TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY – A DISTINCT CONFLICT INTERVENTION CATEGORY

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Track Two Diplomacy – A Distinct Conflict Intervention Category

Executive Summary:

The subject of this DR-598 project is “Track Two Diplomacy” as a distinct conflict intervention category, which aims at the prevention of inter-state or increasingly intra-state conflict escalation and encourages a form of mediation in pursuit of conflict resolution.

US diplomat Joseph Montville coined the term “Track Two Diplomacy” in 1981. Montville distinguished between “Track One” or official diplomacy, conducted by professional diplomats, and “Track Two Diplomacy”, which he defined as: “Unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict”. “Track One and a Half” or “Track 1.5” refers to quasi-official or hybrid processes, as when officials participate in a private capacity, or when non-officials participate under something approaching ‘instructions’ from their respective governments.

The actual practice of “Track Two” conflict resolution/mediation pre-dated the 1981 Montville definition. Early cases of “Track Two” included former Australian diplomat John Burton’s intervention in a boundary conflict between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. This very first Burton intervention process came to serve as a model for the problem-solving “workshop method” of mediation/facilitation typically by an impartial third party. Since then, the workshop model has become the classic approach to Track Two. The Dartmouth Conferences and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World
Affairs are credited with opening avenues for dialogue on strategic stability and security among leading figures during the Cold War.

The leading figures to influence the theory and practice of what was later recognized as Track Two Diplomacy come from a diverse range of professional backgrounds that had a powerful impact on their subsequent thinking. Certain themes emerge. Several of them had earlier training in psychology or psychiatry and straddled the worlds of professional practice, including diplomacy, and academia. Early “scholar-practitioners” in this tradition include John Burton and Herbert Kelman - two pioneers of the “problem-solving” workshop model - Bryant Wedge, Vamik Volkan, Joseph Montville and John McDonald.

The classic problem-solving workshop model to Track Two combines the following elements: small and informal dialogues between representatives of the conflict parties, facilitated by a neutral “Third Party” and composed of so-called social scientist “scholar-practitioners”; participants who are “connected” with decision-makers in their own country; a focus on underlying causes of the conflict, rather than official positions; workshops as ongoing processes, not one-time events; an emphasis on the deep-rooted psychological aspects of disputes; and application of the “Chatham House rules” of non-attribution.

Track Two was pioneered in an international environment marked by state-to-state conflict, notably the Cold War. Early Track Two efforts focused on addressing or mitigating such inter-state tensions. The current international context is very different. Inter-state conflict is increasingly rare. Today, civil war and international terrorism dominate the research and policy agendas. New types of conflict have arisen, in the form of internal tensions over political transitions, and regime change, coup d’états and
coup attempts, election disputes, constitutional processes, access to natural resources, property, and land issues, among others. Many such conflicts may prove difficult to contain and may necessitate costly intervention on the part of the international community in the form of peace-building, peace-keeping, nation-building, development assistance, and in extraordinary cases, armed intervention to prevent humanitarian catastrophes under the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. The failed and fragile states that may result from these conflicts risk becoming incubators for terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, small arms trade, narcotics, refugee flows and human trafficking, with regional and sometimes global security implications. Preventive conflict intervention or “preventive diplomacy”, of which Track Two is one variety, is almost certainly more cost-effective than peace-building, nation-building and peace-keeping, following armed conflict.

Canada should therefore consider an investment in Track Two capabilities, as part of an overall commitment as a global citizen to a more stable and peaceful world. Such an investment may offer one avenue to counteract a decline in Canada’s international standing and influence in recent years. Canada may be able to develop a “comparative advantage” or “niche capability” in Track Two conflict resolution and mediation.

In recent years, Canada’s standing and influence in the world has arguably suffered a relative decline, due to a shift in global economic weight and diplomatic influence to Brazil, India, China, and certain other developing nations; and the declining importance of the trans-Atlantic relationship and of NATO as an institution, as a result of the end of the Cold War, together with the expansion and ongoing integration of the European Union.
Effective engagement with Track Two resources and initiatives has the potential to enhance or multiply Canada’s influence, by leveraging existing capabilities or potential, both domestic and international, in conflict resolution/mediation. Norway and Switzerland offer two examples of small-to-medium-sized powers that have become “niche players” in international diplomacy through strategic partnerships with NGOs involved in international conflict mediation.

A strategic partnership with one or more NGOs, such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) might be one element of a larger Canadian government effort to foster Track Two conflict resolution/mediation. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) might commission a study to identify best practices from Norway, Switzerland, the US and any others, as well as a suitable strategic partner. Such a partnership might take the form of a series of conflict mediation workshops or of international conferences on trouble-spots, co-funded and co-sponsored by the Government of Canada and a Track Two partner such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. An effective partnership with one or more credible NGO partners could offer an opportunity to “brand” Canada as a leader in international conflict resolution and mediation.

A second element in such an overall effort would involve a concerted government initiative to develop or nurture Canada’s indigenous resources in the field of unofficial diplomacy. Canada has arguably an unusual combination of assets that can potentially be deployed in the service of international conflict resolution and mediation: our multi-ethnic, multi-cultural make-up, our native fluency in English and French, the excellent international reputation of Canada’s judiciary and jurisprudence, coupled with our bi-jural legal system, our traditional reputation as an “honest broker” in world affairs, and our universities, which place well in global rankings, and which offer such academic
programs as conflict resolution, peace and conflict studies, regional studies, psychology, and law.

Training would of course be one essential element in an overall Canadian effort to develop, nurture and fund Canada’s considerable potential in the field of international conflict resolution and mediation. A suitable NGO could offer training courses in the Burton-Kelman problem-solving workshop model. Another candidate to offer such training would be the Ottawa-based Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, which is funded by the federal government. A multi-disciplinary academic institute could be established at a Canadian university. It would combine and coordinate academic research and scholarship in conflict resolution with practical mediation and workshop training and field work. It would receive government funding, but be at arms-length from Canadian foreign policy objectives, providing a politically neutral environment for scholarship and training, workshops and conferences.

Promising Track Two projects could be financed through a dedicated fund, to be administered by DFAIT. One possible model is the Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA) Partners for Development Program, through which CIDA funds Canadian-led development projects. A similar “Partners for Peace” fund could be created or an existing DFAIT fund could be adapted. Funding criteria might mirror those for the CIDA fund. Projects might be evaluated for their relevance to DFAIT’s mandate, and coherence with Canadian foreign policy and whole-of-government objectives for a region. It might be more difficult for Track Two projects to satisfy results and effectiveness criteria than for development projects. Requirements might have to be adjusted to recognize the unique requirements of Track Two. A “Partners for Peace” fund might prove a tough sell in an era of cutbacks, given a government funding culture that demands results-based accountability.
Introduction

The subject of this DR-598 project is “Track Two Diplomacy” as a distinct conflict intervention category, which aims at the prevention of inter-state or increasingly intra-state conflict escalation and encourages a form of mediation in pursuit of conflict resolution. First practiced and described during the Cold War, “Track Two” has in recent years gained ever more recognition among scholars and practitioners of international conflict resolution or mediation. In Part I, I will discuss the complex nature of Track Two, with particular reference to early cases of Track Two, the “classic” problem-solving workshop model, the key scholar-practitioners who pioneered it, and leading institutions and fora. I will also discuss some of the recent Canadian projects and initiatives in the field. In Part II, I will examine the strengths and limitations of Track Two. In Part III, I will call for a Canadian investment in Track Two capabilities, as part of an overall commitment as a global citizen to a more stable and peaceful world. I will suggest that such an investment may offer one avenue to counteract a decline in Canada’s international standing and influence in recent years, to “brand” Canada as a leader in international conflict resolution and mediation. I will propose a number of ways in which Canada might foster a made-in-Canada Track Two capability.
PART I Background:

1. Definitions

The term “Track Two Diplomacy”, which is sometimes used interchangeably with “Citizen diplomacy,” has its genesis in a 1981 article by US Foreign Service officer Joseph Montville in the periodical *Foreign Policy*. Montville distinguished between “Track One” or official diplomacy, conducted by professional diplomats, and “Track Two Diplomacy”, which he defined as: “Unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organising human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict” (Montville, 1991, as cited in Jones, 2008a, p. 1).

Dr. Louise Diamond, a human relations trainer and then Director of Washington-based PeaceWorks, later coined the term “Multi-Track Diplomacy.” In their 1991 book *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*, former US Ambassador John McDonald and Diamond identified nine such tracks, each distinguished by the nature of the actors or institutions involved (Diamond & McDonald, 1996):

- “Track One” Government;
- “Track Two” Nongovernment/professional;
- “Track Three” Business;
- “Track Four” Private citizen;
- “Track Five” Research, training and education;
- “Track Six” Activism;
- “Track Seven” Religion;
- “Track Eight” Funding;
- “Track Nine” Communication and the media.
Other scholars have distinguished between “hard” Track Two processes, in which the objective is to help governments negotiate a political agreement, and “soft” Track Two processes, “which are aimed at an exchange of views, perceptions, and information among the parties to improve each side’s understanding of the other’s position and policies” (Agha, Feldman, Khalidi, & Schiff, 2004, p. 3). One scholar has argued that “Track Two dialogues on regional security are less about producing diplomatic breakthroughs than about socializing influential elites to think in cooperative ways” (Kaye, 2007, p. xi).

Fundamentally, what distinguishes Track Two - or in McDonald’s and Diamond’s taxonomy, Tracks Two through Nine - international conflict resolution processes from traditional Track One Diplomacy is the unofficial - namely non-government or non-state actor - character of the former (Kaye, 2007). Some such processes may, however, have a quasi-official or hybrid character, as when officials participate in a private capacity, or when non-officials participate “under something approaching ‘instructions’ from their respective governments” (Jones, 2008a, p. 4). This is what some scholars have termed “Track One and a Half” or “Track 1.5”.

2. Controversies and Challenges

Related to these different conceptions - hard versus soft, Track 1.5 and Track Two - are a number of scholarly controversies and practical challenges for Track Two practitioners. As suggested above, one such controversy centres on the question whether the proper role and function of Track Two processes is to assist governments in reaching agreements, or rather is to advance or foster dialogue. Subject to controversy is also the question of the criteria by which to measure the “success” of Track Two processes - whether through tangible outcomes, such as agreements between conflict parties, or whether the process of dialogue itself counts as success, whether success can be measured at all (Jones, 2008a).
For Track Two processes to translate into political agreement, normally some form of “transfer” from Track Two to Track One processes must take place. In other words, the results of Track Two dialogues must in some way influence or “filter” into official track processes. The issue of how best to achieve such a “transfer” has also generated academic discussion (Jones, 2008a). Related to the issue of transfer is the risk that Track Two processes may become co-opted by “Track One” processes, in which case, a Track Two process would lose its independence – and therefore its advantages - by getting too close to Track One (Jones, 2008a).

Leading Canadian Track Two scholar Peter Jones (2008a) has identified a number of other issues for scholars and practitioners of Track Two, asking the following questions:

- Can a generic model of Track Two be established or should each case be treated as unique?
- What is the optimal timing – the moment of “ripeness” - for a Track Two intervention?
- Should it be considered acceptable to engage with representatives of conflict parties who may have engaged in human rights abuses, particularly where amnesty may be on the table as part of a potential settlement?

3. Early Cases of Track Two

The actual practice of “Track Two” conflict resolution/mediation pre-dates the 1981 Montville definition. Jones (2008a) cites the pivotal role played by the former Australian diplomat John Burton in the mid-1960s. At University College London, Professor John Burton designed an entirely new type of process in an attempt to settle a boundary conflict between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Even though the full extent to which the actual process had a decisive impact on the outcome has been debated, (Jones, 2008a) this very first Burton intervention process came to serve as a model for
the problem-solving “workshop method” of mediation/facilitation typically by an impartial third party, which Burton referred to as “controlled communication.” Since then, the workshop model has become the classic approach to Track Two (Jones, 2008a).

Peter Jones (2008a) also credits the Dartmouth Conferences and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (the latter named after the Nova Scotia town that hosted the first such conference in 1957) with opening avenues for dialogue on strategic stability and security among leading figures during the Cold War. The Pugwash Conferences were inspired by a manifesto signed by Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Linus Pauling and Joseph Rotblat and others calling on the world’s scientists to meet to discuss ways of avoiding nuclear war (Fisher, 1997).

The 1995 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Pugwash conferences and their co-founder physicist Joseph Rotblat “for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and, in the longer run, to eliminate such arms” (Nobel Prize, 2012, “Nobel Peace Prize 1995”). The Nobel Peace Prize Committee recognized the role of the Pugwash conferences in laying the groundwork for the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, SALT I Accords and Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty of 1987, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 (Nobel Prize, 2012, “Pugwash Conferences 1995”).

Aside from its annual conferences, the Pugwash organization convenes several workshops a year on such topics as nuclear weapons, chemical and biological warfare, conflict and regional security, energy, the environment and the social responsibility of scientists. Recent workshop and roundtable topics have included weapons of mass
destruction in the Middle East, implementation of the chemical and biological weapons convention, and the Iranian nuclear program (Pugwash, n.d., “Projects and News”).

The Dartmouth Conferences (named after the location of the first such conference – Dartmouth College, New Hampshire) were launched in 1960 by American journalist and peace advocate Norman Cousins to advance citizen-to-citizen dialogue on difficult issues in the US-Soviet relationship (Fisher, 1997). Participants were selected both for their knowledge and for their political credibility with the current administration. Dartmouth Conferences are credited with serving as channels for important signals on serious issues and with providing visionary thinking on issues not yet on the official agenda (Fisher, 1997). In the early 1980s, with superpower relations at a low point, task forces were formed in two areas of particular difficulty: arms control and regional conflict. Over the years, the regional conflict task force met on such topics as Afghanistan, Central America and the Middle East, and shared insights with official decision-makers. Conflict resolution scholar Ronald Fisher (1997) discusses elements of the Dartmouth task forces that made for its unique functioning and apparent success:

- the conference helped create a public space in which citizens from the two countries were able to discuss creative changes to bilateral relations;
- the discussions aimed at gaining insight into the whole relationship;
- the dialogue led to a mutual understanding of the political environment in each country and the political instruments to bring about change;
- maintaining communication links between the public dialogue and government was deemed essential to successful policy-making;
- the continuity of the discussions and the cumulative agenda allowed for a deeper probing over time that created ideas and helped to bring about fundamental changes in the relationship between the countries.
Policy papers produced by Russian Dartmouth delegates, who also advised Mikhail Gorbachev, are credited with providing some of the impetus to the Soviet leader’s new thinking on US-Soviet relations during the late 1980s (Fisher, 1997).

The East-West Institute (EWI), founded in 1980 and based in New York, played a similar role as the Pugwash and Dartmouth Conferences in bridging Cold War divides and maintaining unofficial channels and lines of communication. In 1984, EWI hosted the first military-to-military talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. These talks helped pave the way for the Stockholm Agreement of 1986. This landmark agreement reduced the threat of war by committing each side to provide advance notice to the other of troop movements, inspections and verified compliance (EWI, n.d., “Lowering the Nuclear Threshold”). During the Cold War, the East-West Institute also invited senior officials from Warsaw Pact countries to work in its offices in New York and held annual conferences of doers and thinkers to discuss East-West issues.

The end of the Cold War has meant a shift in EWI’s focus. Recent activities have included:

- Strategic trust-building projects between the US and Russia;
- Trust-building initiatives between the US and China;
- “Worldwide security” initiatives in such areas as climate security, counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, cyber-security and energy security;
- Regional security initiatives, such as connecting Afghan and Pakistani women parliamentarians and creating a network for cooperation on water issues in Central Asia and Afghanistan, known as the “Amu Darya Basin Network”;
- Weapons of mass destruction initiatives;
- “Preventive diplomacy” initiatives, such as a “Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention” and a biennial “Global Conference on Preventive Action”.

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4. **Track Two Pioneers**

The leading figures to influence the theory and practice of what was later recognized as Track Two Diplomacy come from a diverse range of professional backgrounds that had a powerful impact on their subsequent thinking. Certain themes emerge. Several of them had earlier training in psychology or psychiatry and straddled the worlds of professional practice, including diplomacy, and academia. The afore-mentioned John Burton is a good example. Conflict resolution scholar Ronald Fisher (1997) regards him as a pioneer in what he terms “interactive conflict resolution”, which he defines as “small-group, problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are facilitated by an impartial third party of social-scientist-practitioners” (Fisher, 1997, p. 8). Obviously, Fisher’s concept of “interactive conflict resolution” bears close similarities to Montville’s concept of Track Two Diplomacy. In order to understand the genesis of Burton’s specific approach, it is worth taking a close look at his professional training and his career experience.

John W. Burton (1915-2010) earned a Bachelor’s degree in psychology at the University of Sydney, followed by doctoral degrees in economics and international relations from the University of London. Joining the Australian Foreign Service in 1941, he rose in the ranks to permanent secretary of the Department of External Affairs, which post he held from 1947 to 1950. He served on the Australian delegation to the Founding Charter Conference of the United Nations in 1945 in San Francisco. His diplomatic experience convinced him of the need for an alternative to the approach that gave primacy to state power in its understanding of international relations (Fisher, 1997). Perhaps this insight can be seen as one of the moments in which the “scholar-practitioner” approach was conceived. After leaving the diplomatic service of Australia for University College London, he launched in the 1960s a number of conferences led by social scientists on the subject of international peace and security. All of them were modeled on the
Pugwash Conferences that had been initiated in 1957 (Fisher, 1997). The conference of 1965 on the subject of “Conflict in Society” laid the foundation for the first version of interactive conflict resolution (Fisher, 1997).

During this professional phase, Burton became embroiled in an academic controversy between the international relations theories predominating at the London School of Economics and his own University College London respectively. Burton found his new “pluralist” world view, which emphasized the values and relationships of multiple global actors, at odds with traditional “realist” international relations theory, according to which sovereign states pursue their national interest through the exercise of economic and military power (Banks, 1984). Burton’s application of his social science conference approach to the border dispute between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, described above, which was successfully concluded in the Manila Peace Conference of 1966, had “inadvertently started a conflict resolution process through the power of facilitated analysis made possible through academic sponsorship” (Fisher, 1997, pp. 23-24). Burton had pioneered the classic “problem-solving workshop” approach to unofficial conflict resolution.

It is instructive to trace the steps of John Burton and his associates in their pursuit of an effective intervention process and outcome in this particular case. They got off to a promising start for two critically important reasons: 1. Burton was able to rely on contacts he had made in the conflict region in his former capacity as diplomat; and 2. his project enjoyed the backing of the United Kingdom Government (Jones, 2008a). Between 1965 and 1966, he invited small teams of people, who maintained their own links in London, for a number of informal workshops. With the help of facilitation techniques, he allowed participants to discuss issues underlying the conflict, instead of dwelling - in the traditional Track One process format – on the official positions taken by each conflict party. The teams, assisted by Burton and his colleagues, gradually
developed potential solutions that eventually became part of the final agreement between the three countries (Jones, 2008a).

Inseparably linked to the development and refinement of the Problem-solving workshop model is John Burton’s close associate Herbert Kelman. Kelman is Richard Clarke Cabot Professor Emeritus of Social Ethics in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University and Director of Harvard’s Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution. In the words of Ronald Fisher (1997, p. 56), “his work demonstrates a lifelong commitment to creating and applying social science knowledge for the improvement of human welfare.” Kelman’s early interest made him choose a career in social psychology that focused on the integration of individuals with social institutions (Fisher, 1997). His training in social psychology led him to assumptions about international relations that were at odds with traditional theory - for instance, that conflicts take place between societies rather than states (Fisher, 1997). In the 1950s, he was active in the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War, a first organized attempt at peace research. He helped to launch the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1957 (Fisher, 1997).

Kelman met Burton in 1966. Kelman realized that Burton’s innovative workshop approach amounted to a social-psychological method of intervention: changes at the level of the individual would translate into macro-level policy processes (Fisher, 1997). Kelman accepted Burton’s invitation to become a participant in a third party panel for a workshop on Cyprus. Thus, a close cooperation between these two scholar-practitioners was born (Fisher, 1997). Kelman (1993, as cited in Fisher, 1997, p. 57) commented on Burton’s workshop model: “I saw it as a way of translating the social-psychological concepts about international relations that I had been working with into a model of intervention toward the resolution of international conflicts.”
Together with fellow Harvard scholar Stephen Cohen, Kelman adopted Burton’s workshop approach to the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours, even as he acquired more substantive expertise on the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict. Kelman came increasingly to view his work as a “prernegotiation methodology” and as a “parallel track to the peace agreements themselves” (Fisher, 1997). In Fisher’s (1997, pp. 57-58) words, Kelman’s pioneering Israeli-Palestinian workshops in the early 1970s “identified and helped create the psychological prerequisites for mutual acceptance and the conditions for meaningful negotiations.”

Over the years, Kelman has developed a highly sophisticated articulation of the problem-solving workshop. A Kelman workshop typically brings unofficial representatives of the conflict parties face-to-face in an isolated and academic setting under the guidance of social scientists, who combine knowledge of conflict theory, group processes and the region in general (Fisher, 1997). Participants usually have great influence within their own communities, but are not themselves policymakers (Fisher, 1997). They may consist of Israeli and Palestinian “pre-influentials”, to which he counts graduate students and young professionals, “influentials”, such as academics, writers, journalists, former officials, and “political actors”, such as party activists, parliamentarians and policy advisers (Fisher, 1997). The third party serves as facilitator of communication, offering conflict analysis and the development of creative solutions. The third party functions also as a “repository of trust for both sides” (Fisher, 1997, p. 60).

In Kelman’s conception, workshops serve a double function. They are both educational - aiming at the change of perceptions, attitudes and ideas that individuals hold - and political - aiming at the transfer of these attitudinal changes to the level of political
dialogue and to the decision-making process (Kelman, 1986, as cited in Fisher, 1997, p. 61). The problem-solving workshop is grounded in Kelman’s social-psychological approach to conflict resolution, which takes into account both psychological and institutional factors and their interplay in understanding intergroup and international conflict (Fisher, 1997). The social-psychological approach complements political analysis, as misperception and distrust, for example, feed conflict driven by objective and ideological differences (Fisher, 1997). It is through overcoming such barriers that new opportunities for negotiation on objective conditions and interests open up, which is pre-requisite for the resolution of the conflict (Fisher, 1997).

In Kelman’s account, for the learning accomplished in workshops to have significance, it must be transferred to the level of political discourse and policy process (Fisher, 1997). Kelman and Cohen (1976) emphasize that workshops are not substitutes for negotiations. Workshops can allow for non-committal testing of the feasibility of negotiations and for determining the bases on which negotiations can proceed. They provide a forum for working out details and alternatives on issues that are obstructing progress (Kelman and Cohen, 1976). They may create an “atmosphere conducive to negotiation”, establish “an appropriate framework for parties that are ready for communication but not for official negotiation” or allow “parties to work out pieces of a solution that can then be fed into the formal negotiation process” (Kelman and Cohen, 1976, p. 80). Such contributions turn out to be most valuable in so called intractable conflicts between identity groups where the basic recognition of shared interest is not enough “to overcome the psychological barriers that have been erected” (Fisher, 1997, p. 64), as in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Altogether, Kelman favours a holistic approach in which interactive problem solving should be considered an integral component of what Kelman calls “the larger diplomatic process” (Fisher, 1997, p. 63).
Through his theoretical articulation and practical elaboration of the problem-solving workshop model, Kelman can be considered one of the pioneers, both as a scholar and as a practitioner, of what later became recognized as Track Two Diplomacy. In the words of Ronald Fisher (1997, p. 73), Kelman’s contributions “provide a long-term demonstration of the power of combining process intervention with substantive analyses in a mutually informing and reinforcing manner.” They encompass “a comprehensive and compelling blend of theory, research, and practice in applied social science” (Fisher, 1997, p. 73). On a final note, Kelman’s workshop model deserves credit also for a major breakthrough in international relations. Some of his graduate students took part in the unofficial Oslo Negotiation Process that led to the milestone Oslo Agreement of 1994 between Israelis and Palestinians (Fisher, 1997).

Another distinct group of scholar-practitioners has made a name for itself with its focus on what Fisher (1997) calls the “psychodynamic approach to unofficial diplomacy”. Bryant Wedge (1921-1987) was an American psychiatrist interested in mental health and social policy. As an Eisenhower scholarship exchange fellow in 1958-59, he travelled extensively. He was struck by the similarities of conflict attitudes in the countries he visited, and, like John Burton before him, by the limitations inherent in official diplomacy and power in addressing these conflicts (Fisher, 1997). He recognized the potential of a “psychiatry of international affairs” to gain insight and mitigate what he perceived to be irrational elements of destructive conflicts (Fisher, 1997). His experience as a US State Department-appointed unofficial mediator in the Dominican Republic in 1965, combined with his knowledge of the work of Burton and others, led him to call for a new inter-disciplinary “science of peacemaking”. The new approach would be grounded in a theoretical understanding of conflict from which appropriate procedures would be derived (Fisher, 1997). In particular, Wedge saw the need for honest brokers with independent institutional bases, who could help move conflict
parties toward negotiation. He came to regard himself as a peacemaker who happened to be a psychiatrist (Fisher, 1997).

Wedge co-founded the National Peace Academy Campaign, from which the United States Institute of Peace was established in 1984 (Fisher, 1997). He also founded the pioneering Centre for Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, which set up the first graduate program in conflict management in 1982. Wedge regarded this development as a step towards the creation of a new profession of conflict management. He clearly saw the importance of integrating unofficial mediation with official diplomacy (Fisher, 1997).

Vamik Volkan, a professor emeritus of psychiatry at the University of Virginia medical school, qualifies as another leading proponent of the psychodynamic approach. An American of Turkish-Cypriot origin, he has sought solutions to the tragic conflict with which his homeland has been afflicted (Fisher, 1997). He used concepts from psychoanalysis to gain access to conflict complexities and interactive methods to address them effectively (Fisher, 1997). Ever since the early 1980s, Volkan has cooperated closely with Joseph Montville on a workshop methodology. He describes his conflict resolution work as unofficial diplomacy, to be distinguished from official diplomacy. He considers official diplomacy’s “highly rational and ritualized approach” as inadequate to address “intense conflicts, which are partly fueled by processes such as projection and victimization, and in which emotional and psychological factors need to be managed along with political and economic ones” (Fisher, 1997, p. 105). In Volkan’s (1991) account, unofficial diplomacy plays a complementary role by humanizing the conflict and building confidence between the parties, so they overcome hatred and move toward negotiation. In an unofficial process, a neutral third party or “catalyst group” typically brings politically influential citizens of two opposing groups together for a series of meetings to become acquainted, establish workable relationships and

Vamik Volkan applied his psycho-dynamic approach to a number of workshops, sponsored by the American Psychiatric Association, between 1979 and 1984. Egyptians, Israelis and later also Palestinians met to explore the psychological aspects of the Middle East Peace Process (Fisher, 1997). During that process, Vamik Volkan and Joseph Montville were the key players in the third party team. Over a five-year period, they organized and facilitated six major and a large number of minor meetings (Fisher, 1997). Each team was made up of eight participants, including psychiatrists, journalists, diplomats, politicians, retired generals and historians. The workshops led to several noteworthy results. In Cairo, an Israeli academic centre was set up. At an Israeli university, Israelis, Palestinians and Egyptians began a scholarly collaboration. A project was initiated to examine and revise Arab depictions in Israeli textbooks. The familiarity and trust these meetings generated endured through such crises as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Fisher, 1997). Fisher (1997) comments that the psycho-dynamic approach of Vamik Volkan has important commonalities with other forms of Interactive Conflict Resolution: it serves to create a climate of cooperation between conflict parties that allows them to engage in dialogue and mutual analysis and to create effective ideas for addressing their conflict.

Altogether, the work of scholar-practitioners such as Burton, Kelman, Wedge and Volkan demonstrates that a carefully designed, professionally conducted and highly sophisticated Track Two process can serve as a supplement, and ideally as an integrative element of the official or Track One process (Fisher, 1997).
The notion of Track Two Diplomacy, as coined by former State Department official Joseph Montville, has obvious affinities with Volkan’s concept of “ unofficial diplomacy”. It is noteworthy that Montville and Volkan co-edited a 1990 volume called “The Psychodynamics of International Relationships”. Montville’s work in political psychology has led to a faculty appointment at the University of Virginia Medical School, where Volkan also serves. Montville is Director of the Program on Healing Historical Memory at the School of Conflict Analysis & Resolution of George Mason University, which Bryant Wedge helped to found, and is a member of the International Council for Conflict Resolution at the Carter Centre.

Montville (1987, p. 7-8) has identified “three interdependent processes” that constitute Track Two:

1. “small, facilitated problem-solving workshops or seminars which bring together the leaders of conflicting groups or nations (or their representatives)” to develop personal relationships, understand each other’s perspective and develop joint strategies for dealing with the conflict as a shared problem;

2. The influencing of public opinion to reduce the sense of victimhood and re-humanize the image of the adversary, “to make it safe for political leaders to take positive steps toward resolving the conflict”;

3. Cooperative economic development, which provides “incentives, institutional support and continuity to the political and psychological process.”

I will conclude the discussion of Track Two pioneers with a closer look at John McDonald. Trained as a lawyer, McDonald had a distinguished 40-year career in the US foreign service, holding several ambassadorships. His last assignment was at the US Foreign Service Institute’s Centre for the Study of Foreign Affairs from 1983 to 1987,
where he organized several conferences on the interface between unofficial and official diplomacy (Fisher, 1997). Following his retirement in 1987, he was appointed to the Faculty of Law at George Washington University and served as Senior Advisor to the Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University (IMTD, 2012, “Ambassador John McDonald”). From 1988 to 1992, he served as president of the Iowa Peace Institute. In 1992, with Louise Diamond, he co-founded the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) in Washington, DC, “to promote a systems-based approach to peacebuilding and to facilitate the transformation of deep-rooted social conflict through education, conflict resolution training and communication” (IMTD, 2012, “At a Glance”). He remains the Chairman of the IMTD. IMTD has been involved in various conflict resolution and transformation projects in Europe, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

McDonald’s concept of multi-track diplomacy expanded on Montville’s “‘Track One, Track Two’ paradigm” (McDonald, 1996). In his book “Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace”, McDonald (1996, p. 4) explained that the “designation of Track Two no longer covered the variety, scope and depth of citizen involvement”. He thus distinguished between different varieties of “tracks” of peacemaking activities, each defined by the nature of the actors involved, as described above. As with Montville, “Track One” is “the world of official diplomacy, policy making, and peacebuilding as expressed through formal aspects of the government process” (McDonald, 1996, p.4). Track Two is “the realm of professional nongovernment action attempting to analyze, prevent, resolve, and manage international conflicts by nonstate actors” (McDonald, 1996, p.4). It includes a wide spectrum of activities, such as “problem-solving workshops, involvement as mediators or consultants to ongoing peacemaking processes, private one-on-one diplomacy, conferences, seminars, training and education events, dialogue groups, networking, confidence building, institution building, and acting as messengers and go-betweens” (McDonald, 1996, p. 39).
In summing up his highly nuanced approach, McDonald (1996, p. 5) explains that “the study of Multi-Track Diplomacy is more than simply a view into each of the tracks individually. It looks at the interrelatedness between them as well. It looks at the whole system.” His conception of Multi-Track Diplomacy is rooted in a belief system similar to that of Burton and Saundersons that rejects as unsatisfactory “the worldview of the last several centuries, which saw the nation-state as the unit of power and the balance of power as the principle of order” (McDonald, 1996, p. 23). McDonald thus belongs firmly to the intellectual tradition of the pioneers of what came to be recognized as “Track Two”.

5. The Track Two Process

Even though Track Two does constitute a specific conflict intervention category, it does not fall neatly into one of the five standard Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), intervention methods, notably Negotiation, Mediation, Consensus-building, Mediation/Arbitration, or Arbitration (Goss, 1995). It can take a variety of forms - in some cases combining elements of Negotiation, Mediation and Consensus-Building.

What does a typical Track Two process look like? As discussed, Peter Jones (2008) suggests that the Problem-Solving Workshops represent the “classic” approach to Track Two, as pioneered by John Burton in the 1960s in London, and refined by other scholar-practitioners, such as Herbert Kelman. The “problem-solving workshop model” is characterized by the following elements:

- Small and informal dialogues between representatives of the conflict parties, facilitated by a neutral “Third Party” and composed of so-called social scientist “scholar-practitioners”;

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• Even though the dialogues are unofficial, it is assumed that participants are “connected” with decision-makers in their own country and have some form of impact on the attitudes in their country on the subject matter of the conflict;

• Workshops focus on underlying causes of the conflict, rather than official positions, in the hope of developing alternatives together;

• Workshops serve as ongoing processes, not one-time events;

• Workshops emphasize the value and importance of focusing on the deep-rooted psychological aspects of disputes;

• Workshops are characterized by “Chatham House rules” of non-attribution (Jones, 2008a).

What is the sequence of steps taken in a typical Track Two process? A five-stage model identified by one of the most distinguished practitioners of unofficial diplomacy, Harold Saunders, offers some insight.

Harold Saunders belongs to the large group of practitioners who, in the words of Ronald Fisher (1997, p. 112), “had the courage and vision to break away from the world of realpolitik and move toward new ways of thinking about how nations relate.” Saunders gave up a noteworthy career. He worked in the White House, on the National Security Council and in the State Department as assistant secretary of state. He took part in Henry Kissinger’s Middle East shuttle diplomacy, and belonged to the Camp David team credited with the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel of 1979. Since then, he has participated in a large number of unofficial processes. His colleagues in the field consider as his most important contribution his participation in the Dartmouth Conferences (Fisher, 1997).
On the basis of his extensive experience in the Track Two, as well as in the Track One process, Saunders, together with his colleagues, has suggested a five phase model for unofficial dialogue between conflicting groups (Fisher, 1997), which provides – in addition to the above described characteristics of the problem-solving workshop - supplementary insight into the Track Two process, by focusing on stages and chronological order:

1. “Deciding to Engage” – Creating a safe public space for meetings, and identifying individuals willing to risk interacting with “the enemy”;

2. “Mapping the Relationship Together” – Encouraging participants to think and talk analytically, rather than polemically, or in terms of positions, and raising each other’s awareness of difficulties, capacities and potential inherent in the conflict scenario;

3. “Probing the Dynamics of the Relationship” - Participants listening to each other with a higher degree of sensitivity, to their hopes and fears and imagining a more constructive relationship. The new willingness to try and think together becomes apparent when the two sides are prepared to form smaller, mixed working groups to accomplish an assigned task;

4. “Experiencing the Relationship by Thinking Together” - Small working groups thinking together by identifying obstacles, ways of how to deal with them and a series of actions on how to achieve the desired change;

5. “Acting Together” – Becoming a joint action group and working out implementation strategies (Fisher, 1997).

A short case study will bring this model to life. Harold Saunders and his colleague Randa Slim of the Kettering Foundation applied this five-stage model to their effort, together with three Russian participants of the Dartmouth Regional Conflicts Task Force, who had
personal contacts in the country, to set up a dialogue process on a conflict in Tajikistan (Fisher, 1997). After achieving independence in 1991, this former Soviet republic experienced years of internal conflict, mainly between the government and opposition groups. The first meeting of the task force was held in Moscow in March 1993, followed by meetings every two months. In April 1994, three members of this dialogue group were appointed nongovernmental delegates to the formal UN-sponsored negotiations intended to end what was seen as the equivalent of civil war in Tajikistan.

Saunders’ first phase, “Deciding to Engage”, was implemented by a visit to Tajikistan of the Russian team members. Their task was to recruit participants, to gain official approval and to explain to everyone involved the basic rules of the forthcoming dialogue. The group that emerged from this selection process achieved a fair degree of continuity. Five of the seven original participants were still involved four years later (Fisher, 1997).

Phase Two, “Mapping the Relationship Together”, concentrated on basic diagnostic topics, above all the causes of the civil war and the different interests of the opposing sides. Participants discussed ways out of the conflict and the future direction of the country. Consensus was reached on the need to end the violence and a clear definition of how a democratic, peaceful, secular Tajikistan would function. At that early stage, an agreement was also reached on the need to focus on how to start negotiations towards the creation of conditions for the return of refugees (Fisher, 1997).

Phase Three, “Probing the Dynamics of the Relationship”, focused on the question of how to set up negotiations. It was concluded that negotiations would be possible. The facilitators moved the process forward with their list of points on which a common
position had already been achieved and with a joint picture of perceptions and fears each side had of the other (Fisher, 1997).

Phase 4, “Experiencing the Relationship by Thinking Together”, was reached when participants created a joint memorandum on a negotiation process with the help of the facilitators’ single text method. At the same time, the UN envoy moved closer towards a meeting for official negotiations between the government and opposition groups. Towards the end of this stage, participants named the obstacles to normalize political conditions and generated a memorandum on national reconciliation (Fisher, 1997).

Phase 5, “Acting Together”, was attained when the participants took their two memorandums to officials in Tajikistan. They also pointed to future issues that were likely to come up in negotiations and during the implementation phase of any agreement, in pursuit of the creation of a civil society in Tajikistan (Fisher, 1997).

6. Leading Track Two Fora and Actors

Among the organizations committed to “Track Two” conflict resolution/mediation, four have made a name for themselves in recent years (The Economist, 2011, “Privatizing Peace” [hereinafter “Privatizing Peace”]):

- The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) in Geneva;
- The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program in Atlanta;
- The United States Institute for Peace in Washington;
- The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) with offices in Helsinki and Brussels.

Since 2003, the government of Norway has partnered with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue to offer annual workshops for senior conflict mediators, high level decision
makers and key peace process actors, known as the Oslo Forum Network of Mediators (HD Centre, 2011, “Oslo Forum”). The government of Norway provides nearly half the CHD’s USD 15 million annual funding (“Privatizing Peace”). Topics of the 2011 Oslo Forum included a discussion about the situation in Afghanistan. The Oslo Forum addressed a large variety of subjects, ranging from a session on talking to the Taliban, via regional situation reports on Thailand, the Sahel, Libya and post-election tensions in Ivory Coast, to a session on gender-related issues in peace processes (HD Centre, 2011, “9th Oslo Forum Summary Report”).

Founded in 1999, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is currently involved in a facilitation/mediation role in Sudan, the Philippines and Somalia. Previously, it had been active with a noteworthy variety of projects in Myanmar, the Central African Republic, Timor Leste, Aceh, Kenya, Burundi, Nepal and Somaliland (HD Centre, 2011, “About Mediation”). In 2003, it cooperated with the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs on negotiations towards a draft final status agreement between Palestinians and Israelis. The final status agreement, known as the “Geneva Initiative”, addressed critical issues such as security arrangements, the status of Jerusalem, borders and refugees (HD Centre, 2011, “The Geneva Initiative”). CHD is also credited with helping to bring about the February 2008 power-sharing arrangement, a milestone that ended inter-tribal violence after the disputed 2007 Kenyan election (“Privatizing Peace”).

The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program has been on the forefront of projects in sub-Saharan Africa, the Korean peninsula, Nepal, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Middle East and South America. The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program describes itself as “a nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization with access to world leaders and expertise in mediation, negotiation, and peace building”. The Center also emphasizes that it “helps warring parties when traditional dispute resolution methods fail, filling the space between official diplomacy and unofficial grassroots peace efforts” (Carter Center, 2011, “Conflict Resolution Program”, para. 2).

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), which bills itself as “an independent, nonpartisan conflict management center created by Congress to prevent and mitigate international conflict without resorting to violence” (USIP, n.d., “About us”, para. 1), has been involved in a tribal reconciliation project in Iraq, in post-war conflict prevention training of mediators and facilitators in Libya, in electoral violence prevention workshops in Haiti and Sudan, and in establishing dispute resolution councils in eastern Afghanistan (USIP, n.d., “About us”).

Most prominent of regional fora for Track Two conflict resolution/mediation is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). CSCAP defines itself as “an informal mechanism for scholars, officials and others in their private capacities to discuss political and security issues and challenges facing the region” (CSCAP, n.d., “Home”, para. 1). CSCAP has member committees in Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, both Koreas, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the US and Vietnam (CSCAP, n.d., “Member Committees”).

CSCAP has convened international study and expert groups on a multitude of subjects, among them: Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ("WMD
Study Group”) in Asia-Pacific, export controls, nuclear energy, multilateral security governance in Northeast Asia/North Pacific, water resources security in mainland Southeast Asia, cyber-security, the doctrine of responsibility to protect, maritime security cooperation, safety and security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, energy security, safety and security of offshore oil and gas installations, human trafficking, confidence and security-building measures, and preventive diplomacy (CSCAP, n.d., “Study Groups”). In the words of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) Pacific Forum, which helped establish CSCAP in 1993, these study groups serve as “region-wide multilateral fora for consensus-building and problem solving, and often address issues that are too sensitive for official dialogue” (CSIS, n.d., “Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP)”, para. 4).

According to a former member of the Committee, CSCAP’s Canada member committee has co-chaired a study group on regional peace-building and peace-keeping with Indonesia (E. Williams, personal communication, April 17, 2012). However, since CSCAP Canada lost its federal funding in 2006, it has become a more bare-bones organization and has scaled back its involvement in study groups. Where Canadian experts have attended study group meetings since then, they have been funded through other sources. CSCAP Canada co-organized a study group on the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect in 2009-2011 with funding from the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (E. Williams, personal communication, April 17, 2012).

7. Canadian Track Two Initiatives

Track Two initiatives in which Canadians played a leading role in recent years have included:

- The Jerusalem Old City Initiative (JOCI);
- Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters;
The Ottawa Dialogue;
The International Peace and Prosperity Project (IPPP) in Guinea-Bissau.

Established in 2003 by retired Canadian foreign service officers Michael Molloy, John Bell and former Ambassador to Israel and also Egypt Michael Bell, and housed at the University of Windsor, the Jerusalem Old City Initiative has been aimed at “developing creative options for the governance and management of the Old City of Jerusalem in preparation for a negotiated settlement between Israelis and Palestinians” (University of Windsor, n.d., “Jerusalem Old City Initiative” [hereinafter “UW, JOCI”], para. 1). The project received funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), as well as from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for International and Public Affairs (UW, JOCI).

The Initiative’s Phase One saw the December 2005 publication of a discussion document entitled “New Directions for Deliberation and Dialogue”. A conference of Israeli, Palestinian and international experts was held in Istanbul that month to review the document. The conference led to the creation of working groups on key themes: security, governance, mandate elements, property issues, and archeological and heritage issues. During Phase Two, working groups, made up of Israelis, Palestinians and supported by international experts, conducted fact-finding visits to Jerusalem, consulted with experts and commissioned papers (UW, JOCI). In the words of scholar Peter Jones (2008a), “the team has challenged existing paradigms over the Old City, particularly the ‘sovereignty-centric’ approach, as it is a ‘zero-sum’ paradigm. They encouraged the regional participants to ‘imagine different elements of a new regime for the Old City.’”
There has been a significant Track 1.5 dimension to this dialogue, as many participants have had close ties to their respective governments. Palestinian participants worked “hand-in-hand” with the office of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, according to Michael Bell (telephone interview, April 11, 2012). Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert raised some of the ideas for governance of the Old City with President Abbas, which suggests a degree of “transfer” to official level discourse and thinking. Funding for the Jerusalem Old City Initiative has come to an end for fiscal year 2012-2013 and the project has concluded in its current form. Some 25 papers have been commissioned, reflecting the work of the JOCI, and are to be published in 2012 (M. Bell, telephone interview, April 11, 2012).

The “Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters” initiative consisted of a series of meetings and associated workshops held between January 2001 and March 2007, which were aimed at exploring maritime confidence-building between India and Pakistan (Jones, 2008a). The project was inspired by papers authored by Peter Jones and by another Canadian Track Two scholar - David Griffiths. It was initially funded by the Government of Canada. “Deliverables” included a draft agreement to help prevent incidents between the navies of Pakistan and India, mechanisms to promote cooperation in search and rescue and environmental protection, mechanisms to assist in the speedy repatriation of arrested fishermen, ideas to help resolve the disputed maritime boundary and co-operatively manage resources in the disputed maritime area, cooperation in the extension of jurisdiction over the extended continental shelf, and mechanisms to promote increased maritime trade and commerce between the two countries (Jones, 2008a).

The Ottawa Dialogue is an ongoing dialogue between retired senior officials and military officers, as well as academics, from India and Pakistan. Participants have included former Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India, the chairman emeritus of the Pakistani Nuclear Regulatory Authority, a former Pakistani High Commissioner to India, and
former Vice Admirals of the Indian Navy. The Dialogue is led by Professor Peter Jones of the University of Ottawa. Sponsors are DFAIT, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States Institute for Peace, the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the US Department of Defense/National Defense University, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the Hoover Institution (University of Ottawa, 2010, “University of Ottawa leads Discussions”).

An Ottawa Dialogue meeting in July 2011 at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, hosted by former US Secretary of State George Schultz and attended by former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Secretary of Defense William Perry, led to the adoption of an impressive list of recommended nuclear confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan (University of Ottawa, 2011, “Ottawa Dialogue recommends nuclear agreements for India and Pakistan”). These include:

- Assurances that missiles will not be tested during periods of tension;
- Assurances that measures will be taken to prevent un-authorized and unintended launches;
- A commitment to inform the other side well in advance of tests of new systems;
- An agreement to develop a common terminology on strategic issues;
- Regular discussions on doctrinal issues and strategic stability;
- An agreement that missile tests will be notified to each side as early as possible;
- An agreement to exchange on a regular basis information relating to the management of nuclear accidents;
- An agreement not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons.

A previous round of discussions in Copenhagen in June 2010 had led to the adoption of a statement recommending such measures as the establishment of a jointly acceptable lexicon of “nuclear terms” applicable to India and Pakistan, that all nuclear weapons be placed on the lowest possible alert level during peacetime, and that nuclear risk reduction centres be set up (University of Ottawa, 2010, “University of Ottawa leads Discussions”).
The Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation’s (CIIAN) International Peace and Prosperity Project (IPPP) in Guinea-Bissau between 2004 and 2009 was a political violence prevention pilot project, which involved a number of Track Two elements. These included:

- A February 2006 meeting, consisting of twenty senior representatives from key sectors in Guinea-Bissau, which developed a National Action Plan for Peace and Prosperity;
- A two-day informal dialogue on national reconciliation in March 2007; and
- Two four-day mediation training workshops for community leaders and civil society representatives held in October 2008 and February 2009 respectively (CIIAN, n.d., “The International Peace and Prosperity Project (IPPP) in Guinea-Bissau”).

8. **Track Two Theory as a Branch of General Conflict Theory**

As discussed previously, Track Two is considered an important and by now influential element of a “larger negotiation process.” This close relationship raises the obvious question how Track Two actually relates to some of the key tenets of general conflict resolution theory? Where can we find discernible similarities; where can we find discernible differences? A close look at a small selection of the key texts of general conflict theory can provide some answers.

Morton Deutsch, widely regarded as father of conflict resolution theory, in the lead article to the “Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice” (2006) entitled “Cooperation and Competition”, introduces the foundational concept of *interdependence* between conflict parties, a reality that can generate extremes of
competitive and cooperative attitudes and behaviour. The author then explains the implications inherent in a cooperative vs. competitive orientation during conflict management processes and concludes that “a knowledgeable, skillful, cooperative approach to conflict enormously facilitates its constructive resolution.” (Deutsch, 2006, p. 42).

Cooperativeness and competitiveness constitute also the defining two coordinates in the Thomas & Kilmann “Conflict Mode Instrument” (1974). The two academic practitioners Kenneth W. Thomas and Ralph H. Kilmann offer with their assertiveness vs. cooperativeness grid a measure to assess an individual’s basic conflict orientation and behavior in conflict situations. They define conflict situations as “situations in which the concerns of two people appear to be incompatible” (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974, p. 9). Their term “assertiveness” equates with the concept of “competitiveness”. They define assertiveness as “the extent to which the individual attempts to satisfy his/her own concerns” (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974, p. 9). They define “cooperativeness” as “the extent to which the individual attempts to satisfy the other person’s concerns” (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974, p. 9). Their grid can be used to identify five particular methods of handling conflict:

- “Competing” (assertive and uncooperative),
- “Accommodating” (unassertive and cooperative),
- “Avoiding” (unassertive and uncooperative),
- “Collaborating” (assertive and cooperative),
- “Compromising” (intermediate in both assertiveness and cooperativeness).

The Thomas & Kilmann model is widely recognized and used extensively as a valuable instrument to measure conflict parties’ basic orientation and behaviour patterns in conflict situations, throughout conflict management processes.
What are the basic principles proposed by the recognized authority on conflict resolution theory, Morton Deutsch, towards the development of cooperative relations between conflict parties in any conflict situation? Deutsch (2006, pp. 64-65) lists:

1. Mutual security: “real security requires that both sides have as their goal mutual security”;  
2. Mutual respect: “[e]ach side must treat the other with the respect, courtesy, politeness, and consideration normatively expected in civil society”;  
3. Humanization of the other: each side must experience the other “in everyday contexts as parents, homemakers, schoolchildren, teachers and merchants, which enables them to see each one another as human beings who are more like themselves than not.” Deutsch adds: “Problem-solving workshops along the lines developed by Burton (1969, 1987) and Kelman (1972), are also valuable in overcoming dehumanization of one another.”  
4. Fair rules for managing conflict: “[i]t is important to anticipate that conflicts will occur and to develop beforehand the fair rules, experts, institutions, and other resources for managing such conflicts constructively and justly.”  
5. Curbing the extremists on both sides: “[t]he parties need to cooperate in curbing extremism on their own side and restraining actions that stimulate and justify extremist elements on the other side.”  
6. Gradual development of mutual trust and cooperation: “In the early phases of reconciliation, when trust is required for cooperation, the former enemies may be willing to trust a third party (…) but not yet willing to trust one another if there is a risk of the other failing to reciprocate cooperation.”
On the basis of what have been identified as the main characteristics of Track Two in theory and practice, it is fair to say that the principles identified by Morton Deutsch, notably mutual security, mutual respect, humanization of the other, fair rules for managing conflict, curbing the extremists on both sides, gradual development of mutual trust and cooperation are entirely consistent with the theory and the practice of the workshop model of Track Two. Also, the key categories in the Thomas & Kilmann conflict mode instrument resonate with the main themes of Track Two conflict approach.

PART II Strengths and Limitations of Track Two:

The strengths of Track Two can be best understood if we keep in mind that the Track Two model was conceived by a former Track One practitioner out of his dissatisfaction with the limitations of the traditional diplomatic approach. John Burton drew on the insight gained during his earlier studies in psychology to develop what he considered a more promising approach. On the basis of his multi-disciplinary training and diplomatic experience, he pioneered the problem-solving workshop approach, in an attempt to overcome what he perceived to be the limitations of official diplomacy.

i) Which characteristics of Track Two qualify as strengths? Four key elements of Track Two merit separate examination:

1. **Theory:** Track Two practitioners bring to the negotiation table a “theoretical guide for intervention covering all elements of the practice” (Fisher, 1997, p. 73). Their work is grounded in concepts and research results from the social sciences, notably “accepted principles of human behaviour” (Fisher, 1997, p. 73). Their multi-disciplinary academic training has allowed them to look beyond the narrow “state power” paradigm, central to traditional or “realist” international relations theory. Burton, Kelman and their associates have taken a “pluralist” view of international conflict and its resolution, which stresses the values and
relationships of multiple actors (Fisher, 1997). Their approach has been influenced by their training in psychology, psychiatry and/or social psychology, which are all disciplines that pursue attitudinal/behavioural changes at the level of the individual first, before aiming at an interplay between individual and institutional changes. The social-psychological approach complements political conflict analysis, as “the escalation and perpetuation of conflict is driven by psychological factors such as misperception and distrust” (Fisher, 1997, p. 62). Jones (2008a, p. 11) writes: “Track Two tends to stress interpersonal, social-psychological dynamics aimed at increasing each side’s understanding of the underlying factors motivating the other’s position, and its own as a tool to open up possibilities for cooperative problem-solving.”

2. **The workshop model:** As previously indicated, the workshop model was launched with Burton’s first ever workshop in the 1960s. According to Fisher (1997), problem-solving workshops serve as settings for:

   a) non-committal testing of the feasibility of negotiations, of options or alternatives at the pre-negotiation stage;
   
   b) determining the bases on which negotiations can proceed, again at the pre-negotiation phase;
   
   c) working out details and alternatives on issues that are obstructing progress, in a way that official channels cannot, at the negotiation phase.

Peter Jones (2008b, p. 7), recognized as Canada’s foremost Track Two scholar-practitioner, observes that workshops provide a “‘laboratory’ for the development and testing of ideas”. According to Jones (2008b, p. 7), they offer an environment in which new concepts or specific proposals can be debated
without committing governments and an “alternate route to the continuation of regional security discussions where official routes are blocked.” Workshops allow participants to “step back’ from official positions to jointly explore the underlying causes of the dispute in the hope of developing alternative ideas” (Jones, 2008b, p. 7). They are thus inherently creative and cooperative. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999) comment that workshops:

- help to undermine ‘we-they’ images of conflict;
- establish linkages among influential participants;
- begin a discussion of framework solutions;
- identify steps needed to end an impasse;
- and create an understanding of these steps and processes that can be feed back into the track-one effort where actual decisions are reached.

Typically, workshops are conducted according to Chatham House Rules, which allow participants to speak more openly, without fear of attribution (Jones, 2008a, p. 4).

The experience of the Pugwash and Dartmouth Conferences, as interpreted by Ronald Fisher (1997), suggests a number of further strengths to the workshop model: workshops create public space in which participants are able to discuss creative changes and gain insight into the overall relationship; the continuity of discussions and agenda over a series of workshops allows for a deeper probing over time that creates ideas and helps to bring about fundamental changes.

Problem-solving workshops have proven to be of particular value in laying the groundwork for official negotiations, especially in cases of deep-rooted
international, inter-cultural conflict where issues of identity, historical grievance and dignity are at play. Saunders (2001, as cited in Fisher, 2006) stresses that getting the conflict parties to agree on commitment, even prior to any negotiated result, may be even more challenging than reaching agreement in official negotiations.

3. **Scholar-practitioner expertise**: Due to their multi-disciplinary training and their varied professional experience, including in some cases careers in diplomacy and/or psychology, scholar-practitioners such as Burton, Kelman, Wedge, Volkan and Montville were able to introduce to these workshops an inter-disciplinary approach, which has become a defining feature of the workshop model. This approach has proved its worth at the pre-negotiation stage. In this context, Harold Saunders (1991) argues that breaking a pre-negotiating impasse in a given field may depend as much on the insight of the psychiatrist, the social psychologist or the cultural anthropologist as on the practitioner in what he refers to as the “around-the-table” negotiation, which equates with the official or “Track One” negotiation. Saunders (1991, p. 58) writes:

> Analyzing the pre-negotiation phase of a conflict more fully may enable us to establish reciprocal links between negotiation theory, the psychology of interpersonal or cross-cultural relations and the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy. Students of negotiation itself have written about using the insights of psychology, anthropology, sociology, group dynamics, problem solving and other disciplines in the negotiating room.

What is more, the “scholar-practitioner” approach can lead to the creation of “communities of experts”, who are familiar with new approaches to such issues as regional security, and to the development of networks of influential people who can work to change attitudes in their countries and regions (Jones, 2008a).
4. **Institutional structures:** The first generation of scholar-practitioners realized that institutions had to be created within which these theories and practices could be applied. They created or contributed to the establishment of such institutions that have since become key organizations for the preparation or actual practice of Track Two. In the academic area, perhaps the single most influential establishment is the Center for Conflict Resolution at George Mason University and its graduate program of conflict management, cofounded by Bryant Wedge. Wedge was also instrumental in the founding of the United States Institute of Peace in 1984. The Pugwash and Dartmouth Conferences, though founded before Burton and Kelman began to practice the workshop approach, have since become critically influential adopters of Track Two practices. The workshop model has also been adopted by such influential fora as the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific.

ii) In spite of these obvious strengths, there are limitations inherent in unofficial processes. *The Economist* ("Privatizing Peace") observes that:

- Such concrete successes as are achieved may not last: ceasefire agreements may quickly break down.
- Third party mediators such as the CHD lack the ability to impose sanctions on conflict parties.
- Nor can they enforce compliance with or implementation of agreements reached. Third party mediators usually lack what Ronald Fisher (1997) refers to as the “coercive power” of state negotiators. They tend to fall into the category of “weak” rather than “strong” mediators.

On a related note, unofficial mediators may not always enjoy the legitimacy (and perhaps credibility) that attaches to state power, to its resources and
representatives. Track Two scholars John Davies and Edward Kaufman (2002, pp. 4-5) write:

the first track diplomatic system has the legitimacy and resources necessary for completing the diplomatic process. A peace agreement must ultimately be negotiated, approved and implemented at the official level. Second track diplomacy is not an alternative but a complementary system that takes advantage of resources and opportunities unavailable at the official level.

Finally, and as remarked previously, it is notoriously difficult to establish criteria or indicators by which to measure the success of Track Two processes (Jones, 2008a).

Part III Investing in Track Two Capabilities:

I begin this section by offering a few words about the evolving nature of global conflict. Track Two was pioneered in an international environment characterized by state-to-state conflict, notably the Cold War. Early efforts in Track Two, such as those undertaken by the Pugwash organization, the Dartmouth conferences and the East-West Institute, focused on addressing or mitigating such inter-state tensions, especially on achieving greater mutual communication, trust and understanding between the superpowers. Obviously, the current international context is very different. For a variety of reasons, such as the spread of democracy, international economic interdependence and normative and legal proscriptions (Human Security Report Project, 2010), inter-state conflict, at least of the sort that leads to or carries the potential of war, is increasingly rare. The Human Security Report Project (2010) observes:

The decline of international [inter-state] conflict and the end of the Cold War have led to a major shift in focus in the conflict research and policy communities.

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1 South Asia (i.e.: India-Pakistan) provides one obvious exception to this trend of declining inter-state conflict. Israel-Palestine qualifies as a borderline case, as Palestine lacks some of the attributes of statehood.
Today civil war and international terrorism, not international conflict, dominate research and policy agendas.

The International Peace Institute (IPI) (Mancini, 2011, p. 1) think tank comments: “Today, ‘new’ types of conflicts have arisen, most of them internal tensions over political transitions, and regime change, coup d’états and coup attempts, election disputes, constitutional processes, access to natural resources, property, and land issues, among others.” Many such conflicts as the IPI describes may prove difficult to contain and may necessitate costly intervention on the part of the international community in the form of peace-building, peace-keeping\(^2\), nation-building, development assistance, and in extraordinary cases, armed intervention to prevent humanitarian catastrophes under the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. The failed and fragile states that may result from these conflicts risk becoming incubators for terrorism, trans-national crime, piracy, small arms trade, narcotics, refugee flows and human trafficking (Wright, 2005, as cited in Fraser, 2007, pp. 1-2), with regional and sometimes global security implications. In the words of one scholar (Fraser, 2007), “Global integration has meant that there are no buffers anymore (...) events in the most distant parts of the world can directly affect us.” In this connection, it seems commonsensical to point out that preventive conflict intervention or “preventive diplomacy”, of which Track Two is one variety, is almost certainly more cost-effective than peace-building, nation-building and peace-keeping, following armed conflict. The International Peace Institute (Mancini, 2011, p. 1) writes: “it is more cost-effective and less intrusive to invest in specific preventive initiatives as compared to post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping activities - in terms of helping to save lives and scarce financial resources.”

It behooves Canada therefore to consider an investment in Track Two capabilities, as part of an overall commitment as a global citizen to a more stable and peaceful world. I

\(^1\) For a discussion of the difference between peace-building and peace-keeping see: http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/peacebuilding
would argue further that such an investment may offer one avenue to counteract a decline in Canada’s international standing and influence in recent years. Finally, I will suggest that Canada may be able to develop a “comparative advantage” or “niche capability” in Track Two conflict resolution and mediation.

In recent years, Canada’s standing and influence in the world has arguably suffered a relative decline, due to the following systemic factors:

- A shift in global economic weight and diplomatic influence to Brazil, India, China, and certain other developing nations;
- The declining importance of the trans-Atlantic relationship and of NATO as an institution, over the last 20+ years as a result of the end of the Cold War, together with the expansion and ongoing integration of the European Union, which increasingly coordinates among its member states on foreign and defence policy matters.

Effective engagement with Track Two resources and initiatives has the potential to enhance or multiply Canada’s influence, by leveraging existing capabilities or potential, both domestic and international, in conflict resolution/mediation. To quote Peter Jones (2008a, p. 1), “Certainly Canadians have led some notable Track Two projects, but we have not, as a country, developed a national capacity to systematically support Track Two... by building such a capacity we stand to realize gains in our ability to project Canadian influence in the world.” Norway and Switzerland offer two examples of small-to-medium-sized powers that have enhanced their influence and reputations as peacemakers through strategic partnerships with NGOs involved in international conflict mediation and have, in the words of one commentator, become “niche players” (Greenhill, 2005) in international diplomacy as a result.
A strategic partnership with one or more NGOs, such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) or the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), might be one element of a larger Canadian government effort to foster Track Two conflict resolution/mediation. A first step might be for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to commission a study to identify best practices for partnerships from Switzerland, Norway, the US, and any others, as well as a suitable strategic partner. Such a partnership could take the form of a series of conflict mediation workshops, or of international conferences on trouble-spots, similar to the East-West Institute conferences during the Cold War or the conferences currently offered by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in the UK, which the IISS website (http://www.iiss.org/conferences/) describes as “First Track meetings, with a Second Track component.” Such workshops or conferences could be co-funded and co-sponsored by the Government of Canada, and a Track Two NGO partner such as the CHD. The government of Canada could provide the venue. There might be a sponsorship and organizational role as well for an entity such as the Canadian International Council. An effective partnership with one or more credible NGO partners could offer an opportunity to “brand” Canada as a leader in international conflict resolution and mediation.

A second element in such an overall effort would involve a concerted government initiative to develop or nurture Canada’s indigenous resources in the field of unofficial diplomacy. From the point of view of human and intellectual capital, Canada has arguably an unusual combination of assets that can potentially be deployed in the service of international conflict resolution and mediation:

- Our multi-ethnic, multi-cultural make-up, which potentially gives Canada a pool of regional and linguistic expertise in a variety of global conflict arenas;
• Our native fluency in English and French, which are two of the languages of international diplomacy and give Canadians at least the linguistic competence to mediate in many international trouble-spots (for instance, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia);

• The excellent international reputation of Canada’s judiciary and jurisprudence, coupled with our bi-jural legal system, which would allow us to deploy retired judges and law professors to mediate in civil and common law legal environments;

• Our traditional reputation as an “honest broker” in world affairs.

• Our universities, which place well in global rankings, and which offer such academic programs as conflict resolution, peace and conflict studies, regional studies, psychology, and law. Our network of universities can serve as a kind of intellectual and organizational infrastructure, combining research and scholarship excellence in the above fields with the facilities and administrative support for workshops and conferences.

In other words, Canada would appear to have considerable potential in the field of unofficial conflict resolution and mediation. How can such native potential be developed, nurtured and funded? Training is of course one essential element. Subject to the appropriate funding, the Ontario-based Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIIAN) or a similar NGO could offer training courses for would-be mediators in the Burton-Kelman problem-solving workshop model. Another candidate would be the Ottawa-based Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, which is funded by the federal government.

An academic institute for Track Two Diplomacy could be established at a Canadian University. It could combine and coordinate academic research and scholarship in
conflict resolution with practical mediation and workshop training and field work – the scholar-practitioner model in operation. It would be multi-disciplinary, combining scholarship in psychology, conflict resolution, peace and conflict studies, and regional studies, for example. It would receive government funding, but would be at arms-length from Canadian foreign policy objectives, providing a politically neutral environment for scholarship and training, workshops and conferences. Peter Jones (2008a) suggests something along the same lines: the establishment of a “Centre of excellence in research and training” based within a university, which would offer courses in Track Two and supervised research and publications; undertake comprehensive study of Canadian and other Track Two projects; foster the Track Two community in Canada; launch and run Track Two projects; and partner with Track Two practitioners across Canada. Such a Centre would hold annual or semi-annual workshops of Canadian Track Two practitioners, according to Jones (2008a). I would endorse these ideas as well. Finally, the government of Canada could demonstrate its commitment to Asia-Pacific regional security by restoring funding to the Canadian Member Committee of the Council on Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).

Of course, adequate government funding is a *sine qua non* for any such initiatives. Promising Track Two projects and initiatives could be financed through a dedicated fund, to be administered by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA) Partners for Development Program offers one possible funding model. In the words of the CIDA website, the “Partners for Development Program aims to leverage the development expertise and initiative of Canadians by funding the most meritorious proposals put forward by Canadian organizations to deliver development results on the ground and contribute to poverty reduction” (CIDA, 2012, “Partners for Development Program”, para. 1). It does so on the basis of principles of sound governance, support of Canadians, relevance to CIDA’s mandate and coherence with Canadian government
policy, results and development effectiveness (CIDA, 2012, “Partners for Development Program”). A similar “Partners for Peace” fund, administered by DFAIT, could be created or an existing DFAIT fund could be adapted to leverage the conflict resolution/mediation expertise and initiative of Canadians – to finance such commendable Canadian Track Two projects as the Ottawa Dialogue and the Jerusalem Old City Initiative.

Certain funding criteria might mirror those for the CIDA fund. For instance, projects might be evaluated for their relevance to DFAIT’s mandate, and coherence with Canadian foreign policy and whole-of-government objectives for a region. For reasons given previously, it might be more difficult for Track Two projects to satisfy results and effectiveness criteria than for development projects. Such requirements would have to be adjusted to “recognize the unique requirements of Track Two” (Jones, 2008a, p. 24). Admittedly, the long term horizon, focus on relationship-building and dialogue, rather than on tangible outcomes, and the inherent difficulty in measuring the success of many Track Two projects, particularly of the “soft” variety, might make such a “Partners for Peace” fund a tough sell in an era of cutbacks, given a government funding culture that demands results-based accountability.

In his 2005 book “Making a Difference? External views on Canada’s international Impact”, commissioned for the then Canadian Institute of International Affairs (now Canadian International Council), Robert Greenhill, currently Managing Director of the World Economic Forum, concludes, based on interviews with 40 experienced politicians, academics, NGO leaders and civil servants from 19 countries, including leading Canadian
diplomats and academics, that Canada had little global impact in the preceding 15 years (1989-2004). He writes:

Institutions in which Canada played an important role, such as the G8 and NATO, are seen to be losing influence. Increasingly active major players such as China, Brazil, India, and Mexico and sharply focused niche players such as Norway are seen to be taking on roles traditionally filled by Canada. As one European put it, ‘The current trends are against Canada’s influence.’ (Greenhill, 2005, p. 1)

Greenhill (2005, p. 2) prescribes “differentiation and focus” in its foreign policy as the keys to renewing Canada’s relevance in the world: “Decide on a few areas, invest deeply, and become indispensable: in these areas Canada should be considered pre-eminent, in terms of experience, capabilities and resources.” It is noteworthy in this connection that Greenhill names Norway as one of the “sharply focused niche players” that are displacing Canada. If Norway can be recognized for its leadership in international conflict resolution and mediation and in fostering Track Two initiatives, there is no reason that Canada cannot as well, given the assets we offer. But it will require political commitment.

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3 The period 1989-2004 was hardly without accomplishment in Canadian foreign policy. It saw Canada sign the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), successfully champion a global treaty to ban landmines and advance the concept of human security - all of which Greenhill himself acknowledges. Greenhill also notes the highly effective personal diplomacy of then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney up until about 1992. The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched at the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit, surely qualifies as another instance of Canadian foreign policy leadership. All of that is to say that if the years 1989-2004 qualify as relatively fallow years for Canadian foreign policy – as years of declining influence – the intervening seven years have been even more barren. Perhaps the best proxy for Canada’s declining status in the world has been the unprecedented defeat of Canada’s candidacy for a UN Security Council seat in October 2010.
**Recommendations:**

The Government of Canada should establish a strategic partnership with one or more NGOs involved in international conflict resolution/mediation, such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) or the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), as one element of a larger Canadian government effort to foster Track Two conflict resolution/mediation. As a first step toward this goal, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) should commission a study to identify best practices for such partnerships from the examples of Switzerland, Norway, the US, and any others, as well as a suitable strategic partner. Such a partnership could take the form of a series of conflict mediation workshops, or of international conferences on trouble-spots, similar to the East-West Institute conferences during the Cold War or the conferences currently offered by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in the UK, which the IISS website describes as “First Track meetings, with a Second Track component.” Such workshops or conferences could be co-funded and co-sponsored by the Government of Canada, and a Track Two NGO partner such as the CHD. The government of Canada could provide the venue. The Canadian International Council or a similar entity should be approached about a co-funding and co-sponsorship role.

The Government of Canada should explore modalities and funding models for the creation of an academic institute for Track Two Diplomacy at a suitable Canadian University. One obvious candidate university would be the University of Ottawa, given its presence in the national capital, its status as Canada’s officially bilingual university and the presence of Canada’s foremost Track Two scholar-practitioner, Peter Jones, on its Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. A case could also be made for Carleton University, which is also situated in the national capital, and which houses the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Other candidate universities might include the University of Toronto, which houses the Munk School of Global Affairs, and the University of British Columbia, which houses the Liu Institute for Global Issues, which includes on its faculty noted Track Two scholar-practitioners Paul Evans and Brian Job. The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) in Waterloo, Ontario
might also have the facilities and resources to support such an institute. I would argue, however, that proximity to Canada’s foreign policy establishment and institutions should be a key criterion in the selection of the university to host the institute, which argues for either the University of Ottawa or Carleton. The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) should be consulted closely and engaged in the creation of such an institute.

Such an institute should combine and coordinate academic research and scholarship in conflict resolution with practical mediation and workshop training and field work – the scholar-practitioner model in operation. It would be multi-disciplinary, combining scholarship in psychology, conflict resolution, peace and conflict studies, and regional studies, for example. It would receive government funding, but would be at arms-length from Canadian foreign policy objectives, providing a politically neutral environment for scholarship and training, workshops and conferences.

The Government of Canada should create a dedicated fund, to be administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), or adapt an existing DFAIT fund, to finance promising Track Two projects and initiatives. The Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA) Partners for Development Program offers one possible funding model. In the words of the CIDA website, the “Partners for Development Program aims to leverage the development expertise and initiative of Canadians by funding the most meritorious proposals put forward by Canadian organizations to deliver development results on the ground and contribute to poverty reduction”. It does so on the basis of principles of sound governance, support of Canadians, relevance to CIDA’s mandate and coherence with Canadian government policy, results and development effectiveness. A similar “Partners for Peace” fund would leverage the conflict resolution/mediation expertise and initiative of Canadians – to finance such commendable Canadian Track Two projects as the Ottawa Dialogue and the Jerusalem Old City Initiative.
Certain funding criteria might mirror those for the CIDA fund. For instance, projects might be evaluated for their relevance to DFAIT’s mandate, and coherence with Canadian foreign policy and whole-of-government objectives for a region. Given the difficulty in establishing criteria by which to measure the success of Track Two projects, it might be more of a challenge for such projects to satisfy results and effectiveness criteria than for development projects. Such requirements would have to be adjusted to “recognize the unique requirements of Track Two”, in the words of Peter Jones.
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