SUBVERTING THE SPECTACLE OF SANCTUARY

By:

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University of Victoria, BA (Hons), April 2006.

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In

The Department of Political Science

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Abstract

This thesis critiques the dominant theorization of Canadian sanctuary as expressed by Randy Lippert. Particularly, I contend that Lippert’s Foucaudian analysis offers an impoverished understanding of sanctuary recipients by insisting they are political only insofar as they embrace bare life and become a silent spectacle. To re-conceptualize the political role of recipients, I evoke Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière’s notion that politics is constitutive of an interruption. I suggest that, living in a borderland between citizenship/non-citizenship, sanctuary recipients draw critical attention to their own exclusions and thus enact the political interruption par excellence. However, Arendt and Rancière’s stipulation that this interruption must be visible also limits political efficacy for recipients for it necessitates that they must expose themselves as helpless spectacles which implies a sovereign audience. I argue that this uncontested commitment to visibility is also dominantly expressed by theorists, such as Jenny Edkins, who are concerned with agency for other abject subjectivities. Troubling, this dedication to visibility results in the same apolitical formulation of sanctuary recipients that Lippert offers. As an alternative, I conclude that a type of (in)visible interruption offers a more a fruitful way to understand political agency for sanctuary recipients, and indeed for other seemingly abject figures.
Table of Contents

Supervisory Committee ........................................................................................................... ii
Abstract................................................................................................................................... iii
Table of Contents...................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgments...................................................................................................................v
Dedication.................................................................................................................................. vi

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1: *The* History of Sanctuary? .................................................................................. 6

Chapter 2: Reading Sanctuary through Lippert .................................................................... 11

  Governmentality ...................................................................................................................... 13
  Pastoral Power ........................................................................................................................ 15
  Sovereign Power .................................................................................................................... 17
  Liberal & Non-liberal Rationalities Overlap ........................................................................ 18
  Lippert’s Limits: ‘The’ Migrant ............................................................................................... 25

Chapter 3: The Migrant in the Media .................................................................................... 29

Chapter 4: Interruptions ......................................................................................................... 35

  Arendt’s Political Action ........................................................................................................ 36
  Problematizing the Polis ......................................................................................................... 46
  Rancière’s Interruption ........................................................................................................... 49

Chapter 5: The Spectacle of Sanctuary .................................................................................. 56

  Arendt’s Disclosure .............................................................................................................. 57
  Rancière’s Visibilities .......................................................................................................... 60

Chapter 6: (In)visible Interruptions ....................................................................................... 63

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 75

Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 78

Endnotes ................................................................................................................................... 80
Acknowledgments

First and foremost I would like to thank Dr. Warren Magnusson whose guidance and scholastic excellence is a continual source of inspiration. Warren, thank you for dramatically enacting Aristotle in your undergraduate theory courses - this alone ignited my passion for political thought. Thank you for candidly writing on my second-year paper, “I would suggest you purchase a handbook for writers” (which I promptly did). Thank you for encouraging me to speak up in class, and for creating the space where I felt that I could. Thank you for genuinely caring about all of your many students, for which I deeply believe you have cultivated a more caring and thoughtful world.

I also wish to express gratitude to: Dr. Rob Walker for coffee-shop chats, and for always inciting me to ‘think otherwise’; Dr. Oliver Schmidtke for the productive comments on my thesis; and Dr. Geoff Whitehall whose creativity and passion for teaching infused my academic pursuits with energy and with life.

Thank you also to my classmates who read drafts for me: Melissa Murdock, Sarah Wiebe, Tim Fryatt and Tim Smith. Finally, I give thanks to my oldest friend with whom I have shared bunk-beds and books, my sister: Carly Bagelman.
Dedication
For mom, with love.

Thank you for teaching me the “value of Doing Nothing, of just going along and listening to all the things you can't hear.” – A.A Milne
Introduction

As I step across the threshold into St.Gabriels Catholic Church in Montréal I glimpse at the frayed straw welcome mat that adorns the stoop below my feet. For me, this humble invitation stands only for a few hours. Yet for my host Kader Belaouni, who has become a guest here for two years in sanctuary, this welcome mat implies a more complicated offer. For Belaouni, this space has become a make-shift home in a country that has refused to welcome him. And Belaouni is but one of many illegal migrants¹ who must continually negotiate a welcome which is as frayed as the straw mat itself.

Indeed, from 1983 to 2003 more than 200 illegal migrants confronted with deportation have taken sanctuary in Canadian churches.² Crucially, the state has overwhelmingly respected the tradition of sanctuary by permitting migrants to remain illegally in Canada while they reside within the confines of a church.³ Despite this prolific practice, there has been little critical research on this topic. The most comprehensive study of Canadian sanctuary has been completed by Randy Lippert in his text Sanctuary, Sovereignty, Sacrifice: Canadian Sanctuary Incidents, Power and Law. Although regaled as the most thorough analysis of sanctuary in Canada I contend that Lippert’s understanding of the illegal migrant’s political role is deeply limited. In his reading, sanctuary providers are posed as political agents while migrants appear merely as voiceless victims devoid of political life, or what Giorgio Agamben terms bare life.⁴ For Lippert, ‘the’ illegal migrant may only act politically by visibly drawing attention to his body as a form of bare life.⁵ Ultimately I contend that Lippert de-politicizes illegal migrants by rendering them visible only as abject victims to be saved. In an attempt to understand illegal migrants in a way that does not simply reduce them to apolitical bare life, I look to Hannah Arendt and Jacques
Rancière. Through Arendt and Rancière’s view of politics as a type of rupture or interruption the illegal migrant living in sanctuary may be understood in political terms. Existing in a sort of borderland between citizenship/non-citizenship, sanctuary recipients highlight and interrupt violent exclusions within practices of citizenship which are often left unseen. However, I contend that while Arendt and Rancière offer a language to appreciate sanctuary recipients as political agents they also risk situating illegal migrants within the apolitical domain that Lippert delineates due to their assumption that to act politically one must become visible. As an alternative to this approach, I attempt to re-conceptualize sanctuary recipients in a way that does not necessarily (and naturally) evoke visibility as the condition of possibility for their political subjectivity.

As a prelude to this primary concern I will commence by providing the dominant historical narrative of sanctuary within Canada. Although Canadian sanctuary is typically framed as an extremely recent phenomenon, beginning in 1983, I will situate this contemporary reading within a more extensive ancient practice. In this first chapter I will also consider the way in which sanctuary has primarily, and troublingly, been equated with cases which are highly publicized (known as ‘exposed sanctuary’) while incidents of ‘concealed sanctuary’ are entirely eclipsed. For the purpose of this thesis I will work with and against this prevailing definition and the problematic distinctions it engenders. I will work with this understanding in order to elucidate how sanctuary has thus far been theorized: namely, as a space which is inherently spectacular. However, in and through this usage I hope to demonstrate what is excluded from this discourse. In particular, I wish to critically expose the problematic effect of denying that which is concealed. By drawing attention to the absence of ‘concealed sanctuary’ within the typical telling of sanctuary I seek to de-stabilize the classical historical reading with an albeit
limited genealogy. In other words, I hope to illuminate how the dominant history of sanctuary is indeed just one story which has been privileged over a plethora of others. This awareness enables us to thus trouble a linear trajectory of sanctuary; it seeks to challenge the starting point of this very thesis - namely that the year 1983 is the first articulation of Canadian sanctuary. I contend that if sanctuary exists in other forms that are not simply reducible to exposed protection within a church then perhaps 1983 is entirely an arbitrary origin. Perhaps other forms of sanctuary which have taken, and continue to take place under less visible conditions should be considered.

Following this brief genealogy I critically explore Lippert’s work, *Sanctuary, Sovereignty, Sacrifice: Canadian Sanctuary Incidents, Power and Law*. Lippert’s text has been celebrated as the most exhaustive study on the topic of Canadian sanctuary and as such, it will be investigated in depth. Lippert’s conceptual approach is largely inspired by the works of Michel Foucault and I argue that the primary purpose of his text is to contribute to Foucauldian scholarship - what he has to say about sanctuary *per se* is less nuanced. The central objective of Lippert’s work is to problematize the ways in which the non-liberal rationalities that Foucault offers (namely pastoral and sovereign power) have been largely ignored as a consequence of the liberal love-affair with governmentality. In order to contest this move, Lippert utilizes sanctuary as his pivotal case study to illustrate the contemporary relevance of both pastoral and sovereign power in relation to governmentality. He demonstrates in various ways how we can understand modern sanctuary as an instance of an overlap between *all three* liberal and non-liberal rationalities today. However, while Lippert attempts to avoid eclipsing non-liberal rationalities, he ultimately eclipses the migrant in the process. Troublingly, through his particular Foucauldian reading the migrant is posed as visible only as a marginalized victim to be saved. For Lippert, the
illegal migrant’s political agency resides merely in the ability to expose oneself as a silent spectacle.

With reference to media coverage I show in Chapter 3 how three specific Canadian sanctuary cases have been figured in a similarly visible yet apolitical manner. Although the faces and names of sanctuary recipients are smothered across newspapers, invariably it is in a manner which posits them as helpless supplicants. In this respect, I will suggest that for the illegal migrant, as opposed to the sanctuary provider, visibility is often an obstacle to political efficacy. In other words, visibility itself operates as a technology to know and produce illegal migrants in a particular victimizing and violent way. I ask: *is it only in and through spectactularity that sanctuary recipients may be understood?*

In order to address this question I turn to Arendt and Rancière. Through the concept of the rupture, or interruption, both authors provide a fruitful language to understand the illegal migrant living in sanctuary as political. In different ways both Arendt and Rancière offer means to subvert the illegal migrants’ figuration as a voiceless victim. Despite their differences, for both Arendt and Rancière illegal migrants may enact an important form of political action in that they visibly draw attention to their own exclusions thereby troubling the given order and their very exclusion from that order. In Rancière’s words, they “make visible what had no business being seen, and make heard as discourse where once was only place for noise.”7 What this analysis problematically elides is how visibility *itself* functions as a central modality through which the excluded, or “part that has no part,” are rendered abject victims.8 Indeed as Lippert’s analysis makes evident, the spectacle itself is a strategy of governmental, sovereign and pastoral rationalities through which sanctuary recipients are constituted as bare life. Given this, I suggest
that a type of invisible interruption may be more politically productive than the purely visible one which Arendt and Rancière offer.

In relation to this central proposition I shall pose the questions: might concealed acts which occur within the spectacle of sanctuary offer a more useful way to understand the sanctuary recipient’s political agency? What about the life prior to and following sanctuary itself? Might this less visible space provide an important form of political life? What is to be said about the lives of the many illegal migrants who never step foot within sanctuary: how might their relative invisibility offer important political insight? Furthermore, how might invisibility - more broadly - be a condition for political efficacy for other figures? In sum, I suggest that invisibility is an important political tactic and that this invisibility is not complete but functions within and against technologies which attempt to render illegal migrants as visible abject victims. I call this tactic which manoeuvres in-between visibility/invisibility an ‘(in)visible interruption.’
Chapter 1: The History of Sanctuary?

Although a deep historical, or genealogical, exploration of sanctuary is beyond the scope of this thesis it is useful to briefly examine some of the conditions that have led to the emergence of contemporary Canadian sanctuary. While sanctuary in Canada is said to have “started in 1983” it is important to recognize the long lineage upon which contemporary sanctuary relies. Indeed, as it will be argued, modern sanctuary gains tacit legal recognition by evoking and laying claim to an ancient heritage and precedent. In addition to understanding the classical telling of sanctuary I contend that it is critical to note how alternative stories have been circumnavigated through this dominant historical (re)presentation.

The history of sanctuary is an extensive one, its roots having been said to originate in the Old Testament. As Lippert points out, Numbers 35: 9-15, and Joshua 20:1-6 speak of six asylum cities where sanctuary was offered. The concept of sanctuary, as expressed in the Old Testament, is similar to the right of asylum; specifically, individuals seeking asylum would be protected from forcible removal as this would be constitutive of ‘sacrilege.’ This notion was enshrined in Ecclesiastical law, stating that church property is “sacred and therefore inviolable.” Among ancient Hebrews, sanctuary was a tool to manage revenge by “providing time and space for negotiations between the murdered and the offended party.” There are also detailed historical accounts of sanctuary in ancient Greece, Rome, and Byzantium as well as throughout Medieval Europe.

In the fourth and fifth centuries, secular authorities recognized ecclesiastical sanctuary as “distinct territory under church control.” Church sanctuary was first acknowledged by the state in Theodosian Code in AD 392. Although at this time sanctuary was initially limited to the
church altar, the territory gradually expanded to include bishop’s residences and even cemeteries. By the Middle Ages in Europe, sanctuary as a space and set of discourses gradually “receded in the face of the growing powers of the states.”  

In Britain, where sanctuary had been intensively regulated for centuries, it was formally abolished under James I by statute in 1624.

Since this time the history of sanctuary is increasingly contentious, as Lippert points out: “whether sanctuary retained its link with the church, moved to other sites in civil society, or even completely vanished from Western societies…remain empirical questions.” Indeed, while sanctuary is often defined as “a church” that provides physical protection and attempts to render this practice publicly visible, this very notion may be problematized. Said Jaziri’s entry into a Montreal mosque on December 16, 2006 set precedent as the first person to seek sanctuary in a non-Christian place of worship in Canada, thereby troubling the equation between the terms: sanctuary and ‘church.’ Prior to this incident the places of worship in which migrants were granted sanctuary were exclusively Christian; migrants were not granted sanctuary “in synagogues, mosques, or temples.” Furthermore, if one is to limit sanctuary to the spectacular practice which takes place upon church territory – as Lippert does by stipulating that “concealed sanctuary without an exposure aspect are not dealt with” in his work - then in turn a rather impoverished telling of the sanctuary tradition is told. In this reading, sanctuary all but evaporates by the 1700s in Europe only to re-emerge in the US in the 1980s. However, there is little reflection on what might have occurred in between this time, or in less obvious spheres. For instance, although sanctuary is said to have begun in 1983 in Canada, when a Montréal church opened its cobblestone doors to a Guatemalan migrant, I ask: what about other sanctuary-like movements? What about the Vietnam draft resisters housed in private residences in Canada during the 1960s? What of the modern hospice movement? One could certainly point to a
plethora of other practices that occurred before 1983, and continue to take place today under what is arguably said to be a form of sanctuary.

Clearly, sanctuary is a contested term. Although the history provided in this thesis attempts to illuminate the way in which a conventional church-based trajectory of sanctuary has been thus far theorized, it is by no means the only trajectory which may be traced. Indeed, a peripheral interest of this thesis is to consider: what types of sanctuary are being excluded in this dominant definition and what are the political implications of this exclusion? Though the phrase ‘sanctuary movement’ is evoked here in a conventional sense - in order to understand how these specific sites have been theorized - it is done so with a dose of sustained suspicion.

While contemporary sanctuary practices are complex, it is evident that sanctuary has manifested as church and community groups harbouring individual migrants or migrant families threatened by imminent arrest and deportation by federal immigration authorities. It was the 1970s which catalyzed the return of sanctuary to Britain, and through the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, it also appeared in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, and Canada, among other nations. Sanctuary in the US experienced a revival beginning in 1982. This resurgence occurred amid US-backed war and “oppression in Central America and a resultant increase in the number of migrants desperately fleeing this region by illegally entering the US.” Although this activity in the US is often used to exemplify the height of sanctuary activity, it is important to note that sanctuary has not been limited to these activities which ended in the early 1990s.

Indeed, since 1983 there has been a resurgence of the sanctuary movement in Canada where supporters have been willing to defy governments in order to protect refugees and prevent their forced deportations. As mentioned earlier, Canadian sanctuary is often said to have
catalyzed in 1983 when a twenty-two-year-old Guatemalan migrant was given safe haven in a Montréal church. The migrant lived in the make-shift home of a minister’s study in the St. Andrew’s United Church for five weeks. Within hours of the spectacle being initiated at the church, Canada’s federal immigration minister proclaimed a temporary halt to all deportations to Guatemala and declared that these sanctuary providers, despite violating immigration law, were to be “spare[d] legal prosecution.” 21

Since the first sanctuary case in 1983 until 2003, thirty-six incidents involving 261 migrants have taken place in Canada. 22 Within communities across Canada sanctuary has since been provided to migrants facing legal appeals in vain, and threatened with deportation. The average duration in sanctuary was 150 days and 70% of those who sought sanctuary received legal status. 23

One might ask: what are the central factors contributing to the growth of sanctuary in Canada? Although there are many reasons, one oft-mentioned aspect is that at present there is no appeal procedure in Canada for any refugee claimant whose claim has been refused. As Janet Dench of the Canadian Council for Refugees has remarked, “you have no more rights to appeal when you get a parking ticket than you do as a refugee claimant.” 24 Indeed, it may be argued that a parking ticket has a better chance for appeal. This lack of redress, combined with the refugee determination procedure recently established in 2000 by the New Immigration and Refugee Protection Act which allows “only one person to hear and decide on a claim, thus leaving a claimant dependent on the prejudices and biases of a single individual” has prompted a number of rash deportation orders of which sanctuary has become a tool to address. 25

Furthermore, it has been argued that in harmonizing immigration policies with the US in and through the “Smart Border Declaration” of December 2001, with the proposed “national
security perimeter” around North America, Canada has increased its practice of deportation, rendering sanctuary increasingly necessary. Finally, the 2004 “Safe Third Country” agreement with the US which allows Canada to turn back any claimant who arrived through the US has also been pointed to as a condition which has rendered sanctuary a necessary “last resort.” Of course, much like the definition(s) of sanctuary, the factors which have triggered the sanctuary movement in Canada are multifarious.
Chapter 2: Reading Sanctuary through Lippert

Randy Lippert’s work *Sanctuary Sovereignty Sacrifice* is the most in-depth and current text dealing with Canadian sanctuary. Indeed, as *International Migration Review* has stated: Lippert’s work is the “first comprehensive study of sanctuary in Canada.”27 His text identifies 36 sanctuary incidents since 1983. Through 46 personal interviews with sanctuary providers and an examination of some 1,600 documents Lippert hopes to shed light upon this under-theorized area of sanctuary. As Lippert claims: “published accounts of sanctuary in Canada are few, comprehensive study is nonexistent.”28 And it is true - there are only two extended accounts of sanctuary in a Canadian context, both of which are authored by religious authorities playing a central role in the singular incident being described (Reynolds, 1992; Leddy, 1997). While two prominent Canadian refugee advocates (Matas, 1988; 1989: 147-151; Plut, 1995: 129-137) have also discussed sanctuary they have done so only within the broader confines of refugee policy or sanctuary’s legal aspects. Stastny and Tyrnauer (1993), the only other scholars who have written on Canadian sanctuary, refer to only two incidents; in their following sanctuary guidelines commissioned by a national church, they refer to three (1997). Perhaps then it is no surprise that Lippert’s book is considered an essential source by critical international relations theorists and activist groups alike. *No One is Illegal* – the largest Canadian activist group lobbying for migrants living in sanctuary - cites Lippert’s text as the primary source of current information regarding Canadian sanctuary.29 Even churches providing sanctuary allude to Lippert’s work as the seminal source to provide further investigation into sanctuary.30 Considering that Lippert’s text has become so highly influential in the sanctuary discourse, this section will seek to elucidate his theoretical arguments and objectives.
To begin, it will be fruitful to elucidate the way in which Lippert defines sanctuary. As was alluded to in Chapter 1, sanctuary is often defined in terms of its visibility and in relation to the territorial space and protection predominantly provided by a church. Lippert evokes this meaning in his work by describing sanctuary as “those incidents in which migrants entered and remained in physical protection to avoid deportation by immigration authorities and entailed efforts to expose this fact.” When Lippert uses the term ‘expose’ he is specifically referring to a process which “entails purposely gaining the attention of mass media, communities, and political authorities” whereas concealed sanctuary “involves avoiding such attention.” Interestingly, Lippert states that he relies upon this definition partially to avoid the complexities of considering concealed sanctuary which is that form of sanctuary “without an exposure aspect.” He is determined to avoid the concealed element of sanctuary for methodological reasons. How might one speak of, quantify, or theorize sanctuary that is inherently ‘invisible’ and thus beyond the scope of typical scholarly research? While Lippert’s explicit rationality for side-stepping concealed sanctuary is based on the problematic nature of studying that which appears to not appear, the political ramifications for this exclusion need to be discussed.

It is vital to note that Lippert’s work adopts a conceptual approach inspired by the works of Michel Foucault. Although Lippert’s text is often referred to as a key document in illuminating the history of sanctuary, this is not the fundamental purpose of his book. Crucially, his text is chiefly fixed upon proving a theoretical point. As will be shown, sanctuary itself is a tool through which Lippert makes an argument about contemporary Foucauldian studies. In this respect the title of his text - of which the first word is ‘sanctuary’ - may therefore be misleading; indeed, sanctuary is almost an after-thought, or at the very least simply a case study, for his more general analysis. Lippert’s primary and explicit goal is to consider the ways in which Foucault’s
concepts of liberal, non-liberal and sovereign powers all function today in society more generally. These powers are described as governmental, pastoral and sovereign power respectively. Considering that these three concepts are so central to Lippert’s work it will be productive to briefly summarize the ways in which these terms are mobilized by Lippert.

**Governmentality**

First I shall consider governmentality. To a large extent, Lippert’s definition is consistent with a conventional understanding of governmentality; however, what he takes issue with is the way in which it has overshadowed other Foucauldian rationalities. Lippert understands governmentality as a power which functions through *freedom* and *agency*. In this way, freedom becomes an instrument of power and control, where power does not operate from *above*, telling its subjects what to do, but instead operates through a language of normalization and choice. In conjunction with governmentality, Lippert understands biopower not as an expression of coercion and force but optimization and facilitation. As Foucault suggests, the power over death became the power over life: it was no longer the power to let live or make die, but the power to make live or let die. Foucault’s notion of biopower highlights the way in which power operates – through a language of facilitation – to control those under its sway, to produce a certain type of politically qualified life as the normalized identity of subjectivity. In other words, practices of power do not deny the autonomy of subjects so much as they work “to impose and fix ways of knowing and doing that shall be recognized as natural and necessary to autonomous being.”

Lippert contends that this form of power is necessary to understand in relation to sanctuary practices. Although Lippert believes that sanctuary operates as a form of pastoral and sovereign power – whereby the church and community become the shepherds protecting needful migrant sheep – he also contends that the condition of possibility for modern sanctuary in
Canada is the logic of governmentality. Lippert’s argument that sanctuary is dependent upon a liberal expression of governmentality hinges largely on the logic offered through Nicolas Rose’s *The Death of the Social*. Lippert evokes Rose’s argument whereby he marks a shift away from coercive methods of governing society at large to more precise modes of managing citizens through their own individual choice and freedoms. As Rose points out, through this shift we have not *escaped* the grasp of the state: we still wage the state’s economic, political and social war only now we do so much more willingly in the name of our individual selves and communities.

While Rose is primarily tracing this shift as it relates to the welfare state, Lippert contends that we can understand this as a broader strategy. Specifically, Lippert shows how we can understand this shift in relation to refugee practices in Canada. The shift that Rose offers is evident when we juxtapose the Immigration Act of 1952 to that of 1976, Lippert contends. The 1976 Act, *Citizenship and Immigration Canada*, claimed “it broke new ground.” This Act was considered transformative as it required “cooperation between all levels of government and the voluntary sector in the settlement of immigrants in Canadian society.” The basis of this new Immigration Act was premised upon the language of active inclusion of Canadian citizens. Indeed, 50 public hearings in 21 cities across Canada took place in the creation of this Act and as such, citizens became stake-holders and active participants in a system which was becoming over-burdened and difficult to manage from on-high.

Lippert goes on to argue that sanctuary cases in Canada must be understood as part of this trend. Although sanctuary incidents are often framed as a direct resistance to the sovereignty of the state – in that these churches are harbouring individuals whom the state deems illegal – they are quite persuasively read as a modality through which the state has offloaded governance of refugees through the ‘responsibilization’ of citizens consistent with Rose’s articulation of
governmentality. Indeed, Lippert argues that “the onset of advanced liberalism since the 1970s…explains the rise of sanctuary incidents involving migrants since 1983.”

Lippert refers to Rose who contends that this mode of governance requires the striation of the population into the “affiliated” and the “marginal” - each with their distinct forms of control. The first group that Rose hands us is “the affiliated.” These are the “included: the individuals and families who have the financial, educational and moral means to ‘pass’ in their role as active citizens in responsible communities.”

The second group is the “marginalized.” They, on the other hand, “cannot be considered affiliated to civilized communities because they are incapable of managing themselves as subjects…or they are considered a threat…to political order.” The examples Rose provides are the: poor, unemployed, indigenous peoples, mentally or physically disabled, drug-addicted. Lippert implicitly adds the migrant. Notably for this group, who are “less receptive to responsibilization strategies,” different and “more intensive strategies are required.” The harsh discipline of the police and courts present the final and justified stage of intervention. However, in terms of sanctuary, Lippert maintains the marginalized migrant class faces another sort of strategy that might be best described through pastoral power whereby the migrant is figured as a needful sheep waiting for the protection of the pastoral shepherd. I shall now move onto pastoral power to understand this strategy and how it aligns with the migrant and sanctuary.

**Pastoral Power**

The next Foucauldian power that Lippert explores is pastoral power. As is emphasized by Lippert, this power is “less celebrated” within the Foucauldian literature - as such the term will be explored deeply here. Lippert explains that this rationality is concerned with the “care for life of individuals” and a “constant kindness.” For Lippert it is vital to emphasize how this power is
not exclusively linked with the church in a long-forgotten history. He takes up Foucault’s argument that “this rationality is not a leftover of the distant past when Christian churches wielded over legal subjects.” On Foucault’s heels Lippert argues that pastoral governance is not solely continuous with church governance; indeed, the modern welfare state is a contemporary expression of this power. Lippert quotes Foucault to illuminate this point:

You will say; the pastorate has, if not disappeared, at least lost the main part of its efficiency. This is true, but I think we should distinguish between two aspects of pastoral power – between ecclesiastical institutionalization, which has ceased or at least lost its vitality since the eighteenth century, and its function, which has spread and multiplied outside the ecclesiastical institution.45

In essence, Lippert argues – much like Foucault – that pastoral power is not specifically a form of Christian church or faith-based governance; in particular, Lippert focuses upon the Tanner Lectures on Human Values given by Foucault 1979 to show where pastoral power operates in another form. It is in these lectures that Foucault traces the central themes of pastoral power, within several of its historical transformations, and suggested that the modern welfare state is but one “recent recurrence” of pastoral power, whereby the state provides the role of a caring shepherd for its needful flock.46 Lippert contends that scholars have too often forgotten this manifestation of pastoral power when considering modern questions of governance. In part, Lippert argues that this is because the rationality of pastoral power has been subsumed within the over-used term ‘liberal welfarism.’ The logic of liberal governmentality has eclipsed the pastoral element. Crucially, Lippert insists that this term requires the coupling of liberal and pastoral rationalities – that is, a marriage of governing through freedom and governing through need. The latter, he claims, has been effectively side-stepped. Lippert asserts that this overshadowing of pastoral power is only increasing as we experience the decline of the welfare state in the face of a rising advanced liberalism. In light of this move Lippert asks: just because a “degovernmentalization of the state” has occurred as a result of the rise of advanced liberalism,
is it fair to assume that pastoral power and its corresponding discourse of needs have become obsolete, or “can it be found outside the state?” The answer to this final question, for Lippert, is most certainly yes. Lippert contends that the logic of pastoral power has seeped into other facets of society and is today teeming with life.

Throughout his work, Lippert identifies three key characteristics that are constitutive of pastoral power. To begin, pastoral governance constitutes “authority in the figure of a shepherd.” As Foucault notes: “The shepherd must be informed of the material needs of each member of the flock and provide for them when necessary.” In this articulation, those in need are framed as sheep. Second, pastoral power is inexorably linked with the notion of sacrifice. Lippert alludes to Foucault’s statement that “pastoral power is not merely a form of power which commands; it must also be prepared to sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of the flock.” Third, pastoral power cannot function without shepherds “becoming informed” of the needs of members of the flock; that is, by “making them reveal their innermost secrets.” Lippert emphasizes Foucault’s suggestion that the shepherd “must know what is going on, what each of them does – his public sins. Last and not least he must know what is going on in the soul of each one, that is: his secret sins, his progress on the road to sainthood.” He refers to this final quality as ‘individualizing knowledge.’

Sovereign Power

The third Foucauldian rationality that Lippert deals with is sovereign power. Much like his theorizations of pastoral power, Lippert contends that sovereign power is not “simply one more governmental technology that is inside a totalizing or systematizing neo-liberalism.” Instead, sovereign power is a decidedly distinct form of power. For Lippert sovereign power has three central tenets. First, sovereign power is the monopoly to decide the exception and second it
is the control of territory. The third feature of sovereign power is the most important characteristic, Lippert argues, and this is its “affinity for the spectacle.” He contends that “it is precisely [the] spectacular that seems to distinguish sovereign power from, especially governmental power.” Where governmentality pivots upon the positive language of freedom, sovereign power has an “affinity for the spectacle.” Although the two may be distinguished Lippert agrees with Michael Dillon’s suggestion that “what distinguishes the relationship between the two is their very complementarily.” In other words, although both of these powers operate in different ways, relying on different modalities of control, they also reinforce and reify one another. This relationship will be explored more deeply in a moment.

**Liberal & Non-liberal Rationalities Overlap**

As has been suggested, Lippert’s goal is to demonstrate how these three types of power that have just been explored (governmental, pastoral and sovereign) overlap and function together. In this sense Lippert is contesting what he sees to be a general move taken by Foucauldian scholars: namely, the tendency to focus upon liberal rationalities at the expense of understanding how pastoral and sovereign ones still operate today despite the growth of advanced liberalism. Indeed, he states that his work is to shine light upon the “non-liberal rationalities [that] have been ignored.” For Lippert, it is vital to acknowledge non-liberal powers lest our focus upon governmentality accounts becomes as totalizing as the state-centric narratives Foucault himself was so critical of. As such, Lippert hopes to understand sanctuary as exhibiting not simply a form of liberal governmental power, but also pastoral and sovereign power.

In order to elucidate this point, Lippert first illuminates how pastoral power specifically functions today, in the form of sanctuary. He argues that, consistent with the definition of
pastoral power, the *raison d’être* of sanctuary is to provide care and extend kindness on a continuing, often-individualized basis. As may be recalled, pastoral power hinges upon three main features: authority in the figure of the shepherd; the practice of sacrifice; and the individualizing knowledge. Lippert asserts that each of these qualities is evident within sanctuary today. Indeed, he states that “it is in sanctuary practice that a pastoral rationality appears in near-exemplar form.”

His first move, then, is to show how pastoral power exercises its authority in terms of the shepherd. Lippert argues that in sanctuary a variety of persons are enlisted as shepherds. They range from members of the clergy to members of the congregation or parish to members of the community with no obvious Christian religious conviction or connection. Foucault suggests that: “The shepherd must be informed of the material needs of each member of the flock and provide for them when necessary.” Lippert contends that this is indeed the case in Canadian sanctuary and he cites the following remark made by a sanctuary provider to make this point clear:

> There was a lot of stuff to be done. I mean we had to feed these people for this entire year. We had to look after their medical needs, their spiritual needs, their psychological needs, their dental…I mean, you name it.

Lippert argues that the above passage exemplifies the sanctuary provider’s shepherd-like role, constitutive of pastoral power. It is interesting to note how the central needs addressed by the ‘shepherd’ here are primarily of a bio-political nature.

In order to expose the currency of pastoral power, Lippert goes on to exhibit how the practice of sacrifice is evident within church sanctuary. Lippert argues that in each instance of sanctuary, shepherds actively sought out the well-being of the migrant(s) and through “various means sacrificed themselves on their behalf.” Foremost, Lippert continues, this sacrifice was evident in the “illegality of the sanctuary practices in which they participated.” According to the
sanctuary providers whom Lippert interviews, sacrifice is also exemplified in the fact that their daily routines are radically altered in order to “regularly permit visitors, provide care, and generate support for the migrant(s).” To demonstrate this point Lippert refers to a sanctuary provider who claimed to have “held press conferences during her lunch breaks on [recipient’s] behalf outside her place of work in a way that could have resulted in termination.” Another provider states that he faced “considerable ridicule in setting up a ramshackle booth at the center of the city’s square and staffing it for weeks to collect signatures for a petition and expose the Department of Immigration’s treatment of the migrants residing in the nearby church.” Lippert also makes reference to another provider who, during a meeting for other purposes, had to suddenly rush to the exit in order to “physically block the minister of immigration from leaving the room until the minister had first listened to her queries about the status of the relevant migrant’s case.” Furthermore, Lippert explains, many sanctuary providers have accompanied migrants to nations such as the United States, Mexico, and Peru when the deportation threat that led to sanctuary promised to be rescinded if the migrant agreed to exit Canada voluntarily and then reapply for legal status through Canadian embassies or consulates. For Lippert, these instances are demonstrative of the time-consuming, expensive, and risky sacrificial acts taken upon by shepherd-like sanctuary providers.

Finally, Lippert asserts that sanctuary illustrates pastoral power in that the shepherds are always engaged in a practice of “becoming informed” of the needs of members of the flock. Lippert argues that pastoral governance involves production of “an intimate knowledge of migrant(s).” In many instances Lippert shows how sanctuary providers related efforts to “come to know the individual migrant(s) through regular ‘visits.’” During these meetings, “long and intensive discussion would ensue between shepherds and sheep, often initially exploring the
harm the migrant(s) faced if deported.” The sanctuary providers required that these visits would ensure “guidance and instruction centred on “improving” the migrant(s) in various ways.”

Lippert argues that the close confines of sanctuary in fact enable shepherds to generate intimate knowledge of “pastoral objects” as this space renders migrants more visible. He argues that in sanctuary shepherds literally “keep watch” of migrants, which is an element of pastoral power which Foucault references. Foucault states, “everything the shepherd does is geared to the good of his flock. That’s his constant concern. When they sleep he keeps watch.” In almost every instance of sanctuary, Lippert maintains, one or more shepherd accompanied the migrant during waking hours within the church, and sometimes a twenty-four-hour rotating watch was established.

Lippert alludes to a sanctuary provider who states that

We had probably two hundred people involved in helping in one way or another, getting food, staying there overnight because they didn’t leave him alone…we always had somebody else there so that the federal people knew that if anything happened it would be resisted non-violently if possible and it would be reported.

Lippert concludes by arguing that it was the close-confines and generation of individualizing knowledge in sanctuary that transformed church and community members into shepherds, constitutive of pastoral power.

In order to further demonstrate how non-liberal rationalities still resonate today, Lippert goes on to show how sovereign power also operates in modern sanctuary cases and how this sovereign power cannot simply be reduced to a language of coercion nor be neatly enveloped by the language of governmentality. Lippert instead suggests that sovereign power functions today and is bound up with the ability to define the exception and control territory as well as function through the spectacle. Considering sovereign power this way it is difficult to see it as outdated, Lippert suggests, and easy to see how it functions through modern sanctuary. As Lippert states:
Sanctuary highlights the notions that sovereign power is currently relevant and unrestricted to the (nation-)state’s capacity for ministerial exceptions and exclusion…as well, such power is also seen to have an affinity for the spectacular. 68

Lippert contends that sovereign power has been too narrowly conceived, assumed to be “essentially coercive and to take the form of symbolic punishment, violence or exclusion” which flows from the state. 69 He points to a vast literature where sovereign power is equated with the opening chapters of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish where this form of power is said to take shape as extreme, symbolic punitive force that stems from a central source. 70 Lippert harkens back to Foucault’s first, stomach-turning chapter whereby the spectacle of the scaffold is depicted in painstaking detail. He highlights this scene in order to recuperate what he sees as a forgotten element of sovereign power – the ability to define the exception. He quotes Foucault who describes the role of the sovereign at the scaffold: “the sovereign was present at the execution not only as the power exacting the vengeance of the law, but as the power that could suspend both law and vengeance.” 71 In this way, Lippert highlights the role of exceptionalism as being intricately intertwined with the definition of sovereign power. In a sense, by shining critical light upon this element Lippert is enabled to pose the question: then how can we view sovereign power as outdated? Clearly, if the exception is thriving then so is sovereign power. Furthermore, it follows that sovereign power – as defined through exceptionalism – operates not only in the form of the monarch of the nation-state. Indeed, the granting of sanctuary by the church represents a type of “exception[alism] that is decidedly sovereign in character.” 72 Both the church and community, he claims, are concerned with deciding who will be included or excluded from protection and therefore play an important role in exceptionalism. Furthermore, he argues that churches and communities have their own selection and exclusion procedures that are distinct from elaborate refugee determination procedures. With this in mind Lippert suggests that: stemming from the space of the church and community “a specific power [is] evident in
sanctuary incidents. It [is] exceptional, territorial, spectacular, and every bit as sovereign as the power commonly assumed to flow exclusively from the nation-state” [emphasis added]. As is evident in this passage, Lippert is intent on demonstrating how local spaces may be equally sovereign as the state. I will re-visit the potentially problematic nature of such an objective. For now it will suffice to point out that his point is two-fold: sovereignty must be understood as the ability to define the exception and this exception must not only be seen as flowing solely from the state.

In this way Lippert argues, consistent with Agamben, that “sovereign power can be better understood as a monopoly to decide the exception, rather than only a monopoly to coerce, punish or exclude.” Crucially, the sanctuary recipient – in this articulation of sanctuary as exhibiting sovereign power – becomes reduced to “bare life.” Lippert argues that migrants who are exceptionally included within the sanctuary (through a form of exclusion) are imagined as “neither active and self-regulating nor passive and obedient entities but instead as bare life.” In other words, through the language of exceptionalism they become that existence that can be “killed but not sacrificed.”

Lippert’s next point is that although sovereign power is not simply coercive this does not mean that we can conflate it with the liberal, enabling power of governmentality. Lippert suggests that just as sovereign power is often dismissed as archaic it is also often altogether “superseded by governmentality.” He argues the two should be understood as having a relationship of mutual co-existence. He suggests that governmentalities “defer to sovereign power to create the capacity to make the exception.” Indeed, he argues that the “exception is the very moment at which sovereign power constitutes governmental power.” Calling on
Agamben, he maintains that governmentality nourishes itself on this exception and “is a dead letter without it.”

In addition to exceptionalism, Lippert hopes to illuminate how sovereign power is also bound up with territorial control. Lippert reminds us that in Foucault’s work sovereignty is seen to refer not only to coercive control, but also to territorial control. Indeed, he argues territory “is the very foundation” of sovereignty. Lippert does acknowledge, however, that exceptionalism and control of a given territory may be difficult characteristics to distinguish from governmentality. He maintains that governmentality also relies upon the ability to define the exception and control a bounded population within a given territory. He concedes that both governmental and pastoral power “also have spatial aspects.” Where Lippert feels sovereignty can most effectively be distinguished from governmentality is through sovereignty’s affinity for the spectacle.

Sovereign power’s affinity for the spectacle is perhaps most clearly articulated in Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, Lippert argues. Certainly, it is not difficult to recall the brutal spectacle of stretched flesh, lynched ribs, and decapitated heads that Foucault captures. Lippert argues that this spectacular element can be easily seen today in sanctuary – though perhaps in a less explicitly violent way. He states that on an ongoing basis “sanctuary providers, organized public press conferences as well as visible protests, vigils and picketing of federal political and immigration authorities’ offices” all illuminate the spectacle present in sanctuary.” Indeed, one of the first steps of sanctuary – Lippert argues – is to achieve “exposure” in order to alert mass-media outlets to the fact that the migrant(s) in question had entered the protective space of the church. One need not look far to appreciate this point; in fact, one need only retrieve the newspaper to view the spectacular practice tied up with sanctuary. The recent case of Laiber
Singh, a 48-year-old paralyzed man living in a Sikh temple in Abbotsford, has been splattered across newspaper covers for a number of months. His story has been the heated topic of discussion on radio programs such as CBC’s *Cross-Country Check-Up* with Rex Murphy where a vast array of callers made their views known about his case. Furthermore, in the definition of sanctuary that *No One is Illegal* provides on their website visibility is evidently central:

> The sanctuary movement is premised on the profound recognition that refugees are not to be hidden, made invisible, or to be forced to go ‘underground’ as non-status people. Sanctuary is based on a *public* and assertive act of faith and of conscience.83

Interestingly, Lippert maintains that pastoral and sovereign power intersects in relation to the spectacle. Lippert argues that sanctuary proves that sovereign power has currency today; however, it is sanctuary’s “archaic aura” that facilitates in rendering it seductively spectacular. It is partially because sanctuary is framed as an ancient practice - that is connected to “rarity and ancientness” and aligned with divine pastoral power - that sanctuary is rendered highly visible today.84 With this in mind, it is interesting that the question on CBC’s *Cross-Country Check-Up* regarding sanctuary asks: “is sanctuary outdated?”85 As many callers pointed out, the answer is yes – it is an ancient practice and it no longer has legal purchase; in fact, sanctuary itself is illegal in Canada. Yet, it is precisely because sanctuary is linked to an ancient, non-secular, seemingly outdated heritage that it is rendered curiously appealing to media outlets like the CBC who reify this practice as being relevant today by asking such a question in the first place.

**Lippert’s Limits: ‘The’ Migrant**

By illuminating how both pastoral and sovereign power currently operate in sanctuary Lippert attempts to reposition the limelight away from Foucault’s liberal, governmental rationality. For Lippert, sanctuary is the seminal case study used to prove a larger theoretical point that “non-liberal rationalities may be present in particular instances of governing society
today.”86 As such, Lippert’s central contribution, as he states, is to provide a deeper understanding of contemporary governing society by suggesting that we must “allow for a plurality of sovereignties and rationalities in specific contexts.”87

At this point I wish to ask: if Lippert’s primary contribution is to Foucauldian studies, then are his contributions to understanding sanctuary compromised? Perhaps in his zest for illuminating how pastoral and sovereign power function today the intricacies of sanctuary are side-stepped in his analysis. Yes, Lippert’s analysis does tell us a great deal about Foucauldian rationalities. Indeed, his work provides a more nuanced understanding of governmental, pastoral and sovereign power than is provided in much of the Foucauldian literature. He thoughtfully argues that we cannot simply conflate sovereign power with governmentality, or merely ignore other forms of governance such as pastoral power. This analysis is insightful in that it does not fall into the totalizing trap of projecting liberal governmentality as the form of governance today. Furthermore, he suggests ways of understanding these powers as not simply flowing from a single state or church-based authority. These points which emphasize plurality are important in that Foucault’s own objective may, in part, be articulated as an attempt to avoid totalizing understandings of the world(s). If the purpose of his book is indeed as he says it is – namely “to cast light on theoretical issues in relation to the innovative and expanding body of scholarship known as governmentality studies” – then I would have to agree that Lippert has succeeded. However, perhaps this foremost goal overshadows another important part of his research: namely, sanctuary and those living within it. While he explicates how sanctuary may be an instance of pastoral and sovereign power, and demonstrates how the governmentality lens may be limiting – he never asks: how might all three of these rationalities be limiting when trying to grapple with the complexities of sanctuary?
To reiterate, Lippert understands sanctuary as an overlapping of three Foucauldian logics: governmental power (characterized by a language of freedom and choice); pastoral power (characterized by the language of need, the construction of a shepherd and the use of individualized knowledge); and sovereign power (characterized not only through coercion but through the ability to define the exception and the control of territory and the affinity for the spectacle). Lippert contends that we cannot gloss over pastoral and sovereign power as a result of our liberal obsession with governmentality. Troublingly, however, he does gloss-over the migrant in this very study. His methodology for understanding sanctuary in terms of three overlapping Foucauldian rationalities is largely achieved through interviews with sanctuary providers, rather than recipients themselves. Each of these rationalities, as Lippert presents them, are infatuated with how certain marginalized members of society are protected and saved, and thus the provider becomes central to his study. He states:

To more accurately explore the thirty-six incidents [of Canadian sanctuary] and to access sanctuary discourse, forty-six interviews were conducted over four years with those persons discovered to be intimately involved. These persons are referred to as “sanctuary providers.”

This approach ultimately situates sanctuary providers as the political agents within the study of sanctuary while recipients are simply reduced to supplicants seeking a form of charity - thus their voices are circumnavigated in his political analysis. Although Lippert is not concerned with understanding sanctuary from the point of view of sanctuary recipients - those people who are arguably more “intimately involved” than providers - a very specific depiction of the migrant is nonetheless created through this exclusion. It is essential to consider the way in which the migrant is figured in this Foucauldian reading of sanctuary, while appearing not to be present at all. Lippert’s reading that attempts to understand sanctuary through a triple-lens has the effect of figuring the migrant as apolitical and passive in a triple way.
Through his reading of governmentality the migrant is ultimately structured as a helpless ‘marginalized’ character, in relation to the ‘affiliated’ active and responsible citizen involved in the helpful organization of migrants. Second, through the pastoral power model migrants are formulated as the needful ‘sheep,’ who are simply herded and protected by helpful shepherds. Finally, through the sovereign lens the migrant is structured as bare life – exceptionally included through exclusion and reduced to a life devoid of political agency. Although Lippert attempts to avoid totalizing sanctuary by viewing it through a singular Foucauldian rationality, he nonetheless provides us with a totalizing view of the migrant who is rendered passive in a triple way. Troublingly, this triple figuration ends up producing a singular image of the sanctuary recipient. The multiplicity of contexts within which sanctuary recipients live and act, and the myriad of different stories to be told by a diverse group of migrants are collapsed into the notion of the essentialized migrant whose political agency is ultimately foreclosed. In the following section I shall consider the way in which this figuration of the migrant also seethes with life in dominant media depictions within Canada.
Chapter 3: The Migrant in the Media

Lippert’s construction of the migrant as passive in a triple way is expressed not simply within the context of his analysis; indeed, this conceptualization is the dominant discursive lens through which sanctuary recipients are understood. This section will investigate the way in which Canadian sanctuary recipients are posed as apolitical, helpless figures within the mainstream media, much in the way that Lippert explicates. Three specific cases will be explored. The first case is Amir Kazemian who lived in a Vancouver church for two years and has since gained citizenship; the second is Kader Belaouni who is described as a ‘blind man’ from Algeria currently living in a Montréal church; the third is Laiber Singh who is living in a temple in Vancouver. 89

Although it may be intuitive to begin exploring these three cases in terms of their diverse backgrounds and experiences this would not be in keeping with the dominant depictions of these migrants. Indeed, it is important to note that although Kazemian, Belaouni and Singh experience sanctuary in palpably different ways they have nonetheless been predominantly portrayed as synonymous. In each case these individuals are posed as subjects who elicit sympathy; in this way an image of the sanctuary recipient is produced. Primarily these three men have been inscribed as helpless victims with sorrowful sob-stories. This is perhaps best exemplified by the recent sanctuary recipient, Singh.

The Vancouver Sun begins a description of Singh by stating “it’s hard not to feel some sympathy for” him. If the audience was not effectively persuaded by this initial assertion the article goes onto frame his history in the bleakest of terms:

In 2006…Singh was felled by a massive stroke, left paralyzed and reportedly in ill health. If that weren’t enough, Singh was then ordered deported by the Canadian government. In India, his supporters say, he will not receive adequate medical treatment for his condition. 90
Singh’s life is literally defined as a “sad story.” He is undeniably situated as a victim unable to care for himself. This is also visually encapsulated by the photo that accompanies the article. Below the grim narrative is an equally dismal image of Singh inside a taxi with his hands clasped together revealing a medical bracelet hugging his thin wrist. Outside the vehicle that Singh sits within are his supporters: their clenched fists actively punching the air, their colourful turbans a poignant juxtaposition to the grey tones of Singh’s beard and complexion. In this photo it is obvious who is the political agent (the affiliated or the shepherd), and who is marginalized sheep waiting to be rescued. The sanctuary providers – both temple and the community – hold the protest signs and thus political agency while Singh is simply left holding onto hope. Indeed it would seem that his paralyzed body becomes the metaphor for his political paralysis. Below the picture the caption reads “supporters help disabled Laiber Singh inside the taxi” [Emphasis added]. Curiously, in a newspaper story seemingly about Singh, his supporter’s assistance is in fact the central character: the supporter’s voices are quoted in the article while his voice remains effectively silenced. His role is reduced simply to that of the spectacle, and a particular spectacle at that: a feebly dependent one. The privileging of Singh’s supporters is also evidenced in that it was their protest that gained particular media attention to begin with. The days, weeks and months that Singh spends within sanctuary do not tend to spur front-page news; instead, it is the protest that warrants a $1.50 newspaper fee.

Crucially, Singh is always referred to in relation to his disability before his many other qualities. The fact that he managed to enter into Canada on his own accord and work for three years supporting his family before facing deportation is simply reduced to marginalia, a minor detail that is collapsed in favour of the victimizing story which dominates the press. This victimization is also prolific in the Globe and Mail’s coverage. Snuggled next to his story is a
close-up image of Singh sprawled in a hospital bed, enrobed in a white linen medical gown. His lips and eyes are closed which suggests his silence, at the very least his inactivity. In the background a man with a turban sits over his bed, literally above Singh. Although the man’s face is blurry the effect is clear: Singh needs continual care. This is reminiscent of the very words used to describe pastoral power that Lippert identifies. And this point is further echoed below the picture in the caption which declares: “he suffered a debilitating aneurysm and requires constant care, which his supporters say they will provide.”  
Interestingly, although Singh’s face is central in both the Sun and Globe photographs, he is simultaneously pushed to the margins through the headlines which exclude the mere mention of his name. The title of the Sun reads: “2,000 protesters delay deportation” while the Globe title states: “Protesters decry refugee-claim rejection.” Indeed, Singh is only noted peripherally as the object of the protesters’ political activity who rally outside his closed taxi door.

Belaouni has also been depicted in a similar tone. Again, it is the protest of supporters that rally the media’s meditation. “Marchers seek humanitarian reprieve” is the headline in the Gazette. The subtitle states that “blind Algerian refugee claimant Belaouni has been living in a church for two years.” The frame in which this story is situated is unmistakable: this is a truly sad life that requires our pity and perhaps our help. Where paralysis is the central modality to portray Singh, blindness is the seminal trope used to describe Belaouni. Though he is a visible spectacle, he himself cannot see. This epitomizes the role of the sanctuary recipient within the media – he can be helped, but he cannot help himself; he is received, but really now - what does he have to offer? The story of Belaouni as presented by the Gazette is unfortunately not surprising: it commences with his medical deficiencies. The article states “Belaouni, 40, is blind and has diabetes.” A biopolitical analysis is far from subtle; the fact that he is defined in terms of
his lack of health equally suggests his lack of rightful claim to citizenship. If to be a productive, qualified citizen is to be healthy in our era of bipolitics this story screams out: Belaouni is truly unqualified, he is merely bare life. It is troubling that the article stages Belaouni’s origin story as that moment he left Algeria, at the “height of the murderous civil war in his native country.”

Was this truly the beginning of Belaouni’s life? Would this be the starting point he would choose to narrate his own historicity? His past and present are understood only in terms of utter helplessness. Ostensibly, Belaouni fully lacks political agency – he even has “someone bringing him food.”

What is critical is that this article neglects to mention the life that Belaouni lived before he entered the church. Before he lived within the sanctuary, where he appears to wait for someone to bring him food, he cooked for himself in his own apartment; he provided voluntary support for the many impoverished citizens living within the poor community of Point St.Charles. His daily practices within the church are also surpassed. Based on the Gazette’s rendition, it might seem that Belaouni simply waits with baited breath for the assistance of the church and community. It would seem as if he is incessantly provided for, everything from basic needs to being taught the guitar, incapable to provide for himself or others. This is unquestionably a limited and inaccurate conclusion. Belaouni in fact invites his friends over to the church – a far cry from an ignoble basement suite – to make dinner for them on a regular basis. He teaches members of the community how to play the piano and provides massages to his friends on a table that was donated. He organizes a variety of projects within the community to gain awareness about political, environmental and social issues. This is all expressed within his radio-program, Radio Sanctuary, which is broadcasted on a local Montréal channel, CKUT. Of course, this is not mentioned in the news article. But how might paying attention to this story of Belaouni as one who affects political speech within the church and community trouble Lippert’s
notion of the migrant as apolitical? How might these often untold tales untangle the story of Belaouni as simply a helpless ‘blind-man’?

Finally, there is Kazemain. Unlike the articles describing Singh and Belaouni, the Sun made specific reference to Kazemain’s name in its headline while he lived in sanctuary. The title of the article reads “Who is Amir Kazemain?” While this might instil a degree of optimism in terms of understanding Kazemain’s complexities, the story is troublingly reductionist. The narrative of Kazemain is as follows:

Since arriving in Canada in 1998 on a visitor's visa from Iran, Amir Kazemian has failed multiple times to persuade immigration officials and the Federal Court to allow him to stay in Canada. He was ordered deported in 2004 and began living in St. Michael's Anglican Church in east Vancouver… He says he fears he will be killed if he is sent back to Iran.96

In this articulation Kazemian is ultimately defined in and through fear. This brief biography begs the question: who will help him? Importantly this short description of Kazemian is followed by the question: “What is sanctuary?” This leads to a much longer and in-depth explanation of the tradition of sanctuary. Sanctuary is primarily defined as a process whereby “churches…offer food and shelter to those in need.” Strangely, the question posed “Who is Amir Kazemain?” seamlessly transforms itself into the question “what is sanctuary?” In a sense, this move defines Kazemain in and through sanctuary itself. We can understand who Kazemian is most effectively by understanding what sanctuary is: it would seem as if sanctuary itself is the condition which defines Kazemian’s subjectivity most precisely. And considering that sanctuary is characterized as a practice which posits the migrant as vulnerable prey the obvious implication is that Kazemain is simply reducible to this somewhat pathetic notion. Perhaps this is why Kazemain has all but vanished within the media since his release from sanctuary in 2007. Without the spectacle of sanctuary he ceases to be of interest; in a sense, he ceases altogether. Implicitly the assumption is that sanctuary recipients play a political role in and so far as they exist as pawns
made into passive spectacles within the space of sanctuary. As such, the implication is that sanctuary recipients are not truly capable of political life.
Chapter 4: Interruptions

Up until this point I have framed sanctuary in a way that posits the migrant as apolitical, devoid of agency and defined primarily through a lack. Lippert offers a particular Foucauldian reading of sanctuary whereby politics is exhibited by those providing sanctuary and impossible for those individuals being ‘protected.’ I have shown in both Lippert’s work and in the mainstream media how the sanctuary recipient is considered most significantly where not considered at all. In other words: the sanctuary recipient’s figuration is most present through exclusions. As such, a very particular understanding of the sanctuary recipient becomes evident in Lippert’s work, even despite the fact that he does not deal with the migrant specifically. Indeed, the migrant is deemed as a helpless, marginal character. So too, although the migrant’s voice is often eclipsed from media re-presentations - or included in a particular way implies their silence - a great deal may be learned from this very figuration of absence, namely that the migrant is understood as existing outside the realm of the political. What is more, in and through this characterization sanctuary recipients are depicted as a singular subjectivity – the recipient to be saved.

This section will consider: is this essentialized subjectivity which is defined through an absence the only or most insightful way to understand sanctuary recipients? Are migrants living in sanctuary only able to express an emptiness with regard to political life? In order to address these questions in a different way, in a way that may shed critical light upon the political agency of migrants living in sanctuary, it is productive to turn attention towards a different conceptualization of political life than the one offered explicitly through Lippert’s work and implicitly through the dominant discourse which poses migrants as helpless. This different conceptualization of the political may be understood in terms of the interruption or rupture. I
contend that in particular, Arendt offers us a useful vocabulary to understand political activity in terms of inciting a break, or rupture within habitual political practices. This articulation is also evident in the works of Rancière who also expresses – albeit in importantly different ways – a certain notion of political activity as a type of interruption within naturalized, dominant discourses. I suggest that it is in this rupturing vein that sanctuary recipients may begin to be understood in political terms.

Arendt’s Political Action

In order to engage with Arendt’s notion of political activity as a type of rupture it is important to first foreground this particular notion with her broader understanding of freedom and the political. For Arendt, speech and action are two intimately entwined concepts which are constitutive of freedom and political life. Political human life is defined through a form of activity that necessitates speech – and particularly dialogue - with others. She states that “a life without speech and action…is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men.” The primary reason for this type of political activity, Arendt argues, is freedom. She contends that “the raison d’être of politics is freedom, and its field of experiences is action.” Simply stated, Arendt views political life as a type of speech-act whose purpose is freedom. In this sense freedom is a political practice that is not merely received but exercised in the company of others and thus it is considered coextensive with the notion of politics in Arendt’s work.

The action which Arendt articulates cannot merely be understood as internal dialogue or thought; instead, activity fundamentally necessitates an externality, it requires a public effect. Freedom emerges as a concrete reality only in interaction with others, not ourselves, and becomes real only in a special kind of space, a common and public world where humans
exchange words and deeds about a common world from differing perspectives. She states that “action...is never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act.”

Speech and action become meaningful where “people are with others...in sheer human togetherness.” For it is in and through “our intercourse with others, not in the intercourse with ourselves” that one is able to engage with the world around us. Thus, to reside within the internalized space of the “chamber of our heart” is, for Arendt, to deny political activity. She suggests that this internalized void of political activity is the lonely space of philosophy, where thinkers such as Plato dwell. Such an internal, philosophical place – she maintains – is the antithesis to politics for this solitude “paralyzes and locks one within itself” thereby disabling one to engage with what is at stake in the political realm: not individual life, “but the world.”

It is consequence of this public quality that political activity necessitates courage. Without courage, Arendt argues, it would be impossible to act in a public way. She states that “it requires courage even to leave the protective security of our four walls and enter the public realm, not because of particular dangers which may lie in wait for us, but because we have arrived in a realm where the concern for life has lost its validity.” In this articulation it becomes evident that for Arendt individual life – which she aligns with the space of the private or domestic – is not of central concern for politics, or freedom. The “individual sense of vitality”, or individual life itself is not gratified in the public space of politics; instead, it is demanded of us. In other words, we must be willing to sacrifice – or at least risk – life through courageous political acts in the public rather than submit to securing this life. In this way, the walls which secure human life also operate as a barrier to our potential action and freedom.
Considering the public element that Arendt attributes to political action perhaps it is unsurprising that she likens this activity to a type of performance. Arendt contends that the “performing arts…have indeed a strong affinity with politics.” She remarks:

Performing artists – dancers, play-actors, musicians, and the like – need an audience to show their virtuosity, just as acting men need the presence of others before whom they can appear; both need a publicly organized space for their “work,” and both depend upon others for the performance itself.¹⁰⁶

Thus, without sentient spectators the act is thin and fades away without political ramification into the “inner dwelling” of the philosopher’s mind. In this conceptualization of political activity as performance the stage becomes the metaphoric space where political life unfolds. Interestingly, the stage for politics that she provides is that of the Greek polis. She claims that the polis is precisely the arena that allows men to act within a type of theatre where freedom may appear. I pause here for a moment.

This condition of possibility for political activity – namely the polis – is somewhat paradoxical, perplexing even, as the polis itself is defined in part by Arendt through its bounded walls whose purpose is to protect and secure. Indeed she posits that the organization of the polis is defined partially by its “physical security” provided “by the wall around the city and physiognomically guaranteed by its laws.”¹⁰⁷ The perplexing aspect of the polis is in its similitude to the securing walls of the home which, as I have just explored, she believes to be disabling of political life. She argues that while the “four walls” of the private sphere protect our life, it is in and through this protection that we are unable to exert courage and engage in a public space that cultivates spontaneous, creative acts. One might argue that much like the four walls of the home, which she denies as being a space from which political life may stem, the polis may impede certain acts through its very protection. Perhaps the polis as a stage reduces political
performance to a scripted play where spontaneity itself is secured against and primacy is simply placed upon protecting life.

The fact that the polis is the condition of possibility for political life to unfurl is doubly curious when considering that for Arendt political activity is defined in part by contingency. Importantly, Arendt highlights that the Latin language has two verbs to designate what we singularly call “to act.” These terms are agere and gerere. The first Latin verb, agere, is defined as the inventive act of beginning something new: something unpredictable, contingent, miraculous even, that disrupts routine. This inventive act manifests itself when participants call “something into being, which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as a cognition or imagination.” Unlike a well-rehearsed play - with each gesture scripted to perfection and thus devoid of improvisation – the political act embodies a degree of uncertainty. Given the brutal context within which Arendt was writing – namely the height of a Nazi dictatorship which by her approximation was successful at liquidating a mass population only by first “liquidating all spontaneity” – it is perhaps unsurprising that the notion of spontaneity is so dear to her. This contingent element may also be understood in relation to her concept of the ‘new.’ She states the “character of startling unexpectedness is inherent in all beginnings and in all origins” and indeed, all political acts involve this element of creation, creativity and thus unexpectedness. She makes the connection between action and beginnings in the following passage:

to act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, “to begin,” “to lead,” and eventually “to rule,” indicates), to set something into motion (which is the original meaning of the Latin agere). Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action....This beginning is not the same as the beginning of the world; it is not the beginning of something but somebody, who is a beginner himself.
Antithetical to the routine, the bringing in of something new “always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability...which amounts to certainty.” As such she maintains that the new may manifest in the “guise of a miracle.” In this way political activity is understood as an unpredictable break, or rupture in the given order. For Arendt “setting something new into the world” requires an acceptance of uncertain consequences. It is in this vein of the unexpected that one can read Arendt’s hesitation regarding motives which control activity in a predetermined way. She states that “action must be free, must be free from motives...[and] from intended goal.” She goes on asserting that “action insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will.” In a strange way, however, this unexpectedness inherent to all political acts – which incites new beginnings – is encoded within the language of the expected. This is evident when she claims “the fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected.”

This notion of political activity, as that which breaks with routine, is also exemplified in her work, *Origins of Totalitarianism*. In her chapter “Totalitarianism in Power” Arendt critiques the often default assumption that scientific rationality is desirable. She contends that in fact, intense rationalization and bureaucracy were necessary conditions for the Nazi regime to slaughter such a mass population. Indeed, the concept of ‘population’ itself is a rational, efficient technology whereby a diverse people are known in a particular way that enables increased control conducive to organized extermination. As such, she contests that it is this language of rationality itself which we must interrogate rather than take as a common-sensical given. In the context of this critique Arendt states that “in each one of us, there lurks such a liberal, wheedling us with the voice of common sense.” Here Arendt urges us to question our own seemingly friendly, liberal, naturalized assumptions for it is in the name of common or habitual logic that
we may become complacent to the dangers it conceals. This critique of common sense in the empirical case of Nazi Germany serves as a poignant argument for the importance of viewing political activity as a type of rupture that refuses to accept routinized practices.

Although political activity for Arendt hinges upon a certain degree of flux and spontaneity, she nonetheless articulates political action as requiring a form of fixity. This is apparent in the second Latin word for the verb ‘to act’ which she evokes and that is gerere. Though Arendt indicates that this term is difficult to translate, she interprets it as the “enduring and supporting continuation of past acts” or put otherwise, a task that is to be carried through by those people who participated in its construction. This term signifies a commitment to following through with that new act which has been created. These two meanings of the term ‘to act’ – agere and gerere - though potentially complementary, are more interestingly at odds with one another. Indeed, the contradictory element between these two meanings leads Arendt to offer two very different concepts of political activity. She appears to have a dual commitment to: contingent political action on the one hand, and acts that are preserved and secured on the other.

This is particularly evident in her discussion of memory. While Arendt continually alludes to the temporally contingent quality of political action, she ultimately freezes this fluidity in her desire for the polis as a bounded-community – whose purpose is in part to preserve memory of past acts. Indeed, Arendt asserts that the act creates an "outcome", or tangible product, once the act has completed. This fixed outcome of the act is the "deed and the story"; contrary to her notion of the always changing act, the deed and the story must be preserved. Thus, the polis becomes necessary. For, it is the polis’ “physically secured…walls” which enforce an “organized remembrance.” It is the polis which is the condition of possibility for memory. She states that the polis is the “remedy for the futility of action and speech; for the
chances that a deed deserving fame would be forgotten, that it would actually become
“immortal,” were not very good.” It is interesting to note that an act that is not memorialized
becomes intolerable for Arendt; indeed it ceases to be an act. It is the polis, it may be argued,
which is the necessary pre-requisite for the second Latin definition of ‘act’; namely, the carrying
through, and commitment to an act. Without the polis this quality of continuity has more
difficulty continuing. Of the polis she states:

It assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will never lack the
reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of
fellow men, who outside the polis could attend only the short duration of the performance.

The polis serves an important function in that it ensures that “deed and stories” become
“imperishable,” and forever secured. Interestingly, although the political act and freedom itself
are posited as ephemeral the outcome of the act is framed as requiring stability. It is in fact
curious that the political act itself might become an “outcome” at all, considering that for Arendt
activity ceases to be activity when it has a particular end or motive. Indeed, Arendt likens
political activity to the performing arts rather than an artistic product partially in order to
emphasize the act’s ephemeral quality. It is odd that action may have a surplus product
considering that the act – for Arendt – only exists so long as it is in action. In Arendt’s words,
action is “manifest in the world as long as the action lasts, but no longer.” It would appear
that Arendt’s very definition of political activity – which is seen as a constant practice – would
be inherently ephemeral, for the moment that it ceases to be active it ceases altogether.
Importantly, the first Latin definition she offers in the form of agere (to begin) does not
necessarily crave the continuity and preservation of an act – and perhaps therefore does not
require the polis as its condition of possibility. In fact, the polis may be viewed as a hindrance to
the spontaneity and breaking of habitual ways of being to which the term agere corresponds.
It may be argued that this seeming contradiction stemming from Arendt’s double-meaning of activity is not a contradiction at all. One may contend that we are at once incited by Arendt to act in new ways, to be spontaneous, to engage in ways of being that rupture dominant habits; and we are also called upon to carry out these new ways of being. I contend that resolving these two notions of action by viewing them as mutually reinforcing sutures an important contradiction in Arendt’s work, and that this suture de-politicizes Arendt’s notion of political activity.

If we approach the two terms – *agere* and *gerere* – as working ‘together,’ the spontaneous and rupturing potential of *agere* is domesticated. I contend that the second Latin word that Arendt offers us, *gerere*, in fact undoes the interrupting quality of the first. If a new act must be carried on, and thus must be preserved, does it not cease to be new? If a spontaneous, contingent act must be preserved by the polis – and therefore contained and secured by the polis – does it not cease to be spontaneous, contingent? To my mind, the answer in each of these instances is yes. Indeed by Arendt’s own logic the answer is yes, which is why she in part denies the home – with its four securing walls – as a space for politics to occur. In Arendt’s work she resolves the dual meanings of the term ‘to act’ by privileging the second, and therefore necessitating the security of the polis. I feel it is important to ask: what can be gained by understanding Arendt’s two meanings of activity as being in dis-agreement with one another, rather than in resolution? I believe that it is in and through the rubbing together of these two meanings – not in their peaceful coexistence – that Arendt offers us a meaningful understanding of political activity. By rubbing together these notions it becomes evident how the spontaneous political, rupturing act may be protected by the polis, and therefore also limited by it. This awareness forces us to ask whether privileging political life that emerges from the polis is indeed
the most productive, the most political. Furthermore, it begs the question: what rupturing political acts are deemed unqualified when it is assumed that the contained polis – and its preserving potential - is the condition of possibility for action?

In this regard Arendt both does and does not give us the language to understand the sanctuary recipient in political terms. On the one hand, she explains activity as agere: the beginning of something new, the breaking of routine. Yet, as I have explored, this act is also defined as gerere which requires the maintenance and protection of a political act by the polis which enables fixed memory practices. In the first sense sanctuary recipients may be exemplary of political activity. Indeed, the entrance of an illegal ‘non-citizen’ within the heart of cities across Canada certainly imposes a rupture within the everyday, often unquestioned practices of citizenship. The routinized practice of citizenship whereby one is simply accepted and therefore enforced to engage in the bureaucratic and routinized practices of becoming citizen; or denied and therefore enforced to quietly exit without disruption is troubled. As William Walters has pointed out, the taking of sanctuary guarantees that deportation will “no longer be a routine administrative process.” Instead, the practice of sanctuary ensures that “deportation is revealed as a site where sovereignty is performed: either the state negotiating with the subjects of deportation…or the states as armed bodies of men smashing down church doors, seizing, arresting, pacifying, terrifying, removing bodies in full display of the public.” In this sense, those people living within sanctuary refuse to allow the notion of citizenship (which entails practices of deportation) to smoothly exist as uncontested. These people give face to the violences that citizenship engenders.

On December 11, 2007 the habitual act of entering the Vancouver airport, swiping ones’ passport and travelling seamlessly through an international system was anything but seamless.
Instead, on this day Laiber Singh and his 2,000 supporters flooded the entrance of the airport thereby disrupting not only the Canada Border Services Agency’s plan to deport Singh, but also the thoughts of those people mindlessly travelling through a system which requires the silencing of its own necessary violences. As travellers frantically rushed to pass-through the space of transit to get home, Singh served as the supposedly speech-less person who nonetheless seemed to whisper through his very presence: ‘the practices through which you find and secure your home, have rendered me homeless.’ In this way the routine act of checking a flight number, or going through security are interrupted by the image of a man who waits not for a flight, but demands recognition and right.

Troublingly, however, this unpredictable and rupturing act – seemingly exemplary of Arendt’s notion of *agere* – is excluded by her definition of political activity that relies upon the polis. If the polis is the space of communicative speech deeds that defines ones’ political subjectivity then by definition Singh appears to disappear from the political realm. Or, at the very least he exhibits an unqualified political voice. Although at first sight Arendt herself would exclude the possibility of the sanctuary recipient’s political agency – in that the condition of possibility for political life is the polis – her work offers the tools to undo this very exclusionary logic itself by suggesting that political action manifests in the interruption of routinized practices. While Arendt is the theorist who may provide justification for the denial of sanctuary recipients as political, she is at the same time the theorist who provides a meaningful language with which to speak of migrant’s political agency. As I have argued, crucially this language is only meaningful when holding her two notions of political activity against each other, rather than attempting to resolve them. For, when we hold them against each other an important paradox is revealed and that is: although the polis may be the space which enables public dialogue, and
although it is a space which protects the memory of deeds it is also this space which hinders political activity as a creatively contingent act. Thus, in order to take seriously Arendt’s notion of *agere* the polis as the condition of possibility for political activity must be questioned.

**Problematizing the Polis**

Perhaps more precisely, this particular notion of the polis that has been evoked thus far must be questioned. To remind ourselves, she does refer to the polis in its original Greek manifestation in terms of a physically bounded community. In order to exert political voice and thus freedom what is needed, she states is

> The company of other men who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them – a politically organized world, in other words, into which each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed.\(^{121}\)

Indeed, providing a “common” public space is the purpose of the polis. This is problematic for the sanctuary recipient. The sanctuary recipient is denied entry into the “common public space” and furthermore, may not be in “the same state” as other men. Perhaps this is precisely what makes their voices interesting, and indeed what offers unpredictability within the political sphere. Perhaps it is in and through their denial from the common public space that their voices are consistent with the notion of *agere*: the bringing of something new into being, the rupturing of habit. Indeed, what better way to incite a rupture in the given order than by drawing attention to the very violence that found a seemingly multicultural society?

Considering that the polis for Arendt is that space which provides a place for men of a common state to meet, it follows that this is also the space which denies certain types of subjectivities (women etc) from being in common. She states that:

> Obviously not every form of human intercourse and not every kind of community is characterized by freedom. Where men live together but do not form a body *politic* – as for
example, in tribal societies or in the privacy of the household – the factors ruling their actions and conduct are not freedom but the necessities of life and concern for its preservation.\textsuperscript{122}

Again, this notion would inhibit migrants – and indeed a variety of other forms of existence – from partaking in free, political activity. In this articulation it would appear that the sanctuary recipient is “obviously” relegated to this mere preservation of life – perhaps even bare life. In this expression she unsettlingly equates political activity with the sovereign state or the geographic area with an associated government. This is even more clearly expressed when she claims that:

The human being who has lost his place in a community, his political status in the struggle of his time, and the \textit{legal personality} which makes his actions and part of his destiny a consistent whole, is left with those qualities which usually can become articulate only in the sphere of private life and must remain \textit{unqualified}, mere existence in all matters of public concerns and is left with…only the unpredictable hazards of friendship and sympathy\textsuperscript{123}

Evidently here Arendt considers qualified political voice as dependent upon the inclusion within a community that can guarantee, legally, ones’ inclusion. In this notion the illegal migrant, or the exile, becomes an intolerable subjectivity. Strangely by her own definition Arendt – as an exilic figure – is denied voice. Considering this paradox, it is vital to ask: in order to be considered politically qualified is it essential to be part of a common public space? Or perhaps, does losing ones place from the community provide one with an important position from which to speak? Was this not the case for Arendt herself? This reiterates the conundrum that Arendt’s work poses. While the sanctuary recipient may be most suited to act politically (according to the definition of \textit{agere}) he is denied entry into the space, the polis, from which such action is said to occur.

After considering the way in which Arendt evokes the polis as a physically bounded community it is important to note how she also alludes to a different conceptualization. Before concluding that the polis is antithetical to those figures who are not legally constituted by the
polis, such as the sanctuary recipient, it may be useful to consider the multiple – and potentially subversive - ways in which she evokes this concept. Indeed, Arendt offers an alternative articulation of the polis which does not necessitate a bounded territoriality, or imply legal recognition. It may be argued that in fact for Arendt the polis is not necessarily making a plea for a confined community at all as she does allude to the polis in a more amorphous manner in particular moments. For instance she states that

The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together. And its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be. “Wherever you go, you will be a polis”…[this] expresses[s] the conviction that action and speech create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost any time anywhere.124

In this respect, Arendt unravels the logic of the polis that I previously laid out. Here, she offers an image of the polis as mobile, transient and indeed contingent. This polis is contingent upon the dialogue between participants and appears to only exist during such an exchange. As such, she states that this polis can exist “anywhere.”125 In this theorization of the polis the basement suite of a church where a sanctuary recipient and visitors illegally interact constitutes a polis, and is seemingly deemed just as political as the bounded, legally legitimate community. Interestingly, this flexible-polis aligns more comfortably with her notion of agere in that it is distinguished by spontaneity, fluidity and uncertainty. Perhaps the creative, contingent political act – which itself is without a certain end goal – is best achieved in a political space which does not require fixed and stable borders to limit and impinge upon it. And it is in and through this meaning of the polis that the sanctuary recipient may not find himself outside of the realm of the political.

In summation: Arendt offers us two central forms of political activity (agere and gerere), and correspondingly two main forms of the polis (physically bounded and non). Paradoxically
then, sanctuary recipients - and Arendt herself as exile - are exemplary of her definition of political activity and yet simultaneously excluded by it. In order to understand sanctuary recipients as expressing an important form of political expression it is productive to illuminate the dis-agreement between her two notions of action (and their respective political milieu) rather than simply succumb to a resolution between them. For, when we hold up Arendt’s notion of agere (and its corresponding flexible-polis) against Arendt’s notion of gerere (and the physically-bounded, legally legitimate polis that it requires) the inherent exclusions upon which the latter is premised become blatantly evident. It becomes obvious that by privileging gerere and the bordered polis, what is lost - or at least limited - is a type of spontaneous activity that may trouble habitual practices (such as the polis itself) by an actor who is not fixed nor legally recognized. Indeed, this juxtaposition highlights the violent absences in our own physically-bounded and legally legitimate political communities which strangely deny migrants’ rupturing political potential as political.

Rancière’s Interruption

Much like Arendt’s articulation of agere, as a type of spontaneous rupture in the given order, Rancière emphasizes in his text Disagreement that politics is defined in and through interruption. He states: “the specificity of politics is disruption.” 126 That is to say, the contestation itself over a seemingly naturalized meaning or order that appears to exclude ‘nothing,’ is precisely what constitutes political exercise. Particularly, the naturalized notion that concerns politics most for Rancière is equality.

It may appear odd that the very theorist insistent upon explicating a politics based on ruptures would argue that the activity of politics “turns on equality as its principle.”127 It may appear strange in that equality is often framed as the unproblematic, ultimate telos which is
potentially void of exclusion. Crucially, however, it is not Rancière’s intent to pose equality as a complete end which he hopes to achieve. Equality for Rancière is not a “given that politics then presses into service, an essence embodied in the law or a goal politics sets itself the task of attaining.” Instead he views it as an “assumption that needs to be discerned within the practices of implementing it” [Emphasis added]. In other words, Rancière is compelled to question the ways in which the term and practice of ‘equality’ are mobilized which always-already engender violent absences. As such, equality is framed not so much as a goal but a site of continual problematization for Rancière.

In order to expose the ways in which the notion of equality overcodes its own exclusions, Rancière claims that it is vital to make a distinction between two concepts: the police and politics. He contests that politics opposes the police logic, or as he says politics is an “extremely determined activity antagonistic to policing.” The police signify for Rancière what is commonly, and problematically, understood by the term politics:

Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems of legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution and legitimization another name. I propose to call it the police.

In other words: the police function as the rationality that decides how and what is rendered visible and identifiable as a part of the whole community, whether or not its speech will be heard as intelligible. While on the one hand the police assert how all parts have been accounted for, included and given its due share of the common, politics claims the opposite. Politics asserts that there is a wrong done in the existing count of the community parts, that there is "a part of those who have no part". Thus, it is the goal of politics to shed critical light upon these absences. It is vital for Rancière to contest the way in which the police and politics have been conflated, for the police - as the organization and distribution of a ‘whole’ that always has invisible remnants -
can never be the site from which political contestation may occur. This is primarily because the work of police is to deny the remnants and therefore the ability to contest the seeming equal whole of a given community.

In relation to this part that has “no part” Rancière asserts: who better to highlight such exclusions than those excluded? Indeed, if politics is exercised “solely through interruption” then this requires those who have “no part” in the social order to bring to critical light their exclusions through such an interruption. For Rancière this is the radically political moment. Such instances allow the excluded – “the part who has no part” – to constitute themselves as agents under different terms. Indeed for Rancière, political activity is whatever “shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise.”

Politics for Rancière is a move whereby the excluded re-constitute themselves, make themselves known where they had previously appeared to not appear at all. In this way Rancière perhaps offers a language to understand sanctuary recipients as exhibiting a vital political role as their presence may potentially contests given citizenship practices. As Rancière suggests:

Politics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves of some account, setting up a community by the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing more than this very confrontation, the contradiction of two worlds in a single world: the world where they are and the world where they are not, the world where there is something “between” them and those who do not acknowledge them as speaking beings who count and the world where there is nothing.

This is an important point in relation to sanctuary recipients. It may be argued that because Laiber, Amir and Belaouni do not belong to the qualified political community – indeed are radically excluded from it by law – they are therefore denied entry into the political. However, as Rancière suggests there is a certain political potential offered through this positioning of
exclusion. The presence of these characters brings into being the division between those who are considered speaking beings and those who are not: those who are deemed political, and those who are not. In a sense, each of these migrants highlight the way in which ‘equality,’ celebrated as reality in Canada, is only possible through the continual erasure of alternative experiences which de-stabilize this abstract notion. These migrants highlight what Cruikshank refers to as “technologies of citizenship.” That is to say, citizenship is revealed to be a process which must continually work to exist. Citizenship relies upon particular – often violent - practices in order to appear as naturalized, in order to appear as some fixed given. In this respect the sanctuary recipient may exhibit Arendt’s notion of political activity par excellence. In order for an act to be deemed political, Arendt states, a person must contribute to a “common world.” Indeed, the illegal migrant who is excluded from a common world – whose subjectivity is denied and often deemed apolitical - is ironically perhaps best able to contribute (in an interrupting way) to this common world by exposing its conditions of possibility. Kazemian, Belaouni and Singh all shed critical light upon that which holds ‘us’ as Canadians in common: not equality, not even commonality - but erasures which enable a “common world” to appear as common. Belaouni’s radio program, for instance, broadcast from a Montréal church which describes how he has been faced with deportation highlights how the very glue which holds Canadians in common - as accepting, peace-keeping multiculturalists - is indeed premised upon myth. Or, at the very least, depends upon a re-coding of particular exclusionary practices. On his radio-show Belaouni discusses his impression of the little dog who sits just outside his window which stays propped open with a Campbell’s soup tin:

The dog is outside, why are you angry? I am jealous. I am stuck here and you are outside. His voice is angry like complaining. I don’t understand why he is complaining. That is my life. That is my life.
Here, Bealouni’s voice accentuates the ways in which seemingly humanitarian Canada engages in practices whereby those deemed unfit are actively treated in such a de-humanizing manner that a dog might find objectionable.

Against Rancière one might contend that this notion of the rupturing political potential of the "part that has no part" is indeed nothing more than a move to include the excluded within the dominant order of any given community. Perhaps drawing attention to one's exclusion in fact serves to reify the very order that seeks to politically disqualify certain subjects. For instance, Agamben states that "bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men."¹³⁷ In this sense, it is exclusion that makes possible a particular political order which is defined against the seemingly excluded bare life. As Agamben sees it, bare life itself is in fact the center of the 'city of men' in that this bare life is included as the very foundation upon which the city is articulated against. In other words, the city "at once excludes bare life and captures it within the political order."¹³⁸ What is essentially different, however, in Rancière's work is that he envisions a different space for that form of life which is deemed apolitical, and/or bare and in so doing, contests this very notion of the bare life. Much like Agamben, Rancière suggests that while this form of life is not entirely included - as a legitimate legal subject - it is also not entirely excluded. The vital difference for Rancière is that this life is also not simply included through exclusion. In other words there is another domain that cannot be explained entirely through the triad: inclusion; exclusion; inclusion through exclusion. Rather, there is a fourth space for the seemingly apolitical bare form of life that renders this life anything but. That space is perhaps best described in terms of an 'in-between' or gap.

It is here within this in-between gap that the included-yet-also-not-entirely-excluded are able to "demonstrate the sheer contingency of the order" and shed light upon the mythical quality
of 'equality' that denies their subjectivity. For instance, existing in a sort of borderland Laiber exposes the naturalized uncontested category of 'citizen' as a concept that must continually work to exclude his very subjectivity in order to exist as such. In this notion of political activity Laiber, previously described in terms of an empty political agency, exerts an important political act. This supposedly "wordless victim, the ultimate figure of the one excluded from the logos;" the one "armed only with a voice expressing a monotonous moan, the moan of naked suffering" thus is able to subvert this silence into a powerful voice which calls attention to the practices that attempt to silence. In this respect, then, the figure deemed as a type of 'bare' life is perhaps not so bare at all. And further, perhaps his role is not simply to "found" a city that - in so doing - excludes him as Agamben suggests. His role is not limited to the past tense. Instead, his role can be described more precisely as a continual un-founding, or at least a shaking of those very foundations which seek to deny him.

Crucially in this reading of political activity as a type of rupture, consensus is deemed as antithetical to politics. For Rancière, consensus attempts to suture the always-present gap between 1) what appears to be all-inclusive, where there appears to be nothing left out and 2) that which is absent. Rancière asserts that what consensus presupposes is the “disappearance of any gap between a party to a dispute and a part of society. It is the disappearance of the mechanisms of appearance, of the miscount and the dispute opened up by the name “people” and the vacuum of their freedom. It is, in a word, the disappearance of politics.” The consensus is the moment that the conditions under which any given appearance of completeness ‘disappear.’ For instance, it is the erasure of the conditions under which Canada becomes Canada. It is the disappearance of the violence of colonization which made possible ‘our’ homeland. The consensus is the uncontested evocation of the term Canada which appears to envelop a whole – which is never
whole. It is the moment that the plethora of realities are (mis)counted and given the name of the ‘people’ thereby over-coding and denying the experiences outside such a seemingly complete category. It is the moment when everything appears to be accounted for, the moment that “the whole is all” and the “nothing is nothing.” In this sense, the moment that politics ceases is "wherever this gap no longer has any place, wherever the whole of the community is reduced to the sum of its parts with nothing left over”\textsuperscript{141}

When we juxtapose Arendt’s notion of political action with that of Rancière’s we see some important parallels, and departures. Indeed, both view political activity as a type of rupture or interruption in the given order. However unlike Arendt, Rancière does not necessitate the polis as the condition of possibility for such political activity to manifest. Indeed, it would appear that for Rancière there is a distinctive political potential of existing not within a particular political community or polis, but ‘in-between.’ Furthermore, Rancière’s assertion that keeping open a dis-agreement whereby that which appears whole is questioned and (re)considered may be useful to understand in relation to Arendt’s work. Particularly, Rancière’s notion of the dis-agreement might be applied to her two concepts of activity. Rather than resolving the two terms, a more politically productive reading of Arendt might be to consider at once the notion of gerere – which necessitates a particular political community dedicated to protection and memorialisation in the form of the polis – simultaneously against agere. Through this reading her notion of activity is exposed as relying upon a physically bounded polis that necessarily denies certain forms of political activity. Furthermore, this reading allows us an alternative language with which to articulate the sanctuary recipient in terms of political agency, for it is this part that “has no part” who may be most qualified to destabilize and question what constitutes and is violently excluded from ostensibly qualified political communities.
Both Arendt and Rancière provide an important language to understand sanctuary recipients, whom Lippert poses as apolitical, in political terms. By offering the rupture or interruption as a central modality of political action both Arendt and Rancière compel us to reconsider migrants living within sanctuary. Implicitly, for Arendt and Rancière the very condition under which Lippert denies the sanctuary recipient’s voice – namely that they are not entirely included within the political community – in fact enables these figures an important form of political speech. It is due to the precarious position between citizen/non-citizen (and their obfuscation of both categories) that migrants might draw attention to and contest normalized practices of citizenship. While Arendt arguably provides the logic to deny the exilic figure as political - by suggesting that the territorially-bounded polis conditions political life - she simultaneously provides the logic to destabilize this argument. She does this in two ways: first, she offers an alternative definition of the polis as an amorphous experience; second, the definition of political action as agere (or a spontaneous rupture) that she poses might privilege migrants who do not comfortably reside within the polis and who therefore might be in a position to trouble its foundational, uncontested assumptions.

Though it may appear that Arendt and Rancière provide the theoretical tools to unravel Lippert’s logic which ultimately denies the migrant all form of agency we should pause to consider some important implications, lest we forget the exclusions evident in their own work. While both Arendt and Rancière express political activity as a type of rupture, thereby facilitating an understanding of the illegal migrant as political, they also specify a particular prerequisite: naming and visibility. Indeed, I contend that both Arendt and Rancière privilege activity that is conducive to the spectacle. This becomes problematic in that the sanctuary
recipient’s rupturing potential can only be understood as political in so far as it can be known in a spectacular way. And, as it will be argued, the spectacle itself in many ways limits certain possibilities for political activity. Furthermore, this notion forecloses other political actors who may present meaningful interruptions within habitual practices precisely because they are not spectacular.

**Arendt’s Disclosure**

*For every action what is primarily intended by the doer, whether he acts from natural necessity or out of free will, is the disclosure of his own image*

_-Dante_[^42]

As was explicated in the previous section, Arendt necessitates that in some respects the polis is a territorially-bounded entity partially because it ensures the preservation of the deed and story once action itself has ceased. It is the polis’ physically secured walls which enforce an “organized remembrance” and condition the possibility for memory.[^143] She states that the polis is the “remedy for the futility of action and speech; for the chances that a deed deserving fame would be forgotten, that it would actually become “immortal,” were not very good.”[^144] Here it is evident that for Arendt the act which is not memorialized is intolerable; indeed, it ceases to be considered an act.

Importantly, it is not simply the act or outcome of the act itself that must be remembered – but also the *actor*. She emphasizes the necessity for an act to be connected to an actor who is known by name. Without this exposure, the act is rendered futile. She states that “action without a name, a “who” attached to it, is meaningless”[^145] The unknown generic face is unbearable and cannot exhibit virtuous activity. This assertion is best understood in context of her conceptualization of political activity that I have previously explored. Crucially for Arendt
political activity and freedom require the courage to act in a public way. Dialogue which occurs within the confines of one’s own mind or home (or sanctuary, or . . .) is thus inherently apolitical. Therefore, part of this making-public element for Arendt is the making of one’s identity publicly visible and heard. It is not sufficient to invisibly act within the public world; instead, individuals must make themselves known to the world within which they act. As such, what Arendt calls ‘disclosure’ becomes a quintessential quality of political activity. By disclosure Arendt means the process by which one becomes visibly known in the public realm. As the epitaph that commences both this section and Arendt’s chapter entitled “Action” implies: action and disclosure are mutually coextensive. Indeed, for Arendt it is impossible to act politically without disclosing oneself. In this respect, it is not surprising that she often clings to the notion of the Greek polis which, as she explains, provided ‘men’ with a kind of “theatre where freedom could appear” [emphasis added].

If the political space for activity may be likened to a theatre, political subjectivity thus depends upon functioning as a visible type of spectacle.

The weight that Arendt gives to disclosure is exemplified in her contention that this is the definitive feature of the hero. Disclosure itself enables an ordinary person to transcend to the extraordinary hero. Arendt claims that she excavates the “original” definition of the hero from Homer. Although the term hero often connotes a grand glorified figure, Arendt argues that the hero is in fact simply he “for whom a story could be told.”

The hero for Arendt is one who inserts oneself into the world and commences a story of one’s own. She considers this a courageous act. And this courage is not necessarily associated with a willingness to suffer; instead, it is expressed in the willingness to “leave one’s private hiding place and show who one is.” The hero is one who is keen to “disclose and expose oneself.” Furthermore, glory itself is equated with visibility. This is exemplified in her statement that “action needs for its full
appearance the shining brightness we once called glory, and which is possible only in the public
realm.”¹⁴⁸ The shining spot-light that brings one out from hiding and into clear sight is indeed
what enables an act to transcend the banal to the brave.

Based on this notion of disclosure Arendt offers us three characters. First, there is the
hero – or the political figure who has courage to disclose his name and for whom a story may be
told. The next figure is the “the doer of good works” who must exist without “self and preserve
complete anonymity”; and third “the criminal who must hide himself from others.” Both the doer
of good works and the criminal are unable to disclose themselves, albeit for different reasons.
While the benevolent doer of good is “for all men,” the criminal – Arendt asserts – is “against all
men.” Despite their different intentions the fact that both must resist disclosure makes them
equally “lonely figures” in Arendt’s mind. She states that because of their loneliness, or
isolation, they must “therefore, remain outside the pale of human intercourse and are, politically,
marginal figures”¹⁴⁹ [Emphasis added]. Here, the person who resists becoming visible and who
is not known by name is situated as a marginal character beyond the grasp of political life. It is
vital to highlight the way in which Arendt carves out a very limited and ultimately apolitical
domain for the undisclosed actor through her dedication to visibility.

Unquestionably, Arendt is deeply suspicious and critical of the actor who remains hidden.
She states that freedom “develops fully only when action has created its own worldly space
where it can come out of hiding, as it were, and make its appearance.”¹⁵⁰ For Arendt hiding itself is radically at odds with political life. Arendt exemplifies the problematic nature of the unknown
act by referencing the phenomenon of the ‘Unknown Soldier’ which was a condition of World
War I. Arendt states that,

The brutal fact that the agent of the war was actually nobody inspired the erection of the
monuments to the ‘unknown’ to all those whom the war had failed to make known and had
robbed thereby, not of their achievement, but their human dignity.¹⁵¹
In this articulation Arendt emphasizes a double-danger of non-disclosure. First, the threat resides in the fact that one may perish and cease to be remembered therefore robbing a person of political action and thus “human dignity.” The soldier who cannot be identified fades from memory like dust smattering an anonymous monument and loses that which defines him as hero or indeed human - the deed. Secondly, Arendt is arguing that disclosure is paramount not simply so a story may be told of a hero, but so that an actor may be held accountable for the violences of their act. For Arendt war itself, which lacks a precise name or face with which to attribute the violences it engenders, serves as a key exemplar for the need for disclosure.

It may be argued that the sanctuary recipient could be included within this conceptualization of political activity which privileges visibility. Clearly those living in highly publicized sanctuary are named, known and indeed remembered perhaps more so than the ‘average’ citizen. Indeed, as was made clear in the discursive analysis of mainstream media: the migrant is exceptionally visible. However, to what degree might this visibility in fact disable the notion of the rupture which Arendt poses as epitomizing political activity? Furthermore, what about those migrants who illegally and invisibly slip into Canada and find sanctuary in a less obvious form? They are excluded. So too, migrants who attempt to ensure invisibility before residing in sanctuary cannot be understood in political terms. Yet I ask: how can the somewhat invisible figure also enact an unpredictable rupture, perhaps to a deeper degree than the sanctuary recipient or citizen who is highly visible and known?

Rancière’s Visibilities

This move to equate political activity with visibility or disclosure is also present - though manifests itself differently - in Rancière’s work. Rancière diverges from Arendt in that he
specifically illuminates how visibility of the excluded can destabilize the dominant order that seeks to deny their presence or entry into that very order. However, like Arendt he relies upon visibility as a stipulation of political activity nonetheless. As may be recalled, for Rancière politics is constitutive of an interruption within the dominant order. In this conceptualization the “part that has no part” plays a vital political role as they may draw attention to their own exclusion within the given order thereby constituting a disruption. It would appear that this understanding provides a de-victimizing language with which to understand, for example, the sanctuary recipient. While this may be argued, Rancière’s politicization of the excluded requires the exclusion of those who do not necessarily exhibit or strive for visibility.

The most radical act of politics for Rancière is the moment that those who have “no part” in the social order articulate a wrong as equal speaking beings. Indeed, this is the quintessential political moment, for the naturalness of the “dominant discourse is questioned and its arbitrariness exposed.” This process enables the excluded to render themselves as political agents by “making visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard as discourse where once was only place for noise.” The police deny the existence of any such part by rendering the wrong invisible and therefore non-existent. Since the order of the police, or the (biopolitical) logic of the management of populations, is precisely the denial of its existence giving consistency to the excluded involves the metaphor of the theatre: the logic of a staging, of constructing a scene where the part that has no part may be seen. Unlike Arendt, Rancière does not contend that the polis is necessarily the stage upon which political activity may unfold; however, the “stage” – and thus the actor as a type of spectacle – is nonetheless compulsory. While I have discussed how this theorization opens up the domain of political activity, it is vital to point out the way in which this conception also radically limits it. For Rancière, the excluded
become political by subverting their invisibility into a form of visibility and recognition. As such, Rancière contends that in so far as those who have ‘no part’ remain unseen, unheard, unknown, and uncounted they slip away into a rather meaningless milieu.

Much like Arendt, Rancière maintains that for an act to be considered political the actor must be named. In order for the excluded to draw attention to a wrong done in the existing count of the community parts and in order to highlight that some are not counted, there must be a naming process. The excluded draw attention to a wrong by constructing a “stage” in which the existence of a wrong is demonstrated and – what Rancière calls – *subjectivized*, which is defined as a process of giving a name to the part of those who have no part, the political subjectivity which is the subject of a wrong.\(^{156}\) While this may appear an innocent process, and perhaps indeed necessary, this again limits the domain of political activity to those who are willing and able to be known in this particular way. Again, I ask: what of those who remain nameless, faceless? Is it thus impossible for an act to incite an interruption without a name attached to it?
Chapter 6: (In)visible Interruptions

Through the work of Arendt and Rancière I have shown ways to understand the sanctuary recipient in political terms: to subvert their voicelessness into voice; their invisibility into visibility. What is interesting is the way in which this dedication to visibility expresses itself in a variety of forms: from the definition of sanctuary itself which hinges upon exposure, to specific political movements. Take the case of the occupation of Saint Ambroise church in Paris in 1996 by 324 African migrants. This event has been referred to as setting the foundation for the sans-papiers movement, a campaign that demands legalization of so-called ‘illegal immigrants.’ As Walters has suggested, “one reason for the significance of this movement is that through it undocumented workers…have sought to become autonomous political subjects, rather than merely the causes for which external groups struggle.”\(^{157}\) It is important to note how visibility itself functions as the condition which enables political subjectivity for these migrants. This is evident in their manifesto which reads:

We the Sans-Papiers of France, in signing this appeal, have decided to come out of the shadows. From now on, in spite of the dangers, it is not only our faces but also our names which will be shown [emphasis added].\(^{158}\)

In a sense, this reads as a page from Arendt in that the name and visibility are emphasized as the key qualities which render their act political. Scholars such as Peter Nyers have also taken up this line of argument stating that, “through impossible activism…[illegal migrants] make visible the violent paradoxes of sovereignty.”\(^{159}\) Nyers specifically references the importance of sanctuary in that the “visible and audible presence of non-citizens political subjects” compels Canadians to question unquestioned citizenship practices.\(^{160}\) This commitment to visibility as a central tool for political efficacy is often expressed in the critical body of literature concerning agency for abject subjectivities. For instance, Jenny Edkins’ theorization on resistance in Life,
Power, Resistance, articulates a strong dedication to the visible demonstration as a viable means to subvert the effects of sovereign power which constructs life as simply a powerless bare life. In her text she refers to two ways in which individuals may resist apolitical bare life: 1) through the refusal and 2) through acceptance. First, Edkins identifies how a “refusal to draw lines” may provide a productive way to manoeuvre against the effects of sovereign power. As she points out, this tactic always risks re-drawing lines in new problematic ways. As such, the second avenue is offered as a more viable alternative, and that is the acceptance of bare life. Here, Edkins contends that “accepting” and embracing bare life may subvert sovereign power and allow actors to claim important political agency in the process. The central modality through which one may accept bare life is through the physical demonstration. By using one's own body as a dramatic platform upon which sovereign power is made visible, one may express meaningful political resistance. The exemplar expression of this subversion comes in the form of Abbas Amini - an Iranian man “seeking asylum” who in 2003 “sewed his own eyes, ears and mouth with coarse thread.” According to Edkins, this moment viscerally reveals and draws attention to his own person as nothing but the bare life produced by sovereign power. When he sewed up his mouth to give others a voice, that is, to demand that other speak for him as one who cannot speak for himself, he used the very bare life that the sovereign power imposes on him to unmask the relationship of violence in which he had been placed. Vitally, in doing so he claimed back the possibility of speaking politically. In addition to Amini a number of other examples are utilized in order to illustrate the possibilities constitutive of embracing bare life. These examples include: the hunger striker and the street demonstrator. What is interesting about the examples that Edkins provides is that, as different as they are, they all entail a visible demonstration in order to resist. Indeed, as Edkins states, “whichever route, [sovereign power] can no longer conceal its violence under the pretence of politics.” The emphasis here is upon the resistance to concealment, and the move towards
disclosure (again reminiscent of Arendt). This naturalized dedication to disclosure is troubling as it suggests that, for instance, sanctuary recipients’ agency is limited to their ability to visibly draw attention to themselves. What is particularly worrisome is that this agency whereby one adopts bare life in order to politicize it, leads to the uncomfortable paradox that: in order to become political one must draw attention to oneself as apolitical.

This reliance upon visible demonstration is also expressed in Walters’ work, *Acts of Demonstration*. In his article Walters suggests a variety of strategies to “reveal” how “even the apparent ‘invisibility’ of certain migrants is not straightforward but in many cases a status that has be artfully maintained and reproduced.” Walters argues how ‘acts of demonstration’ (defined as “moments, performances, enactments and events when a new identity, substance or relationship of citizenship is brought into existence”\(^{163}\)) is an important strategy to resist bare life in that it makes “visible a phenomenon to be witnessed by others.”\(^{164}\)

What these theorizations - as expressed by Arendt, Rancière, Nyers, Edkins, Walters and the Sans Papier manifesto - have failed to address is how a type of *invisibility* itself may be an important political site. As I demonstrated in the first section of this thesis: governmental, pastoral and sovereign power all pivot upon the *spectacle*. Lippert describes in great detail the way in which each of these rationalities have a close affinity for visibility. As was suggested in the media analysis of Chapter 3, it is partly the sanctuary recipient as spectacle that has rendered them as a passive figure to be saved. Although both Arendt and Rancière articulate the importance of the spectacle in a way that can not be conflated with these three Foucualtian rationalities it is suspicious nonetheless that they so fervently rely upon this characteristic as a condition for political life. Indeed, it is problematic that Arendt and Rancière – both of whom offer a language to understand the excluded beyond the notion of bare life which these
rationalities imply – would also claim that the spectacle is definitive of political existence. It is necessary to understand the problematics inherent in this commitment to the spectacle. I ask, what is the naturalized assumption or the given behind the definition of political life which necessitates visibility, and how best to rupture or interrupt it? What might be the political potential of invisibility, or at least troubling the notion of disclosure? What may be politically gained in ‘perishing’?

Situating sanctuary recipients’ agency in relation to their ability to visibly draw attention to their own absences is but one way to understand illegal migrants as political. In this reading sanctuary recipients are included within the political because they are lit by a public spotlight; however, I have suggested that they become visible in a particular way which often constructs them as passive. For instance, we might remind ourselves of the dismal, helpless image of Singh that is continually evoked in the media. Ironically then, what defines sanctuary recipients as potentially political – namely that they make visible particular absences – is often also what potentially figures them as victims. 165 Troublingly, less spectacular moments have been largely side-stepped because of the deeply ingrained assumption that to be political one must be visible. In this respect it is important to question visibility as a pre-condition for political life. If it is possible to understand sanctuary in less spectacular terms, perhaps we can also understand the sanctuary recipient in and through less victimizing language.

In this shadowy-light it is important to consider the myriad of less spectacular acts that occur within (and beyond) sanctuary each day that fail to become spectacular and thus may succeed in rupturing the notion of the illegal migrant as a form of bare life. For instance, how might the daily dialogue which occurs between Belaouni and community members who come to visit him within the church constitute an important form of political speech? Although the
sanctuary itself is highly visible, visibility is not necessarily the key defining feature that distinguishes this type of interaction. In many respects, the various conversations that take place within the church serve to subvert the highly spectacular image of Belaouni as victim; among his network of close friends Belaouni is seen as a deeply thoughtful individual whose life experiences elicit intrigue and contemplation, not simply compassion. We might also consider the acts which take place within the church behind the highly-spectacular protests. Before hundreds of protesters take to the streets of Point St-Charles conversations between Belaouni and his many supporters fill the halls of St. Gabriels church. It is here where perhaps the most important political interaction occurs. As Belaouni has made explicitly clear, he has a large say as to what tactics are used and how the protests unfold. On his radio program Belaouni has suggested that what defines him as political are not the posters which seek to attract media attention (by regularly alluding to his disability); instead, what renders him political are the more subtle conversations which take place within the church on a daily basis. Of course, Arendt might interject suggesting that because freedom develops “fully only when action has created its own worldly space where it can come out of hiding,” Belaouni’s largely invisible involvement in his own activism renders him empty with regards to political agency. Conversely, the droves of his supporters who make their presence known publicly (and work to make Belaouni’s presence known) are replete with freedom. In this case it is clear how Arendt’s desire for disclosure eclipses alternative forms of activity that do not hinge on appearance.

Perhaps the moments prior to and following sanctuary may also be considered a meaningful form of political rupture precisely because the spectacle did not necessarily constitute their existence. For instance, consider the sanctuary recipient who decides to no longer merely receive. There have been many incidents where migrants have simply left the sanctity of
the church to find their own ways within Canadian cities. Remarking about a migrant who decided on his own to permanently leave sanctuary unannounced one provider noted, “I felt a little ripped off.”¹⁶⁸ How dare the helpless help themselves. It is precisely this act however whereby migrants are no longer within the limelight that certain possibilities might be created.

Although Kazemian, Belaouni, and Singh are often posed as becoming political by entering into the spectacle of sanctuary this too must be troubled. By Arendt’s approximation these figures became political the moment they stepped into the confines of the church or temple. Prior to this highly spectacular incident they were invisibly meandering through the cities without drawing highly orchestrated attention to their exclusions. Indeed, in the eyes of the state they were invisible, they were nameless. In his poem Refugee Blues, WH Auden poignantly describes this practice: “The consul banged the table and said/ if you’ve got no passport you’re officially dead.”¹⁶⁹ However, is it appropriate to assume that because these individuals were somewhat invisible – and thus dead within the eyes of the law – that they in fact deceased politically? Perhaps it was in and through their relative invisibility that they were able to stimulate a subtle, and perhaps more meaningful rupture within the given statist order which seeks to know/control in particular ways that in fact rely upon the spectacle. If one accepts that we are living within a biopolitical era - whereby we are known and controlled through technologies such as population and health - how might being considered ‘dead’ in the eyes of the state be a productive space from which a meaningful political life might emerge? While rallies were not lobbied in their name, while newspapers were not riddled with their faces is it appropriate to suggest that their illegal and comparatively invisible activities were “meaningless” as Arendt suggests?¹⁷⁰ It may be argued that by silently slipping through city streets, contesting statist practices with each soft footstep that they wield a type of political activity which
outweighs that of their spectacular sanctuary days. Interestingly, the notion that visibility is the central modality through which sanctuary recipients may express political agency is reinforced in that as soon as a migrant exits the church they cease to become a subject of public inquiry. Only a few months after Kazemian gained citizenship and fled the Vancouver church his name elicits raised eyebrows of confusion while reference to Singh – who currently living in an Abbotsford temple – dominates dialogue. It would appear that the underlying assumption is that in and so far as an individual exists within the visible space of sanctuary they exist as political.

In this vein we may understand the way in which ‘concealed sanctuary,’ that which eludes visibility and exposure, has been effectively negated within the sanctuary literature. Now, revisiting Lippert’s initial description of sanctuary as that which hinges upon exposure, an important political move becomes evident. While Lippert claims that he avoids discussing ‘concealed sanctuary’ for methodological reasons (how can one study the invisible?), it may be argued that this move rests on a deeper political assumption made also by Arendt and Rancière (why study that which is invisible?). In order for an act to be considered politically relevant it must be known in and through a type of disclosure. The given supposition behind this move is a kind of Arendtian assertion that “without the disclosure of the agent in the act, action loses its specific character and becomes one form of achievement among others.”\textsuperscript{171} As such it is ludicrous, intolerable even, to consider actions which are not known in a particular naming way in order to be considered political. Yet, it is important to ask: might the plethora of concealed practices obscured in Lippert’s work trouble the Foucaultian reading he offers of sanctuary whereby migrants are deemed as passive as they are imbued with a particularly victimizing visibility? Might invisible practices in a place of extreme exposure offer an important alternative to the sanctuary recipient as bare life?
One might also ask how the many migrants who illegally – and largely invisibly - enter and exist in Canada without ever laying foot within the spectacle of the church or temple figure into Arendt and Rancière’s notion of visible political agency. Arguably, for many illegal migrants it is precisely their lack of disclosure that enables them to circumnavigate statist practices that seek to deny their very existence. The Don’t Ask Don’t Tell movement in the Greater Toronto Area might gesture toward this notion. This campaign proposes a policy whereby city workers and applications should not require information regarding immigration status, and that city employees should not share the immigration status of those accessing city services with federal and provincial enforcement agencies. The campaign contends that city services should be accessible to all city residents, regardless of immigration status, and that municipal funds, resources and workers would not be used to enforce federal or provincial immigration laws. This practice suggests the ways in which invisibility serves an important political function. Here, many illegal migrants depend upon invisibility in order to exert political resistance. In this regard the rupture, which Arendt and Rancière offer, expresses itself tactically through the practice of ‘blending in’ which itself may be an important political strategy to consider. While this practice of ‘blending in’ might be critiqued as a plea for assimilation the way I am attempting to articulate it here is crucially different. Assimilation implies a type of ‘blending in’ which requires migrants adopt the dominant discursive order as a tactic to smoothly fit in. In particular this might manifest itself as a migrant going through statist, bureaucratic practices of becoming a recognized citizen. Importantly, in this first formulation the phrase ‘blending in’ is in fact misleading, for migrants who go through such a process are continually marked as incomplete, always unable to entirely blend (Soguk, 1999). Conversely, the way ‘blending in’ is evoked here refers to a practice whereby illegal migrants indeed contest the...
dominant discourse and technologies of citizenship by resisting the statist practices through which one becomes a citizen. Rather than waiting at the border to be recognized by Canada, the illegal migrant attempts to trouble this border altogether by slipping through it in a different and illegal way. In this space migrants may negotiate a variety of exclusions in a less theatrical manner than the sanctuary recipient.

Importantly, I am not arguing that visibility and invisibility should be seen to function as a binary; in fact, I am arguing that invisibility is evident even in the most spectacular spaces and that it is this interplay which is particularly politically challenging to statist practices of knowing. Indeed, as I have shown in the case of Belaouni: he both is and is not visible. Though he exists within a highly publicized space and while his entire being appears to be made spectacular (as a type of bare life) he simultaneously expresses political activity that also goes un-seen and undermines the apolitical spectacle. I have suggested that it is this invisible activity within the spectacle of sanctuary that subverts the exposed image of him as bare life into a political one. I call this political practice an ‘invisible interruption.’ This term refers to tactics of invisibility that trouble those strategies of visibility which attempt to control and make known a subject in an often victimizing way. Just as illegal migrants living in sanctuary are not entirely visible or invisible the same may be said for the illegal migrant who lives outside sanctuary. It is important not to glamorize the illegal migrant as one who somehow acts outside statist practices or is entirely unseen by them. Surely illegal migrants must face daily struggles to avoid disclosure (at least that type of disclosure which might reveal their citizenship status). Clearly, there would be no need for Don’t Ask Don’t Tell if this were not the case. In this way, illegal migrants avoiding such statist technologies also act in a space between visibility/invisibility, as a type of invisible spectacle. Perhaps the un-decidable notion that I am calling an invisible interruption might best
be understood in relation to Derrida’s spectre. Derrida’s *Spectres of Marx* begins with the yearning desire: “I would like to learn to live finally.” What may strike the modern reader is that Derrida does not attempt to answer this question regarding how to live by looking to the ‘good life’ as our philosophical friends before us so often have. In fact, he does not even look to life itself. Instead, Derrida tells us if learning to live remains to be done “it can happen *only* between life and death, neither in life nor in death *alone*.” He states:

What happens between the two, and between all the “two’s” one likes, such as between life and death, can only *maintain itself* with some ghost, can only talk with or about some ghosts. So it would be necessary to learn the spirits…the exordium is leading us to learn to live *with* ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts…to live otherwise.\(^{133}\)

As far as theorizations of the sanctuary go, this is precisely how we are unprepared to think. It is assumed that the sanctuary must be *entirely* spectacular if it is to be politically effective. So too, the sanctuary recipient is understood as entirely seen (as a type of bare life), and strangely this is posed as the *only* way in which the recipient may exert political activity. To understand the sanctuary recipient as functioning through a type of invisibility is considered outside the scope of the political. As I have argued, perhaps this is in part because of the deeply-embedded assumption that to be political one must be visible. What I am suggesting then is to understand how invisibility is always present even in the spectacular space of sanctuary and that this invisibility troubles the spectacle of sanctuary, and the apolitical subjectivities it produces. In other words I am suggesting that we understand sanctuary through the spectre that Derrida offers. I believe that by conceptualizing sanctuary between the “two’s” of visibility/invisibility the sanctuary recipient as something other than spectacular bare life may be understood. This inter-play is more in keeping with the interrupting force of the ‘in-between’ that Rancière provides, which he ultimately undermines by deferring to visibility. To remind ourselves, this
in-between space is where the ‘part that has no part’ is not simply: included; excluded; included through exclusion. Instead, this ‘part that has no part’ offers an interruption by politically residing in a type of borderland. To understand sanctuary this way is to acknowledge how the rituals of spectacle, which impose the migrant as bare life, are always being troubled by the (in)visible spectres that haunt them.

Although through this more subtle form of activity which is not entirely spectacular migrants may not constitute Arendt’s notion of the hero, perhaps we should contemplate whether this aspiration for such a heroic status (which is transcendental in that it overcomes temporality by living immemorial) is itself a desirable one. While much literature on the topic of ‘marginalized migrants’ is determined to bring the marginalized into the visible spotlight - to heroicize their liminality - we should consider what problematics this process entails. At the very least I hope to trouble the three characters that Arendt offers, that is: the hero, the doer of good works and the criminal. In this cast of actors the only political role is reserved for the hero who craves visibility whilst the doer of good works and criminal lack appearance and are therefore delegated as “lonely” and “marginal” figures outside the pale of the political. It is crucial to ask: might we understand another character who in fact exhibits political agency through invisibility?

Within the context of this chapter I have gestured at how the (in)visible interruption might be a purposefully blurry lens through which to understand the agency of illegal migrants living in sanctuary. I have also implied how the practices of invisibility may be used by illegal migrants living beyond the spectacle of sanctuary itself and how this tactic of invisibility (which is never complete) might serve as an important political rupture. With this in mind I have posed the question, how might this type of invisibility enact a more interrupting rupture within statist
practices of knowing, than the visible act that Arendt and Rancière cling to? In this vein, it is also valuable to explore how invisibility might function as a tool for other figures. For instance, the line of inquiry offered here might trouble the notion that there can be no public action and hence no politics within the private space of the household. Furthermore, this logic may provide alternative ways to read, for instance, Walters’ work which identifies the subversive potential of visible acts of demonstration. Specifically, the figure of the stowaway that Walters’ refers to may be understood differently. For Walters, the stowaway offers an example of the productivity of a visible demonstration. However, in the case of the stowaway: is it not concealment which is the tactic enabling agency? For the stowaway it would seem that the condition of possibility for political action is in fact found in hiding. I wish to excavate this figure of the stowaway in Walters’ work to point to another possibility for political activity that is perhaps more in keeping with what he refers to as an act of “political modesty.” I feel that this modesty is indeed a worthy objective, yet I wonder: might this modesty be more successfully pursued less through a dramatic politics of visible demonstration and more through a subtler politics which manoeuvres in less grandiose ways?

Indeed, it is important to note that the problematics of visibility as a condition for political life are not simply reducible to illegal migrants living within or beyond the church or temple: a larger theoretical point is at stake. That being said, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore in detail the ways in which this type of invisible interruption may operate in and through other forms of political subjectivity. Indeed, perhaps it is undesirable to excessively put words to this type of subjectivity, for it is in and through a critical type of invisibility and silence – paradoxically - that it is potentially subversive.
Conclusion:

We were getting desperate...to keep them in the media spotlight. And so we were always looking for ways to not have the people just forget they were there.
- Sanctuary provider

Sanctuary has become an increasingly visible phenomenon: the complicated borderland in which illegal migrants are living has seized the public eye. Initially I was drawn to the topic of sanctuary in part due to this burgeoning visibility. The exposure of sanctuary seemed like a productive starting point from which political efficacy might be possible for illegal migrants who are often posed as invisible and thus apolitical. Indeed, it seemed that the spectacular space of sanctuary might draw critical attention to the ways in which certain forms of life are often violently excluded. As both Arendt and Rancière’s work imply, sanctuary may be conceived as deeply political in that it serves as a visible interruption within the given order: it “dramatizes the practice of deportation” as well as other more subtle forms of exclusion. So too, Walters has argued “sanctuary ensures that deportation will not operate as a silent, routine administrative process.” Or as Rancière might say, sanctuary “makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise.”

However, as I have argued, exposed sanctuary draws attention to these exclusions problematically by drawing attention to the migrant as helpless. This is most evident in Lippert’s Foucauldian analysis and in the depiction of illegal migrants within media coverage. Continuously the sanctuary recipient is posed as just that – one who merely receives. The sanctuary recipient receives “constant care” only able to offer an image of themselves as feeble bare life yearning to be saved. Given this, my research has led to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion: while the spectacle of sanctuary politically draws attention to illegal migrants it does so in such a manner that renders them apolitical abject victims. What is particularly troubling is
how Arendt and Rancière – whose work potentially offers a language to politically understand the migrant through the interruption – also rely upon the spectacle as the condition for political life. As such, they ultimately re-situate the “part that has no part” back within the realm of the visible thereby denying other forms of political life that might indeed provide a more meaningful interruption precisely because they are not entirely seen and known in a spectacular way. I have also shown how this move is more broadly evident in the works of Edkins, Walters, and Nyers - each who attempt to subvert the apolitical effects of bare life.

But then: how best to understand the illegal migrant living in sanctuary if not through the lens of visibility? Is it fair to assume that because sanctuary, as it is dominantly understood, requires exposure and that because this exposure often expresses sanctuary recipients as victims that the sanctuary is simply politically irrelevant, or worse: simply an extension of the Agambian camp? If the investigation of sanctuary concludes with the work of Lippert then the answer is yes. However, as I have suggested, the sanctuary recipient’s victimization through visibility is troubled when we acknowledge more subtle practices within and beyond the confines of the church or temple. By troubling the dominant definition of sanctuary as that which necessarily entails an element of exposure perhaps the sanctuary recipient’s silence (which ironically has been made exceptionally audible and visible) may be subverted into something less seductively spectacular but more political. Although Arendt and Rancière might deny these concealed actions, which exist in highly exposed spaces, I have argued that it is in and through such (in)visible interruptions that the political moment of their notion of the interruption is most effective.

As such, it is important to loosen our grip on exposed sanctuary itself, which is so steadfast for the spotlight, and instead appreciate other subtle subversions and subjectivities that
divert one’s eager eye. In this way, my analysis which began with a meditation on the spectacle of sanctuary concludes by gesturing towards the myriad of (in)visible practices that trouble this very spectacle. And at the same time, it ends where it began: through a meeting with Kader Belaouni whose blindness might refuse to serve as the spectacular trope for the illegal migrant’s helplessness – and instead for a different insight to be found through (in)visibility.
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Although not without contestation, I have chosen to use the term migrant to refer to those people living within Canadian sanctuary. It may be argued that the term migrant is insufficient when referring to the sanctuary recipient as it reifies the notion that these individuals are transitory, unsettled and therefore lacking claim to a particular territory, set of rights and a politics. For want of a better term, one might refer to the sanctuary recipient not as a migrant but as an immigrant, as this term traditionally implies a sense of settlement and entitlement (Martha Justus: Citizenship and Immigration Canada – Immigrants in Canada’s Cities).

A deferral to the term immigrant I find doubly troubling however. First, the term immigrant implies a particular statist, legal apparatus. To be considered and recognized as an immigrant one must be subjected to a variety of rigorous statist practices (see Barbara Cruikshank: The Will to Empower). In this regard, applying the term immigrant to those who are illegally residing in a church does not address the way in which these people challenge these very statist practices of becoming known as a citizen. Indeed, to refer to those living within sanctuary as immigrants de-politicizes their illegal presence within the country, which contests the traditional immigration process itself.

Still, one may persist that the term immigrant need not imply such a traditional, statist practice. Although those people living within sanctuary may not be legally acknowledged as immigrants (in fact are deemed as ‘illegal migrants’ in Canadian law) to none-the-less refer to these people as immigrants is to re-appropriate the language of immigration in a political way. To use this language is to say that those living within sanctuary are here to stay, whether they are legally entitled or not. By staying, the sanctuary recipient may expose many of the violent exclusions inherent to the community which attempts to exclude him. In this respect, the immigrant is similar to Georg Simmel’s notion of the stranger. The stranger is an exilic character who is “inorganically appended” to a given community, which is to say that he did not come from a particular community in the beginning; instead, he comes from an ‘outside.’ Because the stranger does not originate from the community in which he lives, he is therefore always distant from it, always confronting the community. Although he is never entirely of the community, he is also never entirely excluded from it, and his participation within the community reflects this liminal space: he participates objectively. That is to say that the stranger participates by exposing the community to itself through the impartial eyes of one who is not organically of from that community. What is specifically troubling about this notion of the stranger, however, is that he is one who comes to a community with the intention to “stay.” As Simmel suggests, although the stranger exhibits a certain amount of mobility, “he is fixed within a particular spatial group.”

To refer to the sanctuary recipient as an immigrant in this sense assumes that these people indeed wish to stay, to settle. This postulation is too simplistic. Certainly, some individuals living in sanctuary may wish to ‘settle down,’ but this is not a necessary motivation. In fact, 42% of those living within sanctuary voluntarily left the church, either to go underground or to cooperate with their deportation. This figure destabilizes the easy assumption that all those who live illegally within Canada wish to be recognized and/or settle in Canada. To assume that settlement is the necessary motivation for those who migrate to Canada is also to potentially oversimplify a variety of other complicated categories, such as: sans papier, temporary workers and refugees. If settlement is privileged as the central motivating factor then are we left to assume that the sans papier, temporary workers, and refugees wish to stay? Certainly Canada is not some ultimate end goal for all of these people. And why should settlement within Canada be a pre-requisite for their political participation, as is seemed to be suggested in the notion of the stranger? Is not the sanctuary recipient who lives temporarily in a church and chooses, or perhaps is forced, to be deported as politically engaged as the one who stays in Canada?

In sum, the term immigrant – as a legal term, or alternatively as a hijacked term which I have argued is similar to the stranger – is not appropriate to apply to those living in sanctuary. It is not appropriate for it implies that sanctuary recipients have either gone through the legal apparatus to become recognized citizens, which they have not, or that they are necessarily motivated by a desire for settlement – which is too simplistic and not reflective of the array of people who resist such processes in often importantly political ways. As such I use term migrant, not to imply a lack. The term migrant here is not to imply that those living illegally within Canada lack fixity and therefore lack a politics. Instead, I use the term migrant because it points to a host of experiences of mobility that trouble a spatial fixity, and are therefore deeply political because of this fact.

Although Christian churches have been the dominant site for sanctuary in Canada, a Montreal mosque and a Vancouver Hindu temple have set precedent, within the last two years, by becoming the first two non-Christian sanctuaries in Canada.
While the majority of sanctuary cases in Canada have been tacitly accepted, sanctuary is in fact illegal under Canada’s Immigration Act and Criminal Code as it involved aiding an abetting as well as conspiracy. Since at least 1976, the Immigration Act has prohibited aiding and abetting migrants subjected to deportation orders and has stipulated fines of up to CDN$5,000 and two years imprisonment.

5 I say ‘the’ migrant as Lippert characterizes illegal migrants as a singularity
6 Lippert, *Sanctuary Sovereignty Sacrifice*, 13
7 Rancière, *Disagreement*, 35
8 Rancière, *Disagreement*, 102
9 Stasny, *Sanctuary and the State*, 81.
10 No One is Illegal. [http://noii-van.resist.ca/?page_id=91](http://noii-van.resist.ca/?page_id=91)
11 Ibid.
12 Lippert, 3.
14 Stasny, 5.
15 Lippert, 3.
16 Ibid.
17 Lippert, 1.
18 Lippert, 4.
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20 Ibid.
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25 Ibid.
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31 Lippert, *Re-thinking Sanctuary: The Canadian Context*, 386
33 Ibid
34 Lippert, *Sanctuary, Sovereignty, Sacrifice*, 4.
35 Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, 138-139.
37 Lippert, *Sanctuary, Sovereignty, Sacrifice*, 56.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, 66.
40 Rose, *Death of the Social*, 340.
41 Rose, *Death of the Social*, 341.
42 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 214.
48 Lippert, *Re-thinking Sanctuary*, 381.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid, 539.
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81 Lippert, *Sanctuary, Sovereignty, Sacrifice*, 86.
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90 Vancouver Sun, December 12, 2007.
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98 Arendt, *What is Freedom?* 146.
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104 Arendt, *What is Freedom?* 156.

Drawing on the Aristotelian distinction of the *oikos* (the private realm of the household) from the *polis* (the public realm of the political community), Arendt argues that matters of labor, economy and the like properly belong to the former, not the latter. The emergence of necessary labor, the private concerns of the *oikos*, into the public sphere (what Arendt calls ‘the rise of the social’) has for her the effect of destroying the properly political by subordinating the public realm of human freedom to the concerns mere animal necessity.
165 Here I would like to stop in order to also consider the etymology of the term sanctuary. The word sanctuary derives from the Latin term *sacrarium* (“temple, shrine”) from *sacer* (“sacred”). I think it is important to ask: is there a relationship then, between sanctuary and *homo sacer*? As Agamben points out, homo sacer is Latin for “the sacred man” who he claims is an obscure figure of Roman law: a person who is banned, may be killed by anybody, but not sacrificed. Crucially for Agamben *homo sacer* can be understood as a type of bare life; although he has biological life he has no political significance. Perhaps the conclusion might be drawn that sanctuary, as a sacred place (*sacer*), exemplifies Agamben’s camp – the complex place of bare life inside/outside the polity. Indeed, it has been shown that to some extent sanctuary epitomizes a spectacular space whereby sanctuary recipients are reduced to the image bare life. However, I contend that this reading of sanctuary as a type of camp depends upon an understanding of sanctuary that is entirely spectacular. Importantly, as I will show, this is not the only way to read sanctuary.

166 Radio Sanctuary.


168 Ibid,155.

169 Auden, *Refugee Blues*.


171 Ibid, 180.

172 No One is Illegal. [http://toronto.nooneisillegal.org/taxonomy_menu/14](http://toronto.nooneisillegal.org/taxonomy_menu/14)


174 Here I am referring specifically to Jenny Ekins work, as well as Peter Nyers and William Walters.


176 Ibid,17.

177 Indeed, in *Acts of Demonstration* Walters is suspicious of theorists Hardt and Negri for their “grandiose scheme” and he calls for a more “modest, and perhaps, more minor understanding of autonomous migration” (10)


180 Ibid.

181 Rancière, *Disagreement*, 100.