Democracy as Romance and Satire:
Democratisation in South Korea by Social Movements

by

Chong Su Kim
BA, Hanyang University, 2001

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Political Science

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University of Victoria

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Supervisory Committee

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Supervisory Committee

Dr. Matt James, (Department of Political Science)
Supervisor

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Abstract

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This thesis investigates democratisation in South Korea. Unlike what structure- and process-oriented accounts of democratisation claim, democracy in South Korea was achieved through sustained popular action. The late-late development led by the authoritarian developmental state did not allow bourgeois or institutional politics to take the leading role for democracy. Social movements replaced them by making political opportunities and developing collective identity, their mobilising structures, and by using various discourses, repertoires, and framing. The structural context, movements' interaction with the state, and their strategies produced democracy with paradoxical results. Not only did they fail to achieve social democracy as their objective, but also the “founding election” for the transition to democracy in 1987 was exploited by elites. The paradoxical process of democratisation suppressed the reverse transition to reauthoritarianism on the one hand and constrained the popular sovereignty expressed through constitutionally legitimate massive collective action on the other hand. Though democratisation through collective action did not end “happily ever after,” it brought about democracy not only in institutional politics but also in noninstitutional politics.
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APO</td>
<td>Außerparlamentarische Opposition (extraparliamentary opposition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Bureacratic-Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Constituent Assembly (an acronym of a fraction in social movements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSRS</td>
<td>Council of College Student Representatives in Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Civil Democratic Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRM</td>
<td>Coalition for Democratic Reunification and the <em>Minjung</em> Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKP</td>
<td>Democratic Korean Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJP</td>
<td>Democratic Justice Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOI</td>
<td>Export-Oriented Industrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FJD</td>
<td>Foundation for June Democratic Uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKTU</td>
<td>Federation of Korean Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSLM</td>
<td>Federation of Seoul Labour Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCI</td>
<td>Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDWC</td>
<td>Incheon Democratic Workers Confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCLW</td>
<td>Korean Council for Labour Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Korea Democracy Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Main Currents (an acronym of a fraction in social movements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPO</td>
<td>Mass Political Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Acronym of <em>mintu</em>, meaning struggles for democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMFREL</td>
<td>National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDR</td>
<td>National Democratic Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFDW</td>
<td>National Federation of Democratic Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKDP</td>
<td>New Korea Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>National Liberation (an acronym of a fraction in social movements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLPDR</td>
<td>National Liberation People’s Democratic revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMH</td>
<td>National Movement Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Student Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSMs</td>
<td>New Social Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCSM</td>
<td>Publication Committee for Student Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDR</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td>Political Process Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCAA</td>
<td>Patriotic Students’ Confederation for Anti-Imperialism and Anti-dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reunification Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Resource Mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOs</td>
<td>Social Movement Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMI</td>
<td>Social Movement Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Social Movement Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMTs</td>
<td>Social Movement Theories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>U.S. Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>YCDM</td>
<td>Youth Coalition for Democratisation Movement</td>
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# List of Key Korean Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chaebol</td>
<td>South Korean Large conglomerate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaeya</td>
<td>Extraparliamentary Opposition in South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gitbal</td>
<td>Flag (a name of pamphlet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haklim</td>
<td>A group supporting immediate struggle thesis in 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubae</td>
<td>A junior student under the guidance by a sŏnbae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injeon</td>
<td>Realisation and Strategy (a name of a pamphlet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmin</td>
<td>Human and People (a term for people used by socialists before 1950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeonmang</td>
<td>The Prospect of Student Movement (a name of a pamphlet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonjaeigeon</td>
<td>Literally, transposition of being. Students’ identity shift to workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juche</td>
<td>North Korean Term for &quot;Subject&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minjung</td>
<td>People and mass (collective identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mintu</td>
<td>Struggles for democracy (a fraction in student movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murim</td>
<td>Group supporting preparation thesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nohakyeondae</td>
<td>Workers-students alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samchŏng</td>
<td>Triple purity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samin</td>
<td>Three min. Stands for minjok (nation), minju (democracy), and minjung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samintu</td>
<td>Struggle Committee for Reunification, Democracy, and Minjung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emancipation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sŏnbae</td>
<td>A senior student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ssocle</td>
<td>From English word circle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tushin</td>
<td>Literally, throwing or devoting oneself. Students’ identity shift to workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*Undongkwon*  The movement sphere

*Yabi*  Critique of Night Schools (a name of pamphlet)

*Yechon Yado*  Ruling party in villages and opposition party in cities

*Yushin*  Revitalisation (a term for the authoritarian regime in the 1970s)
Acknowledgments

I have never dreamed of writing a thesis in my life. As an activist for more than two decades, my primary concern was to change the world, not to interpret or to study it. Therefore, writing a thesis was completely a new project for me. This challenging project would not have been completed without support and guidance from a number of people. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Matt James for his insight, inspiration, encouragement, and generosity. Without having his support and guidance, I may have still wandered around in a maze of unfulfillable ambition and vagueness. I would also like to thank to Dr. Feng Xu for her insightful comments and guidance. Further, I would like to acknowledge professors and co-seminarians for their inspiring me with their deep insights and creative ideas. I wish to extend my tremendous gratitude to colleagues working in the Political Science Department office at UVic. Their kindness and readiness to help were great encouragement to me.

Lastly, I would like to thank my beloved life partner Sung Hee, who encouraged and supported me to study and shared her creative ideas. I also thank my beloved daughter Chorong, who is always proud of her father as a late bloomer.
Dedication

To people fighting for democracy.
To Chun, Tae-il who opened my eyes and roused my conscience.
To my father and mother.
Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the role of social movements in democratisation in South Korea (henceforth Korea) and their contribution to democracy. The central question of this thesis—how have social movements democratised Korea?—includes three interrelated questions: who are the agents of democratisation?, what are the ways that democratisation has unfolded?, and what are the degrees of democratic change that have taken place? Many scholars and academic literatures attribute democratisation in Korea to economic growth or elite pacts. In this particularised view, democratisation through social movements is unthinkable. Yet, few serious and comprehensive attempts have been undertaken so far to explain Korean democratisation from the social movements’ perspective. Democratic transition consisted of multiple subprocesses and involved different aspects of society, like political, economic, social, and cultural, in which various actors operated and interacted. Social movements were not just one of many actors in the transition but were a key actor; however, they were not a single unitary actor. Social movements, according to Tilly (2004), are a “historically specific complex.” In this thesis, I explain their collective action in this historical period as composed of multiple subprocesses and numerous interactions that contribute to wider impacts on democracy in Korea.

The first chapter provides a theoretical overview of the relations between democracy and social movements. First, I introduce the definition of democracy used in this thesis and examine how we might consider “causes of democracy”. Here, I discuss two approaches, structure-centred (modernisation theory) and process-oriented (elites-
oriented approach or transitology) approaches related to the causes of democratisation. In particular, I consider the relevant merits of their explanations for understanding democratisation in Korea. Second, I examine the necessity of adopting social movement theories (SMTs) towards explanations of democratisation in Korea. Here, I identify key elements of three SMTs—structural, rational and cultural—that are each relevant to Korean social movements. Limitations in the applicability of these approaches, due to their translation from Western origins to the Korean case will be demonstrated.

From the second to the fourth chapter, I conduct a historical survey of the development of Korean social movements for democracy, their interaction with other actors, and their impacts on democratisation. The time period covered ranges from 1979 to 1987. I disaggregate the phase of the transition into three periods: the rise of the minjung movement under the developmental state (from the mid-1970s to May 1980); a period of social movement abeyance (between June 1980 and 1983); and finally, the liberalisation and democratic transition (1984-1987).

In the second chapter, the historical context and structural changes in the environment within which social movements operated are discussed. Characteristics of Korean industrialisation and the state—“late-late” development (Hirschman, 1968) and the developmental state (Johnson, 1982)—and their implications for the emergence of social movements and the formation of collective identity are explored.

The third chapter deals with a period called “abeyance.” Social movements in Korea had to face ruthless repression of the state, which forced them into a phase of abeyance. The third chapter provides a critical review of two different concepts of SMTs, “cycles of protest” (Tarrow, 1998) and “abeyance” (Taylor, 1989). These concepts are discussed in
the context of a non-democratic polity pursued by Korea between the years 1980-1983. This chapter shows how social movements in Korea under harsh repression did not only survive, but also thrived, particularly through the development of their tangible and intangible resources for cultivating democracy under the strong authoritarian regime.

The fourth chapter reviews two interconnected subprocesses in democratisation: liberalisation and transition. The foci are, at first, on how forms of political and economic liberalisation contributed toward miscalculations by the regime and social movements—miscalculation of the former’s belief in its ability to control liberalisation and the latter’s confidence in transforming liberalisation into radical democracy—which resulted in a paradoxical democratisation without transfer of political power. In terms of transition processes, two distinctive and consecutive mobilisations occurred. One involving the mobilisation for political democracy was led by well organised social movements. Another involving the massive strike waves dominated by spontaneous actions of workers and their impacts on democratisation is also discussed. Characteristics of these two mobilisations are examined in relation to why neither led to radical democracy or reauthoritarianism, but instead contributed to the formation of electoral democracy. The fourth chapter also explains how ensembles of social movements, that is, their normative discourses and framing, narrative and dramaturgical repertoires, political opportunities, as well as mobilising structures including alliance politics, and collective identity, influenced democratisation in Korea. Significant to this process is an examination of how those ensembles, aspects of them, were constrained by the wider socio-political environment. Further, the nature of those ensembles and their impacts will be discussed.
My thesis is an attempt to explain how social movements changed the macro structure of the authoritarian polity. To summarise, the key findings of my thesis are as follows:

First, late-late-development led by the strong developmental state did not allow institutional politics and the bourgeoisie to develop in a way that contributed toward democratisation. This democratic deficit was filled by social movements.

Second, to enhance the explanatory power of SMTs—as a theoretical field that finds its origins and translation from the West—a different ontology of collective action in Korea must be taken into consideration lest these concepts be strained, stretched, or misapplied (Sartori, 1970). The concepts of SMT must be reexamined through contextualisation. Dissimilar ontology between liberal and nonliberal polities requires further modification of concepts that find their roots in ‘liberal’ societies. Protest cycle, abeyance, master frames, and collective identity have different dynamics and lead to different reaction, interaction, and ramification in nonliberal polities.

Third, the paradoxical results of democratisation in Korea are neither the products of pacts between or games of rational actors and their calculations that presuppose elites’ division both within the authoritarian bloc and the opposition (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1986). Nor are they the effects of undemocratic or anti-democratic Confucian legacies (Huntington, 1991). Rather, democratisation in Korea resulted from strategic miscalculations of both the authoritarian regime and social movements, from interactions among divergent actors, and from broader environmental constraints.

Fourth, characteristics of the key elements of SMTs—political opportunities, mobilising structures, framing, repertoires, and collective identity—help explain the emergence of diverse effects, including partial success of social movements, the electoral
or lukewarm democracy, democratisation of shop floors, and “movement society” (Rucht and Neidhardt, 2002). They are either open to every social and political actor or interactive. Political opportunities, collective action frames, repertoires were exploited not only by social movements but also even by incumbent elites. The initiators of these elements cannot monopolise them in terms of explanation. Mobilising structures, repertoires, and collective identity were formed, produced, and changed through the interaction with the state, its policing, and with other actors. These open or interactive characteristics of the elements employed by social movements generated wanted and unwanted or expected and unexpected results. As social movements stand in opposition to the state, repression often causes “repression paradoxes,” however, collective action of social movements can be also understood to generate “action paradoxes” due to the open and interactive nature of the elements of social movements.

Fifth, contrary to claims of modernisers and elites-oriented approaches, the pactless democratisation led by popular mobilisation in Korea failed to materialise in either revolution or reauthoritarianism. Instead, popular sovereignty followed dominant legal representations. The reasons that popular sovereignty remained within the boundary of constitutionality are as follows: (1) a historical construction of events channelled trajectories of political conflicts into ones revolving around the constitutional debates; (2) the interaction of various actors and the open and interactive nature of movements’ elements made the transition itself a process of education for democracy through participation (Pateman, 1970). Even incumbent elites “participated” in transition and acknowledged democracy as “the only game in town”; (3) the “schizophrenic” — historico-political metanarrative and cultural micronarrative—characteristics of collective
identity, *minjung* (people and mass), encouraged workers to choose micronarrative as its fate, not metanarrative for revolution. For the *minjung*, “everyday resistance” (Scott, 1985) or democracy in the workplace (Pateman, 1970) were the framing principles guiding the movement.

**METHODOLOGY and SOURCES**

At first, it is necessary to “unmask” the subtle positionality or perspective of the author of this thesis. Twenty-five years ago, I asked the same question of this thesis from the first-person-activist viewpoint, not from the first-person-observer-analyst position. As an activist of the student movement in Korea in the 1980s, one critical question animated my actions—“how is it possible to democratise Korea?” My activist history therefore prevents me from narrating or writing this thesis purely from the third-person, resigned to limited academic approach or from an omniscient viewpoints. This subtle positionality influenced my thesis in two ways. First, it influenced my choice of the case and the primary research question. Second, my positionality underlies the normative assumption that democracy of popular sovereignty equipped with both political and economic power with society-orientedness is better than democracy of parliamentary sovereignty equipped with political rights with government-orientedness (Arblaster, 1987; Pateman, 1970). For analytical purposes, my thesis adopts a minimal or intermediary definition of democracy. The gap between a minimal definition of democracy and my own normative assumptions of grassroots political decision-making brings the difference between the sort of democracy achieved and the one pursued in Korea into relief.
This thesis draws on two theoretical bodies: SMTs and historical-structural approaches (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Eckstein, 1989). The three approaches of SMTs have their strengths and flaws or biases (See Chapter 1), though together they represent how organized collectivities are generative of sustained collective action. They also detail the significances of movements’ interactions with other actors, their responses to the broader socio-political environment, as well as their uses of symbols, meanings, and how the formation of other cultural assets are created or inherited. The historical-structural perspectives are based on the assumption that there are enduring interactions between collective action and political structures. Structures, in spite of their relatively enduring characteristics, are subject to transformation by social movements. In this view, the emergence of social movements is contingent on historical structures, which, are considered necessary but not unilaterally determinate of collective action. Their relationship is better explained in non-deterministic and non-essentialist terms as “reciprocal determination” (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). SMTs and the historical-structural approaches are considered in complementary fashion in this thesis: social movements inevitably arise under historical circumstances that condition structures and also transform them.

For SMTs, the thesis draws upon literature of three dominant perspectives in the literature. Resource mobilisation (RM) theory considers the influence of resources, both tangible and intangible resources, for the emergence of social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Political process theory (PPT) provides a bridge that links actors to structures and therefore, social movements to political changes (McAdam, 1982; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978, 2004;). Cultural
approaches address interpretative and intellectual frames of collective actors (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992, 2000) as well as the generative influences of shared and negotiated collective identity (Habermas, 1981; Melucci, 1985, 1989; Melucci & Avritzer, 2000).

Regarding structural-historical perspectives, the thesis draws upon literature from three approaches: political economy, political institutionalism, and the transition approach. The political economy stream offers a frame for explaining historical developments in late industrialisation of Korea (Gerschenkron, 1962; Hirschman, 1968) and the developmental state (Johnson, 1982; Kohli, 2004; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The political economy approach explains the reason why social movements, not the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, played an important role in democratisation. The second approach, historical institutionalism (Immergut, 1998; Thelen, 1999), provides a useful conception of path dependence, detailing how outcomes of critical junctures produce a self-reinforcing positive feedback for subsequent events. It can be linked to the approach of the political economy and applied to social movements. For example, in explanations considering the diffusion of framing and repertoires. The transition approach (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1986) provides useful conceptions of distinctive subprocesses associated with democratic transition. This approach facilitates observation of the relationship between social movements, their interaction with other actors and their situatedness within broader environmental circumstances.

Clearly, this thesis draws upon numerous theoretical and empirical works that address the historical development of social movements in Korea. However, as to the development of minjung movement, there are excellent studies that are useful at both a
theoretical and empirical level (Abelman, 1996; Koo, 2001; Lee, 2007). The overview of the historical development of social movements in Korea is grounded within works published by the Korea Democracy Foundation (KDF) (KDF 2010; Lee, 2009).

This thesis also draws on data from Korean and U.S media, as well as documents published by Korean social movement organisations. The Korean social movement documents, such as statements, pamphlets, and yearbooks, are easily accessible for researchers and the public online, thanks to immense archival efforts from the KDF. Eyewitnesses of Korean social movements are obtained from two collections, 6wol hangjaeng ĭl ghirokhada (A long march for democracy in South Korea) and 5wŏl Kwangjurŭl Nŏmŏ 6wŏl hangjaengggji (From Kwangju to June Uprising) published by the KDF. Other pamphlets and documents on discourses and tactics of social movements, circulated underground in Korea in the 1980s, are obtained from the books (Hanguk Sahoigusŏnche 1 & 2, 1989, 1990) edited by the late Park, Hyen-chae, one of the prominent Marxist scholars in Korea, and the book Hanguk nodongundong Nonjaengsa (1989).
Chapter 1: Democracy and Social Movements

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief theoretical overview of democratic transitions and social movements. First, I will investigate structural and process-oriented accounts for democratic transition and their applicability to the specific case of Korean transition. Second, I will discuss three social movement approaches and their explanatory weight when applied to nonliberal polities. I will suggest how elements of these SMTs might be modified in order to improve their explanatory power when applied to different historical and cultural contexts.

DEMOCRACY AND ITS CAUSES

There are two different ways to define democracy: substantively and procedurally. The substantive definition links democracy to its desirable outcomes such as equality, justice, and inclusion, while the procedural one is associated with changes in political institutions and their structures (O'Loughlin, et al, 1998, pp. 546-549). A more conventional approach would be to classify democracy in terms of its scope: as minimalist and/or maximalist forms of democracy.

The Schumpeterian “democratic method” is the canonical example of the procedural and minimal definition of democracy. It prioritises “the rule of the politician” in which citizens’ rights and abilities are limited to electoral choice (Schumpeter, 1976). David Held’s (1987) “democratic autonomy” as a substantive and maximal definition stands opposite to the Schumpeterian method. The democratic autonomy approach considers not only political rights to vote, but also includes insights on popular participation in the
political process, enlightened capacities for understanding political agendas, as well as broader social and economic rights (Held, p. 285). However, in this thesis I adopt, for analytical purposes, Tarry L. Karl’s (1990) intermediary definition of democracy, defined through: “(1) contestations over policy and political competition for office; (2) participation of the citizenry through partisan, associational, and other forms of collective action; (3) accountability of rulers to the ruled through mechanisms of representation and the rule of law; and (4) civilian control over the military.” (p. 2).

**Structural Accounts: Prerequisites for Democracy**

Debates on democratisation in Korea have been dominated by economic accounts. For example, “the economic performance of the preceding authoritarian regime…set the terms and affect[ed] the mode of the transition” (Ahn & Juang, 1999, p. 143). Huntington (1991b) similarly contends that “economic development makes democracy possible” (p. 316). According to these authors, democracy requires industrialisation as a prerequisite.

Prerequisites for democracy are often espoused by theorists and researchers considered as “modernisers.” Lipset (1959) represents this view with an insistence that “democracy is related to the state of economic development. … [the] more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (1959, p. 75). Affirming a linear and causal relationship between economy and democracy can be considered to be a pseudo-“iron-law” in many cross-national quantitative studies on democracy.

A different version of modernisation theory can be found in class analysis. Marx claimed that the bourgeoisie established parliamentary democracy to maintain their power (Marx, 1989, pp. 36-82). Barrington Moore (1996) essentially repeats Marx’s
thesis, associating the bourgeoisie with parliamentary democracy: “No bourgeois, no democracy” (p. 418). Therborn (1977) and Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens (1993), however, reject the bourgeoisie’s revolutionary part in liberal democracy and underline the active role of the working class in democratisation.

In these structural accounts, the discretionary power of actors is highly restrained by structural and institutional constraints. So much so, that the option left to them in any transition to democracy can be seen merely as an option guided by the existing structure but not an active process emergent through human agency and collective choice. These deterministic structural accounts, however, are not applicable to the process of democratisation in Korea. First, in the Korean case, democratisation occurred without the ‘pre-requisite’ of industrialisation. The April 19\textsuperscript{th} Uprising in 1960 succeeded in overthrowing dictatorship and establishing democratic government. Without maturity of the bourgeoisie, the working- and middle-class, Korean social movements changed the existent nondemocratic polity. Second, the crises of dictatorship in 1960, 1979, and 1987 were all accelerated by collective action. The transition from an authoritarian polity to a democratic one was initiated by social movements in which the bourgeoisie played no significant role. The working class played a more important role than the bourgeoisie; however, their role was largely symbolic. Structural accounts cannot account for the significant dynamics of agential transitions and interactions.

**The Process-oriented approach: Pact and Elites**

In contrast to the structural approaches, the process-oriented approach places its focus on actors and their strategic choices regarding changes of polity. It puts more weight on
contingent factors than structural ones and does not insist on structural prerequisites in democratic transitions involving regime change. If it does, it accepts only their correlation, as “correlation evidently is not the same as causation” (Rustow, 1970, p. 342). In addition, the process-oriented approach focuses more on democratisation in the short term than on the long-term development or consolidation of political structures. The process-centred approach focuses on the process of transition, like pact-making among elites.

According to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), neither do the structural elements decide the transition, nor do standard actors. Instead, “fortuna” (unexpected events) and “virtu” (the talents of specific individuals) are frequently decisive (pp. 2-5). Cleavages between hard- and soft-liners between incumbent elites and challenging ones constitute a key condition for pacts which pave the way toward successful and gradual transitions (O’Donnell & Schmitter, p. 37).

One of the problems of the process-oriented approach is that it disassociates the structural factors from actors themselves and disregards the conditioning effects of the former on the latter’s choices. Second, it is hostile to popular protest.¹ It usually considers democratic transition in the framework of abstract game theory where rules should be respected for producing moderate results; moreover, popular mobilisation could also lead to a reversal of democratic transition by incumbent elites. Third, it is difficult to apply conventional transitology analysis to the Korean case of transition. Some authors, Im, Hyug-baeg (1995) and Cheng and Kim (1994), tried to apply the process-oriented approach to the transition in Korea by explaining it as a pact between

hard- and soft-liners among elites in power and oppositional forces. The fact is that there was no pact between incumbent and oppositional elites and no cleavage between hard- and soft-liners (Yun, 1997; Seong, K., 1993). Popular protest determined the critical moment of transition and its characteristics in Korea.²

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES and THEIR MONTAGE

Structural accounts and transitology do not offer effective explanation of Korean democratisation due to their inherent problems of determinsim and a wider inapplicability to the contingencies of the Korean case. They cannot explain the crucial role of Korean social movements in democratisation. There are three reasons why social movements, instead of political institutions like parties, are brought into focus in this thesis: the underdevelopment of political institutions in Korea during the historical period under question, the potential usefulness and explanatory power of SMTs, and finally, the relatively limited number of studies on democratisation based on SMTs.

Historical Constraints and the Role of Social Movements

Spaces for political society have been considerably restricted by international and domestic factors in Korea. The Cold War limited the ideological spectrum of political parties. The division of the Korean peninsula into the communist North and capitalist South constrained the development of political parties with a leftist orientation in South Korea.

² Studies based on the process-oriented approach assign the primary cause of the transition to democracy in 1987 as the division of incumbent elites into the soft-liners and hard-liners without providing specific and detailed information; however, in contrast to their claims, eyewitnesses and historical evidences unanimously indicate that elites were united behind the then-president Chun, Doo-hwan and the liberalisation in 1987 was not produced by their division but initiated by Chun in the face of massive public pressure. See Kim, Seong-ik (Kim, S., 1992) and Shindonga (1997).
Korea, something also reinforced through the Korean War. Domestically, the long period of authoritarian domination deprived political parties of institutionalisation and establishment. The former dictator Park, Chung-hee who ruled Korea from 1961 to his death by assassination in 1979 even suppressed his own ruling party (Han, S., 1988). Therefore, choices left to opposition parties before democratisation were either to remain as “loyal opposition” or to be marginal in political affairs. They were epiphenomenal in democratisation. Second, social movements played the most crucial role in transition (Seong, K., 1993; Choi, J., 2010). Every critical juncture in democratisation—for instance April 19th Democratic Revolution in 1960, 1980 Kwangju Uprising, and June Uprising in 1987—was initiated by social movements’ sustained challenges against the authoritarian regimes.

**The Rational, Structural, and Cultural Approach**

Despite the significant role of social movements in democratisation in Korea, SMTs were rarely applied to the democratic transition in Korea. In this thesis, I will adopt some of their key elements in order to explain democratisation in Korea.

From three modern SMTs—rational, structural, and cultural—I will identify five elements—mobilising structures, political opportunities, repertoires, framing, and collective identity—to explain the role of social movements in democratisation in Korea.

The rational approach (RM) views social movements not as deviant actions of psychologically disrupted individuals, but as the collective action of rational actors. The major elements of the rational approach involve the accumulation of resources (money

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3 For review or critiques of these approaches, see Buechler (2000, pp. 19-57), Goodwin and Jasper (2004, pp. 3-30), McAdam (1982, pp. 1-59), McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald (1996, pp. 1-20), Tarrow (1998, pp. 10-23),
and labour) available to social movements, formal organisations and their aggregation of these resources, as well as how outsiders of the collectivity might be linked to the resource flow. These elements can be termed as a resource mobilisation, or in a more recent term, as *mobilising structures* in PPT.

The structural approach, PPT, can be viewed as a correction of the economy- and a meso-level RM approach. *Political opportunities* are one of its key elements. They refer to “consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national—dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics” (Tarrow, 1998, pp. 19-20). The other important element of PPT relevant to this thesis are *repertoires*. Tilly (2004) suggests that repertoires refer to forms of actions available to social movements, like vigils, demonstrations, sit-ins, and statements (p. 3).

The cultural approach attempts to fill the cultural gap in the structural approach. *Framing* and *collective identity* are the representative elements of the cultural approach. Snow, Benford, and their colleagues (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988,1992, 2000) adapted Goffman’s notion of frame—a schemata of interpretation allowing individuals to recapture occurrences, events, actions in condensed and simplified ways—to the study of social movements. Framing contains three interwoven tasks: the diagnostic framing (identifying problems and attributions); the prognostic framing (addressing possible solution and remedies); and the motivational (providing rationale for participation in collective action) (Snow and Benford, 2000, p. 617). The other important aspect of framing theory is to align frames with movements’ activities. Doing so bridges unconnected frames by linking them to a particular issue, thereby amplifying a frame through clarification and invigoration, as well as extending frames’ boundaries and
transforming frames by creating new values, beliefs, and meanings (Snow et al, 1986).

Snow and Benford (1992) expanded framing to the macro level by adopting master frames and by connecting them to movement’s cycles, which refer to a period marked by massive increases and subsequent decline of conflicts (Tarrow, 1998).

The other important cultural approach is the collective identity approach, developed in new social movements’ (NSMs) theory. This approach sees NSMs as the products of structural changes from material to post-material society, as staging reactions against the colonisation of life-world, which triggers groups of people outside the productive core of capitalism to fashion a collective identity (Habermas, 1981). Collective identity is a process, according to Melucci (1989), “in which actors produce the common cognitive frameworks that enable them to assess their environment and to calculate the costs and benefits of their action.” (pp. 34-35).

The reasons that I employ these five elements are that the success of social movements relies more or less on a favourable environment for social movements (political opportunities), their strength (resources), successful interpretations of themselves and occurrences (framing), diffusive and shared tactics (repertoires), and agency (collective identity). Furthermore, they can together explain the connectivity between structure and agents that expands to include the interactions between social movements and other actors, as well as the multifacetedness of movements impacts on politics and culture.

**Modification of SMTs and Integrated Approach**

Before I discuss how those five elements can be employed in this thesis, I will consider the limitations of the three approaches of SMTs above in order to show the necessity for
adapting the five elements to the processes Korean social movements and
democratisation. Further, I will show the necessity for an integrated approach.

First, all three approaches above were developed geographically in the West and
historically since the 1960s. They have been highly concentrated on democratic polities
in their research, except for some recent attempts. The approaches all presuppose open
societies with relatively affluent resources, accessible and working political institutions,
and social movements grounded in communicative actions. Terms adopted by these
approaches reveal their limited historical context. Regarding political opportunities, for
instance, the expressions “open”, “expand”, “close”, or “miss” are used as predicates for
verbs or modifiers in participle form. The consistent existence and presence of political
opportunities are always “over there” and their absence is in fact excluded from the
beginning. To take one more illustration, “negotiated”, “communicative”, or “public
space”, are all terms associated with collective identity. In this example, each is based on
the premise that “collective identity needs the reassurance of a social space protected
against control and free from repression.” (Melucci and Avritzer, 2000, p. 521). Thus, the
three approaches must be modified in order to be applicable to the case of Korean social
movements that challenged a nondemocratic polity.

Second, there are few studies of democratisation in Korea from the social movements’
perspective. Of the few that exist, they have not provided a satisfactory explanation of the
comprehensive and dynamic processes of democratisation in Korea. Partial adoptions of
SMTs present only limited aspects of social movements and their involvement in, and

5 To illustrate, Seong (1993) tried to analyse democratisation in South Korean based on Tilly’s (1978) polity
and mobilisation models; Yun, Seongyi (Yun, S., 1997) applied political opportunity structures to the South
Korean democratisation process; and Chung, Chul-hee (1996; 2011) employed “mesomobilisation” coined
impacts on, democratisation. Social movements and their impacts on social changes cannot be explained by a single cause. In some cases, a certain element plays a more important role than others. Where movements’ resources are relatively poor, political opportunities could be crucial to mobilisation, as they did in the transition in the former socialist states in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Oberschall, 1996; Zdravomyslova, 1996; Tarrow, 1998, pp. 73-76); however, movement resources are less important where social movements can create a new opportunity or if they can survive under adverse conditions, as they did in the Iranian revolution (Kurzman, 2003; 2004). Collective identities in the German reunification – from *das Volk* (the people) to *ein Volk* (one people) – played a crucial role in the development of collective action. Korean social movements— as a complex of sustained collective action with various tactics and discourses under different political opportunities—and their impacts cannot be also understood through a single element of SMTs.

Based on the above discussion, I reconstruct the five elements of SMT in relation to collective actions pressing for democratisation in Korea.

First, I will adopt the general principles of PPT for my thesis, for democratisation in Korea can be characterised as a political and interactive process between social movements and the state. Macro structural changes, such as industrialisation and demographic changes, as well as institutions at the macro level, all had significant impacts on the development of social movements and processes of democratisation. I delimit political opportunities to external factors that facilitate mobilisation and reduce
power disparities between elites and challengers.\textsuperscript{6} Opportunities that are fully or partially produced by movements will not be integrated into political opportunities in my analysis.

Second, I will expand mobilising structures in RM theory to include informal networks and macro alliances, for their original concept is limited to formal micro- and meso-level organisations. Influential allies are usually considered to be external resources to movements; hence, they are usually regarded as a dimension of political opportunities. In Korea under the authoritarian regime however, institutional politics remained underdeveloped. The survival and development of opposition parties were considerably dependent on extraparliamentary groups, like social movements. Therefore, I will include alliances in the mobilising structures, not in political opportunities. The expansion of the concept of mobilising structure permits an inclusive examination of the contributions of social movements to, and their impacts on, political changes at the macro-level.\textsuperscript{7}

Third, I use framing and repertoires as mutually complementary elements from the cultural perspective. They demonstrate agential initiatives and movements’ interaction with and impacts on others. To this end, I have also slightly modified the concept of the “master frame” in the framing approach by adding “unifying issues” (Ryan, 1992) to it. Democracy as the master frame in Korea had wide extension but its intensity was low. “Unifying issues” (Ryan, 1992) that unite groups of people concerned about similar

\textsuperscript{6} Political opportunity structures threaten to lose their explanatory power on account of the ambiguity, elusiveness (Gamson and Meyer, 1986), and “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970). Every environmental factor of movements – political institutions, history, culture, polity realignment, changes in international position or alliances, etcetera – that facilitates collective action can be bundled into this concept.

\textsuperscript{7} Despite different positions on the relationship between social movements and revolutions, Teda Skocpol (1979) distinguishing the former from the latter and PPT (McAdam, 1982; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 1996; Tarrow, 1998) seeing it in one continuum of collective actions consider alliances as a structural factor in social changes, i.e. independent of collective actors. In contrast to their positions, I included alliances and/or alliance politics in mobilising structures in order to show potentials of social movements to bring out or at least to affect social changes at the macro-level, such as transition of polities.
issues increased the intensity of the master frame in the critical moment of
democratisation in Korea.

Fourth, collective identity used here is not just a unity to be mobilised as a group for
political purposes as considered in PPT or as a purely cultural concept. Minjung, as
collective identity, was regenerated by social movements through interactions with the
state and “subaltern” classes (Gramsci, 1971). Minjung is not only expressive and cultural
but is also strategic and political. It involves a political project, underpinned through a
counter-hegemonic culture and mobilising strategy. Collective identity, minjung, itself
does not possess a single unitary characteristic however. From the perspective of the
NSMs, minjung appears to be schizophrenic. It presents “epic representations” of the past
as an historical agent but, at the same time, involves “disenchanted” voices (Melucci,
1985, pp. 809-810). Since the Kwangju Popular Uprising in 1980, social movements
were used interchangeably with minjung movement. The minjung movement, borrowing
Melucci’s (1985) terms, asked for popular power as a modern political movement and
offered minjung cultures as an anti-, pre-modern cultural movement.
Chapter 2: The Late-Late Development and the Birth of Minjung

In the previous chapter, I reviewed the structure- and process-oriented accounts of transition, as well as the three movement approaches, the structural, the rational, and the cultural. Based on the review, I suggested that democratisation in Korea can be most effectively explained through social movements’ sustained challenges to authoritarian regimes, their interaction with other actors including the state and bystanders, and their interpretation and exploitation of both historical context and the structural environment.

In this chapter, I will at first discuss the historical context and structural changes in the environment which social movements acted during the late or late-late development of South Korea. Hirschman (1968) coined the term “late-late development” to differentiate the Latin American industrialisation that is similar to the early economic power like England from that of Gerschenkron’s (1968) account of late development in countries, like Germany, Italy and Russia. A notion of Korea as initiated by the developmental state will be explored for the following two reasons: (1) it will display why the Korean bourgeoisie played an insignificant and adverse role in democratisation, while the proletariat took a symbolic role rather than a supportive role; (2) the emergence and development of the developmental state will explain, on the one hand, the underdeveloped political society as well as contentious social movements on the other hand. Second, I will focus on the historical development of social movements for democracy in Korea and their explorations of the subject of history, minjung, which were triggered by repeated failures of collective action initiated by intellectuals without public support. While also at the same time, by the potential demonstrated from working people
to threaten authoritarian regimes with explosive protests. The origin of social movements for democracy, for the April 19th Democratic Revolution, and its impact on subsequent movements will be reviewed. Further, the failure of the Revolution and movements’ search for collective identity will be investigated in light of structural changes. Third, I will discuss the birth of minjung and the minjung movement in the mid-1970s. The concept of minjung will be explained through the structural changes and ideational identities of social movements. Then, I will discuss a series of workers’ strikes in 1979, the resulting political thaw and the massacre in Kwangju against protesters in 1980 as practical identity works or also as a confirmation of minjung as a key agent for democratisation. The protests that stirred up Korea in 1979 and 1980 occurred through active participation of working people that summoned and vitalised the concept of minjung as a collective identity.

THE IMPLICATION of THE LATE-LATE DEVELOPMENT

The Korean War, the Aid Economy, and Path Dependence

Korea’s decolonisation from Japan in 1945 coincided with the Cold and “hot war”. Korea was divided by foreign powers. North Korea was occupied by the Soviet Army, South Korea by the US. The Korean War between 1950 and 1953 eradicated possibilities for endogenous capitalistic development in Korea (Chŏn, 2002, pp. 17-19). The War engendered a powerful bureaucratic state with a huge military force (Kohli, 2004, pp. 65-68). The Korean War formed a critical juncture that constrained the subsequent developmental path of Korea in social, political, cultural, and economic respects. Socially, it swept away left-oriented social forces in South Korea where social movements were
completely terminated; politically speaking, the terrain was opened only to right-wing parties. The predominance of the developmental state suffocated the formation of left-oriented parties and suppressed the establishment of a functioning political society as well. The War enabled the developmental state to monopolise financial resources crucial to economic development. Culturally, anti-communism became the hegemonic ideology that legitimised the existence of an authoritarian regime, suppressing any criticism of the regime, and even intruded into people’s psyches through impositional forms of self-censure (Choi, J., 1993, pp. 22-24). Economically, through the destruction of the economy, the war opened and limited South Korea’s economic path to the export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) guided by the “Aid economy.”

The aid economy transformed Korea. The prevelance of favouritism and corruption formed a material basis for later emergence of the chaebol (large conglomerates). The collapse of agriculture had another long lasting effect. Massive aid in the form of farm products worth over 200 million US dollars from the US between 1956 and 1961 deprived mid-small sized farmers of competitiveness and drove out sharecroppers from their villages. A typical situation described by William Arthur Lewis (1954) was created where a degraded agricultural sector provided the industrial sector with unlimited labours working for minimum subsistence wages and thus eventually increasing the national income without any corresponding wage increases (Lewis, 1954, pp. 189-190).

To sum up, the foundation for Korean capitalistic development was laid down in only one and a half decades after decolonisation in 1945, characteristically marked through an

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8 Foreign aid played crucial role in determining the future trajectory of South Korean economy. Its total volume amount 3.1 billion US dollars between 1945 and 1961. Foreign aids made up about average 12 percent of South Korea’s GDP and ca. 70 percent of government’s total revenue. South Korea was even ranked second in the recipient countries of the US aid during 1957-1962 (Park, C., 1981).
overdeveloped state (Hamza Alavi, 1972), the formation of a bourgeoisie, albeit a weak formation, the collapse of land owners, and a massive industrial reserve. Regarding the democratic prerequisites noted by Moore (1966), the demise of land owners produced favourable conditions for democracy, but the capacity of the bourgeoisie was highly limited because their success substantially rested upon a corrupt nexus with the regime. The massive industrial reserve was not yet fully transformed into a working class that would be an essential condition for sustainable democracy, according to Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992). Workers in the manufacturing industry accounted for only 11 percent in 1960, while the majority (58%) of the population still remained in rural areas as peasants (Tongyŏchŏng, 1998). Despite this weak structural basis, a democratic movement arose when the dictator Rhee, Syngman’s repeated abuses came to the fore in 1960. The democratic movement succeeded in changing the regime, but the new regime was only short-lived due to the military coup in 1961. Without industrialisation, i.e. with no bourgeoisie and no proletariat, without resources and opportunities, social movements still emerged and contributed to the democratisation of Korea. This can be only understood through the Korean late-late developmental, historical, and cultural context. I will revisit this subject in the following sections.

Late-Late Development and Developmental State

Late-Late Development and The Developmental State: Fear and Élan

The latent potential for industrialisation in Korea was developed despite, or perhaps due to, its backwardness. Gerschenkron (1962) argued that “the more delayed the industrial development of a country, the more explosive was the great spurt of its industrialisation,
if and when it came” (p. 44). An interventionist state in terms of so-called ‘late comers’ such as Germany and Russia could complement the lack of capital, technologies, corporations, and skilled labourers and organise a large scale process of industrialisation that could release “the forces that made for industrial progress” (p. 11). This form of a Gerschenkronian late development of the 19th century Europe emerged in Korea in the 1960s. This particular late-late development (Hirschman, 1968)9 in Korea was led by the developmental state.

Johnson (1982) suggests that, in the developmental state, the logic of a “developmental orientation” predominates and the state assumes a dominant development function (pp. 18-19). The developmental state originated in the economic nationalism that grew out of war or fighting against enemies such as communism. Industrial policy, one of the key functions of the developmental state, emerged from war. Woo-Cumings (1999) even describes experiences of war or security as a “binding-agent” for development that made East Asian developmental states more similar to the states of late developers like Germany than those of late-late comers of Latin America (pp. 1-31). The developmental state has “a political and not an economic basis” (Johnson, 1982, pp. 3-34).

When Park, Chung-hee seized power with a coup in 1961, he sought his legitimacy through anti-communist ideology fused to strong economic growth. They became his raison d’état and the developmental state of Sourth Korea embodied it. He dressed his dictatorship in fear of war and élan for industrialisation and covered both with heavy

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9 The early, late, and late-late industrialisers are named based on their timing of industrialisation. Although the timing of South Korean industrialisation falls into the late-late industrialisers, its characteristics are analogous to the late ones. The beginning of industrialisation, light industry, in the late-late industrialisers in Latin America resembled the early ones, albeit only in appearance (Hirschman, p. 7). The state form and “convulsive élan” in the late industrialisers which lacked in the Latin American late-late ones (Hirschman, p. 9) can find its analogy in the South Korean late-late development.
makeup that pressed for the “modernisation of the fatherland.” Under such circumstances, the Korean developmental state deflected the demand for democracy into economic growth.

The political complexity of the developmental state yielded different implications for the authoritarian regime and social movements, respectively. The former was prey to its own trap of economic imperatives, whereas the latter had to concentrate on political issues with complicated and to some extent contradictory approaches. First, as the popular protest in the late 1960s and in 1979 during the economic crisis showed, the underperformance of the authoritarian regimes in the economy always led to their crisis; however, the regimes’ overperformance did not guarantee their legitimacy. It rather delegitimized and renounced its existence as the popular uprising in 1987 demonstrated that overperformance nurtured its own grave digger. Industrialisation worked as a master process during modernisation while democratisation worked as a counter process. Second, the hegemonic discourse of the developmental state, growthism under security or élan under fear, narrowed the terrain of political society. The limited access to institutional politics in Korea was undergirded by the Cold war, the Korean War, and the division of two Koreas. Opposition parties and the legislature itself were repeatedly paralysed by the state’s emergency powers. Thus, opposition parties could not be “influential allies” for social movements under this climate of nondemocratic polity (Osa and Schock, 2007).

Social movements were not free from these ideological, environmental, and political constraints. Even trivial claim-making was considered a serious challenges to the regime to be punished by the death penalty. The threat and execution of state violence were exploited through exemplary cases in anti-communist campaigns to discipline publics
(Foucault, 1979). Thus, social movements’ claim-making had to detour around socialism and therefore, they met opposition parties outside the parliament in the process of democratisation. Noninstitutional politics became the main arena where the nondemocratic and democratic forces confronted each other.

**Inventing Bourgeois and Repressing Proletariat**

Authoritarian regimes fostered their allies to suppress challenges and to demonstrate their abilities in successfully performing economic activities to ensure their own survival. They invented a bourgeoisie.

The state used various resources to invent and then tame a bourgeoisie. Financial tools and allocations of business licenses were used as carrots and sticks to discipline private businesses. Those resisting government policies or its non-economic ‘requests’ were rejected and repressed, while those complying with them were rewarded through loans at substantially lower interest rates among other advantages for their businesses (Amsden, p. 17; Eckert, 1993, p. 103; Koo, 2001, p. 31). The more important tool of the state to control the economy and discipline businesses involved industrial policy, which was encapsulated in “development plans.” The shift in industrial policy entailed an overall restructuring of government institutions that altered relationships between state and non-state actors. The developmental state created economic space for the bourgeoisie, “thus tutoring it and, in so doing, virtually reinventing it” (O'Donnell, 1978, p. 22). The turn to EOI of Park’s economic policies promoted the relationship between the regime and the *chaebols* which greatly favoured the *chaebols*. In the year of 1968, big businesses represented 2.4 percent of the all companies and were responsible for 65.2 percent of
value added in the entire economy (Chŏn, pp. 48-49). Thus, the role of the Korean bourgeoisie in democratisation was reactive due to their dependence on the developmental state.

When the economy entered recession in the late 1960s, increased resistance among workers, urban poor, and students destabilised the foundations of the Park regime. Park promulgated Yushin (revitalisation) Reformation in October 1972, while imposing martial law and disbanding parliament. The Yushin system concentrated state power in the hands of Park, Chung-hee. This regime is often called the Korean Bureaucratic-Authoritarian (BA) regime, as O’Donnell has termed it. The economic policy that Park’s regime took in the face of crisis was expansionary (Amsden, p. 112) for its foundation and legitimacy were inseparably bound up with widespread economic growth. The promulgation of Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation (HCI) in 1973 contributed to a further enlargement of the super chaebol. Paradoxically, industrial deepening offered the chaebol a relative autonomy from the state with their enlarged size, while the state witnessed a decline of its power when its industrial policy turned out to be a failure in the second half of the 1970s. These changes in politics and economic policies were paralleled with strict labour controls. In 1971, right before the emergence of the Yushin, the Park regime suspended workers’ rights to collective bargaining and strikes.

The rapid processes of industrialisation produced dramatic changes in Korean society. The industrial structure shifted drastically: the share of manufacturing (incl. mining) industry in the GDP went up from 16.3 percent in 1963 to 29.7 percent in 1980. During the same period, the employment of manufacturing (incl. mining) industry increased from 8.7 percent and 28.3 percent (Tongyŏchŏng).
Two intertwined features are worth noting here. The first involves the rapid increase of women workers in the labour market. The number of women employed in the manufacturing industry increased nearly sevenfold between 1963 and 1980. The overall share of women in the major export industries, mostly light industry, in the 1970s took up nearly 70 percent (Chong, M., 1993); however, industrial deepening through the 1970s worsened their living standards because of widespread bankruptcy of companies due to cuts to government subsidies in conjunction with weakened competitiveness derived from increasing inflation. Women workers’ struggles for survival, eventually, intensified the regime crisis in 1979. The second point worth noting involves the high homogeneity of workers in terms of their spatial concentration. Since 1960, industrialisation caused rapid urbanisation: from 28 percent in 1960 to 57.3 percent in 1980. EOI and the economy of scale channelled this urbanisation into the selective development of industrial urban areas like Seoul, port cities, or cities of free export processing zones. The majority of workers had similar rural backgrounds and lived in shared residential places such as factory dormitories or in extremely cramped “hen houses” or “bee hive” type housing. These conditions were conducive to developing a homogeneous class culture and collective consciousness (Koo, 2001, pp. 41-45).\footnote{This spatial and cultural homogeneity have been being dismantled since the late 1990s. The chaebol-centred industrial structure divided workers into those employed in chaebol corporations and those in small and medium-sized companies. It was promoted by following two reasons: the successful labour movement – which caused chaebols to heighten their industrial structure to survive in the global markets – widened wage differences between the former and the latter; the enterprise-based union contributed also to the heterogeneity of those two groups. Further, the shift from the despotic labour regime to the hegemonic one and globalisation flexibilised the labour market that divided workers into those with regular jobs and those with irregular ones (Koo, 2001, pp. 205-217).} Though Korean workers were systematically oppressed and controlled by the authoritarian developmental state, it paradoxically offered them a favourable foundation to act collectively. Thus, it was not purely accidental that women workers’ struggles first shook the base of the Park regime,
followed by the uprisings in Busan, the second largest and port city, and then in Masan, the largest free export zone, which delivered the final blows in 1979.

The Context of the Late-Late Development and Social Movements

Late-late industrialisation brought about dramatic changes in society. The significance of this development for the process of democratisation ought be discussed in order to understand the origin of social movements in Korea, the birth of minjung as a collective identity, as well as the particular characteristics of social movements in Korea.

The dominance of the strong developmental state over politics, economy, and society at first deprived the bourgeoisie and proletariat of their leading role in democratisation, for the former were dependent on the state while the latter were severely repressed. Unlike the former, the latter had the potential to play a leading role, but it was not fully developed on account of their absolute lack of resources for mobilisation.

Second, as discussed earlier, the terrain of institutional or parliamentary politics was very limited under the developmental state. Therefore, opposition parties sought their allies outside parliament in order to gain influence on it. This resulted in the formation of the extraparliamentary opposition in the 1970s, called chaeya composed of opposition politicians, religious groups, progressive intellectuals, artists, and journalists with middle class backgrounds. Chaeya’s political and ideological position lies, to illustrate, in the middle between radical and noninstitutional-politics-oriented West German APO (Außerparlamentarische Opposition, extraparliamentary opposition) and liberal and institutional-politics-oriented Taiwanese tangwai (people outside the party). Chaeya’s ideological position was limited to liberalism against dictatorship with economic justice.
Third, the dominance of the state offered social movements an opportunity to unify and make the state itself their target, in spite of the state’s intention to oppose any mobilisation. Its basic policy of building the economy provided challengers with new channels of communication, networks, and even discourses. Cities equipped with industrial areas and universities were not only the key places for the industrial production of goods and knowledge but places for the generation of rebellious ideas and communication. The repeated election results “Yechon Yado” (ruling party in villages and opposition party in cities) confirmed that challenges were inadvertently nurtured by the regimes. Regarding discourses provided by the state, the regime instrumentalised nationalism to promote national unity for purposes of security and industrialisation. Historical figures were rediscovered, text books were filled with national heroes, and other nationalistic symbols were introduced. Nationalism developed later into one of the core discourses of social movements in the 1980s. In addition, social movements paraphrased the regime’s discourse: the working-class as the “industrial warriors” of industrialisation was reinterpreted as “the master of history” for democratisation. Further, when the regime forbade socialist discourse or terminology, like proletariat and inmin (human + people), which was used by socialists before the Korean War, social movements reinvented the notion of minjung to mobilise broad population beyond class-based working-class. Minjung, thus, involved both an expressive identity, as in lesbian and gay movements, and a strategic identity (Polleta and Jasper, 2001; Whittier, 2001).

Fourth, the dominance of the developmental state over the economy, however, drove social movements to assume that the removal of the regime would automatically lead to socioeconomic as well as political democracy. This assumption involved the risk of
equating democracy with regime change and to a further separation of socioeconomic democracy from political democracy in the hope that electoral democratisation would be followed through with broader social democratic changes.

**BIRTH of MINJUNG MOVEMENT**

**The Legacy Of the April Revolution In 1960**

The Democratic Revolution of April 19, 1960 was ignited through a crooked election in March. More deeply, however, it was a confluence of social dissatisfaction, political mismanagement, and economic problems. Ill-treatment of political opponents and ceaseless corruption by the President Rhee, Syngman weakened his own political legitimacy. Moreover, decreasing foreign aid, a series of poor crops, and a plummeting economic growth rate in the late 1950s further accelerated the crisis of the Rhee regime.

The rage of citizens was ignited when the dead body of high school student, Kim, Juyul, was found on the coast of Masan in April. His skull had been penetrated by a tear gas grenade. This tragedy incited a nationwide demonstration. More than twenty thousand students and citizens marched on the Presidential Blue House in Seoul on April 19. The demonstrators were fired on by soldiers and more than 20 people were killed in Seoul alone. Finally, Rhee retreated under pressures from the nationwide demonstrations and the US (Lee, M., 2009, p. 35). However, protests did not subside but rather diffused from students and intellectuals to workers. In comparison to figures from 1959, labour disputes doubled in 1960. Though the new regime replaced the old through a free democratic election in July 1960, protesters further radicalised their slogans. Nevertheless, the April
“Revolution” ended in failure, when the new regime was toppled by a group of military officers led by General Park, Chung-hee.

The political opportunities in the year of 1960 were unfavourable for insurgents. There was no division in elites, no increased access to the regime, no political alignment, and no facilitating conditions for mobilisation. A series of spontaneous collective actions in large cities did however, create and broaden the opportunities. This spontaneous collective action exposed the vulnerability of the regime, attracted bystanders, separated standpatters from incumbent elites, and produced opportunities for opponents to increase pressure on the regime (Tarrow, 1996, pp. 58-61). Insurgents succeeded in compelling Rhee to resign; however, they lacked a sustained “connective structure” that could link various actors within and around movements in ways that would enable them to build networks, organise actions, and be sustainable as a movement (Tarrow, 1998, p. 124). Ironically, the absence of a united organisational force and leadership of insurgents may have contributed to the early resignation of Rhee (Han, 1974, p. 32). If the insurgents had represented themselves as a united force that was capable of replacing the opposition parties, their actions would have been met by a unified counterattack of the regime and opposition parties. Naturally, the absence of an organised defiance and coherent leadership limited the continuing effect of collective action and insurgents had to settle upon the satisfaction garnered from a mere change of the regime.

In the phase of uncontrolled liberalisation between 1960 and 1961, intellectuals, trade unions, and left political parties tried to transform their framing from electoral issues to stress social and economic democracy. They interpreted economic poverty, authoritarianism, and corruption as deficiencies of democracy emergent from a
dictatorship, backed by the US’s imperial power. This framing transformation was not tolerated by elites, and in particular, it was similarly opposed by the conservative sector in the Korean army that possessed the largest amount of resources since the Korean War. The Korean army mobilised and seized state power through a military coup d’état in May of 1961, based on justifications that the social movements’ radical demands allegedly threatened the existence of the fatherland.

The April Revolution had significant implications for subsequent democratisation movements. First, it served not only as a starting point but also as a further foundation for democracy in the country. Democracy in Korea had been imposed and implanted from the outside, by the US, after decolonisation. The April Revolution was the first attempt since the Korean War to achieve democracy through popular action. The nascent social movements asserted popular sovereignty (Tilly, 2004). Democracy was declared as the master frame: “the foundation of modern democracy is freedom. … The right to vote as a minimal public right was deprived. To be a democracy-fighter is glorious.” (4.19 Declaration, author’s trans.). Second, the April Revolution produced various resources for social movements. The Revolution nourished the soil for the birth of the first generation of Korean social movements since the Korean War. It offered networks and repertoires for subsequent movements. During ten months of interim government nearly two thousand demonstrations with roughly one million participants took place. These protests were organised by democratic socialists, student organisations, and different civil society organisations (Hart-Landsberg, 1993, pp. 136-137). The repressive state became the common target for all of the movements. “Contentious repertoires” (Tilly, 1993;
such as public meetings, street rallies, strikes, and statements, were revitalised for the first time since the Korean War.

Third, the April revolution showed for the first time the two consecutive waves of collective action. First, when the student movement had created opportunities, they cultivated spin-off actions within the labour movement. This pattern was repeated in the 1980 Seoul Spring and the June Uprising in 1987. The political openings created by collective action led by intellectuals produced an advantageous environment for workers whose rights had been suppressed by the developmental state, under the pretext of competitiveness. The temporary absence of intervention from the developmental state in the labour affairs in 1980 and 1987 offered even greater favourable circumstances for workers’ claims for distributive justice.

The opened opportunities were also exploited by elites, for opportunities cannot be monopolised once they are expanded (Tarrow, 1998). Elite involvement raised serious questions for social movements, since the second waves—led by workers and radical groups who transformed their framing from political democracy to social democracy—menaced “the property rights underlying the capitalist economy” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, p. 27). Claims-making of workers in the second wave was exploited by elites as a pretext to justify violent repression of collective action. The “moderation argument”—that radical popular mobilisations could reverse democratic transition unless movements moderated their radicalism, for not doing so could induce the intervention of incumbent elites (Bermeo, 1997)—must be addressed in understandings of democratic transition. In order to discourage elites from reversing the transition, social movements had to solve the separate occurrences of the two waves and “moderation argument.”
The Birth Of Minjung As Collective Identity

Biographies of Minjung

According to Melucci (1985), social movements are nothing other than networks that share a conflictual culture and a collective identity (pp. 798-799). Collective identity is a negotiated and constructed definition in the collective action field (793). Collective identity of NSMs rejects “epic representations,” and positions itself outside the productive core of the economy, thereby staging post-material protests.

One of the ingenious products of Korean social movements is their reinvention of a collective identity: minjung. Minjung is simple in its literal meaning, people and mass, but is also simultaneously complex. According to minjung practitioners, minjung has been formed in struggle against Japanese colonialism and US imperialism. Minjung refers to the alienated, exploited, and socially underprivileged, and includes the working class, peasant, lower middle class, urban poor, and often a progressive segment of intellectuals (Choi, 1993; Koo, 1993; Kim, H., 1995; Lee, N.). Unlike this example of historico-political minjung, cultural minjung inherited and shares communitarian cultural legacies of pre-modern society and nationalistic consciousness (Cone, 1983; Choi, C., 1995). In this way, it contains utopian vision of an alternative social arrangement. Minjung involves both a political and historical subject against a repressive and exploitative system and advocates counter-hegemonic cultural practices against material industrialisation (Abelmann, pp. 23-26).

The minjung movement, politically speaking, stands for an historical agent against imperialism, capitalism, and dictatorship. It later developed into the three min (people)
ideology – minjok (nation and anti-imperialism), minjung (anti-capitalism), and minju (democracy). Unlike a political and historical minjung movement, the cultural minjung movement refers to “everyday resistance” (Scott, 1985) in forms of culture. In this cultural minjung movement, pre-modern communitarian and traditional culture is considered to be subversive to imperialism and capitalism (Abelmann, p. 25). Folk-theatre, traditional songs and poems, and traditional communitarian cooperatives were rediscovered, reinterpreted, and diffused through movements since the 1970s.

Minjung is the result of Korean industrialisation under modernisation and it operates as a counterproject against modernisation. The condensed growth of late-late development achieved structural changes of a “longue durée” in a short-duration, which produced rapid industrialisation on the one hand and increased disorganisation of rural society on the other. The dual characteristics of minjung is the reflection of these simultaneous changes.

Social movements combined these two aspects of minjung for collective action that fostered a counter-hegemonic project. The two seemingly opposite elements of minjung, however, can be seamlessly combined, as long as Korean late-late development produces repression and exploitation, political and cultural minjung movements are able to mobilise “the past in order to achieve alternative social and political arrangements in the present.” (Abelmann, p. 26).

Constructing Minjung

The Minjung movement emerged in the mid-1970s. Late-late development driven by the repressive developmental state coincided with an increase in repressive labour policies.
These policies accelerated urbanisation, particularly in cities with industrial areas surrounded by impoverished populations that were drawn upon as a reserve labour reservoir. Workers were discontented with low wages and poor working conditions and desperately sought rights to organise. The presidential election in 1971 demonstrated workers’ disaffection, first, when Park, Chung-hee won the presidential election against the opposition leader Kim, Dae-jung with only a narrow margin despite electoral manoeuvres and, later, when the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) swept the votes in major cities in the general election in the same year.

During this period, social movements sustained their challenges against the Park regime. They organised, for instance, popular protests against Park’s constitutional revision extending the presidential tenure to three terms in the mid and late 1960s. Through popular protests, social movements succeeded in building organisational infrastructure for mobilisation. Student movements and chaeya established for the first time, nationwide organisations in 1971. Their issues, however, were limited to procedural democracy, such as fair elections, because they arguably failed to recognise the widespread workers’ disaffection with the regime. The need to extend the boundary of the movement came from its outside in order to include the workers.

On November 13, 1970, a spark in the Pyunghwa Market in Seoul changed the history of the democratic movement in Korea forever. Chun, Tae-il, a 22-year-old garment worker, immolated himself while holding a book of Labour Standard Law and shouted in flames, “Comply with the Labour Standards Law!” and “We are not machines!” The working conditions in the garment factory in Pyunghwa Market in the early 1970s were miserable, often involving laborious work at a maximum of 16 hours per day in cramped
small spaces without windows, leading many workers to suffer from tuberculosis and neurogenic stomach disorders (Golbangsŏ, 1970).

In the face of poor working conditions, low wages, repressive employers, and nonchalant authorities, Chun organised a group of like-minded workers and studied the Labour Standard Law without any help from intellectuals. In September 1970, he strengthened organisational work and conducted a survey to thematise poor working conditions in Pyonghwa Market on the basis of empirical evidence. When nothing happened thereafter, Chun and his co-workers planned a demonstration on November 13 1970. This was the demonstration in which Chun set his body on fire. His wish, while studying the Labour Standard Law, to “have had a friend in a university …” was not fulfilled until he died. His death sparked waves of reaction from intellectuals and religious groups. Students launched a Preparation Committee for the Defence of Civil Rights and other universities organised a series of protests against the regime’s harsh labour politics. Christians held a Joint Catholic-Protestant Memorial Service and criticised Korean churches’ prevailing indifference to workers. (Cho, Y., pp. 37-38).

Chun’s death exposed the barbaric face and oppressive side of Korean capitalism. Moreover, before his struggle, the link between intellectuals and subaltern classes including workers did not cross the boundary of compassion; however, his death provided a linkage based on solidarity between economic and political struggles. His action served as a symbolic representation that translated the economic into the political.

The structural and agential characteristics in Korean late-late development were conceptualised and translated into minjung as a collective identity (Koo, 1993, p. 246). First, the absence of a hegemonic role for the bourgeoisie under the dominance of the
developmental state in democratisation led other actors, such as intellectuals, to replace them. This replacement was facilitated by cultural tradition. Intellectuals played a crucial role in democratisation in Korea because of a Confucian heritage that assigns them morally and socially high status (Dalton and Cotton, 1996; Koo, 1991; Lee, N., 2007). They proactively undertook this role and built a multiclass coalition to counter hegemonic forces and cultures: the authoritarian developmental state and its exploitative growthism. That is minjung as a political and historical subject and cultural practice. Unlike the Latin American populism, the bourgeoisie was not only excluded from the multiclass coalition in the concept of minjung but they were also negatively targeted.

Second, intellectual and religious groups took advantage of rapid proletarianisation and geographic concentration of industrial areas to promote solidarity with workers. The Korean workers’ lack of the self-pride of the European artisanal tradition, of the political, ideological, and discursive environment enjoyed by European workers since the French Revolution, and of political institutions conducive to class consciousness were initially addressed and compensated for by the support of intellectuals and minjung practitioners (Koo, 1993; 2001). They provided workers with self-pride, contentious languages, and skills to organise themselves. Various subgroups for workers within churches, like the Protestant Urban-Industrial Mission, began to be radicalised. They offered educational programme on labour laws and supported the building of informal workers’ groups that raised consciousness and provided technical and human resources for organising independent labour unions (Koo, 2001, pp. 72-78).

Third, since the mid-1970s, critical intellectuals attempted to conceptualise the notion of minjung. Han, Wan-sang, a sociologist, published Minjung goa Jisik’in (People and
Intellectuals) in 1978. He defined *minjung* as a group of politically oppressed, economically exploited, socio-culturally discriminated group of people. One aspect of his influence on social movements concerned the role of intellectuals in forming the *minjung* movement. The role of intellectuals, Han argues, following Marx, is to change *minjung*-in-itself to *minjung*-for-itself (Han, 1989). His book, *Minjung goa Jisik’in*, was a must-read for student activists in the 1980s. Intellectuals in the 1970s attempted to form *minjung*, to “speak to”, and to “represent for” subaltern classes; however, instead of waiting for completion of the concept, the *minjung* spoke themselves. As Chun, Tae-il awakened the necessity of economic democracy, the *minjung* confirmed a multiclass coalition for democracy through action and provided social movements with contentious repertoires. Women workers’ strikes between 1978 and 1979, uprisings in Busan and Masan in 1979, and Kwangju Uprising in 1980, which were all led by workers and ordinary citizens, appeared to confirm the leading role of *minjung* for democratisation.

The then-KCIA chief, Kim, Jae-gyu, Park’s right-hand man, who also assassinated Park in 1979, testified about unrests in 1979 in a court martial as follows:

> “we arrested 160 demonstrators. … Among them, only 16 were students and the rest were ordinary citizens. What matters more than that is that the boundary between riots and bystanders was blurred and citizens provided rioters foods, drinks, and hideouts.” (Gun, 1993, author trans.)

Therefore, the *minjung* was not only born through the interaction of social movements with the state and conceptual formation of the movement through intellectuals but also through the action of working people.
The Birth Of Minjung Movement

Koo (1993) suggested that the minjung movement is a class-based political one whose form and content were shaped by the developmental state and whose material base was emergent from contradictions produced through industrialisation (pp. 145-147). According to Nancy Abelmann (1995), the minjung movement is comprised of “the theories, idioms, and strategies by which a community of activists sought to evoke and mobilize people broadly perceived to be dispossessed, and hence the rightful subjects of history and agents of political transformation” (p. 119). Compared to Koo’s structure-oriented definition, Abelmann places more emphasis on activists’ constructive works and strategic characteristics. As seen above, minjung involved an active interpretation of structure and the minjung movement was its translation into a collective identity.

Opening and Opened Opportunities

Social movements in the 1970s were led by three groups: students, chaeya movements, and labour. Despite continuous repression of the regime, the student movement was able to preserve their resources for mobilisation, albeit in very limited means. For instance, in 1974, the students launched a nationwide organisation under the name The National League of Democratic Youth and Students. Their Minjung·Nation·Democracy Declaration demanded abolition of the chaebol-centred economic policy, freedom for the labour movement, revision of the Yushin constitution, and the establishment of an independent economy. Chaeya organised anti-regime protests through the 1970s and constructed formal and informal networks which were later developed into intermovement networks and organisations for democratisation in the 1980s. Despite
differences in social background and political views, the coalition shared the idea of a full “restoration of democracy” (Cho, H., 1990; 2007). The labour movement was still in an embryonic stage both in labour disputes and political struggles, but the grassroots union movement developed serious potential for resistance. The nexus between them was not mature enough to establish a strong democratic alliance against the regime.

The Park regime continuously suffered from the dangers of falling into its own trap of promised economic benefits. The legitimacy of his regime, grounded on the merits of economic performance, was challenged whenever the economy entered recession.

Strikes of women workers from the YH Corporation in 1979 revealed the violent face of the developmental state. Women Workers of the YH Corporation occupied the headquarters of the opposition NDP on August 9, 1979 during a protest against a lockout from their employer. Police broke into the building and the women strikers were severely beaten. One woman worker, Kim, Gyeong-suk, lost her life. Her death ignited another protest wave of opposition groups and ordinary people. Park expelled Kim, Young Sam, the then-leader of NDP, from the Korean legislature because of his support for the YH workers. This repression of the Park regime brought the people of Busan, the second largest city in Korea and Kim’s political hometown, to the streets in October. The protests developed into a broad uprising and spread to the neighbouring city of Masan, the largest free export zone. Repeated challenges from the minjung movement in the 1970s finally opened political opportunities that were displayed in the assassination of Park, Chung-hee on October 26 in 1979 a few days after the uprising.

During the “Spring of Seoul” in 1980, mass demonstrations swept major cities across Korea. Confronted with more massive and violent protests, the new military elites headed
by General Chun, Doo Hwan, swiftly dispatched the Garrison Decree throughout the entire country on May 17. Their round-up operation targeted leaders of opposition parties and social movements and turned out to be effective in calming protests except in Kwangju, the capital city in the province of South Cholla. On the same day, students of Kwangju shouting “Overthrow Chun, Doo Hwan” confronted soldiers directly and were bloodily beaten. This enraged the citizens of Kwangju and brought them to the streets the very next day. The whole city joined the protests. Despite citizens’ recalcitrant resistance for a week, the military bloodily repressed it under the operation codenamed “Splendid Holiday” and isolated citizens in Kwangju from other Koreans by painting the resistance as being a communist-controlled riot. According to the official record, 195 people, including 168 civilians were killed, over 400 citizens are still considered missing, and nearly 5,000 people were injured during this Kwangju Uprising.

*Minjung Movement and Kwangju*

Mobilisations during the Seoul Spring and the Kwangju Uprising had serious implications for subsequent social movements regarding collective identity, political opportunities, resource building, repertoires, and framing. Despite the attempts of social movements to bridge the gulf between intellectuals and subaltern classes through the counter-hegemonic concept of *minjung* as collective identity, the *minjung* movement was still in a nascent stage. The multiclass coalition required more than episodic and sporadic solidarity. Organised and sustained bottom-up solidarity was necessary for successful mobilisation for democratisation. The *nohakyeondae* (Workers-students alliance) in the 1980s was the result of this reflection (see Chapter 4).
Political opportunities generated through popular mobilisation were exploited by elites. The cleavage of elites in power, understood as political opportunities (McAdam et al., 1996; Tarrow, 1998), did not lead to democratic transition but resulted in a reverse transition to reauthoritarianism. The “moderation argument” raised first in the April Revolution in 1960 was not solved during the two mobilisations in 1980. Failed mobilisations and reauthoritarianism proved that democratisation cannot be achieved without neutralising the state’s repressive power and without solving the predicament of the “moderation argument.” In addition, social movements failed to build a stable alliance with the main opposition party. The movements could not present themselves as a unified force and speak with one voice. The generation of an independent resource base and of an authentic voice became necessary for sustaining effective coalitions for democratisation. Meso-level organisational structure was not mature enough to organise and network micromobilisation, to compete and coalesce with “influential” allies in the polity, and to be responsive enough to incite spontaneous mass actions. I will discuss this issue in the fourth chapter. Finally, the movements’ framing efforts were closely related to other aforementioned elements. Successful framing generates networks of people concerned with similar issues; however, it also relies on the availability of a movements’ resources. Social movement organisations (SMOs) in 1980 were not sufficiently organised to provide plausible collective action frames or to disseminate improvised frames among challengers and bystanders. Furthermore, movements’ framing tasks during two key mobilisations were concentrated on diagnostic not prognostic frames, i.e. solutions. Their framing strategies did not offer cogent frames that would take people to the streets (regarding framing, see Chapter 1).
What social movements achieved however, should not be disregarded. The strong and authoritarian developmental state unwittingly created conditions for social movements to form opposition at the national level and therefore cultivate a contentious civil society. Its control over political society invigorated non-institutional social movements. Its nasty “policing of protesters” (Della Porta, 1996) paradoxically produced critical junctures during the apex of violence as witnessed in 1960, 1979, and 1980 in Kwangju. The minjung movement was a counter-hegemonic ideology aiming at creating a collective consciousness among oppressed people in confrontation with the strong state. Two key mobilisations confirmed the necessity for a multiclass coalition with transformative democratisation as a primary objective. Through the Kwangju Uprising, social movements became identical with the minjung movement. Political and class-based movements acquired a common foundation. Rapid chaebol-centred industrialisation provided a catalyst for a collective homology amongst previously differing social classes. Combined with state domination, it enhanced the potential for a mutual contagion between socioeconomic and political struggles. A canonical illustration was displayed in a series of strikes by women workers in the late 1970s, in which their claims for union rights and against the factory lockout developed into political struggles that eventually led to the Park regime’s demise. Second, social movements in the 1970s developed various repertoires: demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, street rallies, occupations or attacks on symbolic sites (like YH workers’ occupation of the headquarters of the NDP). These repertoires were repeated and successfully reinterpreted by subsequent movements. Third, despite the movements’ defeat in Kwangju, they succeeded in delegitimising the Chun, Doo-hwan regime. The massacre in Kwangju weakened the legitimacy of the Chun
regime. Changes in legal stipulations concerning presidential tenureship over a seven-year single-term in the new constitution is a testament towards the movements’ partial achievements. This article confined the Chun regime when it attempted to prolong its rule. This small achievement, as a discursive shift in the historical trajectory of Korean politics, entrenched subsequent political conflicts between social movements and the authoritarian regime in constitutional debates. Fourth, the Kwangju Uprising provided the necessary resources for widening and deepening the legitimacy of the movements. Notably, this involved recognition of the main actors of the uprising as the workers and urban poor that appeared to confirm the effectiveness *minjung* as the subject of history. It also underscored criticisms of the anti-communistic and developmental state concerning its illegitimate massacre of citizens; it gave social movements resources for cultivating democratic traditions that furthered radicalisation. As a result, movements in the 1980s were better equipped to build on slogans demanding clarification on the massacre in Kwangju and the just punishment of those responsible for perpetrating one of the most grim points in Korean history.

In the next chapter, I will discuss the movements’ deepening between 1980 and 1983. During this period, social movements deepened their ideologies, strategies, organisations, networks, and framing in spite of increased repression which later released explosive energy during the liberalisation phase of late 1983.
Chapter 3: Movements’ Deepening in “Abeyance”

In the previous chapter, I introduced three main points to contextualise the relationship between social movements and democracy that establish a foundation for subsequent chapters. First, I explored the history of late-late development in Korea and its impact on movements and institutional politics. Second, I discussed the emergence of the *minjung* as collective identity. And finally, I noted the Kwangju Uprising as a watershed in the history of democratisation in Korea. Chapter 2 traced the relational processes between the emergence of the developmental state and that of the *minjung* movement.

In this chapter, I look at the period between 1980 and 1983 which has been disregarded in many studies of democratisation and social movements in Korea. This chapter fills that vacuum. It is a vitally important period that bridged the *minjung* movement of the 1970s to that of the 1980s. The period is perhaps best described as a period of creative “doldrums” (Rupp & Taylor, 1987) that laid the groundwork for a democratic upsurge in following years. The primary task of this chapter is to clarify the development of social movements in light of the interaction and relation between the repressive state and social movements in a nuanced way that elucidates the implications of this development for subsequent upsurges in democratisation. At first, I will delve into state repression, detailing its characteristics and effects on social movements. Clarifying the significance

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11 To illustrate, Chung, Chulhee (Chung, C., 1996), Han, Sung-Joo (Han, S., 1988), Han and Chung (1999), Im (1995), Kim, Sunhyuk (Kim, S., 2007), Seong, Kyoung-Ryung (Seong, K., 1993), Yun, Seongyi (Yun, S., 1997) discuss democratization and/or social movements in South Korea; however, the period between post-Kwangju-uprising (1980) and pre-liberalisation (1983) is rarely discussed in their literature; if any, their focus during this period is primarily placed on oppression of the dictatorial regime. One exception may be the book written by Lee, Myung-sik which was published by the Korea Democracy Foundation (KDF); his explanation of this period, however, is descriptive and episodic without analysing its significance for the future movements and democracy.
of repressive flash-points is crucial to not only show how state structured violence influenced social movements, but also to explain how social movements sustained and developed democratisation despite the ruthless state repression. I will discuss this period by reviewing two different SMTs’ concepts: “cycles of protest” (Tarrow, 1998) and “abeyance” (Taylor, 1989). The former concept, “cycles of protest”, is useful for explaining the emergence, development, and decline of social movements. The latter concept, abeyance, is helpful to demonstrate the movement’s continuity. These two concepts are discussed in the context of the nondemocratic polity pursued in Korea during this time. This discussion elucidates the significance of social movements during this period for political transition in Korea. And finally, I investigate the internal factors of social movements as discourses, organisations, goals and framings, repertoires, and counter-hegemonic initiatives. Here, I show how social movements developed their tangible and intangible resources for achieving democratisation under severe repression.

REPRESSION, CYCLES OF PROTEST, AND ABEYANCE

State Repression and Social Movements in Korea

After the massacre in Kwangju, the military junta led by Chun, Doo Hwan systematically institutionalised repression in three main ways. First, in silencing opponents; second, in restricting civil rights; and third, in abandoning the checks and balances system throughout Korean political institutions.

First, the junta swiftly arrested opposition leaders, like Kim, Dae-jung, who was sentenced to death in a court martial for conspiracy to rebellion, and dissolved the opposition party. The junta extended its heavy handed repression to media and journalists.
The junta had 172 periodicals closed and compelled media companies to dismiss more than 800 journalists who had rejected being dictated to by the junta and had attempted to report on the true nature of the Kwangju Uprising. Nearly 200 union leaders were fired. Thousands of student activists were expelled from their universities and conscripted into military service by force and without due process (Asia Watch, 1986). The repression was extended to ordinary innocent people who were arrested and dragged to the so-called Samchŏng (triple purity) Education Camp. Nearly 40,000 people suffered ill-treatment in the military-like Samchŏng camp. Official counts assert that approximately 340 people died in the camp and 3,000 suffered from traumatic after-effects (Lee, M., pp. 109-110).

Second, various laws were enacted to restrict civil rights without due and legitimate procedure by the Legislative Council to Protect the Nation: the Law on Assembly and Demonstration, the National Security Law, and the Basic Press Act. Many other legal protections were further revised, while new executive powers were also enacted. Third, the new constitution monopolised state power in the hands of the president Chun, who was elected president on August 27, 1980 through an indirect election. Chun proclaimed a new constitution that granted him emergency powers, the authority to dissolve the National Assembly, and greater control over the judiciary. The constitutional changes also excluded any possible regime change through electoral democracy since the president was to be elected by an electoral college that was filled with pro-regime loyalists (Song, S., 2010).

The development of social movements and their decline are often closely linked with the state and its policies. This relationship is, however, not a mono-linear and unidirectional one, but is interactive and relational (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow,
1996; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly 2004). State repression, in this respect, directly reveals such complex social linkages, for it touches upon the various elements of social movements, such as political opportunities, resources, repertoires, and framing. Therefore, in what follows, I investigate the influential repressions implemented by the Chun regime in order to fully comprehend the social movements’ reaction and their own developments for changing the course of Korean democratic history.

Tilly (1978) defines repression as “any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action” (p. 100). This definition promptly raises two further questions. First, it forces us to ask what we consider to be an increase in the costs of a contender’s collective action, and second, it prompts us to inquire about the effects of increased costs on social movements. The first question is related to the characteristics of repression while the latter considers its implications or effects.

The Chun regime executed the anti-mobilisation strategy with great force. It constricted access to resources controlled by social movements and narrowed the possibility of their mobilisation in the case of contentious uprisings. Under the Chun regime, violence was institutionalised, routinised, and implemented at random (Asia Watch, 1986, p. 78). This strategy, however, proved financially and administratively expensive based on the fact of its arbitrary and diffusive character.

Movements’ repertoires, their alliances, and even the destiny and quality of democracy are contingent upon types of state repression. For example, strong corporatist control by the Indonesian state kept the opposition from establishing an organisational base and broader links with the public, which restricted collective action to small and localised expressions. In another example, selective repression of the Marcos regime enabled
social movements to continue to survive and build alliances with other moderate reform
groups that characterised the institutional politics of the Philippines (Boudreau, 2002).
The Chun regime’s repression had similar, albeit more drastic structural effects on social
movements. First, the total ban of moderate reform groups from parliamentary politics
encouraged various non-institutional and underground activities. Moderate reform groups
of the opposition turned their eye toward forms of non-institutional politics. Underground
cells, called *ssocle* (from the English word “circle”, henceforth circle)\(^{12}\) mushroomed in
universities and factories as the most effective way to reduce costs for collective action.
Second, indiscriminate and non-selective repression narrowed spaces for independent
actions initiated by a single group or unitary social force; however, it simultaneously
promoted joint actions and alliances for democracy between various groups. Moderate
reform groups reinforced alliances with the *chaeya*. Third, diffusive repression with
intense brutality undermined the physical strength of social movements and their
networks, but it also promoted their work of attribution—whom to blame—and
accelerated their radicalisation.

**Cycles Of Protest, Continuity, and Counter Process**

The ostensible inactivity of social movements between 1980 and 1983, caused by the
regime’s harsh repression, was a sufficient reason to disregard this period as insignificant
for the history of democratisation in Korea. However, social movements as a complex of
SMOs, networks, campaigns, and meanings survived and were revived from the
disastrous defeat. This seeming contradiction requires a new understanding of their

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\(^{12}\) Originally, circles were extracurricular clubs of colleges of which primary activities varied from sports and
religion to study on society and politics; however, many of them served as fora for political debates, units of
mobilisation, and a space generating critical discourses.
dynamics and continuity. There are two significant ways to explain the continuity and
dynamics of social movements—through PPT as well as NSMs (Meyer and Whittier,
1994, pp. 278-280). In terms of PPT, the dominant concept of “cycles of protest” is
adopted to explain the dynamics of social movements. A cycle of protest is, according to
Tarrow (1998), a phase of heightened conflict across the social system. Dynamism within
the cycle is an outcome of the contention between members of a particular polity and
their challengers (pp. 142-143). Tarrow argues that the beginning of a cycle is catalysed
through the emergence of political opportunities to those resisting in the early stages. The
cycle continues through widespread resonance of their claims, and the closure of a cycle
is exemplified through processes of exhaustion, institutionalisation, and repression (pp.
147-150). Identifying protest cycles is useful in that it enables analysts to see collective
action not as a singular origin and discrete event, but as an overall process that considers
a cluster of SMOs or through a wider social movement sector (SMS) (McCarthy and Zald,
1977). Put simply, cycles of protest is a relational concept that avoids the reification of
protest as an independent activity, and instead prioritises cycles of protest as a dynamic,
interdependent process. Many elements of SMTs – such as political opportunities,
resources, and collective action frames – are all linked with the concept of a protest cycle
and find their own explanation in connection with it. However, processes signalling a
closure of a cycle reveal that the concept of a protest cycle is primarily centred on the
shift in resources or in the mobilising capacities of social movement organisations.
Therefore, though the concept usefully demonstrates the dynamics of collective action
within the cycle, its accuracy decreases when explaining interstitial moments between
cycles, and therefore, hides more than it reveals about any movement’s continuity. Social
movements as a cluster of SMOs, networks, campaigns, and symbols and meanings “die hard.” The concept of a protest cycle focuses only on overt activities but not covert ones. Not only are hidden scripts and everyday resistances defocused in Tarrow’s view of a protest cycle, but so too are sustained collective actions that do not necessarily “emerge” but exist in defocused terms. Failures are not simply recognized as demobilisation or the general discontinuity of social movements. Failures matter for social movements.

Unlike the assumption of PPT that social movements wither away when processes of exhaustion, institutionalisation, or repression appear, in actuality, they continue to survive through moments of mobilisation and re-emerge even as renewed and reinforced collectives. The NSM approach suggests that collective identity lends movements the means to withstand repression and other threatening challenges (Meyer and Whittier, 1994, p. 279; Taylor, 1989, pp. 771-772). Melucci (1989) contends that collective identity enables actors to negotiate the costs and benefits of their socio-political environment by providing them with the cognitive framework to do so. Based on this approach, the decline of mobilisation and an adverse socio-political environment do not automatically entail a defeat of movements and the closure of opportunities if they sustain a collective identity. A movements interactive process of identity formation is often configured in the movement’s continuity during demobilisation and “between-the-cycles.” Meanwhile, in explanations provided by PPT, those same productive characteristics identified by NSMs are only recognised during a movement’s “productive dynamism,” and are only considered to be occurring “within-the-cycle” of protest.

From the PPT perspective, the period between 1980 and 1983 falls into a category of demobilisation through repression; however, the minjung movement was not
eliminated—it importantly recast its structure, networks, and frames during this period. The continuity of social movements in Korea was sustained by the minjung as a defiant counter culture and collective identity. This continuity, however, cannot be separated from the cyclic dynamism of socio-political contention between the challengers and members of a polity (Tilly, 1978). The failures of social movements triggered different reactions but not inaction. Therefore, a deeper understanding of the continuity and dynamism of contention needs to be integrated into a grammar of SMTs that embraces these moments and considers their immense significance in explanations of social change.

I suggested in previous chapters that the modernisation of Korea since 1960 has been dominated by a master process, that of industrialisation through a specific version of late-late-development. Industrialisation, which is characterised by the shift in production from agriculture toward manufacturing and from informal and pre-industrial organisations to specialised formal ones (Tilly, 1975, pp. 4-5) was modified in Korea during the period of late-late development. The most significant emblems of this modification involved the developmental state, EOI, and the chaebols. Moreover, late-late development produced numerous co- and by-products such as a weakened bourgeoisie, unstable institutional politics, the rapid growth of intellectuals, as well as a form of nationalism that was mutually exploited by authoritarian regimes and social movements. Democratisation was a counter-process against this master process. Unlike the concept of the protest cycle, these dual processes in Korea had multiple peaks and troughs. In 1980, social movements were forced to their lowest point of mobilisation through indiscriminate and diffusive repression. Yet, they maintained their continuity and prepared themselves for a new peak.
Though opportunity- and resource-based (Tarrow, 1998), issue-revolved (Meyer and Whittier, 1994), entity-centred (Rupp and Taylor, 1987), and frame-oriented (Snow and Benford, 1992; Tarrow, 1998) approaches offer their own explanations for continuity or discontinuity of protest and for the dynamics of movements, they are problematic for explaining the development of social movements and political development in Korea. For Tarrow (1998) a simplified cycle of contention is broken down into two phases: mobilisation and demobilisation. Hence, demobilisation automatically implies the end of a cycle. The arguments of Myer and Whittier (1994) and Rupp and Taylor (1987) revolve around resources and their preservation, and in particular around SMOs. As a result, they cannot explain interactions between various social actors in abeyance. Their explanation is too specific to effectively capture the coalescent work of a range of SMOs, from various SMIs or otherwise understood as a unifying project of a social movement sector (SMS), like democracy. The scope of the master frame attuned to protest cycle, as suggested by Snow and Benford (1992), is apparently so elastic that its ecological scope can be extended from one SMI—for example, from the freeze campaign—to the whole SMS—Civil Rights—and its time span ranges from decades to less than a year. Thus, Snow and Benford’s approach forges an obfuscating connection between the master frame into a protest cycle or vice versa. Understanding democratisation as a counter process, however, provides a framework which covers changes in polities and considers how interactions between members and challengers of a polity undergo various dynamic subprocesses within and across different levels. Such an approach understands the historical case under investigation as a period that cannot be reduced to an “inactive doldrum”; but instead, as a productive period of abeyance (Rupp and Taylor, 1987;

**Abeyance Under Hostile But Supportive Environment**

The post-Kwangju period before 1983 is best understood as a period of abeyance for social movements in Korea. Abeyance is defined as “a holding process by which movements sustain themselves in non-receptive political environments and provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another” (Taylor, 1989, p. 761). According to Taylor (1989), social movements are forced into abeyance because of problems of status recognition. Broader cultural affinities are lacking throughout society in ways that would otherwise work to legitimise the actions of social movements. In other words, they are considered unwelcome, unheard, and marginalised. One of the primary markers of movements subject to abeyance structures’ involves the retention of a movements resources; in this way, during abeyance, a movement’s strategic objectives are often focused on ensuring survival or endurance. The notion of survival can be disaggregated further, such as, temporality (the movements’ endurance over time), commitments (the endurance of belief), exclusiveness (organisational endurance through hardened representations of membership), centralisation (organisational endurance through solidified group structure), and cultural survival (endurance in identity and semiotic preservation). These defensive dimensions of abeyance, according to Taylor, perform linkage functions by “promoting the survival of activist networks, sustaining a repertoire of goals and tactics, and promoting [the endurance of] a collective identity” (p. 762).
The processes of abeyance as defined by Taylor, however, yield a fatal flaw when applied to social movements in Korea. First, as Sawyers and Meyer (1999) admit, Taylor’s concept of abeyance is limited to operation under a liberal polity. Differences of socio-political environment between liberal and non-liberal polities concerning abeyance are not quantitative but qualitative. Abeyance in non-liberal polities usually comes from severe repression, not from marginalisation (Rupp and Taylor, 1987; Taylor, 1989) or missed opportunities (Sawyers and Meyer, 1999). Nearly every public performance of resistance, such as picketing, demonstration, lobbying, and so on, is threatened and punishable. Social movements in liberal polities enter abeyance not because of their failures, but because of their successes, such as the suffrage victory in Taylor’s case and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in the Sawyers and Meyer’s case in US. Disengaging from challenges to the state in order to sustain the core of the movement are the conditions of abeyance under liberal polities. Yet, failures of the movement in non-liberal polities drive the movement to learn from them and to challenge the state through more refined and dramatic ways. Second, Taylor’s dimensions of abeyance structures are too defensive to consider the performance of linkage functions by movements through, for instance, “sustaining a repertoire of goals and tactics.” A bridging role cannot merely be played through a status quo strategy as Taylor suggests. For her, the movement in abeyance is that of a cadre of activists and “may contribute, however unwillingly, to maintenance of the status quo.” (Taylor, p. 762, emphasis added). Other significant dimensions of the movement must have been ignored by Taylor, otherwise the movement that followed the period of abeyance could not have been called the “second wave.” Third, sustaining an exclusivity toward membership, centralizing organisational structure,
and retaining culture alone cannot promote and feed collective identity based on Taylor’s own definition. The definition of collective identity given by Taylor (1989) affirms “the shared definition of a group that derives from its members common interests and solidarity.” This seemingly corresponds with a group identity (Taylor, 1989, p. 771) but not with a broader notion of collective identity. Alternatively, collective identity is “an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place” (Melucci, 1989, p. 34, emphasis added).

Building, developing, and changing collective identity is, therefore, an interactive processes. Abeyance under the authoritarian regime required social movements to avoid being silenced, and prompted them instead to be both cautious and audacious in their reworking of democractisation as a counter-hegemonic process. As an alternative to being disengaged from challenging the state and “waiting for better times” (Sawyers and Meyer, p. 188), social movements in Korea used abeyance for challenging the state.

**Four Dimensions of Abeyance Structures**

In considering democratisation as a counter process in Korea, abeyance can be located between two political circumstances: the massacre in 1980 and the period of political liberalisation in 1984. Abeyance served an incubator function, preparing movements for external opportunities, promoting their values, strengthening collective identity, and sustaining movement visions. Different from abeyance through marginalisation and missed opportunities under a liberal polity, abeyance structures under the authoritarian
polity in Korea demonstrates the following variables: reproduction; inclusiveness; decentralisation; and the formation of “counterpublics” (Fraser, 1990).

Reproduction refers to processes that sustain movements through the generation of mobilisation capacities. Recasting organisational structures, reworking visions and repertoires, as well as reinforcing commitments all fall into the variable of reproduction.

Inclusiveness is a typical characteristic of movements during the mobilisation phase of a protest cycle but is often not considered during the phase of demobilisation (Taylor, 1989, pp. 767-768). However, when state repression brings about a nonreceptive environment not for the challengers but for the regime, movements under non-liberal polities can, or must, pursue inclusive policies in spite of ruthless state repression. The groups studied by Taylor and Sawyers and Meyer, that is, the American women’s movement between the first and the second wave (Taylor, 1989) and the 1980s (Sawyers and Meyer, 1999), respectively, were confronted with a depoliticising environment. Despite the intensity of state violence from the Chun regime, which was unfavourable for mobilisation, these characteristics of non-selective and indiscriminate repression facilitated the politicisation of ordinary citizens. In terms of repression, what makes a difference in the evolution of social movements and their interaction with the state is “not merely the severity of repression… but also its character” (Goldstone, 1998, p. 137, emphasis original).

Decentralisation refers to the organisational dimension of movements under a repressive regime. Reproduction and inclusiveness are dimensions that are associated with considerable consumption of available resources. Decentralisation, alternatively, helps to understand how these resource-consuming processes are offset by the dispersion
of resources and diversification in their alignment. The continuity of social movements depends on the sustainability of cadres, in large part, through the centralisation of SMOs during periods of abeyance in liberal polities. However, such a strategy in non-democratic polities is both dangerous and ineffective.

The concept of **counterpublics** (Fraser, 1990) pertains to the spatial-discursive sphere wherein a movement’s identities, interests, and needs are negotiated in oppositional terms, alternative to the dominant discourses and practices of a repressive regime (Lee, N., 2007, p. 10). In the 1980s, social movements in Korea were called *undongkwŏn* (the movement sphere) by media and regimes. The absence of an historical bourgeois public sphere and of an independent public space from the state and economy helped *counterpublics* form a rebellious but morally righteous image rather than a mere expression of social discontent or deviance. The Korean bourgeoisie’s collusion with the authoritarian regime and its hostility to democracy did not allow the bourgeoisie to exercise its hegemony in democratisation. Critical political issues, such as the truth of the Kwangju massacre, constitutional reform, and economic injustice and corruption, were all discursively articulated by social movements. They were the provider of critical discourses, repertoires, and cultures, which were supplied in the form of statements, pamphlets, texts, songs, poems, folk-theatres, street rallies, and so on (Lee, N., pp. 147-239). *Undongkwŏn* as counterpublics continuously expanded their boundaries during the 1980s through the formation of multiclass solidarity, like *nohakyeonndaeh* (workers-students alliance), and issue-specific alliance movements, such as truth-seeking projects for the Kwangju massacre, an anti-torture campaign, and broad based supports for workers’ strikes.
Fraser assigns dual characteristics to the notion of *counterpublics*. The first understands counterpublics as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; and the second considers how counterpublics provide the basis and training ground for agitational activities (p. 68). When applied to the Korean case, her concept of counterpublics is further strengthened. *Counterpublics* in abeyance in Korea reveals four characteristics—boundary, solidarity, incubation, and innovation. Externally speaking, *counterpublics* worked to delimit a boundary that protected social movements and separated challengers from the challenged. The boundary function of *counterpublics* provided a cultural shield against the cultural hegemonic project of the Chun regime which I will revisit later. However, it also strengthened networks for alliance and solidarity among different groups. Korean *counterpublics* performed an incubator function as a space in which continued exchanges of discourses and repertoires of existing organisations were preserved, and also as a context where fresh ideas from infant organisations further nourished the movements.

In liberal polity based explanations, a non-receptive environment of abeyance drives social movements in to sustain their core cadres or restrain them from being engaged in challenges. However, in the Korean case, social movements proactively recast their discourses, repertoires, and mobilising structures under a repressive yet simultaneously supportive non-democratic polity. So far, I have put more weight on conceptual questions, but below, I focus more attention on empirical questions. To this end, I argue that Korean social movements incubated themselves and reworked democracy during abeyance. During this period in Korea, social movements reinforced their reorganisation, strengthened alliances, held public performances and debates on effective repertoires, and furthered the framing strategies and goals of the movements.
REWORKING DEMOCRACY DURING ABEYANCE

The kind of abeyance imposed by state repression in Korea rather served as a period in which key features of mobilisation in the protest cycle suggested by Tarrow (1998) were prepared. The arrangements of social movements during this period involved a rapid diffusion of collective action, a quick spread of innovative forms of contention, the production of new frames, and increased information sharing among challengers. To fully capture the continuity and dynamism of social movements, it does not suffice to show that movements act strategically in their interactions with the state. Any sufficient explanation should pay closer attention to the movement’s internal dynamics.

Social movements campaigning for democracy in Korea in the early 1980s were spearheaded by the student movement. In fact, student movements have been at the forefront throughout the history of democratic movements (see Table 3-1) in Korea. The student movement was in an advantageous position compared to other movements. It could preserve resources without considerable damage. The student movement was more successful during the beginning and ending stages of abeyance structures when compared to other groups. Colleges provided a favourable space and students enjoyed a relatively esteemed status in the recruitment and production of critical discourses for collective action. Therefore, it was the students who were able to lead the discussion on social movements in abeyance. This point is both instructive and necessary for understanding other and subsequent movements in Korea.

<table>
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<th>Percent</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>----------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian students</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectuals</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>General activists</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
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Organisations In Abeyance: Cells, Networks, and Alliances

The first mobilising base during abeyance in Korea began with the organisational reproduction of movements. Since the April Revolution in 1960, the student movement sustained its organisational base in the form of circles, which usually recruited their members openly while they enjoyed a less repressive environment. These circles played a key role for mobilisations toward democracy during every critical juncture and cleavage. Historically, circles were a most basic unit of bloc recruitment and mobilisation (Oberschall, 1973, p. 125); however, during abeyance, open forms of recruitment were impossible due to harsh repression. Therefore, the student movement and circles had to find a different way to sustain their resources which were pursued through particular types of cultural recruitment and organisational structure.

During abeyance the student movement established a system of self-reproduction based on traditional cultural templates. Not only was the Confucian tradition utilised by authoritarian regimes, but it was also used by the student movement. For instance, in Korea, “age and hierarchical relationships” were accorded primacy and “school and regional ties remain[ed] instrumental in one’s social relationships” (Lee, N., p. 160). Underground circles in universities recruited their members by and large, through these school and regional ties. Every circle was organised hierarchically based on the entrance year of students and the nexus of senior-junior (sŏnbae-hubae) ties. To illustrate a typical
example, a student enters university in 1980 as a *hubae* (a junior student) and attends under the guidance of a *sŏnbae* (a seinor student) in various activities such as seminars and street demonstrations. Their relationship was not, however, reflective of a relationship between the commanding and the commanded, but instead it mirrored that “between an older and younger sibling … entailing mutual respect and reciprocal obligations” (Lee, N., p. 161). The nexus of *sŏnbae-hubae* ties wielded a strong influence for students recruitment into the movement, thereby moulding their political views and commitments. The influence was so pronounced that even activities after graduation were affected. When a *sŏnbae* decided to turn him- or herself into a worker for the labour movement, it would be often followed by his or her *hubae* (Lee, N.; 5wŏl, 2006). Circles provided their members with a variety of activities and trainings in order to keep them committed and loyal to the movement. Common exercises included seminars for critical thinking, the production and circulation of underground pamphlets, the organisation of protests and extra-campus activities, such as teachers at night schools for workers and ‘disguised’ workers. Students in the 1980s entered factories at a massive rate without exposing their previous identities in order to raise the class consciousness of the workers (see Chapter 4). The nexus of senior-junior ties served as an informal institution in which traditional, charismatic, and rational elements for social grouping transformed potential beneficiaries into conscious constituents (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

Forms and structures of the student and labour movement in the early period of abeyance were marked by decentralised decision-making, segmentation in the social structure, and reticulation, which refers to a criss-crossing and weblike network without one central point in the network (Gerlach and Hine, 1970, pp. 33-78). Circles and small
groups prevailed during the student and labour movement. Polycephalous organisations developed into group networks, intercampus cooperatives, and an effective student-worker nexus in 1981. For instance, several circles in the Sungkyunkwan university that operated openly before 1980 were compelled to go into the underground after the Kwangju massacre. They, however, organised campus wide demonstrations together and extended their networks to include inter-university and factories (5wŏl). This nexus is analogous to reticulated forms of networks. These features of organisational structure helped movements sustain security, multiplied their connective nodes with other social groups and minimised movement failures (Gerlach and Hine, pp. 65-78).

The mobilisation of traditional and cultural social ties in concert with non-traditional forms of movement organisation was a chosen strategy after serious internal debates. The student movement was engaged in heated debates right after the Kwangju massacre. Debates between one group supporting the “preparation thesis” (Murim) and the other calling for the “immediate struggle thesis” (Haklim) shaped subsequent forms of the movements’ organisations. The former claimed that movement failures in 1980 resulted from the lack of a mass base, especially from the absence of contributions from an organised working class. In this view, organising the working class was considered a primary task of the movement. The social movements opted to not waste their limited resources on political action unnecessarily; thus, the Murim supported the creation of “small group movements” in campuses and factories. The latter “immediate struggle thesis,” in contrast, reached a conclusion that the movements’ failures derived from the absence of a vanguard organisation problematising issues and leading the popular uprising (Kang, S., 1988, pp. 18-27). The two groups were in complete agreement, those
differences notwithstanding, on the opinion that popular action and an awakened *minjung* constitute indispensible grounds for democracy in Korea.

Since 1981, underground circles in universities started to extend their influence through department student organisations. Underground circles in the universities recast their organisations in ways that could coordinate intra-, inter-, and extra-campus activities. In the labour movement, the “small group movements” that tried to build revolutionary underground cells consisting of students-turned-workers, those that entered factories without exposing their previous intellectual identities in order to raise class consciousness among workers, and workers with class consciousness were challenged by other groups in the movement. These groups called for open and public activities which would attract more workers than the “small group movements” would do. Therefore, a priority was placed on raising workers’ awareness of their rights instead of conveying class consciousness to workers (KPNA, pp. 116-119).

Chaeya began to find their voice in 1983 after a long silence. Representative figures, such as Ham, Seok-heon, a Korean Gandhist, held the Chun regime responsible for the massacre of innocent citizens in Kwangju and began a hunger strike in May 1983 on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Kwangju Uprising. Two prominent opposition leaders, Kim, Young-sam and Kim, Dae-jung (henceforth, the two Kims) were excluded from institutional politics and cooperated with the chaeya’s extraparliamentary activities for democracy. One of the most important organisations in the chaeya movement, the Youth Coalition for Democratisation Movement (YCDM), was founded in September, 1983. It consisted of former student activists in the 1970s. YCDM actively supported
various movements with its rich resources including activists, previous experiences, repertoires, discourses, and networks.

Korean social movements in abeyance developed mobilising structures that took a different path from that followed by their counterparts in the liberal polity—a path to temporality (ability to maintain personnel), exclusiveness, and centralisation of their organisations. Expanded reproduction, inclusive membership, and polyccephalous organisations were all employed despite harsh repression of the state. Unlike SMO-oriented abeyance structures during a non-receptive environment under a liberal polity, Korean social movements elaborated upon goal-oriented abeyance structures through supportive circumstances under a non-democratic polity. Social movements in Korea during abeyance reproduced activists, developed important organisational forms and networks, set the stage for democratic alliances between students and workers, as well as between social movements and reform groups in the opposition party. State repression drove social movements to the underground, but this underground was a seedbed for the future of democratisation movements.

**Wars Of Pamphlets: A Farewell From The “Romantic” Movement**

Since their failures in the Kwangju Uprising, social movements were engrossed in heated discursive debates during the abeyance. The origin and nature of Korean capitalism and dictatorship, the causes of social, political, and economic injustice, and movement strategies were the issues that dominated the debates.

The first group that wrestled with these issues was the National Federation of Democratic Workers (NFDW). The NFDW was an underground organisation composed
of intellectuals and workers. The goals of the NFDW were: “to protect the national interest from domination by monopolised capital of industrialised countries and to emancipate the minjung from domestic comprador capital and the regime. Workers directly suffering from those problems should be organised and mobilised for a democratic movement which would lead to their awakened consciousness.” (Hanguk, 1989, p. 31, author trans.). It equated the labour movement to the democratic movement. Instead of waiting for the opening of political opportunities, the movements, in particular the student movement, sought to challenge the regime immediately. The NFDW supported the establishment of a vanguard organisation that would unify and lead struggles against the regime and for democracy. The NFDW and its underground student groups organised protests in 1981 but collapsed after the massive arrest of its members; however, its attempt to combine the analysis of Korean society with movements’ goals and tactics influenced wider discourses of other groups.

Books on critical thinking could not cross over the threshold of state censorship in the 1970s. Even books written by, for instance, Karl Popper were banned by the regime. However, the movements’ failures in Kwangju fundamentally changed these restrictions. Activists explored different ideas and theories to find powerful analysis and scientific tools to clarify their failures. They found it in Marxism and its revisions, like Leninism and Maoism. Their texts were printed in samizdat and circulated widely in underground circles in the student and labour movement. They developed reading lists to study and to train members. For instance, an activist in the Korea University recollected his reading lists in 1983 that ranged from dependency theory and Euro-communism to case studies of revolutionary movements around the world, like revolutions in Russia, China, Cuba, and
Nicaragua (Lee, N., p. 166). These texts enabled activists to view authoritarian regimes from an historical and structural perspective and to create radical visions and strategies to replace the regime. Vague and romantic images of democracy and transition were banished from the movements’ discourses and replaced by a sort of “scientific socialism.” This turn of visions and discourses found its expression in different pamphlets.

Numerous pamphlets written by anonymous authors were circulated among activists since 1981. The *Yabi* (Critique of Night Schools), *Jeonmang* (the Prospect of Student Movement), and *Injeon* (Realisation and Strategy) are primary examples found in the circulated pamphlets. The debates among them revolved around three main questions. First, who should lead democratisation and revolution? Second, what is the relationship between imperialism and dictatorship and how is it to be resisted? And third, which forms of the movements’ organisations are most effective? I will focus on the first and the second questions, for the third was introduced in a previous section.

The first pamphlet that appeared in the 1980s was the *Yabi* (Critique of Night Schools). Published in the late 1981 or early 1982, it developed the argument that the primary role of the student movement is to fully commit itself to supporting the labour movement and to transform student activists into workers and vanguards. Thus, political action under state repression should be restrained in order to avoid undermining the potential for mobilisation that would waste resources. Instead, students were invited to provide political education for workers in night schools, in order to prepare themselves to become workers and vanguards that would organise small groups in and around factories. These arguments, called “phased struggle theory,” exerted significant influence for many of the students’ exodus to factories to become workers. The underlying assumption in this view
was that the student movement was equally as important in the revolution as the labour movement (Hanguk, pp. 13-16).

The Yabi was criticised by the Jeonmang. The latter argued that the student movement can certainly problematise issues, but it cannot be identified with the same group that was intended on solving the issues. Therefore, in this view, the primary task of the student movement was not to wait for the opening of political opportunities, but to challenge the state through active and immediate political action that would awaken the dormant consciousness of the working class.

The Injeon, by contrast, sketches a comprehensive blueprint for revolution. In this view, Korea was regarded under the dominance of American and Japanese neo-colonial rule, and therefore, national liberation must be the ultimate goal of revolution. Further, based on the recognition that Korean capitalism was at the stage of dependent state monopoly capitalism, anti-imperialism, anti-dictatorship, and the minjung’s emancipation constituted the three major fronts in the realisation of national liberation. Accordingly, the Injeon proposed a multiclass coalition for democracy (Hanguk, pp. 47-83).

These debates laid the foundation for discourses dealing with the goals and tactics of social movements, their repertoires, framings, networks and alliances. These were the social dynamics which subsequent social movements drew upon for further action.

What was not seriously debated in the pamphlets however, was the role of the US in Korea, the characteristics of the Chun regime, and the stage of Korean capitalism in its relations with the chaebol. The reason for this was not because they were insignificant, but because it was self-evident due to the US’ support for Korean dictatorship since decolonisation and to the “invention” of chaebol by the developmental state.
In the 1970s, the US was seen by some dissident groups as an ally supporting human rights in Korea and exercising pressure upon the dictator Park. Yet, the Kwangju Uprising changed this positive image of the US dramatically. For, since the Korean War, the operational control authority over the Korean army was in the hands of the United States-South Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC) which was headed by a US General. It was broadly accepted that the massacre in Kwangju by the Korean airborne troops would have been impossible unless the US had permitted the bloody operation or at least acquiesced. As sketched in the Injeon, activists believed that the system of domination was hierarchically structured with US imperialism at the top of the system, followed by the Korean authoritarian regime in the middle, and, below it, the chaebol. These perceptions changed the political scene of the 1980s to a terrain completely distinct from that of the 1970s. Romantic protests based on illusory images of “enemies” and democracy were expelled by the militant Sturm und Drang movements equipped with an ascending faith in “scientific inquiry.” Democracy was understood not to be restored, but to be created anew (Ablaster, 1987), and if necessary by violence. This dramatic turn was clearly expressed through elaborations of the social movements’ repertoires.

**Repertoires In Abeyance: Political War On Symbols and Symbolic Action**

Movement repertoires refer to an ensemble of routines that are learned, shared, performed, and repeated through a process of choice (Tilly, 1973; 1993; 2004). According to Tilly, repertoires are “learned cultural creations… they emerge from struggle” (Tilly, 1993, p. 264). Thus, movement repertoires are a set of performances that are interactive, collective, context-specific, inherited, created, and interpreted. There were two notable repertoires
adopted by social movements in Korea to articulate injustices and grievances during abeyance—the utilisation of symbols or symbolic sites and suicide protest. These repertoires were not entirely new, but inherited from previous struggles.

**Utilisation of or Attacks on Symbol or Symbolic Sites: a Repertoire Inherited**

As Hae Gun Koo (1991; 1993; 2001) argues, intellectuals supported workers in the formation of a working-class to establish class consciousness in the 1980s. Intellectuals selected and reappropriated the two repertoires—the utilisation of symbols and suicide protest—from the “toolkit” (Swidler, 1986; Zald, 1996) produced earlier by workers in the 1970s. As seen in the previous chapter, the workers politicised their claims-making by occupying the symbolically rich headquarters of the opposition NDP. Targeting symbolic sites as a key component of the movements’ repertoire was repeatedly adopted and reappropriated by social movements throughout the 1980s. Despite losses and negative media coverage during this time, this symbolic tactic could problematise issues that had been put aside, covered, and suppressed by the regime as taboo.

The massacre in Kwangju was a significant event designated for symbolic action. Social movements problematised the justification of the massacre in Kwangju as an inevitable operation to save the nation from the communist North by the Chun regime. They held the regime and the US responsible for the violence and bloodshed. This problematisation was expressed through targeted attacks on symbolic sites. Several activists from the peasant and student movement carried out arson on the US Information Service (USIS) building in Kwangju in December 1980 to protest US support through acquiescence of the massacre in Kwangju. Media reports on the arson were suppressed by
the regime, attributing the cause of the fire to a short circuit in the building. In March of 1982, a second fire to another USIS building in Busan was set by student activists, shocking many Koreans and Americans. The Chun regime exploited this incident as an excuse to suppress any opposition. The death of a student as a result of the arson gave the regime a favourable opportunity to engage in a heavy-handed response that portrayed the students negatively, in ways advantageous for the strong actions of the Chun regime. The students’ claims, embodied in attacks on symbolic targets, called for the withdrawal of the US from Korea, the overthrow of the murderous Chun regime, the boycott of the Seoul Olympics in 1988, and distributive justice for the minjung, were met with mixed reaction inside and outside of Korea. Though condemnation of the incidents targeting US infrastructure dominated public opinion, it also problematised the legitimacy of the Chun regime and the US’s role in Korea.

The burning of the Busan USIS building triggered a chain of effects. For instance, moderate groups, some protestant and Catholic groups, were oppressed due to their role in providing refuge for the initiators of the arson. These religious groups began to raise their voice against the Chun regime and US’s policy towards Korea, drawing them further into the resistance. It also raised serious questions about the movements’ framing strategies. That is, the actions encouraged questions about which direction the movements’ should take—toward anti-imperialism (the question of nationalism), to foster anti-dictatorial practices (the question of democracy), or to cultivate the minjung (the question of class)?

*Suicide: a Repertoire Survived*
“Suicide protest” (Kim, H., 2008) was a repertoire repeatedly adopted by the movements’ activists since the self-immolation of Chun, Tae-il in 1970. According to a study (Biggs, 2006) of 36 countries between 1963 and 2002, Korea is the country with the highest rates of self-immolation, alongside India and Vietnam.

Since the Kwangju massacre, students and workers have immolated themselves or have jumped to their death from buildings to protest against the Chun regime and US policy towards Korea. Unlike arguments from Western scholars that self-immolation is the resulted of psychological disturbances (Ashton, 1981; Scully and Hutcherson, 1983) or other arguments from the Korean regime that it is “orchestrated by dissident organizations” (HRW, 1992), recent studies on suicide protest find that they are a coordinated and politically motivated action that are bound through a distinct political cause that is meant to persuade publics through their dramatic action (Park, B., 1994; Biggs, 2005; Kim, H., 2008).

Table 3-2 The Number of Suicide Protesters (1970-1987)

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<td>9</td>
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Source: The Korean Council for Democratic Martyrs

Based on an analysis of notes left by suicide protesters, Hyojoung Kim contends that such dramatic and symbolic protest actions are intimately bound through collective action. As a form of collective action, suicide protest is intended to promote solidarity among activists, as well as to encourage the participation of bystanders (Kim, H., 2008, p. 573). Thus, it aims to solidify internal cohesion of social movements, while simultaneously being directed externally, to attribute blame of specific injustices and to achieve broader
public support. However, in his study, Hyojoung Kim did not clarify the resonance of protest suicides. The suicide protests were effective at generating the ties necessary for “critical mass” (Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985) through the symbolic politics of memory; however, the framing resonance of this very costly action in its ability to generate public support was not as great as deaths incurred through state violence. The deaths of two students by state violence in 1987 were very significant catalysts for the mobilisation of resistance in Korea (see Chapter 4).

**Cultural War: Hegemonic and Counter-Hegemonic Project**

State repression since the post-Kwangju period, before the political liberalisation in late 1983, drastically increased the costs of protest action. The social movement had to come up with new repertoires and cultural activities that were the most cost-effective, rather than the more costly tactics involving attacks on symbolic sites and suicide protests. Self-sacrifice and dedication alone would not suffice to counter the regime’s brutal state repression that was backed by a supportive hold on cultural hegemony.

The Chun regime initiated cultural policies that were intended to distract people’s attention from the massacre in Kwangju and redirect it toward non-political affairs. The “3-S” policies (sex, screen, and sports) illustrated the regime’s coercive hegemonic project for winning popular consent. The “3-S” policies were, in fact, a modification of those practiced in Japan during the 1950s and 1960s in order to divert public attention.

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13 Approximately 1,400 students were expelled from their colleges from 1980 to 1983. Female students arrested in campus demonstrations were compelled to leave their universities, while the male were forcibly conscripted into military service against their own will and without any consultation process with their parents and lawyers. During the same period, 465 students were conscripted. In the military, they were tortured, brainwashed, even killed, and compelled to spy upon student activists and friends (AWC, 1986, p. 92).
from political affairs under the excuse of producing “cultural citizens” (Park, S., 2010, pp. 83-84). Based on strict control over media\textsuperscript{14}, the “3-S” policies prevailed—national politics penetrated even further into the private sphere. The Chun regime permitted adult movies and night theatres, colour broadcast was made available, a professional baseball league was launched, the Asian Games of 1986 and the Seoul Olympics of 1988 were hosted, and a collective project of citizen calisthenics was resumed, which had also served Japan as a disciplinary tool of state governance to prepare people for war and wartime (Park, S., p. 84). As will be seen in Chapter 4, the developmental state was in retreat since the failures of its industrial policy in the 1970s. The massacre in Kwangju only temporarily demonstrated the power of the regime at the ultimate cost of its legitimacy. “The cultural state”, understood in Gramscian terms, sought to “educate citizens” to ensure broad based consent in “the interests of the ruling classes.” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 258-259).

The minjung movement constitutes a key counter-cultural process against changes of the regime from despotic domination to hegemonic rule. The cultural minjung movement attempted to create an environment in which the minjung could be “philosophers” who were engaged in practical activity (Gramsci, p. 344). Culture in the form of discourses, meanings, symbols, and rituals were intended to “educate” the minjung as “philosophers” or “organic intellectuals” (Gramsci, pp. 5-14).

In the face of the Chun regime’s massive cultural initiatives, social movements embarked on the creation of alternative media outlets for reinforcing the minjung culture.

While SMOs and their networks in the liberal polity are often the centre for promoting

\textsuperscript{14} In the 1980s, the regime controlled the media through a “reporting guideline,” which instructed the media what to write, which topics to be avoided and how to write. The instruction even regulated the size of newspaper titles. This guideline was exposed when a reporter blew the whistle in the late 1986.
and coordinating collective action, social movements in the non-liberal polities play a more proactive role in that they also serve as a hub for communication and distribution of critical information (Osa and Schock, 2007; Lohmann, 1994). Pamphlets, wall newspapers, and printed materials were all pursued by movement activists to debunk the regime’s allegation that the Kwangju Uprising was instigated by communists from North Korea. The overall effect of alternative media tactics was obviously limited.

Ironically, the state provided a solid basis for critical media that had a greater impact than the media practices discussed above. Student activists that were expelled from university, and who took revolution and transformation of the Korean system more seriously, began to publish books on revolution (You, D., 2007, pp. 92-94). Although original texts of revolutionaries or socialists were still tied up on the list of banned books, writers of radical books were able to address revolutionary themes in a roundabout way, for example, through so-called critiques of Marxism that provided detailed information about the original texts. This creative tactic served as a gateway for access to transformative ideas for activists. Books dealing with reinterpretations of modern Korean history from the minjung perspective, the condition of workers in the country, Marxian political economy and historical materialism, and revolutions in the Third World were all published one after the other, finding rapid circulation. These publications had a multiplier effect on the generation of counter discourses through further pamphlet debates and the broader “scientification” of movements.

The political goals of Korean social movements were focused entirely on translating the multidimensional biographies of the minjung—the historico-political and cultural minjung—into a transformative reality. Minjung practitioners identified their goals
through debating political pamphlets. It was thought that national liberation from imperialism, the cultivation of democracy, and the development of a pro-*minjung* society through class struggle could be realised, only when the *minjung* as a coherent counter metanarrative occupied the centre stage of each those three fronts in the struggle. The *minjung* as a cultural movement, since the Kwangju Uprising, undertook various attempts to emancipate the *minjung* from “false consciousness” and to establish the *minjung* as the authentic subject of history (Chai, 1996; Lee, N., pp. 187-212). The *minjung* culture as a micronarrative was instrumentalised for the development of an overarching metanarrative that articulated nationalist struggles against imperialism, struggles for democracy in Korea, and the class struggle of the *minjung*.

The practitioners of *minjung* cultural movements excavated strands from traditional pre-modern culture and amalgamated it with the goals of social movements. Traditional songs, dances, myths, stories, theatres, and rituals were all played, told, or performed in campuses, factories, and even in churches. In particular, mask dances and folk-theatre played a significant role for uniting people around a collective identity of the *minjung*. Traditional Korean folk-theatres played in open spaces where the boundary between the stage and the seats were blurred. The effect was to dissolve the gap between actors and spectators in a way that promoted empathy between the spectators with the actors. Often performed in market places and villages, a typical folk-theatre play assumes the form of an omnibus drama with masked dance and songs. The shows involve humorous social satires, insults of religion, and critiques of the dominating classes. The practitioners of the *minjung* cultural movement revised the traditional folk-theatres and infused more rebellious and transformative elements into them. For instance, the peasant revolt against
anti-imperialism and the incompetent ruling class of the Chosun dynasty that swept the southern provinces of Korea in the late 19th century was reinterpreted by the minjung practitioners as minjung struggles for independence, bottom-up democracy, and utopian socialism. Recurring themes found in the modernised folk-theatres often involved a transformative tale of a factory worker into a revolutionary subject (Lee, N., p. 209). In Bakhtinian terms (1968), folk-theatre was full of rituals of carnival. There was no division between actors and spectators, satirical humour was the main literary trope, the plays placed value upon themes of egalitarianism and freedom of speech through inversions of official ideology and social order, where overall, the plays succeeded in a fusion of utopian vision and Korean realism. The carnivalesque nature of the folk theatre did not end with the performance. Post-performance events involved sharing food and drink, singing and dancing, and very often included political demonstrations that were sometimes considered to be more important than the performance itself (Lee, N.). Since the 1980s, political demonstrations had become routine after the folk-theatre events.

Social movements in Korea during abeyance cultivated a massive and rich body of culture. Norms, values, narratives, and rituals were rediscovered, renewed, reinterpreted, and created. Songs, paintings, poems, novels, symbols, plays, statements, discourses, and rallies all filled the cultural storehouses of social movements and were diffused throughout Korean society. Political issues began to be spelled out through the mouth of the movements’ counter-cultural efforts. The cultural aspect of minjung was instrumentalised for the political-historical aspect of minjung. The front for democratisation was extended from the political to the cultural. Hegemonic culture was refuted by the counterpublics of social movements. Collective identity during periods of
abeyance under liberal polity was consolidated and preserved, while the *minjung* as a collective identity was alternatively constructed and expanded through cultural works during a period of abeyance under a repressive non-liberal polity. Cultural practices during abeyance in Korea were not the “culture of a social movement organization” (Taylor, 1989, p. 769) but instead, were the culture of a social movement undergoing dramatic change within and throughout Korean society.

In the above section, I listed four internal factors of social movements during abeyance structures in Korea that clearly differ from their counterparts in liberal polities: reproduction (including organisations, networks, and discourses), inclusiveness (openness to recruitment and alliances), decentralisation (democratisation of organisations), and the emergence of counterpublics (boundaries, solidarity, incubation, and innovation). In many ways, there are distinct differences between abeyance structures in liberal versus non-liberal polities (See Table 3-2).

<table>
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<th>Table 3-3 Differences of abeyance structures between two polities</th>
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The intensity of repression alone cannot account for the generative and proactive dimensions of social movements. First, the character of repression matters more than its intensity. Indiscriminate and widespread repression by the Shah’s regime in Iran in the late 1970s exacerbated social discontent and accelerated the radicalisation of protests.
Indiscriminate repression by the Chun regime created a supportive environment in Korea where social movements could accumulate sympathetic support for their actions against the regime. Second, the response of social movements to state repression, the interpretation of the movements’ own failures, and wider structural changes were all of consequence for the future development of social movements. The cultural aspect of the minjung as a micronarrative was articulated with the political-historical aspect of minjung as a metanarrative. Simply, cultural development was utilised for political purposes. Social movements learned from previous failures. Normative discourses emerged from numerous pamphlet debates, dramatic rituals of repertoires, and a coherent narrative of collective identity was linked with the structural changes of Korea.

During abeyance in Korea, social movements developed and refined their goals, however, prioritising democratisation as the master frame during this period sparked a series of potentially fatal internal contradictions: should democracy be the final goal or merely a transitional stage for a wider set of goals? Should the priority of democratisation be placed on political or economic forms? Should class emancipation precede national liberation or vice versa? Tensions between violent and nonviolent means for democracy were also shaking the master frame. Though social movements in abeyance retained, developed, and expanded core elements from the minjung movement in the mid-1970s, the tensions resonating through the master frame of “democracy”, were not fully resolved. Therefore, these latent tensions were intensified, feeding internal conflicts between alliances among democratic forces. When political constraints shifted from opportunities,
the “indigenous infrastructure” (McAdam, 1982) of the social movements outgrew the limits of its own sustainability. All of these issues are investigated in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: Liberalisation and Transition

In Chapter 3, I discussed the development of social movements in abeyance. State repression with the support of an hegemonic cultural legitimacy temporarily destabilised social movements, but it failed to diminish them. Not only did social movements continue to endure, they also innovated their organisations, networks, goals, repertoires, and collective identity. The Kwangju Uprising forced many activists to divorce from the “romantic” minjung movement in the 1970s and join political actions against the Korean dictatorship. Social movements, through scientification, analysed global structural economic changes in Korean capitalism. This analysis was grounded upon ideas hitherto considered as seditious, such as Marxism, Maoism, and even the North Korean Juche ideology. The innovation and deepening of movements paralleled their radicalisation under the “scientific” turn of the minjung movement away from its romantic origins.

In this chapter, I review the historical development of social movements between 1984 and 1987. I disaggregate this period into two sub-processes: first, liberalisation from 1984 to 1986 and second, a transition period in 1987. This chapter demonstrates the causes and effects of two forms of liberalisation—political and economic—on social movements. I will show that these liberalisations induced the regime and social movements to miscalculation, which affected the nature of democratisation. Second, I investigate two alliances that emerged in Korea for democracy—the workers-students alliance and a second between the social movements and the main opposition party. Third, I focus on dynamics within social movements between 1984 and 1986 which were mired in disagreement. Controversies over goals, tactics and repertoires, and discourses are all
explored in further detail. Fourth, I explain the mobilisation for the transition to
democracy through five elements of social movements introduced at the outset of this
thesis (see Chapter 1). Here, I suggest that the forms of democratisation initiated by the
movements’ strategic choices were partly conditioned through broader environmental
conditions, which channelled democratisation into political democracy. Further, I insist
that the open or interactive characteristics of the five elements all contributed to
producing a diverse range of uncalculated and unintended outcomes. Fifth, I discuss the
relationship between two waves of mobilisation in 1987 and assess their impact on
democracy. Sixth, and finally, I discuss two important issues that determined the
characteristics of democracy in Korea—popular sovereignty within constitutionality and
the moderation argument.

LIBERALISATION: THE REVIVAL of SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Two Liberalisations and Two Alliances

*Tocquevillian Paradox, Erratic Reform, Or?*

In late 1983, the Korean regime relaxed its repressive grip. Professors and students
previously expelled could return to their universities, politicians barred from political
activities were reinstated, and political prisoners were released, signalling the advent of a
new phase in democratisation.

O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) defined liberalisation as “the process of making
effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or
illegal acts committed by the state or third parties” (p. 7). They argue that liberalisation is
initiated by the authoritarian regime and is conditioned by internal factors, not by external
ones. They further assert that liberalisation cannot exist without the division of incumbent elites (pp. 18-19). Contrary to the expectation of the authoritarian regime, however, liberalisation often leads to the resurrection of civil society. The reception of and response to the liberalisation are equally as important to consider as the regime’s original intention (p. 10). Liberalisation emerges through a social force, a popular upsurge, that pushes toward democratisation.

Liberalisation, as a notion employed by transitologists, is based on two interconnected assumptions. First, liberalisation is initiated by domestic and internal factors, such as elite divisions, but not by international and external factors. Second, despite strategic calculations of an authoritarian regime toward repression, liberalisation emerges through a popular upsurge, a Tocquevillian paradox.

Let me discuss the second assumption first. Tocqueville (1955) argued that “the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways”, for people react to “the government relaxing its pressure” (pp. 176-177). The Tocquevillian paradox was shown in the democratisation of Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Oberschall, 1996; Tarrow, 1998, pp. 72-76; Zdravomyslova, 1996). It presupposes the importance of political opportunities, the cognitive liberation of challengers, and their sequence—that is the prior opportunities must be recognised. Charles Kurzman (2003; 2004), however, claims that political opportunities are better understood as a variation for the emergence and mobilisation of social movements, instead of a structure that determines the inevitable rise of collective action. For instance, the Iranian revolution began despite the absence of political opportunities. This example demonstrates the insignificance of cognitive liberation—
agent’s recognition of the opportunities—, which is considered by McAdam (1982) to be central for the rise of social movements (pp. 48-51). The discrepancy between the original intention of liberalisation and its actualised effects are called “erratic reformism” by Oberschall (1973, pp. 74-84). Erratic reform or its paradoxical effects do not happen, however, “because people act on opportunities” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 74), but because liberalisation contains a built-in miscalculation structure. The miscalculation of the ancien régime stems from the contradiction that though the ancien régime initiated the liberalisation, it was forced to do so by domestic and internal factors, through a crisis of legitimation and the fragmentation of elite networks. The ancien régime identifies its strategic intention with an expected outcome in the equation of liberalisation; however, variables influencing liberalisation are not always controllable. Miscalculation is already present in processes of liberalisation that are likely to end up in half-hearted reform that fails to redress underlying causes of disaffection. In addition, the sequence of liberalisation, that is, directional processes from erratic reform to a people’s reaction, precludes the potential effects of ex ante collective action. Collective action can precede or induce the erratic reform itself. The “most perilous” in erratic reform is not that “bad government” is to mend its ways, but that the government itself is considered to be bad. Moreover, the separation of self-initiated reform from forced reform in the transitologian liberalisation overlooks their compatibility, or a third way. For instance, an authoritarian regime can initiate reforms to solidify the necessary political foundation for steering the entire liberalisation process. Though challenges to the regime are not negligible, relaxation instead of repression can be seen by the regime as a more effective strategy for
steering society and practicing *divide et empera* to control challenges to its authority. In this case, self-initiated reform can be congruent with involuntary processes of reform.

The first assumption of liberalisation theory, that it derives from domestic and internal factors, implies that its analytic framework is limited to the nation state as the primary unit of analysis. ‘Internal’ factors are analytically and empirically separated from the ‘external’ or international level. The reason that transitologists emphasise the effects of internal factors on transition is obvious: the democratic transition hinges upon self-organised and inner-circle-oriented solutions, pacts among elites. Yet, as will be seen, liberalisation in Korea was not caused by cleavages among elites.

**Two Liberalisations: the Political and Economic**

The early stages of liberalisation in Korea in 1984 however, refute the above assumptions taken by transitologists and partly by scholars of PPT.

First, though collective action was not strong enough to shake the regime’s foundation, it troubled the regime and weakened its legitimacy. Protests against the regime were expanded despite widespread repression. The number of students expelled from universities on account of their involvement in the student movement between May 1980 and 1983 was 1,363—twice as many as the seven-year *Yushin* regime. The number of demonstrations soared from 56 in 1981 to 134 in 1983. In 1983, students began to expand demonstrations beyond campuses. Workers reestablished trade unions that had been forcefully disbanded by the Chun regime. *Chaeya* broke the silence in September 1983, signalled with the launching of the YCDM. The YCDM served as one of the earliest “movement halfway houses” (Morris, 1984), providing other movements discourses for
democracy and support by initiating political protests. Before the inception of liberalisation in Korea, social movements began to reemerge from the underground despite continued state repression. Heavy state repression was not enough to exterminate them, and therefore, the Chun regime shifted its policies away from exterminating the opposition entirely to divide et empera through liberalisation (Im, 1995, p. 139).

Second, international (‘external’) pressures compelled the Chun regime to relax repression. The state’s “3-S” policies, designed to distract people’s attention from political affairs in order to sustain the few remaining strands of legitimacy enjoyed by the government, backfired on the Chun regime. The 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Seoul Olympics forced the regime to relax repression and to permit political activities, however limited, to oppositional groups (KTUC, 1997; Seong, K., 1993). Liberalisation conveyed a positive image of the regime to the international community. Thus, international and external factors were a significant influence on the regime’s decision toward liberalisation, since a successful hosting of the Asian Games and Olympics would strengthen the regime’s weak legitimacy.

Third, a reemerging economy instilled confidence in the Chun regime that the Korean people were standing behind it. In the early 1980s, the so-called “3 Lows”—low interest, low exchange rates, and low oil prices—stimulated economic revival. The revitalisation of the economy motivated the Chun regime to initiate liberalisation under conditions that maintained its firm grip.

Causes for liberalisation in Korea seem to be less compelling than those suggested by transitologists. The rise of social movements was a cause for concern but was not alarming enough for the regime to take more repressive measures. Though international
and external factors were regarded as important in the move toward Korean liberalisation, opposing policies that strengthen repression before and during the Olympics are often noted, as the slaughter in Mexico during the 1968 Olympics demonstrates. The booming economy caused the regime to break up with the hitherto repressive policy, but at the same time it could have merited to continue this policy. Considering each of these reasons on their own does not suffice in understanding how the Chun regime eased its repression. However, their co-constitution forms a plausible ground for understanding how the regime modified its repressive policy. All other conditions being equal, the stability of liberalisation hinged on the only agent-causational factor—the rise of social movements, in particular, the revitalisation of social movements for catalyzing democratic transformations.

Liberalisation, as discussed thus far, has been limited to the political. However, during this period economic liberalisation was already underway. In chapter 2, I discussed how the deepening of industrial policy, initiated by the Park regime since 1972, resulted in serious crisis during the late 1970s. Endogenous problems such as high inflation rates due to expansionary policies, weakened export competitiveness, and over-stretched investment; together with exogenous problems, such as oil shocks, drove the Korean economy into disaster. The industrial policy pursued by the Korean developmental state tilted the relationship between the state and the chaebols. The power of the chaebols subsequently increased due to forms of capital-intensive industrial deepening. The combined sales of the top ten chaebols reached nearly 50 percent of GNP in 1980 (Amsden, p. 116). Chaebols have been considered “too big to fail.” The chaebol-centred
industry left the Chun regime no choice but to promote the *chaebols* in order to revive the economy during a troubling period of depression.

The regime embarked on the liberalisation of the Korean economy. Stabilisation measures involving price and wage controls were implemented along with economic “rationalisation.” Policies of deregulation opened domestic markets and led to the privatisation of financial markets. The privatisation and liberalisation of financial markets further strengthened the power of the *chaebols*. The state voluntarily abandoned the means to distribute financial resources and control industry, which had been the key tools of the EOI for managing the economy during the 1960s and 1970s.

Two interrelated effects of economic liberalisation—the weakened developmental state and strengthened *chaebols*—had a more negative effect on social movements and democracy than changes associated with political liberalisation. First, the mobilising discourses of Korean social movements revolved around questions of state power and imperialism. In large part, the chaebols were considered by social movements to be subordinate to the developmental state. Social movements’ discourses for democracy reflected the construction of a hierarchical order of key targets of resistance: first imperialism, dictatorship, and then capitalism. Focus on the strong developmental state overshadowed the growing influence of the *chaebols*. Social movements assumed that political democratisation and the collapse of the dominance of the developmental state would automatically lead to economic democracy. Second, besides this discursive aspect, a shift in the relations of power between the developmental state and the *chaebols* influenced the nature of social movements’ repertoires. Under dominance from the developmental state in the 1970s, strikes often demonstrated a propensity for developing
into larger political events, but now this nexus was delinked. Social movements were increasingly subject to miscalculations in their strategies. Even in small factories in the 1970s, strikes were easily politicised by the intervention of the developmental state. However, since economic liberalisation, industrial conflicts in the large factories of the chaebols were limited to frames about “concerned corporations” that were increasingly isolated from the possibilities of politicisation.

The political and economic forms of liberalisation share a common thread, however. Underlying causes of discontent remained intact. Instead of reaping the expected results of liberalisation that ensured a foundation for legitimation, they brought about unexpected results, such as the revival of social movements, an intensification of democratic alliances and the breakaway of traditionally loyal groups, like chaebols. That is, they all contributed to reducing state power. Nonetheless, they differed in that political liberalisation enhanced democratic potential by promoting civil rights, however limited. This helped in making the political arena more fertile for contestations and the facilitation of alliances. Economic liberalisation however, narrowed possibilities for politicisation by separating economic democracy from the political, making the economic arena less contestable, reinforcing the anti-democratic forces, the chaebols. Alongside the 3-S cultural policies, the two liberalisations signalled a shift in the nature of the developmental state. The despotic domination of the Korean regime in previous years, willingly or unwillingly, made way for subsequent hegemonic rule. Social movements, who were preparing themselves during abeyance recognised the shift and responded with massive displays of radical dramaturgical public enactments.
The Revival of Social Movements: Towards Mobilisation

Before the period of political liberalisation, social movements carefully shifted their sphere of activities back aboveground, after many years underground.

The year of 1984 witnessed the outbreak of massive unrest when social movements sought to widen the aperture of political opportunities in Korea. The number of student demonstrations skyrocketed from 134 in 1983 to 2,185 in 1984 and to an amazing 1,792 in the first half alone of 1985. The *White Paper on Campus Disorder* (henceforth *White Paper*), published by the Ministry of Culture and Education in 1985, reported that nearly one million students participated in protest between 1984 and the first half of the 1985 (Hakwonsiwi, 1985). The *White Paper* identified several trends in student protests such as increasing violence, tightly organised protest actions, increased streets protests, as well as active solidarity between students, workers and peasants. The labour movement recommenced its protest activities during 1983 with a campaign against a blacklist policy that prevented the ousted labour activists from being reemployed. Activists from the labour and student movements launched the Korean Council for Labour Welfare (KCLW) in March 1984. The KCLW was the first open organisation of the labour movement in the 1980s that organised economic and political protests, as well as expanding activities of solidarity with other groups. Industrial conflicts were on the increase from 98 in 1983 to 276 in 1986 (Deyo, 1989, p. 61). Organisations—from workers, peasants, young people, and religious groups in *chaeya*—coalesced into the Council of the People’s Democracy Movement in June 1984. In March 1985, the *chaeya* founded an umbrella organisation, the Coalition for Democratic Reunification and the *Minjung* Movement (CDRM). The CDRM played a key mediating role between social movements and the main opposition
party, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP). It cooperated and simultaneously competed with the NKDP in democratisation.

Between 1984 and 1986, social movements pushed liberalisation further toward the embodiment of democratisation, making this current irreversible. To elucidate how social movements pushed themselves for democratic transition, I divide the following section into three parts. First, I investigate the discursive debates on goals and tactics for democracy within social movements; second, I interrogate the repertoires of social movements during this period; and third, I examine the networks and alliances for democracy in Korea. These three dimensions of social movements made the Chun regime significantly more vulnerable and subject to mounting challenges.

*Discursive Debates: Let A Hundred Flowers Bloom*

Social movements during the 1980s were engrossed in intense debates that determined movements’ goals, tactics, repertoires, and issues. The most fierce debates were carried out on the level of grand theories. Marxism, which had been studied by many activists to analyse their defeats in 1980, was used to interpret the structural social changes sweeping the country and to attract the innovation of other radical ideas for the movement. In the second half of the 1980s, Leninism, Maoism, the North Korean *Juche* ideology were all introduced and discussed in earnest by social movement activists.

The first debate by social movements’ since liberalisation was called the C-N-P debate. C-N-P is an acronym referring to three ideological tendencies—the Civil Democratic Revolution (CDR), the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), and the People’s Democratic Revolution (PDR). The debates concentrated on three main themes, first,
approaches toward leading class(es) of revolution, second, how to realise true democracy, and third, examinations of the relation between imperialism and dictatorship. The CDR assigned a leading role for revolution to the middle class, as the working class was still in a weakened state during this period. The final goal of the CDR was to overthrow the dictatorship and to attain liberal democracy, which it was understood, could be supported by the US. The NDR and PDR agreed that the *minjung* should lead the revolution; however, key differences remained. The NDR emphasized the *minjung*’s alliance with the middle-class and the initiating role of radical intellectuals, while the PDR rejected the necessity of such an alliance and opposed the initiating role of intellectuals in the struggle. Both camps argued that true democracy could be achieved with the overthrowing of imperialist powers controlling the Korean dictatorship; however, the NDR placed significantly more weight on an anti-imperialist strategy than democratic transition, whereas the PDR placed significantly more weight on democratic socialism than on national liberation (Cho, K., 1989; KDF, 2010, p. 231).

The C-N-P debate had an important practical significance. The NDR ignited controversies over alliance-building for democracy, the direction of protest in liberalisation, and the movements’ attitude towards general election in 1985. *Samin* (the three mins)—standing for *minjok* (nation), *minju* (democracy), and *minjung*—ideology occupied the center stage of NDR discourse. Groups, from students to workers, launched a number of struggle committees that attached *samin* to their names.

Debates on social formation of Korea were the most controversial. Social formation, according to Marx (2003),\(^\text{15}\) conditions “the general process of social, political and

\(^{15}\) In the *Preface to A Contribution To The Critique Of Political Economy*, Marx (2003) describes the social formation as a social structure which involves base and superstructure. Marx, however, used the social
intellectual life.” (p. 264), for “the particular structure of economic, political and ideological conditions in the social formation determines the possible outcomes of the class struggles conducted under such conditions” (Hindess and Hirst, 1975, p. 15).

Korean social movements were engaged in debates on social formation in order to develop effective strategies and tactics for democracy (Shin, G., 1995, p. 518).

The most controversial debate took place between the NDR (a different version from the YCDM’s) and the National Liberation People’s Democratic Revolution (NLPDR). The former, based on Marxism-Leninism, defined Korean social formation as a neocolonial form of state monopoly capitalism, while the latter, influenced by the North Korean Juche ideology, sees it as a form of semifeudal colonialism. The NDR emphasised critiques of capitalistic development and argued that priority for true democratic change should emerge through class struggle led by the working class and its small but determined vanguard party. Importantly, this view precludes any alliance with liberal reform groups. The primary work of the party in the democratic revolution, as Lenin wrote in the Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, is to establish the democratic republic based on a constituent assembly (CA) through violent revolution. The NLPDR (known as NL group), however, paid more attention to continuing economic and political domination of the US over Korea since decolonisation. Accordingly, the NLPDR preferred anti-imperialist struggle to the class struggle emphasised a broad alliance between social movements and liberal wings of the opposition party. Therefore, claims for democratic constitutional reform were considered a primary task of social movements affiliated with the NLPDR.

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formation interchangeably with the mode of production. In the Preface, Marx identifies four social formations: Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and the modern bourgeois.
These abstruse debates had practical significance for social movements in two main ways. First, they guided the movements’ goals, tactics, repertoires, and framing; and second, they solidified the internal cohesion of social movements. The introduction of radical ideas and frequent emphases on vanguard organisation were nothing other than an expression of, and reaction to, experiences of the massacre in Kwangju. The major purpose of the debates was to build consensus and reinforce commitment within the “conscience constituents” (McCarthy and Zald), thereby serving as a foothold in efforts to expand the movement.

Moreover, the debates contributed to a further translation of the previous concept of the minjung. The concept of the minjung moved from a predication upon a nationalistic interpretation of history into a viable discourse for democratisation. The debates legitimised continuous mobilisation of a broad population. Thus, the minjung gained an economic and a political foundation over the course of the debates. The minjung, regardless of discursive differences in social movements, was embedded in the wider movements’ goals, tactics, organisational forms, repertoires, and framing strategies (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p. 295). The minjung represented both an expressive dimension as well as forming a platform for strategic action. The discursive debates transformed the concept of the minjung into norms, values, symbols, and meanings. The dual aspects of the minjung were totalised into a construction of the authentic subject of history through the debates. “Epic representations” of the minjung as an enlightened agent changing the course of future history were translated through the everyday culture of the past or vice versa. By employing a notion of the minjung, the democratic movement turned itself from a movement to replace bad government with good
government into a movement for changing regime and the entire Korean system. Democratisation was not understood as one-off political episode but was embodied as “counterhegemonic oppositional practices of daily life in order to account for the long duration in history” (Abelmann, p. 26).

Every contentious activity was discussed under the rubric of *minjung*. Protest was not limited to university campuses but expanded to the streets, factories, and villages. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the totalisation of the minjung and the instrumentalisation of a cultural aspect of the minung worked as an effective counter discourse against the despotic domination of the developmental state. Yet, it also ran the risk of disregarding the state’s shift to hegemonic rule in the 1980s.

**Contentious Repertoires: New Wine in Old and New Bottles**

As the *White Paper* observed, changes in the repertoires of student movements were becoming evident. One of the characteristics of social movements in abeyance, the element of survival or sustenance, disappeared. This trend underscored changes in collective action from “reactive” to “proactive” dynamics (Tilly, 1978). Put in different terms, it signified a move from a self-contained dynamic to an externally oriented engagement with the public, from the individual to the united, from informal networks to increasingly formal organisations. Though some repertoires were similar to those during the 1970s, assuming characteristics associated with repertoires during periods of abeyance, their context, substance, environment were notably distinct.

**Attacks on Symbolic Sites: a Condensed Repertoire**
On November 14 1984, more than two hundred students occupied the headquarters of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Under the banner of the Student Federation for Struggles for Democracy, the group made several demands to stop labour repression, to impose a minimum income guarantee, to lift the ban on politicians, to abolish the Law on Assembly and Demonstration and the Basic Press Act. The occupation was initiated by a group called MT (an acronym of mintu, meaning struggles for democracy). The MT group, strongly influenced by the NDR, argued that the political awareness of students and the public could only be raised through political action (Kang, S., p. 70). The occupation of the DJP headquarters, as an “illegal blitz attack on a symbolic object,” caused controversy among political parties and publics; however, it was considerably less controversial than the subsequent occupation of the USIS building in 1985.

On May 23, 1985, on the occasion of the 5th Kwangju Uprising, 73 students from five universities stormed the USIS building in Seoul and occupied it for four days. They demanded an official apology from the U.S. administration for its support in the massacre of Kwangju and demanded cessation of support for the Chun regime.16 This occupation attracted considerable domestic and international attention.

The attacks on symbolic sites caused the Chun regime to rescind its earlier move toward liberalisation. The regime raided offices of student organisations on campus, arresting more than 70 activists as conspirators of the occupation. The Chun regime attempted to introduce a College Stabilisation Act which would suspend habeas corpus and subject dissident students to a program of “re-education.” The strategy backfired

16 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Reagan administration supported the Chun regime. Furthermore, the Reagan administration unambiguously opposed claims from the opposition NDP for direct presidential elections (Shorrock, 1986, p. 1213).
under strong resistance from the NKDP and the public. This incident rather gave
challengers the lessons and values of alliance for democracy (Lee, M., 2009, p. 123).

Workers’ attacks on symbolic sites increased rapidly during 1985. Workers occupied
the NKDP’s headquarters, the Guro District office, and the headquarters of the Federation
of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) because of blacklists, union repression, and the general
incompetence of the hard-handed FKTU. The intensification of this repertoire in the
labour movement was a proactive response to deepening repression from the regime
against the labour movement (Lee, W., 2005).

Every repertoire is interactive, multi-causal and multi-dimensional, thereby belonging
to “contending actors, not to single actors” (Tilly, 1993, p. 268). Key actors include the
claimants, the object of claims, adherents, bystanders, media, and so on. Attacks on
symbolic sites during this period were less oriented toward targeting “enemies” than
similar attacks were during the 1970s under abeyance. Movements’ target in
liberalisation was directed to the public and media. This repertoire accelerated the
meaning of the actions through the media, conditioning public opinion that placed
pressure on the movement’s opponents.17 As a result, the action reaped an explosive
reaction both from state-level “enemies” and the broader public. The occupation
communicated a clear signal of growing anti-Americanism to the US. This contentious
repertoire was an important cause that led the Reagan administration to withdraw, or at
least to be more cautious in, its support for the Chun regime (Fowler, 1999, p. 286).

Industrial Area Rallies: Politicisation of Class Struggles

17 Therborn (1995) calls this “triangular action,” possible, thanks to mass media society (pp. 313-314).
The sectoral distribution of the labour force indicated radical changes were afoot in Korea. The proportion of the labour force in manufacturing increased from 21.6 percent to 27 percent between 1980 and 1987. Nearly half of all industrial workers were concentrated in Seoul and its neighbouring city, Incheon in the mid-1980s (Chai, G., 1996, p. 279). This demographic shift was recognised by social movements.

The MT group who led many struggles in the student movement during the second half of 1984 collaborated with underground groups in the labour movement. Since May 1984, students and workers organised street demonstrations in factory districts, which were grounded in a movement policy prioritizing political struggles in industrial areas. The purpose of the strategy was to raise political awareness of workers and facilitate an alliance for democracy with the minjung (Hanguk, 1989, pp. 126-140). These actions were most frequently undertaken in Seoul and Incheon. They were not an inherited repertoire, but were intentionally invented and repeatedly used.

Thousands of students and workers rallied in the Guro industrial areas in Seoul and Incheon calling for the punishment of “Chun the murderer” and to reform “evil” labour law. The most controversial event occurred in Incheon on May 3, 1986 when the opposition NKDP attempted to hold a ceremony in support of constitutional reform. Ten thousand students, workers, and chaeya activists gathered in Incheon, turning the ceremony into a radical protest against the regime, the US, and even the NKDP itself. The rally was deluged with radical and revolutionary slogans, calling for “anti-imperialism,” a “samin constitution,” and “power to the people.” The May 3rd rally had serious social and political ramifications. Nearly four hundred people were arrested with 133 imprisoned. The CDRM, the Federation of Seoul Labour Movement (FSLM), and
the Incheon Democratic Workers Confederation (IDWC) were all outlawed. The NKDP broke alliance with the CDRM and agreed with the DJP to discuss constitutional reform inside parliament only.

Although reactions from the May 3rd rally destabilised the alliance for democracy, the rally demonstrated the true power of social movements to the public and the regime. Moreover, the rally manifested a significant emphasis on radical democracy as distinct from previous liberal views. Despite a heterogeneous gathering of groups at the rally, they unanimously criticised the NKDP’s attempt to compromise with the regime on the constitutional reform. Nearly 50 different pamphlets were distributed in the rally (6wol hangjaeng 2, 2007, p. 352), yet they collectively called for a people’s constitution, for the minjung’s right to live, and the overthrow of the regime in nearly one voice. The event also raised questions about limitations of the resonance of radical ideas across Korea. Movement slogans received little sympathy from the public, which caused social movements to moderate their framing to increase their salience in the face of public sentiment.

The political struggles in industrial areas, as a repertoire, bridged the economic and political struggles across various movements. Besides, this repertoire, though limited, politicised the everyday grievances of workers by attributing the causes of their injustices to non-democratic forces like the authoritarian regime.

*Proactive Strikes: Demonstrative and the Spill-over Effect*

Workers strikes began to address injustices on the Korean political landscape. There were two significant strikes during this time that, while they differed from each other, had
found commonality by producing spill-over effects for subsequent events. The first was the Daewoo Automobile Factory strike in Incheon and the second involved solidarity strikes in the Guro industrial area in Seoul.

The Daewoo Automobile Factory in Incheon belonged to the Daewoo group, one of the five largest chaebols in the 1980s. The factory had 7,400 workers, of which 4,300 belonged to the union. The union, despite low wages and ill-treatment by the management, was very passive and had no interest in representing workers’ interests. The students-turned-workers\(^\text{18}\) in the factory gained the support of a majority of union members and began to represent the union in place of the original union leadership. In April 1985, the workers went into the strike for ten days which was the first mass strike upon any of the chaebols since 1980. The strike ended with a successful wage-increase of 10% and other additional achievements.

The Daewoo strike had multiple effects on the labour movement and public consciousness. First, workers pressed the chaebol to break the single-digit wage-guideline imposed by the regime. Subsequent strikes in other corporations forced managements to make a concessions in favour of the worker demands. Second, the strike alerted workers to the importance of strong union formation (6wol hangjaeng 1, 2007, pp. 340-342). Third, the remarkable activities of students-turned-workers promoted further workers-students cooperation. Fourth, the strikes had a massive symbolic impact. Photos in the newspapers of the representative of the union, a factory worker, walking out of the meeting with the powerful Kim, Woo-jung, the head of the conglomerate, gave the image to the public that workers were as powerful as chaebols (KDF, 2011).

\(^{18}\) South Korean regimes branded students-turned-workers as North-Korea-friendly or enemy-friendly elements. If their previous identity was ever exposed, these students-turned-workers were fired and blacklisted.
The solidarity strikes in the Guro industrial area were recorded as the first interfirm strikes since the Korean War. 58,000 workers existed in hundreds of small work places in the Guro area (Ogle, 1990, p. 112). Solidarity strikes began in mid June 1985, when three union leaders of Daewoo Apparel were arrested by the police due to their involvement in organising an illegal strike in May that had ended without conflict. Three hundred union members regarded it as a breach of bargaining agreements by the management. They demanded the immediate release of the arrested union leaders, the reform of labour law, and abolition of the Law on Assembly and Demonstration, as well as the Basic Press Act (6wol hangjaeng 1, p. 342). Daewoo Apparel workers had only just went on strike when union workers of nine other factories in the Guro industrial area staged sympathy strikes. The solidarity strikes lasted a total of six days, in which 2,500 workers participated. The interfirm strikes were enabled by close social ties developed since 1980, in which the students-turned-workers played a crucial role. The Chun regime clamped down on the strikes, seeing the dismissal of 700 workers and the imprisonment of 43.

The Guro solidarity strikes produced a new type of labour organisation called the “mass political organisation” (MPO) which worked to initiate political struggles with the working-class. The FSLM and the IDWC that led the May 3rd rally in 1986 were the most popular examples of the MPO. Further, the strikes attracted broad support from some 26 groups, ranging from students and chaeya to even the opposition party. The Guro strikes “demonstrated the need to act outside legal structures.” The socio-political legacies of the strikes were embodied in the Great Worker Struggle in 1987 (Ogle, p. 113; Koo, 2001 p. 125).
Two Alliances For Democracy

A series of uprisings led by ordinary citizens in 1979 and 1980 transformed the cultural micronarrative of the minjung into an historico-political metanarrative. It was evident to social movements that the minjung, especially the working-class, played a crucial role for democratisation. Social movements considered that only a powerful minjung could guarantee the sustainability of democratisation, define its transformative substance, and attract allies. I will investigate two important attempts by social movements in Korea for building alliances for democracy that conditioned two mass mobilisations of 1987.

The Workers-Students Alliance: An Early Riser for Democratisation

Many forms of workers-students alliances, nohakyeondae, exist. Industrial Area Rallies are just one form. I will discuss the most representative phenomena of worker-student alliances, students-turned-workers, called tushin (throwing or devoting oneself) or jonjaeigeon (the transposition of being). Since the Kwangju Uprising, social movements seriously attempted to raise the political consciousness of the minjung and mobilise them for democratisation. Thus, in the 1980s, students migrated en masse to factories in order to pose as workers without exposing their previous identities. I will, first, review the causes of the students-turned-worker phenomena, to explain why such massive migration happened in such a specific form. Then, I will explain the implications and effects of this strategic process.

Students-turned-workers are the result of a confluence of structural-economic, historico-institutional, and cultural forces. First, they were caused by rapid industrialisation and the underrepresentation of workers’ rights amidst miserable living
conditions. The discrepancy between their contribution as workers and financial compensation was highlighted through the dramatic public enactment of workers, as Chun, Tae-il and the striking female workers in the 1970s. Their actions of Chun, Tae-il and the striking female workers echoed throughout night schools and religious institutions. However, and second, any external supports for the labour movement were completely forbidden by the Chun regime after the massacre in Kwangju in 1980 in order to further oppress unions. The regime stipulated a provision in the Labour Union Law called the “prohibition of third-party intervention” in labour affairs. The law disallowed and illegalised any involvement of a third-party into the affairs of an enterprise union (Lee, N., p. 239). Thus, this historico-institutional environment constrained the strategic choices of students who wanted to explicitly strengthen alliances with the working-class. For the students, the only option left for alliance building with the workers was to undergo jonjaeigeon (transposition of being), the shifting of identity.

Third, to understand the phenomena of students-turned-workers, cultural factors must be taken into consideration. These factors can be divided into two points—culture as structural constraints and culture as discourse.

Unlike the Western experience, late-late development in Korea did not follow the path to democratisation through struggles between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In Korea, this course was filled by critical intellectuals (Koo, 1993, p. 246). Critical intellectuals consisted primarily of petit-bourgeoisie and the middle-class and often enjoyed relative autonomous status (Koo, 1991: 503). In a society with a long Confucian tradition, intellectuals assumed high social, cultural, and moral standing over other social groups, including state power holders and successful capitalists.
The defeat of the movement during the Kwangju massacre transformed the activists from these intellectuals with the middle-class background to Gramscian “organic intellectuals” who supported subaltern classes by actively participating “in practical life, as constructor[s], organiser[s], ‘permanent persuader[s]’ and not just a simple orator” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 10). As Amilcar Cabral (2009) urged to the petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals committed “suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers.”

The failures of Kwangju drove students to embrace radical ideas, which subsequently invited the working class living outside of history—to the inside of history—through discursive debates, cultural excavation and, of course, students’ identity shift.

Since 1980, a large number of students who either dropped out of colleges, graduated, or were expelled entered factories to become workers and to raise class consciousness for mobilisation efforts toward democracy. The total number of students was estimated to be three thousand or more by the mid-1980s (Ogle, p. 99). The Ministry of Labour reported that in 1985, 176 “disguised workers” were dismissed and approximately 25 to 30 percent of labour disputes were led by them (Kyŏkdong, 1985; AWC, p. 264). Students-turned-workers were spread nationwide (Hakwonsiwi, 1985). In Incheon alone, one thousand students worked as “disguised workers” (Kim, Y., p. 321).

The aforementioned two strikes and the May 3rd rally demonstrated the effects of the workers-students alliance. The labour movement during liberalisation was obviously affected by the workers-students alliance. However, while its direct link to and influence on the Great Worker Struggle of 1987 was relatively weak, the alliance certainly served as its early riser, (Tarrow, 1998) or initiator (McAdam, 1995) by demonstrating the vulnerability of the regime and factory management. The alliance contributed further to
mobilisation by providing cultural templates, such as minjung culture and collective identity that bequeathed protest repertoires. Further, the worker-student alliance worked as a springboard for expanding bottom-up networks for democratic transition. The Guro solidarity strikes and the May 3rd rally also contributed to the formation of broad networks for democratisation through politicisation of the labour movement. The alliance attracted different SMIs to democratisation and reproduced further spin-off effects, such as student-peasant solidarity networks.

“This alliance”, Lee, Namhee (Lee, N., 2007) wrote, “was the most distinctive feature of the Korean democratization movement.” (p. 215). More importantly however, the worker-student alliance served as an engine for maintaining radical dimensions during social movement challenges for increased democratisation.

Alliances between Social Movements and the NKDP: Love and Hatred?

Since political liberalisation, polycephalous organisational forms and subterranean networks were replaced by more centralised and official networks. In 1985, the student movement launched a number of nationwide umbrella organisations, including the National Student Association (NSA) which was composed of 62 student unions. Further, students, workers, peasants, women, artists, and others began to launch organisations by early 1987 that were able to represent each SMI.

The emergence and development of SMOs and networks promoted concerted political action among social movements. In February 1985, the groups actively participated in the first general election of the national assembly since 1980. Various repertoires were employed, including the occupation of the headquarters of the ruling DJP, interrupting
the speeches of candidates from the ruling DJP with boos and taunts, as well as broad street demonstrations. The DJP managed to win the election with 35.3 percent of the vote, but they suffered a de facto defeat in kind. The new opposition party, NKDP founded by two charismatic Kims, received 29.2 percent and became the de facto winner. It did not mean, however, the emergence of a strong opposition party (Yun, S., 1997). The opposition parties in Korea were epiphenomenal in political affairs. They very rarely affirmed their political pressure from within institutional parliamentary politics, but instead from non-institutional collective action (Choi, J., 2010, pp. 148-151). Therefore, despite a successful election in 1985, the opposition NKDP still needed support from social movements for regime change.

Since liberalisation, or more precisely since 1980, social movements focused on two interrelated issues—the Kwangju massacre and constitutional reform. Put another way, attention was focused on the past and the future of the Korean regime. The Kwangju massacre represented a fatal political weakness for the Chun regime, while challenges of constitutional reform threatened its future. The 5th constitution, initiated by Chun, instituted a single seven-year term system for the presidency. According to Lee, Myung-sik (Lee, M., 2009), “this limitation on term of office was partly to make up for Chun’s weak legitimacy.” (p. 111). As stipulated by the constitution, Chun, Doo-hwan could no longer seek his re-election. Adhering to the 5th constitution without reform meant the continuation of an indirect election system for presidency by electoral colleges that were filled with pro-regime loyalists. Thus, social movements consistently campaigned for constitutional reform. These two interrelated issues formed the foundation for democratic alliances within social movements and between them and the opposition NKDP.
In spite a broad extension of a master frame revolving around questions of democracy, its intensity was weak. The master frame (Snow and Benford, 1992) in South Korea, democracy, was an “elaborated one”—that is, the frame was open to flexible interpretation and inclusive membership—not restricted one (closed and exclusive). As a result, its potency was weak, however, for it was too broad and abstract to “resonate with the life world” of people in Korea (pp. 139-140). Social movements were divided over how to frame efforts toward constitutional reform. For instance, the CA group supported the constituent assembly, and the YCDM dought direct elections for the presidency to incite democratic constitutional reform.

In 1985, the CDRM, an umbrella organisation of SMIs, embraced constitutional reform as an agenda and built an alliance with the NKDP for democratic constitutional reform. Differences between the CDRM and the NKDP, however, emerged from the notion that democratic constitutional reform, according to CDRM, could only be achieved through extra-parliamentary struggles against the Chun regime. The NKDP however, believed that democracy could only be realised through agreements brokered with the regime in parliament. And further, the CDRM claimed for minjung or radical democracy, while NKDP pursued a liberal solution. When the NKDP announced in April that it could not tolerate anti-Americanism from the student movement, the CDRM broke the alliance with the NKDP due to the reason that the NKDP’s position was untenable.

The severed alliance between the CDRM and the NKDP was accelerated through actions from the regime. The regime, on the one hand, reinforced repression of social movements based on justifications of violence and “pro-communist” slogans in the May 3rd rally to intervene. Major executive members and officials of the CDRM were placed
on a governmental issued wanted list and 159 students and workers were arrested. The student movement was also significantly damaged by the regime. The NL Group, the mainstream faction in the student movement since mid-1986, held a launching ceremony for the Patriotic Students’ Confederation for Anti-Imperialism and -dictatorship (PSCAA) in Konguk University. The ceremony was crushed by the police and 1,290 students were imprisoned. Social movements at the end of 1986 stood at the crossroads between a final collapse or a dramatic recasting. The Chun regime, on the other hand, signalled to the NKDP that it was ready to accept constitutional reform, under the condition that the NKDP could reach an agreement with the ruling DJP on a reform plan within parliament. The conservative contingent of the NKDP agreed with DJP on a direction of the reform that introduced Korea’s first parliamentary cabinet system. This agreement confronted a tough opposition from the NKDP ’s reform wing led by the two Kims. They argued that the cabinet system would only extend the rule of the regime. Thus, also at the end of 1986, the reform group of the NKDP also stood at the crossroads on whether to surrender in parliament or to pursue the possibilities of extra-parliamentary challenges.

An alliance for democracy between social movements and the opposition party was continuously unstable and therefore constantly vulnerable to outside intervention. Nevertheless, the general election in 1985 and the struggle against the College Stabilisation Act proved that this alliance was mutually beneficial and necessary for the realisation of regime change.

Liberalisation in 1984 and its subsequent revocation in 1986 clearly affected social movements and the political process; however, it was not nearly as influential as
repression in the 1980. Social movements successfully developed discourses, organisations, networks, and repertoires, which could not be easily exterminated through state violence and repression. The main question remaining for social movements campaigning for democratisation was how to maximise their resources for successful mobilisation. The answer(s) was not so simple, for two previous tensions had not been adequately addressed. Tensions between political and socioeconomic democracy caused by the two liberalisations were still simmering, as were tensions within the alliance on the end point of liberal democracy or radical democracy were still outstanding.

TRANSITION: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN CONSTITUTIONALITY

A Transitologist argument insists that transition discredits normal science methodology and ought to be replaced with the uncertain contingencies of “fortuna” (unexpected events) and “virtu” (the talents of specific individuals) (O’Donnell & Schmitter, pp. 2-5). This however, is only a partial truth in the Korean transition. In the Korean case, there was fortuna or infortuna but no virtue. During 1987, social movements were consolidated and collective action events spread rapidly. It was also the year of the presidential election, so constitutional reform was the central issue of every political event during the year. A political agenda that was to decide the fate of democracy in Korea was ignited by infortune—the death of two students’ from state violence, and vitium—the suspension of constitutional debates imposed by the Chun regime in April of the same year.

Deep Political Opportunity
The first phase of liberalisation in 1980 ended in disaster for Korean social movements. Belief in liberal groups by social movements, exemplified through the US’s support for liberal democracy was shattered in 1980 when the US approved, or at least did not oppose the use of violence against demonstrators in Kwangju in order to “maintain law and order” (Shorrock, 1986; Fowler, 1999). Historically, economically, and politically, the US exerted significant influence on Korea and its regimes; therefore, the US’s support for the military coup and opposition to popular action produced an unfavourable environment for democratisation, particularly since aid for the Chun regime continued after the Kwangju massacre. Disillusionment with the US and the Carter administration’s “human rights diplomacy” translated into a fervent anti-Americanism. By late 1986, the US did not change its course of “quiet diplomacy” in Korea (Bonner, 1987). However, in 1987, the US began to shift position from quiet diplomacy to “public pressure”—I will call this a surficial opportunity. This provided a clear opportunity for social movements.

The US increased its pressure on the Chun regime after witnessing growing protests against the Chun regime’s statement on April 13, 1987 that suspended all debates on constitutional reform. On June 19, 1987, the State Department of the US released a sharp statement urging “very strongly” that all concerned parties resume political dialogue. The statement clearly signalled its opposition to the Chun regime’s plan of declaring martial law in the face of popular nationwide demonstrations (Fowler, p. 280).

The social movements’ continuous attempts to hold the US responsible for the Kwangju massacre amidst widespread anti-Americanism contributed to the diplomatic shift of the US (Fowler, p. 286). Yet, there is another contributing factor in this political opportunity, which I call the deep political opportunity.
The American position towards the Chun regime was also affected by other international events. The Iranian revolution forced the Carter administration to avoid a second Iran in Korea during 1980 (Shorrock; Fowler). US did not pressure the Chun regime up until late 1986. The People Power movement in the Philippines in 1986, however, motivated the US to reconsider its previous diplomacy towards Korea. Based on US government documents on Korea, Fowler suggests that the counterintuitive outcomes of US policies towards Korea—the human-rights-conscious Carter administration supported the Chun regime while the security-conscious Reagan administration put pressure on it—can be explained through the analogies of Iran and the Philippines. The Philippines analogy motivated the US to force the Chun regime to settle disputes politically. Constraints on the use of violence by the Chun regime were a political opportunity for social movements to intensify mobilisation. The effects of People Power in the Philippines provided an opportunity to avoid a violent resolution of mass popular mobilisation—the deep political opportunity. The unresolved question for social movements in 1980, how to reduce or neutralise the intervention of the military, finally figured as a solution, however temporary and incomplete.

The Filipino effect had also a duality. Surpassing the first effect that helped the Korean democratic movement neutralise the military, People Power in the Philippines also inspired social movements in Korea. The spill-over effects (McAdam and Rucht, 1993) of the Philippines’ People Power in Korea emerged in the areas of politics, strategies, and repertoires. Politically speaking, liberal democracy in the Philippines, represented by Corazon Aquino, seemed to be a viable option to reproduce for the Korean opposition party and social movements. In strategic terms, the centre-left coalition in the Philippines
for democracy was an impressive option for social movements in Korea. In terms of repertoires, the opposition party in Korea imitated repertoires used in the Philippines, while social movement activists also studied and adopted them (Chung, C., 1996). The Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul paralleled the significance of the EDSA in Manila, where demonstrators gathered and sustained their protests against the authoritarian regime. The National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), an independent election watchdog organisation in the Philippines, was also adopted by Korean social movements during the presidential election in 1987.

The political opportunity emergent from the US’s public pressure on the Chun regime was partly a “fortuna” of opportunity. US pressure on the Chun regime presented a political opportunity that was conducive for restraining violence by the dominant state powers. The US induced political opportunity also served as a catalyzing reference, as an event triggering the spread of collective action. However, the effects of the surficial political opportunity and the deep one were limited, for elite division, so evident in the Philippines, was absent in Korea, and US pressure on the regime in Korea was merely brought about through public engagement, not nearly as direct as was the case in the Philippines. As a result, other causes for the transition in Korea are inevitably significant.

It is worth noting that political opportunities in Korea in 1987, regardless of their categorisation as deep or surficial, were accessible not only to social movements but also to their allies. Further, the Filipino effects discussed also presupposed forms of liberal and electoral democracy, not the radical democracy pursued by the Korean social movements.
Framing Democracy Through Peace and Symbols

The fatal damage to the student movement during the May 3rd rally and the PSCAA incident in Konguk University in 1986 forced the NL group to reconsider their hitherto radical slogans and violent tactics. In the late 1986, a majority of the student and labour movement adopted a “mass line” influenced by the North Korean Juche ideology and Maoism. In June of that year, the Council of College Student Representatives in Seoul (CCSRS) which was comprised of student union presidents from 36 colleges, initiated student mobilisation in Seoul under the mass line slogan: “ten people taking one step together, rather than ten steps by one person.” The mass line served as a solution for gaining public support that affected the movements’ framing and repertoires.

On January 14 1987, Park Jong-cheol, an ordinary student, was detained by the police and refused to reveal the location of his activist friend. Park Jong-cheol was tortured to death. The police announced that Park had suddenly died when an investigator “banged his fist’ on the table.” This announcement was pure fabrication. Police obscured the fact that Park had been suffocated by investigators with water torture (Lee, M., p. 134). Unfortunately, Park’s death was foreseeable when the regime began to revoke liberalisation and reinforce repression since 1985. First, there had been the torture of Kim Gun-tae, the chairperson of the YCDM in 1985 and then the sexual torture of Kwon, Insuk, a female student-turned-worker in 1986. The tortures along with Park’s death, as infortuna, served as a bridge between social movements and the reform wing of the NKDP. These groups organised nationwide mass rallies against the regime.

The governmental agenda of reinforced repression in early 1987 challenged social movements’ framing tasks. Slogans against torture and for the punishment of the
murderers in the Kwangju massacre involve diagnostic (who to blame) and motivational (why to struggle) dimensions; however they lacked any prognostic (solution oriented) dimension (Snow and Benford, 1988; Benford and Snow, 2000). Frames, such as the samin constitution and constituent assembly, are simply so radical and abstract that they did more harm than good for social movements. The weak potency and resonance of the master frame, as well as incomplete tasks in successful framing must be overcome.

Over the course of many frame disputes between 1985 and 1986, social movements, or more precisely their majority, sought “unifying issues” (Ryan, 1992) that would unite different organisations across various sectors of the movement. The mass line purged any radical and futuristic substance from the master frame. In its place, democratic constitutional revision and direct presidential election became the unifying issues under the master frame. Though the direct presidential election, for instance, was not elaborate but restrictive, it was potent and resonant. That is, it carried a significant element of “experiential commensurability,” finding articulation with problems that were intrusive into many Korean’s quotidian life experiences (Snow and Benford 1992; Benford and Snow, 2000). These unifying issues diagnosed the injustices perpetrated by the dictatorship as a deprivation of political rights that could subsequently give, or pretend to give, people the power to change the nondemocratic polity through voting. Based on a construction of the problem as a democratic deficit emergent from electoral deceit, any solution accentuated specific polices that would give individuals the power to change the authoritarian regime. Thus, the unifying slogans had now integrated diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational dimensions. The specificity of the unifying issues increased extensity of framing. The newly framed slogans unified social movements, attracted
bystanders, and even encouraged the incumbent elites to play the only game in town—democracy. Thus, the framing tasks of social movements were able to increase the potential of extensity for mobilisation at the cost of future intensity—radical democracy.

Repertoires convey and translate opportunities, resources, meanings and symbols into collective action. Contentious repertoires exploited by social movements in 1987 were partly learned and partly inherited through previous struggles. Repertoires during abeyance displayed characteristics of dramaturgical critiques, whereas those during liberalisation demonstrated a move toward generating widespread appeal across Korean society. A relatively clear line was drawn between speakers and listeners in these repertoires. While the movement’s repertoires in those periods had been less open to the public, repertoires in transition maximised mobilisation and could easily generate spin-off movements and draw in bystanders. Another important effect of the mass line was the Gandhian repertoire of ‘nonviolence’, which was mediated by the Filipino People Power. Nonviolence was incorporated into an important action agenda of the National Movement Headquarters to Win a Democratic Constitution (NMH), which was the main umbrella coalition consisting of SMOs and the opposition party (KDF, 2010, p. 307).

Another recurring and important repertoire was the targeting of symbolic sites. The tactic was now occurring under more supportive conditions. On June 10th, the first nationwide day of protest organised by NMH occupied the Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul. For a week, the protestors attracted public attention and drew in supporters who wanted to provide protection to those in the Cathedral. It served as a centripetal point in the Korean demonstration. Further, the occupation put pressure on liberal groups in the
NMH who wanted to appropriate popular protest as leverage for their own political compromise with the Chun regime (6wol hangjaeng 3, 2007, p. 258).

The framing tasks and repertoires of nonviolence and of the targeting of symbolic sites accelerated the spatial diffusion of collective action for democratisation. Framing tasks clarified whom to blame for, highlighted what needed to be done, and simplified what to do. The repertoires of nonviolence and of the targeting of symbolic sites facilitated the transformation of onlooking pedestrians into protesting challengers, rendering contentious politics in Korea more contagious. Moreover, the unifying slogan and repertoires were utilised by various actors operating at the micro-level and also at the macro. Direct presidential election was an issue that was both acceptable for individuals and power holders. When combined with the nonviolent repertoire, it could simultaneously marginalise more radical and disruptive elements from collective action. Thus, social movements’ framing and repertoires in 1987 were able to fashion a form of collective action that carried the possibility of mass mobilisation and regime change through “electoral revolution.” When viewed from a different angle, a mass mobilisation for the claim of popular sovereignty found its playground in constitutionality.

The repertoires and framing during this period were also, by their nature, open to a range of other actors, just as political opportunities were. Moreover, the outcome of this cross-pollination worked to favour electoral democracy by suppressing the legitimacy of more radical framing and repertoires.

Mobilising Structures: Mesomobilisation and Alliances

Social Movements and Transition
Contexts (political opportunities), meanings and interpretations (framing), and rituals (repertoires) can only ever be materialised into effective collective action through human agency or carriers. These carriers primarily involve SMOs and their networks. These networks are the social movements ‘collective building blocks, through which people can organise collective action (McAdam et al, p. 3); however, any transition from one polity to another requires more than the micromobilisation of individual organisations and their oppositional targets. The terrain on which micromobilisation actors work is primarily determined by their own specific goals. Therefore, without a cluster of common goals, micromobilisation alone cannot materialise the potential for a transition of a polity that involves multiple actors, interactions, and a stream of concerted and coordinated actions.

Gerhards and Rucht (1992) have coined the neologism, mesomobilisation, which refers to the assembly of SMOs and the coordination of their action through cultural works, such as framing (p. 558-559). Mesomobilisation promote “bloc recruitment”, thereby enabling rapid mobilisation through pre-existing networks and resources (Oberschall, 1973, p. 125). An ecology of mesomobilisation is limited to social movements and does not include the polity, and the time span of mesomobilisation covers only short-term mobilisation. The objects of Gerhards and Rucht’s analysis of mesomobilisation, the anti-Reagan and -IMF campaigns, display these limited scope and timespan of mesomobilisation. Mobilisation for transition, which necessitates sustained, concerted, and concentrated mobilisation in its apex, requires something more than mesomobilisation.

Alliance politics holds the capacity to transform mesomobilisation into macromobilisation. Alliances have often been regarded as a variable that is external to
social movements. In PPT, allies are often embedded into political opportunities (McAdam et al, 1996; Tarrow 1998), as “allies within the system are an external resource that otherwise resource-deficient actors can lean on, especially in authoritarian and repressive environments” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 80, emphasis added). PPT presupposes that this external opportunity is a given without any human agency on behalf of social movements. Alliances were not given automatically from the outside of social movements, but were conditioned by structural constraints, a nondemocratic polity, and were partly forged through initiatives of the movement. I therefore opt to embed alliances into mobilising structures instead of reading them in terms of political opportunities. To sum up, mesomobilisation and the alliance politics of social movements yielded possibilities for mobilising significant potential for the transformation of polities in Korea.

Mesomobilisation Actor: Structural and Cultural Integration

In 1987, the student movement completely recast its organisational structure. The mass line shifted the centre of the movement’s activities from underground organisations to student unions. The CCSRS, founded on May 8, 1987, was a product of this shift. The CCSRS soon launched affiliated joint struggle committees for mass rallies in May and June. The coalition of student unions accelerated the mass mobilisation of students, quickened the speed of information exchange, and fostered key solidarities with other movements. The CDRM can be seen as the first mesomobilisation actor. Founded in 1985, the CDRM was comprised of 23 organisations from various movement sectors and provinces, to which organisations such as the Authors' Association for Freedom, the Council for Democratic Journalism, the FSLM, the KCLW, the Minjung Culture
Association, the Movement for Minjung Buddhism Coalition, the Women Friends Association, and the YCDM belonged. The CDRM organised several joint campaigns against the regime including rallies for truth on the Kwangju massacre, campaigns for constitutional revision, anti-torture campaigns, and many others.

The strength of mesomobilisation was enabled through the “connective structure” that worked within and between organisations (Tarrow, 1998). Under Korea’s nondemocratic polity, the movement for democratisation had a diversity of species. For instance, they are marked by religion-specific characteristics, personal ties, informal discussion circles, informal intermovement taskforces, and so on. During abeyance, repression paradoxically enhanced these connective structures through the expulsion of student activists to labour movements and various SMOs of the chaeya. The development of connective structures amongst movements also enabled joint campaigns for political liberalisation, which subsequently increased pressure on the regime.

Beyond structural integration, the CDRM as a mesomobilisation actor also involved cultural integration through solidifying collective identity and framing works (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992). The CDRM applied the term minjung as its organisation title. The adoption of the term demonstrated the social movements multiclass coalition for social democratisation (6wol hangjaeng 1, pp. 341-342). This internal feature worked as boundary function, bringing differences between social movements and the opposition party into relief. Moreover, the CDRM initiated, channelled, and mediated framing disputes in movements after late 1985. It succeeded in narrowing such differences by proposing guidelines and principles for further constitutional debates that sustained a form of loose unification (6wol hangjaeng 2, 2007, pp. 346-349).
Alliances between Social Movements and the Opposition Party

In the face of growing repression and torture, social movements launched campaigns like the anti-torture campaign in 1986. These campaigns sustained alliances between social movements and the opposition party. Though the NKDP held their distance from social movements, the joint campaigns also sustained the threads between them. Alliances between the social movements and the NKDP were further enhanced with the death of Park Jong-cheol and the two political events, vitium by the conservative wing of NKDP and by the regime. When the conservative wing of the NKDP reached a compromise on a favour from the ruling party, the liberal wing of the NKDP defected. In 1987, the separated elements established the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP). The regime’s announcement on April 13 of the suspension of constitutional reform debates, encouraged the reform wing of NKDP to found a new party, for it saw a possibility for regime change based on forming coalitions with other democratic forces. The RDP, led by the two Kims, actively participated in various joint campaigns with social movements, which eventually served as a rehearsal for the NMH.

The National Movement Headquarters to Win a Democratic Constitution (NMH), the main umbrella coalition for democracy in 1987, was based on three principles. First, to organise nationwide demonstration. Second, to build a grand alliance among social movements, religious groups, and the opposition party. And third, to adhere to political minimalism in order to promote the participation of ordinary people (6wol hangjaeng 3, 2007, p. 332). Though the NMH campaigned on reforming the constitution, the national security law, and the labour law (KDF, 2010, p. 302), its primary emphasis was placed on
the direct presidential election. In a wedge decision, it held nationwide mass rallies on June 10, the same day when the ruling DJP planned to nominate its presidential candidate, Roh, Tae-woo. The rallies were already heated with heavy student involvement from previously massive campus, intercampus, and off-campus demonstrations since mid-May. Heightened expectation of the rally was further ignited by a second *infortuna*, the injury of a student, Lee, Han-yeol who was struck with a teargas canister on June 9, fell into a coma, and died on July 5.

Social movements activated various latent possibilities for democratisation and translated them into a strong alliance for democracy. However, their translation was constrained by the environment and was dramatically contingent on several elements. First, it was contingent on a (deep) political opportunity as an analogy and a reference that was likely to induce the translator, social movements, into a drive for electoral democracy based on the centre-left alliance. Second, it was contingent on the framing and repertoires that facilitated the movements’ alliance with the opposition party by marginalising radical content and disruptive tactics. Third, the movement’s mobilising structures that were wideley, diffuse but simultaneously affected by the state repression. The mobilising structures expanded to the extent that social movements accommodated as many organisations as they could, which favoured a broad and loose alliance for democracy. Fourth, the mass line, the self-initiated strategy, channelled these factors into alliance politics.

As the title of NMH as the National Movement Headquarters to Win a Democratic Constitution indicates, it affirmed that collective action for democratic constitutional revision would require “long-term and sustained mobilisation.” However, the alliance-
based politics could not be maintained after the “Democratic Constitution” (6wol hangjaeng 3, 2007, p. 175). The social movements were not prepared to assume power themselves. As a result, social movements were sidelined when institutional politics was normalised after the June Uprising.

Two Uprisings: Political and Economic Mobilisations

The democratic transition in Korea was determined by two consecutive, but discrete, popular uprisings; first, the June Democratic Uprising and second, the Great Worker Struggle in July and August in 1987. Compared to the former, the latter’s role in democratisation has so far been significantly undervalued by many authors writing on Korea’s democratic transition.

What the mass mobilisations in 1960, 1980, and 1987 had in common was the recurring pattern of two sequential mobilisations. First, they involved the student movement as the initiator for mobilisation and second, they also led to mobilisations in the labour movement as a related spin-off effect (Choi, J., 2010, pp. 119-129). When each spin-off movement emerged and spread, social movements were demobilised through repressive backlashes from the state. From the PPT perspective, the student movement as an "early riser" opened and expanded subsequent spin-off opportunities. However, the created opportunities were not only exploited by social movements but also by elites (Tarrow, 1998, pp. 88-89). Coup d'états by Park, Chung-hee in 1960 and by Chun, Doohwan in 1980 demonstrate this recurring pattern. This pattern, however, was not repeated

19 Though the NMH changed its name from the National Movement Headquarters to Win a Democratic Constitution to the National Movement Headquarters for Democracy after June uprising, it could not maintain the broad mobilisation base and the strength of the alliance, which it had had during the June mobilisation.
in 1987. Students and middle-class people initiated an uprising that catalysed nationwide
strikes by workers, which were notably, immune to political backlash from elites.

The June Uprising lasted for approximately 20 days, from June 10th to the 28th. Before
it ended however, it brought approximately five million people into the streets (Lee, M.,
pp. 136-138). In the face of sustained nationwide protests, on June 29th, the presidential
candidate of the ruling DJP, Roh, Tae-woo, announced constitutional revisions, notably
including the direct presidential election system, and amnesty for political dissidents.
Collective action for political democracy had finally achieved its claims.

In contrast to the arguments of transitologists and PPT\textsuperscript{20}, the Korean transition and its
characteristics in 1987 were not determined by incumbent elites and their divisions. There
was no division of hard- and soft-liners in the regime (Kim, S., 1992). The regime was
forced to acknowledge its illegitimacy since the Kwangju massacre. Despite the
ostensible defeat of social movements in 1980, the movement had in fact succeeded with
the 1980 Kwanju uprising by constraining the future choices of the regime. As a result,
the Chun regime accepted the stipulation of the single seven-year term system for
presidency in the constitution. Possibilities for disputes were built into the constitution.
Social movements activated this opportunity for contestation which again limited popular
sovereignty within the frame of constitutionality. In addition to political opportunities,
the movements’ framing and repertoires with their massive mobilisation narrowed the
range of political options available to the Chun regime. On June 29th, Roh’s
announcement did not result from the regime’s own initiative and/or elite division, but
was conditioned through the mobilisation of social movements. When the mobilisation of

\textsuperscript{20}Pact-making among elites (O’Donnel and Schmitter) and elites division (McAdam et al.; Tarrow, 1998) in
political process opportunities are important factors for transition and mobilisation for the transitologists
and the political process theory respectively.
social movements and their allies reached their pinnacle, the power between challengers and the power holders were finally balanced. The fate and characteristics of the polity were not determined by elites and their division but by the shifting constellation of power brought about through the challengers and alliances, their minimal agreements, and the exclusion of maximal damage to the elites. Unlike the transition in Latin America where collective action failed to stabilise democracy (Karl, 1990, p. 8), collective action in Korea carved a path towards stable democracy. Considering the four types of transition—pact, imposition, reform, and revolution—as suggested by Terry Karl (1990), popular sovereignty within the framework of constitutionality in Korea during 1987 assumed reform as its path towards democracy. Political opportunities, mobilising structures, as well as the framing and repertoires of social movements enticed popular protest into choosing a reformist path instead of revolution. Though the popular sovereignty of social movements within the framework of constitutionality might have been a contributing factor in challengers opting for reform as a transitional path, it must be supplemented by other causes to explain why mass mobilisation did not elicit a reversal of democratisation.

For the second wave of the popular uprisings, the wave of workers’ strikes, had consistently been met with backlash by elites, it must be clarified what impact the Great Worker Struggle had on the risk calculation of elites (Bermeo, 1997). It was still an open question as to why the popular mobilisation for democracy did not provoke reauthoritarianism.

After the June uprising had been placated by Roh’s announcement on June 29th, a new wave of uprisings swept the country for more than two months. Strikes between July and

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21 Tarrow (1998) argues that “when they [social movements] do achieve success, it is frequently in terms that are acceptable to influential allies who represent them in court.” (p. 164).
mid-September skyrocketed to 3,311. In August alone, approximately 83 strikes occurred daily. Nearly 37 percent of regular employees participated in the strikes by August. The number of strikes, participants, and working days lost had far exceeded the cumulative totals from 1961 to 1986 (Roh, J., p. 227). The Great Worker Struggle demonstrated that nationwide strikes across whole industries and demands concentrating on the “right to live” (understood as wage increases, the abandonment of pre-modern working conditions, and the democratisation of labour-management relations) were possible and legitimate. The struggles also showed that there was a leading role for industrial workers in the heavy-chemical industry and large conglomerates in strikes. And finally, they demonstrated the value of a “strike first and bargain later” policy (KDF, 2010, pp. 357-366). The relationship between the June Uprising and the Great Worker Struggle, with the latter’s impact on democratisation are still debatable. Workers did not partake in the first wave as a collective working-class; however, workers drew upon the expanded opportunity, for the claim-making of the June Uprising did not include distributive economic justice and was only limited to questions of political democracy. One outstanding question involved whether the Great Worker Struggle pursued a strategy of full-blown societal democracy, which has often been recognized as a pretext for elites to intervene in the course of democratisation and reverse it.

O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) suggest four tipping points in processes of democratisation through mass mobilisation and its reversal by elites. They note that democratisation would often be met by counteracting forces if democratic transition were to threaten the armed forces, the territorial integrity of a nation state, property rights, or a country’s position in international alliances (p. 27). The Great Worker Struggle did not
threaten any of these four points. It was similar to a general strike in its scope; however, there was no unifying issue that integrated the strikes. Spontaneity was the prevailing logic of the strikes, not organisation. Further, workers’ claims were primarily focused on individual factories, such as wage increases and democratic unions, but not on distribution policy or the democratisation of industrial relations. Therefore, calculations of risk from elites did not lead them to reverse the course of democratisation in Korea. The costs of toleration seemed to be bearable (Bermeo, p. 315).

Another important reason that made the costs of toleration bearable for elites is demonstrated through the lens of economic liberalisation. The contagious effects of strikes on political issues in previous decades were lessened by trends toward economic liberalisation. As Kim, Woo-jung, the head of Daewoo Group, symbolically demonstrated, power of the chaebol increased when he disregarded the proposed wage guideline from the Chun regime during bargaining with the union in 1985. The liberalisation process strengthened the chaebols’ power and responsibilities in the labour-manager relation. Massive militant workers’ strikes on the Hyundai group, the then-largest chaebol in Korea, did not lead to regime crisis, as strikes in small factories during the late 1970s had done. The developmental state, after economic liberalisation, changed its labour regime from corporatist to legalist (Koo, 2001). The seemingly inseparable nexus between the developmental state and chaebol was subsequently disassociated. The “invented” bourgeoisie gained its autonomy, however partial.

The nature of transition ensured it was moderate. The transition was facilitated through an open and interactive modality of movement elements, interactions between various social actors, and the risk calculation of elites. The confluence of these factors
transformed the transition largely into a process of “public education” for democracy through participation and practices and practical engagement (Pateman, p. 19). Even still, incumbent elites recognised the dangers of having the military at the forefront of Korean politic and the importance of the rule of democracy. Therefore, in order to win the democracy “game,” the elites rapidly shifted their focus from resistance against popular mobilisation to mobilising resources for dividing democratic forces (Kim, S.; KDF, p. 345). Not only did elites interact and learn from social movements, but they also were influenced from the state. Since the violent Kwangju confrontation against popular protest in 1980, the developmental state learned “something.” Naked despotic domination had to be moderated and changed to more benign forms of hegemonic rule. These forms involved a cultural policy, two liberalisations, and the announcement on June 29th that displayed what the state learned and how it interacted with other actors.

From the perspective of the diffusion of social movements, the second wave of mobilisation was clearly emergent from the first. One of the major claims made by workers involved democratisation through unions and improved labour-management relations. Workers framed these issues through the lens of democracy and democratic civil rights, however their acts were limited toward engagement with individual entrepreneurs. The pre-modern, patriarchal, and hierarchic labour-management relations under Korean military culture were no longer tolerable. Second, strikes during the second wave were partially militant but overwhelmingly non-violent. Nonviolent militancy was the repertoire that workers adapted from the first wave. Organisationally speaking, there was no evidence of links between democratic forces and the strikes of the second wave. Nevertheless, one of the characteristics of the second wave, striking first and then
bargaining, was a tactic that grew from the workers-students alliance. Third, the Great Worker Struggle paradoxically moderated the process of democratic transition and broadened effects of democratisation. By leaving property rights intact, elites calculated the risks associated with the transition to democracy as tolerable. Democratisation of shop floors and labour-manager relations signalled the ineffectiveness of the hitherto dominant culture of hierarchy and militarism that haunted both industry and society.

Workers in the Great Labour Struggle rejected the imposed destiny of the master of history, minjung as metanarrative, by leaving property rights intact. Instead they chose the micronarrative, choosing everyday resistance and participating “in decisions at one’s place of work” (Pateman, p. 49).

Regarding collective identity, the second wave contributed to the establishment of working-class consciousness and a more independent labour movement due to discourses, repertories, and other cultural assets that were adopted from the minjung movement. With its establishment, the labour movement, ironically, did not require the multiclass minjung movement to voice its own claims (see Table 4-2). The Minjung as a homogeneous unity based on a common historical memory, culture, and goals, subsequently became heterogeneous after the two waves.

Table 4-1 Social Groups Participating in Protest by Political Context (1988-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1980-1987</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>34.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students/Youth</td>
<td>21.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Activists</td>
<td>16.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educators</td>
<td>4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Divided Alliances and The Founding Election\textsuperscript{22}

Roh’s announcement on June 29\textsuperscript{th} involved a deeper commitment to liberalisation compared to the liberalisation attempt in late 1983. Not only did the Chun regime accept the direct presidential election system, but it also declared enhanced political freedoms and amnesty for all political dissidents including Kim, Dae-jung. These policies aimed to split the opposition party. If the two Kims, as long-time political rivals, simultaneously ran in the presidential election of December, the possibility for Roh, Tae-woo to win the election would significantly increase (KDF, 2010, pp. 376-377). As the regime expected, Kim, Dae-jung defected from the RDP and founded a new party. The regime saw the opportunity to repair its past mistakes by insisting on “democracy as a formula for their own legitimation” (Bermeo, p. 316).

Social movements were excluded in the discussion on constitutional revision, but they had no interest in doing so. The NMH lost its mobilising power and transformed itself into an independent election watchdog organisation. Social movements concentrated their resources on the founding election. Instead of widening political democracy to include social and constitutional reform, they narrowed their activities toward presidential candidacy. Social movements assumed that regime change through electoral revolution would provide the minjung with greater room to strengthen their power. The movement, however, differed in which tactics to support in this goal. They were divided into three camps. The majority “critically supported” the relatively progressive candidate, Kim, Dae-jung. This “critical support”, in fact an uncritical support, was proposed by the

\textsuperscript{22} According to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), a founding election is the first free and competitive election after a period of authoritarian rule (pp. 61-64).
CDRM. Along with the mainstream faction of student movement, the CDRM justified their support for Kim, Dae-jung on the basis that he could offer more favourable conditions for the end of dictatorship, instill greater political neutrality in the military, enhance the minjung’s right to live, and foster reunification (KDF, 2011, p. 397).

Regardless of the tactical differences, other groups also concentrated on the presidential candidacy. Another major group pressed for an agreement on a single candidate between the two Kims. They were in firm belief that only a single candidacy would end the dictatorship and open a new field for radical democracy. The third camp put forward its own candidate with a strong social democratic electoral programme (Lee, M., p. 140).

While social movements were divided and focused on the candidacy, the constitutional revision was discussed between the regime and the RDP. The revised constitution contained some important constitutional modifications, including changes to the direct presidential election system, increased neutrality of the military; limitations on the emergency powers of the president, elimination of the president’s right to dissolve the national assembly, and the reinforcement of the right of the national assembly to monitor and investigate government affairs. Though these revisions fulfill the four requirements of Terry L. Karl’s intermediary definition of democracy (see Chapter 1), they failed to incorporate economic democracy into the constitutional revision. On the basis of the new constitution, confirmed by the referendum in October, the presidential election was held on December 16, 1987. Roh, Tae-woo won the election with 36.6 percent, while Kim, Young-sam and Kim, Dae-jung gained 28.0 percent and 27.1 percent, respectively. The alliance for democracy was defeated in the founding election, with the results baptising the incumbent elites in the name of democracy.
There are two main reasons why the democratic forces were defeated. First was the success of *divide et empera*. Obviously, divisions in the alliance between social movements and the opposition contributed to the victory of the old elites by using democracy as a formula for their own legitimation. The two Kims’ separated candidacy divided the opposition and social movements. The second division involved the middle class’s exit from the alliance for democracy. With Roh’s announcement on June 29th, the middle class that constituted one of the major forces in the June uprising ceased involvement in the alliance. Roh’s announcement separated middle class’s demands for political democratisation from the socioeconomic claims. The unifying issue, the direct presidential election system, increased the extension of the democratic movement but lowered the intensity in the master frame—that is democracy. The master frame was not only identified with its offspring, the unifying issue (the direct presidential election system); it was swallowed by it. For the middle class with relative material affluence, Roh’s announcement was a reason for celebration, not an incentive to continue fighting.

The second main reason for the defeat of democratic forces can be attributed to social movements. The movements failed to recognise the significance of economic liberalisation in loosening the close tie between the developmental state and the *chaebols*. They failed to recognise the significance of the economic liberalisation that increased the *chaebols’* autonomy. Two opportunities for embedding a social democratic agenda into the democratic frame—the Great Worker Struggle and the constitutional revision—were completely missed. These opportunities were overlooked by social movements due to their limited influence in the newly expanded political society and due to strategic misframing. They were not strong enough to remobilise their resources for furthering
economic democracy, nor were they prepared to politicise “economic struggles.” Unlike the dictator Park, Chung-hee, social movements were captured by the belief—democracy first, economy later. Social movements which provided opposition parties with opportunities and resources had limited access to the expanding political society. Thus, the radical substances embedded in the *minjung* movement were excluded from democracy and subsequently marginalised to irrelevance.

The defeat of democratic forces in the founding election should not be, however, confused with their failure. Instead, constitutional revisions and the founding election were the direct result of the continuous efforts of social movements. Though democratic forces were defeated in the founding election, it was the first step toward the consolidation of democracy. Social movements pursued the overthrow of the dictatorship, improving upon people’s direct and democratic access to political and economic power, and furthering the recognition and interests of the *minjung* society. In this respect, their success was much smaller than they had hoped, in spite of the drastic polity changes in Korea. Yet, based on Gamson’s (1990) determinants of success, as new advantages brought about through policy changes and an improved acceptance of political challengers, or Kitschelt’s (1986) three criteria for success as the development of procedural (new channels and recognition), substantive (policy change), and the structural (new environment of opportunities), social movements in Korea can be said to have made significant gains. The movements changed policies, gained legitimacy and recognition, and produced new cultures and opportunities for other actors. Over the long haul of the counter-hegemonic process, social movements undermined patriarchal
militarism, strengthened civil rights in the areas of policy and culture, cultivated a
minjung with self-esteem, and opened a broader “movement society” in Korea (Rucht
and Neidhardt, 2002).
Conclusion: Democracy as Romance and Satire

The history of democratisation as narrated and explained in this thesis is not pure romance or satire (White, 1973). In history “emplotted” in the form of romance, according to Hayden White, good triumphs over evil, virtue over vice, with “the ultimate transcendence of man over the world in which he was imprisoned by the Fall.” In history dressed as satire, “man is ultimately a captive of the world rather than its master, … human consciousness and will are always inadequate to the task of overcoming definitively the dark force of death” (p. 9). In the Korean transition, democracy triumphed over dictatorship, but its first fruit was reaped by incumbent elites. Political democracy defeated the authoritarian regime, but social democracy was neglected by the political outcome. Passive revolution prevailed in the political society (Choi, Jang-jp, 2010), but active revolution was set in motion in civil society through movement society. Democratisation in Korea was at once a romantic satire and a satirical romance.

In summary, first, structural and process-oriented accounts of the causes of democracy, modernisation and elite-pact, are both ineffective and inapplicable to Korea. The former does not allow any latitude in agential explanations on the path to democratisation, while the latter is limited to explanations through an elite pact. Both accounts are insufficient for assigning an active role to collective action in democratisation. To explain how democratisation in Korea resulted from sustained collective action, it was necessary to employ social movements theories. However, modification was unavoidable since the theories were developed in a liberal polity in which access to the public sphere, freedom
of the right to assembly and speech, and affluent resources are considered to be given and guaranteed.

Second, Korean late-late development initiated by the authoritarian developmental state discouraged the bourgeoisie from playing an active role in democratisation. This role was taken on by social movements. The emergence and development of social movements assumed a deep social interplay with the state. The state provided the movements with resources for collective action through massive proletarianisation, an enhanced communication base through increasing urbanisation, and with discourses such as nationalism. Social movements exploited and twisted these resources in the interests of democratisation. The multiclass, urban-based, and radical *minjung* movement was partly a product of this interaction.

Third, social movements in Korea cultivated a contentious society that recognised and resisted forms of state domination. Stunted parliamentary politics under the developmental state enabled social movements to construct contentious counterpublics that constantly threatened the state on the one hand, and expanded its spatial boundaries and influence, and attracted allies into coalition for democratisation on the other.

Fourth, social movements reinvented collective identity to form a broad coalition for democracy. Based on this collective identity, social movements sustained their continuity and consistency despite harsh state repression. The *minjung* as a collective identity served as a hub of discourses, strategies, and tactics. According to different political circumstances, social movements established different mobilising structures, enacted a variety of contentious repertoires, and catalysed collective action frames that spread the
legitimacy of collective action that facilitated mobilisation and developed alliances for democratic transition.

Fifth, as the political liberalisation led by the miscalculation of the regime brought about unexpected byproducts for elites, the strategic calculations of social movements (embodied through alliance politics, the movement’s discourses, strategic framing, and so on) led to unwanted side-effects. Deep political opportunity, the mass line, unifying issues within the master frame, and nonviolent repertoires all involved a high proclivity to induce collective action for political or liberal democracy, but not for social and radical democracy. Economic liberalisation policy and *divide et impera* promoted the divorce between the spheres of political and social democracy as well as between forms of liberal and radical democracy.

Sixth, these unwanted side-effects had a paradoxical impact on democracy in Korea. They limited democratisation to electoral democracy and were exploited by the elites to legitimise themselves. Simultaneously, the side-effects narrowed possibilities for the transition to reauthoritarianism with the resolution of the “moderation argument.” For instance, this involved leaving property rights intact and affirming popular sovereignty within the confines of liberal constitutionality.

Seventh, the *minjung* movement in the 1980s accelerated democratisation. *Minjung* as a collective identity worked as a binding-agent in social movements. A cultural forging of the *mingjung* involved symbols, meanings, and rituals of past cultures and recruited working people living outside history to the inside of history as its master. This process provided working people with a strong sense of self-pride. It promoted a multiclass coalition and radicalised the democratic movement. The *Minjung* movement was a
political, social, and cultural movement. The homogeneity of the minjung was ironically deconstructed by its own success. Since the two mobilisations in 1987, various social movements united under the rubric of the minjung claimed for their own terrains. Take for example, the labour movement. Workers became the most active social group participating in economic and political actions (see Table 4-2). They, however, were ultimately more interested in the micronarrative of everyday resistances on the shop floor instead of the macronarrative of the mingjung. The Minjung as a metanarrative lost its totalising impact. There is no longer a single unitary for the minjung movement; however, various class-oriented movements, like the labour and the peasant movement, consider themselves as a part of the minjung movement. The hegemony of the minjung movement was overtaken by another collective identity involving a non-class centred and a middle-class-oriented shimin (burgher) movement.

Eighth, despite the paradoxical results, Korea’s democratic transition was not a passive revolution. Social movements achieved political democracy in political society and constructed an active and contentious society. Democratisation of noninstitutional politics was diffused to shop floors. As a collective identity sustained social movements for democratisation even during abeyance, it also sustained them through demobilisation.

Ninth, the elements of social movements—political opportunities, mobilising structures, framing, repertoires, and collective identity—generated various outcomes that were not included in accounts of agential calculation. These elements were all exploited not only by the early riser students and spin-off movements but also through allies and even by their enemies. There are not only “repression paradoxes” but also “action paradoxes.” Action paradoxes derive from the open and interactive nature of those elements. Political
opportunities and mobilising structures were exploited by movements’ allies—Corazon Aquino as reference point for regime change and pressure the authoritarian regime. Framing—the unifying issue—was also open to the elites and abused by them. Repertoires for democratic transition of a polity were utilised for changes at microlevel, shopfloors. Multiclass collective identity for transformative vision contributed to forming class consciousness of workers but was deconstructed by this success.

The emergence of electoral democracy through contentious civil society in 1987 was the result of these action paradoxes. Moreover, the communicative nature of the movement’s engagements, made the transition for democracy a form of “public education,” even for elites. For every social actor was involved in transition of their own. It was a learning process for every social actor engaged in the practices of democracy.

Democratisation in Korea through social movements did not end up with a “happily ever after” ending. It did, however, make democracy the only game in town, thus unfolding a new horizon for broad engagement in noninstitutional politics that still besieges the injustices of institutional politics.
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## Appendix

### Chronological Table of Major Events between 1960 and 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 15, 1960</td>
<td>Election fraud by the Rhee, Syngman regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 19, 1960</td>
<td>The April Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16, 1961</td>
<td><em>Coup</em> led by Park, Chung-hee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 03, 1964</td>
<td>6.3 Rally against the Korea-Japan treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun. 22, 1965</td>
<td>Ratification of the Korea-Japan treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun. 08, 1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 13, 1970</td>
<td>Chun, Tae-il’s Self-immolation</td>
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<td>Oct. 17, 1972</td>
<td>Yushin regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 1974</td>
<td>Arrests of members of the National League of Democratic Youth and Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 1979</td>
<td>YH workers’ occupation of the NDP headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 1979</td>
<td>Uprisings in Busan and Masan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 26, 1979</td>
<td>Assassination of Park, Chung-hee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 12, 1979</td>
<td><em>Coup</em> led by Chun, Doo-hwan and Roh, Tae-woo</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1980</td>
<td>Spring of Seoul</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1980</td>
<td>The Kwangju Democratic Uprising</td>
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<td>Mar. 18, 1982</td>
<td>Arson on the Busan USIS building</td>
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<td>Sep. 1983</td>
<td>Foundation of YCDM</td>
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<td>Dec. 1983</td>
<td>Political Liberalisation</td>
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<td>Nov. 14, 1984</td>
<td>Students’ occupation of the DJP headquarters</td>
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<td>Feb. 12, 1985</td>
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<td>Mar. 1985</td>
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<td>Apr. 1985</td>
<td>Strike in the Daewoo Automobile Factory in Incheon</td>
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<td>May 23, 1985</td>
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<td>Jun. 1985</td>
<td>Solidarity strikes in the Guro industrial area in Seoul</td>
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<td>May 03, 1986</td>
<td>Incheon Rally</td>
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<td>Jan. 14, 1987</td>
<td>The torture death of Park, Jong-chol</td>
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<td>Apr. 23, 1987</td>
<td>Chun’s refusal of constitutional revision</td>
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<td>May 27, 1987</td>
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<td>Oct. 12, 1987</td>
<td>Referendum for Constitutional Revision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 16, 1987</td>
<td>Presidential election based on the direct presidential election system</td>
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