Re-branding Canada: The Origins of Canadian Multiculturalism Policy, 1945-1974

by

Lee Blanding
B.A, Mount Allison University, 2003
M.A., University of Ottawa, 2005

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

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in the Department of History

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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Canadian multiculturalism policy is often said to have come about in 1971 because of factors such as the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the multicultural movement of the 1960s, or the more liberal political and social climate of the postwar period. While all of these played roles in the emergence of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework,” this dissertation takes the approach that the federal civil service was the most important factor behind the adoption of a federal multiculturalism policy in Canada. The author makes the case that the Canadian state had adopted multiculturalism policy and programs as early as the 1950s. A small branch of Government, known as the Canadian Citizenship Branch sought to integrate members of ethnic minority communities into the mainstream of Canadian life, but also sought to reassure native-born Canadians that these “New Canadians” had vital contributions to make to Canadian culture. This dissertation shows how this state discourse intersected with the more familiar elements associated with the rise of multiculturalism, such as the multicultural movement, and ultimately coalesced in 1971 with the announcement by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of a “new” state multiculturalism policy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation is a first attempt at what Ian McKay has called a “reconnaissance” of Canadian multiculturalism. In his now-canonical essay, “The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History,” McKay argues that historians should rethink their understanding of Canadian history by conceptualizing “Canada” as a project of liberal rule diffused across time and geographical space; in other words, as an idea or set of ideas written across the landscape. As he notes at one point in the essay, “historians are inclined to write ‘continuous national histories,’ a strategy that tends to eternalize the present-day map of Canada and to attribute to the entire dominion patterns characteristic of only one of its parts.”¹ In place of this old style of history that takes “Canada” and its attendant myths for granted, McKay would have us explain how and why “Canada” comes to see itself and be seen, for example, as “bicultural” in the 1960s, as “multicultural” in the 1970s, and as “multi-national” in the 2000s. All of these historical moments exist in dialogue with one another and with an often vague notion of “liberalism” that evolves over time. It falls to historians, then, to elucidate the particular conditions that give rise to each moment and each myth. In this dissertation I explain the conditions under which Canada adopted a public policy called “multiculturalism” in 1971.

Most Canadian historians are at least somewhat familiar with the story of how multiculturalism became a public policy in Canada. The standard narrative in textbooks treats multiculturalism as a concept that arose in the 1960s during the hearings of the

Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.² Ethnic minority groups reacted negatively to the Royal Commission’s terms of reference, which referred to the “two founding races”; they argued that Canada was not “bicultural” but “multicultural.” Sometimes these ethnic groups are referred to as the “third force” or even the “multicultural movement.”³ Depending on which scholar you are reading, the Royal Commission either responded to this movement and began to view Canada as “multicultural,” or continued to view Canada as “bicultural.” Similarly, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau is said to have either accepted the Commission’s recommendations (if they were, indeed, in favour of multiculturalism), or ignored its recommendation in favour of biculturalism when he announced his government’s policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” in October of 1971.⁴


³ In Francis, Jones and Smith’s Journeys text, the authors do not even mention the Royal Commission. They refer to “the emergence of a “third force”” in the 1960s and intimate that this was the context in which Pierre Trudeau brought about the 1971 multiculturalism policy. Similarly, they refer obliquely to “bilingualism and biculturalism” later on the page, but neglect to associate the phrase with the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. R. Douglas Francis, Richard Jones, and Donald B. Smith, Journeys: A History of Canada, 6th edition (Toronto: Nelson Education, 2010), 549.

⁴ For example, Hugh Donald Forbes says that “many Canadians” (he doesn’t say whom) “objected to the basic idea of “bilingualism and biculturalism.” He implies that, as a result, the government directed the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to change its mandate, and appoint two “ethnic” commissioners. He then moves on to discuss Trudeau’s 1971 statement without explaining the connection between the policy, the RCBB, and the multicultural movement. Hugh Donald Forbes, “Canada: From Bilingualism to Multiculturalism,” Journal of Democracy 4, no. 4 (October 1993): 77.
As one can see, even the most basic details about multiculturalism are a bit hazy.\footnote{Another example of playing fast and loose with the facts is found in John W. Friesen’s \textit{When Cultures Clash}. In an otherwise good and engaging chapter entitled “Multiculturalism as a Way of Life,” Friesen states the following in regard to French Canadians: “Their peace of mind was short-lived, for with the passing of the Multicultural Act of 1971, their culture was relegated to the same status as that of immigrants, newcomers and the Aboriginal Peoples.” The \textit{Canadian Multiculturalism Act} was not passed until 1988, by the Mulroney government; Trudeau simply announced a policy change (“multiculturalism within a bilingual framework”) in 1971. Two years later, Richard Gwyn claimed that Trudeau introduced “An Act for the Preservation and Enhancement of Multiculturalism in Canada”; clearly he confused Trudeau’s policy with (the full title of) the \textit{Canadian Multiculturalism Act}, passed by the Brian Mulroney Government in 1988. More recently, Fazeela Jiwa referred to “Pierre Trudeau’s 1988 Multiculturalism Act” in her article in \textit{Topia}. John W. Friesen, \textit{When Cultures Clash: Case Studies in Multiculturalism}, Second Edition (Calgary, Alberta: Detselig Enterprises Ltd., 1993), 20; Richard Gwyn, \textit{Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian} (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995), 183; Fazeela Jiwa, “Vamps, Heroines, Otherwise: Diasporic Women Resisting Essentialism,” \textit{Topia} 26 (Fall 2011): 130.} 

In a small way, my dissertation plays the prosaic role of clarifying some of these ambiguities. But the question that initially drove my research was: Why did Canada adopt a multiculturalism policy in October of 1971? Specifically, I wanted to understand the relationship, if there was one, between the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, ethnic minority groups, the “multicultural movement,” and Pierre Trudeau’s multiculturalism policy. I began this work as a Masters student at the University of Ottawa in the fall of 2004, when I took a class on federalism with Michael Behiels. When I elected to write a paper on the historical origins of Canadian multiculturalism policy, Dr. Behiels told me to look at the writings of Howard Palmer and Jean Burnet, both of whom had been affiliated with the early Multiculturalism Directorate. Behiels also suggested that I examine the hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963-1971), and the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution, which reported in 1972. Finally, he pointed me toward Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s writings, especially \textit{Federalism and the French Canadians}\. Not surprisingly, the sources (and my awe of my professor’s
intellect) dictated my paper’s argument. I concluded that Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework,” announced on 8 October 1971, was the result of the Royal Commission, the Special Joint Committee, and Pierre Trudeau’s advocacy of a “Just Society.” With all due respect to Dr. Behiels, we were both wrong.

In the process of answering my research question, I came to realize that I needed to situate multiculturalism within the historical literature on ethnic minority communities and the state. By doing so, I found that what we might call “multiculturalism” or “cultural pluralism” had been one of several competing values in the Canadian state and society as far back as the 1920s. Rather than tread on the toes of other historians, who had very ably chronicled developments between the 1920s and 1940s, I sought to fill the historiographical and chronological void that begins in the 1950s. The questions I then began to ask were: Why did multiculturalism win out over other notions of ethnicity and identity? How did the Canadian state’s understanding of “Canadian” ethnicity change over time? Was there continuity with earlier notions of ethnicity, such as the “mosaic”? Did the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism have as much of an impact as scholars have said it did? Was Pierre Trudeau, as Hugh Donald Forbes has argued, the “first theorist of Canadian multiculturalism,” or was he simply one of many multiculturalists?*

Most importantly, I realized that I needed to explain the relationship between multiculturalism as an ideology and multiculturalism as a state policy. Ian McKay identifies three types of liberalism that arose during the 19th and early 20th centuries:

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liberty/rights of the individual, equality, and property. His argument is that the state and non-state actors mediated the degree to which individuals and “society” were able to adopt these principles. Multiculturalism was (and is) related to the principle of equality; its biggest advocates (in the multicultural movement), as well as civil servants and politicians, all appealed to some form of ethnic or cultural equality. But my research indicates that there was tension between the state’s willingness to recognize the equality of ethnic minority groups via multiculturalism policies and programs, and its commitment to recognizing the major national minority within its borders — French Canadians. The extension of the “liberal order” through the adoption of multiculturalism, then, was uneven and contingent upon pre-existing “ethnic” hierarchies. Therefore, this dissertation explores they ways in which historical actors, such as ethnic minority organizations, influenced the way that the Canadian state came to “think” differently about ethnic diversity between 1945 and 1973.

**Historical Scholarship**

As a matter of course, this dissertation draws on a wide range of scholarship about multiculturalism, ethnicity, identity, and nationalism, as well as the appropriate literature dealing with politics and policy during the postwar period. While I will address each of these bodies of work in turn, I wish to firmly position myself within the literature on ethnicity and the Canadian state in the postwar period that has emerged since the late 1980s.
Ethnicity and the State

The first scholar to suggest that multiculturalism policy grew out of wartime policy toward ethnic minorities was Nandor F. Dreisziger in his article “The Rise of a Bureaucracy for Multiculturalism: The Origins of the Nationalities Branch, 1939-1941,” which was published in an edited collection in 1988. Dreisziger argues “The present-day governmental machinery that deals with the non-British and non-French elements of the population, the multiculturalism sector of the Department of the Secretary of State, is a direct descendant of the wartime Nationalities Branch.” Through the Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services, the Canadian Government sought to control and regulate ethnic minorities within its borders in an effort to curtail their political activities, harness their labour, and gain their support for the war effort after 1939. The Nationalities Branch was renamed the Citizenship Branch in 1945 and was transferred from the Department of National War Services to the Department of the Secretary of State; there it would remain until 1950 when it was transferred again to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Dreisziger’s argument is that the programs and personnel of the Nationalities/Citizenship Branch formed the nucleus of the

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Multiculturalism Directorate after 1972 (which implemented the new multiculturalism policy); thus, he established an historical link between the Nationalities Branch and multiculturalism policy.

This is not to say, however, that “multiculturalism” began in the 1940s. As Ivana Caccia recently pointed out in her book, Managing the Canadian Mosaic in Wartime: “The official wartime policy regarding ethnocultural minorities was by no means an attempt to institutionalize the recognition of Canadian cultural pluralism and the right to cultural difference.” It was instead a means of controlling radical elements within ethnic minority communities and reducing tension between native-born Canadians of Anglo-Saxon heritage and ethnic/immigrant Canadians. Bohdan Kordan, Lubomyr Luciuk, Thomas M. Prymak, Leslie A. Pal, and Nandor F. Dreisziger have also chronicled the ways in which the state sought to control both Communists and ultra-nationalists within the Ukrainian-Canadian community during the Second World War. For example, nationalist Ukrainian Canadians were initially onside with the war effort. However, Canada’s alliance with the Soviet Union turned many nationalist Ukrainians against the war effort. Nationalists viewed the “Russification” or “Sovietization” policies of the

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U.S.S.R in Ukraine to be a form of cultural genocide. The Mackenzie-King government was in the unenviable position of having to court and work with Communist Ukrainian-Canadians who, a short time before, had been demonized for their politics, all the while explaining to nationalists that a Soviet victory over Germany (and nationalist forces in Ukraine) was in their best interest. The staff of the Nationalities Branch worked diligently during the war to explain to ethnic communities (in their own languages) why Canada was fighting in Europe and what was expected of them as residents and citizens.11

As might be expected, the Nationalities Branch and its successor, the Citizenship Branch, had to reorient its approach to ethnic minorities with the end of hostilities in Europe and the beginning of the Cold War. For example, Ukrainian Canadian Communists who were courted during the war became enemies of the state virtually overnight. Displaced persons became valuable for their labour potential, but were also feared because of their alienness and perceived lack of Canadian values. But scholars differ over the degree to which the state played an active role in the shaping of immigrant lives. Leslie Pal characterizes the activities of the CB in the 1950s and early to mid-1960s as the “mobilization of passivity.” What he means by this is that the Branch attempted “to be helpful but neutral and to offer advice without judgment, direction without coercion, and support without favouritism” to both new immigrants and established ethnic minority communities.12 According to Pal, “the branch operated on a conceptual terrain where the “true” Canadian citizen (in a process of “becoming”) lay somewhere between the raw

11 It is worth mentioning that this effort was aimed largely at ethnic groups originating in Europe. There is no indication in the literature that the Nationalities Branch courted Japanese, Chinese or other populations who were affected by the war in the Pacific. The internment of Japanese Canadians living in British Columbia is, perhaps, evidence enough that the Canadian government had no intention of working with these groups.

ethnicity of newcomers and the smug complacency of “established” Canadians.”

In her award-winning book, *Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada*, social historian Franca Iacovetta takes an altogether different approach to that of Pal. She makes the case that the Canadian state (via the Citizenship Branch) and voluntary organizations sought to remake immigrants into good Canadians that upheld specific values: “In the push to have the newcomers conform to “Canadian ways” — which usually reflected Anglo-Canadian middle-class ideals — the accent was on everything from food customs and child-rearing methods, or marriage and family dynamics, to participatory democracy and anti-communist activism.” To fail in this endeavour, Iacovetta writes, “would threaten the values and mores of the Canadian mainstream.” Her book is particularly effective in showing how small organizations like the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto, played the dual role of helping immigrants to understand their new surroundings, as ensuring that any unwanted cultural and political baggage was left at the port of arrival.

Reva Joshee’s work on the origins of “multicultural education” provides a useful model for the development of the discourse within the Citizenship Branch of the 1950s and 1960s. She suggests that there was a shift in the discourse during the mid-1950s from an emphasis on making immigrants into good citizens by integrating them into the Canadian mainstream (what she calls the “citizenship paradigm”), to one in which their cultural attributes were celebrated (the “identity paradigm”). In both periods the CB

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13 Ibid., 85.
15 Ibid., 11.
emphasized “integration” rather than “assimilation” of immigrants; Joshee makes the case that what was meant by “integration” shifted over time from what we would now call “assimilation” to something akin to the modern ethos of cultural pluralism.

What this literature suggests is that, as Ian McKay has pointed out, the growth of liberal ideology is uneven. Although there was a shift toward viewing immigrants and ethnic minorities as potential contributors to the war effort and Canadian society between 1940 and 1950, this was accompanied by suspicion of minorities’ true allegiances and values on the part of the state and citizens’ groups. In the postwar period, ethnic diversity was increasingly celebrated as something that enriched Canada and made its culture more “colourful”; as Iacovetta has shown, not all aspects of “ethnic” cultures were put on display because they threatened the established order. This dissertation builds on this body of literature by elucidating the ways in which the state, voluntary and ethnic organizations, and the media began to re-evaluate what ethnicity meant in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite clear leaps forward at times, other older discourses restricted the growth of multiculturalism as an ideology and policy.

**Cultural and Intellectual Histories of Multiculturalism**

A second strong body of intellectual and cultural history helps to explain why “ethnicity” — broadly speaking — gradually gained acceptance as a part of Canadian identity beginning in the 1920s. A number of music historians and scholars of folk culture have written a series of books and articles that tie the “folk revival” movements of the 1920s and 1930s to an increasing awareness and appreciation of cultural pluralism in the 1950s and 1960s. Stuart Henderson’s “While there is Still Time…” chronicles the attempts by J.
Murray Gibbon to both salvage “ethnic” folk culture and put it on display during the late 1920s and early 1930s.\(^\text{17}\) This early folk revival movement in Canada mirrored similar movements that had taken place during the Romantic age in Europe and the 1920s in Britain and the United States. In a recent book entitled *Americans All: The Cultural Gifts Movement*, Diana Selig makes the case that a "cultural gifts" movement emerged in the United States out of the increased nativism of the inter-war period. White liberals reacted to nativism in the 1920s by sponsoring ethnic festivals, music, art, and dance and material culture. Selig notes that "It seemed critical to ameliorate the problems of racial prejudice in order to diffuse the potential for disruption, violence, and crime. In the interests of social cohesion, liberals preferred to channel — rather than suppress — ethnic difference."\(^\text{18}\) Nonetheless, this movement understood “ethnic” cultures only superficially, and their version of ethnic pluralism "served to confine people to a particular cultural identity."\(^\text{19}\) Henderson’s work suggests that a similar “cultural gifts” movement was gathering steam in Canada. This movement came to fruition in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the folk music revival got under way in the United States and Canada. Gillian Mitchell argues that “cultural pluralism” was central to the folk music revival in both the United States and Canada. Students, protesters, and activists saw their embrace of “ethnic” culture — both home-grown and foreign—as intrinsic to their solidarity with oppressed and racialized groups.\(^\text{20}\) Though the folk music revival alone does not explain the receptiveness of Canadians to “multiculturalism,” it provides the


\(^{19}\) Diana Selig, 13.

backdrop to the political and social changes of the period.

Other intellectual historians look to the political thought of particular individuals or continental (European) schools of thought. The first scholar to attempt a reconnaissance of this subject was Richard J.F. Day in an article published in *Topia* in 1998; he expanded on this work two years later in his book *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity.*\(^{21}\) Day attempts to “show how contemporary Canadian multiculturalism has emerged out of an older and broader discourse on diversity that can be traced back to Herodotus.”\(^ {22}\) According to Day, the modern state policy of multiculturalism is a direct descendant of these earlier forms of diversity discourse. He traces this thought through to the writings of J.S. Woodsworth and Watson Kirkconnell. Whereas Day looks to Europe for multiculturalism’s roots, in his book *A Fair Country: Telling Truths About Canada* the public intellectual John Ralston Saul makes the case that “multiculturalism” really began among Canada’s Indigenous Peoples, who, he claims, were sensitive to cultural and ethnic diversity.\(^ {23}\) According to Saul, multiculturalism began as a social experiment forged during early encounters between European settlers and Indigenous Peoples. The country they built, their mixed-blood progeny, and the institutions they set up are, to Saul, evidence that “multiculturalism” is intrinsic to the Canadian experience.

Peter Henshaw, however, makes the case that Canadian “multiculturalism” discourse originated with the writings and speeches of John Buchan. According to

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Henshaw, Buchan became a multiculturalist during his time as a colonial administrator in South Africa in 1901 and 1902. He came to believe that the British Empire could be sustained if it were to embrace the many peoples within its borders, such as Afrikaners, who would themselves contribute to the vitality of a new, reinvigorated British identity. In 1935, Buchan was given the title “Baron Tweedsmuir of Elsfield” and appointed Governor-General of Canada, a post he held until 1940. Lord Tweedsmuir attempted to apply his understanding of ethnicity to the Canadian context. Most famously, in 1936 he told a gathering of Ukrainian Canadians that “You will all be better Canadians for being also good Ukrainians”; Henshaw sees this as evidence that the Canadian discourse about multiculturalism began a few decades before most scholars have placed it. All three of these authors fail to convince because they do not explain how these broad discourses and, in the case of Saul, ways of life, translated into public policy or even public acknowledgement that Canada was “multicultural.” Without a doubt, multiculturalists of the 1960s drew on these older discourses, but they do not, in themselves, explain where multiculturalism policy comes from.

A third group of intellectual historians deal indirectly with the historical origins of multiculturalism, but provide us with more solid historical footing. Scholars like Phillip Buckner, C.P. Champion, Ryan Edwardson, Jose Igartua, and Gary Miedema have explored the way in which larger social, political, and economic forces called into question Canada’s relationship to Britain in the postwar period.


26 Gary R. Miedema, For Canada's Sake: Public Religion, Centennial Celebrations, and the Re-making of
example, suggests that “Britishness” did not die out as quickly as we previously thought. Jose Igartua makes the case that Canadian public discourse (in newspapers, history textbooks, and speeches) emphasized Canadians’ ethnic attachment to Britain until the 1950s. According to Igartua, it was not until the 1960s that a “civic” definition of the nation evolved; even then, public acceptance of a universal “Canadian” identity, free from ethnic connotations, was uneven. In his recent book, *The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-1968*, C.P Champion cites compelling evidence that Paul Yuzyk and other advocates of multiculturalism as a state policy also maintained an attachment to older symbols of British nationalism. Yuzyk, for example, was opposed to Lester Pearson’s three-leaf flag and hoped that the new flag would, like the old “red ensign,” retain the Union Jack because the British parliamentary system was fundamental to Canadian identity. This work intersects with my own in that it addresses the historical context in which multiculturalism discourse arose in Canada. It explains why, in the span of a few decades, Canadians begin to view themselves less as British subjects or members of the British Empire, and more as “Canadians.” It does not, however, explain how non-British ethnic identities came to be seen as foundational to “Canadian” identity.

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The “Bi and Bi” and the Multicultural Movement

When most scholars discuss the origins of multiculturalism policy, they inevitably look to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Known popularly as the “Bi and Bi,” the “B & B,” or the “Laurendeau-Dunton Commission” (after its co-chairs, André Laurendeau and Davidson Dunton), the Commission is rightfully viewed as a key inspiration for the Trudeau Government’s *Official Languages Act* (1969) and multiculturalism policy (1971). Surprisingly, very little has been written by scholars about this subject. Many of the key authors who have written about these topics were intimately involved in the RCBB as commissioners, researchers, or activists.²⁹ Their understanding of the multiculturalism movement is often tainted by a profound feeling of disappointment at the failure of the Royal Commission to entrench a bicultural vision of Canada in law and the constitution.

Only within the last year has a book-length scholarly study of the Royal Commission come out.³⁰ Eve Haque’s book, *Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual Framework: Language, Race, and Belonging in Canada*, is a close reading of the discourse about ethnicity that emerged out of the Royal Commission and will be an invaluable resource on the Commission for years to come. She makes the case that the

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Royal Commission’s hearings came about at a time in which Canadians were ready and willing to redefine their ethnicity. Haque argues that the Royal Commission’s mandate in regard to “bilingualism” proscribed this debate – and has done so ever since – by reinforcing a linguistic hierarchy that privileges the two “founding peoples.” Thus, she concludes, “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework,” which emerged as a state policy in 1971, entrenched collective language rights for two groups, based upon their settlement histories. However, her book suffers from many of the same problems of historical causality that plague many works on multiculturalism policy. Her neglect of the civil service’s discourse about multiculturalism and, more specifically, the archival sources relating to this topic, is an oversight that this dissertation attempts to remedy.

In some scholarly works, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism is mentioned in connection with the “third force” of ethnic minority groups that arose in response to the Royal Commission’s hearings. Usually this is taken to mean that all of the non-English and non-French ethnic minority groups formed at least a third “solitude” in Canadian society and, at most, a unified bloc of ethnic lobbyists. Scholars continue to use the concept of the “third force” without interrogating or unpacking its meaning(s).

31 I use the term “third force” (in quotation marks) to stand in for a number of similar phrases, including “third group,” “third element,” “tiersmonde,” and “tertium quid.” I certainly do not wish to homogenize the differences between these terms, but they were all used in a similar way. “Third force” was, without a doubt, the most common usage. Paul Yuzyk popularized “third element,” but also used “third force.” Watson Kirkconnell used the term “tertium quid” in an article he wrote for the Ukrainian Canadian Committee’s Bulletin; this is the only place I have seen the term used. Watson Kirkconnell, “Vision of Canada,” The Bulletin 17, no. 1 & 2 (January-June 1969): 15. For “tiersmonde” see “Should Canada Retain Two Official Languages? Rivalries in a Nation of Two Cultures,” The Times (London), 23 June 1964, 10.

32 The phrase “two solitudes” comes, of course, from Hugh MacLennan’s 1945 work by the same name, and refers to French and English Canada. Hugh MacLennan, Two Solitudes (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945).

As Harold Troper and Richard Menkis have shown, the Jewish community, despite being one of the most well-organized and powerful ethnic groups in the country, openly rejected the idea of a “third force.” My work dispels this notion of a “third force” entirely and shows it to have been a rhetorical device used by a handful of activists involved in what can more accurately be described as the multicultural movement.

Recently, scholars like Michael Temelini, Julia Lalande, Richard Menkis, and Harold Troper have argued that Ukrainian Canadians were the driving force behind the multicultural movement. I, too, argue that the movement was almost exclusively a
Ukrainian Canadian endeavour, though it occasionally attracted support from non-Ukrainians. Although the “multicultural movement” and the “third force” are coterminous, if not synonymous in the literature, there seems to be less division among scholars over the use of the term “multicultural movement.” Whereas scholars like Menkis and Troper have shown the “third force” to be a contested notion/rhetorical device during the 1960s, with hindsight we can confidently say that there was a “multicultural movement”; a number of scholars, including Evelyn Kallen and Wsevolod Isajiw, refer to it as such. Kallen, for example, notes that the movement was “spearheaded by Ukrainians.”36 Perhaps more importantly, a number of scholars who were active in the movement have referred to it as the “multicultural movement.” Manoly Lupul says he was a member of the “multicultural movement.”37 In a collection edited by Lupul in 1978, both Roman Serbyn and W. Roman Petryshyn independently used the term “multicultural movement.”38 Whereas the “third force” was a (contested) descriptor of the movement during the 1960s, the “multicultural movement” is palatable to both scholars and former activists.

In this dissertation I use the term “multicultural movement” to refer to a loosely-organized group of activists who pushed the Federal Government to recognize that Canada was “multicultural,” rather than “bicultural,” between 1960 and 1971. During this period, some – but not all – activists claimed to belong to or represent the “third force” or “third element.” What united these activists was not ethnicity, but a belief that Canada was not simply “bicultural” or “dual,” as the public discourse of the time seemed to suggest. Indeed, some supporters of multiculturalism belonged to the (French and English) “two founding peoples.” Whereas the “third force” was said to represent the non-French and non-English ethnic minority communities, the “multicultural movement” is a more accurate description of what was a broader social movement that included both members of the “founding peoples” and ethnic minorities.

**Pierre Trudeau and Multiculturalism**

The other important historical actor who is often cited in connection with the rise of multiculturalism is Pierre Elliott Trudeau, as it was his government that adopted the first multiculturalism policy in 1971. Appraisals of Prime Minister Trudeau’s intentions are polarized. On one end of the spectrum are a handful of scholars who view Trudeau’s intentions as honourable and forward thinking. Though Hugh Donald Forbes acknowledges that there was some public discussion of “multiculturalism” prior to 1971, he refers to Trudeau as “the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism.”

Forbes cites Trudeau’s 1962 essay, “New Treason of the Intellectuals” in which Trudeau declared that “we must separate once and for all the concepts of state and of nation, and make Canada

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a truly pluralistic and polyethnic society” as evidence that Trudeau had a long-standing commitment to “polyethnic pluralism.” Similarly, in their recent intellectual biography of Trudeau, Monique and Max Nemni suggest that (their friend) Trudeau adopted multiculturalism as a state policy because he could accept linguistic rights for Francophones as a viable legal construct, whereas recognition of “cultural” rights was a political and legal minefield.

Other scholars argue that Pierre Trudeau ignored the findings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the service of his larger goal of keeping Quebec in Confederation. On 8 October 1971, Trudeau rose in the House of Commons to announce his government’s multiculturalism policy, which was a direct response to Volume IV of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Trudeau said the following:

It was the view of the royal commission, shared by the government and, I am sure, by all Canadians, that there cannot be one cultural policy for Canadians of British and French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third for all others. For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen or group

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41 Here they refer to Trudeau’s part in the drafting of an article in *Cité Libre* entitled “Bizarre Algèbre.” The “Comité pour une politique fonctionnelle” drafted an article in reaction to the Preliminary Report of the RCBB. They made the case that the Royal Commission’s understanding of the relationship between language and culture was faulty and stood on shaky legal ground. Trudeau and the Comité’s opposition to legal recognition of French-Canadian “culture” (or, in other words, “ethnicity” or “nationhood”) meant that they rejected “biculturalism.” Max Nemni and Monique Nemni, *Trudeau Transformed: The Shaping of a Statesman, 1944-1965* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2011), 449.
of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly.\footnote{Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister), Announcement of Implementation of Policy of Multiculturalism Within Bilingual Framework, Routine Proceedings, House of Commons, 8 October 1971, 8545.}

Kenneth McRoberts, who is a political scientist at York University, views Trudeau’s adoption of multiculturalism as a cynical attempt to defuse Quebecois nationalism. In his book, \textit{Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity}, McRoberts makes the case that multiculturalism policy must have come about because of “Trudeau’s hostility to biculturalism.”\footnote{Kenneth McRoberts, \textit{Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity} (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 124.} Whereas the Royal Commission ultimately concluded that Canada was “bicultural,” Trudeau rejected this notion, as it was tantamount to recognizing Quebec as a unique nation, and might have played into the hands of the separatist movement. Like Forbes, McRoberts dismisses the mobilization of ethnic minorities, saying it was not “sufficiently broad-based to have alone induced the federal government’s adoption of multiculturalism.”\footnote{Kenneth McRoberts, \textit{Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity} (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 124.} In a recent article, Stephane Savard says that Francophone leaders were dismayed at Trudeau’s announcement of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework,” as it undermined the notion of a bicultural Canada.\footnote{Stephane Savard, “Pour “Une politique globale, précise, cohérente et définitive de développement” : Les leaders franco-ontariens et les encadrements politiques fédéraux, 1968-1984,” \textit{Politique et Sociétés} 27, no. 1 (2008): 144-147.}

While Kenneth McRoberts argues that Trudeau “misconceived” Canada and Guy Laforest laments “the End of a Canadian Dream,” Daniel Machabee
calls him “le fossoyeur de la dualité canadienne.”

At best, these scholars view multiculturalism policy as part of Trudeau’s grand strategy to bring Quebec back into the fold; at worst, the policy is seen as shameless pandering, designed to gain “ethnic votes” for the Liberal Party. As it turns out, both of these interpretations overlook the more complex story about the relationship between the multiculturalism movement, the Pearson and Trudeau governments, the Citizenship Branch, and the Royal Commission. The success of this particular school of thought can be attributed to the fact that it is consistent with what we know about Trudeau’s motivations. It is accepted wisdom that Trudeau had little love for nationalism, ethnic or otherwise, and feared any official recognition of French-Canada or Quebec as a “nation.”

Finally, Trudeau’s Liberal Party is often accused — perhaps fairly — of using multiculturalism for political purposes. C.P. Champion attributes the rise of “multiculturalism” to the work of political operatives in the Liberal Party, and says that the Citizenship Branch played a minor role in this process. However, he wisely does not claim that the multiculturalism policy was simply a political move, and confines his analysis to the broader changes at work in postwar Canadian identity. More recently, Varun Uberoi, a political scientist working in Britain, has published two articles that draw heavily on the policy documents presented by Gérard Pelletier and Robert Stanbury

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47 This is a common theme found in much of the polemical literature on multiculturalism. See especially Richard Gwyn, *Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995), 183-184.

to Cabinet in 1971. He concludes that the 1971 multiculturalism policy constituted a successful attempt by the Liberal Party to change Canadian national identity.⁴⁹ Although I agree partially with Uberoi’s conclusions, he neglects to contextualize this attempt by examining Liberal Party policy, the Royal Commission, or the civil service.

Where I differ significantly from other historians and scholars of multiculturalism is in the weight that I assign to Pierre Elliott Trudeau. I view his announcement as a rebranding of existing policy and practice, rather than a significant break with past policy. What was and is most significant about “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” is that it forever changed the way that Canadians publicly understand ethnicity; but these changes had been going on behind the scenes in Ottawa since the 1950s. Trudeau played an important role in that his government brought to light a bureaucratic discourse about multiculturalism, and also acknowledged that ethnic minority groups disagreed with the notion of “biculturalism” that had been guiding the government’s philosophy about ethnicity since Lester B. Pearson created the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963. But the important changes in state practice and policy in regard to ethnic groups had very little to do with Trudeau, or even Pearson.

**Multiculturalism as Ideology**

For better or for worse, our contemporary understanding of “multiculturalism” as an ideology owes much to Pierre Trudeau’s 1971 policy statement. As Gerald Kernerman points out, the modern scholarly and popular debate over multiculturalism began as a

dialogue between the “Canadian School” and the followers of Pierre Trudeau:

“Intellectually and politically, the Canadian School and the Trudeauites presuppose one another.”50 This school, led by Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, James Tully and others, leads the international scholarship on multiculturalism.51 The debate in this body of literature is wide ranging and covers such topics as the Canadian Constitution, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, human rights law, Quebec, and Indigenous Peoples — issues that were all central to Trudeau’s politics.

Similarly, Trudeau casts a long shadow over the popular discussion of multiculturalism. The “normative” or political philosophy literature on multiculturalism arose at the same time that novelists, pundits, and critics began to question the validity of Trudeauvian multiculturalism as a public philosophy and policy.52 Most famously, novelist Neil Bissoondath criticized Trudeau’s multiculturalism policy because, to his mind, it invites ethnic minority groups to remain separate from one another, rather than contribute to a larger “Canadian” identity.53 He is equally critical of the way in which multiculturalism and, in particular, ethnic festivals essentialize complex cultures, ethnicities, and peoples. Though scholars like Kymlicka and Tully have attempted to counter popular critiques of multiculturalism like Bissoondath’s, they have largely been unsuccessful; indeed, Bissoondath’s Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in

50 The connections between these philosophers and Trudeau are even closer than Kernerman lets on: Charles Taylor and Pierre Trudeau were close friends and political rivals in the Mount Royal riding of Montreal. Taylor ran as a New Democratic Party candidate against Trudeau during the 1965 election. Gerald Kernerman, Multicultural Nationalism: Civilizing Difference, Constituting Community (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 7.
51 Ibid., 7.
Canada, published in 1994, became a bestseller. A number of popular critiques of multiculturalism appeared in the 1990s, including books by Richard Gwyn, and Reginald Bibby; more recently we have seen political commentators and journalists like John Ibbotson, John Ralston Saul, and Margaret Wente weigh in.

What is lost in both the scholarly/philosophical discourse and the popular/public discourse about the ideology of multiculturalism is an understanding of periodization, change over time, and historical causality. As Peter Henshaw, Richard J.F. Day and C.P. Champion have all shown, “multiculturalism” has a much longer pedigree than is often acknowledged. But it is not enough to acknowledge that “multiculturalism” has a long history. We must try to understand when the ideology becomes salient to the Canadian public. As Barbara Jeanne Fields points out in her discussion of the ideology of race:

> Ideology is best understood as the descriptive vocabulary of day-to-day existence, through which people make rough sense of the social reality that they live and create from day to day.

Instead of trying to explain when (or if) Canadians came to see themselves as “multicultural,” in this dissertation I show how the Canadian state came to understand Canada as “multicultural.” Fields notes that “Historians can actually observe colonial Americans in the act of preparing the ground for race without foreknowledge of what would later rise on the foundation they were laying.” By the same token, we can see the Citizenship Branch laying the groundwork for multiculturalism in the 1950s and 1960s.

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57 Ibid., 107.
This period is important for the ideology of multiculturalism because it represents the historical “moment” in which popular discussion of and support for cultural pluralism had a decided impact on the Canadian state, public policy, and Canadian identity formation.

**Rebranding Canada**

What my research suggests is that while there were some moments when the Canadian state responded to demands for change to its approach toward ethnicity and Canadian identity, more often than not change came from within the state apparatus itself. I have focused in particular on the activities and philosophy of the Citizenship Branch for two reasons. First, the Citizenship Branch served as the Canadian state’s liaison with ethnic minority groups and immigrants during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. While other agencies, such as the Immigration Branch and the Citizenship Registration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, had jurisdiction over immigrants, only the Citizenship Branch had direct control over and interest in the way that immigrants, ethnic minority communities, and even Indigenous Peoples fit into Canadian society. Whereas the Immigration Branch looked after immigration *per se*, the CB was the only Branch that looked after the public perception and reception of minority communities — what was then known as “integration.” As the multiculturalism policy of 1971 was drafted by bureaucrats working within the Citizenship Branch and built on programs extant in that branch, it therefore seems logical to explain how and why it came to view Canada as “multicultural.”
The second reason that I have traced the historical evolution of thought and practice in the Citizenship Branch is my conviction that multiculturalism “policy” is not as significant as multiculturalism “practice” or programs. As we will see, the Citizenship Branch evolved a range of programs to explain Canada to ethnic minority groups and immigrants, and to explain and champion the cause of these communities among the Canadian-born members of the “charter groups.” Over time, bureaucrats began to view ethnic minority communities as integral parts of Canadian culture and identity, rather than “ethnics” that had to be remade as “Canadian.” As we will see, the multiculturalism policy of 1971 did not amount to a fundamental change in the way that the Canadian state perceived and dealt with ethnicity, but was, rather, a public acknowledgement of both a philosophy and set of social programs that had been built over a couple of decades.

Ian McKay asks us to “[probe] the Canadian state’s logical and historical conditions of possibility as a specific project in a particular time and place.”58 While the conditions under which the historical project known as “multiculturalism” arose are, to a certain extent, “known,” scholars have been unable to show the linkages between the various historical actors. Scholars of ethnicity, the state, and multiculturalism have suggested that the multiculturalism policy originated in the Citizenship Branch, but they have never explained the relationship between the other major players: the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the Citizenship Branch, the multicultural movement, the Liberal Party of Canada, and Pierre Trudeau. As such, I have also attempted a “reconnaissance” of what we already “know” about the origins of multiculturalism policy by re-examining the major players and looking at the connections between them. The

goal here is to explain why “multiculturalism” arose when it did and the degree to which these historical actors brought about changes in the state.

My argument in this dissertation is that these players largely acted independently from one another, but intersected at key moments during the 1960s and early 1970s, thereby leading to the gradual evolution of a policy and public philosophy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.” Though there were many attempts at establishing an ongoing dialogue between the Liberal Party and ethnic minority groups, it was largely unsuccessful until the early 1970s. Likewise, the Royal Commission attempted to dialogue with ethnic minority groups, but failed because of intransigence on the part of the Commissioners, and a misunderstanding about what “biculturalism” meant on the part of ethnic minority organizations. The multicultural movement, though often viewed as having had an impact on the Royal Commission and the Trudeau Government, is shown here to be a divided, almost leaderless movement that had limited success in advancing its aims. For the Ukrainian Canadian community who spearheaded the movement, success would not come through the federal multiculturalism policy, but through provincial reforms to education policy in the early 1970s. The Liberal Party, contrary to much of the literature, is shown to have politicized multiculturalism only after 1971. The Citizenship Branch remained in dialogue with all of these actors as its staff began to create programs and policies that would form the basis of Canada’s multiculturalism policy. Though I contend that the state’s concerns held more weight than those of the Royal Commission or ethnic minority communities in the evolution of these programs and policies, the CB was able to mediate and take into account the concerns of these actors.
This dissertation is laid out in both a chronological and thematic fashion in order to explain each player in the story as well as its interactions with the other players. I begin in Chapter 2 by describing the Citizenship Branch between 1945 and 1963 and the way it evolved an understanding of Canada as ethnically diverse, but united by language and common “Canadian” values. The chronology of Chapter 3 overlaps slightly with the previous chapter by examining the origins of the multicultural movement and the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism between 1957 and 1963. Chapter 4 looks at the intersections between the Citizenship Branch, the Royal Commission, and the multicultural movement between 1963 and 1965. In the fifth chapter I make the case that between 1964 and 1969, the multicultural movement failed to coalesce and, ultimately, was unsuccessful in advancing its aims. Chapter 6 examines how the Liberal Party of Canada began to reconcile “bilingualism and biculturalism” with “multiculturalism” between 1964 and 1970; I also discuss how the position taken by the Citizenship Branch began to align with that of the Liberal Party, thereby facilitating the creation of multiculturalism policy. In Chapter 7, I show how Liberal Party policy intersected with the Royal Commission’s recommendations and pre-existing policy and practice in the Citizenship Branch between 1970 and 1971, leading to the creation of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework as a public policy. I also show how leaders of the multicultural movement played a small role in influencing the policy process. Finally, Chapter 8 explains how the Liberal Party of Canada co-opted multiculturalism after 1971 for political purposes. I suggest that much of what the Citizenship Branch and multiculturalists had worked for in the previous decade was, if not undone, at least tainted by its new association with Liberal Party politics. This turn of
events has, regrettably, obscured what is an important story about the way in which the Canadian state and Canadians came to see themselves as “multicultural.”
Chapter 2: The Citizenship Branch and early discourses of cultural pluralism, 1945-1963

Introduction

In 1952, the Citizenship Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration held its second annual staff conference in Ottawa. The department had only been in existence since January of 1950, so its staff used the occasion to clarify the Branch’s core values and operating principles. As the main liaison between the Federal Government and ethnic minority groups, it was incumbent upon the Citizenship Branch to come to an agreement on the Government’s position on ethnic groups. Among other things, the staff concluded that their department would encourage “co-operation between ethnic groups and between different societies within one ethnic group.” However, the guiding principle behind the Branch’s relations with ethnic minority groups was not the promotion of ethnic cultures, but rather national unity through their integration into the Canadian mainstream. National symbols would bind together cultures, creating a whole out of many parts:

In this connection, the establishment of ethnic societies and folk societies on a local, regional and national level should be encouraged, with the emphasis on achieving a feeling of unity as Canadians, rather than on the individual culture of the participants. For instance, if at the end of a folk festival all the participants would stand together as a mass choir and sing “God Save the Queen”, more would be achieved.

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toward a feeling of unity than any amount of separate folk
dancing that had taken place previously.²

In other words, national unity would be achieved through the singing of a distinctly
British pro-monarchical song. Though the Citizenship Branch’s emphasis on national
unity remained throughout the 1950s and 1960s, just how it believed unity was to be
achieved would change within the next decade.

Six years later the Citizenship Branch sponsored the Second National Seminar on
Citizenship, which was held in Minaki, Ontario. This seminar was different from the
1952 staff conference in that members of voluntary associations involved in citizenship
promotion and immigrant integration were invited. Once again, national unity was central
to much of the proceedings. In a session on Citizenship Day and Dominion Day attended
by two members of the Citizenship Branch (or CB), the Secretary to the Treasury Board,
and seven members of voluntary associations, the group concluded that a national flag
and anthem were key to “the development of a national consciousness.” Nonetheless, it
was important that these symbols did not exclude certain groups:

The fact that “O Canada” and “God Save the Queen” were
used equally in various parts of Canada and on CBC-TV
was considered to highlight the need for the acceptance of
“O Canada” as the official anthem or perhaps even the need
for an entirely new anthem. It was agreed that well
developed symbols could better establish Canada’s identity
in the world and also provide a focal point upon which
New Canadians could centre their pride in their newly-
adopted country. It was further agreed that accepted
Canadian symbols should not be allowed to encourage any
sense of chauvinism within the country.³

³ LAC, Department of Citizenship and Immigration fonds, RG 26, Vol. 67, File 2-18-2, Report of the
Second National Seminar on Citizenship held at Minaki, Ontario, August 24-28, 1958, 44.
So while national unity was still seen as desirable, members of the session did not wish to focus that unity on pre-existing British or “Canadian” traditions if it led to blind patriotism. This declaration reflected the thinking of some members of the CB in 1958, but it should neither be taken to represent the collective wisdom of the department, nor should it be viewed as a shift in policy. Quite to the contrary, at least one member of the department appended a note to the session’s report, noting, “This whole report is highly controversial.” What this report highlights, instead, is a disagreement within the CB over approaches to creating a sense of unity.

During the 1950s and into the early 1960s, the Citizenship Branch privately grappled with many of the issues that became part of the public discussion about “multiculturalism” that opened up after 1963. As the primary liaison between ethnic minorities and the Canadian state during the 1950s and 1960s, an understanding of the Citizenship Branch is crucial to any discussion of the origins of multiculturalism discourse and policy. The Citizenship Branch had established multiculturalism policy and programs well before the Liberal Government of Pierre Trudeau announced its multiculturalism policy in 1971. In this chapter I show how thinking about the role of ethnic minority groups evolved within the Citizenship Branch during the 1950s and early 1960s.

While “national unity” remained a constant concern for this small group of civil servants, their understanding of how national unity was to be achieved evolved between 1945 and 1963. Whereas in the early 1950s national unity would be achieved by integrating ethnic minorities into Canadian society as seamlessly as possible, by the early
1960s ethnic minorities were increasingly viewed as a means of strengthening national unity. Though it was believed that all ethnic groups would eventually assimilate completely into either British or French cultures, their contributions were believed to enrich Canadian culture. By helping ethnic minorities and immigrants negotiate their integration into the mainstream, and by helping them to share their cultures with other Canadians (rather than form ethnic enclaves), Citizenship Branch staff believed that they were encouraging the growth of a stronger national identity. In effect, this laid the groundwork what would become known as “multiculturalism.”

The Nationalities Branch

It is now well established in the historical literature that what we understand as “multiculturalism policy” has its roots in the Citizenship Branch and its predecessor, the Nationalities Branch. The Nationalities Branch was set up during the Second World War to involve ethnic minority groups in the war effort and combat Communism at home and

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4 I use these terms – “ethnic minority groups”/“ethnic minorities”/“ethnic minority communities” and “immigrants” to differentiate between two different, but overlapping, communities. The Citizenship Branch was initially charged with looking after the integration of “immigrants”; in fact, it also was involved in work with established ethnic minority communities (second and third-generation Canadians). As first-generation immigrants are a small part of this story (and can usually be safely included in the category “ethnic minorities”), I use “ethnic minority groups” or “ethnic minorities” to denote first, second, and third-generation Canadians of non-French and non-English background. In cases where immigrants are specifically referred to in a text or source, or are otherwise relevant to the story, I use the term “immigrants.” I am using the terms “ethnic minority groups” or “ethnic minority communities” to differentiate groups like Ukrainian Canadians from what Will Kymlicka calls “substate national groups,” to wit, the Quebeccois/French Canadians and Indigenous Peoples. Although British/Anglo/English Canadians did not constitute a “substate national group” or “national minority” according to Kymlicka’s definition (but were, instead, comprised of many ethnic minority communities, including Welsh, Scots, and Irish), they were perceived as a national minority in this period. It is also worth noting that Kymlicka calls groups like Ukrainian Canadians “immigrant groups”; in keeping with the dominant discourse, relative latecomers (Ukrainians, Germans, Chinese) are seen as “immigrants,” while national minorities like the Quebeccois or Indigenous Peoples are not. This language is problematic for obvious reasons. As such, I refer to these groups as “ethnic minority communities” because they are not “national” minorities, nor are they necessarily “immigrants.” Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007), 68-71, 71-77.
abroad. As Nandor Dreisziger wrote in 1988, “The present-day governmental machinery that deals with the non-British and non-French elements of the population, the multiculturalism sector of the Department of the Secretary of State, is a direct descendant of the wartime Nationalities Branch.” Freda Hawkins, who worked in both the Citizenship Branch and its successor, the Multiculturalism Directorate, notes that “In many ways, multiculturalism in Canada is a new name for an old activity, namely the long-standing efforts of the federal Citizenship Branch to encourage harmonious community relations in Canadian cities and to protect and assist ethnic groups.” Franca Iacovetta recently made the case that civil servants in the Citizenship Branch — she calls them “gatekeepers” — anticipated official multiculturalism by using terms like “cultural mosaic” and “unity in diversity,” and by advocating “a modest form of cultural pluralism.”

The Canadian government's concern over the political leanings of ethnic minority groups during the Second World War precipitated the creation of the Nationalities Branch of the Department of the Department of National War Services in 1942. The Nationalities Branch functioned as a wartime propaganda arm of the Department of the

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7 Franca Iacovetta, Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Postwar Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006), 51.
Secretary of State and was designed to monitor the ethnic press, discourage Communism, and inculcate a patriotic spirit in ethnic minority groups. The Dominion Government was encouraged to create the Nationalities Branch after its earlier success in encouraging the creation of a federation of nationalist Ukrainian groups in 1940. Tracy Philipps, George Simpson, and V.J. (Vladimir) Kaye, whose initial work on behalf of the Department of National War Services led to the formation of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, formed the nucleus of the Nationalities Branch. Though they could not have known it at the time, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), in concert with the Nationalities Branch’s successor, the Citizenship Branch, would have a profound impact on the creation of multiculturalism as a state policy in Canada. With the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the Canadian Government recognized that there would now be “a substantial flow of immigrants to Canada”; as a result, the Nationalities Branch was asked to shift its focus from ethnic minorities to immigrants.

In August of 1944, prior to his departure from the Nationalities Branch, Robert England was asked to draw up a plan for the Nationalities Branch’s work in peacetime. England had been a special assistant in the Department of National War Services during the war, and had been intimately involved in the Nationalities Branch’s work. He proposed an “18-point programme” for the proposed “Citizenship Division” (which would shortly be renamed the “Citizenship Branch.”) Though this mandate would be distilled into only four points by 1951, it is a good example of the kinds of activities that

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would actually fall under the CB’s purview during the 1950s and 1960s. England believed that the Citizenship Branch should take on a number of responsibilities, including research on ethnic groups, work with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board on programs “to assist greater mutual understanding,” reducing racial discrimination, and ensuring that ethnic minorities were represented on the boards of voluntary organizations. Much of the “18-point programme” would find its way into the new Citizenship Branch and its successor, the Multiculturalism Directorate.

In November of 1945, the Nationalities Branch was renamed the Citizenship Branch and transferred from the Department of National War Services to the Department of the Secretary of State. Though it continued to monitor the ethnic press in a vain attempt to manage the Communist threat, the new Citizenship Branch now turned its attention to the socialization of new immigrants. Like the Nationalities Branch before it, the CB tried to make immigrants into good citizens by educating them about Canadian values. In 1950, the Citizenship Branch was transferred to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, where it stayed until 1966. According to Leslie A. Pal, the Branch in the early 1950s “was devoted to education and liaison, not social change or the more

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11 Other activities in the 18-point programme included: submission of articles dealing with Canadian citizenship to the foreign language press; work with the Canadian Handicraft Guild; continued work with Prof. Watson Kirkconnell of Acadia University on the publication of ethnic language “classics”; “promotion of women’s activities”; servicemen killed in action; fitness with “folk dancing as part of the programme”; citizenship material; celebrating “great Europeans of various communities”; the welcoming of European servicemen by Canadian Legion branches; providing “suitable material” for those giving speeches in languages other than English or French; discrimination regarding European family names (and making it easier to change one’s name!); veterans affairs; study of urban segregation and congestion (read: ethnic ghettos). LAC, Canadian Citizenship Branch fonds, RG26, vol. 67, file 2-18-1, Report of the First Annual Conference of the Canadian Citizenship Branch, August 20-25, 1951, 4-5.

12 Upon its dissolution in 1944, the Nationalities Branch was briefly renamed the Citizenship Division at the request of Robert England; Leslie A. Pal, Interests of state: the politics of language, multiculturalism, and feminism in Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 77.

vigorouso mobilization that had been characteristic of the war period.” \[14\] Whereas during
the Second World War the Nationalities Branch had been partially responsible for the
creation of immigration policy, after the war the Department of Mines and Resources
officially looked after immigration policy. After 1950, these responsibilities were
transferred to the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration
(DCI). \[15\] Most of the resources of the DCI were dedicated to the Immigration Branch and
the Indian Affairs Branch of the department, so the Citizenship Branch was charged with
the more benign task of promoting national unity and helping to develop a Canadian
national consciousness, especially among immigrants. \[16\]

In addition to publishing pamphlets and continuing to monitor the ethnic press, the
Branch gave annual grants to various voluntary organizations that promoted a sense of
civic nationalism, such as the Canadian Citizenship Council and the Canadian
Association for Adult Education, throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Instead of stepping on
the toes of people in the Indian Affairs and Immigration branches of the DCI, members of
the Citizenship Branch relied upon private organizations to promote the peaceful and
harmonious integration of immigrants, Indians, and ethnic minorities, but refrained from
making policy pronouncements to this effect. \[17\] The Citizenship Branch, then, maintained
a low profile within both the civil service and Canadian society. It became a catchall
department, with responsibilities for human rights, citizenship development, as well as

\[14\] Leslie A. Pal, *Interests of state: the politics of language, multiculturalism, and feminism in Canada*
\[15\] Hereafter I will use “DCI” and “Department of Citizenship and Immigration” interchangeably.
\[16\] Leslie A. Pal, *Interests of state: the politics of language, multiculturalism, and feminism in Canada*
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 82; Freda Hawkins, *Canada and
Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern* (Montreal & London: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1972), 97.
\[17\] Leslie A. Pal, *Interests of state: the politics of language, multiculturalism, and feminism in Canada*
the integration of new immigrants, ethnic minorities, and Indians. Though it was officially charged with looking after “immigrants” – often called newcomers – in reality the CB looked after all people not of British or French ancestry.

The Citizenship Branch in the early 1950s

With such a wide-ranging mandate, to work in the Citizenship Branch of the early 1950s must have been both exciting and confusing. On the one hand, the Branch was expected to continue the work of the Nationalities Branch, but it was supposed to focus on the integration of immigrants, rather than on established ethnic minority groups. On the other hand, responsibility for immigration policy (recruitment, quotas, legislation) was left to the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Similarly, the CB was asked to look after the integration of Native Peoples into Canadian society; but again the establishment of “Indian” policy was left to the Indian Affairs Branch of the DCI. In short, the Citizenship Branch was responsible for the integration of immigrants and Indians into Canadian society, but was limited in the degree to which its policies could intervene in the lives of (members of) these groups.

As such, the Citizenship Branch operated primarily as a propaganda branch – the term used at the time was “information” – that distributed literature and monitored the activities of ethnic minority groups. As the decade progressed, the Branch moved away

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from a purely “information” role and began to create grants programs that allowed for more direct intervention in the community and organizational life of ethnic groups. Frank Foulds, the first director of the Citizenship Branch, distilled the Branch’s role into a succinct statement at its first annual conference in 1951:

To promote unity among all racial groups; to awaken in every Canadian, regardless of race or creed, a deep conviction of the worth of the individual and the principles of democracy; and to encourage a greater consciousness among our people of the achievements of the Canadian nation and the fact that all Canadians actively share in these achievements.²¹

In its role as a propaganda/information branch, the CB provided private voluntary organizations with pamphlets, books, and language material that emphasized these ideas (democracy, nationhood). The grants programs of the mid to late-1950s allowed the CB to focus its efforts by specifically targeting particular organizations that could help to carry out the Branch’s mandate.

A handful of scholars have attempted to understand the organizing logic behind the programs of the Citizenship Branch in the 1950s and 1960s. Leslie Pal characterizes the CB in this period as a neutral arbiter that tried to balance the need to integrate immigrants and ethnic minorities into the mainstream, with the a desire to create acceptance of ethnic difference on the part of the receiving society.²² Franca Iacovetta, on the other hand, sees the staff of the CB as having taken a more active role in defining what it meant to be “Canadian” in the postwar period; these “gatekeepers,” as she calls them, were Cold Warriors who patrolled the boundaries of Canadian identity. While Iacovetta’s

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characterization of the Nationalities Branch/Citizenship Branch is accurate during the late 1940s and early 1950s, I am not certain that it holds up later in the decade. Her 2006 book *Gatekeepers* shows how the Citizenship Branch and small organizations that it funded, such as the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto, tried to manage the integration process in the postwar period. Iacovetta’s argument rests on a careful and faithful reading of personal papers of the chief liaison officer of the Citizenship Branch, Vladimir Kaye. Kaye was active in monitoring the ethnic press, discouraging Communism among ethnic minorities, and ensuring that immigrants and established minorities understood the responsibilities of Canadian citizenship.\(^{23}\)

But if we look at the Citizenship Branch as a whole, the picture becomes cloudier and less exact. Though Kaye’s work within the CB was important, he was but one of several officials who were trying to simultaneously protect, nurture, project and – in some cases – evolve Canadian culture and identity. Moreover, the activities of the Citizenship Branch expanded dramatically after 1950 – so much so that Kaye’s office became less and less important over time. While there can be little doubt that particular individuals, such as Kaye, had a personal interest in defeating international Communism, the Citizenship Branch as a whole was not oriented this way.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{24}\) In his “historical review” of the Citizenship Branch, written in December 1967, W.H. Agnew notes that Kaye was “the only member of the original staff to transfer with the Branch” when it moved to the SOS (and, later, to the DCI). Iacovetta argues that Kaye overshadowed much of the work in the Branch because of his work as head of the Editorial Section and as head of the Liaison Division. However, Agnew makes clear that the Editorial Section (which monitored the ethnic language press and published the FLPRS reports) was just a small part of what was a rapidly expanding and unwieldy department after 1950. Moreover, although Iacovetta says that Kaye was head of the Liaison Division, this was only the case from 1945 to 1954, when R. Alex Sim replaced him. Iacovetta refers to Sim as “A senior Citizenship Branch official.” Though it is Sim, more than anyone else, who attempted to define the CB’s postwar philosophy of “integration,” Iacovetta privileges Kaye’s work as a liaison officer. As a social historian, she is concerned
The Canadian Government’s commitment to fostering democratic values, good citizenship, national unity, and racial harmony meant that, in practical terms, the CB’s mandate covered more than just producing literature about and for “immigrants” and “Indians.” It was also responsible, among other things, for citizenship ceremonies, the creation of textbooks on citizenship, and the promotion of ethnic minority cultures in the wider Canadian society. The Citizenship Branch’s official mandate in 1951 was fourfold:

1. To collect and disseminate information designed to promote greater understanding among the various groups of people in Canada.

2. To engage in adult education and liaison work with a view to promoting greater understanding of our Canadian way of life and strengthening our convictions regarding the principles of democracy.

3. To accelerate the acceptance of the newcomer and his integration into Canadian life; to increase the present contribution to it on the part of the newcomers.

4. To keep contact with other Departments of the Federal Government and with Departments of the Provincial Governments, especially their Departments of Education; with municipalities; with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the National Film Board, and the Foreign

with what is going on on the ground. Here I am concerned with the overall orientation of the Citizenship Branch, not the way in which it actually dealt with ethnic minority groups. Iacovetta has convincingly shown that voluntary organizations in Toronto, many of which were sponsored by the CB, tried to create a certain type of citizen from the raw “ethnics” then entering Canada. She does not, however, provide convincing evidence that other CB staff members thought of themselves as “gatekeepers” or were overly concerned about international Communism. CTASC, Bernard Ostry fonds, 1991-030, vol. 62, file 504, Historical Review, “The Canadian Citizenship Branch,” 1967, The Canadian Citizenship Branch – Historical Review by W.H. Agnew, Chief, Publications & Information Division, December 1967, 3, 20; Franca Iacovetta, Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Postwar Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006), 60, 80, 110.

25 Franca Iacovetta and Heidi Bohaker have demonstrated how “Ottawa viewed immigrants and status Indians (especially those living on reserves) as marginal and foreign groups who had to be brought into the Canadian mainstream”; the Citizenship Branch adapted policies used for integrating immigrants for use on Native populations. Franca Iacovetta and Heidi Bohaker, “Making Aboriginal People ‘Immigrants Too’: A Comparison of Citizenship Programs for Newcomers and Indigenous Peoples in Postwar Canada, 1940s–1960s,” Canadian Historical Review 90, no.3 (September 2009): 430.
This new branch had three divisions: Liaison, Information, and Research. Vladimir Kaye initially headed the Liaison Division; his responsibilities included the continued monitoring of the ethnic press and liaison with the editors of the various ethnic newspapers. Kaye also liaised with various so-called “voluntary associations” involved in the promotion of good citizenship, immigrant integration, and national unity among newcomers. The Information Division at this point provided materials about Canadian values and the responsibilities of citizenship, which were distributed to the ethnic language press via the Liaison Division.

The Research Division produced booklets on Canadian citizenship, English and French-language textbooks for use in citizenship and language classes, as well as films. As Leslie Pal points out, the CB did not run citizenship and language classes itself. Instead, it relied upon community organizations, local “citizenship councils” (most of whom were affiliated with the Canadian Citizenship Council, or CCC), and provincial governments to carry out programs relating to the training of new immigrants. Annual grants were given to the provinces to carry out citizenship classes for “New Canadians” (a catchall phrase for immigrants and ethnic minorities). During the 1954 calendar year, for example, the smallest grants were given to Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick ($72.00 and $329.10, respectively), while the largest grants went to Ontario and Manitoba ($136,176.34 and 16,710.00, respectively). In 1953 the Minister of

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28 LAC, Canadian Citizenship Branch fonds, RG26, vol. 65, file 2-3-1, vol. 1, Grants to Provinces for
Citizenship and Immigration, on behalf of the Citizenship Branch, negotiated for the Federal Government and the provinces to jointly fund citizenship instruction. A second round of talks took place almost a decade later over the issue of language textbooks for the instruction of immigrants. The Legal Division of the DCI attempted to negotiate an agreement with each province. While Ontario signed in November of 1962, Quebec and British Columbia held out until at least July of 1964.

**Shifting notions of “Canadian”**

Clearly the Citizenship Branch interpreted its mandate in the broadest terms; its staff aimed to bring very diverse groups – immigrants, ethnic minorities, and even Indigenous Peoples – into the mainstream. It liaised with the provinces, voluntary organizations, the ethnic press, and urban Indigenous groups. Heidi Bohaker and Franca Iacovetta have shown that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration had a “mandate to turn both Indigenous peoples and newcomers into Canadian citizens.” The CB tried to inculcate in Indians and Immigrants “common ‘Canadian’ values of respect, tolerance, and liberal democracy, and a demonstrated conformity to Canadian models of social behaviour.”

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Indigenous Peoples were encouraged to enter mainstream Canadian life by changing their life patterns and becoming like everyone else.

In spite of their desire to make immigrants and Indians into good Canadians, the Branch’s staff did not agree on what it meant to integrate into Canadian society. Frank Foulds declared in the Branch’s first annual conference in 1951 that “The entire history of Canada is one of immigration of peoples from other lands to this Continent.” He argued that the principle that would guide the Branch in its dealings with immigrants was “integration,” rather than “assimilation.”\textsuperscript{33} Later in the conference, Foulds’ Assistant Director, Dr. Charbonneau, gave an address entitled “Education for National Unity (English-French Problems).” He told the conference that the main purposes of the Branch were to “promote unity among all racial groups and to promote the integration of new Canadians.” Charbonneau continued by saying that the “charter groups” (the British and French) “should set the example to the new Canadians” by enriching Canada, but not merging.\textsuperscript{34} Others referred to the Canadian population “of origins other than British Isles or French” and national unity being achieved through “mutual understanding between English and French-speaking Canada.”\textsuperscript{35}

To modern Canadians it might seem inconsistent for Frank Foulds to declare that Canada was a country of immigrants and for his staff to say that there were “charter groups” or that the CB was looking after people “other than British Isles or French.” By the standards of the 1950s, the notion that some “immigrants” (and by this Foulds meant ethnic groups) were more equal than the others was entirely in keeping with the

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 26.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 69, 71.
What is more, this kind of thinking continued into the 1960s. But while the Citizenship Branch of the early 1950s often privileged Canada’s two main “cultures” or “charter groups,” this thinking gradually gave way to an embrace of ethnic diversity. Part of this involved a shift in the notion of who constituted a “Canadian.”

If there was an underlying logic to the Citizenship Branch in the 1950s and early 1960s it was based upon the idea of “integration.” Immigrants, ethnic minorities, and “Indians” were expected to “integrate” into the Canadian mainstream, thereby ensuring national unity; in fact, this version of “integration” was similar to what we would now call “assimilation.” Freda Hawkins notes that the staff of the Citizenship Branch was often trained in community development and the social sciences. This background encouraged “a great interest in intergroup relations, in the sociology of integration, and, above all, in the development of the total Canadian community.” Much of the language they used we would now view as racist or, at the very least, insensitive. First Nations and Inuit were portrayed as a “primitive culture,” while Eastern European minorities were a potential “fifth column.” During the 1950s and early 1960s it was

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36 We can see this attitude in contemporary history texts. Arthur Lower wrote the following in 1958: “The new tensions that have been introduced into our activity by mass immigration are often painfully obvious but it can at least be said that these lead us unwillingly in the same direction to which every other large factor in Canadian life impel us— to compromise. Everyone hates compromise too, but where you have a country of two primary cultures, two primary religions, and two pulls on fundamental allegiance—one to the past and one to the country—and now, another large, heterogeneous group which must be built into the original structure, only one attitude becomes possible, short of endemic civil war, the attitude of compromise. Whatever the ultimate balance of his account, the ‘New Canadian’ has at least promoted this most unwelcome of all the Canadians [sic] virtues, compromise.” Arthur M. Lower, Canadians in the Making: A Social History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958), 382.
assumed that all immigrant groups (and, by extension, ethnic minority groups) would integrate into one of the two predominant “cultures.” In other words, to be “Canadian” was to take on the values and language of British-Canadian or French-Canadian society.

Nonetheless, the language that Citizenship Branch civil servants and voluntary organizations they worked with used was more complicated and messy than scholars have acknowledged. For example Joseph Kage of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society, a group that worked closely with the Citizenship Branch throughout this period, wrote an article for a UNESCO publication in 1955 that espoused the virtues of a policy of “integration.” In it he asked the question “But who are the Canadians?” His answer was quite telling:

Ninety-eight per cent are transplanted Europeans. The population of Canada is represented by many ethnic groups, the majority being French, British and Central Europeans. It is these varied human ingredients which form Canada’s national life. No one element predominates. All are minorities, but all are Canadians, entering each with his own capacity into the mosaic of Canadian life.

Despite his contention that “no element predominates” in the Canadian “mosaic,” Kage advocated an integration policy. The unspoken assumption here was that immigrants had to integrate into a (preexisting) Canadian culture. Though he never defined what this was, Kage referred obliquely to “Canadian democracy,” “language” and “Citizenship.” Nevertheless, Kage’s language is very similar to that which would be used by advocates of multiculturalism less than ten years later. There was an underlying tension in Kage’s

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article between a need to make immigrants adopt “democracy” and speak English or French, and a recognition that everyone was, to a certain extent, a minority.

By 1955, it was not seen as inconsistent for the Citizenship Branch to emphasize both the British and French roots of the country and its (new) immigrant identity. This is evident in CB publications from this period. A recommendation was made at the 1953 National Seminar on Citizenship that the CB create a publication of its own.41 Beginning in April of 1955, the Branch began to publish a quarterly journal called Citizen, which was distributed for free to voluntary organizations who wished to receive it. It was meant to “serve as a “clearing house” for information on all kinds of citizenship programmes and projects.”42 In the first edition of Citizen, the Citizenship Branch put forward a mission statement that summarized its current thinking on ethnic minority groups:

The population of Canada is an assorted package with ingredients of many varieties. Since the war, over a million immigrants have come from some 40 different countries. About 30 per cent have been of British origin; the remainder have come from other lands. Thus, in addition to Canadians of French and British cultural traditions, we have many people with other cultural backgrounds. This calls for understanding and co-operation between the people of the various ethnic groups so that we may live together in harmony, and so that everyone can make his best contribution to the country.43

Again, Canada was portrayed as a nation of immigrants, but some of them were “in addition” to the French and British. Only four years later, the Citizenship Branch

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published a booklet for “newcomers” called *The Canadian Scene*. The book emphasized that Canadians both old and new were committed, among other things, to democracy, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, and the Commonwealth. Despite the emphasis on the monarchy and the Commonwealth, the booklet insisted, simply: “Canada is a nation of immigrants.”44 It is not clear that this reflected a change in Citizenship Branch policy. However, Canada was increasingly portrayed as a “nation of immigrants” during the late 1950s and early 1960s, while the references to the British and French “roots” of Canada’s peoples became less prevalent.

“*In Search of Citizens*”

If the war effort required that Canadians learn to accept the “ethnics” already living among them, the postwar influx of immigrants and Displaced Persons (DPs) from Europe required the new Citizenship Branch to extend this acceptance to so-called “New Canadians.” One way that it attempted to do this was through the sponsorship of films and radio programs. These productions offer insight into the way that the CB and other institutions understood “Canadian” identity in the postwar period. During the Second World War, the Nationalities Branch had produced a radio series called “Canadians All,” which was designed to impress upon Canadians the contributions made by ethnic minority groups to the war effort. The Nationalities Branch later added a film, *Peoples of Canada*, produced by the National Film Board, and a magazine, *Canadians All*, to their

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44 Canadian Citizenship Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, *The Canadian Scene* (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer, 1959), 59.
arsenal of pro-Canadian propaganda. In 1948, the Community Programs Division of the Ontario Department of Education corresponded with the CB in regard to a new radio series to be broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in Ontario called “In Search of Citizens.” This series was produced by the Talks and Public Affairs Department of the CBC. The Ontario Department of Education suggested that the Citizenship Branch could contribute funding as well as content to aid in the production of this series. Like the wartime propaganda of the Nationalities Branch, this radio series was designed to educate established Canadians about the virtues of immigrants.

“In Search of Citizens” revolved around a “typical Canadian family in a small town in Ontario,” with each broadcast telling a story and but also conveying ideas about immigration, good citizenship, and acceptance of newcomers. This family included a father, mother, two sons, and a daughter. The father was a member of the Municipal Council and owner of a small store, while the mother was a housewife who belonged to a church organization. Neighbours — presumably ethnic — were “brought into [the] story through the mother.” The older son, aged 27, was a returned serviceman who married an English war bride; he attended university in another town during the week, while his young bride lived with the family. The daughter, aged 20, was a public school teacher with a “steady beau,” and the younger son, aged 16, had a paper route.

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47 Although it is never explicitly suggested, the implication is that the “typical family” is white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant; LAC, Canadian Citizenship Branch fonds, RG26, vol. 66, file 2-18-1, vol. 1, Advisory Committee on Citizenship: General File (Inter-Departmental & Welfare Organizations Committee), Stephen Davidovich to Frank Foulds, 2 September 1948, 1.
representations of immigrants were brought into the story through the daughter who taught classes to DPs, and the older son who “knew many Displaced Persons in camps in Europe.” The father, on the other hand,

[Was] a “sel-made” [sic] man [who] takes a poor view of other groups invading his conservative life. Naturally the son of 27 who has been in the Army of Occupation is sympathetic toward Displaced Persons and those who have lived under distressing conditions.48

In addition to giving Canadians “a real understanding of the background of the immigrants now entering out country,” the radio series was also meant to “define for Canadians ‘good citizenship’” and pay particular attention to showing how they could assist “New Canadians” to become good citizens. It was hoped that the series would “give Canadians an appreciation of the fact that the assimilation process will be a long range project requiring their sympathetic aid.”49

Along with several other federal and provincial departments, the Citizenship Branch gave financial support to broadcasts of “In Search of Citizens.” Although the staff of the CB did not offer suggestions as to how to improve the radio series, a few individuals who were intimately associated with the department did. Stephen Davidovich, who was then serving as the Supervisor of Citizenship for the Community Programs Division of the Ontario Department of Education, had initially asked the CB to contribute to the production of the series. As late as September 1946, Davidovich had been a reader (translator) of ethnic language newspapers, as well as part of a group working on

National Citizenship Ceremonies in the Citizenship Branch of the DCI. As well, Hugh Keenleyside, Deputy Minister of the Department of Mines and Resources (which was then responsible for immigration) corresponded with both the CBC and Frank Foulds in the Citizenship Branch on this issue.

Irene Baird, an information officer in Keenleyside’s office, offered her suggestions on the language used in the series and drafted a reply to the CBC on his behalf. As Joan Sangster has recently noted in an article in the *Journal of Historical Biography*, Baird was giving advice to the National Film Board and the Canadian Association for Adult Education in regard to films and pamphlets dealing with immigrants. Much like the staff of the CB, Irene Baird emphasized that the Federal Government should advocate a hands-off approach to promoting good citizenship among new immigrants. To her mind, the series should emphasize that the Government can only do so much and that eventually the community must take responsibility for “making the newcomer feel at home in the broadest sense.” She also suggested that the producers of “In Search of Citizens” try not to characterize immigrants solely as a “problem.” She noted that an early draft of the script struck her as “essentially negative” in that it included phrases like “some of the problems they meet,” and “ways of preventing unpleasant situations.”

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Baird did not seem concerned with all of the language in the script, however. One passage read: “This broadcast will emphasize the European background of the new citizen, and show how this contributes to his confusion and difficulty of adjusting to the Canadian scene.”

Baird did not comment on the characterization of all immigrants as “European,” but disagreed with the suggestion that they had encountered “confusion and difficulty” upon entering Canada.

In Keenleyside’s response to the CBC, drafted by Baird, he said that the negative aspects of immigration should be contrasted with positive images:

> To balance this, I would suggest an equal emphasis on the constructive or contributory side – what each immigrant is bringing to his new country and how Canada stands to be enriched. With the exception of Canadians of Eskimo and Indian stock, all that we call “Canada” has been the work of immigrants!

Keenleyside thought the CBC should focus on concrete examples of the contributions of immigrants to industry, rather than the social problems that attended their arrival in Canada. The kind of language used in this correspondence is typical of the period. On one hand, “In Search of Citizens” was about the “assimilation process” of “European” immigrants. It was natural that the immigrants should be characterized as European, and it was natural to assume that they would assimilate into the Canadian mainstream. On the other hand, Keenleyside and Baird were concerned with any negative portrayal of immigrants. They hoped that this program would teach established Canadians about how

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54 Baird was not referring to only one new citizen, but to the metaphorical “new citizen,” which can be taken to be plural.
immigrants would enrich Canada with their labour and positive cultural attributes.

Although “In Search of Citizens” was supported by grants from the Ontario and Federal Governments, the CBC broadcast the series on affiliated radio stations across the country. From Moncton, Campbellton, and Yarmouth, to Kenora, Winnipeg, and Victoria, Canadians tuned in to the CBC Dominion network on Tuesday evenings from 30 November 1948 to 4 January 1949 and heard the Canadian Government’s take on new immigrants. The broadcasts were entitled “The Hidden Haven,” “Ideas are Immigrants,” and “The Indian Giver,” with two broadcasts entitled “When is a Canadian?”; bookending the series. A brochure advertised the series as being written by George Salverson with consultation from Professor Charles E Hendry of the School of Social Work at the University of Toronto. However, correspondence indicates that Marjorie McEnaney of the Talks and Public Affairs Department of the CBC also had a hand in writing the script. The broadcasts were advertised to the public as a series of stories brought by immigrants from war torn Europe. Through these stories “We get disconcerting glimpses of “ourselves as others see us.” – our own habits, customs and attitudes as seen through the eyes of the tailoress from Latvia or the lumber-jack from the heart of Poland.” The CBC emphasized that these newcomers were “hard workers” who “bring new techniques to our industries and thus increase our industrial output.” In

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57 Several departments contributed grants. Federal contributions came from the Departments of Mines and Resources, Health and Welfare, Labour, Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of State; the Citizenship Branch was house within the SOS until 1950. Provincial funds came from the Ontario Department of Education. LAC, Canadian Citizenship Branch fonds, RG26, vol. 66, file 2-18-1, vol. 1, Advisory Committee on Citizenship: General File (Inter-Departmental & Welfare Organizations Committee), Will You Help?
addition, their multilingualism was seen as “enriching our culture and broadening our horizons.” The brochure concluded that the radio series was designed to increase “mutual understanding” between newcomers and established Canadians: “We want these newcomers to feel that they are welcome, and we want to understand them better, just as they are trying, most of them, to understand us.”

“In Search of Citizens” went on to win a “Special Award” at the first Canadian Radio Awards. Though we cannot know what kind of impact it had on creating an awareness of or appreciation for cultural pluralism in Canadian society, this series underscores the degree to which civil servants in the Citizenship Branch tried to create a climate in which established Canadians could accept immigrants. Their language spoke simultaneously of assimilating these immigrants, as well as the enrichment that their labour, culture and language offered to Canadians. While the word “assimilation” fell into disrepute after the CB’s annual meeting in 1951, this kind of discourse would remain. At no point before 1963 would the Citizenship Branch suggest that all “cultures” were equal. Its staff clearly felt that immigrants (and ethnic minorities) had something positive to offer Canadians, but that they, in turn, had to accept that “Canadian culture” was something that they would have to fit into.

**Brussels World’s Fair, 1958**

In 1958, the Canadian Government – and through it the Citizenship Branch – had the opportunity to project its understanding of Canadian culture to the world. In that year the

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Brussels World’s Fair opened in Belgium. Best known for its “Atomium” sculpture, Brussels 1958 was the first world’s fair of the Cold War. It was, therefore, an important site for the ongoing cultural battle being waged between Western and Communist bloc countries. As Sarah Nilsen points out in her recent study of the Brussels World’s Fair, “The political and cultural context, together with the opportunity to reach a massive audience, ensured an unprecedented level of concern for the messages and images presented.” Indeed, forty million people would visit the Fair between April 17 and October 19, 1958. Canada enthusiastically took part in this event, with such public figures as Yousuf Karsh and Hugh MacLennan contributing to exhibits in Canada’s pavilion. For its part, the Canadian Citizenship Branch took the opportunity to emphasize Canada’s newfound commitment to integration, rather than assimilation.

Baron Moens de Fernig, the Belgian Government’s Commissioner of the Exhibition, invited the Canadian Government to participate in the World’s Fair in 1954. De Fernig said that this fair was different from other world’s fairs in that it would focus on the social, philosophic, religious, and “moral” contributions of the participating countries, rather than simply their economic contributions and producing power. The Minister of Trade and Commerce proposed to Cabinet that Canada participate and quickly set up an interdepartmental advisory committee to advise Mr. G. Bannerman, Director of the Canadian Government Exhibition Commission. Although the Department

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61 Although the Canadian Government was initially concerned that the Canadian pavilion “would be almost completely surrounded by Communist area pavilions,” the interdepartmental committee determined that it would not pose a problem because “The physical advantages of the Canadian site were felt to outweigh the potential disadvantages”; LAC, Canadian Citizenship Branch fonds, RG26, vol. 82, file 1-24-35, vol.1, Brussels Universal and International Exhibition-1958: General File, Interdepartmental Advisory Committee, Supplementary Minutes, Seventh Meeting, 20 December 1955.


of Citizenship and Immigration was not asked to sit on the interdepartmental advisory committee, the committee’s chair, Mitchell Sharp of the Department of Trade and Commerce, asked the deputy minister to nominate someone to sit on the sub-committee dealing with “the Canadian People.” Laval Fortier recommended Eugene Bussiere, Director of the Citizenship Branch, who subsequently became the head of the sub-committee.  

At the same time, Fortier asked both Bussiere and H.M. Jones, Director of the Indian Affairs Branch, to offer preliminary suggestions to the interdepartmental committee. Bussiere offered nine suggestions dealing with such topics as Canada’s population, government structure, economic development, social legislation, and town planning. At the top of his list was Canada’s demographics. He said that Canada’s pavilion at the World’s Fair could cover such topics as “Ethnic composition and official languages; religious affiliation; population growth in the last fifty years; immigration figures since last war; our concept of integration vs assimilation.” This theme of “integration” would continue to guide Bussiere and the Citizenship Branch in its submissions to the interdepartmental committee. In his comments on the heading “Social Legislation (federal and provincial),” Bussiere commented that compared to Europe’s great advances in this field, “Canada stands in the middle way, so as to prevent too great expectations on the part of prospective immigrants.” Under the heading “Cultural Development,” Bussiere’s first thought was “Displays of Canadian native handicrafts, including Eskimo and Indian carvings; modern handicrafts and sculpture including

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French-Canadian woodcarvings from early days of the colony till to-day”; in other words, Native handicrafts and early French-Canadian handicrafts would show Canada’s development over time, but were not “modern.” The Canada portrayed by Bussiere was one in which groups like Native Peoples, French-Canadians, and immigrants were valued for their cultural and artistic contributions, but were not to expect too much change on the part of the receiving society.

Jones also kept to the theme of “integration” by emphasizing the efforts of the Canadian Government to bring “Indians” into the mainstream of Canadian society. He noted that an ad hoc committee in the Indian Affairs Branch wanted to “include material showing the progress of the Indian section of the aboriginal population.” As Franca Iacovetta and Heidi Bohaker point out, “the Indian Affairs Branch staff took very seriously their citizenship mandate to Canadianize (‘modernize’) Indigenous peoples.”

At the Brussels Expo the Indian Branch’s success was demonstrated to attendees through the distribution of brochures containing statistics about the Indigenous population, the showing of the (aptly titled) film “No Longer Vanishing,” and the attendance of a “selected Indian or Indians.” Jones recommended Joseph Hill, Supervising Principal of Six Nations Day Schools for the job as he was “admirably suited for such a role”; though it is unclear what Hill’s qualifications were (other than being an “Indian”), it is likely that Jones wished to emphasize the degree to which he had adopted “Canadian” values.

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The interdepartmental committee worked throughout 1955 and 1956 on the exhibits and displays that would showcase the Canada of the 1950s that they hoped to project to the world. An early draft of the Canadian People exhibit portrayed a Canada that was both geographically and culturally diverse. This was “A land of broad, fertile plains, pleasant valleys, lakes and rivers by the hundreds…large cities and small villages.” At the same time, Bussiere’s sub-committee noted that “Canada is more than this. It is sixteen million people whose ancestors came from almost all of the countries at Brussels in 1958. Over the years they have woven the fabric of their cultures, their skills and characteristics into the pattern that Canada is today.”68 This language likened Canada to a quilt or fabric of cultures – in idea not that different from the older notion of Canada as a mosaic.69

In its “Final Plan for Exhibition on Canadian People,” the sub-committee presented the main points that it hoped to get across to visitors to the Canadian pavilion. The first point was that “Canada is a nation with two basic cultures – French and English.” The committee said that Canadians had long recognized that these two cultures would be dominant. Nonetheless, “In recent years…a third element, representing a variety of cultures, has come into existence with the arrival in Canada of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from all over the world.”70 It is interesting that Bussiere and his committee should use the term “third element,” as the person that would become associated with multiculturalism as a state policy, Senator Paul Yuzyk, would not champion the idea of a

69 For a discussion of the mosaic metaphor as it relates to multiculturalism, see Richard J.F. Day, Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 146-176.
“third element” until the spring of 1964.

Despite this initial emphasis on Canada as “French and English,” the second point made by the committee was that “A unique characteristic of Canadian life is diversity.” Diversity was defined as ethnic, religious, political, and climatic and geographic diversity. Under the heading “Ethnic Diversity” the Bussiere group specifically mentioned the Scots of Cape Breton, Germans from Lunenberg County, Nova Scotia, Chinese in British Columbia, as well as “the Slavs on the Prairies” and “the Indians throughout Canada and the Eskimos of the North.” The third point raised was that Canadians believed in integration rather than assimilation of these groups. The Canadian concept of integration was contrasted with the “melting pot,” which is often attributed to the United States:

> As a consequence of the facts outlined under Point 2, the “melting pot” concept of complete conformity is not acceptable to Canadians. Instead, individuals and groups are encouraged to contribute from their cultural heritage and traditions to the enrichment of Canadian life.

These contributions included art, music, literature and drama. Indians and Eskimos were also seen as potential contributors to Canadian life “through their economic and cultural skills.” The committee emphasized that these groups were now receiving education, which would allow their contributions to Canadian society to be even greater.

The final three points indicated that the Canadian Government was willing to help out ethnic and immigrant organizations insofar as they were willing to help themselves. Point 4 was that the “diversity of resources and opportunities” available to Canadians had resulted in a “pioneer” spirit. Similarly, Point 5 emphasized that Canadians do not look

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72 Ibid, 2.
for a handout, but instead have a “concept of self-help and co-operation between groups.”

Finally, the government wished to co-operate with “non-governmental organizations and agencies” to move Canada ahead in the world. What the sub-committee hoped to get across was that immigrants could not expect charity from the government, but that there were private organizations that received the encouragement and support of the government.

The overarching themes of the Canadian Government’s portrayal of the Canadian Peoples at Brussels 1958 were “diversity” and “integration.” Whereas during the early part of the decade the Citizenship Branch had focused almost exclusively on “integration,” now “diversity” was given virtually equal billing. That said, integration of ethnic minorities (including in Indigenous Peoples) into the Canadian fabric was more important than the celebration of their cultures. Ethnic groups were not expected to supplant “Canadian” culture or receive equal billing; rather, “Every encouragement is given to retain all that is best of their culture and traditions as a means of enriching Canadian culture.”

Though the CB emphasized that “the “melting-pot” concept of absorption or assimilation is not acceptable or desirable in Canada, there was very little that separated its understanding of “integration” from the “melting pot” or “assimilation” concept in the mid-1950s. Ethnic minorities were asked to contribute the positive elements of their culture (art, literature), just as the “forefathers” of established Canadians had done. But they were also expected to accept the primacy of British and French culture, even if they were a “third element” in Canadian society.

“Free to conform”: Defining integration

The same summer as the Brussels Expo, after at least a decade of espousing “integration” as its guiding principle, the Citizenship Branch finally attempted to define what the concept meant at the Second National Seminar on Citizenship, held in Minaki, Ontario. The conference, held in August of 1958, was open to both members of the Citizenship Branch as well as the leaders and organizers of various voluntary organizations. Over one-hundred people came from all over Canada and represented vastly different organizations, including the Folk Society, Prince George; the Victoria Citizenship Council; the YWCA of Lethbridge; Catholic Immigration Service of Winnipeg; the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews, Calgary Branch; the Canadian Labour Congress, Ottawa; the United Steelworkers of America, Sydney, Cape Breton Island.

R. Alex Sim, head of the Liaison Department, was asked to write a discussion paper for use in a plenary session on “Integration.” Sim, a sociologist by training, wrote a paper entitled “The Concept of Integration in Canada’s Treatment of Ethnic Groups.” He emphasized that there were majority and minority groups in any society; the question was how those groups chose to get along with one another. Assimilation involved “modification” to both the majority and minority cultures, “but the changes are not necessarily beneficial either to the minority or to the dominant group.” Conformity was at the heart of Sim’s understanding of integration. Though at no point did he explicitly

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define “integration,” he indicated that the difference between assimilation and integration was the rate at which minority groups were absorbed into the majority group(s). Sim admitted that some people had likened integration to “a melting pot over a slow fire.”76 Instead of rejecting this, he asked rhetorically if the real difference between assimilation and integration was between the rates of absorption “of the values and traditions of two groups.”77 He concluded that integration was a more “civilized” policy than assimilation because it “not only encourages the smaller group to flourish and grow, but it is the only method, so far as I can see, that does not alter the larger dominant group in a destructive way.” In other words, all cultures were bound to mesh together in Canada; the question was the degree to which “Canadian” culture would be harmed by the process.

Assimilation could lead to ghettos and segregation and was not a “civilized” approach; integration would allow Canada to benefit from immigrants and ethnic minorities, without the threat that their cultures might supplant “Canadian” culture. Integration involved minimal adjustments on the part of immigrants, and little risk on the part of the host society.

The response to Sim’s discussion paper by the conference participants was positive. In the plenary session, the Citizenship Branch officials asked several questions of the participants, including: “What is the meaning of integration when compared with assimilation, segregation and repression?”; “Is the ideal of integration generally accepted in Canada? To what extent is it being actively resisted or promoted?”; and “Do immigrants, Indians and other Canadians realize what is in store for them? Specifically, what are they prepared to welcome, to tolerate, to resist?” According to the conference

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76 Ibid, 70.
77 Ibid, 71.
Several persons felt that integration is the generally accepted ideal, although this is not always evident in practice. Further, it is not always appreciated that integration is a two-way process and that even in the most liberal immigration policy, some elements of assimilation, segregation or repression may be present.\(^78\)

In the discussion that followed, several people noted that integration was “not even the generally accepted ideal in Canada”; most Canadians hoped to assimilate immigrants and ethnic minorities. In response to this, “one participant, himself a newcomer, said that integration is the only process that is acceptable to the newcomer.”\(^79\)

Neither Sim nor the participants in the plenary session defined what they meant by “Canadian” culture. But at several other workshops, it became clear that “Canadian” meant British and French. A workshop dealing with “Intergroup Relations” discussed how best to involve “Indian, Asian and Negro Canadians” in “intergroup projects.” The participants agreed: “Group relations must be envisaged in the light of the recognition in the Canadian constitution of two official cultures, the English and the French.” They went on to say that bilingualism should be encouraged so as to increase communication “between the two major cultural groups in Canada.”\(^80\)

The “other groups” were to be recognized for the contributions they had made to the evolution of Canadian democracy and to “our Canadian pattern.” Another workshop agreed that ethnic folk festivals, food, crafts, and “ethnic floats in city parades” should receive the encouragement of the Citizenship Branch and voluntary associations. Ethnic


\(^79\) Ibid, 20.

artists were encouraged not to be simply quaint entertainers, but to have “a high degree of artistic achievement”; at the same time they were told to preserve their “amateur character.” What this seems to point to is a simultaneous desire to encourage more than superficial outward cultural expression (song, dance, and food), but also to preserve what made ethnic minorities so interesting in the first place: their exoticism. The participants in the Minaki Conference were buying into the idea that folk festivals “serve to minimize differences between cultures while seeming to provide an instance of democratic pluralism.” Groups that threatened Canadian democracy – in particular “well qualified communist ensembles” – were to be discouraged in favour of a representative cross section of ethnic minorities. The “folk” – in this case, all ethnic minorities – could not be recognized as one of the “two major cultural groups.” It was hoped that their artistic and cultural productions would have a high production value, while remaining “amateur” or authentic. The sharing of what made them “ethnic” and the “mutual appreciation” it would engender would allow for greater understanding and respect between and among the charter groups and the “other groups,” provided these groups subscribed to Canadian democratic principles.

Analysis

Despite the fact that the CB made several policy pronouncements indicating an official acceptance of the “integration” model, staff members and organizations associated with

81 Ibid, 37.
the CB continued to question the wisdom of allowing ethnic minorities to integrate, rather than assimilate. Indeed, these civil servants were often unsure as to what kind of Canada they were protecting or whom they should be guarding it from. They were concerned about the racism and bigotry that they saw among established Canadians and they actively worked to eradicate it by educating both newcomers and established Canadians. One thing that was agreed upon was the need to promote national unity by bringing all groups into the mainstream of Canadian life. Although the staff could not agree on a definition for “integration,” it was resolved at the Minaki Conference that the same principles used to integrate immigrants would be applied to the integration of Indigenous Peoples.

We can see a shift taking place in the Citizenship Branch from an understanding of Canada as a fortress that needed to be protected during the early 1950s, to one in which immigrants and ethnic minority groups are considered Canadians like any other by the mid-1960s. The postwar influx of new immigrants (especially Displaced Persons from Soviet Bloc countries), combined with the rising political awareness of second and third-generation “ethnic” Canadians meant that state officials had to constantly re-evaluate not only who was or was not “Canadian,” but also what it meant to be Canadian in the first place. This ideological shift was uneven at best. The bureaucrats in the Citizenship Branch most certainly did not wish to accept immigrants and ethnic minorities as they were. Communist sympathies or even vague socialist tendencies were to be nipped in the

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84 Iacovetta refers to these civil servants as “gatekeepers.” Though the descriptor may have been accurate for V.J. Kaye, whom she describes in detail, I am not comfortable assigning this term as a blanket description of all CB staff.

But in the midst of this messy and confusing time, in their attempt to both integrate immigrants and provide a cohesive national unity policy, the staff of the Citizenship Branch established the basis for “multiculturalism” policy and programs. Their nascent philosophy of cultural pluralism served as a springboard for both the multicultural movement and the Federal Government’s newfound commitment to cultural pluralism in the early to mid-1960s.

Nonetheless, any attempt at finding an overarching logic to the work of the Citizenship Branch has the tendency to create unity where there was a great deal of ideological uncertainty. Though I agree with Iacovetta that some people within and outside the Citizenship Branch acted as what she calls “gatekeepers” of Canadian citizenship and identity in the immediate postwar period, this attitude gradually shifted in the late fifties and early 1960s. This was an uneven shift that was reflective of the different personalities and ideologies at work among the Branch’s staff and the voluntary organizations they served. Reva Joshee’s work on the origins of “multicultural education” provides a useful model for the development of the discourse within the Citizenship Branch of the 1950s and 1960s. She suggests that there was a shift in the discourse during the mid-1950s from an emphasis on making immigrants good citizens by integrating them into the Canadian mainstream (what she calls the “citizenship paradigm”), to one in which their cultural attributes were celebrated (the “identity paradigm”). In both periods the CB emphasized “integration” rather than “assimilation” of immigrants. Joshee makes

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the case that what was meant by “integration” shifted over time from what we would now call “assimilation” to something akin to the modern ethos of cultural pluralism.

What is clear is that by 1963, the Branch could confidently claim that assimilation was “an expression of prejudice.”88 Though “integration” remained central to the way that the CB understood immigrants, Indians, and ethnic minority groups, it increasingly used language that seemed to set these groups on a more equal footing with the French and British. These groups were still expected to integrate, but increasingly their cultures were viewed as a fundamental part of what it meant to be “Canadian.” Indeed, the CB began to use the word “multicultural” to describe the Canadian cultural landscape. For example, the Edmonton Welfare Council and the Citizenship Branch sponsored a seminar at the University of Alberta in June of 1963. Citizen reported that the seminar had three goals:

To explore the relationships among the various ethnic and cultural groups in Edmonton; to develop an appreciation of the difficulties which individuals face in adjusting to a multi-cultural society; and to increase the understanding and effectiveness of people dealing with these problems in their everyday work.89

While it is noteworthy that Citizen’s editors used the term “multi-cultural,” it still characterized ethnic and cultural diversity as a “problem.” In the following issue, the editors of Citizen reported on the second annual Montreal Young Adult Week-End Conference, sponsored by the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews, on the topic of “Cultural Pluralism.” Once again, it was noted that the conference was designed to “provide the young people with an opportunity to study and discuss the problems of

89 Canadian Citizenship Branch, Citizen 9, no. 4 (October 1963): 10.
living in a multi-cultural nation like Canada.” In both of these cases “multicultural” was used to describe the ethnic composition of Canada, not to describe a philosophy of Canadian identity.

The CB at times seemed to advocate multiculturalism or even multilingualism as a public good. In the October 1963 edition of Citizen, in a report on the Ontario Conference on Inter-Group Relations (sponsored by the Citizenship Branch) the editors seemed to support the concept of multiculturalism. They noted that the bulk of the speakers, among them Professor John Saywell and Yves Michaud of La Patrie, emphasized the bilingual and bicultural nature of the country. The editors then noted: “one-quarter of the Canadian population is made up of other racial and minority groups, many of whom were represented at the Port Elgin Conference. What were their views?” The Citizen went on to say that while “most accepted the principle of bilingualism,” Canada was multicultural, rather than bicultural. Even more surprising is that the editors reported on “A Seminar on French-English Relations” held in Winnipeg in September of 1963. Among the speakers was Dr. P.H.T. Thorlakson who argued that bilingualism “should mean the ability to speak any two languages, not necessarily English and French.” Rather than silencing these opinions, the CB gave them a platform.

The Citizenship Branch would continue to walk this fine line during the heyday of the multicultural movement in the 1960s. It gave financial support to ethnic minority organizations that advocated multiculturalism. It sponsored conferences and symposia on

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cultural pluralism and “bilingualism and biculturalism,” and at times it seemed to support the idea of a “multicultural” Canada. However, its benign feel-good version of multiculturalism or cultural pluralism was not compatible with the idea of “multiculturalism” advanced by some members of the movement. Even as the Citizenship Branch moved towards an understanding of Canada as multicultural and bilingual, some multiculturalists moved towards the idea of a Canada as multilingual. It was here that the multiculturalism movement came up against the intransigence of the Canadian state. Although the Citizenship Branch’s staff had evolved their understanding of “integration” since 1940s, there were limits to how far they were willing to bend. Canadians might recognize cultural diversity as a fundamental aspect of their collective identity, but this could not happen at the expense of social cohesion and national unity.
Chapter 3: Biculturalism, multiculturalism, and “unity in diversity,” 1957-1963

Introduction

As staff members of the Citizenship Branch attempted to quietly reconcile the need for national unity and recognition of the “two official cultures” with the need to integrate immigrants and ethnic minorities into the mainstream, Quebec society was undergoing a rapid series of changes that would transform this discourse entirely.¹ In the Province of Quebec, “a profound cultural and social transformation was under way — the noisy Quiet Revolution.”² This revolution sparked reforms to education, the hydroelectric industry, and business; these reforms were sometimes welcomed by the Federal Government as signs that Quebec was modernizing and moving away from its rural and religious past.

But the new nationalist voices emerging in Quebec were less welcome in Ottawa. Quebec nationalists called for a renewed Confederation based on equality between French Canadians and British Canadians and greater rights for the province of Quebec.

Rising concurrently with the neo-nationalist movement in Quebec was a much smaller multicultural movement. A number of civil society organizations, like the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), the Canada Ethnic Press Federation (CEPF), and

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the Bureau du service des Neo-Canadiens of Montreal, as well as concerned individual activists, made the case that Canadian identity was bound up with its ethnic diversity. 3 This small, vocal, loosely-formed coalition of ethnic minority organizations and activists proposed the radical idea that Canada was not beholden to its (British and French) colonial founders for its sense of ethnic and cultural identity. Rather, the nascent multicultural movement conceived of a nation that was ethnically diverse, and richer for it.

When Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson responded in 1963 to calls by Quebec neo-nationalists for a commission of inquiry on bilingualism, the stage was set for a showdown between these two competing visions of Canada. This chapter will first explore the origins of these two schools of thought during the late 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the positions taken on ethnic diversity by the major political parties. I will then explain how the rising tide of Quebec nationalism and Pearson’s concern over national unity led to his government’s de facto adoption of “biculturalism” as state policy in 1963. Finally, I will show how these competing visions clashed at the preliminary hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, thereby creating a particular discourse about Canadian identity and ethnicity and setting the stage for the multicultural movement of the 1960s.

The Quiet Revolution, neo-nationalism, and “biculturalism”

At the heart of the Quiet Revolution was a desire by French-speaking Quebeckers to assume a greater measure of control over their affairs and their destiny as a people. Since the 1940s, political, literary, and social commentators, as well some clerical elites, had called for fundamental changes to the province’s often backwards and anti-modern state apparatus. The death of Union Nationale Premier Maurice Duplessis — long a defender of traditional, rural, Catholic Quebec — in September of 1959, marked the end of a period known colloquially as “the great darkness.” Less than a year later, the Liberal party, led by Jean Lesage, was elected with a mandate to bring the province out of a period that had been rife with corruption, state-enforced religiosity, and stifled economic and social growth. During the election Lesage had warned “il faut que ca change” (“things have to change”) and change they did.

Though this revolution was built by Quebeckers of all backgrounds, including students and labourers, the intelligentsia played the important role of publicly discussing the direction that this revolution would take. In periodicals like L’Action Nationale, Cité Libre, L’Action Catholique, and Le Devoir, intellectuals cogitated over the future of Quebec as a province within Canada, or as a French Canadian nation-state. “Biculturalism,” became part of this discussion long before the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB) made the term a popular shorthand for the “crisis” in Quebec. In a nutshell, biculturalism referred to the relationship between

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French and English Canada, or the relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC); in this period French Canada was synonymous with Quebec, though this situation would change as French Canadians outside Quebec began to mobilize in the 1970s. Over the course of the Quiet Revolution the concept would become loaded with meaning and, eventually fall out of favour. Nationalists and separatists would turn to ideas like the “distinct society,” while federalists referred to “co-operative federalism.”

“Biculturalism” emerged in the 1950s as intellectuals in Quebec tried to make sense of French Canadians’ place within Canada. Two major schools of thought emerged. Intellectuals were split between what Michael Behiels calls the “neo-nationalists,” such as André Laurendeau, Rene Levesque, and Claude Ryan, and the “Citelibristes” or “liberals” such as Pierre Trudeau, Charles Lussier, and Gérard Pelletier. The “neo-nationalists” made the case that French Canadians in Quebec had not reaped the benefits that Confederation had promised in 1867. They were convinced, ultimately, that Quebec’s future lay in a new nation-to-nation partnership with English Canada or, barring that, as a French Canadian nation-state. Since the mid-1990s, a revisionist school of thought has attempted to show that these nationalist intellectuals were the logical successors to a widely-accepted line of nationalist thought dating back to the turn of the century. According to Kenneth McRoberts, “cultural dualism” was “the basis upon

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6 For more on French Canadians and the issue of school governance outside of Quebec, see Michael Behiels, Canada’s Francophone Minority Communities: Constitutional Renewal and the Winning of School Governance (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004).
which most of French Quebec’s political and intellectual classes understood Canada.”

Politician and newspaper editor, Henri Bourassa, had articulated this tradition of cultural dualism in the early twentieth century. In the paper he founded, *Le Devoir*, Bourassa had popularized the "equal partnership" or "double compact" theory of Confederation. He maintained that, in addition to the agreement made between the British North American colonies at Confederation, there had been a second “compact” between the two founding ethno-linguistic groups – the British/English and French – or a double compact.

McRoberts contends that André Laurendeau, who was one of the Quiet Revolution’s leading thinkers, “was in many respects Bourassa’s spiritual heir.” Laurendeau wrote in 1962 that Bourassa’s vision of Canada was one in which French Canadians and English Canadians were linked organically by a common “patrie” or country, but had their own unique legal traditions, religions, and languages. Laurendeau

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9 The original “compact theory” of Confederation held that “the provinces as the founding, constituent units of the federation retained the right to alter the terms of their original union.” Oliver Mowat and other early advocates of provincial rights believed that the British North American colonies that joined together to form the Dominion of Canada in 1867 could also break up the federation if any one province felt that it was not benefitting from Confederation. Matthew Hayday, *Bilingual Today, United Tomorrow: Official Languages in Education and Canadian Federalism* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 43; Peter H. Russell, *Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?*, Third Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 48. See also Ramsay Cook, *Provincial Autonomy, Minority Rights and the Compact Theory, 1867-1921* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969).
10 These rights had been implicit in sections 93 and 133 of the British North America Act of 1867, which guaranteed denominational schools and the use of French and English in the Federal parliament and Quebec legislative assembly, respectively. To claim otherwise, according to Bourassa, was “to say that the pact of 1867 was a delusion, that the Cartiers, the Macdonalds, the Browns, the Howes, all the authors of this magnificent constitution came to an understanding to deceive the people of Lower Canada.” Although the rights of French-Canadians to use their language in education and provincial legislatures had been successively overturned in New Brunswick, Manitoba, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario, Bourassa and his followers maintained that there remained a moral obligation, dating back to Confederation, to guarantee these rights throughout Canada. Henri Bourassa, “Language and Nationality,” in *Issues in Canadian History: Henri Bourassa on Imperialism and Bi-culturalism, 1900-1918*, ed. Joseph Levitt (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1970), 134-135. Originally published in Henri Bourassa, *La Langue francaise et l’avenir de notre race* (Quebec, 1913), 4-5, 9-10, 16-19. See also: Filippo Sabetti, “The Historical Context of Constitutional Change in Canada,” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 45 (1982): 21.
concluded that this notion of a partnership between the French Canadian people and the English Canadian people, while divisive during Bourassa’s day, would “contribute to uniting Canadians of today.”\footnote{12} Bourassa’s championing of biculturalism or the “two nations” view is often associated with his opposition to conscription during the First World War. Though biculturalism was not well-received in that political climate, Laurendeau gauged (correctly) that the Quiet Revolution had made English Canadians willing to at least discuss the issue. To Laurendeau, the failure of Canadians to create a working partnership between the two founding peoples – in a sense the failure of Confederation – was at the heart of the social and political malaise in 1960s Quebec. He felt that the promise of a state based upon the equality of the two founding peoples had not been fulfilled.\footnote{13}

Despite Laurendeau’s centrality to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, his influence over the discussion about the relationship between French and English Canada should not be overstated. The “liberals” who founded the small but influential journal, \textit{Cité Libre}, argued that Quebec needed to modernize, but that it could be achieved through adherence to the powers accorded to the provinces — including Quebec — at Confederation. According to \textit{Cité Libre} founders Gérard Pelletier and Pierre Trudeau, nationalism (and, by extension, separatism) was not an acceptable solution to Quebec’s problems. Instead of looking to English Canada and the Federal Government to solve Quebec’s problems, they argued, Quebeckers needed to look


\footnote{13} Denis Moniere, \textit{André Laurendeau et le destin d’un peuple} (Montréal: Editions Québec/ Amérique, 1983), 290.
inwards to their own failings. Moreover, they needed to view Quebec not as a collectivity or nation that needed protection from the English Canadian nation, but as “a secular, pluralistic, democratic society in place of the ancien regime.” Bryan Palmer remarks that “Cite libre seemed almost simultaneously to stimulate the radical nationalism of a growing separatist chorus within Quebec at the same time that it choked off independantiste aspiration and activity.”

Nonetheless, the divide between the “neo-nationalists” and the “liberals” belies the similarities to their approaches to Quebec’s place within Canada. Levesque, Laurendeau, Pelletier, and Trudeau all moved in the same, small, intellectual circle in Montreal. Though they might disagree over the role of French Canada within Confederation, all were convinced that Quebec’s social policy should reflect its growing industrial base, that Quebec universities should train modern professionals, that the province should exert greater control over its natural resources and public works, and that the French language should become the working language of the business world. While Trudeau and Pelletier remained skeptical of biculturalism or “two nations” theory, many of their fellow Citelibrístes agreed with Laurendeau. Francois Hertel wrote in the October 1954 edition of Cité Libre that there were “two principal ethnic groups in Canada (the

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14 Michael Gauvreau has made the case that the Quiet Revolution also took place among clerical elites and Catholic student organizations, who attempted to reform Quebec society along Catholic lines. These Catholic student revolutionaries fell into both camps. Luminaries on both sides, including Jean Marchand, Pierre Trudeau, and André Laurendeau, subscribed to the Catholic personalist writing of French writers like Emmanuel Mounier; they believed that a new Quebec could be socially and politically progressive but still find guidance in the Church. Michael Gauvreau, The Catholic Origins of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, 1931-1970 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005). See also: André Carrier, “L’idéologie politique de la revue Cité Libre,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 1, no. 4 (December 1968): 414-428.
French group and the British group).”17 This was not an exclusive ethnicity, however. Pierre J.-G. Vennat made the case that all religions and ethnicities could be included in “French Canada,” not just the “Québécois de souche”: “The real culture, the French culture in particular, is not the privilege of one class, one sect or one ethnic group. The French culture is unique in that it is for all men, for all times, religions, races or colours.”18

The Mosaic and “multiculturalism”

The multicultural movement of the 1960s, much like the Quebecois neo-nationalist movement, drew upon older discourses about cultural pluralism. Multiculturalists looked to the notion of Canada as a “mosaic,” found the writings of Victoria Hayward, Kate Foster, John Murray Gibbon, Watson Kirkconnell, and John Buchan.19 As Peter Henshaw has pointed out, Buchan (or Lord Tweedsmuir), who was Governor-General from 1935 to 1940, “encouraged Canadians to make multiculturalism a defining feature of Canadian identity and nationalism.”20 In 1936 he told a group of Manitoba Ukrainians that “You will all be better Canadians for being also good Ukrainians”; this phrase would be frequently repeated by Ukrainian organizations during the 1960s, who had come to believe that their culture enriched the overall mosaic of cultures.21 But it is Gibbon’s

17 François Hertel, “Les évolutions de la mentalité au Canada français,” Cité Libre 10 (October 1954), 52.
1938 publication, *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation*, that is widely viewed as the foundational text of Canadian multiculturalism, though both Hayward and Foster preceded him in using the mosaic metaphor.²² Gibbon, whom historian Stuart Henderson calls “the master mosaicist,” promoted his vision of an “inclusive Canada” by staging the first Canadian folk festivals in cooperation with the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) during the late 1920s. In addition to popularizing the cultures of Canada’s ethnic minority population, Gibbon’s festivals and writings helped to disseminate the idea of Canada as a mosaic of cultures.²³ Kirkconnell, who would later work with both the Nationalities Branch and the Citizenship Branch in an advisory capacity, and helped to organize the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, believed that Canada had much to gain from its ethnic population. A pamphlet that he wrote in 1941 for the Nationalities Branch entitled *Canadians All: A Primer of Canadian National Unity*, argued that national unity could be achieved by conceiving of Canada as a “mixing bowl” in which “no one element predominates.”²⁴ A common theme among all advocates of the mosaic was national unity. Though Buchan, Gibbon, Kirconnell and others believed that ethnic minorities contributed individual pieces to the mosaic, they hoped that a new Canadian nationality was emerging that was greater than the sum of its parts.

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²² Victoria Hayward’s *Romantic Canada* was published in 1922, while Foster’s *Our Canadian Mosaic* was published in 1926. Richard J.F. Day, *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 149, 151.


During the late 1950s and early 1960s, some ethnic minority organizations and their supporters — including the Citizenship Branch — appropriated this discourse about the “mosaic,” and began to speak of a Canada what was “multicultural.” The President of the Vancouver (Jewish) Peretz School, Dr. Harry Winrob, spoke of Canada having a “multi-cultural pattern” during an annual concert in 1957. Two years later, A.J. Arnold wrote a series of articles for the *Jewish Western Bulletin*’s “Chanuka Issue.” One article made the point that Jews were gradually finding recognition as both Jews and Canadians: “In spite of barriers which have not been completely overcome...Jewish culture is recognized as part of the multi-cultural concept which is winning growing acceptance in Canada.” He wrote hopefully about how “nearly 200 years of progressive development in Canada” promised a future in which Jewish Canadians could contribute “to the development of a multi-cultural pattern of Canadian life.” In 1959, Walter J. Lindal, head of the Canada Ethnic Press Federation, told a meeting of the Western Division of the Canadian Jewish Congress that Canada was a bilingual nation that contained three population elements — British, French, and “the third element” comprising the remaining ethnic groups. He maintained that, despite this diversity, “Canada is a nation — one nation.”

One organization that advocated for multiculturalism throughout the 1960s and 1970s was the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (or UCC). Its leadership began to take an...

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26 “Chanuka” was the spelling used by the *Jewish Western Bulletin*, though it is more often spelled Chanukah or Hanukah.
28 Ibid., 36.
30 Ibid., 1.
active interest in the idea of multiculturalism as a means of securing recognition of the Ukrainian contribution to Canadian society and equality with the “founding” groups. In 1959 the Ukrainian Canadian Committee’s member organizations gathered for the Sixth Ukrainian All-Canada Congress in Winnipeg. Their resolutions began with a preamble that stated: “In the multicultural Canadian society it is very important to establish a harmonious relationship, respect and tolerance. Assimilation is destructive and should be eliminated from the Canadian life. Scorn for origin, language and religion places unsurpassable difficulties in the healthy development of every society.”

They further resolved that Ukrainian Canadians should “foster their Ukrainian traditions,” but in order to do this would have to “continue further efforts to strengthen their Canadian citizenship through the unity of the Canadian community within the various talents of her mosaic of cultures.” It was the Congress’ hope that Ukrainian cultural rights would eventually “find suitable expression in the Canadian constitution.” The UCC would work to “realize the fundamental claim that the Ukrainian churches, schools, cultural and educational institutions, press, societies and organizations constitute part of the Canadian life and that they are, therefore, entitled to recognition and privileges including moral and material support and worthy to be recognized and treated accordingly.”

Two years later, in March of 1962, the UCC published a pamphlet called Language and Culture as part of its participation in the Second Canadian Conference on Education, held in Montreal. The UCC emphasized the “importance of mother languages” to the enrichment of Canada’s cultural heritage and for the good of early

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31 Ukrainian Canadian Committee Headquarters; Rev. Dr. B. Kushnir; W.J. Sarchuk, *Brief to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (Winnipeg, Manitoba: September 1964), 26-27.
32 Ukrainian Canadian Committee Headquarters; Rev. Dr. B. Kushnir; W.J. Sarchuk, *Brief to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (Winnipeg, Manitoba: September 1964), 27.
childhood education. The Congress also contended that “Canada is a multi-cultural nation. In addition to the two major races a sizeable segment of Canada’s population is made up of people who came from many lands. They brought with them a priceless treasure of cultural heritage, rich in variety and expressive in its outward manifestations.”  

To the UCC, the country’s cultural diversity was what gave the country its richness; the only way to preserve this richness was through the preservation of ethnic minority languages.

A brief but fruitful dialogue commenced in January 1962 between Scott Symons, then assistant curator of Canadia at the Royal Ontario Museum and Judge Walter J. Lindal. Symons, who would later abandon both his family and his city (Toronto) for Montreal and become one of the first openly gay writers of his generation, was working at the time as the assistant curator of Canadia at the Royal Ontario Museum. Lindal had been the founder and first president of the multi-ethnic Canada Press Club at its inception in 1942. Like the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Nationalities Branch, the Canada Press Club had been founded in order to co-ordinate the response of ethnic minorities to the war effort. The Club eventually merged with the Ethnic Press Association of Ontario in 1958 to form the Canada Ethnic Press Federation (CEPF); upon its founding, Lindal became the CEPF’s first president. The CEPF became one of the major supporters of multiculturalism during the movement’s heyday in the 1960s.

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33 Ukrainian Canadian Committee, *On Language and Culture; Published in connection with the Second Canadian Conference on Education, Montreal, March 4-8* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Canadian Committee, March 1962), 10.
Symons, who was working on a book for McClelland and Stewart, entitled
*Canada, Duel or Dialogue*, and had been inspired to include some of Lindal’s ideas about
the nature of Canadian society. In the course of his research, he had asked for and
received a copy of Lindal’s essay on “The Role of the Ethnic Press in Canada,” which he
had written in his capacity as the President of the CEPF. Symons wrote to Lindal:

> Your own comments touch on many of the concerns of my book […] The crux of the matter, as you state in your letter so succinctly is that ‘Two facts stand out: Canada is bilingual and in the world of to-day that is an asset; Canada is multi-cultural, not bicultural.’ I like the courage and honesty of your first statement; and the little realized truth of the second. We ARE bilingual […] But being bilingual does not mean that we are bicultural.

Symons went on to say that he felt, as the descendant of Loyalists, that he belonged to an
ethnic minority group whose contributions to the Canadian Parliamentary system had	en often been overlooked.

Although Symons advocated a bilingual and multicultural Canada, this did not
stop him from attempting to find common cultural links between all Canadians. He
emphasized that every Canadian had inherited the “British institutional heritage,” as well
as “French as his second culture,” and “the international world of Commonwealth which
in part defines the Canadian experiment.” To modern eyes, Symons’ simultaneous
advocacy of a Canada that is at once bilingual and multicultural, as well as the inheritor
of British institutions may seem quaint or even contradictory. But in the early 1960s,

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proclamations like this were common. Like the Citizenship Branch in the 1950s, Symons’ (and, indeed, Lindal’s) definition of “multiculturalism” only partially formed, and was often tied to older ideas about a “bicultural” country. What was important was that these two men challenged the salience of “biculturalism” as a means of defining Canadian culture and identity.

Lindal seems to have been encouraged or inspired by this exchange. He wrote to Ellen Fairclough, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, that Symons, “a Toronto man of United Empire Loyalist descent,” had endorsed the idea of Canada as “multi-cultural, not bicultural.” However, the real reason for his letter to Fairclough was to request that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration place advertisements in English-language ethnic newspapers, such as his own Icelandic Canadian, and the Jewish Post. These publications, “in the English language, devoted to the ultimate evolution of a distinctly Canadian pattern of citizenship, are performing a public service equal to that of any other ethnic publication, and indeed any publication devoted to Canadian citizenship.” To Lindal, these publications were important because they catered to ethnic communities in one of the national languages, thereby blending the old (English) with the new (ethnic) and creating a “distinctly Canadian” national culture.

But Lindal also responded to the rising chorus in favour of “bilingualism and biculturalism” emerging from Quebec. He wrote to Bruno Tenhunen, his successor as President of the CEPF, regarding a “matter of importance, perhaps urgency”:

As you are aware, some French Canadians are very active at present in spreading the theory that Canada is both bilingual and bi-cultural and that active steps should be

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40 Ibid., 2.
taken to make all of Canada both bilingual and bi-cultural. That would relegate all other languages to a very secondary position. Some of us have been wondering whether something like the enclosed suggestion might be passed at our biennial meeting.

Enclosed was a resolution that the Canada Ethnic Press Federation later passed at its Biennial Convention in Winnipeg in March of 1962. The Federation resolved that “Canada is multicultural, a unity in variety, which will enrich our distinctive Canadian identity.”41 In the face of a chorus of voices in favour of “bilingualism and biculturalism” then building to a crescendo in Canada, the CEPF advanced an altogether different conception of Canadian identity.

Lindal’s contribution to the multiculturalism discourse is greater than has been previously acknowledged. Throughout 1962 he refined Symon’s notion of the contributions of the British and French into a tripartite model. In late June of 1962, in celebration of Dominion Day, he gave a speech to the Kiwanis Club of Winnipeg in which he argued that Canada was bilingual and multicultural. Drawing on his legal expertise, he noted that bilingualism had been established with the Peace of Paris of 1763, the Quebec Act of 1774, and the Constitutional Act of 1791. Canada’s ethnic composition, however, was based on “three population elements or dimensions…the British, the French, and all the other ethnic groups.”42 Two of these concepts — “multiculturalism” and “three elements” — would be central principles around which the multicultural movement would coalesce after 1963. Professor Paul Yuzyk, who would later be credited with introducing the notions of “multiculturalism” and the “third

element,” was privy to the correspondence between Lindal, Symons, and Tenhunen.

Whereas Lindal had worked behind the scenes to encourage the growth of multiculturalism, Yuzyk was catapulted into the spotlight when, as a Senator and champion of multiculturalism, he came up against the dominant bicultural discourse emerging out of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

The dialogue that Lindal, Symons, and a handful of ethnic organizations manifested at the dawn of the 1960s quietly spilled into the public forum. At least a year before the term “multiculturalism” became mainstream, a few Canadians were “suggesting a whole new conception of citizenship.” There was also at least one attempt to unite the representatives of the ethnic minority groups behind this new notion. Several voluntary organizations, including the Ukarinian Canadian Committee, the Canadian Polish Congress, as well as German-Canadian, Italian-Canadian, Estonian, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Netherlander, Portuguese, Romanian, and Slovak associations presented a “Brief on Radio, Television and Films in Canada” to Ottawa in 1962. They called themselves the “Official Representatives of the Ethnic Groups in Canada.” The main thrust of their brief was that Canada, though founded by two cultures, had been enriched by its other cultures: “These Canadians see Canada – bi-cultural, bilingual, but basically multi ethnic – as something of a magic garden, in which each flower can bloom in harmony, so as to make of this country the most fertile ground for human

43 I can state this confidently, as I found this correspondence in Yuzyk’s personal papers. LAC, Paul Yuzyk fonds, MG 32 C-67, vol. 30, file 30-10, Multiculturalism – Misc Addresses, Articles, 1956-77, Scott Symons to Judge W.J. Lindal, 18 January 1962, 1.
They contended that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was doing a great disservice to both the founding groups and the ethnic groups by ignoring “the interests and preoccupations of almost a quarter of Canada’s population.” Though the ethnic group representatives recognized that the Canadian government’s official policy was their eventual integration into the larger population, they believed that it should not be only “a one way affair”; Canadians had much to gain from their ethnic minority population. Their recommendation, therefore, was that the CBC view ethnic groups as “an immense source of new ideas.”

**Political Parties and ethnic minority communities**

Canada’s major political parties were aware of the nascent multicultural movement, but political and historical factors ensured that these new voices had to fight against a political discourse that was heavily weighted in favour of “biculturalism.” Although there were half-hearted attempts to woo “ethnic” voters at election time, ethnic minority communities were not central to Canadian political discourse in the late 1950s and early 1960s. As Jose Igartua points out, “The place of French Canadians within Canadian society, and of Quebec within Confederation, were the most important issues facing

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Canadians.” When ethnic minority organizations and leaders raised concerns about the place of the non-British and non-French minority communities within Canadian society, their concerns largely fell on deaf ears.

Of the major political parties, the Progressive Conservative Party probably had the closest relationship with ethnic minority community leaders and organizations during the 1950s and early 1960s; as a result, the party was more receptive to demands for “multiculturalism.” Beginning in the 1940s, the Tories began to recruit in ethnic communities in Toronto. Christian Champion has made the case that PC leader John Diefenbaker’s defence of “One Canada” and “unhypehnated Canadianism,” as well as his adoption of a Bill of Rights in 1960, gave the Tories an edge over the Liberal Party with ethnic voters. Diefenbaker also gained ethnic support through allusions to his German ancestry when he stumped for votes in Western Canada. Unlike his successor in the Prime Minister’s Office, Lester Pearson, Diefenbaker took a personal interest in ethnic affairs. For example, in July of 1958 he wrote to Allister Grossart, then National Director of the Progressive Conservative Party, about a conversation he had with Paul Yuzyk. Yuzyk had recommended that the Tories establish “a magazine for ethnic peoples in the English language” as the Liberal Party had begun to make inroads in ethnic communities

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51 Champion does not provide polling data to substantiate his claims. The archival evidence he presents, however, does indicate that the Liberal Party felt that the Tories had a leg up on them in recruiting ethnic voters. Whether this was actually the case awaits a future study. Christian P. Champion, “Courting “Our Ethnic Friends”: Canadianism, Britishness, and New Canadians, 1950-1970,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 38, no. 1 (2006): 28.

52 Ibid., 28.
through the magazine *Free World*.53

But it was the Tories work liaison work with ethnic minority leaders that really made the difference. Through its “ethnic strategist,” Norman M. Dunn, and several contacts within major ethnic organizations, the Progressive Conservative Party was able to keep its finger on the pulse of ethnic communities. Among its contacts were Walter J. Lindal, and Bruno Tenhunen in their capacity as successive Presidents of the Canada Ethnic Press Federation; Professor Paul Yuzyk, who was a prominent member of the Ukrainian community and a leader in the Ukrainian Canadian Committee; and C.J. Stanczykowski, who operated CFMB, Montreal’s ethnic minority language radio station.54 In addition, the Tories had the foresight to recruit several “ethnics” — many of them of Ukrainian origin — to Parliament Hill. Nick Mandziuk, a Ukrainian-born MP from Manitoba, came to Ottawa in 1957; Michael Starr was made Minister of Labour in the same year. Diefenbaker later appointed two more Ukrainian Canadians to the Senate — John Hnatyshyn and Paul Yuzyk.55 The Tories were particularly successful in Western Ukrainian communities. Whereas the Liberals had elected a few Ukrainian MPs in the 1940s, “From 1958 to 1965 every Ukrainian elected federally was a PC.”56 It was not until the Trudeau era that the Liberal Party was able to once again recruit and elect Ukrainian MPs.

54 For correspondence between Diefenbaker, his staff, and ethnic minority organizations, see LAC, John Diefenbaker fonds, MG 26-M, Series VI, vol. 34, vol. 35.
55 Ibid., 32.
Historically, the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) had had much greater success with courting ethnic minority voters than the Tories. During the 1950s, however, the LPC’s attempts to forge relationships with ethnic minority leaders met with less success than those of the Progressive Conservatives. Ontario MPP Andrew Thompson acted as the Liberal Party liaison with ethnic groups in Toronto during the 1950s and 1960s. Along with Paul Hellyer, Jack Pickersgill, and Stanley Haidasz, Thompson formed a small group of Liberals who were interested in ethnic affairs. By 1961, Thompson was concerned that the Conservatives had been “making yard [in ethnic communities] with the impression that Mr. Pearson and the Liberal party is soft on communism.” He believed that the Tories hard line on communism had played well among ethnic minorities, especially Ukrainians. For example, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, which was a federation of Ukrainian organizations, had been founded by nationalists and had — without much need for encouragement from Watson Kirkconnell and others —


60 Jaroslav Petryshyn even goes so far as to accuse Diefenbaker of “pandering to Canada’s Slavic groups” though his defence of “enslaved nations”; this sent a clear signal to the imperialist Soviet Union that was not warmly received. Jaroslav Petryshyn, “The ‘Ethnic Question’ Personified: Ukrainian Canadians and Canadian-Soviet Relations, 1917-1991,” in Re-imagining Ukrainian Canadians: History, Politics, and Identity, edited by Rhonda L. Hinther and Jim Mochoruk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 232, 240-241.
deliberately excluded Communist organizations from the federation.\textsuperscript{61} UCC President, Father Wasyl (Basil) Kushnir, Paul Yuzyk, Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, and other prominent Ukrainians were rabid anti-communists. In a letter to Lester Pearson in August of 1962, Thompson enclosed a “Suggested Party Program for new citizens.” He noted that “the Conservatives had strenously [sic] wooed the particular interests of ethnic groups (suggestions of Senate appointments, promises of increased ethnic advertising, anti-discrimination, anti-communism, etc.). It was more difficult to perform when in government, and some disillusionment by ethnic groups followed.”\textsuperscript{62} Diefenbaker’s focus on recruiting members of ethnic minority communities as Conservative candidates and Senators, promotion of his own German heritage, adoption of a Bill of Rights, and personal attendance at ethnic events, had been very successful strategies for winning the ethnic vote.

Instead of trying to beat the Tories at their own game, Thompson suggested that the Liberal Party begin to cultivate relationships with ethnic representatives by attending ethnic dinners, special events, and ceremonies. “It is only by new members attending functions and keeping a personal contact with individuals in ethnic groups,” he wrote, “that they will ensure votes from this area.”\textsuperscript{63} Though Liberal organizer Keith Davey later thanked Thompson and Hellyer for their “single-handed” courtship of ethnic Canadians during the 1962 general election, which led to a “repudiation of Mr. Diefenbaker by a large cross-section of Ethnic voters,” it was not enough to bring the Liberal Party around


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 6-7.
to Thompson’s way of thinking. Almost a decade later, in 1971, Thompson would submit a similar “Suggested Party Program” to Pierre Trudeau.64

But the major intellectual hurdle that the Liberal Party had to overcome was the notion of Canada as “bicultural.” Whereas Progressive Conservatives talked openly about Canada as a “mosaic” and the idea of “unhyphenated” Canadian identity, the Liberals were tied to a concept that had less and less resonance for many Canadians of non-British and non-French descent. This disconnect was most evident in a speech by Jack Pickersgill on “Immigration and Citizenship” that he gave in March 1963. Speaking as a former Minister of Immigration, he noted that more immigrants had come to Canada under Liberal administrations than Conservative administrations. To Pickersgill, immigration was required “to build up Canada.” The Liberal Party’s position was that immigrants could “retain their pride of origin,” but they had to recognize the reality of Canadian life:

Canada exists because, a hundred years ago, English speaking and French speaking Canadians joined together to form an equal partnership in building a single, united country. The Liberal Party is resolved to uphold the equality of the English and French languages and of English and French culture in Canada. We believe that it is the only way to ensure the survival of a united Canada.65

This was not the only occasion when the Liberal Party overlooked the ethnic minority communities. When Thompson was scheduled to speak on “Canadian Identity” at a Canada Ethnic Press Federation luncheon in Winnipeg, he asked Pickersgill to suggest

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talking points. Pickersgill responded that he should “refer to my connection with the founding of the Canada Ethnic Press Federation and to my continuing interest in the valuable work it is doing in assisting in the transition of the new comers to full Canadian citizenship.” 66 This was hardly the stuff to inspire ethnic minorities to adopt a Liberal version of “Canadian Identity.”

The New Democratic Party also demonstrated a disregard for non-French and non-British ethnic minority communities. Though Tommy Douglas personally supported the idea of a mosaic, his views were not those of his party or its president. At the New Democratic Party’s founding convention in 1961, “the convention, with near unanimity, defined Canada as composed of two founding nations, and it recognized what it called the provinces’ inalienable rights.” 67 Michael Oliver, who acted as the first President of the NDP from 1961-1963 (before he became the Director of Research for the RCBB), defended the New Democratic Party’s conception of Canada in an editorial in the Montreal Star in August 1963. He argued that there was an “essential difference” between the founding groups and those that came later:

The Star has very wisely criticized those who, like Mr. Marcel Lambert, blur the vital examination of Canadian biculturalism by attempting to shift our focus to an ill-defined notion of multiculturalism. Nothing but chaos can result from a failure to distinguish between the claims of the founding communities in Canada, on the one hand, and those of cultural groups – Polish, Ukrainian, German,

Italian, Chinese, etc. – who have chosen Canada as their home, on the other.68

To Oliver, these ethnic minority groups “enriched” Canada, but the French and British founding nations would give the country “its basic quality.” He argued that these “national communities” had the obligation to uphold human rights and freedom of the individual, as well as respect the cultural traditions of ethnic minority groups.69

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism

These two conceptions of Canada — “biculturalism” and “multiculturalism” — would clash during the hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. On 20 January 1962, André Laurendeau called for a “royal commission on bilingualism” in the pages of Le Devoir.70 His message was that Canada was in the midst of a crisis, brought on by years of neglecting the aspirations of Quebec and the French-Canadian people. Maurice Lamontagne, who was then acting as an advisor to Lester Pearson, Leader of the Opposition, shared Laurendeau’s view.71 Lamontagne drafted a memo to Pearson in September of 1962 in which he argued that the Liberal Party, once in power, should repatriate the constitution, adopt a new national flag, and introduce a bilingual public service.72 He also suggested a commission of inquiry along the lines advocated by Laurendeau. Pearson agreed, and Lamontagne was charged with drafting a speech to

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72 Graham Fraser, Sorry, I Don’t Speak French: Confronting the Canadian Crisis That Won’t Go Away (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2006), 27.
Parliament. As Lamontagne later recalled, he showed a draft of the speech to both Laurendeau and Gérard Pelletier; although they agreed with the spirit of the speech, “they didn’t believe that the speech would ever be made.”

In early December of 1962, Université Laval political scientist Léon Dion also called for an inquiry into French-English relations in Le Devoir. Whether Dion’s call for a commission was the final push Pearson needed is unclear. But, to the apparent surprise of his political allies, on 17 December 1962 Pearson stood up in the House of Commons and declared: “Recent events have shown clearly that we are going through another crisis of national unity, and I do not think it is an exaggeration to call it this.”

To ameliorate the crisis, Pearson proposed that Canada “should seriously and collectively review the bicultural and bilingual situation in our country.” He promised that if he were elected Prime Minister, his government would appoint a commission of inquiry. Pearson’s speech, though a surprise to his colleagues, was not out of step with the dominant discourse of the period. The notion of “biculturalism” already had a certain resonance for Canadians because of the Quiet Revolution and the overwhelming focus on Quebec and French Canada in the media.

Following his election as Prime Minister in April of 1963, Pearson acted quickly on his campaign promise of “sixty days of decision.” Maurice Lamontagne, who had

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77 For more on the appointment of the cabinet and one of Pearson’s other social policy initiatives, pension reform, see P.E. Bryden, Planners and Politicians: Liberal Politics and Social Policy, 1957-1968
now been appointed President of the Privy Council, was asked to prepare the terms of reference and appoint commissioners to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB). The terms of reference called on the commissioners to

…inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution.

While the English version of the terms of reference referred to the “two founding races,” the French version referred to “les deux peuples qui l’ont fondée,” or “the two founding peoples.” For the purposes of appointing commissioners, Lamontagne wanted the Commission to be made up of equal numbers of Anglophones (English-speakers) and Francophones (French-speakers): “My idea was to have a very balanced commission with four English-speaking of English stock, Irish, Scottish, and four French Canadians, and then two from the new groups because they were included in the terms of reference.”

Charles Lynch of Southam News Services wrote that “Quebec will be setting the pace in the Royal Commission hearings, which is natural enough since it was pressure from Quebec that led to the setting up of the commission.” Lynch worried, however, that in Pearson’s drive to ensure equal representation of French and English speakers on the Commission he had undersold English-Canadians, many of whom worried about the

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(Original page number: 96)

growing neo-nationalist movement in Quebec. The *Calgary Herald*, while praising the representativeness of the Commissioners, worried that the terms of reference were too restrictive: “The new commission will therefore embark on its task under some difficulty, confronted as it is with terms of reference which may well clash with what should be its proper objective. That objective should be to determine the means by which as sense of national unity and national purpose may be achieved.”

André Laurendeau was the natural choice as the Francophone co-chairman of the Commission, as he had initially called for a commission of inquiry. In the 1940s Laurendeau had sat in the Quebec National Assembly as a member of the nationalist Bloc Populaire. He later went on to become the editor and director of *Le Devoir*, as well as a highly-regarded author and commentator on French-Canadian affairs. Despite his pedigree as a nationalist and former separatist, in recent years Laurendeau had become a voice of reason among French-Canadian nationalists. His co-chairman was Davidson Dunton, who was then acting as the president of Carleton University in Ottawa. Dunton had been educated in Montreal, Grenoble, and Munich, and was, like Laurendeau, bilingual in French and English. He had served as a journalist for the *Montreal Star* and the *Montreal Standard*, and later was made chairman of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The Commission was rounded out by the appointment of Reverend Clement Cormier, Royce Frith, Jean Louis Gagnon, Gertrude Laing, Jean Marchand, Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, Frank Scott and Paul Wyczyknski.

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84 LAC, RCBB fonds, vol. 115, file 5E, “André Laurendeau.”
Although the Royal Commission’s terms of reference referred to “two founding peoples,” at its heart, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was an inquiry into the relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada. According to Léon Dion, the Commission was “largely composed of intellectuals who were informed about Quebec and were generally well-disposed to the aspirations being expressed there.”

Though Lauréndeau and Dion had called for a commission of inquiry on “bilingualism” and English-French relations, respectively, and Pearson referred to a “crisis of national unity,” they were all alluding to the Quiet Revolution; as such, the RCBB was really a public hearing to address the concerns emerging out of Quebec. Lauréndeau argued that “there is a growing unrest among French Canadians which is becoming more and more acute.” They would not be content with tokenism or “crumbs,” but required “reforms much more general in nature.”

Lamontagne was careful to also appoint representatives of the “other ethnic groups” referred to in the Commission’s terms of reference. He was not short on candidates. For example, one M. Borowsky, representing the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences of Winnipeg, wrote to Pearson: “We feel that in such an important matter all ethnic groups, and in particular the representatives of the competent people from British, French and Slavic (Ukrainian) side should constitute the nucleus of the Royal

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Commission on this special problem.” The Academy went on to recommend Paul Yuzyk as a Commissioner.\(^9^0\) Lamontagne later noted that he had trouble finding suitable candidates for the two “ethnic” positions on the RCBB: “I had met a great Ukrainian in Montreal, but he didn’t fit. We had to have a Ukrainian from the West because the Ukrainian from Montreal was too assimilated. We appointed J.B. Rudnyckyj who came from Winnipeg and had to be fluent in English and French as well. And we got a Pole, Paul Wyczynski, a professor at the University of Ottawa.”\(^9^1\) Rudnyckyj was a linguist who taught in the Department of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba, while Wyczynski was the founding director of the Centre de recherche en civilisation canadienne-française at the University of Ottawa.\(^9^2\) Though they were expected to be representatives of the “other ethnic groups,” Rudnyckyj and Wyczynski were also seen as members of one of the two linguistic and cultural groups with which the Commission was most concerned.

Despite this attempt to represent the “other ethnic groups,” the appointment of Rudnyckyj and Wyczynski was a token gesture at best. Of all the major party leaders, Pearson was the most disconnected from the needs and aspirations of ethnic minorities. This disconnect was particularly evident in his initial response to multiculturalism. In January of 1963, the Canada Ethnic Press Federation sent a statement to the leaders of the

\(^{90}\) LAC, Jaroslav Rudnyckyj fonds, MG31 D 58, vol. 5, file 2, Pearson, Lester; Correspondence, Other 63, 65, 68, M. Borowsky to Lester Pearson, 29 April 1963.

\(^{91}\) Jaroslav Rudnyckyj would become one of the leaders of the multicultural movement. His “Separate Statement,” which was appended to Book I of the Commission’s report, argued for what he called “regional languages.” Paul Wyczynski was instrumental in the writing of Book IV, which dealt with the “other ethnic groups.” Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book I, The Official Languages (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967), 155-169. Peter Stursberg, Lester Pearson and the Dream of Unity (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1978), 142.

\(^{92}\) Incidentally, Rudnyckyj was the founder of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences. Nicole Bonsaint, “Historique du Centre de recherche en civilisation canadienne-française (CRCCF),” Centre de recherche en civilisation canadienne-française, http://www.crccf.uottawa.ca/presentation/historique.html (accessed 21 October 2011).
four major political parties. The CEPF said that it recognized the “French fact” and the “British fact” in Canada, but was “disturbed when it is suggested that there should be two Canadian cultural streams and everyone of other origin should vanish in the one or the other.” The CEPF Executive argued that the other ethnic groups, which comprised roughly 25 per cent of the Canadian population, were also “a Canadian ‘fact’ no less than the other two.” Pearson replied to the statement, assuring the CEPF “that the “ethnic fact” shall not be forgotten.” But he also enclosed a speech that he gave in the House of Commons in December of 1962 on the right of French Canadians to “the equal partnership of Confederation.”

There were some people in Ottawa who were sympathetic to the multiculturalist position taken by the CEPF, the UCC and others. Gordon Churchill, who served as Minister of Defence under Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, opposed the terms of reference of the Royal Commission. As a Winnipegger, he was well aware of the concerns of ethnic minority communities in that city. Churchill later recalled that Pearson was unwilling to seriously deal with the concerns of these groups because he was worried about the potential fallout in Quebec. For his part, Diefenbaker also opposed the terms of reference because of their focus on two founding peoples; the very notion of French-Canadians and English-Canadians contradicted his belief in “unhyphenated Canadianism.” Though Diefenbaker’s response to the CEPF was to send a letter acknowledging receipt of the statement, New Democratic Party leader Tommy Douglas

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and Social Credit Party leader Robert Thompson both expressed their sympathy with the Canada Ethnic Press Federation’s position. Like Pearson, Douglas felt that a Royal Commission on Biculturalism was warranted, given the political and social unrest in Quebec. However, Douglas also argued that Canada was a mosaic, not a bicultural federation:

Personally I have never accepted the American concept of society as a melting pot. I think it is possible to develop unity without uniformity. Canada is made up of many ethnic groups and each has something to contribute to the Canadian mosaic.  

Social Credit Party leader Robert Thompson underlined the fact that, as an immigrant from the United States and “a new Canadian as well,” he felt that Canada had an opportunity to create a unique culture “quite different to the potpourri of the United States.” Ostensibly, this new culture would take the best elements of the British, French, and “new” groups and create a new hybrid, but not a melting-pot.

But Douglas and Thompson, despite their relative power and importance, do not reflect the accepted discourse of the period. Ethnic minority communities and “multiculturalism” remained on the periphery of public discourse in 1963. When politicians and editorialists engaged with these communities, they did so to remind them what “bilingualism and biculturalism” meant. Jean-Luc Pepin, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, argued that the ethnic minority organizations like the CEPF could not cry foul at the Commission’s terms of reference, as they (ethnic minorities) should have known at the time that they immigrated that they

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would have to assimilate into one of the two “major groups.” Writing in the *Ottawa Citizen*, Pepin argued that the “spirit of 1867 was essentially a pact between two nationalities.” Though it was widely accepted that Canada was “socially multi-cultural,” it was “politically bi-national, bicultural and bilingual, a country in which all nationalities, cultures and languages have a right to live but in which only two enjoy political, constitutional status.”

Likewise, Quebec National Resources Minister, Rene Levesque, argued that while members of ethnic minority groups in Quebec were entitled to the same rights as French-speaking Quebecers, “since French-Canadians make up 90 per cent of the population, they have a collective right to direct the province’s affairs as they see fit.”

In a concession to the “other ethnic groups,” some commentators made the case that the Royal Commission’s work could elevate the status of all minority groups, not just French Canadians. The *Gazette* of Montreal concluded that multilingualism was a bad idea, as it could lead to a situation in Canada like that of the Biblical Tower of Babel in which there was no common language. Bilingualism, on the other hand, would lead to greater unity.

For their part, the RCBB’s commissioners never truly questioned the idea of “biculturalism” because it was fundamental to the way that most of them understood the ethnic composition of Canadian society. One working definition prior to the preliminary hearings in November of 1963 held that a “bicultural state” gave “due weight to two habitual ways of thinking, feeling and reacting and organizes public institutions so as to

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100 “Should Canada Be Multilingual?” *The Gazette*, 12 August 1963.
take account of both.”

According to Michael Oliver, who acted as the Commission’s Director of Research, the principle that guided the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was the notion of the equality of two societies – one Anglophone, and the other Francophone – in Canada. As he saw it, “it is imprecise to think that the Francophone Canadians constitute a simple minority in Canada, and that is because, unlike any other group except the Anglophones, the vast majority among them, as seen in Quebec, has at its disposition a range of institutions that allows it to live fully in its own language.”

Leon Dion, who had also called for a commission of inquiry, became the Commission’s Special Consultant on Research. Dion later wrote that the commissioners were primarily concerned whether or not “the two cultures possessed the required institutions, whether they were adequately represented in public organizations, and whether the members of these organizations have the ability to preserve and express their cultures.”

“Biculturalism,” as it was understood by important members of the

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101 Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 100, J.B. Rudnyckyj’s Selected Papers, Michael Oliver to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, October 1963, 3.

102 In his 2007 Ph.D. dissertation from Duke University, Gregory Smolynec argues that, aside from Paul Wyczynski and Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, “most of the other commissioners were not even remotely interested in “the other ethnic groups.”” In an interview that Smolynec conducted with Jean Burnet in 2002, Burnet noted that Commissioner Royce Frith had “openly stated that he was not interested in ethnicity,” while Leon Dion “simply did not believe that multiculturalism, in any sense, was important.” Similarly, Michael Oliver told Smolynec in an interview that he had opposed “the idea of policy of multiculturalism” [sic]. Gregory Smolynec, “Multicultural Cold War: Liberal Anti-Totalitarianism and National Identity in the United States and Canada, 1935-1971,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 2007); Michael Oliver, “Laurendeau et Trudeau: leurs opinions sur le Canada,” in L’engagement intellectuel : Mélanges en l’honneur de Léon Dion, edited by Raymond Hudon and Rejean Pelletier (Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1991), 344.


105 The full quote in French is: « si les deux cultures possèdent les institutions requises, si elles sont représentées adéquatement dans les organisations communes et si les membres de ces organisations ont la
Commission, presupposed that there were two major linguistic and cultural communities that required public institutions in order to reflect and maintain their status. When ethnic minorities began to question this understanding of Canadian society, they found themselves hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned by a Commission and a Government that were committed to “biculturalism.”

**Preliminary Hearings, November 1963**

As the preliminary hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism got underway on 7 November 1963, it became immediately clear that the Commission’s work would not be a walk in the park. While editorial comment had, to this point, focused on the terms “bilingualism” and “biculturalism,” the hearings broadened the debate to include topics such as Canadian history, linguistic politics, ethnicity, and “founding peoples.” The preliminary hearings were meant to ascertain what kinds of questions the Commissioners should be asking of Canadians during the Commission’s tenure. Interestingly, people appearing before the Commission were urged to make only brief comments relating to its mandate, function and terms of reference. In public advertisements for the hearing, the Commissioners warned: “Briefs will not be entertained on the subject matter of bilingualism and biculturalism until the start of the regular hearings.”

This was, frankly, an unreasonable request, as Canadians could not possibly comment on the Royal Commission’s proposed agenda (hearings, consultations,
reports) without also referring to its mandate! Presenters justifiably felt that what the commission chose to study, and whom it chose to consult was proscribed by the terms of reference. As such, the Commission received three or four times more oral submissions than they had prepared for; these came from a wide range of individuals and organizations, including universities, Members of Parliament, ethnic organizations, academics, and clergy. Most of these submissions cut to the heart of the Commission’s mandate, despite the Commission’s attempts to limit the debate.

The hearings were held in the Christ Church Cathedral Hall on Queen Street in Ottawa, not far from the Supreme Court building. In a featured article in the *Ottawa Journal*, Stan McDowell likened the hearing to a “tapestry” — a fitting metaphor for the variety of people, organizations, and ideas that took centre stage over the two days of hearings. André Laurendeau and Davidson Dunton opened the hearing on 7 November by reading prepared statements from the co-chairs and the other commissioners, respectively. Laurendeau restated the Commission's mandate and explained that the co-chairs hoped to have a fruitful dialogue with the public about the Commission's terms of reference. Though he acknowledged that they had been charged with examining the contributions of the "other ethnic groups" to Canada, Laurendeau noted that, in the opinion of the commissioners "the central idea of the mandate is that of an equal partnership between the two founding races." Dunton echoed this comment, noting that ethnic minority groups were expected to integrate into one of the two primary "cultures":

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107 Because of this surfeit of submissions, the RCBB decided to add another day of hearings on November 8th; *The Ottawa Journal*, 11 November 1963, 5; LAC, RCBB fonds, RG 33-80, vol. 115, file 52E, “THE PRELIMINARY HEARING will continue for TWO DAYS instead of ONE.”
Implied in the word "biculturalism" is the fact that in Canada there are two main cultures, each related to one of the principal languages, sharing much in common but each with many distinctive attributes. It will be an important part of our task to consider how these two main cultures may both develop vigorously under the concept of "equal partnership". At the same time, the Commission shall be concerned with the cultural contributions of the other groups. The term "biculturalism" in our minds does not carry the thought that the two cultures must be mixed, nor that individuals must necessarily possess both. But we do believe that it must imply an equality of opportunity for the individual as chiefly associated with one or the other of the two main cultures.\(^1\)

Most of the people appearing before the RCBB responded favourably to the idea of biculturalism. Francophones were particularly receptive to the idea and referred without hesitation to “our two principal cultures” or “the fundamental problem of the duality of culture in Canada.”\(^2\) Others advanced historical arguments in support of the Commission’s mandate. They applauded the Commission for recognizing the fact that Canada was fundamentally a country based upon the equality of the two groups that founded Canada in 1867.\(^3\) Anglophones also supported biculturalism. Dr. Geoffrey Andrew accepted the terms of reference “without reservation.”\(^4\) The National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS) took the approach that “any reference to other cultural groups should be made only with respect to either the French or the English cultural groups as is implicit in the name of this Commission.”\(^5\) David Jenkins of the NFCUS even went so far as to suggest that the RCBB accept first the

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\(^3\) The Association Canadienne des Educateurs de langue française, for example, noted that « Cette association note avec satisfaction que l’égalité entre les deux peuples qui ont fonde la Confédération canadienne est officiellement reconnue dans la composition de votre Commission et dans les termes mêmes de son mandat »; LAC, RCBB fonds, RG 33-80, vol. 110-114, "Preliminary Hearings, 1963," 121.
submissions dealing with both French and English cultural groups, and only later accept those dealing with one group or the “other” groups, because the Commission was ultimately about French-English duality.\textsuperscript{115} When Laurendeau asked if the Commission should then neglect the reference to the “other ethnic groups” in its terms of reference, Jenkins responded that these “newcomers” should only be studied in relation to the English and French groups in which they inevitably resided.\textsuperscript{116}

A few presenters even went so far as to openly attack the multiculturalist position head-on. In his presentation before the Royal Commission, Paul-Emile Robert of la Société-Saint-Jean Baptiste de Montréal noted that there were “certain facts of the Canadian reality.” He warned the Commissioners that “To ignore them would be disastrous. It is not necessary that this commission degenerate into a muted dialogue. Don’t repeat the unfortunate adventure of the tower of Babel.”\textsuperscript{117} Robert’s co-presenter, Michel Brunet, made a brief statement to the same effect: “I have a preliminary declaration that, in fact, insists on cultural dualism and that refuses to tempt, as we said in our brief, the adventure of the Tower of Babel.”\textsuperscript{118} He went on to say that to explore any option other than French-English dualism was to “risk opening Pandora’s box.”\textsuperscript{119}

Perhaps the most interesting presentation, as a matter of historical record, was by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, then a professor of law at the Université de Montréal. He told the Commission that French Canadians simply wanted to “find their place in the society they

\textsuperscript{118} Trans: « J’aurais une déclaration préliminaire qui, en fait, insiste sur le dualisme culturel et qui se refuse à tenter, comme nous disons dans la déclaration, l’aventure de la tour de Babel. »; \textit{Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Transcripts of Hearings}, Preliminary Hearing, Ottawa, Nov. 7-8, 1963, 49.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Transcripts of Hearings}, Preliminary Hearing, Ottawa, Nov. 7-8, 1963, 50.
want to live in” — Canada. He proposed that the Commission try to understand the constitutional hurdles that were preventing French Canadians from moving beyond “the borders of the Outaouais.” It should concentrate its efforts on studying why one ethnic group had greater access to political, economic, and social power than the other. In other words, the nationalism emerging from Quebec was not that of chest-beating patriots, but people who wanted equality of opportunity. Most presciently, Professor Trudeau spoke of a society that was “bilingual [and] multi-ethnic.” In 1968, following his election as Prime Minister, he would begin to implement his vision of a bilingual and multicultural Canada.

Multiculturalists at the Preliminary hearings

The idea of “two founding peoples” did not sit well with some of the presenters who appeared at the preliminary hearings of the RCBB. As Jean Burnet observed, the preliminary hearings and the regional hearings that followed in 1964 and 1965 “revealed that there was a host of ethnic interest groups eager to win recognition and financial support from the government.” Early in the hearings, Isidore Hlynka, President of the Winnipeg Branch of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) expressed his frustration at the Commission’s terms of reference: “[We] emphatically reject any principle which would tend to recognize or to imply the superiority of one group of Canadians over another, whether it be on the basis of their ethnic origin, their culture, or the so-called

121 Ibid., 207.
prior historical right, because this means a return to a colonial status from which it has taken so long to emerge.”

Throughout the two days of public hearings, the Commissioners found themselves defending the bicultural conception of Canada.

Almost to a person, leaders and representatives of ethnic minority voluntary organizations and communities argued that the Commission’s terms of reference were, at best, exclusive, and at worst tantamount to creating two classes of citizens. The Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen’s Club countered the Commission’s terms of reference by saying that the other ethnic groups were also “founding peoples”: “Canadian Ukrainian citizens feel that they are too a founding race since to a large extent it was the Ukrainians that did the work of building the railways, and it was the Ukrainians who found these settlements in the most inaccessible parts of Western Canada. Our ancestors did not move into a neatly ploughed prairie but opened up the backwoods. It is largely from their efforts and the efforts of other Canadians that the Canadian wilderness was transformed into the Canadian bread basket of the world.”

None of these contentions were new or unique; what was important was that many representatives of ethnic minority communities and organizations felt that the Commission’s mandate relegated them to a second-class status, and were now openly challenging the dominant bicultural discourse.

At times, “multiculturalists” and “biculturalists” seemed to be talking around, rather than to, one another. Indeed, the hearings brought to light a profound difference

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126 I place these terms in quotation marks because they are categories of analysis, rather than finite
in world-views. One exchange in particular highlights this division. B.M. Belash represented the Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen’s Club of Winnipeg, an organization “made up mainly of third generation Canadians.” Several Commissioners, including Laurendeau, came into the preliminary hearings with an understanding of the ethnic hierarchy in Canada. They referred to all non-English and non-French people as “new Canadians” or “neo-Canadians,” to distinguish them from the “founding peoples.”

During his presentation, Belash argued that Ukrainian and other (ethnic minority) language broadcasts on public radio and television could serve widely-dispersed minority language populations and deserved the support of the federal government. When Laurendeau questioned Belash on the amount of homes reached by these broadcasts, he was soon chastised for his use of language:

MR. CO-CHAIRMAN LAURENDEAU: You are speaking of the homes of new Canadians in terms of 25 percent.

MR. BELASH: Pardon me, I am not speaking of new Canadians, I am speaking of third generation Canadians.

MR. CO-CHAIRMAN LAURENDEAU: Excuse my use of that expression, this is just a way of speaking.

MR. BELASH: I think it is a wrong way of speaking, if I may say so.

MR. CO-CHAIRMAN LAURENDEAU: Yes.127

Whereas Belash viewed this as a slight toward ethnic minority communities, it was, perhaps, also an issue of Laurendeau’s meaning being lost in translation. Just as “deux peuples qui l’ont fondée” had been badly translated as “two founding races,” “new Canadians” seemed to be a slight against all those people not of the two founding

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groups. In reality, this was a common turn of phrase in Québec, and usually denoted all of those people who arrived after the two initial waves of European colonization. Indeed, Walter Bossy, who was a Ukrainian Canadian immigrant and proponent of multiculturalism, had founded the “New Canadian Service Bureau” (or Bureau du Service Néo-Canadien) in 1949, as a means of helping fellow immigrants integrate into Canadian society. Nonetheless, Belash and others seized on this language as an indication that the Commission was biased against ethnic minority communities.

By the same token, some representatives of ethnic minority organizations had preconceived notions of what “bilingualism and biculturalism” entailed. In his presentation Belash noted, “We were born here and have full rights to citizenship. We are bilingual and bicultural.” The UPBC’s definition of bilingualism and biculturalism had room for Ukrainian and English bilingualism/biculturalism, which had been practised in small communities in the Prairies for generations, as well as the more accepted French-English model found in Moncton, Sudbury, and many other Francophone communities inside and outside of Quebec. The Commissioners were, understandably, frustrated by this use of semantics, as it was not consistent with their aims or those of the Pearson Government.

The most important new concept other than “multiculturalism” to emerge from

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128 Laurendeau seemed to have a change of heart. Only months before his premature death, he wrote the introduction to Book IV of the Commission’s report, which dealt with the “other ethnic groups.” In the draft, he changed the wording from “de Néo-Canadiens” to “d’immigrants.” However, a later version retained the original phrasing, most likely because the French version of the report would be read by Québécois and French Canadians who were familiar with this turn of phrase. LAC, RCBB fonds, vol. 115, file 4F, “Mandat,” 19 juillet 1963; Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, Fonds Familles Laurendeau et Perrault, P2/C, Boîte 60, Comm. L-Dunton, Groupes Ethn., fiche 677, [Introduction to Book IV], 29 février 1968, 7; Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, Fonds Familles Laurendeau et Perrault, P2/C, Boîte 60, Comm. L-Dunton, Groupes Ethn., fiche 678, André Laurendeau a Dunton, Wyczynski, Rudnyckyj, Findlay, Dion, Jean Burnett [sic], 15 mars 1968.


130 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Transcripts of Hearings, Preliminary Hearing, Ottawa, Nov. 7-8, 1963, 226.
ethnic minority organizations during the preliminary hearings in Ottawa — indeed the concept that would come in many ways to define the multicultural movement — was the idea that ethnic minority groups constituted a “third force” or “third element.” As we have seen, Walter Lindal, Scott Symons, and the Canada Ethnic Press Federation had all embraced this notion privately during the 1960s; the preliminary hearings merely brought the term into public use. For example, in its brief, the Polish Alliance and Friendly Society of Canada argued that the Royal Commission was bound to fail if it was only concerned with the “two founding races.” Instead, it needed to acknowledge that “over the years a third force, a vital force, has emerged and this force must be recognized.”  

The third force was said to contain all of the non-British and non-French groups, like the Polish Canadians, and was a “cementing force” that would hold Confederation together.

The following day, Walter Bossy of the Canadian Ethnic Mosaic Confederation echoed the Polish Alliance’s sentiments. After quoting population statistics and statistics about ethnic language newspapers, he stated that “statistically” the “other ethnic groups” constituted a force in Canadian society.  He went on to say that the idea of a third force “does not mean that we are carrying the bombs behind, but it is a potential force.”  Bossy concluded with two recommendations. First, he said that the Commission owed it to the other ethnic groups to explain the terms of reference of the RCBB in ethnic language newspapers, as the terms could be interpreted as discriminatory. Second, Bossy

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said that any new constitution should have input from all of the ethnic groups living in Canada, as the “third group” deserved to have an equal say as “Fathers of Confederation”.

Even individuals and organizations that employed the term “third force” were unsure whether it represented a demographic or social reality, or a social movement. On one hand, the Polish Alliance and Friendly Society of Canada claimed that a “third force” had already emerged. But it also admitted that, given the dominance of the French and British cultures, “we must be realistic.” Commissioner Royce Frith, who seemed genuinely interested in the idea of a “third force” or a “third founding race,” encouraged Glista not to abandon this idea: “Then you added, perhaps just parenthetically, that perhaps you would be dreaming if you did that, or something of that kind, and that would complicate the issue too much. I hope that you will not abandon that approach.”

Similarly, Walter Bossy claimed on one hand that the statistics supported his idea of a “third force”; on the other hand, he claimed it was still a work-in-progress — “a potential force.”

Although Walter Lindal had privately made case for a “multi-cultural” Canada with “three population elements or dimensions,” his presentation before the Commission mentioned neither of these concepts. Lindal represented the Canadian Icelandic Club, the Canadian Ethnic Press Federation, and the Royal Commonwealth Society. Lindal

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immediately identified himself as “the first representative of the ethnic groups, the first representative from western Canada.” He insisted that Canada was, essentially, bilingual in nature and that it was the Commission’s task to ensure that the French-Canadians could be educated in French throughout the country. He told the Commission that provincial governments should not “prohibit the use of the French as a language of instruction in centers [sic] and pockets of French population.” Furthermore, it was the Commission’s task to “make recommendations to what amendments need to be made, and in what manner to establish as part of the constitution of Canada that the provinces have not the power to enact such prohibiting legislation. The above applies to the use of English in Quebec.” Although he admitted that he was unable to speak French, Lindal insisted that the Federal government uphold French language rights outside of Quebec and English language rights in Quebec under Section 93 of the British North America Act.

Interestingly, he did not feel that the commissioners should pay undue attention to the “other ethnic groups.” He suggested that the Commission collect data on ethnic Canadians, but the Commission’s mandate concerning the “other ethnic groups” “need not be enlarged upon at this stage.” Although he saw the value in the teaching of “ethnic” languages in Canadian schools, Lindal was quick to point out that “[t]hose studies are in a totally different category to the learning of the languages of the founding races, English and French. Such studies [“ethnic” languages] should commence at the

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139 Lindal’s identification of “ethnic groups” with “western Canada” would be echoed by others throughout the preliminary hearings and the public hearings that followed in 1965. Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Transcripts of Hearings, Preliminary Hearing, Ottawa, Nov. 7-8, 1963, 60.
141 Ibid., 62.
142 Ibid., 62.
levels in high schools where curricula provide for optional cultural or practical subjects [sic]143. Though the Canada Ethnic Press Federation’s brief to the Royal Commission was in keeping with Lindal’s earlier correspondence with Symons and Tenhunen, his oral presentation was quite different. This seems to suggest that he had some reservations about openly advocating a “third force” and “multiculturalism.” The “third force,” then, is best understood as a rhetorical device, rather than an accurate depiction of the multicultural movement. Lindal was privately a supporter of the aims of the movement, but did not initially employ the language adopted by some members of the movement at the preliminary hearings.

**Media reaction**

In their study of the portrayal of multiculturalism on the covers of *Maclean’s* and *L’Actualite*, Liette Gilbert and Leela Viswanathan make the case that the media has played a crucial role in creation of the multiculturalism discourse.144 In reaction to the issues raised at the preliminary hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Canadian newspapers magnified the multicultural-bicultural debate. The majority of Quebec newspapers and editorials portrayed the multiculturalists as unrealistic. In an editorial in the *Montreal Star* titled “Tough facts about multiculturalism,” the author noted that although “everybody knows that this is a multicultural land,” the fact remained that all Canadians had to integrate into either the

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143 Ibid., 63.
English or French cultures:

Everybody knows that there is richness in diversity. But surely a line must be drawn between the manifestations of multiculturalism and the status in Canada of the two founding groups. Nobody objects to a solid Canadian businessman wearing a kilt on St. Andrew’s day and taking one drink too many as he dances the Highland Fling. But we keep a careful eye on this Scot when he seeks recognition and status for his “cultural” group. We should keep a similar, careful eye on the organizations set up by the ethnic groups of newcomers whose strength lies in the loneliness and nostalgia of immigrants who, to begin with, have little or no knowledge of either the French or English tongues.145

The Star’s editorial staff continued by writing that Canada had an “English Fact and a French Fact, both peculiarly and distinctively Canadian,” but there was no room for a “Ukrainian Fact.”

There was a great deal of support for the position taken by la Société-Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal (SSJB) at the hearings. For example, the Toronto Daily Star adopted the language of the Société, when it argued “The task facing Canada is to weld English- and French-speaking peoples into a nation, not to construct a modern Tower of Babel.”146 Le Devoir ran a similar article on 9 November that highlighted Robert and Brunet’s arguments. The case made by the SSJB was accepted without criticism, while the Ukrainian briefs were portrayed as “the most radical.”147 In its coverage of the preliminary hearings, The Ottawa Journal ran an article about the SSJB presentation entitled “Will Boycott Inquiry, Fear ‘Tower of Babel’.” According to the article, the French-Canadian nationalist group said it would boycott the inquiry and urge other

146 “Rebuild-or fall apart,” Toronto Daily Star, 9 November 1968, 6.
French-language organizations to follow suit if the Royal Commission pays too much attention to “third language and cultural entities.”

The *Toronto Star* made the case that only English and French had historical precedent as national languages. It lamented the number of “ethnic” voices raised in protest against the mandate of the Royal Commission, noting that “[i]t wouldn’t take much of this to build, not a nation, but [a] modern Tower of Babel, where neighbor could not understand neighbor.” The *Toronto Star*’s editorial staff argued that Canada could only handle “one class of citizenship” — but this citizenship only had room for two languages. One reader wrote in to congratulate the *Star* on its position: “Canadians of Ukrainian, German, Italian or any other racial background should not in any way infer that they are regarded by the indigenous population as inferior or lowly, but such immigrants surely do not come in Canada expecting to remain Ukrainian, German, or Italian, but rather to become Canadian. Not merely by possessing a certificate of Canadian citizenship, but by acquiring Canadian attitudes and outlooks on every aspect of life.”

Another reader wrote that language issues (French, English, or otherwise) were a problem for the diplomatic service, but had no place in other areas of Canadian life.

But not all Canadian news outlets chose to give credence to the biculturalist position. The *Globe and Mail* noted that the Federation of Saint-Jean Baptiste Societies (the parent organization of the SSJB) had also threatened to boycott the Commission if its

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148 Note: *The Ottawa Journal* misattributed this turn of phrase to the Federation of St. Jean Baptiste Societies, which presented later in the day, but also threatened to boycott the Commission; “Will Boycott Inquiry, Fear ‘Tower of Babel’: Alberta Also Serves Warning,” *The Ottawa Journal*, 8 November 1963, 21.
150 F.M. Gaviller, “‘Immigrants are Canadians in the making’,” *Toronto Star*, 15 November 1963.
concerns were not dealt with. However, the *Globe*’s Bernard Dufresne chose to describe in detail the complaints of the Federation. He then presented the comments made in response by Commissioners Dunton and Cormier. Dufresne at least attempted to write a balanced article, whereas *The Ottawa Journal* and *The Toronto Daily Star* carried sensationalist articles that created an artificial division between ethnic groups. The *Globe* later called for Canadians to “co-operate” with the Commission, rather than threaten to boycott its hearings. The editorial staff noted two days later that the Federation of Saint-Jean Baptiste Societies “are probably a declining force and it is extremely doubtful if Dr. Frenette reflects even the view of the majority of his members, let alone the state of public opinion in his Province.” The *Ottawa Citizen* proclaimed “Royal Commission on BICULTURALISM Starts off with built-in bias: French-Canada getting poor deal.” Its editorial staff made the case that the majority of the Commissioners were on a “crusade” to persuade Canadians that the country was bicultural: “Biculturalism is popular. It’s the thing to do. To be against biculturalism is as bad as being against motherhood and the United Nations.” The *Citizen*, despite its criticism for the Royal Commission, still lumped all of the “New Canadians” together; it claimed that the preliminary hearings had “developed mainly into a confrontation between the French Canadians and the “New Canadians” - the “other ethnic groups” of the commission’s terms of reference.”

155 Ibid., 7.
Although the print media briefly acknowledged the presentations made by ethnic minority organizations during the Royal Commission’s preliminary hearings, multiculturalism was only ever a sideshow to the larger debate about bilingualism and biculturalism. Following an initial flurry of coverage in 1963, major newspapers as well as magazines like *Maclean’s* and *Saturday Night* focused most of their attention on the Commission’s mandate – bilingualism and biculturalism – and its potential impact on Canadian society, politics, and law. A handful of ethnic minority representatives did not alter the Commission’s mandate, nor did they significantly change the public discourse. The preliminary hearings were, however, a watershed moment for the multicultural movement because they brought it into the public spotlight. Organizations like the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, the Canada Ethnic Press Federation, and the Institute of the Canadian Ethnic Mosaic Confederation, were able to briefly hold the attention of the national media, thereby inserting “multiculturalism” into the dominant discourse.

**Analysis**

What we see emerging between 1957 and 1963 is what Manoly Lupul later called “a social philosophy like biculturalism, feminism, or the black civil rights movement, whose central tenet was equality, and whose ultimate goal was a greater sharing of power and opportunity in all social areas, in the workplace, education, the media, the civil service, and of course in politics, law, and government.” Multiculturalism was in its early stages, however, and it remained to be seen whether the movement would grow beyond a

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handful of newly-mobilized ethnic minority organizations. Likewise, the claim to a “third force” that was often made in the name of all ethnic minority communities was, if anything, premature. Only a handful of communities, and a few organizations within those communities, openly expressed interest in the idea.

While it is clear that some ethnic minority voluntary organizations were mobilized around the Royal Commission’s terms of reference, they represented a fraction of the total population of ethnic minority communities (and organizations). This “loosely organized coalition of ethnic minorities,” as Matt James has called it, was drawn predominantly from the Ukrainian, Polish, and German communities.\(^{157}\) This is not to say that other communities (such as Lithuanians or Japanese) were not active in lobbying the Federal Government, for example. The Pearson and Trudeau papers show that many ethnic minority organizations were in constant communication with the Prime Ministers’ Office; more often than not, however, they were more concerned with the Prime Minister’s attendance at a local event than they were with “multiculturalism.”

Of the 86 people who appeared before the RCBB during its preliminary hearings, 19 were French Canadians, representing 17 organizations.\(^{158}\) By comparison, 14 people claimed to represent 12 ethnic minority voluntary organizations. In a report about the preliminary hearings, the Commission’s secretaries later noted: “The 76 people who appeared were not sufficiently representative of Canada. A number of Ukrainian and Polish groups were represented, but no German, Italian etc. There were few who spoke


\(^{158}\) French Canadians represented approximately 22% of the presenters; ethnic minorities made up 16% of the presenters. I do not include in these numbers people who were members of French Canadian/ethnic minority communities that presented in their capacity as the member of a non-French/non-ethnic organization. For example, Mrs. Saul Hayes, wife of the Canadian Jewish Congress’ National Executive Vice President, presented in her capacity as the head of the National Council of Women.
for the younger and more radical elements of French Canada. No western universities
sent spokesmen. Of the twelve identifiable “ethnic minority” organizations, one was
Icelandic, one Slovak, four Polish, two Jewish, two Ukrainian, and two were associations
(the Canada Ethnic Press Federation, and the Institute of the Canadian Ethnic Mosaic
Confederation). There was also one Native presenter, Ethel Monture of the National
Indian Council of Canada.

Despite the RCBB’s secretaries’ dismay at the lack of representativeness of the
Commission’s interlocutors, these numbers can tell us something about the nascent
multicultural movement. Ukrainian and Polish organizations and individuals formed
the largest contingents aside from French Canadians. At least four significant ethnic
organizations – the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canadian Polish Congress, the
Ukrainian Canadian Committee, and the Canada Ethnic Press Federation – were all
represented. Four individuals from two identifiable Ukrainian organizations addressed the
Commission; one other individual, Walter Bossy of the Institute of the Canadian Ethnic
Mosaic Confederation, made mention of his Ukrainian background. Perhaps most
importantly, these Polish and Ukrainian representatives were the most strident in their
support for a multicultural Canada. It would be the Ukrainian and Polish communities
and their respective national organizations that would lead the fight for public recognition

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159 The Commission’s method of counting people is clearly different from my own. The secretaries chose to
count organizations as “people.” Thus, even though there were 86 people who presented, they counted 76
organizations. This does not reflect the length of or variance in opinion between statements made by some
of the presenters from the same organization. For example, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee sent three
men, each of whom gave a substantial presentation. LAC, RCBB fonds, vol. 115, file 62E, “Summary
160 In her work on the Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital of 1886-1888, Susan
Trofimenkoff showed that women and women’s voices were peripheral to the concerns of that
Commission. By examining the 102 women who testified (out of a total of 1,800 witnesses), she was able
to “glean” information about the lives of these labouring women. Susan Trofimenkoff, “One Hundred and
Two Muffled Voices: Canada’s Industrial Women in the 1880s,” in Canadian Working Class History:
Selected Readings, edited by Laurel Sefton MacDowell and Ian Radforth (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’
of multiculturalism.
Chapter 4: “Neither rigid biculturalism nor loose multiculturalism will hold its complex elements together”: The multiculturalism debate, 1963-1965

In reviewing the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism’s impact, John Meisel wrote in 1999 that the Commission “put multiculturalism on the political agenda.” While it is true that the Commission’s hearings and the public debate they engendered raised multiculturalism as an alternative to “bilingualism and biculturalism,” it would not be until the early 1970s that multiculturalism was given any serious thought by federal politicians. From its inception the Royal Commission was meant to look into questions of language and culture as they concerned Quebec and French Canadians outside of Quebec. Although the commissioners seemed genuinely sympathetic to some of the concerns of ethnic minority organizations, they did not let these voices deter them from their mandate.

During the first two years of the Commission’s work, prior to the release of its Preliminary Report in 1965, Canadians debated the meaning of “bilingualism and biculturalism.” In the course of these discussions, the multicultural movement began to expand. But what started as symposia, conferences, and public talks, quickly grew into a small battle between French Canadians and ethnic minority communities. What was revealed between 1963 and 1965 was a profound misunderstanding between French Canadians and ethnic minority communities about the meaning of “biculturalism.” To intellectual leaders from Quebec, such as André Laurendeau and Premier Jean Lesage, “biculturalism” implied that there were two societies – what Hugh MacLennan had called

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“two solitudes” – one primarily French-speaking and centred in Quebec, and the other English-speaking and found in the rest of Canada.\(^2\) To this group, French Canada (read: Quebec) needed to strengthen its institutions and language in order to guarantee the continuity of the French Canadian people. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was called in order to find solutions to this problem.

For leaders of ethnic minority communities, the language used at the time – “two founding peoples,” “biculturalism,” and “bilingualism” – seemed to imply an inferior status for those people who did not have French or British ancestry or ethnicity. Although this is not what Pearson had intended to do in calling the RCBB, many communities were troubled by the slight, and even more troubled by some commentators who suggested that ethnic minority communities were being unreasonable in their demands for “multiculturalism.” These communities, like French Canadians, worried that they would not be able to perpetuate their cultures and languages without some form of recognition and/or assistance from the Canadian state. Though a détente of sorts was arranged between French Canadians and two of the most influential ethnic organizations in late 1965, a rift opened up between French Canadians and ethnic communities over the issue of “bilingualism and biculturalism.”

**Conferences and Questions**

The RCBB’s hearings had ignited a desire within some Canadians for answers to the questions they had about Quebec and French Canadians; unbidden by the Royal Commission, they gathered in church basements and university lecture halls to debate

\(^2\) Hugh MacLennan, *Two Solitudes* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945).
bilingualism and biculturalism.³ The Unitarian Congregation of Toronto held three lectures on biculturalism, the third of which was a panel discussion on “Human Rights Factors,” with Norbert Prefontaine of the Canadian Centenary Council, Steven Davidovitch from the Province of Ontario, and Scott Symons from the Royal Ontario Museum.⁴ Davidovitch made the case that “New Canadians” had “been left in the cold by the Battle of the Plains of Abraham and its aftermath.” To his way of thinking, the rights of the non-English and non-French Canadians were being overlooked in the national discussion about biculturalism. Symons, who was, as we have seen, sympathetic to ethnic minorities, nonetheless said that some “New Canadians” were guilty of “historic amnesia” because they were not giving the founding groups their due.⁵

The Ukrainian Women’s Association of Canada and the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada held their annual provincial meetings on 9-10 November 1963 at St. Andrew’s College, Winnipeg. In addition to the regular business that one finds at annual general meetings, these organizations sponsored “a discussion on biculturalism versus multiculturalism, led by members of the affiliated youth organization.”⁶ They invited Prof. George Simpson of the University of Saskatchewan, the Very Rev. Dr. S.W. Sawchuk of St. Andrew’s College, and John N. Mandziuk, M.P. to address these issues. The Winnipeg Free Press, Toronto Star and the Ottawa Journal all gave the event front

³ It is worth mentioning that these early conferences tended to deal with “bilingualism and biculturalism.” Some conferences, especially those held in Alberta and in Ukrainian-heavy areas like Winnipeg and Edmonton, put “multiculturalism” on the agenda or, more often, multiculturalists raised it. The movement, such as it was, stayed initially within the confines of the Commission’s mandate. As the 1960s went on, gatherings became more overtly politicized and even dispensed with discussing “bi and bi” as a viable model of Canadian society.


page coverage. A few days later, Ukrainian Canadian scholar Ol’ha Woycenko gave a presentation entitled “Canada’s Cultural Heritage: Ukrainian Contribution” at the Provincial Council of (Manitoba) Women’s “Symposium on Canada’s Heritage.” What is interesting is that these organizations believed that biculturalism and multiculturalism were of such vital importance that they devoted part of their annual meetings to addressing these issues.

Universities in Western Canada were active in arranging conferences and lectures; faculty members of Ukrainian and Slavic backgrounds were particularly active in arranging and presenting at these sorts of events. In November 1963, Dr. Manoly Lupul addressed the St. John’s Young Adults Club at the University of Alberta on the topic of bilingualism and biculturalism. The club was part of St. John’s Institute, a residence for Ukrainian Orthodox students attending the University of Alberta. A three-person “Special Students’ Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism” at the University of Manitoba held five hearings in January of 1964. According to Jaroslav Rudnyckyj who attended the hearings as an observer (and most likely supporter), between 15 and 65 people attended these meetings. The meetings were covered by the student newspaper; Rudnyckyj reported that “The material gathered will serve as a basis for the Manitoba students’ submission to the Royal Commission during its sitting in Winnipeg.” Faculty were also involved in these sorts of activities. The University of Manitoba’s annual Alumni Conference in March 1964 on the theme “Canada, One Nation or Two?”

included a panel discussion with Maurice Sauve, Jean-Luc Pepin, W.L. Morton, Olga (Ol’ha) Woycenko, and Walter J. Lindal.\textsuperscript{10}

Provincial governments — Alberta and Manitoba in particular — were also invested in the question of bilingualism and biculturalism.\textsuperscript{11} In Manitoba, Premier Roblin appointed historian W.L. Morton to head up the Consultation Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Manitoba, which was charged with making recommendations to the Province of Manitoba in regard to that province’s submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.\textsuperscript{12} The first public meeting of the Consultation Commission (commonly called the Roblin Commission at the time) took place on 16 December 1963 in Convocation Hall of United College in Winnipeg. Of the sixty people in attendance, forty groups were represented, and twenty submissions were made to the Committee. Among the groups in attendance were Jewish, Icelandic, German, Polish, French, Ukrainian, Church, and Women’s groups.\textsuperscript{13} The Ukrainian Canadian Committee’s Winnipeg Branch argued that the Laurendeau-Dunton’s terms of reference “appear to be biased with the result prejudged. The reluctant recognition, that 5 million Canadians of other than French or British ethnic origin exist at all, appears to have been inserted as an after thought, and placed apart and in a subordinate location.

\textsuperscript{10} Lindal, speaking as a member of the legal profession and not as a representative of the CEPF, claimed that Canada was fundamentally a British and French country (because of its Constitution), but also a nation of immigrants. LAC, Paul Yuzyk fonds, RG 32 C-67, vol. 31, file 30-12, Royal Commission on B&B: Misc Articles, Addresses, Brief, Letter 1962-68, \textit{The Alumni Journal}, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Spring 1964, Canada, One Nation or Two?; LAC, Paul Yuzyk fonds, RG 32 C-67, vol. 31, file 30-12, Royal Commission on B&B: Misc Articles, Addresses, Brief, Letter 1962-68, “Symposium on Canada’s Cultural Heritage.”

\textsuperscript{11} In 1965, the Robarts Government in Ontario created the Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation to advise the Government on constitutional issues, especially those relating to bilingualism, biculturalism, and multiculturalism.

\textsuperscript{12} LAC, RCBB fonds, vol. 115, file 97E, FLPRS translation, \textit{Progress/Postup} (Ukrainian), Winnipeg, 1-12-63, “Manitoba in Biculturalism.”

Any presentation of the viewpoint of Canadians of Ukrainian origin is thus as a serious
disadvantage.” UCC representatives said that they expected “full equality for the
Ukrainian language, with other languages representing different cultures of the people of
Manitoba; as a basic right as citizens of this province.”

The major theme that emerged in Manitoba in this period was “multilingualism.”
Given what they perceived as a bias toward English-French bilingualism by the RCBB,
Ukrainians and a few other Slavic groups were keen to ensure that their linguistic rights
would not be trampled on. Furthermore, they argued, one could not speak of a
“multicultural” country without also discussing multilingualism; as they saw it, language
learning was vital to the transferral of culture to the next generation. Following the
second hearing of the Consultation Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in
January of 1964, the Winnipeg Free Press ran an article about the hearing entitled
“Committee Told: Ukrainian Comes First.” Despite the provocative title, the author went
on to write that Ukrainians had advocated the teaching of Ukrainian only in areas where
Ukrainians made up a large percentage of the population. Although six Ukrainian
organizations made the case for language training at the elementary, secondary and
university levels, at no time did they demand that Ukrainian become a national
language. Nonetheless, the Winnipeg Free Press responded to the hearing by printing
an editorial entitled “Linguistic Chaos.” The editorial staff misrepresented the arguments
made by the Ukrainian organizations, and claimed that the Ukrainian groups wanted
“their language placed on an equal basis with English and French.” They advised that if
the Ukrainians “had their way, they would transform Canada into a real tower of

14 Ibid., 2-3.
This was not the first time that the *Winnipeg Free Press* had voiced opposition to Ukrainian language education. During the First World War it had called for an end to Manitoba’s bilingual schools, where some students learned German or Ukrainian and English; such schools were seen as “a sign of disloyalty in a time of war.” As a result of pressure from nativists, bilingual schools were abolished in Manitoba in 1916; Saskatchewan and Alberta, where there had been unofficial bilingual schools, followed suit in 1919. Though Ukrainians and Germans had been suspected of being a “fifth column” during World War One, during the Second World War relations were normalized when ethnic Canadians were needed in the war effort. With the end of the war, public schools in parts of the Prairie West once again “offered Ukrainian as a language of study (grammar mainly) through core programmes of thirty minutes to two hours each week.” In spite of these recent gains, Ukrainians and Germans worried about the impact that the RCBB might have on bilingual ethnic schools in the West. It seemed that French Canadians, who made up a small proportion of the population relative to other ethnic groups, were demanding and might even receive rights which, until recently, had been denied to larger groups.

In response to the *Winnipeg Free Press* editorial, the *Ukrainian Voice* printed a series of four editorials in February and March of 1964. One author pointed out that “no Ukrainian submission asked that the Ukrainian language be made an official language in

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18 The *Winnipeg Free Press* was known as the *Manitoba Free Press* until 1931. Frances Swyripa, “The Ukrainian Image: Loyal Citizen or Disloyal Alien,” in *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada During the Great War*, ed. Frances Swyripa and John Herd Thompson (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), 50.
the land, -- an assumption on which this bogey of the tower of Babel has been created."  

The editors of the *Ukrainian Voice* were so angered by the *Winnipeg Free Press* editorial that they published these editorials in pamphlet form in March of 1964; clearly they wanted their message to reach the wider non-Ukrainian community. They seem to have been successful: Peter Stursberg wrote a sympathetic story on the “ethnics” and the Royal Commission in the March 1964 edition of *Saturday Night.* In response, Isydore Hlyknka, who was quoted in Stursberg’s piece, wrote a letter to the editor thanking the journalist for printing a balanced story about the other ethnic groups. He went on to say that the other ethnic groups “accept as a common denominator the English language (Quebec excepted) and the contemporary North American culture, to forestall the arguments of the Tower of Babel and balkanization.”

Cornelius Jaenen, an historian and member of the Consultation Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, was troubled by the editorial in the *Winnipeg Free Press.* In conjunction with *Ukrainian Voice*, he published a pamphlet in April of 1964 that echoed the sentiments of the Ukrainian community. He made the case that many languages and cultures served to enrich Canadian life; to promote a melting-pot was unwise:

> I am saying that a little effort now to encourage and perpetuate and preserve our valuable “gift of tongues” might avoid future necessity for emergency measures as well as bringing us several tangible benefits in the intervening years. I see only advantages in knowing languages – not disadvantages. To teach more languages in Manitoba does not produce a Tower of Babel as the *Free Press* suggests. The world is a Tower of Babel and to learn

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20 *This Bogey of the Tower of Babel*, Ukrainian Voice, English Series, Pamphlet No 3 (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Voice, March 1964), 7.
another language is a positive step towards understanding other peoples, towards bridging the differences that separate peoples."

Jaenen also used this pamphlet to advise the Ukrainian-Canadian community how to better convey their arguments to the Canadian public. He advised Ukrainians that the argument for ethnic language education would be strengthened were they to show how many people used Ukrainian as their mother tongue, rather than how many people claimed Ukrainian ethnicity. While Francophones could claim French as a national or “trans-Canadian” language, Ukrainians, Germans and others were justified in claiming their languages as vital to “the multicultural nature of Prairie society.” Unfortunately for multiculturalists, these arguments did not put the “Tower of Babel” metaphor to rest. A year later, in March of 1965, the Toronto Daily Star again printed an editorial warning against multilingualism, and promising that such a state of affairs would lead to a “Tower of Babel”; the Winnipeg Free Press also continued its attack on multilingualism.

French-Ethnic Divide

All of this contributed to the belief in intellectual circles in Quebec that ethnic minorities in the West were opposed to the interests of French Canadians. In March of 1964, Ivan

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25 There is even evidence to suggest that this metaphor caught on among the intelligentsia. In a 1970 article in the *Canadian Historical Review*, Allan Smith used the phrase to describe the fear that the English-Canadian mainstream had in the post-Confederation period, as immigrants began to flood into the country. “Two languages are enough,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 31 March 1965, 6. Shaun Herron, “The B. and B. Again: Cries from the Heart,” *Winnipeg Free Press*, 13 December 1965, 6. Allan Smith, “Metaphor and Nationality in North America,” *Canadian Historical Review* 51, no. 3 (September 1970): 268.
Guay wrote an article for *Cité Libre* entitled Le Bilinguisme: Une Mystification.” He contended that the RCBB had “had the effect of creating confusion among Anglo-Canadians and creating hostile sentiment against French-Canadians.” According to Guay, “Anglo-Canadians,” including the minority ethnic groups, viewed the French population of Canada as an obstacle in the way of their ultimate goal of creating an American-style melting pot. They were frustrated in their desire to do so only because of the large French minority concentrated in Quebec. Guay then argued that official recognition of one ethnic group—the French—was preferable to recognition of several ethnic groups. “French-Canadians form one of the two founding nations of Canada, and also want official recognition of their cultural origins,” he wrote; “What is more, it is an aberration to believe that they can preserve their culture of origin when these groups live in a milieu that has a different culture. The evidence of the failure of such an enterprise is well known. All the immigrant groups or French-Canadian exiles (in New England, New Orleans, Ontario, Manitoba, etc.) are assimilated after a few generations.”

The opinion of *Cité Libre*’s co-founder, Pierre Trudeau, was more difficult to pin down. In early June of 1964, Manoly Lupul, a professor of history at the University of Alberta and third-generation Ukrainian, attended the Learned Societies Conference in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. Lupul, like several Ukrainian Canadian academics in the early 1960s, had begun to take part in the multicultural movement; the “Learneds” provided a platform for Lupul to discuss the idea of multiculturalism with people whose business was new ideas. In his 2005 memoir, he recalled that his paper on multiculturalism, presented to the Canadian Association of Professors of Education,

elicited very little response. Instead, “the mood was patronizing, even dilettantish, with the “beautiful” French language and culture frequently lauded.” Later, he attended a session of the Canadian Political Science Association where Pierre Trudeau, then a law professor at the Université de Montréal, gave a paper on federal-provincial relations. At a reception afterwards, Lupul and Trudeau were introduced and began to discuss “the impact of bilingualism and biculturalism on the multicultural west.”

Less than a year earlier at the Royal Commission’s hearings, Trudeau had made the claim that Canada was “multi-ethnic”; however, he did not see this as incompatible with official (French and English) bilingualism. Lupul responded that he and his compatriots felt that English-Ukrainian bilingualism, which had arisen naturally, was threatened by the imposition of French and English as official languages:

Trudeau, of course, denied that there was anything artificial about the French and pointed to historical factors like the Manitoba school question that had discouraged westward French-Canadian migration. I replied with instances of Quebec bishops, politicians and journalists deliberately discouraging such migration, resulting in a settlement policy that brought in people like the Ukrainians, many of whom still retained a linguistic base that was just waiting to be tapped. “And how long will they last?” Trudeau snapped. “Longer than you think,” I replied, which pretty well ended the half-hour give and take.

Clearly Lupul was upset by Trudeau’s (typically flippant) response; but he also misunderstood Trudeau’s logic. A few years later, Trudeau published an article in *Cité Libre* that clarified his position. He stated that "If six million persons with Ukrainian as

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29 Ibid., 53.
their mother tongue lived in Canada, it is probable that this language would impose itself with as much force as French. In terms of real politik, what makes English and French equal in Canada is that each of the two linguistic groups has the power to break up the country." In other words, the Ukrainians did not yet deserve special linguistic rights, because French and English-speakers were more numerous in Canada. He conceived of a bilingual Canada that invested in the French language, thereby allowing Quebeckers to leave “la boite québécoise” for points West. The people already living there would have to adapt to Canada’s (French and English) bilingual reality.

Whereas Lupul felt that Trudeau and other French Canadian intellectuals were prejudiced against ethnic minority groups, André Laurendeau felt that there was a great deal of prejudice against French Canadians coming from ethnic minority groups in Western Canada. During the Commission’s first visit to Winnipeg on 20 January 1964, it met with the students of the University of Manitoba, who had formed their own B and B Commission. “The hearing begins: the first student, a French Canadian, makes a solid argument for Quebec separation,” Laurendeau wrote in his diary; “The second, of English-Ukrainian origin, trots out what Mr. Dunton calls a marvellous collection of the anti-French and anti-Catholic prejudices common in these milieux.” Laurendeau recalled that later that night at dinner with members of W.L. Morton’s Consultation Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism he was “seated between a solemn Icelandic doctor, sure of himself and his own importance, and a Ukrainian war hero.”

During the last part of the meal, the Commissioners “were exposed to a veritable assault

of multiculturalism.”

After a meeting the following day with local businessmen in Edmonton, Laurendeau wrote that some of the people he met with felt that bilingualism was “an old quarrel between Ontario and Quebec.” He felt the need to remind them that, as Canadians, they could not be concerned only with Alberta, but also with Quebec, as the situation there had the potential to break up the country: “By the end of lunch we could feel that some of them had moved a bit…there were problems in Canada that they hadn’t really thought about.” It did not take very long for Laurendeau to feel the pulse of western Canada. After having met with groups and individuals in Winnipeg, Edmonton and Regina, he wrote in his diary that “we began to formulate for ourselves an understanding of the situation we’ve been observing; that is, a multiculturalism that is an undeniable fact.” This multiculturalism, according to Laurendeau, differed from locale to locale, but was small by comparison to the larger problem of French-English relations. What he wanted to express to ethnic groups in the West was that they were “not at all the same as an organized society like Quebec, with a large population, its own institutions, and a long and specific history.” At the end of his first trip to western Canada, Laurendeau outlined some of his preliminary thoughts. He concluded that the overwhelming message he received from western Canadians was “multiculturalism.” In his assessment, the “Neo-Canadiens” had brought attitudes with them from the old country. Ukrainians in particular were used to fighting for their cultural and linguistic

35 Ibid., 35.
36 Ibid., 36.
37 Ibid., 38.
38 Ibid. 38.
rights in Soviet Ukraine and, thus, had “a tendency to look for a collective revenge.”

The Commissioners observed that Ukrainians were over-represented during the Commission’s tours of Canada. In its *Preliminary Report*, the Commission noted that it “met very few Canadians of German or Dutch origin, relatively few Poles, Italians or Finns, but many Ukrainians.” Their assessment was certainly correct in this regard. The seeming diversity among the presenters at the Royal Commission’s hearings often belied the degree to which particular individuals and organizations were responsible for multiple briefs. At the Winnipeg hearing on 18 May 1965, five organizations presented in quick succession: The Canada Ethnic Press Federation, the Canadian Press Club, the Royal Commonwealth Society, the Citizenship Council of Manitoba, and the Icelandic Canadian Club. In each of these presentations, Walter Lindal was either the key presenter or one member of a team of presenters. Similarly, Ukrainian and German organizations were particularly well-represented and were again the most vocal in their support for multiculturalism. On 19 May 1965, for example, the day’s proceedings were filled by four Ukrainian organizations and two Mennonite organizations. Two of the Ukrainian organizations were closely linked. The Ukrainian Academy of Free Sciences (UVAN) had been founded by Royal Commissioner Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, and was closely associated with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. The Ukrainian Canadian University

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42 The Ukrainian voluntary organizations included the Ukrainian Catholic Archdiocese of Winnipeg, the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science, and the Ukrainian Canadian University Students Federation; the Manitoba Section of the (Communist) Association of United Ukrainian Canadians also presented. The two Mennonite organizations were the Manitoba Mennonite Trustee Association and the Mennonite Society for the Promotion of the German Language in Canada. Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *Transcripts of Hearings*, Public Hearings, Winnipeg, May 17-19, 1965, 2192-2652.
Students Federation of Winnipeg was also associated with the UCC, and its national office had received help in drafting its brief from Senator Paul Yuzyk.43

The Commission also noted that Germans, as the third largest ethnic group behind the British and French, were notably absent from the debate. In the July 1964 edition of *Das Mitteilungsblatt* (The New Bulletin), Willi Ullmann wrote about the Calgary meeting of the RCBB. He noted that he had a discussion with André Laurendeau after the meeting at which Laurendeau had noted that the Germans were the third largest ethnic group, “but are the least vocal.”44 Ullmann then took the opportunity to tell Laurendeau that Canada needed a new flag and anthem. He finished the article by making a plea to his fellow German-Canadians “to inject the most valuable aspects of our culture into the life of this nation into which we want to integrate. Looking at it from one viewpoint, out of many, the Canadian nation would not be worse off if it carried also a few a German traits.”45

Another writer in *Der Courier* made the case that Germans “should take a lesson from the Ukrainians” and work harder to push for German language rights.46

As we have seen, one idea that seemed to elicit support from several ethnic groups was the notion of ethnic minorities as a “third element” or “third force.” The Ukrainian Canadian Committee adopted the position that Canada was comprised of three elements: the British, the French, and the “third element.” Its unofficial spokesman was Professor Paul Yuzyk, who became a Senator in early 1964. In addition to an admiration for John Diefenbaker’s idea of “one Canada,” Yuzyk had also adopted Walter Lindal’s

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44 This a note from the translator, and may not reflect exactly what was written in the article.
45 LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33 80, vol. 117, file 367E, 2.
notion of the “third element.” In his first speech to the upper house in March, Yuzyk spoke of Canada as a “multicultural nation.” \textsuperscript{47} At least sixteen times, Yuzyk referred to what he called the “third element,” and argued that both Canadians and the Royal Commission could no longer ignore the fact that Canada “is a nation of minorities.” \textsuperscript{48} The Senator spoke of the contributions of the third element to Canadian society, citing scholars as well as former Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier. He noted that “the Canadian system of multiculturalism” had greater merit than the American “melting-pot” system, as it encouraged all Canadians to contribute to Canada, but not give up what made them special in the first place. Finally, Yuzyk argued that

\[ \text{[i]he third element ethnic or cultural groups should receive the status of co-partners, who would be guaranteed the right to perpetuate their mother tongues and cultures, which should be offered as optional subjects in the public and high school systems and the separate schools of the provinces, and the universities wherever there would be a sufficient number of students to warrant the maintenance of such classes.} \textsuperscript{49} \]

In several ethnic language publications and during the Royal Commission’s hearings, writers asserted that they belonged to a force or movement that was actively working to change the cultural landscape. \textsuperscript{50} For example, the Polish newspaper \textit{Glos Polski} (Polish

\textsuperscript{47} Paul Yuzyk, “Canada: A Multicultural Nation,” \textit{Canadian Slavonic Papers} 7 (1965): 23; Historical memory is a funny thing. By the time (Senator) Paul Yuzyk made his famous speech about multiculturalism in March of 1964, several other individuals had made public proclamations in favour of multiculturalism. Some of them even made the case that a “third force” was on the rise. For example, Bohdan Bociurkiw made a speech in February of 1964 in which he discussed both “multiculturalism” and what he called the “third” ethnic groups.” Even a cursory reading of the Royal Commission’s hearings and the media reaction to them is enough to prove this point. Nonetheless, many scholars have ascribed both the “third force” and “multiculturalism” to Paul Yuzyk. For Bociurkiw’s speech, see LAC, Paul Yuzyk fonds, MG32 C-67, vol. 16, file 21, Bociurkiw, Dr. Bohdan: Corres, Address, Article, Chart, 1964-68, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the “Other” Ethnic Groups in Canada: A Talk by Professor B.R. Bociurkiw at the “Obnova” Banquet, Feb. 1, 1964,” 3.

\textsuperscript{48} Canada, Senate, \textit{Debates of the Senate}, 3 March 1964, 52.

\textsuperscript{49} Canada, Senate, \textit{Debates of the Senate}, 3 March 1964, 56.

\textsuperscript{50} Not all papers were open in their support of the “third element.” For example, in the May 1964 edition of \textit{Canadian Viesti} (The Canadian Messenger), a Finnish-language paper, the editors simply reprinted an
Voice) carried an article in June of 1964 entitled “A Word of protest of a ‘Third Canadian’”. The author noted the animosity between the English and French; he made the case that “the ‘third element,’ which has no racial ambitions and who have the good of a united Canada in their hearts could be instrumental in alleviating the bitterness which exists between the two principal groups.” The author went on to lament the lack of political power held by the “third group” and what he saw as “a tendency to keep the non-French and non-British Canadians from attaining any prominent standing in the country.”

Most of these early responses by ethnic minorities to the bilingualism and biculturalism debate were measured and thoughtful. John Syrnick of the Winnipeg based paper, Ukrainian Voice told viewers on CBC television’s Winnipeg affiliate that Ukrainians felt “‘good will’ towards French aspirations in Canada”; he expressed a desire for the other ethnic groups to also have the opportunity “to preserve their culture and develop it for the benefit of Canada as a whole.” When Nicholas Mandziuk, a Ukrainian Canadian Member of Parliament and Yuzyk’s fellow Progressive Conservative, made disparaging remarks about the French language on a number of occasions, he was taken to task in Ukraïnski Visti (Ukrainian Voice). The M.P. had said that the French language would be dead within fifty years, thus there was little need to placate Quebeckers. The newspaper’s editorial staff responded by saying that such article about the “third force” that had appeared in the Globe & Mail. The editor of the Dutch-Canadian paper, De Nederlandse Courant voor Canada, reacted to an article by Claude Ryan in Le Devoir. Though critical of Ryan’s understanding of the word “culture,” the author took for granted the idea of “the Third Group.” “Manitoba Trilingualism: Ukrainians Demand Equality With French,” Globe & Mail, 4 February 1964, 9. LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33-80, vol. 117, files 401-425.

51 LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33-80, vol. 117, file 350E.
52 LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33-80, vol. 117, file 350E.
53 Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 100, J.B. Rudnyckyj’s Selected Papers, J.B. Rudnyckyj, T.V. Programme re. Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Winnipeg, 9 December 1964.
statements were both inappropriate and “pseudo-patriotic naivety.” Ukrainski Visti concluded by noting Mandziuk’s remarks were “[harmful] to Ukrainians.”

These different approaches to multiculturalism, though sometimes minor, served to divide the community. Paul Yuzyk had emphasized the “third element” as “co-partners” in Confederation, but his closest associates did not always support him. At a stop in Winnipeg in May of 1964, André Laurendeau sat down with Father Basil (Wasyl) Kushnir, President of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. The Commissioner began the conversation indicating his surprise at the reaction of Ukrainians to biculturalism during the preliminary hearing. Kushnir responded that not all Ukrainians were so strident in their beliefs; furthermore, many wished to point out the problems with the terms of reference but had “nothing important to say.” When Laurendeau then asked Kushnir to explain the anti-French attitudes he had witnessed coming from some Ukrainian-Canadians, the priest responded:

I ask myself how this idea has come to the French-Canadians of Quebec, that the Ukrainians are opposed to the French. Here we have adopted English, because it is the dominant language. In Quebec, we tell our people to adopt French. We are ready to support you. Why don't we support you? We don't demand that Ukrainian is recognized as an official language, our complaints are very modest. We want our language to continue to survive; in order for this to happen, it is necessary that it is taught at school, like a second language, and recognized as a school subject where we have enough numbers: Saskatchewan accepts this, why does the University of Manitoba turn us down? … But we don't detest the French-Canadians, we like everybody.”

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54 LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33-80, vol. 117, file 350E, 2.
56 « Je me demande comment cette idée est venue aux Canadiens français du Québec, que les Ukrainiens sont opposés au français. Ici nous avons adopté l'anglais, parce que c'est la langue dominante. Dans le Québec, nous conseillons à nos gens d'adopter le français. Nous sommes prêts à vous soutenir. Pourquoi ne nous soutenez-vous pas. Nous ne demandons pas que l'ukrainien soit reconnu comme langue officielle, nos
Laurendeau indicated that he believed that French-Canadians and Ukrainian-Canadians were “natural allies.” Kushnir agreed: "Tell your compatriots. Your newspapers, except for La Presse, don't like us, and don't understand us. It is necessary to explain this to them." The Ukrainian leader then added that Ukrainians were uniquely disadvantaged because they lacked a homeland. Biculturalism was seen as a threat because it threatened Ukrainian culture in Canada, one of the only places it was safe. Laurendeau seemed to find Kushnir’s conciliatory position attractive. "I have the feeling,” he wrote, “that the problem of the other ethnic groups is not so bad, at least the Ukrainians. I saw once again the effect of fear – everyone at one time fears others.”

Preliminary Report, 1965

Historian Robert Harney argued that the Royal Commission sought to redefine English-French relations “as a national virtue” and “build national independence on dualism (in the form of an official bilingualism and biculturalism).” But his was not a fair assessment. The RCBB’s Preliminary Report, published in February 1965, attempted to strike a balance between the need to acknowledge the power and influence of the two

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réclamations sont très modestes. Nous voulons que la langue continue de vivre; il faut pour cela qu'elle soit enseignée à l'école, comme langue seconde, et reconnue comme matière scolaire, la ou nous sommes assez nombreux: la Saskatchewan l'accepte, pourquoi l'Université du Manitoba nous le refuse-t-elle? Voyez-vous (et ici, l'accent devient plus intime), l'ukrainien est la langue de notre Eglise; si les Ukrainiens l'oublient, vous videz nos églises. Les Ukrainiens sont plus nombreux que ne l'indiquent les recensements...Mais nous ne détestons pas les Canadiens français, nous aimons tout le monde." André Laurendeau, Journal tenu pendant la Commission royale d’enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme (Outremont, Quebec : VLB Editeur/le Septentrion, 1990), 220-221.

57 André Laurendeau, Journal tenu pendant la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme (Outremont, Quebec : VLB Editeur/le Septentrion, 1990), 221.

58 André Laurendeau, Journal tenu pendant la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme (Outremont, Quebec : VLB Editeur/le Septentrion, 1990), 222.

main linguistic communities with the need for national unity and the concerns of ethnic minority communities. The majority of Canadians – not just French Canadian nationalists – agreed that some form of biculturalism or, at the very least, public recognition of French Canada, was overdue. As Jose Igartua has shown, newspapers in English Canada had been generally favourable to the Commission’s work since 1963. Igartua characterizes the Anglo press as “complacent” between 1963 and 1965; however, the Preliminary Report “jolted English Canadians’ complacency” about the crisis in Quebec. But Anglo Canadians were not shocked at how the Commission had overlooked ethnic minority communities. In this political climate, the issues raised by the multicultural movement remained peripheral to the overall public debate.

But the Commission did dedicate several pages of its report to addressing the “other ethnic groups” referred to in its mandate. On the whole, the RCBB found the concerns of ethnic groups to be “quite moderate.” Nonetheless, the Preliminary Report attempted to explain to ethnic minority communities that when the RCBB referred to two main “cultures,” it meant the two main linguistic communities and the societies that they engendered, rather than the British and French ethnic groups. “Biculturalism” was not meant to nor did it reduce ethnic minority groups to a second-class status. Rather, it acknowledged what most Canadians already believed. In its response to “new immigrants” — by which it meant the other ethnic groups — who often expressed resentment at the RCBB’s emphasis on biculturalism, the Commission noted that they

62 Ibid., 201.
were “scarcely conscious of the fact that they belong to a bilingual and bicultural country.” The Commission further recommended that people of British and French origin recognize that these people were now a part of the Canadian ethic landscape.\(^{64}\)

The Commission also had something to say about Paul Yuzyk’s idea of a “third element” or “third force”: it rejected the notion because it was never properly defined and “tended to blend with the mosaic idea” that others expressed.\(^{65}\) The *Preliminary Report* also pointed out how fear of “balkanization” had led ethnic minorities as well as old-style British Canadian nationalists to advocate the American “melting pot.”\(^{66}\) Many advocates of multiculturalism simultaneously pressed for a new, composite (“Canadian”) national identity. For example, the Ukrainian Canadian Students’ Union (SUSK), while arguing for multiculturalism and bilingualism, hoped that Canadians would “develop pride in Canada as she develops into a distinctive national entity”; this would be encouraged through the development of national symbols, such as a national anthem, national flag, and the study of history and literature.\(^{67}\) Commissioners dismissed this point of view because it was often accompanied by the proviso that all Canadians — including French Canadians — should speak English. The RCBB observed that ethnic minority groups tended to argue that English should be spoken everywhere except in Quebec; the Commission viewed this as, essentially, no change from the status quo “concept of

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\(^{64}\) Ibid., 127.
\(^{66}\) Ibid., 53.
\(^{67}\) The Ukrainian Canadian Students’ Union had been advised by Senator Paul Yuzyk and Commissioner Jaroslav Rudnyckyj. LAC, Walter Surma Tarnopolsky fonds, MG31 E55, vol. 9, file 27, Multiculturalism N.D., 1965-1971, “The Canadian Nation: Some opinions of Canadian University Students of Ukrainian descent; Brief Presented to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 1965 by the Ukrainian Canadian University Students’ Union Toronto, 1965,” 2.
Canada as an English country with the French enclave of Quebec.”  

By the end of their tour of Canada, Commissioners were fed up with hearing the same song and dance from Ukrainian Canadians. The second to last public hearing of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was held at the Fort Garry Hotel in Winnipeg on 9 December 1965. During the morning session, Senator Paul Yuzyk, representing the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre, made the case that “Canada is a country of numerous minorities and therefore multicultural in fact.”  

Although this viewpoint would have been considered radical a mere two years prior, by 1965 the Commission expected the submission. Commissioner Gertrude Laing, in a moment of what could only be frustration, responded to the UCC (Lakehead Branch)’s criticism of the Commission’s terms of reference with the following: “By now we are completely aware of your concerns, so when we say “safeguard the rights of other ethnic groups” we don’t mean we are going to cut it off as it is right this minute. … I think we can perhaps set aside this beating over the head of certain terms which has been going on now in this country for two years.”  

Even after two years of discussion, multiculturalists were unwilling to accept the principles of bilingualism and biculturalism as they were understood by the Commissioners. Instead of advancing new arguments or attempting to come to a compromise with the position held by the Commission, the Federal Government, and the majority of commentators, multiculturalists continued to attack the RCBB’s terms of reference.

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68 Ibid., 127.
69 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Winnipeg Public Hearings, 9 December 1965, 5095.
70 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Winnipeg Public Hearings, 9 December 1965, 5208.
Lesage Summit of 1965

In September 1965, an opportunity arose for a détente between biculturalists and advocates of multiculturalism, when Quebec Premier Jean Lesage embarked on a “three-week goodwill tour of Western Canada.” He began his tour in Saskatoon where he called for the “equality of the two ethnic groups which founded Canada.”71 In the same speech, however, he conceded that ethnic minorities should receive the same accommodations for language education that he was urging the Western provinces to grant to French-Canadians. To the Calgary Albertan, this was seen as a call for “multi-culturalism.” In an editorial published two days after Lesage’s remarks in Saskatoon, the Albertan said that “Canada was only two founding nations and that the other ethnic groups who came to Canada following Confederation gave tacit approval to being assimilated into one of the founding groups.”72 Gordon Pape warned in Montreal’s The Gazette that “What people are reading and digesting is that the Premier of Quebec came West to tell the Prairies that if other minority groups show they want equal rights and are willing to fight for them, then they should be granted.” He concluded that this perception could only hurt the cause of linguistic rights for French-Canadians in the West.73

Seizing the moment, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Canada Ethnic Press Federation arranged a meeting with Lesage at the Fort Garry Hotel in Winnipeg for Saturday the second of October. Father Basil Kushnir, John Syrnick of Ukrainian Voice, and Senator Paul Yuzyk made up the UCC delegation, while the Canada Ethnic Press

71 “Ethnic equality urged by Lesage,” The Leader-Post, 23 September 1965, 16.
72 “Bilingual, Multicultural Canada Possible-Lesage,” Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 7 October 1965, 2.
Federation was represented by its past president, Walter Lindal. Lesage first met privately with the UCC delegation, where they hammered out an agreement on linguistic rights. They then met with the Lindal and other members of the ethnic press federation.

Lesage, the UCC and the CEPF representatives then met with reporters where they announced a “two-point agreement”:

> French and English, as Canada’s two official languages, should be languages of instruction in the schools wherever the French or English communities are large enough to warrant classes in their own language. [...] The languages of the ethnic minorities should be recognized as curriculum subjects of instruction from the beginning of the elementary level wherever ethnic groups have large enough communities to warrant it.

Lesage and the UCC had agreed that “bilingualism and multiculturalism are not incompatible.” For his part, Lesage agreed in principle to Ukrainian and other ethnic languages being offered as a subject in elementary schools in Quebec. He promised to speak with Paul Gerin-Lajoie about the matter on his return to Quebec City. Lesage and the UCC embraced a form of “multiculturalism” that we might recognize today: the assembled parties agreed that Canada was, in a sense, both bicultural and multicultural. In a press conference in Sudbury, two days after the meeting, Lesage said that “biculturalism is contained in multiculturalism just as the number 2 is contained in the number 5.” Editorial opinion in Quebec confirmed that biculturalism and multiculturalism could coexist. Claude Ryan wrote that “A cold look at the history of

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74 The details of the meeting are quite hazy. The Ottawa Citizen claimed that it took place on Saturday the 2nd, while other papers reported it taking place on following day or even Monday the 4th. “Lesage gets education accord,” Ottawa Citizen, 4 October 1965; “Lesage Holds Talks To Create Accord,” Winnipeg Free Press, 5 October 1965.
76 “Ukrainians Pledge Backing for French,” Globe & Mail, 4 October 1965, 8.
77 Gérard Alarie, “New Ukrainian accord pleases Premier Lesage,” The Leader-Post, 5 October 1965, 10.
78 “Bilingual, Multicultural Canada Possible-Lesage,” Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 7 October 1965, 2.
Canada makes it clear that neither rigid biculturalism nor loose multiculturalism will hold its complex elements together.”\(^{79}\) Ryan argued that the history and geographic spread of English and French speakers, there had to be some recognition of “this official duality.” However, such recognition did not preclude some form of recognition of the contributions made by ethnic minority groups. He held up the “Lesage Kushnir agreement” as a way forward because it recognized that French and English would be used as teaching languages across the country, but minority languages could be taught as subjects in areas where there were concentrations of a particular ethnic minority group. Most importantly, Ryan saw the crux of the agreement being the recognition that there was a difference between a “teaching language” and a “subject” — something that the UCC had agreed to. Gordon Pape, who had previously worried that Lesage’s take on minority rights would hurt French-Canadians, now argued that “Mr. Lesage may well pull off a coup that would drastically alter the whole position of French-Canadians in Canada.” As he saw it, there had been a recognition by Ukrainians and other ethnic minority groups of the “two founding races view of Canada.”\(^{80}\)

The “Franco-Ukrainian entente cordiale,” as the *Globe and Mail* called it, marked an important step forward, but also drove home the degree to which Quebec would not budge on bilingualism. It also showed that the Ukrainian Canadian Committee was willing to compromise in order to ensure Ukrainian language rights; UCC representatives acknowledged French and English as the two official languages: “We just want our children to be able to learn our language too.”\(^{81}\) In an article he wrote for *The Ukrainian*

\(^{79}\) The Claude Ryan editorial from *Le Devoir* was reprinted and translated in to English in the *Ottawa Citizen*. “Problems of two or more cultures,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 October 1965, 6.

\(^{80}\) Gordon Pape, “....Right Breakthrough...For Lesage in the West,” *The Gazette*, 5 October 1965.

Weekly in 1985, Borys Sirskyj, who was then working as Senator Paul Yuzzyk’s executive assistant, confirmed that the Lesage summit only made limited demands on the Quebec state. He argued that the summit showed that multiculturalism and biculturalism were not “mutually exclusive”; in other words, the organization that claimed to speak for all Ukrainians showed that it was willing to compromise on the issue of multiculturalism. Sirskyj was careful to point out that the UCC understood the perceived position of French-Canadians within the ethnic hierarchy of the country: “It was recognized that Canada had two founding races and that the Constitution accepted this as a fundamental principle of confederation.”

Because the UCC was the “official” voice of the Ukrainian community and the Canada Ethnic Press Federation represented a number of ethnic newspapers, the accord was also seen by UCC allies as a major coup for the ethnic minority groups. But the accord also put into sharp contrast the different groups within the Ukrainian community. After 1965, Ukrainian student organizations like SUSK and a handful of university-based activists would continue to fight biculturalism and bilingualism. The accord, while temporarily successful in neutralizing the main multiculturalist voice, did not address the underlying concerns of the movement. Bilingualism and biculturalism remained anathema to many people.

The Citizenship Branch and the RCBB

As the multicultural movement began to develop between 1963 and 1965, the Citizenship Branch, which had heretofore been a great ally and resource to ethnic minority organizations, became something of a fair-weather friend. Although the CB staff encouraged ethnic minority organizations to present briefs to the Royal Commission, they felt that they could not, as a branch of the civil service, take sides in the discussion or openly endorse biculturalism or multiculturalism.恐龙

During this period the Citizenship Branch remained active in the promotion of citizenship, integration of immigrant groups, and national unity.恐龙其 regional liaison officers had a range of responsibilities and tasks to perform under the headings of “integration of newcomers,” “integration of Indians,” and “general citizenship.” In one monthly report from Alberta in April of 1965, officer R.G. Wray noted that (among other things) he had spoken to a gathering of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire (I.O.D.E.) on intercultural programs, consulted with the Calgary Indian Friendship Centre, met with organizers of the Calgary Food Fair, and worked to set up an Intercultural Music Camp to be held in the foothills.

Nonetheless, through its ongoing funding and support of intercultural conferences and symposia, the Citizenship Branch played a quiet role in the dialogue between the

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85 For example, in August 1965 the Branch approved a $6,000 grant to the Italian Community Education Centre (C.O.S.T.I.) in Toronto. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-4-7, vol. 1, Financial; Grants; Citizenship Branch; Requests for Grants from the Citizenship Branch: General File, John R. Nicholson to Reverend J. Carraro, 12 August 1965.
86 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 660, file 1-15-1, Parliamentary (The Senate) General, R.L.O.’s monthly report on significant activities in: (a) the Integration of Newcomers (b) Integration of Indians (c) General Citizenship, April, 1965, 1-3.
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and ethnic minority organizations. As it had for several years, the CB subsidized the Ontario Conference on Intergroup Relations (or OCIR). The 1965 OCIR conference on Lake Couchiching, with almost 100 attendees, was organized around the theme “Our Changing Canadian Community.” Several papers dealt with the Royal Commission and a staff member of the Royal Commission attended in order to observe the proceedings.

The Branch was committed to promoting the smooth integration of all ethnic minority groups — including French Canadians — into Canadian society. On one hand, the Canada Ethnic Press Federation was given a $1,500 grant, and the First National Conference on Canadian Slavs received $1,000. Both the CEPF and the Conference facilitated interaction between ethnic minority groups, and thus were deemed important to the overall goals of the CB. The First National Conference on Canadian Slavs would, in fact, become a deeply partisan organization that focused a good deal of its attention on

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87 What little contact the Citizenship Branch had with the Royal Commission between 1963 and early 1965 was limited to the exchange of information. In October of 1964, Michael Oliver, who was the Director of Research for the RCBB, wrote to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in regards to his ongoing research on “immigration policy, the social and ethnic structure of Canadian immigration, and foreign policy which affects immigration to Canada.” The Deputy Minister, C.M. Isbister, informed the Assistant Deputy Minister, Charles A. Lussier, that the Citizenship Branch would be kept in the loop in regards to any correspondence provided to the RCBB regarding immigration policy. During a five-day orientation program for Liaison Officers in February of 1965, staff heard a presentation by Arthur Stinson, Director of Programme and Liaison for the RCBB, and Kenneth McRae, Research Associate in the Research Division of the RCBB, gave a presentation on “The Meaning of the Issues.” LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 660, file 1-21-3, vol. 1, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Michael Oliver to Rene Tremblay, 22 October 1964. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 660, file 1-21-3, vol. 1, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Deputy Minister to ADM (Immigration) and ADM (Citizenship), 10 February 1965. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-10-3, vol. 1, Conferences and Meetings-Staff Meetings-Citizenship Branch, Agenda: Orientation Program for Liaison Officers, Citizenship Branch, Department of Citizenship & Immigration, 15-19 February 1965.

88 The staff member was Stewart Goodings. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-12-6, vol. 1, Ontario Welfare Council, John R. Nicholson to Trevor Pierce, 30 April 1965.

discussing multiculturalism and the place of ethnic minority groups in society. On the other hand, La Societe Saint-Jean Baptiste, a French-Canadian nationalist organization, received $3,000. What is clear is that the CB was not committed to any one particular view of Canadian society.

During the second and third years of its tenure, the Royal Commission arranged a number of meetings with various voluntary organizations, government agencies, and departments. Some, like the Federation des Societes Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Quebec, were keen to meet with the Commission, and were sympathetic to its mandate. Others, like the Canada Ethnic Press Federation, were not. At the CEPF’s annual convention in 1964, leaders told invited RCBB representatives (including Jaroslav Rudnyckyj) that the CEPF could act as a representative of “the increasingly growing third element of other than Anglo-Saxon or French origin.” But when the Citizenship Branch’s director was asked to meet with the Commissioners, it could not have come at a better time. In 1964, the four branches of the DCI were asked to begin a program review in preparation for the Department’s dissolution. The Government Organization Act of 16 June 1966 would relocate the Citizenship Registration and Immigration branches to a new Department of Manpower and Immigration; the Indian Affairs Branch would be expanded to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, while the Citizenship Branch

91 Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 100, J.B. Rudnyckyj’s Selected Papers, Réunion consultative de la Commission royale d’enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme, et la Fédération des Sociétés-Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec, 3 February 1964.
93 Ibid., 150; LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-2-4, vol. 1, Administration - Organization (Functional) Citizenship Branch, Charles A. Lussier to Charles M. Isbister, 6 May 1965.
would be shuffled to the Department of the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{94}

There was a keen awareness in the CB that the Royal Commission’s recommendations might have a profound effect on the functioning of the civil service. If the CB was to survive both the looming changes in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Royal Commission, it was therefore imperative that the Branch outline its perceived role within the civil service when the RCBB came knocking. In a document prepared for the Deputy Minister entitled “A New Focus for the Citizenship Branch,” Assistant Deputy Minister for Citizenship, Charles A. Lussier noted: “Since its establishment in 1947, the Canadian Citizenship Branch has gradually shifted the emphasis of its work from the reception, counselling and integration of the immigrants to the much broader field of general citizenship.”\textsuperscript{95} Lussier pointed out that the CB had usually played a supporting role to the Immigration, Indian Affairs, and Citizenship Registration branches, but lacked a definite mandate for itself. As he understood the situation, the CB’s role was that of “ensuring that all elements of the Canadian fabric contributed to the common heritage of the nation.” The ADM recommended that the CB continue in its present activities, but also take on new responsibilities, such as “voluntary action, youth groups, intergroup relations, human rights, citizenship, community organization, research and experimental grants.”\textsuperscript{96}

At a meeting of senior liaison officers in May of 1965, the staff agreed with the

\textsuperscript{95} This document seems to have been attached to the letter of 6 May 1965 from Lussier to Isbister, though someone has pencilled in “Aout 1965” on page 7 of the document. Clearly the reorganization of the CB was not seriously discussed until the correspondence of August 11, 1966. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-2-4, vol. 1, Administration - Organization (Functional) Citizenship Branch, A New Focus for the Citizenship Branch, [May 1965].
\textsuperscript{96} LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-2-4, vol. 1, Administration - Organization (Functional) Citizenship Branch, A New Focus for the Citizenship Branch, [May 1965], 2-4.
thrust of Lussier’s memo. In particular they agreed with his emphasis on “Canadian unity as the central concern of the Branch from which all our other work should be derived.”

When discussion moved to recent activities in the Royal Commission, it was noted that the ethnic groups had been increasingly vocal. Like the RCBB, Citizenship Branch staff were not yet convinced that the other ethnic groups were a “third force.” The senior officers agreed that they needed to collaborate more closely with the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism “to keep abreast of developments in the field of Canadian unity”; they also agreed that French-language training was a “first priority for all officers of the Branch.” In other words, the Citizenship Branch seemed to accept the Royal Commission’s position on the “other ethnic groups” and bilingualism.

UN Seminar

But promoting national unity through ethnic diversity was still central to the way that the CB saw its function within the civil service. Over the next year the CB was enormously cautious not to make any pronouncements about Canadian ethnicity, culture, or identity that would pre-empt or contradict the Royal Commission’s findings. Nonetheless, it was difficult to disguise the Branch’s multicultural understanding of Canadian society. In June of 1965, Jean Lagassé presented a paper to the United Nations Seminar on the

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97 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-10-3, vol. 1, Conferences and Meetings-Staff Meetings-Citizenship Branch, Report of SLO’s Staff Conference, May 18-20, 1965, 7 July 1965, 1.
98 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-10-3, vol. 1, Conferences and Meetings-Staff Meetings-Citizenship Branch, Report of SLO’s Staff Conference, May 18-20, 1965, 7 July 1965, 2.
Multi-National Society in Ljubljana, Yugoslavia. The Canadian delegation was made up of Lagassé, Peter Findlay and Thaddeus Krukowski of the RCBB and Roland Murray, a secretary at the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade. In his presentation to the Seminar, Lagassé noted that “Each successive wave of migrants since that time has left its imprint on Canadian soil. Each has made its contribution, in one form or another, towards the development of a multi-cultural society in Canada.” He gave a potted history of the Canadian peoples, including a discussion of Indians, Europeans (including Germans and Ukrainians), Chinese and Japanese immigrants, and the changes to immigration policy brought on because of the World Wars. Lagassé’s use of the term “multi-cultural” was meant only as a descriptor, however; while he argued that ethnic diversity was “a major characteristic of Canadian society,” there were still “two main cultural streams in Canada, the British and the French.”

By and large, the Canadian delegation noted in their report, they “found the seminar very useful.” One exchange that they found particularly interesting was a debate about differentiation between types of states. It was generally agreed by the delegates that there was a difference between new and old nations, uni-national, multi-national, and

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100 The Canadian Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights, convened by the Department of External Affairs, decided to seek an invitation to this event. Canada was asked to join by the Office of the Secretary-General of the UN on 25 January 1965. The original correspondence indicated that the conference was to be held in “Liubljana” (Ljubljana), but subsequent correspondence claims that it will be held in Belgrade. A book of papers emerging from this conference was published in 1965 and 1975; it confirms that the conference was held in Ljubljana. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 1-23-6/1, vol. 1, United Nations Human Rights Commission Seminars, C.M. Isbister to the Minister, re: United Nations Seminar on the Multi-National Society, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, June 8-22, 1965, 22 June 1965; LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 1-23-6/1, vol. 1, United Nations Human Rights Commission Seminars, Charles A. Lussier to C.M. Isbister, 4 May 1965.


multi-ethnic states. Lagassé remarked: “In this connection, it was interesting to note that several delegations conceived Canada as a bi-national, multi-ethnic state. As this question is presently being studied by the Bi. & Bi. Commission, the Canadian delegation was careful not to attempt to state whether or not this was the case.”\(^{103}\) Although other delegations viewed Canada as “multi-ethnic,” and Lagassé’s presentation described Canada as “multi-cultural,” the Canadian delegation was unwilling to make even preliminary remarks because it was waiting for the Royal Commission’s findings.

### Royal Commission-Citizenship Branch Summit

In 1965, the Royal Commission met with various federal agencies, including the Citizenship Branch, to discuss the implications of bilingualism and biculturalism for the civil service. Given the Branch’s involvement in linguistic and cultural matters, the Commissioners “attached a lot of importance” to their meeting with Citizenship Branch representatives in early October of 1965.\(^{104}\) The meeting took place on 7 October 1965. Deputy Minister Claude Isbister chaired the meeting, which was attended by André Laurendeau, Davidson Dunton, Neil Morrison, Peter Findlay, James Taylor, Kenneth McRae, and Art Stinton of the Royal Commission. The Citizenship Branch was represented by Director Lagassé and William Agnew. Isbister’s remarks, which had been

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\(^{104}\) LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-10-3, vol. 1, Conferences and Meetings-Staff Meetings-Citizenship Branch, Minutes of Meeting of Senior Liaison Officers Held in Ottawa on October 20 & 21, 1965. In advance of the meeting, Commission co-secretary Neil Morrison sent along 10 to 15 clippings on Lesage’s agreement with the Canada Ethnic Press Federation and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 660, file 1-21-3, vol. 1, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, N.M. Morrison to C.M. Isbister, 5 October 1965.
prepared by Assistant Deputy Minister Lussier, emphasized the Branch’s support for the Royal Commission. But Isbister did more than express his department’s commitment to the Commission’s mandate: he questioned whether the activities of the Citizenship Branch had been out of line:

Our Branch has gone a long way towards helping immigrant groups form ethnic associations and promoting cultural contributions from each ethnic group. Has it gone too far? Are grants such as those which we gave to the First Canadian Slav Conference ($1500), the National Indian Council ($3,000), COSTI ($6,000), and the Canadian Press Federation ($3,000), in effect promoting cultural segregation? Or should we attempt to develop further in the direction suggested by those briefs which recommended the establishment of a National Inter-Ethnic Body.

He emphasized that the Citizenship Branch wanted to help improve English-French relations, including an expansion of its second-language services to non-immigrants. Jean Lagassé seconded these remarks by noting “that the Citizenship Branch would welcome an appraisal of our program with a view to receiving ideas on such matters as where our emphasis should be placed, what needs to be done in promoting the objective of the Commission, what areas require attention and how best we can exploit favourable attitudes across Canada.” Isbister suggested the Citizenship Branch would “most certainly exploit” the recent agreement between Jean Lesage and the Ukrainian community. Most importantly, in the name of improving English-French relations,
Isbister indicated the Branch’s willingness to work with French-Canadian minorities outside of Quebec.

André Laurendeau responded that the Commission valued the Citizenship Branch’s advice and was grateful for its help so far. When he asked for an explanation of the Citizenship Branch’s philosophy, Charles Lussier replied that it was involved in the adjustment of immigrants to Canadian life. According to William Agnew’s notes taken during the meeting, Laurendeau then asked for an explanation of the relationship between the Citizenship Branch and the ethnic groups he had met during his tours of western Canada:

Mr. Laurendeau remarked that ethnic groups out west have the impression that they had been encouraged to maintain their respective cultures by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. There appeared to be a conflict, therefore, between the approach of the Department to this question and the appointment by the Government of a Commission stressing biculturalism. He asked what the attitude of the Citizenship Branch was on this matter.¹⁰⁹

Lagassé responded that the Branch “had always sought to encourage individuals and groups to contribute what is best of their own culture to the enrichment of Canadian life.” At this point, Neil Morrison reiterated that ethnic groups had told the Commission that the Canadian Government had told them upon their entry to Canada to “maintain their language and culture,” which contradicted the mandate given to the Commission in 1963.

Lagassé responded again by noting that “our aim was unity through diversity” and that the Branch’s interaction with ethnic groups at the National Citizenship Conferences had “guided the Branch towards a multi-cultural approach.” Moreover, Lagassé indicated that

¹⁰⁹ LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-10-3, vol. 1, Conferences and Meetings-Staff Meetings-Citizenship Branch, Minutes of Meeting of Senior Liaison Officers Held in Ottawa on October 20 & 21, 1965.
his staff did not understand the Commission’s emphasis on “biculturalism,” as it seemed to imply assimilation of the ethnic groups into one of the two major cultures — a concept that had long been out of favour in the Citizenship Branch. Laurendeau then indicated that the CB needed to resolve its approach in light of “the Canadian fact which is French-English”; Lagassé held his ground, noting that that concept had not been well received, especially in Saskatchewan.\(^{110}\)

Following this exchange, Neil Morrison asked rhetorically why Ukrainian Canadians had warmed to the French Canadian viewpoint after two years of disagreement. Lagassé’s provisional answer was that they must have “developed a rapport with Premier Lesage.”\(^{111}\) This exchange, I think, highlights the chasm that existed between the Royal Commission, the Citizenship Branch, and ethnic minority communities. The Commissioners, and Laurendeau in particular, were convinced that the “Canadian fact” was French-English bilingualism and biculturalism. Their surprise at the Citizenship Branch’s advocacy of multiculturalism and “unity in diversity,” and their inability to comprehend the multiculturalist position are an indicator that even after two years the major players in this dialogue did not understand one another.

The result of this meeting was that the Citizenship Branch now attempted to act as a bridge between the bicultural approach to ethnicity of Lesage, Laurendeau, and the RCBB, and the multicultural approach of the UCC, CEPF, and others. It did this not by choosing sides, but by grafting a new French-English relations program onto its existing

\(^{110}\) LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-10-3, vol. 1, Conferences and Meetings-Staff Meetings-Citizenship Branch, Minutes of Meeting of Senior Liaison Officers Held in Ottawa on October 20 & 21, 1965.

\(^{111}\) It seems strange that the Lesage-Kushnir agreement was only mentioned in passing during the meeting. My feeling, though unsubstantiated, is that Lagassé did not want to place too much emphasis on the accord during his meeting with the RCBB representatives. The accord clearly played into the CB’s emphasis on (better) intercultural relations, but it was not yet clear as to whether it was a major development or not. Ibid., 4.
areas of responsibility. Biculturalism would be part of an overall strategy to promote “Canadian unity.” At a meeting of senior liaison officers a few weeks later, William Agnew observed that the Branch was now being asked by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to assume responsibility for particular programs, rather than farming them out to voluntary organizations. Officers produced a list of activities under the heading of “Canadian unity” that were currently the responsibility of the CB; the list included:

(1) Human Rights; (2) Indian and Immigrant Integration; (3) Travel and Exchange; (4) Language Training (bilingualism); (5) Youth Activities; (6) Bicultural and Intercultural Programs; [and] (7) Citizenship Activities (community participation, leadership training, sensitization, voluntary action).  

As the staff understood it, they would now pursue “Canadian unity through programming rather than Canadian unity as a concept.” Before taking his leave of the meeting, Charles Lussier summarized the day’s discussion by noting that the consensus was “that we were looking for a role, a program for the Branch, and that we were seeing this role as the promotion of democratic citizenship in a bilingual and multi-cultural country.” As before, there would be an emphasis on integration (of Indians, immigrants and youth), and interrelations (language, travel and exchange programs, ethnic groups, and citizenship). Part of its new role in the area of “bicultural” programs would involve the extension of language classes for immigrants to the Canadian-born. Over the next year, as Citizenship Branch staff began to prepare for their move to the Department of the

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112 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-10-3, vol. 1, Conferences and Meetings-Staff Meetings-Citizenship Branch, Minutes of Meeting of Senior Liaison Officers Held in Ottawa on October 20 & 21, 1965, 3-4.

113 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-10-3, vol. 1, Conferences and Meetings-Staff Meetings-Citizenship Branch, Minutes of Meeting of Senior Liaison Officers Held in Ottawa on October 20 & 21, 1965, 3-4.
Secretary of State, they also forged ahead with a new emphasis on French-English relations and “Canadian unity.”

Conclusions

Between 1963 and 1965, the Royal Commission remained committed to a bilingual and bicultural Canada, even as it left the rarefied bilingual and bicultural environment of Ottawa for the messy mosaic of the West. André Laurendeau tried to understand the multiculturalist position, but understood it as a sideshow to the inquiry’s mandate. Multiculturalists attempted to present their side of the story; internal divisions and perspectives complicated the message and fragmented the mosaic into hundreds of smaller stories. The Citizenship Branch, meanwhile, spoke to ethnic groups of “integration,” while admitting to the Royal Commission that it had embraced “multiculturalism” and “unity in diversity.” Each group would respond differently to their failure to convince the others. The RCBB would become increasingly irrelevant to a public that tired of it (and its cost), and would lose much of its credibility among ethnic groups. Ethnic minority organizations would continue to split into factions, rather than unite as a “third force”; Ukrainian students became angry when it became clear that the UCC would not protect their language interests. The Citizenship Branch would become a chameleon of sorts: bicultural and bilingual by the light of day, and multicultural to its friends.

Though the Royal Commission’s *Preliminary Report* wrote off the “third force,” by stating that it “had few supporters even among ‘New Canadians’,” André Laurendeau’s diaries attest that a movement of sorts was stirring in Western Canada.¹ Some members of ethnic minority communities were clearly disheartened that the Federal Government felt that they were not “founding peoples,” but was willing to consider changes to Canadian law in order to accommodate the concerns of French Canadians. A small group of ethnic minority leaders, comprised of a cadre of Ukrainian and Polish Canadian activists and community leaders, led the push for public recognition of multiculturalism. But in spite of some minor successes, the multicultural movement never really took off because of divisions within and between ethnic communities, and a failure to articulate a single vision of “multiculturalism.”

In this chapter I make the case that the multicultural movement was largely a Ukrainian Canadian construct that failed to gain popular support because its leaders failed to appeal to a broad range of activists within and outside the Ukrainian community. Their brand of “multiculturalism” excluded both the Ukrainian left and student organizations. Germans, Italians and Dutch organizations offered only lukewarm support of multiculturalism, despite being some of the largest ethnic communities by population.²

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² In this period, the Ukrainian and German communities were the largest of the “ethnic” communities in Canada. According to the 1961 census, the top ten communities in descending order were Germans, Ukrainians, Italians, Dutch (Netherlanders), Scandinavians, Polish people, Jews, Norwegians, Hungarians, and Russians. As we know, these were fluid categories. Although there were categories for Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian ethnicity, there was also a “Scandinavian” category. Similarly, in 1961 1,049,599 people identified as “German,” while 106,535 identified as “Austrian.” A decade later, the “German” population had risen to 1,317,200, while the “Austrian” population fell to 42,120, despite the fact that there
As a result, the movement foundered. At the same time, the mainstream Jewish Canadian community, which would have proved an important ally in this struggle because of its strong community organizations, rejected multiculturalism because support for the idea could have jeopardized the tentative position of Jews within Quebec society.

I begin by examining the divisions within the Ukrainian community, from which the de facto leaders of the movement were drawn. I then move on to a discussion of the Jewish community and its largest mouthpiece, the Canadian Jewish Congress (or CJC), an organization that openly rejected multiculturalism. By examining this community as a counter-example to the Ukrainian community, I am able to show that internal dynamics within the community stifled attempts to create a “third force.” Thirdly, I look at the unsuccessful attempts of organizations like the Canadian Polish Congress and the Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs to form a pan-ethnic coalition. The multicultural movement was ultimately a loosely-formed coalition of ethnic minority leaders, nominally led by the Ukrainian community. It was not a “third force” in the sense that it was unable to attract support from other large ethnic groups, such as Germans and Italians, or even a broad range of ethnic groups. Visible minority communities, such as Chinese Canadians, were virtually silent on the issue of bilingualism and biculturalism – let alone multiculturalism. Most importantly, the movement lacked the cohesiveness and unity of vision needed to successfully counter the predominant biculturalism discourse.

was not a great deal of immigration from Germany (or outmigration of Austrians). These numbers had a lot more to do with the self-perception and political concerns of German-speaking or “ethnically” German peoples in Canada. Statistics Canada, Series A125-1: Origins of the population, census dates, 1871 to 1971; Section A: Population and Migration, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/sectiona/4147436-eng.htm
Divisions in the Ukrainian Community

Ukrainians played by far the largest role in advancing the concept of multiculturalism during the 1960s and early 1970s. This became clear when the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism’s study group on the “other ethnic groups” convened to study the briefs presented to the Commission by ethnic groups. Of the 72 briefs provided, at least 31 were created by Ukrainian organizations; a number of other briefs came from Ukrainian Canadian individual citizens. But the omnipresence of Ukrainians at the Royal Commission’s hearings and their de facto leadership of the multicultural movement did not translate into a pan-ethnic alliance; on the contrary, Ukrainians were vocal, but they were virtually alone in pressing for official recognition of multiculturalism.

According to multicultural activist and scholar Manoly Lupul, “Although the multicultural movement was spearheaded by Ukrainian Canadians, it was not always well understood by them or by others to whom it appealed. To most, it was a convenient way to counter the bicultural movement that powerful voices in Quebec and elsewhere were advancing in the throes of the 1960s Quiet Revolution.” As a Ukrainian Canadian historian, activist, and founder of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, Lupul was in the thick of the multicultural movement, especially after 1968, and was well placed to render judgment on the impact of the movement. In a polemical article in the Journal of Ukrainian Studies in the Spring of 1982, Lupul

4 The 31 briefs that I counted as “Ukrainian” had either “Ukrainian” or “Ukraine” in the name of the organization. I did not count groups like the Markian Shashkevitch Society or St. Andrew’s College in Winnipeg, which was and is a Ukrainian Orthodox college. LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33 80, vol. 123, file 814E, Documents de la Commission, 801-825, Study Group “D”, List of briefs presented by Ethnic Organizations, 1-3.
lamented the fact that Ukrainians were unable to unite during the 1960s:

At the hearings of the Federal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Edmonton in the fall of 1964, the Ukrainians presented five briefs, The Catholics had theirs and the Orthodox theirs, and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, of course, represented everyone, to the utter dismay of media reporters and other observers!⁶

What united these groups was an aversion to biculturalism and the Royal Commission’s mandate. But the submissions and briefs they presented to the Commission advanced slight variations on the themes of “multiculturalism” and the “third force,” which resulted in a movement that presented outwardly as more divided than it actually was.

Although the UCC submitted briefs on behalf of organizations within its federation, many of these organizations submitted briefs that contradicted the UCC line. The UCC’s position was that English and French were the two national or official languages of Canada, but Ukrainian and other minority languages should be given special status in regions or districts where they were commonly spoken.⁷ While some organizations affiliated with the UCC supported publicly funding ethnic language classes, others, like the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN), made the case that “a majority of Canadians of Ukrainian descent are of the opinion that the Ukrainian language in Canada should have its due status within the constitutional provisions of this country.”⁸ UVAN arrived at this conclusion based upon what they called a “Gallup Poll” of 100,000 individuals. However, as we have seen, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee had already

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agreed with Quebec Premier Jean Lesage that Ukrainian was a minority language that did not require constitutional status.

Similarly, many organizations expressed a desire for “national unity” that seemed to overshadow their desire for “multiculturalism.” The Ukrainian National Youth Federation (UNYF), which was also affiliated with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, presented a brief to the Royal Commission at its hearing in Toronto in November of 1965. The UNYF stressed that there was a “third element” in Canadian society and that “Because of the presence of this five million we suggest Canada is not Bicultural but MULTICULTURAL.” Though the students made much of the idea of a “mosaic,” their key recommendation was that Canada adopt a distinctive national flag. In fact it was common for Ukrainian-Canadian organizations to make the case that Canada was multicultural, but also needed common symbols around which all Canadians could rally. In his first speech to the Senate, Paul Yuzyk argued that “we are a Christian and democratic nation. Let us therefore not forget that all men are born in the image of God. … Our faith in freedom, equality, justice … has been the strength that has brought about and maintained Canadian unity.” As the Royal Commissioners noted in their Preliminary Report, these appeals to national unity were the most common appeal heard during the hearings held between 1963 and 1965. In this sense, Ukrainian-Canadians were not that different from most other Canadians who appeared before the Commission. But, as the Commission noted in its Preliminary Report, such appeals for “national unity”

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10 Ibid., 24.
11 Canada, Debates of the Senate, 3 March 1964, 58.
were viewed by the Commission as a slippery slope toward a monocultural Canada — something it could not abide.\(^\text{13}\)

Without a unified voice, even among groups affiliated with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, it was very difficult for multiculturalists to forge a multicultural movement outside of the Ukrainian community. However, this explanation greatly simplifies a larger problem in the movement: the UCC was not representative of Ukrainians as a whole, but, rather, a subset of Ukrainian nationalists. Since the First World War and the rise of the Soviet Union, there had been a major cleavage in the Ukrainian community between nationalists, who supported an independent Ukrainian state, and Communists, who supported the Soviet state. As Jaroslav Petryshyn points out, “Ukrainians were the largest group in Canada whose territory in the Old Country had fallen under Soviet rule.”\(^\text{14}\) This nationalist community was especially “embittered” by the fact that “despite a population of more than 40 million, Ukraine had emerged from the war without its own state.”\(^\text{15}\) When the Ukrainian Canadian Committee was created in 1940, it brought together five nationalist organizations and, through its affiliation with the Nationalities Branch, became the official mouthpiece of the Ukrainian community in Canada. The UCC was an avowedly anti-communist organization.\(^\text{16}\) Paul Yuzyk, whose advocacy of the “third element” and multiculturalism in the Senate had made him the \textit{de facto} spokesperson for the Committee and Ukrainians, made no secret that the Ukrainian

\(^{13}\) Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, \textit{A Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism} (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 127.  
\(^{15}\) Ibid., 227.  
\(^{16}\) Note: In its presentation to the preliminary hearing of the RCBB, Dr. Isyodore Hlynka of the Winnipeg Branch of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee quoted from his organization’s charter, stating that the UCC was “an authoritative spokesman for the Ukrainian Canadian Community.”; Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, \textit{Transcripts of Hearings}, Preliminary Hearing, Ottawa, Nov. 7-8, 1963, 81.
organizations on the left were not affiliated with the UCC. Moreover, he was secretly involved in the “Alert Service” on Communist activities in Canada, based in Toronto.

Most left-leaning or “progressive” Ukrainian Canadian organizations were members of a rival federation, the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC). The AUUC was the successor of the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA), which had been associated with the Community Party of Canada during the 1930s and 1940s. In the 1960s the AUUC operated labour temples which were used by a range of leftist Ukrainian organizations — including Communist organizations — for social and political activities. Although the Canadian government had to hold its nose and work with pro-Soviet groups during the Second World War, they once again became suspect as the Cold War got underway. The ULFTA/AUUC, which boasted 10,000 members and approximately 200 “temples” (labour halls) during its height in the late 1930s and early 1940s, was not a fringe organization.

The AUUC’s take on bilingualism and biculturalism was quite different from that of the UCC. As a progressive/leftist organization, it supported the struggle of the French Canadian working class against the English Canadian elite that dominated Montreal’s business community. Furthermore, the AUUC did not put Ukrainians on the same level as French Canadians. An AUUC brief presented to the Royal Commission at Winnipeg in

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May of 1965 said the following:

The other national groups in Canada are an important segment of the Canadian people, but they should be encouraged in the process of integration into the life of the two nations, English and French Canada, and cannot be equated to either of the two founding nations.\(^{21}\)

Despite this important disagreement with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, the AUUC and the UCC could have united on a number of issues that were important to both organizations. AUUC halls were centres for Ukrainian language and culture, and often boasted dance and mandolin ensembles. In the postwar period, as many AUUC members repudiated the Sovietification of the Ukraine and worked for a more independent Ukraine, the organization moved closer to the UCC politically. Both organizations were concerned with the preservation of Ukrainian language and culture in Canada and the Ukraine. However, as Petryshyn points out, “Cooperation between Ukrainian pro-communists and nationalists in general, and between the AUUC and UCC in particular, was unthinkable even when it would have been apolitical and might have benefited both by raising the Ukrainian community’s profile in Canada.”\(^{22}\)

Other left-leaning ethnic organizations saw eye-to-eye with the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians. The Finnish Communist paper, \textit{Vapaus}, reported that a meeting of the Sudbury branch of the Finnish Organization of Canada had passed a resolution “supporting full equality for Quebec with the English Canada.”\(^{23}\)


\(^{23}\) These clippings were found in the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism fonds; I found similar clippings in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and SOS fonds, as it was the CB’s Ethnic Press review service that translated the originals. This small office within the Citizenship Branch was originally called the “Foreign Language Press Review Service” (or FLPRS), though by the mid-1960s
Serb/Croat paper *Jedinstvo* (Unity) was critical of “New Canadians” and their anti-French stance. Its editorial staff noted that English Canadians wished to retain dominance over the cultural life of the country; therefore, they recommended that the other ethnic groups “try to be more lenient towards the French in Canada.”\(^\text{24}\) Apparently this paper saw French Canadians as potential allies in the international fight against capitalism.

Similarly, the Hungarian paper, *Kanadi Magyar Munkas* (Hungarian Worker) likened the French Canadian neo-nationalist and separatist movements to anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa and the anti-slavery movement in the United States. The *Kanadi Magyar Munkas* recommended that the Canadian government recognize the French-Canadian nation and urged support for “the French-Canadian workers”.\(^\text{25}\) In May of 1964, the newspaper *Glos Polski* (Polish Voice) of Toronto printed an article entitled “Bilingualism? Yes! Biculturalism? No!” in which the author lamented the “increasing concessions in the realm of politics, economics and culture” to French Canadians, even as the Front de libération du Québec was engaging in acts of terrorism.\(^\text{26}\) His solution to this problem was “mutual understanding and mutual concessions.”\(^\text{27}\) However, in the June 1964 edition, Mieczyslaw Sangowicz responded to this author by accusing him of having a “colonial” or “Anglo-Saxon” mentality. Sangowicz said that the demands of French Canadians were not only valid, but should be accommodated in the spirit of an “equal

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I believe it was referred to as the “Ethnic Press review service.” The office provided CB staff, politicians, and the PMO with English translations of articles from (domestic) ethnic minority language newspapers and journals; during the Commission’s tenure, the EPRS provided the Commission’s secretaries and interns with the same material. As I can only read English, French, and some German, these FLPRES translations provided a wealth of material (in Hungarian, Polish, etc.) that I would not have otherwise been able to use. In some cases the translations are verbatim, whereas in other cases the translator has provided a summary; I indicate in the footnotes when the latter is the case. LAC, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism fonds, RG33-80, Vol. 117, Files 401-425.

\(^{\text{24}}\) LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33-80, Vol. 117, Files 401-425.

\(^{\text{25}}\) LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33-80, Vol. 117, File 420E.

\(^{\text{26}}\) LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33-80, Vol. 117, File 335E

\(^{\text{27}}\) LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33-80, Vol. 117, File 335E
partnership.”

Indeed, many so-called “ethnic” voices were sympathetic to the line taken by Quebec newspapers like *Le Devoir*. Though the accord struck between Jean Lesage, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Canada Ethnic Press Federation had shown that Quebec’s priorities could be made commensurate with those of ethnic minority communities, the position taken by the AUUC and other left-leaning ethnic minority organizations was clearly different from that taken by the UCC, CEPF and the leaders of the multicultural movement. What this suggests is that the multicultural movement was circumscribed by both ethnicity and politics.

**Ukrainian-Canadian scholars**

With ethnic minority groups unable – and, more importantly, unwilling – to present a united front to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the Canadian public, it fell to a small group of Ukrainian Canadian academics to drum up support for multiculturalism. Jim Mochoruk and Rhonda L. Hinther have recently observed that “Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism may well be the result of work by leading scholars in the field of Ukrainian-Canadian studies…” Like most scholars of multiculturalism in Canada, Mochoruk and Hinther make the case that there is

29 It seems that certain elements in the Italian community of Montreal also supported the idea of English-French duality. The Montreal-based Italian paper, *Il Cittadino Canadese* (The Canadian Citizen) reprinted an editorial by Claude Ryan in July of 1964 which expressed the notion that Canada comprised “two nations.” A staff member of the FLPRS who translated the article for the use of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism believed that the article was reprinted because the paper shared Ryan’s view of Canada. LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33-80, Vol. 117, Files 351-375.
a direct correlation between the official policy of multiculturalism and the lobbying efforts of Ukrainian Canadians. However, as we will see, these lobbying efforts would ultimately have little substantive effect on the development of the policy. Ukrainian Canadian multiculturalists generally desired more than public recognition that Canada was “multicultural.” Many also sought funding for ethnic minority language education, which was believed to be a prerequisite for real, meaningful “multiculturalism.” But the Canadian state and the Trudeau Government would reject the notion of special status and funding for ethnic minority language communities. Though the state would adopt the use of the term “multiculturalism,” the programs tied to the 1971 multiculturalism policy did not bear the fingerprints of Ukrainian Canadian multiculturalists. Nonetheless, Ukrainian Canadian scholars were at the centre of this movement and were partially successful in keeping “multiculturalism” in the public spotlight after 1963.

Most of these scholars were involved with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee to some degree. Paul Yuzyk, Bohdan Bociurkiw, Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, and Manoly Lupul all had a hand in drafting the UCC’s submissions to the Royal Commission. As we have seen, Yuzyk, as the de facto spokesperson for the “third element,” following his speech in the Senate, represented the UCC during its summit with Jean Lesage in October of 1965. He was called upon again at various points to represent the UCC, though he did not hold an official position within the organization. Bociurkiw drafted the UCC’s early response to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Rudnyckyj, who sat on the RCBB, co-ordinated his efforts with Bociurkiw. His “separate statement,”

published in the first *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (dealing with Official Languages), mirrored the position on language taken by the UCC. Lupul had a hand in drafting the submission by the Edmonton Branch of the UCC to the Royal Commission, and would continue the fight for Ukrainian language rights into the 1980s. Robert Harney has argued that this group was comprised of “nationalist DP intellectuals” who arrived in Canada after the Second World War; it would be unfair, however, to characterize the multicultural movement as an “immigrant” movement. Both Rudnyckyj and Bociurkiw were born in Galicia and could be characterized as “nationalist intellectuals,” while Yuzyk and Lupul were second and third-generation Ukrainian Canadians, respectively.

In addition to their work with the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, all of these men used their positions within the academy to advance their position on multiculturalism. Without a doubt, Paul Yuzyk was the most active in this regard, though Rudnyckj and Lupul would become more active with the end of the Commission’s tenure in 1970. Yuzyk regularly gave public addresses to university audiences and even engaged his fellow Slavic Studies colleagues in a spirited debate about the virtues of multiculturalism. In March 1964, four days after his address to the Senate on multiculturalism and the “third element,” Yuzyk attended the Seventh Alumni Conference at the University of Manitoba on the theme of “Canada — One Nation or

Two.”36 The organizers of the conference asked Yuzyk “to assist in the discussions of the political implications of bilingualism and biculturalism during three different sessions.”37 In the fall he addressed the University of Toronto Annual Conference on the topic “Are All Ethnic Groups Becoming English Canadians?”38 As a member of the Canadian Council on Christians and Jews, Yuzyk was also called upon by Jewish organizations to speak about multiculturalism. He addressed the President’s Council of Jewish Women’s Organizations of Winnipeg’s “Community “Seminar” on Bi-Culturalism” in January 1965; Yuzyk was joined on the panel by a Catholic priest and newspaper editor, a lawyer who was a member of the United Church, and a Jewish economist.39 He also addressed the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews’ “Seminar on Multiculturalism” in 1966.40

Though Yuzyk found great support for his idea of a “third element” within the Ukrainian Canadian community, his fellow academics were not so kind. Prior to taking up his seat in the Senate, Yuzyk had been a historian of Canadian and Russian/Soviet history at the University of Manitoba, and an important player in the Slavic Studies community. In 1965, the Canadian Association of Slavists published his “maiden speech” to the Senate in its journal, Canadian Slavonic Papers. A number of scholars responded to his paper with varying degrees of criticism. William Rose, who was then Canada’s most eminent Slavist, was direct in his criticism:

37 LAC, Paul Yuzyk fonds, MG 32 C-67, vol. 21, file 21-12, Bilingualism & Biculturalism Printed Mat., 1963-77, Canada — One Nation or Two?, [ephemera], 7 March 1964.
38 Paul Yuzyk, “Are All Ethnic Groups Becoming English Canadians?” Address to the U of T Annual Conference, October 1964, 13
Am I ahead of the gun if I assume that Senator Yuzyk envisages the prospect of this third element’s developing in time into what is called today “a third force” — the end in view being that its members become nationally articulate? Of this I can see no possibility. They have only one thing in common, that they live somewhere on Canadian soil. What attraction can this “third thing” have for Eskimos, German Mennonites, Scandinavians, Italians, Greeks, or other language groups … I can see none.  

While Rose’s opinion could be attributed to the fact that he was a member of (to use the Commission’s language) one of the “two founding peoples,” even those scholars who were ostensibly members of the “other ethnic groups” did not necessarily agree with Yuzyk’s concept of the “third element.” Leonid Ignatieff insisted that constructing a “third element” homogenized the differences between ethnic minority groups.  

Even Bohdan Bociurkiw, who was a key advocate of multiculturalism and a friend of Yuzyk, noted that the third element construct was “methodologically ambiguous.” He noted that, despite his sympathy for Yuzyk’s position, he could not support the notion of a “third element” because there was not enough commonality of purpose among the “other ethnic groups.” Moreover, he contended that many ethnic minority groups were

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43 Bociurkiw kept up correspondence with Yuzyk throughout the 1960s because of their involvement in the Ukrainian Canadian Committee’s multiculturalism campaign, and because of their shared scholarly interests. In December of 1968, Bociurkiw informed Yuzyk of his upcoming move to Ottawa to take up the directorship of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies at Carleton University. Yuzyk was then a part-time professor at the University of Ottawa, in addition to his position a Senator. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, “Discussion of Senator Yuzyk’s Paper,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 7 (1965): 40; LAC, Paul Yuzyk fonds, MG32 C-67, vol. 16, file 21, Bohdan Bociurkiw to Paul Yuzyk, 11 March 1964; LAC, Paul Yuzyk fonds, MG32 C-67, vol. 16, file 21, Bohdan Bociurkiw to Paul Yuzyk, 19 December 1968.  
44 Ironically, the language that Bociurkiw used was remarkably similar to that of Claude Ryan: “If the “third group”…was more strongly homogenous, it would be necessary to faithfully examine dualism and study the possibility of conferring official status on a third culture. But this is not the case. This group is too heterogeneous for there to be any question of enlarging the concept of biculturalism without lapsing into an
quickly assimilating into Canadian society and losing their language. To Bociurkiw, the only way to ensure the long-term viability of minority ethnic groups was to ensure that their language was protected; this meant working within the existing system of “two founding peoples,” however imperfect, rather than asserting some vague notion of a “third element.”

Advocates of multiculturalism who were working in the fields of Slavic studies and Eastern European politics and history also published books about the “other ethnic groups” in quick succession during the 1960s. As Canadians began to prepare for the country’s Centennial celebrations in 1967, Ukrainian Canadian scholars took the opportunity to publish accounts of how Ukrainians had contributed to Canada during its first 100 years. In 1967 alone, there were at least four treatises published on the history of Ukrainian Canadians. Paul Yuzyk published *Ukrainian Canadians: Their Place and Role in Canadian Life* in 1967; its chapter headings included “Three Elements of the Canadian Population”, “Third Element”, “Unity and Effectiveness of the Third Element”, and “Canadian Identity is Multiculturalism”. The thrust of Yuzyk’s argument was that Ukrainian Canadians, along with the ethnic minorities who had arrived in Canada in the late nineteenth century and Indigenous Peoples, formed a “third element” in Canadian society. Ukrainians in particular had arrived in Canada after the English and French


“founding peoples,” they had brought the soil of western Canada under cultivation.

Yuzyk was keen to align the Ukrainians with the “Indians,” “Eskimos,” and “Germans,” who had also been forgotten by the advocates of biculturalism. In his attempt to present a vision of the “third element,” he united European settler groups, who had brought “civilization and prosperity to these vast, hitherto unsettled regions” with the Indigenous Peoples whose very land Yuzyk claimed was “unsettled.”

In a similar vein, Yuzyk used unsubstantiated numbers to bolster his claim that Ukrainian Canadians had been disproportionately represented in the Canadian armed forces during the Second World War because of their national pride. Nelson Wiseman points out that Yuzyk repeated the “undocumented claim that thirty-five thousand to forty thousand Ukrainians served in the Canadian armed forces in the Second World War.”

Thomas Prymak later showed that 12,389 Ukrainians served in the Canadian armed forces during that conflict. In spite of Yuzyk’s qualifications, Ukrainian Canadians: Their Place and Role in Canadian Life was not an authoritative history of Ukrainian Canadians, but an attempt to bolster the idea of a “third element.”

Another common trope employed by Ukrainian Canadian scholars and writers in this period was the notion that Ukrainian Canadians did not have a “homeland” because (ethnic) Ukrainians had long been dominated by the Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Russian, and Soviet empires. For example, in his pamphlet titled Ukrainians in Canada: The Struggle to Retain Their Identity, William Darcovich observed that ethnic groups in

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48 Ibid., 11.
Canada tended not to co-operate with one another and that it had fallen to Ukrainians to advocate the idea of Canada as a “mosaic.” He remarked that “this [was] a reflection of their unique position in Canada as one of the few people without an independent mother country.”\textsuperscript{51} Moreover, some Ukrainian Canadians felt that they were helping to preserve Ukrainian culture in exile, as “Sovietization” practices threatened to wipe out Ukrainian culture in (occupied) Ukraine.\textsuperscript{52} As scholar Elizabeth Wangenheim wrote in 1966,

They [Ukrainians] feel compelled to counteract this … threat by (a) preserving “in the diaspora” (their own phrase) the language and culture which is threatened with annihilation in the land of their origin and (b) using all possible means to interpret and project their image of Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{53}

Multiculturalism and multilingualism would allow the community to maintain Ukrainian culture in exile, in the hopes that the Ukraine would one day be independent of Soviet control and Ukrainians able to reassert their language and culture.

The Centennial Commission and the Citizenship Branch also encouraged ethnic scholars to write commemorative volumes to celebrate the Canadian Centennial in 1967. In conjunction with the Centennial Commission, the Canada Ethnic Press Federation sponsored the \textit{Canada Ethnica} series, which included works on “The Indians”, Icelanders, Germans, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Japanese, Italians and Polish people.

These were ostensibly scholarly books, but the political motivations of their authors were...

\textsuperscript{53} Anecdotal evidence also suggests this was the case. A friend of mine is a third-generation Ukrainian on his mother’s side. He remembers his Saskatchewan-born mother telling him “we preserved Ukrainian culture” for the European-born Ukrainians. During 1970s, Ukrainian Canadian voluntary organizations brought Ukrainians to Western Canada to learn about Ukrainian culture! An entire dissertation could be written about this topic. Elizabeth Wangenheim, “The Ukrainians: A Case Study of the “Third Force,”” in \textit{Nationalism in Canada}, ed. Peter Russell (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 89-90.
often apparent in the authors’ choice of words and the structure of the volumes. Ol’ha Woycenko’s *The Ukrainians in Canada* reflected the political beliefs of the author. In her appendices, Woycenko included the brief of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN) to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. UVAN concluded that the Ukrainian language should receive some form of official sanction or even “constitutional recognition” by the Canadian state.54 Joseph Kirschbaum’s study of the Canadian Slovak community appended the brief of the Canadian Slovak League to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The CSL argued that Canada was not bicultural, but multicultural, and was gradually evolving “a Canadian culture.”55 In many cases, authors emphasized the long pedigree of the group under study in order to bolster their claims as “founding people” and to highlight their contributions to Canadian society.56 Victor Turek’s book on the Polish in Manitoba noted that the first Polish people arrived during the New France period.57 In Walter J. Lindal’s volume on Icelanders in Canada, he emphasized that despite their “Icelandic traits or traditional impulses,” “[p]resent day Canadians of Icelandic descent are thoroughly Canadian” and had integrated into Canadian society.58 He continued by saying that “the descendents [sic] of

54 Ol’ha Woycenko, *The Ukrainians in Canada*, Canada Ethnica IV (Ottawa/Winnipeg: Trident Press, 1967), 240. The Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, which had been founded by Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, published a number of pamphlets dealing with Ukrainian culture and language in its *Slavistica* series during the 1960s. In 1968 it published *Blueprint for the B.N.A. Act*, section 133: a simplified version of B. & B. Rudnyckyj’s formula. In this pamphlet, the Ukrainian Canadian Council of Learned Societies made the case for the acceptance of Rudnyckyj’s “Separate Statment, which appeared in Volume 1 of the *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (1967).
58 Walter J. Lindal, *The Icelanders in Canada*, Canada Ethnica II (Ottawa/Winnipeg: National Publishers
Icelandic pioneers have an opportunity to contribute to the Canadian scene, not as Icelandic settlers but as Canadians who have become integrated."\textsuperscript{59}

\textbf{Jewish Canadian community}

At the same time that Ukrainian Canadians were extremely vocal about multiculturalism, major ethnic groups like German Canadians and Jewish Canadians were relatively silent on the matter.\textsuperscript{60} The Canadian Jewish Congress’ reasons for remaining on the fringes of the national debate about bilingualism and biculturalism are especially instructive for scholars of the multiculturalism. Its concerns about a potential backlash against the Jewish community in Montreal trumped the desire by some Jewish leaders to combat a Royal Commission that had deliberately excluded them. The Canadian Jewish Congress responded to the creation of the RCBB by forming an “ad hoc committee comprising professors of law, Sociology, Political Science, Economics; lawyers, and others with Officers of Congress ex officio.”\textsuperscript{61} But while the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) rejected the terms of reference of the Commission — and specifically its reference to “two founding races” — it was hesitant to join any emerging “third force.”\textsuperscript{62} Although the Ukrainian Canadian Committee seemed to have little to lose by advocating

\textsuperscript{59} Walter J. Lindal, \textit{The Icelanders in Canada}, 467.
\textsuperscript{60} Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, \textit{A Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism} (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 126.
\textsuperscript{61} \textbf{Canadian Jewish Congress Charities Committee National Archives} [hereafter CJCCNA], Canadian Jewish Congress fonds, ZA 1963, Box 2, File 17, Michael Garber to National Officers of the CJC, 8 July 1963, 2.
multiculturalism, the CJC, and especially the Montreal Jewish community, “had to walk a political tightrope.”

During the 1960s, the CJC was still headquartered in Montreal and was attuned to the needs of that community. CJC leaders were keenly aware of the tenuous position that the (largely English-speaking) Jewish community had in Montreal. In particular, the issue of public funding and support for English-language education and religious education had long been a bone of contention between the Jewish community of Montreal and the Quebec government. Saul Hayes, the executive director of the CJC, made the case that the organized Jewish community had to be careful not to dismiss the demands of French Canadian nationalists by endorsing multiculturalism; to do so had the potential to sour already tense relations between these two communities. As Harold Troper points out, “Anything that undermined the claim of Montreal and Quebec Jews to parity with Catholics and Protestants was a danger, and any labelling of Jews as an ethnic group akin to Italians or Ukrainians, Hayes warned, would do exactly that.” Congress chose, therefore, to emphasize that the Jews were one of the three founding religious groups in Canada (Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish).

In its submission to the preliminary hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, CJC President Michael Garber came out against the idea of a “third force.” Despite his disdain for the use of the word “races,” the Canadian

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64 Ibid., 70.
Jewish Congress representative essentially agreed with the notion of “biculturalism” that had emerged in the last several years. Garber argued that “[t]he English culture of Canada is the property not only of the original founders, but it is the property of those who adopt it and they ought to be considered as part of it.”67 Garber noted his agreement with the bicultural view of Canadian society presented earlier in the day by the Societe Saint-Jean-Baptiste. According to Garber, immigrants to Canada chose freely to join either French (Quebec) society or English society, and subsequently became owners of those respective “cultures.” Although he mentioned the deep historical roots of the Jewish community in Canada and its contributions to Canada, he stressed that these contributions were expressed as part of the French or English cultures into which they had integrated.68

The Ukrainian Canadian Committee had suggested earlier in the day that federal or provincial funding be set aside for the teaching of “ethnic” languages, where numbers warranted. Garber responded to this directly, saying:

We are not at all interested, for the moment, in the position of the Ukrainians. Our approach is entirely opposite. We have educated people in Hebrew, but we consider that our private reserve. … We have Hebrew schools and other groups probably have the same things. Perhaps the Ukrainians in Winnipeg, because of their large numbers, are in the same position, as their spokesman representative says.69

This is not to say that all Jews or Jewish organizations were against recognition of multiculturalism. During a meeting of the National Executive Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress in December of 1963, three of the committee’s members, all from Montreal, spoke about Canada as a multicultural country. Mr. Lavy M. Becker made the

68 Ibid., 260.
69 Ibid., 261.
case “that the multi-cultural aspect was part and parcel of the Canadian scene.”

Similarly, Mr. Monroe Abbey said that “a true Canadian culture should be formed on the basis of a multi-cultural climate, in which the best of all cultures had opportunity to thrive.” Abbey qualified his remarks by noting that while there were two founding nations and linguistic groups, all ethnic groups had the same rights as Canadians. In other words, ethnic minority groups had the same human rights as French Canadians, but lacked the linguistic and historical basis to press for further rights, as the Ukrainian community was now doing.

Whereas the Ukrainian community had been divided along nationalist/progressive lines in regard to the question of multiculturalism, Jewish socialists, Labour Zionists, and Communists took the same line as the Canadian Jewish Congress. As we have seen, progressive organizations from various ethnic groups took the approach that multiculturalism undermined the legitimate aspirations of the French Canadians; this was also the case in the Jewish community. The United Jewish People’s Order, which had been expelled from the CJC in 1951 because of its attachment to the Communist Party of Canada, supported the Canadian Jewish Congress’ position on biculturalism, albeit for different reasons. In November of 1963, S. Lapedes of the United Jewish People’s Order wrote to the CJC: “At this time, representatives of a number of ethnic groups in Canada seek to inject themselves into this great dispute on nationhood, as a “THIRD

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70 CJCCNA, Canadian Jewish Congress fonds, ZA 1964, Box 2, File 7, “Minutes of Meeting of National Executive Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress,” 15 December 1963, 7.
71 CJCCNA, Canadian Jewish Congress fonds, ZA 1964, Box 2, File 7, “Minutes of Meeting of National Executive Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress,” 15 December 1963, 8.
72 As Ester Reiter notes, members of the ULFTA (the predecessor of the AUUC) and members of the United Jewish People’s Order were friendly because they shared the same politics: “They visited each others summer camps, sang and played in each other's choirs and orchestras, and intermarried.” Ester Reiter, “Secular Yiddishkait: Left Politics, Culture, and Community,” Labour/Le Travail 49 (Spring/Printemps 2002): 131.
73 Ibid., 140.
FORCE: in Canadian life ... However, injected at this time, IT CANNOT BUT
CONFUSE THE MAIN ISSUE AND DO NOTHING BUT HARM TO THE CAUSE OF
A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS FACING
CONFEDERATION.”\textsuperscript{74} The Jewish community was also less rigidly divided than the
Ukrainian community because of its history with organized labour and labour parties.
Until the 1920s, Labour Zionist parties like the Poale Zion had been socialists, but
abandoned those doctrines (including the idea of a Jewish state in Russia) to focus on
creating a state in Palestine. With famous Labour Zionists including among their ranks
such names as David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, “labour” did not have such a bad
name in Jewish circles.

Despite their ideological differences, most Canadian Jews were able to agree on
some common principles. When it came to French Canadian neo-nationalism and the
Royal Commission, the consensus was that “founding races” was unacceptable language,
but “biculturalism” had to be accepted if Jews were to live along side the Quebecois.
Where most Jewish organizations drew the line was any attempt to limit the use of
English in Montreal schools. In the spring 1967 edition of \textit{Viewpoints}, the quarterly
magazine of the Labour Zionist Movement of Canada, M.H. Myerson made the case that
Canada was fundamentally “bi-national.”\textsuperscript{75} Under the principles established by the Treaty
of Versailles and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Myerson claimed, French
Canadians living outside of Quebec and English Canadians living inside Quebec were
entitled to schools and public institutions such as libraries in their respective languages.
Moreover, Myerson argued, minorities should be able to use their languages “before the

\textsuperscript{74} CJCCNA, Canadian Jewish Congress fonds, ZA 1964, Box 2, file 7, S, Lapedes to the Eastern Division
Session, the Canadian Jewish Congress, 25 November 1963, 3.

Like many Jewish Canadians in Quebec, he feared that Jews would be forced to speak French, attend Catholic schools and generally assimilate into Francophone society if Quebec were to separate from Canada. Interestingly, Myerson saw Jewish-Canadians as part of the “English Canadian ethnic group”; but he worried that an independent Quebec “would suo motu undermine the rights of equality of the English-Canadian ethnic group in the existing partnership in that province.” M.H. Myerson, “Ethnic Group Rights and the Rights of Man,” 16.

As for the other ethnic groups, they were expected to integrate into one of the two societal cultures. It was therefore “illogical and erroneous for the Ukrainian in Manitoba, for example, to demand that his language be accorded the same status as French or English.” M.H. Myerson, “Ethnic Group Rights and the Rights of Man,” 17.

Similarly, Joseph Kage, president of the Montreal Jewish Public Library, argued that “we have an ethnically plural society, but, by and large, in Canada it is a binational society, namely the French and the English.” Joseph Kage, “The Jew within the context of Canadian Pluralism,” Viewpoints 4.3 (October 1969): 28.

What is clear is that the Jewish community was concerned with maintaining the “existing partnership” between themselves and French Canadians. The CJC, the UJPO, and the Labour Zionists had accepted that Francophones were numerically superior in the province of Quebec. It therefore made sense to ensure that existing language rights were upheld, rather than insist upon special rights for Jews in Quebec.

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Inter-ethnic co-operation

Whereas the CJC and some ethnic progressive organizations were able to unite against “multiculturalism” – or at least agree that the “third force” was not a sound idea – ethnic organizations that supported the concept found it difficult to form a pan-ethnic multicultural movement. One of the first attempts to unite ethnic minority groups in this period came about under the leadership of Walter Bossy in Montreal. Born in Yaslo, Galicia to a Ukrainian family in what was then part of the Austrian Empire, Bossy served as a machine-gunner in the Austrian army during the Great War. He immigrated to Canada in 1924, and became a language teacher for the Montreal Catholic School Board in 1931. In 1949, at the urging of the School Board, he formed the Bureau du Service Neo-Canadian (New Canadian Service Bureau), and set up an office on University Avenue.80 In addition to helping immigrants like himself familiarize themselves with their new surroundings, Bossy’s office also organized events, such as a “New Canadians celebration” in 1949 to celebrate Montreal’s ethnic diversity.81

In October of 1963, the New Canadian Service Bureau folded and was replaced by the Institute of the Canadian Ethnic Mosaic Confederation.82 Representatives of seventeen ethnic groups met at the Insitute’s headquarters, Villa Semper Fidelis in Ile Bizard near Montreal, to form what was hoped would be an organization that would represent all ethnic minority communities in Canada. To announce the new Institute, Bossy sent an open letter addressed to André Laurendeau on

81 Ibid., 21.
28 August 1963. Bossy noted that he had dedicated forty years of service “on behalf of the non-English and non-French Canadian ethnic groups.” In light of the recent discussion of a “third force” and in light of the need to organize ethnic minority communities, Bossy believed that his Institute might lead the “third force.” The groups that met at Villa Semper Fidelis “requested their former “New Canadian Service Bureau” to assume new dimensions and responsibilities, and in effect to become the rallying centre of representatives of all ethnic groups.” If ethnic groups were unable to rally around the Institute, its founders hoped to “provide the [Royal] Commission with the location and name of a body that the ethnic groups themselves have specifically designated to be their spokesman.”

Despite Bossy’s best intentions, the Institute of the Canadian Ethnic Mosaic Confederation acted neither as a clearinghouse for information about ethnic groups, nor did it help to organize the multicultural movement. While there were some initial attempts to share information with other ethnic organizations, it became clear that there was no real demand for a pan-ethnic body of the kind that Bossy envisioned. Manfred Saalheimer of the National Joint Community Relations Committee (a joint enterprise of B’nai B’rith and the Canadian Jewish Congress) wrote to Bossy that his organization would give Bossy’s open letter “a careful reading.” David Rome of the Montreal Jewish Public Library sent a similar note; neither followed up or seems to have made any attempt to contact Bossy, even though they were living in the same city.

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84 Ibid., 8.
85 Ibid., 8.
Likewise, there was only a limited amount of correspondence between Bossy and other Ukrainian leaders. The Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen’s Club’s president, John Swystun, wrote to the Institute to acknowledge receipt of Bossy’s open letter to Laurendeau. Swystun enclosed copies of the UPBC’s brief to the Roblin Commission in Manitoba, and requested that Bossy send him “a copy of the Montreal newspaper in which our Brief [to the RCBB] was mentioned.”

Two months later, his successor, M. Kepron, sent along more briefs from the Roblin Committee. Kepron offered his best wishes that the Institute would “find their content interesting and helpful in the wonderful work you and your Confederation are carrying on.” The UPBC made used of the Institute in its capacity as a clearinghouse for information, but did not seem to desire to work together on issues like multiculturalism – this in spite of the fact that the UPBC was a supporter of multiculturalism and the idea of a “third force.”

Cooperation between the Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish communities was also unsuccessful. In June of 1964, a Polish Canadian leader and Professor of Physiology the Universite de Montreal, Vincent Adamkiewicz, wrote to Mr. Z.J. Jaworski, President of the Canadian Polish Congress. He made the following recommendation:

The Congress should protect itself on two fronts. On one hand, it should cooperate with those who wish to maintain the “status quo”. On the other hand, it should formally delegate representatives to cooperate with those who want to modify the “status quo”. Representatives of the Congress should be among the founders of an inter-ethnic, pan-
Canadian committee. To this end, Congress should agree with the Ukrainian Committee and reconcile on common action.\textsuperscript{89}

But the Canadian Polish Congress and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee never did come to an agreement; they continued to present separate briefs to the RCBB, and lobbied the Canadian Government separately. A year later, Paul Yuzyk arranged a meeting between ethnic leaders in Ottawa to discuss “coordinated ethnic group participation in the national centennial celebrations”; as Harold Troper points out, the Canadian Jewish Congress sent a delegate, but instructed him specifically to avoid agreeing to any co-ordination between the CJC and such a council.\textsuperscript{90} If ethnic leaders could not even agree to work together on the Centennial, there was little hope that they could form a multicultural movement that stretched beyond the Ukrainian community.

Adamkiewicz was involved in one organization that had some limited success in uniting multiculturalists of various ethnic backgrounds — the Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs. What little co-operation there was in the 1960s was limited to the Slavic Studies community.\textsuperscript{91} Because the leadership of the multicultural movement was based at Canadian universities, they attempted to use scholarly conferences to organize the movement. In 1964, a group of five members of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Slavonic and Soviet Studies at the University of Alberta began planning the First National Conference on Canadian Slavs. Prof. Bohdan

\textsuperscript{89} My thanks to Dorotka Lockyer for her translation of this letter from Polish to English. LAC, Paul Yuzyk fonds, MG32 C-67, vol. 17, file 17-1, Choulguine, Rotislav Corres., 1963-74, Vincent Adamkiewicz to Z.J. Jaworski, 9 June 1964, n.p.

\textsuperscript{90} Harold Troper, \textit{The Defining Decade: Identity, Politics, and the Canadian Jewish Community in the 1960s} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 75-76.

\textsuperscript{91} The Canadian Association of Slavists, which dealt primarily with Eastern European studies (rather than the history, language, and culture of Canadian Slavs), presented a brief to the RCBB in 1964. “A Brief Submitted to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by the Canadian Association of Slavists: June, 1964,” \textit{Canadian Slavonic Papers} 7 (1965): 58-60.
Bociurkiw was chosen as convenor, while Prof. Yar Slavutych acted as Programme Chairman; the committee was rounded out by Prof. A Malycky, Prof. G.H. Wright, and Prof. R.C. Elwood.\textsuperscript{92} Officially the conference, which was to be held on 9-12 June 1965 in Banff, was designed to encourage the study of Slavic ethnic groups living within Canada; this would differentiate the Inter-Departmental Committee from the Canadian Association of Slavists, which was concerned with affairs in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{93} Unofficially however, the idea for the conference came from the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, which hoped to create an alliance of Slavic ethnic groups that could then lobby Federal and Provincial governments for greater recognition of cultural rights of ethnic minority groups.

But it is clear that the First National Conference on Canadian Slavs did not meet the UCC’s goals. The participants did not form a pan-Slavic alliance. However, they enlarged the Inter-Departmental Committee to form the Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs (IUCCS). Bociurkiw was elected Chairman for 1965 to 1967, and Constantine Bida was asked to organize a conference for the following year. Despite the conference’s failure to create a pan-Slavic alliance, as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee had hoped, it did create an opportunity for dialogue about multiculturalism. Although this conference was of a “high academic standard,” the political convictions of its participants were at the forefront of their presentations.\textsuperscript{94} A number of prominent multiculturalists,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{92} Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs, \textit{Slavs in Canada, Volume 1: Proceedings of the First National Conference on Canadian Slavs, June 9-12, 1965, Banff, Alberta} (Edmonton: Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs, 1966), 5.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Vincent W. Adamkiewicz, “The National Conferences on Canadian Slavs,” 110.
\end{itemize}
including Senator Paul Yuzyk, Bociurkiw, Stanley Haidasz, and Isidore Hlynka, were involved in the conference in some capacity. The majority of the presenters at the conference were of Ukrainian background, and a number of papers used language that fell in line with the multiculturalist position. Stanley Haidasz, a Liberal Member of Parliament who would later go on to head the first Multiculturalism Secretariat, noted that the increased “influence” of “this new element” meant that there was a need for “more research on the actual and potential contributions of Slavs of Canadian origin to life in Canada.”

One presenter argued that Canada was “a huge tree with Anglo and Franco-Canadian roots, but with a multitude of various branches composed of the Ukrainians, Poles, Russians, Slovaks, etc.,” while another likened it to a “multi-ethnic” “tapestry.”

The Citizenship Branch recognized early on that the IUCCS was an important organization because it brought together leaders and scholars in the Slavic community. Prior to the 1965 conference, Bohdan Bociurkiw met with a Citizenship Branch official to discuss funding. An internal memo from the Citizenship Branch reported that the organizers’ aim “was to consider the role of the Slavic groups in promoting national unity and, at the same time, making Canadians generally aware of the contributions of the Slavic groups to Canadian development and the enrichment of Canadian life.”

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Branch contributed a grant of $1,500 to be used for delegate travel expenses.\(^98\) Despite the conference’s academic trappings, the two delegates sent to the conference by the Citizenship Branch were well aware of the political motivations of some of its organizers. As we have seen, the Branch was somewhat hesitant to openly support organizations that advocated multiculturalism; in fact, CB staff would later question whether the $1,500 grant they gave to the IUCCS was too much of a commitment to “multiculturalism.”\(^99\) Nonetheless, the CB continued to keep an eye on the IUCCS’ activities. In 1966, it sent G.P. Allen to give a paper on the Citizenship Branch’s new “Multi-Ethnic Program.” According to Allen, the program’s “primary goal” was “to provide and guarantee an opportunity for all members of ethnic groups to participate fully in all phases of Canadian life.”\(^100\) He then asked the assembled scholars for feedback on the new program; their response was uniformly positive.

As Dirk Hoerder points out, by the late 1960s the IUCCS developed into “a respectable as well as insurgent group, with a tradition of opposing the British-colonial tradition.”\(^101\) But it was not until 1971, when it joined with the Research Centre for Canadian Ethnic Studies, based at the University of Calgary, that the IUCCS became a real political force. Clive Cardinal founded the Research Centre for Canadian Ethnic Studies at the University of Calgary in 1968. The Centre published its first bulletin, entitled *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, in June of 1969. Cardinal dedicated the second issue of

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\(^99\) LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 660, file 1-21-3, vol. 1, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Charles A. Lussier to Claude Isbister, 6 October 1965.
\(^100\) G.P. Allen, “A General Outline of the Citizenship Branch, Department of the Secretary of State, With Particular Reference to the Multi-Ethnic Programme,” in *Slavs in Canada, Volume II* (Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs, 1968), 62.
CES to John Murray Gibbon, author of *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation* (1938); Gibbon was one of the first public figures to articulate the idea of the Canadian “mosaic” of cultures upon which some multiculturalists based their ideology. In the journal’s first edition, Cardinal made the case the Research Centre for Canadian Ethnic Studies and its journal were engaged in an effort to study and promote the “ethnic” cultures of Canada. He maintained that the discipline of Canadian ethnic studies “has grown as a significant shift took place from the vague assimilation policies of early years through the enormous metamorphosis which the Dominion experienced during the second world war to the present phase of a search for a binding national consciousness.”

He concluded by summarizing the anxiety that Canadian had about their cultural identity during the 1960s:

> It is out of the interaction, apprehension and harmonization of these divergent elements that a new national identity is growing. To the same degree that the problems have become more complex, the responses demanded by them have assumed greater sophistication. The image in the mirror is not always exactly ours though it reflects our anxiety.

*Canadian Ethnic Studies*, then, had been created in reaction to the national debate over Canadian culture, brought on in part by the Quiet Revolution and the RCBB. The journal would attempt to search for answers not in the study of the “two founding peoples”, but by studying “ethnic” Canadians.

This Research Centre had the immediate support and encouragement of a number of multiculturalists, including Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, J.M. Kirschbaum, and Paul Yuzyk, all of whom published articles within the first two issues. Following the introduction to the

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first issue, the first article appearing in *Canadian Ethnic Studies* was a letter of encouragement from Senator Yuzyk. The Senator noted that the Research Centre and its bulletin were going to fill a gap in the historical record, which had tended to overlook the contributions of the ethnic groups to Canadian society. Yuzyk also took the opportunity to make a case for the “third element”, and concluded that Canada had “evolved into a multicultural nation.”  

Although it is not surprising that the Senator would use the *CES* bulletin as a platform for his political agenda, it is notable the new journal published this letter in its first edition. Clive Cardinal and the *CES* editor, Alexander Malycky, were staking out a clear position in favour of multiculturalism. This became even more apparent in May of 1971, when the Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs merged with the Research Centre on Canadian Ethnic Studies to form the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association. The new association remained at the University of Calgary under the leadership of Cornelius Jaenen, a Belgian-Canadian who, as we have seen, was also sympathetic to the views of Ukrainian multiculturalists.

The IUCCS and the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association kick-started the ethnic studies movement in Canadian universities, opening up a new field of studies and thereby ensuring that new generations would learn about the importance of Canada’s ethnic minority cultures. In the short term, however, these organizations were unable to alter to course of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. They provided a platform for scholar/activists like Yuzyk, Bociurkiw and others, but, much like the Canadian Association of Slavists and the IUCCS, ended up talking to one another.

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Thinkers’ Conference on Cultural Rights

In some ways, Paul Yuzyk and a handful of Ukrainian Canadian scholars kept the multicultural movement alive during the 1960s. Despite the UCC’s virtual capitulation to Jean Lesage in 1965, Yuzyk continued to press the Federal Government on cultural and linguistic rights for ethnic minorities. He used his cachet as a Senator to attempt to make inroads for the multicultural movement. For example, he attended the 1968 International Conference of Christians and Jews at York University in Toronto, along with other prominent political figures like Member of Parliament Mark MacGuigan and Liberal Party President Richard Stanbury. The conference theme, “Overcoming Barriers to Communication,” also attracted other multiculturalists. The editor of Scope made the following observation:

It was a busy, dizzy, tension-packed week, this conference of Christians and Jews. Most were thrilled and a few were disgruntled. Among the disgruntled was your editor of SCOPE. As a member of a minority group (Canadian-Ukrainian) I felt close to my Negro and Indian brethren whose problems are urgent. Why, I asked myself, don’t ALL THESE BRAINS, stop talking and do something practical? I wanted them all to become Martin Luther Kings.107

As a prominent member of the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews, Yuzyk was invited to co-chair the discussion group on “Ethnic Groups and Value Systems.” The Senator’s imprint can be clearly seen on the resolutions that emerged from that discussion group. In its final recommendations, the ICCJ noted that countries such as the United

States and Canada required “urgent action” in a number of areas, including
“Representation of ethnic and racial groups on the decision-making level of education
and guarantee of the right of an ethnic group to instruction in its mother-tongue and
historical heritage,” as well as “Recognition of the role of ethnic group organizations in
communicating with government and the wider society.”

But Yuzyk’s attendance at such conferences could only do so much to change
political discourse. In 1968 he began to drum up support for the Canadian Cultural Rights
Concern Conference, also known as the Thinkers’ Conference on Cultural Rights. The
conference would be held in Ottawa in December of 1968, and boasted an impressive
group of patrons, speakers, and attendees. Maurice Lamontagne, David Croll, Norman
A.M. MacKenzie, James Gladstone, and Paul Yuzyk convened the conference as the
“Senate Committee of Patrons.” Funds and assistance were provided by the Citizenship
Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State and the Ontario Citizenship Branch,
as well as four private voluntary organizations: the Canadian Citizenship Council, the
Canadian Folk Arts Council, the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews, and the
Canada Ethnic Press Federation. Yuzyk also used his position as a Senator to attract a
number of prominent individuals to the event, including RCBB Commissioner Royce
Frith, Le Devoir editor Claude Ryan, Senator Andrew Thompson, Ontario Education
Minister (and future Premier) Bill Davis, and MP John Yaremko.

Just as the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism had worked
from the notion of “two founding peoples” and biculturalism, the Thinkers’ Conference

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began with the premise that Canada was multicultural. The purpose of the conference was fourfold: 1. To gather diverse groups to discuss “the cultural patterns that [made] up Canada, and the multi-cultural aspect of Canadian life; 2. To decide what approach ethnic minority groups should take in respect to the ongoing constitutional talks; 3. “To make recommendations to the appropriate government levels regarding the preservation of Canada’s multi-cultural tradition”; and 4. Discuss the formation of an ethnic advisory body that would advise the Federal Government.\footnote{LAC, Gérard Pelletier fonds, R11939, vol. 27, file 27-14, Thinkers’ Conference on Cultural Rights, 1968, Purpose of the Conference, n.p.} Yuzyk’s biases were also apparent in his choice of speakers and the resolutions that came out of the conference. Walter Tarnopolsky, then Dean of Law at the University of Windsor, spoke on “Group Rights and the new Constitution of Canada”, while Yuzyk and Rotislav Choulguine spoke about “The Emerging New Force in the Emerging New Canada” and “Les minorités ethniques du Canada en face des deux groups linguistiques prépondérants,” respectively. Though Claude Ryan rejected multiculturalism, as he had since 1963, Senator Norman MacKenzie went so far as to advocate ethnic minority language education. “I feel and believe,” he said, “…that because of the numbers of Canadians who are interested and use other languages, that those groups too should be given the opportunity to have their children educated in these languages again with the assistance of Governments, Schools and Universities.”\footnote{LAC, Gérard Pelletier fonds, R11939, vol. 27, file 27-14, Thinkers’ Conference on Cultural Rights, 1968, Norman A.M. MacKenzie, “Education and Languages in Canada,” 1.} Dr. Clive Cardinal, spoke on “The Third Element as a Cultural Balance in the Canadian Identity.”

Yuzyk’s conference was stacked with luminaries like Andrew Thompson, whose support for ethnic minorities, if not multiculturalism, was well known. As a result, the
resolutions that emerged from the conference reflected the position that Yuzyk and the UCC had been taking for the previous five years. Among other things, the delegates to the Thinkers’ Conference suggested that the Canadian Cultural Rights Committee, headed by Yuzyk, act in an advisory capacity to the Canadian Government. The delegates “unequivocally [rejected] the concept of biculturalism and [sought] official recognition of the multicultural character of Canada.”\(^{112}\) It also recommended that the CBC and the National Film Board be more representative of Canada’s ethnic diversity. Finally, the Conference urged all levels of government to “expand existing programs of language teaching” and allow all ethnic minority languages to be taught for credit as subjects in secondary schools and universities.\(^{113}\)

Within Yuzyk’s circle of friends, reaction to the conference was positive. Bohdan Bociurkiw wrote to Yuzyk: “Judging by the response of the mass media, the Thinkers’ Conference has been a success. Congratulations!”\(^{114}\) Ten years later, Bociurkiw would write that the Thinkers’ Conference had inspired the Trudeau Government to adopt multiculturalism as a state policy.\(^{115}\) As we will see in Chapter 7, this was not the case at all. If any conference had an impact on the Government’s understanding of multiculturalism, it was the Manitoba Mosaic Congress, which was held in Winnipeg in June 1970. Citizenship Branch officials, including the Minister, Robert Stanbury, would

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\(^{113}\) Ibid., n.p.
attend the conference and emerge with a deeper understanding of multiculturalism.

Perhaps more tellingly, when the Citizenship Branch eventually needed an ethnic advisory body, it did not call on the Canadian Cultural Rights Committee. The Thinkers’ Conference, then, served little practical purpose, other than to publicize multiculturalism and ethnic language education as public policies.

The Thinkers’ Conference also highlights the larger dynamic at play in the multicultural movement: its inability to attract a broad range of interest groups and ethnic minorities. As with previous conferences, the Thinkers’ Conference had an overabundance of Ukrainians and Slavs on its program. The conference was also stacked with Yuzyk’s friends from the Senate -- people like Maurice Lamontagne, David Croll, James Gladstone, and Norman MacKenzie – who, while clearly sympathetic to Yuzyk’s position, had not previously and did not later endorse multiculturalism. Even more troubling was that the conference deliberately excluded organizations — even Ukrainian ones — that genuinely wanted to attend, because of their political affiliations. In February of 1969, William Harasym, National President of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, wrote an article in The Ukrainian Canadian, charging Yuzyk and the Thinkers’ Conference with deliberately excluding progressive organizations, such as the one he headed. Harasym, admitted that he was impressed by the conference’s patrons, and its resolutions in favour of more ethnically diverse programming on the CBC and the expansion of ethnic minority language education. But, he added, “The conference was not truly representative in that invitations were withheld from all progressive ethnic organizations, e.g. — affiliates of the Canadian Council of National Groups and editorial

116 Most likely these Senators gave added cachet to the Conference, but there is no evidence to suggest that they became “multiculturalists.” LAC, Gérard Pelletier fonds, R11939, vol. 27, file 14, 110-2 [Thinkers’ Conference on Cultural Rights] 1968, Conference Committee.
staffs of the Canadian Language Press Club publications.” He then went on to argue that Yuzyk had overlooked “the basic historical and social facts of Canada’s two-nation character” in favour of the “third force” idea. While he acknowledged that ethnic minority groups had legitimate grievances, and even were justified in their push to have ethnic languages taught in schools, it was unfair to exclude some ethnic voices because they were inconvenient. Harasym ended his article by quoting from a paper given by Mitch Sago, *The Ukrainian Canadian*’s editor, at the AUUC’s 1968 annual convention: “No group or combination of groups can grow and flourish at the expense of others in our society. The crisis of Confederation clearly attests to this.” Although the UCC and its affiliates had resented their exclusion from the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, they had turned around and excluded people within their own communities.

These cleavages within the Ukrainian community would come to a head in 1969 and 1970, as the Ukrainian Canadian Students’ Association (SUSK) openly broke with the established community of nationalist organizations and leaders. Taking up Pierre Trudeau’s call for a “Just Society,” many Ukrainian Canadian students told the mainstream community that it was too timid and old-fashioned and that the UCC was an anti-democratic organization. In an editorial in the Ukrainian student newspaper *Student* in October of 1969, one student argued that “Many Ukrainian organizations have become
irrelevant to today’s youth. … Their approach is outdated. They try to teach their youth unquestionable obedience.”120 At the tenth Congress of the Ukrainian Canadian University Students’ Union (SUSK) in 1969, the students resolved “that the Ukrainian Canadian Committee make all efforts to become a democratic competitive structure.”121 Like many other ethnic and national student groups around the world in the 1960s, Ukrainian Canadian students were inspired to celebrate their language and culture; the UCC’s timidity and inability to allow in alternative viewpoints had left it a stagnant organization with little relevance to young Ukrainians. As Romana Bahrij-Piklyk wrote in Student, “The parent generation is often unaware that the Just Society is not ready-made, that it is the citizens who create it.” She argued that the UCC’s decision to settle for “supplementary” Ukrainian education in 1965 would lead to a “ghetto school” system, rather than a dynamic Ukrainian-language education system.122 During the next few years, SUSK began to push Ottawa to adopt both multiculturalism and multilingualism as a public policy. Though they would be unsuccessful on the second point, their lobbying is evidence that the UCC did not speak for all (nationalist) Ukrainian organizations.

**Conclusions**

“Identity,” according to Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker, is often employed by political actors “to persuade people to understand themselves, their interests, and their predicaments in a certain way, to persuade certain people that they are (for certain

purposes) “identical” with one another and at the same time different from others, and to organize and justify collective action along certain lines.”\textsuperscript{123} The Ukrainian Canadian leaders of the multicultural movement were ultimately unsuccessful in appealing to a broad constituency, even from within their own “community.” They held conferences, wrote books, and attempted to organize using the methods at their disposal. These books and conferences reinforced the convictions of the (nationalist) community, but held little to no appeal for leftist, student and other groups that could have helped to mobilize and expand the movement.

While Paul Yuzyk claimed that a “third element” or “third force” existed in Canada, this force was much smaller than he allowed. In Quebec, intellectuals and leaders like Rene Levesque, Pierre Trudeau, André Laurendeau, and Maurice Lamontagne could meet, exchange ideas, and even work together on occasion, although they differed greatly on the direction that Quebec should take. Infighting in the Ukrainian Canadian community — some of it based upon old, visceral animosities — meant that the groups like the AUUC and the UCC could not work together or even come to a compromise on basic issues. As we have seen, both organizations essentially viewed Canada as “multicultural,” though the AUUC believed that this was subsumed under “biculturalism.” Likewise, both organizations advocated the teaching of ethnic minority languages as subjects in public schools. The real differences between them had little to do with multiculturalism, and everything to do with internal group dynamics.

The few organizations that brought together members of various groups — the Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs, the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association,

the Canadian Cultural Rights Committee, and the Canadian Association of Slavists
(Canadian Slavonic Papers) — also had limited success. The problem with these
voluntary and scholarly organizations was that they talked to one another, but not to
authorities. True, the Canadian Association of Slavists submitted a brief to the RCBB,
and the Yuzyk’s Canadian Cultural Rights Committee attracted attention from politicians.
But these were isolated attempts to make change, rather than a meaningful, long term
mobilization of ethnic minority groups.

The success of the multicultural movement, then, did not come from its broad-
based appeal to ethnic minority groups, or even in-group cohesiveness among and
between Ukrainian Canadian voluntary organizations and individuals. Instead, it came
from sustained effort over time by a handful of committed scholar-activists of Ukrainian
and Eastern European background. Throughout the 1960s they pressured the Canadian
state to adopt multiculturalism as a public policy through briefs, books, symposia, and
lobbying, as well as attempts to bring various constituencies together through conferences
like the Canadian Cultural Rights Concern Conference.

Undoubtedly, the movement put “multiculturalism” on the public agenda and
played a role in the Trudeau Government’s adoption of a multiculturalism policy in 1971.
But the movement was but one part of a larger picture. Changes within the Citizenship
Branch and the Liberal Party of Canada would soon breathe new life into the
multicultural movement. As the 1960s drew to a close, the Citizenship Branch became
the biggest advocate of multiculturalism. Senator Andrew Thompson, who had attended
the Thinkers’ Conference, would help to bring the Liberal Party around to the view that
multiculturalism could provide national unity where biculturalism had failed.

As activists in the multicultural movement battled it out with the Royal Commission and among themselves, the Quiet Revolution was picking up steam in Quebec. Bomb scares and attacks had been carried out in Montreal and Quebec City since 1963, but the “crisis” that André Laurendeau referred to in the Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism seemed to be intensifying. In 1965, Union Nationale leader Daniel Johnson published his manifesto, Égalité ou indépendance in which he argued for a new constitution based on “the alliance of two nations”; as the title of his book and campaign slogan a year later suggested, Quebec demanded equality with the rest of Canada, or it would secede from Confederation.\(^1\) In Quebec City and Montreal, the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) placed bombs near symbols of the Canadian state, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Headquarters. In 1966, a secretary named Therese Morin was killed when the FLQ bombed the Lagrenade shoe factory in Montreal.\(^2\) By 1968, René Lévesque, who had left the Liberal Party of Quebec in 1967 to form his own Mouvement Souveraineté-Association, would warn ominously: “Quebec is heading down a one-way street to sovereignty.”\(^3\)

Although Prime Minister Lester Pearson had endorsed a bilingual and bicultural Canada in 1963, in this emotionally and politically charged context it was increasingly unclear if his approach to ethnicity would be enough to appease either nationalist forces in Quebec, or ethnic minority groups that had mobilized in opposition to the Royal

\(^1\) Daniel Johnson, Égalité ou indépendance (Montréal: Editions Renaissance, 1965), 92.  
Commission’s mandate. In response to both Quebec neo-nationalists and the multicultural movement, Pearson began to speak of a Canadian identity that embraced French Canadians as well as ethnic minority communities. When he was asked by *Weekend Magazine* in April of 1965 what Canada’s most “pressing” problem was, Pearson responded: “We must become increasingly proud of the composition and character of our people – the French part, the English part, and the third force. We must develop a more exuberant spirit of patriotism.”

Along with other nation-building projects like the adoption of the Maple Leaf flag, Pearson’s new approach to ethnicity emphasized commonalties between French Canadians, ethnic groups, and old-style nationalists.

When Pierre Trudeau took the reins from Pearson in 1968, he accepted the emerging consensus in Ottawa. The “Just Society” that he dreamed of would embrace both ethnic diversity and the “French fact” by giving Canadians the freedom to grow and develop their own language and culture. In this sense, his government did not diverge much from that of Pearson on the issue of ethnicity. For both Pearson and Trudeau, the Canadian Government, through the creation of symbols and ideas around which Canadians could rally, could strengthen national unity. Pearson took an all-embracing approach to national unity as it related to French Canadians and ethnic minority groups. He looked to national symbols like the “Maple Leaf” flag and the national anthem (“O Canada”) to shore up support for a united Canada. Trudeau, however, looked to ideas – citizen participation, democracy, and language rights – to bind Canadians together. But,

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4 Terence Robertson, “Conversation With The Prime Minister,” *Weekend Magazine*, 3 April 1965, 2.
like Pearson, he felt that support and recognition of both French Canadians and ethnic minority communities was not impossible or counter-productive.

What I suggest in this chapter is that between 1964 and 1970 Ottawa moved slowly toward an understanding of ethnicity that balanced the need to recognize French Canadians with the need to acknowledge Canada’s ethnic minority communities. This was an uneven process in which the important players were not always in agreement. While Pearson spoke openly about a “multicultural” Canada with a “French fact,” the Liberal Party took longer to come around to the idea. Meanwhile, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism continued to advocate a “two nations” understanding of Canada. But it too recognized the importance of the “other ethnic groups”; in its fourth volume, released in 1969, the RCBB made a number of recommendations that moved it closer to a bilingual and multicultural approach. Working quietly in the background, the Citizenship Branch increased spending on programs designed to improve French-English relations, thereby moving the branch from an emphasis on multiculturalism to an all-encompassing philosophy that accommodated both ethnic minority groups and French Canadians. These developments brought the Trudeau Government in line with the established philosophy within the Citizenship Branch. In a matter of a few short years, the idea of a Canada that was bilingual and multicultural – rather than bilingual and bicultural – became an accepted part of bureaucratic, political, and public discourse.

The Liberal Party of Canada, 1964-1968

The Liberal Party of Canada was initially slow to respond to the discontent emerging out
of western Canada. Though it did not reject multiculturalism *per se*, its overwhelming emphasis on biculturalism did not leave a lot of room for the “other ethnic groups.” Maurice Lamontagne, for example, maintained that Canada had “two founding races” and “two of the greatest cultures.” In 1964, the party struck a committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Despite the discontent that had emerged during the RCBB’s hearings in regard to the Commission’s terms of reference, the committee’s consensus was that the party should continue to accept the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission’s understanding of Canada as bilingual and bicultural. At a meeting in February, the committee agreed that the Commission “had in many areas, allayed the fears of other ethnic groups”; given the degree of anger and resentment felt by Ukrainians especially during this period, it would suggest that the Liberal Party was not really in touch with what was going on the ground in western Canada. Moreover, the committee felt that “many Canadians” were “sincerely unaware of the problems separating our two main cultures”; therefore, the party was to use “patience and caution” in explaining bilingualism and biculturalism to them. However, as many Western-based ethnic organizations pointed out during the RCBB hearings, French-English relations was viewed in the West as a problem found in Quebec and Ontario, not a pan-Canadian problem. According to Liberal Party records, this committee only met in 1964, and does not seem to have attempted to explain what Pearson meant by “bilingualism and biculturalism” to ethnic voters.

As numerous representations to the Royal Commission showed, Ottawa’s

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7 LAC, Liberal Party of Canada fonds, MG28 IV3, vol. 716, Bilingualism & Biculturalism - Royal Commission, Minutes of the Committee Meeting on the Subject of Bilingualism and Biculturalism, [date stamped 21 February 1964], 2.

8 Ibid., 4-5.
understanding of the place of ethnic minorities in relation to the “founding peoples” was out of step with what some ethnic communities in the West wanted in regard to language and cultural rights.\(^9\) With Liberal MPs from Quebec speaking openly of “the French and English character of Canada” in the face of a backlash from ethnic minority groups, some western Liberals worried that the party had gone too far to appease Quebec.\(^10\) Alex Prociuk, who ran unsuccessfully for the Liberals in Saskatchewan in the 1957 federal election, wrote to Richard O’Hagan in the national office in 1964 that “the situation does not look too bright politically. Various discourses on biculturalism, particularly the one by [Rene] Levesque, had a good deal of effect the wrong way.”\(^11\) Gérard Pelletier, who would come to Ottawa as a Liberal Member of Parliament within the year, told a University of Saskatchewan audience in 1964 that Canada was “bi-cultural” and that immigrants were expected to choose one of two cultures:

Many Ukrainians have become English Canadians and a good number of Italians and Hungarians and Jews are now members of the French-Canadian community. … From the very moment you decide in favour of one culture and one group, this culture comes first and so does the group because you belong to it and you identify yourself with it.\(^12\)

Prociuk suggested that a well-known Liberal from Quebec like Louis St. Laurent should

\(^9\) This had not historically been the case. as Nelson Wiseman points out, the Progressive Conservatives’ success in the Prairie West was a phenomenon that begin in the 1950s. Diefenbaker’s ability to identify himself and the party with ethnic farmers was, at least for a time, a successful strategy. Nelson Wiseman, “The Pattern of Prairie Politics,” in The Prairie West: Historical Readings, edited by R. Douglas Francis and Howard Palmer (Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, 1992), 640-660.

\(^10\) Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism Preliminary Hearings, 1963, 80.


\(^12\) Gérard Pelletier, Confederation at the Crossroads, University of Saskatchewan, University Lectures 4 (1965): 5.
say something to “quiet a disturbed Western Canada,” as remarks such as those of Pelletier and Levesque threatened Saskatchewan Liberals at the ballot box.\textsuperscript{13} There seemed to be a perception among Western-based ethnic minority communities that the Liberal Party was not serving their interests.

As he had since the 1950s, Andrew Thompson continued to act as the party’s liaison with ethnic minority communities. Much of Thompson’s work focused on liaising with ethnic groups at election time and corresponding with individual MPs and the Prime Minister to advise them on speaking points when addressing ethnic audiences.\textsuperscript{14} Thompson’s message for ethnic voters during the 1965 election emphasized the Liberal’s record on immigration, rather than the problems of second and third-generation ethnic minorities. An advertisement designed for ethnic-language publications discussed the need for more immigrants and emphasized that “It was a Liberal government and Liberal policy which enabled so many immigrants to come here.”\textsuperscript{15} Though this might have played well in major immigrant-receiving centres like Toronto, Western ethnic communities saw themselves less and less as “immigrants,” and increasingly as Canadians or even “founding peoples.”\textsuperscript{16}

Unfortunately for the party, even Thompson does not seem to have been aware of

\textsuperscript{16} As early as 1957, some Ukrainians began to publically proclaim that they were one of Canada’s “founding races.” Peter Stursberg quotes from an unnamed Ukrainian-Canadian publication from 1957 that said “those who opened up the wheatlands of western Canada were born in the Ukraine, the United States, and elsewhere.” Peter Stursberg, “Ottawa Letter,” Saturday Night 79.3 (March 1964): 11; Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism Preliminary Hearings, 1963, 219-220.
the depth of ethnic discontent in Western Canada. His contacts in ethnic communities did not extend much beyond Montreal and Toronto. The Progressive Conservative Party had close ties to western ethnic organizations and newspapers, especially Ukrainian ones, through its relationship with the Canada Ethnic Press Federation. The CEPF, though based in Winnipeg, also represented a number of Toronto and Montreal-based newspapers, as it had begun in 1958 as a merger between the Canada Press Club (Winnipeg) and the Ethnic Press Association of Ontario. As such, the Progressive Conservatives were kept abreast of the discontent emerging from Ukrainian communities in the West and in Central Canada. Thompson’s contacts, however, were through New Canadian Publications, a rival federation of ethnic newspapers and journals based in Toronto. Most of the publications that were part of New Canadian Publications’ collection were based in Toronto or southern Ontario; many catered to German, Hungarian, Czech, and Dutch communities that had not warmed to multiculturalism, or even agreed that there were “two founding peoples.”

In his memoirs Pearson acknowledged that his government’s emphasis on the “two founding peoples” had been an oversight: “We failed to take adequately into account the sensitivities of citizens from other cultural backgrounds and the problems of multi-culturalism, indeed, a problem of almost multi-lingualism.” As he understood it, Canada was “essentially dual” because all ethnic groups had to “fit into one or the other of the two founding groups for language purposes.”

Biculturalism referred to the two societies, each with its own history, language, and institutions; it did not, however, place

19 Ibid., 241.
the English and French ethnic groups above the others.

In other words, Pearson felt that biculturalism and multiculturalism were not mutually exclusive. Instead of initiating a political response to the multicultural movement, the Liberal Party — and Pearson in particular — took a pragmatic approach to reconciling multiculturalism and biculturalism between 1964 and 1968. This more often than not took the form of speeches emphasizing linguistic duality and cultural or ethnic diversity. Depending on the audience, he spoke about “unity in diversity,” “dualism,” or even the tripartite model (British, French, “third element”) like that used by Paul Yuzzyk and Walter Lindal. Like André Laurendeau, Pearson viewed “biculturalism” as a representation not of ethnicity or ethnic privilege, but a way of expressing the fact that there were two major linguistic groups and (their respective) societies in the country. At times his use of the term “bilingualism” was meant to include “biculturalism” and vice-versa; the slippage between these terms was seen as natural. Pearson believed that Canada could recognize its British and French colonial roots and its modern problems with fitting Quebec into Canada, as well as the reality that many ethnic groups lived in the country. Kenneth McRoberts has argued that it was the Trudeau government that reoriented the Liberal Party’s approach to ethnicity by abandoning Pearson’s emphasis on biculturalism for “multiculturalism.” In fact, Pearson tried to reconcile bilingualism/biculturalism and multiculturalism.

The Liberal Party’s slow embrace of multiculturalism attracted little attention from the news media, as it was overshadowed by the Party’s larger emphasis on French Canada, Quebec, and bilingualism. In a plenary session at October 1966 national

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conference in Ottawa the party adopted a resolution to “promote and encourage one Canada, bilingual and multi-cultural.”²¹ But the bulk of the resolutions involved endorsing the creation of a bilingual civil service, and making Crown Corporations and other federal agencies like the Armed Forces bilingual. Pearson did, however, reiterate his party’s new acceptance of multiculturalism in his closing address to the conference. He noted that unity was needed if Canada was to “survive” as a country:

> Not the unity of a solid bloc, but the unity that recognizes diversity in culture, tradition, and language … A unity based, not on a grudging acceptance, but on grateful appreciate of the fact that our heritage includes two great civilizations and cultures and languages of western Europe, along with the strengthening additions of peoples who have come to live with us, and who have given us so much of their culture, and their colour, and their energy, and their vitality. How fortunate we are in our diversity.²²

During the ceremony for the lighting of the Centennial Flame on Parliament Hill in December of 1966, Pearson told the assembled onlookers that Canada was “forging a new principle of democracy, the principle of political and economic unity in racial and cultural diversity.” He went on to say that “unity in diversity” was a universal principle that Canada should share with the world, and was needed “if we are to survive the perils of a nuclear age.”²³

However, the Government’s emphasis on the “other ethnic groups” was context-specific. In the January 1966 Speech from the Throne, Pearson introduced efforts to

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establish a bilingual and (he claimed) bicultural public service in the name of strengthening “national unity and national identity.” Though he recognized both “the duality of our origin and the multiracial character of our social, cultural and political development,” the reforms to the civil service in the name of national unity would be “based on the English and French speaking partnership of rights and responsibilities developed within the constitution.” Pearson did not deny that Canada was ethnically diverse; however, French Canadians, by virtue of their constitutional place (and, presumably, the threat they posed to Confederation), would be given a more important role than other ethnic groups in order to preserve national unity. A year later, in a very different context, Pearson once again focused on the “French fact.” Before Charles de Gaulle returned prematurely to France in July 1967, following his famous “Vive le Quebec libre” speech in Montreal, Pearson had intended to give a toast to de Gaulle that emphasized “the Anglo-French dualism of our origin.” Pearson claimed that the “French fact” was “an essential part of our identity,” and that Canadians were “becoming more and more conscious” of dualism. But he also noted that the country had now “added diversity”:

Canada has been fortified and enriched by the cultures and the talents of many peoples and many races. Nous n’avons pas peur de nos diversités. Elles sont notre richesse commune. Indeed, our ideal — which we are achieving — of unity in diversity is not only essential in Canadian life, it is the pattern for good international relations.

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24 LAC, RCBB fondo, RG33 80, vol. 123, Documents de la Commission, 801-825, Speech from the Throne: Continuation of Debate on Address in Reply, 1.


26 Lester B. Pearson, “My Undelivered Toast to General de Gaulle,” 27 July 1967, in Words and
Speaking before a group of Ukrainians gathered on Parliament Hill at the end of July 1967, Pearson pointed out that Canada could only hope to survive if it respected the “French fact.” But he also made the case that ethnic groups like the Ukrainians had “added” much to Canada: “We are appreciating more and more not only the importance of our bilingual and bicultural foundation, but also the multiracial, multicultural nature of the Canadian society of today and tomorrow.” Pearson was saying that Canada would continue to recognize the special status of one ethno-linguistic group — French Canadians — because of their numerical superiority and status as “founding peoples,” but that would not diminish the importance of the other ethnic groups.

Public Response to “Multiculturalism”

On the whole, public intellectuals favoured this marriage of “biculturalism” with “multiculturalism.” In an article in *The Canadian Forum* in 1964, Bruce Hodgins, later of Trent University’s Department of History, told members of the minority ethnic groups that a bicultural country “in no way makes inferior the New Canadian, the man of the “Third Force”; it leaves him with more choice than his counterpart in the United States or Australia” who were bound by single national cultures. Lewis Hertzman of the University of Alberta wrote in the journal *Culture* that the country “should shun narrow racial concepts” in favour of a multicultural and bicultural Canada: “This is rather a

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28 Ibid., 3.

multicultural society where French and English in the first place must share legal rights across the country, for without the original compact of these founding elements there would, after all, have been no Canada."^\textsuperscript{30} Two years later in the same journal, Jacques Cotnam argued that biculturalism constituted a recognition that there were “two ethnic and cultural “nations””; ethnic minority groups, or “Neo-Canadians” also had rights and had made economic contributions to the country, but did so in “one of the two official languages of Canada.”^\textsuperscript{31} Biculturalism, as many intellectuals understood it, referred not to two national ethnic groups, but two societies, each with its own language and institutions. Multiculturalism recognized the cultural diversity that could be found in each of these two societies.

This marriage of multiculturalism and biculturalism was encouraged by a number of voluntary organizations that had previously viewed Canada as monocultural or bicultural. Encouraging “unity in diversity” and a spirit of “brotherhood” was supposed to mend fences and break down the solitudes — French, English, and ethnic.^\textsuperscript{32} The Citizenship Branch funded the work of some of these voluntary organizations.^\textsuperscript{33}

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^\textsuperscript{31} Jacques Cotnam, “Are Bilingualism and Biculturalism Nothing But a Lure?” *Culture: Sciences Religieuses et Profanes au Canada/Religious and Secular Sciences in Canada* 28 (1967): 141, 147. Cotnam was responding to an article by historian Donald Creighton in which he argued that “The case for Confederation as a bi-cultural compact is...completely imaginary.” Donald Creighton, “The Myth of Biculturalism or the Great French-Canadian Sales Campaign,” *Saturday Night* 81, no. 9 (September 1966): 38.

^\textsuperscript{32} The Canadian Council of Christians and Jews wrote glowingly in its publication *Scope* about how its “Brotherhood Week” had encouraged Canadians of all backgrounds to work together. On a page that featured photographs of visible minorities meeting with CCCJ representatives in Toronto and Vancouver, the editorial staff wrote: “Just look at the pictures above and below this article. Note the ethnic composition of these groups. Many are public figures elected by you the people and serving you. It is obvious that the climate has changed greatly in the last ten years.” “What Does Brotherhood Week Accomplish?” *Scope/Enverqure* 12, no. 2 (May, 1966): 1.

^\textsuperscript{33} Jean Marchand, then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, approved a $2500 grant to be used to provide scholarships to participants in the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews’ National Citizenship Seminar. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-4-7, vol. 1, Financial; Grants; Citizenship Branch; Requests for Grants from the Citizenship Branch: General File, Tom Kent to
letter announcing the CB’s financial support of the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews’ (CCCJ) August 1966 National Citizenship Seminar, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jean Marchand remarked: “By bringing together young Canadians of various racial, religious and cultural backgrounds in an atmosphere conducive to interchange and understanding, you are making an important contribution to the development of well-oriented future leaders.” The Seminar brought together seventy-five students from all provinces and the North West Territories from “nearly all of Canada’s many racial, religious and ethnic groups” to discuss a number of topics, including English-French relations, “the Indian Situation,” and antisemitism.

The following year, the CCCJ held another National Seminar in Levis, Quebec on the theme of Human Rights. Among the topics discussed were “the rights and responsibilities of citizenship; ways of eliminating religious discrimination and effective guarantees of religious freedom; [and] the guarantees of the rights of minorities.”

Conferences such as these were markedly different from those of only a few years previous, which had often emphasized bilingualism and biculturalism and English-French relations; now human rights and ethnic minorities received equal billing with “Bi and Bi.” Some of this new interest in human rights came about because of the United

34 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-4-7, vol. 1, Financial; Grants; Citizenship Branch; Requests for Grants from the Citizenship Branch: General File, Jean Marchand to Richard D. Jones, 17 June 1966.
37 The 1968 National Citizenship Seminar was held at Mount Saint Vincent University in Halifax. Topics included “Indian-non-Indian relations, as well as Christian-Jew, Negro-White; ethnic groups.” The CCCJ also sponsored conferences with titles like “Human Relations for Labour and Management,” “International Christian-Jewish Dialogue,” and “Role of Minorities in the Second Century of Confederation.” The last of these, held in Sudbury in May of 1968, was “A conference to deal with the recommendations of the Bi and Bi report and the role of minorities (other than French and English) in shaping Canadian identity.” Paul
Nations-sponsored International Year for Human Rights (IYHR) in 1968. The Federal Government invited 150 organizations to a national consultation meeting in September of 1966. A provisional committee emerged out of these consultations, and the founding conference of the Canadian Commission on the International Year for Human Rights (CCIYHR) was scheduled for Montreal in April of 1966.\textsuperscript{38} A number of resolutions that passed at the Commission’s consultation meeting in 1966, predictably, dealt with the rights of minorities. The delegates agreed that minorities had the right to “education” and “religious freedom”; they also agreed that immigration policy should be non-prejudicial.\textsuperscript{39} But the real concern of the Ukrainian and German communities — minority language education — was left vague, and there were no resolutions on the right to the use of languages, ethnic language education, or the preservation of ethnic minority cultures.

Despite what was most likely goodwill on the part of organizers, references to “human rights” and “unity and diversity” were sometimes code for “bilingualism and biculturalism,” and had little to do with ethnic minority groups. Prime Minister Pearson who, along with Pierre Trudeau, acted as an honourary president of the Canadian Commission on the International Year for Human Rights, gave the lunch address to a


Commission meeting in December 1967.\textsuperscript{40} He told the gathering that “the history of multi-cultural countries often shows rigidity on the part of majorities coupled with excessive demands and impatience on the part of minorities.”\textsuperscript{41} Pearson was not, however, talking about the “other ethnic groups,” but French Canadians; he said that national unity had “always been high in the priorities of the Pearson Government,” but that it could be achieved only if the Francophone community did not feel stifled.\textsuperscript{42} A year later, the CCIYHR published a brochure that included much of Pearson’s luncheon speech, as well as the Commission’s take on “group rights.” In this context, “group rights” were again taken to mean “French Canadian” rights:

What Are the Rights of the Two Founding Groups?

The First part of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism points out how we can establish new and widened dimensions of Human Rights within our country. It is in welding together the two founding groups in a new form of harmony, so that “unity in diversity” will be possible and will assure our progress and indeed our survival as a nation.\textsuperscript{43}

In its discussion of ethnic minority groups, the CCIYHR reiterated that “Canada is a country with two official languages and, according to the B and B Commission, two

\textsuperscript{40} The Canadian Commission on the International Year for Human Rights boasted an august group of benefactors and honourary members. Governor-General Roland Michener was its patron, while Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau both acted as honourary presidents. John Humphrey, the New Brunswick-born legal scholar who had drafted much of the International Declaration of Human Rights acted as President and Kalmen Kaplansky of the Jewish Labour Committee acted as Chairman. The Executive Council included Monique Bégin of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women; Myer Belkin of the Citizenship Branch; Saul Hayes of the Canadian Jewish Congress; Arthur Stinson of the Canadian Citizenship Council; Frank Scott of McGill University and the RCBB, and many others. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 1-23-6/2, vol. 1, United Nations Human Rights Commission: International Year on Human Rights 1968, Program, Council Meeting, Canadian Commission on the International Year of Human Rights, 15 December 1967.

\textsuperscript{41} “Pearson says Canada must avoid fate of multi-cultured countries,” Globe & Mail, 16 December 1967, 3.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. 3.

official majorities and societies,” albeit with “many minorities.” Following Pearson’s approach, the CCIYHR advised: “the minority groups must be wise and patient in their demands.” The Commission emphasized that ethnic minorities enriched Canada, but were not the same as the “founding groups.”

Even the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste, a French Canadian fraternal organization dedicated to Quebec nationalism, began to welcome immigrants and non-Catholics to its ranks in 1966. After consulting with its “moral advisor,” Reverend Gariepy, the SSJB decided that “Whether you be of catholic, protestant or of jewish [sic] faith, you can work with equal vigor and interest toward the aims and objectives of our Society.” At its 1967 annual meeting, the SSJB agreed that French Canadians “had traditionally been indifferent or even hostile to immigrants.” The organization resolved to offer a more welcoming environment to immigrants and to work with ethnic minority organizations to help immigrants integrate into French Canadian society.

The Citizenship Branch, 1965-1968

During the mid-1960s, the Liberal Party, the Pearson Government, and voluntary organizations began to speak of Canada as simultaneously “multicultural” and “bicultural.” At the same time, the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary

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46 My translation of: « Attendu que le milieu canadien français a traditionnellement été indifférent et même hostile a l’immigrant. » LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-12-2, La Societe Saint-Jean Baptiste, 31e Congres General Annuel: Proces Verbal; 20, 21 et 22 Octobre 1967.
of State, which had already embraced multiculturalism, began to encourage bilingualism as a public good. Ultimately, the position of the Government and that of the branch of the civil service in charge of ethnic groups — the Citizenship Branch — moved closer together, thereby paving the way for the policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.”

The working assumption within the Citizenship Branch by October 1965 was that the Branch would promote “democratic citizenship in a bilingual and multi-cultural country.” In 1966 the Citizenship Branch initiated what it called “an intensified multi-ethnic programme” to respond to the growth in size and importance of the “third force.” Administered by a number of officers, the Multi-Ethnic Programme of the CB sought “to guarantee the full participation of all ethnic communities in all phases of the life of the nation and to prevent the permanent isolation of any particular ethnic group or a segment thereof.” The Citizenship Development Officer and the Ethnic Press Section were charged with carrying out the program. Their responsibilities included gathering information from regional liaison officers and the ethnic press division, encouraging ethnic minority voluntary organizations to engage with one another and with the broader Canadian public, and sponsoring conference and seminars on inter-ethnic relations.

None of these activities were, in fact, new; rather, the CB grouped together

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47 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-10-3, vol. 1, Conferences and Meetings-Staff Meetings-Citizenship Branch, Minutes of Meeting of Senior Liaison Officers Held in Ottawa on October 20 & 21, 1965, 3-4.
49 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 662, file 2-13-1, Citizenship Branch-Policy & Projects; Policy-General, Une analyse de la Direction de la citoyenneté canadienne, January 1966; LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 662, file 2-13-8, Citizenship Branch-Policy and Projects; Multi-Ethnic Programme, Multi-Ethnic Programme, [1966], 1.
50 Ibid., 1.
programs and policies that had previously been referred to as “multi-ethnic” or “inter-group” activities and had been administered as discrete programs. The CB and its predecessor, the Nationalities Branch, had been monitoring the ethnic press since the Second World War. Since the late 1950s, the CB had supported “inter-group” conferences like those held by the Canada Ethnic Press Federation and the Ontario Human Relations Seminar. And Regional Liaison Officers were already doing the remainder of this “multi-ethnic” work. As such, the Multi-Ethnic Programme did not require any new expenditures. In the 1966-67 fiscal year, $91,000 was spent on the program. Of this, $64,000 was spent on salaries, $10,000 on Program Aids (booklets, etc.); $7,500 on grants, $7,000 on Action Research, and $2,500 on travel. Only “Action Research” constituted a new expenditure; all other expenditures were pre-existing. As a Citizenship Branch Official told the Second National Conference on Canadian Slavs in 1966, “The multi-ethnic programme is an area of work in which the Citizenship Branch has had an interest for more than twenty-five years.”

On a broader front the Citizenship Branch continued to work with “Indians and Immigrants.” Heidi Bohaker and Franca Iacovetta have shown that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration had a “mandate to turn both Indigenous peoples and newcomers into Canadian citizens.” Beginning in 1958 at the Second National Seminar

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51 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 662, file 2-13-8, Citizenship Branch-Policy and Projects; Multi-Ethnic Programme, Multi-Ethnic Programme, [1966] 2.
52 G.P. Allen, “A General Outline of the Citizenship Branch, Department of the Secretary of State, With Particular Reference to the Multi-Ethnic Programme,” in Slavs in Canada, Volume II (Ottawa: Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs, 1968), 63.
54 Heidi Bohaker and Franca Iacovetta, “Making Aboriginal People ‘Immigrants Too’: A Comparison of Citizenship Programs for Newcomers and Indigenous Peoples in Postwar Canada, 1940s–1960s,” Canadian Historical Review 90, no. 3 (September 2009): 430. For more on the Indian Affairs Branch in this period: Hugh Shewell, “‘Bitterness behind every smiling face’: Community development and
on Citizenship, Citizenship Branch staff decided to apply the same principles used to integrate immigrants to the integration of Indigenous Peoples. The CB tried to inculcate in Indians and Immigrants “common ‘Canadian’ values of respect, tolerance, and liberal democracy, and a demonstrated conformity to Canadian models of social behaviour.” Indigenous Peoples were encouraged to enter mainstream Canadian life by changing their life patterns and becoming like everyone else. By 1965, the CB was involved in a number of projects designed to increase interaction between Natives, non-Natives, and newcomers. These included funding of “Indian and Metis Friendship Centres”; a committee on “Indian participation in the Centennial events of 1967”; funding and support for the First National Conference of Canadian Slavs; and “seven youth programs on the theme of inter-cultural relations.” The CB also supported over 50 “ethnic national youth organizations.” Among the grant recipients were the Armenian Youth Federation, the Federation of Hungarian Boy Scouts-Girl Guides, Japanese University Students Clubs, Canadian Young Judea Federation, 27 branches of the Canadian Slovak League, and 3,500 members of Plast (Ukrainian Boy Scouts and Girl Guides).

Unlike the Multi-Ethnic Programme, which allocated grants primarily to ethnic minority organizations and organizations involved in inter-ethnic activities, the

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58 In keeping with the Cold War climate, a footnote to the “Selected List of Ethnic National Youth Organizations” noted the following: “Not listed here are a number of Communist youth clubs, ten of which have fairly active national structures and leadership.” The CB had no problem supporting nationalist and religious organizations. Note also that the Ukrainian Catholic Students Federation, Obnova, was listed incorrectly as “OB Nova.” LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 662, file 2-13-4, Citizenship Branch - Policy & Projects; Youth Services, A Selected List of Ethnic National Youth Organizations, n.p.
Citizenship Branch’s broader grants program also granted funds to French Canadian voluntary organizations. The Branch’s grants program entailed, as Assistant Deputy Minister Charles Lussier put it, “ensuring that all elements of the Canadian fabric contributed to the common heritage of the nation.”59 The Branch was also keen to respond to recommendations emerging from the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism; in doing so it grafted on a new French-English relations program to its main focus on multicultural and inter-ethnic programs. In September of 1965, Deputy Minister Charles Lussier set up a committee to look into the implications of the Commission’s findings on Branch policy. Out of the Departmental Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism emerged a new emphasis on French language instruction for all Canadians, not just immigrants and ethnic minorities. The Citizenship Branch already made funding available for provincial departments of education to purchase second-language textbooks.60 Now, the Committee decided that “the time is appropriate for the Department to enter into a more definite phase of promoting bilingualism and biculturalism.”61

Complicating the situation was the issue of personal bilingualism and the use of French in the Citizenship Branch.62 Earlier that year, Lester Pearson had told the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada that the civil service would now be

59 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-2-4, vol. 1, Administration - Organization (Functional) Citizenship Branch, A New Focus for the Citizenship Branch, [May 1965], 2-4.
60 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-4-8, vol. 1, Financial (Administration): Citizenship Branch Grants, General, G.E. Charron to Assistant Director, Administrative Services, re: Conditional Grants and Shared-Cost Programmes, 8 June 1965.
61 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 660, file 1-21-2, vol. 1, Bilingualism and Biculturalism - Departmental Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, First Report of the Sub-Committee, 1.
62 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 660, file 1-21-2, vol. 1, Bilingualism and Biculturalism - Departmental Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Claude Isbister to Charles Lussier, 30 September 1965.
officially bilingual. As Michael Bliss points out, “Ottawa’s post-1965 commitment to real bilingualism in the civil service was the first fruit of the “French power” that Trudeau, Marchand, and their friends promised to exercise.”

At the first meeting of the Departmental Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, some unilingual English staff members seemed to worry that their jobs might be in jeopardy. CB Director Jean Lagassé, who was bilingual, reassured his staff that this was not the case. He did emphasize, however, that a bilingual and bicultural public service would “reflect the character of the country in which and for which it has been organized.”

Within a month, Lagassé and Lussier, who had previously corresponded only in English, felt comfortable enough to write to one another in French.

This new focus on French Canadians and French-English relations was given a boost in the spring of 1966 when Citizenship Branch officers prepared for the Branch’s move from the Department of the Citizenship and Immigration to the Department of the Secretary of State (SOS), scheduled for October. Under the advice of the Treasury Board, the CB began a two-year program review that would lead to “the intensification of activities and efforts in the field of multi-ethnic programmes, and the coordination of all the Citizenship activities at headquarters under a Chief of National Programmes.” What this actually meant was that “multi-ethnic” programs would now include all programs relating to ethnic groups, including those geared to Indigenous Peoples and French

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63 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, Professional Public Service (May 1965), 4.
65 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 660, file 1-21-2, vol. 1, Bilingualism and Biculturalism - Departmental Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, First Report of the Subcommittee, 2.
Canadians. In a position paper that emerged from the program review, W.H. Agnew argued that the Branch’s main concern should continue to be “the Canadian community and its attitudes towards immigrants.” In regard to “Multi-ethnic Relations,” Agnew noted that postwar immigration had led to “growing tension…between the so-called Anglo-Saxons, the French and ‘the others.’” But he also noted that “The growing interest and concern among Canadians in the wider use of both English and French languages in everyday life, has led the Citizenship Branch to conclude that its role in this area ought to be similar to its role respecting the teaching of language to immigrants.” Agnew went on to suggest that the Citizenship Branch apply the same “insights and skills” gained from its work with ethnic minority groups to the encouraging of good relations between the French and English. Lagassé’s position was that the Department of the Secretary of State needed to deal with both high culture and ethnicity: “I would suggest further that it is mainly through their small “c” culture that Canadians can become more distinctively Canadian.” He suggested that the Citizenship Branch, as part of the SOS, could look after “social development” policy, which would include immigrant and Indian integration programs, multi-ethnic activities, as well as a French-English relations program and a host of other activities related to increasing a sense of unity in diversity.

On 1 October 1966, the Citizenship Branch became part of the new Department of

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71 These included Second language instruction, youth services, travel and exchange programs (exchange programs between French and English students), and national symbols. Ibid., 2.
the Secretary of State. The other two “directorates” which had been housed in the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration and Manpower, were
transferred to the new Department of Manpower and Immigration.72 The Citizenship
Branch included an Immigrant Integration Division that served the same role as the
Multi-Ethnic Programme, by consolidating activities related to immigrant and ethnic
integration, French-English and inter-ethnic relations.73

Ernest Steele, who set up the Department of the Secretary of State and acted as its
first Deputy Minister, initially viewed the Citizenship Branch’s role within the SOS as
being the promotion of immigrant/ethnic integration.74 But Lagassé pressed Steele to
move the SOS and the CB into the area of French-English relations programming. His
Regional Liaison Officer from Montreal reported that there was a need for more French-
English programming in order to overcome the animosities he saw in the city;
furthermore, the officer felt that the Citizenship Branch should get a head start on, rather
than wait for the Royal Commission’s recommendations.75 “It would, in my opinion, be
deplorable,” Lagassé wrote in 1967, “if French minorities were to look towards Quebec

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72 The Citizenship Registration Branch, which had previously been a directorate within the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration (like the Citizenship Branch), was also transferred to the Department of the
Secretary of State. CTASC (Clara Thomas Archives and Special Collections) Bernard Ostry fonds, 1991-
030/065, Box 1, Multiculturalism - Background, 1971-73, Multiculturalism Programme, Citizenship
Branch, Department of the Secretary of State, Briefing for the Prime Minister, 17 May 1972, 3; Freda
Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern (Montreal & London: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1972), 152-153.
73 CTASC (Clara Thomas Archives and Special Collections) Bernard Ostry fonds, 1991-030/065, Box 1,
Multiculturalism - Background, 1971-73, Multiculturalism Programme, Citizenship Branch, Department of
the Secretary of State, Briefing for the Prime Minister, 17 May 1972, 3-4.
74 Judy LaMarsh, Memoirs of a Bird in a Guilded Cage (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968), 231. LAC,
Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 661, file 2-2-4, vol. 1, Administration - Organization
75 Alban Daigle, a Liaison Officer from Montreal argued that the Branch “is likely to become more and
more involved in this program area.” He suggested that the Branch begin to define Canadian identity as
bilingual and bicultural. LAC, Hans and Sonja Roeder fonds, MG31 H128, vol. 15, file 6, Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism: Circular and related materials, 1964, 1968, Paper for Staff
Conference: Bilingualism and Biculturalism; Alban Daigle, S.L.O., Montreal, 24 April 1967, 1, 6.
city rather than Ottawa for the assistance they need not only surviving but enjoying as high a level of cultural and social life as possible as French-speaking Canadians.”

Lagassé also suggested that the Branch staff speak to French-speaking minorities in the west, even before the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism made its recommendations in regard to French Canadians outside Quebec. He admitted that “the Branch has already become involved but in a timid way realizing that it would not be able to live up to expectations given the limited funds now at its disposal.”

Lagassé made the case that the Branch should provide financial aid to French-speaking minorities outside of Quebec in order to give them a stake in the country: “It is evident that there is much work to do if these [French language] minorities are to make up for lost time. It is certain that their days would be extended if they could benefit from the same social and cultural services that are enjoyed by immigrants and Indians.”

He worried that government of Quebec provided more money to French Canadians outside of Quebec than the Federal government did; stronger Francophone minority communities outside of Quebec, Lagassé argued, would weaken the argument for the Quebec as the home of French Canadians.

Though the Citizenship Branch would not develop a French-English relations division commensurate with the Immigrant Integration Division, Steele authorized

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77 My translation from the original French; LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 662, file 2-13-2, Citizenship Branch-Policy Branch; Projects-General, Jean H. Lagassé to Charles Lussier, 30 August 1967, 1.
78 This memorandum, “The Citizenship Branch and its program in French-English Relations,” was commissioned by the Under Secretary of State, G.G.E (Ernest) Steele. Lagassé wrote to Charles Lussier, who had left his post as ADM for Citizenship in 1966 and had become the “Conseiller particulier du Sous-ministre” in the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources. Lagassé sought Lussier’s opinion on the new program: “I want to reassure myself that I am doing justice to the cause I am trying to champion, and it is the opinion of someone like you that I need” (my translation). LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 662, file 2-13-2, Citizenship Branch-Policy Branch; Projects-General, The Citizenship Branch and its program in French-English Relations, 28 August 1967, 2; LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, vol. 662, file 2-13-2, Citizenship Branch-Policy Branch; Projects-General, Jean H. Lagassé to Charles Lussier, 30 August 1967, 1.
greater expenditures in this area. The Branch increased its spending on French-English programming by approximately $50,000 in 1967 for a total of $80,000. Lagassé felt that spending on French-English relations programming “could be easily increased to $250,000 next year without prejudicing the conclusions which the Royal Commission may reach nor awaking negative responses in the Canadian population.” Given the ongoing crisis in Quebec, Lagassé was not willing to wait for the Royal Commission’s recommendations. Whereas, in the past, the Branch had focused its efforts on the “integration of ethnic groups” and had done so through encouraging “a strong sense of citizenship responsibilities and national consciousness” among second-generation Canadians, this philosophy would now be extended to French Canadians.

Within a year, as Pierre Trudeau took the reins of power from Lester Pearson, the Citizenship Branch would become the locus of the creation of a new public philosophy – to wit, “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.” For most of its history, the Citizenship Branch had largely been concerned with integrating ethnic minority groups into mainstream society and had developed both a philosophy and programs akin to what we would now recognize as “multiculturalism.” In recent years it had also recognized the need to work on French-English relations. Moving from the opposite position, the Pearson Government had openly endorsed “bilingualism and biculturalism” in 1962, but gradually came to see ethnic minority communities as important. Trudeau, who already

favoured ethnic pluralism, was ideally placed to consecrate this marriage of “bilingualism and biculturalism” and “multiculturalism.”

**Trudeau and Ethnicity**

The Pierre Trudeau that challenged for the leadership of the Liberal Party in 1968 has been legitimately accused of emphasizing “style over substance.” He had an impressive record as a principled fighter who took on the retrograde politics of the Duplessis Government in Quebec, the power of the Catholic Church, as well as the rising separatist movement; as Pearson’s Minister of Justice, he had brought forward monumental reforms to the *Criminal Code* designed to keep the state out of “the bedrooms of the nation.” Trudeau’s campaign for the leadership of the party, however, emphasized his youthful vigour, charm, and way with words, rather than his politics. As Bryan Palmer points out, Trudeau had bought into Marshall McLuhan’s idea that “the medium is the message,” and used this to his advantage now that he was squarely in the public eye. In a similar vein, Trudeau’s embrace of multiculturalism after 1968 was more about style than substance. His adoption of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” constituted only a slight shift in policy from the Pearson era. In fact, programs within the Citizenship Branch and the Department of the Secretary of State changed very little; they continued to operate much as they had since the 1950s.

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Trudeau was committed to a bilingual Canada in which French Canadians could feel welcome outside of Quebec. According to Kenneth McRoberts, he was opposed to the notion of “biculturalism” because it presupposed the “two nations” concept of Canadian ethnicity. According to Kenneth McRoberts, he was opposed to the notion of “biculturalism” because it presupposed the “two nations” concept of Canadian ethnicity. 83 Trudeau had long disagreed with neo-nationalists and separatists who claimed that Quebec constituted a “nation.” Having seen the negative effects of nationalism during his travels in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, he was convinced that French Canadian aspirations could instead be met through stricter adherence to the principles of federalism that had been established at Confederation, and by ensuring that French Canadian communities across the country could access government services in French. 84

The argument that French Canadians required their own state or equality with English Canadians was not only dangerous, but denied the real power that Francophones already held. “In terms of real politik,” he wrote in Cité Libre, “…the two linguistic groups have the real power to break up the country.” According to Trudeau, “neither the Iroquois, nor the Eskimos, nor the Ukrainians” had this kind of power over the fate of the country. 85

Ethnic minority groups played only a small part in Trudeau’s understanding of Canadian ethnicity. As Manoly Lupul has astutely observed, when Trudeau, Pelletier, and

85 My translation of: « En termes de real politik, ce qui fait l’égalité de l’anglais et du français au Canada, c’est que chacun des deux groupes linguistiques a le pouvoir réel de défaire le pays. Ce à quoi ne peuvent encore prétendre ni les Iroquois, ni les Esquimaux, ni les Ukrainiens. » Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “Le Quebec: Est-Il Assiège?” Cité Libre 86 (April-May 1966), 8. Jean Marchand, Trudeau’s fellow “Wise Man” (along with Gérard Pelletier) agreed with this sentiment. During an exchange in the House of Commons in 1966, John Diefenbaker asked Marchand, in his role as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, to clarify “a report in the press … that when a new group controls a province, then they too will be in a position to demand and get special status in confederation.” Marchand responded that “[i]f an ethnic group takes so much importance in the composition of our society that it can, at a given time, break up the nation, it has a particular position. If there were one million Ukrainians in Manitoba, that would probably be a source of rights not referred to in the constitution.” LAC, RCBB fonds, RG33 80, vol. 123, Documents de la Commission, 801-825, Reported Statement by Immigration Minister Respecting Special Status, 1.
other Quebec cabinet ministers referred to “pluralism” or “cultural diversity” in the 1960s, this was “Ottawa’s code for the French fact.”\textsuperscript{86} Trudeau did not feel that the other ethnic groups had the same weight as the English and French, and were most likely destined to assimilate into one of the two societies.\textsuperscript{87} However, like Pearson, he gave lip service to the other ethnic groups when it fit in to his vision of a “Just Society.” During the second day of the 1968 Liberal Leadership Convention at the Ottawa Civic Centre in a workshop on “Our Country,” a delegate asked him to explain his understanding of “the future role of languages and cultures other than French and English.”\textsuperscript{88} Trudeau responded that the main problem facing the country was to resolve the ongoing conflict between the English and French by ensuring that both could use their languages in schools and Federal offices where their populations were numerically significant. He reiterated his conclusion that only these two groups had the power “to break up the country.”\textsuperscript{89} Trudeau was careful to point out that he was not endorsing “the founding race concept”; he merely wanted to resolve the language issue so that a “civil dialogue” could commence. Ethnic groups would benefit from this recognition of English and French and the ensuing dialogue because “we will have developed a society which is tolerant towards another language and, therefore, one which will be tolerant towards values coming from other ethnic societies.”\textsuperscript{90} Finally, Trudeau suggested that these “values” would be the purview of the Provinces; it was up to the Federal Government to ensure that the language issue was resolved. He did not rule out the adoption of a third or fourth

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{86}{Manoly Lupul, \textit{The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir} (Edmonton/Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005), 167.}
\footnote{87}{Manoly Lupul, \textit{The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir} (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005), 53-54.}
\footnote{89}{Ibid., 62.}
\footnote{90}{Ibid., 63.}
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language if the “facts” changed.

The Trudeau vision of Canadian ethnicity, then, was not hostile to multiculturalism; in fact, Trudeau believed that official bilingualism would bring about a climate conducive to ethnic pluralism. He planned to continue the reforms to the civil service that Pearson had begun in 1965, but would implement an *Official Languages Act* that was even more far reaching. His ethnic policy, like that of Pearson, was designed to tackle the immediate problem of French-English relations with the long-term goal of creating a more unified Canada that was open to ethnic diversity. As Lester Pearson retired from public life, he told delegates that the Liberal Party had many problems to address, including housing, pollution, and education. Topping the list was “the building of the new federalism with a new Canadian unity which accepts duality and diversity as the pattern of development.” Pearson’s vision of Canada included “two basic language groups, and…many races and cultures.” Trudeau would carry on this vision in his government’s policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.” Though he would drop all references to “biculturalism” because of his worry about its implications for Quebec nationhood, he would emphasize bilingualism and ethnic pluralism or “multiculturalism,” much as his predecessor had done.

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93 Ibid., 292.
The notion of “participatory democracy” was one of the pillars of Trudeau’s electoral campaign in 1968. As the Policy Committee and Research Department of the National Liberal Federation pointed out, “The overwhelming popular response to Mr. Trudeau’s invitation to Canadians to become more involved in the political process is a clear indication that the party must democratize.” This process would involve the development of “a grass-roots policy machinery which will permit and encourage the participation, in a meaningful way, of a larger segment of the population.”

Ethnic groups and French Canadians were just two groups that Trudeau hoped to reach out to through encouraging greater participation.

But the Liberal Party was not initially prepared to implement this concept because it was not well understood. Several people working in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO), including Trudeau’s personal secretary, Marc Lalonde, wrote memoranda in late 1969 outlining their thoughts on the meaning of “participation” and how the Government could best address it. Lalonde pointed out that the notion “suffers very badly from the lack of a workable definition.” As he saw it,

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participation was “a state of mind, a feeling, a sentiment” that had to be encouraged among groups within Canadian society that felt disenfranchised; among the groups he listed were Quebec, the Maritimes, the West, students, and hippies. Ivo Krupka in the Privy Council Office made the case that the Government had to address two issues in relation to participation: “how to identify those persons and groups which have the most to contribute to the political system, and then to obtain their “contributions”; and how to keep those who do not have a great deal to contribute, plugged into the political system.” While Lalonde took a strictly philosophical approach to the problem, Krupka made suggestions as to how the Government should proceed. He felt that the Department of the Secretary of State was best equipped to handle the participation file, as the Minister was already responsible for cultural programs, which would be the most relevant to this issue.

The Department of the Secretary of State (SOS) was ultimately charged with creating a political and social climate in which Canadians felt that they could “participate” in public discourse, and that their opinions mattered to the public debate. Trudeau had appointed his friend Gérard Pelletier as his first Secretary of State in July of

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98 Ibid., 1.
100 LAC, The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau Fonds, Prime Minister’s Office Secret Documents Series 1968-1984, MG 26 O11, vol. 50, file 14, Participation 1969, file 1, Ivo Krupka, PCO, Re: Participation, 6 October 1969, 41. Krupka also felt that other departments and leaders within the Government might also play roles in encouraging “participation”; these included the Prime Minister, President of Privy Council, Secretary of State, Leader of the Government in the Senate, Minister Responsible for Information Canada, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, and the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. After reviewing these briefs, Cabinet’s preliminary assessment was that “participation” could be further subdivided into “Participation generally,” “Parliamentary Reform,” and “Youth.” LAC, The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau Fonds, Prime Minister’s Office Secret Documents Series 1968-1984, MG 26 O11, vol. 50, file 14, Participation 1969, file 1, J.M. Davey to Marc Lalonde, 3 November 1969, re: Participation.
1968. Pelletier would have broad responsibilities for cultural agencies, such as the National Museum, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and the National Gallery. Pelletier also had jurisdiction over citizenship and ethnic activities, which were coordinated by the Citizenship and Citizenship Registration branches of the SOS.

Within the first year of his mandate, Trudeau asked his Ministers to draft a series of white papers on various topics, including Constitutional Affairs and Citizenship. Pelletier told Cabinet in July of 1969 that his White Paper on Citizenship “would deal generally with what it was to be a Canadian.” But the Secretary of State had little time to work on citizenship-related issues, following the passage of the Official Languages Act in September of 1969. As the minister in control of the government’s implementation of the Official Languages Act, Pelletier looked after the Secretariat on Bilingualism, the commissioner of official languages, and the official language programs.

Recognizing that Pelletier was busy, Trudeau decided that the department’s responsibilities for citizenship policy and the Citizenship and Citizenship Registration branches would be farmed out to a Member of Parliament from Toronto named Robert Stanbury. Initially elected to Parliament in 1965 as the member for York-Scarborough, he quickly advanced within the caucus, serving as parliamentary secretary to Gérard Pelletier between August 1968 and October 1969. On 15 October 1969, Prime Minister

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103 The reasons for Stanbury’s quick advancement are a mystery. By 1971, is seems that PMO staff believed that he had “not lived up to expectations” and would soon be dropped from the Cabinet. However, he became Minister of Communications in 1971 and Minister of National Revenue in 1972. Judy LaMarsh later described him as “handsome as the man in a collar ad, with somewhat more intelligence. He is seized with a profound respect for his own intellect, an opinion often at variance with that held of him by others.”
Trudeau announced that Stanbury would become a Minister without portfolio with "responsibility for the work of the Secretary of State's Department in the field of citizenship." Trudeau charged Stanbury with looking after the creation of new policy and legislation on citizenship, including the White Paper on Citizenship.

More specifically, he asked Stanbury to find a way of publicly acknowledging “the government’s commitment to the development of a multi-cultural society” in his policy document. With the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism’s fourth volume (on the “other ethnic groups”) due to be released in April of 1970, it was imperative that the Stanbury present a fleshed-out White Paper to Cabinet. At the end of January, Stanbury, in consultation with the Privy Council Office and the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning, decided to leave aside a proposal on substantive revisions to the Canadian Citizenship Act, and instead focus his efforts on a “quasi-White Paper on Citizenship” that dealt more specifically with ethnic minority communities.


At the same time, Cabinet decided to make the issue of “participation” a priority problem of the Government. As Pelletier’s Under-secretary of State Bernard Ostry later pointed out, Pierre Trudeau and Liberal Party President Richard Stanbury wanted their campaign promises to translate into hard programs and felt that the Department of the Secretary of State was best equipped to do this job: “The Liberal election campaign of 1968 was riddled with such portentous phrases as the “just society” and “participatory democracy,” and the philosophy of the new Secretary of State had its roots in [Stanbury and Trudeau’s] determination to apply these doctrines to the cultural scene.”

Gérard Pelletier and Robert Stanbury were both invited to a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning, a body that, as its name suggests, set the Government’s agenda and ranked its priorities. Donald Macdonald of the PCO had synthesized the various memoranda on “participation.” Though Macdonald’s memoranda was judged to be a grab-bag of ideas and proposals — “neither fish nor fowl” as one PCO official put it — the meeting was at least somewhat useful in that Stanbury was also delegated to put the vague idea of “participation” into practice. The cabinet decided that the

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109 In this period, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy Council Office used a system whereby government priorities were ranked. Richard D. French, How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Industrial Policy Making, 1968-1984 (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1984), 47.


111 Peter Michael (P.M.) Pitfield, who was Deputy Secretary of the Plans Division of the PCO and Deputy Secretary to Cabinet, was the senior bureaucrat in charge of planning. Pitfield wrote to Trudeau that Macdonald had written the memo before the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning had concluded its discussions on “participation”; as such, he opined that it was “neither a ways and means memorandum
Department of the Secretary of State was best equipped to tackle the problem of citizen “participation” as well as citizenship as a whole.

A month later, Stanbury returned to the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning with a White Paper on Citizenship. He proposed new citizenship policy and legislation that would put into effect both the notion of a “multi-cultural society” and the (still undefined) principle of “citizen participation.” Stanbury’s plan was ambitious in that it stood to impact the Citizenship Act, as well as the very foundations of national identity, national symbols, an institutions. In his brief to the Committee, Stanbury noted that participation was not just a concern of the government:

National symbols, Canadian identity, the impact of bilingualism, the problems of native peoples and minority groups generally, the position of immigrants of varying backgrounds in a bilingual society, the full participation of Canadians in the life of the community, notions of fundamental human rights and a wide variety of related problems are all under examination in various strata of Canadian society.

His recommendation was that the Citizenship Branch carry out a consultation process with Canadians with a view to revising the Canadian Citizenship Act as well as finding out how to guarantee “greater citizen participation,” especially among ethnic minorities.

nor...a substantive planning memorandum setting out alternatives and a proposed plan of action, although it includes aspects of each.” Macdonald had summarized memos from Gibson, Pitfield, Davey, McGuigan, and O’Connell. LAC, The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau Fonds, Prime Minister’s Office Secret Documents Series 1968-1984, MG 26 O11, vol. 51, file 12, Planning Meetings, December 1969, P.M.P. [P.M. Pitfield, Secretary, PCO], Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Participation [Confidential], 12 December 1969, 1.


113 Ibid., 1.
Among other things, he hoped to examine “future perspectives for citizens in a bilingual country and pluricultural society.”\(^{114}\) Though his brief at no point mentioned the “third force,” the discussion in the Cabinet Committee turned to the “third force” and ways in which it could be made to feel it had a role to play in Canadian national life. Though the committee recognized “the danger of creating expectations which could not be fulfilled,” it asked Stanbury to return to the committee in three months with a “working hypothesis on policy objectives in the field of citizenship, including the role of the third force.”\(^{115}\)

By April of 1970, Stanbury’s new citizenship objectives were well known to Cabinet, though they had not yet been approved. It was recognized that his objectives constituted a “new departure” for the Citizenship Branch because they would require a far greater level of ministerial oversight. The PMO recognized that the Branch’s programs “were generally developed without co-ordination or planning.”\(^{116}\) In May of 1970, Stanbury returned once again to the Cabinet Committee to outline five “policy objectives” that would form the basis of a revitalized Citizenship Branch. The objectives were: “To reinforce Canadian identity and unity”; “To encourage cultural diversification within a bilingual framework, particularly following the publication of the fourth volume of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism”; “To preserve human rights and fundamental freedoms”; “To increase and improve citizenship participation”; and “To develop meaningful symbols of Canadian sovereignty.”\(^{117}\) Stanbury proposed a series of consultations with ethnic minority groups about Book IV of the Royal

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 2.
Commission’s report and the government’s proposed policy of “cultural diversification within a bilingual framework.” He noted that “their full participation in the proposed consultation programme will contribute to a fuller governmental understanding of their response not only to the recommendations of the Commissioners but also to the general question of the place of such groups in their adopted country.”

Conclusions

A little over a year after his 1968 electoral victory, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau sat down with American journalist Edith Inglauer for a profile she later wrote for the New Yorker. Trudeau made the case that his notion of a “Just Society” was not an empty promise: “I was not dreaming the Just Society up as a catchword or cliché, and I shrink from that thought now.” Within a very short time, the Trudeau Government made a clear and bold move toward the adoption of multiculturalism as a government policy. While this development is often portrayed in the scholarship as a radical break with the Pearson years, Trudeau used much of the same language that had been prominent during the Pearson years. His emphasis on “Canadian identity and unity,” and “cultural diversification within a bilingual framework” was very similar to Pearson’s talk of “unity in racial and cultural diversity.” Pearson maintained that bilingualism and biculturalism and multiculturalism could work together — the “French fact” along side the “ethnic fact.” Trudeau, while boldly declaring the Canada would be bilingual with his Official Languages Act of 1969, simply did not feel that the “French fact” – to wit, the cultural

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and numerical importance of French Canadians, especially the province of Quebec – required any explanation or additional support from the Federal Government.

Bilingualism made sense – biculturalism was a political minefield.

By 1970, Trudeau was openly declaring his support for a multicultural Canada. In a speech to the Jewish human rights organization, B’nai B’rith, the Prime Minister made the case that “there is a remarkable resemblance between the Jewish community, with its widely differing cultural traditions, and the structure of our country, which is both bilingual and multicultural.” In June of 1970 at the Citizenship Day Fair in Sarnia, Ontario, Trudeau noted: “Sometimes the word ‘biculturalism’ is used but I do not think it accurately describes this country. I prefer ‘multiculturalism’.”

Chapter 7: Re-branding Canada: “Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework,” 1970-1971

For much of the 1960s, Lester Pearson’s Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was the backdrop to the debate over the public recognition of cultural pluralism. J.L. Granatstein writes that the Royal Commission “had become almost irrelevant to the debate by 1967,” though it had helped to “prepare English Canadians for the necessity of change.”¹ To a certain extent, both statements are true. Editorial content had dried up by 1965, and those who did write about the Commission did so in unflattering terms. Peter Gzowski lamented in Saturday Night that Canadians had “been served one of the most remarkable catalogues of the obvious ever to see print in Canada.”² By 1967, Canadians were far more concerned with the Centennial celebrations than they were a dry, boring Royal Commission headed by a French Canadian intellectual and a former civil servant. The Commission had, as Granatstein points out, made Canadians aware of the seriousness of the problems in Quebec. But it seemed there was little that could be done when politicians like as Rene Levesque and Daniel Johnson, Sr were advocating “sovereignty-association” and “equality or independence.”

Long after the Commission had lost relevance to the Canadian public, Ottawa still saw its recommendations as important and potentially useful in the fight against separatism and neo-nationalism. Its first and second volumes, The Official Languages and Education, were published in 1967 and 1968, respectively.³ From these books

³ By the time volume II was released, André Laurendeau had been dead for several months. Report of the

As it had done since the release of its *Preliminary Report* in 1965, the Commission took the position that the “other ethnic groups” were cultural groups which had to integrate into one of the two major ethno-linguistic communities: “It is within these two societies that their cultural distinctiveness should find a climate of respect and encouragement to survive. … Consequently, we would rather regard the “other ethnic groups” as cultural groups.”

The Trudeau Government would accept the majority of the Commission’s recommendations in regard to the “other ethnic groups,” but it would reject its understanding of the country as “bicultural” in favour of a “multicultural” Canada. While

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this was a tacit endorsement of what Ukrainian Canadians and their supporters had been pushing for since the early 1960s, in actual fact it did not lead to the kinds of changes that some ethnic minority groups felt was necessary. Many multiculturalists believed that public recognition and funding of ethnic minority languages or “multilingualism” was a prerequisite for multiculturalism policy. Though Robert Stanbury made a show of consulting with ethnic minority organizations and leaders in 1970, these consultations did not amount to much in terms of program changes within the Citizenship Branch. Support for ethnic language programs was anathema to Trudeau’s ongoing commitment to increasing the use of the French language across the country. His announcement of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” in October of 1971 fulfilled Trudeau’s promise to increase citizen “participation” and create an inclusive citizenship; in reality, he re-branded existing programs as “multicultural.”

Reaction to Book IV

The RCBB’s sixteen recommendations to the Federal Government in regard to its treatment of the “other ethnic groups” were, for the most part, well received by ethnic minority communities. There was little to quibble with when the Royal Commissioners recommended “that the same conditions for citizenship, the right to vote, and to stand for election to public office be accorded to all immigrants, with no regard for their country of origin.”7 The Commission also addressed some of the substantive concerns of (some) ethnic minority communities by recommending that languages other than French and

English be offered as optional classes in elementary and high schools, where numbers warranted. It also made several recommendations in relation to the use of ethnic minority languages in radio and television broadcasts. Finally, the RCBB recommended that cultural institutions like the National Film Board and the National Museum of Man increase their coverage of the “history, social organizations, and folk arts of cultural groups other than the British and French.”

Some ethnic newspapers supported the Commission’s findings. The German-language *Kitchener Journal* noted that the RCBB was correct to be critical of the idea of a “third force,” because it lacked a “common denominator.” The editorial staff also supported the Commission’s recommendations in favour of the teaching of non-official languages in high schools and universities. They concluded that the recommendations “could indeed give new bloom to the Canadian “Mosaic”.”

J. Cowan, writing for the *Canadian Jewish Outlook*, said that his paper agreed “wholeheartedly” with the Commission’s findings and recommendations, as well as its rejection of the “third force” argument used by so many supporters of multiculturalism. “All in all,” Cowan wrote, “Volume IV of the Royal Commission is a sensible and humane approach to the ethnic question in Canada. Each ethnic group should make a study of it and harness support, and if necessary pressure, to the end that the recommendations will become part of the law and practice of the Canadian governments and people.”

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8 Ibid., 228-230.
to remain silent on Book IV. The German language paper, *Der Courier*, ran a series of articles on Book IV in which there was no editorial comment. Only the title of one article in the series gives a hint of the position taken by *Der Courier*: “German Canadians Have Nothing to Say in Political Matters.”\(^1\) *Sudeten Bote* also ran excerpts of Book IV without providing editorial comment.\(^2\)

Though the Commissioners maintained that there were “two official linguistic communities,” not two “cultures,” many ethnic minority organizations still reacted negatively to what they saw as a continued bias in favour of “biculturalism” that the Canadian Government had allowed to go unchecked.\(^3\) Andreas Matern lamented in the *Torontoer Zeitung* that Book IV’s recommendations were not a surprise: “Of course, how could we expect anything else from this Royal Commission? Its very name suggests that it is only interested in two languages and two cultures. Bilingualism has always been recognized by New Canadians as a fact. Biculturalism is another matter. The very term is nothing but utter nonsense. The ethnic groups have no hope of becoming full-fledged members of the Canadian society until that silly term is dropped.”\(^4\)

Even groups that had been virtually silent during the debate of the previous seven

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\(^1\) Quoted in LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fôns, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 1 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., FLPRS, “The Immigrant in the Canadian Economy,” *Der Courier* (German), 21 May 1970.

\(^2\) LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fôns, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 1 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., FLPRS, “The Recommendations of the B & B Commission for the Preservation of Languages and Cultures of “other Ethnic Groups” in Canada,” *Sudeten Bote* (German), May/June 1970.


\(^4\) LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fôns, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 1 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., FLPRS, Andreas Matern, “The Third Force in Canada,” *Torontoer Zeitung* (German), 1 May 1970, n.p.
years were sufficiently angered by the RCBB’s findings to lobby the Federal Government. Roy Mah of the Chinatown News (Vancouver) wrote to the Department of the Secretary of State to express his dissatisfaction at the Commission’s findings. “The most serious defect of the Commission’s assumption,” Mah wrote, “is that Canada is a bicultural country. This conclusion is based on false and unjust premises.” According to Mah, the Commission’s understanding of ethnic communities place in Canadian society had a “paternalistic ring.” Despite these criticisms, he praised the Commission for its recommendations in regard to human rights, non-prejudicial immigration policy, ethnic language education, and funding for the National Museum of Man. He noted that it was “not totally unreasonable” that the Commission rejected the call by some ethnic groups for ethnic private schools. Though Mah was unhappy that the Commission had “downgraded…the multicultural character of this nation,” he still agreed with some of the Commission’s recommendations.

Certain Ukrainian Canadian organizations were, understandably, upset by the Commission’s failure to address either its own bias toward “biculturalism” or the need of ethnic minority groups for ethnic language schools and requisite funding. The Ukrainian student newspaper, Student, ran a number of editorials and stories which rejected the Commission’s recommendations. SUSK (The Ukrainian Canadian Students’ Union), which published Student, passed a series of motions at their 11th Congress in 1970. The students asked its executive and local branches “to take a strong negative position

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16 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 1 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Mized Feelings on B & B Commission Report, Roy Mah to Kelly Ip, 11 September 1970, 1.
17 Ibid., 1.
towards the Fourth Volume of the B & B and its implications.”

Local member clubs were asked to lobby other Ukrainian organizations (including churches), the media, the university community, elected officials, and other ethnic groups. Student printed a position paper by the University of Alberta’s Ukrainian Students Club, which decided to “totally reject” the Commission’s findings. The USC’s members, clearly angered by Book IV, felt that the Commission had “relegate[d] the native peoples, the Slavs, the Italians, the Chinese to an inferior secondary status.” The only solution was if the Canadian government took “an official position of multiculturalism.” They ended their position paper by saying that “Ethnic groups must not be merely tolerated but encouraged to thrive and develop.”

The paper also printed a poem entitled “Let It Be,” which playfully celebrated the end of the Commission’s work and likened it to the recent demise of the Beatles:

Let it be known that the
Commission on Bilingualism
And Biculturalism, formerly
Known as the BE and BEE
Commission, has of late
Been changed to the Bye and Bye Commission.

According to SUSK President, Bohdan Krawchenko, the organization spent much of 1970 trying “[to] stimulate other ethnic groups to an articulation of demands”; nonetheless, the organization worried that the response of ethnic groups to Book IV had

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18 “Motions and Resolutions of the 11th SUSK Congress,” Etudiant/Student 4, no. 5 (September 1970), 3.
20 A few months earlier, in April of 1970, the Beatles formally broke up; they released their final album, Let It Be, the following month. “Let It Be,” Etudiant/Student 4, no. 6 (October 1970), 3.
Ministerial Consultations

In this emotionally charged context, Ministers Stanbury and Pelletier began to consult with ethnic minority organizations in regard to Stanbury’s five “citizenship objectives,” with an eye in particular to obtaining feedback on the first two objectives – “To reinforce Canadian identity and unity” and “To encourage cultural diversification within a bilingual framework, particularly following the publication of the fourth volume of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.” This three-stage process involved: “dialogues between the Minister and representatives of local citizens groups”; “discussions of the citizenship objectives by voluntary organizations and citizen’s groups”; and a “national public discussion” following the release of a “Discussion Paper on citizenship.”

Between April of 1970 and May of 1971, the ministers held a series of private consultations with the leaders of ethnic organizations, attended conferences (including the Manitoba Mosaic Congress and the founding meeting of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association) and organized public meetings to discuss Book IV of the Royal Commission’s Final Report. In April of 1970, Stanbury gave the keynote address at the

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24 LAC, Privy Council Office fonds, RG 2, vol.6394, file 864/71, Memorandum to Cabinet: Canada: The Multicultural Society – A Response to Book IV of the B & B Commission, 13 July 1971; Appendix B:
annual meeting of the Canada Ethnic Press Federation. A number of MPs and Ontario provincial cabinet ministers were in attendance as Stanbury outlined his duties as head of both Information Canada and Citizenship. Evidently he saw the two roles as overlapping, as he indicated to the CEPF that he wanted “to bring the Canadian public into the whole process of review of our law and programs in support of meaningful and satisfying Canadian citizenship.” In a letter of October of 1970, Stanbury thanked the CEPF for helping the Citizenship Branch during its public consultations: “We needed your views on the many topics that bear on Citizenship, including national unity, cultural diversity, bilingualism, human rights, national symbols and the whole question of participation. We want to make sure that changing government policies on Citizenship continue to meet the needs and wishes of Canadians in all walks of life.”

In late November of 1970, a delegation of the Canada Ethnic Press Federation met with Stanbury in Ottawa and presented him with a “Pro Memoria.” The opening paragraph asked the government “to take some sort of action which will convince the 26% of Canadian population of other than Anglo-Saxon and French background that they are not by-passed or neglected.” The remainder of the memorandum proposed two projects: federal funding of ethnic archives, and federal legislation supporting the establishment of ethnic studies centres at universities. Stanbury responded to CEPF’s memo on 1 December, noting that he was “very interested in pursuing the subject of

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Reaction of Ethnic Communities to Book IV of the B and B Commission Report, 26.
ethnic archives,” and welcomed further input from the CEPF on this matter.²⁹ Both of these recommendations would find their way into the multiculturalism policy. On 28 and 29 January 1971, a delegation of the CEPF met with the Postmaster General, as well as Bernard Ostry, and Richard (Dick) Stanbury, President of the Liberal Federation of Canada.³⁰ Later, the delegation met with Robert Stanbury and Senator Andrew Thompson. In his memorandum to members of the CEPF, Vladimir Mauko noted that “It seems that positive results can be achieved only if all the Ethnic newspapers will continue to press the Government and Members of Parliament and the Senate for honouring the promises and following the recommendations of the B & B Commission...”³¹

Pelletier met with representatives from the various cultural agencies, including the National Museum of Man, the Public Archives, and the CBC, in May of 1970 in Toronto. The first theme discussed during the two-day meeting was “National Unity-bilingualism, ethnic groups, participation.” The minister admitted that the country was not yet bilingual, but the government was trying to move it in that direction. Bilingualism was related to national unity as “bilingualism is one of the chief means by which the government hopes to strengthen national unity by developing a sense of Canadian solidarity that would reflect a renewed sense of community.”³² Pelletier also spoke about


³² LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 1 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Draft Notes for Presentation by the Minister at the May 15th Meeting with the Cultural Agencies at the Guild Inn (Toronto), 15-16 May 1970, 4-5.
new citizenship legislation, the participation of “Indian and Eskimo people,” and the participation of “established voluntary associations representing the diverse interest groups in our society.” Finally, he noted that the SOS was now attempting to respond to Book IV of the RCBB. Interestingly, Pelletier told the gathering that their input was invaluable because “the information tools you have are an essential mechanism required to reduce alienation of these people and offer them an opportunity to belong that they do not now apparently share.” He asked the delegates from the cultural agencies to discuss these issues (citizenship, B & B, participation) in order to help form both short term and “long-term” policy. Other topics up for discussion included “democratization and decentralization of culture”; “cultural politics”; and “stimulating the cultures of the two principal linguistic groups and encouraging the contribution of the other cultures.”

In July, Stanbury, Assistant Under-secretary of State Bernard Ostry, and three staff members from the Citizenship Branch, attended a meeting called by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee in Winnipeg to discuss Book IV. UCC Vice-President H.J. Syrnick told the federal delegation that he was greatly disappointed that the Royal Commission had “rejected the well-founded claim that Canada is [a] multicultural and multilingual nation.” Syrnick said that he was “insulted when somebody calls my ancestral language a foreign language”; to Syrnick (and, presumably, the UCC), Ukrainian was one of several “other Canadian languages.” Nonetheless, he did not wish to challenge the Official Languages Act, and voiced his approval of the Province of Manitoba’s recent efforts to

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33 Ibid., 5.
34 Ibid., 6.
“permit the teaching of other languages beginning at the kindergarten level.”

Dr. Isyndre Hlynka of the Taras Shevchenko Foundation expressed support for the sixteen recommendations in Book IV, but was also concerned about the rights accorded to speakers of minority languages. The Executive Director of the UCC, Dr. S.J. Kalba, took a position between that of Syrnick and Hlynka. He was “pleased” with Book IV’s recommendations in favour of human rights, anti-discrimination, and the teaching of minority languages. He noted that the Ukrainian Canadian community had “a particular interest” in Ukrainian-language broadcasts, and eagerly awaited the CRTC and CBC’s joint study on the issue, which had been recommended by the Royal Commission. Kalba also took the opportunity to ask the Citizenship Branch for a grant to support “daily newscasts edited both in Ukrainian and English by the Ukrainian University Students Union.”

The Canadian Jewish Congress, however, was not as concerned with the conclusions of Book IV. B.G. Kayfetz, who was chair of the CJC’s National Joint Community Relations Committee, attended a discussion about the report, sponsored by the Citizenship Branch, on 11 August 1970. He sent a letter to Bernard Ostry outlining the CJC’s take on Book IV. Overall, the Congress agreed with the Commission’s recommendations; in fact, Kayfetz spent the bulk of the letter commenting on a passing mention during the meeting about Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s relationship with the Jewish community.

In a memo to CJC President Saul Hayes, Kayfetz wrote that there

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38 LAC, Paul Yuzyk fonds, MG32 C-67, vol. 33, file 3, UCC Headquarters; Corres, Minutes of Meetings, 1970, Remarks and Opinions on B & B Report Volume IV expressed at the meeting of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee held in Winnipeg on July 1, 1970, Dr. I Hlynka, 1 and Dr. S.J. Kalba, 2.
39 CJCCCNA, Canadian Jewish Congress fonds, ZA 1970, box 1, file 8, B.G. Kayfetz to Bernard Ostry, 12
was no need to respond to Book IV as there was a “lack of response or reaction when the Bi and Bi was reported at the National Executive yesterday.”\textsuperscript{40} The Royal Commission’s embrace of English-French bilingualism, and its fairly tame pronouncements in regard to the rights of ethnic minority groups and their languages did not seem to threaten or bother the CJC. They had made it very clear since 1963 that the (official) Jewish community was not interested in obtaining additional rights for ethnic minority communities.

Between August of 1970 and May of 1971, the Citizenship Branch also arranged public conferences at Thunder Bay, Toronto, Edmonton, Ottawa, Sudbury, and Regina. The Toronto conference was held in Hart House on the University of Toronto campus on 7 and 8 August 1970. The theme of the conference was “Canada: Multicultural.” Stanbury spoke on Friday evening, 7 August, on the theme of “The Nature of Citizenship in a Multicultural Society.” The following morning, the conference heard “4 analyses of Book IV and multiculturalism”, while the afternoon was given over to talks by Federal, Municipal, and Provincial representatives.\textsuperscript{41} In one of the most hard-hitting papers, SUSK President Bohdan Krawchenko noted that the Canadian Government had spent “fifty million dollars for the French language and culture development outside the province of Quebec,” but “for all other minorities combined in all of Canada, the budget is forty thousand.”\textsuperscript{42} The Ottawa conference, which was arranged by the Ukrainian Students Federation of Ottawa and the International Students Association of Carleton University, was held on 1 November 1970. Members of the Ukrainian, Estonian and Welsh

\textsuperscript{40} CJCCNA, Canadian Jewish Congress fonds, ZA 1970, box 1, file 8, B.G. Kayfetz to Saul Hayes, 24 August 1970.


\textsuperscript{42} Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 100, J.B. Rudnyckyj’s Selected Papers, Bohdan Krawchenko/Ukrainian Canadian University Students Union, Toward a Development of Multiculturalism, at the Canada: Multicultural Conference, Hart House, University of Toronto, 8 August 1970, 1.
Communities presented position papers, and delegates also discussed the fourth volume of the RCBB’s report. While some delegates seemed to be worried about being “‘lumped together’ as a third force in Canada,” others felt that a coalition of ethnic groups or “multi-ethnic council” was needed “in order to make a unified pressure threat on government.” One of the conference’s organizers “said most ethnic groups accept the idea of a bilingual country, but would like to see biculturalism replaced with multiculturalism.”

**Citizenship Development**

In the second and third parts of the consultation process, the Citizenship Development Division and the Ethnic Participation Division of the Citizenship Branch undertook their own studies of the citizenship objectives, respectively. At the beginning of the 1970s, the Citizenship Branch administered five main programs or “divisions”: Travel and Exchange, Ethnic Participation, Indian & Eskimo Participation, Citizenship Development, and Human Rights. Whereas the ministers’ consultations had largely been qualitative in nature, the Citizenship Development phase was also quantitative. A “task force on consultation,” aided by regional liaison and citizenship development officers, met with various voluntary organizations that were believed to “comprise a large representative sample of interest groups within the Canadian population.”

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44 By this point the Citizenship Branch had approximately 110 staff members and had a budget of $3,540,000. Freda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern*, 2nd Ed. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1988), 311.
was to engage with 500 of the estimated 20,000 voluntary organizations across the
country, all the while ensuring “accurate regional representation,” and with an eye to
“securing the views of groups representing youth and the disadvantaged.”
Citizenship Development staff met with three “types” of organizations: “Citizens Groups”
(benevolent associations) “Other Groups” (ethnic minority organizations), and “Youth
Groups.” In Montreal, for example, CB field officers met with 17 representatives out of
21 groups contacted; most of these groups were chosen because they were federations or
associations and therefore “the most representative” of those populations.

Like Stanbury and Pelletier’s consultations, the Citizenship Development Branch’s
“Task Force on Consultation” was directed in its work by the five citizenship
objectives. Though the ministers seemed concerned primarily with gaining feedback on
the Royal Commission’s fourth volume, these consultations were broader in scope. The
idea here was that the Citizenship Branch would prepare the ground for a comprehensive
citizenship policy/program, not simply a response to Book IV of the RCBB’s Final
Report. In practical terms, however, Stanbury’s already stated aim “to encourage cultural
diversification within a bilingual framework” coloured these consultations. The
Government’s desire to respond to the Royal Commission was matched by the

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46 LAC, Gérard Pelletier fonds, R11939, vol. 49, file 15, Rapport sur la consultation sur les objectifs de la
47 LAC, Gérard Pelletier fonds, R11939, vol. 49, file 15, Rapport sur la consultation sur les objectifs de la
citoyenneté, 1970-1972, Gisele Audette, Anthony Gray, Alban Daigle, and Fernand Serre to Yves Breton,
re; Consultation, 22 September 1970, 1-2.
48 The objectives were: “To re-inforce Canadian identity and unity”; “To encourage cultural diversification
within a bilingual framework, particularly following the publication of the fourth volume of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism”; “To preserve human rights and fundamental freedoms”;
“To increase and improve citizenship participation”; and “To develop meaningful symbols of Canadian
sovereignty.” LAC, Privy Council Office fonds, RG 2, vol. 6365, file 440/70, Memorandum to the Cabinet,
49 LAC, Privy Council Office fonds, RG 2, vol. 6365, file 440/70, Memorandum to the Cabinet, “Citizenship
participants in the CB’s consultations. Regional Citizenship Development officers found
that Canadians had a desire to see changes to citizenship policy, broadly speaking. One
member of the Task Force, Fernand Serre, reported to Ottawa that “A consultation of 70
groups in Montreal can not be a “low-key project”. The groups want to do more than just
speak and be listened to; they want to see concrete, rapid results.”

The first two citizenship objectives, which dealt with Canadian identity and
ethnic/cultural pluralism, respectively, would have the greatest bearing on the
formulation of multiculturalism policy. In regard to Objective No. 1 – “How to Enforce
Canadian Identity and Unity?” – members of focus groups were asked a number of
questions, including: “Do you feel that the present efforts on the part of [the] federal
government are conducive to your feeling proud of being Canadian?”; “Should we
strengthen or loosen our ties with British and/or French institutions?”; “When you are
travelling abroad do you think of yourself as a hyphenated Canadian (Canadien)?”; and
“Do you believe in assimilation, integration or in status quo [sic] as a way of promoting
Canadian unity and identity?” In order to explore Objective No. 2, which dealt with
“encourag[ing] cultural diversification within a bilingual framework,” focus groups were
asked to answer four questions:

1. Do you feel that the retention of various cultural
   backgrounds adds [to] or reduces [the] cultural life of
   Canadians?

50 My translation of « Une consultation aupres de 70 groupes a Montréal ne peut pas être un “low-key
project”. Les groupes veulent plus que parler et être entendu; ils exigent des résultats concrets et rapides. »
LAC, Gérard Pelletieronds, R11939, vol. 49, file 15, Rapport sur la consultation sur les objectifs de la
citoyenneté, 1970-1972, Gisèle Audette, Anthony Gray, Alban Daigle, and Fernand Serre to Yves Breton,
51 LAC, Gérard Pelletier fonds, R11939, vol. 49, file 15, Rapport sur la consultation sur les objectifs de la
2. Do you feel that bilingualism helps to strengthen understanding of our two major cultural groups?

3. Are other cultural heritages able to survive in the bilingual milieu of Canada as a whole?

4. Should cultural diversity be encouraged in Canada? Why?  

Voluntary organizations were also asked about their feelings on human rights, the monarchy, Canadian symbols, celebrations, and institutions, and their perception of the degree to which Canadians could participate in national life.

During the Citizenship Development Division’s consultations, “Many groups recognized that Canada is a mosaic rather than a melting pot.” Surveys showed that it was in Ontario and the West where the highest percentages of voluntary organizations identified cultural diversity as a problem related to national unity. Whereas only 10.9% of Canadians saw cultural diversity as a threat to national unity, 13% of Ontarians and 13.8% of Westerners viewed it as a threat; this is not surprising, given that many voluntary organizations that supported multiculturalism came from Ontario and the West. The Task Force also found that “No less than 37% of our sample declared that cultural diversity constitutes a social and/or cultural treasure. This percentage is more significant than it looks at first glance. In fact, more than 58.1% of the groups that deal with cultural diversity [expressed this sentiment].” Moreover, a much greater percentage of Canadians were interested in government promotion of cultural diversity,

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than minor programs, such as travel, language policy, and promotion of Native and Inuit cultures. Whereas 46.8% of those surveyed supported a government policy on cultural diversity, only 13.6% supported a linguistic policy. Travel and Exchange programs, promotion of Native and Inuit cultures, and anti-discrimination legislation were supported by 10.1%, 9.9%, and 7.8%, respectively. The Task Force’s report concluded: “This tendency favouring a policy for the general promotion of cultural diversity is common to all groups we analysed in this report, with the exception of francophone [sic] groups and quebecois [sic] groups, among whom recommendations in favour of a linguistic policy came first in terms of popularity.”

The Department of the Secretary of State’s surveys of 500 voluntary organizations in the summer of 1970 indicated that most Canadians were woefully unaware of human rights issues. One in ten were “totally unaware of human rights problems,” while less than a quarter were able to identify more than two areas where human rights might be a concern (such as housing, discrimination, the courts, police). Similarly, the “non-ethnic groups” (members of the two founding peoples) exhibited a range of opinions on ethnic minority communities, from those who advocated “outright assimilation of ethnic groups” to those who wished the government to “actively support and encourage the various ethnic languages and cultures in Canada.” During the consultative process, the Task Force found that “native Canadians often fail to distinguish

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56 Ibid., 10
57 Ibid., 11.
59 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalités; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Memorandum to Cabinet, Ethnic Participation Policy and Programs in Response to Book IV of the B & B Commission Report, 26 February 1971, Annex C -- Consultative Procedure, 17.
between immigrants and ethnic groups.” Perhaps not surprisingly, ethnic minority organizations and Indigenous (Native) organizations were the most aware of ethnic and racial discrimination; whereas only 11.8% of Anglophones and 15.8% of Francophones were aware of these problems, 52.9% of the “others” reported that ethnic and racial discrimination was a problem in Canada. Cultural diversity, however, “was seen as a source of social and cultural richness by a number of the groups,” and “was mentioned more than all the others combined, mostly by the adult groups.” Ethnic minority voluntary organizations, in particular, felt “that cultural diversity is an enriching factor in Canadian life and thus, should be encouraged.”

The groups and individuals consulted, though often familiar with the Citizenship Branch’s work, were interested in seeing an expansion of its programs. Several expressed a desire for the Citizenship Branch to continue its Travel and Exchange Program for youth “as a means of fostering National Unity;” some groups also wanted the program to “be extended to adults.” Though there were concerns expressed by Maritimers and Quebecois about the value of cultural diversity, “The majority of the groups asked for a general policy that will promote cultural diversity in Canada. Among the specific policy and program recommendations were “linguistic policy, travel and exchange programs,

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60 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Memorandum to Cabinet, Ethnic Participation Policy and Programs in Response to Book IV of the B & B Commission Report, 26 February 1971, Annex C -- Consultative Procedure, 21.
63 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Memorandum to Cabinet, Ethnic Participation Policy and Programs in Response to Book IV of the B & B Commission Report, 26 February 1971, Annex C -- Consultative Procedure, 10.
the promotion of Indian and Eskimo [sic] cultures and legislation against exploitation and discrimination.” As a result of these consultations, the Citizenship Development Branch intended “to intensify its grants programme to ethnic cultural groups immediately to respond positively to the proposals of the Fourth Volume of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and to recommend to the Prime Minister the policy which the government should pursue with respect to ethnic cultural groups.” More generally, these consultations made it clear that the Citizenship Branch was still needed; though many respondents had supported the idea of cultural diversity or “multiculturalism,” there was still a long way to go before all Canadians felt that ethnic minorities and immigrants had cultures worthy of preservation or support. Indeed, the Task Force confirmed that the CB’s major programs in the immediate future would address three themes or goals: “immigration orientation, acceptance of ethnic minorities by the majority, and support for cultural diversity.”

Ethnic Participation Division

The final step in the process of formulating Canada’s multiculturalism policy was delegated to the Assistant Under-secretary of State, Bernard Ostry, and the Ethnic Participation Division of the Citizenship Branch. Until late 1969, the Ethnic Participation

Division had been called the “Immigrant Integration Division,” but was renamed “to emphasize concerns with national unity.”68 The Division had a three-person staff: Stan Zybala, who was the Acting Chief, Steve Jaworsky, and Dennis Galon. These men continued to nurture contacts with the Canada Ethnic Press Federation, various ethnic minority organizations, and kept abreast of the latest developments in the multicultural movement. Contracted experts, including Howard Palmer, Wsevolod Isajiw, Raymond Breton, and a number of graduate students, also assisted the Ethnic Participation Division in its work; however, the reports they drafted were of more academic than practical value.69

The Ethnic Participation Division’s work was divided into two parts. First, Dennis Galon was asked to summarize the results of the Ministerial and Citizenship Development consultations. This discussion paper, which essentially amounted to a draft of the multiculturalism policy, was then floated to a number of small focus groups made up of experts on and representatives from ethnic minority communities. Among the general recommendations made during the previous two rounds of consultations were: television and radio programs dealing with ethnic minority communities on the CBC; more comprehensive information for immigrants about Canadian laws; an international college with programs on “ethnic cultures”; an advisory council of ethnic minority

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68 The Ethnic Participation Division had a budget in 1969-1970 of $800,000; of this amount, the bulk ($620,000) was allocated to language training. CTASC, Bernard Ostry fonds, 1991-030/065, Box 1, Multiculturalism - Background, 1971-73, Multiculturalism Programme, Citizenship Branch, Department of the Secretary of State, Briefing for the Prime Minister, 17 May 1972, 4; Freda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern*, 2nd Ed. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1988), 311

69 The graduate students included Linda M. Gerber and Jean Golden, now professors at the University of Guelph and Ryerson University, respectively. Linda M. Gerber, Personal correspondence with the author, 28 July 2011; Jean Golden, Personal correspondence with the author, 28 July 2011; Manoly Lupul, *The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir* (Edmonton/Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005), 137.
representatives which would advise federal and local officials; expanded Travel and Exchange programs; protection against exploitation and discrimination; support for Indigenous Peoples; and official status for languages other than French and English, which “would permit the other languages to be taught in the schools.”

The Ethnic Participation Division’s draft report was both a comprehensive multiculturalism policy, as well as a response to the sixteen recommendations dealing with the “other ethnic groups” made in Book IV of the RCBB’s Final Report. The Division proposed a number of “projects” which were meant to respond to the RCBB and form the major areas of concern of a revitalized (and officially “multicultural”) Citizenship Branch. The sixteen recommendations made by the RCBB could be grouped into four areas: Human Rights, Education, Mass Media, and Arts and Letters. Six recommendations could be simply ignored, as they were within provincial jurisdiction, while others were already being addressed in other federal legislation. For example, Recommendation 1, regarding fair employment and housing practices, was directed to the provinces. Recommendation 2 asked that “the same conditions for citizenship, the right to vote, and to stand for election to public office be accorded to all immigrants, with no regard to their country of origin.” Galon noted that this recommendation, which was directed to both the provinces and the federal government, was addressed in the new Canada Elections Act and the new citizenship legislation that was to be introduced.

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70 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Memorandum to Cabinet, Ethnic Participation Policy and Programs in Response to Book IV of the B & B Commission Report, 26 February 1971, Annex C -- Consultative Procedure, 15-16.

71 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Memorandum to Cabinet, Ethnic Participation Policy and Programs in Response to Book IV of the B & B Commission Report, 26 February 1971, Annex A, 2.
shortly by the Trudeau Government.\textsuperscript{72} He also noted that further measures would be taken in the area of human rights in a “future Memorandum to Cabinet.”

Recommendations three through seven addressed education, and were mostly directed to the provinces. In Recommendation 4, the federal government was asked to give financial assistance to the provinces for children requiring instruction in one of the two official languages. $1 million was already provided to the provinces annually by the Citizenship Branch to be used for language classes for adults; the Ethnic Participation Division proposed that a further $2 million would now be allocated for instructing (immigrant) children English or French.\textsuperscript{73} Although the Commission did not recommend it, the CB proposed a “Feasibility Study on Support for Non-Official Languages.” This study would determine if the federal government should aid the provinces in providing financial resources for non-official language education, which was called for in Recommendations 3 and 7. Recommendations 6 and 7, which asked Canadian universities to give credit for studying languages other than French and English and expand their area studies programs, respectively, were left to the universities (and, by extension, the provinces). Though the federal government was not required to do so, the CB proposed another feasibility study on the creation of an ethnic studies centre at a Canadian university. It also promised to provide Ethnic Participation Project Grants “for academic and research purposes.”\textsuperscript{74}

A number of recommendations were directed by the RCBB to various federal cultural agencies overseen by the Department of the Secretary of State, as well as CB-

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 5.
supported private organizations like the Canadian Folk Arts Council. Though they would remain “independent” agencies, the Citizenship Branch now asked these bodies to play a larger role in promoting multiculturalism. In a sense, the Citizenship Branch’s concern with ethnic minorities and cultural pluralism was now to be expanded to other agencies of the Canadian State. Most cultural agencies were supportive of the Branch’s new aims. The National Film Board (NFB) wrote to Dennis Galon, indicating how much additional funding it would request from the Treasury Board for films dealing with ethnic minority communities. The CB’s proposed “Project VI,” responded to the Royal Commission’s call for “films about the contribution and problems of both individuals and groups of ethnic origin other than British and French,” as well as more translations of existing films into non-official languages. The NFB indicated its willingness to expand its programs; its new “Ethnic Program” would require annual funding of $240,000 for the production of films, and between $80,000 and $150,000 per year for distribution of films.

The National Library and the Public Archives also responded positively to proposals that they collect books, manuscripts, and documents relating to ethnic minority communities. In fact, the National Library indicated that it was already its policy “to

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75 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalités; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Déclarations-P.M., Bernard Ostry to Pierre Juneau, 3 November 1970; RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalités; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Déclarations-P.M., Denis Galon to Marcel Martin, 10 February 1971.

76 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalités; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Déclarations-P.M., Marcel Martin to Denis Galon, 4 February 1971.

77 I have indicated the range of funding asked for by the NFB, as they provided a five-year projection that varied from a high of $150,000 to a low of $80,000 for film distribution. Apparently costs would peak during the 1972-1973 fiscal year and decrease thereafter. LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalités; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Déclarations-P.M., Production and Distribution of Films Activity Summary.
obtain and preserve all Canadian publications,” including “ethnic and native language material.” Although the Library had had difficulty in obtaining such material, as requests for books and periodicals had often gone unanswered by some “ethnic publishers,” it had been common practice to do so since at least 1953. The Public Archives also claimed that it had “never been guided by a policy which discriminated against any group, ethnic or otherwise.” Its neglect of certain material could be attributed to, as the RCBB had pointed out, a general lack of interest in the country’s history and, therefore, a lack of funds.

However, the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC) was reticent to simply make changes to its policies in regard to ethnic language broadcasts. Whereas the RCBB and many respondents to CB consultations had asked the CRTC to “remove restrictions on private broadcasting in languages other than English and French,” the head of the CRTC, Pierre Juneau, felt that the restrictions, such as they were, were not that onerous. All broadcasts and advertisements in non-official languages were required to be translated into one of the official languages for review by the CRTC; Juneau made the case that this rule was enforced only “rarely.” Furthermore, Juneau noted, the CB’s request to raise the ceiling on the percentage of time allotted to non-official language broadcasts was also seemingly unnecessary, as there had “been few applications

78 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., The Acquisition by the National Library of Canadian Native and Ethnic Language Publications, n.d., 1.
79 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., The Public Archives of Canada and Ethnic Archives, n.d., 1.
80 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Pierre Juneau to Bernard Ostry, 13 October 1970; RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Further Comments of the CRTC on IVth Volume of the B & B Report, 1.
requesting the maximum 40 per cent broadcast time now permitted." The RCBB’s other recommendations to the CRTC requested studies and pilot projects on ethnic broadcasting and the portrayal of ethnic minority communities. Juneau, who was open to reviewing the percentage of ethnic language broadcasts, was also open to commissioning these studies, as long as the federal government provided funding. He once again cautioned the Citizenship Branch that two “foreign language” stations — CFMB in Montreal and CHIN in Toronto — were already doing much of the work asked for by the Commission. Moreover, the CRTC had already commissioned a study on cable television which could be enlarged in order to satisfy the RCBB’s recommendations. Juneau was accommodating, but certainly was not willing to bend over backwards when the CRTC was already involved in these areas.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) was even more reticent to adopt the Commission’s recommendations. Ethnic minority organizations had been advocating an expansion of the CBC’s policy on language since at least 1962, and had continued to press the Citizenship Branch on this issue during its consultations in 1970 and 1971. CBC staff told the Citizenship Branch that it had not modified its position on non-official language broadcasts since its submission to the RCBB in 1964. Quoting from its brief to the RCBB, the CBC noted that its mandate was to serve all Canadians in the official languages; non-official language groups were “much less concentrated than the French and English”; therefore, it was “not feasible to provide the different services they

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81 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Further Comments of the CRTC on IVth Volume of the B & B Report, 2.

82 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Further Comments of the CRTC on IVth Volume of the B & B Report, 3.
want.” The CBC was only willing to consider changes to its policy if the Broadcasting Act was amended “to force the CBC to respond positively to recommendation 9 in the spirit and context in which it emerges.”

In March of 1971, Dennis Galon visited Citizenship Branch field offices in Vancouver, Edmonton, Regina, and Winnipeg “to discuss a comprehensive program of ethnic participation” with field officers. Officers were asked to provide feedback on a total of eighteen proposed programs. They were asked particularly to comment on two of the Branch’s new objectives — “intensified involvement and acceptance of ethnic groups in the mainstream of Canadian life” and “harmonious inter-cultural development through encounter and exchange.” The Ethnic Participation Division also arranged a number of “Private Meetings with Ethnic Community Leaders” and “Confidential Consultation Sessions” with key ethnic organizations and scholars who had been vocal about ethnic minority groups. One “confidential” session was held at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (O.I.S.E.) in Toronto on 27 March 1971 and addressed “Non-Official Language Teaching.” Seven people were invited to the day-long session, including Manoly Lupul, Professor of the History of Canadian Education and multicultural activist; Debra Raposo, Director of Toronto’s largest Portuguese School; and Jarry Grodecki, Vice President of the Canadian Polish Congress. Lupul had been invited to the session for his expertise in the history of education as well as his having “presented several papers

83 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., The CBC and Third Language Broadcasting, 2.
84 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., The CBC and Third Language Broadcasting, 3.
85 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Rita Cadieux [to Western Field Officers], re: Consultation with Western Field Offices on Proposed Ethnic Participation Programs, 16 March 1971.
on the subject of ethnic linguistic rights.” He later recalled that he was “apprehensive” about the Citizenship Branch’s study of “third languages” because “in the absence of a multicultural policy the idea of a comprehensive study of non-official languages appeared to place the cart before the horse.” Officials assured him that that was not their intention and that the federal government would respond to Book IV of the RCBB’s report in September or October. The Citizenship Branch later reported that, at meetings like this one, “Extremely strong dissatisfaction has been registered in some groups to the fact that the Commission did not recommend federal financial support for non-official language teaching in Canada.”

In April, members of the Ethnic Participation Division met with twelve ethnic representatives to discuss a proposed (expanded) “Grants Policy.” Among the attendees were Joseph Kage of Jewish Immigrant Aid Services (JIAS), Bohdan Bociurkiw of Carleton University, and Elio Costa, Vice President of the Federation of Italian Clubs.

These grants were meant to encourage “Intensified involvement and acceptance of ethnic groups in the mainstream of Canadian life,” as well as “Harmonious inter-cultural development through encounter and exchange.” At this point, the Ethnic Participation Division had grouped grants into “directive” and “non-directive” grants. The “directive”

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86 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalités; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Déclarations-P.M., Meeting on Project II -- Third Language Instruction, Toronto -- Saturday, 27 March 1971.
89 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalités; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Déclarations-P.M., Meeting on Grants Policy, Ottawa -- Monday, 5 April 1971.
90 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalités; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Déclarations-P.M., Consultation -- April 5, 1971, Ethnic Participation Grants, 30 March 1971, 1.
grants would be earmarked for histories of ethnic groups, summer camps, ethnic press, sustaining grants, ethnic studies centres in universities, ethnic museums, and library collections. The “non-directive or project grants” would be allocated on a case-by-case basis, and could include funding for conferences, seminars, “multi-cultural encounter,” youth activities, “internal cultural activities,” and “immigrant aid projects.” The staff of the Ethnic Participation Division wondered aloud in their briefing to the meeting whether sustaining grants could be used to stimulate the formation of “inter-ethnic organizations” like the CEPF and the Canadian Folk Arts Council. Clearly these organizations were seen as a positive development that aided in the CB’s overall goals. The final round of consultations simply confirmed that the CB was on the right track.

Though the Ethnic Participation Division and the Citizenship Branch as a whole were now totally oriented toward the idea of “multiculturalism,” there were still dissenting voices. Dennis Galon, who played a major role in drafting the first several versions of the multiculturalism policy, often fell back on the language used by the Royal Commission. At no point had the RCBB abandoned “biculturalism”; “multiculturalism” was seen as a positive development, but one that could not overshadow the country’s fundamental “bicultural” nature. The Commission had argued: “we must not overlook Canada’s cultural diversity, keeping in mind that there are two dominant cultures, the

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91 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Consultation -- April 5, 1971, Ethnic Participation Grants, 30 March 1971, 1-2.
92 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalites; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Consultation -- April 5, 1971, Ethnic Participation Grants, 10.
93 Galon, who later became a professor of psychology, had spent the last several years in Europe and was for the most part unaware of the multicultural movement and the bilingualism and biculturalism debate. He told me that he was a (26 year old) student intern, and was given very little direction by his superiors. He also remembers that he reported to Jennifer McQueen, who, along with Ostry, signed off on the final draft of the multiculturalism policy. Dennis Galon, Personal correspondence with the author, August 2011.
In the fourth draft of the policy, Galon began by noting that “the Government’s first concern has been to encourage the fullest possible participation of all citizens of non-British, non-French origin in the economic, political, and social life of Canada.” Among other things, he referred to the British and French as “the two founding races in the history of our country” and the “ethnic majorities.” Nonetheless, even Galon could see the writing on the wall: “Within the bilingual framework we recognize the fact that Canada is multicultural.” In the final draft of the policy, Bernard Ostry and Jennifer McQueen accepted the Commission’s notion of two linguistic streams, but did away with any reference to “dominant cultures.”

Where the multiculturalism policy’s rubber would hit the road, there would be very few significant changes from the pre-1971 period in the Citizenship Branch. Several projects that Galon proposed, like “Immigrant Orientation” and “Linguistic Integration,” were not really new programs. For more than a decade, the Citizenship Branch had provided funds to voluntary organizations that provided these services to new immigrants, or had run the programs in-house. Perhaps the biggest change was that agencies like the National Film Board, which had previously had only a minor

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95 LAC, Department of the Secretary of State fonds, RG6, box 1, file 3200-0-1, vol. 2 (ATIP Division Interim Container 293; BAN 2003-01367-9), Multiculturalisme; Generalités; Rapport de la Commission B.B./Declarations-P.M., Memorandum to Cabinet, Ethnic Participation Policy and Programs in Response to Book IV of the B & B Commission Report, 26 February 1971, Statement by the Prime Minister in Response to Book Four of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Fourth Draft, 154.
96 Ibid., 155.
97 Regrettably, I have been unable to track down the penultimate draft of the multiculturalism policy. Though there were no changes to the programs proposed by Galon and others working on the draft, the final memorandum submitted to Cabinet removed all references to “dominant cultures” or “founding peoples.”
association with the Citizenship Branch or “multiculturalism” were now rebranded as “multicultural.” These cultural agencies would now receive a modicum of direction on their policy from the Citizenship Branch.

**Cabinet Approval**

Stanbury’s preliminary report to Cabinet indicated that both phases of “citizen participation” consultations were fruitful and yielded useful information. Five main points came out of the consultations. First, ethnic groups saw Book IV as a “belated” but “succinct” summary of the role and contributions of ethnic groups to Canadian society. However, he noted that some Eastern European groups felt Book IV was inadequate in that it did not guarantee support for minority cultures and, ultimately, assumed that all minority ethnic groups would be assimilated into one of the two societal cultures. A third point was made by “some of the larger, established and better organized groups” that Book IV did not recommend the protection and support of minority languages, which they saw as intimately tied to cultural protection. Fourthly, visible minorities and immigrants argued that equality was not possible until systematic discrimination was dealt with. Although not all groups were in favour of minority language education and many were in agreement with the principles in Book IV, there was agreement on one issue: “The most universally applicable observation emerging from all these meetings is that Canada’s ethnic population prefers the concept of multiculturalism or cultural diversity to that of biculturalism. Canada’s official bilingual status, on the other hand, does not present a problem, although there are a few extreme voices which demand
multilingualism. Implicit in their rejection of biculturalism is the sense that “ethnics” [are] relegated to the status of second-class citizens by the concept.”

In July of 1971, Pelletier and Stanbury summarized the main themes that came out of the consultation process in a memorandum to cabinet. The memo proposed “a policy of multiculturalism in response to the spirit and recommendations of Book IV of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.” The Canadian Government would now work toward “the systematic support of all viable cultures within the country.” The proposal followed “extensive consultation” with ethnic groups, during which the Citizenship Branch had found that a number of themes were raised by ethnic minority groups in reaction to Book IV. Stanbury’s memorandum noted that ethnic minority groups had “made it clear at our consultations that they seek a multicultural society within our bilingual framework.” If the Trudeau Government were to ignore this stated need, or if it were to accept the Commission’s recommendations verbatim, “a powerful negative reaction [could] be expected from our ethnic communities.”

Stanbury’s memorandum pointed out alternatives to “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” that had been contemplated by the staff of the Citizenship Branch; the possibilities included: “status quo,” “biculturalism,” “multiculturalism,” “regional language guarantees,” and “ethnic structuring of society.” The status quo was not tenable because it had been rejected by the Royal Commission in Book IV, and was contrary to both the government’s position and that of most ethnic minority groups. “Biculturalism”

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101 Ibid., 3-4.
was also “seriously deficient” because it would be unacceptable to British, French, and ethnic Canadians, for different reasons.\textsuperscript{102} “Regional language guarantees” or regional language units, which had been proposed by Commissioner Jaroslav Rudnyckyj in his “Separate Statement” in Book I of the Commission’s report, had been rejected by the Commission and “runs counter to the government’s expressed policy on languages.”\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, an ethnic structuring of Canadian society would entail “cultural balkanization,” as well as group rights, which would contradict the government’s commitment to individual rights. Therefore, Stanbury argued, “a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself as the most suitable choice for the Government.”\textsuperscript{104}

There would be four “elements” to the multiculturalism policy. First, the government would “support all of Canada’s cultures and assist their development” so long as they demonstrated a will to exist. Second, the government would “assist members of all cultural groups to overcome barriers to full participation in Canadian society.” Third, the government would “promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interests of national unity.” Fourth, the government would “continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada’s official languages and to become full participants in Canadian society.”\textsuperscript{105}

While many of the programs attached to the policy “elements” were a continuation of longstanding Citizenship Branch programs, others involved additions to their program responsibilities. A Grants Program continued the CB’s support for

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\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 6; Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book I: General Introduction; The Official Languages (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967), 155-169.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 6.
\end{flushleft}
conferences and intercultural activities by ethnic and voluntary organizations. Similarly, the “Consultation” program, which would bring CB officials in contact with ethnic voluntary organizations, was a simple re-branding of one of the Branch’s most longstanding responsibilities. $50,000 would be set aside for the Citizenship Branch to (continue) funding conferences, meetings with ethnic groups, seminars, analysis of the ethnic press, and the hiring of consultants.\textsuperscript{106} Another program proposed the creation of urban “Multicultural Centres”; this would merely expand an existing CB pilot project in Winnipeg called the “International Centre” to several other major cities. The Citizenship Branch already had experience in administering funds to so-called “Indian Friendship Centres”; Multicultural Centres would not be significantly different. Whereas the CB had previously disbursed funds to private organizations like the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto and C.O.S.T.I., it would now (assuming the pilot project was successful) administer its own centres. Yet another program on the “Teaching of Official Languages” simply extended the Citizenship Branch’s financial support for the teaching of the official languages to adult immigrants to their children. “Grants” and “Consultation” programs had essentially been in place since the 1950s.

The “Culture Development Programme” would fund studies dealing with third language retention and teaching aids, cultural development, and the ethnic press. The CB noted that this program was quite experimental. Some officers even felt that there was a real risk that the program would “be haphazard, inconsistent and potentially wasteful,” but it was necessary in order to collect the raw data needed for the other program areas, as well as future programs.\textsuperscript{107} But while studies on third language retention were a new

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 11.
development, the CB had long been involved in “culture development,” and had forged strong links with the ethnic press, via the CEPF.

Other programs included new funding to the National Museum of Man, the National Film Board, the National Library, and the Public Archives. The National Museum would be asked to acquire artifacts from Canada’s ethnic communities, conduct research into those communities, and teach Canadians about ethnic diversity through its exhibits. The National Film Board, which had already translated some of its films into minority languages, would be provided with $320,000 to continue this work and produce new films about Canadian ethnic minority groups. The National Library would be asked to look into the feasibility of creating a “National Ethnic Language and Literature Centre” on its premises, while the Library and the Public Archives was to be provided funds to acquire books, periodicals, and manuscript collections relating to Canadian ethnic minority groups.108

Most tellingly, Pelletier and Stanbury recommended the policy to Cabinet as good value for the money that would be spent: “It is quite clear that the suggested programme is modest in comparison to the various programmes fostering the official languages, and this point will be noted by the more outspoken members of minority cultural groups. However, the foregoing proposals will provide a positive, highly visible response to Book IV at a relatively low cost.”109 The Citizenship Branch, which had already been allotted $520,000 for 1971-72, would require an additional $580,000 (for a total of $1,108,000) in order to administer the new multiculturalism program areas. In addition, $1,095,000 would be provided to five cultural agencies (Public Archives, National Library, National

108 Ibid., 14-16.
Museum of Man, National Film Board, and the CRTC) to help them carry out programs that had been directed toward them by the new multiculturalism policy. As Cabinet discussed the new policy, several ministers, including the Prime Minister, remarked that “more emphasis should be placed on self-help by ethnic groups.” Furthermore, Trudeau observed that the policy was not meant to help ethnic groups attain “economic equality,” but was designed to help them achieve “cultural equality.” Multiculturalism, then, would not require a large outlay of cash, but promised to provide ethnic minority communities with the recognition they so desired.

Public unveiling

On the evening of 9 October 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau spoke to the tenth gathering of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress at Hotel Fort Garry in Winnipeg, Manitoba. A day earlier he had given a speech to the House of Commons announcing his government’s new policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.” Because of the important role that the Ukrainian-Canadian community had played in pushing for official recognition of cultural pluralism it was only fitting that he should make a second speech to the Congress. Departing slightly from the remarks written by his staff, Trudeau spoke about his flight into Winnipeg that day:

114 The Ukrainian Canadian Congress was and is an annual meeting of the constituent members of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), a federation of Ukrainian-Canadian organizations.
As I flew into Winnipeg this afternoon and looked down upon the golden fields and the colorful woodlots, I wished that those early settlers could have seen the panorama of this beautiful region from the air. And as we dropped lower and I could make out the carefully tended farms, the tidy outbuildings, the network of roads, railways and power-lines which link this vast land, I wished that those earliest settlers could return and see how their dreams have come true a thousandfold.  

For some Ukrainians, their dreams had certainly come true with the creation of what would later be called Official Multiculturalism. The Trudeau government had responded to the demands of a small but vocal movement by both publically recognizing Canada’s variegated ethnic fabric and creating programs that would ensure the continued viability of those groups. This “new” package of programs included financial aid to cultural groups, training in the official languages, and grants to the National Film Board, the Public Archives of Canada and other Federal institutions. The Prime Minister noted that these programs were “designed to add substance to the policy of the Canadian government”; in other words, multiculturalism was to be more than simply a slogan.  

But the reality of Canada’s multiculturalism policy was quite different from the picture painted by Pierre Trudeau. Indeed, multiculturalism was not much more than a new name for a set of policies and practices that had been in place since the 1950s; the so-called “important policy assertions” announced in 1971 re-branded, but did not significantly alter the state’s approach to ethnic minority communities. Though Trudeau did announce some new programs and funding, his claim that his government had “approved all of the recommendations of Book IV of the Royal Commission on

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116 Ibid., 12.

117 Ibid., 12.
Bilingualism and Biculturalism as they apply to the federal jurisdiction” was a hollow statement. Of the sixteen recommendations made by the RCBB, only four required new funding and initiatives by the Trudeau government. The remaining recommendations were either the prerogative of the provinces, were already in place in the Citizenship Branch, or were to be “studied” by the Citizenship Branch.

Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld make the case that Trudeau’s appearance at the UCC’s tenth tri-annual congress was evidence that the influence of the Ukrainian-Canadian community had surpassed that of the Jewish community: “By reporting in to the UCC, so to speak, he had lent credence to the notion that a new era of ethnic political influence, especially Ukrainian, was dawning in Canada.” But the UCC’s influence only extended so far. While it is clear that pressure by the UCC and activists associated with the organization had an impact on the name of the policy – “multiculturalism” – the substantive concerns of other Ukrainian organizations and activists in regard to minority ethnic languages were ignored. Manoly Lupul, for example, had made the case that any multiculturalism policy that did not include funding for minority language schools would be an empty shell. However, the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State had concluded that minority language education had not been recommended by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and, more importantly, “[ran] counter to the government’s expressed policy on languages.”

Thus, while the policy reflected the needs of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee,

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118 Ibid., 11.
which had shown itself to be willing to accommodate the linguistic needs of French Canada, it did not meet the needs of all activists involved in the multicultural movement. The policy addressed the desire for recognition expressed by of many of Canada’s ethnic voluntary organizations, such as the Canada Ethnic Press Federation and the UCC, but ignored the concrete demands for education rights that had been expressed by many other activists in the multicultural movement for the past eight years. Demands for more “ethnic” voices on the CBC and in radio and television in general were also virtually shut down by the new policy. The CRTC and the CBC, while willing to accept changes to their mandates, required that the laws governing those bodies be changed before they moved ahead with ethnic language programming. While there might be more exhibits of “ethnic” handicrafts in the Museum of Man, and more films dealing with the lives of Ukrainians farmers on the Prairies, it remained to be seen whether these images would ever reach a mass audience. Although “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” gave ethnic minority communities the official recognition that many craved, it did virtually nothing to ensure their linguistic and cultural survival within Canadian society.
Chapter 8: The politicization of multiculturalism policy, 1971-1974

In March of 1973, Howard Palmer, who was then working as a Research Director in the Multiculturalism Directorate, addressed the Canadian Citizenship Federation’s Seminar on Multiculturalism in Calgary. After outlining the Government’s new multiculturalism programs, he took the opportunity to offer a few of his own remarks on what multiculturalism meant:

I think we are basically concerned with two goals in multicultural policy: one is encouraging groups to maintain their ethnic identity but at the same time there is concern to help immigrants orient themselves to Canadian society.

In other words, the Trudeau Government’s re-branding of the Citizenship Branch in 1971 had not led to an overall change in the branch’s understanding of the place ethnic minority communities in Canadian society. The CB continued to attempt to strike a balance between integrating immigrants and ethnic minorities into the mainstream of Canadian life, all the while celebrating the diversity that they contributed to the country. In this sense, the CB’s mandate had not really changed since the 1950s.

What had changed in the Citizenship Branch by 1973 was the way in which the Liberal Party viewed multiculturalism as a political instrument of the Government. In this chapter I discuss the way in which multiculturalism policy was politicized between 1971

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and 1974. Multiculturalism policy arose when the Trudeau Government’s preoccupation with citizen “participation” intersected with its need to respond to Book IV of the Royal Commission’s report; party politics played a negligible role in this process. Within a few months of Trudeau’s policy announcement, however, multiculturalism policy came to be seen among key members of the Liberal Party as a potential strategy for gaining the ethnic vote. With an election on the horizon, the Prime Ministers’ Office and the Liberal Party began to get involved in the Citizenship Branch’s activities in ways that they previously had not; the government’s ethnic policy was tied increasingly to partisan concerns. In the span of a couple of years the Canadian public and Parliament began to criticize multiculturalism as “propaganda” for the Liberal Party, thereby overshadowing much of the nonpartisan work that had been done by the Citizenship Branch in the previous two decades. At the same time, it became clear that multiculturalism policy was not central to the Trudeau Government’s overall approach to diversity. French-English relations continued to trump “multicultural” relations.

Reactions to “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework”

Initial reactions to the policy statement from ethnic organizations were generally positive. The Prime Minister’s Office received a great deal of correspondence from ethnic organizations in response to the announcement of the official multiculturalism policy.


3 At least one non-Canadian organization, the First National Polish American Revival Movement Conference of Wheaton, Maryland, sent a letter of support. LAC, Pierre Elliott Trudeau fonds, MG26 O7, vol. 37, file 8, 040.2 General — Language and Ethnic Groups — Multiculturalism, 1971-1972, Alex Ostoja Starzewski to Pierre Trudeau, 28 October 1971.
Many of these organizations and ethnic communities had not been involved in the multicultural movement. B’nai B’rith President Harry Pachter noted that his organization was “moved” by Trudeau’s announcement. The new policy constituted “a recognition that multi-culturalism is the basis of the Canadian sociology.” Dr. Fritz Wieden of the Trans-Canada Alliance of German-Canadians, who had previously criticized the Trudeau Government for its inattention to ethnic minority groups, wrote that the multiculturalism policy was “so vital to the future independence of this country.” He argued that the American “melting pot” ideal “produced few cultural harmonies and may indeed be a guidebook to anarchy,” whereas multiculturalism promised the “antidote to anarchy.”

Other ethnic organizations were more guarded in their responses to the policy. J.D. Stratychuk of the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada expressed concern that “reaction across Canada to this policy has not been uniformly enthusiastic.” He further noted that the USRLC would continue to press for official recognition of “third languages” and ethnic language broadcasting. Trudeau’s office responded that “the government has no intention of withdrawing in any way from its stated policy.” Mitch Sago, editor of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians’ monthly journal, the Ukrainian Canadian, was initially supportive of the policy. He wrote that “the new policy catches up with the realities of history and contemporary life, and should be

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5 Wieden wrote to Liberal MP Mark MacGuigan, a former colleague of his at the University of Windsor, and asked him to pass on his message to Gérard Pelletier or Pierre Trudeau. Wieden had, apparently, complained to MacGuigan in the past about multiculturalism and felt that he had “some moral title to a complimentary note.” LAC, Pierre Elliott Trudeau fonds, MG26 O7, vol. 37, file 8, 040.2 General — Language and Ethnic Groups — Multiculturalism, 1971-1972, Fritz Wieden to Mark MacGuigan, 15 October 1971.
6 Stratychuk’s letter was forwarded to Jennifer McQueen in the SOS. LAC, Pierre Elliott Trudeau fonds, MG26 O7, vol. 37, file 8, 040.2 General — Language and Ethnic Groups — Multiculturalism, 1971-1972, Pierre Trudeau to J.D. Stratychuk, 10 December 1971.
welcomed.”8 Sago was cautious in his assessment, however, as his organization had a long history of being denied grant money and support from the Citizenship Branch because of its leftist/progressive political stance: “It has been the experience of many ethnic groups and organizations over the years...that government aid to the folk arts and to ethnic groups has often been discriminatory.”9 A few months later, in a speech to the national convention of the AUUC, Sago further explained his reticence. Though he welcomed the spirit of the policy, he was worried that “progressive organizations” like the AUUC would be passed over for grants. “It is to be hoped,” he said, “that the program of aid and assistance to ethnic groups and cultures, announced by Prime Minister Trudeau, will be free of discriminatory prejudices and practices, and that the criteria for grants to all ethnic organizations and institutions will be on the basis of their ability to enrich their communities and Canadian society as a whole.”10

But it was in Quebec where the greatest amount of antipathy to multiculturalism policy was expressed. “Ottawa rejects biculturalism,” proclaimed Le Devoir, the Montreal daily that André Laurendeau had once helmed as editor-in-chief, on the day after Trudeau announced his multiculturalism policy.11 To many commentators within Quebec, the federal government’s new policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” constituted a rejection of the guiding principles of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, if not Confederation itself. As Claude Ryan, Le Devoir’s editor-in-chief wrote, Trudeau had overlooked an “essential fact” of Canadian life: “Canada’s two official languages are the expressions of the two cultures, peoples and

9 Ibid., 5.
societies which give Canada its distinctive character.”12 Louis-Albert Vachon of the Association canadienne d’éducation de langue française, forwarded a response to the policy from ACELF’s head office in Quebec City to the Prime Minister. To ACELF, placing all cultures on the same level would “without a doubt…be to the detriment of the French-Canadian culture.” Whereas all other ethnic groups used English as their language of communication, only French Canadians used French, and were as such accustomed to certain “rights.”13

In November 1971, Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa wrote to Trudeau to voice his concerns about the Federal Government’s new multiculturalism policy. He noted that the policy, despite assertions to the contrary, “clearly contradict[ed] the mandate of the Royal Commission.” Moreover, Bourassa argued, Trudeau’s “dissociation” of language and culture — which the RCBB had viewed as intimately tied together — was no foundation on which to build a policy. Bourassa warned that if the Federal Government was assuming responsibility for all cultural groups, the province of Quebec would be required to become an even greater defender of the French language and culture in Quebec.14

Trudeau responded by assuring his provincial counterpart that for “historic and demographic reasons,” the federal government continued to recognize the “two main linguistic collectivities.”15 Nonetheless, he maintained that multiculturalism was compatible with bilingualism and with the spirit of the Royal Commission.

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Multiculturalism, rather than placing all ethnic groups on a level playing field, would “facilitate the participation of the other ethno-cultural groups within the Francophone majority.” To Trudeau, official bilingualism addressed the linguistic needs of Francophones; the sheer size of the Francophone community and its concentration in Quebec would ensure that the age-old cleavage between French and English would continue to dominate Canadian political life, regardless of the multiculturalism policy.

The government of Quebec expressed its concerns to the public as well. In November of 1971, Francois Cloutier, Minister of Cultural Affairs and Minister of Immigration for the province of Quebec, gave a speech to the Conseil du Civisme de Montreal. Cloutier worried that immigrants to Quebec tended to join the Anglophone population and form their own “micro-societies” in Montreal. He even went so far as to suggest that ethnic minorities found themselves in a privileged position because they were part of the larger Anglophone majority in the rest of Canada. Though Cloutier promised that the government of Quebec would participate in the multiculturalism policy, his government had reservations about the policy’s thrust, which contradicted “la realite quebecoise” of biculturalism.

Selling multiculturalism in Quebec was a difficult prospect from the beginning. In the Department of the Secretary of State, Gérard Pelletier’s staff began planning for the implementation of the policy in Quebec in the midst of a media backlash against the policy. The Citizens’ Cultures working group held a regional meeting in Montreal in

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18 Ibid., 6.
19 Ibid., 8.
December of 1971. At this point, the government had only outlined a “preliminary programme,” which would assist “multicultural encounters,” organizational meetings for ethnic groups, immigrant orientation, conferences, youth activities, cultural exchanges, and multicultural centres. While there had been a favourable response to the new policies and programs in western Canada, SOS staff decided to tread lightly in Quebec. It was suggested that one large “intercultural or multicultural centre” in Montreal would be preferable to “several small ethnic cultural centres,” so long as it emphasized cultural exchange, rather than cultural difference. The planning group noted that “it is impossible in Quebec to consider the development of the various ethnic groups independently of the question of their integration into one of the two language communities. This has become a major social and political problem which cannot be overlooked.” More specifically, the working group worried that French Canadians would see the multiculturalism programs as a means “to assist ethnic groups oriented towards the English-speaking community.” As such, it recommended that ethnic groups in Quebec should be encouraged to integrate into Francophone, rather than anglophone society. By January the Quebec government was convinced by discussions with SOS staff that its own way of dealing with ethnic minorities would not be infringed on by the federal government. Bourassa wrote to Trudeau that both he and Cloutier were satisfied that multiculturalism would not impinge on Quebec ethnic policy.

For Trudeau, as for Pearson, “multiculturalism” could not be allowed to obscure the

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21 Ibid., 2.
22 Ibid., 3.
larger problem of French-English relations. As Kenneth McRoberts points out, “multiculturalism did not have as central a place as language policy in the national unity strategy for countering Quebec nationalism.” Multiculturalism was not simply couched in terms of bilingualism (“multiculturalism within a bilingual framework”); from the beginning, it always took a back seat to French-English relations. The so-called “unmeltable ethnics,” as Assistant Undersecretary of State Bernard Ostry called them, had won their small battle for recognition. But, as Ostry admitted privately to Trudeau, the actual value of multiculturalism policy to ethnic minority communities had been “certainly more psychological than financial and accusations of tokenism or lip service were merited.” Neither the Department of the Secretary of State nor Trudeau had any intention of expanding multiculturalism policy and programs to the level of the Official Languages programs.

Gérard Pelletier who as late as 1969 had viewed Canada as “bilingual and bicultural,” told the Canada Ethnic Press Federation in September of 1972 that multiculturalism had “always existed in Canada — beginning with the diversity of the Indian peoples, followed by the arrival of the explorers, and settlers from around the world, thereby resulting in our present cultural mosaic.” While the government now

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25 Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 106, Notes for an Address by Bernard Ostry, Assistant Undersecretary of State, delivered at The American Immigration and Citizenship Conference; New York, 11 February 1972, 13.
26 Nevertheless, Ostry expressed admiration for the ethnic groups’ “collective will to exist” rather than what we sometimes suspect today is more of an existing will to collect.” CTSAC, Bernard Ostry fonds, 1991-030, Series 8.1, Box 65, file 538, Multiculturalism — Background, 1971-73, Multiculturalism Programme, Citizenship Branch, Department of the Secretary of State; Briefing for the Prime Minister, 17 May 1972, 5.
27 Pelletier told a gathering of Americans at the Waldorf Astoria in New York City that his country had two main cultures and that its constitution allowed all ethnic groups to benefit equally from Confederation. Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 106, Pluralism: The Canadian Way; Notes for an address by the Honourable Gérard Pelletier to the Canada Ethnic Press Federation;
recognized this “Canadian reality,” recent developments had also shown the importance of the “historical role played by francophones.” Despite his lofty rhetoric, Pelletier warned the CEPF that federal grants were not enough to ensure the perpetuation of a multicultural society:

The long range success of this policy depends on the ethno-cultural groups themselves, not on the government and its cultural agencies, nor the funds at their disposal. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism mentions that their continued existence will be determined by “their collective will to exist”. This will cannot be generated by large sums of government funding. Quite the contrary — it can be stifled by an unwise grants policy. The development of a truly multicultural, egalitarian society depends upon the attitudes of the ethno-cultural groups. If they expend most of their time and energy looking back towards their homelands how can they become full participants in Canadian society. … If they become so introverted that they inhibit new ideas or encourage isolation they restrict the full development of the human being and his society; ultimately, they atrophy and are cast off.”

Pelletier was saying a number of things here. First, ethnic minority communities could not expect greater funding than what had already been promised. Second, multiculturalism policy could only recognize ethnic diversity; protection and nurturing of that diversity would fall to the ethnic groups themselves. However, according to Pelletier, the government would continue to rectify the “imbalance” in employment and linguistic opportunities between English and French Canadians. Most importantly, Pelletier indicated that multiculturalism was tied to the creation of an “egalitarian” society in


28 Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 106, Pluralism: The Canadian Way; Notes for an address by the Honourable Gérard Pelletier to the Canada Ethnic Press Federation; Winnipeg, 29 September 1972, 4.

29 Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 106, Pluralism: The Canadian Way; Notes for an address by the Honourable Gérard Pelletier to the Canada Ethnic Press Federation; Winnipeg, 29 September 1972, 7.

30 Ibid., 5-6.
which citizens could reach their full potential. But ethnic minority communities that
failed to engage with Canadian society were retrograde and deserved to be “cast off.”
This suggests that to some key players in the Trudeau administration, it was still
important, even – or especially – in an egalitarian “Just Society,” that ethnic minority
communities realize there were limits to the state’s ability to tolerate ethnic diversity.

1972 Election and ethnic minority groups

Though the Trudeau Government viewed multiculturalism as an integral, but minor part
of its national unity strategy, Liberal Party organizers only gradually came to view the
policy as an electoral asset. Whereas the Liberal Party has often been accused of having
adopted multiculturalism as a cynical attempt to court the “ethnic vote,” the party
machinery did not come around to this position until after the policy announcement. Even
then, Andrew Thompson, Stanley Haidasz, and other liaisons with ethnic minority
communities had to plead with the party to use its new policy as an electoral ploy.31
There were initially some promising signs that the Liberals might be moving toward
greater engagement with ethnic minority communities. With a federal election on the
horizon in 1972, the National Liberal Federation began to study how the government’s
policies were playing with ethnic voters and whether cabinet ministers had enough
visibility in ethnic communities. In December of 1971 it concluded that “the ethnic

31 It has become de rigueur to accuse the Liberals of this, in spite of their long history with ethnic groups and
despite any evidence of a direct correlation between Liberal electoral politics and the multiculturalism
policy. Gregory Kealey says that “For political reasons, namely the Liberal Party’s dependence on new
immigrant votes, the state promoted “multiculturalism” as an official policy.” Gregory S. Kealey, Workers
and Canadian History (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 147. See also
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 1003;
population is reached by few cabinet Ministers”; but by the following year, the party’s assessment had not changed. In February of 1972 there was some discussion of recruiting “women, youth, socio-economic and cultural groups” as Liberal candidates in the coming election, but this discussion fizzled out. In fact, neither the role of ethnic minority communities, nor the new multiculturalism policy were a key part of the Liberal election strategy during the early planning phases in late 1971 and early 1972. An early draft of the Liberal Party Manifesto emphasized how “the flame of the Centennial Year” was “a new flame of identity as Canadians; not anti-American, not anti-British, not anti-French, not anti-anything.” But multiculturalism, apparently, was not intrinsic to this “new flame of identity.” In a summary of the issues of interest groups, George Elliott in the National Liberal Party office listed English Canadians, French Canadians, Irish and Scottish Canadians; but Ukrainians, Poles, and other ethnic groups were nowhere to be found on his list. Party President Richard Stanbury seemed more concerned with Trudeau’s image — “your personality being one with which the little man has difficulty identifying” — than he did with Trudeau’s potentially useful multiculturalism policy.

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35 Ibid., 5.

36 LAC, The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau Fonds, Prime Minister’s Office Secret Documents Series 1968-
Even more surprising was that the Liberal Party had seemingly not learned from its previous failure to recruit ethnic voters. After attending a “Liberal Campaign Countdown” event in early April of 1972, Member of Parliament Stanley Haidasz wrote to Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Robert Andras, to express how he had been “shocked” that the party had no plan to win ethnic voters. “I was further astonished,” he wrote, “to learn from one of my delegates that at the publicity and advertising session … that no funds have been allocated for a national campaign to appeal to the ethnic voters. I think this decision is a grave error.” He went on to say that the party had always found itself in “a last minute scramble” to advertise to ethnic voters, which was rightfully criticized as “political expediency of the lowest level.”

Citing recent surveys that had shown the Liberal Party was losing ethnic voters, Haidasz recommended immediate action. Andras forwarded Haidasz’s letter on to the party’s National Director, Torrance Wylie. Wylie responded almost a month later that the National Campaign Committee was now looking into the issue of advertising in ethnic papers. The National Campaign Committee had also decided to print pamphlets in some of the major ethnic languages (German, Ukrainian, Italian, Polish, Greek, Dutch, and Portuguese). Wylie further noted that the pamphlets would discuss the new multiculturalism policy, and that the National Liberal Federation hoped to make multiculturalism “a very positive talking point during

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38 Unfortunately, while Haidasz refers to these surveys, I have been unable to locate them. Much of this material is spread out among the personal papers of various ministers and MPs.
the campaign."\textsuperscript{40}.

Even those ethnic communities that had welcomed the policy announcement worried that it was a “stop-gap” measure, or mere tokenism.\textsuperscript{41} A number of ethnic organizations, including the Canada Ethnic Press Federation, the Canadian Folk Arts Council, the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews argued that the Trudeau Liberals needed to form an advisory council of ethnic groups show its ongoing commitment to multiculturalism and consulting ethnic communities.\textsuperscript{42} Leon Kossar, a Ukrainian Canadian journalist and founder of the Canadian Folk Arts Council and Toronto’s “Caravan” multi-ethnic festival, wrote to Senator Andrew Thompson in May of 1972; he suggested that the Canadian Folk Arts Council, as well as academics and representatives of ethnic organizations could help to form a new ethnic council to advise the Canadian government.\textsuperscript{43} He noted that the idea of such a body had been recommended by the Thinkers’ Conference and the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews, and, more recently, by Progressive Conservative leader Robert Stanfield.\textsuperscript{44} Thompson immediately wrote to party president, Richard Stanbury to express his concern that the federal Liberals had not done enough to reassure the ethnics of their support for multiculturalism. He argued that the government should create an advisory council, but “if possible, avoid appearing as though this was an after thought to the proposal recently made by Mr.


\textsuperscript{41} Yuri Boshyk, “Multiculturalism & Ukrainianism: Middle Class Sellout,” \textit{Student}, November 1971, 11.


Stanfield for such a National Council.” Instead, a press release would “respond” to the Thinkers’ Conference’s resolutions (now four years old). Thompson further suggested the formation of a steering committee, made up of Paul Yuzyk, Charles Dojack, Stanley Haidasz, and others. Stanbury wrote an “urgent” letter to Trudeau on 16 May 1972 in which he shared Thompson’s concerns and recommendation in favour of an Advisory Council on Multiculturalism. Despite the need to get the jump on Stanfield’s Conservatives, Stanbury felt, like Thompson, that the council should be non-partisan. In fact, he suggested that a steering committee should include both Thompson and (Progressive-Conservative Senator) Yuzyk, among others.

Ultimately, Trudeau’s decision to form a “National Advisory Council on Multiculturalism” in late May of 1972 was based upon its political advantage to the Liberal Party. In a memo to Trudeau, National Director Wylie pointed out the “political advantages” of the announcement: “1. It is a forceful restatement of our commitment to multiculturalism; 2. The Council would have high visibility in the ethnic communities; 3. The appointments to the Council can be staggered over a period of time and each announcement would have the effect of further confirming the government’s support of multiculturalism.”

Trudeau’s assistant, Marc Lalonde, spoke with Gérard Pelletier and Bernard Ostry about the proposed council. They agreed with Thompson’s idea of a

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47 Initially the body was called the National Advisory Council on Multiculturalism. It was subsequently referred to as the Canadian Advisory Council on Multiculturalism and, finally, as the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism.
steering committee that would temporarily report to the Secretary of State; this steering committee would suggest names for the Advisory Council, which would meet later in the summer. But the following day in Cabinet when Trudeau relayed Thompson’s proposal of a steering committee composed entirely of Senators like himself and Paul Yuzyk, Pelletier and other ministers rejected the idea as a “dangerous precedent” for ministerial prerogative. Instead, Cabinet agreed that the Department of the Secretary of State would create an advisory council that would recommend names for the Advisory Committee. Pelletier effectively took control of the matter from Thompson, who was not privy to this conversation.

On 26 May, Trudeau told a gathering of Liberals in Winnipeg that his government would create what was now called the “Canadian Advisory Council on Multiculturalism.” The announcement of the Advisory Council had just the effect that was desired: the Ukrainian Canadian Committee responded to this announcement “with great interest and gratitude.” Perhaps predictably, Rev. Wasyl Kushnir of the UCC implored the Prime Minister to “include among its members the representatives who will enjoy the confidence of the Ukrainian organizations represented by our Committee.”

Stanley Haidasz, the Polish Canadian MP for Toronto-Parkdale who would be appointed Minister of State for Multiculturalism within the year, submitted a list of candidates to

51 Manoly Lupul later noted with incredulity that even among a sympathetic crowd, Trudeau did not mention the announcement’s potential impact on the upcoming election. Ibid., 1. Manoly Lupul, The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir (Edmonton/Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005), 177.
Trudeau, including Ted Glista, President of the Polish Alliance of Canada, and former Liberal candidate for office in the province of Ontario.53

Despite a shaky start, the Liberal Party’s attention to ethnic voters during the 1972 election was greater than it had been in previous elections. In the past several years, Andrew Thompson and a small group of supporters, namely Paul Hellyer, Stanley Haidasz, and Jack Pickersgill, had done the bulk of the “ethnic” work during elections.54 In 1972, however, the Liberal Party’s National Office co-ordinated these efforts. Thompson, who clearly welcomed the help, wrote to Wylie: “it is tremendous to have your active interest in this ethnic area.”55 Among the projects that the National Liberal Party suggested to their provincial counterparts at Thompson’s behest were: an analysis of ethnic populations by riding; compilation of lists of new citizens; newspaper columns in twenty-five ethnic languages; an “ethnic brochure” written by Thompson and printed in Ukrainian, Dutch, Portuguese, Italian, Polish and Greek; and newspaper columns by Trudeau and other ministers; and radio addresses.56 Wylie also asked the Department of the Secretary of State for lists of new Canadian citizens.57 In order to prepare radio advertisements for CHIN Radio (Toronto) and its affiliates, the National Office asked Trudeau and other Liberal MPs which languages they spoke, other than English and

French. Not surprisingly, Trudeau responded that he was fluent in Spanish, and was comfortable saying a few words in Italian, Portuguese, and German; a handful of other Liberals claimed some knowledge of Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, and Polish. Eventually, the party, with Thompson’s advice, put together 60-second commercials in English and French, with two phrases read in several ethnic languages. Part of the English portion of the message read: “The Liberal government has adopted a multicultural policy, for Canada, one that means support and encouragement for each and every culture and its individual contribution to our society and its prosperity.” Trudeau recorded the penultimate “ethnic language” sentence, which read: “No other great nation in the world has so much within its grasp. Together, let us protect it, nourish it, grow great on it.” The final sentence, again in English or French, read: “The Liberal Party of Canada views the nation as a land of people with many differences but with many contributions which help make our country strong. This land is strong — vote Liberal.”

Andrew Thompson was especially keen to use Trudeau’s announcement of the ethnic Advisory Council to the best political advantage. In late July he wrote to Mitchell Sharp, who was nominally in charge of the “National Unity” portfolio, “It is important to

59 The other respondents were Mitchell Sharp (Portuguese), Jean-Eudes Dube (Spanish), Edgar Benson (Dutch), and Bud Drury (Polish). LAC, The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau fonds, MG 26 O 11, vol. 66, file 2, 3, 7, 16, Torrance Wylie to Andrew Thompson, re: Language spoken by members of the Cabinet, 23 August 1972.
63 Ibid., 1.
make some political mileage prior to the election from the formation of this council.”

He told a staffer in the PMO that “the Sikh Indians in Vancouver recently wrote to Senator Stanbury that they felt ignored by the Trudeau administration. I think it would be a grave error to leave the formation of this Council solely in the hands of the Secretary of State’s department staff.”

In mid-August, Thompson advised the Prime Minister that he send a letter to ethnic organizations, immigrant affairs organizations, and newspaper editors before the election asking for input on the council’s composition. He was not keen on Cabinet’s most recent proposal to form a 200-person Advisory Council on Multiculturalism with representatives from each ethnic organization. Not only did he view such a council as unwieldy, but he also felt that Cabinet’s deliberations were delaying a further announcement about the Council, thereby hurting the Liberal’s electoral prospects.

“Your letter, prior to the election,” he wrote to Trudeau, “might reduce some of the cynicism which unfortunately many organizations have about multicultural pronouncements.” Thompson later told Martin O’Connell, who had taken over for Richard Stanbury as Minister of State for citizenship, that this “deep cynicism” on the part of ethnic communities was “justified”: “The Prime Minister announces an Ethnic Advisory Council and then it’s buried in the bureaucracy of the Secretary of State’s department while the cabinet fearfully hesitates about even announcing the

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Thompson’s persistence paid off. On the first of September 1972, Trudeau dissolved Parliament and called an election for 30 October. Pelletier, most likely at O’Connell’s recommendation, drafted a letter to ethnic minority organizations, asking for their advice on appointees to what was then called the National Advisory Council on Multiculturalism. In late September of 1972, Pelletier told the Canada Ethnic Press Federation about the government’s plan to create an Advisory Council on Multiculturalism. He noted that its job would be to “advise the government” in its ongoing work of rolling out the multiculturalism policy. Finally, one month into the election, the SOS formally asked a number of ethnic organizations and individuals to suggest potential candidates for the Advisory Council. Though it is difficult to gauge the degree to which ethnic minority groups were induced to vote Liberal by this announcement, it may have swayed editorial opinion. A week before the election, the Ukrainian News reported on the letter to ethnic organizations from Minister Pelletier. Roman Rakhmanney told his readers that he was not affiliated with any party and felt that

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72 Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 106, Pluralism: The Canadian Way; Notes for an address by the Honourable Gérard Pelletier to the Canada Ethnic Press Federation; Winnipeg, 29 September 1972, 13.
73 Among these groups were the Croatian Peasant Society, the Canada Ethnic Press Federation, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, the Pakistan Canada Cultural Association, the Czechoslovak National Association of Canada, the Trans-Canada Alliance of German-Canadians, the Canadian Arab Federation, the Canada-Korea Cultural Foundation, the Union of Russian Ethnic Organizations, the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Order of the Sons of Italy of Ontario, the Federation of India Associations, the Roumanian Association of Canada, the Sons of Norway, the United Council of Filipino Associations in Canada, the Hellenic Canadian Community of the Island of Montreal, and many others.
“not a single party in Canada has seriously treated Ukrainian Canadians or for that matter any other ethno-cultural group, on a par with the Anglo-British group.”\textsuperscript{74} That said, he applauded the Liberals for their new multiculturalism policy, which he felt had “great politico-social importance.”\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{Minister of State and Consultative Council}

While the multiculturalism policy of 1971 had had a much longer gestation period and was not tied to partisan concerns, the first major new development of the Multiculturalism Directorate, the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, was conceived in the middle of an election campaign and was hastened along because it was seen as politically expedient. Once the Trudeau Liberals were returned to power (albeit with a minority government), they made good on their promise to appoint an advisory council on ethnic affairs. In November of 1972, Stanley Haidasz, a second-generation Polish-Canadian MP was appointed the first Minister of State for Multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{76} What essentially amounted to a renaming of the Minister of State for Citizenship portfolio was a symbolic coup for advocates of multiculturalism. Haidasz had long supported the efforts of Yuzyk and other multiculturalists, and was on friendly terms with the Ukrainian community. He was also, as we have seen, one of the Liberal Party’s liaisons with ethnic minority communities. In announcing Haidasz’s appointment, Prime


\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{76} Canada, House of Commons Debates, 30 May 1973, 4264.
Minister Trudeau also announced the addition of $3 million to the multicultural programme, to be spent on grants, studies, and administration of the new secretariat. The Multiculturalism Secretariat or “Directorate,” as it became known, would continue to be run out of the Citizenship Branch.77

One of Haidasz’s first responsibilities was appointing the Advisory Council on Multiculturalism. The structure of the Council had been proposed by the Canadian Folk Arts Council in a letter to Pierre Trudeau via Senator Andrew Thompson.78 It had recommended a National Advisory Council, which would oversee the work of a Director and Secretariat (made up of civil servants). Hugh Faulkner, who replaced Gérard Pelletier as Secretary of State, still shared control over matters of citizenship and culture with Haidasz. He proposed that the Advisory Council would comprise both a national council and regional councils from the Maritimes, Ontario, Quebec, the Prairie Provinces, and British Columbia. The national council would report to the Secretary of State and advise him on how best the cultural agencies in the SOS could become more receptive to ethnic minority communities.79 Though Trudeau initially felt that provincial councils would make more sense, his staff assured him that it was a sound idea as “ethno-cultural organizations [were] less numerous, particularly in the Maritimes.” Moreover, recognition of individual provinces would be seen in Quebec as an infringement on provincial rights. Regions, quite simply, were less politically charged.80

77 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 30 May 1973, 4264.
According to Bernard Ostry, Pelletier’s Assistant Under-secretary of State, recent developments in the provinces also made it imperative that the federal government followed through on its promise to create an Advisory Council. The Alberta government had appointed a fifty-person Ethnic Advisory Council; Manitoba had a cultural development officer and a fifteen-person Advisory Committee on Multiculturalism, and it was expected that Ontario would follow suit.\(^1\) With Ostry’s assistance, Haidasz submitted a memorandum to Cabinet on 9 March 1973 which called for a “Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism,” expanded grants programs, additional funds, and an approval of these programs for a five-year period.\(^2\) The proposed Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (or CCCM) would comprise 100 members, appointed by the Minister. Eighty percent of the membership would be drawn from the ethnic minority communities, while the remaining twenty percent would be members of the French, English, and Native communities.\(^3\)

But the appointment of the CCCM did not go smoothly. George Manuel of the National Indian Brotherhood wrote to Trudeau in early January 1973 expressing his dismay that the NIB had not been consulted. “In speaking to members and leaders of ethnic communities,” Manuel wrote, “I have come to understand that they are already in receipt of letters sent from your office requesting them to participate in this committee.”\(^4\)

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\(^3\) Ibid., 5.

\(^4\) Manuel also noted that the CCCM had been mentioned in the January 4th throne speech. LAC, Pierre Elliott Trudeau fonds, MG26 O7, vol. 37, file 12, 040.2 Pers. & Conf. General—Language and Ethnic Groups—Official Languages Act—Personal and Confidential, Jan.-Apr. 1973, George Manuel to Pierre
Given the delicacy of the situation, the PMO chose to respond to the letter directly, rather than forward it to Haidasz’s office. The PMO sent a quick reply to Manuel to the effect that his concerns were being brought to the Prime Minister. Even as the PMO was drafting a reply, Manuel responded to the letter by noting that he was “quite used to receiving these non-committal replies from your office.” He reiterated the “deplorable situation” that the Prime Minister had precipitated by ignoring the NIB in his call for candidates for the CCCM. PMO staff scrambled to find a reason for this oversight. An internal memo noted that the views of approximately eighty groups had been solicited, none of which were Native organizations. The official response to Manuel’s missive made the case that Native organizations had not been consulted because the initial letters had been sent to the ethnic minority groups, who would comprise 80% of the Advisory Council. The other 20% — the English, French, and Native communities — would be consulted later. Trudeau’s staff claimed that consultations with these groups “would be quite different in scope and in nature.”

Another problem was a lack of clear chain of authority within the Multiculturalism Directorate and the SOS. Leslie Pal has made the case that the Multiculturalism Directorate was structurally compromised from the outset because it was housed within the Citizenship Branch, rather than its own ministry. “Oddly,” he writes, “the ministry was grafted on to the Citizenship Branch, so that while it was only

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one program in that branch it had its own minister. This organizational confusion led to friction between Haidasz and Ostry…”\textsuperscript{88} Despite the fact that Haidasz was the Minister of State for Multiculturalism and should have had clear jurisdiction over the Citizenship Branch, Assistant Under-secretary of State Bernard Ostry viewed Haidasz’s role as somehow separate from the CB and even the Department of the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{89} In practice, this meant that Ostry, Under-secretary of State Jean Boucher, and Secretary of State Hugh Faulkner had the final say over major appointments and decisions. The Prime Minister’s Office also took an unprecedented interest in the way that the Multiculturalism Directorate engaged with ethnic communities. Martin O’Connell in the PMO, wrote to Trudeau in April of 1973 to express his concern over the Cabinet decision of 15 March that the Prime Minister personally appoint members of the CCCM.\textsuperscript{90} He recommended that Minister Haidasz appoint the counsellors, as the appointments would likely “give rise to controversy and backbiting within and among the various ethno-cultural communities” in any case.\textsuperscript{91} According to O’Connell, there was little political gain to be had from being personally involved in appointments.

By the middle of May 1973, Haidasz had appointed 88 members of a new


\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 118.

\textsuperscript{90} Martin O’Connell, who had taken over for Stanbury as Minister of State responsible for citizenship, had been defeated in the 1972 election. He worked in the PMO until his re-election in 1974.

advisory body called the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM). One-third of the council members were appointed for one-year terms, one-third for two-year terms, and one-third for terms of up to three years. They were ostensibly “chosen on the basis of their ethno-cultural heritage and for their expertise and knowledge of Canada’s ethno-cultures.” A three-person executive (a chair and two vice-presidents) and two members of the Citizenship Branch oversaw the regional representatives. The National Chair was Julius Koteles, a former Liberal candidate for the House of Commons and an active member of the arts community in Winnipeg. In addition to two vice-chairs, Dr. Lino Magagna and Agathe Lacoursiere-Lacerte, five men representing the regional councils were also appointed to sit on the National Executive. Three of the regional representatives had been intimately involved in the multiculturalism discussion: Professor Manoly Lupul represented the Prairies; Ted Glista of the CEPF and Saul Hayes of the CJC represented Ontario and Quebec, respectively. The executive was rounded out by Horst Koehler, representing British Columbia, and Joseph Ghiz, who would go on to become the Premier of Prince Edward Island, representing the Atlantic Provinces. A number of the regional members of the CCM had also been prominent supporters of multiculturalism.

As Lupul later recalled, the first meeting of Ontario Regional Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, held on 16 June 1973 in Toronto, revealed the amount of political meddling in the council. Vice-chair Lacoursiere-Lacerte, Ontario chairman

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92 The Council’s terms of reference, contained in Haidasz and Ostry’s memorandum, allowed for a Council of up to 100 members.
94 Ibid., 7.
Glista, and National Chair Koteles, all present at the meeting, were Liberals. Glista was, according to Lupul, a “good Liberal” and one of several people who were appointed for their political views as much as their “ethnic” pedigree. Other members of the Ontario CCCM were “openly admitting that they had never heard of multiculturalism and owed their appointment to being “good Liberals.”” Lacoursiere-Lacerte was appointed at the recommendation of Martin O’Connell in the Prime Minister’s Office; he felt that one member of the three-person executive should be French Canadian, in order to stave off complaints from that community.

Indeed, Lacoursiere-Lacerte was evidently unaware of the multicultural movement or even her own government’s understanding of ethnicity. She became upset by Lupul’s presentation to the council in which he argued that, in some regions, English-Ukrainian or English-German bilingualism should be given federal support. Lupul suggested that western Canadians could not be expected to learn French in areas where German or Ukrainian-speaking populations were more numerous: “To someone who had never thought of Canada in anything but bilingual and bicultural terms and knew little of the west (she admitted to having travelled only as far as Winnipeg), my paper could be

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97 In attendance at the first meeting were a number of ministers and former ministers, including Donald Macdonald, Robert Stanbury, and Martin O’Connell. Manoly Lupul, The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir (Edmonton/Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005), 180.

quite upsetting.” Lacoursiere-Lacerte was so disturbed by Lupul’s presentation that she had his paper translated into French and “distributed to several members of the B & B Commission and some forty others.” Ironically, she asked former Royal Commissioner Jaroslav Rudnyckyj, who held very similar views to those of Lupul, if Lupul’s comments were congruent with the RCBB’s understanding of language and culture. “This is of great importance to the French groups outside the Province of Quebec,” she wrote, “who fear to be considered as Ethnic.” Lupul’s friend within the Citizenship Branch, Stan Zybala, advised Haidasz that Mme. Lacoursiere-Lacerte’s attempts to sully Lupul’s name should be raised with CCCM Chair Julius Koteles, and that her term as vice-chair should not be extended. Lacoursiere-Lacerte was replaced by Suzanne Drouin in 1974.

Though Haidasz had friends like Zybala and Lupul in the Citizenship Branch and the CCCM, his tenure as Minister of State for Multiculturalism was as troubled as that of Lacoursiere-Lacerte’s on the CCCM. At least part of this can be attributed to his own actions. As one of the former Liberal liaisons with ethnic minority communities, he spent his year and a half as Minister of State for Multiculturalism on the road, promoting multiculturalism at conferences, speeches, and photo opportunities with ethnic leaders. Manoly Lupul later pointed out that Haidasz had a tendency to give long, “ponderous” speeches in which he defended the multiculturalism policy, regardless of the audience. He told the Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen’s Federation of Edmonton, a group that had advocated multiculturalism from the beginning, that 8 October 1971 “would

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99 Ibid., 179-180.
100 Ibid., 179.
come to be remembered by many Canadians as one of the most crucial dates in Canadian history.” Haidasz then qualified his statement by noting that “this realization was probably not shared by too many Canadians because not all of them immediately recognized the importance of this declaration that Canada is a multicultural society.”

Haidasz often used these speeches as an opportunity to attack the detractors of multiculturalism in the press. “There have been those who said that the multicultural policy has been one of “tokenism”,” he said. “We reject this view entirely.” Instead of spending his time promoting multiculturalism to French Canadians or other communities that had not embraced the policy, Haidasz went on a victory lap of the ethnic communities.

The area of Haidasz’s Directorate which attracted the most negative attention was its “new” Grants Program. On 30 May 1973, Haidasz announced “32 grants totalling $127,545.” Among the grants announced were a $3,000 grant to the Canadian Hungarian Authors Association to aid in the publication of an anthology of Hungarian Canadian writers; $5,000 to the Comité Maison d’Haiti of Montreal, which would help “to establish an information and referral centre to serve resident Haitian families and recent immigrants”; and $2,000 to the Manitou Arts Foundation of Toronto “to finance a display of work by young Indian artists.” A more substantial grant of $18,000 was provided to C.O.S.T.I. (Community Organization Serving the Immigrant), of Hamilton,

104 Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 106, Notes for a speech by the Honourable Stanley Haidasz to the Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen’s Federation, Edmonton, 19 May 1973, 1.
105 Ibid., 4.
106 Concordia University Library Special Collections, Rudnyckyj Archives, Box 106, Minister of State for Multiculturalism, News Release: Federal Multiculturalism Grants, 30 May 1973, 1.
107 Ibid., 2.
Ontario, to help the organization to open a Multicultural Centre. A number of other grants helped the Estonian, Polish and Ukrainian communities to publish textbooks, fund summer programs, and provide teaching aids to schools. While there was an infusion of $1 million into the Citizenship Branch/Multiculturalism Directorate for grants, only a small amount of it reached ethnic communities; much of the allotment was spent on studies and multiculturalism programming in the National Film Board, the National Archives, and other federal cultural agencies, as had been laid out in the multiculturalism policy document. The grants to ethnic minority organizations were criticized as “song and dance” or “pizza and pysanky” support of multiculturalism. Detractors of multiculturalism saw them as a handout to ethnic minority communities, while supporters often viewed the grants as tokenism when what was needed were structural changes to institutions like the CBC and schools to allow for more ethnic language programming. In actual fact, the Grants Program differed only in name and in its public profile from the Citizenship Branch’s longstanding grants program. The Citizenship Branch essentially carried on funding voluntary organizations as it had since the 1950s.

Unfortunately for Haidasz, his victory lap, photo opportunities, and spending were brought into the public spotlight in June of 1973, when a leaked memo was published in the *Globe and Mail*. On 18 June 1973, the *Globe and Mail* published excerpts from Bernard Ostry’s recent memorandum to Haidasz regarding his proposed

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108 Ibid., 3.
submission to the Treasury Board. Ostry noted his concerns with Haidasz’s request for $230,745 to advertise the multiculturalism program in ethnic language publications. In April, despite Ostry’s reservations, Haidasz had authorized the publication of “a costly four-page supplement in 133 ethnic publications, with large photos of himself, Trudeau, and the delegation [from the Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen’s Federation of Edmonton].” Ostry’s concern was that almost one-quarter of the Secretariat’s budget would be spent on advertising, when other programs within the Citizenship Branch, such as Native Participation and Opportunities for Youth spent virtually nothing on advertising. Although it was in keeping with the Liberal Party’s and the Cabinet’s new commitment to advertising in ethnic publications, Haidasz’s request (which Ostry dutifully submitted for approval), and his ultimate decision to spend the money, went a bit too far. To the public, it looked like an ethnic slush-fund. The Globe & Mail’s editorial staff, while pointing out the “testy” tone of Ostry’s memo, made the case that “Four-page special sections in 133 publications possibly had all the advantages of saturation bombing in addressing messages to our minorities.”

Ostry, who was a good friend of Trudeau, was most likely expressing the government’s feelings about the relative importance of multiculturalism policy relative to the SOS’s other programs. According to Lupul, “Haidasz was, in effect, hung out to

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112 Terrence Belford, “Civil Servant terms Haidasz’ bid for funds ‘unwise’: $230,745 sought to advertise ethnic programs,” Globe & Mail, 18 June 1973, 1. It was later revealed that Haidasz’s executive assistant, Mel McInnis, had leaked the memo; he resigned his post.
dry” by Ostry.  

Even more troubling was that Secretary of State Faulkner chose not to discipline or fire Ostry; this indicates that, on some level, Faulkner agreed with Ostry’s assessment of Haidasz’s stewardship. Haidasz did receive support from some quarters. The Federation of Italian Canadian Associations wrote to the Prime Minister that they were “disturbed” at recent media reports that Haidasz did not have the support of his staff. But the Minister could never recover from the charge that he was purchasing ethnic votes.

Haidasz’s final move as Minister of State for Multiculturalism was to sponsor the “First Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism,” held in October 1973 at the Government Conference Centre in Ottawa. Though the Citizenship Branch had always been careful to maintain good relations with ethnic minority organizations, the organizing of the conference underscored the degree to which things had changed in only a few years’ time. The first national meeting of the CCCM was held in conjunction with the conference. The conference was designed to look into a number of issues that interested Haidasz and his staff, including “the arts in a multicultural society; the attitude of youth to multiculturalism; overcoming inequality; the immigrant in a multicultural society; language and culture retention; and the preservation of our multicultural heritage.” In a letter to Walter Tarnopolsky, the Vice-President Academic of York University who served as a representative for Ontario on the CCCM, Jennifer McQueen of the Citizenship Branch noted that the conference was meant to discuss “how best the

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120 Ibid., 1.
minority cultures can contribute to shaping the mainstream of Canadian society, and how all Canadians may benefit from the cultural diversity of our nation.”\textsuperscript{121}

Though Haidasz had had a good relationship with multiculturalists and ethnic organizations, during the preparations for the First Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism, he lost the confidence of a number of key players. Again, this came about because of meddling from above. Secretary of State Faulkner, who, like Pelletier before him, had a final say over what his junior minister did, decided to piggyback the first meeting of the CCCM on top of the second “Thinkers’ Conference on Cultural Rights,” organized by Senator Paul Yuzyk. Yuzyk and his “Canadian Cultural Rights Committee” organized both the 1968 conference and the 1973 joint CCCM-CCRC conference. Though Faulkner suggested that this combined effort would result in “a more comprehensive and substantial national gathering on multiculturalism,” in reality the Department of the Secretary of State commandeered the “Thinkers’ Conference.”\textsuperscript{122}

Whereas Yuzyk had personally invited delegates to his conference in 1968, the Department of the Secretary of State would now choose who was invited. Yuzyk responded to Faulkner in an open letter to the media and to the Prime Minister:

\begin{quote}
The Canadian Cultural Rights Committee, the Senate Committee of Patrons and the Canadian Folk Arts Council agreed to co-operate with the government to make the conference a joint undertaking. … We did not agree that the government conference should be limited to 100 delegates in addition to the members of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, both hand-picked by the government. We did not agree that the 100 delegates should be selected by the government. We
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{121} At this point, Jennifer McQueen was the Chair of Citizens’ Cultures in the SOS. LAC, Walter Surma Tarnopolsky fonds, MG 31 E55, vol. 10, file 10-1, Multiculturalism N.D., 1967, 1973-1975, Jennifer McQueen to Walter Tarnopolsky, 21 September 1973, 1.
insisted that all our delegates to the postponed conference (260 persons) should be included as they were chosen by the national organizations of the various ethno-cultural groups and hence were more representative.¹²³

Yuzyk’s open letter was signed by a number of multiculturalists, including Ted Glista and Julius Koteles, who were, respectively, the Secretary and National Chair of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism. Haidasz was caught in between a senior minister and the ethnic leaders with whom he had cultivated relationships for a number of years. Haidasz responded to Yuzyk’s missive in a letter to the members of the Canadian Cultural Rights Committee (or CCRC). He argued that while adequate representation of all ethnic groups was desirable, unity among all ethnic groups was the goal of the CCCM: “I think you will agree that the idea of a multicultural society implies … the creation of a larger identity within which each group may feel an equal interest.”¹²⁴

Although Faulkner relented slightly and allowed 50 more delegates from Yuzyk’s list to attend, the damage had been done; Haidasz had lost the confidence of key members of the CCCM and the de facto leader of the multicultural movement.

The First Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism on October 1973 highlighted the divide that still ran between ethnic minority communities and the Canadian Government. Perhaps the most important resolution to emerge from the conference — that the Canadian government “establish a full Department of Multiculturalism, separate from the Department of the Secretary of State, with its own self-sustaining budget and

staff” — did not come to pass until 1988. Ken O’Bryan, who had been commissioned by the Multiculturalism Directorate to write a “Non-Official Languages Study,” presented his early findings to a workshop on “Language and Cultural Retention.” Though his study would have, if adopted, gone a long way toward easing the concerns that Ukrainians had about language retention and its relationship to culture, the Minister did not table the study for another four years. The Trudeau Government was content to recognize Canada’s ethnic diversity as one of its assets, but was not willing to address any of the substantive concerns about language that so worried certain ethnic communities. The emphasis placed on bilingualism by the Department of the Secretary of State was clearly greater than that placed on multiculturalism, and a full department (or even a secretariat separate from the Citizenship Branch) might have appeased multiculturalists.

**Progressive-Conservatives react**

The Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism was the product of a hurried election-time response to Robert Stanfield’s endorsement of multiculturalism. Though it could have proved a valuable asset to the Government and the Liberal Party as a sounding board for ethnic minority communities, the CCCM’s perceived partisan bias did little to win over Ukrainian Canadian Conservatives, like Senator Paul Yuzyk, and

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Members of Parliament Paul Yewchuk, and John Yaremko. Their endorsement of the Committee would have given it greater credibility. While Yuzyk carried on with his Canadian Cultural Rights Committee, Paul Yewchuk, the Tories’ multiculturalism critic, struck a private Committee on Multiculturalism a few months after the 1972 election. Paul Hellyer, who had abandoned the Liberal Party in 1969 to sit as an Independent MP and had been elected as a Progressive-Conservative, was invited to sit on Yewchuk’s new committee. He brought with him several years of experience working with Andrew Thompson on the ethnic file. At the Committee’s second meeting, it was noted that the Multiculturalism Directorate was “directed to a political motive rather than effective multicultural activity”; the Committee agreed that the Progressive-Conservative Party had the opportunity to “promote activity and thus give the ethnic peoples a definite comparison.”

However, the Tories were not interested in offering more than lip service to the notion of multiculturalism. Yewchuk’s committee prepared a resolution on multiculturalism for the party’s general meeting in March 1974. In a background paper for the resolution, the committee noted that the RCBB had “recognized Canada’s two largest cultural groups…but an embellishment and expansion of the concept was required.” Like the Liberal Party, the Tories saw the “other ethnic groups” as a side issue to the larger French-English problem. Moreover, the party did not wish to give

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129 LAC, Paul T. Hellyer fonds, MG 32 B-33, vol. 233, file 25, House of Commons – Multiculturalism Committee (P.C.), 1972-1973, Multiculturalism; This document has been prepared as a background paper for discussion purposes at the General Meeting of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, March 17-19, 1974.
special treatment to minority ethnic groups to the exclusion of the French and British:

Certain multicultural affairs being sponsored by the Secretary of State and other government agencies are of little benefit or meaningful value. Examples are the three-day conferences and two-day music festivals. These monies should, instead, be spent on developing well-planned and self-renewing cultural and social programs for all ethnic groups.\footnote{LAC, Paul T. Hellyer fonds, MG 32 B-33, vol. 233, file 25, House of Commons – Multiculturalism Committee (P.C.), 1972-1973, Supplemental Policy Resolutions -- Progressive Conservative Association of Canada -- General Meeting, Ottawa -- March 17, 18, 19, 1974, 1.}

The Tories opted not to adopt the Committee’s recommendation of a “Multicultural Act” in 1974. Bohdan Bociurkiw views this as an indication that the party was not willing to risk upsetting French Canadian voters.\footnote{Bohdan Bociurkiw, “The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community,” in \textit{Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism, and Separatism: An Assessment}, edited by Manoly R. Lupul (Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies/The University of Alberta Press, 1978), 115.} As party leader Robert Stanfield had said upon Trudeau’s introduction of the policy, “multiculturalism in no way constitutes an attack on the basic duality of our country.”\footnote{Canada, House of Commons Debates, \textit{Hansard}, 8 October 1971, 8546.}

While the Tories believed that there had been a “trending of ethnic groups to the Conservative Party” because it had lost its association with Anglo-British nationalism, some Liberals were convinced that the decline in support for the Liberal Party in the 1972 election was due to the fact that the party had “no overall program to win the ethnics.”\footnote{LAC, Paul T. Hellyer fonds, MG 32 B-33, vol. 233, file 25, House of Commons – Multiculturalism Committee (P.C.), 1972-1973, Minutes of 2nd Meeting – Multiculturalism Caucus Committee, 2. LAC, Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau fonds, 1968-1974 PMO Priority Correspondence Series, MG 26 O7, vol. 41, file 41.5, “045 General – Language and Ethnic Groups – Ethnic Groups, 1968-1974,” Stan Martyn to Robert Murdoch, 22 February 1974.}

What seems clear is that neither party was willing to fully embrace multiculturalism for fear of a French Canadian backlash.

Conclusions

When Haidasz left his post as Minister of State for Multiculturalism in 1974, the Minister of Labour, John Munro, replaced him. At the regional meeting of the Ontario members of the CCCM, held in November 1974, two councillors asked why Haidasz had been “dropped” as Minister of State responsible for Multiculturalism. Neither Ontario Regional Chair Ted Glista nor Munro offered an explanation to the council. Instead, Glista reminded his colleagues that they were responsible to the new minister and that “the replacement of Dr. Haidasz does not change the emphasis placed on this policy by the government."\(^{134}\) Despite Glista’s reassurances, the government’s commitment to multiculturalism had waned. Munro’s attention was focused on his main role as Minister of Labour.\(^{135}\) More importantly, Munro began to move the Directorate away from supporting the cultural activities of ethnic organizations which, as McRoberts points out, “tended to favour the better-organized groups,” to an emphasis on helping visible minorities to adjust to Canadian life.\(^{136}\) This change in direction would anger CCCM Chair Julus Koteles and lead Munro to ask for his resignation. But it was simply one snub among many. The ethnic minority groups that had pushed so hard for a multiculturalism policy and Ethnic Advisory Council got half measures from the Government and could see that it had no intention of addressing their concerns about language and education.

Moreover, the CCCM, which could have become a springboard for the language programs that multiculturalists so desperately wanted, was largely ineffective and stacked


\(^{136}\) Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 127.
with Liberal appointees. The Liberal Party confirmed as much and more in a 1974 internal policy document called the “Ethnic Strategy.” The anonymous partisan writer noted that during the previous year, “several strategies designed to maintain and improve support for the Government and the Liberal Party amongst this [ethnic minority] electorate have been discussed by Cabinet Committee and by Cabinet.”\(^{137}\) Among the strategies were the appointment of a Minister of State for Multiculturalism, the appointment of “ethnic” Senators, advertisement in the ethnic press, liaison work between the Multiculturalism Directorate and the Department of External Affairs, and public relations relating to the *Citizenship Act*. The “Ethnic Strategy” would also be implemented by using the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism to carry out consultations with ethnic groups designed to “increase [the] level of awareness and sensitivity to ethnic concerns in the Liberal family.”\(^{138}\)

Political meddling, Haidasz’s dual role as Minister and liaison with the “other ethnic groups,” a failure to bring leaders like Yuzyk into the policy-making process, and an overall lack of commitment to multiculturalism by the Liberal government, resulted in the multiculturalism policy failing to take off in a meaningful way. During the 1950s and 1960s, successive governments – from Louis St. Laurent to Diefenbaker to Pearson – were content to leave the Citizenship Branch alone. In the absence of political interference, Branch staff created programs designed to integrate immigrants and ethnic minorities into Canadian society. Trudeau’s rebranding of these programs as

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“multiculturalism” programs had the unintended effect of publicizing the work of the Citizenship Branch, thereby exposing it to public scrutiny. Haidasz’s fall from grace highlighted the degree to which multiculturalism policy had strayed from its roots. Grants and programs that had helped small ethnic voluntary organizations establish a firm footing, supported inter-ethnic conferences, and generally contributed to greater cooperation between ethnic minority communities and members of the “charter” groups were now politically suspect. A new era of multiculturalism policy had begun.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

“Baba was a Bohunk and So Am I — a stranger, despite three generations in Canada.”

- Myrna Kostash

In an essay published in 1977 in the *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies*, Ukrainian Canadian writer Myrna Kostash cheekily recounted the recent history of her people and their attempts to become “Canadians.” The protagonist of her story, the allegorical Ukrainian grandmother or “Baba,” had no other desire than to see her (second-generation) children be successful. “The hyphenated Canadians who became lawyers, doctors, and professors,” Kostash writes, “were the exceptions that proved the rule: the fuss made about them within the ethnic community was fantastic.” In spite of their minor successes at blending into the new country, however, Baba’s children could never “‘pass’ as average citizens”:

At that point, the children became hostile. In their chagrin and disappointment, they defiantly resurrected the left-hand side of the hyphen. The Ukrainian-Canadian was born. And the sub-culture of ethnicity took off. It was fuelled by a number of noisy intellectuals who had refused throughout the pioneering era, to take their lumps as second-class citizens. As lawyers, members of legislatures and Parliament, schoolteachers, and newspaper men and women (in the ethnic press), they had consistently urged their compatriots to insist on their rights as Ukrainian-

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1 This article originally appeared in *Saturday Night*. Myrna Kostash, “Baba was a Bohunk and So Am I — a Stranger, Despite Three Generations in Canada,” *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 2, no. 1 (Spring, 1977): 69.

2 Myrna Kostash, “Baba was a Bohunk and So Am I — a Stranger, Despite Three Generations in Canada,” *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 2, no. 1 (Spring, 1977): 71.
Canadians and not as some soulless, assimilated facsimile of an Anglo-Saxon.  

Kostash’s allegory for the Ukrainian Canadian experience represents the kind of difficulties that confronted members of ethnic minority communities in the postwar period. The dominant discourse of the time focused on “bilingualism and biculturalism,” and left little room for Baba’s children. In a relatively short period of time, Ukrainian Canadians and other members of ethnic minority communities became politicized around the issue of ethnic identity. A handful of voluntary organizations and activists from across the country were able to get “multiculturalism” on the national agenda in a time in which the rights of French Canadians dominated the national discussion. With more money, time, political debate, and editorial space was given over to the Quiet Revolution and the concerns emerging out of Quebec than perhaps any other issue in this period, the ability of activists and organizations to keep “multiculturalism” in the public spotlight was nothing if not impressive. By any measure, the multicultural movement was a success.

But if we are to truly understand why the Trudeau Government adopted a policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” in October 1971, we must look beyond the easy and sepia-tinted stories to which we have become accustomed. I have argued in this dissertation that the multicultural movement was one of a number of forces that coalesced in the 1960s. In that period, state discourse about multiculturalism intersected with that of the multicultural movement, as well as a number of other intangible factors, such as international Human Rights discourse. The more tangible factors that are often associated with the rise of multiculturalism, such as the Quiet Revolution, the Royal

3 Ibid., 71.
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and the government of Pierre Trudeau, were all undoubtedly important variables that contributed to the rise of the multiculturalism policy. However, they do not, in themselves, explain where the policy originated or why it came about when it did.

In the Canadian context, it is often difficult to differentiate between the public ideology of “multiculturalism” and the state policy with which it is often associated. But, as this dissertation has shown, the Canadian State was interested in “cultural pluralism” almost a decade before the multicultural movement took off and popularized the term “multiculturalism.” For the Citizenship Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, cultural pluralism was understood as a core value beginning in the mid to late-1950s. Over time this philosophy evolved from a means of assimilating ethnic minorities and immigrants, to a sense that cultural and ethnic diversity was a source of strength and even unity in a divisive age. Moreover, the Citizenship Branch developed the programs that we now associate with “multiculturalism” in the two decades preceding the creation of Trudeau’s multiculturalism policy.

What this dissertation suggests is that the Canadian state played a more important role in the development of “multiculturalism” than has previously been acknowledged. My dissertation builds on the work of scholars like Nandor Dreisziger, Franca Iacovetta, Ivana Caccia, and Bohdan Kordan, who have shown how the Canadian state came to view ethnic diversity in a more positive light or, indeed, as an important part of Canadian identity. Whereas they show that the state often tried to mould these groups to a particular pattern in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, my work indicates that the state began to see ethnic minority communities as potential contributors to a new Canadian identity. The
most important factor behind the adoption of multiculturalism as a state policy was the Citizenship Branch and the programs it began in the early 1950s. These programs, designed to integrate immigrants, aid in the development of ethnic minority voluntary organizations, and reassure Canadians that ethnic minorities and immigrants were “good Canadians” too, essentially made “multiculturalism” a state program by the late 1950s. More importantly, perhaps, Citizenship Branch officials promoted a philosophy of cultural pluralism or “multiculturalism” which was adopted by many of their constituents in the various ethnic minority communities and would, eventually, be embraced by the mainstream of Canadian society.

The ethos underlying the evolution of multiculturalism policy and programs was “unity in diversity.” The Citizenship Branch of the 1950s and 1960s sought to integrate all ethnic groups, including Indigenous Peoples, into the mainstream of Canadian life. But it also tried to educate Canadians and those outside of Canada about the richness that ethnic minority communities brought to Canadian culture and the way in which these communities contributed to the larger “Canadian” culture. Citizenship Branch staff were not alone in this endeavour. Even the leaders of the multicultural movement were as concerned about unity as they were with diversity. As Bruno Tenhunen told a gathering of the Canada Ethnic Press Federation in 1964, “We must identify ourselves with and dedicate ourselves to a united Canada. We must constantly endeavor [sic] to reconcile the hopes and desires of our diverse groups with the ideal of sharing in the efforts to achieve the common good.”

“Multiculturalism,” then, was a social philosophy that encouraged Canadians to celebrate their differences, but also their similarities.

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Historiographical and scholarly issues

This dissertation calls into question the way in which most scholars have understood the origins of multiculturalism. Perhaps the best book-length treatment of the Trudeau “vision” of Canada is Kenneth McRoberts’ *Misconceiving Canada*. His argument, which has been adopted by many scholars is that Pierre Trudeau introduced the multiculturalism policy in order to effectively nullify the idea of “biculturalism,” then so popular in Quebec. While Trudeau entrenched pan-Canadian French and English bilingualism with the *Official Languages Act* of 1969, he could not extend the same treatment to culture, as that would have implied that Quebec was a nation. Trudeau introduced a multiculturalism policy primarily as a means of declaring that the Quebec nation would not receive state sanction, and only secondarily as a response to the multicultural movement.

While there is little evidence to suggest that McRoberts was wrong about Trudeau’s motivations, there is a wealth of evidence to prove that other factors were also at play. McRoberts’ interpretation, while in keeping with what we know of Trudeau’s personal understanding of Canada, is not consistent with the way in which multiculturalism policy actually evolved in Canada. As I have argued, the Canadian State had introduced “multicultural” programs and evolved a philosophy of cultural pluralism — if not multiculturalism — as early as the 1950s. The hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the multicultural movement, and, finally, the Trudeau Government, were all factors in the development of multiculturalism policy, but they were not the most important factors. Rather, the staff of the Citizenship
Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration deserves most of the credit for changing the way that the Canadian State — and, by extension, Canadians — think about ethnic and cultural diversity. Trudeau’s seeming embrace of “multiculturalism” in 1970 did little to change the way that the State dealt with ethnic diversity. Instead, it was a politically savvy move in which the government was able to re-brand existing practices and programs as “multicultural.”

Rather than creating an entirely new public approach to ethnicity, Trudeau appropriated pre-existing programs that the Citizenship Branch had developed over two decades, and language that had been popularized by activists in the multicultural movement. The Trudeau Government’s interest in citizen “participation” and Robert Stanbury’s citizenship objectives may have provided the theoretical and political justification for multiculturalism policy, but the public philosophy and programs launched by the Liberal Party in 1971 did not diverge significantly from existing or historical practice in the Citizenship Branch.Moreover, it is not clear that multiculturalism displaced biculturalism; instead, it seems, biculturalism or “the two solitudes” became an assumption or a subtext, hovering just below the surface of the multicultural veneer that was (officially) adopted in 1971. For Pierre Trudeau, recognition that Canada contained many ethnic groups did not negate the fact that French Canadians still had the power to break up the country; he would spend the rest of his political career (and some of his extra-parliamentary career) trying to prevent such a scenario.

Similarly, scholars who attribute the policy to the multicultural movement are only telling half of the story. The movement was clearly successful in introducing
“multiculturalism” as an idea into the public debate after 1963. Further, the consultations between the Citizenship Branch, Ministers Stanbury and Pelletier, and various ethnic minority voluntary organizations had an impact on the kinds of programs attached to the 1971 multiculturalism policy as well as the language adopted by the Trudeau Government. In this sense, some activists within the movement (and many outside of the movement who were, simply, consulted by the CB) had an effect on the making of public policy. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the movement had a direct impact on bringing about the public policy. The CB’s consultations with its constituents in 1970 and early 1971 was not a consultation with the “movement,” so much as it was part of an ongoing dialogue between the Branch and various voluntary organizations. As the consultations showed, though a majority of organizations were interested in “cultural pluralism,” they were divided over the degree to which the federal government should support non-official languages, and exhibited a range of opinions consistent with their diversity.

The multicultural movement itself had only limited success during the late 1950s and 1960s. After an initial flurry of activity surrounding the hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the movement was unable to appeal to a broad range of constituents. Indeed, the movement only represented a fraction of the “ethnic” population in Canada; for example, the Jewish Canadian community and many visible minority communities did not become involved in the movement until after 1971. Nonetheless, ethnic minority groups increasingly became a part of mainstream political discourse because of the multicultural movement. As early as June of 1964, the Times of London, England would report that there were “three components of the nation: the
British Canadians, the French Canadians, and the tiersmonde, the one-third of Canada’s population that is made up of the various European races.”  

Much as the Quiet Revolution had thrust French Canadians and Quebecois onto the national stage in new and important ways, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism made ethnic groups a concern for more than just a handful of bureaucrats in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

Following Matt James, I suggest that we should view the movement as a “loosely organized coalition of ethnic minorities” that was nominally headed by Ukrainian Canadian voluntary organizations. The multicultural movement, limited as it was to a handful of activists, did not constitute a “social movement,” but was instead a “political movement” that had a range of material aspirations, such as the desire for minority language schools. Though Mennonite and German organizations lobbied the Federal Government and the Royal Commission for minority language schools, Ukrainians were the most vocal in this regard. The movement was successful in placing multiculturalism on the public agenda, but its leaders would have to wait almost a decade to see changes to ethnic language education. In 1978 the Alberta Government introduced bilingual English-Ukrainian schools; Manitoba and Saskatchewan followed suit in 1979.

In unpacking some of the language used in this period, I have engaged with the idea

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5 “Should Canada Retain Two Official Languages? Rivalries in a Nation of Two Cultures,” The Times (London), 23 June 1964, 10.
of the “third force,” which one still finds in modern scholarship. As early as 1966, Elizabeth Wangenheim noted that the “third element” was synonymous with Ukrainians; in her study of the “Third Force,” she noted that scholarly journals, news media, and public intellectuals invariably referred to Ukrainians when discussing the “third element” and what it wanted.\(^9\) But when significant national ethnic organizations like the Netherlands Canada Cultural Council and the Canadian Jewish Congress did not advocate either “multiculturalism” or a “third force,” it made lobbying in the name of “one third” of Canadians downright impossible. Moreover, when groups like the Netherlands Canada Cultural Council openly supported biculturalism (it preferred “to speak of “dualism” referring to the two main traditions — English and French — which dominate the Canadian cultures”), it made the job of multiculturalists even harder.\(^10\)

Manoly Lupul later wrote that the third force had been “an empty political construct.”\(^11\) Many Canadians, including members of the “founding peoples,” used “third force” as shorthand for “ethnic” or “immigrant” during the 1960s. There was also a great deal of slippage in the way the term was employed, both within and outside the movement. Some, like Senator Paul Yuzyk, spoke of the “third element,” in reference to the notion that ethnic minorities were said to represent one-third of the total population.\(^12\) Some made the case that the “third force” was a real and impending threat to the British and French “founding peoples,” while others argued that the third force was still emerging as a threat.\(^13\)

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As scholars we should be aware of the slipperiness of this term and its contested history. What this dissertation suggests is that while the leaders of the multicultural movement often referred to their movement as a “third force,” it is unwise to accept this idea at face value. As Rogers Brubaker argues “we should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopolitical practice as our categories of social analysis.”\textsuperscript{14} A number of organizations and individuals insisted that they were part of a “third force” during the 1960s and early 1970s; this does not, however, prove that the “third force” existed. The lesson should be that the “third force” has little analytical value for scholars. If we want to discuss the mobilization of ethnic minority communities in the postwar period, we should do so using a framework that is both historically consistent and analytically rigourous.

**Theoretical considerations**

The creation of a liberal, multicultural order in the Canadian state was uneven, contested, and took more than two decades to come to fruition. As Ian McKay points out, during the latter part of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century into the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Canadian state became more “liberal,” albeit grudgingly at times:

Confronted with a serious quasi-revolutionary challenge to its hegemony, the liberal state executed far-ranging changes in its social and political project to 'include' some of those previously excluded, with the *quid pro quo* that they divest themselves of the most radical aspects of their oppositional programs.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} His emphasis. Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity without groups,” *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 43.2 (2002): 166.

\textsuperscript{15} Ian McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History,”
While McKay is describing the Canadian “liberal state” of the early 20th century, these insights apply to the third quarter of the 20th century as well. As I have shown, the officials within the Canadian state were willing to make some small concessions to ethnic minority communities in the late 1960s in an effort to reinforce, if not expand, the state’s commitment to the liberal value of equality. There was less political will, however, to provide additional funding for ethnic minority languages or to raise ethnic minority language communities to the same level as those of French-speaking communities outside of Quebec. But multiculturalists, unlike the Canadian left that McKay has so eloquently chronicled, did not pose a threat to the liberal hegemony. As such, the substantive (and well-founded) demands of some Ukrainian Canadian and German Canadian organizations and multicultural activists could be essentially ignored, even as the Trudeau government adopted the language of the multicultural movement.

Just as older notions of “Britishness” prevailed into the 1960s, so too did biculturalism or the “French fact” persist despite the advent of multiculturalism. As the “summit” between Jean Lesage and ethnic groups in Winnipeg showed, even the leaders of the multicultural movement conceded the power of the Quebec state and their inability to move forward without its approval. Their accord, which Claude Ryan characterized as “neither rigid biculturalism nor loose multiculturalism,” effectively summarized what would be the Pearson and Trudeau governments’ approach to ethnic diversity.16 Neither Pearson nor Trudeau could afford to deny the numerical and political dominance of French Canadians, but recognition of “two nations” was too risky. “Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” struck a balance between biculturalism and

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16 Claude Ryan, “Problems of two or more cultures,” Ottawa Citizen, 14 October 1965, 6.
multiculturalism that has, for better or for worse, held to this day. This philosophy would carry the Canadian state and, by extension, the Multiculturalism Directorate, up until the late 1970s, when it began to look to anti-racism policies to solve the new problem of visible minority integration. As Audrey Kobayashi points out, “During the first decade of official multiculturalism, government documents show a decided sense of ethnicity as an add-on, a touch of flavour enriching, but not fundamentally changing, a society in which the concept of biculturalism (overlain with anglocentrism) remained both dominant and normative.”

Ostensibly, multiculturalism recognized that ethnic minorities had the right to practice their cultural and linguistic practices without fear of the state determining what the “official” ethnicity was. These rights were not protected as group rights, however; individual members of ethnic minority communities had the right to practice their culture and language, but the state would only protect the French and English languages. In a very real sense, the state prioritized the group rights of French Canadians. By recognizing group rights for French Canadians through public support for French-language schools and Official Bilingualism (via the *Official Languages Act* in 1969), the state acknowledged the limits of liberal multiculturalism. What McKay’s model suggests is that multiculturalism extended the liberal order to individual members of ethnic minority communities, but fell short in recognizing their rights as groups.

Canadian multiculturalism

“The early seventies, York University, Toronto. The cafeteria in Central Square was large and brashly lit... A map could be drawn of the cafeteria, with sections coloured in to denote defined areas. To mark out, for instance, the table at which always buzzed quiet Cantonese conversation; or the tables over in the corner from which rose the unsubtle fervour of West Indian accents; or the table more subtly framed by yarmulkes and books decorated with the Star of David. And there were others. To approach any of these tables was to intrude on a clannish exclusivity.”

The above quote comes from Neil Bissoondath’s essay, titled “A Question of Belonging: Multiculturalism and Citizenship”; it was the first piece of writing about multiculturalism that I ever read. In the piece, Bissoondath makes the argument that Canadian multiculturalism policy invites ethnic minority groups to remain separate from one another, rather than contribute to a larger “Canadian” identity. He is equally critical of the way in which multiculturalism and, in particular, ethnic festivals essentialize complex cultures, ethnicities, and peoples. Bissoondath’s Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada, which was published in 1994, a year after his essay appeared in William Kaplan’s edited collection, became a best-selling and controversial book in its own right. A number of popular critiques of multiculturalism appeared in the 1990s, including books by Bissoondath, Richard Gwyn, and Reginald Bibby; more

recently we have seen political commentators and journalists like John Ibbitson, John Ralston Saul, and Margaret Wente weigh in.  

We have also witnessed growing attention to and criticism of multiculturalism in other parts of the world and in the international media in the past decade. As early as 2001, Rogers Brubaker, writing on multiculturalism in France, Germany, and the United States, made the case that the “massive differentialist turn in social though, public discourse, and public policy shows signs of having exhausted itself.”

Geoffrey Brahm Levey points out that the renewed attack on multiculturalism “has been occasioned by a set of developments bound up with Muslim immigration to western liberal democracies, and the coincident rise internationally of militant Islam.” Brahm Levey refers to the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001, the London bombings of 7 July 2005, and the general malaise that has swept the Western world as a result of the rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups. Pundits and politicians on the right often portray “multiculturalism” as leading to greater social fragmentation in Western societies like Britain, Germany, the United States and Canada; they claim that we have gone too far in accepting “diversity” and that “multiculturalism” run amok contributes to home-grown extremism. Conversely, many commentators on the left claim that “multiculturalism” is the only means of ensuring that another 9-11 does not take place.

Now, perhaps more than ever before, “multiculturalism” as a public policy is under serious threat in Germany, Britain, and France. As Levey points out “the

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intellectual and polemical critiques of multiculturalism are now witnessing public policy shifts rather more readily than they once did.”

The events of the past decade have brought about a massive shift in the political discourse around multiculturalism. In an October 2010 speech to the youth wing of her Christian Democratic Union Party, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that German multiculturalism policy (or “multikulti”) “…has failed, utterly failed.”

A few months later, British Prime Minister David Cameron echoed Merkel’s remarks in a speech at a security conference in Munich.

French President, Nicolas Sarkozy declared shortly thereafter that multiculturalism had been a “failure” in his country. We should not, however, take these criticisms of “multiculturalism” at face value. Merkel, for example, is responding to the groundswell of concern about the rise of immigration from Turkey since the 1970s and the degree to which those immigrants have integrated into German society. Likewise, Cameron and Sarkozy are really discussing immigration policy, rather than “multiculturalism” policy.

Neither Britain nor France has a “multiculturalism” policy per se, but both have encouraged immigrant and ethnic minority groups to retain and promote aspects of their respective cultures. All three of these European leaders agree with the values of human rights, fundamental (democratic) freedoms, and the rights of ethnic and religious minorities to exercise their traditions – things considered fundamental to

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“multiculturalism.” What their comments point to is a conflation of “immigration” with “multiculturalism” in political discourse.

That Canadian multiculturalism policy is often seen as synonymous with German “multikulti” or British “multiculturalism” further demonstrates a disconnect between the current popular discourse and the historical and public policy realities of “multiculturalism.” In the domestic and international debate over multiculturalism we have lost sight of where “multiculturalism” — as a policy — comes from. In the Canadian context it arose due to a confluence of factors, including the multicultural movement, an enlightened and sometimes progressive branch of the civil service, a commission of inquiry, and successive governments that were interested in finding new ways to ensure national unity despite ethnic and linguistic divisions.

Though political philosophers have attempted to counter popular critiques of multiculturalism like Bissoondath’s, they have largely been unsuccessful. The “normative” or political philosophy literature, though well known within the academy, does not inform much of the popular debate. Unfortunately, it seems, the pundits are dominating the discussion because solid theoretical work is not generally not read by a non-academic audience. Will Kymlicka’s argument, though not easily summarized, is that most critics do not understand how Canadian multiculturalism actually works. In his book, Finding Our Way, Kymlicka provides us with perhaps the best (and most historically accurate) defense of Canada’s multiculturalism policy:

None of these policies encourages immigrant groups to view themselves as separate and self-governing nations with their own public institutions. On the contrary, all are intended precisely to make it easier for their members to participate within the mainstream institutions of the larger society. These multiculturalism policies involve revisions
to the terms of integration, not a rejection of integration itself.28

This is the essence of Canada’s multiculturalism policy, as Citizenship Branch officials conceived it in the 1950s. Multiculturalism was always about “unity in diversity,” not diversity at the expense of unity. It programs were designed to integrate immigrants and ethnic minorities into the mainstream of Canadian life, while ensuring that their respective cultures and languages were not lost or muddied in an American-style “melting pot.”

If we want to understand what multiculturalism “is,” we should begin by re-examining the assumptions that guided the Citizenship Branch, as well as activists like Scott Symons, Walter Lindal, Walter Bossy, and others. Their understanding of Canadian society, perhaps ironically, mirrors that of many modern critics of multiculturalism policy. All were interested in mitigating the negative (and accentuating the positive) effects of cultural and ethnic diversity, while maintaining common goals, institutions, and values to which all Canadians – new and old – could cling to as their own. The Canadian state’s adoption of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” both recognized the power and strength of its two “founding peoples,” even as it looked to a future in which ethnic and linguistic diversity would play an increasing role in the lives of Canadians.

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