Picturing Prehistory Within (and Without) Science: De-Constructing Archaeological Portrayals of the Peopling of New Territories

by

Sara Elizabeth Perry
B.A., University of Victoria, 2002

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Anthropology

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ABSTRACT

Study of visual representations of the first human colonisations of new territories offers evidence of archaeology's continued complicity in the production of ideologically-loaded imagery. Despite years of theorising about the slippery and powerful nature of visualisation, the practice of colouring scholarly and popular archaeological texts with supposedly objective pictures (e.g., maps, photographs, tables, illustrations and drawings) has yet to be disrupted. This thesis uses depictions of the first peopling of North America, Australia and Oceania to show that even our most scientific renderings of the past are often little more than reflections of the status quo. As archaeological images move between scientific and popular culture (through academic journals, texts, encyclopedias, popular magazines, websites and children's books), it is argued that they feed back on one another in such a way as to turn present-day socio-political circumstances into the prehistoric "realities" of first peoples. Using a mixed methodology of semiological, discourse, content and compositional analysis, this thesis speaks critically about archaeological engagements with imagery in an attempt to encourage closer looks at how contemporary visual artefacts have enabled us to find ourselves in the record of prehistory.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In recent years, "visual culture" seems to have attracted the attention of a countless number of probing eyes. Concerned with ocularcentrism and the supposed primacy of sight among contemporary peoples (meaning, especially, individuals of socio-economically privileged backgrounds, living in industrialised societies, often of European descent), these eyes have variously converged on the "urgency" and spectacle of vision, and its critical role in knowing, socialising with and controlling others (e.g., Emmison and Smith 2000; Mirzoeff 2002:6). Along this vein, Jenks has dubbed the modern world a "seen phenomenon" (1995:2), while Jay has spoken of the "ubiquity of vision as the master sense" (1988:3). Lutz and Collins (1993:4), interested in visual products, have identified images as our primary educators; and, complementing these claims, visual culture "readers" have proliferated in an apparent effort to keep us permanently aware of just how important vision is to the current era (e.g., Jenks 1995; Mirzoeff 2002). Some have rightfully alluded to this sort of eulogising about sight's supremacy as Eurocentric (Rose 2001:8-9), given that vision has relevance across geographical and temporal spaces, with different people—not just present-day Western people—observing the world in different ways. Others, however, including the discipline of archaeology, have barely entered the debate, remaining relatively silent about the worth of visualisation despite the fact that it has so much presence in the field.

This is cause for concern. Whether or not one agrees that vision is the dominant sensibility of (Eurocentric) contemporaneity, sight and visual outputs—such as images (i.e., maps, photos, computer graphics, tables, and drawings/illustrations)—are expressive and powerful. In archaeology, they puncture language, texts, classrooms and sites. They
give non-archaeologists (and often archaeologists, too) access to one of the only forms of physical contact with the past that we have available to us.\(^1\) To disregard the capacity of images to communicate and manipulate is literally to lose sight of some of the most meaningful artefacts in the excavation unit. Writing from outside the archaeological establishment about advertisements, Dyer (1982:104) makes clear that all objects have both physical and cultural dimensions. This is certainly not a surprise to archaeologists who tend to devote their careers to interpreting physical features for the purpose of assigning cultural significance; however the fact that objects produced in archaeology itself, particularly images, might also have claim to these dimensions is perhaps less obvious. Sturken and Cartwright’s (2001:10) distinction between seeing and looking has pertinence here, for, as they put it, to see is to physically perceive the world around us, but to look is to actively make meaningful that world. To see is to arbitrarily observe the activities and shapes of surrounding peoples and structures, but to look is to choose to add value and purpose to those artefacts. Looking is not natural in the sense that it neither reveals essential truths nor is empty of social, political or economic machinations. The things we look at (in archaeology specifically) are, similarly, no more natural (cf. Banks 2001:7).

This thesis stems from the premise that on a regular basis archaeologists, and those of us who indulge in texts dedicated to archaeological subjects, look at pictures in a very narrow fashion. That is, we will see a picture reproduced in an archaeological text, and tend to look at it as nothing more than a reflection of reality. We will see an image

\(^{1}\) I use the term “us” in my thesis knowing that it is a loaded word, but knowing also that my audience is limited and its members will have significant commonalities. Given that in its current form this document will be especially accessible to a university-bound culture in North America that is dominated by socio-economically advantaged, well-educated persons, usually of a European heritage, I suspect that many of its readers will be able to identify, at least in part, with these characteristics.
on-line or in a scholarly journal, and tend not to question what enables us to read that image as “real,” or whether an alternative visual form could have conveyed to us a different reality. This means that while broadening attentiveness to our so-called visual culture has led many to critique the seductive and slippery appeal of imagery (especially imagery produced in the name of science), the traditional practice of plastering academic and popular archaeological literature with supposedly objective, self-evident pictures has yet to be disrupted.

The following document explores the example of archaeological depictions\(^2\) of the first human colonisations of Australia, Oceania and North America as printed in scholarly journals, popular magazines, scholarly and popular textbooks, encyclopedias, websites, and children’s books. I propose that in the face of years of critical inquiry into the nature of truth and truthful representation in archaeology, practitioners and the general public alike continue to look at the most ideologically-loaded images of first peoples and peopling events as objective renderings of the past. Using a combined semiological, compositional, discursive and content-oriented methodological framework designed specially for this research, I endeavour upon an analysis of approximately 60 peopling images with the intent of establishing that the “truths” these pictures communicate seem suspiciously supportive of the status quo. Far from innocent portrayals of North American, Australian and Oceanic colonisations, then, these pictures appear to draw on manipulative signification practices to define notions of normality and Otherness, and therein bolster the “natural” legitimacy and dominance of the West. With the widespread and reiterative distribution of these scientific-seeming peopling images to

\(^2\) That is, images created both by archaeologists themselves and by other individuals who claim to represent the discipline of archaeology.
scholarly and general audiences, ideology-bolstering visions appear to have become commonsense realities. Indeed, via a continuous cycle of manufacture, circulation and consumption across both academic and popular worlds, such visions have arguably hardened into self-evident truths simply because they are scientific evidence (validation) of the Euro-American/Euro-Australian/Euro-Pacific self.

Just as Goode has said about museums that they are like “vulgar sideshows and elitist enclaves” (in Griffiths 2002:xxiv), so do I understand that archaeology often disguises its most oppressive (vulgar) social ideals in the costume of indisputable (elitist) fact. My experience suggests that the discipline and its practitioners are not particularly open to viewing their images as heralds of hegemony—and even when they are appreciative of imagery’s connotative dimensions, it is usually done with the disclaimer that pop culture and its insidious effects are to blame. But blame is a difficult value to assign when everyone has their foot in the door of the popular world. Archaeologists write and illustrate (or engage other individuals to illustrate for) academic articles, which are then turned into textbooks and further distilled into encyclopedias, website entries, children’s books and, more generally, our fantasies about antiquity. As professors, they often teach to an undergraduate audience using these same visions, and, in previous years, have been taught by their own predecessors using related visions. As youth, they regularly grow up under the influence of Indiana Jones-like figures, or are seen to harbour memories of hunting for arrowheads on shorelines. This thesis is therefore prepared to show that over decades and across a range of both “vulgar” and “elite” contexts, archaeological depictions (specifically of first colonisations) often remain constant and compatibly suggestive. And while I would be remiss to argue that the
supposed scientific truth behind peopling images is not as true as my own version of the truth (as contained in this document), I am eager to establish that every image deserves a closer look. I do not believe that we have been disciplined into reading pictures in a certain way, and I do not believe that the meanings I read into the pictures reproduced in the following pages are absolute; but I do wonder whether we ever try to discipline ourselves when it comes to taken-for-granted objects like images.

The upcoming chapters proceed along a trail of thinking about how depictions of North American, Oceanic and Australian peopling are made and used by and for archaeologists and the general public. Chapter 2 reviews the history of thought on visual representation in the archaeological and visual anthropological disciplines, as well as on other “progressive” theoretical veins in Euro-American archaeological research. Chapter 3 outlines the significance of my three case study areas, the nature of my image sample, and the semiological, compositional, discursive and content-oriented analytical methods that I have devised (in the absence of adequate existing methodologies) to sustain my argument. Chapter 4 offers the first of two in-depth analyses of geographically-specific peopling depictions, beginning with a description of theoretical perspectives on the first colonisation of North America, and following up with an examination 30 North American peopling images focused on their internal (e.g., icons, artistry) and external (e.g., authorship, intended audience, physical placement in text, publication date) linkages. Chapter 5 is akin to Chapter 4, but with attention to Australian and Oceanic peopling research and imagery, and with justification for the amalgamation of these regions into a single chapter. Chapter 6 aims at a synthesis of my findings from the preceding chapters, reviewing the means by which “objective” visual forms (i.e.,
manifest power relations and intersect with concepts of normality, legitimacy and inevitability. It proposes that a positive feedback of images and ideas between academic and popular cultures enables the perpetuation of repressive contemporary socio-economic regimes in North America, Australia and the Pacific. Ultimately, it analyses first peopling imagery as an artefact of ideology, a naturalisation of hegemony, and an “everyday talk” that subjugates, or, alternatively, makes disappear indigenous worlds. Chapter 7 then provides several reflective concluding thoughts to my thesis, including comments on certain deficiencies inherent in my arguments, basic possibilities for revamping visual forms in archaeology to more productively—and less stereotypically—represent the past, and recognition that I do not wish for archaeologists to be able to draw true prehistories, but for everyone to be open to seeing and looking at the past differently.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

In the prefatory paragraphs to her appraisal of the predicament of contemporary theory in archaeology, Patty Jo Watson (1991) evokes the image of her first archaeological encounter with a trail of previously undocumented prehistoric human footprints. As Watson recalls, "the big moment...was gazing on those footprints in a physical situation we knew was exactly the same for them as it was for us: time is annihilated, and you are there! I think the moral to be drawn here is [that] the past is real, palpable, and accessible" (1991:266). Arguably Watson’s evocation, as recorded above, divulges at once the bohemianism and the parochialism—the romance and the in-the-dirt materiality—that typify, and yet muddy, archaeology as a scientific endeavour. Her words connect with current and fashionable Anglo-American philosophising on the engaged, interpretive, value-laden and pluralistic character of archaeological research. She hints at emerging concepts of archaeology as theatre, craft, narrative, and poetics (Hodder 1991a; Pluciennik 1999; Shanks 1992; Shanks and Mackenzie 1994; Shanks and McGuire 1996; Tilley 1989, 1993). She is unashamed to engage with Shanks’ (1990) notion of archaeology as a qualitative confrontation with the flesh of prehistory. Concomitantly, her confessed allegiance to a timeless past—a past which is immediately accessible, logical and conspicuous—intimates a rather naive and archaic conviction about archaeology as an untainted, tell-no-lies scientific practice.

Watson’s self-reflective story-telling alludes to a spurious habit. At once, some Anglo-American archaeologists articulate an emergent critical ("post-processual") theory which manifests itself in assorted interrogative, reflexive, and emancipative approaches, and which challenges practitioners to deliberate upon the personal, political, and
ideological implications of the production of archaeological knowledge (Hodder 1985, 1991b, 1997; Leone et al. 1987; Olsen 1991; Potter 1991; Saitta 1991; Shanks and Hodder 1995; Shanks and Tilley 1987a, 1987b). Yet, simultaneously, other professionals subvert this critical theoretical framework via their continued uncritical endorsement of a “no-name” brand of archaeological practice (cf. Barrett 1996:179) which promotes an unproblematised, “down home dirt” methodology (Wylie 1994:6) in the recovery of a timeless past (cf. Flannery 1982). At once, certain archaeologists flatter themselves over their clever contributions to the discipline and their successful invalidations of preceding paradigms (Coudart 1999:163-164; also see Bohannan et al. 1999). Yet, simultaneously, they seem actually to sabotage disciplinary advancement by contradicting their own contentions and by locking themselves “indoors” (after Hodder 1991a:16). This means that it is not uncommon to find archaeologists distracting themselves with sophist-like rhetoric or methodological perfection, and thereby retreating to one of several ivory towers—including the “dusty trench far from the madding crowd” (Kehoe 1998:86)—in an effort to either avoid, or revel in, so-called “pretentious discussions of irrelevancies” (Trigger 1989:31). Just as archaeologists begin to acknowledge the mystery, the intimacy, the subjectivity and popularity that infuse their discipline (Shanks 1990; Shanks and Tilley 1989), so do they often find themselves understating or, conversely, grossly overemphasising these dynamics in their drive to produce a real and progressive science (or art, perhaps) of prehistory. Just as archaeologists begin experimentation with critically incisive paradigms, so too do they appear to exploit this critical theory (or any theory—postprocessual or otherwise) to shield themselves, ironically, from serious criticism.
From my perspective, archaeological philosophy (both past and present) is often stale—little more than a bloated bubble which “merely asserts that the story it tells is real” (Patterson 1989:556), or else a loaded ideological system which simply morphs into a new disguise every time another theoretical bubble is blown. Philosophical developments in archaeology have not rectified long-standing incongruities, nor have they brought about a standardised and enlightened practice (see below; also Trigger 1986). Thus they have not eradicated disciplinary innocence\(^3\) as much as they have diverted onlookers from discerning its lingering presence. Although Shanks and Tilley suggest that “the past is not a fetish in the mud; it is not simply found or observed in an arresting backward glance” (1989:7), this fetish seems still to thrive in fickle philosophical ideals which nurture Patty Jo Watson-like references to annihilated time and overly (or naively) empathetic field experiences. The irony is that as archaeological theory supposedly evolves into a critically and socially responsive enterprise, the products of archaeological practice (including Watson’s evocation) continue to embody a simplicity that inherently undermines any critical philosophical engagement. And such, as per Tilley (1995:341), is the modernist fantasy.

This chapter begins with a brief review of the last 100 years of archaeological theory in North America and abroad. It aims to show that as practitioners have wrestled back and forth over the legitimacy and superiority of various theoretical paradigms, a whole body of archaeological artefacts (namely, images) have slipped through the debate without being subject to \textit{any} real theorisation. Maps, tables, photographs, drawings, illustrations and computer graphics have been left by archaeologists to proliferate

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\(^{3}\) See below for further comment upon archaeological “innocence.”
unchecked, without due scrutiny or much critical deliberation. This is problematic because archaeological theorists have a habit of claiming that the discipline is nothing if not mature and progressive, and that it has “expanded its consciousness” (after Clarke 1973) in ways that have made it acutely aware of facts and knowledge systems that have traditionally gone unspoken. If such is the case, one would expect a general disciplinary consciousness of images among archaeologists, especially considering that pictorial research has a nearly 100-year history in the anthropological field. Unfortunately, advances in archaeological philosophising have not left the majority of practitioners cognizant of the persuasive nature of imagery. Review of pictorial studies conducted by visual anthropologists and other social scientists (see below) suggests that while many researchers are attentive to the seductive capacities of images, most archaeologists are not. Such a predicament has arguably fed yet another “long sleep” in disciplinary theory (after Renfrew 1983). As per Nash, archaeological practitioners “mediate [both physically and metaphorically] between surface and subsurface worlds” (1995:23). I believe that they do the same with images: they fabricate and circulate—maybe unconsciously; certainly indiscriminately—pictorials that appear outwardly benign, but that betray internally shifty and beguiling predilections.

Kelly writes that archaeologists “cannot build a better tomorrow on fictions of yesterday” (1992:263), and he implies that it is a balanced intermingling of robust Anglo-American philosophical perspectives that will facilitate tomorrow’s progressive archaeological science. In response, this chapter argues that those “fictions of yesterday” are in fact inevitable when practitioners (Anglo-American or otherwise) sanction methods that excuse insularity and theoretical arrogance or illiteracy. I refer to archaeological
visual representation as an apt illustration of the ramifications of overvaluing or,
conversely, undervaluing particular philosophical traditions. Distracted by who is right
and who is not, who is versed in appropriate scientific techniques and who is encumbered
by immaterial diversions, archaeologists habitually allow the most harmless-seeming of
artefacts (i.e., their own visual artefacts) to slip past them unnoticed and unproblematised,
with consequences that can prove to be vicious.

*The “Maturation” of Archaeological Theory*

Anglo-American archaeologists have a long custom of embracing and then
quickly recoiling from various *en vogue* theoretical approaches. Between approximately
1900 and 1960, archaeology (American archaeology, particularly) was on the run from
the totalising unilinear evolutionary biases of previous practitioners. Referred to as the
culture-historic era or the classificatory-chronological period, the first half of the 20th
century saw archaeologists becoming increasingly preoccupied with matters of
chronology and detailed geographical and temporal variation. Rejecting the giant-scale
fixations of previous generations, archaeologists at this time jumped upon the study of
small-scale prehistoric change. They indulged in formal artefactual analysis above
comprehensive contemplation of human behaviour, and they were generally absorbed by
typological minutiae. Influenced by diffusionist frameworks and hence by the
conceptions of Franz Boas, archaeology had evolved into a practice devoted to
descriptive detailing and to the endless construction of “trait lists” (Trigger 1980:668-
670). Indeed, the discipline appeared poised to divorce itself from all forms of
generalised interpretation, arguably in an attempt to distinguish itself from its historical roots.

But given the culture-historic tendency toward "obsessive" data collection (Moreland 1991:247) and its strict "study of objects, or of 'dead people's things'" (Nencel 1995:343), it was not long before the next new archaeological theoretical tradition was born: processualism. Originally designated the "New Archaeology," processualism popped up in direct reaction to the particularistic, detail-oriented prejudices of early 20th century practitioners. As per Lamberg-Karlovsky (1989; also Patterson 1990:190; Preucel 1991:19; Shanks and Hodder 1995:3), the New Archaeology was unrepentant in "castigating all that came before it as an inadequate, misconceived 'traditional' archaeology" (Lamberg-Karlovsky 1989:4); indeed, "elders of the 'traditional' approach were caricatured as mentalists communicating with sherds."

Championed by individuals like Lewis Binford, processualism favoured cross-cultural generalisation, law formation, explanatory agendas, and practices of deduction and hypothesis-testing (Shanks and Hodder 1995:3). It sought to advance a value-neutral, positivistic science of archaeology—and it ventured to do so by systematically testing behavioural hypotheses against the facts of the archaeological record so as to generate universal human laws. According to multiple commentators (e.g., Patterson 1990:190-191; Preucel 1991:19; Trigger 1987:523; VanPool and VanPool 1999:38; Watson 1991:267), processualism was nourished by various behaviouralist, methodological objectivist, economic rationalist, and utilitarian paleocological ideals. As per Thomas, the New Archaeology "believed that there was a single truth about the past that could be accessed as long as one had the right approach, and did the right kind of science"
(2000:1). That science—that right approach—was functionalist and materialist in nature: it focused on men and women as controlled by a larger system; and it perceived individual cognitive processes as superfluous or subordinate to the search for cross-cultural behavioural generalisations (Hodder 1985:7). As Hodder has written, processualism typified a “complacent supportive ideology of a timeless past in which Man the passive and efficient animal is controlled by laws that he cannot usurp” (1985:23).

Importantly, the processualist approach was popular. It was understood as a means of disciplinary liberation from the “medieval darkness” (Wylie 1994:5) of tradition approaches (Lamberg-Karlovsky 1989:4; Moreland 1991:247; Shanks and Tilley 1987a:30-32; Trigger 1980:668-670). It was seen as the key step in shedding the “innocence” (or, more realistically, the ignorance) and lack of so-called “self-consciousness” that had long plagued archaeology (Clarke 1973; also Earle and Preucel 1987). But by the late 1970s/early 1980s, processualists themselves were seeking liberation from their own paradigm. Tired of the “dogmatic realism” (Schaafsma 1991:69), the “Law and Order” framework (Bradley 1993:131), the “technological antiquarianism” (Shanks and Mackenzie 1994:23), the “econothink” mentality (Watson 1991:267), the “golly gee, Mr. Science” naivety (Kohl 1993:13), and the homogenising and positivist propensities behind the New Archaeology, some practitioners seemed ready to discard processualism in support of a new “post-processualist” strategy. They wanted a more engaged, ideologically-aware theory—one that contemplated process in conjunction with culture, social systems with individuals, adaptive change with history, and science with the subjective (after Hodder 1985:13). Post-processualism, it was
argued, could offer an escape from the crude “Mickey Mouse” laws (Courbin 1988 *reviewed in* Moreland 1991:250-251; also Flannery 1982) that processualism had fashioned. Moreover, it could appreciate the world (and the archaeological record specifically) as it truly was: composed of living, breathing, emotional, creative, manipulative, and fallible human beings (cf. Shanks and Hodder 1995; Shanks and Tilley 1989).

Post-processualism, however, has been notoriously hard to define. Bintliff has called it a “ragbag of Continental philosophies and a commitment to particular contemporary political causes” (1992:113). I would suggest that it is more like a commitment to trouncing processualist thought via dismantling logical positivism and the “legendary view of science” (wherein total objectivity and rationality can ensure the attainment of enlightenment) (VanPool and VanPool 1999:40). In the end, post-processualism has strived to expose how neo-conservative Capitalist morals have infiltrated our interpretations of the past. It has also embraced the notion that human beings actively engage with their social environments, constructing and being constructed by culture, as opposed to being slaves to a cultural (or biological or environmental) monolith.

The problem is that post-processualism, like processualism before it, and culture historicism before that, and unilinear evolutionism even before that, is not perfect. While post-processual scholars (e.g., Hodder 1986:ix, 2001:1-3; Tilley 1998:693) might be prepared to applaud themselves for finally and *positively* provoking disciplinary maturity—for launching a *genuinely* critical, *genuinely* critically “self-conscious” archaeology (e.g., Leone et al. 1987; Shanks and Tilley 1987a; Thomas 1995; Thomas
and Tilley 1992:108)—such applause is questionable. As detractors have noted, post-processualism is riddled with hypocrisy, as evidenced by its elitist discourse, its non-ideological ideology, and its methodological impotence (e.g., Binford 1989:27-40; Bintliff 1991, 1992, 1993; Bulbeck 2000; Earle and Preucel 1987; Hill 1991:49; Moore 1994a; Trigger 1995; Washburn 1987; Watson 1990; Wilkie and Bartoy 2000).

Processualists have been quick to condemn post-processualists for their “rhetorical puffery” (Bintliff 1992:111), and for their “Yippie” excesses (Binford 1989:28). In turn, post-processualists have been quick to respond with attacks on the processualist character (Watson 1990:679; Yoffee and Sheratt 1993:5), and with orders for New Archaeologists to “stop wafting” their “heavily decomposing scientific red herring...in front of our noses” (Shanks and Tilley 1989:47; Wylie 2000). Preucel (1991:11) and Watson (1991:267) have characterised this back-and-forth contest over stereotypes and straw-men as a form of gladiatorial combat which has secured “telling blows” for both contenders. Schaafsma perhaps better expresses it as a “case of the fogbound fighting with the fogbound, in an unquestionably difficult morass” (1991:68). Likewise, Lamberg-Karlovsky speaks of “bad science” confronting “poor philosophy” (1989:8), or, following Watson, “soulless method” versus “methodless soul” (1991:270). I appreciate this debate to be akin to Asch’s description of the “Self and Oppositional Other” relationship wherein parties “speak past each other, not to each other...[They] see each other in the third person, as objects to be manipulated” (2001:205). Indeed, this relationship appears to underscore what Stephenson (2001:15) describes as our culture of competition. Within this competitive social atmosphere, the processualists and the post-
processualists assume adversarial positions and are propelled forward by the dream of a triumphant win.

Problematically, such a dream of triumph seems fantastical, especially given that a majority of archaeologists just do not care. Indeed, despite the pomp, the theoretical lingo of Anglo-American archaeology is not universally understood (Trigger 1986); it arguably stands as just another “closed shop” amongst a variety of intellectual schools (after Thomas and Tilley 1992:107; see Chippindale 1987:515; also Knapp 1996:147; Rowlett 1987:523). British and American approaches, while undeniably influential (Trigger 1981), do not constitute global theory: they are not known to everyone, not found everywhere. Post-processual paradigms are variously nonexistent or ignored in international archaeological contexts (e.g., Australia, as per Smith 1995 and Huchet 1991:48; and France, as per Coudart 1999); and both processualism and post-processualism are, rather patronisingly, classed by some as “respectable” exoticisms (Coudart 1999:166-167) and impugned by others as products of an “archaeological Howard Cosell” (Flannery 1982:271). In Australia, the practice of archaeology did not even gain professional status until the 1960s (Colley 2000:172; also cf. Brazilian archaeology, as per Funari 2000:183), which suggests that pothunting served as the dominant Australian philosophical leaning at a time when processualist thought was first emerging in Anglo-America. Indeed, into the 1980s, scholars still could not identify regional traditions in Australian archaeology, and the discipline was rightfully chastised for its apparent theoretical unconsciousness (Murray and White 1981:258, 263). Even in the 1990s, with post-processualism well-established overseas, Australian archaeologists experimented almost exclusively with basic deterministic frameworks and cultural
materialist strategies (Huchet 1991), proving themselves enduringly unresponsive to the “mature” theoretical developments of abroad. Similarly, in the Pacific, archaeology’s socio-political dimensions merited barely a mention until just five years past, and Oceanic archaeologists seem still to harbour a-theoretical tendencies as they look toward more objective truths as the only means to “get the story right” (Spriggs 1999:114-116, 120).

Perhaps humorously, then, as some Anglo-Americans allude to the be-all and end-all nature of their archaeological approaches, practitioners elsewhere have shown themselves to be often barely cognizant of, or else indifferent to, these philosophies. Indeed, in Anglo-America itself, practitioners have not been afraid to petition for a return to the good-old-days (for an opportunity to “get back to work,” to “get on with the job,” to, indeed, reclaim archaeological innocence (Wylie 1994:6; also Flannery 1982; Johnson 1987:518; Moore 1994b)). Realistically, however, neither theoretical hubris nor local ignorance/indifference are reasonable responses to archaeological developments. Whether one relentlessly trumpets the intellectual superiority of his/her theoretical paradigm or hides behind an antiquated and conservative tradition, the outcome is an equally blinding (in fact, nearly indistinguishable) set of strategies which comfortably serve as “alibis for cultural escapism” (Tilley 1990:129); which enable a contemptible—but aesthetically pleasing—“fantastic archaeology” (cf. Williams 1991) that is unreliable and inherently narrow-minded (cf. Trigger 1986:4). In my mind, this history of theoretical (and sometimes a-theoretical) posturing between specialists (Mackenzie 1994), their tendency to vilify past approaches and to then contrive new conceptual categories in retort (e.g., “processual-plus” (Hegmon 2003) as a more recent example),
and their back-and-forth strivings for a "good" archaeology, have actually belied all
claims to, and prospects for, full disciplinary maturity.

The remainder of this chapter builds upon this theoretical background to suggest
that while philosophical conceptions in, and of, archaeology might have ripened,
enduring faith in an eventual archaeological "loss of innocence" (or, for that matter, a
"return to innocence") is illusory. Although scholars have awakened to nationalist,
colonialist, masculinist and presentist biases in the field (e.g., Conkey and Spector 1984;
Díaz-Andreu and Champion 1996; Gero 1985; Gero et al. 1983; Gosden 2001; Kohl and
Fawcett 1995; Trigger 1984), although they have unapologetically unleashed the
"archaeological octopus" (as per Lorblanchet 1993 in Bednarik 2003b:518) upon the
academic world (suctioning themselves onto the insights of philosophy, anthropology and
literary criticism in the hopes of attaining theoretical enlightenment), and although they
have newly confronted the insidious manipulations of discourse and text (e.g., Hodder
1989; Tilley 1989, 1990), as well as the more overt, but long unwritten exploits of the
prehistoric human agent (e.g., Dornan 2002), it is still far too presumptuous to speak of
an immanent end to disciplinary naivety. Indeed, to hop upon the bandwagon of lost
innocence in archaeology is to wilfully blind oneself to the slippery and still fallible
products of contemporary research. It is to voice a hollow "rhetoric of change" (after
Ireland 2000:71) whose convincing academic verbiage about self-consciousness and
maturation eclipses the dangerously problematical subjects and objects of current
archaeological inquiry. As Pearson colourfully notes, "archaeologists could benefit from
a certain humility which sacrifices not our expertise and knowledge but our pomposity
and self-importance as high priests of the past" (1998:684). Such humility is born only of
a (self)critical mind and a continuously vigilant eye, of a desire to complicate
proclamations of archaeology’s lost innocence and to wrestle with paradigmatically
uncomfortable materials, rather than to comfortably accept the status quo or ache for a
revival of the good-old-times (cf. Nash 1995:24). Decades of theoretical polemic in the
discipline have debatably illuminated “multiple ways of knowing the past” (Preucel 1991,
1995; also Knapp 1996:152), but they have not eradicated archaeological naivety. In
reality, they have scarcely exposed the most naive—the most unsuspecting and, at once,
most suspect—of archaeological artefacts: images.

The Power of Pictures

It is somewhat curious that as archaeologists generally begin to acknowledge the
social context of their practice, and generally begin to react to long-time disciplinary
taken-for-granteds, they still tend to tolerate insensitivity to the production, circulation
and consumption of archaeological images (especially visual portrayals of the prehistoric
world). At a time when it is conceded (by Anglo-Americans in particular) that the
conjecture, chance findings, negative evidence, disturbed landscapes and hit-and-run
contracts of archaeology can only ever yield a qualified, partial knowledge of prehistory,
many archaeologists nevertheless appear prepared to trivially manipulate and disseminate
certain disciplinary artefacts (specifically, visual representations) as though they were
absolute scientific truisms. I suppose, however, that it is not exceptionally surprising that
a discipline which only recently recognised the relevance of archaeology to the public
(e.g., Jameson 1997; also see Irish and Clark 1999), and which, internationally, has
agreed to not much more than a fuzzy interest in “how people lived in the past” (Trigger
1986:13), should engage with pictorials in a haphazard fashion. Orser, commenting on the purpose of contemporary archaeology, notes that “gone are the days when archaeology could be seen as a purely intellectual pursuit designed to enrich the mind and extol the virtues of human creativity” (2001:465). But an analysis of archaeological images suggests that an unacknowledged and complex—even violent—wielding of visual elements by practitioners has woven intellectualism, creativity, the public and its “heritage” into a complicated disciplinary morass. Preucel unwittingly touches upon the complications and paradoxes inherent in the uncritical manufacture and distribution of archaeological visual materials when he writes that “for all our professed interest in material culture, we have made very little progress in understanding how objects [read: images] move into and out of contexts of commodification, how they are ascribed value and meaning, or how they transform social practice” (1995:162). Pictorials are intrinsically tempting and powerful, productive and transformative; they are resurrections (Barthes 1977:32), pornographies (Kappeler 1986; Shanks and Tilley 1987a:79-80), and materialities (Wright 2004). They “make the world obvious” (Fyfe and Law 1988:12) and yet they mystify, disguise, deny: they are fugitive (Berger 1972:11, 18, 30). With reference to photography, Wright states that an image is a “post-mortem memorial, a monument, and an object that, in its immanence, achieves or conjures up an ‘impossible’ presence” (2004:76). As with any technological production—any object of material culture—imagery makes intangibilities tangible; it concretises cultural values, ideas, and epistemologies; it is self-representation—the embodiment of subjectivity; it has a life history: a past, a present and future (Berman 1999:288; Dobres 2000:28; Kappeler 1986:2-3, 53; cf. Holtorf 2002; Shanks 1997:88). And, whether practitioners
acknowledge it or not, so it is with archaeological representations of the past.

Problematically, however, perusal of most archaeological texts attests both to the common practice of wallpapering the literature with pictorial displays (cf. Banks 2001:17) and, significantly, to the almost complete lack of active analysis of pictures and picturing practices. Despite the recognised importance of images to the conveyance of archaeological knowledge (e.g., Adkins and Adkins 1989), it is habitual for archaeologists to interact with visual representations as axiomatic windows-on-the-world, as neutral reflections of an unquestioned and unquestionable reality, or, alternatively, as a sort of superfluous tinsel which is tossed in merely to decorate the written text. Even in those cases where practitioners do appreciate imagery as something more substantial than a mere prop, they tend, separately, to confess to a complete lack of technical visual training and, therefore, to an inexpert knowledge of visual communication (e.g., Struever 1995:193); and they are often then quick to exile pictorials to the province of popular culture (or to the “visual ghetto” of academia (after Ruby 2000:24)), rejecting them as objects remote from the business of archaeological professionalism, as vulgarities of science or as entertaining diversions (Moser 2001:263; Struever 1995; also Grimshaw 2001:5; Molyneaux 1997:1). But to ignore or discount the force, the agency, the presence and history of imagery is to gravely misjudge its character, and, more severely, it is to dispense with so much “mature” disciplinary theory by reverting to a passive, uniformitarian archaeology wherein humans and their material productions (including images) behave unsurprisingly, inexorably, just as “sand grains being washed down a slope behave entirely as one could predict” (Bednarik 2003b:512; also Dobres 2000:29-35). Realistically, visual representation is far from passive. It is, at once, un-locatable
and "aseptically anonymous" (Schneider 1993:4 in Pearce 1999:23), yet locatable—authored and overt—specific to a place and a creator. It is seemingly a temporal but intimately knowable, infinitely plastic and often irresponsible, but it is also discriminating, homogenising, and pacifying (e.g., Edwards 1992:7; Haraway 1991:190-191; Law and Whittaker 1988; also see Kappeler 1986:55). Like vision itself, visual representation is "unregulated gluttony" (Haraway 1991:189); and, yet, it casts a shadow, it throws us into darkness, it can limit our sight (Bryson 1988:92). Quite frankly, it is a travesty for archaeologists—the very authorities on material culture and its movements, engagements and manipulations—to overlook imagery as an active and productive archaeological tool. Following Tilley, "I touch an object with my hand and am simultaneously touched by it" (Holtorf 2002:54). As I contend, this is no less true of pictorials than it is of endscrapers or hammerstones.

Accordingly, mine is a perspective that draws upon recent visual anthropological theory (e.g., Banks and Morphy 1997; Devereaux and Hillman 1995; Pink 2001) to suggest that, beyond simplistic realist representations, archaeological images are presentations—constructions—that are powerful and seductive in nature. Although typically paraded as static and legitimate products of "the gaze"—"the disembodied eye of observation" (Grimshaw 2001:67)—it is my belief that images are in fact embodied, contextualised, heterogeneous fabrications whose lenses hold the potency both to captivate and persuade their audience, and to frame as truth that which is often make-believe. Furthermore, aligned with recent visual studies, I maintain that such imagery is bolstered by an innocuousness that facilitates an easy slippage (i.e., confusion) between articulations of supposed reality and various cultural, political and ideological interests
(e.g., Bal 1996; Haraway 1989; Mitchell 1998). With its genealogy traceable to the early twentieth century (Grimshaw 2001), the visual anthropological tradition has shifted from a rather messy pictorial strategy (notably filmic and photographic in scope) committed to recording (or salvaging) undilutable truths “out there” in the “real world” (see Collier 1962; El Guindi 1998; Mead 1995:8-10; Morphy and Banks 1997), to a reflexive specialist subdiscipline that has opened itself up to multiperspectival visual readings of, what Worth calls, the “truth of what is in there, in the anthropologist’s mind” (1981:190). Unfastening itself from its conservative, prescriptive and objectifying (naively realist) historical tendencies, contemporary visual anthropological practice increasingly concedes to the surprising, flexible, and transportable character of imagery which is all-too-frequently hidden behind a falsely coherent and deceitfully mute package (e.g., Banks 2001; Edwards 1997; Morphy and Banks 1997; Pink 2001). And visual anthropologists, while now appreciating that no single perspective has any god-like claim upon the truth, finally speak to the potential for using images—carefully and warily so as not to replicate past injustices—as means of commentary upon, and resistance to, hegemonic (visual) regimes (e.g., see Banks and Morphy 1997). Most importantly, newly identified visual anthropological methodologies, both for making and for studying imagery, now enable researchers to interact with pictorials not as fossilised testaments to actuality, nor as pretty pictures amongst so many sophisticated scientific words, but as problematic creations; as promiscuous and eternally reinterpretable but arresting (and seemingly opinionated) cultural artefacts which make our acquaintance—embrace and tempt us—and then often do not let us go (MacDougall 1997:286; also El Guindi 1998; Mead 1995; Molyneaux 1997; Worth 1981:191).
Disappointingly, the archaeological response to imagery has yet to prove as nuanced and adaptive as that of visual anthropology, for archaeologists have generally failed to apply the insights of contemporary visual studies to their current research. Indeed, since the 1900s, archaeological attentiveness to images has shown itself to be untenably shallow, with practitioners tending unilaterally to draw upon visual representations merely for "the facts"; that is, for uncomplicated and reliable-seeming recordings and replications of artifactual evidence. Interestingly, as Worth (1981:189; also El Guindi 1998) explains, it was archaeologists who actually pioneered the long commonplace (visual) anthropological practice of utilising images to tell the truth about the world. It was archaeologists, therefore, who introduced the most powerful visual conceptual paradigm (i.e., images as evidence) into the visual anthropological subdiscipline. Now, one hundred years later, as visual anthropologists thankfully relieve themselves of the illusions of this paradigm, archaeologists (despite all of their "mature" theoretical and methodological posturing) have not responded in kind and, hence, still generally labour under its facile and outmoded visions. Perhaps most disturbingly, archaeologists—who are often quick to cite from interdisciplinary literature (whether positivist or postmodernist or otherwise in orientation), and whose discipline has evident historical interconnections with visual anthropology—rarely attend to contemporary visual subjects. They often make little effort to clearly reference images,\(^4\) to therefore acknowledge the circumstances of pictorial production (which consequently, as per Molyneaux, effects a "suppression of individuality" (1997:5)), or to acquaint themselves

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\(^4\) I will return to this point in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In my mind, clear referencing does not include writing the initials of a visual artist along the vertical border of their image in 5-point font, nor does it include acknowledging their name on the last page of a 500 page document, within an enormous list of illustrators, again in tiny font. One would rarely see the name of a principal author of an archaeological report printed in 5-point font and hidden at the back of the document or in other bizarre contexts.
with semiotic or communication theory (see Ruby 2000 for a comparable example amongst ethnographic filmmakers). The insensitivity of such a strategy was made obvious to me at a recent conference (CASCA—Canadian Anthropology Society, 2004) by an anthropologist who excused archaeological visual negligence on the basis that archaeologists usually do not have access to “good illustrators,” do not have creative control over illustrative productions, or do not themselves have any illustrative talent.

While I do not deny that concerns over control and authorial license can upset academic (and popular) publications, I would argue that similar concerns materialise themselves in all aspects of archaeological study, from project design to field direction and paper-writing, and practitioners respond appropriately; that is, they do not habitually relinquish all command to non-experts, sacrificing their research and reputations to uneducated and uninterested third parties. Countless imperfections invade academic programmes—funding bodies ration financing, educational institutions deny resources, colleagues contest scientific findings, hypotheses prove erroneous, periodicals refuse or limit written contributions, incompetent research assistants mar crucial analyses—and yet scholars adapt to, and manage, such conditions; they do not automatically and unquestioningly toss their projects aside or rationalise negligence or indifference on account of the emergence of imperfect circumstances. This is not the case, however, in terms of sensitive and adequate visual representation, where the archaeological desire to be apathetic is palpable.

I am not (and cannot defend one who is) an apologist for indifference. Never would a scholar openly pardon methodological incompetence, deficient research, shoddy referencing, or inept and unskilled reasoning in textual, word-based productions. Never
would a scholar admittedly outsource scientific argumentation (i.e., the construction and subsequent written presentation of a sound and supportable scientific contention) to untrained others. Never would a scholar expect sympathy and professional concessions for his/her talentlessness in substantiating a technical claim. Only in a discipline which is unworried about image-making processes and the dynamical effects of imagery upon its audience—a discipline which does not respect, does not recognise, or, more likely, does not comprehend the constitutive dimensions of images (images as statements, as interpretations, as deductions in themselves)—would a scholar be granted forgiveness for his/her status as a visual ignoramus. Thirty years past, Ruby (1973) lambasted the anthropological community for its tourist-like (inexpert and theoretically inconsiderate) affinity for taking pictures in the field; for producing anthropological pictorials indistinguishable from those of non-anthropologists. Today, I would argue that the visual practices of archaeologists are akin to those of the anthropological “tourist,” as they shoot pictures unintelligently, or, even more unintelligently, contract the responsibility out to non-professionals. Indeed, this thesis both demonstrates and protests the indistinguishability of archaeological from non-archaeological imagery, and questions why it is that archaeologists are necessary trained as responsible and conscientious field workers, yet are not similarly educated as responsible and conscientious image-makers. While it might be suggested, via appeal to a common anthropological pretext, that archaeologists’ casual and amateurish handling of pictorials is a justifiable product of “iconophobia” (an extreme anxiety over and fearfulness of visual representation and its monocuclear, ideological “bossiness” (Taylor 1996:67-72)), such alleged phobia has not, as might be expected, induced archaeologists to police the content of imagery or to restrict
or deny its usage, nor has it persuaded most practitioners to think critically and vocally about the consequences of indiscriminate image production and display. Instead, the opposite effect has arguably manifested itself. The recent elaboration and complication of visual anthropological theory, together with the self-described theoretical maturation of the archaeological discipline, has resulted in no apparent and concerted investment of effort into the investigation, regulation or curbing of archaeological image-making practices, and, thus, has actually weakened any plausible archaeological claims to iconophobia. The more that visual theory has exposed the potentially fearful and dangerous (phobia-inducing) elements of visual representation, the more that archaeologists seem to have (fearlessly) exploited imagery in their publications. Although I cannot certify that archaeological image production and circulation has indeed proliferated in recent years, a quick perusal of the archaeological literature (periodicals, textbooks, websites, etc.) bears witness to the reality that pictorials are not clearly more cautiously or reservedly applied than before. In fact, the situation appears to be comparable to that of ethnographers. As ethnographic writers grow ever more alert to the fabricated nature of anthropological texts (ever more mature, that is), ethnographic films grow, at once, increasingly naive (Bloch 1988 in Taylor 1996:66). Rather than drawing upon current critical theoretical thought, current visual anthropological study, current communications research and so on, filmmakers (and, I believe, archaeologists as well) “deny” (as per Hastrup in Taylor 1996:72), “or worse, don’t even realize—that they are part of the plot.”

However, in case it be thought that the apparent pictorial inattentiveness of ethnographic filmmakers and archaeologists is somehow natural and therefore
expectable, or is merely indicative of a universal and thus unavoidable scientific visual illiteracy, it is worth recollecting the history of scientific image studies and theory development. Non-archaeologists, it seems, generally identify with a longer and more penetrative history of visual awareness and visual self-critique than do archaeological practitioners themselves. Indeed, the tired anthropological adage that theoretical insight comes twenty years later to archaeology than to all others—that archaeology begrudgingly and flaggingly adopts (or simply concedes to) pre-existing theory rather than independently generating any such theory—appears alive and factual when considering it against the record of visual study that has been applied to other sciences. In particular, over thirty years of investigation (by non-archaeologists) into practices of scientific representation testifies to the existence of multifarious, discipline-specific, highly-influential visual languages in which icons and pictorial constructions are arranged such that, collectively—and often in tandem with text—they both produce and communicate scientific knowledge (see, for example, Baigrie 1996; Fyfe and Law 1988; Lynch and Woolgar 1988; Pang 1997). Among others, research by Rudwick (1976) into the visual habits of geologists, by Mitchell (1998) into the “disease” of representation that infects palaeontologists, by Myers (1988) into the illustrative persuasiveness of E.O. Wilson’s scientific text Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, by Dumit (1997) and Rapp (1997) into biomedical imaging and its reconfiguration of the nature of human nature, and by Traweek (1997) into the aesthetic “pleasures” of particle physicists, calls attention to imagery as an assumed witness to reality, to fact, to symmetry and order which distils complex conceptions into intelligible conventions: lines, points, arrows, colours, captions, shading, borders, and rubber stamp symbols. Via manipulation of scale,
proportion, proximity, and stylisation, and by variously drawing upon semi-naturalistic techniques, photographic realism, commonsense appeal and supposed self-evidence, scientists—backed by their “citadel of scientific certainty” (Dumit 1997:85)—exploit illustrations, maps, graphs and photos to speak truth to the world; to compress the most diffuse of understandings into “finely tuned” (neutral, pocket-sized, concrete) units (Rapp 1997:39; also Law and Whittaker 1988; Myers 1988). At once so simple and so dense, scientific representations necessarily homogenise, discriminate, and suppress information whilst being propped up by authorised text—by Science. Photographs are utilised as seemingly unembellished freezings of time; graphs and flowcharts concede an “objectness” and a fluidity to concepts which otherwise lack material presence; drawings become inconspicuous caricatures of reality, highlighting relevancies at the same time as they fade divergent readings into obscurity; maps shift three-dimensions into two-dimensions, places and spaces into dots and lines, and time and life into virtual nothingness; and all of these pictorial distortions take place unproblematically, as second nature to us (Baigrie 1996; Law and Whittaker 1988; Myers 1988; Rudwick 1976). These images (whether of dinosaur bones, landscapes, or the movement of cancerous cells) act as domestications and, oftentimes, as miniaturisations, making us feel safe and informed (Mitchell 1998:11); they are thus powerfully compact and mobile and, so, can be repositioned, can prove all-knowing and overwhelming, can “burn indelible outlines into the mind” which normalise abnormalities and rationalise all reasonings (Mathews 1993 in Moser 1998:6; also Rapp 1997:37). As Baigrie drollly frames it, this authoritative personality of pictures has long been devalued against (or, paradoxically, has gone entirely unseen because of) the seemingly more authoritative and respectable “textual
deposits" (1996:xviii) of scientists. It is only with the aforementioned pictorial-centred science studies that credit has finally been given to imagery as a utensil that actually does work, performs a job, makes conversation, allows us to see that which its author wants us to see, literally colours our thoughts, and removes imperfections and then substitutes them with tight, clean visual contentions (Baigrie 1996; Fyfe and Law 1988:2; Jones and Galison 1998:6; Lynch and Woolgar 1988:viii).

However, it is important to note that such inquiry into scientific visualisation is bred primarily by sociologists and philosophers of science who have tenuous—if any—experiential links to training and scholarship in the hard sciences or to first-hand laboratory research. With ethnographers and sociology lecturers therefore generating the bulk of scientific representation studies, one might be quick to dismiss my preceding assessment of the pictorial sensitivity of non-archaeological scientists as nothing but confused and groundless glorification. But as Rudwick (1976:150) has claimed, several academic fields (including both medicine and technology-development) do indeed have long-standing appreciations of the gravity of visual representation—appreciations which stem unavoidably from these fields’ disciplinary statuses as highly visual scientific practices. Archaeology too is a highly visible science whose digging-in-the-dirt-to-locate-the-material-past dogma connotes the most corporeal and sighted of experiences, and whose very disciplinary lexicon is explicitly visual in nature or, at least, is visually-loaded (think: survey, screen, profile, exposure, cache, grid, horizon, field, perspective, feature, specimen, Munsell charts, plan view, site) (see Fyfe and Law 1988:3 and Jay

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5 As Latour and Woolgar (1986:273) write about Bruno Latour’s first observations upon entering into a two-year study of a laboratory and its scientific work(er)s: “Professor Latour’s knowledge of science was non-existent.”

6 In fact, it could be reasoned that archaeology is, overall, a uniquely sensuous science given its visual, aural, oral, tactile and olfactory dimensions.
1993 for similar interdisciplinary observations). Archaeological fieldwork, as per Shanks and Tilley, is nucleated in a “visual metaphor of knowledge” (1987a:22): it is about observation, voyeurism, and spectacle. But that archaeology could simultaneously be so ocular-centric and yet so visually unaware is illogical.

It is only in the last fifteen years, pioneered almost exclusively by the archaeologist Stephanie Moser (e.g., 1992a; 1992b; 1996; 1998; 1999; 2001; 2003; Moser and Gamble 1997), that a critique of archaeological picturing strategies has at last punctured the discipline. While certainly not the first practitioner to acknowledge the significance of imagery to the transmission of archaeological information (e.g., see Adkins and Adkins 1989),7 Moser is definitely one of the earliest archaeologists toconcertedly submit disciplinary illustrative traditions to de-construction. Although intermittent scholarly works by, for instance, Conkey (1987), Leone (1981a, 1981b), and Shanks and Tilley (1987a:68-99)—all of which predate the publications of Moser—have confronted the alluring, sometimes sinister and sneaky dimensions to archaeological representations (maps, museum displays and museum reconstructions specifically), Moser has founded a full-time academic career on critical studies of disciplinary visualisations. From student in Australia to her current status as professor at the University of Southampton, Moser has tended to the problematical aspects of archaeological images; to imagery as more than (or less than?) absolute truth rendered pictorially. Her analyses of “scientific” Neanderthal depictions, ancestral hominid missing-link reconstructions, and generalised portrayals of human antiquity (e.g., 1992a,

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7 Indeed, every introductory post-secondary archaeology course admits as much, as undergraduate students are painstakingly instructed in, and tested upon, the art of technical archaeological illustration. As Adkins and Adkins (1989:10) dubiously assert, “even if archaeologists have no desire or time to prepare their own illustrations, it is fundamentally important that they have some experience of preparing illustrations.”
1996, 1998) underscore the subtle ability of pictures to sway and convince their audiences, as well as the acuity with which vivid visual representations can solidify into perennially-appealing and ideologically-satisfying stereotypes. As per Moser (especially Moser and Gamble 1997; also Moser 1996), whilst exploiting a standard visual vocabulary (including clubs, caves, nakedness, wild animals, etc.) that has been milked since classical Greek and Roman times, archaeological illustration is squeezed with extraneous detail, puffed up to the point of near caricature, and framed tautly within a body of authoritative text. Such visual representation not only parcels together, and thus endeavours to make succinct sense of, an archaeological argument that is usually splayed out across multiple pages of written words, but it does so inconspicuously (oftentimes without any physical data to substantiate it (e.g., Moser 1992a)) and unsurprisingly (i.e., it literally fleshes out humanity as we would expect; formulaically; utilising iconography and realist conventions which have long been familiar to and comfortable for us (Moser 1996:188; 2001)). As comprehensive theory-laden contentions (what Molyneaux calls “worlds in themselves...positive forces leading opinions, rather than following words” (1997:8)), such pictures easily limit our thinking about, and certainly restrict our visions of, the human past, thereby conveying the most logical message that “this is solid stuff, not to be challenged, and not challengeable” (Moser 1996:187). As Moser (2003) sees it, archaeological visual representation is therefore inherently conservative both in the sense that its typical icons have been recycled relentlessly over time, and in the sense that so few individuals have pierced the deceptive glass box (or, more appropriately, black box) of supposed accuracy and innocence and reason that encases it.

Whether come by independently or born of Moser’s creative scholarship, research
into archaeology’s various picturing strategies has multiplied and been embellished in recent years as academics have, among other things, criticised Moser’s own work (Mann 2003), published multiple edited visual-archaeology-focused volumes (Molyneaux 1997; Smiles and Moser 2005), and investigated such topics as archaeological filmic representation (Piccini 1996), images of cave man hairiness (Berman 1999), and depictions of Palaeolithic womanly duties (Gifford Gonzalez 1993). Importantly, several of these latest studies have grappled with forms of visual communication that have typically been neglected; namely forms closest to the everyday field and lab practice of archaeology—to the science of archaeology: e.g., technical drawings (Van Reybrouck 1998), photography (Shanks 1997), and all of the other assorted images (unit profiles, plan views, etc.) common to an archaeological project (see contributions in Hodder 2000, particularly Leibhammer 2000). Moser herself (e.g., 2001) has acknowledged her research’s partiality toward illustrative modes of representation. As she explains, illustrations (which are chiefly bound for popular spectatorship in museums, art galleries and commercial publications) are the primary means by which archaeologists make the human past meaningful both for the public and for archaeologists themselves. Moser is right to point out the thin (mostly illusory) line that carves public pictures from scientific representations, for the singular, dramatic, persuasive and authentic-seeming illustrations that prove so entertaining for popular audiences are often the very same illustrations which entice future archaeologists to enter the field. There is no “great divide” between academicians and everyone else (see Latour 1988 for a similar argument about pre-scientific versus scientific cultures): archaeological scholars are bred of common people who might find themselves excited by personal adventure and an Indiana Jones-like
romance of discovery (see Shanks and Tilley 1987a:23). Stated somewhat theatrically, archaeologists are people too; or, as Moser phrases it, “we too are part of the so-called wider public” (2001:264); thus to relegate popular images to some sort of comic, escapist or pedestrian realm—to engage with them only as silly by-products of serious scientific enquiry—is to conveniently ignore the obvious. It is to fall prey to the very conservatism and naivety that have long pursued archaeological studies. Truthfully, such fear of popular imagery is only one component of a much larger academic anxiety over all things public; an anxiety that is made blatant in oft-repeated but obtuse assertions like “widespread interest...[in archaeology] has led to a frightening commercialization and even to frequent abuse of the human record” (Jameson and Ehrenhard 1997:9). The apparent lack of awareness of archaeologists’ own complicity in this commercialization and abuse is astonishing. Indeed, the situation is perhaps comparable to Banks’ (2001:44, 22) account of the “on-duty”-“off-duty” visual researcher who spends the day critically de-constructing imagery, and then, without misgivings, returns to his/her home ready to uncritically and complacently consume newspaper photographs as though they were transparent reflections on the real world. Archaeologists, drawing upon public funding to support their research, committed to public education via university teaching, hiring non-academics (public professionals) to illustrate their findings, and often publishing popular books and cooperating with popular magazines/media outlets to sustain their careers and their pocketbooks, find themselves always active in an unavoidable and entangled public-scholarly interchange. To turn around and cry foul the moment that commercial endeavours and popular interests begin to appear more intrusive than might seem comfortable is hypocrisy. The mere act of producing a flowchart or table (i.e., sketching
a series of vertical and horizontal lines around numbers and words) for inclusion in an academic report is itself a rather dramatic form of abstraction intended to make data interpretable to a group—albeit a scholarly group. Lacking, however, some of the spectacular and emotional “master” imagery (Myers 1988:232) of popular illustrative styles, and having seemingly more orderly (obedient?) and credible manufacturers and readers than do illustrations, such archaeological representation is habitually perceived as neutral and incontestable fact.

From my perspective it is really only a small leap from these sorts of “dependable” academic images to popular pictures of Neanderthals wielding wooden clubs in the wilderness: they are all products of, and statements about, the same science. Moser has not yet commented in depth upon this explicit link between scholarly and popular image types (although see Moser 1992a), and her definition of archaeological representation as “a relatively new field of inquiry... [focused] on the construction of knowledge by the diverse range of ‘non-academic’ media that present the past” (2003:3; emphasis mine) seems to negate even the possibility of such a linkage. Most interestingly, Moser’s interest in illustrations and museum dioramas (to the exclusion of alternative forms of visualisation) could also be understood as its own statement about singular, dramatic and persuasive representation. The sporadic contributions of some other archaeologists to the study of visualisation have not gone far in expanding our understandings of archaeological pictures, possibly as a result of their often pin-hole sized focus on such topics as nineteenth century technical drawings of Neanderthal skulls (Van Reybrouck 1998) or photographs as photowork (Shanks 1997) or cave man hairiness (Berman 1999) or generalised cave man icons (Gamble 1992) or prehistoric
men in children’s books (Burtt 1987). These studies have tended to be pop-culture inclined, somewhat impenetrable (in terms of post-processual discourse), or illustration-biased and hence unresponsive to different (non-illustrative) forms of representation (although see Dobres 2000:20-32, and papers in Hodder 2000 for likely exceptions). Such features have arguably made it easy, then, for a majority of archaeologists to shelve this research as nothing more than inward-looking commentary on pretty pictures detached from everyday business in the field.

Of course, it is possible to refer to sociologically-oriented studies of imagery for insight into more field-based and form-conscious (versus content-focused) visual interpretive strategies, but the degree to which such studies correct existing problems found in archaeological representation research is debatable. Arguably sociological looks at visual representation attend to the traditional “stuff” of science more so than do the looks of certain archaeologists: they are not exclusive exposés of cartoon-like illustrative conventions (as seen in some cave man pictorial research), but reflections on charts, diagrams, models and tables—on mathematical-seeming, space-redefining scientific instruments washed of gratuitous detail (Lynch 1988; Myers 1988). In this vein, sociological visual critiques are somewhat more attuned to the materials, the physicality and the travels and placements of pictorial artefacts (to the ink on paper, the surrounding white space, the movement from page to eye and from one image to the next and from text to text) than are archaeological critiques (but see Dobres 2000; Molyneaux 1997:4). More often than not, archaeological commentary grasps at pictorial subject matter (manliness, hair, brutality, etc.) in place of engaging with what precisely it means to look at that matter; with what exactly manifests itself at the moment of sight. As per Latour,
"what should be brought into the picture is how the picture is brought back" (1988:25).

Our focus should be less fixed upon master icons brainwashing the public into conformance, and more acclimated to unnatural (i.e., taken from the natural world and rendered readable) and divergent marks presented simultaneously to us, placed centimetres from one another (and centimetres from our optical system), meeting together upon, and drawing together, a flat, contained space. With so many inscriptions, so contrived and so nearby, these images build upon one another—play off of one another—not to brainwash, but to back us into a corner (Latour 1988:42). (And in the case of archaeology, this is an especially deep corner, as readers have no touchable evidence to witness or escape to; no site or artefacts directly available for comparison and critique.)

As follows, sociologists have perhaps better addressed the heterogeneity and rebelliousness of images than have archaeologists, recognising visual representations as objects which do not make us see (for we do not have to look at them, and they alone do not convince us of the "truth"), but as active entities which help us along, take us off on tangents, open discussion and keep us occupied while we work to put them together (Amann and Knorr Cetina 1988:115; Latour 1988:41-42; Lynch and Woolgar 1988:1-2; cf. Myers 1988:262). Again, it is an irony that current archaeologists have been slow to respond to pictures as such; that is, as anything more substantial than inertia-inducing objects. Given thoughtful recent reflection upon agency and material culture (e.g., Dornan 2002), archaeological visual study should amount to more than a consideration of human automatons reacting to a static record. "So practical, so modest, so pervasive, so close to the hands and the eyes that they escape attention" (Latour 1988:21), images do not force us to act: they connect to create presence out of absence, to craft substance out
of all of our (inelegant) field practices, to make realistic the impossible and to make the possible almost heavenly (Latour 1988:27, 28; Law and Whittaker 1988:161).

However, just as archaeological visual research tends to favour the pedestrian and fantastical at the expense of related but perhaps more mundane scientific charts and diagrams, so too do sociological visual studies lack a large-scale comparative perspective which joins popular pictures and academic representations into the same process. Among others, the sociologists Law and Whittaker (1988) are particularly culpable of such public-scientific discrimination, as they report on the separation of images from their scientific "origins" and their subsequent translation into a "different" kind of writing about science—that of so-called popularisation" (1988:162; emphasis mine). Elsewhere Fyfe and Law plead for "the visual to be taken seriously" (Fyfe and Law 1988:6), yet this seems an awkward request when the authors themselves (namely Law) disengage from a serious discussion of both popular-scholarly feedback mechanisms and the arguably fantastical nature of scientific representation itself.

On a much more basic level, neither sociologists nor archaeologists tend to the reality that images ordinarily stand as our (i.e., both scientists' and the general public's) first introduction to, and first point of assessment of, the world around us: our immediate surroundings, the items that we procure, the literature we read, etc. When we enter a museum, we see the displays first and the captions second (if at all), and we make instantaneous judgements about their worthiness, meanings, appeal and so on according to these initial visions. When we enter a supermarket to buy a can of soup, or a bookstore to buy a novel, our first point of contact with the product is typically with its label, its package, its cover and iconography—not with the plastic-wrapped food or manuscript
itself—and, so, our purchasing decisions are regularly informed by this initial ocular stimulation alone. Similarly, although it is never spoken aloud, scholars (much like the students that they once were) are apt to make absolute judgements about the usefulness or validity of other academic works (or gather their complete understanding of another’s research) solely via cursory visual examination of a document: a peek at the abstract, a gaze at the various pictures, perhaps a glance at the bibliography; that is it. Imagery, in this instance, can ignite or, conversely, extinguish academic investment into a particular theory or approach, irrespective of the thoroughness or cleverness of the overall product. Images can make or break a document: as Latour writes, “he who visualises badly loses the encounter; his fact does not hold” (1988:41). Thus the primacy of the picture should not be underestimated.

Accordingly, there is a point of departure here for a new kind of study; one that examines professional archaeological maps just as thoroughly as “unprofessional” popular archaeological websites; one that admits to the likenesses between archaeological experts and amateurs, and one that thus discards outdated modernist (high culture-low culture) dichotomies; one that ventures cautiously upon multiple investigational tangents rather than insulating itself in a single regime; one that proclaims not the attainment of maturity, but instead is forthright about its experimental, tentative, perhaps even anxious efforts at seeing archaeology differently. The subsequent chapters endeavour upon just that. Using the peopling of new territories as leitmotif, I outline a programme for de-

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8 Indeed, busy students (and, arguably, scholars too) might make decisions about what they will and will not sacrifice time and intellect to by prioritizing the academic literature according to which documents contain the least amount of written text and the most pictures.
constructing\(^9\) archaeological pictures in order to expose those subsurface spaces which archaeologists silently negotiate. I detail a mixed visual anthropological approach to the analysis of approximately 60 peoping images; and, with reference to recent inquiries into scientific representation, I rationalise this heterogeneous project on the basis that theoretical distractions in archaeology have left some professionals unmindful of, and thus unequipped to respond to, the perverse undercurrents that cut through practices of image-making and image-displaying. Chapter 3 is an anchor for two subsequent case studies of archaeological first colonisation depictions, and it ultimately supplies the scaffolding for looking at imagery (and, to some extent, archaeological science) differently, cautiously, with scepticism and unease. Altogether, the following chapters stand as my plea to take images—archaeological images—\(all\) archaeological images—seriously.

\(^9\) Note that I do not apply the term “de-construction” in any formal Derridean sense, but loosely, in reference to a general unpacking of (or critical thought about) the ideas, meanings and contexts which constitute and feed images.
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

In the following effort to treat archaeological imagery with seriousness, I use prehistoric archaeology (and, as explained below, a particularly controversial branch of prehistoric archaeology concerned with first peoples in their first places) for the substance of my argument. I do so guardedly, in full awareness that serious prehistoric themes frequently devolve into the most lightweight of matters. Indeed, the stuff of prehistory is regularly translated into the sensational (and, often, the imaginary): Cro-Magnon idiocy, the triumph of Homo sapiens sapiens, cannibalism, human sacrifice, Stone Age hobbits, etc. And archaeological visual portrayals of the ancient world (including brave men hunting mammoths on the plains, and naked women processing seeds on the shore) are typically ripe with exotic, romantic, nostalgic, or otherwise familiar cultural icons. Such pictures, of course, prove perfect fodder for pictorial deconstruction, but they also leave me exposed to accusations of replicating the very fantastical analyses that I criticise above. In fact, in incriminating fashion I suppose, this thesis appeals exclusively to depictions of first peoplings (first human colonisations of prehistoric landscapes). These original colonisation events are regularly the subject of rich, colourfully-illustrated, and highly-publicised (that is, highly-public) reportage. They are media-friendly, sentimentally-charged and contentious (the controversy over

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10 Personal observation of the preponderance of human sacrifice and human cannibalism-related term papers submitted by undergraduate students in the University of Victoria’s very broad-based “Archaeology of Pre-Columbian America” course seems an apt illustration of this phenomenon. Similarly, recent and rampant scholarly and popular usage of the term “hobbit” in reference to early archaeological finds in Indonesia also appears to confirm my point about sensationalism (e.g., Davidson and Morwood 2005). And, as an aside, it is perhaps not coincidental that preliminary pictorial renderings of “the hobbit” falsely pictured her as a male, trekking across the landscape with the remains of freshly-killed game slung across “his” shoulder (see Kemp 2004 for this illustration; also reprinted in Dalton 2005; Forth 2005).

11 Conspicuously, at a recent conference in which I participated (Australian Archaeological Association, 2004), it was only the sessions devoted to themes of first colonisation which attracted significant media interest.
the ancestry and "ownership" of Kennewick Man (e.g., Downey 2000; Johansen 1999; Owsley and Jantz 2001; Thomas 2000) being a pertinent example). And, amongst other things, they are easily assimilated into ridiculous majestic narratives about such episodes as humanity's out-of-Africa escape (Dennell 2004) or its abandonment of East Asia (Beaton 1991). Thus I draw upon this material with the consciousness that I am taking advantage of a theatrical topic. But I attempt to perform my research differently by paying equal attention to both scientific and popular representation. This means that I do not engage solely with illustrative visual conventions (drawings, cartoons, pencil/ink-to-paper sketches, etc.), nor with pedestrian-specific pictorial sources (museums, commercial galleries, popular books, etc.). Indeed, I aim to represent a majority of those pictures that, as per Law and Whittaker, "are just there" (1988:171); all of those "innocent" visual productions of both the scientific and lay communities which I believe disclose not-so-innocent machinations just beneath the surface of their manufacture and circulation. I aim, in part, to exemplify the reality that the most sensational of peopling depictions are not necessarily the exclusive products of frightening commercial manipulators or pop culture vultures. And, I speak to a topic (first colonisation research) which, despite its popularity (or, perhaps, because of it), has tended to receive insufficient critical study.

Specifically, it is my argument that first peopling studies are congested by a dense traffic in imagery which has typically garnered little de-constructive inquiry (but see Mandryk 1992, Moser 1992b for prospective investigations of this theme). In an era of purported self-reflexive maturity which sees a variety of Anglo-American theorists broadcasting their intellectual sophistication, such a lack of critical analysis is misguided
and unjustifiable. Most especially, this lack of critical thought sustains ignorance over the very complex encounters that manifest themselves as peopling research is attractively illustrated, unrestrainedly circulated, and then finds itself strewn beyond the "gates" of professional archaeology, into the heart of popular culture. Unsurprisingly, peopling studies are exceptionally civic in nature—and by this I do not mean to hypocritically imply some sort of high-culture, low-culture divide. Rather, these studies (and their pictures) are alluring to most everyone, scholars and non-scholars, children and adults, men and women alike. They are not limited to a specialty audience, they are not confined to a selection of esoteric technical publications, and they are not emotionally or ideologically disconnected from worldly affairs. More than disembodied "down-home-dirt" science, studies of first colonisation events interface with matters of identity, ethnicity, ownership, territory, nationality—*humanity*. These studies connect with human emotions, with human politics; with who belongs and who does not; with who has rights and has none (again, the Kennewick Man controversy is an appropriate example). Such pan-human appeal is attested to by the wealth of sites (including scholarly periodicals, popular magazines, textbooks, children’s books, teaching curricula, public exhibitions, film, television, encyclopedias, dictionaries, websites, etc.) that are dedicated to the display of peopling research. Incredulously, though, archaeologists (and, arguably, popular audiences as well) interact with this research and its display as though they were some disengaged reflections of an obvious, uncomplicated reality. With peopling images particularly, so self-evident and so intimate do they seem that they are served up and digested without question. Yet I contend that there is an exchange apparent here, amidst the mass propagation and consumption of this research and its representation, that is
subtle, powerful, and, as such, is finally deserving of problematisations.

**Geographical Focus**

I thus venture to de-construct,\(^{12}\) and then to compare, the visual depictions which accompany first peopling-themed publications. Specifically, I direct my analysis toward imagery arising in conjunction with the first colonisation events of North America, Australia and Oceania. My decision to spotlight the initial peoplings of these three particular regions is grounded, partially (following the pragmatics of Brim and Spain 1974:82), in the richness and accessibility of their attendant visual representations. These visuals are varied and abundant in form (ranging from photographs, to maps, to computer-generated diagrams); they have a substantial patronage of archaeologists and non-specialists alike; and they, in some cases, have an almost fifty-year history of production. Frankly, of course, they are also privately engaging: images from these regions have startled me, or bored me, or made me laugh, or irritated me with their arrangement, or pleased my aesthetic sensibilities (and, often, angered my anthropological ones). Generally, they are attractive to me and impassioning, and I am not reluctant to acknowledge (and I will further rationalise this acknowledgement below) that my research is moulded around very personal, viscerally-appealing materials.

However, lest it be thought that I have merely selected many pretty pictures from random local assemblages, I would point out that archaeological studies of the first peoplings of North America, Australia, and the Pacific are marked by comparable

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\(^{12}\) Again, I use this term not in the Derridean sense, but as defined in Chapter 2, fn. 9.
dialogues. Beaton (1991) and Webb and Rindos (1997) have already begun to reflect on such intercontinental colonising similarities. I would add, firstly, that the archaeologies of these regions run parallel in their heated argumentation over matters of absolute dating and the definition of accurate timelines of—and plausible paleolandsapes for—initial human colonisation events (e.g., Adams et al. 2001; Bonnichsen and Turnmire 1999; Mandryk et al. 2001; O’Connell and Allen 1998; Webb 1998; also Bellwood 2000).

Secondly, these study areas all have intimate ties to early European explorations, occupations and oppressions, and their archaeologies are themselves principally the productions of the descendants of European colonial regimes. Thirdly, these are three of the last major global landscapes to be inhabited by the genus Homo (Beaton 1991), and they are the only three (beyond the Arctic and other more recently colonised regions) to be populated by the Homo sapiens sapiens (sub)species exclusively (White 1996:303). Moreover, in a remarkably congruent fashion, archaeological research within each of these environments suggests a series of rather orderly natural human pathways onto and through the landscape (e.g., the coastal “corridor,” the ice-free “corridor,” the voyaging “corridor”). Prehistoric Australia, North America and, in some cases, Oceania are further married by ecosystems that once nurtured a diversity of unfamiliar and supposedly naive big fauna; by a roughly similar late Pleistocene colonisation timeframe; by populations who immigrated from a general East Asian geography and later came to inhabit most, if not all, of the principal ecological zones of their respective continents; as well as by coastal topographies (and, possibly, early human archaeological sites on those topographies) that were considerably refaced/obscured with rising sea levels at the close of the last major ice age (Beaton 1991; Webb and Rindos 1997).
I suppose that my selection of focal areas and corresponding colonisation imagery is also rooted in expedience and (for lack of better terminology) opportunity. This thesis stems from previous undergraduate Honours work spotlighting initial North American peopling (Perry 2002). That original research continuously brought me into contact with audaciously comprehensive “peopling of the planet”-type texts which not only purported to explain (and illustrate) New World colonisation events, but which aimed to do the same—albeit in brief—for every first colonisation episode in human prehistory. For reasons suggested above (relating to timing and “order” of continental occupation), I was thus regularly flipping through North American peopling commentaries which were bracketed with reviews of the Australian and Oceanic peoplings (e.g., Clark 1969; Gamble 1993; more recently Oppenheimer 2003). The “chance” opportunity, then, of witnessing North American (pictorial) narratives juxtaposed against Australasian13 narratives initiated in me a private process of thinking about the mostly very dissimilar illustrative renderings which tinted these colonisation manuscripts. So was born this thesis and its comparative archaeological-visual approach.

Materials and Sampling

My research, therefore, began with the fortuitous finding of several New World-specific peopling illustrations (see Figure 114 for what is indeed one of the first images that I encountered) which in turn acted as a catalyst for my uncovering of the bulk of

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13 The term Australasia here refers to the geographic area encompassing the continent of Australia, as well as New Guinea, New Zealand and the neighbouring islands of the Pacific, including the island groupings of Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia (otherwise known as Near and Remote Oceania). Note that this definition differs from that of others who include the islands of Southeast Asia in their classification of Australasia, while excluding Oceania.

14 Images are grouped together at the end of this thesis, in Appendix G, for purposes of convenience and ease of comparison.
cross-continental pictures studied below. Impromptu Internet searches followed by library study, word-of-mouth recommendation, and accidental discovery (as noted above), have provided the means for my drawing of a non-probability sample of images implicated in the promulgation of archaeological knowledge about the initial peopling of North America as well as Australia and Oceania. As this thesis aims, in part, to expose the universally unproblematised traffic in imagery (meaning not specific to low culture or high culture, but to every aspect of culture) which congests peopling research, my sample brings into play a series of scholarly and lay visualisations of these first colonisation episodes. Such visualisations are sited (and sighted and cited!) in sources from periodicals to motion pictures, undergraduate texts to colouring books, and I purposely elected to analyse these images as they were presented in printed press and web-based form; that is, in scientific journals, popular magazines, texts, children’s literature, encyclopedias, and on-line. My decision to pivot this research on print and web media (as opposed to film, television or museum display) followed from concerns over matters of ease of access and mode of analysis, for the breadth and nature of this study demanded that its sources be readily obtainable (and by this I mean both findable and symbolically intelligible) by myself, as well as by a wide audience of specialist and non-specialist readers/viewers. Unless observable in an on-line context, it was logistically infeasible for me to attempt an intercontinental comparative de-construction of museum-bound first peopling exhibitions. I did not have the funding to visit such exhibitions, and, more importantly, I was not willing to muddy my methodological strategies, for, in terms of its interpretive dimensions, museum display (with its material laid out across three-dimensional space and, hence, its demand for close bodily presence and navigation) is
nothing like print media (with its contained but portable nature and its material laid out across pages) (Hall 1997a:8). With regards to moving images, which are perhaps most significant to the pop culture circulation of peopling pictures, these proved similarly difficult to procure and, again, they required a totally different “mode of looking.” Compositional (filmic and televisual) interpretation, like museum analysis, was thus beyond the scope and faculties of this project and its author.  

Constricted, then, to print and web publications, I endeavoured to examine a selection of approximately 60 peopling visualisations gathered via a mixed strategy (suggested above) of purposive and snowball sampling (as per Bernard 1995:95-97). Admittedly, the decision to study 60 images was an arbitrary one which afforded me a detailed, yet not overwhelming, body of source materials for interpretation. It also conveniently allowed me to carve my sample up into neat packages: approximately twelve images drawn explicitly from archaeological reconstructions of the peopling of Australia; approximately twelve from Oceania; and approximately twenty-four from North America illustrating its two predominant and very divergent colonisation theories (coastal colonisation (twelve images) versus the ice-free corridor theory (twelve images)). So as to explore my sense of the back-and-forth, science-to-popular-culture pictorial/archaeological exchange that characterises first peopling depictions—that is, so as to access the plurality and mobility of these images—I further subdivided the aforementioned packages into even tighter parcels: each group of twelve images was

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15 Respecting web material, a comparable argument could be made that this medium also requires a deconstructive methodology unique to its “world-wide,” cyberspatial, hyperlinked nature. This is especially true given the increasing presence of three-dimensional simulations (of a QuickTime-like nature) on the Internet, which pose their own analytical complications. I would suggest, however, that the web images that I have chosen for my thesis have typically been obtained from sites that amount to little more than journal articles pasted into an always-accessible, available-to-most context. These sites are not elaborately developed nor especially sophisticated in their technologies, therefore it was unnecessary to devise a methodologically-specific strategy for the analysis of their imagery.
designed to include no fewer than two images pulled from on-line, web-based displays, and no less than two images pulled from each of the following print media: scholarly periodicals, academic texts, popular magazines, encyclopedias, and children’s books. Again, however, such subdivisions were subjective and contrived, designed to add a sort of comfortable quantitative weight and distinction to my sample. In actuality, I have often meddled with these packages: sometimes I incorporate more visuals than expected (especially where a sequence of images in one document speaks more poignantly to my argument than does a single picture), sometimes I duplicate them (i.e., if the same image is repeated in several sources; for example, in an article and, later, in a textbook), sometimes they overlap (as in a journal article that is available to audiences on-line), and, so, sometimes they seem confusedly categorised (as when an image is pulled from a book that is at once for (undergraduate) scholarly usage and popular consumption, or when a popular encyclopedia entry has been prepared by an academic archaeologist). Indeed, in most instances, I try altogether to avoid mention of such categories, and I will arrange scholarly pictures alongside the most infantile of children’s illustrations in an effort to insist that such imagery is of a parallel (if not identical) species. I have always kept at the forefront the fact that this is a philosophically-exploratory and pictorially-eclectic project, so, while I have a solid base of materials to draw upon, I have not prostrated before it. My thesis is ultimately (and properly) elastic in its sampling strategy and image typology: its methods expand and contract where appropriate and when necessary.

Theoretical Tools

From a purely philosophical standpoint, the following research has a rather
complicated genealogy, shaped as it is by fairly simplistic quantitative strategies used in concert with some of the most impenetrable of recent theoretical views. This thesis is loosely attached to postcolonial theory (the works of Bhabha (1994) and Said (1978) figure variously in upcoming chapters), and it has, again loosely, been shaped by Derridean deconstructive thought in the sense (as Gosden (2001:245) puts it) that it tends to focus on “the things which the text passes over in silence...what the authors did not intend, those revealing slips of the tongue or loose ends in construction which at first sight seem irrelevant but on further consideration provide a vital clue to the whole.” My work is animated by, what Wylie (1985) with scepticism, I believe, thinks of as “prospective social criticism and action,” for it aspires to other possibilities, other tellings of the past; to different archaeological representations that do not assume that the world once was as it is as it always will be. As such, I am obviously inspired by the critical texts of recent historical archaeology practitioners (e.g., Leone et al. 1987; also Wilkie and Bartoy 2000), although I attempt not to dwell on some of their notions of emancipation through truth-telling. This is pertinent because were I to invest in a truth-telling mission—or a process of “retrieving” (as per Wylie 1994:14) the lost past via practices of objective, reflective reconstruction—it would be far too easy for me to fall prey to vacuous, self-contradictory argumentation. In other words, pushed by my suspiciousness of truthful accounts of the past, it would be far too easy for me to find myself trying to truthfully expose the truth about untruths.

My research, then, is multiperspectival and hybrid in its theoretical composition. It has, as will soon be apparent, been influenced by Foucault; and it is (predictably) swayed by the anthropological discipline’s “crisis in representation” and such eccentric
outgrowths as Marcus’ (1995) modernist ethnographic montage (with its focus on restudy, on re-presenting representations, on remaking “reality” with “eyes fully open to the present” (1995:44)) and Shanks’ (2001:298-299) seemingly comparable “poetics of assemblage.” Of course, that this thesis has a critical theoretical/analytical current is obvious; but that it is formulated within an explicitly visually-appropriate framework is less so. This is important because previous archaeo-visual research—while availing itself of such en vogue theoretical topics as gender and racial bias in archaeological science—has been commonly devoid of well-defined, systematically-applied visual methods. Indeed, such research has tended to be structured around no particular methodology at all, beyond, of course, the idiosyncratic (and vague) practice of “looking at” a series of interesting illustrations. But it is one thing to locate and look at a sample of nice pictures (and then to rub them over with postcolonial or gender theory), and it is entirely another thing to actually do analysis. Again, this is the difference between seeing and looking (as per Chapter 1); between haphazard glances at visual things, and penetrative, consistent visions that cannot easily be rejected as objects of private or wishful thinking. While I do not claim to be “right” in my analyses—while I do not claim access to the ultimate reading of first peopling representations—I do claim that the project of taking images seriously necessitates serious engagement with those images, and this means comprehensible, justified interpretation which has a solid analytic grounding.

As is clear from previous statements, I play with various visual/filmic techniques in the arrangement of my images—e.g., montage, bricolage (after Sturken and Cartwright 2001), and catachresis (i.e., the decontextualisation of images and their re(mis?)contextualisation according to my own logic (after Gosden 2001:245))—and I
allude to the necessity of these practices in upcoming chapters. I have, admittedly (and unsatisfactorily, considering my statements above), had a more difficult task in settling on a decent guiding visual methodology, for, as Rose (2001:2; also Banks 2001:2, 176) suggests, visual interpretive methods are not well elaborated. Sadly, too, there does not even seem to be consensus on what precisely it means to speak of “the visual” or of visualisation. Following Mitchell, “we still do not know exactly what pictures are, what their relation to language is, how they operate on observers and on the world, how their history is to be understood, and what is to be done with or about them” (1994:13 *in* Rose 2001:1). The irony of this situation is monumental given our supposed immersion in contemporary visual culture and the associated wealth of intellect that has been invested in visual culture research (return to Chapter 1 for further commentary on visual culture). That the output of visual study could be so excessive, and that we could still be left with no clear definition of the visual and no clear guides to methods of visual interpretation is illogical. But most archaeological visual researchers are obviously complicit in this cycle as they find themselves with no methodological precedent to steer their investigations, nor, in turn, do they leave any behind. Tilley, speaking of textual constructs, hints at the profundity of the current predicament when he writes that the “necessity to place things into texts is simultaneously a violence done to those things and a productive and creative exercise” (1990:142). It is an especially aggressive act to toss images, as have some visual scholars, into condemnatory accounts of archaeological practices without a solid scaffolding to support their (the imagery’s) presence; more so, however, is it an affront against the authors and archaeologists behind those images who are indicted for their ignorance, inattentiveness, prejudices, et cetera, based on little more than a look.
To make this project worthwhile, to moderate (or, at least, justify) its aggressive upshots, to escape some of the oversights of past researchers and to attempt to avoid any inconsistencies on my part, I have here adopted the best (in my opinion) methodological tactic available to me and suitable for my purposes: a many-sided strategy that is composite, oftentimes improvisational, and derived largely from the ideas of Rose (2001). My research aims to negotiate visuality (as it intersects with archaeological studies) at multiple sites of meaning. It takes to heart the visual culture-associated pursuit (see Rose 2001:11-12) of more than just an understanding of the basic appearance of an image; of a grasp on how pictures are beheld, who beholds them, who draws them (and, so, who draws us in). This suggests the equivalent importance of—and thus the necessary analysis of—both the viewed, the viewer, the image’s author and his/her views. A Master’s thesis, of course, can only confront so many themes, and it will soon become apparent that I have not dealt with them all. Logistically, I could not submit my visual materials to one-on-one audience studies, although the very act of figuring children’s literature, encyclopedias and webpage images into my sample speaks to an attempt at an inclusive, multi-viewer oriented (albeit general and impersonal) analytical programme. I have also not invested much into author (illustrator) studies (i.e., auteur theory) given that archaeological publications often do not even make mention of image-makers, or, if they do, the maker’s name alone (i.e., usually without any further biographical details or contact information) is found tucked into an inconspicuous corner of the document. This is yet another interesting comment on archaeological (un)concern over images. Never would a professional, irrespective of his/her specialisation, publish a written document that did not clearly identify the texts of all authors cited within his/her work (and, as a
corollary, rarely would those cited authors be anything less than doctorate-bearing specialists). Images, however, can seemingly be plagiarised, fabricated by amateurs, cut, cropped, and refaced without the least apprehension or acknowledgement. It is perhaps an even more interesting comment on image authorship that so many scholars, again irrespective of specialisation, will leap up to defend poorly constructed and poorly referenced images. Presentation of my ideas to anthropological and archaeological audiences has repeatedly resulted in individuals (many of whom appear to have no obvious vested interest in my research, in the sense that I was not critiquing them directly, nor their area of expertise) taking instinctual offence at my observations, blaming one or another party (never themselves) for potential faults, and ultimately pinning me with the question “what exactly would you have me do?” The answer to this question seems facile: recognise the image-maker and his/her credentials (just as you would do for any author of a text cited in your work), and THINK—think about your intentions, the image-makers’ intentions, your readership’s intentions, and so on (just as you would do for any written document you might prepare). I am continuously amazed that audiences of highly-educated, well-respected, unparalleled intellectuals could, when met with the subject of imagery, be reduced to helpless questions like “what do you want me to do about it?” If there is any rationale for pursuing this thesis, it is certainly to convince archaeologists—and every scholar—that they need to “do something about” their pictures.

My research methodology, then, does two things. After Rose (2001) and Banks (2001), it grapples with the practical site of the image; that is, the sight of the image. It deliberates on the composition of visual representations, and, more intently, it dwells on
an interpretation of the content, relations between, and suggestive intonations of particular visual signs. So too, however, does it grapple with the outer site of the image (the topography which nurtures the image)—that is, with visual representation as an object which has history and material substance, which has a creator with purpose, which has a viewing audience with dreams and preconceptions and convictions, etc. My methodology thus engages with a general consideration of the image’s production (i.e., Who manufactured it? What are its institutional affiliations?), circulation (i.e., How is it disseminated? And why is this so?) and consumption (i.e., Who is ingesting that image? How is it producing or otherwise disciplining its audience? And is this audience passively complying with such discipline, is it resisting, or is it indeed actively engaged in its own self-discipline, its own self-production?). I am concerned with what Banks (2001:11) respects as imagery’s internal and external narratives; that is, the stories which are communicated via an image’s content and composition, and the social context within which (or by which) this image is created and broadcast. But let it be known that I do not claim some grand demystification of archaeological pictures. Although I rely heavily on the study of signs as a theoretical tool, I do not entirely sympathise with approaches that avow to “lay bare the contradictions and prejudices beneath the smooth surface of the beautiful” (Iversen 1986:84). If anything, my methods are not so much definitive decodings of pictures as they are attempts at what Foster (1988:ix) well-describes as “thickening” modern vision, and at what Banks dubs as “bringing knowledges to bear upon the image” (2001:3). I am interested in complicating our sights (and sites) rather than cracking their secret language; I am interested in looking through, looking at, and looking behind visual representations (cf. Wright 1999 in Banks 2001:10) because simply
staring at pictures is not enough. As Hegmon puts it, “meaning resides in the interaction between people and material culture” (2003:222). This project seeks out such meaning by gazing around, across, atop and into archaeological images for the people, symbols and contacts that make these images possible and plausible. Semiological analysis, discourse analysis, and cursory content analysis, complemented by basic compositional analysis, therefore provide the necessary methodological frameworks for the realisation of my ideas.

Theoretical Tools: Semiological Analysis

In writing of visual research methods, Sarah Pink (2001; also Edwards 1997) speaks of the entangled and slippery nature of imagery—its simultaneous ambiguity and expressiveness; objectivity and subjectivity—its promiscuous temperament and so its ability, at once, to convey “truth,” fiction, tradition and identity. Devereaux writes of visual representations as forceful artefacts which are “highly constructed in inapparent [sic] ways” (1995:1). Bryson (1991:61) tells of the dynamism of pictures; Kress and van Leeuwen (1996:3) tell of their specificity. Williamson (1978), Dyer (1982) and Goldman (1992) reflect on images (in advertisements) as deeply political and deeply meaningful. Barthes (1977) comments on imagery’s “rhetoric,” Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) on its grammar, Berger (1972) on its relic-like, mystifying character, and Emmison and Smith (2000:22-23) on its tense status as, at once, science and art, tool of realism (and reason) and emotive text. Images, then, are uneasy objects. They are loaded with cultural baggage; they—in each new rendering—conjure up memories of all previous renderings; they are relationships and interactions across time and space (Bryson 1991; Bal and
Bryson 1991). This is significant given that archaeologists have tended to appreciate pictorials in much the same way as have traditional art historians: as things of accuracy and basic perceptual realism “in isolation from the rest of society’s concerns...in some extraterritorial zone, off the social map” (Bryson 1991:66). Such an appreciation is, of course, archaic, and the study of signs (also known as semiology or semiotics) offers archaeologists an outlet for recognising and finally exploring the knotted history and culture of their pictures.

Distinct from other visual methods (e.g., see compositional analysis and content analysis described below) and from past methodologies used in archaeological representation research, semiology proposes an open-ended, richly interpretive, terminologically-detailed foray into specific images in search of embedded social stereotypes (Rose 2001; Slater 1998). It suggests that every picture is composed of various individual signs which both denote things in the world (artefacts, persons, actions, etc.) and connote assorted higher-level codes. It also contends that the redundant display of these signs, wrapped up in our inclination to impulsively assign a kind of truth value to their denotations, tends to make ordinary (in an almost biological sense) their connotations. Thus, for instance, an image of a red maple leaf mounted onto a white background and bordered bilaterally by two red columns denotes (albeit in a fairly complex and learned fashion) the flag of the country of Canada and connotes, to a majority of readers, a snowy geography of polite, peacekeeping, relatively forward-thinking hockey enthusiasts. In a more simple example, an image of a rose denotes a distinct type of flower and connotes notions of love, romance and commitment. Or, to borrow Barthes’ (1972) legendary case, a magazine image of a black man in French
uniform saluting the French flag denotes, very literally, a black man in state-dress saluting the French flag, but connotes a much more complicated message about loyalty, nationality and the successes of imperialism. Given the mass circulation of such images, and given, following Nader’s (2004) reasoning, that our enculturation typically involves learning to believe in things rather than learning to think through the logic and soundness of those things, we easily come to understand the maple leaf as a sign of politeness, the rose as romance, and, so, the saluting black man as unwavering French patriotism. As Barthes (1972:129) intones, what is happening here is a process of naturalisation: history becomes nature; social, political and material conditions with long evolutionary backgrounds become timeless, even sacrosanct, symbols of normality; ideology is born and human behaviour is, as a consequence, constrained (or conditioned) via relentless distribution of signs of supposed reality (Hodge and Kress 1988:3). Needless to say, a rose does not inevitably conjure up romantic thoughts in all persons, and the Canadian flag might quite realistically arouse impolite, anti-nationalist sentiments in some, and an image of a black soldier saluting France could just as readily connote tyranny and exploitation as patriotism and faith. Obviously, we can choose to see through signs (as semiology attests)—yet this does not mean that we often choose to do so. Mythology (the naturalisation of the not-at-all-natural) is the predictable result.

As Eco sees it, semiology is the “theory of the lie” (1976 in Hodge and Kress 1988:27). Elsewhere, it has been framed as a “science of meaning,” a “science of forms,” a “science of signs” (Barthes 1972:111; Hall 1997b:42; Iversen 1986:86). More recently, semiological researchers seem to have distanced themselves from such truth versus falsehood, rational-scientific versus irrational-unscientific disciplinary prerequisites in
favour of more bottomless studies about how meaning might work and how humans make sense of the signs which surround them (Bal and Bryson 1991:184). While semiology is unavoidably penetrative in its application (for pulling apart significations in a quest for their deeper implications is at the very core of semiotic theory), it is now far less concerned with structuralist-like grasps at “correct” interpretations, and is far more sensitive to the negotiations and confusions behind the meaning-making process (Hodge and Kress 1988:12; Slater 1998:243). From Rose’s (2001) standpoint, a semiological approach to visual analysis specifically entails recognising and extracting meaning from pictorial displays and relating that meaning to dominant societal practices. Its focus is ideological, and it is therefore grounded in a de-construction of the supposed autonomy and naturalness of visual signifiers in an effort to comment on their histories; that is, on their connotations: their underlying, status quo-ratifying, inequality-reproducing signifieds (meanings). Semiology has its historical roots in linguistics (with the European linguist Saussure), as well as in philosophy (through the American philosopher Pierce), and indeed these origins are betrayed in the following thesis via my use of Saussure’s and Pierce’s respective semiotic terminologies (e.g., sign, signifier, signified (Saussure), and icon, index, symbol (Pierce))(Hodge and Kress 1988; Rose 2001).\(^{16}\)

However, my research is not primarily linguistic, nor philosophical; it is not primarily word-sign based. It is visual. I do not, therefore, consult the writings of Saussure or Pierce for methodological input. Rather, my analysis draws on the picture-specific semiological themes and strategies of Bal and Bryson (1991), Barthes (1977:15-31), Dyer (1982), Hodge and Kress (1988), Iversen (1986), Rose (2001:91-92), and Williamson

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\(^{16}\) Refer to Appendix A for my definitions of a majority of the analytical terms employed in this thesis.
(1978). In specific, I apply these authors' ideas to an identification of recurrent visual signs amidst my image sample, to a consideration of the relations of these signs within and between each image, and to a linking of such signs to the dominant codes (Hall 1980) and mythologies (Barthes 1972) which, firstly, structure and naturalise the current social order and, secondly, manifest themselves in preferred readings (Hall 1980, 1997c) across both scholarly and popular audiences. I approach every image in the same manner: with a series of detailed semiological questions which are systematically posed, and whose "responses" (generated by myself, of course) are systematically recorded.\(^{17}\) These questions, and my interpretive reading of them, then serve as data for image comparison and for the fashioning of generalisations about the meanings and travels of various signs. Never, though, do I claim access to some sort of truth. This is not semiotic positivism (after Hodge and Kress 1988; also Bal and Bryson 1991:194). Ultimately, this is a project, as Iversen (1986:88) puts it, about "moving across a chain of significations locating points of contact with institutionalized oppression." What I offer is a methodical means for archaeologists to do what they have long avoided or ignored (in part because no clear method was ever roughed out by previous archaeological visual researchers); that is, to perform an archaeology of their own images. In fact, following Barthes (1972:129), archaeological images offer the ideal material for studying semiotic constructs, for their mythological connotations are neither too obscure, nor too obvious; they are perfectly effortless, commonsensical realities. We use them without thinking, as part of the "natural" rhythm of archaeological explanation. I put forth an instrument, then, with which archaeologists might question such naturalisations, and I do so with

\(^{17}\) See Appendix B for a precise listing of the semiotic questions which I bring to each pictorial. Also see Appendix F for chartings of some of my "answers" to (or, more accurately, my semiological review of) these questions.
attention to Bailey’s note, in the introduction to his monograph on the anthropology of power, that the purpose here is to “stimulate ideas and provoke questions and, perhaps, to foster certain attitudes. But in the end, it is a bag of tools; not an artefact” (2001:xiv).

Theoretical Tools: Compositional Analysis

As a necessary, if not unavoidable, component to visual research, this thesis is also articulated through the rudimentary application of compositional interpretation, which, really, is little more than the very literal art historical practice of “staring at pictures” (Rogoff 2002:27). This sort of analysis entails a basic description of the “exterior” of an image; an account of its look (Rose 2001:33-53). My use of compositional interpretation therefore has as its goal the surface scrutiny of my image sample, and, as such, I confront each picture with a series of questions concerning its manifest content, colours, spatial organisation, lighting and affective characteristics.\textsuperscript{18} As with the semiotic methodology outlined above, I systematically record my “responses” to these questions and such responses then forge a platform for my own more complex commentary on pictorial communication (including setting in motion the process of semiological contemplation). I, like Whitely (1999 in Rose 2001:37), argue that this course of compositional explication is an indispensable initial stage in image analysis. In the sense that it constitutes our first glimpse at the form of pictures, it is our visual foundation; it is the brick which is broken apart via semiology, which is counted via content analysis, which is seen to be mortared and load-bearing via discourse analysis. Compositional interpretation aims to define what appears to be “there” in an

\textsuperscript{18} See Appendix C for an outline of the compositional questions which I bring to each pictorial.
image, and it inevitably impedes upon semiology (in that the decision to colour a sign black rather than white, or to cast it in light rather than in shadow, or to gaze on it from above rather than below, often has profound connotative significance), and its users (i.e., me) are inevitably subject to disparagement for casting the "good eye of connoisseurship" upon shifting visual forms (Rogoff 2002:28; also Rose 2001:33). Certainly, I do not hesitate to utilise compositional analysis just because it overlaps with my semiological methodology—indeed, it will quickly become obvious in this thesis that semiology folds almost imperceptibly over top of discourse analysis which then coincides with content analysis which itself is entirely reliant on compositional interpretation. As Rogoff writes, "images do not stay within discrete disciplinary fields such as 'documentary film' or 'Renaissance painting'" (2002:26). I understand this statement to extend not only to a reflection on the impossibility (and inadequacy) of pinning an image down to a singular methodological tactic, but I also see its absolute relevance to archaeological debates (elaborated upon below) about popular versus scientific materials.

I am, however, more concerned about charges of visual connoisseurship and the indiscriminate application of the "good eye" to my research. Compositional approaches (and, one might argue, traditional art historical approaches too) have long been persecuted by methodological and theoretical blurriness, as they have tended to occupy themselves exclusively with Art: with "great art," "high art," individual genius, and amorphous value judgements about innate quality and style and universal truth (Rose 2001; also Rees and Borzello 1986:4-5, 8). Such thinking assumes that visual researchers (art historians) harness their naturally "good eye" into the demarcation of genius in painted artefacts. Obviously, my own thinking is nothing of the sort: I embrace specific
readings (as opposed to eternal truths); I explicitly define a methodology (as opposed to appealing to my “good eye”); I do not bow to Art, although do acknowledge its polluting influence where apparent; I engage with miscellaneous material sources, not paintings alone; and, most of all, I condemn notions of genius (archaeological genius, especially). But, in spite of such differences, I still make use of compositional interpretation specifically on account of its foundation-defining capabilities. Borrowing from Bal and Bryson, “the act of looking...is a dynamic process. The viewer moves about the surface to anchor his or her look at a variety of positions” (1991:205; emphasis mine). This is significant because what compositional analysis affords us, then, like nothing else, is access to this surface, this anchor, of the image. It is from a baseline compositional interpretation that the whole of this thesis is made possible.

**Theoretical Tools: Discourse Analysis**

Admittedly, however, a dual semiotic and compositional style of analytical enquiry is partial to the *internal* narrative of archaeological peopling depictions, which implies, in this case, that images are important only for accessing the “real” reality that lies hidden beneath their surface appearance (Gill 1996:141). In truth, an image is an elaborate and “real” entity in itself; a tangible object in the world which is cast and deployed, oftentimes very strategically, by various individuals for a variety of purposes. With so much semiological poking about at the underworld of pictures, the more obvious realities of visual representations (i.e., their purposeful creation, circulation and consumption) can conveniently go unconsidered. This is where discourse analysis (issuing from the writings of Foucault (e.g., 1977) and as articulated by Rose 2001) thus
finds its place: as a means toward exploring these *external* narratives of imagery.

I use the term “discourse” in much the same way as Rose (2001:136) makes use of it—that is, with reference to a particular scope of knowledge, statements and ideas about the world which configure our thoughts about things and our subsequent actions upon those thoughts. Rose (2001:136), in attempting to define discourse, draws our attention to the writings of Nead (1988:4) which speak of discourse as a kind of language with its own rules and standards and, even more importantly, associated institutions, professionals and subjects. Nead (1988:4) cites the rather overused case of medical discourse as evidence of the lavishness of discursive languages, for medicine is nothing if not an ornate architecture of doctors who speak a distinct medical tongue, who adorn themselves in distinct medical uniform, who ensconce themselves in distinct medical facilities and, so, who presumably colour the world with a distinct medical dye. In the same way, we can also speak of archaeology’s own discursive “language,” made up as it is by an archaeological vernacular (see Chapter 2 for reference to this disciplinary lexicon), an archaeological institution (the “field”), an archaeological subject (past humanity), an archaeological spectatorship (the “public”), and a hierarchy of archaeological authorities (from the amateur collector to the field school student to the Disney professor\(^{19}\)). Discourse thus involves an elaborate wielding of “facts” and people and argumentation and plausible explanations and linguistics for the purpose of “doing things” (of blaming, excusing, denying, stereotyping, categorising, conferring membership, authorising knowledge, making meaning out of trivialities, making sense out of the senseless, etc.) (Gill 1996:142; also Tonkiss 1998:246-248). Archaeologists, I

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\(^{19}\) Chair of archaeology at Cambridge University (for further information on the discourse of the Disney professorship see Tilley 1989).
believe, have crafted a discourse which justifies their interpretations of humanity above those of others; doctors have done the equivalent for medicine. As Gill puts it, discourse is “occasioned” (1996:142); it is variously brandished to make rational our actions, to make legitimate our (potentially illegitimate) views, to make “solid and unproblematic” our grasp on, and place in, the world (Potter 1996:132; also Potter and Wetherell 1994). But discourse, to be certain, is far from obvious.

This thesis approaches discourse analysis with hesitation, knowing that even Foucault, the virtual father of the methodology, has left it wanting of consistency and obviousness (Nead 1988:4). In methods-specific textbooks, authors incessantly comment upon the messiness of discourse analysis—its lack of formality and conventions—and its near total resistance to explicit description (Potter and Wetherell 1994:55; also Gill 1996:143; Tonkiss 1998:251, 254). Discourse analysts themselves seem to revel in accounts of the intractability of discourse, calling it a pure “craft skill,” like bike riding, that really only comes to its users through practice and “rigorous scholarship,” not through adherence to rules (Gill 1996:146; Potter 1996:140; Potter and Wetherell 1994:55). Such conciliatory talk about discourse’s “craft” nature, its loose interpretive temperament, and its anti-recipe book acumen (Gill 1996:143; Tonkiss 1998:254), has effectively excused ambiguity on the part of discourse analysts, exonerating them from ever having to define the method’s elements. This, arguably, is the discourse of discourse; and it is uncomfortably reminiscent of the “good eye” of artistic connoisseurship considering that only via divine intuition or the nurturing of individual genius can one seem to pop out a discursive interpretation. Potter and Wetherell, anticipating criticisms of this sort, write that they wish to “undermine the idea that by
simply using [a set of] procedures interesting ‘results’ will fall out” (1994:63). But, my response to this is that discourse analysts are not (intentionally) composing poetry or science fiction wherein imagination and procedural abandon might be welcomed. They are perpetrating serious social critique, with potentially fierce ramifications, so it seems as though there should be more reason behind their actions than merely a “good” honed eye. While I do not believe, as Potter and Wetherell insinuate, that by just applying a defined discursive methodology to my results, interesting results will “fall out,” I do believe that in speaking critically of the work and livelihoods of others, one is deserving of more than academic discourse as justification. As Potter (1996:138-139) rather paradoxically (in light of his tendency to belittle methodological clarity) remarks, the import of discourse analysis relates, in part, to its capacity for validation: readers have the unusual ability to assess the adequacy of a discursive interpretation as they can compare it directly against the source material from which it is drawn, and can evaluate it against their own reasonable understanding of that material.20 From my perspective, validation is a direct outcome of the positive appraisal of precisely what is going on in an analysis: what questions are being asked to facilitate the analysis; whether or not these questions make sense in the tradition of discourse analysis; whether or not these questions are the only questions that could/should have been asked; whether or not the results that fall out of the analysis are consistent with the questions that generated them; etc. Really, discourse analysis cannot have any validity if one is unable to closely trace its descent.

Having access only to a discourse analyst’s source material (as well as your own

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20 Here Potter (1996:139) makes a slippery argument: if you are a “competent” individual, you can assess the value of discourse analysis; yet Potter himself is the specialist and he is the only one to know how discourse analysis works, because he is the one who has rehearsed it, because, of course, discourse analysis is a craft skill that can only be gotten through practice. It seems that Potter is the lone individual with the true competency to assess an analysis’ validity!
reasonableness), as Potter suggests, is not sufficient; it does not permit us to see and judge the logic behind an analysis. This is not validation—it permits nothing more than a formless comment upon the worth of interpretations that have sprouted unexplained from the heads of practitioners.

In much the same way as my previously outlined semiological and compositional methodologies, I approach discourse analysis with a series of explicit questions (articulated in Appendix D) that have been informed by my readings of the discourse-oriented works of Gill (1996), Potter (1996), Potter and Wetherell (1994), Rose (2001), and Tonkiss (1998). My interest concerns how it is that we are made to believe in certain archaeological versions of the past (and this clearly implies consideration of who is implicated in the “make-believe” process). My focus is specifically on exploring the powerful, knowledge-producing character of first peopling research as it is revealed via visual representation. I aim for an exploration of how peopling discourse is manufactured by the institutions of academic and pop culture, how it is sustained through a regime of truth founded in scientific practice, and how its consumption has seemingly disciplined its audience into particular ways of knowing and understanding. Such exploration thus converges upon the mechanics of discursive production—the “how” of first colonisation meaning-making—as opposed to the explanatory and penetrative (“why”-centred) premise of semiology. Successful discourse analysis, in this respect, considers the basics: as per Rose (2001:139), the unfussy assumptions, the academic banalities, the everyday taken-for-granted schedules, and the ordinary bits and pieces of texts. This thesis sees me, firstly, identifying the production and dissemination practices

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21 Contrast this with my semiological methodology which is interested in why we might be inclined to believe in these archaeological versions of the past.
surrounding, and the key themes in, my sample of pictures, and, consequently, examining their implicit (complicit, indeed) engagement with constructions of social dominance and social difference, normality and abnormality, privilege and responsibility, scientific certainty and the "natural" world. In my case, I ask questions about things that usually go unquestioned (including images themselves, but also the process which brings images into being). I then record possible responses (Rose 2001 calls this "coding"), and I attempt to do all of this without, myself, falling prey to the trappings of discourse. Undoubtedly, I exploit the academic apparatus (i.e., the institution, its funding, its legitimacy, its people) to make you believe in my argument. But, in the end, what I ask, whether you believe my argument or not, is to look—to literally LOOK—at how our looks have helped to frame the human past. An intertextual approach to my collection of popular and scientific images helps to facilitate these looks at the power/knowledge and absolute truth dynamics of first peopling reconstructions.

**Theoretical Tools: Content Analysis**

Without intending to further complicate my thesis, but knowing that not all images are amenable to detailed semiological or compositional or discourse interpretation, this project also calls upon a very basic strategy of content (quantitative) analysis in its de-construction of peopling depictions. The philosophy behind such a quantitative approach is essentially one of weightiness: the more instances of an object, the more importance we might attribute to that object relative to other objects in an image (Dyer 1982:108-111; Rose 2001:54-68; Slater 1998). In a comparable vein, the greater

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22 See Appendix E for an outline of the content analysis questions which I apply to various pictorials.
the proportion of space consumed by an object in an image relative to other objects in
that image, or by the whole of the image itself in relation to its context, the greater its
significance. The potency of content analysis lies in its supposed rigorous and replicable
discernment of pictorial patterns (i.e., the repeated, standardised display of specific
images and image components) which sees its users fragmenting and coding pictures into
visual elements whose frequencies are then calculated and systematically compared.
Rose (2001), in describing the dimensions of content analysis, offers the example of Lutz
and Collins’ (1993) study of hundreds of National Geographic photographs wherein a
stratified sample was coded for such factors as “smiling in a photograph” and “gender of
adults depicted,” and frequency counts of these codes were then compiled for purposes of
statistical manipulation and qualitative interpretation. Admittedly, as Rose (2001:62-68)
makes clear, Lutz and Collins’ methodology had its deficiencies (the least of which
included overlapping and imprecise coding categories), but content analysis is generally
problematic (see below), and, in my view, its users need to be allowed the latitude to
experiment thoughtfully with its pieces. Indeed, my own approach to content analysis
could be construed as a narrow-minded handling of its possibilities, as I tend to grab
obvious hold of it only where my semiological or discourse analyses have proven
inadequate and where the overt process of “counting things” (Slater 1998:235) seems
pertinent to an elucidation of my argument. In my case, content analysis is already
implicit in the performance of my compositional analysis, for content analysis too is a
(quantitatively) descriptive account of the surface of an image (cf. Rose 2001:56; Slater
1998:235). Compositional interpretations, of course, present a qualitatively more rich
opportunity for description; for me, content studies just concretise the numbers.
This thesis thus struggles with the dynamics of content analysis since, in part, such analysis bumps up incongruously against other aspects of my methodology, and, in part, I actually doubt its basic philosophy (see below). I engage with content analysis because, in certain instances, it is all that I have: semiology and discursive interpretations are not applicable everywhere. Maps are not the same visual phenomena as are tables, nor are tables analogous to illustrations, nor are illustrations like photographs, etc., thus different interpretive tactics must be available to negotiate them. Equally, one from the next, all maps do not communicate meaning in the same way, nor is one photo constitutionally equivalent to the next, nor are all tables of a comparable ilk. Knowing, then, that between and even within visual types, differing processes are at work, I require differing but suitable tools upon which to draw. Content analysis is not ubiquitously relevant to my sample, but, like semiotics and discourse studies, it has its place. Embarrassingly, though, this place is not necessarily clear, as my content codes are tangled in my compositional interpretations (and, to a lesser extent, in the semiological and discursive questions that I pose (see Appendices B, C, D)). Hence, where I pursue absolute and relative frequency counts and attend to the size and proportional measurements of images, I endeavour to be unambiguous about my intentions and reasoning. I do not, however, code every image for content, and I make no attempt to be statistically significant, for I am loath to collude in what Wylie calls our preoccupation with “narrow accuracy” (1985:139), or in what Barthes terms the “quantification of quality” (1972:153). In that I speak critically about the prevalence of such practices (as they are evidenced in archaeological representation) in forthcoming chapters, I would not

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23 The elements and potentials of these various visual technologies will be discussed as they are encountered in the upcoming chapters.
want to find myself liable for the same misdeeds.

Quoting from Banks, "social research has to be an engagement, not an exercise in data collection" (2001:179). I agree with this, and to do so does not make me an apologist for muddled and imprecise interpretations, but it does accept that the closed, quantitative, theory-less method (Slater 1998:237-238) of content analysis is imperfect. The numbers and statistics and exhaustive, mutually-exclusive coding categories of content analysis cannot, for one thing, respond adequately to relations between image parts as much as to the absolute autonomy of those parts (Rose 2001:66). Neither can these figures tend to the sensitivity and expressiveness of signs (Rose 2001:66-67). As Hodge and Kress (1988:12) point out, meaning is negotiated; and content analysis eclipses this negotiation (especially its ideological, pervasive tentacles). This occurs because content analysis is fixated on components of a picture rather than on the full picture itself, meaning, in other words, that the forest is sacrificed in favour of seeing the trees.

Where I exploit content analysis and to what end, I make obvious in my thesis; but I do not bow to this analysis, nor do I swathe myself in a deceptive covering of universal codes and significant "facts." Among other matters, I have an opportunity here to begin unpacking the suspicious underpinnings of content analysis, which have it that more content (of whatever variety) correlates positively with the real importance of that content, while content which occurs with less frequency within a sample correlates positively with lesser overall importance. Returning to Banks, visual research is "bound to be partial and bound to include elements of serendipity: contexts, events and social alignments that could not have been predicted or foreseen" (2001:179). But the
unpredictable and unforeseen scope of visual studies is often attached to the *invisible*, *unseen* elements in a picture: those things that are left out, pushed aside, miniaturised or deemphasised. These are things that content analysis has no capacity to address (or see). Thick repetition of one object in an image does not necessarily equate with meaningfulness, nor does enormity; lack of objects or smallness or nothingness can also signal import (Rose 2001:66; Slater 1998:237). In this instance, following Dyer (1982:111), the whole is indeed more than purely the sum of its parts. So, content analysis has its limits.

Extending from this, content analysis is barely congruent with a critical approach to social research, as it cannot cope with reflexivity (for it is difficult to be reflexive about statistical “certainties”), nor with the agency of viewers (for it leaves no room for alternative perspectives), nor with the formative effects of the discursive cycle (for it omits how the making, circulation and consumption of an image might repeatedly rework our understanding of its content). Above all else, it is concerned with the design of a rigorously representative and replicable methodological programme. Problematically, while my research does indeed endorse a multiply-sited pictorial sample, it cannot sensibly achieve an *every*-sited sample, it cannot reasonably and exhaustively scan *all* public and scientific printed and web-based peopling images in order to define a “typical” sub-set, and it certainly cannot claim any rigid replicability as my vision is not omniscient; I will be counting only that which *I think* that I see (after Rose 2001:54).^{24}

This is important, because I am anxious to avoid the “voice of God” technique so embedded in “objective” methodologies, and so typical of visual productions (e.g.,

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^{24} Although, as a consequence, I happily avoid the classic content analysis quandary of inter-coder inconsistency.
documentary film (Banks 2001:17)). Lutz and Collins (1993:88-89) can argue all that they like about the hidden patterns that only content analysis can uncover and the legitimate, untainted readings that only content analysis can afford; but, in the end, their method provides for them alone to establish the codes, for them alone to define what is important, for them alone to show us what to see, and thus for them to act as God. It is myth to suggest that content analysis offers a scrupulousness and clarity that other methods cannot; a different researcher given the same study sample will likely articulate different content codes, different measures of significance, and different interpretations that are not at all clear in previous analyses. Moreover, legitimacy is not bestowed upon content analysis simply because numbers are attached to it. As Barthes (1972:12; also Bal and Bryson 1991:175) sees it, there is always a mythology of the mythologist. We might be convinced of the accuracy of our (quantitative) explanations, and yet along will come another researcher who destabilises our convictions and proposes new, seemingly unbreakable orthodoxies. Symbols, cites Iversen, “elude the individual will” (1986:91). We would do best to acknowledge as much, and to concede that research of any sort (but especially of the sort that follows) is about experimentation: it improvises in places where improvisation is the only option (but it should do so explicitly); it is not exhaustive in that more could have been analysed with different tactics (e.g., psychoanalytical theory in my case); and it does not necessarily have a right or wrong “answer,” but, rather, a lot of possibilities. Furthermore, it is always informed by passion; passion for looking, for thinking, for success or advancement; for questioning what takes place around us.

As such, this project is fundamentally qualitative in character—it is enmeshed in the social, polysemic, philosophical spirit of archaeology. It is therefore spurious to
reduce my analysis to a parsimonious series of statistics or a "voice of God"-like semiotic positivism, etc. My mixed qualitative methodological strategy accords with Barrett's (1996:209) desire to avoid the "funnel approach" (wherein analysis begins at the top of a wide and lofty qualitative funnel and spirals down into a pinched quantitative pinhole); and it also adheres to Rose's cautionary counsel: "use your methodology to discipline your passion, not to deaden it" (2001:4). It is thus that the following thesis is grounded in a conceptually-rich (as opposed to statistically-representative) framework (Rose 2001:73) which seeks not to see everything, but to illuminate what might go unseen.
CHAPTER 4: AMERICA

The peopling of the Americas is a crowded field of study. Everyone from linguists to geneticists to forensic professionals and neo-Norsemen has converged upon New World peopling research in an attempt to stake out space and lay claim to pieces of the first colonisers (Hitt 2005). Archaeologists have been in the front row of this congested arena, dedicating 100+ years of research and several elaborate hypotheses to understanding the steps of the earliest Americans (Meltzer 1991:15). Unfortunately, critical theory (including critical visual theory) seems not to have complemented these archaeological investments into colonisation research—and this is cause for concern. Not only does American archaeology’s claim to intellectual maturity oblige that critical thinking be applied to peopling suppositions, but in a field of study so populated with conjecturers (academic and non-academic alike) who are willing to pull apart even the most thorough work on a trowel-stroke by trowel-stroke basis (e.g., Fiedel 1999), archaeologists must be prepared to critically reflect on their own assumptions and activities. I venture to guess that archaeologists have devoted so much energy to criticising other researchers’ peopling theories (while, at once, defending their own die-hard hypotheses) that they have sapped any instinct for inward-looking critical reflection. Arguably, this is also true of peopling imagery, with archaeologists producing (or, more likely, recycling) such a wealth of pictures in an effort to concretise their visions of the first Americans, that critical looks at just what is contained within these pictures are inconceivable.

Guidon and Arnaud have rightly dubbed the state of affairs in New World peopling studies as the “‘cold war’ of Americanist archaeology” (1991:167). Such a war
sees individual archaeologists committing lifetimes of research to the defence of one of a few, seemingly mutually-exclusive theories about the timing and route of the earliest occupation of the continent, while tossing aside all other possible ideas. The irony of this situation is that even the most renegade of archaeologists—who, exasperated with the status quo, push forward novel (albeit not always scientifically sound) hypotheses—usually find themselves doing little else than establishing yet more dogmatic and suspicious perspectives (e.g., Bradley and Stanford 2004). As a result, the few individuals who are best positioned to break with orthodoxy in peopling research are the very same individuals who appear to ensure its longevity. But the intent of the following chapter is not so much to discredit the contentions of individual archaeologists (for this task has been undertaken multiple times before to varying degrees of success (e.g., Adovasio and Page 2002; Fiedel 1999)) as it is to think about how visual representation betrays the *commonalities* between these contentions. It is likely that guardians of the various peopling theories will balk at the suggestion that their ideas are interchangeable; however, in terms of ideology, and in terms of the pictorial negligence which ensures that such ideology will survive, North American peopling theories are virtually indistinguishable.

In the end, though, it can be easy to point fingers at the public as the real perpetrator of all vulgar and ideologically-stuffed assumptions in archaeology. It is easy to impugn the popular mind for merging distinct colonisation theories into singular and sensational visions of America’s first occupation. After all, it is the public, as represented by the public education system, that imagines the first American as a light-skinned, coiffed, muscle-bound (and English-speaking) tool user (see Figure 2 in
Appendix G). It is the public, as represented by public television, that pictures the first American as a determined-looking bald man\textsuperscript{25} standing atop a promising—flowering—USA (see Figure 3). And it is the public, as represented by popular journalism, that depicts the first American female as a weed-preoccupied deadweight who is overshadowed by her hunter of a mate (husband?) (see Figure 4).

Or is it?

Indeed, it was a scientific specialist who transformed one of the oldest American skeletal finds into \textit{Star Trek}'s Patrick Stewart, therein legitimising claims about the Caucasian ancestry of the earliest occupiers of the continent, and prompting conversation about an original “European” America (Chatters 2001; also Plumet 2000; Preston 1997) (see Figure 5). And it was the relatively reputable \textit{Scientific American} that drew the first New World coloniser as a light-skinned, coiffed, muscle-bound tool user (see Figure 6)—leading one editorialist to note “You might mistake him for an English professor at Bennington, but in fact he’s the First American” (Hitt 2005).

It was similarly a body of scholars—among them archaeologists—that rendered the earliest colonisation of America as a fearless trek along a mammoth’s tusk (see Figure 7). And it was an archaeology professor—and one of the key critical feminist theorists in the discipline—who wrote the article that accompanied the image as seen in Figure 4. The scientific community, therefore, is far from blameless.

The common thread which links the preceding pictures is not necessarily the route that led these first Americans into the country, nor is it the number of colonisers who ventured on the journey, nor is it the sites that mark the earliest American homesteads,

\textsuperscript{25} Interestingly, as Mackie (2006, pers. comm.) notes, baldness is not a common genetic trait of Native North Americans/East Asians.
nor, therefore, is it the technical details of peopling. Neither, obviously, is it the imagery’s context, producers, or medium of publication. Instead, I would argue that the link between these pictures is their assumptions about the identity of the first Americans: how first Americans look, how they act, what they stand for, and, thus, who they are.

The following chapter has three objectives: firstly, to briefly review the history of ideas behind the two most prominent North American peopling theories (the ice-free corridor theory and the coastal corridor theory); secondly, to consider how the plethora of images that is used to depict these theories offers similarly persuasive—but slippery—accounts of the peopling of the continent; and thirdly, to reflect on the role of both popular and academic agents in producing, disseminating, and consuming such dubious visual products. This chapter (and my thesis as a whole) is inspired, in part, by statements like that of Meltzer and Dillehay which imply that with the possible exception of Australia, only America—with its “large, habitable, and virgin land mass”—was ever colonised by people apparently “like ourselves” (1991:6). Whatever contentious and seemingly irreconcilable differences researchers claim to have over North American colonisation, a look at peopling imagery suggests that, in fact, archaeologists—and the public as a whole—are united around one thing: the first Americans evidently are ourselves.

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26 Note that the North Atlantic theory (e.g., as conceived by Bradley and Stanford 2004) does not have enough tenure in scientific or popular culture to allow for pictorial de-construction (i.e., there is not yet an adequate body of North Atlantic images available to make visual analysis feasible or legitimate). Therefore it is not considered within these pages and, so, its history is not reviewed herein.
**Telling the Truth About North American Peopling?**

Serious archaeological debate about the antiquity of human life in the Americas had its start in the mid to late 19th century, in reaction to the discovery in Europe of Pleistocene-age man (Meltzer 1991, 1994). Encouraged by the finding of ancient European human remains, New World researchers initiated the hunt for an equivalent “American Palaeolithic,” thereby triggering a divisive and still-ongoing contest over the identification of the earliest American, of his earliest route of entry, and of his earliest toolkit and its connection to his earliest cuisine (Dixon 1999; Mandryk 1992; Meltzer 1991, 1994). Realistically, though, postulation about the origins of the first Americans had an even deeper chronology that, in part, extended back to the cleric de Acosta’s sagacious 16th century conception of initial American peopling by way of an Asiatic land connection; and, in part, stretched even further back to the whimsical and often biblically-inspired ideas of the earliest European explorers of the New World (Dixon 1999:24; Fiedel 2000, 2002; Meltzer 1994:8-9; Whitley and Dorn 1993:626). It was in the late 1920s, however, with the uncovering of extinct bison bones in association with human-made stone points at the Folsom site in New Mexico, that definitive evidence of the early presence of humans in America was confirmed. When, later, in the 1930s, Clovis projectile points (named for the nearby town of Clovis, New Mexico) were recovered from deposits underlying Folsom artefacts, and subsequent radiocarbon dating put Clovis at an age of 11,500-11,000 years before present (later revised to 11,200-10,900 years B.P.),27 the archaeological community was ready to pronounce Clovis the original American culture (Dixon 1999; Hoffecker et al. 1993:51). The following 50+

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27 Note that all archaeological dates in this thesis are quoted in radiocarbon years B.P. (before present), which can differ in the thousands from calendar years before present (see Guilderson et al. 2005 for a recent technical review of the recalibration of the radiocarbon clock).
years then saw the “Clovis first” assumption sculpted into a clean prehistoric parcel: the earliest Americans crossed on foot from Asia to the New World along the Bering Land Bridge sometime around 11,000 years past; they were the carriers of Clovis tools; they ate the meat (thus begetting the extinction) of giant American mammals; they overtook the continent in blitzkrieg-like fashion; so they and their Clovis points gave birth to Paleolithic life (e.g., Mosimann and Martin 1975).

While assorted elements of this “Clovis first” model have been subject to alternating expressions of critique and approval (e.g., Grayson and Meltzer 2003; Fiedel and Haynes 2004; Grayson and Meltzer 2004), perhaps its most aggressively debated component is the exact path of Clovis colonists’ travel between the Alaskan side of the Bering Land Bridge and the heart of North America. It is the “ice-free corridor” theory that was initially conceived to explain the means by which the first Americans (equipped with their Clovis assemblages) could have traversed the seemingly un-traversable ice sheets that blanketed the majority of present-day Canada at 11,000 years ago. The invention of an unglaciated (ice-free) path between the Laurentide and Cordilleran ice masses that revealed itself just in time for the earliest colonisers to march straight into America and drop their Clovis tools on the plains of New Mexico, enabled researchers to explain a colonisation event that was apparently otherwise unexplainable. Without the ice-free corridor, the earliest colonisers would have been necessarily marooned on the eastern recesses of Beringia; denied access to the “large, habitable, virgin land mass” waiting in the south. With the ice-free corridor, however, these colonisers were offered a clear, direct path into the New World—thereby making them the first Americans.
The ice-free concept had its original imagining in the late 19th century (Figure 8: the “ideal map of North America during the Ice Age”), but it was not until the 1930s (unsurprisingly coincident with the discovery of Clovis) that it was exposed to a concerted plan of archaeological and geological inquiry (Mandryk 1992, 2004; Wilson and Burns 1999:216). While archaeologists now laugh at the corridor’s aptitude for trampling over us “like a highway beckoning Paleoindians south” (Fladmark 1986:17)—or for lulling us into a prehistoric daydream (e.g., Easton 1992)—the concept is still intuitively sensible and is backed by a century’s worth of scientific literature. Its general premise (see Mandryk 1992 for a thorough review) has it that glacial activity during the last Ice Age locked water supplies in massive ice formations that extended, among other places, across the preponderance of northern North America. The lowering of global sea levels as a consequence of this glacial formation uncovered the bed of the Bering Sea, thus permitting human travellers to walk from Asia to North America in pursuit of food and shelter—but soon afterwards, trapping them in present-day Alaska/Yukon territory at the foot of the ice sheets. As temperatures warmed and deglaciation ensued, the two sheets that had, until now, opposed all further human movement into the New World began to recede mid-continentally (roughly at the border between contemporary Alberta and British Columbia); hence establishing a “corridor” through which the first peoples could pass. With a crowd of naive megafauna wandering helplessly in the south, with the earliest migrants bedecked in Clovis weaponry and hungry for meat, and with an ice-free passageway now open to pedestrian traffic, the ice-free corridor theory had come of age. As Meltzer notes, “it all seemed to work out very, very beautifully” (NOVA 2000).
The corridor, not unexpectedly, has invited the attention of both enthusiasts and sceptics who seem to extol the concept as the product of “logic and theory” (Fiedel 2000:86) or to mock it either as simply an artefact of enduring stubbornness (Laughlin 1998:46) or, as per Mandryk et al., an “historical accident” (2001:301) (i.e., the accident that the earliest American sites were uncovered in direct line with a potential ice-free route). Realistically, however, such arguments are all somewhat shallow explanations of a much more profound issue. Stubbornness cannot adequately account for decades of academic and popular conviction in the corridor; and though the corridor might be convenient, convenience is not a prescription for logical or theoretical soundness. Moreover, as Mandryk’s (1992) own writings demonstrate, the ice-free theory was already in its foetal stages more than 40 years prior to the discovery of Clovis, and was then elaborated over the years through a tangled convergence of disciplines, peoples, ideas and (mis)interpretations; so to blame its persistence on accident is to further misinterpret the evidence. In part, the corridor does stand as a missing link (indeed, a straight arrow) which joins the archaeological data, given that it substantiates (in the most direct manner imaginable) an association between Clovis, the megafaunal remains, the land bridge, and the first Americans. As Easton puts it, the ice-free theory “explains the most with the least” (1992:29). However, this theory has far more significance to it than bespeaks a connecting arrow between old and new landscapes and persons. Such significance is captured in Wilson and Burns’ (1999:222) talk of the evocativeness of the ice-free corridor, in Fladmark’s (1986) mental picture of the corridor as a superhighway, and in Mandryk’s (2004) lecture on the corridor as the “ultimate American origin myth.” To refer to the concept as a mishap, then, is to misread the social, political, academic and
historical context that yielded and nourished it. Indeed, arguably only a theory with as much emotional weight behind it as the ice-free corridor could withstand the scientific firearms that have recently been aimed in its direction.

Doubters of the ice-free corridor have challenged all faces of the theory, suggesting, among other arguments, that Clovis was not the earliest American culture, that the first Americans were not insatiable meat eaters who extinguished the last of the megafauna, that travel by foot was not necessarily the primary mode of continental transportation, and, most importantly, that the ice-free corridor did not exist at the time of initial colonisation, therefore it was not the original route into the continent. The evidence to support such critical interpretations is not insignificant. For instance, proof of the existence of archaeological sites within the corridor predating approximately 10,500 years B.P. has not yet been recovered, meaning that there is no physical indication of human use of the route at any time before, contemporaneous with, or even up to 700 years after the appearance of Clovis (Mandryk et al. 2001:308; Meltzer 2003:544; Wilson and Burns 1999:222). Proof of the corridor’s liveability or its crossable nature is lacking, meaning that with its meltwater-fed glacial lakes, its extreme temperatures, its unvegetated and stagnating landscape, its constricted geography, and its nutritionally-devoid terrain, the route initially could not have sustained human life (Fladmark 1979:56-57; Mandryk et al. 2001:304; Meltzer 2003:543; Wilson and Burns 1999). 28 Proof of the “first-ness” of Clovis has been overturned by evidence of ≥ 12,500 year B.P. human occupation of, among other locations, the Monte Verde site in southernmost South America (Dillehay 1997; Dixon 2001; George et al. 2005), although some persist, in

28 Interestingly, even the author of Figure 8 (the “ideal” map of North America) is cognizant of the potential inhabitability of the corridor (Mandryk 1992:36).
nearly incomprehensible fashion, to suggest otherwise (e.g., Kelly 2003). Proof of the first Americans’ select big-game diet and its role in the blitzkrieg-like extermination of New World megamammals has also been contested on archaeological, ecological and geographic grounds, meaning that the corridor was not necessarily a gateway for meat-crazed migrants looking to indulge themselves on helpless mammoths (Beck 1996; Bryan and Gruhn 2003:177; Dillehay 1997; Grayson and Meltzer 2003; Meltzer 2003:544-545; Roosevelt 2002; cf. Fiedel and Haynes 2004; Martin 1973). Most importantly, proof of the corridor’s very existence at the time of the earliest colonisation of the Americas is missing, meaning that, as confirmed by geological and archaeological research, the ice-free route was blocked between 20,000y B.P. (or possibly earlier) and 11,000y B.P. and, so, could not have facilitated even the first Clovis occupation, let alone any pre-Clovis occupations (Arnold 2002; Clague et al. 2004; Jackson et al. 1997; Mandryk et al. 2001). Proof, then, that the ice-free corridor was the first and only route of entry of the first Americans is underwhelming.

So, seemingly rid of the ice-free theory, its detractors have ventured to cement an alternative colonisation model: the coastal migration theory—otherwise suspiciously known as the “coastal corridor” concept. The idea of an original coastal route into the Americas is not new (Fedje et al. 2004:97; Fladmark 1979), but, to date, it has not seen anything close to the financing that has propped up ice-free corridor speculation. Whether, as Easton (1992) implies, this is because a coastal theory necessitates uncomfortable thoughts about Americans choosing to live on water versus on solid, trusted land (thus necessitating doubly uncomfortable thoughts about initiating undersea

29 Note that genetic and linguistic evidence also appears to attest to the deep (pre-Clovis) history of human life in the New World (Meltzer 2003:542).
archaeological work) is debatable. But with the legitimacy of the ice-free corridor concept broken, the coastal theory now finally stands as a serious alternate explanation for New World peopling. Of significance, the coastal route can account for some of the archaeological details that the ice-free route cannot: coastal travel allows entry into the Americas earlier than 11,000y B.P.; coastal travel allows a mixed and reliable marine/littoral diet that does not hinge on doomed big game or on survival in a narrow wasteland of deglaciation; and coastal travel allows for a non-Clovis-specific toolkit, which might rationalise the variety of lifeways and non-specialised assemblages that are recognisable at early New World sites (Clague et al. 2004; Fedje et al. 2004; Gruhn 1994).

The coastal migration theory has it that the first American colonisers moved into the continent from Beringia on watercraft by way of the Pacific northwest coast likely around 13,000 years B.P. or after. Migrants made use of existing shoreline “refugia,” tucked amidst the deglaciating late Pleistocene landscape, for shelter and for rich non-marine food sources, and, while some might have installed themselves here for the long-term, others could have continued southward along this coastal route, possibly as far as the furthest tip of the New World (Dixon 1999:31-34; Easton 1992:33; Fedje et al. 2004; Fladmark 1979). The coastal colonisation concept has been given credence by geological studies, palaeontological and palaeoecological research, terrain/locational mapping, preliminary underwater finds, and analogy with comparable coastal migration scenarios in Australia and elsewhere (e.g., Fedje and Christensen 1999; Fedje and Josenhans 2000; Fedje et al. 2004; Heaton et al. 1996; Punke 2001; cf. Meltzer 2003:543-544; also see Hall et al. 2002), but, in effect, it does not have much more physical evidence to support
its claim to the first Americans than does the ice-free corridor. As with the corridor theory, proof of human presence along the Pacific northwest coast does not exceed ~10,500 years B.P., meaning that we still have no archaeological evidence to distinguish the first migratory pathway of the Clovis peoples at ~11,000 years B.P., nor that (or those) of all pre-Clovis populations (Fedje et al. 2004:100; Mandryk et al. 2001:308; Meltzer 2003:544). Even more problematically, any archaeological proof of the legitimacy of the coastal route is difficult to procure given that, in the wake of the Wisconsin, rising coastlines and shifting landscapes have drowned or otherwise made invisible many possible early sites (but see Fedje et al. 2004 for a proposed strategy to locate such invisible spots). Perhaps most problematically, the coastal theory alone cannot account for the first peopling of America if we are to admit the authenticity of sites such as Meadowcroft Rockshelter in Pennsylvania with its dates of >14,000 years B.P. (Adovasio et al. 1990). Research has shown that the coastal route was inaccessible between approximately 20,000y and 13,500y B.P. (Clague et al. 2004), thus confirming that it was at least 500 years too late to deliver the first Americans to the earliest purported American sites. Of course, this does not preclude a potential pre-20,000 year B.P. entrance into the continent via the coast (as more moderate environmental conditions then, as later, would have accommodated coastal refugia and travel), but I would wager that a majority of archaeologists would, in an instant, dismiss such a deep-time favouring suggestion. This, indeed, is an irony, particularly amongst archaeologists who have spent their careers attempting to break the “Clovis barrier” and dismantle all its associated prejudices. That the pioneers of pre-Clovis archaeology would be content either to stab

30 Although, emerging human ecological and biological research offers promising corroboration of the coastal route (e.g., Hall et al. 2004).
to death fieldwork that—while admittedly not perfect—signals a 50,000-year history of Americans in the Americas (e.g., Meltzer et al. 1994), or to stand voiceless about the genesis of ~33,000-year-old finds from Monte Verde, speaks to a whole set of other prejudices in peopling studies that have yet to be unpacked (although see Guidon and Arnaud 1991 for rudimentary comments on this matter).

Despite the weaknesses of coastal migration evidence, some, clearly threatened by the theory’s advocacy, have insinuated that it has unfairly overwhelmed the ice-free corridor + Clovis-first dyad with nothing more than politically-correct, feminist, anti-macho rhetoric (Fiedel 2004:77-78). Emotion alone, these individuals argue, is responsible for enfeebling the ice-free corridor concept; “science,” in turn, can revive it. This is laughable, of course, in that “science” has already ascertained that the corridor, among other things, did not exist in time to account for Clovis or any other early site in the New World (e.g., Jackson et al. 1997). Equally laughable is the delusion that emotion and politics would not have had roles to play in initially shaping—and then in maintaining and, later, discrediting—the legitimacy of the corridor. While Fiedel (2004) is right to point out the zeal that often characterises ice-free corridor critique, he is foolish not to discern the zealousness that informs both his own coastal corridor critiques and his own and his colleagues’ defences of the ice-free theory. Only passion can explain why Fiedel (2000, 2002, 2004) has published, virtually word-for-word, the same pro-ice-free dogma in three sources in the past five years, and why Dixon (1999, 2001, 2002), as Fiedel’s foil, has done essentially the same thing with his pro-coastal beliefs.

These archaeologists, and likely all peopling researchers, would contend that it is science that sustains their arguments, and it is science that will offer the final word on the
colonising behaviours of the first Americans. As Fedje et al. write (in regards to the timing and architecture of coastal migration), “this debate will eventually be resolved through empirical evidence” (2004:100). The problem with this claim is that empirical evidence does not demand self-reflection, nor, more importantly, consideration of the devices (scientific and non-scientific) that are used to bolster its legitimacy. To look at archaeological peopling arguments on paper, in words, is to see empirical evidence stacked up into tight technical statements about the truth of the first Americans. But to look at these peopling arguments differently (still on paper, yet with a focus on their visual representation), is to see that “empirical” evidence is really just one more tool in the emotional, passionate, politically-charged pursuit of who we are, where we come from, and why we deserve the places and spaces that we occupy today.

Seeing the Truth about North American Peopling?

When challenged over any logical or theoretical discrepancies in their conjectures, some archaeologists are swift in shifting all possible personal or professional culpability for such faults outside of the discipline—often into the public sphere. Meltzer makes this clear in his chronicle of the arguments of early peopling researchers which, he says, “exposed the vulnerability of archaeological interpretation to non-archaeological data and disputes” (1994:8). Recently, it would seem that institutions like National Geographic have borne much of the responsibility for draining the good work of archaeologists into puddles of national mythology (Gero and Root 1990; also Lutz and Collins 1993; Mandryk 1992). As Gero and Root (1990:19, 24) frame it, National Geographic stands as the disseminator of essentially everything that the general public
knows about the practice of archaeology, and, at the same time, as the bastion of American ideals. The result of this dual personality is, inevitably, the drawing of science (archaeology) into the service of the state (the preservation of the dominant American value system) by way of the popular press (National Geographic magazine). But the most interesting thing about National Geographic is not so much its ideology nor its public appeal, as its intimate link to the financing of academic research. Archaeologists are welcome to attack the shady intentions of National Geographic magazine, but to do so while simultaneously collecting (or watching colleagues and friends collect) its substantial monetary handouts, is to act as a conspirator in its conformist agenda. There is a link here between this type of duplicitous archaeological handling of National Geographic, and an ongoing discussion which I witnessed at the 2004 Australian Archaeological Association (AAA) conference, wherein commentators and presenters (e.g., Smith 2004) accused the public, the media, marketers, “cultural institutions” (museums), and critically-inclined archaeologists themselves, of spoiling the credibility of the discipline. While this argument might have had some validity to it, such validity was crushed when another archaeologist (Hall 2004; also Hall et al. 2005) delivered a 15 minute paper on his “fun” science fiction show-themed TARDIS field school (which involved students digging through an artificial excavation unit layered with the European Bronze Age at the top and the African Pleistocene at the bottom). Interestingly, not a single judgemental word was uttered by the AAA audience about sci-fi television’s role in degrading archaeological fieldwork, or about the ethics of a “fun” curriculum that teaches archaeology through the collapsing of all of space and time into a hierarchy in which Africa underlies Europe. That archaeologists are willing to criticise popular
culture (including its representatives like *National Geographic*) and then turn around and suckle from it professionally and academically is ignorance—but it is far from uncommon.

In December 2000, *National Geographic* introduced an article on the peopling of the Americas with Figure 9 (Parfitt 2000) anchored by the text “Who were the First Americans?” and in smaller, less visible (lower value) script “The Dawn of Humans.” This image denotes Timothy Heaton, professor of earth sciences and researcher of coastal migration issues, in workman’s garb with trowel in hand and scientific accessories at his back, looking over at something that presumably has relevance to the question of American peopling. Heaton is male, middle-aged, wears a concentrated expression on his face, is crouched and prone, yet poised for discovery. From a compositional standpoint, except for the spotlights which illuminate Heaton and his papers in the background, this image is entirely draped in shadow. Its highest value component is the light-bulb that shines from Heaton’s head; and both this light beam and Heaton’s gaze are impenetrable—we cannot see what they see—we do not have the privilege to cast our vision upon their focus. Although we look down upon Heaton’s body, he does not offer himself up to us, for we observe him only from a distance (not up close), in profile (not exposed frontally), and at an oblique angle (not directly top-down). If we diagram the relations between the lit elements of this photograph, our eyes move from the uppermost midpoint of the frame, where a fissure in the rock shines light downwards—god-like—onto the tools of scientific practice (tools which in turn reflect light in the direction of Heaton), to the near-centre foreground, where Heaton’s glowing form is positioned, to the bottommost centre-left edge of the image, where the light from Heaton’s head casts
its beam onto evidence of the first Americans (and arguably onto us, the viewers).

Connotatively, Heaton is the scientific hero of this picture, who, with his trusted equipment and his brightly-lit mind, will emerge from the cave through a tunnel (corridor?) of light to colonise the scientific world with the facts about America’s past.

This, of course, is a rather dramatic reading of an image that, on the surface, signifies nothing but a workman curled on a dirt floor staring at a wall. Yet to interpret it as such is to disregard its far more meaningful underbelly. Heaton inadvertently recognises this underbelly when he usurps the photo for display at the head of his university home page (http://www.usd.edu/~theaton). I recognise it with the argument that this image contains a majority of the ideologically-loaded icons that have long characterised and poisoned archaeological debate over the peopling of the Americas.

Take, for instance, Figure 10 (Henry 1955:801, 786). Printed in National Geographic about 45 years prior to Heaton’s image, such an illustration would appear, again on the surface, to be exactly the reverse of Figure 9—*but* not necessarily so. As deconstructed above, Heaton’s photo (Figure 9) denotes a man, independent, at work, in a cave, concentrated, tool in hand, light shining from his strong mind, and eyes cast toward his scientific prey. Henry’s 1955 image (Figure 10) (on the left-hand side of the frame), too, denotes man (man climbing walls, man dying in combat, man poised for attack, man in all his glory), fearless, in a cave, concentrated, clothed (albeit scarcely) in the workman’s attire of the era, tool in hand (essentially a trowel on a stick), light rippling off his strong physique, and eyes cast toward his prey. As with Heaton, beaming light streams in from the right-hand frame illuminating, in part, man, his object of attention, and his prehistoric equipment. As with Heaton, man’s gaze is directed upwards, his body
stands hierarchically inferior to his focalizer, and his escape route is clear, for here too he will emerge through a corridor (as seen on the right-hand side of the frame) to colonise the Americas with his archaeological remains. Unlike Heaton’s photo, however, the viewer of Figure 10 actually has the privilege to see what man himself sees. That is, whereas we are denied any look at Heaton’s visual target (thus consigning us to the rather powerless position of uninformed witness), we are, in Figure 10 (left-hand side), offered direct contact with prehistoric man’s view of the Alaskan brown bear. It is possible to argue that such manipulation of visual access keeps viewers of Figure 9 satisfactorily distanced from the sacred “cave” of science, while permitting viewers of Figure 10 to participate in the dirty work of everyday survival. It is also possible to argue that, in fact, we do have access to Heaton’s vision. Given that Heaton studies vertebrate palaeontology and is renowned for his analysis of prehistoric brown bear bones on the Alaskan coast, it is a not implausible that he too, like the men of Figure 10, sets his gaze upon the remnants of a monstrous encounter.

It is interesting to note that the caption which anchors Figure 10 reads “early Americans left no evidence that they preyed on the giant bear.” Such a statement speaks tellingly about the sort of deceptive tactics that producers of visual representations are willing to use to persuade viewers about the content and character of the American past. At the same time, however, this statement speaks to the self-reflectiveness of its author, who, however cryptically, actually acknowledges his own abuse of iconography. Neither Heaton’s image, nor, I believe, any of those that follow are so cognizant or obvious about their manipulative designs. This is important because without qualifying statements like that which accompanies Figure 10, we are left unperturbed, believing that these images
are faithful renderings of prehistory. Of course even with such statements, we are not necessarily awake to the coercive nuances of visualisation. If we remove the brown bear from this image and substitute it with a mammoth, as in Figure 4 (and as in virtually every other picture of American peopling), or remove reference to giant mammals altogether, as per Figure 6, we are still left with the same product: an image published in a popular journal, *but endorsed by archaeologists*, that offers us one unbreakable view on the first American male: a tough, spear-carrying, animal skin-wearing (and Caucasian?) settler.

This view, however, is not unique to glossy magazines. Figure 1 is pulled from Texas Parks and Wildlife’s “Education” website, which targets children aged 6 to 12, and has weathered seven long years of distribution in both on-line and children’s book formats. From a semiological perspective, it is ripe with questionable assumptions, not the least of which include reference to Texas as a prehistorically-extant state (indeed, *the only* prehistorically-extant state), and to the tough, spear-carrying, animal skin-wearing settler and his mammoth prey as the only American life forms worthy of representation. Among other semiological details, this image depicts man standing tall (literally on top of the world) with weapon at the ready; while mammoth is shown standing in the ice-free corridor, back turned, oblivious and vulnerable to attack. It depicts man in a position superior to us (he is posed as if looking down at us), with his body swallowing the whole of Beringia and most of present-day Alaska; while mammoth is shown to be shorter, slimmer, negligible in size in comparison to the ice sheets, and inferiorly positioned relative to man (in the sense that it lies below the line of man’s feet). Moreover, this image depicts both man and mammoth heading for Texas; while, beyond Texas, the
remainder of the hemisphere is cropped from the picture. From a compositional perspective, then, this image can be de-constructed into a great-chain-of-being hierarchy, with man—the deity—stationed at the top left-hand corner of the frame, his cocked arm and spear acting as vectors that draw our vision down, along the arrow, through the mammoth's core, out the corridor, into North America, and straight to Texas where our eyes then dribble down, through an empty central America, and out through the bottom right-hand corner of the frame.

From a discursive perspective, Figure 1 presents a closely-woven argumentative case: it refers to "scientists" and "education" in its anchorage, implying, particularly to an audience of young adolescents, that its renderings are indisputable; it exploits size (size of man, size of font) to inflate its contentsions and, simultaneously, to obscure its deficiencies; it reinforces its own claims by asking its audience (in the bottom left-hand corner of the frame) to draw "x-marks-the-spot" and "lone star" symbols over top of the land bridge and Texas; and it uses the globe icon (positioned in the left-bottom quadrant) to prove its case in ultimate heavenly fashion, for if we are not already convinced of man's trek through the corridor, we need only turn to this view from outer-space to see that the planet is in fact aligned to allow Europe to funnel the first Americans to the USA.

The nationalistic, connect-the-dots agenda behind this image is conspicuous. But that a state-sponsored website would draw upon (visual) metonymy and synecdoche to turn the first American into an all-powerful meat-eating Texan is not surprising (cf. Burtt 1987); nor is it surprising that the state would utilise the authority of a map and arrows and geopolitical borders and written instructions to indoctrinate its children (cf. Pollock and Lutz 1994; also cf. Arnold 1990; Bernbeck and Pollock 1996; Shaw 2000). What is
perhaps more surprising is that an independent scholar and professor (Fagan 1987, 1995) would use essentially the same dubious visual package, across multiple publications, to teach university-level archaeology—as per Figure 11. Again, we see a globe centred upon North America, with South America twisted and cropped at its base. Again, we see fur-clad, spear-wielding man standing on top of the world, with an arrow leading through an ice-free corridor to the USA and a doomed mammoth (atop Texas) below. Again, we see prehistory coloured in black and white, and iconography inflated to extreme proportions. Yet, in contrast to Figure 1, Fagan’s image preys far more on scientificity: its view offers the ultimate omniscient satellite capture; its legend supplies temporal legitimacy; the dotted lines of its ice sheets permit an x-ray look at glacial activity/mobility; the grid slapped over its oceans declares a precise geographical rendering; and the straight-line pointers to its archaeological sites hint at the logic of a microchip or telecommunications system.

This image (Figure 11) is particularly adept at concealing its ideology behind factual discourse. We need to poke heavily at its surface to recognise that, although sites are herein given official identification, their symmetrical black-dot markers (which disregard time, language, diet, toolkit, population size, environment, climate, etc.) are still no more intellectually useful than the blank space of Figure 1 (which also lumps all of America into a giant, timeless cultural blob). We need to poke determinedly at Fagan’s (1987:141) written words to recognise that Figure 11 ignores archaeological evidence (e.g., from Monte Verde)\(^\text{31}\) to reach the conclusion that the first Americans were land-bound hunters who could only have settled the New World through an ice-free

\(^{31}\) Note that Monte Verde barely even has a presence in Figure 11. The site is labeled, but an arrow demonstrates that it has been tucked in an invisible location around the backside of the map.
corridor. We need to poke decisively at the dots and facts and at Fagan’s verbiage in the surrounding 288 pages of his text to recognise that Figure 11 is little more than Texas (Figure 1) in disguise.

It is somewhat unfortunate that Fagan has a habit of publishing books for general audiences, as this makes it easy to dismiss the more fanciful aspects of his work as simply products of “a popular writer’s license” (Jennings 1988:784). To label Fagan an “accredited popularizer,” whose 1987 text “counteract[s] the fictional archaeology produced by so many others for the mass market” (Grayson 1990:191), is to shed a veiled (and doubtful) compliment that simultaneously applauds and devalues its honouree. This kind of compliment makes it legitimate to ignore the connotations of Figure 11, for, since we know that Fagan writes for a mass market audience, and since we know that this audience is rarely exposed to scholarship, then for Fagan to merely have gotten the facts more-or-less correct is apparently a significant achievement. Clearly we should forgive Fagan for any inaccuracies in his text (and images), given, as Jennings claims, that “any good writer gets carried away with his or her thoughts and occasionally makes statements for which there are no supporting data” (1988:784).

These sorts of excuses are ridiculous, of course: no one (especially a university professor and archaeological authority like Fagan) should earn compassion for almost-okay work. Moreover, these excuses do not make sense, for, while Fagan’s book might be intended for a popular audience and its arguments might be erroneous, this has not stopped scholars from citing it in the scientific literature as a valid source of academic information on the peopling of the Americas debate (e.g., Bryan and Gruhn 2003:176; Hoffecker et al. 1993:46; Roosevelt 2002:96). As Dixon writes, “Brian Fagan’s The
Great Journey: Peopling of Ancient America ... represents an important contribution to the body of literature on the early archaeology of North America” (1999:xii). Indeed, such importance is confirmed by the fact that The Great Journey has been published twice (in 1987 and again in 2004), and Fagan’s other key American archaeology text, Ancient North America, has been published four times (1991, 1995, 2000, 2005), and each one of these publications (spanning 18 years) has included Figure 11.

Unsurprisingly, then, both his books and his images have seeped into university libraries as well as the scholarly research community. Whatever their faults, Fagan’s productions are obviously influential.

Regardless of any purported populist ties, Figure 11 (and Figure 1 too) has not sprung up without precedent in the archaeological science literature. Of course, there are only so many times, before my point is beaten to death, that I can reprint within this thesis images which seem essentially identical. But it is crucial that I demonstrate the applicability of my argument to the products of all “accredited” authors—not just to those of supposed vulgarists. Figures 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 are just such works of officialdom, having been used to illustrate the writings of a few of the most famous and infamous researchers in American peopling studies. To trace the discursive histories of these images is to concede to their ties to archaeological professionalism and erudition. The “eminent” (as per Adovasio and Pedler 1997:576) Haynes (Figure 12) is professor emeritus at the University of Arizona, a Guggenheim fellow, and an elect of the National Academy of Sciences. Meltzer (Figure 15) is Henderson-Morrison professor of prehistory at Southern Methodist University, and a former research fellow at the

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32 It is notable that the copy of Fagan’s 1987 text that I have borrowed from the UVic library is coloured with notes and highlighting alongside Chapter Seven, “The Ice-Free Corridor?” Plainly, students are drawing on Fagan’s information to inform their academic work.
Smithsonian. Fladmark (Figure 13) is professor of archaeology at Simon Fraser University, who while not the original proponent of the coastal corridor theory, is certainly its most long-term and visible champion.\textsuperscript{33} Dixon (Figure 16) is professor of anthropology at the University of Colorado, curator at the University of Colorado museum, and former fellow of the National Endowment for the Humanities. And Fiedel (Figure 14) is a private consultant with the Louis Berger Group in Washington, DC who—though he has been called a credential-less amateur with just “one rarely used prehistory textbook”\textsuperscript{34} to his name (Adovasio and Page 2002:188)—has written articles which have appeared in \textit{at least} five scholarly journals in the past six years (Fiedel 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005; Fiedel and Haynes 2004). Each of these men draw upon the scientific establishment to give credit to their contentions,\textsuperscript{35} and, interestingly, each of them are aloof about granting credit to others—namely, to the artists whose images figure so prominently in their work. Indeed, neither Fiedel nor Haynes acknowledge their imagery’s producers, and Dixon, Fladmark and Meltzer print only the context-less name or initials of such producers either in small font hugging their pictures’ borders, or tucked deeply into the acknowledgements sections of their publications. In my mind, obscuring the existence of artists in this fashion is a contrived attempt to testify to the obviousness of an image. It is an act of concealing the many-handed manipulations that have gone into the creation of a pictorial so as to confirm that this pictorial (and the publication as a

\textsuperscript{33} Fladmark himself has had to publish statements correcting misperceptions about his role in conceiving the coastal theory (e.g., \url{http://www.sfu.museum/journey/05p_secondary/transcripts/fladmark1.pdf}).

\textsuperscript{34} This statement is questionable. Fiedel’s (1992) text was the principal reference for an undergraduate class (Anth 342: Archaeology of Pre-Columbian America) at UVic in 2002. Moreover, he is a PhD recipient from the University of Pennsylvania, meaning that he holds the same basic credentials as all other academic archaeologists.

\textsuperscript{35} Note that Figures 12 and 13 are published in scientific magazines, Figure 14 and 15 in scientific journals, and Figure 16 in a scientific text.
whole) is a natural and uncorrupted presentation of facts. The result, of course, is the shrouding of archaeological pictures in invisibility: the most visible of artefacts are, essentially, made to go unseen.

Nevertheless, there are visible "arguments" at work in peopling imagery, including in Figures 11-16. From compositional and semiological standpoints, these images do the same thing: they give prominence to a limited set of icons and indices (typically man, his tools and the ice-free corridor) at the same time as they mask everything else in sameness. Indeed, whether the images are split apart, or have their components multiplied or partially removed or reworked, or are printed as photographs versus black-and-white line drawings, they still leave us staring at the same myth—one of chauvinism and colonialism transferred onto the distant past. Within these images: space, time and the cosmos are collapsed to deliver man (elsewhere, a suspiciously Caucasian-looking man) inevitably and directly to the Americas; the ice-free corridor is made a syntagmatic extension of the Bering Land Bridge (i.e., it is made the only visible route into the New World); where the corridor is insufficient, arrows are used as indexical vectors to pull our eyes straight through it and into the heart of the New World; the ice sheets are offered as metonymic evidence of unliveable, intolerable terrain; man is presented as a synecdochal sign of all men; man, too, is used as an unsubtle metonymic representation of power, strength and independent determination; the stone point is made the symbolic equivalent of the gun, ubiquitous, all-powerful and everlasting; and mammoth is offered as the victim of man, and as the objective correlate of all that is inexperienced, available, and in-need-of-taming on the American landscape.
I think there is a case to be made here for understanding these scholarly depictions (and a majority of all depictions of the peopling of the New World) as comments on the contemporary United States of America. That is, I am not convinced that Figures 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 are representations of the early environments that humans happened to colonise during their prehistoric travels. Rather, I believe they are confirmations of the (everlasting) existence, boundedness and bountifulness of the USA. It seems awfully suspicious to me that such pictures (which are supposed to be representative of prehistoric life) contain American borders, arrows that lead straight into the promised land, and a single, larger-than-life male standing, with weapon cocked, at the entrance to the States. Arguably, these are not images of some unfamiliar past reconstructed through diligent archaeological work, but of a very familiar American present made prehistorically possible by the collusion of state, academic and popular reasoning. Figure 1 speaks rather overtly to my argument, with its illustration of one man (Columbus-like) who finds America (in this case Texas), uses his weaponry (spear = gun) to kill or control everything on its landscape, and then claims it as his own (by drawing a lone star on it!). Figure 11 is nearly as overt, although lacks the same lone star blatancy. Haynes’s (1966) Figure 12 is closely related, employing almost identical signification to illuminate a similar, maybe even more, Americanized hypothesis: the first colonisers made it to the US (and, indubitably it is the US, because a dotted line has been included as a denotation of the American border; and Denver, Seattle, Fairbanks, etc. have been demarcated as apparently some of the earliest American sites) earning “a living,” as the text tells us, at the first American job (“elephant hunting”). Figure 12 has unique features: it separates its signifiers (e.g., mammoth, tool, ice-free corridor) into three images spread across three
consecutive pages (in effect, creating a mathematical equation: mammoth + tool = colonising of America; or the visual equivalent of a three part list); it reduces the mammoth, quite appositely, to bones; it removes any direct reference to man, substituting instead a photo of man's enormous, mammoth-dwarfing weapons (note that no scale is used to qualify the photograph); and it adds another dose of authenticity to its map with the inclusion of longitudinal and latitudinal numerical measures. Indeed, Figure 12 is just a few steps away from Fladmark's (1986) picture of the ice-free corridor (Figure 13), which shamelessly exploits satellite conventions in the quest for prehistoric accuracy. Interestingly, relative to Haynes's images, Figure 13 is more complicated at the same time as it seems more simplistic and confused. It omits such cartoon-like and assumption-laden icons as mammoth and man's tools, but still works compositionally to drag our eyes from left to right across the centre of the image, from the yellow (dead) deserts of Asia, through a tiny little corridor to the green (living) pastures of America's core. It depicts a fairly textured terrestrial topography, but stuffs the oceanic landscape into a cold blue void. It accompanies an article by the foremost coastal migration supporter highlighting the plausibility of a coastal route, but is visually mute about the diversity of the coastal terrain and its capacity to nourish human life. And it prizes realism to such a degree that it pictures the atmosphere as distinct from earth and outer space, but crops the majority of the New World from sight, implying, once again, that peopling was a process of moving humans to the USA and no further.

Fiedel's (2000) Figure 14 is connotatively comparable to Figure 13 in that his article claims to engage with the peopling of the New World, yet his image prioritises and then severs North America decisively from South America (a single closed line runs
around the extent of the continent). Unlike Fladmark’s image, however, Figure 14 does not rely so much on compositional devices to guide our sight from Asia to the USA as much on the discursive power of numbers. We are literally able to connect the dots from 1 to 45, tracing man’s systematic footsteps from the end of Beringia/extreme north of Alaska to the tip of Florida, from one corner of the US to another (with a quick but obviously misguided mid-voyage detour into Mexico). Let it be clear that there is no logic to these numbers beyond connoting the filling-in of America: they do not refer to the age of associated sites; they do not denote the excavation order of associated sites; moreover, they do not include two sites from southernmost Central America mentioned in the text, but instead paste these sites onto an ensuing map of South America (meaning that the artist has made a conscious decision to omit North American sites from North America—presumably so that our eyes and minds cannot wander too far from the US core). Furthermore, Figure 14 exploits shading conventions to give the ice sheets the only dimensionality or subjective perspective in this image. It awards the deepest, most concentrated shading to the ice sheets’ edges (chiefly within the ice-free corridor) to make plain, in spite of the scientific evidence, that they are bounded and passable. It offers an x-ray view through the ice sheets onto a barren, terrain-less Canadian geography. And it tapers the ice sheets out into oblivion in the north, underscoring, again without subtlety, the irrelevance of iconography that does not speak directly to man’s path into the USA.

For the ultimate in subtly-less imagery, however, we need just turn to Meltzer’s (2003) picture (Figure 15), which simply goes ahead and cuts all of present-day Canada and Mexico out of the image; draws all of the American states into the frame; provides
numerical measurements for every longitudinal and latitudinal line crossing the USA
(and, just in case we were still unable get our bearings, offers us a kilometre scale and a
north arrow marker for direction); depicts only those “select” sites which lead in a
diagonal queue from the northwest (ice-free corridor region) down to Clovis and Texas
and then eastwards to everything else; and denotes Clovis sites with the usual projectile
point icon, while it marks all pre-Clovis localities with an ambiguous, lopsided twig-like
signifier.

Dixon’s (1999) picture (Figure 16) is essentially as dubious, firstly with its
insertion of “prehistoric” state borders into the image, including, this time, Alaska (notice
that Canadian provincial borders are of no interest here); secondly with its claim to
represent North America despite its exclusion of present-day Mexico (clearly there is
ignorance among academics, whether wilful or not, about Mexico’s status as a North
American country); and thirdly with its Fiedel-like use of site numbering for one effect
only: to channel our eyes (in the absence of the ice-free corridor) straight down from the
tip of Alaska to the tip of Florida, moving back and forth across the country—from
Washington to Idaho to Wisconsin to Pennsylvania to Virginia, back to Nebraska and
Colorado, to California and New Mexico and Texas, ending in southern Florida—until it
is undeniable that the USA as an entirety was colonised by the first Americans.

These images (Figures 12-16) are the products of science. Such scientific
pedigree is important, because only a few moments ago depictions like Figure 8 (the ideal
map of America during the ice age) might have appeared to us to represent little more
than archaic remnants of pre-scientific mumbo jumbo. Indeed, we might have been quick
to dismiss Figure 8 as nothing but a fanciful vision of a 19th century pseudo-scientist. But
now, following the work of Fiedel, Meltzer, Fladmark, Haynes, and Dixon, it seems that Figure 8 is nothing short of empirical truth. Now, in fact, it appears that the 1894 rendering of the “ideal” America has become current archaeologists’ *real* America. A century’s old and *admittedly* speculative (“ideal”) interpretation of ice age glaciation has been sold back to us, in 2006, as the scientific truth on peopling. So what was once essentially fictional (that ice sheets formerly covered all of present-day Canada, extended exactly to the border between Canada and the USA (i.e., exactly to the 49th parallel), left Alaska completely ice-free, and allowed a teeny, tiny passageway to lead precisely from Alaska to the rest of the United States) is now legitimate archaeology. Scholars stop short of asking their audiences to draw the star-spangled banner atop their images...but just barely.

That contemporary political geography is etched into the ice and landscape of archaeological reconstructions of prehistory is undeniable: Haynes does it (Figure 12); Dixon does it (Figure 16); Fiedel does it twice (Figure 14 and Figure 17); Fladmark does it (Figure 13); Meltzer does it (Figure 15)—and, to be sure, he has done it before (Figure 18).\(^{36}\) In each of these mappings, the message seems to be that America—not Canada (for this country is congealed in a block of ice), nor Mexico (for this nation is either entirely eliminated from the map or is implied via a lack of arrows to be less hospitable or welcoming)—has been the target of first peoples. Readers of these scientific maps are essentially confronted with a prehistorically-delimited, prehistorically-colonised United States. Indeed, such images allow us to discern a “natural” American nation whose

\(^{36}\) Note that this image is extremely similar, in terms of ice distribution and corridor placement/width, to the 1894 “ideal” map (Figure 8).
political geography is exactly bounded by the ice-free corridor, and whose physical legitimacy can be traced back at least 11,000 years.

Given such scholarly precedent, then, it should not be a surprise to see Texas Parks and Wildlife (Figure 1) following suit; or the Canadian Museum of Civilization (Figure 19) adopting analogous compositional schemes; or an undergraduate textbook replicating Haynes’s 1966 images (Figure 12) with near exactitude (across three pages) in 2001 (Figure 20); or the Eyewitness youth (encyclopedia) series also piggybacking upon Haynes, reproducing the ice-free corridor at the top of a hierarchy, tugging our eyes down into the fertile green openness of America and out upon a photographic population of extra-large weapons (Figure 21); or the Smithsonian encyclopedia exploiting similar semiological and compositional devices (Figure 22). Indeed, Figure 22, despite its popular origins, is arguably more visually modest and balanced than most scholarly productions. That is, it does not foreground man, his weapons and his deadly reign upon the megamammal, but pushes them into the far background, and gives preference instead to the diversity and expanse of early American life. (It also gives us access to a skinny stretch of verdant land—as opposed to icy cliffs—on the northwest shores of the continent that could have facilitated coastal travel (see map at bottom right of Figure 22)). And it does not explicitly impose contemporary borders on the map, nor carve out present-day American cities on the map, nor further distort the significance of North America as a peopling destination by manipulating the map’s compositional components (e.g., enlarging any associated font or centring the image on the USA). This last point is

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37 Interestingly, as Mackie (2006, pers. comm.) has noted, many of these weapons are actually too recent to qualify as representative tools of the earliest peoples (i.e., as tools of the Paleoindian era).

38 Of course, there is also room to argue that—following this image’s composition and the Western habit of scanning visual materials from left to right, top to bottom—man (in the far left background) is in the preliminary stages of slaughtering all of America’s wildlife one-by-one.
significant because Figure 22 is directed at a general, family-based audience, whose members (especially youth) might quite plausibly be geographic illiterates who can only interpret maps with such visual cues as explicit state border lines, contemporary place markers and bloated textual references to the USA. Figure 22, however, does not make obvious use of these loaded signifiers. Neither does Figure 21, in spite of its youthful readership. Neither does Figure 19, with its young adult viewers. Neither does Figure 20, despite its undergraduate audience. Neither does National Geographic (Figure 10). Neither does Fagan (Figure 11). Neither does Maestro and Maestro’s children’s book as pictured below (Figure 23).

Indeed, beyond Texas Parks and Wildlife’s audacious spotlighting of Texas state, it seems that it is generally PhD-bearing academics writing for skilled or learned audiences who present us with prehistoric maps of the Americas plastered with the explicit stains of modern geopolitics. We see this with Meltzer, with Haynes, with Dixon; with Kelly’s scholarly journal article on the first North American citizens (Figure 24); with Mosimann and Martin’s periodical piece on American man’s swarming of the States’ mammalian life (Figure 25); and with Surovell’s figure, which traces coastal migration not through archaeological sites (Monte Verde is the only such site noted), but primarily through hot-spot American seashore travel destinations including San Francisco and Puerto Vallarta (see Figure 26).

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39 Though, it does not have to do so, considering that the ice sheets offer their own symbolic boundary lines.
40 Murdoch’s (1995) text is available at UVic’s Curriculum Lab (education library) as a teaching resource for elementary and secondary school instructors.
Let us be clear that these images are not destined for juvenile or lightweight consumption. No general readership is going to pick up a copy of *Quaternary International*, or *Current Anthropology*; nor is an uneducated, illiterate audience typically reading *Scientific American*, nor Dixon’s 322 page, University of New Mexico-published *Bones, Boats and Bison* text. Scientifically, there is no sound reason why academics producing papers for knowledgeable audiences should need to qualify their depictions with reference to contemporary city and state constructs, particularly given that the majority of these depictions *already include* other geographic measurements of scale (e.g., longitude and latitude markers, or mile or kilometre specifications). Ideologically, of course, the reason why academics would proceed as such is far more plain, for North American peopling research is nothing if not a matter of identity politics.

**Who ARE the First Americans?**

While archaeologists have perhaps hidden their most prejudicial opinions about the first colonisers of America within innocuous visual representations, these opinions are certainly not deeply buried. To again and again see New World peopling pictured as a single (sometimes white) man holding (or being obscured by) one or many big stone tools while he works a day job as an “elephant hunter” in the 11,000+ year old city of Fairbanks, Alaska or Edmonton, Alberta and dreams of travelling down the ice-free highway to the virgin heartland of the USA, is to be witness to a fairly arrogant claim about what kind of character was once common to the first Americans, what values they prized, and what nationality they identified with even prior to the existence of nations. But to be witness to the ultimate in arrogant statements about the identity of the earliest
Americans requires casting an eye on the title pages of such texts as Dillehay and Meltzer (Figure 27) and Adovasio and Page (Figure 28). In both cases a black and white photograph captures a suit-wearing Caucasian man (men) in profile looking down upon and touching or holding an earthly artefact. Associated text (written in large capital letters that either visually follow the iconography or lead directly into it), makes reference both to a hunt (“search,” “pursuit”) and to the first Americans.

I do not hesitate to suggest that archaeologists have, as seen in Figures 1 through 26, traced Euro-Americans into New World prehistory, and have now gone as far as to trace themselves into the bodies of the first colonisers (Figures 27-28). Really, how far is the leap from the man of Figure 25 to the man of Figure 27? Or from Figure 11 to Figure 28?

If, with Figure 11, we reduce the size of the globe and increase man’s stature, flip him from right-facing to left-facing and replace his fur suit with a business suit, we begin to undress a series of uncomfortable likenesses that connect this picture to Figure 28. Similarly, if, with Figure 25, we flip the icon from left profile to right profile, replace spear with cane, and shift focus from megamammal flesh to megamammal bone, we are confronted with the connotative equivalent of Figure 27: a lone male, face cast in partial shadow, hands clenched, legs apart, body poised, suit well-fitted, gaze directed toward the kill; a (relic) hunter making his living off of the land.

Consider also Figures 29 and 30. What is the semiological difference between an image of an obliquely-aligned row of Caucasian men sitting in front of their dinners over the caption “charting the way into the Americas,” and an image of an obliquely aligned row of men (arguably European—Caucasian—immigrants, given their vectorial
connections to the north Atlantic) standing in front of their dinners in the process, quite literally, of charting their way into the Americas? I would argue that there is very little difference here, for these are all powerful men with powerful ties to the shaping of American (pre)history. Indeed, these men are the same men; their America is the same America.

The irony is that archaeologists now reminisce somewhat patronisingly about uninformed 16th-19th century imaginings of the first Americans as Phoenicians or Huns or survivors of a lost Atlantis (e.g., Meltzer 1994:8), even though their own 21st century scientifically-grounded reconstructions of the first Americans are nearly as fantastical. To create a prehistory wherein the first colonisers of the continent look like contemporary (Euro)Americans, act like contemporary (Euro)Americans, and live in and travel through the same cities and states and countries as contemporary (Euro)Americans, hints at a somewhat desperate attempt to find a legitimate place for ourselves in a changing, contested, but long-lived landscape. In what is at once both an astute and relevant, yet confused statement, Fagan writes, “to read the crank literature on the first Americans is to enter a fantasy world of strange, often obsessed, writers with a complex jargon of catchwords and ‘scientific’ data to support their ideas. Some of them even form new religious cults, with themselves in the role of the ultimate prophet, or the Supreme Deity himself” (1987:10). Fagan’s cranks, of course, include archaeologists, who study New World peopling, carve their discipline up into—among other things—ice-free corridor and coastal corridor factions, claim that evidence will reveal the truth behind their beliefs, and then, in the end, simply draw themselves into the same grand (pre)historic story.
As noted above, it was scholars, including archaeologists, who depicted the peopling of the Americas as pictured in Figure 7 (the logo used as the front piece for the American Quaternary Association conference of 2002). If this is not a "fantasy world," then it is unclear what is. Here again, we are confronted with a group of men who, if they do not lead us down an ice-free corridor to the USA, will instead likely lead us right back to where we began: to a cave on the coast where we can curl up on the floor, turn on our bright minds, and give birth to all those myths which keep Euro-Americans warm and comfortable in bed at night (recall Figure 9).
CHAPTER 5: AUSTRALIA AND THE PACIFIC

Professional archaeology in Australia and Oceania has a brief history. With the Australian field overwhelmed by recreational artefact hunters until 1959 (Murray and White 1981:256), and with Oceania deprived of skilled researchers up to the late 1940s (Terrell 1986:75), dedicated inquiry into the peopling of the Australasian territories did not begin until at least a half century after the initiation of comparable work in North America. Considering archaeology’s slow start in the region, it might be assumed that not only would the discipline seem less crowded with expert opinions on Australasian peopling matters, but that such opinions would seem less well-formed and less up-to-date than the contentions of long-established colonisation authorities elsewhere in the world. As noted in Chapter 2, theoretical trends in Australian and Pacific archaeology have followed a different—arguably stunted and definitely conservative—trajectory favouring determinism and processualism (Huchet 1991; Smith 1995). Archaeologists have typically busied themselves with debating the place of the environment, technology and the “primitive isolate” in the prehistoric development of Australasia, to the exclusion of sociality or agency (Gosden 1994:20-22; Terrell et al. 1997). Bednarik has spoken of Australasian theorising as little more than neocolonialist “uniformitarian minimalist reasoning” (1998:14); and, not surprisingly then, Australia in particular has tended to be relegated to a dusty corner of world prehistory—marginalised by the seemingly more impressive and complicated European Palaeolithic (White 1996:303). Yet as Smith (1995) insinuates, Australasian archaeology is not necessarily doomed to the philosophical backwoods. Even the most modish post-processual styles of Anglo-American scholars have often amounted to nothing but brooding, unintelligible dead-ends
(Smith 1995:30). And North American peopling studies have themselves been seen to privilege “simple but sufficient” least-cost optimisation models (e.g., Bryan and Gruhn 2003:177), which are arguably their own form of (neo)colonial minimalism. Australasian traditions, then, are perhaps no more or less developed than the traditions of other regions and researchers.

In fact, in recent years Australasian archaeology has grown into a far more dynamic commentary on human behaviour than its history might predict. Peopling research in the Pacific has come to increasingly engage with experimental studies that illuminate purpose, negotiation and choice among colonisers (e.g., Finney 1996a; Gamble 1997; Irwin 1992); and Australian work is finally beginning to untangle itself from its “unchanging people in an unchanging environment” upbringing (Davidson 1999). Archaeologists have launched into conversations about the political implications behind reconstructing first movements in the Pacific (Spriggs 1999), and some have even made tentative steps toward discerning the constraining and “clumsy” effects of visualisation on our understanding of the past (Gamble 2001:51-52). This is significant because while some still persist in framing the entire prehistory of Australia, for instance, as a simple “archaeology of hunters and gatherers” wherein founding populations developed “uninterrupted” into contemporary Aborigines (e.g., Smith 1999:324); others can now claim to have progressed toward truly “sophisticated and nuanced” (Kirch 1997:127) contemplation about colonisation.

The problem, however, is that although archaeologists might believe that their work has advanced beyond archaic visions of first peoples capable of nothing more than “ecological relations with hazelnuts” (Gamble 1997:146), their pictures speak differently.
Only among scholars who still do not understand the capacity for images to colour our thoughts and stain our knowledge of the world could a hazy and colourless representation of eleven identically-clothed modern Aborigines arranged in two lines, staring blankly at the camera be accepted as a component of a “new and challenging avenue of research” (Huchet 1991:49) in Australian archaeology (Figure 31; Lourandos 1997). Only among scholars who are incognizant of the socio-political repercussions of visuality would it be acceptable to turn human evolution into a joyride through the United States, where the colonisation of Australia stands as nothing but an unknown stop in Kansas, and where civilisation reaches its zenith in New York City (Figure 32; Davidson 2001:401). Only among scholars who are oblivious of the suggestive interplays between text and image could one sensibly criticise others for attributing to Pacific prehistory “a peculiarly timeless form of movement and no sense that any period of the past was radically different from the present” (Gosden 1994:22), then juxtapose such a statement with a map wherein time is indistinguishable, land and sea are indistinguishable, sites (beyond their official names) are indistinguishable, and movement is nonexistent (Figure 33; Gosden 1994:23). Indeed, only among a pictorially-unaware academia would one have the audacity to write that “Pacific prehistory is...a process of colonization which is in itself a form of altering space and time as settlement spreads and changes shape” (Gosden 1994:22; emphasis mine) while, at once, shrivelling such a process and its changing shapes into eight static, isolated and identical black triangles pasted onto a washed-out one-dimensional plane (again see Figure 33).

The irony is that many of these same scholars are appreciative of the fact that “archaeology, both historically and in the present, is intimately involved in definitions of
humanness” (Gosden 1994:37). These scholars are the same individuals whose words about ancient human complexity have been an inspiration for other academics seeking to elaborate on the complicated “big structures” of Australasian life (e.g., Kirch 1997:63, 303). These scholars are the same individuals who have fought to have the first Australasians acknowledged as the most modern of humans; as humans who actively redefined their environments, and actively redefined themselves (e.g., Davidson 1999; Davidson 2001; Davidson and Noble 1992; Lourandos 1997). Thus for these scholars to visually represent Australasian colonisers as untouched contemporary Aborigines, or to collapse their movements into just one insignificant step on the road to reaching New York City, is folly: it is a demonstration of a lack of reflectiveness about human nature. In a discipline which has been known to label Australasian first peoples as “somewhat retarded” in terms of cultural development (White 1977:15 quoting Clark and Piggott 1965:49), it is unreasonable to argue in words for complexity and thoughtfulness in prehistory, while arguing iconographically for an ancient history that truly does seem retarded (i.e., timeless, uniform, trivial). With archaeologists representing the past as such, it should not seem surprising to see non-professionals doing the same, for as White writes, those with “less direct knowledge of the material simply take their cue from the experts” (1977:14). Indeed, among popular culture it is not uncommon to conduct a search for information on the peopling of the Australian region, only to be confronted with a majority of references to “peopling since 1788.”42 In this context, Australian prehistory is essentially invisible—irrelevant in comparison to the “real” history of the European first peoples.

42 Approximately 80% of initial hits on a standard search engine on the topic of the “peopling of Australia” will guide users to a link relating to the peopling of Australia “since 1788” or “between 1900-1930.”
This chapter is structured similarly to the last, beginning with a review of recent archaeological work on the first colonisations of Australia and Oceania, and continuing with an analysis of the popular and professional pictorial products that are presented alongside this research. Australia and Oceania are addressed here concurrently, not because their archaeologies are consistent in terms of theory and technique, but because their peopling images are essentially indistinguishable. Like Chapter 4, I argue that archaeological pictures are not neutral mirrors of prehistoric realities, but rather provocative comments about our morals and prejudices in which both archaeologists and popular culture indulge. However, unlike Chapter 4, I do not make the argument that visualisations of the first occupants of Australia and the Pacific evoke humans “like us”—humans so familiar that they appear to have popped fully-formed out of the belly of the mid-western US. Instead, I contend that, in their visual representation in archaeology-related documents, the first Australasians are far from US: they are them; they are pictured as that “somewhat retarded” “primitive isolate” that filled up space and awaited the arrival of the ultimate (and very familiar) colonisers, the Europeans.

**Peopling Australia and the Pacific (with Facts)**

*(i) Australia*

In 1890, concerned about the possibility of an ancient human presence on the continent of Australia, Etheridge exclaimed:

“Are there any geological traces of man on this Continent, such as exist in other countries, and whereby the presence of a former race, or the antiquity of the present fast disappearing one, can be traced? The answer given by those most competent to judge is—No!” (Roberts and Jones 1994:2)
Incredibly, for the following 50+ years, Etheridge’s passionate exclamation was generally understood as fact. It was not until 1961, with Mulvaney’s uncovering of ~8700-year B.P. materials from south Australia (Allen 1989:150; Jones 1989:756; Roberts and Jones 1994:2; White and O’Connell 1982), that serious consideration of the time depth of human life on the continent was prompted. Over the next 20 years, this time depth was elaborated four-fold, such that by the 1980s archaeologists had “enshrined” 40,000 years B.P. as the date of initial colonisation of the Australian landmass (also known as Sahul^43), and ~30,000 years B.P. as the date by which all major ecological spaces on the continent had been occupied (Allen 1989:150; Jones 1989:773; Webb 1998:749). By the 1990s, some archaeologists were so convinced of the solidity of these numbers that they were prepared to write that “Australianists are not polarized on the issue of early dates...Chronology, for Australian archaeologists, is one of the few areas where contentiousness does not play an important role in the literature” (Beaton 1991:213). Yet today, such statements seem misguided. A brief scan of the recent science suggests that Australianists have in fact been fixated on dating, arguably to the extent that they have begun to mistake studies of chronology for meaningful inquiries into peopling processes (e.g., see Allen and O’Connell 2003; O’Connell and Allen 1998, 2004; Roberts and Jones 1994; Turney and Bird 2002; Turney et al. 2001; Zazula 2000).

It is perhaps relevant that Sahulian archaeology lacks an iconic Clovis-type site. Although the continent is marked by well-known archaeological locations including Lake Mungo, Devil’s Lair cave, the Huon Peninsula in New Guinea, Malakunanja II, and

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43 With water reserves locked in continental glaciers during much of the Pleistocene, and sea levels sitting at up to 130m below present, the current islands of Australia, Tasmania and New Guinea were once joined by low-lying plains which are believed to have facilitated early human settlement. Collectively, archaeologists and biogeographers refer to these once-interconnected landscapes as Sahul (Gillespie 2002; Groves 1996; Kirch 1997:65-66; Lourandos 1997; Webb 1998).
Nauwalabila I (Bird et al. 2004; Kirch 1997; O’Connell and Allen 2004; Roberts and Jones 1994), none of these sites—not even Lake Mungo with its evidence of 40,000 year B.P. ritualised human burials (Bowler et al. 2003)—appears to have provoked a “eureka”-type moment comparable to that of Clovis. Indeed, none of these sites seems to have crystallised our visions of the first Australians quite like the spearpoint-in-mammoth-bone evidence from Clovis came to shape our understanding of the first Americans. Possibly this is because visions of the initial colonisers of Sahul have always been concrete, unambiguous and, essentially, smothering. As Murray and White contend, Australian prehistory is reminiscent of “nineteenth-century ethnography retrodicting for 50 millennia” (1981:258). Under these circumstances, it is arguable that no findings, not the world’s first evidence of cremated human remains, nor collections of Pleistocene-age rock art that far exceed European collections in terms of vastness (Bednarik 2003a:8), can easily re-work our stereotypes.\textsuperscript{44} Alternatively, it is arguable that in discussions of first peopling (as opposed to in particularised discussions of art or burial or Lake Mungo, etc.) novel findings are obliterated by other matters—including never-ending claims by researchers that they have uncovered a newer, older date or, instead, have affirmed the accuracy of some previously-established (younger) date.

To be sure, Australian archaeology is marked by an unsettling pedigree which has been documented and debated at length elsewhere (e.g., Murray and White 1981; Thomas 1982; White 1977). While inquiry into the antiquity of human life on the continent was apparent as early as the 19\textsuperscript{th}—possibly even the 18\textsuperscript{th}—century (as per comparable inquiry in other areas of the world), by 1910 such work had essentially been dropped due to a

\textsuperscript{44} Indeed, reworking our stereotypes seems especially difficult here given Mackie’s (2006, pers. comm.) point that prehistoric Australia houses evidence of the world’s earliest ground stone tools, making it essentially the birth place of the Stone Age.
lack of success in uncovering the pivotal (eureka-moment) indicator of man’s ancient presence: human materials in association with extinct animal remains (Murray and White 1981:256; White and O’Connell 1982:22). Without such evidence, and with other researchers suggesting that all stone artefacts in Australia were equally primitive-seeming and unrelated to any European tool typologies, the conclusion was that Aborigines were a static population with a static technology: undeveloped people wielding “crude, colourless and unenterprising lumps of rock” (White 1977:14). Ultimately, the advent of radiocarbon dating in the mid-20th century, coupled with Mulvaney’s publications in the 1960s, validated long-time Aboriginal existence on Sahul, but an academic tendency to understand tool evolution as a metre of cultural advancement meant that archaeological interpretations of the first colonisers’ non-formalised flaked, retouched, and chopper tools were themselves little more than crude, colourless and unenterprising interpretive lumps (Clark 1969; White 1977; White and O’Connell 1982). Evidently, history was understood by archaeologists as the history of tool development (White 1977:25), and in light of the excavation of so many non-formal artefacts on the continent, Australian (pre)history was thus construed as essentially meaningless—of nothing more than “marginal importance” (White and O’Connell 1982:23).

Such impressions about the marginal importance of Australia’s Aboriginal past have not been uncommon: they are evoked both indirectly and directly elsewhere. They are visible in undergraduate, popular and academic texts (e.g., Clark 1969; Gamble 1993; Oppenheimer 2003) where commentary on Sahul’s colonisation is typically squeezed-in well after a review of European peopling but, of course, penultimate to American
peopling. They are visible in the fact that just one text, White and O’Connell’s twenty-three-year-old *A Prehistory of Australia, New Guinea and Sahul* (1982), stood for nearly ten years as the “best” summary of Australian evidence in the archaeological literature (Beaton 1991:211), and arguably still stands today (despite never having been modernised/re-released) as one of the discipline’s most vital resources. They are visible in the academic practice of attributing virtually no human agency to Sahulian peopling, such that colonisation appears unsophisticated and accidental, and the first colonisers seem like ignoramuses who “acquired their country as the result of a series of mistakes some 50 000 years ago” (White 1996:304). And they are visible in recent journal publications (see below) which do little more than confirm that there are just two topics of substance to Australian peopling research, neither of which have much relation to real people (i.e., the on-the-ground human negotiations of unfamiliar landscapes): absolute dating of initial Australian occupation and absolute dating of megafaunal extinction.

To be fair, texts and some articles do make reference to the more corporeal, non-date oriented accomplishments of Australian peoples. Commentators have reflected on the first peoples’ use of language, their exploitation of plant products, their ceremonial

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45 Such positioning, I believe, is a comment on Sahul’s limited significance in the pecking order of colonisation, although others would likely argue that for purposes of readability, it is a justified feature of a comprehensive, multi-millennia spanning publication. Again, however, this argument assumes the necessary primacy of chronology in peopling discussions.

46 Compare this to the reality that nearly 10 years after White and O’Connell’s singular publication, at least five comparable resources for American archaeology were available (see Beaton 1991:211), few of which I would be comfortable recommending as critical readings today.

47 This is evident in its continuing status as a recommended or necessary reading in at least five Australian university courses: Bond University (AUST 11-101), Flinders University (ARCH 3009), Latrobe University (ARC 21/31), Macquarie University (ABST 210), and University of Southern Queensland (ANT 3000).

48 Note that I have not investigated linguistic or genetic peopling-related research, and thus cannot speak to its spread in the academic literature.
behaviours, their fishing practices, their capacity for artistic representation and its enabling of colonisation, and their manipulation of fire and its direct effects on the early environment (e.g., Davidson 1999; Davidson and Noble 1992; Jones 1989; Smith 1992; Turney et al. 2001; White 1996). But little compares to the wealth of words that has been devoted to dating megafauna and the Sahulian peopling “event” in recent years. In 2005 alone, at least six periodical papers were published on mammalian extinction in Australia (Burney and Flannery 2005; Johnson 2005a, b; Miller et al. 2005; Surovell et al. 2005; Trueman et al. 2005); which contrasts with the number of new papers published on the topic of modelling early human movements on Sahul: ONE—printed in 1998 and, of course, heavily date-focused (Webb 1998; although Mannino and Thomas 2002 is also a possible contender). In the last five years, no fewer than 24 researchers (e.g., Allen and O’Connell 2003; Gillespie 2002; O’Connell and Allen 2004; Roberts et al. 2001; Turney and Bird 2002; Turney et al. 2001) have published journal articles directly appraising the absolute dating of Australia’s initial colonisation. This compares to the number of researchers whose recent journal articles have reflected seriously on possible non-accidental means for Australian colonisation: less than five (e.g., Bednarik 2003c; Davidson 1999). While it is not my assertion that dates of human arrival or megafaunal demise are irrelevant to discussions of peopling, it is my belief that such topics are often one-dimensional; they turn peopling into a “when”-focused debate whose hero is the archaeologist/scientist. This means that contemplation of the actual first peoples—who the first peoples were, why they colonised, how they moved—is typically subjugated to questions of which archaeologist has the correct date (and consequently the correct peopling hypothesis). It is only the rare scholar (e.g., Brook and Bowman 2002, 2004;
Wroe et al. 2004) who acknowledges that past human culture and tradition (and other non-biology-oriented motives) might have impacted on colonisation behaviours and, therefore, might have an effect on our modelling of events like megafaunal extinction. Sadly, it is far more common for researchers to display an overall inattentiveness to (and misapprehension of) human dimensionality. Such a tradition reveals itself in the publication of confused academic writings whose titles imply that they will attend to human peopling *performances* (e.g., Turney and Bird’s (2002) “Determining the timing and pattern of human colonisation in Australia,” or Turney et al.’s (2001) “Redating the onset of burning at Lynch’s Crater: implications for human settlement in Australia” (emphases mine); also Zazula 2000), but whose contents are wholly date-centred. It is debatable whether or not researchers are genuinely interested in understanding the first peoples behind Australian peopling, for chronology can only explain so much.

Perhaps, though, this chronological prejudice is understandable in light of the problems with dating methodologies that have long hampered Australian archaeologists. With radiocarbon dating being, until recently, the only absolute technique used by researchers to contextualise the Sahulian archaeological record, and with radiocarbon’s effective limit falling at approximately 35,000-40,000 years B.P. (such that all samples that sit at or above this timeline converge, producing unreliable results), Australian colonisation has conveniently been understood to date to about 40,000 years B.P. (e.g., Webb and Rindos 1997; Webb 1998). Suspicious of this clustering of Australia’s oldest dates around the so-named “radiocarbon barrier,” some archaeologists (e.g., Roberts and Jones 1994) have challenged assumptions about the supposed 40,000-year B.P. Sahulian colonisation with novel (but not infallible) optical and thermoluminescence methods.
Such work has yielded dates up to 176,000 years old—dates which have attracted scepticism and, generally, refutation through retesting (e.g., Roberts et al. 1998a). Elsewhere, scholars have used pollen/ palaeoecological records to place Australia’s peopling at 200,000 years ago (Kershaw et al. 1997), and other techniques (e.g., U-series dating, electron spin resonance, and optically stimulated luminescence on the Lake Mungo human skeletons and associated materials) to place it at ~62,000 years B.P. (Thorne et al. 1999). All of these results have variously been challenged or rejected based on flawed methodology (e.g., Allen and O’Connell 2003; and see references in Bird et al. 2004:149). Several of the more prolific theorists on Australian colonisation have committed nearly two decades to safeguarding ~40,000 years B.P. as the “accurate” date of first peopling (Allen 1989; Allen and O’Connell 2003; O’Connell and Allen 1998, 2004), while others, particularly Richard Roberts (see references in Roberts et al. 2001), have spent almost as long in authenticating dates that are, at minimum, 10,000 years greater. The situation is such that discussion of any topic beyond dating (for example, routes navigated by the first Australians) must typically hark back to research conducted up to 30 years past because little else is available (for example, Birdsell 1977; Bowdler 1977; Veth 1989). Interestingly, then, unlike North America where a relatively substantial, although not necessarily nuanced, literature about peopling pathways (and the equipment, environments and foodstuffs that supported those pathways) continues to evolve, comparable work in Australia has seen minimal investment. Sahulian peopling studies mainly concern (the refinement of) chronology;\(^{49}\) and this, I believe, has its

\(^{49}\) Bird et al. (2004) summarise all other relevant research as such: \textit{Homo sapiens} likely colonised Australia from Timor, subsequently splitting northward (into New Guinea and then eastward to the islands of the Pacific) and southward through Australia’s interior, down to Tasmania. Reasonably wet conditions and easy-to-follow riverine systems facilitated this movement, but as climate changed and aridity increased,
advantages: the more time that we dedicate to unreflexively disciplining our temporal scales, the less time we need to spend contemplating the complicated, skilful actions behind Australia’s colonisation (for instance, the manipulation of watercraft technology and the honing of seafaring skills), and thus the less thought we need to give to the humanness of the first Australians and their obvious likenesses to us (modern-day Westerners). After all, if >40,000-year-old Aborigines can claim access to intentional and negotiated behaviours, and if perhaps even 800,000-year-old pre-sapiens (Homo erectus) can do the same (e.g., Morwood et al.’s 1998 finds on the island of Flores), then others (European descendants) have less ability to authenticate our specialness. But to be able to restrict all peopling conversations to a scholars-only debate about dating methodology, or to fight to stall the timing of the continent’s first colonisation at 40,000y B.P. such that intelligent human behaviour is not spoiled on other—more and more distant—populations, or, alternatively, to simply continue to characterise indigenous Australians as unchanged hunters and gatherers who accidentally landed on Sahul, is to be able to powerfully regulate our understanding of prehistory. In privileging chronology (no matter how socio-politically disconnected it may seem), peopling archaeologists thus continue to deliver clear verdicts about who is human, who can legitimately comment upon colonisation processes, and who has ultimate control over the Australian past.

(ii) The Pacific

Given such partialities in Sahulian peopling research, one might expect that studies of the colonisation of the Pacific Islands (a colonisation which generally unfolded humans ventured into different and more marginal surroundings. These first peoples apparently used fire to manage aspects of the environment, and they might have provoked the demise of the continent’s megafauna.
from the coasts of New Guinea, and therefore was made possible via the earlier settlement of Sahul) would exhibit similar leanings. However, the fact is that while temporal arguments still have prominence in this region of the world (e.g., Graves and Addison 1995; Spriggs and Anderson 1993; also see summary in Irwin 1998:114-117), archaeologists have been *obliged* to think differently about Oceania’s peopling considering that it necessitated prehistoric human traversal of millions of square kilometres of shifting sea space.

Importantly, Gosden has recognised the Pacific as “a world without any ethnographic parallel” (Kirch 1997:77). The fortunate result of such an absence of analogues has been that archaeologists have had access to fewer oppressive stereotypes upon which to premise their theories. This has certainly not prevented narrow-minded rationalisations of the existence of the first Pacific Islanders, but it *has* demanded a degree of creativity generally unseen in Australian, and perhaps even American, peopling research. To explain how humans could have found their way over ~90km of water to occupy the Sahulian continent is arguably less problematical than to explain how so-called “Stone Agers” (as per Finney 1996a:71) could have navigated back and forth across the deep sea, without sight or assurance of a destination, without modern satellite technologies or boating equipment to guide them, while negotiating thousands of miles of ocean in a single voyage and carrying sufficient food and resources to support themselves until their return. Unsurprisingly, as with Sahul, several researchers have been prepared to attribute such travels to propitious accidents; however this type of reasoning about the vast settlement of, the traffic between, and the back-and-forth transplantation of foreign animals and plants into, some of the most isolated landmasses in the world is utterly
crude. As Finney (1996a:78-79) highlights, even Captain Cook could appreciate the intentionality behind the movements of the first Oceanic peoples.

Following Kirch and Weisler (1994:285), the Pacific was one of the final jurisdictions on the globe to be subject to rigorous archaeological inquiry; but, general speculation on the origins of the first Pacific Islanders has actually been quite longstanding. Prior to the advent of “serious” archaeology in the region, popularisers (e.g., Heyerdahl 1952), historians (e.g., Sharp 1956), and 18th-19th century explorers/scientists (see Finney 1996a:78-79), among others, all endeavoured to account for the peopling of Oceanic spaces. Archaeologists, it seems, were among the last to offer commentary on this process, and their work served ultimately to correct some of the misconceptions birthed by these earlier theorists while, at once, concretising others. Recent research from the field now suggests that with Sahul colonised by, at minimum, 40,000y B.P., the first peoples spread east from New Guinea through the islands of New Britain (visible from New Guinea’s coast) and New Ireland (visible from New Britain’s coast) in the Bismarck Archipelago, continuing further east (without the advantage of clear island visibility) to settle the Solomons by 29,000 B.P. (Hurles et al. 2003; Kirch 1997).

Collectively known as Near Oceania, this area witnessed the establishment of exchange networks by 18,000-20,000 B.P., the navigation of blind ocean crossings (wherein seafarers would not have been able to see land in any direction for various stretches of travel) by the terminal Pleistocene, and the cultivation of crops by 9,000 B.P. (Hurles et al. 2003; Irwin 1992). Further east and north of Near Oceania (in the islands of eastern Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia—together known as Remote Oceania—where landmasses become increasingly smaller in size, impoverished in marine and terrestrial
resources, isolated and geologically simple), colonisation was delayed for another 25,000y as colonisers trained themselves in survival skills and adapted their maritime technology to suit more complicated water crossings (Irwin 1990, 1992; Weisler 1997). In a near archaeologically-instantaneous event at ~3,500 B.P., colonisers moved east from the Bismarcks and Solomons out to Fiji, Tonga and Samoa; and others, some likely originating from Island Southeast Asia, moved north to settle areas of Micronesia (e.g., Palau, Yap, the Mariana Islands, Truk, Ponape, etc.) (Irwin 1990, 2000). Debate about the timing of additional colonisations is ongoing, but Pacific peoples then ventured into the furthest reaches of eastern Polynesia, occupying Hawaii and the Marquesas by 1,400 B.P., and Easter Island and the Pitcairns by 1,200 B.P., eventually reaching “the end of the line”—New Zealand—at about 1000 B.P. (Irwin 2000:406).50

Hurles et al. have rightly dubbed the Remote Oceanic colonisers “the world’s most advanced explorers of their time” (2003:538). History, however, suggests that a majority of researchers have been slow to appreciate this point. Indeed, in view of its association with supposed “Stone Age” individuals, Oceania has typically been understood not as the nucleus of innovative behaviours, but rather as the hub of an especially anomalous regional colonisation event. Out of sync, it seems, with our perceptions of first peoples, scholars have been quick to label Oceania’s settlement as “one of the long-standing puzzles of Pacific prehistory” (Finney 1985:9);51, 52 or they

50 Evolving research also suggests that Pacific Islanders travelled from Oceania to South America—and possibly even to southern California—then back again by at least 1000 B.P. (e.g., Clarke et al. 2006; Jones and Klar 2005).
51 Note that Finney has demonstrated a particularly bad habit of trademarking the earliest Pacific Islanders as “Stone Age” peoples (see multiple direct and indirect references in Finney 1985, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). Consideration of the connotations of such language and its potential to choke our interpretations of the past is non-existent in Finney’s work.
52 Kirch and Hunt (1998:iii) call it the “problem of Polynesian origins.”
continue to gawk in disbelief at the "most remarkable achievements" of the region's inhabitants (Weisler 1997:7). Such statements are, I believe, belittling; they beg incredulity about the potential for Pacific Islanders to wield intelligent control over their cross-sea movements, and they are simmering with the connotation that, at its heart, Oceanic peopling can only rationally be the result of chance or mechanical response. How possibly could "Stone Agers" have come to be spread over an island environment that is comparable in size to the regions of Europe and Asia combined (Finney 1996a:78)? How possibly could non-Europeans have navigated 20 million km² of increasingly distant and resource-deprived islands in east Polynesia alone (Irwin 1990; Spriggs and Anderson 1993)? The implication is that only by biogeographic miracle could these peoples (read: anyone other than Europeans and their descendents) have colonised an unruly Pacific Ocean.

Predictably, such academic incredulousness at the extensive movements of the first Oceanians has dirtied our research paradigms, conferring legitimacy on accident-privileging hypotheses (e.g., Sharp 1956), which exploit "desperate scenarios" (like clueless pregnant women clinging onto floating vegetable matter across the sea) to explain the peopling of the entire Pacific world (Bednarik 1998:14; 2003c:61). Where such hypotheses have proven flawed (e.g., as established by Levison et al.'s 1973 computer voyaging simulations), parsimonious reasoning has credited Oceania's peopling to island configuration (e.g., Keegan and Diamond 1987; cf. Keegan 1997), which in turn has allowed researchers to construe the Pacific as nothing more than an ideal natural laboratory. Such thinking alleviates any need for the contemplation of deliberate and meaningful peopling acts, for it subordinates first peoples to an omnipotent
environment: they become mere organisms in a petri dish. Island colonisation is thus framed as a mechanistic reaction to biological needs or ecosystemic realities, meaning that the peopling process can be read, at best, as “ecotriumph” (Anderson 2002:375) (i.e., humans survived the environmental inputs well enough to establish viable demographic groups) and, at worst, as uncontrolled inevitability. Either way, the possibility that humans might have purposefully chosen to explore the Pacific (based on interest and seafaring aptitude, not simply on biogeographic necessity) is forgotten. As Gamble puts it, the earliest colonisers tend to be fancifully construed: “presented as demiurges, driven and determined by external forces...They stand outside history with its contingency and human choices” (1997:145).

Fortunately, expanding archaeological research—with a focus on pioneering interpretive approaches—has slowly begun to reformulate these one-sided readings of the peopling of the Pacific. Emergent attention to long-distance interaction spheres and regional homelands, to dispersal strategies and strategic economic behaviours, to “lifelines” and settlement landscapes, to “social fields” and holistic anthropological perspectives (e.g., Green 2000; Kirch 1986, 1988, 2000; Kirch and Weisler 1994; Rolett 2002; Terrell et al. 1997:174; Weisler 1994, 1997), has, I believe, begun to prompt a contextualisation of Pacific colonisation (following Irwin 2000). Peopling studies are finally endeavouring to locate a kind of co-production of humanity and technology/environment/biology in Oceania, such that former paradigms that favoured the “how geography conditions culture” standpoint (Keegan and Diamond 1987:82) are now being turned inside-out to consider how culture shaped Pacific geography, which in turn shaped culture. Moving beyond the disembodied linkage of islands via radiocarbon chronologies
and environment (a practice which, following Irwin (2000:396), tends mistakenly to substitute *post*-colonisation history for peopling processes), the recent emergence of “sophisticated and nuanced” (Kirch 1997:127) archaeological reflections on agency and purpose in Pacific colonisation (e.g., Gamble 1993, 1997; Irwin 1992, 1997, 2000) now grants social lives, futural sensibilities, choice, trading capacity, memory, skill and self-knowledge to first peoples. At the forefront of such novel reflections are the evolving voyaging and navigational studies of Geoffrey Irwin (e.g., 1989, 1992, 1998; Irwin et al. 1990; see application by Graves and Addison 1995) and Ben Finney (e.g., 1977, 1991, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2001; Finney et al. 1989)(cf. Bednarik 1998, 2003c), whose myriad computer simulations and experimental canoe voyages have effectively established the intentional, commonsensical nature of Pacific peopling. According to this research, the earliest Oceanic colonisers exploited predictable westerly wind patterns, engaged in twoway exploratory travel utilising latitudinal sailing strategies, and hence were meteorologically and nautically adept. Importantly, Finney’s and Irwin’s approaches allow insight into the actual *ground-level processes* of colonisation as they intersect with lived human practice—as they cross with intention, habit, training and ideology (also Gamble 1993:233). Moreover, such approaches uncharacteristically enliven the seemingly invisible, abyss-like sea between the Pacific Islands, thankfully addressing the reality that this is not a void, but is instead an active scape that must be wrestled with and felt and lived in (Irwin 2000:396). Finney’s and Irwin’s studies are among the few to appreciate that peoplings might in fact be sensuous, non-teleological engagements with the world; their studies are virtually matchless in their attention to the first colonisers as more than simpletons whose straightforward motions can be connected by dots across the
sea. Ultimately, the fundamental concepts behind their work have relevance to Australian and American peopling studies—studies which have yet to grapple as competently with ideas about dwelling in (after Ingold 1995:75), and realistically moving through, alien worlds.

Problematically, Irwin and Finney have not pondered all that it means to contextualise first colonisation research. Terrell et al. write that “one of the benefits of studying the Pacific is that life there is an affront to Western commonsense notions about the world and how things are...[W]e have some cultural unlearning to do” (1997:187). The problem is that such cultural unlearning is arguably impossible if the very scholars at the forefront of innovative anthropology in Oceania are not wary of the visual/verbal products of their work that allow these “commonsense” (meaning, usually, narrow-minded and patronising) notions to thrive. It should not be surprising that the first Oceanians continue to be collared by the term “Stone Age,” and continue to be ogled by scientists about their “puzzling” appearance in the Pacific, when both scholarly and popular publications present them (pictorially) as naive and impoverished-seeming individuals timelessly cloistered by biology and geography. It should not be surprising that chance-based and mechanistic colonisation models would continue to dominate our peopling theories when rarely do we see the publication of representations of informed prehistoric sailors sailing through the islands with goals and purpose.

This is what, quite literally, draws research on the peoplings of Australia and Oceania together: neither have sufficiently reflected on the visual dimensions of colonisation arguments; and both generally choose to illustrate the peopling process in the most familiar way possible: as exotic and static, ruled by nature and unlike anything
that Europeans later achieved. Even the most progressive theoretical veins in colonisation research are, I believe, rendered meaningless when the artefacts (including images) that buttress their perspectives are loaded with the most unprogressive and antiquated of icons and symbols. Scholars and the public learn from images; and what they learn about Australia and the Pacific, it seems, is that the first inhabitants of these regions were nothing like us.

**De-Constructing Our Looks at the Australian and Oceanic Colonisations**

While attending the Australian Archaeological Association (AAA) conference of 2004, I was at hand for a session in which a speaker exhibited an illustration by the local humanitarian Percy Trezise, and then declared that Percy would be delighted to see his image used in this forum given his current hospitalisation and ill health, but also in light of his always-passionate commitment to Aboriginal (prehistory) issues.\(^{53}\) This incident was poignant for me, firstly, as the illustration displayed to us was not immediately linked to the content of the speaker’s paper, and thus served no obvious function beyond acknowledging the work and spirit of Trezise; and, secondly, as I was preparing to give my own presentation (the following day) on the topic of archaeologists’ arbitrary and uncritical handling of images, and I intended to use several of Trezise’s depictions as fodder for critique. I was humbled by this experience, for Trezise was an illustrator as well as an author, activist, pilot and honorary doctorate recipient—none of which I knew prior to the conference; but I was also upset. I was bothered by the fact that I have recurrently been challenged—including, at my AAA talk itself—on my tendency not to

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\(^{53}\) Sadly, Trezise passed away several months following the conference.
clearly distinguish between “scientific” and “popular” archaeological pictorials in my research (as though there is some primal difference between the two); and yet, here, certain archaeologists seemed to have no qualms about pointlessly drawing popular images into the heart of their scholarly work. I was bothered by the fact that researchers were prepared to engage with imagery in such a superficial fashion, without attention to their unobvious connotations, without thought for their capacity to evoke more than just the character of a sick man. And I was bothered by the fact that I now felt guilt over my analysis of Trezise’s pictures. Neither Trezise, nor any other writer, scientist, illustrator, or scholar deserves abuse/defamation over the images that they create or manage; however this does not make them blameless, and it does not give anyone an excuse to interact unthinkingly with the products of their work. The remainder of this chapter should make clear that the visual representations that we manipulate in all contexts are meaningful: they are layered with evocations that their authors likely never intended, but that each of us have a responsibility to contemplate.

Figure 34 is pulled from Trezise’s (1988: 8-9) children’s book The Peopling of Australia. A brief denotative reading of this image might translate as: “a group of humans standing in a rainforest, surrounded by lush vegetation and wildlife”; thus suggesting three overarching icons: the varied flora (trees, flowers/berries, leaves, grass, and branches/vines), the fauna (birds and a kangaroo-like beast), and a collection of human bodies. The text which is printed below this image anchors it as a rendering of the first Australians: a “happy,” “fortunate” people who “more than 100,000 years ago...entered a beautiful land which was like the Garden of Eden” (Trezise 1988:8-9); yet closer semiological scrutiny of Figure 34 and its neighbouring illustrations hints at the
patronising nature of such anchorage; at its status as little more than an opening foil for what we are next to be shown—the arduous life that many of the first Australians suffer, as they are terrorised by the environment and, therein, readied for salvation by European colonisers.

Take, for instance, the faunal signifiers in Figure 34 which are arranged in a circular formation that encompasses—imprisons—the human signifiers from above and below, left and right. These fauna evoke a rather watchful, inquisitive air; many seem to have a superior viewing position (meaning they look down on the human icons); and most are distinct and relatively high in value and saturation in terms of their exotic colours and textures. The floral icons are similarly diverse in their shape, consistency and rich, multi-shaded colouring; and, importantly, these flora also imposingly envelop (i.e., close in upon) the human signifiers, framing them on all sides, from front and behind. The human icons, in contrast, are surprisingly indecipherable and non-diverse; they are all painted a similar dark-brown colour, all clothe-less, all branded with repeated patterns of white stripes, and all featureless but for white dots presumably symbolising their mouths. These humans are grouped together—still, close, and swallowed by the environment. They are hierarchically and spatially inferior to the grandeur of the vegetation that confines them. They have no eyes, so they make no eye contact. They are distinguishable only as an exotic homogeneity amidst the exotic heterogeneity of the surrounding environment.

Far from an uncomplicated portrait of “happy” first Australians, this is a symbolic depiction of a nearly invisible, non-differentiable people who are overwhelmed by a dominant landscape and overshadowed by giant prey. The first peoples are here
uniformly presented as naked, faceless, diminutive others confronted by a wealthy and untamed (but in need of taming) continent. The principal metonymic symbol is a poor group of natives which is “fortunate” enough to wander into a rich ecosystem—a collective of lucky, anonymous beings captivated by (and captive to) a wild Australian environment.

And this is echoed elsewhere in Trezise’s illustrations. [Note that Trezise is both the artist and author of this book, and, in the book’s preface, he also claims some expertise over the subject matter, having been informed by Aboriginals, modern archaeologists and palaeontologists on their views of Australia’s prehistory.] See Figure 35 whose anchorage identifies the scene as an episode of the “hunters” becoming the “hunted” (1988:14), and whose composition and iconography again represent the early Australian continent as a dominant force which overwhelms and disciplines its human occupants. In the background, the icon of an unstable volcano (which is essentially the highest-value component in the illustration) insinuates an obstructive, ever-imminent threat. In the foreground, as well as behind and to the right of the human signifiers, a collection of strong boulder icons (which could be mistaken for the first Australians in light of their colouring) fences in the terrain. Below, unwieldy grasslands enclose the feet of the human and reptilian icons. Above, tree signifiers form a canopy—a supreme upper frame—to the image. And to the right, the icon of a red-eyed, red-gummed beast bites on a human body and stares the remaining human signifiers (who do not look back) off of the page, back to where they came. Ruling, in effect, one-half of the illustration, this multi-coloured reptile stands still and solid. It evokes a murderous, all-powerful authority, and its imposing size and vector-like shape command our vision, pushing our
gaze across the page and through the narrative. In contrast, the symbols of what are presumably material technologies (the two pole-like icons and the third pod-shaped icon which appear around the female signifier closest to the reptile) suggest rather flimsy (as opposed to robust and strong) human tools—ones that are powerless and discardable, ambiguous and vulnerable. This flimsiness and vulnerability correlates with the human icons which appear gangly, insecure and unstable (indeed, lifeless in one case) and which, unlike the reptile, are generally expressionless and monochrome in colour. Here, then, the distinctive environment clashes with a, conversely, non-descript and impotent human species. And again, a series of connotive signs illuminates the first peoples of Australia as unilaterally homogenised, technology-deprived aliens who are subservient to the natural world.

I would suggest that these signs connect at a meta-level with a broad mythology of “Otherness”—an ideological theme of primitiveness and Orientalism (Said 1978)—which is informed by the hegemonic codes of the West. It is significant that Trezise repeatedly highlights the exotic, untamed nature of the ancient Australian environment, and the overwhelmed, characterless identity of its first peoples. Arguably, such signification legitimises the (neo)colonial ruling of contemporary Australia: it validates the narrow view of the continent as a savage and unruly backwoods begging for correction and domestication; and it sanctions continued bigotry and subjugation via its representation of ancient Australians as weak and faceless “Stone Agers” (although they do not even seem to possess stone tools), controlled by nature and therefore controllable by European colonists.

Trezise’s other images only bolster this argument, as seen in Figure 36 (Trezise
1988:12-13), wherein the terrain (now relatively desolate) continues to entrap and dwarf the human icons, and the human signs themselves continue to allude to an impotent people who are pressed to the front of the frame and flanked by a useless technology.

Figure 37 (Trezise 1988:30-31), too, hints at the timeless character of the earliest Australians, with tens of thousands of years passing in apparent stagnancy such that at the time of European landing on the continent, the Aborigines seem to be the same humans that existed 40,000+ years before. Here, the first peoples are still crowded into the very front of the frame; still imprisoned by their environment (this time, by the tree line and bay); still materially poor (as evidenced by their miniscule fire, their miniscule catch of fish, and their skinny, uncomplicated technology); and still hierarchically subordinate to an inescapable assortment of more powerful natural and social forces. (Note that the ship icons are drawn immediately above—on top of—several of the human signs.) Once more, then, the familiar myths of colonial dominance and inevitability, and Australian fragility and enslavement, manifest themselves. Interestingly, the whole history and identity of ancient Australia appears to be encapsulated in the translucent puff of smoke which escapes from the top of the image. As Trezise writes, the “long, long epoch of Aboriginal history was about to end” (1988:30); and indeed, here, this end of history is naturalised—wiped out of the picture, anticipated and unstoppable, making way for the incoming occupiers.

My interest in Trezise’s art might seem counterproductive in view of his exclusive-seeming association with popular culture. This, though, is precisely why I am intrigued by Trezise, as he produces for a mass audience and, thus, is perhaps dismissed by others as misguided. Notwithstanding blatant flaws in his data, Trezise, by the
standards of most Australian academicians and policymakers, is clearly not an amateur. I was witness to this fact at the AAA conference (as noted above); and I was struck by it again when, on the web, I located an elementary curriculum for the state of New South Wales that utilised Trezise’s text and similar images as teaching tools (see Figure 38; Board of Studies, New South Wales, Australia, n.d.).

No matter how disparagingly one might look upon popularists, individuals like Trezise have power. The stereotypes they insinuate through their visual representations will likely impose themselves on schoolchildren (via the curriculum), who will then, to some extent, drag them into their university education, and perhaps then onto their professional careers—including onto academia. And nowhere, not in undergraduate education, nor post-doctoral education, nor the research community, etc., do I believe that adequate pictorial materials are available to counteract such visions. This is because Australian and Pacific scholars are equally as culpable as Trezise in dubiously depicting first peoplings—they simply tend to exploit different (more scientific, less artistic; more “accurate,” less pedestrian) media to do so.

Take Figure 39 (Terrell 1986:18-19), published in the academic text of a Harvard educated professor and curator, also a former Fulbright fellow, trained archaeologist and anthropologist, and Society for American Archaeology member. At the outset, it is important to note that this series of photographs does not appear to be referenced amid the body of the text; and it is reproduced in a chapter entitled “Peopling the Islands,” focused on theorising about the prehistoric settlement of the Pacific. Most importantly

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54 But that such tools would be helpful in critically clarifying concepts like “terra nullius” is doubtful: confused-seeming (given that their heads, eyes and hands are pointed in haphazard directions), underwear-clad icons that are barely distinguishable from the backdrop do not, I contend, offer the best prompt for judicious thought about colonisation.
(and unfortunately), it is contained in a manuscript whose goal is to highlight the long-term local changes, adaptations and development that have affected the Pacific Islanders over time (including physical changes). This is significant because Figure 39 does little more than figuratively trap (in mug-shot fashion) eight contemporary peoples of Oceania in antiquity, insinuating that these individuals embody, across time and space, all Pacific Islanders, including the original colonisers of the region.\(^{55}\) These human icons are colourless, largely naked, and neutrally positioned; their countenance is generally vacant or lifeless; their bodies are adorned in curious leafy necklaces, beads, or tattoos; half of the icons make no eye contact with the viewer, and none of them engage with their surroundings in any sentient or sensual fashion (indeed, one third are actually arranged in front of a canvass-like backdrop). Essentially, Terrell’s image references a timeless, exotic and homogeneous people. They are formulaically assembled and exposed; imprisoned in the frame, situated in a line-up (as though criminals), and sited for interrogation by the viewer. Via the eye of the camera, these people are caught (tamed?), labelled as archaic everymen, and rendered powerless—that is, without clothing, without individuality, and without animation or soul. Ironically, the very act of displaying them renders them invisible. Following Kress and van Leeuwen (1996:43), Figure 39’s composition creates a “relation of similarity” between the icons, as each element is represented symmetrically, placed equidistant from one another, frontally positioned, similarly sized, similarly gendered, similarly cropped, similarly hued, consuming a similar proportion of space, and thus made basically interchangeable. While the captions underlying this syntagm presumably attempt to discriminate between the human icons,

\(^{55}\) See Sontag (1977) for an elaboration on notions of photographic capture, the camera as predatory weapon, and photography as a form of violation.
the surrounding text does not offer clarification on the physiognomic differences between individuals (indeed, the surrounding text does not even recognise the existence of the imagery at all), and the captions themselves only reinforce that, at least at a regional level, one individual can be taken to represent the whole. Beyond cataloguing and filing away a series of, in essence, transparencies for a Western audience, it is unclear what greater function Figure 39 serves.

This sort of photographic exposing of timeless, nameless (perhaps otherwise pointless) human icons in prehistory-themed publications is not unique to Terrell’s book. We saw it performed previously on the cover of a University of Queensland scholar’s Australian prehistory textbook (Lourandos 1997) (return to Figure 31), wherein a series of unidentified, stationary, non-emotive, colourless, eyeless (in the sense that it is impossible to discern their gaze), costumed male figures are lined up below the words “Continent of Hunter-Gatherers”; captured in soft, dream-like focus; and frontally posed so as to allow us to look straight into them. We see it again, in modified form, in Flood’s (1983:37) Australian archaeology textbook (Figure 40), where we look from an elevated angle down on “The First Boat People” (as per the chapter title): a solitary male, back bare, head and eyes turned such that he is vulnerable to, and unaware of, our presence, floating on an impoverished raft out to an invisible destination. And we see it again, in especially questionable form, in Clark’s (1969: Plate XIII) scholarly review of world prehistory (Figure 41), which not only summarises the entire antiquity of Australia in one contemporary image of a familiarly lifeless man whose face is obscured in shadow and whose material technology is nearly bleached out of sight via the picture’s composition, but which also makes a more explicit comment about the character of the Australian
people: Figure 41 is the thirteenth of exactly 16 images reproduced in Clark’s book—images of “artefacts” from around the globe which together are meant to represent all of world prehistory.

Pictured amid a *Homo erectus skull*, a statuette from Mesopotamia, bronze from Sweden and pottery from Japan, the human in Figure 41 has been camouflaged as a specimen among other archaic specimens (see Figure 42 for his contextualisation among the images directly preceding and following his presentation). It (he), like the 15 accompanying relics in the text, has been pasted into the centre of the page, shot in hard focus, displayed on a generally neutral background, and framed “objectively” in line with archaeological photography’s traditional side-view of artefacts. The only other living creature depicted in Clark’s text is a chimpanzee (Clark 1969: Plate II) which is actually granted more dexterity and dynamism (given the chimpanzee’s active negotiation of a tool in a termite mound, and the photo’s subjective point of view) than the Aboriginal man. Further commentary on prehistoric Australians’ passive and non-dynamic nature is conjured up in the dialogue between Figure 41 and the Easter Island statue captured in an accompanying plate in Clark’s text (Figure 42, far right); indeed, they deliver an equivalent message. With image flipped and physical goods fully bleached out, these are basically the same photograph—one of a lifeless, expressionless (literally stone-faced) and antiquated, alien naked male with eyes obscured in shadow, positioned on a neutral backdrop, cropped into the centre of the page, shot in hard focus, and angled slightly to the side.

That an image of a contemporary man could be mistaken for a picture of a

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56 As Moyer (2005) notes, archaeological photos are typically limited to front, side and back views of artefacts. The figurine presented to the left of the “Aboriginal hunter” in Figure 42 is witness to front-view photography.
centuries old rock monument should not be considered far-fetched. As Bahn’s popular encyclopedia notes “Aboriginal people...were valued more as scientific specimens than human beings well into the twentieth century” (Bahn 1996:182). I am prepared to extend this statement further, arguing that such valuation has, in fact, never ceased. It is apparent in Bahn’s (1996:181) own publication (Figure 43) which draws upon a contrived representation of two posed Australian Aborigines (a type of representation which has already seen critique in the visual anthropological literature (Poignant 1992)) to illustrate archaeological work pertaining to “the stone age in Oceania” (as per the subsection heading); and it is apparent in the work of Clark, Flood, Lourandos and Terrell, as noted above.

These images span 30 years of research; some have survived multiple reprints/rewritings (e.g., Clark 1961, 1969—and see the even more questionable depictions of 1977); and all are contained in the publications of PhD-bearing archaeologists. Indeed, Clark has achieved some of the highest honours in the discipline (named both Disney Professor, and Master of Peterhouse, University of Cambridge); Lourandos (like Clark) has had at least one volume of archaeological essays published in his honour (David et al. 2005); and Bahn is the co-author (alongside another Disney Professor) of one of the most widely used undergraduate archaeology textbooks in the discipline (Renfrew and Bahn 2004), and his encyclopedia is the collective product of 15 university-affiliated professionals. Obviously, then, these people are not amateurs; and clearly their influence is not limited to some uninformed general public. But any

57 While one could argue that Bahn subtly but intelligently exploits the image to signal past deficiencies in archaeological interpretation, another could argue that such an image has no place in his text as, without being clearly de-constructed and without the presentation of alternative visions of first peoples, it can only further engrain long-standing misconceptions.

58 See Chapter 7 for a comment on my own complicity in this matter.
reflection, on their part, about the wisdom or logic of using a single image of a present-day male (no matter how objective or, literally, black-and-white it may seem) to represent 40,000+ years of human life spread over more than 1/3 of the earth’s surface, is absent.

Of course, portraits are not the only connotatively significant media employed by academics to illustrate the first peoples and peoplings of Australia and Oceania. Figure 44 (Irwin et al. 1990:35) appears in the scholarly journal *Antiquity*; its principal author, Geoffrey Irwin—a professor at the University of Auckland, and a fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand—has been called the “leading Pacific archaeologist of his generation” (http://www.auckland.ac.nz/uo/about/news/articles/1999/11/0010.cfm); it has been published, in varying forms, in at least two other sources (e.g., Irwin 1989:193; Irwin 1992:24); and it exploits the typical pictorial badges of science: a grid and labels (which, here, mark geographic terrain), cross-hatched configurations (whose referents are major landmasses), arrows (referencing wind and current patterns), and blank space (representing, in this instance, the Pacific Ocean).

Superficially (i.e., in terms of its diegesis), this image details a group of arrows (winds and currents) swirling confusedly around the sea. However the underlying caption and companion text further anchor this image as a visualisation of the “easy voyaging corridor” (Irwin et al. 1990:38) that facilitated the human settlement of the Pacific Islands. I would suggest that the crucial element to a connotive reading of this figure is the relationality between the arrow, landmass and ocean symbols and their association with a fourth *invisible* symbol: namely, the *people* who utilised this “easy corridor” to ultimately settle the islands. Manifest, here, is the boundless, abyss-like oceanic blank space—an all-encompassing nothingness (a *terra incognita*) that, while
unseen, is nevertheless manipulative. This manipulation is implied, in part, by the ocean’s overlying arrows which reference complex and disorienting natural forces (i.e., wind and current systems), and which guide the reader’s gaze around, through and off of the page. These arrows are arguably the image’s richest, most versatile signs: they are drawn in different lengths, at different widths, some being solid, some perforated, some hollow, and all abundantly arranged (over 180 individual arrows are pictured in total). Moreover, these arrows embody a sort of inescapability; something forceful and direct that criss-crosses the void of the sea, pushes and pulls, encircles and isolates the various landmasses. The landmass signs themselves are typified by their solidity and uniformity, as they stand concrete, bold-faced and timeless against the elements. Together with the ocean and arrow symbols, I believe that these landmass signifiers inform an intricately encoded system of meaning which speaks of a dominant, all-controlling environment. Much like Trezise’s picture book (return to Figures 34-37) offers schoolchildren a myth about a dominant Australian environment that conditions its inhabitants into submission, so are scientists here offered a myth about a Pacific wilderness that is equally wild and unstoppable.

It is significant to note, however, that Irwin et al.’s (1990) reconstruction of the peopling route of the Pacific incorporates no actual people into the image. This is not surprising, for just as Terrell, Flood, Lourandos and Clark are able to eclipse the existence of real people through their anachronistic and comatose portraiture, and just as Trezise is able to erase rational people from prehistory via an artistic technique which renders all bodies faceless and uniform against a ferocious geography, so too does Irwin make first peoples invisible behind a steriley scientific (but powerful) environment.
Again, then, humans are stripped of their technology, of any physical presence, and of any depth or character. Here I see (or, rather, do not see) a people who have little authority over their own peopling events; who are governed by the elements, adrift in the expansive abyss of the sea, and thus manipulated "easily" through the voyaging corridor. These people appear as a foil to the natural world—weak and insubstantial. Paradoxically, however, I perceive them to be the exact equivalent to this world as evidenced by their indecipherability from the geography and hence their seeming "naturalness" (or cultureless-ness). This is precisely my understanding of the effect of a mythology of Otherness. The first Australians and Pacific Islanders are conceived as both natural and unnatural (part of nature and slave to it) and therefore as exotic specimens who are "naturally" subservient. Such a conception then rationalises (indeed, it naturalises) the imposition of Western culture, making it legitimate for the West to control first peoples (who were previously controlled by nature) and to discipline the environment (which was previously undisciplined).

It might seem unfair to criticize Irwin for not picturing people in his colonisation visualisation when, up until this point, I have been quick to pass judgement on all those who do. In reality, much of my concern over depictions of the first Australians and Pacific Islanders relates to scholars’ readiness to represent prehistoric colonisers with photographs of modern-day indigenous peoples. Given that Irwin does not visualise any human life, let alone substitute ancient beings with contemporary photographic "equivalents," it might seem that he (and his colleagues) are irreproachable. But such an argument would be better defended if Irwin’s other projects tended to avoid association with such questionable practices of representation. This is not necessarily the case, as
evidenced by Irwin’s contribution to the government of New Zealand’s on-line encyclopedia (Irwin 2005; http://www.teara.govt.nz/NewZealanders/MaoriNewZealanders/PacificMigrations/2/ENZ/Resources/Standard/1/en), where Figure 45 appears alongside Irwin’s chapter on “Ancient Voyaging in Near Oceania,” and is christened with the caption “...Somehow people crossed these stretches of water...” (italics mine); and where Figure 46 (Irwin 2005; http://www.teara.govt.nz/NewZealanders/MaoriNewZealanders/PacificMigrations/2/ENZ/Resources/Standard/1/en) (showing broken bits of decontextualised pottery) offers the leading visual commentary on “Pacific Migrations” and human culture in Oceania (see below for general critique of images of such “scraps” of culture).

Irwin’s (1980) entry in the scholarly-produced Cambridge Encyclopedia of Archaeology (which, while perhaps intended for a general audience, is authenticated by the contributions of at least three Disney professors, including Grahame Clark) is also problematic, relying as it does on Figure 47’s poor reproduction to situate Oceanic prehistory. Here, the environment—dominated largely by the sea—continues to have primacy, with the colonisation successes of the first peoples collapsed into, and homogenised by, three solid/coloured and eleven emaciated/dotted lines (representing “cultural divisions”). These lines are arguably meaningless since the areas they purport to represent are sometimes verging on illegible, and the cultural distinctions they purport to identify seem more related to geography than to anything social or human-mediated. (Indeed, the well-known Lapita culture, whose characteristic pottery style was known to extend from regions of Melanesia across to such islands as Samoa and Tonga in west
Polynesia, is not even granted the respect of a skinny dotted line on the map.) Moreover, the fact that islands amenable to human settlement even existed in the Pacific is effectively hidden by the artist’s decision to colour these landscapes in a shade of blue akin to the ocean. As the caption notes, “from west to east the Pacific Islands become both more remote and increasingly impoverished...” Juxtaposed with the map, such an observation is highly ironic considering that the islands are not just impoverished-seeming, but mostly invisible—substanceless—or otherwise indistinguishable from the grain of the encyclopedia’s paper.

Confronted with such a depauperate territory, pockmarked as it is by undetectable and irrelevant landmasses, and swallowed by the hollowness of the sea, one seems to be pushed by the artistry into asking the question: why precisely would one want to inhabit such pointless places at all, and who would be so foolish to try? Scanning across the page to the subsequent image in Irwin’s (1980) article, Figure 48, we appear to be offered an easy answer, as once more we are shown a photograph of several barely distinguishable contemporary Pacific Islanders manipulating a fairly rudimentary boat over an unending ocean (no land in sight) with little apparent handle over any of the “sophisticated means” (1980:326) that the text suggests were key to Oceanic colonisation.

Our willingness to shrivel ancient human movements into such uncomplicated and uniform symbols (which are then made even more uncomplicated by their burying behind an omnipotent environment) is, I believe, partially what allows someone with the theoretical ingenuity of Irwin to simplistically write, in 1980, that “In Oceania there is direct continuity from prehistory into history...the distinction between ethnography and

59 Note that the artist, as recorded in small font on the last page of the text, is Andrew Sherratt—a decorated academic archaeologist.
late prehistory is arbitrary,” and then, in 2005 (twenty-five long years later), to still be found writing with seeming incredulity that “Somehow people crossed these stretches of water...” (as per above). Despite the philosophy, the experimental research, and the sequencing of archaeological records that have been invested into establishing that current Oceanians do have dynamism and that past Oceanians did have effective tools and rational strategies for peopling the Pacific, we still seem unable to relinquish our well-worn stereotypes. That Oceanic first peoples might have had control over their surroundings, might have changed over time, might have been autonomous and forward-thinking individuals, might have varied between themselves both physically and socially, is apparently near-impossible to picture.

And so it is that we see Allen (1989; reprinted in 1998), professor emeritus and “one of Australia’s pre-eminent archaeologists” (http://www.latrobe.edu.au/news/2005/mediarelease_2005-56.php), visualising essentially the same ideas in an academic article (Figure 49); in this case with a photo of an overwhelming geography shrouding a supposed 29,000y old population of indigenous settlers. The caption to this image says everything: “For most of the Late Pleistocene the inhabitants of this small cave, seen here to the right of the picture, lived in sight of glacial ice” (italics mine). The fact that most of us will be unable to make out either the people or the cave through the trees in this photo is evidently irrelevant, for to be reminded of humanity or culture or dwelling-in-the-world would be to take away from a line of argumentation that privileges the all-consuming power of nature in Australian prehistory. To suggest that the landscape might have shifted significantly over 29,000y and that its inhabitants might have come and gone, destroyed the geography and rebuilt it,
manipulated and controlled it, adapted and changed, would be to relinquish too much control to the non/pre-European social world. Alternatively, to wrap our images of Australian prehistory in an environment (ice sheets, the “heart of the forest”) that traps humans in situ for millennia without an apparent avenue for escape, allows us to preserve a space that can be freed, saved, and owned by archaeologists and other colonisers in the present day.

We see White and O’Connell (1982) (respectively, professors at the University of Sydney and University of Utah) taking these ideas somewhat further in their Australian prehistory textbook’s “Reconstructions of some extinct Australian megafauna” (as per caption; emphasis mine) (Figure 50). Here, man truly is irrelevant against his surroundings. He is just one more mega-mammal to be found in the Australian environment; hairy, clothe-less, colourless, eyeless, graced with less shading and less detail than his six counterparts, placed diagrammatically inferior to three of his fellow animals, the only icon to be fully frontally exposed (and therefore vulnerable), and the fourth figure (following sequentially from icon “a” in the upper left corner of the image, counter-clockwise around to “f”) in the circle of dead Australian life. Man is offered to the viewer only as a form of scale—he serves no other purpose, and he is left to compete with the surrounding iconography for visual presence. Moreover, even in his meagre role as the image’s scale he is nearing uselessness, for we have to dig through the text of the caption to locate his height (180 cm), and once we find it we can still say little more than that man was in the middle of the pack in terms of the natural world. As per usual, then, humanity in Australia is here depicted as a faceless, uniform stereotype enveloped by an

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60 This is the same textbook that was referenced earlier in this thesis as one of the pivotal—and still relevant—resources on the Sahulian past.
elaborate environment.

Allen and O'Connell's (2003) table (Figure 51) arguably extends these connotations to the extreme. Printed in a scholarly journal article on Sahulian colonisation, this reproduction of 58 radiocarbon and thermoluminescence/optically-simulated luminescence dates, along with >128 more dates on six tables across 8 pages of a 15 page paper, signifies the complete erasure of the human face from Australian prehistory. Here the environment (i.e., laboratory manipulation of the environment) is inflated to gargantuan proportions, and all evidence of human involvement is shrunk into the environmental bits-and-pieces (sand, clay, shell, charcoal, fish otolith and soil carbonate) that facilitate the dating of prehistory. These dates speak to the *age of the landscape* that surrounded the Australian past; they do not say anything about meaningful people. Whether or not the dates are pulled from human hearths or human-touched natural features does not make them attentive to rational, embodied human behaviour. Indeed, this table arguably has nothing to do with behaviour or peopling (or even the landscape) at all; it is an archaeological attempt to wield visibility into (dis)proving the accuracy of other scholars' numbers. The fact that Figure 51 is hidden in an article about colonisation does not mask the reality that it is nothing but an academic game of asserting dominance—of establishing which lab offers the correct dates, which methodology offers the correct dates, which material offers the correct dates, and which researcher can thus be trusted with the correct dates. There is no recognition of real people in this image. And there is no recognition that the first Australians are significant and diverse beings (indeed, it probably indicates the opposite: that the first Australians are only relevant as a single, static date of origin). This image is mute about peopling in terms of how it
happened, why it happened, what direction it followed, and who it involved; but it is indistinguishable from Figures 31-50 in the sense that it pictures Europeans, once again, exerting their control over an apparently clumsy and faceless Australian past.

The concealment of Australian and Oceanic peopling processes behind bloated and ideologically-saturated reconstructions of dispassionate artefacts is echoed elsewhere. We see it on the cover of Kirch and Hunt’s (1988)\textsuperscript{61} edited volume (or “critical review,” as per the text’s title) where the colonisation and cultural negotiations of the Lapita peoples are reduced to a single token splinter of pottery (Figure 52). We see virtually the same image on the cover of Goodenough’s (1996) edited text, with contributing scholars like Jim Allen and Ben Finney—not to mention Goodenough himself, who is a University of Pennsylvania professor and past Guggenheim fellow—letting a decontextualised and colourless photo of a patchy, rebuilt pot stand for the entire prehistoric settlement of the Pacific (Figure 53). We see Dodson (1992), on the cover of his edited volume, going one step further to make certain that we appreciate the scraps of pottery found in Oceania and the Pacific for what they are; not traces of the complicated and multi-faceted lives of early explorers, but cheap, cartoon-like mementos (like the associated extinct bird, rock-on-a-stick, and unstable Australian landscape icons) of anonymous occupants of “THE NAIVE LANDS” (Figure 54). And we see the editors of the popular World Atlas of Archaeology (Wood 1985) unsuspectingly elaborating on our understanding of these “naive lands” in their visualisation (within the chapter “The peopling of Australasia”) of the Australian equivalent of the “Great Wall of China.”

\textsuperscript{61} Note that Kirch is a professor at the University of California at Berkeley; an elect to the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society; and a recipient of multiple professional awards on behalf of such institutions as the School of American Research and the National Academy of Sciences.
which, of course, is a natural—not cultural—feature (Figure 55). Not only does Figure 55 once again make us witness to the conflation of nature with culture in Australian prehistory; but this image also insinuates that the truly unique cultural elements to the Lake Mungo site (which is partially bordered by the “great wall”) are immaterial in comparison to the natural bounty which surrounds it. The “wall,” it seems, is just one more testament to the towering environment that flattens the poor first peoples into submission.

Importantly, even those images which do appear to prioritise the substantial cultural architecture of the earliest colonisers could, alternatively, be interpreted as attempts to indirectly camouflage or disparage the creative possibilities of these individuals. We saw this in Figures 41 and 42 (far right) where the head of the Australian Aborigine (representing prehistoric first peoples) could be taken as akin to the head of the rock statue: both of similar size and shape; both stone-faced and lifeless; and thus neither in need of serious theoretical contemplation because both are identical: curious remnants of a “simple” past. And we see this again, in slightly modified form, in Thorne and Raymond’s (1989:263) popular text *Man on the Rim: The Peopling of the Pacific* (Figure 56), where a photo of the familiar Easter Island stone heads is juxtaposed with the caption “The great stone heads of Easter Island are among the most enigmatic images in the Pacific basin” (emphasis mine).

I understand Figure 56 as an act voyeurism—nothing more. It is intended to reinforce our wonderment at the inexplicable relics of Stone Agers; it is not intended to encourage critical thinking about the meanings or the management behind their creation, nor about the similarities between these monuments and our own. To fill our vision with
big stone heads, and to then continuously feel compelled to speak about the “enigma” of such heads (and of Pacific colonisation in general), is to create a kind of safe place for ourselves—a place where we are not obliged to think about the thoughtful negotiation and learned capacities that informed Pacific peoples (because they seem nothing if not absurd), and thus a place where we can clearly distinguish our “rational” behaviours from the strange and incomprehensible behaviours of everyone else. This is what Barthes calls exoticism: a process by which, in this case, the first Pacific Islanders are converted into “the other...a pure object, a spectacle, a clown” (1972:152). Exoticism allows us to strip the first peoples of all legitimacy in order to place ourselves in complete control. It is premised on ridiculing others into impotence via a technique that is hardly more complicated than schoolyard bullying: “you have no ownership/power/place—you are just odd.” In the end, it is exoticism that allows us to stare in comfortable amazement at Figure 56, for it offers us strength in the face of confusion and fear. In the end, exoticism relegates “the other” to the carnivalesque sidelines so that we can move in and make ourselves at home.

Making Ourselves at Home in Australia and the Pacific

The advantage of a system of visualisation that interprets the peopling of Australia and Oceania as the outcome of uncontrolled movements by lifeless eunuchs swallowed up in a monstrous (or, at other times, depauperate) natural and cultural environment is that the coming of new peoples to these regions can only be construed as a necessity. If power over the prehistoric landscape was once just a pipe dream, and if prior peoples were nothing but an indistinct mass reigned over by, or hidden behind, giant
heads and giant fauna, then the arrival of Europeans (with means for domesticating this natural and cultural world) would be the logical next step in the peopling of Australasia. The subtexts to our visualisations, therefore, give us the right to claim colonial jurisdiction over the region. They make it reasonable for us, in our children’s books, to imagine that prehistoric peoples would wildly welcome any newcomers to their homes, since otherwise the land would remain faceless and static (Figure 57; Grant 1988). They make it reasonable for us, in our on-line professional resources, to dig our heels into the Australian continent given that we would otherwise have access to little more than the feeble and bizarre footprints of the prehistoric world (Figure 58; Australian Heritage Commission 2001). They make it reasonable for us, in our edited academic texts, to stitch our contemporary geo-political borders onto maps of the past, for how else would one presume to tame such an unruly and otherwise unclaimed landscape (Figure 59; Roberts et al. 1998b)? They make it reasonable for us, in our popular on-line magazine articles, to juxtapose an image of two bikini-clad contemporary Polynesian women (Figure 60; Air Tahiti n.d.) with the statement: “Avoiding simplification, it has become difficult to give a clear picture of a process [the peopling of the Pacific] that now appears more and more complex as our knowledge grows” (Air Tahiti n.d.; italics mine). Indeed, they make it reasonable for us to swarm to the Pacific as tourists, since the region is little more than a compendium of naïve and exotic objects laid out for our visual pleasure. And ultimately they make it reasonable for us, in our historical encyclopedias, to appreciate the European occupation of Australasia not as illegitimate or unforeseen—not as brutal, oppressive or inconceivable—but as just one more valid phase (one more

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62 Whose editorial boards tend to be composed of the most decorated and prolific academic archaeologists in the field (e.g., both John Mulvaney and Peter White served as advisors for the Camm and McQuilton 1987 series).
“source of immigrants”) in the evolution of “An Immigrant Nation” (Figure 61; Camm and McQuilton 1987:136-137).

The interesting point to be made about hackneyed and domineering visual representations of the peopling of Australia and Oceania is that (some) archaeologists are cognizant of their complicity in these visions, and, so, some have not been afraid to flip these visions around into self-deprecat ing comments about themselves (Figure 62; Allen and Gosden 1991).

The question, however, is whether these sorts of cartoon-like iconographic twists constitute enlightened pictorial deliberations, or, alternatively, thinly-veiled reproductions of the status quo. They might be humorous and they might underscore all of the pictorial stereotypes that continually harass us in the archaeological literature (e.g., the naked, confused, one-dimensional coloniser with nothing more than bits of pottery to distinguish him from the natural environment), but they do not suggest other ways to envision the past, and, more importantly, they do not prompt critical reflection about visuality as a potentially paradigm-restricting and tyrannical apparatus.

When I first began research on this thesis, I came across a remark about Aborigines being “archival captives” (Murray and White 1981:261) in the world of archaeology that I thought was well-supported by the discipline’s pictures of the past. Now, as I come to the close of my thesis, I am forced to reconsider my original position, for the real archival captives, it might be argued, are not necessarily contemporary Aborigines or long-past first peoples, but those archaeologists whose indiscriminate and unchanging images of prehistory have turned the peopling of Australia and the Pacific into the most crude and meaningless of events.
CHAPTER 6: SYNTHESIS

The images referred to in the preceding chapters are not the result of a random display of shapes and colours and shadows, etc. that has little philosophical meaning and no relationship to archaeological science. They are not unconnected visual packages that, by coincidence, can all be pulled apart into potent, norm-reinforcing comments on the domination or defeat of the world’s first peoples. They are not exotic objects that scholars know nothing about, and that archaeologists have been shielded from out of fear of contamination by popular culture. Nor, of course, are they a uniform archive that only I and several other academic researchers, with our see-through vision, can recognise as more examples of the fixations of the colonial/Eurocentric gaze (cf. Ruby 2000:7). Rather, these are artefacts like any artefacts of interest to archaeologists, and they merit examination for reasons that are not limited to the fact that they reappear across different environments (media), over multiple generations, in front of various peoples (children, students, scientists), built of familiar raw materials, showing comparable compositions and redundant forms, struck from similar (ideological) cores, mixed into the debitage of a thousand different matters (texts), and having generally nameless makers who can be traced to sometimes the most elite, and other times the most proletarian, of cultures.

Describing the process of lithic analysis, both Kooymans (2000:1-2) and Andrefsky (1998:1) contend that artefacts speak to our interpersonal relations, politics, economy, ethnicity, social contacts, relative sedentism, and exchange networks; therefore detailed study of their manufacture and use can allow us to “understand what environment... people lived in and how they exploited and adapted to the possibilities and limits of that environment” (Kooymans 2000:2). So it is with images: they are “dynamic entities”
(Andrefsky 1998:2) just like the stone tools that consume archaeological practice—
similarly stained by the histories and footprints of human environments and cultures.
They can be recovered and analysed, pulled out of context and dusted off to reveal the
most foreign of values and beliefs. Yet, to be sure, they see little of the same respect as
typical artefactual remains. This probably relates to imagery’s manufacture in the present
day by archaeologists themselves and their colleagues (as opposed to the traditional
archaic subjects of the discipline), but it possibly also links to a remark made by Dyer
about complex commercial advertisements: oftentimes they are hard to see because “the
product is buried in the total image created” (1982:91).

In a discipline committed to reconstructing the lives of human-made objects for
the purpose of understanding how people ate, slept, moved, traded, and mated (Kooymann
2000), it is spurious for practitioners to dismiss certain human-made objects (visual
representations) as meaningless, as if these artefacts, unlike every other artefact handled
by archaeologists, have nothing to say about living, moving, mating, trading, etc.
Likewise, in a discipline which has invested significantly in lawsuits aimed at claiming
control over archaeological remains in the interests of a “basic responsibility to educate
the public [about the past]” (Owsley and Jantz 2001:571), it is spurious for practitioners
to turn around and declare that they can do nothing about other remains (i.e., the images
that appear in their publications), because they have no way to control these materials
and, so, no responsibility for the fallout. If images are meaningless, why would one ever
be bothered to incorporate them into a text? And if, in fact, they do have meaning but
their production and circulation are uncontrolled, then why are practitioners not
concerned about rectifying this situation? These sorts of contradictions are not
uncommon in the discipline. On several occasions I have been questioned by individuals about why a majority of my image sample is 10+ years old, the implication being that visual styles are supposedly shifting and I am thus miring myself in obsolescence. My response can only be to visit the local public library to confirm the average age of its archaeology-related texts, or to scan the reference collections at the University of Victoria for evidence of the age of their archaeological encyclopedias. Better yet, consult those well-liked textbooks (some in their fourth editions) which have maintained consistent imagery across 18 years of publication (e.g., Fagan 1987-2005); or those scholars whose writings have been complemented by fairly standardised illustrations for the last 25 years (e.g., Irwin 1980-2005). Merriman has spoken of the “long shelf life” (1999:5) of museum exhibits, and I believe the same can be said about print-based archaeological images. Simply because a new visual style emerges (which is itself a debatable contention) does not mean that we forget the old, or that we have easy or immediate access to the new. As per Iversen, “symbols elude the individual will...you can write down the word ‘star’, but that does not make you the creator of the word, nor if you erase it have you destroyed the word...The word lives in the mind of those who use it” (1986:91). As such, we can create a new icon in an attempt to better represent the peopling process—or we can delete every reference to iconography an attempt to purge our documents of its polluting effects—but that does not rid us of all previous traces of peopling imagery, nor does it guarantee that the rest of the population is aware of our cutting-edge picture-making ways. Similarly, we can add all of the captions that we like to an image in the hopes of shackling it to a singular interpretation, but that does not ensure that we will read the caption or obey (or even understand) its words, and it does
not necessitate that image and text will coincide (following Barthes 1977:27, the two can be contradictory). Indeed, this point about captioning is important in light of criticism that I have seen regarding my willingness to decontextualise images from their associated verbiage. Surely, it is said, I am distorting the intention of a picture if I tear it away from its home on the page, and deny it access to the words that make it sensical. But I am not convinced, as we skim through academic articles to gain a sense of their assertions, or when as 6-year-olds we poke through picture books handed to us by our teachers or parents on the peopling of Australia, that our understandings of the images in these documents are informed solely by the surrounding words. Nor am I convinced that surrounding words always offer a logical footing for our readings of pictures. Bal and Bryson put it nicely: we should fight “against the notion that here lies the work of art (the text), and over there is the context, ready to act upon the text to order its uncertainties, to transfer to the text its own certainties and determination. For it cannot be assumed that ‘context’ has the status of a given or of a simple or natural ground upon which to base interpretation” (1991:177; note that the authors refer to the image itself as “text” and to that which surrounds it—e.g., words—as “context”).

As many archaeologists can attest, we can attempt to fix meaning to a stone tool (with a caption, a new theoretical paradigm, a new visual rendering, etc.), but that does not ensure that it is what we say it is, and it certainly does not ensure that everyone looks at it in the same way. In the case of my own thesis, I recognise that what I see in my image sample might not be apparent to others, but this does not make my fundamental argument irrelevant. The images we use are significant. Whether 20 years old or two years old, whether captioned or uncaptioned, whether filled with “childish” symbolism or
stripped to the barest of columns and numbers, these representations deserve to be taken seriously. I do not assume that the pictorials herein communicate a single indisputable message, however I do contend that we need to be concerned about the fact that these pictures tend to be composed and circulated in such a fashion as to seem transparent (Lynch and Woolgar 1988:viii-ix). Speaking of photographs, Barthes notes that these are the “forms our society uses to ensure its peace of mind” (1977:31). This chapter focuses on just such “peace of mind,” suggesting that the photos, maps, tables, art and graphics utilised by archaeologists to illustrate the peoplings of North America, Australia and Oceania serve a special purpose: they look good, they sound good, they feel good, and they make sense—they are scientific proof of the rootedness of the Western world.

*The Forms Our Society Uses...* 63

The academic literature is definitely not silent about the truth value of visual representation. Chapter 2 reviews the history of thought on this topic, and a quick scan of a majority of archaeology-affiliated pictorials can confirm the discipline’s involvement in the weaving of science, artistic mastery, photo/graphical accuracy and technical precision into a visible and “obvious” past. While a thorough analysis of imagery’s supposedly neutral, fact-communicating character would be redundant here given the wealth of words already devoted to the subject, it seems meaningful to note that Figures 1-62 make use of at least five different visual forms that have repeatedly been condemned by researchers for their role in masquerading social constructions as unarguable objectivities. As an example, images like Figures 16, 19, 26, 33, 47, 61, despite being exhibited as undisputed mirrors of the “real world,” are grounded in the politics of

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63 Again, I use the term “our” in the same sense as I use the term “us” (see Chapter 1, fn 1).
cartography—a science dedicated to the compression of time and the collapsing of space and dimensionality into singular slivers (Leibhammer 2000:131-133; Moser 2001:275; Rose 2001:20). Conkey (1987), Pickles (1992), Turnbull (1996), and Wood (1992) have all reflected on mapping's responsibility for serving interests, averting our attention away from discontinuities and process, and converting geographical messiness into equivalence. Murray (1992) offers a fairly simplistic—but applicable—illustration of the ease with which maps can be manipulated (in this case for economic/political gain) when he refers to a cartographic company's decision to eliminate the Labrador border from a popular wall map of Quebec based on nothing more than Quebecers' distaste for the position of the border. Davies et al. (1990:119), too, hint at the loaded nature of cartography when they suggest that maps have their genesis with armies: their earliest usage traceable to militias seeking to establish battle plans, territories and history.

Leibhammer alludes precisely to what is in play in maps such as Figures 17 or 26 when she writes that a "single, unbroken, black line on a white surface" (2000:133-134) constrains imagination, limiting the eye's ability to invent or negotiate between meanings, and leaving behind instead a feeling of simple, complete accuracy. In this sense, such images are much the same as Taylor's (1996:68) description of films in terms of their singular, falsely harmonious, superhuman angles—or Moser's description of archaeological paintings and engravings as "completely artificial" (2001:275) pastiche. It only helps that images like Figures 1, 12, 20, 21, 22, 63 and 64 use mapping conventions—including a line that moves from the extreme northern corner of the United States at the top of the page down to an abrupt split into two to three arrows at the southern border of contemporary Canada—in almost exactly the same manner. And that
images like Figures 15, 16, 25, 59, 65 and 66 stick modern state borders onto prehistoric landscapes over and over again. Not only do these images legitimate current political geography, giving us the sense that “we are here” even though we have no place in 12,500+ year old America or 40,000+ year old Australia, but they do so unrelentingly: over at least 35 years (1966-2001) across adult and youth audiences in on-line formats, journals, textbooks, encyclopedia and popular magazines. I believe that such repetition is reminiscent of both what Dyer (1982:97 after Goffmann 1979) calls “hyper-ritualization” and what Sturken and Cartwright (2001) call the “narcotic effect”—that is, quick and concise representation that tends toward stereotyping, and that injects you so frequently with the same shapes and poses and symbols (which are intended to convey truth) that it is hard not to be convinced that they are natural. On close inspection, of course, it does not seem especially natural that the prehistoric New World (e.g., Figures 8, 13, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25) should recurrently portray present-day Canada as though congealed in a massive block of ice, and Alaska and the remainder of the continental United States as though open and united (via the ice-free corridor), and Mexico and the entire southern hemisphere as though inaccessible (as implied by a lack of arrows) or different (as implied by the inclusion of borders) or altogether non-existent. And it does not seem especially natural that scholars and university students should think that contemporary American and Australian state dividing lines on maps would help them to better understand the placement of archaeological sites than would more layered contextualising information (e.g., measures of elevation, environmental differentiation, temporal distinctions, climate variations). If Davies et al. are right in stating that many maps are drawn with the knowledge that “the ordinary person’s decision does not need precise
geographical detail" (1990:131), then we might wonder what one’s “decision” would be when the only visual detail they have available to them about an archaeological site is its location in present-day Utah or New South Wales or in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. As Jay (1988:12) and Pickles (1992:221) suggest, the map is a tricky device: it is flat, fabricated, and unapologetic, allowing words, numbers and other objects to intrude upon its space. While peopling images might not admit to it, cartography can be dangerous—it is an “artifact that says one thing wrapped in words that claim it is something else” (Wood 1992:25).

Yet maps are not the only visual media that archaeologists, in the context of first colonisation studies, have exploited to turn the unnatural into the natural. The archaeological discipline is especially partial to what Jeffrey has fittingly labelled “Nature’s own medium” (1981)—that is, photography—and, as with cartography, the academic literature is full of commentary on the photograph’s truthful-seeming character. Photos are likened to quotations, to the freezing of time, to dynamic witnesses, to an authoritative presence (Banks 2001:65; Myers 1988:237; Shanks 1997:74; Sontag 1977:71), or, following Barthes, to the “perfect analogon” (1977:17) of reality. The very language used to describe photography testifies to its authenticity—as per Jeffrey, photos are ‘obtained’ or ‘taken’, as natural specimens caught in the wild” (1981:26). Banks (2001:65) speaks of photographs as objects made into objectivity; Sekula (1981) tells of their negotiation between discipline (exactitude) and freedom; and a brief glance at Figures 31, 39, 41, 43, and 60 suggests the power of these features of photography, for one is at liberty to put who they like, where they like, in whatever position they like, with however many props they like, basked in as much light or shadow as they like, showing
as little emotion as they like—all the while framing this distortion as “real” (i.e., undistorted). Such representation is no different to me than Dobres’ (2000:26) description of the “disembodied-hand-holding-and-working-a-natural-material” typical of archaeological pictorialisation: it is cold, limiting and manipulated specifically to dehumanise and objectify people, making them hardly more complicated than the cross-section of a rock. Moreover, this sort of representation is terrifying because it demands no responsibility; the photographer has free reign to do virtually whatever they please (Sontag 1977:41). The ramifications of such a complete lack of responsibility are blatant in remarks made to me in 2004 at the Australian Archaeological Association conference by an archaeologist implicated in the creation of Figure 40. This scholar insinuated that the subject of Figure 40 would have been a perfectly acceptable synecdoche for the first Australians if only he would have agreed to remove his shorts. Forcing a man to take off his pants, however, clearly does not make him more representative of a hypothetical 40,000-year-old coloniser, and the fact that an archaeologist would argue otherwise is troublesome. In the end, feeling no accountability for the images that we produce means that it is effortless for us to reinforce stereotypes, to falsify the present in order to (mis)understand the past, and to use our science to justify the humiliation and degradation of other human beings.

Frighteningly, it is easy to look uncritically at Figures 31, 39, 41, etc., for they are presented so obviously and so categorically, and most importantly they are backed by an expert archaeological discipline. Pinney speaks tellingly of the affinity between photography and archaeology:

Just as archaeology relies on the objective truths of the buried fragments of ‘material culture’ concealed from the surface pollution of the present by
depth, so photography relies on a spatialization of its temporal anteriority within the negative. To be buried deep in the negative is to be true, just as to be ‘first’, to be ‘before’ the others. (1992:83)

Photography, like archaeology, is about taking possession of moments in time (Sontag 1977); as per Edwards it is “technological superiority harnessed to the delineation and control of the physical world” (1992:6). Such control is fairly obvious in Figures 41, 43 or 45—where human faces are laid out in assembly-line style (after Lynch 1988:156), ready for cataloguing and relegation to the archives—but its mechanics are arguably divergent in other images, such as Figures 9 or 29. Indeed, when Barthes (1977:44-45) proposes that photos are harder to project oneself into, that they tell us “this was the case” as opposed to “this is me,” his words have more relevance to a photograph like Figure 43 than to those like Figures 5, 9, 27, 28 and 29 given the latter could, in fact, possibly be me—or my brother or father or grandfather or someone else from the pool of (manly) western European descent. Thus while the former photo (Figure 43) might draw on precisely the voyeuristic this-is-how-it-was-but-this-is-not-me nature of photography to which Barthes refers, the latter photos do something of the opposite. Both capitalise on the disciplining qualities of photographs, but to different ends: one documents who is controlled, while the other documents who is in control; one tells us, “these are the masses of first Australians and Pacific Islanders, and here’s how we have tamed them,” while the other tells us, “the first Americans look just like me, so naturally, then, I have the power to dig up their remains and theorise (i.e., take over) their worlds and reconstruct their histories in my likeness.” This is the crafty character of photography, especially when used in the context of a fact-finding science. As Myers puts it, photos “cannot show time, space, or even images without us working on them” (1988:236).
They might come across as truthful, then, but they have been engineered. Conveniently, of course, it appears that they have been engineered in just such a way as to convert others’ pasts into Western notions of what is reasonable, possible, and correct.

To be sure, outside of photography there are other means available to us for “working on” images to achieve appropriate, Western-inclined truths. Pictures such as Figures 44, 51 and 67 do so via appeal either to the factuality inherent in computer graphics (reinforced, obviously, by the truth value of cartography and diagramming) or to the precision behind tables of numbers. For instance, as intimated in Chapter 5, an image like Figure 44 is powerfully communicative specifically because it is premised upon stripping its significations of any human interference; of any brush-strokes or corporeality or angles of composition. The picture is not akin to a photo (in the sense that it, firstly, lacks some of the extraneous detail and framing common to photographs, and, secondly, simultaneously presents us with other (diagrammatic) details and frames that would never be visible in typical photography (Baigrie 1996:xix-xx)), and neither is it akin to the standard map. Rather, it, like Figure 67, combines multiple visual forms together to maximise its coldness, inhumaness, and thus its un-impeachability. It works at filling the page with a kind of technical precision and immortality that make it impossible to fault. The very language used to describe visualisations of this sort—e.g., “digital mastery”—speaks to its unavailability for critique. There seems to be no need to query Figures 44 and 67, for they appear empirical and figuratively and materially self-evident. Borrowing from Bal and Bryson, they fall into that “mysteriously fluctuating zone between authorship...and anonymity” (1991:181), where someone, clearly, has been
involved in the making of the images, but where any stains of that involvement have been
dipped clean by the sterilising effects of the computer.

Surely, however, there is a need to query computer graphics for their assumptions,
no matter how flawless they might appear on the surface. This is especially true for an
image like Figure 67 which, despite its intricate make-up, is arguably nothing more
complicated than a scientific translation of Murdoch's (1995) pop-encyclopedia-bound
Figure 21. In terms of composition, both Figure 67 and Figure 21 exhibit a small map in
their right-hand corners aimed at offering viewers a distant bird's eye gaze down on the
real focus of the image: man's centrally-placed artefact(s). While the arsenal in Figure
67 may not be as complete or as obvious as in Figure 21, both pictures are conveniently
contrived to give core placement to the first American's first tool. And the existence of
this tool cannot be denied, for "x"-marks-the-spot (literally as in Figure 67); man is
clearly here, carving his way into the USA, wielding his instruments, exploiting his
environment, making his rightful home at the heart of the map. As Hodge and Kress
reflect, "ideologues like to be understood, and when their target is the common man (or
woman) their techniques and systems of signifiers are likely to be rather common too"
(1988:68). This suggests, conversely then, that the more specialised and exclusive-
seeming the target audience, the more opaque and cryptic their signification (i.e., value)
systems will need to be. Such is the case with Figure 67. Its ideology is perhaps not as
palpable as in Figure 21, but it still exists—in one form or another—and to argue
otherwise is to risk reverting to the "mirror with a memory" (Collier 1962:3) delusions of
late 19th / early 20th century photography. As Barthes (1977:46) hints, new technologies
are facilitating the masking of meaning. I understand Rees and Borzello to be
commenting on this predicament when they write that “in resisting old mystiques of art, new ones are made” (1986:10). We need to be concerned about the novel techniques we develop to display the prehistoric world, for all imagery is loaded and even our most progressive-seeming visual forms are not immune to the discipline’s now-commonplace “crises of representation.”

But old technologies, too, have bearing here considering that images such as Figure 51 are prominent in archaeology, particularly in Australian and Pacific peopling studies. The connotations behind these sorts of tables of dates are discussed briefly in Chapter 5, but they are highly reminiscent of what have been called the “linguistic cages” of scientific discourse (King 1997 in McNiven and Russell 2005:205). Such cages rely on the esoteric language of science to sanitise archaeology, to remove all human and personal elements from its presentation, to inhibit non-specialists from interacting with its findings, and thereby to allow a select group of European descendents to take possession of the past (McNiven and Russell 2005). The table in Figure 51 is just such a cage. It is a parade of numbers whose only purpose is to permit quarrying by certain scholars (after McNiven and Russell 2005:186). Its contents are separated from the field and assembled as specimens that have no recognisable connection to the people from which they have come. And if one were to add straight lines to the current white spaces in the table, Figure 51 really would be a cage, and its latent meanings would perhaps more comfortably simmer to the surface. The “facts,” of course, would literally be boxed-in—constrained, rigidly defined, made tight and, so, reliable—and we would be boxed out. Hodge and Kress call such manoeuvring “the coercion of the physical signals” (1988:61), and its implications are clear: by arranging archaeological data into disembodied cages of
this sort, non-specialists (and arguably everyone other than the author of the text himself) are figuratively barred from the facts; kept separate from the data so as not to pollute them. There is a link here to Malinowski's concept of "phatic communication," which has been described as an exchange between individuals that serves to "rapidly recall and reinforce the relationship itself, with all its inequalities of power and mystification of solidarity" (Hodge and Kress 1988:44). Thinking of Figure 51, an endless listing of data tells us something—that I, the author, am right, and here is my proof; that I have got the facts and you, the observer, may only look at them. In the end, a series of inputs makes such communication possible, including the atmosphere of the image itself which transfers certain feelings directly onto the product (Dyer 1982:91). The cage, accordingly, tells us that we—and the numbers—are safe, and the infinite lists of raw facts suggest that any associated text is likely to be equally as factual.

Pearce has talked of the archaeological act of "depersonalising individual traces and objects by serialising them into anonymity" (1999:23). This is exactly what I perceive to be at play in Figure 51, and exactly what I think is materialising in other types of images like Figure 39 or 50 or even Figures 52, 54 and 56. Moreover, this is precisely what I understand McNiven and Russell (2005) to mean when they speak of the process of subjection. These visualisations are complicit in de-peopling peopling studies; they strip the past clean of passion and dynamism, leaving behind a line-up of nameless specimens; and they strip away the sanctity and personal significance of monuments and other material forms by jumbling them into packets of curiosities. In this sense, the sequence of human heads in Figure 39 is equivalent to the sequence of pottery sherds in Figures 46, 52-54 which is equivalent to the sequence of stone heads in Figure 56 which
is equivalent to the sequence of numbers in Figure 51. All are “speaking corpses”
(Barthes 1972:133), but Figure 51 is especially tricky. Barthes highlights such trickiness
in his description of the language of mathematics:

it has taken all possible precautions against interpretation: no parasitical
signification can worm itself into it. And this is why, precisely, myth takes it
away en bloc; it takes a certain formula [read: $^{14}\text{C} = 40,000$ years B.P.], and
makes of this unalterable meaning the pure signifier of mathematicity [read:
archaeological truth]...Myth can reach everything, corrupt everything...even the
very act of refusing oneself to it... ...When the meaning is too full for myth to be
able to invade it, myth goes around it, and carries it away bodily. (1972:132)

Knowing the reach of mythology, then, and knowing that even our seemingly most
trustworthy visual forms can be riddled with ideological undertones, it should not be
surprising to see more “popular” modes of illustration laden with similar mythological
meanings. Indeed, on the whole, popular texts probably seize upon exactly the same self-
evident scientific “truths” that scholars and professionals use to inform their own
supposedly more legitimate documents. Returning to the work of Trezise (Figures 34-
37), we might recall that the author/illustrator identifies his children’s book as
“incorporat[ing]... modern archaeologists’ and paleontologists’ views of Australia’s
ancient history” (1988:1). So it seems that his work, too, is based in science and stands
as just one more extension of the ornate mythologies that structure academic
representations themselves. Importantly, Trezise’s paintings are not intrinsically less
valid or more fantastical than the tables and maps of accredited archaeologists. Although
artistic traditions (such as those behind Figures 34-37, 4, 6, 10, 22, 23, 38, 57) might
seem more easily victimised by manipulative and subjective hands, their truth value is
undeniable. This is made obvious by Bryson when he finds himself forced to make an
argument to the scholarly community against the conventional view of “ocular accuracy”
(1991:66) in painting—a view that sees painters passively transcribing "the visual echo of...far-off events" (69) onto their canvasses without influence from the social, political, or moral worlds. In a comparable vein, Moser and Gamble (1997:208-209) reflect on the influence of landscape art on archaeologists’, geologists’ and palaeontologists’ conceptions of prehistory and of appropriate visual icons for the authentic reproduction of the past. Myers (1988:238-242) writes of the power of drawings in showering us, as with photographs, in a profuse number of details—enough to suggest some sort of contact with reality—and in implying to their observers the existence of a real world that extends beyond the edges of the frame. Cartoons too (in the style of Figure 62), despite their non-realistic character and their dogged focus on “getting a laugh,” have been traced to truth-making via the concretising of gender, socio-economic inequalities, racism, and nationalistic agendas, and the shaping of public opinion (Emmison and Smith 2000:81-90). Let us not be quick, then, to dismiss visual forms of this sort as the “poor cousins” (after Emmison and Smith 2000:81) of photography, cartography and computer graphing and charting. While perhaps more colourfully illustrated, images by individuals like Trezise acknowledge (and, in fact, tend to be produced within) the same ideological architecture as even the most “rigorous” of scientific pictorials.

*The (Visual) Feedback Between Science and Popular Culture*

Grimshaw states of photos (and I broaden this statement here to include the other forms of visual representation reviewed above) that “they are objects out of time and place, expressions of a fundamental discontinuity between then and now, there and here, between the moment of photography or collection and contemporary viewing or
displaying” (2001:24). This is comparable to what I perceive to be manifest in peopling reconstructions: these images are modern day artefacts which represent neither actuality nor prehistory, neither “then,” nor “there,” nor truth—but invention. They are a negotiation between a past-made-present and a present-made-past, or, as per Shanks and Tilley, between prehistoric fragments that are “colonized and appropriated by a narcissistic present” (1987a:28). The difficulty, unfortunately, is that these peopling images are so under-scrutinised that such discontinuity—such mediation between present and past—is barely perceptible. From a Western point of reference, these depictions simply “make sense”; they are mass-produced and mass-consumed without attracting critical attention. In the meantime, it appears that truth and fiction become less and less discernable: is science informing fiction? Is fiction informing science? Or is, perhaps, a systematic and cumulative back-and-forth movement between archaeology and popular culture feeding a Western dominance-centred peopling consciousness and therein justifying the subjugation of the non-Western world?

I contend that it is exactly such a positive feedback cycle (after Gould 1995 in Mitchell 1998:10) which orders peopling representations. Within this cycle, archaeological science and hegemonic discourse come to mirror one another such that peopling studies (and, more pertinently, peopling images) build upon “sensical” Western conceptions of normality and naturalness that fortify the status quo, and those studies and images are then filtered out into, and devoured by, the public (and by this I mean everybody: scholars, youth, pop-literature readers, web surfers, etc.) as indeed they do seem so familiar, so natural. The scholarly world then reissues these studies; they are re-circulated to a hungry Western public; and ultimately, through the perpetuation of this
loop, they calcify into scientific fact. Mitchell (1998:63) describes this process as the convergence of science and mass desire, and Green and Mort (1996:235) have already alluded to its role in crowning photography as the window on truth. I would argue, however, that we tend generally to be unaware of the existence of such a cycle owing to our (specifically the archaeological community’s) reluctance to engage with “exteriority”—what Tilley calls the “external conditions that make it possible for a discourse to be a discourse and which give rise to the specific forms of the appearances of discourses” (1989:45 after Foucault 1981). The importance of exteriority is hinted at in Bryson’s (1991:65) characterisation of human recognition as a process that does not transpire alone in the confines of one’s mind, but in the crashing together of a multitude of codes that have been lived through and negotiated by us and others across time and space. Archaeologists, I am concerned, are not as cognizant of this process of negotiation and exchange as they should be. In making statements to the effect that archaeology is beholden to ascertain and safeguard what “really” happened in the past (e.g., Bintliff 1991:276; also see McNiven and Russell 2005:211-231), scholars are demonstrating their readiness to draw a line between us and them, and right and wrong; between who is entitled to pull history (fully formed, it seems) from the ground, and who must sit back and accept it; between correct, unadulterated facts, and the converse world of entertainment and fiction. But, let us be clear, the archaeologist does not sit in solitary confinement waiting for the next stone tool to pop into her hands. She lives amidst the same sights and sounds that many of her fellow (non-archaeologist) citizens experience;

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64 As the authors imply, photos and state/academic discourse were (are) linked by a positive feedback cycle, which both satisfied and reinforced the other’s needs. In essence, the state/academy needed power to control its subjects, and photography could seemingly control its subjects, but needed an official home. Together they offered the ultimate passport to truthfulness.
she approaches archaeological analysis from a standpoint that is affected by her
environment, education, mentors, socio-economic status, etc.; and even she sometimes
must wrestle (e.g., with the courts) for the privilege to tell a particular version of the past.
To ignore this is to succumb to the usual mythological pitfall of forgetting that things
(e.g., archaeological visualisations) have been made (Barthes 1972:142). Such forgetting
is easy to do when we are confronted with the empiricism of images like Figure 51; and
particularly so when these images (e.g., 30 of the 67 pictorials mentioned in this thesis)
do not even identify their maker in any sort of easily-accessible or interpretable format.65
Pearce’s (1999:24) words about archaeological museums being “self-entranced” have
relevance here. The discipline is prepared to use science to “create narcissistic images in
which ‘keep off the grass’ signs are more in evidence than flowers” (1999:24). While we
might be willing (or forced) to respect these dividing lines—particularly if they verge on
impenetrable (e.g., Figure 67)—that does not make the objects on the inside of the lines
any more immaculate or less contrived than those on the outside.

Bryson is right to outline power as something that is often microscopic, “a matter
of local moments of change...a swarm of points traversing social stratifications and
individual persons” (1991:71). Peopling mythologies are not necessarily bred of giant,
pop culture scarecrows. They exist in the glances, the stumbles, the misspoken words,
the icons that are bathed in the deepest of shadows in the corner of our texts—including
our scientific ones. Indeed, they are crafted in the cycle which sees culture informing
science and science informing culture. Perhaps the most insightful example of this
interchange was introduced to me at the 2005 American Anthropological Association

65 And note that a majority (16 of 30) of this subset of “un-authored” pictures comes from scholarly
sources: journals, texts or conferences.
conference when, following a series of insistent questions posed to me by a professor from Texas about the veracity of the ice-free corridor theory and the need for mammoth iconography, the scholar approached me to mend fences. As he put it, he wanted to say sorry for his assertiveness during my presentation: he could not help but be passionate about the ice-free corridor given that his grandfather came from the Plains.

**Being or Becoming the First Peoples**

The notion that a web of state+culture+science-based power dynamics and feedback processes might provide critical inspiration to archaeological reconstructions of first colonisations can be elaborated on by returning to Chapter 5. Here it is seen, borrowing from Mitchell, that an “aesthetics of spectacle, shock, mass consumption, and mass violence” (1998:62) are intersecting with scientific authority (as it pertains to the peoplings of Australia and Oceania) in such a way as to turn all of the stereotypes and injustices of the Western world into the most “normal” and “truthful” of circumstances. The maps, photos, paintings, tables, etc. that are circulated through youth and adult, and professional and popular audiences on the topic of Australasian colonisation serve to create what Banks speaks of as a “cultural apartheid” (2001:19); that is, a split between supposedly fundamentally different peoples: the first peoples and the rightful peoples—those who *might* have had a place in the distant past, and those that *do* have a place in the present. Such an apartheid makes possible many things, not the least of which is a feeling of safety and comfort achieved by separating out strangers from ourselves. Barthes describes this as a key component to exoticism, for relegating certain peoples (who seem unlike ourselves) to the “confines of humanity” (1972:152) allows the rest of
us to feel that everyone now “fits in.” To be sure, archaeologists seem, literally, to have made an art form out of this practice of relegation. In the same way that early illustrators often deprived the Neanderthals of the “hallmarks” of humankind in order to reinforce their otherness (Moser 1992a), so have archaeologists and their peers variously deprived the first Australians and Pacific Islanders of clothing (Figure 43), whole tools (Figure 52), meaningful gazes or visibility (Figure 41, 47, 49), physical features (Figure 50), control (Figure 36, 44), or cultural accomplishments that amount to more than living alongside impressive sand dunes (Figure 55). In the same way that 16th and 17th century collectors sought out odd, monstrous, spectacular or otherwise ogle-worthy artefacts for their curiosity cabinets (Moser 1999), so have archaeologists and their peers sought out big (Figure 56), strange (Figure 54), scary (Figure 35), or generally voyeurism-promoting (Figure 60) objects and beings to epitomise the earliest colonisation of Australasian landscapes. What is at issue in these manoeuvrings is reminiscent of Bhabha’s account of colonial discourse, which aims to “construe...a population of degenerate types...in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction” (1994:101). By depicting the first peoples as described above, newcomers to Australian and Pacific geographies are given the opportunity to excuse everything. It becomes easy to rationalise that the first Australasians were out of control, thus in need of control; or were unable to control, thus required controlling hands to intervene; or were overwhelmed by the environment, thus needed someone to cut it back; or were anonymous, thus required classification; or were stranded, thus needed saving (Figure 57); or, alternatively, were just another set of immigrants awaiting the arrival of the next legitimate newcomer to the “immigrant nation”(Figure 61). As Bhabha has said, “by
‘knowing’ the native population in these terms, discriminatory and authoritarian forms of political control are considered appropriate” (1994:119). Archaeologists profit from such control both personally and professionally, for, among other things, it allows access to resources, land, citizenship, and the right to write the past. The argument might be made that scholars themselves are not as guilty as the popular press in facilitating this scenario; but the fact is that the evidence (as presented herein) does not seem to support this position, and, regardless, the discipline is doing little to address the problem. Once archaeology (or whomever) pushes first peoples out, it appears, the rest of us should feel no qualms about making our way in (Figure 59, 62). This, to me, seems unacceptable.

I believe that a similar—although not identical—process is at work in the production and circulation of archaeological depictions of North American peopling. Here, too, our semiological, discursive and compositional systems have justified a non-indigenous domination of the landscape, as well as established the inherent legitimacy of the state (the U.S.A). But while I see visual practices of “othering” in use to discipline the first Australasians and to distinguish them and their landscapes from Euro-Australians/Pacific Islanders, I do not see the first Americans being singled out in quite such a fashion. Indeed, I do not see the first Americans (i.e., indigenous persons who lived >11,000 years ago) at all. Rather it seems that North American peopling images have wiped indigenous first peoples entirely out of prehistory, mapping instead the (Euro) American onto their place in the past (cf. Mandryk 1992). Unlike in Australia and the Pacific, then, where the first peoples (usually) have bodies and some form of presence in antiquity (however untamed or overwhelmed that presence may be), the first indigenous peoples of North America do not seem to exist. Americans exist (meaning, in
this case, peoples with Western value systems and European attachments), but 11,000-year-old Aboriginal colonisers do not. It seems highly coincidental that archaeological depictions of New World peopling tend to invoke the very images that stand at the cornerstone of contemporary US identity: a strong and independent male (Figure 6) with a conveniently Caucasian-like appearance (Figure 2, 5, 6), parting the seas—i.e., ice sheets (Figure 1), so as to find a home in the fully-formed United States (Figure 15, 16, 24), with nuclear family in tow (Figure 4), making his living off the land (Figure 9, 27, 28) in order to secure his daily dietary requirement of red meat (Figure 25, 29), and vacation in resort towns on the coast (Figure 26). Likewise it seems highly coincidental that, in contrast to Australian and Oceanic depictions, the first American is granted elaborate clothing (Figure 25), control (Figure 11, 30), individuality (Figure 6), intention (Figure 4, 23), and vast and complete tool sets (some of which still survive at the bottom of the ocean) (Figure 21, 67).

These coincidences correlate with Barthes’ account of the various responses that the European will have when confronted with an unknown entity: “If he comes face to face with him, he blinds himself, ignores and denies him, or else transforms him into himself” (1972:151, emphasis mine). Hungry for a means to “fit in,” it seems, archaeologists and their contemporaries have become the first Americans. They have constructed an authentic (Euro-American) cultural space within prehistoric continental space. They have fused current citizens and constructs (e.g., borders, Christian values) to the landscape, therein creating (pre)historical continuity and a “point of departure” (after Ryden 1993:40) from which non-indigenous peoples might plant themselves in the New World. Bailey (2001:30) touches on this operation when he writes that, “Victory over a
rival is not got by laying waste his kingdom, but by deposing him from the throne, seating upon it your own nominee, and continuing to collect the revenue.” The difference, of course, is that recent reconstructions of North American peopling do not even seem prepared to admit that rivals ever existed, let alone had a former seat on the US throne. Mulvey’s (1989:24) talk of man’s obsession for “having his cake and eating it too” comes to mind here, as not only have non-Aboriginal (specifically Caucasian) Americans already taken control of almost every socio-economic-political structure in the United States, but now they wish to grab hold of the last privilege that is apparently available to them: the right to (past) life in America’s prehistory. Interestingly, work by Byrne (1996) and Ireland (2000) in Australia implies that this state of affairs has been forced into manifestation, in part, because Aboriginal advocacy and indigenous (legal) claims to archaeological artefacts and landscapes have grown so strong. How else could (Euro) American power-holders escape allegations of wrongdoing, while continuing to exploit indigenous histories, other than by turning the first peoples into themselves? Byrne (1996:98 following Allen 1998) alludes to such appropriation as archaeology’s “national identity project,” aspiring as it does to “graft white culture directly onto an Aboriginal root.” I would argue, however, that, in North America, archaeology’s national identity project seems more of an experiment in grafting white culture onto itself given that Aboriginal roots do not seem to have any presence at all in American peopling pictures.

Significantly, the line of reasoning that I follow above does not coincide with Trigger’s (1984) keynote paper on different archaeological paradigms. Unlike Trigger, I would not necessarily situate American archaeology within the colonialist and imperialist
traditions. While US methodological approaches might indeed qualify as colonialist (i.e., focused on primitivizing and denigrating first peoples in order to justify colonial command) and, more recently, as imperialist (i.e., focused on scientifically generalizing about human behaviour in order to extend and patrol the bounds of world domination), peopling imagery, as produced about America, appears squarely nationalist. By this, following Trigger (1984:360), I mean that it tends to work toward securing unity among threatened or insecure contemporary citizens by lionising first peoples and assuming them as national ancestors. In pictures of North American peopling, though, it seems that nationalist tendencies push even one step further: they help us to turn first peoples into us; people who look, move, and think like Europeans. As a consequence, indigenous first peoples are excised from the past—or symbolically annihilated, borrowing from Dyer (1982:109)—and, of course, contemporary Aboriginal persons are left without history (after Kelly 1992:262 citing Wolf 1982) because archaeologists and archaeological illustrators have made that history their own.

*Everyday Talk*

Olsen (1991:217) speaks of the interplay between archaeology and ideology as the “scientific legitimization of hegemony.” Appreciation of this involvement of science in the ratification of dominant power relations is important considering that it too often goes unproblematised. It might be easy to look at an image of an ancient human being wearing a toque and walking to Texas (Figure 1), and laugh at it as the product of a backwards US elementary educational program; but when we flip to texts produced by archaeologists for academic audiences, and find the toque replaced with a suit (Figure 27)
and Texas (and all its neighbours) still intact (Figure 15, 16), we should be questioning why academia has not intervened in addressing such “backwardness.” Similarly, it might be easy to look at an image of a contemporary man posed and accoutred to impersonate prehistoric humanity (Figure 41), and deride it as a 37-year-old product of an uncultivated profession; but when we flip to texts produced within the last 9 years by key figures in the field, and see the same iconography used to the same end (Figure 31), we should be prompted to ask why decades of disciplinary evolution have not prompted change in our representational systems. Tilley (1989:48), telling of public lecturing, writes that the “impact of [a] speech derives more from the institution than from the individual giving it.” This suggests to me that if the institution of archaeology (with all of its connotations of truth and understanding) is unprepared to scrutinise its own methods of meaning-making, then we should not be surprised to find other interested parties (no matter how suspect they may be) following suit and having influence. Anyone can invoke archaeology to add legitimacy to a story, but if archaeology complies (i.e., by not attending to features of the archaeological institution itself that enable dubious storytelling), then its practitioners have at least some liability for the outcomes.

However, while every visual exchange might then be co-authored in some way by archaeologists, I do not wish to suggest that peopling images can simply be nailed to the cross of “elite” archaeological manipulation (after Hegmon 2003:220). Indeed, I would argue that first peopling reconstructions of Australia, Oceania and North America reflect an everyman’s legitimization of hegemony, in the sense that everyone (children, students, academics, practitioners, etc.) is implicated. We all have a role to play in the “everyday talk” (Gill 1996:148)—or, more aptly, “everyday imaging”—that serves to promulgate
the inequalities and power differentials of the West. As per Nead (1988:8), hegemony works by penetrating all social levels, all beliefs, behaviours and institutions. Thus academia might help to solidify and legalise, so to speak, those inequalities, but when they are compressed into a variety of problematic yet thematically-consistent images that are siphoned out across the general population and that see virtually no analysis by anyone about their nature or pervasiveness, then we are all incriminated. This is meaningful, as it offers a potential explanation for why I have not been very successful in locating indigenous-made visual counterparts to archaeological peopling images.\footnote{66} Aboriginal populations, too, have links to Australian, North American and Pacific “everyday talk”: they, too, might profit from peopling images; they, too, might be prepared to dismiss pictures as nothing but insignificant pieces of decorative candy; ultimately they, too, might have involvement in the preparation of the pictorials reprinted in this thesis.\footnote{67} Rountree’s words have pertinence here: “It is ironic that the most vigorous accusations of appropriation have tended to come from feminist scholars rather than from the indigenous peoples whose pasts have been appropriated” (2001:23). Non-involvement of Aboriginal persons in peopling debates is clearly problematic. The question is unanswered, of course, as to how such non-involvement (or, alternatively, how existing or future involvement) might enable or inhibit certain visions of the past.

\footnote{66}{There are many possible explanations, of course. Insufficient resources might hamper the publication and distribution of differing visions. Use of specialised language might have limited my ability to locate indigenous-oriented visual representations (i.e., in North America, some Aboriginal groups have adopted the term Turtle Island to refer to the earliest landscape of the first peoples). Alternatively, contrasting belief systems (i.e., the notion that first peoples never systematically “peopled” the world, but always inhabited the same geographies) might make peopling reconstructions irrelevant.}

\footnote{67}{Trezise (1988) implies that this was the case in terms of the preparation of his own text. My own experience in Northwest Coast archaeology suggests that local indigenous groups tend to participate in at least the excavation phase of archaeological research. In the end, though, peopling texts are so deficient in their attribution of authorship to imagery that it would seem impossible to discern Aboriginal involvement.}
In the end, this thesis observes the operation of a feedback cycle wherein the scholarly world (informed by the traditions, morals, peers, families, etc., of its workers) formulates ideology-replete interpretations of North American and Australasian peopling events which are then condensed into loaded pictures. These pictures are then circulated through scientific and popular culture (to an all-ages, all-gendered, everyday/everyperson audience) via periodicals, textbooks, children’s literature, magazines, encyclopedias and the Internet, and they ultimately become “everyday talk,” mostly, I believe, because they reflect the everyday: they are comprehensible, normal echoes of contemporary Western politics and consciousnesses. Archaeological scholars consume hegemonic discourse; the public, in turn, consumes an archaeological visual discourse that is reiterative of such hegemony; archaeologists and popular culture together reissue this value-laden peopling imagery; and the cycle continues.

Williamson’s comment about the manoeuvrings of advertisements hints at the costs of such a cycle: “The information that we are given is frequently untrue, and even when it is true, we are often being persuaded to buy products which are unnecessary; products manufactured at the cost of damaging the environment and sold to make a profit at the expense of the people who made them” (1978:17). While not everyone participates in the operation of these sorts of cycles, many do, and the implications—including their cocooning effects which might aid in suppressing different stories about the past (after Hodder 1991a:14)—are profound. As Tilley writes, “archaeological discourses internally limit themselves, tie themselves down to narrow confines...impose a will to truth strictly confining possibilities for knowledge” (1989:50). What is interesting is that scholars appear to have erected a thick wall along the supposed borders of their discipline in a
debatably well-meaning attempt to keep archaeology out of the hands of zealots and tyrants and to therein *purposefully* limit disciplinary possibilities. The problem is that they have set the wall so high off the ground that even archaeologists are passing beneath it, unaware that it exists, since no one can see it and no one knows how far it extends. Wall-building is certainly not the answer to progressive and exacting archaeological science; but vigilance could be. Being aware of our values and ideological histories, being aware of our movements back and forth through popular culture, and being aware of both the artefacts that we study *and* the artefacts that we create (or whose creation we inform), are arguably better strategies for pulling out of the aforementioned feedback loop than is establishing an invisible border, and working blindly to patrol its edges, only to find ourselves in the end overlooking—literally—its most obvious features.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The aims of the preceding chapters have been evolving and multi-fold. I have, firstly, endeavoured to underscore, like so many commentators before me, the status of imagery as an independently meaningful communicative device. I have, secondly, sought to comment, as have others, on the means by which pictorial constructions come to inhabit “truth.” Thirdly, I have suggested archaeology’s rather paradoxical lack of attentiveness to, and complicity in, the production, circulation and consumption of suspicious-seeming (visual) artefacts. Fourthly, I have experimented with a complementary, productive combination of compositional and semiological tools, discursive strategies, and quantitative tactics across academic and popular printed media. And fifthly, and more specifically, I have aimed to identify a body of images that, while produced in the name of rigorous archaeological science, is implicated in the legitimization of the Western status quo, and the subjugation of existing and past peoples. Struggling through the process of achieving these goals, I have been affected by Wilkie and Bartoy’s excerpt from Marx: “proletarian revolutions...criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltriness of their first attempts” (2000:754). In my struggles I, too, have criticised myself, interrupted my work, and felt desperate and illegitimate in situations where I found myself speaking to audiences of archaeologists about their responsibility for the creation of, and development of subtexts behind, visual accounts of the past. Moreover, I have questioned myself again and again about the scale of my image sample; about whether or not I have fallen prey to such disorders as the
“verification effect” (after Bal and Bryson 1991:178-179) wherein I choose a series of images that happen to support my argument and miraculously my argument then becomes true; and about what Bal calls the “complicity of critique” (1996:195-224) where in the very act of “showing” others what not to show, I become the culprit—where in the same breath as I lecture to others about not stealing, I pocket their belongings and run out the door as a thief.

My research is thus not revolutionary given that I wrestle with some of the same ideas and weaknesses that countless researchers before me have wrestled with and, perhaps, conquered. However, it is still different from previous archaeological visual analyses, and possibly even different in practice from a majority of visual anthropological analyses. Namely, I have prepared a methodology to inform my work (i.e., 155 analytical “questions”); I have avoided the well-worn topics of Neanderthals and “cave men,” as well as the highly insightful but somewhat impenetrable post-processual themes of scholars like Tilley et al. (2000); and I have dropped the conceit which, until now, seems to have permitted most researchers to understand maps, tables, illustrations and photos in scientific documents as fundamentally unlike maps, tables, illustrations and photos in the so-called popular media. I have also consciously opted not to act on the words of Bal (1996:196) who insinuates that research of the sort that I am doing suffers from the fact that, while it might be a critique of “whitemale” colonialism, it never actually shows us this colonial male. I seriously considered adding a page to my thesis arranged with a string of images (many of which are available on-line, or on the inside flap of the relevant book jacket) of the scholars and authors whose texts house the images analysed herein. But then I wondered what exactly this would show us beyond the
obvious, i.e., beyond a series of mostly white, middle-aged, bespectacled males laid out in precisely the mugshot fashion that I condemn in Chapter 5. I am not prepared to create my own visual artefacts that reproduce all of the faults of archaeology’s old visual artefacts; neither am I prepared to indulge even further in the tradition of archaeological/anthropological exposition that has proven so stigmatising and objectifying. But I am ready to situate myself; and this is another point that distinguishes my thesis from previous work in this field. That is, I have been influenced by Rose’s (2001:28) recommendation to remember how I am looking, as opposed to remembering only to reflect on others’ looks. I am thus conscious that I am a relatively young graduate student seeking recognition and some form of gain for my conjectures; I am someone who is cynical about an establishment that I still choose to participate in and profit from; and I am one of those people who entered archaeology as a student because of the sense of adventure and mystery and enchantment that hovers above it.

My thesis is obviously, then, not unblemished—however, I embrace my work’s flaws as a means to highlighting its accomplishments. For instance, I am keenly aware that despite all of my talk about the slipperiness and deviousness of imagery, I am still prepared to use images in exactly the same fashion that I critique archaeologists for using them: that is, as expository evidence, as relatively unproblematic facts to prove the “rightness” of my theory. This is awkward, for it is probable that I am perpetuating the same prejudices and injustices that I aim to disrupt. Myers (1988:254) is correct to note that “quotation is always quotation out of context.” In my case, I am appropriating these images; I am keeping alive their connotations despite the need to see them perish. But I do so while also offering an immediately-accessible critique and while attempting to be
explicit about their original context. And I am not willing, as Bal (1996:220) advocates, to limit their number or visibility—I am not willing to use them sparingly. Archaeology is not invisible or un-visual; so to produce a text that does not engage with visuality to the extent that it is readily apparent in the overall discipline is to misrepresent the discipline’s very nature. Moreover, archaeology is a scientific field, and it does require a burden of proof. Reproducing just two images in my thesis, therefore, does not establish a pattern of behaviour in the same way that reproducing 67 images does. More pictures do not necessarily make my argument more “right,” but they certainly add more weight and possibly more potential that the next time an archaeologist hires an artist or sends a text for publication, s/he will think critically about the implications and intentions of the visual representations which are invented to support it. Importantly, many of us also seem eager to invest in the notion that the fewer images in a document, the more adult-oriented and serious its content (Banks 2001:9). However, pictorials offer key tools with which to begin to explore new arguments and critique old ones, thus to eradicate them based on a misguided belief in their childishness is to miss out on a critical opportunity for disciplinary enrichment.

Of course, beyond disparagement this thesis does not offer archaeologists many words on how they might achieve such enrichment. Individuals like Turnbull (2002:278-284) have commented on the fruitful “third space” that certain visual forms (e.g., maps) can open up if we use them critically. Jay (1988), as well, considers how engagement with different “scopic regimes” might offer more textured, revealing, situated readings of the world. Moser (2003), too, proposes means by which museum environments could begin to challenge typical archaeological images through interactive displays, “bushy”
trees through human prehistory (as opposed to linear trails from past to present), and visitor involvement in envisioning human icons. These ideas are important because it is far too easy to propagate critique, to feel no responsibility for offering productive alternatives to the objects being critiqued, or to feel so overwhelmed by the depth of the critique that solutions seem unworkable or elusive. Bryson speaks tellingly of such a predicament: “power flows in, but the flow is in one direction, and it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of the reverse of this process, in which the image could be seen as self-empowered and out-flowing, or as an independent intervention within the social fabric” (1991:71). Therefore in an attempt to put forth my own “solutions” to peopling visualisations, I have begun to think about strategies for combining performance theory and life history methodologies into animated and contextualised looks at past, soon-to-be peopled environments (e.g., Perry 2005). The aim of such “looks” is to break free of the repressive characteristics of archaeology’s usual pictorial habits by developing alternative forms of representation that help us to perceive and, so, excavate prehistory differently.

This thesis clearly, however, does not experiment with such alternative approaches. It is squarely grounded in critique, and it has endeavoured to demonstrate that images of the peoplings of Australia, Oceania and North America tend to do precisely what we would expect them to do: prove that the contemporary world is meant to be the way it is based on pre-historical precedent. The Australian and Pacific peoplings show us that Euro-Australians and Pacific Islanders are justified in consuming the landscape and controlling indigenous peoples—and visualisations of the American peopling do the same for Euro-Americans. By not seeing fit to critically analyse imagery
or to take responsibility for the production, circulation and consumption of images, archaeologists and their peers (both within and outside of scientific culture) have enabled the past to be (visually) domesticated by the West. In other words, they have sold back to European descendents what European descendents have likely always believed: that the West is the rightful occupier of world space.

In the end, I recognise that another individual presented with the same 67 pictures might be able to construct an entirely different and plausible narrative about American, Australian and Oceanic first peoples. I do not claim, therefore, to be concocting a recipe for truth. Instead, I appreciate that culture itself, as per Drummond (in Hodder 1986:159), is a “series of questions and groping responses” that might never offer us correct answers. And, whatever those answers, I still stand confident that my contentions herein are warranted, particularly in light of archaeology’s traditional treatment of images and its ongoing colonialist, nationalist and imperialist ties.

Ultimately, following Bal and Bryson (1991:177), my thesis simply concerns relationships between pictures, people, social values and institutions across space and time. This point about relationships crystallised for me when I was presenting my ideas at the 2004 Australian Archaeological Association conference and found that, as I transitioned from talk about American peopling images into a discussion about the connotations and discourses of Australian peopling images, the audience shifted from laughing and chuckling at the American examples to dead silence. Certain individuals were clearly prepared to ridicule others for their lack of attentiveness to the most obvious of artefacts, but when the relationship intruded upon closer contexts, the implications, unsurprisingly, seemed to have a more personal effect. At the end of the day, I left the
Australian conference with at least some assurance to combat the self-doubt that could have manifested itself under those circumstances. When my partner entered the washroom following the close of my presentation, he came upon two archaeologists debating (not necessarily very kindly) the validity of my arguments. As these archaeologists zipped up and prepared to re-enter the conference, one turned to the other and offered a conclusion that continues to inspire me today: "But she might be right, you know."
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF KEY ANALYTICAL TERMS

The following definitions are informed by (and, in some cases, are pulled directly from) Rose (2001), Sturken and Cartwright (2001), and Hodge and Kress (1988).

**Anchorage:** The use of text (via a caption or storyline, etc.) to clarify the intended (i.e., preferred) reading of an image.

**Connotive Sign** (also **Connotative**): A higher-level sign whose denotive meaning is supplemented by a range of social, cultural, historical and ideological meanings. Given the denotive sign of a rose, its higher-level, connotive reading suggests notions of love, romance and loyalty.

**Denotive Sign** (also **Denotative**): A basic descriptive sign. As per Sturken and Cartwright (2001:353), denotive meaning is a sign’s “literal, face-value meaning.” In this sense, a drawing of a light bulb denotively signifies a light bulb, and a visual representation of a rose stands as the denotive sign of an actual rose or, more generally, a flower.

**Diegesis:** An uncomplicated reading of a visual representation based on a summation of the denotive meanings of that image. A “relatively straightforward” (Rose 2001:80) account of an image according to its denotive signs.

**Hegemony:** Intersecting social, political, economic and disciplinary systems that allow a “ruling class” to establish and uphold power over all other societal classes (as per Nead 1988:8).

**Icon:** The “most persuasive of signs” (Hodge and Kress 27). Icons are picture-like signs which either are, or resemble, what they signify. Icons are understood as “motivated” by nature; that is, they are very like objects or beings in the world around us. Icons have a transparent-seeming nature.

**Ideology:** “An imaginary relation to real conditions of existence” (Hodge and Kress 60). Ideology imposes abstract philosophical parameters upon these “real conditions” as a means to understand, classify, judge, and control them.

**Index:** A sign, often metonymic or synecdochal in nature, which is understood as either causally linked to, or contiguous with, an object, event or other sign. For example, smoke is an index of fire, just as an arrow is an index of motion on a map.

**Intertextuality:** Meaning as it is articulated through the interplay of multiple sites/texts/images (cf. Rose 2001:136).
**Metonymic Sign:** According to Rose (2001:82), this is a connotive sign wherein one thing is associated with another and so comes to represent that other thing. Thus, the rose is a metonymic sign for romance.

**Sign:** Signifier + signified. The effective union between signifier and signified, wherein the larger associative meaning of the signified is achieved via the signifier.

**Signified:** “Concept or meaning” (Hodge and Kress 1988:17). The larger meaning which is ultimately represented by the signifier. For example, “love” is signified by a rose.

**Signifier:** “Carrier of meaning” (Hodge and Kress 1988:17). A symbol, or metonymic or synecdochal sign, which is used to represent a larger or alternate meaning (the signified). A rose is a signifier of “love.”

**Symbol:** An arbitrary sign, based on conventional association rather than on likeness or transparency (as per icons) or causality or contiguity (as per indices).

**Synecdochal Sign:** Similar to a metonymic sign, but in this case the connotive sign involves a part standing in for a whole (or vice versa). Thus, the Eiffel Tower represents all of Paris, or an image of the first Australian represents all Aboriginal Australians, from past to present.
APPENDIX B: SEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

The semiological analysis of the images in this thesis is based upon my co-mingling of the work of a number of scholars, many of whom are noncommittal about the methods behind semiology, and most of whom have highly divergent concepts of analytical rigour. Given that I could locate no single author who, in my mind, was able to adequately describe and lay out the process of conducting a semiological study, I have endeavoured to combine the approaches of several experts into my own semiological “logic.” The result is a somewhat pell-mell strategy that has evolved out of attempts to make sense of the work of others. Unlike previous methodologies, it aims to be as explicit as possible about every step involved in the semiological interpretation of images. Its quasi-informal nature is a function of my own experimentation with this new process. To be clear, I have systematically approached each pictorial in Appendix G with the “questions” outlined below (i.e., S1-S67). My methodology moves from more general, full-picture oriented questions (S1-S3) through to more specific looks (S4-S67) at individual components of images. My answers to these analytical questions have been recorded on a spreadsheet. They subsequently form the basis for the semiological readings that I offer in Chapters 4 and 5.

**General:**

Penetrate the image (penetrative scrutiny (brainstorming))... What do I see? What does it mean? To which dominant codes does it appeal? What mythologies does it provoke? Why do I read it as I do (what are the informational pointers (Barthes 1977:35))? What is (are) the preferred reading(s) of this image?

**S1**

Think about the interplay of art historical tendencies, of “critical” tendencies (feminism, post-colonialism, indigenous readings, etc.).

**S2**

Think about the image’s reflection:

- **Artificial perspective:** mirror held up to nature is flat (Jay 1988:10)
- **Synthetic perspective:** spherical space which is homogeneous but by no means simple; finite infinity; mirror is concave, producing a curved rather than planar space on the canvas (Jay 1988:10)
Specific:

Describing signs (Rose 2001:74, 77-91)
- **icon** (likeness), **index** (inherent relationship, cause and effect, contiguity; e.g., signature = index: ultimate stamp of truth/objectivity/non-intervention (Hodge and Kress 1988:23)), or **symbol** (arbitrary)?
- **sign** (signified + signifier), **signified** (concept, object), **signifier** (image), **referent** (actual object in the world to which the sign relates)?
  - **syntagmatic** signs? (gains meaning from signs surrounding, preceding or following it) [link to possible syntagms in compositional analysis; Terrell]
  - **paradigmatic** signs? (gain meaning from contrast with all other signs)
- **denotation** (signs offering basic descriptive info)?
- **diegesis** (sum of the denotative meanings in an image; generally straightforward account of an image in preparation for more complex analysis)?
- **anchorage** (the caption or text that clarifies the meaning of denotative signs)?
- **connotation** (signs offering higher-level meanings)
  - **metonymic** signs? (one thing associated with another thing which comes, then, to represent that other thing) or
  - **synecdochal** signs? (part standing for a whole, or whole for part)
- **objective correlate** (objects taken for granted as having certain qualities which are then transferred onto other objects; especially common in advertisements)? [e.g., features of first man transferred onto all of prehistory or all products of a regional archaeology]
- **myth**? (naturalising the way things are (Rose 2001:91))

Lines of **appeal** of signs (Dyer 1982:92-93) = attitudes/feelings that signs appeal to or mobilise.
- **expertise or celebrity** [popular texts mobilise expertise]
  - happiness and success
  - fantasy
    - glamour and beauty or sex appeal
    - **culture/the cultural world or nature/the natural world**
  - **hubris or self-importance**
  - humour or entertainment
  - childhood
  - popularity or flattery or temptation

Lines of **persuasion** of signs (Dyer 1982:92-93) = extending from lines of appeal; general themes
- **scientific fact**?
- **repetition** or **redundancy**?
- **fear** (playing on worry)?
**-recommendation** or **association**? (testimonial?) [popular texts and reference books]

**before and after**? [this seems implicit in geo-political maps of “prehistory” wherein readers cannot seem even to understand the past without contemporary borders etched on. Apparently there is no before without the after; it would be “impossible” (unreasonable, disorganised, illiterate, amorphous) to describe before without the organisation and reasonableness made possible by the after (the borders); America/Australia is nothing without the after]

-jingle?

Communication of feelings, meaning and values (power, powerlessness, sexuality, etc.) by signs of the human body (Dyer 1982:97-104; Rose 2001:75-77)

Appearance

- **age**? (does it convey innocence, wisdom, senility, or...?)
- **gender**? (think about objective correlates of gender transferred onto the past; women = feminine, sexual, mothers, homemakers, passivity, emotion, domesticity, almost childlike(Dyer 1982:99)?; men = dominance, activity, rationality, worldliness?)
- **ethnicity** (“race”) and/or **nationality**? (normalising whiteness?; stereotypes?)
- **hairstyle**? (covering face? colour? length? texture? styled?... Long, flowing, feminine = seductive, narcissistic, object of love or self-admiration) [“one of the most potent symbols in cultural communication” (Dyer 1982:98; also Berman article)]
- body **shape**?
- body **height**?
- **physiognomy**?
- “photographic cropping” of body? (e.g., whole body or parts alone?)
- **clothed** (if so, in what? What do those clothes connote? ...wealth, elitism, authority, poverty? regime, work, leisure, sport?),
  - **partially clothed**, or **naked**?
- overall body **size**? (larger relative size = social weight/status/power)
- **makeup** or **bodily decoration**? **accessories**?

Mannerism

- **facial expression**? (emotive?)
- **eye contact**? (see Compositional Analysis: aversion of eyes? = withdrawal/ submissiveness or dependency; female versus male)
- **pose** (static or active? standing or prone? indicative of social position (e.g., female sitting at male’s feet [Conkey]?= “ritual subordination”(Dyer 1982:101))
- body **orientation** (frontal = exposure, vulnerability? or **profile**? or dorsal = exposure, vulnerability? If frontal and profile are
coupled = carriers of opposed values, one high, one low
good/evil; sacred/profane; heavenly/earthly; ruler/ruled;
real/imaginary; living/dead; active/passive;
engaged/unengaged ([Iversen 1986:87]) [Note that “to expose one’s back to someone is also to make oneself vulnerable, and this implies a measure of trust, despite the abandonment which the gesture also signifies” (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:144)]

Activity
-touch and feeling (who is touching what? self-touching?
functional or narcissistic?)
-body movement (passive/static or active/engaged? exaggerated?
high status = stasis, stillness?)

Presence: which bodies are pictured and which are not?

Proxemics (bodies in space) (Hodge and Kress 1988:52-68): intimacy – distance, close – non-close. [“Physical relationships of the (bodies of) participants in space”; “ordering of bodies in physical space and relationships b/w persons in social space...the basis for a system of transparent signs that is fundamental to the org of social life among humans”; “keeping one’s distance, standoffish, high status, grovelling, knowing your place, upper management”; also remember other signifiers (besides distance) which are transformations of physical distance, commenting on the implied meaning of physical space, expressing a specific reception regime (e.g., twisting body and face away, pulling clothes close, kneeling, fetal position, head forward, hands covering face, avertin eyes; all convey messages about space and distance without literally manipulating distance = transformations of the spatial code, redundant statements about social distance). Decoding from both ends of the chain at once (physical distance to cognitive distance (esp. gaze)) (Hodge and Kress 1998:52-56)]

-body movement and placement (as above, but in response to surrounding actors especially) (lively or lifeless?; high status? = often no movement; kneeling? = minus power typically; standing? = aggression or threat; seated? = plus or minus power, could be indicative of high status; is body placement exaggerated by other symbols (e.g., raised chair or crown or staff, etc.)?; does movement connote power(lessness)(e.g., collaring a women by placing a ring on her finger)?)

-head movement and placement (in response to surrounding actors and environment) (bowed or concealed or turned= deferential or embarrassed or unaware? forward-facing = confident, dominating?)

-hand movement and placement (gesture) (in response to surrounding acts; communicating closeness or distance?; linked with touch and feel?)

-adjustment of clothing or placement of clothing (establishing a barrier between actors via clothes?)
**-facial expression** (in response to surrounding acts; communicating closeness or distance?)

**-gaze** (between actors; communicating closeness or distance, establishing a relationship?) [gaze “is a particularly significant sign system, since it is the most flexible, the most easily under control, and it is, so to speak, the last word, the most surface signal”(Hodge and Kress 1988:56)]

**-spatial distance** between bodies? **Proxemic syntagm**? (arm’s length, side-by-side; facing one another, or parallel to each other? intimate, distant?)

**-grouping** of bodies or **independence**? (e.g., alone/independent, nuclear family, all-male or all-female tribe, strangers; etc.)

**-general relations** between bodies? **(reciprocal** = two-way, balanced and attentive relationship between actors; **divergent** = actors have attention focused on something different; **object** = actors focused on same object; **semi-reciprocal** = one actor attentive to another, while the other is focused elsewhere)(Dyer 1988:104)

**-hierarchical relations** between bodies? (superordinate, subordinate; plus power, minus power; higher, lower; closer, more distant; seated, standing)

**-centre-periphery relations** between bodies?  
**-gender-marking**? (gender as revealed via relations between actors and context, rather than by appearance alone)

Communication of feelings, meaning and values (power, powerlessness, sexuality, etc.) by objects and environment (interacting with bodies) in image:

**-signs of technology**?

**-signs of wealth//abundance**? Of **poverty**?

**-pointers or linearity**? (e.g., arrows, guiding symbols, constraining symbols; ushering our eyes in one direction)

**-solid ground**?

**-level of detail, lavishness, texture**?

**-framing**? (bodies framing objects/environment or environment/objects framing bodies/themselves)

**-signs of sameness or difference**?

**-signs of dominance or freedom**?

**-signs of isolation or integration**?

**-suggestions of invisibility or visibility**? **exposure**?

**-suggestions of natural or unnatural**?

**-suggestions of familiarity or unfamiliarity**?

**-presence: what** is pictured and what is not?

Power (Hodge and Kress 1988:46)

**-signs of asymmetry**?

**-signs of magnitude** or **magnification** of an actor/object/environment?
- signs of *elaboration* or *non-simplicity*?
  - signs of *non-equality*?
  - signs of *non-reciprocity*?
  - signs of *self-suppression*?
  - signs of the *absence* of the above?
APPENDIX C: COMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS

As per my experience with semiology, the compositional analysis of the images in this thesis is based upon my co-mingling of the work of multiple scholars. So, too, are the discursive and content analyses highlighted in Appendices D and E. Below I describe each step (Comp 1-Comp 29) that I have taken in examining archaeological images from a compositional perspective. These steps have come to inform the interpretations that I present in Chapters 4 and 5. The train-of-thought notes (in square brackets) that accompany, for instance, Comp 14 and 20 offered me additional prompts for negotiating the analytical process.

General:

Surface scrutiny (brainstorming)...how does the image look? **Products, props, settings, actors** (Dyer 1982:93) = functional or metaphorical?

Who could see this scene in this way? Where would one have to be to see this scene in this way, and what sort of person would one have to be to occupy that space? (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:149)

Think about a "summary diagram" of the image (Rose 2001:43)—**shapes**: "Artists have long learned their craft by reducing the visible world to simple geometric forms...children learn to draw in the same way, building up a repertoire of basic forms, and then, gradually, ‘fusing the parts’" (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:47). Outline the image to see where and how lines intersect, their edges and divergences and extensions.

Specific:

Content (Rose 2001:38-39)
-what does the image show us? [akin to diegesis]

- hue (actual colours; which colours are dominant? monochrome or multichrome?)
- have colours been used for emphasis or effect? If so, how? **Where does light fall?**
- saturation (colour purity; which colours are rich/vivid = high saturation? (hyper-real or excessive?); which colours are neutral/absent
= low saturation in relation to colour spectrum? (less-than-real or ghostly?) (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:163)
- value (lightness or darkness of colours; which colours are near-black = low value?; which colours are near-white = high value?)
- shading or shadow?
- illumination or light source? (e.g., daylight, candlelight, electric light)
- harmoniousness or differentiation (have colours been blended? contrasted?; how do colours connect signs and transfer meanings from one sign to the next)
- realism or photographic likeness (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996) or (if a photo) aesthetic or artistic characteristics (Barthes 1977:35)?

- lines: static or dynamic? curved or jagged? thickness (emphasis)? dotted or whole?
- objects or “volumes”: connected or isolated?
- contextualisation or setting (absence of background = void, decontextualised, simple, generic, “typical examples”? detailed and articulated background = particular, historicised objects? staged, semi-staged or “real life”? outdoor or indoor?) (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:165-166; Dyer 1982:106) [acts “as a context which qualifies the foreground”...the setting can be the ‘product’ itself, so people and objects personalise it...“the more defined, obtrusive or cluttered the background, the more it will affect the main action or purpose of the ad”(Dyer 1982:105)][SEARCH magazine][settings “exert a coercive force on the meanings that can be produced or received within them...sites where the specific meanings of specific groups can be expected to prevail”(Hodge and Kress 1988:68) – cf. school, academy, home, wild, desert, plains, ice fields, etc.; each of these contains “instructions” of sorts about how to read them and what meanings will be found within; just as the text in which a setting is pictured has its own meanings and instructions]
- alignment of looks between viewer and viewed? (demand? = direct address; offer? = object of contemplation or display) (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:122-124) [Terrell; Flood; “there is a fundamental difference between pictures from which represented participants look directly at the viewer’s eyes, and pictures in which this is not the case...vectors formed by participants’ eyelines, connect the participants with the viewer...contact is established...may be a further vector, formed by a gesture in the same direction”(122)]
- focalizers? (arrangement of looks and gazes = can we, the viewers, see what they, the viewees, see? If so = strong identification with image)
- social distance (close-up shot = personal, engaged, intimate, larger than life (literally and figuratively)/exaggerated (Dyer 1982:107);
**medium shot** = social, within reach but not “used”; **long shot** =
public/stranger/other, impersonal, isolated, for contemplation only or
distance as respect for authority, out of reach [Dixon in *National
Geographic*)] ["at a distance of more than 13 feet, people are seen ‘as
having little connection with ourselves’, and hence ‘the painter can look
at his model as if he were a tree in a landscape or an apple in a still
life’" (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:131) ... **portrait distance** = “soul
begins to appear”(131)]

-viewing position:

- angle between spectator and what is pictured (**frontal** =
(maximum) **involvement**, engaged, parallel/aligned? **oblique** =
**detachment**, disengaged, divergent, not face-to-face? **top-down** =
maximum power, god-like point of view, image at your feet (as in
a map) rather than within hands) [oblique = “what you see is not
part of our world; it is their world, something we are not involved
with”(Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:143)]

-does alignment of looks (demand or offer) **coincide with**
alignment of angles (involvement or detachment)? [Note that “to
expose one’s back to someone is also to make oneself vulnerable,
and this implies a measure of trust, despite the abandonment which
the gesture also signifies”(Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:144)]

-height (**eye level**? = equality, no power differential; **low level**? =
looking up or inferiority, power of object over viewer; **high level**? =
looking down or superiority, viewer power, diminishing the
object/flattening him to ground level) [“In many of the illustrations in
school textbooks we look down rather steeply on people – workers in
the hall; children in a school yard. In such books the social world lies at
the feet of the viewer, so to speak: knowledge is power”(Kress and van
Leeuwen 1996:146).] [Note that viewer is often in position of minus
power, (but not necessarily with the web). Perhaps archaeological dread
of all things “public” corresponds to a fear of succumbing to minus
power; they look down on pop culture, just as pop culture looks up at
them and their images (Hodge and Kress 1988:63).][**Reception regime**
(Hodge and Kress 1988:61); “We look up at princes and down at
nudes”(Berger in Iversen 1986:90)]

-perspective or attitude (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:136-137; 149-
153):

- **subjective** (with perspective and point of view; attempting to add
reality or physical substance to 2-D visuals?)? or
- **objective** (no perspective or point of view)?

- **frontal** angle (maximum involvement, “this is how it
works”)

- **top-down** angle (maximum power, neutralising
perspective itself, privileged, theoretical or objective
knowledge, god-like point of view, world at your feet,
satellite view = informational power)
-x-ray or cross-section (does not stop at appearances but reveals the truth hidden within, beyond the surface, deeper)
-classificational processes or hierarchies or diagrammatic relations between parts:
-**syntagm**: grouped together, symmetrical composition, equal distance between objects, similar size and orientation, decontextualised, neutral background, no depth, frontal/objective angle? [Terrell photograph, see Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:81]
-**superordinate** or **subordinate**? (hierarchical arrangements (akin to positional communication (semiology)))
-**diagrammatic relations** b/w parts of image? (top/bottom; center/periphery; moving on or off “stage,” in or out, up or down; trinity with godly object at pinnacle or devilish object at base?, etc.) (Iversen 1986:90); how do we “read” an image via its arrangement, and the arrangement of its parts, on a page?)

**Lens** (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:164-167)
-**depth**? (central perspective is most “realistic”; overlapping is least so) (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:167)
-**focus** (soft or hard? (soft = lower modality, fantasy-like or promising; hard = higher modality, reality/naturalistic)) (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:164)
-**cropping** (drawing attention to certain parts?)
-**representation** or **abstraction** (highly abstract (e.g., contour only)? or showing maximum detail, including texture?) (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996:166-167)
APPENDIX D: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

This appendix follows the same format as Appendices B and C, but with focus on the discursive methods behind my image analyses. Again, due to lack of clarity in the existing literature, I have amalgamated and elaborated on the strategies of several authors in an attempt to define an explicit and consistent methodological process.

**General:**

Look around the image (contextual scrutiny (brainstorming))... How has peopling come to be understood as it is (Potter and Wetherell 1994; Tonkiss 1998:249)? How has peopling come to be constructed as a problem (Tonkiss 1998:252)? How has peopling come to shape archaeological practice/archaeological science/archaeological understanding (Tonkiss 1998:247)?

How has peopling produced the “first” person (after Kendall and Wickham 1999:34)?

**Specific:**


-D3- How is the argumentative case made? how does the image come to be “repeated”? think about persuasion (how are we made to believe?), about accessibility (how is the image rendered accessible to us?) (Gill 1996:150; Kendall and Wickham 1999:27-28; Potter and Wetherell 1994:59-60). [Think about justifying need; creating vision (Tonkiss 1998:256).]

-D4- proof: how is proving achieved?: through common sense?: through factual impersonal discourse?: through emotional appeal?: through systematic vagueness (see D 27)?; through juxtaposition with pseudo-scientific or overtly fanciful or fanatical claims? [Ashmore: first year archaeology text]; etc. (Gill 1996:154).

-D5- reality: how is “reality” made to seem alive and obvious (i.e., present, stable, neutral) in the image (Potter and Wetherell 1994)?

-D6- composition: how are size—smallness (e.g., of numbers, objects...) or bigness—and colour and shape manipulated in the image? [e.g., lots of arrows in the Pacific serve to make it seem even more inspiring or amazing, or disorganized... (Potter and Wetherell 1994:63).]
-fact: how, if at all, is factuality communicated through the image?: how are raw facts displayed (Potter and Wetherell 1994; Tonkiss 1998:246)?
-quantification: how, if at all, are practices of quantification used to manufacture “factual,” authoritative images (Potter and Wetherell 1994)?
  -what types of quantity terms are employed (e.g., percentages, absolute quantities, fractions, exponents, etc.)? (Potter and Wetherell 1994:56)
  -presumption: does the image presume more than what is offered by the “raw facts”? (i.e., does it go, gestalt-like, beyond the facts; overindulge or over-inflate the facts? create something out of nothing?)
-goal: what appears to be the intended “work” (goal) of the author? (invalidation of a claim? validation of a claim? to confuse or complicate a claim? to regulate or order another? to modify or elicit or constrain outcomes? to agree or endorse or forgive or apologise or purchase or enact? (Potter and Wetherell 1994:56). Think about: the privileging of knowledge, persuasion and authority leading to action (Tonkiss 1998:250))

Accountability and Rhetorical Protection (Gill 1996:152-154; Potter and Wetherell 1994:60-62)
-how is the image made to seem accountable? Difficult to rebut or undermine? Fair and objective (Potter and Wetherell 1994:60)?
-how is the image designed to defend itself from criticism (thus offering itself rhetorical protection) (Gill 1996:150)?
-competition: how is the image designed to successfully compete with all alternative arguments?
  -how are alternatives discounted? (trivialisation? cooptation? suppression? attack?) [This is not a question about whether an argument is real or unrealistic, or how real or unrealistic it may be. This is not about revealing the truth so much as it is about understanding the choices that have been made (Potter and Wetherell 1994:63; Tonkiss 1998:255)] [e.g., Hawaiian article with raw data in tables, creating contrast, binary opposition, right vs. wrong][e.g., coastal route in the face of mounting evidence; e.g., IFC as supreme reality]
-Or, are alternatives provided to pacify the viewer, then subtly discounted? [e.g., Fladmark’s popular image of IFC in a pro-coastal article]
-Or, are the proffered alternatives not alternatives at all, just attempts to deal with pesky intruding info in an appeasing, but non-overlapping way? [e.g., arrows heading straight down into Monte Verde, suggesting that these aren’t Americans anyway.]
This is how archs can get around the American issue; they haven’t made them American, not even close.] (see Gill 1996:152-53)

Variation (Gill 1996; Potter and Wetherell 1994; Tonkiss 1998)
-actual variation: how do the elements of an image vary or differ from one another? how does the image itself vary or differ from other images (Gill 1996:146; Potter and Wetherell 1994:55)? so, both between and within images, how is difference or variation levered for action or for doing specific work?

-are internal inconsistencies evident within the image (Tonkiss 1998:255)? [e.g., caption vs. arrows in Irwin; caption vs. man in J.Peter White]

-potential variation: why represent an image in this way and not another; with these signs and not others (Potter and Wetherell 1994:56)?

Reading the Details (“All the details in a stretch of discourse—the pauses, repairs, word choice and so on—are potentially there for a purpose; they are potentially part of the performance of some act or are consequential in some way for the outcome of the interaction” (Potter and Wetherell 1994:58); “much of the business of interaction may be happening in the details” (Potter 1996:133)) [yes—think of J. Peter White and his caption alongside image]

-can particular themes or key signs or elements to the image—and across images—be discerned (Potter and Wetherell 1994; Tonkiss 1998:254)?

-emphasis: is there emphasis on particular components of the image (Tonkiss 1998:257)?

detail: what is the level of detail in the image—and can it be accounted for in the “data” (Potter and Wetherell 1994:63; Tonkiss 1998:246)?

-use of very familiar, taken-for-granted notions (e.g., the three-part “list” = “crescendo effect”; perspective = reality; tropics = nakedness; man = spear), casual assumptions, everyday routines and/or banalities (Rose 2001:139; Tonkiss 1998:257)? [Think about Flannery et al. diagrams of man amidst extinct animals, all lined up like a chart, without perspective, one on top of the other, a kind of syntax of sameness, or its opposite (ascension to dominance/heaven)? = classificational process as per compositional analysis.]

-does the image (and the arguments contained within) flow straightforwardly (Gill 1996:152)? does it appear to be the most appropriate way to deal with the information? [This is where the coastal route fits in. Images do not often seem to flow straightforwardly from the argument; more appropriate signs could have been employed!]

-stereotyping: how does image work to divide up, stereotype and/or categorize its components (Tonkiss 1998:247)?
-vagueness: what is the level of vagueness in the image? (systematic vagueness? inexplicit or unclear argumentation? use of epigrammatic or global formulations which defy pointed criticism or individual accountability? (Gill 1996:152)) [Clearly tables differ fundamentally from paintings in communicating specificity. Think of the “first” American or Australian = global formulation; think of texts with archaeologists under the caption “the first Americans” = “embody values which no one would want to dispute, but at the same time fail to specify precisely who or what they are talking about”; think also of nuclear family implications in American illustrations, of technological backwardness implications in Australian visuals (Tonkiss 1998:258).]
-silence: what and where are the silences? the (systematic) absences? the omissions? the ignorances (Tonkiss 1998:258; Gill 1996:147)?
-idioms: what and where are the pauses, the hesitations, the corrections, the intonations, the overlaps (Potter 1996:136)?
deviant case analysis: is this an image which appears not to mesh with other image patterns (Potter 1996:138)? [Again, this is where the coastal route has its place, seemingly as a deviant case...but not necessarily. “Their special features may help to confirm the genuineness of the pattern...can highlight exactly the kind of problem that shows why the standard pattern should take the form that it does” (Potter 1996:138).

Interpretive Context (“the social setting in which a particular discourse is located” (Tonkiss 1998:249))
-how has the image been made specific to (been made to suit) its context (Tonkiss 1998:249-250)?
-architectural features reinforcing reception regimes: special framing (production)?, special display (production)?, special distribution (circulation)?, special observational spaces/places (consumption)? (Kendall and Wickham 1999:28). [“The coercion of the physical signals is typically reinforced by reception regimes. The low railing around the alter area, for instance, could be leapt at a bound if there were not also rules, adequately taught and policed, reinforcing the rail’s meaning of ‘barrier’” = we know how to read a map, a chart, a diagram. We could choose otherwise, but we do not (Hodge and Kress 1988:61). It is “a matter of emphasis and foregrounding through signals that encourage viewers to read one set of meanings and not to read another” (Hodge and Kress 1988:61). Think about the viewing position and the direction of a viewer’s gaze (e.g., up, down, askew, eye-level implying equal relationship, close-up, distant, side view, privileged access points??; the artist, presumably, has the ultimate position. From whence do viewers see the image and why? What about different types of viewers?: archaeologists, laymen, scholars, etc. = reception regimes (Hodge and Kress 1988:61). “We look up at princes and down at nudes” (Berger in Iversen, 90).]
-does the image affirm the "positive identities" of viewers? of archaeologists (especially if the intended viewership is professionals/academicians)? (Gill 1996:155) [Can viewers happily validate themselves/their histories through the image?]

-what "subject positions" have been produced for the viewer by the image? how has the image been designed to make this possible? (Gill 1996:155)

-how does the interpretative repertoire used in images in formal archaeological texts differ from the repertoire used in more informal, popular consumption-oriented archaeological texts (Potter 1996:131)?

Provenance and Genealogy (Rose 2001:30, 38)

Who?:
-who created/authored the image?
-who circulated the image? who, then, authorised/legitimised it?
-who is the intended viewer?
-who indeed can actually access the image?
-who are the true final consumers of the image?

When?:
-when was the image produced? circulated? consumed?

How?:
-how has the image been disseminated?
-how much space has been allocated to the display of the image? what are the implications?

What?:
-into what type of text has the image been incorporated? (e.g., picture book, newspaper, etc.)
-is the text a part of a series or campaign promoting similar ideas (Hodge and Kress 1988:9) = redundancy?
-what are the text’s institutional affiliations?
-what technologies of display have been exploited in the image (i.e., how has it been made)? to what effect? (Rose 2001:175-178)
-what amount of material/financial resources appears to have been invested in the image and its associated text (Hodge and Kress 1988:9)? Human resources?
-what status does the text of the image seem to boast? in what position does this status put the viewer (Hodge and Kress 1988:9)?

Where?:
-where is the image located within the text?
-where is the author of the image identified within the text?
-from where does the image "hail" us? from whence does interpellation begin (i.e., where are we grabbed by ideology (e.g., behind gates? from a fixed position? from a mobile place? from a universally-accessibly locale?; think about viewing position, physical bodies in space, reception regimes (who can actually get into the university to view these materials? who sees web-based
images? who has a library card? how close can they get? from where do they come? (Hodge and Kress 1988:60-61))

Audience

-how, then, does the image appear to be **producing or disciplining** its audience?

-how do viewers seem to be **negotiating** such production/discipline?: careless compliance? resistance? self-regulation (self-discipline)?, etc.
APPENDIX E: CONTENT ANALYSIS

This appendix follows the same format as Appendices B, C and D, but with focus on the content-oriented methods behind my image analyses. Again, due to lack of clarity in the existing literature, I have amalgamated and elaborated on the strategies of several authors in an attempt to define an explicit and consistent methodological process.

More=more significant?

-frequency counts (“don’t count everything simply for the sake of it...Choose the important frequencies only, deciding which are important by referring to the broader theoretical and empirical framework with which you are working” (Rose 2001:63))
-absolute
-relative (e.g., percentage of total number of images/components)

-size (Slater 1998:237)
-proportion of space (Slater 1998:237)
-of object in image relative to other objects [eye catcher = object occupies more than 50% of space in an image (Dyer 1982:112)]
-of image itself relative to context
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEMILOGY</th>
<th>IFC 3</th>
<th>IFC 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Journal</td>
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</table>

| S 1 | Penetrative scrutiny... What do we see? What does it mean? To which dominant codes does it appeal? What mythologies does it provoke? Why do we read it as we do (what are the informational pointers (Barthes 1977:35))? What is (are) the preferred reading(s) of this image? | Man with high cheek bones penetrating the continent, making the microchip, the microcosm that is the USA. Science, geography, fantasy, technology and evolving abilities = everything we've come to appreciate from childhood to adulthood. Man enters America, conquers mammoth as he builds a network of sites and thus officially establishes a connected and American landscape. Man enters America through IFC following mammoth; populates continent. | Skeleton is interesting addition: why isn't mammoth skeletal too? Full effect of "kill," I suppose, cannot be achieved by osteological rendition of mammoth (it would be even less discernable as a figure if it were just bones). Skeleton of man is one piece that could be argued to be differentiating past from present--giving some temporality to the image; man is gone, but everything that he left behind is exactly the same. Moreover, skeleton only used to signify sites were skeletal remains where recovered -- everywhere else, man = his big, solid tools. NOTICE THAT early CALIFORNIAN sites are missing! |

| S 2 | Think about the interplay of art historical tendencies, of "critical" tendencies | Science, medicine, telecommunications, satellite. | Science, geography, architecture (?) |

| S 3 | Reflection | Artificial? | Artificial. |

<p>| S 4 | <strong>Icon, index, symbol?</strong> | Index = arrow: at some point we might be able to define the whole complex of man-mammoth-arrow as representative of American peopling, and of America; spear as arrow: site pointers; legend. Icon = man, mammoth, spear, globe/earth. Symbol = pack ice represented by diagonal white and grey lines; dots as archaeological sites; dotted lines as ice sheets; labels. | Index = cluster of icons meaning this IS early man, he moved north to south, east to west, making NA; scale and latitude/longitude markers; state borders which collectively create the USA; &quot;signature&quot; at bottom right of image; legend; north arrow. Icon = (arguable) mammoth, skeleton, stone tools (but these are also symbols for whole complexes located at those points on the map). Symbol = ? as above. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S 5</th>
<th>Sign, <strong>signified</strong>, <strong>signifier</strong>, referent?</th>
<th>Note that the same signifier (a saturated black dot) is used to mark 33 different referents (archaeological sites with different dates, features, geography, cultural affiliations, occupants--people who likely spoke different langs, lived at different times, ate different foods, used different resources). This is noncomplexity at its extreme. The first Americans are one people on a mission to kill the beast and conquer the land.</th>
<th>As per IFC3.</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>S 6</td>
<td><strong>Syntagmatic</strong> signs?</td>
<td>Site markers + pointers (dots and angular lines)? = one dot would suggest one small, isolated, random occupation, but 33 dots with coordinated pointers suggest a logically-driven overwhelming of the continent -- <strong>no place left unsettled or unclaimed</strong> (just as in the present!), no place unpurposefully exploited. Arrow + corridor = ice opens, travel southwards is inevitable. Dotted lines = together represent movement of ice sheets, although ultimately the only one of importance (c.12000ya) stands as a paradigmatic sign, b/c it makes possible man’s great journey.</td>
<td>States; icons -- one of several icons which distinguish the peopling of NA from any other kind of event, and particular places as instances associated with the activity of peopling; latitude/longitude measurements behind USA giving substance to the country and its dimensions.</td>
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<td>S 7</td>
<td><strong>Paradigmatic</strong> signs?</td>
<td>Mammoth, man, land, water.</td>
<td>Icons (but see above) distinguishing (prioritizing) American behaviour: 1. Human bodies; 2. Big human toolkits (that can kill); 3. Dead mammoths; 4. Single tools; 5. Old, unclear tools. Great lakes, the only earthly feature meriting colour... different, but a part of “our” world versus the nothingness (the other world) which surrounds the USA.</td>
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<td>S 8</td>
<td><strong>Denotation</strong>?</td>
<td>Bundled man with spear passes through hallway into America at 12,000ya and one-by-one settles sites across the continent while pursuing mammoth.</td>
<td>Late Pleistocene/early Holocene, the states are occupied... What is left behind are bones and tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 9</td>
<td><strong>Diegesis</strong>?</td>
<td>See Comp 3.</td>
<td>See Comp 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 10</td>
<td>Anchorage?</td>
<td>Paragraph underlying image writes (in italics) that this is the Americas, at end of &quot;Ice Age,&quot; when human colonisation took place, &quot;perhaps&quot; via &quot;the corridor.&quot; This image is never referred to from within text of book. Stand alone illustrative picture.</td>
<td>As per Comp 3: identifies this as map of the USA showing certain (it is unclear why these above others) early sites with particular features. Identifies authors of image (J. Cooper, though is an unknown). This image is referred to within text that suggests that these are all post-1965 finds, and that Canadian, Alaskan and Siberian excavations have &quot;enlarged the late Pleistocene arch record&quot; (but don't merit picturing here!!!) (p. 540). The text also differentiates skeletal finds from site finds, as though these aren't all of the same nature (again, this contributes to an understanding of the skeleton icon).</td>
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<td>S 11</td>
<td>Connotation?</td>
<td>Man, standing on top of world, oversees his terrain, his property, his corridor to the good life; easily and uniformly overtakes much of the continent; keeps mammoth fleeing for its life.</td>
<td>At the turn of the epoch, the United States of America was established, and Americans (of various stripes) have taken their places: they are dead, or old, or killers of giant animals, or possess large stone tool collections, or single stone tools. The peopling of NA is summed up in the USA; it ends at the USA; the USA epitomises it.</td>
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<td>S 12</td>
<td>Metonymic signs?</td>
<td>See arrow below (S13). Dots as sites as signs of man's indisputable successes -- his great journey.</td>
<td>Skeletons as the remaining souls; rocks and mammoths as the solid, strong, everlasting, rock hard Americans making their mark on the open, generous, but empty continent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 13</td>
<td>Synecdochal signs?</td>
<td>Man as all of human colonisation; dotted lines (symbolic of ice sheets) as the entire &quot;ICE AGE&quot;; arrow (?) as every movement, thought, emotion, mistake, sensation, decision, etc that humans made in entering, exploring, surviving and succumbing to the New World; mammoth as every innocent (and not-so-innocent) resource that gave themselves up to man's destiny.</td>
<td>Peopling of USA as peopling of all of North America; &quot;selected&quot; sites as representing the whole process of the colonisation of the Americas; 5 single icons as the same phenomenon: people living, breathing, thriving, surviving in the states over thousands of years;</td>
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<td>S 14</td>
<td><strong>Objective correlate?</strong></td>
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<td>Man as intentional, rational warrior turning ancient past into a &quot;great journey&quot; to America. Arrow (see S13) as purposeful, direct, never-confused, IMMEDIATE movements of man into America transferred onto peopling, such that colonisation now comes to be seen as purposeful, direct, never-confused, immediate movement of one man on great journey to USA. Mammoth as naive, exploitable transferred onto America (land is naive - empty -- and exploitable) then transferred onto present to legitimise contemporary behaviour.</td>
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<tr>
<th>S 15</th>
<th><strong>Myth?</strong></th>
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<td>See S14.</td>
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<tr>
<th>S 16</th>
<th><strong>Appeal?</strong> (Expertise or celebrity, happiness and success, fantasy, glamour and beauty or sex, culture or nature, hubris or self-importance, humour or entertainment, youth, popularity or flattery or temptation)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expertise -- the text makes a lot about archaeological and scientific expertise and criteria as paths toward the truth; points on the map as the criteria. Success -- overwhelming of landscape, subduing of giant fauna, foundation of America. Fantasy (virtually identical to the incredible IFC1, excluding Texas of course -- but note that mammoth stands right on the heartland here) -- but this image is for adult readership, not children! Self-importance -- of the man, the American and his &quot;great journey,&quot; as though it was intentional -- a planned voyage to a foreseen destination. Childhood -- in the sense that it appeals to exciting (youthful) visions and youthful, cuddly animal drawings. Temptation? (the IFC tempts us to believe in a particular dialogue of past events). Nature -- as nothing could be more true than a whole hemisphere colluding to pour man into America (Asia through Alaska through corridor, etc.) and water proving impassable terrain. Culture -- American culture then as now.</td>
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<th>S 16</th>
<th><strong>Appeal?</strong> (Expertise or celebrity, happiness and success, fantasy, glamour and beauty or sex, culture or nature, hubris or self-importance, humour or entertainment, youth, popularity or flattery or temptation)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Expertise -- scale, north arrow, latitude/longitude, skeleton in standard anatomical position, &quot;archaeological field excavation&quot; (540), &quot;acceptance by the archaeological community&quot; (541), &quot;secure evidence&quot; (identified by the author himself!). Success -- to some degree (mammoth kill sites + changing technology and caches of tools). Fantasy -- ? cartoonish stuffed animal-like mammoth figure. Self-importance -- of America, as it is made the most important place for understanding the peopling of North America (nowhere else seems to merit consideration in visual form). Popularity -- of sites as &quot;real&quot; sites or most controversial sites or the only sites that we really should care about. Temptation -- to believe that this is the culmination of peopling; to believe that man traveled by land to kill the mammoth with his evolving tool set, and a few unlucky skeletons left in the wake; temptation as in IFC4 (for nothing is truly legible in this image except for the borders and the clear empty states framed within those borders!).</td>
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</table>
| S  | **Persuasion?**  
(Scientific fact, redundancy or repetition, fear, recommendation or association, before and after, jingle) |
|----|--------------------------------------------------|
| S  | **Age?**  
Able-bodied male, adult. Prepared, not innocent, adept (he has slaughtered before, as evidenced by furs, and will slaughter across America, as evidenced by site points). Ready to live the American dream -- making it in the USA, draining all resources and profiting for oneself alone. |
| S  | **Gender?**  
Male, long spear.  
Unclear -- everything is small and identical; sex is irrelevant although presumably male. |
| S  | **Ethnicity and/or nationality?**  
Unclear -- neutral/colourless skin (Caucasian-like), but prominent cheekbones (Asian/Amerindian).  
Unclear. |
| S  | **Hairstyle?**  
Hood shields hair.  
N/A. |
| S  | **Body shape?**  
Lean, able to wield large weapon and to cross the earth in search of America. Fit.  
Unclear -- bones only. |

*Scientific fact. Repetition and redundancy (arrow and spear; site pointers making consistent and undeniable our vision of America's earliest sites; legend duplicating lines on globe; same mammoth across images -- but different man (the American); same image repeated in multiple Fagan books across MANY years; virtually the same image repeated to different audiences (adult, youth, students = IFC 3, 1, 2) across recent past). Recommendation ("one of the foremost living archaeological writers" and university prof deciphering the great journey for us). Before and after -- although the way that these images are laid out (a characteristic of maps generally) makes it seem forever that BEFORE IS AFTER: man was there, sites were there, America was there (ice offers the dividing line, making it permanent, undeniable). Jingle? (the great journey).*
| S 23 | **Body height?** | Unclear; likely tall; taller than mammoth! Not obviously short and stocky. | Long-legged. |
| S 24 | **Physiognomy?**  
( Facial features) | See S20. High cheekbones -- all else is indecipherable. | Unclear. |
| S 25 | **Photographic cropping?** | No. Although mammoth icon is used repeatedly (cropped out of and pasted into other images). Metaphorically, all humans (as mentioned in the caption) have been cropped out to allow for this one man. | Bones alone -- the unromantic leftovers (although Kennewick's reconstruction is far from unromantic!) of individuals whose friends/associates/contemporaries went on to kill, to dominate, to colonise. |
| S 26 | **Clothed?** (Full, partial, naked) | Layers, multiple pieces, warm furs sewn together. Fully clothed-head to toe-in functional garb. Certainly not poverty stricken! Man has killed (multiple?) beasts to shroud himself in; he is unexposed to the elements; he is prepared for all conditions (can remove layers if he wishes). Has power to supply his own wardrobe, has skill (or, more likely, power over a female partner with skill) to sew furs into a textured whole; has wealth to keep these clothes intact and in good condition. Boots, gloves, pants, multi-part jacket, hood with fur accessory. Clothing (and mammoth's fur, which suspiciously resembles man's clothes!!!) is most detailed aspect of image -- this is the only elaboration, the only wealth in the picture. | N/A. |
| S 27 | **Size?** | Man is larger than Siberia and north Asia; the length of Canada! Mammoth is size of the entire eastern USA. With spear, man + mammoth = length of entire US. Big, weighty, omnipresent, omnipotent entities, traipsing across small land. Sites are size of whole American counties. Total lack of proportion. | Skeleton is the same size stone tool is the same as mammoth. They are all markers of man's presence on the landscape -- nothing is apparently more significant than the other. |
| S 28 | **Makeup or bodily decoration?**  
**Accessories?** | Fur collar = crown, booties, gloves. | N/A. But, where skeletons are absent, "man" is accessorised by stone tools. |
<p>| S 29 | <strong>Facial expression?</strong> | Unclear, but body positioning connotes focus, attentiveness, intent. | N/A. Skeletons aren't emotive! |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S</th>
<th></th>
<th>Eye contact?</th>
<th>Eyes are just two dots, but appear to be open, aware, looking out into distance, across globe, over his domain. Head, body, spear follow gaze -- (eyes are not averted or deferential, but intent) -- all act as pointers guiding our vision around globe. Control over globe.</th>
<th>N/A. Mammoth probably isn't making eye contact; its gaze is directed into distance (getting away?); its figure represents mortality (vs. vitality) anyway!</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Pose? (Static, active; standing, prone; indicative of social status)</td>
<td>Standing, active. Cocked left leg (ready to step onto America), extended arm with raised spear (ready to overtake landscape), man's body slightly turned away from us (repositioning for entrance to America or offering himself up for our ogling of him/ourselves?) but ready to move forward. Mammoth is standing, active, moving away, trunk raised, feet splayed.</td>
<td>Skeleton = static, obviously; standing?; certainly not subordinate. Mammoth = arguably active, standing, fleeing or prepared to move to the east. (Standing above (maybe behind??) weapons at Clovis = likely subordinate).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Body orientation? (Frontal, profile, dorsal)</td>
<td>Mammoth = profile, back turned on man, thus vulnerable, fully exposed to us and him. Man = part frontal, part profile, face turned, but body is generally forward, body exposed to us, but head is turned, unaware or uninterested in us, ignorant but intent on greater things. <strong>Coupling of frontal and profile</strong> = opposing values (ruler, ruled; living, dead; heavenly, earthly). Interesting, as per K and VL:144, exposing back signifies vulnerability AND trust (the “naive” fauna). Skeleton = frontal, exposed, clearly vulnerable! Tool = frontal, exposed, but not vulnerable... marking concreteness of site, man's invulnerable taking of the space. Mammoth = profile, the position offering the most complete (exposed) view of the animal. <strong>Coupling of frontal and profile</strong> = ruler, ruled.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Touch and feeling?</td>
<td>Man grasping spear (!!), touching (or floating above) land ready to take step over/out of the abyss onto the firm ground of NA. Mammoth floating above America/sites, moving away from a wake of cultural manipulation and control. Both man and mammoth do not really engage with earth (nor does ice, as it lays on top, then disappears). Only real touch is b/w man and spear (self-touching!?). Mammoth touching (?) weapons at Clovis... as above. Nothing (not even icons) really seem to be touching the USA -- its core lies unblemished, despite things dropped on top of it. At least dots of IFC4 imply that something has penetrated, pockmarked, the continent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 34</td>
<td><strong>Body movement?</strong> (Passive/static, active/engaged; exaggerated)</td>
<td>See S31, S32. Active, engaged in moving toward centre stage (man) or moving away (mammoth). Functional but also glutinous; man gobbling up the landscape, and the mammoth, with unquenchable thirst. Arrow acts to exaggerate, and dots leading into arrow guide our eyes toward dots beyond arrow, and straight lines guide us outward, circling the globe, eating it up, inflating the uniformity, the logic, the precision and rationality of man's movements.</td>
<td>As per S31, S32. Passive and active, static and engaged. Exaggerated sizing. Mammoth as nothing in comparison to tool; skeleton as little in comparison to another (invisible, more successful vs. skeletal!) man's tools.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 35</td>
<td><strong>Which (whose) bodies are pictured; which (whose) are not?</strong></td>
<td>One man, one mammoth -- as usual, all other living beings, all other life forms, all other grains and textures are omitted. Man and mammoth mean all.</td>
<td>Remnants of bodies of those who, at once, both did (survived in the arch record) and didn't (survive all the way as successful colonisers) make it. It's not clear who these bodies are nor what they were found with (e.g., technology), but they are the few bodily remains (as opposed to just indirect evidence of bodies) of the first Americans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 36</td>
<td><strong>Body movement and placement?</strong> (Power dynamics; status indicators; lively, lifeless)</td>
<td>In image, man and mammoth are just over 2 male body lengths apart = unusually close. Man stands 1.7 times taller than mammoth, with arrow he is only 5% smaller than mammoth. Man stands above mammoth and above us. He is upright, poised to step into USA, spear at the ready and crossing his chest = lively, aggressive, attentive, spear exaggerates presence, connotes power, as does arrow. Mammoth is standing, active, moving away from centre, lively but doomed as there is no where left to go! Man's body is open (to us and US); mammoth's is turned, closed.</td>
<td>VERY small size of icons is useful in the sense that they make (more) clear the distance b/w sites and people in the ancient US -- nothing is so giant as to make us feel that sites are actually just millimetres apart and man could stand one foot from mammoth with one isolated point and bring the animal down. Feeling of isolation is more obvious, but otherwise image is artificial: everything looks the same, everything is the same size (why include the scale then?!), mammoth is infantile in comparison to skeleton and tools, everything is connected, harmonious, consistent...</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 37</td>
<td>Head movement and placement? (Bowed, turned, concealed; forward-facing)</td>
<td>See S32. Man head is turned, not concealed, perhaps unaware (but who cares? He’s on top of the world!), definitely preoccupied with big things in the distance. Mammoth head is turned, unaware and endangered as man has been there and will track him down.</td>
<td>n/a -- see above re mammoth (turned away from frontal position = vulnerable, &quot;NAIVE&quot;).</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 38</td>
<td>Hand movement and placement? (gesture)</td>
<td>At the ready. Not violent or confrontational, but prepared.</td>
<td>Mammoth = moving, or ready stance. Skeleton = standard anatomical position, palms forward, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 39</td>
<td>Adjustment of clothing and placement of clothing?</td>
<td>Man is cloaked, armoured (in mammoth skins! = powerful), crowned in fur, but not left immobile. Allows dexterity and power. See S26.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S 40</td>
<td>Facial expression?</td>
<td>Unclear, but eyes have some expressiveness (see S30). Maybe pensive. Doesn’t communicate closeness or distance as much as dominion and ownership.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S 41</td>
<td>Gaze?</td>
<td>See S30. Both man and mammoth look out into distance; man at everything he has and will overtake, mammoth at small bit of remaining space left for it. But both have fairly invisible eyes -- we, instead, use arrow and pointers to direct our gaze.</td>
<td>Mammoth maybe looking away = distance, avoiding any sort of relationship (which would surely only be a death sentence).</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 42</td>
<td>Spatial distance between bodies? Proxemic syntagm?</td>
<td>See S36. Close (2 spear lengths apart); connected by arrow, land, pointers, sites, corridor; one travels on stage to centre, the other travels off.</td>
<td>See S36--these are meant to be &quot;separate but equal&quot; icons. There is a geographic syntagm at work here, but not one related to proxemics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 43</td>
<td>Grouping or independence?</td>
<td>Single adult male. Single doomed mammoth. An invisible &quot;human colonization&quot; behind (but all in the wake of this one man!).</td>
<td>Independence (as usual!)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S 44</td>
<td>General relations between bodies? (Reciprocal, divergent, object, semi-reciprocal)</td>
<td>Divergent? S41. Maybe object-oriented (both fixated on land: what’s there vs. what’s left). Man at once in control and contemplative.</td>
<td>Both man and mammoth headed for a better land to the east? (away from Asia, Siberia, land bridge, Alaska, Canada) = object-oriented? Otherwise, unclear. Stone tools don’t really connote relationships, but do connote a kind of monolithic (look at its shape!) omnipotence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 45</td>
<td><strong>Hierarchical relations between bodies?</strong> (subordinate, superordinate; plus power, minus power; higher, lower; closer, more distant; seated, standing)</td>
<td>Man is superordinate, above world, above ice, above America, above mammoth, above sites. See S44.</td>
<td>See comp 24, 25, 20. Skeleton larger than tool; mammoth larger than skeleton; cache virtually the same size as mammoth. Implicit hierarchical relations evident in which icons are pictured (skeleton before tools; mammoth before tools; cache before individual tool)... <strong>legend (read top to bottom) also seems to suggest a similar hierarchy, with pre-Clovis at BASE.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>S 46</td>
<td><strong>Centre-periphery relations?</strong></td>
<td>Mammoth EXACTLY at centre of globe, moving away. Man on periphery, moving into picture. Majority of sites at centre. Everywhere but America on peripheries -- America as climax of story. See Comp25.</td>
<td>&quot;Conterminous&quot; US at centre; this is all that matters, as most else is illegible.</td>
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<td>S 47</td>
<td><strong>Gender-marking?</strong></td>
<td>Man with spear and resolute determination follows big meat and makes his home in America.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 48</td>
<td><strong>Technology?</strong></td>
<td>Not much, but spear is ultimate weapon here, as evidenced by network of sites (the microchip) that it has made possible. This pins mammoth in.</td>
<td>Tool icons placed into hierarchy as per S45. Mammoth kill as implicit identification of toolkit.</td>
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<td>S 49</td>
<td><strong>Wealth? (Abundance, poverty)</strong></td>
<td>Man and mammoth are alone, but mammoth is truly overpowered, truly impoverished: it is pinned in, without its own resources, without room to manoeuvre. Man has America (the WEALTH of sites) and the mammoth and his luxurious skins. Arrow leads him toward abundance.</td>
<td>71 sites with 11 mammoth kills. 50 states!!! 51 tool collections. 9 skeletons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 50</td>
<td><strong>Pointers or linearity?</strong></td>
<td>Arrow, spear, gaze/facial direction and cocked leg; man's head through left arm through right leg and boot through tip of Asia dumping into Alaska, through corridor to belly of America, mammoth's tusks and trunk and tail, site labels. Ocean space constrains our vision -- it is different, dark, seemingly impenetrable.</td>
<td>Legend hierarchy, guiding our understanding. Generally (seemingly &quot;natural&quot;) layout of sites in the sense that they move rather fluidly from the NW down through S, then NE. Note that coastal Californian sites are missing!! + these sites do NOT duplicate exactly those described in Fiedel...</td>
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<td>S 51</td>
<td><strong>Grounding?</strong></td>
<td>See S50--IFC1,2,3.</td>
<td>Yes -- only Debert floats out in the unknown.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 52</td>
<td>Level of detail? (Lavishness, texture)</td>
<td>Man and mammoth as detailed - fur, perspective, accessories; ice with temporal detail alone; America &quot;detailed&quot; with sites, but all the sites (except in name) appear identical (not worth elaborating on -- at least in image). Pack ice as different, but only so as to distinguish it as part solid ground, part water. All else is naked and plain.</td>
<td>Poor -- lack of clarity ensures the only detailed elements (the icons) are wasted. Great lakes are the only differently textured elements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 53</td>
<td>Framing?</td>
<td>Sites framing (boxing in) mammoth from in front, behind and below, while ice frames him in from above (SQUARE FRAME = ordered, scientific). Man escapes the frames, stands on top of them -- he is not pinned down, but ultimately mobile.</td>
<td>States framing sites; country borders framing the only &quot;full&quot; depiction of &quot;North American&quot; peopling sites in the article. Grid framing accuracy of state-defined grid. Border framing legend. North arrow, scale, legend, and authorial &quot;signature&quot; framing base of image (the counterpoint to the 50 degree latitude frame).</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 54</td>
<td>Sameness or difference?</td>
<td>Man and mammoth similar in detail = living creatures, but man WEARS mammoth! Sites as identical except in name. All land as identical, but America is uniquely overrun with sites. Water as different, globe as unique, pack ice as combo of elements of land and water. Arrow as unique (=path as unique).</td>
<td>As above; sameness of sites, of states, of landscape, of bodies, of fauna, of surrounding neutral space. Difference of coterminous USA, of great lakes, of skeleton from pre-Clovis from Clovis from mammoth.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 55</td>
<td>Dominance or freedom?</td>
<td>As above; man and mammoth on top of world. Both are free but constrained -- man less so than mammoth.</td>
<td>Freedom (borders of states do not hold bodies back) to move everywhere and create everything (out of the nothingness of white space) that we call America.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 56</td>
<td>Isolation or integration?</td>
<td>See S49 and S54.</td>
<td>Both: isolated but integrated sites; isolated but integrated states. Isolated, but dominant USA.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S 57</td>
<td>Invisibility or visibility? Exposure?</td>
<td>Monte Verde is present but invisible. See S54 and S52.</td>
<td>Invisibility of most men, but visible through so many material and animal remains. = exposure of his effects and, elsewhere, his unfortunate compatriots' skeletons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 58</td>
<td>Natural or unnatural?</td>
<td>At once nothing and everything is natural about this image. All elements come together to naturally (or unnaturally, you might argue!) allow man's easy journey into America.</td>
<td>Natural US blending into natural global grid/compass with natural assumption about predominance of mammoth kills. Human quotient pasted on top.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 59</td>
<td>Familiarity or unfamiliarity?</td>
<td>Cuddly mammoth = stuffed animal-like, familiar. High cheek bones of man are somewhat unfamiliar, but his attitude and mission isn't. America is familiar, as is globe, and labels and microchip model.</td>
<td>Everything is familiar: grid, tool, skeleton that looks (in miniscule) just like our own, cuddly little mammoth, states, great lakes, coastline... Harnessing -- gridlocking -- of continent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 60</td>
<td>Presence? (What is pictured; what is not?)</td>
<td>As per IFC1,2. Despite the contemplative caption, no alternative colonisation options are offered. This constrains our vision, for how else would man make it into America except through the corridor which leads him right to the country and his dinner. Why would he stupidly choose to go any other way?</td>
<td>As above: nearly everything is left out of the picture, not the least of which include other relevant early sites and all the rest of North America and the world (esp. in an article claiming to account for the last 40 years of knowledge collected on the peopling of NA!!!).</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 61</td>
<td>Asymmetry?</td>
<td>Man taller than mammoth, larger than much of Asia, sites as large as counties, spear nearly as long as mammoth (note that spear and arrow are of almost identical length).</td>
<td>Again, some sites pictured, others not -- some sites too powerful for depiction??</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 62</td>
<td>Magnitude or magnification?</td>
<td>See S61. Mammoth, man, arrow, sites, spear.</td>
<td>Relatively, sizes are too big: point is only roughly 66% smaller than skeleton; skeleton is only roughly 27% smaller than mammoth; tool cache is only roughly 6.7% smaller than mammoth!! Moreover, all sites seem to be allowed equal weight despite the depth and breadth of finds at them. Great lakes magnified via their deep contrastive colouring.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 63</td>
<td>Elaboration or non-simplicity?</td>
<td>Temporal context of ice, man and mammoth are relatively elaborated in comparison with rest of image. Overall, however, this pic is simplistic -- you don't need to think critically to understand it.</td>
<td>If we could see them, tool cache and point are less simplistic than the landscape. Pre-Clovis is inexplicably rectangular and REALLY indecipherable. Great lakes as above.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S 64</td>
<td>Non-equality?</td>
<td>See S61-IFC 1,2,3.</td>
<td>As per S65.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S 65</td>
<td>Non-reciprocity?</td>
<td>Man vs. mammoth; NA vs. everywhere else.</td>
<td>Contained USA, that doesn't allow travel into or out of it!!! = contained culture, contained technology, contained individuality. Clovis started here, ended here, and everything else has been born from it or given birth to it.</td>
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<td>S 66</td>
<td>Self-suppression?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S 67</td>
<td>Absence?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Symmetry b/w what are, in truth, very different sites = absence of idiosyncrasies, complexities, divergences, temporal changes b/w occupation.</td>
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</table>

As per IFC 4, Meltzer does not seem to have concerned himself with suppression in the caption, where he highlights mammoth-present sites as the most important sites for depiction and cites himself as the luminary behind such an argument.
Figure 1. Texas Parks and Wildlife 1998 (detail)
Early Americans learned to shape stone into different kinds of tools.

Figure 2. "More First Americans", Mr. Joyce's 5th Grade History, Hibbett Middle School
http://www.fcs.k12.al.us/hibbett/jjoyce/pictures_of_the_first_americans.htm
Figure 3. NOVA 2000
Figure 4. Conkey 1989
Figure 5. Kennewick Man Reconstruction and Patrick Stewart
Figure 6. Nemecek 2000
Figure 7. American Quaternary Association 2002
Figure 8. Chamberlin 1894 reprinted in Mandryk 1992:37
Figure 9. Parfit 2000
Figure 10. Henry 1955: 801, 786
The Americas during the last stages of the Ice Age, when human colonization took place, perhaps via the corridor between the Cordilleran and Laurentide ice sheets.

Figure 11. Fagan 1987:136; also Fagan 1995:76
ELEPHANT-HUNTING IN NORTH AMERICA

C. VANCE HAYNES, JR.
June 1966

Bones of elephants that vanished from the continent 10,000 years ago are found together with the projectile points early men used to kill them. Indeed, the hunters may have caused the elephants' extinction.

Elephant-hunting today is a specialized activity confined to a handful of professionals in parts of Africa and Asia, 11,000 years or so ago it provided a living for one of the earliest groups of humans to inhabit the New World. At that time hunting bands whose craftsmen made a particular kind of stone projectile point by the thousands ranged across North America from the east coast to the west coast, as far north as Alaska and as far south as central Mexico. Two generations ago such a statement would have been hard to support. Since 1932, however, the excavation of no fewer than six stratified ancient sites of mammoth-hunting activity in the western U.S. and the discovery of scores of significant, if less firmly documented, sites elsewhere in North America have proved its validity beyond the possibility of challenge. It is the purpose of this article to present what we know of the lives of these mammoth-hunters and to suggest when they arrived in the New World.

The first evidence that man had been present in the New World much before

AMERICAN ELEPHANTS were all of the genus Mammutthus. They included the woolly mammoth, which also ranged the Old World, and the imperial, confined to North America. This skeleton of one imperial variety, the Columbian, is 12 feet at the shoulder.

Figure 12. Haynes 1966: 44 (above, left), 45, 46 (detail, top right)

PROJECTILE POINTS used by early hunting groups in North America include one of bone (left) and one of flint (lower right) found near Clovis, N.M., in the mid-1930s. These artifacts were used to kill mammoths. The smaller flint point (upper right) was made by a later group that hunted bison. The first of these were found near Folsom, N.M., in 1928.
Eighteen thousand years ago, humans migrating from northeastern Asia left across the Bering land bridge while ice sheets were extensive. Alternatively, people could have entered through deep ice-free North America. They left the land bridge through ice-free corridors, which lay between the two principal ice sheets, or by traveling along the coast in boats.

**Figure 13.** Fladmark 1986:8-9 (detail)
Figure 14. Fiedel 2000:45
Fig. 1. Map of United States showing the location of selected late Pleistocene archaeological sites, including (a) possible pre-Clovis localities, not all of which have been accepted by the archaeological community (see text); (b) western Clovis and related fluted point sites in eastern North America; (c) sites for which there is secure evidence of human hunting of mammoth or mastodon (as identified by Grayson & Meltzer, 2002); (d) Clovis and Clovis-like caches; and (e) sites with late Pleistocene and early Holocene human skeletal remains. See key for symbols. Fig. by J. Cooper and D. Meltzer.

Figure 15. Meltzer 2003:541
Figure 3.1 Map of North America depicting the locations of significant sites presented in the text that are possibly older than 11,500 B.P. (Graphic by Eric Parrish.)

Figure 16. Dixon 1999:47
Fig. 8. Paleo-Indian sites. Ice sheets are represented by stippled area; note shrinkage by 12,000 B.P. Broken line indicates late Pleistocene coastline.

Figure 17. Fiedel 1992:52
Figure 1. Map of North America, showing Beringia, the location and extent of the Laurentide and Cordilleran Ice sheets, ca. 18,000 B.P., and the location of sites mentioned in the text. The interior route from Alaska to North America south of the ice sheets would have been through the area of confluence of the ice sheets, once they had retreated.

Figure 18. Meltzer 1993:158
Figure 19. Canadian Museum of Civilization 2000
http://www.civilization.ca/cmc/archeo/cvh/maritim/v65-2.htm
Figure 20. Price and Feinman 2001: 144, 145, 146
Peopling of the Americas

Who were the First Americans?

Archaeologists agree that human beings probably trekked across the Ice Age land bridge from Siberia—but they do not agree on when this happened. Once thought to be 12,000 years ago, the date might be 40,000 years ago according to some new scientific theories. Some present-day Native North Americans believe their sacred stories place their beginnings in America, just as some Christians believe human beings were created in the Garden of Eden. Archeology shows that, however they got here, the first Americans, adapting to changing climate and environment, evolved from hunters using stone-tipped weapons to more advanced societies of farmers and artisans.

ICE AGE HUNTERS

Definitive proof of Ice Age human beings in America came in 1939, with the discovery of Folsom, New Mexico, of carefully shaped stone weapon points dating from 10,000 years ago. In 1932, weapon points from an even older people, up to 12,000 years ago, were unearthed at Clovis, New Mexico.

A STRONGER, LONGER THROW

Hunters of mammoths, mastodons, and giant sloths from 10,000 years ago, such as the Folsom people in New Mexico, used an atlatl, a special device for throwing a spear. It was a bar with a flat stone or bone at the tip that engaged the spear's butt. The greater leverage gave a much stronger thrust.

Figure 21. Murdoch 1995:6
Figure 22.
Kopper 1986:34 (above, detail), 32 (right)
Many thousands of years ago the world was a very different place. 
During the last ice age, a natural bridge formed between the land mass we 
call Asia and what is now North America.

Figure 23. Maestro & Maestro 1991:3, 4-5 (below)
Fig. 2. Dated Clovis (including Goshen) and Nenana localities in North America.

Figure 24. Kelly 2003:140
Figure 25. Mosimann and Martin 1975:306
**Figure 2.** Estimated semilinear distances from the point of origin (approximately the latitude of Seattle) to various locations along the west coasts of North and South America.

**Figure 26.** Surovell 2003:584
THE FIRST AMERICANS:
Search and Research

Tom D. Dillehay
David J. Meltzer

Figure 27. Dillehay and Meltzer 1991
Figure 28. Adovasio and Page 2002

**Charting the Way Into the Americas**

*Scholars Link Theory With Reality During CSFA-OMSI Symposium*

**Figure 29.** Hall 1999
The First Americans

THE PLEISTOCENE COLONIZATION
OF THE NEW WORLD

Figure 30. Jablonski 2002
CONTINENT
of Hunter-Gatherers

New Perspectives in Australian Prehistory

Harry Lourandos

Figure 31. Lourandos 1997
Figure 2. Time line for significant events in hominid and human evolution. The top map shows significant events as if they occurred on a journey from San Francisco to New York. Since so many significant events occurred between Philadelphia and New York (on this scale), the lower map shows that time expanded into another journey from San Francisco to New York. (Drawing by Mike Roach)

Figure 32. Davidson 2001:401 (detail)
Figure 2.1 Pleistocene sites in the Bismarck Archipelago.

Figure 33. Gosden 1994:23
Figure 34. Trezise 1988:8-9
Figure 35. Trezise 1988:14-15
Figure 36. Trezise 1988:12-13
Figure 37. Trezise 1988:30-31
Terra Nullius?
The Very Early Years

- Context
- Areas of Integration - Outcomes Being Addressed
- Learning Sequences: 1 2 3 4 5 - audio files: 🎧
- References

Figure 38. Board of Studies, New South Wales, Australia n.d. (detail)
Figure 39. Terrell 1986:18-19
tremely buoyant. Bamboo would have been present in areas of high rainfall, certainly all along the northern migration route, and at least as far as Java on the southern route. Since bamboo was not available in Australia, it would have been hard or even impossible for them to sail north again. In other words, even accomplished sailors might have been trapped in Australia by the lack of bamboo. Cordage would have been required to lash the bamboo tubes together, but ropes could easily have been made from the rich vegetable and animal resources of South-East Asia.

Figure 40. Flood 1983:37
Figure 41. Clark 1969: Plate 13

Figure 42. Clark 1969: Plates 12, 13, 14
Figure 43. Bahn 1996:181
Figure 44. Irwin et al. 1990:35

A Pleistocene 'voyaging corridor' connected Asia and Melanesia with chains of large intervisible islands. Seasonal reversals of wind and current and a sheltered equatorial position between northern and southern cyclone belts. This region was also where necessary sea-going skills developed for the subsequent settlement of the remote Pacific.
Figure 45. Irwin 2005

Torres Strait Islanders on a bamboo raft, 1906
To get from mainland Asia to Near Oceania at least 10 water crossings of 10–100 kilometres were required. Somehow people crossed these stretches of water, but no remnants of their vessels have been found. Around 50,000–25,000 BC knives had been invented but adzes, which could hollow out logs to make canoes, had not. Although it is speculation, it seems likely that the giant bamboo that grows in the region was lashed together to form rafts. Whatever form these early vessels took, they were seaworthy enough to enable people to island-hop as far east as the Solomon Islands in Near Oceania.
Pacific migrations

by Geoff Irwin

The world’s first seafarers set off from South-East Asia, sailing into the Pacific on simple rafts. Thousands of years later their Polynesian descendants began exploring further east, guided by the stars and the winds. How did they survive these journeys into the unknown? And when did they discover New Zealand, the final major land mass? Radiocarbon dating and computer voyaging have provided a wealth of insights.

Continue...

Figure 46. Irwin 2005
Figure 47. Irwin 1980:326
Figure 48. Irwin 1980:327
When did humans first colonise Australia?

Figure 3a.1: Bone Cave, today in the heart of the forest in south central Tasmania, was first occupied by humans about 29,000 years ago. For most of the late Pleistocene the inhabitants of this small cave, seen here to the right of the picture, lived in sight of glacial ice.

Figure 49. Allen 1998[1989]:51
Figure 50. White and O’Connell 1982:89
The long and the short of it

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Lab No.</th>
<th>$^14$C (ka)</th>
<th>10L/OSL (ka)</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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Figure 51. Allen and O’Connell 2003:10
ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE
LAPITA CULTURAL COMPLEX:
A CRITICAL REVIEW

Patrick V. Kirch and Terry L. Hunt, Editors

Figure 52. Kirch and Hunt 1988
Figure 53. Goodenough 1996
Figure 54. Dodson 1992
Lake Mungo's "Great Wall of China"

This is the name given by the Australians to the crescent-shaped dune which borders the eastern shore of Lake Mungo. The nature of the sediments thus stratified by the west wind reflects the fluctuations of the environment during the Quaternary era. The same applies to all the dunes lining the ancient lakes of the region, drained by the network of tributaries of the Murray river during the cold periods of the Pleistocene.

Figure 55. Wood 1985:376
The great stone heads of Easter Island are among the most enigmatic images in the Pacific basin. *More than 1000 statues in various stages of construction have been found on the island.*

**Figure 56.** Thorne and Raymond 1989:263
Figure 57. Grant 1988:63
Figure 58. Australian Heritage Commission 2001
Figure 2b.1: Map of Greater Australia showing sites mentioned in the text.

Figure 59. Roberts et al. 1998b:20
Figure 60. Air Tahiti n.d.
http://www.airtahitimagazine.com
/us_version/tahiti_mag.asp?num=34&art=2
Aboriginal colonisation

Theories of colonisation

Natural vegetation

Vegetation
- Subtropical
- Tropical rainforest
- Desert

C 9000 BP
C 5000 BP
C 18000 BP
1788

Figure 61. Camm and McQuilton 1987:136-137
IN SEARCH OF THE LAPITA HOMELAND.

Figure 62. Allen and Gosden 1991
New Ways to The New World
An old Virginia sandpit may change our views of the earliest Americans

By ANDREA DORFMAN

I T IS THE AMERICAN EPIC IMMIGRATION saga, long taught in U.S. schools and enshrined in popular books. At the end of the last Ice Age about 13,000 years ago, brave Siberians walked across the Bering Sea land bridge, then edged their way south via a newly opened corridor in the ice and fanned out in all directions. Within 500 years, their descendants had settled most of the hemisphere, from the Arctic Circle to the tip of South America. Also, as anthropologists have learned by digging up and down the Americas, this engaging tale may be wrong.

The latest evidence against the old story was unveiled last week in Philadelphia during the annual meeting of the Society for American Archaeology. Joseph McAvery of the Nottoway River Survey and his colleagues disclosed that an ancient campsite known as Cactus Hill, 70 km south of Richmond, Va., has been conclusively dated at around 18,000 years old. That predates the accepted timing for the opening of that crucial ice-free corridor and bolsters the theory that the earliest Americans came by sea, possibly even from across the Atlantic rather than from Asia. "If the dates hold up, and I think they will," says archaeologist Dennis Stanford of the National Museum of Natural History, "we may have to rethink our current understanding of early human migration in the Americas."

BY LAND OR SEA?
Cactus Hill, an ancient campsite that predates the accepted timing for the passage of the earliest Americans down an ice-free corridor, lends additional credence to the theory that the first New World settlers arrived by sea.

Figure 63. Dorfman 2000:54
Figure 64. Rose 1999:80-81 (detail)
Figure 65. White and O’Connell 1982:98
Figure 1. Map of northern Australia showing locations of key luminescence-dated sites mentioned in text.

Figure 66. O’Connell and Allen 1998:133
Figure 2. Sun-illuminated and color-enhanced digital terrain image of Werner Bay based on EM 3000 multibeam swath bathymetry. Area illustrated is shown by box; view is to southwest. Swath coverage extends to paleodelta at 150 m and defines course of drowned, meandering river.

Figure 67. Fedje and Josenhans 2000:100