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ABSTRACT

In the early years of the twentieth-century, the British Columbia government used game law and conservation as a pretext for the establishment of an alternative, liberal order land regime in the northern reaches of the province. A. Bryan Williams, the first Provincial Game Warden (1905-1918), implemented this new order through legal strictures, promotion of tourism and settlement, and the operation of a wildlife conservation agenda designed to secure control over land managed by Indigenous peoples. The Tahltan of the Stikine Plateau, aided by the activism of ethnographer, hunting guide and Indigenous rights advocate James A. Teit, resisted the encroachment of their hunting territory by emphasizing connections to their land and resources. I analyse the correspondence between these two men to determine the extent of their contributions to the imposition of a new wildlife management agenda, resistance to it, and the incorporation of Indigenous peoples into a wage economy. In addition, I make preliminary attempts to integrate Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, complemented by Ian McKay’s understanding of the liberal order as a ‘project of rule’, into the historiography of British Columbia. I contend that an analysis of colonial hegemonies and local counter-hegemonies can contribute to an understanding of the historical dimensions of power and resistance, both actual and discursive.
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Epigraph

When I first came to this country my plans were not to stay here permanently. It was my intention to move further south. But the glories of this wonderland and the magnificent sport that can be obtained here appealed to me and have held me ever since. It is true that a vague idea may have been fleeting through my mind that some of the wealth from the vast stores of natural resource that are awaiting those that have the ability to acquire it might come my way, but that in itself would never have caused me to stay here. As a boy, my studies were often sadly interrupted by thoughts of hounds and hunting, fishing and shooting. Sport of some kind I had to have, or life was unendurable. There is in every man of British blood traces of primitive man, even if such traces are latent and not developed by opportunity. They create the overpowering desire to hunt and kill. It is likely that there was more than the ordinary share in me. Consequently the call of the “Red Gods” came to me with greater insistence than to most others. Therefore it is not to be wondered at that, when there seemed to be little chance of my being able to indulge in my hobbies at home, I left for a land where it would be possible for me to do so. The wealth has not come my way, but the sport has, and my memories of it are worth a store of gold.¹

¹ A. Bryan Williams, Game Trails in British Columbia: Big Game and Other Sport in the Wilds of British Columbia (London: J. Murray, 1925), viii. This book was also published in North America in 1926 under the same title by Scribner's Sons of New York.
Introduction

This thesis seeks to understand the development of the idea and reality of wildlife conservation in British Columbia from 1905 to 1918. Specifically, I wish to consider the extent to which the state used game law and management as a means to extend power and jurisdiction over land and resources in the Stikine Plateau in northwestern British Columbia. This is a sprawling topic, with many possible avenues of exploration and analysis. Largely for this reason, I have chosen to focus my analysis through one particular case study. I use the correspondence between two men, A. Bryan Williams and James A. Teit, to discuss the effect this regime had on Indigenous peoples, particularly the Tahltan. I try to assess both the coercive and consensual implementation of a wildlife management regime as well as resistance to it. In a broad sense, I hope to contribute to the ongoing debate on the specificities of colonialism in BC.

The visceral reminiscences expressed in the epigraph come from the pen of Arthur Bryan Williams, the 'Dean of BC Hunters'\(^1\) who was responsible for the implementation and administration of wildlife conservation legislation in BC from 1905 to 1917 and again from 1929 to 1934. In tendentious prose, Williams clearly illustrates the cultural assumptions that he brought to his task. Williams appeals to that great, valiant figure of the Sportsman, who respects his quarry and enjoys a noble communion with nature. He trumpets the inherent nobility of the Sportsman's Creed that regulates and administers the hunter's relationship to his environment and his prey by setting out highly structured rules and responsibilities for the gentleman hunter to follow. Indeed, Williams constructs a vision of British Columbia as a veritable 'Sportsman's Eden,' an idyllic and immaculate wilderness unencumbered by the foibles of man and progress. This is an appeal to anti-modernity, to a sacred space where

\(^{1}\) "A.B. Williams Dean of BC Hunters Dies" *Vancouver Province*, Feb. 18, 1946.
men could preserve a threatened masculinity by immunising themselves against the softening instincts of urban life. Williams also appeals to that particular entrepreneurial zest that characterized economic relations in Victorian and Edwardian British Columbia. He wishes his reader, likely a professional-class male seeking a first-hand lens into ‘the wilds of British Columbia,’ to recognize the real economic potential of the province’s resources. While he claims riches have eluded him, his implication is that game animals (and perhaps resources more generally) have more than an aesthetic value. The exploitation of these animal resources could be part of a powerful commercial drive, with benefits including increased tourism, infrastructural development, and the promotion of settlement.

But Williams also exhibits a circumscribed view of Indigenous populations, influenced by imperialistic assumptions of racial typologies and hierarchies. He appeals to contemporary notions of the primitive, whose subsistence hunting practices are removed from the civilising influence of the rule of the hunt. His essentialized and atavistic ‘Red Gods’ (traces in every man of British descent) possess a primal blood lust which Williams must slake by engaging in sport.² It is through the practice and regulation of hunting, differentiated from Indigenous practice, that Williams maintains both his own authority and the subject position of Indigenous hunters. Through this narrative, we can begin to see the outlines of a cultural construction, or hegemonic view, of Indigenous peoples in BC.

In 1905, Williams was appointed to the newly created position of Provincial Game and Forest Warden for British Columbia. His mandate was to “give his entire time and attention to the game, forestry and fishing interests of the province, conduct prosecutions and

see that all laws having reference to game, forestry and fish are enforced.”3 Because existing
game law was considered inadequate, the focus of his commission was to be the construction,
institutionalization, and maintenance of a coherent body of law designed to regulate and
restrict hunting in BC. For his project to succeed, Williams required an effective method of
collecting and disseminating information. To that end, he assembled an informal network of
unofficial ‘advisors’ from throughout the province. These ‘advisors’ were Euro-Canadian
men involved in the hunting and guiding industry. They were not paid for their work, though
they provided invaluable information used by Williams in his game protective efforts.

James A. Teit, of Spence’s Bridge, BC, was one of Williams’ primary advisors. Teit
was an industrious ethnographic collector/field assistant who worked in the southern interior
and northern parts of BC under contract to the American Museum of Natural History (New
York) and the Victoria Museum (Ottawa). Teit was also an accomplished big game hunting
guide, employing his vast environmental and ethnographic knowledge to the tracking of
trophy animals. He emerges as a galvanising figure, valuable to the Talhtan of the Stikine
Plateau and other Indigenous peoples of Northern British Columbia for providing them with
jobs on his guiding trips, paying them as ethnographic consultants, and assisting them in their
political dealings with federal and provincial governments over land issues. Teit, however,
was also important to Williams for his encyclopaedic knowledge of the wildlife resources
throughout the province. Teit and Williams carried on a rich epistolary relationship between
1905 and 1918, exchanging information and opinions on a vast array of topics pertaining to
Williams’ post. The letters act as a lens on their personal, political and professional
sympathies. Moreover, their correspondence helps to illuminate the general assumptions
brought to the conservation debates of the day. In this thesis, I will argue that Teit played an

3 1905 Game Amendment Act, Section 17. Fisheries and forestry were removed from his purview in 1909.
important consultative and sometimes adversarial role in the progress of game law and conservation measures in British Columbia. Specifically, I contend that, in his dealings with Williams, Teit advocated on behalf of the pecuniary, resource and cultural interests of Indigenous peoples primarily in the Stikine River Valley, and elsewhere in the province.

A. Bryan Williams was motivated by a different ideological and cultural agenda. As an employee of the Provincial government, his goal was to conserve animal resources and establish an infrastructure that allowed the province to derive economic benefit from the resource. This involved ordering the activities of subsistence hunters and Indigenous hunters, while augmenting the opportunities for sporting tourism. His primary concern was to maintain a sustainable stock of quarry to keep sportmen coming to the region. As such, Williams was motivated by a constant need to justify his own position and that of his department. An agenda that emphasized the cash value of game resources, the income from guiding and licencing, and the untapped economic potential of sportmen as tourists were key concerns raised by Williams in his letters and in his ebullient annual reports.

In taking this position, Williams promoted a position rooted in the writings of conservation luminaries like Theodore Roosevelt and popular travelogue literature detailing sportmen’s shooting exploits. These writings appealed directly to the masculine virtue of hunting and the outdoors. The inherent aesthetic value of nature and wildlife provided Williams and his supporters with an emotional (though somewhat contradictory) assertion of the value of hunting. This movement hinged on the debate between modernity, with its faith in the transformative power of progress, science and technology, and anti-modernity which sought refuge from the emasculating vacuum of urban life. In reporting on his activities, Williams drew upon a complex collection of rhetorical devices to convince the citizens of BC
and their political representatives that only scientifically regulated hunting practices could properly manage yet derive appropriate economic benefit from the province’s valuable game resources. Williams used circular letters, magazine articles, government bulletins, vast correspondence, participation in international fairs, recruitment of tourism and settlement and a sophisticated public relations campaign to justify his department and spread its message.\(^4\)

Yet much of this conservation effort expressed little concern for the social, economic, and cultural wellbeing of the resource’s previous managers, the Indigenous and rural populations of British Columbia. This raises important questions about where Williams situated Indigenous peoples in his game management scheme. To what extent did he inherit a code of Aboriginal hunting and land rights from previous federal constitutions and treaties? Was Williams cognizant of, and did he confirm and uphold, these rights? Did he actively seek to disenfranchise Indigenous peoples within the confines of the game and resource jurisdiction debate? To what extent did federal and provincial government policy initiatives shape his thinking on resource management? How did the emergent discourse on conservation influence his policies? I will examine these questions in an attempt to situate the establishment of British Columbia game law within the larger discourse of law as a colonial “site of conflict.”\(^5\) Additionally, I will analyse the dialogue between the provincial government and Indigenous peoples within the theories of hegemony developed from the work of Sardinian marxist Antonio Gramsci. Williams can be seen as representing ‘hegemonic discourses’ instrumental in supporting the state and its attempt to create and

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\(^4\) For examples of this literature, see, Vancouver News Advertiser, Jan 13\(^{th}\), 1906; contributions to Rod and Gun in Canada, Outdoor Magazine, Field and Stream; Provincial [Game] Bulletin no. 17; Provincial Game Warden Annual Reports, 1905-1916; Williams’ three books, listed on page 9; Weekly column in Vancouver Province in 1926; A. Bryan Williams, “Fauna: Game Resources of the Province,” in British Columbia, its history, people, commerce, industry, and resources, ed. by Henry J. Boam (London: Sells, 1912) 152-155.

\(^5\) Douglas Harris, Fish, Law, and Colonialism: The Legal Capture of Salmon in British Columbia (Toronto: University Press, 2001), 191-192.
instill a universal socio-cultural worldview of and onto Indigenous peoples. Conversely, Teit can be seen as a facilitator of a ‘counter-hegemonic discourse’ in the way he attempted to influence the codification of the law in favour of a subject people. There are potential pitfalls in a simplistic black and white binary. A Gramscian analysis will avert some of those pitfalls, underscore the resistance impulses of the Tahltan, and show how the resistance interacted both with Teit’s advocacy and with the ‘commonsense’ position advocated by the state. The work of political theorist Jonathan Joseph is useful in this respect. He expands on the contemporary usage of the concept of hegemony, highlighting the central structural role of institutions (and their corresponding ideologies) in securing the power of elite-endorsed worldviews. Brought into the British Columbia arena, individual agents operate within and/or against constricting social and political arrangements that attempt to shape social cohesion and consensus. Through this analysis, I will show that Williams’ role in the institutionalization of game law was part of the larger project of ‘internal colonialism’ that sought to arrogate ‘traditional’ land and resources from the Indigenous peoples of BC.

The work of historian Ian McKay is constructive in analyzing this case study. McKay attempts to marry a neo-Gramscian critique of Canada as a ‘project of rule,’ with post-marxist critiques of Stuart Hall and Michel Foucault. He has developed the strategy of a ‘reconnaissance’ of the liberal order which seeks to understand Canadian history by reevaluating the central role of liberalism in creating Canada. As McKay expresses:

> The category of Canada should henceforth denote a historically specific project of rule, rather than an essence we must define, or an empty homogenous space that we must possess. Canada-as-project can be analyzed through the study of the implantation and expansion over a heterogeneous terrain of a certain politico-economical logic – to wit, liberalism. A strategy of reconnaissance will study those at the core of this project who

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7 This phrase refers to the idea that some minority groups are colonial peoples within society.

articulated its values, and those "insiders" and "outsiders" who resisted and, to some extent at least, reshaped it.⁹

McKay issues a challenge to Canadian historians to apply these considerations to the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state.¹⁰ I take up this challenge in the belief that it can yield illuminating results in attempts to theorize power, representation and the assimilationist policy that mediated the state-Aboriginal relations in early-twentieth century BC. I see this assimilationist drive as only one part of a larger state project seeking to entrench a liberal order across the country. This order was a rhetorical device of the state, used to legitimate a particular form of citizenship and to solidify an agenda favouring individualism, equality, modernity, faith in progress, rule of law and the inherent value of private property. The debate around game law policy in the early-twentieth century was informed by this body of knowledge. As I show, the game law debate was but a small representative discourse of the spread of the liberal order on the larger political, cultural and territorial landscape of BC.

This thesis has two objectives. Firstly, I will show that in an attempt to buttress the forces of colonialism, the state used game law and conservation as a pretext for the establishment of a liberal order land regime in the northern reaches of the province. Williams actualized this new order through the implementation of legal strictures, promotion of tourism and settlement, and through the execution of a wildlife conservation agenda designed to secure control over land managed by Indigenous peoples. Northern Indigenous peoples, aided by the activist efforts of individuals like Teit, articulated a robust resistance to this encroachment of their hunting territory by emphasizing their connection to the land and its resources in petitions, government sanctioned hearings, and activities relating to the

hunting and guiding industry. The correspondence between Williams and Teit, and the policies that were influenced by their dialogue, allows the researcher to offer provisional commentaries on the interplay of resistance and oppression, coercion and consent.

Secondly, I will borrow from the central Gramscian concept of hegemony, complemented by McKay’s notion of the liberal order, to put forth an underutilized way of seeing colonialism in British Columbia. To understand the theory of hegemony, McKay appeals to the metaphor of a dance, wherein the lead dancer is engaged in “a daily bid to achieve support for a political and social project, not a once-and-for-all achievement of total domination.” This framework seeks a fuller understanding of the effects of the legislative, legal and bureaucratic power embedded in the state. Conversely, it will highlight examples of agency and resistance exercised by what Gramsci would call the ‘subaltern’. Gramscian theory has been used sparingly in the historiography of BC. The last chapter of this thesis will help to address this gap, with the goal of forwarding a discussion on an alternative analytical framework that could promote the emergence of a countervailing narrative to the dominant discourse of colonialism. This is not to invalidate previous contributions, but rather, to reinvigorate the debate about the nature of the relationship of Indigenous peoples to the state. Gramsci sees the subaltern asserting agency through the expression of a counter-hegemonic discourse that seeks to subvert the hegemonic view of culture and ideology. By focussing on the power in this alternative worldview, this ‘post-colonial’ research agenda asks if a Gramscian framework can be used to reassess the historical problem of colonialism in British Columbia.

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The Historiography of Hunting and Conservation

The literature on conservation, hunting and game law in British Columbia must be set against the larger backdrop of Canada. The aim here is not to chronicle a linear progression of conservation policy, but rather, to piece together the intellectual and ideological reference points of Williams and Teit as they engaged in the debate about how best to protect British Columbia's wildlife resources. The literature is large and widely dispersed both thematically and geographically. It provides a valuable foundation and context for an examination of the process of conservation and the entrenchment of game law in British Columbia. A number of questions are key: What sorts of patterns, commonalities and disparities emerge from the historiography? How did contemporary discourses of empire influence Williams and Teit? How did federal initiatives interact with provincial legislative agendas? What can we discern from an analysis of the literature on British Columbia fisheries and on law as a 'site of conflict'? And how do issues of class, race, ethnicity, and gender enter the debates? The following chapter will attempt to come to terms with these questions while providing an overview of the literature pertinent to a study of conservation and hunting in BC.¹

Building Nation and Nature: Conservation Historiography in Canada and BC

Dominion entomologist C. Gordon Hewitt wrote the first serious monograph on the new science of game management and its application in Canada. Published posthumously in 1921, Hewitt's Conservation of the Wildlife of Canada attempted to justify wildlife conservation by appealing to the aesthetic and economic value of the resource to the nation. Like Williams, he was an ally of sportsmen and game protective associations, stressing the

valour of their selfless contributions and the infallibility of the code of ethics, or ‘sportsman’s creed’, that guided the pursuit and take of game. Hewitt contended that Indigenous hunting practices did not conform to the creed which emphasized the gentlemanly conduct that mediated the sportsman’s experience. Indeed, the moral value attached to the practice of hunting was clearly demarcated along racial lines. Hewitt disparaged the hunting efforts of Indigenous peoples in opposition to the sophisticated and aesthetic pursuits of the largely white, middle-class sportsmen. He further separated the practices of sportsmen on the basis of class. Class distinctions carried clearly defined attitudes towards the use of wildlife resources. He viewed subsistence hunting and the consumption of big game quarry as a pursuit of Indigenous peoples and the lower classes and well beneath the gentleman hunter who killed for sport and aesthetics alone. Contradicting his earlier depiction, Hewitt’s self-interested ‘Indian’ is green and eco-conscious, one who, “when unspoiled by white men, is traditionally a conserver of wild life, that is, he uses it but does not exterminate it.” He writes of the moral and fiduciary responsibility of the state to Indigenous peoples. He contends that an important part of the project must be “to ensure them an adequate food supply and a potential source of revenue.” Despite the rhetoric, Hewitt was primarily concerned with animal populations, eschewing the state’s professed obligations to Indigenous peoples if they challenged the goals of game management. As this study will bear out, Williams followed a similar logic, maligning some Indigenous peoples as greedy, profligate hunters who constantly flouted the rule of law that he sought to establish.

Hewitt’s project of turning wilderness into a garden, the great liberal arbiter of

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progress, is analysed in some depth by Janet Foster in *Working for Wildlife*, the first broad study of the early history of wildlife conservation in Canada. She contends that recognition of the need for wildlife management emerged in Canada only in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The concept gained credence through the lobbying efforts of a dedicated group of senior civil servants. Because the federal government was slow to recognize the economic value and aesthetic benefit of wildlife and nature, these scientists were forced to embark on a protracted campaign of education and promotion of protected areas. For this cohort, science was the primary management tool. Foster discusses the importance of the effort to transcend political boundaries, both national and international, allowing for much greater coverage and cooperation. Yet Foster does not deal with the effect of the new legislation regulating land and resources on the Indigenous peoples of Canada. This is a crucial shortcoming, as the creation of protected areas and hunting seasons was done with little regard for the subsistence and migratory configurations of Indigenous peoples.

Furthermore, as historian George Colpitts has shown, grassroots organizations played a greater role in creation of ideas about wildlife and landscape than detailed by Foster.

On a national level, the Commission of Conservation mediated hunting regulations. This state organization, headed by Interior Minister Clifford Sifton, held annual federal-provincial meetings from 1910 to 1919. Historian Frank Tough draws on the Committee’s proceedings in an attempt to understand the perceptions that conservation personnel held about Indigenous hunting. Attitudes were mixed. Hewitt argued for the protection of

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5 The most prominent men, as listed by Foster, were: Howard Douglas, Superintendent of Rocky Mountain Park; Robert Campbell, Director of Forestry Branch, Department of Interior; James Harkin, Commissioner of Dominion Parks; Maxwell Graham, member of Parks Board’s ‘Animal Division’, in addition to Hewitt.


Indigenous resource interests in the north, but most provincial wardens showed a much dimmer view of the Indian hunter. Saskatchewan Game Guardian Frank Bradshaw expressed the strongest criticism of Indigenous hunting practices at the National Conference on Conservation in 1919, asserting that the Indian “is a real menace to the big game, and that the operations of the Big Chief Company are contrary to the most elementary principles of economy and conservation.”

Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, attended the 1919 meeting to articulate the federal government’s position on Indians and hunting. The federal government essentially abdicated responsibility to the provinces because “the Indian Act did not legislate on the question of hunting and fishing” as there already existed “provincial laws that regulated the Native economy.”

Legal scholar John Donihee answers some questions about the constitutional context of wildlife law. Donihee contends that eventually “extensive legislative powers with respect to wildlife are vested in the provinces and provincial ownership of public lands confers both legislative and, arguably, proprietary interest with respect to wildlife in the provinces.”

Federal authorities had limited powers in regulating wildlife and neglected their fiduciary responsibility toward Indigenous peoples outlined in the constitution. As a result, provincial authorities were free to negotiate their own administrative space within which to regulate hunting.

Historians have only recently turned to the formative place of wildlife in popular conceptions of nature and culture. Indeed, awareness of the symbolic values and meanings

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10 Donihee, The Evolution of Wildlife Law in Canada, 4
attached to animals has allowed researchers to focus on the cultural contexts of settler efforts to mediate space and landscape. Ideas about western Canada in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were shaped by popular attitudes to its wildlife. The constructed partnership between settler and wildlife encouraged the growth of localised boosterism which “began using wildlife in promotions, natural history museums, pictorial postcards, and slaughter rituals to suggest the natural wealth…” of British Columbia.\textsuperscript{11} In short, constructed ideals of wildlife were exploited for tourism.\textsuperscript{12}

Importantly, Colpitts identifies several gaps in the literature, especially on “the interplay between social thought and environmental thought, modes of subsistence and attitudes toward wildlife, conservation practices and contemporary economics, and preservation movements and social phenomena such as xenophobia and nativism.”\textsuperscript{13} I intend to fill some of these gaps, while being mindful that representations of wildlife and nature are historically and socially contingent. Animals were viewed differently by Indigenous peoples, bureaucrats, sportsmen, frontier settlers, naturalists and tourists. Moreover, these groups attached diverse and often incommensurate values to wildlife. As a result, competing narratives arose, each of which vied within political and social space for the power to mediate individual and state relationships to animals.

Historian Brenda Ireland addresses these issues by chronicling the efforts of provincial authorities in BC to limit the practice of Indigenous trapping. She places the effects of hunting regulation on Indigenous peoples at the centre of her work on the attempts at conservation of fur-bearing animals. Ireland details efforts by the provincial government

\textsuperscript{11} Colpitts, \textit{Game in the Garden}, 10.
\textsuperscript{13} Colpitts, \textit{Game in the Garden}, 12.
to develop a more coherent method of trapline registration. She argues that this institutional drive had a racial component: there was no consultation with Indigenous peoples; Indigenous petitions were ignored as were third-party petitions on behalf of Indigenous peoples; game wardens and police exhibited racist attitudes; and the state apparatus was set up to facilitate trapline registrations for settlers rather than Indigenous peoples while ignoring established rights of descent and effectively precluding the ability of Indigenous peoples to acquire licences.\(^\text{14}\) She argues that many Indigenous groups practiced traditional forms of wildlife stewardship. The state ignored these social and economic stewardship structures and "the government's negligence facilitated the erosion of First Nations land and wildlife resources management techniques and the demise of traditional economies on which self-determination was based."\(^\text{15}\)

Taking a different angle, historian Georgiana Ball has identified a guiding ethic of conservation and environmental control that informed wildlife legislation in BC up to 1918. Ball argues that "wildlife received the most consistent and effective management when their habitat and harvest were subject to the monopolistic control of the users."\(^\text{16}\) She claims that this control was best exercised by Indigenous peoples before the creation of the colony of British Columbia in 1859, and, after 1905, when Williams exercised authority over game management. She shows how his monopolistic control allowed him to promulgate a wide-ranging program for wildlife: he raised convictions for game law infractions, stressed the potential economic benefits of animal resources, advertised sporting attractions, established game reserves, instituted predators and 'vermin' control, instituted border patrol, and


\(^\text{15}\) Ireland, "Working a Great Hardship on Us," 81.

inaugurated a licencing system. Despite these important insights on Williams’ project, Ball fails to contrast the extension of Williams’ jurisdiction against the receding control of Indigenous peoples. Specifically, she does not contrast the growth of Williams’ game management strategy against the weakening of Indigenous regulation schemes.

Contributions by Tina Loo add a postmodern perspective to these debates by subverting the figure of the sportsman as a self-described paragon of masculinity, while stressing the agency of the Indigenous peoples who worked in the guiding industry and were often denigrated for their perceived unmanly behaviour. Loo uses big game hunting as a discursive framework through which to analyse how hegemonic notions of gender, class and race were reinforced. In its idealized practice, sport-hunting was the purview of white, middle-class men. However, Loo maps out a space for resistance within the confines of the established codes of the industry. Drawing on James Scott’s concept of peasant ‘arts of resistance’ as small exercises in power subversion, she argues that Indigenous peoples claimed agency through passive resistance, invoking the trickster figure in acts of sabotage, ridicule and assertions of an alternative masculinity.

In another work, Loo sees the practice of hunting as an expression of malaise with modernity. Many sportsman, she explains, were articulating a peculiar zeitgeist that emerged in countless popular hunting narratives, including one by Williams and an unpublished document by Teit. Indeed, Loo’s work problematizes the notion of nature and raises

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19 Tina Loo, “Of Moose and Men,” 316-319. There has been some suggestion that Loo overstates the agentive power of the trickster figure. Also, the claim is complicated by the different manifestations of trickster throughout the province.
20 A. Bryan Williams, Big Game Hunting in British Columbia: Big Game and Other Sport in the Wilds of British Columbia (London: J. Murray, 1925); James A. Teit, British Columbia and Big Game Hunting (unpub., n.d.), from personal files of Sigurd Teit; courtesy of Wendy Wickwire; cf, W.A. Baillie-Grohman, Sport and
questions about how the natural world was fashioned by Williams and his contemporaries. She argues that the ‘wilderness’ encountered by these men was “the product of rational planning and marketing” which must be seen as the “outcome of the emerging modern science of game management whose principles were implemented by a state bureaucracy and system of laws.”

Furthermore, the aesthetic choice to hunt in a ‘pristine’ wilderness was in direct “response to the market demand for a particular kind of encounter with wilderness.” Market demand was fuelled by a “bourgeois masculinity” thirsty for an ‘authentic’ “landscape of nostalgia,” which promoted a *terra nullius* conception of nature by privileging certain types of environmental knowledge over others. “The problem”, as Loo states, “was that this wilderness was imposed on pre-existing geographies, on other cultural uses of the environment, and that it rendered the competition illegitimate.” My study will seek to understand this imposed ‘wilderness’, as well as the conflicting political and cultural rhetoric employed to bolster state and local geographies of knowledge. The bureaucratization of space described by Loo allowed the state to fashion a particular and circumscribed pattern of use that benefited settler society’s preferred forms of recreation and exploitation. These contentions have been extended in *States of Nature*, Loo’s recent monograph which should stand as the seminal work in the history of wildlife conservation in twentieth-century Canada. Her account focusses on the social, cultural, and political foundations of wildlife policy. Critically, Loo emphasizes the discursive dimensions of the idea of conservation as well as


22 Loo, “Making a Modern Wilderness,” 94.


24 Loo, “Making a Modern Wilderness,” 110.
wildlife conservation’s formative impact on a nascent environmental movement.25

Wildlife and Nature Across the Liberal State: Regional Historiography

The substantial body of literature on the development of wildlife management practices and hunting in various regions of Canada offers valuable methodological and thematic parallels to the study of conservation in British Columbia. Historian Robert McCandless focuses on wildlife in his history of hunting in the Yukon Territory, although his main concern is how game management framed the social development of the sparsely populated region.26 McCandless argues that a powerful sporting lobby generated a preservationist discourse that favoured agricultural and industrialized resource extraction over wild lands (or commons). This lobby, which existed in different forms in much of Canada, privileged wildlife over the interests of the Indigenous populations and rural inhabitants whose economies were largely dependent on these resources.

Focusing on the class disparities that emerged in the ordering of fishing and hunting practices in Hamilton harbour, Ken Cruikshank and Nancy B. Bouchier contend that conservation efforts and the ways they could be contested were influenced by class-based ideas of recreation.27 In Hamilton in the late nineteenth century, conservation debates provided a means of regulating behaviour. Similar perspectives are evident in Newfoundland, where historian Darrin McGrath argues that “different attitudes toward wildlife [were] held by individuals engaged in a subsistence lifestyle than by state supported capitalists interested in profits.”28 In Quebec, Game Associations leased hunting and fishing

areas, thereby regulating access to resources along class lines.²⁹

Historian Anthony G. Gulig chronicles the adverse effects of the development of hunting controls on Indigenous inhabitants in Northern Saskatchewan. Misled by treaty promises, Cree and Dene peoples faced increasing subsistence proscriptions as hunting interests gained prominence and an administrative structure established state control over resources. Working with the federal department of Indian Affairs, Game Guardians used a rhetoric focussed on the supposed avarice and laziness of the Indigenous hunter to justify restrictions on Indigenous subsistence hunting. Seeking a counterbalance, Gulig appeals to the notion of an "Indian self-regulation model,"³⁰ a sustainable wildlife conservation method of harvesting, storing and abstention. State game personnel were blind to this representation, and as a consequence "game management strategies and practices failed miserably when they were applied to Indians and their cultural relationship to the land."³¹ This failure is reinforced by John Sandlos in his examination of conservation ideology in the North. Sandlos asserts that "the full weight [of] state power was used through such management tools as wildlife conservation to impose an aesthetic and technical idea of landscape as a wilderness, as resource producing factory, and as elemental North on local Dene and Inuit people."³² The discursive formulation of an idealized North, which emerged in conflict with existing Dene and Inuit conceptions of the land, allowed the federal government to both preserve and exploit the resource.

The Intellectual Roots of Canadian Conservation: American Historiography

³⁰ Anthony G. Gulig, "'We Beg the Government': Native People and Game Regulation in Northern Saskatchewan, 1900-1940," *Prairie Forum* 28:1 (Spring 2003), 90.
³¹ Gulig, 'We Beg the Government,' 94.
The intellectual development of a conservation ethic and the pragmatic roots of government wildlife policy were imported to Canada from south of the border.\textsuperscript{33} Conservationists in America articulated a forceful conservation rhetoric which emphasized the masculine and antimodern qualities of the artificial and commodified communion with nature. David Stradling states that conservation emerged in partnership with the progressive movement, which sought to expand the role of government in order to regulate social problems associated with urban and industrial growth.\textsuperscript{34} Theodore Roosevelt, himself an avid sportsman, was the central proponent of the progressive reform movement. For some time, historians emphasized two separate positions, conservationism and preservationism, within the overarching project of safeguarding America’s forests, lakes, air and animals. Roosevelt and his Chief Forrester, Gifford Pinchot, promoted the careful and sustained use of natural resources for the economic benefit of the entire populace. They put forth a story that exalted the natural environment as the foundational legacy to be protected for future generations of young Americans. Sierra Club founder John Muir expressed a countervailing position. His spiritual and aesthetic vision, often termed preservationism, sought to protect the environment in its unadulterated, ‘natural’ state. Appealing to the same American environmental legacy of inherent value of nature, Muir opposed its exploitation for economic benefit. Contemporary historiography has largely avoided the simplistic partition of the movement into two competing factions. Instead it has stressed the importance of this period as the first time an environmental movement flourished in North America. Nevertheless, the discussion is instructive as it provides the intellectual and ideological context for the resource


management efforts of Teit and Williams.

Historian Samuel Hays wrote the first major review of the history of the American conservation movement. Hays contends that the conservation movement is important mainly because “its role in history arises from the implications of science and technology in modern society.”35 For Hays, conservation derived its primary impetus from the middle-class ethic that exalted modernity and progress, and was motivated by a scientific drive to constrain and protect nature. Engineers and conservation-minded civil servants ushered in an era of efficiency, he claims, bringing their particular scientific expertise to bear on wasteful and consumptive resource harvesting techniques. Hays depicts the process as a fundamentally capitalistic enterprise, which sought to “sustain industrial consumption, not the rights of ‘the people.’”36 Historian John Reiger, who disagrees with Hays on a number of points, states that conservation was a top-down affair, driven by the interest of a patrician class of elite businessmen, politicians, and intellectuals. Writing against the historiographical grain, Reiger locates the roots of the conservation movement in the 1870s rather than with the progressives at the turn of the twentieth century. For Reiger, it was the aesthetically-motivated sportsmen (self-consciously not subsistence-minded hunters) who led the way in the extension of conservation measures into all areas of the American natural world.37 This assertion is buttressed by Richard Judd who claims that sporting interests held considerable political capital and were able to wield significant pressure in the development of conservation. What emerged was a political situation in which fish and game associations directed conservation efforts away from commercial and subsistence needs of rural and

36 Stradling, “Introduction,” 12
Indigenous hunters and toward the recreational desires of the gentleman hunter and angler.38

Yet how does this square with Gifford Pinchot’s (1910) articulated vision for the conservation movement: “Conservation means the greatest good to the greatest number for the longest time.”39 The democratic and utilitarian sentiments expressed by Pinchot were compromised by ethnocentric and exclusivist assumptions. Stradling contends that conservation policies “did not sufficiently protect the rights of the residents of the west, particularly Native Americans, who could rightly see conservation legislation as simply another aspect of ongoing imperialist invasion.”40 The magnanimous character of the movement has been challenged by recent historiography that has focussed more on the place of the conservation movement within the growth of a homogenized capitalist marketplace.

Indeed, the conservation movement itself must hold some of the blame for the market’s inevitable separation of haves and have-nots. In particular, Karl Jacoby asserts that conservation was not a benign endeavour but, rather, was closely linked to contemporary class conflicts. He contends that conservationists sought to superimpose a unique land regime onto the American frontier through the creation of an ordered, tractable wilderness. In doing so, they ignored the requirements of rural inhabitants who had previously “fashioned a variety of arrangements designed to safeguard the ecological base of their way of life.”41 He argues that the conservation movement was part of an internal colonialism of people and places in which an eastern, urban elite imposed a set of economic regulations on the ‘moral economy’ of a poor, disparate, rural populace. This occurred through the strategy

of ‘state simplification’ wherein the elite used law and land regulations to subvert existing resource management techniques.\(^{42}\)

Recently, a group of historians has added an analysis of race and ethnicity to the traditionally class-based discussion of conservation developments on the American frontier. Historian Louis Warren details the rural social upheaval that grew out of the redefinition of ‘the commons’ from local to publicly managed resource. This was part of an active process whereby “the local became national” in twentieth century America.\(^{43}\) National parks, designed as a type of ‘national commons,’ replaced local and Indigenous land and wildlife use patterns by exerting state administrative and legal power over the intricate management systems that governed local economies of use. Warren focuses on the coercive power of law and state violence in the entrenchment of the authority of federal conservation measures. The discussion of public/national value allowed for the abstraction of resource from place, person and lifeways. Environmental historian Mark David Spence supports this argument in his account of the disputed land created by the contemporaneous development of the reservation system and national parks. Indeed, Spence posits a symbiosis between the two phenomena. The creation of recreation space and wilderness required the exclusion of Indigenous populations.\(^{44}\)

**Hunting Empires: Colonial Historiography**

The literature on the colonial foundations of hunting and conservation yields significant material to this study. Although much of it is focussed on British hunting in

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Africa and India, it has important links to the literature on North America. Historian John M. MacKenzie emphasizes the class-based difference embedded in ‘hunting’ and ‘the Hunt.’ This artificial distinction, which hinged on the construction of the aristocratic hunt, was exported to the colonies through settlement and tourism. It imposed an alternative moral economy onto the landscape, one backed by a powerful legislative framework that was ideologically indebted to the same upper-class that sought to use land and wildlife in a particular manner. Reflecting on hunting and empire, MacKenzie contends that “[a]n imperial and largely masculine elite attempted to reserve for itself access to hunting, adopted and transformed the concept of the Hunt as a ritual of prestige and dominance, and set about the separation of the human and animal worlds to promote ‘preservation’ (later ‘conservation’) as a continuing justification of its monopoly.”

The power amassed in conservation discourse was therefore tied to its central role in the production of knowledge about animals and nature. MacKenzie finds a link between colonialism and “conservation practices [that] were deeply embedded in the ideologies of imperial rule.”

Hunting and conservation acted as confirmation of imperial prestige but also of racial superiority. In his analysis of the ‘Man the Hunter’ theory of human evolution, anthropologist Matt Cartmill contends that by the mid-1800s “the analogy between man’s dominion over the beasts and Europe’s supremacy over the ‘savage races’ was reflected in the symbolism of big-game hunting.”

The work of Edward Said can be used to examine a similar discursive awareness

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regarding the constructions of nature, wildlife and Indigenous peoples. Said examined representations of ‘imaginative geographies’ created in colonial contexts to execute power through the development of an alternative and artificial knowledge. This new geography of knowledge allowed for a representation of ‘other’ based on a fiction. But that fiction, or fictions – which can be seen as the ideological hearth of colonialism – are necessarily based on the unique historical circumstances that inform the social, cultural, and political guidelines of nation-building projects undertaken within Empire. Historical geographer Daniel Clayton uses the work of Said and others to expose the problems that emerge from a hasty application of colonial historiography or post-colonial scholarship across the diaspora of the imperial world. He challenges historians of colonialism in British Columbia to “localize”, “historicize” and “contextualize” the specificities of the colonial project rather than “treat[ing] colonialism… as a uniform or coherent imposition.” Furthermore, Clayton asks “how colonial knowledges and agendas insinuated themselves into imperial master-narratives of progress and possession.” Understanding the peculiarities of this particular ‘way of seeing’ is one of the central problems for a nuanced representation of colonialism in BC.

Writing about western British North America, historian Greg Gillespie mines the travel narratives of the British elite to show how these men remade empire while hunting through the practices of “science, cartography, and landscape aesthetics.” He contends that “the British hunter’s acts of big-game hunting, identifying ‘new’ animal species, collecting trophies, mapping the terrain, and stretching the landscape were more than symbolic: they

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resulted in cultural appropriation of the land and its resources.\textsuperscript{52} Following Gillespie, hunting as a cultural commodity can be used to inscribe the civilising tenets of the imperial project onto the landscape. Building on Said and Clayton, a local understanding of the exigencies of conservation and colonialism is essential to a nuanced representation of the historical problems outlines above.

**Parallels in Resource Conservation: BC Fisheries Historiography**

Existing work on fisheries regulation in Canada is useful because of its close affiliation to the problem of game management. Environmental historian Bill Parenteau shows that a careful analysis of fisheries regulations can help us understand the conflicts that "resulted from the introduction of modern wildlife management regimes in North America."\textsuperscript{53} Much of the literature on Pacific fisheries frames the conflicts around narratives of economy, property, and race. Reflecting on policy motivations, historian Dianne Newell suggests that "[t]he state and its administrative agencies and courts, backed by private industry and non-Indian fishers, characterized Pacific Coast Indian fishing traditions as destructive and demonized Indian food fishers as predatory."\textsuperscript{54} The state employed similar tactics in the effort to establish jurisdiction over wildlife. Private industry was also instrumental in shaping Williams' policy on game law. Local lobby groups, usually a composite of local boosters, influential businessmen, and avid sportsmen (often the same man) enjoyed cordial relations with Williams. Moreover, in an effort to discredit Indian claims to hunting rights, Indigenous hunters and guides were variously depicted as indolent,

\textsuperscript{52} Gillespie, "I Was Pleased with Our Sport Among the Buffalo," 557.
\textsuperscript{53} Bill Parenteau, ""A Very Determined Opposition to the Law": Conservation, Angling Leases, and Social Conflict in the Canadian Atlantic Salmon Fishery, 1867-1914," *Environmental History* 9:3 (July 2004), 436.
rapacious, dim-witted and intransigent.55

In a parallel to hunting, Newell states that British Columbia “has always interpreted
the traditional Indian fishery as a strictly subsistence activity, one to be continued as a
privilege, not a right.”56 But when subsistence practices confronted potential economic
benefit, the latter inevitably won out. A complex process of value attribution that favoured a
modern industrial economy framed government policy and wildlife regulations. Peter Usher
contends that these “policies and regulations have been used as a means of social control and
gineering of aboriginal people, with no less disruptive effect than Indian Administration
itself.”57 Following from this claim, restrictions to the fisheries and hunting practices of
Indigenous peoples can be seen as part of an intentional colonialism imposed from above for
the purposes of acquiring land and resources and their attendant economic gain.

Environmental historian Matthew Evenden shifts the locus of struggle from an
Indigenous-settler axis to a dialogue between a state bureaucracy that advocated a scientific
management structure, and commercial fishers concerned about protecting both their
investment and the elemental source of their income. His contention, that plans to dam the
Fraser River were about attempts to implant “new technologies of power,”58 can be read two
ways. In a material sense, the proposed dams were about the creation of electric power
through the harvesting of an untapped resource, to be used to energize local economies and to
be sold for profit. Here science and technology are presented as the twin engines of progress.
In an abstract sense, the statement symbolizes the imposition of state power over the

56 Newell, Tangled Webs of History, 4.
57 Peter Usher, “Some Implications of the Sparrow Judgment for Resource Conservation and Management”
58 Matthew Evenden, Fish Versus Power: An Environmental History of the Fraser River (Cambridge:
landscape and its inhabitants, who use it for subsistence. Evenden argues that "the fish vs. power debate not only delayed and displaced development, but also produced various side effects on salmon, science, and society." In the case of the Fraser River fishery, a multivalent conservation movement, bolstered by the powerful and rational voice of science, managed to wrest control of the resource from a state bureaucracy which foresaw a much different use of the river.

Literature on the Indigenous fisheries in the Pacific Northwest buttresses many of the arguments that arise out of the British Columbia scholarship. Environmental historian Joseph Taylor concurs with Evenden in his efforts to map out the place of scientific expertise in the state-sanctioned project of re-imagining the cultural and economic place of salmon. Taylor advocates for a geographically centered study focussing on the spatial rather than the temporal aspects of power. In examining historical changes in the use of and access to resources, Taylor appeals to the work of geographer Allan Pred, who contends that we should also observe "the social production of space and the restless formation and reformation of geographical landscapes." In his study of Washington State's manipulations of the Lummi fishery, anthropologist Daniel Boxberger suggests that it is "control of labor and resources by outside interests that keeps [Indigenous peoples] underdeveloped and dependent." It follows that there is a structural complicity not only between state management practices and industry but that this relationship also sought to maintain a subjugated Indigenous population of workers.

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59 Evenden, *Fish Versus Power*, 3
62 Boxberger, *To Fish in Common*, 5.
Analyses of conservation and Indigenous involvement in the Atlantic fisheries offer broad parallels to events on the west coast of Canada. Bill Parenteau examines Indigenous peoples’ presence in the emerging sport fishing and tourism industry in Atlantic Canada in the decades after confederation. He argues that Indigenous people, far from being a marginal presence, were transformed “from active resource users to cultural commodities,” who served an “ideological/cultural function” for the sportsman who sought an ‘authentic’ connection with the primordial environment. The “tourist gaze” created an idealized image of the Indian, one who enjoyed an innate connection with the natural world. This construction was part of an “organized tourist industry…, which advertised and sold native culture as part of the wilderness experience and was predicated on the economic dependence of Native people.” Yet sport fishing provided an important economic resource for Indigenous peoples, who were increasingly reliant on the comparatively large income derived from guiding, especially as fish populations shrank and Indigenous peoples became economically marginalized and disconnected on reserves. In a separate article, Parenteau points to a class-based organic opposition to fisheries regulations among local residents of Atlantic Canada. They used resistance tactics such poaching, vandalism, monitoring, physical violence and black market trade to express their disapproval of the policy implementations. In British Columbia, as will be shown, these disparate tactics formed the basis of an active resistance movement directed against law and its coercive implications.

**Peace, (the Liberal) Order, and Good Governance: Law in British Columbia**

Legal historian Douglas Harris’ *Fish, Law, and Colonialism*, although focussed on

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63 Bill Parenteau, “'Care, Control, and Supervision:' Native People in the Canadian Atlantic Salmon Fishery, 1867-1900,” *Canadian Historical Review* 79:1 (March 1998), 3.
64 Parenteau, ‘Care, Control, and Supervision,’ 35.
65 Parenteau, “'A Very Determined Opposition to the Law,'” 444-446.
fisheries, shifts the debate to the development of legal strictures. Harris outlines the legal apparatus used by the state in its effort to assert crown jurisdiction over fish and waterways formerly managed by Indigenous groups. In mapping out the imposition of English Common Law over fisheries resources, Harris provides an evocative outline of the coercive power of law and the vitality of Indigenous resistance. He argues that the programmatic and prohibitive nature of fisheries law was designed to wrest control of a primary resource from the Indigenous population of British Columbia. Law was simply the most effective vehicle for the achievement of an imperial agenda. Conversely, Native Law (which predated Common Law in British Columbia) is categorized as a dynamic and viable alternative regulatory and resource conservation scheme. However, the “Canadian state insistently denied the legitimacy and even the existence of these systems of Native management and resource allocation, taking the resource as its own, refusing to negotiate.” The ostensible absence of law allowed the state to consolidate its own legal structure while effectively usurping the desired resources. This facilitated the influx of capital and human resources into the fisheries industry. Harris’ analysis of the power/knowledge theorization of authority and representation within fisheries law can be transposed onto the development and codification of game law in British Columbia.

Recent work problematizes differing cultural notions of ‘property’ and ‘ownership’. Anthropologist Paul Nadasdy, discussing the land claims process in the Yukon, asserts that the entrenched “notions about land and property... have their roots in European traditions.” This Lockean (or liberal) notion of property (i.e., individual rights to land are exercised by labour and/or enclosure) allowed for a regulatory scheme that privileged the settler concept

66 D. Harris, Fish, Law, and Colonialism, 3-4.
of land tenure over established Indigenous methods. European and Indigenous conceptions of 'property' and 'ownership' are incompatible because the latter are "enmeshed in a complex web of reciprocal relations and obligations with the land and the animals upon it." In a current context, Nadasdy asserts that,

The negotiation and implementation of land claim agreements amount to an attempt to incorporate aboriginal people's unique relationship to the land into the existing legal and political institutions of the Canadian state. This kind of incorporation requires a translation of cultural beliefs, values, and practices into a language that can be understood and acted upon by Euro-Canadian bureaucrats, lawyers, and politicians.

Nadasdy warns against an essentialized version of Indigenous conception of property and land. He concludes that such a position "subject[s] those very social relations to new and powerful forms of social change."

These issues are particularly salient in BC where questions of land and resource tenure are still outstanding. Several scholars have sought to situate the implementation of provincial law within a larger colonial context. Carolyn Strange and Tina Loo argue that moral sanction was vital to the creation of law in late-nineteenth century Canada. They trace "connections between law and morality in early-national Canada by concentrating on the changing scope and subjects of regulation, the administration of morals laws, and the ideological interests that underlay the imposition of legislation." In a separate study, Tina Loo states that immigrants to colonial British Columbia were less interested in English law to counter crime than they were about creating a particular kind of order "privileging a

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69 Nadasdy, "'Property' and Aboriginal Land Claims in the Canadian Subarctic," 247.

70 Nadasdy, "'Property' and Aboriginal Land Claims in the Canadian Subarctic," 248.

71 Nadasdy, "'Property' and Aboriginal Land Claims in the Canadian Subarctic" 251.

particular set of values through both civil and criminal law.”

For Loo, the discourse of law – the linguistically and culturally contingent nature of legal and authoritative structures – represents the means by which a settler society imposed its social and economic order onto the colonial situation of British Columbia. This morally regulated and Eurocentric legal infrastructure continues to mediate the Indigenous/state dynamic. Loo anticipates an element of Ian McKay’s claim, stating that for new “British Columbians, law was central to the making of a liberal order, but both it and the courts were also constructed through a discourse of classical or laissez-faire liberalism which delineated their role, the ambit of their power, and the basis of their authority.”

Loo’s analysis of the law’s coercive nature and its central role in transporting the liberal order into British Columbia is buttressed by anthropologist Jo-Anne Fiske who shows how ‘Indian Law’ has been conscientiously displaced by the dominant “liberal discourses of rationality, uniformity, and anonymous individuality contained within British law.” She contends that “law was seen as a tool for economic development and… settlers turned to it to protect their property from Aboriginal claims and to advance their corporate interests at the expense of Aboriginal economies.” Colonial society used law as a means to suppress alternative legal discourses which facilitated the importation of a distinct colonial order onto the landscape of British Columbia. Eventually, the organizational infrastructure of Indigenous societies was represented within anthropological literature instead of within the legal discourse that had previously defined it. “And so,” concludes Fiske, “what had

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76 Fiske, “From Customary Law to Oral Traditions,” 269.
formerly been understood as Indian law was reduced to myths collected by anthropologists bent on salvaging cultural survivals and capturing dying memories of ancestral tales."\(^{77}\) English Common law gained primacy because Indian law, through a discursive sleight of hand, had ceased to exist, replaced by creation myths and resilient cosmologies.

Legal historian Hamar Foster shows how this infrastructure placed Indigenous peoples at an institutionalized disadvantage, without adequate protection in a system that used a different discourse.\(^{78}\) Historical geographer Cole Harris has taken a broader approach, situating the governance and supervision of Indigenous land and individuals within a more comprehensive debate on the colonial endeavour. He explains the attendant construction and maintenance of an ordered reservation system that fulfilled much of the state’s supervisory requirements.\(^{79}\) Political scientist Paul Tennant details a powerful and malleable Indigenous political movement that maintained a rigorous criticism of the colonial land policies of the state up until the present.\(^{80}\) These works elaborate upon E.P. Thompson’s claim that “law was never simply a tool of the ruling class…” as it also “provided an arena for struggle, for resistance as well as oppression.”\(^{81}\) The latter is an important distinction. Indigenous peoples were not passive, but rather, were often actively engaged in the subversion of law that did not conform with the tenets of ‘Indian Law’. This resistance emerged in the initiatives of Indigenous peoples to resolve the ‘Indian Land Question.’ But it was also evident in the everyday actions of individuals and groups that sought to prevent the

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\(^{77}\) Fiske, "From Customary Law to Oral Traditions," 285.


\(^{79}\) Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance and Reserves in British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002).


reorientation of land in BC toward a regime informed by liberalism and the market.\textsuperscript{82}

**Addressing the Gramsci Gap**

As stated, this thesis will highlight some possibilities and advantages that emerge from an analysis of the implementation of game law in northern BC within a neo-Gramscian critique of colonialism in British Columbia. Gramscian theory has often been rejected for a perceived totalizing, programmatic tendency.\textsuperscript{83} It was feared that this framework could undermine a nuanced interpretation of the effects of state power and ideology and misrepresent the diverse consequences of the hegemonic discourse for subaltern peoples. Recently, following neo-Marxist contributions that attempted to marry Gramsci’s theory of hegemony with the more discursive critiques of post-structuralism and post-colonialism, Gramscian critiques have been reinvigorated. In the historiography of British Columbia this critique is not large, though there are some significant contributions that frame their analyses through the notion of hegemony.

A prominent example is the work of anthropologist Elizabeth Furniss, who uses the concept of hegemony, which she terms ‘dominant discourse’, to explain the normalization of ‘commonsense’ assumptions of history and identity that underlie a culture of racism in Williams Lake, BC. For Furniss, culture entwined within the dominant discourse “is experienced as a set of common-sense, taken-for-granted truths about the nature of reality and the social world.”\textsuperscript{84} Yet individuals interact with this regime of social and political power in different ways. These unique perspectives “may give rise to different perceptions


\textsuperscript{84} Elizabeth Furniss, *The Burden of History: Colonialism and the Frontier Myth in a Rural Canadian Community* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 14.
of reality and lead to challenges to the legitimacy of a dominant culture.  

Similarly, anthropologist Leslie Robertson uses the concept of hegemony to understand the development of ideas of difference and constructed identities. Drawing from these works, the concept of hegemony is useful in analysing Williams’ attempts to construct an ordered, or ‘commonsense’, landscape through the implementation of a specific regulatory structure. Hegemony is useful for mapping the plurality of voices opposed to Williams’ changes, in this case the voices of Teit and the Tahltan (and also some missionaries and Indian Agents).

The work of John and Jean Comaroff on missionization in South Africa is an important articulation of neo-Gramscian theory that could serve as a blueprint for future studies using similar frameworks in British Columbia. The Comaroffs argue for a nuanced interpretation of power and hegemony emphasizing the plurality of intersecting identities and representations, and the effects that these potential ambiguities might have on the use of a power/knowledge nexus as a method of state discipline. Their application of hegemony has been influential in motivating a renewed neo-Gramscian critique of state power, which has been taken up by scholars of British Columbia seeking to better understand the process of missionization and colonialism in this province. The Comaroffs contend that hegemony is “that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies – drawn from a historically situated cultural field – that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it.”

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the Comaroffs can help to mitigate some of the instrumentalist tendencies of a Gramscian theoretical framework, while maintaining the more emancipatory aspects of his thinking. This is especially valuable in the context of British Columbia, where an awareness of the multiplicity of Indigenous identities, both within and without individual societies, is essential to a valid representation of the historical circumstance giving rise to counter-hegemonies.

My thesis seeks to build on the insights on early twentieth-century notions of ‘conservation’ and ‘hunting’ presented in this chapter. The literature on these subjects encourages an engagement with diverse insights: on race, class and gender as apposite units of analysis; on masculinities and modernities; on binary distinctions of urban/rural, commons/market, metropole/hinterland, conservation/preservation; on ‘authenticity’ in popular conceptions of nature and landscape; on aesthetic and economic values in conservation; on science, technology, and progress. Addressing all of these dynamics is obviously beyond the scope of this thesis. However, there are some commonalities. The bulk of the literature on hunting and conservation deals explicitly with the superimposition of a particular understanding of the state’s relationship to, and power to reconstitute, the land. Through the guise of conservation, the Canadian state reordered the land to the benefit of the individual, for the purpose of administering the resources that would vitalize the economy and encourage settlement. Lines were drawn on a map, actualized on the ground at the expense of existing understandings of the land, and activated to inaugurate new systems of power, hegemony, and sovereignty over land already managed effectively by rural and Indigenous peoples. Following McKay, this new land regime, connected to the economic, social, cultural, and political heartbeat of the state, emphasized a liberal understanding of private property that compromised the existing arrangements of Indigenous peoples.
People, Law, and Land: Framing the Game Law Debate

Williams and Teit: Biographical Sketches

Arthur Bryan Williams (1866-1946), was born in Lismany, County Galway, Ireland to English parents. Educated at Cavendish College, Cambridge University, he earned a BA, excelled in rowing and rugby, and served as a private in the University Volunteers. After graduation, he quit his study of medicine at Middlesex Hospital in London to emigrate to America at the age of 22, intending to settle in Wyoming to indulge his enthusiasm for horses and the outdoors. However, while on a stopover in Vancouver in 1888 he was attracted by the economic and sporting opportunities afforded in British Columbia. He decided to stay in the region, settling at Nicomen Island, a Fraser River island near Dewdney, BC.¹ Though he only farmed the land for several years after his arrival, this homestead was to be his base for the next fifteen years. He worked as a prospector and mine manager and as a big game hunting guide, “visiting... practically every portion of the province and becoming familiar with the different kinds of game and with the laws governing the hunting of the same.”² While there is no coherent record of his exact professional history, it is known that hunting was a significant occupation for him, both financially and as a leisure pursuit. From the time of his arrival in BC, he built a reputation as an excellent sportsman, bullish in pursuit of his quarry, and possessed of a wide-ranging knowledge on the habits and habitat of the province’s wildlife.

His life gained stability in 1902, when he married Alice Moens of Blackpool,

² F.W. Howay and E.O.S Scholefield, British Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present, Vol. 4 (Vancouver: S.J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1914), 477-478. Letters in the PGW files contain references to Williams pre-1905 professional endeavours in the Boundary District, the Skeena Valley, the Kootenay area, the Caribou, and in the northwest section of BC.
England, with whom he had one daughter. They moved to Atlin in 1903 (375 kilometres north of the Stikine, near the Yukon border) when Williams was offered a position as the Manager at the Atlin Lake Hydraulic Mining Co. An important figure in the Atlin business community, he was appointed Justice of the Peace for Atlin County in April 1905. Shortly thereafter, in July 1905 (following his provisional appointment in March), he was confirmed by the Conservative government of Sir Richard McBride to the position of Provincial Game and Forest Warden. Williams’ appointment was secured partly with the patronage of influential friends. Victoria MLA John Sebastian Helmcken, an enthusiastic sportsman and hunting partner, expedited the hiring and helped Williams push through legislation after his appointment. He also enjoyed a close relationships with Dr. H. E. Young, MLA for Atlin, and with Premier McBride, MLA for Dewdney and former resident of Atlin. Williams can be squarely set within the McBride political machine intent on maximizing BC’s economy by cutting spending, raising taxes, reforming labour laws and generating capital by the rapacious harvesting of the province’s ‘abundant’ resources. This focus on capitalism and entrepreneurialism would inform Williams’ approach to game management.

But his was not a strictly political appointment. Williams was well respected by the denizens of British Columbia’s sporting community and by the province’s elite. Indeed, he is described in a contemporary context as “numbered among the representative and valued citizens of Vancouver,” and was a member of the Western Club of Vancouver and the Union Club of Victoria. As a skilled and knowledgeable sportsman, he enjoyed a lofty reputation

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7 Howay and Scholefield, British Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present, Vol. 4, 477.
among the members of BC’s growing number of Game Associations. This, along with his personal connections and steadfast support for the rules of the hunt, contributed to his appointment. As the primary author of the Province’s first cohesive attempt at game legislation, Williams guided most policy, enforcement and personnel decisions made within the department, though this was obviously contingent on legislative support and funding. His vast correspondence, both personal and professional, attests to his vital role in the promotion of British Columbia as a sportsman’s centre, and also as a viable region for settlement and investment. He continued in his capacity as PGW until 1917-18 when major structural changes within the game department, instigated by the new Liberal government of H. C. Brewster (followed shortly as leader by John Oliver), forced his resignation. In his fifties, from 1920-1925, Williams returned to the guiding and outfitting industry that had provided much of his prior livelihood. He worked primarily out of Atlin (though based out of his home in West Vancouver), from where he could access the vaunted Stikine hunting grounds.

Searching for another outlet for his passions and for continued public recognition, he wrote two successful technique and locational reference manual books: *Rod and Creel in British Columbia* (1919) and *Fish and Game in British Columbia* (1935). These have since become a sort of prototype for hunting and angling guide books. But his great literary achievement was *Game Trails in British Columbia: Big Game and Other Sport in the Wilds of British Columbia* (1925), a narrative collection of hunting stories separated into chapters devoted to the various species of the province. This work is still regarded as a classic by devotees of the genre. He was reinstated to his former position in 1929 - when the

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8 Ball, “A History of Wildlife Management Practices in British Columbia,” 58. Ball states that “his interest in hunting, fishing, and wildlife conservation was well-known to the members of the game protective associations: it was they who recommended Williams for the position.”


Conservative party regained the Legislature under Simon Fraser Tolmie - after consistent lobbying from Fish and Game Associations who were disenchanted with the administrative surfeit in the new Game Department. Williams retained the position of Provincial Game Warden until his retirement in 1934. He suffered a debilitating stroke in the summer of 1945 while fishing on the Campbell River, and died at his home in West Vancouver, on February 16, 1946. In a final, fitting remembrance, six Deputy Game Wardens served as pallbearers at his funeral.\textsuperscript{11}

James A. Teit (1864-1922) was born and raised in Lerwick, the central commercial hub of the Shetland Islands. After clerking in his father’s store, he accepted an invitation from his British Columbia-based uncle John Murray, who offered the prospect of employment at Spences Bridge, at the confluence of the Thompson and Nicola Rivers.\textsuperscript{12} On arriving in 1884, Teit worked in his uncle’s store, and began a pattern of employment that would continue for the rest of his life. He took on whatever jobs he could find. Most of these were occasional and seasonal: farming, fruit picking, placer and coal mining, hunting, trapping, and running the ferry across the Thompson, and working in his uncle’s store. In 1894, New York-based anthropologist Franz Boas offered him regular contracts to do ethnographic fieldwork. He later accepted such contracts for Edward Sapir in Ottawa and C.F. Newcombe in Victoria among others. Over time, he became a skilled hunter and by the 1890s he was leading big game hunters on excursions in the southern and central part of the province.\textsuperscript{13} In 1903, he led his first hunting tour to the Stikine where he met and employed members of the Talhtan.

\textsuperscript{11} Victoria Times, Feb. 18, 1946.  
\textsuperscript{12} Wendy Wickwire, “‘We Shall Drink From the Stream and So Shall You’: James Teit and Native Resistance in British Columbia, 1908-1922,” Canadian Historical Review 79:2 (1998), 199-236.  
\textsuperscript{13} Catherine Fenn says he was leading hunting parties by 1887. See, Catherine J. Fenn, “Life History of a Collection: The Talhtan Materials Collected by James A. Teit,” Museum Anthropology 20:3 (1997), 73.
While resident in Spences Bridge, he was exposed to Nlaka’pamux language and culture, through his uncle’s store where local people came to trade. Within three years, he was cohabiting with a local Nlaka’pamux woman, Susannah Lucy Antko, whom he officially married in 1892, thus further cementing his ties to the community. When his uncle died in 1896, Teit assumed debts that were barely covered by the sale of his uncle’s estate. After Antko’s death in 1899, Teit married Josephine Morens, daughter of a local French ranching family. They had six (five survived) children.

As a writer/ethnographer, Teit produced important work on the Indigenous peoples of south central and northern British Columbia.\(^{14}\) Teit’s ethnographic work was informed by the ‘salvage’ ethnographic paradigm articulated by Boas. Its adherents felt compelled to codify and preserve Indigenous cultural knowledge for the benefit of future generations both Indigenous and non-Indigenous.\(^{15}\) This drive was motivated by a pervasive concern that Indigenous cultures would soon disappear, or be subsumed within a more vigorous European culture. At the time, there was an activist bent to salvage work, as it presented a radical, anti-racist alternative to existing paradigms influenced by social evolutionary models. But some scholars argue that there was acquiescence in the acceptance of the trope of the ‘Disappearing Indian’.\(^{16}\)

Teit’s personal and political commitments were starkly removed from salvage ethnographic assumptions. From 1908 until his death, he was heavily involved with an

\(^{14}\) See Teit 1900, 1906, 1909, 1912, among many others. This work was undertaken for anthropologist Edward Sapir, for whom he started working in 1911, under the auspices of the federal Department of Mines which added an Anthropology Division to the Geological Survey of Canada in 1907. However, most of his work was financed by Boas through his affiliations with the American Museum of Natural History and later, Columbia University.


Aboriginal protest movement aimed at resolving the ‘Indian Land Question’. This work was sometimes all-consuming, involving a plethora of activities such as the writing of petitions, organizing meetings and political rallies, translating speeches, lobbying and accompanying delegations of chiefs and activists throughout British Columbia and to Ottawa. Such work dovetailed with his personal commitment to socialism. On a tangible level, Teit was a central figure in the formation of the Indian Rights Association (formed 1910) and the Interior Tribes of British Columbia (formed 1909). Both groups protested against the loss of land but also advocated to raise funds for engaging the courts in a review of Aboriginal title. Teit was also instrumental in the formation of the Allied Tribes of British Columbia, formed in 1916 to protest attempts to rearrange reserve sizes. This was a self-consciously unified group that claimed both to represent almost all Indigenous peoples of British Columbia as well as to combat the prevailing notion that Indigenous peoples had competing interests. In 1920, Teit was involved with opposition to Bill 13 (empowering the government to unilaterally impose land resettlement recommendations) and Bill 14 (on Aboriginal Enfranchisement). After failing in these efforts, Teit was recruited by Deputy Superintendent of the Department of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott to act as representative and liaison for the Indigenous peoples of the province in the Ditchburn-Clark Inquiry, set up to resolve land rights issues left outstanding by the Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British Columbia, known colloquially as the McKenna-


McBride Commission (1913-1916, hereinafter MMRC). Teit worried about the potentially compromising nature of his role as assistant to the Inquiry, and consequently sought and received positive council from several prominent Aboriginal chiefs before agreeing to take the job. Teit’s work in the inquiry was compromised by poor health though he did manage extensive work on this even while sick. He eventually succumbed to a long battle with a debilitating illness on October 30, 1922.

Through his multi-pronged professional endeavours, Teit accumulated a vast storehouse of knowledge concerning the flora, fauna and ecology of his new environment. This proficiency led to communication with Williams, who came to rely on Teit as a trusted advisor, confidant, and colleague.

The Legislative Development of Game Law in British Columbia

Williams did not enter a legislative vacuum upon his appointment in 1905. The first incarnation of game law was enacted in 1859 when the colonial House of Assembly passed the Act Providing for the Preservation of Game. The document was meant to provide an administrative space for colonial authorities (many of whom were Hudson’s Bay Co. officials as well) to regulate the dwindling supply of fur-bearing animals. Fur concerns notwithstanding, the Act was addressed the issue of game animals as well. The preamble of this document reads in part:

Birds and beasts of game constitute an important source of food, and the pursuit thereof affords occupation, and means of subsistence to many persons in the Colony, as well as healthy and manly recreation:
And whereas the pursuit and destruction of game in the breeding season tends to the

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19 Harris, Making Native Space, 252. Scott’s motives were not above reproach: there is evidence Scott, acting as an agent of the federal government sought, through Teit’s participation, to give the Commission a veneer of representation and respectability. It has been suggested that Teit was co-opted in this process. I believe this in incorrect. Teit was aware of the possible implications of the offer, but felt that taking the job would do more good than harm. See Wickwire, “We Shall Drink From the Stream and So Shall You,” 199-236; cf. E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986).
extinction of the whole race, and whereas game is unfit and unwholesome for food, and it is expedient to prohibit the destruction and use thereof in the breeding season...\(^{20}\)

This foundational document emphasized the intrinsic value of game as food, recreation and commercial resource. Moreover, it set general ideological guidelines for the growth of game protection.\(^{21}\) For the next half century, administrative personnel worked under the “general philosophy... of parcelling out a dwindling supply of resources rather than... maintaining and enhancing a renewable resource.”\(^{22}\) Williams himself claimed that “[e]ven at the time of my arrival in this country, there was some sort of game laws – but they were a dead letter... No one paid the slightest attention to them.”\(^{23}\) Over the next forty years, in spite of the awareness of gradual population reduction, legislators made few efforts to preserve or conserve game aside from the implementation of restricted open seasons around major centres and some seasonal restrictions on the sale of game. In 1898, The Game Protection Act brought the disparate legislation dealing with wildlife and hunting into one body of law. However, infrastructural deficiencies and problems policing the vast expanse of territory made the 1898 Act virtually unenforceable.\(^{24}\)

The watershed moment for game management arrived in 1905 when the McBride government enacted the Game Amendment Act, creating the Department for the Protection of Game and Forests. For the first time, wildlife administration came under the auspices of a

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\(^{20}\) *Act Providing for the Preservation of Game*, April 20, 1859, Section 17.


\(^{23}\) Williams, “Game Trails of British Columbia,” 340.

\(^{24}\) Donald Robinson contends that “from the 1880s to the early 1900s, game associations took on an active role in the management of game.” He also suggests that “sportsmen’s associations recognized this shortcoming and lobbied for a single agency to be responsible for the game resource through a revised game act.” See, Robinson, “Wildlife and the Law,” 49, 46.
single legislative unit with the unique duty of game protection. The amendment codified and consolidated existing law and further strengthened laws concerning poaching, hunting by out-of-province Indians, the restoration of depleted herds, seasonal hunting restrictions, the promotion of game-based tourism and the growth of its infrastructure, and the recognition of fair rules of the hunt.25 This document is still the foundation of contemporary game law. Williams played a major role in the construction of the 1905 Act, although his impartiality may have been compromised by his relationship to influential fish and game associations. These community-based sportsman’s clubs functioned as a powerful lobby, advocating for the protection of the game resources essential to their sport.26 Indeed, their interests were often in conflict with those of many homesteaders and Indigenous peoples who harvested game primarily for economic or subsistence purposes.

Williams’ initial years as Game Warden were taken up with lobbying for money and creating an administrative base. As part of his programme, Williams began in 1907 to appoint Deputy Game Wardens (DGWs) typically unpaid volunteers who were responsible (along with local police constables) for the local enforcement of game legislation.27 The fines meted out for infractions were substantial, designed to establish the seriousness of game protection and to deter recidivism.28 The following year, Williams received a budget of ten

26 Two of the more influential Game Associations were based in Vancouver and Victoria. Williams would undoubtedly had contact with these men in his professional capacity. There were also powerful Fish and Game Associations in Kamloops and Kelowna, and the Lower Mainland. The first provincial organization, The British Columbia Fish and Game Protective Association, was formed in the early 1930s. See, Straight, “Wildlife Societies in B.C.,” 139-150. Straight claims that “Behind all those bold moves were the clubs, or just as influential anglers and hunters, urging the members of the legislature.”
27 The first three were in Athelmer, Fernie and Lillocet. See, Ball, “A History of Wildlife Management Practices in British Columbia to 1918,” 60. All of these sites had large Game Associations. Many of the DGWs were unpaid, honorary appointments. Before 1907, there would be sixteen ‘temporary’ wardens appointed, mostly in the more settled areas of the province.
28 In 1906, violators were given one month in jail for possessing one female elk. In 1915, a $1000 fine was given for killing one cow caribou. In 1918, offenders got two months in jail for shooting grouse out of the
thousand dollars (increased to eighteen thousand in 1910) designated for the payment of
bounties for the unsolicited culling of ‘vermin’ and the hiring of full-time DGWs. In 1910,
the department was placed under the legislative control of Attorney-General W. J. Bowser,
reflecting the centrality of law and enforcement to the administration of game resources. The
Bowser-Williams correspondence is voluminous. However, as is befitting his title, Bowser
was primarily concerned with prosecutions and the coherence and development of further
legal proscriptions, leaving policy development to Williams.

In 1913, obligatory resident hunting licences (for non-Aboriginal peoples) were
introduced and quickly became a huge source of revenue for the Game Department. The
radical new system required a licence for any individual to carry a firearm on the rationale
that anyone who wished to shoot game should be required to contribute to their upkeep.
Some considered this practice an infringement of civil liberties, although it did exist in
several other comparable jurisdictions. The resulting increase in revenue allowed for
improved enforcement infrastructure, encouraged public use of the resource and instigated
more tourism promotion. More importantly from the perspective of game management,
guiding was licenced in the same year. This guides’ licencing scheme allowed the industry
to be monitored by requiring out-of-province hunters to hunt with a certified guide (including
Indigenous peoples). It also forced a standard of accountability from guides who could lose
their livelihood if their licences were rescinded. The new licencing plan complemented the

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29 The estimate of 12,000 licences was quickly surpassed, totaling almost 40,000, producing 110,000 dollars annually. Accordingly, field and office staff were increased. Twenty-six full time DGWs were hired. There were four types of licences: 1) Ordinary Firearms Licence (deer and birds), $5.00, 2) General Firearms Licence (all game), $5.00, 3) Special Firearms Licence (Trapping, all game), $10.00, 4) Guide Licence, $5.00. Farmers and prospectors had to be licenced to hunt, though they did not have to pay.


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existing out-of-province hunting licence required by tourists. Over the next few years, Williams was involved in the negotiation of national and international conservation schemes, particularly concerning migratory birds. Williams objected to some of the clauses in the *Migratory Birds Convention Act 1916*, signed by the United States and Britain (on behalf of Canada). He steered BC into an emerging conservation treaty network, though not at the expense of local hunting interests which he feared could be threatened by the trans-national closed seasons that the above agreement imposed.\(^{31}\)

Internal political manoeuvring resulted in the ouster of Williams in 1917-18. The election of a Liberal government in BC resulted in a change in the emphasis of game management from a policy developed around “managing a living resource” to one designed around “policing the users.”\(^{32}\) He resigned his commission, or was perhaps forced into such actions, largely because he believed the new system to be untenable and likely to be compromised by precisely the type of bureaucratic inefficiency that he had struggled to avoid. Under the new structure, the Game Department lost its autonomous status and was subsumed within the Provincial Police force (DGWs were dismissed and replaced by local Constables) which took over sole responsibility for the enforcement of the Game Act. A five member Game Conservation Board took over Williams’ duties. This strictly advisory panel would meet four times per year, making unenforceable recommendations until 1929 when its ineffectuality became manifest and Williams was returned to his former position where he would remain until in 1934.

**Locating the Stikine, Situating the Tahltan**

\(^{31}\) See, Janet Foster, “Working for Wildlife,” 135-36, 139-140.
\(^{32}\) McTaggart-Cowan, “Science and the Conservation of Wildlife in British Columbia,” 94. This reflects a larger shift in governance philosophy from the ‘development’-minded Tories under McBride to the reformist Liberals under Brewster/Oliver.
One of the primary goals of this body of law on game protection was to establish government presence and infrastructure in the more remote parts of the province that were fairly disconnected from the administrative, economic, and political power of the south. In order to analyse this problem effectively, my study will focus on the structural imposition of this power, and efforts to resist its authority, in the Stikine Plateau. Sandwiched between the Cassiar and Coast mountain ranges, the Stikine Plateau in the northwest corner of British Columbia (also called the Cassiar) is dry and relatively moderate in temperature, with forests and rivers inhabited by abundant fish and wildlife. The area is home to the Tahltn, an Athapaskan-speaking people, though the Tlingit, Kaska, and Tagish all have a historical presence in the region. According to Tahltn creation beliefs, the Stikine Plateau was created by Siskee-a-cho (Big Crow), who lived long ago at Siskee-a-cho Kimma (today known as Tahltn Bluff) at the confluence of the Tahltn and Stikine Rivers. In his posthumously-published fieldnotes on the Tahltn, Teit portrayed pre-contact Tahltn culture as semi-nomadic and dependant on seasonal hunting and fishing. Disparate camps, owned by individual clans or families, regulated movement and traditional subsistence patterns.33

Social structures and external relations of the Indigenous peoples of the Stikine Plateau were transformed in the aftermath of European contact in the early nineteenth century. Russian fur merchants traded with the coastal Tlingit as early as 1799, enabling western goods to reach Tahltn territory via firmly established Indigenous trade networks. The Tahltn were directly involved in the fur trade, taking the desirable pelts of mink, marten, muskrat and beaver fur from interior and northern neighbours (mostly Kaska) in exchange for goods received from the Tlingit. This period witnessed increased

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intermarriage, cultural exchange, and trade linkage between the Tahlitan and Tlingit. It was also a time of heavy exposure to European diseases. Epidemics in 1832-1838 and 1847-49, drastically reduced the Tahlitan population, and compromised Tahlitan rights to lucrative fishing stations on the Stikine and its feeder rivers. During the nineteenth-century, the Tahlitan and Tlingit developed a complex system of territorial overlap. The Tlingit, who always had greater population numbers, asserted control over large sections of the Stikine River, where they had several major fishing stations that they used in the spring and summer. Yet the Tahlitan had an adequate resource supply which they secured from their fishing, hunting, trapping, and to a lesser extent, plant gathering activities.

Gold mediated settler-Indigenous interaction in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In 1861, prospector Alexander “Buck” Choquette discovered placer gold on the Stikine River, igniting the first major influx of non-Indigenous people into the region. The miners found little gold, but the episode forced colonial authorities to assert nominal claims of control over the region. The Stikine River also saw its first steamboat in the spring of 1862, when a Prussian named William Moore brought the *Flying Dutchman* up to the Stikine from Vancouver with 125 gold seekers and cargo for trade. In 1866, the Collins Overland Telegraph Expedition of Western Union Co. transported a great quantity of cable aboard the *Mumford* to the site that would become Telegraph Creek. This scheme to connect America and Europe via a telegraph link over the Bering Strait was abandoned the following year, following the success of a separate venture to lay a transatlantic cable. However, it

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34 Sylvia Albright, *Tahlitan Ethnoarchaeology* (Burnaby: Dept of Archaeology, Simon Fraser University, Publication no. 15, 1984), 16-17. Albright says the Tahlitan estimate their highest population at 1000-1500, with a population low of 300 to 325 after the second epidemic. In a March 1908 letter to Williams, Teit estimates the 1906 population of Tahlitan at “200 or less”. See, PGW, Teit to Williams, 19 March, 1908.


established the townsite of Telegraph Creek (at the head of navigation) and contributed to the consolidation of the steamboat infrastructure that eventually brought many non-Indigenous peoples into the region. Travellers would ride up the coast from the Lower Mainland to Wrangell (also spelled Wrangel), Alaska, at the mouth of the Stikine River, where they would change boats for the trip up the Stikine. The Stikine steamboats (and also some sternwheelers) were staffed primarily by Tlingit living around Wrangell.

In the early 1870s, gold was found near Dease Lake, leading to the Cassiar Gold Rush of 1874 which brought about 1500 miners into the region.\textsuperscript{37} The presence of miners and capital instigated great infrastructural and commercial developments: road construction, increased steamer traffic on the Stikine, a Hudson’s Bay Company post and an outfitting post run by J. Frank Callbreath at Glenora, sixteen kilometres downstream from Telegraph Creek. The 1874 gold rush also increased strain on the Tahlta, with further imports of disease and alcohol. Around this time, in reaction to dwindling population numbers and corresponding threats to sociocultural continuity, the Tahlta regrouped under one chief at a common village site called Goon-tedar-shaga (known as Tahlta), approximately twenty kilometres upriver from Telegraph Creek. Anthropologist Bruce MacLachlan claimed that the Cassiar gold rush, which brought white traders to the region, permanently disrupted established trading patterns. Before 1874, the Tahlta would travel to their hunting grounds and establish winter camps at pre-determined locations. They would reconvene for the spring-summer fishing and feasting season and would have major trading assemblies with the Tlingit in June and September. After 1874, however, with the influence of white traders, “it became customary to break the winter hunting by a return to [the village of] Tahlta for

Christmas season.  

The discovery of gold in the Klondike in the closing years of the nineteenth century resulted in a massive flood of prospectors hungry for any advantage in getting to the site sooner than their competitors. Savvy promoters in the Lower Mainland advertised the Stikine as the beginning of the "all-Canadian" route. An estimated 3000-3500 miners wintered at Glenora and Telegraph Creek in 1897-1898 before attempting the newly-cut Teslin (or Telegraph) Trail from Telegraph Creek to Teslin Lake, Atlin and beyond before the spring thaw of 1898. Unfortunately for these men, the Teslin Trail was longer, muddier, with less infrastructural support than the infamous Chilkoot and White Trails out of Skagway and Deah, Alaska. The effects of the gold rush were brief in the Stikine, but the construction of the Yukon Telegraph line, begun in 1900 and completed the following year, ensured that outside influence was maintained in the area.

Telegraph Creek became an important townsit around this time. It was already the outfitting centre of the growing big-game hunting industry. Merchant-outfitters facilitated excursions for sportsmen from around the world seeking an 'authentic' experience in the rugged, pristine and relatively inaccessible Stikine Plateau. In the town there were two principal outfitters, J. F. Callbreath and the partnership of John Hyland and A. E. Belfry. From these men, guides and hunters could procure everything they needed for long trips into the hunting grounds, averaging one to one and a half months, including food, pack trains,

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40 Albright, Tahltan Ethnoarchaeology, 18. Glenora had two booms, both of which died quickly after initial promise. These booms occurred during the Cassiar gold rush (1873-1876) and during the Klondike gold rush (1897-1900).
ammunition, tents, etc.\textsuperscript{41} The big game hunting industry was incorporated into a stout wage economy, in which white and Indigenous peoples were employed as guides, hunters, cooks, horse wranglers, store clerks, and steamboat operators. The Klondike gold rush gave a huge boost to guiding and outfitting operations in the Stikine, further opening the area to the south, encouraging infrastructural growth, and promoting the escalation of a wage economy.

Most of the hunting grounds were north of the Stikine River, though there were some to the south. The high cost of a hunting trip to the Stikine restricted most visitation to middle-class professionals. These men (and a very few women) were primarily from Canada and the United States, though some traveled from Europe. They came to the Stikine because of the great selection of animals available within a relatively small area and because of the large size of the area’s wildlife. They were principally after grizzly bear, though they also coveted a host of other big game: caribou, big-horn sheep, mountain goats, moose (recently returned to the region after a prolonged absence), wood buffalo, and black and brown bear. The guides were a diverse group. A few outsiders, like Teit, came from elsewhere and were hired on a contractual basis. These men were in the minority and were highly sought after. Local guides, mostly Indigenous men, were usually affiliated with one of the outfitters, and could be contracted through them at a daily rate.\textsuperscript{42} Because the Stikine was such a valuable hunting ground, Williams moved quickly to secure it under his purview. He appointed customs agent George Adsit, a former guide (and a friend and collaborator of Teit) as DGW for the Stikine in 1908. C.A. Tervo worked alongside Adsit from 1911 and both were replaced by William Strong in 1914. Like all DGWs, these men sold licences, upheld

\textsuperscript{41} For detailed list of what was needed see, Teit, \textit{British Columbia and Big Game Hunting}, 43-48.

\textsuperscript{42} It is difficult to know how many men worked in the industry in the Stikine, as the work was highly seasonal and some men didn’t work every year. However, a base number can be established from the signatories to the strike-ending agreement (discussed below). Twenty-nine Tahltan men signed the agreement and two or three would not sign. Therefore, there were about thirty men available for hire.
regulations, and filed monthly or annual reports with the head office in Vancouver.

Unfortunately, there is little direct correspondence with Williams and they did little to inform him of the hunting conditions, instead focusing on the legal aspects of their work. However, Williams did correspond with Government Agent Henry Dodd and Indian Agent W. Scott Simpson, who (at Williams’ request) helped to disseminate game protection measures to the Tahltan and advised on local conditions. This was important, as the Tahltan were subject to all of the new regulations with the exception of the gun licencing arrangement.

The Tahltan benefited economically from the growth of big game hunting, at least when viewed in capitalist terms. It continued their incorporation into the wage economy begun during the various gold rushes. Through their work in the industry as guides, cooks, and packers, the Tahltan earned wages (though less than non-Indigenous equivalents) which they used at the trading posts in Telegraph Creek for the purchase of European goods and foodstuffs. The timing of hunting trips in the Stikine overlapped with the beginning of the regular hunting season of the Tahltan. Despite the potential conflict, the Tahltan engaged in both the developing economy and maintained their ties to the traditional subsistence hunting economy. This was a constant process of negotiation for the Tahltan, who resisted many aspects of Euro-Canadian culture but accepted others.\(^{43}\)

James Teit provides a useful snapshot of Tahltan society at the turn of the twentieth-century. Basing his observations on ethnographic data collected while on guiding trips in 1903 and 1905, Teit outlined the extent of European influence on Tahltan culture. He argued that they had “assimilated the customs of the whites to marked degree.”\(^{44}\) They adopted the European style of dress (though they still wore moccasins), built log cabins and rafts for river

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travel, and many of the younger members spoke good English. However, he added that they maintained a strong connection to various aspects of Tahltan culture. In transportation, they preferred dogs to horses and continued to utilize snowshoes as the primary means of travel in winter. Moreover, largely because of climate, they had little motivation to engage in the type of agriculture being advocated by government as a means of progress. Teit stressed that the “Tahltan were, and still are, pre-eminently hunters and trappers, and gain by far the better part of their livelihood by the snaring and trapping of fur-bearing animals, and the hunting of large game.”

Teit collected oral narratives from 15 Tahltan individuals during his two ethnographic field seasons in 1912 and 1915. One of these accounts sheds light on the cosmological complexity of the Tahltan relationship to wildlife. It focusses on a woman who controlled the game, known as AtsEntma or the Meat-Mother. According to the account,

She has the power of making game scarce in certain places. When this happens the Indians believe that some one has not treated the animals respectfully or has failed to make full use of them as food, and that therefore their mother has called them home for a time or for good, as a warning or punishment for the Indians.

There is obvious danger in treating a single story told by one individual almost a century ago as representative of the composite views of the larger group. This story could not speak for all members of the community, but rather, only for individual members speaking with Teit at the time. Despite this problem, the Meat-Mother account does suggest that there were stories in circulation in the early twentieth century that addressed the proper protocol required of hunters in relation to animals. In this one instance, the Tahltan relationship to wildlife was mediated according to this story which laid out their responsibilities to the Meat-Mother. Deviations from accepted conduct could have punitive consequences for hunters and for the

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rest of the Tahltan. The story of the Meat-Mother strongly suggests that some Tahltan
maintained their own notions of a conservation scheme before, or at least at the same time as,
the advent of the Game Department under Williams. Certainly, it shows that conduct
towards animals was regulated in Tahltan culture. Whether or not such stories determined
actual hunting practices circa 1910 has not been recorded.

The strength and veracity of these beliefs was challenged by religious institutions
attempting to establish roots in the community. Anglican and Presbyterian missions vied for
primacy before the former established a permanent presence in 1910 under the stewardship
of T.P.W. Thorman and his sons. With a grant from the federal government, Thorman
established a day school for local Tahltan and worked hard, but with marginal success, to
dissuade all Tahltan from continuing traditional subsistence rounds; subsistence hunting and
fishing retained their importance to Tahltan lifeways.47

Economic and social upheaval, prompted by the massive influx of non-Indigenous
gold seekers to the region, instigated large-scale changes to Tahltan economic practices.
Historian Ken Coates shows that in the Yukon, even before the Klondike gold rush,
Indigenous involvement in the “informal and fluid” mining economy “laid the basis for the
Indians’ participation in the new economic order.”48 Yukon Indigenous peoples worked on
the supply and transportation side of the economy, as there were few opportunities for
employment in the mines themselves. This work established the casual and seasonal pattern
of wage work that would endure into the twentieth century, allowing Indigenous peoples to
adapt successfully to the new economic realities ushered in by the gold rush. When news of
the Klondike gold findings trickled down to the outside world in the summer of 1897,

47 Albright, *Tahltan Ethnoarchaeology*, 19-20
48 Ken Coates, *Best Left as Indians: Native-White Relations in the Yukon Territory, 1840-1973* (Montreal and
Indigenous peoples in the region were well-placed to benefit economically from the tide of miners coming north. Again, they worked primarily as packers, store clerks and in various aspects of the provisioning of prospectors. The Tahltan, involved in this economy based out of Telegraph Creek, were integral to the continuation of the gold rush economy. However, this “accommodation to the new economic ventures occurred, importantly, within the contours of their hunting-gathering patterns.”\(^\text{49}\) Equally as significant was that the Klondike gold rush resulted in the entrenchment of non-Native economic interests in the region.\(^\text{50}\)

The Klondike gold rush also contributed to changing cultural perceptions of nature, wildlife, and hunting among Indigenous peoples of the area. Environmental historian Kathryn Morse describes the commodification of “knowledge, experience, and connections to nature” that occurred during the Klondike gold rush.\(^\text{51}\) This threatened the symbiotic association that the Tahltan had developed with nature and wildlife in the Stikine. The cultural power of the Meat-Mother was jeopardized by the growth of an international commodity market that traded in furs, taxidermy, and pelts. Tahltan involvement in this trade was facilitated through their involvement in the local wage economy. Nature and wildlife began to be consumed in different ways. Valuable for more than subsistence, animals and their habitat were consumed not only on dinner tables, but as art on walls, through gun sights, in photographs and as fodder for the great narratives of hunting and ‘frontier’ travel. The commodification of nature, which became as much a space to consume as a space to sustain, altered Tahltan relationships to their environment, and likely facilitated greater participation in the hunting/guiding industry. Morse also suggests a tangible affect on the diet and hunting pursuits of Indigenous peoples: “The gold rush affected how, where and

\(^{49}\) Coates, *Best Left as Indians*, 43
\(^{50}\) Coates, *Best Left as Indians*, 44.
\(^{51}\) Morse, *The Nature of Gold*, 68.
why Native peoples hunted, fished and marketed their catch, but it also changed the Indians' own connection to nature through the foods they themselves consumed.\footnote{Morse, The Nature of Gold, 162.}

The culture(s) of hunting take on multiple meanings during this time. A complex calculus mediated relations between the Tahltn, sportsmen, the state, and wildlife. The meanings embedded within the act of hunting itself are contingent on the cultural and historical frameworks of the participants. As discussed above, in spite of outside influences the Tahltn maintained a firm connection to their cultural heritage and to the way it managed their relationship to the land and wildlife. The influx of capital, state power, and unique cultural assumptions to land and wildlife confronted Tahltn cultural frameworks at their core. The inclusion of many Tahltn into the wage economy further challenged Indigenous epistemologies. Wildlife, while still maintaining its subsistence value, also gained new commodity value through the practice of big game guiding and hunting for market or export. For example, moose was important for meat, hides, antlers as well as manufactured uses. Conversely, sportsmen valued moose for its aesthetic value, as a head mounted in a den. The Tahltn interacted with these conflicted meanings by integrating ‘modern’ understandings of wildlife into their own economic and cultural vocabularies.

Teit and Williams also had conflicted notions of the cultures of hunting. Williams promoted a profitable, aesthetically-motivated tourist hunting economy that was tied into a liberal state-building project. In order to do so he had to control the subsistence hunting of rural and Indigenous peoples. He used administrative, judicial and corporal power to achieve this goal. Teit’s position also raises questions. He supported Williams’ game management efforts by helping him outline its parameters. Yet, as the case study will bear out, Teit often advised Williams with the interests of Indigenous peoples in mind. As a guide he
incorporated Tahlitan men into a wage economy and guided tourists on 'traditional' hunting territories. In this capacity he also facilitated Tahlitan resistance to state game management practices. Teit recognized that hunting provided the Tahlitan with both a stable, seasonal income as well as a space to resist liberal resettlement of their land. So how do these conflicting 'cultures of nature' interact with each other? And how do they affect interactions with landscape and nature? An awareness of the concept of social nature – that is, viewing environments as nature/culture assemblages – can ease some of the tension surrounding these differing understandings of hunting. The idea that nature is a social construction allows the researcher to account for how and for whom nature is remade.\(^{53}\) Williams, Teit, the Tahlitan, and sportmen all 'made' Stikine nature according their own cultural outlook.

By the early 1900s, largely because of economic opportunities in the new wage economy, many Tahlitan began to base themselves in at the main trading depot of Telegraph Creek, though some still lived in the smaller communities of Glenora and Tahlitan. At Telegraph Creek, they heard about the efforts of an emerging Aboriginal Rights movement from Teit and from the neighbouring Nisga’a who were very active politically. Perhaps instigated by the grievances articulated by southern Indigenous peoples, the Tahlitan voiced their own concerns about land rights and the possible usurpation of hunting territory by the crown. The 1910 *Declaration of the Tahlitan Tribe*, signed by “Chief Nanok, Nastulta, George Assadza, Kenetl, and eighty other members of the tribe”, states explicitly that the Tahlitan have clear conception of a “sovereign right” to their territory as a cohesive entity to be understood apart from any property formulations inscribed by the provincial government.

This "tribal land," they wrote, has been protected "at the cost of our own blood... because our lives depended on our country."54 The Declaration expressed the wish that outstanding land disputes be reconciled through treaty, so that subsequent settlement and infrastructural development would not infringe of Tahltan land rights.

The Tahltan Declaration emerged with the context of a growing Aboriginal Rights movement aimed at redressing the 'Indian Land Question'. The Tahltan were connected to this network through Teit and through Chief Nanok, who had travelled south to participate in several meetings organized by Teit at Spences Bridge for the Indian Rights Association. The Declaration shows that the Tahltan were connected to the wider movement and were aware of the policy goals of the federal and provincial governments and of the prevailing responses to those goals. It was the first concrete (and uniquely Tahltan) expression of a political resistance that would later grow to include opposition to the MMRC. This resistance movement will be a major focus of the case study, as it shaped the Tahltan response to game management practices and the attempt to instill a liberal order world-view.

In the following section, I will look at how conservation measures allowed the state, under the able direction of A. Bryan Williams, to dictate both who used the land and how it could be used. In perpetuating an economy around big game hunting, Williams and his conservation measures compromised existing economies of subsistence by fetishizing animals and the natural landscape used by rural and Indigenous peoples. This continued a phenomenon set in motion by settlers, fur traders, gold rushers, steamboat operators, and telegraph companies. The following chapter will explore the methods, motivations, and innovations of Williams and the vigorous resistance to his program.

Power and Resistance in the Correspondence of Teit and Williams

The correspondence between Teit and Williams covers the period between 1905 and 1918. It is unclear whether it continued after Williams’ job termination in 1917-18 or if they wrote to each other before his appointment as Game Warden. Gaps in the correspondence are likely due to imprecise filing and storage methods within the Game Department and at the Provincial Archives. The gaps may also be explained by other reasons. Both men suffered illness or injury over the years of their interaction. Teit was often busy with his political activism, big game guiding, and ethnographic fieldwork. Nevertheless, the existing correspondence provides a vital insight into the influence of these two men on the development of game law and on each other. Moreover, the growth of game law can be seen within liberal hegemonic understandings of law, land, and society. In the following chapters, I will present the contents of the correspondence thematically.

Chapter Three will attempt to map out the distinct places of Teit and Williams in the expansion of game protection. Firstly, I will examine Williams’ role in tourism promotion with the goal of highlighting possible economic motivations for the development of conservation policy. I will also locate Williams’ role in the strengthening of state infrastructures in remote areas of the province. Secondly, I will undertake an analysis of guiding/licencing policy in order to uncover the restrictions implemented by Williams. This will provide a lens onto both Williams’ and Teit’s views on the status of Indigenous peoples in

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1 It is possible that I have not found all of the correspondence between the two men as there are several extended gaps in the continuity. The first letter (Teit to Williams, 15 Jan, 1905) indicates that they already knew each other, possibly from guiding.

2 Teit suffered from ‘rheumatism,’ causing him to remain bedridden for long periods. He also had failing eyesight, likely from reading in poor light. Williams was badly injured in May 1911 when a pile of bricks fell on him in Vancouver, crushing his left leg and causing serious internal injuries. They also met intermittently at Williams’ office in Vancouver which may have obviated the need for letters at points.
the guiding industry. Thirdly, I will discuss the 'scientific' elements of game management in BC, as well as the vast environmental data that Teit disclosed to Williams and how Williams sought to collect and use that information. This will expose the assumptions underlying the modern practice of wildlife conservation as well as the practical effects of the imposition of game law on the everyday lives of rural inhabitants. The fourth section will examine the information that Williams solicited from Teit, and, how the former incorporated that information in the development of game law. The next section will deal with Williams' representation of Teit to prospective hunters and other correspondents, using ideals of masculinity and anti-modernity to frame Teit within the popular discourse of the early-twentieth century. Chapter Four will look at the resistance to the encroachment of game protection measures in the Stikine Plateau. The first section deals with reactions to Teit's political advocacy and draws connections between his political efforts and the emergence of a resistance movement among the Tahltan. Lastly, I will examine the attitudes toward Indigenous peoples that emerge from the correspondence (particularly those of Williams) and trace the way these prejudices shaped policy.

I have drawn on several other sources in creating this case study. The Provincial Game Warden (PGW) Files, which hold most of Williams' personal and professional communication, contain vast correspondence with other interested parties. These letters to and from guides, potential tourists, fish and game associations, museum personnel, outdoor magazines, government bureaucrats and Deputy Game Wardens will provide a more complete account. Teit's additional correspondence with individual hunters and guiding clients (that Teit often shared with Williams and were therefore catalogued in the PGW Files) will be used to fill out his political and hunting/guiding activities. Each year, Williams filed an Annual Report to the
Legislative Assembly, outlining his financial expenditures, detailing the successes and failures of his department. These are an invaluable source, representing the full spectrum of Williams' professional and political agenda.

"The most ardent sportsman here finds Mecca": Tourism and State Formation

Among his many duties as Game Warden, Williams acted as an unofficial travel agent for the hunting industry in BC. In game-based tourism, Williams saw prodigious economic opportunity. He corresponded with individuals across Canada, the United States and Europe, wrote to Game Associations and magazines extolling the pristine virtue of the BC wilderness, and facilitated hunting trips by developing an organizational infrastructure. To secure funding from the Legislature, Williams had to provide a sound economic rationale for the existence of the Game Department. He sought to validate his expenditures by trumpeting the exponential increase in revenue derived through his policies. This represented not simply licence revenue but, according to Williams, money invested in the growth of the province. Williams certainly had a flair for promotion. In his first Annual Report, he claimed that

It is very seldom that a man comes into this country to shoot big game without leaving $1,500 behind him, and more often it is double that amount; while, in addition to this, it is quite a frequent occurrence [sic] that a man who comes here simply and solely to shoot, while he is here sees the commercial advantage of the country, and not only invests money himself, but advises his friends to do likewise, and generally advertises the country.

In other words, game management was a boon to the province by encouraging the growth of an investment economy. Sportsmen were men of influence and wealth, and Williams sought to

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4 A. Bryan Williams, "Provincial Game Warden Annual Report 1905", Sessional Papers, D7. See also, British Columbia Archives and Records Services, Provincial Game Warden Files (GR-446) (hereinafter PGW), A. Bryan Williams to R.G. Tatlow (Minister of Finance), 31 July, 1908, re. author E. J. Millais.
exploit this image to convince his potential political patrons of the need for sound economic support for his work.

In fact, policies were often guided by business considerations, reflecting a possible tension between game management and economic considerations. In a discussion of sheep hunting seasons, Williams told Teit, "I am aware that [extending the season] might be an advantage to tourists, etc., and there is no doubt that it would lengthen the time that a guide can find employment...", although he admitted that "that is not the question but whether it would be a disadvantage to game protection or the reverse." In developing policy, Williams was forced to negotiate a divide between initiatives focused solely on pragmatic wildlife protection and wider considerations of potential economic advantage. His business focus often shone through in his Annual Reports, providing a model for policy decisions. In 1907, he showed the "enormous profits" that a private company could achieve if "the province were to lease the Cassiar District." Reflecting the econocentrism of the ruling group, he then asked rhetorically, "[w]hy cannot the Government do this as well as a private company." Clearly, Williams' perception of his role as a manager/bureaucrat was blurred by economic considerations.

The business/policy conflict was evident throughout Williams' promotion of his vision of British Columbia as a hunting mecca. Discussing his own correspondence with an aristocratic Austrian hunter, Adolph Von Hagen, Williams told Teit that "I should like to get him out here as, from another letter I had, it rather looks as if he is coming out here just as an advance guard of a number of other Austrians, who would not be likely to do any harm to the game and would be likely to leave a lot of money in the country, some of which would go

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5 PGW, A. Bryan Williams to James A. Teit, 30 January, 1906.
towards game protection.” If Williams could successfully promote British Columbia as a ‘Sportsman’s Eden’ he felt he could better justify the existence of his own department and perhaps lobby for increased funding. He later pleads with Teit, “Now that the matter has gone so far he is very anxious to engage you and I hope you will see your way to come to terms with him as I am very anxious to get a few people over from that country and counteract an unpleasant feeling that has got credit over there as to the way that people are treated when they come here.”

British Columbia was attractive to European and American hunters partly because of the perception that many of the ‘exotic’ hunting grounds in India and Africa were ‘shot out’. Williams maintained that “it can only be a matter of a few years when those countries that do not have strict preservation of their game will not have any game at all, and those that do will reap a rich harvest from the number of people who will come to hunt it.” In contrast, northern British Columbia, in spite of increased hunting associated with the fur trade and various gold rushes, still had ‘abundant’ wildlife resources, particularly such desirable quarry as the grizzly bear. As part of the advertising scheme in Europe, Williams sent a display of stuffed animals to exhibitions in Vienna and Glasgow in the summer of 1910. In his promotion efforts, Williams exalted the spectacular wildlife available to the industrious sportsman in British Columbia. He tried to show that game was “too valuable to be killed simply and solely because a man wants fresh meat.” His class affiliations (and commitments to a hegemonic order) clear, Williams was free to recruit desired sportmen and investors.

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7 PGW, Williams to Teit, 6 February, 1906. See also Williams to Teit, 18 May, 1906.  
8 PGW, Williams to Teit, 28 March, 1906. This refers to a monograph by a Mr. Niedwick (see Williams to Teit, 18 May, 1906) who suggested that he had been mistreated by his guides while hunting in BC.  
Indeed, Williams’ initiatives did boost the number of sportsmen who travelled into the province. He sent some of this increased business to Teit who was similarly enthusiastic about the economic benefits of big game hunting in the province. Within the original reference to the trip of Von Hagen, Williams suggested that “I think it extremely likely it might open up a lucrative business for you.”¹² Financial rewards notwithstanding, Teit appeared to greatly enjoy guiding work. It drew him into the backcountry for extended periods and supplemented his irregular annual income. Initially, Teit was keen to prove his merit. Early in their correspondence, Teit offered that he “can furnish references to many men in America and Europe that I have hunted with[.]”¹³ By this time (1906) Teit had much guiding experience throughout the province, including two trips to the Stikine. Perhaps wanting to maintain a certain amount of continuity in his commercial dealings, Williams gave Teit business advice:

I would suggest that another year you do not bind yourself in any way unless it is a most lucrative engagement. This season I could have put you in communication with at least two parties looking for guides and both of them of unlimited wealth. However, for all I know the men you are proposing to take out may be better than any I know of[.]”¹⁴

Evidently, Teit incorporated some of Williams’ business recommendations into his own dealings. Williams received a letter from Walter Scott, a Colorado Springs lawyer, stating that “Teit asked some little more than your letter mentioned but he wrote us a most businesslike, satisfactory letter.”¹⁵ Teit indicated to Williams that his tourism policies were succeeding, though he lamented the widening divide between policy and law, blaming the vacillation of politicians for the difficulties. As will be shown, despite real concerns over negative consequences for the area’s Indigenous peoples, Teit remained supportive of the overarching

¹² PGW, Williams to Teit, 6 February, 1906.
¹³ PGW, Teit to Williams, 12 February, 1906.
¹⁴ PGW, Williams to Teit, 2 April, 1906. See also 3 December, 1906.
¹⁵ PGW, Walter Scott to Williams, 18 January, 1907.
goal of game protection and generally for commercial uses of game.

As a component of his tourism promotion, Williams sought Teit's help in the outfitting, personnel hiring, and itinerary planning for many hunting excursions, primarily in the Stikine. For the Von Hagen trip, Williams suggested, "You will thus see that if the trip was a success you would open up a good business for yourself and, as well as taking people out, you could make a business of arranging trips for others." In 1908, Williams asked Teit to make arrangements for the Bailey party from England: "I do not think any of them are wealthy men, and they will probably have to do the trip economically... [however] I do not think there will be any doubt but that they will be willing to pay you something for your trouble, anyway I will do what I can with them on your behalf." Teit made hunting plans for numerous groups over the next decade, helping to open up the Stikine as a desirable, though relatively inaccessible, hunting area. During the period covered by the correspondence, the Stikine averaged between 20 and 30 hunting parties per year (one or two persons per party). If Williams' calculations were correct, this brought considerable capital into the region, both in the form of guides' wages and supply purchases from local merchants. Though some of it surely left the area aboard the November steamship heading south, much of it was reinvested in the local economy, contributing to the growth of local liberal-capitalist infrastructures.

**Guiding and Licencing**

Teit was instrumental in the improvement of the regulatory structure for guiding and licencing. The overall goal of this project was to institutionalize and universalize restrictions and regulations for guides and hunters within liberal market guidelines. As well, guides'
licences were meant to use guides as monitors to ensure that kill limits and closed seasons were respected. In early 1905, Teit notes, “I agree with you that the licencing of guides would be a means of keeping track of hunting parties, but such cannot be done effectually excepting every one who takes out a hunting party has to take out a licence.”20 For Williams, licencing guides was the ideal means for regulating hunting practice. He admitted that “[w]hat I am most anxious to get is a guides licence, I do not care about it being a latge [sic] one but I think it is most necessary to have some way of keeping some track of the unscrupulous guides and some of the non-residents who come in here to hunt, will not pay their licence and kill anything and everything they come across.”21 Teit, also concerned about overhunting, sought to bolster his argument (this time on hunting licences) by citing the recommendations of his clients. In late 1906, he claimed that “Mr. Brooks, who was out with me lately, and others of his class advocate the increase of their licence to $100.00 to help the funds for the better protection of game. I think it would be a wise move to increase the licence.”22 Six years later, Teit quoted a letter received from a Capt. Douglas-Pennant, who informed Teit that “the sooner the B.C. authorities wake up, and licence guides, and keep a black list, the better it will be for a fine hunting ground, and for future sportsmen.”23 Williams himself had been approached to augment the fee, stating in response to the previous letter that, “I have had several tourists suggest an increase of the game licences and I am mentioning it [in his Annual Report], if you have any other suggestions let me know.”24

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20 PGW, Teit to Williams, 15 January, 1905. Teit cites many states as examples of where this has worked. He also suggests that guides be required to submit an affidavit of numbers killed during each expedition. It would be eight years until this recommendation was implemented.
21 PGW, Williams to Teit, 13 January, 1906. The ‘non-residents’ to whom he is referring are primarily Indigenous peoples coming across the provincial lines into their traditional hunting territory.
22 PGW, Teit to Williams, 27 November, 1906.
23 PGW, Teit to Williams 30 May, 1912.
24 PGW, Williams to Teit, 3 December, 1906. The ‘loopholes’ in the miners licence allowed them to kill unlimited quantities of animals provided they could show that they were in need.
Indeed, Williams often used his Annual Report as a pulpit to preach the virtues of licencing and policy goals. In 1906, while advocating for a expanded hunting licence (different from a guides’ licence), Williams suggested that “there are numbers of sportsmen who are perfectly aware of the good to be derived from such a licence and are very much in favour of it, but also there are others who would prefer things as they are, fearing, perhaps, that an increased protection staff would tend to put a stop to poaching proclivities, to which some are so unfortunately addicted.” In other words, honourable sportsmen (of the type Williams wished to recruit) would surely not object to a high licence fee if it protected game from those with more dubious motives. The following year, Williams advocated for even more substantial licencing requirements:

The greater part of these tourists were men of considerable means, and it is not probable that many of them would have been deterred from coming had the licence been $100 instead of $50. Certainly for such sport as the Cassiar affords, $100 is none too high, and with a regular Game Warden to prevent illegal slaughter of game in the summer and assist the tourists in engaging good guides, etc., $150 would not be excessive. With the licences raised to $100, we would probably soon have sufficient revenue to put our big game protection on a fairly good footing.

Williams had a particular class of individual in mind. The hunters that he wanted in British Columbia were men of means who could easily afford the steep licence fee. In fact, upper-class hunters would easily agree to a hundred dollar license fee which would pale in comparison to the substantial outlay required for trip to the Stikine (reaching upwards of $2000, plus travel expenses). However, for lower-classes the hundred dollar fee would be prohibitive. The subtext is that hunting should be the preserve of ‘sophisticated’ men who shared a particular approach to the practice of hunting. The above passage also shows Williams pragmatic and business-like attitude to game protection. For Williams, those who

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used the resource should surely not object to contributing to its upkeep.

The argument surrounding hunting and guides licences had a direct effect on Teit and his guiding colleagues in the Stikine and elsewhere, providing ample motivation to supply information that could effect policy implementations. Teit was assertive regarding the terms upon which he would undertake guiding contracts. He was also reluctant to pin himself down to specifics, as he was keenly aware of the many variables attached to hunting big game:

Unlike other guides in this country, (for at least the last ten years) I have never gone out on days wages but have always contracted to do the trip for a lump sum (taking all risks)... I furnish a complete outfit of all cooking and camping utensils, food, horses, boats, men and in fact everything required for the trip excepting liquor and ammunition. For a trip similar to what Mr. Von Hagen proposes say for two months I would probably charge Two Thousand Dollars, but as my charges vary according to the grounds to be hunted & some parts of the country being more than twice as expensive to me to hunt in than others, I cannot state a definite figure except if some special trip was outlined and agreed on first.  

Guides could make sizable amounts if they were successful. Over a twenty year career as a guide Teit built a formidable reputation and as a result was highly sought after, largely because of his expertise, candid business dealings, and affable personality.

Teit had other concerns regarding the distribution of hunting licences to different demographic groups. He viewed the loopholes in the special miners' licence, which allowed miners to kill unlimited quantities of animals, as problematic. He suggests that the privileges pertaining to the miners license (so far as shooting of game goes) ought to be abolished or at least very greatly restricted. It should simply be the same as a gun license in this respect... it should give him no privileges of shooting any kind of game out of season or over the number allowed to other people. Of course if a man is in distress for meat as sometimes altho [sic] rarely happens he will kill any way whether he has a miners license or not but then he should be required to prove he was in such straits.

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27 PGW, Teit to Williams, 12 February, 1906. Here, Teit is writing about guiding near Spences Bridge.
28 Guides would earn about $10.00 per day on contract. However, Teit contracted for a lump sum, assuming all risk and providing all supplies from that amount, about $2000 for a 2 month hunt (1906).
29 Williams allowed this because of a consideration for the hardship inherent in the 'frontier' lifestyle.
30 PGW, Teit to Williams, 21 February, 1907.
Teit was sympathetic to the plight of homesteaders in the less-settled part of the province, due to the similarities in his own circumstances at Spences Bridge. However, he was clear that strict limits on hunting and guiding should be imposed to limit the impact of the human population growth on wildlife and their habitat. It should be mentioned that Indigenous peoples were not subject to hunting licences. However, Indigenous peoples were required under the Game Act to adhere to open and closed seasons, to kill limits and restrictions on the sale and exportation of heads and to obtain guides licences if acting as guides.

**The Science of Nature: Game Management and Environmental Knowledge**

Williams developed legislation to regulate closed and open hunting seasons, kill limits, endangered species and general game population control. Both Teit and Williams were proponents of the 'scientific' management of game resources that was gaining international currency at the time. Concerning kill limits for hunters, Teit contended that "the numbers of game [allowed to be taken] should be reduced at once."³¹ On the alarming scarcity of game in some parts of the province, Teit suggested that "certain districts in which large game are practically exterminated ought to be closed altogether for a number of years."³² He remained optimistic that these regulations provided the most effective method of population management. From Spences Bridge in 1907, he proclaimed that "[d]eer are certainly on the increase again and if the laws are properly observed by everyone (Whites & Indians) there is a very good chance of the deer around here becoming numerous like what they once were."³³

Williams was also optimistic about the effects of hunting restrictions, although he expressed

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³¹ PGW, Teit to Williams, 29 June, 1907. Teit says that "Hornaday's suggestion is just right on this one." He is referencing William Hornaday's support of restricted hunting seasons as a primary method of conservation. Williams had the support of Game Associations in implementing these measures.

³² PGW, Teit to Williams, 15 January, 1905. Teit includes something this type of information in most of the letters he sends to Williams. In addition to letters cited in this section see, PGW, Teit to Williams, February 2, 1906; Teit to Williams, 12 February, 1906; Teit to Williams, June 29, 1907; Teit to Williams, January 20, 1908; Teit to Williams, May 3, 1909, Teit to Williams, November 13, 1913.

³³ PGW, Teit to Williams, 15 November, 1907.
some disillusionment over the reluctance of legislators to implement his recommendations.

Writing specifically about beaver, Williams contended that

[...the results we have obtained from the protection of beaver in the southern part of the Province, where we have been able to enforce the law, have been so good that there is every probability of the traders reaping a rich harvest when the season is opened again and it seems to be a great pity that there should be opposition to our doing the same thing in the north, for, after all is said and done, there is no doubt that, at any rate in a good many places in the north, there is just as much need of the beaver being protected.]

Northern beaver had been decimated in the fur trade and Williams wished to rectify the problem. As a result of lobbying by the department of Indian Affairs, several northern Indigenous groups (including the Tsaltes) secured exemptions from the closed beaver seasons of 1905 to 1907 and 1912-13 because of potential hardship. For Williams, this was anathema to the desired universal application of game laws. Furthermore, Teit and Williams were concerned about the sale of game and the unregulated shipping of heads and pelts outside of the province for greater profit.

Teit's vast environmental and ecological knowledge provided him (and Williams) with a unique and invaluable perspective on game protection and hunting prospects. He often responded in exacting detail to questions raised about habitat, conditions, and behavioural particularities of virtually every game and fur-bearing animal in the province. Moreover, the letters are replete with references to game, weather, seasonal and other variable conditions that might influence hunting prospects. In a letter laying out possible routes for Von Hagen, Teit writes extemporaneously of game in various locales:

Mr. Von Hagen's chief object is Moose, Caribou and Grisly Bear + for this reason he should go to the Cassiar as there these animals can be obtained within comparatively

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34 PGW, Williams to Teit, 24 January, 1908. It is interesting to note in the same letter that Williams suggests that he is not the primary author of game laws. He says, "Anyway the making of game law does not rest with me: I may be called upon to give my opinion."
36 PGW, Teit to Williams, 15 January, 1905; 21 February, 1907
short range of one another as nowhere else in the Province... I am afraid however Mr. Von Hagen will find it very difficult to obtain moose heads of over sixty inch spread anywhere outside of the Kodiak or the Kenai peninsula... Mr. Von Hagen also says he would like good heads of elk, deer, goats and sheep. The last two kinds can also be got with comparative ease in Cassiar on the same trip and near the grounds that moose, Caribou and Bear frequent, but the two former animals cannot be obtained there. As you know yourself all these varieties of game cannot be obtained within close proximity of each other in any part of the Province.\textsuperscript{37}

Teit offers further possibilities and options for Von Hagen in disparate parts of the province. He lays these out according to the desired prey.

However, the best example of the breadth of Teit's knowledge can be found in a 71-page (handwritten on foolscap paper) unpublished document entitled \textit{British Columbia and Big Game Hunting}.\textsuperscript{38} Teit provides exacting detail on the physical features and climatic conditions of every major hunting district in the province\textsuperscript{39} and on the habitats of the most desirable big game.\textsuperscript{40} Teit includes a chapter, “About Hunting – Long and Short Trips,” in which he discusses potential provisioning requirements, methods for organizing excursions, relative costs, ideal trip lengths and itineraries, and traveling options. Taken as a whole, the document shows that Teit saw hunting both as means for employment and a component of a healthy regional liberal-capitalist economy. Moreover, he was involved in the promotion of the hunting industry. In the introduction, Teit states that,

\begin{quote}
[w]e do not intend this pamphlet to be a treatise either on British Columbia or its game. It is simply intended to give sportsmen (in as concise a way as possible) an idea of the Country, its climate, its game both large and small and the range of different varieties.
\end{quote}

This raises some questions concerning the origins and purpose of the document: Who is the

\textsuperscript{37} PGW, Teit to Williams, 12 February, 1906. See also, Teit to Williams, 15 November, 1907; Teit to Williams, 22 November, 1911; Williams to Teit, 29 November, 1915; Teit to Williams, 6 September, 1915; Teit to Williams, 18 November, 1916; Teit to Williams, 27 November, 1916.

\textsuperscript{38} Teit, \textit{British Columbia and Big Game Hunting}, 1-71.

\textsuperscript{39} He lists these as Vancouver Island Region, Coast Region, the Columbia, Kootenai or Mountain Region, the Northern Interior, the Lake Country. These are broad categories, encompassing most of the province.

\textsuperscript{40} He devoted a short chapter to each of Bear, Elk or Wapiti and Dear, Moose, Caribou, Mountain Sheep and Mountain Goat, Cougar, and Antelope, Buffalo and Musk Ox. He then has four distinct chapter given over to Small Game of BC, Game Birds of BC, Water-fowl, and Fish including salmon and trout.
other person(s) involved in the production, or is ‘we’ being used as the consensual form of ‘I’? Had Teit been commissioned to write it up, perhaps by Williams? What was the express purpose of the document? Did Williams incorporate the information into his own publications? Nevertheless, the manuscript does highlight Teit’s impressive knowledge and his importance to game management.

Teit also delivered intermittent (and often unsolicited) reports from the field. In the summer of 1915, while engaged in ethnographic fieldwork in the Stikine, Teit wrote to Williams from Telegraph Creek, detailing the hunting conditions:

There [are] good reports of all kinds of game and especially of moose. The season it seems has been very good for horn growth, and moose are more abundant than ever. The summer has been the driest, and most free of mosquitoes and flies for many years back.\(^{41}\)

In some respects, Teit promoted hunting much like Williams. When conditions were good, especially in the Stikine, Teit offered unsolicited information, perhaps hoping Williams would pass along the positive circumstances to prospective sportsmen deliberating on where to invest their time and capital. He had obvious professional connections to the industry in the Stikine, and was also likely attempting to encourage more business for his guiding colleagues, both Tahlitan and non-Indigenous. Teit often drew information from his Tahlitan and Nlaka’pamux colleagues. To respond to Williams’ question about Cow Caribou horn growth and shedding in the Stikine, Teit conferred with “two old men here viz. Dandy Jim and Taku Johnny of the Tahlitan tribe and they agree with all the points.”\(^{42}\) Yet he fastidiously reported adverse conditions to Williams as well. Describing the coyote situation at Spences Bridge, he claimed,

\[\text{[t]he coyotes have been coming down out of the mountains since about the 1}\text{st Sept owing to the scarcity of rabbits. Since rabbits commenced to become very scarce last year they [coyotes] have been hitting all kinds of grouse very hard, and this is partly the}\]

\(^{41}\) PGW, Teit to Williams, 22 July, 1915

\(^{42}\) PGW, Teit to Williams, 6 September, 1915.
reason for the great scarcity of grouse this season... they killed about 600 domestic chickens... they killed 3 or 4 lambs and ewes.\textsuperscript{43}

Teit’s comments on ‘predatory’ animals were influential on the question of bounty payments. The comments helped Williams formulate policy on the extermination of dangerous ‘vermin.’\textsuperscript{44} When the Game Department received its first financial allotment from the Legislature in the 1907 budget, Teit advocated for the extension of bounty payments to include other species he considered a nuisance. He suggested, because of threats to the health of game animals and fowl, “[t]he bounty of Wolves and panther ought to be extended to include the whole province. It does not matter so much for Coyotes in the less settled parts of the province.”\textsuperscript{45} The following year his critique was more vigorous: “[i]ncrease on bounties all around.”\textsuperscript{46} Teit often wrote to Williams for clarification on points of protocol: amounts to be paid for various species,\textsuperscript{47} problems of Justices of the Peace charging for processing bounty forms,\textsuperscript{48} confusion over remuneration, unpaid bounty claims and lack of proper forms.\textsuperscript{49}

Bounty payments were a significant source of income for rural and Indigenous peoples, and a considerable expense for the Game Department. When available funds were exhausted in the 1916-17 fiscal year due to constraints related to the war effort, Williams used Teit as a conduit to pass the information on to people in the Fraser Canyon. Williams stated that the department was 5000 to 6000 dollars over budget, and therefore “I am sorry to say that I’m afraid these bounties will not be paid for quite a time yet, as we have again exhausted our vote by a long

\textsuperscript{43} PGW, Teit to Williams, 10 November, 1916.
\textsuperscript{44} Bounties were imposed on a number of ‘predatory’ animals including cougars, coyotes, wolves, owls, hawks, eagles, crows and magpies. In the period 1924-1931, bounties on the latter five species are removed, reflecting a shift toward more humane management practices. On the first three, bounties remain until the late 1950s.
\textsuperscript{45} PGW, Teit to Williams, 21 February, 1907. See also, Teit to Williams, 20 January, 1908.
\textsuperscript{46} PGW, Teit to Williams, 28 January, 1908.
\textsuperscript{47} PGW, Teit to Williams, 12 June, 1913: See reply, Williams to Teit, 13 June, 1913. By 1913, wolf and cougar pelts earned a bounty of $15.00, while coyotes and golden eagles received a bounty of $3.00.
\textsuperscript{48} PGW, Teit to Williams, 10 March, 1908. See reply, Williams to Teit, 12 March, 1908.
\textsuperscript{49} PGW, Teit to Williams, 28 May, 1913; Clerk (PGW Office) to Teit, 2 June, 1913.
It was left to Teit to explain the delay. On a more conceptual level, connections can be made between the practice of bounty payment and the commodification of nature, as well as to a utilitarian understanding of nature embraced by Williams and, by extension, the state.

Before the war-induced bounty freeze, Teit acted as mediator between Williams and a number of Nlaka’pamux individuals who had not received their bounty payments. He complained that

there is no one here to pay bounty on coyotes, +c. and the Indians and others have the inconvenience of having to go to Ashcroft or elsewhere with their skins. Would it be possible for me to be supplied with forms which I could fill in or get the notary here to fill in and then have sworn to before the notary here or any J.P. who happens along.\(^5^1\)

It is probable that this was not a racialized problem restricted to Indigenous peoples, but rather, a systematic infrastructural difficulty that was pervasive throughout the region. Teit told Williams in November, 1916, that the “Indians are in a hurry to realize on their skins and are bothering me accordingly.”\(^5^2\) The problem metastasized for several months with Teit pressuring Williams for a timetable on the payments. Eventually, Teit remedied the difficulty when he “paid the bounty on the Indian skins myself as the Indians were hard up and anxious to get the money.”\(^5^3\) Teit acted as a sort of transit bank between the Game Department and his Nlaka’pamux friends, facilitating the transaction by lending money to those unable to collect on their bounties. After repeated cajoling, he eventually received the payments from the Game Department.\(^5^4\)

**Informing Game Protection: Teit’s Advice for Williams**

Williams explicitly sought Teit’s informed advice on a great diversity of topics relating

\(^{50}\) PGW, Williams to Teit, 8 January, 1917.
\(^{51}\) PGW, Teit to Williams, 28 October, 1916. See negative reply, Williams to Teit, 30 October, 1916.
\(^{52}\) PGW, Teit to Williams, 27 November, 1916.
\(^{53}\) PGW, Teit to Williams, 10 November, 1916.
\(^{54}\) PGW, Williams to Teit, 14 November, 1916; Teit to Williams, 18 November, 1916; Teit to Williams, 27 November, 1916, Teit to Williams, 6, 9, 10 January and 1, 12 February and 5, 16 March, 1917; Williams to Teit, 8, 9, 12 January and 3 February and 9 March, 1917.
to game. The correspondence is replete with passages that resemble the questions posed in late 1905:

I should be obliged if you would let me have your opinion on the following. The time at which you consider the sheep season should be. Are the heads of sheep in a fit condition to be mounted before Sep. 1st in Cassiar or in Bridge River. When do you consider the easiest time to get them, when they are up on the mountain tops at the beginning of Sep. or at the end of the season when the snow drives them down into the timber.\(^{55}\)

Williams sought Teit’s opinions when formulating the possible changes to the Game Act. Teit’s response was equivocal, indicating that the proposed game protection amendments favoured the interests of sportsmen, tourists and guides over those of wildlife. Indeed, his response outlined a potential conflict for Teit. “From the point of hunting,” said Teit, “I would favor an open season for sheep in August certainly, but from the point of game protection never.”\(^{56}\) Williams called a meeting in March of 1907 of “delegates from as many districts and game associations as possible” to discuss the desired legislative amendments that he wished to promote. He told Teit

I hope you will make an effort to [come to the meeting] as I would very much like to have your assistance. Among the new amendments are a resident gun licence, guides, trapper and non-resident fishing licence. Protection of bear and several other important amendments. I believe that the time has at last come when we can get some real good done and it behoves all those interested to take as active a part a possible so I hope I shall hear that you will be on hand.\(^{57}\)

Teit could not attend but wrote a detailed letter offering his opinion on the value of a high hunting/trapping licence fee, curtailing the exportation of heads, abolishing the unencumbered shooting privileges of the miners licence, increasing bounties, restocking elk populations, and

\(^{55}\) PGW, Williams to Teit, 8 December, 1905. See also Williams to Teit, 30 January, 1906; Williams to Teit, 3 December, 1906; Williams to Teit, 17 February, 1907.

\(^{56}\) PGW, Teit to Williams, 2 February, 1906. Emphasis in original.

\(^{57}\) PGW, Williams to Teit, 17 February, 1907. This was a political campaign being waged by Williams.
on special protection measures in certain districts. Teit was certainly a convinced advocate of the swift implementation of game management measures. He warned Williams that “[e]very year is going to see a greater influx of sports after game and the present government by not giving the game laws attention last session acted without sense or even criminally.”

Williams tried to use Teit in his own political struggles. For example, he needed support for the proposed implementation of a guides’ licence. He told Teit, “[y]ou can help me in this matter a great deal by writing me a short letter in favour of it. If you will do so I will pledge myself not to favour a bigger amount than a $5.00 licence.” Teit was also instrumental in the creation and editing of *Game Bulletin 17*, written by Williams and distributed to interested parties across Canada and abroad. It was essentially a glorified travel brochure that attempted to entice sportsmen to BC through a methodical description of hunting possibilities and unspoiled environment. Though Teit generally approved of the contents, he told Williams, “I think the information given on p. 18 game animals is rather poor and in some respects incorrect and misleading.” He continued his critique, stating “I think at least it might be improved on a bit.” Williams sheepishly replied

> With regard to the game book, the notes on the different species of game and birds [were] taken from the old book got up by Dr. [Frank] Kermode of the Provincial Museum. I never thought they were satisfactory but as space was an object I let them go as they were. Some time when you have a little time to spare you might make some suggestions for a change and the next edition might be altered.

The following week, Teit wrote a six page hand-written letter, detailing the minutiae of

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58 PGW, Teit to Williams, 21 February, 1907. Many of Teit’s recommendations were implemented, though not for several years. This should not be attributed to Teit alone, as most of these points were part of the common discourse of game protection.
59 PGW, Teit to Williams, 29 June, 1907.
60 PGW, Williams to Teit, 13 January, 1906.
61 PGW, Teit to Williams, 20 January, 1908.
62 PGW, Williams to Teit, 24 January, 1908.
changes that needed to be made to Williams' draft. Teit recommended corrections on sixteen of the entries for individual animals. He suggested alterations for some habitat information as well as seasonal migration patterns. This exposes some of Williams’ knowledge inadequacies as well as the quality and quantity of Teit’s knowledge of animals and their habitat over the entirety of the province.

"The best known and most reliable guide in B.C.": Williams’ Praise of Teit

Williams thought very highly of Teit’s abilities as a guide, and often lauded Teit’s guiding prowess to potential tourists. Writing to W.C. Hobdy, a prospective client from Honolulu, Williams proclaimed, “[i]f expense is no object to you write to J. Teit of Spence’s Bridge B.C. as he is by far the best Guide... Most of your outfit can be procured at Telegraph Creek, but if you take Teit you will not require anything at all except your rifles, etc.”

Williams was less enthusiastic, but still full of praise to Adolph Von Hagen, the self-styled master sportsmen from Austria:

Mr. Teit is personally known to me and I consider him a most reliable guide and one of the best guides in the country and you can rely on his [forthcoming] letter containing nothing but absolute facts. He is the only white guide at present not actually engaged for the coming season, that I care to recommend. If you care to come and can get him you are fairly sure of success.

He similarly told a Colorado Springs lawyer, Walter Scott, after the latter decided to hire Teit for a trip to take place in 1907:

I am glad you have got Teit to take you. If your party does not have good sport it will be the first party he has ever taken out that has failed... He generally has things so well arranged that he is almost certain to get a good start and probably can manage to get [the competition] steered off to some other district.

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63 PGW, Teit to Williams, 28 January, 1908. Several months later, Teit also provided Williams with quantitative list of all of the game he had seen on his 1907 Cassiar hunting trip. See PGW, Teit to Williams, 19 March, 1908.
64 PGW, Williams to W.C. Hobdy, 28 November, 1911.
65 PGW, Williams to Von Hagen, 6 February, 1906. Emphasis in original.
66 PGW, Williams to Walter Scott, 29 August, 1906.
Williams explained Teit’s virtue simply, telling Scott, “[y]ou can absolutely rely on anything he tells you.”

To Von Hagen, who was also collecting specimens for an Austrian museum, Williams extolled Teit as “thoroughly conscientious and energetic man.” Teit’s honesty and unwavering belief in the unassailability of verbal contracts is evident in the correspondence. Teit could not guide Von Hagen because of previous commitments to Homer Sargent, an American business man. Teit told Williams, much to the latter’s chagrin, that although “I would probably receive more from Mr. Von Hagen and some other presumably very rich gentlemen, I had to keep my word given to him [Sargent] at the end of our hunting trip in 1904 that I would give him the first chance of my services in 1906.” Teit organized the entirety of Von Hagen’s hunting trip to the Stikine, making travel arrangements, securing a guide and a full hunting outfit. But Von Hagen was a finicky client, and for some reason did not approve of Teit’s outfitting preparations. In spite of Von Hagen’s threat of poor reviews of BC hunting to the larger sporting community in Europe, Williams stood by Teit, telling him, “we can but do our best and if you cannot make the trip a success I do not suppose anybody can.”

Williams’ praise of Teit was not limited to his guiding acumen. He responded to questions by Edward Preble, Assistant Biologist at the United States Bureau of Biological Survey, about seasonal migration patterns of British Columbia Indians, that Teit “will probably be able to give you some useful information, as he knows more about Indians than any other man in this Province and what he does not know he can find out.” Evidently, Williams was

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67 PGW, Williams to Walter Scott, 30 October, 1906.
68 PGW, Williams to Von Hagen, 18 May, 1906.
69 PGW, Teit to Williams, 10 April, 1906. See also, Teit to Williams, 12 February, 1906. Emphasis in original. Sargent later funded some of Teit’s work through Boas.
70 PGW, Williams to Teit, 4 June, 1906
71 PGW, Williams to Edward Preble, 9 October, 1912.
aware of Teit’s ethnographic expertise, though their correspondence does not deal with ethnographic matters.

Williams often accentuated the rugged frontiersman mythology when describing Teit to potential tourists. He temptingly warned Von Hagen, “However, I must say that though he is a most reliable and pleasant man, also a man of good education you will find him very rough (any man who has lived all his life in these mountains is bound to be that) and if you take my advice you will engage your own cook.” Williams was exaggerating the truth for effect, projecting an idealized identity that served his own purpose. Teit did spend large periods of time in the remote areas engaged in ranching, hunting and guiding. However, Teit was certainly not uncouth, nor was he “rough” in the ‘uncivilised’ or regressed way that Williams conveyed. A popular representation of Teit played a part in Williams’ offer of an ‘authentic’ outdoors experience.

Effusive praise came from other men who dealt with Teit. Charles Sheldon, a New Yorker who was researching for a book on the interbreeding of Alaskan white sheep with the Stikine black sheep, asked Teit for clarification on a number of mapping and habitat questions. He was very pleased with Teit’s reply: “Nothing, since I began to write about sheep, has pleased me so much as to receive a copy of your remarks about the distribution maps… You seem to grasp the subject so clearly.”

Williams’ role in the development of game management is clear. He was the central figure in every aspect of the expansion and dissemination of laws that regulated the practice of hunting in British Columbia. Importantly, he did so within the ideological framework set out by the emerging liberal state. He was tied into the political and economic orthodoxy of the

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72 PGW, Williams to Von Hagen, 6 February, 1906.
73 PGW, Charles Sheldon to Teit, 18 June, 1912.
McBride regime and the development of game management reflected those particular liberal ideological foundations. Yet, he needed help in gathering relevant information and formulating policy. Teit was integral to this process, and therefore, should be considered an important progenitor of game management himself. However, Teit’s allegiance was not exclusively to the state. He also facilitated resistance to the more punitive components of game policy. This resistance is the focus of the following chapter.
“A Dangerous Character” and “Outside Pressures”: Advocacy and Resistance

In the Stikine, praise was marked with some suspicion of Teit’s political activities.

Jack Hyland, a prominent outfitter and Telegraph Creek resident who had a close professional relationship with Teit, wrote to Williams in 1912:

Mr. J. Teit will call upon you in a few days and explain the Indian situation from the guiding point of view. I personally do not agree with their views on the matter and will not encourage sportsmen to come here to teach the indians a lesson. Either that or encourage white guides to come in and take up the business. Teit is an awfully fine fellow but I think he sympathizes with the indians too strongly. Consequently, I think the government should do something to see that the indians act normally toward big-game hunters or cut off a lot of privileges given the indians today.¹

Indeed, Teit’s activism created much animosity among elements of the Euro-Canadian segment of the hunting-guiding industry and also Stikine Indian Agent W. Scott Simpson who perceived him to be an agitator. F. B. Pemberton (a surveyor and real estate speculator) of Victoria and Cowichan alleged in a letter to Attorney General William Bowser (subsequently forwarded to Williams) that “a man named Tait [sic], of Spence’s Bridge, I understand whilst up there [Cassiar] last fall with a hunting party, made it his business to render them as discontent as possible.”² Pemberton (who received the information from an employee who had been in the Stikine in 1910) advocates that action be taken against Teit:

I cannot say he said this or that, but he held a meeting of the Indians and told them not to tell the Indian Agent or Calibreath, the principle employer of the Indians, thus rendering himself liable to a criminal charge under the Indian Act. The Indian Agent was urged to take action but decided that the matter was of no great importance. Since that meeting, however, the Indians have been very much stirred, being under the impression that they are all going to be placed on a massive reserve and not allowed to leave it, and that some other rich white man will buy up level mountain, and another the land around the head of the Klagan (their best hunting and trapping grounds) and that a railroad will be built through the country and a belt of land extending twenty miles on either side of it will be given by the Government to the railroad Company and they will no longer be allowed to hunt. They are a hunting tribe and say they don’t

¹ PGW, Jack Hyland to Williams, 23 October, 1912. Hyland was Teit’s outfitter in Telegraph Creek from the early 1900s and they appear a fairly close friendship though no there is no correspondence between the two at the BCARS. There was definitely some animosity between Hyland and J.F. Calibreath, his chief competitor. This may have contributed to Calibreath’s portrayal of Teit’s activities.
² PGW, Bowser to Williams, 29 August, 1911.
want land or favours or to have to go on a reserve but they want to be assured that their hunting ground will [not] be taken from them. They have collected a matter of $800.00 which they intend to send down, presumably to Tait, to secure justice for them. All our efforts to convince them that Tait is fooling them and has no standing have been useless, because, knowing, as they do, that Tait is sent up here by or through Bryan Williams, the Chief Game Warden, they are convinced that he is a Government official, and are looking forward to his return this year.³

This letter exposes the animosity directed at Teit as well as fears about possible effects on the socioeconomic status quo. Teit’s place within a cohesive resistance articulated by the Tahlta begins to emerge. Teit relayed tangible information about what the provincial government wished to accomplish regarding the formation of reserves, the appropriation of land for railways, and ordering of hunting grounds.⁴ The meeting “last fall” that Pemberton refers to is almost certainly the meeting held on Oct 17th, 1910, where the Tahlta expressed their grievances on land and treaty rights, culminating in the Tahlta Declaration.

Pemberton’s letter places Teit at the meeting as does Teit’s diary.⁵ The Declaration was dated Oct 18th, the day before Teit left the Stikine for Spences Bridge. It traveled south with Teit on his homeward journey, exposing it to the larger Aboriginal protest movement in the south and cementing the ties of the Tahlta to this movement. It is likely that Teit’s continuous trips to the Stikine had provided an opportunity for him to discuss issues being raised by more politically engaged Indigenous leaders in the south. Teit was closely involved in the translation and production of the Declaration and he played an important facilitation role in conveying the political agenda of the Tahlta in clear and concise language. He was involved in the organization and construction of similar documents, including the eloquent appeal of the Shuswap, Okanagan and Thompson [Nlkm’pamux] delivered to Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier during a whistle stop in Kamloops in August,

³ PGW, Bowser to Williams, 29 August, 1911.
⁴ PGW, W. Scott Simpson to Williams, April 20, 1913. The date here may seem off, but Simpson refers to previous political actions by Teit when accusing him meddling in the political efforts of the Tahlta.
1910.⁶ Teit was actively engaged with the Aboriginal political movement in the southern interior and on the coast and the language of the document makes clear that the Tahltan were aware of political developments and the goals of this movement.

Despite the acrimony directed at Teit, Williams was steadfast in his support. In his reply to Bowser, Williams stated categorically that,

I have known Mr. Tait [sic] for a number of years as a guide, in fact he is in this respect one of the most sort [sic] after men in this Province, he keeps me informed of all matters pertaining to the game in that part of the country and has in this way been of great assistance to me. That the Indians are convinced he is an official and sent up by me is absurd, as he was in the habit of acting as guide in the Cassiar district before I ever occupied my present position. Personally I am very doubtful as to Mr. Tait having been stirring up these Indians as alleged, I can only say that as far as my work is concerned he has been of great assistance to me though of course he has received no remuneration for his services.⁷

Williams’s reply indicates that he values Teit both as an individual and as an important advisor in game protection. Within their correspondence, Teit does mention his political inclinations and is explicit about his involvement with the Indian Rights Association.⁸

Perhaps Williams’ defence of Teit’s character is a testament to Teit’s value to the project of game management.

Teit’s advocacy on behalf of the Tahltan was not confined to attempts to incorporate them into the larger Aboriginal political movement. Likely influenced by his socialist leanings, he also was the central figure in efforts to ‘unionize’ Tahltan individuals working as guides, cooks, and packers. This initiative was not appreciated by non-Indigenous outfitters

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⁶ Teit is cited as the “secretary” for this group. There is also a “Chiefs Memorial” sent to Interior Minister Frank Oliver in May 1911. This document was also facilitated by Teit, and was signed by 68 Chiefs and designated representatives, including one Tahltan man, “Nanok, Head Chief Tahltan Tribe.” Teit would have known Nanok, and this connection probably facilitated his political advocacy among the Tahltan.

⁷ PGW, Williams to Bowser, 31 August, 1911. Williams reply to Callbreath’s complaint is very similar, see PGW, Williams to W. Scott Simpson, 22 January, 1913.

⁸ PGW, Teit to Williams, 22 November, 1911. Teit tells Williams that he can take out a client around Ashcroft in late November but must be finished by early December as “the Ind. Rights Assoc. want me to take a trip to Ottawa early next month.”
who profited from their comparatively low wages, usually about half of the ten dollars per
day earned by non-Indigenous guides. Telegraph Creek outfitter and merchant J. Frank
Callbreath wrote to Indian Agent W. Scott Simpson to complain about the unrest caused by
the “excessive” wage demands of the Tahltan guides. He suggested that Teit created the
problem by securing inordinately high wages the previous year for “Guide Dennis”: “[a]s this
was in excess of the wages paid by local Merchants it caused a lot of dissatisfaction.”
Teit was simply trying to secure wages equal to those received by non-Indigenous guides.

Callbreath’s point was that,

When the last of the hunters arrived the Indians held two meetings and decided to ask
$10.00 for guides. No guide to act for two different hunters. Cooks and packers to
secure $5.00 or $6.00 per day each I am not certain which. At both of these meetings I
am informed Teit attended. The Indians tell me they have been advised to ask for this
higher rate of wages. That the Hunters are quite willing to pay it and blame the local
merchants for not getting it for them.

Callbreath, echoing Pemberton, warned that the Tahltan were engaging a lawyer. Lastly,
parroting a sentiment often used to discredit the legitimacy of Indigenous political activism,
Callbreath blamed the disturbance on “outside agitation.” This was almost certainly meant to
refer to Teit, who encouraged a move against the status quo.

When Simpson brought Callbreath’s concerns to Williams’ attention, the latter
responded by expressing his views on the absurdity of ‘unionization’ of Indian guides and on
the importance of securing the Stikine from “outside influence.” Yet in his letter he defended
Teit from spurious attack before predicting the eventual usurpation of the guiding business
by non-Indigenous people:

With regard to outsiders participating in the managing of parties, as far as I am aware
J.A. Tait[sic] is the only man that does such a thing, and I hardly think that the Indians
themselves would consider him an outsider. I shall not encourage the outsiders to do
this if the Indians are reasonable, but if they are not, it is only a matter of time when a

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9 PGW, J. Frank Callbreath to W. Scott Simpson, 23 December 23, 1912
10 PGW, Callbreath to Simpson, 23 December, 1912.
number of white guides will make a regular business of going in there and taking the whole thing out of the hands of the Indians. This I do not want, but you can take it from me that will happen unless the Indians are reasonable.\textsuperscript{11}

By early 1913, Williams was well aware of Teit’s political machinations. In dealing with complaints against these activities, Williams defended Teit’s actions and attempted to minimize both his role in the disturbances and the prospects of Indigenous agitation for better wages. However, it is fundamentally important to recognize that the wage demands were not symptoms of an arbitrary complaint from the Tahlitan, but rather, were the tangible result of a growing resistance movement. Undoubtedly, Teit facilitated the expression and coalescence of the resistance but the organic nature of the complaints should be foregrounded. Moreover, Tahlitan wage demands could have been a consequence of their disadvantaged status (on the basis of race) within a capitalist economy. There are linkages to be made between Teit’s socialist leanings and Tahlitan organization over the wage issue.

In contrast to the supercilious nature of Williams’ response to Callbreath, the aggressive rhetoric in Williams’ annual reports of 1912 and 1913 reveals a much less complacent attitude to the ‘problem’ of wage demands by Tahlitan guides. In 1912, Williams expressed optimism about the growth of the industry in the Stikine, but implied that all of his advances were likely to be undermined by the Tahlitan: “Notwithstanding the fact that the Cassiar District affords the best all-around big-game shooting on the Continent,” warned Williams, “it is very doubtful if it will have any sportsmen next season, as the Indian guides have decided to charge such exorbitant wages which even the wealthiest men will hardly care

\textsuperscript{11} PGW, Williams\textsuperscript{3} to Simpson, 22 January, 1913. Before this episode, Williams claimed to be a supporter of Indigenous guides in the Stikine “to give the Indians some business.” See PGW, Williams to A. W. Vowell (Supt. Of Indian Affairs), 13 January, 1908. This point seems to contradict the quotation from page 83 (footnote 9). However, on the previous page Callbreath is exaggerating and arguing rhetorically, as only one hunting party actually paid the extra fees willingly. The remaining parties expressed great dismay at being forced to pay more than agreed upon.
to pay.”\textsuperscript{12} Ignoring that the Tahltnan were simply asking for equal wages, Williams foresaw knock-on effects for the rest of the industry in the province. He caustically bemoaned that because “the Cassiar guides are on “strike”... there is a great scarcity of first-class guides, and until this is remedied there is little chance in the revenue from big-game licences improving.”\textsuperscript{13} Such statements by Williams suggest that he was clearly hoping to bring institutional pressure to bear on the Tahltnan guides. Moreover, he was hoping to absolve himself of responsibility for any economic consequences of a potentially successful strike. Seen within the context of a liberal hegemony, Williams’ actions reinforced (and emerged out of) the cultural and moral values of a ruling elite that sought to imprint a restrictive and taken-for-granted social and economic regime onto the land in the Stikine.

The resolution of the pay equity issue, in favour of the outfitters, prompted a smug response from Williams in his 1913 report. He maintained that Tahltnan guides saw the folly in their decision to “follow in the white man’s footsteps by forming a sort of Guides’ Union and go[ing] on strike for higher wages,” and equilibrium was restored when “eventually they listened to reason and agreed to a more reasonable wage.”\textsuperscript{14} The 1913 season in the Stikine was successful, as the Tahltnan agreed to work for lesser wages of seven dollars a day, although the sportsmen who made the trip were forced “to endure great insolence from the Indian guides; also some of the guides are said not to have adhered to the price for wages previously arranged.”\textsuperscript{15} Williams charged that “[m]any complaints were also made about the poor quality of the horses supplied, and also excessive rates being charged for everything.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{12} Williams, “Game Warden Report 1912,” Sessional Papers, 1913, O12.
\textsuperscript{13} Williams, “Game Warden Report 1912,” Sessional Papers, 1913, O12.
\textsuperscript{14} Williams, “Game Warden Report 1913,” Sessional Papers, 1914, N11.
\textsuperscript{15} Williams, “Game Warden Report 1913,” Sessional Papers, 1914, N11. The same charge was leveled in 1907. See, PGW, Alexander Brown to Williams, 30 December, 1907.
For Williams, the strike had disrupted the hunting industry at its core. Clearly, guides who were only employed because of a lack of non-Indigenous guides had damaged the profitability and sustainability of his enterprise through impertinence and irreverence. Williams felt partially vindicated by the ‘defeat’ of the strikers, as ‘reason’ had triumphed over fancy. He was not above vindictiveness, intoning that “[i]f nobody goes there for a year of two, which is quite likely to be the case after the reputation the guides now have, a good lesson will be learned.” Presumably, this was to be a social and economic lesson in decorum and submission. Above all, it was to be a lesson in assimilation.

Yet, viewed through a different lens the pay equity issue and the impact of the Indian Rights movement show the strength of a culture of resistance amongst the Tahltan. Williams may have seen evidence of capitulation by the strikers but he was clearly disquieted by examples of resistance, both passive and antagonistic. The “insolence” derided by Williams should rather be seen as a systematic expression of non-compliance by the Tahltan guides. Moreover, Teit was not in the Stikine in 1913 due to illness, so the actions of the strikers cannot be attributed to his influence. He wrote to the Tahltan to keep them abreast of political developments and to advise them of the actions advocated by Indian Rights Association. As such, he clearly played a role in the political awakening of the Tahltan in their dealings with clients and governments, but the events of 1913 were motivated chiefly by the organic grievances of the Tahltan. This is not to underestimate the Indigenous communication network facilitated through the migrant labour market which encouraged

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17 Williams, “Game Warden Report 1913, Sessional Papers, 1914, N11. The Tahltan were compared to the ‘good’ Indians guiding in the Lillooet District. Williams opined, “[t]he Lillooet Indians always have had the knack of making themselves as pleasant and obliging as the Cassiar Indians do the reverse.”

18 PGW, W. Scott Simpson to Williams, April 20, 1913. In this letter, Simpson contends that Teit wrote a letter in advance warning the Tahltan about McKenna-McBride.
travel throughout the region, but rather to reinforce Teit’s contribution. Additionally, the events of 1913, coupled with the strong expression of political dissatisfaction in the 1910 Tahltan Declaration marked the intersection of a coherent Tahltan resistance movement with a larger Indigenous resistance project already extant in the province. When considered along with the powerful opposition to the reordering of reserve land expressed in the Chiefs’ testimony before the McKenna-McBride Commissioners, the resistance movement can be seen as an emancipatory moment for the Tahltan. An alternative ‘commonsense’, influenced by the efforts of Teit, was emerging from the Stikine.

In the summer of 1915, commissioners associated with the McKenna-McBride Royal Commission visited the Stikine Plateau. The Commission was a joint federal-provincial initiative designed to address outstanding questions relating to the size of Indian reserves in British Columbia. Between 1913 and 1915 (the MMRC reported in 1916), Commissioners traveled to every Indian Agency in the province to receive testimony from chiefs, elders, Indian Agents, and interested locals, of which they kept complete transcripts. The meanings contained within the transcripts have been studied in depth by Cole Harris, who contends that the “intricate theatre of power” established by the Commissioners, their entourages, and their officious surroundings were countered by complex responses full of “[e]loquence..., irony, sarcasm, and flattery.”

The transcripts contain an invaluable perspective on how the Tahltan and their neighbours conceptualized their relationship and their rights to the land. Chiefs were often asked to make a statement and submit to questioning at the beginning of the day’s

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20 Harris, Making Native Space, 231.
proceedings. Interestingly, Tahltan Chief Charlie Squash called on former Stikine Indian Agent and Hudson’s Bay Co trader G.D. Cox to make introductory remarks on his behalf at the first meeting in the area on 7 June 1915. The dynamics of the Squash/Cox testimony are difficult to assess. Squash was in the room when Cox spoke (Squash himself is sworn in later in the meeting). Cox, speaking for Squash, questioned the legitimacy both of the Commission and of the ‘land question.’ In his opening statement he demanded that the Commission’s purpose be explained:

As far as the land question is concerned, it is something new to these Indians – they are totally ignorant as to what your object is. It is altogether different here – that is, the conditions are different here to other places around the Coast where you give them agricultural land. Of course this country is not suitable for that and they have had no chance of deciding on a particular part of the country that would be suitable for them in time to use for farming purposes and consequently that makes it hard for these Indians to deal with that matter. What these Indians want is to have your object for coming here thoroughly explained. He claimed that definitive assertions of property ownership were not within the chief’s purview. Squash, via Cox, also had a clear sense of how the land was to be used. Agriculture, part of the assimilative agenda being pushed by the MMRC, was not an activity that roused the interest of the Tahltan. Squash could not speak for all Tahltan, as different families and clans owned different hunting territories, each subject to their own restrictions and hunting methods:

These Indians have not decided what would be good for them. In regard to the fishing and hunting reserves it is all very well at the present time because they make their living that way, but we hope that things will change in this country and we hope that the Indians will also change, and what would probably be suitable for the Indians now, might not be suitable for them in years to come should there be a large influx of white settlers in this part of the country. We are in hopes that the Indians will advance.  

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21 Squash is likely a misspelling of ‘Quock’. Elsewhere is the transcripts it is spelled Quash. Teit has several informants named Quock. There are several Tahltan at present with that same surname.
22 Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British Columbia (hereafter RCIA), RG10 File, Stikine Agency, BCARS reel B1457.
23 RCIA, RG10 File, Stikine Agency, BCARS B1457.
Cox (who was married to a Talhtan woman) used the pronouns ‘we’ and ‘they’ to inject a fascinating process of ‘othering’ into the proceedings. He was speaking for Squash but clearly desired to be separate. The speaker, Cox and/or Squash, emphasized his desire to protect existing and future rights to land and fishing and hunting grounds. But these rights were unique to the Tahltan. Commissioner Day Hort Macdowell, representing the province, was irked by what he believed were evasive answers. He brought a characteristically liberal understanding of property to the discussion. In admonishing Squash for his equivocal statements about Tahltan territory, Macdowell brought a condescending and paternalistic end to the interview:

We will have to leave that matter stand for a little while. The Commission has had a great deal to do and have been travelling over territory about half the size of Europe and we can’t send instructions to every band of Indians – the Indians are supposed to know their own territory and we find invariably that the Indians know their own territory and this is the only case where we have found that the Indians know little or nothing about the country surrounding them.\(^\text{24}\)

Neither Squash nor Cox were invited to respond to Macdowell’s dismissal of the cultural knowledge presented and the remaining questions deal with population numbers, agricultural potential, housing developments and fishing sites. Macdowell either did not understand Squash’s mode of resistance or was unwilling to recognize it as a valid critique of the Commission. However, Squash would not be deterred. When cynically warned of the possible loss of territory to incoming settlers, Squash inverted the threat, telling Macdowell that “I am glad to hear that lots of white people may come into this territory and the salmon creeks are all [sic] the people can come and help themselves together; white people or anyone else. That is what I want. I don’t want to hear about a reserve business – it is all

\(^\text{24}\) RCIA, RG10 File, Stikine Agency, BCARS B1457.
right for salmon." In other words, land rights were clearly and adequately demarcated in Tahltan legal frameworks, though settlers were welcome to share equally in the area’s natural resources. A further point must be stressed. Cox’ participation shows that Teit was not the only Euro-Canadian individual advocating for Tahltan interests.

Macdowell witnessed a much more overt proclamation of territorial integrity at Atlin when he interviewed Tagish Chief Taku Jack. Responding to a request to outline specific Tagish territory on a map or the area, Taku Jack replied that a map was immaterial to his understanding of the land: “I don’t know anything about a map – I cannot read, and you know how big this land is and I know it because it belongs to me.” The map was from another world of understanding, one that the Chief did not acknowledge as superior to his own. Taku Jack possessed an intransigent belief in the validity of his claims to ownership. Conversely, Macdowell was attempting to convince Taku Jack of the danger of property loss while trying to understand and finalize the dimensions of the Chief’s territorial claims.

Chief: This is the only country we have here – You know how big this British Columbia is and this all belongs to me and this is my country.
Macdowell: But you don’t want the whole country do you?
Chief: I like this country – I was born here and this country belongs to me.
Macdowell: You don’t want the white men out of the country do you?
Chief: No, there is no trouble with the whites – we don’t bother them and they don’t bother us – we are just like brothers… You got no land to give to me – this land belongs to me.

He continued in the same vein:

…it is no good for us to have a piece of land all by ourselves – If you give us people a piece of land we are not free. This is my own country and I want to keep it. A white man comes to a creek and gets gold out of that creek after awhile he leaves it and we are sorry to see the white man go away – but we are not like that – we stay here all the time because the land is ours. It is no good for us to move out of this place because this

22 RCIA, RG10 File, Stikine Agency, BCARS B1457.
23 For an example of Cox’ advocacy, see, PGW, G.D. Cox to A.W. Vowell, 19 October, 1908 (copy of letter forwarded to Williams 11 November, 1908). The scope of this study limits the discussion to events in the Stikine. Other Euro-Canadian men also advocated (eg. Kootenay Indian Agent R.L.T. Galbraith)
24 RCIA, RG 10, Stikine Agency, BCARS B1457.
25 RCIA, RG 10, Stikine Agency, BCARS B1457.
is our country. We gave the names to the places around here and these old names came from our old forefathers and they are just names the same to this day – I don’t think you believe when I tell you I belong to this place.
Macdowell: Yes, I believe you belong to this place.
Chief: Do you know what this lake is called?
Macdowell: I know it is called Atlin Lake, but I don’t know what it is called in Atlin
Chief: What does Atlin mean?
Macdowell: I don’t know what it means?
Chief: Acklin means BIG LAKE, and that is the place where we used to stay – that is the reason I used to think that the whites were not going to give any trouble because they call us after this lake – they call us Atlin Indians because they know I belong to this country. 29

Taku Jack recalibrated the power dynamic at this meeting. Instead of responding to Macdowell’s primary concerns (acreage, agriculture, education, infrastructure), Taku Jack rearranged the format of the interview in order to explain his attachment to the land that he belonged to. He led Macdowell through a set of questions that were not on the agenda for the purpose of illustrating the deep, symbiotic connection that his people felt to the land. His land is not bounded, and cannot be quantified on a map or in some organized spatial arrangement. It exists as a central component of their culture, inseparable from the self-definition contested by the Commission and the state. Taku Jack described both how the land belongs to him and how he belongs to the land. It is this intangible and osmotic interface between the people and the land that Taku Jack was trying to impress upon the Commissioners, and that they were, perhaps unwittingly, trying to reign in. The chief’s understanding of the land, as part of his peoples’ chain of being, could not register with Macdowell and his colleagues, as their system of judgement emphasized a completely different set of values.

In representing the interests of the state, the McKenna-McBride Commission was not interested in Taku Jack’s connection to the land, but rather, in consolidating the revenue

29 Similar testimony exists of an interview Billy Johnson, chief of the Teslin Lake Band. He uses a similar language of belonging to the land, and supplements this by suggesting that he does not want to be given a specific piece of land, but wishes “to be free as I was before.”
possibilities and settlement opportunities of potential British Columbians while negotiating Taku Jack’s peoples’ legal rights to the land. The longest interview in the transcripts on the Stikine Agency was with Indian Agent W. Scott Simpson who had the responsibility of recommending reserve allotments, assessing the fitness of land for the presumed needs of its inhabitants, and commenting on behaviour, level of ‘civilization’ and habits of his constituents. The evidence provided by and opinions of Indian Agents and community groups (such as the Atlin Board of Trade who are given a hearing on the same day as Taku Jack’s interview) held greater currency than the information offered by Indigenous peoples. The epistemological values are clear: Euro-Canadian liberal discourse is valued over Indigenous knowledge. The MMRC was above all else designed to facilitate the assimilation of Indigenous peoples. Much of the questioning centres on the availability of the means of cultural transformation. As well as enquiring into the ease of access to water, sanitation, timber, game, fish, and hay for grazing, interviewees are asked if they enjoy adequate access to schools, missionaries, agricultural land, medical care, wage labour, and stable housing.  

Macdowell asked Taku Jack about his willingness to assimilate: “If your children are taught to do the other things the white men do, don’t you think you could learn to do it? Suppose the Government gave you a man to teach you, don’t you think the Indians could learn... [t]o make their living in the same way as the white man make their living.”

It is important to highlight the causal link between the civilizing mission and the settlement of the ‘land question’ that is apparent in the transcripts. Assimilation was to be partially achieved by forcibly imposing a liberal land regime onto the Stikine Plateau. This was largely achieved by the establishment of small, bounded reserves and by the

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30 These questions are very simple, designed to assess the level of assimilation of various groups. They were usually simple ‘yes or no’ questions, or quantified questions about resource infrastructure.
31 RCIA, RG 10, Stikine Agency, BCARS B1457.
modification of behaviour. However, it was also accomplished by the operation of a system of law that allowed the land to be ordered in a particular, circumscribed way. Resistance to those laws shows the Indigenous peoples asserted agency in many different political arenas during this time. Moreover, the Tahlton and their neighbours were not unique in using the MMRC as a platform to resist an assimilative agenda. Indigenous groups throughout the province used the opportunity of the MMRC interviews to express their disapproval of the game protection measures that threatened subsistence practices.32 Indigenous peoples had a clear understanding of game law and recognized the threat that these laws posed.

Importantly, Teit was involved in the effort to limit the reach of this system of law and power embodied by the land redistribution goals of the MMRC. In an April 1913 letter to Williams, Indian Agent Simpson accused Teit of warning the Tahlton of the intentions of the MMRC Commissioners. Teit, acting in his capacity as Secretary of the Indian Rights Association, was accused of writing to the Tahlton with news of the Association’s activities, and with updates of MMRC proceedings. Simpson claimed that Teit advised the Tahlton “to accept no terms from [the Commissioners] without they are acceptable [sic] to the Indian rights associations.” The letter ended with Simpson’s personal observation that Teit was “A Dangerous Character.”33

Williams’ Annual Reports contain additional examples of Indigenous resistance to the spread of a legislated liberal order land regime which I include to show that Tahlton resistance was not unique. In 1908, Williams admonished the Tahlton, “not only for killing game unnecessarily, but also for not giving satisfaction as guides.”34 The Tahlton, who already had an ordered structure of wildlife management in place, did not conform to the new

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32 Ireland, “Working a Great Hardship on Us,” 68, 73.
33 PGW, W. Scott Simpson to Williams, 20 April, 1913.
standards laid out by Williams for game management. Consequently, they were judged to be delinquent and were rebuked accordingly. Political borders became a site of resistance as well. The Coastal Tlingit (living in Alaska) continued to use ‘traditional’ hunting and fishing grounds in the Stikine Plateau, much to Williams’ displeasure. He lamented that Alaskan authorities were not as meticulous in the matter of border control as he would have liked, providing ample opportunities for the flouting of the new regulations.\(^{35}\) Hunting across the southern border by ‘American’ Indians was a similarly problematic and regular occurrence.\(^{36}\)

But it was the Stoney (Nakoda) Indians of the Albertan foothills of the Rockies that posed the greatest annoyance to Williams. Stoney (who were “not even our own Indians”) hunting expeditions into the Kootenay District were regarded as illegal and highly injurious events, prompting the organization of local “posses” and the involvement of frontier law enforcement officials. In his first report, issued in 1905, Williams contended that “it was the intention [of the posses] that, if they returned, some of their chiefs should, if possible, be seized and severely punished.”\(^{37}\) Punishment, either as a fine or jail time, would deter the Stoney from continuing to use ‘traditional’ hunting grounds. According to Williams, the Stoney were simply unsporting. They “come in bigger bands” of 100 men, they “have quantities of dogs to help in their drives”, they export heads for sale, they destroy “large quantities of timber” by fire, and they “defy all our local authorities.”\(^{38}\) Stoney cross-border hunting efforts continued for several years, though Williams reported an improvement in law enforcement from 1906 on. Still, Stoney resistance proved to be a consistent problem for Williams. In 1908, though the perceived Stoney threat had diminished significantly,

Williams described the Kootenay DGWs being drawn into "wild goose" chases, following reports to empty campsites or finding local Indigenous peoples instead of the notorious Stoney. The irony is that Williams spent great energy and capital in his attempt to impose order on a very different sort of "wild goose" chase.

In central British Columbia, the Chilcotin (Tsi'qox't'in) posed another long-term problem for Williams, proving to be the most resistant to the new game laws. In 1905, as Williams was laying the foundations for game management, he complained that

[i]t is to be regretted that reports of the depredations of the Chilcotin Indians in the Lillooet country were not received sooner, as a special constable was put on patrol for a month in that district, with the intention of making an example of some of them, but by the time he was sent out most of the Indians had left, and, though he found numerous evidences of great slaughter of game, he was unable to catch any of them in the act.\(^{39}\)

The situation had not improved by 1907. Williams anguished over what he saw as the wanton slaughter of wildlife. With an attempted poetic flourish, Williams described a situation where the blood-thirsty "Chilcotin Indians were ravaging the famous Bridge River country every summer; deer by the thousands and numbers of sheep and goat fell by their rifles, male, female, and young, without mercy or thought of the future."\(^{40}\) Here was the Game Warden’s cautionary tale combined with a declaration of the absolute merit of his department. For Williams, Indigenous resistance was a nuisance, though it had the potential to incur real damage. But clearly, the Tahltan, Stoney, Chilcotin, and other unacknowledged resistors were expressing discontent with the new system implemented and its destabilization of their hunting territories.

**Williams’ Views on Indigenous Peoples**

Williams had dismissive views concerning the plight of Indigenous peoples. He did


\(^{40}\) Williams, “Game Warden Report 1907,” *Sessional Papers*, 1908, J12.
not recognize (at least explicitly) his complicity in the disruption of Indigenous hunting territories. Nor did he express contrition for his role in the attendant strain on economic subsistence strategies. The contents of his letters and Annual Reports encourage questions about how Williams' feelings towards Indigenous peoples might have influenced his policy initiatives. Here we can clearly see evidence of a paternalistic and ethnocentric attitude typical of the times. He sympathizes with Adolph Von Hagen's desire for a white guide, stating, "the Indians are of course little better than savages but they are a quiet civil people and if decently treated and see that a man really wishes to hunt they soon take pride in showing him game."\(^{41}\) Williams expressed his more general feelings to Teit in early 1908: "if the Liard Indians are in want then it is the duty of the Dominion Government to feed them, but personally I cannot see how they suffer as they get all the moose and caribou they want, and as far as groceries and clothes are concerned they can surely trap enough fox, lynx and marten to supply these wants."\(^{42}\) Williams (much like his contemporary Hewitt) shows an understanding of fiduciary responsibility but alternately exhibits a simplistic comprehension of the corrosive socio-cultural difficulties that his policies helped to entrench. He sees Indigenous peoples as the charge of the federal government and therefore not under his purview. However, when Indigenous peoples impacted game management, Williams asserted his jurisdiction.

The full measure of his opinion of Indigenous peoples is better expressed in his Annual Reports. These are full of recriminations and condemnations of the actions and attitudes attributed to Indigenous peoples. This opinion was laid out in stark terms in his first Report in 1905: "The time has come when more strenuous steps must be taken with regard to

\(^{41}\) PGW, Williams to Von Hagen, 18 May, 1906.
\(^{42}\) PGW, Williams to Teit, 24 January, 1908.
making Indians respect the game laws... [because] the damage they do is enormous."  

Native laws are not countenanced as valid, and are replaced by an imposed logic that regulates resources in a manner favourable to the state without addressing the subsistence needs of Indigenous peoples. Those subsistence needs are clearly secondary to the larger project of adequately preserving wildlife and promoting tourist exploitation. Conversely, Williams was explicitly in favour of the state policy of assimilation, going so far as to denigrate the ‘special privileges’ administered through the Indian Act. He believed that

"Surely the time has come when Indians can make a living as well as Chinese, Japanese, or even the white men. They have the best of the land and do not pay taxes... Now, I claim that it is better for the Indians themselves if they are made to understand that, under the present condition of affairs, the game cannot last long, and that they had better make up their minds to make their living in the same manner as everybody else... as otherwise there will be no game for them to hunt at all."  

In no uncertain terms, Williams laid out how Indigenous peoples must be brought into the state administrative gaze if game management was to have any chance of success. The juxtaposition of Williams’ claims of potential equality and the reality of his views on Indigenous hunters and guides points to the emptiness of his injunction and to the power of the assimilationist agenda. Williams also promoted this agenda by encouraging the incorporation of Indigenous peoples into the labour market. Speaking generally of ‘the Indian’, Williams contended that

"if he were forced to [work] it would tend toward the general prosperity of the country. Everybody knows how scarce labour has been during the past summer and what trouble farmers and ranchers have had to harvest their crops, and what an aid the Indians might have been had they chosen to get down to steady work."  

Williams’ understanding of ‘steady work’ does not include the seasonal subsistence strategies of Indigenous peoples, but rather, useful participation in a capitalist wage economy.

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that contributes to the overall growth of the province. At the time, Indigenous peoples were
directly involved in the wage economy, although apparently not to the extent that Williams
envisioned.

In his Annual Reports, Williams drew on correspondence from interested sportsmen
to make his point about the necessity of getting Indigenous peoples to respect game laws. He
cited a letter from Mr. Phillips, an American hunter from Pittsburgh of the type that Williams
wished to attract to the region: “I belong to a club which has a hundred members, most of
whom go west every year, but, from the experience of a number of us, we are likely to give
British Columbia a wide berth until you can assure us that, after we have paid our licence
fees and spent our money in outfit and guides, we will not be disappointed in finding Indians
in possession of the hunting country and the game exterminated.”  

In 1907, Williams
quoted an “English Gentleman” who had been hunting in the Stikine:

The Indians, I am sure, kill a very large amount of game during the winter... I heard
one, when speaking of a certain mountain, say he killed six sheep there last winter...
They kill a number of moose in winter, their dogs, I am told being fed on it. You really
must have a live Game Warden up there... you will have to do something to keep the
Cassiar a good game country.”

The letters relied the opinions of men from a very particular class. They were used by
Williams to buttress his own agenda and to rationalize the implementation of a very specific
management scheme. Furthermore, they showed to his superiors that he was not alone in his
appraisal of Indigenous hunting practices.

Yet, Williams believed that there were ‘good Indians’ as well. For Williams, these
were exemplars of assimilation and of the benefit that his policies could have for Indigenous
peoples. In 1910, he lauded the behavioural improvements he saw:

During the past year, [Indigenous peoples] have given but little trouble, and it must be acknowledged that, considering everything, they are pretty good. As a matter of fact, the Indians of this province are, on the whole, a law-abiding people. They could not understand the game laws at first and resented the restrictions placed on them, but now they see that they are made to be enforced.  

In other words, if Indigenous peoples were prepared to follow the letter of his law then all would be fine. Yet in his last Annual Report of 1916, Williams claimed that the situation had deteriorated, largely due to the political agitation for recognition of land rights. He stated dismissively that

the Indians are raising their old story of rights to the land and rights to the game and fish, and it is very evident that they have been wrongly advised. In consequence it has been absolutely necessary to take a firm stand with some of them, as they quite refused to listen to reason. It was most unfortunate their adopting this attitude, as not only did game suffer, but many Indians did also, as there were more prosecutions...

Seen in the context of resistance to the McKenna-McBride Commission, the above is another example of the effectiveness of the struggle mounted by Indigenous peoples to state encroachment. Game laws were subverted as part of the deliberate move to oppose the reorganization of territories and usufructuary rights.

The above quotation also shows how Williams used the threat and reality of legal power to bolster his own authority. He was unapologetic about the incarceration of Indigenous individuals for game offences. He took the flaunting of game laws as something of a personal affront. He told Teit in 1906,

...I had means of having two Indians given jail sentences at Ashcroft. I am sorry for them but it was no use going on warning them; they only laughed and said they would kill all they wanted to.

For his part, Teit applauded the stiff measures, believing that “the convictions will have a

49 Williams, “Game Warden Report 1916,” Sessional Papers, 1917, O16. Apparently, Williams wrote an Annual Report in 1917, but it was not published in the Sessional Papers as it was deemed too critical of the impending changes to the Game Department.
50 PGW, Williams to Teit, 28, March, 1906.
salutary effect."\(^{51}\) He clearly believed Indigenous peoples should adhere to the regulations as set out by the provincial government. He told Williams,

I hear it said that one Indian near here this fall killed 12 deer. This is too many. A few other Indians hunted here this fall but all of them killed less than five a piece.\(^{52}\)

This conflict for Teit was undoubtedly a conflict within Indigenous cultures as well. There would have been great pressure to maintain wildlife stocks, much like in previous Indigenous animal regulatory schemes. However, intragroup pressures against 'overkill' would have been in relation to Indigenous self-interest rather than a capitulation to the laws of the emerging liberal state.

Teit sought to advocate within the parameters set out by a Euro-Canadian legal paradigm. Yet it has been shown that Teit played a vital role in the organization and promotion of an Indigenous resistance movement that opposed both the implementation of injurious game legislation as well as the overarching internal colonial agenda. Clearly, this should not be seen as a linear spectrum, with game laws on one side and the interests of Indigenous peoples on the other. Teit may have been caught between two interests that were at times in conflict and at times overlapping. This ambiguity does not render his accomplishments moot. Rather, it shows a political awareness and a desire to accommodate both the needs of Indigenous peoples and the maintenance of a healthy wildlife stock. Importantly, he engaged with the organs of state power in order to achieve what he felt was positive change. Williams was also trying to achieve a measure of positive change. Yet he was attempting to secure Indigenous peoples' participation within the power network of the state. These conflicting legacies each buttressed hegemonies, though these were attached to starkly different interests. These hegemonies are the focus of the concluding chapter.

\(^{51}\) PGW, Teit to Williams, 29 March, 1906. See also, PGW, Teit to Williams, 3 January, 1907.

\(^{52}\) PGW, Teit to Williams, 27 November, 1906. Emphasis in original.
Engaging Counter-Hegemony:  
A Reconnaissance of the Settler-Indigenous Dynamic in British Columbia

Let us begin by reviewing the material presented in the case study for evidence of the tangible achievements, assumptions, and agendas of Williams and Teit in regards to game management. There can be no doubt that Williams was successful in organizing a comprehensive program for game protection in British Columbia. He implemented a regime of control that included closed hunting seasons and kill limits for all game species and a bounty system for the termination of unwanted predatory animals. This was designed to increase control over a healthy and sustainable wildlife population. His control was facilitated by a network of Deputy Game Wardens who reported information on local hunting conditions, enforced game laws, and generally extended the reach of wildlife conservation efforts across the province. Williams initiated a licencing scheme that required the registration of gun owners, out-of-province hunters, miners, and guides. This allowed Williams to ensure a measure of accountability and to extend his control over the numbers of animals taken. In particular, the guides’ licence brought stability to a guiding industry that had been disordered and unregulated. All of these measures were essential components of Williams’ tourism promotion efforts. Additionally, they contributed to the extension of infrastructure (particularly transportation) to the more remote areas of the province.

Teit played an important role in the development of Williams’ ideas and achievements. He shared his vast ecological knowledge on the habits and habitats of the wildlife that Williams sought to protect. Williams’ own knowledge of these matters was already large, and Teit was by no means the only one to offer this type of information. But Teit’s shared knowledge was a significant contribution to the success of game protection.
This knowledge helped Teit make important recommendations on the more ‘scientific’ aspects of Williams’ project: kill limits, closed seasons, and bounties. Many of these recommendations were incorporated by Williams into game law. Teit was supportive of Williams’ licencing agenda. He agreed that various licencing arrangements would allow for better supervision, control, and populations maintenance. For example, as early as 1905, Teit argued for a guides’ licence which he saw as an essential regulatory tool both for the growth of a healthy hunting industry and a healthy wildlife population. Teit and Williams both saw a need for these measures to prevent overkill. Teit was also prominent in the spread of the big game hunting tourist industry into the Stikine. He led nine hunting parties through the region and organized the logistics for several dozen more. Williams helped him secure contracts and often used him to facilitate the hunting excursions of other parties. The general analysis provided above raises some problems because it is necessarily incomplete. It is extremely difficult to trace direct and conclusive links between Teit’s recommendations and Williams’ policies. For example, in 1905 Teit advocated for the implementation of required licencing of guides, but it was not until 1913 that the policy was introduced. This temporal disconnect is problematic for a researcher trying to show causal policy links between Teit and Williams. Surely, Teit’s advice influenced the decisions of Williams, but attempts to quantify the import of that advice must remain partial.

Aside from his advice on hunting policy, Teit also advocated on behalf of Indigenous peoples. He helped some of his friends near Spences Bridge access bounty payments that had been withheld. He helped some Tahltan men get contracts for guiding, cooking, and horse-wrangling. When advising on ecological conditions he kept Williams
informed of the interests of Indigenous peoples regarding hunting and trapping practices. In the political arena, Teit provided an information link to the struggles of the Indian Rights Association and advised the Tahltan on the goals of the McKenna-McBride Royal Commission. He helped to galvanize the Tahltan in their battle for better wages. For their part, the Tahltan actively resisted the encroachment of a liberal land-reordering effort in their territory. Seen in a broad sense, Teit's biggest contribution to this resistance was in explaining the language and the rules of the liberal hegemony. Arguably, Teit provided the essential tools to fight that ruling order.

I would like to continue by addressing some more theoretical considerations. The following should not be viewed as a definitive judgment or as an attempt to reorient disciplinary conventions. In the spirit of embracing the contradictions and ambiguities highlighted by Gramscian scholars I reject unequivocal statements of blame and compartmentalizations into bounded categories of 'hegemony' or 'counter-hegemony'. Rather, the ideas (tentatively) put forth in this conclusion should be seen as theoretical possibilities that could be used to analyse the data offered in the body of this thesis. This theoretical paradigm has been integral to my own conceptualization of the debate surrounding game management, and indeed, has helped to frame the preceding analysis.

Ian McKay challenges scholars who are concerned with the historical relationships between Indigenous peoples and the state to reckon with the inequities that have emerged out of the implementation of the liberal order. "Aboriginals...", claims McKay, "were people whose conceptions of property, politics, and the individual were scandalously not derived from the universe of Locke, Smith, Bentham, or Lord Durham."¹ Rather, Indigenous peoples' constructed relationships to nature, landscape, and wildlife were often

symbiotic and based on a communalist spirit. These relationships were anathema to the emerging liberal state’s agenda regarding private property. A ‘reconnaissance’ of the outcomes of this conceptual divide should lead to “a revaluation of Ottawa’s [and Victoria’s] handling of the ‘Indian Question’ as not just a series of misunderstandings, premised on a distanced misreading of Native societies, but rather as a fulfillment of liberal norms, which required the subordination of alternatives.”\(^2\) Within McKay’s framework, to achieve a fuller understanding of the impact of the liberal order hegemony in Canada, scholars must look at the way in which that power was infused within a national imagination and how it interacted with the alternative worldviews expressed by Indigenous peoples.

In British Columbia, where the exploitation of natural resources played a central role in the development of the economy and infrastructure, the reordering of land through law and institutional power can be seen as a concrete extension of a liberal ordering process. In northern British Columbia, where the state had less institutional presence, conservation became a vital means of state control. Correspondingly, wildlife conservation was part of a process where administrators and policy makers from Victoria legislated restrictions on the lifeways of Indigenous peoples. Williams had a clear and uncompromising vision of the importance of wildlife conservation for the development of British Columbia. But this was an ideologically informed understanding of development that rarely included the interests of Indigenous peoples. Teit sought to mediate the power of these conservation measures in ways that addressed the immediate interests of Indigenous peoples, in particular the Talhtan. He facilitated a resistance movement that sought to protect entrenched and vigorous regulations that arbitrated the relationship

between the Talhtan, their land, and the animals they depended upon for subsistence and continuity.

I have argued that the development of game management in British Columbia was informed by a liberal order understanding, or ideology. This ideology should be seen as part of a more abstract hegemonic effort to "establish moral, political and intellectual leadership throughout the fabric of society as whole, thus equating [the ruling group's] own interests with the interests of society as a whole." In British Columbia, a hegemonic liberal order was infused within early-twentieth century dominant discourse through the elaboration and acceptance of a 'commonsense' understanding of culture. The development of game management spread this 'commonsense' into remote parts of the province through its articulation of a similar cultural code emphasizing private property, the individual and the rule of law. The implementation of game law, then, was vital not only to the broadening of a regime of control over resources and land, but also to the spread of an elite-endorsed representation of the state's relationship to its inhabitants. This particular world-view was encouraged through both material and rhetorical (or discursive) regimes of power. Through these regimes of power, Williams, as the head and intermediary of the new game management structure, came to be a primary engine for the strengthening of this 'commonsense' in northern BC. Williams was imbricated within, rather than an explicit creator of, the ruling structure that mediated the dominant liberal discourse in BC at the time. Thus, he did not create this liberal order, but by virtue of his position was essential to its dissemination.

Gramsci conceptualized hegemony in different ways throughout The Prison Notebooks, his disparate collection of writings on history, philosophy, literature, and

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politics, written while incarcerated in a fascist jail from 1926 to 1937. His first explanation of the notion of hegemony usefully focuses attention on the integral concepts of coercion and consent.

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or "the State". These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the State and "juridical" government.  

In this instance, civil (social, cultural, and moral) and state (political and economic) society are counterposed. Elsewhere in the Notebooks, the binary is less rigid, with force and consent often presented as complimentary techniques of power and control. Indeed, civil and state society are mutually determinative. The incorporation of sociocultural and moral factors into a more nuanced reading of historical change is regarded as Gramsci's fundamental contribution to the theory of ideology.  

Belgian theorist Chantal Mouffe characterizes hegemony, articulating its connections to the concept of ideology, as "a complete fusion of economic, political, intellectual, and moral objectives which will be brought about by one fundamental group and groups allied to it through the intermediary of ideology when an ideology manages to 'spread throughout the whole of society determining not only united economic and political objectives but also intellectual and moral unity."  

By meshing the coercive and consensual capabilities of state and civil society, a purportedly post-colonial society in British Columbia was able to articulate a hegemonic discourse in which its own worldview was canonized and a circumscribed perception, challenging the multiplicity of Indigenous cultures, took root. Conservation,

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5 Crehan, Gramsci, Culture, and Anthropology, 182.
the idea that state control of wildlife resources should supersede existing Indigenous regulatory structures, was part of this hegemonic discourse in BC. More importantly, it was a vital conduit for the export of hegemonic ideals into less-settled parts of the province where state power was less evident.

With the English publication of *Selections From The Prison Notebooks* in 1971, Gramscian theory gained greater currency within critical theory and historiographical debates. Many commentators, criticizing Gramsci’s notion of hegemony as too totalizing or too instrumentalist, argued for a more nuanced understanding of hegemony as a dialectical, dynamic and adaptable discourse of power. For a new generation of ‘neo-Gramscian’ scholars, the concept of hegemony was rearticulated as *hegemonies*. This newer formulation was primarily constructive when used to assess the plurality of discourses of power, as well as the many diverse responses to those modalities of power.

Additionally, the stark binarism that characterized much state-building historiography was undercut by this neo-Gramscian theoretical framework. In speaking of hegemonies, neo-Gramscian scholars put forth a critique that abandoned explanatory models based on outlines of synthesis or secularism. Following from this rejection of ‘top-down’ models of historical explanation, McKay has asserted that within Canadian history “there is no ‘top’ and no ‘bottom’: there is a centre and a periphery, a liberal project and its ‘resistors.’” Consequently, it was no longer adequate to study the *forceful* imposition of an *ideological* world-view of a ruling elite onto a subject people. The

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8 McKay decries the secular (or ideological) nature of much Canadian leftist history. See, Ian McKay, *Reds, Rebels, Radicals: Toward a New Left History of Canada* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2005).

agential process embedded in acts of resistance could be theorized within the concept of hegemony. As anthropologist Kate Crehan claims

For those interested in the analysis of postcolonial societies..., perhaps the most important lesson that Gramsci has to teach is that of paying careful attention to the specificities of local histories, attempting to read the fragmentary narratives left by the subaltern in their own terms while never forgetting to pay equal attention to how these local realities belong simultaneously to larger worlds.\(^\text{10}\)

Hegemonies have resonance within specific localities of power which are each uniquely affected by the process of empire. They provide an opportunity for theorizing both the connections and structural inequalities of the periphery to the core.\(^\text{11}\)

The notion of hegemonies also provides space for an analysis of the alternative discourses that emerge in response to prevailing orders. Crehan maintains that Gramsci’s primary utility “derives from his insistence that ultimately the most important question is that of power: who has power and who does not? Who is the oppressor and who is the oppressed? and what are the specificities of the relations of oppression?”\(^\text{12}\) Gramsci identifies an alternative ‘commonsense’ embedded within the subaltern, in this case, Indigenous peoples engaged with a liberal state. This new ‘commonsense’, once wrested free from under the weight of state hegemony, articulates grievances and attempts to move against its oppressors. Gramsci’s understanding of this alternative ‘commonsense’ must be slightly altered in the case of Indigenous peoples where the extraordinary diversity of cultures meant that the state ‘commonsense’ had to be gradually instilled and then integrated into Indigenous lifeways in different manners. In Canada, this phenomenon was

\(^{10}\) Kate Crehan, *Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 126.

\(^{11}\) For an elucidation of the periphery/core model of colonial power see, Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

called assimilation. It involved the gradual erasure of Indigenous lifeways and subsequent integration into the habitual ‘commonsense’ cultural framework established by the liberal order. This exercise of state power was resisted by Indigenous communities in myriad ways, all of them successful to some extent. This points to the ambiguity of the counter-hegemony.

The ‘counter-hegemony’ is articulated through an ‘organic intellectual’\(^{14}\), which could exist in the form of an individual or a group. In the context of British Columbia, organic intellectuals played a vital role in the creation and dissemination of a resistance movement against the attempted consolidation of a hegemonic order. Individuals, like Taku Jack and Chief Squash who spoke to the McKenna-McBride Commissioners or the signatories to various Declarations, voiced eloquent accounts of their inalienable connections to the land, and of its central place within their communities’ worldview. This tradition of strong leadership has continued in British Columbia over the past century, with activists like Peter Kelly, Art Manuel, Andy Paull, and Delga’muukw engaging the state on behalf of their peoples. Their successes in harnessing the energies of a counter-hegemonic spirit have been profound. Collective organic intellectual structures, like the Allied Tribes of BC or organized Tahltan guiding unions, achieved measurable advances in attempts to have their alternative worldviews recognized. In addition, individual Tahltan hunters and guides voiced their dissent by circumventing the standard rules of conduct.

Teit played an integral role in fostering the many different aspects of a resistance movement among the Tahltan and among the greater Indigenous population in British


\(^{14}\) The ‘organic intellectual’ is a class whose resistance springs directly from lived experience of hegemony rather than a more academic or detached perspective.
Columbia. In this sense, he was part of a counter-hegemonic discourse. While Tahlitan resistance was undoubtedly organic, it gained great force from the tireless lobbying, organizing, and advocacy efforts of Teit. His dedication to the emancipation of Indigenous peoples promoted the potential for a radical equality in British Columbia. Yet, even a man as extraordinary as Teit was unable to completely escape the power of the hegemonic order. Indeed, the hegemonic order engages everybody, at least to some extent. Its power arises from the fact that it becomes normalized as a ‘commonsense’ worldview.

This is not to diminish the importance of Teit’s efforts or his agency in recognizing and confronting hegemonic structures, but rather, to highlight the strength, adaptability, and often insidious nature of a liberal hegemonic discourse that came to dominate social, political, and economic life in British Columbia. Teit’s interactions with both the state and Indigenous peoples expose the complicated nature and potential pitfalls of an analysis of hegemonies. It seems that a nuanced appraisal of his actions serves to reveal more ambiguity. While it is important to avoid the score-card approach derided by McKay in his most recent work, one can analyse Teit’s role in the development of game protection legislation for examples of the immense power of a liberal order hegemony. Teit was involved in the shaping of game policy which I have described as part of the spread of a liberal order into northern British Columbia. Yet within the parameters of this liberal order (manifested in this case through game policy), Teit was able to achieve measurable advances for Indigenous peoples, one of the groups that game law sought to bring within the state’s administrative gaze.

Similarly, through his actions as a guide, Teit contributed to the further incorporation of the Tahlitan into a capitalist wage labour economy. This can be seen in

several ways: Teit was helping the Tahltan to function in a changing economic climate, giving them tangible skills with which to earn real wages; this action further eroded connections to ‘traditional’ lifeways, thereby contributing to the reordering of land in the Stikine; or, he was simultaneously resisting and reinforcing a hegemonic political discourse which ultimately dispossessed Indigenous peoples from the land and resettled it within the tenets of a liberal economic order. Teit was also guiding on ‘traditional’ Tahltan territory, bringing men, capital, infrastructure, law and new spatial arrangements with him. This brings to light further complications, as many Tahltan actively pursued work in the guiding industry, thereby possibly contributing to the dislocation in progress. Indeed, this might give rise to questions on the location of agency, both of Teit and the Tahltan. However, agency is in ample evidence in the resistance mounted by the Tahltan (wage strikes, MMRC testimony, continuation of subsistence patterns, poaching, substandard guiding service, and flouting of new regulations) and by Teit (facilitation of Tahltan resistance, work for Aboriginal rights movement at large, attempts to influence game law toward the interests of Indigenous peoples). In the final analysis, this is the fundamental point that I wish to stress. Gramsci articulated the concept of passive revolution, whereby the state, feeling the growth of a critique of its hegemony, seeks to incorporate elements of the critique into its own discourse while handicapping the power of the critique in the process. There are elements of the passive revolution at play in the Stikine. In fact, this partially explains some of the ambiguities in Teit’s actions. He was unable to transcend many of the barriers placed before him and may have been inadvertently drawn into the parameters and vocabulary of the state. Yet what he did accomplish was exceptional, especially when considered against the prevailing hegemonic discourse.
Drawing on the work of social theorists Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Cole Harris has recently suggested, “the spatial energy of capitalism works to deterritorialize people (that is, to detach them from prior bonds between people and place) and reterritorialize them in relation to the requirements of capital (that is, to land conceived as resources and freed from the constraints of custom and to labor detached from the land).”¹⁶ This phenomenon can be seen in the Stikine. Indeed, capitalism was a primary instigator of the dislocation of Indigenous people from the land. But capitalism was only one, although essential, part of the growth of a hegemonic order. The Tahltan were not just forced to use the land differently but were forced to think about the land differently. In other words, the spatial arrangements of capital (ie. liberal understandings of private property) achieved a program of alienation in both a material and psychological sense.

In his landmark study on the construction of the Nova Scotia ‘Folk,’ Ian McKay attempts to theorize the cultural hegemonic process of appropriation launched by middle-class culture producers. He claims that “[t]he problem we confront is less one of incomplete or repressed information, and more one of conceptual frameworks within which facts acquire their significance and further the hegemony that such frameworks have achieved in society.”¹⁷ McKay incorporates the work of Michel Foucault to bolster the arguments centered on the entrenchment of a power/knowledge discourse.¹⁸ Foucault’s “genealogical research” allows McKay to avoid reductionistic logic in his attempt to theorize the symbiosis “between systems of truth and modalities of power.”¹⁹ Within this

¹⁸ McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*, 296.
¹⁹ McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*, 300.
framework, we can begin to see how bounded, "discursive entities" like 'Indian,' 'property' or 'wildlife' "are constructed as new objects of thought through mutual relations of knowledge and power."\(^{20}\) Awareness of the structure of the liberal order hegemonic framework and of the linguistic devices used in its implementation, allows the historian to more adequately theorize these modalities of power and their role in the creation of a subaltern. An intricate process of knowledge creation and subsequent power entrenchment has occurred in British Columbia over the last 150 years. The attempted marriage of Foucauldian power/knowledge discourse with Gramscian theory may aid in attempts to expose the artificial nature of this construction and of its power. McKay's justification for his development of a neo-Gramscian framework exhibits promising potential for a similar analysis of colonialism in British Columbia:

"Constructed as a subject-position within a new hegemonic framework in the 1920s, the concept of the Folk was and remains a powerful obstacle to the formation of a counter-hegemonic cultural politics, without which a new, profoundly emancipatory politics of class, gender, and racial equality is inconceivable."\(^{21}\)

The application of Foucauldian theory has a rich pedigree in recent historiography of British Columbia. Daniel Clayton shows how pre-colonial BC emerged in the geographical imaginations of imperial subjects. Similarly, in considering Foucault's notion of 'bio-power', or the institutional control of individual bodies, Cole Harris contends that, "[h]ad Foucault worked in colonial settings, I venture that he would have offered a less institutional version of the carceral metaphor and made less of the disciplined individual, while making more of strategies associated with the deployment of land and the


\(^{21}\) McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*, 306.
management and normalization of groups.”22 This fits well within the Gramscian critique that I have put forth, focusing on the power of civil and state institutions in consolidating power through the implementation of “a whole technology of representation.”23 Keith Smith’s research posits similar conclusions. In evoking the pervasive and assimilative presence of panoptic forms of surveillance over Indigenous economic practices, Smith suggests that “[t]he panoptic mechanism is not neutral to this varied activity, and new attempts have been made to submerge the justness of redress for alienated land and resources within the hegemonic understanding of liberalism and democracy.”24 John Lutz takes a similar Foucauldian analysis a step further when he describes the centrality of the projects of naming, surveillance and examination undertaken by the provincial government. These are roughly coterminous with the primary tenets of Foucault’s power/knowledge discourse: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and examination.25 This allows Lutz to contend that, “For the government, from 1871 on, the ‘Indian problem’ was managing, civilizing, and normalizing an officially pathologized population, and ensuring that their former lands and resources were accessible to incoming settlers.”26

Yet, there are profound differences between Gramsci and Foucault in the way they chose to engage with the problem of hegemonies. In contrast to Gramsci’s counter-hegemony, Foucault offers a type of anti-hegemony that is less amenable to the creation of

22 Harris, Making Native Space, 269.
26 Lutz, “‘Relating to the Country,” 30.
an alternative political discourse.\textsuperscript{27} A Foucauldian paradigm alone is not adequate to achieve an emancipatory politics. However, Foucault’s work on power/knowledge complements Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and its centrality to the theory of the State. Foucault, through his recognition of the multiplicity of subjectivities within the power/knowledge nexus, helps to reinforce the contention regarding the plurality of hegemonies. This helps to transcend crude binaries of hegemony/counter-hegemony that alarm some scholars. I suggest that a framework that employs the ideas of both Foucault and Gramsci can best theorize hegemonic power and any emerging alternatives.

In developing this paradigm, I take my cue from Stuart Hall, who insists, “the purpose of theorizing is not to enhance one’s intellectual of academic reputation but to enable us to grasp, understand, and explain – to produce a more adequate knowledge of – this historical world and its processes; and thereby to inform our practice so that we may transform it.”\textsuperscript{28} Research for this thesis is deeply implicated in contemporary, though certainly historically-rooted, problems in which power is manifest in cultural, political and economic relationships. A recalibration of the ‘common sense’ is fundamental to the ongoing project of decolonization. Yet, the process of decolonization is necessarily two-sided. The ‘common sense’ of the (re)settler society in British Columbia must also be part of this process.

Gramsci provides us with a formidable template for thinking about aspects of power and hegemony that have characterized the legacy of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state. Speaking about contemporary British politics, Stuart Hall remarks,

"Gramsci gives us, not the tools with which to solve the puzzle, but the means with which to ask the right kinds of questions."\textsuperscript{29} It is in the questions that a Gramscian critique of hegemony elicits that we see the tangible benefit of the application of his thought. The theoretical paradigm advanced within these pages helps to fill a gap in the historiography. Additionally, it plays a role in the decolonization of this colonial space. Hayden White proclaimed that a "politics of interpretation" is imbued within the study and writing of history.\textsuperscript{30} As such, history "is never innocent, ideologically or otherwise..."\textsuperscript{31} Likewise, the history of conservation policy and practice in British Columbia is not innocent. It is part of the process of dislocation of Indigenous peoples from the land in this colonised space.

\textsuperscript{29} Stuart Hall, \textit{The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis on the Left}. (London: Verso, 1988), 162.


\textsuperscript{31} White. "The Politics of Historical Representation," 82.
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