“Evangelines of 1946:” The Exile of Nikkei from Canada to Occupied Japan

by

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B.A., Saint Mary’s University, 2004

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Supervisory Committee

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During the Second World War, Japanese Canadians were uprooted from their homes along the coast of British Columbia and forced to leave the province. In 1946, almost 4,000 individuals were exiled to Japan. The Canadian government deemed their departure ‘voluntary,’ and labelled them ‘disloyal’ to Canada. However, a close reading of the evidence illustrates that ‘loyalty’ had little to do with their departure, and exposes the intent of federal and provincial officials to forcefully remove Nikkei from B.C. For those exiled to occupied Japan, life was filled with hardship and many were forced into difficult or unfamiliar situations. Many longed to return to Canada, but faced numerous restrictions, while others prospered and stayed in Japan for the duration of their lives. This thesis examines the experiences of many of those exiled to Japan, and explores the process by which the Canadian government facilitated their forced removal from B.C. and Canada.
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Introduction

Distant conflicts had a catastrophic impact on the Japanese Canadian community in the 1940s. Persons of Japanese ancestry in British Columbia (B.C.) experienced the “most dramatic expression of racism in Canadian history,” which began in earnest with the community’s uprooting in 1942. Over 20,000 individuals were removed from their homes and few would ever return to them. Following the official surrender of Japan in 1945, the Canadian government attempted to deport over 10,000 members of the uprooted community but yielded to pressure from Canadians concerned with civil liberties and citizenship and halted the programme after slightly under 4,000 were sent to Japan.

The title “Evangelines of 1946,” comes from the headline of an editorial in the Vancouver Sun by Elmore Philpott in reference to the uprooted community amid the uncertainty of their pending deportation. In 1943, Philpott had described the Japanese in Canada as “potential fifth columnists” but after the war and his realization that there was no evidence to prove the existence of a fifth-column in Canada, he began championing their civil rights and asked, “Have we forgotten the poem “Evangeline?” Do we want some future poet like Longfellow to immortalize a blemish in the record of the west coast, as that of the east coast was?” In Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s epic poem Evangeline: A Tale of Acadie, Evangeline is separated from her lover during the

expulsion of Acadians, and experiences the death of her father amid the destruction of their community. Evangeline spends her life in exile, wandering North America in search of her lost love, never to return to her former home in Acadie. Longfellow’s poem effectively “became the summary of a people's suffering.”

In January 1942, 21,975 persons of Japanese ancestry resided in British Columbia. Five years later, that number was reduced to just 6,776. More than 15,000 were scattered across Canada and Japan.

**A Brief Note on Terminology**

One important legal distinction among Japanese settlers and their offspring in the time period under discussion (1942-1949) was the location of their birth. The first generation of settlers in North America from Japan are referred to as *Issei*, while *Nisei* refers to their North American-born children. The term *Japanese Canadians* refers to the Canadian-born Nisei, as well as naturalized Issei, as they were all legally Canadian citizens. *Nikkei* refers to both the Issei, whether they had become naturalized Canadians (British Subjects) or remained Japanese nationals, as well as the Nisei generation, and all subsequent generations. This term is of quite recent coinage and is used by some to refer to the global Japanese Diaspora.

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Anyone researching the Nikkei wartime experience in Canada is faced with numerous other terminological issues. For example, what terms best describe the process by which Nikkei on the west coast were forced to move 100 miles inland from the coast? Was it an evacuation, or uprooting?

What is the best term to use to refer to the areas in which Nikkei were detained during the war? Is it better to use the terms used at the time by the government, by Nikkei themselves, or terminology that has been employed years later? Anyone engaging with this topic must decide what to call the government run “Interior Housing Centers.” While government documents and some scholars use this term, others refer to them informally as “ghost towns.” Across the literature these centers are also called “detention camps,” “camps,” and “internment camps.” Roy Miki argues that the Nikkei wartime experience in Canada “encapsulates the more common meaning of "internment,"” and so uses the term to remind readers of “the actual effects of the government’s policies.” Although it may not be the most precise legal term, influenced by Miki, as well as because of its

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familiarity, I will refer to the government-run “Interior Housing Centers” in which more than 10,000 Nikkei in Canada were “detained,” as _internment camps_.

However, the term “internment” is problematic. Government documents only refer to camps in Ontario as “internment camps.” These camps in Ontario, at Petawawa and Angler, were quite different in that they housed those individuals deemed potentially dangerous by the government, as well as those Nikkei who resisted their removal from the coast. The most notorious, and longest duration of internment for Nikkei in Ontario camps, was at Angler, which has not only been referred to as an “Internment camp,” but also as a “P.O.W. Camp,” and even a “Concentration Camp.” At Angler, inmates were encaged within high walls, barbed-wire fences, and lived under the constant supervision of armed guards. So as to provide clarity, and to distinguish them from the internment camps of the B.C. interior, when discussing internment in Ontario, I will often simply refer to Angler.

While some scholars and activists use the term ‘exile’ to refer to the process of uprooting and internment within B.C., I use the term exile only to refer to the departure of almost 4,000 Nikkei from Canada to Japan in 1946. Discussions of this departure are also rife with inconsistencies. Miki argues that:

> The term “repatriation” remains perhaps the most outrageous of all the terms concocted by the federal government, especially because the large majority of the nearly 4,000 people who were shipped to Japan, as Canadian-born, had Canada as

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12 Ibid., FN 2. See also the National Association of Japanese Canadians (hereafter NAJC) website: <http://www.najc.ca/thenandnow/experience1b.php> (16 March 2011).
14 Petawawa served as an internment camp for Nikkei only for a brief period during the early stages of the war before those interned there were sent to Angler.
their patria and, clearly, could not be “repatriated.” They were in fact being exiled from the country of their birth.\textsuperscript{16}

At times their departure is referred to as “Voluntary Repatriation,” “deportation,” “exile,” “banishment,” and also “‘repatriation’” in quotation marks. Adding to this confusion and phrased another way, “the people to be deported have chosen to go "voluntarily."”\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Methodology}

My main sources are documents produced by the Canada’s Departments of Labour and External Affairs, newspapers of the time, including The New Canadian, a newspaper that served the Nikkei community, and numerous first hand accounts. This has been supplemented by secondary literature. I also utilize new developments in critical theory, namely that of Yasmin Jiwani and her notions of ‘discourses of denial.’ Jiwani articulates that: “The violence of racism is shrouded by discourses of denial, discourses predicated on the categorization of racism as something other than what it is,” which serve to contain different groups in ways that suit the interests of a dominant, hegemonic power.\textsuperscript{18} Jiwani argues that various forms of violence against people of color, and existing “structures of domination,” are linked to colonization and hidden hierarchies of racialized groups. These structures “define the social order,” whether through “explicit brutality,” or coercion.\textsuperscript{19} Failing to address these issues adequately can amount to a denial of their existence. As I proceed with this research, I approach the material with Jiwani’s notion

\begin{footnotes}
\item [16] Miki, \textit{Redress}, 101 n. 4.
\item [18] Yasmin Jiwani, \textit{Discourses of Denial: Mediations of Race, Gender, and Violence} \cite{nn.18} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 14.
\item [19] Ibid., 9.
\end{footnotes}
of ‘discourse of denial’ in mind. My aim is to contribute to the existing literature on the experiences of the exiles in occupied Japan following their arrival in the devastated island nation. Allowing those Nikkei affected by the federal policies under discussion to speak in their own words is central to this research.

**Context**

Canada declared war on Japan, a few hours before the United States, and took immediate measures to arrest thirty-eight members of the Nikkei community, “allegedly dangerous to national security,” and placed them in internment camps in Ontario. From then on, the status of Nisei and those naturalized from Japan was “eroded in favour of their status as descendants of the Japanese enemy.”20 The process of removing Nikkei from B.C. had begun. As restrictions on Nikkei tightened, in February 1942, all were placed under a dawn to dusk curfew and forbidden to be on the streets, punishable by thirty days imprisonment.21 At this time, Nikkei families began to be split apart as able-bodied men were shipped off to work in road camps.22 On 29 April 1942, Nikkei in Vancouver were told they must be prepared to leave the city within twenty-four hours notice. Many, including the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, however, maintained a determined protest against the splitting up of their families, until they were forced to surrender, and they too were interned in Ontario, in May of that year.23

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22 At this time, Nikkei families in the United States were also being evacuated, however in complete family units.
Under the premise of “military necessity,” between March 1942 and March 1943, the British Columbia Security Commission (BCSC) eventually removed roughly 21,000 Nikkei from within 100 miles of B.C.’s coast. According to Order-in-Council P.C. 1665 of 4 March 1942, the BCSC, was “to plan, supervise and direct the evacuation from the protected areas,” and to provide “housing, feeding, care and protection” for those uprooted. Curiously, while federal politicians officially justified the government’s decision to “evacuate” all Nikkei from the coast, as a “military necessity,” military officials in Canada and the RCMP did not demand the removal of Nikkei and strongly disagreed with the King government’s decision.

If the military believed these actions were militarily unnecessary, what were the actual motives of this uprooting? This question becomes more problematic when one considers that while the entire Nikkei community was uprooted and interned, only selected individual Italians and Germans in Canada had been interned (this is significant considering Italy, Germany, and Japan were allied by the Tripartite Pact after September 1940). An important aspect to consider is the psychological effect of Imperial Japan’s successful military expansionism on residents in B.C. Did the expansion of Japan’s empire in northern China in 1931, and full-scale attack on China in 1937, influence the status of Nikkei in B.C.? Were Nikkei in Canada treated with more respect as a result of Imperial Japan’s military successes, or greeted with greater suspicion and fear?

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numerous restrictions in place on Nikkei in Canada certainly illuminate how Japanese migrants were treated quite differently than most of their European counterparts.

In fact, Trans-Pacific migrants faced tight immigration controls in Canada, beginning with the $50, “head tax,” placed on migrants from China in 1885, which by 1904, rose to $500 until the Mackenzie King Liberal government all but closed the door entirely on Chinese migration to Canada in 1923. Restrictions on Japanese immigration followed suit after the anti-Asian Vancouver race riot of 1907. After this riot, the control of Asian immigration became a primary concern of the Laurier Liberal government. Immigration was subsequently restricted through the Hayashi-Lemieux agreement, in which officials of the Empire of Japan agreed to limit the number of emigrants to Canada to 400 per year in 1908. Prior to that date, the majority of Japanese settlers had been male, however, after 1908, the number of male immigrants dropped considerably, and the number of women arriving increased, many who came to Canada as “picture brides.”

The Federal government also passed the “Continuous Voyage” act in 1908, which halted Japanese migration from Hawaii and effectively prohibited immigration from South-Asia, as the voyage from that region to Canada would have normally required a stopover before crossing the Pacific. The infamous 1914 incident, in which the majority of passengers on board the steam liner Komagata Maru (all British subjects from the

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28 On the origins of the 1908 agreement between Japan and Canada, see Price. “Orienting the Empire: Mackenzie King and the Aftermath of the 1907 Race Riots,” 53-83.

Punjab) were denied entrance to Canada by Borden’s governing Conservatives and forced to return to India, after waiting almost two months in Vancouver harbour, illustrates the federal government’s desire to tightly control trans-Pacific migration to Canada.\textsuperscript{30} The number of Japanese permitted to enter Canada was also further reduced to 150 males and females combined per year by 1928.\textsuperscript{31}

In addition to these immigration restrictions B.C. denied the franchise to Asian settlers and to First Nations. Certainly among the earliest Japanese migrants in Canada, a large proportion intended to work in the rich resource sectors developing in B.C., or in various businesses, until they could make enough money to settle back in Japan. However, some early settlers decided to stay in B.C. with their families. Cognizant of barriers to full citizenship rights for Nikkei in Canada, Naturalized Canadian Tomekichi Homma challenged his exclusion from the democratic process and won an historic case in the Supreme Court of British Columbia in November 1900. This victory however was short lived, and overruled by the Privy Council in December 1902, and thus Nikkei remained unable to vote.\textsuperscript{32} Without the franchise or through other laws or custom, Nikkei were effectively barred from positions in numerous industries, such as logging on crown land, working underground in coal mines, and, in government employment\textsuperscript{33} and from

\textsuperscript{30} Price, Orienting Canada: Race, Empire and the Transpacific, 25-26.
\textsuperscript{31} For a global perspective on Asian migration, see Adam M. McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
\textsuperscript{33} Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was, 52.
becoming architects, chartered accountants, lawyers, pharmacists, and teachers, with few exceptions.  

Much later, the Japanese Canadian Citizens League formed and sent a delegation of Nisei to Ottawa to petition for the franchise in 1936. This delegation was made up of a schoolteacher, a life insurance agent, a dentist, and a university professor and each presented their arguments to members of parliament from B.C. Those M.P.s prepared their official responses to the delegation for the federal government, in which they concluded that the goal of the Japanese in B.C. was to take over the province. In his report on the matter, Liberal M.P. (New Westminster) Thomas Reid warned that Japanese Canadians should not be extended the vote, for if they did: “we might as well pull up our stakes and seek pastures new, for they will then, by reason of numbers to a great extent be able to control the affairs in the province of British Columbia, political, as well as economic.” Reid brought this message to a more popular audience, in order to share the same fears he was helping to perpetuate within the federal government. Reid detailed the “Oriental problem” in B.C., and how legislation, such as immigration restrictions, designed to curb the “Oriental penetration” of the province had been ineffective. Yet, despite these restrictions, Reid bemoaned that, “Orientals are employed in practically all pursuits from labouring and farming to the professional and commercial occupations,” and pleaded for continued public support for the government’s ban on extending the franchise to persons of Asian ancestry in Canada. During that time there was a popular


35 Thomas Reid, cited in Miki. Redress, 35.
theory in some circles that persons of Asian ancestry could never assimilate into Canadian society, as well as widespread fears that trans-Pacific migrants were the ruthless economic competitors of Caucasian labour. He described all Nikkei in Canada (as well as Chinese), racially “unassimilable,” which he curiously defined as “when one race of people cannot, biologically speaking, be absorbed into another race of people by the union of the two races in marriage.”36 In such cases, Reid warned his (predominantly Caucasian) audience, “the Chinese or Japanese by inter-marriage would absorb our own race,” and posed the question: “are we in Canada prepared to allow an unassimilable race of people to control the economic and political life, if not of Canada, then of British Columbia?” In his final warning Reid claimed that if persons of Asian ancestry gained the franchise, then “Oriental governments would have an active voice in Canada and so help to shape the policies of this country.”37 Reid’s article was published just three weeks after Imperial Japan launched its total war in China, and from 1937 to 1941, agitation toward Nikkei in B.C. peaked.38 Japan’s aggression in Asia also excited persistent suspicions of a fifth column in Canada, and fears that Japan intended to conquer British Columbia, which existed even prior to the First World War.39

According to the official Dominion census 23,224 Nikkei lived in Canada in 1941, almost all of whom were in British Columbia.40 Shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, however, the Canadian government “proceeded to dismantle the Japanese-

38 Roy, Oriental Question, 5.
39 Ibid., 168. On popular attitudes of “The "Menace" from Japan,” see 166-188.
Beginning in late-February 1942, all Nikkei living within one hundred miles of the west coast of Canada were forcibly uprooted from their homes and forced to leave their homes and abandon their property. Roughly 8,000 Nikkei were sent through the Hastings Park “assembly center” in Vancouver, where they were sheltered in animal barns before being moved on to various other locations. Mary Murakami’s family was uprooted from their Salt Spring Island home and taken to Hastings Park for two weeks. She recalls: “we didn’t know at the time, but we were walking into hell. The first thing that hit us was the smell or urine and feces.”

By October 1942, 12,500 Nikkei were detained in internment camps in the British Columbia interior; 3,600 went to Alberta and Manitoba to work on sugar beet farms; 3,000 moved into self-supporting communities in the B.C. interior; 2,150 were forced to work in road camps in B.C. and Ontario; and 750 were sent to P.O.W. internment camps in Ontario. Their property, including fishing boats and businesses, were sold very cheaply by the federal government’s Custodian of Enemy Property. With one exception, Nikkei in coastal B.C. would never reacquire their former homes.

After three years of Internment, all adult Nikkei were forced to complete a government survey which gave respondents a “choice:” either settle “east of the Rockies,” or “repatriate” to Japan. Returning to their former homes in B.C. was not an option. Respondents selecting Japan would receive financial compensation of $200 for each adult and $50 for each dependant, as well as free transportation to Japan. Financial

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41 Ayukawa, Hiroshima Immigrants in Canada, 1891-1941, 125.
44 A “special case” was that of Zennosuke Inouye, a Japanese Canadian veteran who successfully reacquired his land. Peter Neary, “Zennosuke Inouye's Land: A Canadian Veterans Affairs Dilemma,” Canadian Historical Review 85, 3 (September 2004): 423.
considerations, as well as dissatisfaction with their treatment by the Canadian government are evident from the results of this survey, as roughly half of the Nikkei population selected Japan. When news of the atomic bombings and Japan’s surrender reached the internment camps in Canada, more than 10,000 Nikkei faced deportation to Japan. Many, with the support of churches and civil liberties groups, sought to stay in Canada. While the federal government’s deportation orders were under review by the Privy Council in London, almost 4,000 Nikkei left Canada for Japan in 1946. By leaving Canada, federal officials deemed these Nikkei ‘disloyal,’ and the two-thirds of those leaving with Canadian citizenship (more accurately, subjects of the British Empire), had it revoked. This group soon arrived among the ashes of a decimated post war Japan to find that their hardships had just begun. While significant literature exists on the repatriation question, the actual departure remains an obscure historical event, and has been portrayed quite inconsistently within the existing literature on Nikkei history in Canada. Tatsuo Kage addressed this issue by stating:

This lesser-known story of those exiled to Japan is an important piece of the bigger picture. In order to fully understand the vulnerability of democracy and citizens’ rights during times of national emergency whether real or perceived, this story of the exiles needs to be incorporated into the history of our community and of Canada.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{45} Tatsuo Kage, “Japanese Canadians Banished to Japan” (paper presented to the Japan Studies Association of Canada International Conference, York University, Toronto, Canada, August 16, 2007).
Chapter 1: Historiographical Review of Exile

Immediately after the Second World War, the Canadian government revoked the citizenship and exiled almost 4,000 Nikkei to Japan amid a time of growing consciousness of not only Canadian citizenship but also an emerging consciousness of concepts of universal human rights. The circumstances surrounding these Nikkei who found themselves among the ruins of postwar Japan remain controversial and much of their experiences remain largely unknown. The Nikkei exiles experienced discrimination, deprivation, and destitution. Some however, used their bilingual skills to work for the occupying American forces and international corporations in Japan, where some found love and married. For many of these Nikkei however, Japan was not their home and they were determined to return to Canada, and many eventually did, though their stories are not without hardship. Before exploring how Canada sent these Nikkei to Japan following Japan’s surrender, the following section will examine the historiography on these 4,000 Nikkei. Government reports of the time indicate that their departure was purely voluntary and facilitated by the Department of Labour. As government documents and personal stories became available, scholars have made a more critical analysis of this event. The numerous terminological inconsistencies within the literature illustrate the difficulty in adequately explaining this exodus.

Forrest E. La Violette’s *The Canadian Japanese and World War II: A Sociological and Psychological Account* published in 1948, was the first major research project on Nikkei in Canada during the war. Based on direct contact with Nikkei in Canada, it analyzes major aspects of the government’s wartime policies and their impact on the Nikkei. La Violette explains that “after the reversal of policy,… no one left for Japan
who did not want to go, [and] 3,964 Japanese actually sailed.”¹ As this was a contemporary study, he speculates about the future for the Nikkei in Japan, but does not analyse conditions or experiences following their departure from Canada.

Ken Adachi’s *The Enemy That Never Was: A History of Japanese-Canadians*, (1976) remains the definitive account of the Nikkei experience in Canada. Adachi who is very sympathetic to the Nikkei suggests that the exodus of almost 4,000 Nikkei makes them, and especially the Canadian-born, “the casualties… who found the prospect of remaining in Canada intolerable and elected instead to go to war-devastated Japan.”² He portrays the dismal situation of the exiles during their initial reception at the U.S. Army Repatriation Center at Uraga in Tokyo Bay, illustrates the difficulties of families split apart by their departure to Japan, and explains the desire of some exiles to return to Canada. However, Adachi implies that the exiles had simply gone to Japan voluntarily, which may not have been the case.

Several studies of the Nikkei published in the 1970s, scarcely mentioned those who went to Japan,³ including Peter Ward’s seminal work, *White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia*. Like Adachi, Ward attributes prevailing attitudes of “white supremacy” and racism toward persons of Asian ancestry as major contributing factors in the experiences of Nikkei before the Second World War. He also describes civic opposition in Canada to the deportation orders as the “most vigorous opposition yet mounted against anti-Oriental government policies.”

which proved successful as the federal government’s deportation orders were cancelled and “only those who still wished to be sent” left for Japan. Ward’s brief mention of those exiled to Japan suggests that they had “wished” to go to Japan. He repeats this argument in two other publications. The Japanese in Canada, his 1982 contribution to the Canadian Historical Association’s series Canada’s Ethnic Groups, and in the afterward to the memoir of an internee at Angler.

In The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians During the Second World War (1981) Ann Gomer Sunahara argues that racism was the major factor driving the government’s policies toward Nikkei during the Second World War. In her one-page discussion of those exiled to Japan, who she refers to as repatriates, she argues that they “ostensibly went voluntarily. In fact, most went because they felt that they had no alternative.” This appears to be the first instance of a scholarly attempt to probe deeper into the possibility that their departure may have been involuntary. Sunahara briefly explores several motives for going to Japan and suggests that elderly Issei, after losing everything in Canada, opted for Japan over eastern Canada in the hopes that relatives in Japan could support them in their old age, or at least until their own children could do so. Sunahara also cites family reunification as a major factor, arguing that since the Canadian government was not repatriating those Japanese Canadians who had been trapped in Japan during the war, many Nikkei had no choice but to go to Japan to find their loved ones. Like Adachi, Sunahara details some of the financial, material, and cultural

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hardships faced in Japan and provides important insights into their experiences in Japan. Her suggestion that they may not have actually left voluntarily really marks the beginning of a critical analysis of their departure, and supports the trend of using quotation marks when discussing ‘voluntary repatriation.’

In Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese During the Second World War, published in 1990, Patricia Roy, J.L. Granatstein, Masako Iino, and Hiroko Takamura refer to these Nikkei as “repatriates” (in quotation marks) and include a few stories about their difficulties in Japan, referring to their experiences in Japan as a ‘clash of cultures.’ They argue that because these exiles sought compensation for their losses from both the Japanese and Canadian governments, “the loyalties of these repatriates were certainly tangled.” They also note that when in 1967 the Diet passed a law to compensate these exiles, the Japanese public was very critical and that “the repatriates found themselves welcomed neither in Japan nor in Canada.”

In Justice in Our Time: The Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement, Roy Miki and Cassandra Kobayashi (1991), explain that:

A cruel irony awaited many Japanese Canadians who “chose” to go to Japan. As a defeated country, Japan may have been forced by Canada to accept them, but there was no obligation on Japan to treat them as their own. The Canadian-born Nisei thus found themselves categorized, in Japan, as “aliens.” They had become totally rootless exiles.

Miki and Kobayashi use “chose” in quotation marks suggesting that this was not actually the case, and illuminate that exiled Nisei had a more difficult time adjusting than

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7 Patricia E. Roy et al., Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese During the Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 190-191.
those exiles born in Japan. They comment that when the government’s deportation orders were revoked, by then, “tragically,” 4,000 individuals had already left.9

In 1992, the National Association of Japanese Canadians hosted the Homecoming ’92 conference. A compilation of papers presented there was published in Homecoming ’92: Where the Heart Is. One section is dedicated to those exiled, under the heading “The Second Uprooting: Exiled to Japan,” and features the words and reflections of four Nisei exiled to Japan who participated in a panel discussion at the Conference.10 These first-hand accounts offer valuable insights into their experiences and how Canada’s policies impacted their respective families, and led them across the Pacific and eventually back to Canada.

R.L. Gabrielle Nishiguchi’s 1993 master’s thesis, “Reducing the Numbers: The Transportation of the Canadian Japanese, 1941-1947,” proposes a new interpretation of the federal government’s wartime policies and suggests the government sought to “reduce the numbers” of Nikkei in Canada and the program of “Voluntary Repatriation” developed from the desire to “remove them from the country with the greatest possible speed.” Nishiguchi also argues that since the aim by 1944 had been “to reduce the numbers by removing the disloyal,” the almost 4,000 departees had to be labelled ‘disloyal’ by the federal government in order to prevent their possible return.11

Roy Ito’s Stories of My People: A Japanese Canadian Journal, published in 1994, devotes one section to those exiled under the heading, “Repatriation to Japan.” It features the stories of five individuals and their experiences in Japan. Ito empathetically suggests

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9 Ibid., 55.
that uncertainty within Canada’s internment camps led many to choose to go to Japan. His presentation of individual experiences and of correspondence between exiles in Japan and the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo is quite illuminating. In one 1961 petition, the exiles requested that the Canadian government grant them the Old Age Pension and stated that:

> Out of sheer sense of insecurity… we boarded the repatriation ship to Japan. If we had been allowed the same measure of complete freedom of movement as enjoyed by Canadian citizens in general, we would have gone back to the British Columbia coast. If measures had been taken in line with the principle of democracy which Canada professes to follow to give us freedom of movement to make a living without fear or uncertainty after the internment camp and interior housing project were closed, we would not have chosen to take the repatriation ship… Coming to Japan, our only means of support was the $200 provided by the government of Canada. This meager amount, however, did not go far in the face of food shortage and rampant inflation sweeping Japan, struggling to rise from its defeat in the war.

Both this petition and one sent in 1964, “received little sympathy from Embassy officials and the Canadian government.” Ito adds that the Issei repatriates voluntarily chose the insecurity of returning to Japan, but their expectation of maintaining the same standard of living they enjoyed in Canada was questionable. Ito also states that while there are no definitive statistics to prove it, “a considerable number of Nisei made their way back to Canada.”


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Okazaki states, “the government’s evacuation and internment policies imposed on our community until 1949 were carried out to satisfy the discriminatory needs of the white ruling majority.” Nevertheless, he believes that the first group of “repatriates (who always wanted to leave) were finally granted their wish,” when the first sailing departed in May 1946. Okazaki also explains that the federal government “called it "voluntary repatriation," and sent almost 4,000 people to Japan.”

Tatsuo Kage assisted in co-ordinating the Redress Implementation Program for Western Canada, and communicated with Japanese Canadians in Japan to assist those eligible to apply for the Redress payment. Using those interviews, and other research, Kage published in Japanese, *Nikkei Kanadajin no Tsuihō [Exiled Japanese Canadians]* in 1998. These stories recount their lives since the 1942 uprooting in Canada, after making the adjustment to Japan and their lives into the 1990s, either in Japan or Canada. Kage’s title, using the term ‘Tsuihō,’ roughly translates in English to ‘expel,’ ‘banish’ or ‘exile.’ Elsewhere Kage also refers to their departure at ‘banishment.’

Popular portrayals, as well as school textbooks, also present this exodus in various ways. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)’s seventeen episode documentary series, *Canada: A People’s History*, features a small segment on the wartime experiences of Japanese Canadians. The narrator for this series explains that in 1945, Japanese Canadians had to choose between “another relocation east of the Rockies, or exile in

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14 Ibid., A-5.
15 Tatsuo Kage, “Japanese Canadians Banished to Japan” (paper presented to the Japan Studies Association of Canada International Conference, York University, Toronto, Canada, August 16, 2007).
17 Tatsuo Kage, “Japanese Canadians Banished to Japan.”
Japan.” They quote a young Nisei girl who said of her parents, “they didn’t want to go to Japan, especially my mother. None of us wanted to go.” The narrator adds that this girl’s family joined “the last boatload of exiles sailing for Japan.” Tracing the same family’s experiences in Japan, this episode tells of the “destruction and destitution” witnessed in postwar Japan, as well as the family’s hardships, especially following the death of the mother in 1947. This documentary refers to the departure of these Nikkei as an “exile in Japan,” but also states that “more than 4,000 quit Canada, most [we]re Canadian citizens.”¹⁸

In *Counterpoints: Exploring Canadian Issues*, the B.C. high school textbook, published in 2001, Michael Cranny and Garvin Moles include a two-page feature on “Japanese-Canadians in the War.” They argue that fear of a Japanese attack on Canada and suspicion of a fifth column within Nikkei in B.C., had been “strengthened by local editorials, gossip, and years of racism towards Canada’s Japanese population.” Importantly, the authors emphasize that, “there was no evidence to suggest that any of these people supported Japan rather than Canada.” However, within this feature, the only mention of those exiled to Japan states that: “in all, 3,964 Japanese-Canadians were repatriated.”¹⁹

In their *History of the Canadian Peoples* two-volume series, first published in 2002, Margaret Conrad and Alvin Finkel, rather than using quotation marks to suggest an involuntary departure, refer to it as a “deportation,” and to “deportees.” They explain that in order “to make deportation a more attractive option, Ottawa offered money and free

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passage to those who were destitute or too elderly or infirm to begin life again in eastern Canada.” This suggests that the Canadian government lured them into leaving Canada by offering financial compensation.

Roy Miki, in *Redress: Inside the Japanese Canadian Call for Justice* (2004), contends that the government had intended to eliminate the Nikkei presence in B.C. through “dispossession, deportation, dispersal and assimilation.” He argues that even after the war, Nikkei in Canada “still found themselves caught by the administrative machinery of a government that was relentless in its efforts to erase their presence through dispersal (assimilation) or deportation (“voluntary repatriation”). Miki does not include much discussion of those exiled to Japan nor their experiences across the Pacific as this work is about the Redress movement and eventual settlement.

For the remainder of the decade, there was hardly a mention of these Nikkei within scholarly literature on Nikkei in Canada, including Patricia Roy’s *Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941-67* and Stephanie Bangarth’s *Voices Raised in Protest: Defending North American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry, 1942-49*. While the latter covers the legal challenges to the deportation orders, and argues that “expatriation” is a more accurate term than “repatriation,” there is scant mention of this group. In the epilogue to *Hiroshima Immigrants in Canada, 1891-1941*, Michiko Midge Ayukawa discusses the dispersal of Nikkei from B.C. to various regions of

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22 Ibid., 101.
Canada and states that, “some 4,000 Japanese had been deported to Japan.” In *A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America*, Greg Robinson refers to them as “voluntary repatriates” using quotation marks, and describes them as, “the portion of the Japanese Canadian population deemed most pro-Japanese.”

The inconsistent portrayal of this group of Nikkei within the existing literature is a reflection of the difficulty in defining their departure. Were they deported, coerced into leaving, or did they leave voluntarily? How exactly did Canada’s government facilitate the exodus of almost 4,000 Nikkei from a prosperous postwar Canada to a bombed out occupied Japan? Was this part of an aggressive campaign to remove the Nikkei presence from B.C. and Canada? By examining the roots of this ‘repatriation’, the motives of the program begin to emerge.

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Chapter 2: “Repatriation Survey,” Resistance, and Exile

How could the Canadian government send almost 4,000 of its residents to a thoroughly decimated Japan? American bombing raids had become a constant threat to Japanese civilians by late 1944, and continued until the conclusion of the war in August 1945. The degree of destruction was largely unknown in Canada when the repatriation survey was conducted in the spring of 1945, and much more damage was inflicted upon Japan in the following months. Shortly after American forces entered the country in late August, however, details of the extent of the destruction in Japan crossed the Pacific. During the first week of September 1945, American occupation forces began allowing foreign journalists to enter and report on the state of the country, at the same time, updated assessments revealed far more extensive destruction than officials had previously believed.¹ The Canadian media covered the devastation in Japan and The New Canadian relayed this news to its readers.² Why did Japanese Canadians ignore the potential problems of moving to war-torn Japan and leave Canada in 1946? Attempting to answer this question, inevitably leads to more questions. Were those who left truly disloyal to Canada and deserving of deportation? Or was the government’s “Voluntary Repatriation” program actually the implementation of a much harsher policy, with the intention of removing Nikkei from B.C. and Canada? Was “Voluntary Repatriation” a euphemism

¹ LIFE photographer George Silk became the first foreigner to get a comprehensive look at Japan and his aerial photos of the destruction were published in “U.S. Occupies Japan,” LIFE, September 10, 1945. One Nisei later discussed seeing images of the destruction in LIFE magazine prior to her departure from Canada and described what she saw of Japan as exactly as the magazine had portrayed it. BCA, Awmack, Winifred J. Collection, Japan (around Kyoto) to Canada, March 1947.
² See for example: “Repats Disappointed in Japan” New Canadian, 5 January, 1946; “Japan Suffers says Eyewitness” New Canadian, 9 February, 1946; Perhaps the article, “Don’t Come to Japan Warns Former Teacher” in the New Canadian on 26 October, 1946, was too late for most as by this time four sailings had already gone to Japan.
for something else? Has this part of Canada’s history been obscured by a ‘discourse of denial?’

Canada’s racialized policies toward Nikkei began long before the war, however, the legislative process facilitating the departure of these Nikkei accelerated after the community’s uprooting. Influential politicians, while appeasing anti-Japanese groups in B.C., advocated the removal of Nikkei from B.C. and Canada, which resulted in the federal government’s draconian policies toward Nikkei.

While Japan’s forces advanced into China in the late 1930s, some British Columbians feared an attack from within, or without, and blurred the distinction between Japanese Canadians and militarists of Imperial Japan. Some groups advocated deportation and demonstrated such hostility that caused some federal officials to fear physical violence toward Nikkei. The federal government began considering the departure of Nikkei from Canada even before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. In the fall of 1941 when a Pacific war seemed likely, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson suggested that any Japanese leaving Canada for Japan on a repatriation ship provided by the Japanese government should not be allowed to re-enter Canada after the war. The Hikawa Maru left on 1 November 1941, carrying 140 Nikkei (69 Japanese Nationals, 28 Naturalized British subjects, 7 Canadian born adults, 32 Canadian born children, and 4 other non-immigrants). The New Canadian reported that they left Canada “because they have families in Japan to support,” and with Canada’s restrictions on remittances to Japan found it “impossible to maintain their families while

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3 Yasmin Jiwani, Discourses of Denial: Mediations of Race, Gender, and Violence (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006).
working in Canada."\(^6\) The government extended “all possible courtesies,” to have them sign a form to record their departure so as to prevent their future return.\(^7\) It was, however, uncertain of the legal way of preventing their return but this policy of banning their return became an important aspect of Canada’s later policy of removing the Nikkei from the country.

The rapid success of Japan’s Imperial Armed Forces over American, British and Dutch imperialists in Hawaii, Philippines, British Malaya, Hong Kong, Singapore, and oil producing areas of the Dutch East Indies, aggravated suspicions and fear of the Japanese as fifth columnists in North America. As Japan’s forces advanced, Canada tightened restrictions on Nikkei. Suspicions of Nikkei within enjoyed wide circulation during the Second World War. *TIME* magazine, for example, reported “sensational facts” that Nikkei owned more than half of all hotels in Vancouver, and owned 1,270 fishing boats, which “regularly patrolled the coast to Alaska.” Additionally, “Japanese properties straddled power lines, overlooked the shipyards, were adjacent to the water-supply lines, gas lines, [and] bridges.”\(^8\) These stories were common in BC from about 1937 on and could only fuel the fear that Nikkei in Canada represented a fifth column, willing and ready to assist the Japanese military in a land invasion of Canada’s westernmost province.

In the wake of Pearl Harbor, vocal anti-Japanese M.P.s and prominent B.C. politicians capitalized on war hysteria and called for a removal of Nikkei from the B.C. coast, which the ruling Liberals carried out with very little opposition. Former

\(^6\) “Can’t Send Money to Support Families – Must Return to Japan” *New Canadian*, 31 October 1941.
\(^7\) Nishiguchi, “Reducing the Numbers,” 51.
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791027,00.html> (12 December 2010).
Conservative cabinet minister Harry Stevens later argued that the “menace” among the Nikkei community was “not small or ineffective,” rather it was a very “dangerous group,” adding that: “we knew if the Japanese were left free, they were capable of subversive activities.” Canadian communists also energetically supported the persecution of the Nikkei community in the wake of Pearl Harbor, not only due to the role of Japanese Canadian fisherman as competition to Caucasian supporters of the Communist party, but as a North American contribution to an international communist expression of support to the Soviet Union after Germany invaded it. Even the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), after championing the right of franchise for Canadians of Asian ancestry during the 1930s, momentarily succumbed to public pressure, both provincially and federally to support the uprooting of the Nikkei from the coast. The CCF, however, quickly resumed its support for Japanese Canadians and fought for their rights more than any other political party during the war.

The growing hostility toward Nikkei in British Columbia, Caucasian insecurity, and the unwillingness of other Canadian provinces to accept potentially relocated Japanese Canadians, influenced the decision to relocate Nikkei from the coast and into isolated camps and some argue this was to protect them from violent reprisals from Caucasian British Columbians. Others argue that rather than as a protective measure, “what happened to the Japanese Canadians is the opposite,” and it “was racial

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11 Ibid., 13-15.
prejudice, not a military estimate of a military problem,”\textsuperscript{14} and that the excuse of “military necessity” was “a then politically expedient term for historic racist animus.”\textsuperscript{15}

Despite his various arguments of Asian “unassimilability,” warnings of unfair economic competition and, threats that Nikkei were bent on taking over B.C., Thomas Reid claimed that the 1942 uprooting was necessary for “security” reasons, as many Nikkei fishermen in Canada were actually officers for Japan’s Imperial navy, adding that several Japanese in Canada even admitted to him directly that they were spies for Japan. James G. Gardiner, the federal minister of Agriculture recalled that officials argued, not only in favor of the uprooting of all Nikkei due to fears of a potential Japanese attack on B.C., but also for the security of Nikkei in Canada themselves.\textsuperscript{16} Several scholars also agree that Nikkei in Canada were “subjected to the hardships of evacuation as much for their own protection, and by implication, the protection of Canadians in Japanese hands in Hong Kong and elsewhere, as for any other reason.”\textsuperscript{17}

Soon after the fall of Singapore in February 1942, the British Columbia Security Commission (BCSC) began uprooting Nikkei in B.C. and placing them in remote parts of the interior. Along with the uprooting of the entire community from the west coast, came the confiscation and sale of their fishing boats, property, businesses, and farms to non-Nikkei at extremely discounted prices by the federal government’s Custodian of Alien


\textsuperscript{17} Patricia E. Roy et al., \textit{Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese During the Second World War} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 215.
The proceeds of these liquidation sales even ironically partially funded the maintenance of the internment camps.

The 1942 uprooting was clearly based on a confluence of complex factors, including the process by which racism had become institutionalized through private interest groups and public servants, fuelling animosity and directing prohibitive legislation toward persons of Asian ancestry so as to curb the “Oriental penetration” of B.C. In the years to follow, federal politicians crafted a program of forced population transfer, which remains controversial more than sixty-five years later.

Despite their monetary losses, most Nisei were primarily concerned with the emotional effects of their removal from the coast. Robert K. Okazaki reveals that, “the horrendous mental anguish of the compulsory evacuation plus our massive material losses dealt an overwhelming blow to the foundation of our lives.” To Hideo Kokubo, the impact of these policies was “like being cut off at the root. All those years of work, just gone,” he says. Not only did the uprooting sever Nikkei roots in B.C., the compensation for their confiscated property was astonishingly inadequate. Yoshimi Susan Maikawa (née Suyama) recalled her mother in tears when her parents received a mere $60 for their Cumberland, Vancouver Island, home that the government had

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auctioned off. The Issei lost virtually everything they had struggled for over the previous decades while trying to establish themselves and their families in Canada. These measures very effectively eliminated their ties to property and their livelihoods in B.C and the dispossession of Japanese Canadian property was the “necessary first step toward deportation.” Unfortunately for Nikkei in Canada, they had no recourse to stop it.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, following their uprooting, a number of Nikkei expressed their desire to leave for Japan to the Protecting Power of Japanese interests in Canada at the time, the Spanish Consul General. In August 1942, ninety percent of Issei held at Angler wished to return to Japan as over 150 Issei applied to repatriate. Arrangements to repatriate some on the S.S. Gripsholm were settled by September 1942. Naturalized Canadians and Nisei leaving for Japan would be stripped of their Canadian citizenship; all assets remaining in Canada would be liquidated by the Custodian of Enemy Property and placed to the credit of departing Nikkei; each was permitted to take the equivalent of $260.85 in U.S. currency, and the rest would be credited to their accounts. All sixty-one Nikkei departing from Canada on this ship travelled first to Montreal by train before proceeding directly to New York.

Under the control of the U.S. State Department since May 1942, the Swedish ship (Sweden was neutral during the war), S.S. Gripsholm carried, along with relief supplies

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21 Yoshimi Susan Maikawa first presented her life story during an oral history panel to participants at the “Changing Japanese Identities in Multi-cultural Canada Conference,” held at the University of Victoria, August 22-24, 2002. Following that presentation, Maikawa self-published her life story in order to share it with her grandchildren. I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Midge Ayukawa for sharing this publication. Yoshimi Susan Maikawa, Ba-chan’s Story: Thoughts and recollections of a Japanese-Canadian Growing up in Canada (Yoshimi Susan Maikawa, 2002), 6.
24 Nishiguchi, “Reducing the Numbers,” 80.
for American P.O.W.s and civilians in Japanese-controlled territory, 1,330 Nikkei civilians to be exchanged for 1,500 Americans, Latin Americans and Canadians, at an exchange point in the port of Mormugao, Goa, in Portuguese India. The *Gripsholm*, painted white with the word "Diplomat" in huge letters, passed through Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo to pick up another 173 Japanese, before crossing the Atlantic to Port Elizabeth, South Africa, then finally to Goa.26 Approximately 200 Canadian nationals were among the 250 non-American nationals who sailed aboard the *Teira Maru* from Yokohama to Goa.27 The Nikkei who left Canada in wartime, however, represented only a small proportion of the total Nikkei population and officials soon looked to ways of increasing the numbers of those leaving.

In August 1943, prior to the Quebec Conference when President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and W.L. Mackenzie King convened in Quebec City, Norman Robertson put forth his ideas for Canada’s policy toward Nikkei. J.L. Granatstein describes Robertson as “a humane man” who put his “responsibilities to the state he served… before his own conscience.” He also argues that Robertson “abhorred the racism” in his home province of B.C. and was “appalled by its virulence in such men as [Liberal M.P.] Ian Mackenzie.” Robertson was powerless to turn the political tide as his “political masters” orchestrated the uprooting of the community, and so attempted to “moderate the hostility to the Japanese” in B.C. and to work from within the government “for a more humane policy.”28 What he soon proposed came as a shock to many.

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Robertson argued that due to a number of factors, including limited shipping options, and a lack of interest from the Japanese government to repatriate its nationals from North America, the number of Nikkei leaving Canada for Japan during the war was “too small to be of any consequence… and not many Japanese Canadians have shown any desire to return to Japan.” He believed that as a result, the federal government would be faced “with the problem of some 25,000 residents of Canada of Japanese origin,” and where these residents should be allowed to reside. Robertson then outlined a means to remedy this difficult situation and stated:

My own preliminary feeling is that we should

(1) afford every facility, including free transportation and permission to transfer funds and furniture, for the voluntary repatriation from Canada of all persons of Japanese race, regardless of nationality, who wish to return to Japan;

(2) deport Japanese nationals whose behaviour during wartime made their internment necessary;

(3) revoke the naturalization certificates of naturalized British subjects of Japanese origin and cancel the national status of natural-born British subjects of Japanese origin who either had to be interned under the Defence of Canada Regulations or put themselves under the protection of the Protecting Power for Japanese Interests. Such persons would then become liable to the deportation recommended under (2);

(4) permit the residual population of Japanese racial origin, who would be predominantly British subjects and Canadian nationals to reside in Canada where they should not be subject to any special or peculiar disabilities with respect to place of residence, employment, civil obligations or educational opportunities; and
Robertson’s proposal of facilitating the repatriation of those wishing to leave Canada and deporting all ‘disloyal’ Nikkei, after which the federal government could remove restrictions on ‘loyal’ Japanese Canadians, proved to be very influential. King approved all but the fourth point regarding the removal of restrictions on Japanese Canadians remaining in Canada, and the federal government later implemented many of Robertson’s suggestions. First, however, it was necessary to determine the ‘loyal’ from the ‘disloyal’ Nikkei in Canada.

During the later stages of the war in the Pacific, any threat of a possible attack from Japan’s Imperial Forces had all but completely disappeared, however, the federal government had yet to resolve the resettlement problem. A 1944 Gallop Poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion suggested that 80% of Canadians would send all Japanese nationals in Canada to Japan after the war, while 33% would send Canadian citizens of Japanese ancestry to Japan. Interestingly, this poll also suggests that public opinion in British Columbia resembled that of the rest of the country. While majority public opinion may have been leaning away from the mass deportation of Canadian citizens of Japanese ancestry, federal politicians on the other hand had developed a program to facilitate the complete removal of Nikkei from B.C. and mass deportations from Canada.

29 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 20 August 1943, *Documents on Canadian External Relations* (hereafter *DCER*), 1942-1943 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1980), 552-553.
30 University of British Columbia Archives (hereafter UBC), Japanese Canadian Research Collection - Chukichi Oyagi Collection, Box 11, File XXXII A, Gallup Pole 16 February 1944; see also *Montreal Daily Star*, 16 February 1944.
On 27 March 1944, Robertson reiterated the main points from his memo of 20 August the previous year, and told King that he believed Canada’s policy thus far, “has not been unduly harsh and can be defended as reasonable in the circumstances.” Robertson also argued the case for dealing strictly with selected Nikkei on an individual basis, by segregating the ‘disloyal,’ and establishing a tribunal to deal with such cases. Based on these assessments, individual Nikkei could be deported, and the government would assist any others wishing to leave for Japan. Robertson argued that by doing so, the federal government could then relax restrictions on Nikkei remaining in Canada, which could result in Nikkei settling elsewhere in Canada, thus “helping to meet the otherwise adamant stand of British Columbia in the face of a probable return of almost all Japanese to that province.”

Undoubtedly, some Nikkei interned in Canada held deep loyalties to Imperial Japan and genuinely wished for Japan to win the war and some simply wanted to return to Japan. Within some B.C. internment camps, a vocal pro-Imperial Japan element tuned in to shortwave radio broadcasts from Tokyo on contraband radios which gave them a very different interpretation of the war, even leading them to dismiss the Canadian press as ‘propaganda,’ and convinced many in the camps that Japan was actually in a position to win the war. During this time, a “growing bitterness” among Nikkei facilitated the spread of pro-Japan sentiment, as the pro-Japan elements argued that Canada was a

31 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 27 March 1944, DCER, 1944-1945 Part I (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1987), 1132-1134. See also Granatstein, A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson, 164-165.
32 According to Takeo Ujo Nakano, many interned at the Angler P.O.W. camp expected to receive compensation after Japan had won the war, at which time they would return to Japan. See Takeo Ujo Nakano and Leatrice Nakano, Within the Barbed Wire Fence: A Japanese Man’s Account of his Internment in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 80.
“racist nation,” and “only in Japan could Japanese live as human beings.” Soon, Nikkei would have to choose between Canada and Japan.

Robertson’s 1944 memo formed the basis of Prime Minister King’s speech in the House of Commons on 4 August 1944. This speech outlined his government’s policy and accelerated the process by which Nikkei would leave Canada for Japan. Despite clearly stating that, “no person of Japanese race born in Canada has been charged with any act of sabotage or disloyalty during the years of war,” King declared that it was necessary to investigate “the background, loyalties and attitudes of all persons of Japanese race in Canada” in order to determine which Nikkei would be allowed to stay in Canada, and which must leave. King added that the commission responsible for this undertaking would then compile a list of “disloyal” Japanese nationals, Naturalized Issei, or Canadian-born British subjects. King’s intention was to have these “disloyal” Nikkei “deported to Japan as soon as that is physically possible.” The New Canadian referred to this policy as “another, if inevitable, event in a historical series which has revealed the current of anti-Oriental prejudice in Canada.” The paper’s editors, while acknowledging that this policy is being undertaken on “a strict racial basis,” pleaded for Nikkei to cooperate by stating that, “it will be sensible and patriotic for us to accept and cooperate in the situation with good grace.”

In the fall of 1944, the Commissioner of Japanese Placement, George Collins informed Robertson that the R.C.M.P “have record of 3,275 Japanese persons who have declared their desire to go to Japan.” He also believed that up to 10,000 Nikkei would

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34 Ibid., 97.
36 “Mr. King’s Policy” New Canadian, 12 August 1944.
leave Canada “if they were encouraged to do so by the publication of definite and
generous terms on the basis of which they would be assisted to leave Canada.” Robertson
advised the Prime Minister that, “if these declarations could be secured at an early date
the work of the Commission would be simplified and we would be on the way to
achieving a desirable reduction of the Japanese population.”

Mackenzie King’s 4 August 1944 speech directly influenced the “Voluntary
Repatriation Survey,” which required all Nikkei over the age of sixteen to decide whether
to live either east of the Rockies, or go to Japan. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police
conducted the survey between February and August of 1945. While providing
respondents an “illusion of choice,” it did not offer the choice most Nikkei wanted –
returning to the British Columbia coast. By dispossessing Nikkei from their homes and
property, the federal government used this survey to capitalize on discontent among
Nikkei in Canada. Federal officials, who censored all letters sent from Nikkei in B.C.
camps to their friends and family in eastern Canada also cut out “any advice to not sign
the papers” contained in letters sent to those remaining in B.C. camps. As a result, those
Nikkei in B.C. “felt very much cut off from their youngsters in the east and from any
advice they could get.”

Canadian-born (British subjects), and Naturalized Canadian Nikkei not wishing to
accept their forced transfer to eastern Canada, had no alternative but to sign a carefully
worded document prepared by the federal government stating:

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37 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 4 November 1944,
38 See Pamela Sugiman, “Unmaking a Transnational Community: Japanese Canadian Families in Wartime
Canada.” in Transnational Identities and Practices in Canada, ed. by Vic Satzewich and Lloyd Wong,
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 52-68.
39 British Columbia Archives (hereafter BCA), Winifred Awmack Interview, 21 February 1985.
I “hereby declare my desire to relinquish my British nationality and to assume the
status of a National of Japan…. Further, I request the Government of Canada… to
arrange for and effect my repatriation to Japan. I declare that I fully understand the
contents of this document, and I voluntarily affix my signature hereto.”

The federal government would later use these signatures to establish its narrative that
they were ‘disloyal’ to Canada.

Confident that the confluence of present factors would result in large numbers of
Nikkei deciding to leave Canada, the results of the survey came as no surprise. Bitterness
within the internment camps, as well as racial animosity outside of the camps, influenced
the results of the survey, and upon its completion, “morale in the camps was at an all-
time low.” In total, 10,397 respondents, almost half of the Nikkei population in Canada,
selected moving to Japan over unknown locations ‘east of the Rockies.’ These
respondents would eventually serve as the ‘disloyal’ the King government sought to
deport.

A closer examination of the statistics of the survey is quite revealing. The total
number choosing Japan reached 10,813 but that included 3,117 children, mostly
Canadian-born, under the age of fifteen who were ineligible to complete the survey. In
B.C., survey respondents from within the internment camps selected Japan at a rate of
81%, as did 34% of respondents outside internment camps in the province, whereas only
15% of those already living east of British Columbia ‘requested repatriation.’ Those
still in B.C. at the time had no choice but to move, while those already east of B.C. did

40 Supreme Court of Canada (hereafter SCC), In the Matter of a Reference as to the Validity of Orders in
Council of the 15th day of December, 1945 (P.C. 7355, 7356, and 7357), in Relation to Persons of the
Japanese Race (Supreme Court of Canada, 1946), 27.
not, which helps to explain why the proportions opting for Japan were so different. Many chose Japan due to a generally negative reaction to Nikkei settlement east of the Rockies; there was no guarantee of permanent residence there, and no indication that restrictions on travel, trade licences, or property ownership would be removed.\textsuperscript{43} Officials were well aware that such factors, especially the restrictions on property ownership in B.C., would influence decisions, and ensure the removal of Nikkei from the province. As Robertson noted “the capacity to acquire real property is closely related to the problem of assuring that the Japanese will not drift back after the war to British Columbia to re-new the pre-war concentration there.”\textsuperscript{44} Maintaining strict regulations governing property ownership rights in B.C., and Canada, worked in favour of officials bent on removing Nikkei from B.C. and Canada.

The extreme circumstances in which Nikkei were interned, and the uncertainty of their future suggests that decisions had little to do with ‘loyalty’ or ‘disloyalty.’ Rather, they were largely based on “personal circumstances, experience and psychological factors” resulting from their uprooting.\textsuperscript{45} The number of Nikkei selecting Japan was influenced by many factors, including some administrators who had informed survey respondents they would be able to revoke their selection at a later date, and was generally “inflated by misunderstandings, administrative errors and practical considerations that the federal government refused to acknowledge”\textsuperscript{46} One Nisei woman believed such a high proportion selected Japan because, “all that goes with signing that, is much more advantageous than going east,” and said that the clause which stated, “subject to

\textsuperscript{43}Adachi, \textit{The Enemy That Never Was}, 299.
\textsuperscript{44}Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 12 February 1945, \textit{DCER, 1944-1945 Part I}, 1148.
\textsuperscript{45}Adachi, \textit{The Enemy That Never Was}, 299.
relocation again after the war,” suggested another potential forced transfer, to which she exclaimed, “Oh, Lord, when will this thing ever close!” Others argued that many chose Japan because the “choice” was presented in such a way that tolerable life in Canada seemed impossible to them. Understandably, many were simply bitter at the treatment they received from the Canadian government and chose to migrate to Japan.

Some Canadians wanted to deport all Nikkei from Canada to Japan. Among the most prominent figures was B.C. Member of Parliament and Liberal Cabinet Minister, Ian Mackenzie, who repeatedly called for the removal of all Nikkei from B.C. as did Vancouver mayor Jonathan Webster Cornett. Those opposed to such discriminatory attitudes argued that rather than representing a B.C.-wide consensus, anti-Japanese sentiment was being “whipped up by political rabble-rousers or less reputable publicists,” in a similar fashion to “Hitler’s use of the Jews as a political bogey.” Additionally, the emerging awareness of the value of Canadian citizenship as well as the recognition that one objective of the war was to fight against racism, led many others to recognize that “repatriating” these Canadian citizens was not possible.

One of the most vocal supporters of Japanese Canadians was the Toronto-based Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians (CCJC). It evolved out of the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), which in 1943 began assisting with the resettlement of single Japanese Canadian women, and soon after joined with a number of other groups to assist with resettling all Nikkei in the Toronto region. Another small, and

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48 Ibid., 25.
49 Barry Broadfoot, Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame: The Story of the Japanese Canadians in World War II (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1977), 313.
50 Norman, What About the Japanese Canadians?, 15-16.
51 Roy, The Triumph of Citizenship, 125.
largely unknown group, even to the majority of Japanese Canadians, was the Nisei organization, the Japanese Canadian Committee for Democracy (JCCD), which by 1944 was prepared to speak on behalf of Nikkei in Canada, and began to do so in the spring of 1945, while the government conducted its repatriation survey.\(^{52}\) In a July 1945 meeting with members of the CCJC, Labour Minister Humphrey Mitchell made it very clear that “the government intended to follow the demands of public opinion in British Columbia in Japanese matters.” Instead of listening to pleas from civil society organizations opposed to deporting Japanese Canadians, the Canadian government moved forward plans to deport 10,000 Nikkei from Canada.\(^{53}\)

News of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima crossed the Pacific with great speed. Mackenzie King confided in his diary on the evening of 6 August 1945, the bit of solace he found upon hearing this “world shaking” news. The diary entry reads: “We now see what might have come to the British race had German scientists won the race. It is fortunate that the use of the bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather than upon the white races of Europe.”\(^{54}\) The destruction of Hiroshima, followed by the Soviet Union’s declaration of war on Japan two days later, and in rapid succession the atomic bombing of Nagasaki led Japan’s imperial headquarters, through the Emperor, to capitulate on 14 August 1945 (15 August in Japan), drawing to a close fifteen years of devastating warfare.\(^{55}\) The dramatic official surrender ceremony was held aboard the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945, and on that day all remaining restrictions

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\(^{53}\) Ibid., 120.


on Japanese Americans in the United States were lifted.\textsuperscript{56} By then, the Canadian government had received 285 requests from Nikkei to cancel their ‘repatriation requests.’\textsuperscript{57}

Wasting little time, by 17 September 1945, Mackenzie King, acting in his role of Secretary of State for External Affairs, requested that Canada’s Ambassador in the United States ask U.S. authorities to transmit a request to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur, to accept in Japan approximately 10,000 Nikkei from Canada, including roughly 500 Nikkei interned at Angler scheduled for deportation.\textsuperscript{58} On 19 September 1945, Department of Labour officials announced that those Nikkei who signed to go to Japan in the repatriation survey “will be returned to their native islands at the convenience of the Canadian and Allied Governments.” Officials added, “they’ll be sent back to Japan when it suits us to send them.”\textsuperscript{59}

On 29 October 1945, General MacArthur agreed to accept the Nikkei subject to shipping availability.\textsuperscript{60} King now had approval from SCAP, but by the end of 1945, 4,720 Nikkei, the majority of whom were Canadian-born, had applied for cancellation. However, the Canadian government was unwilling to accept any cancellation requests from Japanese Nationals, or those who did not apply to cancel their requests prior to 1 September 1945, the date of Japan’s official surrender.

To many officials in the federal government, there was no question that those Nikkei who signed to go to Japan were guilty of disloyalty. Japan was at war with

\textsuperscript{58} Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 17 September 1945, \textit{DCER, 1944-1945 Part I}, 1155.
\textsuperscript{60} Chargé d’Affaires in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 29 October 1945, \textit{DCER, 1944-1945 Part I}, 1161.
Canada when they had agreed to go to Japan, and their cancellation of repatriation requests should not even be considered. However, the government still needed a clear piece of legislation to authorize their deportation, and preferably as soon as possible. On 14 December 1945, Robertson sent the Prime Minister an urgent memorandum, in which he assured King that his statement of policy in the House of Commons in August 1944, “represented a compromise between a very vocal demand for the total expulsion of all persons of Japanese racial origin, regardless of conduct or loyalty, and the less articulate feeling in the country that flagrant racial discrimination was one of the things the war was being fought against.”\footnote{Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 4 November 1944, \textit{DCER, 1944-1945 Part I}, 1163-164.} He told King that since then, the government conducted “a voluntary poll of all persons of Japanese racial origin in Canada, which resulted in a very large proportion expressing the wish to be repatriated to Japan at the close of the war. Steps are actively under way to effect this repatriation.”\footnote{Ibid.,164.} Efforts to arrange their passage to Japan stepped up following Japan’s surrender, however ongoing bureaucratic negotiations and shipping limitations delayed their deportation. That thousands now wished to remain in Canada and rebuild their lives rather than eke out an existence among the ruins of postwar Japan, mattered little to powerful politicians within a government aiming to legislate mass deportation. To facilitate this deportation, on 17 December 1945, Orders in Council P.C. 7355, 7356, and 7357 were tabled in Parliament.\footnote{For these complete Orders-in-Council see also \textit{DCER, 1944-1945 Part I}, 1165-1171.}

Order in Council P.C. 7355 outlined four categories of Nikkei subject to deportation, including:
i) Japanese Nationals who had requested repatriation or who remained in Internment [in Angler] on 1 September 1945.

ii) Naturalized Canadian citizens who requested repatriation and did not revoke their requests in writing before midnight on 1 September 1945.

iii) Canadian-born Japanese sixteen years of age or over who had requested repatriation, if such persons had not revoked their requests in writing before the issuance of an Order for their deportation.

iv) The wife and children (under sixteen years of age) of any person in the above categories for whom the Minister of Labour made an Order for Deportation.

Order in Council P.C. 7355 included provisions to take their funds, subject to currency exchange arrangements, and personal property with them to Japan. It also stated that all transport costs would be covered by the federal government, and guaranteed that each person would leave with a minimum of $200 per adult and $50 per child at the time of departure from Canada.

Order in Council P.C. 7356 declared that any naturalized person deported (under the conditions of P.C. 7355) would cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian national. Finally, Order in Council P.C. 7357 authorized the establishment of a Commission to investigate the cases of Japanese Nationals and Naturalized Canadians, whose behaviour during the war cast doubt upon their loyalty to Canada.64 These Orders contained all the key elements of Robertson’s 1943 memo. The three Orders permitted the Canadian government to deport some 10,000 Nikkei from Canada and strip them of their Canadian citizenship. A commission would further determine whether Japanese

Nationals and Naturalized Canadians remaining in Canada were ‘loyal’ enough to remain in Canada, or ‘disloyal’ enough to be deported.

**Resistance Grows**

The Orders-in-Council caused a public uproar, and proponents from all directions sought to affect the fate of those facing deportation.\(^\text{65}\) Unlike 1942, it appeared Nikkei in Canada “had friends this time around.”\(^\text{66}\) Robertson’s critics, for example, were shocked that he advocated the deportation of innocent Nikkei and found it “appalling that he did not fight for the principle at stake.”\(^\text{67}\) Additionally, while King and his Cabinet were well aware that the twenty-eight CCF Members of Parliament posed a significant obstacle to the Liberal agenda of removing Nikkei from B.C. and Canada, the growing pro-Japanese Canadian lobby seemed to have taken the government by surprise. By 1944, the CCJC and its Nisei advisors acknowledged that the resettlement of Nikkei outside of B.C. necessitated a much more extensive program than existed, and that resettlement must take place immediately in order to “counteract the debilitating influences of the detention camps,” which included the “dominance of Japanese language and customs…, the presence of the pro-Japan patriots, the isolation of Japanese Canadians from interaction with non-Japanese and the growing poverty and apathy of both Issei and Nisei inmates,” all of which, “greatly disturbed them.”\(^\text{68}\) In late May 1945, the JCCD, along with

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\(^{65}\) For an overview of opposition to deporting Nikkei from Canada and the U.S. see Bangarth, *Voices Raised in Protest*, on challenging Canada’s deportation orders see also Sunahara, *Politics of Racism*, 117-131.


representatives of twenty Caucasian organizations, officially joined the CCJC, which soon grew to include representatives from over thirty organizations including churches, labour unions, the National Council of Women, and the Canadian Jewish Congress, with the purpose of challenging the federal government’s deportation programme.\(^69\) Japanese Canadians were not fully united under the JCCD, however, as “groups in Manitoba and Quebec disassociated themselves from its position.”\(^70\) For such groups opposing the deportation orders, the Charter of the recently formed United Nations provided reassurance their cause was just within international diplomacy. Of particular importance was the declaration of Article 1.3 of the Charter, that the new international body would promote and encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Based mainly on “racial” criterion, federal policy toward Nikkei in Canada would soon be challenged by a growing lobby of civic organizations.

The JCCD, CCJC, and the Vancouver Consultative Council,\(^71\) which was comprised of various religious, humanitarian, cultural and political groups, along with the major churches, began an intensive publicity campaign.\(^72\) The CCJC aimed to demonstrate that not all Canadians were anti-Japanese, and that the government’s wartime treatment of Japanese Canadians disturbed many. By circulating petitions deploiring the repatriation survey, and the numerous restrictions placed on Japanese Canadians, including restrictions on buying property, this massive public education

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\(^71\) The Vancouver Consultative Council indicated that its special function was “the serious and continuous study of problems of citizenship arising from or influenced by wartime conditions.” See their pamphlet by Norman and The Consultative Council, *What About the Japanese Canadians?*, 3.
\(^72\) Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was*, 304.
campaign, funneled through similar organizations across Canada and local media, included the distribution of 50,000 CCJC pamphlet’s titled, *From Citizens to Refugees – It’s Happening Here!* For its part, the JCCD worked to organize Nikkei within internment camps and the Prairies through previously established Nikkei committees, and began collecting sworn statements from unwilling signers, detailing their reasons for originally selecting Japan on the repatriation survey.” In the pamphlet, *What About the Japanese Canadians?*, the Vancouver Consultative Council argued that in Canada, “we have stumbled, maybe unwittingly, the first step towards Nazism… Canadian citizens by law can be deprived of certain legal rights on the grounds of race. This is one of the cardinal points of Nazism.”

The federal government’s position changed very little during the fall of 1945, and the CCJC had expected the worst. So when Orders-in-Council P.C. 7355, 7356, and 7357 were tabled in parliament on 17 December 1945, the CCJC was not surprised. CCF Members of Parliament, however, were outraged by the Orders-in-Council. Allistair Stewart (CCF M.P. from Winnipeg North), for example, clashed strongly with Mackenzie King in the House of Commons after the Orders-in-Council provided Labour Minister Mitchell the authority to deport these Nikkei. Stewart argued that because these matters were of “fundamental importance to democracy,” and since the Prime Minister and the committee knew that they have “been exciting interest all over this country,” bringing these matters to the House of Commons “on almost the last day of the session is not fair to parliament.”

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73 Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism*, 119
75 Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism*, 120.
Stewart also alleged that coercion was involved in obtaining signatures of Nikkei indicating their desire to go to Japan, explaining that, “coercion is not a matter of sticks or bludgeons or clubs… there is more than one kind of coercion.” He also boldly stated that, “the policy which is to be carried out as regards these Japanese Canadians certainly is not Liberal… the democratic principles which the Liberal government are supposed to hold are being shamefully violated,” and added, “I regard this policy as a direct negation of Liberalism and of decent, elemental, fundamental democracy.” Stewart added that, “in carrying through this policy, in deporting these Canadian citizens of Japanese origin, the Liberal Government has merely proven itself to be what many of us have long suspected, an organized hypocrisy.” King took immediate offence and asked Stewart to withdraw his statement. Stewart retorted, “I will withdraw the words if I am out of order. I should have said the Liberal Party.” Labour Minister Mitchell, for example, quipped that those signing to go to Japan, “had backed the wrong horse; that is all.” When Stewart drew the attention of the House of Commons to Mackenzie’s argument for re-election to parliament in 1944; “No Japanese from the Rockies to the sea,” Mackenzie responded, “take them into Manitoba, if you want them.”

The Nikkei themselves also protested against “repatriation.” In one of many petitions to Prime Minister King, on 2 January 1946, a group in Alberta wishing to escape deportation pleaded: “we did not consider the signing of "repatriation forms" was to be used as an evidence of our disloyalty.” The petitioners added that they were “loyal, law abiding, and always had co-operated with the Government within reason,” and

76 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 17 December 1945, p. 3701-3702.
78 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 17 December 1945, p. 3703.
believed that their “loyalty to Canada should not be questioned.” They strongly protested that the government had deemed them disloyal because they had “signed "repatriation forms,‘” and requested the government reconsider its stand to deport them from Canada so that they “may enjoy the privileges of Canadian citizenship and to exercise a useful contribution to the progress and well-being of the Nation.” Their fate was to cause much debate across the nation.

The CCJC responded quickly and issued a writ claiming Orders in Council P.C. 7355, 7356, and 7357, authorizing deportation were ultra vires (beyond the powers of government) and invalid on a number of grounds including habeas corpus (unlawful detention). A writ of habeas corpus demands that a detained individual’s case must be heard in court so as to determine the validity of their detention. The court would then determine whether or not the individuals concerned would be deported. The federal government sought to make the work of the anti-deportation lobby very difficult by first denying, then restricting the entry into the camps of anyone attempting to assist Nikkei facing deportation. Robert J. MacMaster, counsel for Vancouver’s Consultative Council, however, asserted that Canada’s War Measures Act, “permitted detention without recourse to the courts only during time of war.” Since the war was over, the detention of potential deportees could be challenged in the courts by a writ of habeas corpus. Since individual court proceedings would delay their departure and disrupt the entire deportation program, the federal government agreed to negotiate with the CCJC. In a meeting with Justice Minister Louis St. Laurent on 4 January 1946, Andrew Brewin, the

80 Bangarth, Voices Raised in Protest, 174-182.
CCJC’s lawyer, argued that the deportation orders were not only unconstitutional, but also “contrary to international law,” and “had recently been declared a war crime by the newly formed United Nations.” As such, Brewin requested that the Orders-in-Council be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for a decision.\(^81\) On 8 January 1946, the federal government referred to the Supreme Court for hearing and decision: “Are the Orders in Council, dated 15\(^{th}\) day of December, 1945, being P.C. 7355, 7356, and 7357, *ultra vires* of the Governor in Council either in whole or in part and, if so, in what particular or particulars and to what extent?"\(^82\)

The CCJC, parliament, and the public had to wait six weeks for the Supreme Court’s decision. In the meantime, the anti-deportation lobby maintained its publicity and education campaign. At a gathering of six-hundred individuals in a Toronto church on 10 January 1946, jointly sponsored by the Civic Liberties Association of Toronto and the CCJC, representatives from the Church, and members of the Senate united with CCJC chairman B.K. Sandwell in calling for a “united protest against "a particularly flagrant denial of justice."” Rabbi A. Feinberg, spoke on behalf of the “whole Jewish community in Toronto,” and declared that he was there representing “six million Jews who have been slaughtered in Europe for no other reason than they were Jews.” Feinberg added that the Orders-in-Council embodied “the spirit of the things for which Hitler stood,” and would “punish children for crimes they could not have known... If Canada permits this wrong to be inflicted,” he argued, “it will by this little step have forsaken God.”\(^83\) Senator Roebuck invoked the recently enshrined United Nations Charter and declared that “it is most important that we in Canada keep ourselves free from the hateful Nazi doctrine of

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racialism, for in this country we are all minorities. Discrimination against one group is a precedent for use against other groups.”

Senator Cairine Wilson, the first woman appointed to the Canadian Senate, also told the crowd that “Canada had no right to criticize the action of any other nation if it is about to violate the principles of the Atlantic Charter,” at a time when “the United Nations Organization meetings are inaugurated in London.” Wilson added, “We talk casually about the millions of displaced persons… Why should Canada add to this?... If this injustice is carried out, it will leave a blot on our escutcheon which will take many years to efface.”

In late January 1946, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the case, with Andrew Brewin (supported by the Attorney General of the province of Saskatchewan), and J.R Cartwright, arguing against the deportation orders. The CCJC argued on several points that the Orders-in-Council were ultra vires. Among them they argued that the term "deportation" could only refer to "the forcible removal of aliens," and could not apply to Nisei or naturalized Japanese Canadians, as the definition did not encompass “the exile or banishment of a citizen to an alien country.” The CCJC also argued that habeas corpus expressly forbade the banishment of subjects by any other reason than conviction of felony, and that “the banishment of nationals, particularly on racial grounds, is contrary to the accepted principles of International Law.”

On behalf of the federal government, the Attorney-General of Canada Louis St. Laurent (supported by the Attorney General of B.C.), argued that the government could legally deport both aliens and citizens, and strip

those deported of their Canadian status, and that the authority of the Cabinet under the War Measures Act was “not subject to review in a court.”

During this time, Canadian officials were caught in a tangle of international diplomatic negotiations with American officials, including the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers in Japan over the deportation and reception of Nikkei from Canada in Japan. Among the matters of discussion included property and the transfer of money belonging to Nikkei. Amidst the correspondence negotiating this matter, Canada’s Deputy Minister of Labour worried that “unless we can get immediate satisfactory action on this matter, our whole repatriation programme may fall through.” Robertson agreed and added, “the entire programme for movement, even of those Japanese who are anxious to go of their own volition, has to be completely held up until this question can be settled.”

On 20 February 1946, Canada’s Supreme Court justices unanimously held the Orders to deport aliens and naturalized Japanese Canadians to be intra vires (within the powers of government, and therefore legal). However, they split 5-2 in favour of deporting some Nisei, and 4-3 against authorizing the deportation of the wives and children (under sixteen years of age) of any person the Minister of Labour made an Order for deportation. This ruling meant that the Canadian government could legally deport

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89 Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Ambassador in the Unites States, 8 February 1946, *DCER, 1946*, 326.
90 Ibid., 327.
6,844 adults although their 3,500 dependants could stay in Canada. Federal officials soon communicated to King that this ruling “might become a very real obstacle in the way of any effective deportation proceedings.”

The Supreme Court’s decision to approve the deportation of naturalized Canadians was upsetting to many challenging the deportation orders. Thomas Clement "Tommy" Douglas, the CCF premier of Saskatchewan, said of the ruling, “This is very disappointing…I think the long-term effect on every Canadian will be very bad… If upheld it establishes an unfortunate precedent for the country… In effect this nullifies the provisions for Canadian citizenship just laid down… If this can be done to naturalized Japanese-Canadians, it can be done to any group in Canada. No one is secure in his citizenship.” Douglas added “It is reported 5,000,000 people are doomed to die in Japan from starvation this year, and here we are sending more people back there.” Charles Millard, director of the United Steelworkers of America, stated: “If Ottawa goes through with its policy, obviously based on racial discrimination, we can only wonder whether Hitlerism really was defeated.” Editor for The New Canadian, Kasey Oyama explained that “habeas corpus proceedings would be taken in respect to individual Japanese Canadians involved,” if necessary. Oyama also explained that while Nikkei facing deportation “made the request to be sent to Japan during the war… it is important to understand the circumstances under which that request was made.” At the time of the Supreme Court’s ruling, 1,370 individuals had instructed their legal counsel to apply for

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92 Bangarth, Voices Raised in Protest, 178.
93 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, February 27, 1946, DCER, 1946, 328.
95 “May Try Habeas Corpus For Every Jap-Canadian” Toronto Daily Star, 21 February 1946.
97 “May Try Habeas Corpus For Every Jap-Canadian” Toronto Daily Star, 21 February 1946.
habeas corpus, and evidence had been collected to illustrate that they had all signed to go to Japan as a result of “misrepresentation” or “coercion.” If these Orders-in-Council were put into effect, for example, the family of Mickey Nobuto, one of sixteen Japanese Canadian soldiers serving with the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in the Far East, would be deported to Japan because they did not think they could support themselves in eastern Canada.

While the anti-deportation lobby grew in numbers and volume, some Canadians continued to conflate Japanese Canadians and the military expansionism of Japan’s Imperial armed forces. At another public meeting in Toronto, under the auspices of the CCJC on February 24, 1946, one former Canadian Prisoner of War spoke out against defending the rights of Japanese Canadians stating, “If you had been a prisoner of war for four years you would think otherwise. We should sweep them all out of the country. They are subnormal beings.” While this veteran was respectfully allowed to voice his opinion, his view was in the minority at such public gatherings in Toronto. At that same meeting Brewin told the large crowd, “I hope the Government will recoil from the assumption of guilt against children who are innocent of everything but of being of the Japanese race.” Brewin believed the agitation for deportation resulted from “racial prejudice and political expediency,” and that many of those originally signing to go to Japan, were coerced to do so. He argued that privileges were offered to those who signed to go to Japan, and threats of withholding privileges for those who did not. He also argued that respondents were told they could revoke their decisions at anytime and added: “I am not suggesting there was force or violence, but there were certain inducements.” Additionally, he declared that

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99 “May Try Habeas Corpus For Every Jap-Canadian” *Toronto Daily Star*, 21 February 1946.
the Orders-in-Council were wrong “because they provided for punishment without cause, were based on racial prejudice, were against international rules of law, impugned the value of Canadian citizenship, and represented a threat to every minority group in Canada.” Brewin concluded that, “we must call on the Government to withdraw from a position which could leave only a blot on the reputation of our country. Rev. Hugh MacMillan also proclaimed that deportation was “a Nazi-like threat to Canadian democracy, planned at a time when Canadian men and women are returning from fighting that sort of thing” overseas.\footnote{“Former Captive Raises Lone Voice on Jap Issue” \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 25 February 1946.}

While federal officials were already negotiating with American officials on how the Nikkei would leave Canada, they anticipated further legal challenges to their deportation orders in reaction to the Supreme Court’s ruling. External Affairs dispatched a confidential telegram to the Ambassador in the United States, indicating that it was “probable” that the CCJC would appeal to the Privy Council. Illustrating the anxiety of the Federal government, the telegram stated:

In these circumstances, this may mean that only those Japanese who are genuine volunteers may be moved in the near future – possibly along with certain Japanese Nationals. The government is very anxious, however, to have any Japanese who wish to leave Canada do so at as early a date as can be arranged.\footnote{Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Ambassador in the United States, 2 March 1946, \textit{DCER}, 1946, 332.}

The CCJC did appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Canadian government, recognizing that it would be “useless to attempt to carry forward the movement of any other than voluntary repatriates as long as the decision remained at
present,”102 suspended all deportation orders pending the Privy Council’s decision. Nonetheless, as federal officials were “very anxious” to remove Nikkei from the country, after they completed arrangements with American officials and SCAP, the Canadian government announced on 13 March 1946, that any Nikkei wishing to go to Japan under the terms of 7355,103 which included the financial incentive of $200 per adult and $50 per child, could now do so at the expense of the Dominion government.104 A total of 3,964 Nikkei eventually accepted this offer of free passage to Japan with financial compensation. The government encouraged Nikkei to leave Canada by restricting their rights and providing incentives to leave, and while the deportation orders were still under review by the Privy Council, and the Canadian government continued to receive ‘repatriation cancellation requests,’ it did not accept them.105

Certain elements within the federal government, like M.P. Ian Mackenzie, who referred to the anti-deportation work of the CCJC as ““frothy idealism” by persons unable to face "hard realities,””106 and Minister of Labor Humphrey Mitchell,107 remained determined to facilitate mass deportation from Canada. Despite their best efforts, the outpouring of support for Nikkei in Canada helped begin to turn the tide among policy makers away from mass deportation. In a meeting with representatives of the CCJC on 26 March 1946, for example, King publicly scolded Humphrey Mitchell for calling Japanese Canadians “yellow bastards,” and by April 1946, the federal Cabinet was deeply divided.

102 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 February 1946, DCER, 1946, 329.
103 See Appendix 1.
105 Officials received a total of 6,313 by 1 April 1946. Ibid., 13.
107 Sunahara, The Politics of Racism, 123.
However, by that time, the lack of movement of Nikkei from Canada to Japan was “proving a source of embarrassment” for federal officials.\textsuperscript{108}

The Attorney General for B.C., Gordon Wismer, made his position clear on the deportation orders to Ian Mackenzie, on 6 May 1946 when he stated that, “from the standpoint of British Columbia, the position is most unsatisfactory.” He believed the question before the Privy Council was “largely academic,” there was “a danger that, …the whole of the Orders-in-Council, may be held to be ultra vires.” He then stated that acting on behalf of British Columbia,

I feel that it would be most unfortunate if this situation were permitted to continue, and I would urge that steps be taken to bring this whole matter before Parliament, with a view to passing legislation clearly authorizing the Government to carry its announced policy into effect.

Fearful of a sudden increase in Nikkei wishing to return to B.C., Wismer stated, “if the Privy Council appeal succeeds, then their numbers would be augmented by all Japanese in Canada who wished to go there. This would create a most serious situation in our Province.”\textsuperscript{109} Thomas Reid presented to the House of Commons a petition from the Japanese Repatriation League stating its unalterable opposition to Japanese in British Columbia and proposed that no Nikkei should reside in B.C, and that all Nikkei, who not permanently settled east of the Rockies be shipped to Japan or any possible territory in the Pacific ocean.\textsuperscript{110} Reid stated that this was just one of many such petitions coming from B.C.

\textsuperscript{108} Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 25 April 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 343.
\textsuperscript{110} Canada, House of Commons, \textit{Debates}, 4 June 1946, 2153.
Deportations Approved

By the time the Privy Council in London announced its ruling on Canada’s deportation orders on 2 December 1946, close to 3700 Nikkei had already departed. The Privy Council unanimously held the three Orders-in-Council *intra vires* under Canada’s War Measures Act, and therefore legal.\(^{111}\) However, by that time in Canada, the strength of public opposition to the deportation policy had made the Orders-in-Council quite unpopular for the King government.\(^{112}\) Shortly thereafter, on 24 January 1947, Prime Minister King announced:

> Under the provisions for assisted movement from Canada which the government put into effect, the separation of those whose continued presence would be undesirable in Canada has been accomplished on a voluntary basis. Nearly 4,000 persons of Japanese origin have now left Canada and returned to Japan. Among those were the Japanese whose deportation would have been necessary had they not gone voluntarily.\(^{113}\)

Canada’s federal government claimed responsibility for removing the “undesirable,” who left “on a voluntary basis,” along with those who would have been forcefully deported, had they resisted and tried to remain in Canada.

It is difficult to determine just how voluntarily this departure actually was, as it is also necessary to consider how earnestly federal officials sought to make life in Canada less appealing than in Japan. That Pacific island nation had been thoroughly decimated by American bombing during the Pacific War, and was from 1945 to 1952, occupied by the

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U.S. under the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers and General Douglas MacArthur. The immediate postwar period in Japan was filled with uncertainty and hardships, as millions had been made homeless, unemployment was widespread, and inflation, rampant. For those 3,964 Nikkei arriving from Canada, very little could have prepared them for the hardships to come. What happened to them in Japan?
Chapter 3: The Exile to Occupied Japan, 1946-1952

On 17 December 1945, the Canadian government tabled Orders in Council P.C. 7355, 7356, and 7357 in Parliament.¹ These Orders allowed it to deport approximately 10,000 Nikkei, or about 45% of the Nikkei population of Canada, revoke the citizenship of those deported, and to establish a commission to investigate the loyalties of any Japanese Nationals and Naturalized Canadians as deemed necessary by officials.² Following an extensive legal battle, both the Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, then the highest court of appeal for Canadian constitutional cases, upheld the validity of the deportation orders. Nevertheless, responding to a well-organized public outcry against the mass deportation the government withdrew the orders, however, not before almost 4,000 Nikkei departed Canada for Japan between May and December 1946. As far as Canada’s government was concerned, those departing for Japan did so as part of their ‘Voluntary Repatriation’ program, and as a result of their departure, were deemed ‘disloyal’ to Canada by the federal government, which revoked their Canadian citizenship upon departure. What motivated them to go? The experiences of those 3,964 Nikkei in a devastated, defeated and subsequently occupied Japan have not yet been systematically studied. Understanding their exile experience requires an understanding of who they were. Accounts from exiles in occupied Japan vary though, despite the difficulty, many expressed a hope of returning to Canada. Their descriptions of life in occupied Japan also

¹ See Appendix I.
provide unique insights into conditions of post-war Japan. Their journey, which brought them into the chaotic world of a defeated former imperial nation, began as they left Vancouver’s Immigration building, on the harbour front, and boarded their respective transport ships.

Table 1. Departure of Exiles from Vancouver to Uraga, Tokyo Bay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Embarkation Date</th>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Nikkei on Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 31, 1946</td>
<td>S.S. Marine Angel</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16, 1946</td>
<td>S.S. General Meigs</td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2, 1946</td>
<td>S.S. General Meigs</td>
<td>1,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2, 1946</td>
<td>S.S. Marine Falcon</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 24, 1946</td>
<td>S.S. Marine Falcon</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


_The New Canadian_ reported that the ‘repatriates’ fell into several categories: those leaving due to family obligation; elder Nikkei wishing to retire in Japan; and those who, discouraged by their treatment, saw no future in Canada. Many of those leaving accepted the repatriation offer as “an easy way out of their hardship.” However, the Nisei were reluctant to leave the country of their birth, but had little personal choice in the matter.³ La Violette believed they were reluctant to go because they were “highly Canadianized and will find it difficult to change habits of food, dress, thinking, and recreation.”⁴ Nonetheless, Nisei May Inata explained that “as was custom in traditional Japanese families, our father made all the major decisions for us.” Inata would “never forget the

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³ “The Repatriates Leave” _New Canadian_, 1 June 1946.
⁴ La Violette also provides a very thorough quantitative analysis of those Nikkei who left Canada in 1946, including ages and occupations, Forrest E. La Violette, _The Canadian Japanese and World War II: A Sociological and Psychological Account_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948), 272-273.
hopeless, disconsolate foreboding” she felt when she “reluctantly signed for ‘repatriation.’” Feeling no particular emotional attachment to the country she had never seen, she explains that, “to me, Japan was some unknown far-off foreign country where I happened to have a brother – a stranger to me, because I had only been three years old when we parted.”

Regarding the “painful decision” of where to move, Nisei Yoshimi Susan Maikawa remembered that, “although Mama firmly believed that it was wiser to remain in Canada because she thought the reckless war had brought great destruction to Japan, the final decision was Papa’s to go to Japan. The final decision to go to Japan “was Papa’s,” is often expressed by those exiled Nisei, as many Issei practiced customs brought from Japan, including patriarchal social customs. This custom was the norm in Nikkei families, as was also generally the case in Canadian society.

Not all Nisei in Canada accepted their banishment to Japan. While the Privy Council reviewed Canada’s deportation orders, and prior to any sailings to Japan, the Slocan Valley Nisei Organisation petitioned the federal government asserting that “many Canadian-born of Japanese extraction of 16 years and upward who will be compelled to go to Japan by parental obligation… wish to return to Canada immediately [after] their parents are placed in reliable hands.” They hoped the federal government would allow them to maintain their Canadian citizenship. Two months later, they repeated their request and specifically asked “for an issuance of a passport or a certification of re-entrance into Canada within a reasonable time” and added, “We further request that this

6 Yoshimi Susan Maikawa, Ba-chan’s Story: Thoughts and recollections of a Japanese-Canadian Growing up in Canada (Yoshimi Susan Maikawa, 2002), 7.
7 Michiko Midge Ayukawa, Hiroshima Immigrants in Canada, 1891-1941 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 98.
8 “Let Repatriate Children Retain Citizenship Slocan Niseis Plead” New Canadian, 23 March 1946.
application be considered and granted immediately."9 The Slocan Valley Nisei did not receive a positive response prior to their sailings, and upon leaving Canada, relinquished their rights as Canadian-born citizens. However, their efforts to organize and petition the federal government to recognise them as Canadian illustrate how they were losing their birth rights against their wills. As the June 1946 petition claims, “unavoidable family reasons” forced these Nisei to go to Japan.

Among the Issei, and some Nisei, the most important reason for leaving was “family obligation” and reunification with family in Japan with whom they had had little or no contact since the war began.10 La Violette also claims that motives for leaving for Japan ranged from “a dominant wish to die in Japan to the feeling of rebelliousness against the Canadian Government;” “informants available at one of the sailings” most frequently cited “age and family wishes” as their motives.11 In one case, Hideo Kokubo’s daughter was in Japan with her grandparents when the war broke out and he had no way to know if she, or any other relatives were even still alive at war’s end, so he and his wife decided to leave Canada to reunite their family in Japan.12 Kokubo was interned at Angler, Ontario, after protesting the separation of Nikkei families, while the rest of his family had been interned at Slocan.13 Just prior to their embarkation from Vancouver, they met again after four years of separation. Kokubo and his family sailed aboard the

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9 Cited in “Accompanying Parents to Japan; Seek Right to Return” New Canadian, 8 June 1946.
10 “The Repatriates Leave” New Canadian, 1 June 1946.
S.S. General Meigs, on 16 June 1946.\textsuperscript{14} Other Issei were married to women in Japan, whom they hadn’t seen for years,\textsuperscript{15} while others wished to see their parents in Japan, if indeed they were still alive.\textsuperscript{16}

Another group of older departees expected that starting over outside of B.C would be more difficult than resuming their lives in Japan.\textsuperscript{17} For example, Sahei Kato, a Naturalized Canadian Issei living in Vancouver, owned a shoe store on Powell Street until the government confiscated it, as well as his family’s home on Cordova Street. Kato’s daughter Irene (later Irene Tsuyuki) observed that, “everything that my father had managed to build up since coming to Canada around 1907, while still a teenager, was taken overnight and [he] was stripped of his property, his livelihood, but most of all his pride and faith in [Canada]... He felt betrayed by his country.”\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, he had been in poor health since before the war. Irene believes that with their poor health and the betrayal of their own government, both her parents felt they had no choice but to go to Japan.\textsuperscript{19} Marie Kawamoto (later Katsuno)’s family went to Japan because she was an only child, her parents were elderly, and her father, who “wanted to see his birthplace once again,” believed he would likely have “little difficulty settling in his native Fukui prefecture where over the years he had sent money to build a home for the family.” Kawamoto and her mother agreed to support her elderly father in his wish to see Japan once more. She explains that her “earlier frustrations” with having to leave Canada,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Marlatt1} Marlatt, 	extit{Steveston Recollected}, 70.
\bibitem{Ward} Peter W. Ward, 	extit{The Japanese in Canada} (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1982), 15.
\bibitem{IWantToReturnToCanada} “I Want to Return to Canada” 	extit{New Canadian}, 24 December 1949.
\bibitem{RepatriatesLeave} “The Repatriates Leave” 	extit{New Canadian}, 1 June 1946.
\bibitem{NationalNikkeiMuseum} National Nikkei Museum & Heritage Centre Archives (hereafter NNMA), 	extit{Transcript of Homecoming ’92 Panel Discussion}, Irene Tsuyuki (Tetsuko Kato), File. IF 95/121.1.016. See also 	extit{Ohanashi: The Story of our Elders, Irene Tsuyuki}. Vancouver: National Nikkei Museum and Heritage Centre, 2008.
\end{thebibliography}
“turned into a feeling of adventure.” As an eleven year old Nisei, Chizuru Marge Ikebe (later Yamori) had little say in her parent’s decision, but explains that since her mother had been weakened by heart disease, and with four daughters (aged 16 to 3) to support, her father felt that with no knowledge of eastern Canada, nor any employment guarantees, returning to his family property in Japan would be easier.\(^{20}\)

Another small group, including some of those interned in Ontario, also saw no future in Canada.\(^{21}\) Internment camps in Ontario were akin to Prisoner of War camps and were enclosed by high walls and barbed wire, with armed military guards in watchtowers constantly keeping the internees under surveillance.\(^{22}\) At Petawawa, almost three hundred Nikkei men were interned before being moved to Angler, on the north shore of Lake Superior, where over 720 Nikkei were interned at its peak.\(^{23}\) Of the 425 men still interned at Angler at war’s end, 170 individuals (roughly 4.3 percent of all exiles),\(^{24}\) a “considerable proportion,” “repatriated to Japan on a voluntary basis.”\(^{25}\) Many of those interned at Angler were Nisei who had protested the separation of all able-bodied Nikkei males over eighteen, from their families and forcing them to work on road construction camps. Another fifty-seven (1.4 percent of all exiles)\(^ {26}\) at Angler who refused to declare where they wanted to live after their release from internment were transported to a Moose

\(^{21}\) “The Repatriates Leave” *New Canadian*, 1 June 1946.
\(^{24}\) Figure is from Okazaki, *The Nisei Mass Evacuation Group and P.O.W. Camp ‘101’, Angler*, 122.
\(^{26}\) The New Canadian provided a list of the names of all fifty-seven of these Individuals. “List of Repatriated Interness” *New Canadian*, 5 April 1947.
Jaw hostel before going to Japan on the third and fourth ‘repatriation ships.’ Former Nanaimo Nisei Yuki Haru Mizuyabu was interned in B.C. Bitter toward the Canadian government, he decided to go to Japan when he was seventeen years old. He was “thoroughly disgusted” with Canada and had vowed never to return, after, as he says, “my teenage life was all in internment … it didn’t take much prodding for me to go to Japan… [because] my parents lost everything.”

After learning of conditions of Japan, many attempted to negotiate with the government more favourable terms prior to their departure. One group expressed their concern to T.B. Pickersgill, Commissioner of Japanese Placement, of potential currency exchange losses. Upon reading the 24 January 1946 issue of the Japanese American newspaper Rocky Shimpo, they learned that the instability of the Japanese Yen and rampant inflation in Japan would result in an unfavourable conversion from Canadian funds into Yen. They asked that their currency be converted into American dollars, rather than into Yen receipts since the rate of 15 Yen to the American dollar was causing even American soldiers to face sacrifices due to inflation, and informed him that presently in Japan “the value of perishable food is twenty times the normal value.” Another such group requested a minimum of $500 per adult and $200 per child and pleaded for adequate compensation from the Government for their property “sold by the Custodian at unfair prices and also financial loss suffered from evacuation.”

28 NNMA, Irene Tsuyuki (Tetsuko Kato), File. IF 95/121.1.016
29 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Department of Labour (hereafter DOL), RG36/27, 19/634. Kamloops Repats Committee to T.B. Pickersgill, 16 February 1946.
The following month, another group wrote to Minister of Labour Mitchell informing him that through The New Canadian and other news sources, they had learned of the hardships and inflation in Japan and therefore wanted their financial compensation to be increased to $520 per adult and $100 per child upon their departure. They argued among other reasons: the widespread destruction and homelessness in Japan would make it difficult to find accommodation and employment, and “disastrous inflation” would mean, “the present allowance of $200 from Government of Canada will not last a month.” The petition concluded by requesting a guarantee for Canadian-born children sixteen years and under “being repatriated with their parents without being able to stress their desire to remain in Canada,” maintain “their rights and privilege to return to Canada at any future date.”\(^{31}\) Their pleas fell on deaf ears.

By the time of the final sailing, The New Canadian warned potential repatriates of difficulties in Japan and stated that while the “the voluntary repatriation plans appeared simple and clear-cut enough on its surface,” a “considerable number… feel more or less obliged to go to Japan against their true desire.” The same article reported that “a number of destitute or near-destitute evacuee families [who] have been repatriated to Japan, or have requested and are awaiting repatriation,” believe that re-establishing themselves in Canada was “hopeless,” and hoped that their remaining relatives in Japan could assist them. The New Canadian suggested this was simply a “case of choosing the lesser of two evils,” based on faulty reasoning and “if acted upon will almost certainly bring disastrous results.”\(^{32}\) For destitute individuals and families, the lure of financial compensation for all willing expatriates, as well as free passage was an offer they couldn’t refuse. Susan


\(^{32}\) “The Reluctant Repatriates” New Canadian, 12 October 1946.
Maikawa recalls that no remaining savings, no house, no job, and limited employment opportunities made her family’s future in Canada look “rather bleak.” The Issei generation’s pioneering hard work and all they had invested in Canada had been completely eliminated and financial incentives encouraged departures. While these 3,964 individuals contemplated leaving for Japan, Nikkei in Canada still faced restrictions on employment and property ownership and were ineligible to vote, and there was no indication that these restrictions would ever be removed, or that they would even be allowed to return to B.C. Rather than accept a future of potentially continued discrimination, Japan must have seemed like a better option for some of these individuals.

As the first Nikkei en route to Japan arrived in Vancouver from various internment camps to await embarkation, they were housed in the Immigration building on Vancouver’s waterfront for several days under the supervision of the R.C.M.P “for their protection.” Officials ensured that no one left the building, and “only outsiders with medical or legal reasons [we]re allowed to see the repatriates.” Several Vancouver citizens asked if their Nikkei friends could join them for dinner, or to spend the day together but T.B. Pickersgill replied: “It would be impossible to keep these people under

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33 Maikawa, Ba-chan’s Story: Thoughts and recollections of a Japanese-Canadian, 7.
34 Property owning restrictions date from Order-in-Council P.C. 1457, 5 February 1942, which specified that Japanese Canadians who wished to purchase or lease property, must get a permit from the Minister of Justice. Renting properties on a yearly basis was exempt from this. This OIC was amended in December 1943 to allow yearly leases on property for business purposes. Almost no permits for land purchases were granted, save for two instances where the license was granted so the land could be sold to non-Japanese. See Norman, What About the Japanese Canadians?, 10. In October 1945, control over land purchases was transferred to the Department of Labor, and in April 1947, restrictions on land purchases were relaxed considerably. On the 1942 restrictions, see also The Canada Gazette No. 211, vol. IXXV, 26 February 1942, p. 1-2.
35 “400 Persons at Vancouver Await Repatriation Vessel” New Canadian, 1 June 1946.
proper control. We don’t want to be autocratic but we feel it’s the only way we can handle it.”

Thus, they could not visit non-Japanese friends prior to embarkation.

Upon learning that these Nikkei were being confined in the Vancouver Immigration building and prevented from seeing friends in Vancouver, the Vancouver Consultative Council wrote directly to Prime Minister King complaining that departees were “being held incommunicado,” on “instructions from Ottawa.” It explained that a number of individuals wishing to see their friends prior to their departure had contacted it and it asked the government to reverse this decision and to “take such steps as may be necessary to protect the elementary human rights and privileges of these unfortunate emigrants.” Deputy Minister of Labour, Arthur MacNamara responded that “an officer is stationed at the Immigration Sheds to interview local people wishing to see Japanese, and if the circumstances are pressing or important such interviews are granted.” Furious at this response, the Vancouver Consultative Council replied that Rev. W.R. McWilliams was refused permission to see members of his congregation by Pickersgill himself, and another Christian missionary with numerous members of her Vancouver group in the sheds, was also refused permission to see them, as was a colporteur wishing to distribute Testaments in Japanese. The Vancouver Consultative Council argued that this was “closer custody than that to which we subject criminals,” and reminded MacNamara “that there have been no charges laid against these people.” Moreover, they stated, “there are a number of people in the Immigration Sheds now who have been there under these

36 “Vancouver Folk Would Wine and Dine Deportees” Vancouver Sun, 27 May 1946; and “Turns Down Requests to Fete Repatriates” New Canadian, 1 June 1946. For a discussion of popular attitudes toward Nikkei during the immediate post war period until the deportation orders were withdrawn, including politicians, the press, and civic organizations in Canada see Patricia E. Roy, The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941-67 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), Ch. 5.
circumstances for almost a month” before asking, “if nothing else, are these cases not serious breaches of religious liberty?” The same letter continues: “We submit that the civil rights of Canadian people are being violated when they, respected and responsible citizens are arbitrarily refused permission to visit or entertain other, even temporary residents of Canada.”

The deportation orders for the roughly 10,000 Nikkei who had not cancelled their repatriation requests prior to 1 September 1945, were still under review by the Privy Council, and subsequently on hold, while more than 600 Nikkei waited for the first of the so called ‘repatriation ships’ to pull into Vancouver Harbour. After being released from the Immigration building, at dusk on 31 May 1946, they began a journey across the Pacific and the chaos and destruction of occupied Japan. This first sailing quickly proved to be an unpleasant ride for the passengers, perhaps a sign of things soon to come? One Nisei wrote to a friend during the trans-Pacific journey, and described the sights as they left the city:

The boat left the dock at 10 P.M. We all stayed up on deck to see the last sight of Vancouver. The night view of the city. The Lions Gate Bridge looked very beautiful with the lights reflecting against the deep dark sea…. the ocean started to get rough after we left the [Juan de Fuca Strait]. Then gradually the passengers started to get sea sick. I was in bed myself for about a day. Now I am all well and in a very healthy condition…We will be reaching Japan on Saturday morning, so there are

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38 LAC, DOL, RG27, vol. 660, file, 23-2-17-21. Vancouver Consultative Council to A. MacNamara, 14 June 1946. The exiles were allowed to leave the Immigration building on 4-hour permits prior to later sailings. See “SS Marine Falcon Leaves on October 2 with 500 Repatriates” New Canadian, 5 October 1946.
only two more nights on the boat. I know I will miss all the friends that I made during our trip. But I hope to meet them again.39

The extensive American bombings and consequent surrender of Japan left the nation in a state of shock and for many, utter desperation. This was the first time Japan had ever been occupied by a foreign power; the sudden influx of American forces and political reforms were rapidly changing it. The Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the governing body in charge of occupying and reforming post-war Japan, calculated in 1946 that during the war the country had “lost one-third of its total wealth and from one-third to one-half of its total potential income.” Sixty-six major cities in Japan experienced heavy bombing, which destroyed 40 percent of those urban areas overall, and 30 percent of their inhabitants had become homeless. In Japan’s three largest cities, Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, 65 percent, 57 percent and 89 percent respectively of all residences had been destroyed.40 Aside from the extensive destruction, the Nikkei exiles quickly discovered that their difficulties had just begun.

Table 2. Proportion of Exiles by Nationality and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
<th>Male / Female / Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Nationals</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>54 / 49 / 51.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalized Canadians</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>61 / 51 / 56.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-Born</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>18 / 15 / 16.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


39 British Columbia Archives (hereafter BCA), Awmack, Winifred J. Collection (hereafter Awmack), Letter written while on board the SS Marine Angel, 13 June 1946.
Disembarkation and Life in Japan

In mid-June 1946, at Uraga, Tokyo Bay, on the site where in 1853 U.S. Naval officer Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived with the sole intention of opening trading relations between Japan and the United States, the port experienced another uniquely trans-Pacific historical exchange. The S.S. Marine Angel had arrived from Vancouver, after fifteen days at sea and the birth of one new passenger, to drop off more than 650 former residents of Canada. One Canadian official observing their arrival described what he saw at the Uraga Repatriation Centre. In addition to the “considerable amount of sea sickness... the majority of the younger people, especially those in their teens were obviously depressed and desirous of returning [to Canada] as soon as possible.” Since leaving Canada for Japan resulted in losing their Canadian citizenship, this would not be an option in the foreseeable future. One Nisei reported that when they first landed at Uraga the Nikkei “suffered many hardships,” and had to sort out and keep watch over their belongings for two days upon arrival.

SCAP had arranged to receive these Nikkei from Canada at the sprawling Uraga Repatriation Center, which consisted of six large camps around the Miura peninsula (at the entrance of Tokyo Bay), with a central reception point, capable of processing up to 10,000 persons per day. Japanese civilian authorities operated the centre under the command of Lt-Col Ling of the U.S. 8th Army. Between November 1945 and May 1947, it processed approximately 520,000 individuals in what was akin to “a mass production

assembly line system.” However, this repatriation centre was just one of fifteen in operation throughout Japan from 1945 to 1950. SCAP calculated that from the conclusion of the war until 1 October 1950, approximately 6.3 million individuals ‘repatriated’ to Japan from Japan’s former empire. During that same period, 1.3 million Koreans, Formosans, and “other foreign nationals” were “evacuated” from Japan. Japan thus received a net migration increase of about five million individuals by 1950, which means the exiles from Canada represented only a tiny fraction of those passing through the gates of Japan’s repatriation centres. Not only did Japan’s repatriation programme necessitate an enormous amount of Japan’s resources, the sudden influx of roughly five million mouths to feed placed an enormous strain on its reeling postwar economy. Upon arrival at Uraga, Yukiharu Mizuyabu and his family had to spend about two weeks at the filthy repatriate holding camp in Kurihama (near Uraga), during which time he could hardly eat, partially because the “only meat in the meals served there was small chunks of whale meat in a soup.”

Although “returnees from the West” were processed by the same repatriation centres, they fell into different administrative categories than those coming from former colonies. As such, they did not qualify for the same compensation and recognition as other ‘returnees.’ However, some of these “returnees from the West,” insisted that they were also “hikiagesha [repatriates].” Initially, Japan’s Repatriation Bureau did not classify the exiles from Canada as repatriates, “since they had returned voluntarily and

not as refugees,” and “whereas refugees had often fled with only the poor clothing on their backs, the Canadians had arrived ‘dressed like gentlemen’ and carrying plenty of baggage.” 48 One Nisei explained that the experience at Uraga, “really made us realize how easy life in Canada was, making us feel thankful for all the things we took so much for granted back there.” 49

Following their disembarkation, currency problems abounded for the new arrivals, as some had predicted, the money given as credit by the Canadian government was not sufficient. One Canadian official in Japan informed Ottawa that, “the rate of exchange is very inequitable and has the effect of mulcting these people of about 50-75% of their money.” 50 Occupation authorities only permitted a total of 1000 yen to be exchanged from Canadian currency, and the official exchange rate was actually less than one-third the dollar value in local markets. 51 So after losing their property in Canada, and receiving payment for just a fraction of its actual value, the exiles lost an additional two-thirds of their money in Japan. A Canadian diplomat explained to the Department of National Defence in 1946 that, “Canadian funds are being used to subsidize either the U.S. or Japanese governments. One fact is outstanding, namely that a greater part of the money that leaves Canada does not in effect benefit the repatriate.” 52

This is easily seen from the experiences of families such as that of Chizuru Marge Ikabe. The funds they received from the Canadian government disappeared within two

48 Patricia E. Roy et al., Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese During the Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 189.
49 BCA, Awmack, One letter sent From Japan (around Kyoto) to Canada in March 1947.
52 Officer-in-Charge, War Crimes Liaison Detachment, Japanese Theatre, to Secretary, Department of National Defence 17 December 1946, DCER, 1946, 349.
months, and the Japanese government refused to assist them.\textsuperscript{53} Under these circumstances, the recent arrivals formed the National Federation of Repatriates from Canada, through which they petitioned the government of Japan to recognize them as war repatriates, in order to become eligible for compensation for their losses. However, “they did not associate themselves with the general organization of repatriates because their losses had resulted from the \textit{outbreak} of the war rather than from Japan’s ultimate defeat.”\textsuperscript{54}

While the exiles from Canada arrived marginally better off than most of those coming from Japan’s former empire, as well as the millions made homeless in Japan because of the war, they shared in the hardships and struggles for survival, especially during the first few postwar years. Many Nisei, due to their proficiency in both English and Japanese, found jobs working for the occupation forces as translators, and some found translation work with private companies. One exile, Yoshio Ted “Chuck” Terada explained that most of the Nisei were working as interpreters, stenographers, typists, and domestic workers, essentially “using English as their meal ticket.”\textsuperscript{55} Despite their ability to find employment during the occupation, as one Canadian diplomat noted, “even their employment does not help much because they are only permitted to draw a certain part of their salary in cash, the rest is taken into frozen bank accounts.”\textsuperscript{56} Nonetheless, another Nisei explained in 1947 that, upon working as an interpreter for the British Commonwealth Occupation Force along side fellow Nisei (both Americans and

\textsuperscript{54} Roy, \textit{Mutual Hostages}, 189-190.
\textsuperscript{55} “People Eat Grass, Pay Million for Saccharine” \textit{New Canadian}, 2 November 1946.
\textsuperscript{56} Officer-in-Charge, War Crimes Liaison Detachment, Japanese Theatre to Secretary, Department of National Defence 17 December 1946, \textit{DCER}, 1946, 349.
Canadians) “I lost most of my bitterness towards life and starting a second life [in Japan].” Another Nisei explained that their employment duties varied at times and included travelling “with the G.I.s to do interpreting out into the city and sometimes around the countryside,” however, this changed over time and by 1947 they explained, “I seldom go out… I work six days a week from about 7 to about 5 or 6 at night.”

Securing such employment unquestionably benefited these exiles, as one explained, “to all Japanese, it is a fierce struggle to make a living. More fierce than fighting another human being in a battle field.”

While many of the recent arrivals found work with the occupation forces, some were reluctant to do so. Two years of hunger eventually led Yukiharu Mizuyabu to seek employment with the occupation forces even though he had equated them with “the powers responsible for all the misfortunes that had befallen [his] family since Pearl Harbor, [and] Mackenzie King and his regime in Canada.” Mizuyabu compromised his attitude, because of his hunger, not because he forgave Canada’s government. Yoshimi Susan Maikawa and her family moved to a farming community in Fukuoka prefecture. Along with her brother and two sisters, she worked for the American Armed Forces to support her family. After some time in Japan, Hideo Kokubo worked as a cook for American officers, a position he held for six years, even cooking for American troops.

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59 BCA, Awmack, Kanagawa-Ken, Kawasaki-shi, 8 February 1948.
60 NNMA, Irene Tsuyuki (Tetsuko Kato), File. IF 95/121.1.016.
participating in the Korean War. Numerous Nisei worked for the occupation forces all across Japan, however, after the Korean War, job opportunities for Nisei dwindled.\textsuperscript{63}

While during the Occupation in particular, those exiled from Canada held certain advantages, they also had many disadvantages. Following their years of uprooting and internment in Canada, moving to various destinations throughout Japan made their experiences all the more difficult, particularly for the Nisei.\textsuperscript{64} Some exiles took up unaccustomed and difficult farm work and physical labour. In addition, these exiles “were frustrated by the complete failure of the Japanese government to recognize their problems.”\textsuperscript{65} Accounts from exiles provide a glimpse into the personal struggles of individuals confronting the harsh realities of a war-torn nation, and a country that did not exactly welcome them ‘home.’

Yoshimi Susan Maikawa recalls that shortly after their arrival at Uraga, her family was reunited with her brother, who surprised them by informing them that he had sent a letter through the Red Cross advising them not to come to Japan.\textsuperscript{66} Unfortunately for the Maikawa family, they learned of this letter far too late. Hideo Kokubo said that when he arrived in Japan, “everything was burned down. It was terrible,”\textsuperscript{67} “people had nothing to eat.”\textsuperscript{68} Kazuyuki Cass Ide describes his initial experiences in 1946 as “a shock,” seeing “the terrible destruction of the bombing raids, the despair on the faces of the people,” and there was no reception for their arrival. Ide believes that the “returning Japanese were another unwanted problem for the authorities.” He complained that on top

\textsuperscript{63} NNMA, Mr. Hideo Kokubo, Interview, 17 May 1991. 94/80.034a-b. Kokubo said that he considered staying in Japan to open a business, but instead decided to go back to Canada to return to fishing.
\textsuperscript{65} Roy, Mutual Hostages, 189.
\textsuperscript{66} Maikawa, Ba-chan’s Story: Thoughts and recollections of a Japanese-Canadian, 8 (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{67} NNMA, Mr. Hideo Kokubo, Interview 17 May 1991. 94/80.034a-b
\textsuperscript{68} Marlatt, Steveston Recollected, 70.
of having to eat terrible food, and a lack of rice, upon their arrival, “drunken Japanese soldiers came to the gate demanding cigarettes.”

The country had been very obviously devastated by the war. Arthur Hitoshi Sato described his initial perception of Japan: “when we got to Yokohama we could see from the ship… for all intents and purposes it was all bombed out. Yokohama was all bombed out. Yokohama, Kawasaki, Tokyo…it was all bombed out.” Another Nisei detailed her observations of post-war Tokyo in 1948:

As we came through Yokohama (business section)... there were Americans everywhere.... Everything was destroyed between Yokohama and Tokyo. Small one-story shacks are up, or going up everywhere. In Tokyo from Aoyama Gakuin you can see the Imperial Diet Buildings. Nothing between but ruins and shacks. There are miles and miles of ruins grown over with weeds interspersed with vegetable gardens and shacks... There are small sections here and there that escaped destruction but wherever you see a fine old residence you also see an American name on the gate.

The same letter continues: “Young people are certainly choosing these days between communism and Christianity and they are very serious about it.” Ideological divisions were quite apparent and greatly influenced how the American authorities directed their control over the occupation in order to facilitate their “Reorientation of Japan.” Upon arrival, another Nisei reported “I could not believe my eyes that I was to start a new life here for there was hardly anything to start on.”

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69 Ito, Stories of My People, 402.
70 University of Victoria Digital Collections (hereafter UVic), Military Oral Histories, ID No. 595, Arthur Satoshi Sato.
72 BCA, Awmack, Kumamoto city, 27 January 1948
A large number of Japanese immigrants from Hiroshima prefecture had settled in Canada, and still had family and friends living there.\textsuperscript{73} Those who went to Hiroshima were even worse off than in other regions of Japan.\textsuperscript{74} Some estimate that as a result of the atomic bombing, ninety percent of the city was destroyed, and up to 140,000 individuals were killed instantly or died in the following five months.\textsuperscript{75} When the Canadians arrived, the destruction was still very evident. Illustrating how intensely the war had affected Japanese Canadians and their families on both sides of the Pacific, one wrote: “How I miss dear old Canada… I’m still at home… learning knitting from my married sister. Her home was burned in the city by the bombs so is living with us for the time being.”\textsuperscript{76} The widespread difficulties faced by all in post-war Japan, especially Hiroshima, impacted those exiled from Canada on the deepest emotional levels. One Nisei wrote that:

Two of my smallest sisters passed away suddenly leaving the oldest the only girl now in the family. They were suddenly taken ill that morning. I think it was something they ate because day [sic] before they didn’t show any sign of sickness...

It was like a horrible nightmare.

Everyone faced enormous difficulties, in particular, access to medical facilities, and adequate food and water. Other difficulties included the high costs for living, food and clothing.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{73} For an overview of the pre-war history of settlers from Hiroshima in Canada, see Ayukawa, \textit{Hiroshima Immigrants in Canada, 1891-1941}.

\textsuperscript{74} Kage, \textit{Nikkei Kanadajin no Tsuihou} [Exiled Japanese Canadians], 123.

\textsuperscript{75} Kyoko and Mark Selden eds. \textit{The Atomic Bomb: Voices from Hiroshima and Nagasaki} (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, INC, 1989), xxi. This collection of works also includes numerous first-hand accounts of the atomic bombings. For a survey of recent literature on the motivation behind using the atomic bomb, see Samuel J. Walker (April 2005). “Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground”. \textit{Diplomatic History} 29 (2) 311-334.

\textsuperscript{76} BCA, Awmack, Postcard from Hiroshima, 27 March 1947.

\textsuperscript{77} BCA, Awmack, Letter from Hiroshima, 20 October 1948.
Hiroshima’s extensive wartime destruction was soon overshadowed by its postwar re-development. One Nisei described the city’s re-development: “Buildings are going up everywhere... in western style and there’s still hundreds of small shacks lying here and there but they will gradually disappear.”78 Another reported that, “the lights of Hiroshima are getting very bright you wouldn’t believe the place was atom bombed now. Houses have sprung up everywhere.”79 A sense of optimism accompanied the reconstruction of Hiroshima as indicated on a postcard, which one Nisei sent to a friend in Canada, “I wish you were here to see the scenery, it’s very beautiful. Big ocean in front, fishing boats, trains and streetcars going past.”80 The natural beauty of Hiroshima, as well as the city-wide signs of material progress helped to make life in occupied Hiroshima more bearable. Small orchestras, bands and American music filled the dancehalls, much to the pleasure of the Nisei, although this was not enough to satisfy those longing to return to Canada.81

**To Stay in Japan, or Return to Canada?**

For many Nisei, keeping and making friendships with other Nisei in Japan was very important for keeping up their spirits. Although many lost contact with other arrivals from Canada, some were able to restore old relationships. One former Vancouver resident described: “They’ve all got the same idea as I have and what I think about this place.”82 Sharing the same experiences in Canada meant that Nisei could better understand each other’s situation, providing a sense of belonging to a community, in a country where they were often outcast and misunderstood. Another Nisei commented that, “whenever we

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78 BCA, Awmack, Letter from Hiroshima, 6 October 1947.
79 BCA, Awmack, Hiroshima, 20 October 1948.
80 BCA, Awmack, Postcard from Hiroshima, 27 March 1947.
81 BCA, Awmack, Letter from Hiroshima, 6 October 1947.
82 BCA, Awmack, Letter from Okayama City, March 1948.
Nisei get together all we talk about is the happy times we spent back home.”

Remembering the past is important for deported, or exiled communities, as a means of resisting “spiritual fragmentation.”

Irene Tsuyuki said that leaving under Vancouver’s Lion’s Gate Bridge felt like she was leaving her country. Later recalling her initial reaction of Japan, she says, “We were terribly disappointed in Japan… The Japanese were saying, ‘Why are they coming back here for?’… They didn’t have enough food for their own people and we were coming out there from a country of plenty… We were strangers to them, foreigners. Canadians.” This surely influenced Irene’s own feelings toward Japan, as having not been accepted as Japanese, no doubt strengthened her feeling of being Canadian. Although she found employment as an interpreter for a Japanese company, and later worked for the American Occupation Forces, and found friends, she felt she did not belong in Japan and saw no future for herself there. She returned to Canada in 1949 after being sponsored by her father’s friend, who later became her father-in-law, while her parents remained in Japan. However, despite their desire to return to Canada and her best efforts to get them back to Canada, both died before they could return.

Many others echoed Irene Tsuyuki’s sense that the Nisei were not accepted as Japanese and wished to return to Canada. One young Japanese male reportedly responded to the question, “What do you think of the Nisei?” with, “We Japanese hate them.” Using the Canadian government’s branding of ‘disloyal,’ the same newspaper

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83 BCA, Awmack, Letter from Kyushu, 7 April 1947.
85 Enomoto, *Homecoming ’92*, 41.
86 Broadfoot, *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame*, 322-323.
87 Enomoto, *Homecoming ’92*, 41.
reporter argued that the Nisei were not accepted as Japanese, and that “they have been found guilty of disloyal acts to Canada and consequently they cannot get back to the land of their birth… These people are Canada’s No. 1 headache in Japan.”\(^89\) One Nisei mother pleaded that: “The people here will not accept us as one of them and our children find it difficult to fit in at their schools. They resent our presence here.”\(^90\) In Japan some neighbours even blamed the Canadian Nikkei for the extensive destruction resulting from American bombing raids.\(^91\) Numerous other exiles experienced various other forms of persecution. Sho Numata, sixteen at the time, said that the villagers made his life miserable by taunting him, at times surrounding him and screaming “Gaijin, gaijin” (foreigner, foreigner). Another Nisei, Minoru Ohara said that his relatives gave his family a “poor reception” upon their arrival in Japan.\(^92\) For some of the Issei, their families resented them for coming from a wealthy country like Canada to beg from their Japanese relatives left with so little after years of war.\(^93\)

For many other Nisei, the unfamiliar culture and customs of Japan proved difficult to overcome. One Nisei explained in 1948 that, “I thought that I could live here in Japan but when I come to think of all the different customs and especially the language I simply cannot go through it.” Unfamiliarity with their new cultural environment was not the only obstacle, as their new environmental climate also caused them health problems. The same Nisei explained: “Ever since I came to Japan I have been getting sick. I might be

\(^{89}\) Bill Herbert, “Japs Show Hatred of Canadian Nisei” \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 15 December 1950.  
\(^{91}\) Roy, \textit{Mutual Hostages}, 189.  
selfish wanting to go back to Canada but if I want to take care of my body that is the only thing that I can do.”

Far away from Japan’s larger cities, in Yamaguchi prefecture, another Nisei did not feel accepted into Japanese society, and was very disappointed in not meeting other North American Nikkei, writing to a friend that “this sort of life gets me down,” the Japanese “don’t accept us,” instead, “they insult us,” and asks rhetorically, “why did I ever come back to such a wicked place?” The same Nisei tells of insufficient food rations provided to his family, leaving them no choice but to buy black market goods, and spending more than three-quarters of their earnings on food. Missing the food they were accustomed to in Canada, he also described that, “all we get is rice, wheat (whole) a tin of fish a month [and] seldom fresh fruit and eggs. You could see why I’m not putting on weight or height… I sure wish they sell milk but they don’t – no cows.”

Each Japanese Canadian’s experience in Japan was different, and contained varied difficulties. Since remittances from Canada were not allowed until 1949, friends and family sent goods such as “cloth, yarn, and other goods” from Canada, which could be sold, or traded on Japan’s black market. Although illegal, the black market was a major industry. Rations sometimes reached their destinations as much as twenty days behind schedule, thus forcing most people to purchase foodstuffs illegally, or even to find employment in black market industries.

Despite their Japanese ancestry, the arrivals from Canada were quite often viewed as outsiders, and expressed a great difficulty in adjusting to their new lives. Others found

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94 BCA, Awmack, Kyoto, 1 November 1948.
96 Roy, Mutual Hostages, 189.
that their families in Japan had lost everything during the war. One Issei discovered, upon his return to Osaka, that his parents’ house had been destroyed in the bombing raids. He said it was “like a bad dream which bears no resemblance to the Japan he once knew.”

Another Nisei woman who left Canada with her Issei husband and their children, discovered that her in-laws had died during the war and so they no longer had family in Japan. By 1949 they desperately wanted to return to Canada so the children could “grow up in their own country,” as they were considered foreigners in Japan. The same woman pleaded: “We were more of less forced to come here (for we did meet a lot of racial prejudice then)... won’t they give us an opportunity to correct our mistake and allow us to reenter our country, and not keep us in exile like this?”

Many exiled individuals shared their hopes and dreams with each other, which in many cases they held in common, namely the desire to return to Canada. One such Nisei reported that in every letter received from her Nisei friend “she mentions about going back to Canada” and adds that, “I think most of the repatriates are planning to go back again.” The same Nisei continues: “There’s a Nisei boy from Canada and he was saying that there’s about 25 persons going back to Canada this month. I sure envy those people.” One Nisei believed that: “Mother and father agree that I don’t fit in Japan and say that I may come back to Canada if the Canadian government will fix it up the way the Americans are doing.” By 1948, many American-born Nisei had already returned to the U.S., and many in Japan believed that the Canadian-born should also return to

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100 BCA, Awmack, Letter from Fukushima, 18 September 1948.
Canada. Many exiled Nikkei families had a more favourable view of the American government than the Canadian government because restrictions banning Nikkei from the coast of the United States had been completely eliminated in September 1945. In contrast, Nikkei in Canada were still legally prohibited from returning to the west coast of British Columbia until 1 April 1949.

The Canadian government “made it extremely difficult” not only for those exiled in 1946, but also for any Nikkei stranded in Japan during the war “by refusing assistance with travel funds or exit documents.” One way to regain Canadian citizenship was to join the Canadian Army in Japan. Vancouver-born, Arthur Hitoshi Sato who was “forced to go to Japan,” for family reasons, decided after some time in Yokohama, that he wanted to return to Canada, and so asked officials at the Canadian embassy in Tokyo what he had to do to make that happen. When he said he had no money, no job, and no place to stay, the embassy officials suggested he join the Canadian Army, so became a part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force stationed in Kure, near Hiroshima, as the Korean War was winding down. He says: “A lot of them joining up were not aware of what had happened [to Nikkei in Canada]…although there were some who knew.” While Arthur was determined to return to Canada, his father, an Issei, had quite a different view of Canada and never did return. Prior to Arthur’s departure from Japan, his father said to him (in Japanese): “You know when you were a boy, during the war,… you suffered a

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102 BCA, Awmack, Takamatsu, Shikoku, 18 November 1948.
lot.” Then he just turned around and walked away. “And that’s the last time I saw him,” Arthur said. Arthur’s father harboured quite a bit of resentment toward Canada.

Along with Arthur Sato, almost forty exiles volunteered to join the Canadian Army in Japan, and many fought in Korea during the Korean War (1950-53). All completed basic training at the Commonwealth Division’s battle school in Haramura (near Kure). Sergeant C.W. Kelly said of the first Nisei recruits, “They’re above average for the normal recruit and they work hard. They get full marks for enthusiasm and interest.” One such recruit was Hiroshi Kawanami, who after joining the Canadian army in Japan said he was “willing to work, even as a civilian, if I could be with Canadians. But now I’m a Canadian soldier. It’s wonderful.” The Canadian contingent at Kure was rarely more than two-thousand strong, comprised of “administrative, reinforcement, and training units, together with medical and ordnance corps detachments attached to larger Commonwealth installations.” Another Nisei among those joining the Canadian Armed Forces was Minoru Fukushima. In the animated film Minoru: Memory of Exile, he describes how he felt at the time:

I must have wondered, you know, how come they forced us to Japan and now they were recruiting us - to fight. I mean Canada only ever saw me as Japanese, but I’d always been a Canadian. So, the Canadian Army, I guess, was how I saw getting back to the only home I knew, or didn’t know. I mean, I only had the two memories of Canada: Vancouver growing up, and then Internment camps. That was it…. After I enlisted, my father told me that if he had known what it was like in Japan after the

107 Bill Boss, “Canada and Japan Argue Over Status of Canadian Soldier” 7 July 1952, CPN 155(4)-66.
war, he would have never brought us to Japan. That was his greatest regret. So, he was happy when I joined.\textsuperscript{109}

While many Nisei men joined the Canadian Army in Japan in order to regain their Canadian citizenship, some Nisei women found alternative means of doing so. One way of returning to North America was by marrying American GIs, whether out of love, or desperation to leave Japan.\textsuperscript{110} Others married Australian soldiers stationed in Japan.

Certainly not all recent arrivals from Canada longed to return to Canada, and not all family members agreed on whether or not to return to Canada either. Hideo Nose grew up in Vancouver and went to Japan with his parents and three siblings. He did not consider their departure as an exile, as his father had sent money to Japan and had a house in his home village.\textsuperscript{111} Only his eldest brother returned to Canada. Nose was determined to fit into life in Japan. He believed that in Canada, “racial prejudice against the Japanese will never change.” He settled in Kawasaki and found work using both his English and Japanese language abilities for a large American company.\textsuperscript{112} Nose was certainly not the only exile to feel this way. Even though Yukiharu Mizuyabu expected the worst in Japan, and discovered it was much worse than even he expected, he was determined to settle into his post-Canadian life in Japan. He says, “I decided that that was better for me than to continue to be persecuted [because] of my race… in Canada.”\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{109} Minoru Fukushima, cited in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Bill Herbert, “Japs Show Hatred of Canadian Nisei” \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 15 December 1950.
\textsuperscript{111} Kage, \textit{Nikkei Kanadajin no Tsuihou} [Exiled Japanese Canadians], 129.
\textsuperscript{112} Ito, \textit{Stories of My People}, 406.
\textsuperscript{113} NNMA, Irene Tsuyuki (Tetsuko Kato), File. IF 95/121.1.016.
Another Nisei, content in Japan, wrote to Canada stating, “I really don’t mind it here at all. I don’t seem to miss Canada but I sure miss all my friends.”

Despite describing the program in which her family left for Japan, as a “forced exile,” Chizuru Marge Ikebe completed her schooling and remained in Japan long after the Occupation. She initially faced harassment from other students, but says such troubles gradually changed as English became a compulsory subject for schools throughout Japan. She married a Japanese man, and they both worked for major corporations, settling in Tokyo. Ikebe also stayed in Japan to look after her parent’s graves. Another Nisei, Kazuyuki Cass Ide, decided to stay in Japan, despite the unwelcoming reception his family initially received from his father’s family. Ide married a Japanese woman in 1950, they had a son and raised him in Japan.

When Marie Kawamoto (later Katsuno) was interviewed in Tokyo in 1951, she said that while in Aikawa, Fukui prefecture, during the early stages of the occupation, wherever she walked in the village, curious children and adults followed her and stared at her strange clothing. For this reason, she simply stopped going for walks. She later moved to Yokohama to live with a relative, where unlike the countryside, employment “opportunities were plentiful for anyone with a working knowledge of English.” She worked for an American airline and as a freelance stenographer at international conferences, and married an American Nisei businessman from Seattle. Katsuno regained her lost Canadian citizenship, and though remaining in Japan with her husband and their

114 BCA, Awmack, Letter from Yokohama, 18 December 1946.
117 See Ibid., 106.
119 NNMA, Marie Katsuno File.
two children, made frequent visits to Vancouver and Seattle over the years.\textsuperscript{120} Since she did not have a formal education in the Japanese language, and was born and raised until adulthood in Canada, she was not surprised “that we were apt to be regarded as foreigners in Japan, although by race we are Japanese.”\textsuperscript{121} Indeed it is ironic while that in Canada, Nikkei experienced persecution for being Japanese, and in Japan many of these Nikkei experienced persecution because they were culturally Canadian. However, it is important to reiterate that despite initial hardships in Japan, a large proportion of those Nikkei who decided to stay in Japan successfully rebuilt their lives, and remained in Japan. Many also married Japanese partners and raised their children in Japan, having no regrets about their decision to stay in Japan.\textsuperscript{122} This was certainly not the case for all.

Despite efforts like those of the Slocan Valley Nisei Organization to petition the Canadian government to allow them to return to Canada, as well as the numerous personal reasons for leaving Canada, the government branded all the departees as ‘disloyal.’ This was extremely effective in preventing their immediate return to Canada. The experiences of those exiled varied considerably. Life in occupied Japan brought destitution and death for some, and great opportunities for others, but also drove others to find a means of returning to Canada. Many more stayed in Japan for the duration of their lives. Irrespective of their experiences, when viewed along side wartime policies in the

\textsuperscript{120} Ito, \textit{Stories of my People}, 404.
\textsuperscript{122} For accounts of those who stayed in Japan beyond the Occupation period, see Kage, \textit{Nikkei Kanadajin no Tsuihou} [Exiled Japanese Canadians].
United States, a historical analysis of the development and implementation of the forced transfer of Nikkei from B.C. reveals the distinctiveness of Canadian policy.
Conclusion

Amid the chorus of civic opposition to the deportation orders of 10,000 Nikkei from Canada, Elmore Philpott asked, “Do we want some future poet like Longfellow to immortalize a blemish in the record of the west coast, as that of the east coast was?”¹ While this ‘blemish’ may have been lessened by the eventual cancellation of the deportation orders, the Canadian government remains fully responsible for the attempted elimination of the Japanese Canadian community in British Columbia, which had been reduced by two-thirds between 1942 and 1951.² Such dramatic figures resulted from carefully orchestrated federal policies, yet references to such policies often do not adequately assign culpability. Under the guise of a “voluntary repatriation survey,” government records suggest this exodus from B.C. was done so on a voluntary basis, and those leaving for Japan represented the ‘disloyal’ among the Nikkei community in Canada, while in actuality, it represented the forced removal of Nikkei from B.C. A close reading of the evidence illustrates that ‘loyalty’ had very little to do with the departure of the majority of those deportees, and additionally exposes the intent of federal and provincial officials to remove Nikkei from B.C. Those departing for Japan instead of “east of the Rockies,” have been inconsistently portrayed, and at times said to have “left voluntarily,” “rejected Canada,”³ or “quit Canada,”⁴ while others believe they were

³ Peter W. Ward, The Japanese in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1982), 15.
“deported.” Despite inconsistencies in the existing literature, what is at stake is not simply a question of language, but rather our appreciation of this episode as a part of the federal government’s initiative of trying to rid B.C. of Japanese Canadians, in response to pressure from anti-Japanese organizations and powerful politicians in B.C. The pre-war Nikkei community in B.C. was all but destroyed in the 1940s. Nine years after the community’s uprooting and expulsion from B.C, Nikkei were scattered throughout the provinces of Canada, the Yukon and Northwest Territories, and across the Pacific to various prefectures of Japan. A more comprehensive understanding of this episode in historical and comparative perspective reveals the full extent to which federal officials sought to remove Nikkei from B.C. and Canada. While the perspectives of those concerned with Nikkei in Canada spanned the full range of the spectrum, the influence of those most eager to have Nikkei removed from B.C. eventually won the day. The success of these policies is especially confirmed by examining Canada’s policies toward Nikkei in comparative perspective with those of the United States.

Wartime policies toward Nikkei in Canada and the United States appear quite similar in many respects, however, many important aspects were markedly different. Nonetheless, both Canada and the United States sent thousands of Nikkei to Japan during the course of the war and immediately after. Numerically speaking, those Nikkei sent to Japan immediately after the war, from both countries were very close, however, as a proportion of their Nikkei populations, they differed greatly. Those departing Canada represented roughly 17 percent of all Nikkei in the country, while those leaving the United States represented less than 5 percent of Nikkei in America. Why was the proportion of Nikkei leaving Canada so much higher than in the United States? By
exploring some of the differences in policy decisions and the legal status of Nikkei in these two countries, the answer to this question becomes somewhat clearer.

**North American Comparisons**

As in Canada, Nikkei in the U.S. were forcibly uprooted and removed from the west coast of the continental United States in early 1942. While the decision to uproot Nikkei in the U.S., also continues to be debated, many of the same fears over “Oriental penetration” existed among the country’s top politicians. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, for example, also “had clear racial prejudices against Japanese Americans,” and had long considered them “racially ‘unassimilable’ and innately Japanese on racial grounds.”° Positions such as these proved devastating for Japanese Americans. During their uprooting in the U.S., while the steps of the federal government to protect property belonging to Japanese Americans “led to considerable loses,” it did not seize and sell their possessions as Canada’s Custodian of Alien Property had with property belonging to Nikkei in B.C.°° Japanese Americans could not officially have their property taken away from them by the government because Nisei property ownership was protected under the U.S. Constitution. More specifically, the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution deems that anyone born in the U.S. is an American citizen, which therefore meant Nisei had the right to own property in that country, and had a “natural right” to have their Issei parents

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°° Ibid., 153.
as “guardians and/or trustees for their property.” Nonetheless, some estimate that upwards to 75 percent of Japanese Americans lost all their property as a result of their relocation, in which the U.S. government imposed deadlines for departing from the west coast, which led to forced private sales at low cost and enormous losses. Peggie Nishimura Bain explains that the compensation she received from the American government, the compensation was “such a small amount for the loss that I had, because I lost everything.” Just prior to their departure from their home, Bain’s family left some of their more valuable items with their neighbours, however they were all gone when they returned after the war. Her neighbour explained: “Well, I guess it got stolen or something. We don’t know what happened to it.” Such experiences were the norm, rather than the exception.

In early 1943, Nikkei in the U.S. were forced to complete a “Loyalty Questionnaire,” also referred to as “the wartime inquisition of Japanese Americans,” and all Nikkei over the age of seventeen held in concentration camps were forced to register. The loyalty questionnaire was used for determining who was ‘loyal,’ and ‘disloyal,’ to the U.S. The two most important questions on the questionnaire were

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9 Robinson, A Tragedy of Democracy, 257.
13 This questionnaire is sometimes referred to as “registration.” Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc, 1976), 134.
numbers 27 and 28, sometimes referred to as the “Loyalty Questions.”\textsuperscript{14} Question 27 asked all Nisei males if they were willing to serve in the Armed Forces “wherever ordered,” and 28 asked if they would “faithfully defend the country in the event of an attack,” while all Issei, and Nisei females were asked if they would be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps. Question 28 also asked all Nikkei if they would swear “unqualified allegiance” to the U.S. and, “foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?”\textsuperscript{15}

The Issei, who could not legally become American citizens, felt this questionnaire, especially question 28, was “improper, unfair, and utterly outrageous,” and some Nisei took such questions as the “ultimate insult.”\textsuperscript{16} Nonetheless, eighty-five percent of those incarcerated in the U.S. said, “Yes” to both question 27 and 28, and the other ten to fifteen percent of incarcerated Japanese Americans were deemed “disloyal.”\textsuperscript{17} As was the case in Canada, personal reasons influenced how all Nikkei in the U.S. responded to this questionnaire, however, once they answered, the results were ultimately beyond their control. While the questionnaires were being processed, all responses were “judged on the basis of subjective interpretation,”\textsuperscript{18} and based upon how each survey was interpreted, respondents were deemed either ‘loyal,’ meaning they could potentially leave their


\textsuperscript{16} See Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 136-140.

\textsuperscript{17} Robinson, A Tragedy of Democracy, 185-186. The War Relocation Authority figures show that 74,588 out of a possible 77,842 individuals registered from the 10 “relocation centers.” 65,312 individuals answered “yes” to question 28, another 6,700 answered “no,” while 2,083 qualified their answers in some way, and 426 refused to answer this question. See also Collins, Native American Aliens, 31.

\textsuperscript{18} Robinson, A Tragedy of Democracy, 185-186.
incarceration, or ‘disloyal,’ and were shipped to the Tule lake segregation centre.\textsuperscript{19} The entire Questionnaire program had the harmful effect of “moving thousands of otherwise loyal Americans down the road to rejection of the United States and loss of citizenship.”\textsuperscript{20} Between December 1944 and March 1945, roughly six thousand Japanese Americans applied to renounce their citizenship.\textsuperscript{21} Within Tule Lake, militantly pro-Japan organizations used intimidation and bodily harm to influence the choices of others. Jean Miyoko Aoyama Tanaka recalls that she and her three brothers felt “pressured by aggressive pro-Japan groups” at Tule Lake to renounce their American citizenship. They warned Tanaka: “you better renounce or someone in your family could get hurt,” and she adds that, “we had no place to go. We were poor.”\textsuperscript{22} Some of those Japanese Americans who renounced their citizenship, soon regretted it and wished to cancel their renunciation.\textsuperscript{23} Many claimed they had done so under duress.\textsuperscript{24} Tanaka and her family were among the more than 6,200 Nikkei repatriated and expatriated to Japan after the war by the U.S. government, most of whom had been incarcerated at Tule Lake.\textsuperscript{25} Like answering “No” to question 28 on the loyalty questionnaire, requests for ‘repatriation’ and the renouncing of American citizenship were chiefly motivated by that fact that “the

\textsuperscript{19} See Weglyn, \textit{Years of Infamy}, 156-140; Daniels, \textit{Concentration Camps USA}, 114-117; and Collins, \textit{Native American Aliens}, 22-34.
\textsuperscript{20} Collins, \textit{Native American Aliens}, 23.
\textsuperscript{21} See Ibid., 84-104. At the Tule Lake segregation center, 85 percent of Japanese Americans renounced their citizenship. Many of the renunciants were motivated by family reunification, although a small minority was “militantly pro-Japan and sought immediate repatriation.” See Ibid.,189-190.
\textsuperscript{22} During most of Tanaka’s wartime incarceration in the U.S., her father had been separated from the rest of her family. Tanaka had been incarcerated at Tule Lake before it became a segregation center. Cited in “WWII brought hard choice for some Japanese-American Internees” \textit{Seattle Times}, 30 June 2004.
\textsuperscript{23} For a first hand account, see Minoru Kiyota, \textit{Beyond Loyalty: The Story of a Kibei} translated by Linda Klepinger Keenan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997).
\textsuperscript{25} See Collins, \textit{Native American Aliens}, 121. According to Collins, of these 6,200 individuals, 1800-2000 had renounced their American citizenship.
incarcerated people were subject to all kinds of pressures, real and imaginary.”

Many of those Japanese Americans sent to Japan after the war eventually returned to the U.S. and like Tanaka, regained their citizenship.

Despite their hardships and losses, Japanese Americans did have greater legal rights than Japanese Canadians. Nikkei in Canada had no legislated protection of their rights whereas the United States Constitution, not “any greater liberalism on the part of the United States executive branch,”

gave Japanese Americans marginally better protection than their Canadian counterparts. As a result, powerful politicians in Canada orchestrated the removal of Nikkei from B.C. with relative ease.

Another important difference between these two countries was that Japanese Americans had greater access to the political process than Japanese Canadians. In the U.S., Japanese Americans could vote once old enough. In contrast, until 1949, B.C. denied the franchise to Japanese who were otherwise qualified to vote. When they moved east of the Rockies, they found themselves in a position to vote. Federal politicians, however, were intent on preventing the extension of the franchise to any further Japanese Canadians and passed Bill 135 in July 1944. As a result, whereas prior to July 1944, Japanese Canadians moving east of B.C. gained the right to vote in provincial and therefore federal elections, Bill 135 meant that Japanese Canadians moving east of B.C. after July 1944 consequently did not gain the right to vote. Those Nikkei who had earlier moved to provinces east of the Rockies did, however, retain their rights to vote.

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26 Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, 116.
Why did the federal government change this law to prevent Japanese Canadians interned in B.C. in 1944 from gaining the franchise after moving out of the province? One clue into the attitudes of federal politicians on this matter comes from the Commissioner of Japanese Placement, T.B. Pickersgill, who stated that those Nikkei remaining in B.C. internment camps, “clearly demonstrated that they were a different breed,” from those already east of B.C. By passing this legislation, the federal government showed that prior to conducting their ‘voluntary repatriation survey’ in early 1945, they intended to remove inducements for moving ‘east of the Rockies,’ making leaving for Japan more appealing. This also helps to explain why such a large proportion of Nikkei interned in B.C. selected Japan over east of the Rockies in early 1945.

Another important difference in the federal policies of each of these countries was the ability for Nikkei to prove their ‘loyalty’ by serving in the Armed Forces. Although Japanese Canadians had served in the Armed forces during World War I, not long after the outbreak of war in Europe, B.C. politicians presented numerous arguments against Japanese Canadian enlistment in the Armed Forces. These arguments included fears that Nikkei would assist in an invasion by Imperial Japan on B.C., and thus it was unadvisable to train them militarily, while others argued that by serving in Canada’s Armed Forces, Japanese Canadians would strengthen their argument that they were entitled to the franchise, as eighty Nikkei had gained in B.C. in 1931, thirteen years after serving during World War I (one hundred sixty-six Nikkei served in World War I). For these politicians, extending the vote to Japanese Canadians was clearly undesirable. At the same time,

other prominent politicians argued in favour of allowing them to serve, however, they were unsuccessful in the end and Japanese Canadians were initially unable to volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces during World War II.\(^\text{30}\) During the latter stages of the Pacific War, however, Canadian Nisei began serving in overseas intelligence units of Canada’s Armed Forces, and after the war mainly with the War Crimes Investigation Force stationed throughout Asia as translators.\(^\text{31}\) Many also served in Japan during the American Occupation.\(^\text{32}\)

In contrast, Japanese Americans were given the opportunity to first volunteer, and then be eligible for the draft, after which a large number of Japanese Americans saw combat overseas. The “well-publicized performance of Nisei combat troops in Italy,” played a large role in the “post-war rehabilitation of the Japanese Americans.”\(^\text{33}\) By ‘demonstrating their patriotism,’ they helped to hasten the elimination of restrictions on Nikkei in the U.S., while Japanese Canadians were mostly forbidden from doing the same, and thus continued to experience “more intensive discrimination and official restrictions” than Japanese Americans.\(^\text{34}\)

Robinson argues that, Nikkei in Canada also “faced far harsher conditions” than Nikkei in the U.S., as they were more isolated, lived in “a more extreme climate,” and had fewer employment options. However, he adds that the most important difference during the war was that the Canadian government provided far less funding for the


\(^{32}\) I150 Japanese Canadians Slated for Liaison Work as Members of Canadian Intelligence Corps” New Canadian, 5 September 1945.


\(^{34}\) Robinson, A Tragedy of Democracy, 244.
incarceration/internment camps than in the U.S. The Canadian government provided just one-third the amount of funding (per person) the American government provided, and as a result, Nikkei in Canada had no choice but to “eke out an existence largely on their own funds.”35

End of Wartime Restrictions

The differences in federal policy between Canada and the United States became greater toward the end of the war, which may help to explain why the proportion of Nikkei leaving Canada was so much higher than in the United States. Prior to the commencement of the federal government’s repatriation survey, on 18 December 1944 the United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously that, “Japanese-Americans of unquestioned loyalty to the United States could not be detained in war relocation centres,” and that, “loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind, not of race, creed, or colour.”36 Shortly thereafter, on 2 January 1945, eight months prior to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and nine months prior to the ceremonial ending of the Pacific War, the West Coast mass exclusion orders were officially lifted in the U.S., although there were still some restrictions on those wishing to return to the west coast.37 However, all restrictions in the U.S. were lifted following Japan’s official unconditional surrender on 2 September 1945.38 It was not until 1 April 1949, almost four years after the war had ended, that Japanese Canadians were permitted to resettle on Canada’s west coast and gained the franchise.

35 Ibid., 201.
36 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 21 December 1944, Documents on Canadian External Relations (hereafter DCER), 1944-1945 Part I, 1144.
37 Robinson, A Tragedy of Democracy, 252.
38 Ibid., 254.
There are also a number of other differences in the experiences of Nikkei in these two countries. Following the removal of restrictions on Nikkei in Canada in 1949, “there was no stampede to return to the B.C. coast.”\(^{39}\) As a result of the forced sale of their assets by the federal government, the majority of Japanese Canadians had little to return to on the west coast, and so did not initially attempt to resettle in their former communities.\(^{40}\) In contrast, by 1946, roughly half of the Japanese American population was living in the former 100-mile exclusion zone.\(^{41}\)

As the above demonstrates, Canadian and American policy toward Nikkei in their respective countries differed greatly. Whereas Japanese Americans were entitled to vote and their property was legally protected under the Constitution, Japanese Canadians were ineligible to vote and the Canadian government confiscated and sold off their property during the early 1940s. Japanese Americans were able to serve in the Armed Forces and prove their ‘loyalty’ to America, while Japanese Canadians were prohibited from entering the Armed Forces until 1944 when the British identified their need for Japanese interpreters. The American government also provided more funding to sustain the uprooted Japanese Americans than the Canadian government supplied for Japanese Canadians, and also used proceeds from the sale of Japanese Canadian property to fund their internment camps. Additionally, restrictions on Nikkei along the Pacific coast were completely lifted in the U.S. on 2 September 1945, while restrictions on Nikkei entering


\(^{40}\) See also Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was*, 346-49; and Daniels, “The Japanese Experience in North America,” 97.

the B.C. coast remained in place for an additional four years. Canada’s federal government was still planning to deport of over 10,000 Nikkei from Canada, when all restrictions were removed from Nikkei in the U.S. These differences help to explain why a higher proportion of Nikkei left Canada after the war. Why were Canada’s policies toward Nikkei so much harsher than in the U.S.? Did the Canadian program have very different goals from the outset? Was this an ethnic cleansing of British Columbia?

Table 3. Nikkei Population in British Columbia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nikkei in B.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>22,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>7,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>10,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>13,585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An Uncomfortable Past

These events in 1940s Canada were clearly not the first time an entire community was uprooted, as “forced population transfer (which is the older expression used to describe those practices associated with ethnic cleansing),” has occurred in every age of recorded history. Whether organized groups have encouraged voluntary assimilation

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43 Jennifer Jackson Preece, “Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 20.4 (1998), 819. Michael Mann has devised a schematic table along two dimensions conceptualizing some of the many forms in which ethnic cleansing occurs and delineates between none, partial, and total cleansing; and the degree of violence employed, ranging from none, to policed repression, and premeditated mass killing, the total culmination of which is genocide. See Michael Mann, *The Darker Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12. Mann argues that while ethnic cleansing takes many forms, most “has been quite mild,” and “murderous cleansing is uncommon.” Mann, *The Darker Side of Democracy*, 18.
“by positive inducements,”\textsuperscript{44} or resorted to genocide, the difference is often indistinct when accounting for the consequences, rather than their intent.\textsuperscript{45} As a colonial settler state, Canada is carved from lands inhabited by Indigenous peoples for thousands of years, and has a rather uncomfortable past. Michael Mann refers to such states as “Genocidal Democracies in the New World,” where Indigenous peoples were decimated, largely through disease brought from Europe, but also due to aggressive policies to acquire land for the state.\textsuperscript{46} Mann also argues that, “murderous ethnic cleansing, amounting at its worst to genocide, was central to the liberal modernity of the New World.”\textsuperscript{47} Among new settlers in such emerging states, the quality of being “civilized” differentiated them from other large “out-groups,” such as “savages,” “natives,” “orientals,” and so on, and this difference was later cast as “racial.”\textsuperscript{48} Pressure remains for First Nations peoples to either retain their cultural distinctiveness, or, along with many of Canada’s immigrant minorities, assimilate into the mainstream of (“civilized”) Canadian (Anglophone, or Francophone) society.

Without question, federal policy, orchestrated the total uprooting of Nikkei in B.C., and the dispossession of their property assuring few would return; forced able-bodied Nikkei men to work in labour camps; interned remaining Nikkei, and provided a financial incentive to move to Japan, while scattering those remaining across the country.\textsuperscript{49} However, much of the public pressure to carry out these policies originated in B.C.

\textsuperscript{44} Mann, \textit{The Darker Side of Democracy}, 13.
\textsuperscript{45} Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliot, \textit{Unequal Relations: An Introduction to Race and Ethnic Dynamics in Canada} 4\textsuperscript{th} Edition (Toronto: Pretence Hall, 2003), 11.
\textsuperscript{46} On “Genocidal Democracies in the New World,” see Mann, \textit{The Darker Side of Democracy}, 70-109.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 108.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{49} Despite its range of forms, on the most general level, “ethnic cleansing can be understood as the expulsion of an “undesirable” population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.” See Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), 110.
Politicians in that province embraced the cause of numerous organizations in the province such as the Japanese Repatriation League, and called for a complete removal of Nikkei from B.C., if not from all of Canada. B.C. Premier T.D. Pattullo advocated the mass “repatriation” of many Asians from B.C., before the war, and B.C. Premier John Hart suggested to King during the war that the demands for repatriating Nikkei from Canada represented the general feeling of the province. Attorney General for B.C., Gordon Wismer, feared a return of Nikkei to B.C. after the war, and expressed his desire to prevent their return to anti-Japanese agitator, Liberal M.P. Ian Mackenzie. Liberal M.P. Thomas Reid, Labour Minister Humphrey Mitchell and numerous others also advocated a removal of Nikkei from the country. So, while federal politicians passed legislation to enact the removal of Nikkei from B.C., they did so in response to demands from elements from within Canada’s westernmost province.

Susan Maikawa, who left Canada in 1946, argues bitterly that Canada’s government “encouraged” Nikkei to leave by providing free passage as well as extra food ration coupons, and in hindsight, complained that “this choice of returning to Japan was the Government’s motive and plan for "ethnic cleansing”… I was virtually being exiled.” Those leaving for Japan did so in response to this aggressive campaign to remove Nikkei from B.C. and Canada. After years of internment, and federal policies implemented to facilitate this removal, “the record shows that the Canadian government attempted to commit the same crime for which Nazi officials were tried and executed –

53 Yoshimi Susan Maikawa, Ba-chan’s Story: Thoughts and recollections of a Japanese-Canadian Growing up in Canada (Yoshimi Susan Maikawa, 2002), 7.
the deportation of citizens.”54 The federal government’s policies were very effective in changing the demographic make-up of Nikkei in Canada, as rather than living in communities in B.C., the entire community was now widely scattered. Roy Miki and Cassandra Kobayashi describe the impact of these policies as “cultural genocide,”55 while John Price describes these policies as a “liberal ethnic cleansing.”56 Perhaps after sifting through ‘discourses of denial,’ we can begin to accept this chapter of Canadian history as a form of ethnic cleansing, or “cultural genocide.” For politicians, and their voting public, driving these federal policies of “dispossession, deportation, dispersal and assimilation,”57 of Nikkei in Canada, the departure of these 3,964 exiles to Japan represented a ‘success rate’ of 17 percent, and by 1951 less than 33 percent of the 1941 Nikkei population resided in B.C.58 Upon concluding the removal program, Prime Minister Mackenzie King summarized his government’s achievements during the 1940s as follows:

In 1941, out of a total population of 23, 149 persons of Japanese origin, 22,096 resided in British Columbia; only 1,153 resided in all the rest of Canada. On December 31, 1946, the total had decreased to 20,558. Of this number only 6,776 were in British Columbia, while 13,782 now live in other parts of Canada. Since 1941 the population of British Columbia of Japanese origin has declined by 15,320 – or approximately two-thirds. In addition, the pre-war concentration on the coast has been eliminated.59

58 See Table 3.
Certainly by 1947, after removing more than 15,000 Nikkei from B.C., the federal policy of removing one of British Columbia’s minorities had largely succeeded.
Epilogue

Mackenzie King’s statement on January 24, 1947 summarized how his government successfully separated and removed “disloyal” Nikkei from Canada, and could therefore repeal the controversial deportation Orders in Council, tabled on December 15, 1945. Provisions “permitting deportation as an emergency measure” in P.C. 7355 were revoked, and P.C. 7356, which removed the Canadian citizenship of deported Nikkei, was revoked in full as was P.C. 7357, authorizing a commission to investigate individual cases of Nikkei whose behaviour during the war cast doubt upon their loyalty to Canada.¹ The revocation of these Orders-in-Council marked the success of civic opposition to the federal government’s deportation orders of roughly 10,000 Nikkei from Canada.

Japanese Canadians finally attained the federal, and B.C. franchise in 1949, yet the enormity of their sufferings still lacked official recognition. It then became necessary for Nikkei to rewrite their history in order to debunk past governmental claims that they were “unassimilable” and a “threat to national security.” Since their uprooting, Japanese Canadian activists have successfully narrated Japanese Canadians as true ‘pioneers’ in British Columbia and Canada, and upon firmly establishing this narrative, the movement for Redress argued that the Canadian government’s wartime actions were “a violation of their civil and human rights.”² An investigation into Japanese Canadian economic losses conducted by Price Waterhouse in 1986 cited losses at no less than $443 million dollars

(1986 dollars). Expressed in 1948 dollars, their losses totalled $48,167,000, forty times the value they received of $1,200,000. The arguments for redress were overwhelming.

Finally, on 22 September 1988, forty-six years after their uprooting, the Canadian government reached a redress agreement with the National Association of Japanese Canadians for those “Canadians of Japanese ancestry” who had been denied citizenship rights from 1942-1949, and “as a consequence, had endured mass uprooting, dispossession, dispersal and deportation.”3 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed the official government acknowledgement of the injustice served to the Nikkei Community in Canada, which states:

Despite perceived military necessities at the time, the forced removal and internment of Japanese Canadians during World War II and their deportation and expulsion following the war, was unjust. In retrospect, government policies of disenfranchisement, detention, confiscation and sale of private and community property, expulsion, deportation and restriction of movement, which continued after the war, were influenced by discriminatory attitudes. Japanese Canadians who were interned had their property liquidated and the proceeds of sale were used to pay for their own internment.4

The document stated that the Government of Canada acknowledged that “the treatment of Japanese Canadians during and after World War II was unjust and violated principles of human rights as they are understood today,” and officially recognized that despite the “great stress and hardship,” Japanese Canadians retained their “commitment and loyalty to Canada and contribute so richly to the development of the Canadian

nation.”\textsuperscript{5} It is also interesting to note that the once deemed “unassimilable” Nikkei born after 1950, now marry non-Nikkei at rates of ninety percent.\textsuperscript{6}

The ceremonial gesture of Redress represented an important accomplishment for the Nikkei community in Canada, and included modest financial compensation for those affected by the federal government’s policies. Once the redress agreement was reached, it became necessary to determine which individuals were eligible to receive this compensation, both in Canada and Japan. The exact number of exiles that remained in Japan after their arrival in 1946 is unknown, however, Kazuyuki Cass Ide, former president of the association of Japanese Canadians in Japan (formed after the Redress Settlement), estimated that roughly half of the exiles chose to stay in Japan. Tatsuo Kage helped co-ordinate the Redress Implementation Program for Western Canada, and as part of his duties, communicated with Japanese Canadians in Japan to assist those eligible to apply for the Redress payment.\textsuperscript{7} Of the 1,337 Japanese Canadians in Japan that had applied for the redress payment, 1,123 received compensation.”\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{7} Tatsuo Kage, “Japanese Canadians Banished to Japan” (paper presented to the Japan Studies Association of Canada International Conference, York University, Toronto, Canada, August 16, 2007).
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Appendix

Appendix I. Orders in Council 7355, 7356, and 7357.

Order in Council P.C. 7355 outlined four categories of Nikkei subject to deportation:
   i) Japanese Nationals who had requested repatriation or who remained in Internment on
      September 1, 1945.
   ii) Naturalized Canadian citizens who requested repatriation and did not revoke their
       requests in writing before midnight on September 1, 1945.
   iii) Canadian-born Japanese sixteen years of age or over who had requested repatriation,
       if such persons had not revoked their requests in writing before the issuance of an Order
       for their deportation.
   iv) The wife and children (under sixteen years of age) of any person in the above
       categories for whom the Minister of Labour made an Order for Deportation.

Order in Council P.C. 7355 also included provisions for deported persons to take
their funds, subject to currency exchange arrangements, and personal property with them
to Japan. It also stated that all transport costs would be covered by the Dominion
government, and guaranteed that each person would leave with a minimum amount of
$200 per adult and $50 per child at the time of departure from Canada.

Order in Council P.C. 7356 declared that any naturalized person deported under
P.C. 7355 would cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian national.

Order in Council P.C. 7357 authorized the establishment of a Commission to
investigate the cases of Japanese Nationals and Naturalized Canadians, whose behaviour
during the war cast doubt upon their loyalty to Canada.9

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9 Canada, Department of Labour of Canada, “Report of the Department of Labour on the Re-Establishment
of Japanese in Canada, 1944-1946.” In Two Reports on Japanese Canadians in World War II (New York:
Appendix II. Loyalty Questions on Loyalty Questionnaire

Nisei Males were asked:

**Question 27.** “Are you willing to serve in the Armed Forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?”

**Question 28.** “Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any attack by foreign or domestic forces, and foresew any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?”

All Issei, as well as Nisei females, responded to an almost identical questionnaire save for the same two questions, which asked:

**Question 27.** “If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified, would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or the WAAD (Women’s Army Auxiliary Corp)?”

**Question 28.** “Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and foresew any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?”

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