Turning Relatives Into Resources (and Back Again?): Towards a Decolonial Marxism

by

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BComm, University of Victoria, 2001
MA, University of Victoria, 2009

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Abstract

To be meaningfully in solidarity with Indigenous liberation struggles, Marxism must bring Indigenous values of consensual intimacy, relational autonomy and responsibility to its centre, by (1) plucking out premises in ethical, political, ontological, epistemological and analytic registers that close off Marx and many contemporary Marxists from centring these values, and (2) bringing Indigenous resurgence values to the centre of Marxism to engage in normative and theoretical repair to enable a more decolonial praxis.

I generate my understanding of Indigenous values through a close examination of Indigenous Resurgence Theory, guided by the ethical framework of the Two Row Wampum. With these in hand, I examine the aforementioned registers through immanent critique of the places in Marx's thought where he elaborates them, and suggest transformations that eventuate from incorporating Indigenous values.
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I feel a little shy about committing to paper the intimate and deep feelings of gratitude I have for my family, friends and comrades. I am so lucky to have so much affirmation, support, teaching, and love in my life. From my wonderful kids, to long-term partner, housemates, friends, co-conspirators, and more, I just want to say how honoured I feel to be in relationship with you all, and how it is my highest goal in life to reciprocate the love I am so generously extended all the time.

And finally I want to acknowledge all the Indigenous people, from closest friends to distant mentors, who I am so deeply humbled by and inspired to learn from and relate with. I hope to continue to try and uphold my responsibilities as a settler, and to struggle for decolonization through your leadership and together.
Introduction

Section One: The Goal of the Dissertation

In 1975, amidst the prolonged and extensive mobilization of Indigenous people known as the Red Power movement (Vine Deloria Jr, 1968), the Berger Inquiry heard testimony about the potential impacts of the McKenzie Pipeline to the Dene people. In addressing Judge Berger, Phillip Blake, a Dene from Fort McPherson, explained to Berger that

"we do have something to offer your nation, something other than our minerals. I believe it is in the self-interest of your own nation to allow the Indian nation to survive and develop in our own way, on our land...I believe your nation might wish to see us, not as a relic from the past, but as a way of life, a system of values by which you may survive in the future. This we are willing to share."

The quote appears in a collection edited by Mel Watkins, entitled Dene Nation: the colony within (1977: 6-7). At the time, Watkins was working in the Department of Political Economy at the University of Toronto and as a consultant to the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories. The collaboration speaks to the encounter between Red Power and Marxism, which took place across Turtle Island at meetings, blockades, occupations and more.

Appraising that encounter 30 years later, Deborah Simmons, a settler socialist, documents the intense "disillusionment" of Indigenous people coming into contact with Marxism (Simmons, 2006: 13). Citing memoirs by Sto:Lo Lee Maracle (2017 [1970]), Okanagan Jeanette Armstrong (2017 [1970]) and Metis Howard Adams (1975), Simmons borrowed Hal Draper’s expression (Draper, 1963) to explain that "Red Power activists" were met with a politics of "socialism from above" (13). In other words, Marxists or
socialists of the day were not able to respond to Blake's invitation to see Indigenous people as offering a system of values by which they might survive. Simmons’ assessment echoes that of Lakota Russell Means, who at an international gathering in the Black Hills, declared: “I don't believe [Marxism] can be separated from the rest of the of the European intellectual tradition. It's really just the same old song” (Means, 1980).

Today, Indigenous resurgence has been going through a similar period of vibrancy. From Idle No More to the Indigenous Nationhood Movement and beyond, Indigenous people continue to revitalize their languages, arts, spiritual ceremonies and governance structures. Indigenous intellectuals are generating powerful scholarship criticizing settler colonialism and the discourses, like reconciliation, through which it operates. And, Indigenous land and water protectors are asserting sovereignty over their territories and blocking the intensification of resource extraction and transport.

For white settler Marxists like me, the words of Philip Blake once again hang in the air. This dissertation seeks to respond to Blake's invitation and reciprocate the gift of Indigenous values by bringing them to the centre of Marx and Marxism. As Lila Watson has put it, "If you have come here to help me, you are wasting your time. But if you have come because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together” (Watson, 1985). This dissertation begins from the premise that the liberation of settlers, including Marxists, is bound up with that of Indigenous people, a premise that points to the necessity of contributing to Marxists being able to learn decolonial songs.

This requires that Marxists like me seek to learn from the past. We can no longer show up as consultants to Indigenous peoples' struggles for liberation. For those of us who continue to see value in Marx and some contemporary Marxisms, we need to look
attentively to Indigenous resurgence and bring its core values carefully and non-appropriatively into Marx(ism). We also need to liberate Marx(ism) from those aspects of its theory and practice that Indigenous people recoiled from in the 1960s and 1970s, while equally carefully affirming those elements that do resonate with Indigenous liberation, so that Indigenous people might look positively on Marxists as decolonial comrades.

Section Two: The Objects of Inquiry for the Dissertation

One element missing from the encounter between Red Power and Marxism was the movement of Indigenous values into Marxism (Churchill, 1983). While Indigenous people were willing to experiment with social forms originating in socialist struggle (Coulthard, 2014: 68), Marxists did not similarly ask themselves what it meant to be a Marxist on stolen land. In other words, what it meant for unions, parties, cooperatives, and more diverse modes of socialist-inspired relating to tune into the values that arose here Indigenously. Or, how theories of struggle might need to be redrawn to take seriously relationships and values being defended through Indigenous liberation struggles.

My dissertation constitutes dual objects of inquiry to enable the non-appropriative transmission of Indigenous values into Marxism. If the goal of my dissertation is to rectify past Marxist mistakes as deeply as I can, it stands to reason that I cannot simply address the failed encounter itself. To underlabour¹ effectively for a Marxism that can

¹ I borrow this term from Roy Bhaskar, who in turn borrows it from John Locke, and argues “it to be an essential (though not the only) part of the business of philosophy to act as the under-labourer, and occasionally as the mid-wife, of science” (Bhaskar, 2008 [1975]: 10).
genuinely undo its colonial errors and be meaningfully in solidarity with the struggle for
Indigenous liberation, I need to find a certain path through Indigenous and Marxist
thought that can provide deep and extensive points of contact, in order to diagnose how
colonial encounters between socialists and Indigenous people were prefigured in the very
foundations of Indigenous and Marxist thought.

To be in a position to underlabour towards a decolonial Marxism, I need to
inquire into what is being resurged by Indigenous people. While I must avoid trying to
decide for myself what Indigenous resurgence consists of, I cannot avoid the truth and
responsibility that every word about Indigenous resurgence in my dissertation runs
through me and my socialization into settler subjectivity, a fact with inevitable, though
hopefully minimized, colonial consequences. To best steer clear of these pitfalls, I will
conduct careful, close readings of Indigenous Resurgence Theory in order to understand
what matters most about Indigeneity for those who are directly involved in this linked
body of theory and practice. For the dissertation, I will take Indigenous Resurgence
Theory to begin with Mohawk Taiaiake Alfred's *Peace, Power and Righteousness* (2009
[1999]) and *Wasase* (2005), and the paper by Alfred and Cherokee Jeff Corntassel
entitled "Being Indigenous" (2005). In addition to Alfred and Corntassel, I will centre the
work of Dene Glen Coulthard (2014) and Anishinaabe Leanne Simpson (2008, 2011,
2013, 2014, 2015, 2017) as exemplary of Indigenous Resurgence Theory, while also
drawing on articles in the *Decolonization* journal and to a smaller extent *Settler Colonial
Studies*. At a 2017 symposium at the University of Victoria, entitled “Indigenous
Resurgence in an Age of Reconciliation”, Indigenous scholars re-affirmed the value of
Indigenous resurgence as a framework through which to think about the defense and flourishing of Indigeneity.

Spatially, Indigenous Resurgence Theory comprises a body of thought that centres Indigeneity and settler colonialism on Turtle Island. At the same time, Alfred and Corntassel consider Indigeneity in a global sense, and certainly Indigenous Resurgence Theory draws on anti-colonial theorists, like Memmi (1991 [1957]), Cabral (2008 [1979]), and especially Fanon (2008 [1952], 2004 [1961]), beyond Turtle Island. I wish to keep the globality of Indigeneity, and more importantly for my responsibilities, of non-Indigeneity and white settlerness, in mind, even as I primarily consider the experience of Onkwehonwe of Turtle Island as theorized by Indigenous Resurgence Theory.

Historically, Indigenous Resurgence Theory's antecedents stretch back to Red Power, and, of course, through the millenia that Indigenous people have lived their original instructions from the Creator.

The delineation of my object of inquiry within Marxism arises from my reading of Indigenous Resurgence Theory, which positions values of consensual intimacy, relational autonomy, and responsibility as central to Indigeneity. With those values in hand, I must look to places in Marx(ism) where I can assess the relative presence or absence of those values. Ultimately, I take the construction of Marx's historical materialist worldview to dictate those presences and absences. This means my object must include Marx's ethical, ontological and epistemological foundations. In this dissertation I take Marx's ethics to arise from the logic of Hegel's parable of the lord and bondsman, more commonly expressed as the masterslave relation. I look for Marx's ontological and epistemological foundations to be spelled out in two places: in Marx's
Theses on Feuerbach (1978 [1845]), and his analysis of the first historical act in The German Ideology (1978 [1846]). Together, these texts originate historical materialism.

The configuration of Marx's ethics, ontology and epistemology gives rise to his concrete analyses. To assess Marx's analytic framework in relation to Indigenous values, I will primarily look to Capital: Volume One (1976 [1867]), in particular Parts I, II, IV, VII, and VIII, while keeping in mind that Marx's research program stretches back to his first newspaper articles in the New Rhineland News, through The Grundrisse (1973 [1857]) and his posthumously published Theories of Surplus Value (2000), and is informed by his close collaboration with Friedrich Engels. The inner logic of my assessment of Marx's analytic framework also arises from Indigenous Resurgence Theory. In this case, my point of departure comes from the reassessment of Marx's utility for Indigenous resurgence by Glen Coulthard (2014), and Leanne Simpson's anti-capitalism from within Anishinaabe thought (2013).

While the preceding parts of my Marxist object will take note of places that might resonate with Indigenous values, my dissertation will primarily subject these parts to critique. And yet, rigorously adhering to my ethical framework points to the fact that a fully elaborated attempt to assess Marxism would also consider those places within Marx(ism)'s thought that have the greatest possible resonance with the Indigenous values I am analysing it through. Simultaneously, an examination of Marx(ism)’s resonance with Indigenous values entails far more risk of unwarranted moves to innocence than I am prepared to take without more Indigenous guidance than I can avail myself of. The path of settlers naming the subjugated places in our own histories that provide better points of contact is strewn with re-colonizing outcomes. Accordingly, in Chapter Five I

**Section Three: Ethical Framework for the Dissertation**

One way to try and dislodge my socialization into settler colonial values and habits of thought is to attempt to explicitly and critically adopt an ethic developed by Indigenous people for settlers in relating to Indigenous Resurgence Theory. For me this ethic is represented by the Two Row Wampum, a 1613 treaty framework offered by the Haudenosaunee Confederacy to Dutch settlers to ensure peaceful coexistence between the original inhabitants of those territories and the newcomers. Again, in my attempt to be internal to Indigenous Resurgence Theory in making sense of the core values that animate it, I want to also notice that the Two Row Wampum has played a role in Taiaiake Alfred's theorization of an ethics for Onkwehonwe to relate to settlers, and has been critically drawn on by non-Haudenosaunee Indigenous intellectuals (Coulthard, 2014; Flowers, 2015).

While I propose to more fully unpack the ethical pitfalls and implications of the Two Row for settlers and the dissertation in Chapter One, Anishinaabe John Borrows explains its rudiments as follows:

“The belt consists of two rows of purple wampum beads on a white background. Three rows of white beads symbolizing peace, friendship, and respect separate the two purple rows. The two purple rows symbolize two paths or two vessels travelling down the same river. One row symbolizes the
Haudenosaunee people with their law and customs, while the other row symbolizes European laws and customs. As nations move together side-by-side on the River of Life, they are to avoid overlapping or interfering with one another.” (Borrows, quoted in Keefer, 2014)

For terminological clarity, in the dissertation I will refer to the purple rows representing the canoe and ship as the two rows, while the ‘middle’ white row will pack the value of non-interference, and the outer rows represent friendship and respect.

As I will explain in Chapter Four, adopting the Two Row framework to guide my engagement with Indigenous Resurgence Theory also entails the displacement of a framework, implicit or explicit, that might have guided my engagement had I carried it out from within a Marxist worldview. I argue that Hegel’s parable of the Lord and Bondsman provides this framework and prefigures the colonial outcome between Indigenous people and settlers who are guided by Marx and many contemporary Marxisms. Making this framework explicit forms a necessary part of my dissertation, not only to enact the ethic of responsibility entailed by steering one's own ship, but also to hone in on the persistent colonial premises, and absence of decolonial ones, in the ethics that have guided Marx(ists).

**Section Four: Methodological Framework for the Dissertation**

The dissertation uses a methodological ethic derived from the Two Row Wampum that contains three analytically distinguishable, temporally concurrent, moments. I will 'look over' to the Indigenous canoe, represented by Indigenous Resurgence Theory, to affirmatively interpret how the Marxist ship might sail better in Indigenous waters. I will also do the work of maintaining the middle row by ‘looking
between’ or comparatively reading key Indigenous Resurgence Theory texts alongside the textual sites where Marx and his predecessors or descendants establish analogous positions to better understand their differences. Finally, the work of looking over and between organizes how I intend to 'look at' Marx(ism) through the methods of immanent and affirmative criticism.

My look over to Indigenous Resurgence Theory will proceed through the affirmative interpretation of key texts (Sedgwick, 2003: 123-152), a method that suits the Two Row Wampum’s ethical injunction to respect Indigenous autonomy. With affirmative criticism the impulse is not to find texts incoherent or incomplete, or to generate a criticism from the outside, textual practices that configure ‘paranoia’ in the reader (130). Neither is the intention to adopt a naively celebratory approach. Rather, the idea is to strive for hermeneutic precision and draw lessons from the selected text for how it might shed light on other domains. Expressed through the values of the Two Row, my intention is to approach Indigenous Resurgence Theory with a spirit of friendship and respect.

In my case, the domain I wish to shed light on is the Marxist one. I will do so by running the affirmative interpretation of key Indigenous Resurgence Theory texts alongside those places within Marx and his predecessors and descendants where I can diagnose the presence or absence of the affirmed elements of Indigenous Resurgence Theory. For example, I do a close exegesis of Leanne Simpson's "Land as Pedagogy" (2014) and Marx's analysis of the first historical act (Marx, 1978 [1846]: 156) to diagnose differences in their theorization of practice and to explicate the entailments of those differences for how the Marxist ship might sail better in Indigenous waters.
My look back at Marx(ism) will proceed through immanent critique (Bhaskar, 2008 [1975], 1998 [1979]). The basic premise of immanent critique is to begin from some position everyone working within a theoretical framework presumably agrees to be valid, and to show how sticking to the position actually entails properties the theoretical framework does not adequately account for. At its most elemental, this position would be Marx's resolution of the tension between particular and universal, or person and society, where "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (Marx, 1978 [1848]: 491). If I can show that the theoretical framework of historical materialism does not adequately provide for the free development of Indigenous people, the immanent critique must eventuate in theoretical repair to historical materialism such that the position can be unburdened of its colonial baggage.

Finally, I will also seek to affirm those places within Marx(ism) that potentially resonate with the Indigenous Resurgence Theory values of consensual intimacy, relational autonomy and responsibility. As with my affirmative reading of Indigenous Resurgence Theory, the impulse is not to castigate Marx(ism) for its colonial shortcomings. Instead, I will look to the places in Marx and some contemporary Marxisms that could potentially resonate with my understanding of central values of Indigenous Resurgence Theory. Whereas immanent critique will diagnose what elements of the Marxist ship must be abandoned, my affirmative reading will identify promising planks Marxism might strip back to, in order to fashion a potentially more decolonial vessel.

Section Five: Original Contribution of the Dissertation
Returning to the methodology of immanent critique, I propose that the dissertation itself be read as an exercise in underlabouring for the diagnosis of those places within Marx(ism) that block the free development of Indigenous life, asking what properties are excluded by the blockages, and suggesting repairs that might deepen and expand Marx's theoretical framework to provide for the decolonial inclusion of Indigenous people.

At the same time, taken to its logical limits, Marx's concluding slogan to the *Communist Manifesto* rebounds most on settlers and non-Indigenous people: the free development of people who are Indigenous is also the condition for the free development of people who are settlers. In Hegel's language, the freedom of the master is no freedom at all. Not only, on Hegel's grounds, because the recognition we receive as settlers from Indigenous people is non-essential, but also because the properties of Indigeneity excluded from Marx's theoretical framework are also, by definition, excluded from consideration of master-like practices. While settlers have clearly turned Indigenous land and life into resources to fuel settler existence, and in this way have benefited from settler colonialism, commitment to Marx's slogan entails the realization that, when measured by the criterion of freedom, master locations are more impoverished by virtue of their greater distance from the valued properties being attacked.

In a best-case scenario, repair and expansion of the theoretical framework then means it can contribute its share to a politics that furthers resurgence of Indigenous life while also offering pathways for settlers to responsibly take apart and do other than reproducing settler colonialism. This marks my highest hope for what the dissertation can contribute to.
Section Six: Hooking This Dissertation Into Broader Problems and Literatures

In 1977, a collective of Black Feminists issued the Combahee River Collective Statement (Combahee River Collective, 1983 [1977]). In it, they argued that systems of oppression interlock to uphold each other. They drew on their experience in political struggles of the day, as in the feminist movement, where in order to struggle for liberation from patriarchy, they had to be quiet about white supremacy within their movement. The result was that racialized oppression was reproduced through feminist struggles in a way that maintained division and weakened the movement. Of importance to my dissertation, Combahee feminists argued that they agreed with Marx, only he did not go far enough.

This could mark another intellectual point of departure for the dissertation. I agree with Marx, and yet, as many Indigenous intellectuals would argue, I believe he needs to be pushed further in the difficult struggle to transform the currently hegemonic order in a way that can be liberatory for all. There is, by now, a robust literature showing the ways that capitalism interlocks with white supremacy, the state, or patriarchy to reproduce the hegemonic order. For instance, in thinking about the relationship between patriarchy and capitalism, and in the spirit of agreeing with Marx but wanting to push him further, the work of Maria Mies and Silvia Federici comes to mind (Mies, 1998 [1986]; Federici, 2008 [2004]). These intellectuals have politicized the ways that social reproduction materially connects with the capitalist labour process, and especially through Maria Mies, have gone back to Marx and shown ways that patriarchal assumptions inform the fundamental categories of historical materialism (Mies, 1986: 50-3), replaying in an
intellectual register the patriarchal practices that have beset anti-capitalist struggle informed by Marxism.

On the other side of the river, Indigenous intellectuals have been looking over to the settler ship for some time in search of liberation thought that might resonate with values and practices at the heart of Indigenous resurgence. There has been cautious and critical output on the ways that Indigenous resurgence might ally with anarchism (Lasky, 2011; Barker and Pickerill, 2012; Alfred, 2009: 45-6), and anti-racism (Lawrence and Dua, 2005; Lawrence and Amadahy, 2009). In carrying out my own attempt at an exchange between Indigenous resurgence and historical materialism, I am trying to incorporate lessons from the ways these other attempts to work towards peaceful coexistence have gone and are going.

Relatively speaking, the conversation with historical materialism is less developed. While an earlier generation of Indigenous intellectuals drew on Marx in theorizing red power (Lee and Rover, 2000 [1993]; Adams, 1975; Cardinal, 1969), more recently Indigenous academics who are theorizing the intersection of settler colonialism and capitalism are not drawing centrally on Marx (Newhouse, 2000; Champagne, 2004; Miller, 2013). The interlocutors I am most interested in, who uphold the Combahee principle of mutually interlocking systems of oppression, and also uphold the necessity of beginning from Indigeneity, with the notable exception of Coulthard, are not publishing work in dialogue with Marx. And yet, Coulthard's incorporation of Marx's analysis of

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2 Nick Estes' recent publication of *Our History is the Future* (2019) may signal a widening of engagement with Marx within contemporary scholarship. While I will not integrate Estes into this dissertation, his scholarship, and especially his political work with Red Nation, with its open advocacy of “revolutionary socialism”, signals a return to the question of the relationship between Indigenous, and proletarianized, people in making political change (2019b).
capital to better understand settler colonialism (Coulthard, 2014), has garnered a lot of attention. *Historical Materialism* devoted an issue of its journal to respond to *Red Skin, White Masks*. Settler Marxists Peter Kulchyski, Geoff Mann, and George Ciccariello-Maher are united in praising the book, from highlighting Coulthard’s concept of the “bush mode of production” (Kulchyski, 2016: 30), to the “powerful theory of countersovereignty” that can be developed from Coulthard’s framework (Mann, 2016: 45), and finally how Coulthard’s shift “from the capital relation to the colonial relation...liberate[s] the concept [of primitive accumulation] from its European origins” (Ciccariello-Maher: 62).

These responses are a welcome development. And yet, I worry that not enough distinguishes these respondents from the consultant dynamic of the 1970s. The authors, while praising Coulthard’s work, do not appear to really extend it into their own domains by unsettling established premises and ethical commitments. For example, Kulchyski’s recommendation that Coulthard raise “Marx’s concept of ‘mode of production’ from the secondary status it enjoys in the work to a more foundational role” (ibid, 30) reads like volleying back a Marxist concept without seriously contending with the possible colonial implications of doing so. Instead, Kulchyski builds a critique using a citational politics that re-centres settler Marxists like Frederic Jameson. Rather than turning the lens on himself and his own inherited conceptual framework, he maintains the lens on Coulthard, a move that misses a chance to bring Coulthard’s interrogation of Marxism deeper into the framework. This dissertation will attempt to practice vulnerability by not only assenting to Coulthard’s critique, but also creatively extending it further into the core of Marx’s thought.
At its broadest, my audience comprises radicals who agree with Combahee and who see that Indigenous resurgence and historical materialism have something to contribute to praxis aimed at transforming the hegemonic order. In this regard, my audience stretches beyond settlers to all non-Indigenous people. As Marxists already know, there cannot be socialism in one country. Similarly, somehow decolonizing Turtle Island without considering how the remaining seven billion Indigenous and non-Indigenous people live would, in the long run, resolves nothing.

Most narrowly conceived, I hope my dissertation will speak to Marxist European-descended settler intellectuals and activists on Turtle Island who are trying to be in solidarity with Indigenous resurgence. For me, part of building accountable relationships to the people of these territories requires that I take responsibility for settler colonialism. This responsibility arises, not from guilt, but from embracing the horizon of the Two Row, wherein peaceful co-existence becomes impossible if one party to the agreement steers in a dominating way, and even existence itself, whether Indigenous or settler, as Coulthard reminds us (2014), becomes imperilled.

Section Seven: Locating Myself in Relation to My Dissertation

Close to a century ago, Antonio Gramsci wrote that:

"If the ruling class has lost its consensus; i.e. is no longer "leading" but only "dominant", exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously...The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old world is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear" (Gramsci, 1971: 276).
I remember my keen response the first time I read this passage in the *Selections From the Prison Notebooks*. I identified with everything about it. I agreed wholeheartedly that the ruling class had lost its consensus. I could think of my own examples: through the coercion of austerity the ruling classes no longer led, but merely dominated. And I loved the dual sense of time conveyed through the quote, and extended by my own identification reading it so long after it was written, of an indefinite period where the hegemonic capitalist order could not secure the consent of the masses to its rule, where capital in some sense lived on, but in a deeper sense had already reached its expiration date. And I loved the confidence it gave me, gained through study, that I might play a role in articulating the latent aspirations of the masses who no longer wished to be ruled by capital. Or that the revolutionary task was not simply to remain at the frothy level of morbid conjunctural symptoms, like challenging this or that attempt by Trudeau or Trump to secure neoliberalism, but to be part of bringing into being a new, better hegemony by building a historical bloc extensive enough to unite sub-altern classes into a socialist new order, dictate it to capital, and thereby end it.

I wonder, now, how an Indigenous person might relate to this quote? To begin with, they might question if they're even on Gramsci's side? After all, the Indigenous world pre-exists the 'old world' of capitalist rule that was in crisis, and continues to survive in spite of it. And if they knew something about Gramsci, would they wonder if the consensus that might come about through the new, socialist world would include the values and practices that comprise Indigeneity? And if it didn't, would they be coercively incorporated into the new order, just as they have into the old? And what about hegemony itself? Gramsci tied closely his development of hegemony as a concept to the
understanding of capital developed by Marx. Would the death of capital and birth of socialism entail an end to settler colonialism? Like the Black Feminists of the Combahee statement, an Indigenous reader might wonder if hegemony runs deeper than that? Perhaps it includes the period of primitive accumulation, and given the matriarchal organization of governance within many Indigenous societies, an Indigenous person might also wonder if perhaps the site of social reproduction of capital, with its sexual division of labour, might also form part of the deeper structure of hegemony? And what of the relative omission of the land, and our relations to animal and plant nations, in Marx? If those nations are seen as outside the historical bloc, how would a socialist new order relate to them?

Imagining even this short list of questions makes me feel chastened about my revolutionary confidence. Indeed, it makes me wonder whether my confidence might simply have been a symptom of the continuation of a deeper hegemonic order that Marx and many contemporary Marxists still find themselves entangled with? For while that earlier version of myself might have detached from some of the values promulgated by capital, I might still have participated enough in the common sense of the deeper hegemonic order to have continued to be part of its organic reproduction. It wouldn't have occurred to me at the time to wonder about social reproduction, let alone my responsibilities to the many other-than-human beings through which, ultimately, I secure my life, and the history of the land on which I reside.

And yet, I continue to rely on Marx to understand capital even when I teach about settler colonialism, and I still partly think through Gramsci when I am organizing around Indigenous land-based struggles: even as the Two Row Wampum guides my response to
what is to be done by settlers today, I continue to think the Two Row through the lens of normatively guiding the construction of an alternative, consensual hegemony that is deep, extensive and compelling enough to provide a basis to end the currently hegemonic order. So while some of my inheritance from historical materialism has become deeply unsettled by Indigenous thought, and worrisomely associated, not with challenging hegemony, but with ultimately continuing its operation by other means, I continue to feel that learning to steer my ship includes retaining aspects of Marx(ism).

Moving away from my personal relationship to the dissertation, from a Gramscian perspective, the project feels like an urgent one because no unifying set of norms exists to guide the construction of a historical bloc to challenge the currently dominant order. While many have become sub-altern and/or refuse to consent to the currently dominant order's rule, at the deep organic structure that an alternative hegemony must also operate to replace the currently dominant order, no agreement exists on how to knit alternatives together. I am curious to see to what extent core values and practices of Indigenous resurgence resonate with those being affirmed at other points of resistance, whether that is through feminism, black liberation, or anti-capitalist struggle. Indeed, following Federici (2009 [2004]: 115), I suspect division itself may be a primary mode of operation for hegemony. Thinking the conditions for unity, while respecting diversity, becomes a necessary part of the revolutionary task of a Gramscian.

One such division remains the settler colonial one. In Canada, the relatively recent space Indigenous scholars have opened up in the academy has led to an outpouring of critical thought on the nature of settler colonialism, the values and practices that Indigenous people are resurging, and the terms on which decolonization should occur
(Corntassel, Dhamoon and Snelgrove, 2014). I wish to relay these thoughts into historical materialism as my humble attempt to be in solidarity with decolonization and prefigure the idea that challenging hegemony requires that we think the best of political currents alongside each other so as to critically find ways to move together.

I think this logic resonates with Marx's third thesis on Feuerbach, where he writes that "men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing" (Marx, 1978 [1846]: 144). I grew up at the foot of PKOLS, a sacred mountain for the W̱SÁNEĆ and Lekwungen people. And yet, I was never invited to think about settler colonialism as a present reality at any point in my education. I didn't establish relationships with Indigenous people until my 30s. I imagine the same applies to Marx. So in our case, for the educator to be educated requires looking over to the Indigenous canoe for tips about how to steer our ship in a non-interfering, respectful way. But this cannot simply be a question of rote application and adoption of Indigenous practices. That settlers steer a ship rather than paddle a canoe reminds me that my circumstances are different. The dissertation represents my attempt to appropriately modify lessons from Indigenous people to suit a settler upbringing.

Section Eight: Chapter Summary

The dissertation consists of five chapters and a conclusion that attempt to stage a deep engagement between Indigenous Resurgence Theory and the Marxist tradition. Chapter One will foreground the ethical register. I will explain how and why I critically adopt the Two Row Wampum as the ethical framework for the dissertation, and what its
adoption entails for settlers. While I affirm its horizon of peaceful coexistence, and the values of friendship, respect, autonomy and non-interference intended to guide the Indigenous canoe and settler ship towards that horizon, I also grapple with Coulthard’s pointed requirement to “sink the settler ship” (Coulthard, 2014) as a precondition for those values to be enacted, as well as Tuck and Yang’s concern that adopting an ethical framework that leaves a settler ship in Indigenous waters continues to entertain a settler future, which may constitute a “move to innocence” (Tuck and Yang, 2012). In response to Coulthard and Tuck and Yang, I argue that fidelity to the Two Row’s values entails that settlers bring an ethic of struggle to the centre of their efforts to live the Two Row, an ethic that entails the difficult work of sinking the settler ship even as we also learn from Indigenous people in accountable ways what it means to enact the Two Row’s values.

I also question whether the passage of over 400 years since the Two Row was laid down has made things so complicated on both sides of the middle row that sticking to the language of two rows does more disservice to colonial reality than not. While noting the dizzying internal differentiation of both the canoe and settler ship, I ultimately decide that the specific context of Marxism’s history with Indigenous people necessitates sticking to the Two Row model even at the risk of eliding ways each has influenced the other and each is internally differentiated.

Finally, and also in keeping with the Two Row, I argue we must begin from ourselves in committing to the Two Row, and further, see our commitment not as an oath to renew periodically, much as a State might revisit its constitution, but as a way of life to
engage in continuously, in keeping with the Two Row’s underlying ontology of the ever-moving and -shifting river.

Chapter Two revisits the origins of historical materialism to examine Marx’s ontological and epistemological commitments. I closely analyse Marx’s thought experiment on “the first historical act” (Marx, 1978 [1846]: 156), and pay close attention to Marx’s ontological supposition that "life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things" (156), and the related epistemological imperative he derives from his supposition, that "the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature" (149-150). I also reconstruct the concepts Marx develops to understand people’s organization and relation to nature, like putting ‘needs’ at people’s centre, and using ‘productive forces’ to apprehend the connection between needs and nature.

At the same time, I look over to the Indigenous canoe, this time in the form of Leanne Simpson’s “Land as Pedagogy” (2014), to see what ontological and epistemological lessons Simpson draws from her analysis of Kwezens’ movement through the sugar bush. In Kwezens’ world, Marx’s idea that one can isolate and foreground some activities, like eating and drinking, and the internal states of hunger and thirst, from others, does not hold. Instead, even as Kwezens meets physical needs like sating thirst, Simpson attends to elements that would evade Marx’s historical materialist epistemology, like Kwezens learning from the squirrel, laying down tobacco for the maple tree, or having her back rubbed by her mama.
Through my analysis and comparison, I argue that Marx splits ‘man’ from nature and family such that he cannot uphold values of consensual intimacy or relational autonomy that are central to Simpson, and that this leaves historical materialism incapable of valuing how Indigenous Resurgence Theory theorizes a spiritual core to every entity in the universe.

In Chapter Three, I turn to the analytic register. Beginning from Coulthard’s critique of Marx’s normative developmentalism and temporal framing of capital (Coulthard, 2014: 6-15), and sustaining his contextual shift to the colonial relation, I extend Coulthard’s critique of Marx from primitive accumulation to the domain of capital’s expanded reproduction, where most proletarianized settlers are in contact with capital. In extending Coulthard, I attempt to avoid the persistent dynamic where consideration of colonialism for Marxists begins and ends with primitive accumulation. Instead, I theorize capital's expanded reproduction as a key mode by which settler and non-Indigenous proletarians daily and generationally are re-accumulated into capital's dynamics in a way that re-severs our connection to the very qualities we might orient to in even beginning to think a settler path to decolonization; in other words, I look at capital’s expanded reproduction as a key site of colonialism that eviscerates relational autonomy and consensual intimacy. In passing, I also take up David Harvey’s prominent attempt to do theoretical repair on Marx’s framework in reformulating the relationship between primitive accumulation and expanded reproduction, and argue that without normative transformation, Harvey dooms his theoretical repair to repeat Marx’s colonial dynamic.
Chapter Four looks at the political difference the Two Row makes with respect to Marx. The chapter offers the meta-critique that Hegel's master-slave parable, whose logic guides the Marxist tradition, ultimately cannot uphold the Two Row Wampum. Worse, when placed alongside the Two Row, Fanon and Coulthard, it becomes clear that Hegel’s parable works as an ideology of colonialism, reflecting the material structure of proletarianization I examine in the previous chapter, whereby being drawn deeper into the subjectivity of proletarianization appears to be the path to liberation, while in fact stitching colonial masks more and more securely onto proletarianized faces. This means politics energized by Marxism will not lead to peaceful coexistence. I key in on responsibility as the crucial Indigenous resurgence value for Marxism to adopt so as to better contribute to, rather than impede, decolonization efforts.

I carry out my argument in three sections that follow Hegel’s master-slave parable. In section one, I begin by closely examining how Hegel sets up the parable and wonder whether the individuals who emerge from immediate Life to possess Self-Consciousness come endowed with the qualities they will need to eventually mutually recognize each other. In section two, I continue by analysing the period of dialectical struggle between the Self-Consciousnesses who become master and slave. From the side of the slave, I analyse and put Hegel’s logic of struggle for the slave next to Coulthard and Fanon’s and suggest an alternative ethics of political struggle for white proletarianized settlers so as to short-circuit the entrapping effects of the dialectic. In section three, I turn to the side of the master, and notice how Hegel theorizes no role at all for the master to play in arriving at mutual recognition. I suggest this absence structures the Marxist tradition and limits its capacity to take responsibility for its own
entanglement in colonialism. I develop an alternative ethics, foregrounding the value of responsibility, through the Two Row, Fanon and Coulthard.

In Chapter Five, I shift from immanent critique to explore and tentatively affirm those places in Marx, and some contemporary Marxisms, where resonances with responsibility, consensual intimacy and relational autonomy may be found, and that may set out from alternative, better premises in the previously assessed registers. In section one, I key in on Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in particular the section on “Estranged Labour” (Marx, 1978 [1844]: 70-93). Unlike the thought-experiment on the first historical act that leads Marx into limiting premises, here Marx critiques the tendency to “go back to a fictitious primordial condition” (71). Marx’s analytic focus on alienated relationships - to ourselves, each other, the land and the products of our work - coupled with a deepened conception of human properties that are alienated, provide a more propitious starting point to both register similar critiques as Indigenous people facing the currently dominant order, and ground the cultivation of place-based, non-alienated relationships. At the same time, following Tuck and Yang (2012), I do not make friendship and connection too easy a thing. I notice how Marx’s earlier materialism does not totally undo the divisions and hierarchies of the later Marx.

In section two, I tackle Marx’s division between production and social reproduction as well as the division between people and the beings through which they live. I look to feminist Marxists Maria Mies and Silvia Federici to assess their critiques of Marx’s patriarchal division, particularly noticing how their standpoint outside production enables them to see the limitations of a body of thought built up from the proletarian standpoint. I suggest this methodological ethic resonates with the one entailed by the Two
Row. Next, I centre the ecological analysis in the work of Burkett (1999), coming out of the wider body of eco-socialist interventions by O’Connor (1991), Foster (2000), and Benton (1989). While applauding Burkett’s intention to take ecology seriously, I mostly worry that his attempt to develop Marxism’s ecological dimension remains wedded to many colonial premises. Finally, in section three, I end the chapter by seeing how John Holloway, an autonomist Marxist, provides a creative refiguration of the Marxist tradition that shares many qualities with the commitments coming out of my own analysis and argumentation. On the whole, the intention in this chapter is not to supplant the continued need to look over to the Indigenous canoe. Rather, the intention is to practice friendship and respect to the Marxist tradition and affirm the possibility, not the actuality, of sailing down the river in peaceful coexistence with Indigenous people while struggling to undo the currently dominant order.

Finally, I close the dissertation by gleaning its lessons and use them to sketch out implications for ‘what is to be done’ in the struggle for decolonization.

**Conclusion**

This introduction has provided an overview and contextualization of the dissertation. Its point of departure lies in the failed encounter between Marxism and Indigenous people during the Red Power movement. As such, I explain how a primary aim of the dissertation is to diagnose those places in Marxism that help explain the failed encounter. The impetus for this diagnostic work lies both in the renewed and sustained wave of resurgence of Indigenous people since Idle No More, coupled with the tentative interest being shown to Marxist analyses of capitalism from Indigenous Resurgence
theorists. The hoped for outcome of the dissertation is a document that takes Blake
seriously: I wish to see Indigenous Resurgence Theory as a gift for Marxism to transform
and do better. I now turn to discussing the ethical framework for the dissertation.
Chapter One - The Two Row Wampum: Steering the Settler Ship in Contemporary Waters

The Two Row Wampum constitutes the ethical and methodological framework that guides the dissertation. I first encountered it through Taiaiake Alfred at the Indigenous Leadership Forum six years ago and it has remained in my mind as a powerful expression of what it means to live treaty within Indigenous thought. It has also stuck with me, and guided my solidarity work, because it was developed by the Haudenosaunee Confederacy with settlers in mind. In reading Indigenous Resurgence Theory, I have seen the Two Row's values of non-interference, autonomy, respect and friendship recur often, and have also seen its political horizon of peaceful coexistence articulated by other Indigenous theorists.

This chapter explains why and how I intend to use the Two Row. I unpack the Two Row’s ethical implications for settlers. In particular, following Coulthard and maintaining fidelity to the Two Row itself, I will argue for a critical application of it that incorporates the need to 'sink the settler ship'. In other words, I will argue that steering towards peaceful coexistence requires struggle, and I will try to derive what role settlers can play in undoing settler colonialism. I also attempt to justify my continued use of a two row model in the face of 400 years of settler colonial disturbance, a period of time which has not only disrespected the middle row, but made the internal divisions on both sides of the river more complex. Finally, I address how adopting the Two Row, as a white settler writing in a settler colonial context, may constitute what Tuck and Yang name a 'settler move to innocence' (2012), while ultimately arguing for an affirmative, unsettled commitment to begin from myself in attempting to uphold the Two Row’s values and underlying ontology.
For the dissertation, this chapter serves to justify my critical adoption of the Two Row as the ethical and methodological framework, and provides the springboard for my analysis, in Chapter Four, of the contrasting framework for Marx, Hegel’s parable of the Lord and Bondsman (1977 [1807]).

Section One - Why The Two Row Wampum Now?

That Taiaiake Alfred chose to interpret the Two Row Wampum emphasizes that for Mohawks it was not a treaty signed and forgotten four hundred years ago; the Two Row was always meant to endure. As Alfred explained, its intended longevity is indicated by the words: "as long as the sun shines upon this Earth, as long as the water still flows, and as long as the grass grows green at a certain time each year". And yet, on the territory of the Lkwungen, where I live, when I started work on my dissertation I had not seen the sun all day because it had been blotted out by the haze from wildfires; it hadn't rained in a month and a half, and Spring has now been arriving at an un-certain time each year.

Which makes me wonder what happens to the Two Row Wampum when the conditions under which it was meant to apply have changed? Can it still serve as an ethical and methodological framework to guide my dissertation? As Glen Coulthard has explained through his concept of grounded normativity (Coulthard, 2014: 60-4), Indigenous ethics come through the land; it stands to reason that if the land has undergone some fundamental changes, Indigenous treaty-making ethics may also need to change, with consequences for settlers and how we orient ourselves on stolen land. Coulthard has explicitly connected degradation of the land to the Two Row by explaining
that "[settlers] have come to totally pollute the river and destroy the riverbanks" (Coulthard, 2014). Following Fanon, for Coulthard this means that "the ship needs to be sunk...settler subjective attachments to a state, to a certain mode of production, to a certain mode of governance, need to be blown to smithereens" (ibid). For Coulthard, "all this serves as a pre-condition for any sort of relationship that is not based on domination and exploitation" (ibid).

Can there be a Two Row without a settler ship? My interpretation of Coulthard's dramatic pronouncement is that he is renewing the Two Row to take account of how the canoe and ship have continued to move down the river, not rejecting the values on which the Two Row was founded. In other words, peaceful co-existence, or in the terminology of Red Skin, White Masks, mutual reciprocity, continue to be norms guiding Coulthard's orientation to relating to settlers. But moving towards that horizon now requires struggle. In fact, when Coulthard looks to sectors of settler society with which Indigenous people might ally, the identities he chooses are those "that are also struggling against the imposed effects of globalized capital, including...the labour, women’s, GLBTQ2S, and environmental movements; and, of course, those racial and ethnic communities that find themselves subject to their own distinct forms of economic, social and cultural marginalization" (Coulthard, 2014: 173). In other words, struggling against settler colonialism now becomes (and has been since its origins) a necessary condition for attempting to embody the ethic of the Two Row. Most specifically, of doing the hard work of recovering the middle row. As part of enacting friendship, settlers must also enact an ethic of enmity towards all those aspects of settler colonialism that intensify the degradation of Indigenous homelands.
I have seen this ethic embodied by the Unist'ot'en on their homelands. While unequivocally refusing consent to the resource extraction and transport corporations that seek to run pipelines through their territory, the Unist'ot'en welcome settlers who can adequately respond to their free, prior and informed consent protocol. If settlers can answer to who they are, where they come from, and how their presence will support the Unist'ot'en, they can cross the bridge and take up roles on Unist'ot'en territory. In this manner, I see the Unist'ot'en seeking to resurge their Indigeneity by continuing to practice their ancestral responsibilities on their homeland; in other words, continuing to paddle their canoe. At the same time, they are also seeking to sink the settler ship by preventing pipelines from crossing their territories. And, even as they do so, they create a place on their territory for settlers who also wish to resist settler colonialism.

One might argue that the Unist'ot'en's invitation is a strategic one. As Coulthard points out to his intended Indigenous audience before inviting solidarity relations with settlers, "we also have to acknowledge that the significant political leverage required to simultaneously block the economic exploitation of our people and homelands while constructing alternatives to capitalism will not be generated...alone. Settler colonialism has rendered our populations too small to affect this magnitude of change" (Coulthard, 2014: 173). This makes eminent sense. And yet, in addition to running politics through a category of interest, I think the Unist'ot'en practice a Two Row ethics in a profound way. One of the most humbling experiences of my life has been standing in circle and having one of the elders, Dorris Rosso, speak to how the land is sacred for her people – and consistently inviting settlers into that relationship by asking them to bless the food. I can hardly fathom what it must be like for an Indigenous elder resisting the latest wave of
colonial genocide to practice such generosity to settlers. Inviting us to learn to live a relationship to the land that sees it as sacred and familial and to uphold our treaty relationships when we have mostly done the opposite asks a lot. I think Rosso's invitation for settlers to play a part in ceremony arises from the Two Row ethic of respecting autonomy. Rosso understands that for the land to thrive settlers must step into their responsibilities to relate to the land in a non-interfering way that respects its autonomy. And yet, she too is bound to respect the autonomy of every living being so she will not practice domination over settlers or tell them what to do. She will uphold her responsibilities, share her teachings, and invite settlers to do the same.

Section Two - Why The Two Row Wampum Here?

Following countless Indigenous intellectuals, I understand that ultimately the land decides. Why then should I take an ethic for treaty making that arose from the grounded normativities of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy; in other words, the territories of the Iroquois, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga and Seneca, and imagine it has relevance to other territories, like those of the Lekwungen and W̱SÁNEĆ on which I live? In part, I am following Taiaiake Alfred in doing so. Not only did he share the Two Row on Lekwungen Territory at the Indigenous Leadership Forum, but in Wasase he also posits “a fundamental commonality of Indigenous values” (Alfred, 2009 [2005]: 34).

The importance of orienting to place cannot be understated, especially when bringing Indigenous Resurgence Theory into relationship with Marxism. To put it

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3 Alfred puts it similarly: “If non-Indigenous readers are capable of listening...they will discover that while we are envisioning a new relationship between Onkwehonewe and the land, we are at the same time offering a decolonized alternative to the Settler society by inviting them to share our vision of respect and peaceful coexistence” (Alfred, 2009 [2005]: 35)
bluntly, Marxism has always devalued the intimate and the local. In setting its sights on worlds, totalities and revolutions, the intimate and local scale has been colourfully and enduringly denounced. Marx called the peasants "potatoes in a sack" (Marx, 1978 [1852]: 608), given that “[t]heir field of production, the small holding, permits no division of labor in its cultivation, no application of science, and therefore no multifariousness of development, no diversity of talent, no wealth of social relationships” (ibid).

David Harvey, borrowing from Raymond Williams, pejoratively refers to local struggles as "militant particularisms" (Harvey, 1996: 32) and castigates organizers for “operat[ing] largely outside of any institutional or organised oppositional channels, in the hope that small-scale actions and local activism can ultimately add up to some kind of satisfactory macro alternative” (Harvey, 2014: xiii). Given this tendency, I am particularly anxious that my use of the Two Row will be misinterpreted. It is one thing for Taiaiake Alfred to offer up a concept like Onkwehonwe, or Original People, to an Indigenous readership already attuned to the necessity of orienting to an intimate, land-based scale recreated for millenia; it is quite another for a settler, and especially a Marxist one, primed by generations of identification with politics on a world-scale, to take kinship and intimacy with local, non-human relations seriously.

I also think it might be warranted to blur the edges of the distinctions I am making a little. Much as Leanne Simpson insists that "[i]f you're forced to stay in your 50-mile radius, then you very much are going to experience the impacts of extractivist behaviour" (Simpson, 2013), it is also the case that Indigeneity does not overlap with sedentarism. Kinship and intimacy have always travelled, and as Simpson knows better than I do, so have the Anishinaabe. Indigenous people have a much longer history of internationalism
than does socialism. So while I want to preserve an orientation of intimate connection to place, I do not want to generate an understanding of place that maps on strictly to a geographic block of land. And also following Indigenous internationalism, I hope to not fall into a Marxist habit of putting place and world in opposition to each other, with world the preferred term in a dichotomy.

Section Three – Why Two Rows?

The Two Row was always meant to endure, but does it still make sense to speak of only two rows? Might the canoe and ship themselves be distinctions that need to be blurred? Can we still speak of an Indigenous canoe, or even a middle row? When the Haudenosaunee encountered the Dutch it certainly made sense to speak of two rows, and the space between them could not have been more distinct. As Patrick Wolfe explains, “to situate settler subjecthood historically, we can start with the frontier...[g]o back far enough...and there can be no disputing the existence of an unqualified empirical binarism” (Wolfe, 2013: 257). Nowadays on Turtle Island, however, the frontier has given way to the reserve and urban life for Indigenous people. Wolfe argues that “Natives have been...transformed, spatially at least, from outsiders into insiders. They have become surrounded by, and contained within, settler society” (258). Colonization has complicated the detection of the Indigenous canoe and a middle row.

A crucial part of Indigenous Resurgence Theory has been to unflinchingly track the political consequences of this spatial process of dispossession and envelopment. Coulthard (2014) and Art Manuel (2015) pay attention to how the imposed band council system offers white masks to cover over red faces, and point to the emergence of top hats
through the creation of a red bourgeoisie in place of Indigenous economies of continuous redistribution; Sarah Hunt’s intimate geographies name the invasiveness of patriarchal mindsets that shade out Indigenous matriarchal feminisms (2015); Kim Tallbear examines how monogamous sheets tuck Indigenous desire into beds made by white cis heterosexual fantasies (2019); Simpson uncovers how a mode of extinguishment of Indigeneity lies in the binarization of Indigenous gender and imposition of white patriarchal masculinity on Indigenous men (2015). Altogether, these studies show that the settler ship has not just ignored the middle row and befouled the surroundings of the Indigenous canoe; it has, to varying degrees, been hard at work attempting to transform the canoe itself.

For settlers attempting to do solidarity work with Indigenous people, the ethic of looking over to the Indigenous canoe, respecting autonomy, and maintaining the middle row does not really get one very far. Speaking from my own experience, it can be very difficult to do solidarity work without exacerbating divisions within Indigenous communities and furthering colonial dynamics. I would like to go into one recent example in some detail to better help name the irreducible complexity that faces any model for conceptualizing decolonization.

With a number of other settlers, I responded to a request for support from the Manuel family to build a tiny house for the Tiny House Warriors, a Secwepemc resurgence project connecting Indigenous people with their ancestral territory at the same time as it impedes the further development of the TransMountain pipeline. To begin with, we wanted to seek consent for the build from the Lekwungen, on whose land we wanted to build the tiny house. But who represents the Lekwungen? Colonial enclosure divided
the six traditional family groups of Lekwungen into two elected band councils, the Esquimalt and Songhees. Do the band councils represent the Lekwungen? We were planning to build in a part of the territory known as MUKWUKS, overlooking an ancestral site for reef net fishing. Who decides about MUKWUKS? The Esquimalt or Songhees First Nation? In the case of our project, we knew the Songhees had not signed a benefits sharing agreement with, at the time, Kinder Morgan, but Esquimalt had. And yet, I had attended the first round of the federal government’s ‘deeper consultation’ hearings around TransMountain and listened to the Esquimalt First Nation chief, Andy Thomas, speak eloquently against the pipeline. He explained how the consent his band had given to the pipeline was under the duress of youth suicide, increasing unemployment and a historical context that did not even assign their First Nation a number (all are numbered) because they were not meant to survive. And I also remember how in 2012 his brother, August Thomas, led traditional dancing at the very first open house Kinder Morgan attempted to have on Lekwungen Territory, an open house that settler activists, including myself, shut down and turned into a town hall meeting on the relationship between resource development and colonialism.

Another possibility might have been to ally with grassroots Indigenous women whose values and practices most resonate, to us, with the values and practices of the Manuel family who are at the centre of resurging traditional Secwepemc culture. In my case, I could have reached out to Cheryl Bryce, a Lekwungen woman who has been in contention with her band council in the past for her work restoring Indigenous food systems, and who I have got to know through the Community Tool Shed project, which she has written about with Jeff Corntassel (2012), and Corey Snelgrove has reflected on
I’ve attended Cheryl’s invasive pulls for years; yet, at the same time, getting to know her even a little makes it clear she already has her hands very full and we did not want to put her in a difficult position with her band council. Taking all that into consideration, asking her for permission would most likely not receive a response. Not, perhaps, because she opposes the tiny house build, but because she has a lot going on. What then?

Within Secwépemc the Tiny House Warriors are not without their Indigenous detractors. The unemployment Andy Thomas described holds true in the interior of colonial British Columbia as well, where Victoria’s mostly ‘civilized’ gaslighting gives way to more solid states of racism. Some Secwépemc band councils have signed benefits sharing agreements as well. Moreover, the tiny houses are currently located at Blue River to better oppose the construction of an industrial man camp that, if it follows the horrible pattern of resource extraction, will enact its gendered violence against Indigenous women (Native Youth Sexual Health Network, 2016). The trouble is that the Manuel family does not hail from that part of the larger ancestral territory of the Secwépemc. Some Secwépemc feel the Tiny House Warriors are engaging in their own trespass even as the Manuels themselves respond that they are upholding ancestral responsibilities.

Richard Day and Adam Lewis, writing from their own experiences doing solidarity work as settlers, have also explored the reality that “the Indigenous canoe is no more of a monolith than the Settler ship” (184). For Day and Lewis, the canoe’s internal differentiation “problematic[s] any simple understanding of the concept of non-interference” (ibid). Making choices about which relationships to cultivate and whose authority to legitimate, even if animated by “carrying out obligations to support
decolonization and return of land”, can, from an Indigenous perspective look like “taking sides on an issue that should, strictly speaking, be decided only by those within the affected community” (ibid). As Janet Rogers underlines in her spoken word piece, “Forever”, “it is hard work to maintain the middle row” (Rogers, 2012).

Meanwhile, on the settler side of the river, the ship no longer consists simply of people who are of Dutch or European origins, if it ever did. The Europeans who came in search of ‘opportunity’, in addition to dispossessing Tainos and countless more Indigenous people, also enslaved Black people to produce the commodities that would concretize those opportunities. The Combahee collective’s injunction that systems of domination interlock (1979), can be traced right back to the very origins of settler colonialism. As Bhandar has examined in the context of the emergence of property law, settlement and racialization were intertwined from the outset (Bhandar, 2018: 5). Surviving the confinement of the Middle Passage could not be more dissimilar than the voyage of the Mayflower or Santa Maria, even as those differences are connected by white supremacy.

As the heightened waves of contemporary forced migration demonstrate, these different modes of arrival and presence have only proliferated. The politically complicated ‘Refugees Welcome’ movement reminds us that justice-aspiring responses to migration can themselves re-inscribe the dynamics of settler colonialism (and imperialism) by eliding Indigenous authority, while re-imbuing settler governments with the power to create and impose borders that often bifurcate Indigenous territories. Even the radical migrant justice network, No One Is Illegal, cannot will away the complexity and contradictory interweaving of decolonization and migrant justice when it affirms the
right to move, remain and return, even as it acknowledges the authority of Indigenous
people on whose land some people might choose to remain. Lawrence and Amadahy
have wended into this thicket of complexity by insisting that even as “Black people [or
contemporary people forced into migration]...have not been quintessential ‘Settlers’ in
the White supremacist nature of the word; nevertheless, they have, as free people, been
involved in some form of settlement process” (2009: 107).

And racialization constitutes only one of the axes of oppression that
 compartmentalizes the settler ship. The aforementioned analyses of distinct systems of
oppression within Indigenous Resurgence Theory have their analogues on the settler side
of the river. The statist, patriarchal, hetero and cis norms, among other modes of
oppression, that Indigenous intellectuals are contending with were invented first by
Europeans and then imposed on others. In the context of building a tiny house for the
Secwepemc, even as we were contemplating these questions and complexities, even a
cursory look around Lekwungen territory showed new building cranes going up,
promising the next round of gentrification and displacement of urban Indigenous and
proletarianized settler people; it also showed police budgets increasing in spite of heroic
campaigning to restrict even more money from flowing to the defense and entrenchment
of the dominant order; and it showed homeless encampments being encircled by those
better-resourced cops and driven further out of the urban core to suffer new rounds of
criminalization and stigma. Or, disguised to the public eye but no less pressing and
relevant to the reproduction of oppressive relationships, the intimate violence of
sexualized assault and abuse continued to inflict its traumas.
To grapple with the immense internal ‘compartmentalization’ of the Settler ship, Day and Lewis propose an alternative model of the Two Row that they call the “N-Row Wampum” (Day and Lewis, 2013: 173). Like this dissertation, Day and Lewis couch their argument for an N-Row Wampum within the “theoretical paradigm of intersectionality” (ibid), while ultimately arguing that for “mutual respect and autonomy...to be revived and respected, the Two Row Wampum model can, and in some cases should, be seen as a ‘slice’ of a higher-dimensional space” (ibid). For the purpose of my dissertation, I would like to argue this is one of the cases where it may not be best to foreground an n-dimensional model even while Day and Lewis put forward compelling arguments to do so that are immanent to my own ethical framework. Rather, I prefer to retain the language of the Two Row given the history of Marxism’s encounter with Indigeneity. At the same time, I wish to reaffirm that I am writing as a European-descended settler and that my own analytic project will foreground the complicities and responsibilities of white, proletarianized settlers on my side of the water.

Even as I choose to stick to two rows, I do not want to lose sight of how the encounter between Indigenous people and Marxism has doubtless seen countless consensual and nonconsensual crossings of the middle row. To name one central to the Two Row itself, its originators, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, themselves exerted an enlivening and persuasive influence Marx. In the provocative assessment of Marx’s *Ethnographic Notebooks* by surrealist autodidact Frank Rosemont (Rosemont, 2009), Rosemont describes how closely Marx read Lewis Morgan’s *Ancient Society* in late 1880 and 1881, and how Marx’s encounter with the Iroquois, even through Morgan’s evolutionist anthropology, sparked a deep re-assessment of convictions we will examine
closely in the following chapters. Many, including Coulthard (2014: 9), have emphasized Marx’s ‘Russian Road’ (Shanin, 1983); in other words, the period towards the end of his life when Marx imagines that the ancient peasant commune could “serve as a point of departure” (Marx, 1978 [1882]: 472) for communism. Rosemont argues that we should not stop at the Russian Road in assessing the scope of Marx’s throwing into question of basic premises of historical materialism. Instead, Rosemont points out how the very confederacy whose Two Row model I am drawing on interweaves closely with Marx’s inquiries into the *obshchina*. As evidence, Rosemont cites how a draft of the letter to Vera Zasulich that is widely quoted to support Marx expressing his positive valuation of the rural commune includes an explicit connection of the commune to “the revival...of an archaic social type” (Marx, 1881) that is none other than the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (Rosemont, 2009).

While sticking to two rows risks collapsing complexities, including those internal to Marx’s scholarship, and imposing a binary on a variegated reality, for this project I prefer this risk to the one of disappearing the middle row. As Wolfe quips, “I have regularly been accused of binarism – though not once by a Native” (257). And perhaps Taiaike Alfred and Richard Day’s laudable attempt to forge alliances under the auspices of anarcho-indigenism (Alfred, 2005: 45-6) also attests to the perils of emphasizing commonalities and cross-pollinations: these conversations, experiments and relationships of solidarity certainly exist, and point to the enactment in some places and times of multidimensional mutualistic and diverse attempts at peaceful co-existence, but it nonetheless remains important to begin from analytic frameworks that emphasize the middle row.
given the difference that settler colonialism makes and Marxism’s entanglement with that history.

Section Four - Can the Two Row Wampum Be Reduced to Metaphor?

Another concern in taking the Two Row as my ethical point of departure is that it could be construed as a settler move to innocence (Tuck and Yang, 2012). By choosing a framework that appears to leave a settler ship in Indigenous waters, I could be re-centring a settler discourse, entertaining a settler future, and rendering decolonization a metaphor (3). Brought into the machinery of reconciliation, a horizon of peaceful coexistence could easily shore up liberation discourses with settler origins, rather than unsettle them, and once again subsume Indigenous cosmologies under non-Indigenous ones to the ultimate detriment of Indigenous people.

I do not want to pay this critique easy lip-service. Embracing the Two Row entails a commitment to the possibility of finding value in a non-Indigenous discourse. I believe the logic of the Two Row Wampum suggests there could be aspects of Marx that can not only provide a place to strip back to and build from in fashioning a vessel capable of steering here in a good way, but maximally might even provide ideas that Indigenous people may want to adopt, though it is not my place to decide on that. I can, however, see how Coulthard has cautiously and carefully drawn from Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation to help him theorize transformations to settler colonialism, even as the settler ship continues to pollute the river. It stands to reason that if a Dene scholar can find something of value in a non-Indigenous discourse, then when he suggests blowing the settler ship to smithereens, he reserves the possibility of discerningly picking through
the flotsam for useful materials. Or perhaps better, through mutual dialogue those elements of non-Indigenous discourse that offer potential for fashioning a non-interfering vessel can be named and support the fugitive work of settlers who want to cut ties with settler colonialism, help sink the dominating ship, and support Indigenous resurgence as we figure out decolonial ways of being on the river.

Like Coulthard, Tuck and Yang undoubtedly seek to sink the settler ship. In so far as they theorize the ship as settler colonialism, I could not agree more with this aim. Where they seem to part ways with the logic of the Two Row is in appearing to also strip settlers of responsibility to learn to exist on these territories in a way that does not continue to degrade them. The role they seem to envision for settlers is to work unrelentingly towards negating settler colonialism in the most literal sense. What they seem to leave out is the positive work settlers like me need to equally unrelentingly embrace, of accountably learning from Indigenous people how to live here. Without this work, I wonder what would transpire if Tuck and Yang's blueprint for decolonization were materialized?

Tuck and Yang desire a form of solidarity that makes it an "uneasy, reserved and unsettled matter that neither reconciles present grievances nor forecloses future conflict" (3). In this regard, I wonder if a positive aspect of the Two Row framework is that it offers the preservation of difference? One could argue that the presence of a settler ship underscores the difference that will always exist between Indigenous people and settlers even if all the values of the Two Row are actualized. If Tuck and Yang worry that settlers make joining together too easy and too open, perhaps a framework that preserves difference in perpetuity serves as a reminder that settlers will always have different
responsibilities on Indigenous territories? Unity and sameness are not synonyms for decolonization. Diversity might be.

To the degree I can discern a role for settlers in a decolonial process in Tuck and Yang, it stems from ratcheting up emotional states of guilt, "so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence" (10). I think Tuck and Yang seek to maximally pin settlers to their responsibility to account for the harm done to Indigenous land and life. The antonym for innocence is guilt, a condition whose calculation arises in relation to an absence of justice. There can be no doubt that any serious accounting of settler colonialism must not look away from its enormity. And yet, I wonder about the relation between justice and peaceful coexistence? Alfred argues that “[j]ustice is one element of a good relationship; it is concerned with fairness and right and calculating moral balances, but it cannot be the end goal of a struggle, which must be conceived as a movement from injustice and conflict through and beyond the achievement of justice to the completion of the relationship and the achievement of peace” (28). Alfred also inaugurates Indigenous Resurgence Theory by insisting on the importance of a consonance of means and ends (2009: 23). If there is to be peaceful co-existence at the end, it must be an ingredient at the beginning.

This should not be confused as a kind of black-mail for Indigenous people to embody friendship and respect in the face of its absence amongst settlers. The Two Row points to different responsibilities for Indigenous people and settlers. As Rachel Flowers, a Hul'qumi'num from Leey'qsun First Nation has compellingly pointed out, in the context of a colonial politics of recognition, demands by settlers for Indigenous love to appease
their own need to feel included in decolonial politics only ends up perpetuating colonialism (Flowers, 2015). For settlers committed to decolonial politics, we need to understand Indigenous refusal to forgive as crucial to Indigenous resurgence; Tuck and Yang's austere insistence on pinning settlers to their complicity without extending easy forgiveness works towards the horizon of peaceful coexistence by shaking us out of our easy adoption of a decolonization discourse without actually sitting with the intensive and extensive transformations that demands. In a cultural context where settler colonialism demands reconciliation, Indigenous people must see red.

What I am trying to preserve is a need for settlers to figure out and practice what friendship and mutual reciprocity require. As Flowers explains, "the emphasis from Indigenous people on sharing and co-existing are [already] essential to our ontologies and governance systems" (35). The same cannot be said for settlers. While sharing and co-existing may form part of our legacy and present, Flowers' people named us "hwulunitum, meaning hungry people. It explicitly refers to the fact that settlers were not from the land and did not know how or where to get food...also to the greed of settlers to accumulate resources, land, people and wealth" (Flowers, 2015: 34). As long as this continues, an Indigenous ethic of refusal is a necessary condition for friendship.

Meanwhile, for settlers, this demands we rectify the ways we show up on Hul'qumi'num and other Indigenous territories. As Corntassel has pointed out, "[t]he ultimate goal is to create the need for a new word or phrase to describe the positive features of a settler-Indigenous relationship" (Corntassel, Dhamoon and Snelgrove, 2014: 17). What use will a bunch of hwulunitum be for Tuck and Yang if a decolonial process eventuates in the
repatriation of land and life to Indigenous people? Wouldn't the whole disaster simply begin anew, as we recreated the relations that made us hungry in the first place?

Section Four - Friendship and Respect Through Affirmative Critique

Methodologically, the attempt to embody a positive ethic of friendship and respect in my dissertation, includes practicing that same ethic towards Marx. While it makes sense for Tuck and Yang to make settlers squirm, my own responsibilities are to read critically and affirmatively. My training in Marx already orients me very strongly to critique. As James Sperber, Marx's most recent academic biographer, has noted, Marx not only heaped criticism on his political enemies, he also followed a pattern of making enemies of comrades whose political ideas he once shared (Sperber, 2013: 172). Marx's venom towards the Young Hegelians can be read as a kind of disavowal of positions he once held without actually acknowledging those positions. When Marx enjoins socialists, in *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, to "let the dead bury their dead" (Marx, 1978 [1852]: 597), he disavows his revolutionary ancestors of 1789 and the very revolutionary process that he studied so assiduously and used to guide his own insurrectionary politics in Cologne during the tumultuous years of 1848 and 1849 (Sperber, 2013: 193-236). In my case, most of the premises and consequences of Marx's politics that I will critique represent ideas I once shared, and have only (hopefully) disentangled myself from thanks to paying attention to the brilliant work of Indigenous elders, warriors, protectors, intellectuals, two-spirits, youth and more. My own politics of refusing the consequences of colonialism cannot also be a refusal of my ancestors. Pushing Marx away only serves
to disavow my own complicity with intellectual colonial legacies and ideas. I wish to affirm my complicity.

I also wish to affirm those aspects of Marx, and people inspired by him, that could potentially resonate with ethics and politics pointed to by Indigenous resurgence. At bottom, criticizing Marx as colonial is a little easy. It is impossible that a non-Indigenous European man writing in the 19th Century could produce Indigenous thought. Diagnosing Marx's colonial premises, while important given the continued reproduction of colonialism within contemporary Marxisms (a fault we should be more impatient with), cannot be the whole project. Moreover, it feels more than a little awkward for me to cash in on critiques of Marx when the possibility of articulating them originates with Indigenous resistance to settler colonialism; to the extent we have wide-open windows to see Marx's colonial premises, they have been opened by the hard work of Indigenous people. The "ruthless criticism of everything existing" cannot be my sole intellectual program (Marx, 1978 [1843]: 13). What feels more complicated, ethically and intellectually, is to carefully pluck out colonial premises while also naming impulses and fragments - the cumulative sparks - that could help Marxists fan our own decolonial conflagrations from within Marx. Concretely, this will look like naming those aspects of Marx that help shed light on settler colonialism as well as potentially offering ethical and political guidance. In particular, through Hegel, I will affirm Marx’s emphasis on the need for struggle (Ch. 4), salvage the autonomous kernel from the colonial shell of historical materialism (Ch. 2), echo Coulthard’s critical valuation of Marx’s analysis of capital (Ch. 3), and finally (Ch. 5) begin a reading of Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* in a decolonial direction, while embracing aspects of the contemporary work
of autonomist John Holloway, feminist Marxists Silvia Federici and Maria Mies, and eco-Marxist Paul Burkett.

Section Five - Beginning From Ourselves

Thinking of Tuck and Yang’s injunction to remember the unsettled aspects of solidarity, I wish to name this as a positive ethic to confound the detached, disaffected certainties of colonial expertise. My dissertation project can only be written from a place as uncertain as the weather. As someone deeply socialized into the systems Coulthard argues must be destroyed for peaceful co-existence to be possible, I recognize that by definition my project will be impure, messy and unsatisfying to many Indigenous people and, most likely and for different reasons, many settler Marxists. Whatever peaceful co-existence might look like, it will be an emergent and embodied process that unfolds immanently to this uncertain and hazy place we are now. This cannot be understated.

Surveying events over the course of writing this dissertation, like the approval of the Site C dam, the acquittal of Gerald Stanley and Raymond Cormier, the continued parading of the ‘national interest’ by Justin Trudeau to justify TransMountain’s expansion, or the RCMP’s violence against the Wet’suwet’en, testifies to the depth and toxicity of settler colonialism. More deeply, I am simply not in contact and never will be sufficiently in contact with the intimate kinship from which grounded normativities arise. I can only strive, with sincerity, humility and uncertainty to help move towards decolonization.

At the same time, as Alfred pointed out, he always carries his Wampum Belt as a reminder that treaty must begin from ourselves. As he puts it in Wasase, “The transformation will begin inside each one of us as personal change, but decolonization
will become a reality only when we collectively both commit to a movement based on an 
ethical and political vision" (Alfred, 2005: 20). Beginning from myself as a settler leads 
me back to Rosso's offering. Accepting her gift requires trusting that I am at least 
potentially capable of taking steps towards decolonization. In beginning from myself, the 
Two Row presupposes that I am not always already only a settler; that complex set of 
drives, mindsets, and modes of conduct does not totally determine me. I must begin from 
this messy, uncertain place I know best, and I must continue to work at personal 
transformation even as I organize with others to transform the broader settler colonial 
order. Ethics might just be another word for a politics of the intimate-scale 
transformations I must work out even as I also relay the political vision of Indigenous 
resurgence by suggesting possible responsibilities and protocols for settlers. For the 
dissertation, beginning from myself means I am choosing historical materialism as a 
place to think through the implications of what I have learned from Indigenous 
resurgence, as it is the Western body of liberation thought that has most influenced the 
development of my politics. Further, and in an attempt to be consistent with the Two 
Row's value of non-interference, I will foreground the work historical materialism has to 
do. While Indigenous scholars and activists may choose to draw on historical materialism 
to further their resistance to colonialism, my role in that work is to pay attention to how 
historical materialism steers its ship.

Section Six – The River

In his preface to Wasase, Leroy Little Bear stresses that “Native American 
paradigms...consist of and include ideas that there is constant flux/motion, that all of
creation consists of energy waves, [and] that everything is animate” (Leroy Little Bear in Alfred 2009: 9). In the Two Row these ontological properties are captured by the river. This couldn’t be further from the tacit ontology underlying the currently dominant order. As Robin Wall Kimmerer has noted, “English is a noun-based language, somehow so appropriate to a culture so obsessed with things. Only 30 percent of English words are verbs, but in Potawatomi that proportion is 70 percent” (Kimmerer, 2013: 53). Alfred makes a similar point: “Taiaiake, in English, is a proper noun that labels me for identification. In Kanienkeha, it literally means, “he is crossing over from the other side” (Alfred, 2009: 32).

For Alfred, the reality of “movement and activity” means that “[i]n fighting for our future, we have been misled into thinking that...‘Mohawk’ is something that is attached to us inherently and not a description of what we actually do with our lives” (Alfred, 2009: 32). For Little Bear, this tenet points to the constant need for “renewal” (10). On the settler side of the river, for instance, movement is represented as the exception to the rule of fixity upheld by the State through unchanging laws. In settler Canada this takes the form of imagining treaties to be written documents upheld by the government and periodically dusted off for reference, rather than living commitments enacted, or more commonly not enacted, by citizens.

I will leave it to chapter two to examine more closely how Marx stakes out an ontology for historical materialism, and whether his ontology resonates with the tenets set out by Little Bear, Alfred, Kimmerer and the Two Row. For now, I will close my examination of the Two Row with Vanessa Watts’ warning that Western philosophy’s very distinction between ontology and epistemology may already put settlers off course
compared to the “Place-Thought” frames that direct “Haudenosaunee and Anishinaabe cosmologies” (Watts, 2013: 21).

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the Two Row Wampum and what it entails for settlers. I explained my critical adoption of it, in light of its own inner logic, and the anticipated concerns and critiques by Indigenous scholars. For the dissertation, this chapter serves as a counter-point to my examination, in Chapter Four, of the inner logic of Hegel’s master-slave parable. It also grounds my development of political principles for decolonization in parallel with Coulthard’s enjoiinder for Indigenous people to see and live red.
Chapter Two - Visiting the Origins of Historical Materialism

Introduction

This chapter visits the birth of historical materialism. I will examine the two texts where Marx originates the premises and core concepts of his materialist conception of history, "The Theses on Feuerbach" (1845) and The German Ideology (1846), by replaying the moves by which Marx develops them, and analysing their entailments. I will show how Marx sets out to develop his materialism as a self-conscious attempt to leave behind Hegel's philosophical idealism and cross over to a "this-sided" understanding of "sensuous activity" or "practice" (Marx, 1978 [1845]: 144-5). In particular, I will focus on Marx's thought-experiment about "the first historical act" (Marx, 1978 [1846]: 156) and pay close to attention to how Marx spins out the concept of productive forces from the satisfaction of the first need and originates division of labour, private property and class struggle.

In keeping with the Two Row, my aim in this chapter is not simply to analyse and explain Marx. I also want to look over to Indigenous Resurgence Theory, especially, in the case of this chapter, to Leanne Simpson's "Land as Pedagogy" (2014) to make sense of its elucidation of Indigenous practice. Like Marx, Simpson develops her understanding of practice through a thought-experiment. And also like Marx, she seeks to leave behind thought systems that misconstrue Indigenous practice. Simpson crosses over to an Indigenous 'materialism' by interpreting the story of Kwezens in the Sugar Bush, and uses it to elucidate the premises and core concepts of Indigenous practice.

Through my comparison, which proceeds from section two to six, I hope to show which properties of Indigeneity become impossible to see using Marx's epistemology. To anticipate my results, I will say that Marx makes a number of moves in crossing over
from idealism to materialism that foundationally occlude seeing the Indigenous canoe. To begin with, (1) his ontological bet that existence requires, above all else, survival, does not pay off when considering Indigenous societies. Stemming from Marx's ontological bet, (2) his epistemological assertion that real knowledge arises from analysing the physical organization of the means by which survival takes place also sets Marx on a path away from Indigeneity. According to Simpson, in Indigenous societies people are all of their properties all at once, such that building an epistemology from an analysis of physical organization leaves out a lot.

Marx fleshes out his epistemology around the concept of needs, and dialectically entwines them with the productive forces through which people satisfy needs and develop new ones. By comparing to Simpson, I will show that (3) needs entrain an individualizing and anthropocentrizing dynamic absent from Indigenous activity; rather, consensually intimate kinship relations extending across Marx's natural-human divide inform, and are informed by, a practice oriented to relational autonomy. Finally, (4) building an understanding of productive forces from a physically construed category of needs entails that Marx's restricted epistemology cannot grasp the spiritually productive forces that organize how Indigenous practices unfold.

But first, I begin by attempting to warrant an Indigenous critique and complication of Marx's assessment of practice from within Marx's thought. I do this in section one through a close interpretation of his philosophical method. I argue that Marx 'permits' my critique because his ultimate point of departure and arrival is human, not simply proletarian, liberation, and also because Marx’s materialism commits him to the
ultimate test of liberatory practice. When the practice of liberation cannot be explained by a theory of revolution, the theory of revolution must be rectified.

For the dissertation, this chapter will establish coordinates to track into Marx’s analysis of capital. It will also help me tune into how Marx’s point of origin informs the politics he - and contemporary Marxists - end up with. At the same time, by establishing some properties of Indigeneity Marx cannot apprehend, this chapter will establish what needs to be brought back in to an anti-capitalist politics informed by Marx if settlers and non-Indigenous people are to take Indigeneity and the horizon of peaceful co-existence seriously. Last, in section six, I will offer a reading of Marx that centres autonomy as a possibly resonant basis from which to rebuild a historical materialism that can engage in non-interfering solidarity with Indigenous resurgence.

Section One - Lessons From Marx’s Method

As the title to Marx’s theses allude, in passing from Hegel's idealism to historical materialism Marx attributes the first steps to Feuerbach. Before providing an explication of Marx's materialism, I will dwell a little on his treatment of Feuerbach to show how it reveals something about Marx's philosophical method. I will suggest I am hewing to Marx’s method when I introduce Simpson's theorization of Indigenous practice, and use it as a standpoint to complicate the proletarian one Marx develops his philosophy from. Just as Marx did to Feuerbach, thanks to Simpson, I will do to Marx. Finally, granted permission by Marx's referral of judgment on politics to practice itself, I will relate how my own attempt to follow Marx’s theses and engage in political struggle corroborates the
necessity of continuing to complicate and enrich Marx - and the politics animated by Marx.

Marx acknowledges Feuerbach in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* by signalling that "[i]t is only with Feuerbach that positive, humanistic and naturalistic criticism begins" (Marx, 1978 [1844]: 68). At the same time, Marx uses Feuerbach to show how much further materialism must go to actually comprehend practice. Marx argues that the social reality disclosed by his own materialism, when put to work explaining Feuerbach's thought, explains why Feuerbach's materialism falls well short of grasping sensuous activity in its real fullness.

Feuerbach shares Marx's aim to give properties that Hegel granted to Absolute Spirit back to a material 'man'. In Marx's account, Feuerbach succeeds in showing how the religious essence has a profane basis in 'man' 'himself'. And yet, in depositing this religious essence into a human one, Marx disagrees with how that human gets packaged. By placing the human essence inside what Marx names an "abstract individual" (145), Feuerbach fails to notice how "'religious sentiment' is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society" (ibid). Feuerbach fails to comprehend that the human essence "is...in reality the ensemble of social relations" (ibid).

What's more, Marx argues that if Feuerbach were to have investigated the social and historical basis for his materialism, he might have realized that the particular form of society informing his theorizing was a capitalist one, and that unconsciously taking a bourgeois standpoint of "civil society" (145) was responsible for the mystifying resolution of idealism into an abstract, individualistic 'man'. In contrast, Marx sees the
standpoint for his socialized, historical and sensuous theorization of practice in "human society, or socialised humanity" (145).

This requires further explanation. After all, I claim above that Marx takes the standpoint of the proletariat, and yet here he is siding with human society or socialised humanity as the basis for his materialism. How can the proletariat equal humanity? According to Marx’s own instructions to Feuerbach to pay better attention to history, we would have to conclude no evidence exists for a socialised humanity to take a standpoint in. So what is Marx up to?

My question is a little disingenuous, as by now Marx's tendency to conflate the proletariat with humanity has been well diagnosed. Still, in the spirit of attempting to be as immanent as I can to his thought, I think Marx's own resolution to this paradox merits reviewing. In my estimation, he makes a succinct statement of his position in his 1843 critique of Hegel. In this work, Marx wonders "[w]here, then, is the positive possibility of German emancipation?" (Marx, 1978 [1843]: 64). He responds,

"In the formulation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular wrong, but wrong generally, is perpetuated against it" (ibid)

Marx sees proletarianized humanity as the class with radical chains, and takes the position that its revolutionary practice will bring into being socialized humanity. Proletarian revolutionary activity will remove the class contradictions that have generated 'abstract individuals' in practice, and idealisms and limited materialisms philosophically, in favour of an actual, historical concretized socialized humanity with its accompanying historical materialist philosophy.
This chapter questions whether the humanity that proletarian revolutionary activity might bring into being, guided by Marx's materialism, can row with the Indigenous canoe. I am not asking a new question. It has been posed to Marx by feminists, anarchists, Black people in America, people of colour in the Third World or Global South, and I am now posing it as a white settler informed by, and in important respects still identifying with, Marx, who wants to be in solidarity with the struggle of Indigenous people to sustain and resurge their worlds.

I want to emphasize that Marx himself teaches us to distrust master philosophies. In his case, he connects Hegel's philosophical idealism to fading feudal ideologies, and Feuerbach's attempted materialism to bourgeois ideology. Marx insists that the philosophical key to leaving the realm of mystifying idealism lies in theorizing a proletarian practice; in other words, that the practice of the slave or oppressed carries with it a richer understanding of social reality because it reveals the exploitative conditions that the master represses as well as containing the properties of human reality alienated to or destroyed by the master. In the struggle of master against slave, or for Marx, bourgeois against proletarian:

"[m]aterial force can only be overthrown by material force, but theory itself becomes a material force when it has seized the masses. Theory is capable of seizing the masses when it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself...[Theoretical criticism] ends, therefore, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned and contemptible being" (60).

I interpret this passage to mean that philosophical thought can only provide positive support to social struggle if it actually grasps what abases 'man' in practice. Taking my
cues from this 'imperative', in this dissertation I wish to turn this approach on Marx. I understand settler colonialism as a system of domination, and, following Marx, I agree that to support decolonization, thought must grasp the root of Indigeneity, of what is being abased and destroyed through settler colonialism and defended and resurged by Indigenous people. And also like Marx, I agree that thought can only supply concepts that practice itself points to. Ultimately, decolonial theory requires Indigenous activity.

Some might argue that turning settler colonialism on Marx misses the mark. Marx was European and Europe was not a settler colonial formation. I would like to argue otherwise. Regardless of whether Germany, France, Belgium or England were settler colonial, Marx's writings have travelled. He has come to be adopted as a liberation theorist by settlers, like me, who live in settler colonial formations. If we agree with Marx that the only practice that can revolutionise a system of domination is carried out by people who are debased through that system, then we too must come to value, understand, and, in close accountability to Indigenous people not only resist settler colonialism, but begin our own self-transformations towards land- and place-based existences. We must embrace the kinds of practices that allow us to discover in ourselves the properties that have been debased through settler colonialism and spark the desire to defend and resurge those properties.

Second, an argument that Europe is settler colonial can be entailed by the position of Indigenous resurgence. A strong theory of Indigenous resurgence might argue that any social formation that has become disconnected from its landbase has become settler colonial, whether there are Indigenous people there or not to alert them to this fact. If grounded normativity is to be our guide in building frameworks to make sense of the
world, then the languages of so many non-human entities cry the violence of non-Indigenous people's relationship to the land; the abasement of non-Indigenous people lies in not grasping how at the root this is a violence and loss that diminishes us too.

Marx built his materialism from an elaboration of the proletarian standpoint. This suggests that the philosophical properties Marx supplies to people through his thought experiment on the first historical act are those which are at stake in proletarian practice. For Marx, 'man' equals 'proletarians'. And yet, we know there are more systems of domination afoot than capitalism, and more standpoints to complicate our conception of people and the properties at stake through systems of domination. In my case, I wish to assess Marx’s materialism against the elaboration of the Indigenous standpoint offered by Indigenous Resurgence Theory. If Marx's theory holds, then it must necessarily be the case that historical materialism contains mystifications that enable the reproduction of the system of domination in question; in this case, settler colonialism.

In this sense, one could say I am also trying to defend Marx against Marxists who would wish to press pause on the unfolding and enrichment of historical materialism; to define materialism in a restricted sense as a philosophical system that seeks to apprehend proletarian practice rather than the full depth and complexity of human practices that are abased by systems of domination. An Indigenous materialism and a colonial critique of Marx is a logical entailment of the lessons Marx so carefully laid out in his theses, just as a feminist materialism and a patriarchal critique of Marx has also been developed by thinkers like Maria Mies (1998 [1986]) and Silvia Federici (2009 [2004]), or a black materialism and anti-racist critique of Marx has been put forward by Cedric Robinson (1983).
Can this approach be warranted? While I have tried above to justify it through an immanent critique of Marx, I wonder if another immanent mode of questioning Marx stems from his second thesis, where he declares that "[m]an must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question" (Marx, 1978 [1845]:144).

I see Marx instructing us to be at the fault line between the dominant order and resistance to it, in all the places that fault line arises, whether that's in ourselves, or in our intimate relationships, or in the latest proposal to expand police budgets or extract resources. Trying to be in fidelity to this orientation to the relationship between thought and political practice has taught me, over and over, that everything is always in play when it comes to struggle. In other words, political practice has sensitized me to the complexity of our human ontology. When I reflect the political lesson of complexity back onto the epistemologies that size up that complexity, an enduring feeling about Western political thought has been a disappointment about the persistent tendency to pick out some un- or under-theorized property of human being and build an epistemology and politics almost exclusively from that property to the ultimate neglect of other necessary features of practice.

When I give practice the final say, as Marx appears to do when he writes that "[t]he question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question" (144), then the practice of radical political movements appears to affirm what I've managed to glean from experience: it's not just capital we're fighting, the workplace is not the only site of struggle, and the proletariat is
not the only political subject. Political struggle opens windows onto the dominant order, and the worlds being prefigured or defended against that order, and these windows reveal the workings of something far more complex than even the three volumes of *Capital* can convey. Rather, political practices that go to the root of their respective systems of domination reveal that vis-a-vis Marxism, struggle encompasses an inwardly and outwardly expanded terrain; the dominant order seeps beyond the workplace into most everything - our psyches, bodies, mindsets, intimacies, relations, institutions and beyond.

Consequently, restricting how we respond to Marxism's great question, 'what is to be done', to a reading of the economic conditions prevailing in any given concrete conjuncture and an assessment of whether this or that particular crisis merits unleashing the all-at-once movement of proletarianized people, means our politics will be impoverished, and, most likely, reproduce domination against practices Marx did not self-consciously incorporate into his understanding of historical materialism. Worse, Marxists will continue to find contemporary political movements lacking because they do not live up to their 'historical task', in spite of how those movements are usually doing heroic work to potentially enrich our collective understanding of what struggle can mean and what liberation entails.

In this chapter, I will trace Marxism's great political question back to its epistemological moment of origin. I will try to show how the premises that Marx starts from shape the answers offered by Marxist readings of struggle; and, further, how excluded or repressed properties of human being that do not enter into the reckoning of what to do - in this dissertation I foreground properties revealed by theorizations of Indigenous activity - mean that those of us doing our politics strictly through Marx and
those inspired by him will end up reproducing systems of domination, like settler colonialism, to our, and especially Indigenous, impoverishment.

**Section Two - From Idealism to Materialism**

In this section, I primarily shift to *The German Ideology*, as I continue to interpret Marx's passage from idealism to materialism. I also begin to put Marx's materialism into relation with Simpson's elaboration of what's at stake in Indigeneity in "Land as Pedagogy". This allows me to show some similarities in their approach, like their shared insistence on coming close to practice. I will also begin to sketch out key differences and the questions those differences prompt, like wondering whether habits of philosophy in its idealist mode cling to Marx and constrain his crossing-over to practice, in spite of his attempts to do philosophy in a new way. In other words, I ask whether a discourse he grabs onto to make sense of practice, that of political economy, contains assumptions that reveal as much as they occlude?

While the “Theses on Feuerbach" offers some specifications to Marx's emerging materialism, for example that human nature must be understood as the ensemble of social relations and that practice must be grasped historically, the text primarily creates a kind of checklist for what philosophical materialism demands. It is not until *The German Ideology*, written immediately following the theses, that Marx attempts to tick the boxes and furnish his emerging materialism with a conceptual framework. The content of Marx's conceptual framework will take centre stage in the next sections. In this one, I will pay attention to how Marx prepares his audience.
After introducing *The German Ideology* with a polemic against Young Hegelians, Marx begins to lay out the premises of his materialist conception of history. He argues that his premises, implicitly unlike those of his erstwhile comrades, the Young Hegelians, "are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination" (149). Or, "[i]n direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven...We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real-life process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process" (154). As with his theses, Marx again uses a philosophical contrast to situate his own premises. This makes me wonder how the practices and problems of philosophy, and the Hegelian philosophy against which he is polemicizing, shape how Marx approaches the construction of his own materialist philosophical system? My curiosity arises from Marx's premises themselves: if the point of thought is to prove its this-sidedness, its connection to practice, then to what extent does Marx risk losing that connection if he is organizing his approach to the world of practice through questions generated by a philosophical system he considers to be abstracted from reality?

When I look over to Simpson's "Land as Pedagogy", I see a shared attempt to stake out an epistemology from an analysis of practice. Simpson argues that Indigenous philosophy must emerge from and remain in contact with Indigenous practice because "'theory' is generated and regenerated continually through embodied practice and within each family, community and generation of people" (7). And echoing Marx's concern about devolving into scholasticism, Simpson clarifies that "'theory' isn't just an intellectual pursuit - it is woven within kinetics, spiritual presence and emotion, it is
contextual and relational. It is intimate and personal" (ibid). I will unpack below what Simpson interweaves theory with. For now, I wonder how Simpson navigates the peril of thought becoming detached from the practice it seeks to explain and draw lessons from? She too is thinking in relation to an approach to thought - through the academic form - that she wishes to criticize and create an alternative to, as well as publishing in a journal that will have a primarily academic, if also Indigenous, audience. Throughout the piece she warns how the academic form threatens the unity of Indigenous theory with its land-based practice. For example, she wonders what would happen to Kwezens' experience in the sugar bush "if the university got a hold of the sugar bush and made Kwezens get SSHRC funding before she could go out in the field" (Simpson, 9)? Or, in an earlier work, Simpson explains that she wishes to leave behind the 'cognitive imperialism' of Western thought that is "often unable to see our Ancestors" (Simpson, 2011: 15).

And yet, she seems to navigate this peril differently. Unlike Marx, who continues to be in dialogue with his philosophical adversaries, Simpson places herself at the outset on the side of the practice she wishes to think the conditions of: "This spring, while tapping a stand of maple trees, I remembered that [Kwezens in the Sugar Bush] is one of my favourite stories" (6). While Simpson's interpretation of the story has the status of a thought experiment on account of having been subjected to the colonial education system, it is not a thought experiment in the same sense as Marx's. Whereas Marx's thought experiment appears to spring ex nihilo, or from Marx's own reasoning, Simpson attributes her story to Doug Williams, while acknowledging it is her own re-telling (Simpson, 2014: 2).
Simpson also explains that "it is a traditional practice to begin by talking about how I learned this story" (Simpson, 2014: 2). Marx passes by the opportunity to explain how imagining the first historical act, and using it to draw philosophical or political lessons, has its own tradition within European thought. For one famous example, Rousseau employed the same tactic at the outset of the *Social Contract* to draw conclusions about the nature of society and the political system that ought to organize it (Rousseau, 2004 [1762]).

After distinguishing his premises from the Young Hegelians', Marx explains that the "first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature" (149). Marx then continues his dialogue with European philosophy, this time responding to the question of what distinguishes humans from animals, by advancing the position that "men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation" (150).

In addition to its dialogue with philosophy, these passages also reveal how Marx begins to use the language of political economy to conceptualize practice. According to Ernst Bloch, Marx not only draws on political economy; he also unconsciously incorporates capitalist valences in his use of those concepts. In an extended interpretation of Marx's theses in *Principles of Hope*, Bloch explains how

"...the ideology of the entrepreneur, the bourgeois, the so-called homo faber whose profit-dynamic, becoming free in the new age, forming the new
bourgeois age, still by a long chalk progressive, also certainly makes itself evident in the superstructure and activates the base itself. Both morally, in the shape of a so-called work ethic, and epistemologically, in the shape of a concept of activity, a work logos in cognition. The work ethic, preached particularly by the Calvinists for the purpose of creating capital, this capitalist vita activa contrasted with aristocratic idleness, and also with the vita contemplativa of a quiet, monkish, scholarly existence. In parallel fashion, the work logos in cognition, this concept of ‘producing’ particularly exaggerated in bourgeois rationalism, differed from the ancient and also scholastic cognitive concept of mere receiving: vision, visio, passive depiction.” (Bloch, 1986 [1959]: 256)

If the passage between contemplative idealism and a materialism oriented to the sensuousness of practice is organized, as Bloch suggests, by a capitalist understanding of activity as transformative of the sensuous world around that activity, what is getting left out of the materialism Marx ends up with? What ways of relating to the world around us are impossible to theorize? Further, if they are left out, how can they be valued, recognized as potential places where politics can and are happening, and therefore also turned into intentional sites of struggle, and building or sustaining alternatives?

Reading Simpson's re-interpretation of Kwezens' learning in the sugar bush comprises my attempt to do the looking Marx was unable to do given the context he laboured under. Rather than being unconsciously guided by Marx's capitalist backdrop and a conscious attunement to the theoretical coordinates of political economy, I will try to imagine Simpson as guide for Marx's passage to the this-sidedness of practice. In a way, Simpson is attempting a similar kind of passage, though her journey carries her from a settler colonial ideology, which likely includes but is certainly not limited to Marx, that cannot apprehend her Indigenous world, to an Indigenous philosophical 'materialism'. By paying close attention to the Indigenous world Simpson discloses, perhaps I can get some grip on the Indigenous human that I wish for Marxism not to
foreclose on, the properties they possess, and ultimately, how a politics for defending those properties might proceed.

Section Three - The First Historical Act

This section will go back and forth between Marx's thought experiment about the "first historical act" (Marx, 1973: 156) and Simpson's interpretation of Kwezens in the Sugar Bush. By 'looking over' to Kwezens, I will take cues on where in Marx's text to pause and interrogate his assumptions more deeply. The next four sections comprise the core of my visit to the origin moment of historical materialism, where Marx draws up blueprints that ultimately guide the construction of the Marxist flotilla in all its many offshoots and variants. The implications of Marx's blueprints for developing a politics that can be in solidarity with Indigenous resurgence will be taken up further in later chapters.

Marx's point of departure is that "men must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history'" (Marx, 1973: 155-6). He also explains that "life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things" (156), all of which Marx conceptualizes as "needs" (ibid). In looking over to Kwezens, Marx's claim that before everything else life involves eating and drinking requires that we detain our progression through the text. In the sugar bush, while Kwezens drinks from the maple tree, the act of drinking itself appears to not take precedence. Instead, Simpson emphasizes a number of details that precede Kwezens' drinking, which appear to have no relation to satisfying physical need. Perhaps foremost, because Simpson repeats it, we learn Kwezens is happy, an emotional state that appears to arise in relation to "feeling
that first warmth of spring on her cheeks" (2). To the extent physical survival might be
read into the story, it arises in relation to Kwezens "collecting firewood for her doodom"
(2), a task she sets aside in deciding to sit under the maple tree.

For Marx, an epistemological imperative arises from the precedence he gives to
subsisting: "[t]hus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these
individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature...The writing of history
must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of
history through the action of men" (149-150). From this ontological and epistemological
argument, Marx concludes that "the first historical act" (156) is "the production of the
means to satisfy these needs" (156). Also, he makes the "second point...that the
satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying, and the instrument of satisfaction
which has been acquired) leads to new needs; and this production of new needs is the first
historical act" (156). Thus, the first historical act has as a referent both the "productive
forces" (150) to satisfy needs, and needs themselves, in a manner that appears to set in
motion an expansionary logic, where satisfying an original need leads to the creation of
new ones.

As this dense cluster of theorizing puts in motion premises that inform a long
history of research and political programs within Marxism, I want to unpack how Marx
makes sense of productive forces, needs, and their relationship (and will return later to
the division between people and nature it constitutes). As I read it, when new needs arise,
people cease to appropriate only the pre-given bounty of nature to meet their needs; they
now appropriate the pre-given bounty of nature and a surplus. This surplus must be
produced through the activity of people, which in turn entails that people must possess a
productive force to produce the object that will satisfy their new need; in other words, to transform nature presupposes a productive force with which to transform it. For example, to produce a vessel to drink from requires more than thirst, the existence of natural materials to fashion a vessel from, and the discharge of physical energy to make the vessel; it also requires the tools, knowledge and skill to transform natural materials into a vessel suitable for holding liquid; these elements are productive forces.

Marx sees productive forces expanding with the expansion of needs. Because the production of new needs presupposes the development of new instruments to satisfy those needs, new modes of cooperation to produce the objects that satisfy new needs and so on, one can see that productive forces must themselves expand when the satisfaction of needs on an expanded level takes place. In this sense, a dialectic may be said to take place between productive forces and human activity, in which the satisfaction of needs through conscious activity presupposes and expresses productive forces that cannot be reduced to the activity of satisfying needs. Looked at from the side of productive forces, the existence of productive forces presupposes concrete individuals with concrete needs whose activity reproduces and expands the cumulative stock of productive forces. In this sense, productive forces, like nature itself, determine the possible activity of people at any given 'stage' of social development, both in the sense that the development of productive force enables certain forms of production, and in the sense that productive forces constrain activity to the actual existing stock of how people can cooperate, transform nature and so on.

But what might Simpson make of this dialectic between productive forces and need? To return to Kwezens' encounter with the squirrel, she might question why 'need'
guides the analytic cut into the scene of Indigenous life. Kwezens' learning from the squirrel appears to show that need does not organize her conscious activity. While Kwezens does nibble at the maple bark, and later fashions a cedar shunt to tap the maple, and a birch bark container to carry the water to show her mama, her relationship to the squirrel actually seems to organize her activity; it prompts her curiosity, looking, experimentation and, ultimately, the pleasure of tasting the water.

Perhaps drawing on another meditation on the disjunction between a settler and Indigenous way of relating to land can help illustrate my point. In *Braiding Sweetgrass*, Robin Wall Kimmerer relates a story about an engineering student visiting Ojibway territory to go ricing (Kimmerer, 2013: 181-2). She explains how they "were on the lake by dawn and all day long they poled through the rice beds, knocking the ripe seed into the canoe" (181). To express his gratitude for the experience, the student designs "a grain capture system that could be attached to the gunwales of the canoes" (ibid). The student reasons that the Ojibway system was "not very efficient" (ibid). While his hosts "listened respectfully" as the student showed them his design, they decline to implement his gift and explain that "we're not the only ones who like the rice. Do you think the ducks would stop here if we took it all?" (181-2).

Marx's epistemology could be said to guide the student's eye. In considering the Ojibway's physical survival and their need to eat, the student anchors into that need as the point of departure from which to understand his ricing experience. From there he designs productive forces that could better meet the need to satisfy hunger, productive forces that would require the elaboration of new instruments and techniques to meet the original need, and therefore new needs, for materials, to create the instruments to satisfy the
original need. The Ojibway response seems to fit with the way Kwezens moves through the Sugar Bush. What comes first is their relationship to all the entities through which something like their physical need to survive might be construed. From those relations a way of practicing arises. While it might be tempting to say that in relation to Indigenous practice, Marx stands needs on their head, and that Simpson puts them right side up again; in other words, places them in a correct, secondary position to the relations through which needs arise, I am not so sure. In neither of these stories does need appear to have epistemological purchase. Of course, I'm not trying to say Indigenous people don't drink or eat. What I am trying to make a point about is the thoroughly relational orientation of Indigenous practice. Later, I will try to see which concepts, if any, might take the place of need as some kind of anchor in the people who relate. But for now, what I think can be shown is the importance of relationship in considering how Indigenous people orient to each other and the land.

If need has no epistemological purchase in Simpson's theorization of Indigenous practice, we also must question Marx's 'second point' that the satisfaction of the first need leads to new ones. While this might seem like a minor addition to Marx's analysis, the second point carries the burden of justifying Marx's developmental, or stageist, reading of history. Once Marx analyses the first historical act, he periodizes history according to "various stages of development" (Marx, 1978: 151) whose borders are inserted based on Marx's reading of the development of productive forces (through the elaboration of the concepts of property and division of labour), which we now know are tethered dialectically to needs. Later in the dissertation we will review Coulthard's critique of Marx's normative developmentalism (Coulthard, 2014: 6-15) from the standpoint of
Coulthard's "grounded normativity" (60-4) to better grapple with the analytic and political consequences of Marx's stageist reading of history. For now, it seems enough to say that looking over to the grounded normativity of Kwezens' relationship to the sugar bush, or the Ojibway relationship to rice harvesting, entails no necessary new needs from the satisfaction of thirst or hunger. The argument for the ontological precedence of survival, and the plans Marx draws up for productive forces and need as the concepts through which to make sense of survival, would be politely refused by Indigenous people making sense of their practice.

I am a little horrified to be claiming that a philosopher who some readers might consider the most relational in European thought is not relational enough. I'm sure better-read interpreters of Marx than me could point to many passages where Marx brilliantly and self-consciously distances himself from 'abstract individualism'. One of my favourites comes from The Grundrisse, where Marx explains that:

"Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interactions, the relations within which these individuals stand. As if someone were to say: Seen from the perspective of society, there are no slaves and no citizens: both are human beings. Rather, they are that outside society. To be a slave, to be a citizen, are social characteristics, relations between human beings A and B. Human being A, as such, is not a slave. He is a slave in and through society" (Marx, 1973: 265).

A clearer statement on the ontological status and importance of relations could not be written. And yet, I want to put my claim to Simpson's interpretation of Kwezens in the Sugar Bush. How might that story differ from Marx's thought experiment in a way that helps us make sense of this paradox? An additional element I notice in contrasting the two texts is that other people don't actually appear in Marx's thought experiment. Like Rousseau's man whose strength can no longer preserve him in nature (Rousseau, 2004
Marx's man assesses his needs and develops his productive forces alone. Unlike in Kwezens' story, which is peopled by squirrels, trees, aunties and the seasons, Marx's first historical act occurs in isolation. While Marx's analysis of the act entails that we learn about the actor's physical organisation to other individuals, and to the rest of nature, neither those individuals nor nature are anywhere concretely present.

I wonder whether this might be another point where Marx's philosophical training clings to him, simultaneously helping uncover important elements of practice even as others are occluded? If we were to import the logic of Hegel's concept of totality to Marx's concept of the social (Lukacs, 1971), I think that might help make sense of how Marx apprehends that understanding any given practice requires extending beyond it to the society that provides its context. At the same time, it would help explain how the widest possible frame of reference is the only one Marx can bring into focus. In the following section, again following Marx's method, we will see what Marx's concept of relations misses, and diagnose social reasons for that omission.

Section Four - Family, Kinship and Intimacy

To the extent other people appear in Marx's thought experiment, they seem to be pushed off-stage from the main action through the 'third circumstance': "from the very outset...men, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation between man and woman, parents and children, the family." (Marx, 1978: 156). But we learn immediately that, in spite of entering into historical development from the very outset, the "[t]he family...becomes later, "when increased
needs create new social relations...a subordinate one" (ibid). As a consequence, the "production of life...now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relationship" (Marx, 1978: 157). Marx splits the family off into a natural domain that implicitly appears an effect of needs (the increase of needs appears to be the cause of family's subordination in the first place) or by extension also closed off from being included under the referential scope of productive forces (as these are linked to the satisfaction of needs). Marx fleshes out the term social to mean "the cooperation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production...is always combined with a certain mode of production...and this mode of cooperation is itself a 'productive force'" (ibid).
The recurrence of productive forces in this passage emphasizes how the dialectic between need and productive force continues, but without the family.

On the Indigenous side of the river, we already know that family entangles with production when Kwezens moves through the sugar bush. Her mama sends her out to collect firewood. Also, as the story progresses, human family takes on an even more central role. Kwezens takes the sweet water back to her mama, who has many excited questions for her, and the following day Kwezens shows off her discovery surrounded and supported by Michi Saagig Nishnaabewewag. As if in conversation with Marx, Simpson explains how physical survival - Marx's bottom line - "is ultimately dependent on intimate relationships of reciprocity, humility, honesty and respect" (Simpson, 2014:

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4 Here too Marx appears to be in dialogue with Rousseau, who claims that "The oldest of all societies, and the only natural one, is that of the family" (Rousseau, 2004: 2).
10). And sparring with the individualism that seems to underlie Marx's thought experiment (however social the consequences he tries to draw from it), Simpson writes:

"Settlers easily appropriate and reproduce the content of the story every year, within the context of capitalism, when they make commercial maple syrup; but they completely miss the wisdom that underlies the entire process because they deterritorialize the mechanics of maple syrup production from Nish intelligence and from aki [earth]. They appropriate and recast the process within a hyperindividualism that negates relationality. The radical thinking and action of this story is not so much in the mechanics of reducing maple sap to sugar, it lies in the reproduction of a loving web of Nishnaabeg networks within which learning takes place" (9).

Marx's materialism would indeed orient us to miss the wisdom of which Simpson speaks. Guided by productive forces and need, we would train on the cedar shunt, the birch basket, the boiling process and the eventual consumption of the syrup and anticipate the new needs arising from this labour process. The squirrel would vanish, as would any reference to Kwezens' emotional states, and the support of her mama and community; in short, the actors that take centre stage when Simpson reconstructs the loving web of Nishnaabeg community.

What also stands out to me is the way family, or kinship, entangles with production, such that any analytic distinction between production and kinship becomes difficult to sustain. For Simpson kinship overlays with all the practices Marx may have deemed properly 'productive'. Kwezens' tapping of the maple, as Simpson explains, takes place within 'intimate relations of reciprocity, humility, honesty and respect'. Not only does Marx's subordination of family to production not hold; it also cannot be made. Production itself is a site of intimacy and closeness.

Further, Simpson extends kinship across Marx's species divide. The quote above on the importance of intimate relations ends by extending familial intimacy to "all
elements of creation, including plants and animals" (Simpson, 2014: 10). In contrast, we saw how Marx sets up the materialist conception of history by distinguishing 'men' from 'animals' (plants bear no mention). When 'men' "begin to produce their means of subsistence" (Marx, 1978: 150) they become human and historical. Marx renders the birth of 'man' in terms very unlike Indigenous Resurgence Theory. Instead of confirming people's intimate connection to the land, birth marks a divide wherein 'man' seems to stand on one side regarding nature on the other as means to the satisfaction of his needs, a view that reduces nature to resource. Marx's 'man' may not come into his world, like capital, dripping blood, but one imagines that the world around him might do just that as his needs expand and he uses his nascent productive forces to transform the land around him. Thinking through Simpson, the moment of man's birth, for Marx, marks the end of his intimate connection to the plant and animal nations through and with which he lives. From here on in, to understand production means to centre human needs and their ever expanding satisfaction. The Indigenous world is left behind, neither human nor historical, its intimate textures unknown to a materialism that cannot feel.

Section Five - Spirituality and Autonomy

How else does the division and separation of production from Indigenous people's kinship with each other and the land close off Marx's analysis? Stated otherwise, what does Simpson key in on in a relational elaboration of Indigenous practice that includes closeness and intimacy? I think the answer, in short, is Indigenous spirituality. Oh dear. If Marx had a spectre, I think it would want to haunt me right now. After all, Spirit constitutes the central object of Marx's long and sustained critique in *The German*
Ideology. He devotes most of the work to an extended polemic against the way a spiritualization of reality leads Max Stirner astray in his *Ego and Its Own*. In fact, Marx's critique of Stirner is longer than Stirner's entire book! And so I realize I am inviting a similarly trenchant critique from contemporary Marxists when I suggest the retrieval of properties that, for Marx, exist either as mystification, or worse, as a primitive religion because men "are overawed like beasts" by nature (Marx, 1978: 158).

But Simpson does not view the spiritual order, as Marx might, as a mystification arising from social conditions that would ultimately explain the 'conjuring' of non-existent properties to reality. Rather, I believe her argument is that the land's spiritual properties disclose themselves as a result of concrete, Indigenous land-informed practice. In Marx's language, I believe she theorizes a spirituality that is itself material. Much as the properties of the sub-atomic world have required generations of social, concerted scientific activity to disclose, the spiritual order Simpson describes requires similarly coordinated and ongoing efforts. But rather than building a Large Hadron Collider to access them, they "require long-term, stable, balanced warm relationships within the family, extended family, the community and all living aspects of creation" (Simpson, 10).

Just as Marx insists that "[t]he way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence" (Marx, 1978: 150), Simpson too insists that the specificity of nature's spiritual properties requires a particular mode of approach to access. For example, Simpson explains how Kwezens "offered tobacco to the maple tree before she cut the bark to collect the sap. She does this as a mechanism to set up a relationship with the maple tree that is based on mutual respect, reciprocity, and caring" (Simpson, 12). Like
establishing the conditions necessary to access the appropriate ontological stratum of reality in an experiment, Kwezens' tobacco practice establishes the appropriate relational connection to the maple tree. Simpson understands "it as her spirit speaking directly to the spirit of the maple tree, entering into a balanced relationship of mutuality" (12). The internal states of respect and care are integral to establishing closeness and consent. The spiritual protocol wherein Kwezens offers tobacco points to internal states that can ultimately only be known in an embodied way.

Simpson emphasizes that "[t]he maple tree does not have to produce sap for Kwezens, the tree has agency over this act. Kwezens also has agency - she has chosen to act in a way that aligns herself with the actions and beliefs her people know promote more life and interconnection within Kina Gchi Nishnaabeg-ogamig" (12). Simpson seems to be saying that respecting autonomy forms a necessary condition for accessing the land's spiritual properties. Were Kwezens to approach the tree in a way that strips it of its autonomy, she would close herself off from relationally connecting with it. We will see in Chapter Three how Simpson centres relational autonomy and consensual intimacy as the properties of Indigeneity most under attack by settler colonialism when she identifies it with an extractivist and assimilationist mindset (Simpson, 2013). For now we can note that the absence of a consideration of autonomy in Marx's materialism puts it in perpetual danger of instrumentalizing Indigenous people when it comes to political struggle.

The concept of autonomy I am noticing in Simpson's essay must not be construed as having an individualistic referential scope. Unlike Marx's individual, whose consideration of agency might begin and end with auditing internal states of need, as in
Marx's reverie on a communist future where he might "hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, [and] criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind" (Marx, 1978: 160), Kwezens' conduct with respect to the maple tree, as we have seen, takes place within a community of kinship that maximally considers her ancestors and the ones coming up, as well other entities, like the squirrel, that relationally tie in to the internal states she cultivates and choices she makes in relating to the maple tree. At its fullest, autonomy entails a many-layered and many-directional consideration of all our relations.

Taking Simpson seriously requires reformulating Marx's concept of productive forces to include the spiritually productive forces Simpson puts at the centre of her theorization of Indigenous practice. "Within a Nishnaabeg epistemology, spiritual knowledge is a tremendous, ubiquitous source of wisdom that is the core of every system in the physical world" (12). The spiritual world is not an idealism disconnected from a world of practice, as it very well might be construed in a European context; it lies at the core of the physical world. Materially, "to access that knowledge", one must be "engaged in a way of living that generates a close, personal relationship with our ancestors and relations in the spirit world through ceremony, dreams, visions and stories" (12). The world of kinship that Marx partitions and subordinates to production holds the keys to the spiritual realm, keys cut by relational autonomy and consensual intimacy.

Marx's ontological bet on the precedence of physical survival has not paid off, with the consequence that his epistemological prescription to build knowledge from an analysis of physical organization has no a priori priority for making sense of Indigenous practice. This is not to say Marx's epistemology has no value. We will see below, in the
chapter on Marx's analysis, how Marx's concepts help him come to terms with aspects of capital's accumulation that Indigenous theorists may want to take on board in making sense of settler colonialism. While Simpson argues that "[i]ntellectual knowledge is not enough on its own" (Simpson, 2014: 16), it also does not become automatically disqualified from contributing its share to the work of liberation: "If bell hooks or Franz Fanon speaks to my heart as an Nishnabekwe", as parts of Marx may speak to Coulthard, "then Nishnaabeg intelligence compels me to learn" from them (16). What matters is that judgment over the utility of a body of liberation thought is left to the territorially contextual, immanent, relational, embodied and autonomous decisions of Indigenous people.

We are now in a better position to make sense of why Simpson places herself close to the story she narrates, and why Marx feels no particular compulsion to do so. If embodied, close knowledge forms a necessary condition for resurging Indigeneity, then knowledge must move with Indigenous practice. In fact, for Indigenous knowledge to exist at all, Simpson argues that her people "need to re-establish the context for creating a society of Kwezens because we need to recreate a society of individuals that can think and live inside the multiplicity of our culture and our intelligence" (13). This sounds like an instance of Marx's revolutionising practice: "[t]he coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionising practice" (Marx, 1978: 144). Simpson models her revolutionary goal off Kwezens. For Simpson, "Kwezens represents Indigenous resurgence. She is in essence the goal of community, the re-creation of beings that continually live lives promoting the continuous birth of life itself" (13).
Section Six - Division of Labour, Private Property and Theory of Revolution

As we have seen, Marx founds historical materialism by making distinctions that turn into hierarchical divisions. The epistemological consequence of these divisions, in relation to Simpson's thought, is to close historical materialism off from the possibility of considering nature as a set of relations people have to entities endowed with agency on par with themselves, and from the possibility of considering intimacy and spirituality as relational properties revealed by Indigenous practices oriented to autonomy.

Ontologically, Marx ends up with a concept of man stripped of intimacy, spirituality and consensual connection to beings other than himself. To draw on a quote above, if the point is to be radical and go to the root of injustice in order to pluck it out, and if that root lies in man himself, then an epistemology that ends up with a shallow concept of man will inevitably not get to the root of injustices. Perhaps historical materialism might give us a concept of people that is rich and deep enough to pluck out capitalism. Perhaps. But in relation to the project in this dissertation, of not only plucking out capital, but of also plucking out settler colonialism and moving in solidarity with resurging Indigeneity, the people we might end up being after Marx's revolution will still be incapable of being meaningfully in solidarity with Indigenous resurgence. This is a great lesson I take from Marx himself.

As I will show in this section, Marx also tunes into division and bases his politics around undoing it. As Marx continues his account of history, he inaugurates the concept of division of labour, which also connects to property, and serves as the foundation for his political concepts of contradiction and, ultimately, revolution. Marx's attunement to
division, and the political horizon of repairing it, suggests a further way in which the previous sections' emphasis on naming divisions, analysing their consequences, and advocating deeper concepts that might be capable of restoring what's devalued by those divisions - remains immanent to Marx's own method. Further, I think reading Marx's account of what division of labour does to the society that labours shows Marx also cares about autonomy, even if the social autonomy that division of labour and *a fortiori* capital turns into a power that stands over and against people has a more restricted and shallow scope of reference than the Indigenous concept Simpson theorizes.

Marx does not stop at productive forces, needs, and activity in conceptualizing historical materialism. Indeed, returning to the aims of *The German Ideology*, Marx’s analysis of the first historical act has not clarified why Hegelian philosophers would be incorrect to explain history by beginning from the conceptions people have of themselves. As we have seen, during the period of primitive communism, activity arises to satisfy personal needs, and people’s use of productive forces remains subordinate to their conscious activity aimed at satisfying needs. People thirst, and from that need put in motion the instruments, skills, knowledge and modes of cooperation necessary to quench thirst.

Marx’s conceptual point of transition out of primitive communism, which is the first stage in the history of class struggle, occurs with the emergence of a social division of labour. Although the mechanisms by which Marx accounts for the emergence of a social division of labour are ambiguously integrated to the concepts he derives from an analysis of primitive communism, the unequivocal empirical marker for the emergence of a division of labour, when it “becomes truly such”, dates from the appearance of a
“division of material and mental labour” (159). The division of material and mental labour is itself Marx’s materialist re-conceptualization of the point in society’s development when concrete reality produces a camera obscura effect in consciousness (154). For Marx’s concept of ‘man’, this is the moment of split. Now, ‘self-understanding’ cannot be seen as something within ‘real life-process’; it becomes separated from and subordinated to real life-process. And the concepts Marx uses to explain real life-process, in turn, no longer make reference to self-conception or consciousness.

Connected to the division of labour, the other concept that Marx derives from the emergence of class struggle and the split in man is that of private property. Marx explains that “[w]ith the division of labour…is given simultaneously the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products, hence property” (159). Marx stresses the close relationship between division of labour and private property; in the division of labour “the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity, as is affirmed [in private property] with reference to the product of the activity” (160).

The introduction of private property and the division of labour complicates the relationship between productive forces and activity as they are understood under primitive communism. In relation to productive forces, a division of labour indicates that the concretization, reproduction or elaboration of any given productive force devolves on varying individuals according to how activity, now become labour, is divided in the society under analysis (e.g. tribal, feudalist or capitalist). In relation to the individual who now labours, a division of labour “implies the contradiction between the interest of the
separate individual or the individual family and the communal interest of all individuals” (160). Moreover, the devolution of certain forms of labour to certain social positions entails that an individual is restricted to “a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape” (ibid). In other words, a disjuncture arises between the form of labour imposed on people through the social division of labour, and the kind of activity that might arise from the autonomous inclination of people satisfying personal needs.

The emergence of the division of labour also affects the dynamic between activity and productive forces. Under primitive communism, the primary element in the expansionary dynamic appears to be the satisfaction of needs through activity; the satisfaction of the first need leads to the development of new ones. Meanwhile, active people consciously apply productive forces to satisfy and expand needs. Under conditions of class struggle, however, productive forces appear to become super-ordinate to the activity that concretizes, reproduces and develops productive forces. Marx writes that productive forces appear to individuals “not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them…independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these” (161).

The division of labour intervenes between productive forces and conscious activity as a mediating term. More specifically, the division of labour (and the property relations associated with it) creates an antagonism between productive forces and labour. Rather than allowing for a process of smooth expansion of needs and productive forces, as appears to be the case under conditions of primitive communism, the property relations associated with the stage of development of the division of labour inhibit the
expansionary dynamic. In Marx's stageist rendering of history, one imagines a period of indefinite length where the labour process goes through more or less static reproduction. Meanwhile, new needs arise and existing needs are not met; objects to satisfy those needs are conceived of in the imagination or maldistributed when produced, and the productive forces to bring these objects into being are developed but not manifested. Thus, owing to the fixity of the division of labour (and property relations), the satisfaction of new needs and unmet existing ones, objects and productive forces must exist only in potentia. But the fact that new productive forces already exist in potentia means that the new, ‘higher’ development of the division of labour must in some sense also be pre-figured.

What does any of this mean for Kwezens? What does division of labour do to the people whose activity has become divided labour? I think the answer that resonates with Simpson's interpretation of Kwezens is that it robs people of their autonomy. Marx seems concerned to show that the social division of labour plays out on people's insides as a split wherein most people's activity goes from being consciously self-directed to being shorn of conscious choice and reduced to bare material labouring. As a secondary consequence, property becomes mal-distributed and needs fail to be satisfied. However, a key property at stake in revolution is the return to people of their own powers, which also looks like a restoration of their wholeness through the repair of the split between mental and manual human properties. Of course, if my comparison to Simpson has been persuasive, then the autonomy Marx imagines will be returned to people through their "all at once" movement (Marx, 162) in an act of revolution will lack spiritual, relational or intimate properties, centre on individualistic assessment of needs, and have a political horizon of maximally satisfying need. And yet, part of the work of steering our own ship
is to find the planks we can strip back to that might provide a more suitable vessel for relating to the river we are on. I think Marx's politicization of division of labour as a political problem that rids people of their autonomy could be one such plank to retain. Or, stated in Marx's language, perhaps autonomy may be the rational kernel hiding inside Marx's mystical shell of individualistic need, a kernel we can now see, not having stood Marx right side up again, but having placed him in relation to Kwezens and Simpson.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has visited the origins of historical materialism and compared the results of Marx's thought experiment with Simpson's interpretation of Kwezens in the Sugar Bush. To sum up the differences between Simpson's canoe and Marx's ship, attention to Indigenous practice requires a radical overhaul of Marx's blueprint for historical materialism. I found two constitutive splits Marx makes - in subordinating family to production, and separating man from nature - that must be repaired. Simpson's theorization of Indigenous practice overlays the intimacy and closeness of kinship with all production activities and extends kinship to all the beings with whom Indigenous practice takes place. Repairing Marx's splits brings to the centre a more thoroughgoing concept of relationality that renders needs insufficient as an analytic point of departure. Furthermore, the deeper concept of relationality Simpson offers also clarifies the residual individualism that clings to Marx's solitary man carrying out the first historical act. Tossing needs and individualism overboard leaves us with relational autonomy as a concept to think Indigenous practice, a concept that I believe can also be found in Marx. Healing splits with land and kinship causes a radical expansion of productive forces to
include and centre the spiritual properties that come through the land. Marx's ontological bets are off. An Indigenous materialism shows that people are all of their properties all at once.
Chapter Three - Normative Repair and Marx's Theorization of Capital

In "Unsettling Settler Colonialism", a collaborative article by Jeff Corntassel, Rita Dhamoon and Corey Snelgrove (2014), the authors discuss the politicized use of the term 'settler'. They share a desire that the term denaturalize settler colonialism and work towards decolonization; however, they also note how use of the term can end up accomplishing the opposite. Snelgrove warns about the "danger of it being a performance" (16). He relates how "I see it used in Indigenous studies classrooms...or at the Indigenous Leadership Forum...; but, for example, I don't see it used in this political theory class that I audited last fall." (ibid) For Snelgrove, "this is an example of how 'settler' declarations can just be a move to innocence" (ibid). Dhamoon asks "I wonder then if it is more effective to make these statements/declarations in a context in which Indigeneity is not considered relevant?" (ibid) Finally, Corntassel explains how 'settler' declarations can become "almost like a reaffirmation of the original logic of colonialism - paying lip service to the Indigenous people of the region but subsequently reinscribing settler names and histories on the landscapes" (ibid).

What does it mean to apply these reflections to Marx(ist)'s thought? Do similar dynamics occur within the Marxist tradition? Do we acknowledge Indigenous people in our thought when it helps us pass as anti-colonial, but then leave them and their values behind once they are not around? What would it look like to bring the values and priorities of Indigenous people to the centre of Marx(ism)? This chapter marks my attempt to respond to Corntassel, Dhamoon and Snelgrove's concerns in the context of Marx's analysis of capital. I take the position that a dominant current within Marxism reproduces the bad dynamic outlined above by restricting the consideration of Indigenous
people to the theorization of primitive accumulation, while leaving Indigeneity and settler colonialism behind when it comes to theorizing what is at work in capital's expanded reproduction. Put differently, I argue that to rectify this performance of concern for Indigenous people requires a deeper interlocking of the analysis of settler colonialism with capitalism by noticing how they interlock not only through primitive accumulation, but also through capital's expanded reproduction.

While exploring settler colonialism through capital's expanded reproduction marks the central effort of this chapter, the means of this exploration matters just as much. For me, doing this reparative work requires beginning from how Marx's critique of capital has been taken up within Indigenous Resurgence Theory. In keeping with the ethic of the Two Row that guides my dissertation, I want to look to the Indigenous canoe for cues in getting my bearing in waters that Marxism's ship was not necessarily designed to navigate. The work of Glen Coulthard in *Red Skin, White Masks* will mark my point of departure in this chapter. In Section One, I will examine his critiques of Marx's normative developmentalism and temporal framing of primitive accumulation (Coulthard, 2014: 9) and begin to unpack and extend Coulthard's critiques beyond domains of primary concern to Indigenous people to settler Marxists who wish to be in solidarity with Indigenous resurgence.

In Section Two, I will take up an attempt by the most prominent contemporary Marxist, David Harvey, in *The New Imperialism* (2003), to resolve the problem of Marx's normative developmentalism and temporal framing of primitive accumulation. I will show how Harvey engages in theoretical repair of Marx's framework by bringing primitive accumulation, now reformulated into accumulation by dispossession, alongside
capital's reproduction on an extended scale (Harvey, 2005 [2003]: 137-182). This section will serve to illustrate the problems that arise when Marxists engage in theoretical repair without *normative* transformation. I will demonstrate how Harvey reproduces the tendency to think Indigenous people solely in relation to primitive accumulation, and, even more unfortunately, how the absence of normative transformation in Harvey ends up re-imbuing his theoretical repair with the same colonial impulses as Marx.

In Sections Three and Four, Volume One of Marx's *Capital* will take centre stage. In Section Three, I will unpack the norms that drive his theorization of capital's reproduction on an extended scale. In particular, I will use Marx's analysis of the labour process to diagnose how and why Marx offers a positive valuation of capital, even as he trenchantly criticizes it. This diagnosis will revisit reasons that connect to the previous chapter's analysis of the coordinates of historical materialism. In Section Four, I take up the problem of Marx's temporal framing of primitive accumulation. Rather than rehearse the many critiques of the way Marx imagines primitive accumulation to refer to capital's prehistory, I try to show how it necessarily also finds its complementary problem in the theorization of capital's circuit of accumulation as closed, self-sufficient and encompassing the present. This section zeroes in on Marx's explanation of the emergence of capital from generalized commodity exchange.

In Section Five, I bring Indigenous resurgence out of the 'broom closet' and back into the site of capital's expanded reproduction. Given the ethical emphasis Coulthard places on grounded normativities, I also use Simpson's interpretation of the grounded normativities arising from Kwezens' practice as a further guide in thinking how the site of capital's expanded reproduction is also a site that daily and generationally perpetuates
settler colonialism, not only by impelling new waves of primitive accumulation, but as a key site unto itself. I will theorize capital's expanded reproduction as a key mode by which settler and non-Indigenous proletarians daily and generationally are re-accumulated into capital's dynamics in a way that re-severs the very qualities we might orient to in even beginning to think a settler path to decolonization; in other words, that attacks relational autonomy and consensual intimacy. My argument will not be that an Indigenously-informed anti-capitalism sufficiently entails some smooth indigenization for settlers; rather, that proletarianization, thought with Simpson's grounded explication of Kwezens' normativity in mind, prevents proletarianized settlers from getting very far in the work of responsibly and accountably working towards a land-based and -informed existence; in other words, while not sufficient, an anti-capitalism centring Indigenous values in a way appropriately modified to our own unique responsibilities as settlers is a necessary condition for a decolonial settler anti-capitalism.

Section One - Glen Coulthard and the Indigenous Critique of Marx

The ten pages Coulthard devotes to an appraisal of Marx's utility in making sense of settler colonialism anchor this dissertation. Coulthard explains that "[i]n thinking about colonialism as a form of structured dispossession, I have found it useful to return to a cluster of insights developed by Karl Marx in chapters 26 through 32 of his first volume of Capital" (Coulthard, 2014: 7). For Coulthard, Part VIII of Capital, on so-called primitive accumulation, "is crucial because it is there that Marx most thoroughly links the totalizing power of capital with that of colonialism" (ibid).
In light of the racist history I reviewed in the introduction, Coulthard's call for a rapprochement between Marxists and Indigenous scholars is a humbling gesture. This chapter marks my attempt to reciprocate Coulthard's gesture by maximally tuning in to the critiques he offers of the Marxist tradition and taking on board the insights he offers. As I alluded to above, this calls for an ethics of not only registering Coulthard's critiques, which in academic form might look like referencing Coulthard and perhaps even recapitulating his recognition thesis, but also internalizing and working them beyond the crucial chapters on primitive accumulation. As the ethics of the Two Row entail, it is not enough for settlers to look over at the Indigenous canoe. Recognition is not enough, as it does not challenge the assumptions that guide the Marxist gaze. We must also take responsibility for our own ship by looking back at our own history to deeply consider why Indigenous people have considered the Marxist tradition colonial, remove aspects of the tradition that generate colonialism, and replace them. In this chapter, that will look like thinking Coulthard's critiques into the parts of Marx's presentation in *Capital* that precede his theorization of primitive accumulation.

Coulthard offers some ethical prescriptions for how a rapprochement might proceed. In particular, he stresses how "rendering Marx's theoretical frame relevant to a comprehensive understanding of settler-colonialism and Indigenous resistance requires that it be transformed in conversation with the critical thought and practices of Indigenous peoples themselves" (Coulthard, 2014: 8). For Coulthard, what comes to the fore in thinking Marxism in relation to those thoughts and practices is that "the history and experience of dispossession, not proletarianization, has been...dominant" (13). Addressing dispossession "can most effectively be accomplished by contextually shifting
our investigation from an emphasis on the *capital relation* to the *colonial relation* (10).

And dispossession itself needs to be thought from the land up:

"the theory and practice of Indigenous anticolonialism, including Indigenous anticapitalism, is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented around the *question of land* - a struggle not only for land in the material sense, but also deeply *informed* by what the land as *system of reciprocal relations and obligations* can teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and the natural world in nondominating and nonexploitative terms - and less around our emergent status as 'rightless proletarians'. I call this place-based foundation of Indigenous decolonial thought and practice *grounded normativity*" (13).

In this dissertation, my interpretation of Simpson's elaboration of Kwezens' practice represents the core of my attempt to begin from an Indigenous grounded normativity. I will draw on the norms Simpson attributes to Kwezens' practice in this chapter to follow through on Coulthard's protocol for how to transform Marx(ism). As we will see in the following sections, the need to bring grounded normativity to the centre as the *sine qua non* of any attempt at decolonial transformation of Marxism represents the missing ingredient of previous attempts, an absence I will chart through Harvey's prominent attempt at theoretical repair.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that by trying to begin from the values that emerge from Kwezens' grounded normativity Marxist settlers can move to innocence. As the ethics of the Two Row make clear, we do not have the Ancestors, Elders or Original Instructions that would ever allow for innocence. Our instructions, in the lower case, are to take responsibility for a colonial history that has preponderantly made us the product of, and bear attachments to, un-grounded normativities at the same time as we figure out how to live here now in a way that not only prevents the further degradation of the land
or its original inhabitants, but might one day even contribute to their flourishing – and our own. Even if we were to undo these systems and attachments, make reparations, and flourish, the distinction of our past would still require that we maintain the middle row by enacting the special obligations towards Indigenous people and the land arising from our past. Finally, while we might identify alternatives to the colonial order in our past that resonate with Indigenous grounded normativities, those alternatives were developed in other places and times and do not necessarily provide a blueprint for how to live here and now. Ultimately, we require something new; neither the continuation of settler colonialism, nor the illusion of indigenizing towards innocence.

What gets in the way of Marxists bringing Indigenous grounded normativities to the centre of our analysis? Coulthard offers three problematic features. First, he explains that the "temporal framing" of primitive accumulation needs to change from one of "inaugurat[ing] the accumulation process" to seeing its "persistent role" (9). A "second feature that needs to be addressed concerns the normative developmentalism that problematically underscored Marx's" formulation of the primitive accumulation thesis in Capital, Volume One (9). Finally, Coulthard explains that Marxists need to be able to think colonialism as not only a process accompanied by spectacular state violence, but also "through the asymmetrical exchange of mediated forms of state recognition and accommodation" (15).

In the next section, I will show how the attempt to resolve the temporal framing of primitive accumulation takes place in the work of David Harvey. By explicating Harvey's attempt to adequately resolve Marx's temporal framing of accumulation, I will argue that his reformulation actually loses some of the critical purchase of Marx's primitive
accumulation concept, while making no strides towards addressing normative developmentalism. Through my explication, I will diagnose how Harvey's inadequate resolution of Coulthard's first two critiques has normative roots. This diagnosis will help orient my own attempt to move away from Harvey and towards Coulthard's ethical prescriptions in my own attempt to do repair work on Marx's theoretical framework in Section Five of the chapter.

Section Two: David Harvey's Theorization of Accumulation by Dispossession and Expanded Reproduction

Some might say Coulthard's critiques cover well worn ground. But my worry is that while this ground has been tread, we have not really learned the lessons offered. I believe Harvey shows one way to not take the problems Coulthard identifies seriously enough; in other words, to attempt theoretical repair from within the Marxist tradition without first doing normative transformation.

In his reformulation of primitive accumulation into accumulation by dispossession, Harvey pulls no punches when he assesses the primacy given by the Marxist tradition to proletarian struggles, calling it a "fatal mistake" (171). While not explicitly naming the problem of normative developmentalism, Harvey at least agrees that proletarian struggles have mattered more than those by people struggling against their dispossession. He explains that if accumulation by dispossession and capital's expanded reproduction "are organically linked within the historical geography of capitalism, then the left was not only disempowering itself but was also crippling its analytical and programmatic power by totally ignoring one side of this duality" (ibid).
I share Harvey's assessment of Marxism's fatal attraction to the proletariat, and also his tacit premise that Marx's analysis of capitalism can nonetheless shed light on colonial processes. And yet, in a book dedicated to putting struggles against dispossession on an equal footing to struggles against capital's expanded reproduction, Harvey once again succumbs to an array of disastrous tropes that I imagine would instigate most Indigenous readers to remember Russell Means and think not nearly enough has changed. I think the tropes can be explained as the recurrence of norms, such as developmentalism, that contaminated Marx's thought more than a century earlier, norms that must be abandoned and replaced with norms that matter to Indigenous people if Marxism is to add its insights to the many brilliant discourses seeking to liberate people from empire.

To reconstruct Harvey's theoretical repair of the temporal problem, he begins by citing Luxemburg's argument for an 'organic' link between "the place where surplus value is produced" and the "relations between capitalism and non-capitalist modes of production" where the "predominant methods are colonial policy" (Harvey, 2003: 137). Harvey proposes "to take this 'inside-outside' dialectic seriously...and examine how the 'organic relation' between expanded reproduction ...and... dispossession...have shaped the historical geography of capitalism" (141-2).

His first move is to reformulate primitive accumulation into accumulation by dispossession, because "capitalism can either make use of some pre-existing outside (non-capitalist social formations) or some sector within capitalism - such as education - that has not yet been proletarianized" (141). Harvey's justification equates goods provided through the state form, like education, to non-capitalist societies. This
connection erases the colonial distinction. In the one, the state uses taxation to provide a purported good, while in the other, the state imposes dispossession. Creating a concept that loses the state is a strange oversight given its centrality in the process of primitive accumulation (to say nothing of colonialism itself).

Harking back to Coulthard, Harvey's reformulation does not make a contextual shift to the colonial relation or take the analytic standpoint of Indigenous people. Rather, his context remains the capitalist one, and his analytic standpoint is a view organized by capital's needs to accumulate, a view that cannot begin from the land and consider the specificity of grounded normativities capital extracts and assimilates (Simpson, 2013). Moreover, Harvey's reformulation remains internal to Marxist thought. Using Luxemburg as his point of reference misses an opportunity to register the array of critiques put forward by intellectuals from non-capitalist societies. In other words, his reformulation does not take place in conversation with Indigenous thought and practice.

Harvey's concept of accumulation by dispossession even erases distinctions that would allow him to sustain a difference between proletarianized and Indigenous people, distinctions that Marx's original formulation were at least designed to capture. In explaining capital's need to "have 'something outside itself' in order to stabilize itself" (140), Harvey uses the example of "Marx's argument concerning the creation of an industrial reserve army" (141); in other words, that capital supplies itself with people whose only recourse is to sell their capacity to labour by flinging proletarians out of the labour force at one point only to re-employ some of them under new conditions. By citing this as an example of capital creating its own outside, and naming this as an instance of
accumulation by dispossession, Harvey's concept loses the capacity to distinguish between proletarianized and Indigenous people at all.

In taking the view of capital, Harvey ultimately is incapable of making the necessary distinctions to avoid the fatal mistake of obsessing over proletarian struggles. His concept lacks the necessary purchase to make the crucial analytic distinctions to avoid recolonizing dynamics in its political programs. For capital, what matters about people is their reduction to abstract labour, an assessment of units of extractable labour time to slot into the spiral of capital accumulation. And what matters about land is the differential capacity of cadastrally mapped parcels to facilitate capital accumulation (Harvey, 1982: 330-372). While it is part of Marx and Harvey's genius to describe these drives, Marxism must also ground its analytic standpoint outside them if it is to even stand a chance at apprehending what is at stake in Indigenous resurgence.

So far I have considered Harvey's thought on capital's necessary outside, and the analytic inadequacies of his concept of accumulation by dispossession for bringing Indigenous people in to Marxism's theoretical framework, inadequacies that stem from ignoring the colonial context, not beginning from an Indigenous standpoint, and ignoring Indigenous thought and practice. In short, Harvey does not look over to the Indigenous canoe. Put into the ethical terms I began the chapter with, he does not acknowledge territory during his seminar on rectifying Marxism's colonial legacy in spite of appearing to want to.\(^5\)

\(^5\) To the extent Harvey actually enters into 'dialogue' with people struggling against dispossession, it takes the very unfortunate form of unsolicited advice to "rise above nostalgia for the past", or "recognize the positive gains that can be had through limited forms of dispossession" or establish "a more generalized political goal that has more universal valency" (Harvey, 2003: 179), as if Indigeneity must by definition be local and particular rather than offering possible lessons all people may want (and even need) to take on board.
But what does not even occur to Harvey is to consider the ways capital's inside, or its expanded reproduction, is *itself* a site of colonialism. In other words, we are now in the domain of Snelgrove's political theory seminar, or replaying Corntassel's observation about settler governments when they are not in treaty negotiations with Indigenous people. Insofar as Harvey takes up capital's expanded reproduction it is to treat it as an engine - through the overaccumulation thesis (138-143) - for driving new waves of dispossession, but not as a site for the daily and generational re-dispossession of people from the qualities through which we might even begin to decolonize.

My hunch about why Harvey cannot consider capital's expanded reproduction as an exemplary site of colonialism lies in his reproduction of Marx's developmentalist norms; in other words, that capitalism, while violent, marks an improvement over Indigenous (or peasant) life, and that in the final analysis, capitalism brings people closer to the good life. I believe these assumptions underlie Harvey's evaluation of dispossession in the following passage:

"It is then arguable whether the problem in Indonesia, for example, was the impact of rapid capitalist industrialization on life chances during the 1980s and 1990s or the devaluation and deindustrialization occasioned through the financial crisis of 1997-8 that demolished much of what that industrialization had achieved. Which, then, was the more serious problem: the import and insertion of capital accumulation through expanded reproduction into the Indonesian economy or the total disruption of that activity through accumulation by dispossession? While it is obviously true that the latter was a logical corollary of the former, and that the real tragedy is constituted by drawing (sometimes forcibly) populations into the proletariat in short order only to cast them off as redundant labour, I also think it plausible that the second step did far more damage to the long-term hopes, aspirations, and possibilities of the mass of the impoverished population than did the first. The implication is that primitive accumulation that opens up a path to expanded
reproduction is one thing, and accumulation by dispossession that disrupts and destroys a path already opened up is quite another" (164).

Harvey appears to want capitalist expanded reproduction - 'rapid capitalist industrialization' - without also including in it the contradictions and crises that are internal to it - 'the financial crisis of 1997-8'. If he could have the former without the latter, then he seems to agree that primitive accumulation would be a good thing. Harvey bolsters his position in a preceding passage by alluding without reference to "ethnographic accounts of the social transformations wrought by foreign direct investments, industrial development, and offshore production systems in many parts of the world...[where] [f]aced with the choice of sticking with industrial labour or returning to rural impoverishment, many within the new proletariat seem to express a strong preference for the former" (163-4). It is frustrating for Harvey to present a binary between "the idiocy of rural life" as Marx would have put it (Marx, 1979 [1848]: 477), and industrial capitalism, as if Indonesian peasants might not have their own ideas about non-dominating ways to incorporate elements of industrialization into their society without having to give up their land and the intimacies, knowledges, skill-sets and relations arising from that connection, and then have to sell their capacity to labour to survive, and finally be conscripted into the further degradation of the land. If Harvey positioned himself at the point of rural life (as Coulthard reminds us Marx did later in his life in his analyses of Russian communal villages [Coulthard, 2014: 9 and 186]), he might grasp these alternatives and refuse to offer limited binaries for better futures. Thinking of Coulthard's *Red Skin, White Masks*, Harvey comes off here as lacking a critique of why people might be made to desire their own subjection. Indonesian peasant bodies, Harvey seems to say, desire proletarian masks, a purported position Harvey uses to try and sell
the same, now even older, normative developmentalism back to people struggling against their dispossession.

Section Three - Marx and the Roots of Normative Developmentalism

What is it about capitalism that enthralls Marx(ists) so much that in spite of laying bare its necessarily expansive and exploitative nature, Marxists like Harvey still insist that people outside it would be better off inside it? This section attempts to provide a response to this question from within Marx's *Capital*. In particular, I focus on Part IV, "The Production of Relative Surplus-Value" (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 427-639), where Marx analyses cooperation and the way capital combines workers in the labour process to extract surplus value through the period of manufacture and on to large-scale industry.

Marx begins Part IV by defining relative surplus-value, which pertains to capital's drive to curtail the portion of the working day where labour reproduces its value so as to maximize the portion where labour is producing surplus-value for the capitalist. As Marx goes on to show, capital's drive for relative-surplus value leads it to introduce technologies that allow for commodities to be produced with less labour time objectified in them. Marx follows his definition of relative surplus-value with a chapter that explores cooperation. He defines cooperation as taking place "[w]hen numerous workers work together side by side in accordance with a plan, whether in the same process, or in different but connected processes" (Marx, 1976: 443), a definition that closely follows his earlier one of the social in *The German Ideology*: "the cooperation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end" (Marx, 1978: 157). The similarity serves as a reminder of the earlier analysis of how Marx cut family and
nature out of the definition of the social, and interpreted the development of the social through the dialectic between productive forces and physical needs.

After offering a number of ways through which cooperation takes place, Marx draws the conclusion that "...whichever...is the cause of increase[d productivity], the special productive power of the combined working day is, under all circumstances, the social productive power of labour...This power arises from cooperation itself. When the worker cooperates in a planned way with others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species" (Marx, 1976: 447). Unlike the period of his thought experiment, where Marx thinks sociality through individuals, Marx now attributes cooperation to workers, as a power or productive force that belongs essentially or 'under all circumstances' to them. The rare recurrence of the word 'species' in *Capital* evokes Marx's earlier use of 'species being', a concept derived from Feuerbach, that reinforces the idea that Marx intends for cooperation within production to be isomorphic with human sociality (Marx, 1976 [1844]: 75). And yet, Marx also explains that "[t]he cooperation of wage-labourers is entirely brought about by the capital that employs them" (Marx, 1978: 449). Or that "[workers'] unification into one single productive body, and the establishment of a connection between their individual functions, lies outside their competence. These things are not their own act, but the act of the capital that brings them together and maintains them in that situation." (449-50).

Marx places a paradox before us. One the one hand, cooperation *essentially* belongs to labour; on the other hand, it is *entirely* brought about by capital!

A second paradox arises in the relationship Marx describes between the effect of the capitalist division of labour on the individual worker and workers considered
collectively. At the level of the individual, Marx notes the stunting and one-sidedness imposed on proletarians when capital expends their labour-power: "[Manufacture] converts the worker into a crippled monstrosity by furthering his particular skill as in a forcing-house, through the suppression of a whole world of productive forces and inclinations...Not only is the specialized work distributed among the different individuals, but the individual himself is divided up, and transformed into the automatic motor of a detail operation" (481). At the same time, one-sided constriction appears to be redeemed when viewed from the perspective of the whole: "The one-sidedness and deficiencies of the detail labour become perfections when he is part of the collective labour" (469). Marx may have ridiculed religion, but here he seems to want to engage in some miraculous thinking of his own, trans-substantiating a labour process that chains individual workers to machines for the span of their working life into a perfect whole.

Even leaving aside the awful human suffering he documents, and training our gaze solely on the technical elements of cooperation, I wonder how the materialization of a labour process designed to maximize surplus value can be revolutionized to achieve the "many-sided flow of a man's vital forces, which find recreation and delight in the change of activity itself" (460)? Marx explains how "[t]he manufacturing period simplifies, improves and multiplies the implements of labour by adapting them to the exclusive and special functions of each kind of worker" (460). Marx seems to note how a capitalist development of productive forces in the period of manufacture, in the form of tools, has a positive aspect. But, if what underlies these tools is the repetitive use of them by one worker who performs a single task within production, of what possible use could seizing these means of production be for the many-sided development of a worker's capacities? I
struggle to understand how tools that presuppose the subordination of vital energy could, through a revolution, potentiate them. By making all cooperation an essential property of labour, and defining capital's labour process as tending to increase cooperation, Marx makes it impossible, at worst, to judge the development of some productive forces as contrary to bringing about a better world. At the very least, he inscribes Marxism with a tendency towards seeing capitalist development as, in the last instance, a good thing. This ambivalence reverberates through Marx's theoretical framework. After all, the capitalist labour process is also its process of valorization, a moment in the spiral of accumulation that entails primitive accumulation, expanded commodification, proletarianization, and exploitation. We see this reverberation above when Harvey wishes capitalist industrialization on Indonesian peasants.

To make sense of this ambivalence, I can only return full circle to the protagonist of Marx's thought experiment on the first historical act, imagined alone and in meek submission to nature and think this individual in relation to the complex collaboration Marx attributes to capital's labour process under large scale industry. Whereas Marx interprets the former as an "isolated, independent worker" (453), who "has as little torn himself free from the umbilical cord of his tribe or community as a bee has from his hive" (452), the latter is described over and again as "the social productive power of labour" (453). In the first historical act, Marx envisions the separation of man from family and nature as a self-emancipatory act. Now, capital wields the knife that further 'perfects' the division and separation of man from nature, a separation that severs workers from Kwezens' world. And Marx provides ideological cover, as before, by justifying the act through the idea of collective cooperation that further develops productive forces.
This section has attempted to extend the investigation of normative developmentalism from the site of primitive accumulation to capital's expanded reproduction. Coulthard, writing with his Indigenous audience in mind, highlights how Marx's normative developmentalism plays out in the colonial realm. Citing Marx's 1853 writing on India in the *New York Tribune*, Coulthard describes how Marx believes that in spite of colonialism's barbarism in practice, it would nonetheless have the "'revolutionary' effect of bringing the despotic, undignified, and stagnant life of the Indians...onto the one true path of human development - socialism" (Coulthard, 2014: 10). This is a crucial passage to document Marx's normative developmentalism vis-a-vis colonized people. What this section shows is that normative developmentalism does not end at colonial primitive accumulation; it runs through the dynamics that organize capital's expanded reproduction as well. In Marx's mind, capital not only brings light to Indians, it betters and 'perfects' proletarians too. Plucking out the premises of normative developmentalism requires, then, not only that we abandon our obsession with proletarians, but also, capital itself.

Section Four - Marx and the Closed Circuit of Accumulation

When Harvey sets out to resolve the problem of Marx framing primitive accumulation as a prehistory to capital, he notes how Marx begins from "certain crucial initial conditions that broadly match those of classical political economy" (Harvey, 2003: 143). After listing those conditions, such as freely functioning markets, and a state that guarantees private property, guards the integrity of money, and provides for juridical individualism, Harvey then explains how for Marx "'Primitive' or 'original' accumulation
has already occurred and accumulation now proceeds as expanded reproduction (albeit through the exploitation of living labour in production)" (ibid). This section keys in on Harvey's parenthetical phrase - the exploitation of living labour - and attempts to show how resolving the temporal framing of primitive accumulation also requires tackling the problem of Marx's conceptual closure of the circuit of accumulation; in other words, the tendency to put parentheses around what does not fit the tidy theorization of an expanding circuit of accumulation. Put in terms Tuck and Yang might favour, the colonial moment within capital's expanded reproduction cannot be treated as parenthetic. Rather, for Marxists to take decolonization seriously requires turning what gets parenthesized when theorizing expanded reproduction into something that gets emphasized.

Like the previous section, this section attempts to diagnose and explain a problem Coulthard describes by thinking alongside him into the parts of capitalism that it makes sense for me, as a settler Marxist, to take responsibility for. I focus on Marx's account of capital's emergence from generalized commodity exchange primarily through Parts I and II of *Capital* and attempt to describe how, to offer the labour theory of value to explain how accumulation takes place, Marx must make analytic cuts into what is happening within production that sweep the elements that take centre stage within primitive accumulation into a kind of theoretical broom closet. In Marx's terms, entering the 'hidden abode of production' itself hides aspects of capital's ongoing expanded reproduction that come into view when switching to the analytic standpoint of colonialism.
Marx begins *Capital - Volume One* by stating that “[t]he wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an 'immense collection of commodities'; the individual commodity appears as its elementary form. Our investigation therefore begins with the analysis of the commodity” (Marx, 1977 [1867]: 125). He explains that a commodity, like iron or paper, is “a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind” (Marx, 1977: 125); in Marx's conceptual language, it possesses a “use-value” (126). The use-values of things “constitute the material content of wealth” (126). Recalling our analysis of the first historical act, Marx anchors the commodity through an appeal to the category of need. As with other resonances to the origins of historical materialism I've taken up in this chapter, the appeal to need reminds us that we are working within the grid of historical materialism, a grid that we have already seen is built on exclusions that prevent considering what is at stake in Indigeneity.

Continuing Marx's analysis of the commodity-form, he explains that while all commodities must be useful, the material properties that make them useful, or the needs they fulfill, vary. Use-value, therefore, cannot account for the element that brings all things into a common relationship as commodities. Once Marx abstracts from the use-value of things, what remains is that they are “products of labour” (128). This means that when we compare commodities, what we are measuring is the amount of labour time that has gone into their production. Their value, Marx theorizes, consists of the labour contained in them. More specifically, “the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society” (129). Marx names this
“socially necessary labour time” (129), and explains that it takes hold as a “regulative law of nature” (169) only “when exchange has already acquired a sufficient extension and importance to allow useful things to be produced for the purpose of being exchanged, so that their character as values has already been taken into consideration during production” (166). Again recalling the first historical act, not just any labour gets to count towards the valuation of a commodity, like that which takes place within the family, and which feminist Marxists have come to name as the work of social reproduction (Federici, 2009).

Marx also explains that as producers begin to make articles for sale, and consequently presuppose the existence of other commodities they must acquire to meet their needs, a medium of exchange to express and compare the labour character of commodities must also arise. In Marx's language, a social need “towards an independent form of value” (181) develops. The commodity whose special use-value becomes to meet this need is money. Marx now possesses the concepts he needs to explain the circulation of commodities, or C-M-C, a process that “bursts through all the temporal, spatial and personal barriers imposed by the direct exchange of products” (209).

Stated using the terms Marx introduces through the analysis of commodities, the emergence of capital inverts the circuit of commodity exchange. C-M-C becomes M-C-M', or “the general formula for capital” (257). Marx, writing in conversation with liberal political economists, needs to show how a process in which all commodities are exchanged at equal value can produce an outcome where there is more money, and therefore more value or embodied labour, at the end of the circuit than at the beginning. Marx names the additional increment “surplus value” and calls it the moment of origin
for capital (251-2). To explain this mysterious origin, Marx needs to leave the realm of commodity exchange, and, as he artfully puts it, enter the “hidden abode of production” (279-80).

And yet, exchange remains entangled with the birth of capital. For in order to produce commodities, the capitalist, defined as the “conscious bearer” who sets money in motion to produce more of it (254), must find all the elements necessary for production available for exchange. This means the capitalist must find labour-power to produce commodities, a fact which entails there are people who can neither produce their own commodities, nor subsist within their own communities, and who therefore have no recourse left but to exchange their capacity to labour for a wage (272); in other words, the birth of capital simultaneously entails the birth of a proletariat. Within exchange, capitalists pay proletarians an amount that will allow them to purchase enough commodities to reproduce their now commodified labour-power.

Within production, along with combining raw materials and the means of production, capitalists consume their labour-power commodity by putting proletarians to work for the length of the working day. This means that the articles into which proletarians objectify their labour during this period belong to the capitalist. At the end of the period, the value created by proletarians exceeds the value represented by the wage proletarians receive; if the commodity subsequently sells, capitalists pocket the surplus value, exploit the proletarians, and have a greater sum of money at their disposal with which to repeat the circuit in an expanded way; the circuit becomes an expanding spiral (727) whose voracious appetite for surplus-value has continued devouring worlds since
Capital's publication, entailing, as Harvey shows, the necessity of an 'outside' that he re-conceptualizes as accumulation by dispossession.

It also entails the repetition of the circuit of accumulation, a repetition that has a progressively extending scale as capitalists 'invest' the surplus value they realize through the sale of their commodities and primitively or more intensively accumulate non-human entities. While Coulthard, given his Indigenous audience, will tune into the direct action politics through which to block capital's primitive accumulation—entailing reinvestment of surplus value (Coulthard, 2014: 166), his ethical prescriptions make me want to pay attention to the part of capital's valorization that repeats itself. As we have seen, Marx explains that the capitalist must find all the elements necessary for production available on the market in order to begin the valorization of capital anew the following day. While the original accumulation destroys people's capacity to flourish outside of capital, nonetheless there is a re-accumulation that daily takes place through the site of capital's combination of commodities into new ones through the hands of labour.

Marx's theorization of primitive accumulation as once and for all, coupled with his positive normative valuation of the productive forces capital brings into being and develops, leaves him very little appetite to wonder about and theorize from the vantage point of the daily repeated violence of workers having to sell their labour power to the capitalist to survive. At worst, in creating a theoretical closure, the spiral of accumulation becomes a rollercoaster that Marx leaves proletarians no choice but to take over. While Marx brings the sickening laws of motion of that rollercoaster to life, this comes at the expense of thinking from the vantage point of living labour, both in its daily re-extraction, and in the devaluation and subjugation of the social reproduction that more
distantly, but nonetheless indisputably, also informs the socially necessary labour time required to produce commodities. Furthermore, labour is not the only element of production. The capitalist must also find raw materials and must replace worn out means of production to repeat the process. This too entails a daily and generational period where plants, animals and beyond are re-extracted and assimilated into the capitalist labour process.

The theoretical point, while simple, has extensive consequences. By restricting the consideration of value to the labour objectified in commodities within production, Marx produces a theory of value that does not account for all the other necessary conditions for capitalist accumulation. Unwittingly, Marx elevates proletarian exploitation above that of others, and worse, he loses the potentially common, colonial ingredient shared between those points of exploitation. For a theorist so perspicaciously attuned to the deleterious effects of division on labour, Marx's production of his own divisions through the labour theory of value can feel bemusing. Dividing off and elevating proletarian 'contributions' to capital from the 'contributions' of people and non-human entities who support their reproduction, as well as dividing off and elevating proletarians from the other entities being (re-)extracted into commodification and capital's valorization, entrenches a colonial divide into any anti-capitalist politics that might eventuate from a politics guided by Marx's labour theory of value.

As with Marx's choice to polemicize with idealism in developing historical materialism, a choice that we saw puts him at cross-purposes to tracking and elaborating practice, one wonders how Marx's immanent method of critique limits his results. One impression I can have at times when re-reading *Capital*, subtitled *A Critique of Political
Economy', is that Marx's goal to explain how capitalism exploits, in spite of commodities exchanging at their value, ultimately limits how radical a critique he ends up with. In spite of the wide-ranging ramifications of Marx's investigation, his analysis begins from, and remains within, the world conceptualized by classical political economy. The categories and concepts he critiques and produces are drawn from predecessors like Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. Marx's choice to “begin with the analysis of the commodity” (125) necessarily centres liberal economic categories in his presentation. Marx wants to show how wealth in capitalist society may 'appear' as an immense collection of commodities, but in reality has other origins, origins that carry him into the "hidden abode of production", where "[t]he secret of profit-making must at last be laid bare" (Marx, 1976: 279-80).

Undoubtedly, Marx discloses that secret to devastating effect. And yet, why stop there? Marx does not really wonder what happens to workers when they leave the hidden abode of production to the equally if not more hidden (to the liberal eye) abode of proletarian domesticity, or what it means to transform living beings into commodities, or how the state props up markets, money and private property, all of which could equally be said to play a necessary role in production. In part, I think because classical political economy already begins from statist, patriarchal and colonial assumptions, the choice to work immanently within that tradition steers Marx away from posing questions as deeply as he could. Within political economy, the enigmatic thread Ricardo et al leave dangling for Marx to tug on is the role of labour in production, a thread Marx spins wonders from,
but nonetheless also might tangle him up in assumptions that reproduce destructive systems like colonialism\(^6\).

As we will see in the next section, incorporating the absent entities and 'contributions' does not mean simply doing a better job of quantitatively accounting for labour times objectified into commodities through social reproduction, or puzzling over the anthropocentric problem of how to retain the labour theory of value while also accounting for the 'free' gifts from nature. It also does not mean erasing distinctions in how people who are Indigenous and people who are proletarianized white settlers, for example, face capital. Rather, in shifting the analytic standpoint to the colonial moment and beginning from the values we derived from Indigenous resurgence, a whole new mode of valuation emerges, with consequences for how we theorize capital.

Section Five - Capital's Expanded Reproduction as a Site of Colonial Reproduction

This section shifts from diagnosis and explanation to an attempt to refigure capital's expanded reproduction vis-a-vis settler proletarians. It represents an effort to be persistent in naming colonialism by theorizing the site of capital's expanded reproduction as a key site of the overall structure of colonialism. Put differently, I investigate how as a European-descended person we not only did colonialism to ourselves before imposing it on others, but we also continue to relive the tearing up of even the most elemental basis of orienting to grounded normativity - a consensual relationship to our own bodies and each other - daily and generationally through the site of capital's consumption of our

\(^6\) In Part VIII of *Capital* Marx also grapples with liberal explanations for the emergence of capital, or the 'previous accumulation', in Adam Smith's words, that puts stock in the hands of capitalist. Marx points out how 'primitive accumulation plays approximately the same role in political economy as original sin does in theology' (Marx, 1976: 873).
labour-power. As Patrick Wolfe has argued, settler colonialism aims at the 'elimination of the native' (Wolfe, 2006), a fact which renders settler colonialism a "structure, not an event...elimination is an organizing principle of settler colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence" (388). In the way I am theorizing Indigeneity in this dissertation, as a set of embodied relations enduringly oriented by values of consensual intimacy, relational autonomy, and responsibility, the drive to eliminate the native arises from the original and ongoing elimination of the centring of those values in the settler colonial society itself.

In relation to Marx, seeing capital in its colonial dimension requires dropping the problematic developmentalist norms that generate his theorization of capital as master cultivator of labour's perfection through the development of productive forces that may one day burst capital asunder. It also requires resolving Coulthard's critique of Marx's temporal framing of primitive accumulation in relation to capital's expanded reproduction, a resolution which, I showed in the previous section, must go further than simply theorizing primitive accumulation as ongoing and alongside expanded reproduction, but also as stacked on top of each other; in other words, that the 'outside' of living labour's objectification into capital's commodities represents a colonial moment at the heart of capital, a colonial moment that spreads out from the proletarian to the work of socially reproducing proletarians and extracting innumerable other-than-human beings into capital's expanded reproduction. This resolution requires opening up Marx's account of capital's circulation to the systems of power he sweeps into the conceptual closet of primitive accumulation.
In this section I begin from Indigenous values, values that lead me to the position that capital's expanded reproduction entails expanding forces of destruction rather than Marx's position that capital expands productive forces that essentially continue belonging to proletarians who might recoup them through the revolutionary seizure of the means of production. I also use Indigenous values to theorize that capital's labour process daily and generationally renews the structure of colonization vis-a-vis proletarianized settlers, and use Leanne Simpson's critique of capital as extractive and assimilative as the basis to refigure capital's expanded reproduction into a site of colonialism proper. Finally, and crucially, I try to preserve the distinction, or incommensurability, between the colonization of Indigenous people that settler proletarians, and non-Indigenous proletarians, via imperialism, are complicit in, and the ongoing re-colonization of proletarians through capital's expanded reproduction.

In "Land as Pedagogy" (2014), given Simpson's audience of Indigenous educators, she wonders what it would mean for Kwezens if she had to apply for SSHRC funding to get out into the bush (9). In other words, Simpson thinks about Kwezens in relation to the settler state. Unfortunately, for every Kwezens that follows Simpson's imagined developmental path, there are many more whose engagement with settler society takes the shape of precarious low-wage labouring. To the extent the settler state mediates Kwezens' life, it would continue to do so through cordonning her off to the reserve, perhaps running a session of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls nearby for Kwezens to display her grief about her missing aunties to appease the settler state's drive to reconciliation, and maybe incentivizing
Maple Inc to train her to perform some of the 'dumb labour' that ensures automation of maple syrup proceeds without halt. In the case of this chapter, I am trying to think the halcyon scene of Kwezens in the Sugar Bush through the nightmare of its insertion into capital's circuit of accumulation. Continuing to think alongside Coulthard (2014: 170-3), I would like to consider the many Kwezens being assimilated into capitalist production who remain connected to their reserve, perhaps by being semi-proletarianized into fish farm labouring, pipeline construction, or lumber harvesting even as they continue to participate in a bush mode of production. Sadly, this approximates reality all too closely. 150 years on from Marx's forensic examination of capital's inner tendencies, the number of beings rationalized into capitalist production only continues to expand. From farmed salmon to porcupines, oysters, and crickets, humans are not the only entities being 'really subsumed' into the capitalist production process (Marx, 1976: 1023-25). There is even a discourse, 'wildlife farming', to study and practice the process of bringing previously (relatively) wild beings into capitalist production, with attendant justifications for 'saving' wildlife (Nogueira, S and Nogueria-Filho, S., 2011).

Maple trees are also in the process of going from formally to really subsumed by capital. Recent discoveries at the Proctor Maple Research Centre at the University of Vermont are leading to experiments at the centre's demonstration farm that may do away

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7 Or, Maple Inc might partner with Indigenous leaders, in other words, a red bourgeoisie, through the formation of a limited partnership, to access incentivized tax structures for on-reserve businesses.

8 Offering my own thought experiment immediately makes me conscious of the many exclusions it entails. In reality, Indigenous women, girls and two-spirits live on reserve and in urban centres. They face disability, unemployment, street-involvement, and incarceration. Or, when employed, are variously exploited by settler, and, in a minority of cases, Indigenous capital. Thinking only of my own acquaintances and non-exhaustively, employment can look like retail, service and hospitality labour in urban centres, sex and social work, eco-tourism, industrial farming and trades and various kinds of NGO, non-profit, and university-affiliated labour.
with the need for a Sugar Bush altogether (Van den berg et al, 2016), a development reminiscent of the 17th century rhyme about the greater thief stealing the commons from under the goose, only this time capital is intent on eliminating the forest for the trees. In its search for relative surplus-value, capital has put science to work isolating maples from their surroundings and determined the conditions under which they can become a plantation crop (ibid), all to minimize the labour time ultimately objectified in the syrup. Sensors detect freeze-thaw cycles and the automated system of tubes drain off sap from the saplings planted in rows and accumulate it in vats, which then undergo reverse osmosis to separate water off from the sap before finally being converted to syrup, which is bottled under assembly line conditions. Meanwhile, the former sites of maple syrup production, to the eye guided by capital, are devalued. There is too much labour time objectified into the syrup under the Sugar Bush organization of production, a fact which compels capital to not only cast off labourers (perhaps re-employing a minority of them under the more automated conditions prevailing at the maple farm), but also compels capitals owning the Sugar Bush to seek a new 'highest and best use' for the land, perhaps in the form of a rezoning application to the relevant municipality claiming sovereignty over it to build Sugar Bush Cottages in place of the existing forest, which could be purchased by managers at Maple, Inc for getaways to connect with their pioneering past.

What does Simpson make of capital and its relationship to the Anishinaabe? In an interview with Naomi Klein, she explains capital is:

"based on extracting and assimilating. My land is seen as a resource. My relatives in the plant and animal worlds are seen as resources. My culture and knowledge is a resource. My body is a resource and my children are a resource because they are the potential to grow, maintain, and uphold the extraction-assimilation system. The act of extraction removes all of the
relationships that give whatever is being extracted meaning. Extracting is taking. Actually, extracting is stealing—it is taking without consent, without thought, care or even knowledge of the impacts that extraction has on the other living things in that environment. That’s always been a part of colonialism and conquest. Colonialism has always extracted the Indigenous—extraction of Indigenous knowledge, Indigenous women, Indigenous peoples.” (Simpson, 2013)

From Simpson's Indigenous standpoint, capital extracts. Unlike Marx's account of how capital combines resources into marvels of collective cooperation that bring into being new productive forces, Simpson sees destruction. Her emphasis on intimate and autonomous relationship attunes her to losses that cannot be recouped by capitalist accounting. Kwezens, the maple tree, the cedar shunt, the tobacco, the caring work of Kwezens' extended kin, and her mother's work to boil down the sap, would enter into capital's valorization process, if they entered at all, as commodities whose value is determined by the labour time objectified in them. The relationships between them, rather than being guided by the aforementioned values, are severed. The site of expanded reproduction has no place for intimacy. Kwezens' mama would not be there to rub her back, and her aunties would not get to celebrate Kwezens' learning. The automated removal of syrup would eliminate the tobacco offering, and the squirrel, rather than serving as teacher, would be rendered a pest more liable to damage tubing (perhaps itself something to learn from!) than offer teachings.

By turning relatives into resources, capital violates the necessary conditions to sustain Indigeneity with the consequence of closing off access to the spiritual properties that we saw in the previous chapter lie at the centre of Indigenous life, properties that are accessed by Kwezens through practices of intimate, relational respect for the autonomy of all entities through which 'production' takes place. In fact, to be precise, we also saw
that isolating production from the run of life would already impose analytic distinctions that do not hold up under Indigenous conditions where people are all of their properties all at once. For Indigenous life, capital interrupts the flow of intelligence amongst all entities of plant, animal and human nations.

How can we think proletarianized settlers into this scene? On the one hand, the wages capital pays out to settler proletarians include subsidies gained through the assimilation of Indigenous relatives into resources, and therefore lures proletarians into desiring the benefits of colonialism. In a capitalist settler society, these benefits can take the monetized form of the wage, or be converted into the consumption of commodities, like organic maple syrup, PhDs, natural gas, clean water, vacations to other colonized nations rendered hygienic for tourists, and more. And, of course, proletarianized settlers are privileged through other systems of power that go beyond the subject of this dissertation and yet still are implicated in the organization of settler colonialism, even as these systems further interrupt and inhibit the flow of consensual intelligence between beings, like the dichotomization of gender expression to a binary, the shrinking of kinship to the nuclearized family, the confinement of desire to monogamy, and the separation of the point of production from that of social reproduction.

On the other hand, when assessed according to the values arising from Kwezens’ grounded normativity, a consequence of colonialism is to also continually rid proletarians of the possibility of embodying our appropriately modified version of them. Proletarianized settlers who are daily re-accumulated into capital lose the possibility of cultivating their own autonomy, relating to themselves with consent, and sustaining the intimacies that arise through deepening relationship to the beings around us. Of course,
the backdrop differs. While capitalist encroachment on Indigenous life takes place against millenia of unbroken orientations towards the promotion and re-birth of life itself, for proletarianized settlers that can sometimes shrink to the single point of an individualistic and atomized survival that desires subjection. And yet, that survival always already provides an alternative standpoint to anchor into, a place to begin or continue undoing divisions between settlers and Indigenous people, amongst settlers, and inside ourselves, as well as disentangling ourselves from capital.

Thinking Simpson's insight about extraction in relation to proletarianized settlers helps uncover that the extraction her people face does not end there. It also continues and is daily and generationally renewed amongst proletarianized settlers. The autonomy Kwezens relies on to stop and listen to the squirrel while searching for firewood vanishes for the proletarians who are employed by capital. As Coulthard explains, Kwezens carries that ancestral knowledge with her and can be informed by its grounded normativity as a guard to internalizing the values, or white masks, inculcated partly through proletarianization. For white settler proletarians, our original accumulation and separation from ancestral grounded normativity can lie totally buried in a forgotten European past. We live, often, literally divided from the land by the paved surfaces of the capitalist built environment, a paving over that finds its internal expression in being cut off from connecting to our own autonomy and contending with the accumulated generational toxicities or capitalist 'externalities' of being generationally extracted.

If, as Simpson explains in an interview with Matt Hern and Am Johal, the opposite of dispossession is connection (Hern and Johal, 2018: 66), then capital accumulation proceeds through increasing disconnection. This puts us in a position to
understand an Indigenous accounting of the commodification of our capacity to labour. From this perspective, the point is not to quantify the socially necessary labour time objectified in the commodities we need to consume that will reproduce our capacity to labour by the following day, a mode of accounting that points politically to wresting unpaid labour time away from capital, or culminates in the revolutionary seizure of the machines themselves; rather, Indigenous accounting tunes into the myriad ways that our commodification shears us off from the rich complexity of our surroundings, where our capacity to be exchanged relies on the elimination of our emplacement with, and kinship to, the entities through which we do survive as well as the consensual and intimate relationship we have to ourselves and each other.

What is more, in place of connection capital's extraction foments division. The extraction of people and their assimilation into capitalist production divides them from those outside of production. Marx squarely replicates this mode of division when he originates historical materialism by dividing and elevating production from nature and the family, and continues to replicate colonial division through the normative developmentalist and temporal framing of his analysis of capital. We can better understand now the depth and extent to which Marx(ism) can be complicit with colonialism. If capital proceeds through expanding division, uprooting Marx(ism)'s replication of the norms that foment division becomes an indispensable condition for a decolonial Marxism. We saw in Chapter Two that Marx himself is invested in the removal of division, within labour, as necessary to the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society. What we can now clearly conclude is that the division of capital and labour rests on its colonial division from the land and Indigenous people. We can see now
that undoing the division capital puts between proletarianized settlers and Indigenous people forms an integral part of reaching Marx's goal of undoing capital in favour of a society where the flourishing of each is the condition for the flourishing of all. At the same time, the necessity of autonomy in steering our own ship reminds us that removing division is not the same as removing the middle row, but rather a process of removing division in order to proliferate consensual diversity.

In considering the ongoingness of the colonial moment, both through primitive accumulation as thought by Coulthard, and expanded reproduction as we have been considering here, we also must come to grips with how division cannot be plucked out once and for all, but must be constantly weeded out, even as the attempts to connect in non-dominating ways are cared for. With respect to Marx, the thought experiment on the first historical act cannot be undone, nor can the colonial assumptions embedded in Capital. It will always be possible to re-activate those readings as new generations of Marxist scholars contend with the circumstances of their own often commodified and extracted existence.

As Marx himself knew and taught, the work of interpretation, while fundamental, must be converted into practice. Having now looked over to Indigenous resurgence for orienting instruction in visiting the origins of historical materialism, and recapitulating core elements of his analysis of capital, the next task is to see how the logic of Marxist politics might also centre a settler ship and get us nowhere closer to the Two Row’s horizon of peaceful coexistence. What is to be (un)done for a Marxist politics to remain anti-capitalist while also steering its way towards a decolonial horizon of peaceful coexistence with Indigenous people?
Conclusion

This chapter has tried to practice Corntassel, Dhamoon and Snelgrove's ethical injunction to acknowledge territory in places where settler colonialism is most naturalized. I argue that the Marxist tradition will be unable to take this injunction to heart without undergoing normative transformation. I demonstrate this by thinking alongside Coulthard's critiques of Marx's normative developmentalism and temporal framing of primitive accumulation, and showing how these problems confound Harvey's attempt to repair Marx's theoretical framework, as well as ally Marx with colonial divisions in his theorization of the labour theory of value, his inability to grasp the destructive quality to capitalist development of productive forces, his closure of the circuit of capital accumulation, and his separation of capital's expanded reproduction from its ongoing colonial underpinnings.

I further attempt to show that when we try to drop colonial norms and bring Indigenous ones to the centre of Marx's analysis of capital, a different figuration of capital emerges, with consequences for how we consider the ongoing renewal of the proletarian condition amongst settlers. While still complicit in the colonial pillage of Indigenous people, the critiques of capital offered by Coulthard and Simpson allow us to theorize the site of capital's expanded reproduction as one of the daily and generational re-extraction of settler proletarians away from the attunements that might make a decolonial anti-capitalism possible, attunements that include the cultivation of intimate, consensual relational autonomy amongst extended networks of kin.
Chapter Four – From Revolution to Peaceful Coexistence: Leaving Behind the Logic of Hegel

In his preface to *Black Orpheus*, a 1948 collection of Negritude poetry, Jean-Paul Sartre, the leading French Marxist intellectual of the time, wrote that...

“...the notion of race does not intersect with the notion of class: the one is concrete and particular, the other is universal and abstract....In fact, Negritude appears as the weak stage of a dialectical progression: the theoretical and practical affirmation of white supremacy is the thesis; the position of Negritude as antithetical value is the moment of negativity. But this negative moment is not sufficient in itself and the Blacks who employ it well know it; they know that it serves to pave the way for the synthesis or the realization of the human society without race. Thus Negritude is dedicated to its own destruction, it is transition and not result, a means and not the ultimate goal” (Sartre, 1951 [1948]: 112)

Writing in *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon exclaimed that “[w]hen I read this page, I felt they had robbed me of my last chance. I told my friends: ‘The generation of young black poets has just been dealt a fatal blow.’ We had appealed to a friend of the colored peoples, and this friend had found nothing better to do than demonstrate the relativity of their action.” (Fanon, 2008 [1952]: 112). Writing this dissertation makes me wonder whether Marxists help or hinder the cultivation of a decolonial settler politics? Sometimes I wonder, does the logic of how the mainstream of Marxism conceives of struggle allow Marxists to even think this question? If not, then what is the logic that prevents it, and how must that logic be normatively transformed and theoretically rectified to nourish, and not squelch, Indigenous resurgence and the decolonial settler anti-capitalism we began to elaborate in the previous chapter?

How was it that Sartre could do no better than to suggest Black identity was a means to the end of class struggle in a collection devoted to the celebration of Black culture? How, in a passage acknowledging white supremacy, could Sartre so squarely
perpetuate it by telling Black people that racism would be resolved by subordinating it to class struggle? Following Fanon and Coulthard, in this chapter I will suggest that, friend or not, Sartre’s approach to thinking about colonialism was organized through Hegel, and that Hegel’s thought has left the mainstream of Marxists often unable to think about their implication in, and responsibility for, systems of oppression that interlock with the capital-labour relation. Fanon also pointed to Sartre’s Hegelian roots, calling him a “born Hegelian” (112). In his frustration with Sartre, Fanon emphasized how the Hegelian script cast him in a subordinate and pre-determined role: “And there you have it; I did not create a meaning for myself; the meaning was already there, waiting...it is not as the hungry nigger that I fashion a torch to set the world alight; the torch was already there, waiting for this historic chance” (113).

Just as Indigenous people have constantly had to remind settlers that there was never a terra nullius, this chapter tries to avoid the illusion that my dissertation begins from a blank slate or historia nullius; settlers, including Marxist ones, must account for the parts of our traditions that have contributed to colonialism. While I am attempting to self-consciously look over to the Indigenous canoe to critically adopt political ethics that spring from the Two Row, I must also look back and reflexively consider the political framework that has guided the development of Marxism, to better sensitize myself to the ways Marx(ism) may be programmed, in spite of its emancipatory intentions, to eliminate Indigeneity. In this chapter, I would like to suggest that Hegel’s parable of the Lord and Bondsman (Hegel, 1977 [1807]: 111-118), popularized through Kojève as the master-slave dialectic (Kojève, 1969 [1947]), has, in crucial respects, provided the logic for mainstream Marx(ism)’s political framework. Thinking alongside Coulthard’s critique of
Hegel, of his own and through Fanon, I want to show how the logic of Hegel’s master-slave relation renders Marx(ism) incapable of enacting a Two Row ethics.

This chapter makes two primary arguments. First, revolution, or the undoing of a system of domination, while necessary, is insufficient to enact what I have described as decolonization’s horizon of peaceful coexistence. While revolution may liberate the slaves who carry it out, the society that eventuates will not ensure peaceful coexistence on the strength of liberation alone. In addition, embodying the horizon of peaceful coexistence requires the “active and integral participation” of settlers (Walia, 2013). The logic of Hegel’s dialectic, however, by conflating peaceful coexistence with liberation for the slave leaves a gaping hole where Marxists most need ethical and political thought: on how to escape what Hegel calls the sluggish and inessential condition of mastery. The work of this chapter is to carry out these arguments, make sense of the cluster of premises that has produced this situation, and outline a value, responsibility, and some premises that could take their place.

Another way of putting it is that this chapter looks at the difference the Two Row Wampum makes with respect to Marx. I will do so in three sections that follow the unfolding of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. In Section One, I closely examine the way Hegel sets up the dialectic, keying in on the emergence of self-consciousnesses from immediate Life. I argue that Hegel may not endow his individuals with the qualities they will ultimately require to recognize each other as self-determining. In passing, I note the similarities between Hegel’s dialectic and Marx’s thought experiment on the first historical act. Finally, I compare this set up to the critically updated Two Row I put forth in Chapter One.
In Section Two, I hone in on Hegel’s account of the slave within the period of dialectical struggle and connect its logic to Sartre and Marx. I argue that the persistence of colonial misrecognition within Marxism’s mainstream suggests Hegel’s dialectic may function as an ideology of capitalist colonialism for proletarianized people. When put in dialogue with the analysis of proletarianization in the previous chapter, Hegel’s dialectic unfortunately seems to provide intellectual legitimation for the cul-de-sac of proletarianization. If the material process of proletarianization itself leads to the sequestration of proletarianized people away from the values and relationships through which they might actualize the mutual recognition sought by Fanon and the Two Row, then the logic of Hegel’s dialectic makes this seem like a valued process. I build my argument through a close comparison to the alternative ontological current Fanon, and especially Coulthard, draw on to sharpen the contrast between the path of self-affirmation and seeing red, and Hegel’s invocation for the slave to go deeper into the dialectic.

In Section Three, I turn my attention to the role of the master in Hegel’s dialectic. I diagnose that the logic of liberation in Hegel, in which the slave acts as the sole protagonist, leads to the absence of any consideration of the necessary role of masters in working towards the horizon of peaceful coexistence. I show how this absence structures Sartre’s assessment of negritude, and then suggest that taking on board the value of responsibility, in conjunction with relational autonomy and consensual intimacy, would provide the normative basis to support contemporary Marxism in reckoning with its complicity in reproducing colonialism, and support developing an ethics and politics for proletarianized settlers to contribute to decolonization efforts.
For the dissertation, this chapter puts my Two Row ethics to work in the political register by looking over to Coulthard's critique of the master-slave parable through Fanon and extending the entailments of that critique to the settler side of the water. In looking back at Hegel, while I affirm the necessity to struggle against systems of domination, I ultimately argue that Hegel’s constraining ontology and logic must be placed within the wider and deeper framework of the Two Row to support the generation of settler decolonial struggle towards a horizon of peaceful coexistence. Finally, the chapter offers a meta-critique of how Hegel's master-slave parable, as a political and ethical framework guiding the Marxist tradition, ultimately cannot uphold a Two Row ethics, and analyses the consequences that has for decolonization struggles.

Section One – The Beginning of Hegel’s Parable

Like Coulthard, I am not interested in engaging with Hegel per se (Coulthard, 2014: 27); rather, I too wish to restrict my examination of him to the chapter on “The Truth of Self-Certainty” from The Phenomenology of Spirit, especially the parable of the Lord and Bondsman, which I will also refer to by its popularized name of the master-slave dialectic (Hegel, 1977 [1807]: 104-138). Coulthard, in conjunction with Fanon, shows how liberals like Charles Taylor have used the dialectic to justify a benevolent bestowal of recognition on people in slave positions, exemplified through the discourse of multiculturalism (Day, 1998) and the politics of contemporary Indigenous recognition (Coulthard, 2014: 25-49). In my case, I wish to tease out how the master-slave dialectic also inaugurates a logic of political struggle that Marx and its mainstream have tended to reproduce. Coulthard also engages with this logic and develops a political ethics for
Indigenous people from that engagement, an ethics and engagement I will also draw from as a basis to derive an alternative ethics to Hegel for settler Marxists.

While I do not wish to beg the question of Marx’s relationship to Hegel, neither do I wish to bog myself down in it. After all, in the postface to the second edition of *Capital*, Marx declares how “[I] openly avowed myself the pupil of the great master and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him.” (Marx, 1976: 103). The question, then, is not whether Hegel influenced Marx, but how. To continue the passage from Marx, his own belief was that “[t]he mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell” (ibid). Put in Marx’s language, I wish to engage Hegel’s dialectic to describe the inner logic, or kernel, Marx discovers by standing Hegel right side up. A logic Marx runs with, and passes on to the tradition of liberation thought informing how settlers do their radical politics and how they attempt solidarity with Indigenous struggle. While I will notice in passing places where Hegel adopts premises contrary to Indigenous Resurgence Theory, and connect them to premises we saw Marx adopt above, the work of this chapter above all is to describe the logic of the dialectic and compare and contrast that to the logic of the Two Row with the support of Coulthard and Fanon.

One premise of Hegel’s that Marx seems to place inside the rational kernel is the horizon towards which politics advances, rendered by Marx as the free development of each forming the condition for the free development of all (Marx, 1978 [1848]: 491).
Moreover, and germane to my work here, the similarity between Hegel’s political horizon and that of the Two Row stands out. While the Two Row seeks to provide a framework for peaceful coexistence between the Indigenous canoe and settler ship, Hegel looks for his consciousnesses to “recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another” (Hegel, 1977: 111). A good deal of Hegel’s section on the master-slave puzzles through the way the relationship of domination might eventuate in mutual recognition, a puzzle I will elaborate in detail to show how Hegel may ultimately leave some very important pieces out. Like Marx’s thought experiment on the first historical act, though, Hegel first provides an explanation for how history gets underway in the first place.

Hegel sees consciousness, “to begin with”, as “simple being-for-self, self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else” (113). He further explains that “in this immediacy, or in this [merely] being, of its being-for-self, it is an individual” (ibid). Already we can detect further resonances with Marx’s thought experiment, where in spite of Hegel committing to a relational ontology, history begins with an isolated individual. In Marx’s case, following Hegel’s logic, he explains that “man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all” (Marx, 1978 [1846]: 158). This construes the period preceding the emergence of consciousness or the first historical act as a period of individuals co-existing in ‘limited’ connection, or, as Marx puts it, a period where “the identity of nature and man appears in such a way that the restricted relation of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and their restricted relation to one another determines men’s restricted relation to nature, just because nature is hardly modified historically” (ibid). Again following Hegel, Marx explains that “this beginning
is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct” (ibid).

Hegel imagines, next, that “one individual is confronted by another individual” (ibid). Hegel’s first characterization of this ‘confrontation’ stresses how “they are for one another like ordinary objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the being [or immediacy] of Life – for the object in its immediacy is here determined as Life” (ibid). Marx might stand Hegel back on his feet, but we can see here how they both construe the land on which they stand as subordinate to the people who stand on it. While Marx renders land as resource, in Hegel’s case the realm of immediate Life is subordinate on account of not possessing the valued property of self-consciousness. Furthermore, while Marx mounts an attack on the precedence given to consciousness by fleshing out historical materialism through the concept of need, thereby standing Hegel on his feet, the hierarchical privileging of some stratum of human being at the expense of another continues. In both cases, the internal consequence is to entrench hierarchy on our insides, a move, again, at odds with Simpson’s theorization of Kwezens.

The question then arises: do the people who are about to enter into master-slave relations come endowed with the properties and capacities to mutually recognize each other as self-determining beings on the far side of the dialectic? And, can they extend this recognition to the animal and plant nations Kwezens is ensconced with in Simpson’s telling of the Sugar Bush story? The answer would appear to be ‘no’ on both counts. While people might get along prior to the emergence of the first individual, Hegel’s dichotomization and hierarchicalization of being rules out that possibility once history
begins. Where Life is ‘immediate’ and object-like, self-consciousness, on the other hand, begins to distinguish itself by its relative separation from thing-hood and particularity through a process of “rooting out all immediate being” (113). This means that the individuals who confront each other also increasingly, as their confrontation proceeds, lose access to the very qualities that they may have relied upon to co-exist prior to the period of the dialectic. Moreover, on closer scrutiny, this period before the dialectic gets underway, where the individual “may well be recognized as a person” (114), seems bereft of any of the qualities Hegel wishes to end up with. If these persons get along it appears to only occur because the immediacy of their lives does not entangle them sufficiently to require confrontation.

Similarly with Marx. While he names the period of pre-history primitive communism, presumably signalling its endowment with the qualities he values in people and their relationships, as well as his intention to retrieve those qualities on the other side of history through revolution, the individual of the first historical act comes wired with the same constitutive isolated separation from land and other people. And Marx carbon copies from Hegel the devaluation of the sheep-like people who stand on the threshold of the first historical act. Maybe the separation of mental and manual labour has yet to cause its historical mischief, but these non-separated people are nonetheless construed as overawed beasts. With respect to land, the contrast to Simpson could not be more evident. Hegel and Marx devalue the register of ‘closeness’, ‘immediacy’ or ‘intimacy’ and equate that with ‘nature’ or ‘life’. Marx concedes its existence among people but quickly subordinates intimacy to family, which he then drops from history by rendering it ‘natural’. Hegel, on the other hand, leaves intimacy behind with nature altogether.
The Two Row, on the other hand, begins from peaceful coexistence. The canoe and ship share a river and are placed in a landed setting that expresses the values and relationships that must be actively maintained through careful navigation; or, in the critically updated version that incorporates the settler ship’s destruction and domination, return to balance. Moreover, Alfred’s insistence that the Two Row begins from one’s self links individuals to the vision and practice of coexistence and points to their roles and responsibilities in upholding it. By extension, this also endows people, at least in potentia, with the properties they require to enact peaceful coexistence. Hegel, on the other hand, may imagine mutual recognition between self-determining beings but does not actually begin with them or endow his individuals with the qualities to achieve it. To the extent the individuals are placed in a landed framework, the land forms one more constraint to overcome. We will take these deficiencies up once again at the other end of history to pose some final questions on the shortcomings of Hegel’s logic of liberation and his belief that liberation also produces mutual recognition.

As we continue in the parable, Hegel’s individuals do not simply confront each other, but “prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle” (114). This moment of engagement also marks the moment when “self-consciousness makes its first appearance” (104), a moment that seems to launch the process of overcoming everything immediate, including within oneself, culminating in the coronation of cognition to rule over the inner realm of emotions and the outer one of nature. Hegel also names self-consciousness “Desire in general” (105), which seems to play an analogous role to Marx’s arising of the second need from the first. As with Marx and the expansion of needs, Hegel emphasizes that the struggle born of self-consciousness and Desire is not
optional. Each consciousness “must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case” (ibid). There are no alternatives: “…it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won.” (ibid). Similarly with Marx, the satisfaction of the first need leads to the next and so on, an internal engine, to use an industrial metaphor, that links with productive forces to stimulate feats of co-operation.

I think we can better understand now why Coulthard goes after the developmentalism that Marx adopts from Hegel. Developmentalism does not simply condemn Indigenous people and everyone else to be turned on the rack of history’s wheel of domination. It also intellectually occludes access to actually existing ontological fires that continue to be kept alight by Indigenous people even through the catastrophe of the settler order. What’s more, if we are to take Simpson adducing a spiritual core to every living entity in the universe seriously, these ontological fires smoulder inside settlers in spite of being so much more deeply caught up in the enclosing, atomizing and desacralizing systems of domination through which the settler order is reproduced. Put more concretely, why does Coulthard urge Indigenous people to look across the river to a ship that is befouling it and discerningly pick out potential allies? Why do the Unist’ot’en allow settlers onto their land to hunt and live together, even as settler representatives of the state and capital launch a new wave of destruction on them? If we were to ask Hegel we could not get an answer for he would only see a self-consciousness driven by its Desire to dominate and overcome everything around it. Instead, we need to look to the Two Row. While Coulthard and the Unist’ot’en certainly affirm the need for struggle by engaging in it themselves, this struggle continues to take place within the larger embrace
of landed ethics of friendship and respect for relational autonomy. Struggle, while necessary, does not fully encompass the people who struggle. In spite of our deep internalization of the subjective attachments of settler colonialism, the logic of the Two Row holds that we are at least potentially capable of being otherwise. Hegel snuffs out this otherwise at the inception of the dialectic, and, as we will see below, makes it impossible to retrieve on the slave’s liberation day.

Some readers might wonder why I am interrogating the inceptive moments of these philosophical texts so closely. Marx himself provides one answer when he explains in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1978 [1851]: 595). I am interested in the circumstances Hegel transmits to Marx. And, as if to underline the connections I am trying to make in this chapter, Marx precedes this famous quote, and opens his political essay, by invoking Hegel, writing: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce” (ibid, 594). Of course, I am not trying to suggest Marx descends to farce, and anyway, any Indigenous person would be quick to point out that the themes I am exploring here are well past their second repetition. What I am trying to disclose is the deep persistence of premises antithetical to the continued resurgence of Indigeneity in the logic Hegel inaugurates and Marx repeats, premises that bear down most of all, perhaps, on the individuals with the misfortune of occupying slave positions in history.
Section Two – The Slave

As we saw above, by the time Sartre repeated these premises Fanon certainly found nothing amusing in their application. This section hones in on the logic Hegel scripts for the slave through the dialectic, and connects that logic once again in passing to Marx so as to continue showing the recurring influence of Hegel’s dialectic on Marxism. I also elucidate how Coulthard, using Fanon, goes beyond the logic of the dialectic with respect to the slave through the two-fold process of ‘seeing red’ and engaging in practices of ‘self-recognition’. To ground the many interlocutors I am trying to be in conversation with in this section, I will continue with a compressed description of Hegel’s parable assisted by Kojève’s interpretation.

Marxist readers may, at this juncture, be reaching for their straw man card. Perhaps they might concede that some nightmarish elements of Hegel may have weighed down on Marx and Sartre. But they might also insist that contemporary Marxists have awoken to this unfortunate legacy and begun to seriously interrogate our penchant for subsuming anti-colonial or Indigenous resurgence struggle into an unreformed historical materialist, anti-capitalist framework. I would like that to be true; however, I believe this legacy persists. For example, in a recent introduction to a survey of political movement writing, A World To Win, William Carroll does precisely that, engaging with Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks under the heading of historical materialism, and more specifically deploying Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession concept, and Harvey’s political alternative to capitalism, “a secular revolutionary humanism” (Carroll, 2016: 32), to frame “the struggles of Indigenous peoples” (ibid). To the extent Carroll acknowledges how Marxists have landed in colonial ways to Indigenous people, he simply re-affirms
Marxists’ classic insistence that “HM [historical materialism] has long seen colonialism and imperialism, and struggles for self-determination by colonized peoples, as part and parcel of world capitalism” (ibid), ignoring so many attempts to disentangle the specific logic of each, including in the book Carroll summarizes. In a footnote, without actually rehearsing any colonial critiques directed at Marxism, Carroll refers to “Nimtz’s vigorous disputation of the myth of Marx’s Eurocentrism” (ibid). But even a cursory examination of Nimtz’s article displays the very colonial assumptions that are being disputed. Nimtz’s primary evidence against “the charge that Marx and Engels were Eurocentric” lies in the argument that “they were first and foremost revolutionaries who viewed the entire globe as their theater of operations” (Nimtz, 2002: 65), as if that does not represent the primary mode by which Europe views the rest of the world. To suggest that Marx’s colonial assumptions can be resolved by expanding their geographic scope of (militaristic) application makes no sense at all.

While Carroll’s intention may be to affirm Indigenous struggle, and his recognition that Indigenous peoples are “arguably at the cutting edge of critical movement praxis today” (33) evinces that intention, the fact remains that the Hegelian past continues to transmit itself directly to the present. Carroll, like Harvey, Sartre and Marx himself, continues to position Indigenous people within an ontological, analytic, political and ethical framework that is not of their choosing (let alone making), a positioning that violates Hegel’s own premise of recognizing others in their self-determination, and the Two Row’s horizon of respectfully not interfering with the relational autonomy of the Indigenous canoe. Instead, Carroll subsumes Indigenous people yet again under a theoretical framework that has not taken on board the
Indigenous critiques directed at it. To say that Indigenous peoples are at the cutting edge of critical movement praxis without decentring historical materialism one inch to incorporate the theoretical consequences of that practical cutting edge unfortunately reproduces colonialism and undermines the affirmative intention. The work of this chapter is to both try to make sense of why this continues to occur, and to put forward an alternative ethics that can better safeguard against contemporary Marxism’s habit of granting recognition to Indigenous people only to turn them into a term in a dialectic that will see them sublated into a revolutionary secular humanism, historical bloc, multitude or eco-socialist synthesis.

As Hegel sees it, the “first experience” (115) of the self-consciousnesses who in a trial “must seek the other’s death” (114) results in a stage where “there is posited a pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for itself but for another, i.e. is a merely immediate consciousness, or consciousness in the form of thinghood...the former is lord, the other is bondsman” (115). The latter becomes the slave because ‘he’ (Hegel’s choice of pronoun) “tremble[s]” (118) in the life-and-death struggle and opts for survival in the form of servitude. Hegel dwells on the significance of fear in the development of consciousness. He explains that “[i]f consciousness fashions the thing without that initial absolute fear, it is only an empty self-centred attitude” (119). Without having “experienced absolute fear but only some lesser dread...determinate being [would] still in principle attach to it” (ibid). Hegel seems to be saying that fear forms an internal pre-condition to fully evacuate determinate ties and give oneself over to a dialectical process that will eventually transform the slave’s consciousness in a liberatory direction.
Fanon’s account of subjection also highlights the significance of the deeply felt negative emotions of being subject to domination. In Chapter Five of *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon returns over and over to the *Erlebnis*, or deeply felt lived experience (Macey, 2012 [2000]: 162), of a black man being enveloped by the colonial relationship of domination. He opens the chapter with the famous line: “‘Dirty nigger!’ or simply ‘Look! A Negro’” (Fanon, 2008: 89) and replays the experience of being reduced “to an epidermal racial schema” by a white child on a train in France (ibid, 92). Throughout the chapter, Fanon refers to the emotional consequences of the colonial relationship: “Shame. Shame and self-contempt. Nausea” (92). Fanon’s reconstruction of the impact of subjugation resonates closely with Hegel. For instance, when he explains that “[i]n the white world, the man of colour encounters difficulties in elaborating his body schema. The image of one’s body is solely negating. It’s an image in the third person. All around the body reigns an atmosphere of certain uncertainty” (90).

And yet, unlike Hegel, Fanon simultaneously places this smothering mode of colonial recognition in conversation with a non-dominating alternative that the colonial one covers over without ever fully encompassing. In resonance with the ongoingness, at least in potentia, of mutuality at the heart of the Two Row, Fanon exclaims that he “came into this world anxious to uncover the meaning of things, my soul desirous to be at the origin of the world” (ibid, 89). Encountering instead the reifying colonial gaze, he “appealed to the Other so that his liberating gaze, gliding over my body suddenly smoothed of rough edges, would give me back the lightness of being I thought I had lost” (ibid). And even as the white gaze introduces an “atmosphere of certain uncertainty”, Fanon has recourse to alternatives. In fact, in spite of the depth and intensity he gives to
the experience of colonization, Fanon maintains a consistent analytic separation between
the colonial condition and the potentially mutually recognizing alternative. In the
Introduction he stresses how “there is nothing in common between the black man” in the
chapter where he analyses black people wanting to be white, and the fifth chapter where
Fanon provides an alternative ontology for the black soul, “as vast as the world, truly as
deep as the deepest of rivers” (119).

In Hegel’s dialectic the slave has no recourse to an alternative. To the extent the
slave can draw on any alternative to his plight during the period of the dialectic it is
represented by the master. One consequence of this foreclosing of alternative, mutualistic
ontological possibilities lies in the way the slave’s vision of freedom can come to mimic
the very means by which he was enslaved. Kojève demonstrates this disturbing slide from
a vision of freedom as mutual recognition to freedom as mastery throughout his
interpretation of Hegel. For example, Kojève asserts that the slave “has a positive ideal to
attain; the ideal of autonomy, of Being-for-itself, of which he finds the incarnation, at the
very origin of his Slavery, in the Master” (Kojève, 1969: 22). Owing to this ideal, “The
Slave knows what it is to be free. He also knows that he is not free, and that he wants to
become free” (ibid). From these premises Kojève completes the substitution of
domination for freedom: “In order that mutual and reciprocal recognition, which alone
can fully and definitively realize and satisfy man, be established, it suffices for the Slave
to impose himself on the Master and be recognized by him” (22).

Kojève’s reading evinces the logical contradictions at the heart of Hegel’s
dialectic. To begin with, we saw above that the person in the master position does not
engage in the life and death struggle in order to dominate, but rather he risks his life in
order to be recognized as self-determining. Because the recognition that eventuates comes from a subordinate being the master finds himself trapped in a sluggish and inessential condition. So for Kojève to now call this freedom either demonstrates that no actual freedom is possible through the dialectic, and that what people actually desire is the inessential recognition of domination, or that freedom simply means domination. For if the slave were to achieve his liberation from the master, he too would suddenly find himself receiving an inessential recognition, as the master is not capable of self-determination, seeing as the consciousness through which he receives the objects that consummate his desire would no longer provide them. Kojève’s interpretation may show that the dialectical progression, rather than producing a coming-to-consciousness in the slave, actually draws the slave into a false consciousness about the path to freedom.

Fanon, on the other hand, shows an acute awareness of the englobing effects of the dominating relationship. In addition to the book’s central white mask metaphor, he writes that “[t]he white man is all around me; up above the sky is tearing at its navel; the earth crunches under my feet and sings white, white. All this whiteness burns me to a cinder” (Fanon, 2008: 94). As he explains in the introduction, alluding to W.E.B. Du Bois’ *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903), his fifth chapter “demonstrate[s]...that what is called the black soul is a construction by white folk” (xviii). Unlike Kojève, Fanon is not unaware of the way that master forms of freedom, this construction by white folk, can come to contaminate the slave’s vision of himself. He begins his third chapter with the declaration: “Out of the blackest part of my soul, through the zone of hachures, surges up this desire to be suddenly *white*” (45). Within this encircled place, Fanon provides the motto, “From black to white – that is the way to go” (34).
And yet, Fanon advocates a very different path from Hegel for the black man to escape the cul-de-sac of the white environment. It begins, as Coulthard emphasizes, with seeing red: “Fuck you, madame” (Fanon, 94). At the existential level, this moment of anger punctures the white cocoon. After pages of documenting ways the black man is prevented from “quite simply being a man among men”, Fanon finds that “once again the Negro is trembling” (94). But this moment of anger changes the existential terrain from one of trembling and feeling engulfed to a “battlefield” (ibid). As madame’s face “color[s] with shame”, Fanon, “at last”, is “freed from his rumination.” (ibid). Fanon “realize[s] two things at once: I had identified the enemy and created a scandal.” (ibid). He feels “overjoyed” (ibid). Fanon does not negotiate with the white woman. He repudiates her colonial recognition. Coulthard, meanwhile, sustaining Fanon’s connection between the psychic structure of colonialism and the ‘economic’ structure in which it plays out, advocates for collective expressions of seeing red to take the form of “the blockade” (118) and “direct action” (165-9), tactics that also entail struggle, but crucially from a grounding maximally outside of the structure that refuses recognition. In Fanon’s words: “Since the Other was reluctant to recognize me, there was only one answer: to make myself known” (Fanon, 2008: 95).

In addition to throwing off the white mask and making himself known, Fanon’s act of seeing red also connects him with the alternative ontological current that can ground and nourish him to continue struggling, a current that for Coulthard is encapsulated by the ethical concept of “grounded normativity” (60-3) and material one, again drawing on Fanon (2), of the “bush mode of production” (171). Continuing the imagery of the battleground, Fanon writes that he “tried to escape without being seen, but
the Whites fell on me and hamstrung me on the left leg...It was here I made my most remarkable discovery, which in actual fact was a rediscovery. In a frenzy I excavated black antiquity. What I discovered left me speechless” (109, italics mine). Fanon’s rediscovery “emboldens” him to “put the white man back in his place...: accommodate me as I am; I’m not accommodating anyone” (110). Coulthard emphasizes this passage as well, noting how Fanon prompts us to “redirect our attention to the host of self-affirmative cultural practices that colonized peoples often critically engage in to empower themselves” (Coulthard, 23).

In Hegel, however, the pathway to liberation lies in going deeper into the dialectic of domination. Without an alternative ontological current to connect with, the slave’s coming-to-consciousness of his oppression has to come through working on the objects that will consummate the master’s desire. Within this logic, as we saw through Sartre above, the slave’s self-affirmation ultimately acts as an impediment, not a resource, for struggle and achieving peaceful co-existence. Fanon rejects this direction. He declares, in his chapter on “The Black Man and Recognition”, contra Hegel, that in the colonial relationship “the slave here can in no way be equated with the slave who loses himself in the object and finds the source of his liberation in his work” (195). This represents a crucial passage, for the shift to the colonial analytic standpoint I am trying to make in this dissertation at Coulthard’s invitation suggests that Hegel’s – and Marx’s – ontology traps masters and slaves alike on the circuit of the dialectic; in other words, that there is no separate geographic zone where Hegel’s dialectic might actually eventuate in the horizon of mutual self-determination. Instead, the difference between the ‘slave here’ and the one
somewhere presumably over there, in Europe, ‘who loses himself in the object’, is one of
degrees of colonial enclosure.

At most, we might grant that exploitative work, Hegel’s catalyst for coming-to-
consciousness, might assist in recognizing domination. Marx’s account of the way the
capitalist labour process pools proletarians in the giant industrial factories of capital’s
large-scale industry phase, pulverizing their humanity through endless repetition of
mechanical tasks, and therefore creating the tinderbox conditions for its own overthrow
seems, on the surface, to be compelling. But it cannot be said that this reveals a truth
about what a proletarianized person really is, let alone an Indigenous one. The essential
attributes of Indigeneity – and, if we accept the idea of the previous chapter, of
proletarianized settlers as well – remain outside of the relationship of domination. Thus,
it would be more accurate to say that relations of domination in toto, while real, are
parasitic to what people really are when viewed through Indigenous Resurgence Theory.

Solidarity with Indigenous people is not possible without changing Hegel’s
premise. Capitalist labouring cannot be perceived as bringing about a fullness in
previously stunted beings. But this is Hegel’s position. When he writes that it is through
work “that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the
object] its own independence” (118) Hegel is committing himself to a number of
premises that do not hold for Kwezens. Similarly with Marx. We saw already in the
previous chapter that he does not simply coquette with Hegelian phrases, but directly
imports Hegel’s logic that proletarians perfect themselves through capital’s labour
process. Simpson, however, would stress that Kwezens remains Kwezens whether she
learns to tap the maple tree or not. Her actualization does not expand by discovering the
potentialities for creating objects to consummate desire that are slumbering in nature (while also not being necessarily in contradiction with those discoveries, as Simpson’s story also shows). But Kwezens’ Indigeneity does become dangerously restricted if the land under her feet is privatized, if the trees are commodified, and she is displaced to the reserve and now has to commute to the plantation to subject the maple tree to unconsensual domination, and herself to the sale of her capacity to labour. Privatization, commodification, and dispossession all effect interruptions of intimate and consensual relationships among kin.

Sartre’s response to negritude shows the pernicious impact of the political logic Hegel inaugurates. Once it gets off the ground, it also provides auto-immunization against the very emancipatory practices that might reveal its own limitations. To Marx, Sartre, Harvey and Carroll, turning away from Fanon and Coulthard’s self-affirmative practices in the name of luring politicized people deeper into the dialectical progression is not a colonial act, but one of revolutionary service in the name of liberation. This psychic division away from Indigenous emancipation and the subsequent sequestration to the proletarian condition mirrors the colonial one. Hailing Indigenous people’s critical edge does not evince the disposition to recognize them under their own terms. Carroll’s engagement with Coulthard does not unpack what grounded normativity implies for people who have been extracted from their own grounded normativities and incorporated into the dialectic of the capital-labour relation; rather, Indigenous critical praxis continues to be read through a developmentalist ontology, where the very values and practices that ground that praxis are to be jettisoned in favour of entering into the theatre of operations for the (colonial) world to win.
The persistence of the colonial impulse from Hegel through Marx and into their contemporaries leaves me wondering whether Hegel’s dialectic, rather than inaugurating a logic to achieve freedom in the form of mutual recognition, actually constitutes the original politics, or even *ideology*, of recognition? When I ask this, I do not simply mean that Hegel’s dialectic offers a vision of freedom that it cannot logically eventuate in even through the most rigorous adherence to its strictures. Nor do I wish to limit this suggestion to the psychic insulation from the alternative non-dominating ontology Fanon and Coulthard are in contact with. In a reading of Hegel’s dialectic as ideology, the persistence of his tenets points to a material structure of the colonial relation that leads to the expression of those tenets. In fact, towards their intensification. Harkening back to the previous chapter’s analysis, the process of proletarianization itself may provide the material basis to perpetuate and intensify the ideology of the dialectic as pathway to mutual (mis-)recognition. The capitalist version of the colonial form offers its proletarianized victims the receding horizon of a world to win, even as the pursuit of that horizon more deeply eviscerates the people pursuing it, an evisceration that severs access to the very properties that could provide an escape hatch from the colonial enclosure; in other words to the vision of non-dominating alternatives, the collective memory of living within it, and the actuality of remaining connected to the nourishing consensual intimacies of relational autonomy. The material colonial ideological structure then ensures that any victories won by proletarianized colonized people along the way only stitch the colonial masks onto our faces more securely.

Section Three – The Master
Alfred suggests, in his preface to the first editions of *Red Skin, White Masks*, that Coulthard’s intervention “rescued Karl Marx from his nineteenth-century hostage chamber in that room in the British Library” (Alfred, 2014: xi). The reading I have developed in this dissertation suggests that capitalist colonialism may function in such a way that, at worst, Marxists may not even realize the need to be rescued. From the Haudenosaunee to Fanon, Coulthard and Simpson, Marxism may not, ultimately, provide us with the listening ear to respond to the call of peaceful co-existence from the Indigenous canoe or the even quieter whispering of it on our side of the river. Having been mostly disconnected from the spiritual core at the heart of every living entity in the world, including ourselves, and having developed a materialist philosophy that excludes its consideration, as well as a theoretical framework that locks those properties into a conceptual broom closet to place a capitalist understanding of production at the centre, Marxists may have been ushered into the hidden abode of production only to lock the door behind them.

And yet, Indigenous people continue their resurgence. Coulthard’s theoretical framework, true to the significance he places in the resurgence moment of seeing red, periodizes colonialism according to it. Coulthard argues that in the 1970s, the structure of colonial rule “underwent a profound shift” (6), from “a deployment of state power geared around genocidal practices of forced exclusion and assimilation” (4), to “practices that emphasize [Indigenous] recognition and accommodation” (6). To explain this transformation, Coulthard keys in on “the tumultuous political climate of Red Power activism in the 1960s and 70s”, and points out that it was not until this period “that policies geared toward the recognition and so-called ‘reconciliation’ of Native land and
political grievances with state sovereignty began to appear” (4). Today, we are seeing a similar resurgence of Indigenous mobilization. From Idle No More to Elsipogtog, Grassy Narrows and Unist’ot’en, Indigenous people are mobilizing with deepening intensity. In fact, Coulthard’s book, read immanently to his own theorization of political change, could be taken as a reflexive intervention into a historical moment of renewed transformative possibility, sharpening the intellectual tools Indigenous people will need to effect yet another transformation of settler colonialism towards decolonization.

Coulthard sticks to his responsibilities and addresses his book primarily to his Indigenous audience, and so leaves unanswered what role settlers might play in deepening the decolonial transformative possibilities afoot today. And yet, in his second thesis, Coulthard urges his readership to “remain open to, if not actively seek to establish, relations of solidarity” to a variety of settler communities in struggle (173), a position that invites, if not demands, that settlers deeply consider how they might respond to the attempt to establish solidarituous relationships. As someone who has ended up being one of those settlers building relationships with Indigenous people in struggle, I have been tempted to wonder if one possible emergent feature of this political period, compared to the previous wave of righteous Indigenous anger, might be the repudiation of settler colonialism by some settlers themselves? A different way to wonder about this might be to ask what would it look like if some fraction of settlers came to desire decolonization, not only from a place of accountability to an unjust reality, but also from valuing for themselves the horizon offered by Indigenous resurgence? What if some fraction of settlers genuinely desired the land-based existence decolonization could offer for people who currently benefit from settler colonialism?
How does Hegel’s dialectic help prepare us to think about our role as settlers in contributing to this possibility? In other words, how can the master contribute to deepening a practice of mutual recognition? We saw in the previous section that the life and death battle between self-consciousnesses eventuates in the dialectic of master and slave, wherein the slave labours to produce the objects that consummate the master’s desire. The master, meanwhile, becomes trapped by this outcome. Instead of receiving the recognition he fought for, “[w]hat now really confronts him is not an independent consciousness, but a dependent one. He is, therefore, not certain of being-for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action” (Hegel, 1977: 117). According to Kojève’s interpretation of this situation, “if man can be satisfied only by recognition, the man who behaves as a Master will never be satisfied” (19-20). The quote seems to indicate that for the master the dialectic thwarts mutual recognition. This sounds like a promising beginning. After all, we saw at the beginning of the dialectic that, according to Hegel, the master seeks recognition from a self-determining being, and so the desire for recognition from a self-determining being ought to propel the master to look for some other way of achieving it.

But Hegel leaves the Master straitjacketed in his existential impasse. Confined inside the dialectic, there seems to be no alternative for people in master positions to step into. To the extent the master has any role to play in overcoming his inessential condition it lies in continuing to desire the objects that will consummate it, as this will accelerate the slave’s coming-to-consciousness of being dominated. Liberation from this inessential condition comes from the outside in the form of the slave completing his process of coming-to-consciousness and ending the relationship of domination, thereby presumably
bestowing liberation on the master as well, though Hegel does not actually explain how the master’s consciousness ends up changing. This outcome parallels, in the opposite direction, the liberal bestowal of recognition that Coulthard so piercingly critiques (25-49). In that case, Coulthard quotes Fanon to say that with bestowal of recognition, the slave “[goes] from one way of life to another, but not from one life to another” (38). Fanon says in this case the slaves become “emancipated slaves” (39). Similarly, in a revolutionary anti-colonial outcome, we settlers would become overthrown settlers, and not people capable of living a land- and place-based existence.

Hegel’s ontological strait-jacket and logic of liberation underwrites the absence of any consideration of ethical and political practice from masters, and explains why Sartre, even as he names white supremacy in his preface to Black Orpheus, does not expand at all on the white proletariat’s complicity in Martinican colonization. He names no Black-led organizations to be in solidarity with. He carries out no historical materialist analysis of the role of slavery in cheapening commodities consumed by the European proletariat, thereby sharing the spoils, however unevenly, of racist imperialism with European capitalists, and thereby giving white Europeans a stake in the reproduction of colonialism and imperialism. He offers no ethical or political strategies for how the white European proletariat can engage in anti-colonial action within the metropole, extending and amplifying Black struggle in the places where Sartre exerted the most sway. In this regard, Hegel’s scant analysis of the master’s potential role in arriving at the horizon of mutual recognition appears, inadvertently, to be spot-on. The deeper we go into a master subjectivity, the more difficult it becomes to get any bearings on what it might look like to leap away from masterdom. Perhaps the saddest part of reading Black Skin, White
Masks is that in so many pages of Fanon’s probing analysis of the relationship between whites and blacks, where he reveals so many ways Black people, through the white gaze, are cordoned back into a limiting subjectivity, he nowhere feels the inspiration to name positive examples of anti-colonial relationship across racial difference. This painful absence prompts the question, how do we awaken a desire for something many of us are too deep inside of colonialism to be in contact with?

We saw in the previous section how Fanon and Coulthard draw on the existence of non-dominating alternatives in parallel with domination to ground struggle against the master. What could this look like on our side of the river? What ethics and politics can be derived from the Two Row that Hegel forecloses on and Sartre does not practice? To mirror Coulthard, I would suggest that settlers need to affirm Indigenous people’s “turn away from their other-oriented master-dependency” (43). Put in the language of Hegel, the master needs to be re-endowed with the actional existence that led him to enter into the life and death struggle in pursuit of recognition in the first place. For Hegel this means the desire to recognize a mutually self-determining being. In other words, to recognize others, not as slaves, but as people equally fully endowed with all the potentialities for freedom. In the moment of recognizing Indigenous self-determination, or autonomy, the escape hatch out of the existential impasse opens and the process of decolonization, for the master, takes its first tentative step.

Fanon’s injunction to go from one life to another demonstrates the necessity of a qualitative change in stream, not just a step but a leap into air, to recall Benjamin (1942), that also applies to the master. Those of us in master positions must, to the extent we are able, also affirm our own relational autonomy. We must leap away from the structural
conditioning of the proletarianized settler and onto the shifting and uncertain ground of relational autonomy. And the injunction to leap reminds us that, unlike Hegel, this is not simply an act of cognition. Rather, it requires an embodied, relational transformation. Fortunately, the leap is not a lonely one. Instead, it is into the river of relational autonomy. While solidarity might begin with the cognitive change of recognition, the lesson that Indigenous people are all of their properties at once reminds us that we must bring our whole selves into this leap.

In the ethical register, this calls for a deepening incorporation of relational autonomy. We might begin from Hegel’s condition of re-cognition, affirming Fanon’s anger and refusal of the colonial gaze, rather than getting trapped in white psychic fragility and colouring with shame, as madame does. From this moment of affirmation, we must extend the relationship in time and deepen in it body from there. As Corntassel suggests, solidarity is not simply an act limited to a conflictual moment in time before and beyond which we continue our self-enclosed existence (Corntassel, Dhamoon and Snelgrove, 2014: 19). Rather, it requires cultivating close, intimate and accountable relationships that may, through ongoing trust, eventually necessitate that Indigenous people create new names for settlers because the negatives ones we’ve earned no longer fit (ibid, 17). Sartre misses this opportunity. But I would suggest that Fanon’s injunction requires an even deeper ethical practice. Affirming resurgence and building lasting, close and accountable relationships is crucially necessary, and also not quite enough. We must also and ultimately come to embody, in appropriately modified ways, the values Indigenous people hold up, and we must do so even when Indigenous people are not there to guide us. It is only if we can cultivate relational autonomy, consensual intimacy and
responsibility where we are, on our side of the river, that the colonial dimensions of the settler order will reveal themselves to us. One aspiration for this dissertation is to have practiced this insight with regard to Marxism, not as an all-at-once movement that marauds the colonial ship and hoists some decolonial jolly roger, but as a deepening of my own practice of responsibility that opens up new potentialities for intellectual practice in a decolonial direction and that perhaps resonates with other people doing this work who can then point to shortcomings, dig deeper and extend wider.

I would like to suggest that what these ethics all point to, and Hegel’s account of the master misses, is a valuing of responsibility. In other words, the incorporation of the understanding that nobody else can accomplish freedom or peaceful coexistence for us. While we require another for freedom, as all freedom, according to Hegel and the Two Row, is relational, it is only if we begin by taking responsibility for our own relational autonomy that we can recognize it in another. Hegel’s dialectical logic prevents this realization, and therefore he does not theorize a passage out of masterdom for the master, leaving him in his inessential existential impasse awaiting liberation. Here, again, Fanon teaches lessons that the Two Row affirms. Fanon does not begin from an assessment of the ripeness of revolutionary conditions in deciding whether to act. He begins from himself and in doing so repudiates the master, reformulates the white cocoon into a terrain of struggle, and connects with a non-dominating ontological current that further emboldens him. Our own act of taking responsibility requires these elements as well. In affirming our own relational autonomy we simultaneously accept our implication in systems that endanger Indigeneity, and also affirm our capacity to struggle against and prefigure beyond those systems.
Without comprising all these elements, our leap falls short. If we only affirm our own capacity to create alternatives to the dominant order outside of ongoing relationships with people who are Indigenous, we will lapse into white enclavism and almost certainly be re-absorbed into a future wave of capital accumulation. Moreover, taking leadership from ourselves will likely see us fall well short of the multi-generational effort that the intensive and extensive work of decolonization requires. At the same time, if we ratchet up our sense of complicity without also taking responsibility for creating alternatives, we remain trapped in the logic of the dialectic, cultivating the subjectivity of the disciplined militant impervious to the tending work of kinship that decolonization also relies on. Finally, taking responsibility asks that we not simply gather around Indigenous people asking what to do even as the settler colonial sites that made us, and that we therefore know best and might most impactfully transform, go unchallenged. Taking responsibility calls on us to open our own front-lines in relationship with, but distinction to, Indigenous front-lines.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed Marx’s political logic through Hegel’s dialectic of the master and slave. Beginning from Marxism’s ongoing inability to value Indigenous resurgence under its own terms, I have attempted to answer why Marxism is wired to suspend its commitment to the free development of each for Indigenous people outside the capital-labour relation. My response argues that Hegel’s dialectic expresses an ideology of proletarian colonialism that conflates the slave’s liberation with the horizon of mutual recognition, leading at best to the terminal expulsion from proletarian freedom.
dreams of Indigenous values examined in previous chapters, and at worst to the slide into
and replication of master forms of domination.

In contrast to Hegel’s logic, I describe the anti-colonial alternative Fanon
develops through his own encounter with Hegel via Sartre. With the support of
Coulthard, I show how the political ethics to see and live red point to the necessity for
proletarianized settlers to prefigure mutual self-determination here and now, rather than
deferring these ethics to a political future outside of historical time. For Marxist settlers
this entails bringing a value of responsibility on board to practice our own version of
collectively detaching from capitalist-colonialism, struggling against it, and attempting to
embody a place-based ethics in deep and accountable relationship with the Indigenous
canoe. Suggesting the value of responsibility marks my attempt to engage in normative
repair of the absence of any consideration of the master’s role in mutual recognition.

For the dissertation, this chapter attempts to take responsibility for Marxism’s
political logic of liberation by placing it alongside the Two Row Wampum. This chapter
also completes the critical project of the dissertation. Having now looked over to the
Indigenous canoe to compare Marxism’s ontological, epistemological, analytic and
political commitments, I will now turn to the affirmative work entailed by the Two Row.
Just as Fanon felt emboldened by negritude to struggle better, I will now turn to those
elements of the Marxist tradition that resonate with the Indigenous values of resurgence,
elements contemporary Marxists may want to bring to the centre in the decolonial task to
begin from ourselves in sinking the settler ship and embodying the Two Row.
Chapter Five – Practicing Friendship Towards Marx(ism)

Introduction

This chapter looks to parts of Marx and contemporary Marxisms that might resonate with the values and practices I have been attending to within Indigenous Resurgence Theory. While the previous chapters have emphasized contrast and incommensurability, the aim of this chapter is to move the dial towards similarity and connection. Simultaneously, I am not looking to simply affirm places within Marx(ism) where analogous premises can be found to Indigenous Resurgence Theory. I do not wish to fall into the bad dynamic of using Indigenous Resurgence Theory as a springboard from which to compose a self-sufficient Marxism that can then dispense with the need to continue looking over to the Indigenous canoe; the danger of falling into colonial appropriation stands out to me in this chapter. While this chapter marks my attempt to look for the resonant planks within Marx(ism) to strip back to, to build up decolonial historical material alternatives, I will not relinquish the need to continue noticing incommensurabilities. Even as I notice the better premises from which these planks begin, that they were developed, for the most part, absent conversation with Indigenous thought, in each case also displays the limits of how far Marxism can go on its own.

At the same time, I do not want to dispense with Marx(ism). I believe that settlers cannot abscond from our responsibility to steer our own ship. The Two Row presents us with responsibilities specific to our tradition and trajectory. We cannot just surround Indigenous people and be told what to do. While we need Indigenous thought, and must, as this dissertation does, begin from it, we cannot remain there. Instead, I believe the Two Row requires that we listen and take leadership from Indigenous people and then exercise relational autonomy and think our instructions into the specific conditions of settler life. I
have tried to carry out this ethic in previous chapters, perhaps most concretely in Chapter Three, when I considered the specific colonial dynamics of capital’s site of expanded reproduction. More broadly, I have affirmed the need to understand the capitalist valence to settler colonialism and, like Coulthard, believe Marx(ism) provides a very insightful epistemology to catch hold of capital’s inner tendencies. I also have affirmed aspects of historical materialism itself, like Marx’s basic methodological commitment to begin from social practice in unfurling the historical, relational and inward entailments of practice; and finally, Marx’s ethical dictum that the free development of each requires the free development of all has emboldened me to complicate and critique Marx himself.

To summarize, Marx(ism), I believe, has a role to continue playing in the hard work of respectfully co-existing with Indigenous Resurgence Theory. At its best, I hope for a kind of Marx(ism) that Indigenous people themselves may see the value of, as it guides proletarianized settlers to take responsibility in those places within the intricate web of colonialism where we can effect the greatest impact because we find ourselves enmeshed there. Like the solidarity work I am attempting to prefigure in the intellectual domain in this dissertation, I hope for an anti-colonial praxis, engaged in by settlers, that is supported by elements of the Marxist tradition and welcomed by Indigenous people for how it transforms the world for the better.

As we saw in previous chapters, placing Indigenous Resurgence Theory alongside Marx yields a need to bring the values of consensual intimacy, relational autonomy, and responsibility to the centre of Marxism. For contemporary Marxism to adequately centre these values requires major reworking of its foundations. In the philosophical register, Marxism needs a materialism that can grasp what is at stake in Indigenous practice. In
Section One, I will look to the early materialism of the 1844 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* for its potential to philosophically house a conception of people that can include the excluded properties of what I called, in Chapter Two, Leanne Simpson’s Indigenous materialism. We also saw in Chapter Two that the premises from which Marx begins in founding historical materialism split ‘man’ from ‘nature’, or people from the land, and also expels the realm of social reproduction from consideration. In Section Two I look to the feminist Marxism of Maria Mies and Silvia Federici for its attempt to undo the division between production and social reproduction and the patriarchal division it perpetuates. I then turn to ecosocialism, particularly through Burkett, to assess its attempts to heal Marx’s originary split between people and the land. Finally, a further consequence of the dialogue I have staged between Indigenous Resurgence Theory and Marx is the need to refigure the site of capital’s expanded reproduction into a site of colonial reproduction. In Section Three, I look to the thought of John Holloway and argue that his creative refiguration of what is at stake in production, through the concepts of self-estrangement and fetishism, brings him closer to Indigenous understandings of capitalism.

**Section One – A Materialism that Can See Indigenous Ancestors?**

In the closing section of Chapter Two, I argued that a point of resonance between Marx and Simpson may lie in their shared valuation of autonomy. Simpson’s commitment to what I call relational autonomy arises from the material fact that every living entity has a spiritual core. Without valuing relational autonomy whatever material practices that ensue will be closed off from the world’s spiritual dimension, an
impoverishment at odds with Indigenous natural law and therefore, sooner or later, bound to founder. For Simpson, material access to our and other entities’ spiritual core comes about through continuously reproduced kinship practices expressing a valuation of consensual intimacy; without approaching the maple tree with a respect for its autonomy, expressed by laying down tobacco for it, neither maple tree nor Kwezens can, in the long run, flourish; sustaining the flow of intelligence between entities requires consensual respect for every entity’s spiritual core.

In Marx’s case, in his development of historical materialism in *The German Ideology*, a valuation of autonomy can be discerned from his analysis of the relationship, or dialectic, between people and the productive forces through which they produce. Marx’s description of the period of class struggle, where productive forces come to be seen as an alien force acting over and against the people who labour, restricting them to exclusive and stunted spheres of activity, emphasizes the need to bring those powers back under the conscious, intentional control of collective workers. In fact, revolution consists of resolving the contradiction between people and their productive forces. Reading Marx this way opens up an interpretation where the primary need, perhaps even greater than physical survival, could be to consciously direct production much the way people did under conditions of primitive communism. In the sixth section of Chapter Two, I likened this primary ‘need’ to valuing autonomy.

If we accept this interpretation then new problems proliferate for historical materialism. Because Marx makes his ontological bet that existence requires, above all, survival, and builds his epistemology around understanding how production to ensure survival is organized, then whatever understanding of autonomy we can develop from
Marx will remain restricted to, and filtered through, the understanding of production we get from political economy. We saw in detail how this makes historical materialism incapable of seeing the much broader and deeper practice of autonomy Simpson develops from her analysis of Kwezens; the corporeal scope Marx can give to autonomy restricts it to the cultivation of knowledge, skills and modes of cooperation particular to production. Further, having cut his revolutionary subject off from the land, and the social realm of intimacy, the people who will effect a revolution, while they may re-integrate and autonomously exercise their productive powers, may still not apprehend the qualities Simpson foregrounds in *her* development of the properties that sustain relational autonomy, namely the spiritual order that forms Simpson’s *sine qua non* of Indigeneity.

But the problems would not end there. If, to maximize the resonance with Simpson, we put autonomy in the centre of historical materialism, then what do we make of the productive forces developed under capitalist conditions of production where workers’ autonomy is turned against them? Marx does not really question how to contend with productive forces developed under alienated conditions. He does not grapple with how the state, industrialization, consumer subjectivity, and so on might impact the capacity for workers to enact a revolution, or become transformed into a means for communist life through proletarian dictatorship. Or, maybe more accurately, as we saw in our close reading of *Capital* in Chapter Three, he seems to imagine capitalist productive forces, in the final analysis, to allow for a more fully realized autonomy once proletarians take over the means of production. This interpretation collapses an assessment of autonomy back into need-meeting, whatever the texture and consequences of those needs. Either way, Marxism sets off on political paths that lead away from Simpson’s
Indigenous understanding of the spiritual dimension. As we saw with the example of the grad student developing novel harvesting techniques for Ojibway rice farmers, productive forces developed under non-Indigenous conditions are forces of destruction; in the final analysis of the all-propertied, all-relational consideration of consensual flourishing guiding Kwezens and the Ojibway, the spiritual dimension takes precedence over expanded physical need-meeting.

If I put this autonomy-oriented interpretation of Marx into Simpson’s terms, we could infer that capitalism cuts off access to a kind of spiritual dimension as Marx might have understood it. Once productive forces become a power over and against people, Marx’s spiritual dimension becomes cut off. To recuperate access to the spiritual register requires revolutionary activity while sustaining access requires people whose mental and material conditions coincide. In Marx’s rendering, the spiritual dimension re-opens when people, through their work, can engage in integral action; when the mind can conceive of actions the body can pursue, with the skills, knowledge and tools to sustain that integrity. Read in a generous spirit, Marx desires a revolution that not only will satisfy physical needs, but also, more deeply, will repair divisions; the division of mental and manual labouring in society, and the division of head and hand within ‘man’; that will abolish “the antagonism of town and country” and allow head and hand to work together in socially undivided roles to further develop the productive capacities of individuals and the species (Marx, 1978 [1846]: 176). But, continuing the synecdoche, what of the heart and the extension of spirit to other beings?

To explore this question, I will turn to the early Marx, as Althusser coined the period of Marx’s work prior to the development of historical materialism (Althusser,
1969 [1965]: 49-86), especially the section on Estranged Labour in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (1978: 70-81). In this, I join a significant fraction of Marxists who have also turned to the early Marx in search of an alternative philosophical footing. Among the more famous examples, Bertell Ollman’s *Alienation* (1976 [1971]) develops a reading of Marx that foregrounds a philosophy of internal relations; Erich Fromm (1973 [1961]) allies Marx with existentialism; and, David Harvey, in recent work, has also turned to the early Marx, to argue for a revolutionary humanism (Harvey, 2015: 264-293).

I think the quality of Marx’s early materialism most resonant with Simpson’s Indigenous materialism lies in its emphasis on people’s self-estrangement or alienation.

To begin at the point of greatest resonance, Marx points out how...

...in the first place labour, *life-activity, productive life* itself, appears to man merely as a *means* of satisfying a need – the need to maintain the physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species – its species character – is contained in the character of its life-activity; and, free conscious activity is man’s species character. Life itself appears only as a *means to life*. (Marx, 1978: 75-6)

In a friendly spirit, I believe it’s possible to understand this passage as Marx repudiating the narrower emphasis on needs that he turns to in the *German Ideology*. In this passage Marx appears to argue that the need to maintain physical existence is itself a historical problem owing to the reduction of man’s life-activity to labouring under capitalism. In contrast, he seems to want a much more expansive understanding of productive life as that which engenders life itself. This sounds a lot like Simpson, when she explains that Kwezens represents “the goal of community, the re-creation of beings that continually live lives promoting the continuous birth of life itself” (Simpson, 2014: 13). When Marx explains alienation, he also, in places, begins from a less restricted, more relational
ontology that brings us closer to Simpson. For instance, he argues that “the estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man stands to himself, is first realized and expressed in the relationship in which a man stands to other men” (77). This quote places no a priori restrictions on the practices through which relationships are assessed to be estranged or in consensual, flowing connection.

Unfortunately, though, when Marx fleshes out the concept of life-activity he constitutes the by now familiar divisions of the thought experiment on the first historical act: “Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life-activity...Conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity. It is just because of this that he is a species being...Only because of that is his activity free activity” (1978: 76). Brain directing hand expresses species being, and this quality, rather than connecting us to other-than-human beings, signals our foundational disconnection to the world around us: grounded normativities cannot get through. Similarly, to understand alienation Marx trains his gaze on production: “[h]ence within the relationship of estranged labour each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the position in which he finds himself as a worker” (77). This collapses the open-relational statements of the preceding paragraph into a worker-relational scope of operation, with land- and gender-disconnecting entailments.

And yet, following the logic of Marx’s analysis of estrangement might provide the very means to notice his own conceptual restrictions and the alienations on which they depend. Marx explains how “[t]hrough estranged, alienated labour, then, the worker produces the relationship to this labour of a man alien to labour and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labour engenders the relation to it of the capitalist, or
whatever one chooses to call the master of labour” (79). This approach provides the method with which to analyse the self-activity that produces the gendered estrangement between production and social reproduction that must also be undone. But in order to discover this estrangement one needs to expand the properties of people to include the emotional register, and also expand the qualities of social life to include the enactment and exclusion of consensual intimacy and care. If one remains wedded to a notion of people that assesses only the production of objects then the estrangement cannot be felt. The same goes for the estrangement of people from the beings that surround them. If one does not expand assignation of spiritual value or agency to the other-than-human world then it would similarly pass without notice that consent, and the underlying respect for autonomy on which consent depends, becomes alienated from nature to people, who then stand over against the beings through which and thanks to which they survive.

The difficulty for Marxism in trying to develop an analysis of settlers’ self-estrangements of Indigeneity is multiple. On the one hand, it relies on a prior concept of what Indigenous relating looks like to even be able to tune into the results of the self-estrangement of Indigeneity amongst settlers. When Marx analyses estrangement he takes the reified categories of political economy as his clues to explain estrangement. In a similar way, we could take the categories of Marxism as our own clues as to the deeper self-estrangements effected by a self-divided and estranged non-Indigenous world. The previous chapters of this dissertation then come into view as analyses of self-estrangement, showing the conceptual results of the multi-generational process through which we white proletarianized settlers have estranged ourselves from the beings through which we survive; estranged ourselves from each other in the form of gendered divisions;
and also effected the estrangements Marx notes from ourselves, and the products of our labour. Simultaneously, these conceptual results take intellectual stock of what must be materially re-connected to enable ever-deepening practices of kin-making, spirit-respecting, responsible flourishing.

The crucial difference between Marx’s approach to alienation and the one I want to advocate here lies in the empirical point of departure. Even in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx already “proceed[s] from the premises of political economy” (70). While beginning from wages, private property, and division of labour allows Marx to make powerful explanatory arguments about how these concepts were generated from workers’ self-estrangement, at the same time beginning in a master discourse ends up implanting Marx’s materialism with the divisive seeds that end up bearing the bitter fruit of colonialism and patriarchy.

While this may appear to be simply a methodological point, we can see how methodological instructions arise from ethics and ontology. Marx’s methodological starting point within the facts of political economy reproduces within historical materialism the logic of liberation Hegel sets out for the slave. Marx labours to clarify how the person he calls the capitalist actually owes his existence to the self-estrangement of the one who labours. While this intellectual labouring has the emancipatory implication of making visible the autonomy, in the last instance, of the one who labours, nonetheless, by remaining within the horizon of the oppressive relationship, rather than stepping outside of it, as Fanon and Coulthard advocate, Marx reproduces the premises Combahee wishes to go beyond.
I think that to the extent I have caught some of the premises that prevent Marxism from seeing Simpson or her ancestors, it is by adopting the Two Row’s framework that I have been able to do so. Following the ethic of ‘looking over’ intrinsic to the Two Row has allowed me a chance to notice Indigenous grounded normativities and think them over into the alienated conditions of settler life. In a more dialectical language, ontology, ethics and methodology are internally related; the premises of one shape the premises of the other, and vice-versa. The Haudenosaunee’s ontological point that Indigenous people and settlers are differently situated helps short-circuit Marx’s penchant for making proletarians stand in for everyone else, even as it sustains the necessity to continue thinking about the proletarian condition. At the same time, sharing the river helps sustain the connection that Indigenous people and settlers alike are subject to the evisceration of the values and relationships that comprise Indigeneity; the value of non-interference does not entail indifference. Finally, there being more than one vessel on the river entails the necessity of the methodological ethic of ‘looking over’, which provides the intellectual escape hatch from the engulfing of capitalist colonialism, an escape hatch that we simply cannot do without as we daily renew our mostly commodified, alienated and auto-extracting material condition.

Section Two – Undoing Divisions

I am not the first Marxist to notice these divisions. Feminist Marxists and eco-Marxists have worked hard, respectively, to analyse Marx’s patriarchal division between production and reproduction, and anthro-supremacist division between people and land. In the case of social reproduction, the critique that Marx ushers the family off stage just
as history takes off is not a new one. Much like I did in Chapter Two, Maria Mies, in a short section of *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World-Scale* (Mies, 1986: 49-56), also goes back to *The German Ideology* to scrutinize the origination of historical materialism. In her case, she accentuates how Marx begins from patriarchal premises (and looks to how that reverberates into Marx’s analysis, particularly of the labour process, and his politics, especially around the concept of labour). Mies also criticizes Marx for only making the “production of the means of subsistence” social and historical, and not the “production of human beings themselves” (50). Mies looks to graft her critique onto Marx’s roots. She does so by developing a feminist materialist conception of history that begins from the idea that “the first means of production with which human beings act upon nature is their own body” (52); in fact, she argues that the body is the “first force of production” (53). For Mies it is of “crucial importance that women's activity in producing children and milk is understood as truly human that is conscious, social activity” (53). The political point for Mies is that women's bodies become a productive force violently appropriated by men and also by the capitalist accumulation process. Mies summarizes that women's historically developed object-relation to nature consists of a productive and creative interaction, not based in dominance or property, and leads them to be the first subsistence producers (56).

Mies also consciously grounds her standpoint outside the production of capitalist commodities by developing her epistemology – the subsistence perspective - from an analysis of what she calls ‘life production’, which comprises the subsistence labour of peasant communities mostly in the Global South, and the reproduction of the species in procreation and child-raising (Mies, 2005). This standpoint also leads Mies to emphasize
how capitalism above all arises from colonialism and continues to be sustained by it, namely the three colonialisms of “the man-woman relationship...the relationship between the small farmer and industry...and naturally, the colonial relationships between metropolises and colonies” (ibid).

The points of resonance with Indigenous Resurgence Theory are numerous. Foregrounding original and ongoing colonialism, honing in on the devaluation of the intimate sphere within Marxism, and bringing into view a contrast between capitalist production, where the goal is that “everything that there is, has to be transformed into a commodity” versus the “entirely different goal” of subsistence production, which aims at “the direct satisfaction of human needs” (Mies, 2005), all bring us closer to Simpson’s theorization of Anishinaabe Indigeneity. Mies’ valuation of the body approximates Simpson’s emphasis on embodiment; in Dancing On Our Turtle's Back Simpson also accentuates the importance of mothering when she describes breastfeeding as "the first treaty" (Simpson, 106).

And yet, remembering Tuck and Yang, I do not want to make connections that disappear differences. I wonder about Mies’ decision to use the concepts of political economy to make sense of practices she wants to stress are outside of commodity production. If nothing else, this seems contrary to her own project. In developing her standpoint in life production, Mies stresses how life production takes place outside of the logic of generalized commodity production, which to my mind should entail the development of concepts that come out of subsistence to describe it. Turning to the concepts of political economy, instead, puts Mies at risk of intellectually colonizing the subsistence perspective with the logic inscribed in the discourse of political economy. If
nothing else, it runs counter to Indigenous Resurgence Theory’s commitment to grounded normativities as the point of departure for conceptual and theoretical development.

My uneasiness about Mies’ choice to stretch historical materialism into parts of the social it originally cannot apprehend extends to my own choice to describe Simpson’s theorization of Kwezens as an Indigenous materialism. Or, my choice to consider Simpson’s spiritual register through the language of spiritually productive forces. In Mies’ case, she takes the stance that Marx’s concepts – like “nature...labour...sexual division of labour....and productivity” (Mies, 1986: 45) - while inscribed with patriarchal “biases”, “cannot [be] abandon[ed]” (47) by feminists. Instead, Mies advocates that feminists “look at them from below, not from the point of view of the dominant ideology, but from the point of view of the historical experiences of the oppressed” (ibid). In my case, I think I am locating myself in a slightly different place. I am not trying to be outside of and looking up at the site of proletarian life. Rather than generating a methodological ethic from below, I am trying to generate a methodological ethic that aspires to be alongside Indigenous Resurgence from within the white proletarian condition. A commitment to materialism dictates that if and as the material practices of proletarianized white settlers begin to move in decolonial directions, new concepts will need to spring up to describe those practices. While there are conscious efforts between Indigenous people and white proletarianized settlers to move in this direction, this dissertation has not tried to situate itself at the point of emergence in settler anti-colonial solidarity and struggle. Rather, I am trying to name the need for this process in a language that can be heard by people who currently occupy white settler proletarianized social locations. I’m not sure this justifies my choices. I think this is one place I need to
invoke the ethic of uncertainty I tried to claim in Chapter One as a necessary
consequence of this deeply disturbed period where the grass no longer grows green at a
certain time each year. Time may show that the attachments to settler subjectivity that
Coulthard wants to sink cling too much to Marxism, and that the work of translation I
have been doing only inaugurates a new wave of frustration for Indigenous people.

Perhaps the Marxist with the most analogous approach to my own is Silvia
Federici. Like Mies, she hones in on the patriarchal implications of Marx’s political
economy. She argues, “against the Marxist orthodoxy”, and with intellectual comrades
Maria Dalla Costa and Selma James (1975), “that the exploitation of women has played a
central function in the process of capitalist accumulation” (Federici, 2009: 8). Tuning into
this exploitation, especially by foregrounding the witch-hunts in the ‘transition to
capitalism’, teaches Federici that “separation of production from reproduction, the
specifically capitalist use of the wage to command the labour of the unwaged, and the
devaluation of women’s social position with the advent of capitalism” are “its main
structural components” (8). Like my own analysis, Federici’s study has big implications
for how she understands Marx:

“*Il Grande Calibano* was an attempt to rethink Marx’s analysis of primitive
accumulation from a feminist viewpoint. But in this process, the received
Marxian categories proved inadequate. Among the casualties was the
Marxian identification of capitalism with the advent of wage labour and the
‘free’ labourer, which contributes to hide and naturalize the sphere of
reproduction” (8).

Like this dissertation attempts to do, Federici makes connections to colonialism while
also sustaining necessary distinctions. As the title to her best known work, *Caliban and
the Witch*, indicates, Federici is as much interested in the witch, or women’s experience
of primitive accumulation in Europe, as she is Caliban, which for her represents the “proletarian body” (11) - but crucially from an anti-colonial perspective informed by her experiences living in Nigeria. In Nigeria, she “realize[s] that the struggle against structural adjustment is part of a long struggle against land privatization and the ‘enclosure’ not only of communal lands but also of social relations that stretches back to the origin of capitalism in 16th Century Europe and America” (9). Federici draws lessons from these connections; she underlines how, “[w]ith the demise of the subsistence economy that had prevailed in pre-capitalist Europe, the unity of production and reproduction which has been typical of all societies based on production-for-use came to an end, as these activities became the carriers of different social relations and were sexually differentiated” (74). Noticing the self-alienation of life-activity into two spheres tracks divisions that matter a great deal to Simpson, who theorizes a unity between productive activities and kinship.

The connection to anti-colonial struggle also helps Federici “realize how limited is the victory that the capitalist work-discipline has won on this planet, and how many people still see their lives in ways radically antagonistic to the requirements of capitalist reproduction” (9). Looking over to communal land defense in Nigeria radically expands her conception of who gets to count as in struggle against global capitalism; it “was a source of great strength, as it proved that, worldwide, formidable forces still contrast the imposition of a way of life conceived only in capitalist terms” (9). Much like I am trying to find sparks within Marx that resemble the well-tended fires of Indigeneity, Federici looks from communal land defense in Nigeria to similar experiences within Europe: “This is why in Caliban and the Witch I reconstruct the anti-feudal struggles of the
Middle Ages and the struggles by which the European proletariat resisted the advent of capitalism. My goal in doing so is...to revive among younger generations the memory of a long history of resistance that today is in danger of being erased” (10). Whereas Marx writes that primitive accumulation erases even the memory of connection to land (Marx, 1977: 889), Federici sees value in restoring that memory, inspired by the landed resistance of Indigenous people in Africa. This chapter is trying to do in the intellectual register what Federici does in affirming anti-colonial struggles within Europe.

But what of Marxism’s tendency to rob species other than our own of agency by reducing land to resource? Are there contemporary Marxisms whose ethics come through the land? Eco-socialists like O’Connor, Benton, Burkett, Foster and Saito, have, in recent years, dedicated themselves to the question of Marxism’s relationship to nature, building from earlier analyses like Schmidt’s (2014 [1962]), and of course taking Marx’s own writing as a point of departure, especially his natural science notebooks (Saito, 2017: 12). Altogether, these inquiries have generated important ways, connected to Marx, to think about capitalism’s relationship to nature. For example, O’Connor, the primary editor for *Capitalism, Socialism, Nature*, developed concepts like “the conditions of production” and “the second contradiction of capitalism” (1991) to make ecological sense of capitalism. Foster, meanwhile, working closely from within Marx, further developed an understanding of capitalism’s ‘treadmill of production’ (2000), underlining the scary and alarming acceleration of production, while also doing early underlabouring to develop Marx’s concept of the ‘metabolic rift’ (ibid). Benton, finally, turns the spotlight on Marx and notices how his fixation on large-scale industry and the factory leaves him inattentive to labour processes that do not effect transformations in nature; but, rather, work more
closely with natural limits, as in agriculture (to a degree) and hunting and gathering (Benton, 1989).

From this wide and probing scholarship, in this chapter I wish to foreground Burkett’s authoritative *Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective* (1999). While noticing how Marx’s ecological analysis of capitalism brings to light pernicious dimensions of capital’s relationship to nature, I particularly appreciate how Burkett also tries to show what sort of relationship to land might be possible through an affirmative reading of Marx’s ecological thought. Like the other strands of Marx and contemporary Marxisms I look at in this chapter, a close reading of this branch of Marxism would entail another dissertation. Instead, I want to hone in on whether, in his most ecologically-minded prescriptions, Burkett incorporates some of what would matter to Indigenous people in guiding a relationship to the countless other species with and through which we live. To anticipate my results, while the eco-socialists undoubtedly do crucial work in bringing ecological concerns to the centre of Marxism, they do so while remaining within elements of Marxist epistemology that I do not think endow land with a spiritual core, entailing no mutuality between people and other beings.

When Burkett shifts to a description of Marx’s vision of communism, in the third and final part of the book, which he entitles “Nature and Communism” (145), he attempts to “redirect the debate over Marx’s vision from its prior focus on the allocative efficiency of planning versus the market” - what we might call the priorities that political economy centres - “toward Marx’s original emphasis on communism as a system of human development” (Burkett, 2014: xxv-xxvi) – the Marx of 1844. From this grounding, Burkett begins by revisiting the part of *Capital* that I looked at in Chapter Three when I
extended Coulthard’s critiques of Marx into the site of capital’s site of valorization. I want to begin here because I believe Burkett’s ecologically-leaning interpretation of Marx reveals concerning and recurring limitations in Marxism.

Burkett acknowledges that many “Marxologists of all political persuasions” (147) interpret Marx making “Promethean” arguments for “the historical progress of humanity over nature” and the role of capitalism in advancing this progress in Marx’s analysis of the capitalist labour process. Burkett, instead, wants to argue that “Marx’s belief in the historical progressivity of capitalism is not based on an anthropocentric preference for material wealth over nature” (149). Burkett nuances Marx’s argument by “distinguishing the human-developmental content from the productive form of capitalist progress” (154). Burkett feels that the Promethean interpretation errs because “Marx does not see capitalism’s necessity in terms of a simple floating humanity on a rising tide of material goods and free time created at nature’s expense” (ibid). Instead, “the key potential Marx sees prefigured by capitalism is for a less restricted form of human development, both socially and vis-a-vis nature” (ibid). Burkett underlines the point by insisting that “[c]apital’s development of productive forces (hence the negation of scarcity rationales for class limits on human development), along with its extensive and intensive development of the social division of labour and exchange (hence the potential universalization of free human individuality)...are the vehicles here, not the human-evolutionary content” (ibid).

Burkett’s analysis flies in an opposite direction to the analysis I carried out guided by Coulthard’s premises. From Burkett we still get an inability to gauge how development of productive forces under capitalism leads to the evisceration of the spiritually productive forces of relational autonomy and consensual intimacy. Burkett also reproduces an arc that identifies locality with restriction, and culminates in the universalization of a free
individual rather than an all-propertied and -directional embodiment of responsible, consensual relationship. Methodologically, while attempting to bring the division between proletarians and the land closer, Burkett seems to push other social locations further away: Burkett simply does not position his reading of Marx within any critiques of Marxism beyond ecological ones, a fact that might explain how, like Harvey, he argues Indigenous people are better off thanks to capitalist displacement as it puts them on the conveyor belt towards a potential universalization of free individuality.

Even in Burkett’s most ecologically affirming prescriptions I feel uneasy about naming a thread that could lead towards decolonial solidarity with Indigenous struggles, or prefigure decolonial outcomes for white settler relationships to ourselves and the land. In summarizing his own results, Burkett argues that four conditions must be met for a communist “economy” to be considered “ecologically sustainable” (ibid: xxvi). First, it must “protect the land as communal wealth for current and future generations” (ibid), a tenet that, however well intentioned, still imagines land as resource, and constitutes the economy as separate from the current generation, which sustains a division between economy and some other part(s) of the social where people who do not form part of the economy reside. Second, the economy must “diffuse scientific and technological knowledge among all producers and communities as required for this ecological responsibility to be fulfilled throughout the entire process of production and consumption” (ibid). While I want to notice that the language of responsibility resonates with formulations we’ve seen in Indigenous Resurgence Theory, other difficulties stand out. Burkett, in spite of wanting to ground in human development, nonetheless sticks to the materialist restriction of production relations as encompassing human ones.
Meanwhile, the knowledge and skills that Burkett most wants to endow communists with are scientific and technological ones. While Kwezens certainly embodies both in her own discoveries, we can again hear Simpson pointing out how settlers miss the entire web of loving relationships that are the most important determinants to Kwezens’ discovery of how to consensually tap the maple tree for its sweet water. Burkett ends with more promising prescriptions, asserting the need to “recognize the uncertainty and incompleteness of our knowledge” and “respect the need for diversity in human economic relations” (ibid), but I cannot help but feel he has not really followed his own tenets: Indigenous scholarship is wholly absent from the book, and Indigenous people do not bear more than a passing mention.

Burkett’s development of an ethics and politics for the ecological dimension of Marx’s communist vision also provides a test of my curiosity in section one about the prospects for grounding Marxism in the larger philosophical house of Marx’s early materialist emphasis on alienation. I aired my worries, above, that while providing for an expansion of the social and personal sphere, Marx’s own immediate reduction of self-activity to work, and social considerations to production, would nonetheless foreclose the potentialities of the richer philosophical footing. Burkett proves my concerns are warranted. Simply replacing one set of philosophical premises for another makes little difference if the replacement does not get worked through into the other aspects of the replaced philosophy. It does not seem to occur to Burkett, for instance, that if the emotional sphere is to count, then Marxists need to develop a methodological means by which to incorporate the textures of intimacy registered by the emotional landscape, and a politics by which to uphold the importance of this sphere. Simpson, grounded in
Anishinaabe culture, shows one way to do so by insisting on the web of embodied kinship through which Indigenous thought takes place. Similarly, Coulthard’s crucial concept of grounded normativity entails embodied relationship to land. Worryingly, Burkett writes a book celebrated by Marxists without giving any real signs he’s aware that based on the philosophical premises he commits to, something might be missing from the relationship Marxists are to have with nature or each other.

These concerns, again, rebound on my own work. In this dissertation, from the many places I might have foregrounded as a point of departure in doing transformative repair to the Marxist tradition, I have chosen ethics as the place to begin. Once again, this comes from trying to pay close attention to Indigenous people and their thought while also reading those instructions into the specific domain of my own responsibility, the Marxist tradition. By insisting on always beginning from yourself, Indigenous thought also always begins from embodiment and the ethical register, elements that I have diagnosed are difficult to apprehend within Marxism. Of course, brought into white settler bodies already primed to begin and end with consideration of the self, this could prove to be yet one more cul-de-sac for sending Marxism in the direction of a decolonial praxis. My hope is that the values I have tried to cross the water with, while crucial to embody, also all point beyond ourselves and into a colonial world that attempts to occlude and eviscerate them.

Section Three – Autonomist Marxism and the Site of Production

As I argued in Chapter Three, refiguring capital’s site of production as the site of colonialism’s daily renewal makes visible the material reasons for the concerns I have
been airing in this chapter. If Marxism arises from the proletarian condition created in and through capitalist colonialism, then it will bear in the register of its thought the eviscerations of the values I am trying to bring to Marxism’s centre. Furthermore, consistent with Marx himself, no amount of intellectual work can be sufficient to repair these deficiencies until the material structure that generates them has been transformed, even if we might hope, with Gramsci, that better ideas can become a material force unto themselves when crises in the colonial system help people question it. Are there any threads within contemporary Marxism that might lead us out of this mostly invisible colonial labyrinth at the heart of capitalism?

I want to nominate the work of John Holloway, particularly *Change the World Without Taking Power*, as one place to look for resonances with the refiguration I am arguing that solidarity with Indigenous people entails (2005 [2002]). Like Indigenous Resurgence Theory, Holloway urges an approach that begins from the ethical sphere in an embodied way: “In the beginning is the scream. We scream” (1). He shows his sensitization to the trap of individualization when he explains that “we start from ‘we’, not from ‘I’, because ‘I’ already presupposes an individualization, a claim to individuality in thoughts and feelings” (4). He is wanting to avoid the tendency for “[t]he starting point for thought [to] become not the person-as-part-of-the-community but the individual as a person with his – [a pronoun he chooses to “emphasize alienation” (250)] - own distinct identity” (60).

Further, beginning from the scream also affirms the emotional register to life under capitalism, an affirmation he sets against the tendency within some branches of Marxism to say “it is unscientific to scream” (3).
At the same time, Holloway does not abandon the intellectual register. Rather, he brings intellect to bear on why those of us who are proletarianized want to scream. In his poetic voice, “[c]riticism..is the theoretical voice of the scream” (114). While distancing himself from the tradition of scientific Marxism, Holloway brings near Marx’s early materialism, particularly Marx’s analysis of “self-estrangement” (44), and weds it to Marx’s concept of “fetishism”, which he argues is “the central category in Marx’s Capital” (43). In Holloway’s rendering, alienation describes the “rupturing of doing which is characteristic of the capitalist organisation of production” (43). Specifically, “the commodity is the point of fracture of the social flow of doing” (46). Fetishism describes the fractured results of alienation, where the done comes to dominate the doing, creating a world where the continuously reproduced outcome of ongoing self-estrangement is a world of things – the thingification of reality itself – dominating the active world of doing (48-9). Holloway stresses how “[w]e are born into a world in which the community of doing is fractured. The separation of doing and done permeates our whole relation to the world and to those around us” (49).

Holloway’s knitting together of alienation with fetishism resonates with Indigenous Resurgence thought. One way Kimmerer, for instance, expresses the difference between settler colonial and Indigenous culture, is by noticing how Indigenous languages are verb-based, whereas in settler languages nouns predominate (2013: 70). In emphasizing the connection between alienation and fetishism Holloway also maintains a thoroughgoing emphasis on “autonomy” (21), while also wanting to take care to avoid its Scylla and Charybdis trap of either falling into building power through the state, or falling into self-absorption: “[autonomy] is far, far wider than that which is usually
indicated by the term” (ibid). Holloway’s attempt to urge a politics that does not fall into the mainstream Marxist habit of state-centric politics marks another major point of resonance with Indigenous Resurgence politics, where mostly matrilineal lines of authority are embodied and diffused throughout a nation. In fact, Holloway links his core political concept of autonomy to “the confused area in which the Zapatista call resonates, the area in which anti-power grows” (ibid).

Holloway’s invocation of the Zapatistas points to one place of limitation for me in Holloway’s creative refiguration of the Marxist tradition. In keeping with the connection Holloway wants to maintain between the self-estrangement of doing, and the fetishing domination it leads to, Holloway makes much of the “tension between that which exists and that which might conceivably exist, between the indicative (that which is) and the subjunctive (that which might be)” (6). Holloway locates the scream simultaneously as the moment of refusal of that which is, and the moment of “a projected doing, the project of doing something to change that which we scream against” (25). To dwell in the place of the scream, for Holloway, “is to wander in a largely unexplored world” (22); it is to admit, in answer to the question of how to change the world without taking power, that “we do not know” (ibid). While I appreciate the honesty and humility of Holloway’s response, and also agree, at the same time, I think Holloway minimizes how much Indigenous thought could provide compass points for our striving in this confusing place of self-estranged fetishism. On the one hand, Holloway appears to agree, citing how the challenge to change the world without taking power “has been formulated most clearly by the Zapatista uprising in the south-east of Mexico” (20). But on the other hand, he does not draw any real sustenance from the usos y costumbres that have grounded the
Zapatistas in their revolutionary refusal of transforming their world through the state. A less generous reading of Holloway would maybe point out that here, at the last, Holloway continues the Marxist tendency to subsume others into the single world created by capitalism, a deficiency that traps us in the dialectic and renders opaque the very Ariadnes that are trying to hand us a spool of thread by which we might escape this estranging and fetishizing labryinth. I prefer to immanently develop Holloway’s affirmation of the Zapatistas by saying there is an ‘is’ - the Indigenous world – that might also be an ‘ought’, or an actually existing set of ethics, practices and relations those of us trapped in the “spider’s web” (5) of capitalist colonialism may want to take seriously in trying to extricate ourselves from the trap.

Conclusion

The task of this chapter has been to practice friendship and affirmation towards Marx and some contemporary Marxisms. At the same time, like the Indigenous materialism I am trying to learn from Simpson, the practice of Two Row values does not proceed capriciously: I have tried to direct attention to those places in Marx and contemporary Marxisms that might provide alternative intellectual points of moorage to better support Marxists in looking over to the Indigenous canoe and actually grasp the full depth and complexity of its practice. I want to translate the depth and complexity of Indigeneity conveyed by Indigenous Resurgence Theory into a fuller set of instructions for political work by Marxist settlers.

I began my task with Marx himself. Thinking about the philosophical presuppositions that Marx commits himself to in the founding of historical materialism,
which we examined closely in Chapter Two, Marxism needs a more capacious philosophical starting point to think about people; it also needs an even more thorough commitment to a multi-propertied, relational ontology than historical materialism allows. We saw how Marx makes his cut into reality based on the ontological bet that physical survival is the *sine qua non* of human life, and that therefore an epistemology created to understand human life should grasp how people organize their production. In the spirit of friendship, how could Marx have thought otherwise? He was writing at a time of intense material scarcity on a continent in crisis. As he brilliantly and scathingly documents, particularly in the chapter on the Working Day in *Capital*, capital was industriously killing the bearer of labour-power, the proletarians whose liberation he dedicated his life to.

The problem is that Marx’s act of revolutionary fidelity to proletarians, by creating an epistemology programmed to never lose sight of the struggle to stay alive, inadvertently expels from historical materialism qualities of relational life equally necessary to survival and indispensable for flourishing. Simpson’s own act of loving attention to Kwezens’s movement through the sugar bush, and the grounded normativities that guide her movement, show that the non-coercive domain of Indigenous life shows Indigenous people embodying all of their properties all at once in social practices that ‘stack’ spiritual, relational, emotional and productive functions: a single point of Indigenous life, as embodied by Kwezens, displays the intimacies of kinship, the rigour of scientific discovery and attention, the consensual connection to animal and plant nations through spiritual respect, and the skillful manipulation of productive forces to nourish the body. Stated with language Marx made use of, indigenous resurgence can be
considered an expression of concretized, many-sided species being. As such, it can provide the normative foundation to think what transformations are required to end self-estrangement and the alienation of parts of the species from the land, each other, ourselves and what we make. It invites us to see settler colonialism, and the sub-systems that have organized it, as a complex set of modes of estrangement, from the state to capital, patriarchy and hetero-normativity. It also invites us to see those of us who are white proletarianized settlers as employing our life-activity to reproduce self-estrangement, and to critically analyse the identities, values and practices that perpetuate that self-estrangement while still preserving the agency to move towards less-alienated modes of self-activity.

My tour of more propitious premises for decolonization within Marx and contemporary Marxisms has underscored that Marx(ism) bears the riven and divided qualities of the self-estranged European-descended settler world from which it comes. While each element of thought I investigated has provided points of meaningful connection with values and ideas of Indigenous Resurgence Theory, I have equally felt compelled to notice the very real continuing limits of even a maximally Indigenous-resonating Marx(ism). As the aim of this chapter has not been primarily argumentative, I will not conclude by attempting to sketch out a more integrated Marx(ism); Nonetheless, the interested reader can connect for themselves the resonant places in Marx, Mies, Federici, Burkett and Holloway and possibly add their own. Within the project of my dissertation, this chapter has underlined that the brilliant insights into capitalist life that Marx’s development of historical materialism allows, simultaneously dazzle Marx(ists) from noticing aspects of life that lie beyond historical materialism’s spotlight.
Nonetheless, brought all together, Marx(ism) can generate many of the ingredients that could continue to track capital while also developing the navigational skills to value spirit and heart, both as they are disoriented within the self-estranging of capital’s site of expanded reproduction, and as they emit orienting signals from the land, social reproduction, and inside us. Ultimately, I feel this chapter has affirmed my choice to emphasize the ethical register as pivotal to Marx(ism)’s renewal in a decolonial direction; I believe relational autonomy, consensual intimacy and responsibility point Marx(ism) beyond itself into the illuminating exigencies of Indigenous solidarity according to the Two Row.
Conclusion

Introduction

This conclusion sets itself two tasks. First, in section one, I summarize the results of the preceding chapters with an eye to highlighting the contributions I believe the dissertation makes to interpreting the world. Second, in section two, I make some closing statements on whether the dissertation can help shed light on what it means to change it; in other words, on what it means to decolonize. I close the dissertation by considering how I might complicate and deepen it.

Section One – Summary of the Dissertation

In this dissertation I have claimed fidelity to two core aspects of Marx’s thought, while changing the social practice to which I have connected these aspects. First, I claim fidelity to Marx’s philosophical method of developing premises and theoretical understandings of the world from an examination of real-world social practices, a commitment most clearly elaborated in his “Theses on Feuerbach” (Marx, 1979 [1845]). Second, Marx’s ethical commitment that “we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (Marx, 1979 [1848]: 491), set forth in The Communist Manifesto, also guides this work. At the same time, while attempting to stick to these two aspects, I have also self-consciously attempted to change the real-world practice to which these aspects are linked. Rather than beginning from (and ending with) proletarian practice, as Marx does, I have begun from Indigenous practice, as elaborated by Indigenous resurgence theorists, while, crucially, attempting to sustain attention to, or ending with, proletarian practice.
This shift at the level of practice has produced significant reverberations for and challenges to many of the ethical, ontological, epistemological, theoretical, and political premises that Marx and many contemporary Marxists commit to. The dissertation sets forth from the fact many Indigenous activists and intellectuals have found Marx and Marxists to perpetuate colonialism in their work to change the world. My task has been to take this fact seriously, not by mounting a defence against it, but rather by believing the charge and carrying out the deepest investigation I’m capable of for why it might be so. I have felt motivated to undergo this investigation as an act of solidarity with my Indigenous comrades, and hopefully in the service of the revolutionary project Black feminists inaugurated when they interlocked capitalism with patriarchy, white supremacy and heterosexism.

In Chapter One, I developed an ethical and methodological framework for the dissertation by adopting a critically updated Two Row Wampum. The chapter reviewed core literature within Indigenous Resurgence Theory to orient myself as a settler wanting to do intellectual solidarity work. For the dissertation, this chapter centred my methodological ethic to ‘look over’ and take Indigenous thought as my point of departure. While entertaining the ambiguities, uncertainties, and possibilities of perpetuating ‘moves to innocence’ of continuing to use a treaty framework settlers have never upheld, I nonetheless committed to begining from myself in analysing Marxism, maintaining the middle row by thinking the implications of Indigenous thought on colonialism into the heart of Marxism, and practicing friendship towards the Marxist tradition by affirming its capacity to shed light on our colonial condition.
In Chapter Two, I went back to the origins of historical materialism to make lucid the presuppositions on which the subsequent development of Marx’s political economy depends, to show the doubts that arise about historical materialism’s capacity to animate the free development of each and all, and to begin suggesting presuppositions and values, arising from Leanne Simpson’s theorization of Indigenous practice, that might replace the limited ones Marx arrives at by restricting the development of his materialism to buttress proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie.

In Chapter Three, with my sensitization to valued Indigenous properties in hand, and conscious of the presuppositions of historical materialism that prevent Marx noticing them, I journeyed into the heart of Marx’s analysis of capitalism, to capital’s point of production and extraction of surplus-value from the proletariat. With coordinates from Coulthard to keep my bearings in the hidden abode of production, I was able to suggest a refiguration of the site of capital’s expanded reproduction, from Marx’s emphasis on exploitation and unpaid labour, to a site that daily renews the colonial condition. Viewed that way, I identified a material structure that re-instantiates the divisions Marx incorporates into his own thought, and re-eviscerates people’s capacity to embody the values that sustain Indigenous life.

In Chapter Four, I turned to an analysis of the political presuppositions that Marx takes on board through Hegel. From the dizzying complexity of Hegel’s thought, I zeroed in on the logic of Hegel’s master-slave relation as the core impulse that animates Marx’s attempt to think proletarians towards freedom. With the logic of the Two Row Wampum as a contrast, along with Coulthard’s elaboration of Fanon’s two-fold politics of self-affirmation and struggle, I suggested that the logic Hegel originates, wherein the slave
finds freedom by passing through the unique ontological-epistemic conditions of labouring bondage, commits Marx to a self-defeating political orientation. Worse, Marx’s political logic inadvertently furthers colonial ends by misdiagnosing the movement into colonial intensification as a path towards freedom. Finally, it doubles down on this inadvertent furthering of the colonial condition through its political rendering of master positions as tending towards sluggishness, which perpetually steers Marxism away from considering its own implication in the perpetuation of systems of oppression. I suggested that perhaps the material process of proletarianization itself, similarly to the process of commodity fetishism that Marx names, disguises capitalism’s ongoing colonial premises, while destroying the values and practices that might reveal those premises. I ended the chapter by creating some protocols for proletarianized white settlers to begin stepping out of the dialectic and pointed to responsibility as a value to guide this orientation.

In Chapter Five, to complete the ethical project of the dissertation, I suggested alternative anchorage points within Marx and contemporary Marxisms that might intellectually resonate with the Indigenous presuppositions (and values) that have come up through my look over to Indigenous resurgence. This chapter did not aim to replace the need to ‘look over’ to Indigenous resurgence theory; rather, it sought to practice friendship and respect to the Marxist tradition by affirming propitious places for developing a more anti-colonial Marxism attentive to the values and practices that must be resurged even as we struggle against settler colonialism in solidarity with our Indigenous comrades.

Section Two - Decolonization
What if Marxists were to grant Indigenous people the same far-seeing and far-reaching qualities as those Marx attributes to the Communist Party? What if the Haudenosaunee were as perspicacious as the Communists, that “most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others...[with] the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate results of the proletarian movement” (Marx, 1978 [1848]: 484)? What if the Haudenosaunee offered the Dutch a framework in full recognition of the existential, relational and spiritual results of displacement and proletarianization? What if the Haudenosaunee already understood that the Dutch settlers, who viewed them as children, had forgotten their responsibilities to the implicate order, and offered them a framework by which they might recuperate their connection to their own relational autonomy and their capacity to steer their ship in a non-interfering way?

I want to begin this final section with these questions because part of upending developmentalism within Marxism, and reckoning seriously with the exigencies of Indigenous solidarity, requires that Marxists open ourselves up to the possibility that Indigenous people have known all along that we, like so many other Europeans of various philosophical and political persuasions, have lost contact with properties of being, or the implicate order, that Indigenous people have long since developed ceremonies, protocols, and modes of governance to remain connected to and reproduce the conditions of. In other words, that Indigenous practices of consensual kinship and relational autonomy are not the hallmarks of a consciousness somehow blinkered and enmired by Life, but rather, a relational practice of responsibility to ensure its flourishing fully aware of the consequences of not doing so.
Without being folded into the deeper and broader framework of the Two Row, we have seen how the logic of Hegel’s dialectic, reproduced through Marx, can end up drawing people deeper into master-slave dynamics. Returning to Hegel’s transition into the period of the dialectic, perhaps the element of Hegel’s analysis most antithetical to Indigeneity lies in the way that the purging of immediacy, and its replacement with fear and trembling, marks a kind of step towards, not away, from mutual recognition. We see Marx put similar conditions on revolution in *The German Ideology*. For him, “*estrangement* can only be abolished” when it has “rendered the great mass of humanity propertyless”, or put them in a condition of servitude. This condition must also become “intolerable”, or stimulate a deep, negative feeling. Finally, “a universal development of productive forces” has to have taken place. In other words, capitalists have to have made proletarians develop, through labour, capitalist modes of social cooperation to fashion a great wealth of objects, such that when proletarians make the revolution they do not simply make “want...general” and reproduce “the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business” anew (Marx, 1978: 161). Hegel and Marx stand united in their political logic of drawing slaves or proletarians deeper into exploitation as a condition of their emancipation.

And yet, it might be possible for Marxists to adhere ourselves to Fanon and Coulthard’s mode of struggle. Harking back to the logic of Marx’s philosophical method, it is tempting to wonder whether he might even invite the transformations I am suggesting need to occur for Marxist theory to animate decolonial struggle? Put in Marx’s language, I wonder if he might favour Indigenous people as a more revolutionary subject than the proletariat? We saw above that Marx took the proletarian standpoint
because, in his estimation, breaking the chains that bound it would release the fullest possible expression of humanity. In other words, for Marx the most radical class is the one whose liberation can potentiate the fullest expression of humanity, even as that humanity is beset by a relationship of oppression or exploitation. In his 1843 critique of Hegel, given the relationship Marx posits between social life and thought, he also takes the proletarian standpoint for intellectual reasons, as he imagines proletarian revolution will also end, not only ‘abstract individualism’ in practice, but also ‘mystifying idealisms’ in thought.

Marx’s search for a class with the most radical chains invites a comparison between revolution and decolonization according to his criterion. If we take the comparison between Marx and Simpson seriously, then decolonization, or the removal of all the conditions that undermine Kwezens’ presence in the Sugar Bush, as well as the embodiment of all the conditions that do ensure them, seems to promise not just an end to abstract individualism, but also the mystifications that beset Marx. Kwezens’ practice ends ‘abstract humanism’, or the practice of a division and hierarchy between people and the relationships that surround them. At the same time, the ‘universalization’ of Kwezens promises an end to ‘humanistic idealism’, or forms of thought separated from the bodies, relationships and landed contexts that give rise to them. Had he been able to slip the surly bonds of Europe, the Marx of 1843 might well have compared the standpoint of Indigenous people with people who had been proletarianized and opted to locate himself at the point of Indigeneity to think a revolutionary politics. In other words, at the end of my comparison between Indigenous resurgence theory and Marx I am left wondering, not whether Marx was radical, but whether Marx was radical enough.
But if this is the case, then surely the intelligibility of what a revolutionary subject comprises stretches to bursting? To begin with strategic considerations, what does it mean to have a revolutionary subject with a shrinking number of people able to stand in the relations that make it so? In the essay I’m considering, Marx insisted that “[m]aterial force can only be overthrown by material force” (Marx, 1978 [1843]: 60), and Marx at least had the consolation of watching his revolutionary subject numerically expand in leaps and bounds. Sizing up this political reality on Turtle Island, Coulthard states that “settler colonialism has rendered our populations too small to affect this magnitude of change” (Coulthard, 2014: 173). Moreover, within my own dissertation, following the strictures of the Two Row, I have set limits on who and what Indigeneity can consist of. One perilous solution to Coulthard’s numerical problem, which as far as I can detect is mostly unwelcome from Indigenous people, at least outside of the closest and most-longstanding relationships, is to explore a reconceptualization of Indigeneity. Not, of course, to lose the robust intelligibility of Alfred and Corntassel’s canonical definition (2005), but to perhaps provide un-appropriatable openings for settlers to move towards it.

For Alfred and Corntassel

“[t]he communities, clans, nations and tribes we call Indigenous peoples are just that: Indigenous to the lands they inhabit, in contrast to and in contention with the colonial societies that have spread out from Europe and other centres of empire. It is this place-based existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples, that fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other peoples of the world” (597).

The first sentence in their definition provides a welcome safeguard against any settler claims to Indigeneity. Without going back to Catalunya or Sicilia, where most of my ancestors are from, and recuperating the grounded normativities that arose there, as well
as struggling against the systems that have mostly wiped out those normativities, neither I nor my ancestors will ever be on a path towards Indigenization. This kind of safeguarding seems crucial to avoid interpretations of Indigeneity that homogenize and make decolonization too easy at the expense of being efficacious. As one example, Robin Wall Kimmerer’s suggestion that Skywoman was an immigrant to Anishinaabe territory, just as white settlers were, violates Alfred and Corntassel’s distinction (Kimmerer, 2013: 3-10). The Anishinaabe’s creation story came from the land they have related with since time immemorial; my arrival story does not.

Given the long and monstrous history of white settlers appropriating Indigeneity, exploring ways to open up the category of Indigenous makes me blanch, and I of course agree that preserving difference in the face of an assimilation machine must be the priority. And yet, fidelity to my analysis suggests that understood relationally, and crystallized through values and practices, what can appear as a binary, for example with the Two Row, can be thought in a less binary way. This might even accord with Indigenous thought, even if the reality of settler colonialism demands a protective concealment of this possibility in most circumstances. As Simpson explains in her response to Coulthard’s book, “the duality present in so many Indigenous intelligence systems is misinterpreted as a binary – day versus night. In reality, every second of every day has a different level of light because the entire system is in motion” (Simpson, 2015). Simpson’s expression, thought next to her essay interpreting Kwezens, suggests a logic of something more like intensities of relationality, and relative embodiments of consensual intimacy, responsibility and relational autonomy, for people to make contextual judgments in service of decolonial work. In this reformulation Indigenous people still
mark their distinction from settlers through their millennia-long lineages of historical, relational density and richness of protocols, ceremonies and myriad other practices through which to sustain the embodiment of Indigenous values.

This reformulation may open a door (and admittedly open doors can let in all manner of unwelcome visitors) to a detection of properties by settler people who are the products of dispossession and proletarianization to meaningfully recognize that our liberation is bound up with that of Indigenous people. Writing this reminds me that Marx suggests “[theoretical criticism] ends, therefore, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, and contemptible being” (Marx, 1978: 60). The underlabouring I have been trying to do in this dissertation is to provide the kind of theoretical recognition that settlers like me have, for the most part, had the lucid practice of these properties, and even the memory of them, drained from us by the vampire of the dominant order. It strikes me, then, that for Indigeneity to be possible, a necessary condition will be for settlers to recommence, in ongoing guidance with Indigenous people, connecting with our own capacity for relational autonomy, consensual intimacy and responsibility so as to increasingly live in recognition not only of the spiritual core to entities living as Indigenous, but also our own.

This work of reconnection to the embers of our own capacity for Indigeneity, while intensely inward, also is irreducibly outward, and in both cases deeply material. In what sense can I possibly mean ‘material’? It after all connotes deadness (Bennett, 2009) and therefore could not be more contrary to the suggestion that every living entity in the universe has a spiritual, living core. What seems resonant in materialism to me, at least as
Marx construes it, is the non-voluntaristic, non-individualistic aspects of his philosophical method. If nothing else, Marx believed that if we are to change the world for the better we need to get it right and that what ‘right’ and ‘it’ looks like isn’t up to any capricious consideration of our own. Marx’s resolution in Thesis VII that “[s]ocial life is essentially *practical*” (Marx, 1978: 145), and concomitant argument that “[a]ll mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice” (ibid) allowed him, by tuning into proletarian practice, to disclose the secret of capital’s exploitation of proletarians, and even retroduce how material processes, like commodity fetishism (Marx, 1977: 165), explain the mystifications of Smith, Ricardo and Mill’s liberal political economy.

I’ve suggested the colonial process itself provides the explanation for why Marx’s historical materialism leads him into the mystifications of flattening the ontology of what people are about to a category of needs, and foregrounding economic production as the activity to pay attention to, to make sense of people. Now that, at Coulthard’s urging, we have examined the capitalist labour process from a colonial standpoint, we can see how the material process of capitalist production itself imposes the divisions that Marx incorporates unknowingly into his theoretical work. And we can also see how this very production process materially jettisons the very possibility of cultivating the values that would allow for Indigenous practices to resurge. A contribution I hope this dissertation makes is to show that meaningful decolonization must include the site of settler proletarian’s daily and generational re-colonization in its ambit.

In fact, the colonial process shares a similar logic to Marx’s explanation of commodity fetishism. With commodity fetishism, Marx wants to make sense of how a
system that arises through the actions of people ends up making people feel as though they are dominated by things. This strange effect stands out most when it comes to the money commodity (Marx, 1977: 168). On the one hand, money can only fulfill its use-value to aid in the circulation of commodities if it represents a measure of socially necessary labour time. And yet, on the other hand, money is the primary means by which the social character of labour becomes concealed, as it more and more facilitates that labour be expended privately for the purpose of exchange, and that production and exchange proceed at greater removes from each other. Similarly the colonial process. As more and more people are doubly ‘freed’ (Marx, 1977: 874) and brought into a condition of proletarianization, the real secret of primitive and ongoing colonization becomes ever more concealed: its continued reliance on living labour and living land, the ontological current Fanon reaches for, that Coulthard amplifies, and that Simpson theorizes through Kwezens. Thought this way, the colonial process conceals that proletarians, too, remain a part of the land however much our existence becomes atomized. The revolutionary task becomes to reconnect with connection and to cast off the relations that keep us dazzled. To reformulate Fanon, “[g]enuine disalienation will have been achieved only when things [and people], in the most materialist sense, have resumed their rightful place[-based existences]” (Fanon, 2008: xv, square bracketed text mine).

Returning to Marx’s dazzlement, staking the development of historical materialism on proletarian practice already condemns him to premises that reproduce the colonial division for materialist reasons. And, beginning from Indigenous practice provides the rational solution to understanding the enigma of Marx’s colonial impulses in spite of his ethical commitment to everyone’s free development. Fidelity to Marx’s
seventh thesis, then, demands a radical expansion of materialism itself to include the occluded properties of Indigenous practice. Getting ‘it’, when it comes to decolonization, means we need a historical materialism that understands that “to access knowledge...we have to engage our entire bodies: our physical being, emotional self, our spiritual energy, and our intellect” (Simpson, 2011: 42). Only when we posit all these qualities, and their irreducible connection to other-than-human beings, can we look at capitalism and properly take stock of not only the “letters of blood and fire” of its primitive and ongoing accumulation (Marx, 1977: 875), but also its daily recolonizing violence even amongst proletarians.

And what of ‘right’? What is to be done? I wonder if one contribution Marx continues to make in helping think, feel, relate and practice in decolonial directions lies with helping to understand the difference that capitalism makes to settler colonialism. I began this dissertation affirming Combahee River’s assertion that systems of domination interlock to uphold each other, and I have noted how Indigenous intellectuals have been deeply incorporating this insight and producing analyses of settler colonialism that grasp some of the manifold ways it interlocks with other systems of oppression. Too many inquiries into decolonization begin and end in the ethical register. I worry that while ethics are a necessary condition for a decolonial politics, they are nonetheless insufficient. An equally necessary condition remains the political expression of those ethics, a condition that a transformed historical materialism could potentially do indispensable underlabouring for. Marx’s use of the materialist method to track capital helps us see why decolonial politics must also be anti-capitalist.
If I were to have the privilege of continuing this intellectual work, I would want, most of all, to attempt to take the feedback gained from sharing it and develop the transformations I have argued for in ethical, analytical, methodological, ontological and epistemological registers in more politicized directions. What can a decolonially-aspiring philosophy of praxis look like for European descended proletarians? While this dissertation has not ignored the political domain, it has felt premature to me to move from diagnosis of unhelpful political logics into a program for transforming the world for the better. I would like to put the results of this dissertation into conversation with the findings of the Black Radical tradition, and I especially want to attend to the solidarities in practice and thought taking place between Indigenous and Black radicals right now.

Conclusion

This conclusion has summarized the results of the dissertation and made a brief foray into thinking what it might mean to decolonize, and why Marxists may want to embrace this political horizon for peaceful coexistence. I wish to end the dissertation by expressing my sincere commitment to the continued resurgence of Indigenous people and the long work of struggling against settler colonialism and for decolonization as a settler and colonized person.

¡Hasta la victoria, siempre!
References


