provoking essay on the development and historical portrayal of “Krupp and Essen” (1970) and Ute Peltz-Dreckmann’s 1978 dissertation *Der Nationalsozialistische Siedlungsbaus* [The National Socialist Settlement Construction].

After providing a scathing indictment of the stagnant state of the German art history profession, Roland Günter proceeded to provide a Marxist interpretation of the history of Krupp housing. Denied access to the Krupp company archives, Günter was nonetheless able to draw on the wealth of company publications to depict a remarkably transparent account of Alfred Krupp’s motives for becoming involved in the planning and construction of workers’ dwellings. The picture that emerges is one of an aging Ruhr steel baron who was absolutely obsessed with maintaining the loyalty of his workforce. After completing their shifts, for example, employees of Alfred Krupp were strongly encouraged to return to their “workers’ colonies” and focus their free time on home and family or, in his words,
“to seek their domestic bliss... in a thankful and modest manner.” An outspoken anti-socialist, Alfred Krupp made no attempt to mask the fact that for him, providing housing was an act of paternalism intended to maintain his cherished position as “Herr im eigenen Hause” [master in his own house].

Günter’s article was the first to allude to architectural and motivational commonalities between Krupp and National Socialist communities. It was Krupp’s idyllic Margarethenhöhe (construction began in 1909), whose curved streets and picturesque, low-density housing were offset by the imposing character of its central square containing the monumental palace-like Krupp company store, that eerily foreshadowed the future of the German urban form. He explains: “This combination of absolutist and orderly architecture [absolutischer Herrschafts- und Ordnungsarchitektur] with the petite bourgeois idyllic would find its most overt expression in the architecture of the “Third Reich” twenty years later.” Unfortunately, Günter’s references to the N.S.D.A.P. era and Krupp’s influence remained vague. Not one post-1933 publication was cited to substantiate his intriguing claims.

Ute Peltz-Dreckmann’s impressive dissertation Der Nationalsozialistischer Siedlungsbau [The National Socialist Settlement Construction] did much to fill in the gaps left by Günter’s article. Peltz-Dreckmann persuasively argues that the early efforts of Ruhr employers to build workers’ housing served as key precedents for rather unimaginative National Socialist urban planners. Like the early industrialists, the National Socialists would view housing as first and foremost an element of social and political control. The government provision of housing held
the potential of appeasing the electorate just as it had proven it could attract and maintain essential workers in the coal and steel industries. Again, due to the wealth of material published on Alfred Krupp’s motives, the company’s showcase Margarethenhöhe community in particular served to substantiate the author’s hypothesis convincingly. Unlike Günter, Ute-Peltz-Dreckmann used Gottfried Feder’s *Neue Stadt* as proof-positive that *Krupp’s Siedlungswerk* [settlement activities] had made a considerable impact on its N.S.D.A.P. counterpart. The only shortcoming of her findings was that they did not extend beyond Krupp influences on one National Socialist supporter.

This study contends that the impact of the Krupp Workers’ communities on N.S.D.A.P. reformers extended well beyond Feder (See Ch. 6). Whereas *Die Neue Stadt* did represent the most detailed N.S.D.A.P. study on the future of German urban planning, it was certainly not the only publication released after the press censorship decrees of 1934 to draw inspiration from Krupp housing efforts. Walther Bolz’s: *Krupp – Siemens: Nebenerwerbssiedlungen für Kurz- und Voll –Time Employees*, A. Heinrichbauer’s 1936 effort *Industrielle Siedlungen im Ruhrgebiet - In Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft* [Industrial Settlements in the Ruhr Region: In the Past, Present and Future] and Waldemar Wiedmann’s 1936 study: *Industrielle Heimstättensiedlungen - Der Weg zur Krisenfestigkeit des deutschen Arbeiters* [Industrial Homesteads – The Way to make the German Worker Prepared for Crisis] all made extensive references to Krupp precedents. In his contribution to *Krupp und Siemens*, A. de Neuville for example, explained
Alfred Krupp's (1812-1887) importance to the new community planning of the mid-1930s as follows:

Clearly recognizing that the industrial workers needed to be re-rooted in their plot of land, he [Alfred Krupp] wanted to give them the opportunity through thrift [**Sparsamkeit**] to obtain their own home. Internally this ingenious man preoccupied himself with plans that were well ahead of his time and his guiding principle has only become accepted in the last few years.17

In other words, the author credited Alfred Krupp with having had the visionary foresight to promote the construction of detached single-family dwellings that would 're-root his industrial workers in their native soil'. Alfred Krupp’s directives for building detached single-family dwellings with modest gardens in 1887 were thus isolated as a key forerunner of the N.S.D.A.P. housing policy of the mid-1930s. In Alfred Krupp, National Socialist urban planners re-discovered an austere pragmatist whose anti-socialist tendencies, loyal military support of the German state and visionary workers’ welfare initiatives proved very inspirational. Numerous Nazi reformers thus fell under the spell of the propaganda machine created by Germany’s largest capitalist establishment.

No other German industrial establishment has even come close to possessing such an immense catalogue of writings on its company history.18 Noted Bielefeld labour historian, Klaus Tenfelde has correctly stated: “the House of Krupp was always historically conscious.”19 It is also unlikely that any other firm has a catalogue whose writings are so blatantly divided between extremely favourable depictions of its history on the one hand, and highly critical treatments on the other. Company publications have repeatedly recounted Alfred Krupp’s nearly
folkloric tale of perseverance, discipline and hard work in transforming a fledgling steel foundry into Germany's largest and most successful industrial complex. Predominantly the work of a long line of company historians and/or head archivists, these publications (e.g. Diedrich Baedeker, Wilhelm Berdrow, Gert von Klass, and Ernst Schröder) have provided a tidy and unblemished portrayal of a highly controversial past.

As a number of key studies have recently shown, company efforts at self-promotion were by no means limited to printed matter. Due to the time and effort which its sole-proprietor spent on advertising his products at European and World industrial fairs, Elaina Glovka Spencer has aptly referred to Alfred Krupp as the "world's first propagandist". The excellent collection of photographic imagery and essays, Bilder von Krupp [Pictures of Krupp] has recently added considerable weight to Spencer's assertion as well as broadened her interpretive scope. Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, for example, has shown that since Kaiser Wilhelm I's inaugural visit to Essen in 1853, the firm continued to conduct "Besucherpolitik" on a grand scale. Foreign and domestic dignitaries, the Prusso-German military establishment in particular, would receive guided tours to view the company's most impressive achievements. After 1892 these widely publicized company visits would include tours through its workers' communities.

By 1871 these publicity efforts and military achievements had created a new company image. More than anything, this had to do with the success of Krupp artillery in the conflict against France. As Klaus Tenfelde explains: "...after the success of Krupp cannon in the Franco-German War of 1870/71, it [the Krupp
company] was at the zenith of its reputation; it represented a model Prusso-
German firm of global stature."^20 Between 1871 and 1918 the name Krupp
became synonymous with what Nicholas Stargardt has coined the “German idea of
militarism”.^21 If nothing else, this meant that these tremendous publicity efforts by
Germany’s most renowned armaments manufacturer provided Krupp supporters
and critics with ample material for debate.

It is important to note that as the firm’s reputation as a pillar of Prussian
militarism grew in the 1870s it also began to release the first in a long line of
publications outlining its workers’ welfare initiatives. From the catalogue to the
1876 Brussel International Exhibition for “Gesundheitspflege und Rettungswesen”
[Health Care and Rescue] and entitled Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen der Fried.
Krupp’schen Gussstahlfabrik zu Essen zum besten ihrer Arbeiter [Welfare
Provisions of the Fried. Krupp Crucible Steel Works in Essen for the benefit of its
Workers], a pattern was established that numerous subsequent company workers’
welfare publications would follow.^22 Krupp’s supposedly visionary foresight in
this area provided an apparent bulwark in the fight against labour unrest and the
spread of socialism. To eliminate both threats the document outlined that, first and
foremost, “the worker must receive better dwellings. If in his domesticity with his
family he felt content and comfortable, then a start had been made for the better
which must one day bear fruit."^23 Although the welfare program also included old
age pension benefits, medical coverage and sickness insurance, workers’ housing
was represented as its centrepiece.^24
To this day, Richard Klapheck’s 1928 work *Siedlungswerk Krupp* [Krupp Settlement Activities] remains the most comprehensive and widely cited company history on the firm’s housing initiatives. It is also by far the most controversial. Covering a period from approximately 1861 to 1926, Klapheck’s *Siedlungswerk* contextualized the Krupp housing activities within the broader framework of the emergence of European urban planning. In nearly all facets Klapheck portrayed the history of Krupp housing as not only an unprecedented deed of industrial philanthropy, but even more importantly, an exercise in groundbreaking social vision and urban planning.

In an attempt to substantiate these lofty claims, which also included crediting Alfred Krupp, rather than Ebenezer Howard, with having been “the true German originator of the garden city idea”\(^\text{25}\), the writer drew heavily on archival sources, mainly, Alfred Krupp’s well-preserved private correspondence\(^\text{26}\) contained in Wilhelm Berdrow’s unpublished collection of *Alfred Krupp's Briefe und Niederschriften: 1826-1888* [Alfred Krupp’s Letters and Notes].\(^\text{27}\) It was therefore through *Siedlungswerk* that the reading public gained a remarkably transparent view of the aims and motives which inspired Europe’s most renowned industrialist to become involved in the housing sector. For example, Klapheck would resurrect Alfred Krupp’s most famous 1871 quote for his Weimar readership:

> Who knows, when in days or years, the full revolution sweeps through the land and an uprising of all classes of workers against their employers occurs, that we will be the only ones spared, if we act in a timely manner.\(^\text{28}\)
Although Klapheck clearly attempted to perpetuate the company tradition of depicting the most famous Krupp as a caring industrial patriarch, his choice of quotations often inadvertently revealed that Krupp was predominantly motivated by economic necessity and self-preservation rather than benevolent social idealism. The author thus portrayed Alfred Krupp as type of “prophet” who was willing to make immediate financial sacrifices to secure the ultimate long-term goal, elimination of the threat of social upheaval.29

Klapheck’s Siedlungswerk already contained many of the themes, such as “will”, “sacrifice” and resolute pragmatism which were to become all too familiar to the German public after 1933. Writing in the politically charged climate of the late 1920s when the progressive Bauhaus school had already gained world-wide fame, Klapeck hoped that Krupp’s housing activities could serve as a working model with which the Weimar government could solve Germany’s housing crisis. Moreover, the value of the existing Krupp communities, according to Klapeck, lay not so much in their imposing scale, but in the qualitative characteristics which apparently contained vital elements of national preservation or Heimatschutz [Homeland or heritage protection].

Klapeck was not the first writer to attach an element of national cultural survival to the Krupp housing precedents. In his 1917 effort Der Krupp’sche Kleinwohnungsbau [Krupp’s Small Housing Construction] Hermann Hecker had already clearly argued that Krupp’s national importance lay well beyond the production of armaments and munitions and extended into the realm of Kulturarbeit [cultural work]. Like Klapheck, Hecker also viewed the Krupp
housing developments in the Ruhr industrial heartland as groundbreaking achievements in the realm of German *Heimatschutz*. In the gradual development of Krupp housing activity, the reader could see the evolution of the German "Kleinwohnungsbau". In this view, Hecker was not alone. Several of his contemporaries like Karl Weißbach, Walter Mackowsky, Hermann Muthesius, Theodor Fischer, Richard Riemerschmidt and Paul Schultze-Naumburg, to name only a few, also interpreted the Krupp communities as guarantors of German culture. It will be shown that especially Krupp’s low-density ‘garden communities’ (Altenhof, Magarethenhöhe and Heimaterde) had an immense impact on the above-mentioned group of urban planners, architects and social reformers. This impact preceded the N.S.D.A.P. era and has thus far escaped historical analysis.

Given the extent of the firm’s publicity efforts, its close connection to the German state and above all its reputation as national armourer, the steel giant also had some very vocal opponents. Especially the S.P.D.’s national daily *Vorwärts* engaged in a constant offensive against the nation’s dominant capitalist establishment until it was silenced in the National Socialist era. It would, however, take until 1937 for a comprehensive critical history of the firm to be published. Why this took so long to materialize may be a direct reflection of the firm’s economic and/or political clout. One thing can be said with some degree of certainty: the firm’s association with the National Socialist Party after 1933 cast its historical role in strengthening the German economy, state and military establishment in a far more negative light. Due to the strict censorship controls
(Gleichschaltung) exercised by the N.S.D.A.P. during this period, literature critical of the regime and its supporters had to be published outside of Germany.

Bernhard Menne’s *Krupp: the Lords of Essen* published in Zurich in 1937, represents the first comprehensive attempt to assess the firm’s history from a critical perspective. In the aftermath of Gustav Krupp’s recognition as *Reichsführer der deutschen Industrie* [Reich Leader of German Industry] and his public overtures to Adolf Hitler, Menne presented a courageous indictment of its long-established links to Germany’s military establishment. Menne’s work concluded with the highly publicized 1936 visit of Adolf Hitler to Essen during which Gustav Krupp pledged his allegiance to the National Socialist cause. The long continuum of Krupp’s *Besucherpolitik* now extended to Hitler. *The Lords of Essen* also offered the first concentrated attempt to deconstruct the firm’s carefully orchestrated image of social benevolence.

Despite the refreshingly confrontational tone of Menne’s work, it disappoints insofar as its treatment of the housing question is rather contradictory. He writes:

> ...careful study of his [Alfred Krupp’s] actual achievements in this direction should serve to convince anybody that, so far from being in advance of his time, or even up to date in regard to it, he was frequently the reverse.³⁴

Yet after having conducted his “careful study”, amounting to a mere four pages, Menne abruptly changed his opinion:

> Admittedly, his [Krupp workers’] standard of living was an improvement on that of many other workers in the [Ruhr] district as [Alfred] Krupp had more vision than the shortsighted industrialists of an earlier generation. He cared for his men, because he recognized that any improvement in their living conditions would react a thousand-fold on their productivity and
sense of responsibility.\textsuperscript{35}

Not wishing to attribute too much foresight and benevolence to Krupp, Menne hastily concluded: "in relation to the company's enormous profits, the contributions to its worker welfare initiatives was minute compared to the princely endowments of Carnegie and Nobel."\textsuperscript{36} Even in this critical treatment of the firm, the author found it impossible not to acknowledge its housing achievements.

If any questions had existed regarding the extent of Krupp's leading role in the German re-armament program before and during the war, these were to be fully answered at the Nuremberg trial of Krupp. With the sensational trial and conviction of Gustav and his son Alfried Krupp in 1948, Krupp critics received legal vindication of their stance. Indeed, the extent of the company's war profiteering, close ties to the N.S.D.A.P. regime and especially its appalling treatment of slave labourers, would forever tarnish its image.\textsuperscript{37} In retrospect, Menne had blazed a trail in exposing the close connections of the Krupp Firm to the N.S.D.A.P. regime in the pre-war era.

This dubious association with the Nazi regime would dominate the Krupp historiography after the war. Subsequently, the firm's pre-1933 workers' welfare initiatives were either stricken from the post-war Krupp literature altogether or viewed through a rather Germanophobic lens. Accounts by Peter Batty, Norbert Mühlen and above all, William Manchester, made a concentrated effort to capitalize on post-war public fascination with all things associated with the "Third Reich". As a direct result, they often utilized a journalistic style and approach and
thus their utility as objective historical accounts remains marginal. These books
focused on Krupp's reputation as Reich armourers first and foremost, skipping
over facets of the company's history that were not connected with its military past.

No work has done more to perpetuate Krupp's global image as a 'war-
monger', 'merchant of death' and 'loyal Nazi servant' than William Manchester's
1964 work: *The Arms of Krupp*.³⁸ As a former reporter for the *New York Times*,
Manchester approached the Krupp estate in the early 1960s with the intention of
writing the long overdue comprehensive history of the firm. The American writer
seems to have timed his project favourably, since, judging by the wealth of
damaging file material used, the archival curators had not yet practiced what
Roland Günter would in the early 1970s strongly criticize as a policy: "not acting
in the interest of scholarship but rather image preservation". What Günter took
issue with was the selective access policy the firm exercised with its archival
collection. It is very significant that Manchester was one of the last historians prior
to the 1980s to have unlimited access to the vast archival material stored in the
Villa Hügel company archives.³⁹

For all its sensationalistic references to *Götterdämmerungen, Nibelungenlieder*
and primal Germanic aggression, *The Arms of Krupp* does represent a valuable
reference guide if one is able to stomach the author's infatuation with Richard
Wagner.⁴⁰ Spanning an astounding four-hundred years of family history in nearly
nine-hundred pages, Manchester's substantial work is well-researched.

Nonetheless, the firm's housing activities receive scant treatment: a mere five
sentences. In his characteristically sensationalistic style, the author introduces
Krupp’s social welfare measures as “the work of a mad genius” and then makes at least one valid observation on the housing issue: “What Alfred was achieving [in the mid 1870s] was the transformation of Essen into the largest and most stable company town in history”. In reference to the “cottage style” dwellings in the Altenhof community, Manchester cynically commented on their picturesque exteriors: “[The Altenhof houses] ...looked like half-timbered huts designed by Hans Christian Andersen”. In his rather awkward manner, William Manchester was indirectly exposing two of the predominant themes of 1970s and 80s Krupp historiography: the hidden socio-economic motives of binding the worker to the firm through rent/work contracts and the manipulation of architectural style to create a false sense of upward social mobility among the Krupp workers.

Roland Günter’s 1970 aforementioned contribution to Martin Warnke’s Das Kunstwerk zwischen Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung [The artwork between Science and World View], remains the most memorable writing on Krupp housing; skillfully interpreting the relationship between architectural form, function and class consciousness. Representing the left-wing socio-political idealism of the late 1960s, Günter’s contribution to Kunstwerk raised extremely important questions about the firm’s housing legacy. What were the central aims and motives which prompted Alfred Krupp to become involved in the construction of “workers colonies” on such a vast scale? How did their various architectural styles and physical layouts influence the owner/employee power relationship? What were the central motives which resulted in the very peculiar decision to build English-style workers’ cottages that looked so remarkably out of place in the Ruhr region?
What was the worker’s response to these employer provisions? Finally, and most controversially, Günter alluded to the central question: was there a connection between the aims and motives of Krupp’s housing plans and those of the National Socialists? These were all questions Roland Günter began to address in the early 1970s, yet without access to the invaluable documents stored in the Villa Hügel company archives, he was severely limited in his efforts. It would be left to subsequent scholars to grapple with these issues.

For the first question relating to Krupp’s aims and motives, Joachim Schlandt provided an almost immediate response in his 1970 article: “Die Krupp Siedlungen - Siedlungsbau im Interesse eines Industriekonzerns” [The Krupp Settlements – Settlement Construction in the interest of an industrial establishment]. Schlandt re-introduced the now widely accepted rationale, first outlined by Friedrich Engels in 1887 and resurrected and reapplied to modern town planning by Leonardo Benevolo in 1966, that capitalist employers’ central objectives in providing housing was the self-preservation of the bourgeoisie. In essence, housing offered a bulwark to stem what he perceived to be the inevitable tide of labour unrest. According to Engels, Benevolo and Schlandt, through combining work and rental contracts the employer/landlord was able to limit the labourer’s mobility and bargaining power and thus bind him/her to the workplace. Although also working with a sketchy archival source base in 1970, Joachim Schlandt’s hypothesis was eventually confirmed in 1987 by Johann Paul’s Alfred Krupp und die Arbeiterbewegung [Alfred Krupp and the Workers’ Movement], and Frank Bajohr’s extensive 1988 study of Essen’s S.P.D.: Zwischen Krupp und Kommune.
[Between Krupp and Commune]. Both studies greatly benefited from access to the Krupp archives.

In their 1985 collaboration: *Nach gethaner Arbeit bleibt im Kreis der Eurerigen* [After work stay at home in your circle of equals], Eduard Führ and Daniel Stemmrich broadened this discussion to the realm of calculated social engineering through architectural design. The two scholars argued that the decision to isolate workers in separate dwellings eliminated their potential to associate with neighbours, in turn deliberately hindering the development of class consciousness through limiting peer contact. Moreover, the self-contained character of the Krupp housing developments (which usually included a company store, recreation facilities and even beer halls) and their location on the periphery of earlier housing districts, was intended to isolate the Krupp workers from potentially "dangerous" external contacts. Thus, according to Führ and Stemmrich, the physical design and layout of the Krupp housing developments represented a conscious effort to render the proletariat powerless, a divide and rule tactic confining the working class to their "respective private spheres".43

More recently, Axel Schollmeir has convincingly argued that this class-based interpretation is overly simplistic and does not address what were arguably the most distinguishing traits of these communities: Krupp’s "social facilities".44 Why, for example, would Krupp decide to include green spaces and parks, recreation provisions and especially beer halls, if consciously isolating the labourer into his or her private sphere was truly the central motive? In his 1990 dissertation, *Gartenstädte in Deutschland* [Garden Cities in Germany], Schollmeir expanded
the discussion of the historical significance of the workers’ housing beyond the limiting confines of class-based paradigms to consider their contribution to the development of modern urban planning. Equally important, the writer broadened the discussion of the Krupp housing debate beyond the Alfred Krupp era (1812-1887) that seems to have preoccupied the majority of German academics, to include the critically important period from 1892 to 1919 when the most influential Krupp ‘garden communities’ were constructed. Contextualized within a period that gave rise to modern German city planning, Schollmeier illustrates how the firm’s heightened publicity campaign managed not only to influence considerably, but also to alter public perception of the German Garden Cities Movement. The writer explained this critically important development with reference to the firm’s Margarethenhöhe community: “Together with Dresden Hellerau it represents the most well-known example of, what especially in later times was perceived to be a garden city [my emphasis].” Remarkably, therefore, Krupp’s extensive marketing efforts managed to cultivate an image of the Margarethenhöhe project as one of the first realizations of the garden city concept in Germany. Thus, prior to the First World War, Germany’s largest corporate establishment was hailed as being on the cutting edge of progressive social reform. To this day the Margarethenhöhe not only remains the company’s most famous housing development, but it is also still erroneously heralded as one of the nation’s first garden cities.\(^4\)

With Schollmeier a number of works have done much to deconstruct the Magarethenhöhe’s garden city mythology. Noteworthy are Peter Hall’s 1988
historical survey of urban planning entitled: *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century*. Renate Kastorff-Viehmann’s growing catalogue of writings chronicling the history of the Ruhr’s urban development, Walther Kieß’s comprehensive 1991 work: *Der Urbanismus im Industriezeitalter* [Urbanisation in the Industrial Period], and most recently, the 1997 collection of essays *Geschichte des Wohnens* [History of Housing] edited by Jürgen Reulecke. These publications examine not only the historical significance of Krupp’s company housing as it relates to the German *Städtebau* reform movement, but also its contribution to the evolution of the European urban form. Unfortunately, however, with the exception of Walter Kieß’s *Urbanismus*, the lack of archival documentation and historical contextualization has usually left their overall discussion at the survey level.

Walter Kieß’s *Der Urbanismus im Industriezeitalter* cast employer housing developments in a new light by thoroughly contextualizing their development in the social, economic, and political climate of their inception. He isolated the Krupp developments in particular as critical experiments in the planning and implementation of the German *Siedlungsform* which were established long before the state was willing to become active in this area. Like Axel Schollmeier, Kieß attempted to cover the Krupp topic beyond the well-documented Alfred Krupp years to include the increased housing construction efforts of his successors: Friedrich Alfred Krupp (1854-1902) and Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (1870-1950). Unfortunately Kieß only began to scratch the surface of what was
arguably the most prolific and influential period of the company’s housing construction activity, the years from 1914 to 1939.

The most recent comprehensive history of Krupp by noted Bismarck biographer Lothar Gall, Krupp - Der Aufstieg eines Industrieimperiums [Krupp - The Rise of an Industrial Empire], claims to be the first objective treatment of the firm’s rather checkered past. It should, however, be noted that this rather non-critical account also enjoyed the full co-operation of the Villa Hügel’s archival staff and “generous financial assistance from the Alfred Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Stiftung.”

Like Klaus Tenfelde’s Bilder von Krupp and Kieß’s Urbanismus, Gall’s history also continues a somewhat disturbing trend in the current Krupp historiography: it only covers developments up to the conclusion of the First World War. Assurances from the author that: “this is the first in a multi-volume set leading up to the present”, have yet to be realized, leaving the firm’s post-1919 history a rather neglected topic.

It is indeed a puzzling characteristic of the recent flood of publications on various aspects of Krupp history that German scholars have predominantly steered clear of the firm’s post-World War One history. It is odd for example, that the most recent academic treatment of Krupp’s Margarethenhöhe project, Andreas Helfrich’s architectural history Die Margarethenhöhe Essen: Architekt und Auftraggeber vor dem Hintergrund der Kommunalpolitik und der Firmenpolitik Krupp [The Margarethenhöhe Essen: Architect and contractor in the context of municipal and Krupp company politics] has chosen an 1886-1914 time-frame for a housing development that was begun in 1909 and arguably did not reach its
architectural maturity until the death of its main architect in 1934. Even more disturbing is the fact that after providing an otherwise impressive bibliography on the project, the author has chosen to omit the two most thought-provoking and/or outright critical publications on the topic: Roland Günter’s “Krupp und Essen” (1970) and Joachim Schlandt’s “Krupp: Wohnungsbau im Namen eines Industrieunternehmens”. With an unprecedented 691 footnotes and, judging by the enormous wealth of Krupp files, unrestricted access to the company archives, it is also remarkable that Helfrich’s work makes very limited references to the firm’s militarist past or even its high-profile connection to the House of Hohenzollern. Even though adopting the pre-1914 time-line and dealing specifically with the Magarethenhöhe, the study makes no mention of the well-publicized Kaiser visit to this community in 1912. Surely this event (Fig. #1) was an integral part of the company’s “Firmenpolitik” for the chosen period from 1886 to 1914.

Barbara Wolbring has also avoided the complexities of the Weimar and National Socialist years in her otherwise convincing study (2000) Krupp und die Öffentlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert [Krupp and the public in the 19th century]. She traces the origins of the firm’s corporate identity from 1851 to 1914. That company housing was an integral part of forging this corporate identity from 1876 onwards has largely been overlooked. Wolbring’s doctoral supervisor, Lothar Gall, was at least able to begin to fill in some gaps in this regard. For all its positive and negative attributes, Gall’s Krupp was able to focus on a much neglected aspect of the firm’s history; its cultural implications. On the housing question in particular, Gall did manage to convey a qualitative change in emphasis
between the communities constructed under the leadership of Alfred Krupp (to 1887) and those built under the supervision of his successor, Friedrich Alfred (after 1892). Gall pointed out that, unlike his father, who was mainly obsessed with providing qualitative housing improvements quickly, Friedrich Alfred Krupp hoped to build workers' communities that would foster a **spiritual and cultural** transformation in his workers. The author outlined this central objective:

> ...definitive was and remained the thought, not just to integrate the growing numbers of white collar employees culturally and spiritually into bourgeois society, but also to gradually accomplish the same (verbürgerlichen) with the mass of workers and release them from their confrontational class-based stance...  

Interestingly, unlike earlier works by Roland Günter, Joachim Schlandt and Eduard Führ, Gall depicts this "Verbürgerlichung" process as something quite admirable. Yet he merely scratched the surface of the historical meaning of these housing activities.

The following pages will argue that neither the short- nor the long-term historical impact of the Krupp housing activities can be fully understood without considering their social, political, economic, and architectural significance. This study therefore follows the lead of Nicholas Bullock and Allan Read's benchmark study *The Housing Question* in which the authors "cut across traditional subject boundaries" in their approach. This dissertation however attempts to take an even more holistic approach than Bullock and Read by adding the cultural ramifications of Krupp's housing activities to the equation.
It was during World War One that the Essen steel firm became a highly visible symbol of national identity both in and outside of Germany. The title of Theodore Andrea Cook’s 1915 work Kaiser, Krupp and Kultur best captures three of most identifiable symbols of Wilhelmine Germany. At the same time, Canadian recruitment posters echoed this sentiment by calling upon soldiers to enlist with the slogan “Loyal talk won’t beat Kaiser, Krupp and Kultur. Trained men will! Enlist now!” (Fig. #2). Within Germany propaganda proudly heralded the destructive force of Krupp’s monstrous “Big Bertha” field-piece, and praised its place of origin by labeling it “ein Essener Kind” [a child of Essen]. In and outside of Germany, grotesque war-time jingoism had the effect of elevating Krupp’s militaristic image to new heights. To use the words of Nicholas Stargardt, as a result of the First World War Krupp became as much a symbol of German militarism as “the sabre and the pickelhaube”.

What historical writings have thus far overlooked, however, was that the socio-economic and political climate of the 1914-1918 period also refocused attention on Krupp and Essen for an entirely different reason: housing. In 1932 A. de Neuville would reflect back on the war years and the housing issue in the following manner:

During the World War the idea of the personal home gained new momentum. With the struggle surrounding the defence of the Nation (Heimat) grew love for the native soil (heimatlichen Erde). Out of this emerged everyone’s wish to create homesteads for warriors and those they left behind. In Essen the settlement co-operative under the name of Heimaterde [Native Soil], was founded by Krupp workers in 1916...
Similarly, de Neuville’s contemporary, Richard Klapeck, praised the achievements of Krupp’s planning team in the Margarethenhof community: “In contemporary housing matters, Robert Schmohl and his co-workers achieved *Heimatschutz* [Homeland or Heritage protection] in its truest sense with the Margarethenhof project. That is the meaning of the Margarethenhof for the subsequent settlements.”

Commenting on the Krupp community Dahlhauser Heide near Bochum, which was completed during the same period (1906-1915), Horst Bronny stated: “It has deeply influenced settlement construction after the First World War.” In part due to the combined efforts of concentrated company marketing schemes and the desperate desire of post-war reformers to find a distinctly German *heimatlichen* [national and/or native style, see below] style, the Krupp housing developments became “highly influential (*richtungsgebend*) for the development of settlement activity in Germany…” In this sense they need to be contextualized within the complex dynamic of the German *Heimat* reform movement.

In her work: *A Nation of Provincials - The German Idea of Heimat*, Cecilia Applegate has made a valiant attempt to translate a word which has no direct English equivalent. Loosely translated as homeland or home region, “*Heimat*” became an integral part of the German nationalist revival that began in the 1890s. Applegate’s cultural study focused on the nuanced meaning of *Heimat* in the picturesque Palatinate region whose disputed border controversy with France had made it a favourite topic of *Heimat* literature for over two hundred years. The author eventually arrived at the following useful definition of the term:
Heimat’s claim to the status of a key word in German history goes beyond the particularities of regionality and the generalities of nationality to rest finally on what both nation and region have in common: the effort for better or for worse to maintain community against the economic, political and cultural forces that scatter it.  

In the early twentieth century, one could scarcely imagine a greater geographical contrast than the one between the idyllic rolling hills and vineyards of the Palatinate and the heavily industrialized Ruhr region. In his comprehensive 1907 geographic survey, for example, Gottlieb Gassert felt compelled to create an entirely new label that extended beyond his Industriestadt [Industrial City] category to describe the heavy industrial development of Bochum, Gelsenkirchen and Essen as Schwerindustriestädte [Heavy industrial Cities].

Due to its towering collection of smokestacks, soot-filled skies and noisy around the clock production activity, the greater Essen area would seem to be the last place in which the kitschy rural romanticism of the Heimatler [Heimat advocate] would take hold. Yet as the following 1916 quote by Krupp housing director, Max Halbach indicates, the company was doing its best to instill a Heimatgefühl [feeling of Heimat] in its industrial communities. During his inaugural address to begin construction on the “Perle des Kruppschen Siedlungsbau” [Pearl of Krupp Settlements], Heimaterde, Halbach would state: “Whoever is deeply rooted in the native soil (Heimaterde) will love the Heimat, will share in its luck and misfortune.”

Krupp’s Heimaterde was completed between 1916 and 1928 and was intended to provide detached and semi-detached homes with gardens for deserving workers. Special preference would be granted
to returning veterans and large families who, the firm contended, were in most
desperate need of being re-rooted in the German soil.

The parallels between Cecilia Applegate's and Halbach's quotes remain
striking, yet she proceeds to construct historical discourse in a particularly
thought-provoking manner when applied to the Krupp case: "Heimat has never
been a word about real social forces or real political situations. Instead, it has been
a myth about the possibility of a national community in the face of fragmentation
and alienation." The complexities of assessing the historical significance of the
Krupp housing activities lie in the fact that the firm was both an innovator in the
construction of myths, through its marketing strategies, and was also extremely
active in the actual physical construction of idyllic self-contained communities.
The lively debate which these developments generated amongst architects, urban
planners, social reformers and politicians, serves as a testament to the legacy of its
marketing strategies. However, the impact of Krupp's housing achievements
cannot be fully understood without keeping its Sonderstellung [special position] in
the political economy of Germany in mind. As the nation's dominant industrial
complex and largest armaments manufacture, the steel giant transformed the Ruhr
city of Essen from a mercantile backwater in 1811 into a daunting
Schwerindustriestadt by the 1890s. Significantly, prior to the first German state
housing law of 1919, the Kruppstadt [Krupp city] somehow managed to fend-off
the "fragmentation and alienation" of social unrest. Especially for National
Socialist reformers, the city and its Krupp housing developments represented
inspirational models that held the promise of fostering a new "national
community”. The central objective of the following pages is to separate myth from reality.

This study is divided into six chapters. The opening chapter sets the scene by examining the historical construction of Krupp’s corporate identity between 1851 and 1923. Following the lead of Nicholas Stargardt and Klaus Tenfelde, this chapter is particularly concerned with the rise of the Essen steel firm to the level of “Preußisch-Deutsche Vorzeigefirma” [Exemplary Prusso-German Firm] following its first appearance at the Great London Exhibition in 1851. For better or for worse, this label was as much a result of a calculated media campaign as it was a result of the close links between Krupp and the Berlin military establishment throughout this period. The extent of this linkage was exposed in a series of high profile scandals ranging from the mysterious death of Fritz Krupp in 1902 to the French Ruhr Occupation in 1923. From the 1870s Krupp made concerted efforts to counter-balance this militaristic image with its workers welfare initiatives of which housing was always the centerpiece. Remarkably, Alfred Krupp was not only depicted as the “cannon king from Essen”, but also a man of great social foresight. Ultimately, however, it was the company’s position as the nation’s leading armaments manufacturer during the First World War that forever linked it to “the idea of German militarism”. No other firm was so inseparably linked with the rise and fall of Germany in the twentieth century. This is absolutely critical for examining the historical impact of its planned communities.

The second chapter sets the historical scene by examining the extent of the German housing crisis prior to the passing of the first National Housing Law of
1919. In addition to clarifying the complexities of the German housing problem, this chapter is especially intended to consider the diverse solutions that were proposed to rectify it. Although the national housing shortage continued to spiral out of control, this was not the result of a lack of proposed remedies. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, it was increasingly the detached single-family home and garden that was heralded as the ideal German housing form. The popular appeal of the German Garden Cities Association and the Warrior Homestead movement will be examined as key backdrops to Krupp’s housing efforts. Critically, while debates on the housing issue were restarted in the Reichstag after the armistice, Krupp’s housing activities had been moving beyond the realm of ideas for nearly sixty years. By the 1920s Krupp had constructed over 12,000 units, making it the largest private sector provider of housing in Germany. Although impressive in overall scope, these diverse housing projects were of uneven quality.

The third chapter is mainly concerned with examining the qualitative characteristics of these diverse housing projects. Ranging from the shoddy barrack construction of projects built in the 1860s to the firm’s showcase ‘garden city’ of Margarethenhöhe that was opened in 1912, the Krupp developments were all radically different. Examining the rich primary and secondary sources from the Villa Hügel Archives, this chapter depicts the remarkably transparent aims and motives of not only the employer but also the Krupp planners and architects. By comparing Krupp achievements with those of selected competitors it is clear that the firm’s Baubüro displayed a keen sense of capitalizing on contemporary
planning and architectural trends. While seldom innovators, the Essen steel company possessed the financial clout and marketing acumen to transform theory into practice on an unprecedented scale.

Chapter four assesses the positive and negative public reaction to the Krupp housing efforts prior to 1919. It examines what contemporary Krupp supporters and critics had to say about both the showcase communities and the not-so-picture-perfect examples of Krupp housing. Like the German Garden Cities Association, Krupp was able to display and market its “Propaganda der Tat” [propaganda of the deed]. The completed developments coupled with the remarkable absence of labour unrest in Germany’s most industrialized cities, invited reformers of all political stripes to voice their opinions. The often heated exchange between supporters of the Social Democratic Party, the Krupp establishment itself and reformers of the political right is profiled in this chapter. It will become apparent that, beginning with the growing wave of Heimat nostalgia in the first decade of the twentieth century, it was no longer just Krupp weaponry, but also its housing developments which were being heralded as “defenders of German culture”.

The fifth chapter focuses on the housing initiatives of the Weimar state. The coalition government under Friedrich Ebert took the remarkable step of enshrining the right of every German citizen to reside in suitable accommodations in its constitution. For the first time in German history, the provision of housing thus became an urgent matter of state. Of particular interest are the modernist proposals of individuals like Bruno Taut and Walter Gropius, both of whom
believed new housing forms needed to break radically with past traditions. More importantly these innovative proposals like Dessau-Törten, the Weißenhof Exhibit and Taut’s Hufeisensiedlung were funded directly with public funds, ensuring a lively response. Significantly, it was the sharp economic downturn of the late 1920s that forced the government to adapt Stephan Poerschke’s Kleinsiedlung [small settlement] proposals that had been based on a traditional Ruhr housing form. Whatever their true merit, events after 1933 ensured that the state housing proposals of the 1920s were unfairly denounced as failures of the ‘socialist experiment’.

The final chapter of the dissertation re-opens the debate concerning the reaction of National Socialist reformers to the well-publicized Krupp housing efforts. Previous studies have raised this connection but not examined the specific individuals who were involved. Housing experts like August Heinrichsbauer, Wilhelm Wiedmann, Walter Bolz and Gottfried Feder became mesmerized by Krupp’s propaganda efforts in the 1930s. Advertised since 1876 as working models of social control and employer benevolence and built by Germany’s largest armaments manufacturer, whose hatred of the political left was legendary, Krupp’s self-contained communities seemed tailor-made for solving the chronic housing crisis. The sheer lack of vision and technical training of these outspoken critics of Weimar housing legislation led them to rely on Krupp’s experiments rather than develop truly innovative housing solutions of their own. A particular focal point in this final chapter is the connection between the Krupp housing projects and the emergence of the German Kleinsiedlung’s form as a socio-economic cure-all.
Tilman Harlander has described the peculiar longevity and popular appeal of the 
*Kleinsiedlungsidylle* [small settlement idyll] as a "spezifisch deutsche Geschichte" 
[specifically German story]. The following pages contend that in the unfolding of 
this history, Krupp housing activities played a considerable part.
CHAPTER ONE

Cannon Kings and Social Visionaries: Tracing Krupp's Corporate Identity (1851-1923)
With the fusion of the two German steel giants, Krupp and Thyssen, in March of 1998, Germany gained yet another mega-corporation whose new name, Thyssen-Krupp, reflected the terms of the negotiations. The startling merger meant that one of the longest lasting rivalries in the German steel sector had come to an end. From a historical perspective this event marked the first time in a nearly two hundred-year history that the Krupp name was relegated to second billing. In effect, Germany’s most famous industrial establishment of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ceased to function as an independent entity. The name Krupp, whose complex historical meaning has been so closely linked to the fate of modern Germany, seems on the verge of disappearing off the European corporate map altogether.

Although the steel firm is presently engaged in a struggle for economic survival, the continued debate over its historic legacy is still very much alive. This opening chapter traces the development of Krupp’s corporate identity from the time of the Great London Exhibition to the French Ruhr occupation in 1923. Although recent publications by Uwe Keßler, Lothar Gall, Andreas Helfrich, and Barbara Wolbring have gone to great lengths to stress that Krupp was never purely an armaments manufacture, it was during the period under examination that the firm’s name did become synonymous with the “German idea of militarism”. Largely the result of ground-breaking efforts in self-representation, this association was also linked to the performance of Krupp weaponry on the battlefield, the firm’s close ties to the Prussian military establishment and a number of highly publicized scandals. By the 1920s Krupp was as much a symbol of German
militarism as the "sabre and the pickelhaube".\textsuperscript{67} It is, however, often forgotten that by the early years of the Weimar Republic the firm had also cultivated a corporate image of being a far-sighted and benevolent employer with a social conscience. Since 1876 it had advertised its workers' welfare initiatives as safeguards for maintaining an extremely loyal workforce while simultaneously fending off the threat of socialism. Of these initiatives, its housing settlements were always showcased as the centerpiece. Numerous company publications not only heralded its most famous owner, Alfred Krupp, as Germany's "cannon king", but also as a man of great social vision. All subsequent sole-proprietors of the firm would go to great lengths to build upon this legacy.\textsuperscript{68} The extensive negative and positive historical discourse its housing activities generated prior to 1939 simply cannot be understood without examining the origins of the peculiar duality between militarism and social benevolence. All previously published material on the topic has failed to make this critical connection.\textsuperscript{69}

An obvious theme for the chosen period is Krupp's role in the rise and collapse of Prusso-German militarism. Spanning the roughly seventy year period that included the final struggle for German hegemony between Austria and Prussia (1864-66), the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71), Otto von Bismarck's sabre-rattling Realpolitik (1871-1890), Admiral von Tirpitz's naval construction program (1898-1914) and finally culminating in the horrific carnage of the First World War, it is well-established that Krupp weaponry played an integral part in both the formation and the collapse of imperial Germany.\textsuperscript{70} By the end of the First World War, the senseless slaughter on the Western Front, unrestricted submarine warfare
(conducted with Krupp U-boats) and the heated wartime propaganda campaign, firmly identified Krupp as a cornerstone of the modern German military industrial complex.\textsuperscript{71}

In his work \textit{The German Idea of Militarism: Radical and Socialist Critics, 1866-1914}, Nicholas Stargardt maintains that the historical writings on Wilhelmine Germany have been preoccupied with the theme of prussianization. He argues convincingly that what has all too often been overlooked is the complex dichotomy that existed between purveyors of militarism and the powerful social, political and cultural forces that attempted to deconstruct it. Not only was this the era of \textit{Realpolitik} and the Tirpitz Plan, but it was also the age that gave rise to the world's largest Social Democratic and Communist parties (1874 and 1919 respectively) and culminated in the First World War. The many bombastic displays of German military prowess and Hohenzollern grandeur therefore co-existed with a political and cultural milieu that included the first issue of \textit{Vorwärts} (1891) and Thomas Mann's brilliant socio-political satire \textit{Man of Straw} (1918) and Kaiser Wilhelm's reactionary response to the "Zabern Affair".\textsuperscript{72} Stargardt utilized the popular play \textit{Der Hauptmann von Kopenick} [The Captain from Kopenick], to provide a memorable historical window into the socio-political complexities of the Wilhelmine years. Although the above-mentioned cultural satire is illuminating, it was not actually performed until 1932. The following pages will show that two Wilhelmine political scandals, Kaiser Wilhelm II's 1902 \textit{Tischuchrede} [table-cloth speech] and Karl Liebknecht's exposure of the \textit{Kornwalzer} affair in 1913, provide an even more effective snapshot of the complexities of this era. Both directly
involved the problematic relations between Krupp and the German political establishment and each resulted in a media circus that clearly divided the population between the forces of reaction and reform. Tracing the origins of Krupp’s role in constructing the German idea of militarism is essential to understanding the far-reaching impact of both consequences.

For Stargardt the idea of German militarism was a construct of banal displays of Hohenzollern propaganda that originated from the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 and ended with the domestic political Burgfrieden [fortress truce] of 1914. This dissertation contends that Krupp was already instrumental in extensively promoting the image of Prussian militaristic grandeur over sixty years earlier. In the marketing realm, the efforts of Alfred Krupp were groundbreaking and served to expose the militaristic Prussian image to audiences well beyond the geographic boundaries of the German Customs Union. As Evelyn Kroker’s detailed study of Ruhr industrialists’ participation at world trade exhibitions has concluded: “In the usage of informational material Alfred Krupp proved himself to be the undisputed champion of marketing strategies.”73 It would be at the famous Great London Exhibition of 1851 that the Krupp display first drew international attention to the firm’s apparent Prussian heritage and military prowess. Neither claim was particularly accurate at the time.

The Krupp Crucible Steel Works were established on the outskirts of Essen in the central Ruhr Valley in 1811. At the time, neither Krupp, Essen nor the entire Ruhr region for that matter, could claim to be part of any Prussian military heritage. Prussia acquired the present area of North Rhine Westphalia in the Peace
of Vienna in 1815. A more powerful German state to the west of France, it was argued, would serve as a buffer to any future French expansion efforts. In the pre-1815 military history of Prussia, Krupp therefore played absolutely no part.

During the subsequent period of relative European peace prior to the revolutionary year of 1848, the factory had not yet even cast its first piece of military ordnance. Instead, Alfred Krupp focused its production on modest cutlery and coin rollers and began to contemplate delving into the manufacture of railway parts. In 1851 Krupp had a grand total of two steel cannon completed, the second of which would be on display at the world’s first great industrial fair in London.

For the many visitors who viewed Krupp’s Crystal Palace display, it would have appeared that the Essen steel firm had played a considerable part in Prussia’s military history. Under an ornate plaque reading “Prussian Customs Union”, Krupp had erected a military tent topped by the royal Prussian flag. Therein stood a polished six-pounder cannon. To complete the militaristic illusion, this field-piece was surrounded by an array of seventeenth century armour. Even the contemporary London press was taken by the display describing: “the magnificent steel cannon of Herr Krupp” as “the very coxcomb of great guns”. All the public attention garnered by the steel cannon was not lost on Alfred who would write back to his manager in Essen: “The cannon has the greatest public appeal.” Even though the London visitors were infatuated by the artillery piece, at the time of the Great Exhibition the Essen foundry was still eight years removed from even securing its first minor contract with the Prussian military. Steel cannon were still considered to be a novelty item rather than a serious challenger to the tried and
proven iron or bronze counter-parts. Neither fact obviously deterred the Essen
steel magnate from posing as a great defender of Prussian militarism. At the Great
London Exhibition of 1851, Alfred Krupp was the first to export this illusion to a
global audience. Back in Germany the prized London metal became the
centrepiece of the company’s earliest marketing brochures and business cards.

The popularity of the London Exhibition ensured that subsequent international
trade exhibitions would become the key advertising venue for the world’s steel
manufacturers. From the very start, this climate was characterized by increasingly
intense, megalomaniac competition that had national pride at its core. Nowhere
was this more apparent than in the nearly comical efforts of firms like Armstrong,
Vickers, Schneider-Creuzot and Krupp to cast the largest so-called “monster
ingots” of steel. At the exhibitions in London, Paris, and Vienna, the foundries
involved engaged in near super-human rivalry, not only pouring these enormous
steel blocks, but also transporting and displaying pieces which weighed in excess
of 20,000 kilograms. Stories of transport ships sinking and display floors
collapsing under these tremendous loads serve as testament to the intensity or
insanity of these supposedly ‘friendly competitions’. As the bearers of progress in
the age of steel, these companies saw winning the “monster ingot” rivalry as a way
not only to put new manufacturers on the map, but to gain accolades for the nation
states they represented. Alfred Krupp pursued this goal with a fanatical zeal,
carrying off the first prize ribbon at London (1851 and 1862), Paris (1855), and
Vienna (1873). Significantly, at each fair, Krupp’s enormous steel casting was to
be surrounded by an ever-increasing array of military hardware. In other words,
Krupp did not fail to act on the marketing lessons of the Crystal Palace. In an era of increasing nationalist competition, the Essen steel firm led the way, projecting the image that Prussia was closing the technological and military gap between itself and the “first industrial nation”.79

For his extensive involvement in designing spectacular displays at domestic and world trade fairs, Alfred Krupp has been labeled “the world’s first propagandist”.80 It was a reputation that his successors would staunchly uphold after his death in 1887. When the World Exhibition was held in Chicago in 1893, the zealous efforts of Krupp to steal the international spotlight arguably reached their peak. Even the American press stood aghast at the enormous cost and trouble the company had invested in its latest militaristic display. The Scientific American reported:

Of all the foreign nations that are taking part in the World’s Columbian Exposition at Chicago, Germany takes the lead in extent, variety, cost and superiority in almost every characteristic. Of the private exhibitors, whether foreign or American, Krupp, the great metal manufacturer of Germany, stands at the head. His exhibit is wonderful and by its greatness almost dwarfs all other exhibits on the same lines.81

At the Columbia Exposition ‘dwarfing all competitors’ involved constructing an entirely separate building to house the steel equipment that measured two hundred feet in length, was eighty-two feet wide and forty-two feet high. Again, Krupp weaponry dominated the display with “the heaviest piece of ordnance ever to be brought to an exhibition” - a coastal defense gun one hundred and twenty two-tons and over forty feet long. The observer concluded his report with the highest of praise:

... not only has Mr. Krupp fully maintained the reputation of his firm
by this remarkable exhibit, but he has added additional glory to the
German section, and has contributed more than any other single exhibitor
to the success of the World’s Fair.\textsuperscript{82}

It is interesting to note that the non-military hardware, like steel boilers, railway
parts and mining equipment, received only very scant attention in the article, even
though, according to annual production figures, armaments only accounted for
thirty five percent of Krupp’s total manufacturing output from the previous year.\textsuperscript{83}

In the words of its current head archivist, Renate Köhne-Lindenlaub: “The way
the firm presented itself to the public reflected the \textbf{spirit of the times} [my
emphasis] and for decades the manufacture of guns was given a prominence
beyond its actual share of production.”\textsuperscript{84} In Chicago, the Krupp pavilion catered
to the sentiments of the “Blue Water Navy” age by perpetuating its militaristic
image.\textsuperscript{85} It was an age in which Krupp was not merely a passive participant, but
one who actively helped to define an era. As the Scientific American concluded, it
was after all “great guns for which the Krupp establishment is now so famous.”\textsuperscript{86}

All grandiose attempts at advertising aside, the validity of Krupp’s claims to be
a major force in the armaments sector ultimately rested on its performance on the
battlefield. The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 marked the first time that Krupp
weaponry was involved in a major military engagement. This conflict between the
two dominant German military states would have an enormous impact on shaping
the future of the nation. Krupp supplied artillery pieces to the winning side.
Ultimately, however, it was not Krupp’s cannon but Johann Dreyse’s needle gun
and superior Prussian strategy that decided the outcome of this conflict. In fact,
Krupp’s artillery was an embarrassment, many of its breech mechanisms proving to
be defective. In a very significant gesture however, Alfred Krupp “the Prussian Patriot” and shrewd businessman, not only personally apologized to the German Emperor, but also replaced four hundred defective cannon free of charge. This move not only salvaged, but greatly solidified what had been a fragile working relationship between the Prussian military establishment and Krupp.

During the next major Prussian military engagement, against France in 1870/71, this gesture paid dividends for both the army and the steel firm. This time improved versions of the 1866 cannons were decisive in battle and Alfred Krupp again reaffirmed his allegiance to the Prussian monarch with the ominous words: “...my establishment will rise and fall with Prussia’s greatness and military superiority.” Predictably, the firm lost little time in publicizing its patriotic contribution to an international audience by prominently displaying its present weaponry and latest technological advancements at the victory parade in front of the Brandenburg Gate in 1871. Alfred Krupp justified this participation with the following words: “A more effective advertisement for the factory to show what has been achieved and what is still to come, is simply unimaginable...” The bond between the house of Hohenzollern and the house of Krupp was therefore solidified with the collapse of France in 1870/71 while the company’s marketing strategies ensured this relationship was reaching a global audience.

Crown Prince Frederick Wilhelm made his first trip to the Essen foundry in 1853. He would return in the fall of 1861, this time as the newly crowned King of Prussia. This second royal visit came on the heels of Krupp’s first major weapons contract with the Prussian army, which had encouraged the sole-proprietor to
expand his factory considerably. Even the so-called „soldier king” was, in his own words, “...amazed at the remarkable expansion of the establishment, that has, besides its economic purpose, a noble national purpose.”

Wilhelm I would visit Essen on two more occasions before this tradition was continued, at far more frequent intervals, by his successor Kaiser Wilhelm II. These visits became known as Essen’s Kaisertage [Emperor Days] and were the equivalent of a national holiday, with the local and national press having an absolute field day with the carefully stage-managed royal tours of the factory, city and the Krupp estate. The powerful social and political symbolism of these visits had an immense impact on Alfred Krupp. Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann has described these early visits as establishing a pattern that the historian has aptly named Krupp’s Besucherpolitik [politics of visitation]. Just as Wilhelm I described Krupp as serving a “noble national purpose”, the house of Hohenzollern was utilized by Krupp to give the firm an aura of royal sanction. These combined efforts in self-representation, military performance, industrial expansion and patriotism paid dividends in 1870/71. After the stunning Prussian victory over France, Krupp “represented a Prusso-German model establishment of world renown.”

Much of the recent literature on Krupp has gone to great lengths to underline the important fact that the company could never be truly described as having been predominantly an armaments manufacturer. This, however, is hardly a revelation, since it has been well established that all major steel firms were never able to rely solely on the very cyclical demands of the armaments sector to keep afloat. Citing a detailed yet unpublished archival study by Michael Epkenhans,
Klaus Tenfelde, for example, went to great lengths to prove that Krupp was “never in the same way a pure armaments manufacture, like its English and French competitors Vickers, Armstrong and Schneider Creuzot.” The real peculiarity or Sonderweg of Krupp’s history remains, however, that it was perceived to be the great German armoury of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. No effort to compare the percentage of war and non-war materials can really obscure this basic fact. The title of “cannon king” would, after all, not be bestowed upon the proprietors of Vickers, Armstrong or Schneider-Creuzot, but only on Alfred Krupp.

Much of Krupp’s history has, and continues to be, centered on the historical legacy of this individual. In the long line of sole-proprietors Alfred was neither the founder nor monetarily the most successful of the company’s owners, but he was without a doubt the figure who would cast the longest shadow over all those who succeeded him. After his death, the legend of the “Prussian patriot” and “cannon king” took on near mythical proportions. Alfred Krupp, the Ruhr’s “self-made man” as one of the recent studies has re-emphasized, rose to the head of a fledgling foundry that employed a mere seven workers in 1827 and transformed it into a world famous industrial complex that employed over 20,000 employees at the time of his passing in 1887. Admirers of Krupp have retold this Horatio Alger-like story of the disciplined pragmatist whose will, perseverance, ingenuity and loyalty to the state made him into the most identifiable figure of Germany’s industrial age, on countless occasions.
Beyond the afore-mentioned efforts in public self-representation, a flood of company histories that began with Diedrich Baedecker’s 1889 work, *Alfred Krupp und die Gussstahlfabrik zu Essen – Nach Authentischen Quellen* [Alfred Krupp and the Crucible Steel Factory - Based on Authentic Sources], ensured that the achievements of Alfred Krupp would reach an even wider audience. Significantly, from the very outset these hagiographic portrayals also underlined that Alfred’s achievements were by no means confined to the military or even the industrial sector, but extended into the field of social welfare. This very symbol of Germany’s emerging capitalist order and military prowess was also being depicted as a social visionary. The following quote by Baedecker must have seemed like a striking revelation to many contemporary readers:

He [Alfred Krupp] had before any other German or foreign employer shown himself to be a true friend of the worker. He was well in advance of the supposedly worker-oriented aspirations of Lassalle, Marx and Liebknecht because he *practically applied* [my emphasis] his ideas long before them.98

One needed to look no further than the company’s unprecedented activities in the workers’ housing realm, these publications argued, to measure the extent of this individual’s greatness. History would prove, these writings prophesied, that this was a man who in the realm of social welfare was decades ahead of his time.

So much has been written about the most famous Krupp owner that it is a challenging task to separate myth from reality. One aspect of his character, however, remains indisputable; he was an absolutely obsessive note-taker who committed most of his ideas, theories, and directives to paper. Combined with the
company tradition of always having been "conscious of its historical legacy", this trait has left behind an absolutely invaluable and transparent paper trail with which historians have been able to reconstruct many of Krupp’s central aims and motives (see Ch. Three). That the very first comprehensive history of the firm by Baedecker was based on "authentic sources" was therefore of considerable importance. Even though much of the book reads like a hagiography, it nonetheless allowed the reader direct access to Alfred’s own words. Often the use of these primary sources conveyed perplexing messages, as Baedecker’s quote documenting Krupp’s strong reaction to the possibilities of a socialist-incited factory strike [1872] illustrate:

I warn again about the [socialist] temptation of a conspiracy against solitude and peace. Within the confines of my establishment it is possible for the loyal and righteous worker after a reasonable working career, to enjoy his pension in his own home – in a manner like nowhere else on earth.

What set Alfred Krupp apart from “Lassalle, Marx and Liebknecht” was obviously much more than the gulf between theory and practice; it was a social vision that actually excluded political socialism at all costs. To those workers who displayed parade-ground type discipline and loyalty to their superior, Krupp held out the promise of a well-deserved pension that could be spent in the confines of one’s own home. Alfred Krupp’s dealings with the house of Hohenzollern displayed loyalty, perseverance and discipline as the key to improving one’s own social and material standing. This feudalist power-dynamic of an Untertan [vassal] serving his Emperor was one that Krupp modelled for his employees in the hope they
would display the same loyalty towards him. Numerous authoritarian company directives underline the historical meaning of the “cannon king” label as by no means confined to the military realm but as also reflecting Alfred Krupp’s paternalistic attitude towards his growing workforce.

Alfred Krupp’s own words also stressed that his personal rise to affluence was a very arduous journey during which he had to make enormous sacrifices to guide his establishment through the most trying of times. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of his sole-proprietorship in 1873 he would send a postcard, picturing a modest workers’ cottage oddly situated in the middle of the factory grounds, to all his employees. Underneath this image the hand-written print read:

> For fifty years this original workers’ dwelling was the sanctuary of my parents. I hope that every worker will be spared the suffering that the founding of this factory cost us. 25 years ago the success that has now slowly materialized as a result of sacrifice, effort, hope and perseverance, seemed doubtful. Let this example give strength to the distraught; let it serve as a lesson to respect modest homes and the great people that may reside in them. The purpose of work is the common well-being, only then is work blessed, only then is work holy. Let everyone in our establishment from the highest to the lowest in rank pursue his domestic bliss modestly and thankfully, then my greatest wish [my emphasis] has come true.^[101]

Surprisingly, the greatest wish of Essen’s “cannon king” was that all his employees would be able to pursue and attain their domestic good fortune. Placing and preserving the so-called Stammhaus [ancestral home] directly in the middle of the factory’s busiest thoroughfare provided a constant reminder to Krupp employees that their owner was of humble origin. More than this, as outlined in the above citation, it also held the promise of something they might one day enjoy if they served the factory loyally throughout their tenure in Essen.
By 1876 the company ensured that it would not just be employees who were exposed to this benevolent side of Alfred Krupp. International exhibitions were again utilized as the preferred venue to publicize Krupp’s achievements, only this time in the realm of workers’ welfare. Many, including the Belgian newspaper *Echo du Parlement*, were surprised to see the Essen steel company even participate at the 1876 Brussels International Exhibition for Health Care and First Aid. The tone of the daily’s observations is telling: “Even Mr. Krupp, the inventor of the crucible steel cannon from Essen, wanted to take part in our peaceful exhibition and here he has taken up the same honourable rank that is usually the reserved for his cannon.” The Brussels’ Fair marked the first time that Krupp displayed its workers’ welfare initiatives at an international fair. Housing (especially the recently completed Kronenberg settlement) took centre stage and garnered Krupp the first prize gold medal. But the *Echo* was not just perplexed that Krupp had participated; it was also taken aback by the images on display, especially a small rural cottage that was shown beside the pictures of the new Kronenberg tenements. “What is the purpose of this small modest rural home beside the tenement display? It is the home of his parents…” Again, the imagery of Krupp’s humble origins and his vision for the homes of deserving employees had been exported well beyond the German borders. It would be a theme perpetuated and greatly accentuated at subsequent international and domestic exhibitions.

The promise of an idyllic cottage community for deserving Krupp employees would not, however, be kept in Alfred’s lifetime: barrack and tenement style
construction prevailed (see Ch.Three). As countless company publications have stressed, economic variables would simply not allow Alfred to fulfil his “greatest wish” of building detached homes for deserving workers. However, he did manage to draft the blueprints for this development based on the modest Stammhaus during the last days of his life. While lying on his deathbed in 1887 Alfred was apparently haunted by one thought: to create a cottage community for his loyal workers. According to company sources, in a last dramatic ‘visionary act’, he summoned up enough strength to draft plans for his only son Friedrich Alfred [Fritz hereafter] Krupp to carry out. A closer examination of the ‘plans’ preserved in the company archives reveals a collection of lines and scribbles whose sketchy outlines display a vague resemblance to the spartan ancestral home. These in turn, so the legend goes, would prove to be sufficient and served as the main inspiration for Fritz Krupp to fulfill his father’s last wish by beginning construction of the Altenhof settlement in 1892. Here, in the words of Fritz Krupp: “Old workers should receive modest family dwellings with gardens in which they can live out their final days rent free.” Unlike his father, Fritz Krupp would actually deliver on this promise.

Relating the historical legacy of Alfred Krupp from the outset is essential since so many accolades would be showered on him after his passing. Ironically, it would be under the leadership of his much less famous successor, Fritz Krupp, that the firm would experience its greatest period of expansion, reap record profits and gain a level of political influence that Alfred could scarcely have imagined. Still the historical writings have continued an infatuation with the Alfred Krupp years
(1812-1887) while paying much less attention to the 1887-1902 period when, under the comparatively brief leadership of Fritz Krupp, the firm became a truly imposing global player in the steel sector. It is difficult to explain this historiographic phenomenon, but it would seem that the considerable character differences between these two individuals played a key part in shifting the spotlight away from Fritz Krupp and back onto his father. Above all, the mysterious circumstances surrounding Fritz’s sudden death in 1902, rumours about his sexual orientation and exploits on the Italian island of Capri, all but ensured that his image would be forever tarnished. Yet given the remarkable growth the company would experience under his guidance, this lack of historical attention is a gross oversight that the following pages hope at least to partially rectify.

Much more than his father, Fritz Krupp was truly a product of the Wilhelmine era. He would formally take over the company in the summer of 1887 and staunchly continue to preserve the sole-proprietorship position his father had created. His leadership thus began almost in parallel with the fateful change in leadership that the house of Hohenzollern would experience when Crown Prince Wilhelm II took the throne in 1888. The close professional and personal relationship, which these two individuals shared over the next fourteen years, would greatly shape not only their own respective destinies, but the destiny of their nation. Krupp’s links to the Prussian military establishment during this period were vastly intensified and proved instrumental in laying the foundations for the modern German military industrial complex.
A brief glance at production and employee growth figures the firm experienced under the respective leadership of Alfred and Fritz Krupp reveals the enormity of the firm's expansion under the latter's leadership. In the year of Alfred's death in 1887, the total gross production figures amounted to RM 42,201,110. In comparison, at time of his son's death in 1902, this number had nearly tripled to RM 125,803,983. The increase in the total number of Krupp employees working at the Essen plant and beyond tells a similar tale. Under Alfred's leadership the number of workers in Essen peaked at 13,044 in 1887 with an additional 7156 being employed in plants outside of the city. In 1902 the figure in the Gußstahlfabrik [crucible steel factory] itself had nearly doubled to 24,109 whereas nearly 20,000 worked beyond the main factories. It was not so much the extensive expansion efforts embarked upon by Fritz Krupp between 1887 and 1902 that caught the attention of contemporary critics (the S.P.D. in particular), but the ruthless manner in which this tremendous growth was achieved. It proved to be part and parcel of Wilhelm II and Admiral von Tirpitz's fateful shift away from Bismarck's Realpolitik towards pursuing the aggressive expansionist policy of what Fritz Fischer has aptly defined as the Griff nach der Weltmacht [Grab or Quest for World Power]. From the outset it was clear that Kaiser Wilhelm's desire for Germany’s “place in the sun” could never be fulfilled without bringing the nation's largest steel manufacture on side.

Whereas Alfred Krupp had toyed with the idea of becoming involved in the manufacture of naval vessels as early as 1870, it was through the combined efforts of Wilhelm II, Admiral von Tirpitz and Fritz Krupp in the 1890s that the drive to
transform Germany into a major naval power began to take shape. The complicated interdependency between the state and private manufacturers, that was so characteristic of implementing the ambitious German Naval Bills (1898, 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912), has been eloquently discussed by Holger Herwig, Richard Owen and Gary Weir. The enormous scope of this undertaking and Krupp's role therein is directly reflected in the growth figures cited above.

Becoming the main government supplier of naval guns, armour plate, capital ships and submarines, meant transforming the company into a vertically and horizontally integrated economic entity. In other words, in order for the considerable capital outlay and risk to pay dividends, steel manufacturers attempted to gain complete control of the production process from the mining of raw materials, development of new technology and production facilities to the eventual shipyard construction and launch. As a direct result, between 1887 and 1902, the reputation of Krupp would be transformed from one of mere cannon king to “the armoury of the German Empire”.

In what amounted to gaining a monopoly position in the naval armaments sector, Fritz Krupp proved himself to be every bit as focused and driven as his father. During his brief leadership tenure, the Essen firm virtually swallowed-up all of its main competitors, merging with armoured-plate manufacturers Dillinger Hütte in 1890 and the Gruson Works of Magdeburg in 1893. Acquisition of two iron mines in the hotly contested Franco-German border region of Alsace-Lorraine in 1889 and 1894 secured the invaluable quantities of high-grade ore that were so essential to feed the furnaces in the new era of rapid naval expansion. With the
lease (1896-1902) and then outright takeover of the Germania Shipyard in Kiel (1902), the Krupp firm was extremely well-situated to take on the lion’s share of government contracts when Tirpitz’s first Naval Bill was passed in 1898. This enormous transformation would leave Krupp much more susceptible to political criticism and the threat of labour unrest than at any time in its previous history. Himself a member of the German parliament since the early 1890s, Fritz Krupp was keenly aware of these new socio-political prospects. Nowhere was this awareness more visibly displayed than in the way he chose to represent the firm at the Düsseldorf Industrial Fair just months before his sudden death in 1902.

For the 1902 exhibition Krupp’s penchant for the symbolic gesture was embodied in the physical construction of its pavilion. The entire structure was designed to resemble a heavy battleship. Housed inside were the newest fruits of the recently acquired Gruson Works in Magdeburg and the Germania shipyards in Kiel: a battery of naval artillery, armour plate, machinery for the manufacture of smokeless powder and torpedo boat engines. The strong emphasis on military material was rounded-out by the newly commissioned Depeschenboot [Telegram ship] Sleipner and the infamous gunboat Panther whose exploits off the coast of Agadir in 1911 came to symbolize the dangerously aggressive foreign policy of Wilhelmine Germany.¹⁰⁸ At the Düsseldorf Fair, both ships lay moored directly adjacent to the Krupp pavilion on the banks of the Rhine, both were sent to Düsseldorf under direct orders from Wilhelm II. These vessels represented a royal gesture of support for the nation’s most significant armourer and a personal favour from the Kaiser to one of his closest friends, Fritz Krupp.¹⁰⁹
An analysis of the Düsseldorf commemorative photo album provides an excellent visual record of the striking extent to which the naval theme was present in the entire Krupp exhibit. The photos depict the display and its wares from all angles. “Internal View of the Hall” for example, shows the two 30.5cm and 28cm heavy naval guns alongside an equally enormous propulsion shaft for the new high-speed liner Kaiser Wilhelm II, while an external perspective entitled “Krupp Hall” proudly displayed the German naval standards adorning the entire Krupp pavilion.

By far the most interesting picture in the collection however was the “Full View”. Taken from the Rhine River Bridge, it portrayed the daunting physical dominance the colossal Krupp pavilion and its accompanying naval vessels, exerted over the entire fair grounds. The accompanying brochure proudly announced that with over 4280 square meters the 1902 pavilion not only exceeded the 1893 Krupp exhibit in Chicago (1816 sq. m.), but also represented a nearly ten-fold increase over the firm’s previous Düsseldorf Industrial Exhibition (1880) display area.110

As the scope of everything the firm undertook changed dramatically during the Fritz Krupp era, this also applied to how the firm’s housing activities were now an integral part of the industrial exhibit itself. A closer examination of the panorama perspective reveals a peculiar sight: sandwiched between the overt displays of German militarism lay an idyllic two-family worker’s dwelling constructed in “English cottage-style” (Fig. #3).111 Significantly, this picturesque semi-detached dwelling more closely resembled a miniature villa than a traditional workers’ tenement and was thus a radical departure from anything the company had constructed during the Alfred Krupp era. The exhibition guide provided the
following explanation for this apparent aberration amongst Krupp's weapons of war:

The overall picture of the products and achievements of the various Krupp production facilities would have been an incomplete one, had the company efforts in the realm of workers' welfare not been displayed. On the banks of the Rhine behind the Krupp hall, a workers home for two families that presently exists in [Essen's Altenhof and] Alfredhof was therefore displayed.  

For those visitors who were interested in looking beyond the naval tour de force of Germany's largest armaments manufacturer, the company took considerable effort to construct a full-scale replica of one of its most recent worker's houses. Fully furnished, this modest yet picturesque dwelling was intended to complement the pavilion's comprehensive second floor exhibit which had been entirely set aside to display the company welfare activities and housing projects. Dedicating nearly half of the entire display area to workers' welfare provisions was a substantial attempt to counter-balance the militaristic image of the firm. However, the passing of Admiral Tirpitz's naval bill in the same year virtually ensured that the name of Krupp would again become increasingly linked with the Prussian military establishment.

Although it has been proven that Tirpitz was the true architect of the naval program, he himself would later reflect that: "Krupp and the Navy belong historically together. Without Krupp, the present [1913] development of our Navy would hardly have been conceivable."  

Ironically, this was a view shared by the contemporary socialist press which correctly interpreted the monopoly position that the Essen firm attained during the Tirpitz era as the height of state-private
sector capitalist collusion. Two sensational scandals not only exposed this mutually beneficial relationship for all to see, but provide intriguing insights into what the name Krupp stood for prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Both scandals bear witness to the fact that this was a reputation which ultimately crystallized in the “crossfire of public debate”.

At the very least, the aforementioned efforts in self-representation had given the supporters and critics, ample material for debate. The fact that German nationalism and socialism lay at the heart of both controversies only added further fuel to the fire.

Contextualized in the decade that began with the repeal of the draconian anti-socialist laws and the re-birth of the S.P.D., the carefully chosen photo opportunities of the new Kaiser took on an ever-increasing political significance in the 1890s. The young and ambitious Wilhelm was faced with putting his stamp on the German political landscape. Domestically his so-called political “new course” meant neither alienating supporters on the political right (Nationalists and Conservatives) nor further enhancing the cause of parties garnering working class support (S.P.D and Center). Wilhelm II was trying desperately to increase the popular appeal of the Prussian monarchy on the left of the political spectrum. In what promised to be an increasingly democratic age, this was much more than a mere exercise in popular campaigning; it was truly a struggle for Hohenzollern political survival. What better place to showcase the Kaiser as a supporter of the German proletariat than in the familiar confines of Essen’s Krupp factory?

By the 1890s, Alfred and Fritz Krupp’s patriarchal treatment of their workforce and the firm’s experience in carefully orchestrated Besucherpolitik had
fostered a controlled environment in which the Kaiser could be shown to be in tune with needs of the proletariat. Photographic images of the monarch in ever-present military dress inspecting columns of Krupp workers were thus worth their weight in gold. They created the illusion that the German working class, in Essen at least, stood firmly behind the new Emperor and that his sympathy for their concerns, in turn, was genuine. In one of his first letters to the new Kaiser in 1890, Fritz Krupp had written: “Your Majesty is undoubtedly aware that during the strike wave in the last years, my workers have behaved in an exemplary manner, especially during the Reichstag elections, they withstood all oncoming temptations.” He then went on to conclude: “I am utterly convinced that my workers in Essen will remain on the right path and will serve so many others as a fine example.”¹¹⁵ The critically important fact that the firm would be spared the threat of labour militancy until the French Ruhr occupation in 1923, greatly added to the Krupp mystique of unwavering worker loyalty. It was a mystique Wilhelm II hoped to exploit for political gain during his many visits to Essen.¹¹⁶

It was, however, during an unscheduled visit on November 28th, 1902, that the German Kaiser would expose his true autocratic face. He had come to Essen to deliver the eulogy for his close friend Fritz Krupp who had died suddenly and under mysterious circumstances, at the age of forty-eight. Wilhelm’s so-called Tischtuchrede [table-cloth speech] was delivered at Krupp’s gravesite and it proved to be a defining moment, not only in the history of the Essen firm, but in the socio-political history of Wilhelmine Germany.¹¹⁷
Fritz Krupp’s death had been preceded by a sensational scandal that was uncovered by the left-wing Italian daily *Propaganda* at the beginning of November. According to the Italian paper, the “King of cannons and Capitoni” had been caught engaging in ‘unspeakably indecent’ acts with Italian boys at his vacation villa on the island of Capri. When the shocking news first reached the German press, it was the voice of the S.P.D., *Vorwärts* that skilfully led the charge of denouncing the actions of Krupp while simultaneously calling for the government finally to repeal the discriminatory anti-homosexual paragraph 175 from the German legal code. Describing the behaviour of the industrial magnate as representing “a capitalist cultural image of the most crass dimensions”, the *Vorwärts* coverage of the scandal provides invaluable insights into what the name Krupp represented for the political left in 1902. The article stated:

The *Geheime Kommerzienrat* [Privy Council] Krupp, member of the Prussian Upper House, the richest man in Germany, whose yearly income since the naval orders has increased to over 25 Million [Marks], who employs over 50,000 workers in his factories, in which lies the centre of genocidal war technology, Mr. Krupp, who foreign royalty and heads of state visit while in Germany, belongs to those very individuals for which the paragraph 175 would represent a direct burden and threat, if on this issue the legal system does not remove the blindfold from justice.

The citation outlines the scope of Krupp’s social, political and economic clout and links all three directly to the gravy train of German naval contracts. Under a supposedly democratic legal code, *Vorwärts* proposed, Krupp’s *Sonderstellung* [unique position] in the nation’s political economy should have no bearing. In theory, this presented the government with two options: either charge Krupp under paragraph 175 or repeal this draconian legislation altogether. The response from
government officials was not to ‘remove the blindfold from justice’ but, immediately to confiscate all copies of the cited Vorwärts issue. This action was indicative of the government’s protectionist stance, which it loyally maintained towards Krupp until his death on November 22nd, 1902.

At the funeral of Fritz Krupp in Essen the Kaiser made one of the most politically charged speeches of his erratic reign. Introducing himself as “a friend of the immortal [F. A. Krupp] and his establishment”, Wilhelm explained that the reason for his attendance was to “hold the shield of the German Emperor over the [Krupp] establishment and the memory of the deceased”. Fritz Krupp himself was then described as: “… a thoroughly German individual who had not only lived for the well-being of the fatherland, but above all for the well-being of his workers, whose honour had now been attacked.” The emotionally charged tirade then singled-out the German political left and the ‘un-German’ elements of the working class, as having been directly responsible for the murder of this national hero. In contrast to these alleged saboteurs, the 50,000 Krupp workers were then given the highest praise:

You the Krupp workers have always loyally stood by and supported your employer; your heartfelt gratitude has never diminished; in foreign countries I have proudly seen the fruits of your labour bring pride to our nation. Men who claim to be leaders of the German workers have robbed you of your faithful master.120

The speech then concluded with the infamous warning to the entire German working class: “Whoever does not sever the ties [das Tischtuch zerschneidet] between themselves and these individuals most bear their moral guilt.”121
In an era when European national interests were hurtling the continent towards the First World War, the socio-political impact of these words cannot be overestimated. Yet as Nicholas Stargardt has so eloquently indicated, it was the duality between the forces of reaction and reform that made the Wilhelmine era so unique. As the rhetoric of Wilhelm’s *Hurrapatristismuß* [patriotic jingoism] mounted between 1902 and 1914 so did the popular support for the Social Democratic Party. The name Krupp was an integral part of this political discourse throughout the period.

The death of Fritz Krupp left the company facing a considerable dilemma. Even though the Kaiser’s support was unwavering, the negative press surrounding the so-called “Capri Affair” did tarnish the firm’s public image considerably. An even more urgent matter was that the time-honoured sole-proprietorship tradition had effectively died out with the passing of Alfred Krupp’s only son. What followed was the brief yet fascinating “Interregnum” (1902-1908) of leadership under Fritz’s widow Margarethe Krupp who was faced with putting her stamp on the firm while simultaneously restoring its public image. She showed herself to be very capable in facing these challenges. Significantly, she would attempt to use a highly publicized new company housing initiative to accomplish both tasks.

The first part of the Krupp dilemma, the issue of male succession, was solved at the wedding of the oldest daughter and heiress, Bertha in December of 1906. At the ceremony Wilhelm II made the unprecedented gesture of allowing the groom Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach to take on the family name of his new bride. Thus Gustav von Bohlen and Halbach became Gustav Krupp von Bohlen
und Halbach and the male proprietorship tradition was artificially restored by royal decree.

Not to be outdone by the Kaiser's gesture, Magarethe Krupp would use her daughter's wedding to restore the firm's public image by making the following announcement: "In honour of the wedding of my daughter I will create a foundation that is above all intended to assist with housing provisions for the lower classes. The foundation will be called The Margarethe Krupp Housing Foundation." The unheard of private donation of one million marks was then set aside for this purpose and the construction of this 'garden city' project was begun in 1910. It capitalized on the popularity of the garden city idea that gained enormous popularity with the completion of Dresden-Hellerau (1910) while forever immortalizing Margarethe's memory. The Margarethenhöhe project (see pp. 146-151) thus carried on the company tradition of adapting to the "spirit of the times". It was the first Krupp housing project open to non-employees and to this day it continues to be praised as a tremendous act of social compassion.

While the first phases of the Margarethenhöhe were beginning to take shape the firm was shaken by yet another scandal. The S.P.D. leader Karl Liebknecht had been the most outspoken critic of Krupp's monopoly position in the German military industrial complex. It was Liebknecht who coined the term "merchants of death" to describe the maddening pace of Krupp's activities in the armaments sector. But it was not just Krupp who in the eyes of Liebknecht was pushing the nation ever closer to a devastating military conflict. Krupp's market dominance, he argued, was only attained through the direct support of the German
government. The S.P.D. had made these allegations ever since the first naval bill was passed, but it was nearly a decade later that Liebknecht’s assertions were finally confirmed in the so-called Kornwalzer affair.

In April of 1913, the S.P.D. delegate made a sensational Reichstag speech in which he indicated that he had obtained incriminating evidence that Krupp agents had bribed military officers and senior government officials to ensure armaments contracts. The company files of the operation were labelled under the heading “Kornwalzer” and had been seized by criminal investigators in the fall of the previous year. The ensuing “Krupp trial” received extensive foreign and domestic press coverage. Given the chain of events described in this chapter -- the manner of the rapid Krupp expansion and the string of takeovers that occurred just prior to the first naval bills -- there were undoubtedly many Krupp critics who suspected improper business practices. In fact, Richard Owen has gone as far as describing the trial as “the inevitable public conflict” that both the government and industry were bound to face for their actions.124

Many supporters and critics of the authoritarian state were probably surprised at the “guilty” verdict. The head of the company’s Berlin bureau was sentenced for bribing high officials in the War Ministry for inside information on other armaments suppliers. He would receive a three-month prison sentence for his involvement. A Krupp director at the Essen office was also implicated yet received only a paltry 300 Mark fine as a result of the scandal. In retrospect, the sentences seem extremely light but they are telling, since, as Stargardt has indicated, to enforce a comprehensive fine against Krupp in 1913 “would have
literally halted German armament.¹²⁵ The government promised to look into the matter in future by establishing a parliamentary inquiry into the armaments dealings. When Liebknecht himself requested to sit on the committee, the government flatly rejected his participation. On the surface, the only real casualties of the entire episode were Minister of War von Heeringen and two Krupp managers who chose to resign over the affair.¹²⁶

The real importance of the 1913 Krupp trial was, however, that it provided considerable validation for the S.P.D.'s assertions that heavy industry and the Prussian military establishment had betrayed the people's trust. Fittingly, due to the lenient sentences to the two Krupp officials, the judgment only aroused further suspicions of a two-tiered justice system. Hastily proposing to form a government committee on the matter only added to the controversy. In protest at the government's handling of the armaments scandal, the S.P.D., which had recently [1912] become the largest political party in the Reichstag, chose to boycott the inquiry altogether. In what seemed to be a socio-political climate on the verge of dramatic reform, Krupp's name had been firmly re-established alongside the forces of reaction.

Whereas the subsequent German Burgfrieden safeguarded the firm from any political attacks domestically, the horrific European slaughter over the next four years elevated the militaristic image of the firm to unprecedented heights. "Loyal talk won't beat Kaiser, Krupp and Kultur trained men will. Enlist now!" read a World War One Canadian recruitment poster.¹²⁷ It speaks volumes for the company's reputation that the mention of its very name was used as a rallying cry
for young recruits halfway around the world. The poster was published after the German military had unleashed the ill-fated Schlieffen Plan on the Low Countries and France in 1914. The initial drive westward was to be made possible by annihilating Belgian fortifications with enormous ninety-eight ton Krupp siege cannons. These unprecedented artillery monstrosities possessed a forty-two centimeter bore and proved brutally effective in the first months of the conflict. In a crude act reflecting the military jingoism of the age, the weapons were nicknamed after Fritz' eldest daughter and heiress to the company fortune, Bertha. The so-called “Fat [or Big] Berthas” would gain world-wide notoriety and were used as a pillar of German propaganda of which the following poem was indicative:

    Bertha is an Essener child
    She has a 42cm waist,
    If she finds her way to Paris,
    Then watch out, scoundrels [Kanaille]!
    How, she has given the troops breathing space
    The world will never forget,
    Shout, when the “industrious Bertha” hits:
    This is a „Greeting from Essen“

On the same theme, a German political cartoon in 1914 depicted a caricature of a 42 cm Krupp shell questioning a disgruntled looking French sentry in front of the Eiffel Tower with the caption reading: “Good day, my name is Brummer [Boomer or Hummer] from Essen. Could I speak to Mr. Poincare? I am sorry, but he has left for Bordeaux. I see, then I will pay him a visit there.”Ironically, although Bertha’s mother, Margarethe, had made every attempt to refocus public attention on the benevolent side of the firm with the planned community that would
immortalize her memory (Margarethenhöhe), her daughter's name would be forever linked to a weapon of mass destruction.

Although it is undeniable that Krupp's reputation during the war years was once again based first and foremost on armaments, company efforts to refocus attention on the firm's social vision did not cease during the military conflict. Historical writings on Krupp have thus far overlooked that while the factory was nearing record production and employee levels and the inhabitants of the Ruhr were desperately attempting to cope with what Jürgen Kocka has so vividly described as the effects of "Total War", the steel firm resolutely pushed ahead with plans to construct its next housing project. It was specifically designed and advertised as addressing the needs of Ruhr inhabitants on the "homefront".

In 1916 when the war had dragged on for nearly two years and it became clear to everyone involved that the troops would not be home before Christmas, the Krupp housing office began to draft plans for an entirely different settlement that was to be built on the boundary of Essen and Mülheim. In theory, this was to be a homestead for returning soldiers and their families where they could be re-rooted in their very own piece of native soil. The name of the Krupp community was a direct reflection of this sentimental idea; it was to be called Heimaterde [native soil]. If any lesson could be learned from the horrors of the First World War, the planners argued, it was how dearly the combatants cherished the sacred ground of their respective homelands. Moreover, the dire food and supply shortages that every German was experiencing on the homefront clearly indicated how much the population was dependent on importing the most basic staples. In other words, it
was argued that the rapid rate of industrial and economic expansion had undermined Germany's ability to remain self-sufficient. The devastating impact the continental blockade (1915-1918) exerted, especially on the heavy industrial areas of Germany, was a constant reminder of this new reality. In the Ruhr region Krupp's *Heimaterde* was intended to guarantee the nation's social and economic survival by restoring its agrarian independence. The company depicted the construction of this particular settlement as an act of patriotism.

Once again, the opening announcement of the firm's intentions was highly publicized, with Krupp director Max Halbach making a lengthy and sentimental speech in 1916. Laden with references to *Heimat* [nationalist and native regional] nostalgia and praise for the German soldier, he eventually arrived at the following conclusion:

> The *Kotten* [traditional Ruhr workers' cottage] is our ideal dwelling! It means houses surrounded by fruit trees situated in greenery and sunshine, a plentiful supply of vegetables with bacon, ham and sausages, which do not cost any money (since the sale of the second pig will more than pay for the cost of both pigs), it means the sound of goats and poultry coming from the shed, it means good health, love for life and work; it means love of *Heimat* and fatherland...

Taken from a speech delivered at the height of the German war effort, the description of this utopian setting must have seemed surreal to those in attendance, not to mention those for whom the new settlement was intended. Images of idyllic homes with gardens, livestock and all the home-grown produce that one required to make hard currency all but superfluous, represented a stirring contrast to the increasingly desperate conditions facing the homefront. No matter how dire these conditions had become in parts of Germany, it is remarkable that Krupp was ready
and willing to begin turning these proposals into reality in that very year. Only a government restriction on war-essential building delayed the beginning of construction until August of 1918.

The company motives behind beginning the Heimaterde project in 1916 were not just to provide deserving veterans with a generous reward for their years of service, but following in the tradition of Alfred Krupp whose fear of revolution (see p. 127) were well-documented, to defuse the potential of social unrest. In the highly volatile climate of the last months of the conflict the considerable threat that disgruntled civilians and especially returning soldiers posed to the “powers above” was very real. The 1918 Kiel sailors’ mutiny which erupted literally outside the gates of Krupp’s Germaniawerft [Germania Shipyard], was an ominous reminder of the revolutionary atmosphere during the waning days of the Wilhelmine Reich. It remains one of the most important chapters of Krupp history that workers uprisings did not ignite at the Essen plant. If the long-awaited proletarian revolution prophesied by Marx, Engels, Bebel and Liebknecht was to be successful, surely it would need to sweep through the factories of the nation’s largest capitalist establishment. Sadly, it was Krupp’s most vocal and articulate critic, Karl Liebknecht, who himself fell victim to a heinous police assassination plot in 1919. When the revolutionary tide did sweep through the Ruhr in 1920, it left the Krupp establishment virtually untouched. Plans to construct the Heimaterde continued amongst the post-war turmoil.

One final incident during the period under discussion did bring the threat of labour unrest to Krupp’s main plant in Essen. It also proved to have an enormous
impact on shaping the image of the firm during the early Weimar years. Although
the Essen factories were spared violent militancy during the revolutionary period,
the same would not hold for the French Ruhr occupation of 1923.

William Carr has described the controversial decision by French premier
Raymond Poincaré to occupy the industrial heartland on January 11th, 1923 to
enforce the Treaty of Versailles, as an extremely unpopular measure: “A wave of
anti-French feeling swept through Germany, and she was united as she had not
been since August 1914.” The German Communist Party [hereafter K.P.D.], for
example, called for a general strike and the obscure National Socialist German
Workers’ Party [hereafter N.S.D.A.P.] advocated ‘direct action against the French
invaders’. The official stance of the Weimar coalition government of Wilhelm
Cuno was to break off all diplomatic relations with France, suspend the prospect of
any future reparation payments and, most significantly for the Ruhr region,
officially sanction a passive resistance campaign in the industrial sector. With
neither side willing to back down by the spring of 1923, it seemed a virtual
certainty that the Krupp factory would sooner or later become directly embroiled
in the occupation standoff.

In a political climate of mutual distrust, the French countered the passive
resistance campaign by placing sentries directly in charge of supervising coal
production and dispatching units to take stock of industrial inventories throughout
the Ruhr. From the French perspective, the direct supervisory measures were
justified in order to establish once and for all exactly what the German industrial
sector was truly able to pay. It was for this very purpose that a unit of eleven
French soldiers armed with a single machine gun arrived at the gates of the Krupp main factory on the morning of Easter Saturday, 1923.

The details of what occurred next remain sketchy. According to local newspaper accounts, when word of the French inspection reached the factory workers, they gradually began to emerge to confront the soldiers in an orderly and peaceful manner. At the subsequent trial, one of the French soldiers testified that 'the crowd of over 30,000 began to get unruly and did not follow an order to stand down'. Whatever the exact sequence of events, the outcome was the same; a French machine-gunner opened fire on the crowd, killing thirteen and wounding approximately thirty others. The foreign and domestic press reaction to the "Krupp massacre" was one of unilateral outrage towards the heavy-handed response of the French troops. Realizing the political ramifications of the French action, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach used the occasion to give his fallen workers an enormous funeral at which he urged the mourners to: "Honour their memory, for they also died for German freedom, for German honour and for the vindication of German labour; their lives and deaths shall remain a building block for Germany's future."  

One year later in his typical bombastic rhetoric, Adolf Hitler described the Ruhr occupation as a life altering experience where the Weimar government failed to act. In Mein Kampf [My Struggle] he stated:

Either we stood for this new offense [Ruhr Occupation] and did nothing, or, directing the eyes of the German people to this land of glowing smelters and smoky furnaces, we inspired them with a glowing will to end this eternal disgrace rather take upon themselves the terrors of the moment than bear this endless terror one moment longer.
Krupp's loyal workers became national martyrs whose actions were praised by individuals of all political stripes. Their deaths were, however, only the beginning of the public outrage, for the French added insult to injury by holding Krupp officials legally responsible for the unruly behaviour of their workforce. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach himself was to answer the allegations in yet another sensational trial.

This chapter began by examining the gradual evolution of the Krupp corporate image. In large part the construct of Alfred Krupp and his abilities to harness the early powers of marketing at all cost, this image was built on the aura of Prussian militarism. Begun at the Great London Exhibition in 1851 and carefully honed at subsequent domestic and international fairs, the firm's militaristic image would later be put to the test on the battlefield. Twice within a span of two years this fame was garnered and then shamelessly exploited at the expense of France. In 1871, Alfred Krupp unscrupulously displayed his latest armaments at the victory parade in front of the Berlin's Brandenburg Gate. Between 1914 and 1918, the German propaganda office continuously recycled images of Krupp's 42cm cannon or the so-called "Big Bertha" threatening the complete annihilation of its French archrival. In short, the fame and national accolades of Alfred Krupp "the cannon king" and Essen the "Armoury the German Reich" came as a result of the jingoistic ridicule of France.

After 1919 Gustav Krupp repeatedly went on record to claim that his establishment had been the hardest hit by the industrial restrictions clause of the Treaty of Versailles. When German reparation payments were not being made in
the winter of 1922/23, it came as little surprise that given the opportunity, the
Poincaré government would not hesitate to act against, what it considered to be
the bastion of German militarism. Arguably, the show trial that followed the
shooting of the Krupp workers in 1923 represented the final act in a bitter
propaganda campaign that began in 1871.

For the second time in little over a decade, the name Krupp was once again
embroiled in a legal spectacle. Unlike the Kornwalzer affair of 1912/13, in which
some dailies still described the firm as warmongers and merchants of death, the
1923 headlines spoke of the scandalous injustice that a vengeful France was
exact ing on one of Germany's most upstanding citizens. Had it not been enough,
the press asked, that the Essen factories were being subjected to the humiliation of
the Treaty of Versailles? Under such headlines as "Krupp faces French military
court", the reputation of Krupp as a great defender of German nationalist interests
was quickly restored. Moreover, the shooting of the thirteen workmen was
depicted as an act of Krupp worker loyalty not just to the firm, but the entire
nation. What greater act of sacrifice could have been made to underscore the
fierce dedication the labourers felt towards their place of employment and their
nation? What greater validation was required to show that the social welfare
policies implemented by Alfred Krupp had paid enormous dividends in the most
trying of times?

Coming to terms with the historical construction of the Krupp corporate image
between 1892 and 1923 is an essential precursor to any discussion that tries to
define the historical significance of its housing activities. Previous historical
discussions of this subject have predominantly overlooked this critical aspect, treating the housing issue as a separate entity, divorced from the social, political and cultural forces that defined its meaning. From its international debut at the 1851 Great London Exhibition, the company projected itself as a pillar of Prussian militarism nearly a decade before securing its first minor armament contract with the War Ministry. From then on, the militarist theme dominated the company displays at trade fairs, often grossly distorting the actual production percentages of non-armament to armament production in favour of the latter. Present company historian Renate Köhne-Lindenlaub has explained the company efforts in self-representation with the important observation that it was always “adapting to the spirit of the times”. Under the leadership of its most famous sole-proprietor, Alfred Krupp, “the world’s first propagandist,” the militarist reputation of the firm was solidified by the success of Krupp’s cannon in the stunning 1870 victory over France. It was a victory that would forever immortalize Alfred as “the cannon king” from Essen. It was also a reputation that all subsequent leaders of the firm would attempt to uphold. However, under the leadership of the historically neglected figure of Fritz Krupp, an ever-increasing effort was made to counterbalance the firm’s militaristic reputation with its efforts in the realm of workers’ welfare. In this process the firm’s housing activities would play the central role.

Fritz Krupp took over the firm in an age that was radically different from that of his father. The leadership change in Essen (1887) virtually coincided with the leadership change of the Hohenzollern monarchy that saw the erratic Wilhelm II
take the throne. As Nicholas Stargardt has shown, the Wilhelmine era was a period in which militarism and the forces of social reform evolved in parallel. On the eve of World War One, the S.P.D. was by far the largest party in the German Reichstag. Himself a member of the Reichstag, Fritz Krupp, unlike his father, was an individual who was directly involved in the domestic political process. With the enormous expansion of the Krupp works under his leadership, went the potential of losing his growing workforce to the temptations from the political left.

Beginning with the radically different Altenhof development in 1892, Fritz Krupp created a highly publicized incentive to loyalty among workers. After years of hard labour, one could hope to live out one's final days rent free in a picturesque cottage and garden community that looked strangely out of place in the Ruhr's most industrialized city. In the year of his sudden death (1902), the company display of workers' welfare provisions at the Düsseldorf Industrial Fair actually rivalled its armament exhibit.

Ultimately, Krupp's efforts at self-representation would crystallize in the arena of public debate. In the period under examination, three high profile scandals were utilized as a historical window in order to gain a sense of the firm's corporate identity: The mysterious death of Friedrich Krupp in 1902, when the Kaiser showered praise upon the deceased and his loyal workers while subsequently lambasting the S.P.D.; the so-called Kornwalzer affair of 1912/13, in which Karl Liebknecht was finally able to provide proof of the collusion of government and monopoly capital in the armaments sector; and finally, the shooting of thirteen Krupp workers at the hands of French soldiers in 1923, an incident that seemingly
underlined the legendary loyalty of Krupp workers to both their employer and the nation. In the same year that the little known National Socialist German Workers' Party began to make a name for itself with the ill-fated march on the Munich Feldherrnhalle, the name Krupp once again become synonymous with German national defence and worker loyalty.
CHAPTER TWO

Chasing Ideals: The German Housing Reform Movement before 1919
There is something Germanic in the garden city concept, the proud enjoyment of ownership and the building on one’s own land, this the German people [Volk] should never forget.\textsuperscript{138} Karl Weißbach and Walter Mackowsky \textit{Das Arbeiterwohnhaus} [The Worker’s Home] (Berlin: 1910).

In the pre-World War One history of the German housing reform movement there were two constants: the demand for quality dwellings continued to rise throughout this period and the German state did not become directly involved in solving this escalating housing shortage. Even though the overall material achievements in the housing realm were meagre, this was certainly not the result of a lack of proposed remedies. On the contrary, from a diverse group of political theorists, historians, architects, artists and even military leaders, came an imaginative list of plans aimed at preventing the horrific living conditions of the infamous Berlin \textit{Mietskasernen} [rental barracks] spreading throughout Germany. This extensive list projected the single-family, detached home with garden as the ideal German housing form. The tremendous popularity of the German Garden Cities Association (D.G.G.) in the early twentieth century serves as a testament to the mass appeal of the single-family dwelling concept. Similar to other proposals, however, the garden cities movement failed to spur the German government to take action. Ultimately it was only as a result of the calamitous post-war socio-economic conditions that a desperately needed national housing law was finally initiated in 1919. By this time it is crucial to remember that Krupp had been active in housing for well over half a century. The aims, objectives and most importantly
the results, of the diverse housing initiatives proposed prior to 1918 are a critical historical backdrop for Krupp’s achievements (see Ch. Three).

The worst fears of the German housing reformers were realized in the squalid Berlin rental barracks that began to emerge in the German capital from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. With their poor, five storey, high-density construction, lack of proper lighting, ventilation and sanitary provisions, these structures were indeed the worst the speculative German housing market had to offer. According to Victor Aimé Huber (1800-1869), one of the first scholars to publish extensively on the emerging Berlin housing crisis in the late 1840s, herein lay one of the root causes of the problem. To Huber it became clear that if left completely to free-market forces, the Berlin housing sector would fail miserably in providing suitable housing for the working population. Huber was fully aware that the conditions in the German capital, similar to those in Paris and London, were certainly not indicative of overall national trends. Rather, like Edwin Chadwick in England and Jean Dollfus in France, he saw Berlin as an ominous window to the future. If the contemporary trend of German industrial expansion and unrestricted speculative building continued, Huber projected that the housing problem would soon spread to all the German states.

Victor Aimé Huber represented the archetype of the conservative German social reformer or Kathedersozialist, the antithesis to Friedrich Engels. For Huber the deteriorating living conditions in the Prussian capital represented a potentially lethal threat to the established social order. As it had done for Marx and Engels, the revolutionary climate of 1848 inspired Huber to devise a proposal with which
to address the socio-political complexities of the developing industrial age. In the
same year that saw publication of the Communist Manifesto (1848), Huber
released his essay on: "Innere Colonisation" [internal or domestic colonization]. It
was a concept that would have far-reaching implications for future German
housing proposals.

Internally colonizing the German working class, as the name implied, entailed
approaching the housing problem like the formal settlement of a newly conquered
territory. For Huber and the conservative social reformers who followed his
precedent (Gustav Schmoller, Emil Sax and later Adolf Damaschke) this process
needed to be conducted like a military engagement. Schmoller (1838-1917), for
example, illustrated this in the most graphic terms and entrusted the task of
colonizing the workers to the upper classes:

The property owning classes have to be awoken from their slumber, they
must finally realize that even if they make great sacrifices, these will only
serve as a modest insurance policy with which they can protect themselves
against the epidemic social revolutions that are inevitable unless we stop
treating the lower classes in our larger cities like barbarians due to their
poor housing conditions. As a result [of these conditions] they have
been degraded to an animal-like existence. The citation bears an uncanny resemblance to the famous statement made by
Alfred Krupp in the 1860s declaring that it was imperative to act sooner rather
than later in order to be spared the inevitable prospect of revolution (see p. 127).

Both individuals thus believed that decisive leadership needed to be provided from
the upper echelon of society downward to assist the 'barbarous' proletariat living
in the squalor of 'our larger cities'. Great sacrifices were required in order to
preserve the social status quo. What exact physical form these supposedly essential new housing projects were to take, Schmoller, unlike Krupp, left to the imagination.

What set Victor Aimé Huber apart from the early circle of conservative social reformers was that he did present very concrete ideas about how his proposals were going to be realized. He went to considerable lengths, for instance, to distance himself from the likes of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, both of whom he dismissed as utopian socialists. As a member of the educated bourgeoisie, Huber also took great care not to be misinterpreted as a supporter of the new communist doctrines by drawing a clear divide between himself and Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Ferdinand Lassalle. He repeatedly emphasized that his plans lay within the realm of the possible. Huber’s pragmatic approach often involved exposing the shortcomings of existing workers’ housing (specifically Mulhouse in France and Saltaire in England) to underline his case for the detached single dwelling with garden style.  

In addition to the form, location and approximate size of the new communities, Huber also specified that the realization of these proposals was only possible if the state, the private sector and the workers themselves co-operated. The state needed to initiate legislation for land provisions and encourage investors and financial institutions to make capital available at affordable interest rates. The employer needed to assist financially to ensure that new production facilities were situated close to the new workers’ settlements. And lastly, it was imperative that the workers themselves be persuaded to take part in the physical construction of
the homes and establish a financial base along the lines of English co-operative associations. All in all therefore, a considerable degree of public and private interest and genuine goodwill was required from a cross-section of German society to realize Huber's dreams.

Like many who were to dedicate their lives to the study of the housing question, Huber proved to be an individual who was decades ahead of his time. What was required to ward off an impending social catastrophe, according to Huber, was equally clear in his publications. As he predicted, the rapid rate of German industrial expansion did continue, yet his proposed remedies for solving the ensuing housing crisis did not receive widespread support. His initiatives did however, result in the formation of the *Berliner Gemeinnützige Baugesellschaft* [Berlin Co-operative Building Society] in 1847 and this co-operative organization did manage to construct a modest number of dwellings on the outskirts of Berlin beginning in 1851. In three separate projects, twenty-eight, fourteen and eighteen plain "cottage" dwellings were constructed near the Bremerhöhe as a stark contrast to the inner city *Mietskasernen*. Unfortunately for Huber and the building society members, the projects were soon abandoned due to a lack of interest and monetary backing. Although in his most famous 1861 *Concordia* article Huber had forewarned that "good or bad housing is a question of life or death if ever there was one," the demographic, social, political and economic pre-conditions did not exist for his ideas to take hold before his death in 1869. Huber therefore did not live to see German unification of 1871 and the tremendous rate of industrial expansion that followed. The dramatic changes this
unprecedented economic phenomenon unleashed have been thoroughly depicted and debated elsewhere. Arguably the most noticeable shift in this industrial takeoff was demographic. The often-cited 35-65% rural to urban population shift for this period serves as a useful point of departure. At the time of the German “Reichsgründung” in 1871 it is estimated that approximately 36.1 percent of the German population resided in urban areas whereas the vast majority (63.9%) still lived in rural regions. In very sharp contrast, when the Treaty of Versailles was ratified in 1919, this figure had been virtually inverted with only 37.5 percent of the total population still living in rural areas and an overwhelming 62.5 percent now residing in cities. By the mid 1920s the top five urban concentrations were in order of total population density: Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Munich and Essen. It was here that the positive and negative effects of the radical demographic transformation were most pronounced.

Following German unification the social question became increasingly linked to the national housing shortage, and in turn, further entrenched in the heated political debate between the forces of reaction and those of reform. For Friedrich Engels it seemed the opportune time to clarify his stance on what was to become one of the most politically charged issues of the age: The Housing Question. When the co-author of the Communist Manifesto committed his thoughts on the German housing question to paper in 1871 he was doing so in response to the ramblings of Emil Sax. For Friedrich Engels, Sax’s conservative paternalism provided a convenient bourgeois target onto which he could unleash his own class-based paradigms. According to Engels, housing, in particular the provision of dwellings
by large industrialists, was a key impediment to the proletariat’s freedom of movement. In other words, by combining work and rental contracts the owners of capital were in effect chaining the workers to their place of employment. Significantly, based on this Marxist model, actually allowing the workers to own dwellings outright was even more devastating to the ultimate class struggle than paying rent. Instead of the employer limiting the workers’ "vogelfreie Beweglichkeit" [unrestricted freedom of movement], financial institutions, with or without the co-operation of the business establishment, now bound the new homeowner to a long-term mortgage.\textsuperscript{144} Worst of all, as Engels was quick to point out, the worker had been coerced into believing that he had been welcomed into the realm of the property owners when in reality he had been further enslaved by the corrupt capitalist system.

Engel’s diatribe was long on Marxist theory and condemnation of the bourgeois establishment, but it was short on offering any practical solutions to the housing question itself. The issue itself was treated as a mere diversion from the ultimate task facing the proletariat, which both Marx and Engels had defined as the complete revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist order. Remarkably, however, Engel’s \textit{The Housing Question} was to serve as the official S.P.D. platform on the workers’ housing issue well into the late 1890s. Placing the revolutionary goal above all others did little or nothing to lessen the plight of the increasing numbers of workers who were searching for suitable accommodations. When set against the backdrop of rapid industrialization and growing population density (above all in the Ruhr region), it does seem that the S.P.D. had neglected the needs of
workers in favour of "theoretical purity".\textsuperscript{145} For the German political left and the S.P.D. in particular, this was a vexing political conundrum that became more complex as the national housing shortage steadily spiralled out of control. When Engels was releasing the first edition of The Housing Question (1872), Krupp was nearing completion of its largest workers' colony in the Ruhr industrial heartland: the Cronenberg (see p. 130-132).

Beyond re-affirming the worst revolutionary fears of the German bourgeoisie itself, Engel's attack on Emil Sax was significant for another reason. In remaining true to orthodox Marxism, the author emphasized that the ultimate goal of the proletarian masses was going to be achieved on an international, not merely a national scale. Not just the projected ideal of owning a cottage and garden for all workers was a bourgeois construct designed to divert the proletariat's attention from opposing the injustices of the capitalist system, but nationalism, Engels argued, was a similar smoke screen. German nationalism would in the long term only lead to the division and total destruction of the international workers' movement. Events after 1914 were to prove that Engels was certainly correct in predicting the enormous destructive force of nationalism in Europe, but the same force was also to prove instrumental in igniting the wave of revolutionary activity in Russia and Germany. Neither revolution adhered to the tidy formula laid out by Marx and Engels.

What Engels should have anticipated, however, was that publishing such an anti-nationalistic political tract only a year after the widely popular German unification of 1871 was virtually certain to generate critical resentment. In sharp
contrast, his contemporary W.H. Riehl's overtly patriotic *Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Sozial-Politik* [Natural History of the People as a basis for a German Social Policy] was to garner extensive critical acclaim and subsequently became the standard academic socio-political study of German history through the end of the nineteenth century. A remarkable ninth printing of this work was published in 1894. It differed greatly from Engel's views on housing in that it emphasized the need for every German citizen to reside in a detached home and garden. It was a housing ideal that was to gain more and more popularity as the century drew to a close.

Obviously aware of this public sentiment, Engels directly attacked the cottage ideal in the preface to the second printing of *The Housing Question* (1887), stating in rather confusing terms:

> The rural domestic industry of earlier times combined with kitchen-gardening and agriculture was, at least in some countries in which industry was developing, the basis of a tolerable and, here and there even comfortable material situation for the working class, but at the same time the basis of its intellectual and political nullity.  

Friedrich Engels thus acknowledged that the working class may have actually gained some material advantages from living in dwellings that combined the rural and urban life-styles, yet then concluded condescendingly that it was exactly this type of subsistence existence that was to blame for their "intellectual and political nullity". This was a perplexing stance which undoubtedly only gave further ammunition to his adversaries who sang the praises of the capitalist system. More importantly, this statement must have sounded rather uninspiring to workers who
were already aware of living conditions in existing colonies like Stahlhausen, Eisenheim and Krupp's Cronenberg. In sum, The Housing Question presented Friedrich Engels as a social reformer who seemed awkwardly out of touch with Germany's rapidly changing socio-economic conditions. Not providing at least some vague outline of what his supporters may have expected to receive, even after the revolution had been achieved, made his views as utopian as those of the individuals he criticized. In contrast, for all its shortcomings, Riehl's popular history of the German people at least addressed the housing issue in far more concrete and less intellectually aloof terms.

Ironically, although originating from opposite ends of the political spectrum, Riehl and Engels shared a common grievance: the increasing decadence of the German bourgeoisie. For Riehl the root cause of this social decay was a lack of understanding and respect for the so-called "Germanic traditions". The newly emerging German liberal Mittelstand [middle class] of the mid-nineteenth century was harshly criticized for aping French manners and customs, which according to Riehl were endangering the very survival of German cultural traditions.

The second dangerous threat to the German way of life Riehl identified was the ideology of socialism. At the very center of this struggle for "cultural survival" and renewal were the German family and what the author effectively described as the first line of defence against cultural dilution: the single-family home and garden. In the second section of his socio-political history entitled Haus und Familie [House and Family] Riehl wrote about the dangers of the new age:

Family life ceases and the egotism of the individual fills every cranny. The
work (of the non-profit housing associations) shall be cursed, not blessed, if they build blocks of tenements, 'hotels' for workers, instead of houses for families. It would not be surprising if gradually the architecture of the tenement block does not lead us to the barracks of socialism; the poor man can bear this living together in mass community even less than the rich man... Architecturally even the central areas of our cities have been made to look like the courts or closes of some Jewish Ghetto.  

Lastly, the third enemy for Riehl beyond the threat of French assimilation and socialism was the rapidly decaying urban landscape of Germany's larger cities. Whereas the modern tenement barrack was identified as the very hothouse of socialist agitators, the single-family home was projected as the guardian of German cultural values. Riehl thought this issue to be pressing enough to dedicate one entire volume of his three-volume study solely to the German home and family. His work introduced what was later to be coined Agrarromantik [Agrarian romanticism] a strain of German historical revisionism that was to be continued by the likes of Paul Schultze-Naumburg, Adolf Damaschke and Walter Darré. It was outspokenly nationalistic, vilified the French, denounced Jews, was violently anti-communist and großstadfeindlich [opposed to large cities]. In its bombastic blood and soil ramblings it was to reach its most grotesque form in National Socialist propaganda material (see Ch. Six).

With the stunning German victory over France in 1871, one of the main targets of the diatribes of the Agrarromantiker was temporarily removed. After the French defeat Agrarromantiker increasingly turned to fighting the remaining two 'evils' -- uncontrolled urban growth and socialism. One strategy of this fight was the reconstruction of the traditional German home within newly planned housing developments. These low-density projects were to form the antithesis to high-
density tenements and Mietskasernen which were interpreted as "Brutstatten des Sozialismus" [breeding grounds of socialism]. Thus a new wave of inner German settlements, dotted with cottages and gardens, was heralded as the ideal weapon with which to combat these perceived threats associated with rapid industrialization. All that was therefore required was for planners and architects to learn from the past and resurrect "German housing traditions".

What did this Germanic tradition look like? Walther Riehl was one of the first to provide some concrete guidelines on this topic in 1858. His solutions drew on a strange amalgam of what he described as the "honest peasant home" and the curved street layout of German towns from the Middle Ages. Designing from the "inside outward" meant using the peasant dwelling as the planning nucleus since it had apparently not yet been completely corrupted by foreign influences.

The house was the last sphere in which the German abandoned his native cultural identity. Castles, churches, and town halls had long since been adulterated to conform to the styles dictated by prevailing European states, only residential buildings still preserved some remnants of a national heritage. It was clear by the space the author dedicated to the topic that he did not just intend his suggestions to reach other historians, but rather to influence contemporary architects and town planners. Riehl appealed to his audience to adhere to regional vernacular styles and to respect individualism. Through these means, the planning pattern itself would take on its own 'organic' quality. The rigid symmetry of elaborate French boulevards and English tenement blocks as well as the "mass-production" techniques used to construct supposedly inferior
American homes were all cited by Riehl as standing in diametrical opposition to German traditions. The author even went as far as taking on the role of prophet:

There will be general agreement about the course [the new housing forms will take]... In this consensus everyone will build their house according to their own needs, customs and tastes. Eventually without any theory or conscious intent, a picturesquely curving lane will emerge, flanked by a complex and equally picturesque array of house fronts. In our [German] gardens we have long imitated the pleasing lines of the natural footpath. Who will seize the honour of laying out the first such pleasing crooked new street in one of our cities? Our older towns still provide countless models of such streets. The only honour that now awaits is the honour of first imitation.150

The individual who is widely regarded as having "seized the honour" of reviving professional interest in the study of historic German towns was in fact a young Austrian architect by the name of Camillo Sitte (1843-1903). It was Sitte's very influential work Zum Städtebau nach seinen künstlerischen Grundsätzen [On City Planning after its Artistic Principles] that finally gave the nostalgic ideas outlined by Riehl a desperately needed theoretical grounding. First published in 1889, Zum Städtebau called for a revival of the European town planning traditions of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. In the spirit of the new romanticism of the late nineteenth century, Sitte, like Riehl, also openly criticized what he called the soulless symmetry of the rigid Parisian boulevards. What was desperately needed he argued, was a scholarly rediscovery of the classic European towns whose central squares, churches and quaint shops had proven to be the very fabric of bourgeois existence. Why, Sitte asked, had planners become obsessed with the construction of monumental architecture, inhumane tenement blocks and soulless
industrial tenements? What had contemporary architectural styles produced except the "Schnurgerade H"außerflucht" [straight-line housing alignment] and the "würfelförmigen Baublock" [cube-like building block]? It was not too late, Sitte suggested, to look backward and revitalize the present by infusing new developments with the characteristics of old towns like Karlsruhe and Rothenburg. Above all, he argued that contemporary architecture and urban planning needed to be reinfused with an artistic creativity and this could only be attained by a thorough study of the most desirable aspects of the past. Like William Morris and John Ruskin in England, and Riehl in Germany, Sitte believed in the nostrum that: "Nur in dem wir die Vergangenheit ergreifen, besitzen wir auch die ganze Gegenwart." [Only in seizing the past, do we own the entire present...] Thus as the century drew to a close and the fin de siècle ushered in a promising new era of progress and modernism, what was to become known as the "Sitte school" of architecture attempted to recapture the charms of a bygone era.153

The critically important fallout from Zum Städtebau was that it inspired an entire generation of architects and planners to refocus their efforts away from designing high-profile Monumentalbauten [monumental structures]; in the words of Walther Kieß: "the gradually awakening social responsibility of planners was apparent".154 The immense popularity of his ideas soon made themselves felt in an ever increasing picturesque style that considerably influenced the architectural style and planning layout of urban areas. Most pronounced in the urban renewal projects of Karl Henrici (1842-1927) in Munich and Sitte's own work in Marienburg, this new approach began to break the rigid symmetrical stranglehold
of the grid pattern. The curved-street had in essence been rediscovered. The popularity of Sitte’s ideas therefore greatly contributed to inspiring an entire generation of young academics to take a renewed interest in housing the masses.

There was, however, one notable aspect in which Sitte’s proposals were to break decidedly with the past: their mode of construction. The fusion of new and old was therefore to create a nostalgic architectural style by using the latest production techniques and the most advanced building materials. The clay, mortar, slate and thatch construction of earlier times was to give way to ornamental décor like mock-Tudor panelling, mass-produced roofing tile and the material that served as the very staple of the picturesque revival: stucco. That these new materials were very well-suited to imitate this older crafts tradition was amply displayed in picturesque late nineteenth century projects like Sitte’s own aforementioned plans for the expansion of Marienburg, Theodor Fischer’s (1862-1938) activities in Stuttgart, Robert Schmohl’s design for Krupp’s Altenhof and the first stages of Krupp’s Margarethenhöhe designed by Georg Metzendorf. All displayed very distinct influences of the Sitte style. Metzendorf, in particular, would make a name for himself by introducing a “romantic Hessian housing village style” into the Ruhr, an approach for which he would be severely taken to task by Walther Gropius’ Bauhaus successor, Hannes Meyer (see pp.179-181). All in all, however, in an increasingly mechanized age, these examples of the nostalgic architectural wave did serve as a striking antithesis to the functionalist simplicity of contemporary industrial designs. On the surface at least, it seems that this was exactly the aesthetic effect Sitte hoped to promote.
A closer reading of *Stadtebau*, however, reveals that its author went to considerable lengths to caution his contemporaries not to become involved in merely copying previous architectural and planning precedents, but rather to adapt selectively to improve present urban conditions. Most importantly, he warned against falling into the trap of blending the worst elements of contemporary construction methods with a mindless desire for regional-nostalgia. Sitte explained that

modern life, as well as modern technology, no longer allows a genuine replication of the old city structures, a fact that we should no longer ignore, or else we will risk creating unproductive phantasy projects.\(^{156}\)

The Viennese architect thus clearly underlined that it was not his intention to fall victim to the wave of national nostalgia that was beginning to sweep through Germany under the *Heimatschutzbewegung* [Heritage or national preservation movement] banner of the 1890s. Ironically, from the ranks of the *Heimatschutzbewegung* came both the most outspoken critics as well as some of the most vocal proponents of the picturesque style. Examining the practical achievements of its supporters reveals the accuracy of G.R. Collins and C. Crasemann-Collins statement on Sitte’s legacy: “his own disciples as well as his opponents, did not really understand his message.”\(^{157}\)

Formally established in 1904 in Dresden, the German *Bund für Heimatschutz* [Association for Heritage Preservation] proclaimed in its mission statement that the central objective of its activities was: „die deutsche Heimat in ihrer natürlichen und geschichtlich gewordenen Eigenart zu schützen.“ [to protect the
German homeland in its natural and historically unique form. That architectural styles and German housing traditions were to be part and parcel of this heritage preservation effort was ensured from the outset with an entire organizational branch being designated to „Pflege der überlieferten ländlichen und bürgerlichen Bauweise; Erhaltung des vorhandenen Bestandes.” [Care for the pre-existing bourgeois building styles; preservation of the existing stock.]\(^\text{158}\) That the initial efforts of the Sitte school to pay homage to German historical traditions were thus applauded by supporters of the Heimatschutz movement, which included a very broad cross-section of academics like Werner Sombart, Adolf Wagner and even Max Weber, was a foregone conclusion.\(^\text{159}\) Prior to 1904 its efforts to gain popular support, or according to its mission statement, “win over the masses”, were considerably hampered by the reactionary views of its first president, Ernst Rudorff. It was only with the election of the up and coming architect Paul Schultze-Naumburg as Rudorff’s successor later in the same year, that the Bund gained a much more popular orator. Schultze-Naumburg was a self-proclaimed cultural expert whose critical gaze was as much directed to the present as it was to the past.

Paul Schultze-Naumburg was a key transitional figure whose influential views on the German housing question spanned the Wilhelmine, Weimar and Nazi (see Ch. Six) periods. Obsessed with identifying a national cultural heritage, he illustrated his views in his multi-volume study \textit{Kulturarbeiten} [cultural studies] by reducing his discussion to “good and bad” examples of “visual culture”\(^\text{160}\). Heavily influenced by Riehl’s admiration for the modest German farmhouse, the new leader
of the *Bund für Heimatschutz* praised the current trend towards improving the living conditions of the working classes yet simultaneously cautioned against incorporating too many elements of the picturesque style. Rather than over-rely on English precedents for inspiration, Schultze-Naumburg suggested that his professional colleagues should "...sich noch etwas mehr auf den Schatz der heimischen ländlichen Bauformen besänmen, da hier noch ungeahnte Möglichkeiten zum weiteren Ausbau aufgespart sind." [...focus more on the treasures of local building types, since here are stored unrealized possibilities for future development.]\(^{161}\) In *Kulturarbeiten* the rich pre-existing photographic catalogue of Krupp workers' dwellings served the young architect effectively by providing the required visual examples for his all or nothing, "good or bad" reductionist assessments (see pp. 171-175).

Unfortunately for Schultze-Naumburg, even though Germany may have contained numerous inspirational "architectural treasures", the most significant impetus for change in the housing sector was to originate in England. Well-known housing reformers like Hermann Muthesius, Krupp architect Georg Metzendorf, *Bodenreformer* Adolf Damaschke and even members of the S.P.D. like the brothers Kampfmeyer, were all to be swept up by the popularity of the garden cities movement.

The English book that was to ignite a truly European-wide movement was Ebenezer Howard's *Tomorrow – A Peaceful Path to Real Reform* (1898). The title of this modest publication by an unknown London parliamentary stenographer was of considerable importance. Far more than a one-dimensional tract on urban
planning, the book proposed that the way to meaningful social reform could be achieved without political friction, threats of proletarian upheaval or draconian reactionary safeguards. According to Howard, the threat of social unrest that had been plaguing the European bourgeoisie since 1848 could finally be put to rest if enough people of vision could be persuaded to act. He prescribed a radical transformation of the urban and social landscape that combined the most desirable aspects of rural and urban existence, a “Wunderschlüssel” [magic key] for solving societal ills.\textsuperscript{162}

The German version of Garden Cities Association [hereafter D.G.G] emerged out of the Berlin-Schlachtensee literary society \textit{Neue Gemeinschaft} [New Society] and was founded in 1902. Key members of the \textit{Neue Gemeinschaft}, like the brothers Julius and Heinrich Hart and Paul, Bernhard and Harald Kampfmeyer had been advocating the construction of idyllic communal developments in the rural enclaves outside of Berlin since the late 1880s. Previous experiments in Friedrichshagen and Schlachtensee had faltered due to infighting between socialist idealists who advocated the construction of pure communes and more moderate activists who hoped to work within the parameters of the established political system.\textsuperscript{163} Ebenezer Howard’s writings provided the theoretical backbone for both sides to establish a common ground.

It was ultimately the Kampfmeyer brothers whose skillful interpretation and marketing of Howard’s concepts allowed them to become the most identifiable figures in the D.G.G. Himself an active member of the revisionist wing of the
S.P.D., Harald Kampfmeyer outlined the association's aims in a non-confrontational manner that would have certainly horrified Friedrich Engels:

The ultimate goal of a progressive garden cities movement is an *inner colonization* [my emphasis], that strives for a planned formation of garden cities, a decentralization of industry and therefore an even distribution of economic activities throughout the country. Such settlements will make urban life healthier and more multi-faceted and the surrounding rural areas will gain cultural and technological benefits as well as the direct market access.  

Here was an outspoken member of the German Social Democratic Party openly advocating the internal colonisation of its populace. With members of the S.P.D now openly supporting inner colonization through the construction of garden cities, one of the greatest hurdles plaguing right-wing reformers since the time of Huber had apparently been cleared. All signs pointed towards the possibility that the "peaceful path to real reform" might actually be achieved in Germany.

That the German Garden Cities movement was truly a catchall organisation for diverse reformist strands was most evident in the pages of its annual periodical "*Gartenstadt*". As Klaus Bergmann indicates in his thought-provoking study *Agrarromantik und Großstadtfeindschaft* [Agrarian Romanticism and anti-Metropolitanism], the German Garden Cities branch quickly altered some of Howard's main principles even though he had the greatest influence on its direction.

The German Garden Cities Association was not willing to adopt Howard's recommended concentric city with its monumental central square and concentric as well as radial street patterns. This [Howard's] city it interpreted as too uniform, too monotonous and systematic and perhaps it felt the presence of a patriarchal, if not a technocratic planning that was definitely noticeable in Howard's utopia.
Indeed, once the theories were transformed into practice in the famous
development of Dresden-Hellerau beginning in 1909, Howard’s radial layout was
replaced with streets that followed the natural terrain. Thus the influence of Sitte
had not yet abated; neither had the preference for the detached single-family
dwelling and garden as the desired housing form as advocated by Riehl. Even the
nostalgic elements advocated by the Schultze-Naumburg wing were addressed by
not referring to the new Gartenstädte as “Wohnort” [place of residence] or plain
“Wohnung” [dwelling]. Instead the more endearing terms “Heimstadt” [home or
native city] and “Heim” [home] were preferred by the contributors to
“Gartenstadt”, inferring a sense of tranquility and permanence, one that was
undoubtedly enhanced by the unique choice of street names like: “Trautes Heim”
[Beloved Home], “Im Stille Winkel” [In the Quiet Nook] and
“Sommerburgstraße” [Summer Castle Street].¹⁶⁷ Even the Heimatler lobby
around Paul Schultze-Naumburg was thus appeased.

What ultimately set the efforts of the German Garden Cities Association apart
from the other reformist groups was the extent of its “Propaganda der Tat”
[propaganda of the deed].¹⁶⁸ In other words, by becoming a catchall organization
that was able to address the concerns of a number of substantial special interest
organizations, it was also able to draw upon their combined financial reserves.
This meant that it was in a position actually to begin construction of its proposals,
starting in 1909 with Dresden-Hellerau. The key threshold between theoretical
rhetoric and practical achievements had thus been crossed. Within a time-span of a
mere four years a number of high-profile garden city projects were underway,
some with the official sanction of the Association [Karlsruhe-Rüppurr (1911), Nürnberg (1911), Mannheim-Waldhof (1912) and Ludwigshafen (1914)], and others like Krupp’s Margarethenhöhe (also begun in 1910) initiated and constructed by the private sector yet loosely carried-out according to garden city principles (see pp. 146-151).

Of the above-mentioned projects, it was Hellerau that garnered the most initial attention. It was here that one of the central guiding principles of Howard’s ideas was most closely followed: an attempt at the wholesale transformation of modern society. It was on this highly controversial level that the first rifts between the various reformist elements began to be exposed.

Soon after its construction began, Hellerau became a magnet for numerous progressive reformers: artists, vegetarians, anti-alcohol advocates and suffragettes. In short, it became a highly desirable place to live for supporters of the Lebensreform [life-style reform] movement who sought to establish a symbiosis between their inner selves and the surrounding environment. Arguably the most famous of the first Hellerau residents was the rhythmic gymnastic pioneer, Jacques Dalcroze, whose efforts to fuse mind, body and natural movement served as the very visual embodiment of what the Gartenstadtbewegung hoped to achieve throughout Germany.

While proposing to create an egalitarian society the publicity images of Hellerau often showed predominantly well-to-do intellectuals at play. Whereas many observers were fascinated by the overall experiment, it was also the outspoken Lebensreformer wing in the association’s press releases that gave
Hellerau an aura of utopianism. This label, whether justified or not, was to be magnified a thousand-fold by the events of August 1914. As the war years dragged on and the German populace became more and more preoccupied with day-to-day survival, the admirable social experiment in Hellerau began to appear more and more trivial and eccentric. By 1919, public interest in and financial support for the Gartenstadtbewegung waned and by the early-1930s it would be unfairly historicized by National Socialist writers like Walter Darré as the work of shortsighted “urban intellectuals”\(^\text{170}\) (see pp. 242-243).

All reformist efforts or proposals to eliminate the German housing shortage depended on one essential to be successful: direct government support. However, prior to 1919, the German government was either unable, unwilling or was simply uninspired by the types of solutions that had been proposed to take desperately needed action. That the Baugenossenschaften and Gartenstadtbewegung had achieved some quantitative achievements is undeniable. However, even the wave of Gartenstadt foundings between 1909 and 1914 had only resulted in constructing just under 5000 new dwellings. These efforts barely made a dent in the overall national shortage, which was estimated at well over 300,000 units and was climbing.\(^\text{171}\)

The position of Germany’s most powerful state and the seat of the Krupp works, Prussia, was absolutely crucial in implementing any meaningful reforms. With the exception of Munich, four out of the top five urban concentrations (see p. 81) were situated within its political jurisdiction. D.O. Lehmann succinctly captured the Prussian stance on the housing problem: “The Prussian state until
1918 viewed housing as a commodity just like any other, one whose price would be determined by economic factors; supply and demand.Outside the 1889 Reichs Bill that officially recognized the legality of *Baugenossenschaften* and outlined their main function, little progress was made until 1901. On March 19th of that year the first tentative steps towards a comprehensive housing legislation in the nation’s most powerfull state became law. The ministerial document entitled “Social policy for the commercial worker” was designed to provide adequate housing for the working class. The only catch was that the wording limited the definition of “workers” to those who were in the direct employ of the Prussian government itself. Obviously impressed by the achievements of the *Baugenossenschaften* throughout Germany, the legislation was amended in 1904 to create state-sponsored *Baugenossenschaften* solely for public sector workers. As a result *Baugenossenschaften* for the Postal Service, the Railway, Army, Navy and Mine workers sprang up throughout the state of Prussia. In effect, prior to 1918 the state was only interested in directly regulating the housing of its own employees and not taking any broader social welfare measures in this area.

Beyond the state level, the debate surrounding a national housing law became more and more heated after Prussia had set this key precedent. Examining the increasing number of relevant Reichstag debates from 1901 to 1918 reveals that nearly all the major political parties -- although their ideas on the extent and type of government intervention varied -- with the exception of the National Liberals concurred that housing could no longer be left at the mercy of open market forces. Bullock and Read persuasively trace the origins of these debates to the
flood of data collected from the turn of the century onwards that showed the extent of the housing shortage. For example, only 1 percent of dwellings in Berlin were unoccupied in 1901. They also show that the debate was cyclical in nature, subsiding with the economic upturn in 1905-1907 when the availability of dwellings in Berlin was also on the rise and "the housing question ceased to command public interest." Although the Center Party and S.P.D. tabled motions in 1908 and 1910 that called for more centralized control, both were scuttled "under the weight of opposition of municipal government and in the face of the implacable opposition of the land and financial speculators". Neither the extent nor the type of building that was to be pursued on a national scale was therefore in any way government directed prior to 1914.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities there was also no consensus on the type of buildings the government should promote when it did act. Riehl's *Natural History* and the *Bodenreformer* lobby headed by Damaschke seemed to exert the greatest influence on the right of center parties like the Conservatives, German Reich Party and Centre Party. It was here that the notion of the single-family homestead took hold in the Reichstag political arena. Up to 1914 the socialists seemed split between the moderate factions represented by such individuals as the brothers Kampfmeyer, who viewed the single-family dwelling as a positive vehicle to promote social change, and more radical members like Liebknecht and Zubeil who never tired of telling members that the rights of the workers must come first. For the latter it was not so much the dwelling type that was the key issue but rather that the government take charge and create quality dwellings that workers could
In pressing the government to pursue detached homesteads as their ideal housing form, the Bodenreformer lobby led by Adolf Damaschke was, if nothing else, persistent. Since 1871 various members championing their cause had unsuccessfully tabled motions in the Reichstag on no less than twelve occasions. Significantly, in framing his arguments, Damaschke drew heavily on the historical precedent of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71. Even though the German military campaign had been surprisingly successful, Damaschke underlined that the state had ultimately failed in adequately providing for its returning soldiers. First and foremost, he argued, the state had blundered in the area of housing. In his popular Die Bodenreform: Grundsätzliches und Geschichtliches zur Erkenntnis und Überwindung der Sozialen Not [Land Reform: Basic Principles and Historical Context for the Recognition and Overcoming of Social Crisis], Damaschke cited the conservative historian Adolph Wagner who openly criticized German land speculators who had reaped record profits and increased their property holdings as a result of the sacrifices of the German soldiers. In sharp contrast to the speculators, Wagner described what awaited “our warriors” when they returned from France:
I must say, the simple fact that a returning warrior's rent was raised or because he was blessed with a large family his accommodation was terminated was ten times more likely to ignite [discontent] than anything the Social Democrats have theoretically or practically stood for.\textsuperscript{178}

Damaschke himself then added to Wagner's heart-wrenching tale of veterans who returned to Berlin in 1871 and were forced to reside in shoddy barracks. Ultimately this miserable existence actually led them to take up arms against their own government. If loyal patriots could be driven to violence by horrid living conditions, then what were more the radical elements of society capable of?

In the first edition of \textit{Bodenreform}, published in 1912, Adolf Damaschke was also able to raise the socialist threat in a historical context in which the S.P.D. had just emerged as the largest party in the \textit{Reichstag}. Although its revisionist wing had long since diverged from adhering to the teachings of Marx and Engels, Damaschke was able to resurrect the ghost of the latter's \textit{The Housing Question}. Just as Engels had methodically deconstructed the polemics of Emil Sax over forty years earlier, his own words were now manipulated to become Damaschke's rhetorical fodder. Engel's views on the betrayal of the German soldier/worker were reissued by the S.P.D. in 1887. This move infuriated Damaschke who chastized the Social Democrats, claiming that: "rekindling the memories of the returning warriors in 1871 was the easiest way to keep the mistrust against this government alive."\textsuperscript{179} In a blatant distortion of historical events, Damaschke was able to link the supposed increased radicalization of the S.P.D. since 1887 directly to the housing question. Electoral gains which were a direct result of a
much more moderate political platform were therefore conveniently overlooked.

Hans J. Teuteberg places the gravity of Damaschke’s distortion into perspective:

The socialist workers’ movement’s attempts to come to terms with the housing question, like hardly any other issue, characterize the transformation of the Social Democrats from a party of proletarian class struggle to a party of socialist reform functioning within the existing [political] system. ¹⁸⁰

The increasing degree of support for the garden city concept by the revisionist wing of the S.P.D. after 1902 adds considerable weight to the validity of Teuteberg’s statement.

That Damaschke’s views did, however, remain widely popular during the same period was directly reflected in the success of Bodenreform and the ever-increasing numbers that joined his organization -- Dorothea Berger-Thimme estimates 730,000 members by 1911. ¹⁸¹ Damaschke did his best to highlight the support for his movement from a cross-section of society: the press, soldiers, academics, businessmen, artists and even the military establishment. By selectively quoting these sources in Bodenreform Damaschke was conducting his own version of Sammlungspolitik [politics of rallying state support].

In newspaper headlines, advertisements and editorials from the 1870s, Damaschke used historical testimonies to tug at the very emotional make-up of his readership during the “war in sight” year of 1912. Using advertisements from the Rheinische Zeitung [Rhenish Newspaper] from 1871 Damaschke displayed the availability of rental spaces and landlords specific requests for only “childless couples” to apply. He also quoted the announcement of an opportunistic land speculator in the „Kieler Neusten Nachrichten“ [Kiel Latest News]:
Victory is ours! Secure yourself a building site near Kiel, temporarily as a garden plot, before the land prices double after the war [all Damaschke's emphasis]. A 3-500M deposit is sufficient. Size according to preference. Contact at...

Juxtaposed with the plight of the wounded returning soldier, unable to find a home for himself and his family in Kiel, the bombastic claims of the land speculators were certain to strike a chord. Damaschke skilfully rounded out his argument by allowing a Franco-Prussian War veteran with three children to describe his own struggles:

When I return from the war and search for housing with shot-up limbs then the “finest” prospects await me; yet no building here would be standing, if we [the soldiers] did not risk life and limb. Could we not forbid such cruel advertisements?

In 1912 the last thing the Bodenreformer lobby wanted was for history to repeat itself should the nation become involved in another major military conflict. The Bodenreformer were to go well beyond the requested ‘outlawing of such ads’ to demand sweeping legislative changes at the highest level. In their view, they were fighting a war abroad as well as at home: “It is inherent [organische] faults in our land and settlement [Siedlungswesen] regulations that carry out this war against the German child”. Just as it had for Riehl, the defence of the German’s ‘natural right’ to suitable accommodations was depicted as a matter of cultural survival.

In order to underline the dire cultural implications of housing conditions the South German poet Peter Rosegger also added his views to a revised edition of Bodenreform. Labelling the book as “a great cultural work”, he cautioned against
making the same mistakes on the housing question as after the Franco-Prussian conflict when the German government had failed to act. Now [1916] in a wartime predicament he correctly identified as “incomparably more horrific” than 1871, Rosegger outlined what he viewed as the natural symbiosis of one’s personal home and Heimat. For the poet the social gravity of the housing question during World War One was now directly linked to the very survival of German culture.

Rosegger began with the rhetorical question:

The man who risks his life for his homeland [Heimat] must himself have a piece of this homeland – what could be more natural and just than that? The German war participant a German plot on which, in his peaceful home he can raise well-grounded citizens for the fatherland and enjoy the strengthening work and nature! From such a homestead will originate a new rural and urban middle class – the cornerstone of the state. True human beings can only grow out of the earth, and the physical work shall protect against poverty and affluence. The new culture must create, not rich, not poor, but instead content people, if the victorious peace we hope for will be worth anything.  

In terms eerily reminiscent of a speech made by Krupp director Max Halbach at the founding ceremonies of the Heimaterde [native soil] project in the same year (see p. 66), the new post-war society was, according to the Rosegger and Halbach, going to grow organically out of the German native soil. Once the “victorious peace” was won, the government only needed to ensure a suitable environment in which the Kriegerheimstatten could naturally flourish. In the most utopian of scenarios Rosegger thus predicted the emergence of a new “peace-loving” and content Mittelstand, which was “neither rich nor poor”, not divided between urban and rural interests and that would be able to regenerate itself and ensure a harmonious German future.
Subsequent events would prove that Damaschke was far more in tune with the harsh realities of the ever-worsening wartime conditions than Rosegger. No matter what materialized on either the Western or Eastern Front, win or lose, for Damaschke the events of 1871 had already shown that the battle for domestic peace was certain to continue long after an international armistice had been signed. Significantly, on this point he was to be wholeheartedly supported by the person whom the First World War had transformed into Germany’s most powerful military and political figure: Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg.

Himself a veteran of the 1871 conflict in which the name Krupp had risen to international prominence, the reactionary Hindenburg began to take a very keen interest in the *Heimstättenbewegung*. In a number of letters sent to Damaschke between 1915 and 1917 it is evident that the Field Marshall’s interest in the housing issue increased as the conflict dragged on. Damaschke gained the most propaganda mileage from a Hindenburg letter dated December 16th, 1917 in which he affirmed that: “*Die Arbeit des Hauptaussusses für Krieger-Heimstätten findet mein volles Verständnis.*” [The work of the Central Organization for Warrior Homesteads has my complete understanding]. The German war hero then went on to express his views on the housing issue in these melodramatic terms:

The fatherland should help anyone who makes a living through honest work to obtain a home that is protected from the hands of speculators, in which German family life and the development of children’s bodies and souls is possible. That is what your movement strives for, and that is why the best wishes accompany those that have honest intentions for our people and our warriors, those that have recognized the scope of our times.

We are dealing with a work of the greatest social implications here. The quicker this [the homestead issue] can be addressed, the quicker it will
become a source of joy and grateful dedication to our troops.¹⁸⁷

The second paragraph of Hindenburg's letter bears an uncanny resemblance to Alfred Krupp's most widely publicized quote (see p. 127), of over forty years earlier. (In 1871 Alfred Krupp had directly responded to the post-war conditions with his most ambitious project, the Cronenberg.)

Undeterred by wartime developments, in fact claiming to be doing their "patriotic duty" inside Germany, Damaschke and the Bodenreformer advocates were the key figures in forming the Hauptausschuss für Kriegerheimstätten [Central Organization for Warrior Homesteads] on March 20th, 1915. The Hauptausschuss was supported by an initial twenty-eight affiliated organizations and regional authorities, a figure that mushroomed to an amazing total of 3,378 by 1918 which according to Damaschke, probably encompassed five million German families.¹⁸⁸ Given the scope and diversity of the associated groups it is difficult to argue with Damaschke's claim that "the widespread support for Kriegerheimstätten made them a unique social phenomenon."¹⁸⁹ On November 21st, 1915, the organisation managed to publish its central guidelines, according to which the central Government was supposed to provide the states with suitable resources to begin constructing Kriegerheimstätten. The following excerpts were definitive:

1. The warrior homesteads must be suited to ensure a physically and morally healthy regeneration of the people, to raise the military potential of the people and increase the fruits of the native soil.

2. As far as the aims do not require new regulations, the preferred applicants should be local wounded veterans, war widows and large families.
10. At least 10% of the building costs should always be provided by personal means or through direct participation in the construction process.

In addition, the Heimstattenausgeber [Homestead provider] was to remain in possession of the building property in order to rule out land speculation. And the document clearly stated that the single-family dwelling with adjacent “Nutzgarten” [subsistence garden] was to be the preferred building type.

When the warrior homestead issue was up for debate in the Reichstag on April 10th, 1916, the homestead supporters received their most significant endorsement. Returning ‘directly from the front in Verdun’ to address the delegates, Minister of War von Heeringen opened his speech by ordering the nation to persevere for the army: “we will not be starved out by England!” He then made the following intriguing connections between Heer, Haus und Heimat [Army, Home and Heimat].

Come to battle alongside our fighting army in this war that has been forced upon us the unarmed Volk [people], the unarmed Heimat. I do not know of any time in our history where the people and army have been so closely united in battle [my emphasis]. The German nation has been a co-sufferer in many wars but a co-combatant like it is in this conflict, it has never been. (Cheers from the delegates) ...[the army] will sacrifice everything for the best of the nation; for home, hearth and peace.”

After this emotional plea, stressing the plight of the German servicemen, there was virtually no opposition to a motion to recommend that the chancellor pledge to pursue the construction of warrior homesteads. Significantly, even the S.P.D., whose more radical wing had never supported the concept of the detached family home, was now onside. One of its delegates suggested that a budget commission
might be required to examine the issue of overall costs, but otherwise, there was wholehearted support for the motion and it was carried unanimously on May 24^{th}, 1916.\textsuperscript{192}

In contrast to Krupp, whose own warrior homestead, the Heimaterde (see pp. 151-154) was well underway in 1916, the Heimstätten movement itself fell victim to war-time conditions. Even with the powerful endorsement of Hindenburg, the Kriegerheimstätten movement was not able to attain more than a handful of practical results. Meagre results tended to focus the media spotlight on the rare projects that were completed. Equally as important, although all the theoretical debates and legislative obstacles had been cleared by 1917, Germany's increasingly desperate wartime predicament made the construction of such new low-density communities a pipe dream. Paul Wendt has estimated that the annual rate of housing construction in 1913 was approximately 200,000 units, a figure that dropped drastically by 1918 when only 3,000 dwellings were completed.\textsuperscript{193} For those few in a position to begin construction during the war, a 1918 government emergency decree allowing only war essential construction ensured that projects would be delayed until at least the conclusion of European hostilities.

When the long-overdue national German housing legislation was finally enshrined in the Weimar constitution on August 11^{th} 1919, the supporters of the Kriegerheimstätten movement had to be content with the adoption of their ideas in a greatly watered-down form. With the dark cloud of Prussian militarism still hanging very much over the head of the new Weimar government, it was a foregone conclusion that overt nationalistic, militaristic ramblings about returning
“warriors” with large families contributing to the “Wehrkraft des Volkes” [Military Preparedness of the People] on their Kriegerheimstätte would not be resurrected.

For the time being, Damaschke and his supporters had to be content with contributing to the inclusion of article 155. It stipulated that:

The distribution and usage of land would be supervised by the state, to safeguard against misuse and to strive for the goal of ensuring every German a healthy dwelling and all German families, especially those with many children, a living or subsistence [Wohn – oder Wirtschafts] homestead. War participants are especially to be kept in mind when formulating the homestead legislation.

Thus the plight of the German war veterans seems to have been included almost as an afterthought. The real task facing the new government was to ensure that “every German” was to be able to reside in healthy housing conditions. In essence the long-awaited reformer’s dream of pressuring the central government to intervene decisively in the housing realm was achieved at the outset of the Weimar Republic. The shaky Weimar coalition in turn faced the absolutely daunting task of implementing initiatives that would eliminate what was then by far the greatest housing shortage (over 500,000 units) in German history. The continuous debates and solutions proposed to solve the housing issue therefore resulted in meagre qualitative and quantitative results before 1919. The housing question which Huber had linked to the “life and death” of the nation as early as 1861 (see p. 80), had still not been solved.
CHAPTER THREE

"We strive for the attainable...": An Assessment of Krupp Housing Activities before 1930
We do not intend to chase after ideals, which may look impressive on paper but are not reachable, instead we strive for the attainable: we do practical work and achieve results that are within our reach...\textsuperscript{195}

\textit{Krupp Housing Director, Ernst Haux (1907)}

When the first national housing law went into effect in 1920, the Krupp Steel Company had been constructing workers’ housing for over seventy years. With over 12,000 units completed at the beginning of the Weimar era, it was the largest private sector provider of housing in Germany. Krupp Housing Director Max Haux made the above statement at the ninth annual general assembly of the Rhenish Society for Promoting Workers’ Housing in October of 1907, when what he described as the company’s ‘attainable results’ were already impressive. The German steel giant had constructed over ten thousand units of workers’ housing in Essen, Bochum, Rheinhausen, Kiel and Magdeburg. Haux, however, went on to stress that the firm did not measure its success with mere quantitative but rather qualitative achievements. On this key issue he was surprisingly candid and explained that since the firm became active in the housing sector in the mid-1850s, the results had been mixed, ranging from shoddy barrack-like tenements (Schederhof) to solid multi-level apartments (Cronenberg) and even picturesque workers’ “cottages” (Altenhof). Similarly, the respective locations, land utilization and even the targeted residents, varied considerably from one development to the next. One aspect, however, according to Haux, remained consistent: “The ultimate goal of Krupp housing policy was and will always be: the actual improvement of the living conditions of its employees.”\textsuperscript{196} The following discussion will provide an overview of what had been attempted and achieved by
the Krupp Building Office [Baubüro] in the era before the National Socialist rise to power. The central focus will be on defining the characteristics of these developments in their historical context.

The information in this chapter comes predominantly from primary sources. Extensive comments by the owners, planners, architects and directors involved indicate what these key individuals intended to achieve in the housing realm. At first glance, this may not seem like a novel approach. However, when one considers that what is arguably the most comprehensive study of Krupp housing to date, Daniel Stemmerich's *Die Siedlung als Programm*, [Housing Settlement as Policy] utilizes not a single statement by the architects involved, the rationale for such an approach becomes clear. In addition to these written sources, visual supplements (see attached numbered diagrams) detailing the building types, site layouts and respective locations, will be drawn upon to begin the process of assessing their historical legacy. An attempt will also be made to compare Krupp housing achievements with those of its contemporaries in continental Europe and England.

In considering the scope and diversity of the projects undertaken prior to 1930, it is also important to point out some consistent aspects of Krupp housing initiatives from the start. First, the physical structures themselves were predominantly intended to remain in the possession of the company. Secondly, with the exception of the Margarethenhöhe, the residents were always Krupp employees and their families. Although there were rare exceptions where managers were given an option to buy their dwellings outright, the vast majority of
114

residents were tenants whose rents were deducted directly from their wages. Significantly, it is estimated that on average, the rents charged in Krupp housing projects were approximately thirty percent lower than those of comparable accommodations on the open market. Thirdly, the company’s building activity and the quality of construction itself were mainly governed by economic principles and not social compassion. Again, there were two significant exceptions to this rule, the Margarethenhöhe and the Altenhof estates, which will both be extensively examined in this chapter. Finally, the cherished position of remaining “Master in their own House” (reserving the power of final executive decision making) was vehemently upheld by all of Krupp’s sole proprietors until 1945. In the housing sector this meant that the final decision to approve or scuttle new proposals ultimately lay in the hands of a single individual.

Due to their scope and diversity Krupp’s housing activities need to be divided into distinct chronological phases and headings. The first phase in which the company began to construct accommodations for its workers can best be described as The Functionalist Phase (1855-1863). The company’s rapid economic expansion in the 1850s and Essen’s inability to house workers in the open market virtually forced the firm into the housing field or else face a dire labour shortage. Under the leadership of Alfred Krupp, housing constructed during this period was therefore intended to provide rudimentary shelter for essential workers. Its style and quality of construction were very basic and did not represent any architectural improvement over efforts of other Ruhr employers at the time. Austere and
monotonous barrack-like construction, poorly situated near the main factory,
served as the hallmarks of this functionalist phase.

The second phase saw Krupp begin to actually plan comprehensive so-called
“workers’ colonies” by creating a separate Building Branch under the leadership of
former Regierungsbauemeister [state planner] Gustav Kraemer. To qualify as
colonies these projects, like the Schederhof and Cronenberg, were professionally
planned to include company amenities like schools, grocery stores, beer halls and
recreation provisions and thus functioned as virtually autonomous urban entities.
Although the dwellings themselves were a marginal qualitative improvement over
the previous phase, overall they were architecturally unimpressive and continued to
be laid out in a rigid grid pattern. What can therefore be described as the Planned
Colony Phase (1863-73) relied solely on the multi-level tenement style and all
projects were still situated in close proximity to the noisy main factory.

Significantly, in what was to be the last period of construction under the leadership
of Alfred Krupp, no detached single-family homes had yet been built.

After a complete stoppage in building construction from 1873 to 1892,
Alfred’s successor, Fritz Krupp, radically altered the direction of the firm’s
housing policy. The names of these new projects — Friedrichshof, Alfredshof and
Altenhof — were reflective of their heightened symbolic function as benevolent
company deeds rather than just the rudimentary provision of shelter. Under the
guidance of Fritz Krupp and his head architect Robert Schmohl, the company
embarked on a conscious shift towards building quaint single-family “cottage”
style homes situated along curved streets and lined with greenery. A concerted
attempt was also made to avoid any signs of aesthetic uniformity. Although high-density tenements remained the dominant building style, the existence of these picturesque cottages in the Altenhof was a radical architectural shift. In addition, in the Altenhof project, select retired workers could live out the remainder of their days free of rent while residing in what looked like miniature villas. During this phase the firm thus took a marked step towards attaining The Picturesque Cottage Siedlung (1892-1902) as its desired housing form. This meant that the shift towards building low-density garden communities was begun, but not yet fully realized. These company efforts to build in the picturesque cottage style would, however, cease with the sudden passing of Fritz Krupp in 1902.

Following the Fritz Krupp era, head architect Robert Schmohl continued to plan low-density projects whose planning layout resembled the Altenhof. Significantly, the previous picturesque style was now abandoned for a much less decorative architectural style that took its inspiration from the Ruhr’s traditional Bergmannskotten or simply Kotten housing form. The new garden provisions in projects like the Dahlhauser Heide and Emscher Lippe were intended to supplement the employees’ incomes. Keeping small livestock and growing vegetables were thus encouraged. The architectural styles of these homes also displayed a linkage to local vernacular styles or the pre-existing Landschaftsnorm. In the abovementioned communities, for example, Schmohl accomplished this task by utilizing mock Fachwerk décor to reflect an architectural lineage to local Westphalian farmhouses. Overall, this period could thus be labelled The Functionalist Kotten (1903-15) phase of the firm’s housing construction.
A unique exception to anything attempted by the Krupp Building Office was the Margarethenhöhe project begun under the planning supervision of architect Georg Metzendorf in 1909. Subsequently praised and criticized for introducing a south German urban style to the Ruhr, this undertaking will be examined under the heading of The Margarethenhöhe Anomaly (1909-34). Intended as a company showpiece from its inception, the Margarethenhöhe was and would remain the only company housing project open to non-Krupp employees. In theory, therefore, it marked a key transition from company to social housing provisions. With its curved streets and well thought out exterior and interior designs, it seemingly ushered in the era of the new German Kleinsiedlung. Unfortunately for Metzendorf, what the architect intended to feel like “a small world in itself” would remain an anomaly.

The last phase from 1916 to 1928 will be examined under the heading of Housing as Heimatschutz [national preservation], the dates coinciding with the planning and construction of Krupp’s Heimaterde project near Mülheim. Designed by local architect Theodor Suhnel, the Heimaterde was intended to address the socio-economic needs of a war-torn age. This was to be a community where veterans and large families would be ‘re-rooted in their plot of native German soil’. Here the Kotten housing type with its characteristic livestock shed and self-sufficient garden plot was resurrected as the ideal housing solution for the problems of a desperate age. Gone were any signs of exterior décor on homes that were kept remarkably plain and uniform in appearance. Suhnel’s creativity was to be channelled into bringing out the natural beauty of the land. In his opinion, it
was neither the time nor place to be overly concerned about architectural aesthetics. His efforts were to be widely applauded by Heimat preservation societies in the 1920s and 30s.

I. The Functionalist Phase (1855-63)

No other individual had such a lasting impact on the firm's housing policies as Alfred Krupp. Especially in this first construction phase the steel baron treated housing as a function of economic necessity. As mentioned in the first chapter, Krupp was absolutely obsessed with ensuring that his leadership role would remain unchallenged. This applied not only to forces within but also to forces from outside of his establishment. This meant keeping all foreign and domestic competition at bay, while internally safeguarding his establishment from the threat of socialist agitation. Krupp was also a calculating pragmatist who was absolutely obsessed with ensuring that nothing should ever stand in the way of the physical expansion of his Essen factory. Depending on economic necessity, housing could be utilized as a key means of securing a steady labour pool at one point and then be deemed expendable if it stood in the way of factory expansion. It was only while facing his own mortality during the last month of his life in 1887 that he contemplated the symbolic value his housing initiatives might play in shaping his historical legacy.

Perhaps fittingly, the first housing projects initiated by Germany's dominant capitalist establishment in 1855 were guided by one main principle: supply and demand. The previous chapter has outlined that the year 1851 represented a
watershed in the company's history, with the London Exhibition acting as a catalyst for the firm to break onto the international economic stage. A brief glance at Krupp's sales figures after this marketing breakthrough reveals that the London efforts apparently paid dividends. Whereas the firm employed 195 workers in the Essen plant in 1851, this figure increased tenfold by only a decade later. Increased profits from railway and armaments contracts allowed Krupp to reinvest in the expansion of his factories and to modernize his production process. In the early 1860s the Essen factory therefore entered a marked period of modernization and expansion that included installing the world's largest hammer-press ("Fritz"), completing its first Bessemer plant and a new rolling facility, all of which would considerably improve Krupp's ability to manufacture railway parts and cannon. Whereas the plant employed 2,108 workers in 1861, this figure more than doubled by 1863 and would double again by 1865 to reach 8,248.\textsuperscript{201} The problem for labourers and the company by the mid-1850s and early 1860s was therefore that Essen's open housing market was simply no longer able to accommodate this rapidly expanding workforce.

Official statistics from the city of Essen are available for the years 1849 and 1864, but do not include data for the years 1851 and 1863. Nonetheless, the local census for housing occupancy in 1849 indicated that an average of 9.28 individuals occupied a single dwelling. By 1864, this number showed a marked increase to an average of 15.3 occupants per house.\textsuperscript{202} In areas located closer to its industrial district like the Weberstrasse and Thiemannsgasse, occupancy increased to 18.74 per dwelling. These statistics peaked in the predominantly working class district
"Zum heiligen Geist" [To the Holy Spirit] where an astonishing average 23.89
were crowded into a single building. The outbreak of a severe cholera epidemic
in 1863 gravely underlined that the lack of housing in Essen had reached crisis
proportions. Krupp was therefore faced with the prospect of either providing
company housing or risking losses to his labour pool.

In 1854 Krupp gained a major competitor in the crucible steel sector, the
Bochumer Verein. The Bochum steel company also began to construct impressive
low-density workers' housing modeled on the French Mulhouse system as early as
1857 and thus fired the first volley in a fierce labour recruitment battle. Located
a mere forty kilometers north of Essen, this new establishment was not only to give
Krupp a run for its money in the manufacture of high-grade steel, but it was also
competing directly for the recruitment of Ruhr metal workers. The real challenge
for both employers over the next decade was not only to attract workers, but also
to maintain their allegiance. This was not only the case for highly sought-after
skilled craftsmen who became increasingly indispensable as foremen when the
workforce increased, but also the recruitment of less-skilled migrant workers. For
Krupp and the Bochumer Verein, early housing efforts were not driven by
principles of social compassion but rather direct open market competition. In turn,
their earliest housing types and the quality of their design were a direct reflection
of the types of labourers they intended to attract.

The latest company effort to publish a detailed chronology of Krupp housing
activities was compiled by present head archivist Renate Köhne-Lindenlaub and
her co-worker Hans Joachim Völse in 1985. The document is invaluable as a
quick reference guide documenting the type, location and date of completion for all of Krupp’s housing projects built between 1861 and 1985. However, it also perpetuates a historical inaccuracy by placing the origins of Krupp’s company housing in the year 1861. The oversight is significant since the buildings that were constructed in 1855 differed radically, both in their design and quality of construction, from the dwellings built in 1861. As a result, the underlying aims and objectives that sparked Krupp’s first foray into the housing market have been considerably blurred.

The Menagen or Logierhäuser [Mess or Lodgers’ Homes] that were built in 1855 and 1857 (Fig. #4) were a high-density design intended to house migrant labourers. Whereas the high quality and spacious Meisterwohnungen (Fig. #5a) built in 1861 housed a mere ten foremen and their families in separate dwellings, the Menage was a high-density terrace design that housed five hundred low-skilled, single labourers in cramped quarters. The twin threats of strict company regulations and overcrowded living conditions in Essen presumably left the lesser-skilled Krupp employees in an unenviable position of having to share a single room with up to twelve others. Krupp himself was aware of their plight yet viewed these workers with considerable disregard:

We will soon have more workers than before, more families (than transient singles), whereas for building excavation and manual work we will also require more employees than the birds of passage [Zugvögel] now housed in the Menage.

The citation indicates that Krupp was certainly aware that the changing economic conditions required him to act. It was not, however, the so-called “Zugvögel” who
would be the first to be taken care of, but rather the highly skilled master craftsmen.

Additional on-site master craftsmen not only became a necessity to run and maintain the latest machinery, but also were essential in training and supervising this rapidly expanding workforce. The early 1860 factory expansion that made such an impression on Frederick Wilhelm IV also resulted in the construction of the Meisterwohnungen in 1861/62. The fact that these were the only workers' dwellings ever to be built in the very center of the factory grounds was a direct reflection of their intended function. Six years after constructing the high-density Menagen, Alfred Krupp set about the task of securing a core group of highly skilled workers essential in supervising the around-the-clock production process.

The Meisterwohnungen were comprised of ten single-family dwellings grouped together to form two separate rows (one containing four and the other six units) of housing (Fig. #5c). The rowed format was probably chosen for lowering the overall cost of construction and allowing the buildings to be wedged in between the pre-existing linear layout of the factory halls. The only archival sources outlining Krupp's directives for these buildings was a 1859 note under the heading "Directives for planning Meisterwohnungen": "...[They] should be kept as simple and cheap as possible (yet should be of suitable quality). Functionalism for their required usage and provision of light and ventilation in their most basic form, is what I recommend." Although their unfavourable location amongst the factory noise and pollution left much to be desired, their generous dimensions (Fig. #5a) were clearly an improvement over contemporary Ruhr rental barracks.
The ten units were further characterized by solid brick construction, spacious layout (five separate rooms), a basement and remarkably, even though they were located in the very thick of the main workshops, a modest yard and livestock shed (Fig. #5b). According to the recollections of some of the firm's senior workers, it was not at all uncommon to see pigs, geese or chickens in the Ruhr's most technologically advanced production facility. In fact, every one of the first ten residents living in these dwellings went through the trouble of keeping a pig which was annually slaughtered in their backyards. The individuals interviewed boasted that the meat from a single animal was sufficient for the entire year and that homegrown garden vegetables supplemented their diets. It must be stressed that during the leadership period of Alfred Krupp, the Meisterwohnungen design would not be built again. The particular housing style on which they were based, however, was to be of enormous significance to the firm's housing activities long after his death.

The Meisterwohnungen represented a direct link to the dominant 19th century Ruhr miners' housing form, the Bergmannskotten [miner's cottage] or simply Kotten. These privately constructed workers' dwellings were essentially miniature farms. They began to emerge in the Ruhr in the late eighteenth century and therefore preceded the first company housing in the region, the Gutehofnungshütte's Eisenheim near Oberhausen (1841), by well over fifty years. The Kotten emerged out of the new opportunities which the mushrooming Ruhr coalmines represented for its predominantly agrarian population. It was the miner's attempt to maintain his rural existence, whose
elements of self-sufficiency allowed his family to continue their traditional lifestyles, but it also served as a supplement to his wage earnings. Working the land and keeping livestock was therefore combined with trekking to the mine to earn wages. In other words, this housing type seems to have represented a transitional form bridging the agrarian to industrial eras. The fact that the Bergmannskotten allowed the Ruhr miner to continue to grow produce, raise chicken, rabbits and even fattening up a pig for slaughter, all lessened the impact of economic adversity and/or employer dependency.

The mine owners themselves were also not oblivious to these elements of self-sufficiency and the appeal of this housing style to their workers. Beginning in the 1820s and 30s they began to allow the construction of so-called Steigerhäuser [mine inspectors’ homes] near their mineshafts. However, the appeal of this particular housing type extended well beyond the first stages of industrialization as shown in the previous chapter. In fact, especially in the 1920s (see pp. 227-232), the Kotten housing form was resurrected as an economic, social, political, and cultural cure-all for Germany’s post-war recovery.

For Krupp, adopting this particular design in the early 1860s was a direct attempt to appeal to the needs and desires of his most valued foremen. Rather than attempt to sever his most essential workers from their traditions of rural self-sufficiency, Alfred Krupp’s desperate need to secure these skilled individuals actually forced him to transplant elements of rural self-sufficiency directly onto his factory site. Moreover, the first ten workmen residing in these houses were actually not charged rent, underlining their importance to the firm. Once rents
were charged, former residents estimated that they still remained approximately at one third of the price of similar dwellings on the open market. It is also interesting to note that even though these were rowed structures, the workmen still affectionately referred to them as "Kotten", indicating that the company efforts to transplant this housing style in more economical form were having the desired effect on its residents.  

A closer examination of one of the only surviving photographs of these initial ten factory units also shows Krupp's first venture into the construction of multi-storey development of Alt-Westend (Fig. #6). It represented the firm's first extensive housing project and consisted of nine tenement blocks containing a total of 144 units. These two-storied brick and wood structures were located approximately 200 meters from the factory gates and bore an uncanny resemblance to military barracks (Fig. #7a). Even though the provision of sufficient natural lighting and adequate ventilation probably placed the livability of these units above those of the infamous Berliner Mietskasernen, the Alt-Westend buildings were at best only on par with average Ruhr workers' housing of the-era. The dominant trait of these two and three room units (combined kitchen and eating area, bedroom and foyer) was their rudimentary functionalism. Alt-Westend therefore did not contain the provision of company amenities that would allow it to be labeled a workers' colony. Neither the building quality, chosen locale (directly adjacent to the factory), nor its overall layout, represented anything that could be described as progressive or innovative. Walther Kieß echoes this sentiment by stating that: "[Alt-Westend possessed] neither an element of planning nor
characteristics of a colony; it was merely a collection of workers' dwellings located in the factory vicinity. The fact that the entire complex of one hundred and forty-four units was completed in a mere three months speaks volumes for its meager overall quality and lack of planning ingenuity. In comparison, the aforementioned projects of Krupp’s competitors in Eisenheim and Stahlhausen, for example, were qualitatively superior to the makeshift character of Alt-Westend.

II. Planned Colonies (1863-74)

Alfred Krupp was aware that this first venture into the housing sector left much to be desired. In 1863 he created a separate housing planning division under the leadership of former state planner [Regierungsbaumeister] Gustav Kraemer to address the problem. With Kraemer’s appointment an element of professional planning was first introduced into the company housing efforts. An economic downturn after the completion of Alt-Westend temporarily forced the company to put further construction projects on hold until the war boom of 1871 enlarged profit margins sufficiently to begin new projects, but the eight-year period during which building was suspended did not mean that Alfred Krupp forgot the housing problem. On the contrary, what emerges from a regular exchange of letters between Krupp, Kraemer and the Board of Directors during this period was that the enormous social and political implications of well-planned housing had finally become clear to Alfred. In March of 1865 he addressed a letter to his management instructing them to “create plans for family dwellings situated on the best terrain of the establishment, there where the units will fit nicely but will never jeopardize the
Krupp therefore realized the need to improve housing quality without jeopardizing factory expansion. In the end, the needs of the growing factory were still placed above those of his workers.

By the mid 1860s Alfred Krupp was fully aware of the gravity of the housing issue, treating it as an essential long-term investment that required great sacrifices:

I believe that a great sacrifice must be made or else we will be missing our greatest resource, the people. No one can truly imagine the turmoil that will follow or the advantages we will enjoy over others, if we give our workers secure housing.\footnote{218}

This recurring theme would find its most overt expression in a stern letter to his board of directors justifying the human and monetary resources now being diverted to the housing issue. In his most famous quotation, Alfred Krupp clearly identified his greatest fear:

The attainment of success only depends on the will... This may seem uncomfortable and tedious, may even be denounced. That does not bother me at all. I am thoroughly convinced that everything I have recommended is necessary and when the day arrives when the revolution sweeps through the country, an uprising of all classes of workers against their employers, that we will be the only ones spared, if we only act in time.\footnote{219}

Krupp would in fact act in a timely manner. Over the next four years he set in motion a flurry of company building activity. All that was required to succeed in this area was, according to Krupp, the sufficient "will" and "sacrifice" to see the proposals through to their fruition. Sadly, these words proved to be a tidy fit for Nazi housing reformers in the 1930s who used them to fabricate a historical lineage to their own housing initiatives (see Ch. Six).

Once construction was restarted in 1871, the new projects completed under the supervision of Kramer -- Neu-Westend (1871/72), Nordhof (1871) and Schederhof
(1872/73) -- all displayed signs of definite planning improvements. Still, they did not abandon the poor barrack-type construction of earlier projects. Only the later projects of Cronenberg (1872-74) and Baumhof (1871/72) began to combine solidly constructed units with planning elements that set Krupp housing apart from efforts of other Ruhr employers. With the exception of the Baumhof, all four new colonies also continued the Westend trend of being situated directly adjacent to the industrial core. The real change that was initiated under Gustav Kramer was to create industrial colonies rather than mere factory barracks.

Gustav Kraemer’s first task in 1871 was to maximize the pre-existing land usage of the Alt-Westend property. Under the rather unimaginative name of Neu-Westend, he added an additional five buildings containing 120 units to the pre-existing nine (144 units) that had been completed in 1863. The barrack-like style was continued in a slightly altered form (Fig. #7b) that now included a three-room layout, more solid brick construction and three storeys instead of the previous two-storey design. It should also be noted that two of these new buildings were designated as Beamtenwohnungen [administrative staff dwellings], which explains their slightly larger size and more solid construction (Fig. #7c). The exterior facade of all these structures continued to be strictly utilitarian and was devoid of any ornamentation (Fig. #6).

In regards to the site layout, the new units continued the rigid grid pattern of the first buildings. Unlike Alt-Westend, which was laid out in parallel rows, the second stage was comprised of two perpendicular rows that somewhat shielded the entire development from the very busy Frohnhauser street to the south.
Similarly, the two new structures lining Westend Street also partially shielded the project from the industrial sector. The same could not, however, be said for the eastern and northern exposure where the inhabitants were subjected to a network of railway lines and main factory shops (Fig. #7). Overall, the altered housing design and its geographical layout can thus only be described as a marginal improvement over Alt-Westend.

What did improve the quality of life in this dreary housing project were two new non-residential buildings: a company grocery store and a beer hall (Figs. #7d and e). Their inclusion must be directly linked to Alfred Krupp's desire to make certain sacrifices to begin to appease his most precious asset, the worker. The Krupp Consum [Krupp Grocery Store] offered products for employees at a 6% rebate over regular market prices. With its growing network of branches the Krupp Consum was to become an Essen institution over the next century.220 Interestingly, the inclusion of what amounted to public houses, since access was not limited to employees, has always been overlooked by German Marxist historians. Presumably the inclusion of these facilities would not have fit into their schema of presenting Alfred Krupp as an authoritarian tyrant whose every move was calculated to control his workers through divide and rule tactics. Daniel Stemmerich and Eduard Führ, for example, have both gone to great lengths, even utilizing an Alfred Krupp quote for the title of their 1985 work: Nach Gethaner. Arbeit Verbleibt im Kreise der Eurigen. [After work remain at home in the vicinity of your equals] to argue that all of Krupp building types were consciously designed to domesticate and isolate the workers from one another.221 Surely the beer halls
provided a very public venue in which the patrons were in direct contact. Both the company grocer and the beer hall became hallmarks of all future Krupp housing initiatives.222

The next significant housing project extended the company provisions well beyond a company store and a beer hall. Although still situated adjacent to the factory site and utilizing barrack construction (Fig. #8), the new Schederhof contained a Catholic and a Protestant school, an industrial school, a central marketplace, a park, a nursery and a music pavilion (Fig. #9). Built between 1872 and 1874, it surpassed the previous four projects in overall size, containing 772 units of housing. More importantly, in theory at least, the inhabitants of the Schederhof would not need to travel beyond the confines of this company environment to obtain their basic necessities. The provision of the central park, a music pavilion and even a bowling alley, also suggest that their entertainment and recreational needs may have been fulfilled here. In other words, this was the first Krupp project with the characteristics of a small, autonomous city district.

The last and by far the most ambitious project that displayed these overt "colony" characteristics was the Cronenberg, which was to house over 8,000 workers and their families in 1572 units at the turn of the twentieth century. No other project undertaken by the firm was to come close to attaining this enormous scope. Rather than a mere colony, it would often be described as an entirely separate Krupp city.

Prior to the construction of the Altenhof, it was the Cronenberg project that the company brass heralded as its greatest housing achievement. At an 1892
conference of the Centralstelle für Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen [Central Office for Welfare Provisions] in Berlin, Krupp director D. Gussman explained that this Krupp community was designed to promote cultural and political activities amongst its workers. He proudly described the new facilities that included a:

... library and meeting hall for different clubs and a 12-1500 workers’ hall with galleries, 704sqm. total area, in which the different employee celebrations, political or personal events can be held. In addition, the different religious, patriotic and social clubs can freely assemble and in addition to serving as a gymnastic facility it also houses a 14-day winter theatre.223

Gussman would go on to say that green spaces and modest communal gardens had also been added to the Cronenberg in the 1890s. With the latter the Building Office had fulfilled another one of Alfred Krupp’s wishes: to win over the residents in his colonies for the benefits of garden cultivation. Krupp wrote in 1884: “I believe that it is economically and morally sound to win over the working families for garden cultivation [Gartenkultur]. The men will lose the desire for the pub and the women and children will enjoy the harvest and the garden activity itself.”224

This was a new dimension of the Krupp colonies that rapidly increased in significance from the 1890s onwards.

Cronenberg also represented a qualitative improvement in Krupp housing. It utilized solid brick construction (Fig. #10) in a rather plain three-level apartment form. Although still relying on a grid pattern (Fig. #11), it was nonetheless interspersed with green spaces and at least displayed some attempt to break the stifling monotony of previous Krupp projects. In the words of Walther Kieß:

“... no other German workers’ colony around 1875 displayed a similar standard of
Unfortunately for its residents, the Cronenberg eventually fell victim to the firm's adherence to Alfred Krupp's original directives: 'never to allow a housing project to stand in the way of factory expansion'. When the firm's most extensive factory expansion took place in 1933, in anticipation of increased armaments orders from the new N.S.D.A.P. regime, Krupp's largest workers' colony was demolished to clear the way for more production facilities. Political and economic objectives ultimately triumphed over the welfare of Krupp's workforce.

The final project undertaken under the leadership of Alfred Krupp was to represent a transitional phase between the utilitarian colonies that had previously all been located directly adjacent to the factory and the future Siedlung [settlement] form that was to flourish under Fritz Krupp. The colony in question was the Baumhof (Fig. #12) and it was built in 1872. The first phase of construction included 72 dwellings with an additional 82 being added in 1890. It was situated approximately five kilometers west of the factory in Essen-Rüttenscheid. This therefore was the first project that was not directly built in the immediate vicinity of the factory grounds. The Baumhof project was also unique in that it was the first to be located on a completely undeveloped property. It therefore offered the Krupp planners a blank slate on which they were not restricted by previously existing structures.

Even though the opportunity thus existed to create a radical break from the design pattern of Westend, Cronenberg and Schederhof, the general characteristics of tenement dwellings, modest green spaces and adequate company amenities
remained very similar. Again, very limited attention was given to matters of architectural style and the overall site layout. The Baumhof plan adhered to the familiar rigid grid pattern of the earlier colonies. There was, however, one important departure in the type of dwelling that was constructed in this development; for the first time since the ten Meisterhäuser, the company built low-density, one level dwellings with separate gardens for its workers.

For Alfred Krupp, the individual to be hailed as "the father of the modern Siedlungswesen", this final attempt to construct low-density housing was anything but innovative. In fact it was but a mere copy of the Mulhouse style (Fig. #12a and c) that had originated in France in the mid-1850s and had already been built by the Bochumer Verein and the Gutehoffnungshütte three decades earlier. In other words, the last project formally undertaken in the Alfred Krupp era can hardly be described as a radical departure from pre-existing Ruhr workers' housing initiatives. Significantly, nothing that even resembled a modern Kleinsiedlung was therefore built under his guidance.

The first scholarly treatment of private, co-operative and municipal housing policy in Essen by Erich Enke would in fact reach the following conclusion about the Krupp colonies of the 1870s:

Overall the impression that one gains from the [Cronenberg] colony is not a particularly friendly one. The same can also be said for the other [Krupp] colonies of the 1870s. For our current [1912] more refined tastes the sombre and plain manner of construction of the 1870s is very unappealing. Enke's study concluded that the activities undertaken in the 1890s by Fritz Krupp and his new head of planning, Robert Schmohl, marked a distinct departure from
anything that Alfred Krupp may have sanctioned. Enke for one, certainly did not consider Alfred Krupp's achievements to be the work of a planning genius.

There was, however, the legend of Alfred Krupp's dying wish for his son to build workers' dwellings modelled on the ancestral home [or Stammhaus]. As alluded to in the previous chapter, this dramatic last act of the "cannon king" has been retold ad nauseum in company publications. A closer examination of the directives passed on to Fritz and the actual direction of the Krupp housing projects in the 1890s reveals that these had little to with the creative 'genius' of Alfred.

III. From Workers' Colony to Cottage Siedlung (1891-1902)

The economic downturn lasting from the mid 1870s to the mid 1880s brought company housing construction to a virtual standstill. Official figures cite a substantial reduction in the Essen workforce from 11,971 in 1873 to 8,264 in 1879.229 It was not until the economic recovery of 1887 that this figure reached 12,959, with subsequent years showing a continuous succession of increases. At the time of Fritz Krupp's death in 1902 for example, the employment figures for Essen alone had swelled to over 24,000. More than ever it seemed, in the Fritz Krupp period, the company was in dire need of functional, high density housing in the Alt-Westend tradition. What materialized, however, it could be argued, was exactly the opposite of a strictly functionalist solution.

The deathbed drama of Alfred Krupp's last moments needs to be revisited one final time in order to establish to what extent Fritz Krupp and Robert Schmohl actually followed his directives. The last notes written in 1887 have been carefully
preserved in the company archives. To whom the last directives on the future of company housing were dictated remains a mystery. However, whom they were ultimately intended for does not. Fritz Krupp was entrusted to turn these ideas into reality. It is also important to keep in mind that Alfred considered his letters and directives to be the greatest gift bequeathed to his son. It was predominantly based on these last directives that, especially right-wing reformers in the 1920s (see Ch. Five) and 30s (see Ch. Six) resurrected Alfred Krupp as a social visionary. Examining the main themes of these directives is therefore of considerable importance to this study.

In these last housing directives, Alfred Krupp was most adamant that this next housing project was to be unlike any other the firm had previously undertaken. Three points were to be avoided at all costs: high-density construction, colony characteristics and architectural monotony. In a letter dictated to his finance manager Gussmann on May 17th, 1887 he specified:

> These small homes should have completely different characteristics than the colonies. In the latter we should never waste a square foot of space. These new widely dispersed homes, however, cannot and should not form a colony. If one situates 4-6 on one Morgen [.9 Acres] of land then that is sufficient. One could also introduce different building types to avert unpleasant monotony. I personally have a preference for the modest style of the ancestral home. I am envisioning 100 of such dwellings and that this number will not be enough.\(^{230}\)

Although bedridden, Krupp managed to scribble a vague outline of what these new single-family dwellings were to look like.\(^{231}\) In essence, they were to contain the same layout as the ancestral home [Stammhaus] of some of his “dearest memories”. This meant that the dwellings were supposed to include a shed
attachment and a garden allotment. To what extent Krupp thought through the precise nature of these provisions is exemplified by the following quote: "Land and dairy cultivation should not be allowed, this would mean that the man has to help the women with the garden work if she is not able to manage and then he works at home and rests at the factory. All these aspects need to be kept in mind." The quality of life in these new dwellings was therefore to improve over the previous colonies as long as this improvement did not impinge upon the worker's ability to perform his duties at the factory. The underlying economic variables still guided Alfred Krupp in the last days of his life.

That Alfred did feel a genuine concern for the workers who would ultimately reside in this new project is apparent in the final housing directive dictated directly to his son on July 10th, 1887, only four days before his death. Speaking from personal experience as a former labourer in his own factory, Krupp speculated that his employees desired peace and solitude above all else after they had completed their shifts. The physical layout of this new housing development was therefore to cater to this need for tranquillity:

With complete quality of construction the houses should cost less than 3000 Mark, they should not be situated near a main street but in an open field because the worker who spends his entire day amongst 12,000 men should be able to enjoy the company of his family at home, he does not wish to be disturbed by a noisy neighbours. Houses that are located only 5m from one another will therefore please no one, because the neighbours could be nice but could also be undesirable individuals. I estimate that the homes will need to be situated 25-30m apart.

The only real company precedent that Krupp could have drawn upon on this issue was the close proximity of the first ten Meisterhäuser to each other. Interestingly,
the far more economical rowed design of these earlier structures was now to be replaced with a substantial 25-30m buffer zone between each of the projected minimum 100 dwellings. Barely able to move in his last days, Krupp did believe the issue of low-density, garden communities to be important enough to command his attention. All hagiographic portrayals aside, the archival documents do support the view that the final words Krupp committed to paper concerned workers' housing: "... I would appreciate it if I could give the go ahead for such dwellings while I am still alive." For his successor not to act on what amounted to Alfred's dying wish would have been unthinkable.

IV. The Picturesque Cottage Siedlung (1891-1902)

Initially, the changes in housing policy under the leadership of Fritz Krupp proved to be rather modest. They resulted in a number of minor projects in external plants and the further expansion of Cronenberg and Baumhof colonies. The real break with previous traditions was made when the head of the Building Office, Gustav Kraemer, passed away in 1890. Kraemer's death concluded a nearly thirty-year period during which he had supervised the construction of all housing projects. As mentioned, the rigid geometric grid patterns and bland, functionalist architectural styles of the buildings had been the hallmark of this period. Provision of company amenities and modest communal green spaces were the elements that began to set some of these projects apart from the work of other German employers. Once compared with earlier French (Mulhouse) or English (Saltaire) company housing efforts, however, the combined efforts of Alfred Krupp
and Gustav Kraemer appear far from groundbreaking. It was not until the appointment of Robert Schmohl in 1891 that the firm’s Building Office embarked on an entirely new direction.

In their benchmark study *The Movement for Housing Reform in Germany and France*, Nicholas Bullock and James Read isolate the 1890s in Germany as a decade in which the planning and design of workers’ housing first became a respectable craft. Led by the likes of Camillo Sitte, Hermann Muthesius, Richard Riemerschmid, Karl Henrici and directly inspired by the English arts and crafts movement, a new wave of German architects focussed their efforts on improving the overall quality and architectural design of the working class dwellings (see Ch. Two). Bullock and Read concluded: “From the 1890s onwards architects no longer considered the design of housing as being below the dignity of the profession.” Recently obtained Robert Schmohl documents clearly indicate that he believed himself to be part of this new movement. It was not until his tenure at Krupp, however, that this became clear to the young architect who had previously aspired to design only “*Monumentalbauten*” [monumental structures]. Looking back on his lengthy Krupp career, Schmohl wrote on his eightieth birthday in 1935: “That one could gain such satisfaction on an artistic level, in this seemingly dreary task of designing workers’ housing, did not become clear to me until I started at Krupp.” It was the “artistic” decoration Schmohl gave to his Krupp housing designs between 1891 and 1902 which truly separated him from the utilitarian functionalism of his predecessor Kraemer. This preference for the “picturesque” style would win him both critical acclaim and vehement criticism.
(see Ch. Four). The project that was to ignite by far the greatest critical response was the Altenhof.

From its earliest planning stages in 1892 the Altenhof was to be a truly unique undertaking. It was designated as a community for “old, invalid [Krupp] workers and their widows” in which they could live out their final days in a quaint cottage (Fig. #13) and garden community “free of rent”.

Situated approximately twenty kilometers south of the noise and smoke of the factory near a substantial greenbelt, the mere location of this housing development was a major departure from any previous Krupp initiative. Due to its considerable distance from the central factory the Altenhof did not represent an advantageous housing locale for active workers. The company tradition of building self-contained urban entities was, however, continued by including two grocery stores, two churches, bathing facilities and a library in the site layout (Fig. #14). For these older residents schools and beer halls were now replaced with a nursery and a basket-weaving workshop for those who “still wished to keep busy with light manual work.” Not surprisingly, the company and its supporters widely publicized this idyllic community, while its critics viewed it as the very height of Krupp’s propaganda policy (see Ch. Four).

Whatever the motives, it is important to re-emphasize that from a strictly economic standpoint, this housing project was never intended to generate a financial return. Therefore, unlike any project that Alfred Krupp implemented, the value of his successor’s first venture into the housing sector could not be measured in monetary terms.
That the Altenhof was very much an exercise in public and employee relations was made clear by the way Fritz Krupp and Robert Schmohl embarked on the planning process. Unlike the previous Krupp colonies, the design and layout for the Altenhof project were opened to a national planning competition. The final results were published in the building trades periodical *Deutsche Konkurrenzen* [German Competitions] in the summer of 1893. The peculiar names of the top five proposals are intriguing: "Familienheim" [Family Home], "Ein eigener Herd, ein braves Weib sind Gold und Perlen werth" [One’s own hearth and brave wife are worth their weight in gold and pearls], "Con Amore" [With Love], "Individuell" [Individual] and "Aus Liebe zur Sache" [Out of love for the cause]. All seem to reflect a romantic new attitude which building professionals displayed towards the planning of workers’ housing. Moreover, the tremendous response of ninety-four entries for this competition to claim the 1000 Mark first prize also seems to support Bullock and Read’s assertion about the new-found professional interest in working class housing. Strangely however, although prizes for the first, second and third place finishers were awarded, the Krupp judges could not find one of the entries suitable enough to actually implement. After all proposals had been examined, it was ultimately left to Robert Schmohl to plan and design the Altenhof.

Numerous scholars (e.g. Renate Kastorff-Viehmann, Roland Günter, Walther Kieß and Daniel Stemmerich) have repeatedly suggested that the design of Krupp’s Altenhof contains distinctly English influences. In other words, the inspiration for its picturesque style may not have emerged out of the German
planning competition at all. While thought provoking, none of these historians have provided archival evidence to support this hypothesis. An examination of the rare English language sources in the Krupp archives does reveal that at the same time Fritz Krupp opened the Altenhof planning competition he was also involved in obtaining blueprints for "workers' cottages" [original in English] from his "dearest English friend", Edward Brown Lees. It was Lees who acted upon Krupp's request to suggest an English architectural firm to draft a variety of plans for "cottages to be built in Germany" and he therefore represents the variifiable English link that has eluded the above-mentioned scholars. After a lengthy exchange of letters about costs and royalties, four blueprints from the Oldham architects Messrs. Heywood and Sons were sent to Essen. The entire business was finally settled with a last letter from Lees to Krupp dated May 31, 1893: "I am very glad that you found the plans of the cottages useful, but conditions are so different in the 2 countries that they could not be expected to meet your requirements." The final line suggested that the plans were utilized in a slightly altered form to suit German conditions. Lees received the final payment for the blueprints from Essen in early December of 1892. As soon as the winter weather conditions improved, construction on the Altenhof was begun in the spring of 1893. Since the original plans have not survived, it is impossible to gauge the exact extent of the English influences. However, the letters offer the first real proof that Fritz Krupp actively pursued housing designs outside of Germany.

The link to England in the design of the Altenhof is significant because the ornate design of the cottages that were built between 1893 and 1896 was later
denounced for being “un-German” (see p. 174). What was meant by this significant criticism will be elaborated on in the following chapters. For now it is important to point out that the ten designs for homes utilized for the Altenhof displayed no physical links to the traditional Ruhr Bergmannskotten. On the contrary, with their busy exterior facades (Fig. #13): peaked gables, spiral towers and verandas, these houses more closely resembled miniature versions of Richard Norman Shaw’s famous villas in Bedford Park than a Ruhr vernacular style. The same unique attributes applied to the curved street layout (Fig. #14) that was now favoured over the rigid grid design of the previous Krupp colonies. Under directive “2f” of the Altenhof competition Krupp stipulated a further break with the past:

In its external appearance the colony should be completely devoid of plain uniformity. In keeping the floor plans limited, the street will need to be enhanced through diverse exterior finishing touches on the homes.\footnote{In addition, this very pronounced attempt to avoid the physical monotony of previous Krupp building types was to be accomplished by using the “cheapest means of production”. What appeared as an obvious contradiction would indeed be accomplished by keeping the size of the structures small (Fig. #13) and the various exterior enhancements superficial. Instead of actually exposing structural beams to project a Tudor-like style for example, wood trim was merely tacked on to the exterior walls, giving many of the houses an appearance that resembled the well-known English factory village of Port Sunlight.\footnote{Certainly these rather involved housing designs did not follow Alfred Krupp’s suggestions for a simplistic form. The first phase, and what could be aesthetically described as the}
most picturesque part of the Altenhof, was completed between 1893 and 1899. It contained 186 units that were liberally dispersed along curved streets (Fig. #14). With its picket fences, fruit trees and public benches the Altenhof had the appearance of a quaint retirement community in which residents lived in miniature villas.

In sharp contrast, the second phase or Altenhof II, completed between 1907 and 1913, opted for a housing style that was much less picturesque. The curved streets, gardens surrounded by picket fences and the detached or semi-detached housing form were maintained. Missing, however, was the exterior woodwork décor as well as the overall miniature-villa appearance (Figs. #15 and 16) of the dwellings. While the second phase still avoided monotony and uniformity, it did so by variations in the colour of housing trim or the manner in which the houses were placed in reference to the street (Fig. #17) instead of through elaborate exterior touches. This distinct shift in building style is important to isolate since many contemporaries referred to the changes of the Altenhof II as being very progressive (see p. 193-194). Significantly, this architectural break took place after the death of Fritz Krupp in 1902, suggesting that he may have preferred the earlier more, complex designs.

The houses of the Altenhof II neither contained elements that paid homage to a distinct Ruhr vernacular style nor followed workers' housing precedents from England. Robert Schmohl therefore did not take elements of the so-called *Landschaftsnorm* [prevalent regional style] into account. Moreover, if compared to contemporary efforts of English industrialist, the latter phases of Port Sunlight
(Fig. #18) being the most suitable comparison, then the Altenhof-Heide appears as a radically scaled-down version of the picturesque style. Especially to the ever-growing legions that joined the Heimat reform movement in the first decade of the twentieth century, forging a distinctly German style that was plain, unassuming yet paid homage to local traditions took on an ever-increasing importance. Robert Schmohl's subsequent efforts in the Dahlhauser Heide and Emscher-Lippe really began to take these variables into account.

V. The Functionalist Kotten (1907-1915)

Completed between 1907 and 1915, Dahlhauser Heide and Emscher-Lippe were located approximately forty kilometers north of Essen near Bochum and contained 1,792 and 1,038 units respectively. Unlike the Altenhof or Margarethenhöhe, which were situated en route to the Villa Hügel estate in Essen, neither the Dahlhauser Heide nor Emscher-Lippe was ever intended to be a company showcase. Rurally situated on more affordable real estate, both offered Schmohl nearly uninhibited creative freedom. Here the head of the Krupp building office was assigned to create a housing project for the workers of two recently acquired mines (Hannibal and Hannover). The houses were to be designed to appeal directly to their Bergmannskotten traditions. This entailed being generous in overall size, containing a built-in shed attachment to keep small livestock and having a generous yard allotment for vegetable cultivation. Unlike the Altenhof, where the gardens were very modest and intended predominantly for flower
cultivation, here the yards were once again intended to provide an element of self-sufficiency [Nutzgärten] for the residents.

In regards to the site layout, Schmohl continued to use curved streets. Gone were any vestiges of the rigid grid patterns of the earliest colonies. Although the building styles were uniform, the curved streets did serve to break the overall monotony in housing design (Figs. #20 & 22). In contrast to the Altenhof, however, the architect also opted for a housing form that was based on a regional style with lengthy dropping rooflines and light Fachwerk [exposed beam] exterior décor (Figs. #19 and 21). In Emscher Lippe the respect for local housing traditions went even further, with Schmohl actually choosing to plan the new community around a pre-existing Westphalian farmhouse. The old farmhouse was used as a natural focal point of the project, therefore allowing the past to blend with the present. The decorative Fachwerk facade further served to underline this architectural continuity.

In these two projects Robert Schmohl therefore displayed a very noticeable awareness of local geographic, architectural and labour traditions. Emscher-Lippe and Dahlhauser Heide represented a very important synthesis of contemporary architectural functionalism and regional historical styles. Neither could have been described as being overly idyllic or picturesque in the Altenhof sense. Due to their respective locations, it is important to re-emphasize that neither was initially intended to be a showcase company housing development. These two settlements were also the last two projects that were directly supervised by Robert Schmohl.
In 1920, the University of Aachen would award him with an honorary doctorate for a lifetime of achievement in the workers’ housing realm.245

VI. The Margarethenhöhe Anomaly (1909-1930)

The Krupp housing project that was gaining all the publicity while the abovementioned Siedlungen were under construction was Georg Metzendorf’s Margarethenhöhe. In choosing the much younger Metzendorf over the more experienced Schmohl to plan the most involved housing project in the firm’s history, Krupp took a calculated risk. Metzendorf, a Hessian architect, was thirty-four at the time the planning process was begun in 1909, compared to Schmohl who was sixty-four. He had just recently made a name for himself by displaying a model workers’ home at the Landeskunstaustellung [Provincial Art Exhibition] in Darmstadt.246 The debut was impressive because Metzendorf displayed an uncanny ability to blend the ornate with the economic by utilizing standardized building parts. Equally as important, his Darmstadt display home was the first in Germany to include a bath, laundry and an advanced central heating system in a working class dwelling. It was presumably this attention to detail and his obvious desire to improve the liveability of workers’ homes that ultimately convinced Robert Schmohl himself to recommend Metzendorf for the Margarethenhöhe project.247

From the outset, Metzendorf strove to create something unique with the Margarethenhöhe by drawing his inspiration from South German Kleinstadtidyllen [small town ideals], which incorporated architectural and planning elements from
eighth century German towns. Metzendorf favoured neither *Colonie* nor *Siedlung*, but a return to a walled-city site plan. The periphery of Metzendorf's project was not, however, a fortified wall, but rather an external ring of multi-level tenements that shielded the inner core (Figs. #25). Like the traditional walled cities, the low-density homes, the central market square, shops and churches were thus shielded from the outside world. Access to the Margarethenhöhe involved crossing a lengthy bridge and passing through a large archway (Figs. #23 and 24). To this day, upon entering what is now a suburb of Essen, it truly feels as though one is entering "a small world in itself" which was exactly what its architect had intended.

For the first time in the history of the steel company, Metzendorf's vision for a "small world" was intended to allow non-Krupp workers to rent the company dwellings. Moreover, Margarethe Krupp had specified that the potential new residents were to be chosen from the "less fortunate classes" [*minderbemittelten Klassen*]. Here therefore was a critically important aspect of the Margarethenhöhe that set it apart from all other employer housing of its day. According to the firm's publicity campaign, this development was supposed to have marked a transition from company to social housing. Herein lay one of the central reasons why this particular endeavour has garnered so much attention over the years. The experiment would, however, never be repeated.

For the community that was intended to immortalize her own name, Margarethe Krupp had purchased a densely wooded 50-hectare parcel of land near the Nachtigallen and Mühlbachtal, approximately ten kilometers southwest of
Essen. She also set aside the unprecedented sum of one million Marks to subsidize the project. The entire benevolent act was initiated to celebrate the marriage of her daughter Bertha to Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach in 1908. In other words, the pomp and pageantry that already surrounded, what German dailies billed as ‘the social event of the year’, all but ensured that the spotlight was on Margarethe’s substantial wedding gift from its inception.

Undoubtedly aware of the pressures of what was to become his life’s work, Georg Metzendorf clarified how his design was going to differ from those of his contemporaries, many of who were beginning to be heavily influenced by Ebenezer Howard’s garden cities concept. In 1909 Metzendorf explained his novel project: “It cannot be a mere urban settlement like the garden cities, but a part of greater Essen that is architecturally and artistically unique from the main city itself.” He described how the unique terrain was ideally suited to accomplish this task:

...to connect the valley with a bridge and create a wide and comfortable access way... The bridge [should be kept]..., in monumental yet plain form, [it] connects the city and the Siedlung, but simultaneously accentuates its uniqueness and detachment [from Essen]...252

The architect thus displayed a desire to adapt to the natural terrain while simultaneously utilizing the deep entrenchment formed by the Mühlbachtal to accomplish one of his main goals, to accentuate the Margarethenhöhe as a self-contained urban entity. This meant that adhering to any prevalent *Landschaftsnorm* in the Essen vicinity was strictly out of the question. Both in its architectural form and its planning layout, this was intended to be an entirely different development.
Direct access to the Margarethenhöhe from Essen could only be gained by passing over the imposing 175 meter long Mühlbachtal bridge (Figs. #23 and 25) that underlines the feeling of moving into a distinctly new region of Essen. The mouth of the bridge itself was flanked by two pavilions, one a shelter and the other a police station, both resembling guard houses (Fig. #23). Once across, to gain entry into the development required climbing a wide set of stairs and then proceed through a large arched doorway built into one of the few multi-family dwellings. Beyond the gate (Fig. #24) the steep curved street has houses with fancy gables lining the route, which ultimately winds its way to the stunning central market place complete with a quaint fountain and detailed masonry work. The market place itself, is overshadowed by the largest building in the entire development, whose outward appearance closely resembles a baroque palace (Fig. #26). Metzendorf chose this very unique design to house the obligatory Krupp Consum or company store. Significantly, this combination of the central market square and the monumental Consum with its vertical pillars towering over the surrounding Kleinstadtidylle [small town idyllic] was to be widely applauded by national socialist planners of the 1930s (see Ch. Six).

What arguably garnered the most attention at the time were Krupp and Metzendorf’s attempts to extend the traditions of the firm’s workers’ welfare activities to non-Krupp workers. The young architect was given a remarkable amount of leeway in how he was going to house these individuals. The main company directives he received were quite permissive:
The basis for the site plan should be the construction of two-storey one and two family homes, partly arranged in groups and partly detached, with three, four and five room dwellings having mansard-roofs. The interior design of the three-storey homes should, if local or aesthetic variables allow, not be ruled out. Some of the units should have gardens and some should do without. However each house should have a 14 to 24 square Ruten \[?] of garden area. Bathing facilities should either be communal for the entire area or be included in the laundry facility of each separate unit.\textsuperscript{253}

Metzendorf was particularly adept in addressing the later hygienic aspects of the Krupp directives. In adopting his innovative central heating system with which he had first debut in Darmstadt, he truly did revolutionize the liveability of German working class housing. Central heating systems of a similar quality would only have been found in the housing of the well to do. Metzendorf's heating solution was soon adopted by countless cast-iron oven manufactures throughout German, creating an entirely new interior necessity. This basic idea proved so popular in fact, that it remained a fixture of German \textit{Siedlungshäuser} long after the Second World War. Metzendorf was also one of the first architects to build two fully furnished showcase homes on site so that visitors could view the future homes before the project was actually finished.

Whereas the solutions Metzendorf instituted for the interiors were to be widely copied, the same could not be said for his exterior designs of the Margarethenhöhe. Even though the architect adhered to three basic floor plans in order to lessen overall costs, he went to enormous lengths to ensure that these did not in any way appear to be monotonous or repetitive in appearance. The end result was that the first phases of the development were characterized by intricate exterior trim and woodwork accents which clearly distinguished this settlement.
from anything else in the Ruhr region at the time. Although (Fig. #23) they were not nearly as picturesque as the Altenhof, they were still much more ornate than Robert Schmohl’s more recent work in Emscher-Lippe and Dahlhauser Heide. And even though the Kaiser himself was duly impressed by Metzendorf’s work during his 1912 tour of the development, many of the architect’s contemporaries were not (see Ch. Four). Interestingly, Metzendorf would explain later that the “notwendig geworden Sparsamkeit” [necessity of economy], forced his hand in adopting more spartan designs for the latter building phases after 1918.254

VII. Housing as Heimatschutz (1916-30)

What changed everything for Metzendorf, and Germany itself, was the First World War. Krupp’s next housing project was specifically designed to address the changing conditions of this radically new age. From its inception the Heimaterde [native soil] was designed as a modest homestead development and as such, was intended to reintroduce elements of rural self-sufficiency back into the industrial heartland. Unlike the Margarethenhöhe, which was publicized as an exercise in social housing open to all Essen residents, the stipulations for becoming a resident of the Heimaterde [native soil] were extremely selective. Non-Krupp employees were never considered eligible as potential residents. To even qualify for selection, prospective renters were required to become members of the newly formed Heimaterde Genossenschaft [co-operative] whose initiation fee was two hundred Marks. In sanctioning the formation of this co-operative, the company not only rode the wave of popularity which these organizations enjoyed just prior to the
First World War (see Ch. Two), but also lessened the burden of start-up capital for the project during some very trying economic times. In addition, it made it appear as though the membership controlled the co-operative without interference from the company itself. A review of the Heimaterde directives first published in August of 1918 clearly shows that it was the company that remained very much in charge.

The Heimaterde concept was first announced to the public at the very height of the German war effort in 1916. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Krupp director Max Halbach outlined that this latest Krupp Siedlung was going to reunite 'deserving' veterans and large families with their native soil. Halbach also identified the Kotten as the ideal housing form for this new community. Although the restrictions on war-essential construction delayed the start of the actual construction until August of 1918, the tenant selection process had already begun in 1916. Beyond the required two hundred Mark fee, the criteria for eligibility were very specific. In fact, the firm went as far as categorizing the applicants in five main groups:

Group I consists of war participants and their widows with six or more children; II is comprised of war pension eligible veterans and soldier widows who do not belong to Group I; III includes other co-operative members with at least six children; IV consists of war veterans not belonging to Group I and II; V will be formed from the remainder of the eligible co-operative members. The remainder of the dwellings, the document stipulated were, to be allotted to Krupp workers who became members of the co-operative in the first six months of
its existence. This last group of applicants needed to win their piece of Heimaterde via company lottery.

With their pronounced emphasis on housing veterans first and foremost, the aforementioned criteria bore a strong resemblance to the British 'Homes for Heroes' proposals of the early 1920s and the first German Housing Law of the same year (see Ch. Five). Like its British counterparts, the Heimaterde stipulations also strongly encouraged its residents to become self-sufficient. Here the Kotten housing precedent was ideally suited for the harsh economic conditions of the age. As mentioned, Robert Schmohl had also employed this design as the basis for the Emscher-Lippe and Dalhauser Heide Siedlungen in order to appeal to the needs of Krupp miners. Whereas the previous plans still allowed for some exterior touches that drew on the Westphalian farmhouse tradition, the dwellings of the Heimaterde were to be devoid of all exterior ornamentation. In what was later to be described as the “neue Sachlichkeit” [new functionalism] of the predominantly semi-detached housing style, the architect of the Heimaterde chose the most austere design of the single-family dwellings (Fig. #27) the company had yet sanctioned. During the initial phase of construction, this functionalism and emphasis on lowering cost was taken to the very extreme by choosing mud and clay as the major building materials for the first section of homes. Brick and mortar were ultimately chosen as the dominant building materials after the quality of these first dwellings left much to be desired.256

Since Robert Schmohl had taken on his new portfolio as head of the Building Office in 1914 and Georg Metzendorf was fully engrossed with the high-profile
Magarethenhöhe, the task of planning one of Germany's first Kriegerheimstätten [warrior homesteads] fell upon a new architect, Theodor Suhnel. A resident of Mulheim where the Heimaterde was to be built, the architect was to distinguish himself by skilfully adapting his housing projects to the diverse contours of the landscape (Fig. #29). The varied geography of the 350-hectare parcel was characterized by a hilly terrain, which was traversed by numerous small ravines and a lake. Since the housing styles were going to remain in the most basic of forms, Suhnel therefore channelled his creativity into bringing the natural beauty of the landscape to the forefront. This involved turning meadows into playing fields, the lake into a rowing and bathing facility, the valley basin into a sports field and the ravines into hiking paths.\(^{257}\) Undoubtedly aware of the pronounced sentimental value individuals would attach to the very name of the Heimaterde, the architect opted to accentuate the natural beauty of the landscape while deliberately downplaying the architectural aesthetics of the new dwellings. In striking this balance between natural beauty and austere architectural functionalism, this project differed considerably from anything the Krupp Housing office had previously undertaken.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the opportunity did exist, as it had for Schmohl in the Dahlhauser Heide, to attempt to adapt his housing to the vernacular building style of an old Bergmannskotten that was situated near the center of the development. Like Schmohl, Theodore Suhnel did opt to preserve the plain aging structure, therefore incorporating it into his new vision. However, unlike Schmohl, who actually chose to decorate the exteriors of his Dahlhauser
Heide homes with mock *Fachwerk* to suggest a link to the farm house and, in turn, architectural *Landschaftsnorm*, Suhnel made absolutely no effort to do so. Even though the *Kotten* housing type inspired the entire Heimaterde project from the outset, the new austere exteriors of Suhnel’s post-war homes bore little resemblance to this vernacular style itself (Fig. #28). The old existing farmhouse was simply preserved and transformed into a pub called “*Krug zur Heimaterde*” [Heimaterde Tavern]. Ironically, a rudimentary nineteenth century miner’s cottage, whose very function was to supplement the incomes of industrial workers, was now preserved as a nostalgic reminder of simpler times. In an age of wartime food shortage and hyperinflation even adding a hint of exterior ornamentation would have been interpreted as frivolous.

Given the widespread support for these proposals, the propaganda value of Krupp seizing the moment in 1916 to implement construction proposals for the Heimaterde should not be underestimated. The company was able to claim that it was doing its part on the foreign battlefields as well as on the home front. When Hindenburg committed his thoughts on warrior homesteads to paper in 1917, conditions in Germany were indeed “incomparably more horrific” (see p. 102). Nonetheless, Krupp’s efforts to build its own project intended for deserving veterans and their families, the *Heimaterde* was well under way. With the government effectively paralyzed by deteriorating wartime economic conditions the housing question was left unattended. In sharp contrast, from 1916 onwards, Krupp company propaganda (see Ch. One) could claim that the firm was doing its part to provide suitable homesteads for deserving veterans and their families.
Reaping war time profits as the "Reich Armoury" placed Krupp in the enviable position of possessing the financial clout to move ahead with low-density housing projects like the Heimaterde. World War One thus magnified the firm's peculiar duality of a dominant military industrial force while keeping its time-honoured reputation as a workers' welfare innovator in tact. It will be shown in chapter three that this contribution did not go unnoticed.

Economic conditions in the 1920s would force both Metzendorf and Suhnel to complete their respective projects by moving away from constructing single-family dwellings altogether. Even though both the Margarethenhöhe and the Heimaterde had been begun by chasing this ideal, it was simply no longer economically feasible to build low-density projects in the Essen region. Numerous additional projects were therefore begun in the mid-1920s such as Wickenburg, Bergmühle and Borbeck. None, however, bore similarities to the Altenhof, Margarethenhöhe or Heimaterde. Furthermore, coming on the heels of the hyperinflation, these new initiatives were now subsidized by the German state and opted for a three-level, high-density style that was to become the Krupp standard from the mid-1920s onwards.

In 1930, the last company publication on its housing activities prior to the fateful disintegration of the Weimar Republic was released as the *Führer durch die Essener Wohnsiedlungen der Firma Krupp* [Guide through the Krupp Housing Projects]. The document recycled the 1907 speech which opened this chapter. In an effort to depict continuity of its housing policy goals the words of Ernst Haux (d.1925) served as its conclusion:
The quintessential goal of Krupp housing policy is, and will always be, the real improvement of our workers' living conditions. Every step in this process will be assessed on the basis of whether or not it represents a real improvement in the standard of living for as many of our workers as possible.  

The 1930 document is of interest because it also contained the latest company figures on the extent and type of dwellings constructed over the last forty years. In other words, with a few basic calculations it is possible to ascertain to what extent Haux's goals had been attained. 

In total the company had built over 20,000 units of housing near their various production facilities throughout Germany. Nearly 12,000 of these workers' dwellings where still located in Essen where the total number of Krupp employees had now reached 120,000. This meant in effect that Haux's claim, while certainly impressive, only translated into company housing for approximately 10% of the Essen workers. On a national scale, these percentages decreased even further to 8.7% out of a total of 235,000 employees. Moreover, the figures also indicate that the vast majority (92%) of all Krupp workers in Germany lived in buildings containing four or fewer rooms, indicating the extent of high-density over single-family buildings. In the final analysis therefore, a mere 1,917 workers, or 1.6% of Krupp employees in Essen, resided in dwellings that would have fit the criteria of Alfred Krupp's final wish. 

Ultimately what did remain, however, was what Haux described as "the results that are within our reach". Of these the low-density projects of Altenhof, Dahlhauser Heide, Emscher-Lippe, Margarethenhöhe and the Heimaterde all sparked the most public and professional interest. What they had in common was
that they all projected the detached or semi-detached family home with gardens as the ideal housing form for the working class. Furthermore, in various forms, they continued the company tradition, first fully realized at Cronenberg in the early 1870s, of creating self-contained urban entities by providing green spaces, company stores, schools, churches, recreation facilities and even beer halls. This chapter has outlined the quantitative and qualitative achievements of Krupp’s housing projects that dotted the greater Essen area (Fig. #30) by the 1930s. It serves as essential backdrop for the subsequent discussions of the historical discourse surrounding these housing activities. In order to begin to assess the historical impact of the Krupp initiatives, it was imperative to outline their defining features and overall scope. The following chapter will focus on the ongoing debate surrounding the German housing dilemma, the historical context in which the Krupp efforts were made.
CHAPTER FOUR

"Monuments of Foresight" and "Cemeteries for the Living":
Supporters and Critics of Krupp Housing before 1919
The previous chapters have outlined how the Krupp steel firm took the initiative to construct workers' dwellings en masse after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. At approximately the same time, the company solidly established itself as a world leader in the realm of marketing and propaganda. Under the leadership of Friedrich Alfred Krupp this potent mix of tremendous financial resources, extensive housing activity and tried and proven marketing strategies combined to create a "Propaganda der Tat" [propaganda of the deed] similar to the activities of the D.G.G. (see p.94). When the German debate on housing reform began to gain momentum in the late 1890s and eventually reached a pinnacle during the climatic war year of 1917, a number of key Krupp housing projects were completed: Nordhof, Cronenberg, Alfredshof Altenhof, Dahlhauser Heide and Emscher-Lippe and the first phase of the famous Margarethenhöhe. One other significant project, the "warrior homestead" Heimaterde, was quickly moving from the planning stage to the first phase of construction. All projects had one thing in common: the firm's marketing efforts coupled with its growing reputation as a bastion of German militarism ensured that its housing activities reached a very wide audience. In other words, the supporters and critics of Krupp's "Propaganda der Tat" increased in direct relation to the intensifying debate about the housing problem. In turn, prominent figures in the housing debate, Paul Schulze-Naumburg, Hermann Muthesius, Otto Hue, Karl von Gamp-Massauen, Hannes Meyer and even Wilhelm II, were able to narrow their focus on the pre-existing Krupp housing initiatives. Their personal judgements ranged from praising the projects as
"monuments of foresight" to denouncing them as "cemeteries for the living". These critical verdicts on the pros and cons of the Krupp projects were therefore as diverse as the political outlooks of those that publicized their views. It is with this lively historical discourse, that emerged before the new Weimar Republic finally made housing an urgent matter of state in 1919, that this chapter is predominantly concerned.

One of the most intriguing episodes that initiated discourse on the Krupp housing legacy occurred when the "Canadian Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Technical Education", made its way to Essen on July 18th, 1911. During its stay in Germany the delegation viewed industrial facilities in a number of states, taking detailed notes on production techniques, facilities, working conditions and even the overall demeanour of the workers themselves. Upon arriving in Essen, for reasons that still remain unclear, the commission did not gain access to the Krupp facilities. The delegation also did not approach representatives of the civic government in Essen to request an official tour of the city. Instead, one of the senior Canadian delegates, James Simpson, took the unusual step of approaching the editor of the local S.P.D. weekly Die Arbeiter-Zeitung [The Workers’ Newspaper] to request a guided tour to gain an impression of workers’ living conditions. The German editor was extremely eager to oblige and did his best to act as tour guide for the Canadian visitors.

Whether by intent or chance, the members of the Royal Commission embarked upon a tour of the darker side of the Krupp housing legend. In other words, unlike any previous foreign or domestic delegations visiting Essen to view Krupp housing
projects, the unique choice of tour-guide allowed the Canadians the rare opportunity to side-step the official company tour. A record of what took place on this unique 'unofficial' walkabout has only survived in an article entitled “A non-scheduled visit at the Welfare Firm” that was immediately published by the editor in Essen’s Arbeiter-Zeitung [Workers’ Newspaper] the very next day. Thus far this valuable historical account has escaped analysis.

The article was a passionate account by an individual who had developed an outright hatred for everything the carefully constructed Krupp company welfare myth symbolized. First and foremost, the author set his sights on exposing the living conditions of those workers who were not fortunate enough to obtain a dwelling in one of Krupp’s showcase housing developments. The tone of the article was reflective of an individual who had been eagerly awaiting his chance to counter-balance the carefully orchestrated company propaganda efforts. Just months before he had witnessed the official visit of Admiral Tirpitz to Krupp’s Margarethenhöhe. This he described in the following terms:

Here they [Krupp] even managed to let the gramophone play the entire day and place sentries in front of the homes that were to be viewed, so that the chauffeur would not stop at the homes that would destroy the reputation of the welfare firm. During this process, the cave dwellings in the Borbecker Street [Alt-Westend and Nordhof] were avoided altogether. 

Now the opportunity presented itself to conduct his own tour, which made no attempt to stay clear of the Borbecker Straße, but made the shoddy barrack developments of Alt-Westend, Nordhof and Schederhof its very focal point. With a noticeable degree of personal satisfaction, the editor noted: “What the gentlemen witnessed in the cave dwellings of the Nordhof and Borbecker Street,
sufficed to destroy the often praised reputation of the welfare firm. As a final gesture of hospitality, he even presented the Canadian guests with “successfully taken photographs of human misery” which the delegation could add to its research material.

What was eventually released in Canada as the Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Technical Education – Report of the Commissioners Report in 1913, would have certainly been a major disappointment to the accommodating Essen tour guide. His pictures were nowhere to be found in the final government publication. All that was included in the exhaustive three volume summary was a short sub-section entitled “Conditions of Living” which painted a favourable picture of German industrial life. Judging by the emotional tone of the above-mentioned article, this was certainly not the type of foreign exposure for which the editor of Essen’s Arbeiter-Zeitung had hoped.

From the company’s perspective, the impressions gained by the Canadian visitors to the Essen colonies continued a trend that was predominantly positive. By far the largest single group to visit a Krupp housing development was a five hundred-member delegation attending the International Congress of Workmen’s Accidents and Assurances, which was held just twenty-five kilometres south of Essen in the provincial capital of Düsseldorf from June 17th to June 24th, 1902. Krupp went to the trouble of chartering a special train for all in attendance to make the trek from Düsseldorf to Essen in order to view the picturesque Altenhof community. A correspondent from the prestigious British Medical Journal subsequently submitted the following reflections to the periodical:
The [Altenhof] visit was most interesting and instructive. The greater part of the time was spent in visiting the large number of houses erected for the working men of Essen, homes for men convalescent from injury or sickness, homes for aged couples, aged bachelors and widows – buildings that are monuments of foresight and the consideration for the working people by the present [Friedrich Alfred] Krupp.

The British visitor was duly impressed by the workers he encountered: “Here in Essen the acerbity that exists so often between capital and labour has never shown itself. An air of contentedness without signs of servility is at once apparent.” Moreover, it was clear to the British visitor that Krupp’s foresight in building these colonies had paid tremendous dividends. The correspondent virtually gushed:

If any proof were required of the friendliness that exist between Herr Krupp and his workmen, it is found in the fact that since the works were established one hundred years ago [sic] there has never been a strike. The houses with their little gardens are the best of buildings the writer has ever seen.

The steel company could scarcely have hoped for a more successful outcome to its efforts in presenting the Altenhof to this critical international audience. It was exactly the type of smoke and mirrors display that the writers of Essen’s Arbeiter-Zeitung had grown to loathe.

As an account written in 1912 by the ill-fated Bavarian revolutionary leader Kurt Eisner (d. 1919) reveals, it was very easy to gain this same positive first impression of the most idyllic of Krupp colonies, the Altenhof, if one were to stumble into this suburban enclave on the outskirts of Essen. It was exactly this accidental tourist approach Eisner took in his article “A Cemetery for the Living” in which the oasis-like characteristics of the quaint little community with its
miniature workers’ villas, gardens, fruit trees, cozy benches and nooks, were vividly portrayed and then systematically deconstructed. Many characteristics of this Rüttenscheid housing project were noticeably different from the remainder of Essen. In the words of Eisner: “Even of the Essen air, which is always saturated with thick oil, this oasis contains no remnants; [here] fragrant, natural air finally allows the lungs to breathe freely again.” The article then completes this image of tranquility by describing the many picturesque little villas, a housing style which the author had apparently not encountered in the Ruhr region before:

And these homes also no longer have remnants of the horrific aura of the workers’ houses, these blackened brick graves that are devoid of colour and form, ones which Krupp welfare has built en masse and which remain as witnesses to the barbaric capitalism of earlier times. Here [in the Altenhof] art and labour are united through the wise and heartfelt social deed of their benefactor... 266

Kurt Eisner believed that this quaint setting was a carefully orchestrated company facade. For all its external appeal, what the planners of the Altenhof had overlooked, according to Eisner, was the most important variable in any community plan; the human factor. It was exactly this human element of the Altenhof that the author hoped to expose. He wanted to lay bare his own views on this housing project and, equally as important, the quality of life of the retired workers who inhabited the dwellings.

What ultimately left the greatest impression on Eisner during his Altenhof visit was the dreary, greyish, almost ghost-like appearance of the senior residents he encountered. All were apparently preoccupied with carrying-out depressingly repetitive daily tasks that, the observer believed, were literally draining them of
their last ounce of life. Whether the residents realized it or not, Eisner cynically remarked, they were living out their final day in a setting that was more like a “colourful coffin” than a vibrant community. When he eventually came across a couple whom he described as still having ‘a glimmer of life in their eyes’, Eisner struck up a conversation and was granted the opportunity to see the inside of their home.

What he encountered was an interior of very modest dimensions, decorated in a rustic manner and filled with very plain furnishings, all details the author related in the following, rather condescending tone: ‘...inside nothing remained of the artful exterior facade since, what the passers-by could not see, did not concern the landlord’. What was most surprising, however, was how this local Ruhr labour activist then chastised the simplistic interior décor of the accommodating elderly couple; their poor taste in wallpaper and cheap furnishings was mocked. Eisner would, however, save his greatest criticisms of the old couple for their habit of displaying numerous images of their employer:

Dozens of times the old and young master [Krupp] is displayed, very tasteless and very cheap looking. But the house occupants point these out with considerable devotion, like the Russian farmer who worships his holy pictures. The old man does not know any better. His entire soul is filled with the images of his master.\textsuperscript{367}

With an odd mix of admiration for the physical structures erected by Krupp and an aloof attitude towards the supposedly naïve individuals who occupied them, Eisner sent very conflicting messages to his readership. On the one hand, the residents of the Altenhof were fortunate enough to reside in a picturesque community that was, by Eisner’s own admission, a vast qualitative improvement over previous workers
dwellings, yet on the other hand, they had also been essentially indoctrinated into worshipping the likenesses of the Krupp patriarchs.

Dragging the supposed malleability and ignorance of the Russian peasantry into the framework of his argument, Eisner further highlighted his adherence to Marxist doctrines. Marx chastised the intellectual capacity of the peasant workers and, as the events in Russia were to prove, erroneously misjudged their potential as a major revolutionary force. In many ways, Eisner’s condescending attitude towards the aging couple who, were after all part of the industrial working class, mirrored Marx and Engel’s attitudes towards the European peasantry. What signal were the readers of the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, most of whom, according to Eisner’s own rationale, lived in dwellings whose qualitative standard would have been below those in the Altenhof, to take from the article? Workers were gullible enough to fall into the trap set by Krupp? Left to their own devices, they did not have the intellectual capacity even to decorate their house interiors in a manner that Eisner deemed as tasteful? Or lastly, that Krupp propaganda had achieved its goal of transforming these people into mindless drones who now worshipped the likeness of “their saviour”? What Eisner exposed, however, were the glaring deficiencies of certain members of the political left in recognizing the socio-political gravity of the housing issue.

One aspect of Eisner’s findings towered over the rest: the peculiar mix of admiration and denunciation of the Krupp endeavour was long on criticism and short on personal vision. If the air was that much cleaner, the buildings that much more appealing and life in this “industrial oasis” that much more tranquil than in
the remainder of the soot-covered city of Essen, then the real shortcoming of the
Altenhof project was that it was solely reserved for aged and injured Krupp
workers. From a critical perspective, the deeper political question was why the
federal government was not pro-active in constructing quality housing facilities
that lay within the reach of the average labourer. It was a question that had been
gaining political urgency since the 1890s and went hand in hand with rapid
industrialization. By 1911, the German Social Democratic Party (hereafter S.P.D.)
in particular used the growing housing shortage to underline the increasing
economic disparity between capital and labour. Solutions were desperately
required that extended well beyond the construction of a handful of show homes
for aging industrial workers.

A very intense pre-war political debate on the housing question took place in
the Reichstag in February of 1911. It pitted the S.P.D. delegate Otto Hue against
the conservative Deutsche Reichspartei (hereafter D.R.P.) member Karl von
Gamp-Massauen. These two politicians were the central figures in a heated
exchange over the potential spread of the infamous Berliner Mietskasernen to
other industrializing regions of Germany. This time these well-known symbols of
Germany's worst living conditions were pitted against a venue in which they were
conspicuous by their very absence: Essen. Drawing on a recent Essen civic
census, Otto Hue argued that even in what he sarcastically referred to as "Krupp's
Kingdom", the workers' housing shortage was beginning to spiral out of control.
Targeting Krupp and its carefully orchestrated image as a leader in workers'
wellfare initiatives (see Ch. One), allowed the S.P.D. to strike at the heart of the
German capitalist order. If housing conditions had deteriorated to this extent in a
city repeatedly praised for its exemplary Krupp housing projects, then the situation
in other developing urban centres (Hue cited the Ruhr towns of Wattenscheid,
Gelsenkirchen, Bochum, Herne, Witten, Steele and Duisburg) must be infinitely
worse.268

It was the company’s dual reputation as the bastion of German capitalism and
the undisputed leader in the provision of company-sponsored housing that ensured
that the mere mention of its name was guaranteed to incite heated political
discourse. Hue’s assertions were therefore certain to provoke a response from his
conservative political opponents. On this occasion it was the D.R.P. and even the
government representative, Alfred von Tirpitz, who answered the call and jumped
to Krupp’s defence.

Karl von Gamp-Massauen, a member of the Prussian aristocracy, used the
same census cited by Hue to argue that in comparison to conditions in Berlin,
Krupp had actually done a remarkable job of keeping the housing shortage in
check. He was quick to point out, for example, that the inspection found that 72%
of workers living in Krupp dwellings were fortunate enough to have at least a three
room flat, a luxury labourers residing in the German capital could only dream of.
Like Hue, the D.R.P. delegate also asserted that the Krupp precedent had been
followed in other German cities. However, in contrast to the S.P.D.
representative’s interpretation of this development as an outright calamity, the
landed aristocrat saw these developments in a much more positive light. In fact, he
challenged all S.P.D. delegates to take the time and view these areas first-hand:
Go and visit Leverkusen. There [like at Krupp in Essen] you will also enjoy the nice workers' dwellings and the manner in which they have been decorated. You will also be pleased with the flowers in their windows. I believe that by such content workers, the Social Democrats will never find [politically] fertile ground.269

Berlin and its Mietskasernen remained as they were for Huber and Riehl years earlier, the negative housing model that was to be avoided at all costs. The difference was that when Hue and Gamp-Massauen framed their respective arguments in 1911, an extensive planned housing model existed in Essen that offered a clear alternative to conditions in Berlin. The latter rounded out his argument by stating: "I believe there is not one worker in all of Berlin, who is in an equally favourable situation like the 72 percent of the workers at Krupp."270

Interestingly the debate surrounding workers' living conditions in the "Kruppstadt" did not end there. In fact, for the D.R.P. members just having the gall to call the steel firms's social welfare initiatives into question amounted to an attack on national honour. In turn, Gamp Massaunen lashed out at Hue: "It really requires a certain type of courage, to attack such a firm as Krupp in public. I regret this courage on behalf of my colleague Hue; I can't say that this attack has done much to contribute to your honour."271 Surprisingly, Hue quickly found himself under attack as this issue was raised and was just beginning to regroup, when state secretary Alfred von Tirpitz also sprang to Krupp's defence.

The member has specifically showed up the Krupp firm. In the name of justice, this forces me to reply that as far as I have personally gained insight into this topic, there is hardly a firm like Krupp that has done so much for the living conditions and well-being of their workers. I have pledged myself to this assertion even though I am of course involved in a business battle with the firm.272
It is clear therefore, that for conservative Reichstag members, the Krupp mystique was constructed on the firm's dual reputation as legendary Reich armaments manufacture and exemplary provider of workers' welfare measures. An attack on either tenet of this corporate identity could result in the very personal honour of the critic to be called into question.

As indicated in the second chapter, the type and quality of Krupp dwellings built between 1855 and 1919 varied greatly. The existing physical structures in Essen and beyond, offered reformers both positive and negative examples of what form large-scale workers' housing developments could take. Although acknowledged as sub-standard by the firm itself, aging projects like Alt-Westend, Nordhof and Schederhof for example, were not torn-down and/or renovated until the 1930s. However benevolent this foresight may have been in its time, little or no effort was made by the company to upgrade or fully replace structures that, by its own admission, were only ever intended as temporary barracks. To the detriment of those who were unfortunate enough to live in these decrepit structures, characterized by the Arbeiter-Zeitung as "Mietshöhlen" [rental caves], the long-term existence of these buildings provided housing reformers with examples of how things should definitely not be carried out. By no means were these negative perceptions limited to representatives from the left of the political spectrum. On the contrary, the individual who utilized the Krupp housing precedents most extensively, even charting them on a critical graph, was Paul Schultze-Naumburg, a future (1930) N.S.D.A.P. Reichstag representative.
This outspoken leader of the Heimatbund certainly did not hold back in unleashing a harsh critique on the stark functionalism that dominated early examples of employer housing: "[Only] In recent years has the realization that the worker should no longer be housed in prison-like boxes become obvious to some people." Attempting to place himself in the position of the worker and his family, Schultze-Naumburg recreated the depressing psychological effect that living in these barracks may have had on the inhabitants. Images of barrack-like workers' housing were thus utilized to arrive at the following question: "Can one imagine the feelings, or even the subconscious impact, that walking through the dreary entranceway must have had on the worker, his wife and their children?" It is significant to remember that these Zuchthäuser [penitentaries] for workers continued to be the dominant housing form in the majority of German industrial areas. In his study Kulturarbeiten (1909), Schultze-Naumburg was, however, quick to point out that more recently, workers' housing had gone through a phase of noticeable qualitative improvements or what he termed: "the first period of awakening". Once again, Krupp was at the epicentre of these developments.

Given the amount of public exposure the Altenhof had from the date of its completion in 1893, it is not surprising that Schultze-Naumburg used this well-known Krupp colony as his example from the "first period awakening". This did not, however, mean that he chose to suspend all criticism of this project. The architect's critique of the Altenhof was anything but subtle, referring to the miniature villa-like exteriors of these Krupp homes as prime examples of
“angeklebte Romantik” [stuck or glued on romanticism]. And this was only the beginning of Schultze-Naumburg’s attack on the Altenhof aesthetic:

... [in the Altenhof] they fell into the trap of using an over-abundance of gables and alcoves, miniature towers and little roofs, that make the colony look like a pure catalogue of pseudo-building elements that are cultivated today. In addition, it takes its tradition from an inorganic [unnatural or ahistorical] precedent, since the houses are built to resemble castle gate-keepers’ houses from the Middle Ages rather than modest [vernacular] farm houses.

According to Schultze-Naumburg, the lessons to be learned from the errors made in the Altenhof was that the architect needed to be historically aware and selective in choosing to adhere to a local vernacular style and not to import foreign elements. He thus viewed efforts like the Altenhof as a deliberate distortion of the past as well as the potential ruin of his desired “organic” present. Remaining true to the Heimatbund organization he represented, he denounced such architecture as dishonest, yet had to concede that this was a popular trend.

Klaus Bergmann has explained that Schultze Naumburg was one of an increasing number of German conservatives who rediscovered the appeal of pure völkisch [of the people] values in the early 1900s to offset what they believed to be the ludicrous pace of modernisation. Taking the simple, hard-working and unpretentious Bauernvolk [Agrarian population] as their guide, movements like the Dorfkirchenbewegung [Village Church Movement] and the Wandervogelbewegung [Hiking Club Movement] urged middle class members to incorporate elements of the rural lifestyle into their everyday existence. A return to these völkisch traditions could, they believed, offset the twin threats of proletarian upheaval and bourgeois decadence. Following this line of thought,
Schultze-Naumburg interpreted the involved designs and artistic accents of the Sitte School as "das Kainzeichen unserer Zeit." [the Cain-like symbol of our times]. He was to pursue its eradication with an equally religious zeal.

In keeping with the main purpose of the Heimatbund’s creed (to preserve and protect local German traditions), the architect advocated a simpler architectural style that was to be based on the local Rhenish-Westphalian farmhouse. Due to the Altenhof's lack of modest local architectural influences, Schultze-Naumburg labelled its picturesque style as "un-German". It was, he argued, the architect’s patriotic duty to keep these traditions alive by drawing on the so-called "buried treasures" of basic vernacular architecture. According to Schultze-Naumburg, these treasures were present in all areas of Germany. His personal mission was to open the eyes of the next generation of architects and planners to the enormous possibilities of ‘unearthing their inspirational domestic potential’. Modesty, functionality and organic ties to local conditions, were thus the ideals to be followed by the next generation of architects. In the words of the author, the new German home would then:

Rise out of the soil like one of its own products, which had to grow there, as naturally as the trees which stand beside it. In such a house live human beings, in such a house they can link their fates. Such a house can become Heimat for them.277

In the end, the Altenhof did contain a number of newer buildings whose exterior appearance did conform to Schultze-Naumburg’s stated prerequisites; the much more plain communal buildings for widowers [Pfründnerhäuser]. With their far simpler outer appearance, devoid of the miniature towers, gables and alcoves, he
deemed these buildings as a substantial improvement. Because of their rather discrete utilization of mock-Fachwerk and slate ornamentation (Dia. #42), these structures had the ideal blend of past and present, leading the Heimatbund spokesman to the euphoric conclusion: “These houses are so exemplary that one can only gain joy from them.” These select Krupp homes thus passed the future N.S.D.A.P. delegate, Schultze Naumburg’s, central acid test: “Such a home can become Heimat for them”.

A leading German architect of the early twentieth century, Hermann Muthesius, expressed similar interests in constructing a sense of Heimat in his influential work Kleinhaus und Kleinsiedlung [Small Home and Small Settlement], first published in 1912. Along with Heinrich Tessenow, one of the central figures involved in the planning of the garden city Dresden-Hellerau, Muthesius launched an offensive against the supposedly decadent and overly romantic architectural styles of the recent past. Similar to Schultze-Naumburg, he viewed himself as part of a vanguard movement that was involved in reclaiming simple architectural styles for the German masses. Muthesius also saw the task ahead for individuals in the building profession as a defining historical struggle. Robert Schmohl’s work for Krupp in Emscher-Lippe, Dahlhauser-Heide and the Margarethenhof was all praised as exemplary first steps in this effort to reclaim a definitively German housing style. All displayed a respect for local housing traditions and avoided the excessively decorative “miniature alcoves, towers and Firstgitter [roof awnings]” that were deemed as socially irresponsible, culturally offensive and economically
unwise. Predictably therefore, the Altenhof was also definitely not a source of inspiration for Muthesius.

Although, as Schmohl’s efforts in the above-mentioned Krupp projects had shown, the shift towards a simpler architectural housing form was well under way, its acceptance as the general norm, was still many years away. Undeterred, Muthesius saw winning over the masses for this simplified and functionalist housing form as a matter of utmost importance:

To spread the movement to the German Volk is a difficult future task. *Kitsch* [gaudiness] currently still has a strong popular appeal. Trashy romance novels, pretty picture postcards, the cinema and Variété art is often the cultural nourishment. Here [in Germany] we are still miles removed from what one can call a healthy popular mood.278

According to Muthesius, in Emscher-Lippe, Dahlhauser-Heide and Margarethenhof, Robert Schmohl had shown the way to fostering this “healthy popular mood” in the housing sector. The next, and by far the more challenging task, was “to spread the message of the entire movement to the people”, a goal that Hermann Muthesius, Paul Schultze-Naumburg (see. Ch. Five) and especially Gottfried Feder (see Ch. Six) were to rigorously pursue well into the 1930s.

Far less concerned with striving to be a mover of masses, Erich Enke, a political science doctoral candidate at the University of Tübingen, was also preoccupied with the same topic as Muthesius and Schultze-Naumburg. In 1912 he released what was arguably the most scholarly treatment of its time concerning Krupp and Essen’s housing developments. Enke’s published dissertation was refreshing since it did not contain the overly dramatic and emotional tone so characteristic of many of the pre-war reformers. Not affiliated with any political
and/or special interest group, nor in the direct employ of the company itself, the young doctoral student provided a very candid account of the Krupp housing projects and assessed both their qualitative state and architectural characteristics.

What emerged from his detailed account was an image of a company that had left the majority of its workers' dwellings in a state of disrepair by 1912. The often-cited impressive scope of the Cronenberg project, for example, was not enough for Enke to sing its praises. While acknowledging the size of the undertaking and the firm's capital outlay, Enke still arrived at the unflattering conclusion:

The impression that one is left with from this colony is not a particularly friendly one. And what holds true for the Cronenberg also more or less applies to the other colonies from the 1870s. From our current, more refined taste, this sombre, plain form of construction of the 1870s is very unattractive. 279

In sharp contrast, Enke's "more refined taste" was completely captivated by the 'very significant' aesthetic changes that took place when Friedrich Alfred Krupp assumed the leadership of the firm in the late 1880s. Applied to the construction that took place during this time, the author saw the move towards the curved street layouts and new picturesque styles of the Friedrichshof and Alfredshof as an enormous improvement. Uninterested in questions of national character and/or following the lead of traditional vernacular structures in an organic manner, Enke based his final judgement on assessing the sheer aesthetic and qualitative improvements. Using these criteria, his final verdict on the Altenhof was filled with admiration for the prevalence of the low-density cottage system and the firm's choice of location in a 'healthy and sunny locale approximately one hour [walk]
from the inner city.’ Unlike the harsh verdicts cast upon this development by Kurt Eisner, Paul Schultze-Naumburg and the editor of Essen’s Arbeiter-Zeitung, Erich Enke continued to hold the Altenhof in the highest regard. The author was, however, even more impressed by the Margarethenhöhe which he described as not only a worthy successor to the Altenhof, but actually a housing project that far exceeded it in overall social worth.\(^{280}\)

Apparently duly impressed by the social changes desired by Hans Kampffmeyer and the D.G.G., Enke thought it necessary to create an entirely different section in his dissertation to deal with Georg Metzendorf’s Margarethenhöhe. Here, according to the author, was a radical break from anything the firm had been involved with earlier: the transition from constructing workers’ housing to the construction of social housing; from building colonies to building Siedlungen.

Enke was particularly impressed that the company had used its own resources and was successful in safeguarding one of Essen’s most idyllic regions from the threat of land speculators.

Citing the guiding principle of the Margarethe Krupp Society’s constitution, that the housing project was to be designated for “low-income classes”, Enke noticed its “…new, essentially ground-breaking significance [lay] far beyond Essen’s, yes even the Rhineland’s borders.” Remarkably, his own research subsequently revealed that the actual tenant selection process did not remain true to the society’s guiding principle. A detailed breakdown by occupation revealed that it was a company fallacy to portray this housing project as benefiting “low-income classes” at all. The initial residents of the first phase were predominantly
well paid Krupp and public and private sector Beamten [white-collar workers].

Enke provided the following numeric breakdown by occupation:

- 48% Krupp Workers and Beamte
- 16% civic workers and Beamte
- 11.7% Postal and Telegraph managerial staff
- 4.7% Railway managerial staff
- 7.5% Court Beamte
- 2.5% Syndicate Beamte
- 9.6% Private sector Beamte and workers

The figures indicate that this was a social composition that could hardly be characterized as "low-income", even if this term was stretched to the extreme.

Rather, the high concentration of state, provincial, public employees and private sector Beamte was much more in line with Jürgen Kocka's definition of the so-called "neue Mittelstand" [new middle class] that was to feel increasingly politically isolated in the post-World War One era.

From Enke's perspective, the great significance of the Margarethenhöhe was, not that it assisted the disadvantaged, but that the Krupp firm and Metzendorf had created a low-density urban settlement that brought together individuals from different professions. It was this "Mannigfaltigkeit" [diversity] in its social composition that the political scientist believed was its greatest legacy. Either Enke was yet another unassuming victim of Krupp propaganda, or he saw in the Margarethenhöhe only what he wished to see: a noble, capitalist social experiment.

Given the fact that he had this specific demographic data at his disposal, it appears as though the latter hypothesis may have been more appropriate to explain his peculiar conclusions.

It should also be mentioned that Enke was astute enough to recognize in 1912 that Metzendorf's housing project in Essen was not a true garden city by the
standards of Ebenezer Howard's. Interestingly, the Margarethenhöhe was never intended, as Metzendorf himself clearly stated, to be an autonomous urban unit that would be able to rely on its own production, employment and educational facilities and become virtually self-sufficient. Instead, it was designed to be an extension or a satellite branch of Essen proper. The connection of a tramline to the inner city assured that individuals could reach their place of employment with relative ease. In essence therefore, the Margarethenhöhe could more accurately be described as a precursor to the modern suburb. Erich Enke was acutely aware of this key divergence from Howard's ideas and deliberately used the term "Gartenvorstadt" [garden suburb] instead of "Gartenstadt" [garden city] to distinguish between the two urban models.

Lastly, it is important to note that rather than chastise Georg Metzendorf for importing a south German architectural style to the Ruhr, Enke instead seemed enchanted by both the architect's choice of building style and his utilization of the landscape. He expanded upon what he viewed as the tranquil "bergische Kleinstadtidyl" [mountainous village ideal] in rather sentimental terms:

There [in the Margarethenhöhe] the dark slate roofs shine across the steep gables, there the fine ornaments adorn the walls and shutters, there the door knocker has not been forgotten, so that a [door] bell does not destroy the harmony of the entire project.  

For his final verdict on what Metzendorf had achieved, Enke also did not shy away from giving out the highest of praise:

He has understood, not only to protect the surrounding natural beauty of the Siedlung but also through its skilful utilization, managed to even increase its worth. He has done the Heimat a great service in a region where it is under constant attack from a thousand forces." [my emphasis].
As the First World War approached and the S.P.D. was nearing the height of popular support, writings on the Krupp housing settlements increasingly underlined their alleged function as protectors of *Heimat* ideals. Significantly, this was a notion that had not just suddenly materialized in 1912, but had been building over time. This trend had been consciously underlined by a skilfully orchestrated company propaganda campaign, which repeatedly invited a long string of German government and military officials to view Krupp's facilities. These tours often extended beyond the famous armaments plants to include select housing projects. Most visitors took the time to express their respective thoughts on the national significance of these company facilities to the German press. Each visit successively underlined the vast importance of the Krupp firm for 'the protection of the homeland'. What historical scholarship has thus far ignored, was that this image of Krupp as a national protector of the German *Heimat*, went beyond its capacity to manufacture arms. Through nationalist rhetoric and countless photo opportunities showing military officials dressed in full regalia strolling through the streets of Krupp housing projects, the Kaiser and his entourage gave the company's housing efforts an aura of official state sanction. In the immediate pre-war period (1912), this aspect undoubtedly filled members of the ultra-conservative D.R.P., like Karl von Camp-Matthausen, with an unbridled sense of patriotism. Conversely, the very presence of these public figures invited a barrage of criticism from members of the S.P.D., like Otto Hue. It was however, the numerous Essen visits of Kaiser Wilhelm II, whom many believed was the very
symbol of German militarism, which repeatedly focussed the public spotlight on Krupp’s initiatives.

Chapter One outlined how the Hohenzollern monarchy established close ties with Krupp dating back to Wilhelm I’s inaugural visit to Essen in 1853. With the ascension of Wilhelm II to the throne in 1888, the frequency of the royal visits increased substantially. The official tours of Krupp’s housing facilities increased in turn; with the Kaiser always being shown what the company considered to be its showcase developments of a given period. The very chronology and choices of the Kaiser’s stops is thus informative in itself: the Cronenberg in 1890, the Altenhof in 1900 and the Margarethenhöhe in 1912; each representing the showcase development of its era. During the 1890 visit, for which the Kaiser dressed in the unusual uniform of the Garde-Feldartillerie [Royal Infantry] out of respect for the “cannon king”, he chose the Cronenberg’s Saalbau [main hall] to toast the company stating: “The Krupp factory has given the German worker, German industry a global reputation unlike any other firm…”

The conservative industrial periodical Stahl und Eisen [Steel and Iron] reported that after visiting the new public school added to the Schederhof, the colony Baumhof and the Cronenberg, the German head of state was

... understandably full of praise for all these provisions. In fact, the Kaiser – and we believe this to be extraordinarily important – witnessed here that Rhenish-Westphalian industry has created a mass of facilities for the welfare of workers, long before the state took up these socio-political duties upon itself and he [also] saw that the expansion of these facilities continues, even after the state has now taken up a part of these provision for the working people.”
Stahl und Eisen may have been correct in alluding to the fact the Bismarckian reforms had in fact begun to lay the foundation of social welfare reform. However, the provision of workers’ housing was not among them.

When the Kaiser left Essen in 1890, Friedrich Alfred Krupp and Robert Schmohl were indeed preoccupied with ‘eagerly expanding’ on these housing facilities. A decade later the Kaiser was to return and visit the fruits of their labours: the Altenhof colony. Judging by the Kaiser’s reaction to what he saw in the Altenhof during his visit on October 26th, 1900, it appears as though this colony impressed him above all others. In a sense, Friedrich Alfred Krupp may have deliberately canvassed this response by naming one of the Altenhof’s main care facilities the “Empress Auguste Viktoria Home”, after the German Empress. This time it was the Essener Volkszeitung [Essen People’s Newspaper] that covered yet another royal visit and quoted the following response from the Kaiser on the Altenhof: “This is of course a truly exemplary development. The people for whom you [F.A. Krupp] have created such a wonderful convalescent facility cannot thank you enough.” The images that have remained from this visit depict the royal couple being chauffeured through the Altenhof streets and cheerfully shaking hands with the retired Krupp labourers. The Kaiser’s dress, the horse and carriage situated amongst the quaint little village setting with its tiny church, fruit trees and park benches, evoked memories of a bygone era. In viewing these snapshots, it is easy to see why members of the S.P.D. often referred to Essen in the cynical terms “Krupp Kingdom.” The images of these well-choreographed
Kaiser visits, flashed across the German dailies, virtually begged for such a
response from the political left.

If the firm showcased the Cronenberg and Altenhof at the very height of its
workers' welfare achievements in the 1870s and 1890s respectively, then as the
second decade of the twentieth century opened, it was undoubtedly the new
Margarethenhöhe that became the "pearl of Krupp housing" endeavours. The
development would of course, be honoured with a visit by the Kaiser. In 1912,
just after Metzendorf had completed the first phase of the project, Wilhelm and his
seemingly ever-expanding entourage of military officials once again inspected a
Krupp Siedlung. This time, the housing project and the Emperor seemed a perfect
match: the self-proclaimed "soziale Kaiser" [social Emperor] inspected what the
steel company itself was proudly publicizing as it first foray into the social housing
realm. The German press was present en masse and again captured this symbolic
moment in a number of memorable photographs.

One particular image that stands out shows the Kaiser, wearing his
*Pickelhaube* and long military overcoat, strolling casually through streets of the
Margarethenhöhe. The German Emperor is shown flanked by the new head of the
Krupp firm, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, who owed the very use of the
Krupp name to an unprecedented imperial decree. To their right, the young
Hessian architect, Georg Metzendorf, proudly kept pace while a group of military
men and Krupp officials followed in his wake. The first individual following the
lead group of three was Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, whose skills in political
persuasion and effective propaganda campaigns had made him the leading figure in
the fateful German naval program. Metzendorf and Krupp officials were dressed in their upper bourgeois finery while the Kaiser, Tirpitz and two other individuals, wore their full military dress. All were pictured ascending Metzendorf's curving Steile Straße [Steep Street] situated inside the castle-like arched entrance way of the sparkling new Margarethenhöhe (Fig. #1). The very power-brokers of German government, the military establishment and industry joined to admire the latest work of one the nation's most promising young architects. Three worlds were uniting in Krupp's latest housing creation.

The residents of the Margarethenhöhe came out in full force to welcome the Kaiser and his entourage on his August 9th, 1912 visit. Featuring sloping rooflines, elaborately designed and covered with slate, each house was decorated with flower baskets for the special occasion. The streets were lined with clapping men, women and children all dressed in their Sunday best. Their well-to-do appearance in itself shattered the myth that this housing project was in any way intended for Essen's "low income classes", as the company publicity campaign had claimed from the Margarethenhöhe's very inception. For many critics of the firm and/or the eccentric German monarch, these images only served to further deconstruct company and government propaganda: Wilhelm II was as much a genuinely "social Kaiser" as the Margarethenhöhe was a genuine experiment in social housing.289

The criticisms of Krupp's highest profile pre-war housing project were, however, by no means limited to the social and political level. Georg Metzendorf himself was to come under increasing scrutiny from his own peers for having
created a deliberate architectural distortion through his choice of south German building styles. In essence, many believed it wrong to import a busy, elaborate architectural style into a region where it simply had no place. Particularly vocal on this issue were many of his traditionally-minded architectural colleagues, especially those who were influenced by the ideas of Paul Schultze-Naumburg. Essen architect Otto Schneider, for example, made the following observation on the Steile Straße:

Indeed in this enchanting little architectural section [Steile Straße to market square] the south German has allowed his personal feelings to come to the fore too strongly. Here the Zweckgedanke [functionalist thought], although it may have contributed to the individual as well as whole [effect], disappears behind the emotional joy of the poetic detail.

Schneider expressed a sentiment that was to haunt Metzendorf for the remainder of his career, namely, that he had acted in a selfish, individualistic and overly emotional manner and thus ignored the functionalist demands of the age. If the Margarethenhöhe was, as advertised, a purely social housing endeavour, then many of Metzendorf’s critics maintained that he spent far too much time, energy and resources on aesthetics. Moreover, according to the central principles of the growing German Heimatbund, the architect had created a direct affront to the local Bergmannskotten [miner’s cottage] housing tradition by constructing a cheery south German village in the very centre of the nation’s industrial heartland.

As the First World War drew ever closer, the Hessian architect seemed more and more out of touch with the movement towards a neue Sachlichkeit [new functionalism] that was being demanded by housing reformers. The war itself would transform this critique from an intellectual debate about architectural
aesthetics, into a matter of national expediency. In one of the first post-war publications on the historical significance of the Margarethenhöhe by Essen Museum curator Gosebruch, the author described Metzendorf's ability to adjust and learn from his 'previous mistakes':

In addition it has been stated about the houses in the Steile Street, those that have been adorned with mountain village style gabled-roofs. That this is Alterstümelei [nostalgic playfulness], an accusation that the master builder [Metzendorf] has seemingly concurred with, since he has attempted to transform his later houses by reverting to a plain cube-like form that impresses through the pureness of its simplicity.\(^{291}\)

When Metzendorf himself bowed to both the criticisms and to the economic conditions of the post-war age, he did so by sacrificing his artistic creativity. He commented rather cynically in 1920: "In my post-war houses I did not, due to the essential element of [economic] necessity, need to begin with any new housing styles, even if through the omission of shutters etc. their design became even more simplistic."\(^{292}\) The criticisms from the conservative or "traditionalist" members of the architectural profession were therefore reluctantly addressed in the later more functionalist structures of the project.\(^{293}\) Unfortunately for Metzendorf, the criticism of what was to become his defining life work did not stop there. The Basler architect Hannes Meyer (1889-1954) also critiqued Metzendorf's defining work from a progressive perspective.

Hannes Meyer was to emerge as one of the leading figures of the Neues Bauen [new building] in the 1920s. Ultimately rising to fame as the successor of Walter Gropius and as the director of the famous Bauhaus movement in 1928, Meyer was one of the most outspoken proponents of a revolutionary new building style. He
extensively used the term “Wohnmaschine” [housing machine] to describe his desired form and function for the modern German home. Meyer’s goal lay far beyond creating a new architectural aesthetic; through his work he intended to foster the formation of a new, egalitarian society that knew no national boundaries. In his best-known essay, “Die Neue Welt” [The New World], published in 1926, he proclaimed: “Pure construction is the hallmark of the new world form. The constructive form knows no fatherland; she is beyond states and is an expression of international building sentiment. Internationalism is a positive trait of our era.”

His attack on dated German architectural traditions also knew no boundaries and did not shy away from taking on even some of the most sacred cultural traditions. Not even the notion of Heimat itself escaped the writer’s critical gaze. On the contrary, it was the very notion of Heimat that he set out to destroy,

> Our dwellings will be more mobile than ever before: mass-rental building, the sleeping car, the live-on yacht and the Transatlantique undermine the local notion of ‘Heimat’. The fatherland collapses. We learn Esperanto. We become citizens of the world.294

Rather than re-root the German people in their native soil and/or construct backward-looking model villages, Meyer made the antithesis his life goal. Significantly, during his tenure as an assistant to Georg Metzendorf, Meyer’s hatred towards the capitalist order and the traditional German architectural aesthetic began to crystallize. Krupp’s housing policy, and the Margarethenhöhe project in particular, represented everything the cosmopolitan, socialist Meyer hoped the Bauhaus would one day replace.
The fact that Meyer was employed by Krupp from 1917 to 1918 is a fascinating chapter in the history of German housing. Meyer’s first major project during his two years at Krupp’s Building Office involved planning an enormous new multi-level tenement called the *Menage* [workers’ hostel] to accommodate massive wartime labour expansion. Subsequently, Meyer was made an assistant to Georg Metzendorf, a working relationship in which two diametrically opposed architectural visions collided. Unfortunately, the only records that survive of this interim period of Meyer’s career are contained in a posthumous publication honouring the centenary of his birth. The passages contained therein stem from Meyer’s memoirs and illustrate how this brief tenure at Krupp had a definite impact on shaping the views of an increasingly radical modernist. The fact that this complex individual would even agree to work for Germany’s largest armaments producer during the height of the war effort in 1917 shows that his political worldview had not yet crystallized. His memoirs not only disclose some of the origins of his opposition to the German capitalist establishment, but more importantly, his growing distaste for Metzendorf’s idyllic housing styles.

In regards to the completion of the Menage project, Meyer seems to have been increasingly annoyed with the dehumanising effect of the capitalist mode of production. The prospect of feeding 27,000 manual labourers in this new facility left Meyer in awe of the tremendous scope and military drill of this undertaking. Simultaneously, however, the young architect never lost sight of the destructive potential the capitalist forces could unleash at any moment. The outspoken views of ultra-right-wing Krupp director Alfred Hugenberg served Meyer as a constant
reminder of this reality. In 1917 Hugenberg praised the ‘benefits’ of housing projects like the Menage in no uncertain terms: ‘... with such facilities the German people can make the World War a perpetual event [ewige Einrichtung].’

Meyer’s critique of what he experienced at Krupp did not, however, end with what he viewed as the ‘dehumanising and destructive force’ of the capitalist giant, but extended directly to the firm’s exercise in building ‘social housing’ in the Margarethenhöhe. Working as an assistant to Metzendorf, Meyer recognized first-hand that this project was not going to be housing anyone that belonged to the advertised “low income classes”. He therefore did not even attempt to explain that this was a project that lay within the financial reach of well-paid Krupp manual labourers or foreman. In his memoirs, written in the early 1950s, Hannes Meyer interpreted his work on the Margarethenhöhe as a project solely intended for white-collar employees:

For the Krupp Beamten, I had to draft plans for a Siedlung in romantic Hessian village style, in which the slanted roof, the curved street and the wide alcoves, deceive the member of the Krupp Beamten Casino that he is chained to the House of Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach in a much more romanticized fashion.

Under Metzendorf’s guidance, Meyer saw himself as a mere cog in the capitalist machinery: “So I designed a Siedlung [first phase of the Margarethenhöhe] for 1600 Beamten dwellings, was myself the building Beamte Meyer number 16824 and every Wednesday I would receive a war-time Beamten ration of 2 m[eters] of horse sausage.” It was obviously a work environment that left Meyer feeling intellectually and creatively stifled.
Not surprisingly, Meyer severed ties with Krupp in 1918 and embarked on a quest to uproot the nostalgic architectural styles that Krupp, the capitalist order, and its employees like Metzendorf, stood for. Ultimately, this creative journey was to see Meyer reach the pinnacle of his career in 1928 (see Ch. Five) when he succeeded Walter Gropius as the head of the Bauhaus movement. It proved a promising appointment that was cut tragically short by the combined efforts of Paul Schultze-Naumburg and Gottfried Feder who, under the dubious auspices of the "Kampfbund deutscher Architekten und Ingenieure" [Militant League of German Architects and Engineers], were to be instrumental in closing the Bauhaus. In place of the progressive ideas of Hannes Meyer and his calls to construct new "Wohnmaschinen", Gottfried Feder resurrected Krupp's Margarethenhöhe and Heimaterde as exemplary models of German town planning (see Ch. Six).

Interestingly, Feder, the future head of the National Socialist Raum und Siedlungsplanung [Area and settlement planning] division, was to have a very close working relationship with a senior regional planner who built his early academic reputation as an expert on Krupp housing (see pp. 258-262). This individual whose career, like Paul Schultze-Naumburg's, spanned the Wilhelmine, Weimar and National Socialist periods, was the Düsseldorf Landesplaner [regional planner] Hermann Hecker. Published by the Gesellschaft für Heimkultur [Society for Home Culture] in 1917, Hermann Hecker's Der Krupp'sche Wohnungsbau [Krupp Housing Construction] was chosen as the society's book of the year, an honour that meant it would be distributed to all its members free of charge. A
previous publication by the same society entitled *Hof und Heim* [Yard and Home] called for all levels of German government to heed the call for "Heimatschutz [homeland preservation] through successful internal colonization.” The support for the construction of so-called “Warrior Homesteads” was now identified as a matter of the utmost national importance. *Des Kriegers Weg zum eigenen Heim* [The Warrior’s Way to his own Home] was a further title released by the association whose author, M. Beetz, a *Landwehrmann* [militia man], dedicated the work to Hindenburg himself. The publishing house pitched Hermann Hecker’s Krupp study as a “work of fundamental importance for the entire small home construction sector of our age”.

Undoubtedly aware of the sentiments of his core readership, Hermann Hecker opened his preface by boldly highlighting five terms he believed to be intricately linked: *Krupp, Kriegsgerät* [weapons of war], *Kulturarbeit* [cultural work], *Kleinwohnungsbau* [small home construction] and *Kriegsverletztenfürsorge* [care for the war-wounded]. The author described all in a manner that reflected the mood of an age. “Krupp” and “Kriegsgerät” were depicted as working hand in hand, a powerful combination that Hecker boastfully proclaimed ‘our enemies must now experience first-hand’. Critical to this dissertation, Hecker then explained what appears at first glance to be a glaring contradiction, namely, that the Essen company that had brought such “suffering and sorrow” upon mankind was also a purveyor of great cultural deeds. In the words of the author: “Everyone who visits Essen for the first time – expecting to find a smoke and soot-blackened city – sees [instead] an image of *Kulturarbeit* by wandering through the
living quarters which the Krupp firm has either directly or indirectly helped to create.\textsuperscript{302}

For Hecker the time for the German population, not only to take notice, but more importantly, to learn from Krupp’s exemplary housing precedents, was never more opportune than in 1917. The urgency of this matter was explained in the following dramatic terms:

The war raging outside leaves those that remain home increasingly contemplating the social obligations that will need to be addressed after the conflict: not in the least in the area of small home construction. Krupp’s activities provide us with models in this regard: Even on the homestead issue, the care for the wounded soldiers which poses a very unique dilemma for the housing sector, it [Krupp] provides inspiration through its exemplary [Altenhof] facilities for invalids and aging workers.\textsuperscript{303}

The fortunate few that were left behind were to be increasingly vigilant in formulating plans to alleviate what threatened to be a social catastrophe. If these individuals were not fighting the German foes directly, so Hecker’s argument, then it was their social duty to ensure that the servicemen were properly taken care of by receiving a homestead upon their return. Alfred Krupp’s quote on the toil and sacrifices that needed to be made to provide his labourers with modest homes and gardens during the uncertain post-Franco-Prussian War period served Hecker as a fitting historical precedent for 1917. Branching out from Alfred Krupp’s statement, Hecker was able to formulate the challenge as separating “families from one another and through the provision of a livestock pen and a garden, to provide the residents with \textit{Beschäftigung} and \textit{Zerstreuung} [occupation and diversion] – a \textbf{Homestead} in its truest sense.”\textsuperscript{304} The visitors to Essen needed to look no further
than the impressive Altenhof in Rüttenscheid to see that the social vision, patriotic
duty and economic sacrifices of Krupp had paid off in creating a loyal and content
workforce.

In what the author described as being ‘a study that was predominantly
concerned with matters of architectural form’, Hecker made a significant
distinction between the more elaborate first phase of the Altenhof (1893-1900)
and the less ornate second 1907-1913 building segment (see pp. 142-143).
Speaking from the perspective of 1917, he criticized the initial work of Robert
Schmohl as having done “too much of a good thing” in sticking to the strong
“malerisch” [artful] building plan. The second phase, with its far less elaborate
exterior facades and more uniform overall planning layout, was a transitionary
phase moving towards what he interpreted to be the very cutting edge of German
housing construction: the Krupp developments of Emscher-Lippe and Dahlhauser
Heide. Hecker saw in the evolution of Krupp’s detached housing forms, the
development of the German Kleinwohnungsbau in microcosm.305

In these two projects a new functionalist style was emerging that addressed
social and economic issues very differently from the Altenhof’s ‘pretty and lovingly
designed’, non-uniform rest homes for the ‘long serving workers of the firm’.
Now [in 1917] the task at hand was “...the mass production of housing for newly
arriving groups of workers, whose individual needs, although seemingly diverse,
are pretty much the same.” The functionalist monotony of Schmohl’s standardized
building plans and identical housing layouts, so characteristic of the Emscher-
Lippe and Dahlhauser Heide, were highly praised for their ideal adaptation to contemporary conditions. In the words of Hecker:

Here we are dealing with a grand, new, uniform creation for arriving miners, for whom it was first and foremost necessary to provide civilized exterior simplicity, without neglecting the goal of creating an attractive overall development, in which one can feel at home. The [contemporary] conditions gave the project its final form.  

Rather than view the daunting monotony of these housing styles as undermining their artistic merit, Hecker instead believed that Schmohl had skilfully succeeded in accomplishing the exact opposite. Employing a ‘less is more’ rationale, the Düsseldorf regional planner concluded: “And by no means did art suffer under these circumstances. On the contrary, through the characteristically rhythmic rows [of houses], and repetition, Dorfbilder [village images] of unique beauty emerge.” 

Ironically, it was the overwhelming uniformity of these two projects that apparently made them unique. According to Hecker, Krupp had created two new “Dorfbilder” whose architectural monotony had been adapted to the necessity of the age. They had been tailored to the supposedly simplistic and similar needs of their future inhabitants and created a unique sense of place or being [Heimat].

By the early twentieth century Krupp’s housing projects provided a diverse list of housing reformers with an equally diverse list of housing styles and layouts onto which to set their sights. Heavily publicized by Krupp propaganda, these housing developments beckoned politicians, architects, social reformers and cultural experts to voice their opinions. Extensive media coverage of the German political and military elite strolling through the showcase housing projects was certain to stir the emotions of reformers from the right and left of the political spectrum.
Regardless of praise or criticism, the overt physical presence of these housing projects allowed vocal advocates to ground their hypothetical debates in a concrete reality. Their views ranged from depicting the Krupp efforts as “cave dwellings” or “cemeteries for the living”, to seeing them as “monuments of foresight” and “acts of immense cultural significance”. All provide an invaluable historical window into one of the most pressing questions of the age. As the First World War was reaching its bloody climax, the ghost of Alfred Krupp was being resurrected by individuals like Hermann Hecker in order to serve as a historical precedent for the post-war generation. Able to stem the tide of social chaos in Essen after the Franco-Prussian War, the Krupp company, so the conservative argument, had always striven to provide homesteads for all its employees. Occasionally accused of providing ‘too much of a good thing’, as was the case in the overly picturesque Altenhof, the Krupp building office had shown itself to be able to read and address the changing conditions of an age. As the task of reconstruction and the daunting prospect of housing returning servicemen rapidly approached, it was the functionalist simplicity and utility of projects like the Emscher-Lippe and Dahlhauser Heide that evoked enthusiasm on the part of housing reformers. Based on the Ruhr’s Bergmannskotten tradition and its element of rural self-sufficiency, their cost-efficient, uniform style (devoid of any artful décor) appeared to suit the harsh realities of a war-torn age. They were structures that, in their striking uniformity, could be heralded as unique. In essence, they represented a working housing model for a new coalition
government that would become involved in a desperate search for socio-economic solutions throughout the 1920s.
CHAPTER FIVE

The State in Control:
Weimar Solutions to the German Housing Crisis
This is more than just a lost war. A world has come to an end. We must seek a radical solution to our problems.\textsuperscript{307}

\textbf{Walter Gropius (late in 1918)}

The warriors returning home are the first to receive this gratitude from the nation, because over four difficult years they have sacrificed their bodies in thousands of battles and remained undefeated. Those war participants, who have done their duty until their orderly discharge, Germany will, as soon as possible, provide with a homestead.\textsuperscript{308}

\textbf{Hindenburg Proclamation to the Returning Troops (1919)}

In the turbulent months after the conclusion of hostilities and the birth of the Weimar Republic, two prominent persons with very different political views, Walter Gropius and Paul von Hindenburg, both identified the housing problem as one of the most pressing issues facing the nation. Although their solutions differed greatly, Hindenburg advocating soldiers' homesteads and Gropius progressive prefabricated tenements, both realized that the housing problem could no longer be left to the mercy of open market forces. The first coalition government under Friedrich Ebert was also in full agreement and took the groundbreaking step of enshrining the right of every German to “occupy a suitable accommodation” in the new constitution. For the first time in German history, the provision of housing thus became an urgent matter of the federal state. Over the next fourteen years, the government was to sanction a broad range of potential solutions to alleviate an enormous housing shortage of over one million dwellings. These ranged from the innovative Bauhaus workers' housing experiment at Dessau-Törten (1926) and the Weissenhof Modern Housing Exhibition (1927) to the \textit{Kleinsiedlung} plans of Stephan Poerschke, a last-gasp socio-political and economic cure-all in 1931. Due
to this unprecedented level of state initiative, what all these housing proposals had in common was that they were all products of the Weimar Republic. This very direct link to the Weimar state would have tremendous ramifications after the fateful change in government in 1933 (see Ch. Six). It is the central purpose of this chapter to examine the Weimar initiatives and to explain their intriguing relationship to Krupp housing efforts.

Walter Gropius made the statement about “seeking radical solutions to our problems” when he was a soldier home on leave from the Italian front in 1918. Recently decorated with the iron cross first class, he had experienced Berlin crowds jeering at their own returning countrymen and believed that the nation was on the brink of momentous changes. The driving force behind the most famous modern architectural school of the 1920s, the Bauhaus, would later reflect that as a result of his war experience his ‘full consciousness of his social responsibility as an architect’ had crystallized. For Gropius, developing innovative solutions to housing the masses subsequently emerged as a life-long goal. He believed that the modern architect was not only empowered to alleviate the housing shortage, but even more importantly, could transform all of Germany into a more egalitarian “new society”. The first model of his vision was fully realized in 1926 when he secured the necessary state financial and political support to construct the workers’ housing development of Dessau-Törten.

Another key figure in the post-war reconstruction process, Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg, also interpreted the dramatic events in the waning months of 1918 as a defining moment in German history. With the end of the conflict all but
a foregone conclusion, the war hero of the battle of Tannenberg, had also begun to ponder the future of his nation after the armistice. Although definitely representing the opposite end of the political spectrum to Walter Gropius, the archetypical Prussian aristocrat and career soldier was also troubled about the plight of the returning servicemen. Like Gropius, he viewed the housing question as one of the most pressing problems facing the new government. The brazen manner in which the ultra-conservative Hindenburg chose to speak on the housing issue, had a considerable impact on the eventual fate of the new Republic.\textsuperscript{310}

With a 1918 public proclamation, Hindenburg took the remarkable step of preempting the official announcement on state housing policy by the coalition government.\textsuperscript{311} In this document the future president of the Republic (1925-1934) specifically promised all soldiers who, had “performed their duties until their orderly discharge”, a suitable homestead in return for their peaceful reintegration into society. Once the veterans had been taken care of, the remainder of the ‘Hindenburg housing policy’ then stipulated what the state would provide for other ‘deserving’ members of society:

On cheaply purchased land bought with a minimum of public funds, hundreds of thousands of sites for farmers, gardeners, rural artisans, urban workers, managers, white-collar workers and members of similar professions, houses in garden cities and garden suburbs will be built and made available at low-interest loans.\textsuperscript{312}

Thus targeting a wide cross-section of society, Hindenburg’s definition of who was eligible for these new dwellings, after the veterans had been housed, was based on one precondition: all were employed. This specific criterion was to have wide-
ranging consequences after October 6th, 1931, the date of the last housing directive of the Weimar period.

Acutely aware of the gravity of Germany’s post-war condition, Hindenburg concluded his tract by urging loyal citizens to practice a patient form of patriotism:

Be patient for just a little while longer! Help our wounded fatherland through this most difficult of times. Save it once more with German manliness [Manneszucht] and the German sense of order, then you are paving the way for your own future, your own good fortune.\textsuperscript{313}

All who complied were guaranteed the same reward for their hard work and obedience: their own single-family home and garden. The mystique of the inherent right of every German to occupy an idyllic detached homestead, previously heralded by Wilhelm Riehl, Adolf Damaschke and Paul Schultze-Naumburg, was thus formally perpetuated in the Hindenburg Proclamation. An entrenched conservative housing ideal was therefore kept alive before the coalition government even had time to act.

As a result of the Hindenburg Proclamation, German post-war housing policy was off to an auspicious start, tarnished by the twin legacies of aristocratic paternalism and Prussian militarism, the two forces of the Imperial era which the new Republic was so desperately trying to dispel. The coalition government inherited the lofty promises of the Prussian Field Marshall at the worst time imaginable. The strains of war, the flood of displaced persons and the already acute shortage from the pre-war era left the German government facing a housing shortage of unprecedented proportions. Whereas prior to 1914 it is estimated that the housing market was able to produce an average of 300,000 units annually, the
years from 1914 to 1923 saw a virtual standstill in new construction. The total shortage by 1919, according to the latest *Reichstatistik*, was estimated at over 600,000 family units.\textsuperscript{314}

The Weimar coalition government immediately made housing a matter of paramount national importance. In fact, it attached enough political urgency to the subject that it actually enshrined the government's obligations to the public in the new German constitution. Passed on August 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1919, this document spelled-out the new interventionist role of the government. In essence, it followed the lead of Hindenburg since it also promised something it was not in a position to deliver. Article 155 clearly stated the government's main objective was to ensure "...every German a healthy dwelling and all German families, especially those with many children, a worthy living and economic homestead [$Wohn- und Wirtschaftsheimstätte$]."\textsuperscript{315} The constitution further stipulated that due to the dire economic conditions of the immediate post-war era, it was necessary to regulate private market forces in the housing sector. This key aspect of the constitution therefore virtually ended the open market individualism with which land speculators and/or the private sector (employers like Krupp for example) had been able to purchase land and construct dwellings. For better or for worse, the provision of housing had truly come under the direct supervision of the new German state.

Rather than alienate tried and proven providers of housing construction, like building co-operatives and companies, the government intended to work together with them to tackle the housing problem. It did so by making provision for
regulation and permit clearance, but most importantly subsidies, dependent upon private sector co-operation with state-approved mechanisms. In other words, for all intents and purposes, the autonomy of firms like Krupp, Bochumer Verein and the Gutehoffnungshütte prior to 1919 was effectively over. The new state subsidies, which eliminated the initial investment risk, were actually a welcome change for the employers. In Krupp's case, for example, the new legislation resulted in the firm directly contributing to the Heimaterde Genossenschaft [co-operative] instead of funding the entire project outright. This meant that government subsidies to individuals seeking homes and partial funding for the co-operative associations made it more attractive for employers to become involved in these projects indirectly. In the case of the Heimaterde, this still left hiring an architect, final approval of all building and site plans and controlling the settler selection process firmly in the hands of the company.

On May 5th, 1920 the government made a concerted attempt to deliver on elements of the Hindenburg promise by implementing the Reich Homestead Law. Realizing the popular appeal of the homestead concept, this legislation stipulated that every German family should now be granted the means to attain their own home and garden. Significantly, the Homestead Law diverged markedly from the Hindenburg Proclamation by not solely citing ex-servicemen as the primary settler target group. Whether members of the Reichswehr viewed this government shift as a personal betrayal, or a socialist plot to undermine the old general's wish, deserves weighing in light of the explosive socio-political climate of the early 1920s. What is clear, however, is that by adopting the Homestead Law in 1920,
the German government officially sanctioned the detached single-family home and garden as a preferred housing type. On paper at least, the government mistakes of 1871, which had been so passionately articulated by Adolf Damaschke (see pp. 102-103), were not to be repeated in the 1920s. Not just returning veterans were to be granted their own homestead, but the entire population was now to receive the same reward. Even the previous doubts the S.P.D. who had raised about funding in 1916 had now subsided, leaving the Independent Socialist as the only party officially opposing the Homestead Law.  

Unfortunately, the post-war hyperinflation effectively scuttled any possibilities that the government could even begin to deliver on these promises until currency reform of 1924 had stabilized the economy. Patience was indeed the operative word for anyone hoping to see significant changes in the housing sector during the early years of the Republic. Once the long inflationary wait was over, the national shortage of dwellings had escalated into an all out crisis, peaking at an estimated two million units in 1924. It was the severe gravity of the situation which by 1928 dictated that high-density, multi-level dwellings and not detached single-family homes, were the most economical manner in which to build. Efficiency, standardization and rationalization were to emerge as the key labels in the years of “modern building”. Significantly, this was a marked shift away from pursuing the low-density goals of the Homestead Law. The two to four level apartment building and not the idyllic detached single-family homestead eventually became the predominant Weimar housing form during the national construction boom that lasted from 1925-1930. The time was thus ideally suited for proponents of
modern, more high-density designs to take center stage. From the mid-1920s onwards, the individuals developing new and innovative designs gained unprecedented notoriety in the liberal and progressive climate of the Weimar Republic.

The exciting new work of leading modern architects like Bruno Taut, Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius and Hannes Meyer led a very public campaign against what they considered to be dated German housing conventions. Actively publishing their views, these creative individuals firmly believed that they were on the threshold of a radically new future. In 1918 Taut and Gropius, for example, displayed the courage to break with the old and passionately announced their revulsion toward war and Prussian militarism. Taut explained his feelings in the following terms:

It was not possible for anyone to make use of any pre-war traditions, for that period was perforce regarded as the cause of misfortunes of the past, and every achievement of those days seemed more or less to hang together with the origins of the war...  

In 1919 Gropius expressed similar sentiments about these pre-war traditions:

Today’s artist lives in an era of dissolution without guidance. He stands alone. The old forms are in ruins, the benumbed world is shaken up, the old human spirit is invalidated and in flux toward a new form. We float in space and cannot yet perceive the new order.  

Unclear about the exact direction of their respective futures, the two architects were nonetheless certain that the forces that had led Germany towards this path of destruction had been completely discredited. Taut, Gropius and fellow modernists, viewed themselves as an unstoppable artistic vanguard poised to create
architectural designs that would allow a “new society” to prosper. A radical break with all past traditions became the watchword of the modernist housing revolution of the mid-1920s.

From the earliest days of the Republic, the coalition government showed that it intended to support the experimentation in developing new housing designs by providing state grants to innovative projects. By far the highest profile of these was the construction of the Bauhaus Academy in Weimar (1919). In the mid-1920s, it was followed by further innovative housing developments like Bruno Taut’s Hufeisensiedlung in Berlin, Walter Gropius workers’ dwellings at Dessau-Törten (1926) and the Mies van der Rohe co-ordinated Weissenhof Exhibition (1927) near Stuttgart; all were subsidized by government funds. These funds were made available as a result of a new and controversial fifteen percent housing tax (in effect from 1924-1929) on property owners. The post-1924 period was therefore not only the golden age of “modern building” but it was simultaneously dubbed the “Hauszinssteuer” [Housing Tax] era. Critically, the Hauszinssteuer essentially meant that the landowning public’s tax contributions funded these bold projects. Due to the direct public stake in these initiatives the political debates over the social value of the completed developments were guaranteed to be extremely lively.

Of the numerous innovative projects undertaken during the height of Weimar’s public housing construction, two in particular garnered the greatest attention: Walter Gropius workers’ housing project at Dessau-Törten (1926) and the Weissenhof Settlement in Stuttgart (1927). The former was arguably the most
complete realization of a comprehensive workers' housing development for the "new era" designed by its most vocal proponent. The Weissenhof also showcased the work of Gropius, yet this time, in unison with houses by other high-profile modern architects from across Europe. Mies van der Rohe, Le Corbusier, and Bruno Taut all contributed at least one dwelling that they believed represented the present and future of the European home. Dessau-Törten and the Weissenhof were advertised as being designed for the average citizen and as such, employed mass production techniques and standardized parts to keep the overall construction costs and purchase price affordable. Both represented what Taut and Gropius had striven for in 1919: a radical departure from all previous German housing conventions. These two Siedlungen became symbols of Weimar housing modernity and, as the following examination of their form and intended function will show, were worlds removed from anything the Krupp Building Office had ever undertaken.

After his much-publicized forced exodus from Saxe-Weimar in 1925, Walter Gropius moved the Bauhaus academy to the more receptive political climate of Dessau, Thuringia. Unlike the conservative political opposition he and his colleagues were forced to endure earlier, the strong liberal presence in the municipal government in Dessau, in particular the support of its progressively minded mayor Fritz Hesse, proved to be ideal for fostering the new Bauhaus agenda. Reaping the combined benefits of a 60,000 RM state grant, and gaining municipal approval, Gropius was able to forge ahead with planning and constructing his first complete housing project. The industrial village of Dessau-
Törten, consisting of sixty single-family houses which were intended for "low-income workers", began to take shape over the next year. That it quickly moved from the drawing board to the final phase of construction between 1926 and 1928, served as a demonstration of what lay within the realm of the possible in this brief period of economic and political stability.

An acute sense of social responsibility and historical agency characterized Gropius' views at the time of creating his first workers' housing project.

The time is past for manifestos which helped prepare the way intellectually for the new architecture. It is high time to enter the stage of sober calculation and precise analysis of practical experience... A house is a technical-industrial organism, whose unity is composed organically from a number of separate functions...

Paying homage to the first Bauhaus Manifesto (and presumably Karl Marx for his intellectual preparatory work), Gropius made a concerted effort to distance himself from all previous historical ideologues who did not succeed in transforming theory into practice. The Dessau-Törten commission allowed him to display his solutions and finally provide affordable housing for the masses. Although not quite on the same scale, it also allowed Gropius' modernist vision to compete directly with contemporary housing projects like Krupp's Margarethenhöhe and Heimaterde.

Reflecting the immense value their respective builders (Bauhaus and Krupp) placed on marketing, all three were widely publicized as contemporary social housing milestones of the Weimar era. Although none was truly reflective of the dominant Weimar municipal housing form, which was row-housing with gardens (1924-27) and later (1928-1931) low-rise apartment blocks located in green
landscapes, it was high-profile projects like Dessau-Törten and the Weissenhof on which housing reformers of the political right unfairly set their sights.\textsuperscript{322} One glance at the outward appearance of the initial sixty cube-like dwellings (the final total would reach 300 dwellings) erected at Dessau-Törten reveals that this Bauhaus development had little in common with anything being built in the Ruhr. Employing the radical production method of concrete plates [Plattenbau] and concrete frame, the development was truly a technological marvel. The rigidly organized process, pictured in numerous Bauhaus publications, gives the impression of a modern assembly line instead of the organized chaos of traditional building sites. More importantly, the end result was a strikingly symmetrical assortment of white two-level rowed settlers' housing, fronted by a larger community building, all containing characteristically flat-roofs and situated along an equally linear main road. Delivering on his promises to defy tradition, Gropius eliminated steeped-roofs, curved streets and all exterior ornamentation. The full image of modernity was completed by a set of high voltage power-lines that towered above the barren landscape (Fig. #31). The future of German housing for the masses had arrived.

"Wohnmaschinen" [machine dwellings], built according to the calculated principles of "die neue Sachlichkeit" [the new functionalism] were the main descriptives used by the proponents of the modern styles to characterize their work. By no means were these references intended to have negative connotations often attached to industrial materialism. Instead, they were terms that captured the idea that homes were to make use of all the latest technological and material
innovations to improve the lives of the greatest number. Rather than look backwards and take their inspiration from nineteenth century farmhouses or miners' cottages, the latest offerings by Ernst May (Frankfurt-Römerstadt), Bruno Taut (Berlin-Hufeisensiedlung) and Walter Gropius (Dessau-Törten), all proudly displayed a radical break from past traditions. With their innovative use of new construction materials and cost-efficient mass production techniques, they all seemed to show German housing reformers the path to the future. Given the intense debates about where the "neues Bauenv [new building] was leading the nation, it was apparent that this was a path that many housing reformers were not yet willing to embark upon.

Critics had extensive reservations about the new housing styles, charging them with lack of overall quality and soulless or barren aesthetics, yet it was the idea of Germans residing in "Wohnmaschinen" that really seemed to strike a negative chord. It was particularly this issue of the stark materialism of the new structures that were attacked by professor Jobst Kissenkoetter in 1928. Describing the recently completed Heimaterde, he particularly praised the elements of architect Theodor Suhnel's housing designs that broke with modernist characteristics. For Kissenkoetter this meant creating: "reizvolle Straßenbilder" [appealing street scenes] that respected the existing wooded area, the natural terrain and employed a curved-street layout lined with detached and semi-detached homes. The image of peacefulness was further enhanced by the presence of "behagliche" [tranquil] sloping rooflines. Finally it was all completed with
... hedges, lawns and flowering vegetation – all these are elements of beauty, of stern functionalism, which thank God, does not appear too barren and cold, as oft-cited *Wohnmaschinen*. Instead, it welcomes us in a warm and friendly manner.\(^\text{323}\)

According to Kissenkoetter, in the Heimaterde, Suhnel had achieved the right balance between not creating an overly picturesque development and preserving traditional elements. This avoidance of the supposedly “barren and cold” aesthetics of the “*Wohnmaschinen*”, led the writer to the conclusion that Suhnel had designed: … a model settlement with the comforting, yet really fitting name “*Heimaterde*” [native soil].\(^\text{324}\)

In the same publication, local poet Christoph Wieprecht was so impressed with the *heimatlichen* characteristics of this project that he composed an entire poem in its honour (Appendix Doc. #1). Overflowing with a kitschy nostalgia about a simpler, more honourable German past, the poem depicted the Heimaterde as part of long historical continuum. According to this romanticized version of Ruhr history, it was the rapid onslaught of industrialization that changed the lives of the robust and hard-working rural population forever. Rural forefathers had sacrificed their homes and lives for work and war while the next generations searched for “a small house [*Häuschen*] for their women and children”. Then, in miraculous fashion, Wieprecht relates how the Heimaterde appeared and provided the searching workers with a homestead just like their ancestors. Only Wieprecht’s lyrical words can convey the emotions with which these “searching working heroes” finally received their reward:

[They] Greeted their new home,  
Gently caressed the animals of the house,
Turned to the soil for new offerings
And peered into the cheerful hope-inspiring greenery
Heimaterde, you singing land—

This poetic serenade to the Heimaterde project and its direct link to the Ruhr’s Kotten tradition offered a marked contrast to the modernist efforts of avoiding all past conventions. Kissenkoetter and Wieprecht were definitely not alone in their efforts to glorify past housing forms just when the modernist projects were springing up across the country. It was the Heimatlers’ defiant response to offset the growing influence of modernism.

As he had prior to the First World War, Paul Schultze-Naumburg placed himself at the very helm of these efforts to preserve a ‘characteristically German’ building style in the post-war era. Whereas he had been previously involved in safeguarding the present from what had been interpreted as a falsified worship of the past, his activities in the 1920s were predominantly focussed on stemming the tide of modernism. If Walter Gropius’ Bauhaus showed the world the gateway to the future, then Paul Schultze-Naumburg’s Weimar crusade against the “dangerous infiltration” of modern styles made him the most vocal defender of traditional architectural styles and building methods. Ironically, a staunch proponent of respecting vernacular styles of specific historical periods, Schultze-Naumburg’s attempts to scuttle the modernist movement actually stood in the way of developing a unique Weimar vernacular style. In 1926, the periodical Uhu provided Gropius and Schultze Naumburg with an intellectual forum in which publicly to debate their views on the “new modernism”. Under the provocative heading “Who is right?”, this heated exchange captured the dynamism of the
modernist impulse that was so alive in Gropius clashing head-on with Schultze-Naumburg's unrelenting nationalism. In its raw intensity, this important series of publications contained both the promise and tragedy of the housing question in the Weimar Republic.

Writing in his provocative lower case style, Gropius marketed himself as a revolutionary representative of the new age. More than simply being spurred to act by what he witnessed in Berlin in 1918, he had now matured intellectually and was able to present the readers with some very concrete ideas. In his *Uhu* contribution, he proclaimed, that the post-war era needed to make use of all new technologies and evaluate all new ideas to decide how to solve the housing dilemma most efficiently. Central to arriving at this solution was to find a suitable balance between the past and present housing forms. On this key issue Gropius expressed the following thoughts:

> the imitation of past styles [gothic, rococo, renaissance and baroque] comes across as just as ridiculous, as if we would wander around our streets wearing costumes and headdress from these periods. the modern person from 1926 needs cities, houses, dwellings and machines from his time period, clear results based on the form function and methods which the struggle with our souls has placed in our hands...

Remarkably, his attack on the misguided use of past architectural styles echoed earlier statements made by his most outspoken critic, Paul Schultze-Naumburg (see pp. 171-175). Where the two differed greatly, however, was in the degree of influence that these historical styles should exert on the new housing forms. Schultze-Naumburg's response to Gropius displayed how far the ideas of the
Bauhaus director would need to travel to gain acceptance amongst his conservative contemporaries.

That the gaze of Schultze-Naumburg continued to be firmly focused on glorifying past, architectural achievements rather than applauding the achievements of the modernists, was apparent from the outset of his article. Filled with characteristically sentimental ramblings about the historical legacy of the "nordischen Kulturkreis" [nordic cultural circle], the author lashed-out at the picturesque housing forms that had supposedly poisoned pure German traditions before the war. The modernist style, according to the architect, had now continued this deliberate dilution of "pure" German housing traditions. Like Wieprecht, he longed for the purity of a golden age:

In sharp contrast to the previous [housing] stock, which showed clear and extensively developed forms so that our houses looked like a collection of gorgeously rustic character portraits of healthy farmers, manly artisans, keen academics and knightly aristocrats, we are now faced with a chaos of forms. More accurately, a lack of form ... 327

By 1926, however, it was clear that Schulze-Naumburg believed that this 'chaos of housing forms' was infinitely worse than at any previous time in German history. According to the architect, a new threat had emerged that did not just distort traditions (in the manner of Robert Schmohl's picturesque Altenhof homes, for example), but ignored past traditions altogether. Although not mentioning Gropius, or any other architect by name, Schultze-Naumburg made it was clear that he opposed the modernist movement outright.

Throughout his career in Germany, Gropius countered these attacks from traditionalists like Schultze-Naumburg with the motto: modern problems require
modern solutions. This meant deliberately not paying homage to outdated building concepts or production techniques of earlier times, but instead, fully utilizing all new ideas and construction methods at his disposal.

...a paramount product of the industry of the future will be: the fully assembled and furnished solid house available to order. as the goals of the modern building art form are reached, so our times will have found its own style!\textsuperscript{328}

Rather than waste his time adapting to a pre-existing vernacular style, Gropius' central aim was to reinvent housing form and function and, in turn, create what he hoped would be the Weimar vernacular. This modernist impulse found its most overt expression in the highly publicized Weissenhof Exhibition held in Stuttgart in 1927.

Sponsored by the federal \textit{Werkbund} [Work Association], this ambitious housing display invited sixteen of Europe's most famous architects to construct thirty-three housing units containing approximately 320 separate dwellings. In the spirit of internationalism and co-operation, the individual Weissenhof contributions were then merged to form a single modern \textit{Siedlung}. Under the supervision of Mies van der Rohe, the Weissenhof was therefore intended to be far more than just a temporary display of new ideas. After the exhibition was viewed by the public, all the homes constructed were to be made available as public rental units by the city of Stuttgart. It was a landmark experiment which combined the spirit of the "\textit{neues Bauen}"", state socialism and international co-operation intended to create a lasting monument to progress.
The organizers also believed that as a result of the radical improvements in design production costs would be lower and rents were projected to remain low, serving only to recover the construction costs and architectural commissions. In order to underline the entire theme of fostering a new, more egalitarian society, these cutting edge dwellings were therefore widely advertised as housing every worker could afford. Reading through this admirable list of objectives, it is clear that the Werkbund may have presented Mies van der Rohe and his colleagues with an insurmountable task. Carrying the hopes of the vanguard of the modernist movement and the financial support of the state-sponsored Werkbund, the Weissenhof’s success or failure would have far reaching repercussions for the future of German housing.

In terms of attracting public attention, the Stuttgart exhibition was a smashing success. It is estimated that approximately 20,000 visitors a day viewed the unique buildings (Fig. #33). The critical response, however, could best be described as mixed. Soon after their completion, the houses of Mies van der Rohe, Le Corbusier and Walter Gropius were singled out for a number of design deficiencies. Edgar Wedepohl for example, commented in the trade periodical Wasmuths Monatshefte für Baukunst [Wasmuth’s Monthly Periodical of Building] that “if dwelling type is supposed to correspond to the type of person inhabiting it, then one can only imagine the inhabitant of Le Corbusier’s houses a certain kind of intellectual.” Judging by the spartan amenities provided, Wedepohl deduced, that the future resident would be an eccentric international intellectual “who could easily shed himself of historical ballast”. Like the house he was to
inhabit, which had been constructed on concrete pillars (Fig. #32), the writer concluded, that this intellectual occupant had lost his connection to the land and instead, preferred to reside in this “nomad’s tent of concrete and glass”. To the conservatively minded Wedepohl, all the allusions to what was later to be repeatedly denounced as the “un-German” characteristics of the modern style, were already embodied in Le Corbusier’s Weissenhof house. It showed no respect for architectural tradition, made no effort to re-root inhabitants in their native soil and seemed to be designed for well-to-do intellectuals instead of the German workers who so desperately needed new dwellings. Wedephol undoubtedly felt vindicated when this Le Corbusier creation was one of the few dwellings that remained unrented over a year after the Exhibition. Asking a rental rate of over two hundred RM per month (when an average worker’s salary in the Stuttgart area was estimated at RM 250), this ‘modern home for the people’, lay far beyond the financial means of its target group. The aim of creating a more egalitarian society through innovative architectural forms thus seemed a hypocritical creed to many observers. The massive economic downturn of the late 1920s only served to magnify this crucial aspect of the modern housing experiments.

As the decade drew to a close and economic conditions began to deteriorate, the conservative assault on the modern housing forms escalated considerably. Paul Schultze-Naumburg’s thinly veiled 1926 attack on Gropius had already showed distinct signs of his political agenda. In his 1929 publication Das Gesicht des Deutschen Hauses [The Face of the German House] his rhetoric became increasingly laced with racial and anti-socialist overtones: “For some time now
trends have emerged that intend to radically break with our entire past and recommend houses to us that no longer have anything in common with the German [housing] face and the German landscape.” Increasingly, he added the term “radicalism” in a manner that was intended to stir up the old ghosts of socialist agitation undermining the common good of the German Volk. To safeguard against the further advance of so-called “bolshevisation”, the future N.S.D.A.P. Reichstag member (1930), emphasized that it was imperative nordic traditions be respected when creating new housing forms.

The new house must clearly emerge out of the shoot [Sproff] of our nordic cultural circle. In order not to be mortally derailed, it must continue this tradition exactly from the point to which it has evolved in an orderly and healthy manner. The interregnum of the great style-masquerade should be packaged [eingekapselt] and left to rot.^^

Taking this peculiar rationale to the extreme, Schultze-Naumburg treated not only the late-nineteenth century picturesque romanticism as an historical aberration, but also condemned all modern attempts to change traditional housing forms outright. To underline the absurd point of foreign influences corrupting ‘pure German traditions’, the author went to the trouble of picturing the Weissenhof filled with crudely, superimposed individuals dressed in Middle Eastern clothing and accompanied by camels (Fig. # 34). To stress its supposedly “un-German” characteristics, the caption below the image read: “Weissenhof Araberdorf” [Arab Village Weissenhof]. Not surprisingly, Schultze-Naumburg would become a founding member of Alfred Rosenberg’s ultra-right wing Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur [Fighting Union for German Culture] in 1929.
The major dilemma facing self-proclaimed defenders of 'German housing traditions' like Schultze-Naumburg was that by the late 1920s few comprehensive studies existed that persuasively documented that such a tradition did in fact exist. Although Schultze-Naumburg claimed to have filled this void with Gesicht, his sensationalistic nationalist writing style, coupled with numerous historical distortions, made his interpretation suspect at best. Even more importantly, the author's increasingly racist proclamations seriously undermined his already suspect academic credibility.

As indicated in the previous chapter (see pp. 192-194), Hermann Hecker proposed that in studying the development of Krupp housing up to 1916, it was possible to chart the evolution of the German home. Although Hecker's 1917 work Der Krupp'sche Wohnungsbaus was filled with persuasive photographic imagery, it lacked a thorough historical grounding for the topic itself. Overall, its lack of archival sources made the study little more than a thought-provoking survey text. In 1930, a professor at the State Art Academy in Düsseldorf filled in many of the gaps left behind by Hecker's work. Remarkably, Richard Klapeck's Siedlungswerk Krupp [Settlement Activities of Krupp] was to remain the unchallenged standard treatment on the topic until Daniel Stemrich's 1980 dissertation Die Siedlung als Program [The Settlement as Policy]. From 1930 onwards, this was the work anyone who was interested in the Krupp housing topic was to consult. The final chapter of this dissertation will show that its contents especially piqued the interests of National Socialist supporters.
The timing of *Siedlungswork*’s publication was very significant. In the text, Richard Klapheck continuously made reference to contemporary social and economic problems facing the Weimar Republic. His work was intended to be much more than a chronological history of Krupp housing; it was meant to serve as a guide to solve the socio-economic and political problems of the late 1920s. Klapheck was quick to point out that it was indisputable Krupp not only led the entire private sector in units of housing produced, but also had a flawless record when it came to labour relations. With the nation caught in the seemingly irreversible downward spiral of the Great Depression, Klapheck documented the reasons, methods and results with which three generations of the Krupp family had avoided an economic and a social catastrophe. No time was more opportune than the early 1930s for these Krupp prescriptions for averting social turmoil to be unveiled. For Klapheck, Krupp’s housing initiatives therefore held the key to restoring socio-economic and political stability in Germany.

*Siedlungswork* did document the progress of a number of diverse Krupp housing forms over time, yet especially zeroed-in on the low-density, single-family housing projects: Heimaterde, Dahlhauser Heide, Emscher Lippe and the Margarethenhöhe as being truly exemplary. Developments in which the single-family detached house and garden form predominated were praised above all others. Klapheck actually went as far as claiming “...almost 70 years old, it [Krupp’s housing activities] portrays an almost seamless presentation of the newer German small dwelling construction of all building types up to the present”. His Krupp housing study therefore vividly depicted a German housing tradition that
was perfectly suited to address Schultze-Naumburg's prerequisite: it was "...a tradition that had developed in an orderly and healthy manner."

Besides his academic post at the Düsseldorf Art Academy, Richard Klapheck was also the senior editor of the periodical *Rheinisches Verein für Denkmalpflege and Heimatschutz* [Rhenish Association for Historical Monument and Heimat Preservation]. He was therefore part of a fascinating historical continuum. Like Hermann Hecker, Paul Schultze-Naumburg, Erich Enke and Hermann Muthesius, he interpreted the Krupp housing activities as a very bold move in preserving the German *Heimat*. This entailed respecting the Ruhr's workers' housing precedents and attempting to re-root their employees in their native soil. Paying homage to this *Kotten* tradition of garden self-sufficiency meant that the economic burden, on both the company and the workers, could be lessened simultaneously. Rather than create a "new society", Krupp housing, according to Klapheck, intended to keep the workers content and eliminate the threat of socialism. Unlike anyone before him, however, Klapheck was able to cite the primary catalogue of Alfred Krupp's writings and directives to find selective quotes which validated the historical aims of his housing initiatives. In 1930, Klapheck therefore repackaged the Alfred Krupp mythology and presented it to an entirely new readership, one in desperate need of solutions.

Although dedicated to the widow of Fritz Krupp (d.1902), it was Alfred Krupp (d.1888) "the cannon king", whom Klapheck resurrected in *Siedlungswerk* as a "genius" for, not only recognizing, but also acting decisively to combat the societal ills of his age. Even more importantly, Klapheck argued that the industrialist was a
prophet" whose words and deeds could now be used to address the social and economic problems of the early 1930s. First and foremost, he believed the Krupp precedents could be used to solve the housing nightmare currently facing the Weimar Republic. Ultimately, he took the hagiographic portrayal of Alfred Krupp to a new level:

Alfred Krupp is the father of the new settlement policies [Siedlungswesens] in Germany. The socio-political thought-processes that guided him, were decades ahead of their time, and are today [1930] of the most pertinent interest. His letters and directives read as though they were written out of the dangers of our present-day situation.

The contemporary dangers that Klapheck identified were familiar ones: increasing proletarianisation of the workers, bourgeois déclassement, political instability and the age-old threat of revolution. These were all threats, as the historical record of Krupp housing could show, held in check by the timely construction of workers' dwellings. This record of worker pacification led Klapheck to pose the all-important question in Siedlungswerk: If Krupp had acted decisively to ensure social tranquillity through its housing activities, then why could the German state not simply follow suit?

Arguably the most intriguing aspect of Klapheck's work was his direct citing of Alfred Krupp to underline the immense historical importance of his deeds. The passages quoted were saturated with the rhetoric of "will", "great sacrifices", "resolute pragmatism" and "unyielding dedication" on the part of an individual who had risen from the ranks of the factory floor and become the nation's foremost industrialist. Klapheck's aim was to gain the most mileage out of Krupp's 1860 directives which outlined the initial motives behind beginning the
construction of workers' dwellings on a large scale. Like Adolf Damaschke before him (see pp. 102-103), the author drew parallels between the economic downturn of the 1870s and deteriorating economic conditions in the 1930s. What set Krupp apart from his contemporaries, Klapheck claimed, was that he did not lack the courage to act on the housing question. The Düsseldorf professor then revived Krupp’s famous statement as his supporting evidence of his uncompromising perseverance:

> No one should be alarmed or confused about these [housing] recommendations, that we could attain all these goals with the available resources is impossible, but alone therein lays the solution. Without setting any limits on complete control and pragmatism, these provisions must be created. The attainment [of goals] only depends on the will...  

With the benefit of nearly seventy years of hindsight, Klapheck was able to argue that the steel firm had been amazingly successful in avoiding major labour unrest at its numerous plants. Furthermore, the fact that by 1930 the company could proudly proclaim that it had assisted in providing over 20,000 units of housing only underlined the success of its endeavours. That the initial impetus for attaining these goals had been Alfred Krupp’s “will” to succeed eerily foreshadowed the lasting appeal of Siedlungswerk in the 1930s.

Ensuring his work would appeal to supporters of the political right, Richard Klapheck closed out his study with a vocal attack on the Weimar Republic. He specifically chastised the government for its inability to act decisively on the housing question. Concluding with the völkisch rhetoric befitting his position as chief editor of a Heimat publication, he demanded that the Weimar coalition finally
display courage and act decisively on this pressing issue or else suffer the consequences:

The well-being of the people is the well being of the individual. The well-being of the individual person is his health; and it is unimaginable without a humane home. Nation and state can no longer close their eyes to this fact.\textsuperscript{338}

Nearly ten years after paragraph 155 of the Weimar Constitution had promised “to provide every German a healthy dwelling and every German family, especially those with many children, a living and economic homestead based on their needs”, Klapheck believed that the state had reneged on its promise to every citizen. He concluded \textit{Siedlungswerk} by sending the government “a serious reminder”, using Alfred Krupp’s ominous warning:

\textit{We still have much ground to make up. Who knows, if in the days and years when the full revolution sweeps through the land, we will not remain the only ones unscathed if we still act soon enough... The attainment [of goals] only depends on the will.}\textsuperscript{339}

Conveniently omitted from this edited version of the original quote (see p. 127) were Krupp’s references to the “uprising of all classes against their employers”. Instead, the final passage adopted the more simplistic ‘us versus them’ argumentative form to address one of the more complex issues of the age. It would prove to be a language well-suited to National Socialist interests. Gottfried Feder, August Heinrichsbauer and Walter Bolz all cited Klapheck’s study in their own publications during the 1930s.

After continuous wrangling between the exponents of modernist solutions and advocates of traditional German housing forms, it was ultimately the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions of late 1920s that decided the housing
controversy. It was the German state planner, Stephan Poerschke, who devised a plan which he believed to be ideally suited for the times. Poerschke had spent the greater part of the 1920s lobbying the government to implement his so-called *Kleinsiedlungs* [small settlement] proposals which he believed would simultaneously curb three growing threats: unemployment, economic uncertainty and political instability. Significantly, his plan was based on the *Bergmannskotten* housing type and called for the government to implement a nation-wide initiative to create spartan, single-family settlements. According to Poerschke, these homes needed to contain a sufficient land provision to allow the inhabitants a high degree of economic self-sufficiency.

When the issue of the single-family dwelling again entered the Reichstag debates in December of 1929 the earlier divisions within the S.P.D. were clearly in the past. Under the slogan "Luft, Licht, Sonne und Spiel" [Air, Light, Sun and Play] the party now viewed the construction of single-family dwellings in planned settlements, as "a cultural question of the highest order." S.P.D. member Wendt eliminated any doubts with his statement attaching "the utmost priority to the single-family home". In fact, in a peculiar role reversal Wendt openly criticized the short-lived *Wirtschaftspartei* [Economic Party] which, along with the K.P.D., had urged the government to focus on building multi-level tenements. Whereas the *Wirtschaftspartei* defended their cause by arguing that modern construction methods had made these dwellings much more livable and the K.P. member Schumann even pointed to the great advancements in multi-level housing made in Moscow and Baku, the S.P.D. countered by asking whether it should be the
government's intention to 'return to the Mietskaserne?' Rounding-out this lively
debate on preferred housing types, Communist Party member Schumann arrived at
the very fitting conclusion: "If words were houses and speeches settlements, then
the homeless would have nothing to complain about."

Bowing to the enormous pressures of the Great Depression, the Brüning
government did adopt Poerschke's Kleinsiedlungs plan in its entirety and
transformed it into the final Weimar state housing legislation of 1931. As a
number of historians have correctly identified, this government action represented
a "drastic turning point from the reformist housing policy of the [previous] Weimar
period". At its core, the Kleinsiedlungs plan was modelled on the Ruhr's
worker's Kotten tradition that combined a very modest dwelling with a sufficient
parcel of land to allow the inhabitants to grow produce and keep small livestock.
Poerschke's ideas were thus based on the same industrial homestead tradition that
Krupp had used extensively in projects like Dahlhauser-Heide, Emscher-Lippe and
most recently in the Heimaterde (1928). In theory this meant that the
Kleinsiedlung's historical lineage could be traced back to Adolf Damaschke's
Bodenreform movement, Hindenburg's promise for soldier homesteads and even
Wilhelm Riehl's nostalgia for the detached rural home and garden. The
Kleinsiedlung proposal was thus thoroughly grounded in a German conservative
housing tradition of the detached single-family home that Riehl had first advocated
in his Naturgeschichte des Deutschen Volkes (see pp. 84-86). It was a housing
form that was a century removed from the progressive communal prefabs
advocated by the modernists.
It is significant, however, that Poerschke's ideas were by no means those of a utopianist reactionary or a sentimental nationalist. On the contrary, his entire concept actually recognized the harsh realities of massive unemployment in Germany as a long-term phenomenon that showed no signs of correcting itself in the near future. The initial title outlining the plans for implementation -- "Program for the reduction of unemployment through the creation of small settlements" -- underlined the paramount importance he attached to the unemployment issue. In this document, Poerschke also candidly outlined where he believed this threat was headed if left unchecked: "A unified mass of unemployed workers represent a political, economic and social threat. The reduction of unemployment is the most pressing issue facing our state." That the Weimar coalition agreed with this dire assessment was directly reflected in the ominous title given to the final 1931 legislation: "Emergency Decree of the Reichs President for securing the economic and financial means to combat political disturbances". It implemented Poerschke's suggestions almost in their entirety on October 6th, 1931. It was clear that the Brüning government was not merely interested in creating housing legislation to address long-standing social inequalities, but also linked its very political survival directly to the housing issue. Similar to Alfred Krupp in the early 1870s, the threat of economic disparity, leading to full-fledged revolutionary upheaval, ultimately forced the coalition government to draft decisive legislation on the housing question.

It is also important to reiterate that the elements of self-sufficiency and self-help were integral parts of Poerschke's program. This meant that the new
Kleinsiedlungen would contain elements of small-scale gardening and animal husbandry to lessen the burden on both the residents and the state. To lower costs and combat unemployment still further, the future inhabitants would also be required to assist in the physical construction of the homes themselves. In addition, the Emergency Decree gave the German state unprecedented powers to supersede provincial authorities, thus allowing it to expropriate suitable land and building materials for the new Siedlungen. For the latter, Poerschke had stipulated that he preferred to use local construction materials whenever possible. Gone were any references that even alluded to the construction of modern tenements, importing materials or experimenting with flat roofs. Economic necessity had forced the state to fall back on established local building traditions.

Economic principles also dictated that the homes constructed under this new initiative were to have only the most rudimentary amenities. Each settler was to be allowed a maximum of two morgen of land on which he was allowed to build. In Poerschke’s words this meant:

... a predetermined and uniform type of house with only the minimum of necessities (2-3 rooms); provision of drainage is out of the question. The provision of electricity and gas must only be allowed with the permission of the local gas and electric authority and road construction is to be kept in most primitive form.

The homes were thus modest and uniform in order to lessen the overall construction cost. In addition, the uniformity in construction materials and building layouts allowed for the most efficient use of a semi-skilled labour pool. “Luxuries” like adequate drainage, light and gas hook-ups were to be sacrificed in
an effort to keep overall costs as low as possible. The desperate Weimar
government thus firmly identified the traditional, spartan settler homestead as the
building type most suited to alleviate the most pressing socio-economic problems
of the age. The power struggle between the proponents of the modern and
traditionalist housing types had thus been decided in favour of the latter.

The German state also followed another of Poerschke's central
recommendations: that new settlements were to serve first and foremost as a
remedy against unemployment. Thus state-housing authorities embarked on a
settler selection process which was to give preference to “physically and morally
qualified” individuals. Since an integral part of the construction was to be done by
the settlers themselves, it was obviously important that the applicants were in good
enough health to perform manual labour. During the application process, the
decisions about the ‘moral qualifications’ of the future residents were also made by
local housing authorities. Critically, however, the key attribute state officials were
looking for during the settler selection process was that the applicant come from
the ranks of the unemployed. The Emergency Degree of 1931 was therefore one
of the most comprehensive measures in state socialism implemented during the
fourteen years of the Weimar Republic.

It needs to be re-emphasized that this unprecedented exercise in state socialism
was implemented by an emergency decree of the Reich President. Ironically, since
1925 this political office had been held by Paul von Hindenburg. Due to a set of
remarkable circumstances, the state housing policy of the post-war era had thus
come full circle. In 1919 Hindenburg had recognized the inherent dangers of not
addressing the housing question quickly after the end of hostilities. He had advocated a large-scale homestead solution that was now, over a decade later, being implemented by a centre-right German government. There was, however, one enormous difference between the Hindenburg Proclamation of 1919 (see pp. 201-203) and the Emergency Decree of 1931 and that was in the settler selection process. In one of the final desperate acts to solidify the nation’s economic and political future, the ranks of the unemployed and not German veterans and ‘deserving workers’ were identified as the primary settler catchment for the new Weimar Kleinsiedlungen.

The approximately 80,000 Kleinsiedlungen homesteads (Fig. #35) completed under the Weimar Emergency Decree between 1931 and 1933 bore a striking external resemblance to Krupp company housing. Their plain housing style and generous overall plot size did not differ greatly from the company projects of Emscher-Lippe, Dahlhauser Heide and Heimaterde (Fig. #27). In retrospect, this was not surprising since both the Kleinsiedlungen and the three above-mentioned Krupp projects were based on the same Bergmannskotten housing form. In the case of the Heimaterde for example, it has been pointed out that Krupp Director Max Halbach had gone to great lengths to publicly announce that the Kotten was the firm’s ‘ideal housing form’ (see p.66).

Krupp’s housing projects, however, differed considerably from Poerschke’s Kleinsiedlungen in three key aspects. The Essen steel firm had been not forced to compromise construction quality by making drastic cuts to light, heat, drainage and road provisions to the extent of the very spartan Weimar developments. A very
strong case could therefore be made that the Krupp detached housing projects, although far from lavish, were qualitatively superior to their Weimar counterparts. The same applied to the comprehensive provision of amenities like schools, churches, libraries, grocers, recreation facilities, and even pubs. Admittedly, all three projects mentioned above were completed before the full brunt of the Great Depression was felt. Lastly, Krupp’s projects differed significantly from the Weimar *Kleinsiedlungen* in that they were obviously never intended to house the unemployed. Instead, they were predominantly assigned to skilled and/or essential workers and their families, based on a seniority ranking system and the applicant’s degree of need. In other words, this was not an exercise in the construction of social housing in anywhere near its purest form, no matter what the company’s numerous press releases may have claimed. Instead the homes were granted to the individuals whom the firm deemed to be “most deserving”. In the Heimaterde in particular, this definition placed the returning veterans at the very top of the waiting list.

As the final chapter will explain, all these characteristics took on a heightened level of importance when examined against the historical backdrop of National Socialism. From the announcement of the 1931 Emergency Decree, the N.S.D.A.P. housing reformers began to slam the Weimar coalition for giving homes to individuals who were, in their eyes, some of the least deserving members of society. In the early 1930s, the party propaganda machine was already posing very politically loaded questions: Should the hard working and productive industrial labourer and his family not be rewarded for his years of toil? Why
should the unemployed simply be allowed to jump the cue to satisfy the political agenda of the doomed Sozialstaat experiment? And last but not least: Why were the 1919 Hindenburg promises to house German veterans never honoured? For all their vocal criticism, the National Socialists lacked definite constructive proposals of their own. Moreover, as the next chapter will show (see p. 258) that the overall quantitative achievements in the housing realm under the National Socialists would pale in comparison to their Weimar predecessors. Hitler, however, increasingly vilified everything associated with the Republic. The N.S.D.A.P. housing reformers were caught in a perplexing bind as they searched for their own unique solutions. Ideally, as the newly elected N.S.D.A.P. Reichstag member for Thuringia stipulated, “the new house must clearly emerge out of the shoot of our Nordic cultural circle and continue this tradition exactly from the point it has evolved...” 346 With Hitler mindlessly relegating all Weimar housing initiatives to the “Trümmerfeld” [rubble heap] of history, it became increasingly challenging to determine how far this German tradition had evolved. For those individuals searching desperately for inspirational, domestic housing precedents, *Siedlungsverk Krupp* could not have been published at a more opportune time.
CHAPTER SIX

Krupp Housing in the National Socialist Years, 1933-1941: An N.S.D.A.P. *Musterbetrieb* [Exemplary Business] and its *Mustersiedlungen* [Exemplary Settlements]
Fourteen Years [of Weimar], a field of Ruins!\textsuperscript{347}  \textbf{Adolf Hitler}

This [Award as an Exemplary N.S.D.A.P. Business] honours a socio-political position that, rooted in its 128-year [company] tradition, has organically grown into the new era of National Socialist Germany.  \textbf{Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (May 1st, 1939)}

After the fateful change in government on January 31st, 1933, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party embarked on leading the nation towards a new and brighter future. Aiming to restore public confidence in the German state, its leader, Adolf Hitler, announced that he would work towards “reawakening” a national feeling of community or \textit{Volksgemeinschaft} in the new “Third Reich”. An essential part of this ambitious, and often very ambiguous, process was to reinvigorate the population with a love for their homes and their \textit{Heimat}. Fanned by the vocal diatribes of its party members, especially the racist “blood and soil” polemics of Walter Darré, the anti-Marxist ramblings of Gottfried Feder, Robert Ley’s desire to make German workers \textit{krisenfest} [crisis prepared] and last but not least, Hitler’s own insatiable quest for \textit{Lebensraum} [Living Space], this ambition encompassed the construction of so-called “\textit{volksgerechte Wohnungen}” [dwellings suitable for the people]. Ironically, it quickly became apparent that the Weimar \textit{Kleinsiedlung} model was the ideal housing type with which to address all elements of the above-mentioned National Socialist aims. It proved, however, an enormous stumbling block to N.S.D.A.P. officials to adopt Stephan Poerschke’s plans wholesale that Hitler had formally denounced all products of the Republic. Moreover, even though the N.S.D.A.P. reformers assigned to the housing question
were all boisterous orators, few could be described as having any clear vision of the future of German housing. Krupp’s impressive quantitative and qualitative achievements in the housing sector by 1933 and its reputation as the “Waffenschmiede des Reiches” [Armoury of the Reich] combined to re-ignite interest in the firm’s housing legacy. Resolute, pragmatic and vehemently anti-socialist, “the Cannon King’s” well-documented stance on the housing issue proved a suitable foundation for proponents of the Nazi Weltanschauung [world-view]. Remarkably, this fascinating linkage between Krupp housing and Nazism has thus far eluded thorough historical analysis.348

The connection of Krupp to the National Socialist political party has been the focus of a number of historical studies. Ever since the guilty verdicts were handed down to Gustav and Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach at the Nuremberg Trials in 1948, it seems as though the company has not been able to vindicate itself fully from its association with the Hitler regime.349 Combing through the historical records, one becomes clear that Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach did not directly support the N.S.D.A.P. prior to its rise to power. Given the vocal anti-capitalist tirades of Hitler during the Great Depression, Krupp’s ambivalence towards this party of political nobodies was certainly understandable. Unlike his main competitor, Thyssen, whose owner publicly supported the Nazis outright, Krupp simultaneously funded a number of right of centre parties which seemed capable of forming a majority in the early 1930s.350 While the Essen corporate giant actively supported potential pro-business forces, it is important to point out that it also did nothing to assist the Weimar Republic in weathering the economic
turmoil of the Great Depression. Ultimately, this corporate ambivalence towards the Republic contributed to the latter’s demise in 1933. After struggling through fourteen years of the Weimar “socialist experiment” and being starved of invaluable military contracts as a result of national armament restrictions, any change of government that promised to restore the nation to its pre-World War One level of economic prosperity and international significance was viewed as welcome. As H.A. Turner’s standard work has shown, like other German industrialists, Krupp hoped to play a key part in the post-Weimar economic recovery process.\textsuperscript{351}

Once in power, Hitler quickly realized that his earlier approach of verbally attacking Germany’s corporate community was enormously counter-productive. If National Socialist propaganda leading up to the 1932 election was to be believed, then the party did possess a well-defined plan for leading the nation back to its pre-World War One greatness. In retrospect, the party platform would fail to deliver on the vast-majority of its promises.\textsuperscript{352} Sadly, there was one area in which it did deliver: national rearmament. Ensuring that the largest Ruhr industrialists were immediately brought onside in 1933 was paramount in attaining Hitler’s goal of rearming the nation on an unprecedented scale. If the Krupp steel firm could somehow be restored to its position as Europe’s dominant armaments producer and, even more importantly, could be won over for the National Socialist cause, Hitler would have cleared a major hurdle on the way towards full military and economic reconstruction.
The fact that Hitler was acutely aware of the critical role Krupp was going to play in this process was reflected in the numerous visits Hitler made to Essen between 1934 and 1942. During one of the most publicized visits on September 27th, 1937, Hitler and his 'special guest', Benito Mussolini, entered the city from the central train station where an enormous banner draped across the Hotel Handelshof greeted the two fascist leaders with the phrase: "**Herzlich Willkommen in der Waffenschmiede des Reiches**" [A Heartfelt Welcome to the Armoury of the Reich] (Fig. #36).\(^{355}\) Within three years of National Socialist rule, this dubious distinction, first bestowed upon Essen after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, had been resurrected. Predictably, Krupp's economic situation would improve in direct relation to the speed of the Nazi rearmament program. In 1939 the financial publication *Der Wirtschaftsring* was able to assess the company figures received for 1937/38 and proclaim this was: "Krupp’s best post-war year". The firm's production figures and profit margins had been on a steady increase since 1934, a fact that the trade journal attributed directly to the company’s speedy reversion to armaments production.\(^{354}\) With the growing profits from military contracts and buoyed by the Nazi propaganda machine, the firm’s pre-Weimar position as *Reich Waffenschmiede* was fully restored.

Reaffirming this position as a major weapons manufacturer went hand in hand with a vast intensification of the firm’s time-honoured *Besucherpolitik*. Whereas Krupp’s reception of dignitaries had slowed to a trickle in the 1920s, the renewed militarist climate in Berlin insured that the party brass made numerous trips to Essen after 1933. The list of Krupp visitors, first published during the Nuremberg
Trials, reads like a virtual ‘who’s who’ of the N.S.D.A.P. elite. Visitors to Essen included Martin Bormann, Joseph Goebbels, Hermann Göring, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Heinrich Himmler, Konstantin von Neurath, Werner von Fritsch, Wilhelm Keitel, Erich Raeder, Fritz Todt, Albert Speer, Walter Funk, Robert Ley, and Fritz Sauckel.355 Due to the immense resources the Nazi government lavished on the media, the constant press coverage of these visits ensured that the connection between Krupp and the new political powerbrokers had never been more vividly publicized. The intensified Nazi press coverage surpassed even the militarist portrayal of the firm during the Wihelmine era.

The constant visits of high-ranking Nazi officials to Essen not only refocused public attention on the company’s traditional role as the nation’s leading armaments manufacturer, but they also rekindled interest in the firm’s history. In particular, popular histories that recounted the life stories of so-called “great men of German history”, refocused attention on the life and achievements of Alfred Krupp. Presenting heroic tales of resolute individuals possessing innate leadership qualities -- perseverance, discipline and courage -- to overcome any adversity, these publications (e.g. Paul von Hindenburg, Otto von Bismarck, Helmuth von Moltke, Baron von Schwerin, Nikolas von Dreyse, Werner von Siemens and last but not least, Adolf Hitler himself) found a captive audience during the height of the Nazi dictatorship. Popular histories like Männer deutscher Geschichte [Men of German History] (1938), Männer aus eigner Kraft [Men of Personal Strength] (1938), Genie und Fleiss – führen deutsche Männer zum Erfolg [Genius and Hard Work – Lead German Men to Success] (1938) and Krupp - Kampf um Stahl
[Krupp – Battle for Steel] (1935), underlined Alfred's Krupp’s direct link to Prussian militarism which had ultimately allowed him to the ascend to the throne of “cannon king”.

In particular, these hagiographic portrayals of great German industrialists like Alfred Krupp and Werner von Siemens stressed that they were self-made men who had shared a unique characteristic: “All worked themselves up from the lathe to the level of Wirtschaftsführer [economic leader]!” Accordingly, in Alfred Krupp’s case, his first-hand experience as a factory labourer was depicted as crucial in allowing him to develop into a benevolent, yet stern employer. The uncompromising loyalty of his senior workers, even during the most difficult of times, was later rewarded with his own support of their every need. Conversely, disloyalty, in particular the workers’ support for what Krupp called the “schleichende Pest” [creeping pest] of socialism, was ruthlessly suppressed.

Thus a popular image of the steel baron emerged in the 1930s that pictured Krupp as a hard working and disciplined former blacksmith, whose perseverance and loyalty to his country was part and parcel of his economic success. Although one of the most powerful businessmen of his era, he never forgot to reward the loyalty of his workforce and to defend his establishment from socialist incursions.

The same publications argued that social welfare provisions, housing in particular, had been initiated to “take the wind out of the sails of the socialist movement.” Wolfgang Loeff, for example, described Krupp’s ultimate success against the socialist threat in uncompromisingly militarist terms: “With it [the diffusion of the socialist threat] the factory owner actually won a campaign in his
empire.” Even Robert Ley, the head of the German Labour Front, was so impressed with the Alfred Krupp legend that he underlined its national significance during a tour of German industrial facilities in 1934.

We should never forget that such large companies like the Krupp works in Essen could never have been built without the creativity, courage and far-sightedness of the German entrepreneur. Especially in this the largest of German facilities, that has so underlined the Führerinitiative [leadership initiative] in the economy, one believes in the truthfulness of the phrase carved into the statue of the founder of the company, Friedrich Krupp [sic.]: “The purpose of work is the common well-being.”

In retrospect, few “Great Men of German History” possessed characteristics that were so perfectly aligned with the all-encompassing Führerkult of the N.S. years.

Not to be outdone by these non-company publications, the firm’s own propaganda campaign also underwent a renaissance of sorts that arguably ‘unofficially’ began with Richard Klapheck’s book Siedlungswerk Krupp in 1930. Most interesting in the list of Krupp’s own publications during the Nazi period was its latest company history, Alfred Krupp und sein Geschlecht [Alfred Krupp and his Genus], written by its head archivist Wilhelm Berdrow and first published in 1937. The book’s rare second edition (1943) is very intriguing since it provided Berdrow’s version of the struggles the Krupp firm faced during the key transition period from the end of the First World War and its “tiefe Erniedrigung des aufgezwungenen Friedens” [deep degradation of the dictated peace], to its rebirth in the Third and, according to Berdrow, “greatest German Reich!” The company historian then went on to explain Krupp’s historic role in this political transition by stating that “Krupp was involved in all this grief and toil like few
other companies!^\textsuperscript{361} Considering the rich history of the firm and its extensive links to past German governments, this statement places the role of Krupp in the political economy of the National Socialist state into perspective. Its own company historian had absolutely no doubt that prior to 1937 the fate of the firm had never been so closely linked to the fate of the nation.

Nazi ideology had the ambition to re-root the German population in native soil at its very core. It was Walter Darré whose self-proclaimed "groundbreaking" polemics *Das Bauernntum als Lebensquell der Nördlichen Rasse* (1928) [Farming as the Life Foundation for the Nordic Race], *Um Blut und Boden* (1929) [For Blood and Soil] and *Neuadel aus Blut und Boden* (1930) [A New Aristocracy from Blood and Soil] heavily influenced the spread of the "Blood and Soil" myths. As Minister of Agriculture and head of the S.S. Central Office for Race Settlement (1931-1942) this obscure individual whose lesser known publications included the ludicrous 1930 essay "*Das Schwein als Kriterium für nordische Völker und Semiten*" [The Pig as Criterion for Nordic Races and Semites], sadly, did have a considerable impact on N.S.D.A.P. social policies.^\textsuperscript{362} Following closely in the anti-capitalist footsteps of *Agrarromantiker* like Adolf Damaschke, Darré believed that the only salvation for the German population was to stop the tide of rapid urbanization and become re-attached to the soil. Darré considered all previous attempts at social reform that did not take the "blood purity" of the population into account as totally ineffective: "Whoever robs the German soil of its natural landscape, destroys her. Even the best garden city is not an authentically German landscape in the true sense."^\textsuperscript{363} Moreover, according to Darré, those who were to
be selected for this re-agrarianization process had to possess a blood lineage to the past generations which had been directly attached to the land: the German farmers.

Disturbingly, "Blood and Soil", the re-attachment to a rural existence built upon the supposedly pure blood of the German farmer, became a critical ideological pillar of early Nazi housing policy. Fostering an international community of creative individuals based on the Hellerau garden city precedent was thus the farthest thing from Darré's mind. In fact, this was not the only social reform precedent he viewed as completed misguided:

With hobby gardens and personal homes, with Kleinsiedlungen and agrarian romanticism, with vegetarianism and nudism, with stand-up bass and bare legs, they believed they could expel the evil without noticing the diabolical grin of capitalism. It [capitalism], however, is quite content when hobby gardens, personal homes, garden cities and Kleinsiedlungen are built within its system to make it healthy and homely. For Darré, however, all these efforts were simply half-measures. It was only by fully reagrarianizing the German population that the real 'root of all evil', capitalism, could be eliminated. As was the case with most sub-branches of nazi ideology, Walter Darré's ideas soon underwent a considerable metamorphosis once the N.S.D.A.P. was actually in power. Whereas the general notion of reattaching the nation to its native soil remained, the process was by no means going to be confined to the agrarian sector, nor was it, as Darré stated above, to be anti-capitalist in scope. Not surprisingly, it was Adolf Hitler who was instrumental in initiating this ideological shift to accommodate the established capitalist order.

In one of his first speeches as the newly appointed Reich Chancellor, Hitler did express support for Darré's pledge to reinvigorate the German agrarian sector. He
proclaimed that it was a central aim of his first four-year [Reinhart] economic plan to utilize: "...the reserve of the German farm worker in order to maintain [national] self-sufficiency and preserve the living foundation of the nation." But unlike Darré, Hitler and party ideologues like Gottfried Feder, Johann Wilhelm Ludowici and Franz Seldte also recognized the enormously important economic role of the industrial worker. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that much of Hitler's preoccupation with reinvigorating the industrial sector had everything to do with jump-starting armaments production as soon as possible. Companies like Messerschmidt, Henkel, Thyssen and above all Krupp, were expected to play leading parts in this ludicrous process. Given Hitler's insatiable militaristic aims, the reconstruction of the German economy simply could not fall predominantly on the shoulders of the agrarian population, as Darré had predicted, but rested rather on the "twin pillars of the agrarian and industrial workforces" (Dia.# 37). In this context, it was not just the German farmer whom the state attempted to re-root in the soil. Hitler essentially gave hope to all industrial workers by promising them a home in which to "feel like a lord in his castle". In order to fulfil this promise the new N.S.D.A.P. homesteads not only needed to be constructed in rural areas, but also in the industrial heartland.

It was Johann Wilhelm Ludowici and Gottfried Feder who both emphatically underlined the historic importance of not neglecting the industrial workers when it came to the housing issue. In order to emphasize his point, Ludowici reminded people of the ever-present threat of the proletarian revolution by citing Friedrich Engels directly:
In order to create the modern revolutionary proletariat class, it was absolutely necessary that the umbilical cord be cut which tied the worker of the past to land and soil. The craftsman who had his little home, his little garden and his little plot beside his loom, was in all his misery, a quiet and content individual. – Only the proletariat that was created as a result of large-scale modern industry and has been driven together in the large cities and is free of all its inherent chains that bind it to the ground, is able to bring about the great social change.

In *Das Deutsche Siedlungswerk* [German Settlement Activities] (1935), Ludowici indicated that he did not believe this revolutionary threat had yet been eliminated.

A year earlier, Feder had expressed similar views about the perpetual threat of revolution in industrial areas, yet he also provided a detailed remedy on how to safeguard against the problem.

The detachment from the *Heimaterde* [native soil], the alienation that occurs in the large cities, only results in spiritual, physical and moral detachment. That is why the *heimatferne* [Heimat-distant] large city was the origin and breeding ground for the misguided Marxist teachings. If one wishes to deprive it [Marxism] of fruitful ground, one must find the way back to the *Heimat*. The reintegration of the large German city population into the rhythm of the German landscape, is becoming one of the most important and pressing tasks facing the National Socialist government.

Already rooted in an ideology that was violently anti-communist at its core, Feder used Engel’s views on ‘workers, land and soil’ as additional propaganda fodder to depict the political left as enemies of the German workers. Writing over sixty years after Engels had made his observations in 1872, these two N.S.D.A.P. housing officials had the enormous benefit of hindsight on their side. Especially in heavily industrialized regions, like the Ruhr, the growth of large urban concentrations had indeed occurred at a bewildering pace after the 1870s. However, the great proletarian toppling of the established order predicted by
Engels simply did not accompany it. If Engel’s hypothesis was correct, then the industrial centers of Germany should have become the epicentres of violent change and the revolutionary wave should have spread outwards. Something had, however, occurred in these industrializing regions that simply did not allow the great proletarian masses to develop the unity and agency to bring about the fall of the established order. For Nazi party members like Gottfried Feder, the historical lessons had been learned, yet the final victory over Marxism had not yet been won.

Feder believed that the love of home and nation had triumphed over the anti-nationalistic and rootless threat of Marxism. For the N.S.D.A.P. it was left to housing officials, like Feder and Ludowici, to ensure that this tranquillity was maintained. For both, pinpointing the historical reasons for the pacification of the German proletariat promised to ensure continued social peace. In this regard, two leaders of German industry were able to offer some insights into their respective formulas of success. With its long list of company publications dating all the way back to 1876, Krupp in particular, had repeatedly stressed how its housing initiatives had served to prevent workers’ unrest. In 1934, Krupp and Siemens jointly released *Krupp und Siemens – Nebenerwerbs-Siedlungen für Kurz und Vollarbeiter: Neue Wege industrieller Siedlungspolitik praktische Erfahrungen, Ziele und Forderungen* [Krupp and Siemens – Subsistence Settlements for Full and Part-time Employees: New Methods of Industrial Settlement Policy from Practical Experiences, Aims and Demands] (1934). The document was intended to demonstrate that the correct form of government intervention in the housing sector could pay enormous social dividends. Moreover, the respective economic
success of their companies also stood as living testaments to the economic
dividends the government stood to gain if it followed their lead. Again, it was the
mythical figure of Alfred Krupp that provided the historic validation for this
hypothesis. Sounding curiously similar to Richard Klapheck (see pp. 220-222), A.
de Neuville for example, pointed-out the renewed importance of Krupp’s legacy
for the Third Reich, writing in *Krupp und Siemens*: “Much of what Alfred Krupp
has written about his ideas for the worker and his personal home could be written
for the housing program of the most recent of times, the suburban
*Kleinsiedlung.*”

Viewed against the backdrop of balancing the National Socialist housing
program with massive German re-armament, the importance of the World War
One housing precedents also took on a radically new meaning in 1934. Again, de
Neuville outlined the historical lessons learned at Krupp:

> With the struggle to defend the *Heimat* grew the love of the *heimatlichen*
> [native] earth. Out of this emerged everyone’s wish to build homesteads
> for warriors and the relatives they left behind. In 1916, an Essen settlement
> co-operative was founded by Krupp employees with the name
> “Heimaterde”...

The Krupp experiences in the Heimaterde had shown the benefits of cultivating a
sense of *Heimat* by favouring the construction of *Kotten*-inspired single-family
dwellings. The company policy of settler selection also ensured that only the most
deserving employees were the first to receive their highly sought-after homestead.
The Heimaterde provided the company blueprint for other Krupp homestead
projects like its Gruson Settlement near Magdeburg (1932-1936), whose central
purpose was “...to make the worker into a full-fledged member of the state, make
him into a proud and free person and bring him closer to the *heimatlichen* soil and nature." By 1935, these Krupp housing precedents had shown that if industry, capital and the state worked together to build new settlements, it was possible "to integrate the working class into the *Volksgemeinschaft* [national community]."  

Representing Krupp’s housing legacy as an influential historical precedent during the National Socialist period was by no means confined to company-sponsored publications. When the Ruhr coal magnate and historian August Heinrichsbauer made the most comprehensive attempt to trace the origins of Ruhr industrial housing tradition, in *Industrielle Siedlungen im Ruhrgebiet* [Industrial Settlements in the Ruhr Region] (1936), it was the Krupp housing activities that again took center stage. It was Heinrichsbauer who painstakingly traced the *Bergmannskotten* tradition in the region and depicted the mutual benefits of this housing type for the worker and employer. Replete with facts and figures, the study related the difficulties which industrialists faced in, literally, creating entirely new villages or colonies for their ever-expanding workforce, beginning in the mid-19th century. The author correctly distinguished the Eisenheim colony, the oldest of these developments, as having set the pattern for the adoption of the *Kotten*-style dwelling that many others were to follow. Unlike Klapheck therefore, Heinrichsbauer did not erroneously depict Alfred Krupp as having been the innovator of the industrial house and garden form. Where he did, however, concur with Klapheck was in the view that Alfred Krupp’s housing activities surpassed all others in scope and historical importance. By contributing directly to stopping the
spread of socialism in this vital industrial region, Krupp, Heinrichsbauer believed, had had an immeasurable socio-political impact.  

The "blood and soil" theories of Darré seem to have had a definitive impact on Heinrichsbauer's views on the future of German workers' housing. Similar to Ludowici and Feder, he stressed the critical importance of not just re-rooting the agrarian population, but especially the industrial workers, in their native soil:

If the unions used to praise freedom of movement as one of the most important rights of the worker, they were either too short sighted to recognize the consequences of such demands, or they consciously desired the Mietskaserne as a care- and breeding ground for collectivism.  

The number one goal of contemporary settlement policy, according to Heinrichsbauer, was therefore to increase a sense of Volkstum [nationality] in the industrializing regions. In this regard, military history had apparently taught him a key lesson: "Healthy soldiers had not just originated from rural areas, but in particular, from the Ruhr region." The author intended to change common misconceptions about the Ruhr industrial worker's alienation from the land and nation. In the violent language characteristic of his time he proclaimed: "Just the annihilation of the misnomer that only the farmer, but not the industrial worker, can be volkstums- und heimatverbunden [bound to the nation and homeland] is difficult." Krupp's Heimaterde served the writer as proof positive that this re-connection to the land could be achieved. It was built in the tradition of Alfred Krupp, the "große Sozialpraktiker" [great social practitioner], who had acted courageously at the right time. Heinrichsbauer concluded his study on Ruhr workers' housing by re-emphasizing that no one should ever forget Alfred's
warning about the paramount importance of constructing workers’ housing: “I only recommend that if we act, - we do it without any hesitation...” For this leading Ruhr coal magnate, the time for the N.S.D.A.P. government to follow this Krupp dictum had never been more pressing.

It is safe to assume that neither August Heinrichsbauer nor Richard Klapheck, who had made a similar analogy between Krupp and state intervention in 1930, were particularly impressed with either the pace or overall direction of early N.S.D.A.P. housing reforms. Once in power, the National Socialists lacked any clear and/or innovative vision on how the housing problem was to be tackled. Earlier lofty promises, from vocal party organizations like the Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur, were now quickly exposed as little more than political posturing. Ironically, the most outspoken member of the Kampfbund, Paul Schultze-Naumburg, was one of the first casualties of the very political force he had helped to bring to power. The degree of influence he exerted on party housing policy reached its zenith in the early 1930s and then rapidly declined. In his informative biography of this right-wing architect, Norbert Borrman explains Schultz-Naumburg’s political decline in the following terms:

The casting-off and distancing from bothersome conservatives that was so typical of the National Socialist rise to power, also applied to him. In addition to his he had managed to make a powerful enemy in Goebbels and his relations with Hitler also quickly showed signs of first rifts.

Paul Schultze-Naumburg was a victim of perhaps the most defining characteristic of National Socialist housing policy, its “organizational chaos”. Between 1933 and 1939 a confusing array of competing individuals and ministries wrestled for
political control of the housing portfolio. Whereas it seemed, for example, that the star of Gottfried Feder was on the rise when he was appointed as the first Reichssiedlungskommissar [Reich Settlement Commissioner] in 1934, his political career lasted little over one year. He was exposed as a backer of the ill-fated Gregor Strasser faction that fell victim to the “Night of the Long Knives” in 1934. Feder’s successor, Wilhelm Johann Ludowici, was to suffer another kind of fate when his political climb was undermined by Robert Ley’s efforts to take over the entire housing portfolio for the Deutsche Arbeitsfront in 1935. It is doubtful in retrospect whether anyone but the very highest Nazi officials (Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels and Bormann) ever had a clear grasp of who exactly was in charge of reducing the housing deficit, which had already crossed the one million unit threshold by 1933.  

If gaining a clear overview of the most influential housing officials and ministries is a bewildering task, the housing type which the National Socialists favoured above all others was quite clear. The single-family detached or semi-detached dwelling containing a generous land provision was consistently identified as the best solution with which to “re-root” the German population in its native soil. Whereas the most notorious figure associated with the Blood and Soil idea, Walther Darré, was turning his attention entirely to the revitalization of the agrarian sector, party functionaries like Franz Seldte and Johann Wilhelm Ludowici, Robert Ley and Gottfried Feder all did their best to apply his theories to non-agrarian areas. Ludowici, for example, continued to underline the importance of not neglecting the German worker when addressing the housing crisis:
If the German farmer is king of the German soil, then the worker must at least be its lord. In this sense, the homestead settlement shows the inherently healthy, hard-working senior worker and his family the way back into the Heimat.  

Seldte followed a similar line of argument and cautioned against making the same mistakes as in the past: “No longer shall the Mietskaserne with all its unfriendly accompanying characteristics, but the small personal home, the settlement on the city periphery, the agrarian settlement be the focal point of our building activities.” Critically, simply advocating the rural and/or suburban creation of homestead settlements was already the solution implemented as a result of the last Weimar Emergency Housing Decree of 1931 (see p. 227-229) which had the construction of rudimentary homesteads as its centerpiece. In other words, there was nothing new or innovative in these N.S. proposals. Ironically, it was therefore Stephan Poerschke’s Kleinsiedlungen concept that proved itself as ideally suited for attaining three main objectives of the Nazi Weltanschauung. It would reconnect Germans to the soil and promote a housing type that was, supposedly, diametrically opposed to the “Marxist” Mietskaserne. In addition, this low-density housing form gave the impression that efforts were being made to deliver on Hitler’s promise to create more Lebensraum. The vexing problem facing the party faithful was, however, that Poerschke’s Kleinsiedlungen were clearly products of the much maligned-Weimar Republic.

In the previous chapter, it has been shown that Stephan Poerschke’s concept was primarily based on the Ruhr Bergmannskotten tradition (see pp. 123-124). He advocated a housing type that was modest in size and appearance, yet was still able
to provide its residents with a considerable degree of economic self-sufficiency.

Three years into the National Socialist period, W. Wiedmann reminded his readers that the industrial homesteads had historically proven themselves in making their inhabitants "krisesfest" [crisis prepared]. Writing in Berlin, this political scientist was able to cite Krupp’s nearby housing settlement in Magdeburg as an example of what exactly such a krisenfest project should look like. A 1935 D.A.F. propaganda pamphlet gave the following point-form response to the question:

“Why therefore [build] homestead settlements?”

   Workers [will be] rooted in their Heimat, [and not turn into] property-less proletariat, more income [will be generated] through increased production, better and more affordable living conditions [will be created], healthier diets, healthier dwellings, healthier offspring [and] increased self-sufficiency of the nation [will also materialize].

For visual support it included a three-image pictorial that displayed how the preferred N.S.D.A.P. housing form differed vastly from both the crowded Mietskaseren of the turn of the century and the multi-level tenements of the [Weimar] “Systemzeit” (Fig. #38). In a period when Hitler’s political rhetoric became increasingly more expansionist in tone, a housing type that could potentially lessen the country’s dependency on food imports became evermore appealing. This lesson had been learned the hard way during the food shortages brought on by the devastating Allied continental blockade of 1917/18 and more recently, during the Great Depression. Stephan Poerschke’s Kleinsiedlungen thus truly seemed ideally suited to serve the ideological, economic and military prerequisites of the new regime.
Not surprisingly, therefore, following the creation of two new housing ministries on September 22nd, 1933 — the Reich Settlement Office (under the leadership of J.W. Ludowici) and the Reich Housing Office “Neue Heimat” [New Homeland] (under the leadership of Gottfried Feder) -- the N.S.D.A.P. simply continued what was essentially Stephan Poerschke’s plan, for housing reform. In fact, so noticeable was this rather embarrassing continuity with the Weimar program that some of the party faithful took it upon themselves to underline that the new government did have some new solutions. Karl J. Fischer, for example, was alarmed enough about the issue to set the record straight and show exactly how the N.S. Siedlungswerk differed from its Weimar predecessor. Under the rather patronizing heading: “What does the National Socialist need to know about the [Weimar] Reich Unemployment Settlements?”, he highlighted four points intended to distance the N.S.D.A.P. from the Weimar housing program once and for all. He argued that Weimar officials had not taken true real estate values into account when planning their new developments and did not provide the proper infrastructure that could reintegrate the unemployed back into the workforce. Furthermore, he criticized the primitive nature of the Weimar communities which, supposedly, hampered the healthy expansion of growing urban centers. Fischer pointed out that the poor quality of wooden construction and equally poor building sites did not fit Darré “blood and soil” prerequisites.\footnote{386} It is glaringly apparent from this unimaginative critique that it was not the general concept of the Kleinsiedlung program that was at issue, but much rather the lack of qualitative emphasis it contained. In other words, this low-density settlement concept was
not attacked for being the wrong type of solution to the problem, but as simply being qualitatively unacceptable to the new regime.

If the National Socialists found it difficult to find fault with Poerschke's overall housing concept, the same definitely did not hold true for the social group placed at the top of his settler selection lists. In his 1938 work, *Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich* [Social Policy in the Third Reich], Franz Seldte went one step further than Fischer and at least acknowledged that the concept for the new *Siedlungsform* was indeed a product of the Weimar period. However, like Fischer, he emphasized the glaring ideological differences between the Weimar and new Nazi *Kleinsiedlungen*:

The political and spiritual change of the year 1933 has, of course, brought a fundamental change in the *Kleinsiedlung* with it. Out of the unemployed and part-time workers' settlements emerged the *Kleinsiedlung* in today's sense. It is no longer the objective to take the unemployed proletariat off the street and onto a settlement plot, but to give the German *Volksgenossen* [fellow countryman] a permanent *Heimat* on his own land and soil.\(^{387}\)

Using the politically loaded description of the "unemployed proletariat", Seldte identified the N.S. *Siedlungspolitik* as being built upon selecting prospective residents solely according to merit. Accordingly, it was no longer the government's policy to take the economically disadvantaged and "politically threatening" elements of German society and effectively reward them with a settlement plot. Instead, by 1934, the Reich Housing Office moved in exactly the opposite direction: only the fully employed and politically dependable citizens [*Volksgenossen*] were to be re-rooted in "land and soil." According to this rationale, productive and deserving members of society should be acknowledged for their hard work; the "*schaffende Volk*" [productive people] was going to be
rewarded by a Reich Housing Office intent on living up to its name: "Neue Heimat" [New Homeland].

That this "Neue Heimat" was going to be anything but an egalitarian society was clear from the start. It was particularly reflected in the way N.S. housing propaganda differed from the actual implementation of its initiatives. In sharp contrast to the admirable aims of Poerschke's Kleinsiedlungen, which were to provide the unemployed with both a new residence and work, the first wave of settlements completed by the National Socialists in the spring of 1934 was designated as so-called "Frontkämpfersiedlungen" [Front Fighter Settlements]. Again, a D.A.F. propaganda pamphlet clarified what settlement based on merit meant:

But settlement is also a privilege. That is why party fighters, S.A. and S.S. comrades, the war-injured and those with many children, if they meet the overall prerequisites of the settler, receive preferential treatment.\(^{388}\)

Thus with much party fanfare and banners reading "Jedem S.A. Mann ein Eigenheim!" [For every S.S. Man his own Home!], the new socially engineered housing era was ushered in.\(^{389}\) Party functionaries, members of the S.A. and the S.S. subsequently vaulted to the top of the housing waiting lists. Moreover, unlike in 1919 when the Weimar government supposedly chose not to honour the Hindenburg Homestead promise and reward the deeds of front-line soldiers, the N.S.D.A.P. claimed finally to be rewarding the patriotism of German veterans. In reality, it was the new militarist strata, the S.A. and S.S. who were the first to be rewarded with their "Häuschen im Grünen" [House outside of town].\(^{390}\)
Nonetheless, Nazi propaganda had a field day proclaiming that German soldiers were finally receiving their due and that another wrong of the "Verräterrepublik" [treasonous republic] had been righted. This policy of basing housing distribution on party merit was to remain a defining characteristic of National Socialist housing policy throughout the 1930s.

Blatantly rewarding party loyalties with housing provisions was therefore one of the only innovations the propaganda ministry could accurately claim for the National Socialists. Like so many of the party initiatives, once the glossy propaganda lining was removed, all that remained was a housing experiment that stood out only for its remarkable lack of ingenuity. Beyond the rather tasteless adornment of Nazi standards and self-glorifying names like *Schlagerterstadt* [Schlagerter City], *Stadt der Hermann Göring Werke* [City of the Hermann Goering Works] and *Reichssiedlung Rudolf Hess*, even the casual observer could see that there was really nothing new here. Moreover, situated mainly on the peripheries of larger urban concentrations, these spartan housing projects predominantly had no shopping facilities, schools, recreation facilities or even a central market square. Rather than being the norm of the new *Siedlungswerk*, the comprehensive provision of "a central square, fountain, schools, Hitler youth hostel, storefronts and in a few cases, a church" was reserved only for a handful of showcase communities completed before 1939.\(^\text{391}\) For a party that had promised a monumental change in the housing realm, this inability to display impressive results was a tremendous embarrassment.
The discrepancy between promise and achievement was also quantitative.

Between 1933 and the outbreak of war, after which a Führer Order for the Prohibition of Non-Essential Building in Wartime (Nov. 15th, 1939) halted non-essential building and formally ended the National Socialist housing program, 983,964 new dwellings were built. Yet by November of 1939 the overall housing shortage figure had also risen to 1.5 million.\textsuperscript{392} In comparison, during the 1919-1932 Weimar period 2,036,453 dwellings were constructed. Even if the average rate of construction had continued for another five years, the sum total would have only exceeded the Weimar totals by approximately 400,000. Viewed against the backdrop of the extensive economic instability plaguing Germany for much of the 1920s, this figure must be interpreted as a major disappointment even to staunch party supporters. Anna Teut has even gone so far as to suggest that "with nothing else did the National Socialists disappoint their lower middle class supporters more than with their inactivity in the housing realm."\textsuperscript{393}

Long before Anna Teut made her observation in the benchmark study \textit{Architecture in the Third Reich}, Gottfried Feder, a leading party ideologue, had to recognize this failure. As the man whom Hitler had personally appointed to draft the official party program in 1927, Feder realized the immense socio-political importance of putting the Nazi stamp on solving the housing question. Although eventually falling victim to party infighting and losing his position as \textit{Reichssiedlungskommissar} in 1935, he continued to be preoccupied with the housing issue while taking on a professorship at the Technical University of Berlin. Here he embarked on a lengthy process of drafting a detailed proposal for the ideal
National Socialist city, entitled: *Die Neue Stadt* [The New City] (1939). The book was given little public exposure, not to mention serious consideration for implementation in new housing developments. The German attack on Poland on September 1st, 1939, ensured that plans for military operations and new weaponry and not housing initiatives were to receive first billing. The ill-timed release of *Die Neue Stadt* does not, however, decrease its historical value. It remains by far the most detailed account of the future direction of “German city and settlement planning”, written by an individual who had been instrumental in laying the very ideological foundations of National Socialism. Throughout the 1930s, Feder remained the party policy expert, officially entrusted by Hitler to address any matters of ideological clarification.

After taking on the professorship at the T.U. Berlin, Feder spent the next five years trying to complete a painstaking empirical study to determine the ideal German housing form. It was intended to be a definitive project that was going to transform and reorganize the entire German urban landscape according to National Socialist principles.

The cities of the future must in their planning and execution, in their harmonic adaptation to the landscape and their surroundings, in their relationship to *Kreis, Gau* und *Reich*, be a living expression of the new *Zeitgeist* of the life and work ethic of the new *Greater Germany* created by Adolf Hitler.

Unlike industrial colonies, garden cities or large urban developments, these new National Socialist urban centers were to combine the best attributes of all three and establish the very socio-economic foundation of the new “Greater Germany”.

Remarkably, two Krupp housing projects served Feder as inspirational models. In fact, in his concluding section, he underlined their respective importance:

At this point we should already mention foreign and some domestic exemplar practical examples. Above all the model large settlements of the Friedrich Krupp A.G. in Essen: the Margarethenhöhe and the Heimaterde…

Accompanying this immense praise for these two Krupp developments were two site-plans of each settlement as well as an aerial photograph of the Margarethenhöhe (Figs. #s 39, 40 and 41), all images that the author felt simply “spoke for themselves”. By examining the aims and objectives of Feder’s work it is possible to piece together why these two existing housing projects were heralded as ‘exemplary above all others’.

Following a line of argument reminiscent of the urban reformers of the late 19th century, Feder equated the increasing uncontrolled growth of German urban centers with the very “death of the nation”. The dark historical precedent of the Berliner Mietskaserne was again cited as representing the worst living conditions that the spirit of “unbridled liberalism” had created. For Feder, the very opposite end of this historical spectrum of urban models were quaint German towns like Rothenburg and Nördlingen, whose central market squares, timbered craftsmen’s homes and the comforting safety of peripheral walls were all defining traits of “the triumphant heights of the German Middle Ages”.

Although a thread of romantic nostalgia can be discerned in his descriptions of these walled cities dating from the Middle Ages, he was also quick to point out that these were urban settlements that had developed without any general plan; they had, according to Feder, ‘grown
organically' out of the needs and desires of their populace. He further acknowledged that such developments had taken place gradually over centuries and could not be replicated over night. However, he also stressed that the dire housing shortage of the mid-1930s did not allow the nation the luxury of waiting for more of such self-contained organic entities to emerge. What was required, according to Feder, was a concerted planning effort that learned from the mistakes of both the past and the present. Taking decisive action and truly reorganizing housing conditions according to N.S.D.A.P. principles had never been more urgent.

Feder intended his suggestions to be applicable to the planning of entire new cities and the construction of smaller Siedlungen. Like Seldte and Fischer, he identified Kleinsiedlungen as a step in the right direction since they were comprised of the single-family dwellings with garden format. They addressed two of his main concerns: to decrease urban population density and increase national economic self-sufficiency. Feder was, however, quick to point out that the latest N.S. Siedlungen built in the 1930s still had some glaring shortcomings:

After all, a Siedlung is not just the provision of so and so much living area in a single-family dwelling, or a settler home. It is the home for people, who have to travel to work somewhere, who must send their kids to school somewhere, and who must be given the opportunity to meet their needs for food, clothing and recreation in close proximity. 399

The close proximity of these new housing developments to a place of employment, schools, recreation facilities and shops was therefore essential in creating not mere housing clusters, but self-contained urban entities. Altogether these comprehensive and thoroughly planned new housing projects would then
contribute to fostering a new feeling of national social solidarity. As Feder indicated, the dwellings in these new settlements were intended to serve not merely as houses, but as "homes". Together the comprehensive layout of the new housing projects and their "Volksgerechte dwellings" were to reawaken a common sense of Heimat, especially in industrial regions. Not surprisingly, in Feder's section on inspirational housing models, the reader searches in vain for any reference to the Weimar Kleinsiedlungen.

Ute Peltz-Dreckmann, and more recently, Tilmann Harlander, have alluded to the Krupp connection in Feder's work, but neither historian has examined the reasons for this appeal. Conversely, Roland Günter pointed out the N.S. characteristics in the Margarethenhöhe itself, yet provided no direct references to any National Socialist publications to substantiate his thought-provoking claims.

It is possible to discern why Feder was particularly impressed with Krupp's Margarethenhöhe and Heimaterde. Both were indeed thoroughly planned urban entities situated in the very heart of the Ruhr. Located far enough away from the city center of Essen to safeguard its inhabitants from the "negative influences" of city life, they were also situated in areas that made the commute to the main place of employment (mainly Krupp) very manageable. Repeatedly advertised as two of the only Krupp housing projects that were "social" in outlook and composition, meaning neither was a pure company "colony", on the surface at least, they seemed to represent the "social structure of the [working] population". In reality, however, it was the company selection criteria which determined who was deemed suitable for settlement. These chosen residents then resided in a planned
environment where all provisions desired by Feder—schools, shops and recreation facilities etc.—had been built by the firm. Due to their all-encompassing physical composition alone these settlements differed vastly from the spartan Weimar housing projects of the late 1920s and the N.S. Siedlungen of the 1930s.

The Krupp connection to Feder however, ran even deeper than the direct references in Die Neue Stadt. In 1936 for example, both Feder and Hitler attended an exhibition in Duisburg called “Heimat und Heim” [Heimat and Home] to commemorate the first anniversary of the German Bauvereinstage [Building Association Day]. The twelve major German states contributed displays showcasing their respective building achievements under the new regime. Amongst these was an exhibit entitled: “Von Fugger bis Krupp” [from Fugger to Krupp] that projected a Germanic paternalist housing tradition that, supposedly, stretched from the Augsburg banking house to the Essen steel firm. The Duisburg Exhibition also had another direct link to Krupp, since it was co-ordinated by Hermann Hecker, the Düsseldorf city planner who had made a name for himself by publishing the first non-company account of the firm’s housing activities, Der Krupp'sche Kleinwohnungsbau, in 1917. It was at this Duisburg exhibition that Gottfried Feder first met Hermann Hecker, a meeting that led to a brief yet productive working relationship.

In his memoirs Zur Geschichte der Landesplanung: Über sozialen Wohnungsbau, Städtebau und Bauberatung zur Landesplanung [On the History of Regional Planning: Covering Social Housing, City Planning, Building Consultation
and Regional Planning], Hecker recounts his meetings with Hitler and Feder in
detail. He describes Hitler's attitude towards the social housing displays at the
exhibits as distant and aloof. Hecker relates that Hitler's ambivalence was a major
disappointment to himself since he had been inspired to become involved in a
further 1937 Düsseldorf Exhibition: “Schaffendes Volk” [Productive People] by
Hitler’s statement that “I would rather build a million dwellings than manufacture a
million grenades”. In sharp contrast to Hitler, Hecker believed that Feder
actually had a genuine interest in solving the housing question. Surprisingly,
Hecker who was not in any way affiliated with the party, and was in fact already
retired at the time, was so impressed by Feder’s passion for the subject that he
took on the position as his research assistant for the token sum of 1 RM per hour.
Over the next three years, this odd couple worked together on establishing a
Research Association for Spatial Development at the Berlin Technical University
and jointly published a book entitled Systematik der Raumforschung [Systematic
of Regional Planning]. Hecker also contributed an entire collection of models and
diagrams chronicling the history of urban planning under the heading “So it once
was – So it is now – So it could become” whose argumentative scheme mirrored
Feder’s approach in Die Neue Stadt. Unfortunately, this collection did not survive
the Berlin bombing raids of World War Two. Hecker would, however, remain in
close contact with the Feder until the latter’s death in 1941.

Why Feder and Hermann Hecker were able to forge such a close working
relationship is not difficult to explain. From Hecker’s perspective, the politically
derailed former Reichssiedlungskommissar seemed to have a very genuine concern
about the future shape of the German urban form. Hecker therefore believed that Feder differed from his party colleagues by at least having made a concentrated attempt to study, analyze and solve the housing problem. Just like Hecker, whose first major publication was also the first scholarly treatment of Krupp company housing, Feder’s work at the T. U. Berlin tried to find practical solutions by learning from the mistakes and/or successes of previous housing initiatives. In other words, Hecker’s work with Feder convinced him that he was, at the very least, a passionate student of housing history. Significantly, like Hecker, Feder viewed Krupp’s company housing as a critical contribution to the evolution of the German housing form. In his 1917 work Der Krupp'sche Siedlungsbaum, Hecker had already indicated that for him the Krupp housing efforts reflected the history of the German Kleinwohnungsbau (see pp. 191-194). With his work Die Neue Stadt, it was Feder himself who contributed the latest chapter to this history.

In the same year Gottfried Feder was putting the finishing touches on Die Neue Stadt, and Adolf Hitler made the calamitous decision to invade Poland, the Krupp firm received a prestigious government award. Hectically involved with last minute war preparations, Hitler still found the time to make yet another trip to Essen. On this occasion it was personally to bestow a special award upon the head of the firm, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach. With the obligatory kitschy and overblown militaristic pomp, Hitler awarded Krupp the distinction of “N.S. Musterbetrieb” [Exemplary N.S. Business Establishment]. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, whose list of N.S. awards included the title of “Reichswirtschaftsführer” [Reich Economic Leader] and “Pionier der Arbeit”
[Pioneer of Work] and who also received the "Goldene Ehrenabzeichen der
N.S.D.A.P." [Honourary Golden Party Badge] for his seventieth birthday, received
the Musterbetrieb honour with the following remarkable announcement: "It [the
award] honours a socio-political stance which rooted in the 128 year [Krupp]
tradition has organically grown into the new era of National Socialist Germany."

Once applied to the very centrepiece of this socio-political tradition, its housing
activities, this statement by Gustav Krupp places the rejuvenated interest in this
topic during the N.S. years into clearer perspective. Historically constructed
around the image of the benevolent patriarch Alfred Krupp, for over sixty years, its
housing legacy had been depicted as far-sighted, pragmatic and vehemently anti-
socialist. These were all traits that were ideally suited for admirers of the
Führerstaat.

Apparently aware of this heightened contemporary appeal, the Krupp Firm
commissioned a leading official in its Housing Division, Eugen Lauffer, to
undertake a long overdue historical study of its housing activities. Unfortunately,
his findings did not see publication. In its thorough scope and detailed discussion
of nearly all of the Krupp housing projects completed to date (1941), Eugen
Lauffer's *Das Wohnungswesen der Fried. Krupp A.G. in Essen* [Housing
Activities of the Krupp Firm in Essen] did appear to be the first comprehensive
company history of its housing activities. Blending archival sources with a rich
array of photographs and an objective discussion dealing with the pros and cons of
various Krupp building types, Lauffer's report read like the first scholarly internal
assessment of the topic. That his findings were thorough and informative should
not have come as a surprise given the author’s credentials as the vice-Chairman of
the Housing Division from 1919-1943. What was, however, refreshing was the
unbridled candour with which Lauffer presented his material. Given the
company’s record of carefully stage-managing its corporate identity over the years,
it seems quite plausible that the author’s openly critical style probably also
contributed to it not being cleared for publication. Interestingly, even when the
economic fate of the firm had improved sufficiently to begin to rehabilitate the
shattered company image in the early 1950s, it was Richard Klapheck’s
\textit{Siedlungswerk} that appeared in reprint while Lauffer’s work continued to gather
dust in the company archives.

Lauffer began his report by indicating his awareness of the wealth of material
that had been published on Krupp housing. Yet he stressed that his work was
unlike any other since it intended to “…critically illuminate all that has been
achieved and to assess the success of these initiatives to date.” For Lauffer this
meant coming to terms with its historical impact. As in all previous publications,
Lauffer credited the dominant figure of Alfred Krupp with having influenced the
direction of the company’s housing efforts most profoundly. He made the
following observation about Alfred’s past and present housing legacy:

\begin{quote}
Such an achievement, which was so far ahead of its time, is never the result
of chance. Especially by the design of the exteriors and the avoidance of
overly decorative additions, Alfred Krupp was a staunch advocate of the
highest simplicity and functionalism – for which, especially our present age,
has great sympathy…
\end{quote}

Significantly, Lauffer portrayed Alfred Krupp as a type of renegade defender of
German housing traditions, aesthetically understated in form yet containing
enduring functionalist qualities. Commenting on the earliest buildings of the Alfred Krupp period, Lauffer observed that “one also feels the Krupp spirit, that only values the purely good, which demands quality, not in superficial adornments, but in complete construction...” Thus the meagre functionalism of these earliest dwellings (Nordhof, Westend and Schederhof) was interpreted as having been a defiant trait and admirable legacy of the Ruhr industrialist, one that consciously rejected the overtly decorative, architectural styles of the age. Like Hecker therefore, Lauffer believed this “Krupp Spirit” safeguarded its housing from overly decorative, “non-German” influences. He even went so far as to propose that it was Alfred Krupp’s innovative bare-bones functionalism that was much more deserving of the title “Neue Sachlichkeit” [new functionalism] than anything the modernist movement of the 1920s had produced.

Although Alfred Krupp had laid the foundations for the emergence of a definitive Krupp housing style, Lauffer argued that it was not until the period of housing starts under Friedrich Alfred that this style reached its most recognizable form. Acknowledging the latter’s tendencies toward the picturesque style of the earliest Altenhof cottages, Lauffer wrote that what ultimately emerged as the most distinctive Krupp characteristic was already evident in the structures of the so-called Pfriindnerhäuser (Fig. #42). He was, therefore, in complete agreement with Paul Schultze-Naumburg who had also zeroed in on these structures as “good” examples of German housing. It was this transformation towards “heimatständigen” [based on the Heimat] building, which took its inspiration from the modest German rural home and not the “Elizabethan building styles in
England”, that Lauffer isolated as the origin of a definitive Krupp housing style.\textsuperscript{411}

According to Lauffer, this distinct style was most fully realized in the two latter phases of the Altenhof [-Heide].

Plain unassuming houses, purely German in origin and in line with the lifestyle of its residents, built in the tradition of the good German Kleinhäuser [lower middle-class houses] are aligned in changing groupings to modest roads caringly adapted to the landscape.\textsuperscript{412}

The ambiguous phrase “purely German in origin” was clarified with the concluding statement: “With few resources a remarkable amount has been achieved, a sign of a truly artistic solution without false pretensions.”\textsuperscript{413}

Well-planned, modest, plain and achieving the maximum results with limited means -- these were identified as the defining characteristics of the Krupp housing style and the very essence of a distinctly German housing tradition. By reverting to functionalist styles in the later phases of the high-profile Altenhof development, Krupp, Lauffer believed, had considerably contributed to the evolution of the “Heimatgebunden Bauens” [Heimat- grounded building], proposed by Paul Schultzze-Naumburg and Theodor Fischer. Lauffer argued that the German housing style was in considerable danger of being diluted by “foreign influences” at the turn of the twentieth century. Adhering to the ‘instinctive pragmatism’ of the Krupp housing tradition in Altenhof-Heide (1907-1913) had, supposedly, paid incalculable cultural dividends. On this point the author added emphatically:

Avoiding all the artistic and cultural confusions with instinctive resolve and finding such good solutions for the new German building, is the great legacy of the Krupp housing activities from this period. This approach not only influenced building in industrial regions, but has left its trace in the entire German housing sector in the subsequent years.\textsuperscript{414}
Given the list of historical figures -- Hannes Meyer, Kurt Eisner, Hermann Muthesius, Paul Schultze-Naumburg, Richard Klapheck, Hermann Hecker and Gottfried Feder -- all of whom committed their diverse views on Krupp’s housing to paper, it is difficult to argue with Eugen Lauffer’s statement.

One final such “trace” of this influence cannot be attached to a particular individual, but rather, to a curious 1940 N.S.D.A.P. propaganda pamphlet. Released under the heading: *La Vie En Allemagne – L’Habitation Allemande* [Life in Germany – German Habitats], this booklet showcased the supposedly advanced state of housing in the new Germany. Filled with images of healthy families with multiple children residing in their well-kept *Kleinsiedlungen*, the publication also contained two rather familiar images that had been ‘borrowed’ directly from the Krupp archival collection. They clearly showed the same Altenhof-Heide development that Lauffer and Paul Schultze-Naumburg praised. But, remarkably, this time all references to Krupp’s direct connection to this community were erased. Instead, the French caption accompanying the Altenhof images simply read: “Just like it takes care of its youth, the National Socialist states devotes itself to the well-being of the elderly. A big business establishment funded this housing project.”415 The propaganda images thus gave the impression that this housing project was a product of the new era when it had actually been completed in 1913 (see p.143). The propaganda ministry did not even take the time or make the effort to take its own pictures (Figs. #45 and 47) for publication. Instead, they helped themselves directly to the identical photographs used by Hermann Hecker (Figs. #s 43 and 44) in 1917 and Richard Klapheck (Fig. #46) in
These drab street scenes that had inspired Kurt Eisner to label the Altenhof cynically as “a cemetery for the living” (see pp. 164-167) were now recycled to illustrate an exemplary housing project for the N.S. years. The firm, whose exploits in the housing and propaganda realms had been so instrumental in constructing its corporate identity, could now provide the N.S. propaganda ministry with images it was proud to proclaim as representing Life in Germany.

It was during the National Socialist period that the history of Krupp housing entered its most fascinating phase. Faced with an unprecedented national housing shortage in 1933, unimaginative N.S.D.A.P. reformers engaged in a desperate search for solutions. Attempting to honour ideological N.S. prerequisites -- re-rooting the population in its native soil, gaining additional Lebensraum, making the population krisenfest and reawakening a national sense of Heimat -- they found Stephan Poerschke’s Kleinsiedlung form as ideally suited to become the preferred housing type of the N.S. state. There were, however, considerable stumbling blocks facing the party faithful who attempted to adopt this housing program wholesale. First and foremost, it was a housing initiative that was clearly the product of the Weimar Republic, which Hitler had ignorantly chastised as a “Verräterrepublik”. Moreover, with its admirable efforts to provide work and housing for the unemployed, the N.S.D.A.P. denounced the program as being overly socialist, emphasizing that it was the lazy “proletariat” and not the loyal, hard-working German Stammarbeiter, who were being rewarded for their efforts. In their search for housing precedents that could prove inspirational, the Nazis found Krupp’s over sixty-year tradition of marketing the aims and achievements of
its housing activities irresistible. Robert Ley, W. Wiedmann, August Heinrichsbauer, Gottfried Feder and, last but not least, the N.S. propaganda ministry itself, were all inspired by Krupp precedents. Historically contextualized in a period of Gleichschaltung and the height of the Führerkult, the legend surrounding Alfred Krupp's achievements in the housing sector was recast anew. Resolute, pragmatic and fiercely anti-socialist, Essen's benevolent "Cannon King" had laid the foundations for a housing tradition that by 1933 included the Meisterhäuser, Westend and Nordhof barracks, and the more recent "pearls of Krupp housing", the Margarethenhöhe and the Heimaterde. Marketed as having always favoured the "Kotten as its ideal" housing type (see p. 66), these low-density developments were thoroughly planned, self-contained urban entities located in the near vicinity of the "Waffenschmiede des Reiches". Gottfried Feder, in particular, recognized that these company settlements were qualitatively superior to anything the N.S. Siedlungswerk had completed prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Both socially engineered, based on company "merit", the Margarethenhöhe and Heimaterde were the showcase examples of the Krupp housing tradition. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, when Feder published what was to be the most detailed study on the future of the National Socialist urban form Die Neue Stadt, he cited these two Krupp housing developments as "exemplary above all others..."
CONCLUSION
Since Wolfgang Schulze and Arnold Weiler asked “Why yet another book about Krupp?”, nearly a quarter century has elapsed and rather than gradually decreasing in volume, the historical catalogue of Krupp writings has actually continued to increase. Largely the result of the firm’s much more forthcoming policy towards historical research beginning in the 1980s, the last two decades of Krupp writings have produced a wealth of publications on the steel company’s historical legacy ranging from the absurd Roy Calogeras’ *The Krupp Dynasty and the Roots of the German National Character* (1989), to invaluable benchmarks like Klaus Tenfelde’s *Bilder von Krupp* (1994). Due to the refreshing shift away from predominantly allowing company historians access to its enormous wealth of archival materials, the firm’s historiography has been considerably enriched in both quantitative and qualitative scope. Thankfully, it seems as though the scathing criticisms leveled at the steel firm by the outspoken Bielefeld historian Roland Günter, who had accused Krupp of *Denkmalpflege* [heritage preservation] in 1970, apparently no longer apply. Beyond the wealth of primary documents that have been meticulously preserved by the thorough staff, the Villa Hügel also contains an entire room of secondary publications that have been collected over the years. These make clear that Schulze and Weiler’s statement was not a gross over-generalization at all. Here indeed is an “entire library” that has been comprised of the wealth of materials that has been published on the firm.\footnote{This dissertation has attempted to carve-out its own niche in this vast historical catalogue by assessing the Krupp’s historical legacy in the housing realm.} This study contends that the considerable attention Krupp’s housing projects generated between 1855 and 1941, amongst supporters and critics alike, can only be fully understood by keeping the firm’s *Sonderstellung* [unique status] in the
German political economy in mind. A number of historians have recently correctly identified that Krupp was never purely an armaments manufacture. As the discussion of numerous fairs, ranging from the Great London Exhibition of 1851 to the Düsseldorf Trade and Industrial Fair of 1902, has shown, however, Krupp’s penchant for superlative displays was increasingly geared towards showcasing enormous weapons of war. If after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 Krupp was, in the words of Klaus Tenfelde, “an exemplary Prusso-German firm of global stature” then by the 1890s the steel company was well on its way to establishing itself as the *Reichswaffenschmiede* [Armoury of the Reich]. By the First World War, this militaristic image was so pronounced that Canadian soldiers were asked to answer the call of duty to battle “Kaiser Krupp and Kultur”. Into the 1920s, Krupp remained, in the words of Nicholas Stargardt, ‘as much a symbol of German militarism as the sabre and the pickelhaube’. Remarkably, however, at the same time the company had accumulated a sizeable catalogue of publications that counterbalanced the image of Prussian militarism with its workers’ welfare initiatives, of which housing was always the centerpiece. It is this fascinating dualism of the firm’s corporate identity as both agent of mass destruction and social welfare innovator that provided the central impetus for this dissertation.

During the period under examination (1855-1941), Krupp’s meteoric expansion, its seemingly insatiable drive to overtake its most challenging competitors and its instrumental role in supplying armaments to the military establishment have no parallel in German history. Following the enormous German industrial takeoff in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the history of
Krupp Steel was truly one of superlatives. In particular, the record profit margins under the new leadership of Friedrich Alfred ["Fritz"] Krupp (1854-1902) beginning in the early 1890s, allowed the steel firm’s Building Office the luxury not only to assess and modify current trends in housing, but much more importantly, to transform theories into practice. At a time when the much-heralded housing reform efforts of the Garden City Movement and Adolf Damaschke’s warrior homestead proposals were only beginning to capture the attention of the German public, Krupp’s showcase Altenhof community had existed for nearly two decades. Indeed, by the end of the First World War, the Krupp steel firm was not just Germany’s largest industrial establishment, but with over 12,000 units constructed, it was also the nation’s largest private sector provider of housing.

It has not been my intention to claim that the study of Krupp housing is in any way uncharted territory. On the contrary, alongside its own catalogue of publications, numerous outside scholars have taken a keen interest in Krupp’s initiatives. Accompanied by the remarkably transparent aims and motives of Alfred Krupp published by the firm, Krupp’s housing legacy has continued to fascinate German historians. In the tradition of the more comprehensive studies, like those of Richard Klapheck, Eugen Lauffer, Daniel Stemmrich and most recently Andreas Helferich, this dissertation has attempted to provide a balanced assessment of what the firm physically constructed over time. This examination has shown that there was no distinct housing style that could be labeled definitively as “Krupp”. The firm’s housing designs varied dramatically from the initial Ménage (1855), multi-level tenements for single workers, to the far more spacious
Meisterhäuser (1861/62), barrack-like dwellings Nordhof (1869) and the picturesque Altenhof cottage development that was begun in 1892.

This project has been inspired by elements that all three above-mentioned studies have not included. First and foremost, they share an alarming tendency to silence invaluable historical voices. It has been a perplexing characteristic of writings on Krupp housing, for example, that even the architects involved in the planning process seldom receive any attention. These individuals like Robert Schmohl, Georg Metzendorf and even the future head of the Bauhaus, Hannes Meyer, offered fascinating commentaries on their achievements and experiences while working for Krupp. Each was a representative of a different generation and their respective professional outlooks proved to be equally diverse. Backed by the financial resources of the nation’s largest industrial establishment, each had the opportunity to construct workers’ dwellings on an unprecedented scale at a time when German housing became an ever-increasing topic of political debate.

General attempts at reading the Krupp housing achievements against the backdrop of the German housing reform movement (1890 to 1919), have only been made by Walther Kieß and Bullock and Read. As the discussion of the Reichstag debates on the housing problem throughout this period has shown, all political parties believed that it was a key social issue that could no longer be left at the mercy of open market forces. Still, after all the political bickering had ended, by the outbreak of World War One, the Reichstag factions had not been able to pass long-overdue national housing legislation. All the while, the torrid pace of Krupp’s housing construction had not abated. Combined with the firm’s expertise in the marketing realm, it was a forgone conclusion that its housing activities would not go unnoticed.
A brief glance at the list of visitors to the Krupp’s workers communities in and around the Ruhr city of Essen between 1890 and 1919 is reflective of the broad extent of their impact. Amongst others, this list included Kaiser Wilhelm II, Admiral von Tirpitz, a five-hundred member British delegation from the “Congress for Improving the Housing of the Working Classes”, a Canadian “Royal Commission on Technological Education”, and even the later Bavarian revolutionary Kurt Eisner who travelled to Essen to view the Krupp projects first-hand. The above-mentioned individuals left Essen with impressions that were as diverse as their respective socio-political outlooks. Many contemporary observers portrayed the Krupp housing initiatives as sinister experiments in social engineering and draconian worker control by the nation’s highest profile industrial establishment. In sharp contrast, supporters heralded these housing activities as forerunners of Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City concept, exemplary models for the Kriegerheimstädtten [warriors' homesteads] movement, and most remarkably, blueprints for the ideal National Socialist cities. What all critics and supporters had in common, however, was that for both, the Krupp communities provided a high-profile sounding board for their own visions of urban development in Germany.

While never the originators of truly original styles, designs or planning layouts, the members of the Krupp Building Office displayed an uncanny ability to monitor and capitalize on emerging housing trends. Even more importantly, they possessed the financial clout and marketing acumen to move contemporary housing concepts quickly from the drafting table to the building site. When 'miniature workers villas' constructed
by the Lever Brothers in Port Sunlight were beginning to receive positive reviews in England, for example, Krupp was able to import and adapt this housing style to build the picturesque Altenhof as early as 1892. When the German Garden Cities Association increasingly gained public support and notoriety with its high-profile project in Dresden-Hellerau in 1907, Krupp was able to commission the noted young architect Georg Metzendorf to design and construct his own version of a low-density garden development, the Margarethenhöhe, beginning in 1909. Finally, while lobbyists for warrior homesteads were still struggling to secure political support for their cause, Krupp’s plans to begin construction on the company’s first low-density development intended for returning soldiers were already well under way.

Although admirable, housing reform initiatives attempted at Hellerau -- the gymnastic school, the anti-alcohol crusade and the efforts of the suffragettes -- were ultimately overtaken by the events of 1914. As the war years dragged on and the German populace became more and more pre-occupied with day-to-day survival, these reformist strands began to appear more and more eccentric and trivial. While the support for garden cities waned and Adolf Damascke’s plans to build warrior homesteads were gaining broad acceptance in the Reichstag, Krupp propaganda could proudly proclaim that it was now (1916) beginning construction of its first “warrior homestead”. Based on the Ruhr Bergmannskotten tradition, this low-density development, with the appropriate name Heimaterde [native soil], promised to re-root the prospective residents in their native German soil. Krupp placed returning soldiers and large families at the top of its settler selection list and by building the Kotten style en masse, would allow the new residents to supplement their incomes by keeping small livestock and cultivating fruit and vegetable
gardens. Housing projects like the Heimaterde, and later the Gruson settlement in
Magdeburg, held out the promise of making the firm and its employees *krisenfest* [crisis
prepared]. The potential benefits of the *Kotten* housing type were underlined
immeasurably by the crippling economic blockade of World War One. By publicly
identifying the *Kotten* as “our ideal” housing form, Krupp could claim that it was doing its
share to support the German war effort both on the battlefield and the homefront.

The Weimar government, virtually paralyzed by dire economic circumstances until
1924, gravely disappointed those who hoped for quick results in the social housing realm.
For the first time, it was the *Hauszinsteuer* [direct tax on home owners] that provided a
sufficient capital base to allow the German government to experiment with different
housing solutions. Although clause 155 of the Weimar Constitution committed the
government to ‘strive to provide every citizen with a healthy dwelling and every family
with a subsistence homestead’, it was not the traditional homesteads which gained the
most notoriety after 1924. Bold, refreshingly innovative and attempting to utilize the most
modern methods, techniques and materials, it was the Bauhaus school of design that
proclaimed the ‘death of tradition’ and stole the spotlight. Seeking a world without
limitations and a world without borders, this modernist movement tried to deconstruct the
very idea of “*Heimar*”. That public tax funds were used to support high-profile projects
like the Dessau-Bauhaus and Stuttgart’s stunning Weißenhof Exhibition, which did little to
eliminate the housing shortage by 1928, only aided the ultra-nationalist causes of Paul
Schultze-Naumburg and Gottfried Feder. With the onset of the Great Depression,
criticisms of the supposedly “ungerman” modernist impulse were magnified a thousand-
fold.
The crisis level to which matters had deteriorated by 1931 was directly reflected in the title of the emergency legislation issued by the Brüning government to combat the housing crisis —“Emergency Decree of the Reichspresident for securing the economic and financial means to combat political disturbances”. By economic necessity, it called for the construction of the most rudimentary single-family detached or semi-detached dwellings that were, above all, to be self-sufficient. These Weimar Notstandsiedlungen [Emergency Settlements] were to contain a modest piece of land on which the settler and his family could cultivate fruits and vegetables. Significantly, by promoting the single-family detached home and garden form it advocated a housing model that had not only a direct historical linkage to the Ruhr’s Bergmannskotten but also to the modest single-family home and garden form which Theodor Riehl had promoted in his widely popular Natural History of the German People (1871). Following Riehl, the notion that this housing form could act as a socio-political and cultural cure-all was especially kept alive by reformers from the political right.

Although promoting the detached single-family home, the Weimar Kleinsiedlung initiatives were truly products of the final years of the struggling Republic. Rudimentary architectural efficiency and settler self-sufficiency, not romantic nationalist nostalgia, were therefore their hallmarks. Light, gas and even plumbing hookups, were deemed optional and only allowed if these “luxuries” were sufficiently available in their respective building regions. More importantly, it was the unemployed who were to be singled-out, not only to assist in construction, but also to be the first housed in the new developments. In sharp contrast to the Krupp tradition of utilizing housing selectively as a reward for years of loyal service, the Weimar initiatives were true social welfare measures. All in all the
Weimar *Kleinsiedlung* program was an admirable solution implemented by the Brüning government which was desperately attempting to accomplish one goal -- offset the social, political and economic fallout from the Great Depression.

Whereas a fateful chain of events seemed to conspire against the coalition government surviving past 1933, the same did not apply to the basic principles of the *Kleinsiedlungs* program. Ironically, even though a product of what N.S.D.A.P. propaganda repeatedly referred to as the "^Verräterrepublik" [treasonous republic], it was a housing type that was ideally suited to the Nazi world-view. Its low-density layout addressed Hitler's own insatiable demands for "living space" in the east. In the event of a major international military engagement, it allowed the populace to become *krisenfest*. And due to its low-density home and garden layout it even seemed to please Walter Darré, whose racist polemics emphasized the essential need to 're-root the population in the soil'. For a political movement that had promised so much change, however, adopting the Weimar housing initiatives wholesale would have exposed a severe lack of ingenuity.

Once in power, it quickly became apparent that the National Socialists lacked the vision or capability to implement a truly original housing policy. In the end, the *Kleinsiedlung* concept was simply too well-suited to its own Siedlungspolitik. With the exception of a handful of model settlements, the party which had promised "every German a home in which he will feel like a lord in his castle", actually built homes which were hardly improvements on Weimar precedents. In fact, the defining initial characteristic of distributing these highly sought-after dwellings to party functionaries and members of the S.A. and S.S. directly undermined their function as social welfare initiatives. According to Karl J. Fischer, who went to great lengths to explain the differences between the Weimar
and N.S. Kleinsiedlungen, it was the N.S.D.A.P.’s position to reward the fully employed, politically loyal members of society. He also specifically underlined that after 1933 housing was no longer going to be akin to a welfare hand out for the “unemployed proletariat”. The individuals who so desperately needed both work and accommodations were therefore excluded in favour of those whom the party defined as most deserving.

The few N.S. housing officials, like Johann Wilhelm Ludowici and Gottfried Feder, who did have a vision for the future of housing in the new Germany, quickly realized the lack of progress in the housing field was a tremendous embarrassment. Merely adorning new communities with party banners and choosing self-glorifying names like “Reichssiedlung Rudolf Hess” did not hide the visible continuity with Weimar. Even qualitatively, the new dwellings continued to be of the most spartan design and their planning layout was utterly unimaginative. Moreover, Ludowici and Feder realized that proposals of reagrarianizing the nation, as advocated by Walter Darré, were completely out of touch with Hitler’s aims of jump-starting the German industrial sector. First and foremost, this meant launching a rearmament program that was unprecedented in scope and intensity. Working in unison with, rather than against the capitalist order, as Darré had advocated, was absolutely imperative to accomplishing this task.

That Krupp’s business fortunes were to improve under the new militarist regime was a forgone conclusion. Bringing Germany’s most famous armaments manufacturer onside was paramount to achieving Hitler’s military aims. Krupp quickly re-established its reputation as the “Reich Armoury”. As a result, a steady stream of N.S. powerbrokers flocked to Essen to view, and be viewed, amongst the impressive company facilities. Historical scholarship has thus far overlooked that the time-honoured company tradition
of Besucherpolitik, which was very much in the background in the Weimar period, thus underwent a renaissance of sorts after 1933.

What was also resurrected under the new regime was the mythical figure of Alfred Krupp the ‘cannon king and social visionary’. Under headings like Männer aus eigener Kraft, [Men of personal Power] Genie und Fleiss – führen deutsche Männer zum Erfolg [Genius and hard work – lead German men to success] and Krupp – Kampf um Stahl [Krupp – Fight for Steel], the steel baron was portrayed as a hard working German patriot who had been victorious in battling the enemies abroad (mainly the archrival France) and the enemy within (socialism). The wealth of Alfred’s letters and directive was now pilfered to stress how he had built an industrial empire on perseverance, discipline and undying loyalty to his workers. The rewards, these popular histories claimed, could be seen in three main areas: record financial profits at the time of his death, the ‘victory of the ages’ against France in 1871 and a loyal workforce which had kept the nation’s largest industrial establishment strike free. As the head of the German labour Front, Robert Ley underlined during his visit to Essen in 1934 that ‘few companies have employed the Führerinitiative as well as Krupp.’

In the very epicenter of the Ruhr industrial heartland where the threat of Marx’s proletarian revolution should have been most pronounced, the pacification of the Krupp workforce was truly an amazing achievement. Alfred Krupp’s endless citations stated that he would allow nothing to stand in the way of maintaining his cherished position as “Herr im Hause” [master in his house]. His outright hatred towards what he scathingly denounced as the “schleichende Pest” [creeping pest] of socialism was depicted in numerous hagiographic portrayals published by the firm since 1881. The dramatic story of
his dying wish to construct a low-density cottage and garden community for his workers was retold time after time. In particular, the courage to display the will, make the necessary sacrifices and act decisively on the housing issue in order to safeguard the establishment from the inevitable "Auflehnen aller Klassen" [rising of all classes] against their employers took on a new meaning after 1933. Alfred Krupp's well-publicized views, linking the firm's housing activities directly to this success in averting labour unrest, provided an inspirational historical precedent for right of center reformers. Like Hermann Hecker before them, Richard Klapec, August Heinrichsbauer and Alexander de Neuville cited Krupp's words directly in an effort to show the German government that acting decisively on the housing issue could pay considerable dividends.

The links between Krupp housing and National Socialism have been examined by a number of historians: Roland Günter, Ute Peltz-Dreckmann and more recently Tilmann Harlander. Only the latter two, however, have exposed the direct influence of the Margarethenhöhe on Gottfried Feder's study *Die Neue Stadt* [The New City]. Neither has made a concerted attempt to examine this connection in detail. Both, for example, overlooked the fact that it was not just the Margarethenhöhe that was cited by Feder but, perhaps even more importantly, the Heimaterde. It is crucial to remember that *Die Neue Stadt* was by far the most comprehensive study undertaken on the future of the German urban form by one of the N.S.D.A.P.'s founding ideologues. While completing his research for this work at the Technical University of Berlin, Feder developed a close working relationship with the Düsseldorf state planner Hermann Hecker. It was Hecker who had released the first detailed study on Krupp's housing activities in 1917 and referred to the firm's housing efforts in Essen as "an image of extraordinary Kulturarbeit"
Amusingly, over twenty years later, Feder was equally impressed by Krupp housing achievements, referring specifically to the Margarethenhöhe and Heimaterde as "exemplary practical examples" whose planning design and layout simply "speak for themselves".  

Qualitatively superior to anything Weimar and National Socialist housing activities created by 1939, the Heimaterde and Margarethenhöhe were the "pearls of Krupp housing activities". Low-density and including company stores, schools, churches, and recreation facilities the two projects were essentially fully self-contained urban entities. Situated in the near vicinity of a major source of employment (the Krupp facilities), both foreshadowed the emergence of the modern suburb. Constructed by the firm, which had repeatedly displayed its allegiance to the German military establishment, they were certainly in no way associated with the Lebensreform movement that had been present in the German Garden Cities Association. Socially engineered to allow only those whom the company deemed suitable for settlement to take up residence, they were also not pure social welfare initiatives like the Weimar Kleinsiedlungen.  

In 1939 Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach accepted the "Exemplary N.S.D.A.P. Business Award" on behalf of the firm with the statement: "... [it] honours a socio-political position that rooted in the 128 year tradition, has grown organically into the new era of National Socialist Germany". Since 1855, the firm's housing activities had been an integral part of this socio-political stance. Based on the directives of the austere pragmatist Alfred Krupp, "the cannon king", its early colonies were characterized by functionalist design and rudimentary planning layouts that did not represent a qualitative improvement over the efforts of its Ruhr competitors like the Gutehoffnungshütte and the
Bochumer Verein. It was only after Friedrich Alfred Krupp assumed the leadership of the firm in 1887 and employed the expertise of architect Robert Schmohl that its housing designs began to distinguish themselves. Subsequently, buoyed by the firm's extensive Besucherpolitik, which showcased only its most impressive projects to visiting dignitaries, what Krupp undertook in the housing realm was certain to evoke a response from both supporters and critics. Carefully constructed around the vehemently anti-socialist historical image of Alfred Krupp, the firm could claim that its housing activities had safeguarded the nation's most industrialized city from proletarian revolution. Although at its high point of construction only 10% of its enormous workforce of well over 100,000 employees actually resided in Krupp dwellings, and less than 2% of these in the low-density home and garden projects, the firm's tireless marketing campaigns highlighted this housing type above all others. In numerous publications it projected the idyllic existence of its workers who had been re-attached to their native soil. Whereas the modernist housing movement of the 1920s attempted to deconstruct the very concept of Heimat in the post-World War One era, Krupp was proudly proclaiming that it was doing its patriotic duty to provide the German soldier with a piece of Heimaterde. During the National Socialist era, the likes of Walther Wiedmann, August Heinrichsbauer and Gottfried Feder praised Krupp's housing initiatives as historical precedents to be emulated. As the images of Krupp's Altenhof in the shameless N.S.D.A.P. propaganda publication: La Vie En Allemagne – L’Habitation Allemande attest, by 1941 Krupp's housing legacy had indeed "grown organically into the new era of National Socialist Germany."
ENDNOTES

1 Richard Klapheck, Siedlungswerk Krupp, (Berlin: Wasmuth, 1928), 161-63. Klapeck’s work continues to be the most often cited text on Krupp housing. In particular his appendix on the number and size of dwellings constructed is useful. Seemingly unrestricted in his access to company archival sources, he was able to trace the firm’s housing activities back to the Meisterwohnungen of 1861. This is a favourable depiction of Krupp’s activities. With some remarkable yet unsubstantiated statements, most famously naming Alfred Krupp the “father of the new settlement activity in Germany”. (see p. 6). Due to its lack of proper footnoting Siedlungswerk is a fascinating yet often frustrating read.

2 Hermann Hecker, Der Kruppsche Kleinwohnungsbaus, (Wiesbaden: Heimatkultur, 1917), 5. Released by the Gesellschaft für Heimatkultur during the First World War and awarded this association’s book of the year title. This is the first comprehensive treatment of Krupp housing. Particularly interesting since it attempted to fuse the firm’s militarist image with its company welfare initiatives.


4 Gottfried Feder, Die Neue Stadt: Versuch der Begründung einer neuen Stadtplanungskunst aus der Sozialen Struktur der Bevölkerung, (Berlin: Springer, 1939), 436. Feder’s detailed study on what he perceived to be the ideal cities for the new Germany. Remarkably this N.S. ideologue drew inspiration from two Krupp communities which will be discussed later in this dissertation.

5 Cedric Bolz, Zero Hour has come and gone: Allied efforts to alleviate the German Housing Shortage, 1945-1949, (Simon Fraser University: Burnaby, 1996), 82-84. Hallmarks of the post-war communities built during the early reconstruction period were their remarkably solid construction, generous land allotments, extensive degree of state supervision and their striking physical uniformity.


8 Teut, 251.


10 Feder, Die Neue Stadt, 110.

11 Ibid, 436.

12 Roland Günter, “Krupp und Essen”, Das Kunstwerk zwischen Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung, ed. Martin Warnke, (Göttingen: Bertelsmann, 1970), 136. Unfortunately Günter was not able to substantiate his claims since he did not gain access to the company archives in the early 1970s. Nonetheless, this is an absolute must-read for anyone interested in the socio-political and cultural aspects of workers’ housing. In describing the cultural implications of Krupp housing, Günter was decades ahead
of his time. This historian was to make a name for himself in the successful preservation of the oldest worker’s community in the Ruhr: Eisenheim. To this day it has been carefully preserved near Oberhausen and has proven an inspiration to this study. See Günter Morsch, Eisenheim: Die Älteste Arbeiteriedlung im Ruhrgebiet, (Cologne: Rheinland, 1990).

13 Ibid. 147.

14 Ibid. 138. Günter citing a Krupp speech to his employees delivered in 1877: “Dieser Geist [der Sozialdemokratie] ... ist verderblich ... Man erwärmt keine Schlange an seiner Brust, und wer nicht von Herzen ergeben mit uns geht, wer unseren Ordnungen wiederstrebt, kann nicht im Kreise unserer Arbeiter bleiben.”

15 Ibid. 151.


18 To date this collection includes nearly fifty major company monographs and approximately thirty substantial external publications on Krupp’s history. This very comprehensive collection can be found in the Villa-Hügel archive.


20 Ibid. 14.

21 Nicholas Stargardt, The German Idea of Militarism: Radical and Socialist Critics, 1866-1914 (New York: Cambridge UP, 1994), 56. A very balanced and refreshing study that contextualizes the development of German militarism against the backdrop of the increasingly popularity of the German political left. Rather than portray the forces of militarism and radicalism in isolation, Stargardt was able to find numerous examples in the popular press that show how archaic displays of Prussian militarism provided publications like Vorwärts and Kladderadatsch with an endless stream of material. That the S.P.D. emerged as the largest socialist party in Europe during the 1912 elections is all too often overshadowed by the mayhem that broke out in 1914. Stargardt has done a great deal to reverse this one-dimensional historical trend.


24 Wilhelm Berdrow, *Alfred Krupp und sein Geschlecht: 150 Jahre Krupp Geschichte nach den Quellen der Familie und des Werks von Wilhelm Berdrow*, (Berlin: Schmidt, 1943), 233-236. This is the standard company history by the firm’s most prolific archivist/historian.


26 Alfred Krupp was an obsessive note taker, leaving behind over 50,000 written documents.


28 Klapeck, *Siedlungswerk*, 16.

29 Ibid.


31 See for example Johann Paul’s *Alfred Krupp und die Arbeiterbewegung*, (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1987) and Frank Bajohr’s *Zwischen Krupp und Kommune*, (Essen: Klartext, 1988). Both publications rely heavily on the Vorwärts coverage of Krupp’s activities.

32 Vorwärts, Nr. 297, December 20, 1902.

33 In 1998 the company still enjoyed the clout to keep the re-release of Bernt Engelmann’s critical *Krupp zwischen Legende und Wirklichkeit*, (Munich: Schneekluth, 1969), off the shelves of Essen’s largest bookstore (Baedeker).


35 Ibid., 117-118.

36 Ibid., 118.


38 Interestingly enough, published under the less aggressive title: *Krupp - Zwölf Generationen in Germany*.

39 Günter, 136. Upon my first visit in 1998 I was asked to submit a copy of my M.A. while permission was pending. After examining the thesis the archive granted me access. The process begs the question whether or not the firm is still involved in what Roland Günter has labelled as “Denkmalpflege” [Heritage Preservation].

40 Manchester went to extremes and traced Krupp’s ‘mythical lineage’ back to Wagner’s Schmied Wieland!, 833.

42 Ibid, 235.


52 Canadian Recruitment Office, *Loyal Talk won’t beat Kaiser Krupp and Kultur train men will! Enlist now!*, illus., (Toronto: Central Recruitment Committee, 1914-1918). Canadian recruitment poster probably from 1914/15. Used here with the very kind permission of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Rare Books Collection.

53 Wolfgang Schulze and Arnold Weiler, *Krupp und Essen: Geschichte und Geschichten in dokumentarischen Ansichtskarten*. (Essen: Pomp und Sobkowiak, 1978), 177. This is a fascinating and at times very humorous account of the postcards that were sent around the globe from Essen.

54 Stargardt, 56.

55 de Neuville, 57.

56 Klappeck, *Siedlungswerk*, 75.


Cecilia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials - The German Idea of Heimat. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 3-6. More recently, Elizabeth Boa and Rachel Palfreyman have broadened the debate on the Heimat dialectic to stretch from the 1890s to the reunification of Germany. Although their approach is more general than Applegate’s, the authors do concur that the word “bears many connotations, drawing together associations which no single English word could convey.” See Elizabeth Boa and Rachel Palfreyman, Heimat - A German Dream: Regional Loyalties and National Identity in German Culture, 1890-1990. (New York: Oxford UP, 2000), 1.


Applegate, 198.

Harlander, Kleinsiedlungspolitik, 123,137.


See in particular the controversy surrounding German reparations to slave labourers that was not settled until June, 2002. On Krupp’s role in particular see Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers and the proceedings of the Nuremberg Trials of which Volume Nine deals specifically with the Krupp case.

Stargardt, 56.


H.C. Engelbrecht, Merchants of Death. (New York: Garland, 1934), 70-84.

H.C. Engelbrecht, Merchants of Death. (New York: Garland, 1934), 70-84.


“The Illustrated London News,” (February 8, 1851), from Manchester *Arms of Krupp*, 69.


Gall, *Krupp: Der Aufstieg*, 145. Krupp’s first contract with the Prussian state was in May 1859.


Ibid.


“The Krupp Exhibit at the Great Fair”, *The Scientific American*, July 15, 1893

Ibid.

Tenfelde, 35.

Renate Köhne-Lindenlaub, “Krupp”, *International Directory of Company Histories Vol. IV*, (London: St. James Press, 1992), 86. Köhne-Lindenlaub was the head archivist at Krupp while I was conducting my research. Along with Hertwig Muther the staff was very accommodating and professional.

Franklin B. Cooling marks the Naval Appropriation Bill of that same year (1893) as the birth of the American Military Industrial Complex in *Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy*, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1979).

*The Scientific American*, August 22, 1896, 175.


Krupp Archiv, WA 10 3,9, (April 21, 1871). See also Gall *Krupp: Der Aufstieg*, 154.

Krupp Archiv, Briefe, vol.10 (1871), 32.


Vickers and Schneider-Cruzeot. Intensification of this politics of visitation seemed to rise and fall in relation to armaments contracts.

92 Tenfelde, 14.

93 Willy Boelcke ed., Krupp und die Hohenzollern. (Berlin: Rütten und Loening, 1956), Appendix non-paginated. This is a key primary source document that already included an appendix of Krupp’s clearly distinguishing between “Kriegs” und “Friedens” Material from 1848 to 1851.


95 Ibid, 37.

96 Tenfelde, 20. The author breaks these figures down into 13,044 being employed at the main factory in Essen and a total employee number including branchplants of 20,200.

97 See for example the catalogue of writings by Wilhelm Berdrow, Ernst Schroeder, and Gert von Klass.

98 Diedrich Baedecker, Alfred Krupp und die Entwicklung der Gussstahlfabrik zu Essen: Nach authentischen Quellen. (Essen: Baedecker, 1889), 122.

99 Tenfelde, 18.

100 Baedecker, 121.

101 Undoubtedly the most famous Krupp quote containing the company creed: “Der Zweck der Arbeit soll das Gemeinwohl sein” and reprinted in numerous publications. See Hecker, 9, Wilhelm Berdrow, Krupp und sein Geschlecht, 84 and Klaepeck, Siedlungswerk, 21-22.

102 Berdrow, Krupp und sein Geschlecht, 170-71.

103 Krupp Archiv, WA 9h 234.

104 Berdrow, Krupp und sein Geschlecht, 212.

105 See Owen, “Military Industrial Relations” in which the author shows that it was often a challenge for both sides to obtain suitable prices for armaments.

106 Tenfelde, 20.


109 Information provided via e-mail courtesy of Hartwig Muether, Krupp Archivist (November 11, 1998).


Stoffers, 58. Images of this exhibition have also been reproduced in Kristiana Hartmann's Deutsche Gartenstadtbewegung: Kulturpolitik und Gesellschaftsreform. (Munich: Heinz Moos Verlag, 1976), 26.

Tirpitz to Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, BA-MA, RMA, Nachlass Tirpitz 17, October 5, 1913.

Köhne-Lindenlaub, 86.


Wilhelm II visited Essen on the following dates: June 26, 1877, Summer 1890, 1896, June 19-20 and November 26, 1902, August 10 and October 15, 1906 and September 10, 1918.

The official company release cited a stroke as the cause of death. See Boelcke, Krupp und die Hohenzollern, 100. The company version is disputed by Bernt Engelman Krupp: Zwischen Legende und Wirklichkeit and especially William Manchester in The Arms of Krupp, 228-230. Both point towards a suicide and cover-up.

Augsburger Postzeitung first picked up the story on November 8th, 1902.

Vorwärts, Nr. 268, November 15th, 1902.


Ibid.

Klapeck, Siedlungswerk, 128.

See for example the recent newspaper article: „Auf der Margarethehöhe gehen die Uhren anders: In der Gartenstadt lebt es sich beschaulich“, Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 214, September 11, 1998.

Owen, 84.

Stargardt, 122.

For a contemporary account of the proceedings, see A. Zimmermann, Prozess Brandt und Genossen: Der sogennante Krupp-Prozeß. (Berlin: 1914).

Canadian Recruitment Office.

Schulze and Weiler, Krupp und Essen, 127.

Ibid, 129.

131 *Kruppsche Mitteilungen*, Nr. 32, File # DII 91, (Essen Library Heimatkunde Collection: September 4, 1918), 200-201.

132 See for example Berghahn, 44-51.


134 Kocka, 159-160. For a primary account see War Minister von Heeringen’s address to the Reichstag in 1916 to explain the supposedly ‘brutal methods the English were employing against the German people.’ He went on to say that these methods had backfired since at ‘no time in its history was the nation closer to the soldiers at the front.’ *Stenographische Berichte*, Session 43, April 10, 1916, 956-957.


141 See Walther Kieß’ overview of on Huber’s impact in *Urbanismus*, 336-340.


143 D O Lehmann, “Die Entwicklung der staatlichen Wohnungspolitik in Preußen und dem Deutschen Reiche”, *Heimstättenarbeit in Westfalen im Lichte 50jähriger Staatlicher Wohnungspolitik*, eds. Stephan Poerschke and Joachim Seraphim, (Münster: Wilhelms UP, 1952), 16. This is an important collection of essays penned by individuals who were active in pushing for the national housing law. Most significantly, it includes an introductory essay by Stephan Poerschke himself. It also includes a contribution by former Krupp housing director Eugen Lauffer.


145 Bullock and Read, 49-50.

146 Schollmeier, 27.

147 Engels, 12.

148 Bullock and Read, 76.

Ibid, 324.

Camillo Sitte cited in Kieß, 393.


Two of the most famous German followers of Sitte were Karl Henrici and Theodor Fischer. See Kieß, 398-99.

Ibid.

For a scathing critique of this building material in England see for example Olive Cook, *The English House through Seven Centuries*. (London: Nelson, 1968), 262. The book also contains some gorgeous photographs of some of the finest examples of English domestic architecture.

Camillo Sitte, *Der Stadtteilbau nach künstlerischen Grundsatzen*. (Vienna; C. Graeser, 1889), 123-24. Original German reads: „Sowohl das moderne Leben als auch die moderne Technik lassen eine getreue Nachahmung alten Stadtanlagen nicht mehr zu, eine Erkenntnis die wir uns nicht mehr verschließen können, ohne in unfruchtbare Phantasterei zu verfallen.“


Ibid, 130.

Reducing everything to the lowest common denominator of “good or bad”, foreshadowed the rhetoric of National Socialist propaganda. In particular Adolf Hitler’s speeches were filled with this reductionist phraseology as J. P. Sterns has so convincingly illustrated in *The Führer and the People*. Paul Schultz-Naumburg’s involvement with the N.S.D.A.P. is further examined in Chapter Six.

Ibid, 183.

Bergmann, 153.


Probably the best example of the diverse list of members is evident in the Gartenstadtgesellschafts trip to England in July 1909. Among the people who made the voyage were: the brothers Kampffmeyer, Georg Metzendorf and his wife, Dr. Karl Oppenheimer and his wife, Architect H. Wagner from Bremen and Franz Zell architect and editor of *Süddeutschen Bauzeitung*. See Deutsche Gartenstadtgesellschaft, *Aus Englischen Gartenstädten: Beobachtungen und Ergebnisse einer sozialen Studienreise*. (Berlin: Renaissance Verlag, 1910), 13-16.

Bergmann, 156.
All street names taken from Krupp’s Margarethenhöhe.

A memorable term coined by L. Feuth in “Reichsmetropole und Gartenstadt” to describe what needed to be done on a practical level. Published in Gartenstadt, Year III, (Berlin: 1909), 67.

See for example the pictures of music and hiking clubs along with the famous image of Hellerau that shows women in flowing gowns dancing and reaching for the sky. The last image was accompanied by the caption “Empor!” in Hartmann, Deutsche Gartenstadtbewegung, 20-21.

Excerpt from Walther Darre’s 1931 essay „Wiedergeburt des Bauernums“, cited here from Bergmann, 299.

Figure taken from the most recent and comprehensive study on the D.G.G. by Schollmeier, 69.

Remarkably, given the rising shortages of dwellings, Wirtschaftspartei member Törissen reflected in 1926 that “the private sector did not fail prior to the [First World] war.” See Verhandlungen und Stenographische Berichte des Reichstages, 1871-1932, Volume 424, Session 68, 1799.

Bullock and Read p. 236.


For the Independent Socialists and later the Communist Party homesteads and co-operatives were interpreted as half measures that coerced the workers to become part of the petit bourgeoisie. In the 1920s, especially the K.P.D. would chastize the S.P.D. for having sold out on this issue. See for example K.P.D. member Schumann who stated in reference to the detached single family dwelling in 1929 “Vor dem Kriege waren sie [S.P.D.] noch mit uns.” Stenographische Berichte, vol. 426, Session 118, Tues. December 17, 1929, 3624.

Number cited by German Nationalist Party member Gierke when the thirteenth attempt was finally made law in 1920. Stenographische Berichte, vol. 333, Session 175, Thurs. April 29, 1920, 5611.


Ibid, 445.

Hans J. Teuteber and Clemens Wischermann eds., Wohnalltag in Deutschland, 1850-1914, (Münster: Coppenrath Verlag, 1985), 369. This is a memorable work utilizing mainly primary documents on the housing issue and fusing them with insightful comments by Teuteberg.

Berger-Thimme, 103.

Damaschke, 449.

The significance of Kiel as Germany’s major naval base is important in this regard. An urban concentration with a very high percentage of military personnel that could, and as events proved in 1918 during the Kiel Mutiny did escalate into a revolutionary activities.


See for example: Klapeck, Stemmerich and Hecker who all make this significant oversight in their respective studies.


Krupp Archiv, „Erinnerungen Merks“, WA 8 181. Merks was a single non-skilled worker.

Krupp Archiv, „Erinnerungen Hagewiesche“ WA 135. Hagewiesche was one of the original highly-skilled master craftsmen.

This covers Roland Günter’s successful effort in the mid-1970’s to have the community designated as a historic site.

The second part of this local history which makes a valiant attempt to retrace who occupied these early dwellings. It also captures some of the last photographic images of Kotten that did not survive past the 1960s.


Personal interview with Frau M. Narres, June 3, 1998. As a child of a Krupp worker she remembered what a benefit it was to be eligible to shop at the Cronenberg Consum. Once a week she would buy fresh rolls there and sell them to office workers for a 40% mark up!

Krupp Co., Führer durch die Wohlfahrtsinrichtungen der Gussstahlfabrik, 31. By 1907 nine of these halls were built and were located in: Westend, Schederhof, Cronenberg, Nordhof, Friedrichshof plus one in downtown Essen and one in the suburb of Bredeney.
Directly translated into English as settlement. The concept is however infinitely more complex. One of the most comprehensive definitions can be found in Ronald Wiedenhoeft Berlin’s Housing Revolution: German Reform in the 1920s, (Ann Arbor: Uni Research Press, 1985), 12. “A Siedlung is not simply a housing project, but rather group housing ideally designated as a community and with a close and fruitful relationship to the land. There was always an implication – at least in the early years – that a degree of subsistence gardening was needed at least in order to achieve physical and moral regeneration from the debased state to which the urban workers had sunk.”

Klapeck, Siedlungswerk, 6.

Enke, 31.

Köhne-Lindenlaub and Völse eds., 15.

Krupp Archiv, “Krupp an Gussman”, May 17, 1887, WA 9h 234.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Bullock and Read, 123.


Krupp Co., Führer durch die Essener Wohnsiedlungen der Firma Krupp, 16.

Deutsche Konkurrenzen, Nr. 18, 1893, 1.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Deutsche Konkurrenzen, Nr. 18, 1893, 1.


Photo taken from Hubbard and Shippobottom, 63. It shows the homes constructed by Lomax-Simpson in 1906.


Krupp Archiv, „Letter from Haux to Margarethe Krupp regarding Schmohl and Metzendorf“, February 14, 1910, FAH III M 94.


Official statistics indicated the highest percentage of non-Krupp employees residing in the Margarethenhöhe was approximately 38%. Moreover, these were predominantly white collar professionals and not individuals from the lower classes.


Metzendorf, preface, non-paginated.

„Siedlungsgenossenschaft Heimaterde“, *Kruppsche Mitteilungen*, Nr. 32, September 4, 1918, 200-201, Essen City Library Archival Collection, D II 91.

Bertrand, 11-12.

Krupp Wohnungsbau, *Untersuchung Heimaterde*. (Essen: Information zur Stadtentwicklung, 1976), Krupp Archiv K10.41, 21. This is an urban impact study commissioned by the city of Essen containing useful demographic profiles.

Krupp Co., *Führer durch die Essener Wohnsiedlungen der Firma Krupp*. 36.

Ibid, 37. Based on his ancestral home (*Stammhaus*), workers were to have dwellings of five rooms. See Klapheck, p. 22 for *Stammhaus* floorplan.


Ibid.


Bergmann, 89.

Schultze-Naumburg *Kulturarbeiten*, 193.

Ibid, 188-189.


Enke, 31.


Ibid, 234-235.

Kocka, 85-87.


Enke, 232.

Ibid.
Although both Volker Berghahn and Hans Ulrich Wehler have suggested that the Kaiser’s attempts to highlight his social deeds towards the working classes abated after 1890, Kristianna Hartmann’s images of the display of “social political actions” at the Düsseldorf Industrial Exhibition indicates that the Hohenzollern propaganda campaign was still going strong a decade later. His photo opportunities at Krupp’s Margarethenhöhe seem to follow in this tradition. See Hartmann, Deutsche Gartenstadtbewegung, 9.

Otto Albert Schneider, „Die Gartenstadt Hüttenau und andere Wohnbauten von Architekt Professor Georg Metzendorf, Essen“, Moderne Bauformen, Year 9, Nr. 4, April, 1914, 161.

Essen Museum Director Gosebruch, as cited in Metzendorf, 5.


Hannes Meyer, „Die Neue Welt“, Das Werk, Nr. 7, 1926, 205-224.


See most recently Boa and Palfreyman, Heimat: A German Dream, 34. The authors also depict Schultze-Naumburg as a key right-wing Heimat advocate who spanned three historical periods. On the whole, however, their focus on Schultze-Naumburg is rather brief choosing instead to examine the works of Adolf Bartels and Clara Viebig.

Hecker, Der Kruppsche Kleinwohnungsbau, 170.

Ibid, 88.

Ibid, 5.

Ibid.
Ibid, 9.

Ibid, 8. On this point Hecker stated specifically: “This is why the study of the Krupp Kleinwohnungsbau from an architectural perspective is so incredibly informative. Here we see the uninterrupted sequence of all development phases pass by us, which the Kleinwohnungsbau has gone through.”

Ibid, 15.


Gropius, Total Architecture, 19.

Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976). Kitchen depicts the immense political clout these two generals exerted in Germany as the First World War dragged on. Both would comprise a critical component of the so-called “stab in the back myth” and Hindenburg in particular seemed to remain an ever-present political remnant of the Prussian militarist order. Raising the mantle of Prussian paternalism or esprit de corps immediately after the armistice thus added extra political pressure on the Ebert coalition from the political right at an inopportune time for the new government.

Dorothea Berge-Thimme remarks on the letters from Hindenburg and Ludendorff: “The letters were published in the [Bodenreform] yearbook for 1918 – in the third issue, the last before the revolution and functioned in the following versions as the highest proof of the national importance of this issue.” Wohnungsfrage und Sozialstaat, 110.

Hubatsch, 182.

Ibid, 183.


Examining the Stenographische Berichte just prior to the passing of the Homestead law reveals that only the Independent Socialists vehemently opposed it. Most vocal was their member Zubeil who stated: “It is our opinion that this law cannot in any way provide social assistance to those from whom it was intended. We therefore vote to oppose the law.” Stenographische Berichte, vol. 333, Session 175, April 29, 1920, 5612.


Ibid.
In 1930 Krupp continued with its publications heralding the social achievements of its communities in the publication: Krupp Co., Führer durch die Essener Wohnsiedlung der Firma Krupp.

Here I am particularly indebted to Dr. Susan S. Henderson for her very useful and informative insights on the German housing during the Weimar period.


Ibid, 16.


Ibid. Paul Schultze-Naumburg’s reply.

Ibid.

Miller Lane, Architecture and Politics, 122.


Ibid, 142-145.

Klapeck, Siedlungswerk, 3.

Ibid, 6.

Not surprisingly, Klapeck’s work would receive official company approval in its 1938 publication Führer durch die Essener Wohnsiedlungen der Firma Krupp, 5.

Klapeck, Siedlungswerk, 16.

Ibid, 159.

Ibid.
For a comparison of both documents, see Poerschke, 220-226.

Most damaging in this regard were the protocols of the Nuremberg Trials: Trials of Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals - Vol. 9 The Krupp Case. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952). William Manchester’s The Arms of Krupp also did much to keep the memory of Krupp and the N.S.D.A.P. alive in the 1960s.


Gottfried Feder was instrumental in drafting the platform and by the 1920s Hitler appointed Feder as the official party contact for all matters concerning official policy. See Gottfried Feder, Hitler’s Official Programme and his Fundamental Ideas. (New York: Howard Fertig,1971), 25.


P. Buß, „Krupps bestes Nachkriegsjahr“, Der Wirtschaftsring. Nr. 12, March 31, 1939, 405-406.

Manchester, 366.

Bruno Paul Schaumburg, Männer aus eigener Kraft. (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1938), 266.


360 Klapeck, while not an official company publication, nonetheless went out of his way to dedicate the book to „Frau F.A. Krupp – Der hocherzigen und feinsinnden Hitterin eines grossen Vernüchtertisses...”

361 Berdrow, Krupp und sein Geschlecht, 238. This hard to find 1943 edition of the 1937 book is perhaps the most intriguing since the Krupp company historian has added a number of pages on the position of the firm in the 1930s. Interestingly, along with the well-known Altenhof and Margarethenhöhe, Berdrow also elevated the Heimaterde to the level of “Perle des Kruppischen Siedlungswerkes”, 234.

362 Nolte, 389.

363 Walther Darré cited in Bergmann, 299-300.

364 Ibid.

365 Teut, 251.


366 Gottfried Feder, “Rede anläßlich der Eröffnung der Ausstellung Baugesinnung und Gemeinschaftsinn“, Siedlung und Wirtschaft, Nr. 5, May 9, 1934, 185-186.

367 National Socialist publications were notorious for not citing their sources thoroughly. In Das Deutsche Siedlungswerk, (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1937), Johann Wilhelm Ludowici does not mention any industrialists specifically but praises the function of workers’ homesteads for senior employees (see p. 88). Robert Ley was seemingly also impressed by the Krupp workers’ welfare record and restated the famous Alfred Krupp quote “the purpose of work is the common well-being” to underline his point in his work Schaffende Volk, 23-24. Feder provides by far the best direct link to Krupp in his work Die Neue Stadt, 436.

369 de Neuville, 57-58.

370 Ibid.

371 Ibid, 69.

372 Ibid, 102.


While I was conducting my research in the Essen Library I was fortunate enough to meet a senior professor from the University of Koblenz who recommended the Heinrichsbauer book with the preamble that “It began with a great deal of promise and then deteriorated into N.S. rhetoric”. The scholar found the latter part of the book to be ‘virtually unreadable’. All the more curious about what had triggered this emotional response, I ordered the book immediately. Subsequently Dr. Richard Kraemer was nice enough
to send me two additional letters with his insights and further references on the topic.


376 Ibid, 74.

377 Ibid, 90.

378 Ibid, 168.

379 Borrmann, 198.

380 Fey, 22.

381 Ludowici as cited in Wiedmann, Industrielle Heimstättensiedlung, preface, non-paginated.


383 Wiedmann, 127-129.


385 Ibid, 7.


387 Franz Seldte, Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich, 1933-38. (Munich: Beck’sche Verlagbuchhandlung, 1939), 176.

388 Deutsche Arbeitsfront, 8.

389 Harlander, Zwischen Heimstätte und Wohnmaschine, 54.

390 Teut, 251.

391 Weihsmann, 69.

392 Effectively, funding for the housing sector had been slashed drastically by the N.S.D.A.P. by 1937 when only 10 percent of new homes were supported by state subsidies compared to 20% in 1933 and approximately 50% during the last four years of the Weimar Republic. See Teut, 252, Cedric Bolz Zero Hour, 37-40 and Paul Wendt Housing Reform, 114-115.

393 Teut, 251.

394 This work has received some long overdue scholarly attention by Harlander in Zwischen Heimstätte und Wohnmaschine, 65, and, more recently, Ulrike Hærendel, Kommunale Wohnungspolitik im Dritten Reich: Siedlungsideologie, Kleinhausbau und Wohnraumarisierung am Beispiel Münchens.
Both however barely examine its contents and only Harlander mentions the link to the Margaretenhöhe.

395 Feder, _Hitler’s Official Programme and his Fundamental Ideas_, (New York: 1971). English translation of the 1927 original: “Adolf Hitler, at a conference of all district organizers in Bamberg on February 14, 1923, formally appointed Gottfried Feder to be the final judge of all questions connected with the program.” By 1934, this unaltered edition of the party program had reached its fifth edition.

396 Feder, _Die Neue Stadt_, 2. As N.S.D.A.P. State Secretary, Feder visited Essen on October 18, 1933. During his speech in the Saalbau, he identified the “bevölkerungspolitische” role of Siedlungen and the key responsibility state and industry had in promoting their construction. He also warned: “the peripheral Siedlungen should not become a romanticized construct. One should only create peripheral Siedlungen when it is possible to guarantee full-time employment for their inhabitants.” Essener Volkszeitung, October 18, 1933, Essen Library File Za 5,11. Thus, the ideas that led him towards admiring Krupp’s Margaretenhöhe and Heimaterde in _Die Neue Stadt_, were already beginning to take shape in 1933.

397 Ibid, 436.

398 Ibid, 14.

399 Ibid, 18.

400 See Peltz-Dreckmann, 183 and Harlander Zwischen Heimstätte und Wohnmaschine, 65.

401 Günter, 150-151.


403 Ibid. In his memoirs Hecker reflected his relationship with Feder “The continuous professional conversations with him were very valuable to me.”, 88-89.

404 Berdrow, _Krupp und sein Geschlecht_, 238-239. This edition also includes some interesting observations by this Krupp historian about the grand attributes of Nazi Germany...

405 Köhne-Lindenlaub and Völse, Chronological entry for the year 1943.

406 During my Master’s research I already came across a copy of Lauffer’s study in the Essen Library Heimatkunde Collection. Unaware of the author’s background, the importance of its contents only began to crystallize as this dissertation took on its final form.

407 Eugen Lauffer, _Das Wohnungswesen der Fried. Krupp A.G. in Essen_, (Essen: 1941), unpublished manuscript in Essen City Library Heimatkunde Collection, File #StB 1961-1310. Another copy is stored in the Krupp Archiv, p.3

408 Ibid, 10.


410 Ibid, 4.

411 Ibid, 18.
La Vie En Allemagne – L’Habitation Allemande. (Brussels: Maison Internationale, 1940), non-paginated. This propaganda document was presumably published by the Deutsche Arbeitsfront soon after the conquest of Belgium in June 1940.

The identical images can be found in Hecker’s Der Krupp’sche Kleinwohnungsbau, p. 147 and 126, and in Klappeck, Siedlungswerk, 57. The original is in the Krupp Archiv, W 1019. Interestingly, Hecker’s image of the street scene (Dia. # 46) is identical to the N.S. propaganda image (Dia.# 47) with the exception that in the latter the elderly people and the Krupp photo number have been removed. Even all the shadows and leaves are in exactly the same locations!

Schulze and Weiler, 2.

Tenfelde, 14.

Canadian Recruitment Poster.

Stargardt, 56.

Andreas Helfrich’s study on the Margarethenöhöhe is the latest offering in this regard. The odd dearth in English language publications is very difficult to explain given the scope and global stature of the Krupp firm. Nicholas Bullock and Allan Read have offered the most thorough English assessment of the topic thus far. Most recently see Barbara Miller Lane, National Romanticism and Modern Architecture in Germany and the Scandinavian Countries. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), 146-148, where the author has made mention of the Altenhof.

Teut, 251.


Hecker, Der Krupp’sche Kleinsiedlungsbau, introduction, non-paginated.

Feder, Die Neue Stadt, 436.

Head archivist Wilhelm Berdrow cited these two projects along with the Altenhof as the best the company had produced up to 1941 in Krupp und sein Geschlecht, 234.

Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach on May 27th, 1936 on occasion of a Hitler visit to the Krupp plant in Essen. Cited from Berdrow, Krupp und sein Geschlecht, 434. Hitler believed Essen and Chemnitz to be the “capitals of German industry.” See H.R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler's Table Talk. (Suffolk: Clay and Company, 1953), 603.

Berdrow, Krupp und sein Geschlecht, 434.
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Archiv für Sozialgeschichte
Archiv und Wirtschaft
Augsburger Postzeitung
British Medical Journal
Centralblatt der Bauverwaltung
Central European History
Concordia
Der Wirtschaftsring
Deutsche Konkurrenzen
Deutsche Monatsschrift für das gesamte Leben der Gegenwart
Essener Volkszeitung
Frankfurter Zeitgemäße Brochüren
Harper's New Monthly Magazine
Kruppsche Mitteilungen
Kruppsche Monatshefte
Journal für Geschichte
Moderne Bauformen
Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte
Review of Reviews
Scientific American
Scientific American
Schriftenreihe des Reichsheimstättenamt der N.S.D.P. und der Arbeitsfront
Siedlung und Wirtschaft
Stahl und Eisen
Tradition
Tradition
Vorwärts
Wacht auf!
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
Zeitschrift des Rheinischen Vereins für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz
Zeitschrift für Unternehmergeschichte
Secondary Publications


Feder, Gottfried. „Rede anläßlich der Eröffnung der Ausstellung Baugesinnung und Gemeinschaftssinn“. *Siedlung und Wirtschaft.* Nr. 5. May 9, 1934. 185-186.


Gussman, D. Vortrag über die Kruppischen Arbeiterwohnungen. Essen: Buchdruckerei Krupp, 1892.


“International Congress of Workmen’s Accidents and Assurance”. *British Medical Journal*. June 28, 1902. 1613-1614


Tirpitz to Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach. BA-MA, RMA, Nachlass Tirpitz 17, October 5, 1913.


FIGURES
Kaiser Wilhelm II with his military entourage (including Großadmiral von Tirpitz and members of the General Staff) accompanied by Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and architect Georg Metzendorf during a visit to the recently completed Margarethenhöhe on August 9th, 1912.

Source: Stephan Reulecke, ed. Geschichte des Wohnens (Stuttgart: 1997)
Fig. #3  Source: G. Stoffers ed. *Industrie- und Gewerbe- Kunstausstellung* (Düseeldorf: 1903)

Fig. #4  

**Menage**

Source: Krupp Co. *Führer durch die Wohlfahrtsseinrichtungen* (Essen: 1907)
Fig. #5a

Fig. #5b

Fig. #5c

Meisterhäuser

Source: Daniel Stemmrich Die Siedlung als Programm (New York: 1981)
Fig. #6

Colonie Westend

A. Alt-Westend
B. Neue-Westend
C. Baugrund-Wohnhäuser
D. Consum-Anstalt
E. Bierhalte

Fig. #7

Krupp Co. Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen der Gusstahlfabrik (Essen 1902)
Fig. #8 Colonie Schederhof

Wohnhaus für 4 Familien
System D

Source: Krupp Co. Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen der Gusstahlfabrik (Essen: 1902)
Fig. #10
Colonie Cronenberg

Wohnhäuser für je 6 Familien
System F

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Anzahl der Wohnungen</th>
<th>Räume pro Wohnung</th>
<th>Fläche pro Wohnung (qm)</th>
<th>Wohnraum u. Küche im 1. Obergeschoß (qm)</th>
<th>Fläche pro Wohnung (qm)</th>
<th>Preise pro Gebäude (Mark)</th>
<th>Baukosten (Mark)</th>
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<tr>
<td>F Eckbau</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>128,23</td>
<td>75,72</td>
<td>67,66%</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>146,00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>96,77</td>
<td>62,78</td>
<td>64,04%</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>148,10</td>
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Source: Krupp Co. Wohlfahrtsinrichtungen der Gusstahlfabrik (Essen: 1902)KRUPPBAU BUREAU.
Fig. #11  
Colonie  Cronenberg

[Map of Colonie Cronenberg with labels for different buildings and areas such as housing blocks, schools, parks, etc.]

Source: Krupp Co. Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen der Gusstahlfabrik (Essen: 1902)
III. Colonie Baumhof  
Wohnungen  
Consul-Anstalten  
Feuerwache  
Spritzenhaus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baujahr System</th>
<th>Wohnungen</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Dämmproz.</th>
<th>Dämmung in Mm</th>
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<td>1873</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

Summa: 154

Feldgrösse: 21309 m²  
Wegen: 5966 m²

Häuser und Gärten: 119,10

Source: Krupp Co. Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen der Gusstahlfabrik (Essen: 1902)
Source: Krupp Co. Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen der Gusstahlfabrik (Essen: 1902)
Source: Hermann Hecker Der Kruppsche Kleinwohnungsbau (Wiesbaden: 1917)

Source: Richard Klapheck Siedlungswerk Krupp (Berlin: 1930)
Siedlung Altenhof II

Fig. #17

Source: Hermann Hecker Der Kruppsche Kleinwohnungsbau (Wiesbaden: 1917)
Fig. #18  Port Sunlight

Source: Hubbard and Shippobottom  A Guide to Port Sunlight (Liverpool: 1990)

Fig. #19  Siedlung
Dahlauser Heide

Source: Hermann Hecker  Der Kruppsche Kleinwohnungsbau (Wiesbaden: 1917)
Source: Richard Klapheck *Siedlungswerk Krupp* (Berlin: 1930)
Fig. #21  Siedlung Emscher-Lippe

Source: Hermann Hecker Der Kruppsche Kleinwohnungsbau (Wiesbaden: 1917)
Fig. #22  Siedlung Emscher-Lippe

Source: Richard Klapheck Siedlungswerk Krupp (Berlin: 1930)
Fig. #23  
Margarethenhöhe  
(Bridge View)

Source: Gerhard Steinhauer, Gartenstadt Margarethenhöhe (Essen: 1956)

Fig. #24  
Margarethenhöhe  
(Steile Straße)

Source: Gerhard Steinhauer, Gartenstadt Margarethenhöhe (Essen: 1956)
Fig. #25  Margarethenhöhe  (Aerial Photograph, 1931)

Source: Gerhard Steinhauer  Gartenstadt Margarethenhöhe  (Essen: 1956)

Fig. #26  Margarethenhöhe  (Krupp Consum)

Fig. #27
Siedlung
Heimaterde

Source: Richard Klapheck *Siedlungswerk Krupp* (Berlin: 1930)

Fig. #28
Heimaterde Gasthaus
(Krug zur Heimaterde)

Source: Herbert Schmitz *Höfe, Kotten und ihre Bewohner* (Essen: 1989)
Fig. #29  Siedlung Heimaterde

Source: Richard Klapheck  Siedlungswerk Krupp (Berlin: 1930)
Fig. #30
Krupp Housing
Developments
in Essen

Source: Krupp Archiv
Fig. #31
Dessau-Törten

Source: Barbara Miller Lane *Architecture and Politics in Germany* (Cambridge: 1968)

Fig. #32
Weissenhof

Source: Barbara Miller Lane *Architecture and Politics in Germany* (Cambridge: 1968)
Source: Barbara Miller Lane *Architecture and Politics in Germany* (Cambridge: 1968) *Fig. # 33*

Weissenhof

Source: Norbert Bormann *Paul Schultze-Naumburg* (Essen: 1989)

[Postcard originally released in 1941] *Fig. # 34*

Weissenhof

“Araberdorf”
Fig. # 35
Weimar Kleinsiedlung

Source: Poerschke and Seraphim eds. Heimstätten in Westfalen (Münster: 1952)

Fig. # 36
"Welcome to [Essen]
the Armoury of the Reich"

Source: Völkischer Beobachter (27th September. 1937)
Fig. # 37
N.S. Propaganda
"Farmer and Worker as Neighbours
The New Germany must be built on the Twin Pillars of the Farmer and Worker"

Source: Johann Wilhelm Ludowici *Das Deutsche Siedlungswerk* (Heidelberg: 1937)

Fig. # 38
N.S. Propaganda
"Development of the Housing Culture of the Worker"

Source: Deutsche Arbeitsfront *Die Deutsche Heimstätten – Siedlung* (Berlin: 1935)
Fig. # 39
Margarethenhöhe in Feder
(Site Plan)
Source: Gottfried Feder  Die Neue Stadt
(Berlin: 1939)

Fig. # 40
Margarethenhöhe in Feder
(Aerial View)
Source: Gottfried Feder  Die Neue Stadt (Berlin: 1939)

Fig. #41
Heimaterde in Feder
(Site Plan)
Source: Gottfried Feder  Die Neue Stadt
(Berlin: 1939)
Fig. #42

Source: Richard Klapheck *Siedlungswerk Krupp* (Berlin: 1930)

Altenhof I
Pfründnerhäuser
De même qu’il prend soin de la jeunesse, l’État national-socialiste se voue au bien-être des vieux. Maisons pour invalides du travail et pensionnés. Une grande entreprise industrielle a fondé cette maison.

Source: La Vie En Allemagne – L’Habitation Allemande (Brussels: 1940)
Source: Hermann Hecker Der Kruppsche Kleinwohnungsbau (Wiesbaden: 1917)  
Fig. #46

Source: La Vie En Allemagne – L’Habitation Allemande (Brussels: 1940)  
Fig. #47

Altenhof II
Heimaterde

Auf ihren Höfen wohnen sie frei,
Tranken die Sonne und lachendes Glück,
Wandten die fruchtbringende braune Scholle,
Erbe der Väter von Jahr zu Jahr.
Grüne Acker, goldig wogende Flächen
Lächelten still an der Erde Brust.
Heimaterde nannten sie dich.
Du singendes Land!

Altehrwürdige Bücher bargen die Truhen,
Gelesen, gehrnt von Geschlecht zu Geschlecht.
Bilder von Päpsten und Luther, dem Starken,
Von Fürstern und Kämpfern vergangener Zeit,
Grüßten sich friedlich von Haus zu Haus,
Und Friede duftete selig herauf vom Tal.
Vom Tale, wo Silbersang des Bachs
Traumhafte Weisen flocht.

Aus dem, was geschen durch die Jahrtausende,
Aus dem, was sprengend die Zukunft entlud.
Heimaterde nannten sie dich,
Du singendes Land.

Aber dann - herrlich-dämonisch rücktest du an,
Arbeit, mit deinen Hämern und Glutem,
Mit deinem Segen und deinem Fluch.
Unerbittlich triebst du dein Reich
Zu den blühenden Toren des Friedens
Mit deinem eisernen Domen der Pflicht.

Und die Bereiter und Erben der Scholle schwanden,
Gaben die stillen Hütten und Höfe
Der stürmenden eisernen Zeit,
Verloren sich auf kleine rettende Inseln
Im wogenden Meere der Kraft.
Doch vor den Toren des blühenden Friedens,
Im Geleucht der schaffenden Flammen,
In den Stollen im Urgrund der Erde
Standen die Helden der Arbeit
Und suchten - suchten ein Heim -
Ein Häuschen mit ihren Frauen und Kindern
Und dazu ein wenig fruchtbare Erde.

Da lächeltest, Heimaterde du,
Gabst deine Flächen, dein lauschiges Tal
Den Menschen, die suchten nach Schönheit und Glück
Und Häuschen erhoben sich, Grün rankte empor
Aus dem schenkenden Grund;
Werkmeister, Bildner freuten sich
Der herrlich erstanden blühenden Welt,
Des Werks ihres Geistes und schaffender Händen.
Und die suchenden Helden der Arbeit
Grüßten ihr neues Heim,
Streichelten zärtlich die Tiere des Hauses,
Wandten die Scholle zu neum Geben
Und schauten hinein
In das jubelnde Hoffnungsgrün -
Heimaterde, du singendes Land - - -

Christoph Vrieprecht

Source: Heinrich Bertrand ed. *Entstehung und Entwicklung der Siedelung "Heimaterde"* (Düsseldorf: 1928)
### Werkswohnungen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ort</th>
<th>Anzahl der Wohnungen</th>
<th>Baujahr</th>
<th>Erweitert</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nordhof</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baumhof</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1872/73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schederhof</td>
<td>1872/74</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>1899/100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kronenberg</td>
<td>1904/06</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>1893–1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfredshof</td>
<td>1899/1900</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1899/1900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friedrichshof</td>
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<td>733</td>
<td>1891/92/99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meisterhäuser an der Kerckhoff- u. Martin-Luther-Straße</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>1912–1917</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bärendelle</td>
<td>1915–17</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1922–1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bötrop</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>1923–1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am Loubenhof</td>
<td>1916–18</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1927–1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pottgießerhof</td>
<td>1917/18</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>1937/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borbeck</td>
<td>1917/18</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1938–38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergstraße</td>
<td>1917/18</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1938–38</td>
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<td>Kaulbachhöhe</td>
<td>1917–1923</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>1938–38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wickenburg</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>Krupp-Kämpenstr.</td>
<td>1937–1938</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1938–38</td>
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### Baugenossenschaft des Vereins der Kruppschen Beamten e.G.m.b.H.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ort</th>
<th>Anzahl der Wohnungen</th>
<th>Baujahr</th>
<th>Erweitert</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heerten, Osnabrücker, Liebigstraße</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>55</td>
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### Heimaterde

einget. Siedlungsges. m.b.H.

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### Bäuverein Kruppscher Beamten

e.G.m.b.H., Essen

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<th>Erweitert</th>
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<td>1935–1936</td>
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Source: Krupp Archives File WA 7f 1038