

Thawing the Tension:
U.S.-Greenland Relations and Climate Change (non)Securitization

by

Joe Edward Crowther
B.A.H., University of Leeds, 2015

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Political Science

© Joe Edward Crowther, 2021
University of Victoria

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author.

I acknowledge and respect the ɫə́kʷəŋən peoples on whose traditional territory the university stands, and the Songhees, Esquimalt and W̱SÁNEĆ peoples whose historical relationships with the land continue to this day.

Supervisory Committee

Thawing the Tension:
U.S.-Greenland Relations and Climate Change (non)Securitization

by

Joe Edward Crowther
B.A.H., University of Leeds, 2015

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Will Greaves, Department of Political Science
Supervisor

Dr. Colin Bennett, Department of Political Science
Departmental Member

Abstract

The Legend says:

‘It is in the Arctic that we will find that the importance of our common humanity concerns outweighs our differences’ - Aqqaluk Lynge

U.S. Arctic foreign policy and the U.S. influence on Greenland has been studied predominantly regarding U.S. military and defence concerns. However, during the Trump Administration, the U.S. Arctic foreign policy agenda significantly shifted, placing Greenland as an integral component of the 2017-2021 Republican administration’s Arctic geopolitical aspirations, and not only for defence purposes. I argue that U.S.-Greenland relations were significantly impacted when President Trump offered to purchase Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark in the summer of 2019. Following the offer, Greenland emerged as a focal point of the Trump Administration’s geopolitical and economic security interests in the Arctic. Consequently, Greenland finds itself at the centre of a complex Arctic arena, with vastly larger and more powerful states taking an interest in Greenland’s economic potential due to its natural resources. Nevertheless, Trump’s offer was highly problematic as Greenland is an Inuit nation with the political goal to become independent from their colonial ties with Denmark. Despite the offer causing initial outrage, U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations have only developed since. I analyze why this has occurred, conveying that the similar approaches of Trump and Greenland towards climate change created the possibility for the strengthening of U.S.-Greenland bilateral relations. Climate change threatens the Arctic, yet the melting ice also provides more accessibility to rich natural resources. Climate change therefore presents not only threats, but opportunities. Greenland has a right and desire to pursue economic development for a financially viable independence through utilizing carboniferous, extractive industries. The U.S. has also sought to utilize the economic opportunity that Arctic climate change presents but with different motives. The U.S. and Greenland have subsequently become interlinked in a complex Arctic constellation of foreign policy and economic opportunity. Regardless of changing approaches to climate change, the Trump Administration has significantly impacted the future of U.S.-Greenland relations and Greenland’s political future.

List of Abbreviations

AC: Arctic Council
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CBDR: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CO₂: Carbon Dioxide
DEW: Distant Early Warning Line
ECCC: Environment and Climate Change Canada
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone
EU: European Union
GEUS: Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland
GHG: Greenhouse Gases
IA: Inuit Ataqatigiit Party
ICC: Inuit Circumpolar Council
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IR: International Relations
MOU: Memoranda of Understanding
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement
NDC: Nationally Determined Contributions
NGO: Non-governmental Organization
OSTP: Office of Science and Technology Policy
POTUS: President of the United States
REE: Rare Earth Elements
UK: United Kingdom of Great Britain
UN: United Nations
UNCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDRIP: United Nations Declaration On The Rights Of Indigenous Peoples
UNIPCC: United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
UNSG: United Nations Secretary General
U.S.: United States
USMCA: United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement

Table of Contents

<i>Supervisory Committee</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>Abstract.....</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>List of Abbreviations.....</i>	<i>iv</i>
<i>Table of Contents</i>	<i>v</i>
<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>vii</i>
<i>Acknowledgments.....</i>	<i>viii</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>1</i>
Research Design.....	5
Methodology.....	9
Chapter Outline	13
<i>Chapter One – Securitization, Greenland, and U.S.-Greenland History</i>	<i>16</i>
Securitization in the Arctic.....	16
Securitization Theory in the Arctic	18
Introducing Greenland	22
United States Previous Attempts to Purchase Greenland	26
<i>Chapter Two – Obama’s Arctic Legacy.....</i>	<i>30</i>
The Complex Balance of Environmental and Energy Security Concerns under Obama	30
Obama’s Approach to Arctic Security: International Relations and Multilateral Cooperation with Arctic states.....	35
Summary of Obama’s Arctic Legacy and Greenland Relations.....	40
<i>Chapter Three – Trump’s Arctic Legacy: A Shift in the U.S. Arctic Agenda</i>	<i>43</i>
Trump on Climate Change, Science and the U.S. Arctic Research Agenda	43
The Complex Balance of Environmental and Energy Security Concerns under Trump	44
Trump’s Approach to Arctic Security Concerns and International Relations with (non)Arctic States	46
The Differing Presidential Approaches to Arctic Geopolitics: the Arctic Council	50
The (In)Famous Pompeo Speech to the Arctic Council	52
An Economic Focus	56
Lack of Climate Change Discussion and the First Arctic Council Declaration Failure	57
<i>Chapter Four – The U.S. Purchasing Greenland?</i>	<i>61</i>
Trump’s Offer: Outrage and Rejection	61
Greenland Responds: “Open for Business, Not for Sale”	64
Outrage but Elevation: The Funding Package	65
<i>Chapter Five - Greenland: An Emerging Inuit Arctic Power.....</i>	<i>70</i>

Greenlandic Framing of the Right to Develop	70
Connecting Approaches to Climate Change	73
Enhanced U.S.-Greenland Economic Ties: Joint Technical Engagement	77
<i>Chapter Six – Major Changes: Elections, Diplomacy, Greenland Bans Oil and Climate Change Urgency</i>	<i>82</i>
Greenland Elections 2021	83
Biden’s Direction for U.S. Climate Change Securitization	86
U.S. Secretary of State Blinken’s Diplomatic Visit	89
Major Announcements: Greenland bans Oil and Limits Mineral Extraction	92
Implications for Future U.S.-Greenland Relations.....	96
<i>Conclusions</i>	<i>99</i>
Looking to the Future.....	99
Looking Further: UN Code Red and Climate Change	105
<i>References.....</i>	<i>109</i>

List of Figures

<i>Figure 1:</i>	3
<i>Figure 2:</i>	16
<i>Figure 3:</i>	22
<i>Figure 4:</i>	48
<i>Figure 5.</i>	64

Acknowledgments

To my supervisor, Dr. Will Greaves, thank you as always for your guidance and support with this thesis project and throughout my entire Master of Arts degree. You have provided me with knowledge, enthusiasm, and passion for a topic I knew little about prior to coming to the University of Victoria. Thank you for motivating and pushing me, and for the invaluable opportunities you have provided me over the years; I will always appreciate it. To Dr. Colin Bennett, thank you for agreeing to be the second reader on this project. Your insightful comments and suggestions have pushed me to improve myself academically. To Dr. Jason Colby, thank you for agreeing to be the external committee member; your questions and discussions during the thesis defense were extremely interesting and academically engaging.

To my cohort, thank you for your unwavering support and fellowship throughout this graduate degree – I could not have made it without you. To Tracy and Kayla, thank you for always encouraging me in this process and being willing to talk; it really helped me. To Nic, my fellow Arctic co-author, it's been a pleasure authoring my first publication with you. To Dom, I will always cherish our talks and late-night academic discussions on the beach. To the rest of my cohort – Claude, Fazila, Adelaide and others – we made it!

And finally, to my friends, family and loved ones around the world – I'm looking forward to seeing you all soon (as a Master) and can't wait to celebrate life together again. To my mother, I really could not have done this without you - you always support and enable me to follow my dreams wherever I go in the world. To my grandad, you inspired me and I'm sure you would be proud of my achievements (so far). And last but not least, to myself: this has been an immensely challenging process and time, both mentally and physically – always remember, you can achieve great things if you work hard and stay positive.

Introduction

The Arctic is at the forefront of climate change. With the Arctic warming at twice the rate of the rest of the planet, this may lead to the Arctic Ocean being largely free of summer sea ice as early as 2035.¹ Average Arctic temperatures have increased by around 2-3 degrees Celsius since the preindustrial era, in comparison to 1 degree Celsius for the rest of the planet.² Indigenous leaders further note that Arctic sea ice that used to be present for eight months of the year has now been reduced to three to four months.³ The impact of climate change is threatening the Arctic's geophysical structure, yet with these threats also comes geopolitical opportunity. The warming in the Arctic is enabling increased accessibility of natural resources for exploration, extraction, and exploitation. The impact of climate change has led to the Arctic being pushed as a priority for many states' energy security agendas. This presents a multifaceted constellation whereby Arctic states have referred to the Arctic's "abundance" of natural resources becoming more accessible as "opportunities" for economic gain.⁴ The complex Arctic geopolitical arena has seen the U.S., Canada, Russia and even self-declared "near-Arctic" state China staking a claim to the billions of dollars' worth of natural resources becoming increasingly accessible in the Arctic Ocean.⁵

It is Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat), however, that finds itself at the centre of this geopolitical and economic dichotomy. Over 200 years of scientific exploration into Greenland's underground has led to the discovery of various rare minerals – approximately

¹ Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. *Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic*. Arctic Council, 2017; 3

² Alejandra Borunda. 'Arctic summer sea ice could disappear as early as 2035'. *National Geographic*, August 13th, 2020. URL: <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/arctic-summer-sea-ice-could-be-gone-by-2035>

³ Richard Slats et al. 'Voices from the Front Lines of a Changing Bering Sea: An Indigenous Perspective for the 2019 Arctic Report Card'. Arctic Program, November 22nd, 2019. URL: <https://arctic.noaa.gov/Report-Card/Report-Card-2019/ArtMID/7916/ArticleID/850/Voices-from-the-Front-Lines-of-a-Changing-Bering-Sea>

⁴ Mike Pompeo. 'Looking North: Sharpening America's Arctic Focus.' U.S. Department of State. (May 6, 2019). URL: <https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/> ; *Emphasis in the Original*.

⁵ The State Council. 'China's Arctic Policy.' Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2018. URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm

75 new mineral species – and vast potential of oil and gas reserves.⁶ The U.S. Geological Survey predicted that the Arctic contains around 30% of the globe's undiscovered resources, thus holding immense economic potential.⁷ It is further estimated that Greenland's west coast alone holds around CAD\$3.5bn worth of de-risked barrels of oil, with the east coast further holding double the amount of crude and natural gas. The economic opportunity that climate change presents, therefore, places Greenland in a unique situation. Greenland is a self-governing Inuit nation, whose aspiration is to achieve independence from the colonial ties with the Kingdom of Denmark, but only when economic development enables the financial viability to do so. Resource extraction, further enabled by the impact of climate change, creates this increased possibility for independence. Despite Greenland being the single most advanced case of Indigenous self-determination in contemporary world politics, international interest in Greenland has increased, leading to U.S. President Donald J. Trump expressing strategic interest in purchasing Greenland in the summer of 2019.

In August 2019, President Trump made a series of tweets and startling remarks to interviewers regarding the idea to purchase Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark. Trump's offer to purchase Greenland sent shockwaves around the world, accounting for another set of bizarre headlines for global media and confusion from perplexed world leaders. *The Wall Street Journal* first brought attention to this offer, reporting 'President Trump eyes a new real-estate purchase: Greenland'.⁸ Trump responded via Twitter offering a giant image of a Trump tower looming over a peaceful small Greenlandic village, accompanied with the words "I promise not to do this to Greenland!"⁹ At first this appeared to be just another peculiar outburst from the President's social media account, then the reality of the offer

⁶ Naalakkersuisut, 'Economy and Industry in Greenland', 2021.

⁷ Hobart King, 'Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Arctic.' *Geoscience News and Information*, 2021. URL: <https://geology.com/articles/arctic-oil-and-gas/>

⁸ Vivian Salama et al. 'President Trump eyes a new real-estate purchase: Greenland' *The Wall Street Journal*, August 16th, 2019. URL: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-eyes-a-new-real-estate-purchase-greenland-11565904223>

⁹ Donald Trump. Twitter post. August 19th, 2019. URL: <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1163603361423351808>

ensued: “Strategically it’s interesting [...] but we’ll talk to them a little bit,” Trump declared.¹⁰ Trump argued that his offer was “essentially a large real-estate deal,” further commenting that Greenland is hurting Denmark due to losing around “\$700 million a year carrying it.”¹¹ Greenland’s growing economic potential, due to the impacts of climate change, reached its pinnacle with Trump’s interest in purchasing Greenland.



Figure 1: On August 19th, 2019, President Trump posted – via Twitter (pre-suspension) and Instagram – a fake picture of a Trump tower looming over a Greenlandic village in the Arctic. Sources: The Mainichi, August 20th, 2019; Trump Instagram post @realdonaldtrump

¹⁰ Jan Olsen. ‘Danish PM: Trump’s idea of buying Greenland is ‘absurd’. *Associated Press*, August 19th, 2021. URL: <https://apnews.com/article/europe-donald-trump-ap-top-news-greenland-arctic-37da8cbadb39488d87154ce820da43c2>

¹¹ Martin Sorenson. ‘In Denmark Bewilderment and Anger Over Trump’s Cancelled Visit.’ *New York Times*, August 22nd, 2019. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/world/europe/greenland-denmark-trump.html>

Trump's offer is a key focal point for analysis throughout this thesis. There are various implications connected to the offer including the impact it had on U.S.-Greenland relations; a shift of U.S. Arctic foreign policy; the impact on Greenlandic domestic policy; issues of Indigenous politics; and international interest in the Arctic.¹² Alongside these issues, the increased accessibility of natural resources influenced the U.S. economic interest in Greenland. The case of U.S.-Greenland relations therefore finds itself at the intersection of climate change, intertwined with resource extraction and economic development. Consequently, climate change is causing many actors to reconceptualize the very meaning of security in the Arctic. Greenland is caught in a dilemma whether to 'securitize' climate change – meaning effectively prohibiting extractive industries by identifying climate change as a security threat to be contained, thus limiting the financial viability for independence – or to continue with non-securitized 'normal politics' – in this case meaning promoting and prioritizing resource extraction as a means to economic development, which has been an integral component to Greenlandic visions for the future.¹³ Similarly, the U.S. prospect for Arctic energy security is significantly impacted by their approach to climate change (non)securitization.

Securitization theory is a framework that explains the social construction of security threats over time, and thus, securitization theory in relation to climate change is employed as the analytical framework throughout this thesis.¹⁴ An issue being securitized is distinct from an issue simply being placed at the top of the political agenda. The process of securitizing

¹² Defining the Arctic for this thesis, I identify the Arctic geopolitical realm as the international jurisdictional space encompassing the sovereign territory of Arctic states and the resources within that area. I am focussing upon the circumpolar Arctic and Arctic Ocean. Eight Arctic states are legal territorial sovereign over the region's frozen seas and ice – this includes: Canada, Denmark – with the territory of Greenland - Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. The jurisdiction of Arctic states encompasses peoples, natural world and wildlife, fisheries, resources and climate.

¹³ Nicholas Andrews, Joe Crowther, and Will Greaves. *(De)securitization, Colonialism, and Normal Politics in Kalaallit Nunaat and Inuit Nunangat*. (2022; Forthcoming)

¹⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) ; 25.

climate change causes significant shifts in policy (domestic and foreign), due to the socio-political construction of climate as a security threat, thus enabling exceptional measures to be taken. The major research question of this thesis, therefore, is: How did the Trump Administration affect U.S.-Greenland relations? Alongside the major research question, the secondary research question asks: What are the implications of Greenland and the U.S. individually constructing similar approaches to climate change? The Trump Administration affected U.S.-Greenland relations directly, and the individual approaches towards climate change also impacted U.S.-Greenland relations. I therefore analyze the implications of these two interconnected research questions.

Research Design

To answer the major research question, I first analyze whether the U.S. Arctic policy agenda shifted from the Obama to Trump administrations. Within this analysis, an examination of the key differences of Obama and Trump occurs, assessing differing Arctic foreign policy approaches towards issues of climate and energy security; approaches to China and Russia; the importance and acknowledgment of Inuit representation; and the differing approaches to Arctic state relations. Following this analysis, I assess how the Trump Administration affected U.S.-Greenland relations due to Trump's differing approach to Arctic foreign policy from the Obama Administration. I argue the U.S. Arctic agenda drastically shifted from the Obama to the Trump administrations, significantly increasing the importance of U.S.-Greenland relations by offering to purchase Greenland from Denmark. Ultimately, I demonstrate that Trump raised the profile of Greenland not only for the U.S., but also for the international community. Whether this can be perceived as positive or negative, Trump's impact has been influential in establishing a new era of collaborative U.S.-Greenland relations.

To answer the secondary research question, I analyze how individually constructing similar approaches to climate change by Greenland and the U.S. impacts U.S.-Greenland relations. This leads to further examining the implications for U.S.-Greenland relations and approaches to development prospects for Greenland. Due to the non-securitization of climate change by both Trump and Greenland, the possibility for increased U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations occurred and significantly raised the profile of Greenland further. With the Trump Administration completely downplaying climate change and Greenland maintaining a moderate approach to non-securitized politics – meaning prioritizing resource extraction over identifying climate change as a security issue, but not specifically downplaying climate change either – these similar approaches held implications for future U.S.-Greenland relations. This analysis links post-Trump U.S.-Greenland relations, the long-term implications of Trump’s Arctic foreign policy, and developing approaches toward climate change (non)securitization.

I argue that from January 2017, when Trump was inaugurated, to April 2021, when the Inuit Ataqatigiit party was elected in Greenland, Greenland’s non-securitized approach to climate change aligned with the Trump Administration’s approach to climate and extractive industries. From April 2021 onwards, Greenland’s stance towards climate (non)securitization and development via carboniferous industries has shifted, once again aligning with the U.S., but now under the Biden Administration. In sum, Trump raised the profile of Greenland and paved the way for the strengthening of U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations which did not occur under Obama. Due to Trump’s offer and the administration’s aggressive approach to the Arctic, the economic and geopolitical significance of Greenland has increased. If Trump had not increased the U.S. interest in Greenland, we would not be witnessing this developing relationship today. This is largely due to Trump’s aspiration for Arctic energy security via extractive industries, unlike Obama’s complex approach to balancing energy and

environmental concerns. Trump has therefore unintentionally created a new legacy for U.S.-Greenland relations, but not for the initial reasons that he may have desired.

This thesis, therefore, fills a research gap by offering a new perspective on the implications of Trump's U.S. Arctic foreign policy and U.S.-Greenland relations. By studying Trump's Arctic agenda, this qualitative project analyzes the recent disruptiveness of Trump's foreign policy by adding to the state of knowledge regarding the U.S. and the vastly less powerful and less-studied country of Greenland. There is a need to study the effects of the Trump Administration's foreign policy on U.S. partners and allies, and Trump's offer to purchase Greenland was so outrageous and disruptive that it warrants in-depth study. In this case, Greenland as a smaller and weaker country than the U.S. offers an instructive case study located in the intersections between climate change security politics; the Trump Administration; Arctic geopolitics; and asymmetrical relations between the U.S. and the small countries that it engages with.¹⁵ The geopolitical balance of the Arctic is drastically transforming, international climate change discourse is intensifying, and this places U.S.-Greenland relations at the forefront of the emerging Arctic arena.

Arctic defence issues have dominated academic writing pertaining to U.S.-Greenland relations, mostly focussing on the U.S. impact on Greenland via the Thule air base during the Cold War.¹⁶ Further scholarly writing has engaged with the environmental consequences of the U.S. military presence in Greenland, such as remnants of toxic waste from U.S. aircraft and military waste from decommissioned Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line stations.¹⁷ However, this is precisely why I am shifting focus away from these widely covered defence and military issues of the past. The geopolitical constellation in the Arctic is transforming,

¹⁵ Jonathon Moses and Torbjorn Knutsen. *Ways of knowing: Competing methodologies in social and political research*. (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2019); 132-142

¹⁶ Kristian Kristensen and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen. *Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic: Postcolonial Paradiplomacy between High and Low Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2018

¹⁷ Myra Hird. 'The DEW Line and Canada's Arctic Waste: Legacy and Futurity.' *Northern Review*, 42 (1) 2016: 23-45.

placing economic concerns as a growing priority for Arctic and non-Arctic states' security. This project does cover defence issues relating to the U.S. Arctic foreign policy, however, the focus mostly refers to U.S. defence concerns regarding Russian and Chinese Arctic economic aspirations. With natural resources becoming the new priority for Arctic states' security, climate change and extractive industries are interconnected issues that are beginning to take precedence in Arctic geopolitics. As a result, other defence concerns or military issues that have dominated academic writing in the past are outside the scope of this project.¹⁸

By connecting U.S. Arctic foreign policy with the importance of Indigenous peoples' rights to development, and Greenland as an Inuit polity seeking independence, I offer something new. The importance of in/security, reconciliation and decolonization for Indigenous peoples is growing rapidly within 21st century politics. This can be witnessed globally, notably within Canada in 2021 with the recent residential school discoveries, and with Indigenous peoples in many parts of the globe positioned at the forefront of climate change's harshest impacts.¹⁹ Greenland is a distinct actor, which finds itself in a truly unique situation as a key developing actor in the complex constellation of Arctic geopolitics. The dilemma, however, remains with the Indigenous right to development, intertwined with the growing urgency of the climate crisis. Indigenous peoples hold exclusive legal rights to development alongside other underdeveloped states and peoples.²⁰ There has been little connection to securitization of climate change by Inuit linking to the U.S. impact on this, ultimately filling an ever-developing research gap. My intention is to speak to an audience that is interested in the overlapping issues of U.S. Arctic foreign policy; Indigenous peoples'

¹⁸ Peter Kikkert and Whitney Lackenbauer. *The Militarization of the Arctic to 1990*. 2020; 487-505. In: Coates, K. and Holroyd, C. (eds) *The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan; Hird, *The DEW line and Canada's Arctic Waste: Legacy and Futurity*; Doel, *Exploring Greenland: Cold War Science and Technology on Ice*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016

¹⁹ Holly Honderich. 'Why Canada is mourning the deaths of hundreds of children.' *BBC NEWS*. July 15th, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57325653>

²⁰ Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104. URL: https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf

rights; climate change; extractive industries; and Arctic geopolitics. Consequently, the thematic focus is unique, timely, and growing in importance.

Methodology

By choosing case studies, as proposed by Levy, an in-depth exploration of a historical moment can occur, enabling analytical insight to explain why such events occurred and the implications to related future events.²¹ To explore the major and secondary research question(s), I focus on U.S.-Greenland relations as an illustrative case study that seeks to analyze the implications of foreign policy and approaches to climate change (non)securitization. To accomplish the goal of analyzing U.S.-Greenland relations, I predominantly utilize academic and journalistic sources, combined with primary and secondary materials to conduct an interpretive and occasionally textual analysis of U.S.-Greenland relations. Furthermore, comparative methods are used in this study through comparing the differing approaches of Obama and Trump regarding U.S. foreign policy in the Arctic; approaches to climate and energy security; approaches to defence concerns vis-à-vis China and Russia; approaches to the importance of Inuit representation; and the differing approaches to conducting Arctic state relations.²² Further comparative methods are incorporated by connecting the lack of climate change securitization of both the Trump Administration and Greenland.

Another methodological choice includes the use of textual and discourse analysis to structure part of the analytical framework.²³ For instance, in Chapter Three, three large block quotes from former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are examined to identify the Trump Administration's position of Arctic issues. Other speeches and texts are analyzed throughout

²¹ Jack Levy. 'Case studies: Types, designs, and logics of inference.' *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25, 2008; 1–18.

²² Moses and Knutsen. *Ways of knowing: Competing methodologies in social and political research*; 94-117

²³ Stefan Titscher and Bryan Jenner. *Methods of text and discourse analysis: In search of meaning*. Sage, 2000.

to further strengthen analysis, such as Greenlandic political statements, quotes from Trump, and international law relating to Indigenous rights to development and climate change. Using this qualitative and interpretative method assists analysis of text and discourse, therefore enabling interpretation based on the details of the material and linking to the contextual knowledge produced prior.

To make these connections and analyze differing approaches to the construction of climate change as either securitized or non-securitized, securitization theory is employed as the theoretical framework. Securitization theory offers a useful framework for analyzing issues of (non)securitization and (de)politicization, particularly with regard to exploring the social construction of security issues, including the capacity of issues constructed as security-relevant to shift back to non-securitized, ‘normal politics’.²⁴ Securitization theory is therefore relevant for application in the Arctic and for the case of connecting Trump’s administration with Greenland for several reasons. First, climate change has been widely depicted as being a security threat in the Arctic, yet we have not seen climate change being adopted this way by Greenland or by the U.S. under Trump’s administration. Because Trump was such an extremely disruptive president, his Administration sought to radically redefine what the U.S. regarded as a security threat, and climate change was not one of them.²⁵ With Greenland at the forefront of climate change, this requires examination as to why Greenland would also not seek to construct climate change as a security threat, despite Inuit being so impacted by climate change. Subsequently, securitization is briefly unpacked in Chapter One.

On a reflexive note, it is essential to acknowledge and respect the ləkʷəŋən peoples on whose traditional territory the University of Victoria stands, and the Songhees, Esquimalt and WSÁNEĆ peoples whose historical relationships with the land continue to this day. It is a

²⁴ Ole Wæver. Securitization and Desecuritization, 1995, 46-86. In: Lipschutz, R. (ed) *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

²⁵ Coral Davenport, Mark Landler. ‘Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate Science.’ *The New York Times*, May 27th, 2019. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climate-science.html>

privilege to be completing my master's degree at the University of Victoria, and I acknowledge that this thesis writing process, research and critical analytical thinking has taken place on occupied lands. It is also fundamental to acknowledge my personal position of privilege and background: I am a British citizen and an international student in Canada. As a white, abled, cisgender man, I have been enabled to pursue academic research from a considerably privileged position. Furthermore, I situate myself within this thesis project as a self-identified environmentalist with extended Indigenous Māori family (Whānau) in New Zealand (Aotearoa). I therefore understand the fundamental importance of reconciliation, decolonization and stand in solidarity with the principles of respect and reconciliation of the *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)*.²⁶

My values have been deeply shaped by working alongside marginalized Indigenous peoples and vulnerable populations in Canada, Australia, and Japan. I understand the importance of organizations and institutions working collaboratively to empower those who have been oppressed and to provide equal opportunity for those most at risk to the impacts of climate change. I further recognize that I am continuously learning, and I seek to constantly broaden my knowledge and understanding of Indigenous and climate related issues. As a non-Indigenous and non-Inuit scholar, I do not speak on behalf of Indigenous peoples, nor do I intend to impose my own viewpoint as analogous with Indigenous peoples or Inuit. Rather, my aim is to critically analyze issues of Arctic in/security concerning Inuit who are impacted by the actions, words and discourse of Inuit actors and politicians, alongside other non-Inuit states, and actors. Within this analysis, I incorporate and examine the interests, priorities, and visions for the future that Inuit actors – specifically politicians in Greenland – and non-Indigenous actors – regarding the U.S – have publicly expressed. My goal is to critically

²⁶ UN General Assembly. 'United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly', October 2nd, 2007, A/RES/61/295. URL: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html>

contribute to research surrounding U.S.-Greenland relations, Arctic geopolitics and discourse pertaining to climate change securitization. Within this research I am contributing to an extremely limited body of research that exists regarding ideational factors toward impacting the framing of climate change as a (non)security issue for both the U.S. and Inuit Greenland.

It is also essential to acknowledge the limits and challenges of this research project. With an ever-developing topic that has witnessed major political change in both countries of focus, this has presented various challenges, with potentially thesis altering updates coming during the writing process. As with any study of political science, political updates create major implications which must be addressed. In the case of my thesis project, the major updates have come in the form of changing governing administrations, both in the U.S. from Trump to the Biden Administration, and in Greenland with the Inuit Ataqatigiit party gaining power from the Siumut party. However, the most challenging aspect of the project came when the newly elected Inuit Ataqatigiit party announced the major ban on oil and gas, as well as limiting mineral extraction and exploration in June 2021.²⁷ This update caused me to significantly adjust my thesis to analyze if Greenland is now seeking securitization of climate change via outlawing extractive industries. This is addressed in the penultimate chapter.

Approaches to presenting Arctic climate change as security threat are changing, which may impact the viability of the independence movement in Greenland, due to effectively outlawing the carboniferous industries which have previously been framed as essential. Greenland has moved towards sustainable and climate responsible development. This update also occurred in alignment with the U.S. stance towards pushing climate change into the realm of securitization under the Biden Administration. The focal period for the core scope of analysis in this thesis project is therefore between 2017 to 2021. However, to fully understand

²⁷ Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut). 'Greenland halts new oil exploration', July 15th, 2021. URL: https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/News/2021/07/1507_oliestop

the impact of Trump on U.S.-Greenland relations it is also critical to briefly examine the Obama Administration as well as the transitional period for changing U.S. and Greenlandic administrations in 2021. I acknowledge that the validity of my analysis may shift with future developments, however, this is the chosen timeframe that this project examines. Any new developments past October 2021 are simply beyond the scope of this project. Geopolitics with other Arctic states such as Canada are interesting to explore, regardless, this thesis will for the most part, strictly focus on U.S.-Greenland relations.

Chapter Outline

The remainder of this thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter One explores securitization and securitization theory, offers descriptive material regarding Greenland, and a historical overview of the U.S.-Greenland relations. Chapter Two briefly explores the Arctic legacy of the Obama Administration, examining Barack Obama's approach to Arctic climate issues, energy security and balancing environmental concerns. Obama's Arctic foreign policy is also addressed, including his approach to the Arctic Council, Arctic state relations and briefly analyzing approaches to Arctic defence issues. In Chapter Three, I comparatively analyze how the Trump Administration approached climate issues, energy security, U.S. Arctic defence issues, acknowledging Inuit representation and the differing foreign policy approaches in the Arctic. Incorporating these issues provides the fundamental structure for analyzing how the Trump Administration impacted U.S.-Greenland relations.

Chapter Three analyzes the significant turning point for the U.S. Arctic agenda under Trump, and for U.S.-Greenland relations: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's speech to the Arctic Council in Rovaniemi. Chapter Four then examines Trump's offer to purchase Greenland and links to the implications for U.S.-Greenland relations. Chapter Four highlights the shift in the U.S. Arctic agenda and approach towards (non)securitization of climate from Obama to Trump. I argue that the significance of the Arctic geopolitically moved into the

limelight for the U.S. following Pompeo's speech and Trump's offer. This shift in U.S. Arctic policy led to major implications for Arctic states, the Arctic Council, and most importantly Greenland.

Chapter Five explores Greenland framing its right to develop, alongside the tendency to not present climate change as a security issue, similar to the Trump Administration's approach to climate. Furthermore, Chapter Five analyzes academic and political insights into the Greenlandic pursuit of economic development and conveys how Greenland have done so via international legal norms and the justifications for the lack of climate change securitization. This chapter also analyzes why Greenland have pushed for the advancement of carboniferous industries and mineral exploration has come with little criticism from the international community. I further explore how Trump's offer led to developing collaborative U.S.-Greenland relations and has further advanced Greenland to push for economic development.

Chapter Six explores the 2021 Greenlandic election, U.S.-Greenland relations transitioning into the Biden Administration, and the direction for climate change securitization. Developing U.S.-Greenland economic collaboration is also addressed whilst examining the major announcement from the Greenlandic government to ban oil and gas and limit mineral extraction. This chapter links to the long-term implications of the Trump Administration and how Trump's administration has undeniably impacted future U.S.-Greenland relations. Finally, I look to the future with a concluding chapter, briefly restating the findings of this thesis and link to the future of U.S.-Greenland relations via shifting approaches to climate change, new economic opportunities, and expectations for future U.S.-Greenland relations. I depict a shifting framework for Arctic geopolitics and international climate change discourse approaching UNFCCC26, thus placing Greenland at the key

exemplary figure for the future of the climate movement, creating the possibility for the further development of U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations.

Chapter One – Securitization, Greenland, and U.S.-Greenland History

Securitization in the Arctic

“There just could be a change in moral attitude, from people worldwide, politicians worldwide, to see that self-interest is for the past. Common interest is for the future.”²⁸




Figure 4: A still image visualizing Arctic sea ice on Sept. 16, 2021, when the ice appeared to reach its yearly minimum extent. On this date, the extent of the ice was 4.72 million square miles (1.82 million square kilometers). Source: NASA's Scientific Visualization Studio. URL: <https://climate.nasa.gov/news/3114/nasa-finds-2021-arctic-summer-sea-ice-12th-lowest-on-record/>

Climate change in the Arctic constitutes a multi-faceted threat, endangering wildlife and natural habitats critical to the Arctic; the melting of Arctic sea ice; rising sea levels and temperatures worldwide; and threatens Inuit and northern Arctic communities.²⁹ Scientists have warned of the dangers of a rapidly changing Arctic environment, with the threat of climate change interlinking the entire globe in which sea ice maintains the low temperatures of polar regions, helping to moderate the global climate. Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO) contend that the biggest threat that comes with melting Arctic sea ice is that when ice

²⁸ Sir. David Attenborough. 'People are listening'. *Greta meets Sir David*, BBC, April 12th, 2021. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4Cw2ASwSnU>

²⁹ There are approximately four million human inhabitants in the Arctic today; Whitney Lackenbauer, Heather Nicol, and Wilfrid Greaves. *One Arctic: the Arctic Council and circumpolar governance*. Centre on Foreign Policy & Federalism, 2017; 7. URL: <http://carc.org/one-arctic/>

melts there is a loss of reflectivity, in which the surface of ice reflects over 80% of sunlight from Earth to Space. With the melting of sea ice in the Arctic, important reflective properties are lost, and the darker surface (of ocean) absorbs an exponential amount of heat, and thus, increasing melting rates of sea ice adds to the effects of climate change. SIO further estimates that losing the surface qualities of the Arctic sea ice would be comparable to releasing around one trillion tonnes of CO₂ into the Earth's atmosphere.³⁰ NASA conveys that Arctic permafrost holds huge levels of carbon and methane gas, which if melts would be disastrous for intensifying climate change and for achieving the ICPP's goal of holding the average global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius.³¹³² The ice sheet in the Arctic is therefore threatened existentially by the change in the natural geophysical transformation of itself; being a positive feedback loop, also known as the 'albedo-effect'.³³ The importance of preserving the natural geophysical Arctic is instrumental to mitigating climate change.

2020 witnessed the UNIPCC's worst-case climate warning scenario being matched, with Greenlandic ice sheet melting at a higher rate than it has for 12,000 years.³⁴ The Arctic is therefore at a critical juncture. Protecting the environment of the Arctic is crucial, not only for the local inhabitants of the Arctic, but for all states, peoples, and regions of an interconnected globe. Despite these concerns, states have turned to the Arctic as an emerging prospect for relative gain. Since 2007 with Russia planting its flag on the underwater

³⁰ Scripps Institution of Oceanography. July 29th, 2019. URL: <https://www.kpbs.org/news/2019/jul/29/melting-ice-may-speed-climate-change/>

³¹ Ellen Gray. 'Unexpected future boost of methane possible from Arctic permafrost.' *NASA's Earth Science News Team*, August 10th, 2018. URL: <https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2785/unexpected-future-boost-of-methane-possible-from-arctic-permafrost/>

³² IPCC, 2019: 'Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems.' *IPCC*, P.R. Shukla, et al, 2019.

³³ *Albedo-effect*: this is a phenomenon defined by the reflectivity of an object in space using a term called albedo. Scientifically stated, the lower the albedo, the higher amounts of radiation from sunlight is therefore absorbed by the planet – thus causing temperature increase.

³⁴ Andrew Freedman and Bradley Dennis. 'Greenland ice sheet on course to lose ice at fastest rate in 12,000 years, study finds.' *The Washington Post*, September 30th, 2020. URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/09/30/greenland-ice-melt/>

Lomonosov Ridge, the Arctic has increased in importance for Arctic states' foreign policy.³⁵ Consequently, phrases such as a 'northern gold rush' and a 'scramble for resources' have emerged throughout Arctic discourse.³⁶ During Trump's administrative era, the U.S. expressed the clear intent to utilize the Arctic natural resources becoming more accessible for exploration and extraction. The U.S. adopted a non-securitized approach to climate change under Trump. Climate change presents not only threats, but opportunities.

Greenland has also expressed a collective desire for economic openness and for normalizing climate change - as opposed to securitizing resource extraction - to prioritize developing carboniferous activities like offshore oil and gas drilling. The dilemma, however, is that economic development – which heavily focusses on fossil fuel industries – could indeed contribute to anthropogenic global carbon emissions and the acceleration of global climate change. This is not to say that Greenland and Greenlanders do not believe in climate change, the scientific evidence depicting melting Arctic sea ice, thawing of permafrost and rising temperatures is undeniable. Climate change is unquestionably impacting Arctic communities, thus forcing relocation and threatening traditional ways of life all over the Circumpolar North.³⁷ Despite this, Greenland has chosen to contain climate change in the realm of non-securitized 'normal politics', where resource extraction remains possible. Securitization theory is therefore appropriate for analyzing this dilemma.

Securitization Theory in the Arctic

Securitization – coined by Ole Wæver in 1993 - within International Relations refers to the process of state – and non-state – actors transforming an issue from 'normal (non-

³⁵ Tom Parfitt. 'Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed', *The Guardian*, August 2nd, 2007. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic>

³⁶ Jon Carlson et al. 'Scramble for the Arctic.' *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2013): 21-43.; Klare, M. *The Race for What's Left: The Global Scramble for the World's Last Resources*. New York: Picador, 2013; 72-73

³⁷ Katy Toth. 'Don't like moving? Try relocating your sinking house during a pandemic'. *CBC News*, April 23rd, 2021. URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/tuktoyaktuk-homes-relocated-pandemic-1.5542057>

securitized) politics' into issues of security.³⁸ By pushing an issue into the realm of securitization this enables extraordinary measures to be taken in response to that security issue. An issue that has been securitized does not necessarily link to matters that are critical to survival of a state, yet signify matters that political actors were successful in constructing as existentially threatening.³⁹ Issues that have been successfully securitized often obtain higher levels of consideration and resources as opposed to unsuccessfully securitized issues. In essence, securitization theory can be understood as “who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions”.⁴⁰ U.S. foreign policy can be used to securitize issues for and by the U.S., likewise, Greenland may or may not securitize issues through their domestic and foreign policy.

Securitization effectively begins with a political speech act with reference to a specific threat, by a politician, institution, party, or other authoritative actor. These speech acts intend to shift that threat from a state of non-securitized ‘normal politics’, or politicization, into a security issue, thus justifying exceptional measures that can contain that security threat.⁴¹ An act of securitization can only be deemed successful if this is accepted by the audience, no matter if that issue is a real threat or not. Climate change – intertwined with resource extraction – is the security issue to be examined. This interlinks the approaches of the U.S. and Greenland toward climate change, as well as international discourse relating to development and carbon emissions. Whereas climate change and resource extraction has been securitized in other contexts, it has not been in Greenland.

³⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) ; 25.

³⁹ Giovanni Arcudi, ‘La sécurité entre permanence et changement.’ *Relations Internationales*. 125 (1) (2006); 97–109. doi:10.3917/ri.125.0097.

⁴⁰ Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde (1998); 32

⁴¹ Anatol Lieven. *Climate Change and the Nation State: The Case for Nationalism in a Warming World*. Penguin Random House, 2020; 6–9.

Securitization theory can be understood by envisioning a continuum in which the issue of climate change can be placed on the spectrum from *depoliticized*-*politicized*-*securitized*. Climate change can therefore shift along this imagined continuum from a position of being *depoliticized*, to *politicized*, often referred to as ‘normal politics’ (or “business as usual” in the Greenlandic context).⁴² If an issue has been pushed to a state of being securitized, this also holds the potential to revert back to being politicized through the process of *desecuritization*, and vice versa. It is the state or political actor that chooses to *depoliticize*, *politicize*, or *securitize* an issue. Securitizing an issue establishes a certain aura of societal and political meaning for states or the international community’s in/security. Doing so can lead to compromises that could ultimately adversely affect other elements of in/security, such as values like liberty, political autonomy and (climate) justice.⁴³

Consequently, if a state, political actor, or the international community agrees that climate change is an existential threat that must be securitized, this unavoidably must come with compromises. By securitizing climate change, this requires the immediate end to carboniferous industries that are responsible for creating anthropogenic GHGs; particularly the exploration, extraction, and exploitation of environmentally destructive fossil fuels such as oil and gas.⁴⁴ Although being somewhat permissible within ‘normal politics’, if climate change were to be moved up the continuum to a state of securitization, it becomes morally and practically impermissible for actors to continue with methods of “carboniferous capitalism” that have fundamentally produced the very anthropogenic emissions causing climate change today.⁴⁵

⁴² Nicholas Andrews, Joe Crowther, and Will Greaves. *(De)securitization, Colonialism, and Normal Politics in Kalaallit Nunaat and Inuit Nunangat*. (2022; Forthcoming)

⁴³ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. 2022

⁴⁴ Will Greaves. ‘What would it mean to treat climate change like a security threat?’ *CIGIOOnline, Centre for International Governance Innovation*, August 21st, 2021. URL: <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-would-it-mean-to-treat-climate-as-a-security-risk/>

⁴⁵ Simon Dalby. ‘Biopolitics and climate security in the Anthropocene.’ *Geoforum* 49 (2013); 184-192.

Securitizing any issue creates a plethora of impacts, holding the potential to disrupt other political objectives and priorities, and change policy. In the case of Greenland, the dilemma is whether to securitize climate change which could potentially impede with the financial viability for the independence project. For Inuit Greenland, self-determination, and independence through the pursuit of economic development – via international interest and investment in Greenlandic fossil fuels – has been a higher priority than securitizing climate change. Economic development has been an integral component of normal, non-securitized politics in Greenland, climate change therefore offers opportunity for Greenland and Greenlanders, not threats. In short, Greenlandic securitization of climate change may be counterproductive to the prospect for economic development - free from Danish financial subsidies - to finance the independence movement.

The U.S. approach to climate change also holds the potential to directly impact the Greenlandic pursuit of economic development via extractive industries. As a significantly more powerful economic actor than Greenland, the U.S. Arctic foreign policy and approaches to climate change impacts U.S.-Greenland relations via investment in natural resources located in and around Greenland. The Greenlandic approach to not securitizing climate change somewhat aligned with the Trump Administration's approach, thus providing opportunity for economic development via investment and increased U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations. Development for Greenland – via extractive carboniferous industries - has often been depicted as the “only” path forwards for the independence project.⁴⁶ However, shifting approaches toward climate change (non)securitization for both the U.S. and Greenland creates interconnected implications for both actors. In particular, the U.S. approach shifted with the transition from the Obama to Trump administrations. The following

⁴⁶ Lill Bjørst. 'Chapter 8: The right to 'sustainable development' and Greenland's lack of a climate policy'. *Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic*. (2018): 121-136.

chapter will examine Obama's Arctic legacy, firstly though, it is essential to offer a descriptive material of Greenland and then outline the U.S. history with Greenland as foundational for discussing shifts in policy.

Introducing Greenland



Figure 7: Figure 3: A map of the Circumpolar North and the Arctic Ocean.
Source: *Officers Pulse*. URL: <https://officerspulse.com/arctic-council-2/>

Trump's offer to purchase Greenland and his accompanying comments are highly problematic due to the Indigeneity and self-governing status of Greenland. The current population of Greenland is around 57,000 people, with the vast majority – approximately 89% - being Inuit, representing a unique Arctic polity.⁴⁷ With roughly 7.8% of the population being Danish, 1.1% Nordic and 2.1% being other, Greenlandic contemporary political climate is focussed on gaining independence from their colonial ties with the Kingdom of Denmark. The offer effectively sought to undermine decades of progress towards Inuit self-

⁴⁷ World Population Review. 'Greenland Population.' 2021. URL: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/greenland-population>

determination and offends the gains made by Greenlanders in recent decades toward that goal.

Greenland began to part ways with their colonial status upon being represented in Danish parliament and establishing a sociocultural movement with anti-colonial political intentions. This spark consequently led to a formal agreement of Greenlandic *Home Rule* in 1979. Greenlanders gained a certain extent of political autonomy via Home Rule, leading to the establishment of an official Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut) and also a separate Greenlandic Parliament (Inatsisartut); asserting a considerable degree of self-governance and autonomy for a post-colonial nation.⁴⁸ Following this, in 1985 a referendum witnessed Greenland parting ways from the European Community, and further still the 2009 *Self-Government Act* added to the newfound autonomy that Greenland was experiencing.⁴⁹ Since the *Self-Government Act*, Greenland is in essence - in all but defence and foreign affairs – a self-governing Inuit actor.

The motivation behind the push for the Self-Government Act came due to the limitations that Home Rule afforded to Greenland, curtailing the actual economic and political autonomy that Greenland received in contrast to Danish peoples. In 1979 the Government of Greenland and Parliament gained control over Greenlandic mineral resources and governance over police, civil law, and certain elements of the coast guard. The most important component, however, came with the freedom for Greenlanders to make the sovereign decision, free from Danish authority over one crucial issue: independence.⁵⁰ It is this socio-political issue that has been the centrefold of the Greenlandic cultural and political movement for many decades, Trump's offer to purchase Greenland was therefore mistimed,

⁴⁸ Ulrik Gad. 'Greenland: A Post-Danish Sovereign Nation State in the Making.' *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49 (1) (2014): 98-118.

⁴⁹ Robert Petersen. 'On ethnic identity in Greenland.' *Études Inuit Studies*, 25 (1/2) (2001): 325.

⁵⁰ Jessica Shadian. 'From states to polities: Reconceptualizing sovereignty through Inuit governance.' *European Journal of International Relations*, 16 (3) (2010): 485-510.

misinformed and ultimately a ludicrous proposition in the contemporary era. The Indigenous status of Greenland emerging as a key Inuit actor in Arctic geopolitics is a quintessential issue to address.

Despite Trump's offer initially causing outrage and appearing irreconcilable with the Greenlandic aspiration for self-determination, U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations have increased in interaction since. This is due to a shared connection between Trump's administration and Greenland, one which would appear incompatible prior to in-depth analysis: both the U.S. under Trump and Greenland shared the same approach towards not securitizing climate change. With Greenland being positioned as the primary witnesses of climate change in the Arctic, as well as a global climate symbol, this requires examination into why Greenland would seek to not present climate change as a security issue.⁵¹ It is the potential that resource extraction holds for the financial viability for an Inuit nation whose aspiration is to achieve independence from Denmark.

At present, Greenland currently receives a subsidy of 3.9bn Danish kroner (approximately USD\$600m) per year from Denmark.⁵² The main export in Greenland – accounting for 88% - comes from its fisheries, making the Greenlandic economy fragile to international price fluctuations.⁵³ In recent years, only 2% of export has derived from mining industries including gold and olivine. For a self-sustaining Greenlandic economy, Greenland must seek alternative sources of income from traditional fishing and hunting industries. International interest in the sector of energy and mineral resources offer this alternative. Self-determination and independence through the pursuit of economic development – via extractive industries and international interest in Greenlandic fossil fuels – has therefore been

⁵¹ Lill Bjørst. 'Chapter 8: The right to 'sustainable development' and Greenland's lack of a climate policy.' 2018; 121-136.

⁵² Bjorn Schionning. *As the ice melts, Greenland considers its future*. BBC NEWS, January 9th, 2020. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51014148>

⁵³ Naalakkersuisut. 'Economy and Industry in Greenland'. URL: <https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Economy-and-Industry-in-Greenland>

a higher priority than securitizing climate change. Inuit in Greenland have instead sought to advocate ‘non-securitized’ politics which does not prioritize climate change as a security issue. Securitization of climate change would restrict the potential for utilizing extractive resources, and thus, would weaken the financial viability for the primary goal of independence.

Greenland has therefore promoted a specific criteria that is fundamental for the viability of independence, this criteria combines three sustainability dreams: “(1) a sustainable economy (a national budget independent from Danish subsidies, based on private investments and the use of own resources); (2) a sustainable community (jobs, growth, regional development, and a new infrastructure); (3) a sustainable polity (a referendum leading to a sovereign Arctic nation state, able to represent itself in the UN and the Arctic Council).”⁵⁴ The priority for Greenland has been to “ensure that the people living in Greenland [...] benefit from the new economic opportunities which climate change also makes possible; in tourism, in agriculture, in mineral and oil extraction and in industrial development based on hydropower.”⁵⁵ Subsequently, development via extractive industries – including oil and gas and rare earth elements (REE) – is essential for establishing the financial viability for a self-sustaining Greenlandic economy, free from dependence on Danish subsidies.⁵⁶

By restricting these industries, Greenland may face a much slower path to this political aspiration. The two largest, and most influential Greenlandic political parties – Siumut (social democratic) and Inuit Ataqatigiit (socialist) – both desire independence, but only when the economy allows it. The potential of REE and oil and gas extraction has been

⁵⁴ Bjørst, ‘The right to ‘sustainable development’ and Greenland’s lack of a climate policy’

⁵⁵ Statement of Greenland. Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting Iqaluit, Nunavut, April 24th, 2014. URL: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/905>

⁵⁶ Paige Wilson. ‘An Arctic ‘Cold Rush’? Understanding Greenland’s (In)dependence Question.’ *Polar Record*, 53 (5) (2017): 512-519.

viewed as the “only” viable road to establishing this self-sustaining Greenlandic economy, and the attraction of external investment into the rich Greenlandic underground increases this viability.⁵⁷ Consequently, Greenlandic approaches to climate change and development hold implications for external interest, and thus, prospects for U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations. Vice versa, the U.S. approach to climate change and U.S. Arctic foreign policy directly impacts Greenlandic development prospects. Accompanying Trump’s administration came a complete disregard for climate change, which saw Trump identifying the degradational impacts of climate change facing Greenland as a potential opportunity for economic and geopolitical gain. Nevertheless, this is not the first time that the U.S. has been motivated by geopolitical strategy in Greenland.

United States Previous Attempts to Purchase Greenland

The U.S. has a history of being interested in purchasing Greenland, with two previous attempts. Paul Musgrave argues that this third attempt coincides with a shift in international relations that makes this a worse idea than previously.⁵⁸ Musgrave contends that Trump’s offer of purchasing Greenland portrayed his 19th-century, imperialist values, echoing previous historical offers. The first occurrence came within President Andrew Johnson’s administration. William Seward - a Lincoln holdover - pushed for U.S. territorial expansion whilst Johnson was preoccupied with reconstruction. Seward’s buccaneering policy firstly succeeded with the Alaska Purchase from Russia in 1867.⁵⁹ A further expansive attempt came with trying to purchase Greenland and Iceland from Denmark. Robert J. Walker - former Treasury Secretary - during the mid-19th century obtained the knowledge that Danish officials were potentially willing to sell both Greenland and Iceland in 1867, whilst Walker negotiated

⁵⁷ Bjørst, 2018; 121.

⁵⁸ Paul Musgrave. ‘American Imperialists Have Always Dreamed of Greenland.’ *Foreign Policy*, August 16, 2019. URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/16/american-imperialists-have-always-dreamed-of-greenland/>

⁵⁹ Annika Nilsson. ‘The United States and the making of an Arctic nation.’ *Polar Record*, 54(2), 2018; 95–107.

the purchase of Danish Caribbean colonies in the West Indies.⁶⁰ Within receiving this report, Seward encouraged Walker to produce a report outlining the resources of the Danish owned islands. Walker's report argued that purchasing the two islands could lead to 'greatness for the U.S.'. ⁶¹ Despite Seward's intentions, this failed when the plan to purchase the Danish West Indies was blocked in the Senate, regardless of the treaty to purchase having already been ratified by the Danish parliaments and a plebiscite in the islands.

The second attempt occurred following the Second World War. Denmark - whilst still administering Greenland as a colony - became conquered for six hours in March 1940. In the following year, the Danish ambassador signed an agreement with the U.S. government, enabling the U.S. to occupy and fortify Greenland in order to halt Germany from using it as a military base against North America.⁶² This occupation of Greenland enabled the U.S. to install numerous military bases, in which the U.S. deemed Greenland to be an indispensable component for national security.⁶³ Ultimately the bid was rejected by the Danes and led to Greenland being offered status as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, as an alternative of a colony. Nevertheless, the U.S. established multiple military air bases in Greenland as part of the Cold War nuclear strategy as Denmark acquiesced with U.S. demands to add additional bases throughout Greenland.⁶⁴

The previous purchase attempts did have strategic intentions behind the logic. Geopolitics and regional competition have influenced U.S. policymaking in the Arctic since becoming an Arctic state in 1867. Musgrave adds, however, that Trump appeared additionally motivated by ego rather than solely strategy with the idea of purchasing

⁶⁰ Nilsson, 'The United States and the making of an Arctic nation.'

⁶¹ Benjamin Peirce. 'A Report on the Resources of Iceland and Greenland (1868).' United States Dept. of State, Benjamin Mills Peirce, Dept. of State, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, United States, 1868. URL: <https://archive.org/details/areportonresour00statgoog/page/n13/mode/2up>

⁶² U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943; 641-47

⁶³ Musgrave, 'American Imperialists Have Always Dreamed of Greenland.'

⁶⁴ Nikolaj Petersen; SAC at Thule: Greenland in U.S. Polar Strategy. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2011; 13 (2) June 2011: 90-115. URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00138

Greenland. Trump's offer had been motivated by the potential to secure U.S. energy needs by utilizing Greenlandic natural resources, which could have bolstered Trump's Arctic legacy; being somewhat comparable to the legacy of President Eisenhower following the admission of Alaska. In 2018, James Mattis - former Secretary of Defence - attempted to coerce Denmark to halt the intentions of Greenland, which invited Chinese investment and financing of three new Greenlandic airports.⁶⁵ Mattis further expressed concern regarding the new shipping lanes that could develop, due to the impact of "global warming" - not climate change which had been eradicated from the Trump Administration's vocabulary - on the thawing of Arctic sea ice.⁶⁶ With the opening of new shipping routes, alongside the potential of an abundance of rich natural resources, this inspired Trump's logic with the offer.⁶⁷

Musgrave ponders, however, that it is no longer clear if states can buy or sell sovereign territory in the contemporary era. International norms pertaining to sovereign exchanges of territory has certainly eradicated this concept long ago. In essence, the offer from Trump was an extremely outdated one, more akin to the imperialist era of previous centuries, hence the comments of how "absurd" this offer was from Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen.⁶⁸ During the 19th century the U.S. purchased various lands from European powers, expanding south and west where Indigenous peoples of America – Sioux, Pawnee, Cheyenne, Crow, Seminole, Apache, Inuit and many more – who lived on the land were subject to colonial control.⁶⁹ With Greenland being Inuit, the absurdity of Trump's offer only grows when analyzing the implications of offering to 'purchase' an Indigenous territory

⁶⁵ Drew Hinshaw and Jeremy Page. 'How the Pentagon Countered China's Designs on Greenland.' *The Washington Post*, February 10th, 2019. URL: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-pentagon-countered-chinas-designs-on-greenland-11549812296>

⁶⁶ Richard Gonzales. 'FEMA Drops 'Climate Change' From Its Strategic Plan.' *National Public Radio*, March 15th, 2018. URL: <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/15/594140026/fema-drops-climate-change-from-its-strategic-plan>

⁶⁷ Andreas Østhagen. 'Arctic Oil and Gas: The role of Regions.' *Institutt for forsvarsstudier*, 2013. URL: <https://fhs.brage.unit.no/fhs-xmlui/handle/11250/99831>

⁶⁸ Peter Baker and Maggie Haberman. 'Trump's Interest in Buying Greenland Seemed Like a Joke. Then It Got Ugly.' *New York Times*, August 21st, 2021. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/politics/trump-greenland-prime-minister.html>

⁶⁹ Peter Beinert. 'Greenland's Wishes Don't Matter to Trump'. *The Atlantic*. August 27th, 2019. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/what-greenlanders-want-never-even-occurred-trump/596902/>

today. With Greenland pushing for independence, it does indeed appear illogical to be regressing to the former era of territorial exchanges and sales as “Greenland is no longer a colony to be disposed of as the government in Copenhagen wishes.”⁷⁰ The Trump Administration’s slogan of “Make American Great Again” essentially reshaped the ideas of ‘greatness for the U.S.’ by Walker, only proposed centuries later. In essence, the offer is deeply rooted in visions of the past.

U.S. presence in Greenland in general has been frowned upon since the American Air Force B-52 crashed in Greenland in 1968, leaving remnants of toxic waste that still exist in Greenland; particularly considering that Greenland did not formally agree to becoming a U.S. base.⁷¹ Further illogicality of Trump’s offer comes with the Greenlandic independence project being focussed on gaining autonomy and removing the shackles of a protectorate, not inviting a new protectorate.⁷² Additionally, Musgrave proposes that the U.S., even if it wanted to seriously purchase Greenland, could not offer the people of Greenland a better deal, be it with trading the Danish healthcare system for the privatised American one, or due to the Trump Administration’s mistreatment of its colonies, and historically in general.⁷³ Hypothetically, if the purchase *did* successfully occur, this could have sparked further state interest in securing Arctic resources. Ultimately, the offer held the potential to revamp an extremely outdated form of colonialist international relations. In contrast, however, Trump’s predecessor did understand the importance of Inuit representation and Indigenous politics. It is necessary to explore President Obama’s Arctic legacy to fully understand the shifts in the U.S. Arctic agenda and the impact Trump had on Greenland.

⁷⁰ Musgrave, ‘American Imperialists Have Always Dreamed of Greenland.’

⁷¹ Musgrave

⁷² Andrews, Crowther, Greaves, *(De)securitization, Colonialism, and Normal Politics in Kalaallit Nunaat and Inuit Nunangat*. (Forthcoming; 2022)

⁷³ Musgrave, ‘American Imperialists Have Always Dreamed of Greenland.’

Chapter Two – Obama’s Arctic Legacy

President Barack Obama holds a distinct legacy, not only for being the first ever African American President of the U.S., but also because of his focus on the Arctic. During Obama’s time in office, the Arctic offered a variety of challenges to be addressed, including rapidly developing environmental concerns, issues of defence policy and energy security pressures. In 2015, Obama became the first ever sitting U.S. President to travel north of the Arctic Circle, significantly raising the profile of the Arctic’s importance both domestically, and internationally.⁷⁴ Obama also focussed on environmental issues which created a multi-faceted Arctic legacy for the Obama Administration. Although far from complete or free from criticism, the intentions of Obama with the Arctic left mostly a constructive legacy; one focussed on raising awareness to environmental issues, climate change and working collaboratively. This chapter offers a brief overview of Obama’s Arctic legacy, analyzing issues of climate change, energy security, how Obama approached Arctic state relations, and whether Obama increased the importance of U.S.-Greenland relations.

The Complex Balance of Environmental and Energy Security Concerns under Obama

Obama pursued a complex ‘all of the above’ energy agenda, with the President strategically promoting “conventional and unconventional” sources of fossil fuels, whilst also highlighting the need to mitigate the detrimental impact of climate change in his later years in office.⁷⁵ Rising temperatures have impacted the U.S. Arctic in numerous ways, affecting Arctic ecosystems, such as with reducing Caribou populations by 50% and majorly impacting U.S. Arctic communities, both in economic and cultural terms.⁷⁶ Due to thawing permafrost,

⁷⁴ Sarah Wheaton. ‘Cold War echoes during Obama’s Arctic trek.’ *POLITICO*, September 1st, 2015. URL: <https://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/obama-alaska-visit-russia-arctic-circle-213234>

⁷⁵ Whitney Lackenbauer, Heather Nicol, and Wilfrid Greaves. *One Arctic: the Arctic Council and circumpolar governance*. Centre on Foreign Policy & Federalism, 2017; 7

⁷⁶ Jillian Rogers. ‘Declining Western Arctic Caribou Herd worries hunters, biologists.’ *Anchorage Daily News*, September 28th, 2016. URL: <https://www.adn.com/rural-alaska/article/plummeting-size-arctic-caribou-herd-leaves-subsistence-hunters-biologists-worried/2014/12/28/>

the first case of climate refugees in the Arctic was witnessed during the Obama era, seeing the population of Newtok, Alaska, relocating their entire town in 2015.⁷⁷ The climate agenda therefore advanced under Obama, with a variety of initiatives and extensive strategies designed to tackle climate change. On March 19th, 2015, President Obama passed an Executive Order that intended to reduce the federal government's greenhouse gas emissions by 40% from 2008 levels over the next decade.⁷⁸ Within this Executive Order, there was a strong focus on moving to renewable sources of electricity and investment in clean energy technologies.⁷⁹

With regards to international relations with other states, the U.S. under Obama pledged to reduce its GHG emissions to 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025 and negotiated an agreement with China to reduce their GHG emissions.⁸⁰ And most notably, the Obama Administration's greatest achievement towards the environment came with the *Paris Agreement* on December 12th, 2015, which witnessed 178 state signatures agreeing to limit the global temperature increase to under two degrees Celsius.⁸¹ However, the quintessential caveat of Obama's accomplishment with the *Paris Agreement* is that this was achieved through presidential prerogative, not through U.S. Congress.⁸² This presents a challenge to the overall environmental legacy of Obama, and indeed, the future approach to U.S. Arctic policies whereby Obama's successor must continue this work for this legacy to develop.

⁷⁷ Richard Clifford. 'What is Obama's Arctic Legacy?' *The Polar Connection*, August 25th, 2016. URL: <https://polarconnection.org/obama-arctic-legacy/>

⁷⁸ Clifford, 'What is Obama's Arctic Legacy?'

⁷⁹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 'FACT SHEET: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Federal Government and Across the Supply Chain.' March 19th, 2015. URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/19/fact-sheet-reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions-federal-government-and-acro?fbclid=IwAR38Qvko5DNt0TT0VEmVbB8FGj7kIvaSh5YmO_iBT06U05KI-mxpAYxMfbI

⁸⁰ Lenore Taylor. 'U.S. and China strike deal on carbon cuts in push for global climate change pact.' *The Guardian*. November 12th, 2014. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/12/china-and-us-make-carbon-pledge?fbclid=IwAR01lleHwl7BKqmLkoYVHNHDiBIKl8P9BVDOstYhgyHeZLflEtFrzpJJbYo>

⁸¹ Paris Agreement, December 12th, 2015.

⁸² Clifford. 'What is Obama's Arctic Legacy?'

Obama took a multilateral, cooperative approach to tackling climate change, addressing climate change to be a key issue, and opening the possibility for securitization amongst the international community. Despite this, the Obama Administration should not be free from criticism, particularly when examining U.S. energy security via the Arctic. There has long been debate surrounding U.S. energy security, which played an integral part in Obama's presidential campaigns. Obama was extremely conscientious regarding mitigating climate change in the Arctic and globally. Obama held deep concerns for the consequences of Arctic exploration and economic projects, including risky oil extraction projects. However, Obama was not excluded from the pressures of both energy security and economic advancement which advocated for oil extraction and exploration in the Arctic. This led to a complex Arctic approach: pursuing policies to advance the environmental agenda, which coincided with supporting Arctic oil exploration, albeit in a very cautious manner. Oil extraction and exploration hold the potential to damage Arctic ecosystems, yet the economic attraction towards extractive carboniferous industries remains prevalent, not just for the U.S., but for all Arctic actors, including Greenland. By cautiously favouring drilling in the Arctic whilst also citing environmental concerns, Obama's administration approached climate change in a non-securitized manner, thus enabling the pursuit of energy security via fossil fuels to continue.⁸³

Congressional agendas also influence foreign policy. Obama did only hold a Democratic majority in Congress for two years, and then was confronted by a Republican House and Senate; both being much more sympathetic to resource extraction. Foreign policy creation and implementation is therefore not just an executive responsibility but is shaped by a multitude of legislative agendas. With the pressures of a Republican House and Senate during the majority of Obama's administrative tenure, this influenced the 'all of the above'

⁸³ Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde (1998); 25-32

energy agenda that Obama implemented. The U.S. Arctic economy relies on fossil fuels; for example, over a third of all jobs within the state of Alaska are linked to the oil and gas industry, employing around 110,000 jobs across the state. The paradoxical nature of the energy industry grows as the impacts of climate change threaten further destabilization, yet over 90% of Alaskan revenue currently comes from taxes on oil and gas pipelines.⁸⁴ This exemplifies the complex attractiveness of carbon-intensive energy industries, even with the acknowledgement of the potential environmental degradation. During Obama's time in office, many within the Republican party actively voiced their frustration vis-à-vis his reluctance to push Arctic exploration and grant further leases to oil exploration companies. For instance, in 2015 the Governor of Alaska openly criticized Obama for not "putting oil into the pipelines" and exclaimed that he was "declaring war on Alaska's future" due to classifying expansive areas of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) as wilderness, thus limiting exploration within the region.⁸⁵

With the ANWR being classified as wilderness, this depicted Obama's concerns for environmental protection.⁸⁶ The area is home to the most diverse range of wildlife species in all the Arctic; homing polar bears, grizzly bears, grey wolves, migrating Porcupine caribou herds, Arctic fox, muskoxen, and many coastal plain bird species which encompass all fifty states of the U.S. The region has faced interest and pressure to enable oil drilling, despite parts of the region, including the coastal plain not being protected and classified as wilderness. By January 2015, Obama had developed a Comprehensive Conservation Plan which intended to sustain and protect the ANWR, receiving harsh criticism from Republicans

⁸⁴ Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde (1998); 25-32

⁸⁵ Nathaniel Herz. 'Alaska Gov. Walker to Obama: Help us put more oil in the pipeline.' *Anchorage Daily News*, August 25th, 2015. URL: <https://www.adn.com/politics/article/alaska-gov-walker-obama-help-us-put-more-oil-pipeline/2015/08/26/>

⁸⁶ The White House, President Barack Obama. 'President Obama Calls on Congress to Protect Arctic Refuge as Wilderness.' January 25th, 2015. URL: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/01/25/president-obama-calls-congress-protect-arctic-refuge-wilderness>

due to once again, energy concerns.⁸⁷ Within the same year, Obama insisted that Congress – Republican-led at the time – block a further twelve million acres from oil and gas drilling; totalling the protected wilderness area within the ANWR to be twenty million acres. Once more this conveyed Obama’s concern for Arctic environmental matters, which is quintessential in contrasting with Trump’s approach, ultimately highlighting the appeal of Greenlandic natural resources for Trump’s energy security agenda.

The Arctic has consequently been at the forefront of U.S. energy security discussions for decades, with predictions that the northern polar region holds substantial amounts of undiscovered natural resources, including 23.6 billion barrels of accessible oil in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas alone.⁸⁸ There appeared a duality to the Arctic policies of the Obama Administration due to balancing energy security concerns alongside that of environmental. For instance, in 2015 Obama had approved exploration within the Arctic for Royal Dutch Shell, receiving criticism from former Vice President and notable environmentalist Al Gore as being “insane.”⁸⁹ Coinciding with Gore’s comments, the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management estimated there to be a 75% chance that major oil spills could occur.⁹⁰ Regardless, Obama pushed the agenda of energy security to justify Arctic exploration, which was argued to be a matter of national security for the U.S. In due time, Obama reversed this decision and withdrew the permission for Arctic exploration for Royal Dutch Shell. Nevertheless, this conveys the appeal of the Arctic in economic terms, even for an extremely environmentally conscious administration such as Obama’s.

⁸⁷ Reuters Staff. ‘Obama asks Congress to widen Arctic refuge protections.’ *Reuters*, April 3rd, 2015. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-environment-usa-arctic-idUSKBN0MU1ER20150403>

⁸⁸ King, ‘Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Arctic’

⁸⁹ Suzanne Goldenberg. ‘Al Gore criticizes Obama on climate change and ‘insane’ Arctic drilling.’ *The Guardian*. July 16th, 2015. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/16/al-gore-obama-climate-change-arctic-drilling>

⁹⁰ Alice Harrold. ‘Arctic drilling: Obama gives Shell the go-ahead despite fears of oil spills.’ *The Independent*, July 24th, 2015. URL: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/obama-agrees-let-shell-drill-arctic-despite-75-chance-major-oil-spills-10412604.html>

Obama did, however, block Arctic drilling for two years from 2016, moving into the Trump Administration, and further still rejected the extension of oil leases that were granted under the Bush Administration. Essentially, this pushed new rules for Arctic exploration and oil companies in favour of environmental protection. Yet despite the two-year ban, the Arctic was still included in the 2017-2022 Outer Continental Shelf Program and granted leases in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, once again portraying the duality of Obama's stance toward U.S. energy security and Arctic environmental concerns.⁹¹ This analysis could be extended beyond the Arctic, for instance fracked natural gas in general became an extremely destructive industry under Obama, witnessing the BP-Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.⁹² Obama further supported multiple pipeline projects and never truly passed climate change legislation. In sum, Obama's complex Arctic agenda – balancing environmental and energy concerns – outlined the threat of climate change but did not explicitly securitize the issue either. The Obama Administration certainly raised the profile of the Arctic, and increased focus on Arctic environmental issues, but Obama cannot be truly considered a pro-environment POTUS. The duality of Obama's climate and energy agenda should not escape criticism.

Obama's Approach to Arctic Security: International Relations and Multilateral Cooperation with Arctic states

Alongside the economic and environmental legacy of the Obama Administration, the growing security debate within the Arctic also challenged the administration's geopolitical approach, most notably with Russia. Russian military expansion within the Arctic caused concern during Obama's time in office, which included concern over the restoration of

⁹¹ Clifford, 'What is Obama's Legacy?'

⁹² Greaves. 'Environmental Security, Energy Security, and the Arctic in the Obama Presidency'. In: *One Arctic: the Arctic Council and circumpolar governance*. (2017); 109

approximately ten Soviet-era military bases.⁹³ With the confrontation of ‘losing’ the Arctic, the Administration did not resort to increasing military presence in retaliation to Russian military expansion, but instead opted for a diplomatic policy of cooperation to address Arctic security matters. Obama did not wish to exacerbate security tensions in the Arctic and instead opted for maintaining cooperative relations with Russia on further soft security issues, including Coast Guard cooperative efforts. With the U.S. focus on soft security issues with Russia, it must be acknowledged that the U.S. did of course still hold the military capacity to engage in activities in the Arctic, as was exemplified with the U.S. Naval mission *IceX*, taking place in 2016.⁹⁴ Hard defence issues appeared secondary to Obama’s Arctic agenda, however, instead prioritizing environmental and economic concerns, conveying a cooperative, multilateral and non-confrontational approach.

The Obama Administration brought a liberal internationalist approach to Arctic international relations, whereby the Democratic Administration worked collaboratively with a multilateral approach to cooperate with other Arctic states. There are a variety of inferences that demonstrate the intention to increase cooperative multilateral Arctic relations, such as with the appropriately named GLACIER Conference (Conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement & Resilience) in August 2015.⁹⁵ The GLACIER conference was a political event which intended to highlight Obama’s climate change agenda ahead of the 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21), held from November 30th to December 11th 2015, in Paris. Seven states sent their foreign ministers to join U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in Anchorage to discuss issues of climate in the Arctic, including Arctic states

⁹³ Clifford, ‘What is Obama’s Legacy?’

⁹⁴ Clifford

⁹⁵ Lawson Brigham. ‘The GLACIER Conference & President Obama’s Links to the Arctic.’ *Arctic Yearbook* 2015; 1-4

such as Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. President Obama closed the three-day event stating that:

Climate change is no longer some far-off problem. It is happening [...] now and climate change [...] affects all trends – economic trends, security trends. Everything will be impacted”. The President continued that “if we [...] abandon our course of action, if we stop trying to build a clean-energy economy and reduce carbon pollution, if we do nothing to keep the glaciers from melting faster, and oceans from rising faster... we will condemn our children to a planet beyond their capacity to repair. That’s what we have to convey to our people [...] when we meet in Paris later this year.”⁹⁶

This speech addressed the highly complex challenge that faces the Arctic and the international community. With examples emphasizing the importance of Arctic change – including melting sea ice; retreating glaciers; thawing permafrost; migration changes; and the threats facing coastal communities – this speech ultimately would lead the President to push this agenda further at COP21 in Paris. This historic event, coinciding with Obama’s Arctic visit demonstrates a significant attempt by a sitting U.S. President to bring attention towards climate change and the Arctic, not just for Americans, but for the entire globe. This effectively identified climate change as concern for the U.S. in the north and insinuated the potential to securitize climate internationally.

Furthermore, under Obama the U.S. chaired the Arctic Council (AC) between 2015-2017; the second time in the AC’s history. During the chairmanship of the AC, the U.S. advocated three central focal areas: firstly, with improving Arctic Ocean safety, security and stewardship, including search and rescue cooperation, oil pollution preparedness and

⁹⁶ Brigham. ‘The GLACIER Conference & President Obama’s Links to the Arctic’; 3

response, maritime protection, maritime shipping and ocean acidification monitoring. Secondly with an attempt to improve the economic and living conditions of Indigenous communities. And thirdly with addressing the impacts of climate change.⁹⁷ It must be noted that the AC excludes discussions of military issues, instead prioritizing focus on issues such as sustainable development, environmental protection and the threat of climate change.⁹⁸ With advocating these thematic agendas during the U.S. chairmanship of the AC, Obama emphasized a willingness towards increasing multilateral cooperative relations with other Arctic states, regardless of geopolitical developments in other regions.

A further exemplification of enhancing Arctic cooperation came with the White House Arctic Science Ministerial which took place on September 28th, 2016. During this first inaugural Ministerial, the Administration proposed “advancing, promising, near-term science initiatives and creating a context for increased international scientific collaboration on the Arctic over the long term.”⁹⁹ This event took place to commemorate the first Arctic visit for Obama, with the intention of enhancing cooperation and awareness of climate change issues and increasing scientific collaboration between Arctic states on community-based projects. Finally, but certainly not least, the Ministerial outlined the importance of utilizing Inuit (Indigenous) knowledge to build resilience to climate change and create cooperative strategies acting as resilience to existential threats. This final point is both timely and geopolitically important within the Arctic context, which is important to discuss further with Trump’s impact on U.S.-Greenlandic relations. This is an interesting element to analyze, as the focus on Inuit knowledge also echoes the sentiments of the Paris Agreement, which states that all parties agree upon:

⁹⁷ The Arctic Council. States: The United States. URL: <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/the-united-states/>

⁹⁸ Rob Huebert. ‘United States arctic policy: the reluctant arctic power.’ *University of Calgary School of Public Policy Briefing Papers*, 2(2) 2009; 1–27; Oran Young. ‘The Arctic Council at twenty: how to remain effective in a rapidly changing environment.’ *UC Irvine Law Review*, 6(2) 2016; 99–119

⁹⁹ Jon Holdren. White House Arctic Science Ministerial. May 13th, 2016. URL: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/05/13/white-house-arctic-science-ministerial-september-28-2016>

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, *the rights of Indigenous peoples* [...] and people in vulnerable situations and *the right to development* [...] and intergenerational equity.¹⁰⁰

Greenland therefore presents a unique and dynamic case for analysis, considering the push for independence via economic development. The importance of Indigenous Knowledge is evidently growing in international recognition and respect, leading to further challenges for state relations which affect the agendas of both climate and energy security. With the importance of Indigenous peoples clearly outlined in the Ministerial and the Paris Agreement, it would surely be unfathomable that in the 21st century another state would offer to purchase Greenland. The Presidential approaches of Obama and Trump clearly interpreted the heightened importance of Indigenous issues very differently.

Alongside raising awareness for Arctic environmental concerns, Obama's administration therefore highlighted the importance of Inuit representation. Following the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was openly critical of the 2010 Arctic 5 conference in Chelsea, Quebec, due to the exclusion of Indigenous peoples. The U.S. consequently announced it would no longer participate in Arctic 5 meetings as this omitted the Indigenous permanent participants of the Arctic Council.¹⁰¹ That was the very last Arctic 5 meeting. Obama's administration highlighted the importance of Inuit representation with regards to discussions of Arctic sovereignty and resource management. In stark contrast to this, Trump's failure to firstly discuss his offer to purchase Greenland, with Greenland,

¹⁰⁰ Paris Agreement, 2015, Para. IX

¹⁰¹ Klaus Dodds. 'The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, 'Law of the Sea,' and Arctic Ocean.' *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2013); 45–55.

highlights the lack of importance that Inuit representation and self-determination represents for the Trump Administration.

Obama's focus on developing cooperative multilateral relations and acknowledging the importance of Inuit representation portrayed a liberal internationalist approach to the Arctic. Koskenniemi argues that the international community is becoming more integrated due to international law, collective projects, and the interpenetration and cross-fertilization of different elements of international law.¹⁰² He argues that developing institutions and state relations to tackle mutual challenges symbolize *collective projects*. The Paris Agreement, the Ministerial and the collaboration within the AC can be considered collective projects. Obama therefore advanced an agenda of multilateralism within the Arctic in attempt to mitigate the issues of climate change with other Arctic states, and did so with respect and concern for Inuit.

Summary of Obama's Arctic Legacy and Greenland Relations

The Arctic legacy of the Obama Administration can subsequently be perceived to be mostly a constructive one, if not slightly conflicted. The U.S. advanced the climate change agenda, brought increased attention to the Arctic, advanced multilateral state relations and cooperative efforts in the region, improved scientific collaboration and recognized the importance of Inuit representation. This is a commendable legacy. However, Obama also dealt with pressures of furthering the energy security agenda in the name of national security. Obama did not, however, succumb to militarizing the Arctic when confronted with the issue of Russian restoration of military bases, and essentially proceeded with an agenda of Arctic cooperation and diplomacy. Raising the profile for Arctic issues is the most significant achievement of the Obama Administration. The importance of addressing climate issues also

¹⁰² Martii Koskenniemi. 'Law, Teleology, and IR: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity.' *IR* 26 (1) (2011); 3- 34.

increased in the Arctic and for the international community in general. Nevertheless, Obama certainly did not push securitization of climate change in the Arctic, due to his “all of the above” energy agenda, cautiously leaving climate change in a state of politicization for the U.S.

Obama’s visit to the Arctic prior to the GLACIER conference absolutely increased the significance of Arctic issues for the U.S., however, this did not increase relations with Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark directly. Following the GLACIER conference, whereby Kristian Jensen - the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark - attended, Jensen invited Obama to visit Greenland.¹⁰³ The intention of this invite - to the first ever sitting President of the U.S. to travel to the Arctic - was to raise awareness and witness the visible impacts of climate change directly; with considerable detrimental impacts to Arctic icebergs and icesheets in Greenland on full display, particularly near Ilulissat. Despite this official invitation, Obama did not visit Greenland during office, only later in 2019, once his influence on U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-Greenland relations had diminished.¹⁰⁴

The only instances of direct correspondence between the U.S. and Greenland occurred with Clinton’s attendance to the AC in Nuuk, Greenland, in 2011 and with the post-GLACIER conference invitation to Obama.¹⁰⁵ Academic knowledge and journalistic sources on U.S.-Greenland relations during Obama’s era is limited, certainly in contrast to the Trump Administration. Before moving towards analysis surrounding increased U.S.-Greenland relations under Trump, it is necessary to depict whether the Trump Administration continued with elements of Obama’s Arctic agenda or if this differed entirely. In the following chapter Trump’s approaches to climate change, energy security, defence and international relations

¹⁰³ Marc Jacobsen. ‘Denmark’s strategic interests in the Arctic: It’s the Greenlandic connection, stupid!’ *The Arctic Institute*, May 6th, 2016. URL: <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/denmark-interests-arctic-greenland-connection/>

¹⁰⁴ Elle Hunt. ‘Is Trump’s deep fear and envy of Obama behind his plan to purchase Greenland?’ *The Guardian*, August 21st, 2019. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/shortcuts/2019/aug/21/is-trumps-deep-fear-and-envy-of-obama-behind-his-plan-to-purchase-greenland>

¹⁰⁵ Jacobsen, ‘Denmark’s strategic interests in the Arctic: It’s the Greenlandic connection, stupid!’

with Arctic states are comparatively addressed. This is fundamental to analyze if the multilateral, cooperative approach to Arctic geopolitics under Obama continued, or if Trump opted for a less-cooperative agenda and impacted the U.S. approach to climate.

Chapter Three – Trump’s Arctic Legacy: A Shift in the U.S. Arctic Agenda

Trump on Climate Change, Science and the U.S. Arctic Research Agenda

Presidential priorities and approaches to state relations, climate change and Arctic policymaking differ, but it is how a POTUS and their administration perceives these issues which cause significant impact. The Trump Administration approached science and climate change in stark contrast to Obama, completely downplaying and outright denying the impact of climate change.¹⁰⁶ From the very start of Trump’s single term in office, it was made clear that supporting scientific research that outlined the impacts of climate change was not of importance. This radical shift with the approach to climate change is a far cry from the agenda of Obama. Beginning on January 21st, 2017, climate change data deletion begun.¹⁰⁷ The *U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic*, the *Implementation Plan for the Strategy*, and the report on Arctic data progress all vanished from search engines. Various U.S. Arctic scientists witnessed their research disappearing and citations becoming invalidated due to this purge on climate science.¹⁰⁸ Trump further dropped climate change from the list of national security threats, refusing to refer to climate change by name, contrasting with Obama, who in 2015 outlined climate change to be “an urgent and growing threat to our national security.”¹⁰⁹

For Trump’s administration, the phrase ‘climate change’ was replaced by ‘resilience’, therefore completely downplaying the threat of climate change, and refusing to discuss the issue entirely.¹¹⁰ The Trump Administration effectively institutionalized an agenda of climate denial. Ultimately this culminated in Trump notifying the international community on November 4th, 2019, that the U.S. would officially withdraw from the Paris Climate

¹⁰⁶ Davenport and Landler, ‘Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate Science.’

¹⁰⁷ Victoria Herrmann. ‘I am an Arctic Researcher: Donald Trump is deleting my citations.’ *The Guardian*, March 28th, 2017.

¹⁰⁸ Herrmann, 2017

¹⁰⁹ National Geographic. ‘A running list of how President Trump is changing environmental policy.’ December 18th, 2017. URL: <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment>

¹¹⁰ National Geographic, 2017.

Agreement in the Fall of 2020.¹¹¹ On November 4th, 2020, this withdrawal left the world's second-largest emitter of GHGs as the only state to abandon the global effort to combat climate change.¹¹² This move symbolized a rejection of climate change as a political and security threat. Trump also criticized and questioned the validity behind the *Fourth U.S. National Climate Assessment* by creating a new review panel on climate, once more attacking the very notion of climate science.¹¹³

The U.S. did maintain their participation of the *Arctic Science Ministerial* moving into the Trump Administration, yet climate science received a drastically different approach. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) held a vacant position for over a year following the inauguration of Trump on January 20th, 2017, all the way into August 2018.¹¹⁴ Since established in 1976, the OSTP enables the President and executive agencies of the U.S. to receive advice on devising scientific policy.¹¹⁵ The fragmented institutional environment in both the executive and legislative influence U.S. foreign policy too, but Trump's lack of urgency demonstrates that climate science held little concern for the Trump Administration in general, which further holds significant influence on U.S. Arctic energy security concerns.

The Complex Balance of Environmental and Energy Security Concerns under Trump

Trump's approach to U.S. domestic Arctic energy concerns differed from Obama's to a certain extent. Much like Obama, Trump chose to push development of fossil fuel production in Alaska. However, this came following Obama placing restrictions on oil and gas drilling in the Arctic, most notably within the ANWR. The U.S. Senator for Alaska

¹¹¹ The Paris climate agreement legally entered into force Nov. 4, 2016, after the U.S. and other states formally signed the treaty. Under rules set out by the United Nations, no state could leave the accord for three years, after which there is a one-year waiting period for the withdrawal to fully take effect.

¹¹² Bradley Dennis. 'Trump makes it official: U.S. will withdraw from the Paris climate accord.' *The Washington Post*, November 4th, 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/11/04/trump-makes-it-official-us-will-withdraw-paris-climate-accord/>

¹¹³ Davenport and Landler, Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate Science.'

¹¹⁴ Jeffrey Mervis. 'U.S. science adviser sees smaller federal role.' *Science Policy*, 363 (6429) (2019); 800–801

¹¹⁵ John Sargent and Dana Shea. *Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017; 1-38

incorporated permissions to drill into the ANWR alongside tax cuts passed by Republicans in 2017.¹¹⁶ Alongside this attempt to remove Obama's restrictions, in 2017 Trump signed an Executive Order seeking to review and effectively repeal Obama's drilling ban in prohibited waters passed in 2016.¹¹⁷ Trump attempted to develop oil drilling in 128 million acres of the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. Despite this attempt, legal statutes do not authorize a reversal without approval from Congress.

Ultimately, this resulted in U.S. District Judge Sharon Gleason overruling Trump's Executive Order with Gleason stating that Trump had "exceeded" his authority and promptly restored the protections that Obama had established.¹¹⁸ This illegitimate attempt by Trump to reverse Obama's drilling ban produced a giant legal blow to Trump's Arctic energy intentions within Alaska.¹¹⁹ This legal debacle conveys the contrasting approaches of Obama and Trump regarding balancing U.S. energy security versus environmental concerns. Whereas Obama had cautiously favoured energy security - whilst simultaneously advocating for environmental protection - Trump proceeded with aggressively advocating for energy security with complete disregard for environmental issues. The uncooperative nature of the Trump Administration's push for energy security can be further exemplified with revoking President Obama's Executive Order – *Northern Bering Sea Climate Change Resilience* – which aimed to protect the Bering Sea from further destabilization and environment harm.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Dermot Cole. 'How the Trump administration's rush to drill in Alaska's Arctic refuge is backfiring. *Arctic Today*, May 19th

¹¹⁷ Trump, D. J. Executive Order 13795: implementing an America-first offshore energy strategy. *Federal Register*, 82(84), 20815–20818, April 28, 2017.

¹¹⁸ The United States District Court for the District of Alaska: CASE- LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants, and AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE and STATE OF ALASKA, March 29th, 2019. URL: <http://www.alaskapublic.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/80-Order-granting-MSJ-1.pdf>

¹¹⁹ Sharon Gleason. League of Conservation Voters, et al., v. Donald J. Trump, et al., Defendants, and American Petroleum Institute and State of Alaska, Intervenor-Defendants. *in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Case 3:17-cv-00101-SLG*, March 29, 2019.

¹²⁰ Diana Haecker. 'Trump Issues Executive Order Revoking Northern Bering Sea Protection And Tribal Participation.' *Nome Nugget*, May 5th, 2017.

Trump experienced the same energy security pressures that Obama faced, yet increased attempts to enable more oil and gas drilling throughout the U.S. Arctic. This exemplifies the difference between the two approaches to energy security, climate change, and the crucial difference to each President's pursuit of U.S. Arctic policies. In sum, Obama led a complex pursuit of an 'all of the above' energy agenda but also focussed on environmental science and the importance of Inuit representation. On the other hand, Trump followed a path led purely by energy security and disregarded environmental concerns, thus laying the foundations for the U.S. economic interests in Greenland.

Trump's Approach to Arctic Security Concerns and International Relations with (non)Arctic States

Trump's foreign policy approach also differed to Obama's with reference to containing Arctic state rival Russia, and non-Arctic state rival China. The Arctic has increased in interest for the international community and Chinese Arctic interest has also grown exponentially. With the potential of new sea lanes opening - meaning quicker trade routes with European partners – as well as the opportunity to secure natural resources, geopolitically the Arctic could be key to China's status as a rising global power. This hypothetical U.S. concern is becoming reality. The intention of China in the Arctic has been clarified with China's *Arctic Policy* being released in 2018, whereby China claimed to be a "near-Arctic state", much to the dismay of many Arctic states.¹²¹ Further alarm for the U.S. came with China announcing their intention to create a "Polar Silk Road" as a component of the Belt and Road Initiative. China has also been under scrutiny due to their scientific research projects being criticized as being a façade, hiding China's real interests in the Circumpolar North. The U.S. Department of Defense outlined to Congress that "civilian

¹²¹ The State Council. 'China's Arctic Policy.' Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2018. URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm

research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean [...] deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks.”¹²² China’s increased economic interest in the region has caused concern for Washington, which did not occur to the same intensity during Obama’s administration.

Alongside Chinese economic interests in the Arctic, an increased militarization in collaboration with Russia has caused further concern in Washington. Russia has begun restoring its military bases in the Arctic and expanding the Russian icebreaker fleet as well as aircraft, tanks, submarines, and fleets of UAVs in the region.¹²³ Alongside hard security concerns, Russia is also expanding oil and gas extraction sites in the Arctic as a component to fortifying Russia’s energy security goals for the foreseeable future. With the potential of new sea trade routes opening, this increases the opportunity for trade through the Northern Sea Route - although far from established at present - creating further unease for the U.S. and other Arctic states. Growing Sino-Russian ties could place further geopolitical stress in the Arctic for the U.S.; if China does indeed financially assist Russia to develop the infrastructure necessary for commercial trade through the Northern Sea Route.

¹²² Office of the Secretary of Defense. ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019.’ Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019.

¹²³ Stacy Closson, S. Russia’s recent arctic activities: military threat or development strategy? *Russian Analytical Digest*, 237 2019; 9–12; UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle)



Figure 10: A map of the Arctic Ocean and Circumpolar Arctic, depicting the current sea routes used by vessels to navigate Arctic sea ice. Source: Radhiki Kant. '10 facts about Northwest Passage.' *Marine Insight*. April 8th, 2021. URL: <https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/10-facts-about-northwest-passage/>

Both Obama and Trump acknowledged the potential implications of the increasing international interest in the Arctic, particularly with the growing collaborative ties between Russia and China. Despite this mutual acknowledgment, the administrative approaches differed vastly. The Obama Administration approached this security dilemma with a cautious diplomatic approach, choosing to utilize pre-established U.S. Arctic policy institutions whilst remaining neutral to Russian and Chinese regional influence.¹²⁴ Obama under the National Security Council (NSC), invited insight throughout the government to establish the first ever *U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region* in 2013.¹²⁵ This Arctic Strategy sought to approach certain thematic issues such as protecting the environment of the Arctic, managing

¹²⁴ Katherine Weingartner and Robert Orrtung. *U.S. Arctic Policymaking under Trump and Obama*. Cambridge University Press, 2020.

¹²⁵ Barack Obama. *National Strategy for the Arctic Region*. Washington, DC: White House, 2013.

the natural resources, addressing national security concerns, and strengthening international cooperation in the northern region. Supplementary to the NSC, the OSTP and the Council on Environmental Quality co-developed the strategy. The key emphasis here should be placed on the *strengthening* of international cooperation, acting in an extremely diplomatic, multilateral approach rather than exacerbating tensions in the Arctic.

In contrast to Obama's approach, Trump pushed an extremely aggressive geopolitical approach to state relations in the Arctic, intensifying existing tensions by choosing to circumvent traditional policy approaches. The offer to purchase Greenland in August 2019 not only acted as an attempt to deter Chinese strategic engagement in the Arctic but also raised the profile of the growing importance of the Arctic symbolically. Unlike the Obama Administration, formal policy processes such as collaborating with the State Department were disregarded.¹²⁶ Diverging from Obama's cautious approach, Trump addressed China directly in October 2019, warning that "affairs of the Arctic should be governed by actual nations of the Arctic [...] as you know, there are other people coming into the Arctic [...] we don't like it [...] we can't [...] won't let it happen."¹²⁷ Choosing a confrontational approach such as this may only encourage further international interest in the Arctic and invite China and Russia to strengthen relations. Unsurprisingly, the *U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region* created under Obama did not develop further under Trump.

This brief insight establishes a basic understanding of the core differences and fundamental approaches of each administration. What connects the two U.S. administrations, however, is the general distrust and concern of the growing relations and activities of Russia

¹²⁶ Daniel Lippman. 'Trump's Greenland gambit finds allies inside government.' *Politico*, August 24th, 2019.

¹²⁷ David Brennan. 'Donald Trump Says U.S. Will Block China from Expanding to the Arctic: "We Won't Let It Happen"'. *Newsweek*, October 3rd, 2019.

and China.¹²⁸ The Pentagon consequently released the first *Arctic Strategy* in 2016¹²⁹ which continued to develop with an updated version being outlined in 2019.¹³⁰ China and Russia clearly posed significant threats to U.S. national security interests under Obama and Trump, and this impacts U.S. Arctic foreign policy and geopolitical strategy. Despite the Trump Administration's accusations of Canada's illegitimate sovereign claim to the Northwest Passage, even Trump intended to increase collaborative Arctic defence with Canada.¹³¹ With the U.S. 2019 *Department of Defense Arctic Strategy* being essentially analogous to Canada's *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* – mentioning a “secure stable region” - collaborative U.S.-Canadian Arctic defence concerns remained crucial with respect to growing Sino-Russian Arctic interest.¹³² Categorically, Obama and Trump did agree on certain elements of each other's Arctic security agenda, but it is the approach to the Arctic Council where the two administrations truly parted ways.

The Differing Presidential Approaches to Arctic Geopolitics: the Arctic Council

Under the Ottawa Declaration that established the Arctic Council in 1996, it is explicitly stated that military security issues are beyond the scope of the AC's mandate. Since its establishment, the AC has acted as an institution for international cooperation, which has for the majority been successful with deescalating Arctic tensions. The AC also consists of Permanent Participants which include various Indigenous groups such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) - encompassing Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Chukotka - and

¹²⁸ A.A. Kravchuk. 'A neo-realist approach to analyzing the military-political situation in the Arctic.' *Polis*, 1, 2019; 136–148

¹²⁹ Department of Defense 'Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region.' Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2016.

¹³⁰ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. *Department of Defense Arctic Strategy*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June, 2019.

¹³¹ Mike Pompeo. 'Looking North: Sharpening America's Arctic Focus.' U.S. Department of State. (May 6, 2019). URL: <https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/> ; *Emphasis in the Original*.

¹³² Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. The Government of Canada. September 10th, 2019. URL: <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1567697304035/1567697319793>; Department of Defense Arctic Strategy

non-Arctic state observers such as China and India.¹³³ Within the U.S. second chairmanship of the AC¹³⁴, running from April 24th, 2015, to May 11th, 2017, this term experienced the end of the Obama era and the start of the Trump era. The Obama Administration acted in an extremely supportive and cooperative manner within the framework of the AC. The AC's importance to the U.S. grew under Obama when Hillary Clinton became the first Secretary of State to attend an AC Ministerial meeting in Nuuk, Greenland in 2011; thus, symbolizing a heightened importance of the AC.

Michael Byers previously argued that we must celebrate the peaceful coexistence of state activities that exist in the Arctic.¹³⁵ During the Obama period, the cooperative nature of the AC that Byers referred to continued, actually establishing a legal instrument with the Task Force on Search and Rescue.¹³⁶ Within the *2011 Senior Arctic Official's Report to Ministers in Nuuk, Greenland*, it was asserted that “the agreement is the first legally binding instrument [...] of the AC [...] on any topic ever negotiated among all eight Arctic states.”¹³⁷ Furthermore, in 2017, the AC witnessed an agreement on international scientific cooperation, entering into force in May 2018.¹³⁸ These inferences illustrate that the Obama Administration acted cooperatively and constructively within the forum of the AC.

Upon the inaugural year of U.S. activities in the AC under Trump, it initially appeared that this cooperative nature would continue. In 2017, the U.S. continued its support for enhancing search and rescue in the Arctic, increasing resilience activities, aimed to tackle issues of black carbon reduction, and cooperated in conversations regarding implementing

¹³³ Arctic Council. Permanent Participants. (2021) URL: <https://arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/>

¹³⁴ The AC operates on a two-year basis, sessions take place every 6 months culminating in a Ministerial Meeting, whereby Arctic foreign ministers review the work of the Council.

¹³⁵ Michael Byers. ‘Peaceful Competition on Arctic Ice.’ *Toronto Star*, 24th, August 2011. URL: <https://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2011/08/peaceful-competition-on-arctic-ice.html>

¹³⁶ Arctic Council: Task Force on Search and Rescue. Accessed December 14th, 2019. URL: <https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/task-forces/71-tf-sar>

¹³⁷ Arctic Council: Task Force on Search and Rescue.

¹³⁸ Paul Berkman et. al. ‘The Arctic Science Agreement propels science diplomacy.’ *Science*, 358 (6363), 2017; 596–598

protected areas in the Bering Strait alongside their Russia counterparts.¹³⁹ The first concern for a shift in U.S. agenda with the AC appeared at the AC Ministerial in Fairbanks from May 10th-11th, 2017, when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson attended the Ministerial. It was expected that Tillerson would attempt to disrupt climate negotiations, but ultimately he acted supportive to AC discussions of climate change.¹⁴⁰ Even within Trump's second year in 2018, the U.S. adhered to AC consultations which sought to increase goals on black carbon by highlighting the economic potential that developing energy in the Arctic holds.¹⁴¹ It appeared that the precedent set by the Obama era for cooperative, constructive and environmentally conscious participation in the AC was set to continue. However, a drastic shift in U.S. participation begun when Mike Pompeo succeeded Tillerson as the new U.S. Secretary of State in March 2018.

The (In)Famous Pompeo Speech to the Arctic Council

The departure from the Obama era became clear with Pompeo's speech to Arctic Council Ministerial attendees on May 6th, 2019, in Rovaniemi, Finland, the day prior to the Ministerial. Pompeo incorporated military issues into the AC, essentially reshaping international norms and traditional policies within the AC forum. The confrontational approach to the Arctic and AC impacted the entire Arctic geopolitical realm, Arctic states were verbally attacked, and the Kingdom of Denmark - encompassing the territory of Greenland - was not excluded from this. Pompeo effectively presented the Arctic's changing environment via climate change as an economic opportunity. This speech represents the tipping point for the U.S. Arctic agenda under Trump, shifting away from the multilateral,

¹³⁹ Weingartner, K, Orrtung, R. (2020)

¹⁴⁰ Martin Breum. 'Why U.S. climate hostility might be a bigger threat to Arctic Council cooperation than security tensions.' *Arctic Today*, May 3rd, 2017. URL: <https://www.arctictoday.com/why-us-climate-hostility-might-be-a-bigger-threat-to-arctic-council-cooperation-than-security-tensions/>

¹⁴¹ Andrew Chater. 'The Presidency of Donald Trump in the Arctic Council.' *The Polar Connection*, March 9th, 2019. URL: <http://polarconnection.org/presidency-trump-arctic-council/>

cooperative era of Obama, shifting the U.S. Arctic foreign policy, thus enabling bilateralism towards Greenland. Three block passages from Pompeo's speech will now be examined to assess the Trump Administration's position of Arctic issues.

The AC has acted as a forum for cooperative multilateralism and has functioned as a useful forum for U.S. foreign policy in the Arctic. Under Trump this approach shifted dramatically, choosing to take U.S. foreign policy in an alternate direction within the AC. Pompeo's speech to the AC represents the significant turning point for the U.S. Arctic agenda under Trump. The speech comprises three thematic focuses: first, U.S. defence concerns directly addressing China and Russia; second, with an economic focus regarding energy security in the Arctic; and third, the lack of climate change discourse discussed. Pompeo outlined the U.S. concerns pertaining to China, stating that:

China has observer status in the AC, but [...] is contingent upon its respect for the sovereign rights of Arctic states. The U.S. wants China to [...] contribute responsibly in the region. But China's [...] actions raise doubts [...] Beijing claims to be a '*Near-Arctic State*' yet the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles [...] Our Pentagon warned [...] that China could use its civilian research presence in the Arctic to strengthen its military presence [...] Let's just ask ourselves: Do we want Arctic nations [...] Indigenous communities specifically, to go the way of former government in Sri Lanka or Malaysia, ensnared by debt and corruption? Do we want crucial Arctic infrastructure to end up like Chinese-constructed roads in Ethiopia, crumbling and dangerous after only a few years? Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims? Do we want the fragile Arctic environment exposed to the same ecological devastation caused by China's fishing fleet

[...] or unregulated industrial activity in its own country? I think the answers are pretty clear.¹⁴²

This component of Pompeo's speech invokes the notion that Chinese interest in the Arctic could destabilize the region. Interestingly, Pompeo addresses Indigenous communities, militarization, and ecological concerns. Conveying a concern for Inuit in the Arctic implies that Indigenous rights, self-governance and an acknowledgment for the colonial past and injustices served by colonial states would be recognized. Yet linking to this concern for Indigenous communities, an offer to purchase Greenland would not occur if this administration truly respected and understood the colonial history of Inuit and the current political movement in Greenland. Furthermore, for an administration that so clearly disregarded the importance of addressing climate change as a security threat, the concern for ecological devastation is undoubtedly a strategic ploy to avert attention to Chinese ecological impacts in other regions. Trump's pursuit of energy security in the Arctic, opening new oil and gas drilling leases and disregarding ecologically sensitive areas in the ANWR conveys the real nature of the administration. Pompeo's speech and supposed concerns appeared to be a shroud for advancing the U.S. foreign policy agenda and strategic goals in the Arctic; this being, halting China's 'near-Arctic state' geopolitical intentions.

Following the focal point on Chinese Arctic intentions, Pompeo turned to disputes with Russia and even Canada, asserting that:

We are entering a new age of strategic engagement [...] complete with new threats to the Arctic [...] its real-estate and to all of our interests in the region. No one denies Russia has significant Arctic interests. We recognize that

¹⁴² Mike Pompeo. 'Looking North: Sharpening America's Arctic Focus.' U.S. Department of State. (May 6, 2019). URL: <https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/> ; *Emphasis in the Original*.

Russia is not the only nation making illegitimate claims. The U.S. has a long-contested feud with Canada over sovereign claims through the Northwest Passage. But Russia is unique. Its actions deserve special attention [...] of this Council [...] we know Russian territorial ambitions can turn violent. 13,000 people have been killed due to Russia's ongoing aggressive action in Ukraine [...] just because the Arctic is a place of wilderness does not mean it should become a place of lawlessness. It need not be the case [...] we must hold each other accountable [...] and not allow this forum to fall victim to subversion – from Arctic or non-Arctic states.¹⁴³

Ultimately, this element of the speech amounted to a shocking departure from previous discussions and U.S. statements to the AC by heavily focussing on military security issues and verbal accusations towards China and Russia. Pompeo's speech represents an unquestionable departure from an era of institutionalised policymaking, cooperative diplomatic negotiations, and a drastic shift in the U.S. approach to their Arctic agenda. Pompeo presented the Arctic as being a theatre for conflict and competition, the era of multilateralism that Obama influenced was vanishing, making way for an aggressive U.S. foreign policy in the Arctic, which snubbed traditional formalities. Pompeo choosing to incorporate military issues into the AC discussion forum held the potential to destabilize the very intention of the council. And with Pompeo referring to Arctic "real-estate", this would soon develop a whole other meaning leading to Trump's offer to purchase Greenland.

¹⁴³ Mike Pompeo. 'Looking North: Sharpening America's Arctic Focus.' U.S. Department of State. (May 6, 2019). URL: <https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/> ; *Emphasis in the Original*.

An Economic Focus

Accompanying defence concerns, Pompeo recognized the economic importance that the Arctic holds for the U.S. energy security agenda, choosing not to focus on the potential environmental impact – as construed with concerns of Chinese Arctic interest - that carboniferous exploration and extraction could cause, but instead the prospect for economic gain. Pompeo argued that:

Far from the barren backcountry [...] the Arctic is at the forefront of *opportunity* and *abundance*. It houses 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30 percent of its undiscovered gas, an abundance of uranium, rare earth minerals, gold, diamonds, and millions of square miles of untapped resources, fisheries galore. Its centerpiece, the Arctic Ocean, is rapidly taking on new significance. Offshore resources [...] are the subject of renewed competition. Steady reductions in sea ice are opening new passageways and new opportunities for trade. This could potentially slash the time it takes to travel between Asia and the West by as much as 20 days. Arctic sea lanes could become the 21st century Suez and Panama Canals.¹⁴⁴

With reference to “opportunity” and “abundance”, this speech fanned the flames of competitive tensions in the Arctic and further invited interest in securing rare earth minerals and fossil fuels becoming more accessible due to climate change.¹⁴⁵ Pompeo neglected the facts that retreating ice sheets, thawing permafrost and rising temperatures are affecting Inuit traditional ways of life and wildlife habitats in the Circumpolar North, choosing instead to present this positively as a chance to secure energy resources and opening discussions for

¹⁴⁴ Michael Klare and Tom Dispatch. ‘The Trump administration doesn't want to talk about climate change, but it's already preparing to take advantage of the world climate change is creating.’ *Business Insider*, September 16th, 2019. URL <https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-administration-focuses-on-arctic-as-it-ignores-climate-change-2019-9>

¹⁴⁵ Pompeo, ‘Looking North, Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus.’

investment negotiations.¹⁴⁶ Highlighting the economic potential for the Arctic in this manner invites international interest, without the consideration for the potential negative impacts that an increased state presence could bring to the northern polar region. Pompeo's speech confirmed that the Trump Administration had internally reduced climate change to a non-securitized economic prospect, not a security issue, paving the way for the U.S. new Arctic agenda.¹⁴⁷ Combining this focus on the abundant economic opportunities that the Arctic offers, alongside the strategic geopolitical importance of the Arctic – to counteract China and Russia – in hindsight offered a precursor for what was to follow. And thus, the offer to purchase Greenland comes as no surprise once having analyzed Pompeo's speech and connecting this to the overall Arctic aspirations of the Trump Administration.

Lack of Climate Change Discussion and the First Arctic Council Declaration Failure

Throughout the entire eight-state summit in Rovaniemi, Finland, Pompeo declined to use the phrase 'climate change' entirely.¹⁴⁸ Whereas Obama had clearly sought to address climate change issues such as Arctic Sea ice melting as potential security threats - both to the inhabitants of the Arctic and the wildlife species that exist there - contrary to this, the Trump Administration did the exact opposite, effectively reducing Arctic climate change to an opportunity. Viewing melting sea ice and the detrimental effects of climate change as "opportunities" creates an aura of positivity around climate change. The framing and language used to depict the impacts of climate change in a positive light conveys the disparity of Trump's approach to climate change in contrast to virtually all other Arctic states, Obama's administration, Inuit, and the international community. Presidential framing of issues as security threats directs an administration's discourse. Trump's views towards

¹⁴⁶ Toth. 'Don't like moving? Try relocating your sinking house during a pandemic', 2021.

¹⁴⁷ Davenport and Landler, Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate Science.'

¹⁴⁸ Mike Blanchfield. 'Canada stands by Arctic climate goals as U.S. eyes melting ice as economic opportunity.' *Global News*. May 7th, 2019. URL: <https://globalnews.ca/news/5249435/arctic-climate-change-pompeo-economic-opportunity/>

climate change influenced the Republican's stance toward Arctic climate issues and ultimately enabled Pompeo's (in)famous speech to occur.¹⁴⁹

As is tradition following AC meetings and summits, there is always a joint declaration from the Arctic states, however, the U.S. refused to sign the agreement due to a disagreement over the wording of climate change, thus failing to present a declaration for the first time in the AC's history since formation in 1996. Pompeo's refusal to utter the words climate change ultimately surmounted to more than a symbolic tool. Pompeo consequently addressed the AC stating that President Trump's administration "shares your deep commitment to environmental stewardship" in the Arctic, but added that "collective goals... are rendered meaningless, even counter-productive as soon as one nation fails to comply."¹⁵⁰ Other states expressed their dismay at this comment with the Swedish Foreign Minister declaring that "climate crisis in the Arctic is not a future scenario, it is happening as we speak."¹⁵¹ Pompeo's refusal to acknowledge climate change – despite expressing a supposed concern for ecological impacts of China - and sign the shared agreement depicts a shift from the AC's multilateral collective goals of what could be considered a liberal internationalist collective project, towards more of a realist approach to international relations, disregarding the importance of unanimity towards climate change issues in the Arctic.

AC ministerial agreements are not legally binding, yet they portray a commitment to the region's stability and the future direction of the AC.¹⁵² With the U.S. refusal to sign the declaration in 2019, and furthermore accusing Russia and China of not playing "by the rules"

¹⁴⁹ Breum. 'Why U.S. climate hostility might be a bigger threat to Arctic Council cooperation than security tensions', 2017

¹⁵⁰ Simon Johnson. 'U.S. sinks Arctic accord due to climate change differences: diplomats.' *Reuters*, May 7th, 2019. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-arctic-council/us-sinks-arctic-accord-due-to-climate-change-differences-idUSKCN1SD143>

¹⁵¹ Simon Johnson. 'U.S. sinks Arctic accord due to climate change differences: diplomats.'

¹⁵² The AC ministerial meetings' produce non-legally binding declarations, which detail progress alongside the future direction of the Council. The AC was not established by an international treaty, yet despite this lack of legal authority, the AC has generated legally binding agreements. The instruments are the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic – signed at the 2011 Ministerial Meeting – furthermore, the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic – this was signed at the 2013 Ministerial Meeting – respectively.

regarding resources and Arctic trade routes, this led to great frustration from other AC states, as well as with observer states such as China and India.¹⁵³ The shift in AC diplomatic relations is a far cry from the successful cooperative framework conducted under the auspices of the Obama era. Pompeo's speech represents a critical moment which ultimately changed the U.S. approach to the Arctic significantly, and in turn created unintended consequences for the Arctic as a geopolitical arena. The U.S. Arctic agenda shifted from cooperative multilateralism to institutionalizing a pursuit of self-interest, thus paving the way for the Greenland offer. Trump and Pompeo shifted U.S. foreign policy to include the Arctic as a strategic priority, acting as a key piece of the geopolitical puzzle to secure energy resources and to assert geopolitical influence as both a symbolic and strategic countermove to Arctic and 'near-Arctic' adversaries.

Alongside this, Trump's climate denial impacted the administration's approach to climate issues with other Arctic states, further clarified with Pompeo's confirmational speech. The once cooperative North American Arctic framework between the U.S. and Canada also shifted, witnessing a lack of acknowledgement to continue U.S.-Canadian joint climate goals set under Trudeau and Obama.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, territorial claims to Canadian waters were made by Pompeo alongside Trump's general uncooperative diplomacy leading to an arduous salvage of NAFTA at the 11th hour – by Canadian Deputy PM Chrystia Freeland – becoming USMCA, and containing Trump's other erratic harms to Canada such as Trump's general indifference for longstanding U.S.-Canadian trade relations.¹⁵⁵ Unlike Obama's 'all the above' approach to energy concerns and climate - which tentatively pushed securitization of

¹⁵³ Richard Milne. 'U.S. provokes fury after blocking Arctic Council statement.' *Financial Times*, May 7th, 2019. URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/f879ff9a-70ab-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5>

¹⁵⁴ Nicholas Kusnetz. 'Trudeau, Trump meeting sidesteps the countries climate change agreements.' February 13th, 2017

¹⁵⁵ John Geddes. 'How NAFTA was saved: the bitter fight and the final breakthrough.' *Macleans*, October 1st, 2018; Pompeo, 'Looking North, Sharpening America's Arctic Focus.'

climate internationally, whilst still continuing with non-securitized Arctic politics domestically – Trump’s administration explicitly conducted non-securitized ‘normal politics’ and denied the threat of climate change entirely. Pompeo’s speech represents the seismic turning point for U.S. Arctic intentions under Trump. With the shift of U.S. Arctic intentions away from the Obama era being established, the focus now turns to the offer made to purchase Greenland; the impacts that this had on U.S.-Greenland relations; and the unintended consequences this had for the Greenlandic independence movement.

Chapter Four – The U.S. Purchasing Greenland?

Trump's Offer: Outrage and Rejection

The offer held substantial implications for U.S.-Greenland relations, Greenlandic domestic politics and economic potential, and the importance of Greenland as a developing Inuit polity. Trump asserted that selling the territory of Greenland to the U.S. would in essence be a financial favour for Denmark. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen responded: “thankfully, the time where you buy and sell other countries and populations is over. Let’s leave it there.”¹⁵⁶ Frederiksen understood the plethora of problems surrounding an offer to purchase Greenland; being that Inuit are attempting to break from their colonial ties, and Greenland is one of, if not perhaps the most autonomous, self-governing non-state actor in the world. Former Danish Prime Minister Lars Rasmussen also tweeted “it must be an April Fool’s Day joke... but totally out of season!”¹⁵⁷ However, Frederiksen added that “jokes aside, we would naturally love to have an even closer strategic relationship with the U.S.”, encouraging increasing U.S.-Greenland bilateral relations.¹⁵⁸ Trump further responded via Twitter that due to Frederiksen’s lack of interest in discussing the purchase of Greenland, he would be postponing the diplomatic visit to Denmark.¹⁵⁹ This barrage of tweets in response to U.S.-Danish foreign relations should not be perceived as just another wild presidential whim, there was serious intent and strategic motive as well as serious socio-political implications.

Following these remarks, further information emerged that the idea had been discussed regularly within the Oval Office due to the potential strategic benefits. Republican Representative Mike Gallagher had argued that the offer was not “as crazy as the headline

¹⁵⁶ Musgrave, 2019

¹⁵⁷ Lars Rasmussen. Twitter post. August 15th, 2019. URL: <https://Twitter.com/larsloekke/status/1162124827592994817>

¹⁵⁸ Musgrave, 2019

¹⁵⁹ Donald Trump. Twitter post. August 20th, 2019. URL: <https://Twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1163961884225277954>

makes it seem,” being a “smart geopolitical move” in which the U.S. could use the strategic location of Greenland to fortify U.S. national security interests.¹⁶⁰ Trump’s offer did indeed appear strategic, with economic aspirations coinciding with the geopolitical location of Greenland. However, it appeared Trump lacked any comprehension of the current Greenlandic political climate: Greenland being an Inuit polity, seeking independence from its colonial ties. Sure, hypothetically Trump *could* have purchased Greenland, but the main problem that the real-estate minded president did not comprehend is this: it is not Denmark’s decision to sell. The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Denmark gained further attention due to the offer, consequently damaging U.S.-Denmark foreign relations, yet it is the relationship with Greenland that is important to decipher.

As outlined, Frederiksen outright opposed this offer, further replying that “Greenland is not for sale. Greenland is not Danish. Greenland belongs to Greenland; I strongly hope that this is not meant seriously.”¹⁶¹ Greenlandic and Danish people, and political figures were perplexed and angered by Trump’s offer. Former President of the ICC, Aqqaluk Lyngé declared that the offer is “dead serious for Greenland,” elucidating that the proposition actually held serious intent, and with-it major implications.¹⁶² Sara Olsvig - former leader of the Inuit Ataqatigiit party - also argued that “to talk about buying a whole nation and the people is [...] extremely imperialistic and should not be something that we hear world leaders say in 2019. It shows that we are still living in a world where Indigenous peoples, or self-governing nations [...] are seen as something that can be bought or sold.”¹⁶³ Olsvig’s concerns directly highlight Trump’s referral to the offer being a large “real-estate” deal,

¹⁶⁰ Rep. Mike Gallagher. Twitter post. August 15th, 2019. URL: <https://twitter.com/RepGallagher/status/1162163381173985282>

¹⁶¹ Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati. ‘Sure, Trump can buy Greenland. But why does he think it’s up to Denmark?’ *POLITICO*. August 23rd, 2019. URL: <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/23/donald-trump-greenland-purchase-sovereignty-denmark-227859/>

¹⁶² Selena Simmons-Duffin. ‘What Do Greenlanders Think of Trump’s Interest in Buying Greenland?’ *NPR News*, August 23rd, 2019. URL: <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/08/23/753479744/what-do-greenlanders-think-of-trumps-interest-in-buying-greenland>

¹⁶³ Simmons-Duffin, ‘What Do Greenlanders Think of Trump’s Interest in Buying Greenland?’

which further corresponds with Pompeo's choice of words regarding "Arctic real-estate" to the AC.¹⁶⁴

Olsvig's words effectively summarize the problematic nature of Trump's offer. Trump's choice of wording pertaining to "real-estate" implies that Inuit in a territorial acquisition would mean nothing more than merely chattel – that is if Trump even understood that Greenland is indeed Inuit – and echoes deeply imperialist and colonialist sentiments. There are unintended consequences from Trump's aspiration to purchase Greenland, including spurring further discussion regarding the importance of Indigenous rights, as discussed in Chapter Five. The attention brought to Inuit by this offer elevates discussions of Indigenous politics regarding outdated political constructions in the 21st century, and encourages self-determination, reconciliation, and autonomy for those who have been subjugated to colonialism.

Ultimately, Trump's offer should not be perceived as a joke, it was a serious offer that intended to affect U.S. foreign policy with a blatant disregard for those who have been subject to colonialism. Frederiksen's response perfectly summarizes the sensitive nature of contemporary politics surrounding the push for independence for Greenland, with Danish officials acknowledging the right to Greenlandic self-determination. The *Self-Government Act* recognizes Kalaallit (Greenlanders) as people, in international law, with the opportunity to become independent. Therefore, even if Greenland were to favour becoming part of the U.S., it would be entirely dependent on an approved transfer of sovereign territory – via a popular referendum or legislative vote – in and by Greenland.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Martin Sorenson. 'In Denmark Bewilderment and Anger Over Trump's Cancelled Visit.' *New York Times*

¹⁶⁵ Naalakkersuisut, Government of Greenland. 'International Relations: Politics in Greenland'. 2021. URL: <https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Politics-in-Greenland>

Greenland Responds: “Open for Business, Not for Sale”

Nevertheless, despite the responsive outrage the offer generated, Greenland has in fact stated it is ‘open for business’, inviting and encouraging international interest from Arctic and non-Arctic states. The Greenlandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to Trump’s offer with a tweet: “#Greenland is rich in valuable resources such as minerals, the purest water and ice, fish stocks, seafood, renewable energy and is a new frontier for adventure tourism. We’re open for business, not for sale.”¹⁶⁶ The offer may have been framed poorly, and clearly lacked a political understanding of the sensitive political history of Greenland, yet this may not have been so far off the mark as first thought. The response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs effectively confirms and echoes Pompeo’s reference to an abundance of opportunities in the Arctic, insinuating the potential for a mutually beneficial economic partnership to ensue.



Figure 13: On August 16th, 2019, Greenland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a Twitter post in response to Trump’s comments and offer to purchase Greenland. Source: Greenland Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Twitter post*, August 16th, 2019.

¹⁶⁶ Greenland Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Twitter post. August 16th, 2019.

Economically speaking, Greenland must be financially secure to properly actualize the vision of being a fully independent, self-governing Arctic state. Lill Rastad Bjørst has argued that extractive industries may be the “only” road to economic development, and thus political independence, in and for Greenland.¹⁶⁷ Economic trade and investment from external states, both Arctic and non-Arctic may consequently be a very realistic future that Greenland is set to experience, if Greenland wishes to be financially independent from Danish subsidies.¹⁶⁸ As the central focus of the political movement in Greenland is founded on moving away from being ruled by others, the notion of being purchased and essentially trading status as being an autonomous territory under yet another colonial state is illogical. Regardless, Greenland does need to secure itself financially if the independence movement is to be successful, this is where the U.S. does have a logical strategy with establishing further bilateral relations with Greenland.

Outrage but Elevation: The Funding Package

The idea of purchasing Greenland as a strategic move absolutely outraged many Arctic leaders and Inuit, however, there is an unintended consequence that cannot be denied: U.S.-Greenland bilateral relations have increased despite Trump’s offer. The U.S. understands the soft power of economic incentives, even after the backlash received from the offer, in 2020 the U.S. donated USD\$12m to Greenland for ‘sustainable’ economic development purposes. The economic funding aimed to support tourism, the mining sector, education, and consulate trips to Nuuk and around Greenland.¹⁶⁹ However, this can be construed as a strategic move to repair some of the damage caused by Trump’s offer. With

¹⁶⁷ Bjørst, ‘The right to ‘sustainable development’ and Greenland’s lack of a climate policy’; 121-136

¹⁶⁸ Schionning, ‘As the ice melts, Greenland considers its future.’

¹⁶⁹ Conor Finnegan. ‘After Trump tried to buy Greenland, U.S. gives island \$12M for economic development.’ *ABC News*, April 23rd, 2020. URL: <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-buy-greenland-us-island-12m-economic-development/story?id=70305163>

Russia enhancing their military presence, and China advancing their economic and diplomatic influence as a 'near-Arctic state', the U.S. sought new ways in securing their national interests in the Arctic.

With the idea of purchasing Greenland being quashed, the U.S. had an opportunity to work with Greenland by advancing U.S.-Greenlandic bilateral relations as an alternative option; not only to secure U.S. national interests in the Arctic, but to counteract geopolitical rivals. Increasing the importance of U.S.-Greenland relations may have been in the strategic favour of both actors. The U.S. can no longer act passively regarding Greenland, as other Arctic and near-Arctic states seek to assert their presence, economically, militarily, and diplomatically. The offer to purchase Greenland was indeed ridiculous, but the importance of strengthening U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations is strategically logical. The economic aid package to fund 'sustainable' development therefore symbolizes a modern chapter for developing collaborative U.S.-Greenland relations, and in turn the U.S. Arctic agenda.

Following the announcement of the \$12m deal, the U.S. Ambassador to Denmark posted a message on her embassy's website, depicting the U.S. aid package as a symbolic moment in the shift of U.S. Arctic policy: "While Greenland stands on the cusp of a new era of productivity, governments who operate by different standards are looking to exploit opportunities to bring their authoritarian set of values to the future development and governance of the region."¹⁷⁰ Essentially this outlined the importance of shifting the U.S. Arctic approach, as a means to counteract the potential destabilization of the Arctic by authoritarian regimes looking to assert their own influence. The economic aid package can be interpreted as being a cloak for geopolitical intentions, with the reality of the shifting U.S. Arctic policy seeking to prevent Russian and Chinese dominance from being asserted, not for

¹⁷⁰ Carla Sands 'Wake up to the Arctic's importance.' *U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the Kingdom of Denmark*, April 20th, 2020. URL: <https://dk.usembassy.gov/wake-up-to-the-arctics-importance/>

a genuine concern for Greenlandic development. This package caused outrage from numerous Danish politicians, arguing that this was an “insult” to and sought to undermine the Kingdom.¹⁷¹

Danish foreign affairs officials asserted the U.S. “crossed the line” and that “it’s completely unheard of that a close ally tries to create division between Greenland and Denmark this way.”¹⁷² Trump’s administration clearly prioritized strengthening U.S.-Greenland bilateral relations over appeasing the Danes. In response, a U.S. senior State Department official denied that Trump’s administration was purposely trying to create divisions, justifying the strategic move to be “good old-fashioned diplomatic stagecraft designed to enhance our engagement” and reaffirmed that the aid package was not linked to a path to purchase Greenland.¹⁷³ With renewed focus on the Arctic following decades of unimportance, this move came as an adjustment to ‘new strategic realities’ for the U.S. Arctic agenda. The support for economic development in Greenland is an interesting development, as this advances a cooperative framework but also raised tensions with Denmark, a longstanding ally of the U.S. With Greenland welcoming financial assistance, the polity arguably experienced a resurgence of importance for U.S. military means. Thule air base – 1200 kms north of the Arctic Circle – where the U.S. ballistic missile early warning system is located, had previously been perceived as the key component of real-estate for the Pentagon’s defence and military capacities to counter the USSR since 1951. However, the U.S. strategic use for Greenland is moving away from Cold War-esque containment strategies towards new means for countering Russian and Chinese Arctic economic intentions.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Martin Breum. ‘The U.S. aid package to Greenland marks a new chapter in a long, complex relationship.’ *Arctic Today*, April 29th, 2020. URL: <https://www.arctictoday.com/the-us-aid-package-to-greenland-is-a-new-chapter-in-a-long-complex-relationship/>

¹⁷² Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen and Humeyra Pamuk. ‘U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic.’ *Reuters*, April 23rd, 2020. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-greenland-idUSKCN2251ZF>

¹⁷³ Gronholt-Pedersen, Pamuk. ‘U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic.’

¹⁷⁴ Gronholt-Pedersen, Pamuk.

As established, Greenland is ‘open for business’ and has welcomed foreign investment as an option to financially support development, particularly with the self-proclaimed “near-Arctic state” China. Unsurprisingly, encouraging Chinese investment in Greenlandic infrastructure projects holds a plethora of concerns pertaining to Arctic security for the U.S.¹⁷⁵ The U.S. - alongside Denmark - conveyed their dismay with Chinese investment in Greenland, particularly with the proposed construction of new airports in 2019, leading to a proposal withdrawal from the Chinese state-owned *China Communications Construction Company*.¹⁷⁶ Despite initial support from former Greenlandic Premier Kim Kielsen, it became clear that Denmark and the U.S. inherently opposed further Chinese engagement with an anonymous Danish official asserting they were “deeply concerned” and that “China has no business in Greenland.”¹⁷⁷

On the other hand, Greenland expressed no such concern with Chinese investment, with Greenlandic IA party member Aaja Larsen stating that “in Greenland we don’t suffer from China anxiety, like [...] in Copenhagen. They lack an understanding for Greenland’s need for investments, and we can sense a big interest in China for our projects”.¹⁷⁸ The mentality of ‘open for business’ had been truly endorsed by Greenland and invites competitive foreign investment. Nonetheless, it is no secret that the U.S. has sought to counteract Chinese Arctic influence for some time, particularly in Greenland. Washington directly ordered Denmark in 2016 to prevent China from purchasing a former marine station in the south of Greenland. The U.S. took a proactive approach towards China vis-à-vis Greenland, not waiting for Copenhagen to obstruct Chinese investment plans. U.S. concerns

¹⁷⁵ Patrik Andersson, Jesper Zeuthen, Per Kalvig, P. ‘Chinese Mining in Greenland: Arctic Access or Access to Minerals?’ *Arctic Yearbook 2018*, Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2018; 1-15.

¹⁷⁶ Reuters staff. ‘China withdraws bid for Greenland airport projects: Sermitsiaq newspaper.’ *Reuters*, June 4th, 2019. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-greenland-idUSKCN1T5191>

¹⁷⁷ Erik Matzen and Tom Daly. ‘Greenland’s courting of China for airport projects worries Denmark.’ *Reuters*, March 22nd, 2018. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-arctic-greenland-idUSKBN1GY25Y>

¹⁷⁸ Matzen, Daly, ‘Greenland’s courting of China for airport projects worries Denmark.’

regarding Chinese investment have seemingly raised the significance of U.S.-Greenland relations. With Trump reactively placing tariffs – approximately USD\$60bn - on Chinese imports in 2018, this once more depicts how important Greenland could be, not only the U.S. energy security concerns, but for concerns of enabling Chinese hegemony worldwide, via the Arctic.¹⁷⁹ Trump's administration therefore strategically offered U.S. investment as a smart alternative to diminishing Chinese prospects.

Alongside the geopolitical intentions of the U.S., the funding package aligns with the Greenlandic need for non-Danish financial support to establish financial viability for the independence movement. Receiving support from the U.S. under Trump was welcomed by Greenland, commencing a new chapter in advancing the economic development necessary to actualize independence. Despite the purchase offer clearly failing, the funding package acted as a geopolitical move by the U.S. to counter interest from China in Greenland, both economically and diplomatically. Trump's administration sought to reconcile the damaged relations due to the offer and in turn signified the importance of strengthening U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations in a more proactive manner. The Greenlandic push for development has been supported by the U.S. through the Trump Administration, albeit due to geopolitical and economic concerns for the U.S. The Trump Administration has downplayed climate change, and this may have been beneficial for Greenlandic development prospects. The following chapter shifts focus toward U.S. and Greenlandic approaches to climate change by connecting and analyzing approaches toward development via carboniferous industries.

¹⁷⁹ Gronholt-Pedersen, Pamuk, 'U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic.

Chapter Five - Greenland: An Emerging Inuit Arctic Power

In Chapters Two and Three I established the Trump Administration's Arctic agenda and their non-securitized approach and tendency to completely downplay climate change as a threat. This chapter comparatively explores why Greenland have also tended not to push climate change into a state of emergency via securitization, and have instead predominantly maintained a state of politicization, or 'normal politics' vis-à-vis the changing climate as a developmental strategy.¹⁸⁰ The advocacy of Greenland maintaining normal politics over securitization has aligned with the Trump Administration's approach to climate, thus increasing the opportunity for advancing U.S.-Greenland relations and economic potential. Notwithstanding the initial outrage caused by Trump's offer and the fallout from Pompeo's AC speech, a collaborative agenda that advocated for economic development via extractive carboniferous industries between the U.S. and Greenland has been pursued. It is important to firstly analyze Greenlandic framing for the right to development, and how this has been enabled due to the indigeneity of Greenland and its positioning within international climate discourse.

Greenlandic Framing of the Right to Develop

Any kind of foreign policy for Greenland, is in essence, Arctic policy. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vittus Quiaukitsoq reasserted this, expressing "several states have [...] Arctic strategies, which is a typical characteristic of *non-Arctic* countries", continuing that "for an Arctic country like Greenland, our foreign policy strategy is an Arctic strategy. We *are* the Arctic. We are the epitome of the Arctic."¹⁸¹ For Greenland, contemporary domestic and foreign policy are inexorably intertwined. Greenlandic politicians

¹⁸⁰ Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998)

¹⁸¹ Naalakkersuisut. Udenrigspolitisk redegørelse 2016. Naalakkersuisut | Government of Greenland, 2016. URL: <https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Udenrigsdirektoratet/DK/Udenrigspolitiske%20redegørelser/Udenrigspolitisk%20Redeg%C3%B8relse%202016.pdf>

have not been afraid of asserting their Arctic and foreign policy intentions, despite foreign affairs technically residing under the jurisdiction of Denmark. Instead of asserting climate change to be a security issue, Greenland has expressed the right to economic development as an Inuit, less-developed Arctic actor within international climate discourse as a strategy of non-securitized politics.

This can be traced as far back as 2008 whereby former Premier of Greenland Kielsen argued - during his tenure as Environmental Minister - that Greenland was “not a developed country yet [...] to be self-sustaining, it is hard to not do something which will emit more CO₂ – then again, it has to be as little as possible.”¹⁸² Furthermore, former Premier Kuupik Kleist - during the UN COP15 held in Copenhagen (2009) - advocated the significance of ‘*common but differentiated responsibilities*’¹⁸³ (CBDR) as a political tactic for Greenland, and further still in 2010 declared that Greenland was “especially interested in having rights that enable development” exemplifying that “you have to clarify which countries can reduce their enormous use of energy and give room to others.”¹⁸⁴ CBDR is a legal international environmental principle which advocates that all states be held responsible with addressing global climate change and environmental destruction. However, the caveat is that not all states (and peoples), such as Greenland are equally responsible for this. There are vast differences in economic development throughout the international system; hence, CBDR. A clear divide between developed and developing actors exists, creating differences for international actors’ emissions reduction contributions and their capacity to address climate change.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² Lill Bjørst. ‘Grønland og den dobbelte klimastrategi.’ *Økonomi og Politik*, 4 (1), 2008; 26–37

¹⁸³ The principle of CBDR was officially crystallized into international law with the 1992 *United Nations Conference on Environment and Development* (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. The UNCED, byname *Earth Summit* was held between June 3rd -14th 1992 aspired to reconcile global economic development alongside the safeguarding of the global environment. During this period, the UNCED surmounted to the largest gathering of state leaders, with 117 heads of state and officially international representatives of 178 different states in attendance.

¹⁸⁴ Bjørst, ‘The right to ‘sustainable development’ and Greenland’s lack of a climate policy; 121-136.

¹⁸⁵ John Vogler. ‘Chapter 24: Environmental Issues. In: Baylis, Smith, Owens. *The Globalization of World Politics. Eight Edition*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2020; 397

Kielsen continued to push these arguments at COP16 in Mexico (2010), arguing that special provisions for developing states and Indigenous peoples must be allowed. Most significantly, Greenland began to actively discuss climate issues and development as an Inuit nation during COP16. Doing so effectively applied the increased autonomy provided through the *Self-Government Act* to utilize the Indigenous voice of Greenland throughout global climate negotiations.¹⁸⁶ Due to this increased autonomy – and more so political legitimacy – Greenland has been able to assert a substantial amount of influence towards policy approaches regarding the realm of Arctic climate change and economic development. Marc Jacobsen argued policymakers in Greenland have utilized the considerably low CO2 emissions to rationalize carboniferous growth within the framework of “sustainable development.”¹⁸⁷ Greenland has therefore pursued a “double climate strategy that argues for growth and industrial development in Greenland” as a component to the “ongoing nation-building process with a growing self-image of Greenland [...] on the path to full sovereignty and independence.”¹⁸⁸

With slogans such as ‘*Greenlandization*’ and the importance of self-determination being prioritized, Bjørst argued “the economic self-sustainability for Greenland offered one very local and situated perspective [...] with Greenlanders positioned not as victims or witnesses, but as *potentially marginalized citizens* of the world fighting for their right to sustainable development.”¹⁸⁹ Nuttall further proclaimed that “far from being mere victims of the impacts of industrial development, Indigenous peoples are participants in, and increasingly beneficiaries of, the development of the Arctic resource frontier.”¹⁹⁰ Extractive

¹⁸⁶ Marc Jacobsen. ‘The Power of Collective Identity Narration: Greenland's Way to a more Autonomous Foreign Policy.’ *Arctic Yearbook 2015*. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2015; 102-118.

¹⁸⁷ Marc Jacobsen. Digging sustainability: Scaling and sectoring of sovereignty in Greenland and Nunavut mining discourses. In: Gad, U.P. and Strandsbjerg, J. (eds) *Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic: Reconfiguring Identity, Time and Space*. London: Routledge, 2019; 52-73

¹⁸⁸ Gad. ‘Greenland: A Post-Danish Sovereign Nation State in the Making’, 99.

¹⁸⁹ Bjørst, L. R. (2018); 126; *Emphasis in original*

¹⁹⁰ Nuttall, M. *Pipeline Dreams: People, Environment, and the Arctic Energy Frontier*. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2010; 23

industries therefore provide opportunity for Greenlanders. To a certain extent, Nuttall's assessment is accurate. Greenland is beginning to experience a heightened sense of importance in the Arctic geopolitical puzzle, alongside the increasing ability to push for economic development whilst somewhat inviting, and controlling external interest from states such as the U.S.

Connecting Approaches to Climate Change

The priority for Greenland has not been to securitize climate change, but to advance autonomy through Greenlandic economic development and the potential to utilize carboniferous industries. As I previously argued with Andrews and Greaves, Greenland's political objective "for independence, is antithetical to the invocation of emergency associated with securitization" of climate change, therefore "expanding the [...] extractive development necessary to fund independence [...] ending the long relationship with Denmark, is a greater political priority for Inuit in Greenland" than seeking to securitize climate change.¹⁹¹ Rasmussen also argued that it is "very likely that Greenland will base its strategy for independence on economic rather than geopolitical considerations."¹⁹² Thus, Greenland's economic development strategy requires the maintenance of 'normal politics' vis-à-vis the changing Arctic climate, instead of shifting the discourse into an existential emergency via securitization. If carbon-intensive practices were to be securitized - alongside the normalized discourse of climate change – as existentially threatening to Greenlandic people, this could be of detriment to the independence movement.¹⁹³ Greenland has therefore approached climate change moderately, not completely denying the impact such as Trump's

¹⁹¹ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022. Emphasis in Original.

¹⁹² Rasmus Rasmussen. 'The desecuritization of Greenland's security? How the Greenlandic self-government envision postindependence national defense and security policy.' *Arctic Yearbook 2019*. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2019; 287-305.

¹⁹³ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022; 20

administration did, but not securitizing the issue either.¹⁹⁴ This has enabled joint U.S.-Greenland technical engagement to occur, and invites external interest in the joint pursuit of advancing carboniferous industries.

The lack of consultation regarding foreign policy and security policy formulation of Denmark vis-à-vis Greenland has been somewhat disconcerting for the Naalakkersuisut, despite itself not formally articulating a specific security framework for the Greenlandic people. Within the Naalakkersuisut's foreign policy, climate change is only referred to twice, although climate change has been a central component of foreign policy discussions within Arctic politics for many decades.¹⁹⁵ At first glance this appears a peculiar approach, considering the threat that climate change poses for Greenland.¹⁹⁶ Climate change is of course a pressing matter among Greenlandic people, yet other issues that threaten the stability of daily life such as socio-economic issues like living costs, employment rates and family income tend to take precedence in discourse.¹⁹⁷ National polls have portrayed that the vast majority are in favour of independence, but not if this is to reduce the standard of living, thus making economic development an inescapable necessity for successful independence.¹⁹⁸ Therefore "this curbs the degree to which Greenlanders are prepared to articulate climate change as a security issue with existential implications for their homeland."¹⁹⁹ Logically, climate change has not been securitized by Greenland which has coincided with Greenland justifying their right to development by utilizing their international legal permissions.

¹⁹⁴ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022; 16

¹⁹⁵ Marc Jacobsen. 'Greenland's Arctic advantage: Articulations, acts and appearances of sovereignty games.' *Cooperation and Conflict*, 55 (2), 2020; 176-177.

¹⁹⁶ Frank Sejersen. *Rethinking Greenland and the Arctic in the Era of Climate Change*. New York: Routledge. 2015; In: Greaves. W. (2016a) Securing Sustainability: The Case for Critical Environmental Security in the Arctic. *Polar Record*, 52 (6); 660-671.

¹⁹⁷ Maria Ackrén and Ramus Nielsen. 'The First Foreign- and Security Policy Opinion Poll in Greenland.' Nuuk: Ilisimatusarfik and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2021; 1-16

¹⁹⁸ Martin Breum. 'Rare poll hints at the real differences between Danish and Greenlandic thinking on Greenland independence.' *Arctic Today*, January 22nd, 2019. URL: <https://www.arctictoday.com/a-rare-poll-hints-at-real-differences-between-danish-and-greenlandic-thinking-on-greenland-independence/>

¹⁹⁹ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022; 16

As established, Trump's administration advanced and advocated for an Arctic energy security agenda which promoted carboniferous industries, whilst entirely disregarding the threat of climate change itself. The U.S. under Trump received heavy criticism for its lack of concern for collectively mitigating the impacts of climate change. On the other hand, with minimal resistance, Greenland as a developing Inuit Arctic actor has frequently emphasized the intention to utilize extractive fossil fuel industries; being legally permitted to do so under international law. This push of carboniferous industries alongside mineral exploration has been met with little to no criticism from the international community. As outlined in *Paragraph IX* of the Paris Agreement, when considering the global effort to mitigate the impacts of climate change, a respect and obligation to human rights and the rights of Indigenous peoples must be upheld.²⁰⁰ This includes the right to development for Indigenous peoples and those in vulnerable situations. *Article 7.5* of the Paris Agreement further states that: "Parties acknowledge that adaption action should follow a country driven [...] fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems [...] as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems [...] integrating adaption [...] where appropriate."²⁰¹

Combining *Para. IX* and *Article 7.5* of the Paris Agreement creates room for Indigenous peoples and Inuit Greenland to pursue development. Whether this is considered 'sustainable' development or not, this right has been crystalized in international law, in what is quite possibly the most ambitious legally binding treaty ever formulated, binding 196 Parties of the international community. Denmark is one of three Participatory Signatures to sign *Approval* (AA) of the Paris Agreement, instead of choosing *Ratification and Acceptance*

²⁰⁰ Paris Agreement. *Paragraph XI*, 2015. URL: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf

²⁰¹ Paris Agreement. *Article 7.5*, 2015. *Emphasis in Original*. URL: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf

(A).²⁰² On December 12th, 2015, the Paris Agreement - via the UNSG's consent - approved a Depositary Notification titled: *Denmark: Territorial Exclusion In Respect Of Greenland*.²⁰³ This action was effected on November 1st, 2016, excluding Greenland from the collective responsibilities of the Paris Agreement. Consequently, Greenland's unique status as an Inuit Arctic polity and being approved territorial exclusion from the Paris Agreement may in fact be beneficial for the developmental goals that accompany the independence movement.

The Paris Agreement's exclusion of Greenland precedes the Trump Administration being in office, however, the connection is that Greenland's positioning vis-à-vis the non-securitization of climate change – in favour of prioritizing the pursuit of extractive industries – has been further enabled by Trump's positioning toward climate. By the two actors sharing this non-securitized approach to climate, this increased the possibility for developing U.S.-Greenland economic ties. Obama's 'all the above' approach to energy security and environmental issues can also be deemed as a non-securitized approach to climate change. However, Obama's approach developed to prioritize the Arctic environment in his final years; somewhat attempting securitization of climate internationally and raising the profile of the Arctic environmentally. With Trump's administration regressing the U.S. approach to climate change under Obama, this created the possibility for increased U.S.-Greenlandic economic ties regarding extractive industries that were not established under Obama. Prior to Trump, U.S.-Greenland relations had been dominated by the issue of defence only. But due to Trump's offer and the administration's aggressive approach to the Arctic, the economic and geopolitical significance of Greenland has increased. Obama had not engaged with Greenland bilaterally to gain a geopolitical foothold in Arctic economic resources and to contain Sino-

²⁰² The other (AA) Participant and Signature status are with respect to Georgia and Vietnam; *United Nations Treaty Collection*: Paris Agreement. 7.d URL: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en

²⁰³ United Nations Paris Agreement. Denmark: Territorial Exclusion In Respect Of Greenland. *Paris Agreement Depositary Notification*, December 12th, 2015. URL: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.819.2016-Eng.pdf>

Russian Arctic intentions. Contrary to this, Trump engaged with Greenland despite the fallout from the offer and pushed U.S.-Greenland relations to develop regardless of climate concerns relating to carbon-intensive development.

Greenland's right to development has therefore been enabled by international law, transnational norms, and the international community. The notion of climate justice and CBDR – alongside the Paris Agreement's exclusion - offers a degree of permissibility for Greenland's intention to develop through carboniferous and extractive industries.²⁰⁴

Greenland's unique status in climate discourse - supported by international legal frameworks - presents an opportunity to circumvent the collective international responsibilities of the climate agenda and to pursue development via carboniferous methods. The permissibility of carboniferous developmental initiatives for an Inuit nation that is not technically a state justifies the 'open for business' invitation to the international community. Greenland has been able to bypass scrutiny from the international community for promoting carboniferous and extractive economic development thus far, which the Trump Administration also advanced to lesser permissibility. With Greenland's moral justification to pursue economic development being entrenched, the Trump Administration openly engaged.

Enhanced U.S.-Greenland Economic Ties: Joint Technical Engagement

The U.S. interest in Greenland has significantly raised the profile of Greenland, both in geopolitical importance and economic investment potential. Pompeo's actions within the AC, combined with Trump's offer to purchase Greenland, as well as the U.S.-Greenlandic funding package demonstrates this. Greenland is growing in importance and recognize their strengthened ability to negotiate bilaterally. In June 2019, Greenland and the U.S. developed a bilateral *Memorandum of Understanding* (MOU) on mineral sector governance and

²⁰⁴ Vogler, 'Climate Change in World Politics', 2020.

engagement. The Greenlandic Ministry of Mineral Resources and Labour, alongside the U.S. Department of State joint forces to develop a new aerial hyperspectral survey which intended to boost mineral exploration investment in the southern parts of Greenland.²⁰⁵ The plan to lead joint mineral sector technical engagement through the MOU was signed by Greenland's Minister for Mineral Resources and Labour, Erik Jensen, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Francis Fannon. The MOU constructed a framework of bilateral cooperation on mineral sector governance in Greenland, which jointly funded and operated an aerial hyperspectral survey over approximately 3,000 square kilometres in the Garder Province of southwest Greenland. The survey took place out of Narsarssuaq in July and August 2019.²⁰⁶

Fannon noted that “Greenland has an impressive resource endowment and [...] is seeking to maximize opportunities to develop key energy and mineral sectors”, further arguing the U.S. to be an “important geopolitical partner” that seeks to “ensure [...] Greenland pursues an enabling environment to attract diverse and private investment to achieve its own energy and mineral resource security goals.”²⁰⁷ The diverse and private investment mentioned heavily favours the U.S. geopolitically through this funding, and further acts as a countermove to unfavoured investment interest from ‘near-Arctic’ state competitor, China. The Garder Province holds huge potential for new discovery of various mineral commodities, including rare earth elements (REE) and already hosts REE mineralization. With the region being under-explored and holding this potential, the U.S.

²⁰⁵ Hyperspectral data is collected by measuring the reflection from sunlight from the ground surface, utilizing visible light, near and short wave infra-red light, and is invisible to the human eye. The light provides information regarding minerals in the rocks, which geologists can assess unrecognized mineralization and improve geological maps, thus helping mineral explores target their exploratory activities.

²⁰⁶ Naalakkersuisut (Government of Greenland). ‘Joint Greenland-U.S. technical engagement’, *Naalakkersuisut*, June 5th, 2019. URL: https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/News/2019/06/0506_aftale?fbclid=IwAR2sTum9czI1YQImxN8qekev9H_a6uPMdmlfMeajv8nN6Q_aLJiEm1htAU

²⁰⁷ Naalakkersuisut, ‘Joint Greenland-U.S. technical engagement.’ June 5th, 2019; U.S. Secretary of State for Energy Resources, Francis Fannon.

sought out the bilateral MOU as a geopolitical and economic strategy to secure U.S. resource interests. The U.S. assistance in advancing Greenland's resource and security goals appears somewhat analogous to the U.S. own push for securing national energy security interests. Through financial support – via the MOU – the U.S. was in essence, staking their claim to the vast undiscovered mineral potential, and thus strengthening U.S.-Greenlandic economic ties in the process.

Jensen declared Greenland to have a “long-standing cooperative association with the U.S. [...] to exchange scientific and technical knowledge [...] of the mineral resources sector. This MOU is [...] a new phase of this relationship and mutual commitment to cooperation and development.”²⁰⁸ Jensen's comments verified Greenland to be fully embracing their developing bilateral relations with the U.S., pushing U.S.-Greenland relations into the future to financially fund exploration and increase data collection. Promoting geoscience and foreign investment into Greenland conveys that Greenland is seeking economic development and embraces external funding. REE extractive intentions further solidifies that Greenland chose to promote extractive industries with the U.S. over securitizing climate change, and under Trump this gained further momentum via the MOU.

Greenland has increasingly utilized their heightened political autonomy, combined with the vision for independence as I further argued with Andrews and Greaves to “transform the long legacy of colonial subordination into a modern collective identity that eschews further victimhood, even that entailed by the threat of climate change.”²⁰⁹ In order to break from the colonial legacy of the past, Greenland is now pushing to control their future, liberating the nation from a sense of victimhood and taking control of its future via economic development opportunities. Greenland as a people and polity do not deny the vulnerability it

²⁰⁸ Naalakkersuisut, ‘Joint Greenland-U.S. technical engagement.’ June 5th, 2019; Minister for Mineral Resources and Labour, Erik Jensen.

²⁰⁹ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022; 15

faces towards the impacts of climate change, yet the pursuit of carbon-intensive economic development and the invitation for foreign investment has been expected to continue. The paradox is therefore how to instil impactful measures from the international community which intend to reduce GHG emissions, whilst recognizing that vulnerable populations who are most impacted by climate change are ambivalent about “shifting [...] from economic dependence on fossil fuels because of their valorization of an even great political goal than decarbonization.”²¹⁰ There is a certain complexity towards Arctic politics, security and climate change discourse that persists to challenge the very nature of what Arctic security is. When analyzing the decision to not amplify climate change as a security issue in Greenland, this appears rational and somewhat permissible considering an Inuit nation that holds the right to development.

Greenland may subsequently take advantage of CBDR, climate justice, and the considerable elements of the Paris Agreement, and rightly so. After all, the climate crisis has not been a result of Greenlandic development, but due to industrialized, often former colonial states, which have disproportionately impacted Arctic, coastal and small island communities in the Global South the most. Developing states and actors have argued that the permissible amount of ‘carbon space’ has been historically monopolized by the emissions of those already industrialized and developed.²¹¹ Considering this, there is a moral dilemma with asking developing states, Indigenous peoples and those formally repressed by colonial powers to reduce emissions which could impede their development. At the AC Ministerial Meeting in Iqaluit in 2014, the Greenlandic representative depicted this narrative by declaring “Greenland will benefit from the new economic opportunities which climate change also makes possible [...] Greenland will not be a passive victim of climate change” and will

²¹⁰ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022; 22

²¹¹ Vogler, ‘Climate change in world politics’

establish a “building of resilience” to mitigate the effects of climate change.²¹² Following the MOU and the new chapter for U.S.-Greenland relations beginning under Trump, this certainly appeared true. The U.S. and Greenland are vastly different Arctic actors, yet shared similar developmental and energy security goals under Trump’s era. By actively engaging in these shared interests, Trump’s era has significantly impacted the future of U.S.-Greenland relations, and in turn Arctic geopolitics that we are witnessing today.

²¹² Statement of Greenland. Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting Iqaluit, Nunavut, April 24th, 2014.

Chapter Six – Major Changes: Elections, Diplomacy, Greenland Bans Oil and Climate Change Urgency

The Trump Administration has undeniably influenced the future of U.S.-Greenland relations, increasing bilateral diplomacy, economic ties, and prospects for further collaboration. This is largely due to Trump's Arctic foreign policy and approach to climate, which advocated for increasing U.S.-Greenlandic economics ties via extractive industries with a disregard for environmental concerns, unlike Obama's 'all of the above' agenda. Trump may have unintentionally impacted U.S.-Greenland relations transitioning into the Biden Administration, creating a new legacy for U.S.-Greenland relations, but not for the initial reasons that Trump may have desired. Regardless of whether the Trump Administration's increasing collaborative ties with Greenland can be perceived as good or bad per se, this has created the foundations for continuously advancing U.S.-Greenland collaboration. Furthermore, irrespective of approaches to climate change during Trump's administration, the U.S. has now gained a foothold in Greenland's development aspirations that other Arctic states lack.

Within this penultimate chapter, I look to Greenland's snap election, the Biden Administration's direction for climate change and the implications of Secretary of State Blinken's diplomatic visit to Greenland. Initially the U.S. has been shifting away from Trump's denial of climate change but continues to enhance U.S.-Greenland bilateral relations via investment in Greenlandic resources. However, 'sustainable development' into Greenland's underground has been heavily questioned. Following the 2021 election in Greenland, the Naalakkersuisut has completely banned oil and gas, limited mineral exploration and extraction, and has dramatically shifted climate change into an emergency footing associated with securitization. The U.S. is also actively seeking to divest from fossil fuels and look towards more sustainable options via the green tech movement. Both actors' climate stances are once again aligning, but this time towards divesting from carboniferous

methods and effectively pushing climate change into the realm of securitization, significantly shifting resource extraction policy. Despite these shifts, the Trump Administration enabled the collaborative U.S.-Greenland relations that we are witnessing today.

Greenland Elections 2021

Greenland's snap election occurred on April 6th, 2021. As a result of the widely anticipated election, the left-wing Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) emerged victorious as the largest party, receiving 21 of the 31 seats in parliament, followed by the governing Siumut party with 10 seats.²¹³ The IA party is a democratic-socialist-separatist party, currently led by Múte B. Egede, and founded by former President of the ICC, Aqqaluk Lynge. All Greenlandic political parties hold similar anti-colonial and pro-independence sentiments, such as with Siumut unifying around nationalist phrases such as "Development in Greenland on Greenlandic terms" and "*Greenlandization*."²¹⁴ Greenlanders have opposed development in Greenland if this comes via Danish policies. On the contrary, development on Greenlandic terms has very much been supported. Chemnitz Larsen of the IA party has stated that IA operates with the internal motto "nothing about Greenland, without Greenland."²¹⁵ It is evident that any matters - whether geopolitical or economical - that concern Greenland, will continue to only be discussed with Greenlandic influence.

The Greenlandic election came at a time of significant international interest in Greenland's rich underground resources.²¹⁶ Mineral exploitation and oil and gas exploration were highly influential factors in the voting decision of Greenlanders. Kuannersuit - a Greenlandic mineral site owned by the Australian firm Greenland Minerals - has been in

²¹³ Line Hebbelstrup. 'Greenland election could see halt to rare-earth mining.' *EU Observer*, April 9th, 2021; <https://euobserver.com/world/151487>

²¹⁴ Jens Dahl. 'Greenland: Political Structure of Self-Government.' *Arctic Anthropology*, 23 (1) 1986; 315-324; In: Larsen, F. B. 'The Quiet Life of a Revolution: Greenlandic Home Rule 1979-1992.' *Études Inuit Studies*, 16 (1), 1992: 199-226.

²¹⁵ Line Hebbelstrup. 'Greenland election could see halt to rare-earth mining.'

²¹⁶ King, 'Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Arctic'

assembly since 2007; Chinese firm Shenghe Resources Holding is the biggest shareholder with approximately 10.5% of shares.²¹⁷ However, Chinese investment received a huge blow as Greenland Minerals outlined the intention to export potentially all deposits of REE from Kuannersuit, not to China, but to Europe. This decision came due to a European Commission report outlining the economic needs of Europe in contrast to Chinese supply chains, in which China possesses approximately 80% of the supply chain of rare earth minerals worldwide.²¹⁸ This relieved the U.S. that their hegemonic state rival was not to be gaining further economic power through securing Greenlandic mineral exports.

Kuannersuit illustrates that international interest is indeed providing competitive opportunity for Greenlandic investment. External interest and China's intent to invest played an important role in the outcome of the election. To fully comprehend the election results, one must refer once more to the historical underpinnings of Greenland's colonial ties with Denmark. Prior to the election, a national poll revealed that 63% of those asked were against the Kuannersuit mining project. Egede had promised that if the IA party were to be elected, that this would mean putting a halt to the mining activities in Kuannersuit. Creating viable options for financing independence from Denmark could be achieved faster through the mineral mining industry, nevertheless, IA has shifted the discourse pertaining to climate and non-securitized politics.

Prior to April 2021 - as reflected through the electoral dominance of Siumut - Greenland's political objective of expanding extractive development necessary for independence has been a greater priority than securitizing climate change.²¹⁹ Yet with the electoral dominance of Siumut being interrupted – governing for all but four of 42 years since achieving *Home Rule* – the approach to climate change and carboniferous methods for

²¹⁷ King, 'Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Arctic'

²¹⁸ Line Hebbelstrup. 'Greenland election could see halt to rare-earth mining.'

²¹⁹ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022.

development has shifted.²²⁰ Aaja Larsen - Greenlandic MP and IA representative in the Danish parliament – has denounced the vision of independence via quick, extractive and exploitative means funded by external players, insisting that other more sustainable, eco-friendly paths must be assessed. In strong opposition to so called ‘quick-fix independence’, Larsen argued that IA believes “in a slow process, where Greenland has [...] time to adjust to financial independence, through peaceful and environmentally sustainable solutions”, further stating that Greenland has other more pressing issues such as “rising inequality and a healthcare system on its knees.”²²¹ Chinese interest and increasing international interest most certainly impacted the ballot box. The concept of an authoritarian regime attempting to gain a foothold within Greenland’s development – via non-environmentally conscious methods - caused concern for Denmark, Inuit, and international climate discourse. Although Greenlandic politicians have previously claimed a lack of “China-anxiety” like other states possess, surely inviting China, the world’s largest GHG emitter would have caused some ecological concern.

On the contrary, Høegh-Dam – Greenlandic MP representative for Siumut in the Danish parliament – argued that the perception towards Kuannersuit was incorrect, claiming that “it is a narrow, Western, post-colonial premise to focus on Kuannersuit and the potential profit [...] for Greenland [...] and the potential buyers of [...] rare minerals.”²²² But surely the concerns of voters undermines Høegh-Dam’s claim, suggesting that ecological and climate concerns are beginning to take precedence over development. Yes, REE and carboniferous industries open possibilities to reduce dependency on Danish grants, yet this also creates room for exploitation of Greenland by international actors. Denmark, however, has increasingly engaged with Greenland and enabled Greenlandic input of foreign policy,

²²⁰ Breum, ‘Here is the real difference between Danish and Greenlandic views on the future.’

²²¹ Line Hebbelstrup. ‘Greenland election could see halt to rare-earth mining.’

²²² Line Hebbelstrup. ‘Greenland election could see halt to rare-earth mining.’

particularly with the recent diplomatic visit from the U.S. Secretary of State, in April 2021. Collaborating with Greenland on foreign policy matters redefines normal protocol for Denmark-Greenland relations. The concept of *Greenlandization* and “nothing about Greenland, without Greenland” has evidently influenced Copenhagen’s approach to diplomatic relations by increasingly including their territory in matters concerning Greenland. Denmark recognizes the increased profile of Greenland and the strategic ability to negotiate investment on Greenlandic terms.

It is these concerns relating to the environmental impacts of extractive industries that are gaining momentum within Greenland. No longer is the path to independence so clearly outlined by the need for quick-fix independence via external actor investment. Greenland has portrayed that despite their right to develop as an Inuit nation, Greenlanders are willing to decelerate the independence project if this means doing so in a truly environmentally sustainable manner. Previously, Schriver argued that Inuit have acted as ancestral stewards of the land for centuries, therefore resource extraction was and is possible in a sustainable manner.²²³ This justification has pushed the goal of economic development further. However, with the IA party transforming Greenlandic political visions, Greenland’s perspective toward ‘sustainable development’ is being reconceptualized. The U.S. shifting approach to climate under Biden has also shifted to align with that of Greenland.

Biden’s Direction for U.S. Climate Change Securitization

President Biden, merely hours after being inaugurated in Washington D.C., began to undo his predecessor’s controversial and detrimental Executive Orders pertaining to climate and environmental policy. On January 20th, 2021, Biden officially declared that the U.S.

²²³ Nikoline Schriver. ‘The debate of Greenland’s raw materials - A comparative discourse analysis from 1975-2012.’ *University of Copenhagen*, 2013; 1-113.

would be re-joining the Paris Agreement, with immediate effect.²²⁴ The executive action saw the U.S. rejoin the international treaty and global effort to curb the effects of climate change; following a 30-day notification period to the UN. Biden also cancelled the Keystone XL Pipeline, which had sparked extreme opposition from environmentalists and Native American groups for over a decade. The cancellation of Keystone XL prevents vast amounts of oil being transferred from Canada to the U.S. for refinement, alongside protecting the Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments. Biden's administration simultaneously placed a moratorium on oil and gas drilling leases in the ANWR, effectively undoing Trump's attempt to exploit fossil fuels in an already ecologically sensitive area.²²⁵ Biden's inaugural speech emphasized that the U.S. would be responding to a "climate in crisis", effectively attempting to push climate change into the realm of securitization.²²⁶

Furthermore, Biden wasted no time signing an 'existential' Executive Order on climate and environment on January 27.²²⁷ Additionally, during a speech at the White House on 'Climate Day', Biden declared "we've already waited too long to deal with this climate crisis [...] It is time to act. We take steps towards [...] achieving 100% carbon pollution free electric sector by 2035. Transforming the American electric sector to produce power without carbon pollution."²²⁸ Biden is essentially pushing away from Trump's non-securitization of climate to invoking an existential emergency associated with securitization. The speech also pointed to increasing a "collective resilience" with other world leaders to address the climate crisis whilst pushing climate change to "the centre of domestic, national security and foreign

²²⁴ BBC News, U.S and Canada. 'Biden gets to work on reversing Trump policies with Executive Orders.' *BBC News*, Jan 20th, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55738746>

²²⁵ Adam Federman. 'Biden freezes oil leases in Alaska refuge pending new environmental review.' *POLITICO*, January 6th, 2021. URL: <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/01/biden-anwr-alaska-oil-491498>

²²⁶ Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. *The White House*. January 20th, 2021. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr/>

²²⁷ BBC News, U.S. and Canada. 'Biden Signs 'existential' Executive Orders on climate and environment.' *BBC News*, January 27th, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55829189>

²²⁸ BBC News, U.S. and Canada. 'Biden Signs 'existential' Executive Orders on climate and environment.' *Video Link*.

policy [...] and securing environmental justice.”²²⁹ The Executive Order highlighted the intent to strengthen work with other nations to support the most vulnerable to the impact of climate change. These promises escalated at the G7 Summit - held in the UK in June 2021 – when Biden alongside other G7 leaders pledged to raise \$100bn per year to assist developing nations transition away from fossil fuels and cut their GHG emissions; distinctively different from Trump’s approach.²³⁰

Further still at the *Leaders’ Summit on Climate* hosted by the U.S. in April 2021, Biden pledged to reduce CO2 emissions by 50-52% under 2005 levels by 2030. A sustainable future via clean energy and green technology was pursued at the Summit, alongside reiterating the importance of maintaining the earth’s temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius to circumvent the most catastrophic natural disasters.²³¹ Biden concluded his Summit speech by declaring that a prosperous, sustainable future is contingent on establishing a “clean energy boom” in order to “reap the economic benefits”, but acknowledged that this requires decisive action immediately to achieve this.²³² Presidential Climate Envoy John Kerry acknowledged that even if the U.S. did achieve its goal of reducing CO2 emissions to net zero, this would “not be enough when almost 90% of [...] global emissions come from outside U.S. borders, we could go zero tomorrow and the problem isn’t solved.”²³³ Kerry continued that “the stakes couldn’t be higher. It is *existential*. And most importantly it commissions a national intelligence estimate, on the security implications of climate change. This is the first time a president has ever done that.”²³⁴

²²⁹ BBC News, U.S. and Canada. ‘Biden Signs ‘existential’ Executive Orders on climate and environment.’ *Video Link*.

²³⁰ BBC News, World. ‘G7 summit: Leaders pledge climate action but disappoint activists’ *BBC News*, June 13th, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-57461670>

²³¹ Matt McGrath. ‘Biden: This will be the ‘decisive decade’ for tackling climate change.’ *BBC News*, April 22nd, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-56837927>

²³² McGrath, ‘Biden: This will be the ‘decisive decade’ for tackling climate change.’ *Video Link*

²³³ McGrath, *Video Link*

²³⁴ McGrath, *Video Link*

Kerry's statement highlights substantial changes from the U.S. pushing climate into an emergency footing associated with securitization. With Biden's reference to "collective resilience" alongside Kerry's words, the U.S. is acknowledging climate change as a collective project that requires a global effort to counteract.²³⁵ During the Leaders' Summit, both China and India made no new commitments to their emissions targets. China - as the world's largest GHG emitter - insinuated that coal is expected to increase once again as the Chinese economy recovers from the economic impact of Covid-19. President Xi Jinping insisted that China will "strictly control the coal-fired power generation projects [...] limit the increase in coal consumption over the 14th five-year plan period and phase it down in the 15th five-year plan period."²³⁶ Tackling the climate crisis appears futile if key developing states such as China are unwilling to take climate responsibility and action immediately. The coal reduction phasing period will most likely not occur until after 2026, and according to the International Energy Agency China represents over half the global growth in coal in 2021 alone. With China's reluctance to readily commit to meaningful action on climate, it is no surprise that Greenlanders, the U.S., and other Arctic states have been extremely concerned with Chinese Arctic development projects. The U.S. therefore seeks to capitalize on the clean energy boom, and U.S.-Greenland's developing relations offer this opportunity.

U.S. Secretary of State Blinken's Diplomatic Visit

In May 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken embarked on a diplomatic mission to Denmark, Iceland, and Greenland. Blinken visited during a global pandemic, conveying how increasingly significant the Arctic is becoming.²³⁷ Blinken met with new Greenlandic Premier Mute Egede, seeking to improve cooperation on trade and investments

²³⁵ Koskeniemi. 'Law, Teleology, and IR: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity.'; 3- 34.

²³⁶ BBC News, World, 'G7 summit: Leaders pledge climate action but disappoint activists'

²³⁷ Nauja Bianco. LinkedIn Post. May 2021. URL: <https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6800163439001120768/>

by creating specialized forums, and discussing investment in Greenlandic mining projects which excluded uranium. Other topics for discussion included increasing collaboration with science, education and academic research projects, and the intention to create an industry of sustainable tourism via direct airline routes.²³⁸ With Greenland actively engaging in foreign diplomacy, this effectively remoulds the status quo of how Danish-Greenlandic affairs are handled, thus providing Greenland with an exponential amount of input in Greenlandic matters.

Blinken stated in Denmark that the U.S. “relationship with Greenland is growing and deepening [...] that we are trying to strengthen the partnership.”²³⁹ Blinken further declared that the U.S. no longer seeks to purchase Greenland from Denmark. Effectively, we are seeing the Biden Administration shift the U.S. approach to foreign transatlantic relations in attempt to repair some of the damage caused by the Trump Administration. Furthermore, the U.S. under Biden is attempting to secure future investment, trade initiatives, and advocating for general cooperative bilateral relations. Within Blinken’s visit to the Kingdom of Denmark, he expressed the importance of mutual goals with combating climate change, encouraging the development of green technology, and shifting away from the Trump Administration. This shift in approach has also been noticed by Danish Prime Minister Fredericksen, expressing “it’s a different approach [...] for cooperation around the Arctic region, where changes are taking place.”²⁴⁰ It was the final stop in Greenland, however, that held the most significance.

On the final day of Blinken’s visit, Blinken confirmed once again – in Greenland - that the U.S. no longer wishes to buy Greenland: “I am in Greenland because the U.S. deeply

²³⁸ Bianco, Linkein Post.

²³⁹ Zaini Majeed. ‘Anthony Blinken Says U.S. Not Planning To Buy Greenland from Denmark.’ Republic World. May 18th, 2021. URL: <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/us-news/antony-blinken-says-us-not-planning-to-buy-greenland-from-denmark.html>

²⁴⁰ Matthew Lee. ‘Dogged by Mideast, Blinken aims to revive U.S.-Denmark ties.’ *Alternative Press News*, May 17th, 2021. URL: <https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-donald-trump-denmark-europe-middle-east-4c8ba3c6bc0937bf62c1f0de209e9793>

values our partnership and wants to make it even stronger,” when questioned if the U.S. had definitively ruled out the intent to buy Greenland, Blinken “confirm(ed) that’s correct.”²⁴¹ Regardless of the initial fallout from Trump’s offer, U.S.-Greenland relations have only increased since with the U.S. reopening a consulate in the Greenlandic capital, Nuuk in 2020, and pledging USD\$12m to assist civilian projects. Transitioning into the Biden Administration, the U.S. is further seeking to strengthen their commercial relationship with Greenland. Egede stated he is “convinced that this decade will be the beginning of a new era in the relationship” with the U.S.²⁴² Trump may have enhanced U.S.-Greenlandic relations rather unconventionally, but it is undeniable that this brought newfound attention to Greenland.

Trump’s administration unintentionally laid the foundations for establishing contemporary U.S.-Greenland bilateral relations, which upon analysis of Blinken’s visit, appear set to continue. U.S.-Greenland relations are at a critical juncture, establishing a path of dependency by strengthening mutually beneficial collaborative ties, and there may be no going back.²⁴³ Nevertheless, the increased collaboration may come in a different form than previously expected. With the removal of Siumut and the election of IA, the push for development via extractive and carboniferous industries with foreign actors may have been quashed. Climate change discourse is shifting for Greenland, the U.S. under Biden, and the international community. International climate discourse is increasingly attempting to push climate change into a unanimous state of securitization. It would be economically counterproductive for the U.S. and Greenland to disregard this truth by continuing business as usual, and thus, a new era of Arctic geopolitics may have begun.

²⁴¹ Helen Sullivan. ‘U.S. no longer wants to buy Greenland, Blinken confirms.’ *The Guardian*, May 21, 2021. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/may/21/us-no-longer-wants-to-buy-greenland-blinken-confirms>

²⁴² Sullivan, ‘U.S. no longer wants to buy Greenland, Blinken confirms.’

²⁴³ Hélène Trouvé et al. ‘The path dependency theory: analytical framework to study institutional integration. The case of France.’ *International Journal of Integrated Care*, 2010; 10.

Major Announcements: Greenland bans Oil and Limits Mineral Extraction

On July 15th, 2021, the Naalakkersuisut updated their official governmental website with a statement titled: ‘*Greenland halts new oil exploration*’.²⁴⁴ This press release comes with two subheadings, the first being ‘*The Greenlandic Underground*’. The IA party outlined the rich potential of Greenland’s underground, as a source of both oil reserves and minerals, with reference to the global legacy of exploration and exploitative activity of such natural resources. This statement firstly poses an acknowledgement of Greenland’s continuing intent to develop the immense mineral potential, but with the decision to exclude the extraction of uranium. Mineral exploration is still occurring, for instance, in July Canadian mining company *AEX Gold Inc.* – the largest mineral resource exploration license holder within the territory – submitted an application for further exploration permits for gold and copper in southern Greenland.²⁴⁵ Despite this, the Naalakkersuisut issued a draft-bill for consultation which bans the investigation, exploration and extraction of uranium in Greenland, stating: “Greenland [...] based its livelihood on [...] natural resources for centuries [...] the ban on uranium mining is rooted in a profound belief that business activities must take nature and the environment into account.”²⁴⁶ Effectively this is an act of securitization by impacting shifts in policy.

Greenland as an Inuit actor can legally and morally choose to exploit natural resources if desired, however, it appears that we may be entering a new phase of responsibilities as a globalized, interconnected community, placing climate responsible development over environmentally destructive industries. Coinciding with the announcement to ban uranium mining, the Naalakkersuisut announced a stop to *all* new oil and gas exploration in and around Greenland. The second subheading reads ‘*An end to oil*

²⁴⁴ Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut), ‘Greenland halts new oil exploration’, July 15th, 2021

²⁴⁵ Morton Bloomberg, ‘Greenland Bans All Future Oil Exploration Citing Climate Concerns.’ TIME, July 16th, 2021. URL: <https://time.com/6080933/greenland-bans-oil-exploration/>

²⁴⁶ Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut), July 15th, 2021.

exploration’ and highlights the vast potential of unexplored deposits of oil within the Greenlandic underground. Interestingly, the statement incorporates a recent study from the *Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland* (GEUS), which estimated there to be DKK 18 billion²⁴⁷ de-risked barrels of oil on the west coast of Greenland. Additionally, it is believed that substantial deposits of oil exist below the Greenlandic seabed on the east coast, hence the U.S. interest in investment.

The Greenlandic government’s reasoning behind banning oil exploration and extraction comes with two justifications: firstly, the price of oil extraction is too high - based on economic calculations - and secondly the impact on climate and the environment must take precedence in this decision. However, Greenland does still have four active hydrocarbon exploration licences, which it must legally honour until exploration activities cease.²⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the future of Greenland’s stance towards oil and gas exploration has been outlined. With heavy focus on climate and environmental concerns, the Naalakkersuisut declared that it will “cease [...] oil and gas exploration in Greenland” and further commented that this was for “the sake of our nature [...] fisheries [...] tourism industry and to focus our business on sustainable potentials.”²⁴⁹ It is here that the approach to development and climate change has shifted, no longer is Greenland defending their right as Inuit to utilize carboniferous and extractive industries with the self-declared knowledge and capacity to ‘*sustainably*’ do so. Climate change is being securitized. The political act of restricting mineral extraction and banning all oil and gas exploration acts as this securitizing move which impacts policy by taking exceptional measures to contain that security threat.

²⁴⁷ Approximately CAD 3.5 billion dollars

²⁴⁸ The Associated Press. ‘Greenland bans all oil exploration.’ *CBC News*, July 16th, 2021. URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/greenland-oil-1.6105230>

²⁴⁹ Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut), July 15th, 2021.

Law and Urry notably argued there is not one global perspective, but situated globalities.²⁵⁰ Bjørst’s previous arguments outlining Greenland’s local and situated perspective to be “marginalized citizens [...] fighting for their right to sustainable development” is no longer as convincing.²⁵¹ Greenland as a developing Arctic actor is now acknowledging the fact that development to finance independence - using carbon intensive and extractive methods - is no longer feasible or responsible. To a certain extent, situated globalities still exist, but the urgency of the global climate crisis in 2021 is pushing even underdeveloped actors towards climate conscious development. This is a far cry from Bjørst’s previous compelling arguments which declared the Greenlandic government were effectively playing games “as a climate symbol [...] climate-responsible country [...] change agent [...] Indigenous peoples [...] Arctic citizens in a developing country, primary victims or witnesses of climate change, or as citizens in an up-and-coming independent state.”²⁵² Bjørst appeared critical and sceptical of the strategic position of Greenland “occupy(ing) the most privileged position in any given round of negotiations” in order to secure development.²⁵³ I previously agreed with Bjørst’s arguments, but circumstances have changed. Greenland’s position has shifted, sacrificing quick-fix independence to become a truly climate-responsible country within the context of the independence project, and this is commendable.

Following the announcement, various Greenlandic ministers have unanimously supported this move with an array of statements. Most notably, Naaja Nathanielsen - Minister for Housing, Infrastructure, Mineral Resources and Gender Equality - stated we must “ask ourselves why we want to exploit a resource [...] are we just continuing *business as usual*? The Greenlandic government [...] is better off focusing on sustainable development, such as

²⁵⁰ John Law and John Urry. ‘Enacting the social.’ *Economy and society*, 33(3), 2004; 390-410.

²⁵¹ Bjørst, 2018; 126; *Emphasis in original*

²⁵² Bjørst, 2018; 124

²⁵³ Bjørst, 2018; 124-126

the potential for renewable energy.”²⁵⁴ Nathanielsen’s reference to “*business as usual*” is evidently a jab at the former Greenlandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs response to Trump’s offer, being “*open for business*”, but “*not for sale*.”²⁵⁵ This is indeed a radical shift away from embracing and encouraging all foreign investment into Greenland’s underground and natural resources. Other notable supporting statements include Kalistat Lund - Minister for Agriculture, Self-sufficiency, Energy and Environment - declaring the “Naalakkersuisut takes climate change seriously [...] we are ready to contribute to global solutions to counter climate change [...] attract new investments for the large hydropower potential that we cannot exploit ourselves. The decision to stop new exploration for oil will [...] place Greenland as *the* country where sustainable investments are taken seriously.”²⁵⁶

Lund’s comments epitomize the shifting dynamic of climate change discourse in Greenland; climate change is being pushed into the realm of securitization. Despite shifting the potential for international investment away from aspects of REE as well as oil and gas, Greenland is actively pursuing foreign trade and investment into other more sustainable avenues, which could still help fund the independence project, albeit with a more eco-conscious mentality. Greenland’s Minister for Business, Trade, Foreign Affairs and Climate confirms this, expressing that “international investments in the energy sector [...] are moving away from oil and gas and into renewable energy” further clarifying that Greenland must “emphasise business on the opportunities of the future [...] the decision to halt oil exploration is the story of a population that puts the environment first.”²⁵⁷ Oil and gas, alongside uranium may have been outlawed, but REE remain vital sources for advancing the green technological

²⁵⁴ Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut), Naaja H. Nathanielsen. ‘Greenland halts new oil exploration.’ July 15th, 2021.

²⁵⁵ Greenland Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Twitter post*, August 16th, 2019.

²⁵⁶ Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut), Kalistat Lund. ‘Greenland halts new oil exploration.’ July 15th, 2021.

²⁵⁷ Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut), 2021.

revolution and will still have a crucial part to play in developing U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations.

Implications for Future U.S.-Greenland Relations

Despite the Greenlandic announcements, Secretary Blinken's diplomatic visit should not be taken in vain, the announcement to increase U.S.-Greenlandic collaborative ties and push further trade and investment still stands. Biden's administration has made its intentions very clear: the U.S. seeks to become a global leader of the green tech movement. Securing further forms of renewable energy aligns with Biden's sustainable and climate conscious agenda. *KoBold Metals* - supported by U.S. billionaires Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos - have recently signed exploratory contracts with UK based *Bluejay Mining*, to explore Greenland's west coast for REE that can be utilized for electric vehicles.²⁵⁸ This USD\$15m green tech project intends to discover metals such as copper, cobalt, nickel, and platinum. REE are key materials in meeting new green energy environmental goals and lowering CO2 emissions to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. With a 51% joint ownership by Bezos and Gates, this may be the first of many new ventures into Greenland's rich underground, thus enhancing U.S.-Greenland economic ties further.

Greenland has rejected carboniferous methods in favour of pursuing a sustainable and climate responsible future. Consequently, Greenland has a renewed opportunity to continue attracting international interest – particularly with the U.S. - but in a sustainable manner, placing Greenland as a key contributor to the global green tech revolution. Although the banning of extractive industries may initially decelerate the financial viability for quick-fix independence, this could be a smart strategical move in the long run. Considering the stigma now attached to investing in fossil fuel industries - regardless of a state's development status,

²⁵⁸ Reuters. 'Billionaire back mining firm seek electric vehicle metals in Greenland.' *Reuters*, August 10th, 2021 URL: <https://www.reuters.com/business/billionaire-backed-mining-firm-seek-electric-vehicle-metals-greenland-2021-08-09/>

and whether Indigenous or not - there remains little moral justification in encouraging carboniferous and extractive industries in contemporary politics. Securitizing climate change may therefore be beneficial for Greenland's political aspirations, particularly when considering the annually intensifying effects of climate change.²⁵⁹

In the past, Greenland's political aspirations had been analogous with toning down approaches to climate change and encouraging non-securitized politics, whereby trade and carbon-intensive economic development were prioritized. Rasmussen argued that this positioning demonstrated a “*desecuritization* move which attempts to secure foreign political autonomy.”²⁶⁰ Bjørst asserted that extractive industries were the *only* road to development in and for Greenland, therefore enabling Greenlanders the ability to “invent their own scale of sustainability (depending on the referent object).”²⁶¹ Yet this is no longer defensible, climate change is being pushed toward securitization and is no longer being downplayed as an existential threat. And thus, prioritizing a maintenance of ‘normal politics’ in order to pursue development at any cost has ceased.

Nuttall's past postulation that Indigenous peoples were “participants [...] and increasingly beneficiaries [...] of the Arctic resource frontier” remains true to a certain extent, but with a redirection towards non-carboniferous, sustainable options.²⁶² The Arctic resource frontier is rapidly changing and even Inuit are now approaching development differently. To contrast the major 2021 Naalakkersuisut statement with the *Future Greenland* conference of 2015, Greenlandic politicians' stances towards climate have shifted exponentially. During the conference in 2015, ‘*growth*’ was placed at the top of Greenland's priority list, whereas ‘*climate*’ was at the bottom. Greenland's political and developmental

²⁵⁹ U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center. *Greenland Ice Sheet Today*. August 14th, 2021. URL: <http://nsidc.org/greenland-today/>

²⁶⁰ Rasmussen. ‘The desecuritization of Greenland's security? How the Greenlandic self-government envision postindependence national defense and security policy.’; 287-305.

²⁶¹ Bjørst, 2018; 131.

²⁶² Nuttall, *Pipeline Dreams: People, Environment, and the Arctic Energy Frontier*; 23.

priority list – via the IA party – has been completely transformed, placing climate responsibility at the top and growth further down. Compromising quick-fix independence may in fact lead to a more successful, economically attractive, and sustainably viable future for Greenland. The U.S. also remains interested in Greenland and in strengthening U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations, yet unlike the era of Trump, approaches towards climate have shifted on the securitization continuum in the direction of securitized climate politics.

Conclusions

Looking to the Future

Throughout this thesis I have addressed the major and secondary research question(s) by examining the shift of U.S. Arctic foreign policy; developing U.S.-Greenland relations; Indigenous politics; and similar approaches to climate change (non)securitization. The U.S. Arctic foreign policy agenda shifted under Trump, highlighting the geopolitical and economic importance of Greenland. The profile of Greenland has been significantly raised by the Trump Administration, bringing heightened attention to Greenland via Trump's offer, but also paving the way for the strengthening of U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations not enabled previously under Obama. This is the impact of Trump on U.S.-Greenland relations. Additionally, both the U.S. under Trump and Greenland – prior to April 2021 – chose not to securitize climate change to prioritize carboniferous economic development. Greenland had maintained 'normal politics' over securitized-politics and the U.S. under Trump had prioritized a specific energy security agenda, also pursuing non-securitized approaches to climate change.²⁶³ The two Arctic actors' approaches have therefore aligned much closer on the climate (de)politicization-securitization continuum than one would first expect.

Following the initial outrage with Trump's offer to purchase Greenland, coinciding with the shift in the U.S. Arctic agenda, one would assume that Greenland would wish for nothing to do with the U.S. Despite this, regardless of whether Trump's impact be considered good or bad per se, it is undeniable that U.S.-Greenland collaborative relations increased under Trump. And thus, Trump has created unintended consequences for the future due to enhanced bilateral relations. International interest in Greenland continues and the strategic benefit of further strengthening U.S.-Greenland economic ties is the reality for the U.S. future

²⁶³ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) ; 25.; Wæver, O. *Securitization and Desecuritization*, (1995); 46-86.

Arctic agenda, not only for countering Chinese and Russia Arctic aspirations, but for securing the U.S. own resource interests. Furthermore, Greenland's need for a Danish-subsidy free economy creates the need for financially viable independence, thus, inviting further U.S. collaboration in creating a mutually beneficial, and reciprocal relationship. Greenland's newfound significance has created an ability to negotiate and construct their own future, and this is partially due to Trump's influence.

Post-April 2021, however, U.S.-Greenland relations continue to develop, and bilateral cooperation intensifies, yet this drastically shifted once the Greenlandic IA party made the major announcement banning oil and gas and limiting mineral exploration and extraction. Essentially this has reshaped the future of Greenland's political objective towards independence, potentially slowing the process due to reducing the financial viability but doing so in a more sustainable and climate conscious manner. Greenland is still placed in a strong strategic position but is pushing economic development via more sustainable avenues. The U.S. climate agenda is also changing. Whereas Obama led a conflicted 'all the above' energy agenda alongside environmental concerns, and Trump led a non-securitized approach to climate, the Biden Administration is actively pushing to securitize climate change, advancing the green tech movement, and subsequently creating new collaborate economic opportunities for the U.S. and Greenland.

In conclusion, these opportunities for bilateral collaboration will continue to see an increase in U.S. investment in Greenland, acting as a geopolitical and economic strategic move for the U.S. Greenland is still undeniably in the process of actualizing the aspiration for independence, but Arctic geopolitics and international climate discourse – via reconceptualizing CBDR – is constructing a historical moment of change, thus additionally placing Inuit Greenland as a key – if not *the* key - actor in the highly complex geopolitical Arctic puzzle, increasingly intertwined with the securitization of climate change.

Approaching UNCOP26 in Scotland, Greenland emerges as the inspirational figure for change in the international climate movement for Indigenous nations, developing, developed, and non-state actors alike. Ultimately, 2021 may very well be a critical juncture for the Arctic and for the positioning of climate change on the *depoliticized-politicized-securitized* continuum. By Greenland and the U.S. now invoking climate change to be in an emergency footing associated with securitization - with exceptional measures being taken by Greenland - this essentially prohibits and limits the possibilities for resource extraction via carboniferous methods.²⁶⁴ Climate change has been moved from a position of politicized to securitized. And thus, this impacts Greenland's prospect for quick-fix independence and further impacts U.S.-Greenland relations in the process. Identifying climate change as a security threat to be prioritized effectively redefines the very meaning of in/security in the Arctic.

To revisit the application of securitization theory throughout this thesis, the theoretical framework has been useful to analyze the implications of Greenland and the U.S. individually constructing similar approaches to climate change.²⁶⁵ Throughout, I analyzed why this occurred, conveying that the similar non-securitized approaches of the Trump Administration and Greenland towards climate change created the conditions for the strengthening of collaborative U.S.-Greenland relations. Securitization theory has, therefore, been an important component to connecting the implications of Greenland and the U.S. constructing climate change as a (non)security issue vis-à-vis advocating for or restricting economic development and extractive industries. Furthermore, the theory is beneficial for understanding this case by assisting analysis of the impacts of transitioning U.S. administrations by interlinking the impact that the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations had to changing approaches towards climate change (non)securitization. Consequently, the

²⁶⁴ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022; 3.

²⁶⁵ Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde (1998); 32

application of securitization theory is multifaceted with regards to U.S. and Greenlandic approaches to climate change and impacts on foreign relations. The impacts for economic development and a financially viable independence project for Greenland are intertwined with Greenlandic approaches towards climate change (non)securitization. Similarly, the U.S. approach to climate change holds implications for the development and external investment into the rich Greenlandic underground. In parallel, U.S. Arctic foreign policy is influenced by approaches to climate change, which holds major implications for the pursuit of extractive industries and resource exploration in the Arctic. And thus, once more (in)directly impacts Inuit and Greenlandic domestic politics.

Linking to Indigenous politics and securitization theory, previously there has been an inability of Indigenous peoples to successfully securitize issues – such as climate change – because of their subordinate structural positions within settler and colonial states.²⁶⁶ In the case of Greenland, however, Inuit are now securitizing climate change and essentially reshaping the structural positions within the framework of colonial relations with the Kingdom of Denmark. By Greenland and Greenlandic politicians implementing specific policy changes towards climate change, via extractive industries, these are effectively acts of securitization which have not been experienced, been possible, or implemented by other Indigenous peoples. Greenland, therefore, finds itself in this unique position of being able to securitize issues due to the heightened political autonomy afforded through *Home Rule* and the *Self-Government Act*. Through this heightened political autonomy, Greenland has - alongside the vision for independence - sought to transform a legacy of colonial subordination into a modern collective identity that eschews further victimhood, despite the threat of climate change.²⁶⁷ This is in structural contrast to other Indigenous peoples within

²⁶⁶ Wilfrid Greaves. 'Damaging environments: land, settler colonialism, and security for indigenous peoples.' *Environment and Society* 9.1 (2018): 107-124.

²⁶⁷ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022; 15

colonial and settler states. By analyzing the Greenlandic move to securitize climate change, the independence project - which requires the financial viability to achieve independence - is assisted by the opportunities created by climate change and Indigenous rights to develop via carboniferous industries. And thus, economic development - combined with Greenland's unique political status as a non-state actor - makes for an interesting case when applying securitization theory as a theoretical framework to assess climate change (non)securitization.

There are limitations to using securitization theory. For instance, Greenland is an exceptionally distinct non-state actor which is experiencing heightened political autonomy that other Indigenous peoples have not experienced. Ultimately, Greenland as a case may not be fully representative of other Indigenous peoples, specifically Inuit, and their approaches towards the (non)securitization of climate change and the implications this has for other contemporary cases of Indigenous self-determination. In contrast, Inuit in Canada are structurally positioned very differently than Inuit in Greenland. The political voice gained via self-government and devolution for Inuit in Canada has been used not to pursue independence, but rather to attempt securitization of climate change without the same political implications Greenlanders face. Without a vision for full independence and “without any immediate prospect of losing (federal) funding [...] Inuit in Canada can attempt to securitize climate change as an existential threat that requires rejecting high-carbon economic development in order to address.”²⁶⁸ There appears a greater contentment with the “political status quo and current degree of Inuit autonomy within Canada than Greenlanders feel within the Kingdom of Denmark.”²⁶⁹ Subsequently, further research and comparative study is required to analyze the contrasting approaches of Indigenous peoples regarding climate change (non)securitization, particularly across the Arctic states.

²⁶⁸ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022; 21

²⁶⁹ Andrews, Crowther, Greaves. Forthcoming; 2022; 21

Consequently, it must be acknowledged that this research is incomplete. There are multiple questions that arise from the findings of this thesis that must be further explored. Pertaining to geopolitics with Greenland alone, questions include, but are not limited to the following: firstly, considering that Greenland has been able to circumvent international climate norms via CBDR, this begs the question: would achieving statehood be of detriment to Greenland's economic development aspirations? If Greenland became a state, regardless of the Indigenous status, would the state of Greenland be morally implicated to adhere to the same climate norms – such as in the *Paris Agreement* – as the rest of the international community? Secondly, if Greenland were to actualize their vision to become an independent state – via financial viability - how would Greenland proceed with conducting foreign affairs with other states such as the U.S. and China? Thirdly, if Greenland does indeed push for further development, this creates more job opportunities, and with such a small population, requires more workers in Greenland. Therefore, how would this impact Greenland socio-politically as a developing Inuit nation? And what transnational implications does this hold for other Inuit? Would Greenland proceed with Indigenous politics – potentially pushing for Inuit cross-border rights - or invite an influx of integration for non-residents?²⁷⁰ These are just a few of many interesting geopolitical questions that require further research.

With reference to constructing approaches to climate change of both the U.S. and Greenland, this also creates a plethora of questions that must be addressed. For instance, considering the exponentially increasing impacts of climate change yearly, how will Greenland proceed with addressing climate change as a security threat? In parallel, how will the U.S. move forward with addressing climate change as a security threat, and how will this impact the U.S. and Greenland's developing economic collaboration? Further still, what are the transnational implications for other Arctic states, and how do the other Arctic states not

²⁷⁰ Aaron Stephenson and Lindsay Bec. 'Supreme Court of Canada Affirms the constitutional protection of cross-border Aboriginal rights.' *Norton Rose Fulbright*, April 27th, 2021.

discussed in this thesis fit into the equation? These are a few other fascinating questions that demand further attention. With this thesis located at the intersection of U.S. foreign policy; climate change; Arctic resources and geopolitics; and Indigenous issues, there are numerous directions that could be taken to fill further gaps in knowledge, thus highlighting the need for further research and analysis. As the Arctic climate changes, so too does an ever-developing requirement for contributions to knowledge.

Looking Further: UN Code Red and Climate Change

In August 2021, unprecedented rainfall was recorded on Greenland's highest snowy mountain summit,²⁷¹ leading to 872,000 square kilometres of ice melt on a single day.²⁷² With Greenland's ice sheet melting at unprecedented rates, sea level rise will rapidly increase, impacting other coastal areas around the globe and threatening human security.²⁷³ With such extreme environmental change intensifying globally, it should be expected that Greenland continues to securitize climate change and the U.S. transitions away from the former mentality of prioritizing fossil fuels. The social construction of global security issues is changing, and the UN's sixth major climate change report came as yet another confirmation of the threat of climate change. The report outlined that without a major reduction in global fossil fuel emissions, temperatures will continue to increase, averaging well above 1.5C since the pre-industrial world of the 1800s by the next two decades or sooner.²⁷⁴ UN Secretary-General António Guterres outlined the report to be "code red for humanity", with the UN climate panel identifying humans to be "unequivocally" to blame. Guterres further exclaimed that the "alarm bells are deafening" and the UN report "must

²⁷¹ 72.58°N 38.46°W – reaching 3,215 metres in elevation.

²⁷² U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center. August 14th, 2021. *Greenland Ice Sheet Today*. URL: <http://nsidc.org/greenland-today/>

²⁷³ CBC News. September 9th, 2020. *Rise in sea level from ice melt in Greenland and Antarctica match worst-case scenario: study*. URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/rise-in-sea-level-caused-by-melting-ice-sheets-study-leeds-1.5716021>

²⁷⁴ David Lohead. 'Code red' climate change report nothing new to Nunavummiut. ' *Nuantsiaq News*, August 12th, 2021. URL: <https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/code-red-climate-change-report-nothing-new-to-nunavummiut/?fbclid=IwAR2-0ybQCo1vvyPf3SmwWk9paIIIv8L0nhDYppo5sbOrJuFy0gKCAOTeGZg>

sound a death knell for coal and fossil fuels, before they destroy our planet.”²⁷⁵ By exacerbating the urgency of the climate crisis, this attempts to securitize climate change – seeking effective policy measures at UNCOP26 - whilst effectively outlawing carboniferous industries that have caused the anthropogenic emissions leading to the climate crisis.

The UN report – accumulating to 3,949 pages - predicts that the warming of the Arctic will pose catastrophic consequences for the planet, yet despite this enormity, there is no connection to the observations of Inuit in the Arctic. Ultimately the “code red” report offered nothing new for Inuit. With a limited number of permanent scientists that inhabit the vast Arctic region, it is Inuit that are the primary eyewitnesses to the rapidly changing effects of Arctic climate change. The UN climate report is no doubt valuable, adding a sense of urgency that action must be taken immediately, nevertheless Indigenous Knowledge and principles “are key [...] layers of knowledge to decision-makers” that must be heard.²⁷⁶ The ICC also expressed that the UN climate report confirms what Inuit have been observing for over three decades with ICC Chair Dalee Sambo Dorough stating: “Inuit have moved beyond ‘if’ climate change is real, to action to protect Inuit Nunaat [...] including Arctic land, sea ice, and Inuit way of life.”²⁷⁷ Not only are Inuit in Greenland pushing to securitize climate change, but Inuit in Canada are too; Lisa Korperqualuk – ICC Canada Vice-President – has also urged for increased inclusion of Inuit knowledge as part of the international climate response. Korperqualuk argued that “Inuit recognized early that safeguarding the Arctic would protect the planet – however, these calls remain unheard.”²⁷⁸ Indigenous Knowledge

²⁷⁵ Lochead, 2021.

²⁷⁶ Emma Tranter. ‘Northern communities face one of the biggest climate change risks, study says.’ *Nunatsiaq News*, July 8th, 2019. URL: <https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/northern-communities-face-one-of-biggest-climate-change-risks-study-says/>

²⁷⁷ Ellis Quinn. ‘UN climate report confirms what’s been witnessed in Inuit Nunaat for decades, says int’l Inuit org.’ *Thomson Reuters: Eye on the Arctic*, August 11th, 2021. URL: <https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2021/08/11/un-climate-report-confirms-whats-been-witnessed-in-inuit-nanaat-for-decades-says-intl-inuit-org/>

²⁷⁸ Quinn, 2021.

has been frequently recognized as an essential knowledge source to mitigating climate change and must be utilized.

U.S. Climate Envoy John Kerry also responded to the *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (IPCC) report that it “underscores the overwhelming urgency of this moment” and “the world must come together before the ability to limit [...] 1.5C is out of reach.”²⁷⁹ The divestment of carboniferous and extractive industries is required to prevent triggering ‘runaway climate change’ with catastrophic and irreversible effects. The UN climate report further outlines that even if all emissions are cut in the next decade, 1.5C temperature rise will still occur by 2040, and there is a possibility that 1.6C could occur by 2060 before stabilizing. If Arctic permafrost thaws further - coinciding with the death of global forests - further carbon emissions would be released, with high-emissions scenarios estimating the Earth’s temperature to increase to 4.4C above pre-industrial averages by 2081-2100.²⁸⁰ The *code red* alarm is yet another wakeup call for all states and actors worldwide. Fossil fuel industries must end, and end now.

Leading to COP26 in Glasgow, both China and Russia - notable GHG emitters – have still not submitted revised emissions plans. Around half of all parties to the 2015 Paris Agreement have failed to submit new emissions pledges set for July 2021. The new pledges submitted have hardly pushed the international community toward the goal of cutting global emissions in half by 2030, and nowhere near net-zero by 2050. Developing states are still leaving substantial carbon footprints and the states responsible for over half (53%) of contemporary emissions have not yet submitted their ‘Nationally Determined Contributions’ (NDC).²⁸¹ The U.S. since March 2021, alongside the EU – being the world’s second (U.S.)

²⁷⁹ Thomson Reuters: Eye On The Arctic. ‘UN sounds clarion call over ‘irreversible’ climate impacts by humans.’ *Thomson Reuters*, August 9th, 2021. URL: <https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2021/08/09/un-sounds-clarion-call-over-irreversible-climate-impacts-by-humans/>

²⁸⁰ Thomson Reuters: Eye On The Arctic, 2021.

²⁸¹ Kate Abnett and Valerie Volcovici. ‘Flurry of emissions pledges still not enough to meet global climate goals.’ *Reuters, Sustainable Business*, August 4th, 2021. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/flurry-emissions-pledges-still-not-enough-meet-global-climate-goals-2021-08-05/>

and third (EU) biggest GHG emitters behind China - have set stricter emissions cut targets ahead of COP26. Other states are now under heightened pressure and scrutiny from the international community to outline their NDCs to the UN before the conference.

COP26 therefore presents an unparalleled opportunity – in another year of notable extreme weather due to climate change – to push toward phasing out fossil fuels entirely, alongside protecting vulnerable ecosystems and forests across the globe. The caveat of achieving meaningful change remains with the world’s biggest emitters who need to commit to cutting their GHG emissions swiftly. Developing economies of the rising BRICS – particularly with India and China – have previously been resistant to enacting change that would restrict their opportunity for economic development.²⁸² However, Greenland may stand tall as an exemplary figure of change for developing economies that have been resistant to meaningful change until now. If Greenland as a developing Inuit nation– placed at the forefront of new economic opportunities in the Arctic – is willing to completely ban oil and limit mineral extraction, then Greenland stands as *the* exemplary figure in the global climate movement. No longer is economic development the most important component for developing nations, states, and actors. A compromise, sacrifice, and willingness to collectively counteract climate change must ensue, otherwise aspirations for development and political goals will be rendered meaningless in the long run. Simply put, climate change is here; the world can no longer prioritize individual energy security goals like the Trump Administration inconsiderately did. Greenland’s decision to securitize climate change should be taken as an inspirational action that must collectively encourage other developing actors and of course, developed states to follow suit.

²⁸² Abnett, Volcovici, 2021; Sanjeev Miglani. ‘India baulks at carbon neutral target as pressure grows.’ *Reuters*, March 30th, 2021. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/exclusive-india-baulks-carbon-neutral-target-pressure-grows-2021-03-30/>

References

- Abnett, K, Volcovici, V. 'Flurry of emissions pledges still not enough to meet global climate goals.' *Reuters, Sustainable Business*, August 4th, 2021. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/flurry-emissions-pledges-still-not-enough-meet-global-climate-goals-2021-08-05/>
- Ackrén, M. and Nielsen, R. 'The First Foreign- and Security Policy Opinion Poll in Greenland.' Nuuk: Ilisimatusarfik and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2021): 1-16.
- Andersson, P., Zeuthen, J.W., and Kalvig, P. 'Chinese Mining in Greenland: Arctic Access or Access to Minerals?' *Arctic Yearbook 2018*. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum (2018); 1-15.
- Andrews, N, Crowther, J, Greaves, W. (De)securitization, Colonialism, and Normal Politics in Kalaallit Nunaat and Inuit Nunangat. (2022; Forthcoming)
- Arctic Council: Task Force on Search and Rescue. Accessed December 14th, 2019. URL: <https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/task-forces/71-tf-sar>
- Arctic Council. Permanent Participants. (2021) URL: <https://arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/>
- Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. 'Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic'. *Arctic Council*, 2017; 3.
- Arcudi, G. "La sécurité entre permanence et changement". *Relations Internationales*. 125 (1) (2006); 97–109. doi:10.3917/ri.125.0097.
- Baker, P, Haberman, M. 'Trump's Interest in Buying Greenland Seemed Like a Joke. Then It Got Ugly.' *New York Times*, August 21st, 2021. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/politics/trump-greenland-prime-minister.html>
- BBC News, U.S and Canada. 'Biden gets to work on reversing Trump policies with Executive Orders.' *BBC News*, Jan 20th, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55738746>
- BBC News, U.S. and Canada. 'Biden Signs 'existential' Executive Orders on climate and environment.' *BBC News*, January 27th, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55829189>
- BBC News, World. 'G7 summit: Leaders pledge climate action but disappoint activists' *BBC News*, June 13th, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-57461670>
- Beinert, P. 'Greenland's Wishes Don't Matter to Trump'. *The Atlantic*. August 27th, 2019. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/what-greenlanders-want-never-even-occurred-trump/596902/>
- Berkman, P. A., Kullerud, L., Pope, A., Vylegzhanin, A. N., & Young, O. R. The Arctic Science Agreement propels science diplomacy. *Science*, 358 (6363), 2017; 596–598
- Bianco, N. LinkedIn Post. May 2021. URL: <https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6800163439001120768/>

- Bjørst, L. 'Chapter 8: The right to 'sustainable development' and Greenland's lack of a climate policy'. In: Gad, U.P. and Strandsbjerg, J. (eds) *The Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic: Reconfiguring identity, space, and time*. London: Routledge, (2018); 121-136.
- Bjørst, L.R. Grønland og den dobbelte klimastrategi. *Økonomi og Politik*, 4 (1), 2008; 26–37
- Blanchfield, M. 'Canada stands by Arctic climate goals as U.S. eyes melting ice as economic opportunity.' *Global News*. May 7th, 2019. URL: <https://globalnews.ca/news/5249435/arctic-climate-change-pompeo-economic-opportunity/>
- Blocher, J, Gulati, M. 'Sure, Trump can buy Greenland. But why does he think it's up to Denmark?' *POLITICO*. August 23rd, 2019. URL: <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/23/donald-trump-greenland-purchase-sovereignty-denmark-227859/>
- Bloomberg, M. 'Greenland Bans All Future Oil Exploration Citing Climate Concerns.' *TIME*, July 16th, 2021. URL: <https://time.com/6080933/greenland-bans-oil-exploration/>
- Borunda, A. 'Arctic summer sea ice could disappear as early as 2035'. *National Geographic*, August 13th, 2020. URL: <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/arctic-summer-sea-ice-could-be-gone-by-2035>
- Brennan, D. Donald Trump Says U.S. Will Block China from Expanding to the Arctic: "We Won't Let It Happen". *Newsweek*, October 3rd, 2019
- Breum, M. 'Rare poll hints at the real differences between Danish and Greenlandic thinking on Greenland independence.' *Arctic Today*, January 22nd, 2019. URL: <https://www.arctictoday.com/a-rare-poll-hints-at-real-differences-between-danish-and-greenlandic-thinking-on-greenland-independence/>
- Breum, M. 'The U.S. aid package to Greenland marks a new chapter in a long, complex relationship.' *Arctic Today*, April 29th, 2020. URL: <https://www.arctictoday.com/the-us-aid-package-to-greenland-is-a-new-chapter-in-a-long-complex-relationship/>
- Breum, M. 'Why U.S. climate hostility might be a bigger threat to Arctic Council cooperation than security tensions.' *Arctic Today*, May 3rd, 2017. URL: <https://www.arctictoday.com/why-us-climate-hostility-might-be-a-bigger-threat-to-arctic-council-cooperation-than-security-tensions/>
- Brigham, L. 'The GLACIER Conference & President Obama's Links to the Arctic.' *Arctic Yearbook*, 2015
- Buzan, B, Wæver, O, and Wilde, J. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998)
- Byers, M. 'Peaceful Competition on Arctic Ice.' *Toronto Star*, 24th, August 2011. URL: <https://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2011/08/peaceful-competition-on-arctic-ice.html>
- Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. The Government of Canada. September 10th, 2019. URL: <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1567697304035/1567697319793>
- Carlson, Jon D., Hubach, C, Long, J, Minteer, K, and Young, S. 'Scramble for the Arctic'. *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2013): 21-43.

- CBC News. September 9th, 2020. *Rise in sea level from ice melt in Greenland and Antarctica match worst-case scenario: study*. URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/rise-in-sea-level-caused-by-melting-ice-sheets-study-leeds-1.5716021>
- Chater, A. The Presidency of Donald Trump in the Arctic Council. *The Polar Connection*, March 9th, 2019. URL: from <http://polarconnection.org/presidency-trump-arctic-council/>
- Clifford, R. 'What is Obama's Arctic Legacy?' *The Polar Connection*, August 25th, 2016. URL: <https://polarconnection.org/obama-arctic-legacy/>
- Closson, S. Russia's recent arctic activities: military threat or development strategy? *Russian Analytical Digest*, 237, 2019; 9–12
- Cole, D. 'How the Trump administration's rush to drill in Alaska's Arctic refuge is backfiring.' *Arctic Today*, May 19, 2019.
- Dahl, J. Greenland: Political Structure of Self-Government. *Arctic Anthropology*, 23 (1) 1986; 315-324; Larsen, F. B. The Quiet Life of a Revolution: Greenlandic Home Rule 1979-1992. *Études Inuit Studies*, 16 (1), 1992; 199-226.
- Dalby, S. 'Biopolitics and climate security in the Anthropocene.' *Geoforum* 49 (2013); 184-192.
- Davenport, C., & Landler, M. 'Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate Science.' *The New York Times*, May 27th, 2019. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climate-science.html>
- Dennis, B. 'Trump makes it official: U.S. will withdraw from the Paris climate accord.' *The Washington Post*, November 4th, 2019. URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/11/04/trump-makes-it-official-us-will-withdraw-paris-climate-accord/>
- Department of Defense. Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region. Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2016
- Dodds, K. 'The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, 'Law of the Sea,' and Arctic Ocean.' *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2013); 45–55. URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26995399>.
- Doel, R.E. 'Exploring Greenland: Cold War Science and Technology on Ice.' New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016
- English, J. *Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples, and the Arctic Council*. Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013
- Federman, A. 'Biden freezes oil leases in Alaska refuge pending new environmental review.' *POLITICO*, January 6th, 2021. URL: <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/01/biden-anwr-alaska-oil-491498>
- Finnegan, C. 'After Trump tried to buy Greenland, U.S. gives island \$12M for economic development.' *ABC News*, April 23rd, 2020. URL: <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-buy-greenland-us-island-12m-economic-development/story?id=70305163>

- Freedman, A, Dennis, B. 'Greenland ice sheet on course to lose ice at fastest rate in 12,000 years, study finds.' *The Washington Post*, September 30th, 2020. URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/09/30/greenland-ice-melt/>
- Gad, U. P. 'Greenland: A Post-Danish Sovereign Nation State in the Making.' *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49 (1) (2014): 98-118.
- Geddes, J. 'How NAFTA was saved: the bitter fight and the final breakthrough.' *Macleans*, October 1st, 2018. URL: <https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/how-nafta-was-saved-the-bitter-fight-and-last-minute-recovery/>
- Gleason, S. L. League of Conservation Voters, et al., v. Donald J. Trump, et al., Defendants, and American Petroleum Institute and State of Alaska, Intervenor-Defendants. *in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Case 3:17-cv-00101-SLG*, March 29, 2019.
- Goldenberg, S. 'Al Gore criticizes Obama on climate change and 'insane' Arctic drilling.' *The Guardian*. July 16th, 2015. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/16/al-gore-obama-climate-change-arctic-drilling>
- Gonzales, R. 'FEMA Drops 'Climate Change' From Its Strategic Plan.' *National Public Radio*, March 15th, 2018. URL: <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/15/594140026/fema-drops-climate-change-from-its-strategic-plan>
- Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut). 'Greenland halts new oil exploration.' July 15th, 2021. URL: https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/News/2021/07/1507_oliestop
- Gray, E. 'Unexpected future boost of methane possible from Arctic permafrost.' *NASA's Earth Science News Team*, August 10th, 2018. URL: <https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2785/unexpected-future-boost-of-methane-possible-from-arctic-permafrost/>
- Greaves, W. 'Damaging environments: land, settler colonialism, and security for indigenous peoples.' *Environment and Society* 9.1 (2018): 107-124.
- Greaves, W. 'What would it mean to treat climate change like a security threat?' *CIGIO Online, Centre for International Governance Innovation*, August 21st, 2021. URL: <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-would-it-mean-to-treat-climate-as-a-security-risk/>
- Greaves, W. "Environmental Security, Energy Security, and the Arctic in the Obama Presidency." In: *One Arctic: the Arctic Council and circumpolar governance*. Centre on Foreign Policy & Federalism, 2017.
- Greenland Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Twitter post. August 16th, 2019. URL: https://Twitter.com/GreenlandMFA/status/1162330521155887105?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1162330521155887105%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fabcnews.go.com%2FPolitics%2Fgreenland-responds-reports-trump-talked-buying-territory%2Fstory%3Fid%3D65012001
- Gronholt-Pedersen, J, Pamuk, H. 'U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic.' *Reuters*, April 23rd, 2020. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-greenland-idUSKCN2251ZF>

- Haecker, D. 'Trump Issues Executive Order Revoking Northern Bering Sea Protection And Tribal Participation.' *Nome Nugget*, May 5th, 2017.
- Harrold, A. 'Arctic drilling: Obama gives Shell the go-ahead despite fears of oil spills.' *The Independent*, July 24th, 2015. URL: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/obama-agrees-let-shell-drill-arctic-despite-75-chance-major-oil-spills-10412604.html>
- Hebbelstrup, L. 'Greenland election could see halt to rare-earth mining.' *EU Observer*, April 9th, 2021; <https://euobserver.com/world/151487>
- Herrmann, V. (2017) I am an Arctic Researcher: Donald Trump is deleting my citations. *The Guardian*. March 28th, 2017. URL: <http://urbauerlab.uga.edu/fyo/war-2019-html-pdf/I%20am%20an%20Arctic%20researcher.%20Donald%20Trump%20is%20deleting%20my%20citations.pdf>
- Herz, N. 'Alaska Gov. Walker to Obama: Help us put more oil in the pipeline.' *Anchorage Daily News*, August 25th, 2015. URL: <https://www.adn.com/politics/article/alaska-gov-walker-obama-help-us-put-more-oil-pipeline/2015/08/26/>
- Hinshaw, D, Page, J. 'How the Pentagon Countered China's Designs on Greenland.' *The Washington Post*, February 10th, 2019. URL: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-pentagon-countered-chinas-designs-on-greenland-11549812296>
- Hird, M. J. *The DEW Line and Canada's Arctic Waste: Legacy and Futurity*. *Northern Review*, 42 (1) 2016; 23-45.
- Holdren. J. White House Arctic Science Ministerial. May 13th, 2016. URL: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/05/13/white-house-arctic-science-ministerial-september-28-2016>
- Honderich, H. 'Why Canada is mourning the deaths of hundreds of children.' *BBC NEWS*. July 15th, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57325653>
- Huebert, R. United States arctic policy: the reluctant arctic power. *University of Calgary School of Public Policy Briefing Papers*, 2(2) 2009; 1–27
- Hunt, E. 'Is Trump's deep fear and envy of Obama behind his plan to purchase Greenland?' *The Guardian*, August 21st, 2019. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/shortcuts/2019/aug/21/is-trumps-deep-fear-and-envy-of-obama-behind-his-plan-to-purchase-greenland>
- Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. *The White House*. January 20th, 2021. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr/>
- Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee of the National Science and Technology Council (2016). *Arctic Research Plan FY 2017–2021*. Washington DC: Executive Office of the President
- IPCC, 2019: Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, E. Calvo Buendia, V. Masson-Delmotte, H.-O. Pörtner, D. C. Roberts, P. Zhai, R. Slade, S. Connors, R. van Diemen, M. Ferrat, E. Haughey, S. Luz, S. Neogi, M. Pathak, J. Petzold, J. Portugal Pereira, P. Vyas, E. Huntley, K. Kissick, M. Belkacemi, J.

- Malley, (eds.)]. In press. URL: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf
- Jacobsen, M. 'Denmark's strategic interests in the Arctic: It's the Greenlandic connection, stupid!' *The Arctic Institute*, May 6th, 2016. URL: <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/denmark-interests-arctic-greenland-connection/>
- Jacobsen, M. Digging sustainability: Scaling and sectoring of sovereignty in Greenland and Nunavut mining discourses. In: Gad, U.P. and Strandsbjerg, J. (eds) *Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic: Reconfiguring Identity, Time and Space*. London: Routledge, 2019; 52-73
- Jacobsen, M. Greenland's Arctic advantage: Articulations, acts and appearances of sovereignty games. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 55 (2) (2020); 176-177.
- Jacobsen, M. The Power of Collective Identity Narration: Greenland's Way to a more Autonomous Foreign Policy. *Arctic Yearbook 2015*. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2015; 102-118.
- Johnson, S. 'U.S. sinks Arctic accord due to climate change differences: diplomats.' *Reuters*, May 7th, 2019. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-arctic-council/us-sinks-arctic-accord-due-to-climate-change-differences-idUSKCN1SD143>
- Kikkert, P, Lackenbauer, W. *The Militarization of the Arctic to 1990*, 2020; 487-505. In: Coates, K. and Holroyd, C. (eds) *The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.
- King, H. 'Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Arctic.' *Geoscience News and Information*, 2021. URL: <https://geology.com/articles/arctic-oil-and-gas/>
- Klare, M, Dispatch, T. 'The Trump administration doesn't want to talk about climate change, but it's already preparing to take advantage of the world climate change is creating.' *Business Insider*, September 16th, 2019. URL <https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-administration-focuses-on-arctic-as-it-ignores-climate-change-2019-9>
- Klare, M. *The Rest for What's Left: The Global Scramble for the World's Last Resources*. New York: Picador, 2013; 72-73
- Koskenniemi, M. 'Law, Teleology, and IR: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity,' *IR* 26 (1) (2011); 3- 34.
- Kravchuk, A. 'A neo-realist approach to analyzing the military-political situation in the Arctic.' *Polis*, 1, 2019; 136–148
- Kristensen, K, Rahbek-Clemmensen, J. *Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic: Postcolonial Paradiplomacy between High and Low Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2018
- Kusnetz, N. 'Trudeau, Trump meeting sidesteps the countries climate change agreements.' February 13th, 2017. URL: <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13022017/justin-trudeau-canada-trump-climate-change-agreements/>
- Lackenbauer, W, Nicol, H and Greaves, W. *One Arctic: the Arctic Council and circumpolar governance*. Centre on Foreign Policy & Federalism, 2017.

- Law, J., & Urry, J. Enacting the social. *Economy and society*, 33(3), 2004; 390-410.
- Lee, M. 'Dogged by Mideast, Blinken aims to revive U.S.-Denmark ties.' *Alternative Press News*, May 17th, 2021. URL: <https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-donald-trump-denmark-europe-middle-east-4c8ba3c6bc0937bf62c1f0de209e9793>
- Levy, J. 'Case studies: Types, designs, and logics of inference.' *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25, 2008; 1-18.
- Lieven, A. *Climate Change and the Nation State: The Case for Nationalism in a Warming World*. Penguin Random House, 2020
- Lippman, D. Trump's Greenland gambit finds allies inside government. *Politico*, August 24th, 2019.
- Lohead, D. 'Code red' climate change report nothing new to Nunavummiut. ' *Nuantsiaq News*, August 12th, 2021. URL: <https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/code-red-climate-change-report-nothing-new-to-nunavummiut/?fbclid=IwAR2-0yBQCo1vvyPf3SmwWk9paIIIv8L0nhDYppo5sbOrJuFy0gKCAOTeGZg>
- Lyngé, A, Former President of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, 'The Legend Says'. In: John English. *Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples, and the Arctic Council* (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013); 299.
- Majeed, Z. 'Anthony Blinken Says U.S. Not Planning To Buy Greenland from Denmark.' *Republic World*. May 18th, 2021. URL: <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/us-news/antony-blinken-says-us-not-planning-to-buy-greenland-from-denmark.html>
- Matzen, E, Daly, T. 'Greenland's courting of China for airport projects worries Denmark.' *Reuters*, March 22nd, 2018. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-arctic-greenland-idUSKBN1GY25Y>
- McGrath, M. 'Biden: This will be the 'decisive decade' for tackling climate change.' *BBC News*, April 22nd, 2021. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-56837927>
- Mervis, J. 'U.S. science adviser sees smaller federal role.' *Science Policy*, 363(6429) (2019); 800-801
- Miglani, S. 'India baulks at carbon neutral target as pressure grows.' *Reuters*, March 30th, 2021. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/exclusive-india-baulks-carbon-neutral-target-pressure-grows-2021-03-30/>
- Milne, R. 'U.S. provokes fury after blocking Arctic Council statement.' *Financial Times*. May 7th, 2019. URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/f879ff9a-70ab-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5>
- Moses, Jonathon, and Knutsen, T. *Ways of knowing: Competing methodologies in social and political research*. Macmillan International Higher Education, 2019
- Musgrave, P. 'American Imperialists Have Always Dreamed of Greenland.' *Foreign Policy*, August 16, 2019. URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/16/american-imperialists-have-always-dreamed-of-greenland/>
- Naalakkersuisut (Government of Greenland). 'Joint Greenland-U.S. technical engagement', *Naalakkersuisut*, June 5th, 2019. URL:

- https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/News/2019/06/0506_aftale?fbclid=IwAR2sTum9czIIYQImxN8qekev9H_a6uPMdmlfMeajv8nN6Q_aLJiEm1htAU
- Naalakkersuisut. 'Economy and Industry in Greenland'. URL:
<https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Economy-and-Industry-in-Greenland>
- Naalakkersuisut. Udenrigspolitisk redegørelse 2016. Naalakkersuisut | Government of Greenland, 2016. URL:
<https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Udenrigsdirektoratet/DK/Udenrigspolitiske%20redegørelser/Udenrigspolitisk%20Redeg%C3%B8relse%202016.pdf> .
- National Geographic. 'A running list of how President Trump is changing environmental policy.' December 18th, 2017. URL:
<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment>
- Nilsson, A. E. The United States and the making of an Arctic nation. *Polar Record*, 54(2), 2018; 95–107.
- Nuttall, M. (2010) *Pipeline Dreams: People, Environment, and the Arctic Energy Frontier*. Copenhagen: IWGIA. p.23
- Obama, B. National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Washington, DC: White House, 2013
- Office of the Secretary of Defense. 'Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2019.' Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019.
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Department of Defense Arctic Strategy. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June, 2019
- Olsen, J. 'Danish PM: Trump's idea of buying Greenland is 'absurd'. *Associated Press*, August 19th, 2021. URL: <https://apnews.com/article/europe-donald-trump-ap-top-news-greenland-arctic-37da8cbadb39488d87154ce820da43c2>
- Østhaugen, A. 'Arctic Oil and Gas: The role of Regions.' *Institutt for forsvarsstudier*, 2013. URL: <https://fhs.brage.unit.no/fhs-xmlui/handle/11250/99831>
- Parfitt, T. 'Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed'. *The Guardian*, August 2nd, 2007. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic>
- Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104. URL:
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf
- Paris Agreement. (2015) Article 7.5. Emphasis in Original. URL:
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf
- Paris Agreement. (2015) Paragraph XI. URL:
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf
- Paris Agreement. December 12th, 2015. URL:
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf

- Peirce, B. 'A Report on the Resources of Iceland and Greenland (1868).' United States Dept. of State, Benjamin Mills Peirce, Dept. of State, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, United States, 1868. URL: <https://archive.org/details/areportonresour00statgoog/page/n13/mode/2up>
- Petersen, N. SAC at Thule: Greenland in U.S. Polar Strategy. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2011; 13 (2) June, 2011: 90–115. URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00138
- Petersen, R. 'On ethnic identity in Greenland.' *Études Inuit Studies*, 25 (1/2) (2001): 325
- Pompeo, M. R. 'Looking North: Sharpening America's Arctic Focus.' U.S. Department of State. (May 6, 2019). URL: <https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/>
- Quinn, E. 'UN climate report confirms what's been witnessed in Inuit Nunaat for decades, says int'l Inuit org.' *Thomson Reuters: Eye on the Arctic*, August 11th, 2021. URL: <https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2021/08/11/un-climate-report-confirms-whats-been-witnessed-in-inuit-nanaat-for-decades-says-intl-inuit-org/>
- Rasmussen, L. Twitter post. August 15th, 2019. URL: <https://Twitter.com/larsloekke/status/1162124827592994817>
- Rasmussen, R.K. 'The desecuritization of Greenland's security? How the Greenlandic self-government envision postindependence national defense and security policy.' *Arctic Yearbook 2019*. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2019; 287-305.
- Rep. Gallagher, M. Twitter post. August 15th, 2019. URL: <https://Twitter.com/RepGallagher/status/1162163381173985282>
- Reuters, Reuters staff. 'China withdraws bid for Greenland airport projects: Sermitsiaq newspaper.' *Reuters*, June 4th, 2019. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-greenland-idUSKCN1T5191>
- Reuters. 'Obama asks Congress to widen Arctic refuge protections.' *Reuters*, April 3rd, 2015. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-environment-usa-arctic-idUSKBN0MU1ER20150403>
- Reuters. August 10th, 2021. *Billionaire back mining firm seek electric vehicle metals in Greenland*. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/business/billionaire-backed-mining-firm-seek-electric-vehicle-metals-greenland-2021-08-09/>
- Rogers, J. 'Declining Western Arctic Caribou Herd worries hunters, biologists.' *Anchorage Daily News*, September 28th, 2016. URL: <https://www.adn.com/rural-alaska/article/plummeting-size-arctic-caribou-herd-leaves-subsistence-hunters-biologists-worried/2014/12/28/>
- Salama, V, Ballhaus, R, Restuccia, A, Bender, M. 'President Trump eyes a new real-estate purchase: Greenland' *The Wall Street Journal*, August 16th, 2019. URL: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-eyes-a-new-real-estate-purchase-greenland-11565904223>
- Sands, C. 'Wake up to the Arctic's importance.' *U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the Kingdom of Denmark*, April 20th, 2020. URL: <https://dk.usembassy.gov/wake-up-to-the-arctics-importance/>
- Sargent, J. F Jr., & Shea, D. A. *Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017.

- Schionning, B. 'As the ice melts, Greenland considers its future.' *BBC NEWS*, January 9th, 2020. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51014148>
- Schriver, N. 'The debate of Greenland's raw materials - A comparative discourse analysis from 1975-2012].' *University of Copenhagen*, 2013; 1-113.
- Scripps Institution of Oceanography. July 29th, 2019. URL: <https://www.kpbs.org/news/2019/jul/29/melting-ice-may-speed-climate-change/>
- Sejersen, F. *Rethinking Greenland and the Arctic in the Era of Climate Change*. New York: Routledge, 2015. In: Greaves. W. (2016a) Securing Sustainability: The Case for Critical Environmental Security in the Arctic. *Polar Record*, 52 (6); 660-671.
- Shadian, J. 'From states to polities: Reconceptualizing sovereignty through Inuit governance.' *European Journal of International Relations*, 16 (3) (2010): 485-510.
- Simmons-Duffin, S. 'What Do Greenlanders Think of Trump's Interest in Buying Greenland?' *NPR News*, August 23rd, 2019. URL: <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/08/23/753479744/what-do-greenlanders-think-of-trumps-interest-in-buying-greenland>
- Sir. David Attenborough. 'People are listening'. Greta meets Sir David', *BBC*, April 12th, 2021. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4Cw2ASwSnU>
- Slats, R, Oliver, C, Bahnke, R, Bell, H, Miller, A, Pungowiyi, D, Merculief, J, Menadelook Sr., N, Ivanoff, J and Oxeroek, C. 'Voices from the Front Lines of a Changing Bering Sea: An Indigenous Perspective for the 2019 Arctic Report Card'. *Arctic Program*, November 22nd, 2019. URL: <https://arctic.noaa.gov/Report-Card/Report-Card-2019/ArtMID/7916/ArticleID/850/Voices-from-the-Front-Lines-of-a-Changing-Bering-Sea>
- Sorenson, M. 'In Denmark Bewilderment and Anger Over Trump's Cancelled Visit.' *New York Times* August 22nd, 2019. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/world/europe/greenland-denmark-trump.html>
- Statement of Greenland. Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting Iqaluit, Nunavut, April 24th, 2014. URL: <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/905>
- Sullivan, H. 'U.S. no longer wants to buy Greenland, Blinken confirms.' *The Guardian*, May 21, 2021. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/may/21/us-no-longer-wants-to-buy-greenland-blinken-confirms>
- Taylor, L. 'U.S. and China strike deal on carbon cuts in push for global climate change pact.' *The Guardian*. November 12th, 2014. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/12/china-and-us-make-carbon-pledge?fbclid=IwAR01lleHwl7BKqmLkoYVHNHNDiBIKl8P9BVDOstYhqyHeZLflEtFrzpJJbYo>
- The Arctic Council. States: The United States. URL: <https://arctic-council.org/en/about/states/the-united-states/>
- The Associated Press. 'Greenland bans all oil exploration.' *CBC News*, July 16th, 2021. URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/greenland-oil-1.6105230>
- The Mainichi. 'US President tweets pic of Trump Tower looming over Greenland', August 20th, 2019. URL: <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190820/p2g/00m/0in/059000c>

- The other (AA) Participant and Signature status are with respect to Georgia and Vietnam.; Paris Agreement. 7.d URL: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en
- The State Council. 'China's Arctic Policy.' Beijing: The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2018. URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm
- Stephenson, A, Bec, L. 'Supreme Court of Canada Affirms the constitutional protection of cross-border Aboriginal rights.' *Norton Rose Fulbright*, April 27th, 2021.
- The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Accessed November 1 2019: https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
- The United States District Court for the District of Alaska: CASE- LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, et al., Plaintiffs,v. DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., Defendants, and AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE and STATE OF ALASKA, March 29th, 2019. URL: <http://www.alaskapublic.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/80-Order-granting-MSJ-1.pdf>
- The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 'FACT SHEET: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Federal Government and Across the Supply Chain.' March 19th, 2015. URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/19/fact-sheet-reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions-federal-government-and-acro?fbclid=IwAR38Qvko5DNt0TT0VEmVbB8FGj7kIvaSh5YmO_iBTto6U05Kl-mxpAYxMfbI
- The White House, President Barack Obama. 'President Obama Calls on Congress to Protect Arctic Refuge as Wilderness.' January 25th, 2015. URL: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/01/25/president-obama-calls-congress-protect-arctic-refuge-wilderness>
- Thomson Reuters: Eye On The Arctic. 'UN sounds clarion call over 'irreversible' climate impacts by humans.' *Thomson Reuters*, August 9th, 2021. URL: <https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2021/08/09/un-sounds-clarion-call-over-irreversible-climate-impacts-by-humans/>
- Titscher, S, Jenner, B. *Methods of text and discourse analysis: In search of meaning*. Sage, 2000.
- Toth, K. 'Don't like moving? Try relocating your sinking house during a pandemic'. *CBC News*, April 23rd, 2021. URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/tuktoyaktuk-homes-relocated-pandemic-1.5542057>
- Tranter, E. 'Northern communities face one of the biggest climate change risks, study says.' *Nunatsiaq News*, July 8th, 2019. URL: <https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/northern-communities-face-one-of-biggest-climate-change-risks-study-says/>
- Trouvé, H., Couturier, Y., Etheridge, F., Saint-Jean, O., & Somme, D. 'The path dependency theory: analytical framework to study institutional integration. The case of France.' *International Journal of Integrated Care*, 2010; 10
- Trump, D. J. (April 28, 2017). Executive Order 13795: implementing an America-first offshore energy strategy. *Federal Register*, 82(84), 20815–20818

- Trump, D. Twitter post. August 19th, 2019. URL:
<https://Twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1163603361423351808>
- Trump, D. Twitter post. August 20th, 2019. URL:
<https://Twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1163961884225277954>
- Trump, D. Instagram post, @realDonaldTrump, August 29th, 2019. URL:
<https://www.instagram.com/p/B1XXkVshvhT>
- U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center. *Greenland Ice Sheet Today*. August 14th, 2021.
 URL: <http://nsidc.org/greenland-today/>
- U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943; 641-47
- UN General Assembly, *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly*, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295. URL:
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html>
- United Nations Paris Agreement. Denmark: Territorial Exclusion In Respect Of Greenland. *Paris Agreement Depositary Notification*, December 12th, 2015. URL:
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.819.2016-Eng.pdf>
- Vogler, J. 'Chapter 24: Environmental Issues. In: Baylis, Smith, Owens. *The Globalization of World Politics. Eight Edition*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2020; 397
- Wæver, O. (2017). Afterword: The Arctic Security Constellation. *Politik*, 20(3):121-136. (p132)
- Wæver, O. *Securitization and Desecuritization*, (1995); 46-86. In: Lipschutz, R. (ed) *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Weingartner, K, Orrtung, R. *U.S. Arctic Policymaking under Trump and Obama*. Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- Wheaten, S. 'Cold War echoes during Obama's Arctic trek.' *POLITICO*, September 1st, 2015. URL: <https://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/obama-alaska-visit-russia-arctic-circle-213234>
- Wilson, P. 'An Arctic 'Cold Rush'? Understanding Greenland's (In)dependence Question.' *Polar Record*, 53 (5) (2017): 512-519.
- World Population Review. 'Greenland Population.' 2021. URL:
<https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/greenland-population>
- Young, O. R. 'The Arctic Council at twenty: how to remain effective in a rapidly changing environment.' *UC Irvine Law Review*, 6(2) 2016; 99-119