Recognition Denied: An Examination of UK and US Foreign Policy towards the Republic of Croatia

By
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B.A. York University, 2010

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Abstract

This thesis examines the development of decision making taken by two countries, the United Kingdom and the United States, in response to Croatia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. The focus is on the recognition process and the reasoning and rationale used by the government officials and diplomats of the United Kingdom and United States to arrive at their policy decisions and opinions. The concentration is mainly on events from the early 1990s until mid 1992. Topics explored include matters such the politics behind non-recognition, democratic social norms, respect for human rights and Western national interests.

The thesis first hypothesizes, then analyses, which International Relations theory, that is, realism or constructivism, possesses the best capacity explain why these nations initially withheld their recognition of Croatia’s independence before moving to accept the Republic of Croatia as an independent state. The role of the International Relations theories is to offer an interpretation and understanding of these events and decisions. Subsequently, they are judged on their ability to do so. The thesis finds that via the insight of scholars, analysts and theoretical perspectives that both the John Major government of the UK and the George H.W. Bush Administration of the United States behaved mostly according to realist principles, with some instances of constructivist manner.
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I would also like to thank Dr. Dejan Guzina for agreeing to serve as my external examiner.
Dedication

To my parents, Slavko and Berislava Ljubic
and to my brothers, David and Petar.
## List of Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav National Army</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

When a change occurs to the borders of a state, it is up to the international community to decide whether to accept the alteration or to reject it. There are numerous considerations which need to be deliberated before heads of states decide whether abiding by Westphalian principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention are still viable. Although these principles are extremely important to International Relations (IR), many people, such as former North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary – General Javier Solana, acknowledge that the Westphalian system has got its limits. They point out that at its conception, the values that modern society holds dear today, such as the principles of humanity and democracy, were not given a place at the table then, for at the time, they were not considered to be relevant (Solana, NATO Speeches, Nov 12, 1998).

Being aware of the limitations of the models that shape state relations is vital in all circumstances. This is especially true in instances when a state breaks away from a federation and declares itself sovereign; for this is when heads of nations are placed in a powerful position that requires them to either recognize and support the independence of the newly seceded nation, or to withhold recognition. Such was the scenario in 1991 when Croatian President Franjo Tudman acted upon the results of a democratic national referendum (ninety-four percent of citizens voted in favour of seceding from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and declared Croatia a separate state (Meier, 1999, p.173). The swift international recognition that the Croatian parliament and its citizenry hoped for, was not granted however. What followed instead was world governments failing to acknowledge Croatia’s right to national self-determination as per Yugoslavia’s 1974 Constitution (Ingrao and Emmert, 2009, p. 103). This was in turn interpreted by
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his government, as acquiescence to keep the Croatian republic subordinate within the fraying patchwork of Yugoslavia by force (Nohlen, and Stöver, 2010).

Large numbers of Western media personnel were present in Europe to document fully the Yugoslav Army’s invasion of Croatia, to snap pictures and record videos of burning looted homes, desecrated churches and bullet-riddled civilian bodies on the streets. Because of this extensive reporting, Croatian individuals, both in Croatia and abroad, felt it was only a matter of days before strong Western nations such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) would publicly denounce the atrocities being committed and would recognize Croatia’s independence. It was believed that global state-recognition would signal to Serbia that their violent attempts to keep Croatia within Yugoslavia were unsupported and condemned. However, this denunciation did not occur. Some argue that the lengthy negotiations and deliberations taken by the European Community (EC) acted as an inadvertent authorization to the Yugoslav Army to accomplish what it saw as being necessary to preserve the status quo of Yugoslavia (Gutman, 1993). The United States, reluctant to make decisions on its own, chose to stand behind the decisions of its EC partners overseas — a move which ultimately left Croatian civilians completely unarmed as they faced the wrath of the tanks, bombs and machine guns of a fully equipped Yugoslav army.

Because the United States was created on the belief that all people have a universal right to freedom and because the United Kingdom champions liberalism and democracy as ideal state components, it was confusing to Croatian statesmen and citizens when UK and US support was not rapidly extended towards Croatia — a nation which
saw itself as pursuing these exact principles. In some minds, there even existed questions regarding the legitimacy of the Yugoslav government before the war, for legitimate and illegitimate governments do not operate in the same way (Meier, 1999, p. ix). As Sabrina Ramet writes, ‘...while legitimate governments encourage their citizens to behave in responsible ways, illegitimate regimes do the very opposite — as shown in the Serbian government’s encouragement of ethnic Serbs to organize mass demonstrations against the 1974 constitutions, while banning mass demonstrations in support of the then-still-valid constitution by ethnic Albanians’ (Ibid). Ramet contends that when it becomes impossible legally to uphold a constitution, it is apparent that one can no more speak of legitimate politics in the system in question (Meier, 1999, p. ix). Josip Glaurdic, like Ramet expresses puzzlement at the hesitancy of the UK and US to support the peace-pursuing politicians of Croatia (who tried all other avenues of negotiation before secession and did not instigate conflict), while holding such faith in the inflammatory Slobodan Milosevic (Glaurdic, 2011). Sabrina Ramet argues that if one is to view legitimacy triadically (as consisting of moral, political and economic aspects) this lack of support for Croatia can be interpreted as a double standard vis-à-vis Croatia: that liberalism may be the accepted ideal for the West, but that it was seen as not entirely necessary for Croatia (Meier, 1999, p. ix).

It is possible that this flawed rationale of perceiving liberty and democracy as something unsuitable for the Balkans played a part in the radical departure taken by the UK and the US from the customary practice¹ of state recognition. As stated by Richard

¹ For a comprehensive and thorough look at how the West’s use of political criteria as the basis of Croatian recognition represents a drastically different approach than what had been common practice before the Yugoslav conflict see Richard Caplan (2005) and Colin Warbrick (1992).
Caplan, the West’s use of conditional recognition of Croatia raises critical normative questions regarding equitable relations between states; ‘Is it really fair to expect new states — and select new states at that — to satisfy requirements for recognition that established states have not had to meet and in many cases, could not meet?’ (Caplan, 2005, p. 8). The UK and United States conveyed that they were interested in the quickest, most peaceful resolution to the conflict. Yet, there are those who argue that in fact, destruction and loss of life was magnified by the policy routes taken which did not provide the opportunities timely recognition would have created (Freedman, 1998; Woodward, 1995; Zimmermann, 1995).

Cases and questions of conflict prevention, conflict management as well as the dissolution of states are extremely important for us to study. They remind us and keep us vigilant to the fact that ‘identities remain dormant behind a smokescreen of homogeneity, until they find the opportunity to spring back with a vengeance’ (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 269). In fact, it points to a risk that for every assimilated group in a country, there is a waiting Milosevic personality, keen only on amassing followers and power to use aggression to make their twisted vision a reality (Ibid).

Croatia’s declaration of independence came shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and a few months before the formal dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Many Western politicians had trouble interpreting Croatia’s declaration of independence as either the result of a dissolving Yugoslav federation, or a case of a break-away state. Examining the responses, concerns and subsequent policies of these Western nations towards Croatia’s situation can add insight to numerous concepts of global politics such as to theories and practices of secession, the debates on
‘responsibility to protect’, the role and authority of international law as well as international adherence to the laws of war.

This thesis examines the development of decision making taken by two countries, the United Kingdom and the United States, in response to Croatia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia. The focus is on the recognition process and the reasoning and rationale used by the government officials and diplomats of the United Kingdom and the United States to arrive at their policy decisions and opinions. The main sources that were used to provide information on these diplomatic proceedings and gain insight on the rationale behind selected policy choices include, but are not limited to, foreign policy statements, transcripts of government meetings, newspaper articles as well as published works of diplomats. The concentration is mainly on events from the period of 1991 until mid 1992 — the phase from which Croatian independence was declared until its recognition by the United Kingdom and the United States. Topics explored include matters such the politics behind non-recognition, democratic social norms, respect for human rights and Western national interests.

The thesis first hypothesizes, then analyses, which International Relations theory, that is, realism or constructivism, possesses the best capacity to explain why these nations initially withheld their recognition of Croatia’s independence before accepting the Republic of Croatia as an independent state. The role of the two International Relations theories here is to have each of them offer an interpretation and understanding of these events and decisions. Subsequently, they are judged on their ability to do so.

The structure of this thesis is as follows: ensuing this introductory chapter, the second chapter provides a literature review of the war in Croatia, the socio-political
climate and recent history of Yugoslavia before the war, as well as an overview of the recognition process. The second chapter also presents the specific versions of realist and constructivist International Relations theories referred to in the analysis when attempting to further understand the motivations behind UK and US foreign policies. The third chapter is dedicated to reviewing the foreign policy of the United Kingdom towards the newly succeeded Croatian state, with the focus being on the discussions and negotiations surrounding the debate on recognition. The fourth chapter is devoted to the inspection of United States foreign policy towards the Croatian nation during the period before state-recognition was granted. Chapter Five offers an analysis of UK and US foreign policy responses first from available literature and then from the perspectives of realist and constructivist International Relations theories. This analysis will offer an assessment of the hypotheses first presented in the second chapter and how well they explain the findings. Any perceived shortcomings on the part of the selected theories to explain satisfactorily the conduct of the United Kingdom and United States towards Croatia are also addressed here. The final chapter provides a detailed summary of the findings in the previous chapters, followed by suggestions on where additional research and studies can be completed in order to enrich and fulfill the existing literature regarding customary state-recognition and Western responses to the Yugoslav war.
Chapter Two: Setting the Scene

This chapter first presents a short account of the socio-political climate in Yugoslavia shortly before the outbreak of war in 1991. What follows is a literature review of the most salient sources used to inform the thesis, including clarification of the two types of International Relations theories (realism and constructivism) utilized in the analysis chapter, Chapter Five. The research and methodology techniques are explained next, followed by the hypotheses posed regarding the ability of the IR theories to explain the choice of foreign policy responses by the United Kingdom and United States towards Croatia.

Pre-War History

There are those who say that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, put together after the Second World War, was simply a socio-political and economic experiment — one that could only be sustained by the right ruler and for a limited amount of time (Patterson, 2011). Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces, each of them possessing its own representative regional government who participated at the federal level. The constituents were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Vojvodina. It is important to note that Yugoslavia was not a ‘nation’ defined as one with a strong political identity built on an ethnic community. As Stevan K. Pavlowitch explains, ‘The modern nation, endowed with a political identity, was built on the ethnic community, a collective characterized by cultural and historical affinities’ (Pavlowitch, 1994). In
Eastern Europe, unlike in most of Western Europe, political unity and stable entities could not be created due to the persistent survival of the imperial idea and the Turkish conquest. These realities did not prevent ethnic communities from maturing however, as was the case in Yugoslavia which was a composition of eight different ethnicities (Pavlowitch, 1994).

The Yugoslav federation was not democratic. Something akin to a dictatorship was established under Communist Party President Josip Broz Tito who was proclaimed ‘President for Life’, a man who maintained his authoritarian leadership separate and non-aligned with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics throughout the Cold War period. A cause for resentment among many of Yugoslavia’s citizens was Tito’s ‘trinity’: his diplomatic corps, the Yugoslav police and the Yugoslav army, whose compositions were ethnically unbalanced, as they were dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins. These were the dreaded individuals who carried out Tito’s orders for thirty-five years, suppressing democratic decisions, persecuting and imprisoning religious civilians and clergy and silencing those advocating political freedoms throughout the federation (Pavlicevic, 1996).

In 1971, dissatisfaction began to become more and more apparent among the Croatian public. Among other civil rights grievances, the Croatian people were upset at being misrepresented and underrepresented in the political system and at having the modest income earned through Croatian tourism being continually drained from the Croatian economy and into the Serbian republic. They also passionately objected against the persecution they suffered for attempting to uphold and cultivate any national

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2 For a thorough history of Croatia’s particular experience under centuries of foreign rule by Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, the Austrian Empire see Marcus Tanner (1997).
traditions, including the use the standardized Croatian language\(^3\) in public and professional spaces (Pavlicevic, 1996). The Croatian Spring, which was the culmination of these concerns and more, erupted in the early 1970s, with Croatians calling for equality among the Yugoslav’s nations, changes to the constitution to officiate the use of the standardized Croatian language and the right to keep more of the hard currency earned through tourism inside the Croatian republic (Tanner, 1997). Only a short time later, by 1971, these protests were all quashed, with thousands of Croatian dissidents either killed or imprisoned, while others, fearing for their life, were forced to flee the country (Pavlicevic, 1996).

In 1974, however, Tito did concede somewhat to the pressure which was still present, by instituting a new constitution, which defined all the republics unequivocally as ‘states’, making them into sovereign agents of political decision-making with a right to self-determination (Ingrao and Emmert, 2009, p.103; Meier, 1999, p. 6). Though the country became less centralized as the 1970s progressed, there was never any question of who held the reins of power: Tito was a one-man, single-party state (Silber and Little, 1995). Tito aged, and since he saw no convincing successor available, he decided to create an eight-member presidency that would replace him when need be, consisting of one representative from each of the republics and provinces (Ibid). The Yugoslav head of state position would be rotated annually between the members. When Tito’s health

\(^3\) The people of Yugoslavia spoke five different languages. Tito’s policy, in order to promote more unity in the federation, downplayed the differences between the Serbian and Croatian languages to create a Serbo-Croatian language, which was a mixture of the two. Although the Serbian and Croatian languages do hold similarities, they are considered distinct from one another by linguists due to differences in aspects such as typological level and genetic relatedness, in addition to using two different alphabets; Croatians uses Latin alphabet while Serbians uses Cyrillic (Kacic, 1997).
started to decline, however, the federal institutions deteriorated with him. Yugoslavia became only a messy compilation of eight regionally-based Communist parties, the secret police and the Army (Silber and Little, 1995).

On May 4th 1980, Marshal Tito died, leaving a huge leadership vacuum in the country. His death came at a very inopportune time when Yugoslavia found itself in a severe economic crisis exacerbated by the enormous foreign loans accumulated during the 1970s. At the time of his death these loans amounted to $20 billion — a staggering amount for a country with a Gross Domestic Product of $17,764 (Akhavan and Howse, 1995, p. 79; Tanner, 1997, p. 207). Inflation soared to over 50 per cent, which was made worse by the rise in oil prices and consumers were faced with harsh shortages of goods and power cuts (Tanner, 1997, p. 207). It is possible that this distressing Yugoslav climate was a contributor to the rekindled nationalism that sprung up among its republics (Radeljic, 2007).

In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences renewed the ‘Greater Serbia’ program with a pamphlet known as the ‘Memorandum’ which was drafted in the nineteenth century (Pavlicevic, 1996). This document passionately claimed that the entire Serbian race was under threat by a menacing anti-Serb conspiracy and called for the fusion of all Serbians throughout Yugoslavia into one state (Tanner, 1996). The Memorandum’s portrayal of the Serbian people being plotted against had no convincing evidence since the Serbians in Croatia benefitted from being overrepresented within the Party, the police, the judiciary, state enterprises and the prison services (Mann, 2005). Nevertheless, after excerpts from the Memorandum were published in a major daily newspaper and after its ideas were circulated and echoed by the Serbian Orthodox
Church, the Memorandum’s inflammatory language ignited sectors of the Serbian public (Ramet, 2006). Although the Memorandum was denounced by the League of Communists, a number of Serbian politicians publicly upheld the ideas, and when Slobodan Milosevic engineered a coup in 1987 and quickly become Serbian president, the execution of the Memorandum’s ideas were set in motion (Ramet, 2006).

By 1990, the representatives of Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo were supplanted with individuals faithful to Milosevic and his vision of a Greater Serbia. Through this act, Serbia secured for itself four out of eight federal presidency votes and thus held great sway at the federal level since the remaining Yugoslav republics each only held one vote (Brown and Karim, 1995). It was at this time that Slovenia and Croatia began to voice their desires for greater autonomy within a confederation, a request that was staunchly opposed by Serbian leadership. Serbia insisted upon a higher centralized federation complete with a dominant Serbian position within it (Bassiouni, 1994). Due to these unsolvable issues, the unified Communist Party of Yugoslavia broke down with Slovenia and Croatia voicing that they rejected the communist system and would be holding democratic elections as soon as possible.

The Croatian Democratic Union, headed by Franjo Tudman proved victorious after the Croatian elections and Tudman, now the president of Croatia immediately started making plans for a referendum that would offer citizens the option of voting whether they desired Croatia to become a sovereign state, or to remain a republic within Yugoslavia. May 15th 1991, marked the day when Stjepan Mesic, a Croatian politician was scheduled to take his seat as the next president through the rotating presidency model Tito had set up. The leadership of Serbia, backed by Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina
brought on a constitutional crisis by blocking the installation. This move was interpreted by onlookers as a final effort by the Serbian government to preserve dominance over the frail federation (Bohlen, 1991). What the blockage ultimately did was leave the country without a head of state. This crisis caused the Croatian president and citizenry to lose even more confidence in the Yugoslav federation and a few days later, when the independence referendum was held, ninety-four percent of Croatians voted in favour of seceding from Yugoslavia (Meier, 1999, p. 173).

When the referendum results became known, Tudman and the Croatian Parliament passed a resolution that launched the independence of the Republic of Croatia. Milosevic and the Serbian government fervently opposed this move, even though before the referendum they had rejected Croatian offers to create a confederation (Pavlicevic, 1996). On June 25th, 1991, Tudman declared Croatia an independent state and thus its disassociation from Yugoslavia, which was a right it held under Tito’s 1974 Constitution (Ingrao and Emmert, 2009, p. 103). Milosevic and his regime refused to accept the proclamation however. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), which in theory should have been neutral, was used by Milosevic as a de facto Serbian army, since it was largely composed of Serbs or Montenegrins (70 percent) (Hitchcock, 2003, p. 389), to invade Croatia under the pretence of securing Yugoslavia’s borders and to offer assistance to Croatian Serbs who were seeking to carve out miniature Serb enclaves within Croatian territory (Nier, 1992). Unfortunately, even before Croatia’s declaration of independence, the Yugoslav Army had disarmed the territorial units of Croatia, leaving the Croatian people completely defenceless before the might of the JNA army and its Serb supporters in Croatia. This problem of vulnerability was further exacerbated by the arms embargo
later imposed by the United Nations (UN) which prohibited the Croatian state from acquiring weapons for self-defence against the JNA’s brutal attacks on all things civilian including homes, hospitals, churches, historic sites and most troubling, innocent people.

Here, at the conclusion of the historical background, the thesis now turns to an exploration of selected literature written on the Croatian war and Western responses to it. Following the literature review, a brief account of the realist and constructivist IR theories will be provided which will be used in the analysis in Chapter Five.

Literature Review

This section reviews some of the information and ideas that have been published on the Croatian conflict regarding the role of Western powers in the mediation process, reasoning behind Western policy choices, morals and norms of conflict resolution and Western state interests in the maintenance of Yugoslavian unity.

Much of the literature regarding the war in Croatia addresses the question of whether the conflict should be considered a ‘civil war’ or instead a ‘war of aggression’ (Fenske, 1993). A civil war can be understood as a conflict where no clear aggressor can be established and where both warring factions are organized regular forces and considered ‘equally guilty’, whereas a war of aggression can be defined as a war waged on a people without the validation of self-defence and used generally to gain territory (Blitz, 2006). At the onset of the conflict, it was common for it to be referred to as a civil war (Marinos, 2008; Sambanis, 2004), but after repeated violent attempts on the part of the Serbian-run JNA army to consolidate conquered Croatian land, numerous books and
articles emerged criticizing this depiction and arguing that it should instead be conceptualized as a war of aggression (MacKinnon, 1994; Nordstrom and Robben, 1995; Woodward, 1992). This distinction, made by numerous authors (Glaurdic, 2011; Pavlowitch, 1994; Woodward, 1992) is important to the thesis development because many Western leaders and politicians labelled the conflict as a civil war in order to justify their non-interventionist stance, because with no party appearing as the victim, they rightly assumed that it would take longer for public opinion to begin demanding something be done to assist the weaker side against being attacked. Explaining why the West primarily inaccurately characterized the conflict a civil war, Germany’s Foreign Minister at the time, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, stated it was due to the fact that the majority of foreign journalists had received their briefings in Belgrade and so their reports naturally reflected the Serbian agenda (Blaskovich, 1997).

The general consensus on the reaction of the Western world to the conflict is that from the outset of the crisis, the UK and most of the European Community (EC) agreed on the necessity to preserve a united Yugoslavia, but then rapidly fell into dispute on how to react to the assertions of Croatia’s right to secede (Macleod, 1997). The Germans however, wanted to recognize Croatia’s independence soon after its declaration, saying that Croatia had ‘as much right to self-determination as did the Germans and that...independence and international recognition were the surest means to block the violent designs of the Serbian regime in Belgrade’ (who ruled under the false pretence of being the ‘guardians’ of Yugoslavia) (Fenske, 1993). Despite this argument, the UK persisted in backing Serbia as the heir to the Yugoslav state and looked to delay recognition of Croatia for as long as possible (Macleod, 1997). The United States and the
Bush Administration, took almost a year to recognize Croatia’s independence. As justification for their general inaction and unresponsive attitude they stated that the Balkans were not a ‘vital interest’ to the United States of America at the time (Naftali, 2007). Learning about these initial reactions by Western powers guided research to look for statements, conversations and interests that reinforced and helped clarify why such policy routes were taken by the Western powers.

On the topic of the capabilities international recognition can have in conflict management and the ‘innovative’ and controversial policy procedures within the European Community during the Croatian war, Richard Caplan’s book *Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia* (2005) is an invaluable source. His focus on the UK and European Community’s divergence from previous practice assisted in steering the thesis research to focus on particular diplomats such as UK’s Lord Carrington and Douglas Hurd when examining actors who had a great deal of influence on the mediation process. His dialogue regarding the distinctions between conflict management, conflict prevention and conflict resolution is enlightening, as well as his questions on whether international law had any bearing at all on the EC’s actions. Caplan writes that the case of Croatia merits further study due to the fact that ‘the controversy surrounding its recognition raises important questions about the strategic premises of the EC policy, the role of the Arbitration Commission and ultimately, the relationship between international law and international politics’ (Caplan, 2005, p. 38). He highlights throughout the book his contention that the UK’s and EC’s actions were motivated ‘largely, if not entirely, by extra-legal considerations’ (Caplan, 2005, p. 73). He also argues that an important characteristic of Western states is that no matter what action they choose policy-wise,
they make certain their behaviour is interpreted as legitimate and in line with international law. Assertions such as these, implying realist conceptions, allowed the thesis to draw connections between the actions of the UK and how they related to the International Relations theories chosen for the analysis.

The article by David H. Bearce (2002) argues that the risk of institutional breakdown may have assisted in promoting bargaining cooperation by increasing the opportunity costs of bargaining failure. Bearce argues that the risk offers a compelling incentive for nations who find meaning in frail international institutions to bargain an accommodating agreement. This concept was useful in studying the interaction of the United Kingdom with the rest of the EC members when not all states agreed on how to proceed with the handling of the Yugoslav crisis because near the end of 1991, although Croatia had fulfilled the conditions the EC had set out, the UK along with France were still not entirely convinced that recognition would be the best step. Bearce shows how the importance the UK and France put on the cohesion of the EC may have had more influence than previously thought on their decision to proceed with recognizing Croatia. His article also offers a convincing argument against the stance made by many authors with regards to Germany’s early decision to recognize the Croatian state’s independence. Bearce holds that contrary to what is spurred, Germany’s pro-recognition decision should be considered multilateral; it should be seen as a sign of conditional agreement among the European states, (even though the timing of the recognition declaration was a little irregular) with Germany moving first (Bearce, 2002, p. 489).

States had at the onset of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and how these perceptions slowly changed when human rights became a major element of US policy. Zimmermann discusses some of the criticism the United States received for promoting Yugoslav unity in the face of Slovenian and Croatian attempts to be recognized as democratic republics, but defends US action stating that at the time, it was what they felt was the best route to take. Zimmermann argues that the breakup of Yugoslavia was a classic type of nationalism, one from the top down — meaning, a ‘manipulated nationalism’ used to provoke ethnic violence (Zimmermann, 1995, p. 12). He believes that if the US had become involved earlier than they did, the catastrophe that followed could have been averted, or the damage lessened. Zimmermann’s piece helped place US political conduct within IR theoretical paradigms in the thesis’ analysis with his provisions of conversations US diplomats had amongst each other off the record, which were then compared to the statements the White House released to the public. His detailed account displayed how misconceptions that are repeated and asserted in the media and amongst global leaders can prevent progressive policies from being implemented for extended periods of time.

Regarding the implications of Slovenia and Croatia’s secessions and their recognition as international states upon accepted principles of self-determination, an article by Peter Radan (1994) provided developed and engaging discussions. Radan writes that it was on the basis of self-determination that both republics justified secession and that eventually it was this rationale that caused both republics to find support from the international community (Radan, 1994, p. 183). Radan points to the significance of this occurrence, reminding readers that Croatia and Slovenia’s secessions are the first
cases of successful secessions since Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan in 1971 (Radan, 1994, p. 183). What was particularly helpful was Radan’s dialogue regarding the different ways the concept of self-determination can be understood. He shows how even Western and Eastern Europe hold traditionally diverse interpretations of the principle. Radan’s work is different from many analysts of the Yugoslav crisis in that he argues that what had the most sway in Croatia and Slovenia being recognized was not the generosity and/or power politics between European states, but the actual principles the two republics were pursuing.

Laura Silber and Allan Little’s *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (1997) has been among the most widely cited books on the conflict in Yugoslavia. Silber and Little’s contribution is that they examine the myths the West ‘hid behind’ in order to justify their lack of a cohesive response to Slobodan Milosevic’s violent quest for a ‘Greater Serbia’. A good deal of the book is dedicated to an analysis of confidential meetings held between key Western diplomats and the Serbian government, which assist the contention that there existed interests and motives not publicly discussed, but that were nevertheless present behind Western policies towards Croatia. They argue that the UK and the US felt they had much more to lose than to gain from the disintegration of Yugoslavia and they suggest this be considered when one attempts to explain their stances during the early part of the conflict. Silber and Little’s work assisted the analysis component of the thesis in making the connections between certain politicians, their interests and their sought-after policies. These connections could then be interpreted as either exemplifying realist or constructivist notions of global politics when put alongside the main precepts of each theory.
Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic’s (eds) (1996) book, principally a collection of intellectual essays written from a blend of theoretical approaches, offered the thesis insights on the numerous functions Western players had before and during the conflict. Furthermore it provided several rationalizations for the dynamic interrelationship between countries like the UK and the US with the Belgrade regime. This information was utilized in the analysis where reasoning behind the policies the UK and US chose was tied to their connections with the Serbian elite. A theme observed many times throughout the book is the authors’ critique of Western moral relativism, which was a tool they convincingly argue, that was used to allot blame to all sides because that became the most convenient way to justify non-involvement (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996). This work contributed to the thesis’ reflective study of UK and US interpretations and responses to the war through its provision of policy statements that conflicted with the stated aims of the John Major government and the George H.W. Bush Administration. It also adeptly scrutinizes the internal politics of Yugoslavia prior to its dissolution, thus creating a clearer image of realities faced by civilians and politicians alike on the eve of war. It is believed this background was a necessary foundation the thesis could build upon as it proceeded to contemplate the legitimacy of the Croatia’s secessionist claim and Western reactions to it.

The literature surrounding the war in Croatia contains extensive sources listing the chronology of main events and how the conflict unfolded, which Western power supported which Balkan player (similar to the alliances before World War I), who initiated what policy decision et cetera. Much less literature exists on the connections made regarding the reasons behind the way things unfolded, the reasons behind the
decisions and policies chosen by the UK and US. Foreign policy is never a trivial or arbitrary matter. If conducted correctly, policies have the potential to save millions of lives and evade the destruction and outpouring of refugees that always occurs in cases of armed conflict. In the same vein, very little has been written comparing Western responses to notions asserted in theoretical frameworks. It is hoped that this thesis can assist in the filling of these vacuums with explanations of (1) why these Western states hesitated as long as they did despite the growing public outcry to ‘do something’, and (2) to see how their responses resonate with conceptualizations held in the realist and constructivist International Relations theories. It is believed that with the information presented here, a clearer historical overview can be painted, where actors who possessed the power and ability to save lives, homes and cities can be properly studied and understood.

Theory Clarifications

Since this thesis is attempting to assess, among other things, which (if any) IR theory best aids in understanding the policies chosen by the UK and the US in response to the Croatian declaration of independence, it is useful to outline what is meant by ‘constructivist’ and what is meant by ‘realist’ for the purpose of this exercise.

Although there are many interpretations of realism, the version utilized in this thesis is one which holds that realism explains international politics as ‘a practical exercise and not a moral one’ (Kennan, 1954, p. 48) and that world politics are motivated mainly by competitive self-interest (Rourke, 2010). In this view, realism contains four main assumptions. Primarily it assumes that nation states are the main actors on the world
stage and that because no final authority exists above that of states, the international system is characterized by anarchy. Second, realism holds that when people act politically, they do so as part of self-interest and this egoism is simply part of human nature. Third, realism claims that politics occur within and between groups, that group cohesion is essential to progress, but that cohesion can also generate clashes with other units (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008). Lastly, realism stands behind E.H. Carr’s assertion that ‘international politics are always power politics’ (Carr, 1946, p. 145) and that interactions between states are influenced primarily on the extent of their individual economic and military power.

In realist texts, one finds the opinion that following the hunter-gatherer stage, human affairs are enduringly characterized by immense disparities of power in terms of both social influence and resources (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p.133). As Waltz states, ‘The web of social and political life is spun out of inclinations and incentives, deterrent threats and punishments’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 186). When realists study International Relations, they seek to find what the group interests are, where the power is and how conflicting interests are resolved through ‘power relationships’ (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 134).

Since realist theories seek to explain why war occurs, they may also be adopted to analyse how one might be able to explain peace. In the minds of realists, peace occurs when major grounds for war are nonexistent, or when one group of states feel it necessary to comply with each other due to their mutual duty to oppose another group or state (Reus-Smit and Snidal, pp. 144-145). What realist theorists hypothesize is that peace is dependent on a certain formation of power and once the particular formation alters, it is
likely that clashes will occur (Reus-Smit and Snidal, pp. 144-145). One example of a way a ‘clash’ could present itself is in the form of territorial expansion. Since realists argue that states are intrinsically belligerent and fixated on security, the only means by which aggressive territorial expansion can be repressed is by the joint forces of opposition powers.

With regards to morals, realists are defined by proclamations such as those made by George F. Kennan who wrote that international politics should be seen as ‘a practical exercise and not a moral one’ (Kennan, 1954, p. 48) and those of E.H. Carr who stated that ‘no ethical standards are applicable to relations between states’ (Carr, 1946, p. 153). Theorists of realism even claim that no universal moral principles exist; thus there is no rational way that they can be ‘applied to the actions of states’ (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 9) and that different standards apply to the public actions of national leaders and the actions of private individuals (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 155). Perhaps because of the wide acceptance of these prominent opinions, contemporary political scientists are said to be a lot less likely to devote energy reflecting on matters with moral underpinnings compared to their professional predecessors (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 151).

As for constructivism, this thesis looks primarily to Alexander Wendt’s writings for guidance; writings which have been highly influential in the field of International Relations. Wendt holds that there are two basic precepts in constructivism: first that the structures of people’s relationships are established mainly by ‘shared ideas rather than material forces’ and second, that the ‘identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 1). Constructivist theory holds that the important areas of world politics are strongly defined
by social and historical processes and that ‘interests are not just “out there” waiting to be discovered’ as Martha Finnemore writes, but instead ‘are constructed through social interaction’ (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2).

One way that constructivism differs from realism is that realism can be seen as a theory about material power in world politics, while constructivism focuses on social meaning that is attached to objects and practices (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 299). Constructivism stands out from other frameworks because it explicitly concerns itself with both empirical and philosophical issues; a combination that was previously unapproachable using the other established models of International Relations in the 1980s (Ibid). Elaborating on the constructivist approach Wendt writes that ‘people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them’ (Wendt, 1992, p. 396). Because of this conviction, expectations, beliefs and interpretations are examined thoroughly by constructivists when studying global politics in addition to the role of history in the construction of ‘national interests’ (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, pp. 301-302).

Another way constructivism deviates from realism is in its interpretation of the term ‘anarchy’ in International Relations. Constructivists make the previously unrecognized distinction that ‘an anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies’ (Wendt, 1995, p. 78); a stance that can stand to explain in theoretical terms why ‘500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons’ (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Wendt claims this is so because the United Kingdom is depicted and seen as a friend to America, while North Korea is not (Ibid).
Constructivism also sees world politics and anarchy as being heavily influenced by cultural stimuli (not just by material forces as depicted by realists in the past). While realists will look to explain global patterns by studying the flow and development of things such as money, militaries and resources, constructivists will examine social concepts, symbols and state-rhetoric to see exactly how stated interests are created and defined (Reus-Smit, and Snidal, 2008, p. 301). As Jeffrey Legro explains, ‘new foreign policy ideas are shaped by pre-existing dominant ideas and their relationship to experienced events’ (Legro, 2005, p. 4).

One significant contribution made by constructivists to the field of International Relations has been its argument that moral norms and ethics actually do matter in global politics and that progressive moral change can in fact occur (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 317). An important concession of constructivist scholars is that settlements of most ethical impasses often require one morally substantive concept of politics taking precedence over others — such as the case of humanitarian intervention, which overrides norms of self-determination (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 321). Therefore, they also hold that more often than not, moral progress is achieved with considerable difficulty and usually arrives at the price of generating new moral predicaments (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 325).

The realist theoretical perspective was selected as one of the two IR theories due to various considerations; primarily because the main actors the thesis studies are state actors and realism looks at states as the key global players. The realist school of thought was also considered appropriate because realist notions of state interests and the interplay between groups of states was a common theme found throughout sources on the
Yugoslav conflict. It was hoped that realism could help explain the stated inclinations of the UK and US as well as provide reasoning behind the power politics in which these states were entwined, along with the arguable lack of moral concern for the victims of the conflict.

The constructivist theoretical perspective was chosen as the second theory because it is considered a challenge to realist perceptions, and thus it was believed that should the realist framework not be able to fully address certain policy actions or decisions, the constructivist model, with its focus on social and historical processes, might be able to do so instead. Furthermore, because the United Kingdom and the United States primarily stated that they would not be recognizing the republics seceded from Yugoslavia, and then later changed their stance, it was thought that the constructivist model might be able to offer insight on the process by which both countries attempted to publicly justify the change in their foreign policy decisions.

**Research Approach and Methodology**

This thesis utilized qualitative methods for gathering data. It included reviewing academic literature, analyzing newspaper and television reports, reading the memoirs of diplomats and government officials, looking through transcripts of UK House of Commons and US Congress proceedings and comparing reports on various policy implementations with political correspondences. While inspecting these sources, what was specifically being sought were instances in which the United Kingdom and the United States were given opportunities to change their stance, to implement policies to lessen civilian deaths and failed to do so. The timeframe that was chosen to focus upon
was from the onset of war in 1991, up until the near-summer of 1992 by which point both the UK and US had extended diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Croatia.

The case of the United Kingdom was chosen because the UK’s response is important to study for numerous reasons. These include the central role its academics and governmental institutions played in legitimizing the impasse, the fact that UK’s Lord Peter Carrington was appointed as the chair of the European Community’s Conference on Yugoslavia and the UK’s privileged position as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Malone, 2004). The United States was chosen because of its typically active stance in foreign affairs, its stated dedication to peace and democracy, because it is the world’s greatest power and because of its ties to Yugoslavia. The United Kingdom and the United States were chosen together because doing so allowed for transatlantic comparison and it made it possible to study two nations who are usually very proactive and decisive, who behaved in a totally different manner during the Yugoslav conflict.

There are, of course, different nations that could have been selected as case studies instead or in addition to the UK and the US. It was decided to forgo the German case because the thesis was looking to focus on the ‘English’ response to the crisis so that all primary sources available could be easily understood and nothing would be lost or unavailable due to language barriers. The German case is considered controversial by some who characterize Germany as recognizing Croatia’s independence ‘prematurely’ in December of 1991 and thus as having gone against an ‘EC consensus’ on the matter (Crawford, 1996; Woodward, 1995). Burg and Shoup even allege that Germany’s vocal support for Croatia and Slovenia intensified the Serbian threat to Bosnia (Burg and
Shoup, 2000, p. 98). These claims and others like them are all put to rest when one considers the points made by scholars such as Lukic and Lynch who argue that on the contrary, it was the UK and the rest of the EC that gave encouragement to Serbian aggression with their insistence on the preservation of a unified Yugoslavia, which had already been labelled as being in ‘an advanced state of decay’ by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in the summer of 1991 when Serbian hostilities began (House of Commons, July 3, 1991; Lukic and Lynch, 1996, p. 271). On the subject of breaching consensus, Lukic and Lynch point to the fact that the EC had already agreed in July 1991 to extend diplomatic recognition to Croatia in October (at the end of the three-month moratorium the EC had imposed on the seceded republics). Therefore, if anyone had gone against ‘international cooperation’ it was the UK and France through their refusal to give recognition, when that was what had been previously arranged (Lukic and Lynch, 1996, p. 272).

When these points were coupled with the anti-German sentiment carried over from the Nazi era, the EC’s fear of a growing German power upsetting the European balance (Ramet, 2005, p.8), and the pro-Serb bias apparent in London and Paris (Blitz, 1996), the non-interventionist and anti-independence positions held by the UK and US (despite evidence that the Milosevic regime was pursuing a campaign of ethnic cleansing and territorial expansion) was thought to be more interesting to study.

The other component of this thesis includes the incorporation of two International Relations theories, that being realism and constructivism, to assist in the explanation of why the UK and US delayed giving their support to the newly seceded state of Croatia. Works from both schools of thought were consulted in order to gain a better
understanding of what practices and behaviours to look for among the policy proceedings of both Western states.

Hypotheses

The United Kingdom

This thesis hypothesizes that the realist International Relations theory is the most useful in explaining the foreign policy choices and stances taken by the United Kingdom towards Croatia following Croatia’s announcement of its secession from Yugoslavia. It is also theorized here that although the constructivist approach is insufficient to stand as the solitary theory of explanation, it may be able to further our understanding of UK’s conduct overall.

The United States

With regards to the United States foreign policy motivations and decisions towards Croatia, this thesis hypothesizes that, once again, the International Relations perspective that possesses the best capacity to elucidate the deliberation process is realism. It is anticipated however, that the constructivist approach is in a position to supplement additional insight to that offered by the realist perspective.
Conclusion

This chapter presented a summary of the political and social environment that was present in Yugoslavia prior to the conflict and hostilities that broke out after Croatia’s declaration of independence. Then, a review of the relevant literature that was used to inform the thesis was offered, which was followed by elucidation of the two International Relations theories (realism and constructivism) selected for the analysis. The techniques utilized in the research and methodology of the thesis were explained next, which was followed by the presentation of two hypotheses — one for the United Kingdom and the other for the United States — and the ability of the two IR theories to speak to the policy decisions and statements each country made with regards to the war in Croatia. The next chapter studies the foreign policy of the United Kingdom towards Croatia by providing an outline of the choices and occurrences that brought the UK to recognize Croatia’s independence.
Chapter Three: The United Kingdom and Croatia

This chapter examines the United Kingdom’s foreign policy towards Croatia upon Croatia’s declared secession from Yugoslavia and focuses mainly on the politics regarding the granting of diplomatic recognition. It provides a recapitulation of the events and decisions that led to the United Kingdom recognizing Croatia as a sovereign nation in early 1992. The proceedings and choices presented here are examined and analysed in the fifth chapter.

Initial Reactions

June 25th 1991 marked the day when Croatian president Franjo Tudman reacted to referendum results which showed ninety-four percent of Croatians wished to secede from Yugoslavia. Tudman formally declared Croatia’s disassociation from Yugoslavia (Meier, 1999, p. 173). Upon the declaration, Tudman, the parliament and Croatian citizens waited in anticipation, hopeful that public recognition would soon be forthcoming so that the new republic would be able to begin establishing diplomatic ties with world leaders. Tudman was aware that Croatia was not in a position to take on the menacing Serbian-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) who threatened war in response to Croatia’s secession. So instead, Tudman concentrated not on military capacity, but on attracting international goodwill; he trusted that Croatia could secure its sovereignty not by triumphing militarily over the JNA, but through international recognition (Silber and Little, 1995).
Unfortunately, the straightforward recognition procedure that was hoped for did not become reality. According to Glaurdic (2011) numerous factors, such as the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, uncertainties about how Europe would function without a unified Yugoslavia, contributed to the United Kingdom responding with a feeble, ineffective and mainly diplomatic intervention (Glaurdic, 2011). However as much as these issues may have affected or steered policy decisions, they do not constitute all of the concerns and motivations behind the UK’s and the EC’s policy. Scholars such as Susan Woodward have argued that what appeared to be honest indecisiveness on the part of the UK and EC to come to a strong decision was really mostly a struggle for the balance of power among the UK and France on one side and Germany on the other (Woodward, 1992).

Germany was the first EC member state to advocate for the recognition of Croatia, although until hostilities erupted in late summer of 1991, Germany had supported the continued unity of Yugoslavia along with the United Kingdom and the other EC states. On June 27th, Germany was among those nations who released a statement that said the Western European Union ‘expressed regret at the recent unilateral decisions’ of Croatia and Slovenia and ‘urged all political authorities in Yugoslavia to resume the dialogue with a view of securing the unity of the state (Caplan, 2002, p. 159). However, as attacks on Croatia dramatically increased, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl sided against Serbia when he stated that ‘the unity of Yugoslavia cannot be maintained with force of arms’ (Caplan, 2002, p. 159). German diplomats joined in saying that the main question that should be on the table was whether ‘the people's choice should or should not be respected’ — referring to the referendum results (The Washington Times,
July 8 1991). These German-led assertions, which ran counter to the initial stances of those supporting a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia, (mainly France, Greece and the UK) inspired propaganda claiming that Germany only supported Croatian and Slovenian independence because it was seeking to establish new spheres of influence (Cafruny and Ryner, 2003, p. 99). As Josip Glaurdic writes, Germany’s change of heart ended up becoming a double-edged sword since it provoked the anti-German suspicions and rivalries of other European nations, mainly France and the United Kingdom, who in response hardened their own positions against recognition (Glaurdic, 2011).

The first mediating step the European Community took in response to the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia was to convene a conference in Brioni on July 7th 1991 to ‘resolve’ the crisis (Ramet, 2006). A troika of EC representatives decided that the ‘solution’ would involve a three-month moratorium on the further implementation in the actualization of Slovenian and Croatian independence, the withdrawal of JNA troops from both republics and the confirmation of Stipe Mesic (a Croat) as the next chair of Yugoslavian presidency (Meier, 1999). Basically, as Ramet writes, the UK and EC solution was to ‘perpetuate an illusion for three months that Yugoslavia still existed’ (Ramet, 2006, p. 396). ‘The first prize is to hold the federation together in Yugoslavia’, explained UK’s Prime Minister John Major (Silber and Little, 1995, p. 159). In addition to the moratorium, Croatia was also banned from authorizing a defence law or creating an army — prohibitions which would prove devastating in the weeks to come when the Yugoslav army and Serbian rebels within the republic began their military attacks on towns and civilians.
Following the conference in Brioni, hostilities gradually increased, caused by Serb rebels launching attacks on Croatian settlements in their desire to carve out ‘ethnically-pure’ Serbian mini-states within Croatia. At the height of the war, with the support of the Yugoslav army, Serbian dissidents through repeated offenses on air, land and sea managed to gain control of over one-third of Croatia (Nier, 1992). In feeble attempts to pull the Serbian insurgents back to the negotiating table, the Croatian government repeated their guarantee of equal rights and pledge to full cultural autonomy to Serbs living within Croatia’s borders, but to no avail; the Serbs were to force Tudman and Croatia into war ‘whether they wanted it or not’ (Ramet, 2006, p. 398; Silber and Little, 1995, p. 171). ‘The old system is in an advance state of decay and cannot survive,’ British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd warned the British House of Commons that summer, however, his words did not deter the remainder of UK politicians on their aim to keep the Yugoslav federation together (The Washington Times, July 1991).

On the 27th of August 1991 the Badinter Arbitration Commission was set up by the UK alongside its fellow EC member states to advise them on legal questions arising within the context of the EC’s peace negotiations with Croatia and Serbia. Pierre Hassner has suggested that the Arbitration Commission was also seen by the UK and French as a way to slow down the German march towards recognition (Hassner, 1996). To some it appeared peculiar for an Arbitration Commission — usually related to settling disputes between parties — to now be acting as a researcher and evaluator for the UK and Europe in its recognition of states. The Badinter Arbitration was different from other arbitration committees in that the actions to be followed and the rules of law used to serve as basis of
judgements (which are normally made public) were not done so in this case; this commission adopted its own rules of procedure and furthermore, never exposed them (Terrett, 2000). The queries that developed over the commission’s capability however, had mostly to do with issues of international law bearing on statehood secession, while the commission’s ‘opinions’ with regards to recognition dealt with how suitably the candidate republics fulfilled the EC’s conditions (Caplan, 2005).

The United Kingdom’s policy on recognition it seems, was not based on the scenes of violence and destruction flashing on its TV screens or by the miserable stories printed in its newspapers. It remained resolute in its stance that the independent state of Croatia was not desirable and held that Serbia was not the initiator of the war. According to the UK policy, there was not only one party accountable for the outbreak of the war and therefore all sides were to be considered equally guilty (Pond, 2006). Douglas Hurd, probably one of the most cautious of European statesmen, was compelled to assert that ‘The time has passed, when you could keep a state together by shooting it’s citizens’ (Silber and Little, 1995, p. 161), but he was in the minority with this opinion and thus no proactive action was inspired.

The United Kingdom, to validate its inaction and refusal to recognize the Croatian state had its statesmen and diplomats declare that the war should be interpreted as a peculiarly Balkan phenomenon, the consequence of ancient and illogical animosities, intrinsic in Balkan peoples, who had been ‘at each others’ throats since time immemorial’ (Bennett, 1995, p. 194). As Pavlowitch writes, ‘knowledge and understanding of Yugoslavia in the West was illusory; Western experts might have had the information, but their perceptions were often wrong’ (Pavlowitch, 1994, p. 211). It has been argued
that language such as ‘Balkan tribes’ and ‘ethnic hatreds’ was used time and time again in an effort to produce a kind of justification as to why the UK should steer clear of the Yugoslav war (Marolov, 2012). Also, the UK was not prepared to devote itself to major risks or long-term commitments; if Croatia was recognized, UK troops and aid would be expected, which were militarily and economically costly (Pavlowitch, 1994, p. 215).

In late August, UK’s former foreign Secretary Lord Carrington was chosen to serve as the EC agent for Yugoslav negotiations; his responsibility was to work for an end to hostilities and towards a political solution (Meier, 1999, p. 226). The initial phase of talks yielded no solutions because the European ministers rejected Hans Van den Broek’s (Netherlands’ Foreign Minister) suggestion of sending some ‘lightly armed’ European peacekeeping troops into the war zone (Meier, 1999, p. 228). Then, in late September, ironically at the request of Serbia, the UK along with the other four members of the UN Security Council passed resolution 713 — an arms embargo on all of Yugoslavia — which was adopted unanimously by all five members. The fact that this embargo was requested and then welcomed by the Serbian government should have been taken as an early sign of the asymmetric impact it would have on the different parties to the conflict (Bromley, 2007).

Resolution 713 was to have grave consequences for the ensuing path of the conflict. It is possible that the UK chose to support the arms embargo because some believed that weapon deliveries could only agitate or prolong the conflict, however this notion did not take into account the fact that in reality, it was a one-sided embargo, working against those factions of the war who did not possess adequate armaments (Meier, 1999, p. 228). The UK government stated that to intervene or to supply arms
would ‘prolong the agony’ and this was why the embargo was being enforced. Brendan Simms calls this reasoning ‘sheer nonsense and insolence’ and asks what would have happened if the British government had been denied aid against the Nazis in 1940 on the grounds that it might ‘prolong the agony’ (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 76). It was no secret that the Serbian side had managed to seize control over most of the Yugoslav army’s weapons arsenal, tanks, artillery and mortars, in addition to nearly the entire air force and the most of the navy, because of this, the enforcement of the embargo became that much more controversial (Ibid). Resolution 713 therefore, deprived first Croatia and then the Bosnian Muslims, of the right to self-defence, a right guaranteed in Article 51 of the UN Charter (Meier, 1999, p. 228).

Another issue Lord Carrington and the UK should have arguably taken more care to resolve was the question of blocking Yugoslavia’s foreign currency reserves, those of which remained in the accounts of the Yugoslav National Bank and which Serbia could use for its own purposes whenever it saw fit (Meier, 1999). When Slovenia realized this dilemma and questioned Lord Carrington on his intentions to rectify it, his simple response was that the issue was ‘too complicated’ to be dealt with (Ibid). Lawrence Eagleburger later admitted that Serbia was looking to purchase $300 million worth of rockets from China using these very currency reserves (Ibid). What is disconcerting is the fact that this transaction, intended to supply Serbian forces for many more months could have easily been prevented, but due to the UK’s and Carrington’s indifference nearly all of the currency reserves of the Yugoslav National Bank did come into the wrong hands and were most likely utilized for weapons purchases as intended (Meier, 1999, p. 233).
Lord Carrington was kept busy composing draft after draft of a general settlement all parties involved could accept. Agreement for recognition was to be granted ‘at the end of the negotiation process’ and only after consensual constitutional settlement acceptable to all six republics had been forged (Caplan, 2005, p. 20). The last draft Lord Carrington provided was on the 5th of November 1991, to which Serbia declined to even respond, upon which Lord Carrington, without any further discussion, quietly ceased all mediation (Meier, 1999, p. 234). Various sides reproached Lord Carrington for this ambivalent behaviour claiming that by doing so, he was evading circumstances where Serbia would be perceived as exclusively to blame for the disintegration of the conference. It is believed that there were possibilities to find solutions to some of the issues associated with state secession and though the other republics were prepared to cooperate, Lord Carrington made it apparent that because the endeavour to reinstate some sort of Yugoslav unity had failed, in his eyes, any further diplomatic activity for himself or for UK interests was pointless (Meier, 1999, p. 234).

According to Daniele Conversi, the overall United Kingdom’s attitudes towards Yugoslavia and towards happenings that have transpired following the secession of Croatia and Slovenia have been characterized by a certain degree of ‘Serbophilia’, reasons for which he claims are historical and contingent (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 245). Conversi writes that two things have assisted in the proliferation of Serbophilic tendency in the UK: the first is a small elite of pro-Serbian activists and the other is a vague group of minor scholars and key politicians easily convinced by the propaganda of
this minority (Ibid). He claims that in the absence of any credible interpretative and decision-making competence, Britain’s Foreign Office had often fallen back on historical determinism and pseudo-academic rationalizations to inform UK foreign policy throughout the war (Ibid).

Conversi feels that the central attributes of UK official and elite discourse on Croatia can be identified as a form of moral relativism, which he defines as belief in the non-universality of human values, including human rights (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 246). He writes that moral relativism can be recognized as the ‘underlying current of public opinion that even at the peak of Serbian atrocities and ethnic cleansing [Vukovar for example] was determined to view all parties in the conflict as ‘warring factions’ engaged in ‘civil war’ (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 245). This position, he contends contributed to the rhetoric of ‘equidistance’ prevalent in the Major government during the conflict which assured the public that every faction in the war was ‘equally to blame’, constructing the conflict into one without victims and aggressors (Ibid).

Many authors feel that historical determinism has inundated academic undertakings, government rhetoric and popular discourse on the Balkan conflict (Bennett, 1995; Ramet, 2005). Repetitive mentions of supposed traditions of endless bloodletting and prevalent conflict in the Balkans have served to create an impression of inevitability that has in turn been utilized to rationalize the unravelling of events (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 247).

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4 For the archaeology of British Serbophilia which is traced to the early 19th century see Daniele Conversi’s chapter in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic (eds), (1996).
It has been argued by many observers that early recognition would have produced prospects for more effectual global action, but since Croatia was only recognized half a year after its declaration, these opportunities could not be exploited (Caplan, 2005). Due to the gross significance attached to preserving political consensus within the Community, persistent objections from other member states — particularly France, the Netherlands and the UK — EC recognition would not be forthcoming until the opposing states finally yielded at December’s foreign minister’s meeting (Lukic and Lynch, 1996).

In early November, when the JNA’s attacks on the Croatian cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik were at their height, UK’s Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hogg, told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons that the reason the UK government did not support the recognition of Croatia was because it would produce an ‘obstacle’ to territorial adjustments in Serbia’s favour and at Croatia’s expense (Glaurdic, 2011, p. 254). However, though perhaps a little belatedly, the Badinter Commission finally concluded in late November that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was indeed in the ‘process of dissolution’ and that it should be seen as such (EC Arbitration Commission 1992: Opinion 1). Upon this announcement, Germany became more vocal with its opinion that recognizing Croatia and Slovenia’s independence was long overdue.

Concerned that the EC was losing its unity just when the Community was attempting to strengthen its common foreign and security policy making capability, France and the United Kingdom suggested to Genscher on December 10th at the Maastricht summit an idea where France and Germany would put forward to the rest of the community, a set of conditions whose fulfillment would enable candidate republics to
receive EC recognition (Caplan, 2005). Along with the UK’s and EC’s general requirements was the obligation for the eligible republics to agree to the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris — in addition to agreement to certain basic norms of international society: respect for the inviolability of borders, acceptance of disarmament and a commitment to settle any disputes arising from state secession peacefully (Caplan, 2005, p. 24). Croatia also had to agree to the requirements of Lord Carrington’s Conference on Yugoslavia’s draft, specifically those stipulated in chapter II on human rights and the rights of national or ethnic groups (Ibid). The Badinter Commission was given the responsibility to inform the Community by January 15th if Croatia had indeed fulfilled these requirements or not. It was implicated that should Croatia meet the demands, the UK along with other EC members were then free to extend conditional recognition to it.

By mid December, it was evident that Croatia had agreed to and fulfilled the requirements given to it by the UK and remaining European nations, but German Foreign Minister Genscher noticed that despite this, there was still reluctance among the UK and French diplomats to commit to giving their recognition to Croatian independence in January. Filled with determination not to return to more circular and dead-end negotiations, Genscher declared that Germany would recognize Croatia’s sovereignty by Christmas since it had satisfied its conditions but that diplomatic relations would commence only in January when the rest of the EC was expected to extend diplomatic recognition. The UK along with France immediately sought to block the impending German recognition with a UN Security council resolution rebuking nations not to take independent actions that might upset the political balance in Yugoslavia (Caplan, 2005, p.
47). The question observers ask is what great ‘balance’ was the UK and France referring to here? By this point in time, Osijek, Dubrovnik, Sibenik, Zadar and countless other Croatian cities and towns had already come under intense artillery bombardment, precious Croatian cultural and historical treasures had been mercilessly destroyed and the border town of Vukovar, after holding out against a brutal three month siege, had been razed to the ground (Meier, 1999, p. 230). Hundreds of thousands of refugees had fled or been expelled from their homes, thousands more had been murdered and disappeared.

**Recognition**

Previously, France and the UK had said that they believed that they could employ the Security Council to prevent Genscher from going through with his vow to recognize Croatia and Slovenia before Christmas — an act they held would only ‘inflame ethnic passions further and dampen the chances of peace’ (*New York Times*, Dec 16, 1991). It was evident that they had not yet shaken their previous conviction that recognizing the breakaway republics would only work to rouse up further ‘ethnic tension’ through the remaining segments of the federation, thereby intensifying the fighting and encouraging other republics to secede (Ibid). The other claim held by the UK and France was that the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would only encourage other separatist movements in Eastern Europe; especially the Soviet Union, which was already then in a state of dissolution (Ibid).

However, after Genscher showed in an exchange of letters with the United Nations Secretary General that he was standing firm on his pledge to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, France, who regarded its alliance with Germany as the foundation of its
European policy, agreed to give in and the UK followed suit, also yielding to Germany's vision of the best method to ending the war (*New York Times*, Dec 16, 1991). Both were aware that if Germany did recognize Croatia and Slovenia, at least three other community members, Italy, Belgium and Denmark, would be likely to follow, as would Austria, who was at the time seeking EC membership (Ibid). On December 23rd as promised, Germany publicly recognized Croatia as an independent state and on January 15th, 1992, the remaining European Community members extended their diplomatic recognition as well (Tanner, 1997).

Croatia’s case deserves further investigation due to the controversy that surrounds its recognition and because its experience seeking approved independence raises imperative enquiries about the strategic premises of the EC policy, the role of the Arbitration Commission and ultimately, the relationship between international law and international politics (Caplan, 2005, p. 38). As Caplan writes, a ‘charitable’ study of proceedings would have it that Germany was genuine in its appreciation of EC policy but that it realized the policy was too vague and based on a compromise method which cloaked rather than resolved the disparities of the European states (Caplan, 2005, p. 39). The UK’s use of recognition can be seen as demonstrating a divergent method to conflict management — a method that revealed the UK’s conviction that its security environment could be handled in part with ‘a judicious EC mixture of diplomatic carrots and sticks’ (Caplan, 2005, p. 48).
Conclusion

This chapter examined particular statements and policy decisions that were selected by the government of the United Kingdom from Croatian President Franjo Tudman’s declaration of independence until the John Major government reversed its position on Croatia and extended diplomatic recognition to the republic. The next chapter examines the foreign policy response of the United States and its diplomats towards the Croatian republic from 1991 until the White House recognized Croatian independence in mid 1992.
Chapter Four: The United States and Croatia

This chapter observes the foreign policy and conduct of the United States towards Croatia upon Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia up until the United States decided to recognize Croatia as a sovereign nation in the spring of 1992. Like the previous chapter, it also concentrates on the politics of granting diplomatic recognition. The subsequent chapter, (Chapter Five) examines and analyses events and choices discussed here.

Initial Reactions

‘No element of international policy has gone more askew in the break-up of Yugoslavia than recognition — whether, when, how, under what conditions — of the emerging parts’ was just one such statement written in the Washington Post after the United States recognized Croatia’s independence in the spring of 1992 — almost a year after it had seceded from Yugoslavia (Washington Post, May 16, 1992). As the article implies, the political conduct of the United States towards Croatia was unfortunately not much more decisive than the European Community’s; in fact it can be argued that the US was even less inclined to allot time and resources to mediating the Yugoslav conflict than Europe was. Although President Tudman declared Croatia’s independence in late June of 1991 and the European Community extended its diplomatic recognition in January of 1992, the United States and the Bush Administration held off even longer, recognizing Croatia and Slovenia’s independence only in April of 1992 (Fenske, 1993). From the onset of Serbian aggression, US President George H. W. Bush and most US diplomats repeatedly stated that the United States had ‘no vital national interest’ in Yugoslavia and
that thus they were only concerned with the ‘strategic goal of maintaining [Yugoslavia’s] territorial and political unity’ (Bekic, 2010, p. 12). US Secretary of State James A. Baker, reiterated this sentiment while in Belgrade in June of 1991, after his fruitless marathon of meetings with the Yugoslav leaders, when he announced loudly, ‘We've got no dog in this fight’ as he left the last meeting (Glaudric, 2012, p. 74). Some observers have written that this ‘crass remark’ epitomised his decision to detach the US from all things to do with the Yugoslav crisis (Ibid).

In the beginning, the question of recognizing the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was not even really debated among US foreign policy agencies and in Congress, mainly due to the fact that the United States had been emphatically opposed to the secessions. While speaking in Yugoslavia prior to Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence, Baker stressed that European heads of state would ostracize independent republics and that the United States would definitely not recognize their independence if the republics were to secede officially from Yugoslavia as planned (New York Times, June 22, 1991). Following this announcement, President Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker were criticized extensively in the days that followed for what observers called their ‘indirect encouragement’ to the Serbian government who then deployed the Yugoslav army against Slovenia and Croatia. Bush and Baker later altered their wording, but still did not offer any support to Slovenia or Croatia (Duthel, 2008).

The Yugoslavia crisis occurred at the start of what was to become a new age in European affairs where the European Community (which would soon become the European Union after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 entered into force on November 1st 1993) was to have a much bigger responsibility in security matters; the war in Croatia
became the first real test of the post-Cold War European order — a test many say was too readily handed over to the European Community by the George H. W. Bush Administration (Glaurdic, 2012). US Secretary of State James Baker’s words encapsulate this general attitude, ‘It was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show that they could act as a unified power,’ he had stated (Baker and DeFrank, 1995, pp. 636-637). Transcripts of US Congress meetings in June 1991 describe US policy toward Yugoslavia as being ‘based on support for the interrelated objectives of democracy, dialogue, human rights, market reform and unity’ and clarifying that ‘by democracy, we mean that all citizens of Yugoslavia should enjoy democratic rights and civil liberties and be able to present themselves through free and fair elections’ (US Department of State Dispatch articles, June 3, 1991). The transcript also shows that the United States wanted disputes between republics, ethnic groups, or individuals to be resolved ‘only through peaceful means’ and that ‘[the US] would be strongly opposed to any use of force or intimidation to settle political differences, change external or internal borders, block democratic change, or impose a non-democratic unity’ (Ibid).

Though these words were spoken and written, the United States did not act accordingly. Slovenia and Croatia held peaceful, democratic elections that were later followed with democratic referendums, all before they made the decision to secede. Croatian President Franjo Tudman even attempted discussing the possibility of creating a confederation with Milosevic, where the republics would have more autonomy and be free to implement democratic reforms, but Milosevic and his government were only interested in running a Serb-dominated and non-democratic centralized state. After Slovenia and Croatia seceded, Milosevic utilized the Yugoslav army to keep first
Slovenia and then Croatia within Yugoslavia by brutal force. If one were to go by what was discussed in Congress, one would expect that the Bush administration would have recognized that the secessions were democratically and peacefully induced, that the Serb regime was trying to ‘impose a non-democratic unity’ and was using ‘force and intimidation’ in an attempt to keep the republics within the federation. This should have prompted swift condemnation of Serbian aggression and brought on deliberations of independence-recognition to the table since Slovenia and Croatia’s intentions were largely peaceful and democratic.

According to Warren Zimmerman, the last US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, one of the biggest obstacles negotiators faced was how to persuade Milosevic to forgo his violent plans without threatening him with credible US force because President Bush had made it clear that the deployment of ground forces in the former Yugoslavia was not an option (Zimmerman, 1996). ‘President Bush was very clear...that ... we’re not going to get involved in a ground war in the Balkans. We’re just not going to do it...’ Secretary Baker had said in an interview (Lino, 2006, p. 533). Since the US was not willing to get involved in the conflict, other than voicing their support for whatever the newest policy the European Community came up with, there were not many actions available to the United States to take other than the making of toothless political announcements such as the White House Statement from July 1991 which read, ‘The President deeply regrets the resumption of violent conflict in Yugoslavia’ (US Department of State Dispatch, July 2, 1991). ‘At no point before the actual declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia did Washington threaten force against either republic, against Serbia or against the Yugoslav army ...’ Ambassador Zimmermann writes (Danner, 2009, p. 275). Not
surprisingly, without the use of political threats, the US ambassador, along with the array
of Washington diplomats did not have any hope of averting the downward spiral of
Yugoslav events.

Throughout the course of 1991 and 1992 there were several initiatives raised in
Congress to alter the Administration’s policy towards the violent conflict in Yugoslavia,
but because the Bush government was firm in its stance that it only supported the
outcome of Yugoslav unity, all of these initiatives fell through leaving the US to
recognize Croatia in mid 1992, after 50 other international states had already done so
(Bekic, 2010). One vocal proponent of strong action in Yugoslavia was Democratic
Congressman Frank McCloskey who had actually been in Croatia during the war and had
witnessed firsthand the results of one of the first massacres to occur in Croatia in the
village of Vocin. McCloskey was the first congressman to utilize the term ‘genocide’5 to
depict what was occurring in Croatia at the hands of the Yugoslav army and was
extremely critical of President Bush’s refusal to get involved in the conflict and stop the
human rights abuses (Blaskovich, 1997). The US only began to refer to the gross
instances of mass murders as ‘genocide’ much later in the conflict, following the killing
of a quarter million people (Ibid). Foreign Service Officer George Kenney was another
political figure who was extremely critical of US policy (or lack thereof) towards the
Yugoslav crisis. As a sign of protest to the Bush Administration’s failure to address the
genocide in Croatia, he resigned from the US Department of State. When questioned on
reasons behind his resignation, Kenney expressed that he was frustrated and at a loss at

5 Genocide: ‘a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus. . .
Genocide represents a systematic effort over time to liquidate a national population, usually a minority . . .
[and] functions as a fundamental political policy to assure conformity and participation of the citizenry’
how despite the ‘overwhelming preponderance of evidence that Serbia was responsible for the conflict, senior officers (at the State Department) took every opportunity to find fault with Croatian ...efforts to defend themselves’ (Nordstrom and Robben, 1995, p. 191).

In response to those authors who posit that perhaps the US was reluctant to form any decisive policies because it did not possess enough information to make an informed decision, Josip Glaurdic, drawing on evidence from recently declassified documents, shows how the United States and other Western leaders undoubtedly had an astounding amount of intelligence regarding the political on-goings in Yugoslavia, which makes Bush’s ‘stubborn preference for stability and the familiar at a time of global systemic uncertainty’ even more puzzling (Glaurdic, 2012, p. 70). Glaurdic writes how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated the development of the Yugoslav crisis with stunning accuracy and how the analysis of those reports is indisputable: ‘the White House (and likely all other decision-making centres in the West, given that intelligence was normally pooled and Yugoslavia was thoroughly covered by all intelligence agencies due to its Cold-War geopolitical position) had extensive and detailed information on what was taking place in Yugoslavia’ (Glaurdic, 2012, p. 71).

The documents show that the primary instigator behind the destabilisation of the Yugoslav federation was the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic whose main goal was to create a Greater Serbia. An example of these prophesising CIA reports is one from August 1\textsuperscript{st} 1987, which reads that Yugoslavia still could either ‘revert to greater authoritarianism or collapse into instability’, primarily due to the threat from the centralist camp run by Serbia's leadership, whose ‘hidden agenda’ was to ‘use
recentralisation to re-establish its dominance over a unified Yugoslavia’ (CIA, ‘Yugoslavia: Prospects for Stability and Economic Recovery — An Intelligence Assessment’, 1 August 1987, pp. 2-4, 10). Probably the CIA’s most remarkable reports are those dated from late 1990 which are now referred to as the ‘National Intelligence Estimate’ (NIE) entitled ‘Yugoslavia Transformed’. These reports actually predicted that Yugoslavia was to cease functioning as a federal state within a year, that it would break up within two and that ‘no all-Yugoslav political movement has emerged to fill the void left by the collapse of the Titoist vision of a Yugoslav state and none will’ (CIA, ‘Yugoslavia Transformed’, 1 October 1990, pp. 1-23).

Another compelling fact arose during the Milosevic trial in The Hague where more than two hundred intercepts of Milosevic’s telephone conversations from May 1991 – May 1992 with his collaborators were provided as evidence for Milosevic’s responsibility for ethnic cleansing and overall conduct throughout the conflict (Glaudic, 2009). The Hague found that the phone conversations displayed that Milosevic and his associates crafted ‘an elaborate and very systematic series of campaigns, employing a combination of military assets and local paramilitaries’ to achieve the unification of Serbs across the republics (Time, July 15, 1995). The fact that the Tribunal received these said intercepts from none other than the UK and United States governments shows that Western intelligence services had been aware of exactly what was being planned militarily and politically as the recorded conversations were taking place and thus cannot

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6 Ethnic cleansing can be defined as a ‘systematic purge by the ethnic group exercising control over a given territory of other ethnic groups’ in an attempt to establish an ‘ethnically homogenous geographic area through the deportation or forcible displacement’ of an ethnic group labeled as ‘unwanted’ by the dominant group (Encyclopedia of Human Rights, 2009, p.164). In practice ‘individuals may be rounded up, detained, deported’ while ‘destruction of property, beatings, rape, castration and even death’ also occur en masse (Ibid).
logically hide behind claims of lack of information or belief that all parties were equally guilty.

In September of 1991, President Bush released another statement that called upon the Serbian military leaders to ‘renounce the illegitimate use of force and to embrace the principles... [of] the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes’ but once again did not follow up this statement with any possible policy implementations, apparently putting full faith in Lord Carrington’s negotiations and draft writing to halt the violence (US Department of State Dispatch, September 2, 1991). Ambassador Warren Zimmermann explains that during the first few months of war between Croatia and the Yugoslav army, ‘the US government did not [even] consider the use of force ... The issue arose for the first time ... in the autumn of 1991. The catalyst was the Yugoslav army’s shelling of the Croatian city of Dubrovnik ...However, [after being consulted] the Defense Department and US Military argued against the use of force, as they were to do consistently thereafter’ (Lino, 2006, p. 534). Speaking to this policy of non-intervention, David Hamburg writes that in a globalizing world ‘local conflicts are everyone's business because they have implications far beyond their local circumstances’ (Hamburg, 2002, p. 365). He argues that there should be a feeling of ‘international obligation to intervene proactively’ and that states should realize that ‘doing nothing is not a cost-free strategy, but that it oftentimes entails a more costly reactive involvement as well as the loss of international legitimacy’ (Hamburg, 2002, pp. 56-57).

Transcripts from United States Congress proceedings are filled with references to the US’ commitment to the respect of human rights within Yugoslavia, while also commenting on the fact that though ‘many parties have contributed to Yugoslavia's
instability, the leadership of the Serbian Republic and the Yugoslav military bear a particular and growing responsibility for the country's tragic descent toward civil war,’ and that it was evident that the Yugoslav army had not been ‘serving as an impartial guarantor of a cease-fire [but] instead... have been actively supporting local Serbian forces violating the cease-fire and causing loss of life to the citizens they are constitutionally bound to protect’ (Department of State Dispatch, September 02, 1991). Lawyer Catherine MacKinnon has written extensively on her difficulty to accept US policy towards Croatia during the war because of the United States’ stated dedication to the concept of human rights was not put into practice when it was evident that instances of human rights abuses of all sorts were occurring in alarming measures across the former Yugoslavia. She has investigated and written about the abuses of women’s rights in Croatia and Bosnia and the Serbian strategy of using rape and rape camps as an instrument of war and ethnic cleansing and argues that ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a euphemism for genocide. Furthermore, in the Yugoslav wars it was used as a ‘policy of ethnic extermination of non-Serbs with the aim of [getting] all Serbs in one nation,’ — in a ‘Greater Serbia’ (MacKinnon, 1994, p. 8).

MacKinnon finds it incomprehensible how the Bush Administration (and then later Clinton’s) could construct this war of aggression (defined so because it was not between advancing and retreating armies) as something bilateral, as a civil war. She questions whether the US diplomats were aware that by referring to it as a ‘civil war’ it covered-up and obscured the role of Belgrade in invading Croatia and committing genocidal acts in the process. She clarifies that a civil war is not an invasion by another country. If the war in Croatia had indeed been a civil war, the aggression would have
been mutual and the genocide reciprocal (Ibid). However, she points to the fact that Croatians were not ‘advancing and retreating into and out of Serbia’, they were not ‘carrying out genocide against Serbs on their own territories,’ and additionally, there were no concentration camps for Serbs in Zagreb (MacKinnon, 1994, p. 10). She maintains strongly that the term ‘civil war’ translates in all languages as ‘not my problem’ and that in construing the crisis in Croatia as a civil war, the United States and Europe ‘defined it in terms of what it [had] been willing to do about it’ (MacKinnon, 1994, p. 11).

**Recognition**

As much as US President Bush and his aides may have hoped for a settlement of disputes to occur, negotiations collapsed in late 1991 when Serbia rejected Lord Carrington’s proposals and ceased all willing participation in the European Community’s ‘Conference on Yugoslavia’ deliberations. The Bush Administration finally began to question whether it was rational to expect the Yugoslav army ever to be able to peacefully preserve the federation’s unity. In December when Germany announced its plans to recognize Croatia and Slovenia before Christmas, President Bush was quoted saying he disagreed with the German decision because the Yugoslav situation was ‘fraught with danger’ and that the United States was waiting to see a ‘peaceful evolution’, which was an interesting comment to make considering Serbian aggression had been occurring non-stop since the summer of 1991 and it had been Milosevic who had refused to continue negotiations with Lord Carrington (*The Ottawa Citizen*, 16 Dec, 1991).
By the spring of 1992, months after the EC had recognized Croatia and Slovenia, most US analysts and diplomats had given up their hope of seeing Yugoslavia staying intact. When it became apparent that the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia would be vital to the strengthening of stability in the Balkans, President Bush and his administration abandoned their policy of only seeking Yugoslav unity and released a statement saying that, ‘The United States recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign and independent states and will begin immediate consultations to establish full diplomatic relations...We acknowledge the peaceful and democratic expression of the will of citizens of these states for sovereignty’ (Presidential Documents, April 7, 1992).

This turn of events shows that Jonathan Paquin is correct in arguing that the United States should be seen as a ‘stability-seeking power which always supports the integrity of the central states facing secessionist crises as long as they can guarantee the stability of their international borders’ (Paquin, 2010, p. 6). His other contention proves true for the case of Croatia as well: that should a situation arise when a supported central state becomes unwilling or unable to preserve the stability of its borders and then refuses to hold discussions with secessionist leaders, that is when the US will alter its policy to recognize the secessionist state — but only if the secessionist can exhibit its capability to maintain stability (Ibid).
Conclusion

This chapter looked at certain policy choices and statements that were made by the United States government during the early part of the Croatian war up until the Bush Administration changed its stance on only accepting a unified Yugoslavia and gave diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Croatia. It was seen how the United States was initially very firm in its stance of supporting the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and how it took a very minimalistic approach to the conflict, giving full reins of policy making to the European Community. The Bush Administration defended this choice by saying that the Yugoslav crisis provided the EC (who was looking to play a bigger unified role in security matters) an indispensible opportunity to prove its capabilities. Although several initiatives calling for intervention and the recognition of the republic were raised in Congress after the Yugoslav army invaded Croatian territory, they were not seriously considered until late December of 1991 when the EC announced that it would be recognizing the independence of Croatia in January of 1992.

The chapter that follows is two-part. The first is an analysis of the UK and US policy choices towards Croatia from the time of Croatia’s declaration of secession until mid 1992 and looks at possible reasons why particular Western approaches were taken and considers rationales explaining why others were not. The final part of the chapter contemplates the ability of the realist and constructivist IR theories to speak to the unraveling of UK and US foreign policy towards the war, while also reflecting on each IR theory’s capability to do so.
Chapter Five: Analysis

This chapter contains two sections. The primary part is an analysis of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy towards Croatia from the onset of war in 1991 until its recognition of the Croatian republic in 1992, which is followed by an analysis of the United States policy choices towards Croatia during the same time period. Both analyses consider possible reasoning behind the approaches selected by political actors of UK and US governments, while offering suggestions why alternative tactics were not utilized.

The second component of the chapter considers the capabilities of the realist and constructivist International Relations theories to address the development of UK and US foreign policy towards Croatia from the onset of the conflict until the point whereby both nations had extended diplomatic recognition to the secessionist republic. During this exercise, the limitations of the realist and constructivist approaches to explain the progression of events are also deliberated.

United Kingdom

Numerous theories and explanations have been offered to explain why certain policy decisions were made by the United Kingdom in response to the Republic of Croatia’s declaration of independence from the Yugoslav federation. Some scholars like Sabrina Ramet, describe the post-Yugoslav studies as being mostly divided between two groups: those who have chosen the moral universalist perspective, maintaining that there are universal norms in international politics, founded in Universal Reason and articulated in international covenants such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and those
who reject the universalist premise and instead support a certain version of moral relativism (Ramet, 2005, p. 1). The scholars holding a moral universalist perspective are inclined to argue that claims of state sovereignty should not be taken as absolute and that a government’s legitimacy should be correlated to its adherence and treatment of basic human rights, while authors siding with the type of moral relativist philosophy Ramet refers to in her writings hold state sovereignty as the ultimate principle and dismiss addresses to ethics which would substantiate external intervention (Cohen, 1995; Ramet, 2005, p. 2; Woodward, 1995).

Despite the popularity of the two camps in literature after the Yugoslav wars, it was neither a universalist nor moral relativist text that was the most significant influencer of the general reading public in the UK and the West; this book, Balkan Ghosts by Richard Kaplan, is one which Ramet describes as a ‘sand castle’ that advances the ‘myth of ancient hatreds’ and ‘lack[s] any sturdy foundations’ (Ramet, 2005, pp. 2-3). Although the rationalizations Kaplan employs ‘crumple at first touch’, the book definitely made an impression on leaders such as Prime Minister John Major who on numerous occasions uttered statements such as, ‘The biggest single element behind what has happened [in Croatia and Bosnia] is...the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia,’ implying Kaplan’s main contention that the people of the Balkans are just uncommonly tempestuous and essentially predisposed to aggression and war (Saha and Bangura, 2006, p. 2).

7 For further elaborations regarding the misconception that Balkan ‘ethnic hatreds’ are to blame for the violence and dissolution of Yugoslavia see Anzulovic (1999), Gagnon (2006) and Ramet (2005).
This rationalization of supposed ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ was reiterated by numerous other Western politicians and done, according to many observers, partly to excuse their failure in steering Yugoslavia peacefully into post-Cold War Europe and partly to lessen the expectations and responsibility the international community may have placed on them to do so (Saha and Bangura, 2006, p. 2). This rationalization is undoubtedly what led the UK Foreign Office to fall back on historical deterministic assertions when the scarcity of any decision-making competence became unquestionably evident (Rydgren, 2007). By painting Yugoslavia as a place where people were simply inclined to war with each other, diplomats and officials of the United Kingdom were able to take a less active role in mediating the conflict (and not fall under extreme public scrutiny) because the war could be interpreted (using pseudo-academic rationalizations) as something unmanageable and inevitable (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 247).

One also finds plenty of apologist explanations peppered throughout sources such as the words of Sir Percy Cradock, previous chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee as well as the former foreign policy adviser to the United Kingdom prime minister. Sir Cradock explains that observers should take into account that foreign policy at the time of the Yugoslav dissolution was intensely affected by the other major happenings in the international arena such as the Persian Gulf war, the end of the Cold War which led to the dissolving Soviet Union and the unification of Germany, et cetera: ‘Policy recommendations were made by overstretched advisers working at breakneck speed and digested by leaders under even greater stress. This meant a dependence on idées recues, drafts on a dwindling intellectual capital amassed years before,’ he emphasises (Cradock, 1997, p. 35).
Sir Peter Hall, United Kingdom’s ambassador in Belgrade at the time of the conflict, echoes this sentiment saying that it was this dependence that led John Major’s government — as well as the administrations of other Western leaders — to construct their policies regarding Yugoslavia on the idée reçue that the crumbling federation had to remain unified at all costs (Glarudic, 2012, p. 73). These accounts do hold sway when one considers the United Kingdom’s reaction towards the announcement of Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia — it was not considered a welcome piece of news at all. Though not explicitly stated, Prime Minister John Major and his diplomats were most likely not thrilled at the prospect of adding yet another international crisis to their negotiation table discussions. These feelings were perhaps just one of reasons why the UK and Lord Carrington pushed so relentlessly for the Yugoslav federation to stay united.

It is interesting to take note of the numerous authors who have commented on the correlation between the UK’s policy choices towards the proceedings of the Soviet Union and those that were occurring in Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia. In both cases, the United Kingdom vocalized persistently its firm preference for the USSR and Yugoslavia to remain intact. Similar to the United Kingdom’s response to the Serbian regime’s violence towards the newly seceded Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, the UK’s reaction to eruptions of aggression in the Soviet Union in the early 1990s varied from ‘complete silence to muted ambivalence’ (Glaurdic, 2012, p. 74). If anything, these responses at least illustrate that there did exist some form of consistency in the UK’s foreign policy towards dissolving states, secessionist republics and campaigns of violence in the early 1990s; the UK government was either too preoccupied with other policy decisions to
become more involved in the Croatian war, or else recognition of new states was simply not a priority.

Other rationales offered by several diplomats and officials of the United Kingdom and EC for not recognizing Croatia’s declaration of independence in 1991 was that they did not wish to discount the inviolability of Yugoslavian state borders, due to the fact that the UK and EC were firm supporters of the Westphalian system and its principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states (Caplan, 2005). Meier finds this explanation quite dubious when he considers how Western politicians later felt ‘quite free to interfere unabashedly in the internal affairs of the Yugoslav successor states’ (Meier, 1999, p. 221). During the war in Croatia, government administrators repeatedly stated that they hoped and expected Milosevic and Tudman to hold their own negotiations and come to their own peaceful solutions without threats of violence. One can appreciate such political statements, but only until the point when the Serbian regime dispatched the Yugoslav Army as a de facto Serbian Army in attempts to keep the Croatian republic within the federation by violence and force. When a government begins massacring its own citizens, surely enquiries about its legitimacy and stability must be raised along with questions of continued support for such a regime. The United Kingdom however, practised an outstandingly rigid and consistent policy from even before the war commenced, up until the following year, of determinedly supporting Yugoslavian unity and rejecting Slovenia’s and Croatia’s requests for recognition, while at the same time avoiding to label the Serbian government as the aggressor and looking to placate Milosevic by extracting concessions from the weaker Croatian side (Glaurdic, 2012).
The United Kingdom’s continued insistence on its support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia becomes at least somewhat questionable when one considers the fact that British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd announced with assurance to the House of Commons in July of 1991 — a few weeks after Croatia’s declaration of independence that ‘The old [Yugoslav] system is in an advanced state of decay and cannot survive... [it is] past saving. I am sure that that is true’ (House of Commons, July 3, 1991). He went on to state that ‘Yugoslavia's problems cannot be resolved by force and further military action will lead inevitably to widespread bloodshed. The army cannot hold Yugoslavia together in this way. Indeed, it has accelerated its disintegration...it is...hard to see how the dismemberment of Yugoslavia could be brought about by peaceful means’ (House of Commons, July 3, 1991).

Sir Gerald Kaufman, another UK diplomat added that, ‘There can be no justification for the Yugoslav Army to take action unless in response to a clear and immediate military threat, which plainly does not exist...Unilateral action amounts to a military putsch and cannot be labelled a restoration of order’ (House of Commons, July 3, 1991). When one contemplates that such sensible sentiments had been articulated in the UK House of Commons so soon after Croatia’s secession and then compares these words with the policies that were actually implemented — such as the three month moratorium, the arms embargo and even the futile pursuit of Lord Carrington to appease Milosevic’s territorial demands for months on end while thousands of people perished — one is understandably led to wonder about the other influences and forces that existed in policy-makers’ minds.
One such concern that is said to have kept the United Kingdom from extending diplomatic recognition to Croatia and Slovenia in early summer of 1991 was the UK’s worry that if it were to recognize Croatia and Slovenia’s independence, new republics would begin popping up all over Europe, also requesting global recognition. UK government officials identified that these potential republics would come from the dissolving USSR, but other authors have suggested convincingly that it was not only the USSR that the UK was thinking about. James Gow writes that the United Kingdom’s government was interpreting the Yugoslav crisis through its own historical lenses and saw what was happening in Croatia as something akin to what the UK was experiencing/had experienced with Northern Ireland (Gow, 1997, p. 306). Thus, it is conceivable that the UK’s reluctance to promptly accept Croatia’s secession could have been in some part caused by the notion that doing so might aggravate domestic disputes and possibly result in Prime Minister Major losing potential votes in upcoming elections.

One of the reasons Croatian President Franjo Tudman wished to gain international recognition for the republic was because he hoped that when Croatia was considered sovereign it could count on at least the theoretical protection of the international community in the face of Serbian hostilities. This is also said to have been another motive in the UK’s unwillingness to recognize Croatia; the Major government did not want this probable financial and military weight (Meir, 1995, p. 226). As Brendan Simms writes, the UK and the EC had absolutely ‘no stomach for the additional financial burden resulting from a rigorous defense against aggression’ (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 75). Though this stance was the predominant one, there were opposing voices in the House of Commons such as politician David Howell’s who argued that, ‘It is absolutely
vital to ensure, in all the encouragement and support that we give, that the bloodshed is at least limited. We must show that our minds are on the ability of these independent democratic republics to come together in their own freely formed confederation or federation, rather than being ruled by a bankrupt and out-of-date dictatorship’ (House of Commons, Jul 3, 1991). Unfortunately voices like his were in the minority and were not heeded until months later.

While there are many observers who feel that there were objective strategic interests among Western leaders to evade any obvious signs of force in the settling of European challenges, some authors feel that the approach of the United Kingdom towards Croatia revealed something more than straightforward indifference (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996, p. 271). They maintain that the intensity and frequency of pro-Serbian propaganda among well-identifiable groups, proposed the existence of an element other than sheer apathy or lack of will to get involved (Ibid). Carole Hodge informs how British Serb sympathies are not of modern origin and shows how UK support for the Serbians can be traced at least to the 1870s (Hodge, 2006, p. 3). She writes about the large Serb émigré population in Britain and how many became politically active during the war in Croatia, significantly influencing the UK parliament and the media (Ibid). Many observers noted how the UK Foreign Office for example, displayed a strong pro-Serb bias in its proceedings and how it, along with Prime Minister Major and Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd exuded the impression that possessing one strong ‘partner’ in the Balkans was much more desirable than acquiring several weaker ones (Simms, 2003). British journalist Michael Sheridan also found similar sentiments being expressed and wrote in his article that what ‘successive British envoys in Belgrade [are asserting] is that
without a strong Serbia, there will be no stability in the Balkans’ (*Independent*, 3 June, 1995).

The UK’s pro-Serb bias is not all that surprising when one considers how Serbian people were well-entrenched in diplomatic corps, how they enjoyed solidly established commercial and financial associations with the United Kingdom, in addition to the substantial professional connections that were present among the militaries of both states, with the Yugoslavian army consisting of 70 per cent ethnic Serbs (Hodge, 2003, p. 2). Prior to the onset of hostilities, there was a great deal of cooperation between the UK and Yugoslavia, carried out mostly through Belgrade, so there existed a great deal of familiarity in a variety of arenas between the Serbian elite and the UK. Thus, when the crisis arose, many UK professionals and government officials aligned themselves ideologically with Serbia’s policy, some perhaps believing that Milosevic was looking to preserve the socialist system, while others did so because they disliked the notion of having to foster brand new political and economic connections with fledgling nation states (Hodge, 2003, p. 2).

Numerous writings can be found describing the different ways Serbophilia is ‘rooted in the Foreign Office's psyche’ and how for the most part, the foreign policy of the United Kingdom appeared to be solely concerned with ‘protecting’ the Serbs (*The Guardian*, April 14, 2010). As was shown from the negotiations in the House of Commons, there did exist a struggling minority of officials who sought policy action to stop the Serbian offensive but were consistently opposed by Prime Minister Major, defence secretary Malcolm Rifkind and Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, who for some reason perceived Slobodan Milosevic's regime as the successor of Tito's partisan
tradition, when in reality it was what destroyed it (The Guardian, April 14, 2010). The variety of sources detailing the United Kingdom's political aid to the Serbian Administration during the Croatian war, suggest that the Major government went through great lengths to placate Milosevic, thereby giving him space to accomplish his aim of constructing an ethnically cleansed ‘Greater Serbia’ at the cost of Croatian lands and lives (Ibid).

It appears as though a number of UK men who held influential positions during the conflict, such as Lord Carrington — the chosen EC agent for Yugoslav negotiations — were well acquainted with Serbians in high positions and were thus very sympathetic to Serbian perspectives, such as ones from Serb Crown Prince Alexander living in London, with whom Lord Carrington was good friends (Meier, 1999, p. 229). Many criticized Lord Carrington arguing that his European plan did nothing but consecrate the triumph of Serbian ethnic cleaning in Croatia (Julliard, 1994). As Carrington himself writes, the original concept of the EC negotiations had been that recognition would be granted only within the framework of a broad arrangement to which all parties agreed; recognition therefore was considered the UK’s and EC’s ultimate instrument — the one to keep the parties engaged in the arbitration process (Carrington, 1992, p. 2). But as observers have shown, the logic of this method was flawed; ‘the approach assumed that the interest of all parties had in recognition was symmetrical’, when in fact, it was anything but (Caplan, 2005, pp. 108-109). While it was in Croatia’s interest to attain global recognition, it was conversely in Serbia’s interest to deny them it, while also pursuing to capture from Croatia more and more territorial concessions (Ibid). It was evident that Milosevic took full advantage of Carrington’s accommodating nature and
kept stalling negotiations so the JNA troops would have more time to capture additional Croatian territory. When the Serbs had control over one-third of de facto Croatian land, Milosevic pulled out of negotiations and rejected the Carrington Plan, knowing that his gains and the altered borders would then be consolidated. He then began to devise strategies for these mini-Serb states within Croatia to declare themselves autonomous so he could incorporate them into Serbia.

Another influential UK diplomat who was very involved in the Yugoslav crisis and whose attitude towards Croatian recognition was reluctant and negative was UK Foreign Minister Hurd. He also was considered by many to be too cozy with Serbian President Milosevic during the conflict proceedings and dismissed or discouraged fellow diplomats, such as Ken Livingstone, when they questioned his and the UK government’s ‘unsympathetic response’ to Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations by saying things like, ‘I am very anxious that we should not exaggerate what we can do or pretend that we in Western Europe can substitute for a lack of will for peace in Yugoslavia itself. When they are ready for peace, we can help monitor it’ (Hodge, 2006, p. 9; House of Commons, July 3, 1991). The problem with such a statement should be apparent to any observer who is cognizant that Slovenia and Croatia did not leave their borders to conquer additional territory; they had attempted Yugoslavian reform through negotiations but Milosevic would not cooperate. Hurd’s flaw was that he grouped all Yugoslav republics together as if they all behaved in the same manner. Slovenia and Croatia, in contrast to Serbia, had had no desire for war (Ramet, 2006, p. 398).

At the House of Commons, politician Jim Sillars who was not comfortable with the UK policy towards the two republics began his speech by requesting ‘some honesty
for the record’ and then asked Hurd if he could ‘acknowledge [the fact] that the people of
Slovenia and Croatia ... have attempted... adjustment[s] by peaceful reform through the
ballot box and that the only reason for the present violence is that the Yugoslav Army
prefers the bullet’ (House of Commons, July 3, 1991). Hurd characteristically gave a
broad, noncommittal response saying what the UK ‘need[ed was] to keep the matter
under constant review’ (Ibid). Suspicions of Hurd’s pro-Serb bias were confirmed when
at Milosevic’s Hague trial, Hurd’s name was also disclosed among the lengthy list of
Western leaders and politicians who were willing to bargain with Milosevic during the
Yugoslav crisis, even after he and his government were labelled the aggressors (The
Telegraph, July 1, 2001). At his trail it was argued that Foreign Secretary Hurd and Lord
Carrington negotiated peace deals that were designed to keep Milosevic in power, despite
his record (Ibid). What is more is that Hurd was found to have played a vital part in
‘shoring up Slobodan Milosevic in power by mediating a billion-dollar privatisation deal
which provided the indicted war criminal with his war chest...’ (The Guardian, July 2,
2001).

Yet another factor that has been said to have influenced the UK’s foreign policy
towards Croatia was its claimed dedication to act in unison with the rest of the EC and its
fixation on keeping the newly unified Germany’s power in check. As Adrian Hastings
from Leeds University stated at the time, ‘The [UK] Foreign Office remains farcically
preoccupied with maintaining a ‘balance of power’ in central Europe and ‘containing’
Germany’ (Hastings, 1993). UK distrust and apprehension over the progression of
European unification combined to create a dominant pro-Serbian foreign policy and was
coupled with what certain authors refer to as the ‘customary British obsession over the
maintenance of international borders’ (Ibid). The United Kingdom was accused of utilizing the Yugoslav crisis as a stepping-stone to enforce its own vision of European politics ... (Ibid). As Hodge writes, ‘strategic factors...assumed a new relevance’ for the United Kingdom due to its mighty concerns that Germany’s reunification spelled a likely ‘concomitant diminution of British influence’ (Hodge, 2006, p. 2). This in turn caused the Foreign Office to figure that Yugoslavia, with the third largest army in Europe, would be a fantastic medium through which to preserve the United Kingdom’s influence in South Eastern Europe (Ibid). Observers criticized how the UK appeared to be more concerned with ‘outmanoeuvring’ the Germans or whatever other nation brought up the question of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia earlier, than with actually ‘solving real issues on the ground’ (Glaudric, 2012, p. 70). How this played out in reality was that questions of conflict resolution that were extremely time sensitive were not addressed and solved in a manner that is fit for foreign policy makers at the verge of the twenty-first century.

Questions about why the UK’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations supported the Serbian-requested and UN-imposed arms embargo in late September of 1991 are interesting ones to consider. Of course, there are the rationalizations given by spokesmen and diplomats and then there are the critical observances of onlookers of the conflict who interpret the proceedings differently than they are narrated. The popular reason provided by UK politicians was that the arms embargo would help douse the conflict and would lessen the length and severity of the war. In the House of Commons, politician Roger Knapman asked Foreign Secretary Douglas Hogg if he agreed that ‘from the Croatian point of view the United Nations arms embargo is merely a reinforcement of the current position, which means that the federal troops — in reality the Serbian troops
— have hundreds of tanks, guns and aeroplanes, while the Croatians have only a motley variety of small arms? Is not there a danger that the Serbians will advance village by village and slaughter the majority of the Croatian population?’ (House of Commons, October 14, 1991).

Foreign Secretary Hogg, answered like many other UK representatives at the time, vaguely, indirectly and dismissively: ‘....we would not advance the cause of peace in that part of the Balkans by introducing more weaponry. There is a great deal of weaponry already there. I would not urge the House, or, indeed, anyone else, to import arms into Croatia’ (Ibid). As can be seen, Hogg did not even address Knapman’s points on the asymmetric impact the embargo would have on Croatia and what that meant for Croatian civilians. Scholars such as Viktor Meier and Branimir Anzulovic hold that the UK and EC had been expecting a quick Serbian victory from the onset of the war and since they were hoping for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia to stay intact, they found it ‘extremely inconvenient’ that Croatia was somehow managing to hold its ground and defend its borders and towns (Meier, 1999, p. 230). The embargo was then blanketed over Yugoslavia they argue, to lock into place Serbia’s militarily superior position in hopes that this would ensure the reunification of Yugoslavia, albeit by force (Anzulovic, 1999).

Anzulovic goes further saying that since the UK and EC had failed at preventing the outbreak of war, they could have ‘impeded its spread by letting the Croats defeat the aggressor instead of restraining them with the arms embargo and other measures’ (Anzulovic, 1999, p. 169). He, like many others believe that if the pan-Serbian ambitions had been properly dealt with at the onset of hostilities, the catastrophe of Bosnia could
have been avoided because it had been common knowledge at the time that if left unchecked, Milosevic’s campaign of a Greater Serbia would surely bring the war to Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the war there would be even more destructive (Ibid). Showing how pervasive the foreboding really was, an American reporter wrote in early 1992, ‘It has become a cliché of Yugoslavia’s collapse that the war in Croatia, where about 10,000 people have been killed and more than 600,000 made homeless is but a prelude for the unspeakable butchery that could come in Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (Ibid).

Seeing how blatantly obvious to everyone the inequality and unfairness of the Yugoslav-wide embargo was — without hindsight — it is unfortunate that other statesmen and diplomats were willing to accept the flawed and incomplete rationale that came with it. ‘We had no strategic interest in the Balkans, no commercial interest, no selfish interest at all. We simply wished that quiet should return’, is what British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd later maintained (Glaurdic, 2012, p. 75). However, judging the performance of the United Kingdom and its EC partners convinced many to conclude that what the foreign policy makers actually believed was that ‘quiet’ meant having the stronger party win; as one diplomat observed of the negotiating strategy: ‘There was always a certain tendency of pressuring the weaker party because the stronger party didn’t budge’ (Ibid).

When Milosevic rejected yet another of Carrington’s drafts for a resolution to the conflict and then ceased to even respond to any calls for additional negotiations in November of 1991, the UK realized that they needed to re-evaluate their end goal, because it did not seem likely that any semblance of a Yugoslavia would be able to be lawfully arranged. In the House of Commons politician Patrick Cormack voiced such concerns, when he said, ‘...when no real progress is made, the time comes for
reassessment and it seems to me that that time is now. Like many....I followed with a mixture of admiration and exasperation Lord Carrington's attempts to negotiate a proper ceasefire, but watched with mounting anger the callous disregard for life....something more must be done to identify the aggressor and to hold him to account’ (House of Commons, Dec 12, 1991). He went on to say that ‘the great majority of acts of wanton wickedness have been perpetrated by the forces of a state that has, by all normal criteria, forfeited its right to be recognised as a sovereign independent nation’ and that the time had come for the UK to ‘stop acting as an honest broker between victim and aggressor’ because the ‘evidence of responsibility for the carnage and destruction is too overwhelming to be ignored’ (House of Commons, Dec 12, 1991).

In addition to this, the UK had to acknowledge that Croatia had successfully fulfilled the requirements the EC had set in order for it to be eligible for recognition and that it had become clear that the ‘desire for independence on the part of Croatia was too strong to be countered indefinitely’ (Caplan, 2005, p. 48). This, coupled with an ever-growing flow of Croatian refugees that the UK had to process led the Major government to look more yieldingly at the prospect of a sovereign Croatian republic (Woodward, 1992). In the end, even after the EC members agreed that Croatia would be recognized in January of 1992, the UK still harboured some reluctance to part with the idea of the dissolution of Yugoslavia; what is said to have convinced the UK to go through with the granting of recognition was Germany’s determination for the EC to deliver on their side of the agreement. The agreement was that that when the Badinter Commission confirmed that Croatia and Slovenia had met the conditions set out by the EC and was deemed
cooperative during negotiations, they would be extended the diplomatic recognition they sought.

United States

In mid 1991, when Croatian President Franjo Tudman and his administration were preparing for the referendum that would determine whether or not the people of Croatia wished to remain a republic within Yugoslavia or to seek independence, the United States reacted with disapproval and vocalized its preference for a united Yugoslavia and the certain refusal of recognition any secessionist states from the federation would face. This reaction was due to the fact that the US believed the Yugoslav crisis threatened to destabilize the continent at a time when Europe was attempting to adjust to the transformation brought on by the end of the Cold War (Pavlowitch, 1994, p. 212). US President George H. W Bush’s announced that the new enemies that the Western alliance had to gather to face were ‘unpredictability’ and ‘instability’ — and Yugoslavia’s disintegration was seen to fall under both headings (Beschloss and Talbott, 1993, p. 192).

Many reasons why the United States showed opposition to the notion of separate republics closely mirrored the existing worries in the United Kingdom regarding the consequences of a possible Soviet breakup. As one State Department official told the US congressmen who were arguing for the Bush Administration to act in favour of Croatia and Slovenia responded saying, ‘Don't make a big deal about them. The Serbs are trying to hold the country together... Don't break up [Yugoslavia] because [people in] the Soviet Union will use it as a model’ (Almond, 1994, p. 45). Such rationale gives some insight as to why despite the disturbing information increasingly coming in from Croatia was
usually not addressed properly in the US — it simply did not fit the framework the US was adhering to and it went against the predominant administration stance of supporting the status quo. Thus, it is not surprising that Croatia’s elections and subsequent referendum were perceived by the Department of State as more of threat than an improvement of reforms and democratization as one would expect (Glaurdic, 2011, p. 81). President Bush continued stressing that the US strongly wanted the solution to the Yugoslavian crisis to come from peaceful negotiations — as if the only solution that could be derived from negotiations was unity (US Department of State Dispatch articles, June 3, 1991). What Bush clearly meant however, is that Yugoslavian unity was the only ‘solution’ the US was willing to accept.

Transcripts from Congress show that the US also wished for ‘all citizens of Yugoslavia [to] enjoy democratic rights and civil liberties and be able to present themselves through free and fair elections’ (Ibid). Again, as in the aforementioned statement about the US calling for peaceful settlements (interpreted to mean peaceful settlements that result in Yugoslav unity) this declaration expressing US wishes for Yugoslavians to have access to ‘fair and free elections’ was also meant to be interpreted as ‘elections that call for unity’. These Congressional statements (and others like them) have to be interpreted in this manner because if the US statements were actually to be understood directly, the Bush Administration would have had a completely different approach to Croatia because they were fully aware that prior to the democratic elections and referendums held, Slovenia and Croatia had already attempted on numerous occasions to engage Milosevic and the Serbian government in talks about the restructuring of Yugoslavia to allow for more transparency and democracy — but the
image of a democratic Yugoslavia, comprised of autonomous republics was not one that was desired by Serbia.

Another inconsistency that was found with regards to US policy statements and following policy conduct was the assertion that the US would be ‘strongly opposed to any use of force or intimidation to settle political differences, change external or internal borders, block democratic change, or impose a non-democratic unity’ (US Department of State Dispatch articles, June 3, 1991). Even before Croatian President Franjo Tudman had reacted to the referendum results on the question of independence, the Los Angeles Times wrote, ‘Serbia has vowed to resist with all of its force any attempt by Croatia to leave the federation’ (Los Angeles Times, June 22, 1991). That same article had Secretary of State James A. Baker warning that should Croatia and Slovenia secede, Western leaders would definitely ostracize the new independent republics (Ibid). Considering what was said in Congress about force and intimidation and then Milosevic’s threatened use of force against Croatia, Baker’s menacing comment directed towards Slovenia and Croatia was misplaced to say the least. On this matter Anzulovic writes that it should all be about elementary logic: ‘One does not prevent wars by assuring the potential aggressor that his victims would not receive any support’ (Anzulovic, 1999, p. 168).

When Croatia and Slovenia did in fact secede, the US policy did not deviate from its pre-referendum stance. When the Yugoslav Army started the war, the Bush Administration transferred global management and mediation efforts to the eager Europeans on the grounds that the Yugoslav crisis was a ‘European problem’ and that the emergency in the Balkans was the ‘perfect opportunity’ to show how well the European Community could handle European affairs. As Secretary Baker elaborated, ‘The
Europeans wanted the lead diplomatically because the United States had been dominant for the preceding three years or so on the world scene. And the United States was more than happy to give it to them ...’ (Lino, 2006, p. 533). As is known, the war in Croatia coincided with the end of the Cold War and while Yugoslavia was important to the United States when Soviet threats were high, after the superpower rivalry dwindled, Yugoslavia lost its significance to US security interests and, therefore its general value among US foreign policy priorities declined drastically (Liang-Fenton, 2004). The United States’ Yugoslavia policy shifted from accommodating Tito’s socialist system to a less significant, non-committal policy of promoting unity, democracy and human rights and economic reforms (Ibid).

Another reason for the United States’ unwillingness to consider Croatian independence in 1991 was similar to that of the UK. It had also invested billions to support Yugoslavia as it developed political institutions detached from those of the Soviet Union. Through this arrangement, numerous diplomats from United States served in Belgrade from the 1950s on (Council of American Ambassadors, 2008). When the war broke out in Croatia, these US politicians who had served in Belgrade naturally became supporters of the US policy of keeping Yugoslavia together, mostly one thinks, because of the familiarity they had with the system and the decades-old professional connections they held fostered with Serbian officials in Belgrade. A politician that especially exemplifies this scenario was Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.

Eagleburger was arguably one of the most vociferous and influential US opponents of recognizing Croatian independence. He had served in Yugoslavia on two separate occasions — first as second secretary (1962-1965) and then as popular US
ambassador in Belgrade from 1977 to 1981 (Meir, 1999, p. 41). Eagleburger was a fierce advocate of Milosevic and saw him as a reform communist (LeBor, 2004, p. 110). Their friendship was known to have extended well past the customary diplomatic practices (Ibid). President Bush and Secretary of State Baker relied very heavily upon Eagleburger’s recommendations on how to approach the war in Croatia and the dealings with Serbia due to Eagleburger’s ‘well-tested relationship’ with Milosevic (Almond, 1994, p. 44).

Eagleburger’s ties with Serbia were both political and economic: as Eagleburger was President of Henry Kissinger Associates (a US consultancy which provided world strategic and economic advice) he had substantial contracts with numerous Yugoslav companies such as Yugo America (where he was on the Board of Directors) (Karadjis, 2000, p. 28). Yugo America, which was owned by Zavodi Crvena Zastava, was the main producer of Serbian weapons and also a client of Kissinger Associates. Likely reasons for Eagleburger’s negative attitude towards Croatian independence are given in an article that states that, ‘Since the late 1970s...Washington sources [state that] Kissinger Associates [(where Eagleburger was chairman and CEO) has] channelled hundreds of millions of dollars in private US investments into Yugoslavia. By sheer coincidence, most of it was made after Eagleburger served as American ambassador to Belgrade’ (The World of Sunday, April 25, 1992). The article goes on to say that Kissinger risked his reputation by directing clients to ‘invest heavily in Yugoslavia where his connections were excellent’ (Ibid). The resulting conflict of interest is evident: since Kissinger Associates had advised several of their clients to invest heavily in Yugoslavia, Eagleburger could not allow Yugoslavia to break up since that would inevitably lead to
war and economic chaos, severely endangering Kissinger-directed investment (Skoric, 2001). Milosevic knew all about these said investments since he was Eagleburger’s main liaison in Yugoslavia; and many believe this knowledge most likely allowed Milosevic to effectively blackmail the United States into almost conceding Serbia’s aggression.

It is important to note that the US State Department and the White House were in ‘stark contrast to the prevailing opinions in the US Congress’ (Glaudric, 2011, p. 246). One particular speech Senator Al Gore made later in the war reflected the kind of concerns and initiatives that were being brought up with more and more frequency in the US Congress after Serbian hostilities intensified in Croatia. Gore and other congressmen beseeched the State Department to make a ‘dramatic change of course’ — meaning, to cease US insistence for a continuance of a unified Yugoslavia; Gore declared, ‘Yugoslavia was created... and valued by us as a barrier to the Soviet aggression. It no longer reflects the concept of self-determination, but rather the reappearance of imperialism in all its arrogance. It no longer serves any geostrategic purpose for us. On the contrary it is now the breeding ground for troubles that will plague the United States for another generation...’ (US Congress Statements, Oct 25, 1991).

Despite such sentiments being vocalized, when Eagleburger met with the Yugoslav ambassador, Eagleburger acknowledged that although the Bush Administration had information of Milosevic’s strategy for a greater Serbia, it still had no plan of punishing Serbia with any measures other than perhaps economic sanctions (Glaudric, 2011, p. 246). There, Eagleburger also guaranteed the ambassador that the White House had no intentions either of assisting Slovenia or Croatia in any possible way and that President Bush, the US national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and secretary of state
Baker were all ‘committed to resisting all congressional pressure for a change of policy’ (Ibid).

With regards to the implementation of the UN arms embargo, the reasons the US gave for the need of such a policy unsurprisingly echoed those of the UK since both countries were adamantly opposed to the breakup of the Yugoslav federation and sought to preserve it at all costs. The Bush Administration also disseminated remarks heard from the United Kingdom, such as that the war would be shortened with less arms available, that they did not wish to encourage more hostilities etc. This was all said and done, it should be added, despite heavy opposition from many members of congress who pointed out the clear benefit it would give the aggressor. They were correct: the Yugoslav Army openly admitted to the Western press just a few days after the embargo’s implementation that they were certain they would be the embargo’s ‘principal beneficiaries’ (New York Times, Sept 27, 1991).

What is a more plausible reason for the United States’ support for the embargo according to sources is that the hope remained at the White House that Milosevic could win militarily and diminish Croatia to a subordinate entity within a Serb-held Yugoslav state (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996). A number of analysts have expressed that it is indeed unfortunate that the White House did not consider the thought that if the Croatian civilians had been promptly and adequately armed, the situation most likely would have generated a stalemate or ceasefire, which in turn could have saved tens of thousands of lives (Ibid). One of many political players who spoke later from the vantage of hindsight was Warren Zimmermann, the US’s last ambassador to Yugoslavia. In his book he writes that what he regrets is not being more firm from the onset of the conflict and that
knowing what he knows now, he would have recommended the use of force by the US and EC to stop Serbian aggression as early as 1991 (Zimmermann, 1999).

In December of 1991, as the UK and the rest of the EC were slowly coming to the conclusion that Slovenia and Croatia would have to be granted recognition soon, the US, notably Bush himself, Eagleburger and Baker were still campaigning and warning EC members to hold back on any ‘rash’ decisions. Baker exerted strong pressure with his calls to European leaders not to steer the EC away from what he labeled the ‘non-recognition consensus’ (Baker and DeFrank, 1995, p. 638). Despite the US’ greatest efforts however, the EC did come to the conclusion to jointly extend diplomatic recognition to Slovenia and Croatia in early January of 1992 — half a year after the outbreak of war. The Bush Administration however, did not follow suit immediately. Reasons for this are not very clear since the United States had previously stated that they were in full solidarity with and had faith in the decisions made by its EC partners. However, as Zimmermann writes, ‘The arguments for non-recognition of Slovenia and Croatia had grown weaker. Slovenia was virtually independent already and by January 1992, the major bars to recognition of Croatia ... had been lifted’ (Azrael and Payin, 1996, p. 11).

Some analysts suggest that the White House had been extremely dissatisfied with the fact that Yugoslavia would never be unified again and hence did not want to exhibit an overly enthusiastic reaction to the outcome of events, hence, holding back its recognition a few more months until April 1992. Others claim however, that the US would have held out even longer than April, had it not been for the quickly growing crisis in Bosnia — for which Bosnian global recognition (given to Bosnia by the US the same
day as it was to Croatia) was thought to be the best course of action to take in order to halt the invading Serbian army (New York Times, April 08, 1992).

Recognizing IR Theory in Practice

United Kingdom

Realism

The realist International Relations perspective can be useful in the framing of events surrounding some of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy decisions towards Croatia during the early part of the war. The realist conception holds that politics occur within and between groups and that world politics are power politics (Carr, 1946, p. 145). This is evident when one looks at the way the UK grouped together with countries such as France and the US in opposition to so many of Germany’s pro-Croatia policy initiatives throughout negotiations due the UK’s concern about the balance of power on the European continent (Bakke, 2011, p. 198). According to Hodge, the UK, due to its historical connections and more recent professional relationships with Serbians, diplomatically grouped its UK policymakers with those of the Milosevic government in attempts to slow down and/or prevent Croatian secession from going through (Hodge, 2003, p. 2). Even within the UK itself, group politics were very much in play between politicians in the House of Commons on issues of Croatia’s recognition and the asymmetrical implications of the arms embargo (House of Commons, July 3, 1991).
Realism holds that states are intrinsically fixated on security. The United Kingdom was certainly concerned about Germany’s motives in supporting Croatian independence; it feared that Germany had some clandestine arrangement that would give it protectorate powers over Croatia and increase its sphere of influence (Meier, 1999, p. 220). Meier writes that this was the main reason why the UK opposed most of Germany’s suggestions at the peace talk negotiations (Ibid). Another issue of security that influenced the UK’s policies was its worry that if it were to recognize Croatian independence, republics from the dissolving USSR would also begin seeking the same treatment. In addition to these security concerns, the question of how extending diplomatic recognition to Croatia would affect domestic issues such as the UK’s problems with Northern Ireland was also said to have been a significant consideration in its decision-making (Gow, 1997, p. 306).

The realist perspective is also characterized by its emphasis on the world’s lack of an overarching government, which realism believes leads to the international system existing in a state of anarchy. However, as Kenneth Waltz explained, this anarchic state does not necessarily mean one of constant chaos and disorder, just one where there is no sovereign body that looks over the interactions between autonomous nation-states (Waltz, 1979, pp. 93-97). This ‘anarchy’ can be identified in the way the UK was struggling to come to terms with and work around Germany’s pro-Croatia stance. The UK was certain that Germany was taking advantage of the Yugoslav crisis in order to expand its sphere of influence.

Another assertion of the realist viewpoint is that world politics are motivated by self-interest while also revolving around materialism (Rourke, 2010). The UK’s foreign
policy choices regarding the Yugoslav crisis (which can be considered as ‘world politics’ since it was internationally followed and had numerous countries as well as the United Nations involved in mediations and policy decisions) were shown to be deeply motivated by UK interests. These interests included things such as the bureaucratic and economic ties with Belgrade that the UK did not wish to lose (Hodge, 2003, p. 2), its reluctance to disregard the time, diplomatic and financial investments it had put into the maintenance of Yugoslavia since the end of the Second World War and its unwillingness to recognize Croatia because there would be a financial expectation for the provision of UK defence troops (Meier, 1999, p. 226). A domestic interest that was influential in the UK’s decision to recognize Croatia was the hundreds of refugees that began arriving seeking asylum in the UK (Woodward, 1992).

The UK’s refusal to voice any decision individually, constantly stressing the importance of ‘cohesion’ and ‘complete solidarity’ within the European Community seems to fall perfectly in line with realism’s assertion that group cohesion is essential to progress (Caplan, 2005, p. 19). The fact that the UK (along with France) who had sought to block the impending German recognition of Croatia with a UN Security Council resolution agreed to yield to Germany's vision of the best method to ending the war show how much the UK valued group solidarity (New York Times, Dec 16, 1991).

With regards to the realist concept that interactions between states are influenced mainly by the extent of their individual economic and military power is displayed when one looks at the relationship between the seceded Croatian republic with that of the UK; it is evident that Croatia was restrained by its lack of economic and military power and the UK empowered because of its monetary and army might. When one studies the
political proceedings between the UK and Croatia during the conflict, what is visible is
the very characteristics realists claim political life is spun of — incentives, threats and
punishments — especially evident when one considers the many carrot and stick tactics
the recognition negotiations held (Caplan, 2005, p. 181). Simms writes that the UK’s
relationship with Milosevic and Serbia was also influenced by military and economic
considerations since the UK made it clear that it felt it was much more desirable to have
one strong ‘partner’ in the Balkans than acquiring several weaker ones (Simms, 2003).

Realists hold that peace is dependent on a certain formation of power and that
once this particular formation changes, clashes are the likely result (Reus-Smit and
Snidal, 2008, pp. 144-145). This is true in the case of Yugoslavia, in that after Tito died,
the dynamics of power that had been in place changed and eventually led to the territorial
expansionist aims of the Serbian leader, which then necessitated UK presence in the
negotiations that ensued. It is possible to say that the UK’s foreign policy with Croatia,
Serbia and even Germany during the time of the Yugoslav crisis contained elements of
the idea that peace is dependent on a particular formation of power. This line of thinking
explains why the UK said it did not wish to see Yugoslavia break up: it would alter the
power balance in Europe and perhaps encourage even more secessionist republics on the
European continent. With regards to the UK’s relationship with Germany, it was evident
throughout the Yugoslav negotiations just how apprehensive and suspicious the UK was
of the newly unified German state and how it was still adjusting itself to the new
formation and all that that entailed. As Glaurdic writes, ‘in the “realist” calculation of the
Western policy-makers, any challenge to the continuing existence of states like
Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union was accelerating uncertainty at a time when, more than anything else, the world needed certainty’ (Glaurdic, 2012, p. 74).

Realism is known for its stance that no universal moral principles even exist; thus, there is no rational way ‘morality’ can even be applied to actions of states (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 9). Similarly, realism also holds that international politics should be seen as a practical exercise, not a moral one (Kennan, 1954, p. 48). If morals had been on the minds of Prime Minister John Major’s government, one would think that the arms embargo would not have been placed over all of Yugoslavia, but only on Serbia, who was the only republic not cooperating in negotiation talks while utilizing the Yugoslav army’s tanks and weapons against defenceless civilians. If morals had had a part in the foreign policy of the United Kingdom in the Yugoslav conflict, perhaps the UK would have taken into account and supported the fact that Croatian and Slovenian people possessed the right to seek democracy and possessed the right to secede from a federation that did not allow them to pursue this ideal. Instead, the UK, even when it had reluctantly agreed that Croatia had achieved the conditions to receive recognition, exemplified the Machiavellian principle of ‘picking the less bad as good’ (Machiavelli, 1998, p. 91) when Lord Carrington described seeing the decision as only a ‘choice of evils’ (Financial Times, December 18, 1991).

Constructivism

The constructivist theoretical approach holds that areas of world politics are strongly defined by social and historical processes and that social meaning is attached to both objects and practices (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 299). The United Kingdom
was so adamant on keeping Yugoslavia as a unit precisely because it was affected and attached to the historical process that had made it so. The UK felt fond and comfortable with the concept of a unified Yugoslavia, because its experience with the federation since the Second World War had been consistent, strong and reliable and all those were qualities the UK values (Simms, 2003).

Constructivism maintains that people act towards objects (including other actors) according to meanings that objects have for them (Wendt, 1992, p. 396) and that interests are constructed through social interaction. This conception can be seen in the way Serbophilic tendencies were apparent in UK’s policy proceedings — because the UK identified Serbians as linked to UK’s historic past and because the UK saw Serbian leadership as sturdy and competent, it thus put every effort into keeping the Yugoslavian system going if it meant a continuation of a Serb-dominated Yugoslav army, government et cetera, because that was what had worked for the UK and what it was used to (Mann, 2005, p. 363). The UK was cold, demanding and lacked compassion for the Slovenian and Croatian causes because it did not share a historic and social bond with the people of these republics as it did with the Serbians. The UK did not see Slovenia or Croatia in the positive light it saw the Serb governance and treated them as such.

Constructivism states that ethical impasses often require one morally substantive concept of politics taking precedence over others (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 321). This perception can be said to have been observable in a couple of cases during the Yugoslav crisis. The first case was when the principles of territorial integrity and stability were emphasized by the UK over those of democracy and human rights from the onset of the conflict until late November 1991. In order to justify this position, the theory of
‘ethnic hatreds’ was often invoked by the Major government to construct the conflict in such a way as to make intervention by the UK seem foolish (Saha and Bangura, 2006, p. 2). The second discernible case of certain norms prevailing over others politically was when the United Kingdom finally recognized Croatia’s independence; by doing so it made a conscious decision to override principles of Yugoslavia’s self-determination and previously understood inviolability of Yugoslavian state borders, (due to the fact that the UK was firm supporter of the Westphalian system) (Caplan, 2005). In addition to the overriding of these principles, the practice of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states also had to be superseded in order for Croatia and Slovenia to be accepted as sovereign states.

**Shortcomings**

For the case of the United Kingdom, the thesis did not encounter difficulties explaining the studied foreign policy decisions and behaviour by the John Major government using the chosen two International Relations perspectives. It was found that the main stances, statements and courses of action chosen by UK representatives could easily be lined up with either realist or constructivist notions.
Hypothesis

Let us now turn to the hypothesis regarding the United Kingdom mentioned in Chapter Two:

This thesis hypothesizes that the realist International Relations theory is the most useful in explaining the foreign policy choices and stances taken by the United Kingdom towards Croatia following Croatia’s announcement of its secession from Yugoslavia. It is also theorized here that although the constructivist approach is insufficient to stand as the solitary theory of explanation, it may be able to further our understanding of UK’s conduct overall.

The analysis showed that the realist International Relations perspective was indeed able to speak to much of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy proceedings towards Croatia from mid 1991 to early 1992. The hypothesis was correct in its proposal that the constructivist theory would be able to account for less of the events surrounding the conflict, but that it would still be in a position to fill in some spaces the realist perspective was unable to do. The analysis illustrated that although the realist framework was more useful than that of the constructivist, realism cannot stand on its own to explain adequately the case of Croatia’s recognition by the UK. It is evident that the realist theoretical perspective needs to be complimented by a constructivist lens in order to provide a fuller and more comprehensive understanding of the recognition politics.
United States

Realism

The realist perspective holds that since there is no actor above states with the capability or power to standardize their interactions, the world exists in a state of anarchy. As E.H. Carr writes, ‘In domestic affairs it is clearly the business of the state to create harmony if no natural harmony exists. In international politics, there is no organized power charged with the task of creating harmony’ (Carr, 1939, p. 51). An anarchy of sorts can be perceived in the way the United States struggled in December of 1991 to keep the EC countries from committing their recognition for Croatia’s independence, the Bush Administration even giving orders to their ambassadors in EC countries to pressure their hosts to reconsider changing their stance (Glaurdic, 2011). The United States did not feel that the European Community had done all it could to keep Yugoslavia intact and that the EC should have been working harder to enforce order in the Balkans to ease the violent anarchy between Croatia and Serbia (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 144).

Realism assumes that countries and global political players are motivated mainly by competitive self-interest and that states are fixated on security (Rourke, 2010). This was very apparent in the way the White House sought to keep Croatia within the Yugoslav federation to avoid ‘unpredictability and instability’ which President Bush had announced were the new security enemies of the West (Beschloss and Talbott, 1993, p. 192). This fear was compounded by the Cold War coming to an end shortly before Croatia seceding, causing the US worry that the Soviet Union republics might use the Yugoslav break up as a model for their own secessions (Almond, 1994, p. 45). On the topic of interests, the United States had invested a great deal of social and economic
sources in the creation and upkeep of the Yugoslav federation since the end of the Second World War and naturally it did not want to see all those assets lost, which is why it pursued its policy of Yugoslav preservation at all costs. As Meier writes, ‘a whole series of American diplomats felt that their personal prestige was bound up with this pro-Yugoslav policy’ (Meier, 1999, p. 220). A very prominent example of a the sort of political and economic ties and interests the US diplomats had with Belgrade and how fiercely they were guarded was Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger who, other than serving in Yugoslavia for two terms, was also a CEO of a powerful consultancy firm where he had directed clients to invest heavily in Yugoslavia (The World of Sunday, April 25, 1992). These clients had helped channel ‘hundreds of millions of dollars in private investments into Yugoslavia’, most of which was made after Eagleburger had completed his ambassadorship in Belgrade (Ibid). Since Eagleburger had spent so much time in Belgrade and because he had such a ‘well-tested relationship’ with Milosevic, he ended up being President Bush’s and Secretary of State Baker’s prime advisor on how to proceed with Yugoslav policy and guided them to adopt policies in opposition to Croatian independence (Almond, 1994, p. 44).

The realist perspective also assumes that politics occur within and between groups and that international politics are always power politics (Carr, 1946, p. 145). These principles were reflected at the onset of the crisis when the European Community and the United States still had not come to a consensus among themselves as to who would take charge of mediating the situation. It is possible that the US could have taken the lead, but according to Secretary Baker, the Bush Administration was at the time entangled in a severe schism with some West European states over the fact that the Europe needed a
defence identity separate from the United States in the post-Cold War world (Glaurdic, 2011). The United States believed it could do a better job with the Yugoslav crisis, but since the EC was so eager to prove its capability as a group, the US gave them full reins to do so — but with a smirk. James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger allegedly even had a two-way bet on the outcome; ‘They will screw up,’ Eagleburger had said, ‘and this will teach them a lesson’ (Simms, 2002, p. 50).

There was also a great deal of power politics occuring within the United States itself. The US State Department and the White House were adamant in pursuing Yugoslav unity at all costs and were in ‘stark contrast to the prevailing opinions in the US Congress’ (Glaurdic, 2011, p. 246). Many Congressmen such as Al Gore, Frank McCloskey and Foreign Service Officers such as George Kenney caused plenty of friction with their criticism and appeals for a different route to be taken in the Balkan policy (Nordstrom and Robben, 1995, p. 191).

Realism also claims that global affairs are characterized by immense disparities of power — both in regards to social influence as well as resources — and that international politics are spun out of inclinations, incentives, deterrent threats and punishments) (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 133; Waltz, 1979, p.186). Illustrations of such theories can be seen when one considers the position the Republic of Croatia was in at the time of its declared secession; no international support, no military resources, minimal capital and basically at the mercy of Western powers to legitimize the republic so as to offer its citizens some form of theoretical protection against aggressors. The European Community and the United States however, offered more than their share of incentives (such as the 3-month moratorium) misleading inclinations — such as statements made by
Baker saying that Serbia and the Yugoslav federal military bore a ‘special and indeed growing responsibility’ for the war in Croatia, but then not following up these sentiments with any serious policies (*New York Times*, Sept 27, 1991), threats such as Baker’s announcement before Croatia’s secession that Western leaders would ‘ostracize’ independent republics and that the United States would definitely not recognize their independence (*New York Times*, June 22, 1991) and as for punishments, the lack of a coordinated and decisive response by the US at a time when Croatian land and citizens were under attack can constitute for that.

**Constructivism**

The constructivist theoretical perspective holds that many aspects of International Relations are socially and historically dependent (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 299) and that ‘new foreign policy ideas are shaped by pre-existing dominant ideas and their relationship to experienced events’ (Legro, 2005, p. 4). These conceptions can be seen in the words of President Bush who called ‘unpredictability’ and ‘instability’ the new enemies of the West and constructed US policies towards Yugoslavia based on such fears (Beschloss and Talbott, 1993, p. 192). Bush and his administration were tied to their experience of US’ recent history with Yugoslavia and wished to preserve the status quo. They did not want to disrupt the stability Yugoslavia as a unit had provided the US over the decades. Such feelings and practices demonstrate typical constructivist thinking which assumes that social meaning is attached to objects and practices and that political actors act towards these objects according to the meanings that objects have for them (Wendt, 1992, p. 396). Constructivism does point out however, that these meanings and
practices may at times be moderately stable but they are never fixed — again shown when Bush abandoned his policy of a unified Yugoslavia and recognized Croatia and Slovenia and Bosnia (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 300).

Another opinion accepted in constructivist theory is that ‘actors acquire identities — relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations ...’ (Wendt, 1992, p. 397) and that interests are in part, products of those identities (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 303). This can be recognized in the way the United States had adopted a view of Slobodan Milosevic, thinking he was a reformist, level-headed and stable — Eagleburger who had known him for years at the onset of the war always had only words of support for Milosevic — and Bush, Zimmermann, Baker and the rest of the White House listened to him and felt secure in continuing their policy of the preservation of Yugoslav unity. However, when the evidence began coming in, showing that Milosevic was anything but what the White House had taken him for, Eagleburger was forced to acknowledge his error of judgement about Milosevic. ‘I thought he was a liberal; he talked so convincingly...I must have been wrong’ Eagleburger had later said to Zimmermann (Zimmermann, 1999, p. 59).

Constructivism also takes into account that the principle of sovereignty — usually considered inviolable — can in actuality be overridden in circumstances of human rights violations, at which point the autonomy of some rulers would be reduced significantly, while that of others (potential interveners) would be increased (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 300). A form of this concept was played out in April of 1992 when the United States finally ceased to consider Yugoslavia as a respectable, lawful, functioning state
and reversed its previous policy in order to extend diplomatic recognition and ties to both
Croatia and Slovenia.

The constructivist paradigm also asserts that state and actor interests are not just
‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but that they are instead consciously constructed by
political players (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2). Finnemore writes that ‘much of foreign policy
is about defining rather than defending national interests’ (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne,
2008, p.74). A compelling aspect of the crisis was how the United States so willingly
gave up the leader’s position in mediating the Yugoslav talks to the European
Community. It is interesting to contemplate why the United States would have wanted to
give away the power they could have had in the construction of a new phase of Europe.
The United Kingdom worked hard to secure Lord Carrington the lead position for the EC
Yugoslav negotiations just so that the UK’s interests and opinions would be sure to be
represented and so that the Major government would have some form of indirect control
over the outcome (Caplan, 2005). It is believed the realist perspective would have a more
difficult time explaining the relinquishment of power and influence over this coveted
role, but since constructivist theory assumes interests and responsibilities to be
constructed, one can say that since the US framed the Yugoslav conflict as outside its
sphere of interests, authority and involvement in the crisis was seen as unnecessary and
misplaced.

The notion that both political institutions and actors can be redefined in political
processes is another prevalent assumption found in constructivist theory (Reus-Smit and
Snidal, 2008, p. 303). One can see this concept expressed when one considers the way the
United States primarily declared that it had ‘no vital national interest’ in Yugoslavia and
that it was only concerned with the ‘strategic goal of maintaining [Yugoslavia’s] territorial and political unity’ (Bekic, 2010, p. 12), but then later, ended up labeling Serbia as the aggressor, Croatia’s government as ‘legitimate’ and stated that bringing about peace in the region was of the upmost importance (US Department of State Dispatch, June 8, 1992). The Bush Administration went on to say that the US would begin ‘immediate consultations to establish full diplomatic relations...’ and that the White House acknowledged the ‘peaceful and democratic expression of the will of citizens of these states for sovereignty’ (Presidential Documents, April 7, 1992), showing that dramatic redefinitions in foreign politics can take place in a relatively short amount of time.

The foreign policy of the United States also encapsulates the constructivist idea that nations are concerned simultaneously with shifting their behaviour to correspond with the rules and recreating the rules to substantiate their behaviour (Hurd, 2007). When the United States did not want to get involved in the conflict, the Bush Administration quoted norms and reasons acceptable to society such as the need to preserve territorial integrity of states and the necessity of only pursuing vital interests beneficial to the US, but then when the EC recognized Croatia and the US needed to shift itself to be in line with the EC foreign policy, the White House provided another set reasons — this time to justify why it was accepting Croatian independence. The White House at this point stated that its reasons for the change in policy were due to the US wanting to ‘contribute to the peace process’ and because the US had a responsibility to uphold the ‘legitimate governments of Croatia and Slovenia’; arguably, such statements give the impression that the US was not interested in contributing to the peace process prior to April 1992 and that
the governments of Croatia and Slovenia were illegitimately brought to power or that they had somehow changed in essence and rhetoric since 1991, which was not the case in the least (New York Times, April, 8, 1992).

**Shortcomings**

As was seen, the realist and constructivist theories do have a lot to contribute to the understanding of the United States’ foreign policy towards Croatia from 1991 until mid 1992. Yet, there are some actions, statements and policy decisions that do not fit comfortably under either of the realist or constructivist umbrellas such as why the United States continuously and on many occasions declared that its policy toward Croatia was based on ‘support for the interrelated objectives of democracy, dialogue, human rights...democratic rights’, that it wanted ‘all citizens of Yugoslavia [to] enjoy democratic rights and civil liberties and be able to present themselves through fair free elections’ and that the US would be ‘strongly opposed’ to imposed non-democratic unity — when the Bush Administration was not planning on getting involved anyway (US Department of State Dispatch articles, June 3, 1991). This non-interventionist stance was made clear when Lawrence Eagleburger met with the Yugoslav ambassador and assured him that even though the White House knew of Milosevic’s scheme for creating a Greater Serbia, there were no plans of punishing Serbia and that Bush had no intentions assisting Croatia in any possible way — the US Department of State was ‘committed to resisting all congressional pressure for a change of policy’ (Glaurdic, 2011, p. 246).

Another US policy that is not made clearer with the use of either of the theoretical perspectives is Bush’s choice to wait for several months after the European Community
to extend diplomatic ties and recognition to Croatia. The selection of this political route is puzzling because the United States had indicated at the onset of the crisis that it would stand in full solidarity with EC policy and decisions and that the US supported the efforts and decisions made on behalf of the EC and Arbitration Commission. Yet, when the EC did recognize Croatia’s independence in January of 1991, the United States did not follow suit.

Hypothesis

Let us recall the hypothesis for the United States stated in Chapter Two:

With regards to the United States foreign policy motivations and decisions towards Croatia, this thesis hypothesizes that, once again, the International Relations perspective that possesses the best capacity to elucidate the deliberation process is realism. It is anticipated however, that the constructivist approach is in a position to supplement additional insight to that offered by the realist perspective.

The hypothesis was correct in its proposal that the realist perspective would have the capacity to speak to most of the important policy decisions and motivations made by the United States in their response to the Yugoslav crisis. It was also right to posit that the realist perspective would not be able to account for some US political behaviour that the constructivist theoretical paradigm was able to address using its different perspective. As was the case for the United Kingdom, it was seen through the analysis, that even though
the realist perspective was more helpful than that of the constructivist, realism by itself is not able fully to explain the United States’ foreign policy towards Croatia. In order to supply more satisfying and extensive insight on the US response to Croatia’s declaration of independence, the realist theoretical perspective needs to be complimented by looking at the analysis through a constructivist lens. It is also noted that the hypothesis failed to anticipate there being US policy actions and decisions which neither of the two selected IR theories could satisfactorily address.

Conclusion

This chapter was divided into two sections. The first part contained the analyses of the foreign policies of the United Kingdom and the United States towards Croatia from mid 1991, when Croatian President Franjo Tudman declared Croatia’s independence, until mid 1992, by which point both the UK and the US had recognized the Croatian republic as a sovereign state. The analysis of each Western power explored reasons given by scholars and political actors themselves for the policies and behaviour exhibited by the UK and US during this period. In the United Kingdom’s case it was seen that factors influencing Prime Minister John Major’s government’s policy were things such as the recent unification of Germany, the dissolving Soviet Union and a pro-Serb bias within the Foreign Office. With regards to the United States, influential factors affecting its foreign policy included President George H. W. Bush’s aversion to unpredictability and instability, the EC’s eagerness to prove its handling of security issues, the US’ willingness to have the EC test the effectiveness of its newly established post Cold War foreign and security policy, and the US’ historical and economic ties with Belgrade.
The second section of the chapter examined the abilities of the realist and constructivist International Relations theories to speak to the choices the United Kingdom and United States made regarding the Yugoslav conflict until their subsequent recognition of the Croatian republic. The capability of each theory to address the political conduct of each Western country was compared to the hypotheses made in Chapter Two. It was shown how the realist paradigm was able to account for much of the foreign policy decisions of both the UK and the US and how the constructivist paradigm also had insights to offer in supplementation to those given by realism. There were however, some political manoeuvres made by the United States that neither of the two theories discussed here were able to account for comfortably. The next chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis and offers suggestions on where additional research can be done regarding Western responses to the Yugoslav war.
Chapter Six: Conclusion

When the citizens of the Republic of Croatia demonstrated in the May 1991 referendum their overwhelming desire to secede from the federation of Yugoslavia, they had no idea that their decision, along with Croatian president Franjo Tudman’s subsequent declaration of Croatian independence, would unleash four years of brutal conflict with Serbian rebel paramilitaries who were intent on keeping Croatia within the Yugoslav federation. Croatian anticipation for timely global diplomatic recognition — which was hoped would halt Serbian aggression — did not come to pass; instead, long months of lengthy negotiations, peace talks, embargos and moratoriums were the reality.

This thesis studied the foreign policy proceedings of two Western nations — the United Kingdom and the United States — towards the Republic of Croatia, from President Tudman’s declaration of Croatian independence in 1991 until mid 1992, by which point both the UK and the US had extended diplomatic recognition to the newly seceded state. The focus of the thesis was on the recognition process and the statements provided by UK and US political players explaining the reasoning behind their policy decisions on the Yugoslav crisis. The thesis sought to analyse and understand these rationales that influenced foreign policy and looked to analysts and scholars to explain additional motivations of policy decisions that may have not been publicly stated. In order to further the understanding of the politics of recognition and peace mediations, two International Relations theoretical perspectives — realism and constructivism — were brought in to see if they could make sense of UK and US foreign policy decisions during this time.
Two hypotheses were presented in the second chapter, one regarding the United Kingdom and one for the United States. The hypotheses were as follows:

This thesis hypothesizes that the realist International Relations theory is the most useful in explaining the foreign policy choices and stances taken by the United Kingdom towards Croatia following Croatia’s announcement of its secession from Yugoslavia. It is also theorized here that although the constructivist approach is insufficient to stand as the solitary theory of explanation, it may be able to further our understanding of UK’s conduct overall.

With regards to the United States foreign policy motivations and decisions towards Croatia, this thesis hypothesizes that, once again, the International Relations perspective that possesses the best capacity to elucidate the deliberation process is realism. It is anticipated however, that the constructivist approach is in a position to supplement additional insight to that offered by the realist perspective.

These hypotheses were tested in the analysis chapter by looking for policy decisions and political behaviour that would fall under the umbrella of each IR theoretical framework.

The third and fourth chapters provided a recapitulation of the political events and decisions that took place in the United Kingdom and the United States respectively that led to both the John Major government and the George H.W. Bush Administration to
eventually recognize the independence of the Croatian republic in 1992. The proceedings, statements and political conduct presented in Chapters Three and Four were subsequently analysed in Chapter Five, primarily with the assistance of relevant literature and then through the lenses of realist and constructivist theoretical perspectives to see why the decisions that were made by the UK government and the US White House were actually chosen.

For the case of the United Kingdom, the issues that influenced Prime Minister John Major’s government policy and its non-recognition stance on Croatia’s sovereignty were things such as the recent unification of Germany, the UK’s preoccupation with the balance of power in Europe, the dissolving Soviet Union, the Major government’s belief that the conflict was due to ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’, Major not wanting to commit to a military defence of Croatia (which he felt might be expected if recognition was given), a pro-Serb bias within the Foreign Office and the breakdown of negotiations with Lord Carrington and the Yugoslav republics. When these events and other statements made by UK politicians were examined using the realist and constructivist theories it was discovered that the hypothesis seemed correct in its assumptions that the realist theory would be able to account for a majority of the United Kingdom’s behaviour during the period examined.

The thesis showed how the UK exhibited realist conceptions such as ‘politics occur within and between groups’ and ‘world politics are power politics’ (Carr, 1946, p. 145) — one instance being the way the UK grouped together with nations such as France and the US against many of Germany’s pro-Croatia policy initiatives. Realism’s belief that ‘states are intrinsically fixated on security’ was also identified in the UK’s concern
about Germany’s motives in supporting Croatia (Hodge, 2006) and its worry that if it were to recognize Croatia’s independence, republics from the USSR would begin to declare their sovereignty as well. Realism claims that world politics are motivated by self-interest and that politics revolve around materialism (Rourke, 2010). These claims found resonance in the bureaucratic and economic ties that the UK had fostered with Belgrade and was very set on preserving, as well as its unwillingness to lose the financial investments it had put in over the decades to assist with the maintenance of Yugoslavia (Hodge, 2003, p. 2).

The way the United Kingdom avoided voicing any decision unilaterally and the way it constantly emphasized the importance of ‘solidarity’ and ‘cohesion’ within the European Community was one of the interpretations found falling in line with realism’s assertion that group cohesion is essential to progress (Caplan, 2005, p. 19). Another realist contention that was found corresponding to the UK experience was the one that claims that the interactions between states are influenced mainly by the extent of their individual economic and military power. This was recognized in the relationship between the UK and the newly seceded Croatian republic when one became aware of the restraint the Croatian state faced due to its lack of economic and military power and the empowerment the UK enjoyed due to its abundance in both.

Lastly, realism is well-known for its opinion that no universal moral principles exist and that therefore, it is unrealistic to expect ‘morality’ to be applied to the actions of states (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 9). It is believed that if Prime Minister John Major’s government had been concerned with morals, it would have made different policy decisions, such as placing the arms embargo not over all of Yugoslavia, but upon the only
republic that was failing to cooperate and the one that was pursuing territorial expansion through force and destruction, Serbia.

With regards to the United Kingdom and how the constructivist theoretical perspective spoke to its political behaviour, the analysis found that the hypothesis was once again correct in thinking that the constructivist paradigm would be insufficient to stand as the sole theory of explanation but that it would be able to offer some added insight to the United Kingdom’s case. The constructivist paradigm asserts that world politics are strongly defined by social and historical processes and that social meaning is attached to both objects and practices (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 299). The analysis found that it can be said that the reason the Major government was so intent on keeping Yugoslavia together was in a large part due to its attachment to the historical process that had made it so, in addition to its positive experience with the federation since the Second World War (Simms, 2003).

Constructivism holds that people behave towards objects (including people) in accordance to the meanings that those objects have for them (Wendt, 1992, p. 396) and that interests are constructed through social interaction. The way the UK was found to have exhibited these conceptualizations is through the Serbophilic tendencies that were recognized by scholars to have been present in the UK’s political proceedings. This ‘Serbophilia’ was said to have been a product of the UK identifying Serbians as linked to the UK’s historic past and also because the Major government viewed Serbian leadership as capable and reliable (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996).

With regards to shortcomings, it was seen that between the two selected International Relations theories, all of the main political happenings and decisions
surrounding the United Kingdom’s recognition of Croatia examined in this thesis were able to be satisfactorily addressed.

For the case of the United States, the analysis chapter showed that although the US had a unique foreign policy experience with the Yugoslav crisis, many of the factors that had influenced the United Kingdom had also had an effect on US policy as well. The United States, like the UK, was also concerned with the destabilizing effect the breakup of Yugoslavia might have on the European continent and how the secessions of Croatia and Slovenia might encourage republics of the ex-USSR to do the same. Other things influencing US foreign policy towards Croatia was shown to be the European Community’s insistence on having the leading role in conflict management, the billions of dollars the US had invested in the creation and upkeep of Yugoslavia over the decades, the numerous US diplomats in positions of power during the Yugoslav crisis who had previously served in Belgrade, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger’s friendship with Milosevic and his subsequent advisory role to President Bush and Secretary of State Baker and the EC’s recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in January of 1992. The hypothesis regarding US political conduct towards the Yugoslav crisis was found to be correct in its prediction that the realist theoretical framework would have the best capacity to address the actions and statements of US political actors.

One way in which the United States was found to exhibit principles of realist theory was in the way the White House fought hard to keep Croatia within the Yugoslav federation to evade President Bush’s fears of ‘unpredictability and ‘instability’ — which he deemed were the new security enemies of the West (Beschloss and Talbott, 1993, p.
This particular political behaviour was interpreted as an instance of realism’s claim that states are fixated on security (Rourke, 2010). On the subject of realism and its assertion that global political players are motivated mostly by competitive self interests, the fact that the United States had invested a great deal of social and economic resources into the Yugoslav federation was not lost on its policy makers who kept this information at the forefront of all their political decisions (Meier, 1999, p. 220). One particular US diplomat who was very tied both politically and economically to the Belgrade regime and was thus a very vocal opponent of recognizing Croatia’s independence was Lawrence Eagleburger. Eagleburger was also found to have been the prime advisor for President Bush and Secretary of State Baker and it was noted that his personal and professional ties were a great factor in the advice he gave to the Bush Administration on what actions to take in Yugoslavia (Almond, 1994, p. 44).

The analysis showed how the realist presumptions that politics occur within and between groups and that international politics are always power politics (Carr, 1946, p. 145) were reflected in the dealings between the US and European Community before the US had conceded to allow the EC to take the leading position in mediating the Yugoslav crisis. Power politics were also recognized to have occurred in the United States itself, in between the White House, US State Department and the Congress, who were at severe odds with each other on how to properly and competently address the Croatian situation (Glaurdic, 2011, p. 246).

The realist theoretical perspective also claims that international politics are spun out of inclinations, incentives, deterrent threats and punishments (Waltz, 1979, p. 186). The analysis pointed to examples of each of these behaviours such as the Western
imposed moratorium, misleading inclination statements made by US politicians, threats to Croatia made by Secretary of State James A Baker (*New York Times*, June 22, 1991) and the absence of significant condemnation and intervention in response to the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing.

The analysis showed that the hypothesis was correct in its forecast that, as was the case with the United Kingdom although the constructivist theoretical perspective would be able to account for less behaviour than the realist stance, it could still provide useful insight into US foreign policy decisions. The Bush Administration’s battle to preserve the status quo of Yugoslavia due to their preference to continue with a Belgrade-run federation which they had become accustomed to over the years, was shown to constitute for constructivist ideas stating that numerous aspects of global relations are socially and historically dependent and that political actors act towards objects according to the meaning that objects have for them (Wendt, 1992, p. 396).

The constructivist paradigm also holds that the interests of state actors are not just ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but that they are actually consciously constructed by political players (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2). The analysis recognized this conception in the way the United States principally stated that the US had ‘no vital national interest’ in Yugoslavia and that it was only concerned with the ‘strategic goal of maintaining [Yugoslavia’s] territorial and political unity’ (Bekic, 2010, p. 12), but then later, ended up labeling Serbia as the aggressor, Croatia’s government as ‘legitimate’ and stated that bringing about peace in the region was of the upmost importance (*US Department of State Dispatch*, June 8, 1992). It was also stated in the analysis chapter that this behaviour could also constitute for the constructivist notion that both political institutions and actors
can be redefined in political processes (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 303) — the Croatian government was first considered invalid, but was later deemed ‘legitimate’ (US Department of State Dispatch, June 8, 1992). Slobodan Milosevic went from being seen 'a reasonable man with whom Washington could do business' to being labelled as an expansionist and aggressor (Cohen, 1993, pp. 215-216). Similarly, the United States also encapsulated the constructivist notion that states are concerned with shifting their behaviour to correspond with the rules and recreating the rules to substantiate their behaviour at the same time (Hurd, 2007); this was recognized in the way the United States behaved when it did not wish to get involved in the Yugoslav conflict — the Bush Administration quoted norms and reasons acceptable to society such as the need to preserve territorial integrity of states and the necessity of only pursuing vital interests beneficial to the US — but then when the European Community recognized Croatia’s sovereignty and the US had to change its stance in order to be in line with the EC foreign policy, the Bush Administration provided another set of reasons — this time to justify why it was accepting Croatian independence.

Lastly, the constructivist position that states that ‘actors acquire identities — relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations ...’(Wendt, 1992, p. 397) and that interests are in part, products of those identities (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008, p. 303) was recognized in the way the Bush Administration had adopted a perception of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic as a reformist and liberal (due to Eagleburger’s assurances) and made pro-Yugoslavian policy choices throughout 1991 and based on this. And constructivism’s deliberations on the principle of sovereignty — that it can actually be overridden in circumstances of human rights violations — was seen played out in
April of 1992 when the Bush Administration finally ceased to regard the federation of Yugoslavia as a respectable, lawful, functioning state and changed its previously held pro-Yugoslav policy in order to extend diplomatic recognition and ties to both Croatia and Slovenia.

Contrary to the case of the United Kingdom, the United States foreign policy experience during the early part of the Yugoslav conflict did contain conduct and statements the analysis felt could not be adequately explained by the two selected International Relations theories. The instances were the confliction between what the White House publicly stated its policies were and what US diplomats told Belgrade officials, and the reasoning behind President Bush’s choice to wait several months after the European Community recognized Croatia’s independence to do the same.

In sum, the analysis had shown that in both the case of the United Kingdom and the United States, the realist framework was limited and could not stand on its own to explain adequately the foreign policy of the United Kingdom and the United States towards Croatia. It was made apparent that the realist theoretical perspective needed to be complimented by a constructivist one in order to provide a more thorough and comprehensive picture of the politics that surrounded the granting of diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Croatia.

This thesis has provided insights via scholars, analysts and theoretical perspectives to explain the political conduct of the United Kingdom and the United States towards Croatia following its secession from Yugoslavia until its recognition in 1992. It was shown that both the John Major government of the UK and the George H.W. Bush
Administration of the United States behaved mostly according to realist principles, with some instances according to constructivist insights. The existing literature regarding the earlier part of the war and the process by which Croatia gained international recognition could be enriched by scholars consulting declassified conversations and meetings held by Western governments where they discussed what they had to gain and lose from recognizing Croatia’s independence, as well as comparing publicly made policy statements to conversations Western leaders had amongst themselves and with leaders of the Serbian regime. It is also believed that investigating the social and economic ties that prominent Western policy makers had with the Belgrade-run Yugoslavia and how this affected the outcomes they sought politically would also be enlightening. It is expected that the information and intelligence gleaned from taking such research avenues would do much to advance students, scholars and the general public in their overall comprehension of the back doors of politics that are just as fascinating, if not more so than the edited statements and premeditated results we are exposed to.
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Appendix 1: Cast of Characters

Baker III, James A  

Bush, George H. W.  
US President (Jan 20, 1989 – Jan 20, 1993)

Carrington, Lord Peter  
UK Foreign Secretary (1979-1982)  
EC agent for Yugoslavia (peace negotiator)

Eagleburger, Lawrence  
Deputy Secretary of State (1989 –1992)

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich  
Germany’s Foreign Minister

Hogg, Douglas  
UK Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Hurd, Douglas  
UK Foreign Secretary (1989 - 1995)

Jovic, Borisav  
Yugoslav President (May 1990 – May 1991)

Major, John  
UK Prime Minister (Nov 28th 1990-1997)

Markovic, Ante  
Yugoslavia’s last Prime Minister

Milosevic, Slobodan  
Serbian President (1991 – 1997)

Tudman, Franjo  
Croatian President (1990 – 1999)

Vance, Cyrus  
Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the UN for Croatia U.N. peace mediator

Zimmermann, Warren  
US Ambassador to Yugoslavia (last one)
Appendix 2: Map of Yugoslavia

<http://images.nationmaster.com/images/motw/europe/fm_yugoslavia_pol96.jpg>