Citizenship, Culture and Ideology in Roman Greece

by

Jamie Patrick Nay
B.A. (Hons.), Dalhousie University, 2005

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Supervisory Committee

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Supervisory Committee

Dr. Gregory D. Rowe, (Department of Greek and Romans Studies)
Supervisor

Dr. Gordon S. Shrimpton, (Department of Greek and Roman Studies)
Departmental Member

Dr. Cedric A. Littlewood, (Department of Greek and Roman Studies)
Departmental Member

Dr. Warren Magnusson, (Department of Political Science)
External Examiner
Abstract

A study of the cultural and ideological effects of Roman citizenship on Greeks living in the first three centuries AD. The ramifications of the extension of citizenship to these Greeks illustrates that ideas such as 'culture' and 'identity' are not static terms, but constructions of a particular social milieu at any given point in time. Roman citizenship functioned as a kind of ideological apparatus that, when given to a non-Roman, questioned that individual's native identity. This thesis addresses, via an examination of four sources, all of whom were Greeks with Roman citizenship - Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Paul in the Acts of the Apostles, Ulpian, the minters of eastern civic coins - the extent to which one could remain 'Greek' while participating in one of the most Roman institutions of the Empire. Utilizing these sources with the aid of a number of theoretical bases (notably Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu), this study attempts to come to a conclusion about the nature of 'Romanness' in the ancient world.
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Introduction: Old Worlds and New Ideology

In a favourite passage for anyone writing on the intersection of Roman and Greek cultures, Horace states that *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes / intulit agresti Latio* (‘Greece, captive, captured her fierce conqueror and brought the arts into uncultivated Latium’ *Epist.* 2.1.156-7). To paraphrase Susan Alcock (1993: 1), the history of Greece (and Asia) under the Roman Empire is paradoxical. Roman they may have been in name, but, for many of them, the world was still Greek; they were “true Hellenes”, as Dio Chrysostom said on more than one occasion.¹ Yet, in reality, these Greeks were not as Hellenic as they thought, since their culture only existed under the umbrella of the Roman Empire. In other words, the meaning of ‘Greek identity’ now had to take into account the new, quite un-Greek monarchs in town. To be Greek was less a political than a cultural (or even moral) statement (Desideri 2002: 223). Greece meant high culture, ancient custom, rich history – in short, those things which Rome, the *ferus victor*, did not possess before annexing its neighbours to the east.

Such a simple view of things, however – that Greece was governed by Rome but was still *Greek* – is not satisfying, since it ignores all of the grassroots political and social changes happening in the provinces of Greece and Asia. A prime example is the extension of Roman citizenship: it is one thing to be governed by Romans and still maintain one’s Greek identity, but to *become* Roman? To participate in the ideological institutions of the Empire? If, as the political philosopher Louis Althusser (1971: 160) says, “man is an ideological animal by nature” (simultaneously recalling and challenging

¹ For example, Dio Chrys. 31.161-3; 44.10; 48.8.
his philosophical predecessor Aristotle), the establishment of such institutions as the Imperial cult must have had some effect on the daily lives of those who participated in them (in other words, everyone living under Roman rule).

These institutions – ideological state apparatuses, to use Althusser’s terminology – are the primary way in which a ruler asserts his culture, practices and ‘victorious’ ideology on those being ruled. Ideology, “the imaginary relation of… individuals to the real relations in which they live,” is only a set of abstract ideas, manifesting itself in the culture of a society and obtaining a material existence through the practices or rituals that are associated with the ideological state apparatuses (Althusser 1971: 155). For example: the head of a modern-day religion has a certain ideological doctrine in mind for his followers (how they should best follow God), so he ensures that this ideology is accessible via apparatuses (individual churches), which themselves use rituals such as prayers and communion (practices) to deliver the ideology as intended. As long as the apparatuses reinforce the notion that the subjects should subject themselves (‘if I pray to God, subscribing to the beliefs and rituals of the ideology, everything will be OK’), the ideological machine rumbles forth, its institutions transforming the cultural landscape around it (Althusser 1971: 159-168).²

It is within this cultural landscape that new Roman citizens are born – some by birth, others by special appointment. Surrounded by ideological state apparatuses for their entire lives (if not physically, such as those living in ‘Romanized’ communities, then at least mentally, since cultivated Greeks would have at least known of Rome’s various institutions), those living under the Roman Empire were in fact living in what Pierre

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Bourdieu calls a *habitus*. This term represents the habits and dispositions an individual acquires (unconsciously or consciously) via the interaction with certain structures, causing that individual to behave in certain ways. Through habitualized rituals such as, for example, table manners (‘don’t slouch,’ ‘don’t talk while eating’), “the individual acquires a set of dispositions which literally mould the body and become second nature” (Thompson 2002: 12). These collective dispositions form the backbone of what Bourdieu calls ‘taste culture,’ which, “through differentiated and differentiating conditions associated with the different conditions of existence” – such as the hierarchy of the social structure, differences in language, regional differences in family conventions and educational systems, and the value ascribed to cultural products and objects – inscribe in a group of people (that is, a gathering of individuals) the idea of a fixed social order. Through this habitualization of prescribed cultural tastes, an individual gains “a ‘sense of one’s place’ which leads one to exclude oneself from the goods, persons, places and so forth from which one is excluded,” leading to the creation of a “common-sense world” governed by the practical (innate) knowledge of one’s social environment (Bourdieu 1984: 468-71).

Bourdieu’s *habitus*, shaped by his idea of pre-determined taste, is similar to the structure of Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses: individuals in a community are shaped by the institutions of those communities. If one is taught from childhood to

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3 In Bourdieu’s own dense language (1977, 72), *habitus* represents “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and… collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.”

4 Aristotle (*Eth. Nic*. 1105b3), who in many ways anticipated many of Bourdieu’s theories, recognizes this practice in his definition of virtue, which ὁπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τα δίκαια καὶ
sacrifice to Roman gods, participate in the provincial Roman property censuses, and so on, then one may well become Roman *naturally*. The age of the Empire and the extension of its institutions and habitualized practices meant that a traveling Roman “could recognize at least one temple in every city he visited and would know the prayers for one divinity in every ritual he witnessed” (Ando 2000: 407). These normalized ideological apparatuses made the most far-reaching provincial community part of Rome, in turn bringing even the most Greek of citizens under the umbrella of Roman identity. These provincials need not have accepted themselves as ‘Roman,’ necessarily, but they could not have avoided at least acknowledging the existence of a ‘Roman’ identity; their predisposition to the habitualized ideological apparatuses means that they would have had at least some level of investment in Roman culture.

The ‘investment’ a person makes into the culture(s) to which they belong – native, Roman, religious, mixture – is what I shall call ‘ideological capital.’ This term refers to the extent to which an individual immerses himself in the *habitus* and ideological apparatuses of the community in which he lives. For example, a Greek provincial who adopts a Roman name, participates in as many Roman rituals as he can, and ignores his ‘Greekness’ is investing his ideological capital entirely in his rulers’ culture. On the other hand, a Greek who receives Roman citizenship yet still calls himself ‘Greek’ keeps most of his ideological capital invested in his ‘original’ culture. Participation in the Imperial cult is one example of an apparatus which demanded the investment of ideological capital via its participation, forcing natives to acknowledge Rome’s existence and influence. Nor were temples to Roma, Julius Caesar, Augustus and the like regarded as strictly ‘Roman’

σωφρόνα περιγίνεται (“results from the repeated performance of just and moderate actions”). In other words, virtue is a product of a habitualized, ‘second nature’ process.
in the East; individuals in the less ‘Romanized’ parts of the Empire could welcome these new figures into their personal theologies as overarching representations of their regional deities, in effect merging two identities (native and colonial) into one. Although far from a perfect tool to transform a community from ‘native’ to ‘Roman(ized),’ ideological state apparatuses such as the Imperial cult brought Roman culture to places it had never before been, establishing new paradigms for the political milieux of communities, re-defining ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and allowing for the investment of ideological capital into the imported culture (Levick 1996: 657; Ando 2000: 391-410).5

The extension of Roman citizenship worked in a way similar to the spread of the imperial cult, providing another, more penetrating avenue for ideological investment in one’s non-native culture. Cicero famously stated that all people have two homelands, *unam naturae, alteram civitatis... sed necesse est caritate eam praestare <e> qua rei publicae nomen universae civitati est* (‘one by nature, the other by citizenship... but it is necessary for that homeland to be superior in favour in which the name of the republic is of universal citizenship,’ *Leg.* 2.2.5). Although Cicero, thanks to his conservative political beliefs, may have thought that it was the duty of any good Roman – whether or not by birth – always to put the Republic(/Empire) first, this was simply not the case, especially in places already rich with history such as Greece and Asia.

No doubt, as this study intends to show, citizenship was an important part of life for those living under Rome in the East, helping to shape the way individuals viewed both their homelands ‘by nature’ and ‘by citizenship.’ Yet the acquisition of Roman citizenship did not necessarily mean the adaptation of Roman custom. As the subsequent

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5 Levick 1996, 657; Ando 2000, 391-410. See also Dio Chrysostom (1.9-41) and Plutarch (*Ad. Princ. Inerud.* 780d).
chapters will argue, a Roman citizen born in Greece or Asia often retained his ‘Eastern’ beliefs, values, and customs, frequently to the detriment of his new ‘fatherland.’ Thus, for every Aelius Aristides, a ‘Greek’ Roman citizen who, judging by his oration To Rome, actively forgot his native culture (Aelius calls Rome the greatest empire in the history of the world, to the explicit detriment of the previous Greek empires), there is a Dio Chrysostom, a somewhat reluctant Roman living in the Bithynia region who would take the culture of ‘true Hellenes’ over those unbearded Romans any day.  

Neither of these typecast individuals – one ‘for’ Rome, one (mostly) ‘against’ it – will receive any in-depth attention here. Instead, I shall analyze three somewhat more problematic ancient figures, all Roman citizens but born in the East: Paul of Tarsus (as depicted in the Acts of the Apostles), a Christian who uses his Roman citizenship when he must; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, thoroughly Roman but proudly Greek; and Ulpian, a Greek who gave the Latin language some of its most distinctively ‘Roman’ prose. Additionally, a close investigation of Eastern numismatic evidence will attempt to discern a more ‘communal’ attitude among Greeks and Asians about their Roman rulers – in other words, attitudes that may differ from what the elite authors, whose evidence we rely on so much, say about the same issues. Starting with a close look at the means by which one could acquire Roman citizenship in the age of the Empire, an investigation of the varied nature of these ancient sources will bring to light the relationship between individual, homeland ‘by nature,’ and homeland ‘by citizenship,’ as seen through the lenses of those in the East with Roman citizenship writing about, or representing, the Empire.

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6 For Aelius Aristides, see Or. 26. For Dio Chrysostom and ‘true Hellenes,’ see esp. 31.161-3. For Dio’s disdain for the Romans’ habit of shaving, see 36.17.
Chapter One: The Ideology of Identity

Becoming a Citizen

New Ruler, Old Rules

The annexation of Greece and Asia by the new Roman monarchy (picking up where the old monarchy, the Hellenistic kings, left off) did not spell the end of Hellenic culture. The daily way of life for those living in these provinces was basically unchanged – in some cases, as will be discussed below, the biggest difference was substituting the name of ‘king X’ for ‘Emperor Y’ in the local rites of a community. Greece was officially a full provincial member, as ‘Achaia’, of the Roman Empire in 27 BC (the generally accepted date) at the hands of Augustus and the ‘reorganization’ of his lands (Alock 1993: 9; Spawforth 1996). Even though a new province meant new places to which existing Roman citizens could travel – since with new Roman soil came roads and the army (Treggiari 1996: 901) – the more prominent cities in Greece kept their right of local autonomy which T. Quinctius Flamininus, praetor and triumvir,7 granted in 196 BC. Specifically, this autonomy meant that the cities were to be ‘free’ (eleutheroi): their own laws (autonomoi), no Imperial garrisons (aphrouretoi), and no tribute (aphorologetoi). These rights stayed in effect until the reign of Constantine I, who brought the cities under the swift hand of Roman proconsular jurisdiction.8

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7 That is, a member of a board of three Roman Republican public officials responsible – at least originally – for duties such as founding colonies and assigning land (Lintott 1996:1555).

8 For the details of Flamininus’ declaration, see Pol. 18.46.5 (cf. 44); RDGE 34 (= RGE 8), 19-21. For Constantine I, see Cameron 2005.
Autonomy, however, is a tricky word when dealing with the Roman Empire. The Greeks may have been granted ‘freedom’, but, as Lintott (1993: 36) notes, “any freedom granted by a dominant power has implicitly an element of dependence, and most Greeks had no doubt that they were still subject to a dominant power (hegemon).” With regard to taxation, for example, even though Flamininus eliminated taxation and Julius Caesar removed direct tax collection from the publicani, indirect taxes and portoria (tolls, duties, and so on) persisted in forms such as ‘duties’ on goods, penalties for failing to declare goods, and fees for dealing with contracts (Lintott 1993: 85).9 In all cases, since local independence was established by decree of the senate, the authority of the governor was pervasive, this local independence was maintained on Rome’s terms. In Lintott’s (1993: 41) words, therefore, while varying degrees of autonomy and other such statuses may have existed under the Roman Empire, these statuses “obscure the fundamental homogeneity in the imperium Romanum – the fact that the Romans expected their commands to be obeyed, even when they allowed a great deal of de facto autonomy and frequently exercised power by indirect means.” Free, in other words, meant ‘more free than some.’

This ‘almost-but-not-quite’ sense of autonomy in Greece, combined with the region’s long history of self-government (sometimes radically different from monarchical life, such as the case was in Athens), resulted in some understandably anti-Roman sentiment among the Greeks. Many Greek cities, for example, sympathized with the ‘wrong side’ during the civil wars in the first century BC. Nor did this sentiment ease with time: Plutarch (Ad. Princ. Inerud. 780d) warns his readers a century after the death

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9 See Tac. Ann. 13.51, 15.18 for more on indirect taxation in the first century AD.
of Augustus to forget the glorious deeds of their ancestors who achieved sovereignty in the Persian Wars of the fifth century BC (Levick 1996: 651). They were subjects of a greater Empire now, and, as Ando (2000: 58) notes, “could do better by placating [the Romans] rather than antagonizing them.” As Dio Chrysostom (31.67) recalls (more than one hundred years after the fact), however, Augustus at least made the effort to reconcile his empire with the Greek cities, offering debt relief to all the provinces, including the ‘free’ cities of the East.

Asia’s annexation was not quite as spectacularly eventful as that of Greece: originally bequeathed to Rome by Attalus III of Pergamum in 133 BC (because he had no male heirs), the land from the Aegean to the Euphrates came under the umbrella of the province of Asia until the end of the third century AD. All too used to subjection under the Hellenistic monarchs, the regions of Asia – which, like the Achaian cities, enjoyed some level of autonomy, especially by means of public assemblies, locally enforced laws, and the like – simply moved from the old kings to the new Emperor (Levick 1996: 646; Mitchell 1996: 189-90).

In some cases, the Romans even left the remaining monarchs alone, allowing client kings to rule. These dependent kingdoms, which, along with the overarching rule of Rome, formed a kind of two-tiered monarchy, were essentially ‘worlds within a world,’ “in which quite large populations were subject both to local kings and, indirectly, to… the emperor” (Millar 2002: 2:229). Yet, just as ‘autonomy’ must be qualified, these client

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10 For Plutarch and the relationship between Greece and Rome, see Vasunia (2003), who aims “to show how Plutarch’s work delineates the awkward truths of Roman colonisation and, at the same time, presents to his audience a way of being Greek that is sensitive to the inescapable presence of the Empire” (369).

11 ὁθὲν πᾶσιν ἐδοθή τοῖς ἐξωθέν χρεών ἀφεὶς (‘Consequently all the provinces were granted a remission of their debts,’ from the ‘Rhodian Oration.’).

12 For examples of local assemblies in the Bithynia region, see Dio Chrys. 34.21-3; 47; 48.
kingdoms were still under the rule of the emperors somewhere down the line – Rome’s priority was still “the pursuit of self-interest,” even if it meant having “to override considerations of justice” when dealing with ‘independent’ client kings (Lintott 1993: 34-6).\(^\text{13}\)

While the regions of Greece and Asia, after becoming Roman provinces, may have retained their ability to self-govern “autonomously” – and had the benefit of a \textit{senatus consultum} to engrave its freedom in stone – “even this free status had to give way to \textit{imperium}, if the general authority of the Romans was to be maintained” (Lintott 1993: 192). The visage of the emperor, in other words, was ever-present. The ruler and his underlings may have somewhat lurked in the shadows, but, in the spirit of Michel Foucault’s Panopticon\(^\text{14}\) (taken from Jeremy Bentham’s original idea), this threat of Imperial intervention was enough; Rome “subordinated other cities without necessarily subjecting them to direct rule by the imperial power” (Lintott 1993: 129). That is, Greek autonomy existed essentially because ‘someone up there’ allowed it to exist.

Even the evidence that Greek and Asiatic cities enjoyed the benefits of local councils, courts, and assemblies must be taken with caution, since, as A.N. Sherwin-White notes, these offices were often artificial creations of the Roman government (as

\(^{13}\) For client kings and emperors, see Strabo 17.3.25; Suet. \textit{Aug}. 48; Tac. \textit{Ann}. 11.31, 14.40; Tac. \textit{Hist}. 3.45; Stat. \textit{Silvae} 5.2.42ff. For Rome’s self-interest, see Pol. 31.10.7 and 31.11.4ff.

\(^{14}\) The Panopticon, illustrated in Foucault’s \textit{Discipline and Punish} (1979), is essentially a large tower in the middle of a circular prison, which is able to see into every cell at once, although the inmates cannot see any of the other cells, nor can they see who – if anyone – occupies the tower. The very presence of the tower carries a sense of authority; the inmates will follow the rules as if they were being watched all the time, since, even if the tower is empty, the threat that the tower is not empty still exists. Foucault (1995: 200) sums up the effect of the Panopticon: “to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary: that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearer.”
Dio Chrysostom shows when he mentions appeals by cities for local autonomy), “to which no strong feeling of local unity necessarily corresponds” (Sherwin-White 1973a: 442). Thus, cities such as Amisus did administer their own laws, but only, as Pliny says to Trajan, *beneficio indulgentiae tuae* (‘because of the benefit of your kindness’, *Ep.* 10.92). Additionally, just as the Delian League in the 5th century BC had to refer all ‘serious’ legal matters to Athens, so cases of importance “tended to be handled by Roman magistrates” in all parts of the Empire (Lintott 1993: 160). Anti-Roman sentiment was only natural for societies that had for so long been used to a Hellenic way of life. Even activities as superficial as shaving one’s facial hair and cutting one’s hair were seen by some as too ‘Roman’; a *real* Greek likes his beards bushy and his hair flowing. Nevertheless, the presence of Rome in the East brought many advantages – we cannot underestimate benefits such as a “stable, clean water supply” to urban areas that Rome brought to Greece (Ando 2000: 309) - as well as the potential to become a full citizen of Rome, a token of special status throughout the Empire.

*The Reward of Citizenship*

The establishment of the provinces of Achaia and Asia did not come with free Roman citizenship to all those born within their borders. Quite the contrary – unlike the

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15 10.108 and 109 (a letter from Pliny and Trajan’s reply) speak to the autonomy of Bithynia and Pontus in settling disputes. See also Dio Chrys. 40, 44, and 45 for local ‘autonomy’ granted by the Roman government.

16 So says Dio Chrys. (36.17) about the people of Borysthenes, who, with the exception of one ‘pretty boy’ who was trying to impress the Romans, all looked like characters in a staging of the *Iliad*.
lucky people born in Italy (who had the benefit of living in well-established Roman colonies, having two Romans as parents, and so on), those in the eastern Imperial provinces had to procure their citizenship through means such as benefaction toward the emperor, calling on their local governors for favours, and the like (at least until 212 AD – see below [Sherwin-White 1973a: 408]). Pliny the Younger, in a series of letters he wrote to the emperor Trajan while touring around the Bithynia and Pontus areas (just as a regional manager of a national store chain tours the local outlets), gives some good examples of provincials either receiving Roman citizenship because of some sort of good deed, or simply because they asked for it. Either way, apparently only the emperor could authorize citizenship requests, which puts the deed squarely in the realm of benefaction (Shaw 2000: 364). For example, Pliny was nursed back to health on two separate occasions by two different doctors, which apparently qualifies them for Roman citizenship. In the same two letters, the legate asks Trajan to grant citizenship rights to some freedmen and women of two different patrons, in both cases just because they asked: quod a te petente patrona peto (‘which I seek from you because the patron wishes,’ Ep. 10.5); quod a te volentibus patronis peto (‘which I seek from you because their patrons wish,’ Ep. 10.11).\footnote{The patroness who asks for citizenship for her freedwomen in 10.5 is actually Pliny’s relative, as he mentions is 10.6.} In another letter, Pliny asks that a local centurion’s daughter be granted citizenship, which Trajan grants without hesitation or further inquiry, because of the centurion’s dutiful service.\footnote{10.106 (107 for Trajan’s reply): Pliny says that durum putavi negare, cum scirem quantum soleres militum precibus patientiam humanitatemque praestare (‘I found it difficult to refuse, since I know much you are accustomed to exhibiting tolerance and kindness to the requests of soldiers’).} Millar, then, is justified in calling citizenship
“the normal concomitant of prominence in a Greek city of the second century” – do a good deed, get a reward (Millar 2002: 2:280).

Pliny’s first citizenship request for a doctor sheds some light on the nature of dual citizenship and local autonomy. The legate writes an apologetic letter to the emperor stating that, unbeknownst to him, Arpoctras (the doctor) resides in Egypt but is not a citizen of Alexandria. One must be a citizen of the Egyptian city before one can become a full Roman, so Trajan grants Alexandrian citizenship, even though *civitatem Alexandrinam secundum institutionem principum non temere dare proposui* (‘in accordance with the rule of my predecessors, I have not intended to grant Alexandrian citizenship rashly,’ *Ep.* 10.7). This rule would not be significant if it were not for Pliny: *quia inter Aegyptios ceterosque peregrinos nihil interesse credebam* (‘since I believed that there was nothing different between Egyptians and other aliens,’ *Ep.* 10.6). In other words, one did not normally have to be a citizen of a city in the east (other than Egypt) before one could become a Roman citizen. This custom shows that dual citizenship was certainly an accepted part of life in the further regions of the Empire – how times have changed since the days of Cicero, who praises a law *ne quis nostrum plus quam unius civitatis esse possit* (‘that none of us is able to be of more than one city,’ *Balb.* 13.31). Although, as discussed above, Cicero’s attitude applies only to law, not to spirit.19 The

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19 In 10.10, Pliny thanks Trajan for the grant of dual citizenship, also mentioning imperial precedent using language very similar to the emperor’s: *quamvis secundum institutionem principum non temere eam dare proposuisses* (‘although you had intended not to give it [the citizenship] rashly, in accordance with the rule of your predecessors’). Pliny cites a similar law, instituted by Pompey, that restricts citizens of one Bithynian city from being a citizen of another (10.114), although that law seems to have fallen out of favour by Dio Chrysostom’s time, since he mentions being a citizen of both Prusa and Nicomedia (38.1). See Cicero *De Legibus* II.ii.5, discussed above (n.14), on having two homelands ‘in spirit.’
Cyrenean edicts of Augustus also show that the gaining of Roman citizenship did not affect a man’s duties at home (Millar 2002: 2:304-5).\(^\text{20}\)

The *Tabula Banasitana*, a bronze tablet from the reign of Marcus Aurelius found in Morocco that outlines the granting of citizenship to the leader of a Mauretanian tribe and his family, sums up the themes of Pliny’s aforementioned letters: citizenship by request, beneficence, and the retaining of local citizenship duties. The tablet consists of two imperial letters, which are responses to two separate citizenship requests from successive governors from Mauretania, a Roman province. Acknowledging that benefaction is the ticket to becoming a citizen, one of the imperial letters (the two are quite similar) states that *civitas romana non nisi maximis meritis pro|vocata in[ dul]gentia principali gentilibus istis dari solita sit* (‘the Roman citizenship is not normally granted by imperial *indulgentia* to these tribesmen unless earned by the highest deserts’). And, indeed, the emperors (Aurelius and Lucius Verus, his partner at the time) acknowledge this tribesman *de primoribus esse popularium | suorum, et nostris rebus prom[p]to obsequio fidissimum* (‘to be among the most prominent among those peoples of his and most loyal in his prompt obedience in our interests’).\(^\text{21}\) In other words, the tribesman, who lives at the very tip of the Roman world, is a good, loyal subject, and is being rewarded. As Shaw notes, this grant is an example of “the control and integration of local elites,” a way of gaining control over ‘wild’ parts of the world by converting them into “centres of Roman civilization and political domination.” Saving himself the trouble of building a whole new city, the emperor instead slowly converts the existing

\(^{20}\) For the edicts themselves: Anderson 1927; SEG IX, 8.

townspeople, simultaneously depicting himself as a kind benefactor (Shaw 2000: 363). These people want to be Roman; the ideological apparatuses are doing their job, and the culture of high Roman taste is being habitualized by the new citizens. Thus, non cunctamur... civitatem | romanam (‘We do not hesitate to give the Roman citizenship’). And why would they?

This grant of citizenship, however, does not mean that the tribesman must abandon his local community. Just as in Pliny’s letters, the Tabula Banasitana makes it clear that Roman citizenship is being granted salvo iure gentis (‘without prejudice to the law of the tribe’). Thus another example of dual citizenship, and, as will be discussed below (see ‘On Identity, Culture, and Ethnicity’), the potential for dual identity and the equal spread of ideological capital. As was mentioned above, dual citizenship was not always an accepted part of Roman policy, especially in the days of the Republic: the Gracchan lex repetundarum stated that an enfranchised provincial must give up his local duties, and the aforementioned Cicero speaks out against it on more than one occasion (Sherwin-White 1973b: 92).22 Yet, documents such as the Tabula Banasitana, Pliny’s correspondence with Trajan, and Augustus’ edicts from Cyrene show that, under the empire, Roman citizenship was given salvo iure gentis (Sherwin-White 1973a: 382).

Dual citizenship reached its pinnacle in 212 AD when Caracalla extended Roman citizenship to all free-born men and women in the empire. In the words of Ulpian, in orbe Romano qui sunt, ex constitutione imperatoris Antonini cives Romani effecti sunt (‘those who are in the Roman world were made Roman citizens by decree of the emperor

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22 Cic. Caecin. 101, Balb. 28. For the lex repetundarum: FIRA² i, 7.
Antonius’, Dig. 1.5.17).23 Just as with the Tabula Banasitana, the constitutio Antoniniana existed on the principle that, once given, Roman citizenship should not infringe on any laws or duties of a local community. This notion is especially true with Caracalla’s act, since if everyone had Roman citizenship, nobody could claim to be ‘special’ and thus exempt from certain responsibilities (Lintott 1993: 164). As Carrié (2005: 272-5) notes, however, giving everyone dual citizenship in effect turned all communities in the empire into Roman cities without actually converting the cities themselves (just their inhabitants), effectively turning local laws (nomoi) into customs (ethe).

The constitutio antoniniana marked an end to a long history of citizenship grants, stretching back to the Hellenistic world, as a way to acknowledge honour, confer benefaction, and reward devotion to the empire. Whatever the primary motive of the constitutio (perhaps, as Cassius Dio [78.9.5] says, to increase tax revenue), being Roman was no longer a ‘special’ privilege that conferred bragging rights; it was just another legal title. Because of these ramifications, this study will focus mostly on evidence before 212 AD – in other words, when ‘being Roman’ was a decision to make, not a universal constant. Caracalla turned Roman citizenship from something to be sought to “an automatic right” (Alcock 1993: 9; Shaw 2000: 372).24

In what Lendon calls “a wild march of the empire in order to inspire [the emperor’s] rivals with loyalty to Rome,” citizenship grants – exemplified by the letters of

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23 For other direct evidence of the constitutio Antoniniana (which is a modern term), see Cass. Dio 78.9 – ‘Ρωμαίοις πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτοῦ… ἀπεδείξεν (“he made Romans all those living under his rule”) - and St. Augustine’s De civitate dei 5.17: fieret… ut omnes ad Romanum imperium pertinentes societatem acciperent civitatis et Romani cives essent ac sic esset omnium quod erat ante paucorum (“it was done so that all the subjects of Roman empire [lit. ‘those belonging to Roman command’] would accept possession of citizenship and would be Roman citizens.”).

Pliny and the *Tabula Banasitana* – were a way for the ruling power to extract honour from their subjects, especially those living in the far reaches of the ‘civilized’ world. A tribal chief with Roman citizenship would inspire his fellow tribesman to become Roman; emulation was not only appreciated, it was an expected way to convert people to the empire without founding new cities (Lendon 1997: 150; Shaw 2000: 363). More Roman citizens meant more opportunity for a system of culture of Roman taste (that is, a *habitus*) to develop. Combining Roman ambition with local interests, however, especially in the East, provided almost a conflict of interest: as inhabitants of a land rich in cultural heritage, eastern provincials with Roman citizenship had to worry about relations with the Emperor, pursuing imperial office, and the loss of autonomy, revealing many of the tensions involved in being both Greek and Roman (Levick 1996: 673; Preston 2001: 91).

The key to advancement within the ranks of the empire but also potentially a way to lose one’s local roots – since becoming an imperial officer had the potential to put a provincial citizen out of touch with the needs of his city – Roman citizenship in the east created a new modality of identity, linking provincial elites with both the huge number of Roman citizens throughout the world and the inhabitants of their native cities (Bowman 1996: 360; Whitmarsh 2001: 272). When one seeks out the citizenship as an honour, rather than being born into it, it becomes passive, something to be gained and utilized (Sherwin-White 1973a: 222; Nicolet 1980: 20). The legal right brings with it crucial questions of personal and communal identity. Can one still be Greek when one *actively* seeks out another identity, or can one use Roman citizenship as a mere tool, without any ‘cultural baggage’? Can one ignore the increasingly habitualized ideological apparatuses around oneself, and the growing inclination towards Roman culture and taste? How much
‘ideological capital’ must a new Roman citizen invest in his adopted culture? In other words, what was a ‘Roman’?

On Identity, Culture, and Ethnicity

Race and Identity

On that note, what is ‘identity’, anyway? I have used the term a number of times without explaining its meaning. Yet, there is no easy definition, especially as it applies to a civilization for which we have (relatively) few pieces of evidence. One constructs one’s identity in the contexts in which one finds oneself. In other words, one could argue, there is no innate or static sense of identity, but instead a mosaic of social constructions. Identity, then, is more akin to ‘culture’, “an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing, plastic process subject to the macro forces of social and political struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions” (Haney Lopez 2004: 966). One’s identity is not static; since communities are subject to social and political change, any definition of ‘culture’, ‘identity’, ‘self’, and the like is constructed sociologically rather than biologically. And, indeed, Emma Dench, in her study of the peoples of the Central Apennines, remarks (1995: 216-17) that “notions of identity are far from fixed and ‘objective’, and… questions of identity must be posed in such a way to allow for the possibility of frequent regroupings according to individual circumstances.” Culture and identity are not constructed in vacuums. Their formations depend on engagement with other cultures, referring to and even expropriating ‘the other’ in order to reinforce notions of themselves by identifying themselves either with or against ‘the other,’ or even both (Gruen 1993: 14; Marshall 1998: 49). In other words, two modes of ‘identity’ – ‘I am myself because I
am utterly unique’ and ‘I am myself because I identify with culture X’ – exist simultaneously.

Since these notions (culture, identity) are defined within the contexts of the world in which they are found, it follows that one’s cultural history – family, participation in ancient institutions, and the like – is often transmitted, as Levick (1996: 380) argues, by a “common language or dialect.” These shared traits help an individual identify with a ‘people’, a historical context within which one can place oneself. Levick also states, however, that identity is “biologically transmitted,” which may hold true in some cases, but certainly not all, especially since the identity of a single race can change entirely depending on the time period. For example, how does one determine the ‘people’ or ‘biology’ of a place when its inhabitants change every one hundred years? Howarth (2006: 158) points out a Livy passage (7.31) that discusses the history of Campania: although it eventually became Roman, the area was first home to Phoenicians (ninth century BC), Greeks (eight century BC), Etruscans (sixth century BC), and Samnites (fifth century BC) before the Romans moved in the following century. This amount of cultural plasticity and flux “defies easy characterization in terms of ethnic, linguistic, and political identities” – what was a ‘Campanian?’

Identifying a coherent cultural tradition of a place becomes even stickier when the very definition of ‘place’ comes into question. The Roman Empire encompassed more than just cities. The existence of “vast tracts of cityless lands,” as well as regions that were defined by their ethnic groups rather than by their geographical features – gentes, nationes, ethne, even misplaced uses of civitates – makes any definition of ‘Roman’, ‘provincial’, or the like problematical, perhaps even impossible, since, with ‘place’ taken
out of the equation as a constant from which to draw history, one must look elsewhere to construct identity (Shaw 2000: 373).

As Haney Lopez (2004: 968-9) notes, “race must be viewed as a social construction.” This statement should be extended here to include ‘culture’ and ‘identity’, since, they, too, are shaped by external factors. As the multifaceted history of a place such as a Campania shows, a culture is “constructed relationally… rather than in isolation,” taking into account prior inhabitants of the land and their (sometimes vastly) different cultures. Thus, one cannot simply take a snapshot of a person, group of people, or geographical area (A city? A region from point ‘A’ to point ‘B’? An ethnos?) and simply construct a static idea ‘identity’ from that, since such a definition, while appearing to be objective, would ignore the most important aspect of identity – its utter subjectivity.

Definition and Subjectivity

Discovering a ‘subjective’ view of the identity of an individual or community becomes nearly impossible, however, when one relies on the information given by outside sources such as imperialist conquerors, foreign ethnographers or geographers, and the like. In both ancient and modern literature, the (fabricated) dichotomy of colonizer and colonized, outside versus inside, is all too often taken for granted, ignoring the existence of the historically plastic relationship of diverse social groups that really exists – such as the Campania example above (Stoler 1989: 136). The notion of the uncivilized ‘other’ – the barbarian – so common in both Greek and Roman thought, is one of the most prominent symptoms of this problem. For example, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the Tauri, a group of people who lived on the northern coast of the Black Sea,
as *inmani diritate terribiles* (‘men terrible with inhuman cruelty,’ 22.8.33) – likely not how the Tauri would describe themselves. Also, Livy famously describes the Samnites of the fourth century BC as *montani atque agrestes* (‘mountainous and uncultivated people,’ 9.13.7), bringing into question their standard of living and level of sophistication. Ovid, during his exile, similarly has only bad things to say about the people of Tomis, connecting the harshness of the land (*locus est inamabilis*, ‘the place is revolting’) with the cruelty of its inhabitants (*homines... quamque lupi, saevae plus feritatis habent*, ‘and the men have more cruel savageness than wolves,’ *Tr.* 5.7.43-46). These three authors all show the tendency of outside sources to practice ‘environmental determinism,’ giving the inhabitants of the land the same qualities as the land itself. The Tauri, living far off on the north side of the Black Sea, have strange, inhuman customs; the Samnites live in the mountains and thus are uncultivated themselves; Tomis has bad weather and thus bad men.  

The prominence of such writings in the ancient world leads to false modern constructs such as ‘Romanization’, which implies that one culture is totally dominant over another. If we only take as ‘true’ the accounts of native culture given by outside geographers, biased sources, and soon-to-be conquerors of that culture, the temptation to see pre-Roman culture as primitive and post-Roman culture as civilized is unavoidable. Thus, while the Samnites are *montani atque agrestes* in the fourth century BC, in the Augustan Age they become the paradigm of “manly excellence” (Dench 1995: 127).  

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25 See also Ovid *Tr.* 3.5.4-24 and 5.10.15-26. From *Pont.*: 1.3; 1.8; 2.7; 3.8; 4.14. For ‘environmental determinism,’ see Dench (1995). See also Ross (1987: 108ff) on the *laudes Italiae* in *Georgics* 2.

26 See Juvenal 11.76-116 for a satirical self-representation of Rome’s own lack of civilization in ancient (to the author) times.
Yet as many scholars have pointed out, a term such as Romanization takes for granted the culture of both the conquerors (the Romans) and the natives whose culture they are assimilating.\textsuperscript{27} To accept the total domination of one culture over another is to ignore that “neither colonizers nor colonized constitute neatly defined groups” and that “any colonial society is made up of a range of social groups with different intentions and interests” (Van Dommelen 1998: 33). Romanization’s tendency to lump all Romans together as ‘the dominant culture’ fails to account for both diachronic change of Romanitas and dissention within the group itself (Lomas 1998: 65; Laurence 1998b). The city’s “cultural melting pot,” as Woolf calls it, extends back to its Greek, Etruscan, and Italian roots, not to mention influences from the many cultures it was assimilating constantly (Dench 1995: 219; Woolf 1998: 7-20). Rome even represented itself as a Greek city of sorts – especially as it became dominant beyond the Italian peninsula, such as after the victories over Pyrrhus and Hannibal – in order to make itself more appealing to the places it was attempting to swallow up.

Even in the realm of non-imperialistic literature, many Romans were trying to make themselves seem ‘more Greek,’ once again bringing into question the definition of ‘Roman’. For example, Cicero “goes on sprinkling his letters with self-conscious bons mots and collecting Greek objets d’art for his library” (Dench 1995: 45-63).\textsuperscript{28} Ignoring such instances of cultural uncertainty and instead choosing the vague, problematic term ‘Romanization’ to describe the expansion of the empire makes a study such as the present one futile, since the term ignores not only the aforementioned changes and ambiguities in


\textsuperscript{28} See Cic. \textit{Att.} 14.12. For Rome representing itself as a Greek city, see Plin. \textit{HN} 29.
the idea of ‘being Roman’, but also other influences such as Rome’s history of civil wars and drastic changes in government (from kingship, to republic, and back to kingship).

So, to avoid falling into the trap of viewing the expansion of the Empire as a series of exercises in Romanization (that is, from a Roman, rather than native, point of view), one must turn to the other side: the literary and physical representations created by those born, and living, in the conquered lands. ‘Natives’ would hardly have described themselves with the same kind of environmental determinism as did those observing from outside (if not literally outside, then with an outside frame of mind, such as with Ovid). Even something as simple as a description of a landscape would have been vastly different. The establishment of Roman roads, for example, created for Romans “a landscape that emphasized familiarity and power; for the native it was ultimately a landscape of difference and powerlessness.” In other words, the existence of a Roman-built road did not necessarily signify that a place was becoming ‘civilized,’ but hinted at another (forced) cultural influence in the area (Petts 1998: 83-88).

Even in cases where natives did willingly adopt the culture of their conquerors, there was bound to be dissent from within; not all natives would have become ‘Romanized’, since many no doubt would be too used to ‘the old days’. And, those who wished consciously to ‘become Roman’ to please their conquerors might change their culture from within, publicly manipulating material images in order to redefine their identity and relation with the new ruling power (in other words, ‘re-investing’ their ideological capital and bringing in a new system of habitus themselves). Although such changes do represent, in one sense, ‘Romanization,’ they were the conscious decisions of the ‘conquered’ natives to re-establish themselves as part of the Roman world. Thus, for
example, the inhabitants of Pativium willingly connected with the Trojan legend of Antenor, altering their ethnicity in order to become closer to their new Roman rulers (Strabo 5.1.4; Laurence 1998b: 104).

Alternatively, individual natives could petition for Roman citizenship (as discussed above) – another way to ‘self-Romanize’, but, again, one that put the power of change in the hands of the conquered, allowing him to attach himself to the central state. Grants of citizenship allowed zealous provincials to re-situate themselves within the power scheme of the Roman Empire, becoming senators and knights while still maintaining their link with their native language and customs (Levick 1996: 674).29

Aside from formal citizenship rights, some provincials, as Shaw (2000: 366) notes, even drifted towards “the adoption of cultural symbols that practically identified one with a Roman citizen in appearance.” In other words, one could impersonate a Roman citizen, taking a suitably Roman name and subscribing to Roman-style municipal institutions and “technical vocabulary” generally only used by the elites of the Empire.30 By adding themselves to the list of Roman citizens – whether by genuine means or in practice only – these provincials altered the very definition of what a Roman citizen should be, by showing that this definition shifts to such an extent that perhaps there is no definition.

Far from being an adaptation of a “ready-made cultural package,” as Woolf (1998: 11) puts in, becoming Roman meant joining an ongoing debate about the makeup of that cultural package (and, moreover, only at that one point in time). As the cities of the east show, Rome as ruler does not mean that poleis were converted to civitates;

30 For the adoption of Roman names by non-Romans, see Suet. Claud. 25.2. For an instance of a discovery of ‘fake citizens’, see CIL v.5050 (= ILS 206).
rather, the institutions and customs of the *civitates* were modified to fit the needs of individual *poleis*, especially the ones that enjoyed local autonomy (Bowman 1996: 359; Laurence 1998a: 8). Ideological apparatuses were given a distinctly ‘native’ spin. The influence of an outside culture manifested itself less in any sort of dominance than in a given local society’s desire to use their conqueror’s cultural influence in order to express themselves and their needs in their own ways (Dench 1995: 219; Shaw 2000: 370-371).

In order to properly see these local desires, then, self-representation must be at the forefront of any analysis of cultural identity.

Outsider geographers and ethnographers do have their place, of course. Their descriptions of ‘barbarians’ and ‘aliens’ should not, however, be taken as objective, but as examples of how the ancients characterized ‘the other’, paying particular attention to the environmental determinism inherent in so many of these texts. As Laurence (1998a: 5; 1998b: 102-108) notes, the statements of these authors represent a worldview that used ethnicity to divide spatial territory. Such a view turns ethnicity into a static construct, in effect changing the term from representing a group of people (and thus plastic) to representing ‘lines in the sand’ – simple divisions of territory. The next step, as argued above, is Romanization: natives are defined as simple, unchanging ‘things’ that are more akin to pieces of land, rather than living, complex human beings capable of change from within. To avoid this trap, one must look at the self-representation of those living in lands conquered by the Roman Empire. Greece and Asia in particular, having a rich history of culture and kingship – as well as plenty of surviving evidence with which to conduct such a survey of self-representation – provide excellent examples, through their literary and

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31 For examples of local autonomy, see note 12 above.
physical representations of identity, of a culture in which the definition of ‘being Roman’ changed not only from city to city, but from individual to individual.
Chapter Two: Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *Roman Antiquities* and Graeco-Roman Identity

A prime example of a Greek author caught up by the wave of ideological optimism of the rebuilding of Rome and the ‘revival’ of the republic following Augustus’ victory at Actium, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his *Roman Antiquities*, captures the essence of the attitude of the ‘Greek Roman,’ an intellectual citizen of both cultures who is both proudly Hellenic and squarely aligned with the interests of his ‘conqueror.’ Many scholars see Dionysius’ willing support of Rome’s ideology of conquest as a problem: how can an author with such an obvious agenda (’Ελληνας… αὐτούς ὄντας ἐπιδείξειν ύπισχοῦμαι: “I engage to show that they [the Romans] are Greeks,” 1.5.1), possibly describe Rome’s history objectively? Yet as Gabba (1983: 20) notes, “any piece of historical writing... naturally attempts to establish its own interpretive approach in the reconstruction of the past, in the choice and elaboration of themes and facts, and in the organization and disposition of the narrative.” In other words, we cannot take the words of any text at face value. A piece of writing is not a static artifact to be ‘tested’ for its historicity as an archaeologist examines a piece of pottery (Dench 1995: 219-20). No history, especially one so obviously steeped in the ideology of Rome as the *Roman Antiquities*, is objective; facts (insofar as they can even be called facts) must be viewed and depicted from a certain perspective. Thus, while Swain (1996: 26-7) says that, for

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33 Gabba (1983: 20) uses the word “distortion” to describe a historian’s view of the past, but a better word would be “interpretation,” since any representation of any event will necessarily contain the biases, prejudices, and ideological viewpoints of the person depicting it. Since past events only survive in memory (and not in some state of ‘doneness’ to be viewed as a piece of archival footage – and even film depends, for example, on the angle of the camera and its operator), there is no objective view of history. For an
Dionysius, “actual past events are not especially important” in the *Roman Antiquities* – since the historian was “recreating an image of the past according to a particular elite viewpoint” – in reality (to use another problematic term) every author has this ‘problem.’

Dionysius is not unique in laying his cards on the table: Tacitus, Livy and Polybius all either imply or state outright the objective(s) and perspectives of their histories. The *Roman Antiquities* differs from the works of these other authors, however, in that it is the only work (of which we know) written by an ancient historian devoted *entirely* to ancient history. While the works of Livy, Tacitus and Polybius – but especially Livy – may start with, or make ample reference to, Rome’s early history, they do not confine themselves to the period. Dionysius, on the other hand, does not attempt to follow a historical pattern from the origins of Rome to the author’s own time, which is a common *topos* used by authors to bring out certain moral or ethical themes.

Keeping this idea of unavoidable subjectivity at hand, I shall argue, through a close examination of certain passages in the *Roman Antiquities*, that, although Dionysius views Rome as the greatest in a long line of empires – which includes the Hellenic cities – he nonetheless believes that to ‘be’ (that is, identify oneself as) Roman, one must also be Greek. In other words, a cornerstone of the historian’s text is an ancient version of the modern ‘Graeco-Roman’ identity construction. The ‘native’ culture of the first (Hellenic) Romans persists throughout the city’s history. The idea of *Romanitas* (a modern, not excellent discussion of the inseparability of an author’s perspective of an event from his description of that event, see Alain Gowing’s *Empire and Memory* (2005: Cambridge University Press).

34 Tacitus, whose *Annals* drips with anti-Tiberian/-Augustan/-Imperial invective, states that he will relate the reigns of the early emperors *sine ira et studio* (‘without anger or perspective,’ 1.1); Livy strives to show that the moral character of the Romans has declined so much that, by his own time, *nec vitia nostra nec remidia pati possumus* (‘we are able to endure neither our vices nor their remedies,’ praef. 9); Polybius seeks to discover how the Romans came to rule the entire inhabited world, *ὅ πρότερον οὐχ εὑρίσκεται γεγονός* (‘which is not found to have come to pass before,’ 1.1).
ancient, term) as outlined by Dionysius is a product both of the *habitus* brought on by the culture of Roman tastes and ideological practices, and of the very act of writing history – a state of being rather than a biological lineage. This state of being, moreover, is firmly grounded in the ideological apparatuses of Rome, particularly the institution of citizenship. For Dionysius, being a citizen is a necessary prerequisite to contributing to the growth and prosperity of a community and identifying oneself with, and thus investing one’s ideological capital in, a certain culture. A Roman with citizenship is, according to Dionysius’ *Roman Antiquities*, a Greek. Moreover, these Roman Greeks surpass in greatness, piety, and honour ‘real’ (non-Roman) members of the Hellenic community.

*Citizenship in the* Roman Antiquities

The subject of Roman citizenship is a common one in Dionysius’ work, appearing often in the context of the narrative: a ruler does something to please his citizens, the citizens get upset about something, and so on. Although there is little explicit editorializing on the subject during the course of the historical narrative, the author does make clear at the beginning of the work his opinion about the importance of citizenship and its role in the identity and growth of an individual and culture:

> ἔθνος τε μέγιστον ἐξ ἐλαχίστου γενέσθαι σὺν χρόνῳ παρεσκέυασαν καὶ περιφανέστατον ἐξ ἀδηλοτάτου, τῶν τε δεομένων ὀικήσεως παρὰ σφίσι φιλανθρώπῳ ὑποδοχῇ καὶ πολιτείας μεταδόσει τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ γενναίου ἐν πολέμῳ κρατηθείσι, δοῦλου τε ὅσοι παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐλευθερωθείσιν ἀστοίς ἐίναι συγχωρήσει, τύχης τε ἀνθρώπων ὑδεμαίς ἐὶ μέλλοι τὸ κοινὸν ὀφελεῖν ἀπαξιώσει. (1.9.4)

They [the Romans] contrived to raise themselves from the most obscure to the most illustrious, not only by their human reception of those who sought a home among them, but also by sharing the rights of citizenship with all who had been
conquered by them in war after a brave resistance, by permitting all the slaves, too, who were manumitted among them to become citizens, and by disdaining no condition of men from whom the commonwealth might reap an advantage.\footnote{Ernest Cary’s \textit{Roman Antiquities} translation from the Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press, 1968) shall be used throughout this chapter for all subsequent translations, unless otherwise marked.}

A new citizen is a new member of the ideological community – someone who will, by virtue of his presence in the city as a man from whom Rome “might reap an advantage,” increase the greatness of the state. Other than physical expansion of Rome’s borders, the assimilation of conquered communities through the extension of citizenship was, according to Dionysius, the main source of the development of Roman society (Gabba 1991: 158). A state that shares its citizenship with everyone – and thus enrolls new members into its ideological state apparatuses – achieves τὴν τῶν πολιτευμένων ὁμοφροσύνην (‘unanimity among the citizens,’ 2.3.4), an important attribute (so says the historian) of any great city.

Being a citizen, then, is one’s key to soaking up Roman identity. One may be able to take part in some Roman institutions to a limited degree as a foreigner, but unless one is actively contributing to the growth of the empire and participating in its most important ideological apparatus, one cannot, according to Dionysius’ reasoning, call oneself Roman. As such, the historian fills the pages of his text with narrative embodiments of his early editorial on the value of citizenship. Early on, Dionyius commends Romulus for granting citizenship to men from captured or conquered cities (2.16). During the reign of Tullius (4.22-3), the author relates that the patricians are upset that the king extends the citizenship to all foreigners, even manumitted slaves. Dionysius chooses to make Tullius argue that slaves are not, by nature, inferior souls; it is silly to deny citizenship to someone merely because of his low social status. The consul Cassius grants the same
legal status to the Latins, so that they might look upon Rome as their πατρίς
(‘fatherland,’ 8.70.2). Similarly, when describing an incident in which the superior Romans quash a rebellion by the Tusculans (14.6), Dionysius is careful to point out that citizenship was extended to the defeated men, making them, in effect, native-born Romans.

While Dionysius lavishes Rome with praise for extending citizenship to foreigners (which, in his view, confers on them instant ideological identification with their new ‘fatherland’), he predictably maintains an unfavourable view of the elitist citizenship practices of the Greeks. The Romans’ generosity, which Dionysius calls κράτιστον ἀπάντων πολιτευμάτων ὑπάρχου (‘the best of all political measures,’ 2.16), is in sharp contrast to his own ancestors’ attitude,

οἱ φυλάττοντες τὸ ἐὕγενες καὶ μηδενὶ μεταδίδοντες εἰ μὴ σπανίοις τῆς παρὸ ἑαυτοῖς πολιτείας (ἐώς γὰρ λέγειν ὅτι καὶ ἐνηλικοῦστε ἔνιοι) πρὸς τῷ μηδὲν ἀπολούσαι ταύτης τῆς μεγαληγορίας ἀγαθόν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα δι᾽ αὐτὴν ἐβλάβησαν. (2.17)

all of whom, jealous of their noble birth and granting citizenship to none or to very few (I say nothing of the fact that some even expelled foreigners), not only received no advantage from this haughty attitude, but actually suffered the greatest harm because of it.

Being stingy with citizen grants was not just a bad policy, but the reason for the downfall of the old Greek empires. Had the Greeks made more of their defeated foes citizens, instead of treating them with such cruelty ὥστε μηδὲ τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις τῶν βαρβάρων ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εἰς τὰ ὀμόφυλα παρανομίας παραλιπέτων (‘as to equal even the most savage of barbarians in their mistreatment of people of kindred stock,’ 14.6.10), they would have been able to call upon these people to replenish their armies, rebuild their cities, and generally share in the growth of their ideology (in other words,
invest their ideological capital) – all things which new Roman citizens do for their city (4.23).  

While Dionysius’ words are perhaps on the dramatic side, his underlying point is supported by historical fact: as Ober (1989: 6) notes, the exclusion of ‘others’ (that is, women, slaves, foreigners and conquered peoples) “from political rights must be faced by anyone who hopes to gain a fair understanding of classical Greek civilization.” In Athens, for example – our most complete source for the workings of a Greek polis – lineage laws existed in many forms from Pericles through the third century. Because of this elitist attitude, Athenians regarded citizenship as an enormous honour and expected that any new citizens would fully immerse themselves in Athens’ ideology (Ober 1989: 266-9). In Sparta, as well, citizens were required to earn their keep, so to speak, contributing financial and/or physical resources in order to avoid being disenfranchised (Davies 1996: 334; cf. Thuc. 8.65). Since citizenship is a crucial part of immersing oneself in the habitus of a society, the non-citizen Greek subjects did not identify themselves as part of their rulers’ culture. A non-citizen living in the Athenian Empire, would not (again, following Dionysius’ reasoning) call himself “Athenian,” thus absolving himself of any obligation to help the city in a time of need. Without participation in such a crucial civic institution, there is no outlet for one’s ideological capital; it remains unspent.  

36 The Emperor Claudius in Tacitus’ Annals has a similar attitude towards the extension of citizenship. Tacitus makes Claudius say that making foreigners citizens of Rome increases the city’s power, and, after all, manent posteri eorum nec amore in hanc patriam nobis concedunt (‘their descendants remain and do not yield their love to our nation to us,’ 11.24). See SIG 543 for the ‘official’ version of this speech.  

37 Dionysius’ diatribe is reminiscent of Karl Marx’s idea of alienated “externalized” labour, which argues (1998: 217ff) that workers under a capitalist system help to maintain a factory/city/country yet are unable to enjoy its benefits. Similarly, non-citizens of Rome, Athens, and other ancient cities which allowed foreigners to remain were, in a sense, alienated from the cities in which they lived.
On the other hand, Rome (as discussed above) did extend its citizenship to those whom it conquered. When the time came to call upon them for help, the citizens obliged, recognizing that it was a Roman’s duty – and, indeed, they were Romans – to help his fatherland. Thus, as the main ideological apparatus of a growing empire, the institution of citizenship, which allowed its members to enjoy the culture of Rome as an ‘insider’ and become habitualized to its practices, was one of the driving forces behind not only Dionysius’ vision of the city’s greatness, but also (and perhaps more importantly) the construction of an individual’s identity.

*The Greek Roots of Rome*

The Greeks were not all bad, though. Dionysius may have had disdain for their parsimonious attitude toward extending their coveted citizenship rights, but alongside this criticism comes an acknowledgement that, while Rome may have better foreign policy than the Greek empires of old, they owe their customs and culture to their Hellenic counterparts. As mentioned above, Dionysius’ primary aim is to prove that Rome is, in reality, a Greek city – a *polis* miscast as a *civitas*. Since the Romans have always lived like Greeks (βίον Ἐλληνα ζωτες, 1.90.1), “all that is good in Roman society… is attributable to Greek ideals and Greek culture” (Schultze 132-8). In other words, the historian ensures that, although Rome is ‘the’ empire, the Greeks maintain their traditional habit of appropriating others into their society (Swain 1996: 161). As Gruen (1992: 6-21) has shown via his analysis of Greek authors writing on archaic Rome, postulating a Hellenic origin for the city was not an innovation particular to Dionysius;
the most Greek of authors, Homer, sings a few words on the subject as well.\textsuperscript{38} Dionysius himself, in fact (as well as Plutarch, Festus, and Servius) collected many accounts of earlier Greek authors writing the ‘Greek’ history of Rome (Bickerman 1952: 65).\textsuperscript{39} Like other pro-Rome authors, however (for example, Aelius Aristides and his 26\textsuperscript{th} oration), Dionysius’ reasoning is that Romans are Romans, and thus necessarily better than their predecessors.

A common \textit{topos} that Dionysius uses to prove the Greek origins of Roman society is the similarity of many Roman political and social institutions to their Hellenic prototypes. Beginning with Romulus, who himself maintains Greek-inspired marriage laws (2.24-25), the Roman people as depicted in the \textit{Roman Antiquities} uphold a very ‘Greek’ set of civic and ethical standards (6.83-6, 8.5-8; Gabba 1991: 203). Dionysius asserts that political and social institutions such as clientship (2.9.2), the Senate (2.12-14), the dictatorship (5.73-4), and \textit{ovatio} (5.47.2) all have their origins in Greece, and links Roman magistrates to their Greek equivalents (5.73.3). The historian also notes the similarity between Roman and Spartan kings (2.14.2), namely that neither had arbitrary power (Hill: 1969: 89).

Religion, too, is a frequent topic in the \textit{Roman Antiquities}, and a facet of Roman society which Dionysius identifies, along with politics and society, as Greek in origin. To point out a few examples: Numa invented a story concerning Egeria (emulating the examples of Minos of Crete and Lycurgus of Sparta) in order that the people would be

\begin{quote}
\textit{νῦν δὲ δὴ Αἰνείας βῆ Τρώεσσιν ἀναζεῖ / καὶ παῖδων παιδές τοὶ κεν μετόπισθε γένωνιοι (‘and now the might of Aineias shall be lord over the Trojans, / and his son’ sons, and those who are born of their seed hereafter,’ II. 20.306-7, translation by Richard Lattimore [1961, University of Chicago Press]).}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Dion. 1.72-73; Plut. \textit{Rom.} 2; Festus s.v. “Roman”; Servius ad \textit{Aen.} 1.273. Bickerman (1952: 65) warns, however, that “they are mostly jejune inferences from the name of the city to the person of the supposed founder or foundress: Romus or Roma.”}
\end{quote}
fear the gods (2.61.1-2), and instituted a temple to the Greek god Faith (2.75); the rites of
the goddess Vesta were originally brought to the city by Romulus’ Greek ancestors
(2.65.1-2); Dionysius remarks that Greek Sibylline oracles are among Rome’s most
prized possessions (4.62). The ancient rites of Hercules, still performed in Dionysius’
time, are even more explicitly the product of ‘Greek Romans.’ Hercules and the Epeans
erected an altar to Saturn ὃς ἔτι καὶ νῦν διαμένει παρὰ τῇ ῥίζῃ τοῦ λόφου κατὰ τὴν
ἀνοδον τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἁγορᾶς φέρουσαν ἐίς τὸ Καπιτώλιον (‘which remains to this
day at the foot of the hill near the ascent that leads from the forum to the Capitol,’ 1.34).
In other words, the Romans are so Greek that even the religious rituals of the fabled
Hellenic heroes, of whom Hercules was one of the most distinguished, have their roots in
the heart of Rome itself.

Being a good and pious citizen – a requirement of a healthy city, state, or empire
(Dionysius singles out Romulus, 2.18) – is an essential part of the Roman (and Greek)
identity. This need for piety is, in effect, a need to acknowledge the Greek origins of
Rome’s religious rites. To those who question his hypothesis, the historian argues that,
if Romans were not Greeks but barbarians,

τοσοῦτον ἂν ἐδέσσαν αὐτοὶ τὰ πατρῴα ἱερὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιχυρίους ἔθισμαῖς ἀπομαθεῖν, δῆ όυς ἐις τοσαύτην προήλθον ἐδαιμονίαν, ὡστε καὶ τῶις ἄλλοις ἀπαίσιν, ἢν ἤρχοι, ἐν καλῷ κατέστησαν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς σφητέροις τιμᾶν νομίμως· καὶ οὐθὲν ἄπαν ἐκβεβαρβαρώθησαι τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ ὑπὸ τῷ Ῥωμαίων ἐβδόμην ἡδὴ κρατουμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν γενεὰν, ἐπεὶ ἦσαν βάρβαροι. (7.70)

they would have been so far from forgetting their ancestral rites and the
established customs of their country, by which they had attained to so great

40 Bickerman (1952: 68) aptly notes that Dionysius’ desire “to explain Greek ignorance of ‘the earlier Roman
history’ by anti-Roman prejudice” is nothing new, and may be a literary strategy, since in the next century
Flavius Josephus “no less bitterly complains that the Greek authors misrepresent the primitive history of
another chosen people because they have not read the Bible.”
prosperity, that they would even have made it to the interest of all their subjects as well to honour the gods according to the customary Roman ceremonies; and nothing could have hindered the whole Greek world, which is now subject to the Romans for already the seventh generation, from being barbarized if the Romans had indeed been barbarians.

In other words, had Rome not been a Hellenic city in origin, when it took over the Greek world it would have converted all of the native religious customs to ‘barbarous’ Roman rites. Since, as Dionysius reasons, the current Greek rites are the same as they have always been – and just happen to be the same as the ones the Romans practice – then they must be the same culture. Otherwise, the current state of religious affairs in Rome would be such that the city would have forgotten all of its native rites. Similarly, when discussing why he believes the Tyrrhenians were not a Lydian colony, Dionysius cites as his primary evidence that Tyrrhenians οὔτε… θεοὺς Λυδίους τοὺς σὺτοὺς νομίζουσιν οὔτε νόμους οὔτε ἐπιτηδεύμασι κέχρημαται παραπλησίοις (‘neither worship the same gods as the Lydians nor make use of similar laws or institutions,’ 1.30) – the same criteria the historian uses to argue for Rome’s Hellenic roots. Since the Tyrrhenians are not Lydian because they do not have the same religious customs or laws, so the Romans are Greeks because they do observe the same rites, speak a language derived from a mixture of Greek and foreign tongues (βάρβαρος – ‘barbarian,’ to use Dionysius’ language), and utilize a similar legal system (1.89-90).

In ascribing Rome’s political, social, and religious customs to the Greeks, Dionysius is essentially arguing that the Hellenization of Rome in modern (for Dionysius) times – of which he himself, as a Greek author writing about, and partaking
in, the empire, is a part – began in a “prehistoric stage,” 41 before “the more recent cultural influences of the Hellenistic period” (Gabba 1991: 11) embodied by men such as Cicero who took an active interest in the ins-and-outs of Greek culture. The prominent presence of Hellenization in the Roman Antiquities, however, does not rob the Romans of all of their unique, non-Greek qualities. Dionysius may identify the Greekness of the Romans, but he is firm in pointing out their political superiority to the old Athenian and Spartan constitutions, especially concerning “the Roman capacity to assimilate other populations” via citizenship, which was the basis for their rightful (so the historian believes) hegemony and moral magnanimity (Gabba 1991: 87). In other words, while the majority of their institutions may be Greek, the Romans’ ability to use these institutions (along with the citizenship policy, an innovation of the new city) to build their empire propels them beyond their roots. This, in turn, makes them worthy of being, as fellow pundit Aelius Aristides would say much later, the universal country (26.100) – the wisdom of Greece combined with the power of empire.

‘Being Roman’ for Dionysius

Rome as represented by Dionysius in the Roman Antiquities has no native, innate culture. A ‘Roman’ is the product of a myriad of diverse Hellenic communities, not a being whose ‘Romanness’ is devoid of outside influence. The biggest and most important urbs in the Roman Empire is a Greek polis (the shining paradigm of one at that), the greatest in a succession of cities stretching back to classical Athens (Preston 2001: 100). As Dionysius’ many examples of the continuity of ethical, religious, political and civic

41 Bickerman (1952: 77) notes, regarding prehistory, that “the Greeks, and they alone, tried to reconstruct the pre-history of mankind.”
institutions show, an integral part of being a Roman in the context of the Roman Antiquities is identifying with the different cultural influences within the society. In other words, one cannot acknowledge the existence of ‘Romanness’ without first acknowledging the persistence of the native culture from which it sprang and alongside which it continues (in Dionysius’ day) to thrive.

Although this idea of Romanness (and, for that matter, Greekness) in the Roman Antiquities is more of an ideological frame of mind than a biological blood relation, in a way it is, nonetheless, a lineage: one is born into the culture, learns about its intricacies from elders, and so on. Still, one can, according to Dionysius, be a good Roman by respecting one’s native/(Greek) culture and participating in its institutions, even without the proper blood (Cicero being a fine example). Belonging to a ‘people’ – a gathering of individuals with the same tastes and participating in the same systems of habitus (language, religion, citizenship, and so on) – is “one of the strongest modes of identification for individuals in the Roman world,” whether transmitted through the continuity of culture or the inheritance of a certain set of genes (Shaw 2000: 380).

In his narrative and its examples of virtuous behaviour, Dionysius instills active participation in the ideological state apparatuses which make up the habitus of Rome. That citizens alone have the power to benefit Rome reflects the ideological importance of the institution. An ideology, according to Althusser (1971: 156), “always exists in an apparatus, and its practices, or practice.” In other words, ideology manifests itself concretely in a society. Therefore, to ‘exist’ as a Roman means to carry out one’s material duties as a citizen – to invest one’s ideological capital in one’s culture. Without citizenship (according to Dionysius), one feels no obligation, and thus no cultural
connection, to one’s city. An ideologically invested citizen is able both to immerse and to invest himself in the plastic world of Roman cultural identity in which the intellectual, and not strictly biological, connection to one’s native roots brings together the two worlds of Greece and Rome.

Despite the intertwined nature of their cultures, however, Dionysius is not arguing that the idea of Romanness is completely indistinguishable from Greekness. Even to write a ‘Roman history’ is to assume that Romanness is something about which one can write. The historian does identify throughout the narrative particular differences between the two cultures. Some Roman qualities, even those Hellenic in origin, exceed the grandeur of their predecessors – for example, their capacity, πεπρωμένου (‘ordained by fate,’ 1.31), to build and rule an empire, and their generous extension of citizenship. As Preston (2001: 92) has argued, the very act of writing about these two ideas “asserts the existence of identity itself,” which Dionysius expands by re-writing Rome’s history to connect, albeit with some reservations, the two cultures.

Nonetheless, the attribution of unique, non-Greek characteristics to the idea of Romanness does not change that, for the historian, neither identity can exist without the other: just as Rome began as a Hellenic city, Greeks in Dionysius’ day exist under the umbrella of the Empire. For Romans this meant a loss of a distinctly autochthonous ‘Roman’ identity; Greeks such as Dionysius were forced to re-situate themselves within the context of their new imperial rulers. Yet, as the author shows via his reconstruction of the history of the Graeco-Roman identity, the Hellenic languages and “cultural physiognomy” remain intact in the Roman Antiquities (Desideri 2002: 222). The burden of accepting Dionysius’ version of history lies with the Romans, not the Greeks. In other
words, the Greeks come out ahead in the deal: their rulers, the Romans, would not exist without the original coming-together of Hellenic communities.

Dionysius is not arguing for the ideological supremacy of either Greece or Rome; the two identities are crucial to both the imperial Roman and the Greek living under the Empire. The *habitus* in which Roman citizens immerse themselves is steeped in the ideology of empire, but stands on the shoulders of Hellenism. The historian utilizes Greece’s superior ethical and social institutions in tandem with Rome’s political prowess “as the basis for civic cohabitation in the Mediterranean world” (Gabba 1991: 216). One may go so far as to say (as Gabba does) that the *Roman Antiquities* foretell the rise of the new ruling class— the cultivated Greeks— of the Roman empire (1991: 22). Dionysius attempts to explain the current milieu by imposing the ideological and political models of his own time on the archaic age of Rome, which in a way justifies Greece’s subjugation to the empire: by expanding its borders to include the Hellenic cities, Rome is simply returning to its proper roots (Gabba 1983: 11).

In a proto-Dionysian moment, Cicero remarks of his wisdom that *ea quae consecuti simus iis studiis et artibus esse adeptos quae sint nobis Graeciae monumentis disciplinisque tradita* (‘those things which I have learned were obtained by the pursuits and crafts which were handed down to us in Greek literature and instruction,’ *QFr.* 1.1.28). Dionysius, by re-conceptualizing the idea of Roman identity in Hellenic terms, links this prominent trend of ‘Atticism,’ exemplified by Cicero and his elite intellectual milieu, to the archaic history of his adopted city. Dionysius’ *Roman Antiquities* suggest that to be Roman one must identify with one’s native roots. Rome may conquer all the cities and regions it wishes, but it will always be Greek; one must recognize this necessity
when constructing the Roman identity. In ideological terms – away from which Dionysius does not shy – a citizen must take part in the state apparatuses and institutions, which themselves contain both Greek and Roman elements, in order to invest his ideological capital properly in the two cultures. From these two co-existing, equally important identities, Dionysius creates a new cultural classification: Graeco-Roman.
Chapter Three: Paul’s Three Identities in the *Acts of the Apostles*

Haec ergo caelestis civitas dum peregrinatur in terra, ex omnibus gentibus cives evocat atque in omnibus linguis peregrinam colligit societatem, non curans quidquid in moribus legibus institutisque diveesum est, quibus pax terrena vel conquiritur vel tenetur, nihil eorum rescindens vel destruens, immo etiam servans ac sequens, quod licet diversum in diversis nationibus, ad unum tamen eundemque finem terrenae pacis intenditur, si religionem qua unus summus et verus Deus colendus docetur non impedit.

While this heavenly city, therefore, goes its way as a stranger on earth, it summons citizens from all peoples, and gathers an alien society of all languages, caring naught what difference may be in manners, laws and institutions, by which earthly peace is gained or maintained, abolishing and destroying nothing of the sort, nay rather preserving and following them (for however different they may be among different nations, they aim at one and the same end, earthly peace), provided that there is no hindrance to the religion that teaches the obligation to worship one most high and true God. (August. *De civ. D.* 19.7)

Writing the passage above in the fourth century AD while surrounded by the milieu of the then well-established Christian Roman Empire, St. Augustine can confidently acknowledge a distinct Christian identity, separate from the other, more tangible cultures which rely on their own *mores, leges*, and *instituta* and which necessarily define these attributes against other societies (‘this custom is Roman, while *that* custom is Greek’). Three hundred years earlier, however, when Christian culture was still in its early stages and the product of a covert operation, figures such as Paul, as depicted in the New Testament’s *Acts of the Apostles*, were busy trying to establish the identity and the *habitus* with which Augustine and the other church fathers of the later Roman Empire could associate themselves. While the Graeco-Roman world that Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes in his *Roman Antiquities* (chapter two) gives the impression that two major cultures – Greece and Rome – can exist in a kind of

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multicultural paradise, Paul’s struggle to establish a different form of religious identity while simultaneously remaining in good standing with non-Christian people reflects a ‘messier’ reality. Dionysius, in a sense, asserts that the Graeco-Roman identity is – or, at least, should be, static: its ingredients, native Hellenic culture and Roman virtue, were present in the early Romans and thus should continue to his day as well. On the other hand, the *Acts of the Apostles* depicts a more active, shifting type of identity, exemplified by Paul’s spreading of a new religious mode.

The existence of this religious identity, however, cannot be separated from the two major civic identities, Greek and Roman, which served as the new culture’s backdrop. Identity in the ancient world was a murky blend of overlapping qualities, “a series of… cultural values” sometimes shared, sometimes opposed (Williamson 2005: 27). Paul, a Hellenised Jew, Roman, and Christian all at once, consistently represents himself (or, strictly speaking, is represented by the author) in the *Acts* in such a way that his three identities, while sometimes clashing, generally overlap without too much trouble. While he acknowledges his Hellenic and Roman roots often throughout the narrative, Paul asserts his religious association.43 That is, he actively establishes his new identity – designed to supplement, not supplant, his existing civic connections - during his travels across the Roman Empire.

But is the *Acts* really historical? As Stephen Mitchell (1993: 3) reminds his readers, “the very nature of the books of the New Testament” makes them dangerous documents; one must tread lightly, after all, when using texts whose main purpose is explicitly to assert a theological doctrine. Yet this does not mean that Luke, the alleged

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43 Indeed, it is in the *Acts* that Jesus’ followers first call themselves “Christians” (15.3).
author of the Acts, strove to write an historically flawed account of Paul’s travels. Much like the origin of Paul’s Roman citizenship, we will never be able to say for certain whether the narrative of the Acts is historically faithful. This is a question, however, that we can ask about virtually any text from the same era. Daniel Marguerat, who addresses this issue at length, argues that the key difference between Luke and other ancient historians is that, while most non-Christian authors “systematically make a point of distancing themselves from the supernatural phenomena they report to their readers… the readers of the Acts are never called on to distance themselves from supernatural manifestations, but rather to marvel at them” (Marguerat 2005: 21). Marguerat describes (2005: 25) Luke’s writings as “confessional history” rather than ‘strict’ historiography, since he strays from the “ideal objectivity” found in such authors as Herodotus and Thucydides (even though, just as with every author, their points of view and selection of events discounts their objectivity). Luke’s “exclusively theological” concern in his “quest for causality” places the Acts dangerously close to the realm of idealized history: the author himself states, in the preface to Luke, that he is καθὼς παρέδωσαν ἡμῖν οἱ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς αὐτόπται καὶ ὑπηρέται γενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου (“following the traditions handed down to us by the original eyewitness and ministers of the word,” Luke 1.2).

44 On this subject Sherwin-White (1963: 151) remarks, perhaps with a hint of sarcasm, that “to speculate how and when the family of Paul acquired the citizenship is a fruitless task, though lack of evidence has not deterred the ingenious.” Murphy-O’Connor (1996: 39) argues against those who claim that Luke fabricated Paul’s Roman citizenship, stating that the author’s “assertion that Paul was a Roman citizen cannot be ascribed to his propagandizing intent because he found it in one of his sources, namely, the Travel Document. Moreover, Paul’s voyage to Rome, which is presented as a privilege of his citizenship… cannot be ascribed to Lucan invention because it is not exploited. Nothing happens in Rome.” While this is not strictly true – something does happen in Rome, namely Paul’s successful preaching and spreading of Christian doctrine – Murphy-O’Connor’s argument is still valid. For the ‘Travel Document,’ see Boismard and Lamouille (1990).

45 For example: Polyb. 16.12.9, Tac. Ann. 6.22.
Nevertheless, even if it is idealized history, the *Acts* deserves as much attention as, say, Dionysius’ *Roman Antiquities*, which, unlike Luke’s story, is explicitly revisionist; both texts— all texts— tell their own version of history, which may or may not be in accordance with any other document.\footnote{Dionysius states his objective outright (*Ant. Rom.* 1.5.1): “Ἐλληναὶ… σὺν τοῖς ὄντος ἔπιθείειν ὑποσχόμει. (“I engage to show that they [the Romans] are Greeks”). See the second chapter of this volume for a full discussion of the issue of Dionysius’ historical motives.} Luke likely intended the *Acts* to be interpreted as a history, and even now many people read the entire Bible as a factual document. At the very least, the *Acts* reveals its author’s views on the importance of establishing one’s identity, connecting with culture, and utilizing one’s citizenship. Keeping in mind the likely intentions of the author— to write a theologically-invested history describing the beginnings of Christianity— I shall argue that Luke’s representation of Paul (or Paul’s self-representation, as Luke describes it) in the *Acts of the Apostles* is consistent throughout the entire text. This self-representation manifests itself in both Paul’s civic duties and his new religious culture. Using his civic identities (Hellenic, Roman, Jewish) as tools, Paul travels around the Roman Empire in order to establish a universal, non biologically-dependent identity centered on religious beliefs. This new culture does not supercede Paul’s (or anyone else’s) Hellenic or Imperial heritage, but is instead superimposed as a complementary third layer, uniting its with a common, borderless bond.

*Paul - Hellenic and Roman*
When an official in Jerusalem questions Paul after he causes an uproar with his preaching, he identifies himself—“with a great deal of pride” (Woloch 1973: 137)—as Ἰουδαῖος, Ταρσεύς, τῆς Κιλικίας οὖχ ἄσήμου πόλεως πολίτης (“a Jew, a Tarsian from Cilicia, a citizen of no mean city,” Acts 21.39). Just a few lines later, when addressing the angry Jewish crowd (προσεφώνησεν τῇ Ἑβραίδι διαλέξω, “in the Jewish language,” 21.40), Paul once again calls himself ἀνήρ Ἰουδαῖος, γεγεννημένος ἐν Ταρσῷ τῆς Κιλικίας (“a true-born Jew… a native of Tarsus in Cilicia,” 22.3-4). In other words, Paul chooses, when asked, to identify himself as a Tarsian and a Jew (the religious aspects of Paul’s identity will be discussed in detail below in The Pioneer of a Universal Identity), but not a Roman: he consciously connects himself with Hellenic culture. When he addresses the crowd in Jerusalem, he does so as a member of their culture, not as some visiting foreigner. Indeed, as Wallace and Williams (1998: 6) have argued, while this layer of Paul’s identity remains mostly unstated and in the background throughout the Acts, “it is the Hellenistic Paul who is most accessible to us.”

While Paul is not strictly a Greek (Tarsus was a city in Asia Minor), this Hellenistic aspect of Paul manifests itself in the apostle’s cultural practices and conventions. For example, he uses Greek to communicate with locals, write his letters, and transmit the Christian religion when preaching; as Wallace and Williams note (1998: 136), “to identify oneself as a ‘Hellene’ was in the first instance to claim membership of an association bound together by a common language.” As well, Paul’s travels take him to various Greek (or, at the very least, Greek-speaking) cities, at which he seems (as we shall see) to be at home with the locals. It is also worth noting that Tarsus, Paul’s native

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city, has a rich Greek heritage, minting coins with Greek legends and claiming various Greek mythological figures as founders or kin, such as Triptolemus, Perseus, Hercules and Argos (Jones 1978: 71-82; Gough 1976: 883-4; Strabo 673c).

Paul is also a Jew, however, as he himself says in the Acts of the Apostles (see above). Thus, he is subject to the same Jewish obligations and privileges in Tarsus as other Jewish citizens of the city. And, unlike many of his diasporic Jewish contemporaries (such as Philo of Alexandria), he could communicate in Hebrew and Aramaic. Because of these ties to both Hellenic culture and Judaism, I shall instead be referring to Paul as a “Hellenized Jew,” following the trend of ancient Greek authors who apply the term “Hellenic” to someone who partakes in ‘true’ Greek culture – the use of the language, association with other Greeks, and so on.48

Paul’s connection with Hellenic culture stays mostly in the background throughout the narrative. The author of the Acts, however, highlights the apostle’s Roman background more frequently. Yet despite the importance of having this legal status, in many ways Paul’s Roman identity “is the least obtrusive of all” (Wallace and Williams 1998: 6), in that he only reveals his membership in the Empire when he needs to do so. Unlike his connection to Hellenism, in other words, which he displays every time he uses the Greek language, Paul uses his Roman citizenship more as a tool, seamlessly

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48 Dio Chrysostom, the second century AD Greek orator, maintains a clear distinction between nominative and ‘true’ Hellenes in his orations. The former is a purely descriptive term with no baggage; the latter is reserved as a compliment to those whom Dio believes exemplify Hellenic culture. When praising citizens of his home town Prusa, for example, Dio boasts that they are cultivated – pure Hellenes (48.8). While the orator does not explicitly list the qualities of a real Hellene, he seems simply to mean that a true member of his culture is one who follows the classical ideals of Greek sophistication and cultural purity. Thus, a Greek from Borysthenes who shaves to please the Romans is not a Hellene (36.17), while the other inhabitants of Borysthenes, who worship Homer and Achilles as gods (36.14), are true Hellenes. And, indeed, the inhabitants themselves remark that, unless a society immerses itself in Greek culture – excellent wine, fine clothes, and the like – its members are only ὄνοματι Ἐλληνες (“Hellenes in name,” 36.25).
switching from one social code to another in order to protect himself or to further his mission (Williamson 2005: 25). For example, in the same Jerusalem incident as discussed above with regard to his Hellenism, Paul appeals to his legal rights when, after the angry Jewish mob demands that the apostle be punished, a Roman official drags him into the barracks:

But when they tied him up for the lash, Paul said to the centurion who was standing there, ‘Can you legally flog a man who is a Roman citizen, and moreover has not been found guilty?’ When the centurion heard this, he went and reported it to the commanding officer. ‘What do you mean to do?’ he said. ‘This man is a Roman citizen.’ The commanding officer came to Paul. ‘Tell me, are you a Roman citizen?’ he asked. ‘Yes’, said he. The commanding officer rejoined, ‘It cost me a large sum to acquire this citizenship.’ Paul said, ‘But it was mine by birth.’ Then those who were about to examine him withdraw hastily, and the commanding officer himself was alarmed when he realized that Paul was a Roman citizen and that he had put him in irons. (Acts 22.25-29)

Whereas, judging from this example (and others, to be discussed below), non-Roman citizens have no protection from pre-trial physical abuse, Romans are safe from unwarranted corporal punishment. When Paul informs the centurion that he is a Roman citizen (one wonders why he waited until after the thongs were in place) he is essentially using his ‘get out of jail free card.’

Nor does this legal protection necessarily depend on Paul’s biological lineage. While the apostle himself may have been born into it, he could have just as easily bought his citizenship and been granted the same rights, as the centurion reveals. As Wallace and
Williams (1998: 137) state, to identity oneself as Roman “was not to claim membership of a nation or a tribe… nor a body linked to a common language… but to claim a political and legal status.” Interestingly, the seventh-/eighth-century monk Bede, in his commentary on the *Acts*, interprets Paul’s ἔγω δὲ καὶ γεγένημαι to mean *in hoc ego plus te Romanus sum, quod non alibi natus Romanum nomen emi, sed in ipsorum sum civitate progenitus* (“in this respect I am more Roman than you, since I did not buy the Roman name having been born elsewhere, but I was born into their citizenship,” Bede 88). Bede holds inherited citizenship in higher regard than the purchase of the status, which seems to be implicit in the narrative. Nevertheless, this section of the *Acts* reveals the two types of citizenship to be equal in the eyes of the law: Paul only reveals his method of gaining citizenship when the centurion asks him, and by then his protected status has already been determined.

Paul uses his citizen’s privilege in a similar example earlier in the narrative of the *Acts*, where, once again, some disgruntled locals carry out a citizen’s arrest after the apostle causes an uproar. This time, the commotion occurs after Paul removes an oracular spirit from a slave girl he finds in Philippi. Her owners (who were exploiting her power for profit) report Paul and his travel companion Silas to the authorities:

καὶ προσαγαγόντες αὐτοὺς τοῖς στρατηγοῖς εἶπαν Οὗτοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐκταρασσοσυν ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν Ἰουδαίοι ύπάρχοντες, καὶ καταγγέλλουσιν ἐθή ἀ οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἡμῖν παραδέχεσθαι οὐδὲ ποιεῖν Ρωμαίοις οὕσιν, καὶ συνεπέστη ο ὁχλος κατ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ περιρήξαντες αὐτῶν τὰ ἰμάτια ἐκέλευον ῥαβδίζειν…

… and bringing them before the magistrates, they said, ‘These men are causing a disturbance in our city; they are Jews; they are advocating customs which it is illegal for us Romans to adopt and follow.’ The mob joined in the attack; and the magistrates tore off the prisoners’ clothes and ordered them to be flogged. (*Acts* 16.20-22)
At this point, neither the magistrates nor the accusers are aware that Paul is indeed a Roman citizen. Thus, he is accused of being anti-Roman. The apostle’s accusers assume that, since Paul is a Jew and thus practicing a religion other than the officially sanctioned state cult, he cannot possibly be a citizen (Barrett 2002: 253). Yet, when Paul is due to be released from prison the next day – the author does not relate why the Romans issue the release, but perhaps it is because the charges do not directly violate Roman law (a topic to be discussed in further detail below in *The Pioneer of a Universal Identity*) – he uses his legal right as a citizen to lambaste his captors:

Πάυλος ἐφε πρὸς αὐτούς Δείραντες ἡμᾶς δημοσίᾳ ἀκατακρίτους, ἀνθρώπους Ρωμαίους ὑπάρχοντας, ἐβαλαν εἰς φυλακῆν καὶ τὸν λάθρα ἡμᾶς ἐκβάλλοντις; οὐ γάρ, ἀλλὰ ἐλθόντες αὐτοὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξαγαγότεσαν. ἀπήγγειλαν δὲ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς οἱ Ῥαβδοῦχοι τὰ ῥήματα τούτα· ἐφοβήθησαν δὲ ἀκούσαντες ὅτι Ρωμαίοι εἰσίν, καὶ ἐλθόντες παρεκάλεσαν αὐτούς, καὶ ἐξαγαγόντες ἤρωτα ποιήσαν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως.

Paul said to the officers: ‘They gave us a public flogging, though we are Roman citizens and have not been found guilty; they threw us into prison, and are they now to smuggle us out privately? No indeed! Let them come in person and escort us out.’ The officers reported his words. The magistrates were alarmed to hear that they were Roman citizens, and came and apologized to them. Then they escorted them out and requested them to go away from the city. (*Acts* 16.37-9)

Because they have revealed their citizenship, Paul and Silas are enemies no more; indeed, the magistrates who arrested the men are distraught that they arrested and flogged Roman citizens without justification. Paul’s behaviour, judged to be anti-Roman *before* the local officials knew this fact, now does not seem to be an issue (although it could be argued that, since Paul was going to be released anyway, the magistrates had decided that his behaviour was acceptable even before they discovered his legal status). The apostle’s Roman citizenship, in fact – which the officials seem to take on his word, though it is quite possible that Luke omitted the mundane detail of Paul reaching into his toga and
pulling out proof – carries such authority that the magistrates obey his order to escort him and Silas in public, rather than secretly ushering them out the back door. As Dunn (1996: 223) notes, Paul is likely not just “rubbing his persecutors’ face in the dirt” by demanding the apology and escort (that would be quite un-Christian of him), but is taking a step towards establishing the legitimate authority of the new Christian community, “free from the spite of any other important citizens they happened to offend.” In other words, early Christians such as Paul were Romans too, and thus should have been entitled to all of the same legal rights as pagan citizens.49

Similarly, when Paul is once more captured by an angry mob of Jews – who this time want to kill him – the apostle’s Roman citizenship, one of the most important devices in his ideological toolkit, saves the day yet again, resulting in his fateful trip to Rome. When the local magistrate Claudius Lysias learns that Paul is a citizen of the Empire, he arranges, by way of a letter to the governor Felix, for the apostle to be sent to Caesarea immediately for his own protection against the Jews, since ὃν εὗρον ἐγκαλούμενον περὶ ζητημάτων τοῦ νόμου αὐτῶν, μηδὲν δὲ ἄξιον θανάτου ἢ δεσμῶν ἔχοντα ἐγχλημα (“I found that the accusation had to do with controversial matters in their law, but there was no charge against him meriting death or imprisonment,” Acts 23.27). Claudius Lysias’ letter reveals the full extent of Paul’s rights as a citizen: he is under the magistrates’ jurisdiction and protection, and he committed no

49 When discussing this passage (or even the question of Paul’s citizenship in general), most skeptical scholars wonder why Paul does not make any reference to his citizenship in the other Biblical texts, such as the epistles. According to 2 Corinthians (11.23-5), he received many beatings at the hands of Roman and Jewish officials. So why does he use his citizenship as protection throughout the narrative of the Acts, but not elsewhere? There is no answer – perhaps he mentioned his citizenship but was ignored, perhaps because Paul, not Luke, wrote his letters and he was modest about his own actions, or, as Barrett (2002: 257) postulates, maybe “because this [Philippi] was the first occasion; subsequently he would act differently.” Besides, argues Barrett, as Paul reveals in 1 Corinthians 9.12, he “was not in the habit of laying claim to things to which he was entitled.”
Roman offense, which in turn permits him protection against internal (that is, not officially Roman) Jewish strife (Barrett 2002: 359). Paul the Roman citizen, while identifying himself as a Jew many times throughout the narrative of the Acts, stands apart from the Jewish community in this case; the passage emphasizes the recognition that, although Paul is Jewish, he is also Roman, and, when the fragile Christian community is at stake, sometimes one’s legal rights outweigh one’s religious duties (Dunn 1996: 308).

When Paul is finally in Caesarea, his Jewish detractors follow him, intending to try him for breaching their laws. Once again, however, Paul knows his rights. He argues that

Oùte eîς tôn nóμon tôn Ioudaïon ouète eîς to Íerôn ouète eîς Kaisâra tî Ímârtôn. Ï Fêstos de thlô toîs Ioudaîois Xârin kataðéçhai âpokriðhîs têô Paulôw eîpên Ïheîs eîς Êeroðolûma ânabâs ekeî perî toutôn kriðhîs ëp' emôu; eîpên de Ï Pâulos Êstôs ëpî toû Bîmatos Kaisâros eîmî, Ï me deî kriñesbâi. Ioudaîous ouðèn Ïdikêka, Ïs kai su Kállyoun êpîgivôskes. [...] Kaisâra épikalôûmai. Tôte Ï Fêstos swulalîsas metà toû sumboulûsou âpokriðh Kaisâra épîkëklhîsai, ëpî Kaisâra porêuôs.

‘I have committed no offence, either against the Jewish law, or against the temple, or against the Emperor. Festus, anxious to ingratiate himself with the Jews, turned to Paul and asked, ‘Are you willing to go up to Jerusalem and stand trial on these charges before me there?’ But Paul said, ‘I am now standing before the Emperor’s tribunal, and that is where I must be tried. Against the Jews I have committed no offense, as you very well know. [...] I appeal to Caesar!’ Then Festus, after conferring with his advisors, replied, ‘You have appealed to Caesar: to Caesar you shall go.’ (Acts 25.8-12)

This appeal to Caesar, for which we do not have any ancient parallels, ensures that, as a full citizen of the Empire, Paul receives all the protection to which he is entitled. Even after Paul’s appeal, when Festus, the governor of Jerusalem, decides (along with King Agrippa) that Paul has committed no offense against Roman law, Agrippa responds that ἀπολελύθαι ἐδώσατο ο άνθρωπος οὗτος ἐι μὴ ἐπεκέκλητο Καίσαρα (“that fellow could have been discharged, if he had not appealed to the Emperor,” Acts 26.31). In other
words, the narrative once again shows that not even the highest-ranking officials can negate Paul’s rights as a Roman citizen: alongside his Hellenic aspects and his religious quirks lies his legal status as a member of the Empire.

As these passages show, Paul – at least, the literary-historical figure that Luke describes – does not carry his Roman citizenship as a badge of honour, nor does he subscribe to all of the other ideological institutions that come with being a member of the Roman Empire (such as following official state religion, as the Jews so zealously point out at 16.20). The apostle’s citizenship is an “essential and permanent feature” of his identity as a Roman, and, at least legally speaking, the primary way of defining himself as a member of the Imperial community (Dench 2005: 94). Though he and his companions provoke an uproar in virtually every city they visit, Paul only rarely finds himself in trouble with Roman officials. Instead, the Romans usually protect him, since Paul’s enemies are most often his own people (Saunders 2005: 235). Even the apostle’s trip to Rome after appealing to Caesar is self-inflicted, since Agrippa reveals that he would have been released had he not invoked his right (Wallace and Williams 1998: 6).

In ideological terms, Paul – and every other Roman – carries the *habitus* of the Roman Empire around with him wherever he goes: Paul is a citizen, and knows that this important ideological institution benefits all those who share in it. Thus, every time he mentions his citizenship as a trump card to get him out of trouble, the apostle is investing his ideological capital in his Imperial homeland. While he may neglect many of the other important ideological apparatuses of the Empire, such as the Imperial cult (though he certainly knows how to recognize the authority of the Emperor when he needs to do so), Paul is certainly, if often only out of necessity, a Roman.
The Pioneer of a Universal Identity

legebat… sanctam scripturam, omnesque Christianas litteras investigabat studiosissime et perscrutabatur, et dicebat Simpliciano… “Noveris iam me esse Christianum.” Et respondebat ille: “Non credam nec deputabo te inter Christianos, nisi in ecclesia Christi videro.” Ille autem inridebat dicens: “Ergo parietes faciunt Christianos?”

[Victorinus] was reading… the Holy Scripture, and was very zealously tracking down and searching though all the texts of the Christians, and said to Simplicianus… “You shall now realize that I am a Christian.” And Simplicianus responded: “I shall not believe, nor will I regard you among the Christians, unless I will have seen you in a Christian church.” Victorinus, however, smiled, saying: “Do walls therefore make Christians?” (August. Conf. 8.2)

Paul acknowledges his connection to Hellenic culture and Roman roots; he asserts his religious identity. In other words, he does not deny being a citizen of these two ‘earthly’ societies, but he uses the legal and cultural privileges that come with being Hellenic and Roman as tools by which he can attempt to establish his universal religious culture. Paul’s Roman citizenship provides him protection by authorities from undue harm, relatively unhindered access to the cities of the empire, and so on. His Hellenic connection gives him the ability to converse with locals in Greek and identify with their culture. And, although Paul clashes with them a few times throughout the narrative, his Jewish heritage provides him with yet another identity to bridge with his new religious culture, a culture that, being scattered across a large empire, multilingual, and comprised of citizens of many cities, had to establish itself – as Augustine illustrates in his story of Victorinus and Simplicianus quoted above – by replacing physical walls with spiritual boundaries (Balaam 2000: 323). In other words, Paul is helping to found a new kingdom, another avenue into which potential citizens can invest their ideological capital without
necessarily withdrawing from their other cultures. Paul is the paradigmatic citizen of this kingdom of God, fully Christian but no less Roman or Hellenic than the pagan next door.

Indeed, the references in the *Acts* to early Christianity as a kingdom or a city – or to the religion’s followers as citizens – are common. ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ δεοῦ (‘the Kingdom of God’) itself is mentioned in passing in many places throughout the narrative, such as 14.22 (disciples at Antioch), 19.8 (the narrator remarks that Paul argues persuasively about the kingdom at Ephesus), 20.25 (again at Ephesus), and 28.23 (in Rome). And, just like any city, this one has its enemies. When in Thessalonica preaching, Paul incites the local Jews into a jealous rage, who in turn gather in front of the house of a man named Jason, where the apostle and his entourage are staying. They claim that Paul and his friends ἀπεναντι τῶν δογμάτων Καίσαρος πράσσουσιν, βασιλέα ἕτερον λέγοντες ἕιναι Ἰησοῦν (“flout the Emperor’s laws, and assert that there is a rival king, Jesus,” 17.7). Jesus, in other words, is not simply just another religious figure; he is a rival emperor (Barrett 2002: 261). According to Cassidy (1987: 90), the Greek ἕτερον “emphasizes that Jesus is another king, someone whose authority and prerogatives are comparable to those of Caesar.”

While membership in this kingdom may not come with any of the rights, privileges, or responsibilities of a ‘real’ state such as the Roman Empire, this spiritual city does have its fair share of apparatuses and institutions into which Paul and the other members might invest their ideological capital. As long as Paul identifies himself as a citizen of this kingdom and follows its laws, its impact on his identity (as part of God’s culture) is as tangible as the impact that any civic citizenship would have. Paul’s membership in the Christian community can almost be seen as his ‘local citizenship,’ the
place at which he feels most at home (and, as Clark [2004: 41] notes, “I am a Christian” became even more important during the time of the martyrs, for whom “that was the only identity that mattered”).

Christianity offered “a supportive community with outreach to those in need, regular meetings and Mediterranean-wide connections” (Clark 2004: 24). Paul, as Luke depicts him in the Acts, establishes many of these pan-Imperial connections on top of the already established Greek, Roman, and Jewish worlds. None of these worlds exclude any of the other, but combine to establish a unique Christian identity; Paul helps to create this identity by using his three existing, aforementioned affiliations, sometimes in harmony with one another, sometimes opposed, but always present in what Marguerat (2005: 66) has called “a programme of theological integration.” The unknown author of the Epistle of Mathetus to Diognetus, written in the second century AD, describes the uniquely Christian way of life, a passage which echoes the actions of Paul in the Acts:

They do not live in private cities, or speak a special language, or follow a peculiar way of life. [...] They live where they happen to live, in Greek or foreign cities... yet their citizenship is of a remarkable kind. They live in their own homelands, but as resident foreigners. They share everything as citizens, and put up with everything as foreigners. (Letter to Diognetus Ch. 5)\(^{50}\)

Thus, when the angry mob assails Paul at Jerusalem (Acts 22.22-30, discussed in detail above), the apostle is fulfilling his proper role by addressing them as a Hellenic Jew and a Roman citizen. Spanning these multifaceted worlds, the new borderless spiritual state that he represents commands the attention of citizens of every earthly city he visits (Dunn 1996: 298).

\(^{50}\) Quotation taken from Clark 2004: 1.
This talk of a borderless identity superimposed over existing civic culture does not, of course, take away from the fact that Paul still is Roman: the apostle still has plenty of ideological capital invested in the Empire. Nowhere in the text does Paul argue against involvement in Rome; as noted many times, Imperial officials protect him from harm (and usually from his own Jewish people). Christianity’s religious customs, in other words, are in accordance with “the ethos of Roman society, allowing believers to combine their faith with allegiance to Rome” (Marguerat 2005: 79). By exploiting the full legal privileges of his Roman citizenship, Paul keeps one foot firmly planted in the Roman world while the other foot travels from Hellenism to Judaism (and often back again). Furthermore, as Mitchell has shown in his close study of the Acts’ travel itinerary, Paul travels to the most important Roman cities in the east. Antioch, for example, one of the most important colonies in the Greek East (among all the other important ones he visits, such as Alexandria Troas, Phillipi, Corinth, Athens, and Ephesus) and “deliberately modeled… on the imperial capital itself,” is one of the apostle’s most important stops, since, in light of his strategies as a missionary, “the temporal success of the Christian mission depended not only on its ability to win converts, but above all to win converts of substance” (Mitchell 1993: 7). And, indeed, Paul does seek out the most important Roman men in each place. Sergius Paulus, for example, was the most famous convert of Paul, who also just happened to be the Roman proconsul of Cyprus. As Mitchell notes, the importance of this particular conversion and subsequent friendship is symbolized by the apostle’s adoption of the Roman cognomen Paul, since he had been known by his birth name, Saul, until that point.
Paul visits many places throughout the eastern part of the Empire in order to “display his skills and win admirers in the major centres of power and learning,” such as Antioch, which Paul thought of as “a new Rome” (Mitchell 1993: 8), and Ephesus, “a religious centre of immense importance” (Dunn 1996: 261). Paul’s ultimate goal, however, is the capital of the Empire itself, which he states explicitly after discussing his plans to go to Macedonia, Achaia, and Jerusalem: μετὰ τὸ γενέσθαι με ἐκεῖ δεῖ με καὶ Ρώμην ἰδεῖν (‘after I have been there, I must see Rome also,’ 19.22). He finally realizes this goal at the end of the narrative. Just as, for example, Virgil’s Aeneid (not to mention Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey) ends with an open-ended incident, so Luke ends his tale of Paul’s travels by having him preach for years at the heart of the Roman Empire (Marguerat 2005: 229). Tertullian’s famous declaration in the second century AD – de vestris sumus. fiunt, non nascuntur Christiani (‘We are from among you. Christians are made, not born,’ Apol. 18.4) – reflects the reality of Paul’s character: Hellenic and Roman by birth, Christian by invention. By the end of the Acts, Paul, the ultimate dual (or triple, or quadruple) citizen, has succeeded in expanding his universal city, recruiting new followers into τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ δεσοῦ (‘the Kingdom of God,’ 28.30) at Rome itself.

51 Dunn (1996: 261) notes that Acts 19.18-40, which depicts Paul speaking at Ephesus and the clash with Greek religion that ensues (some of the locals are offended at Paul’s implicit claim that Artemis is a false god), is “pregnant with significance for the future of Christianity within the Roman empire,” since “the cult of Artemis at Ephesus was one of the greatest cults in the Mediterranean world.”
Chapter Four: Ulpian and the Universality of Roman Law

… a quite different form of study takes a terrible grip on my mind, and binds my mouth and my tongue, if I ever wish to say the least thing in the Greek language – our admirable laws, by which the affairs of all those who are under the rule of the Romans are regulated, which can neither be composed nor studied without great labour, being as they are wise and accurate and varied and admirable, and in a world most Hellenic, but expressed and transmitted in the language of the Romans, which is impressive and pretentious and wholly suited to the imperial power – but none the less burdensome for me. (Gregorius Address 1.6-7)

Fergus Millar (2004: 464) remarked that these words of Gregorius, who was born in Greek Neocaesarea, “may remind us of how arduous and challenging an intellectual journey it was for citizens of Greek cities to master both Latin and Roman law, and then to enter the imperial service, and even… to contribute a work to the corpus of juristic writing in Latin.” Yet this is precisely the path of Domitius Ulpianus – Ulpian – one of the most prolific (via the sheer amount of his work) and influential Latin authors in history, who just happened to be a Greek from Tyre.52

Not that he abandoned his home nation; on the contrary. As Desideri (2002: 222) notes, by Ulpian’s time at the beginning of the third century AD, “it had been a very long time since the Romans themselves had begun to remould their cultural identity in Greek terms, actually to become Greeks.” In other words, by studying Roman law, Ulpian was, in a sense, studying one of the fruits of Hellenic thought, which, argues Dihle (1994: 312) calls jurisprudence “the most precious legacy which the Romans left to posterity” – Ulpian and the other jurists are often ignored in surveys of Latin literature, and are rarely counted among the ‘great’ surviving Roman literary sources. Gian Biagio Conte’s Latin Literature: A History (trans. J.B. Solodow, Johns Hopkins Press: 1987), for instance, one of the landmark surveys of the literature of Rome, devotes (for example) six pages to the decently obscure Republican author Gnaeus Naevius. Yet Conte only allows one page in total(!) to “The Jurists: Papinian, Ulpian, and Others,” even though he acknowledges that they are “several of the most important jurists in the history of Roman law” (615) – not to mention that the body of surviving juristic literature dwarfs Naevius’ extant works.

52 Despite, however, the huge amount of surviving literature and the undeniable influence of Roman jurisprudence on modern conceptions of law – Dihle (1994: 312) calls jurisprudence “the most precious legacy which the Romans left to posterity” – Ulpian and the other jurists are often ignored in surveys of Latin literature, and are rarely counted among the ‘great’ surviving Roman literary sources. Gian Biagio Conte’s Latin Literature: A History (trans. J.B. Solodow, Johns Hopkins Press: 1987), for instance, one of the landmark surveys of the literature of Rome, devotes (for example) six pages to the decently obscure Republican author Gnaeus Naevius. Yet Conte only allows one page in total(!) to “The Jurists: Papinian, Ulpian, and Others,” even though he acknowledges that they are “several of the most important jurists in the history of Roman law” (615) – not to mention that the body of surviving juristic literature dwarfs Naevius’ extant works.
was very sophisticated in its own right. And, as we have seen when looking at Paul in the *Acts of the Apostles* (chapter three) and the Romans in Dionysius’ *Roman Antiquities* (chapter two), the line between ‘Roman’ and ‘Greek’ is not only constantly shifting, but being reinterpreted depending on the text read and the viewpoint given. In response to Desideri, for example, Dionysius may point out a paradox: how could the Roman *become* Greeks, since they already *are* Greeks? Similarly, Paul may have viewed these cultures as inseparable as well, since he seemed always to be both a Roman and a Hellenized Jew, even if only one came through at a time. As well, the snippets of Ulpian’s texts collected in Justinian’s *Digest* reflect this inescapable link between Greek and Roman cultures, especially considering how large a role elite Greeks (Ulpian included, as will be discussed below) were playing in the Roman government by the third century AD.

Unfortunately, the passages attributed to Ulpian that are preserved in the *Digest* are often taken out of context, essentially ‘cut and pasted’ wherever Justinian’s compilers thought they might fit best with the writings of the other jurists and thus form a coherent explanation of ‘official’ Roman law. Yet, while Ulpian’s passages (indeed, the entire *Digest*) may put on the guise of being official, one must keep in mind that they are private opinions written by a private individual, and not a statement of ‘The Law.’ In other words, they are the product of a certain point of view and thus are biased. The *Digest*, a huge work in fifty books that contains the writings of a number of classical Roman jurists on virtually every issue facing the Imperial Romans, is essentially a

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53 Often, for example, one author’s passage will end in mid-sentence and be finished by the passage of another author (e.g. 48.22.9-10). Techniques such as this, while giving the *Digest* an attractive aphoristic aspect, run the risk of misrepresenting the actual words of the jurists (unfortunately, we will never know just how much misrepresentation, if any, occurred).
hodgepodge of different voices of authority, preserving for us “an almost inexhaustible
treasure-house of economic and social history, and of ideologies, conceptions, and attitudes” (Millar 2004: 419). My aim in this chapter, then, after outlining the intellectual and cultural milieus within which the third-century jurist operated, is to illustrate, via a study of a select few of Ulpian’s passages preserved in this ‘treasure-house’ of Justinian’s Digest (a select few since we are in the [un]fortunate predicament of having almost too much evidence), the jurist’s views on the coexistence of a myriad of peoples and cultures under one rubric – “Rome” – and how, from a legal perspective, one can remain ‘native’ while still being immersed in the habitus of the Empire.

By examining Ulpian’s legal writings – notably the De officio proconsulis, devoted to the duties of the provincial governor, but also a few of his other works – I intend to argue that the jurist represents a prime example of this study’s central figure, the “Greek Roman,” someone who has ideological capital invested in both his native land and his adopted state. Ulpian appears to be as fully Roman as Aelius Aristides, yet at times is as proud of his Hellenic origin as Dio Chrysostom.\textsuperscript{54} His writings in the Digest, while nominally (and importantly) explaining the intricacies of Roman law, also reflect his personal opinions about how all the distinct and often vastly different Roman provinces should exist as a single harmonious state. As a manifestation of Bourdieu’s habitus, Ulpian’s jurisprudence is the product of the integration of the provincial elites into the Roman aristocracy, and the subsequent extension of Roman citizenship to the entire Empire. Writing for not only the old guard of Roman citizens but also the millions of new provincials who, after Caracalla’s grant of universal citizenship in 212 AD,

\textsuperscript{54} See chapter one, “The Ideology of Identity,” for more words on Aelius Aristides and Dio Chrysostom.
suddenly found themselves part of the Empire and its ideology, Ulpian’s legal texts are essentially a commentary on, and guide to, the definition of “Roman.”

Arriving at the Age of the Third-Century Jurist

As mentioned above, Roman Imperial jurisprudence was, one could say, a distant descendant of classical Greek law. While a discussion of specific traits passed on to the Roman judicial system by the Greeks is beyond the scope of this study,\(^{55}\) it is nonetheless important to note that, exact legal points aside, the Romans at least inherited the notion that “nothing should be allowed to happen within a community which was not justified by its laws,” something which the Greeks upheld with steadfastness even under “the most adverse political circumstances” (Dihle 1994: 313). Yet, while the most prominent legal specialists in ancient Greece were usually also orators or statesmen (one thinks of Demosthenes or Aeschines), whose job was essentially to explain the law within the scope of the people’s courts, it was not until the rise of ‘classical’ (in other words, second- and third-century Imperial) jurisprudence in Rome that the strict legal specialist, who stayed out of the courtroom and instead wrote treatises for others to follow, gained prominence (Dihle 1994: 313).

The Greek conception of the statesman-jurist did not disappear entirely, however. During the Republican period, Roman jurists were often, as Schulz (1953: 103) puts it, *clarissimi et amplissimi viri*, men “intimately connected with government” who had a strong influence on the development of the law. Just as in the old Greek system, the legislative and procedural elements of the Republic involved popular assemblies passing

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\(^{55}\) Schulz (1953) provides the most comprehensive guide to this topic.
laws and criminal trials before juried courts (Millar 2002: 77). Over time, however, the role of the jurists evolved: although they still served as advisors to magistrates and other high-ranking government officials, the effects of Imperial bureaucratization meant that the jurists, once “aristocratic volunteers,” were becoming paid officials (Schulz 1953: 117).

Yet, while Schulz’s point is sound, it would be misleading to say that the jurists were paid as *jurists*. Millar’s survey (2002: 72-5) of eleven different jurists and their government jobs are varied enough – the personal advisor to a magistrate, governor, or emperor, an Imperial secretary, an *ab epistulis* or *a libellis*, or even a prefect of varying types (the vigiles, the Annona, the praetorian cohorts) – that we can (and should) say that the definition of a ‘jurist’ is not someone paid to explain and maintain the law, but simply someone who, at one time or another, worked in the public sphere and is the author of at least one work of jurisprudence. And, however close to the Imperial government the jurists may have stood, they nonetheless wrote their legal treatises as private intellectuals,\(^{56}\) articulating (as will be discussed below) their own interpretations of the law – not to mention that we analyze the texts of many others who were close to the government as well, since many of the elite Latin authors held official posts during their lives. While Schulz (1953: 125) claims that individual jurists such as Ulpian “had no desire to step outside the tradition or at least to deviate seriously from it,” resulting in a total lack of “pronounced scientific originality,” we must keep in mind that, given that the

\(^{56}\) Millar (2004: 421) calls the jurists – at least the more prominent ones – “academics,” a label that has interesting implications, especially concerning the target audience of their works. Since academics usually write for an academic audience, it is interesting to ponder on the nature of the intellectual connectivity of jurists living at the same time, engaged in an intellectual debate. The *Digest* does reflect this academic atmosphere in which the authors seem to have thrived; often a jurist will begin a point by referencing or challenging the work of a colleague or predecessor, which is reminiscent of today’s academic journals and conferences.
Digest is a huge collection of legal opinions written by private individuals, this is simply not the case. Ulpian himself says cogitationis poenam nemo patitur (‘nobody endures a penalty for thinking,’ 48.19.18 [Ad Ed. 3]);\(^57\) one would hope that he followed his own advice.

As well, the political and social atmospheres surrounding the lives of the third-century jurists reflect their immersion in the far-reaching habitus of the Empire, despite their place of origin or provincial loyalties. Ulpian and his colleagues were writing at the period of Rome’s greatest physical extension, when, thanks to the efforts of Septimius Severus, the boundaries of the Empire had been extended to the Tigris and no territory had yet been lost in Europe (Millar 2002: 70). Roman citizenship, additionally, was becoming widespread among the Greek elite, which in turn allowed Greek provincials to become high ranking officials – including senators – without ever setting foot in Italy. Roman culture was becoming a dominant presence in the East, with Roman literature and the Latin language being in the domain of a huge number of people; “even Greeks, grudgingly or otherwise, had to acknowledge the significance of all this” (Millar 2004: 417).

In ideological terms, the presence of the institutions – namely the laws, the courts, and so on – of the Roman Empire in the Greek East naturally led to the tendency of certain (and sufficiently bright) individuals to participate actively in those institutions. In turn, thanks to the influence of Greek provincials such as Ulpian, Rome became a little

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\(^{57}\) All Latin passages from the Digest are taken from: Lenel, Otto. 1889. Palingenesia iuris civilis : iuris consultorum reliquiae quae Iustiniani digestis continentur ceteraque iuris prudentiae civilis fragmenta minora secundum auctores et libros. Vol 1-2. Unless otherwise noted, translations of integrated passages are my own, and translations of block quotations are adapted from the four-volume Alan Watson edition (University of Pennsylvania Press: 1985).
more Greek and Greece became a little more Roman. As Millar (2002: 71) states, “the fact that Roman law… was studied [in Latin] by Greeks is a very significant element in the culture of the Empire, and in the formation of a (partially) integrated Graeco-Roman governing class.” In other words, Ulpian and the other jurists of his time – who together form the most immense body of Latin literature on a single subject – are an excellent example of Greg Woolf’s (1994) formulation of individuals who became Roman, but stayed Greek.

The Life and Career of Ulpian

Before launching into an examination of some of the passages attributed to Ulpian in the Digest, the details of his life and career form an important part of his Graeco-Roman identity and provide the background against which he expounds his pan-Imperial viewpoint in his legal literature. When Ulpian discusses his native Greek city (his origo) of Tyre\textsuperscript{58} in the Digest – “with considerable pride,” as Millar (2002: 80) notes – he stresses its connections with the ideology of Rome:

Scientum est esse quasdam colonias iuris Italici, ut est in Syria Phoenice splendidissima Tyrriorum colonia, unde mihi origo est, nobilis regionibus, serie saeculorum antiquissima, armipotens, foederis quod cum Romanis percussit tenacissima: huic enim divus Severus et imperator noster ob egregiam in rem publicam imperiumque Romanum insignem fidem ius Italicum dedit...

One must realize that there are some colonies with \textit{ius Italicum}, as in Syria Phoenice, the most splendid colony of the Tyrians, which is my place of origin, outstanding in its territories, of very ancient foundation, powerful in war, always loyal to the treaty it made with the Romans: for the deified Severus and our emperor granted it \textit{ius Italicum} because of its great and conspicuous faithfulness toward the Roman state and empire. (\textit{Dig.} 50.15.1 [\textit{De Cens.} 1])

\textsuperscript{58} As Millar (2002: 80) notes, however, to call Tyre ‘Greek’ is too simplistic: “Phoenician lettering appears on the coinage of the city up to the moment in the 190s when Severus made it a \textit{colonia}, and there is no doubt that even after that its Phoenician past was remembered and celebrated.”
In other words, Ulpian is proud to be a Tyrian, but a large part of that pride stems from the city’s strong Roman – not only Greek – roots. The jurist acknowledges that the city’s Hellenic foundations are serie saeculorum antiquissima, but focuses most of his attention on the fact that Tyre acquired the ius Italicum after its great and continued service to the Empire. Since the greater context of this passages focuses on the granting of ius Italicum to many cities (not just Tyre), it is not surprising that Ulpian chooses to emphasize the Romanness of his native land rather than its Greekness (judging by the proud tone of his passage, one could persuasively argue that he may have emphasized Tyre’s Hellenism in another context).

Ulpian’s connection with Tyre also extends to Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae, or Sophists at Dinner, a long work which depicts (quasi-)historical characters debating a number of topics. Oulpianos, one of the main speakers at this fictional dinner, has long been associated with Ulpian, although many scholars now believe that the literary character is perhaps the father or grandfather of the jurist. Named as Ὀὐλπιανὸς ὁ Τύριος (‘Ulpian of Tyre,’ Athen. Deipn. 1.1d) – perhaps the nail in the coffin for linking the jurist to the Deipnosophistae – the dinner guest has all sorts of strange habits, including not tasting food until he learns the etymology of the name and whether it has been used in literature; to describe this, Athenaeus says ὁ συνήρ νόμον ἐξέχειν ἴδιον (‘the man observed his own private law’ 1.1e). Oulpianos is a “partisan of Greek culture, an Atticist in matters of language” who is obsessed with proper words and “at a cultural level… rejects Rome” (Honoré 2002: 12-13). Additionally, Oulpianos is “a learned

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60 See, among others, Athen. Deipn. 1.1c, 9.368c, 9.401b, 14.613c.
devotee of Greek literature and an expert in its vocabulary” (Millar 1993: 291), just as Ulpian appears to be (judging from his liberal use of Greek terms peppered through the entire Digest). While we should take this ‘evidence’ of Ulpian’s heritage with a grain of salt, it is significant that, even in the ancient world, Ulpian was associated with such a character through their common homeland of Tyre, their mutual knowledge of language, and their need for proper law in every situation, no matter how mundane. Just as Oulpianos has a law for proper food etymology, so Ulpian explains, with reference to earlier jurists, the intricacies of laws concerning mules and horses (Dig. 21.1.38.7 [Curule Aediles’ Edict 1]).

In addition to his professed pride in his homeland and his (possible) ancestry, Ulpian’s Imperial career also reflects his unique perspective as an individual intimately immersed in two cultures. A rescript in the Codex Justinianus (a collection of the official constitutiones of the Roman Emperors), written by the Emperor Severus Alexander and dated to 31 March 222, advises a petitioner secundum responsum Domitii Ulpiani praefecti annonae iuris consulti amici mei (‘according to the response of Domitius Ulpianus prefect of supply, lawyer, my friend,’ CJ 8.37.4). As Honoré (2002: 29) points out, amici mei, aside from superficially indicating that the person in question is friendly with the emperor, can also mean that the friend could “greet the emperor at his morning salutation,” in effect being part of his inner circle. To be an amicus of the emperor, however – in other words, to share amicitia – was a “fluid and imprecise” title, since a

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61 Honoré (2002: 92) attributes Ulpian’s use of Greek “to a change in the intended readership of legal works [after 212 AD and universal citizenship]. It counts as part of the cultural change of which the Antonine constitution is the most prominent legal expression.” Honoré also sees Ulpian’s Greek terms as “an act of solidarity” with Greek-speaking citizens, since, after all, “to use Greek without apology implies that the reader is bilingual and is attuned to the nuances of Greek” (Honoré 91).
‘member’ the imperial court was not officially defined as such (Wallace-Hadril 1996: 285). Brunt’s study of *amicitia* in the late Republic (1988: 351-381) has shown that the term could denote a political connection, a genuine friendship, a mutual economic interest, or anything else that indicates a kind of partnership: “From the constant intimacy and goodwill of virtuous or at least of like-minded men to the courtesy that etiquette normally enjoined on gentlemen, it covers every degree of genuinely or overtly amicable relation” (381). No matter how one define *amicitia*, *amicus*, and other similar terms, however, the main idea is still sound: at some level, the Roman lawyer from Tyre was in good with the Emperor, the physical manifestation of every one of Rome’s ideological institutions and ideals.

Aside from the honorary title of *amicus meus*, Ulpian was also *a libellis* from 202-9 (a date which Honoré [2002: 18-22] has deduced via a philological analysis of both Ulpian’s excerpts in the *Digest* and rescripts in the *Codex Justinianus*), an official in charge of answering petitions from Imperial citizens. Millar (2004: 428) persuasively suggests that, given the nature of the job – penning a large number of Imperial rulings and private rescripts about the finer points of Roman law – that it was during his time as *a libellis* that he formed his writing style and personal legal viewpoint, which “found its full expression subsequently in an immense output of private legal, or academic, works, written in his own name, in the second decade of the century” (2002: 81). This influence suggests that, indeed, one can argue for a kind of ‘dialogue’ between official law creation, as is found in the *Codex Justinianus*, and the works of jurisprudence excerpted in the *Digest*. In other words, the interpretation of Roman law was far from black and white, leaving ample room for personal voice and opinion.
Finally, that Ulpian wrote most of his private works after Caracalla’s grant of universal citizenship in 212 (again confirmed by Honoré [2002: 7] via references to the joint constitutions of Caracalla and his “dead but deified father”) – which the jurist himself records, noting that *in orbe Romano qui sunt, ex constitutione imperatoris Antonini cives Romani effecti sunt* (‘those who are in the Roman world were made Roman citizens by decree of the emperor Antonius’, *Dig.* 1.5.17 [Ad Ed. 22]) – is significant, since, as Honoré (2002) argues as one of the primary theses of his study, Ulpian’s potential audience included not simply the elite members of the Empire, but all of the newly enfranchised citizens as well (albeit often indirectly, for example in the form of legal advice given to a commoner by a lawyer who was well-versed in Ulpian’s writings). No matter how varied the daily lives or societal practices of these citizens may have been, Ulpian and the other jurists of his time had to take into account the interests and concerns of Romans from Britain to the Tigris.

*The Philosophy of Universal Law*

And, indeed, Ulpian’s legal literature shows a concern for the needs of the provinces and of all Roman citizens – or, as Ulpian says in one instance, *popularis meus* (‘my fellow citizen,’ *Dig.* 45.1.70 [Ad Ed. 11]). Specifically, the jurist’s view of law as philosophy, his interpretation of *ius gentium* (the law of nations), and the importance of his work *De officio proconsulis* (*On the Duties of the Proconsul*) reflect the idea of multiple identities wrapped into one already seen in his life and career. A good starting point for understanding Ulpian’s viewpoint is a famous passage from book one of his
In other words, the lawyer is a philosopher; the law his philosophical doctrine. Since this is the first passage one reads when one opens the *Digest*, the idea of law as philosophy naturally clings to the rest of the compilation. Philosophy by its very nature is, at least on a theoretical level, designed to apply to all people in all modes of life. By equating his legal writing to philosophy, Ulpian is, in effect, stating that his legal opinions are universally valid and can (and should) be followed by all citizens of the state, just as a Stoic, a Neoplatonist, or an Epicurean hopes that everyone will follow his philosophy. Even if we were to have access to all of Ulpian’s literature and thus were able to determine that he does not live up to his grandiose claims to be a *sacerdos* of the philosophy of law, the very terms he uses are significant (Millar 2002: 85). These terms⁶²

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⁶² Rodger (1983: 389) presents a fair argument from the other side, cautioning against attributing a devotion to general philosophical ideas and terms to Ulpian or any other jurist: “The judge has yet to be born who will not invoke justice and fairness in making a decision which may often appear to be the reverse of just and
reflect the jurist’s self-representation – how he, a Hellenic Greek who is also Roman, sees his place in the world, and how he describes the ideological institution (the legal system) of which he is an important part. Far from “an empty rhetorical phrase,” as Schulz (1953: 136) claims, Ulpian’s definition of *ius* and *iustitia* form the backbone of his juristic and philosophical thought.63

As mentioned earlier, Ulpian did his private writing mostly after Caracalla granted universal citizenship in 212 AD. Thus, his view of law as philosophy – and thus something that is (or should be) applicable to all people – could, perhaps, be seen as a reaction to the *constitutio antoniniana* and the need, in Ulpian’s view, for “a law based on a view that all people are born free and equal and that all possess dignity” (Honoré 2002: 76). As Ulpian says, *iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi* (‘justice is a constant and perpetual will to grant to each person his own right,’ *Dig.* 1.1.10 [*Reg.* 1]); every person, not simply the privileged, deserve justice. Therefore, it makes sense that Roman law is derived not only from legal precedents and decisions set by mankind, but also by natural law, *quod natura omnia animalia docuit* (‘that which nature has taught to all animals,’ *Dig.* 1.1.1.3 [*Inst.* 1]).

Honoré (2002: 80-1), Dihle (1994: 316), and Schulz (1953: 136), among others, have identified Stoic elements in Ulpian’s explication of law as philosophy. As Honoré (2002: 80) puts it, the jurist “shares with the Stoics the view that we are born free and fair, at least to the losing party. Only when a judge or jurist proclaims his belief in injustice or cruelty should we really sit up and take note…”

Schulz is, for some reason, wholeheartedly against assigning any real meaning to Ulpian’s exposition of law as philosophy, maintaining that the writings in the *Digest* “show no signs of personal reflection. In short, Roman legal science was a professional science, which stuck to its last and left philosophy to the philosophers” (1953: 135). Yet, with evidence to the contrary quite literally staring one in the face when one opens the first page of the *Digest* proper, it is quite difficult to see the validity of Schulz’s argument.

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equal and should live according to nature,” as for example when he states that *ad ius naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt* (‘as far as natural law reaches, all men are equal,’ Dig. 50.17.32 [Sab. 43]). Honoré (2002: 79) gives a long list of citations to support his view that Ulpian emphasizes “writing on what is natural” rather than on an artificial construction such as the Roman *ius civile*.

Related to Ulpian’s philosophical outlook, his Stoic roots, and the preference for what is ‘natural’ is the post-212 AD idea of *ius gentium*, a kind of ‘local law’ that had been separate from general Roman legislation until 212 AD. Dihle (1994: 316) argues that the Stoic doctrine of natural law, discussed above, helps to define the relationship between *ius gentium* and *ius civile* (the law concerning inter-Roman relations). Dihle (1994: 316) calls the *ius gentium* “a law governing relations between citizens of different states,” which neatly sums up its function before 212 AD. “The Roman people,” he continues, “became aware of principles that had to be observed in legal transactions between Romans and foreigners,” which naturally led to the *ius gentium*, a law distinct from *ius civile* (which is, as the name suggests, civil law, having grown out of Roman legal proceedings rather than native custom or ‘common sense’).

After Caracalla’s extension of citizenship, however, “the contrast between the civil law and common custom was now of purely historical interest” (Honoré 2002: 79). *Ius gentium*, the law of peoples, had to take into account – and, in effect, integrate – the

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64 See, for example: 1.5.24; 4.4.1; 12.4.3.7; 13.5.1 pr.; 15.1.7.7; 15.1.11.2; 19.5.4; 37.5.1; 37.10.3.13; 38.16.1.4; 43.16.1.27; 43.26.2.2; 47.4.1.1; 50.16.52; 50.17.32. Of course, due to the complexities of Roman political life, the prominence and acceptance of slavery, and other similar social realities, almost any social inequality can be defined as ‘natural’ if the need arises. As Brunt (1975: 26) notes, for example, the hierarchies of “degree, priority and place” were such strongholds in the structure of Roman society that “they could not have regarded [them] as incompatible with the providential order of the Universe.” On the realities of Stoic ideals in the Roman world, see also Wirszubski, C., *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early Principate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
existing *ius civile*, since, thanks to the *constitutio antoniniana*, local customs became ‘regular’ Roman law. Thus, when Ulpian states that *ius gentium est, quo gentes humanae utuntur* (‘the law of nations is that which humans utilize,’ *Dig*. 1.1.1.4 [*Inst*. 1]), he is essentially laying the foundation, applicable to all of the citizens of the Empire, for “a clear exposition of the common law to which they were subject and in doing so to bring out its universal and rational character” (Honoré 2002: 24). In other words, an important function of Ulpian’s legal literature is to bring Rome to non-Romans, preserving their native customs and stressing commonalities between the various cultures.

General philosophical and cultural ideals aside, the *De officio proconsulis* – a work on the duties of the provincial governor or proconsul – deserves a mention unto itself, since not only is it one of Ulpian’s most famous works (to us, at least), but it also reflects the importance the jurist places on respecting native and non-Roman custom (although, as argued above, thanks to the nature of the *ius gentium* after 212 all custom was, in a strict legal sense, Roman). The text represents “an attempt to construct out of… locally varying regulations a common administrative law applicable to all” provinces (Shulz 1953: 139). For example, when outlining various types of crimes and their respective punishments, Ulpian is careful to note that both may vary from province to province, and, rather than relying on general Roman law, the proconsul should follow existing practice, since *sunt quaedam, quae more provinciarum coercionem solent admittere* (‘there are certain things which are accustomed to allowing punishment according to the custom of the [individual] provinces,’ *Dig*. 47.11.9 [*De off. proc*. 9]):

> ut puta in provincia Arabia σχοπελισμὸν crimen appellant, cuius rei admissum tale est: plerique inimicorum solent praedium inimici σχοπελιζεῖν, id est lapides ponere indicio futuros, quod, si quis eum agrum coluisset, malo leto periturus esset insidiis eorum, qui scopulos posuissent...
For instance, in the province of Arabia, σκοπελισμός is called a crime. Its nature is this: a number of enemies σκοπελεῖζειν the land of the person to whom they are hostile, that is, they place stones as a sign that if anyone cultivate that land, he will die horribly by reason of the plot of those who place the stones... (Dig. 47.11.9 [De off. proc. 9])

As well, a person who breaks the embankments of the Nile in Egypt aeque plectitur extra ordinem ('is also punished beyond the normal process,' 47.11.10 [De off. proc. 9]). In other words, the endeavour of the De officio proconsulis – beyond the official rescripts that Ulpian had already written for eight years as a libellis – is “to evolve general principles applicable to all, and thus to build up a common system of provincial administrative law” (Schulz 1953: 243). A serious crime in one province is not necessarily a crime in every province; all may be Roman, but all are still native.

As this preservation of regional crime and punishment suggests, Ulpian’s advice to the proconsul in other matters also centers on preserving native custom. The jurist states (Dig. 1.3.34 [De off. proc. 4]), for example, that the first step to deciding what law to follow in a civitas or a province is to check to see whether local custom has been upheld in the past, and, if so, to follow it (Ulpian qualifies the passage with arbitrōr, ‘I believe,’ emphasizing once again that this is his own interpretation of the law). Ulpian also urges the proconsul et ferias secundum mores et consuetudinem quae retro optimiit dare (‘both to grant holidays according to local customs and the practice which has previously prevailed,’ Dig. 1.16.7 [De off. proc. 2]). In the Ad Sabinum, the jurist makes a similar statement:

Semper in stipulationibus et in ceteris contractibus id sequimur, quod actum est: aut, si non pareat quid actum est, erit consequens, ut id sequamur, quod in regione in qua actum est frequentatur.
In stipulations and in other contracts we always follow what has been done; or if it is not clear what has been done, the consequence will be that we shall follow what is the established practice in the region in which the action has taken place. *(Dig. 50.17.34 [Ad Sab. 45]*)

Again, local custom is the top priority; even an Imperial ideological apparatus as important as the legal system recognizes needs to integrate with, not dominate over, existing native law. To follow always *quod actum est*, what has been done, implies that even if Rome itself was not there when ‘it’ (that is, the local practice) was done, nonetheless it must be followed.

Of course, it is important to keep in mind that (as has been mentioned earlier), while the *De officio proconsulis* – indeed, all of Ulpian’s private works – may look official (and, in many ways, they might as well be, essentially being handbooks for officials to follow), we still must remember that the opinions within are private and personal, and thus subject to the jurist’s own biases and interpretations. Statements such as *melius fecerit* (‘he should do better,’ *Dig.* 1.16.9 pr. [De off. proc. 1]) that Ulpian inserts into his guidelines reinforce this idea of opinion. In light of the statements of philosophy, the need for equitable justice, and the explanations of *ius naturale, ius gentium,* and *ius civile* discussed above, Ulpian’s *De officio proconsulis* seems to be a paradigmatic piece of the jurist’s work: it recognizes and legitimizes what has come before Roman society, while simultaneously integrating and adding native practice to the ever-growing body of Imperial jurisprudence.

**Ulpian’s Achievement**

This chapter has been as much of a general survey of Ulpian’s life, career, writings, and intellectual surroundings as it has been an examination of the Latin
preserved in the *Digest*. While the jurist’s personal voice is often hard to discern in his legal texts, the circumstances surrounding the very writing of these texts gives Ulpian a place among the other ‘Greek Romans’ that have already been discussed in this study, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Paul of Tarsus. Honoré (2002: 13) calls Ulpian “one of those easterners… who found in [Roman law] a systematic discipline whose intellectual demands were comparable to those of Greek literature and philosophy” (italics added for emphasis). Those easterners form an important part of Roman society, helping, as this survey of Ulpian’s life and literature has argued, to shape its very laws.

In a rare moment of shortsightedness, Schulz (1953: 129) remarks that, for all the “great and unforgettable achievements” of the great jurists, they did not engage in any sort of legal reform, having “neither the inclination nor the energy… The sun of jurisprudence still shone, but with an autumn brilliance.” While perhaps Ulpian and his colleagues did not actively try to ‘reform’ the law, one cannot simply shrug them off as having no energy or inclination to produce original thought. Schulz’s remark of “great and unforgettable achievements,” however, does fairly sum up both the still-felt influence of Roman law on modern legal thought, and the conscious effort on the part of Ulpian to write legal *philosophy*, something that would apply to all Roman citizens no matter their class or location.

An inscription found in Ephesus (*AE* 1966, 436), perhaps dating from the Tetrarchic period (Millar 2004: 433), illustrates this unforgettable influence that Ulpian, a private citizen writing private legal opinions, had on the Eastern Roman world. The inscription is a letter, written in Greek, in which a proconsul tells the city “to collect and present to him the evidence bearing on its privileges (*dikaiomata*)” (Millar 2004: 433),
paying close attention to συντάξαντες τά τε ἐχ τῶν παλαιῶν νόμων ἐν τοῖς Δῆ ὀφφικίῳ παρ᾽ || Ὀυλπιανῷ ἐρημένα (‘the things said on the basis of ancient laws in the De officio of Ulpian,’ 7-9) – that is, the De officio proconsulis. One is reminded of Ulpian’s advice, originally from that same work and now preserved in the Digest, to a proconsul planning his trip to Asia. The jurist urges the proconsul to follow established (that is, non-Roman) custom:

Ingressum etiam hoc eum observare oportet, ut per eam partem provinciam ingrediatur, per quam ingredi moris est, et quas Graeci ἐπιδημίαις appellant sive χατάπλους observare, in quam primum civitatem veniat vel applicet: magni enim facient provinciales servari sibi consuetudinem istam et huiusmodi praerogativas. […] imperator noster Antoninus Augustus ad desideria Asianorum rescrispt proconsulii necessitatem impositam per mare Asiam applicare χαί τῶν μητροπόλεων Ἑφεσον primam attingere.

He [the proconsul] must observe this point in making his entry, that he enters by that part of the province where such entries are customarily made, and that he pays attentions to what the Greeks call epidemiae (stopping-off places) or kataplous (port of entry), whatever be the civitas to which he first comes or at which he first lands. The provincials set a high value on fidelity to that custom and to prerogatives of this kind. […] The present Emperor Antoninus Augustus on the entreaties of the Asians gave out a rescript imposing a requirement on the proconsul that he proceed to Asia by sea and that he land at Ephesus first of all the metropolitan centers. (Dig. 1.16.4.5 [De off. Proc. 1])

The Digest reflects a world, as Millar (2002: 435) puts it, “with proconsules and procuratores, provinciae, Latin-speaking cities called civitates or res publicae, and Greek-speaking poleis.” Born in one of these poleis but adopted by the most important civitas in the Empire, we should not be surprised to find that Ulpian’s advice to high-ranking Imperial officials stresses the need for Rome to adapt to native culture by following existing custom, rather than imposing its own methods on civilizations much older than itself. By using his philosophy of universal law to explain the ius gentium – which by the time the jurist began writing his legal treatises denoted not the laws of
various ethnic groups, but the law of all of those groups combined – Ulpian, the paradigmatic Roman, stayed Greek.
Chapter Five: Civic Coinage and Elite Identity

When one reads Fergus Millar’s statement (1993: 230) that coins in the ancient Roman world are “the most deliberate of all symbols of public identity,” one cannot resist thinking that he had in mind coins such as the one pictured above. Iconium, a city in the region of Lycaonia in Asia Minor and far away from the Tiber River, briefly discussed by Strabo and Xenophon but of no particular distinction,65 presents itself as the home of the very beginning of Rome: Remus and Romulus suckling at the she-wolf. Such a striking assertion of ideological identity illustrates that, as George Williamson (2005: 23) has said, the search for ancient identity cannot end at literary works, since “identity was most often carved out through practice… and was rarely interpreted by the Romans themselves.” Whereas a historical text – as well-thought out and philosophically aware as it may be – is essentially a work of cultural hindsight (‘I have analyzed the situation and now I wish to opine on it’), coinage as a medium is more raw: it reacts to, reflects, and even initiates the changes in a society’s culture as they happen, rather than imposing

65 Strabo 12.2-8, 14.2, 14.5; Xenophon Anabasis 1.2, 7.8.
cultural and ideological bias on events that happened in the past (Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *Roman Antiquities* being an example of that trend). Thus, while the previous chapters focused on individual constructions of identity, here we will attempt to look at a communal attitude. Images on coins, in other words, are performative tools; the issuing and circulation of an ideological image is also the performance, or introduction into (and acceptance by) a society, of that image. That is, the coins do what they claim to do (they ‘perform’): not only construct a culture, but also create changes within that culture by the very nature of its existence.

Indeed, Greek provincial coins as a vehicle for ideology and culture bear a distinct advantage over their literary and oratorical counterparts, exemplified by such works as Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *Roman Antiquities* and the legal works of Ulpian. Because of the nature of these works – one a detailed historical narrative with many interwoven arguments, the other a collection of philosophical and legal treatises on the finer points of complex Roman law – they were most likely read only by others in the same elite position as the authors themselves, since contemplating such intellectual issues were most likely uncommon amongst ‘regular folk’ in the imperial age. The provincials who controlled the mints (and thus determined the images on the coins), however, knew that every bread-winning member of their communities would see their work. The nature of the institution of Roman citizenship (as outlined in chapter one) suggests that these same elite provincials were, most likely, Roman citizens. In other words, they had ideological capital invested in both their native culture and their adopted city. This mixture of

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66 The *Acts of the Apostles* is a special case, being part of a document intended to reach as wide an audience as possible. Thus, text is similar to coinage in its intended audience and its straightforward nature. Nonetheless, currency is still more immediate: while reading the *Acts* requires a decent amount of time, glancing at a coin takes no more than a few seconds.
identities that the minters experience transfers, as will be argued below, to the images on
the coins, which reflect both Hellenic cultural autonomy and acceptance of the
Mediterranean’s superpower.

But why were coins in the Greek and Asian east such a popular way of asserting
cultural identity, especially when one considers the more or less standardized imperial
mints of the west? As Christopher Howgego (1995: 58) notes, western civic coinages
died out after the reign of Claudius (AD 54), while their eastern counterparts survived
nearly until the end of the third century. Howgego attributes this observation to a
difference in culture: the citizens of the west viewed themselves as wholly Roman –
“there were no local histories, and civic architecture was very much on the Roman
model” – but ‘ancient’ Greek traditions such as coin minting survived, and even thrrove,
during the imperial age. So, while the western ‘Roman’ provinces used coins produced
by central imperial mints (with ‘official’ images and text), civic coins in the east were
minted on a smaller, more local scale.

These eastern Roman/Greek coins, which were in active circulation from the
second century BC to the third century AD, came in three mains forms, which Harl
(1987: 12-14) outlines in his fundamental study of eastern Roman Imperial coinage.
‘Provincial coins,’ usually made of silver and consisting of Greek denominations such as
the drachma, were, as the name implies, in circulation throughout a province and struck
by provincial minters. Koina, coins struck by regional leagues of cities, were struck at
sporadic intervals and usually to commemorate a special occasion or to worship the
emperor. Finally, individual cities (and nothing smaller than a city, such as a village tribal
organization) in the east produced civic coins, which were minted only in bronze in
contrast to the more expensive (and not locally-made) silver denominations. The abundance of bronze civic coins combined with the sporadic and expensive natures of the silver provincial and *koina* issues meant that local coins were the most commonly seen pieces of currency in the Eastern economy. These civic coins, whose local themes form the backbone of this chapter, were ‘reborn’ as a result of Augustus’ reorganization of the eastern portion of the Empire – specifically, the visage of the emperor became a standard obverse design, which often complemented native designs on the reverse. As the Principate progressed, as did civic coins: the reverse designs became progressively ‘looser’ in terms of homogeneity, and by the reign of Hadrian cities were minting a wide variety of artistic reverse designs.

With fewer of the emperor’s henchmen breathing down the necks of the provincial minters, the rules surrounding minting seem to have been looser, which is (perhaps) why there is such a wide variety of coinage in the east; each city celebrates its own ideological, mythological, political, and cultural heritages. That these eastern cities were able to meet most of the demand for local currency – at least at the level of small change – adds to the penetration of the ideas presented on them and their inclusion in the *habitus* of everyday provincial life (Harl 1987: 19). As well, that bronze civic coins circulated alongside the more standardized silver coins minted by Rome and the provinces reflects a kind of ‘ideological dialogue’ between the two coin types, with the local bronze coins representing regional interests and the more expensive silver denominations reflecting the ideals of the Empire.

Keeping in mind these crucial differences between western and eastern mints of the Roman imperial era, I shall argue, through an analysis of a select few Greek and
Asian civic coins (which are, I believe, representative of the general pattern of eastern provincial currency), that the elite provincials – who controlled both the mints and the cities – used the designs on the coins to reflect their ideological, political, and cultural beliefs. The coins, in other words, became a kind of physical manifestation of an Althusserian ideological apparatus, bearing the messages of the leaders of the communities and reflecting the status of their ideological capital. These messages emphasized the rich Hellenic heritage of the provincial communities, while at the same time acknowledging their debt to the Empire. Delivering their subtle hints of cultural ideology with every transaction, the coins penetrated the most ‘normal’ aspects of life in the provinces – buying food, paying for services, and so on. Even travelers would have experienced firsthand the ideological bombardment of the coins, since, with currency varying so much in design from town to town, it was likely necessary to change ‘foreign’ coins into locally minted ones (Burnett 2005: 173-175).

Yet one must be careful to keep the context of coins in mind. While they were tools with which certain privileged individuals might passively express their convictions, coins were but one “part of a unitary living reality” (Weiss 2005: 58), competing with other culturally significant aspects of society such as literature, oratory and monuments. We cannot say with any degree of certainty how the ‘common’ users of provincial currency interpreted the messages on the coins, but one can postulate that images of patron gods, famous monuments, and the emperor of the day would have at least been recognizable as such.

Despite the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of currency-based ideology, however, the ideas that coins express represent the intertwined relationship between the
Roman political milieu and the Hellenic cultural heritage present in other aspects of provincial life. The coin images can be seen as an instance of Greek provincials coming to terms with life under an empire, especially if one considers that provincial coins – as autonomous as they may seem at times – could not have existed without imperial assent. Local coins, in other words, were the ideological tools of both the elite provincials and their Roman rulers. As the minters show via their expressions of “internal values and assumptions” on the coin faces, to accept Roman rule is to harmonize, not subordinate, one’s native heritage with the colonial reality (Harl 1987: 25-31).

Coins as an Ideological Apparatus

While Eastern civic coins may have been currency at their most basic level, and not ideological tools, one must view this distinction in the same way one views, for instance, a satirical play: Aristophanes’ comedies may have been a form of entertainment, but the political undertones are nearly impossible to ignore. As well, a piece of art – a statue, a mosaic – may topically function as an aesthetic product, but the person or scene it depicts may be constructed in such a way that an ideologically influenced interpretation is unavoidable. Yet, as Althusser (1971: 164) reminds, “ideology never says ‘I am ideological.’” The necessity of coins in provincial life means that the minters did not have to force their messages across; each transaction in the marketplace meant an opportunity for the elites to affirm the identity of their community (as they saw it). Moreover, since most daily transactions probably involved small, locally minted coinage, and not “the fancy gold aurei or silver denarii struck at Rome,” a provincial civilian was bombarded with images of ideology each time he opened his
change purse (Harl 1987: 10). In other words, the system of coins and their images were for the eastern provincials one of the many “distinct and specialized institutions” of a given community, a physical manifestation of the practices of the ideology of the Roman Empire (Althusser 1971: 136-156). To buy goods with ideologically stamped coins was to buy into the system (or, at the very least, to acknowledge the existence of that system).

While some scholars argue against coinage as an effective means of asserting ideology – A.H.M. Jones, for example, states (1956: 15) that historians should not study coins as serious reflections of the political milieu of a given culture, since they “throw a sidelight on the history of the period… [but] no serious historian would use them as a clue which revealed changes of government policy” (he uses modern postage stamps as an analogy) – these arguments ignore that, while coins are not explicitly ideological, the images or events they depict are often deeply engrained in the communal memory of the society already, and thus are important symbols of identity.\footnote{One need only look to modern coins (not postage stamps) for parallels: the Euro, for example, allows for each participating country to use its own reverse design, which depict mostly monarchs (in the case of monarchical countries) or important cultural symbols such as the Eiffel Tower or the Coliseum. Coins minted by the United States feature important memorials or historical buildings (the Lincoln Memorial on the penny, Jefferson’s home on the nickel) and ideologically significant cultural markers (the olive branch, torch, and oak branch on the dime, the bald eagle on the quarter). While these images are not overwhelmingly forceful, they do reinforce the identity and political mythology dominant in their respective countries’ culture.}

As argued in chapter one, the \textit{habitus} of a society does not have to be made up of explicitly ideological or cultural elements. Explicitly naming cultural
products as one of the prime ingredients of a *habitus* (among other institutions such as marriage, education, language, and the judicial system), Bourdieu (1984: 471) states that the sum of these ingredients gives “a sense of one’s place” – in other words, the all-encompassing milieu of a community. Thus, a coin (figure 2) from Cyzicus, dated to AD 191-192, depicts on its reverse the embodiment of the city, the hero Kyzikos, equipped with standard mythological fare (spear, horse, shapely figure, and so on). By celebrating the native heritage of the city, the provincials in charge of the minting bring forth the ideas of religious piety (for Kyzikos is presumably at least a demigod), the monumentalization of time and the past (celebrating one’s ancient heroes), and the assertion of native culture (the ‘Greekness’ of Kyzikos). The reverse coin image is deliberately Greek.

Yet, as mentioned above, eastern civic coins were an ideological tool not only of the elite provincials who minted them, but also of the Roman Empire itself, since the production of coinage was so important that no “city in the provinces of the Empire could proceed as it saw fit without any reference to the central power” (Weiss 2005: 58). And, as has been mentioned numerous times, the provincial minters were quite likely Roman citizens themselves. So, while the coin from Cyzicus boasts its wholly Greek hero on the reverse, the obverse image depicts the emperor Commodus, letting the handlers of the coin know that the city is Greek, but not *too* Greek – independent, but not autonomous. It is notable, however, that Commodus is wearing a lion skin, a very ‘Hellenic’ mythological symbol – known from both Heracles and Cadmus, for example – presenting a mixture of imperial and native identities which will be discussed in more detail below (see *Coins and Cultural Statements*). Just as those in charge of the eastern cities were
coming to terms both with life under the empire and life in the empire (as citizens), so the coins, functioning as ideological apparatuses, reflect these changing circumstances, interweaving familiar cultural symbols (the hero and the lion skin) with a new foreign power (the emperor).

That the denominations of coins themselves, if not the specific images, were at least theoretically constant across the entire span of the Empire means that, at some level, all citizens were using the same basic coins. In other words, the provinces may have been doing their own minting, but there was no absolute freedom of identity under the hegemony of the Roman Empire. Provincial currency could not escape the subject/ruler relationship – the very essence of Roman political ideology – since, ultimately, the very makeup of this currency linked back to the imperial machine (Howgego 1995: 43; Williamson 2005: 24). Thus, while the act of minting coins may have represented a degree of sovereignty on the part of the eastern poleis, and while the images on the coins themselves were an “effective means to announce new values or uphold traditional beliefs” (Harl 1987: 20) into the habitus of a society, nonetheless the autonomy that came with producing the currency was more cultural (‘we will allow you to promote your own culture on your coins…’) than political (‘… so long as you acknowledge us’). As an ideological apparatus, then, the use of coins in the eastern Roman provinces represented the interests of both ruler and ruled, however ‘free’ the ruled may have acted.

Coins and Cultural Statements

So how did the elite provincial minters, citizens of both their native communities and the colonial power, represent this inescapable relationship between ruler(Roman)...
and ruled (Hellenistic)? The Greeks seemed to have had an ongoing desire know, and connect with, their historical and mythological past, a trend which manifests itself in many of the coin images. Yet, as Swain (1996: 87-8) points out, “the majority of Greeks whose testimony we can call on had no deep interest in Rome’s past or culture.” Even those with Roman citizenship (such as our provincial minters) were likely more interested in reconciling Roman power with their own ancestral feeling of Hellenic autonomy or cultural superiority than they were in taking an active interest in Rome’s heritage. The civic coins were, as argued above, a statement of the local aristocracy’s cultural independence – but that independence was mediated by the ruling power (Bruun 1999: 38). Nor was this trend unique to the Roman Empire. Shipley (2000: 70-1) notes that previously free eastern communities were faced with the same problems of lost autonomy under the Hellenistic kings, and legitimized their new political situation by assimilating the monarchs into “the visual repertoire” of their traditional values represented on coins.

Under the Roman Empire, similarly, those in charge of minting in the Greek and Asian communities used the space afforded them on coin faces both to assert their Hellenic identity and to incorporate their newfound Roman culture. I shall focus primarily on a select few coins which, via their mixing of local and imperial themes, bring out this trend – already seen, in previous chapters, in literary contexts – of Hellenic citizens of the Roman Empire coming to terms with their political situation.

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68 A notable exception, of course, being Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the subject of this study’s second chapter.
What better way to come to terms with a new political reality than literally to alter the course of time? Two coins from the eastern provinces – one from Laodicea in Asia (figure 3), and one whose uncertain origin may lie in Syria (figure 4) – employ a system of dating based on events related to Rome. As Howgego (2005: 7-10) notes, this trend stemmed from the Greeks’ tradition of dating by magistrate, which existed both in the Classical period and under the Hellenistic kings; “the city eras were modeled on Hellenistic eras of autonomy, and marked turning points in the internal histories of the cities concerned.” So, one would expect that, just as Hellenistic kings were used as the basis for dating eras, so too would the Roman emperors, the new kings of the east. The coin from Laodicea (from the reign of Caracalla) is dated “year 80,” referring to Hadrian’s visit to, and re-foundation of, the city. Figure 4, a somewhat more mysterious example, features the head of the goddess Roma on the obverse and marks the date as ‘year one of Rome’ on the reverse. This coin series, argues Howgego (2005: 9), represents “the one explicit acknowledgement on coinage that Rome lay at the heart of the restructuring of time.” The coin does not simply mark an era; it begins time over again. For this city, the ideological world was re-born when political power fell to the Romans – an acknowledgement of the historical consciousness of the community’s collective memory (Howgego 2005: 10).

Of course, counting the years based on imperial visits or reigns was not the only way in which an eastern community might interpret its new political situation. Much more common (insofar as the surviving evidence tells us) was the superimposition of
imperial images on existing native themes. A popular imperial image on these provincial coins was, predictably, the likeness of the emperor himself. Already visible through other ideological apparatuses such as the imperial cult, putting the face of the emperor on coins assured that ‘he’ would be present not only in the religious ceremonies of those who participated in the Roman side of the provincial *habitus*, but even in the most trivial of day-to-day transactions.

Figure 5, for example, is part of a series of coins from Nysa that depicts a scene from the myth of Pluto and Kore (specifically their marriage at Nysa itself). While, on the reverse, Kore stands with a sceptre (accompanied by the text ΚΟΡΗ ΝΥΣΑΕΩΝ, ‘Kore of Nysa’), the coin’s obverse features the emperor Domitian, laurel wrapped around his head, and text declaring him to be the revered emperor. By interweaving scenes from the local cult into existing imperial themes, the elites at Nysa bring together the two cultures into one ideology, establishing the city’s identity “as a city in the *Roman* empire,” not just an eastern city governed by a foreign power (Burnett et al. 1999: 36). Similarly, figure 6, a coin from Laodicea and minted during the dual reign of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, combines the city’s religious rites and the imperial figures of the day. Laodicea’s patron god, Zeus
Laodiceus, is pictured on the reverse of the coin, standing between the two emperors. This concord between local and imperial authority figures suggests, again, the acceptance of Roman rule by the provincial minters. While the emperors may be in command of their city, Zeus Laodiceus reminds everyone who uses the coin that a native identity still exists. As Howgego (2005: 3) notes, coins such as this raise doubts about the argument that the provincial elites “were everywhere more interested in universal deities associated with the Roman empire than in local indigenous cults.” Figure 7 (from Otrus) provides yet another example of the adaptation of Roman mythology to a local context: Aeneas is fleeing Troy and seeking Otrus as a haven. This “antiquarian emphasis on the mythical founder” of the colonial city connects the provincial community with not only the emperor, but also the very foundation of the city itself (Burnett et al. 1999: 33).

In addition to the manipulation of time and combinations of Roman and Hellenic themes, many elite eastern provincials in charge of civic coin production promoted a ‘partnership’ of sorts between Rome and the minting city. In other words, the coins constructed the two entities as equally important to the well-being of the empire – which, in a way, was true, since, just as a community is a gathering of individuals loosely bound together by a common identity (‘I am an Athenian’, ‘I am a Sabine’), so the Roman Empire was, at a grassroots level, a collection of multifaceted communities, each with a unique sense of native identity but also bound together by the indefinable attribute of ‘Romanness.’ To say that every province was equally important would be naïve, but if
one were to take away the territory from Rome, then the emperor would have nothing left to rule.

The theme presented on figure 8, a coin minted in Thrace under a dependent monarchy, is indicative of this depiction of a partnership: four heads – Rhoemetacles I and his consort on one side, Augustus and Tiberius on the other – of seemingly equal importance dominate the coin (Levick 1999: 47). Figure 9, minted in Diocaesarea during the reign of Caracalla, declares itself the “faithful friend and ally of the Romans” – a bold statement for what was, in fact, an area that Rome ruled, not merely ‘befriended.’

Similarly, figure 10, a coin minted in Amorium (Phrygia) and dated to AD 200-250, depicts clasped hands on the reverse, signifying its concord (and presumably its ‘partnership’) with Rome, represented by the goddess Roma on the obverse. Coins such as these, Harl (1987: 82) argues, deliver the central theme of eunomia. The poleis of the

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69 Although the exact meanings of the terms “friend” and “ally” are topics of hot debate, the basic meaning seems to refer to what many scholars today call “client kingdoms,” which refers to a region that had a peace treaty with the Empire but nonetheless did not receive a formal foedus of alliance. As discussed in chapter one, the term “client king” is misleading because it implies far too much independence on the part of the client kingdom, when in fact these allied regions were still subordinate to Rome. Friends or allies could be called amici (and thus enjoyed an amicitia, friendship without formal alliance), or socii (more of an alliance, or societas, with Rome), or even both by some looser standards, especially if the kingdom was a partner of Rome in war (Lintott 1993: 32-36).
east had always enjoyed a rational rule of law; accepting the Romans as ‘allies’ allowed the notables to reconcile a new type of law with their established customs.

The inclusion and adaptation of imperial figures and themes on Eastern civic coins reflect, as Weiss (2005: 68) notes, “the fundamental process of mental integration in the provincial elite, whose governing class was increasingly composed of cives Romani.” These increasingly Roman provincial minters did not replace images of Greek religious symbols with imperial themes. Rather, the “universal majesty of the Roman emperor” was stylized and incorporated into existing depictions of the Hellenic gods, stressing a concord – perhaps even an equality – “between the emperor and tutelary god,” not a supremacy of the former over the latter (Harl 1987: 70). Some cities even rewrote their histories in an attempt to identity with their newfound rulers, beginning new eras based on significant imperial events or adopting Roman history as their own (especially clear in the cases of figures 1 and 7), in turn bringing themselves into harmony with the Roman past (Ando 2000: 305). By symbolically linking Hellenic and Roman political interests on eastern civic currency, the Greeks literally coined their own definition of Romanness (Harl 1987: 73).

Coins in Context

Coins do have their limits. They cannot tell us as much about a significant event as an inscription on a monument, nor do they provide the kind of historical hindsight of a similarly motivated literary text. Yet that is precisely what makes them appealing as
objects of evidence: they were products of the present, and used dominant, unambiguous images to deliver their messages. On the most basic level, to use the words of Barbara Levick (1999: 58), “there was nothing baffling about coinage. It presents in images and words… thinking about power within the state and thinking by the very men who were engaged in the struggle for power.” Coinage, in other words, was neither subversive nor subtle, but a means by which elite provincials could represent and construct – alongside other media also reserved for privileged individuals (such as statues of imperial figures and inscriptions on buildings) and the penetration of the imperial cult into provincial communities (Howgego 1995: 45) – the physical manifestation of their ideological capital, the *habitus* as they saw it, their dual Greek and Roman identities.

Those using the coins, however, did not necessarily have to buy into their messages. We can never know for certain, of course, how influential coinage was, but we cannot assume that they represent the cultural identity of the entire community – just its leaders. As stated above, however, these leaders do make up an important part of any community, since it is they who primarily interact with, and strive to appease (or emulate, or resist against) their Roman rulers. The manipulation of coin images is an instance of privileged Greeks, (likely) holding the Roman citizenship, renegotiating their identity to take into account the strangers to whom they now had to answer (Laurence 1998: 8). Still, while undoubtedly more of a visible affirmation of cultural identity than Jones’ modern postage stamps, coins were but one avenue by which privileged provincials could deliver their ideology to ‘the masses.’

Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that – and may speak to the significance of coinage in the eastern provinces – while Roman imperial coins exclusively circulated in
the west from the middle of the first century AD, local coinage in the east continued to thrive for a couple of hundred years after that. Howgego (2005: 14) compellingly suggests that “emulation of Rome in the west was in the ideological interests of both local elites and Rome, just as an emphasis on Greek heritage served both parties in the east.” Since the Emperor represented himself as a kind of king in the east anyway, and built on the tradition of the Hellenistic monarchs of old, allowing Greek culture to thrive – promoting the survival, in other words, of Dio Chrysostom’s “true Hellenes”\(^{70}\) was a logical step towards a seamless transition from Greek to Roman (yet still Greek) political life. To allow the *poleis*, which had been minting their own coins for centuries, to continue the tradition transferred their former political independence to the realms of culture and power reconciliation (Howgego 1995: 42).

Beneath all of the typological, cultural, and temporal differences, however, Greek provincial coins were still Roman. To polarize the two types of coinage (east versus west) ignores the basic, recognizable continuity of currency between the two regions. Even the so-called ‘pseudo-autonomous’ coins – which featured local designs on both the obverse and reverse, instead of the standard ‘local and imperial’ pattern – shared many traits with ‘standard’ Roman coins, such as, for example, denomination. In other words, the myriad of coins under all areas of the empire constitute, to use Burnett’s terms (2005: 180), a plurality, not a duality; this is especially true when one considers that, as more provincials became Roman citizens, the natural dichotomy between native and colonial gradually lost much of its validity (Kremydi-Sicilianou 2005: 106).

\(^{70}\) For example: Dio Chrys. 31.161-3; 44.10; 48.8.
While the ‘SPQR’ engraved on the face of figure 11 (from Philomelium in Phrygia) likely brought to mind a different ‘populus’ in the east than it did in the west (since most eastern citizens probably never traveled to Rome or even Italy, interacted with ‘native’ Romans, and so on), that two quite different cultures subscribed to the same ideology – even if the specifics were different – is indicative of that ideology’s penetration and applicability. When Jesus, upon looking at a coin bearing the face and inscription of Caesar presented to him after being asked if Christians should pay taxes, remarks Ἀπόδοτε οὖν τὰ Καίσαρος Καίσαρι καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τῷ θεῷ (‘give, therefore, to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s,’ Matthew 22.21), one can not help but consider the political authority and penetration that such Imperial images have, combined with the plurality of local variations. When one considers the blending of imperial themes with native culture as an instance of the continuity of ideological institutions, diverse aspects of the same habitus, and the same tendency towards homonia between Hellenic and Roman identity also present in Greek imperial literature, then this plurality is inescapable.

Figure 11 (Harl 1987, pl. 30, no. 7)
Conclusion

One might expect, after setting out a series of assumptions, asking a set of questions, and then attempting to answer those questions via a close study of some important ancient sources, to come to some sort of firm, satisfying conclusion about the nature of Roman identity. Four chapters later, however, no neat conclusion is in sight; ‘what is Roman?’, the most important question of this study, remains a contentious issue. The theoretical bases were sound enough: Louis Althusser’s ideological doctrines – which identified Roman institutions such as the imperial cult, coinage and citizenship as apparatuses which spread the ideology of the empire – were combined with Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of a cultural habitus, the sum of a society’s practices and beliefs. Because of the pervasiveness of Roman ideological apparatuses everywhere – if not represented by physical buildings, then at least mental constructions – any community that was part of the empire shared in this habitus. A community or individual did not have to call itself ‘Roman,’ but the presence of this habitus made the investment of at least some ‘ideological capital’ into the empire unavoidable.

One of the most significant ways to invest one’s ideological capital into the empire, Roman citizenship has been the common thread of this study, binding together the subjects of the otherwise discrete preceding chapters. Others have made valuable contributions to the study of ancient culture by focusing on other important aspects of identity. For example: Swain on language (1996), Ando on physical images (2000 – especially chapters 7 and 8), Petts on natural and manufactured landscapes (1998). Yet while some of these attributes focus on the more latent or subconscious parts of an
individual’s self-representation – which is part of their appeal – a person who actively becomes a Roman citizen is not leaving much to the subconscious imagination; to utilize the empire’s institutions is to invest into its culture.

This active ideological adoption is related to another fundamental basis of this study: a rejection of the term ‘Romanization,’ an erroneous modern term that ignores differences within the culture of both the city being ‘made Roman’ and the empire itself. Since the very meaning of Roman was always up for debate (and Rome’s civil wars speak to the intensity of such debates), a city could not simply ‘become Roman’ in such a wholesale, unproblematic manner. Instead, if we are to use the term ‘Romanization,’ we should see it as a complex process that is as much a product of native support as it is of imperial conquest. This native participation has been shown through the examination of the main sources of this study: Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ Roman Antiquities, the Acts of the Apostles, Ulpian’s jurisprudence, and Greek civic coins. As Harl notes (1987: 72) notes, Greek elites wrote about, and accepted, Rome as a leader in an intellectual, cultural, and political setting long before Roman citizenship was a commonplace honour in the east (and, after 212 AD, not an honour at all).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ argument for the Greek roots of Rome and a Graeco-Roman identity reflects the author’s connection to, and investment in, both cultures. One cannot be Roman without being Greek; there is no ‘native’ Roman culture. Additionally, since Rome is the greatest in a long line of empires stretching back to classical Athens, all empires before it – Greek or not – are necessarily inferior. Dionysius attributes this inferiority to unwise citizenship practices. Rome’s inclusive citizenship tendencies, allow its ideology, and thus its empire, to grow; the more people who have ideological capital
invested in the culture, the more who are willing to help the society in a time of need. One cannot identify oneself with a state, according to Dionysius, unless one is a citizen and thus able to enjoy all of the privileges that come with being a member of that state.

The jurist Ulpian’s idea of multicultural integration is reminiscent of, but goes far beyond, the Graeco-Roman identity that Dionysius constructs in his *Roman Antiquities*. As the first passage of Justinian’s *Digest* – studied in detail in chapter four – illustrates, Ulpian is not merely writing a historical treatise (such as Dionysius) or a set of legal doctrines (as the titles of his works would indicate), but a philosophy – one that should be followed by all members of the empire, whether born at the foot of the Aventine or on the east banks of the Black Sea. As Ulpian himself reminds the reader, each member of the empire was not merely a citizen but *popularis meus*, “my fellow citizen” (*Dig.* 45.1.70 [Ad Ed. 11]). The *ius gentium*, the law of peoples, was tailor-made for these new citizens. Formerly the law of various ethnic groups within the empire, after 212 these ethnic groups become wholly Roman communities comprised of full Roman citizens. Thus, the former law of ‘peoples’ became, in effect, the law of Rome.

The representation of Paul in the *Acts of the Apostles* is less idealistic than Ulpian’s harmonious world of multicultural harmony and Dionysius’ vision of a wholly Greek Rome. Paul’s travels and self-representation reflect the often-muddled reality of identity in the ancient Roman world: Paul is a Greek, Roman, Jew, and Christian simultaneously. The cultures do not often overlap, but sometimes – especially concerning ‘violations’ of Jewish law and Paul’s rights as a Roman – there is conflict. The apostle’s Roman citizenship in particular reflects his investment, often somewhat hidden, in the empire: he knows when to use his rights, what cities to visit, and what Roman officials to
befriend – all the while focusing on his main mission, establishing a new mode of identity, Christianity, that can exist above all others without discord.

Finally, a statement of Fergus Millar, quoted at the beginning of chapter five on civic coinage, is too apt not to be repeated: Millar states (1993: 230) that coins are “the most deliberate symbols of public identity.” Coins tend not to be subtle, but to represent without much ambiguity the ideas – political, cultural, ideological, historical, mythical – that the minters wished to bring across. Contrary to well thought-out pieces of literature, whose authors had time to deliberate, correct and so on, the ideas represented on currency were relatively immediate reactions to, and catalysts for, cultural and ideological change. Not only did coins depict current or past politics, but they also circulated new ideological messages based on the desires of the minters, often mixing native and imperial themes and thus bringing the Roman Empire into the preexisting history of the city.

Despite revealing a great deal about how certain Greek provincials constructed their identities and represented the relationship between themselves, their eastern homelands, and the Roman Empire, the evidence uncovered in these sources nonetheless leaves this study’s most important question – what it meant to be ‘Roman’ in the empire – unanswered, since every source suggests a different interpretation of the question, let alone the answer. In a way, however, that precisely is the answer. The search for a pattern to tie together neatly a series of varied sources has revealed that, in fact, there is no pattern; individuals are just that, individual, and despite similarities between the sources, they nonetheless each have a unique answer to the question ‘what is a Roman?’ For Dionysius, a Roman was essentially a Greek with some extra (that is, Roman) virtue; Ulpian does not single out individual ethnic cultures as such, for all are Roman; a Roman
in the world of Paul could belong to any number of cultures at once; the minters of civic coins viewed the imperial as something to be integrated into native culture. In other words, the Roman Empire is not some sort of collective mind, but a large group of unique individuals, each with his (or her, though unfortunately we do not have nearly enough insight female self-representation in the ancient world) own view of Rome, its ideology, its culture and its origins.

And, of course, only a fraction of the surviving literary evidence that has something to say about culture in the Roman world was able to find its way into this study. Although, if the evidence uncovered in the four body chapters is any indication, more case studies would yield similar results: a pattern of continuity only insofar as all evidence would point to an ongoing debate about the definition of ‘Roman.’ Others who have been mentioned but not studied at length, for example, may fill out the ‘definition’ of Roman as has already been determined. Dio Chrysostom, a Greek from Bithynia living during the Second Sophistic who simultaneously rejected Roman culture while accepting the benefits of citizenship, has been mentioned in passing, but his eighty discourses have much to say on the topics of Greek and Roman identities.71 Conversely, Aelius Aristides, another Greek with Roman citizenship, takes the opposite viewpoint, embracing Rome. Like Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Aristides – especially in his 26th oration on the subject of Rome – argues for the empire’s superiority over Greece, although he allows even less room for Greek virtue than does the historian. And there are others still: Pliny the Younger, *legatus Augusti* (Emperor’s ambassador) of the Bithynia-Pontus region, whose correspondence with Trajan reveals intracultural complications of the eastern Greek

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world, as well as some evidence of the interaction between early Christians and Romans (Ep. 10.96); Strabo the geographer is, in many ways, the paradigmatic ‘outside definer,’ categorizing the known world from a Roman point of view. Though these are some of the more prominent examples, any text that explores the intersection of these two significant cultures has the potential to cast a new light on working definitions of ‘Roman’, ‘Greek’, and other similar terms.

Nor should all studies of this kind be limited to ‘obvious’ sources of identity such as literature, coins, inscriptions and the like (all of which tend to make their ideological and cultural biases relatively explicit) when attempting to come to some sort of conclusion about the identity (or identities) of a given culture. Any piece of evidence – so long as a particular person living in a particular place in time has constructed it (thus making it a product of certain biases, prejudices and viewpoints) – will say something about the culture from which it originates. For instance, pottery designs, mosaics, architecture and the like reflect aesthetic tendencies, which in turn may reveal cultural or ideological influences. In the case of this study, however, literature has made up the main body of evidence, which, since it literally spells out the ideas of its authors, provides ready insight into the complex, multifaceted world of ancient identity.

Not all agree, however. In an otherwise excellent paper, George Williamson sums up a viewpoint that, while losing prominence, is still (as the copyright date shows) an accepted viewpoint in the realm of classical scholarship. According to Williamson (2005: 22), relying on passages from elite authors to come to a conclusion about the nature of Romanness or identity “may represent nothing more than personal viewpoints, calibrated to the needs of a particular audience, and as such it is dangerous to adopt any as a key to
interpreting Roman attitudes towards its empire, or to ask questions of who the Romans were.” Williamson is right: a work such as the Roman Antiquities, for example, is full of personal viewpoints and could very well be tailor-made for a certain audience.

Yet, as this study has attempted to show, the “Roman attitude” is simply the coexistence of many individual viewpoints. No community’s attitude is homogeneous; these elite authors do represent an important part of the empire’s culture, since they were Roman and thus were just as much a part of the empire as the ‘common people.’ Our only sources of evidence for any kind of Roman attitude, in other words, are individual Romans. And, while Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ulpian, Paul, and the minters of Greek civic coins may have been in unique positions which allowed them to transmit (albeit indirectly in the case of Paul) their opinions about themselves and their cultures, had the common baker or tradesman had enough resources to record his thoughts they may well correspond to the ideological doctrine in the Roman Antiquities or the philosophical standpoint of Ulpian’s jurisprudence. Regardless of social status, place of birth, degree of literacy, or career – Paul was just a tent-maker, after all – any evidence that provides insight into such a complex culture must be taken seriously, even if to show that the only answer to this study’s most important question – what is a Roman? – is that, as an ever-changing cultural melting, there is no answer.
Bibliography


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