Human, not too Human:
A Critical Semiotic of Drones and Drone Warfare

by

Timothy Vasko
B.A., University of Victoria, 2011

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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Taking as its starting point Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s theses on liberalism and war, and Dillon and Reid’s extensive engagement thereof, this thesis offers a critical conceptualization of drones and drone warfare. I argue that deployment of drones specifically over and against bodies and communities in conflict zones in and between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and until recently, Libya, is the material practice of a legal and political doctrine and precedent that has been established and policed most prominently by the United States and its military and intelligence apparatuses since the end of the Cold War. This novel precedent, however - due to its necessarily mutually constitutive relationship with a perceived danger said to be emerging from specific spaces, bodies, and communities in the decolonized and still-colonized worlds - locates its ontological and thus political genealogy in the anthropological knowledge that legally justified the (in)humanity of peoples and communities in these spaces during the era of high imperialism that lasted roughly from the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. I theorize this as a mode of political, tragic nihilism through a reading of some key theories of Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, and Nietzsche and specifically, their import to the field of critical security and international relations theory. I demonstrate that the semiotic image of the drone is a highly pertinent point of departure through which we can understand these political stakes of strategic discourses enunciating the imperatives of both the Revolution in Military Affairs as well as recent global counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations, specifically as they relate to claims about what it is drones are said to productively offer such militaristic projects. Ultimately, I argue that it is through the semiotic image of the drone as a clean, precise tactic that furthers the strategic goals of counterterrorism to target specific bodies that we can begin to politically theorize a particularly malignant political nihilism symptomatic of contemporary liberal societies. However, I also suggest that it is through Nietzsche’s politics of nihilism that we can begin to think about radical critical interventions that resist such a dangerous mode of politics.
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Jorge Luis Borges once wrote that “... the unquestionable if mysterious truth is that the person who bestows a favor is somehow superior to the person who receives it.” I have unquestionably and mysteriously found myself fortunate enough to have received the favor, guidance, support, and inspiration of a great many extraordinary people throughout the process of researching and writing the present work, and indeed, in the broader conditions of my life that have made it possible as such. First of all, I would like to extend my deepest and most profound thanks to my supervisors, Dr. Rob Walker, and Dr. Scott Watson, both of whom have been of paramount importance to my understanding of the material presented in this thesis and beyond. I would similarly like to thank the administrative staff in the University of Victoria Political Science department, for their exceptional congeniality and assistance throughout my year as a masters student in the program. Many thanks are also due to Dr. Simon Glezos and Dr. Siba Grovogui for their insightful commentaries on Chapters I and II, respectively, and I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Bradley Bryan, Dr. Arthur Kroker, Dr. Nicole Shukin, and Dr. Andrew Wender more generally for their academic guidance and inspiration during my studies at UVic. While all of these people have helped me in the most profound ways, any mistakes, missteps, and/or errors are of course, solely my own doing.

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all. I would, however, like to ultimately acknowledge the Coast Salish peoples and their unceded
(but nevertheless violently (mis)appropriated and colonized) territory upon which this thesis was
written, and which has long been a home that I love very dearly.

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July 13, 2012
Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to the victims, their families, and their communities, of the tragically nihilistic drone strikes and broader policies of neocolonial violences (for there are many: military, cultural, and economic, to name a few) upon which so much of the supposed “security” and “affluence” of my own society and indeed, the conditions of possibility for those conditions, fundamentally relies. I hope that this thesis at the very least helps to illuminate and, perhaps beyond that, serves as a map for some tactical points at which these violences might begin to be resisted. To that end, there are three theoretical sentiments from which this thesis flows and to which it is dedicated:

To a sentiment expressed by Aimée Césaire:

... in certain circles they pretend to have discovered in me an “enemy of Europe” and a prophet of the return to the pre-European past.

For my part, I search in vain for the place where I could have expressed such views; where I ever underestimated the importance of Europe in the history of human thought; where I ever have preached a return of any kind; where I ever claimed that there could be a return.

The truth is that I have said something very different: to wit, that the great historical tragedy of Africa has been not so much that it was too late in making contact with the rest of the world, as the manner in which that contact was brought about; that Europe began to “propagate” at a time when it had fallen into the hands of the most unscrupulous financiers and captains of industry; that it was our misfortune to encounter that particular Europe on our path, and that Europe is responsible before the human community for the highest heap of corpses in history.

To one expressed by Walter Benjamin:

The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about this state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism. One reason Fascism has a chance is that in the name of progress its opponents treat it as a historical norm. The current amazement that the things we are experiencing are “still” possible in the twentieth century is not philosophical. This amazement is not the beginning of knowledge - unless it is the knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable.

And finally, to one by Friedrich Nietzsche:

Toward a critique of the big words.- I am full of suspicion and malice against what they call “ideals”: this is my pessimism, to have recognized how the “higher feelings” are a source of misfortune and man’s loss of value.

One is deceived every time one expects “progress” from an ideal; every time so far the victory of the ideal has meant a retrograde movement.

Christianity, the revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words have value only in a fight, as flags: not as realities but as showy words for something quite different (indeed, opposite!)
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**Prelude: Race, The Drone, and War**

“Does he know his sentence?” “No,” said the officer, eager to continue his explanations, but the traveler interrupted: “He doesn’t know his own sentence?” “No,” repeated the officer, and paused for a moment as if he were waiting for the traveler to elaborate on the reason for his question, then said: “It would be pointless to tell him, he’ll come to know it on his body.” The traveler would not have spoken further, but he felt the condemned man’s gaze trained on him; it seemed to be asking if the traveler approved of all this... “But does he at least know that he’s been sentenced?” “No, not that either,” the officer replied, smiling at the traveler as if expecting him to make more strange statements. “Well,” said the traveler, “then you mean to tell me that the man is also unaware of the results of his defense?” “He has had no opportunity to defend himself,” said the officer, looking away as if talking to himself and trying to spare the traveler the embarrassment of having such self-evident matters explained to him.

- Franz Kafka

**Ghosts of Progress, Dressed in Quick Death**

In this thesis, I want to offer a highly critical reading of the problem of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or “drones” as they are commonly referred to, in the form of what I will call a symptomatic semiotic of drones and drone warfare (or more specifically, drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, a term I introduce in Chapter I and maintain throughout the remainder of this thesis). Taking as its starting point Foucault’s theses on war and Dillon and Reid’s extensive engagement thereof, this thesis conceptualizes and theorizes the contemporary relationship between the securitization of advanced liberal societies - of which the United States is the example *par excellence* - and those of the decolonized and still-colonized worlds through a semiotic and symptomatic reading of drones and drone warfare. Through a reading of some key theories of Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, and Nietzsche and specifically, their import to the field of critical security and international relation theory, I argue that drones and drone warfare inaugurate and attend a *praxis* of (in)humanity that constitutes, administers, and polices an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality, and that as an ethico-legal complex of problematics, symptomatically express supposedly necessary and ultimately, tragically nihilistic violences specifically visited upon peoples in the decolonized and still-colonized worlds as the constitutive
conditions under which a specifically EuroAmerican concept of the human is possible and necessary as a regulative ideal in world politics. I demonstrate this through a reading of strategic discourses enunciating the imperatives of both the Revolution in Military Affairs as well as recent global counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations, specifically as they relate to claims about what it is drones are said to productively offer such militaristic projects.

My decision to undertake such a project springs from two much broader primary research interests that - not until very recently, it should be noted - guided me toward this particular topic: 1) A genealogy of the relationship between the political thought of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Michel Foucault and their respective undertakings of the problem of Anthropology; that is, as I understand it, epistemological fields and ontological problematics that, toward the end of the eighteenth century, began to cohere around the questions about the supposed “nature” of Man as that figure that is performed through, and performs, and thus brings into the world, the materiality and reality of Reason itself - especially in the inauguration of social scientific thought. 2) The inherited violences of contemporary international politics - or as it is more broadly and sometimes interchangeably called (problematically so), world politics, during the historical period that lasted approximately from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century.

In various projects throughout the period of my coursework throughout the fall of 2011 and winter of 2012 leading up to the drafting of the present thesis, I attempted to work through intersections of these theoretical exegeses of Kant, Nietzsche, and Foucault in order to advance my own understanding of these figures on the one hand, and both theoretical and historical accounts of this problem as it was expressed more specifically in the studies of Grovogui, Walker, Mudimbe, Mamdani, and Fabian, on the other. Rarely, if ever, were these attempts
successful; however, they were of crucial importance to my understanding of both the broad theoretical problematics of the Eurocentric limits of received anthropocentric accounts of political theory, and contemporary expressions of the necessary violences inherited from this specific regime of Eurocentric limits in real political processes springing from the interactions between (former) colonial and decolonized and still-colonized political actors.²

Initially, this inspired an interest in the American Military’s recent creation of the Human Terrain System (HTS) program that deploys anthropologists and other social scientists into theaters of operation such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and various sites in Africa following the recent establishment of AFRICOM. Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), as they are called, are deployed into combat zones alongside combat battalions in order to utilize positivistic ethnographic and socio-scientific qualitative and quantitative data metrics in order to more precisely cut up occupied communities and territories into “friends” and “enemies” for tactical purposes.³ Though I still deal with this program to a minor extent in Chapter II, I quickly realized that the HTS needed to be understood in terms of the strategic thinking that enunciated the necessity of such programs, and in terms of a more specific theoretical problem than simply the broad orientalisms of modern political thought.

Thus, this realization compelled me to pursue a different but not unrelated set of questions that circulate around three empirical and theoretical problems: 1) The recent upsurge in United States drone strikes, in favor of human military troops, in theaters of combat operation such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya.⁴ 2) Theoretical accounts of the triangulation between war, typologies of sociopolitical power such as biopower, and categorizations of human beings according to regimes of identity/difference in the production of knowledge for war, such as Nietzsche’s, Foucault’s, or as we will see in contemporary IR theory,
Dillon, Reid, or Grovogui. The reading and theorization of broader discursive and performative symptoms as they are expressed in the context of contemporary counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations being conducted by advanced liberal states and international institutions, and how they might be enunciated as a problem more specifically cast in terms of the inherited racial structures of late nineteenth and early twentieth century imperial power relations, demonstrating the necessary subordination of decolonized and still-colonized people to the will of Euro- and American-centric power structures.

These problematics constitute the foundation of sites and literatures that this thesis attempts to engage in order to argue that drones and drone warfare inaugurate and attend a praxis of (in)humanity that constitutes, administers, and polices an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality, and that as an ethico-legal complex of problematics, symptomatically express the necessary violences specifically visited upon peoples in the decolonized and still-colonized worlds as the constitutive conditions under which a specifically EuroAmerican concept of the human is possible and necessary as a regulative ideal in world politics. In order to properly understand these specific problematics, however, I will need to introduce them in the context of the broader theoretical field with which this thesis is attempting to engage. This is of course, the field of critical security theory that engages the theories of continental European philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Benjamin, Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida, in order to conceptualize, critique, and rethink some of the fundamental ontological assumptions embedded in received accounts of international relations, and its discursive and/or performative problematics of identity, security, community, and war, among others.

As such, I have found it necessary in this thesis to synthesize brief exegeses of what I think are helpful politico-theoretical tools in Deleuze, Foucault, and Nietzsche, in order to
understand the vernaculars, and indeed, the stakes of accounts of contemporary world politics by
critical security theorists such as Dillon and Reid, Glezos, Walker, Grovogui, and der Derian.\textsuperscript{11}
To this end, the remainder of this introduction attempts to offer an overview of the basic problem
of war in both Nietzsche and Foucault, and their reception in the field of critical security theory.
I then move on to discuss my basic analytical framework through a discussion of semiotics and
symptomization, which I pick up from James der Derian’s injunction for such an analytical
framework in the context of what he then called the logos, pathos, and ethos of the Global War
on Terror.\textsuperscript{12} I move on to offer a brief history of drones and drone warfare, before closing with a
brief overview of the thesis’ trajectory in the three chapters and conclusion that follow.

\textbf{Killing in the Name Of.: War, Biopower, Race}

The German literary critic and essayist Walter Benjamin, in what is perhaps his most
well-known essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” famously noted
that it is always fruitful, if conducting sociopolitical analyses and diagnoses, to attend to the
material and ideological means through which a society and its corresponding state prepares
itself for and mobilizes its own particular mode of war.\textsuperscript{13} Benjamin’s reflections on war yielded a
body of texts that expressed the onset of a mode of warfare that reduced human beings to a
“standing reserve,” in Heidegger’s words.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, they are a body of texts that ominously and
tragically at once draw on Nietzsche’s initial claims about the centrality of warfare for the
constitution and survival of liberalism and liberal institutions (not least among which was the
modern European state), as well as the fascistic mobilization of the German population,
materi ally and ideologically, for the onset of what would become the horrors of World War II
and the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{15} Regarding the impact of Nietzsche’s critique on both Benjamin and, more
broadly, subsequent attempts to critically theorize and theorize about war (about which I will say
more below), it is here worth recalling his critique of liberalism and liberal institutions for their capacity to foster what he called an

... increased herding animality... [...] On looking more accurately, we see that it is warfare which produces these results, warfare for liberal institutions which, as war allows illiberal instincts to continue. And warfare educates for freedom. For what is freedom? To have the will to be responsible for one’s self. To keep the distance which separates us. To become more indifferent to hardship, severity, privation, and even to life. To be ready to sacrifice men for one’s cause, one’s self not excepted. Freedom implies that manly instincts, instincts which delight in war and triumph, dominate over other instincts; for example over the instincts of ‘happiness.’ [...] The free man is a warrior. - How is freedom measured in individuals, as well as nations? By the resistance which has to be overcome, by the effort which it costs to retain superiority.\(^{16}\)

That war is a fruitful site for sociopolitical analyses has, seemingly, been taken as a particular truism (consciously or not) in the history of the discipline and study of International Relations; indeed, the canon and discursive domain of International Relations - of the so-called “realist” and “neo-realist” variety, especially - presuppose a state of “war” as a key constitutive condition under which claims to knowledge about the wider domain of IR theory and practice can be made, to such a degree as to incite claims of poverty and crisis in the very capacity of this discipline to lay a claim to legitimate knowledge about both war and international relations itself.\(^{17}\) More interesting, however, than these somewhat mainstream and even canonical accounts of warfare in IR theory and practice, is the recent emergence of a school of so-called critical security theories inaugurated by the work of critical theorists such as David Campbell, James der Derian, Michael Dillon, and Julian Reid, among others.\(^{18}\) This school of thought typically takes as its point of departure the late French philosopher Michel Foucault’s theses regarding the problem and centrality of warfare in the making and governance of liberal European states and societies.

In articulating these arguments, we should note that Foucault himself was drawing directly on Nietzsche’s claims about war that I quoted above, the thought of German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz regarding war in the age of mass populations and the citizen-
soldier, and that of German legal theorist Carl Schmitt who argued about the fundamental ontological necessity of the friend/enemy distinction to modern political thought. Following on Nietzsche, Foucault, as well as those contemporary critical security theorists that have sought to write with and beyond their thought (a project with which I have aligned this thesis), Foucault demonstrates not only that war provided the material conditions through which nascent modern states could constitute themselves, indeed, the very philosophy and mode of warfare through which these states were constituted fundamentally underpinned and animated the normative imperatives through which human social life was lived and experienced. Echoing Nietzsche in this regard, Foucault noted: “... The law was born in burning towns and ravaged fields. It was born together with the famous innocents who died at the break of day... Law is not pacification, for beneath the law, war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power, even in the most regular. War is the motor behind institutions and order. In the smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war... We are all inevitably someone's adversary.”

That war is the very constitutive condition through which the peace that is (quite inaccurately, as this thesis demonstrates) supposedly provided by the normative conditions of liberalism and the liberal state can be achieved and secured is not a novel claim borne from either Nietzsche or Foucault, nor is it particularly “Nietzschean” or “Foucauldian” (if such adjectives can be accurately applied to any claim) to make this argument. Indeed, this is an old story that has a long and dubious history in both political theory and its (mis-)interpretations of figures like Machiavelli and Hobbes, as well as in more traditional and mainstream historico-political accounts about the advent and evolution of the modern territorial state. In both cases, this claim is not simply articulated, it is taken as an a priori fact that must be assumed in order to enter any conversation about either war and/or international politics in a serious manner. Cliché
though such a claim may be then, in making it, Foucault nevertheless offered a particularly insightful contribution to this tropical legacy in political thought namely because, as Julian Reid notes, “[t]hrough Foucault it is possible to pose questions and develop modes of analysis of the relations between war and the development of liberal societies that take is some way beyond the ordinary limits of studies derived from existing traditions of IR.”²⁴ In this way, as we will see, the question of drones allows us to open up questions about how life is currently being made to live (or somewhat differently, being said to be made to live) by discourses and performances constitutive of advanced liberal states’ - led by the United States - ongoing global counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations.

Chief among the reasons that Foucault’s theses have garnered such purchase in, and indeed, have helped to inaugurate the very field of critical security theory is the fact that at the base of his theories about war is the idea that knowledge produced in and for the conduct of war in the modern, liberal period of European politics and political institutions (beginning around the close of the seventeenth century), itself produced - and, when genealogically engaged, reveals - an understanding of the limits of what is understood and deemed to be a proper human and a properly human life, and thus conversely, what is not. This theme of differentiation between a modern, reasonable, subject on the one hand, and a supposedly anti- or pre-modern, unreasonable subject on the other, both of which are constituted by the advent of novel technologies of governance from the seventeenth century on, is one that underpins a majority of Foucault’s major works; in this regard, I speak more directly to this theme in the second chapter of this thesis as I engage his early work on heterotopias, about which I will say more below.²⁵ Specifically however, Foucault’s theses on war dealt with and offered some crucial philosophical, social, and historical insights about how, in their quest to remove war from the
supposed realm of social order in liberal societies, liberal European states in fact instantiated a
new from of warfare that crystallized around and staked its claim on its ability to secure, (re)produce, and administer life itself. Reflecting on these arguments, Dillon and Reid note that

Liberalism universalizes war, then, not simply in the name of human life, but in promotion of a
quite distinct form of ‘biohumanity’. Committed to promoting and securing the life of the
biohuman means, indeed, that liberal rule must be prepared to wage war not so much for the
human, but on the human. It does so by seeking, among other things, to globalize the
domesticating power of civil society mechanisms in a war against all other cultural forms,
invoking horror at other cultural, as well as tyrannical, political practices as its generic causus
belli; practices it nonetheless also finds useful, on occasion, to patronize rather than to demonize...
[the] liberal way of war, which, waging war on the human in the name of the biohuman,
systematically also now demonizes human being, from the individual to the collective, as the very
locus of the infinite threat posed to the biohuman by the diverse undecidability of the human as
such.26

Dillon and Reid, as we will see throughout the course of this thesis, are crucial figures for
understanding the procedure, performance, and stakes of what they call the liberal way of war;
that is, the mode of warfare peculiar to states and societies that have inherited the legacy of a
series of complex historical, social, political, economic, and cultural transitions that emerged
around the end of the seventeenth century, states and societies that hope to realize the imperative
of removing war from the normal function of a society through the mobilization of war itself.27

Central to this claim that Dillon and Reid make by way of Foucault are the concepts of biopower
and biopolitics, which Foucault himself defined as “... the administration of bodies and the
calculated management of life.”28 Through drones, as we will see, it is possible to semiotically
and symptomatically read novel modes of administering bodies and managing life - in a highly
absent-neocolonial manner, as I argue in Chapter II - that are necessarily inaugurated and
attended by the lethal practice of warfare itself.

To this end, however, the centrality of the concept of race both in Foucault’s theses about
the biopolitical imperatives of warfare, as well as in the constitutive ontological presuppositions
of theories about and practices that perform world politics that Siba Grovogui has highlighted,29
remain troublingly under-theorized. In this regard, I do not mean an exegesis of what Foucault may or may not have “meant” by race, nor do I mean a retrieval of the intellectual legacies from which his theory of race was borne. Both of these projects have been pursued and engaged to a helpful, if not particularly interesting, effect. The most serious of such engagements, to my mind, unsurprisingly, comes once again from Michael Dillon. Engaging the relationship between race, biopower, and Achille Mbembe’s problematic but nevertheless provocative theory of what he calls “necropolitics,” Dillon argues:

Necropolitics is the ‘letting die’ required by the biopolitical injunction to ‘make live.’ Making live must systematically adjudicate the living in respect of their contribution or otherwise to the project of making ‘life’ live. Just as making live can be a violent process, so letting die is no mere accident. It is here that racial markers are commonly employed to operationalise the biopolitical adjudication required to follow the injunction to make life live. Hence biopolitics, necropolitics and race are closely related phenomena. Race contributes directly to the triangulation of biopolitics with its necropolitics. That triangulation helps strip biopolitics with of any assumed innocence in respect of its project of making life live.

As such, I take the term “race” to mean a key, biopolitical metric overcoded with imperial power relations inherited from the colonial legacies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a metric that facilitates what I call in Chapter III - vis-à-vis an exegesis of this phenomenon as it is theorized by Nietzsche - socio-ontological identification and violent, fatal, differentiation. I am less interested in retrieving and working through Foucault’s conceptualization of a “race war,” as some readers of his theory of race have suggested, than I am with exploring the potential implications of triangulation between biopower, race, and necropolitics that Dillon has suggested above. While, as should be clear by now, the biopolitical function and injunctions embedded in the contemporary “liberal way of war” has been powerfully and helpfully articulated by theorists such as Dillon and Reid (among others), much less has been said about the way in which the novel technologies, discourses, and logics through which this mode of war operates are fraught with embedded racializations of power dynamics between the global North and the global South. Even less has been said about the way in which
these embedded racializations themselves are the direct heirs to the legacy of presuppositions and ultimately, divisions, between Western and non-Western peoples that are the product of regimes of knowledge that emerged through the disciplinary practice of anthropological ethnography during the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{33}

Through a reading of the function and operation of these regimes of otherness in the current context of the United States’ current military and intelligence campaigns against supposed terrorists and terrorist organizations, primarily in the Middle East and Africa, this thesis seeks to write both with and beyond both Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s theories of liberalism, biopower and war; as well as those of Dillon and Reid, as they have been drawn from those former theorists. Dillon and Reid’s reading of Foucault is particularly helpful here insofar as it demonstrates that what is at stake in Foucault’s theories is nothing less than the negotiation and the administration of what is a fundamentally \textit{human} life that must be made to live, and what is a fundamentally \textit{(in)human} life that must be killed in order to ensure the success of that project.\textsuperscript{34} In so doing, this thesis attempts to explore the operation and implications of the triangulation between race, biopower (which itself fundamentally relies on necropower and necropolitics as I suggested through Dillon above), and the liberal way of war through a semiotic reading of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or “drone” warfare. The remainder of this introduction will be concerned with explaining what I mean by a semiotic reading of drone warfare, introducing the figure of drones and the practice of drone warfare, and finally, laying out the trajectory of this thesis’ three chapters.

**Semiotics, Symptoms, Tragedy**

In a study of the “\textit{logos}, \textit{pathos}, and \textit{ethos}” of what was, at the time of writing, still referred to as the so-called “Global War on Terror,” James der Derian called for a critical
semiotics of the images that the various “sides” of this war (the United States, al-Qaeda and bin Laden, and curiously, anti-war activists such as Michael Moore) produced in order to propagate and justify their claims to the politico-moral superiority of their campaign against their respective enemy. About this project, and semiotics more generally, der Derian writes:

... ‘semiotics’, or the study of signs, emerged in the 16th century in the arts of war and medicine. It referred to new methods of military manoeuvre based on visual signals, as well as new medical techniques for identifying pathological symptoms in humans. From day one signs had the power to kill as well as to cure. In the 21st century we need to develop a new semiotics for the images of the war against terror. Otherwise we will continue treating its most morbid symptoms with morality plays rather than finding a cure for the all-too-real disease of imperial politics.\textsuperscript{35}

In effect, der Derian is here inviting us as critical security theorists to take the very real material stuff of contemporary securitization processes, phenomena, and discourses (such as drones and drone warfare, as this thesis demonstrates) as signifying symbols that are enunciated and circulated by proponents of counterinsurgency/counterterrorism security strategies in order to politically legitimate and make intelligible their epistemological and ontological claims about the kinds and sources of danger and threat over and against whom liberal societies and subjects supposedly need to be secured. Moreover, this invitation to a critical semiotics, given its genealogical origins in both medicine and warfare, suggests that as critical theorists, we use semiotic images such as the drone in order to theoretically “diagnose” some of the most intractable, but necessary, politics animating the impasses and contradictions that are borne from the hysterical claims about the need to secure liberal societies and subjects widely evident in the thought of counterinsurgency/counterterrorism theorists such as David Kilcullen, for example. Such diagnoses in turn allow us to read widely circulated semiotic images in contemporary security practices and theories, such as the drone and drone warfare, as symptoms of deeper politico-theoretical problems really at play in the very material stuff of “security” and the kind of thought that produces such a field of practice. If this can be understood as der Derian’s invitation
to a certain kind of praxis of critique, in short, then it is this invitation to which I am attempting to respond in this thesis.

der Derian’s injunction for a critical semiotics of warfare itself has crucial and not coincidental forebears in the work of both Nietzsche and Foucault, which I think helps to situate the theoretical impetus behind a semiotic reading of drones. Beyond the obvious imbrication of epistemic signs and frameworks for the understanding and ontological self-constitution of a biopolitical logos and pathos of liberal war that Dillon, Reid, and Campbell have highlighted in Foucault’s work in particular, it is here worth noting that Foucault’s own socio-historical “project” (for lack of a better term) was deeply indebted to Nietzsche’s approach to the problems and debates in the history of European philosophy as a “symptomization” or diagnostic assessment of the political, economic, and cultural contexts to which they were attempting to respond. To that end, Foucault explicates the role of genealogy in his work and in the praxis of critique more generally when, reflecting on Nietzsche directly, he argues

The genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of origin, somewhat in the manner of the pious philosopher who needs a doctor to exorcise the shadow of his soul. He must be able to recognize the events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats - the basis of all beginnings, atavisms, and heredities. Similarly, he must be able to diagnose the illnesses of the body, its conditions of weakness and strength, its breakdowns and resistances, to be in a position to judge philosophical discourse.

Read in this light, the potential purchase of the kind of semiotics that der Derian suggests might hold for a critical theoretical reading of contemporary warfare and securitization practices amounts to a kind of socio-cultural symptomization of broader currents in both the contemporary performances and inherited heredities embedded in these kinds of violent performances in world politics. This kind of symptomization then, would help us to open up questions about and critically examine the kinds of problems to which both the material technology, as well as the discursive image and/or figure of drones, is intended to be an effective and progressive response. Indeed, this is precisely what this thesis seeks to achieve.
In principle, this is not a particularly new idea to the field of critical international relations theory. The fundamental impetus of this approach to theoretical problems, debates, and conceptualizations in supposedly canonical and/or “mainstream” accounts of international relations as a disciplinary discourse has been deployed to a devastating effect by, for example, RBJ Walker, another theorist central to the formulation of my arguments in this thesis. Not least of Walker’s theoretical contributions to this thesis are unsettling questions he poses of what he sees as the conceptual limits and theoretical untenability of what have come to be uncritically received accounts and presuppositions about the structure, operation, and negotiation of both the field of international studies as well as the “system” to which it supposedly epistemically refers. This approach, however, is not one that we should think of as confined to or solely emerging from Walker’s work. It bears repeating, at the risk of redundancy, that the diagnostic impulse of a Nietzschean/Foucauldian critical response to theories about and performances of warfare and securitization that are part of a larger mobilization effort necessary to the function of the biopolitical, liberal way of war is indeed evident in the works of Campbell, der Derian, Dillon, Glezos, Grovogui, and Reid; these are all crucial figures that I engage in detail throughout the course of this thesis.

What the explicit and specific recourse to the symptomization or diagnostic of broader cultural, social, and political problems vis-à-vis a critical semiotic reading of drones should suggest, once again with and beyond these aforementioned theorists, is that this thesis is, in its deepest impetus, an attempt to - à la Nietzsche and Foucault - retrieve and meditate on the tragedy of narratives about Western Reason, progress, and modernity (or indeed, postmodernity, if such a thing can be identified) more widely, specifically as these narratives have historically legitimated the disproportionate influence and control of the non-Western world by European
and American empires. As Foucault notes regarding this deeper impetus in both Nietzsche’s thought and the works of figures like Weber that followed therefrom:

At the centre of these limit-experiences of the Western world is the explosion, of course, of the tragic itself - Nietzsche having shown that the tragic structure from which the history of the Western world is made is nothing other than the refusal, the forgetting and silent collapse of tragedy. Around that experience, which is central as it knots the tragic to the dialectic of history in the very refusal of tragedy by history, many other experiences gravitate. Each one, at the frontiers of our culture, traces a limit that simultaneously signifies an original division.  

The question of Tragedy however, is a deeper problem that I will return to in Chapter III and the concluding reflections of this thesis via Nietzsche and Dillon. There remains a more immediate and obvious question that we need to confront and address, that being: Under what conditions, and in what context, can we semiotically read drones as an image, or sign, or symbol, or indeed, symptom of the biopolitical and indeed, racial (as I suggest in this thesis), liberal way of war? I will begin to answer this question by way of some preliminary notes on what exactly I mean by drones and the figure of drones, and what it is said to be used for.

**The Faster Blade: A Brief History of Drones and Drone Warfare**

The official categorization(s) of drones used by the United States military, arms industry, and governing bodies (including Congress, the Executive, and the Department of Defense) is in fact twofold: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is the name assigned to the actual aircraft that is deployed, while Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) refers more widely to the assemblage-network of computers, bandwidth connections, military personnel, and the like that are required in the operation of any UAV. Moreover, there is an overwhelming preponderance of different models in use throughout the four main arms of the United States military (the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the Coast Guard, border patrol agencies such as Homeland Security, and, more clandestinely, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The term “drone” then, is here used to refer to five main “large UAV” systems currently being deployed to varying degrees, and to some extent, for varying purposes by these
agencies; a second category, “small UAV” systems, which can be transported and deployed by individual soldiers and/or agents, and are used primarily for short-range surveillance purposes, are similarly deployed, but are less central to the basic problems that this thesis seeks to unpack. Specifically in this thesis, I focus on the military and intelligence agency deployments of this weapons system in the course of supposed counterterrorism operations, as they are currently deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, although there are some particularly pertinent analogues and overlaps of logic in the deployment of UAVs to police the United States’ shared border with Mexico, as well as shipping lanes, namely those that run through the Gulf of Aden.

Despite the prevalence in recent years of news articles cataloguing the lethal instances and consequences of the increasingly prominent role drones are playing in the United States’ global counterterrorism campaigns in these aforementioned regions of the world (a spatial-racial relationship that I explain in detail in chapter two of this thesis), UAVs have been deployed in United States military operations since 1917, during the First World War. Between that time and the early years of the new millennium, UAVs have been deployed by a number of advanced liberal militaries to serve a variety of purposes, namely, as moving aerial targets for training combatants, as well as for surveillance and intelligence-gathering missions. It was not until the early 1980’s when the Reagan administration, primarily citing the success of Israeli UAS deployments during the Lebanese occupation (though they were at this time, still unarmed), began to conceive of utilizing UAVs in an explicitly weaponized capacity; these designs were ultimately realized in 2002, with the first successful test flight of a weaponized UAV.

Today, UAVs make up almost half of the entire United States military’s air fleet, with around 10,000 manned aerial vehicles to about 7,500 unmanned. About 140 drones, ostensibly
controlled and deployed by the Air Force and the Army, are of the so-called “Reaper,” “Predator,” and “Gray Eagle” types, which are specifically designed for “precision strikes,” that is, the specified targeting and killing of supposedly dangerous bodies abroad by remote operators located either in the United States, or on a regionally proximate military base or warship (though it is widely recognized that the CIA itself launches such missions as well with an even more expansive fleet, the exact numbers are, for obvious reasons, unclear and unavailable). Another 6,700 are controlled and deployed by the Marines, Navy, and SOCOM for ostensibly surveillance purposes; these types of UAV are not listed as being equipped with the necessary capacity to launch precision strikes against targets. This increase in the overall number of both drones and their deployments is reflected in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) FY2012 request to congress for a projected $3.9 billion budget for further development and purchase of UASs by the military from their primary corporate manufacturers: Northrop Grumman, General Atomics, and Boeing. Moreover, In addition to their current primary deployment as a weapons system that figures centrally in global counterterrorism campaigns, Gertler lists an additional series of experimental (that is, current deployments in a limited capacity) and potential applications for UAS:

Other missions for which UAS appear useful, or are being considered in the near term, include electronic attack (also called stand-off jamming, or escort jamming), and psychological operations, such as dropping leaflets. UAS such as the Army’s Shadow have been evaluated for their capability to deliver critical medical supplies needed on the battlefield.

While UAS use in foreign theaters is well established, one of the most commonly discussed new mission areas for UAS is homeland defense and homeland security. The Coast Guard and U.S. Border Patrol already employ UAS such as the Eagle Eye and Predator to watch coastal waters, patrol the nation’s borders, and protect major oil and gas pipelines.

It appears that interest is growing in using UAS for a variety of domestic, and often non-defense roles. Long-duration law enforcement surveillance, a task performed by manned aircraft during the October 2002 sniper incident near Washington, DC, is one example. The U.S. Department of Transportation has studied possible security roles for UAS, such as following trucks with hazardous cargo, while the Energy Department has been developing high-altitude instruments to measure radiation in the atmosphere. UAS might also be used in sparsely populated areas of the
western United States to search for forest fires. Following the widespread destruction of Hurricane Katrina, some suggest that a UAS like Global Hawk could play roles in “consequence management” and relief efforts. Also, UAS advocates note that countries like South Korea and Japan have used UAS for decades for crop dusting and other agricultural purposes.

The potential deployment of drones in the policing of domestic territory here should recall Didier Bigo’s recent argument that the boundary between international or interstate military operations and domestic police practices and policies, is in the process of wholesale reconfiguration, to such a degree that military and policing technologies, practices, and operations are increasingly coming to represent the geometrical indeterminacy of a möbius ribbon rather than the traditional visual analogue of a bounded circle with a clearly defined inside and outside, police pertaining to the inside, military to the outside.46

Further, it suggests that drones themselves are a symptomatic expression of a deep theoretical problematic and debate currently taking place in the discursive domain of IR theory, largely concerned with determining whether the contemporary configurations, performances, and processes of world politics are still by and large ordered by either a sovereign system of sovereign states, or by the return to a United States-led (or somewhat differently, primarily neoliberal capitalist) form of empire.47 It is not my intention to align myself with, nor to argue in favor of, either side of this debate. Instead, I largely accept Walker’s argument, that while both the terms “international” and “empire” retain a valuable discursive currency, if a nevertheless conceptually cliché and impoverished one, “... neither international nor imperial are entirely persuasive terms through which to understand the dynamics of contemporary political life, even if neither of them is simply dispensable, while claims about the exceptional are increasingly disturbing in their implications.”48

There are a number of troubling potential implications that might follow from deploying drones for the purpose of assisting disaster relief, policing domestic territory, monitoring and
securing the flow of high-value and highly volatile commodities (that is, the securitization of capital, as Luis Lobo-Guerrero has discussed extensively), and the patrolling of national borders offer some interesting points of reflection - most notably on the play of society and state building capacities developed through technologies intended to make war, a phenomenon we will recall from my discussion of war above. Indeed, these statements offer whole constellations of even more interesting possibilities for further research. The primary focus of this thesis is however, as I have said, on the deployment of UAVs in the context of the United States’ (and its allies’) global counterterrorism military campaigns. To this end, I think that Walker’s claim about the increasingly exceptional nature underpinning any grand architectonic vision of world politics - à la Schmitt is particularly compelling, especially when brought into relief alongside an understanding of the primary impetuses behind the increasingly preponderant deployment of drones in global counterterrorism operations.

Drones, it is claimed, offer the United States three crucial strategic advantages over the vaguely-defined enemy targeted in by counterterrorism operations: First, they are believed to be more cost-effective than manned aircraft. Second, they reduce or indeed, almost entirely eliminate the risk of mortal harm visited upon the pilot. Third, they allow the United States to establish a persistent and indefinite surveillance infrastructure globally, that can collapse and undo the spatiotemporal limits to how far and for how long a human body can move through the air at high speed. To these strategic advantages, we might add a final tactical advantage that was best articulated in a recent speech delivered by one of the Obama administration’s chief legal counsels:

... this Administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, including:
First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and

Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

In U.S. operations against al-Qaeda and its associated forces—including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles—great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.52

Drones, it is believed then, allow for the maximum capacity of discrimination and facilitates the minimalization of any potential collateral damage that may occur in the event that an attack need be launched against a specific target. The technē of Schmitt’s sovereign par excellence; a violent weapon become decision-machine.53 I will speak more to this technic calculation of threat and risk in the first and second chapters of this thesis, ultimately arguing in the third chapter that the deployment of drones is symptomatically expressive of nihilistic discourses and performances upon which many contemporary accounts of the supposed “ethics” of engaging in violent actions in world politics stake their claim to legitimacy. What is worth recognizing here, however, is the explicitly biopolitical nature of this liberal war machine, as we noted Dillon and Reid defined these kinds of phenomena above:54 drones are the Obama administration’s weapon of choice in counterterrorism operations, precisely because it is believed that this weapon can make certain lives worth living live, while allowing (making) other lives not worth living die. Drones are a fundamental nexus through which humanity and (in)humanity is categorized, decided, and intervened upon. Drones enframe, order, and reveal a standing reserve of (in)humanity (for example, the (in)humanity of populations indiscriminately targeted and attacked by such strikes in the tribal regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, Yemen, or Somalia) that must be killed, in order to secure contemporary claims to the humanity of Western states like the U.S. (and thus, the humanity of the bodies they claim to be securing), and thus the universal justness of both the
means and ends of this violent process of securitization. This is how I think we should begin to semiotically read the drone.

In this regard, it is curious and troubling to note that minimal academic effort has been put toward any serious and deep reflection on drones; perhaps most surprisingly, chief among the fields that seemingly have a good claim to offer some insightful reflections on the deployment of UAVs, but have nevertheless remained silent are those of both international relations and critical theory, to say nothing of critical IR theory itself. This is particularly surprising given the steep and marked ascendance in the number of deployments UAVs have experienced in the past four to six years, as we have noted above. Much of the literature that does directly take up the issue of drones either deals with one of three problems: 1) The overall legality of its unilateral use by the United States in an international legal system of sovereign states that stakes its claim to legitimacy on its capacity to first and foremost secure equivalencies in sovereignties between states; 2) the moral legitimacy of using a non-human machine to kill humans in the name of humanity; or finally, 3) the overall strategic effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness of this weapon in a global war against terrorists and terrorist organizations, primarily because using drones in this manner requires U.S. forces to primarily target already devastated, exploited, and disenfranchised communities that are said to be so-called “hotbeds” of terrorist recruitment and sanctuary. Only one article in a critical vein directly addresses drones, reading it as a Deleuzian assemblage of embodiment. While I am in agreement with the article’s author on this point, I note in my critique of that article in chapter three, beyond the paltry attempt to explain the assemblage-ness of drones, the technology and context within which that technology are situated are theorized to a particularly vacuous and indeed, dangerous effect. Consequently, I read this as one of two examples of such arguments concerning drones in Chapter III in order to
symptomize some deep ontological problematics and stakes in contemporary world politics that I think they express.

Specifically, this thesis argues that drones are indeed a novel assemblage of biopolitical technologies deployed with the impetus to “make live and let die,” in Foucault’s words, therefore affirming the arguments Dillon and Reid have made in their theorization of the liberal way of war. In this thesis, I argue that drones and drone warfare inaugurate and attend a praxis of (in)humanity that constitutes, administers, and polices an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality, and that as an ethico-legal complex of problematics, symptomatically express supposedly necessary and ultimately, tragically nihilistic violences specifically visited upon peoples in the decolonized and still-colonized worlds as the constitutive conditions under which a specifically EuroAmerican concept of the human is possible and necessary as a regulative ideal in world politics. To read biopolitical practices currently operating and being deployed in the pursuit of a global war with the aim of counterterrorism (whatever that may be), and specifically, to read the deployment of UAVs primarily against territories, populations, and bodies in the global South, without a keen and deep exegesis of this presupposed divide, is indeed to efface some of the most central and disturbing stakes of this current mode of warfare.

Moreover, I argue that it is precisely through a semiotic reading of the drone that we can begin to lay out and understand some of these stakes. To that end, I offer a semiotics of the drone by using some key theories first articulated by Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and Friedrich Nietzsche over the course of the three chapters of this thesis, respectively. I tactically deploy these theories by situating them in the context of the critical security theories of figures like Dillon and Reid, Campbell, Grovogui, Glezos, der Derian and Walker, demonstrating the import and the purchase of the former on the latter, and attempting to write with and beyond both
literatures to symptomize the stakes and implications of humanity and (in)humanity in an age of drone warfare. The final section of this introduction then, will be dedicated to outlining the structure and trajectory of this thesis’ three main chapters.

**Tracing the Narrative**

In engaging Deleuze, Foucault, and Nietzsche and their deployments in the field of critical security theory respectively throughout the three chapters that follow, I am trying to answer three basic questions about drones and drone warfare: 1) What do drones do?; 2) How do drones know, and know *how*, to do this?; and 3) What are some of the implications that we can draw from analyzing what it is drones do and how they do it? Each chapter deals with its numerical parallel in this list, and in the process attempts to offer an answer, the successive series of which might read like: 1) Drones, as a consequence of their technological capabilities and the strategic imperatives to adopt such capacities, and as a consequence of the peculiar demands to which they are supposedly responding, realize a military techno-fetishism of swiftly, totally, and fatally identifying and exterminating an (in)human enemy. 2) Drones are run by human operators and both computer and human networks of knowledge culled from massive databases that biopolitically identify, categorize, and calculate metrics that determine whether or not a target and her surrounding population is a human life worthy of making live, or if she and her community are (in)human enemies that need to be killed from a distance. Further, these metrics are products of power relations and thus sites of knowledge production reifying the exploitative and violent power relations established during the Age of Empire and European nihilism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is to say that, because of *where* and *against whom* drones are specifically deployed, and because of the inherited power relations from older forms of colonialism, drones help to establish a neocolonialism based on principles of metric
exceptionality, metrics drawn from and articulated according to racial, cultural, and economic criteria that circumscribe, codify, and target supposed (in)human bodies that must be killed in order to make human life live. 3) The ethical and the legal arguments that take drones and their deployment as a question to be answered, and in so doing generally affirming the legitimacy of drone strikes, express a symptomatic nihilism in the context of the inheritance of imperial power relations, as well as in the necessarily limited nature of the supposedly universal concept of the human as a regulative ideal in both discourses and politics of world politics itself. This means that we need to come to terms with what is at stake in contemporary conceptualizations and elisions of identity/difference structures, and the constitutive cost of those structures themselves.

As such, Chapter I obviously takes as its point of departure Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s highly influential theses on what they called state, nomad, and worldwide war machines. 62 I argue in this chapter that drones and what are called their reconnaissance-strike complexes are a weapon that are situated within, deployed by, and indeed, symptomatically expressive of an emergent worldwide war machine that attempts to capture and command the evasive strategic factors of speed and persistent presence (or as Glezos calls it somewhat differently, potential omnipresence); 63 this is accomplished through a rhizomatic assemblage of both what are considered to be properly human bodies and the intelligent machines (UAVs and their supporting technological and informational infrastructures in UASs more generally) that allow for these bodies to be biopolitically made to live by absenting their presence in the theater of war.

I argue that drones and drone warfare are a particularly telling example of the fundamental aporia inherent to the worldwide war machine that relies upon the perceived speed of nomad war machines while simultaneously seeking to capture, command, and ultimately,
destroy this speed, the speed of becoming-dangerous. I do this by first offering a brief exegesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s theories on war machines; followed by a discussion of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as Glezos similarly conceptualizes this phenomenon through the theory of war machines; a theorization - once again through Deleuze - of drones as weapons of war machines; and finally, a discussion of how this weapon and its constituent war machine inaugurate a praxis of (in)humanity.

Following from these observations, Chapter II engages two of Michel Foucault’s most famous concepts: heterotopias and biopower. Although the former is a much older concept than the latter, I argue in this chapter that it is crucial to understanding not only the biopolitical mechanics and implications of drones and what are called their “reconnaissance-strike complexes,” but also the colonial nature of the power relations that both the production of knowledge from which the imperatives and targets for drones are drawn, as well as the very violences that drones enact.

To that end, I argue that these complexes constitute an absent neocolonial exceptionalism best understood through the lens of Foucault’s theorization of heterotopias. Heterotopias, as we will see, are places without place that organize a hierarchical topology of relations between discrete sites, wherein no internality can be understood independently of its external relationship with interrelated, discrete, internalities, both those that are proximate and distanced in the hierarchy of relations organized therein.64 Drones are facilitating the constitution of a kind of absent neocolonial exceptionalism as they open up supposedly perfect spaces of biopolitical administration based on the undisclosed praxis of (in)humanity that their deployment inaugurates.65 I argue that this is a neocolonial topology of relations, not as an associative act on either one side of the contemporary debate in IR theory about which I spoke in the introduction
as positing that the structural order of international politics presently is *either* one of empire/imperialism (most likely, American or more broadly, neoliberal), or one of a states system; instead, I argue that it is a neocolonial topology of relations because it is operating within an epistemological and ontological genealogy directly inherited from the colonial legacies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I present this argument first through a reading of Foucault’s essay “Des Espaces Autres” that first conceptualized heterotopias (and further, demonstrating how biopower is implicated in this concept). Following that, I discuss Dillon and Reid’s theorizations of biopower in the contemporary context of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations (what they call “the liberal way of war”), and identify three sites of biopolitical knowledge production that help to determine where and under what conditions drones can and must be deployed to fatally strike a target. I close this chapter by these observations bringing into historical relief by discussing Siba Grovogui’s historical genealogy of the imperial inheritances of contemporary international political structures and power relations.

Finally, Chapter III reads through Friedrich Nietzsche’s theory of the socio-ontological recognition of identity and difference as read through his understanding of “herd” morality. Understanding this thesis’ conceptualization of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes as a *praxis* of (in)humanity that inaugurate and police an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality as I have described these concepts thus far, this chapter argues that as an emergent *ethico-legal* problem in contemporary world politics - evidenced by two works I engage directly here by Ryan Vogel and Allison Williams, respectively - drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes need to be semiotically read as a symptomatic expression of what I call the ethico-legal complex of problematics of that crystallize around the category of the human as a fundamental and constitutive *limit concept* in the context of contemporary world politics; this
will be the primary concept that I want to work through in this chapter. Put differently, the *praxis* of (in)humanity played through the absent neocolonialism of exceptionality that drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurate demonstrate the *tragic* limits (a term I will define below) of contemporary conceptualizations of humanity or *post*humanity that increasingly stake their claims to legitimacy on the supposed capacity of a secured-yet-embodied and/or expanded field of international politics to in fact provide access to the categorical identification of “human” for certain bodies, while violently exterminating certain other, (in)human bodies in order to achieve this goal.\(^7^0\)

To that end, following the structural pattern of this thesis’ previous two chapters, I offer a brief exegesis of Nietzsche’s theory; followed by a discussion of the problem of ethics in international relations theory through Burgess and Walker; this is succeeded by a demonstration of the nihilisms about which I am arguing through a critique of two articles by Ryan Vogel and Allison Williams; and finally, a reflection (with an eye toward the conclusion) of the implications and triangulation of nihilism, tragedy, and virtuous war through the work of Nietzsche, Dillon, and der Derian. Following Chapter III, the conclusion of this thesis outlines the primary themes and arguments that I attempt to make in this thesis, and subsequently return to the triangulation of Nihilism, Tragedy and Virtue as I have present it in Chapter III in order to suggest how we might think through and explore what I call the Tragic nihilism of which the ethico-legal complex of problematics legitimating the use of drones as a productive object of critique from which we can begin to rethink the stakes and function of identity and otherness in attempts to “secure” humans in world politics.
I. War Within a Breath
Drones, Speed, and the Praxis of (In) Humanity

“Signs of blood have been written by them on the way they went, and it was taught by their folly that truth is proved by blood.”

- Friedrich Nietzsche

Sleep Now in the Fire: Drones, Speed, and the Praxis of (In) Humanity

In this chapter, as part of this thesis’ project to write with and beyond both Foucault’s theories as well as those of Dillon and Reid, I will engage Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s equally influential theses on what they have called nomad, state, and worldwide war machines, as part of this thesis’ broader attempt to theorize beyond Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s original triangulations of biopower, war, and liberalism. Deleuze and Guattari’s treatise is helpful because, as Julian Reid notes in his own attempt to read these two bodies of work together, “Deleuze and Guattari identify a comparable problematic involving the relations between power, life, and war in their account of the strategy of political sovereignty.” As a result, Deleuze and Guattari help us to think through some of the broad strategies and imperatives to which Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s theories directed us in the introduction, but as we will see - specifically in Glezos’ deployment of their theses - they also help us to theorize beyond these thinkers insofar as they focus on the specific weapons and tactical maneuvers that military assemblages deploy in order to achieve the specific political imperatives in whose name war is being waged.

The next section of this chapter attempts to offer a brief synopsis of Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis on nomad, state, and worldwide war machines. Nomad war machines, I argue, are only conceivable as a pure form of exteriority when it is in relation to that pure form of interiority that is the State-form, and indeed, the proliferation of the ontological presuppositions, anxieties, and institutions of control across multiple State forms, and indeed, beyond these forms
altogether (for example, in flows and flights of Capital). Through Deleuze and Guattari, I will demonstrate how it is possible to pose questions of and possibilities for logical and operational contradictions inherent in state and worldwide war machines, of which I argue drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are a crucial ballistic weapon; indeed, Delueze and Guattari will be especially helpful to this end for a semiotic reading of drones and drone warfare. In this regard, I move on to discuss Glezos’ interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari’s theories on speed in the context of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). From here, I discuss specifically how these factors pertain to the concept of weaponry (Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of which I will explain below) as a critical intervention through which we can further theorize drones and drone warfare. This is because, as a weapon of a worldwide war machine, and indeed, a weapon that is said to facilitate a persistent presence precisely through the absenting of human bodies and the velocity of their ballistic deployment, drones are fundamentally predicated on the kinds of deterritorializing speed that Glezos notes as being inherent to the imperatives of the RMA. Indeed, as a recent Congressional report on drones and drone warfare cites, “unmanned systems reduce the risk to our warfighters by providing a sophisticated stand-off capability that supports intelligence, command and control, targeting, and weapons delivery. These systems also improve situational awareness and reduce many of the emotional hazards inherent in air and ground combat, thus decreasing the likelihood of causing civilian noncombatant casualties.” “UAVs have gained favor as ways to reduce risk to combat troops, the cost of hardware time, and the reaction time in a surgical strike” and “to conduct missions in areas that are difficult to access or otherwise considered too high-risk for manned aircraft or personnel on the ground.”

So, in order to understand drones as weapons of a worldwide war machine, we need to understand the speed that they are said to activate and invent.

Glezos, through Deleuze and Guattari, demonstrates how their theses on war machines offer a toolkit that is helpful in critically theorizing attempts by military strategists and their political patrons to capture and command the factors of speed and rhizomatic network organization(s), in and through their deterritorialization from the anthropos and toward the
reterritorialization of weaponry capable of overcoming human limitations in order to secure and police human boundaries, the most crucial of which, for Glezos, is speed.\textsuperscript{78} I argue in this chapter that drones and drone warfare are the weapon of the worldwide war machine that symptomatically express the logic that Glezos identifies at play in the RMA \textit{par excellence}. Moreover, I suggest that, in their deployment, the weapons that are drones and drone warfare should be understood as the \textit{praxis} of (in)humanity; that is, they reveal and order an (in)humanity that they fundamentally presuppose and legitimate through the retroactive legitimacy of their attacks. This is because, as I demonstrate in Chapter III, there now exists a precedent for the \textit{praxis} of (in)humanity inaugurated by drones that above all privileges the category of \textit{humanity} as one that regulates the conditions under which drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes can and must be deployed, over and against the formerly-privileged category of citizenship. Indeed, responding to questions about the targeted assassination of the United States Citizen Anwar Al-Awlaki, US Attorney General Eric Holder affirmed such a legal precedent in a recent address to Northwestern University Law students and faculty, arguing that the due process of determining what I am here calling the (in)humanity of drones’ targets and the potential collateral damage that might follow on an attack thereupon, overrides any rights and/or privileges said to be afforded to even American citizens.\textsuperscript{79}

Consequently, in this chapter I read military discourses about the supposed “nature” of the contemporary global (in)security environment in order to contextualize and demonstrate the critical purchase that these theories have on our conceptualization contemporary counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations, the RMA, and specifically drones and drone warfare. I focus on discourses that espouse precisely \textit{how} drones and drone warfare are supposed to facilitate either the mitigation or total domination of the obstacles of spatial distantiation and
temporal velocity that plague attempts to respond to supposed threats to the project of securing the biopolitical striation and administration of human life at the expense of lives that are considered to be less than human; in other words, what Dillon and Reid have elsewhere referred to as a framework in contemporary security ontologies as a becoming-dangerous. For Dillon and Reid, this means the ontological emergence of threat as it is perceived and produced by a state military/security apparatus, as it codes bodies not only with already-available informatics, but indeed, the algorithmic potentiality of specifically-coded bodies that might indeed, become dangerous as this ontological apparatus sees it. I explore this concept and theme briefly in the concluding section of this chapter, and its actual function in the following chapter.

As such, this chapter argues that drones and drone warfare are a weapon that are situated within, deployed by, and indeed, symptomatically expressive of an emergent worldwide war machine that attempts to capture and command the evasive strategic factors of speed and persistent presence (or as Glezos calls it somewhat differently, potential omnipresence); this is accomplished through a rhizomatic assemblage of both what are considered to be properly human bodies and the intelligent machines (UAVs and their supporting technological and informational infrastructures in UASs more generally) that allow for these bodies to be biopolitically made to live by absencing their presence in the theater of war. I argue that drones and drone warfare are a particularly telling example of the fundamental aporia inherent to the worldwide war machine that relies upon the perceived speed of nomad war machines while simultaneously seeking to capture, command, and ultimately, destroy this speed, the speed of becoming-dangerous.
Drones and drone warfare, in deterritorializing claims to dualistic *spatial* boundaries between a disordered outside and an ordered inside, and reterritorializing that claim based on a technological, authoritative capacity to decide *when* and at what point (in)humans must be exterminated in order to make proper human lives live, demonstrate a novel practice of *exceptional* boundary policing that is troublingly theorized in Deleuze and Guattari’s observation that the worldwide war machine (in the context of this discussion, the RMA), for which drones are a crucial *weapon*, “... takes peace as its object directly, as the peace of Terror or Survival.”84

This is because, as Walker observes “... boundaries, borders, and limits [are] becoming further disaggregated, dislocated from territorial topographies, articulated in novel topological forms, laid out more obviously as zones and fields of practice, and increasingly susceptible to temporal quite as much as spatial accounts of what it means to authorize discriminations as boundaries, borders and limits.”85 As we will see, this is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari, and by extension, Glezos help us to conceptualize through the former’s theories of the deterritorializing imperatives embedded in the operational logics of nomad, state, and worldwide war machines; and through the latter’s adoption of Deleuze and Guattari to demonstrate these operational logics at play through the attempts to capture and command speed in the RMA. As such, the boundaries, borders and limits that drones are said to police and enforce - those between safe, human bodies and dangerous or becoming-dangerous (*in*)human bodies - are nothing less than the *praxis* of (in)humanity itself.
Spatiality, Movement, and the Mechanics of Nomad, State, and Worldwide War Machines

“Legend has it that when he awoke, he sensed that he had received and lost an infinite thing, something he would never be able to recover, or even to descry from afar, because the machine of the world is exceedingly complex for the simplicity of men.”

- Jorge Luis Borges

Deleuze and Guattari’s theses on war, life, power, and sovereignty are the product of their conceptual triangulation between what they identify as three different types of so-called “war machines:” nomad, State, and worldwide. As Glezos notes, these three types of war machines are further coupled in Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis with two corresponding types of speed, about which I will say more below. At the outset of this synopsis of Deleuze and Guattari’s theories, however, it is critical to note that the basic problem with which they are dealing, and as such, the critical point of intervention they open up is upon one that amounts to a fairly conventional Hobbesian spatial dualism: an ordered inside, a disordered outside, the injunction for the capture and command of the latter, by and for the securing and administration of the former; in other words, a political anthropology about civilized societies protected by spatial enclosure and striation, and uncivilized societies that threaten this protection and indeed, fundamentally undermine it in their very existence as such. As we will see, in taking up this trope of spatial dualism through their conceptualizations of nomad, state, and worldwide war machines, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate that this political anthropology of territorialization is in fact a political anthropology of the necessity for the state form and the consequential worldwide war machine that is borne therefrom necessarily must deterritorialize itself, and reterritorialize its attempts at self-securitization over and against a nomad war machine by mimicking the tendential essence of that war machine. As we will see, this political anthropology has a particularly pertinent purchase in understanding the contemporary of global counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Consider, for example, military strategist
David Kilcullen’s description of the United States military’s “struggle to adapt” to what he sees as the exogenous, uncivilized circumstances within which supposedly “stabilizing” counterinsurgency operations are being conducted:

In many insurgency environments, rapid, large-scale social change may also be occurring: mass population movement, ethnic or sectarian “cleansing,” flight of refugees and displaced persons, social revolution, or even genocide may be occurring alongside the guerrilla conflict itself. Thus, the imperative is to understand each environment, in real time, in detail, in its own terms, in ways that would be understood by the locals - and not by analogy with some other conflict.  

The Hobbesian narrative that I suggested above as being central to Deleuze and Guattari’s account of nomad, state, and worldwide war machines is predicated on their subsequent argument that the state and worldwide war machines attempt to capture and command en toto the productive contingency and innovation that they see as being essentially inherent to the nomad war machine, that is, the only type of “true” war machine, one that is entirely and essentially external to the state form, as we will see. This latter concept, they argue, is the fundamental ontological anxiety through which the state and worldwide war machine reproduce themselves, and this process of reproduction is only possible as a result of the dualism that produces the distinction between the rhizomatic, smooth assemblage of the nomad war machine on one side, and the arborescent, striated assemblages of the state and worldwide war machines on the other. For Deleuze and Guattari, the nomad war machine is that which the state sees as having evaded or escaped it, indeed, as they note, “It is not enough to affirm that the war machine is external to the apparatus. It is necessary to reach the point of conceiving the war machine itself as a pure form of exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes the form of interiority we habitually take as a model, or according to which we are in the habit of thinking.”

This is a narrative that Deleuze and Guattari retrieve through a reading of the anthropologist Pierre Clastres’ ethnographies, but it is one of which they are explicitly skeptical.
Consequently, it is more helpful to attend to Deleuze and Guattari’s use of this account as a material reference that helps explain the war machine as a concept as they see it, that is, as a pure form of exteriority that the state is always attempting to capture and command, than it is to uncritically receive this account as a sociohistorical or anthropological description of how nomadic tribes came to be incorporated into and by exogenous and hostile territorial states. Indeed, it is not particularly clear that they are convinced by the Hobbesian overtones in the spatiotemporal/cultural assumptions of Clastres’ account as empirical fact, as much as they are interested in the fundamentally canonical boundary that this reifies. What is at stake for Deleuze and Guattari here is less the production of a social state through war that prevents statehood, than Clastres’ production of this break itself. In fact, it is Clastres’ very reification of this boundary that I think Deleuze and Guattari find a field of analysis that disturbs more than it confirms the separation of war and the state.  

Insofar as Deleuze and Guattari recognize in this narrative a Hobbesian dualism, as I mentioned above, it is important to note that the nomad war machine in and of itself is only conceivable as a pure form of exteriority when it is in relation to that pure form of interiority that is the State: “It is hard to imagine primitive societies that would not have been in contact with imperial States, at the periphery or in poorly controlled areas. But of greater importance is the inverse hypothesis: that the State itself has always been in relation with an outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship.” Further, because the war machine is entirely and essentially external to the state form, and because the nomad war machine is the primary object of the states’s ontological anxiety about its capacity to secure its own existence, the state is always seeking to capture and command, that is to colonize the nomad war machine and deploy it to its own ends. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari continue: “It is in terms not of
independence, but of coexistence and competition in a perpetual field of interaction, that we must conceive of exteriority and interiority, war machines of metamorphosis and State apparatuses of identity, bands and kingdoms, megamachines and empires. The same field circumscribes its interiority in states, but describes its exteriority in what escapes States or stands against States.”

What is clear at this point is that the war machine, as a concept in Deleuze and Guattari, not only describes that which the State anxiously sees as having always already evaded or escaped its command and capture, it is also that which the State needs to capture, metabolize, striate, and reduce to itself, a process of colonization necessary to its own reproduction. Conversely, we might understand the concept of the State itself to be the capture, command, striation, and production of power-relations (through space, time, machines, and bodies) in both its ideational as well as its material attempts to colonize and totalize any understanding thereof.

Indeed, Glezos confirms this in his reading of the relationship between nomad and state war machines:

For Deleuze and Guattari the relationship between the state and nomad form is synchronic and oppositional. Whenever the state-form appears, there will be nomad war-machines to challenge it... The relationship is thus not historical, but geographic, not one of supplementation in time, but of conflict in space. The nomad war-machine wards off the coming of the state apparatus, and the state apparatus seeks to acquire and enclose the war-machine.

Indeed, it is only via the nomadic tribe that the state acquires a war-machine. Policing, enforcing, coercion, incarceration, punishment, and execution; these forms of violence come naturally to the state form, reinforcing, as they do, order and discipline. But to build a war machine - to invent a collective body capable of functioning without lines and borders, of living in the heat and chaos and uncertainty and friction of battle - this is antithetical to the arborescent structure of the state apparatus, which requires order and discipline.

From the point of its colonization of the nomad war machine, however, the state form’s attempt to capture and command the smooth, rhizomatic dynamism inherent to the nomad war machine will be constantly and necessarily plagued by resistance from issued from the war machine, precisely because the war machine is not colonizable as such. Nevertheless, this resistance, this
inherent capacity for the nomad war machine to draw creative lines of flight that escape and evade the total control of the state form’s war machine, are precisely the factors that make the nomad war machine the object of the state war machine’s anxiety, and thus the necessary to capture and command. Again, this is no longer a mere metaphor. In the context of the contemporary era of what has been termed by Antoine Bousquet as one of so-called “Chaoplexic Warfare,” the author notes,

At the turn of the century, the Pentagon adopted the doctrine of network-centric warfare and set out its vision of autonomous ‘swarming’ and ‘self-synchronized’ warfighting units connected to one another by high-speed data links and superior battlefield awareness. Of course, the actors that have truly excelled at adopting loose, decentralized organizational structures are the jihadist networks and insurgent movements that have tied down the net-enabled US army in Afghanistan and Iraq. The recently retired head of US Central Command responsible for operations in the Gulf and Central Asia, General John Abizaid, is in no doubt that ‘the enemy is in fact more networked, more decentralized, and operates within a broader commander’s intent than any twentieth century foe we’ve ever met. In fact, this enemy is better networked than we are.’ The lesson is clear, however: ‘It takes a network to beat a network, and our network must be better.’

We should be careful to note therefore, as Deleuze and Guattari do, that the nomad war machine does not offer the possibility of total emancipation from the state form; that is, it is not always and everywhere deployed to productive, revolutionary ends. On the contrary, because of the war machine’s fundamental tendency toward metamorphosis and flight, the state will constantly attempt to reconsolidate its totalizing interiority over and against the nomad war machine: the state war machine necessarily becomes a total, worldwide war machine. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, “The question is therefore less the realization of war than the appropriation of the war machine. It is at the same time that the State apparatus appropriates the war machine, subordinates it to its “political” aims, and gives it war as its direct object. And it is one and the same historical tendency that causes the State to evolve from a triple point of view: going from figures of encastment to forms of appropriation proper, going from limited war to so-called total war, and transforming the relation between aim and object.”

Put differently, this means that the state war machine, recognizing in its attempt to capture the nomadic war machine
the latter’s tendential essence to “... spring up unexpectedly, serving as an irruption of the new,” attempts to capture and command that essence itself, in the process of doing so however, distorts and indeed emaciates the productive capacity of this essence itself by assigning to it the teleological end of striating, organizing, and (re)producing a totalizing condition of warfare in and for itself. We can already see this at play in military attempts, through the worldwide war machine that is the RMA, to capture and command what it sees as the smooth, rhizomatic space of the network form as I mentioned above. Indeed, as Glezos notes “From one perspective, the worldwide war-machine is the re-emergence of the war machine at the global level, having passed through the state apparatus, and having gained a taste for enclosure and interiority. From another, it is the totalization of the state-form, breaking free of its territorial specificity and recapitulating itself as a universal movement, occupying a smooth space.”

It is evident that in this movement, this process, from the state to the worldwide war machine, we have reached a fundamental limit in our capacity to understand what is at stake. This is because in the necessary deterritorializations and reterritorializations through which state and worldwide war machines attempt to colonize the nomad war machine, we see that what is at stake is not so much the fixity of space as it is the movements, and most crucially, their speeds, over and against space through which any concept of spatiality intelligible to the state and worldwide war machines is possible. What is important to recognize in the preceding synopsis, as I have said, is that in taking up the conventional spatial dualism à la Hobbes through their conceptualizations of nomad, state, and worldwide war machines, Deleuze and Guattari have demonstrated that this political anthropology of territorialization is in fact a political anthropology of the necessity for the state form. Consequently, the worldwide war machine that is borne therefrom necessarily must deterritorialize itself, and reterritorialize its attempts at self-
securitization over and against a nomad war machine by mimicking the tendential essence of that war machine. In order to propel this chapter’s arguments beyond the limit of this understanding of nomad, state, and worldwide war machines, we will thus have to understand how these deterritorializing movements operate, which is, as we will see below, through the attempt to capture and command the *speed* of the nomad war machine, and moreover, the mechanism through which this speed (as Glezos conceptualizes it) is deployed and actuated, through the weapon as defined by Deleuze and Guattari.

**Rebel Without a Pause: War Machines and their Speeds**

“The tracks of the murderers bore on to the west but they were white men who preyed on travelers in that wilderness and disguised their work to be that of the savages. Notions of chance and fate are the preoccupation of men engaged in rash undertakings. The trail of the argonauts terminated in ashes as told and in the convergence of such vectors in such a waste wherein the hearts and enterprise of one small nation have been swallowed up by another the expriest asked if some might not see the hand of a cynical god conducting with what austerity and what mock surprise so lethal a congruence.”

- Cormac McCarthy

Deleuze and Guattari’s troubling of the dualistic spatiality of inside and outside in received traditions of political anthropology through their discussion of the necessarily *deterritorializing* drive in state and worldwide war machines is helpfully interpreted by Walker when he writes of Deleuze: “[t]he continuing force of claims about the eternal presence or impending disappearance of the modern state and modern system of states suggests that Deleuze may have been right to suspect that, while modern accounts of politics may claim to have freed themselves from divine authority, they have still clung tenaciously to a metaphysics of place, or perhaps a particular conception of spatiotemporality.” Indeed, the canonical trope of spatiality and the securitization thereof, crucial though it is in modern accounts of politics, is revealed by Deleuze and Guattari to only be possible through the aporetic maneuver of deterritorialization, of the state and worldwide war machines freeing themselves of spatial restrictions and operating in
a register that is in fact an antithetical counterpoint to the very logic of sovereign states or indeed, a sovereign system of sovereign states. In this regard, I write with Glezos in his powerful recognition that the radical temporality of speed (understood as the “irruption of the New,” as we noted above) is the deterritorializing phenomenal force that at once resists and undermines the state and worldwide war machines’ attempts to consolidate, order, and control space, but at the same time, is that force through which these war machines mobilize and actuate these attempts. In other words, speed is the qualitative feature of the war machine movements of deterritorialization from territoriality as the preeminent political unit necessary to capture and command, and reterritorialization toward speed, as I discussed them above.

We have already seen this at play in the strategic injunctions I highlighted in the last section that have called for the capture and command of the rhizomatic, smooth spaces of complexity inherent to contemporary warfare and warzones seen as outside or beyond the state form, precisely through the deterritorialization and disaggregation of space through the temporal velocity of informational networks (an injunction for which I provide a more detailed overview in the next chapter). We will see this further at play below with a brief overview of the RMA as Glezos understands it, specifically because this is the worldwide war machine of which drones are a product, a weapon made possible by and making possible the unfolding of this so-called “revolution.” However, I will approach this by way of conceptualizing speed as Glezos reads this concept in Deleuze and Guattari, as well as conceptualizing the weapon through these latter thinkers.

As noted above, Glezos informs us that coupled with the nomad, state, and worldwide war machines are two distinct types of speed, necessarily related to the typology of each war machine. On the side of the nomad war machine, Glezos says, is war-machine speed, which is
“... tied to its unexpectedness, its secrecy, the way in which it comes from without (exteriority);”¹⁰⁶ on the side of the state and worldwide war machines, however, is state-speed, that is, a speed of thickening velocity, of gravitational pull, of striation, of the “brake.” It is, indeed, a speed against the tendential essence of speed itself, one that “... can be (relatively) safely incorporated into the state apparatus’ organizing projects...”¹⁰⁷ However, Glezos goes on to note that, confronted with the radical contingency and unexpected Newness that war machine speed presents to the state apparatus, the state apparatus attempts to capture and command war machine speed, in the process becoming a “... strange mutant or hybrid creature, a machine defined according to its speed, its futurity and exteriority, yet constrained and degraded into an apparatus functioning according to a velocity, and hence a temporal and spatial interiority.”¹⁰⁸

The ultimate consequence of the state apparatus’ attempts to colonize and command the radical contingency of war machine speed is, as we have seen, the emergence of a worldwide war machine that, he notes, ultimately seeks to reconstitute the globe as a space wherein the dynamic movements of which nomads were only thought to be capable, are now performed and utilized by a the worldwide war machine that takes total war as its end. Glezos continues that “... the instantiation of the worldwide war-machine in a particular location may produce the surprise and newness with which we associate speed... But this surprise and newness, this speed, are only ever relative. The worldwide war-machine seeks control, and hence whatever exteriority and futurity it creates are always in the service of, and reterritorialized on, a plane of interiority and an extended present.”¹⁰⁹ Shifting away from the metaphorical rhetoric of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualizations of war machines and their speeds, Glezos explicitly demonstrates what he sees as a worldwide war machine really in play in the context of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which, he argues “... produces a military apparatus capable of springing up and
striking ‘at any point’. The dream of the RMA is thus the dream of the complete and total integration of the war-machine into the state apparatus. [RMA theorists] imagine a rapidly approaching time when the speed, secrecy, and rhizomatic organization of the war machine are at the beck and call of the state apparatus.**110**

It is necessary to understand the drone as being borne of this broader techno-industrial drive to establish the “technological and organizational fix” brought to bear on some of the perceived “fundamental limitations” to human bodies colonized, captured, and commanded in and through military assemblages.**111** Indeed, as both Glezos and de Landa note, the RMA is as much a revolution in the logic and function of military assemblages as it is a revolution in the phenomenal forces that these assemblages capture and command. Whereas the primary forces these assemblages previously sought to capture and command were the individuated bodies that constituted the body of the population,**112** RMA injunctions for capture and command of vast and complex techno-ecological machines in and through certain “machinic paradigms,” such as that of the network, demonstrate the deterritorializing movements through which a kind of nomadic speed is mobilized by this worldwide war machine that reduces this smooth, nomadic exteriority to itself and for itself, that is, with the end of actuating a totalizing form of war as peace.**113** Indeed, attempting to offer a prescriptive solution to their diagnosis that the primary danger posed to what they see as the “postindustrial” world, Deibert and Stein confirm the validity of the mechanics of these war machines as I have discussed them above explicitly:

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**Military attacks, conducted through a command-and-control structure, are designed to be effective against hierarchical state structures with conventionally structured and consolidated forces. Here the purpose must be not only to destroy the capacity of this host to act as a secure environment but also to disrupt and eventually disable the network. Military doctrine will have to change to decentralize intelligence and command to the lowest possible levels and to provide as much flexibility as possible to give local area commanders the capacity to launch continuous pinprick attacks from multiple directions to confuse and overwhelm the network.**114
What I mean to emphasize here is an understanding of the way in which the RMA can be conceptualized as a worldwide war machine. This war machine takes as its point of departure the radical contingencies of, for example, insurgent and terrorist challenges to the primacy of the state-form through the secrecy and rhizomatic movements inherent to their operations, and indeed, seeks to capture and command these movements’ capacities such that this war machine itself can rise up, unexpected, secretively, “in a single stroke.”

Glezos’ discussion of the relation between speed and the fundamental necessity of deterritorialization to the securitization of territory itself - as we saw with Deleuze and Guattari in the previous section - helps us understand this well, and successfully demonstrates this in the context of the RMA. Curiously absent, however, from Glezos’ theorization of the RMA as a worldwide war machine is a conceptualization of the concept of the weapon as Deleuze and Guattari discuss it. As such, I will briefly return to Deleuze and Guattari in order to lay out their basic conceptualization of the weapon, and then use this concept in order to frame an understanding of drones as such.

**Welcome to the Terrordome: Worldwide War Machines and their Weapons**

The advance in organizational logics and operative technologies said to be indicative of the RMA seeks to capture and command not just the instantaneous production and relay of images and information through computational technologies, that is, the Newness of speed, but indeed, the very capacity of these technologies to process information and autonomously “reason” based on this information, thus removing the human from their operation altogether. Moreover, this revolution in military affairs seeks not only to capture and command the techno-ecology of computational informatics and instantaneous relays thereof (in short, networks), it also seeks to capture and command what it sees as the dangerous instantaneity, or what Dillon and Reid have termed the “radical contingency” of what it produces as its nomadic war machine:
so-called insurgent and terrorist networks. Drones are the example of such attempts *par excellence*. A recent Congressional report on drones claims that these weapons facilitate “...identification and strikes against targets hiding among civilian populations... persistent surveillance and prompt strike capability [minimalizing] collateral damage... UAS provide an asymmetrical - and comparatively invulnerable - technical advantage in these conflicts.”

Indeed, the capacities drones are said to offer military combatants-at-a-distance confirms Glezos’ critical deconstruction of the RMA’s inherent logic, about which he argues: “RMA theorists explicitly look to the speed, secrecy, and rhizomatic organization of the nomadic tribe for inspiration. Indeed, in some cases, supporters of the RMA in the military have been known to attempt to use Deleuze and Guattari on the war machine to inform their tactical and strategic operations. This use of local packs and bands is then bolstered by the use of aerial bombardment, directed with exacting precision by an optical network of satellites, turning the whole earth into a smooth, targetable space.” Glezos is slightly off the mark, however, in identifying an optical network of satellites that produce and relay information making the entire earth a smooth, targetable space. Instead, as we have seen, drones have come to supplant both satellites as well as manned aerial vehicles as the primary means through which this optical network has come to be constituted. Inasmuch as drones allow the RMA to capture and command smooth, rhizomatic speed of a reconnaissance-strike complex, however, it is clear that we are not just dealing with another re-organizational imperative so prevalent in RMA theorizations, in fact, we are dealing with a specific type of *weapon* that is supposedly bringing these imperatives to fruition.

In that regard, we would be well-served by momentarily stepping back and once again reflecting on Deleuze and Guattari’s theses on war machines, insofar as these theses present a brief but helpful theorization of weapons and their function in and for war machines. Recalling
from our discussion above the fact that war machines are fundamentally made functional and operative through the movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, and thus that what is most crucially at stake is the phenomenal factor of speed, we need to remember to take this as our point of departure in conceptualizing the weapon through Deleuze and Guattari because, as they note: “… the war machine implies the release of a Speed vector that becomes a free or independent variable…” This is important for us to note not simply as a redundant claim about the centrality of speed that underpins a conceptualization of the war machine, but indeed, because it is fundamentally bundled up in a conceptualization of the weapon itself. As Deleuze and Guattari note further, “the weapon invents speed, or the discovery of speed invents the weapon (the projective character of weapons is the result). The war machine releases a vector of speed so specific to it that it needs a special name; it is not only the power of destruction, but ‘dromocracy’ (=nomos).”

Speed and weapons are synchronous in the vortical exteriority of smooth, rhizomatic war machine space and deterritorialization because, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, the weapon needs to be defined in contradistinction to the tool as a ballistic projectile. The tool, they argue, presupposes work, labour, striation. A tool has a specific purpose, it is necessarily constrained in the actions it can perform, because it is the specific extension of an assemblage whose principle movement is gravitas, thickening. The weapon, on the other hand, presupposes productive reaction, counterattack, the warding-off inherent to the function of the war machine: “… the weapon concerns only the exercise or manifestation of force in space and time, in conformity with free action… [the weapon] appears only when force is considered in itself, when it is no longer tied to anything but the number, movement, space, or time, or when speed is added to displacement.” The weapon is the projectile extension of the war machine, that is, it is the
ballistic delivery system through which the the pure speed - speed as absolute speed, speed as somewhat paradoxically, *immobility* - of the war machine is activated. This is why, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate, the tank is seen to be better than the bullet, for example: “It can happen that speed is abstracted as the property of a projectile, a bullet or artillery shell, which condemns the weapon itself, and the soldier, to immobility (for example, immobility in the First World War). But an equilibrium of forces is a phenomenon of resistance, whereas the counterattack implies a rush or a change of speed that breaks the equilibrium: it was the tank that regrouped all of the operations in the speed vector and recreated a smooth space or movement by uprooting men and arms.”127

In this sense, we can understand the drone as a weapon of the RMA-as-worldwide war machine. In the RMA’s attempt to effectuate deterritorializing movement from conventional spatial axiomatics of the state form and the reterritorialization of these axiomatics on to the smooth, rhizomatic space of pure speed inherent to the nomadic war machine that it seeks to capture,128 drones add speed to the territorial displacement of which the RMA is always in pursuit. Seen as a weapon, drones are supposed to be a counterattack to the smooth, nomadic space that RMA theorists see their primary foes - insurgent and terrorist networks - having constituted or opened up. Deibert and Stein express this imperative in their injunction “[t]o disrupt a network of terror, we will need a reconfigured system of intelligence, one that is decentralized, network based, with a capacity to communicate and confuse in real time across borders.”129 In response to this injunction, Zaloga comments regarding drones specifically,

On the modern battlefield, what can be seen can be destroyed. In an age of information warfare and network-centric battlefield tactics, something has to go out and gather real-time intelligence. At the beginning of the 20th century, real-time targeting was limited to the range of human eyesight. With the advent of UAVs, real-time targeting can be extended hundreds of miles into the depth of enemy territory. UAVs have proven to be the most versatile intelligence collection system of the current era, offering more flexibility and better image quality on the tactical battlefield than alternatives such as reconnaissance aircraft or satellites. UAVs are finally making possible the “reconnaissance-strike complexes” first dreamed about in the 1970s. They are a
critical element in a battlefield network that begins by collecting real-time information on potential targets, then rapidly passes this information to a data fusion system that in turn rapidly processes the targeting information and passes it to the “shooter” best suited to attack the target, whether an artillery battery, tank, strike aircraft, UCAV, or missile system.\textsuperscript{130}

Drones, as weapons of a worldwide war machine understood through the RMA, are the ballistic delivery system through which the the pure speed of that war machine is said to be activated. They have been authorized for deployment, legitimated as a response, a counterattack, to the smooth, rhizomatic war machine said to have made itself visible, apparent, in the attacks on 11 September, 2001. This much is plain in the President’s document detailing the Obama administration’s \textit{National Security Strategy}: “For nearly a decade, our Nation has been at war with a far-reaching network of violence and hatred... This is part of a broad, multinational effort that is right and just, and we will be unwavering in our commitment to the security of our people, states, allies, and partners. Moreover, as we face multiple threats - from nations, nonstate actors, and failed states - we will maintain the military superiority that has secured our country, and underpinned global security, for decades.”\textsuperscript{131} Drones are the tactical means, indeed, the \textit{praxis} of this strategic end. As such, I will close this chapter with a discussion of the intersection between the tactical \textit{praxis} that drones, as weapons, are said to facilitate in the realization of the strategic ends of the RMA, understood as a worldwide war machine, and how this \textit{praxis} inaugurates an (in)humanity that departs from traditional friend/enemy distinctions that supposedly characterize traditional modes of international conflict.\textsuperscript{132}

\textbf{Drones and the \textit{Praxis of (In)Humanity}}

It should be clear that the worldwide war machine inaugurated by the RMA that we discussed above, capturing and commanding the smooth rhizomatic speed of nomadic networks as it attempts to do, and indeed, delivering unto itself this capture and command vis-à-vis the weapon of drones, is not in and of itself a wholly smooth, rhizomatic machine; it is instead, the
strange mutated creature of which Glezos spoke above. However, as Glezos notes, the worldwide war machine is fundamentally incapable of in fact becoming a pure war machine, indeed, this is the animating aporia that simultaneously prevents the becoming-smooth, the becoming-speed, the becoming-rhizomatic of the RMA-as-worldwide war machine, and at the same time, delivers the speed unto its deterritorializing and reterritorializing movements in its attempts to do so through the ballistic deployment of drones. This is because, as Glezos argues, “[t]he end goal of the RMA is an epistemological one. It seeks to turn the state into a knowing/seeing body, the apotheosis of the state military apparatus as a vision machine. However, the war machine is unavoidably an anti-optical machine. It works in secret and functions according to the rules of surprise, bringing the unforeseen (and unforeseeable).”

We have seen what this worldwide war machine seeks to accomplish specifically: the capture of the smooth, rhizomatic space and speed it sees as being inherent to its fundamental ontological anxiety, the exteriority of the nomad war machine that it attributes to terrorist networks. We have seen how it attempts to accomplish this goal: through the ballistic deployment of the speed and smoothness it believes the weapon of drones deliver unto itself. It is a mutant creature and impossible task, obviously, because although it seeks to capture and command the speed and smoothness of its counterpoint in the nomad war machine, it is still operating on a fundamentally dualistic spatial axiomatic. “We are in here, they are out there,” this machine says to itself. “They are out there, operating like that,” in doing so, “they” threaten the “in here,” and so this “in here” must be secured by the mimetic capture and command of the violence that springs up “in a single stroke,” “out there.” In effect, we are back to the Hobbesian narrative that Deleuze and Guattari took as their point of departure as a means of demonstrating the aporetic becomings of state and worldwide war machines in and for
themselves. In his attempt to “... defy the Cartesian, reductionist analysis traditionally applied to conventional warfare,” the prominent theorist of counterinsurgency strategy David Kilcullen articulates an analysis as Cartesian-Hobbesian as ever, though admittedly one that inaugurates a more complex, quasi-rhizomatic form in its constitution:

This chapter argues that this present conflict is actually a campaign to counter a globalized Islamist insurgency... On this basis, the analysis argues for a strategy of “disaggregation” that seeks to dismantle or delink the global jihad. Just as so-called containment strategy was central to the Cold War, likewise a disaggregation strategy would provide a unifying, strategic conception for the current war - something that has been lacking to date... My principle thesis is this:...

- Complex adaptive systems modeling shows that the global nature of Islamic jihad, and hence its dangerous character, derives from the links in the system - energy pathways that allow disparate groups to function in an aggregated fashion across intercontinental distances - rather than the elements themselves.
- Therefore, countering global insurgency does not demand the destruction of every Islamist insurgent from the Philippines to Chechnya. Rather, it demands a strategy of disaggregation (delinking or dismantling) to prevent the dispersed and disparate elements of the jihad movement from functioning as a global system.

Not only does Kilcullen’s call for a rhizomatic strategy of disaggregation - both on the side of the state military apparatus’s internal organization, as well as the end to which it attains in its interventions against the dangerous exteriority of the global insurgency - demonstrate some of the fundamental mechanics that I have suggested are at play in nomad, state, and worldwide war machines above, but indeed, it should remind us of Walker’s comment, which I quoted in the introduction to this chapter, that “... boundaries, borders, and limits [are] becoming further disaggregated, dislocated from territorial topographies, articulated in novel topological forms, laid out more obviously as zones and fields of practice, and increasingly susceptible to temporal quite as much as spatial accounts of what it means to authorize discriminations as boundaries, borders and limits.” Indeed, it is this increasingly temporospatial authorization to discriminate, delivered over to the worldwide war machine through the ballistic deployment of drones that reveals such deployments to be, at bottom, nothing less than the praxis of (in)humanity.
I will specify what I mean when I argue that drones are the *praxis* of (in)humanity by way of example. On the day this chapter is currently being written, 13 June, 2012, United States Congressman Rand Paul (R) proposed the Bill S.3287, with the express purpose “To protect individual privacy against unwarranted governmental intrusion through the use of the unmanned aerial vehicles commonly called drones, and for other purposes.” Of this bill, Congressman Paul commented, “Americans going about their everyday lives should not be treated like criminals or terrorists and have their rights infringed upon by military tactics.” What is worth observing in this episode is the fundamental distinction being made between “Americans going about their everyday lives” and “criminals and terrorists” who are legitimately susceptible to have “their rights infringed upon by military tactics.” Of course, Mr. Paul seems to be of the opinion that in the case of drones, the primacy of the category of the citizen trumps the category of the human, but as we have seen - for example, in the proclamation quoted above in the *National Security Strategy* - the American state military apparatus, actuated through the worldwide war machine of the RMA, is far more concerned with defending the category of the human through the military tactics, indeed, the *weapon*, of drones and drone warfare.

Against Mr. Paul’s politics in almost every way imaginable though I am, his anxiety seems to be well-placed. As the German legal theorist Carl Schmitt famously noted, “When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way that one can use peace, justice, progress, and civilization in order to claim these as one’s own and deny the same to the enemy.” So what Mr. Paul is crucially missing here, is the fact that the deployment of drones and drone warfare have inverted the modernist hierarchy that privileges citizenship over humanity, and indeed, in
their deployment, are now actuating a *praxis* that presupposes, identifies, and exterminates (in)humanities; indeed, in maintaining the legitimacy of drones’ deployment against “criminals and terrorists,” he is reifying the very boundary between humans and (in)humans that seems to underpin his anxiety.

The authorization to discriminate between humanity and (in)humanity that Mr. Paul reifies is reminiscent of Deibert and Stein’s suggestion that “[s]mart ‘targeted’ security, rather than blanket security, is the way to deny project-based activities against a mobile network of terror.” Again, here we see the authority to discriminate given over to the temporospatial boundary that is said to distinguish humans from (in)humans based on the ontological perception of an (in)human body *becoming*-dangerous. We have seen this at play, for example, in the discussion of the retroactive designation of bodies targeted in drone strikes as “militants” by the United States’ legal-military apparatus. It is in this way that we can see, for example, why I argued in the introduction to this thesis that I follow Walker, in his assessment of the states-system/Empire debate currently taking place in international relations theory, that the contemporary form and operation of the problem of sovereignty in world politics is neither that of a state, a states-system, nor an Empire, it is one of discriminations of *exceptionality*.145

It is these discriminations of exceptionality between humanity and (in)humanity that drones are said to facilitate *par excellence*. As we have seen, it is claimed of drones that they allow for maximal precision in the targeting and killing of nomadic, becoming-dangerous, or indeed, become-dangerous bodies of supposed insurgents or terrorists.146 However, we need to remain highly suspicious, if not outright *hostile* to this claim, for as Bashir and Crews note regarding drone attacks along the so-called Durand Line that constitutes the 1,600-mile border that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan, “... a growing number of eyewitness accounts of civilian
deaths and psychological trauma among villagers (and their animals) who had survived the attacks, often to be targeted again as rescuers or funeral attendees, called into question security officials’ claims about the technological precision that allowed them to decipher the identities of the inhabitants that they had marked for death under the drones.”

I have hopefully, by this point demonstrated the important purchase Deleuze and Guattari have in helping us to conceptualize and theorize not only the praxis of (in)humanity that drones and drone warfare inaugurate, but indeed, the broader strategic contexts within which such tactical weaponry is deployed. Deleuze and Guattari have been helpful to my attempt to write with and beyond Foucault, I also hope it is apparent, because, like Foucault, as Reid notes, Deleuze and Guattari “... [conceive] the functioning of power in terms of strategy. This concept conveys for each of them the ways in which power’s attempt to pacify life logistically is always by definition also an attempt to reconstitute and increase its war-making capacities.”

I think the express purchase of strategies of power is evident here, as I have read demonstrated it through the interactive mechanics of war machine mutations and colonizations, and further, these mechanics and colonizations into the strategic imperatives espoused by military theorists making injunctions for network-centric developments in the worldwide war machine constituted by the RMA. Moreover, I have demonstrated that it is not enough to remain satisfied with understanding these strategies, indeed, we need to understand stakes when these strategies are tactically mobilized through weapons like drones, bringing the destructive capacities of these weapons to bear on bodies perceived to be becoming-dangerous, simultaneously actuating a unilateral praxis against these bodies that inaugurates a becoming-(in)human.

However, Deleuze and Guattari’s theories fail us when we start to ask questions about how bodies are specifically perceived to be becoming-dangerous, that is, becoming-(in)human.
In the next section, therefore, I (re)turn to Foucault as a theorist specifically interested in and helpful to an understanding of the process of knowledge-production pertaining to space, populations, and bodies. I will demonstrate specifically how drones inaugurate the process of becoming-(in)human through the production of knowledge about spaces, populations, and bodies that is sedimented within a longer historical legacy of the production of non-Western bodies as (in)human according to racial, cultural, and economic taxonomies.
II: Solemn Geographies of Human Limits

Drones, Reconnaissance-Strike Complexes, and Absent Neocolonialisms of Exceptionality

"Thus-and this is the event of the entire epoch, the occidental event par excellence - we are confronted with the end of consideration, that is, with the end of the observation and observance of sidereal order, an order regulated to the point where it was necessary to reestablish its truth against the appearance of aberrant motion presented by certain stars. That was called 'saving the phenomena', and the stars in question were named planets ('wandering ones'). Henceforth, the entire world will have become planetary: wandering from one end to the other. But the word wandering is still too narrow, for it presupposes a rectitude with respect to which one can then measure the deviation or the divagation of what wanders. But the planetary, the planetary disaster, is something other than a wandering, something other than a phenomenon one would have to save from its appearance: it exhausts being in its phenomenon, and its phenomenon exhausts itself in the nonappearance of intersidereal spaces, a universal occident, without directions or cardinal points. Neither simply wandering about nor in error, the universe drifts along by its own momentum. That is all. It is as if all of sense were proposed to us by means of a monstrous physics of inertia, where a single motive were propagating itself in all senses and directions at once..."

- Jean-Luc Nancy

I appear everywhere and nowhere at once: Heterotopias and Reconnaissance-Strike Complexes

While Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical mechanics concerning the spatiotemporality and subsequent temporospatiality of these deterritorializations and reterritorializations of received inside/outside spatial axiomatics in political anthropologies served us well in conceptualizing just what specifically it is that drones do and are meant to do, they also hinted at, but to my mind never sufficiently theorized, how it is possible for state and worldwide war machines to recognize the pure exteriority and antithetical resistance posed thereunto by their nomad counterparts in the first place. It is thus, the conditions under which this process of recognition is rendered possible to which I will turn in this chapter, before moving on to describe the topological mechanics of this process itself in the next. To that end, this chapter (re)turns its theoretical attention to a synthetic reading of Michel Foucault’s reflections on what he called “heterotopias,” as well as his later theorizations of biopower, and alongside these, the critical security theories of Michael Dillon and Julian Reid that directly take up primarily the latter set of Foucault’s theories.
As such, in this chapter I argue, recalling military historian Steven Zaloga’s observation of drones that they make possible what he refers to as “reconnaissance-strike complexes,”\textsuperscript{154} that these complexes constitute an absent neocolonial exceptionalism best understood through the lens of Foucault’s theorization of heterotopias. Heterotopias, as we will see, are places without place that organize a hierarchical topology of relations between discrete sites, wherein no internality can be understood independently of its external relationship with interrelated, discrete, internalities, both those that are proximate and distanced in the hierarchy of relations organized therein. This is to say that Foucault’s concept of heterotopias helps us to conceptualize how technologies of spatial and biopolitical identification, organization, and administration - such as those three that I identify as underpinning and animating the very function of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes as such: Informatic Threat Perception Coding; Human Terrain Systems; and Tactical Common Data-Links, which I will explain below - organize hierarchies of sociopolitical relations wherein bodies are conducted and indeed, conduct themselves. This conduct itself is a product of each body’s specific \textit{locus} within a heterotopic regime, a locus that is situated according to temporal inflections and imperatives invested into that specific site.\textsuperscript{155}

Drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are most helpfully read through the concept of heterotopias, I believe, for three specific reasons: 1) Drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are - à Foucault description of heterotopias - places without place: these complexes are unseen by the bodies over and against whom they are lethally deployed (and indeed, to a certain extent, by their operators as well, given the distanced and limited optical capabilities of drones),\textsuperscript{156} and they disappear at the very moment that they are fully realized. 2) Drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes organize a hierarchical set of relations based on exceptional temporospatial metrics: supposedly “human” military operators killing (in)human
“militant threats” based on the former’s fundamental presupposition that the latter is situated in and thus an embodied product of a barbaric, anti-human, cultural site in the international realm; thus, the subordination of decolonized and still colonized spaces, polities, and bodies to the violent will of the absent neocolonial power (thus far, this power is primarily the United States), a hierarchy of relations inherited from the imperial structures of the nineteenth and twentieth century, is construed as both natural and necessary.\textsuperscript{157}

Put differently, drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are facilitating the constitution of a kind of absent neocolonial exceptionalism insofar as they open up supposedly perfect spaces of biopolitical administration based on the undisclosed \textit{praxis} of (in)humanity that their deployment inaugurates; this exceptionalism is measured and conceptualized through supposedly scientific discourses and practices inherited from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ imperial legacies.\textsuperscript{158} In this sense then, Dillon and Reid are right to note that deploying Foucault’s theories help us understand biopolitical attempts that, on the one hand, claim to “... examine the detailed properties and dynamics of populations so that they can be better managed with respect to their many needs and life chances,” while on the other how, through such attempts, “... biopower deploys force and violence, not least because biopower hides its violent face and, ‘gives to the power to inflict legal punishment a context in which it appears to be free of all excess and violence’.”\textsuperscript{159}

By extension, Dillon and Reid direct our attention in this regard to precisely how some of these processes are at play in the biopolitics of global counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. The political perceptions of spaces and bodies that are said to occupy, operate, and constitute these corresponding spaces is of fundamental importance not only to the strategic use of drones (in the capacity to overcome territorial obstacles posed by geography and claims to
sovereignty, for example), but also, in how these drones are tactically deployed as well (for example, in their supposed - and highly contested - capacity to discriminate between “human” non-militants and (in)human “militants”).\textsuperscript{160} This is to say that, through Foucault, Dillon, and Reid, it is possible for us to understand the topology(ies) of relations through which the ontological anxieties necessitating the deployment of drones and drone warfare that we explored in the previous chapter are enunciated and acted upon, and further, the historical conditions under which such an anxiety and response is possible in the first place.

Thus, I argue that this is a neocolonial topology of relations, not as an associative act on either one side of the contemporary debate in IR theory about which I spoke in the introduction,\textsuperscript{161} but rather, because it is operating within an epistemological and ontological genealogy directly inherited from the colonial legacies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\textsuperscript{162} By this I mean, institutionalized, disciplinary frameworks of through which knowledge about peoples, communities, and polities in the decolonized and/or still-colonized worlds is enunciated as scientific truth (such as, taking Grovogui’s example that I present in the closing pages of this chapter, the intersection between positivistic international law and highly racist ethnographic accounts); as well as the ontological differentiations of self/other between imperial powers and their colonial subjects affirmed through such regimes of knowledge.

As such, the remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: First, I detail the import of Foucault’s theories of heterotopias and biopower on an understanding of the production of knowledge about spaces and bodies targeted by drones and drone warfare, and indeed the relationships between those bodies and spaces and those political actors and networks by whom they are targeted. I specifically focus this theoretical synopsis in relation to the aforementioned “reconnaissance-strike complexes” that drones are said to inaugurate, arguing that these
reconnaissance-strike complexes need to be understood through the lens of heterotopic topologies of relationalities between sites in order to understand precisely how it becomes possible that threat is imagined to be emerging from the spaces and bodies most commonly targeted by drones and drone warfare.

Next, I argue that the present understanding of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, their praxes of (in)humanity, and the heterotopic topologies of hierarchical relationalities constituted in these biopolitical heterotopias amount to nothing less than an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality. In doing so, I turn to, first, Dillon and Reid’s discussions regarding the biopoliticization of strategic informational imperatives in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations launched in the name of what they call “global liberal governance,” specifically in their theorizations of what they call biohumanity and its rogues. I discuss how this biopolitics of informationalization as they discuss it is directly implicated in the capacity of drones to constitute reconnaissance strike complexes and thus their absent neocolonialism of exceptionality. I take up Siba Grovogui’s historical cues in order to demonstrate that, despite the novel complexity and specificity of these tactical deployments of information as they are disseminated throughout the informational networks underpinning the drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, these exceptional political ontologies of security and securitization are heterotopic slices of temporal registers that are genealogical inheritors of the topological relationalities between imperial powers and their colonial holdings in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Crisis, Deviation, Organization - Drones, Heterotopias, and Biopower

“If wandering is the liberation from every given point in space, and thus the conceptional opposite to fixation at such a point, the sociological form of the “stranger” presents the unity, as it were, of these two characteristics. This phenomenon too, however, reveals that spatial relations are only the condition, on the one hand, and the symbol, on the other, of human relations.”
In an unpublished and unfinished manuscript from 1967 titled “Des Espaces Autres (Of Other Spaces),” Foucault opens his discussion of what he theorized therein (as well as in his seminal work, *The Order of Things*) as heterotopias by invoking the second principle of thermodynamics; according to this principle, the accumulation of unused energy increases in the absence of absolutely equal relations between two thermal bodies, thereby constituting a mutually imbricate but nevertheless distinct tertiary boundary negotiating the inside/outside of the body properly understood. Such an invocation, to my mind, foreshadows the course of Foucault’s subsequent theorization of heterotopias in at least two ways: first, it foreshadows the six principles of heterotopias that Foucault will lay out by the end of the lecture; second, it foreshadows the troubling of fixed bodies and his recognition of the necessity of the unequal relations between bodies, that is, the constitutive function of dissymmetry between bodies that modern concepts of spatiality necessarily presuppose universally in order to orient, situate, and render intelligible any particular place, or as Foucault will refer to it in this lecture, site. We saw a similar process at play in the previous chapter. By contrast, however, Foucault’s theories of heterotopias specifically help us to understand the topological conditions under which relationality between these dissymmetric, doubled sites of politics are inaugurated and (re)performed.

In that regard, it is worth continuing with a reflection on Foucault’s invocation of the second principle of thermodynamics, especially as it was articulated in relation to the “mythological resources” of nineteenth-century philosophies of historicity such as Hegel’s. What Foucault attempts to demonstrate in drawing this metaphorical analogy is that, specifically in relation to conceptualizations of spatiotemporality between say, Hegel and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century an epistemic break occurs wherein, generally, the tendency of historicity is...
less the attempt to totally and completely theorize relations between to symmetrical bodies according to a transcendental reason, and more of an attempt to understand and come to terms with the aporias that attend the stillborn failures of such a project. Foucault suggests that it is these aporias upon which what he calls heterotopias are built, which he sees as the primary form of spatiotemporal organization, negotiation, and administration. As such, he suggests - and it is this suggestion that I follow in this chapter - that it is these constitutive aporias are crucial to understand the purpose and function of spatiotemporality in the contemporary *epistème*. As he notes in his opening remarks:

The nineteenth century found its essential mythological resources in the second principle of thermodynamics [sic]. The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment. I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein. One could perhaps say that certain ideological conflicts animating present-day polemics oppose the pious descendents of time and the determined inhabitants of space. Structuralism, or at least which is grouped under this slightly too general name, is the effort to establish, between elements that could have been connected on a temporal axis, an ensemble of relations that makes them appear as juxtaposed, set off against one another, implicated by each other that makes them appear, in short, as a sort of configuration. Actually, structuralism does not entail denial of time; it does involve a certain manner of dealing with what we call time and what we call history.

Put simply, briefly, and crudely, heterotopias, as Foucault conceptualizes them, are indeed spaces of simultaneity, they are places that can only be perceived as such insofar as they are always already understood to be in relation to other places, and insofar as this is the case, they are places without place, as he notes. Here, it is worth remembering what Zaloga said of drones, which is that

With the advent of UAVs, real-time targeting can be extended hundreds of miles into the depth of enemy territory. On the modern battlefield, what can be seen can be destroyed. In an age of information warfare and network-centric battlefield tactics, something has to go out and gather real-time intelligence... UAVs are finally making possible the “reconnaissance-strike complexes” first dreamed about in the 1970s... They are a critical element in a battlefield network that begins by collecting real-time information on potential targets, then rapidly passes this information to a data fusion system that in turn rapidly processes the targeting information and passes it to the “shooter” best suited to attack the target, whether an artillery battery, tank, strike aircraft, UCAV, or missile system.
The reconnaissance-strike complexes that UAVs make possible, according to Zaloga, are spaces that fundamentally and necessarily presuppose a rhizomatic network at once connecting and distantiating friend from enemy, here from there, us from them. These complexes, at the center of which are drones and drone warfare, are places without a place, places only possible on the condition of a radical, self-evident relationality between places;\textsuperscript{175} the rhizomatic, network aspect should here recall our previous discussion of weapons, war machines, and mobility through Deleuze, Guattari, and Glezos in the previous chapter, however, in the sense that this chapter seeks to invoke - vis-à-vis Foucault’s theorization of heterotopias - our former aspect should be understood solely as a praxis and movement, between sites;\textsuperscript{176} in this chapter, I am attempting to draw an image of these discrete sites upon which and through which drones intervene, and indeed, the constitutive relations between those sites.

Drones and drone warfare deterritorialize the anxiety of externality from conceptualizations that crystallize around this presupposed externality focussing primarily on territoriality itself to those that reflect on, and worry about, the radical emergence of threat made possible by speed.\textsuperscript{177} In so doing they inaugurate and perform a praxis of the (in)humanity that they necessarily presuppose. The reconnaissance-strike complexes that drones are said to constitute and make possible need to be understood as the heterotopic expression of exceptionality, and these complexes should be understood as the condition under which the division between human/(in)human is made. This is because, as I have already noted, first, these complexes are unseen by the bodies over and against whom they are lethally deployed and they disappear at the very moment that they are fully realized; and second, the subordination of decolonized and still colonized spaces, polities, and bodies to the violent will of an absent neocolonial power is the product of a hierarchy of relations inherited from the imperial structures
of the nineteenth and twentieth century, a violent hierarchy believed to be both natural and necessary. In other words, drones inaugurate and attend a space of (in)humanity in and through the reconnaissance-strike complexes they make possible precisely because of their radical reliance on external relationality, and therefore, further inaugurate and attend an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality.

As we will see, since the end of the Cold War, the securitization frameworks of the United States and its associated allies in disparate but interrelated networks of global liberal governance more generally have tended to focus on the pure potentiality of networked-yet-individuated bodies that constitute smooth, rhizomatic forms of absolute threat that can spring up at a moment’s notice - *becoming-dangerous bodies*; it is this network of pure potentiality to which drones are supposed to respond.\(^{178}\) Pure potentiality though these imagined enemies may be, however, it is critical to understand that this pure potentiality is only possible of being imagined in the first place because it is necessarily overcoded with an Orientalist geography of danger and human limits more broadly, that both implicitly and explicitly refers to the still-colonized and decolonized worlds, the genealogy of which I will explore in detail in the concluding portion of this chapter.\(^{179}\) It is this register of relationality that is both presupposed by and constituted by drones and the reconnaissance-strike complexes that they inaugurate, that is, their heterotopic organization of hierarchical relations between sites.

However, we need to understand exactly what it means, in a Foucauldian sense, to speak of heterotopic relationality. It is first worth noting that, although “Des Espaces Autres” precedes Foucault’s theorizations of biopolitics and biopower by a decade or more, this should not mean it in no way foregrounds these theories, nor is his theorization of heterotopias incongruous with
those theories that so underpin this thesis’ reading of drones and drone warfare. Indeed, in
enunciating his theories of biopolitics and biopower much later, Foucault demonstrated that the
key *sites* in which these phenomena functioned were those of, for example, the *milieu*, the
population, and the body. In his theorization of heterotopias, he portended the importance of
these sites in his brief discussion of the discipline of demography, in which he demonstrates that
this discipline constituted a heterotopic conceptualization of spatiotemporalities in its obsession
with the organization and administration of bodies according to their propinquity and/or
necessary distantiation. In so doing, he also identified the recalcitrant tendencies toward
hierarchizations of relations said to have been abandoned in the secular turn:

In a still more concrete manner, the problem of siting or placement arises for mankind in terms of
demography. This problem of the human site or living space is not simply that of knowing
whether there will be enough space for men in the world -a problem that is certainly quite
important - but also that of knowing what relations of propinquity, what type of storage,
circulation, marking, and classification of human elements should be adopted in a given situation
in order to achieve a given end. Our epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations
among sites.

In any case I believe that the anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a
great deal more than with time. Time probably appears to us only as one of the various distributive
operations that are possible for the elements that are spread out in space.

Now, despite all the techniques for appropriating space, despite the whole network of knowledge
that enables us to delimit or to formalize it, contemporary space is perhaps still not entirely
desanctified (apparently unlike time, it would seem, which was detached from the sacred in the
nineteenth century). To be sure a certain theoretical desanctification of space (the one signaled by
Galileo's work) has occurred, but we may still not have reached the point of a practical
desanctification of space. And perhaps our life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions
that remain inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down. These
are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example between private space and public
space, between family space and social space, between cultural space and useful space, between
the space of leisure and that of work. All these are still nurtured by the hidden presence of the
sacred.

Put differently then, heterotopic relationality is the capacity to organize sites and their
constitutive relations hierarchically on the premise of a radical horizontality between all sites at
all times. This means that space is at once the external data that renders the internal *milieu*
intelligible, but also, that this internal *milieu* is always already necessarily implicated in and
referentially constituted by its radical relationality to all other sites that it presupposes as either in
a hierarchically more or less proximate relationality to itself: through this relationality, heterotopic sites are thus rendered as places without place. Further, heterotopic relationality is capable of organizing sites and their constitutive relations hierarchically because it does so on the dispersed (re)investment of these spaces and their relations with principles of temporality, two types of which I will highlight below. Regarding this capacity to organize relations according to principles of time, however, Foucault notes that “[h]eterotopias are most often linked to slices in time - which is to say that they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies. The heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time.”

Foucault notes that heterotopic relationalities, and thus, the hierarchical organizations thereof according to principles of time, generally tend toward either one of two types: the first is the heterotopia of the telos, of the normative and the pathological, a heterotopia organized around the anxiety of deviation that is marked by the latter condition in relation to the former. The second type is that of the chronos, of irruptive threat and emergency - heterotopias of crisis. Foucault attributes the latter more tendentially to so-called “primitive” societies, whereas he attributes the former to more modern societies. As he describes them:

In the so-called primitive societies, there is a certain form of heterotopia that I would call crisis heterotopias, i.e., there are privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis... In our[r] society, these crisis heterotopias are persistently disappearing, though a few remnants can still be found... these heterotopias of crisis are disappearing today and are being replaced, I believe, by what we might call heterotopias of deviation: those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed. Cases of this are rest homes and psychiatric hospitals, and of course prisons, and one should perhaps add retirement homes that are, as it were, on the borderline between the heterotopia of crisis and the heterotopia of deviation since, after all, old age is a crisis, but is also a deviation since in our society where leisure is the rule, idleness is a sort of deviation.
I think that, as Foucault likely did, these categorizations are less useful as absolute ideal types than they are as two poles, in between which there exist find combinative constellations through which we can begin to think, theorize, and critique heterotopic spaces and relationalities. Indeed, later on in the lecture, Foucault himself points to what he sees as “... two types of heterotopia that come together here[.]”\textsuperscript{185} In the context of drones and drone warfare and the reconnaissance-strike complexes that they are said to make possible, we might see such a synthesized constellation between these two poles. On the one hand, as we will see in my discussion of Dillon and Reid’s helpful mapping of attempts to organize these relationalities in the next section, these reconnaissance-strike complexes organize sites of relationality according to biopolitical imperatives: make life live, let (make) life die; value and secure certain lives at the expense of others determined to be not worth living.\textsuperscript{186} On the other, however, these biopolitical imperatives are \textit{necessarily} presupposed as always already under threat, in crisis, thereby calling forth the necessity of their implementation in the first place.\textsuperscript{187} As Foucault noted, this crisis is inherent to biopolitics because, in its recognition of new heterotopic sites and relationalities based on propinquity and distantiation to a normative/pathological \textit{telos}, bodies therein being the signifying sites of these relationalities, the fundamental crisis always already plaguing biopower is that inaugurated by the constitution of the various bodies of knowledge through which it is performed and exercised.\textsuperscript{188}

As such, we can see how reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurated by drones and drone warfare should be understood as heterotopic spaces because, through their biopolitical function, “[e]ither their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory... Or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well
arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled.” Heterotopias, as we have seen, are places without place - because they are constituted by relations between all places - that hierarchically organize topologies of relations based on the imagined premise of horizontal relationality. We have also seen that heterotopias constellate and oscillate between the oppositional poles of teleological deviation or chronological crisis. The reconnaissance-strike complexes of drones herein constitute a heterotopic organization of relations between sites, on a topological, temporal basis as they include networked information of demographic and biological metrics about bodies; topographical, cartographical, and ethnographical maps of spaces and populations that are said to be either normative or pathological according to a predetermined set of geographical and sociological metrics and measurements; historical relations between colonizers and colonized; and networked spatiotemporal complexes between data storage and dissemination between sites of knowledge production and sites of drone deployment and operation.

As such, it is important to remember that these relations are organized according to hierarchical principles of time, as I noted above. However, because of Foucault’s limited focus on the function of time in heterotopic organizations of relations between sites, it is these principles of time to which we need to now turn our attention through a different lens. In the next section, I will help to frame an understanding of the heterotopic topologies that the reconnaissance-strike complexes of drones and drone warfare constitute into an understanding of the biopolitical and geopolitical times of contemporary securitizing ontologies that are sliced up and distributed throughout the legal-political-strategic-anthropological networks of knowledge according to which drones and drone warfare are deployed. This is to say that in the next section, through Dillon and Reid, I will explore the instantaneous politics under which bodies are
believed to be *becoming-dangerous* according to racial, cultural, and economic metrics upon which the decision to deploy drones and drone strikes are determined. I will demonstrate an example of such knowledge production through the cases of Informatics Threat Perception Coding; Human Terrain Systems (HTS); and the Tactical Common Data-Link, in the function of reconnaissance-strike complexes made possible by drones and drone warfare. Following that section, I will conclude this chapter with a discussion of the longer historical imperial relationalities to which such processes of knowledge production are genealogically indebted. The intersection between these contemporary practices and their historical legacies in the reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurated by drones and drone warfare, I argue, is best understood as an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality.
Threat Perception Coding, (In)Human Terrain, Data-Links - Heterotopias of (In)Humanity

“The law, the thoroughly realistic formalization of certain conditions for the self-preservation of a community, forbids certain actions directed to certain ends, namely those that are directed against the community: it does not forbid the disposition that produces these actions - for it needs these actions for other ends, namely against the enemies of the community. Then the moral idealist appears and says: “God beholds the heart: the action itself is nothing; one must exterminate the aggressive disposition that produces it-” Under normal conditions one laughs at this; only in those exceptional instances when a community lives absolutely outside the necessity of waging war for its existence does one lend an ear to such things. One abandons a disposition whose utility is not longer apparent.”

- Friedrich Nietzsche

In Chapter I, I introduced Michael Dillon and Julian Reid’s concept becoming-dangerous; that is, of the ontological emergence of external threat to the internal milieu of what they call global liberal governance (a term about which I will say more below) as perceived, and indeed, produced by a state military/security apparatus that codes bodies not only with already-available informatics, but indeed, the algorithmic potentiality of specifically-coded bodies that might become-dangerous as this ontological apparatus sees it. Further, as I explained in detail in the introduction to this thesis, Dillon and Reid have explicitly situated their discussion of this process in the context of what they call the biopolitics of the information revolution, about which they have argued elsewhere that, “Information is now regarded as the principle of formation of life itself. That move has been both cybernetic and molecular, a function of the way the information and the life sciences now install information at the centre of the organisation and functioning of life.”

Having seen some the principles of heterotopias at play, in a broad conceptual manner at least, in the reconnaissance-strike complexes made possible through the deployment of drones and drone warfare in the previous section, then we can begin to understand some of the specific processes and stakes of the information revolution as Dillon and Reid describe it, and its subsequent implication in the complexes UAVs inaugurate. As Dillon and Reid do not write
specifically on drones and drone warfare, we will have to rely on their theories as relevant theoretical contextualizations to some of the primary discursive evidence pertaining specifically to drones as I present it below. I will present this evidence in three brief overviews of some key sites of knowledge production about their necessarily constitutive counterpoints of threat, to which drones are subsequently deployed as a response: 1) Informatics Threat Perception Coding; 2) Human Terrain Systems (HTS); 3) The Tactical Common Data-Link. Put differently, these sites of knowledge production need to be seen as their own discrete sites with their own discrete times that nevertheless are part of the heterotopic organization of hierarchical relations in the reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurated by drones and drone warfare. It is imperative to understand how these sites work to themselves in order to see how they inaugurate the absent neocolonialisms of exception instantiated and enforced by the deployment of UAVs over and against bodies in spaces such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Libya. And while each of these three sites of knowledge production warrant exhaustive studies on the merit of their own complex functions, I nevertheless find it necessary to highlight these sites because of how they crucially inform and animate the conduct of drone warfare.

In these sites of knowledge production supposed threat is not only being identified (according to racial-ethnic-sectarian complexes, cultural-tribal-sociopolitical complexes, and socioeconomic-geostrategic-biopolitical complexes, all of which are always already interpenetrating and investing each other in these networked sites). The way in which this threat is acted upon - that is, through the praxis of (in)humanity that drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurate and attend - to my mind, gestures toward the necessary presuppositions and conditions of possibility for that threat to be considered as such in the first place. As I close this chapter out in the following section, we will see that these conditions of
possibility have their root in imperial sites of knowledge production such as anthropological accounts of non-Europeans as peoples that need to be considered less than human, and the legal codification of these peoples in the practices and institutions of imperial politics during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All of these heterotopic sites in relation to one another - that is, both the categories I have laid out here, as well as the actual function of these categories as sites in the heterotopia of reconnaissance-strike complexes - constitute, as I have argued thus far, an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality. In this way, drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes can be understood as heterotopic sites of hierarchical relations aimed at disciplining potentially (in)human bodies into the conduct of “non-militant” conduct, by lethally punishing those bodies believed to be conducting, or potentially conducting themselves otherwise.

1) Informatics Threat Perception Coding

It is worth briefly returning to the broad focus of Dillon and Reid’s work for a similarly broad, if not somewhat crude, overview and reminder of their theories pertaining to the biopolitics of global liberal governance, the war on terror, and the liberal way of war. One of the most consistent themes with which all these works seriously concern themselves is the possibility of reading Foucault’s theories of biopolitics as a crucial point of departure in an understanding of, as I noted above, what they call the information revolution in the production, monitoring, and neutralization of threat in securitization discourses and strategies emerging primarily from the United States and its military-industrial complex, or as James der Derian has more accurately described it, the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment-Network.

We have seen this already at play to a certain extent in the previous chapter’s discussion of the Revolution in Military Affairs vis-à-vis Glezos, and its specific relationship to the strategic
imperatives necessitating the tactical deployment of drones and drone warfare. This Revolution in Military Affairs, Dillon and Reid argue, has coincided with the inauguration of the liberal, biopolitical way of war in the constitution and defense and global liberal governance signalled most powerfully by what they call the information revolution attended by an explosion in the production and technological capacities of informations communications technologies (ICT); this includes such technologies as broadband biometric and imaging relays, and bodies rendered intelligible as either normatively safe or pathologically becoming-dangerous, all of which are crucial elements in the reconnaissance-strike complexes made possible by and through drones and drone warfare. Taking the Gulf War of 1991 as their historical point of departure they note,

Albeit long in gestation, the 1991 Gulf War is often said to have introduced [a] new era of warfare. Signalling also the prospect of a ‘new world order’, it grandstanded the military strength of the US-led coalition. The destruction of Iraqi forces demonstrated the vast military difference between advanced liberal regimes, notably the United States, and other states. Since its humiliating defeat in Vietnam, the US, especially, had invested heavily in the development and application of ICT for the purposes of providing what, in military jargon, is known as a ‘force multiplier’, and it used these to great effect in the counter-attack that drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. But, what became known controversially as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was to involve more than the exploitation of the digital revolution in ICT as a force multiplier. Rethinking the very nature of materiality as well as force - ‘code is the prime mover’ said its two early pioneers - military strategic thinkers began to rethink force, power, and war as such. A newly biologized discourse of military strategic affairs thus entered the biopolitical lexicon of the liberal way of war.

In other words, Dillon and Reid suggest that this revolution in ICT digitizes biopolitical informatics in a very specific register of discursive and indeed, epistemological presuppositions underpinning its production of knowledge, to such a degree, they argue further, that this process comes to (re)constitute the very materiality of the human and indeed, becoming-dangerous (in)human bodies. This is a result, on their account, of military strategic theorists’, as well as software theorists and engineers’, adoption of a fairly recent understanding of the complexity of life processes borne by biological theorists such as Stuart Kauffman. While Dillon and Reid specifically focus on the genealogical relationships between these three aforementioned
interrelated but nevertheless, distinct, theoretical disciplines, it is worth noting that while the
knowledges these disciplines produce are at bottom doubtless biologized and biopolitical, they
need to be understood in the context of a fairly recent historical trend in the gaze of the
contemporary securitizing ontology. Indeed, one example of such a trend can be seen in
engineering of software that calculates the possibility of threat and resistance to institutions and
practices of global liberal governance in specific cultural spaces throughout the Middle East and
Africa, software that, as one programmer helpfully discloses,

... was originally derived in earlier studies of the ancient Crusades and this was transferred to the
SE Asian and Iraqi domains. The only thing updated was the values of the weights for the value
trees and various other group relations and membership parameters – derived from open sources.
So the structure of the leader model also survived and passed two out-of-sample tests relative to
the Crusades dataset.202

This ontology looks to the biologized informatics of materially coded bodies of which
Dillon and Reid speak for suggestions and solutions that, as der Derian puts it, produce “...reality effects for a world in flux through a one-sided gaze - from the omniscience of the orbital
gestationary platform to the beady eye of the hovering unmanned aerial vehicle - that aspires
not only to oversee but to foresee all threats, rooting out potential as well as real dangers with an
anticipatory, normalizing panoptic.”203 These threats themselves, it should be noted however, are
and have been explicitly imagined to be emerging from spaces and bodies considered to be at the
edges of normative global order: so-called “failed states,” as well as cities and megacities
(particularly their megaslums, as Mike Davis describes them), come to geographically and
culturally signify spaces of extreme threat in contemporary securitization imaginaries.204 In its
most recent manifestation, this gaze is evident, for example, in David Kilcullen’s strategic
imaginary of what he calls “Islamist Theaters of Operation,” most of which are identified on the
African and Asian continents. While Kilcullen suggests the Americas and Western Europe as
further theaters of operation, they are only considered so by him because of what he sees as
infiltrations of these spaces by transient bodies from the outside - again, mainly Africa and Asia (including the Middle East) - all of which share basic “cultural links” which can be traced back to militant tendencies in Islamic cultures, on this account.\textsuperscript{205}

The biologization of which Dillon and Reid spoke in the passage above is indeed evident in Kilcullen’s work specifically, as he opens his strategic treatise on counterinsurgency by arguing that “Insurgencies, like cancers, exist in thousands of forms, and there are dozens of techniques to treat them, hundreds of different populations in which they occur, and several major schools of thought on how to treat them.”\textsuperscript{206} Indeed, what we see in Kilcullen’s work is not only interpenetration of biologized understandings of life as cellular, viral threat (thereby, it should be noted, organizing a hierarchical topology of relations between sites of threat and sites said to have the capacity to intervene upon and treat that threat invoking the hierarchy of doctor-patient relationships, as David Campbell has argued).\textsuperscript{207} What we see instead is a heterotopic organization of hierarchical relations between discrete sites according to a primary a presupposition of threat as emerging from specific spaces and specific bodies within those spaces; an organization that is explicitly evident in the reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurated by drones and drone warfare, as we will see in my discussion of the Tactical Common Data-Link disseminating information amongst the drones’ reconnaissance-strike complexes below.

So, while I agree with Dillon and Reid in their assertion that,

.. as the digital and molecular revolutions has [sic] transformed the very vital signs of life, so also has it [sic] transformed the very nature of threat perception. Molecular processes of emergence - infrastructural as well as organic - become prime sites of security. As their life-like properties are foregrounded, so also is their potential for becoming-dangerous. Monstrosity arises as much from within as from without. Catastrophe finds a new location. It continues of course to be associated with forces of nature: earthquakes, cyclones and tsunamis. But it also finds a new site here in the very expression of bio-informatic order as such: the body itself threatens catastrophe. Immune structures provided by the very complex adaptive structures of life become the very mechanisms which endanger it as well,
I also want to slightly contend with their assertion that “... the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs which [was] initiated in the hiatus of geopolitical threat perception afforded by the dissolution of the Cold War,” altogether. Instead, as I will demonstrate through a discussion of the Human Terrain System (HTS), the emergence of biopolitical informatics was not, as they claim, attended by the evacuation or “hiatus” of a geopolitical strategic gaze, but rather, a recalibration and mutation of this gaze itself.

2) Human Terrain Systems (HTS)

Biopolitical gazes did not come to occupy the spaces left vacant by the geopolitical undoing of the bipolar Cold War order, instead, they became fundamentally imbricated in and necessary to these geopolitical recalibrations and mutations. As David Harvey helpfully demonstrated at the beginning of the Iraq invasion, that war in particular was as geopolitical - in terms of an express interest in the command and control of a given territory for broader politico-strategic reasons - as ever. As developments in that war have demonstrated however, this is now a geopolitics that is fundamentally underpinned and animated by biopolitics and a biopolitical obsession with the collection and codification of informatics about bodies that, it is believed, must be simultaneously made to live, while also being closely monitored and assumed to always possess the potential to become-dangerous.

Nowhere is this more evident, for example, than in the advent of the Human Terrain System (HTS) in 2006. Intended to mitigate various problems that occupying ground forces were commonly believed to be facing in their occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, the HTS actively seeks to train, employ, and utilize cultural and linguistic academics in fields such as anthropology, sociology, and political science, among others. The original impetus of the program was to equip outward-facing military operatives with an anthropological and
sociological literacy of the populations and territories they would be penetrating in order to both maximize the success and efficiency of military operations in these regions, as well as to mitigate the marginal danger supposedly posed to soldiers that is a consequence of inter-cultural and -linguistic unintelligibility between occupiers and occupied. One need only consult the HTS mission statement:

**Task:** Recruit, train, deploy, and support an embedded, operationally focused sociocultural capability; conduct operationally relevant, sociocultural research and analysis; develop and maintain a sociocultural knowledge base.

**Purpose:** Support operational decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share sociocultural institutional knowledge.

The HTS concept is to attach Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) to deployed BCTs [Army Brigade Combat Teams] / RCTs [USMC Regimental Combat Teams], Divisions, & Corps/theater, and support them with a CONUS-based Reach-back Research Center (RRC). The Human Terrain System uses empirical sociocultural research and analysis to fill a large operational decision-making support gap. This research provides current, accurate, and reliable data generated by on-the-ground research on the specific social groups in the supported unit’s operating environment. This human terrain knowledge provides a sociocultural foundation for the staff’s support to the Commander’s Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), both in planning and execution. It also enables a more effective rotation of forces through the creation and maintenance of an enduring, sociocultural knowledge base.\(^{210}\)

The tactical task of socioculturally taxonomizing and categorizing individuals in a combat environment as either “friends” or “enemies” - a task that Carl Schmitt once reserved for the unique space and practice of the political -\(^{211}\) is now the primary means of military engagement by American forces and their allies in an age of, as the HTS website claims, “persistent war”.\(^{212}\) As Schmitt once predicted, politics is dissolved by technical sociological calculations about the limits of humanity in a pervasive economy of violence.\(^{213}\)

This biopolitical and geopolitical economy of violence that conditions the limits of humanity, however, has itself already departed from the on-the-ground demand for and exercise of sociocultural knowledge expressed in the constitution and operation of the HTS. As we saw in the previous chapter, drones and drone warfare deterritorialize the primary anxiety of strategic discourses away from concerns for the military bodies of troops on the ground, to the command,
capture, or policing of space vis-à-vis the reterritorialization of that anxiety on the speed at which it is believed that threats can emerge - that is, *become-dangerous* - and the capacity to predict and intervene upon these threats. In their capacity to create “an enduring sociocultural knowledge base” that itself is housed in the Reach-back center (that is, the server to which the Tactical Common Data Link about which I speak below is connected), the HTS and its HTTs (Human Terrain Teams) are actively producing and contributing to an existing database of “… maps… assembled in layers so that analysts can correlate previously unrelated qualities of an area to each other… One map might show the locations of all the tribes in a region. A second map of that same region might depict the known locations of all the suspected insurgents. By superimposing one over the other, an analyst might discover that the bad guys are in a single tribe.” As we will see, these maps are exemplary of the kinds of informatics disseminated amongst the reconnaissance-strike complexes constituted by the deployment of drones and drone warfare.

While it should be emphasized that the HTS was not designed *primarily* for the dissemination of its information in the reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurated by drones and drone warfare, their information is indeed being incorporated into informatic threat perception coding about which Dillon and Reid argued above. Nevertheless, as David Price has noted, it is already likely that this information has been coded, processed and disseminated to the various operators of drones and drone warfare in various theaters of operations, as HTTs are now publicly acknowledged as being active in the theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well being deployed out of the regional command center in AFRICOM: “[w]hile battlefields become increasingly dominated by high-tech gadgetry and panoptical drones, iris-scanning and computer
tracking software, something like the currently attempted Human Terrain Teams [otherwise known as HTTs] will be needed to gather human knowledge on the ground.”

Indeed, it is worth further recalling our brief discussion of Didier Bigo’s conceptualization of the möbius ribbon as a useful topological analogy for the relationship between domestic policing agencies and international military assemblages, and tendential move toward a conflation of the two as there becomes a highly integrated transfer of technologies, policies, and practices between each type of institutions’ territorial jurisdiction. As Price described these technologies above in the context of the sociocultural data produced by HTTs in theaters of operations abroad, and indeed, as Dillon and Reid corroborate such a description in the related but separate context of domestic policing tactics in advanced liberal states, what we see is that the HTS data is necessarily coupled with biometrics of racial data, for example, in the use of facial recognition technologies. According to Dillon and Reid, these technologies work specifically as follows:

In turn the measurement of risks posed by particular candidates for insider threat, principally on the basis of whether or not individuals share facial characteristics with the populations constructed on databases, means that identification depends on the representation of a face within a racially encoded visual field. Whereas in the abstract ‘anyone can be presumed to be a candidate for insider threat’, the application of facial recognition techniques and their use in combination with ‘databases of terrorist faces’ means that individuals are targeted on account of their visual appearance decoded in racialized terms. To belong to a particular population distinguishable within a visual field of representation as of higher risk than other populations, is to be distinguished as a more dangerous individual than other individuals.

While this is, it bears repeating, simply an example of one of the many different ways in which the site of knowledge production that is the HTS hierarchically organizes topologies of relations (inherited from specific temporal-ontological assumptions inaugurated in the relations of colonial powers and their colonized holdings), it also bears repeating that this is indeed a site of knowledge production specifically implicated in the deployment of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes.
3) The Tactical Common Data-Link

While the majority of the “securitization” knowledges that pertain to military operations (overt and covert) as we have discussed them thus far - specifically, in the decolonized and still-colonized worlds -²²⁰ obviously still tend to involve neocolonial United States’ and/or NATO and UN ground forces to some degree or another - in the capacity of military advisors, special operations teams, or indeed, in the outright (legitimized) occupying role of stationed troops on regional bases -²²¹ the precipitous reliance on drones and drone warfare in these regions suggests that the conditions under which knowledge is produced specifically for and disseminated throughout the deterritorialized network of drones and their operators is of crucial importance to a semiotics and symptomization of drones and drone warfare themselves. Put differently, the imperative to study these processes does not come from a speculative impulse, but indeed, from the fact that “[t]he members of the House Armed Services Committee included a clause that called for the requirement of all tactical unmanned aerial vehicles to be equipped with the Tactical Common Data Link, which has become the services’ standardized communication tool for providing ’critical wideband data link required for real-time situational awareness, as well as real time targeting data to tactical commanders.’”²²²

We have seen what the logic of drones and the information upon which they are deployed suggest as being the pragmatic operational value of such a system in Zaloga’s description and definition of the reconnaissance-strike complexes that the deployment of drones facilitate; that is, it allows either ready-to-launch or already “loitering” UAVs to swiftly and precisely be deployed to survey, and then, exterminate their designated targets - almost always, as we have seen in recent years, these targets are supposed “militants” said to be hiding in the confines of small villages or camps in states and regions in the still-colonized or decolonized world that are for
various reasons determined to be either geographically and/or politically too perilous and precarious for penetration by human military bodies.\textsuperscript{223} It should be made clear that, while the majority of these UAVs and their more extensive UASs are more often than not still operated by human soldiers from a distance, as opposed to preprogrammed flight paths and/or autonomous loitering missions (Gertler quotes one general, indeed, as saying: “‘There’s nothing unmanned about them’, [former Air Force Lt Gen David] Deptula said. It can take as many as 170 persons to launch, fly, and maintain such an aircraft as well as to process and disseminate its ISR products.”),\textsuperscript{224} the Tactical Common Data-Link nevertheless delivers its tactical strike maps of terrain (geographic and (in)human alike) to either its robotic or human node in the reconnaissance-strike complex, thereby allowing for the decision to be made to kill a specific (in)human body, and any potential collateral damage (retroactively designated as a “militant” by the Obama administration, in a move that makes Benjamin’s Critique of “fated” violence called forth in the violent interventions of exceptional determinism disturbingly prescient)\textsuperscript{225} that might result therefrom.

Understood in this way, it is interesting to note that drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes have been recently decried by none other than the counterinsurgency strategist David Kilcullen. While Kilcullen has recently claimed regarding the drone campaigns against the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan that, ultimately, “[... the use of drones displays every characteristic of a tactic — or, more accurately, a piece of technology — substituting for a strategy. These attacks are now being carried out without a concerted information campaign... or a real effort to understand the tribal dynamics of the local population, efforts that might make such attacks more effective,”\textsuperscript{226} what he fails to realize is that, as I have tried to demonstrate here, the reconnaissance-strike complexes that organize a heterotopic hierarchy of relations
between sites of knowledge production - for example, in Informatic Threat Perception coding and the enemy data production system about (in)human terrains in HTS -, disseminate that information, and act upon that information is nothing less than the logical conclusion of his own strategy to counter what he calls a “global Islamist insurgency.”

The Tactical Common Data Link is nothing less than something designed to allow for the faster flow of information collected, according to Kilcullen’s own sociological principles and imperatives for a counterinsurgency in order to administer and make certain lives worth living in the spaces of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Somalia, and kill those (in)human lives not worth living; as the primary logistical delivery system of information for the reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurated by drones and drone warfare - information that was produced specifically according to these biopolitical imperatives to administer life as I have described it above - the Tactical Delivery System demonstrates how the hierarchical organization of relations between discrete sites such as the bodies about whom this information is produced, the praxis of their becoming-(in)human by the drone strikes visited upon them, and the weapon-assemblage of the UAS delivering that strike itself, constitute a heterotopic topology that I have been calling an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality. I will now close this chapter with a discussion that explicates precisely why I further describe it as “neocolonial.”

People of the Sun: Colonialism, Anthropology, Law

In this section, I emphasize the fact that the sites of knowledge production about which I spoke in the previous section of this chapter are genealogical inheritors of hierarchical relations between liberal empires and their colonial holdings in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To that end, I suggest we briefly close this chapter with a reflection Siba N. Grovogui’s postcolonial critique of international relations theory. Grovogui’s critique, as I noted above, is particularly
helpful because of the ways in which it troubles their tendency to either ignore or efface the profound and complex legacy of colonialism on the post-World War II international system of state and non-state actors. In this regard, we can find in Grovogui’s work some historical points of origin for the the information produced in and for the reconnaissance-strike complexes that drones and drone warfare inaugurate, directly in the colonial regimes and legacies of these regimes inherited today from the nineteenth and twentieth century. Specifically, I think that we can find some direct parallels in the practices Grovogui discusses and those in the contemporary context of drones and drone warfare as I described them above.

At the outset of this discussion then, it is worth noting that the processes of knowledge production about international or transnational threats posed to advanced liberal states, societies, corporations, and the like as I have described it at length hitherto in this thesis, should be read, following Grovogui, as an expression of a broader problematic in international relations and/or world politics discourseses that he calls the “racialization of history” and the “racialization of international knowledge.” By this he means, as he explains,

... where once analysts sought to advance social justice by examining social relations, power, and the nature of material transactions among entities, the new theories now assume the inevitability of the present order on the basis of the supposed civilizational attainments, cultural dispositions, and work ethics of the inhabitants of different regions of the globe. Typically, these explanations depend upon a reverse orientalism that extols the economic achievements of the “Asian Tigers”; a cultural determinism that faults African cultural practices alone for the underdevelopment of that region; and a refashioned Weberian notion of work ethic to explain away class and regional differentiations within the international system. Such approaches frequently oppose culture and agency to structures and institutions in order to favor the former. Moreover, they place “culture” and “agency” outside of their structural and institutional contexts and, as a result, substitute the presumed “habits” and “dispositions” of “regional” groupings for the culture and agency of their constituent members...

As we have seen in the context of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, the kinds of knowledges that take as their point of departure the “regional” and “cultural” dispositions for their strategic and tactical production and identification of threat is, for example as David Kilcullen puts it, latent militant tendencies in specifically Sunni sects of Islam that cover north,
northwest, and east Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and the greater Middle East region, Central and South Asia, as well as Southeast Asia, primarily. As we well know, however, these kinds of given assumptions about spaces, populations, and bodies, especially those of the de-colonized and still-colonized worlds, have a much longer history that goes back to the anthropological and legal representations of peoples in these worlds during the era of widespread colonizer-colonized relations in world politics throughout the nineteenth and early-mid twentieth centuries. À la Foucault’s theory of heterotopias, Grovogui’s argument suggests that these spaces and indeed, technologies of spatial organization are only conceivable as such by consequence of their hierarchical topologies of relations made possible by the imperial temporal registers with which each space is inflected.

Recalling our discussion above concerning how heterotopias, according to Foucault, organize relations between discrete sites on the premise of radically equal horizontality, that nevertheless stubbornly clings to a sanctified hierarchical topology of these relations, which are distributed vertically, according to either the proximity or distance between sites based on their temporal investments, we can see these processes at play, for example in Grovogui’s discussion of the changing legal statuses colonially imposed on Africa from the fifteenth century on:

The position of Africa within the Christian-inspired universal or international order has been determined by four successive international regimes. The first was inspired by the 1493 papal bulls that proclaimed the authority of the Roman Catholic pope and, by extension, his anointed Christian rulers over all humankind. The Enlightenment movement divested this regime of its ecclesiastic foundation but maintained its basic tenets throughout the transatlantic slave trade and the era of informal empire. This first regime was replaced by one that formalized colonial rule in Africa during the 1884-5 Berlin Conference. This colonial regime was perpetuated by the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference and the 1920 Geneva congress following World War I. In 1945, following the San Francisco United Nations Conference, the colonial regime gave way to a fourth, postcolonial regime.

What this should suggest, as Grovogui explicitly does here and elsewhere, is that the contemporary relationships between the former colonialists, and decolonized and still-colonized worlds in a system of states that supposedly claims to make possible radical horizontality
between sovereign states, is in fact made possible because of those previous colonial relationships between colonized peoples and advanced liberal empires during the nineteenth and twentieth century especially.\textsuperscript{234} These relationships legally and anthropologically codified certain peoples as dangerously resistant to, and in dire need of intervention of, biopolitical imperatives to administer life in a particular way in these colonies, let (or make) life die there, and in so doing, reify a particular structure of power relations between colonizers and colonized both domestically and internationally.\textsuperscript{235}

In this regard, I think it is particularly crucial to think about the implications that follow from the anthropological-legal complex of temporal distantiation and barbarity established under the conditions of colonialism during the colonial era, especially as we have seen, a similar complex at play in the determination of (in)humanities legitimately vulnerable to drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes. Regimes of knowledge such as positivistic international law and socio-scientific anthropological accounts pertaining to non-Europeans,\textsuperscript{236} and the interplay between these knowledges, produced many of legal, political, and economic structural consequences still being experienced in the post- or, as I argue, \textit{absent neocolonial} era. This is evident, as thinkers such as Achille Mbembe and Mahmood Mamdani have shown in their genealogies of domestic sovereignties/exceptionalities in colonies and postcolonies on the African continent, in the determinations of deviant bodies, populations, and spaces in the negotiations of internal \textit{Poliseweissenschaft} according to racial, sexual, and class categories.\textsuperscript{237} This is also especially evident in the production of knowledge about spaces and peoples currently being opened up to the violent and forceful targeting of their bodies and populations, as we have seen in the triangulation between Informatic Threat Perception coding, Human Terrain Systems,
and Tactical Common Data-Links; writing about those targeted in the tribal regions of
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Bashir and Crews note:

The people who populate [stories about the NATO-ISAF campaign against the tribes on the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border] seem to be stuck in a kind of time warp of unchanging, “tribal”
traditions, eternally isolated since time immemorial and only now coming face to face with the
realities that the rest of the planet takes for granted as part of the modern world. The Taliban, the
region’s most potent sociopolitical force of recent times, is referred to as “medieval” without
anyone batting an eye, even though the social formations that comprise the group have their
origins in the 1980s. On the rare occasion when a historical perspective is invoked, it has only a
few oft-repeated markers: Alexander the Great, the “great game” between the Russian and British
empires in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the Soviet invasion of 1979 and
its consequent civil war. People who live there would seem to become historical subjects only
when they are acted upon by outsiders, most recently by the Americans and their NATO allies.
The most striking image of this engagement with the inhabitants of the region is that of the drone
aircraft, piloted from Nevada or Florida, conducting high-altitude aerial surveillance of this rugged
borderland and periodically unleashing lethal fire on suspected militants below in what many
commentators have understood as a contest between the sophisticated technology of the modern,
civilized West and the savagery of a backward foe.²³⁸

What makes Grovogui’s work most pertinent to our present conceptualization of what I
have been calling the absent neocolonialism of exceptionality, in contrast to these
aforementioned scholars - invaluable though their research may be - is that Grovogui’s
postcolonial theory allows us to think through the exceptionalities that have been determined and
performed in the historical structures of world politics between and indeed, beyond states (in the
form of colonial trading companies, and international institutions/treaties like those established at
the Berlin Conference in 1884-5), that have, by consequence, have made possible the
internalized sovereign discriminations and exceptionalities about which the former set of
thinkers write.²³⁹ Indeed, while the former set of thinkers may help us to think through the
biopolitical and heterotopic organizations of hierarchical relations and the administrations of life
and death in the colonial and postcolonial world, and indeed, their impacts on contemporary
politics in these spaces and populations, Grovogui helps take these analyses one step further and
demonstrate the broader international regimes of otherness within which the explicitly domestic
disputes of sovereign exceptionality about which Mbembe notes, for example, are made possible.\textsuperscript{240}

The anthropological accounts and legal complexes about which I spoke above, as Grovogui highlights in the context of Africa, were expressive fragments of broader intellectual movements that were integrally tied and mutually informative regimes of otherness that both scientifically and legally subordinated African peoples and communities to the position of a lesser or nonexistent humanity to which European powers had a right and responsibility to respond in the form of territorial acquisition. Grovogui demonstrates such an explicit relationship in the works of the British international legal theorist James Lorimer, writing around the time of a crucial institutional moment in the history of European-African colonial relations, the 1884-5 Berlin Conference. As Grovogui notes,

The international legal norms that, under the Berlin regime, applied to Africans were integral to the epistemic apparatus of colonial discourse. Like political philosophy, these juridical norms were shaped by natural history, in particular pseudoscientific racism. Specifically, the ordering idioms of the law, including zones of influence and protectorates, reflected the naming system of colonial discourse. This system depended upon such symbols as “dark continent” and “primitivism.” In short, international law helped to invent Africa for imperial Europe, as well as to provide the means for political control and the acquisition of natural resources.

Nineteenth-century positivists assumed that international legal norms reflected natural phenomena. Sharing the imperialist aim of the colonial discourse, they drew on the scientific notions of racial hierarchy in their “discovery” of the properties of the natural phenomena reflected by the law... Lorimer advised his readers to incorporate “ethnical differences” in the study of international law... Indeed, anthropology and ethnology provided Lorimer and many of his contemporaries with the foundation from which they developed legal categories that applied solely to non-European communities...

The majority of non-Europeans, whom Lorimer termed the “residue of humanity,” belonged at the bottom of the hierarchy. They were supposed to be both culturally and politically immature. Lorimer presumed this residue to include Africans, Australian Aborigines, the native populations of the Americas, and so on. According to Lorimer, these savages had not achieved the degree of social and political organization of other communities. This majority was thus unfit for any political or juridical recognition. To grant recognition to the savages would be contrary to natural law. Not only would it be futile, it was not up to Britain to “advance or retard the progress of human life” by fiat of recognition.\textsuperscript{241}

Today, as we have seen, the Lorimers of the world are deployed as members of Human Terrain Teams operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and on the African continent under AFRICOM. Their information is coded according to biopolitical regimes of normative stasis and
pathological deviation inaugurating a temporal crisis that allows for the hierarchical organization and *praxis* of (in)humanity by drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, which separate executioner and executed by thousands of miles. This constitutes what I have referred to in this chapter as the absent colonialism of exceptionality. However, what we have not yet explored are the ethical, normative imperatives further animating the logic to deploy drones and establish an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality. It is to the ontological conditions of possibility and categorical imperatives that follow from these ontologies of identity/difference that I will turn in the next chapter through the work of Friedrich Nietzsche.
III: Human, Not Too Human
Drones, The Ethico-Legal Complex of Problematics, and the Tragedy of (In)Humanity

“The judge wrote on and then he folded the ledger shut and laid it to one side and pressed his hands together and passed them over his nose and mouth and placed them palm down on his knees. Whatever exists, he said. Whatever in creation exists without my knowledge exists without my consent. He looked about at the dark forest in which they were bivouacked. He nodded toward the specimens he’d collected. These anonymous creatures, he said, may seem little or nothing in the world. Yet the smallest crumb can devour us... Only nature can enslave man and only when the existence of each last entity is routed out and made to stand naked before him will he be properly suzerain of the earth... A suzerain rules even where there are other rulers. His authority countermands local judgements... The judge tilted his great head. The man who believes that the secrets of the world are forever hidden lives in mystery and fear. Superstition will drag him down. The rain will erode the deeds of his life. But that man who sets himself the task of singling out the thread of order from the tapestry will by decision alone have taken charge of the world and it is only by such taking charge that he will effect a way to dictate the terms of his own fate.”

- Cormac McCarthy

Ashes in the Fall: The Nihilism of Humanity

Broadly speaking, Deleuze and Foucault’s theories have been helpful to my conceptualization of drones and drone warfare insofar as they have helped us come to terms with the fact that the boundaries and limits according to which political life, in this case, international politics and more specifically, securitization practices and technologies such as drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are said to operate, are indeed multiple, dispersed, and disaggregated: boundaries and limits operate and interoperate in different spaces, according to different times, inflected with diverse registers of, for example, necessity and/or utility, and affecting (or not) various consequences in and among the populations and bodies they either claim to make live or let/make die as part of their project to establish something that might be called “security.” These two insights especially have helped us to semiotically read, and thus, symptomatize, the contemporary state of international politics and the claims and practices under which it is said to be secured through drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes. As Walker has noted more generally in this regard,
We live amidst competing claims about change and transformation, especially claims about
globalisms, localisms, regionalisms and multiple challenges to the authority of the modern state.
These challenges are intricately entwined with claims about new engagements with, and
legitimations of, mass violence. Perhaps the most disconcerting of these claims suggests that
political life does not always occur where the traditions of the modern sovereign state tell us it
must occur... Violence persists, but not in the forms in which we have come to expect it, and not,
especially, in the supposedly obsolete forms enacted as wars between sovereign states.244

In this chapter, however, I want to deploy a helpful theory conceptualized by a thinker who,
arguably, helped to inaugurate the philosophical conditions of possibility under which both
Deleuze and Foucault’s critical work could be enunciated in the first place: Friedrich Nietzsche,
and specifically, his theory of the socio-ontological recognition of identity and difference as read
through his understanding of “herd” morality.245

Understanding this thesis’ conceptualization of drones and their reconnaissance-strike
complexes as a *praxis* of (in)humanity that inaugurate and police an absent neocolonialism of
exceptionality as I have described these concepts thus far, this chapter argues that as an emergent
ethico-legal problem in contemporary world politics - evidenced by two works I engage directly
here by Ryan Vogel and Allison Williams, respectively -246 drones and their reconnaissance-
strike complexes need to be semiotically read as a symptomatic expression of what I call the
ethico-legal complex of problematics of that crystallize around the category of the human as a
fundamental and constitutive *limit concept* in the context of contemporary world politics; this
will be the primary concept that I want to work through in this chapter. Put differently, the *praxis*
of (in)humanity played through the absent neocolonialism of exceptionality that drones and their
reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurate demonstrate the tragic limits (a term I will define
below) of contemporary conceptualizations of humanity or *post*humanity that increasingly stake
their claims to legitimacy on the supposed capacity of a secured-yet-“globalized” international
politics to in fact provide access to the categorical identification of “human” for certain bodies,
while violently exterminating certain other, (in)human bodies in order to achieve this goal.247
Drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, as an ethical legal problem, not only demonstrate the violent political elisions that attend imperially-inherited structures of world politics and indeed, accounts thereof (as we saw in Chapter II), but moreover, symptomatically express the necessary violences specifically visited upon peoples in the decolonized and still-colonized worlds as the constitutive conditions under which a specifically EuroAmerican concept of the human is possible and necessary as a regulative ideal in world politics.248 In arguing as much, this chapter proceeds as follows: the next section, following the structure of the previous two chapters, offers a brief exegesis of Nietzsche’s theory on what might be called the socio-ontological conditions under which it becomes possible to recognize, and indeed, the implications that follow from the recognition of identity or difference, specifically as he discusses them in relation with what he calls herd morality in *The Will to Power*.249 The following section deploys Burgess’ recent discussions of ethics and Nietzsche in the politics of security and securitization theory,250 as well as Walker’s discussion of the problems and implications of ethical injunctions enunciated in international relations,251 in order to at once contextualize my deployment of Nietzsche, as well as the discussion of Vogel and Williams that proceeds in the subsequent section of this chapter by defining specifically what I mean when I use the term ethico-legal complex, and indeed, the implications that broadly follow from such complexes in world politics. Thus, the section that deals with Vogel and Williams attempts to lay out what I refer to as the two poles of the ethico-legal complex of problematics crystallizing around drones and their reconnaissances-strike complexes. In this section I argue that and demonstrate how both Vogel and Williams’ legal and ethical positions symptomatically demonstrate the tragic limits of conceptualizing humanity or indeed, *posthumanity*, insofar as they both tend toward a EuroAmerican-centric nihilism that *necessarily* effaces questions
pertaining to the power relationships between (neo)colonial powers such as the United States and the decolonized and/or still-colonized worlds. Finally, I close this section with an eye toward my more general discussion of world politics, tragedy, and nihilism in the conclusion, by returning to Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism and contextualizing it for the contemporary era of warfare through Dillon’s conceptualization of the Tragic, and indeed, the Tragic politics of security, as well as der Derian’s discussion of what he calls “virtuous war.”

**Bulls on Parade: Man, The Herd, Identity/Difference**

"The man described for us, whom we are invited to Free, is already himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A ‘soul’ inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body."

- Michel Foucault

It is neither a new nor a particularly controversial move to point to Nietzsche as a radical critic of the modern project, inaugurated - at least in the realm of political philosophy - by figures such as Immanuel Kant and GWF Hegel. Indeed, Nietzsche is arguably one of the first modern thinkers to not only use the aporetic conditions of possibility for received political accounts of boundaries and limits in order to critique them, but further, he was one of the only thinkers of the nineteenth century to demonstrate the multiplicity of sites - what he called “culture complexes” in which the fundamental aporias of modern thought played themselves out (eg. politics, morality, philosophy, history, religion, the arts, etc.). Moreover, he introduced (or at the very least, re-introduced) a radical Kantian onto-anthropology that sought to, as a necessary mode of political praxis in itself, critically theorize the limits of what he saw as the secular replacement for God as a regulative ideal under which it was possible to conceptualize philosophical arguments, that of course being the figure of Man (indeed, in the Kantian sense). As he noted in *Human, All Too Human*:
All philosophers have the common failing of starting out from man as he is now and thinking they can reach their goal through an analysis of him. They involuntarily think of ‘man’ as an *aeterna veritas*, as something that remains constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure of things. Everything the philosopher has declared about man is, however, at bottom no more than a testimony as to the man of a very limited period of time. Lack of historical sense is the family of failing philosophers; many, without being aware of it, even take the most recent manifestation of man, such as has arisen under the impress of certain religions, even certain political events, as the fixed form from which one has to start out. They will not learn that man has become, that the faculty of cognition has become; while some of them would have it that the whole world is spun out of this faculty of cognition. Now, everything essential in the development of mankind took place in primeval times, long before the four thousand years we more or less know about; during these years mankind may well not have altered very much. But the philosopher here sees ‘instincts’ in man as he now is and assumes that these belong to the unalterable facts of mankind and to that extent could provide a key to the understanding of the world in general: the whole teleology is constructed by speaking of the man of the last four millennia as the *eternal man* towards whom all things in the world have had a natural relationship from the time he began. But everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths. Consequently what is needed from now on is *historical philosophizing*, and with it the virtue of modesty.

The final claim of this passage, Nietzsche’s injunction for a *historical philosophizing*, is indeed the very kernel of his critical project. In introducing the concept of historical particularity to the theorization and critique of the inherent limits of specifically *modern* thought, Nietzsche demonstrated that the normative enunciations and policing practices of culture complexes and their limits, borne from their necessarily aporetic metaphysical presuppositions, were better understood as a symptomatic *effect* of the conditions under which it was possible to think of Man as such within these complexes. Ergo, for Nietzsche, the very possibility of thinking through the concept of Man as a regulative ideal in culture complexes -whether these be politics, philosophy, or morality - is only possible when one thinks through the necessary limits and exclusions of space and time (that is, the historical moment and location of such enunciations, in Nietzsche’s case, late nineteenth-century Europe) that make such a conceptualization possible in the first place; recalcitrant attempts to positively philosophize this concept in the project of fulfilling the unfulfilled (and to him, necessarily *unfulfilling*) promises of modernity in these complexes through the figure of Man, to Nietzsche’s mind, signals the nihilism of such attempts that itself opens up the promise of another “Man,” but more
dangerously and immediately, foreshadows the destructive perils that such attempts might entail
before such an ontological emancipation would ever be possible:

What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no
longer come differently: the advent of nihilism. This history can be related even now; for necessity
itself is at work here. This future speaks even now in a hundred signs, this destiny announces itself
everywhere; for this music of the future all ears are cocked even now. For some time now, our
whole European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is
growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the
end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to reflect... [I]n this formulation a countermovement
finds expression, regarding both principle and task; a movement that in some future will take the
place of this perfect nihilism - but presupposes it, logically and psychologically, and certainly can
come only after and out of it. For why has the advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the
values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because nihilism represents the
ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals - because we must experience nihilism
before we can find out what value these “values” really had. - We require, sometime, new
values. 261

I will return to the question of nihilism in the closing section of this chapter. For the
moment, however, I want to use Nietzsche’s discussion of the differentiation between the
identity of what he calls “the herd,” - a central epistemological referent in understanding his
diagnosis of European more broadly - and those rogues that it seeks to violently eliminate as the
necessary, constitutive act of (re)producing its identity as the ideal status of humanity. 262 It is
worth cautioning, however, as always with Nietzsche, that the combination of his Darwinian
hierarchies of “species” of Man, combined as they fallaciously have been with accusations of
anti-Semitism and a retroactive association of Nietzsche with the Nazi party and all the problems
that go along with that legacy (effected by, it should be remembered, Nietzsche’s sister, not the
philosopher himself), 263 should not be read as a crippling contradiction of my attempt to argue
that the ethico-legal complex of problematics in which drones and their reconnaissance-strike
complexes are implicated symptomatically express the necessary violences specifically visited
upon peoples in the decolonized and still-colonized worlds as the constitutive conditions under
which a specifically EuroAmerican concept of the human is possible and necessary as a
regulative ideal in world politics. While Nietzsche’s classifications seemingly (and admittedly, to
a certain extent do indeed) recall similar categorizations of races of human beings such as those in Kant’s *Anthropology*, it is worth retaining his metaphor of the herd species as just that because, as Cynthia Kaufmann has argued in the case of the similar problematic pertaining to the adoption of Nietzsche’s often highly misogynistic vernacular in feminist studies, he is ultimately “... an ally in challenging the dominant tendencies in the Western philosophical tradition;” as we have seen, not least of these tendencies are the violent effacement and eradication of peoples and populations in the (now) decolonized and still-colonized worlds.

As such, it is worth emphasizing the metaphorical nature of the herd, as a means of at once ultimately preempting accusations of theoretical hypocrisy, as well as beginning to conceptualize Nietzsche’s theory of socio-ontological recognitions of identity and difference in relation to the herd. Indeed, Nietzsche himself satisfies both of our requirements in his discussion of how the herd itself needs to be understood as a cause of nihilism: “The lower species (“herd,” “mass,” “society”) unlearns modesty and blows up its needs into cosmic and metaphysical values. In this way the whole of existence is vulgarized: in so far as the mass is dominant it bullies the exceptions, so they lose their faith in themselves and become nihilists.” This statement should immediately suggest three crucial insights: First, as I have said, the concept of the “herd” is metaphorical, Nietzsche obviously uses it as a synonym for the mass populations of nation-states and their (civil) societies. Second, this herd, as a metaphor for European nation-states and their societies, needs to be simultaneously understood as the historically and geographically limited provincial population of a more generic and amorphous complex of culture complexes made possible first and foremost by the dominant philosophical traditions of Western thought (this much, Nietzsche also noted in the passage from *Human, All Too Human* that I referenced above). Third, this herd is at once the cause and the site of nihilism: indeed, it is
the sovereign political body that will aporetically establish regulative boundaries and limits to which it will attain in its administration, and consequently, that it will violently and unequivocally police what it sees as dangerous and threatening exceptions to its normative injunctions.

For Nietzsche, the herd’s recognition of the limits to Man’s knowledge as the regulative boundaries and limits according to which the herd will be administered are *not* the fundamental limit under which Life is at all possible, but instead, the limits of the concept of Man itself as the regulative ideal through which and toward which these limits will be policed. These limits themselves, however, operate invisibly within that concept, producing an illusion of an eternal Nature: Man forgets that he has made himself, that he is constantly remaking himself, that he is always already a new creature of becoming. Nowhere is this more evident, for example, than his critique of sociology as a normative science enunciating such boundaries and limits:

> Even the ideals of science can be deeply, yet completely unconsciously influenced by decadence: our entire sociology is proof of that. The objection to it is that from experience it knows only the form of decay for the norms of sociological judgement. In these norms the life that is declining in present-day Europe formulates its social ideals: one cannot tell them from the ideals of old races that have outlived themselves.

> The **herd instinct**, then - a power that has now become sovereign, is something totally different from the instinct of an *aristocratic society*: and the value of the *units* determines the significance of the sum. - Our entire sociology simply does not know of any other instinct than that of the herd, i.e., that of the *sum of zeroes* - where every zero has “equal rights,” where it is virtuous to be zero.

> The valuation that is today applied to the different forms of society is entirely identical with that which assigns a higher value to peace than to war: but this judgement is antibiological, is itself a fruit of the decadence of life. - Life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war. 268

Once again, Nietzsche’s closing thought offers a powerful provocation. Recalling from the introduction both Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s theses that the relative peace of contemporary, advanced liberal societies was inaugurated by embedding into the very function of society the mechanisms of war in order to make life live and let/make it die as deemed necessary to the function of this society, biopower, 269 Nietzsche’s conceptualization of the herd and its
“instincts,” that is, its tendential ethical propensities, presages these theses by arguing that the sociological mechanisms that constitute the boundaries and limits of the herd - such as the aversion to war in favor of peace - is less of an accurate representation of the conditions under which the herd is possible in the first place, than it is a representation of the values the herd must first adopt and subsequently forbid in order to constitute itself such that it is recognizable to itself as such.

In this way, we might understand advanced liberal states such as the US, and the mobilization of its population’s support for global counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, especially as these operations are increasingly deferred to the functions provided by drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes against populations and bodies in the decolonized and still-colonized worlds, in a Nietzschean sense, as the symptomatic expression of advanced Western societies to constitute and police their conceptualization of security at the expense of bodies that are deemed (in)human and not worthy of living, according to racial, cultural, and economic categories. Indeed, as we will see below, such an expression can be found in Ryan Vogel’s legal and political defense of drones as “... spectacularly successful - both in terms of finding and killing targeted enemies and avoiding most of the challenges and controversies that accompany using traditional forces... [specifically those surrounding] principles of proportionality, military necessity, distinction and humanity[.]”

These values that the herd simultaneously adopts and forbids as the constitutive aporia of its identification as itself to itself should be understood as, if not outright synonymous, then at the very least intricately linked with the exceptions that the herd, as Nietzsche noted, “bullies” into submission to its will. As Nietzsche himself puts it, they are “[m]oral valuations as a history of lies and the art of slander in the service of a will to power (the herd will that rebels against
human beings who are stronger).” Moreover, he notes elsewhere, “[I]f the more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more thoroughly it is proscribed.” Thus, it is through a regime of signs that indicate the possibility of identifying individuals as either a member or dangerous rogue of the herd that we can at once trace the limits of humanity within the herd, that is, the limit of being considered a human to the herd and thus being worth the herd’s protection, as well as the limits to the herd’s claims, through its regime of signs-as-values (Nietzsche uses the example of the morality of “truthfulness”), to universally capture and conceptualize the figure of the human (“Man”) in the first place. So, sociological expressions of difference-as-threat need to be understood less as the fundamental limits under which any life can be lived, and understood more as symptomatic anxieties enunciated by herds in order to efface the very aporia upon which claims to identity that crystallize around sociological understandings of the fundamental limits under which life can be lived are premised. As Nietzsche notes:

Morality of truthfulness in the herd. “You shall be knowable, express your inner nature by clear and constant signs - otherwise you are dangerous; and if you are evil, your ability to dissimulate is the worst thing for the herd. We despise the secret and the unrecognizable. - Consequently you must consider yourself knowable, you may not be concealed from yourself, you may not believe that you change.” Thus; the demand for truthfulness presupposes the knowability and stability of the person. In fact, it is the object of education to create in the herd member a definite faith concerning the nature of man: it first invents this faith and then demands “truthfulness.”

The fundamental indeterminacy of the category “Man” in Nietzsche then, needs to be read in two crucial ways for the purpose of this chapter, and indeed, this thesis more broadly then: 1) It needs to be understood as being the constitutive condition under which broader regimes of modern Western thought and their traditions have staked their claim to some authoritative capacity to enunciate and define their truths. Again, we saw Nietzsche’s critique of this in the passage from Human, All Too Human above, wherein he critiqued the “family of failing philosophers” for their inability to recognize and indeed, accept the fundamental novelty
of such a category, instead tending to attach this category to residual theological tendencies in metaphysics.  

2) It needs to be understood more specifically in the context of the present discussion, particularly as we examined the fundamental problematics in contemporary counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations’ perceptions of threat through Informatic Coding, Human Terrain Systems, and the Tactical Common Data-Link that allows the operators of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes to determine when a body, or indeed, group of bodies, has exceptionally transgressed the normative limits of what is considered a proper human life (when bodies are, in other words, becoming-dangerous), and thus, in order to administer and cultivate the reproduction of human life, kill (in)human lives that it perceives to be a threat thereunto. Ethical and/or moral injunctions that enunciate the condition under which a life can be considered human and thus identifiable with the herd, or conversely, the condition under which a life needs to be considered (in)human and thus dangerous to the herd, need to be understood as expressions of the self-recognized limits of the herd’s capacity to identify humanity in the first place, and thus are symptoms of its nihilistic tendencies.

Though we might at this point be able to take stock of some of the fundamental problems that Nietzsche works out in the onto-sociology of modern Western thought that wagers its legitimacy on its capacity to make authoritative claims to Truth(s) about Man through a series of culture complexes that identify Man as such or his (in)human counterpart through a regime of truth-telling signs, it may seem conceptually and theoretically dubious to draw a direct line between the political import of this critique, especially to the field of international relations theory and its critical security theory arm, and the metaphysical form-moral code-ethical performance complex to which Nietzsche specifically referred in the passages I quoted above. I
think, however, that such a critique of my move can be countered somewhat insofar as I follow the linear trajectory Bradley Bryan draws between these two poles when he writes that, “Nietzsche sees the moralizing of the western world as integral to its own understanding of what politics is,” and further, that for Nietzsche, “... the essence of the human is its first appearance and defining of itself, and this is the great crime, the great act of revenge – but it presupposes a ‘law’ that the vengeful antecedently erect, the godhead (or, for Brown, the state). It is both present in our moralizing, and yet is not simply reducible to it simply because, for Nietzsche, it is the moralizing of the herd that characterizes human beings (for the most part).”^277

In effect, at the very heart of politics in Nietzsche, lies in his critique of the ontosociological recognition of identity difference through a regime of metaphysical-moral-ethical signs that condition the terms under which one can be considered a human in the first place, or not. Indeed, as we will see in my reading of Vogel and Williams below, the metaphysical-moral-ethical regime of signs we discussed in Nietzsche above can be traced in the ethico-legal complex of problematics (as we will see in Williams, one could arguably also tag on to the the end of this string “-emobidment,” for reasons that will become clear below) that crystallize around drones and drone warfare, a complex of problematics that nihilistically effaces questions of both historical and contemporary power relations between the (neo)colonizing powers of advanced liberal empires and states, and decolonized and still-colonized worlds.

**Blood Meridian: The Ethico-Legal Complex of Problematics**

“Anyone who wishes to engage in politics at all, and particularly anyone who wishes to practice it as a profession, must become conscious of these ethical paradoxes and of his own responsibility for what may become of him under the pressure they exert. For, I repeat, he is entering into relations with the satanic forces that lurk in every act of violence... Anyone who seeks the salvation of his soul and that of others does not seek it through politics, since politics faces quite different tasks, tasks that can only be accomplished through the use of force.”

- Max Weber^278
The ethico-legal complex of problematics coheres around and constellates a regime of truth-telling between two poles that figure a particularly fixed epistemic referent to which security performances are currently or indeed, need to be directed. In order for us to understand such a process, it is important to understand the fundamental, underlying link between (in)security and ethics as a problematic implicated more broadly in critical deconstructions of the presuppositions upon which such a link can be made in the first place. It is worth noting, as Walker does, that this particular problematic is situated within a long genealogical line of claims made by political theorists seeking to espouse the political virtues of either security or liberty, or on another account, security or equality.279

In that sense, it is worth briefly reflecting on J. Peter Burgess’ introductory remarks on this relationship itself in a recent work that takes this theoretical problematic very seriously indeed. Following Derrida and Dillon, the latter being another critical security theorist that we will consult below, Burgess notes that “[t]he experience of the subject of thought, of language, of action, is one of insecurity. To open a thought, to put pen to paper, means running the risk of getting it wrong or being misunderstood. Both the assertion of insecurity, the anchoring of securitization theory and the very experience of insecurity, stem from a subject whose position is already insecure and at risk.”280 We have already seen, via Nietzsche, how this insecurity works on a much grander theoretical, as well as much greater-in-scope sociological scale; the intersection thereof being what I have hitherto referred to as the onto-sociological recognition of identity/difference.

If, for Nietzsche, the subject called forth to be identified by a securitizing herd needs to reveal itself to that herd vis-à-vis a regime of truth-telling signs produced through the structural mechanics of the particular culture-complexes within which that subject is situated (here we
should think, as I have said, of the interoperation of regimes of truth-telling signs that informationally underpin the deployment of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes as I noted in the previous chapter, then Burgess recognizes that the fundamental ontological insecurity inherent to the performance of enunciating and displaying such a regime of signs in the first place. The insecurity of making truth claims is itself the very injunction for and condition under which secured truth claims can take place. In that case then, Burgess continues elsewhere, ethics is the very practice of securitization, insofar as “[e]thics, from a certain point of view, is nothing other than making decisions in the absence of certainty.” The problematic intersection of (in)security and ethics, as Burgess sees it, is not necessarily the requirement to make decisions in the face of uncertainty, but instead, the construction of a certain type of subject, a certain regulative ideal that needs to be secured in itself and for itself.

Burgess is of particular interest to this thesis’ attempt to critically read a symptomatic semiotic of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes through both continental and EuroAmerican critical theorists, not necessarily because of his account of the construction of an evasive and indeterminate subject of security that implores the performance of securitization by virtue of its indeterminate and conceptually elusive nature (an account that is more or less conventional at this point in the field of critical security theory, indeed, it is arguably one of its necessary presuppositions), but rather because of the direct connection he draws between what he calls “... the relation between uncertainty, security, and subjectivity in Nietzsche.” Indeed, as he notes later, for Nietzsche, “... morality is linked to a kind of determinism. It corresponds to a set of principles of predictability, of security understood as knowledge of where we are going. Morality, according to Nietzsche, provides protection against the unknown. Thus, in Nietzsche’s reconstruction, all that is linked to the unknown is gradually assigned a moral character.
Contingency and the undecided and undecidable, is conceptualized through the history of the West as immoral.”

In this sense, we can begin to trace the link between the metaphysical-moral-ethical signs that condition the security of the subject in Nietzsche’a analysis, and a more contextually relevant ethico-legal complex of problematics that are implicated in the regime thereof that crystallize around, specifically, drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes. Recalling that drones and their reconnaissance strike complexes inaugurate and attend a praxis of (in)humanity that constitutes and polices the boundaries of an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality and all that goes along with the implications of those effects, we begin to see the crystallization of a ethico-legal complex of problematics around drones, in the sense that this is a complex of problematics that epistemologically presuppose and indeed, ontologically enact the indeterminacy of a subject that must nevertheless be secured; this subject is above all, a human subject dangerously threatened by (in)human rogues. This is because, in a very real legal sense, there now exists a precedent for the praxis of (in)humanity inaugurated by drones that above all privileges the category of humanity as one that regulates the conditions under which drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes can and must be deployed, over and against the formerly-privileged category of citizenship (a precedent we will see further cemented in Vogel’s legal authorizations for drone warfare in the next section); thus, the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes is always already, and indeed, necessarily a complex of problematics that attempts to negotiate the limit concept of a human life worthy of being made to live, and an (in)human one that needs to be left or made to die.
This crystallization is evinced, for example, in the complex of problematics that arises between the ethical limits of the concept of the human in international political institutions and regimes such as the United Nations and the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*; as well as the specific legal problematics underpinning the principle of United Nations’ so-called “responsibility to protect,” both in terms of the structure of the sovereign system of sovereign states said to be cemented in the UN as an international institution (à la Article 39 of the *Charter*), and the supposedly *universal* jurisdiction of the *Declaration*, and the United States’ claim that it is indeed doing precisely that in deploying drones as a weapon defending the interests of American citizens, and by extension, *all humans*. Further, it is evinced in the fact that in the very legal indeterminacy opened up by these intersections, as Vogel argues, it is incumbent upon the United States to *unilaterally* launch drone strikes in order to defend and secure the interests of *all* humans (properly understood and recognized as such), as though these universal interests naturally flow from, through, and toward those of the United States as a (supposedly) sovereign state. Here then, we see the ethico-legal complex taking form in at once the indeterminacy of the ethics of intervention in the purpose of security in the first place, and at the same time, the legal indeterminacy of who and by what right is authorized to intervene on behalf of the human, and indeed, in what manner.

How should we receive the ethico-legal complex of problematics in critical security theory then? That is to ask, in what way should we understand the regime of truth-telling signs inscribed on to the bodies of those dangerous exceptions, as we saw in chapter two, in concert with the indeterminate loci of ethical and legal authorizations to intervene on, and indeed, neutralize these bodies on behalf of the security of humanity? The answer is, of course, that we are best served by following Nietzsche at reading enunciations of this complex - such as those of
Vogel and Williams in the following section - as indeed, symptoms of a broader tragic nihilism inherent to the aporetic conditions upon which modern regimes of knowledge and truth stake their claims to legitimacy. We will recall, in this line of thought, that “... the supposed remedies of degeneration are also mere palliatives against some of its effects: the ‘cured’ are merely one type of the degenerates.”

In principle, this tendency toward symptomization of the ethico-legal complex of problematics that announces itself in contemporary debates surrounding the ethical and legal legitimacy(ies) of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes that I have suggested through Nietzsche can be understood in the context of critical security theory by (re)visiting Walker’s early engagement with the problem of ethics and international relations theory. Similar to Burgess (among others), Walker suggests that the field of ethics “… is not a repository of principles awaiting application; it is an ongoing historical practice. And,” Walker continues, “far from being devoid of any ethical principles, the theory of international relations is already constituted through accounts of ethical possibility.” However, where Burgess prefers to refigure the practice of security of itself as a kind of post-liberal negotiation over values on the very principle of their indeterminacy (thereby, it could be argued, rehashing the old moves through which the violent consequences of ethico-legal complexes play themselves out), Walker instead suggests a reading that takes ethical enunciations in and of international relations theories as a useful point of departure in order to unpack the political stakes of such enunciations. As he notes, “[t]heories of international relations... are especially interesting... as expressions of the limits within which claims about ethics are - or are not - reconcilable with claims about the spatiotemporal articulation of political identity and community.”
While Walker’s reflections on the tendency of international relations theory to oscillate between two supposedly distinct poles staked out by the schools of realist thought on the one hand, and internationalist/cosmopolitan liberal thought on the other, reflections that are perhaps more pertinent to the so-called “third debate” he and other critical IR theorists helped to inaugurate through the reactionary isolation of “poststructural” or “reflexive” theorists of IR from those that chose to articulate more normative and empirical accounts in keeping with the traditions of the discipline,297 his basic critique still has immense import to us today if we want to come to conceptualize what it might mean to talk about an ethico-legal complex of problematics. This is because, as he notes, “[t]he distinctive problematic of ethics and international relations arises directly from [the] spatio-temporal resolution of questions about community.”298 On this account, the problem of the intersection between ethics and international relations is a direct consequence of the discipline’s incapacity to either offer an alternative to the myopia of literatures that seek to account for political phenomena in the domestic arena without recognizing the international conditions making possible the ability to have a discussion of domestic politics, or to overdetermine the phenomena that take place between and beyond state borders with a reductionist account of the structural determinism of the international system. For Walker, recognizing this doubled problem thus alerts us to the fact that in the case of the former, “… the lack of a centered community suggests - and here the distinction, and the ambivalence it permits is crucial - either the difficulty or the radical impossibility of establishing ethical principles that are applicable to international relations,”299 or, in the case of the latter, “[a]ttempts to resist [the] dichotomising of extremes, this logic of identity and difference, same and other, embodied in the principle of state sovereignty, are easily caught up in temptations and prohibitions enabled by these extremes. If the problem is pluralism, the solution must be
universality. If the problem is temporal contingency, the solution must be the progressive realisation of universality through time.\textsuperscript{300}

When read through the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, questions about the ethics of interventions supposedly necessary to secure the human concept, and at the same time, the legal limit of humanity itself in international politics, Walker’s account illustrates the fact that the ethico-legal complex of problematics should only be read as broader symptomatic expressions concerned with the limit of the concept of the human itself. While Walker himself is more interested in the intersection of ethics and received accounts of political community in the context of international relations theory in the particular work that we are currently consulting, it is worth recalling his more recent theoretical accounts sketching out a picture of contemporary world politics as being increasingly determined in and by exceptional and disaggregated sites of sovereign political decisionism beyond the sovereign state and sovereign system of sovereign states.\textsuperscript{301}

This suggests, to my mind, that the monopoly the international community of states claims to hold on the legal category of humanity, and the enunciations of advanced liberal states like the US to commandeer that claim as the ethico-legal conditions under which it is imperative to, for example, deploy drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes in defense of that category, that the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallizes around UAVs in discourses of world politics is indeed best read as a series of symptomatic expressions articulating the limits under which a politics that increasingly defers to the category of humanity itself can in fact identify and inscribe bodies with a regime of truth-telling signs that thereby warrant the inclusion of that body in whatever form of community such a politics presupposes.
This is to say that, following Nietzsche once again, the regime of truth-telling signs under which either identity with or difference from the international community, and by extension, the concept of the human supposedly monopolized and subsumed by this community can be determined, is more helpful as an indicative metric signaling to us both the limits of the concept of humanity itself in that community and in that context, and indeed, the dubious limits inherent to any universalistic claim about the capacity to define something called the “human,” tied as this concept so obviously and irretrievably to received accounts of political community. On Walker’s account, this means that “… it remains clear both that the meaning of a universal basis for ethics in international relations remains to be established and that the very possibility of something called ethics as we have come to understand it may well require fundamental reconsideration.”

For us however, it suffices to recognize that the ethico-legal complex of problematics is the reading and conceptualization of the limit of the concept of humanity itself in the context of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, specifically. As such, I will now demonstrate this through a reading of the limited capacity of both Vogel and Williams to think either the human or indeed in the case of the latter, the supposedly posthuman, before moving on to discuss the connection between tragedy, limits, and (in)humanity in the symptomatic context of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes.

**Ethico-Legal Complexes of (In)Humanity: Between the Human and the PostHuman**

*With relief, with humiliation, with terror, he realized that he, too, was but an appearance, that another man was dreaming him.*

- Jorge Luis Borges

The previous chapter of this thesis traced an outline of the sites and mechanisms through which the production of knowledge about certain bodies and spaces of threat over and against which drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are deployed as a securitizing praxis of
(in)humanity that inaugurates and polices an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality. In this chapter, I want to demonstrate that the regime of signs inaugurated and circulated between sites of knowledge production about bodies and spaces of threat, and the drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes that facilitate swift and decisive extermination of such threats, are made *decisively actionable* through the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around the semiotic theme of UAVs as an expression of the nihilistic reading of the limit of the concept of humanity in the very sites where that concept is supposedly produced and secured. As Nietzsche himself writes of the supposed process of “humanization” that we will see drones are said to make possible in the neocolonial policing of exceptional threats, “The demand for ‘humanization’ (which quite naively believes itself to possess the formula for ‘what is human?’) is a tartuffery, behind which a definite type of man seeks to attain domination: more exactly, a quite definite instinct, the herd instinct.”

To that end, I think there are two crucial discursive documents that specifically address drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes that are worth consulting. The first is, as I have mentioned, an article by international legal scholar by Ryan J. Vogel outlining the legality of the use of drones under the conditions outlined by what he refers to as the “law of armed conflict,” which is better understood, as we will see, as a legal complex of executive authorizations to determine the conditions under which bodies and lives believed to be *becoming-dangerous* can be and must be legitimately deployed. The second is an article by the critical geographer Allison J. Williams that attempts to map out the problematic ethics of an embodiment complex troubled and reconfigured by the questions that drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes pose to received assumptions about a metaphysics of presence and absence inherent to conceptualizations of human *being*. 
I want to argue that both of these articles are symptomatic expressions of the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallizes around the reading and conceptualization of the limit of the of humanity itself in the context of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, specifically. For Vogel, this is inaugurated and attended by a legal deferral to *exceptionally-determined* decisionisms made possible in the unintelligible complex of legal aporia opened up in the space he stakes out for the “Authorization in the Use of Military Force” under the conditions of what he calls the “law of armed conflict.” For Williams, this is because the critical edge of her somewhat misguided reading of drones as Deleuzian assemblages is premised on her necessary effacement of questions pertaining to the strategic context according to which the deployment of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are authorized as a necessary *weapon* for the war machine. As such, I will illustrate how, as attempts to outline and resolve a specific set of ethico-legal problematics that crystallize around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, each article should be seen as a symptomatic expression of the nihilistic limit of the concept of humanity itself that is realized through the *praxis* of (in)humanity that establishes and polices the *exceptional* limits of an absent neocolonialism.

1) *Vogel: The Law of Armed Conflict*

Vogel’s legal theorization and legitimation of the use of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes in global counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations is, obviously, of less interest to me in terms of taking a position that is either politically in agreement or disagreement on his conclusions than it is a clear and evident expression of the official resolution to the ethico-legal complex of problematics that the use of UAVs obviously poses to the Obama Administration and the United States military-intelligence security apparatus. Indeed, Vogel himself is a Foreign Affairs Specialist who works in the office of the Secretary of Defense, and
thus for our purposes should be read as someone with a unique capacity to enunciate, organize, and systematically authorize the various regimes of signs inscribed on populations and bodies that allow for the determination of those populations and bodies as either human and worthy of being considered lives that should be made to live, or (in)human lives that either pose or may pose a threat, lives that are becoming-dangerous.\(^{310}\)

Recalling Vogel’s argument as I mentioned it above, one that enunciates the incumbent obligation of the United States to unilaterally launch drone strikes in order to defend and secure the interests of all humans, it is worth noting at the outset that this argument itself is a direct response to the United Nations’ *Special Report on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions*, referenced as that report is in the epigraph of Vogel’s essay.\(^{311}\) The debate that seeks to locate the primacy of either the executive determinism of an executively-led sovereign state over and against that of the sovereign conditions under which that determinism is supposedly made possible by the legal framework of a system of states, of course, is not a novel one we can only find in Vogel. Indeed, it is the very basis of contemporary claims of sovereignty, famously rooted in the legal debate between Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen in 1920’s Germany.\(^{312}\) Nevertheless, this old debate takes on a new urgency both for the purposes of this thesis’ attempt to symptomatically read a semiotics of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, especially through the ethico-legal complex of problematics such as those with which Vogel is attempting to come to terms in this context.

In this regard, Vogel situates the deployment of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes in the very specific legal context of what he calls the “law of armed conflict,” a singular law that actually derives from a simultaneously tautological and aporetic feedback circuit of authorizations oscillating between the domestic and the international. Vogel locates
this circuit between the Congressional “Authorization for the Use of Military Force,” (AUMF) signed into law on 18 September 2001 that grants the executive branch wide-ranging powers to launch lethal military force when she and her security councils determine such actions (about which I will elaborate below) to be necessary;\textsuperscript{313} and the United States’ invocation of Article 51 in the UN Charter, citing the events of 11 September 2001 as an act of war against its international person thereby triggering the necessity of the laws of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{314} Indeed, it is in the latter where the United States derives its “... foundational legal authority to target AUMF belligerents... while,” Vogel continues, “the AUMF clearly provides for the use of military force, it offers a great deal of ambiguity for its application... the AUMF grants the president sweeping power to determine who falls within the enemy forces. In a war against a shadowy and purposefully indistinct adversary, this power to define the enemy is significant, even if operationally necessary.”\textsuperscript{315}

Note the self-invoking authoritative grounds of sovereign legitimacy in the supposed self-evidence that the AUMF (the Congressional resolution granting the “Authorization for the Use of Military Force”) clearly provides the authorization of military force; here we encounter the groundless ground of sovereignty, and thus the calling forth of its technē - war, as Jean-Luc Nancy has noted.\textsuperscript{316} The AUMF, however, is not unilaterally determined by the president and his staff, as they are required in their invocation of the laws of armed conflict through Article 51, to define the type of conflict to which the (pre)supposed “combatants” the United States will be targeting are party, thereby making possible a regime of signs that can broadly be inscribed on populations and bodies excised from any politico-legal community securing them from unilateral, targeted killing. And although the AUMF provides a groundless ground for the exercise of sovereign decisionistic power, this power needs to be exercised as a categorical
imperative responding to a specific type of conflict at the edge of, or beyond, sovereign state boundaries; indeed, it is a foundational authority invoked specifically from the limit concept of defining wars from the Hague and Geneva Conventions of warfare, that is, in the reading of the type of enemy being defined as itself a fundamental limit concept, and therefore, the United States must doubly locate the category of the conflict and thus its (pre)supposed combatants at once outside of its own (or as a fifth column within) its own borders, but also beyond the boundaries as what might be called the international. Here we can see the legal complex of problematics resolving itself by virtue of the very aporia that open up the spaces making such exceptional discriminations possible.

However wide-ranging and ambiguous the executive’s AUMF may be, this should not suggest by any measure a principle and/or structural network of global panopticism and potential targeting in all places or against all bodies at all times. Indeed, as Vogel notes,

Of course, in practice, the United States will almost certainly not embrace the broadest application of a global ‘battlefield’ with regard to targeting operations. If there is a government willing and able to either capture or kill a sought-after belligerent within its territory, the United States is not likely to undermine that state’s sovereignty and risk the certain diplomatic blowback by targeting the individual anyway. However, in countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, where the respective governments maintain only partial control over terrorist actors and activities, the United States has resorted to territorial incursions through drone strikes. Again, the “foundational authority” and the principles that follow therefrom, upon which the legitimacy of such “incursions” are premised, are derivatives of the function of the international system and community of states - in this particular case, the principle of recognition between sovereign states as constituting a broader structural sovereignty making the sovereignty of each individual state therein possible -, albeit derivatives that are nevertheless channeled through the unilateral, exceptional, determinations about whom doubly falls outside the category of the citizen as it is granted to humans within the state, or the human, as it is supposedly granted in the “foundational” principles of the international structure. The principle of recognizing humans
between mutually-recognized states as either citizens or simply humans, has now been turned into a question of recognizing (in)humans situated within what are effectively (non-)states.\textsuperscript{321}

So what we see in Vogel is nothing other than a symptomatic expression of the ethico-legal complex of problematics as reading of the limit concept of humanity that attempts to resolve itself through the necessary contradictions making the regulative operation of this concept possible. On the one hand, Vogel demonstrates the legal resolution to this problematic through the international legal principle that he thinks the United States rightly invokes, vis-à-vis the intersection of the AUMF and Article 51, of \textit{jus in bello}.\textsuperscript{322} On the other, with all the problems of legality finding their resolution at the very limit of conceptualizing the law, the ethical limit of drone strikes is resolved through the recognition of the principles of proportionality, military necessity, distinction and most crucially, \textit{humanity}.\textsuperscript{323} For Vogel, the basic \textit{ethical} capacity of drones to facilitate the operator’s distinction between combatant and civilian, that is, between human and (in)human, is in principle acceptable when understood through the intersection of a comparative economy of drones’ destructive capacity (collateral damage included), and the recognition that this distinction itself

\ldots{} depends on the interpretation of when a civilian or civilian object loses its protected status and becomes lawfully targetable. While a good number of US operations in the AUMF conflict occur in traditional skirmishes with enemy forces, the United States typically uses drones to target individuals outside the traditional battlefield, in civilian areas where they may or may not be engaged in hostile activities at the time they are struck.\textsuperscript{324}

Thus, the identification and/or differentiation of the (in)humanity of a body is only possible through a contingent and ambiguous regime of signs that established at once through a discrete set of categories, knowledges, and social performances, as well as an indeterminate distinction, an incapacity to resolve the human with itself as a limit concept. The ethical problematic is resolved through the wager that through an indeterminate but nevertheless definitive regime of signs, the identification of the human as \textit{either} human \textit{or} (in)human is itself contingent on the
limited access to the category of humanity drones and the consequences of their strikes are capable of facilitating.\textsuperscript{325}
2) Williams: Embodiment and Persistent Presence

The ethico-legal complex of problematics crystallizing around the human as a limit concept in the context of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes presents itself quite differently in Allison J. Williams’ critical article on the topic, “Enabling Persistent Presence?” Whereas Vogel’s resolutions were very much rooted in the legal and institutional negotiations over definition(s) designating the (in)humanity of drone targets between a sovereign state and a sovereign system of sovereign states, Williams is much more concerned with the spatio-embodiment negotiations in which drones and their operators are always already engaged, and thus, the more general psycho-ontological consequences for theorists of posthuman, “cyborg,” embodiment. Indeed, as Williams herself comments, “[t]he raison d’être of this paper is... to uncover how the purported capability of the Reaper to loiter in the skies for hours at a time and watch the battlefield unseen from below generates a persistent presence, and how its ability to be piloted remotely at a great distance reduces the risk of harm to the aircrew.”

Central to Williams analysis in this regard is the centrality of her conceptualization of the “... attendant move from geopolitics as representation to geopolitics as performance[.]” While I am happy to accept this move, indeed having articulated a similar phenomenon in the first chapter of this thesis, Williams’ analysis of the human as a limit concept through drones only serves to supplant the problematic categorization of the human with the body, and in doing so, allows her to efface the crucial context in which the assembled cyborg bodies of drones and their human military operators (a Deleuzian conceptualization about which I am suspicious, not least because it disregards a number of crucial Deleuzian concepts - namely, the variants of the war machine, speed, deterritorialization, reterritorialization, and weapons - that I outlined in Chapter I) are ethically and conceptually privileged at the expense of any conceptualization of the way in
which populations and bodies are targeted for and by these violences in the first place.\textsuperscript{330} While I am not particularly hostile to an analytical lens with which we might approach drones in the future, insofar as Williams argues that her approach “... explicitly rejects the problematic Cartesian perspectivalist all-knowing objectivity of classical geopolitical enquiry by refocusing from the strategic level to the individual experiences of Reaper operators,”\textsuperscript{331} I am also not particularly convinced that this move allows Williams to subvert either the Cartesian objectivity she is attempting to resist, nor does it, to my mind, tell us much if anything about the geopolitics of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes that we did not already know.

At the bottom of Williams’ critique is the claim that because of both the limited capacities of the actual optical technologies with which Reaper drones are equipped (they cannot provide peripheral vision), and because of the limited capacities of their human operators (humans, Williams insightfully reminds us, blink their eyelids), the supposed “persistent presence” that UAVs are said to enable is a misleading idea.\textsuperscript{332} Less troubling to me than the banal, vacuous, and rudimentary obviousness so readily evident in a published critique, is Williams’ explicit and repeated refusal to think through the human as a limit concept in relation to the violent and destructive consequences of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, and to privilege the “more-than-human assemblages” as the primary \textit{ethical} geopolitical terrains through which we can begin to approach the indeed, \textit{ethical} consequences that follow from the deployment of UAVs to military ends. As Williams herself notes, “Whilst [this privileging] might be seen as troubling, as a continuation of the privileging the voices of the powerful... [w]e need to appreciate what can be learnt by down-scaling our analysis to the individual experiences of UAV aircrews and others who are involved in the actual practices of war-fighting.”\textsuperscript{333} Again, while I am not hostile to this suggestion in principle, I think it is at best misguided of Williams to
assume that she can effectively decouple her analysis from questions of identification and
difference, the organization of regimes of signs rendering certain bodies intelligible as properly
human and others unintelligible as such, and the always already present structure of power
relations that follow therefrom that necessarily authorize the former to violently penetrate, form,
and regulate the bodies of the latter; indeed, as a scholar ostensibly proclaiming her allegiance to
a school of feminist thought that espouses the lessons of the material *embodiment* of bodies,
especially those lessons learned through the array of violences that embodied bodies experience
in their becoming-intelligible as bodies, it is surprising that Williams so willingly betrays the
very critical thrust of that school of thought in her articles refusal to even *recognize* the bodies of
UAV victims in her analysis.

It bears repeating that this critique is not one of my own ethical regime against
Williams’, but instead, a reading of the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallizes
around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes that inaugurate and attend a *praxis* of
(in)humanity that polices an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality. The basis of my critique
against Williams follows from what I think I have demonstrated in conceptualizing drones and
their reconnaissance-strike complexes such as I have thus far; that is, that drones and their
reconnaissance-strike complexes (which include their human military operators) operate on the
Nietzschean principle of socio-ontological identification and difference from the herd, which is
the inscription of certain bodies as properly intelligible through a regime of signs marking them
as human, or improperly unintelligible, thus casting their (in)human bodies out of the identifying
group and category and opening them up to all forms of violences deemed necessary in order to
secure the concept of the human in whatever culture complex that human may be implicated.

These categories of identification/differentiation simultaneously spring from power relations
inherited from the colonial legacies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as I have demonstrated Chapter II, and operate through the fundamental recognition of the human as such, as I demonstrated thus far.

To that end, I think Williams’ analysis is not only fatally flawed in its overall approach and focus, but indeed, it is symptomatically expressive of the violent and nihilistic tendency that we have seen at play in the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes to efface questions about the limit of the concept of the human and the inextricable link between the limited nature of this concept and the power relationships between former colonial powers like the United States and the decolonized and still-colonized worlds, in the discourses and practices constituting what we understand to be world politics.336

It is thus at this juncture that I want to now turn to some closing reflections on the link between security, the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes as a reading of the limit concept of humanity (especially in relation to the legacy of colonialism and contemporary neocolonialisms of exceptionality that we have seen drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes inaugurate, attend, and police through their praxis of (in)humanity), and indeed, tragedy. We will see through a brief reflection on Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism, its connections to Dillon’s theoretical situation of the concept of tragedy itself (one he indeed locates in Nietzsche’s thought) within a more contextually relevant conversation pertaining to critical theorizations of securitizing ontologies, that I think is best summarized in der Derian’s concise conceptualization of what he calls “virtuous war.” I want to make it clear that these closing reflections should be read as a kind of set-up for the overall conclusion to this thesis that follows the present chapter.
The Work of Killing in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: Nihilism, Tragedy, Virtue

“I remember an old man in my village, a Christian convert, who suffered one calamity after another. He said life was like a bowl of wormwood which one sips a little at a time world without end. He understood the nature of tragedy.’ [said Obi Okonkwo] ‘You think suicide ruins a tragedy,’ said the Chairman. ‘Yes. Real tragedy is never resolved. It goes on hopelessly forever. Conventional tragedy is too easy. The hero dies and we feel a purging of the emotions. A real tragedy takes place in a corner, in an untidy spot, to quote W.H. Auden. The rest of the world is unaware of it. Like that man in A Handful of Dust who reads Dickens to Mr. Todd. There is no release for him. When the story ends he is still reading. There is no purging of the emotions for us because we are not there.”

- Chinua Achebe

Above, in my discussion of Nietzsche’s theorizations of “herd” socio-ontological identification and differentiation of rogue bodies that explicates the way in which the herd demands such bodies make themselves knowable - as either valuable human lives worthy of recognition and incorporation into the herd, or dangerous (in)human bodies that must be excised and exterminated - vis-à-vis regimes of “moral” signs, I suggested that for Nietzsche, this process needs to be understood as a part of what he identified as a broader set of nihilistic symptoms and circumstances endemic to continental European conceptualizations and performances of the political, the aesthetic, the religious, the social and the like in the closing decades of the nineteenth century to which Nietzsche himself was a contemporary. In this chapter’s closing pages, I want to bring my discussion of what I have framed as contemporary expressions of an analogous kind of nihilism that I have argued is evident in, for example, the ethico-legal complex of problematics crystallizing around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes of which we have seen Vogel and Williams are exemplary symptomatic expressions.

Recalling from my specific theorization of the ethico-legal complex of problematics that contextualized Nietzsche’s theories of identification/differentiation through Burgess and Walker’s respective theoretical takes on ethics, politics, value, community, and world politics,
that this complex is the reading and conceptualization of the limit of the concept of humanity itself in the context of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, I want to begin to tie together what I have hitherto only gestured toward or suggested as being some of the broader theoretical stakes in the specific context of this ethico-legal complex of problematics. These stakes, I will show, are best understood by bringing Nietzsche’s explicit reflections on nihilism into relief with Dillon’s Nietzschean-cum-Heideggerian conceptualization of the Tragic, as well as der Derian’s theorization of what he calls “virtuous war,” in order to understand the tragic stakes in the supposed virtues of the contemporary modes of society-making warfare of which drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are a contemporary symptomatic expression par excellence. Put differently, I want to suggest that the triangulation between nihilism, tragedy, and virtue in the specific context of the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are a symptomatic expression of reading the human as a fundamental limit concept itself that at once makes possible and animates the violences of contemporary international politics as the necessary constitutive acts over and against those peoples in the still-colonized and decolonized worlds such that the promise of the category of the human through international politics can be maintained.

To that end, it is worth noting at the outset of this discussion that there is a crucial internal split in what is in fact Nietzsche’s doubled concept of nihilism. As Nietzsche himself describes it: “Nihilism. It is ambiguous: A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism. B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as passive nihilism.” I want to return to the former figuration of nihilism in the conclusion to this thesis, specifically as it pertains to theories and modes of resistance more broadly in political theories of
world politics as well as more specifically in contemporary struggles to counter some of the 
tragic nihilistic machinations of world politics. In order to do so, however, we need to here focus 
on what Nietzsche calls *passive* nihilism in his comments above, or what I would here slightly 
recast as *tragic* nihilism for reasons that will shortly become clear.

Put simply, *passive* nihilism, for Nietzsche, is a threefold phenomena that 
psychologically and *physiologically*\(^344\) contributes to an overall degeneration the body of 
philosophy’s overall regulative ideal, the human. First, it leads to an overall spiritual 
degeneration insofar as it limits, paralyzes, and emaciates the human’s capacity to conceptualize 
and *experience* her spiritual, psychological, and ontological fulfillment, meaning, and purpose 
through the emaciation of religious and philosophical attempts to *re*inflect a culture with a 
fulfilling meaning and purpose by *re-*asserting and deferring to those spiritual, psychological, 
and ontological (that is, “moral”) virtues that made possible such a degeneration in the first 
place.\(^345\) Second, through its deferral to the old virtues, *passive* nihilism throws its subject into an 
ontological set of circumstances wherein she is at once forced to recognize the limits of the 
claims under which she is capable of identifying herself and others *as such* (that is, this subject is 
forced to confront the *moral* limits of her own condition of possibility), and simultaneously, 
disciplined into submission to these violent, *tragic* limits, such as I outlined them above in this 
chapter.\(^346\) Third, this subject that is forced to come to terms with the limits of her own 
possibility is disciplined into submission to the groundless grounds upon which the *virtues* of 
these limits are articulated and espoused vis-à-vis an ultimate rejection of the aversion of the self 
to these disciplinary virtues in favour of a promotion of these virtues *as though they constituted 
her, and all others’, selves*, thereby making any possibility for the realization or fulfillment of the 
self possible only by the embodiment of the herd’s proscribed virtues. This, Nietzsche says,
ultimately announces and inaugurates a nihilism that enunciates, above all else, a supposed social
growth or supposed “advance” out of the impossibility of the virtues upon which this subject is
forced to wager the possibility of her own existence as such, a move that itself is only made
possible by the simultaneous undoing of the very principles such an advance is said to
consecrate:

Actually, every major growth is accompanied by a tremendous crumbling and passing away:
suffering, the symptoms of decline belong in the times of tremendous advances; every fruitful and
powerful movement of humanity has also created at the time a nihilistic movement. It could be the
sign of a crucial and most essential growth, of the transition to new conditions of existence that the
most extreme form of pessimism, of genuine nihilism, would come into the world.347

So passive nihilism, as Nietzsche describes it, is best understood in terms of the ethico-
legal complex of problematics as we explored them above: the recognition of the groundless
grounds upon which the category of the human is enunciated and enforced, either in terms of
politico-legal machinations necessarily making possible the killing of (in)humans in the name of
the human as Vogel described it, or in terms of totally effacing the human consequences of the
praxis of (in)humanity that are drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes by emphasizing
the supposed “humanity” of drones and their operators as Williams described it. Whereas,
however, Nietzsche understood this becoming-of or becoming-nihilism in terms of passivity, it is
also worth thinking of this process, as I have said, in the language of the Tragic, as Dillon
describes it.

The most important of Dillon’s insights in this regard is first and foremost that, the Tragic
is not the aestheticization of the politics, nor the overall spiritual enunciation of politics as the
void created by the evacuation of a transcendental, ontological metaphysics coupled to a
regulative regime of moral virtues by which the political subject can live (an evacuation that has
effectively plagued every politico-philosophical attempt to formulate concepts of subjectivity
and political community since at least Descartes).348 Rather, the Tragic, both as a concept in the
history of philosophy (which Dillon, following Nietzsche, traces back to the pre-Hellenic Greek *polis*)\(^{349}\) in addition to a politico-philosophical ontological experience and expression of Being-as-such (a broader problematic Dillon works through in his major reflections on the Tragic and its context in *The Politics of Security* through an engagement with Heidegger’s highly Nietzschean theories on Being),\(^{350}\) “... [calls] into question the very demarcations that [constitute] it... the tragic recognises [sic] Otherness to be immanent, as well as radical, it is compelled to find ways of responding to it with agonistic respect.”\(^{351}\)

This however, for Dillon, is not in itself ontologically lamentable, nor even a political experience that needs to be effaced and/or foreclosed. Indeed, the question of the Tragic itself, for Dillon,

... sets the question of the political aside from all those, conventionally studied in terms of the (inter)national politics of security, of the structures, institutions, rationalities and technologies of our contemporary regimes of power and practices of rule. In particular, it sets the question aside from the intense and pervasive cult of the subject which constitutes the (inter)national politics of Modernity, as such. While the cult of the subject seems to have arisen as a liberatory move within the dissolution of the Christian imaginary, it necessarily called into effect, and thereby entered into an intimate alliance with, the rationalising and reifying practices of rule of which ‘we’ are the inheritors. This was no mere accident. Neither was it a coincidence, nor the unfortunate pathology of an otherwise admirable development. It was integral and essential to what was a radical mutation in the symbolic order, and intensification of the logic of ontotheology, by which the very staging and sense of the political was fundamentally re-ordered. (Inter)national political Modernity, as the legatee of that mutation, is, itself, already mutating—through the rationalising, technologising, globalising velocity of its very own representational practices and dynamics—just as radically as the times which engendered it. That bequest from the dissolution of the Christian world is, in consequence of the very logics at work within it, rapidly fashioning a radically different political bequest to ‘us’. *The (inter)national politics of Modernity must, therefore, become concerned not with living-out but with out-living the modern.*\(^{352}\)

If anything, the Tragic is worth retaining insofar as it is a powerful performative force through which we might find the possibility of radically rethinking the conditions under which we establish regimes of signs through which we codify identity and difference. This being said, it is at the same time always already invoked and present in the regimes of signs through which the virtues that affirm these regimes identity/difference are enunciated.\(^{353}\) Indeed, this much is explicitly evident in understandings of international relations theory that could be cast as
contextual frameworks within which the necessary effacements and elisions that the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes.

As the IR theorist Chris Brown uncritically describes this contextual situation of these problematics more broadly, this makes the Tragic reducible to a series of questions around utilitarian calculations of the greatest benefit violent measures taken in the name of international politics; that is, the Tragic is reduced to nothing but the supposedly “realist” recognition that certain violent measures will be required in order to preserve or cultivate an acceptable status quo according to a specific regime of political virtues under which the human as such is conceivable.\(^{354}\) I think in this sense then, that instead of a \textit{passive} nihilism in the sense that Nietzsche understands it, we are better served by conceptualizing the ethico-legal complex of problematics of which Vogel and Williams are symptomatic expressions as a kind of \textit{Tragic} nihilism that recognizes the limits of identity/difference as necessarily violent regimes as the very limit and indeed, performance that \textit{must} be embodied, enunciated, and enforced in order to maintain a coherent conceptualization of the political at all.

James der Derian helpfully describes this kind of Tragic nihilism in his theorization of so-called “\textit{virtuous war},” a conceptualization of contemporary warfare that I think nicely encapsulates the \textit{virtuous} imperatives and injunctions that drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are said to realize.\(^{355}\) “At the heart of virtuous war is the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualize violence from a distance - \textit{with no or minimal causalities}.”\(^{356}\) For der Derian, Tragic nihilism occurs at the intersection between this technical capability/ethical imperative enunciated and performed by advanced liberal states like the United States, and indeed, in the deployment of those technical-ethical capabilities and
imperatives, over and against “... a chasm [that] has widened between the rhetoric of global peace and the continuation of particular practices of violence. This chasm is not unrelated to the ballyhooed digital divide, and is certainly a function of the inequality, exploitation, and internalized dominion... in regions kept distant tropes like ‘the inner city’, ‘the near abroad’, ‘the third world’, and most generic of all, ‘the South’.”

Consequently, we need to understand this triangulation between nihilism, tragedy, and virtue in the specific context of the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes as the symptomatic expression of reading the human as a fundamental limit concept itself that at once makes possible and animates the violences of contemporary international politics as the necessary constitutive acts over and against those peoples in the still-colonized and decolonized worlds such that the promise of the category of the human through international politics can be maintained. To that end, I want to move on to the conclusion of this thesis, which will first outline the primary themes and arguments that I have attempted to make in this thesis, and subsequently return to this triangulation as I have discussed it above to think through what we might be able to explore if we take this Tragic nihilism as a productive object of critique from which we can begin to rethink the stakes and function of identity and otherness in attempts to “secure” humans in world politics.
Conclusion: *Pithecanthropus erectus* 358

(Re)Tracing the Narrative; Nihilism, Tragedy, Resistance; Toward a Political Ecology of Weapons

(Re)Tracing the Narrative

1) The Argument

This thesis has attempted to emphasize three arguments in the three respective chapters that constitute its main body: i. Drones and drone warfare inaugurate and attend a *praxis* of (in)humanity. Through the deterritorialization of the primary *locus* of security away from fortified bounding boundaries, and toward the biopolitical speed at which a body can ontologically emerge as a fundamentally *(in)*human enemy threat that marks the broader strategic imperatives of the Revolutionary in Military Affairs (RMA), especially in the context of global counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations, drones and the reconnaissance-strike complexes that they make possible lethally mimic and indeed, *practice*, the very conditions of *(in)*human threat their deployment is attempting to annul, if strategically only as one weapon, of course, among many. Although the strategic imperatives that render intelligible and this *praxis* - with drones understood as the weapons *par excellence* through which these imperatives are presently said to be realized - tend to cast their broadest epistemological analytical framework in terms of chaos and/or network theories (two distinct but interrelated accounts of sociological performance and organization in and amongst various actors under the conditions of late capitalist and late liberal world political economy), these frameworks nevertheless tend to rely on an ontological dualism expressed in political theory’s received anthropologies of human life as being secured within an identifiable inside only made possible through the constitutive recognition of a threatening, *(in)*human, contradistinctive outside.

ii. As such, it is necessary to understand the processes through which this constitutive outside is indeed represented as always already potentially threatening and dangerous; how this
representation of potential threat as knowledge and thus, as truth is produced in discrete but interrelated sites with discrete but interrelated histories; and finally, the topology of power relations that is both presupposed within these representations and the sites through which they are produced as truthful knowledge, as well as that which follows therefrom. Thus, it is necessary to understand the reconnaissance-strike complexes that drones are said to inaugurate *par excellence* as constituting a heterotopic space that:

a. Isolates representations of threat to a relatively discrete geographical location of regions and states made up of former colonial holdings in Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. Simultaneously, valued-as-human military bodies that would have previously been required to be present in these territories in order to secure their correlative “inside” from its constitutive “outside,” and indeed, any subsequently required valued-as-human administrative bodies that would necessarily follow from the deployment of their military counterparts, are made absent in the securitization process.

b. Following from the logic of the networked information and its deployment in the name of all humans by advanced liberal states such as the United States (defending the humanity claims so far as to assassinate its own citizens through such means, and retroactively declare any collateral damage potentially caused by drone strikes), determining bodies identified and located within these spaces and populations as *exceptional*, (in)human threat that consequently presupposes;

c. Certain imperatives that follow from a topology of power relations, established through a network of sites wherein knowledge about these spaces and their
constituent populations, as always already potentially threatening, are produced, sites that are direct genealogical heirs to;

d. The legacy of hierarchical power relations between colonial powers and the peoples, territories, polities these powers colonized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes need to be understood as inaugurating and facilitating an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality that follows from a dualistic, socio-ontological process of recognition and differentiation between inside and outside.

iii. In that regard then, it is necessary understand what makes the socio-ontological recognition and differentiation between inside and outside both possible and indeed, necessary; especially if what is at stake is nothing less than the violent practice and enforcement of a recognizable distinction between the human that needs to be secured inside, and the (in)human outside that needs to be killed in order to secure the human in the first place. With this problem in mind, and recalling the categorical metrics said to define, and indeed, the imperatives that follow from these metrics’ definition of, either a secured or to-be-secured human body from an insecure, (in)human threat (or at least, a potential threat), it is evident that the socio-ontological recognition of identity/difference is made possible through a regime of signs that follow from a distinct regime of ethical and/or legal imperatives about what can and must be understood as a human life ethically and legally worth living, and conversely, and (in)human that is not. These ethical and/or legal imperatives are themselves enunciated as responses to what I call the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallizes around the problematic category of the human in the context of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, problematics that necessarily run up against the very aporetic presuppositions built into the category of the human that drones
are ultimately said to either secure or defend, insofar as these presuppositions involve the inherent humanity of all peoples, except those that have been metrically identified through a regime of signs sedimented within neocolonial power relations as being threatening, exceptional, (in)humans that must be exterminated by a drone strike.

The discursive evidence that I have presented in this regard should suggest that drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, and indeed, the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around the imbrication of the human in that context, express a symptom of what I call tragic nihilism evident in contemporary relations between neocolonial powers, and decolonized and/or still-colonized populations and polities, especially those most directly affected by the global counterinsurgent/counterterrorism operations that drones in part facilitate. This is most evident in the sustained refusal of arguments that enunciate ethico-legal imperatives that follow from their complex of problematics to call into question these presuppositions. This is to say that they uncritically articulate and evince the necessary, particular limits that make such supposedly universal presuppositions possible, and thus explicate the violent implications that follow from these presuppositions and their actuation through drone strikes for peoples and communities in these neocolonized spaces. Further, such articles’ deference to received and inherently aporetic, limiting, categories of either the humanity or indeed, posthumanity drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes make real and explicitly intelligible. As such, tragic nihilism, expressed as it is in these instances, needs to be understood in terms of the representation and recognition of (in)human, and therefore, threatening otherness to an otherwise universal regime of signs identifying humans.\textsuperscript{359} This representation and recognition is subsequently redressed through the violent policing of certain, exceptional, categorical imperatives that follow from the Eurocentric Anthropological category of the human as the
regulative ideal of world politics, and thus nihilistically defers to (neo)colonial virtues of
biopolitical or “virtuous” war as authoritative legitimations for its otherwise violent practices.\textsuperscript{360}

2) The Framework

I have made these arguments, and in the process conceptualized some key concepts and
processes - war machines, speed, weapons, heterotopias, topological hierarchies of relations,
socio-ontological recognitions and representations of identity/difference -, by deploying some
crucial theories articulated by Deleuze, Foucault, and Nietzsche, respectively, over the course of
this thesis’ three chapters.\textsuperscript{361} My choice to deploy their theories has been, it bears repeating, not
an attempt to offer any insights of any of these thinkers’ profoundly influential and complex
theses. Rather, it has been an attempt to first, work through some of the somewhat canonical
theoretical vernacular of contemporary critical security theory, and second, to draw out some
more evasive philosophical concepts that help us to understand the implications of the historical
and political networks of knowledge and practice that make, as I have argued, the emergence of
drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes both possible and worthy of politico-
thetical reflection.

The vernaculars that critical security theorists - specifically, in the context of this thesis,
Burgess, der Derian, Dillon, Glezos, Grovogui, Reid, and Walker - import from Deleuze,
Foucault, and Nietzsche then, have been of particular use to us insofar as that former set of
theorists has helped me to carve out a conceptual space for drones and their reconnaissance-
strike complexes, situated amongst and related as they are, as we have seen, to specific
genealogies of sovereignty, liberal-biopolitical war, the RMA, security and securitization, and
the imperial inheritances of contemporary institutions, structures, and performances of world
politics.\textsuperscript{362} To be sure, these are highly complex theorists and theories on their own, each one of
which warrants detailed and sustained engagement in order to fully conceptualize each individual field and problematic to which each individual theorist is attempting to respond. I have chosen to write with and beyond these theorists and fragments of their work, however, insofar as I think that they are authoritative and contextually relevant voices on what are indeed highly complex phenomena in their own right, but phenomena that, as I have argued, are necessary in order to understand how it is possible that drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes can be and indeed are deployed as a supposedly necessary weapon responding to a specific set of geopolitical, biopolitical, and ethico-legal complexes of problems and limits.

Insofar as this much has, I hope, been established at this juncture of the thesis, I want to conclude first with some reflections that follow further from those I made of Nihilism, Tragedy, and Virtue at the end of the previous chapter and bring these reflections and concepts to bear on the broad theoretical framework that I noted I am working within in the introduction: namely, the triangulation between Race, Biopower, and War as they were theorized by Foucault and taken up in the contemporary context of global counterinsurgency/counterterrorism strategies by Dillon and Reid. Following this brief discussion, I will close by suggesting some potential analytical lines of flight that might take their point of departure from some of the implications of this thesis’ arguments; namely, I will suggest that this thesis demonstrates a materialist ontogenealogy of a specific weapon - this being of course, drones - that could be helpfully and more rigorously applied to wider ecologies of weapons as a symptomatic semiotic of processes, structures, and performances of contemporary world politics.

**Perfecting Nihilism and the (Re)Birth of Tragedy: Nihilism, Tragedy, Resistance**

In the closing pages of Chapter III, I argued that the triangulation between nihilism, tragedy, and virtue in the specific context of the ethico-legal complex of problematics that
crystallize around drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes needs to be seen as the symptomatic expression of reading the human as a fundamental limit concept itself that at once makes possible and animates the violences of contemporary international politics as the necessary constitutive acts over and against those peoples in the still-colonized and decolonized worlds such that the promise of the category of the human through international politics can be maintained. Similarly, in the introduction to this thesis, I pointed to the triangulation between race, biopower, and war in Foucault’s work especially, suggesting that it was through the performance of the latter that the former category and mode of sociopolitical administration became possible, and thus, at the nexus of this triangulation was the production of categorical knowledges - not least of which was the highly imperialist notion of race - and negotiations between these categories concerning nothing less than the conditions under which a life was deemed worthy of being made to live, or not.

It would be too obvious to here suggest that war, biopower, and racism are nihilistic, tragic, and borne certain sets of self-contradictory virtues pertaining to the praxis of warfare itself, and while this may be true, this is in many ways a foregone conclusion in any analysis that takes up these themes, and so says little or nothing about drones and their reconnaissance strike complexes, nor how they might be helpfully understood. This does not, however, altogether foreclose the possibility of drawing some connections between the Foucauldian themes of war, biopower, and race with which I opened this thesis - themes that this thesis has attempted to write with and beyond - and the Nietzschean themes of nihilism, tragedy, and virtue with which I close this thesis. Indeed, both are, at bottom, theories that attempt to explain negotiations over the quasi-sacred “humanity” of certain human lives versus the “(in)humanity” of other human lives; both are thus also questions about the limited capacity of the supposedly universal category
of the human insofar as that category relies on a series of either potential or ongoing exceptional moments, emergencies, and differentiations in order to secure and sustain that category of the human, only intelligible as such under certain conditions; finally, and perhaps most importantly, both also attempt to invert received assumptions concerning the exceptionality of circumstances under the category of the human is secured, instead attempting to demonstrate that these supposedly exceptional circumstances are in fact the very constitutive conditions under which contemporary life in advanced liberal societies as such is made possible, that these exceptional circumstances are in fact transmuted and codified into legitimated discriminations necessary for ongoing sociopolitical practices and relations as such. For Foucault, the supposedly exceptional circumstance to the normative function of late liberal sociopolitical life par excellence was war, and it was thus that he inverted Clausewitz’s aphorism, claiming that “politics is war by other means.”

For Nietzsche, the supposedly exceptional circumstance was the supposedly nihilistic crisis of European philosophy, or indeed, the very end thereof, at the close of the nineteenth century. As he demonstrated, however, supposed revolutions in Western thought, whether these revolutions proceeded from the Greeks to the Christians, or from the Christians to the moderns, were each borne out of similar questions concerning the limited legitimacy of the incumbent epistème’s formulation of Truth or truth production, and in seeking to supplant the received formal regime with a novel replacement, often tended to cling to some of the structural contradictions, limitations, and imperatives of their predecessors, at least back to the Socratic turn in Greek philosophy. Under these circumstances for Nietzsche then, the tendentious move evident in a great number of not only philosophical and religious regimes, but indeed, in sociopolitical phenomena such as advancing liberalism and warfare, is the nihilistic recognition
of the particular limits to a certain regime’s claim to universal Truth, and simultaneously, the apotheosization of those limits as virtues themselves.  

Thus, we can see a certain kind of nihilism at play in the espousal of the necessity for and virtues of deploying drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes. It is at play, as we saw in Chapter I, in the upholding of the (in)human speed of becoming-dangerous as the very speed that will secure the human supposedly threatened by that presupposed becoming-dangerous of certain bodies. In Chapter II, we saw this nihilism at play in attempts to limit the most invasive, penetrative, and violent consequences of colonial expansion, control, and policing through invasive, penetrative, and violent codifications of bodies and spaces gathered and policed through neocolonial sites and praxes of truth production. We finally saw it at play in Chapter III through explicit recognitions of the limits to the category of the human in both legal and critical analyses of the ethico-legal legitimacy of drones, and upholding that category as the normative condition that can only be retroactively established by the identification and elimination (either practically, legally, or discursively) of those most fundamental of (in)humans - targets and victims of drones - as the condition under which the human, or indeed, the posthuman can be upheld.

In Chapter III, I identified in such identifications and apotheosizations of exceptional limits what Nietzsche called a passive nihilism. I also argued that it was best understood in terms of the Tragic, or tragic nihilism, insofar as the Tragic is the attempt to represent and meditate on the necessary limits under which knowledge is at all possible; more specifically, the Tragic, as Dillon describes it, is the recognition of a profound Otherness that is violently excised from ontological self-identification, despite the constituent function of that profound Otherness to the possibility of self-identification in the first place. What I have tried to maintain out of all
of this is how drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, when semiotically read as a
signifier for the supposed virtues of humanity to which the strategic imperatives, injunctions, and
performances - of which they are a weapon - lay claim, is a symptomatic expression of tragic
nihilism at play in the very regimes and epistemic regimes of intelligibility through which the
deployment of these weapons are legitimated.

To that end, it is important to distinguish my arguments from those of say, a Chris
Brown, who says that tragedy lies in the violence of international politics - especially in the
contingency of necessary military interventions flowing from the supposed “Responsibility to
Protect,” - but that nevertheless the tragic violences of international politics needs to be
embraced as a virtue in order to temper “our” worst impulses in the performance of such
tragedies (presumably, against an ill-defined “them”).\footnote{372} Tragedy is the opening up of the
recognition of the limits of identification in the first place, and the invitation to fundamentally
rethink those limits, not to inaugurate them as virtuous principles of politics, as Dillon has
shown.\footnote{373} Nor should my arguments about nihilism should be similarly misconstrued as being in
any way derivative of or aligned with the vacuous understanding of the concept by, for example,
Michael Ignatieff when he wrote of the Kosovo conflict that

> What we are up against is apocalyptic nihilism. The nihilism of their means - the indifference to
> human costs - takes their actions not only out of the realm of politics, but even out of the realm of
> war itself. The apocalyptic nature of their goals makes it absurd to believe they are making
> political demands at all. They are seeking the violent transformation of an irremediably sinful and
> unjust world. Terror does not express a politics, but a metaphysics, a desire to give ultimate
> meaning to time and history through ever-escalating acts of violence which culminate in a final
> battle between good and evil.\footnote{374}

Ridiculously biblical - and thus not surprisingly, painfully simplistic - though Ignatieff’s
comments may obviously be (especially in his cavalier deployment of the concept of nihilism
itself), I have attempted to demonstrate that such expressions are not gestures toward any kind of
redress for, but instead, symptomatic performances of nihilism itself that make intelligible and
legitimate, for example, the *praxis* of (in)humanity inaugurated and attended by the absent neocolonialisms of exceptionality made possible through drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes. Bloviations *against* nihilism or tragedy like Ignatieff’s or Brown’s are better understood as the performative becoming-nihilistic, or indeed, becoming-tragic of international and/or world politics through the biopolitical frameworks of racialized relations in contemporary counterinsurgency/counterterrorism strategies and operations being waged in the name of the “humanity” made possible by advanced liberal regimes of global liberal governance.

I have argued for reasons explicated above, that drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, from their very performative function in combat operations, to the knowledges and relations under which the conditions of threat and/or combat to which drones are a response are constituted, to the ethico-legal complex of problematics that crystallize around the question of humanity in relation to drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, need to thus read semiotically as the symptomatic expression of nihilisms and tragedies *par excellence* performed into being discursively by the Ignatieffs and Browns (or as we saw in Chapter III, the Williams’) of the world;³⁷⁵ legally by the Vogels, Holders, and Kohs of advanced liberal military states like the US;³⁷⁶ and practically through the deployment of drones and the networks of informatic threat perception coding that inform their ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen. Indeed, in this way, this thesis has attempted to take up the problem of tragedy as Foucault himself first identified it in Nietzsche, as I noted in the introduction:

> At the centre of these limit-experiences of the Western world is the explosion, of course, of the tragic itself - Nietzsche having shown that the tragic structure from which the history of the Western world is made is nothing other than the refusal, the forgetting and silent collapse of tragedy. Around that experience, which is central as it knots the tragic to the dialectic of history in the very refusal of tragedy by history, many other experiences gravitate. Each one, at the frontiers of our culture, traces a limit that simultaneously signifies an original division.³⁷⁷

This being said, it is not exclusively to the performances of real tragic(/passive) nihilism to which I think we are thus forever restricted in our analyses, though this thesis may very well
be. Indeed, one of the reasons Foucault and Nietzsche are such powerful theorists from which we can begin to enunciate critical readings of such performance (as I think der Derian, Dillon, and Walker in particular have recognized) is that - whether it is in the language and epistemological framework of the former’s theoretical triangulations of race, biopower, and war, or if it is in that of nihilism, tragedy and virtue as the latter’s work would have it, is that in critically reading and symptomatizing such performances, and indeed by inverting our understanding thereof from one wherein they are exceptional performances that punctuate an otherwise uninterrupted normatively stable set of social relations, to instead one wherein they are ongoing, necessary exceptions endemic to the very function of what is considered “normative” at all - Foucault and Nietzsche simultaneously map out spaces wherein fruitful, tactical resistances might take place.

For Foucault, such resistances are indeed “tactical,” and thus do not involve a long, cumulative, teleological project of emancipation, but instead involved minor, non-prescriptive, but nevertheless surgical disruptions directed at sites of knowledge production that are symptomatic of the kinds of performative, tragic nihilisms violently excising, affecting, and neutralizing or disciplining bodies for the normative function of late liberal, or as some might call it, neoliberal biopower. For Nietzsche, resistance takes the form of what he called active nihilism, which, as we will recall, “… means as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism.” Indeed, describing what such an active nihilism entails, and indeed, the analytical framework of the supposed active or as he otherwise called it “perfect” nihilist (a title Nietzsche obviously bestowed unto himself) elsewhere, Nietzsche writes that

We desire strong sensations as all coarser ages and social strata do. - This should be distinguished from the needs of those with weak nerves and the decadents: they have a need for pepper, even for cruelty. All of us seek states in which bourgeois morality no longer has any say, and priestly morality even less (every book to which some of the air of pastors and theologians still clings gives us the impression of a pitiable niaiserie [silliness - W. Kaufmann] and poverty. - “Good society” consists of those whom at bottom nothing interests except what is forbidden in bourgeois
society and gives a bad reputation: the same applies to books, music, politics, and the estimation of woman.

If this is the case, then *contra* the performative nihilisms of contemporary international politics evident in, for example, Ignatieff and Brown, or as we saw in Chapter III, Vogel and Williams, or indeed as has been evident throughout this thesis, the animating strategic imperatives of RMA and counterinsurgency/counterterrorism strategists, we might be able to find and take counterpoints of resistance in discourses of world politics that seek to take up the symptomatic problems they perform into being, as lines of flight from which we can begin to indeed counterposit critical, and *actively* nihilistic, readings of the conditions under which such performative enunciations are possible in the first place.

Indeed, reading and writing theoretical points and counter-points of resistance to received assumptions in mainstream, liberal-bourgeois-oriented accounts of international relations and security theory, in and through the expressions of such accounts themselves, has long been a mode of resistance in critical IR/security theories at least since the 1980’s, explicitly articulated, for example, in the work of Walker and Ashley. Similar echoes can be found, as we have seen, in Dillon’s invitation to revisit the Tragic as a site of reflection on and radical reevaluations of our constitutive *valuations* of Otherness, specifically in relationship to our ideas of security. Likewise, Glezos’ reflections on *The Politics of Speed*, and Grovogui’s memories of non-Eurocentric world-political institutions in the face of international institutions inherited from the legacy of colonial relations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, offer powerful reflections on some of the most intractible impasses in contemporary world politics, and indeed, radical ways in which we might begin to rethink the constitutive conditions under which these violent *aporias* are allowed and made to play themselves out, as we have seen in the case of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes. Beyond these thinkers with whom we are
already familiar, I think the work of François Débrix on the representation of horror beyond biopolitical intelligibility in world politics,\textsuperscript{383} and Arthur Kroker on the nihilism of contemporary techno-fetishism, especially as it pertains to bodies, capital, and state-making warfare,\textsuperscript{384} are particularly compelling sites of investigation into the broader problems and implications this thesis has attempted to bring to the fore.

Thus, in the spirit of looking beyond my attempt to clarify the deeper themes and stakes of this thesis and the implications that follow from the arguments I have made in its preceding three chapters and introduction, I want to close on some more explicit reflections on where the work I have undertaken in the present thesis might most helpfully be applied. The arguments and sites I have identified above are interesting trajectories and lines of analysis I am happy to accept and engage with the specificity and attention to detail each one deserves in another forum. It bears repeating, however, that the express purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate the nihilistic logics and enunciations of a regime of signs inscribing absolute (in)human otherness on to bodies murdered at a distance by drones, and thus, to demonstrate the tragic, 	extit{exceptional} limits that such a 	extit{praxis} of (in)humanity signals in the increasingly complex and transmutable securitizing performances of and for contemporary institutions said to engender and defend the regulative ideal of the human in world politics. In that regard, I close by suggesting what it is that I think this thesis’ mode of engaging drones semiotically and symptomatically suggests both in terms of a critical theory of world politics, and how similar theories might be researched and posited in future projects.

\textbf{Semiotics, Symptoms, Systems: Toward a Political Ecology of Weapons}

Above, I suggested that this thesis needs to be understood as a materialist onto-genealogy of a specific weapon, drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, and that such a
materialist onto-genealogy of weapons could be helpfully and more rigorously applied to wider political ecologies of weapons as a way of symptomatically and semiotically reading processes, structures, and performances of contemporary world politics, as this I have attempted to do here. I want to close this thesis by explaining what I mean by this comment.

This thesis should not be read as an enunciation or postulation of any necessary Truth about drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes. That is to say, that this thesis has not been an attempt on my part to catalogue, document, and diagnostically present a supposedly neutral and/or objective regime of facticities about drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes. As Nietzsche notes, “‘Truth’ is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations: - to classify phenomena into definite categories.”\(^{385}\) It is this will to mastery at play in the operation and deployment of drones and their reconnaissance strike complexes, and indeed, the sites of knowledge production through which their legitimacy is rendered intelligible and necessary, that I have explicitly sought to resist throughout this thesis. While factical documents concerning are not wholly without their value - indeed, much of this thesis has culled much of its empirical data from such documents -\(^{386}\) my aim here has been to draw out and reflect upon some of the specific strategic genealogies, imperatives, and affective rationales embedded in and crystallizing around the deployment of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes that make possible certain topologies of sociopolitical relations in world politics, relations performed into being and sustained precisely through the deployment of these weapons. In short, I have attempted to conceptualize and to theorize drones; that is, to open up a series of analytical lenses and related contextual circumstances that help us think through what are the stake involved in and the implications that follow from the increased deployment of drones in global counterinsurgency and/or counterterrorism operations.
To that end, it is worth emphasizing that drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are not a necessary development in the history and practice of liberal warfare, nor are they neutral objects assembled and deployed independently of a great deal of subjective prejudice and exclusion. Contrary to the often-invoked pre- and post-9/11 divide in a presupposed universal history of world politics enunciated and reified by a wide array of commentators, policymakers, academics, and military strategists over the subsequent decade since that intervention, the imperative to deploy drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes has a much longer historical reach than the relatively recent preponderance of counterinsurgency/counterterrorism-centric security and securitization discourse in advanced liberal societies and politics might suggest. Indeed, drones and the reconnaissance-strike complexes they are now said to make possible have long been a weapon to which not only the United States, but virtually every NATO member nation, and its allied states (most notably, Israel), have aspired at least since the end of the Cold War, if not longer. And While there has been intermittent articulations of concern regarding supposed terrorists gaining access to and using drones against “Westerners,” to date, the only recorded private militia currently in possession of and using drones is one of the United States’ largest, White-nationalist “Minutemen” militias that patrol the US- Mexico border, flying their surveillance drones at just under the 400-foot legal limitations placed on unsanctioned aerial devices.

If the early, experimental deployment of UAVs in Iraq and Kosovo during the 1990’s, and indeed, the subsequent espousals of the virtues these weapons offer articulated by military strategists is any indication, then drones can be understood to have long been operating within made possible by securitization discourse’s epistemic regime of intelligibility that has taken the kinds of absent neocolonialisms of exceptionality as the preeminent goal to which its
performative practices should attain, well before the attacks of 11 September.\textsuperscript{389} So while drones and their subsequent deployment in the context that I have primarily addressed in this thesis - counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations, especially in Africa, the Middle East and Central/South Asia - are in no way a necessary development, they are a logical consequence of a number of political aspirations, presuppositions, and relations endemic to contemporary international politics, as we have seen.

If anything, UAVs deployed in the specific capacity of weapons and weapons systems such as they are in the kinds contexts that I have explored and highlighted throughout this thesis, have been a long-running fantasy of advanced liberal states and their militaries, effectively since the first use of unmanned aerial vehicles in 1917, though to be sure, this fantasy has been especially evident and pronounced throughout the performative discourses of espousing the virtues of the post-Cold War RMA. This is not least because of advanced liberal powers’ highly orientalist tendencies and gaze(s) at virtually every level of its securitizing discourses and performances. Indeed, drones and drone warfare are part of an expansive, rhizomatic complex that der Derian has helpfully termed the “military-industrial-media-entertainment network,” that reifies inherited imperial relations through a litany of insidious avatars: from cinematic representations of conflict and threat; to software programs that evolved out of attempts to historically and statistically model the causes and effects of the Crusades, which have been updated to calculate anticipated responses of targeted populations and polities to United States military incursions, operations, and occupations (these programs, it is worth noting, draw their raw data from Human Terrain Systems collections and reach-back databases); to the very deployment of HTTs for the purposes of better facilitating neocolonial (mis)adventures, recalling
the use of anthropologists for the purposes of imperial expansion during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\(^390\)

Thus, through conceptualizing drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes in these contexts, and through the work of Deleuze, Foucault, and Nietzsche, as well as their theoretical heirs now writing the field of critical security theory, this thesis can hopefully be understood as a materialist onto-genealogy of these weapons; that is, as a symptomatic semiotic that reads the material object of drones, their support systems, and the sites of knowledge production that motivate and inform their deployment to specific ends, as the expression of certain logics with deeper roots in received canons of political theories that offer accounts of world politics that (re)instantiate and enforce certain kinds of historical power relations. This line of inquiry, I think, has helped me to offer a critical conceptualization of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes into critical security conversations that otherwise demonstrate a troubling silence on this particular topic. Moreover, I think that, taking this kind of inquiry one step further, it might also help to constitute the beginnings of a future framework for analyses of those oft-referenced but rarely theorized objects so crucial to the performances of contemporary world politics: weapons.

Weapons, as we have seen in the case of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes, are obviously crucially sedimented within and thus symptomatic problems of and for international relations theory and world politics more generally. This claim is not new, finding its precedent in highly divergent attempts to theorize weapons in and toward understandings of world politics; such theorizations have attempted to give a symptomatic account of, for example, nuclear weapons, AK-47s, car bombs, suicide bomb(er)s, and insurance.\(^391\) Thus, attempts to conceptualize weapons such as that found in the present thesis, not only help us to understand the
performed and performative structures and histories of power relations in contemporary world politics, but indeed, offer an interesting and unique point of departure from which we might begin to inquire about the multiple sites into which certain kinds of weapons and/or defenses therefrom are deployed, perhaps indicating new or alternative sites of sovereign securitization and resistance thereunto between and beyond sovereign states and a sovereign system of sovereign states. Further, they might help us to understand capital flights and flows, commodity and resource extraction and circulation, relations between various owners of various means of production, and indeed, the ecological costs and consequences of producing and deploying certain kinds of weapons. Most importantly, however, this line of questioning reveals to us socio-ontological presuppositions about what is a life worthy of being allowed or made to live, and what is a life that must be made to die. This is all to say that, to these ends, we should perhaps begin to think through the contexts and regimes of intelligibility within which weapons like drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes are circulated and deployed as constituting a kind of political ecology that can be semiotically read as expressing symptomatic tendencies that help us to understand, and critique contemporary discourses and performances of world politics.\textsuperscript{392}

In any event, my hope is that an understanding of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes as inaugurating and attending a \textit{praxis} of (in)humanity that establishes and polices an absent neocolonialism of exceptionality, around which a tragically nihilistically ethico-legal complex of problematics crystallizes, has helped to highlight the stakes involved in their deployment, especially the implications this might hold for the received power structures and performances of world politics to which they are directly tied. It is worth noting that any kind of real material resistance to drones on the part of those most vulnerable to their lethal capacities
seems at best implausible, not least because of the exceptionally advanced - not to mention costly - technological systems that make drones such effective killing machines. At worst, any attempt at violent resistance would likely invite further violent reprisals from drones and their operators. Thus, this thesis has at least partially attempted to redress this implausibility for direct resistance by highlighting the channels through which the deployment of drones is legitimated, authorized, and nihilistically understood as the tragic necessity of identifying and enforcing a limit between who an be considered human, and who is not too human to warrant the security such a category suggests.
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Notes

1 Franz Kafka, “In the Penal Colony,” *Metamorphosis and Other Stories* (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003), 99-100.


3 The distinction between the categories of international politics and world politics is one that has long plagued theorists of international relations, especially so, it seems, since the collapse of the legitimacy about claims pertaining to a bipolar, state-centric international order that attended the end of the Cold War (though, to be sure, this is likely less a result of any direct causality than it is a symptomatic expression of the increasing complexity of processes and performances said to constitute the epistemological field about which International Relations theory - as a disciplinary discourse - either claims to give an account, or inaugurates through the articulation, instantiation, and performance of its ontological postures). For the purposes of this thesis, I want to make three distinctions that will underpin what might otherwise seem to be a problematic synonymity with which I deploy these terms: 1) International Relations refers to the theories and discursive enunciations of an institutionalized, Anglo-American discipline of studies of the interactions among, between, and underneath sovereign states, and a sovereign system of sovereign states. 2) International Politics refers to the political negotiations, mediations, and relations that take place between states and/or inter-state institutions. 3) World Politics refers to a broader epistemological field of sites that include and go beyond the traditional epistemic referents of states, the states system, and international institutions; this includes supposed “terrorist” networks, private mercenary armies, institutions that deal with and facilitate flows and flights of capital, and bodies that trouble received assumptions about the universality of the institution of citizenship (including migrants, refugees, and as I deal with them in this thesis specifically, bodies that are enfamed and ordered as (in)human by and through the deployment of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes), among others. See: Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” *Daedalus* 106 (Summer, 1977); Ole Waever, “Sociology of a Not-So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations,” *International Organization* 52 (Autumn, 1998); RBJ Walker, “History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations,” *Millenium Journal of International Studies* 18 (1989); RBJ Walker, *Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992); RBJ Walker, *After the Globe, Before the World* (New York: Routledge, 2009).


5 See note 3.


17 See, especially: Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism” International Organization 38 (1984); Ashley, “Living on the Borderlines” (1998); der Derian, Virtuous War (2009). As Walker has helpfully demonstrated, Hans Morgenthau, a figure often characterized (or caricatured) as the founder of realism, and indeed the contemporary Anglo-American discipline of international relations itself, was deeply influenced by the German sociologist Max Weber, albeit through a problematically narrow and crude reading of Weber that should not necessarily be uncritically accepted. Weber himself, of course, was profoundly haunted by Nietzsche, not least in his analyses of sociopolitical development, the advent of modern ontology(ies), and the conceptual and ethical problems posed


24 Reid, *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror* (2006), x. Reid continues: “Indeed, traditional theories of International Relations are in the process found to be constitutive of the very problems of war and its relations to the development of liberal modernity which International Relations is tasked to solve.” This is a claim long made by so-called “post-structural” IR theorists, one that was somewhat inaugurated by the work of Richard K. Ashley and RBJ Walker. In the vein of this tradition, the emphasis is more pronounced in the call for theorists to offer incisive and troubling deconstructions of and to received canonical traditions of international relations theory as not only an exercise in the critical self-reflection of a discipline, but indeed, a mode of resistance to these theories said to be constitutive of and legitimations for all manner of violations that take place within, between, and beyond states in the realm of world politics. See: Richard K. Ashley and RBJ Walker “Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990). To that end, this thesis is primarily concerned with moving with and beyond this project by offering a deconstructive semiotics of drone warfare in order to establish an understanding of the limits to the claims of “humanity” in whose names such violent attacks, and the wider conflicts of which they are but a part, are invoked by United States’ foreign policy. See: President, *National Security Strategy* (hereafter NSS), May 2010.


30 See: Dillon, “Security, Race, and War,” (2008); Chloë Taylor, “Race and Racism in Foucault’s Collège de France Lectures,” *Philosophy Compass* 6 (2011); Dianna Taylor, “Countering Modernity: Foucault and Arendt on Race and Racism,” *Telos* 154 (2011). The primary issue I take, at least with the latter two of these selections, is that they offer a sophisticated, if uninspired and vacuous, quasi-analytical reading of Foucault’s theories on race that tells us more about a possible reading of the mechanics of these theories than they do about the possible implications. In this sense, I find the Dillon reading of race in Foucault’s work the most helpful. Moreover, all three articles, to my mind, crucially elide the very apparent - and not unproblematic in itself - conflation between race and European nationalisms that Foucault uncritically makes in “Society Must Be Defended” - a move that he never publicly addressed or explained. Dianna Taylor’s suggestion that we consult Arendt’s potential influence on Foucault is perhaps the most provocative in this regard, although it does not seem as concerned with drawing out the problematic of Foucault’s theory of race as it does to further Giorgio Agamben’s highly dubious attempt to align Arendt and Foucault as theorists of Schmittean sovereign decision/exception, ultimately rendering a less-than-helpful examination of either Arendt or Foucault. An investigation into the connections between and divergences from Foucault’s theory of race and, for example, the kinds of nationalisms as “imagined communities” that Benedict Anderson traced in his book of the same name, remains an interesting possibility, albeit one that is far outside of the

31 Dillon, “Security, Race, and War,” (2008), 170. See also: Achille Mbembe: “Necropolitics” *Public Culture* 15 (2003). Mbembe’s analysis and theorizations of necropolitics indeed offer an interesting theorization of the “letting die” aspect of Foucault’s theory of biopower, as Dillon suggests. However, my reservations about this theory is the uncritical acceptance of Agamben’s theory of “bare life,” a misguided attempt to read the problems of totalitarianism with which Arendt was obviously concerned, alongside the distinctively different (though to be fair, not unrelated) phenomenon of liberal biopolitics that Foucault theorized, and to bring both of these into relief through a reconsideration of Carl Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty. While Mbembe’s theory that the so-called “living dead” are somehow imbricated and included in the operation of sovereign biopower - indeed, constitutively so - is one with which I am fully prepared to agree, I am less convinced that Agamben’s confused and ultimately shallow theory of “bare life” is a useful analytical lens through which to approach this issue. See: Agamben, *Bare Life* (1998); Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006).


34 Dillon, “Security, Race, and War,” (2008); Dillon and Reid, *The Liberal Way of War* (2009); Reid, *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror* (2006). It should be noted that while I am indeed attempting to write with and beyond both Dillon and Reid, I have chosen not to adopt their distinction between the biohuman and the human that is evident, for example, in the passage from their *The Liberal Way of War* which I quoted above, primarily because it is never evident, to my mind, what specifically constitutes the threshold through which, that is, the conditions under which this distinction materializes and is affirmed, or indeed, even negotiated. Instead, I have chosen to use the much simpler distinction human/(in)human. I have largely done so because, first, as the President’s *National Security Strategy* evinces, the current “war” against terrorists and their affiliated organizations is justified not solely on the grounds of a threat to United States citizens, indeed, it is justified in the name of humanity itself. As the President’s message that opens this document states:

In all that we do, we will advocate and advance the basic rights upon which our Nation was founded, and which peoples of every race and region have made their own. We promote these values by living them, including our commitment to the rule of law. We will strengthen international norms that protect these rights, and create space and support for those who resist repression. Our commitment to human dignity includes support for development, which is why we will fight poverty and corruption. And we reject the notion that lasting security and prosperity can be found by turning away from universal rights - democracy does not merely represent our better angels, it stands in opposition to aggression and injustice, and our support for universal rights is about fundamental to American leadership and a source of our strength in the world. (My Emphasis).

Ergo, the United States is not only the preeminent representative of the human in world politics, it is the primary force that can establish the conditions of access to individuals in achieving such a status. There is of course, the recognition throughout the document that there will indeed be human beings that must be killed in order to make other human beings, proper human beings, live. I will examined how this takes place through, and what is at stake in, the deployment of drones to achieve this goal. This subordinate category of humans exposed to legitimate killing in the name of *more* legitimate, unkillable humans then, is the category to which my term (in)human refers. See: President, *NSS* (2010).

35 der Derian, “Imaging Terror” (2005), 36.
This irreverence, that the great wise men are declining types, first suggested itself to my mind with regard to a case where the strongest prejudices of the learned and the unlearned stood opposed to it: I recognised Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decline, as agencies in Grecian dissolution, as pseudo-Grecian, as anti-Grecian (“The Birth of Tragedy,” 1872). That consensus sapientium - I understood it and better - proves least of all that they were correct in that on which they were in accordance: it proves rather that they themselves, those wisest men, were somehow in accordance physiologically to take up a position - to have taken up a position - unanimously negative with regard to life. Judgements, valuations with regard to life, for or against, can ultimately never be true: they only possess value as symptoms, they only come into consideration as symptoms, - in themselves such judgements are follies.


Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” (2012). It is interesting to note that, according to Gertler, the cost-effectiveness of a drone is still highly contested among different government agencies in the United States, particularly as the data that the supposed cost-effectiveness of drones fails to take into account the cost of training soldiers to operate drones, and the often highly complex ground systems they require in order to stay in flight for extended periods of time. Moreover, the bandwidth requirements for operating a single drone are spectacular - 500 megabytes per second, thereby establishing a limit to the interoperability of UASs with one another.


As Jean-Luc Nancy notes, “War is indissociably the physis and technē of sovereignty.” In this context, we can understand drones to be a war machine that is the most recent, and insidious, realization of a whole series of technic attempts to extend sovereignty through the praxis of war, that is, extend the capacity and scope of the sovereign to decide on the exception. See: Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2000), 121; Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (2006). See also: Manuel de Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Zone Books, 1991).


Here I am once again using Heidegger’s language from his reflections on technology. Primarily, I deploy this language because of the discursive capacity I think it offers one to explain what is at stake in reading the technic figure of the human through a further technic figure like drones, which is said to indeed provide access to humanity for some, while foreclosing the possibility of achieving that status in defense of that category for others. To that end, I follow Heidegger in his argument concerning technology that “... when represented as a means, discloses itself when we trace instrumentality back to [the] fourfold causality [of]...” causa materialis, causa formalis, causa finalis, and causa efficientis, and thereby supposedly further discloses something essential about the human and human capacity. As I argue, these reflections can and must be retained in and inflect a reflection on both the military technē of drones. See: Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology (1977), 6.


Allison J. Williams, “Enabling Persistent Presence? Performing the Embodied Geopolitics of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Assemblage,” Political Geography 30 (2011). Indeed, this article, as I show, offers little in the way of a helpful understanding of drones beyond its initial claims that drones should be read as a Deleuzian assemblage, a particularly straightforward claim that is more helpfully made, albeit in different terms, in Gertler’s 2012 report on UAVs to Congress: “UAVs operate as part of a system, which generally consists of a ground control station, a ground crew including remote pilots and sensor operators, communication links, and often multiple air vehicles. Unlike a manned aircraft such as an F-16, these supporting elements are requisite for the vehicle’s flight.” See: Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” (2012), 13.

Walker, UN, much more contextually relevant to this thesis’ direct interest in, and the exemplary expressions of the legal
by Burgess, Campbell, Vogel, and Williams, as I describe them below. To my mind, these latter texts are
telling and informative, see: Bahir and Crews, Under the Drones (2012); Vogel, “Drone Warfare and the Law of
Armed Conflict,” (2010). For a discursive document that would, to my mind, be the most telling enunciation of the
kind of biopolitical - that is, as we will recall, “… the administration of bodies and the calculated management of
life” - “perfection” (a term I am perhaps using more casually than is advisable) that drones facilitate, see: Gertler,
“U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” (2012). On biopolitics more broadly, see also: ouault, Discipline and Punish
(1978); Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” (2003); Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (2008); Foucault,
68 See: Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries” Harvard International Law Journal (1999); Asad ed., Anthropology and the
Colonial Encounter (1995); Bhabha, The Location of Culture (2004); Campbell, Writing Security (1998); Deleuze and Foucault have been more than explicit about the fundamental necessity of Nietzsche’s thought to their own. See: Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (2006); Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” (1984); See also: Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002); Sheldon Wolin, “Nietzsche: Pretotalitarian, Postmodern” in Politics and Vision (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012).
70 Of course, the most obvious examples to which one could first point are the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, followed closely by the UN Charter itself. Both of these documents purport to constitute, circumscribe, and
defend universally the human being, precisely by securing this figure through securing the institution of state
sovereignty in a sovereign system of states. However, because of the size and scope that would be required of a
project interested investigating the legitimacy and validity of the claims articulated these documents and their
Corresponding institutions are far beyond that of this thesis, or indeed, this thesis’ direct interest with drones and their
reconnaissance-strike complexes, I have chosen to forego direct engagement with these documents in lieu of those by Burgess, Campbell, Vogel, and Williams, as I describe them below. To my mind, These latter texts are
example expressions of the legal-ethical politics of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes that are
much more contextually relevant to this thesis’ direct interest in, and theorization of drones and drone warfare. See:
... are produced in the strata, but operate in zones where milieus become decoded: they begin by extracting a territory from the milieus. Every assemblage is basically territorial. The first concrete rule for assemblages is to discover what territoriality they envelop, for there always is one... The territory is made of decoded fragments of all kinds which are borrowed from the milieus but then assume the value of ‘properties’: even rhythms take on a new meaning (refraims). The territory makes the assemblage... The reason that the assemblage is not confined to the strata is that expression in it becomes a semiotic system, a regime of signs, and content becomes a pragmatic system, actions and passions... This is the first division of every assemblage: it is simultaneously and inseparably a machinic assemblage and an assemblage of enunciation... There is a new relation between content and expression [that is, substance and form] that was not yet present in the strata: the statements or expressions express incorporeal transformations that are “attributed” as such (properties) to bodies or contents... The assemblage is also divided along another axis. Its territoriality (content and expression included) is only a first aspect the other aspect is constituted by lines of deterritorialization that cut across it and carry it away. These lines are very diverse: some open the territorial assemblage onto other assemblages... Others operate directly upon the territoriality of the assemblage, and open it onto a land that is eccentric, immemorial, or yet to come... Still others open assemblages onto abstract and cosmic machines that they effectuate (p. 503-5).

As Foucault notes, it was precisely the body of individuated bodies, the population, that not only presented a problem for Clausewitz, but indeed, for modern European states more generally around the end of the seventeenth century. Militaries, it might be said, should be considered assemblages (only one type of assemblage among many, obviously) because they territorialized both the body of these bodies, the population, insofar as they laid claim to representation and defense of that body (the deterritorialization of this body as a problem and the reterritorialization of this body as both that from which the military was borne, as well as that toward which its ends were aimed), as well as each of these bodies, as their bodiness; that is, they decoded the physiological milieu of each body, as well as the body of these bodies, machinic them, made them an army. Moreover, they were both the expression of a political ideal, as well as the institution through which this ideal was realized (“war is politics by other means,” Kant’s Perpetual Peace). See: Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1978); Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (2008); Foucault The Birth of Biopolitics (2009); Kant, Political Writings (1991). In this way, we can begin to see what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they argue that “[t]he State has no war machine of its own; it can only appropriate one in the form of a military institution, one that will continually cause it problems. This explains the mistrust States have toward their military institutions, in that the military institution inherits an extrinsic war machine. Karl von Clausewitz has a general sense of this situation when he treats the flow of absolute war as an Idea that States partially appropriate to their political needs, and in relation to which they are more or less good ‘conductors,’” (p. 355). The State itself sees the bodies, and the body of these bodies, the population, to which it is said to correspond, as not an inherent expression of its own content (its own content is sovereignty), but instead, and extrinsic war machine that needs to be colonized, ordered, controlled. This is the basic problem that Clausewitz opened up, and that Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari recognized. See: Clausewitz, On War (2009).
It is not formation among others, nor is it the transition from one formation to another. It appears to be set back at a remove from what it transects and from what it resects, as though it were giving evidence of another dimension, a cerebral ideality that is added to, superimposed on the material evolution of societies, a regulating idea or principle of reflection (terror) that organizes the parts and the flows into a whole. What is transected, supersected, or overcoded by the despotic state machine, which it reduces to the state of bricks, of working parts henceforth subjected to the cerebral idea. In this sense the despotic State is indeed the origin, but the origin as an abstraction that must include its differences.

See: Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), 420-1. Deleuze and Guattari, it should be noted, define the State-form as such (a definition that I will accept for the purposes of this thesis):

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See: Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), 219. What this in effect means is that the state is less a material “thing” that one can locate, isolate, and study, than the state is an ontological regulative ideal within which one is always already imbricated in conceptualizing sociopolitical forms. For a similar argument vis-à-vis a critical genealogy of the central, constitutive, and indeed, regulative role of the State concept in the discipline and discursive theoretical articulations and performances of political science and specifically, international relations, see: Jens Bartelson, *The Critique of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001).

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74 See: Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), 420-1. Deleuze and Guattari, it should be noted, define the State-form as such (a definition that I will accept for the purposes of this thesis):

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80 To that end, the primary sources through which I will read these discourses are as follows: Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” (2012); Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (2010); President, NSS (2010); Singer, *Wired for War* (2009); Yenne, *Attack of the Drones* (2004); Zaloga, *Unmanned Aerial Vehicles* (2008).
92 Of Clastres they go on to write:

> The more deeply Clastres delved into the problem, the more he seemed to deprive himself the means of resolving it. He tended to make primitive societies hypostases, self-sufficient entities (he insisted heavily on this point). He made their formal exteriority into a real independence. Thus he remained an evolutionist, and posited a state of nature. Only this state of nature was, according to...
him, a fully social reality instead of a pure concept, and the evolution that was a sudden mutation instead of a development. For on the one hand, the state rises up in a single stroke, fully formed; on the other, the counter-State societies use very specific mechanisms to ward it off, to prevent it from arising. We believe that these two propositions are valid but that their interlinkage is flawed. There is an old scenario: “from clans to empires,” or “from bands to kingdoms.” But nothing says that this constitutes an evolution, since bands are no less organized than than empire-kingdoms. We will never leave the evolution hypothesis behind by creating a break between the two terms, that is, by endowing bands with self-sufficiency and the State with an emergence all the more miraculous and monstrous.

Ibid, 359.
97 Ibid, 360.
98 Ibid.
102 Bousquet “Chaoplexic warfare or the future of military organization,” (2008), 916.
105 See also: Dillon and Reid, “Global Liberal Governance” (2001); Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War (2009).
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid, 65.
113 Ibid, 67.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid, 60-1.
116 See note 4.
120 Bousquet “Chaoplexic warfare or the future of military organization,” (2008); de Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (1991).
122 Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War (2009).
129 Ibid, 395.
130 Ibid, 398.
131 Ibid, 397.
Deibert and Stein, “Social and Electronic Networks in the War on Terror,” (2003), 172.

Zaloga, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (2008), 45.

President, NSS (2010), i.


ibid., 70.


Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (2009), 193.


Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (2009), 166-7.

Walker, After the Globe, Before the World (2009), 252.


Deibert and Stein, “Social and Electronic Networks in the War on Terror,” (2003), 172.


Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror (2006), 43.

A selection from Pierre-Jean Jouve’s Lyrique, originally quoted by Gaston Bachelard in his The Poetics of Space, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 211.


This was particularly evident in Deleuze and Guattari’s ambivalent embrace and critique of Pierre Clastres’ ethnographies, as I mentioned in that chapter. See: Clastres, Archaeology of Violence (2010); Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (1987).


Zaloga, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (2008), 45.


This is, if nothing else, a very limited contribution to an understanding of drones Williams offers in an otherwise vacuous analysis of the topic. See: Chapter III, Williams, “Enabling Persistent Presence?” (2011).


For two politically opposite accounts of this praxis specifically that are nevertheless, as I see them, the most telling and informative, see: Bahir and Crews, Under the Drones (2012); Vogel, “Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict,” (2010). For a discursive document that would, to my mind, be the most telling enunciation of the kind of biopolitical - that is, as we will recall, “… the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” - “perfection” (a term I am perhaps using more casually than is advisable) that drones facilitate, see: Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” (2012). On biopolitics more broadly, see also: oucald, Discipline and Punish...
This space of emplacement was opened up by Galileo. For the real scandal of Galileo's work lay not so much in his discovery, or rediscovery, that the earth revolved around the sun, but in his constitution of an infinite, and infinitely open space. In such a space the place of the Middle Ages turned out to be dissolved. as it were; a thing's place was no longer anything but a point in its movement, just as the stability of a thing was only its movement indefinitely slowed down. In other words, starting with Galileo and the seventeenth century, extension was substituted for localization.
Today the site has been substituted for extension which itself had replaced emplacement. The site is defined by relations of proximity between points or elements; formally, we can describe these relations as series, trees, or grids. Moreover, the importance of the site as a problem in contemporary technical work is well known: the storage of data or of the intermediate results of a calculation in the memory of a machine, the circulation of discrete elements with a random output (automobile traffic is a simple case, or indeed the sounds on a telephone line); the identification of marked or coded elements inside a set that may be randomly distributed, or may be arranged according to single or to multiple classifications.


182 Indeed, elsewhere in the lecture Foucault helpfully demonstrates this the whole of this organizational process through his discussion of the mirror:

From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Starting from this gaze that is, as it were, directed toward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there.


183 It should be noted that I am highly dubious of this categorization because of the number of well-documented violences and exclusions that such a unilaterally-imposed status on non-Western societies by European and American imperial powers facilitates (even this distinction between Western and non-Western or non-European is one of which I remain particularly suspicious). Indeed, I am even more suspicious of Foucault’s adoption of this category than I am of Deleuze and Guattari’s analogous reference to Pierre Clastres, who used similar distinctions between “savage” and “state” societies, not least because whereas the latter to some extent or another attempted to trouble and remained at best ambivalent toward Clastres’ distinction (as I have shown), the former does not seem particularly concerned with engaging such a distinction in that manner. At best, we could forgive this interpretation due to a less-than-astounding translation, given that this unfinished manuscript has not received the official “treatment” of an official publication. Thus, we could attempt to read this distinction as one that is more of a shorthand attempt to distinguish between two broadly conceived ideal types than it is a strongly supported anthropological/ethnographic category. Nevertheless, even such a shorthand invocation of this category should signal the still highly parochial perils of engaging Foucault’s theories in order to symptomatize and diagnose (neo)colonial relationalities between sites. We will see this especially in my turn to Siba N. Grovogui’s demonstrations of the genealogical inheritance of imperial power relations in contemporary international structures, which, I will argue, will provoke the limits of our capacity to understand drones and drone warfare through the heterotopic topologies Foucault offers, prompting the turn I will take in the next chapter of this thesis. See: Clastres, *Archaeology of Violence* (2010); Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987); Fabian, *Time and the Other
Electronic Networks in the War on Terror,” (2003); Gertler, “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems,” (2012); Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (2009); Newton, “Flying into the Future” (2010); Glezos, The Politics of Speed (2011); Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, their Cities,” Parameters (Spring 1996); Ralph Peters, “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations,” Parameters (Spring 2000); Singer, Wired for War (2009); Vogel, “Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict,” (2010); Yenne, Attack of the Drones (2004); Zaloga, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (2008). Examples of such discourses can be found in, for example, a number of widely-read and accepted accounts of international relations in that subfield of political science. Such a progression is often articulated via fairly standard accounts - many of which I have already gestured toward above - regarding the emergent rationality of the novel political structures of sovereign states and a sovereign system of sovereign states. Particularly telling is a fairly popular genre of inquiry in the discipline that attempt to come to terms with and give an account of the contemporary phenomena of “failed states,” about which there exploded a preponderant archive of literature from the early 1990’s on, that generally speaking, pointed to the historical repudiations of colonialism and thus, Western rational-scientific politics which of course resulted in the widespread decolonization of non-European peoples and spaces throughout the early 1960’s until about the early 1980’s. The general tendencies of such accounts point to either one or a combination of two general factors that predisposed such states to failure in the international system of sovereign states: Either, 1) The inherent backwardness of these primordial societies that were and remain fundamentally antagonistic to the rational order of Western political structures, thus resulting in the outbreak of ethnic, religious, and/or tribal (or often a complex interrelation of all three modes of identification) violences that can and must be mitigated, mediated, and resolved by the international community or at least hegemonic actors in the international system. Or, 2) The premature evacuation of colonialist structures and relationships from the non-European (or as it was popularly referred to during the period of decolonization, the ‘Third’ or ‘Non-Aligned’ world as a way of situating this highly diverse but often discursively and politically homogenized group of states against the bipolar international order of the cold war), thereby cutting short the opportunity of Western political authorities to train and impart their rational scientific political practices, institutions, and organizations on colonized communities and peoples that failed to construct such apparatuses in the absence of Western powers, has precipitated the contemporary imperative of Western intervention as a way of correcting this historical “miscalculation” on the part of the formerly colonized. See: Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, “Failed States, or the State as Failure?” University of Chicago Law Review 72 (2005); Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter, 1992-3); Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan (New York: Vintage, 2003); Jeffrey Herbst, “Responding to State Failure in Africa,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996-7); Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993); Ian Hurd, “Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World,” Ethics & International Affairs 25 (2011); Sebastian Mallaby, “The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire,” Foreign Affairs 81 (March-April 2002); Hendrik Spruyt, “The End of Empire and The Extension of the Westphalian System: The Normative Basis of the Modern State Order,” International Studies Review 2 (Summer 2000); Georg Sørenson, “Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution,” Political Studies 47 (1999).

Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (2009).

Ibid. 1.


Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War (2009), 144.


Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (2009).


Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (2009).


Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns, and Africans (1996), 67.


It is worth mentioning here Johannes Fabian who, in a somewhat similar vein to Grovogui’s, has traced the ontological conditions of possibility for this categorical recognition of such places as “uncivilized” or “backward” in the very temporal phenomenon of what he calls ethnography/anthropology’s tendency to “deny coevalness” in homogenous, empty to time to the non-Western subjects such disciplines are representing to primarily Western audiences. Specifically, this claim garnered the currency of one that is “scientific” in the course of its production of knowledges about peoples based on a not-unrelated epistème of the human sciences more generally that attempted to herald a new, purely objective science about the philosophical ideal-type of Man. See: Fabian, Time and the Other (1983); Foucault, The Order of Things (1994). Additionally, Anthony Anghie’s legal history of the imperial origins of contemporary international legal order, especially its relationship to the positivist turn in nineteenth century international law theory helps shed light on the specifically international character of these relationships in a similarly helpful manner to that of Grovogui’s. See: Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries,” (1999). Finally, a widely influential account of the domestic “bifurcation” of colonial/state structures in Africa through a comparative analysis of the administration of the South African and Ugandan colonies through racial and class categories, and indeed, the this structural organization of relationships’ historical impact (here we should recall Foucault’s reflections on colonies as heterotopias) on contemporary relations between ethnicities as well as state structures in the postcolonial and post-apartheid era. See: Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (1996).
236 See note above.
247 Of course, the most obvious examples to which one could first point are the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, followed closely by the UN Charter itself. Both of these documents purport to constitute, circumscribe, and defend universally the human being, precisely by securing this figure through securing the institution of state sovereignty in a sovereign system of states. However, because of the size and scope that would be required of a project interested investigating the legitimacy and validity of the claims articulated these documents and their corresponding institutions is far beyond that of this thesis, or indeed, this thesis’ direct interest in, and theorization of drones and drone warfare. See: UN, *Charter of the United Nations*, 26 June 1945 <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>; UN, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 10 December 1948 <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>. See also: Walker, *After the Globe, Before the World* (2009).
256 Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (1968), 255.
257 Indeed, as Deleuze notes, “If Nietzsche belongs to the history of Kantianism it is because of the original way in which he deals with... post-Kantian demands... Nietzsche seems to have sought (and to have found in the “eternal return” and the “will to power”) a radical transformation of Kantianism, a re-invention of the critique which Kant betrayed at the same time as he conceived it, a resumption of the critical project on a new basis with new concepts.”
Similarly, Walker traces the legacy of Nietzsche’s project in this regard, and its radical inheritance and inversion of Kant, on Weber, commenting:

It was by expressing such ambivalence that Kant had articulated a realm of critical possibility, the possibility of human freedom enacted between the limits of immanence and the limits of phenomenal knowledge, each limit remaining an indication of what is beyond yet what is also constitutive of a merely human capacity to both know and to become. In a dramatically different and yet recognizably Kantian era, Max Weber looked out and saw that the world had indeed been brought into the modern, in ways that had set modern man even further adrift from all meaningful contact with any other world. He also looked up, saw all the perils of confusing an ethic of ultimate ends with an ethic of political responsibility, and affirmed the need for a new man, the new hero able to stand here and do no other. From this radicalized (Nietzscheanized but still recognizably Lutheran) stance, various lines cutting across the lines of perspective from man to world appeared in even starker light.


Ibid, 23.


It is worth recalling Dillon and Reid’s observations from the introduction that it is this fundamental argument concerning the stakes in warfare-as-the-production of society that Foucault articulated in his lectures and writings on race, biopower, and war that gives this line of thought its critical urgency. As such, this is fundamentally what is at stake, to my mind, in any semiotic of drones and their reconnaissance-strike complexes. See: Dillon, “Security, Race, and War,” (2008); Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War (2009); Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” (2003); Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror (2006); Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended” (2003); Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (2008); Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics (2009).


See: UN, Charter, 1945; UN, Declaration, 1948; UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,” 28 May 2010; Holder, “Address at Northwest University Law School,” 2010; Hurd, “Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal” (2011); Newton, “Flying into the Future,” (2010); Vogel, “Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict,” (2010). Indeed, the discourse in this indeterminate overlapping and conflict of legal jurisdictions is best described, albeit crudely, as follows: Because drone strikes are considered an act of war by the United Nations insofar as they violate territorial sovereignty as well as the biopolitical sovereignty believed to be held by individual states, the United Nations outwardly has condemned and resisted the United States’ claim to unilaterally launch drone strikes. In response, the United States has claimed that the indeterminate and mobile nature of its “enemies,” and further, the fundamental threat that these “enemies” pose not just to American citizens, but indeed to all citizens of all states because of the implicit threat they pose to a broader global peace, allows the United States to at once treat drone strikes as a criminal punishment subject to an undefined “due process” of executive decision-making, a national security measure codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter itself, and indeed, an ethical responsibility inherent to the United States’ preeminent economic and military influence on the function and structure of the sovereign system of sovereign states itself to at once protect or secure the integrity of, as well as avenge any violent affront to, the system that stakes its own claim to legitimacy on its monopoly on the concept of humanity itself.

be noted, is not isolated to these political discussions or circumstances. It is indeed possible to read the problem of
traces of these respective relational postures toward one another in the global North and the global South, it should
(2001). This problematic of recognition between colonizers and the colonized and the contemporary inheritors of the
Peripheries,” (1999); Grovogui, evident in international relations and international law (both in theory and practi

See note ____ above for a more extensive discussion of
the genealogy behind this process of recognition. This issue of recognition has been dealt with extensively, particularly in regards to the residual colonial legacies still evident in international relations and international law (both in theory and practice) by: Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries,” (1999); Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns, and Africans (1996); Grovogui, “Come to Africa,” (2001). This problematic of recognition between colonizers and the colonized and the contemporary inheritors of the traces of these respective relational postures toward one another in the global North and the global South, it should be noted, is not isolated to these political discussions or circumstances. It is indeed possible to read the problem of
recognition in the domestic organizations of colonies and postcolonies in Mamdani and Mbembe; more broadly through the political polemics of a Fanon, a Césaire, or an Nkrumah; through the literary exegeses of a Spivak, a Said or a Bhabha; or indeed, through broader socio-scientific critiques in a Fabian or a Mudimbe. A related but not wholly synchronous problem of the biopolitics of migrant labour is discussed, further, in by for example, Pheng Cheah. See: Bhabha, The Location of Culture (2004); Aimée Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (New York: Monthly Review Press 2001); Pheng Cheah, Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006); Fabian, Time and the Other (1983); Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2005); Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (1996); Mbembe, On the Postcolony (2001); Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa (1988); Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: Panaf Books, 1966); Said, Orientalism (1978); Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988).

323 Ibid, 103.
324 Ibid, 122.
327 This is a school of thought that comes out of Donna Haraway’s sometimes provocative and oftentimes problematic attempts to rethink the human as a limit concept to scientific conceptual categories (primarily those in the fields of biology and computer sciences) in order to trouble the received ontological distinctions and conceptualizations of power relations between humans and animals, machines, “nature,” etc. See: Donna Haraway, The Haraway Reader (London: Routledge, 2003).
329 Ibid, 384.
330 Ibid.
331 Ibid, 382.
332 Ibid.
333 Ibid, 388.
335 Nietzsche, The Will to Power (1968).
336 Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries,” (1999); Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns, and Africans (1996); Grovogui, “Come to Africa,” (2001); Bashir and Crews, Under the Drones (2012); Bhabha, The Location of Culture (2004); Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (2001); Cheah, Inhuman Conditions (2006); Fabian, Time and the Other (1983); Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (2005); Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (1996); Mbembe, On the Postcolony (2001); Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa (1988); Nkrumah, Neocolonialism (1966); Said, Orientalism (1978); Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988).
337 Chinua Achebe, No Longer at Ease (Toronto: Anchor Canada, 2010), 45-6.
338 Nietzsche, The Will to Power (1968); Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols and the Antichrist (2004); See also: Ansell-Pearson, Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker (1994).
342 der Derian, Virtuous War (2009).
343 Nietzsche, The Will to Power (1968), 17.
344 The evocation of the term physiologically here is an attempt to remain as faithful to Nietzsche’s own terminology in this thesis as possible. Nietzsche’s suggestion that socio-philosophical problems (or indeed, psycho-philosophical problems) need to be understood in terms of the real, material, health of the body has a long and complex genealogy and legacy that itself cannot be justifiably or accurately explained in the present context. It suffices to say, however, that this move needs to be understood as a resistant response to the long Cartesian legacy of modern philosophical and political thought that evacuated the figure of the physical human body from any kind of serious consideration of politics and/or philosophy wherein that body and the effects upon it that might follow from an author’s politico-philosophical postulates. Nietzsche’s own re-centering of this concept in his writings have had wide and obvious import in twentieth and twenty-first century politico-philosophical thought, particularly as it is generally the basis of
The composition is actually a jazz tone poem because it depicts musically my conception of the modern counterpart of the first man to stand erect - how proud he was, considering himself the “first” to ascend from all fours, pounding his chest and preaching his superiority over the animals still in a prone position. Overcome with self-esteem, he goes out to rule the world, if not the universe, but both his own failure to realize the inevitable emancipation and his greed in attempting to stand on a false security, deny him not only the right of ever being a man, but finally destroy him completely. Basically the composition can be divided into four movements: (1) evolution, (2) superiority-complex (3) decline, and (4) destruction.

Now what I think is most interesting about this particularly continuous in Mingus’ account of his composition with the aim of this paper is twofold: first is the idea that Man is emergent at a particular time, imperial in his ambitions, and becoming he imbues to a conceptualization of Man, as he describes it as such:

Turning against oneself should not be confused with this destruction of self, this self-destruction. In the reactive process of turning against oneself active force becomes reactive. In self-destruction reactive forces are themselves denied and led to nothingness. This is why self destruction is said to be an active operation and “active destruction”. It and it alone expresses the becoming-active of forces: forces become active insofar as reactive forces deny and suppress themselves in the name of a principle which, a short time ago, was still assuring their conservation and triumph. Active negation or active destruction is the state of strong spirits which destroy the reactive in themselves, submitting it to the test of the eternal return and submitting themselves to this test even if it wills their own decline.


Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (1968), 73.

Ashley and Walker “Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline,” (1990).


The idea of a political ecology more generally is one that has sparked much recent interest in Jane Bennett’s theorization of the concept, and indeed, one of her former students, Jairus Grove, has begun to interestingly apply this concept to the specific domain of warfare: See: Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2010); Jairus Grove, “How War Exceeds the State: Insurgencies, Cities, and the Materiality of Violence,” July 31, 2010, <http://becomingwar.blogspot.com/2010/07/jairus-groves-prospectus.html>.