Tours of Non-arrival: The Politics of Escape in Tourist Practices

by

Caroline Patricia Bagelman
B.A., University of Victoria, 2007

MASTER OF ARTS

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Supervisory Committee

Dr. Arthur Kroker, Department of Political Science
   Supervisor

Dr. Rob Walker, Department of Political Science
   Departmental Member

Abstract

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The prevalent frame of ‘tourism as vacation’ explicitly implies that one vacates ‘the familiar’ and escapes to ‘the foreign’. Discourses of escape, therefore, function on the assumption that a rather clean and uncomplicated rupture between the familiar and foreign takes place (an assumption not only informing conventional readings and practices of tourism, but also the modern logic of states and citizenship and modern thought more broadly). A failure to account for the effects of this escapist logic on both the performance and materialization of tourism, as well as the ways in which tourism has come to reflect profound political problematics endemic to modern thought, has produced a serious gap in ‘critical tourism’ literature. To contest this notion of rupture, or, to disrupt escape, requires what Judith Butler terms a ‘radical re-articulation’ of tourism. In hopes to excite such a disruption, my work draws on Jacques Derrida’s texts concerning ‘non-arrival’ and ultimately re-articulates tourism as a practice of everyday life.

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continually placed upon exploration, and not arrival, has aided me in thinking about politics as a profound site of possibility – an awareness that informs my everyday practices and, undoubtedly, my future work. I am endlessly grateful to Arthur for acting as conscientious supervisor as well as a heartful advocate and support since we started working together at the undergraduate level.

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Dedications

To my mom who I adore,

For sharing a love and an appreciation for life so profound, that no text or lecture could ever hope to convey.

Down the Rabbit Hole: An Introduction

*Down went Alice [...] never once considering how in the world she was to get out again*

– Lewis Carroll

I self-consciously begin this project in media res – already embedded in a plot whose origin is both ambiguous and always figured by the past. In this sense, I am beginning in the midst of a discourse on tourism that has been constructed by particular origin stories but, importantly, has always been in ruins. To begin by acknowledging that I cannot properly begin, for tourism is already saturated by particular understandings, is also to begin with the refusal to take such understandings for granted. The conceptions of tourism which have become salient or privileged, I argue, frame tourist practices as a mere series of departures and arrivals, as an uncomplicated escape. Understanding these discourses as being in ruins, however, suggests that breakages and points of entry for re-articulation are available, and it is within these spaces that I will tour. Akin to Carroll’s rabbit hole, which signals the impossibility of exit, this tour does not offer possibilities to ‘get out’ of escapist discourses, into which we have fallen, instead, it will explore the promise of disorientation.
My practical and methodological refusal to take 'tourism' for granted reflects a desire to make more of it than our current discursive frameworks permit and, hence, a desire to consider its often-disavowed political possibilities and consequences. To open up these possibilities and consequences, I assert that it is necessary to consider tourism through its relationship to escapist discourses. For, when unchallenged or unexamined, a logic of escape acts as a foreclosure to the political possibilities born from alternative understandings of tourism (namely, tours of non-arrival). It is my primary concern in this thesis, therefore, to consider the interesting political possibilities born from a tourism that disrupts the privileged “Odyssean paradigm” of tourism informed by escape (Malabou 40).

As will I outline with more detail later in this introduction, each chapter follows the structure of exploring a different set of foreclosures and then considering the particular openings (or political promise) offered by an aporetic logic of non-arrival. For instance, in Chapter I, I consider foreclosures that follow from the escapist conception of fixed origins and language as exemplified by Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, and in response I think through the openings provided by Judith Butler’s notion of ‘radical re-articulation’. In Chapter II, I reflect on foreclosures that follow from escapist assumptions of fixity in ‘place’ (which assumes a definitive separation of the familiar from the foreign

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1 Tourism, within the salient tradition of escape, is structured by a point of origin or departure (a familiar realm) and a point of arrival (an unfamiliar realm). The ‘voyage’ which occurs is structurally determined by a teleological ‘forward march’ towards its point of arrival. This structure disavows the many possibilities which non-arrival promises.

2 Jacques Derrida suggests that the Odyssean paradigm (rooted in Homer’s *The Odyssey*) informs the predominant western understanding of ‘the voyage’, travel or tourism. It assumes the existence of a point of departure and point of arrival, and, assumes further that these are two distinct points. The purpose of the voyage, this framework suggests, is the arrival itself. This voyage is propelled by the prospect of *destination*, not destiny or chance.
as well as a continuity in both), and I then think through the political possibilities of non-arrival, non-place and tours of the everyday. Finally, in Chapter III, I meditate on foreclosures that follow from simplistic escapist notions of consumption and absolute difference (both of which one supposedly encounters or arrives at through the conventional tourist gaze), and I then think through the promise of reflexivity and blindness. It is the particular possibilities that are unearthed from each of these iterations throughout my thesis that reflect what is ultimately at stake in this discussion of tourism.

Underlying each chapter is my assertion that tourist practices embodying and enabling escape are framed as the shift from static existence within a familiar space and time to the motion associated with entering and navigating a foreign space and time. The political possibilities of this conventional tourism, consequentially, seem to be limited to the realm of the state. Moments of border-crossings - of exiting the ‘domestic’ and entering the ‘international’ - are, within this narrow imagination, what we must call tourism. Troubling the particular unfolding and geophysical mappings of tourist practices in foreign places is what we must call ‘critical tourism’. Understood as a complex practice and an avenue for disrupting escape, however, a rearticulated tourism (or tours of non-arrival) presents interesting detours from the conventional tour. For a rearticulated mode of tourism, the proliferations of strange and navigable limits within everyday spaces and encounters enter into understandings of tourism. While tourism within the escapist tradition suggests tourist acts takes place in the transgression of official borders, boundaries rearticulated tourism troubles the notion of simple transgression.
Throughout this thesis, I demonstrate the ways in which these formulations illustrate different relationships to time, space and ‘the subject’ within tourist practices. Temporally, I insist, an escapist framework constructs tourism as a moment along a linear trajectory (as an isolated act of navigating the spaces within limits), while the tours of non-arrival thinks of tourism as constantly occurring along looping trajectories (as a continual process of navigating limits themselves). Spatially, the former is concerned with official sites enclosed within limits. The latter, however, is concerned with the strange character of limits, and thus considers not only the geophysical tourist site as the realm of tourism, but also a plethora of other terrains such as the tourist body.

While the widely-accepted understanding of tourism-as-escape, which reads tourism as calculable, acts as an established “apparatus of capture” in which alternative, non-calculable readings and performances of tourism have been discounted, a re-articulation of tourist practices creates possible “lines of flight” (Deleuze, Guattari 1980). These moments of flight, however, do not comprise an escape from apparatuses of capture. If conventional escape is defined by a rather clean and uncomplicated rupture, to disrupt escape is to challenge and rethink this logic, not to generate new points of rupture. Otherwise put: productive disruption does not aim to escape the structure of capture and escape, for this would be to counter-productively enable the rupture that it wishes to calls into question. A failure to account for the effects of this escapist logic on

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3 Giving a tactical reading of Deleuze and Guattari, I suggest that the problem of escape, which informs tourism, is illuminated by the notion of “lines of flight” and “apparatuses of capture” explained in *A Thousand Plateaus*. The former are described (largely in reference to social movements) as acts of resistance which forge transformative spaces of rhizomatic movement, chance, change, deterritorialization and metamorphosis, and which give rise to new forms of subjectivities, and re-evaluated relationships to space. The former (apparatuses of capture) however, seek to govern, regulate, and channel this movement to serve a particular norm that attempts to fix and stabilize bodies, territories and ideologies. Flight and capture are inevitably in a symbiotic relationship.
both the performance and materialization of tourism, I suggest, has produced a serious gap in ‘critical tourism’ literature. To excite meaningful disruption through critique, I argue, it is necessary to generate what Butler terms a “radical re-articulation” of tourism as a practice of everyday life, embodying non-arrival (Butler 16).

Due to the inescapability of escape, expressed through the partnership between ‘lines of flight and apparatuses of capture’, an aporia is, methodologically, the most productive point of entry into the discussion of escape. ‘Notions of escape animate modern political thought and practice’ is one such aporetic problem I would like to engage with throughout this project. The difficulty, or even impossibility, of making such a remark without invoking escape speaks to the gravity of escape itself and the aporetic nature of tourism-as-escape. For instance: I evoke escape when I make this aporietic statement because the supposed escape from a ‘pre-modern’ is the very condition of possibility for a ‘modern’. Embedded in this aporia is a productive self-referentiality: its looping logic refuses the expository call to a persuasiveness and conclusiveness that forecloses curiosity and critique.

I will suggest that tourism viewed as the strange navigation of foreign and simultaneously familiar spaces, rather than a clean and uncomplicated escape from one to the other, offers interesting avenues of analysis, which encourage a more fluid understanding of the limits between ‘familiar’ and ‘foreign’. Read this way, tourism can

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4 The notion of aporia that I find useful is one that can be described as an impassable paradox – a contradiction beyond resolution. It is not a blocked road or a dead end, but, instead, as Derrida explains, it is a non-road. One cannot travel a passageway of the aporia to get somewhere; she must dwell in the impossibility of moving from point to point (escaping) and getting somewhere.
be conceived of as an everyday practice, taking place not simply in the traversing of official borders and sites but, perhaps more notably, in seemingly neutral terrains and moments that are too often depoliticized.

Due to the convergence, which Derrida and de Certeau emphasize, between travel and thought – and between metaphysics of the voyage and metaphysics as a whole - this re-articulation also has implications for theoretical approaches to politics more generally. Re-assessing the value placed on the Odyssean voyage, by extension, means ascribing value in theoretical work to questioning (a type of wandering/exploration) and the distrust of definitive answering (a type of endpoint/arrival).

**Itinerary:**

“Chapter I: A Return to Escape” enters this discussion by considering ways in which the escapist paradigm operates through a binaric logic: ‘escaped from’ and ‘escaped to’. This binary, which rests on the creation of a *rupture* between ‘escaped from’ and ‘escaped to’, also involves the imposition of a specific temporality. That is: that the ‘escaped from/familiar’ is prior to the ‘escaped to/foreign’. From this, an origin story is enabled and any deviation from the constructed origin point becomes framed as an escape. Engaging with Judith Butler’s work on the citational process aids in understanding how this manner of structuring movement gains salience and informs practices of tourism - in other words, how certain understandings of a phenomenon, like tourism, become privileged. In claiming a definitive move from the state of nature to the
modern state (by way of the social contract), I suggest that Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan* exemplifies this structure of rupture, origin and escape - I argue that it exemplifies a powerful narrative that has entered the citational process. Looking at Hobbes’ text, therefore, serves to map out a popular construction of escape that has become internalized by tourist practices.

In following with an aporetic approach to the escapist logic, I end the first chapter not with an absolute alternative to tourist practices, but rather with what Butler terms a ‘radical re-articulation’ of tourism.

In “Chapter II: Unpresentable Tours”, I apply this radical re-articulation by offering a critique of escapist conceptions of place, arrival and the framing of tourism as an everyday practice. Opening with the questions ‘what is tourism’ and ‘where is tourism present’, I suggest, along with Derrida, that a tour of non-arrival, rather than the tour of absolute escape illustrated by Hobbes’ social contract theory, can embrace the complex and disavowed nuances of travel. The widely held understanding that tourism is present in official tourist sites, which are tangible, mappable locations, attributes a spectacular quality to tourist practices and tends to occlude the political character of our everyday navigations and relations to place.

I suggest that displacing a point of departure or origin and a point of arrival necessarily poses a challenge to distinctions conventionally made between the ‘familiar’ and ‘the foreign’. Situating a familiar place in opposition to a foreign, one
problematically assumes a completeness and continuity in both. Derrida suggests, however, that place is never constant, perfectly known or unknown, for it is characterized by catastrophe: the instability and incompleteness of all possible landscapes. Since place - a place of tourism or a place of dwelling - have for so long been understood as constant and separate, Derrida responds with the concept of *non-place* to reflect the contingent and catastrophic. In this Derridean sense, I contend that tourism is not present in a site, but ever-present in all sites. I consider the political implications of deterritorializing tourism in this way by briefly introducing Derrida’s notion of the ‘asylum city’. Though not always explicit, this chapter serves as a space in which I can put Hobbes and Derrida into conversation – or, a space in which I can engage with Derrida in order to respond to Hobbes. While Hobbes’ Leviathan establishes a political place that is defined by its strict limits separating it spatially from other states and temporally from other ages of existence (e.g. the state of nature), for instance, Derrida responds with the notion of non-place or asylum city which is characterized not by definitive limits but by a constellation of breakages and fractures, or what he calls a catastrophic site. Hobbes, in this sense, is the voice of the foreclosures being confronted in this chapter, and, in response, Derrida articulates the political possibilities found in contesting a Hobbesian logic of escape and exploring tours of non-arrival.

If indeed tourism is not simply present in designated tourist sites – and therefore does not present itself in a visible, localizable fashion - this certainly troubles an understanding of tourist perception. In “Chapter III: Complicating the Tourist Gaze”, I consider the political implications of the tourist gaze within theorizations of tourism. I
open this discussion with an explanation and critique of John Urry’s *The Tourist Gaze* and Haunani-Kay Trask’s “Lovely Hula Hands: Corporate Tourism and the Prostitution of Hawaiian Culture”, which I suggest are indicative of the popularized contemporary perspective on the gaze within critical tourism literature. Urry suggests that the tourist gaze only operates *outside* of the places and routines of the everyday. He presents the tourist gaze, therefore, as a gaze which reaches an image of absolute difference. The tourist gaze is politically significant, he holds, because in generating an image of the foreign, one can also generate an image of the familiar. Put differently, political knowledge is gleaned through comparison, made possible by the absolute difference encountered through the gaze.

Trask, who I argue also follows this model of absolute difference, uses the case study of Hawaiian tourism to illustrate the exploitation involved in these practices (a common narrative in critical tourism literature). While conceding to the validity of her arguments concerning cultural appropriation and the imperial characteristics of the tourist industry, I also take issue with her understanding of the tourist gaze as a uni-directional one, whereby the tourist (the subject of the gaze), who is imbued with a colonial privilege, violently casts her gaze at the toured (the object of the gaze). I open my critique by asking how Marxian understandings of reflexive consumption complicate the gaze and the notion of exploitation operating within the tour.

Further, I ask how the non-reflexive understanding of consumption, which both Urry and Trask articulate, is the product of a liberal humanist understanding of the
subject (tourist in this case) as independent, autonomous and bounded by her skin. I suggest that Katherine Hayles' articulation of the feedback loop, which seeks to challenge this construction of embodiment and subjectivity, creates a space in which we can consider the complexity of the tourist gaze. Not only are the consumer/consumed, subject/object put into communication with one another, but, as Kathy Fergusson insists, there is also an intimacy between geo-physical sites and bodies – to the extent that bodies must be seen as sites themselves and, indeed, to the extent that a conversation of the tourist gaze and tourism can no longer eclipse questions of the body. Posing yet another challenge to the conventional frame for the tourist gaze, I explore Derrida’s work on blindness. Considering the way in which sight and blindness necessarily function in tandem to produce an image, and the way in which the person trying to capture this image is also captured within it (a process that Derrida calls the ‘destiny of the self-portrait’), makes it possible to think of the gaze as a reflexive and catastrophic practice and to explore the implications of this thinking.

**Destination/Destiny of Critique**

The Odyssean paradigm, embodying the logic of escape, prescribes a “forward march” to the voyage (Malbou 14). That is, it suggests that the raison d’être of the tour is precisely its ability to arrive, to move from the point of departure (a familiar place) to the point of arrival (a foreign place). I will argue that this commonly cited story not only ascribes a deeply purposive and teleological essence to tourism, but also to thought, language, place, and the gaze. In the process of writing this thesis, I have been forced to
confront this teleology of arrival, which is so heavily placed on thought itself. Having internalized this “forward march” to a certain degree, each chapter reveals that I am often compelled to answer the questions ‘what is the point’ of a re-articulation of tourism (that is, ‘the point of arrival’) – and ‘where does this get us’ (ibid).

Critique is at times understood and utilized as a vehicle that will allow us to depart from a problematic and arrive at a more satisfactory alternative; certainly such offerings of alternatives are present within this project. The very fact that I am unable to completely transcend this pull of arrival makes the case for the inescapability of escape, or, it makes the case for the profundity of escape. However, because I strive to re-articulate narratives of arrival in order to consider the political possibilities of non-arrival, I have applied a certain methodological awareness and playfulness to the organization of my work. For instance, I have maintained an awareness of the way in which introductions, conclusions, and the employment of canonical figures like Hobbes threatens to institute a set of origins and promise an endpoint, and I have tried to respond playfully. In presenting a tour of escape, writing this thesis has, in one sense, been an exercise in navigating the possible lines of flight and apparatuses of capture in the structure of a thesis itself.

**Non-sense and Non-arrival**

I open this discussion of escape with the poetic nonsense of Lewis Carroll to colorfully illustrate this reflexive relationship between apparatuses of capture and lines of
flight. Alice’s fall through the rabbit hole seems to enable a split from the familiar realm of mundane, didactic school lessons to the disorienting foreign realm of Mad Hatters and philosophizing caterpillars. However, as Carroll’s tale unfolds, we realize that Alice does not experience a conventional escape in this sense of a rupture but rather, a strange and complicated tour. The foreign, nonsensical space produced by her imagination is a re-articulation of her supposedly sensical and familiar lived experience (the fantastical Cheshire cat being a manifestation of her ordinary cat Dinah, for instance); the two become entwined. She tours Wonderland while also resting in her garden under the shade of a tree, encountering at once an ‘out-of-body’ and in-body (embodied) experience. This muddling of limits demonstrates a destabilizing of conventional notions of escape – it is a story which encapsulates the spirit of the aporetic logic as one that does not point us to a point of departure and point of arrival, but as one which takes us through “curiouser and curiouser” terrain (Carroll 19). Like Alice wistfully traversing the labyrinths and unmappable landscapes of Wonderland, my thesis takes some peculiar detours and is always in the process of, but never properly, arriving…
Chapter I: A Return to Escape

Haunting the Boundaries

A condition of possibility for the modern conception of escape seems to be a deep-seated binaric logic. Enabling one to conceive of an ‘escaped from’ (familiar) and an ‘escaped to’ (foreign), the binary functioning in tourist discourses relies on the construction, performance and materialization of an origin in order to construct its opposite: “[a] voyage ordinarily implies that one leaves a familiar shore to confront the unknown. The traveler derives or even drifts from a mixed and assignable origin in order to arrive somewhere” …somewhere else (Malabou 2). This origin asserts that we cannot have the second (‘escaped to’) without the first (‘escaped from’) and the chronology instilled by such an origin (that the first came before the second) indicates a profound political decision, which becomes deeply embedded in understandings of escape. Catherine Malabou, giving an account of Derrida’s work, suggests that the “adventure of representation [which is inherent in any act of travel] constitutes the history of metaphysics as a whole [it] is structured by a series of oppositions - presence/representation, cause/effect, essence/accident, transcendental/empirical, which are governed in their very principle in the overarching opposition between ‘originary”
and ‘derivative’” (Malabou 40). The representation of the self as visitor or stranger during a voyage depends on the existence of a host or a local who is familiar to the ‘strange’ space; it relies on an origin from which the stranger strays, and an origin to which the local belongs. Modern citizenship, of course, secures these origin stories.

Though the origin is often presented as a natural and uncontested point in time\(^5\) (one that is uncovered through distilling an accurate image of the past), it more accurately reflects a messy alchemy of time – one that Jean Baudrillard and Michael Foucault (among others) suggest necessarily contrives a particular historical trajectory. Baudrillard’s understanding of “History as a Retro Scenario” and likewise Foucault’s “History of the Present”, speak to the impossibility of isolating a natural origin: being situated in the present, the historian invariably inscribes her context-bound experience and ways of knowing onto the past. The past and present are better understood, according to these theses, as reflexive (and mutually constitutive) rather than disconnected entities. These critical readings of time are a response to a popularized formulation of history that can be visually represented by a ‘timeline’: this linear trajectory of history is not simply composed of a single horizontal line which plots a flow of time from past, present and future, but also a system of vertical lines, which segment the and separate the past from the present from the future - the intersections forming points of rupture. Foucault and Baudrillard have in a sense taken this plot line, twisted it and connected the ends, forming some sort of temporal Mobius strip, which disallows a logic of singular origins or strict ruptures.

\(^5\) ‘Point in time’ suggests that temporal dimensions have been spatialized (e.g. on a timeline). Spatializing time in this way seeks to grant hegemonic historical trajectories a concreteness and legitimacy.
The origin, being fiercely naturalized through a continual process of what Butler terms “citing”, often assumes a privileged position beyond audible discourse. She suggests that there is

[…] An inevitable practice of signification, of demarcating and delimiting that to which we then ‘refer’, such that our ‘references’ presuppose –and often conceal– this prior delimitation. […] This delimitation, which often is enacted as an untheorized presupposition in any act of description, marks a boundary that includes and excludes, that decides, as it were, what will and will not be the stuff of the object to which we then refer (Butler 11).

When one refers to tourism, a particular escapist tradition (one which privileges the notion of rupture) is indirectly cited. To say one is engaged in an act of tourism, then, is to evoke the extra-discursive: escape. Also delimited and excluded from the “object [of tourism] to which we then refer”, and hence residing in the extra-discursive realm, is the origin enabling notions of escape (Butler 11). Consider the normalized way of speaking about travel: ‘on spring break I am taking a vacation to Mexico’. This suggests that an act of travel requires one to both vacate and break away from the everyday. Escape, as this insipid colloquialism demonstrates, is included through its exclusion. The discursive power of this routine citational act continually grants the Odysseas or escapist formulation of tourism a monopoly of meaning over tourist practices.

The extra-discursive character of an origin story working in tandem with escapist logics poses a host of problems to political theory: how can one recognize or isolate an origin; in lieu of this recognition, how is critique possible? While Butler’s remark concerning delimitations “enacted as an untheorized presupposition” is a productive
caution, which suggests that an interesting set of typically silenced presumptions foreground our referred-to presumptions, I maintain that the extra-discursive (in the case of tourism: escape) does not escape articulation or critique.

Locating and naming the true or official origin story for escape inherent in tourism (through a history or ethnography of the concept), is not the object of this thesis. Such a practice serves to reify a problematic timeline. Instead, as an opening to the subject of escape, this chapter takes interest in how strong claims to particular origins are asserted in a way that unfolds popularized notions of escape that engender a set of problematic dismissals. It therefore focuses on *how the delimitations work politically to generate an origin, which enables escapist discourses and practices*. In so doing, I will consider how this functions within Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, which tells a story of the genesis of the social contract by developing a specific understanding of nature (the origin/the escaped from) and the modern state (the escaped to [through the social contract]).

**Citing Escape**

Employing Judith Butler’s discussion of the citational process, I suggest that escape has attained a privileged position in our conceptions of movement, such that an act of or reference to ‘tourism’ evokes a particular escapist tradition. This tradition has come to frame escape as a strict rupture and, in so doing, has foreclosed the possibility of a flight and capture functioning together. This foreclosure, Butler suggests, is a basic product of citing. Performing the veracity of a concept is accomplished though a
tautological process of constantly citing the veracity of the concept. This, Butler’s latest work *Bodies that Matter* insists, has material effects, for instance: adopting the routinely cited concept of escape (based on simple rupture) that informs one’s experience of tourist space and understanding of herself as a tourist – the tourist performs rupture (the performance of citizenship), and materializes rupture (border crossings, passports, photographs of ‘the foreign’). For the citational process to produce hegemonic meaning, delimitations must be enacted. The ability of a citation to lay such heavy claims to meaning, she suggests, is enabled by concealing the inevitable act of delimiting: “[a] delimitation […] is enacted as an untheorized presupposition in any act of description, [which] marks a boundary that includes and excludes” (Butler 11). Butler uses the term ‘extra-discursive’ to describe those elements of our discourse which are referred to almost exclusively in an indirect manner. This indirect practice of citing allows for the extra-discursive to largely remain an ‘untheorized presupposition’, allowing for the delimitations of that particular underlying discourse (such as discourses of escape within tourism) to become concealed.

In the spirit of theorizing these often ‘untheorized presuppositions’, concealed by a host of cunning delimitations, I will consider how the notion of rupture (from the State of Nature to the Modern State) that functions in the social contract story offered by Hobbes is a story of escape, which has become embedded through citing and has thus enacted serious delimitations. My reading of *Leviathan* ultimately seeks to illustrate the way in which this citational process has served to generate a conceptual framework for tourism, which is informed by Escape. The delimitations drawn by his text, which has served to exclude alternative conceptions to the normative ‘escape as rupture’ paradigm,
will therefore be my central concern here. Featuring this concern in my discussion of Hobbes will of course require me to enact my own set of delimitations and to deal tactically with the text. I will not feign to give a comprehensive reading of *Leviathan*. To do so is to disavow the necessary preferences and exclusions at work in my reading and to claim completeness of my analysis, which tends to discount the need for further rumination. Michael De Certeau remarked, “[a]ll readers are travellers, actively poaching texts for their own tactical and playful ends” (De Certeau 1984). This notion is informs my methodological approach, for it implicates and locates me in my own project as a writer/thinker who is deeply embedded in a myriad of tourist practices as I write/think. When read in conjunction with Butler’s analysis, therefore, Hobbes will not be granted the privileged position of an originator of escape. Rather, by engaging with Hobbes, this first chapter seeks to unfurl the problematic escapist norms that the proceeding chapters will take issue with.

To display the ways in which the *Leviathan* is not only an exemplary case of an escapist discourse, but also an exemplary case of a discourse which enters the citational process and gains power through its position in an extra-discursive realm, I open with a discussion of “Chapter IV: Of Speech”. The origin story Hobbes unfolds here, which is centrally concerned with specific linguistic practices of iteration (linked to transcendant creation) and proper reiteration (liked to immanent duty and governance), will be put into conversation with Butler’s understandings of iteration, re-iteration (linked to a citational process which governs understandings of origins) and re-articulation (linked to [re]creation, creativity and disruption). I hold that language or discourse, which is
paramount to both Hobbes’ and Butler’s conception of the origin, is therefore a productive terrain to tour.

In the Beginning, There was the Word Citation

Hobbes’ account of the genesis of the social contract embodies the logic and structure of escape that is internalized by tourism. As will be drawn out from his text, Hobbes’ insistence on the fixity of words and their meaning as well as the absolute rupture between the point of origin (the state of nature) and point of arrival (the social contract) exemplifies the escapist foreclosure of contingency, complexity and reflexivity.

Though Hobbes insists that language is “[a] profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past”, it seems that, more aptly, language becomes profitable for Hobbes as the mechanism for continual 'invention of the memory of the past' (Chapter IV). Namely, he invents a memory of the State of Nature, social contract, and Leviathan. Employing a Christian origin story, however, Hobbes seeks to remove the creative and inventive role he plays in his own work – and instead to seeks to assume a reiterative role having the effect of displacing a direct citation to Hobbes. He asserts:

The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as He presented to his sight; for the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to join them in such manner by degrees as to make himself understood[.]
To this effect, the passage John 1:1-4 declares “[I]n the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God and the Word was God[…] Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made” (John 1:1-4). It is not surprising that the question of language factors so heavily in the Hobbesian characterization of creation and origins, for “The Word” this well-known passage suggests, “became flesh and made his dwelling among us” (John 1:14). In following with this, Hobbes understands language not merely as a means to describe what exists but a means to bring being into existence, to create something from nothing. This also seems to explain Hobbes’ need for an earthly sovereign (Leviathan) to govern the use of language and the possibility of creating it inorganically.

Indeed, the connection between Hobbes’ cosmological and scientific beliefs is clearly formative of his relationship to and understanding of politics (one which necessitates rupture). While Hobbes maintains that God is the author of language, speech and all matter, and that man assigns names to this matter (as well as naming our interactions with it), he also expresses an intellectual commitment to Plenism (that all space is filled with matter). With this, Hobbes asserts that nothing is unaccounted for – and therefore there is quite literally no space for further organic invention or intervention of names and their meanings. “The first use of names”, therefore, “is to serve for marks or notes of remembrance”, not for interpretation or contestation (Hobbes 17). He asserts that speech is useful not for critique, quizzical dialogue, negotiating and renegotiating meaning but rather, is useful for “men [to] register their thoughts, recall them when they
are past, and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation”; thus, language and meaning must remain uncontested and fixed (Hobbes 16).

Though Hobbes maintains there is no space for organic invention outside of God’s, he notably begins *Leviathan* with the claim: “NATURE (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal” (Hobbes 10). As this insistence on singular readings indicates, complexity or reflexivity (for instance a reflexive relationship between ruptures and flows, flight and capture, State of Nature and Social Contract) is deemed dangerous and intolerable within a Hobbsian logic. The rupture permitting escape must be absolute. This “artificial animal”, Hobbes’ Leviathan, thus becomes a mechanism for enforcing the fixity of language and meaning - a mechanism for governing contestations and forcing obedience. The disavowal of these reflexive moments in his text highlights Hobbes’ desire for his social contract story to be read as one of un-tempered and absolute rupture permitting absolute escape from the State of Nature.

One can point to a plethora of such dismissals in *Leviathan* emphasizing his insistence on an escapist logic. For instance, though Hobbes suggests the State of Nature preceded the social contract, *modern* assumptions and arguments proceed and consequentially frame his description of nature. In the position from which he writes, as a modernist tracing the origins of the state, escape has always already occurred and hence he must produce a conception of escape through reading the past through the present.
The insistent interpolation of the past in generating an understanding of the present (and vice versa) testifies to their deeply relational or reflexive character – making any serious distinctions indistinct. Otherwise put, this relationality speaks to the impossibility of the very rupture and escape their work seeks to demonstrate. The constant re-articulation of the past in the present, prevents it from residing exclusively in the past.

Hobbes also insists that someone desiring to live in the State of Nature, described as the estate of wild liberty and right of all to all, contradicts himself; for, everyone by natural instinct desires his own good, to which this existence is contrary. The desire for one’s own good, therefore, is not only derived from nature, but is also (being the force which prompted individuals to join a state under the contract and encourages them to remain bound by the state) maintained after entering into the state. Likewise, while he holds that violence is an inherent quality of men, one which is embedded in nature, he also maintains that the threat of violence must always exist as a potential so as to justify the continued presence of the modern State. Violence is therefore not broken away from but rather sanctioned, governed and performed by the sovereign under the social contract. Contrary to his own assertion that a break occurred and a limit was drawn, Hobbes seems to unintentionally indicate fluidity between the pre-modern and modern realms and, in doing so, reveal the vulnerability of the escapist logic.

In the same way Hobbes utilizes metaphors throughout his work yet, paradoxically, holds they are dangerous misuses of language, Hobbes reveals sites and moments of flow between the State of Nature and Social Contract yet refuses to entertain
these reoccurring slippages (in favour of a linear and binaric reading of history). As Malabou expresses,

Traditionally, language is conceived of as a phenomenon derived from speech, and metaphorical sense as derived from, or a drift away from, the literal. Writing and figures of speech would therefore act as the zealous ambassadors of a sedentary origin that would resist any expatriation, just as the virgin, natural, and local resist the violence of the technology, abstraction and corruption which nevertheless constitute them (Malabou 40).

Hobbes' move from State of Nature to Social Contract invents a history of rupture in such a way that removes the possibility of flow (despite the reflexivity between the State of Nature and state arising from the Social Contract which is present in his own text). Man, according to Hobbes, only has the capacity to cite – and since interpretation is framed as an abuse of language – he may only cite the Christian origin.

Though only alluded to briefly, the biblical story of the Tower of Babel reinforces the fixity of language and speech in Hobbes’ text. Indirectly citing the book of Genesis that tells the story of Babel in which men are beckoned to construct a grand tower (“Come, let us build ourselves a city, and a tower with its top in the heavens, and let us make a name for ourselves; otherwise we shall be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth””) he explains that man’s vanity and desire for praise or recognition was punished by God (Genesis 11:4) (Hobbes 16). While God bestowed man with the power to assign names, He punished them for making names for themselves by inflicting upon human kind the “confusion of tongues” (Genesis 11:4). While men had earlier possessed the ‘privilege’ of a shared language, common names, mutual understanding and a coherent, unified community; their vanity resulted in God’s imposition of multiple languages or tongues and the division and dispersal of men across the earth:
But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God every man was stricken for his rebellion with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several parts of the world, it must needs be that the diversity of tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them in such manner as need, the mother of all inventions, taught them, and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious.

According to this account, it seems that with confusion of tongues and dispersal of men, God not only generated a pointed difference between men which before had not been so evident, but also, in a sense, the ‘international’.

This story serves three deeply political functions for Hobbes’ text. First, evoking this biblical passage that frames confusion of tongues as a punishment justifies his explicit disdain for the complexity and confusion of the metaphor and the paradox (which he frames as abuses of language)\(^6\). This enables Hobbes to employ a simple escape-as-rupture paradigm in his explanation of the move from the State of Nature to the Leviathan (despite the above noted flows between these realms that are evident in his work). Second, it is useful for Hobbes to stress that this confusion is a punishment, since it allows him to suggest that the inability to communicate (in lieu of a regulating or universalizing force serving to fix language and meaning, [the Leviathan]) in part results in the very violence that he insists is inherent in the State of Nature. Third, it reinforces the notion that only God can properly claim authorship. Since God determines the past, men merely find the words for “continuing the memory of the past” (Hobbes 16). In

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\(^6\) The widely-noted irony of Hobbes’ dismissal of the metaphor and paradox is his use of ‘Leviathan’ and body for metaphors of the state.
removing his role as a theorist/author from the construction of his State of Nature and Social Contract origin story (which Hobbes generates through a tactical reading of Christian narratives and imposition of particular conceptions of nature and natural man), one is in a sense unable to contest Hobbes and must instead contest God. A rather cunning design. In his work, this religious doctrine functions as an “untheorized presupposition” (Butler 11). When one cites a Hobbsian notion of the State of Nature, for example, she inadvertently and often silently evokes this prior presupposition or delimitation.

Butler suggests that recycled language flowing through the citational process often results in the reifying of a heterosexual norm, and while Hobbes is not constructing a heterosexual norm, his understanding of language embodies the problematic norm-setting process of which Butler speaks. For, he suggests that language often has universal and fixed meaning that functions to normalize and govern meaning. Hobbes makes the parallel between universality and geometry, to demonstrate the way in which names/words take on a coherent meaning. He writes:

And thus the consequence found in one particular comes to be registered and remembered as a universal rule; and discharges our mental reckoning of time and place, and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places (Hobbes 18).

Here, Hobbes’ refusal of contingency and fluidity (between nature and artifice, for instance) becomes clear. Such a drive to universalize, which “delivers us from all labour of the mind” and strives to secure a norm, is a drive to depoliticise language and theory
itself. Again, this delimitation masks the prior delimitation permitted by his assertion of the transcendent-immanent split.

Speaking to such violent delimitations as these, Butler suggests that “[d]iscourse and the law operate by concealing their citationality and genealogy, presenting themselves as timeless and singular...citation similarly ’conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition’ (Butler 12).

In a similar way that the Hobbsian social contract denies the true agency, creativity and voice of members composing the body politic through a tacit agreement and never explicit consent or participation, the predetermined universalizing of names and their meaning (instituting norms) impairs the speaker from engaging in language politically. Butler remarks: “This not owning of one's words is there from the start, however, since speaking is always in some ways the speaking of a stranger through and as one’s self, the melancholic reiteration of a language that one never chose” (Butler 241-2). Hobbes claims “in respect of all which together, it is called a universal, there being nothing in the world universal but names”; however, if names are designed to continue or convey a memory of time past, and these names are universal, this would suggest that history, too, must be understood as a universal (Hobbes 18). Likewise, when an escapist logic is uncritically privileged in contemporary understandings of tourism, the tourist is effectively denied a political relationship to space, self and ‘other’ during the process of travel. When one says she is going on vacation, she becomes, in a sense, bound by a tacit agreement, bound to the terms of travel as vacating the everyday and entering the foreign.
Derrida emphasizes the futility of *locating* and securing universal meaning for the word, since “words of language in general already raise in and of themselves the question of *displacement*”. Without the critical use or the re-articulation Butler calls for, the banal use of language alienates us from the political (Malabou 14, emphasis added). When speaking of travel, I heartily agree with Derrida that this disorientation of language cannot be re-oriented through a Hobbsian taxonomy of meaning, but rather that displacement lends to an understanding of tourism that is not reducible to a place, and hence remains open to everyday possibilities or aberrations.

**Disrupting Logics of Rupture and Escape:**

In the same way that citing necessitates a re-articulation and hence re-circulation of a citation (an extra-discursive), escape cannot be escaped. There is, Butler insists, no “absolute outside” to a discursive framework - for any (constitutive) outside “can only be thought […] in relation to that discourse, and at its most tenuous borders” (Butler, 8). Any form of resistance is, therefore, in a dialectical relationship with subsumption:

The problem of subjectivation (assujetissement) is precisely that the subject who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by such norms. Although this constitutive constraint does not foreclose the possibility of agency, it does locate agency as a reiterative or re-articulatory practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of external opposition to power (Butler 15).

In light of this inescapability, though, what disruptions are possible? In particular, what disruptions of conventional tourism are possible? Or, Butler asks, “[w]hat would it mean to “cite” the law in order to reiterate and co-opt its power, to expose the [norm…] and to
displace the effect of its necessity” (Butler 15)? One of her responses to this problem has of course been performativity and while she holds that some performances result in consolidating the norm, she also maintains that “others work to reveal the contingency, instability and citationality” (Salih 95). One such disruptive performance is, in a paradoxically simple and profound way, what she calls “a radical re-articulation of the symbolic horizon” (Butler 23). “That which has been foreclosed or banished from the proper domain of [the regulative norm] might at once be produced as a troubling return, not only as an imaginary contestation that effects a failure in the workings of the inevitable law, but as an enabling disruption […] a radical re-articulation” (Butler 23, emphasis added). The idea, she holds, “is to show that the uncontested status of [norms…] secures the workings of certain symbolic orders, and that its contestation calls into question where and how the limits of symbolic intelligibility are set” (Butler 16).

Considering the role of speech (and language more generally) in acts of disruption, Derrida meditates on or negotiates with the very problem of “not owning one’s own words”, which Butler highlights. He suggests

There is my language, but in order, precisely, that it be mine, I must invent it my whole life through, enter it in my own way, delineate my style within it […], conquer a space in it that is no longer just language, but my language within the language without which I wouldn’t be able to speak. In a sense, I am therefore required to colonize my own language. At the same time, this idiom that I invent is not absolutely peculiar to me, for it bears the scar of another colonization: every integral style takes on, interiorizes rules that don’t belong to it, but which issue from the law of the mother tongue, its history, the political genealogy of its institutions. I am therefore always at once master and hostage of my language[[…]] (Malabou 51).
Re-articulation, in this sense, requires at once a deliberate re-invention of language (as a form of flight) and a self-consciousness about how one becomes snagged and temporarily caught in its intricate system of restrictions, or in its apparatuses of capture.

If, as I maintain, a potential for the disruption of escapist logic rests in a radical articulation (and hence also a radical re-materialization) of tourist practices, the question might still be asked: what is the point of such a disruption to begin with? I have tried my best not to begin with this question; I will continually try not to entertain the kind of response this problematic question hopes to elicit. An interesting re-articulation of tourism, I believe, resists a single point; it avoids mapping a discussion in a way that points us from a point of departure towards a point of arrival. In relinquishing the ‘point of departure’, one largely relinquishes the possibility of founding, deducing or deriving (in a Hobbesian fashion) a discussion of tourism. Derrida asks, “Does this impossibility [of generating a point of departure] signal a failing?” He responds: “[t]he failing is in fact another name for a promise, a promise for a voyage that, because it does not arrive, is always in the process of arriving” (Malabou 28). Because “life and thinking travel together”, displacing ‘the point’ has ramifications not only for the way we think about tourism, but also the way we engage in acts of tourism. In Derrida’s words, “[i]t is impossible to start out from the “lived” experience of the voyage in order to subsequently derive a “theoretical” or “philosophical” sense from it”, for the two are inseparable (Malabou 14).

What points of opening are offered by the Derridean voyage this thesis embarks
upon, this voyage that is always in the process of arrival? In the following chapters, I suggest that disturbing the established norms of escape by radically re-articulating tourism as an everyday practice denaturalizes ‘the familiar’, de-exoticizes ‘the foreign’ – and hence destabilizes the limit seeking to separate and reify these fictional spaces. This has the effect of displacing a Hobbesian originary state of nature (or logic of ‘origin’ more broadly), politicizing a wider range of movements (not simply movement across official borders), and hence opening up new terrains of investigation beyond the traditional or sanctioned tourist site.

While the logic of an escapist tourism operates in partnership with the logic of the state, tourism functioning as a disruption of escape can operate as a certain critique of the state. For, positing tourism as a mode of escape relies on a problematic set of modern assumptions that *stasis* or settlement constitutes the human norm from which one tries to escape and hence that *movement*, or travel and tourism constitutes a break from the norm. Tourism, as it is figured by this discourse, therefore describes a central condition of modernity: that of assumed-to-be-natural borders and human containment/stasis within them. Simultaneously, it describes the construction of movement as a disturbance, an interruption. Border-drawing and enforcing practices inscribe demarcations on territory in hopes to produce boundaries and limits to movement, and therefore to institutionalize and territorialize stasis as the norm. Otherwise stated, the state system (which depends on the existence of stationary groups of citizens like those within the Leviathan) enables notions of escapism, and vice-versa. ‘Tourism as an everyday practice’ operates as a critique in the sense that it resists the binaric ordering (domestic/international, inside/outside,
foreign/familiar, here/elsewhere) upon which the state relies. This re-articulation thus illustrates the inability the state’s official boarders to enclose, interrupt and govern movement.

Reifying the sanctity of often-violent borders and limits, the prevalent frame of ‘tourism as escape’, or, ‘tourism as vacation’, which circulates and accumulates authority in a citational process, explicitly suggests that one vacates ‘the familiar’ and escapes to ‘the foreign’ (which is, of course, in line with Hobbes’ formulation of escape). As this chapter has argued, however, this formulation fails to consider a great degree of complexity and, ultimately, depoliticizes tourism. “According to the traditional conception of the voyage” Malabou and Derrida explain, “everything comes to pass as if one of the scenes of deriving and arrival (provenance, accomplishment) in fact had priority over the other (drift, side-tracking, fortune, accident [...] This systemic locking-out of chance “constitutes the metaphysics of the voyage and perhaps governs metaphysics as a whole” (Malabou 4). In offering re-articulations and destabilizing this traditional conception of the voyage grounded in a logic that we can see playing out in Leviathan, readings of tourism can begin to take this ‘chance’ into account.
Chapter II: Unpresentable Tours

The problem of territorialization in general requires precisely that one renounce territorializing in any simple manner. Because, between the register of space-world or earth-and that of the concept, there cannot but pass however improbably, the line of a series of catastrophes.

– Jacques Derrida

Site, Sight, Cite

The normative questions ‘where is tourism present’ and ‘how does it present itself’ carry with them a normative demand. Regardless of the response one might offer, these questions demand that tourism must be present somewhere - that it presents itself to us in some way. This mode of thinking (which, I hold, is the predominant one) presupposes that tourism is both localizable, and knowable - that it always makes itself visible. The escapist or Odyssean paradigm explored in the first chapter seeks to make visibility and location a condition of possibility for even thinking about the tour: its insistence upon point of departure (an origin) and a point of arrival requires a tangible,
isolated and geophysical site that offers itself to sight, which we can then cite.

In order to begin an analysis, even literature on tourism identifying as ‘critical’ tends to narrow in on a tourist site (a case study) and explore the phenomenon of tourism and its nuances within that site without acknowledging the political implications of that ‘narrowing in’. I suggest that this narrowing in inevitably produces a narrow view of the inherently complex practice of tourism. A radical re-articulation of tourism as an everyday practice, characterized by a process of non-arrival, therefore, also calls for a radical cartography – a different mode of mapping which can critically consider ways in which the tour functions within non-place.

Playing with this strange cartography which challenges arrival, my thesis can therefore not rely on a localizable case study to unfold its analysis: "the motif of travel is not 'empirical' to the extent, precisely, that it is not 'derived' " (Malabou 12). Instead, this chapter will trace the notions of non-arrival and non-place, and in doing so, make links between tourist practices and the Derridean notion of Catastrophe, which he describes as "any discontinuity at all occurring within phenomena" (18). I will consider Derrida’s Asylum City as an interesting catastrophic space that might help one to think about the ways in which tourism as an everyday practice actually operates. This space of the

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7 The first noted iteration of the ‘Asylum City’, which Derrida takes up, is found in the Book of Numbers. In this section of the Bible, God ordered Moses to establish six cities of refuge or asylum for the “alien resident” or “temporary settler”. Derrida elaborates on this ethos of welcoming by destabilizing traditional conceptions of place and belonging which systematically exclude the other. For him, the Asylum city is a way of both articulating and experiencing the impermanence of place. This understanding of city is characterized by flows of population, capital, information, construction, destruction, reconstruction, appearance, disappearance, legal codes, social codes etc. It therefore considers the city as first and foremost a site of constant change in which one can reside but never completely belong.

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Asylum city is catastrophic or in ruins in the sense that it remains permanently incomplete and characterized by breakages, which allow it to remain open to others. The Asylum City, which is in constant (com)motion, keeps those within it also in motion – or in the state of travel. Such a place reflects his ‘ethics of hospitality’: “Derrida saw the city as the ‘very structure of welcoming’ and therefore maintained that their existence could not in good faith exclude the other” (Damai 1). He insists, “If a city of refuge stays too stagnant, it is committing a ‘radical evil’. It is the responsibility of a city of refuge to constantly re-evaluate what it means to welcome and to think about how their hospitality is matching the call of the other” (Damai 1). Conversely, the notion of place and the tourist maintained within modern tourist sites involved the performance of an insincere hospitality, which invites the tourist to spend but not to stay, which welcomes her to follow designated pathways to and from sites and keeps her on the periphery.

Finally, elaborating upon this re-articulation of tourism incites my consideration and reconsideration of the strange figure of the tourist. Because escapist traditions pose the familiar in opposition to the foreign, it also poses the citizen in opposition to the foreigner, the host in opposition to the visitor, or ‘the local’ in opposition to ‘the stranger’. Disrupting this escapist understanding of tourism through non-arrival requires a disruption of the tourist-as-foreigner construction. A re-articulation of tourism must also be a critique of citizenship.

While I am interested in the way an Asylum city can demonstrate a politics of openness and a sense of contingent place, Derrida’s ethics of hospitality seems to preserve an understanding of ‘the other’ (refugee, asylum seeker, illegal immigrant) who should be welcomed within. In some senses, then, this concept is complicit with the difference Urry and Trask highlight between the local and the tourist. I am more interested in expanding the notion of an Asylum City which embodies a looser understanding of the ethics of hospitality; that is: the marriage of ethos (home/inside) with hospitality (welcoming the outside) to the extent that the two become indistinguishable.
Out of Place

Renegotiating the limiting parameters set by the questions ‘where is tourism present?’ and ‘how does it present itself?’ (which serve as conventional starting points for most discussions concerning tourism), I instead ask: ‘how is it that tourism is constantly arriving at a non-place’ and 'how is it that one can think of tourism that functions within a non-place’? For, according to Derrida, “what has come to pass, what is coming to pass, or what can come to pass, draws its resource from a non-place: the pure possibility – which can never present or presentify itself” (Derrida 61).

Malabou observes, “[a] voyage ordinarily implies that one leaves a familiar shore to confront the unknown. The traveler derives or even drifts from a mixed and assignable origin in order to arrive somewhere” (Malabou 2). This insistence on arriving ‘somewhere’ reflects the way in which a location for tourism has become a requisite for rendering it knowable. As the first chapter demonstrates, this account of tourism, which requires an origin (with a corresponding destination) and a rupture, is a violently reductive one that leads to the disavowal of a host of other possibilities for understanding tourism: “The derivative schema prescribes for the voyage the sense of a forward march” towards a point and site of arrival, and in doing so, obfuscates that which strays from or interrupts this path (Malabou 8). This chapter will consider the political promise of these disavowed possibilities.

Before considering the distinction between the origin from which we derive and
the destination to which we arrive, according to the escapist paradigm, I will give the terms *derive* and *arrive* some closer attention and consider how the solidarity (or co-constitutive relationship) between derive and arrive enable the rupture between foreign and familiar. Deriving, Derrida reminds, is described both as a “continuous and ordered trajectory from an origin to an end; [and, also], a loss of control, deviation or skidding…necessity and chance thus cohabit, in a paradoxically complicitous way, within the same verb” (Derrida 1). Likewise, while the verb arrive signifies the reaching of a destination “[…] arriver is also the term for what happens, what comes to, surprises, or falls from the event in general, what is anticipated as well as what is not expected” (Malabou 2, emphasis added). Despite this reflexive relationship of necessity and chance or expected and unexpected, which produce the notion of ‘deriving’ and ‘arriving’ that Derrida highlights, the Odyssean ‘familiar-to-foreign’ voyage attempts to embody only the former description:

> According to the traditional conception of the voyage, everything comes to pass as if one of the scenes of deriving and arrival (provenance, accomplishment) in fact had priority over the other (drift, side-tracking, fortune, accident […] This systemic locking-out of chance constitutes the metaphysics of the voyage and perhaps governs metaphysics as a whole (Derrida 4).

In the same way that Hobbes writes out the possibility of flows between the realms of nature and a contractual state, and the possibility of a word/name embodying multiple meanings, in favor of absolute rupture and fixity, the traditional conception of the voyage writes out the possibility of chance, in favour of the map and itinerary (or, in favour of departure and arrival). Derrida uses catastrophe to call the normative metaphysics of the voyage into question. Evoking the Greek use of the term (katasrophe), Derrida once again
opens up the political implications of the multiple meanings that the word bears: the word signifies both the end (the completion of a theatrical play, or death), and reversal or disruption, an unanticipated event that disturbs or leads to the demise (the ruin) of an established order. He highlights this double role and insists that the Western ascription of value to the first understanding of catastrophe problematically secures privilege for the Odyssean paradigm of travel: “The metaphysics of the voyage installs a hierarchy among the plural senses of catastrophe: dénouement exercises control over the event, thus implicitly but surely determining the meaning of the voyage” (Derrida 4). Within this privileged modality, the destination is treated as the teleos of the voyage or tour – and this is a destination that requires a map, a point, and a location.

Wishing to accord value to the double meaning of catastrophe (not just closure/capture but also opening/flight), Derrida insists that the concept of catastrophe explicitly involves limits, fault lines, ruptures, disruptions and slippages. Because his reading disrupts the normative frame of catastrophe, Derridean catastrophe is itself catastrophic. He cannot engage critically with the catastrophic voyage without invoking the very fault lines and slippages that he describes in his writing. This again demonstrates the way in which thought is on tour, the way in which travel and tourism functions beyond the geophysical site, and within everyday practice. Catastrophe, thought in this dynamic way, is a source of problems and possibilities – it holds the promise of chance which deviates from or ignores a governing teleos: “As a result, catastrophe refers as much to the truth, the accomplishment of a play or a life, as to the accident whose surprise interrupts the teleological trajectory” (Malabou 4). For Derrida, “the way in
which the relation between voyage and destination, voyage and event, voyage and truth, corresponds with a certain treatment of catastrophe” (ibid). The Western treatment of catastrophe is to frame it as an absolute rupture, and then to create systemic techniques of traversing the limit of this rupture in a way that reifies the distinctiveness of the familiar from the foreign:

When drift as deviation happens, like some unforeseen catastrophe, it always occurs as an accident befalling an essence, and far from causing structural damage, reaffirms it rather. The border between same [familiar] and other [foreign] us always distinct and indivisible, restricting any wandering between the two (Malabou 6).

As shall be discussed in greater detail, the creation of state citizenship, passports and the general regulation of movement through state borders are a part of this systemic traversal (not wandering) over this strict, 'indivisible' limit, and reflect this Western treatment of catastrophe, which aids in framing tourism as a modality of escape. This regulation of the voyage frames chance as deviation and responds to this deviation by governing it and channeling it toward the point of arrival. Derrida maintains,

The shore [used in the Odyssey as a site/point of departure and arrival] is divided in its very outline, and there are effects of anchoring, collapsing at the edge, strategies of approaching and overflow, strictures of attachment or of mooring, places of reversion, strangulation, or double blind. This division [of the shore/horizon] is precisely the place of a radical disassociation between deriving and arriving (Malabou 8).

In order to reconsider these regulatory practices, which seek to restrict the possibilities of a catastrophic tour understood through non-arrival and non-place, Derrida must contest the notion of supposed 'indivisible borders' separating the familiar and foreign. Malabou poignantly opens Counterpath by deconstructing the derive/arrive
binary and introducing catastrophe:

Arriving and deriving [deriver] have separated. Catastrophe is the name for the parting [ecart] that henceforth keeps each out of range if the other. ‘Henceforth’ means Derrida […] has situated the very possibility of the voyage within that space or parting. When one destabilizes the origin with this disruption of the indivisible shore, ‘what arrives, under emergency conditions, as a catastrophe, will be the chance that starts the voyage’ (Malabou 1).

Destabilizing a point of departure and arrival enables a conception of tourism which does not necessarily rely on traditional boundaries of a tourist site/location but as functioning within and along complicated catastrophe – it is therefore helpful in thinking of tourism not a grand escape from or vacating of the familiar to enter the foreign but as an everyday practice. This conception of everyday tourism is only possible with the recognition of everyday spaces as being catastrophic.

Since thinking of the tour through catastrophe requires the decoupling of the derive/arrive dialectic, non-arrival becomes imperative to a discussion concerning catastrophe – which ultimately enables one to understand tourism outside of a localizing logic. In contrast with the ‘forward march’, which precisely choreographs the escapist or Odyssean tour, non-arrival is a non-teleological state of perpetual wandering. Again, denying the possibility of a clear origin and endpoint, or a clear trajectory, a tour of non-arrival cannot be localized to a specific geophysical or geopolitical point. Derrida remarks,

Non-arrival is the very possibility of the arrival if every wholly other (thing), the worst along with the best, and there is therefore no contradiction in thinking of non-arrival as the ‘absolute arrivant’. This absolute arrivant does not wait, it exceeds every horizon of waiting, every apocalypse, all visibility, turning toward it also means turning away from it… (Malabou 63)
This tour of non-arrival which “exceeds all visibility” is without a set itinerary; it becomes difficult to map, and perhaps more difficult to locate, hence the problem of a localized case study being used to unveil the complexities of tourism. "Différence" serves to elucidate this. Thinking through difféance, Derrida once again explores the political implications of multiple meanings, which “cohabit, in a paradoxically complicitous way, within the same [word]” (12). Though it is difficult to give a simplified rendering of the multiple readings operating within the concept of difféance, I will describe it as embodying both ‘to differ’ (a becoming through a relation of difference, e.g. identity, truth and meaning which rely on its distinctiveness from another identity, truth and meaning) and ‘to defer’ (meaning is never present in itself, it is always unreachable, unavailable, deferred). Jim Powell’s Derrida reader makes the overt connection between difféance and non-arrival:

No meaning of difféance ever arrives, because it is always already suspended between two meanings: “to differ” and to “defer” – without ever settling into one or the other. This suspension creates a kind of interval or blank in space and time that underlies all cases of differing-of distinction-all writing… it produces and undermines all pairs of binary opposites.” (Powell 119)

Difféance therefore cannot be submitted to the question “what is it”. The form of the question already presumes that difference can be or has been derived: “it is therefore no more legitimate to ask what a voyage is [, for], travel is difference itself - temporalization, spacing, incessant [and] displacement […]” (Malabou 12).

I suggest that it is within this state of suspension between differ/defer,
derive/arrive or this ‘blank in space’ (which is a catastrophic space), where tourism of the everyday functions. As Malabou articulates, “non-arrival designates a non-place in the place and stead of the origin” (Malabou 156). So, in holding with a radical re-articulation of tourism as an everyday practice (not a practice of departure and arrival, not an absolute escape from a familiar site to a foreign site), I suggest tourism is not present in a place but rather a non-place, and as such, it cannot present itself to us in a completely intelligible way within conventional tourist sites.

Monstrosities

How, then, can we think of this non-place and the tourism which functions through it? Making the connection between non-place and Derrida’s ‘Open City’ or ‘City of Asylum’ provides an interesting avenue for considering the non-localizable, everyday nature of this re-articulated understanding of tourism. The strange and impermanent character of the Asylum City makes it a space that defies the fixed categories of familiar or foreign:

Walking through cities, one finds that the city is indeed an open, non-totalizable set of idioms, singularities, styles: a place to welcome the other within oneself, a place open to what is coming, the very coming of what is to come, open to imminence. What makes possible the living community of the generations who live in and construct the city, who are permanently exposed to the stress of even projecting a city to be de- or re-constructed, is [...] the acceptance of what a logician would perhaps call the axiom of incompleteness… (Derrida 109).

Cities are, by design, incomplete, non-places of non-arrival. The open city he describes is
certainly a catastrophic space, for, it is constantly being re- and deconstructed, it is made up of a complex network of fractures and limits. The possibility of an absolute rupture and an uncomplicated escape hinges on the prior existence of an un-ruptured (and hence stable, static space – a knowable familiar realm in opposition to the foreign realm); however, the notion of an Open City articulates the impossibility of such stability.

Consider, the catastrophic character of our daily spaces, for instance, the traditional border delineating public from private that one might be said to cross as she leaves the city streets and enters her apartment. An apartment building is composed of many small cells of ‘private’ space (rented suites). These cells become a space of privacy for the tenant and yet are privately owned and operated by the landlord. In order for the tenant to access their ‘private’ apartment, she must traverse hallways, elevators and staircases - the tenant must enter a shared, public realm made up of other private tenants. The building itself is secured from the general public that make up the city - keeping the hallways, elevators, staircases and laundry machines private with security and surveillance systems. The suites, too, are secured and surveilled against other tenants (the public within) with the individual use of locks and peepholes. While the buzzers, cameras, locks and peepholes attempt to shut out the public and delineate a private realm, they fail to achieve such purity. The sounds of ambulance sirens that permeate windows or graffiti tags that mark apartment balconies are persistent reminders of this failure. If, by some fantasy, a perfectly sealed private space could be realized, it would nonetheless be a private realm defined through its relative position to a sealed public realm. There is a profound co-constitution: the inside being made possible by the outside (and vice versa)
will continually deny the possibility of a pure in or outside. Though the modern discourses (perhaps most famously those emerging from a Lockean tradition) construct living spaces as private settlements (a space of rest, stagnation or stasis), this simple example displays that even these locations viewed as settled are best described as unsettled spaces of flows. This example does not simply illustrate the inverse of the familiar-to-foreign escape formulation. Instead it exemplifies the way in which the foreign and familiar are elements of daily experience that put one in the constant state of travel and that finds the foreign and familiar overlapping.

Problematically, though, the conception of ‘place’ has conventionally required a geophysical point exhibiting differentiating features that can produce a simple recognition of that place (for instance: Paris, a French-speaking tourist hub of Europe marked by the Eiffel tower, is differentiated from London, an English-speaking tourist hub marked by ‘Big Ben’). If the Eiffel tower collapses - if there are in fact more people speaking minority languages than English in London, how would we begin to differentiate and recognize these places in light of such catastrophes? These catastrophic moments will not signal the total ruin of these places but rather the failing of this conceptual framing of place, which refuses to see them as in ruins from the start. Differentiating and recognizing a place in this reductive way again relies on a static place and hence fails to account for change, chance, migration, movement, construction, destruction and reconstruction. It fails to account for différance.

The practice of localizing discussions of tourism through a case study often
produces an impoverished sense of the way in which sites are perceived and become codified. Knowledge, experience and memory of the so-called familiar is inscribed upon the so-called foreign tourist site in such a way that it is impossible to think of these realms as distinct. The perception of place is not only packaged by our prior encounters and memories, but also by what Jonathan Culler terms a process of Boutique. He argues that every site (be it a university campus or famous historical landmark) is akin to a boutique window in which items are placed with the effect of structuring what is perceived through the window shopper’s gaze. The display is made to look complete so as to satisfy this gaze, and in doing so, the passer-by forgets to ask what is missing, what is excluded, what is being privileged. A Boutique is therefore any space, which is positioned and ordered in a naturalized fashion in a way that influences the frame of perception. This organization of space produces or reinforces re-memberance before the tourist moving through that space has had a moment to member or collect an impression of the site. This is a useful conceptual tool, for, it emphasizes the packaging of and inscription upon not just recognizable tourist sites, but also everyday spaces. Assuming complete familiarity with a place, as the escapist paradigm, which starkly divides the familiar from foreign encourages, enables these sites of Boutique and their functions to go unnoticed and un-analyzed.

Non-place (such as the Asylum City) takes seriously this structurally determined and contingent nature of location. To think of tourism operating within an isolated tourist site attempts to make the place and the practice of tourism differentiated, recognizable, and knowable (despite the many evasions this type of knowledge requires). Derrida
maintains that a place must

Remain open to what it knows about what it doesn’t yet know about what it will be. It is necessary to inscribe, and to thematize, the respect for non-knowledge in architectural and urbanistic science or know-how. Otherwise, what would one do other than apply programs, totalize, saturate, suture, asphyxiate? (Derrida 109).

This notion of the asylum city characterized by contingency or change is reflective of daily encounters in the city - encounters of “[the r]apid crowding of changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single glance and the unexpectedness of onrunning impressions” (Simmel 409). So, while the practice of differentiating seeks to identify absolute difference to indicate an absolute distinction that then serves to create relational definition (the city of Paris defined against that of London), différance suggests that one will never arrive at a definition through difference. Again – meaning is never present in itself, it is always already deferred: each trait we might use to identify a place is always in ruins – it is undergoing re-trait. To this effect, Derrida insists “the trait is always a re-trait, a graphic mark from which presence has already withdrawn” (Derrida, 10). “[T]he trait joins and adjoins only in separating” (54). Therefore, the depiction of any trait involves a retrait/a retreat away from unity which aims to generate it visibility.

Memoirs of the Blind demonstrates this in a fairly literal way: in drawing, lines (which are marks of separation) join and adjoin to compose a trait (for instance a facial feature in a portrait) – it is only through separating (retrait) that the trait is given life. To demonstrate a trait in a clear, recognizable way requires a de-monstration – an effacement of the monstrous, complicated and unsightly characteristics. In a drawn portrait, the clean white surface of paper takes the place of the imperfect, living, breathing epidermis. Non-place considers these monstrous qualities to be an inextricable part of the landscape. The
tour is therefore unpresentable in the dual sense, for, it is does not present itself in a site, to sight, and it is full of hideous complexities. In terms of ‘place’, it is only through acknowledging its catastrophic qualities (the multiple and overlapping separations it embodies that signal its inability to be defined) that it is possible to disturb an Odyssean paradigm of tourism and give life to tourist practices of the everyday: unpresentable tours of non-arrival.

**Knowing by Heart**

Posing 'tourism as an everyday practice' as an alternative to the Odyssean voyage has political implications for place, and how one exists within it - or, put concretely - for state and citizenship practices. While the state and the citizen is enabled by a notion of indivisible borders (which functions to close out the foreign and foreigner), daily encounters prove these borders to be nothing if not divisible:

Customs, police, visa or passport, passenger identification - all of that is established on the institution of the indivisible, the institution therefore of the step that is related to it, whether the step crosses it or not. Consequently, where the figure of the step is refused to intuition, where the identity of indivisibility of a line is compromised, the identity to oneself and therefore the possible identification of an intangible edge- the crossing of the line becomes a problem. There is a problem as soon as the edge-line is threatened. And it is threatened from its first tracing (Derrida 165).

Drawing or tracing the line (which claims to be indivisible) is itself based upon (or requires) a division. Its own existence (or its intended purpose: which is to divide) indicates the possibility of its own divisibility: “as soon as this intrinsic division divides
the relation to itself of the border and therefore divides identity of the being-one-self of anything whatsoever” (Derrida 165-6). This divisibility or porousness of borders indicates the porousness of the citizen it seeks to generate.

If we can never arrive in the Odyssean sense, it is partly because we never arrive at a fixed or complete understanding of place long enough for it to serve as a sturdy destination upon which to land - because our perforated borders (state and otherwise) fail to enclose any location which is whole or constant. If place is impermanent and incomplete, as the Open or Asylum City suggests, so too is our belonging to place. For this reason, Derrida insists that “[b]elonging to a place, to any space of habitation whatsoever, in the world or in the text can no longer be conceived of in terms of soil, blood, filiation or decent” (Derrida 164). Such a belonging hinges on the indivisibility and fixity of these places and histories – a fixity which is unreflective of them, due to the inevitable re-trait of each trait that soil, blood, filiation or decent is thought to hold. The category of citizen and indeed the borders striving to produce them, does not account for, yet is perfectly or ironically indicative of, retrait. A radical re-articulation of tourism as an everyday practice does not merely suggest that we are perpetually touring our unsteady landscapes, but that these tours which disrupt escapist traditions also disrupt powerful statist norms or practices.

These escapist traditions have constructed the local figure as one who is thoroughly familiar with her place. In light of this familiarity, she is expected to stop navigating, interrogating, and puzzling over her lived-in space. This ‘knowing by heart’
lacks heart. This is a dispassionate and even false ‘intimacy’ with place – one that depoliticizes. Sincere intimacy (one that comes with a political awareness), I maintain, comes not out of perfect familiarity, which demands a permanence of the traits comprising a place, but out of a love for indeterminacy and the unknowable nature of place, which acknowledges unarchivable fluidity. Acknowledging this impermanence and impossibility of a perfect familiarity, forces one to recognize her role as a tourist within everyday encounters with place. Derrida remarks that “‘[b]eing a part’, belonging as ‘fully a part,’ should be incompatible with belonging ‘in every part’ ” (Derrida 92). That is to say, developing an intimacy with place involves both closeness and estrangement – it involves travelling between the roles of citizen and of foreigner.

In the absence of a place from which one can derive and a place to which one can arrive, the distinction between locals and strangers, hosts and visitors, citizens and foreigners cannot be maintained. Perpetually touring, we are neither citizen nor foreigner, but rather, we are more aptly asylum seekers. This figure of the perpetual tourist within an open city (often unknowingly) plays the political role of disturbing notions of belonging:

Every border is perforated by a multiplicity of openings that render infractions of it ungovernable, uncontrollable, even impossible. The frontier always intersects or breaches itself. Everything that is kept outside of it, expelled, not tolerated by it, comes back at it from the other side, confrontationally or indirectly (Derrida 164-4).

What makes the infractions of the asylum seeker particularly ungovernable by a system of borders, however, is that she is not merely kept outside or expelled. The citizen-as-asylum seeker or citizen-as-tourist remains inside but because her existence and
movements highlight the vulnerability and divisibility of borders, she is the outsider from within – or she brings the threat of the outside within. Her inability to fit within one of the categories ‘tolerable’ or ‘intolerable’, poses a particular challenge to normalizing and governing forces.

The state, which tries to defend the indivisibility of its borders, is congruent with escapist traditions. In its systematic insistence upon static place and populations, these practices, this paradigm of escape, informs daily life. Tourism, within this system is a legitimized form of movement, which goes to reify divisions between familiar and foreign realms as well as the categories of citizen and foreigner. When tourism is rearticulated as an everyday practice, however, it disturbs conventional notions of place as fixed and emphasizes the importance and viability of open cities characterized by contingency. It disturbs the figure of the citizen and considers the figure of the asylum seeker. Acknowledging the catastrophic character of place and embodying the asylum seeker politicizes all sites and our complicated relationships to them. Derrida states: “[t]he catastrophe […] comes from its never allowing one to settle down, from the constant hesitation that prevents any clear distinction again between two meanings of strophe: staying and going on tour.” If a Hobbesian-style claim to an absolute origin or the derivative schema (of departures and arrivals) is contestable, and I certainly believe it to be, one can no longer think of tourism as distinct from daily experience, for, there is “no originary sedentariness [which] pre-exists it” (Derrida 12). The political promise which tourism holds when we think past the governing teleos of the voyage (arrival), is a disruption of the ideological, ontological and geopolitical boundedness that has for so
Chapter III: Complicating the Tourist Gaze

Viewing the Unpresentable

If the tour is indeed unpresentable, how is it that the tourist perceives that which she encounters? The discussion to follow in this chapter extends from a curiosity with what seems like a preoccupation with the tourist gaze in current theorizations of tourism and flows from my consideration of non-place. A great deal of the work done on the tourist gaze operates on the unacknowledged adoption of escapist logics, which structures the way in which the gaze is then understood. In an effort to bring these untheorized presuppositions into the gaze of critique, this chapter will consider the political function or role of the tourist gaze in formulations of escapist tourism. Two such normative formulations which I will interrogate in order to engage with this question are John Urry’s *The Tourist Gaze* and Haunani Trask’s “Lovely Hula Hands: Corporate Tourism and the Prostitution of Hawaiian Culture”. The gaze, they hold, operates through an
absolute difference between tourist and (often unwilling) host, and between the tourist’s daily environment and tourist site. This understanding of difference enables the argument that every voyage involves a voyeur, and that the gaze is intrusive, exploitative, and unwelcomed. It suggests that consumption is one-way: the tourist consumes ‘the toured’. The tourist gaze seems to arrive at an image of difference: the foreign. For Urry, this allows one to arrive at an understanding of the norm (daily, static, state-bound existence) through the strange (the act of travel within a foreign tourist site). Otherwise put, difference enables comparisons, which make the arrival at particular conclusions possible.

Thinking of gaze through the terms of non-arrival not absolute difference and absolute escape requires a re-evaluation of the consumer-consumed binary, which Urry’s and Trask’s work exhibit. I will therefore engage with a Marxian and then Haylesian understanding of consumption, which affords room for complexity and reflexivity. To expand upon Hayles’ account of consumption and to further critique the tourist gaze as a moment of absolute difference, I will explore her discussion of embodiment. In the same way that the Odyssean narrative asserts the grounding of tourist practices in place, this chapter will illuminate the way in which the tourist gaze often frames the tourist as grounded in a Liberal Humanist conception of the body. The Odyssean drive to locate tourism demands a fixity and continuity of place and of the tourist practices that take place within it. Likewise, the liberal human subject demands fixity and continuity in the ‘human’. While the second chapter considered ways in which normative readings of tourism produce limiting conceptions of place, this chapter explores the way in which
normative readings of the tourist body produce limiting conceptions of her gaze. I will close with Derrida’s analysis on blindness and the self-portrait in his work “Memoirs of the Blind”. This will serve to bring the theoretical offerings of Marx and Hayles together by troubling vision as strictly embodied and outward looking. Derrida’s work challenges both Urry and Trask by eloquently positioning us as the objects and subjects of our own gaze, blurring the distinction between sight and blindness.

The Gaze of Absolute Difference

Urry begins “The Tourist Gaze” with what he considers to be a universal truth, or organizing principle of the gaze. He states:

The gaze in any historical period is constructed in relation to its opposite, to non-tourist forms of social experience and consciousness. What makes a particular tourist gaze depends upon what it is contrasted with; what the forms of non-tourist experience happen to be. The gaze therefore presupposes a system of social activities and signs which locate the particular tourist practices, not in terms of some intrinsic characteristics, but through the contrast implied with non-tourist social practices, particularly those based within home and paid work.” (Urry 1-2)

Though he holds that the particular system of social activities and signs that become subjects of the gaze within tourist practices are contingent on many levels (historically, culturally, geographically), he insists what remains constant about these practices and the gaze which perceives and produces these practices is they become possible through difference. That is, the difference between a point of departure (one’s familiar origin) and a point of arrival (be it climate, language, ethnicity, history, geography). To this effect he writes, “[tourist] practices involve the notion of departure, of a limited breaking with established routine and practices of everyday life and allowing one’s senses to engage with a set of stimuli that contrast with the everyday and the mundane” (Urry 2). Making
the case for the importance of theorizing tourism and the tourist gaze within the social sciences, Urry claims, “we can use the fact of difference to interrogate the normal through investigating the typical forms of tourism” (ibid). In his estimation, then, the tourist gaze brings to light the rupture between foreign and familiar involved in any tourist act. This reading poses movement, which is of course involved in acts of touring, as an exception that reveals the rule: the stasis and citizenship present in ‘non tourist spaces of the everyday’.

Urry stresses that a central difference between tourist and non-tourist spaces is the fact that the first space is one of leisure with the (non) end of pleasure and the other is one of work with the end of survival: “the places gazed upon are for purposes not directly connected with paid work and they often normally offer some distinctive contrast with work” (Urry 3). Therefore, he understands tourism as practice of “consuming goods and services, which are in some way unnecessary. They are consumed because they supposedly generate pleasurable experiences, which are different from those typically encountered in everyday life (2). Urry assumes that casting a gaze towards an ‘exotic’ scene is a way of escaping the mundane, monotonous, practical, utility-driven existence of working life. He thus draws a sharp division between accumulation and consumption. The tourist gaze, as Urry and indeed most theorists on this subject characterize it, is an outward looking one – a looking towards the foreign and other which requires looking away from the familiar and self, a looking away from reality and towards fantasy. He maintains,

Places are chosen to be gazed upon because there is anticipation, especially
through daydreaming and fantasy, of intense pleasures, either on a different scale or involving different senses from those customarily encountered. Such anticipation is constructed and sustained through a variety of non-tourist practices such as film, TV, Literature, magazines, records and videos, which construct and reinforce that gaze (3).

Urry rules out the possibility of experiencing this anticipation and intense pleasure in the everyday since he holds that the everyday involves continuity of senses, sights, and experience.

This difference involved in Urry’s formulation of the tourist gaze is not neutral. The tourist holds power, for she actively casts her gaze, whereas the tourist site and the locals within it are simply objects of that gaze. The site and the local are there to satisfy the desire of the gaze, which is to perceive otherness. Unlike the welcomed gaze of a lover, which can produce a romantic satisfaction in both the object and subject of the gaze, the local who is looked upon for only the satisfaction of the looker is in this sense enslaved by the gaze. While the lover can return the gaze at her partner, Urry frames the tourist gaze as one which (generally) goes unreturned. He holds the opinion that “the touristic gaze encodes ideological hegemony over the objects of their view” (Lena 1).

It might be argued Urry’s work on the tourist gaze simply presents a view of how tourist practices function – that his work observes and describes what is empirically true about these practices. It seems this is indeed how Urry presents his text. However, this observational role is of course a false one, for he makes non-neutral assertions concerning tourism and the gaze which are not mere reflections of their essence, but reflections of a culturally embedded escapist logic which he has adopted. The most troubling of his
assertions is that the very condition of possibility of tourism and the gaze is absolute difference. In efforts to justify the importance of discussing tourist practices within the social sciences, he claims: “by considering the typical objects of the tourist gaze, one can use these to make sense of elements of the wider society with which they are contrasted” (Urry 2). Knowledge, this suggests, comes through comparison of norm against abnormality, through the logic of the binary. As such, the tourist gaze embodies this difference and is therefore capable of revealing important truths. For instance, this difference can illuminate “how class, gender, ethnicity and nationhood are constituted through powerful and intersecting temporal regimes and modes of dwelling and travelling” (Urry 9).

**The Invader’s Gaze**

At this juncture, I find will it useful to put Trask’s “Lovely Hula Hands”, into conversation with Urry’s “The Tourist Gaze”, as her discussion of tourist practices within Hawaii is exemplary of the way in which a difference-based notion of the tourist gaze (which Urry’s work embodies) can become contextualized within a particular site. Trask, a native Hawaiian, begins by suggesting that a general ignorance of the native culture and violent imperial history that the Hawaiians and their land have endured allows tourists to perceive and consume Hawaii as a place of fantasy-like escape. This gaze, she holds, is an inherently destructive one. The tendency to fetishize and exoticize the land and natives produces a passive feminine image of Hawaii, while the tourist gaze, which actively consumes these images for pleasure, is masculine in character. She asserts:
To most Americans, then, Hawai’i is theirs: to use, to take, and, above all, to fantasize about long after the experience. Just five hours away by plane from California, Hawai’i is a thousand light years away in fantasy. Mostly a state of mind, Hawai’i is the image of escape from the rawness and violence of daily American life. Hawai’i - the word, the vision, the sound in the mind-is the fragrance and feel of soft kindness. Above all, Hawai’i is “she,” the Western image of the Native “female” in her magical allure. And if luck prevails, some of “her” will rub off on you, the visitor (Trask 2).

She extends this gendered reading to suggest that the tourism on her land is a prostitution of Hawaiian culture, emphasizing the way in which the feminine becomes commodified and consumed through a process of male exploitation. She explains: “‘Prostitution’ in this context refers to the entire institution which defines a woman (and by extension the “female”) as an object of degraded and victimized sexual value for use and exchange through the medium of money” (Trask 5). Within this analogy, she considers tourists as representing the role of ‘johns’ and the tourist industry itself to reflect the role of pimps. The Hawaiian landscape and Hawaiians themselves can struggle with or become apathetic to their own prostitution; however, their conditions refuse them the possibility of existing outside of the prostitution ring in some way. She elaborates that “because the selling of Hawai’i depends on the prostitution of Hawaiian culture, Hawaiians and other locals must supply the industry with compliant workers. Thus our Hawaiian people---and not only our Hawaiian culture---become commodities” (7).

Part of this compliance to the process of prostitution is performance – and these moments of performance, she holds, invites the most palpable and uncritically colonizing male gaze. Trask explains that the tourist industry’s appropriation of Hula dancing, which markets and eroticises the dance for the tourist gaze, is a poignant and disturbing example
of this: “Hula dancers wear clown-like make-up, don costumes from a mix of Polynesian cultures, and behave in a manner that is smutty and salacious rather than powerfully erotic. The distance between the smutty and the erotic” she boldly claims, “is precisely the distance between Western culture and Hawaiian culture” (8).

Cultural images are simplified and reduced to accommodate incorrect stereotypes, which she suggests the tourist seeks to confirm with each gaze: “In the hotel version of the hula, the sacredness of the dance has completely evaporated while the athleticism and sexual expression have been packaged like ornaments. The purpose is entertainment for profit rather than a joyful and truly Hawaiian celebration of human and divine nature” (ibid). Though not overtly, her discussion of prostitution follows a basic Marxian line quite closely: there is exploitation through commodification (of the land and people and their labour and culture), consumption of these ‘goods’ by the tourist through the gaze, and accumulation. While accumulation for the tourist industry is at large financial, the accumulation for the tourist is both material and immaterial. Through her gaze, the tourist accumulates images (stored in the memory of her mind, camera, and computer), ‘cultural information’, and ‘authentic’ experience, among other things. Trask’s specific description of a Hula performance prepared for tourist illustrates how the gendered gaze functions in this exploitation-consumption-accumulation schema:

The male figure in the background is muscular, partially clothed, and unsmiling. Apparently, he is supposed to convey an image of Polynesian sexuality that is both enticing and threatening. The white women in the audience can marvel at this physique and still remain safely distant. Like the Black American male, this Polynesian man is a fantasy animal. He casts a slightly malevolent glance at our costumed maiden whose body posture and barely covered breasts contradict the innocent smile on her face (Trask 4).
Here, the Hawaiian body is quite literally prostituted, becoming an object of sexual intrigue and enjoyment not simply through the dance, but through the tourist gaze at the dance.

She insists that the tourist who casts a gaze is imbued with male privilege and the subject who is gazed at is left with a female lack of privilege. Aside from the problematic need for Trask’s gendered tourist gaze to essentialize qualities of men (aggressive, exploitative, dominant), and women (vulnerable, sensual, subordinate), such gendering fails to account for any reflexivity between the object and subject of the gaze (which I will explore later). The gendered tourist gaze, in other words, must assume an absolute difference between genders and an absolute difference between the subject and object of the gaze, leaving little or no room to think about the way in which both sides of the gaze govern in interesting ways.

Confronting Trask’s work on the tourist gaze is worthwhile, because it forces me to reconcile theories of non-arrival with experiences of exploitation associated with the very real practices of escapism-based tourism. Though the conception of a non-place of non-arrival resists defining and locating (in efforts to rearticulate tourism), it is not possible, or useful, to dismiss the way in which the performance and materialization of conventional tourist practices effect geophysical/political locales and bodies within them. Certainly there is much to be taken from her work. Her explanation of the devastating effects of cultural appropriation and tourist-related developments proliferating across the
landscape is of great value, for it speaks the lived experience of many Hawaiians (and, by extension, many other groups who have experienced the commodification of their homes, histories, customs and experiences). Importantly, she is trying to tell the largely unheard story of Hawaii. Though airline passengers are greeted by ‘native-looking’ Hawaiians with plastic leis in hand who offer wishes of ‘aloha’ as each tourist enters the airport, for instance, the translation of the word aloha in Hawaiian is meant as an expression of love between intimately connected family members. The word has become a hollowed-out greeting - a more exotic sounding ‘hello’ exchanged between strangers: “the use of this word in a capitalist context is so far removed from any Hawaiian cultural sense that it is, literally, meaningless” (Trask 4). Trask’s story attempts to reconnect and restore a meaningful sense of ‘aloha’ to the native people and land of Hawaii and in so doing, encourage an unlearning of the ‘well-known’ stories of Hawaii.

While Urry develops a theory of difference using the gaze, Trask describes more tangibly how this difference is performed and consumed in a site. This insistence on difference (between the tourism and the ordinary, local and tourist as Urry puts it) is guilty of many dismissals. In thinking exclusively through the terms of colonial voyeur who casts her gaze at the object of voyeurism, she neglects to consider the gaze of those (Hawaiians in this case) being toured. Perhaps she does not think of the toured as possessing a gaze of their own due to the imperial framework under which tourism in her home that has placed natives in a politically, economically, socially subordinate position, only assume the role of the feminized, passive object of the gaze. Her own role as a Hawaiian academic critiquing the tourist practices within Hawaii, however, is revealing
of the fact that the gaze is in fact not one-way – that she too is engaged in the act of touring. In order to offer her analysis, she must gaze not only at the tourists who she characterizes as greedily consuming her culture, but also at herself and others living within that tourist environment.

Trask does not maintain the undisturbed role of comfortable local, for the landscape is constantly morphing to the tourist industry’s next phase of development. Though Hawaii is her home and is familiar to her in many ways, this influx of unfamiliar faces, erecting of new hotels, swimming pools, restaurants, private beaches, nightclubs and landscapes planted to mimic what the wild growth used to look like, the land necessarily becomes foreign in many ways. This manufactured tourist Mecca may well be more familiar to the tourist who has become at home in tropical resort environments with excessive travel than the elderly Hawaiian whose memories and traditional connections have become associated with a place that no longer exists. Likewise, the space (exemplary of a non-place) has become too complex to claim simple belonging – to maintain the role of familiar local who, as Urry argues, does not tour her own non-tourist spaces and thus does not partake in the tourist gaze. The tourist gaze, which Urry and Trask describes as a desire to capture the foreign, fails to embody this complexity.

She generates the image of a people who have become disenfranchised by and unwillingly complicit with the tourist industry – people that have become reduced to a stereotype by the tourist gaze. The concluding sentences of her article however (“If you are thinking of visiting my homeland, please don’t. We don’t want or need any more
tourists, and we certainly don’t like them”), are not the words of a people gazed into submission. As in all writing, I would argue, her work casts a gaze and awaits one in return. She looks to tourists for a responsible, and ethical response, she hopes they will look back and recognize the damage done: “If you want to help our cause, pass this message on to your friends” (Trask 8).

Trask’s final point, that completely aborting tourism is the ultimate solution to the problems she outlines in her work, is perhaps the most troubling. Although she takes issue with the fantasy of the tourist to escape through a gaze at the ‘exotic’, her desire to abolish Hawaiian tourism seems to enact an escape away from tourism and towards a nostalgic fantasy of pre-imperial Hawaii. She is, in other words, utilizing the same escapist logic that has laid the groundwork of the tourism practices of escaping to a tropical paradise that she so loathes. This escape back to a pure and unadulterated Hawaii implies that through the time, trauma and change, her culture has remained static – she thus reinforces the notion of those that get toured (Hawaiians, in this case) as objects of the past, or pre-modern beings, and those that tour (tourists) as present and agential actors. The stasis that she attributes to her culture is posed at odds with complexity. Ironically, she puts forth the same notion of ‘native cultures’ as cemented in the past that has been mobilized by imperial forces to justify civilizing, modernizing and developing. She poses Hawaiian culture as an entity that can be preserved if the movement of land, travellers and capital (for the benefit of the tourist industry) were to cease. Tourists should avert their eyes, cast their gaze elsewhere. Hawaiians will thrive again if they are able to escape the tourist gaze.
Complicating Consumption

Urry and Trask prompt one to consider the tourist’s consumption of culture, cuisine, sites (geophysical and bodily), images, artefacts, and souvenirs through the gaze. This account of consumption fails to consider the way in which ‘the toured’ (like Trask’s portrait of the native Hawaiian being toured in Hawaii by foreigners) are engaged in tourism, the way in which the tourist is toured and the role of self-consumption. A simplified rendering of Karl Marx’s notion of alienation, however, seems useful in further complicating the process of consumption that operates through the tourist gaze. In his early work, Marx famously describes four stages of alienation resulting from the commodification of labour within a capitalist mode of production. The labourer, he explains, becomes alienated from the commodity she produces (for she has no creative input in its construction and, further, she has no property in it); she becomes alienated from herself (for monotonous tasks and meaningless labour provides little or no intrinsic satisfaction – this labour empties out the self rather than fulfilling it); she becomes alienated from others she encounters (relations in all areas of life become purposive and commodified); and she becomes alienated from the species being (human kind, and human existence is reduced to its use value) (Marx, Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844). Importantly: under the capitalist framework, the labourer produces commodities, commodifies others and is commodified. The production of a good is simultaneously the production of the individual involved in its production – it follows that alienation of the self from one’s own labour (to produce an empty good) results in an
alienation from the self and others (an empty being). The capitalist framework results in a commodification of labour (so that labour and consumption becomes alienating), and likewise, the escapist framework results in the commodification of movement, travel or the tour, thus rendering both touring and the gaze alienating.

Furthering Marx’s conclusions, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri suggest that the production of a good is secondary to the production of subjectivity (the subject that will circulate, consume and produce) for it is the production of the subject as commodity that propels the capitalist system (Hardt, Negri, 16). This maps on to the discussion of gaze, for, it can be suggested that the production of consumable goods like tourist images, sites, and kitsch function primarily to produce the subject (the tourist, who is also the toured) as commodity that can be consumed - not a subject who merely consumes the good. Contrary to Trask’s assertion that the foreign tourist consumes the local figure (and her culture, land etc) through her colonial gaze, a Marxian reading of the gaze suggests there is instead a feedback of commodification and consumption occurring - a reflexivity which Urry’s ‘absolute difference’ fails to articulate.

In thinking about ways in which consumption works in reciprocal flows, this reading certainly expands upon the conventional critique of the tourist gaze, which maintains that strictly the tourist colonizes the toured. While it is useful to draw out some parallels between the capitalist economy of production (which produces labourers and consumers as well as goods) and the escapist economy of production (which produces the tourist, toured and the site as goods), the applicability of a Marxian approach to the re-
articulation of the tourist gaze I am offering is by no means seamless. The process of alienation, which Marx asserts is endemic to exploitative capitalist structures, is of course described as an ill to overcome through a universal reclamation of labour. Of course, such reclamation, for Marx, can only be arrived at with class revolt – a revolution of the masses. His work expresses a deep commitment to escaping a capitalist system and arriving at a communist one. Revolution is the rupture, which enables this escape. This re-articulation of tourism and the tourist gaze, conversely, does not consider reciprocal consumption and alienation as an ill to overcome – but rather a complexity with which we must negotiate daily. It therefore does not call for a rupture and escape, but rather for an exploration of fractures in the categories of tourist and toured which are posed as indivisible. Pointing to their divisibility and vulnerability, these fractures upset absolute difference and permit other possibilities for relationships between the self, ‘the other’, and the site, consumption, and alienation.

The Body is Always a Tourist Body; the Tourist Body is Always on Tour

The inability of mainstream literature on the tourist gaze to acknowledge this complex relationship, which is cultivated through a reciprocally consumptive gaze, partly lies in the unarticulated presupposition that the tourist takes the form of a liberal humanist subject. I argue that the particular understanding of the tourist’s embodiment justifies political limits to tourism as a whole. The tourist understood through the terms of the liberal humanist subject, is an entity who is sealed or contained by the indivisible border of her skin. When these limits are used to define the body, the separation of tourist from toured and tourist from tourist site seems only ‘natural’.
The challenge to this liberal humanist subject posed by Hayles text *How We Became Posthuman*, offers a complex notion of consumption, which seems to proceed from Marx. She remarks:

Shifting patterns of consumption initiate new experiences of embodiment; and embodied experience interacts with codes of representation to generate new kinds of textual worlds [… E]ach category – production, signification, consumption, bodily experience and representation – is in constant feedback and feedforward loops with the others. Pull any thread in the skein and the others prove to be entangled in it (Hayles 1).

The liberal humanist subject, which she contests, is conversely understood to maintain a static position - implicated in but unaltered by environmental shifts. This stasis and boundedness of the individual, Hayles suggests, is a dangerous fiction, which occludes most of our daily interactions with space, others, machines and indeed ourselves. “The posthuman view”, she states, “thinks of the body as the original prostheses we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born” (Hayles 3). Indeed, long before birth we started with a split not a singularity: the mother’s body and father’s body submit 2 distinct parts (sperm and egg) to generate a zygote which comes to embody both sperm and egg giving rise to the fetus (a body of multiplicity). This fetus is embodied by the biological mother; in leaving the womb a fetus experiences yet another embodiment as a baby – and for a few moments is still sharing bodies with the mother through the umbilical cord. In snipping the cord the baby experiences another form of embodiment in which he/she is still connected to the environment in a variety of ways.
This story becomes so familiar that the political implications seem to become unspoken. That is: this widely accepted sequence of events demonstrates the less-accepted notion of embodiments in flux – of bodies as spaces which are permeable by the environment, and which permeate the environment – of bodies in the midst of travelling and never arriving at a static form of embodiment. For Hayles, this story of our conception seems to make the simple yet poignant case that if in the first few months of life the human body undergoes such a rich set of trans-formations, it seems unlikely that the rest of human life is characterized by stasis.

Hayles maintains that the story of our bodies being put into conversation with the technologies that it uses or, the technologies that use it, is a familiar one that highlights the fantasy of sealed subjects.

The enacted and represented bodies are brought into conjunction through the technology that connects them…the overlay between the enacted and the represented bodies is no longer a natural inevitability but a contingent production, mediated by a technology that has become so entwined with the production of identity that it can no longer meaningfully be separated from the human subject (Hayles xiii).

This interplay between the virtual and real, and flexible-boundaries between skin and wire is explained by her analogy of a feedback loop (in which input and output work symbiotically). The tourist, for example, becomes a part of a multi-directional feedback loop in which the environment enters tourist and the tourist enters the environment.

Her framing of the fluid body entering a feedback (e.g. of consumption), is one which resists logic of escape. Hayles evokes Arthur Kroker’s term ‘the flesh-eating 90’s’
to describe an era that posed the body as a limit to the type of reflexive existence she describes above. This rejection of flesh became necessary for many theorists, she suggests, because they perceived the ‘real’ or material as incommensurable with fluid embodiments (e.g. like those found within the virtual realm). This paradigm dreamt of a cyber-world unbounded by time and space constraints. Ironically, to produce this time/space limitlessness this stream of thought drew a limit or distinction between the material and fluid or virtual, and attempted to escape the former. Hayles, however, asserts that the flesh poses no such limit to fluidity, instead, our physical embodiment(s) \((\text{characterized by flux})\) become sites of possibility and renegotiation – sites whereby the material and virtual enter feedback loops. She therefore dreams of "a version of the posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a condition of human being, and that understands human life is embedded in a material world of great complexity, one on which we depend for our continued survival" (Hayles 48).

The ‘flesh-eating 90’s’ are not over. While Hayles suggests that cybernetic thought has undergone a shift away from this analytical approach, she insists that no ‘past’ episteme is transcended and eclipsed by those of the ‘present’. Instead, an episteme continues to circulate, re-surface, and get re-articulated and de-articulated to such an extent that imposing a timeline of past-present becomes highly unreflective. She says of her own work that “[t]his transition [from the liberal human subject to the posthuman] isn’t so much a radical break as a continuation of a much older technological process”
This suggests that an intellectual tradition or episteme cannot be escaped but there are, however, breakages which allow for the insertion of ideas that permit critical dialogues through and between traditions (these traditions or histories becomes both an apparatus of capture and a line of flight in this sense).

While Hayles’ work on embodiment places a focus on the feedback between ‘nature’ and ‘artifice’ (and hence challenges these very categories) it is interesting to interrogate the conventional (generally Western) limits distinguishing bodies from land, and how this functions in tourism. Ferguson’s article From a Kibbutz offers a way to rethink the limits between liberal human subjects and their environments. Employing feminist power analytics and semiology, she unpacks a variety of (broadly conceived) memorial sites scattered throughout tourist land and bodies - she offers a thoughtful account of codifications inscribed upon Israeli (geo-physical and biological) space. For instance, in challenging perceived limits between liberal human subjects and their environments, she looks at the bodies of Israeli soldiers as living, breathing tourist sites. As personas of the state, adorned in national symbols, these soldiers come to embody the official Israel – they become part of the tourist landscape to be consumed by tourists. The soldiers are not merely sites but tourists themselves. Training with the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) produces soldiers as tourists who must continually navigate (and not merely exist in) the territory that has been marked by a particular military cartography. Because an IDF soldier’s comfortability in the territory of Israel is perceived to impair her defensive or offensive reflexes, Israel can never be a perfectly familiar or naturalized place for her.
What I find particularly valuable in Ferguson’s work is her framing of tourism as an everyday practice (a navigation of ordered space, a feedback of space and bodies inscribing upon one another). Any Israeli, according to her account, remains a tourist in her own home. Even citizenship, which appears to lock the citizen within her borders, involves tourism. Ferguson’s own experience living in Israel, feeling like the outsider inside (as an American ‘gentile’ married to an Israeli Jew) serves as a powerful, autobiographical framing of her work - one that poses the movement associated with tourism as the condition of, rather than escape from, daily existence.

Challenging the limits of the body (established by the widely-held liberal humanist conception) permits an understanding of the tourist body as interconnected with sites and others within these sites as well as the tourist body as a site itself. This, again, calls the formulation of the gaze as a product of absolute difference into question.

**The Blind Gaze**

Hayles and Ferguson prompt a re-imagining of embodiment by highlighting the feedback relationship between bodies, space, and technologies, which, I have suggested, also prompts a re-imagining of the gaze as reflexive, and not mono-directional (cast by one individual and exploitatively inscribing upon another individual). Urry and Trask hold that the gaze arrives at an image of difference which presents itself to the tourist within the site: “the travel narrative always presumes to accord a privilege to the present - presentation of the country, phenomena of a culture, manifestation of a political apparatus- and the possibility of recounting would be derived precisely from that, with
writing become transparent to the actual ‘object’ of the narrative” (Malabou 26). Further, of course, they suggest this gaze operates in a uni-directional schema. I will engage with Derrida’s discussion of drawing in Memoirs of the Blind to consider the way in which the blind gaze operates outside of an arrival schema terms of arrival. His suggestion that every drawing is inevitably a self portrait emphasizes the way in which the body of the gazer or ‘capturer’ is put into conversation with what it attempts to see and capture. Akin to the way Marx indicates how the consumer is also consumed and Hayles argues the body both enters environments and environments enter the body, Derrida holds that there is always an element of capture in the act of capturing.

In this work, Derrida draws on images from the prints and drawings department of the Louvre and makes the intimate connection between drawing and the act of looking (or, the gaze). In following the trace of these images, he develops the Ab-ocular Hypothesis. The ab-ocular (ab Latin for ‘out of’ or ‘from’ and oculis Latin for ‘the eye’) is constructed on an inherent paradox. ‘Out of or from the eye’ suggests that a vision is emanating from within the eye, or away/separate, distant/discrete from the eye. Each act of drawing (or perception), he asserts, involves both types of looking. While the gaze implies vision and blindness a lack of vision, Derrida asserts that they are not oppositional, but rather co-constitutive.

The Ab-ocular Hypothesis poses a challenge to arriving at a clear image (for instance of a tourist site or a local within it) by suggesting that this paradoxical inward and outward looking gaze transcends a conceal/reveal binary. There is not concealment
or revelation brought on by the drawing, but instead there is an elision of concealment and revelation. Both of these feign to arrive at a complete image or a completely obscured image – the elision of this binary gestures towards an incomplete image. This troubles Urry’s notion that absolute difference, perceived by the gaze during acts of travel, can reveal a truth about the norm through measuring it against the abnormal. He holds that the drawing (or indeed any image) is a telling that does not tell - a showing forth that does not show, for “all the coloured thickness that [tracing] retains tends to wear itself out as to mark the single edge of a contour: between the inside and the outside of a figure. Once this limit is reached, there is nothing more to see, not even black and white, not even figure/form” (Derrida 53). That is, once the limit is reached, the illusion of a complete and whole image cannot be maintained. The gaze is in this sense, an exploration of the catastrophic. Indeed, Derrida remarks

When one attempts to see a drawing, she is involved in the process of an interview. It is an interview in a dual sense: an interrogation of accuracy/beauty or authenticity and a view of space between (inter) lines or limits. Or: assuming the role of the spectator necessitates insight – to be both in the act of sight, and to looking at spaces locked within lines. (Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind, 24)

Both blindness and sight are limit experiences, which work in tandem within the gaze. Consider the term ‘line of sight’. The line of sight can emphasize or engender sight (it is a vantage point for perception). Line of sight also emphasizes a blindness to that which is not in the line (the imperceptible images in the periphery). The line of sight, in this latter sense, is like a horizon: a point of disappearance. To create a line of sight, one focuses with their eye. The clarity that this focus permits also requires the obscuring of surrounding objects that fall out of the line. Or, to use Derrida’s poetic example, consider the effects of a blink. Blinks punctuate our sight with moments of blindness and this
blindness, even in a medical sense, is a condition of possibility for vision: “The moment of blindness ensures sight” (Derrida 68).

His second hypothesis, that “any drawing of the blind is a drawing of the blind”, suggests that a depiction of someone who cannot see is inevitably a depiction made by an unseeing someone (2). In a rather simple way, the draftsperson/portraitist will always be blind in the process of drawing because she must necessarily cast her gaze away from that which is being depicted (a model, the portraitist’s own reflection) and towards the paper, canvas, surface or toward the tool that makes the mark. In the moment of casting her gaze away from the present subject in order to (re)present it, she is blind to the subject. Drawing in this sense is a practice of tracing whose product does not have a trace of that which it traces. In casting her gaze away from that the subject she attempts to capture and towards the blank drawing surface, she must work only from memory and not ocular perception. She therefore draws from memory and draws on memory. Because drawing is an act of memory that attempts to evoke/preserve memory, it can, at best, (re)present a memory of a memory. For this reason, a drawing is from the start, in ruins; it is a ruin. In this vein, Derrida writes in one of his many travelogues: “Turkey is different again, but I had a certain ‘memory’ of it even before arriving here. I ‘recognize’ everything, fatally, for one can recognize without being cognizant, whence the principle of ruin at the heart of travel” (Derrida 11). The image is never new or whole, for it draws on a past and imperfect memory, which has its blind-spots.

Urry, Trask and others, frame the tourist gaze as an act of capturing and drawing
has conventionally been understood in a similar way. Derrida’s discussion of the self-portrait, however, illustrates the way in which the ‘capturer’ is captured. He elegantly unfolds this assertion with his discussion of blind drawing: since the draftsperson who attempts to (re)present a blind person is necessarily blind during the practice of drawing, she also draws herself. To depict, she draws on her experience of blindness, and the depiction becomes a drawing of her experience of blindness. In light of this, Derrida suggests that any drawing is portrait of the self: “[a] drawing of the blind is a drawing of the blind[...] there is no tautology here, only a destiny of the self-portrait” (2). “Memoirs of the Blind”, for instance, must be thought of as a portrait of blindness in the form of a strange and impossible self-portrait of Derrida. He claims:

There is no self-portrait without confession. The author of the self-portrait does not show himself, . . . does not lead one to knowledge, he admits a fault and asks for forgiveness [...] At the moment when the self-portraitist fends off the temptations of sight and calls for this conversion from the light to the light, from the outward realm to the realm within, it is a theory of the blind that unfolds (117).

To the reader and to himself, Derrida confesses. This re-articulation of the tourist gaze also calls for a self-conscious confession of the tourist, that is, a confession of her presence in each image (created through her gaze) and the limitations or blindness involved in generating such an image.

Troubling Expectations

Marx, Hayles and Derrida have served to demonstrate the way in which an escapist formulation of the gaze fails to reflect the complicated relationships of self to object, body to space (virtual, physical, geophysical etc), and sight to blindness. Stressing
the divisibility of these categories and the fluidity that this divisibility creates, their discussions forge a space for considering alternative political possibilities of the tourist gaze. The political implication of the conventional tourist gaze, defined by difference and exploitation, however, is a reification of escapist logic and structures. Interestingly, “if one looks at the etymology, one finds that to denote directed vision French resorts to the word *regard* [gaze], whose root originally referred not to the act of seeing but to expectation” (Starobinski 2). The violence of Urry and Trask’s rendering of the gaze is that their arguments are not simply descriptive, but rather, they engender a particular performance and materialization of the tourist gaze. The gaze they construct is one which *expects* to arrive at difference, calls for the performance of difference (for instance, Trask’s Hula dancers) and materialization of difference. It is expected that the gazer casts her gaze out at the world. It is expected that this casting-out indicates a type of *castration*: a cut that definitively separates that which that which is the body of the gazer and that which is not. In other words, this cut delineates the subject from that which lies outside of the subject. The limit this cut produces quickly becomes a policed border, which attempts to arrest movement between subject and object, body and space, consumer, consumed, capturer, and captured. The political possibilities that a gaze of non-arrival presents, however, is precisely this movement.

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9 Re-articulating the tourist gaze is fruitful, for, it *also* has performative and material consequences which can reformulate what is expected from the tourist gaze: a complex set of feedback loops in tours of non-arrival.
Inconclusion: Caught in Escape

*I call travelling the experience of all experiences, the greatest ordeal.*

- Jacques Derrida

Viewing the Unpresentable

Escape remains a largely liberatory trope. For Urry, tourism and travel frees us from the mundane everyday realm associated with the practical concerns of labour, survival and capital accumulation; for Trask, an end to Hawaiian tourism frees her land and peoples from exploitation; and, for Hobbes, the social contract and the modern state frees us from the brutishness of nature. As I have sought to demonstrate, however, each desire to transcend, each escape, fails to arrive at any pure liberation from limits. The previous chapter, for instance, explored the failures of the tourist gaze to produce an escape from the familiar realm by highlighting the way in which the tourist becomes caught in a dialectic of relations: Marx illustrates that one is caught in the act of consuming, for she is also consumed; Hayles illustrates that the tourist body is caught in a feedback loop, for the tourist enters space, and space enters the tourist body; and Derrida illustrates that the one is caught in the act of capturing, for she is also captured.
As my first chapter argues, this is the case because escape itself is a liminal practice, which relies on generating a set of spatial and temporal limits: a point of rupture, a binaric split, and a point of origin. Indeed, each mode of escape is an effort to free oneself from a particular set of limits, which, as Foucault’s notion of the empirico-transcendental doublet insists, are all ultimately expressions of a desire to transcend the condition of the modern subject. Drawing out the concept of the empirico-transcendental doublet will help to briefly elucidate the connections between tourism as a mode of escape to modern thought as a mode of escape, which I have implied more subtly throughout this thesis. Foucault’s doublet offers a new and productive way of articulating the problems to which Derrida’s notion of non-arrival has been mobilized throughout my work as a certain response. Finally, it will serve to explain some of the theoretical and methodological choices I have made in discussing the subject of tourism, for instance: my decision to employ an aporetic logic and my reluctance to ground tourism in a case study.

Immanent/Imminent Escape: the Empirico-Transcendental Doublet

For Foucault, “modern thought has been a series of attempts to overcome the paradox inherent in the figure of man” (Oksala 32, emphasis added). In a sense, for the modern tradition, escape has been immanent to the problem of man. This paradox, or doublet, which man embodies is that he is at once the “knowing subject” and “object of knowledge” (Foucault 252). He is “a product of a history he can’t reach, and at the same time, he is the writer of that history” (Oksala 31). He has knowledge and possesses
agency, yet as the object of this knowledge he is constrained and informed by particular conditions – there is hence a finitude embedded in his ability to think and act. The very fact that man can have an awareness of the limits to that which he can know – or a knowledge that limits are a condition of knowledge - is demonstrative of his paradoxical existence: “Man, in the analytic of finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible” (Oksala 318). Indeed all thought and practice is haunted by this subject-object paradox, which the case of the tourist gaze and my own role as both theorist of tourism and tourist illustrates. My interest in tourism has stemmed, in part, from the fact that escape and the predicament of getting caught in escape which is endemic to modern thought and practice in response to this paradox, is geo-physically manifest in tourist practices. Tourism is the literal acting out of what Foucault identifies as the modern obsession with transcendence.

Johanna Oksala states that “[a]lthough taken for granted by us, to the extent that it is difficult for us to conceive of any other ways of thinking about the relationship between the subject, knowledge and history, Foucault diagnoses man as the problem of the modern episteme” (Oksala 31). His work, therefore, resolves to bring these taken-for-granted conditions into the realm of critique; in this spirit, I have considered the conditions of escape which both become taken-for-granted within and govern understandings or performances of tourism. I have then considered how these powerful discourses might be critiqued.
Modern thought, Foucault holds, “has been searching for ‘a discourse whose tension which would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental, while being directed at both’ ” (Oksala 32). However, each effort at transcendence it has offered, as Foucault stresses in *The Order of Things*, institutes a new set of limits to transcend. Escape has, in other words been suspended in a stage of imminently occurring but never arriving. For instance, he suggests that reductionism, “the first post-Kantian attempt to overcome the paradox of man”, was not able to solve the problem of the modern subject through escape: “if they reduced man to his empirical side, they could not account for the possibility of knowledge, and if they emphasized the transcendental side, they could not claim scientific objectivity, or account for the contingency of man’s empirical nature” (Oksala 32). Foucault, therefore, strives to “show how, after a series of convoluted attempts to deal with the paradoxical predicament of the modern episteme, modern thought has arrived at a dead end” (ibid).

Interested in considering how this paradox is pregnant with political possibility for reflection and critique, Foucault’s treatment of the doublet resists an either/or response, as did the reductionist mode:

Just as Nietzsche heralded the death of God as promising philosophical thought a new beginning, Foucault clearly and consciously imitates him in heralding the death of man as an event important enough to inaugurate a new episteme: ‘the void left by man’s disappearance [is] the unfolding of a space in which it was once more possible to think (Oksala 33).

Despite the seeming extremity of the word ‘death’, in both instances death does not indicate an end, passing or ultimate escape, but rather a beginning or *life* reared by re-articulation. This, of course, has been the strange map with which I have navigated the
problem of modern tourist practices.

I have engaged quite centrally with Malabou and Derrida’s text *Counterpath* to illustrate not only the problems with escapist frameworks embedded in how tourism is understood and performed, but also the problem with transcending these escapist frameworks. As Malabou succinctly puts it: “Deconstructing the derivative schema does not imply an attempt to replace it with a different one [...] It is not a matter of playing arrival off *against* derivational drift, but of showing that the latter is in no way essential; that as far as thinking is concerned it is merely an unavoidable derivative” (Malabou 284). The aporia with which I opened this thesis: ‘Notions of escape animate modern political thought and practice’ communicated the problem of deriving, and in particular the problem of deriving a discussion of tourism, for, in evoking the term ‘modern’, this aporia is already implicated by escape. Where can I begin to think of tourism when certain parameters and conditions always pre-exist me and my critique – what is my point of departure?

Beginning this thesis ‘in media res’ and waiting to evoke Foucault’s doublet, which in a sense underlies the entire discussion, served to displace an ultimate origin point for this project. The fact that that Foucault does eventually surface, however, indicates a self-consciousness that my writing is necessarily informed by something prior. Derrida gently re-assures, “There is no problem with the fact that a text is haunted, obsessively so, by the derivational drift that it has set itself the task of deconstructing”, there is, however, a problem with suffocating these ghosts (Derrida 284).
The Tour and Critique

For Foucault, Kant’s question, ‘what is man’, was a problematic displacement in so far as it “makes the contents of empirical experience work as their own condition of possibility” (Oksala 33). As I have claimed, the normative approach to tourism, which similarly asks ‘what is tourism’ or ‘in what way does tourism present itself’, makes a plethora of assumptions about tourism, place and the tourist that are embedded in the question work as their own condition of possibility. Akin to Foucault’s critique of this presumptive structure for arriving at knowledge (an answer to the ‘what’), Derrida insists:

Différance […] cannot be submitted to the question ‘What is it?’: If we accept the form of the question, in its meaning and its syntax (‘What is’…), we would have to conclude that difference has been derived, has happened, has been mastered and governed on the basis of the point of a present being, which itself could be something, a form, a state, a power in the world. It is therefore no longer legitimate to ask what a voyage is. On the one hand because travel is différance itself – temporalization, spacing, incessant displacement of the letter and of sense - and on the other hand because no originary sedentary pre-exits it. (Derrida 12)

I have instead asked ‘how is it that tourism is constantly arriving at a non-place’ and 'how is it that one can then think of a tourism that functions within a non-place’? ‘How is it…’ invites a consideration of conditions, which ‘what is…’ structurally neglects. The latter, which I have tried to avoid, focuses on that which the conditions have produced and not the nuances and process of their production. For this reason, I have decided not to ground a discussion of tourism in a particular case study.
Through Derrida, I have suggested that catastrophe is a condition of possibility for a tour of non-arrival. Place conventionally understood as offering some coherence and stability reinforces a coherent and stable familiar and as well as a coherent and stable identity to this ‘familiar’ place. This static notion of place is, of course, structurally embedded in the state which encloses land, creates a national narrative (which indicates what is coherent about that place) and creates citizens who are to internalize this set of norms. This citizen is expected to remain an “[i]dentifiable, self-identical subject persisting throughout the discontinuous history” (Derrida 113). Such a system supports the understanding of absolute difference between the space of dwelling, the space of tourism, the local and the foreigner – it formalizes and institutionalizes escape.

In response to the popular notion of place, Derrida uses the term non-place to describe the catastrophic sites which stress their own divisibility. The Asylum city, for instance, constantly welcomes change. Here, “replacement [is] the very possibility of place […] the possibility of all placement” (Derrida 285). If place is considered catastrophic, or thoroughly discontinuous, fractured and unfixed, an understanding of absolute difference is not sustainable. Because within non-place the familiar and foreign are overlapping, one remains in a constant state of travel – there is no discernible site for tourism. Since non-place is contingent, Derrida suggests that so too is our relation to it. Importantly, I hold, displacing our sense of complete familiarity and belonging to place politicizes our daily interactions and navigations. Further, the rather overt political implication of critiquing modern tourist practices is that it also necessarily critiques the logic of the state which seeks to naturalize static place with borders and belonging with
Because I am more interested in a tourism which is not present within a sealed tourist site and does not present itself to us as a moment of absolute difference, I have suggested that the conventional reading of the tourist gaze (which holds that in casting a gaze the tourist produces an image of difference which reveals the norm) fails to offer productive insight. This incomplete presence provides a problem for the gaze. How is one to see what is never wholly present or never presented to her? Acknowledging that a certain blindness is always married with vision, as in Derrida’s Memoirs of the Blind, suggests that one can never arrive at a complete image of the tour. Further, as Derrida suggests, each effort at capturing (drawing and the tourist gaze alike) that which lies outside always implicates the capturer to the extent that each image generated is a strange self-portrait.

Indeed, my own incomplete image of tourism is a self-portrait. Initially intending to tour through a different set of authors to unfold a discussion of tourism, I continually returned to my inherited Derrida texts whose pages are marked by a constellation of my grandfather’s cryptic marginalia. As I become better acquainted with a small portion of Derrida’s work, I have unknowingly been touring memories of my grandfather – I have been both clarifying and further obscuring the images I keep of him. Playing with the possibilities of non-arrival has taken me through new understandings of this white-haired professor who dictated riddles to his confused grandchildren from a well-read copy of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (but, frustratingly, never a whole chapter all the way
through). I have started to cobble together an image, for instance, of how he taught *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*, which is, in essence, a story of non-arrival, alongside Derrida’s wirings. These images are of course in ruins, not only because they are incomplete but also because this tour began for me three years after his death.

**Circumnavigation**

While thought often travels the path from problem to solution, I have sought to instead meander through a set of questions and offer a re-articulation of the powerful iterations of escape (for instance, of the Hobbesian shift from a state of nature to the Leviathan) that become taken-for-granted with a citational process. In Derrida’s words:

> The traveller-intellectual endlessly experiences this strange ‘adestinerrant’ condition, and his destiny is henceforth sealed by a wandering circumnavigation’ rendered possible by the new structure of spacio-temporal différance, pre-empting deriving or any continual departure from the shore (Derrida 20).

Just as Foucault indicates the way in which certain limits of the modern subjects are the site of possibility for critique, the limits to arriving, emphasized by différance, do not render the tour helpless but, rather, continually possible.
Bibliography:


