Struggle for Influence: A Multi-leveled Appreciation of the Europeanization Process

by

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Abstract

This thesis examines the Europeanization process with a focus on the structure of influence and the role of agency in influencing the domestic change of the EU candidate states. In order to understand these qualities of the Europeanization process I discuss the current literature on Europeanization and critically evaluate contemporary conceptualization of the structure of influence. An assessment of the five mechanisms of Europeanization first advanced by Heather Grabbe—models, financial and technical aid, benchmarking and monitoring, advice and twinning, and gate-keeping—is then conducted in order to show that Europeanization can be discussed both conceptually and empirically. The categories reveal the important role that the structure of influence and windows of opportunity play in influencing the outcome of Europeanization. Throughout this thesis I argue that the Europeanization process is governed by a multi-leveled structure of influence that is affected by the actors’ ability to capitalize on windows of opportunity. Moreover, I conclude that the outcomes of the Europeanization process are shaped by the structure of influence and windows of opportunity available to each level of actors.
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<td>Croatian Agency for the Protection of Personal Data</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>IT</td>
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<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
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<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Authorizing Officer</td>
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I would additionally like to acknowledge the unwavering support of my mother and step-father, Lauren and John Reece, and my father, David Crouch, without whom I would not have been able to take this leap into academia.
Dedication

To my loving and supporting wife Amber
Chapter 1: Introduction

The European Union (EU) has played a significant role in setting the domestic reform agenda of the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and, more recently, those candidate states from the Balkans. Domestic change often occurs as a result of the persuasion, negotiation, and coercion often labeled “Europeanization.” Unfortunately, this concept has been so inconsistently applied to the study of EU-candidate state relations that many contemporary renderings fail to understand the intricate and multi-leveled processes paramount to the domestic reform of the candidate states. As Heather Grabbe states, “the domestic effects of transferring policies and institutions to them[candidate states] are likely to be comparable…” to what is observable in member states, but the political synergy that exists between the EU and the candidate countries certainly “affects how Europeanization occurs” (Grabbe, 2003: 303).

Much of the data on the Europeanization of the candidate states was collected, prior to 2004, on the countries of CEE, and more recently from Croatia and Macedonia. These countries offer a wealth of material on the subject because for nearly 20 years these countries have been obliged to accept the EU’s demands in order to attain their goal, EU membership. In some cases, these countries were asked to implement reform that challenged the very fabric and history of their political arrangement, begging the question, why would the candidate states accept demands that would lead to outcomes apparently against their political practices? The most common answer is that the candidate countries were/are being “Europeanized” by an asymmetric process wherein the EU is able to control the reform agenda due to the subordinate position candidate states accept in order to become member states. Leading up to the 2004 accessions the EU made clear that enlargement was becoming burdensome and that accepting new member states was becoming more and more contested. As a result, candidate countries were forced to
accept the EU’s demands as a “package deal” (Grabbe, 2006: 2). The EU was able to demand reforms that were not necessarily appealing or politically beneficial to the domestic actors, but which the candidate states accepted in recognition of the long term promise of membership.

The asymmetric and manipulative relationships that exist during accession negotiations are no doubt important to the overall understanding of the domestic reform and Europeanization process that occurs. Furthermore, an understanding of domestic reform through a top-down, asymmetric Europeanization process reveals much about the ways in which the EU is able to manipulate and coerce candidate states into limiting their demands and complying more fully with EU initiatives. Extensive research has been conducted on this top-down rendering of Europeanization (see Olsen 1996; Börzel 1999; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Risse et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003). However, this singular version of these events does not take into account the domestic manipulation of the accession process that also affects how Europeanization occurs. In addition, a simple top-down approach to the Europeanization and accession processes does not attempt to address the ability of individual member states to persuade candidate states to harmonize their policies and political understandings, making compliance much easier.

As such, this thesis examines the ways domestic reform in the candidate countries can be understood through the lens of Europeanization. I choose to structure this analysis around two interlocked questions:

(1) Does the Europeanization process contain some exclusively top-down, bottom-up, or horizontal structure of influence or is it rather a more multi-leveled and amalgamated structure involving actors from all three levels of influence?

Implicit to this analysis is an understanding of the domestic (candidate), transnational (member state), and supranational (the EU) actors and their attempts to influence the development of the
candidate’s reform agenda.\(^1\) Actors at all three levels have the desire to make their priorities become part of the membership requirements which then must ultimately be implemented to gain full EU membership. To further this argument I also ask:

(2) How does influence occur during the Europeanization process as the result of the complex interactions between domestic, transnational, and supranational actors? Particular attention will be paid to the mechanisms of influence and windows of opportunity utilized by the various actors.

Together these two questions will illuminate both the structure of the Europeanization process and the ways that actors from this multi-leveled structure are able to impact effectively the accession process.

My conceptualization of Europeanization, specific to the accession process, develops from an appreciation of the various understandings of Europeanization (see Chapter II, 9-14), and the various mechanisms which demonstrate that actors from multiple levels have the ability and desire to influence the process. More importantly, this conceptualization accepts that Europeanization is a very contextually driven concept that may exist as a top-down, bottom-up, or horizontal process depending on the time and space that it is observed. For these reasons Europeanization cannot be divorced from its multi-leveled arrangement and, thus, I will attempt to marry the various levels together to illuminate the ways in which Europeanization can help explain the domestic reform of candidate states.

It is also important to note that Europeanization has clear “identifiab\(^2\)les” that demonstrate it is not simply a concept, but also a set of physical mechanisms\(^2\) that further illuminate its multi-
leveled structure. Using the work of Heather Grabbe (2003) I will focus on five categories, (1) models, (2) financial and technical aid, (3) benchmarking and monitoring, (4) advice and twinning, and (5) gate-keeping (Grabbe, 2003: 312). Models and aid have been used frequently by the EU to encourage compliance and the effective implementation of policy in current member states (Grabbe, 2003). Additionally, as the EU has evolved, monitoring and benchmarking have been critical to the integration of the current EU member states (Grabbe, 2003). The last two categories have generally developed out of an appreciation of the historical and political diversity present in many of the 2004 and current candidate states. This appreciation revolves around the EU’s attempts to “return” these CEE and Balkan states back to Europe, from the chaos that gripped this area after the demise of communism in 1989. Many of these candidate states have relied heavily on the EU’s twinning projects in order to facilitate a quicker and more individualized compliance to the EU’s *acquis communautaire*.³ Concurrently, in recognition of “enlargement fatigue” the EU has also made it a priority to use benchmarking and monitoring capabilities to control the candidate’s access to further negotiations, in what is called “gate-keeping”.

Considering the first two foci, this thesis seeks to clarify that Europeanization, as a cause of domestic change and embodying a multi-leveled structure of influence, must be analyzed from a balanced perspective. There is no doubt that Europeanization, regardless of its presented structure, has influenced the development and implementation of reform in the candidate states. However, it is erroneous to present it as a cookie cutter concept that simply occurs unabated or as a general causal force. In this thesis I present a more meticulous approach to Europeanization.

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³ The *acquis communautaire* is a French phrase essentially meaning “The EU as it is”. The *acquis* encompasses all of the EU treaties, laws, declarations, resolutions, and international agreements. Member states are obliged to recognize and accept the entirety of the acquis, while the candidate states must accept the acquis before they may join the EU. (Acquis Communautaire, n.d.)
that accepts that it can be observed in various contexts, with varying levels of success. Yet, this thesis recognizes the difficulty of identifying Europeanization as a causal explanation of change; but insists the task is not impossible.

This thesis intends to fit into two strands of the Europeanization literature. First, I intend to focus exclusively on the EU’s relationship with its candidate states and, thus, focus on Europeanization specifically as it has been applied to the candidate states. This concentration will allow this thesis to contribute to the field, as much of the previous literature limits itself to Europeanization as it occurs within the EU. Second, the multi-leveled appreciation of the Europeanization process builds upon nearly 15 years of literature that has attempted to conceptualize the structure of the Europeanization process. This thesis does not intend to verify or vilify any specific conception of Europeanization. Rather, it accepts the value of many of the popular conceptions and attempts to marry them together to offer a deeper understanding of the Europeanization process.

**Preliminary Literature Introduction**

The arguments within this thesis build on four existing strands of Europeanization literature. The first is literature concerning the conceptualization of Europeanization (Ladrech, 1994; Olsen, 1996; Radaelli, 2000; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Buller and Gamble, 2002; Goetz, 2002; Olsen, 2002; Börzel, 2003; Radaelli, 2004). This body of literature has demonstrated that the conceptualization of Europeanization has steadily evolved as the EU’s global position and regional importance has grown over the past 20 years. Specifically relevant to this thesis is the literature within this strand that grapples with the structure and format of the Europeanization process. This literature debates the orientation of the Europeanization process as either top-down, bottom-up, or aligned horizontally. This thesis intends to use this literature to demonstrate that
all three tiers should be married together in order to develop a more thorough appreciation of the Europeanization of the candidate states.

The second strand of literature unpacks the Europeanization process and speaks specifically to the “Europeanization models” (Featherstone, 2003). These models refer to the conditions that are often seen as determining the relative success or failure of Europeanization. Especially relevant are the discussions on conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Sasse, 2008, Schimmelfennig, 2008), and the “goodness of fit” (Börzel, 1999; Knill and Lehmkühl, 1999; Cowles et al., 2001; and Börzel and Risse, 2003). Both of these models (i.e. “conditionality” and “goodness of fit”) delve into the complexities that ultimately determine the level in which Europeanization will occur. Furthermore, a nuanced assessment of both of these models reveals that Europeanization occurs through the negotiation, persuasion, and coercion of the candidate states involving actors from multiple levels of the accession hierarchy.

Arguably the most critical strand of literature is that which exposes the physical mechanisms of the Europeanization process. These mechanisms reveal how Europeanization actually takes place providing empirical validity to the highly conceptualized Europeanization research. This body of literature provides this thesis with two very important avenues of analysis. First, highlighted by the works of Heather Grabbe (2003, 2008), scholars have began to isolate the specific tools that the EU uses to encourage or force compliance within the candidate nations. This knowledge allows this thesis to identify specific ways Europeanization occurs, thus concurrently offering new ways to assess the viability of the Europeanization process. To aid in this process the EU also releases assessment documentation in which it evaluates both the progress of its initiatives and the compliance of candidate states. Coupled together both these sources allow this thesis to make judgments about the viability of the Europeanization process.
and, more broadly, understand the ways in which Europeanization influences the reform agenda of the candidate states.

The last strand of literature, which completes this assessment of the Europeanization and accession processes, argues for a more tempered appraisal of Europeanization relying heavily on concepts that emphasize differing levels of adaption. As I have mentioned above, Europeanization occurs very differently depending on the context in which it is assessed. This thesis intends to use this fourth body of literature to clarify that evaluating the accession process through the lens of Europeanization does not answer all of the research questions, nor does it attempt to. Rather, a balanced understanding of the Europeanization process will answer questions regarding the use of it as a casual explanation and begin to unravel the ways Europeanization can help us grapple with the differentiated levels of compliance seen across both CEE and the Balkans.

**Structure of the Thesis**

The remainder of this thesis is organized into three distinct chapters. Chapter II, “Literature Review” examines the current state of Europeanization literature, with particular focus on the many conceptualizations offered that attempt to understand the structure of influence observed during the Europeanization process. This goal of this chapter is to outline the progression of the Europeanization field and begin to discuss the relevant works that have influenced my conceptualization of the Europeanization process.

Chapter III, “Tools in a Toolbox: Mechanisms of Europeanization” relies heavily on the work of Heather Grabbe (2003, 2006) to demonstrate that Europeanization manifests itself in very observable ways. This chapter focuses on the assessment of five groups of mechanisms which clearly show the “struggle for influence” occurring between domestic, transnational, and
supranational actors. This chapter approaches these five categories from both a conceptual and empirical point view in order to assess both their intended and realistic ability to transfer initiatives from multiple-levels.

Chapter IV, “The Uncertainties of the Europeanization Process” builds on Chapter III by offering a critical appreciation of the mechanisms of Europeanization. This chapter aims to demonstrate that Europeanization is constrained by many intervening variables that can ultimately undermine our ability to use Europeanization as a causal explanation. Variables like “deficient administrative arrangements” and “misfit” policy requirements play a major role in determining whether a specific policy area can and will be Europeanized. Because of many of these intervening variables Europeanization does not occur in the same fashion across all contexts. It is made clear that to understand better the structure and occurrences of Europeanization there must also be an understanding of its successes and failures.

This thesis concludes with a discussion of the structure of influence observed during the Europeanization process. Special attention will be paid to how this structure of influence is constantly altered by windows of opportunity. With an appreciation of the contemporary perspectives on the process I intend to advocate a more balanced understanding of Europeanization based on my own rendering of the process’ structure. The closing sections offer suggestions for a new research agenda suggesting to add more specificity and empirics to the study of Europeanization.
Chapter II: Literature Review

This chapter provides the rational for researching the structure, process, and validity of Europeanization. Europeanization has been grappled with for much of the last fifteen years as scholars have continually attempted to assert their own conception on the ever-broadening field. Each scholar has presented new ways of conceptualizing Europeanization that offer differing thoughts on the structures and processes inherent to its existence. Europeanization has been defined popularly as a “process” where policies, institutional preferences, and community norms are transferred to the domestic level (see Ladrech, 1994; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Hix and Goetz, 2000; Radaelli, 2000; Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001; Börzel, 2002; and Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). However, Europeanization has also been presented as an observable event, or “situation”, wherein domestic politics have been altered by higher levels of governance (see Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 2001; Buller and Gamble, 2002; Howell, 2004). My thesis intends to build on this body of literature by accepting many of the popular conceptions and using them to construct my own rendering of the Europeanization process based on evidence from the European Union accession process.

The Europeanization process itself has become a critical area of study for researchers of the EU. When trying to understand the nuances and complexities of the Europeanization process structure plays a critical role in determining the level of influence available to actors from the domestic, transnational, and supranational levels. Consequently, this thesis examines the interactions between these actors by identifying the structure of influence, or lack thereof, which may ultimately explain if and how Europeanization takes place.

The remainder of this chapter reviews the literature that examines the role of structure, mechanisms of influence, and applicability of the Europeanization process. Specifically, I chose
to organize Chapter II into the following sections: (1) Conceptualizing the Europeanization Process, (2) The Conditionality Effect, and (3) Mechanisms of Influence.

**Conceptualizing the Europeanization Process**

Most conceptions of Europeanization are influenced by the authors' attempt to answer *who* exactly is being Europeanized (Olsen, 2002). The *who* represents an important juncture in the conceptualization of Europeanization because it represents the level of analysis from which conclusions are drawn. Based on nearly fifteen years of scholarship from leading researchers like Ladrech (1994), Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999, 2002), Börzel and Risse (2000), Radaelli (2000, 2003, 2004), Cowles *et al.* (2001), Buller and Gamble (2002), Olsen (2002), Featherstone (2003), Mörth (2003), and Howell (2004) it is clear that Europeanization can occur as a top-down, bottom-up, or horizontal process. But as the wealth of scholarship demonstrates, these contemporary conceptions are the results of an evolution of the field.

One of the first ways offered to appreciate this process was from a top-down, or impact driven conception of Europeanization. Ladrech (1994) provided the initial rendering of this top-down approach as:

“…an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994: 69)

Inherent to Ladrech’s conception of the Europeanization process is his placement of the EU as the dominant actor. In this way, Ladrech furthered the notion that Europeanization was a reaction by the domestic\(^4\) to the requirements of EU membership. While offering a structurally singular conception of the Europeanization process, Ladrech’s thoughts expand the boundaries of the process to include the transformation of domestic “politics” and “policy-making”.

\(^4\) By “the domestic” I mean a state’s political actors, structures, institutions, norms, and values.
Buller and Gamble (2002) advance Ladrech’s study of Europeanization but ultimately conclude similarly that “distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics” (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 17). Buller and Gamble attempted to redefine the term by moving beyond Europeanization as a process and suggesting that Europeanization can be seen as a “situation where certain effects can be shown to have occurred” (Buller and Gamble 2002: 17). “Situation” is used to differentiate this conceptualization from the process oriented conceptualizations accepted by many scholars. By presenting Europeanization as a “situation” it can be observed as an empirical event that encourages the literature to think “explicitly about what Europeanization is” (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 17). While this emphasis helps steer the Europeanization literature towards an empirical analysis of the outcomes and causal application of the Europeanization process, like Ladrech they lack the appreciation of domestic and transnational factors that not only affect the structure of Europeanization but also the “situation” where an outcome is expected. Accepting that policy formation and norm/value creation only happen at the supranational level overstates the role of international actors and devalues the significance of domestic institutions and actors. Although the EU certainly plays a role in the development and implementation of community norms and policy initiatives, domestic actors also have the ability to manipulate the process. In this sense, it is unjust to label the Europeanization process as “downloading.”

Similar to what Buller and Gamble allude to, Europeanization has also been conceptualized as something beyond a process. Scholars like Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse (2001) and Olsen (2002) offered a broader conception of Europeanization that goes beyond the top-down conception by emphasizing the development of European-level institutions. Cowles et al. (2001) present it as:
“The emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules” (Cowles et al., 2001: 3).

In this way Europeanization is much more than a process that induces domestic change. Rather, it is the development of “new layers of politics” at the European level that must now reckon with the individual political environments present throughout Europe and the world (Cowles et al., 2001: 3). Cowles et al. maintain the privileged position of the EU but differentiate themselves from the exclusively top-down conception of Europeanization by demonstrating an understanding of the EU’s sensitive relationships with national and sub-national political actors. In this way, their conception builds upon scholarship from the 1990s that began to look at the ways that a supranational entity could and would challenge the functional and political status of the nation state. Andersen and Eliassen (1993) for example privilege the EU as a “transnational authority” but also recognize that the existence of such an authority inherently challenges Europe’s diverse political environments. Unfortunately, while the authors’ original intention was to provide a conceptualization that addresses the domestic significance of a European polity, these conceptions fail to capture the domestic significance of Europeanization (Buller & Gamble, 2002; Radaelli, 2004). Consequently, this perception of Europeanization and subsequently different research agenda is better labeled “Europification” (Andersen and Eliassen, 1993: 256) or integration because of its emphasis on politicizing Europe.

Radaelli (2004) argues that any conceptual offering of Europeanization must understand that the Europeanization research agenda emphasizes the domestic impact of European integration in a way that does not prefer either a statist or supranational hegemony. Europeanization is disinterested in any balance of power because it does not advocate any
preferred outcome or international hierarchy. In this way, theories of Europeanization and European integration are not compatible because the latter is interested in the political dynamics of coordination, while the prior is more interested in the domestic impact of such coordination. Furthermore, most contemporary studies accept that the EU represents a certain level of European integration, but also understands that the process of Europeanization is complicated now by the existence of a supranational entity with a desire to expand (Mörth, 2003).

Demonstrating the gradual scholarly appreciation of domestic level politics Börzel (2002) postures that “Europeanization is a two-way process, it entails a ‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top down’ dimension” (Börzel, 2002: 193). Börzel shows her appreciation of the inner workings of the EU and asserts that the member states desire to shape EU policy-making in ways that ensure their priorities and political arrangements. However, she goes on to conclude that while “uploading” or bottom-up Europeanization occurs the member states must still reform their institutions to “EU legislation once [they have] been enacted” (Héritier, 1994, cited in Börzel, 2002: 195). In this way, scholars like Dyson (2000), Börzel (2002), and Howell (2004), who examine Europeanization from a multi-leveled appreciation, do not attempt to supplant the EU as an influential actor with one of the other levels of actors; rather they contend that Europeanization has a much more diverse structure of influence.

In terms of an analysis of EU-candidate state relations a “two-way” appreciation is incomplete. It forgets that there is a middle level that can play a major role in determining the structure and outcome of the Europeanization process. Howell (2004) briefly addresses what he calls “horizontal transfer” which he says “incorporates learning from, and assimilating other member state policies without EU involvement” (Howell, 2004: 5). Although he goes on to say that Europeanization is problematized without an inherent EU component, he recognizes that
change can result from horizontal influence. Even Radaelli (2003: 30-31) who purposefully ignores the “transfer of policy between one European country and another” admits that Europeanization may emanate from something other than a “coherent, rational layer of ‘EU decisions’” (Radaelli, 2003: 30-31). The fault with many of the scholars who begrudgingly address horizontal Europeanization—like Howell and Radaelli—is that they simply do not choose to recognize the empirical cases where member states actively influence other member and candidate states. Twinning, which I discuss later, is a primary example of where member states are able to influence the Europeanization process, thus adding to it a horizontal dimension.

I stop short of presenting horizontal Europeanization as convergence or harmonization. Rather, it simply provides an opportunity to learn from similar political situations and provide candidate states with the opportunity to understand the diverse set of political environments available to them (for more see Radaelli, 2003). Montpetit (2000) differentiates these concepts because “Europeanization does not accord harmonization” as not all “states will opt for the same types of change” (Montpetit, 2000: 590). Furthermore, Europeanization induces such infrequent policy convergence due to the candidate states’ diverse “learning capacity[ies]” and “institutional infrastructures” that the two cannot be equated (Paraskevopoulos 2001: xx). As a result, I do not attempt to rationalize horizontal Europeanization as the most effective form of Europeanization. Rather, I appreciate it as simply another avenue from which more actors are able to influence the Europeanization process.

The top-down, bottom-up and horizontal strands of Europeanization are not wrong or erroneous in their conception of the process. Rather they offer a singular conception that ignores the “circular, rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one-off” process that Europeanization so clearly embodies (Goetz, 2002: 4). Recognizing the need for a more
thorough and complete rendering of the Europeanization process, and building upon observations from the accession process this thesis offers a multi-leveled conception of the Europeanization process that marries the three “familiar” conceptions together in a network like framework.

**Conditionality Effect**

Vachudova (2005) concludes from her analysis of the EU’s “active leverage” that “the benefits of EU membership…must be immense” in order to overcome domestic resistance (Vachudova, 2005: 108). The immense benefit of membership is precisely the reason why the EU’s power of conditionality exists. If the candidate wants to join the EU then it must comply with the EU’s demands, thus membership is “conditional” on the candidate states speedy and adequate compliance. Conditionality has most recently been described as a “carrot-and-stick” approach wherein the EU rewards (carrot) member/candidate states based on their compliance with some EU rule (Anastasakis 2008; Trauner 2009; Freyburg and Richter 2010). If compliance is not achieved then the EU will sanction (stick) the state often through a suspension of funding, a fine, or, in the case of accession negotiations, suspended membership negotiations. It is because of this clearly EU-dominated approach that scholars like Ladrech (1994), Cowles et al. (2001), and Buller and Gamble (2002) can conceive of the Europeanization process as top-down. However, research by prominent scholars Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004) reveal that conditionality does not always induce change and therefore may not always serve the EU’s interests.

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) based much of their research on the accession process of the 5th enlargement and conclude that there are two types of conditionality, a democratic and an *acquis* strand. Both democratic and *acquis* conditionality vary in effectiveness and can be offset by the actions of the member states and candidate states. For democratic
conditionality Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier conclude that its effectiveness is questionable at best because the intervening variables—domestic power costs/benefits—have such a deciding role (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 675). Nevertheless, *acquis* conditionality has had remarkable success due in large part to the credible promise of membership. The candidate states realized that when applying to the EU there are changes that are going to have to be made and as such the candidate states have appeared to be willing to implement the changes necessary to meet the *acquis*.

As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier reveal there are still questions regarding the impact of conditionality on the accession process. It is apparent that conditionality serves as a mechanism that allows the EU the opportunity to influence the Europeanization process. However, it is also clear that the role and impact of conditionality has no certainty or permanence. The complexity and sheer number of demands required by the accession process may explain why conditionality has such varied results. Sasse (2008) claims that unless the EU’s demands are directly tied to the *acquis* then conditionality may be ineffective in inducing change. Furthermore, in her discussion on ethnic politics Judith Kelley (2004) notes that only demands that are attached to a membership promise can hope to overcome domestic opposition. In this sense, a membership prospective must be intertwined with conditionality in order to ensure that domestic actors legitimate the EU demands and perceive their adoption as ultimately beneficial.

In order to start conceptualizing Europeanization as a multi-leveled rather than an exclusively top-down process it is pertinent to understand that conditionality is constrained by several criteria: the size and speed of the reward to be given, the clarity of the rule the EU expects to be implemented, and the legitimacy of the EUs reward/threat, that is, the probability
of attaining a reward or suffering the consequences of non-compliance (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Lavenex and UçArer, 2004). Each of these criteria are weighed by domestic actors and ultimately shape the receptiveness of the target country and determine the level of domestic change one can expect to see. Depending on the domestic assessment of these criteria a target nation may perceive EU demands as a more efficient way of addressing domestic concerns (Lavenex & UçArer, 2004: 421). However, the candidate state or new member state may not fully understand the EU’s demand, or expect the punishment for non-compliance to be too severe. Unaware of the political cost of non-compliance political actors often misjudge the value of collective reform, perceiving it as a threat rather than a potential benefit. Domestic actors may want to maintain the pattern of compliance, but remain unsure whether the consequences of such compliance may mean political and personal sacrifice. Either way the EU’s ability to remedy the fears of domestic actors often determines the effectiveness of conditionality.

An understanding of the principle of conditionality and an appreciation for how it is used by the EU is extremely important. Conditionality makes clear that coercive actions are used throughout the accession process. While I argue that the Europeanization process is structured in a more differentiated manner than conditionality offers it is important to accept that the structure of influence apparent to the Europeanization process contains a top-down orientation.

**Mechanisms of Europeanization**

Attempting to draw conclusions about Europeanization necessarily involves an analysis of the ways in which the process takes place. Some scholars have begun to coin these explanations as “mechanisms” of Europeanization (see Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999, 2002; Radaelli 2003; and Grabbe 2003; 2006). Either way it is from these appreciations of the Europeanization process that we begin to conceive the multi-leveled processes that facilitate Europeanization.
Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999; 2002) identify three mechanisms of Europeanization, which they base on a trio of theoretical explanations: (1) institutional change, (2) opportunity change, and (3) change in beliefs and expectations (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999: 1-2; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 256). The first explanation, institutional change, arises from the belief that domestic change and the occurrence of Europeanization is contingent on the candidate states’ ability to alter their political arrangements. In this scenario the EU will have prescribed some institutional model that must be reproduced at the domestic level to fully comply. In this way change necessitates an institutional assessment and reform. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) explain that this mechanism of Europeanization is primarily found in areas where the EU has used “positive integration”—policies meant to shape the candidate states reform agenda—like environmental reform (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 258). Obviously, this explanation is heavy on the historical institutionalist rendering of change and prioritizes the role and effectiveness of political institutions.

Knill and Lehmkuhl’s second mechanism of Europeanization ignores the institutionalist rendering of change and focuses more on the power of altering domestic opportunity structures. Change in this manner occurs as the EU opens up the reform making process and shifts much of the power and decision making responsibility to the domestic actors. A policy “market” is created wherein the EU prefers change as the result of evolving domestic opportunities rather than from a prescribed model. Change in this case cannot be predicted with any certainty, it depends on who is being given opportunities and how well they are able to utilize the opportunity (see Radaelli, 2003: 42) Conceptualized as “negative integration” this mechanism is usually reserved for policy areas where administrative reform or alterations are needed (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 258).
Knill and Lehmkuhl’s last and admittedly weakest mechanism is Europeanization based on the alteration of domestic beliefs and expectations (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 258). Reserved for policy areas that require the most fundamental changes, this mechanism requires neither a prescribed policy nor an opportunity recalculation. Rather, it necessitates the gradual change of domestic perceptions of specific policy areas. By encouraging certain conceptions of specific policy fields, say democratic governance, Europeanization is expected to occur as domestic advocates put pressure on the underlying institutions that possess the power to change political arrangements. In this way, Europeanization is only observed sporadically depending on the strength and opportunities of those advocacy groups with “EU” beliefs.

Radaelli (2003) takes Knill and Lehmkuhl’s argument one step further by elaborating on their three mechanisms of Europeanization. Radaelli concludes that there are basically two mechanisms of Europeanization: a vertical and horizontal one. His vertical mechanism encompasses “positive” integration and furthers it by explaining that it occurs either by coercion or mimetism. In this context coercion emphasizes forced change where as mimetism emphasizes change as the result of peer pressure. In contrast, Radaelli’s horizontal mechanism of Europeanization elaborates on “negative” integration by explaining that change can also occur as the result of “international regulatory competition” (Radaelli, 2003: 42). As the candidate states are exposed to diverse and, at times, competitive political arrangements they are able to choose the best way to comply with the EU’s demands. This way the EU may set the reform agenda but a “competition” between member states, and the candidate states’ choice ultimately lead to change.

Heather Grabbe’s mechanisms of Europeanization are by far the most specific rendering of Europeanization and prove to be the most influential for this thesis. As I will elaborate on in
the following chapters Grabbe has come up with a set of five mechanisms of Europeanization that she claims—and I debate—are “largely used instrumentally by the European Union” (Grabbe, 2003: 312). Each of her mechanisms—Model, Money, Benchmarking and monitoring, Advice and twinning, and Gate-keeping—emphasize a different arrangement of influence and “Europeanization”. Some, such as gate-keeping and money seem to privilege the EU’s position and contain an element of “positive” integration. While others, such as advice and twinning, and benchmarking and monitoring entail such heavy involvement from the member and candidate states that a multi-leveled structure of influence may be more appropriate.

Regardless of whether Grabbe’s mechanisms are agreeable they break from Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999; 2002), and Radaelli’s (2003) “explanatory” emphasis and provides the discipline with ways to assess empirically the Europeanization process. Her emphasis on empirical renderings of Europeanization is needed more in the discipline. This thesis aims to continue her efforts by analyzing the empirical structure of influence apparent in her various mechanisms.

Conclusion

The scholarly works presented above form the basis of this thesis and are appreciated for their contribution to the ever-developing field of Europeanization. These strands of literature highlight the evolution of the Europeanization field and discuss the conceptualization that are of utmost importance to this thesis’ contribution. Many of the issues discussed by the various authors will be evaluated further in the successive chapters. However, this initial presentation of the Europeanization literature serves to clarify and accustom the reader with many of the concepts that will be used in this thesis to evaluate the current state of the Europeanization process.
Chapter III: Tools in a Toolbox: Mechanisms of Europeanization

This chapter discusses the mechanisms of Europeanization and aims to demonstrate the various ways actors from domestic, transnational, and supranational levels are able to manipulate the Europeanization of the candidate states. Manipulation in this sense refers to both the formal manipulation (i.e. setting the reform agenda, prescribing legislative models) and informal manipulation (i.e. nationalizing reform legislation, negotiating compliance) of the Europeanization and accession process. This chapter provides a critical analysis of the validity of the Europeanization process, with regards to whether Europeanization occurs as the result of some stagnant and predetermined influence structure (i.e. exclusively top-down, bottom-up, etc) or rather a combination of these popular conceptions in what I define as a multi-leveled structure of influence. From this multi-leveled appreciation of the Europeanization process the structure of influence is fundamentally determined by the various actor’s ability to capitalize on their windows of opportunity.

This chapter offers an analysis of the five mechanisms of influence advanced by Heather Grabbe (2003, 2006), paying particular attention to the Europeanization structure apparent in all of the mechanisms. She reveals that certain mechanisms are dominated by the EU, while others leave much discretion to individual candidate states. Furthermore, some of the mechanisms necessitate the development of relationships between actors from all three levels. As such, these mechanisms point to an accession process that is dominated by a multi-leveled system of influence where Europeanization occurs as the result of windows of opportunity and agency.

Heather Grabbe (2003: 312) categorizes the Europeanization process into a set of five categories:
• Models: Provision of legislative and institutional templates
• Money: Aid and technical assistance
• Benchmarking and monitoring
• Advice and twinning
• Gate-keeping: access to negotiations and further states in the accession process

Some of these mechanisms are frequently used within the EU to coordinate the implementation of community-level reform while others are specifically reserved for the Europeanization of candidate states. These mechanisms, just as the accession process itself has evolved as the EU and its candidate states have encountered new and complex challenges. As such, the Europeanization of the candidate states has always involved an environment of struggle between actors from the EU, the member states, and the candidate states themselves. All of the political actors involved in the accession process have a desire and opportunity to influence the terms of Europeanization. The EU clearly has the most pervasive role in the process but this does not mean that actors from the member and candidate states are inactive. The candidate states do not simply “download” the EU’s demands. Similarly, the mechanisms Grabbe describes do not prioritize the EU as the sole influencing actor.

Specific mechanisms such as gate-keeping allow the EU a dominant position at certain times during the accession process. However, other mechanisms such as twinning reveal that Europeanization can also occur through less coercive member-candidate negotiations. I aim to show that the EU’s Europeanization efforts have been effectively shaped by the candidate states’ willingness to implement the acquis. Thus, Europeanization has occurred as the EU has capitalized on its opportunities to set the reform agenda and, simultaneously, as the candidate states have taken advantage of the few windows of opportunities available to them.

This chapter is structured into five sections that follow Grabbe’s mechanisms. Section one introduces models and focuses on the ways that models are effectively transferred to the
candidate states either horizontally, vertically, or a mixture of both. Section two discusses one of the most important Europeanization mechanisms, aid. In this section it is pertinent to understand that the EU’s aid programs have evolved and so too has the structure of Europeanization implicit to the aid mechanism. Section three exposes monitoring and benchmarking as a mechanism crucial to the continuing Europeanization of the candidate states. Section four argues that twinning and advice is arguably the most multi-leveled dimension of the Europeanization process, in that it inherently and purposefully involves actors from all three levels. Section five closes out the discussion on mechanisms and speaks to the undeniable power given to the EU and its member states in the form of its gate-keeping ability.

An empirical section has been added to each of the five sections. Examples from Croatia are particularly relevant to this argument because they allow this thesis to be appreciated from a contextually relevant perspective. Croatia is a current candidate state and by demonstrating that the results of the Europeanization process are influenced and shaped by actors and interests from multiple levels of government this thesis’ initial argument concerned with the current state of the Europeanization process is further illustrated.

Models

Adopting the *acquis* is a *requirement* for the candidate states. The EU has made it clear that the 35 chapters\(^5\) of the *acquis* must be implemented absolutely. Failure to implement reform adequately may lead to what every candidate dreads; the suspension of negotiations. Thus, it is imperative that the *acquis* and other EU requirements are translated clearly and effectively to the candidate states in order to ensure the swift and complete implementation of EU demands.

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\(^5\) The *acquis* has recently *expanded* to 35 chapters from 31 in order to deal with circumstances in Croatia and Turkey.
In order to facilitate the reform of their institutional and legislative arrangements, and to develop a comprehensive policy agenda, the candidate states often rely heavily upon models, or on “best practices.” According to Claudio Radaelli (2003) the transfer of models happens either vertically, demarking a top-down, EU-domestic transfer; or horizontally, where there is little pressure to conform and transfer occurs through acts of socialization between member and candidate states (Radaelli, 2003: 40-44). Vertical transfers emphasize an asymmetric relationship between the EU and its candidate states, where the candidate states are little more than consumers of the EU policy-making process (Grabbe, 2003). According to the premise of vertical model transfer the EU will develop a set of criteria and an implementation strategy—a model—that will articulate to the candidate states the EU’s demands and the desired way those demands can be met. This structure demonstrates that the Europeanization process does have a top-down, EU centric component in which the candidate states have little opportunity to “upload” their preferences. By contrast, “Horizontal Europeanization” allows for a more tempered perception of this mechanism by demonstrating that the process of Europeanization does not necessitate a “hierarchical chain of command” (Radaelli, 2003: 41). In contrast, the transfer of models may occur as the result of notions of “good policy and best practice” facilitated by the amiable and ongoing relationships between member and candidate states (Radaelli, 2003: 41). So while the EU certainly requires the mandatory adoption of the *acquis*, the ways in which compliance is achieved results from both vertical and horizontal model transfer.

Discussing horizontal and vertical model transfer is important because depending on which mode of transfer is analyzed, the structure and outcomes may differ tremendously. The biggest discrepancy between these two modes of transfer is the flexibility regarding compliance.
For example, when the EU transfers models directly to the candidate states there is often a large amount of pressure to adapt the domestic policy agenda—meaning full compliance is expected of the candidate state, leaving them little ability to manipulate how such implementation should occur. This vertical form of model transfer is often labeled “coercive” because the EU knowingly has the more dominant position and therefore has the power to make accession harder if the candidate state resists or gains too much influence.

At its foundation, vertical model transfer is based on the EU’s desire to spread its legislative and political norms. In this regard, the acquis communautaire represents an EU model that must be complied with, exhaustively in order to gain membership. The candidate states are unable to influence the development of the acquis and, as such, have no real ability to set the terms of the EU’s demands. Thus, Europeanization certainly has a top-down orientation wherein the EU’s demands are able to set the reform agenda of the candidate states.

Conversely, when the EU does not advocate a clear reform direction the candidate states often look to the member states for advice and consultation to develop a more nationally acceptable implementation strategy. Sometimes referred to as “negative integration” these bilateral negotiations occur when the candidate states have the opportunity to choose from several acceptable policies or institutional arrangements instead of being prescribed a certain model (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Radaelli 2003). The point is to encourage “market-making” policies rather than “market-shaping policies” (Radaelli, 2003:42). Through the complex negotiations and consultations that take place during this “Horizontal Europeanization” the member states frequently offer models of “best practice” that, depending on some basic principles, may be fully or partially accepted by the candidate state. Borrowing from Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s (2004, 2005) discussion on socialization and lesson drawing,
the likelihood that horizontal model transfer (Europeanization) will occur is very much determined by the model’s perceived legitimacy and its resonance with the candidate state’s current political system.

The model must be perceived by the candidate state to be legitimate in two ways. First, the legislative, institutional, or policy change that the model advocates must have developed from a legitimate political process. In other words, the member state must be recommending a model that was legally developed from acceptable political processes. If the model’s origin or purpose is unclear, then the candidate state is less likely to perceive it as being legitimate for their particular goal. Second, the model and its outcomes must be generally based on community wide norms and values (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). The model must clearly indicate how its implementation will lead to outcomes that are “consistent with the values of the EU” (Sissenich, 2005: 162). Without a clear indication of how the model will help the candidate state better implement the EU’s acquis, horizontal model transfer, as a voluntary process is unlikely to occur.

Furthermore, the model being advocated must resonate with the candidate state by either filling a policy void or advocating a beneficial adjustment of the current system. Model transfer is increasingly likely to occur if a domestic practice is absent, either because it is new or because the current practice is no longer legitimate to the political system (Checkel 2001b, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 20). Without a current system in place the candidate states are at a natural disadvantage because they may lack the knowledge or institutional capabilities to implement the EU’s acquis. Member states can often fill this void by offering “practices” that have proven successful in similar situations. If the current system exists but is no longer deemed legitimate then the candidate state may have knowledge of the specific demand
but remains open to any reform options. In this case the negotiations are more complex because the candidate state will frequently conduct a cost-benefit analysis that weighs its ability to nationalize the proposed model against the probability of the model’s success.

Bulmer and Padgett (2004) offer yet another way of advancing model transfer in a way that melds principles from both vertical and horizontal model transfer. Their perception presents horizontal transfer within an environment mediated by the EU. Under “facilitated unilateralism” (Bulmer and Padgett, 2004: 110) models of policy, institutions, and legislation are still exchanged between domestic actors but only because the EU has provided them with an environment where this exchange is possible. Bulmer and Padgett’s perception offers a good understanding of the asymmetric qualities of the accession process while still maintaining an appreciation of the multi-leveled process of Europeanization. In most cases during the accession process candidate countries reach out to a number of the member states specifically to initiate dialogue that will facilitate their speedy entry into the EU. Not all bilateral relations form because of the EU’s rigorous demands on the candidate states but the pressure the EU exudes definitely encourages the candidate states to pursue various means to aid them in their reform. A prime example, which I will elaborate on in a future section, is twinning. In these instances candidate states reach out to the member states to help them develop reforms that will expand specific administrative arrangements. Developed by the EU, twinning has provided the funding and environment to facilitate the exchange of models and advice between candidate and member states. As such, facilitated unilateralism may describe the most realistic appreciation of the multi-leveled structure of both the Europeanization and accession processes.
An empirical case from Croatia will demonstrate that model transfer during the accession process is most appropriately understood as a strand of facilitated unilateralism in that it has both a horizontal and vertical dimension.

*The Empirics: Croatia’s Facilitated Employment Reform*

Article 145 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states:

“Member States and the Union shall, in accordance with this Title, work towards developing a coordinated strategy for employment and particularly for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to economic change with a view to achieving the objectives defined in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union” (European Commission, 2010a: 112).

This same policy initiative also governs similar relations between the EU and its candidate states. Using a “Joint Assessment of the Employment Policy Priorities of the Republic of Croatia” the EU has identified the main challenges to Croatia’s employment policy and developed “priorities for actions” that will “advance the country’s labour market transformation, and prepare for accession to the European Union” (Polančec and Špidla, 2008: 1). Together these “priorities for action” represent an employment reform model that is repeatedly and intentionally connected to the EU’s current priorities in labor reform. These priorities for action may not be directly linked to the *acquis* but they still represent vertical policy transfer because they are set in recognition of the EU’s demands. These transfers occur because the EU is employing what Heather Grabbe describes as a “framing” mechanism (Grabbe, 2003: 313).

Framing is a less coercive form of vertical model transfer whereby the EU convinces candidate states that the adoption of non-*acquis* demands may help them persuade other member states and their national constituencies that they take the EU’s demands seriously (Grabbe, 2003). In the Croatian case the joint assessment stresses that the “good governance of
employment policies” is of paramount importance to the community and its hopeful members (Polančec and Špidla, 2008: 47). By framing labor reform as a critical policy area and repeatedly correlating it to community initiatives the EU has effectively manipulated the accession process by making a non-compulsory issue seem mandatory to both the domestic politicians and the general public.

Like facilitated unilateralism, the EU-directed reform of Croatia’s labor system seemingly bridges the gap between vertical and horizontal model transfer by simultaneously encouraging a specific reform agenda while leaving open the option of reform through bilateral negotiations between Croatia and the member states. On the one hand, the EU has certainly employed tactics of vertical model transfer by independently assessing Croatia’s policy climate and jointly prescribing a specific plan of action. In addition, the joint assessment has made sure to include that “progress in the implementation of these priorities will be monitored” while “taking account of developments in the EU labour market policies” (Polančec and Špidla, 2008: 1). On the other hand, the EU does not advocate specific ways to implement these priorities. Specific action is necessary but the ways in which these actions are to be carried out are left to Croatia’s discretion; opening the door to horizontal Europeanization.

Financial and Technical Aid

Aid is perhaps the EU’s most effective Europeanization mechanism and certainly one, which based on conditionality, improves the effectiveness of all its other mechanisms. The EU is the single largest contributor of financial and technical assistance to the candidate countries, providing both directly administered funds as well as facilitating bilateral negotiations that often yield assistance (Grabbe 2003, 2006). Financial and technical aid represents a mechanism that
can be utilized by all three levels to ensure that their priorities are recognized and paid for. Moreover, the Europeanization of the aid programs is critical for the candidate states and the EU alike. For the candidate states, failure to communicate and ensure the continuation of their preferences may result in a lack of funding in the areas they perceive as being most important. Consequently the EU can use its discretion to ensure that the candidate states realize that they depend heavily on the EU to fund their reform initiatives. The EU’s funding packages offset the multi-million euro cost of reform development and implementation that would have otherwise been accrued by the candidate states. With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) often less than 30% of the EU’s many of these countries would not have the funds or organization to conduct the reforms without EU aid (Bache, 2010: 6). Therefore, it would seem that aid, and the candidate states’ dependence on it, gives the EU an opportunity to influence the terms of reform. However, an effective oversight framework must be in place in order for the EU to sustain the ability to Europeanize using aid.

Manipulation occurs throughout the aid process and by actors from many levels. The EU is often able to control the candidate states’ reform agenda by allocating large amounts of moneys to specific policy areas, while the candidate states’ have the ability to nationalize the EU’s priorities by developing aid applications and implementation frameworks based on their domestic needs. In the end, the candidate states certainly have the ability to manipulate the implementation of aid but must still acknowledge the demands of the EU.

A brief history of the EU’s aid program will outline the ways actors from all three levels of influence have utilized the aid program to further their priorities. Although the EU has repeatedly reformed the aid program in an effort to strengthen its authority, candidate states have
frequently frustrated the EU’s efforts by purposefully implementing policies that do not fully mesh with the EU’s demands.

*The History of Aid in CEE and the Balkans*

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its communist allies in 1991 the EU began efforts to spread democratic and single-market principles to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Eventually those efforts evolved into an outright membership perspective and the EU had committed itself to accepting countries that had an average GDP of one-third the average of the EU15⁶ (Bache, 2010: 6). As a result the EU realized that funding would be an area critical to its desire to Europeanize its eastern neighbors.

**PHARE**

Several different funding programs have been implemented to offset the financial and technical deficiencies of the CEE and Balkan candidate states. The Poland and Hungary: Aid for Economic Restructuring, or Phare program, was implemented first in 1989 to support the economic and political transition of the newly independent former communist republics of CEE. Phare funded projects were based on demand and originated as applications from the CEECs (see European Council, 1989). Funding was then given in the form of grants, which had no inherent implementation framework—meaning that the EU did not have a lasting way of influencing the candidate states’ priorities (Grabbe, 2006).

Phare provided funding to a wide range of policy areas from agriculture to energy (see European Council, 1989). As long as the projects were devoted to achieving compliance with the

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⁶ In 1995 the EU was composed of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
newly formed *acquis* they were seemingly eligible for Phare funds. Europeanization through the distribution of Phare funds was therefore limited by the lack policy specific implementation frameworks. The EU had initiated and funded the reform of the CEECs but failed to provide the guidance and direction needed to ensure compliance. Moreover, the aid from Phare was relatively small compared to foreign investment in the CEECs and could therefore be brushed aside if the EU’s demands were too severe (Grabbe, 2006). It was becoming clear that the EU’s aid packages were simply too disorganized for an exclusively top-down Europeanization to occur.

In 1997 the Phare program was transformed into a “radically accession driven” program focused on institution building and “*acquis*-related investment” (European Commission, 2002: 8, 10). Sympathetic to the CEECs’ administrative deficiencies the Phare program allocated 30% of its financial mandate to its first priority, institution building which was designed to strengthen the candidate states “economic, social, regulatory, and administrative abilities” (European Commission, 2002: 8). Phare’s remaining financial mandate was spent on co-financing the candidate states’ regulatory framework and economic and social cohesion⁷ (European Commission, 2002: 8). To this extent, by aiding the development of the candidate states’ institutional capacities the Phare program accords the EU the opportunity to Europeanize the candidate states’ institutional, legislative, and policy-making arrangements.

**ISPA**

In 1999, the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) was established to give specificity to the EU’s aid package by focusing exclusively on the candidate states’ transportation and environmental reforms (see European Council 1999a, 1999b, European

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⁷ Most of the money allocated to this area was spent on twinning projects (Grabbe, 2006: 81).
Commission 2002). The ISPA allocated over $1 billion euro a year to the candidate states in order to facilitate the development of the candidate states road, rail, and water networks, as well as the advancement of their water treatment abilities (European Commission, 2002: 12). Similar to the twinning project funded by Phare, the ISPA projects originated at the domestic level (European Council, 1999b: Article 7). This allowed domestic actors from localities, corporations, and social groups to utilize EU funding to address their individual issues; reiterating the fact that while ensuring its position in the Europeanization process the EU has also intentionally allowed for the purposeful manipulation of the process at the local level. It is clear that the EU has a position of authority in that they have the ability to approve or deny programs and maintain the right to reassess the programs viability. However, the candidate states still have the ability to manipulate the Europeanization process by developing nationally relevant projects and implementing the projects based on their desires; albeit under the watch of an overly bureaucratic and economically focused EU oversight committee.

**SAPARD**

Like the ISPA program, the Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) was designed to aid candidate states in specific policy areas. Still inseparably attached to the advancement of the *acquis*, Sapard aimed to make sure that the candidate states were prepared for the EU’s single market and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (European Council 1999c, European Commission 2002). Recognizing the “administrative impossibilities” of implementing such a complex funding package the EU had chosen to approach Sapard using a decentralized structure (European Commission 2002: 15). Because a decentralized structure is unusual the EU portrayed the allocation of Sapard funds as a chance for
the candidate states to earn “valuable experience” (European Commission, 2002: 17). Again, this type of rhetoric emphasizes an intentionally multi-leveled system of Europeanization. The EU retained its oversight and monitoring abilities and, through the acquis, set the reform priorities. Yet, they allowed the candidate states to seek advice from sub-national and transnational actors, and left the development and implementation of the Sapard projects purposefully in the hands of domestic actors. As a result actors from an increasing number of levels had the opportunity to Europeanize the candidate states’ reform process and facilitated the implementation of priorities that may deviated from the EU’s original intentions.

**IPA**

Since early 2007 the EU has reformed its pre-accession funding packages and implemented a new package, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), based on five fundamental components: (1) transition assistance and institution building, (2) cross-border cooperation, (3) regional development, (4) human resource development, and (5) rural development (see European Commission 2006, 2007, 2010b; Bache 2010: 6-7). By 2006 it had become clear that PHARE, ISPA, and SAPARD had further complicated the accession process by putting undue administrative pressure on the accession candidate states. Furthermore, the candidate states had proved that they were quite capable of manipulating the funding instrument. As a result the IPA intended to provide the EU, its candidate states, and its potential candidate states\(^8\) with a clear framework of assistance in order to remedy the administrative and oversight issue that plagued previous aid packages.

The establishment of the IPA demonstrates that the accession process, more specifically the financial and technical aid mechanism has been constantly challenged by issues at both the

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\(^8\) Identified in 2006 as the “Western Balkans”, (see European Commission, 2006).
EU and domestic level. The EU realized that the candidate states had manipulated the aid process with complex implementation strategies. Likewise, the EU has realized that its ability to aid the candidate states has been hampered by the candidate states’ administrative inabilities. As a result, it is appropriate to label the aid mechanism as inherently Europeanized by actors from all three levels, and even further by sub-state actors. Financial aid may emanate from the top, but advice and technical assistance on its implementation may emanate from anywhere.

IPA Funding: EU and Croatian Benefits

There is no doubt that funding decisions are now made through fragile negotiations between the EU and its candidate states. Furthermore, it can be said that funding is needed by both in order to facilitate an outcome that is mutually acceptable. On the one hand, the EU must realize that in order to encourage a non-member to comply with its demands it must offset the physical and political costs by offering a financial contribution. On the other hand, the candidate states do not necessarily have the means or ability to implement the EU’s demands and therefore rely on the EU’s funding to implement the reforms necessary for membership. In the case of the Croatian police department, EU funding has helped offset the costs of implementing a mutually beneficial project.

In order for Croatia to comply with Chapter 24 of the acquis, Justice, Freedom and Security, it needed to strengthen the technical and administrative capacities of its Ministry of the Interior (MOI). One of the main ways to accomplish this task is by overhauling the MOI’s IT and Communications system. In response, an IPA project for 2009 was earmarked to supply new IT equipment to the police departments throughout Croatia. The two-year project’s 2 million euro budget is being financed through an EU contribution of 1.5 million euro, with the remaining
moneys coming from Croatia (European Commission, 2009: 2). While the project’s implementation responsibility and benefits clearly reside in Croatia, it is clear that the EU has both set this agenda and will ultimately benefit from the project’s completion. Thus, Europeanization occurred as the result of both actors being able to capitalize on their opportunity to influence the areas where reform is necessary.

Thanks to this project Croatia’s police stations will have access to the MOI’s information system, which will enable the use of biometric travel documents (European Commission, 2009: 6). Furthermore, 2000 personal computers and 400 printers will be distributed to police stations across Croatia, facilitating the continuous availability of the MOI’s information system (European Commission 2009: 7). While this certainly benefits the Croatian government and serves to further protect the citizens of Croatia, it no doubt simultaneously benefits the EU’s collective security concerns and facilitates a European-wide police infrastructure. If Croatia’s justice services improve, then upon accession, the EU will have successfully expanded its judicial capabilities and grown its monitoring and implementation abilities. Thus, Croatia and the EU mutually benefit from reform.

Key to the Europeanization argument is the issue of development and implementation. As the IPA doctrine makes clear individual states have the responsibility to develop the IPA-funded projects. However, the projects must indicate some connection to the candidate’s effort to implement the acquis. Moreover, the EU has the ability to deny funding to a project deemed too expensive or too detached from its demands. Therefore, the candidate states’ agenda is essentially controlled by the EU’s emphasis on compliance. This begs the question whether the development of the reform alone represents an opportunity for the candidate states to influence the Europeanization process?
Development responsibility alone may not lead to Europeanization but implementation definitely leaves open the possibility of Europeanization by the domestic-level. As has been previously stated, the candidate states are responsible for the implementation of the reform project. By entrusting the candidate states with full rights to the development and implementation of IPA projects the EU encourages the formation of nationally driven projects, which they control only loosely through the funding requirements. In the Croatian case, the IPA’s project fiche outlines only the basic characteristics of the project, so Croatia may choose to develop its IT system organically or with the help of other member states. While the EU maintains the ability to monitor the projects implementation and cancel funding if necessary the bureaucratic structure of EU oversight complicates its ability to ensure project compliance. Recognizing this deficiency the candidate states may use funding on un-sanctioned or illegal project activities. Thus, Europeanization can occur because the candidate states have the opportunity to manipulate the aid packages and overstep project limitations.

**Benchmarking and Monitoring**

Repeatedly mentioned in the 1999 Helsinki European Council Conclusions are the words “progress” and “assessment”, alluding to the fact that candidate states are regularly appraised on how well they meet the *acquis* and other EU requirements (European Council, 1999d). But the ways in which the EU has monitored and assessed its candidate states has not always been so clearly identifiable. Over the past 20 years the EU has relied on several different documents to form the basis of its monitoring and assessment abilities.

From 1989-1993 the EU relied on the bilaterally agreed upon Europe Agreements (EA) to govern its relations with the CEE (see Sedelmeier, 1994; Sedelmeier and Wallace, 1996;
The EAs were designed to encourage the newly independent former Soviet Republics to reform their command economies and liberalize their political system. The EAs were based upon a set of five conditions: rule of law, human rights, a multi-party system, free and fair elections, and a market economy (Grabbe, 1999: 10). The CEECs were expected to show progress in these sensitive policy areas in order to maintain PHARE funding. Failure to comply with the EU recommendations could lead to the suspension of the EAs, although no such suspensions ever occurred (Grabbe, 1999). In terms of the EU’s ability to monitor and assess the viability of its eastern neighbors the EAs represent an initial framework from which the EU was able to conditionally offer the CEE support in return for compliance with “European norms.”

As previously mentioned the Copenhagen Council of 1993 developed a set of pre-accession conditions called the *acquis communautaire* designed to provide the EU and its candidate states a guide on the evolution of the accession process. Unfortunately, in 1993 these demands were still so new to both the EU and its candidate states that it would take nearly ten years for them to be properly enforced. In the meantime the EU chose to pay particular attention to the economic advancement of its eastern neighbors and relied heavily upon the economically charged “Single Market White Paper” to assess and monitor the preparations of the CEECs. The White Paper emphasized a set of 12 policy areas that the EU believed would help liberalize the CEECs’ economies, further preparing them for their “return” to Europe (see Commission, 1985; Grabbe, 1999). Although the White Paper was not legally binding the EU’s emphasis on its complete and mandatory acceptance made it resonate in the minds of CEE policy-makers (Grabbe, 1999). Moreover, the White Paper represents the EU’s use of specific criteria to reinforce its Europeanization abilities and judge the candidate’s preparations for membership.
From 1997 to the present two of the most important documents used by the EU to assess the candidate states are the “Accession Partnership” and the annual “Progress Reports”. The Accession Partnerships represent a single framework of demands and promises that the EU uses to guide the candidate states through the accession process. Based primarily on the conditionality principle the Accession Partnerships can then be altered and priorities can be reassessed depending on the outcome of the ‘Progress Reports’. Every year the EU assesses the candidate states’ progress towards implementing the *acquis* and details their findings in a progress report. Depending on the outcome of the yearly assessment the candidate states can have funding cut or even negotiations suspended. Conversely, a positive assessment may lead the EU to close an *acquis* chapter, edging the candidate closer to membership. In this way the Accession Partnership and Progress Reports serve as the key gate-keeping tools from which the EU ultimately decides whether a candidate should pass through to the next level of accession.

Although neither is legal binding the Accession Partnership and yearly Progress Reports do represent the “main instrument[s] governing EU-CEE [and Balkan] relations’ and as such must be respected by the candidate states’ policy-makers (Grabbe, 1999: 14). This supposedly top-down mechanism represents the EU’s attempt to manipulate the Europeanization process and ensure that its priorities become the priorities of the candidate states. But as the Croatian case will demonstrate the manipulative power of the documents is at best questionable. While the Accession Partnerships articulate a set of “key priorities” the importance of each priority is vague, leaving the candidate with the ability to nationalize the specific priority. As such, it is unclear whether the Accession Partnerships and subsequent Progress Reports represent exclusive tools of an EU-dominated Europeanization process or whether there is also an inherent level of candidate-level Europeanization occurring.
An EU Concern: Croatia’s Minority Rights Record

The Accession Partnership between the EU and Croatia is expansive and covers issues from governmental spending to political corruption (see European Council, 2008). One of the most significant issues in the minds of the EU and Croatians alike is the promotion and enforcement of human rights (European Council, 2008). In order to understand the significance of this issue it is important to remember that Croats were very active participants in arguably the worst war in Europe since World War II. After the Bosnian War ended in 1995 a number of the high-ranking war criminals responsible for the torture and deaths of thousands of civilians fled to Croatia where officials have struggled to bring the accused to justice. As a result, the relationship between Croats and Croatia’s fragile Serbian and Bozniak minorities continues to be strained by the terrible memories of the war. As such, the EU certainly has an interest in securing the safety of minorities and ensuring that the criminals responsible for the Bosnian atrocities are brought to justice.

Croatia’s Accession Partnership reflects the EU’s recognition of Croatia’s fragile demographic environment and declares that Croatia must “promote respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with international law and best practice in EU Member States” (European Council, 2008: 55). Additionally, Croatia must “maintain full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and ensure integrity of domestic war crimes proceedings” before its membership negotiations can be fulfilled (European Council, 2008: 54). While these priorities give Croatia direction and emphasize areas where the EU wants to see progress, they stop short of prescribing an implementation strategy. This omission opens the door to the nationalization of EU priorities, or put another way, the bottom-up Europeanization of the EU’s demands. Bottom-up Europeanization occurs as the candidate states
employ various methods to implement the *acquis* and other EU requirements. In these ways domestic change can be encouraged by the EU (through twinning or vertical model transfer), negotiations between the candidate states and member or non-EU states; or reform can purely be a domestic initiative.

Regardless of the ways “mandatory progress” is demonstrated the EU utilizes the Progress Reports to decide the candidate’s preparedness. In regards to Croatia’s minority rights, the 2010 Progress report concluded that “there has been some progress with respect for and protection of minorities, cultural rights” but “many problems remain for minorities” (European Commission, 2010c: 13). The EU encourages Croatia to “foster a spirit of tolerance” in order to eliminate the discriminatory environment that still plagues members of Croatia’s minority community (European Commission, 2010c: 13). With accession on the near horizon, this type of rhetoric represents little more than the EU’s continued efforts to ensure Croatia’s complete and continued compliance with the *acquis*. In addition to their monitoring function, progress reports have also been used to ensure that a candidate’s long-term reform agenda reflects the desires of the EU. In this respect, the EU will continue to press Croatia to address its minority rights records in hopes that the Europeanization of Croatia will last well beyond the accession process.

**Advice and Twinning**

When discussing the possibility of including certain CEE and Balkan states into the EU one consideration that deserves further analysis is their ability to undertake the administrative burden implicit to the accession process. In fact the CEE and Balkan countries have been repeatedly cited by the EU for their slow or incomplete implementation of the Association agreements and funding requirements; an unavoidable consequence of the regions administrative
deficiencies (Papadimitriou, 2002). For this reason administrative reform is critical for the candidate states if they aim to adequately address the EU’s demands and implement the *acquis* quickly. As such this section will discuss the “twinning projects” that were instigated by the EU in recognition of the administrative gap that threatens to stifle both the Europeanization and accession processes.

It became clear quite early on that the main challenge for the candidate states was not their “legal texts, but in adopting their administrative machinery and societies to the conditions necessary to make their legislation work” (European Commission 1995, point 3.25). As a result the EU in 1998 (for the 5th enlargement) and 2002 (for the Balkans) developed twinning as “an instrument for targeted administrative co-operation to assist Candidate Countries (CC) to strengthen their administrative and judicial capacity to implement EU legislation as future Member States (MS) of the European Union” (European Commission, 2009). Since 1998 over 1500 twinning projects have been undertaken in the EUs effort to close the administrative gap (European Commission, 2009). Originally designed to develop the candidate’s justice and home affairs capacity, the twinning projects have expanded in scope to cover issues ranging from the reform of the Albanian public auction system to more serious issues with road safety in Croatia (Twinning, 2009). As the issues facing the CEE and Balkan states have become more diverse the breadths of the twinning projects have been forced to expand as well. The development of more twinning projects has meant that the EU has had to recalculate their already stretched financial package.

Initially these projects were to be funded by the Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) program which had allocated upwards of 30% of its entire budget to the administrative reform of the CEECs (Papadimitriou, 2002). As funding
packages have changed so too has the funding source of the twinning projects. The most recent allocation of twinning funding comes from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Unfortunately the allocation of these funds alone has been difficult for the candidate countries to handle. Until the candidate states have the administrative and managerial capacities to handle the financial responsibilities of the twinning project the EU maintains its oversight role through the National Authorizing Officer (NAO). This office was created to ensure that aid from the national fund is implemented properly while the countries develop the capacities to undertake this process themselves. Over time the EU encourages quick and appropriate compliance by agreeing to defer the oversight responsibilities and slowly delegating financial tasks to the candidate states. The quicker the candidate states build their administrative abilities, the quicker they are able to make decisions about the financial management of twinning projects.

The development and implementation of specific twinning projects is “based on a triangular partnership” wherein the European Commission, the twinning member state(s), and the candidate state have varying levels of influence and responsibilities (Papadimitriou, 2002: 9). This instrument demonstrates the intentional diffusion of responsibility to various levels of actors. The EU plays a central role in the formation of the twinning project, prioritizing projects that will encourage closer cooperation, strengthen the candidate’s administrative capacities, and prepare them for enlargement (European Commission, 2009). In this way the EU maintains its ability and right to Europeanize the candidate states’ reform priorities. From there, the Europeanization process becomes much more confusing as the EU has purposefully taken a hands-off approach to the selection of twinning partners, simply encouraging “equal opportunity and transparency” (European Commission, 2009: 3.5).
The purposeful diffusion of power during the twinning process rectifies the EU’s conflict between maintaining power/influence and its insistence on facilitating a genuine environment of mutual responsibility. To begin with the EU wants to foster a working relationship between the member and candidate states and refrains from labeling it “one-way technical assistance” (European Commission, 2009: 2.1). Furthermore, the EU’s aim is not to replicate the administrative system of any single member-state, making it clearer to see why an environment of equal opportunity is so important. The selection of the twinning partner lay in the hands of the candidate states because a basic principle of this instrument is the candidate’s recognition that they need assistance from experts in the public rather than private sector (European Commission, 2009: 3.5). While the EU maintains an advisory and coordinating role in the selection process, the partnership decision is ultimately made through complex procedures and discussions carried out between then member and candidate states.

Once the partnership decision has been made the twinning process relies heavily on bilateral talks between the candidate and member states in order to develop the work plan. The process culminates in an agreement between the two (or more) nations that sets the project’s targets and implementation strategies. Detailed plans are necessary to ensure that team members from both the candidate and member states operate in unison. Working together and maintaining an open dialogue between all participants will ensure that the EU will offer funding for the project. Because funding is the most important criteria to consider the participants must also make sure that there is a connection between the project and the *acquis* because the EU still has the ability to decide the projects funding allocation. In this way a concise work plan, explicitly connected to a target area, is necessary because the EU has made it clear that the goal of the
twinning project is to “yield mandatory results” and, therefore, may cut funding if the work plan is weak (European Commission, 2009: 2.1).

The CEE and Balkan states’ administrative deficiencies have made monitoring and evaluation a crucial component of the twinning project. The EU understands that twinning projects are often “ambitious, large scale and lengthy”, and as such may lose track of the projects ultimate purpose (European Commission, 2009: 6.3). In response the EU has made it its priority to maintain monitoring mechanisms that ensure the projects compliance with EU demands. The EU requires the NAO to fill out routine progress reports with the Commission reserving the right to conduct on-the-spot checks of twinning progress (European Commission, 2009: 6.3, 6.5). Additionally, the EU’s twinning manual (2009) advises that monthly meeting between the NAO and both project countries be held to ensure that their goals and requirements are being met. If these meetings reveal deficiencies in the process then the implementation of the work plan can be altered to ensure that the “mandatory results” remain the focus (European Commission, 2009: 6.6).

Twinning represents a very systematic way of Europeanizing the accession process. It is clear by the intentional inclusion of actors from multiple political levels that Europeanization, using this instrument, is not dominated by any one level. Twinning necessitates a coordinated effort on the behalf of the EU, member, and candidate states in order to facilitate domestic change. In this way Europeanization does not occur unless all levels work together to encourage change.
The Empirics: A Croatian Example

Due to the over-application and “conceptual stretching” of Europeanization it is becoming increasingly important to underpin any conceptualization of Europeanization with empirical data (see Radaelli, 2000, 2003; Olsen 2002; Buller & Gamble, 2002; Howell, 2004). For this sub-section a twinning project from Croatia will be discussed in order to further illustrate the multi-leveled nature of the Europeanization process, and more specifically, the opportunity structures inherent in the mechanisms that allow policy reform to proceed.

In 2009, the Croatian delegation to the EU submitted twinning proposal HR/2007/IB/JH/02 entitled “Capacity building of the Croatian Agency for Protection of Personal Data (CAPPD)” (Republic of Croatia, 2007: 2). The project intends to strengthen both the “consultative and supervisory roles of the Croatian Agency for the Protection of Personal Data (CAPPD)” by harmonizing its policies on the legal protection of personal data and implementing ISO standards on information security systems (Republic of Croatia, 2007: 2). In their proposal Croatia made clear that “real efforts are needed to bring the legal and technical component of supervisory activities in line with EC requirements” (Republic of Croatia, 2007: 5). In order to facilitate this change the proposal was divided into a legal and technical component that structures the project and increases the likelihood that mandatory results will be seen. Additionally the proposal articulated a clear set of objectives to be fulfilled and called upon member states to submit assistance proposals that would help them harmonize with the EU’s acquis. Submitting the application demonstrates two levels of Europeanization. On one hand Croatia recognizes that this project must fulfill the “EC requirements”—alluding to the fact that the EU has effectively transposed their priorities. On the other hand, the fact that Croatia has the ability to develop the objectives and implementation strategies crucial to this project means that
there is an opportunity for them to influence the terms of *acquis* compliance. Furthermore, the member state Croatia chooses to partner with may affect the depth of compliance the EU can expect to see.

The Croatian government eventually selected Spain over the Netherlands to be their project partner and looked to the Spanish Data Protection Agency to provide the knowledge and technical assistance needed for this administrative overhaul (Croatian, 2010). The 1.3 million euro, IPA-funded project officially began in August of 2010 under a 22-month mandate that will carry out activities intended to meet a specific set of EU benchmarks (Croatian, 2010). One of the key benchmarks of the legal component was the revision and proper implementation of the Act of Personal Information Protection in order to harmonize Croatian policy to EU Directive 95/46/EC (Croatian, 2010). CAAPD was originally set up in 2003 to oversee Croatia’s personal data protection but a recent EU Progress Report stated that the Act is not fully harmonized with the EU’s directive and fails to meet many of the directive’s specific provisions (European Commission, 2008). As a result, Croatia and the EU concluded that Croatia must revise its original legislation and pay particular attention to the supervisory role of the CAAPD (Republic of Croatia, 2007). Spain’s role therefore was to aid Croatia in the development of policies and legislation that will increase its oversight capabilities and further its abilities to harmonize domestic policies with the *acquis*.

This twinning project also contained a technical component centered on the development of an information security system based on ISO 27001 standards (Croatian, 2010). This component was a highly technical and country specific task that called on Spain to offer recommendations of “best practices” and required the development of a multi-leveled security system unique to Croatia’s specific accessibility and security needs. By enhancing the
effectiveness, reliability, and security of their security system Croatia hoped to boost the administrative and supervisory capabilities of CAAPD, thus making it “fully operational and completely complying with relevant EU acquis” (Republic of Croatia, 2009: 18).

Twinning projects occur because of one main reason: candidate states must harmonize their policies with the EU’s acquis in order to gain membership. Therefore, they must appreciate the EU’s recommendations and utilize any opportunity to gain advice from the EU’s member states. The candidate states also desire to implement policies that are nationally accepted and considerate of both public and private interests. As this project demonstrated the reformation of Croatia’s legal and technical frameworks for the protection of personal information inevitably relied on multiple actors and multiple mechanisms of Europeanization. In additions to its advice giving abilities the EU also utilized it monitoring and aid mechanisms in order to ensure Croatia’s continual compliance with EU norms. In this way Europeanization occurred because the EU was able to use multiple tools to ensure the most efficient use of their Europeanization opportunities.

More glaring is the fact that this multi-leveled structure was designed intentionally and in recognition of the increasingly complex and important relationships that develop between actors from domestic, transnational, and supranational levels. The twinning projects are perfect examples of the ways that actors from all three levels maintain their ability to manipulate the Europeanization process, thus ultimately determining the success of the accession proceedings.

**Gate-Keeping**

Arguably the EU’s most powerful and most influential Europeanization mechanism is its ability to decide when and how fast candidate states access the different levels of the accession
process (Grabbe, 2003). Unlike the other mechanisms gate-keeping gives the EU an unchallengeable position of authority from which it determines whether a candidate will ultimately become a member. Gate-keeping relies on principles of conditionality in that candidate states must meet certain criteria in order to gain entrance to the next level of accession. Originally a vague set of economic and political conditions, the basis of the gate-keeping mechanism has had to evolve as the issues stemming from expansion have grown. Eastern expansion has been an exhausting and often troubling exercise for the European Union. As such, the Community has had to decide which political and economic conditions were necessary for a candidate to be advanced through the various levels of accession. Although the 1993 Copenhagen Council established the *acquis communautaire* it was not until the 1999 Helsinki Council that the EU had a clear set of progressive accession stages and the mechanisms necessary to determine the candidate’s compliance (EU Parliament, 1999: Part 1).

The Helsinki European Council effectively made gate-keeping an Europeanization mechanism of its own. Gate-keeping and the accession negotiations had long served to reinforce the other Europeanization mechanisms, but because of Helsinki they developed into yet another way the EU could coerce candidate states to reform (Grabbe, 1999). In effect, the EU had given substance to the *acquis* by attaching its adoption to the progression of accession negotiations. The successful adoption of the *acquis* would serve as the criteria from which the EU would assess and either reward or punish the candidate states based on their compliance. For example, in the Helsinki Conclusions the EU identified nuclear safety as a policy area that must be “in the framework of the enlargement process in accordance with the relevant Council conclusions” (European Council, 1999d: Part 1: 7). In this way the EU made clear that nuclear safety was an important issue in the CEEC and compliance with the EU’s nuclear policies would be a
mandatory step in the process of accession. Gate-keeping is yet another way for the EU to influence the candidate’s priorities and Europeanize the accession process from the top.

_Slovenia says, “No!”_

One of the most recent and relevant examples of the EU and its member states’ ability to gate-keep is the recent suspension of Croatian accession due to an ongoing border dispute with Slovenia. Because membership is ultimately decided upon by the EU and its member states, the individual member states can also participate in this gate-keeping ability. In this case, Slovenia was unhappy with Croatia’s delineation of their common border and wanted a satisfactory resolution before they would allow anymore of Croatia’s chapters to be closed, therefore moving them to the next level of accession. Slovenia based its nearly 10-month block of Croatia’s accession on a twenty-year border dispute around the Bay of Piran, which they both share. According to Slovenia’s claim Croatia has frequently challenged Slovenia’s exclusive economic rights and throughout the accession project has disregarded Slovenia’s claim to the area (Avbelj and Cernic, 2007).

On December 18, 2008 the Slovenian government effectively put a halt on Croatia’s accession by claiming that 12 of Croatia’s remaining _acquis_ chapters were prejudice against the Croatian-Slovenian border (Slovenian Ministry, 2008). Slovenia’s refusal to allow Croatia’s negotiations to go forward lasted until both sides agreed to EU sponsored mediation in early November of 2009 (Government of Republic of Croatia, 2009). Regardless of the validity of the dispute Slovenia’s ability to halt Croatia accession, much to the behest of the EU’s French Presidency, demonstrates that gate-keeping is a very powerful tool available to the EU and its
member states. When used effectively the gate-keeping mechanism has a power unlike any other mechanism to force a candidate state to comply.

**Conclusion**

As the discussion of Grabbe’s mechanisms intended to show, the Europeanization process has neither an inherently dominant actor nor any singular structure of influence. Nearly all of the mechanisms discussed have elements of a multi-leveled Europeanization process. Although the EU, by virtue of its exclusive right to accept new member states, has a position throughout the accession process, the candidate and member states have proven able to manipulate the EU’s demands and add elements of horizontal or bottom-up Europeanization. In this way Europeanization is determined by the actors’ ability to capitalize on windows of opportunity. The accession process contains many such windows of opportunity and thus the actors’ opportunity to influence are determined not by some predetermined structure but by the ability of the various actors to manipulate and set the accession priorities.

The multi-leveled structure of influence observed in the various mechanism questions the very meaning and explanatory value of Europeanization. If the mechanisms clearly show a multi-leveled structure of influence then what determines the ability of one level of actors to Europeanize the other? The next chapter aims to address this question by providing a more tempered look at the effectiveness of the mechanisms of Europeanization.
Chapter IV: The Uncertainties of the Europeanization Process

The mechanisms of Europeanization provide clear insight into the multiple ways Europeanization takes place during the accession process. They also begin to reveal the inherent and disorderly element of the Europeanization process whereby influence occurs based on ability and opportunity rather than on some predetermined and ordered structure. Yet, as Grabbe herself questions, “how (and how far) did the routes analyzed…actually drive change” (Grabbe, 2006: 89)? Furthermore, are there intervening variables that ultimately determine the depth of Europeanization one can expect to see? Do those intervening variables threaten the ability to use Europeanization as a causal mechanism?

This chapter suggests that a more balanced appreciation of the Europeanization process and its mechanisms of change is needed. This type of in-depth assessment is needed in order to understand the complexities and intricacies of the candidate states’ Europeanization. The point is not to invalidate the Europeanization process, but rather to understand its disorderly and realistic characteristics so that a conclusion can be drawn about its structure and applicability during the accession process. There is of course nothing to suggest that the Europeanization process has some clearly defined order, or that Europeanization causes some general outcome. Moreover, Europeanization has clearly impacted the various candidate states and, even more minutely, the individual policy areas quite differently. This diversity is caused by the presence of several “intervening variables” (Grabbe, 2006), and factors that make both the process and outcome of Europeanization disorderly and multi-dimensional.

In order to facilitate this discussion this chapter is organized into three sections. Section one connects the previous chapter’s discussion on the mechanisms of Europeanization to this chapter’s more critical appreciation of Europeanization. The section shows how the mechanisms
of Europeanization fail to influence uniformly and how frequently their influence potential is subverted by their uncertain effectiveness. Section two highlights two intervening variables, the candidate states’ institutional capacity and the “goodness of fit” theory (Cowles et al. 2001). By focusing on these two variables it will become clearer how Europeanization happens in a much more multi-leveled way than many of the familiar conceptualizations offer. Section three concludes this discussion with a focus on the varying levels of adaption (change) that, because of the issues discussed in the first two sections, occur at random. In total this chapter serves to answer some of the fundamental questions surrounding the structure and effectiveness of the Europeanization process.

Uncertain Influence

Although they shed light on the ways Europeanization can be observed, the mechanisms of Europeanization do not have an inherent or certain outcome. However, these mechanisms were not designed to grapple with any fictional universality of the Europeanization process, and therefore should not be conceptualized as a set of causal mechanisms. Europeanization does not cause uniform change, and likewise the mechanisms of Europeanization are problematized by deficiencies and intervening variables that threaten their Europeanizing potential. A more critical analysis of the mechanisms reveals that their uncertain influence problematizes familiar structures of the Europeanization process (i.e. top-down, bottom-up, horizontal). Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding the mechanisms of Europeanization furthers my notion that Europeanization occurs as the result of windows of opportunity rather than some clearly organized structure of influence.
Models

Very early on Page and Wouters recognized that “there is no clear EC model, distinctive and relevant to the national bureaucracies of nation states, that is likely to find its way through contagion, emulation, the demonstration effect or the natural process of adaptation to an important source of political power” (Page and Wouters, 1995: 202). To further this argument and provide some contemporary relevance it could be said that the EU simply has too many models. As the EU has grown so to have the institutional, legislative, and policy arrangements that have helped candidate states, now member states, deal with the EU’s pressure to reform. While many member states share similarities in their monetary policy (Buller and Gamble, 2002), there are conversely many different variations of transport or regional policy (Radaelli 2000; Grabbe 2006). With so many arrangements which model does the EU choose to transfer to the candidate states?

There are also questions regarding the need for models. The candidate states often initiate domestic reform before the EU has the chance to prescribe some institutional or legislative model. In this way, can Europeanization occur without structure, or as the result of “voluntary adaption” (Lavenex and UçArer, 2004: 424)? For instance, some of the fifth enlargement’s leading candidate states (i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary) had reformed their political systems based on EU norms prior to their accession period (see Grabbe, 2006: 79). These candidate states calculated that their preemptive reforms would serve two purposes. For one, oversight would primarily be their exclusive responsibility, meaning that they could ensure compliance was acceptable nationally and supranationally. Second, their preemptive reforms were a strategic move designed to quell the member states’ concerns about their ability to implement the reforms needed for EU membership. These candidate states capitalized on their opportunity to reform

9 Also see Mörth, 2003; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004: 636, and Grabbe, 2006: 78.
their political systems by basing their reforms more mutually on national and supranational desires. They proved that they did not need the EU to prescribe some “best practice” or model in order to facilitate the acceptable reform of their institutional, legislative, and policy-making structures. In this way the candidate states limited the coercive power so often given to the EU through vertical model transfer.

The real question may be: does the EU really have the ability or desire to transfer a single policy model to the candidate states? Therefore, can it be said that model transfer enables the Europeanization of the candidate states? As Grabbe discusses the EU has been very careful about what they advocate and what they condemn. With such diverse political structures present in its members the EU must be politically sensitive when prescribing a certain implementation strategy (Grabbe, 2006: 79). It is as if there cannot be a EU model because of concerns that it may reflect an inherent bias. That is why the acquis are so broad in nature. The individual chapters are not focused on a universally correct way of reform. Rather they simply present the candidate states with a set of priority areas that the EU and its member states have agreed represent their core values and norms. It can be deduced then that the EU can only utilize models for its Europeanization purposes if it prescribes a specific plan of action that the member states can agree upon and one that the candidate states cannot circumvent (e.g. democratic or single-market reform).

Model transfer illustrates the opportunistic environment that is ever present in the Europeanization process. Whether the EU is able to maximize its opportunities and implement a community-accepted model, or if model transfer occurs as a result of the member states’ opportunity to influence the candidate states through exercises like twinning, it is clear that Europeanization is still taking place. Additionally, the proactive candidate states are not lost to
this Europeanizing mechanism and can even upload their own models if they can demonstrate its utility. Either way, model transfer is clearly not a process where one level of actors has the dominant position of influence. Rather, in order to ensure their place in the Europeanization process actors from all three levels must make sure to capitalize on their windows of opportunity.

Aid

The most important calculation to be considered in this assessment of the EU’s aid program is the size of the aid versus the cost of implementation. It may be said that the only reason why aid is a credible reward for the candidate states is because of the implementation costs attributed to the necessary political reforms. In other words, if compliance with the *acquis* were not so costly then the social and political value of aid would be minimized. Nonetheless, membership costs are high and thus aid provides domestic actors both the finances necessary for reformation and the justification they need to “sell” the sometimes burdensome reforms to their citizenry. Because aid is undeniably important to the candidate states the EU must ensure the level of aid corresponds with the level of reform. If the aid is too high then the EU is effectively wasting money, which may be a result of domestic manipulation. Conversely, if the funding package is too low then the political elite may disregard the EU’s demand, and EU membership may become less desirable to politicians and citizens alike.

In order to appreciate the influential power that aid has there must be an understanding that it is in the best interest of the domestic political elite to attract as much funding as possible. For domestic actors aid represents the clearest opportunity to set the terms of the accession process and ensure that nationally relevant initiatives are paid for. The more money they can procure from the EU, the more likely they will be able to use external funds on nationally relevant reforms. However, if the EU is able to meticulously calculate the funding necessary to
implement a given reform then they can ensure that the money spent has a high probability of encouraging complete compliance. In other words, the EU must make sure that they allocate funds appropriately so that it is clear to the candidate states the reforms that should be a priority. Failure to do so leaves open the door to domestic and transnational manipulation of the Europeanization process.

Even by its own admission the EU understands the power and importance of its aid program. In many ways the effective use of aid has been a learning process for the EU. As is reflected in the development of the IPA program the EU has realized that previous aid packages have failed to provide the “consistency, complementarity, and concentration of assistance” necessary to be an effective Europeanization tool (European Commission, 2007). In previous aid packages opportunities to set the terms of Europeanization seeped down to the domestic and sub-national levels because they were effectively given the sole responsibility of implementation and more importantly the EU was not there to ensure a legal and acceptable level of compliance. As a result for much of the last two decades of EU funding the power of Europeanization was not exclusively held in the hands of the EU. Aid has represented an opportunity for all levels of actors to manipulate the Europeanization and accession processes.

Benchmarking and Monitoring

The issue of concern for the benchmarking and monitoring mechanism is its misuse. Monitoring like the EU’s gate-keeping mechanism has the ability to be used by the EU for the explicit and unchallengeable Europeanization of the candidate states. However, the EU’s monitoring documents have lacked the specificities necessary to give them this dominant position. The annual ‘Progress Reports’ give the EU the opportunity to articulate its concerns to
the candidate states. If these concerns are expressed clearly the EU may gain the ability to set the candidate’s subsequent reform agenda. Again the problem is that the EU is often vague in its assessments and overlooks its ability to send a much stronger signal; effectively misusing its opportunity to Europeanize the candidate states.

A section of Croatia’s 2010 Progress Report demonstrates the EU’s vague prescriptions. In regards to Croatia’s intellectual property protection the progress report states, “Measures are therefore required to strengthen the capacity of the police and prosecutors”—giving no indication on what the measures should be or how they should be implemented (European Commission, 2010b: 32). Candidate states are frequently left with a vague outlook on their reform priorities and are forced to depend on other means to gauge the EU’s stance on their progress. It is not that giving the candidate states the ability to implement their own reform is a bad thing; rather it is simply a lost opportunity for the EU to increase its power of influence during the accession process.

Advice and Twinning

Like the issues with the model mechanism, advice and twinning is plagued by ineffectiveness. The problem is twofold: (1) There are purposefully a vast number of expert twinning agents, representing each of the EU’s member states; and (2) the EU lacks the coordination to guarantee that the twinning projects were adequately and consistently implemented. The first problem is simply an issue with the plural environment of twinning. As I have mentioned before, the EU wants to foster a twinning environment that opens up candidate states to the many ways EU demands can be implemented. As such, individual advisors represent diverse nationalities and backgrounds, which lead to considerably different policy advice based on a diverse set of policy norms and values (Grabbe, 2006: 86). Because of these diverse
political values the EU refrains from purposing one singular reading of its *acquis*, recognizing the political consequences of doing so. The second issue is a fixable problem that when fixed could greatly improve the effectiveness of the twinning projects.

A recent evaluation of German-led twinning projects revealed a dire need for a stronger EU presence in the twinning process. This evaluation, conducted by a pair of German ministry employees, revealed that out of 25 twinning projects administered from July 2006 to February 2008 only 52% successfully\(^\text{10}\) met the needs of the candidate country (Bartels and Rach, 2009: 13). Even more alarming was when the candidate states themselves were asked to assess the project’s success only two-thirds of the respondents deemed the projects to have successfully met the targets (ibid). These statistics reveal that a more proactive and effective benchmarking and monitoring body is needed to ensure both the effectiveness of the twinning projects and the proper use of the millions of euro spent yearly on the projects. The correlation between the “failed” twinning projects and the millions of euro sunk into the projects should motivate the EU to take a more ardent stance on the implementation and oversight of the twinning program. Right now both the member and candidate states are capitalizing on their opportunity to influence the EU’s demands, but unfortunately by their own admission they are doing so in an unsatisfactory manner. A more multi-leveled system of involvement is needed in the twinning project to ensure that this Europeanization mechanism is used effectively.

*Gate-Keeping*

Because of the political consequences attached to it, the EU’s gate-keeping mechanism is virtually unusable. The EU prefers to use such blunt force prior to a state’s acceptance as a candidate (Grabbe, 2006). After all, the EU’s reputation is on the line if candidate states turn out

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\(^{10}\) “Successfully” represents those projects receiving a “good” or “very good” rating.
to be so incompetent that they must be “refused” access to the next level of negotiations. The EU has the desire to show the international community that its way of encouraging democratic change is a model from which the world should learn. However, if the EU is forced to use its gate-keeping, or put differently its exclusionary mechanism, then it may be perceived by the international community to have failed ambitions.

Gate-keeping is at one end a very powerful tool that can be used to embarrass candidate states into compliance, while at the other end it demonstrates the failures of the EU’s efforts to Europeanize. Gate-keeping is not to be used to voice concerns about the candidate states; fundamental characteristics (i.e. institutional framework, community norms, etc), rather it must be reserved for issues pertaining to violations of community values—those that simply must be complied with to meet the vary basis of EU membership (i.e. minority rights, democratic elections). If the EU frequently uses its gate-keeping ability then the credibility of its membership promise is threatened. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) point out, in order to Europeanize a candidate using an external incentive—in this case membership—the candidate must be convinced that the incentive can be achieved. If the EU continually threatens the availability of membership then the candidate states may begin to believe membership will never be attained, therefore limiting the EU’s Europeanizing ability.

**Intervening Variables**

There are undoubtedly dozens of variables that have the ability to alter the structure and effectiveness of the Europeanization process. The continued presence of the Europeanization process confronted continually with these intervening variables demonstrates the resilience, or rather the chaos of the process. To clarify, this section aims to focus on two of the more critical intervening variables. Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse (2001) first concluded that the “goodness of
“Goodness of Fit”

Börzel and Risse identify two types of “misfit”—a policy and institutional variant—that demonstrate instances where the Europeanization process can be fundamentally threatened. Policy misfit is essentially an issue of compliance where domestic level policies contradict EU level rules and norms (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 5; Börzel and Risse, 2003: 61). Institutional misfit also exists where EU rules threaten not only the policy preferences of the target country but also the procedural norms and collective understandings attached to the domestic institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Traditional understandings of the “goodness of fit” theory says that the higher the misfit between domestic and EU level arrangements, the higher the adaptational pressure (Cowles et al. 2001: 7). Subsequently the EU should be able to pressure and influence the candidate states more if the candidate states have systems in place that contradict the EU’s preferences. However, there are two scenarios that show that varying degrees of misfit and
adaptational pressure may undermine the functionality of the Europeanization process (Cowles et al. 2001).

The first scenario is an instance where adaptational pressure is low due to the presence of a highly proactive or generally accepted political environment. This does not mean that there is a perfect fit between the EU’s and candidate’s political arrangement, rather it means that the actors and political environment easily accept the EU demands and do not resist operational changes. Although this scenario rarely occurs, when it does there is little opportunity to observe any type of Europeanization. In this way Europeanization may be more voluntary and cooperative than any conceptualization can attempt to explain. It remains unclear whether Europeanization can even be defined as voluntary and whether, if it can be, if there is any inherent structure to the voluntary process taking place.

The second scenario is a much more combative situation where the misfit and adaptational pressure is very high. These situations evolve when the EU’s demands challenge the candidate states’ political identity, core institutions, collective values, and common practices. For instance, during their initial accession negotiations some candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia) struggled to accept the EU’s liberal market and democratic requirements because the candidate states perceived them as fundamentally incompatible with their community norms and political preferences (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). In this type of scenario the candidate states frequently have a desire to “upload” their preferences to the EU in hopes that they may change the EU’s requirements or better the image of their domestic arrangements. If the candidate states and EU fail to persuade the other then a stalemate may develop as neither one benefits from relenting to the others demands (Cowles et al. 2001). The stalemate illustrates that a purely top-down appreciation of the Europeanization process has its
faults because sometimes the EU’s “download” is not welcomed. The stalemate is often remedied by negotiations where actors from each level have a chance to advocate their particular stance. The negotiations will succeed if the solution is able to amalgamate the desires of all the actors. Therefore, it can be said that Europeanization occurs more frequently when all actors are given the opportunity to set the terms of reform, rather than a single dominate force “downloading” decrees. However, this type of situation reveals that the orientation and effectiveness of the Europeanization process can at times be questionable.

_I institutional and administrative capacity_

Because of their diverse communist and authoritative legacies the most recent set of candidate states brought very different institutional arrangements to the accession process. For Heather Grabbe (2006) their communist legacies have made these countries prone to developing institutions that fail to provide the resources and leadership necessary to operate properly (Grabbe 2006: 105). As a result, these countries have institutions that are ill-equipped to handle the burdensome tasks necessary for EU membership. In many instances these dysfunctional institutions may have been designed purposefully in order to give corrupt political actors the ability to maintain the status quo (Grabbe, 2006). The institutions are intentionally developed based on the institutional models of the EU but their operational capacities are purposefully devoid of the manpower and resources to meet their ever-expanding needs. In this way domestic actors present the guise of institutional compliance while maintaining their ability to determine how EU demands are implemented. By manipulating the institutional arrangements these post-communist political leaders help determine the effectiveness of the EU’s Europeanization efforts.

Political leadership, as it relates to institutional capacity, is an important area that deserves further discussion. Institutional capacity is not solely determined by the presence of an
effective institutional structure. Institutional reform necessitates the transformation of ideologies and the reconnect between domestic and supranational actors. In order for there to be a connection between the EU and the institutional capacities of the candidate states the domestic leadership must become acclimated to the EU’s “way of doing things” (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2004: 141). In this way Europeanization is a cooperative process wherein the EU, through negotiations, convinces the domestic political elite to accept the EU’s collective norms of policy-making and policy implementation. Consequently, the domestic elite are Europeanized and begin to internalize the acceptable ways to manage and develop their institutional arrangements. However, a mere description of this example of Europeanization does not begin to detail its actual complexities. In reality the Europeanization of the elites is not a given (See Romania and Slovakia) and dysfunctional institutional arrangements may exist well into the accession process.

The discussion thus far has assumed that the candidate states have the institutions to deal with all of the EU’s policy reforms. There is no doubt that the candidate states’ existing institutions have had to evolve to implement the policy reforms necessary to meet the EU’s demands, but for issues like minority rights and immigration the candidate states have had to develop all new institutions. Naturally in situations like these candidate states must rely heavily on outside sources to remedy the unavoidable knowledge gap. In this case the candidate states count on Europeanization to occur as a top-down or horizontal mechanism. The only problem is that most of the models prescribed by the EU are not designed to mediate administrative voids. Rather they are specifically attached to the demands of the acquis and fail to appreciate a candidate’s individual needs (Grabbe, 2006: 107). As a result, the candidate states’ institutional
and administrative deficiency coupled with the EU’s ineffective models threatens the ability of the Europeanization process to induce domestic change.

**Levels of Adaption**

A combination of intervening variables and mechanism uncertainties challenge the effectiveness of the Europeanization process. It is very hard to predetermine the amount of domestic change to expect from the Europeanization process because depending on the situations different variables may ultimately determine the structure and outcome of Europeanization. Consequently, it may be beneficial to conceptualize the outcomes of Europeanization as varying levels of adaption, or degrees of Europeanization. Using Börzel (1999), Cowles *et al.* (2000), Radaelli (2000), and Börzel and Risse (2003) we can conceptualize these levels as: Inertia, Absorption, Accommodation, Transformation.

**Level 1 Inertia:** Seen when the candidate’s policy, institutions, or legislation are entrenched to a level where no Europeanization, thus no domestic change occurs. Does not match-up with the overall goal of the accession process, which is membership. If a candidate truly wants to succeed then this type of behavior must be overcome. If it continues for a length of time then rapid or abrupt change may occur as the political and social environments become receptive to the EU (Radaelli, 2000).

**Level 2 Absorption:** Occurs when EU policies or initiatives are transplanted onto the existing political structures, but with very little policy, legislative, or institutional change. (Börzel and Risse, 2003). Absorption represents minimal top-down Europeanization because the candidate is able to maintain much of its existing political structure and norms.

**Level 3 Accommodation:** Candidate states accommodate the EU’s demands by injecting new understandings, procedures, processes, and policies into their existing political structures and norms. Domestic policies, institutions, and legislation are not as much altered as they are added onto.

**Level 4 Transformation:** Candidate states replace many existing policies, institutions, and legislation in what represents the most in-depth case of Europeanization. In many
cases new institutions or policies are developed causing the candidate’s collective
political identity to change (Börzel and Risse, 2003).

The explanation for these varying levels of Europeanization is a complex one that only
furthers the confusion surrounding the structure and applicability of the Europeanization process.
Although these levels demonstrate that Europeanization does in fact occur, they do not speak to
any particular structure of Europeanization. As a result, it is rational to appreciate the
Europeanization process and its outcomes as inherently dependent on all levels of actors.
Depending on the actors’ ability to capitalize on their windows of opportunities the results of
Europeanization may be varied.

The mere existence of these “levels of Europeanization” alludes to the innately complex
process that must occur in order for domestic change to be seen. Based on these levels of
adaption it can be concluded that Europeanization occurs without any predetermined outcome, or
any pre-determined regularity. The irregular occurrence and depth of Europeanization alludes to
a more disorderly process than has been previously subsumed.

Conclusion

The Europeanization process is necessitated by the accession process, but the uncertain
influence of its mechanisms and the intervening variables that often compromise the process
renders the prediction of its outcome and structure a mere guessing game. When all of its
inadequacies and variables are assessed in total it becomes clear that Europeanization actually
occurs at varying levels. In addition, the levels of adaption clarify the ways in which the structure
of influence and windows of opportunity available to each level of actors affect the outcomes of
the Europeanization process. In the next chapter I will draw some conclusions about the structure and applicability of the Europeanization process.
Chapter V: Conclusion

This thesis has conducted its analysis based on two fundamental questions regarding the structure and process of Europeanization. Is there a singular structure of influence apparent to the Europeanization process or does influence result from a more mediated structure of interaction? Within this structure of influence, what determines an actor’s ability to influence the process? To answer these questions this thesis was purposefully organized around a group of five mechanisms that revealed that the Europeanization process can be appreciated both conceptually and empirically. This focus on both the conceptual basis and empirical relevance of Europeanization has allowed this thesis to use evidence from the accession process to draw conclusions about the structural conceptions of the Europeanization process.

Throughout this thesis I have asserted that in order to understand the inherent structure and process of Europeanization there must be an examination of actors at three levels of analysis: domestic (candidate countries), transnational (member states), and supranational (the EU). Based on this appreciation, and my analysis of the mechanisms of influence and intervening variables, I offer a much more unbridled conceptualization of Europeanization. I posit that the mechanisms of influence and intervening variables that constrain them empirically validate a multi-leveled rendering of Europeanization where domestic, transnational, and supranational actors utilize windows of opportunities in order to influence the reform agendas of candidate states. Although authors like Radaelli (2003) may claim that my explanations are plagued by “conceptual stretching”, in fact I have looked at only evidence of political change, that is institutional, policy, and legislative change, with little focus on the social repercussions. Moreover, I have refrained from stretching my conception over all of the intricacies of Europeanization and have limited my analysis to only a few of the processes that lead to domestic change. I have focused on five
mechanisms of influence that clearly show that Europeanization and domestic change occur sporadically based on agency and the diversity of domestic, transnational, and supranational preferences. Therefore, based on my observations and the specificity of my analysis this chapter concludes this thesis by answering my research questions and asserting that the evolution of the Europeanization field and its application as a causal explanation has not yet reached a conclusion.

**Structure of the Process**

A review of the literature and an analysis of the mechanisms of Europeanization reveal that a conception that posits a one-dimensional structure (i.e. exclusively top-down, bottom-up, etc.) of Europeanization is flawed. At first glance the Europeanization of the candidate states seems to prioritize the position of the EU as the sole influential actor. However, I argue that both candidate and member state actors have the opportunity to subvert the EU’s exclusive position of authority by manipulating the ways in which compliance is achieved. The EU has struggled to maintain its position of authority because of the increasingly complex nature of the political and social issues present in its candidate states. These new candidate states have new and fragile political environments that have resisted some of the EU’s assertions. To further complicate matters, EU enlargement has brought together countries with diverse political structures and practices; muddling what is and is not acceptable in the EU. These new problems have forced the EU to reinvent the ways that it encourages domestic compliance while also constraining its ability to prescribe one single method of reform. With these new threats to the EU’s dominate position in mind I reiterate my first research question: *Does the Europeanization process contain some explicitly top-down, bottom-up, or horizontal structure of influence or is it rather a more*
multi-leveled and amalgamated structure involving actors from all three levels of influence? The empirics point towards the latter.

In addition to an acceptance of the EU’s natural desire to Europeanize the candidate states, it is also important to understand that the Europeanization process is not lost to the candidate states and member states. They both have the desire and opportunity to set the terms of the EU’s reform agenda and can frequently undermine the EU’s plans. For instance, the candidate states often influence the Europeanization process by developing projects that while loosely attached to acquis compliance aims rather to address a more nationally relevant issue. This way they ensure that money allocated for reform is also spent on the development and reform of issues beyond the EU’s agenda. Furthermore, it can be concluded that Europeanization does not exist without some level of domestic influence. As the EU’s political sensitivity demonstrates the EU has no set formula of compliance and therefore in order for the acquis to be realized there must be some level of domestic specificity, meaning that the acquis must be implemented with an understanding of the uniqueness of each candidate country. In order to ensure the most complete adoption of the acquis, the structure of Europeanization combines the authority of the EU and its acquis with the knowledge and responsibility of the individual candidate states.

The member states act as a facilitator of Europeanization by ensuring that the reforms being undertaken incorporate both nationally and supranationally appropriate strategies. The member states incorporates these strategies in two ways: (1) sharing the EU’s political diversity; and (2) ensuring that the candidate states ultimately comply with the Community’s political and social norms. The member states use activities like the twinning projects and bilateral negotiations often to impart their political structures and practices on the candidate states. Thus,
the member states influence the ways in which the candidate countries comply with the *acquis*, thus ensuring that their “best practices” are recognized by a larger audience. The member states’ influence can also be much more forceful as they have the ability to halt negotiations or embarrass a candidate into making a change. As I have discussed in previous chapters, the member states want to ensure that the accession countries demonstrate an acceptance of community held norms and values. As a result, when a candidate country fails to comply with any number of these values the member states can and will use their gate-keeping ability to enforce the EU’s priorities.

By accepting the roles of actors at all three earlier mentioned levels of analysis, and understanding that they interact with each other frequently, the Europeanization process can be conceptualized as a multi-leveled network of influence that remains fluid in structure in order to encourage the deepest level of domestic compliance. My thesis has not attempted to prioritize any one level of actor over another. Rather my goal has been to offer a much deeper appreciation of the process that embraces all of the structures of Europeanization. In so doing I contend that we have a better grasp on the realistic process and mechanism that take part in the accession process.

**Europeanization as Opportunity**

Accepting the multi-leveled structure of the Europeanization process the next logical question is: *how does influence occur during the Europeanization process as the result of the complex interactions between domestic, transnational, and supranational actors?* Put another way, how can actors from the domestic, transnational, and supranational levels influence the Europeanization process? My examination of the mechanisms of Europeanization and
subsequent intervening variables revealed that Europeanization occurs largely as the result of the actors’ ability to capitalize on windows of opportunity.

Actors from all three levels have formal and informal opportunities to influence the Europeanization process. Gate-keeping for instance is clearly a formal opportunity because it is an expressed right of denial given to both the EU and its member states that, while disliked, is nonetheless accepted as such by the candidate states. In this sense, the mere existence of this legal recognition gives both the EU and its member states the opportunity to set the terms of the Europeanization process. Conversely, informal opportunities are instances where actors are able to manipulate the process or force their priorities into the system. In this case actors may act legally or illegally in ways that may not be appreciated by all the actors. For instance, domestic actors may choose to implement reforms that prioritize local and national issues with only a passing appreciation for how their reforms may be perceived by the EU. In this way, the candidate states may constrain the EU’s ability to set the reform agenda by capitalizing on their few opportunities to interject domestic preferences into the process. Regardless of whether opportunities are formal or informal it is clear that throughout the Europeanization process actors must be able to utilize effectively their opportunities in order to maintain their influential role and ensure their preferences will be recognized throughout the process.

The complexities of the mechanisms of Europeanization make clear that actors from all three levels have the ability to undermine the actions of the others. Hence, the existence and outcome of Europeanization is not determined by a rigid structure of influence or the domination of one level of actors. It can only be logically concluded that Europeanization occurs based on the actors’ agency in regards to their windows of opportunities. The actors are constantly
challenged by one another, and thus their ability to Europeanize is determined by the actors’ ability to capitalize on their opportunities in relation to the efforts of others.

**Explanatory Power of the Europeanization Process**

The multi-leveled structure of influence and windows of opportunities inherent to the Europeanization process make it difficult to draw conclusions about the explanatory value of Europeanization. Depending on the actors’ agency and the structure of influence during a specific period of the accession process it is questionable whether Europeanization can be used to explain the outcomes of the negotiations. In the case of a candidate state’s voluntary adaption is it clear that the reform agenda is influenced primarily by the candidate state and therefore involves little or no Europeanization on the behalf of the other levels. Similarly, if actors from a certain level are unable or restricted from utilizing their windows of opportunity then their role in the Europeanization process is diminished. In crucial or sensitive areas the exclusion of any of the actors may compromise the entire Europeanization process and therefore render it completely useless as a causal explanation. For this reason any study of the Europeanization process must first understand the multi-leveled nature of influence and pay close attention to the various actors’ ability to capitalize on their windows of opportunity.

**The Future of Europeanization Research**

With a newfound appreciation of the Europeanization process and an understanding of its multi-leveled and opportunity-driven structure of influence, this thesis concludes by encouraging a more outcome-oriented path for research. As the literature review demonstrated, studies that attempt to grapple with the processes and interactions that drive Europeanization dominate the field. While these assessments are valuable and necessary parts of the broader analysis of
Europeanization the discipline must venture away from merely explaining the process and focus more on the outcomes of Europeanization. As many of my empirical illustrations demonstrated, no matter the structure of influence, Europeanization occurs quite sporadically causing various degrees of domestic change. I contend that a more nuanced scholarly focus of these varied outcomes is needed if we are eventually going to draw conclusions about the explanatory abilities of Europeanization.

While this thesis has admittedly reiterated much of the process driven research of the past it has also challenged many of the popular conceptions of the Europeanization process. By demonstrating that the structure of influence is much more mediated than previously thought this thesis offers the field a more thorough appreciation of Europeanization that marries many of the field’s more popular concepts. Yet, in this thesis I have analyzed only three major levels of influence when in reality there are likely many more sub-national actors who undoubtedly affect the orientation and impact of the Europeanization process. Once again, a more nuanced and results driven appreciation of the process with special attention paid to individual cases of Europeanization will further the discipline and provide valuable knowledge from which the process can be evaluated more minutely.

Based on my findings, I would suggest that fruitful avenues of future research should focus on validating empirically the existing conceptions of Europeanization rather than focusing on defining Europeanization further. It is here that the discipline will show the most promise and undoubtedly finish “unpacking” the most relevant conceptions of the Europeanization process.
Bibliography


