

Marcomannia in the making.

by

Eva Bullard
BA, University of Victoria, 2008

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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During the last stages of the Marcommani Wars in the late second century A.D., Roman literary sources recorded that the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius was planning to annex the Germanic territory of the Marcomannic and Quadic tribes. This work will propose that Marcus Aurelius was going to create a province called *Marcomannia*. The thesis will be supported by archaeological data originating from excavations in the Roman installation at Mušov, Moravia, Czech Republic. The investigation will examine the history of the non-Roman region beyond the northern Danubian frontier, the character of Roman occupation and creation of other Roman provinces on the Danube, and consult primary sources and modern research on the topic of Roman expansion and empire building during the principate.

Table of Contents

Supervisory Committee	ii
Abstract	iii
Table of Contents	iv
List of Figures	vi
Acknowledgments.....	x
Dedication	xi
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1 – Barbaricum	8
A. Geographical and political meaning of <i>barbaricum</i>	8
B. Character of information on <i>barbaricum</i>	13
I. Narrative sources	13
II. Historical texts.....	15
III. Inscriptions.....	17
IV. Coins	18
V. Artistic sources.....	18
VI. Archaeological remains	19
C. History of <i>barbaricum</i>	20
D. Importance of the information	40
Chapter 2 – Evidence for the Roman occupation of Southern Moravia	42
A. Primary sources.....	44
I. Brick stamps	53
B. Structures.....	55
I. Two residential houses	60
II. Workshops.....	62
III. The apsidal building.....	63
IV. Valetudinarium	64
V. Fortifications	66
C. Local borrowings.....	70
D. Chronology.....	77
Chapter 3 – Creation of new provinces.....	83
A. Pannonia.....	83
I. History	84
II. Archaeological evidence	86
III. Romanisation	88
B. Dacia.....	90
I. History	92
II. Archaeology	95
III. Romanisation	100
IV. The role of the Roman military	104
Chapter 4 – Character of the Roman interaction with the barbarian neighbours.....	109
A. Political motives for annexation	109
B. Was the area in a client relation with Rome?.....	110
C. The role of the military on the frontiers	119
I. General description of the Roman military along the Danube river.....	119

II. A case of Tiberius Claudius Maximus	123
D. Commercial interaction: local and long distance	127
E. Roman relationship with the <i>externae gentes</i>	131
F. The aftermath of the Marcomannic Wars	139
Conclusion	143
Appendix A	160
Appendix B	163

List of Figures

Figure I.1 Map of the proposed province Marcomannia.(commons.wikipedia.com)	2
Figure I.2 Map of Roman installations in southern Moravia. (Archeologický ústav AV ČR, Brno.v.v.i.)	4
Figure 1.1. The Augustan Roman world in A.D. 8. (www.johndclare.net).....	10
Figure 1.2. The Ludovisi sarcophagus 250-60; the Romans fighting the Goths. (flickr.com).....	19
Figure 1.3. Marobuduuus' kingdom. (jarnik.pise.cz)	24
Figure 1.4. Aureus of Domitian, Germania defeated. (www.romancoins.info)	27
Figure 1.5. Antoninus Pius coin, Rex Quadis datus. (etudesanciennes.revues.org).....	29
Figure 1.6. Marcus Aurelius sestercius A.D. 172, Germania subacta. (etudesanciennes.revues.org).....	34
Figure 1.7. The Column of Marcus Aurelius, The miracle of the rain. (flickr.com).....	35
Figure 1.8. Marcus Aurelius sestercius A.D. 173, The miracle of the rain (edgarlowen.com).....	36
Figure 1.9. The Laugaricio inscription. (vznadla.sk).....	37
Figure 2.1 Mušov-Burgstall hill from the south. (www.rimskelegie.olw.cz).....	42
Figure 2.2 Top of the Mušov-Burgstall hill looking south towards the confluences of the rivers, now flooded by an artificial lake, and the border of Austria (Roman Pannonia province). (EB photo)	42
Figure 2.3 Mušov-Burgstall hill Roman installations. (www.jiznimorava.cz).....	43
Figure 2.4 The <i>lorica squamata</i> . (EB photo).....	51
Figure 2.5 Buckle with inscription from the <i>lorica squamata</i> . (EB photo).....	52
Figure 2.6 Column of Marcus Aurelius, the emperor addresses his troops, scene 9. (airminded.org/wp-content/img/travel.rome-aurelian-column)	53
Figure 2.7 Legionary bricks excavated at Mušov. (EB photo).....	54
Figure 2.8 Present day confluence of the rivers Svatka and Jihlava. (tracker.cz.torrent.net)	57

Figure 2.9 Archaeological landscape in the surroundings of the Roman fort at Mušov-Burgstall. 1-2 Burgstall and Neurissen, Roman fortified sites; 3-5 Roman marching camps and defenses visible by cropmarks; 6 Pasohlávky. (www.2.rgzm.de).....	58
Figure 2.10 Reconstruction of the two structures and the balneum. (EB photo).....	60
Figure 2.11 Hypocaust from the <i>balneum</i> excavation at Mušov. (EB photo)	61
Figure 2.12 Workshop site and reconstruction of the workshops. (Archeologický ústav AV ČR, Brno.v.v.i.).....	62
Figure 2.13 Ground plan of the workshops and few of the metal finds. (Archeologický ústav AV ČR, Brno.v.v.i.)	62
Figure 2.14 Site and reconstruction of the apsidal building. (Archeologický ústav AV ČR, Brno.v.v.i.).....	63
Figure 2.15 Site and reconstruction of the <i>valetudinarium</i> . (Archeologický ústav AV ČR, Brno.v.v.i.).....	65
Figure 2.16 Site and reconstruction of the defensive ditches. (Archeologický ústav AV ČR, Brno.v.v.i.)	66
Figure 2.17 Plan and reconstruction of the gates and towers. (Archeologický ústav AV ČR, Brno.v.v.i.)	67
Figure 2.18 Column of Trajan, embarkation at a riverside harbour, scene 25. (Conrad Cichorius Die Reliefs der Traiansaule)	69
Figure 2.19 Bronze vessels found in the Germanic grave. (EB photo)	72
Figure 2.20 Detail on a bronze vessel: a Suebi man with a typical Germanic hair knot. (EB photo)	72
Figure 2.21 Silver utensils. (Archeologický ústav AV ČR, Brno.v.v.i.)	73
Figure 2.22 Bronze folding table and detail of one of the supports. (EB photo).....	73
Figure 2.23 Gold plated decoration with Roman gods. (EB photo)	74
Figure 2.24 Gold buckles and belt decorations. (www.arachne.uni.koeln.de/index.php?)	74
Figure 2.25 Roman glass. (EB photo).....	75
Figure 2.26 Roman pottery lamps. (EB photo).....	75
Figure 2.27 Terra sigillata. (EB photo).....	80

Figure 2.28 Marcus Aurelius coins. (EB photo).....	80
Figure 3.1 Map of the Roman Empire in B.C. 44. (www.roman-empire.net).....	84
Figure 3.2 Map of the Roman Empire at the death of Augustus A.D. 14. (www.roman-empire.net).....	84
Figure 3.3 Pannonia in A.D. 116. (en.wikipedia.org).....	85
Figure 3.4 Reconstruction of Carnuntum. (www.radiopast.eu).....	87
Figure 3.5 reconstruction of a military camp in Pannonia. (www.radiopast.eu).....	87
Figure 3.6 Aerial view of Aquincum . (romanage.blogter.hu).....	87
Figure 3.7 Imperial palace in Sirmium. (en.wikipedia.org).....	88
Figure 3.8 Dacia in A.D. 116. (en.wikipedia.org).....	92
Figure 3.9 Sarmizegetusa: Roman forum. (archeotek.org).....	97
Figure 3.10 Apulum: plan of the camp of the <i>legio XII Gemina</i> . (<i>apulumarcaeology.wordpress.com</i>).....	97
Figure 3.11 Apulum: stamp of the <i>legio XII Gemina</i> . (<i>commons.wikipedia.org</i>).....	99
Figure 4.1 Column of Marcus Aurelius, the emperor receives barbarian prisoners and emissaries. (employoes.oneonta.edu).	118
Figure 4.2 Column of Trajan, the emperor's fleet leaves a port, scene 58. (Conrad Cichorius, plate 93).	122
Figure 4.3 Column of Marcus Aurelius, the Roman army crossing the Danube into <i>barbaricum</i> . (www.studyblue.com).....	123
Figure 4.4 Tiberius Claudius Maximus' monument. (www.draconesro/imagini-site/document-complet).....	124
Figure 4.5 Column of Trajan, the suicide/capture of Decebalus. (www.draconesro/imagini-site/document-complet).....	126
Figure 4.6 Distribution of 201 coin hoards of denarii north of the imperial Roman frontier. (Archive of Vilnius Academy of Fine Arts Lithuania Art Museum).....	129
Figure 4.7 Amber trade route. (www.baltictraveling.lv).....	130
Figure 4.8 Route from Carnuntum to Mušov along the rivers Morava and Dyja/Thaya. (www.baltictraveling.lv).....	131

Figure 4.9 Roman legions A.D. 100. (index of/ancient_maps/Rome_Maps)..... 136

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Dedication

Mému tatínkovi

Profesorovi Jiřímu Kahle

Introduction

In all its long duration the Roman Empire conquered the regions along the whole Mediterranean shore and all of Western Europe and parts of Britain. We are still attempting to understand how this process was accomplished and what kind of motivation compelled the Romans. Why and how did they extend their sovereignty over such a vast territory? The Greek historian Polybius (200-118 B.C.) described the rise of Rome in his *Histories*. Polybius understood the process of expansion as an intentional Roman plan.

τίς γάρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥάθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιοτο γινῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνοι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην οὐχ ὅλοις πενήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ εὕρισκεται γεγονός; (1.1.5)

For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting the whole inhabited world to their sole government – a thing unique in history?

Polybius believed that Rome had conquered the whole known world. In reality Rome did not annex or absorb the whole known world. As the Roman army marched into conquered territories, the Roman knowledge of geography expanded and the result of the new knowledge was more conquest and war. Relying on Polybius still, his *Histories* claim that the Romans conquered others by fear. The “intimidating” image of Rome and its power was part of the accepted Roman strategy, as was the importance of booty and reparation payments to the wealth of the state (Mattern 1999: 211-13). Rome also annexed her new territories by alliances and treaties. This thesis will narrow its focus on one specific time period (the second century A.D.)¹, one region – *barbaricum* (the area north of the Danube and east of the Rhine), and one specific interest – the probable annexation and creation of a new Roman province, called *Marcomannia* in the ancient sources (SHA *Marc.* 24.5).

¹ All dates are A.D. unless otherwise stated




Figure I.1 Map of the proposed province Marcomannia.

The location of the new province is on the Roman frontier, in the territory of the Marcomannic and Quadic tribes, north of the Middle Danube. The region had an important position against the rest of the non-Roman Europe, not only because of its geographical closeness to the Roman frontier, but also because of its position on the crossroads along the Danube and the north and south routes to the Baltic. The area covers the territory of present southern Moravia, south western Slovakia and northern Austria, with the Marcomanni occupying southern Moravia. Tejral (1994: 123) writes that the region became a zone of cultural contacts and political tension between Rome and the Germanic tribes who have settled there in the first century. Internal conflicts among the Germanic tribes resulted in a gradual shift of Germanic populations towards the south, closer to the Danube.

After the defeat of Roman forces in the war in Germania in 9, Rome engaged only occasionally in conflicts with the Germanic peoples, but the main concentration of effort was put into defensive installations along the *limes*. This border was not a strict border in the modern sense, marked by a clear line, but more a frontier zone. Forts were built both inside the *barbaricum* and inside the Roman territory. The fortifications and troop placements were supplemented by diplomacy, in an effort to engage the barbarians as ready participants in the Roman Empire by persuasion and ties of economic dependence. The scope of Roman influence on the neighbouring tribes can be judged by studying the

Marcomanni and Quadi, the Germanic peoples living on the northern bank of the Danube (James 2009: 30). Tejral assumes (1994: 124) that the tribes north of the Danube maintained their independence to some extent, though the relations with Rome were characterized by a strong Roman political influence. The failures and successes of the relationship were determined by the history of the whole region. As a result, the working contacts were occasionally interrupted by military conflicts. The complications of examining the Roman frontier policies arise from the fact that we have more complete information on times of conflict, rather than on times of peace. For example Tacitus (*Ann* 2.62) mentions the rich commerce with Rome during peace under the rule of the Marcomannic king Maroboduus.

The trading routes that connected Rome and the peoples north of the Danube were important corridors for transferring goods, manpower and cultural influences. The Roman army used ancient trade routes for their main drive north. During the first two hundred years A.D. three crucial events affected major troop movements across the Danube. The first event was the Marcomannic War of Augustus (commanded by Tiberius) in 6, the second was the Germanic war of Domitian against the Chatti at the end of the first century, and the third event was the Marcomannic Wars of Marcus Aurelius at the end of the second century.

The basis for any Roman military campaigns into enemy territory had always been the establishment of military installations that were able to sustain the army advance (Tejral 1998: 111). The massing of Germanic forces on the northern bank of the Danube after the establishment of Pannonia province forced the Romans to concentrate on fortifying the *limes* by a series of defensive structures. From the Flavian era on, a string of timber-earth forts was constructed, facing the direction from where the greatest danger was imminent. As in other border regions, the Romans tried to implement non-military means with the defense systems of the frontier, though alliances with the Germanic tribes were periodically interrupted by armed conflicts (Tejral 1998:120).

The Marcomannic Wars in 166 interrupted the relatively peaceful co-existence along the Danube (James 2009: 32). The wars centered on what is now the territory of the Czech Republic: Bohemia and Moravia. (The south-eastern part of the Germanic territory did not hold Slavic peoples yet.)

In Mušov Czech scholars investigate traces of different military activities in several periods. One possible time period is Tiberius' expedition in 6. Evidence of the most important Roman habitation of Mušov is from the period of the Marcomannic Wars. According to present scholarship it is possible that Mušov was the center of Roman diplomatic contact and control for the northern bank of the Danube and a place of importance to the Romans (Šedo 2001: 101). The research and study of the events is crucial for understanding the interaction between Rome and its barbarian neighbours to the north and more broadly for contacts between two different civilizations with diverse cultures (Šedo 2001: 106). Information on the camps themselves opens room for speculation about the strength of the barbarian opposition to Roman armies and in some cases also about their activities. Examining the military conflicts in *barbaricum* now means not relying solely on few lines of an ancient historian or writer, and their interpretation of the situation. An extensive reassessment of former assumptions about the Roman military impact has been brought only by new investigations and new archaeological evidence that has been collected in recent decades (Tejral 1994:127). Archaeological evidence opens new possibilities for further interpretation of the connections between the barbarians and the Romans.

The camps are the direct and material confirmation of the literary sources, and also a solid evidence of the goals of Roman aggression and solutions during times of crisis when the customary diplomatic solutions failed. Even at the early stages of the investigation of the camps, their importance is evident. The Roman invasion into *barbaricum* in 6, and the complete defeat of the Roman army at Teutoburg Forest in 9 signaled the end of Augustus' plans for Roman continental Europe. The plans were replaced by diplomatic solution for control of the frontier by the system of client-king alliances. When those treaties failed, the Romans invaded the territories in their attempt to annex the regions north of the Danube (Šedo 2000: 103). The decisive victories in 179-80 A.D. over the Germanic tribes opened the path to the goal of Marcus Aurelius, namely the creation of a new province *Marcomannia*, and the push the Roman frontier forward, deep into the center of *barbaricum*.

The combination of large and small camps at Mušov is now interpreted as an indication of a site that functioned as a station for a legion and its auxiliary unit. The

Roman military installations depicted on the column of Marcus Aurelius include stone buildings and ramparts, as well as marching camps. No large stone structures of this kind exist at the Mušov site. Tejral considers that these contradicting depictions (wooden forts in reality, stone buildings depicted in art) were for the purpose of stressing the importance of the sites as leading military bases, from which Roman operations were launched. Mušov-Burgstall might have been a part of a larger defense system during the Marcomannic Wars (Tejral 1998:130). A high concentration of temporary camps in the area of the Mušov fort is evidence for one of the largest concentrations of military installations beyond the Danube and a massive gathering ground for the Roman army. This interpretation can be supported by the discovery of repair workshops, in which were found various metal implements serving the Roman troops. The key position of the Mušov-Burgstall fort, placed at the two confluences of three rivers, stresses its role as a military fort but also as a supply and trading center (Tejral 1998: 131).

Tejral (1997: 535) writes that the extraordinary material evidence of numerous Roman military installations and the evidence of the process of Romanisation of the local nobility support the hypothesis of formation of the new province mentioned in written sources. The hypothesis was challenged in the past in historical literature: the scholars whose research I have consulted for this work continue the scholarly discussion on the question of annexation of the Marcomannic lands. Beckman (2011: 4), Birley (2012: 229), Burns (2003: 244), Grant (1985: 90), Goodman (1997: 83), Mackay (2004: 234), Mattern (1999: 116), Oliva (1962: 294), Southern (2006: 186) and Williams (1988: 177) allow that Marcus Aurelius intended to make a new province. Brunt (1990), James (2009), Luttwak (1976) and Wachter (1987) avoid the controversy altogether; Kováč (2009: 238) considers the proposal at best as a projection of the plans drawn by Marcus Aurelius earlier in the Marcomannic wars, and Wolfram (1997: 35) and Komoróczy (2009: 124) are positive that there was a new province in the making. To answer the questions surrounding the formation of the province I rely on work of Czech historians and archaeologists Bouzek, Dobiáš, Droberjar, Komoróczy, Musil, Šedo, Oliva and Tejral. Primary sources, literary and epigraphical, are essential evidence for the argument. More recent works of scholars, who research the history of Rome, and the relations between Rome and non-Roman peoples, provide the academic background

necessary to understand the underlying historical forces of the reign of Marcus Aurelius in the second century.

In this work I will propose that Marcus Aurelius indeed intended to create a new province in the land of the Marcomanni.

Chapter 1 will examine that geographical area of the *barbaricum*. The ancient sources consulted provide a historical background that illuminates the situation in the *barbaricum* in the second century. The analysis of the material rising out of the gathered geographical, political and cultural information will consider the forces that affected the Roman and barbarian interaction along the Danube, with a focus on the region at Mušov. The information will enable me to place the Mušov installations in their rightful context. Within the turbulent history of the Danubian frontier lies the insight and comprehension of the Roman reasons for choosing Mušov as the military and administrative center for the region.

Chapter 2 will investigate the Roman military and civilian presence at Mušov through a variety of sources, including primary Roman sources and archaeological materials. Archaeological evidence gathered in the last two decades by Czech archaeologists is the foundation of my argument.

Chapter 3 will briefly focus on formation of other trans-Danubian provinces, in order to provide a short comparison and a model for creation of a new province in the Marcomannic lands. Germania province, Pannonia and Dacia will be discussed. Lacking direct information on the administrative processes and plans for the Marcomannic region, the concrete examples from nearby provinces will contribute positively to our knowledge of Roman annexation and province creation.

Chapter 4 will study the relationship the Roman state had with other non-Roman peoples. The assessment of the process will help to explain the components of a successful Roman annexation of a new territory. Having examined the established Roman treatment of the *externae gentes*, the methods and treaties, it will be possible to propose that Marcus Aurelius was in a position to annex the Marcomannic territory, and even to create a new province.

Chapter 1 – Barbaricum

The Roman Empire lived with barbarians, real and imagined, for centuries, and much of the time vast resources were spent to keep the barbarians at bay. As it proved in much of modern history, the claim of the “barbarian” threat suited the various governments to demand funding for the campaigns and military installations. By the end of the second century much wealth and technical competence had been transferred from the shores of the Mediterranean to the edges of the Empire and beyond, in order to contain the supposed barbarian threat (Burns 2003:13). Geographical, political and cultural information on *barbaricum* is the topic of this chapter, focusing on the part of *barbaricum* settled by the Marcomanni and the Quadi in the Roman period. The analysis of the materials assembled in this chapter helps to discover the forces that affected the Roman and barbarian interaction along the Danubian frontier, especially in the region of the fort installation at Mušov, southern Moravia.

A. Define geographical and political meaning

B. Character of the information

I. Narrative sources

II. Historical texts

III. Inscriptions

IV. Coins

V. Artistic sources

VI. Archaeological remains

C. History as can be gathered from literary evidence, epigraphy and coins.

D. Importance of the information

A. Geographical and political meaning of *barbaricum*.

In the first two centuries the Roman Empire surrounded the shores of the Mediterranean. The early imperial vision was to fashion an *imperium sine fine*, to conquer the entire known world. Though the statement is not an official imperial policy, Cicero praised both Pompey and Julius Caesar for making Rome’s state boundaries of

equal extent as the *orbis terrarum* (Cic.*In Cat.*26). Vergil's Jupiter (*Aen.* 1.279) instructs Aeneas to build a city from which the *imperium sine fine* would rise. Brundt (1990: 300) writes that Rome acknowledged a duty to protect its friends and allies, and this duty brought Rome into wars with peoples beyond the frontiers. When Rome moved into the non-Roman territories, the limits of the *orbis terrarum* advanced. As long as any independent people existed, there was no point where Rome could stop her expansion. There is no doubt that the Romans placed a great value on glory in war and military achievements. The very first line of Augustus' *Res Gestae* is:

Rerum gestarum divi Augusti, quibus orbem terrarum imperio populi Romani subiecit...

The achievements of the Divine Augustus, by which he brought the world under the empire of the Roman people....

Whether as part of the official state policy, or as a manifestation of his own power to command the Roman world, Augustus embarked on a conquest east of the Rhine and north of the Danube. However, he was forced by geographical realities to restrict his empire, in particular by natural obstructions in form of great rivers and the immense continent of uncultivated land which contained migrating tribes, always pushing against the Roman *limes*. The Illyrian revolt (*Bellum Batonianum* between 6 and 9) and the disaster of Varus' losses at the Teutoburg Forest in 9 put an end to this initiative (Maxfield 1987: 139).

Typically scholars have accepted the limited empire models but it is possible to challenge this traditional wisdom. The conceptions of the Roman boundaries north of the Danube are fluid at the present. Limits of the empire are being contested by new research in Germany, notably by Werner Eck. His article "Augustus und die Grossprovinz Germania" strongly argues that between the campaigns of Drusus against the Germanic tribes from 12 B.C. and the disaster at Teutoburg Forest in A.D. 9, a part of Germania was annexed to the Roman Empire and was ruled as a pacified province. This new approach to the available evidence does not affect my research or thesis, since the *Germania* province existed on the western boundaries of the territory that is the focus of this paper. I will discuss Eck's theory later in this chapter.

highlands, and most of the vast Great European Plain stretching east to the Ural Mountains, were considered barbarians by the Romans. Romans called the area *barbaricum*. Roman writers were far more interested in their own peoples and civilization than in the barbarians beyond the frontier, but they noted the character of those population. The western part of Europe was more successfully cultivated and supported greater numbers of inhabitants. The Romans divided the barbarians living in the Great European Plain into the Germani and the non-Germanic Scythians (Heather 2010: 5). It is important to note that the Germanic tribes were Germanic, not *German*; the name *German* was given to the German speaking peoples living in Central Europe in the Middle Ages. Further divisions were created within barbarian Europe north of the Roman boundaries. The area was commonly divided by the Romans into three regions: the most developed western, Celtic one, closest to the Mediterranean, the Germanic dominated Europe, and Eastern Europe. The material evidence indicates that the introduction of the boundaries was not accidental; the Celtic culture produced a characteristic art style of finely worked metal objects and advanced wheel turned pottery, and they lived in walled settlements called *oppida*. In comparison, the early Germanic cultures had less sophisticated crafts, lacked wheel worked pottery or fine metallurgy, and did not inhabit formally structured, permanent settlements. The eastern European cultures have left the least material evidence to examine (Heather 2010: 5). The original Celtic tribes occupying the areas were either absorbed into the Roman Empire or pushed further west by the advancing Germanic tribes. In addition to their less developed material culture, the Germanic peoples practiced agriculture at a much lower level of production. Consequently, the Germanic economy produced fewer surpluses to support complex artistic expression in every-day articles. It appears that early in Roman history the military leadership near the Germanic areas was aware of the marginal, subsistence economy of this part of Europe and did not consider it worthwhile to attempt a direct conquest. The Roman indifference to the extensive area between the Rhine and the river Vistula in the East resulted in various Germanic tribes assuming power over their immediate territory. The tribes were typically modest in population numbers, and their political and social influence was limited to their area of habitation.

The focus of the research for this thesis is a small area of Europe populated by the Germanic peoples, concentrating on the southern central part of the *barbaricum*, the region of southern Moravia and Bohemia. These areas were settled by the Marcomannic and Quadic tribes.

Droberjar (2002: 15) explains the differing meanings of the term *barbaricum*. From Augustan times, the area beyond the Roman frontier north of the Rhine and the Danube, occupied permanently by both Germanic and non-Germanic tribes, was habitually named *barbaricum*. Sometimes, for the sake of understanding European *barbaricum*, the area is variously named in sources as *Germania Magna* or *Germania Libera*. From the archaeological point of view, the distinguished diverse cultures, cultural groups, and chronologies of material finds define the *barbaricum*. Tejral (1993: 424) points out that the time period of *barbaricum*, characterized by contacts and relationships between the Roman Empire and its neighbouring barbarian, mostly Germanic tribes living on the territory of the present day Czech Republic, is a critical historical moment for both ethnicities. The formative influence of Roman culture on the barbarian societies is lately in the centre of much scholarly interest, since it offers general models for acculturation and integration that lead to formations of new social trends and structures.

Modern European scholarship has investigated all aspects of the extensive historical heritage of the landmass that the term *barbaricum* covers; each nationality living on the land of *barbaricum* at this time has been the subject of wide ranging archaeological, historical and literary research. This is the period just before the great migration of the peoples that permanently rearranged the ethnic distribution of tribal groups in Europe and established the cultural backgrounds and social structures that survive to the present day. It was the push of the Slavs into Europe that created the modern notion of European East and West, pushing the Gauls and the Germani into central Europe and the Celts to the western fringes of Europe and to the British Isles. This event is currently dated by Droberjar (2005: 13) and other Czech scholars to between the late third and sixth century.

B. Character of information on *barbaricum*

I. Narrative sources

The Romans called *barbaricum* the territory north of the Danube and east of the Rhine. Sarnowski (1991: 137-44) listed and discussed the uses of the term *barbaricum*. The inscription documented in his article dates from 224 or 227, from Preslav in Bulgaria, *AE* 1991: no.1378:

.....| leg(ionis) I Ital(icae) [Al]ex[andrianae], | militauit b(ene)f(iciarius) co(n)s(ularis) et | cornicul(arius) proc(uratoris), | quot (!) tiro proficiscens | in bello Bosporano | uouerat et adiuuante | numen(e) (!) eius multis | periculis in barbarico | liberatus sit merito | uotum posuit.

.....of the *legio I Italica Alexandriana*, served as consular secretary and senior clerk of a procurator, because as he was being sent to the Bosporan war as a recruit, that which he had vowed; and favoured by his divine will, freed also from many dangers in barbaricum, may it be rightly deserved, he placed as a vow. (Translation: E.Bullard)

The inscription is important to the understanding of *barbaricum* since it is so far the earliest document of the use of this Latin term. The author identifies three other inscriptions:

1. D(is) M(anibus)/ Aurel(ius) Ditus/anus stra/tor trib(uni) Vix(it)/ an(nos) XLVIII et Cl(audia)/ Coc(eia) coniunx/ memoria/ posuit vivo/ suo qui di/[...]us est/ in barbarico/ et Aure(lius) Ael(ius)/ fil(ius) eius et her(es)/.

To the spirits of the dead: Aurelius Ditusanus, distributor and equerry to a tribune lived 48 years and Claudia Coceia his wife: placed this in her memory while still living and in barbaricum, and Aurelius Aelius his son and heir. (Scorpan 1980: 211 Br.1) (Translation: E. Bullard)

2. ----- vix[it]----- / Aur(elius) Asdula mil(itus)/ coh(ortis) V pretorie/fratri ben[e]meren [ti]/ qui mecu[m] labora[v]it/an(nos) XII et Fruninone²/ est in barbarico.

-----lived-----Aurelius Asdula soldier of the fifth praetorian cohort, to his well-deserving brother who laboured with me for 12 years and in Frunino, (he, it) is in barbaricum. (*CIL* 10. 216) (Translation: E. Bullard)

² Mommsen note, p. 565 *CIL* X 216: Frumino mihi locus est extra fines Romanos, ubi diem obierit is cui titulus positus est.

3. Viatorinu(s) prot/ector mi[li]tavit an/nos triginta o/ccissus in bar/barico iuxta D/ivitia a Franco./ Vicarius Divitesi(u)m

Viatorinus, now a member of the guards, served for 30 years, was killed in barbaricum near to Divitia a Franco. A deputy of (the tribune)³ of the Divitienses. (*CIL* 13: 8274) (Translation: E.Bullard)

The term *barbaricum* in these inscriptions refers to the lands beyond the Lower Danube. In contrast to the older term *barbaria*, testified since Cicero's time, describing the total area of the territory of Rome's barbarian neighbours, *barbaricum*, depending on the context, relates only to the area beyond the Danube up to the eastern banks of the Rhine (Sarnowski 1991: 143-44). The *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (p. 1733) contains almost all the instances of the term *barbaricum* in the ancient sources, though I found that only the second definition of the term referred specifically to the land of *barbaricum*. The *Thesaurus* lists six uses of the term, one from inscriptions and five from ancient sources. The Packard Humanities Institute digital compilation of all Latin literature has more specific information on literary sources and the use of the term, and provides a more comprehensive list. The Latin grammarian Flavius Caper wrote in the second century; his short treatise *De Orthographia* contains a fictional dialogue with Cicero and refers to *barbaricum* in the context of a tribe inhabiting a tract of cultivated land:

Bargena, non Bargina, genus cui barbaricum sit.

Bargena, not Bargina, the race who hold *barbaricum*. (1229: 001)

The phrase “*in barbarico*” occurs twice in *SHA*, in clear reference to the geographical land mass of *barbaricum*:

Milites expeditionis tempore sic disposuit, ut in mansionibus annonas acciperent nec portarent cibaria decem et septem, ut solent, dierum nisi in barbarico. (*Alex. Sev.* 47.1.2)

During his campaigns he made provision for the soldiers such that they were furnished with supplies at each halting place and were never compelled to carry food for the usual seventeen days, except in *barbaricum*. (Translation: E.Bullard)

Et genus factionis fuit tale: cum ponte iuncto in Germanos transire Maximinus vellet, placuerat, ut contrarii cum eo transirent, pons postea solveretur, ille in

³ Mommsen note, p. 29 *CIL* XIII 8274: vicarius (tribuni) Divit(i)ensi(u)m

barbarico circumventus occideretur, imperium Magnus arriperet. (*Max.Duo* 10.2.4)

It was a conspiracy of this sort: since Maximinus wished to make a bridge and cross over against the Germani, and it was resolved that the conspirators should cross over with him and then, breaking the bridge behind them, surround Maximinus in *barbaricum* and kill him, while Magnus seized the rule. (Translation: E. Bullard)

II. Historical texts

More extensive and explanatory information on the middle Danube region can be found in the works of ancient historians. Oliva (1962: 14–40) presents an exhaustive list of primary sources. The first Roman source for information on the Germani appears in Caesar's *Gallic War*, Book 1. Livy dedicated book 30 of his history to a description of Germania. Pliny the Elder wrote on the Germanic Wars, but his work is lost to us. Tacitus may have drawn on Pliny for his works *Annales* and *Germania*, but we cannot be certain. The most important information on the Germanic culture and society was recorded in Tacitus. He describes the complexities of the Germanic societies, the culture and its belief systems, and the geography of the region. We cannot determine whether the information Tacitus offers us is in any way reliable. It is almost certain that Tacitus had no personal knowledge of Germania, and he himself obtained his information from literary sources.

The writings of Pliny (*NH* 3, 25), Strabo (7. 315) and Cassius Dio (55. 29.3), all offer information on the tribes bordering the Germanic tribes in the south. (Pliny based his information on the circular world map and writings of Marcus Vispanius Agrippa, specifically mentioning Germania in *NH* 4.13.98-99.) In the material on the Danubian provinces Pliny and Cassius Dio discuss and preserve not only the geography of the area but also list the tribes living near the borders, and Roman conflicts with them (Oliva 1964: 144).

a. Geography

Pannoniae iungitur provincia quae Moesia appellatur, ad Pontum usque cum Danuvio decurrens. (Plin. *NH* 3.26)

Adjoining Pannonia is the province called Moesia, which runs the course of the Danube right down to the Black Sea.

b. List of tribes

Populorum haec capita; praeterea Arvates, Azali, Amantini, Belgites, Catari, Cornacates, Erasvisci, Hercuniates, Latovici, Oseriates, Varciani, mons Claudius, cuius in fronte Scordisci, in tergo Taurisci (Plin. *NH* 3.25)

These are the principal peoples; and there are besides the Ariavates, Azali, Amantini, Belgites, Catari, Cornacates, Erasvisci, Hercuniates, Latovici, Oseriates, Varciani, and mount Claudius, in front of which are the Sordisci and behind it the Taurisci.

c. Roman conflicts

ὡς δ' ὅτε Τιβέριος ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς τὸ δεύτερον ἐστράτευσε, καὶ Οὐαλέριος Μεσσαλῖνος ὁ τότε καὶ τῆς Δελματίας καὶ τῆς Παννονίας ἄρχων αὐτὸς τε σὺν ἐκείνῳ ἐστάλη καὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ στρατοῦ συνεξήγαγε, καὶ τινὰ καὶ σφεῖς δύνανται πέμψαι κελευσθέντες συνῆλθόν τε ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ τὴν ἠλικίαν σφῶν ἀνθοῦσαν εἶδον, οὐκέτι διεμέλλησαν, ἀλλ' ἐνάγοντος αὐτοῦ ὅτι μάλιστα Βάτωνός τις Δησιδιάτου τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀλίγοι τινὲς ἐνεωτέρισαν καὶ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐπελθόντας σφίσι ἐσφηλάν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐκ τούτου καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι προσάπεστησαν (Dio Cass. 55.29.1-3)

But when Tiberius made his second campaign against the Germans, and Velleius Messallinus, the governor of Dalmatia and Pannonia at the time, was sent out with him, taking most of his army along, the Dalmatians, too were ordered to send a contingent; and on coming together for this purpose and beholding the strength of their warriors, they no longer delayed but, under the vehement urging of one Bato, a Desidiatian, at first a few revolted and defeated the Romans who came against them, and then the rest also rebelled in consequence of this success.

Cassius Dio's descriptions of the Danube region are mostly taken from earlier authors, but he was the governor of Pannonia and had personal knowledge of the land and the people, and may have had contacts with the people beyond the Roman frontier in the north. Unfortunately his *Roman History* survives only in fragments, so our vision of the area is seriously compromised (Oliva 1964: 15). Cassius Dio's contemporary Herodian wrote the history of the Roman Emperors from 180, slightly later period than this research requires. A later collection of the lives of the emperors, starting with Hadrian's life, is referred to as *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*; the portion of the work that concentrates on Marcus Aurelius is particularly important for this thesis. Ammianus Marcellinus in his *Res Gestae* offers information on the same time period. Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* cover the period of the Marcomannic Wars and were written while he was campaigning against the Quadi in northern Pannonia. The work is a personal

handbook on Stoic philosophy and chronicles the emperor's life; there are few historical references but two books of the work end with a note on the location of the military camps where Marcus Aurelius was based at the time of his writing. One site is placed in southern Slovakia on the River Hron (Granova) and another one in Carnuntum, in northern Pannonia (Austria).

Τὰ ἐν Κουάδοις πρὸς τῷ Γρανούα.
Among the Quadi at the Granua. (MA *Med.* 1.17.9)

Τὰ ἐν Καρνούντῳ
This in Carnuntum. (MA *Med.* 2.17.2)

An important source of recorded information is the writings of Roman authors on legal subjects. Legal sources offer important knowledge on social and economic development. The work of Gaius, *Institutiones*, dates from the middle of the second century, from the reign of Marcus Aurelius. The work reports on the legal status of slaves in the provinces and records changes in the status between master and slave in the societies on the Danubian borders. The works of the agrimensors, who measured the land when a colony was founded and land distributed, can be placed alongside the legal sources (Campbell 2000: 21-2).

III. Inscriptions

Almost no inscriptions have been found in the territory that this study covers: two are known from the border settlements on the northern side of the Danube in Slovakia, and will be discussed later in the work.

The only epigraphic evidence of Roman presence on southern Moravian soil is obtained from one small fragment of armour, and from stamps on bricks originating in Roman military installations. Oliva (1962: 23) stated that evaluation of any inscription must examine the style and the shape of the monument, along with the actual text, and the style of the letters and the execution of the carving. These three factors are essential to dating the epigraphy. Chronology and dating remains a problem in the Danubian provinces and in *barbaricum*. The dating of epigraphic material is essential for evaluating its worth as historical evidence.

New inscriptions from the provinces on the Danube continue to be found, and their dating and study supplement older collections of epigraphy such as the *Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum (CIL)* volumes 2, 10, 12 and 13; and Dessau's *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae (ILS)*. Epigraphic evidence reveals much that is not mentioned in literary sources. Funerary inscriptions and epitaphs of Roman soldiers contribute information to details of distribution and location of Roman legions and auxiliary forces, and military epigraphy assists with the chronology of military campaigns (Oliva 1962: 29-30).

IV. Coins

Coinage is important in several areas of research; it offers information on dating, wealth distribution, military pay, military events and trade. The wording on the coins often describes events that are not proven by any other method. One of the great advantages of numismatic sources is that they are dated (Oliva 1962: 32). Numismatic evidence however, when available, must be considered with caution in view of the frequent use of stylized imperial iconography and the significant amount of pure propaganda that is utilized on Roman coinage.

V. Artistic sources

Historical information can be collected from artistic creations on Roman monuments, in this case from Roman reliefs carved on columns of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius. The column of Marcus Aurelius is of a greater interest to this study since the decorated frieze on it depicts the wars the emperor waged against the Germanic tribes. The column of Marcus Aurelius was commissioned after the emperor's death by his son Commodus and was most likely completed in 192. A spiral frieze decorates the shaft of the column, and commemorates Marcus Aurelius' campaigns during the Marcomannic Wars. The numerous battle scenes graphically portray the violence of war and the desperate, defensive nature of Marcus Aurelius' Germanic Wars (Ferris 2009:15). The warfare depicted, and the violence of the military engagements differs greatly from the war narrated on the column of Trajan. Trajan's war is aggressive, orderly and highly organized; Marcus Aurelius' war is graphically violent and terrifying. Regrettably, no accompanying text to the pictorial carved chronicle exists, and neither column can be

considered a chronological narrative of the wars. All we can gather from the order of the events on Marcus Aurelius' column is that it covers the years 172 to 175, from the start of the Roman offensive beyond the Danube, and Commodus' arrival on the borders (Dobiáš 1964: 198). In military and cultural terms, these conflicts were the turning point in the history of the Roman Empire. The dehumanization in the depictions of the barbarians represented in the frieze reflects the deep-seated fear of the barbarian peoples threatening the northern borders of the Empire. Despite any historical inaccuracies that rise from the complicated relationship between Roman art and official state propaganda (Ferris 2009: 15-16), the column provides useful visual models for some material realities that did not survive in the *barbaricum*.

Much ethnographical information on the Germanic cultures has been gathered from the column. Another artistic resource for study of the Germani are the reliefs on Roman funerary monuments. Perhaps it was the intensive military activity of the age of Marcus Aurelius that produced a new subject on the sarcophagi of wealthy Romans: scenes of battles between Romans and the barbarians became a popular theme (Ramage and Ramage 2005: 257).



Figure 1.2 The Ludovisi sarcophagus 250-60; the Romans fighting the Goths.

VI. Archaeological remains

Vast amounts of varied material evidence are collected from archaeological sites in the *barbaricum* area. Anyone involved in a serious study of the history and culture of *barbaricum* must rely on material evidence to supplement the available primary sources. Numerous reports of excavations in southern Moravia have been published in recent

years, following the surge of interest in the Roman influence there (Komoróczy 2008; Šedo 2000, 2001; Tejral 1995, 2000). New scholarship is available in books and articles published in German and Czech, containing wealth of new and valuable information on the Roman military presence (Bálek, 1994, 1996; Bursche 2009; Droberjar 2000, 2002, 2005; Kabálek 2008; Kehne 2006; Komoróczy 2005, 2007; Musil 2000; Salač 2005, 2006; Tejral 2002, 2008; Vachutová 2004; Wells 2005).

C. History of *barbaricum*

The following historical account is based on Dobiáš (1964: 75-195). In the third to second century B.C. new people started arriving in the Elbe basin: they were a Germanic group, but the names of the tribes are unknown. By the second century B.C. these Germanic tribes were concentrated largely in the north, in the present day Saxony and Thuringia. The most accepted theory is that they were the Suebi, containing both the Marcomannic and the Quadic peoples. The etymology of “Marcomannic” is thought as “marco” meaning a boundary, and “manni” meaning men: designating the Marcomanni as the “border people”. This can possibly explain their settlement on the borders near the Germanic tribes, adjoining the areas of Celtic occupation. It is not clear if they were near the Boii, the Celtic tribe inhabiting Boihaemum, the area that became Bohemia, western section of the Czech Republic. The Marcomanni settled around the middle area of the river Main, with Cherusci and Quadi as their neighbours. It is probable that the Marcomanni belonged to the tribal confederation of Ariovistus, the leader of the Germanic tribes established in Gaul (Dobiáš 1964: 75). In 58 B.C. Ariovistus was defeated by Julius Caesar at the Battle of Vosges and driven beyond the Rhine with his tribes. The very first written evidence of the Marcomanni appears in 58 B.C.:

Tum demum necessario Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt generatimque constituerunt paribus intervallis, Harudes, Marcomanos, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusios, Suebos; (Caes, *B.Gall.*1, 51)

Then at last, compelled by necessity, the Germans led their own forces out of camp and posted them at equal intervals according to their tribes, Harudes, Marcomani, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suebi;

Much of Julius Caesar’s writing boasts that he defeated the Gauls, but in reality the Germanic tribes gave Rome much concern in his time and in following generations.

The Suebi tribal groups were expansionist, encroaching on the territories of their neighbours, who had no available lands to escape to, and no recourse but Rome. Cassius Dio reports the following (39.47.1-2):

ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θέρει ἐπράχθη, χειμαζόντων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ Τέγκτηροί τε καὶ Ούσιπέται, Κελτικά γένη, τὸ μὲν τι καὶ πρὸς Σουήβων ἐκβιασθέντες τὸ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τῶν Γαλατῶν ἐπικληθέντες, τὸν τε Ἴηνον διέβησαν καὶ ἐς τὴν τῶν Τρηουήρων ἐνέβαλον. κἀνταῦθα τὸν Καίσαρα εὐρόντες καὶ φοβηθέντες ἔπεμψαν πρὸς αὐτὸν σπονδάς τε ποιούμενοι καὶ χώραν αἰ τοῦντες, ἧ σφίσι γε ἐπιτραπῆναί τινα ἀξιοῦντες λαβεῖν.

...the German tribes, partly because they were forced out from their homes by the Suebi and partly because they were invited over by the Gauls, crossed the Rhine and invaded the territory of the Treveri. Finding Caesar there, they became afraid and sent to him to make a truce, and to ask for land, or at least the permission to take some.

Whether responding to their appeal or on his own accord, Julius Caesar campaigned from Gaul to Germania in 55 B.C. Having constructed a bridge across the Rhine, Julius Caesar was preparing for a war against the Suebi. The Suebi reacted by moving their families away from the Rhine frontier and mustered their own army. The decision not to engage in the conflict was taken by Julius Caesar, the bridge was destroyed, and Julius Caesar retreated. A second assault was attempted, with another bridge built; but this time Julius Caesar left the bridge standing (Dobiáš 1964: 76). The Suebi remained undefeated by Caesar. In 10 B.C. Augustus appointed his stepson, Nero Claudius Drusus to oppose the Suebi. Cassius Dio reports that Drusus was made governor of the Rhine region of Gaul and given a command to campaign against the combined Germanic tribes. Having crossed the Rhine, Drusus confronted them, commencing with the Chatti.

οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἐφρόντισέ τι αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἔς τε τὴν τῶν Χάττων ἐσέβαλε καὶ προῆλθε μέχρι τῆς Σουηβίας, τὴν τε ἐν ποσὶν οὐκ ἀταλαιπώρως χειρούμενος καὶ τοὺς προσμινύοντας οἱ οὐκ ἀναιμωτὶ κρατῶν. κἀντεῦθεν πρὸς τε τὴν Χερουσκίδα¹ μετέστη, καὶ τὸν Οὐίσουργον² διαβὰς ἤλασε 3] μέχρι τοῦ Ἀλβίου, πάντα πορθῶν. (Dio Cass. 55.1.2-3)

Drusus...invaded the country of the Chatti and advanced as far as that of the Suebi, conquering with difficulty the territory traversed and defeating the forces that attacked him only after considerable bloodshed. From there he proceeded to the country of the Cherusci, and crossing the Weser, advanced as far as the Elbe.

Cassius Dio does not state that Drusus defeated the Suebi, but that like Caesar, he withdrew from the area. Ultimately, the Germanic coalition was broken, and Drusus fought the tribes individually.

The Marcomanni emerged from the conflict as a significant force among the Germani. It was not possible for any Germanic tribe to consider expansion into the Roman-held Gallic territory. On the contrary, Drusus' campaigns were signaling that the Roman expansion would continue *into* the Germanic territory. Eck (2004: 11) proposes that Augustus devised the plan to shape the new empire without dependence on the goodwill of individual peoples or rulers. The plan to expand north and east from the upper Italian boundaries emerged around 20 B.C. The most important part of the plan was the inclusion of the territories from the source of the Danube to its end at the Black Sea. The regions east of the Rhine up to the North Sea were added to the plan after the defeat of Marcus Lolius in 16 B.C. (the defeat is called *clades lolliana* by Seutonius *Aug.* 23, after three Germanic tribes had crossed the Rhine into Roman Territory), to remove the threat from the frontier. How these plans evolved or were instituted, we do not know. Such considerations were never discussed openly in Rome, and there are no contemporary historical sources that confirm the strategy (Eck 2004: 12). Modern historians maintain that Augustus intended from the start to extend the conquest of the territories beyond the Rhine up to the Elbe. Augustus writes in *Res Gestae* 26.1:

Omnium provinciarum populi Romani quibus finitimae fuerunt gentes quae non parent imperio nostro fines auxi. Gallias et Hispanias provincias, item Germaniam, qua includit Oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacavi.

I extended the boundaries of all the provinces which were bordered by races not yet subject to our empire. The provinces of the Gauls, the Spains, and Germany, bounded by the ocean from Gades to the mouth of the Elbe, I reduced to a state of peace.

Velleius Paterculus describes Drusus' campaign against the Germani:

Moles deinde eius belli translata in Neronem est: quod is sua et virtute et fortuna administravit peragratusque victor omnis partis Germaniae sine ullo detrimento commissi exercitus, quod praecipue huic duci semper curae fuit, sic perdomuit eam, ut in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret provinciae (Velleius Paterculus 2.97.4)

The burden of responsibility for this war was then transferred to Nero. He carried it on with his customary valour and good fortune, and after traversing every part of Germany in a victorious campaign, without any loss of the army entrusted to him — for he made this one of his chief concerns — he so subdued the country as to reduce it almost to the status of a tributary province.

On the borders of the territory contested by Rome, and possibly a pacified Roman province now, the Marcomanni occupying the Main river area moved eastward to escape Rome. The region was vacated by the Boii, a naturally defended area of the Bohemian basin, surrounded by mountains. The mountains in the south are named in sources, particularly in Tacitus, as the Hercynian Mountains (see *Ann.* 2.45 below). Dobiáš (1964: 78) and many modern Czech scholars claim that Marcomannic king Maroboduus was instrumental in devising this plan. In a series of campaigns the Germani were defeated in war. Droberjar (2002: 170-2) suggests that Maroboduus formed a first Germanic kingdom with elements of state organization; after the migration into the Bohemian basin and colonization of the area, the Marcomannic power increased due to military, economic and political successes.

We know from Strabo 7.1.3 that Maroboduus was held as hostage by the Augustan imperial court, and was educated at the court by the grammarian Marcus Verrius Flaccus, under the protection of Augustus himself.

ἐπέστη γὰρ τοῖς πράγμασιν οὗτος ἐξ ἰδιώτου μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Ῥώμης ἐπάνοδον:
νέος γὰρ ἦν ἐνθάδε καὶ εὐεργετῆ τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ, ἐπανελθὼν δὲ
ἐδυνάστευσε καὶ κατεκτήσατο πρὸς οἷς εἶπον Λουγίου τε, μέγα ἔθνος.

For after his return from Rome this man, who before had been only a private citizen, was placed in charge of the affairs of state, for, as a youth he had been at Rome and had enjoyed the favour of Augustus.

His Roman upbringing had secured him certain authority among the Germanic tribes. The favour of the Roman imperial court and his own considerable diplomatic skills promoted Roman trade in his kingdom; the center of his kingdom gained importance with the Germani as well as with the Romans, who were always exploring diverse way to control the tribes. Gradually the surrounding tribes joined Maroboduus through treaties and formed the greater empire that stretched between the Elbe, Danube and Visla rivers north to the Baltic (Droberjar 2002: 172).




Figure 1.3 Maroboduus' kingdom.

The Romans attempted treaties with the emerging empire, but their diplomatic means failed. In 6 Augustus launched a campaign against Maroboduus: the goal was the liquidation of Maroboduus' kingdom and annexation of the territory into Germania province. Tiberius devised the strategic plan, a two-pronged attack that enabled the Roman forces to meet in the center of the kingdom. Tiberius entered the Moravian region from the south, from Carnuntum, but the proposed meeting never occurred (Dobiáš 1964: 98). The Pannonian Revolt in 6 occupied the Roman legions and Tiberius until 9, and in the end Tiberius had to resort to treating with Maroboduus. Tacitus reports concerns about Maroboduus:

Contra fugacem Maroboduum appellans, proeliorum expertem, Hercyniae latebris defensum; ac mox per dona et legationes petivisse foedus, proditorem patriae, satellitem Caesaris, haud minus infensis animis exturbandum quam Varum Quintilium interfecerint. (*Ann.* 2.45)

Maroboduus, in contrast, was described as the fugitive who, without one stricken field, had lain safe in the coverts of the Hercynian Forest and then sued for a treaty with gifts and embassies.

There are no detailed accounts of the treaty, but Tacitus quotes Maroboduus:

At se duodecim legionibus petitum duce Tiberio inlibatam Germanorum gloriam servavisse, mox condicionibus aequis discessum; neque paenitere quod ipsorum

in manu sit, integrum adversum Romanos bellum an pacem incruentam malint.
(*Ann.* 2.46)

For himself, when he was attacked by twelve legions, with Tiberius at their head, he had kept the German honour unstained, and soon afterwards the combatants had parted on equal terms: nor could he regret that it was now in their power to choose with Rome either a war uncompromised or a bloodless peace.

Modern scholars question Maroboduus' decision not to press the advantage the Pannonian revolt offered him against Rome. But both the Marcomannic king and the Romans could claim victory through the treaty; the greater plan of Augustus to annex the territory failed, but the region was pacified (Dobiáš 1964: 99).

In 9 a smaller alliance of Germanic tribes, not including the Marcomanni, under the leadership of the Cherusci king Arminius, encountered the Roman commander Publius Quintilius Varus at the Battle of Teutoburg Forest. Excavations undertaken since the 1980s in Kalkriese, Germany, have finally correctly identified the site (Schlüter 1999, Wilbers-Rost 2007, Wilbers-Rost 2009: 93). The massive defeat of three Roman legions was so decisive that Rome never again controlled that area. After Augustus' death Tiberius spoke in the senate, showing that he was going to follow his predecessor's plan for the borders on the Danube and the Rhine. Tacitus (*Ann.* 1.11) conveys his address to be:

Opes publicae continebantur, quantum civium sociorumque in armis, quot classes, regna, provinciae, tributa aut vectigalia, et necessitates ac largitiones. Quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus adideratque consilium coercendi intra terminus imperii, incertum metu an per invidiam.

It contained a statement of the national resources – the strength of the burghers and allies under arms; the number of the fleets, protectorates, and provinces; the taxes direct and indirect; the needful disbursement and customary bounties: all catalogued by Augustus in his own hand, with a final clause (due to fear or jealousy?) advising that the restriction of the empire be within its present frontier.

Internal disputes among the Germanic tribes led to weakening of their alliance, especially the continuing disputes between the Marcomanni and the Cherusci which culminated in a battle between the tribes, somewhere in central Bohemia (Dobiáš 1964: 103). The site of the battle is unknown and finding its location and the site of “Maroboduum”, the center of the kingdom, remains the dearest wish of present day

Czech archaeology. The Cherusci king Arminius defeated Maroboduus and by the year 19 Maroboduus' kingdom disintegrated. The king himself, in Roman favour since he refused to join Arminius against the Romans, was granted exile in Ravenna by Tiberius. Tiberius himself spoke of Maroboduus (Tac. *Ann.* 2, 63):

Ceterum apud senatum disseruit non Philipum Atheniensibus, non Pyrrhum aut Antiochum populo Romano perinde metuendos fuisse.

He asserted, however, in the senate that “not Philip himself had been so grave a menace to Athens – not Pyrrhus nor Antiochus to the Roman people.”

The region was relatively peaceful during the reigns of Claudius and Nero (Dobiáš 1964: 154). Pliny (*NH* 37.11.45) reports a Roman knight travelling along the Amber route:

DC M p. fere a Carnunto Pannoniae abesse litus id Germaniae, ex quo invehitur, percognitum nuper, vivitque eques R. ad id comparandum missus ab Iuliano curante gladiatorum munus Neronis principis. Qui et commercia ea et litora peragravit, tanta copia invecta ut retia coercendis feris podium protegentia sucinis nodarentur.

The distance from Carnuntum in Pannonia to the coast of Germania from which amber is brought to us is some 600 miles, a fact which has been confirmed only recently. There is still living a Roman knight who was commissioned to procure amber by Julianus when the latter was in charge of display of gladiators given by the Emperor Nero. This knight traversed both the trade route and the coasts, and brought back so plentiful a supply that the nets used for keeping the beasts away from the parapet of the amphitheater were knotted with pieces of amber.

After the Marcomannic and Quadic dynasties collapsed, the Suebi kings stood between the barbarians in the north and Rome. Rome gave the Suebi unstinting gratitude for their protective role, in the form of monetary help and even weapons. Roman support was critical at the time of the middle of the first century, when somehow the Germanic dynasties disappeared altogether and Rome imposed a ruler of its own choice (Dobiáš 1964: 171). Dependence of the Germanic tribes on Rome varied, depending on who was ruling Rome at the time. During Domitian's campaigns against Dacia, both the Marcomanni and the Quadi were obliged under the treaties to help Rome, but both were reluctant and Domitian punished them by a second invasion into their territory (the first being the Augustan one, led by Tiberius).



Figure 1.4 Aureus of Domitian, Germania defeated.

There is almost no information on this conflict; all that is known is that the Marcomanni defeated the Roman army and the Romans retreated beyond the Danube again. The Germanic tribes must have considered this a great psychological victory. Free of Roman control since the time of Maroboduus, the tribes felt more confidence in their own strength and possibilities, though their tribal structure was comparatively primitive and did not allow for a consolidated single front against any powerful enemy. Tacitus was writing his literary works at this time (Dobiáš 1964: 172-73).

The attacks on the Roman frontier on the Danube in the reigns of Domitian and Nerva were the first successful barbarian attacks on the Empire. This appears to be the period when the first Roman defenses north of the Danube were built (Oliva 1962: 268). Around 100 a series of frontier forts were constructed along the Danube border to hold back the Germanic tribes. In the south the Romans constructed two types of military camps: the *castrum* for winter accommodation, and the *castellum* for temporary use. Written sources and stamps on bricks verify that the *legio XIV Gemina* and the *legio XV Apollinaris* were placed in the forts on the northern side of the Danube, in present day Slovakia, in support of the Roman clients on the frontier or possibly to hold back the Quadi. The posts also controlled the southern stages of the Amber route leading north to the Baltic (Dobiáš 1964: 175). The area was not entirely pacified by Trajan's time, and there is evidence that the emperor himself was stationed in the Danube region, most likely to supervise the war against the Suebi tribes. Trajan was planning a campaign against Dacia, and it was imperative that the middle Danube region be peaceful during the conflict: Trajan re-organised Pannonia and re-enforced the borders along the line of

the Danube. There are no written records on the Marcomanni or Quadi during the 20 years of Trajan's rule (Dobiáš 1964: 176). In the first year of Hadrian's rule there was yet another conflict with the Quadi and their neighbours the Iazyges. Hadrian's army with Batavian cavalry attacked the tribes:

λαμβάνοντες, οὐδὲν ἐνεόχμωσαν. οὕτω γὰρ καλῶς ἤσκητο τὸ στρατιωτικὸν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἰππικὸν τῶν καλουμένων Βατάουων τὸν Ἰστρον μετὰ τῶν ὀπλων διενήξαντο. ἄορῶντες οἱ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους κατεπλήττοντο, τρεπόμενοι δὲ ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐχρῶντο αὐτῶν δαιτητῆ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορῶν. (Dio Cass. 69. 9.6)

So excellently, indeed, had his soldiery been trained that the cavalry of the Batavians, as they were called, swam the lower Danube with their arms. Seeing all this, the barbarians stood in terror of the Romans, and turning their attention to their own affairs, they employed Hadrian as their arbitrator of their differences.

Near Budapest under the banks of the Danube was found an inscription referring to the same Batavi:

Ille ego Pannoniis quondam notissimus oris
 Inter mille viros fortis primusque Batavos
 Hadriano potui qui iudice vasta profundi
 aequora Danuvii cunctis transnare sub armis
 emissumq. arcu dum pendent in aere telum
 ad redit ex alia fixi gregique sagitta
 quem neque Romanus potuit nec Barbarus unquam
 non iaculo miles non arcu vincere Parthus.
 Hic situs hic memori saxo mea facta sacravi
 viderit an ne aliquis post me mea facta sequatur
 exemplo mihi sum primus qui talia gessi.

This is I, formerly the best known on Pannonian shores,
 the first and the strongest among one thousand of the Batavi.
 I was able, but how, let Hadrian be the judge, to swim the vast waters
 of the deep Danube in full armour,
 and while a weapon from a bow hung in the air and fell,
 I transfixed it with an arrow and broke it,
 I, whom no Roman nor Barbarian,
 nor a soldier with a javelin, nor any Parthian with a bow was ever to outdo.
 This is the site, here I have consecrated my deeds to memory in stone.
 Anyone will see whether he can follow my deeds after me.
 I am an example even to myself, the first who achieved these deeds. (*CIL* 3. 3676)

With the help of the Batavi, the Romans defeated the Iazyges, and possibly the Quadi, who are collectively named as the Sarmatians in ancient sources. Dobiáš (1964:

177) stated that the result of the conflict and the Roman victory was the acceptance of Hadrian's choice of a king and client status:

Per ea tempora et alias frequenter in plurimis locis, in quibus barbari non luminibus sed limitibus dividuntur, stipitibus magnis in modum muralis saepis funditus iactis atque conecis barbaros separavit. Germanis regem constituit, motus Maurorum compressit et a senatu supplications emeruit. (SHA: *Hadr.*12.7)

During this period and on many other occasions also, in many regions where the barbarians are held back not by rivers but by artificial barriers, Hadrian shut them off by means of high stakes planted deep in the ground and fastened together in the manner of a palisade. He appointed a king to the Germans, suppressed revolts among the Moors and won from the senate the usual ceremonies of thanksgiving.

Another king of the Quadi placed in his position by the Romans is commemorated on a coin from the reign of Antoninus Pius, the text on the coin: "Rex Quadis Datus", dated 143.



Figure 1.5 Antoninus Pius coin, Rex Quadis datus.

Even if the timing of the appointment of the king is uncertain, the image on the coin proves the authenticity of the client relationship between the Quadi and Rome. The repeated pattern of conflict and subsequent Roman intervention by placing a ruler of Roman choice proves that the relationship between the tribes and Rome was not constant but changing depending on the political circumstances on each side. Since there are few Roman literary sources devoted to the concerns of the region, it appears that there was relative peace during this time. On the other hand, in the intervals of conflict the border was breached, and invasions into Roman provincial territory occurred. It seems that early in Hadrian's reign there was a possible Quadic invasion into Pannonia. Hadrian appointed

a new governor to oppose them. He placed his adopted son Lucius Aelius Caesar as commander in Pannonia in 137 (Dobiáš 1964:177).

Quem preatura honoravit ac statim Pannoniis imposuit decreto consulatē cum sumptibus. (SHA: *Hadr.* 23.13)

He dignified him with the office of a praetor and immediately placed him in command of the Pannonian provinces, and also conferred on him the consulship together with money enough to meet the expenses.

Dobiáš (1964: 194) established that the incursions into Roman territories happened periodically, with limited success on the part of the invaders. At the beginning of the second half of second century the tribes launched the biggest invasion, covering not only the Danube region but, having crossed the Alps, also northern Italy and the Balkans.

Inundarunt Italiam ex abditis oceani partibus Teutones repente cum Cimbris, sed post inflictas rei Romanae clades immensas, ultimis proeliis per duces amplissimos superati. (Amm. Marc. 31,5.12)

The Teutones with the Cimbri, coming from unknown parts of the ocean, suddenly overflowed Italy, but after inflicting enormous disasters on our country, in the final battles they were overcome by our great generals.

Many scholars consider this invasion the beginning of the crisis that eventually brought down the Roman Empire; all the tribes inhabiting the northern border of Danube were involved. What was the motive for it? The acquisition of new arable land, population pressures, and economics do not seem sufficient for this breach of treaties and peace with Rome. We do not have any evidence of alliances among the various Germanic tribes, but do know that they were competing with each other.

Marco itidem moderante imperium, unum spirando vesania gentium dissonarum, post bellum fragores immensos, post aerumnas urbium captarum, et pessum datas copias, concitas probi rectoris interitu, partes earum exiguas reliquisset intactas. (Amm. Marc. 31.5.13)

Again, when Marcus was ruling the empire, the united madness of different tribes, after endless alarms of war, after woes of captured and plundered cities, after the destruction of forces shaken by the death of their able leader (Macrinus Vindex), would have left only a small part of them unscathed.

The ancient interpretation of the invasions was that that there were pressures of another ethnic group moving into the Germanic tribal area. (Undeniably, there was territorial pressure on the Marcomanni. Dr.Komoróczy (personal communication 2013) is of the opinion that it was due to climactic changes, for there seems to be evidence of fluctuations in plant growth, and consequently indications of crop failures. If there were shortages of food and fodder, the migration pressures were not pure ethnic movements as such, but infiltration of one group into another, in the course of a search for arable lands.)

Profecti tamen sunt paludati ambo imperatores et Victualis et Marcomannis cuncta turbentibus, aliis etiam gentibus, quae pulsae a superioribus barbaris fugerant, nisi reciperentur, bellum inferentibus. (SHA: *Marc* 14.1.)

Clad in military cloak the emperors finally set forth, for now not only were the Victuali and Marcomanni throwing everything into confusion, but other tribes, who had been driven on by the more distant barbarians and had retreated before them, were ready to attack Italy if not peaceably received.

Moving down to the shores of the Black Sea, a tribe, possibly the Goths, displaced other tribes ahead of them, putting pressure on the Marcomanni and the Quadi. Their potential escape route was blocked by the Roman Empire and the frontier on the Danube, which was guarded by strong garrisons in small and large forts protecting the valleys and approaches from *barbaricum* to the Danube. Dobiáš (1964: 195) writes that this was the function of the fortified military camps along the *limes*. Facing the Moravian border and the Quadi were three legions: *X Gemina Pia Fidelis* in an unspecified location, in Carnuntum the *Legio XIV Gemina Martia Victrix*, in Brigetio the *Legio I Adiutrix Pia Fidelis* with a possible fourth legion available from lower Pannonia, the sister *Legio II Adiutrix Pia Fidelis*. Further west, the Marcomannic border was not similarly defended by Rome, since the Marcomanni were isolated from the Danube border behind the Bohemian mountain ranges. This mistake in strategy and faulty understanding of the extent of the political alliances with the Marcomanni was clearly identified as soon as Marcus Aurelius was placed on the throne in 161. Marcus Aurelius spent most of his reign on the battle lines, fighting wars forced on him by incursions against his empire. On the Danubian frontier the Marcomannic Wars, known to the Romans as the *bellum Germanicum et Sarmaticum*, continued between 166 to 180. Mackay (2004: 232) argues that for the previous two centuries, the barbarian frontier was reasonably quiet; and since

the late second century B.C., there had been no serious invasions of Roman territory from the north, but the circumstances changed during Marcus Aurelius' rule. Some of the eastern European tribes pushed the established border tribes aside and entered Roman territory. Although there were many periods of respite, these Germanic incursions increased in frequency, sometimes completely overwhelming the *limes*.

Dobiáš (1964: 195-96) demonstrated that the Parthian conflict demanded greater forces, and any legions that were not immediately necessary were pulled from their positions to Syria. The *Legio II Adiutrix* was pulled, and some detachments from others were placed on the Danubian border. Even if the tribes north of the Danube border did not have full intelligence of the numbers that were recalled for the Syrian/Parthian war, the knowledge of the depleted forces must have existed. Shortly before the end of the Parthian campaign a plague broke out among the soldiers returning to Rome; it spread swiftly throughout the Empire, weakening the Roman armed forces. Both these situations provided an opportunity to the Germanic tribes for incursion beyond the Roman frontier in search of land. In 165, 6,000 of the Langobardi, the Obii and possibly even the Marcomanni, crossed the Danube in the vicinity of the Morava River, near the confluence of the river Váh with the Danube. When the barbarian forces were obstructed by the Romans they sent an embassy to the Pannonian governor M. Iallius Bassus to sue for peace. Dobiáš (1964: 196) dated the governor by the epigraphic evidence from an inscription from Lyon (*CIL* 12. 2718):

M(arco) Iallio M(arci) f(ilio) Volt(inia) Basso Fabio Valeriano co(n)s(uli) prae[tor]i leg(ato) leg(ionis) XIII Geminae Mart(iae) Vict(ricis)] leg(ato) Aug(usti) pr(o) pr(aetore) / provinc(iae) Pannoniae inferioris curatori oper(um) [p]u[blic]o[rum] leg(ato) Augg(ustorum) pr(o) pr(aetore)] provinc(iae) / M<oe=Y>siae inferior(is) comiti Augustorum Parthicae exp[ed]ed(itionis) leg(ato) Augg(ustorum) pr(o) pr(aetore) provinc(iae) Pan]noniae superioris.

To Marcus Iallius Bassus Fabius Valerianus, son of Marcus of Voltinia (voting tribe), to the consul, praetor and legate of the *legio XIII Gemina Martia Victrix*, to the *legatus pro praetore* (acting legate with propraetorian imperium) of the emperor of the Pannonia Inferior province, to the guardian of public matters, to the *legatus pro praetore* (acting praetor/governor) of the emperor of the Moesia Inferior province, to the companion of emperors for the Parthian expedition, to the *legatus pro praetore* (acting praetor/governor) of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, pro praetor (governor) of the Pannonia Superior province.

This barbarian attempt of breaking the *limes* must have been carefully observed by all the tribes in the territory north of the Danube. Since Rome was heavily burdened by the Parthian war, the treaty was granted and signed, with a condition that peace be observed. The treaty may be recorded in SHA: *Marc.* 14.4:

Quadic autem, amisso rege suo non prius se confirmaturos eum qui erat creatus decebant, quam id nostris placuisset imperatoribus. Lucius tamen invitus profectus est, cum plerique ad legatos imperatorum mitterent defectionis veniam postulantes.

And the Quadi, after they had lost their kings, said that they would not confirm the successor who had been elected until such a course was approved by our emperors. Nevertheless, Lucius went on, though reluctantly, after a number of peoples had sent ambassadors asking pardon for the rebellion

The work of Droberjar (2002: 168-69) provides evidence that whatever treaty both sides negotiated was not in practice long, since the next invasion concentrated larger forces of the Germanic tribes, and this time they were more successful. The two emperors, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, faced the greatest threat to Rome that came from its northern neighbours on the central Danube frontier. The Marcomanni, Quadi and Iazyges, who jointly invaded Pannonia and Noricum, had reached as far as northern Italy. In 169 Aquileia was besieged and the town of Opitergium was destroyed:

Quadorum natio mota est diu inexcita repentino, parum nunc formidanda, sed immensum quantum antehac bellatrix ac potens, ut indicant properata quondam raptim proclivia, obsessaque ab eisdem Marcomannisque Aquileia, Opitergiumque excissum, et cruenta complura perceleri acta procinctu (Amm. Marc. 29.6.1).

The Quadi, who had long been quiet, were suddenly aroused to an outbreak; they are a nation now not greatly to be feared, but were formerly immensely warlike and powerful, as is shown by their swift and sudden swoops in former times, their siege of Aquileia in company with the Marcomanni, the destruction of Opitergium, and many other bloody deeds performed in rapid campaigns.

The invasion, though repelled, is considered the beginning of the Marcomannic Wars; a time of drastic changes in the relationship between the barbarian tribes and the Romans. The conflicts brought serious intrusion in the economic and administrative system of Roman governance and heralded the beginning of the crisis of the Roman Empire. The early invasions are classed as “The Germanic Invasions” and are dated 166-

171. After the death of Lucius Verus, the burden of the rule fell to Marcus Aurelius alone. For two years he fought the Germani in Roman territory, and by 171 the Germanic forces were suppressed to such an extent that they were gradually forced to retreat from the Roman positions they had gained. Pertinax, who became Roman emperor later, was the commander of the forces at Brigetio. He and his *legio I Adiutrix* drove the barbarian armies out of both Danubian provinces. Marcus Aurelius then transferred his main command to Carnuntum and was preparing his troops for counter-offensive. The campaign known in antiquity as *expeditio Germanica prima* started in early 172 (Droberjar 2005: 169), and was aimed against the Quadi. The emperor himself crossed the Danube at the head of the army, most likely over a pontoon bridge, as recorded on a relief decorating his column in Rome (Figure 4.3). The force crossed at Carnuntum and continued north along the river Morava into Quadic territory (Dobiáš 1964: 204). The successful campaign against the Quadi resulted that year in a treaty Rome signed with the Quadi. Droberjar (2005: 170) considers the settlement a result of intra-Germanic political pressures.

With the Quadi humiliated by their loss and separated from their Germanic allies in the east and west, the Romans continued to wage war against the Marcomanni. After the defeat of the tribe, Roman coins were minted with allegories of conquered Germania, with words *Germania subacta*.



Figure 1.6 Marcus Aurelius sesterceus A.D. 172, *Germania subacta*.

Some of Marcus Aurelius' commanders perished in the conflicts, including Marcinius Vindex, mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus 35.5.13. above, and Claudius Fronto. They, and other generals, were honoured in the Forum of Trajan with statues

which commemorated their military achievements. Fronto's statue declares (*ILS* 1098) that he died "bravely fighting to the very end for the state" (Goodman 2012: 83).

Huic senatus auctor[e] imperatore M. Aurelio Antonino Aug. Armeniaco Medico Parthico maximo, quod post aliquot secunda proelia adversum Germanos et Iazyges ad postremum pro r.p. fortiter pugnas ceciderit, armatam statum [*poni*] in foro divi Traiani pecunia publica cen[suit].

To him the senate decreed, with Imp. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus Armeniacus Medicus Parthicus Maximus as *auctor* of the motion, he who after a number of favourable battles against the Germani and the Iazyges died for the republic, bravely fighting to the end, an armed statue [*to be placed*] in the forum of Divine Trajan. (Translation: E. Bullard)

In 173 the Romans set out against the Quadi again, possibly from Brigetio. This campaign is connected with the myth of the "Miracle of the Rain" depicted on the column of Marcus Aurelius.



Figure 1.7 The Column of Marcus Aurelius, The miracle of the rain.

During a summer heat wave the Quadi surrounded the Roman legions in hope that the Roman army, lacking fresh water, would be forced to surrender. But the Romans were saved by storm of hail and water.

τῶν οὖν Ῥωμαίων ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καμάτου καὶ ἐκ τῶν τραυμάτων τοῦ τε ἡλίου καὶ τοῦ δίψους γενομένων, καὶ μῆτε μάχεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα μῆτε χωρῆσαί πη δυναμένων, ἀλλ' ἐν τε τῇ τάξει καὶ τοῖς τόποις ἐστηκότων καὶ κατακαιομένων, νέφη πολλὰ ἐξαίφνης συνέδραμε καὶ ὑετὸς πολὺς οὐκ ἄθεεῖ καταεράγη· καὶ γάρ τοι λόγος ἔχει Ἄρνοῦφιν τινα μάγον Αἰγύπτιον συνόντα τῷ Μάρκῳ ἄλλους τέ τινας δαίμονας καὶ τὸν Ἑρμῆν τὸν ἄεριον ὅτι μάλιστα μαγγανείαις τισὶν ἐπικαλέσασθαι καὶ δι' αὐτῶν τὸν ὄμβρον ἐπισπάσασθαι. (Dio Cass. 71.8)

The Romans, accordingly, were in a terrible plight from fatigue, wounds, the heat of the sun, and thirst, and so could neither fight nor retreat, but were standing in the line and at their several posts, scorched by the heat, when suddenly many clouds gathered and a mighty rain, not without divine interposition, burst upon them. Indeed, there is a story to the effect that Arnuphis, an Egyptian magician, who was a companion of Marcus, had invoked by means of enchantments various deities and in particular Mercury, the god of the air, and by this means attracted the rain.

This occasion was not only commemorated on the column of Marcus Aurelius but also on coins. A sestertius was struck with the legend *Religio Augusti* and images of water or rain.



Figure 1.8 Marcus Aurelius sestertius A.D. 173, The miracle of the rain.

In 174 the Quadi and the Marcomanni signed a treaty with Rome. The authors of the *Historia Augusta* claimed that at this time Marcus considered a plan to create a new province named *Marcomannia* (Beckmann 2011:4).

Voluit Marcomanniam provinciam, voluit etiam Sarmantiam facere et fecisset, nisi Avidius Cassius rebellasset sub eodem in Oriente. (SHA *Marc.* 24.5)

He wished to make a province of Marcomannia and likewise Sarmantia, and he would have done so had not Avidius Cassius just then raised a rebellion in the East.

In 175 Commodus was recalled from Rome to help Marcus Aurelius manage the conflicts on the frontier. The next phase of the wars, so called *expeditio Germanico secunda*, broke out in 177 and lasted until 180. There are no records that might explain the motives of the Germanic tribes for the renewed hostilities against Rome or the location of the start of the second war (Dobiáš 1964: 212). Both emperors set off into the field on August 3, 178 as recorded in SHA *Com.* 12.4-6:

Cum patre appellatus imperator V kal. Exsuperatorias Pollione et Apro iterum consulibus. Triumphavit X kal. Ian iisdem consulibus. Iterum profectus III nonas Commodias Orfito et Rufo consulibus.

Together with his father he was acclaimed Emperor on the fifth day before the Kalends of Exsuperatorius, in the year when Pollio and Aper served their second consulships, and he celebrated a triumph on the tenth day before the Kalends of January in the same year. He set out on his second expedition on the third day before the Nones of Commodus in the consulship of Orfitus and Rufus.

The battles of the second war took place in the regions north of the Danube, and also in the southern area of Moravia (Droberjar 2005: 170). Droberjar continues with his analysis of the conflict: Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, with the accompaniment of the new *prefector praetorio*, Tarruntenus Paternus, and other experienced military personnel, departed directly for the site of the battle. Deep in the territory of *barbaricum* the Romans won a victory in 179, in the most decisive battle of the Marcomannic Wars. This great victory enabled the Romans, first time in the thirteen years of war, to move their winter quarters into the enemy territory north of the Danube. Evidence of the campaign and victory are the numerous military camps in southern Moravia and also the inscription (CIL 3 13439) from southern Slovakia. It records the overwintering of the *vexillatio* of the *legio I Adiutrix* at the site of Laugaricio, present day Trenčín, Slovakia.



Figure 1.9 The Laugaricio inscription.

This unit was of 855 soldiers was under the command of M. Velleius Maximianus. The monumental inscription that Maximianus dedicated to the goddess of Victory, chiseled into the rock near the camp, celebrates the step the commander took by

placing his troops in the enemy territory. Overwintering among the enemy was the greatest and most risky operation of his military career (Dobiáš 1964: 213). The inscription will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

The following year brought an unexpected conclusion to the wars. Marcus Aurelius died early in 180, and his death brought to an end any plans of establishing a permanent Roman presence in the Marcomannic and Quadic territory. *SHA Marc. 27.10* records Marcus' intentions:

Triennio bellum postea cum Marcomannis Hermunduris Sarmatis Quadis etiam egit et, si anno uno superfuisset, provincias ex his fecisset.

For three years after he waged war with the Marcomanni, the Hermunduri, the Sarmantians, and the Quadi, and had he lived a year longer he would have made these regions provinces.

Commodus was not able to finalise his father's intentions and decided to abandon the battlefields and return to Rome.

Bellum etiam quod pater paene confecerat legibus hostium addictus remisit ac Romam reversus est. (*SHA Com. 3.5*)

He abandoned the war which his father had almost finished and submitted to the enemy's terms, and then returned to Rome.

The Germanic tribes exploited the situation and sued Commodus for peace; the wars were concluded with the peace of Commodus in 180. Cassius Dio (73.2.1-2) gives details of the treaty:

καὶ ἐξεργάσασθαι αὐτοὺς δυνάμενος ῥαδίως, μισόπονος δὲ δὴ ὤν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄστικὰς ῥαστώνας ἐπειγόμενος ἐσπέισατο αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐφ' οἷς ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ συνετέθειτο, καὶ ἵνα τοὺς τε αὐτομόλους καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, οὓς μετὰ ταῦτα ἔλαβον, ἀποδώσιν αὐτῷ καὶ σίτόν τινα κατ' ἔτος τακτὸν τελῶσιν, ὃν ὕστερον αὐτοῖς ἀφῆκεν. ὅτι οἱ Μαρκομάνοι οὔτε τροφήν οὔτ' ἄνδρας συχνοὺς ὑπὸ τε τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀπολλυμένων καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς αἰ τῶν χωρίων κακώσεως ἔτι εἶχον: δύο γοῦν μόνους τῶν πρώτων καὶ δύο ἄλλους τῶν καταδεεστέρων πρέσβεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπεμψαν. καὶ ἐξεργάσασθαι αὐτοὺς δυνάμενος ῥαδίως, μισόπονος δὲ δὴ ὤν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄστικὰς ῥαστώνας ἐπειγόμενος ἐσπέισατο αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐφ' οἷς ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ συνετέθειτο, καὶ ἵνα τοὺς τε αὐτομόλους καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, οὓς μετὰ ταῦτα ἔλαβον, ἀποδώσιν αὐτῷ καὶ σίτόν τινα κατ' ἔτος τακτὸν τελῶσιν, ὃν ὕστερον αὐτοῖς ἀφῆκεν.

The Marcomanni by reason of the multitude of their people that were perishing and the constant ravaging of their lands no longer had an abundance of either food or men. At any rate they sent only two of their chief men and two other of inferior rank as envoys to sue for peace. And, although Commodus might easily have destroyed them, yet he made terms with them; for he hated all exertion and was eager for the comforts of the city. In addition to the conditions that his father had imposed upon them he also demanded that they restore to him the deserters and the captives that they had taken in meantime, and that they furnish annually stipulated amount of grain – a demand from which he subsequently released them.

The conditions of the treaty were much the same as the previous ones that Marcus Aurelius had signed, with the exception of the grain duties. Further demands are documented in Cassius Dio (73.2.4).

προσεπέταξε μέντοι σφίσιν ἵνα μήτε πολλάκις μήτε πολλαχοῦ τῆς χώρας ἀθροίζωνται, ἀλλ' ἅπαξ ἐν ἐκάστῳ μηνί καὶ ἐς τόπον ἓνα ἑκατοντάρχου τινὸς Ῥωμαίου παρόντος, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἵνα μήτε τοῖς Ἰάζυξι μήτε τοῖς Βούροις μήτε τοῖς Οὐανδίλοις πολεμῶσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν τούτοις συνηλλάγη, καὶ τὰ τε φρούρια πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν μεθορίαν τὴν ἀποτετμημένην ὄντα ἐξέλιπεν.

However, he further commanded that they should not assemble often nor in many parts of the country but only once each month and in one place and in the presence of a Roman centurion; and furthermore, that they should not make war upon the Iazyges, the Buri and the Vandili. On these terms then, he made peace, and abandoned all the outposts in their country beyond the strip along the frontier that has been neutralized...

Commodus was able then to withdraw the Roman forces from the frontier (Dobiáš 1964: 217). The conditions of the treaty were harsh, but in practice the Germanic tribes were not entirely decimated by their military losses. The repayment of men was granted for one time only and the grain duty was forgiven in its entirety. Other peace conditions were easily circumvented, especially the limit imposed on their assemblies. The Germanic tribes met regularly only three times a year, not monthly, and as soon as the Roman military withdrew from the border areas, there were no Roman centurions to supervise the meetings (Dobiáš 1964: 218).

Commodus' peace terms meant a radical departure from existing imperial strategy of expansion. In antiquity he was reviled for abandoning his father's policies and Roman imperial interests, but modern scholars consider his strategy a fitting response to the conditions on the Roman northern frontiers. The Roman military, forced at this stage to

accept Germanic tribesmen and slaves into its ranks, was hardly able to exert its influence over the wide regions of the *barbaricum* stretching to the Bohemian mountain ranges in the north and the Carpathian Mountains in the east (Dobiáš 1964:219).

D. Importance of the information

The concept of “the barbarian” changed during the course of Roman history; but from the Augustus’ reign on, the barbarians inhabiting *barbaricum* became the largest political and military threat to Rome on the European continent. The Germanic tribes were engaged in frequent armed conflicts with Rome, escalating in magnitude into the Marcomannic Wars during the reign of Marcus Aurelius. From the third century on, the importance of the barbarians increased through their integration into the Roman military, and sometimes even into administration. Droberjar quotes Foustel de Coulanges: “for many barbarians Rome became not an enemy, but a career” (Droberjar 2002: 16). In late antiquity the history of the Roman world concerned itself with the relations of Rome with its barbarian neighbours more than with the rest of the non-Roman world.

The Romans maintained contacts with other cultures across their borders; in the north the connections were along the Danube and by means of the Amber route which linked the Roman Empire with its northern neighbours. The Roman fortifications that have been found in southern Moravia and Slovakia were constructed as outposts for the Roman settlements on the *limes* on the Danube. The garrisons stationed along the border guarded the limits of the Roman Empire. The Romans recognized the importance of the defense structure along the middle Danube border; unprotected, the area offered an easy access for the barbarian tribes inhabiting the territories lying in the north of it. The invasion into Italy and siege of Aquileia had proven that the integrity of the empire was at stake.

Traditionally the Roman frontiers and frontier provinces have not received equal attention in historical studies as Rome and Italy. Interest in the provinces was generated only if something atypical occurred, especially when there were conflicts, insurrections or wars on their territories: ample literary sources describe the Marcomannic Wars and other conflicts along the Danube valley (Oliva 1962: 13). The modern practice of

European *Limesforschung* (frontier research) is now well established and numerous studies discuss the areas in contact with the Roman influence.

Modern researchers gather information on Roman presence and influence among the Marcomanni from a combination of sources: from literary sources, from epigraphy whenever available, and from material finds from archaeological excavations. Unfortunately there is only meager evidence of Roman presence in southern Moravia. Written sources provide no specific information on precise locations in *barbaricum*. The Hercynian Forest or the rivers are mentioned few times but no further geographical details are recorded. The Roman military camps do not merit any direct comments at all. So far only two monuments with epigraphy have been found in southern Slovakia and none in Moravia. No matter how little light these two examples shed on Roman presence in this part of *barbaricum*, the fact remains that they prove the Romans were living in the region. The brick stamps of the legions that constructed the military camps reveal Roman manufactured bricks as the preferred building materials, and pinpoint accurately the names of the legions involved. Since on the whole the Roman literary sources and epigraphy of Roman origin are vastly biased against the “barbarian Germanic” cultures, it is archaeology that is able to supply more impartial information on the cultures in *barbaricum*, provided that the evidence is interpreted correctly. Archaeology contributes details from the actual structures and material finds; Roman art supplements the general knowledge with visual representation of barbarian cultures; both the columns of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius depict scenes from wars with the barbarian Germanic peoples.

All these ancient sources provide a historical background that illuminates the situation in the *barbaricum* in the second century. The information enables modern scholars to place the Mušov installations in their rightful context. Within the turbulent history of the Danubian frontier lies the insight and comprehension of the Roman reasons for choosing Mušov as the military and administrative center for the region.

Chapter 2 – Evidence for the Roman occupation of Southern Moravia



Figure 2.1 Mušov-Burgstall hill from the south.



Figure 2.2 Top of the Mušov-Burgstall hill looking south towards the confluences of the rivers, now flooded by an artificial lake, and the border of Austria (Roman Pannonia province).



Figure 2.3 Mušov-Burgstall hill Roman installations

This study investigates Roman military and civilian presence and its importance for the Mušov site in Southern Moravia. The importance of relevant information on the geographical area of *barbaricum* was discussed in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 looks into specific sources of data on the area and introduces the issues that rise from lack of direct literary sources on Southern Moravia. In order to create a comprehensive image of the Roman presence in Southern Moravia, data have to be collected from indirect sources and pieced together to form a potential reality. This section of the study will examine these sources:

- A. Primary sources
- B. Structures
- C. Local borrowings
- D. Chronology

The past twenty years brought in a rapid increase in information on Roman temporary camps in Southern Moravia. In other Danubian provinces aerial archaeology has been practiced for decades. For example, Austrian archaeology located several Roman military installations in Pannonia and the Danubian border areas. The socialist government in Czechoslovakia did not allow any aerial surveys of its territory. The

prohibition was explained with concerns for national safety and security. In the late 1980s the socialist system collapsed and the resulting political changes made aerial archaeology in Southern Moravia possible. Czech archaeological teams surveyed the frontier regions in the area of the *barbaricum* north of the Danube *limes* and found twenty two well-preserved temporary military camps and several camps identified by presence of Roman trenches. Some of the camps are still under investigation and research results have not been published. In addition, new locations of Roman installations continue to be discovered in the area.

Temporary field camps provide opportunities for study of the Roman incursions into *barbaricum* and archaeological evidence corroborates particular references recorded by Roman writers. The largest area under investigation is the Mušov site in Southern Moravia. In Mušov, Czech scholars are investigating traces of different military activities in several periods. One possible occupation time period dates to Tiberius' expedition against Maroboduus in 6. Evidence of the most important Roman habitation of Mušov is from the period of the Marcomannic Wars. The Roman installation there may well have been a permanent fort designed for Roman occupation forces. The research and study of the site and of the events of the Marcomanni Wars are crucial for understanding the interaction between Rome and its barbarian neighbours to the north, as well as conceptualizing more broadly contacts between two different civilizations with diverse cultures (Šedo 2001: 106).

A. Primary sources

The oldest literary source describing Roman military field installations appears in the second century B.C., in Polybius' *Histories* (*Hist.* 6, 26-42). Book 6 of the *Histories* concentrates on the 53 years between 220 B.C. and 167 B.C. Both Carthage and Corinth, Rome's ancient rivals, were defeated, and Rome became the dominant military power in the Mediterranean (Nagle 2010: 136-7). Key to this power were Rome's legions. The Romans built permanent, fortified military camps, which served as forts guarding a territory, and temporary, fortified marching camps. Both types of camps were constructed to house and protect the troops, and Roman army regulations required that the soldiers retire to a correctly designed camp each night. As a Roman legion travelled, temporary military camps were built along the route for its safety. C. Julius Caesar's *Commentarii*

de bello Gallico, Hyginus' *De metatione castrorum*, and Flavius Vegetius Renatus' *Epitoma rei militaris* all mention field military camps. Sometimes these camps rose in enemy territories during threats of attacks against Rome. The camps did not serve solely a defensive purpose, but during counterattacks against the enemy served also as fortified refuges in hostile areas. They functioned as a chain of strategic points and tactical retreats during conquest of new territories (Musil 2000: 104). Josephus wrote the following about Roman military camps:

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς εὐάλωτοι πολεμίοις: ὅπη δ' ἂν ἐμβάλωσιν εἰς ἐχθρῶν γῆν, οὐ πρὶν ἄπτονται μάχης ἢ τειχίσαι στρατόπεδον. τὸ δὲ οὐκ εἰ καὶ ὄν οὐδὲ ἀνώμαλον ἐγείρουσιν οὐδὲ πάντες ἢ ἀτάκτως διαλαβόντες, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀνώματος ὧν τύχοι χῦρος, ἐξομαλίζεται: διαμετρεῖται δὲ παρεμβολῆ τετραγώνος αὐτοῖς, καὶ τεκτόνων πλῆθος ἔπεται τῶν τε πρὸς τὴν δόμησιν ἐργαλείων (*Bell. Iud.* 3. 76-78).

The Roman never lay themselves open to a surprise attack; for, whatever hostile territory they may invade, they engage in no battle until they have fortified their camp. This camp is not erected at random or unevenly; they do not all work at once or in disorderly parties; if the ground is uneven, it is first leveled, a site for the camp is then measured out in the form of a square. For this purpose the army is accompanied by a multitude of workmen and of tools for building.

The central argument of this chapter is the evidence of Roman occupation of Moravia. Since there are no primary literary sources directly connected to the geographical area of this study, we must look instead for any Roman writing that might refer to Southern Moravia in sources that concern Germania, its tribes, and the Marcomanni Wars. Rarely can the region be recognized, and then by implication only; for example as discussed in Chapter 1, Tacitus in *Ann.* 2.45 mentions by name the Hercynian Mountains, located in central Moravia. There are inscriptions that are able to shed light on the Roman presence in southern Slovakia, not Moravia, and some small archaeological finds with writing have been found in Southern Moravia.

Williams (1996: 172) gives an explanation for the onset of the Roman military installation building program north of the Danube *limes*. He portrays the Marcomanni Wars as *the* major catastrophic event of the reign of Marcus Aurelius. The wars had two stages: 166-75 and 177-80. In the first stage, the empire suffered serious setbacks, and in the second, Marcus Aurelius retaliated and won. The Romans very quickly lost control of the conflict at the beginning. The attacks centered on what is now the territory of the

Czech Republic: Bohemia and Moravia. This same region was where both Trajan and Hadrian encouraged the developing trade between Rome and Germania through their policy of peaceful incursion. We need to ask what brought the changes to the time-honoured arrangement. As mentioned before, the movements of various tribes across the European continent pushed the Marcomanni and the Quadi towards the Danube. The Marcomanni and Quadi broke out through the frontier, and devastating the northern reaches of Pannonia, swarmed into northern Italy. On the western side of the Danube, the Marcomanni attacked Noricum. The Romans considered the area geographically too unforgiving and least likely to be approached by their enemies and consequently its borders were insufficiently guarded.

As the Marcomanni marched along the frontier destroying forts, further Germanic tribes in the region joined the conflict, and the whole border territory of the Danube erupted in conflict (Williams 1996: 173). With the exceptions of the incursion into Italy and Noricum, the barbarian gains were not great. The tribes had no common goal, and the difficulty with the war was not the possible barbarian gains but the length and the spread of the disturbances and the slowness of Roman response to them. It took Marcus Aurelius almost three years to regain control over the central area of the Danube frontier. The overall size of the Germanic forces opposing Rome is uncertain, but Williams points to a count closer to 100,000 combatants. The Germanic attacks came from in between the fortresses, and once within the border of the empire, the Roman road system was open to them. The usual barbarian tactic was to leave the forts behind and rush inland (Williams 1996:174). The Romans responded with a construction of a barrier of defensive installations to protect the Danube frontier.

Williams (1996: 175) states that the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* and Cassius Dio are inconsistent about the early years of the wars. No comprehensive written accounts of a Roman military response survive, and most of our knowledge of the conflicts is gathered from archaeological finds.

The first Roman goal was to safeguard Italy itself against possible aggression from the north. The decisions to protect the borders relate directly to examinations of the Roman presence in Moravia, and to establishing military posts and camps in the trans-Danubian frontier. An inscription from Thibili, Numidia (*ILS* 8977) describes the new

command, called *Praetentura Italiae et Alpium* (Protection of the Borders of Italy and the Alps). Quintus Antistius Adventus was appointed to the command in 170.

[Quinto.Antistio Advento] Q(uiti) f(ilio) Quir(ina) Postumio Aqu[i]lino co(n)s(uli)., sacerdoti fetiali, **leg(ato) Aug(ugusti) pro praetore provinciae Germaniae inferioris, leg(ato) Aug(usti) at prae[t]enturam Italiae et Alpium expeditione Germanica**, cura(tori) operum locorumq(ue) publicorum, leg(ato) Aug(usti) pr(o) pr(aetore) provinc(iae) Arabiae, leg(ato) Aug(usti) leg(ionis) VI Ferratae et secundae Adiutricis, translato in eam expeditione Parthica, qua donatus est donis militaribus coronis murali vallari aurea hastis puris tribus vexillis duobus, praetore, leg(ato) pr(o) pr(aetore) provinc(iae) Africae), [t]r(ibunato) pl(ebis), seviro eq(uitum) R(omanorum), q(aestori) pr(o) pr(aetore) provinc(iae) Macedoniae, tribune mil(itum) leg(ionis) I. Minerviae p(iae) f(idelis). IIII vir(o) viarum curandarum, Sextus Marcius Maximus ob insignem eius in se benivolentiam s(ua) p(ecunia) p(osuit), d(ecurionum) d(ecreto). (inscription transcribed by Excerpta Romana. De Bronnen der Romeinsche Geschiedenis van Nederland, p. 262)

To Quintus Antistius Adventus Postumius Aquilinus, son of Quintus, Quirinal tribe, the consul, fetial priest, **the *legatus pro praetore* of the emperor of the province Germania Inferioris, the legate of the emperor to protect the borders of Italy and the Alps from Germanic invasions**, the supervisor of public buildings in Rome, the *legatus pro praetore* of the emperor of the province of Arabia, the *legatus pro praetore* of the emperor of the *legio VI Ferrata* and of the *legio II Adiutrix*, transferred from the Parthian expedition, for which he was granted military decorations, the mural crown, the golden crown awarded to the first soldier to scale an enemy rampart, three untipped spears and two banners; to the praetor, the *legatus pro praetore* of the province of Africa, the tribune of the plebs, seviro of the Roman knights, quaestor, *legatus pro praetore* of the province of Macedonia, the tribune of the soldiers of the *legio I Minerva Pia Fidelis*, quattuorvir for the maintenance of public roads; in return of his (ie Quintus) outstanding benevolence toward him (ie Sextus): Sextus Marcius Maximus with his own money placed this monument, by decree of the decurions. (translation: E. Bullard)

The purpose of the new command was to block entry through the eastern Alps (Williams 1996:175). Three new bases were established close to the Danube, one of them, Laugaricio, in southern Slovakia, in modern Trenčín. Marcus Aurelius' central command was in Carnuntum, placed strategically to direct operations in Southern Moravia and Slovakia. Marcus Aurelius lived in Carnuntum for five years, supervising the war, and died there in 180. There are no documents detailing how the wars were won or precisely where the battles took place (Williams 1996: 176). By the end of the

conflicts 20,000 Roman troops were left in Marcomannic lands. The *legio II Adiutrix* overwintered at Trenčín in 181-82 and left the following inscription, figure number 9 in Chapter One (*CIL* 3.13 439):

Victoriae Augustoru(m)/ exercitus qui Langaricione sedit/ mil(ites) l(egionis) II DCCCLV (Marcus Velleius) Maximianus leg(atus) leg(ionis) II ad(iutricis) cur(avit) f(aciendum)

To the Victory of (our) emperors, the army that lies at Laugaricium, 855 soldiers of the *legio II*, Marcus Velleius Maximianus, legate of the *legio II Adiutrix*, looked after the making of this monument. (translation: E. Bullard)

The inscription is backed up by a find from Zana, Algiers (*AE* 1956, 124). A statue base dedicated to Marcus Velleius Maximianus describes his long military career and mentions his overwintering in Laugaricio in trans-Danubian *barbaricum*. The dating of this monument is possible by the dedication to the Victory of the two emperors Marcus Aurelius and Commodus (Oliva 1962: 280).

M(arco) Valerio Maximiano M(arci) Valeri Maximiani quinq(uennalis) s[ac(erdotalis)] / f(ilio) pont(ifici) col(oniae) Poetovionens(ium) equo p(ublico) praef(ecto) coh(ortis) I Thrac(um) trib(uno) coh(ortis) I (H)am(iorum) / civium R(omanorum) praep(osito) orae gentium Ponti Polemoniani don(is) don(ato) bello Phart(ico)(!) allecto ab Imp(eratore) M(arco) Antonino Aug(usto) et misso in procinctu / Germanic(ae) exped(itionis) ad deducend(a) per Danuvium quae in annonam Panno(niae) / utriusq(ue) exercit(uum) denavigarent praepos(ito) vexillation(um) clas(sium) praetor(iarum) / Misenatis item Ravennatis item clas(sis) Brittanicae item equit(um) Afror(um) et Mauror(um) / elector(um) ad curam explorationis Pannoniae praef(ecto) al(ae) I Aravacor(um) in procinc(tu) Germanico ab Imp(eratore) Antonino Aug(usto) coram laudato et equo et phaleris / et armis donato quod manu sua ducem Naristarum Valaonem / interemisset et in eade(m) ala quartae militiae honor(em) adepto praef(ecto) al(ae) / contar(iorum) don(is) don(ato) bello Ger(manico) Sar(matico) praep(osito) equitib(us) gent(ium) Marcomannor(um) Narist(arum) / Quador(um) ad vindictam Orientalis motus pergentium honor(e) centenariae dig(nitatis) aucto salario adeptus procurationem Moesiae inferioris / eodem in tempore praeposito vexillationibus et at(!) detrahen(dam) Briseorum latronum manum in confinio Macedon(iae) et Thrac(iae) / ab imp(eratore) misso proc(uratori) Moesiae super(ioris) proc(uratori) prov(inciae) Daciae Porolis/sensis a sacratissimis impp(eratoribus) in amplissimum ordinem inter prae(torios) allecto et mox leg(ato) leg(ionis) I adiut(ricis) item **leg(ato) leg(ionis) II adiu(tricis) praep(osito) vexil(lationum) / Leugaricione hiemantium** item leg(ato) leg(ionis) / V Mac(edonicae) item leg(ato) leg(ionis) I Italic(ae) item leg(ato) leg(ionis) / XIII gem(inae) item leg(ato) Aug(usti) pr(o) pr(aetore) [[[leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae)]]] don(is) don(ato) a nobilissimo / [[[principe) M(arco) Aurelio Commodo Aug(usto)]]] expeditione

secunda Ger(manica) / splendidissimus ordo Dian[ensium veteran(orum)] aere conlato.

Campbell (1994: 64-65) provides an English translation of the entire inscription:

To Marcus Velleius Maximianus, son of Marcus Velleius Maximianus who was local censor and priest, priest of the colony of Poetovio, with the public horse, prefect of the first cohort of Thracians, tribune of the first cohort of Hamians, Roman citizens, placed in charge of the coastline of the peoples of Pontus Polemonianus, decorated in the Parthian war, chosen by Emperor Marcus Antoninus Augustus and sent on active service in the German expedition with the task of bringing food by boat down the river Danube to supply armies in both provinces of Pannonia, placed in charge of the detachments of the praetorian fleets of Misenum and also of Ravenna and also of the British fleet, and also of the African and Moorish cavalry chosen for scouting duties in Pannonia, prefect of the first *ala* of Aravacans, while on active service in Germany praised in public by emperor Antoninus Augustus because he had killed with his own hand Valao, chief of the Naristi, and was granted his horse, decorations, and weapons; in the same *ala* he achieved the honour of his fourth military post, prefect of the *ala* of lance-bearers, decorated in the war against the Germans and Sarmantians, placed in charge with the honour of centenarian rank of the cavalry of the peoples of the Marcomanni, Naristi, and Quadi journeying to punish the insurrection in the east (i.e. the revolt of Avidius Cassius, 175 A.D.), with an increased salary appointed to the procuratorship of Lower Moesia and at the same time placed in charge of detachments and sent by the Emperor to drive out a band of Brisean brigands on the borders of Macedonia and Thrace, procurator of Upper Moesia, procurator of the province Dacia Porolissensis, chosen by our most revered emperors for admission to the senatorial order among men of praetorian rank, and soon after legate of Legion I Adiutrix, also **legate of Legion II Adiutrix, placed in charge of the detachments in winter quarters at Laugaricio**, also legate of Legion V Macedonica, also legate of Legion I Italica, also legate of Legion XIII Gemina, also legate of the Emperor with propraetorian power of [Legion III Augusta], decorated by the most noble Emperor Marcus Aurelius Commodus Augustus on the second German expedition; the most distinguished council of the people of Diana Veteranorum (set this up) with the money distributed.

The Laugaricio inscription is the most northerly evidence of Roman occupation in Central Europe, but it is not the oldest. The oldest inscription was found in 1976 during reconstructions of a Romanesque church in Bolgod, southern Slovakia. An old portal included two stone slabs, with a Latin inscription honouring the interpreter of the *legio XV* (AE 1988, 938):

Q(uintus) Atilius Sp(uri) f(ilius) Vot(uria) Primus **inter(p)rex leg(ionis) XV** idem (centurio) negotiator an(norum) LXXX h(ic) s(itus) e(st) Q(uintus) Atilius

Coctatus Atilia Q(uinti) L(iberta) Fausta Privatus et Martialis hered(es) l(iberti) p(osuerunt).

Quintus Atilius Primus, son of Spurius, of the tribe Voturia, **interpreter of the Legio XV**, likewise centurion also a trader; he lived 80 years, and is placed here. Quintus Atilius Coctatus [his son] and Atilia Fausta, freedwoman of Quintus, Privatus and Martialis, his heirs placed (this monument). (Translation: E. Bullard)

Mair (2012: 23-4) includes the text and interpretation of the inscription. She dates the text from the second half of the first century. We know nothing of Quintus Atilius Primus' ethnic origins, but he must have had local language skills to be able to interpret for the legion. Mairs (2012: 24) also considers the inscription an indication of his two possible positions: one as a *negotiator* for the army, or another as a retired soldier-trader on the frontier. It is possible that his trading activities were connected with the Amber Route trade which was guarded by the *legio XV* from Carnuntum. The legion was stationed at Carnuntum in 14-62 and in 118-19 (Oliva 1962: 218).

The fragmentary Tusculum Elogium (*ILS* 8965) is the oldest document related to the regions of the present day Czech Republic. It dates approximately to 10 B.C., records several names of tribes inhabiting the area, and describes the march of a Roman expedition across the Danube during the reign of Augustus (Oliva 1962: 26):

(M.Vini)cius..... [cos., XV] vir s(acris) f(aciundis);.....
[*legatus pro*] pr. August Caesaris in [*Illyrico primus ?t*]rans flumen Danuvium
.....m et Basternarum exerc[*citum*].....
.....[*fu*]gavitque, Cotinos.....s et Anartio[s].....[A]ugusti

(M. Vinicius) consul, quindecimvir sacris faciundis, legate pro praetor of Augustus Caesar, in Illyrica first across the river Danube..... and the army of the Basternas.....and fled, the Cotini and Anartii....of Augustus (translation: E. Bullard)

Both the *ILS* and Oliva associate this inscription with the consul M. Vinicius, who participated in the expedition beyond the Danube in 19 B.C. The Cotini were the original Celtic tribal group living in the area which included Southern Moravia. Both the Marcomanni and the Quadi employed them in their mines (Burns 2003: 181). Tacitus (*Ger.* 43) writes about the Germanic tribes:

Retro Marsigni, Cotini, Osi, Buri terga Marcomannorum Quadorumque claudunt. E quibus Marsigni et Buri sermone cultuque Suebos referent: Cotinos Gallica, Osos Pannonica lingua coarguit non esse Germanos, et quod tributa patiuntur.

Partem tributorum Sarmatae, partem Quadi ut alienigenis imponunt: Cotini, quo magis pugeat, et ferrum effodiunt.

Behind them are the Marsigni, Cotini, Osi and Buri enclosing the Marcomanni and the Quadi from the rear: among them the Marsigni and Buri in language and mode of life recall the Suebi: as for the Cotini and the Osi, the Gallic tongue of the first and the Pannonian of the second prove them not to be Germani; so does their submission to tribute. This tribute is imposed on them as foreigners in part by the Sarmatae, in part of the Quadi. The Cotini, more to their shame, have even iron mines to work.

During the 1976 excavations at Mušov, Czech archaeologists found a bronze tablet from a Roman silver breastplate⁴, a *lorica squamata*. It dates from the second half of second century, and is associated with the Roman military activities during the time of the Marcomannic Wars (Tejral 1986, Musil 1997).



Figure 2.4 The *lorica squamata*.

⁴ All archaeological finds depicted in this chapter were excavated at the Mušov site.



Figure 2.5 Buckle with inscription from the *lorica squamata*.

Musil (1997: 48) describes the breastplate: the buckle on the *lorica* has military symbols worked on it, together with emblem of the *legio*. The upper symbol is one of the Dioscuri leading a horse (the Dioscuri are patrons and protectors of Roman cavalry). The central panel of the buckle bears the inscription “Leg X” identifying the *legio Gemina Pia Fidelis*. Over the back of the bull on the lower panel is the inscription *Bruti*. Both shortened inscriptions are typical of the Roman legionaries marking their belongings with the name of their legion.

The interpretation of the lower of the two inscriptions is more problematic. The method of fabrication alone is indicative of the inscription’s later addition to the buckle. The inscription may define more narrowly the position of a specific bearer and it is most likely that the inscription was added once the bearer was posted to his legion. Both Musil and Tejral (1986) classify the inscription as marking both the bearer, and his military unit. This type of inscription has many analogues from other military finds. On the basis of the pattern, scholars have interpreted the Mušov buckle as the following (Musil 1997: 50):

Leg(ionis) X (centuriae) Bruti(i)

Of the *legio X* of the century of Brutius.

Musil writes that parts of Roman festive armour bore personal names and, most commonly inscribed were Roman military helmets. In the case of the Mušov buckle, it may be possible that the legionary was the secondary wearer of the *lorica*, with the name of his own centurion embossed on his armour. The confirmation of the interpretation could be found on the column of Marcus Aurelius, where the *loricae* were worn by *signifers* and *aquilifers* (the standard bearers) of the legion:



Figure 2.6 Column of Marcus Aurelius, the emperor addresses his troops, scene 9.

Even though we are unable to confirm the exact name of the bearer of the Mušov *lorica*, we are able to gather from the inscription that he was stationed with the *legio X* in Mušov during the Marcomannic Wars (Musil 1997:50).

I. Brick stamps

Other important sources of primary information are the stamps on Roman bricks. Roman legions fired their own bricks necessary for their buildings, and the legionary bricks were sometimes stamped with a mark of the legion under whose management the bricks were manufactured. The earliest legionary stamps date to about 43 (Brodrigg 1987:

118). Roman brick stamp texts are brief and contain abbreviations rather than entire words. This fact complicates the interpretation of the texts, but it is compensated by the stereotypical character of the subject matter (Helen 1975: 9). Dating methods for the bricks are more precise than dating methods for inscriptions due to two factors: the subject matter and characteristics of the stamps, and the use of bricks as building material (Helen 1975:10). Bricks from military structures can be also dated by the dates of the construction, if it is known. The bricks used in military installations occasionally specify the names of the legions that manufactured the bricks for their own use, and their interpretation and dating can be supported by various primary sources such as military inscriptions or historical texts.

Musil (1993: 89-103) describes in his article the Roman brick finds from Mušov. Roman ceramic finds, lamps and coins are known at the site from as early as the 17th century. All of this material evidence has indirectly pointed to a Roman presence in Moravia, but it was the surprising finds of Roman building materials in 1927 that confirmed it directly. Roman bricks, *lateres*, *tegulae*, and *tubuli* are all marked with the legionary stamps (Musil 1993:89). Several Roman bricks from the *legio X.*, *XIV.* and *XV.* have been excavated from the site.



Figure 2.7 Legionary bricks excavated at Mušov.

Musil (1993: 98) comments that the bricks originated from both the military camps and from the Germanic settlements surrounding the Mušov site. Komoróczy (2008: 406) catalogued the bricks of the *legio Pia Fidelis* as originating from the *balneum* at the Neurissen terrace site. About 100 bricks and fragments were found and 95 different stamps are known. Most originate from the *legio X Gemina Pia Fidelis*: 91 bricks in the *planta pedis* type with three variations of the same legionary stamp exist (the text is LEG X GPF). Another three stamps of the *vexillatio* of the legion are stamped on *imbrices*. Only one stamp of the brickyard of the *legio XIII Gemina* was found (the 14th legion was stationed in Carnuntum). 14 *tegulae* and a *tubulus* from the hypocaust were found with the same stamps of the *legio X*. The Roman bricks from the site are usually square, 20 x 20 x 5 cm and 45.5 x 45.5 x 6 cm. Some other sizes were found as well: the *bessalis* and the *sesquipedalis* type (*bessalis* is a square Roman brick, approximately 20 cm in on a side; *sesquipedalis* is a square Roman brick approximately 45 cm on a side). The legionary bricks are a valuable source of information on the Roman buildings within the Mušov fort site, and their texts verify the Roman presence in Southern Moravia.

B. Structures

Roman structures (excavated anywhere in the Roman world) endorse relevant written sources by their physical existence. During Trajan's reign, the first Roman stations with Roman structures were founded north of the Danube, some in Quadic territory in southern Slovakia (Trenčín) and some in the Marcomannic territory in Southern Moravia, in the Mušov-Burgstall area (Bouzek 1990: 26). Bricks from military brickyards confirm that founding these stations was not possible without the help of the Roman army, but their character points to their function as administrative centers, and as trading centers at the southern end of the Amber Route. Roman imports from the period reach further north into *barbaricum*. It appears that the center of the Roman import distribution system lay in Southern Moravia already in the first half of the second century (Bouzek 1990: 28). Aerial photography has uncovered a number of Roman sites in Southern Moravia that have been studied and documented as temporary Roman military camps. Characteristic features are trenches, ramparts, and gates. Internal structures were mostly tents or wooden structures if the army was required to remain for a longer time

period. Moravian military camps differed in size; small camps of one to three hectares, larger ones of up to 20 hectares, and occasionally large camps that were able to hold up to two legions of soldiers (Droberjar 2002: 14).

A new point of view in current Czech archaeology is the theory that the Roman military outposts and installations were erected over existing native settlements. Without a doubt, the indigenous settlements were placed on strategic points that were as useful to the Romans as they were useful to the Germani. The chronological relations between the native settlements and the Roman camps on Germanic sites are uncertain, but it is probable that the Romans drove the Germanic natives out before they erected the forts (Tejral 1998: 130).

According to the latest studies, it is possible to claim that the Mušov area played a decisive role during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, and also early in the reign of Commodus. The discovery of a rich grave of a Germanic noble at the site convinced Czech archaeologists that the Mušov site performed a crucial function in diplomatic and administrative dealings between the representatives of the Roman Empire and the Germani. Mušov itself, or somewhere near the site, was the location of the Roman military command for operations in *barbaricum* north of the Danube. Archaeological excavations reveal not only military structures but also traces of military conflict. One of the trenches in Mušov contains a large number of human and animal remains, including skeletons of women and children. Animal bones are predominantly of horses and clearly the casualties of war (Droberjar 2002: 17).

Šedo (2000: 183) writes that Southern Moravia was in the reach of Rome for centuries. During this time, the Roman military took advantage of the location of their camp in Mušov. The base was strategically placed not only for invasions into *barbaricum*, but was useful also during peace time for contact with representatives of local tribes and for trade. The area was known to archaeologists previously, especially the Burgstall hill, marked by its outstanding geographic position. The site is 50 km north of the Danube river and it is placed directly at the confluence of Svatka and Jihlava rivers, and a short distance down from the confluence of Svatka and Thaya (Dyje) rivers.



Figure 2.8 Present day confluence of the rivers Svatka and Jihlava.

The site is on a low hill overlooking the rivers and the flat lands surrounding it, and at the crossroads of important ancient trade routes: the Amber Route leading north and the route north-west into the Bohemian basin (Tejral 1998: 115). The site comprises the Burgstall hill that includes the Neurissen track, the low area in the south called Na Pískách, and a further unclassified military defense system at Pasohlávky.




Figure 2.9 Archaeological landscape in the surroundings of the Roman fort at Mušov-Burgstall. 1-2 Burgstall and Neurissen, Roman fortified sites; 3-5 Roman marching camps and defenses visible by cropmarks; 6 Pasohlávky.

The entire site is classified as a fortified Roman civil/military station, constructed by the detached legions from Vindobona. This interpretation was confirmed by the finds of new locations connected to Roman military activities. Four temporary field camps, the first ever found in Moravia, were located in the southern part of the Mušov site in 1991. It is apparent that the camps were guarding the approach to Burgstall. Around the circuit of these installations ran the ditches and a low rampart. Šedo (2001: 93) quotes Cassius Dio (72.20.1) on Roman forts in the Marcomannic lands:

ὅτι τοῖς Κουάδοις καὶ τοῖς Μαρκομάνοις πρεσβευσαμένοις δύο μυριάδες ἑκατέροις στρατιωτῶν ἐν τείχεσιν ὄντες οὔτε νέμειν οὔτε γεωργεῖν οὔτ' ἄλλο τι μετὰ ἀδείας ποιεῖν ἐπέτρεπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτομόλους παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ αἰχμαλώτους τῶν σφετέρων πολλοὺς ὑπεδέχοντο, μὴ πάνυ τι αὐτοὶ ταλαιπωρούμενοι διὰ τὸ καὶ βαλανεῖα καὶ πάντα ἀφθόνως ἔχειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια.

With regards to the Quadi and the Marcomani, who sent envoys: the twenty thousand soldiers that were stationed in forts among each of these tribes would not allow them to pasture their flocks or till the soil or do anything else in security, but kept receiving many deserters from the enemy's ranks and captives of their own; yet the soldiers themselves were enduring no great hardships, inasmuch as they had baths and all the necessities of life in abundance.

The following account of classifying and dating the site is based on Tejral (1998: 111-36). In recent years the programs of the Institute of Archaeology of the Academy of Science of the Czech Republic in Brno have focused on Southern Moravia, especially on the region around Mušov (Tejral 1998: 112). Recent excavations have revealed part of a large military outpost whose defense systems consist of a rampart with a timber inner face (Tejral 1998: 123). Later reconstructions of the rampart include bricks. The archaeologists' opinion is that the rampart had been crowned by a superstructure of clay bricks (Tejral 1998: 126). Excavations also discovered foundations of an apsidal building on the Neurissen hill. Adjacent to the building are other smaller structures and remains of some five superimposed earthworks, mostly ditches. This demonstrates that the site had been used repeatedly by the Roman army during many campaigns. The excavations have also discovered the presence of a wide (16 m) recessed timber gate with two towers and four towers within the rampart.

The excavators have interpreted this gate as similar to gates in Augustan forts of the Rhineland and concluded that these structures may be associated with the Roman campaign against Maroboduus in 6 (Tejral 1998: 115, Šedo 2000). But scholars differ on this analysis and some conclude that there is no evidence for an Augustan camp on the site of Mušov (Komoróczy 2003). Komoróczy (personal communication 2013) stated that the answer is more complicated, as Tejral, in particular, has revised his former opinion on the dating. Ten years ago the scholars thought that the installation was indeed an Augustan camp even though no direct materials for dating were available. Today the opinion leans to "no Augustan camp directly confirmed", but the researchers do not rule that they may find Augustan artifacts in the future. There are three archaeological stratigraphical layers at the Mušov site, and exact dating is difficult to establish. The whole question of dating Mušov is more complex than previously thought. Literary sources mentions Roman military camps but never specifically a camp at Mušov. Komoróczy (personal communication 2013) argues that there is enough evidence that there was no Augustan camp at the Mušov site, and that the entire installation is dating to the Marcomannic Wars.

The stratigraphy of Roman finds at the location “Na Pískách”, dates the camp from the first stages of the Marcomanni Wars (Droberjar 1993, Tejral 1998: 130) and all recent studies date the Roman installation to the Marcomanni Wars, and more precisely to 172-180 (Komoróczy 2008: 437). Interior development of the area has been explored only marginally. The structures discovered to this date are: two residential houses, one of them interpreted as the *balneum*, a series of workshops, a large apsidal building beside a gate, and fortifications. The new excavation results have not yet been published but there are photographs and some details about the large military hospital found recently. There are also some traces of an ancient Roman river harbour published in the site of: Archeologický ústav Akademie věd ČR Brno, v.v.i: Detašované pracoviště Dolní Dunajovice (The Archaeological Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Brno).

I. Two residential houses



Figure 2.10 Reconstruction of the two structures and the balneum.



Figure 2.11 Hypocaust from the *balneum* excavation at Mušov.

Foundations of two structures were found, one of them a bathhouse consisting of four rooms. Masonry was found in both buildings, and there were large post-holes in the perimeter wall. Other traces of post-hole structures have been found, but the extent of the excavated area is inadequate to present a complete ground plan. Neither of the buildings has been entirely excavated, and it is possible that there are masonry support walls yet to be found. Komoróczy (2008:437) presents the option of two phases of construction: a simple two room residential building was erected in the first phase, and in the second phase the building was enlarged by two other rooms and the *balneum*. Both buildings represent a combination of brick supported superstructures and wooden, plaster covered vertical walls (Johnson 1997, Komoróczy 2003 and 2008:408, Tejral 1999) and their roofs were covered with *tegulae* and *imbrices* (Musil 1993).

The scholars studied the residential building and compared ground plans of other Roman military camp buildings but were not able to find any definite similarities. The current interpretation is that the building is of a civilian character within the military compound. The *balneum* structure is a type used in both civilian and military constructions (Komoróczy 2008:410).

II. Workshops



Figure 2.12 Workshop site and reconstruction of the workshops.

In the 1990s the excavations of the houses on the Burgstall hill continued and revealed at least six one-room houses of timber-earth construction. Simple kilns and a waste pit were discovered in the spaces between the houses. The small structures have unusual architecture; they had been positively identified as belonging to the Roman installations during the Marcomannic Wars. Placement of the six small rooms on the side of the Burgstall hill gives the area the definite interpretation as the workshops site: the workshops classification is based on the exclusively Roman finds. Rich traces of industrial activities connected with metallurgy include mended and broken metal objects, and items indicating direct manufacturing process, such as raw materials, slag, smelting dishes, and tools (Komoróczy 2008: 437).



Figure 2.13 Ground plan of the workshops and few of the metal finds.

In Roman practice the placing of the workshops within the military camp was not exceptional. The defense of civilian population who worked for the Roman army was indeed in the interests of the Roman military (Komoróczy 2008: 413). Both the formal and the functional features of the uncovered buildings at Burgstall originate from the basic types in the military settlements along the frontier, and in newly occupied territories. Komoróczy (2008: 437) explains this as a phenomenon emerging at the beginning of any Roman camp construction, with Roman provincial and frontier structures rapidly superimposed over the primary basic designs. Komoróczy (personal communication 2013) pointed out that the placement of the workshops is crucial to the thesis of this work. On the *limes* workshops are never placed within the camps in peace times, they are always *extra muros*. Only during wartime, the workshops are placed, and function, inside a camp. The placement of the workshops within the walls, help date the Mušov site to the Marcomannic Wars.

III. The apsidal building




Figure 2.14 Site and reconstruction of the apsidal building.

On the lower foothill of the Burgstall hill, on the Nuerissen terrace, is another architecturally complex structure found at the only gate to the entire installation. Komoróczy (2008: 437) suggests that the structure was a large residential house, containing a *triclinium*, and was designed to serve high ranking personnel of the camp. The central part of the wooden building contains an apse; there are several rooms and a peristyle. The structure is set apart from standard provincial architecture by its ground plan and size. In the past, the building has been interpreted as an Augustan period structure (Bálek-Šedo 1996, Šedo 2001) but recent investigations have denied the existence of any structures of the Augustan period at Neurissen and place this atypical structure in the period of the Marcomannic Wars (Komoróczy 2003, Tejral 1996).

The wooden residential building had a dominant feature of a central big room with an apse and a peristyle courtyard. Both the apse and the peristyle are commonly a hallmark of a higher social prestige: in classic military camp architecture peristyles exist in houses of centurions only and apsidal ends of rooms are typical of *principia*, *praetoria* and *balnea* (Komoróczy 2008: 411). Czech scholars studying the design of this building have so far found no parallel to Mediterranean type buildings. (Komoróczy 2003) and Johnson (1987: 123) write that this type of a building is reminiscent of other Roman colonial *fora* structures. The character of the apsidal room is in some details similar to provincial examples of *triclinia* (Komoróczy 2008: 412). Comparisons of the ground plan indicate the presence of an open *porticus* and Komoróczy calls the building “a villa with a winged corridor”. The Mušov building with an apse and side corridor is confirmed as a civilian structure which was intended for a highly ranked person in the Roman military. Šedo (2000: 190) mentions a well as part of the apsidal building complex. The well was 8 m deep, 2.6 x 2.6 m and Šedo envisages the well size adequate for supplying a large number of inhabitants with fresh water.

IV. Valetudinarium



Figure 2.15 Site and reconstruction of the *valetudinarium*.

The latest archaeological find is the foundation of a vast wooden structure within the compound of Burgstall. The building's ground plan identifies it as a Roman military hospital. The longest two sides have been explored; their maximum length is 71 m. The *valetudinarium* contains two parallel lines of rooms separated by a wide corridor, where the shorter, south-west side rooms are arranged differently. The side includes entry into a large courtyard. The size of the entire building is 2950 sq.m. The hospital at Burgstall is a type that appears in the Roman Empire in the largest military camps and so far only ten Roman hospitals of this size have been found. At the same time, this building is the largest Roman building ever excavated in the Czech Republic. The excavation results have not been published and the illustrations and information are taken from the site of: Archeologický ústav Akademie věd ČR Brno, v.v.i: Detašované pracoviště Dolní Dunajovice (The Archaeological Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Brno).

The latest information on the *valetudinarium* originates from my interview with Dr. Komoróczy (2013). The area of the Roman hospital is now under the new parking lot of the Aqua Park development that is being constructed at the site. Archaeological investigations were conducted before the site was covered by a pavement. No artefacts were found, only the foundations of the walls. No exact dating for the hospital is available. C 14 dating was attempted but produced no results, due to excessive intrusion in the sediments. The base of the excavation was greatly disturbed by earlier constructions in the recent past. No research findings were published.

V. Fortifications



Figure 2.16 Site and reconstruction of the defensive ditches.

The research of Tejral (1986, 1992, 1997) and Tejral-Bouzek-Musil (1995) focuses on the construction and placement of the defensive ditches. Before 1994, the research investigated the actual existence of the defensive ditches. The goals of the latest excavations are to refine the direction and configuration of the ditches (Komoróczy 2008: 394). The defense system consists of massive earthworks, where the rampart is accompanied by series of parallel ditches. In front of the rampart was a V-shaped ditch about 2.4 to 2.5 m deep and 5 m wide, separated from it by 8 m wide berm (Tejral 1997: 231). In most locations there were two ditches and the clay rampart rises to 1.5 - 1.7 m. Clay unfired bricks found in the ditches indicate that the rampart was revetted both internally and externally with bricks. Although there are many forts in the Near East with mud-brick fortification, this use of mud-bricks is unique in Central Europe (Tejral-Bouzek-Musil 1995: 65). Scholars have proposed that the technique may have been introduced by military units that were recalled from the east to engage in the Marcomannic Wars. To corroborate this theory these archaeologists point out the eastern influence of the *lorica squamata* described previously. At the outer edge of the rampart rose a wooden palisade, in some places supported by an additional row of posts that could

have held up an interior palisade (Komoróczy 2008: 403). The excavated and examined section of the defensive system is 2.5 km long and the entire length of it is revetted with bricks. The defense system encloses the site of 40 to 50 hectares. The technological complexity of the structures points to the site's importance for the Roman military and supports the claims that the installations were not short-term encampments but a long-term base (Komoróczy 2008: 404). If the installations are interpreted as permanent, their role in Roman plans for the area is clear. The site of Mušov was designed for establishing a stable Roman community beyond the Danube, and a Roman administrative center for governing the future province.

In its overall characteristic, the fortifications fit into the category of other Roman installations built outside the Roman Empire for the Roman army during its offensive and defensive campaigns in the *barbaricum*. The strategic advantages of the Burgstall hill played a role in many later military campaigns: in the Thirty-Years War, in the Napoleonic Wars, and also in the Second World War (Tejral-Bouzek-Musil 1995: 68).



Figure 2.17 Plan and reconstruction of the gates and towers.

The only excavated gate to the site is from the north-eastern side of the Burgstall hill. Komoróczy (2006: 164-66) identified the dimensions of the gate: the ground plan is 15 m wide and 6.75 m wide. The ground plan indicates that the gate had two side towers standing on six posts each and the entrance was divided into two openings. The chronology of this type of gate construction falls into the building stage of typical Danubian wooden military camps during the second half of the second century. There is no doubt in the archaeologists' minds (Komoróczy 2006, 2013 and Šedo 1999.17) that the towers were embedded into the rampart. The towers stood on the edge of the terrace

over the river, and there would have been no space in front of them to place a rampart or an embankment. The towers are 4.5 x 4.5 m, buried in the rampart of 5.5-6 m wide (Komoróczy 2006: 163).

Alongside the structures excavated and identified, the Archaeological Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences ČR Brno mentions that there are traces of a Roman river harbour at the Mušov site. So far no excavation results of the site have been published. Komoróczy (personal communication 2013) confirms that the presence of the harbour has been identified only by the existence of the gate on the north-eastern side of the fort, directly beside the river bank. The river Svratka has slightly retreated in the past centuries, but its channels are still extending as far as the steep bank, where the eastern gate was placed. There was no access from the gate to the river, except by the harbour entrance through the gate. The images carved in both the column of Trajan, and Marcus Aurelius, portray permanent stone harbour structures. The harbour at Mušov differed from the reliefs. It was possibly few wooden posts supporting a pier for unloading cargo. An entry into the camp through the harbour is the only feasible explanation for the gate set in such a steep bank directly over the river. The river was navigable with flat bottomed boats. Its importance to trade is confirmed by the bricks from Carnuntum, which were brought to Mušov. Dr. Komoróczy argues that the bricks were brought to the Mušov fort on the river.

Since the site is positioned to guard two separate confluences of three rivers, a Roman harbour would be essential for the military as it provides transport for supplies and assists trade. A river harbour on the Danube, and its activities are depicted on the column of Trajan.



Figure 2.18 Column of Trajan, embarkation at a riverside harbour, scene 25.

On Trajan's column the fortified city lies beyond the harbour, with buildings in the interior, and an amphitheater and houses in the suburb. The emperor with his entourage is preparing to embark in his ships, while on the river a busy harbour is at work. The men carry cargo to be loaded onto the ships. A gate with a quadriga is immediately at the river's edge. The loading docks or the harbour structures are not easily detectible, but the relief does show a range of practical structures that made up a Roman river harbour.

Šedo (2000: 199) recounts the unusual defense system at Pasohlávky. The defense ditch is flanked by a rampart; the longer side is of 2180 m and the shorter one 500 m long. It seems that the defense system continued all around Burgstall in order to enclose the entire site of 400 hectares = 4 sq. km. It is not feasible that the entire area was occupied solely by the military, and Šedo surmises that the area was expropriated from the barbarian territory and must have had a symbolic meaning. The area was fortified and designed for solving some goals of the Roman military which are not as yet determined. The large scale of the defensive system illustrates how the Romans were able to assert their domination over the trans-Danubian regions during the Marcomannic Wars. The camps were spacious enough to house whole legions of soldiers as well as civilian support staff, and the defense systems protected all from any intrusions.

C. Local borrowings

Vachútová (2008: 23-29) writes on the research of Germanic settlements during the Roman presence in Southern Moravia. The first settlements were found in early twentieth century and exploration continues to the present day. Numerous sites have been found, but no intensive excavations have been carried out. Surface surveys have recorded traces of habitation activities. Some material finds exist but without provenance, and most have been found in surface soil disturbed by agricultural activities. Although the number of the settlements is over one hundred, so far no settlements of any of the Suebi tribes have been systematically explored. Any information gathered so far has limited utility for research of any Roman influence on the local tribal communities (Vachútová 2008: 28). The region of Southern Moravia has many examples of Germanic villages, many of them in the vicinity of Mušov. Study of Germanic settlements is closely associated with research of grave sites and localities with evidence of Roman military occupation (Vachútová 2008: 29).

Pitts (1987: 219-35) identifies six sites with Roman style buildings on the Marcomannic and Quadic territory, the area that is now Moravia and Slovakia. Only one of the sites, Mušov in Moravia, is of a military character. The identity of the occupants and the function of the structures are so far unknown. Pitts writes that the sites are an indication of the extent of Roman influence in an area beyond the *limes*, and that may perhaps help to explain the system of the client states and clarify the literary sources (Pitts 1987: 221). The sites in Slovakia are Stupava, Děvín, Bratislava-Dúbravka, Milanovice, and Trenčín (Laugaricio). All the Slovak settlements have some masonry buildings with hypocausts, bath houses, and timber structures contemporary with the masonry buildings. Roman finds include coins, pottery, glass, and roof tiles (Pitts 1987: 225). The presence of tiles of the *legio XIII* and *legio XV* date the buildings to early second century A.D., earlier than the Mušov site in Moravia. Some of the Roman finds are of the late second and third century. Pitts (1987: 227) explains that Roman influence increased at those later dates and there are also tile stamps recorded from the fourth century. Thus the Germanic settlement in the region was continuous from the first to the fifth century. Despite the presence of the Roman legionary bricks in the six sites with Roman style buildings, only Mušov seems to be suitable as a military base. None of the

other sites have adequate defense systems, and there is evidence of German habitation at or near the sites (Pitts 1987: 225). All the sites have two features in common: the strong relationship with Germanic settlements and the official Roman involvement in the construction of the buildings. Some of the sites can be interpreted functioning as trading stations after the Marcomannic Wars, and others may have been the residences of the centurions in charge of supervision of the Germanic tribes. Mušov especially is well suited for this administrative role since it is in a region densely populated by the Germani (Pitts 1987: 235).

Tejral (1993: 447) discusses the surprising phenomenon of the marked increase of Germanic settlement finds in the period connected to the Marcomannic Wars. The assemblage is not only surface material finds but also structural remains of Germanic huts and their contents: metal pins, combs and both imported and domestic pottery. Chronological surveys date the settlements into the second half of the second century. Generally this dating is associated with increased settlement density during the times of crisis. Tejral explains that the destruction of houses was more frequent during conflicts and the accumulation of archaeological material manifests sudden departures or liquidations of whole populations. The settlement level that fits chronologically with the Marcomannic Wars reflects the devastation of Germanic villages by the Roman army. The horrors that the military events meant for the local populations are well recorded visually on the Column of Marcus Aurelius (Scene 67: the screaming barbarian and other combatants; scene 97: violence against female barbarians; scene 113: the sacking of a Germanic village; scene 102: the sacking of a Germanic village and the probable aftermath of a rape; scenes 104 and 99: barbarian women prisoners). Primary sources such as Cassius Dio (72.8.1, 72.16.1-2, 72.17.3-4) record similar events.

According to Tejral (1993: 453) the transfer of the Roman military units from the west to the Danubian *limes* carried with it certain technological advantages and influences for the Germanic tribes, such as small metal-working industries and their products. Different types of pins and buckles, as well as house-wares imitated Roman designs. The cultural impact of the Roman world worked its effect on the ordinary local inhabitants, but even greater Roman cultural influence was shaping the Germanic upper classes. The best example is the important find of a royal tomb in Mušov, excavated in

1988. Located a short distance from Burgstall hill, it is a hollow grave lined with slabs of local limestone. The dimensions are 4x6 m (depth of the grave is uncertain since the site was damaged during road construction prior to the discovery). Collapsing, the grave lining crushed the metal objects within. 187 items were salvaged from the grave, made of iron, bronze, silver, gold, and glass.



Figure 02.19 Bronze vessels found in the Germanic grave.



Figure 2.20 Detail on a bronze vessel: a Suebi man with a typical Germanic hair knot.

Animal sacrifices were included in the grave; pig, goose, hen, sheep, goat, and calf bones are present. Three humans were interred, two men and one woman. The grave was obviously robbed out in the past, but the richness of the finds convinced Czech archaeologists that the persons buried in the grave were significantly important members of the barbarian ruling class. Most remarkable are the grave offerings that illustrate the strong Romano-provincial influence. The items vary chronologically and it is possible that they were antique items the family owned for some time. The items can be connected with the beliefs of posthumous banqueting. The sacrificial animals were to be prepared in the offered bronze cooking vessels and various cooking implements. These items date to the first century.



Figure 2.21 Silver utensils.



Figure 2.22 Bronze folding table and detail of one of the supports.

The remnants of a silver plate set and dining utensils and the heavy gold furniture decoration date to the second century.



Figure 2.23 Gold plated decoration with Roman gods.

Surgical and cosmetic instruments and glass vessels, painted glass, and Roman pottery, military objects and gold jewelry are all represented in the grave (Tejral 1993: 454).



Figure 2.24 Gold buckles and belt decorations.



Figure 2.25 Roman glass.



Figure 2.26 Roman pottery lamps.

The striking Romano-provincial nature of the grave finds testifies to the close contacts of the Germanic nobility with their Roman allies (Košnar 2005: 229). Tejral (1993: 457) provides a detailed analysis of all the grave goods that contribute to an assessment of the mutual relations between the Romans and the Germani. The grave inventory is varied in provenance and in date of manufacture. The goods from Augustan and Tiberian reigns could have entered gradually into the possession of the Germanic nobility through booty or gift exchange in the first century. The fragmentary condition of some of the articles could have been preserved for the value of the precious metals alone.

(Košnar 2005: 235). The unique collection of archaeological finds sheds light on the position and the lifestyle of Germanic rulers who lived in close proximity to the Roman occupying forces. The grave assemblage also documents the powerful influence of Roman ideals and traditional burial customs, and it is probable that the later rich goods were Roman gifts to a Germanic ally during the Marcomannic Wars. The gifts might have guaranteed a favourable reception for the Roman representatives and smoothed the way for Roman plans of governing the occupied territory (Tejral 1993: 457). Košnar (2005: 235) concludes that at least one of the buried nobles was a romanised German or even a Germanic king, placed on the throne during the Marcomannic Wars.

Tejral (2008: 83) writes about the Germanic settlements rising immediately after the Marcomannic Wars in the area adjacent to the installations at Mušov. Germanic structures were rebuilt on the original general plan of the settlements but also covered areas not previously inhabited by the Germanic peoples during the Roman occupation. Dates of the archaeological strata are confirmed by numerous fragments of Roman bricks, in some cases even with the brick stamps of the legions. Building material robbed out of the Roman structures at Burgstall appears in the Germanic settlements at Na Pískách and even in localities further away from the original Mušov site (Tejral 2008: 85). There is noticeable proof of the later Germanic settlements after the peace of Commodus from Burgstall and Neurissen. Traces of post-Roman, Germanic housing were found near both the sites and were covered by the fortification debris from the period of the Marcomannic Wars. Later structures of post-supported Germanic huts contain secondary Roman artifacts in addition to Germanic, hand made ceramics, and date after the wars (Tejral 2008: 86).

Another secondary Germanic settlement was found at Pasohlávky. In 2002 the Czech archaeologists found a workshop. Made of wooden post construction, it contained fragments of the legionary bricks and traces of metallurgical production dated from second to third century (Tejral 2009: 90). A mould for smelting was found and dated to the period after the Roman departure. The workshop is a unique sample of a barbarian settlement, whose inhabitants exploited the departure of the Roman military and literally “mined” the remnants of the Roman military equipment. Broken iron, bronze armour, and

tools that the barbarians found at Burgstall, and maybe other locations as well, were repurposed for their own needs (Tejral 2008: 87).

By the third century, the Germanic settlements enter a new phase; Czech archaeologists call this development “the late Roman epoch”. The hallmark of this stage is the distinct lack of any *terra sigillata* and a strong presence of hand made Germanic pottery. Some third-century Roman coins appear in a few of the settlements in the Quadic territory (Tejral 2008: 92). In Moravia the Germanic settlements do not contain late Roman pottery, but there are finds of metal, silver, bronze, and iron pins with Roman influence. From archaeological contexts the dating of the settlements extends up to late fourth century. At this date the Suebic culture appears to vanish. It is feasible that this cultural destruction reflects the greater replacement of Germanic peoples by new historical and cultural phenomena associated with the changes of the time period of the migration of nations (Tejral 2008: 93). The Slavs arrived in Moravia from the east in the sixth century, and pushed the Germanic tribes further into Western Europe. Their arrival fundamentally changed the ethnic distribution of the European continent.

D. Chronology

The dating of the site is slightly problematic given that all the earlier scholarship maintained that the structures were of Augustan origins. Modern scholarship recognizes two or more stages at the site. Šedo (2000: 201) writes that it is possible to find the first traces of Roman presence at Mušov in the early first century. It is feasible that Southern Moravia played a key role in Roman territorial interests during the conflicts in the kingdom of Noricum. The Tiberian campaign against Maroboduus was part of the imperial goal to dominate continental Europe and formation of the *Germania* province. In the framework of this aim the camp at Mušov was fortified, and the apsidal building was constructed. During the Pannonian revolt, the Romans themselves interrupted the building work and in the end destroyed the structure. The army was recalled from Mušov camp to fight in Pannonia. The abandonment of the Roman goals to annex the entire European continent resulted in the Danube river becoming the border line dividing the barbarians in the north and the Roman Empire. In the second half of the second century A.D., the situation deteriorated, and the conflicts moved north of the Danube.

Consequently Mušov became the military base from which the campaigns in *barbaricum* were launched.

Numerous excavations since the late 1980s have uncovered new information, and the general agreement now is that the greatest majority of the Mušov installations date to the Marcomannic Wars. The scholars (Komoróczy 2008, Šedo 2000, Tejral 1993, 1997, 1999, 2008) writing on the chronology of the site base the dating process on the evidence gathered from the archaeology of the site. Buildings, building materials, brick stamps, pottery, coins and various small artifacts are crucial pieces of evidence.

The starting date of the Roman base at Mušov is most likely 172, at the time of the *expeditia Germanica prima*, and the year when the Marcomannic territory was invaded directly by the Roman forces. When we attempt to reconstruct the course of the Marcomannic Wars by literary sources, it appears that the Romans abandoned the Mušov site between the two stages of the wars. It is necessary to take into consideration that archeology is not able to support this fact. The workshops on the eastern bank of the Neurissen terrace may shed some light on the dating. The material evidence from the workshops proves that Roman armour was repaired at the sites. Similar industrial activity has been documented in other military camps on the *limes*, but is more characteristic of civilian settlements adjacent to military camps. The view that appears following the interpretation of the workshops is that the Mušov settlement combined both military and civilian components of the Roman forces that entered *barbaricum*. This was the process the Romans followed routinely as each new territory was occupied; new Roman provincial structures soon covered the area (Komoróczy 2008: 426). The placement of both military and civilian structures within the fortifications is also customary. Understandably, the army protected the civilians who were serving its needs, especially in an area that was not entirely pacified. The Mušov site held a dominant position in an area densely populated by the potentially restive Germanic peoples. The placement of the defensive temporary military camps nearby attests to its strategic importance. (Komoróczy 2008: 427).

Komoróczy (2008: 141) dates the structures of the civilian building and the workshops by layers of almost exclusively Roman finds. In the workshops alone, 166 fragments of *terra sigillata* were found. Coin finds and the typical metal fragment finds

from the workshop all date the structures. Chronological classification and overall dating each category of finds is essential for the interpretation of the Roman fortified camp at Mušov (Komoróczy 2008: 415). The *terra sigillata* fragments are dated to both offensive stages of the Marcomanni Wars. The exact dates are based on similar interpretations of ceramic finds from other Danubian provincial localities (Komoróczy 2008: 417). For dating, coin finds are the most important category. So far 203 coins have been classified; 70% have been struck in the second century, and 33% of those in the reign of Marcus Aurelius. In their date of minting, no coins have crossed the boundary of 180 and 39 of them from Marcus' Aurelius' rule are dated precisely to a particular year (Komoróczy 2008: 419). Similarly to the *terra sigillata*, the coins have been compared to other provincial assemblages and their dating has been confirmed. Komoróczy (personal communication 2013) adds that the unusual structures found at Mušov, with the non-standard architecture, indicate that it is possible that Mušov was destined to be the base of the whole new province. The architecture exceeds a style commonly used in Roman legionary camps. The Mušov camp had capacity to support the military as well as traders and reconnoiter personnel.

Tejral (1997: 531) points out that the actual dating of the Mušov site has been uncertain until very recently. Investigations have produced a large collection of small finds, mostly Roman weaponry and typical military equipment. But exact dating is achievable by material evidence, especially the *terra sigillata*. Especially important is the Samian ware of the prevailing late Lezoux production, together with several pieces of early Rheinzabern ware. The *terra sigillata* finds are mostly late Gallic products, and the scholars expect that their arrival in the north and middle Danube regions started from the first half of the second century. Great amount of Lezoux pottery shards originated in the workshops of Cinnama and Paterna and it is most likely that the import of the pottery was at its height at the time of the Marcomannic Wars (Tejral 2008: 82). Tejral (1993: 453) points out that the import of *terra sigillata* is not necessarily only a by-product of Roman military advances into Moravia. Traders and merchants arrived with the army and the Roman ware was marketed to the local Germanic population.



Figure 2.27 Terra sigillata.

Numismatic finds, with the latest dated 177, provide definitive evidence that the fort was occupied primarily during the Marcomannic Wars (Tejral 1997: 532).



Figure 2.28 Marcus Aurelius coins.

The entire Mušov site is associated with a large united defense system during the Marcomannic Wars (Tejral 1997:535). Tejral continues by explaining the dating of the military installation at Mušov by historical context. Most of the camps north of the

Middle Danube were constructed in the time of the Marcomannic Wars and placed in the areas of newly conquered tribes. Beside the reports of Cassius Dio (72.20.1) on the Roman army stationed in the territory of the Marcomanni and the Quadi, there are examples of epigraphic evidence from Trenčín and Zana supporting exact placement of the Roman military in the region.

Šedo (2000: 193) reports on the finds on the Neurissen terrace. Several seemingly incoherently- placed post holes have been discovered. Only after the collective assemblage of the posts was plotted did the archaeologists find the pattern: the post holes were a part of a system of quadratically-placed individual elements. Similar structures exist in other military camps that were known to be designed for overwintering. The structures contained *hibernacula*, wooden structures that protected the rows of tents in inclement winter conditions. If the structures on the Neurissen terrace are indeed *hibernacula*, then the dating of the camp may be more closely placed at the end of the campaigning season of 179 and the following winter of 179/80. According to the ancient sources (Dio Cass.72.20.1) the Roman forces overwintering in the Quadic and Marcomannic territories numbered over 20,000. The most distant dimensions of the *hibernacula* measure 970 m from each other and the size of the encampment of this size can hold up to six thousand soldiers at one time. The Roman forces at Mušov could then contain significant contingent of the forces the Romans held beyond the Danube during the last phases of the wars. The archaeological evidence of the presence of a large numbers of the military could confirm that there were sufficient Roman forces at Mušov to safeguard Roman domination, and sufficient military power that could support a creation of a new province (Šedo 2000:194).

The Neurissen ditch containing human and animal skeleton has been analyzed. The animals are mostly horses and draft quadrupeds used by the Roman armies. The human remains were thrown into the ditch without ceremony; wearing their clothes and some holding their small belongings, such as one of the women holding two keys. All the twenty women, five children and seven older men died violently. The items found with the skeletons were of barbarian origins. Šedo (2000: 196) interprets the remains as part of a northern Germanic group hostile to the Romans during the Roman occupation of Mušov, and the killing of the people as a settling of accounts between two barbarian

groups. Most of the items found in the ditch date the event to the Marcomannic Wars, before 180.

Tejral (1999: 111) proposes a different dating, that of after 180, on an interpretation of some smaller finds that could originate after 180. Tejral concludes that the barbarian finds belong to the period after the departure of the Roman troops and that they bear witness to later occupancy of the site by local inhabitants. With slight variations then, the current dating based on archaeological evidence of the Mušov site does correspond with the events of the Marcomannic Wars of 172 – 180.

The examined material sources present ample information on the Roman presence in Southern Moravia. Even if we can not rely on literary sources to describe Moravia, or Mušov/Burgstall directly, the structures and artifacts that the Romans left behind in Moravia prove undeniably that the Romans did occupy the area. Roman troops constructed military camps in Mušov, lived there, traded with the local inhabitants, and left permanent evidence of their presence. The size of the encampment, and the numbers of the personnel needed to administer the settlement, will help to prove that the Romans successfully planned, and executed, their intentions to form a province north of the Danube frontier, on Moravian territory.

Chapter 3 – Creation of new provinces

In order to form a plausible theory on the creation of Marcus Aurelius' new province, which he may have intended to call *Marcomannia*, and the political forces affecting the annexation, we need to understand contemporary evidence of the events. No literary sources record details of the process; nor do they specify any aspects of the treaties that could reveal the proceedings that would have paved the way towards a formation of the province. We must look to other examples of the creation of new Roman provinces.

Dacia was conquered by Trajan for political and strategic reasons in the age of a great territorial growth of the Roman Empire. This particular era, and the age of territorial expansion during the reign of Caracalla, was the embodiment of Roman imperial rule and is used repeatedly as a model for studies of Roman imperialism. The Romans had perfected the organization of new provinces at this time. As a result, analyzing the implementation and the effects of Roman administration in Dacia helps us to understand the patterns of conquest and Romanisation (Oltean 2007: 1). This chapter will consider some characteristic features of the creation of Pannonia, and reflect briefly on the assimilation of the neighbouring provinces, and focus on the annexation and Romanisation of Dacia. The formation of the Danubian provinces, those that became a part of Roman Empire before the reign of Marcus Aurelius, may shed light on the models of the processes of annexation of the Marcomanni territory.

A. Pannonia

The Roman province of Pannonia is an illustrative example of a Roman annexation of a tribal area south of the middle Danube. This section of the chapter will look into the processes of annexation and Romanisation. Archaeological evidence and literary sources document the development of the new province. A study of the Pannonian Romanisation may provide a useful model to examine creation of future provinces, especially *Marcomannia*. Several aspects of implementation of Roman rule in creating the province of Pannonia will be examined:

I. History

II. Archaeological evidence

III. Romanisation.

I. History

The creation of the province occurred early in Roman imperial history during Augustus' initiative to extend Roman control northward into central and eastern Europe as far as the river Danube. The campaigns were fought between 15 B.C. and 6 A.D. and led to the formation of provinces of Raetia, Noricum, Dalmatia, Pannonia and Moesia. The new provinces created a link between the empire's western and eastern halves (Boatwright 2012: 295).



Figure 3.1 Map of the Roman Empire in B.C. 44.



Figure 3.2 Map of the Roman Empire at the death of Augustus A.D. 14.

In 6 A.D. the chiefs of the Pannonian and Dalmatian tribes realized that Roman rule was not sufficiently secured over their territory, and they raised the so called Illyrian Revolt against Rome. Tiberius was at the time poised to attack the powerful Marcomanni in Bohemia but had to abandon the campaign in order to concentrate his forces on the rebellion. It took him three years of fighting until the uprising was finally put down in 9-10 (Boatwright 2012: 299).

Pannonia was pacified, separated from Illyricum, and the Pannonian tribes were split up into different groups. The divided population posed a lesser threat to Rome. Roman Pannonia guarded the approaches to Italy, and was given provincial status in the middle of the first century. From then on, Pannonia was a key province on the Danube, mid-way on the river facing two sides of possible attacks, and commanding the passes across the Alps which were the access into Italy (Williams 1988: 21).



Figure 3.3 Pannonia in A.D. 116.

The early Roman measures to secure the Danube frontier were adopted under Tiberius, and garrison towns were placed along the northern bank of the Danube. Under Domitian and Trajan, the fortifications were extended, and the legionary camps were connected by a road. By the end of Trajan's reign, the *limes* were securely defended by the Roman legions. The Danube, and the frontier it formed, was of a great military importance. Roman harbours were built and the river even had its own fleet, called *classis Pannonica* (BNP 2007: 451.s.v. 'Pannonia').

Positioned in the center of the Danubian provinces, Pannonia held a vital position, and its strategic importance for Rome only increased in subsequent reigns. Under Trajan

the province was divided into *Pannonia Superior* and *Pannonia Inferior*. Each one of the provinces had a *consilium* (an advisory body) early on. Romanisation arrived early, with concentrated efforts to develop urban centers. Active trade was in the hands of non-Romans, and followed the old north-south Amber route as well as the new route along the Danube (Le Glay 2009: 359). Pannonia expanded under Domitian and Trajan as a result of the growing prosperity of the province and Roman expansion into Dacia. The favourable economic conditions rising out of the annexation of Dacia initiated additional development on the central and lower Danube. (BNP 2007: 452.s.v. 'Pannonia').

All the prosperous conditions are attributed to the existence of Roman legionary camps in the north. In *Pannonia Inferior* a series of inscriptions record the construction of garrisons and a line of watchtowers to protect the Danube frontier (Maxfield 1987: 188). Wherever the camps were located, the area attracted additional people. Good soil, livestock breeding, forestry and metal mining, as well as the slave trade from across the Danube, all contributed to high density of population. (Le Glay 2009: 449). The new garrison towns enabled contact with *barbaricum*, and the flourishing trade was concentrated on established transport routes (BNP 2007: 452.s.v. 'Pannonia').

II. Archaeological evidence

Over sixty auxiliary forts and cities are recorded in the province. The majority of the cities were of Roman origin. Carnuntum (north of Vienna) was the capital of Pannonia and the seat of the military command. From Carnuntum Tiberius directed his campaign against Maroboduus, and Marcus Aurelius was based there for three years during the Marcomanni Wars.



Figure 3.4 Reconstruction of Carnuntum.



2006 M. Klein - <http://www.limes.co.at>

Figure 3.5 Reconstruction of a military camp in Pannonia.

Two examples of Roman developed settlements in Pannonia are Aquincum (Budapest, Hungary) and Sirmium (Syrmia, Serbia):



Figure 3.6 Aerial view of Aquincum.



Figure 3.7 Imperial palace in Sirmium.

The abundant archaeological evidence from Pannonia spans over four hundred years, and reveals a rich Roman culture for all its duration. Pannonia existed as a Roman province until the fall of the Western Roman Empire. The local inhabitants' desire for Roman culture and practices survived in the influence of Latin language and traditional Roman cults (BNP 2007: 453.s.v. 'Pannonia').

III. Romanisation

Romanisation of the indigenous population progressed from the south, as advancing urbanization brought in the dissolution of tribal territories. Crucial factors in Pannonian Romanisation were the settling of veterans, who were mostly of Italian descent, and the elevation of individual communities into the rank of *municipium* or *colonia*. The continuing Romanisation of the province is reflected in the spread of Latin language (as recorded on inscriptions), and in the evidence of traditional Roman cults, along with oriental and local deities (BNP 2007: 452.s.v. 'Pannonia'). Velleius Paterculus (2.110.5) comments on the ability of the Pannonians to learn Roman ways:

Omnibus autem Pannoniis non disciplinae tantummodo, sed linguae quoque notitia Romanae, plerisque etiam litterarum usus et familiaris animorum erat exercitatio.

Now all the Pannonians possessed not only a knowledge of Roman discipline but also of the Roman tongue, many also had some measure of literary culture, and the exercise of the intellect was not uncommon among them.

No doubt Velleius Paterculus was referring to the upper classes of the Pannonian society who learned Latin, not the great majority of indigenous people. As was the case in Roman provinces established earlier, the nobility were the first segment of the indigenous society to accept Romanisation. The nobles became administrative officials of the new towns, and received Roman citizenship. The ordinary people living and working in the countryside accepted Roman culture less readily. Those who enlisted in the Roman auxiliary units were in closer contact with Roman culture, and were given citizenship at the end of their service. Administration of the province was given to proven officials from Rome, in whose interest it was to spread Roman ideals among the local population (Oliva 1962: 163).

The express influence of Rome on Pannonia is most notable in the first century. In later ages the western provinces began to be affected by cultural pressures from the other Roman provinces. Oliva (1962: 166) quotes many inscriptions from Pannonia that refer to inhabitants with origins in Greece, Africa, and the neighbouring provinces (*CIL* 3.3583: a doctor from Africa; 3.3584: two Greek brothers; 3.4499: a man from Trier). In summary, Romanisation of Pannonia originated in the civil administrative and military centers of the province.

The creation of Roman provinces on the Danubian frontier contains elements identical to those enabling Rome to annex Dacia as a province. Roman desire to safeguard its frontier, to remove threat of a hostile people on Roman borders, to suppress revolts and uprisings that posed a serious threat to the empire, to acquire land and its products, resources, and wealth, to control trade and trade routes, all shaped the process of establishing Pannonia, along with the ready acceptance of Roman culture by the local nobility.

It is also useful to consult the circumstances in other nearby northern provinces of Noricum and Moesia. In Noricum the annexation of the new province happened peacefully in 16 B.C. There is no evidence of any opposition to Roman annexation. The local aristocracy was loyal to Rome, and the military immediately recruited local inhabitants into Roman auxiliary units. A former Celtic region, its population was romanised, which can be observed from the evolution of Celtic names into Roman names.

Moesia Superior was assimilated into the Roman Empire during the reign of Tiberius and divided into two provinces in 87 but the integration happened slowly, and it was completed only under Hadrian. *Moesia Inferior* is an unusual situation in the process of Romanisation because its ethnic makeup included Thracian and Moesic tribes from nearby Greek colonies, who spoke related languages. *Moesia Inferior* was also a military province, and later some of the settlements rose out of villages near the auxiliary or legionary camps or forts into the special status of *municipium*. These settlements were given self-administration through the local *principes* (Ruscu 2007: 79).

The new research related to the Augustan province *Germania* suggests, that there was another pacified province bordering the Danube. The province was in Roman hands for approximately two decades, from 12 B.C. to A.D. 9. The Roman reasons for annexation were, as in the other examples mentioned, the removal of a military threat, economic advantages and territorial expansion. Since Velleius Paterculus introduced some doubt (*paene redigeret provinciae*) into the claim that the province was formed, Eck (2004: 16) supports his thesis on the formation of the Augustan *Germania* with archaeological and epigraphical finds. He claims that these sources' essential advantage is the fact that they are more specifically dated and they cannot be changed by later viewpoints of the events. Eck cites verification rising out of the material evidence: the presence of Roman civilian settlements in the regions east of the Rhine, the erection of the altar of Roma and Augustus in the *oppidum Ubiorum* (modern Cologne), the establishment of administrative structures in Cologne, and the economic exploitation of the region.

B. Dacia

Some scholars do not think that the annexation and Romanisation of the province of Dacia fits the patterns typical to the formation of other provinces. The late twentieth-century interpretations of the process were highly influenced by political and ideological constraints of the previous socialist regime. President Nicolae Ceausescu's official policy denied the Romanisation of Dacia and championed the notion of "an independent Dacian state", using the model to propose a socialist defense doctrine against external threats (Ruscu 2004: 75). For this reason Ceausescu encouraged research that supported the

connections between the Dacian kingdom, in its independent Iron Age stage, and the Roman province (Chappell 2005: 35).

For more than twenty years after the Communist takeover in Romania no archaeological excavations were allowed in the province of Dacia. The official policy of the socialist government was that archaeologists showed too much interest “in bourgeois values” by excavating Roman villas and bath-houses. The Soviet-backed ideology regarded the classical world as an expression of the decadence of the West. Furthermore, the ideology maintained that modern Romanians were entirely unaffected by Roman culture and had no cultural relationship to ancient Rome. After the fall of the socialist regime, the large scale excavations of Roman sites began. Despite the scope of modern research, many questions remain, because the archaeological research is relatively recent, some of it is on-going, and many of the results are not yet published. The origins of Roman towns, the urbanization of Dacia, and the end of Roman urban life north of Danube, are all investigated by modern Romanian archaeologists (Chappell 2004: 44).

Archaeologists in other Soviet-bloc countries were in much the same situation as their Romanian colleagues. The scholars were forced to accept a uniform attitude towards the official doctrine of a political discourse interpretation of archaeology. Human behaviour, past and present, was discussed within the language of firm political positions and state ideologies (Bintliff 1995: 34). All forms of opposition were suppressed and the discipline had to adapt to the officially imposed dogma (Tabaczynski 1995: 70). In most socialist countries Marxist interpretations of history were required, and in Romania, the Marxism was affected by Ceausescu’s nationalistic ideals.

Dacia is singular in the studies of the Roman Empire for its short duration as the Roman province called *Dacia Romana*. The province was based on the preceding Dacian kingdom of Decebalus (85-7 – 106) and its political, rather than geographical, extent formed the frontiers. *Dacia Romana* did not reach as far as the kingdom had, and it did not integrate all its people (Chappell 2005: 44). The province’s time period covered the second and most of the third century, when the empire was at its height of power and at the start of its decline.




Figure 3.8 Dacia in A.D. 116.

Several aspects of implementation of Roman rule in creating the province of Dacia will be examined:

- I. History
- II. Archaeological evidence
- III. Romanisation
- IV. Role of the military

I. History

Various Dacian kingdoms existed independently on the lands north of the Danube since the second century B.C. The Romans took several steps to create the province of Dacia in the first century. First, Vespasian attempted to strengthen Rome's northern frontiers. Vespasian took in the *Agri Decumates*, the lands between the upper Rhine and Danube, presently in southern Germany. The area was settled under Vespasian and further colonised in the reign of Domitian (81-96). A network of roads and forts was constructed to improve Roman defensive positions. In 82-83 Domitian attacked and suppressed the Chatti, and thus completed his father Vespasian's occupation of the *Agri Decumates*. The campaigns combined offensive actions with construction of defensive fortresses, a precedent for future emperors campaigning in the Danube frontier areas. His next target was Dacia, which at this time became a formidable power under the leadership of king Decebalus (Grant 1985: 61). Decebalus united the Dacian tribes into a

kingdom and persuaded the Sarmatian and Germanic tribes to join him against Rome. When he invaded the lands of the Iazyges and Moesia province, Domitian led a war against him (BNP 2007s.v. ‘Decebalus’).

Before Domitian was in position to act against Dacia, a major revolt, lead by Lucius Antoninus Saturninus in 88, erupted in Lower Germany. Two legions and their German auxiliaries joined in, but the revolt was brutally suppressed within 24 days. Domitian then re-arranged the military organisation of Germany, concentrating on the Danube *limes* where the Marcomanni, the Quadi, and the Iazyges tribes were rising against Rome. Domitian wished to deal with the Dacians before he concentrated on the Iazyges, and as a result, signed a peace treaty with Decebalus in 88 (Grant 1985: 61). After the peace treaty with Domitian, Dacia was incorporated as a client state. (Le Gay 2009: 326).

Domitian defeated the trans-Danubian tribes, but did not crush them completely (Grant 1985: 61). The emperor’s difficulties were complicated later in 92 when his army was defeated by the Dacians. It is possible that two entire legions were destroyed and the Balkan border region was left open to attack (Potter 2009: 203). Domitian’s problems on the Danube frontier were only a foretaste of the crises on the Danube that the Germanic tribes triggered in the next century (Grant 1985: 62), specifically the Marcomanni Wars, which are discussed in previous chapters.

In the two centuries before the wars, Dacia had extensive links to the classical world. Archaeological evidence shows an influx of Roman *denarii*. Some complicated relationships are recorded in literary sources. For example, Cassius Dio (67.7.3-4) remarks on the treaty Domitian signed with the Dacian king Decebalus:

καὶ πολλοῖς τὴν ἑορτὴν πομπείοις ἐκόσμησεν οὐκ ἐξ ὧν εἶλε ἅπαν⁵ γὰρ
τοῦναντίον καὶ προσανάλωσε ταῖς σπονδαῖς, συχνὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτίκα χρήματα
καὶ δημιουργοὺς παντοίας τέχνης καὶ εἰρηλικῆς καὶ πολεμικῆς τῶν Δεκεβάλων
δούς, συχνὰ δὲ καὶ αἰεὶ δώσειν ὑποσχόμενος ἄλλ’ ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἐπίπλων:
τούτοις γὰρ ὡς καὶ αἰχμαλώτοις αἰεὶ ποτε ἐχρήτο, ἅτε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτὴν
δεδουλωμένος.

He graced the festival that followed with many exhibits appropriate to a triumph, though they came from no booty that he had captured; on the contrary, the truce cost him something besides his loses, for he had given large sums to Decebalus on the spot as well as artisans of every trade pertaining to both peace and war, and had promised to keep on giving large sums in the future. The exhibits which he

displayed really came from the store of imperial furniture, which he at all times treated as captured spoils, inasmuch as he had enslaved even the empire itself.

Decebalus invested the Roman subsidies from the treaty into projects that were in direct conflict with Roman interests. It is apparent from excavations in *colonia Dacica Sarmizagetsa*, Decebalus' fortress, that Dacia was a major power on the eastern Danube, where Rome was potentially exposed to barbarian attacks (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 14). The Roman motive for the Dacian Wars was, primarily, to ensure the safety of the Danube frontier. Rome could not tolerate such a powerful enemy on its frontier (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 15).

Trajan succeeded to the throne in 98, and while he may have wished for a peaceful reign, it was not to be. As with the causes of the Marcomanni Wars, the exact causes of Trajan's two Dacian Wars are unclear. Whatever the reasons may have been, Trajan, with his powerful army, intended to bring the Dacian kingdom back to limits acceptable for a Roman client-kingdom (Lica 2000: 219). In the campaigns of 101-02 and 105-06, both sides sustained heavy losses. The first treaty contained these conditions: Decebalus had to abandon all his kingdom's weapons; hand over all Romans recruited for military purposes, and raze all his fortresses (BNP 2007: 146.s.v. 'Decebalus'). When Decebalus broke the terms of the treaty with Rome in 105, disastrous results followed for him and the Dacian people (Potter 2009: 205). In the two campaigns of the Dacian Wars Trajan occupied all of Dacia, and made it into a new province of the Roman Empire. This was the last major territorial conquest of Rome on its northern frontier. (The only other new imperial territorial acquisition was by Septimius Severus, who established the province of Mesopotamia in 198, after winning a war against the Parthians). Trajan gained not only the territory but also vast quantity of plunder for Dacia was rich in gold and iron (Grant 1985: 72). The vast spoils of war funded the constructions in Trajan's Forum in Rome, and also other monuments in Rome and Italy. Dacia's riches prompted new immigrants to enter the new province. Also, Dacia's location beyond the established Danube boundary shifted the bulk of Rome's garrisons east from the Rhine to the lower Danube (Boatwright 2012: 363). The removal of Decebalus and annexation of his kingdom eliminated Dacia as a regional force. Without a doubt, the balance of power in

the area north of the lower Danube changed, and new alliances had to be forged among the barbarian tribes on the borders of Dacia.

II. Archaeology

While Domitian was forced by circumstances to offer peace to Decebalus, Trajan solved the situation on the Danube through war. The literary sources for Trajan's campaigns are few. No complete narrative has survived and the chronology is pieced together from inscriptions and fragments of written sources, and by an unusual visual source. The Dacian Wars were commemorated in Trajan's carved column in his Forum constructed from the spoils of the wars (MacKay 2004). Even early in the 20th century, Lehmann-Hartleben (1926: VII) pointed out that anyone looking to the reliefs as a source of chronology of the conflicts will be disappointed, but the column and its carvings remain a permanent record of many realities of the age of the emperors, and the knowledge of Roman army and its structures. Regrettably the carved narrative of the column does not have a written description of its own, and the lack of literary evidence renders the exact interpretation of the column impossible (MacKay 2004). Zanker (Coarelli 2000: VIII) points out that the latest generations of scholars have focused on questions of ideology and content in the typology and sequences of the images. The sequences and the detailed representations of battle scenes are considered less important than the descriptions of the rituals of war that followed fixed rules of conduct. This thesis is examining the events of the Marcomanni Wars; the episodes of the wars are carved into the column of Marcus Aurelius. The historical evidence obtained from these reliefs must be treated with the same caution as the reliefs on Trajan's column.

Historical evidence can be also gathered from the permanent memory of the Dacian Wars that survives in the Dacian landscape. Archaeology marks the progress of Trajan's army advancing into the region. Trajan's forces numbered over 100,000 men. The logistics of simply moving the troops were daunting, even apart from the problem of provisioning them. Trajan built a system of military roads into Dacia. In the months following the Second Dacian War, Roman surveyors quickly mastered the landscape. One example of this is the inscription on a Roman *milliarium* discovered in Aiton,

Romania, dated to 108. The milestone inscription records a construction of road from Potaissa, built by Trajan. This road was part of the *Via Traiana Pataesina* (CIL 3: 1627):

Imp(erator)/ Caesar Nerva/ Traianus Aug(ustus)/ Germ(anicus) Dacicus/
pontif(ex) maxim(us)/ (sic) pot(estate) XII co(n)s(ul) V/ imp(erator) VI p(ater)
p(atriciae) fecit/ per coh(ortem) I Fl(aviam) Vlp(iam)/ Hisp(anam) mil(liariam)
c(ivium) R(omanorum) eq(uitatam)/ a Potaissa Napo/cam / m(ilia) p(assuum) X.

The emperor Caesar Nerva Trajanus Augustus Germanicus Dacicus, pontifex maximus, holding tribunician power for the twelfth time, consul five times, called *imperator* six times, pater patriae six times, built this (road) through/by means of/through the agency of the mounted *Cohors I Hispanorum Miliaria* of the Roman citizens, from Potaissa to Napoca, tenth Roman mile/ten Roman miles .

This inscription is the first epigraphical evidence of the Roman Dacian settlements of Potaissa and Napoca and indicates that the road construction was progressing well by 108 (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 15). The Romans built five roads that interconnected the initial military camps and the urban settlements that rose out of in the province. The system of roads used mountain passes and also broke through difficult terrain across the Carpathian Mountains. All parts of the province were accessible to the military by road, and in the event of trouble, forts and garrisons could be reinforced quickly, since large forces could be moved at speed (Chappell 2005: 54).

In the center of the road network was the *Colonia Ulpia Traiana Augusta Dacica Sarmizegetusa*, called *Colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa* afterwards. The city became the headquarters of the governor and two legions, the *legio XIII Gemina I* and the *legio III Flavia Felix* were stationed seventy two Roman miles from the *colonia*. Powerful military forts were guarding the centers. Unlike the Mušov settlements in Moravia, the excavations at the Dacian Roman settlements did not uncover previous pre-Roman habitations. Distribution of the western Dacian settlements may reflect patterns of depopulation resulting from the Dacian Wars. The human relocation was not the only model to re-settlement; it was precisely managed to take advantage of the area's rich natural resources. *Colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa* was advantageously placed to make use of the gold and iron mines in nearby mountains. The city controlled an ancient salt-trade route as well, connecting to Pannonia and Upper Moesia (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 18).



Figure 3.9 Sarmizegetusa: Roman forum.

Apulum was the largest city in Dacia of a possible ten substantial settlements (Diaconescu 2004: 120).



Figure 3.10 Apulum: plan of the camp of the *legio XII Gemina*.

Large towns were built according to Roman urban grid plans, and contained public spaces such as *fora*, temple complexes, amphitheatres, granaries, and *insulae*. Romanian archaeology has concentrated its efforts on main urban sites; however, a considerable number of sites never achieved municipal status but are considered semi-urban communities. Oltean (2007: 3) writes that these sites have been neglected, and only some of the many military *vici* have been excavated. Of late, greater emphasis has been put on examining the military remains of Roman occupation.

Hanson and Oltean (JRA 2012: 297-318) discuss the new research conducted recently on the linear fortification in eastern Romania, from the Danube to the coast of the Black Sea, called *Valu lui Traian*. The length is 61 km, and consists of three interlinked walls, with associated forts and fortlets adjacent to the walls. All three walls (the Stone Wall, the Small Earthen Wall and the Large Earthen Wall) were considered Roman, specifically Trajanic, until the 1950s, when Romania archaeologists started dating the walls to the tenth and eleventh centuries. Hanson and Oltean's research is reviewing the classification of the walls with the aim to bring them to "their rightful place as elements of a well-preserved and chronologically complex Roman frontier system" (2012: 297). The walls consist of ramparts and ditches, and the forts are spaced regularly along the walls, notably, along the Large Earthen Wall. The forts are surrounded by ramparts, and some have attached annexes, integral to their layout (2012: 311). Aerial photography provided evidence of linear features, most likely roads leading to the forts. The character of the walls and the forms of the forts nearby are paralleled to second century. A limited amount of artefacts identify the wall system as Roman (2012: 314). While Hanson and Oltean judge these walls Roman, more detailed analysis shows greater chronological complexity, and there may be several phases of construction hidden in the walls. The *Valu lui Traian* lacks present-day research focus and the authors express their hope that once a firm Roman date of the walls is established, they may consider a more precise historical context of the fortification system (2012: 316).

Thorough examination of military deployments reveals that for all of the history of the area as a Roman province, Roman forts served as the administration centers for the rural areas (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 18). A large number of Roman forts had been excavated, highlighting sites with stone structures. Unfortunately, the research into field or temporary military camps is limited. The resulting pattern of fort distribution is more similar to patterns of occupation rather than to patterns of defensive system (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 25). There are numerous settlements attributed to the military, but these interpretations are based only on few bricks marked with the legionary stamps found in an otherwise civilian context (Oltean 2004: 155).



Figure 3.11 Apulum: stamp of the *legio XII Gemina*.

The most detailed study of Roman installations is in the north-west, controlling the mountain passes into the province. A series of auxiliary forts join a large fort site at Moigrad (Porolissum). The site is contemporary with a smaller fort and the complete site was able to hold at least 2,000 men. 66 stone watch towers have been indentified, as well as some linear barrier joining eight very small forts. The purpose of this installation is not yet clear. Archaeological research confirms that the Roman fort distribution in Dacia is not exclusively for defense, but fits a design for a continued occupation (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 25). The Romans meant to remain.

The forts are difficult to trace since they are spread throughout the countryside. As in Moravia, aerial reconnaissance and mapping were severely restricted under the socialist regime in Romania. However, new landscape projects have started lately and are producing results (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 23). The first program of aerial reconnaissance exclusively for archaeological purposes was started by Doctors Oltean and Hanson between 1998 and 2004 (Oltean 2007: XI).

Archaeological evidence gathered from the military installations is at times supported by literary sources. For example, Sextus Aurelius Victor's history of Rome (from the reign of Augustus to the year 361) includes a mention of the forts in Dacia:

Castrasuspectioribus atque opportunis locis extracta ponsque Danubio positus, ac deductae coloniarum pleraque (*Liber De Caesaribus* 13.4).

Forts were built in suitable places and with commanding views, a bridge was built over the Danube and numerous colonies founded. (Translation by E. Bullard)

(Sextus Aurelius Victor's historical sources are named on page 102.)

No strictly defined frontiers of the province are known. The main military routes must have controlled the central plateau and connected the plateau with the Danube. Haynes and Hanson (2004: 19) infer that the archaeological evidence from Dacian forts does not support a deliberate Roman design to incorporate more distant areas.

III. Romanisation

Adaptation of an indigenous society to Roman influence has been called Romanisation. Burns (2003) writes:

“Although the term and the concepts behind it are simplistic and one-sided, if not contrary to fact, it is so ubiquitous in modern literature that to avoid its use entirely would itself impose artificiality upon the discussion.”

The term is convenient, but there are some complex circumstances accompanying it. Cultural changes took place between all groups involved, even though mostly among the barbarians. Romanisation is a term therefore that describes the way by which the barbarians adapted to living near Romans and, and during the gradual transformation, left an imprint on Roman society (Burns 2003:27).

For a more detailed explanation of the present controversies in the studies of Romanisation and acculturation, see Appendix B.

Dacia offers a unique opportunity to study the process of Romanisation. In the one hundred and fifty years of Roman rule, varied and rich Roman culture grew in Dacia. The final stages of the culture are equally revealing as the beginnings, because Dacia was the first entirely incorporated province to be abandoned by the Roman Empire. Many of the archaeological sites were unchanged by subsequent occupations or destructions. Alongside the archaeological remains, a linguistic legacy of Rome is still obvious in present-day Romania. Romanian is a Romance language, surviving in a region surrounded by Slavonic language groups. Latin was imported to Dacia by the Roman occupiers almost two thousand years ago and has continued to exist even after the collapse of the Roman rule (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 11). The Roman writer Flavius Eutropius, a historian writing in the fourth century, offers some information on the population of the new province of Dacia. His *Breviarium historiae Romanae*, in ten books, is a Roman history from the foundation of the city to the accession of the emperor

Valens in 364. His historical sources were Livy, the first six books, and Suetonius, book seven. Other sources for the work are unknown (Conte 1987:647). The passage (8.6.2) describes the depopulation of Dacia and the transfer of new colonials into Dacia:

Idem de Dacia facere conatum amici deterruerunt, ne multi cives Romani barbaris traderentur, propterea quia Traianus victa Dacia ex toto orbe Romano infinitas eo copias hominum transtulerat ad agros et urbes colendas. Dacia enim diuturno bello Decibali viris fuerat exhausta.

When he was proceeding to act similarly with regard to Dacia, his friends dissuaded him, lest many Roman citizens should be handed over to the barbarians, because Trajan, after Dacia was defeated, brought from the whole Roman world countless masses of people to live in the fields and in the cities, since Dacia was exhausted of men after the long war with Decebalus (Translation E. Bullard).

The first part of the quote is regarded as an accurate report of the organized process of colonization of a new province of Dacia (Ruscu 2004:75). The Roman Empire needed loyal populations to fill the demographic void and to keep the province, which was surrounded on three borders by enemy territory, safe from incursions (Ruscu 2004:84). Eutropius is not the only literary source that speaks of a devastation of the Dacian indigenous population. Later sources, such as *Caesares* 28 of the emperor Julian, and *Scholia in Lucianum* 24.16, mention the huge losses among the Dacians after Trajan's wars. However, the losses mentioned are due to war, not a systematic extermination of an entire people (Ruscu 2004: 78). Many native Dacians perished in the Dacian wars or in the triumphs that followed the victories. Some of the survivors were conscripted into the Roman army and were sent to various parts of the empire.

Epigraphically, the indigenous population is invisible, and this fact suggests that the Dacian elite did not play an important role in the creation of the new Roman colonial society. Later, some names of Dacian origins appear in epigraphical records, naming the men who acquired Roman citizenship under Hadrian (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 22). The problem is that scholars are not able to identify the indigenous population archaeologically, and this complicates the interpretation of the cultural changes that followed the conquest (Oltean 2007: XI). Eutropius *BHR* 8.6.2. provides the one piece of primary literary evidence showing that Dacia's population suffered enormous losses in the wars, and in the subsequent deportations that weakened indigenous resistance. Eutropius writes about the *infinitiae copiae hominum*, and Trajan is clearly involved in the

organized strategy of colonization. More information on the colonization comes to us from Sextus Aurelius Victor. Like Eutropius, whose sources are mentioned above, Sextus Aurelius Victor information was derived from earlier sources. Livy and Suetonius were his models and it is possible that the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* were consulted by him as well (Conte 1987: 646).

Quippe primus aut solus etiam vires Romanas trans Istrum propagavit domitis in provinciam Dacorum pileatis †satisque nationibus, Decibalo rege. (13.3)

Since he was first and the only one, he even increased Roman power beyond the Danube, with certain tribes (the text is corrupt here and the words could mean: wearing felt hats) having been conquered into the province of Dacia, with Decebalus their king. (Translation by E. Bullard/ C. Littlewood)

A survey from the two main Dacian communities, *Colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa* and Apulum, show that at least half of the *nomina* recorded are of Italic origins. Scholars surmise from this information that the Romanisation of the province was less a result of influencing the Dacian indigenous population, and had more to do with importing a Roman community in Dacia. Archaeological evidence also proves that colonists from neighbouring provinces settled in Dacia (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 21). In Dacia, archaeology presents a mix of different cultures and its evidence is open to interpretation (Chappell 2005: 22).

Indigenous communities similar to Dacian ethnic and linguistic background were integrated into the empire through a classic method of self-administration through the intermediary of local *principes*. The impact of Roman influence in Dacia was extremely successful in accordance with this approach, and while no settlements flourishing prior to the Roman conquest are recorded as organized into the communities of *civitates* (Ruscu 2004: 80), eleven cities supported the Roman state in the new province (Chappell 2005: 150). Cities formed the bases of administrative units. The highest status of a city was that of a *colonia*, below that were the *municipia*, below that the *civitates*, and the rural *vici* and *pagi*. In Dacia there were also *territoria*, which were based on original *castra* (Chappell 2005: 56).

As to the depth of the Romanisation, Chappell (2005: 151) argues that the archaeological and epigraphical evidence proves that Romanisation was superficial only. The structures were not built or used for the advantage of the native population, and the

public buildings were built on a more modest scale than in the cities on the northern frontier in Noricum and Pannonia. The Roman emblematic structures did not lead to a widespread acceptance of Roman culture, but rather to an adaptation of it in the view of the *limes* experience. In this case Roman imperialism resulted in the creation of a new culture on the frontier (Chappell 2005: 152).

Diaconescu (2004: 120) discusses the importance of the military in the process of Romanisation. In Dacia the Roman army constructed the roads and in the case of the *Colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa*, the military also built the public buildings. Since most of the new colonists were army veterans, at first the structures had predominately a military character. The size of the occupation forces was at least 55,000 soldiers, and they all received pay from Rome. Their income was spent in the new province. In Dacia five towns were given exemptions of taxes by the *ius Italicum*:

In Dacia quoque Zernensium colonia a divo Traiano deducta iuris Italicum est. (Ulpian, *Dig, L, 15, 1.8*)

In Dacia also the Zernensian colony founded by divine Trajan has the *ius Italicum*. (Translation by E. Bullard)

Zarmizegetusa quoque eiusdem iuris est: item Napocensis colonia et Apulensis et Patavissensium vicus, qui a divo Severo ius coloniae impetravit. (Ulpian, *Dig, L, 15, 1.9*)

Sarmizegetusa also holds the same right: likewise the colony of Napoca, and the *vicus* of Apulum and Patavissensium (Potaissa), which have requested the *ius coloniae* from divine Severus (Translation: E. Bullard)

By this right, Dacia benefitted from belonging to the Empire, and its natural resources and revenues from them were not completely robbed by Rome but shared with the provincials.

After a region was annexed, various Roman religious cults became prominent. Some were used to spread political loyalty, such as the imperial cult. Others, such as the collegial and civic cults, expressed the public support for the social order imported by the Roman conquerors (Chappell 2005: 264). The demonstration of political loyalty was not necessarily an indication of Romanisation. Loyalty to Rome was expedient, and publicly proclaimed was essential for inclusion in the new regime (Chappell 2005: 278). However, literary sources do not record religion in Dacia. Epigraphical evidence is helpful; about

one thousand votive inscriptions survive from the province. Archaeological evidence relating to religion consists of temples, temple reliefs and cult statues, but the remains are poorly preserved and difficult to interpret. Their information is therefore limited (Chappell 2005: 203).

IV. The role of the Roman military

The Roman army played a vital role in the development of Dacia economically, socially, and religiously. Since there were few Roman civilian administrators in the province, the military was the main institution of the Roman state. The government allocated land in the *territorium* to imported settlers and retired veterans (Chappell 2005: 113). Roman army veterans settled in each major city or town and became an important part of the civic leadership. The countryside was influenced by the military through the auxiliary camps that guarded the different regions (Chappell 2005: 163). Urban settlements expanded economically and politically because of the presence of the military (Chappell 2005: 181), and all the major Roman buildings display the dominance of the army. Archaeology provides evidence to the process, since the primary sources of the formation of the new Roman are epigraphical. Five hundred inscriptions associated with the Roman military have been identified (Chappell 2005: 154).

Chappell (2005: 199) writes that the Roman structures found in the provinces were built for the use of the army, not the indigenous population, as large numbers of inscriptions, dedicated by soldiers, attest. Soldiers brought their culture to the province in two ways: on retirement from the units they took part in civic life, and through their family life in the *canabae* surrounding the camps (Chappell 2005: 201).

Irregular auxiliary units were employed to subdue the native population and protect the frontier. The difficult geography of Dacia required large numbers of auxiliaries drawn from all over the empire (Chappell 2005:63). At the time of the Marcomanni Wars another legion, the *legio V Macedonica*, was added to the defense of Dacia to counter the threat of the Iazyges and their Germanic allies (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 19). The threat of the Iazyges was grave enough for the Romans to take serious notice: the death of the Marcus Claudius Fronto, the commander of Moesia and Dacia was recorded (*ILS* 1098). Administrative changes to the provincial governance followed,

but the most important reason for the creation of the new Dacia was the accommodation of Roman settlers after the defeat of Decebalus.

The important function of the military in the development of urban centers emerged only recently. Comparisons are made to several places in Britain, where excavations have uncovered evidence of succession from military to civilian occupation (Diaconescu 2004: 87). Urban development then followed the process of increasing the borders, and the departure of the Roman army. During the age of Septimius Severus, appearance of new cities in strategically crucial military centers of the province may prove that the location of these military sites had a key role in the placing and developing the towns (Diaconescu 2004: 88).

While the towns were of military origin, they developed as civilian communities later. They owed their prosperity to a complicated system of military defenses. The geographic realities of Dacia meant that the province could not be defended by a single barrier, like Hadrian's Wall in Britain or the *limes* of the Rhine or Danube rivers. What is more, the Roman military kept the 50,000 men in 100 military camps for the duration of the 165 years (Hanson and Haynes 2004: 143).

Dacia provides a typical model for the development in the northern provinces. The army performed a strong role in the development, together with the civic administration. The army and the administration were the agents of cultural change, though the culture did not penetrate profoundly into the countryside or among the lower classes. Legionary soldiers had more in common with their fellow soldiers on the borders, than with the Dacian civilians. Economic development was promoted by the rich business of military contracts and supply (Chappell 2005: 337).

The main elements of creating a Roman province in Dacia include accommodation of Roman settlers, a Roman desire to safeguard its frontier, and removing a threat of a hostile people on Roman borders. Revolts and uprising that posed a serious threat within and without the Empire had to be suppressed before they spread to wider regions. Acquisition of land and its products, resources and wealth, and control of trade and trade routes launched wide economic expansion and development. The annexation and Romanisation of Dacia was facilitated by the ready acceptance of Roman culture by the local nobility.

Chapter summary

The examples of the systems creating new provinces on the Danubian frontier suggest a model involving a special administrative pattern of assimilation of indigenous societies. The assimilation of the societies into the governmental system of the Roman Empire involved their organization into the standard of Roman *civitates* (communities). In all the Danubian provinces, Romanisation was aided by the loyalty of the resident aristocracy, and local inhabitants were drafted into Roman auxiliary units (Ruscu 2004:79).

Next, the local communities were integrated into the Roman administrative system by choosing officials from the centurions of the troops, who were granted the title *praefectus civitatum*. The title was granted by the emperor, and the office was intended for ruling an independent district (BNP 2007:s.v. *praefectus civitatum*). The next stage of development included a larger autonomy for the *civitates*. When a conquered town was incorporated into the Roman Empire, it became a *municipium*. The local administration of *municipia* was under the control of the governor (Abbot 1926:8-9), and in the Danubian provinces they were governed by their own civic elite, chosen from the local aristocracy. This group of leaders was romanised first (Ruscu 2004: 80).

The conquest of Dacia removed a problem Rome had been facing for fifty years. Its frontier projected outward from the Danube, and was not an ideal frontier to protect, but holding Dacia secured all imperial regions from Middle Danube to the Black Sea. Dacia's territory forced a wedge into the surrounding *barbaricum*, and continued to be a strategic asset for Rome for 165 years, for as long as Rome was powerful enough to control it (Williams 1996: 62). *Marcomannia* province, when annexed, could have proven as difficult to protect, with its borders vulnerable to barbarian attacks. But, if the Roman administration and the military were able to maintain Dacia for nearly two centuries, Marcus Aurelius may have looked to Dacia for an example of occupation of a difficult territory. With his intentions of creating the new province in *barbaricum*, he followed the precedent earlier Roman emperors set before him.

Many characteristic actions had to be set into motion by Rome for the creation of *Marcomannia*. Many questions associated with the process arise. Some of the questions will be addressed in the next chapter, and few can never be solved, since our information

on the Marcomanni is severely limited. Some guidance is available to help us understand the process. In all the cases mentioned in this chapter, the elements of creating a new province follow the same pattern. Rome pursued a defined path of conquest and annexation of new territories, and of Romanisation. Accepting the elements of creating a Roman province as discussed in this chapter, the reasons for conquest may also be consistent in all the regions the Romans conquered. If conclusions can be drawn from the examples of annexation of Dacia and Pannonia, then these patterns of conquest and assimilation can be traced and compared in the creation of *Marcomannia* as a Roman province.

Although the land of the Marcomanni was not rich in resources, and had no precious metals, it provided manpower as soldiers and slaves, and also supplied Rome with valuable timber and furs. The trade operated along the Amber Route was important, and vast amounts of goods moved north. Economic advantages of Roman occupation were considerable; annexation always resulted in economic expansion and development. The territory itself was as indefensible as Dacia, and all three sides of the new province would face the *barbaricum*. A great number of troops would be necessary to guard the frontiers. The expense for the additional military may have appeared warranted, as the rebellious tribes on the Roman northern frontiers always threatened Rome's security. Marcus Aurelius needed to safeguard his Danubian borders, in view of the Marcomanni and Quadi hostilities against Rome.

Acceptance of Roman culture among the Marcomanni is demonstrated as marginal at the stage of early occupation. The grave of the Germani nobles discussed in chapter two contains goods with strong Roman influence, and there are Roman-style buildings and structures in Mušov. But so far there are no finds of Latin inscriptions or evidence of the local inhabitants consenting to Roman religious practices. Gradually more colonists could arrive in the region and bring with them further Roman influence.

The pattern that has emerged from Dacia demonstrates that small military settlements eventually grew into civilian communities, and sometimes into cities. There are numerous military installations in southern Moravia, and in time, many could emerge as permanent cities. Considering that Mušov is the only extensive fort excavated in Moravia at the present time, it is possible that the site was intended to grow into the first

large Roman community in the region, and that others could grow next. Lacking direct information on the administrative processes and plans for the Marcomanni region, the concrete examples from nearby provinces contribute positively to our knowledge. From all the models taken into account, it seems plausible that Mušov was at the first stage of annexation and Romanisation process, and was meant to serve as a base for administering the new province.

Chapter 4 – Character of the Roman interaction with the barbarian neighbours.

With the establishment of the western provinces and the gradual shift to a system of preventative defense based on stationing army units along the administrative frontiers of the empire, the situation was right for the Romans and the barbarians to carry on a continual interaction (Burns 2003: 18). The various systems the Romans instituted for interaction with their barbarian neighbours is the subject of this chapter. In order to determine what the Roman intentions were for the new province of *Marcomannia*, it is essential to investigate (and compare) existing components of successful annexations.

The aspects under consideration are:

- A. Political motives for annexation
- B. Was the area in a client relation with Rome?
- C. The role of the military on the frontiers
- D. Commercial interaction: local and long distance
- E. Roman relationship with the *externae gentes*
- F. The aftermath of the Marcomannic Wars

A. Political motives for annexation

Rome's control over the shores of the Mediterranean lasted for five hundred years. Moreover, Rome's domination extended over large areas of continental Europe. The rivers Rhine and Danube formed the principal frontier line, and the empire expanded into Britain and Dacia. The conditions that were in place for Roman expansion on the European continent, and for its eventual constraints, are considered briefly in this section (Fullford 1992: 294).

An essential element of Roman conquest was the tribute Rome demanded and obtained from the vanquished. Sometimes, the territory was annexed, and another important element was extracted: the deference of the conquered. Rome's resolve on the terms of surrender meant that every capture of new territory enhanced its economic and military power (Mattern 1999: 214). Regional circumstances had major influence on the process. For the most part, the European provinces were annexed through wars, and the expenses associated with the military conflicts and safeguarding the newly acquired

territories were vast. Scholars do not agree on the definite interpretation of the expansions: the debate of an offensive or defensive empire will continue for some time. For example Lutwak (1976) maintains that the frontier policies were strategically planned for the purpose of defense. Mattern (1999: 215) considers Harris (1979) on the offensive empire side of the debate.

The significant aspect of the Roman state was the small size of its military and comparatively small expenditures, considering the immense size of the areas the army acquired. Fullford asks (1992: 295) what kinds of restraints were placed on the territorial expansions and why Rome did not expand further. In Europe the Roman advance was restricted to the societies that already had the rudiments of advanced central systems. Fullford argues that societies beyond the Danube, with the wide distribution of settlements, were difficult to dominate, although the fact of the wide distribution did not prevent occupation in the case of Britain.

The political motives for annexation or occupation were the same in all parts of the empire: protection of the Roman frontier, removing a threat of a hostile people on Rome's borders, and accumulation of the annexed territory's wealth and resources, both material and human.

B. Was the area in a client relation with Rome?

As Rome developed as an imperial power, it met up with existing foreign monarchies. All the Roman provinces were at one time independent entities ruled by kings, and Rome increased its empire at the expense of these kingdoms. The relationship between Rome and the monarchies did not exist only as relationships between the conquered and the conqueror. Roman rulers were able to expand and keep the empire due to the system that was called *amicitia* (friendship). The maintenance of the friendship system was essential to the survival of the empire, since the friendly states supplied manpower and resources that Rome was able to use (Braund 1984: 5). It has become customary to call the friendly kings *clients*, though the term is rarely used in ancient sources (Braund 1984: 7). Braund (1984:23) points out that the term 'client king' is not to be taken literally; the full articulation of the term was *rex socius et amicus*. The primary

sources we rely on are consistently imprecise, and the client king is referred to as *rex*, *socius* or *amicus*, and often any combination of the three terms.

The role of the kings along Roman frontiers has been regarded in different ways in recent scholarship, and the question asked is: were the kingdoms functioning as buffers or not? Braund (1984: 91) states that the king's and his territory's role on the frontier was more complex and important than a mere buffer. The key geographical position of a kingdom on a frontier meant that any invasion force had to pass through it. If the Roman military combined with the kingdom's army, they formed a formidable force. Even when the kingdom did not provide its army, the kings supplied Rome with essential provisions. Rome was also in a position to offer protection to a particular king, against forces within his kingdom (Braund 1984: 94). It was also possible that the kings did not keep the foreign peoples and Rome apart, but that a king as an intermediary brought them in some instances together. Since the friendly king was a part of Rome's military power, Rome maintained an interest in keeping the king strong. The kings' positions of importance to Rome lay in their ability to maintain links with Rome and the peoples in the provinces (Braund 1984: 95). If the relationship with the non-Roman forces for some reason became untenable, Rome protected the kings by offering a refuge in Rome itself. The city provided safety for the king, and restoration to power was possible through negotiations aided by Rome. Augustus named the kings who took refuge in Roman territory in his *Res Gestae* (32.1.), among them the king of the Marcomanni, Maroboduus (Braund 1984: 98). Braund (1984: 165) sees Augustus' list of the kings who were offered an asylum in Rome as yet another manifestation of the advantages this custom offered both the kings and the emperor. Tiberius offered Maroboduus refuge in Ravenna, and Tacitus (*Ann.* 2.63) specifically mentions the fact that the king of the Marcomanni proved a useful source of information on his former subjects (Braund 1984:172).

Now let us consider the client-kingdom system. Boatwright (2012: 530) offers a definition:

“Client kingdom is a state usually on the fringes of Roman territory which remained independent, but whose ruler agreed to maintain and advance Roman interests; Rome offered protection in return.”

Many questions arise from this definition, since the regions regarded as client states were used as buffer zones along the frontiers, and their political and administrative status was not always specifically defined. Schörner (2011: 114) points out that the Roman Empire, and the territories under various treaties with it, were divided into three different administrative zones: one zone was under direct Roman control, one was not under direct control (in this case to be a part of the empire meant also to stand under the imperial control, but not necessarily as a province under direct Roman administration with a ruling governor), and one was on the outside periphery. All zones were controlled, but not all were absolutely managed by Rome. This brings into question the client-kingdoms. The discrepancies between managed and controlled areas were at the base of the Roman governance of their empire and the client-kingdoms. Rome's power was not diminished when the foreign king dominated areas were in a close relationship with Rome. Suetonius wrote on Augustan policy regarding client-kings:

Reges socios etiam inter semet ipsos necessitudinibus mutuis iunxit, promptissimus affinitatis cuiusque atque amicitiae conciliator et fautor; nec aliter universos quam membra partisque imperii curae habuit (*Aug.* 48).

He also united the kings with whom he was in alliance by mutual ties, and was very ready to propose or favour intermarriage or friendships among them. He never failed to treat them all with consideration as an integral part of the empire.

A client-kingdom could be converted into a province and come under a management of a Roman governor (and then revert again: for example, Judea became a Roman province in A.D. 6, regained autonomy between 41 and 46 under King Herod Agrippa, and was made into a Roman province again by the emperor Claudius in 46.) The territories dominated by the client kings were allied to, and under the influence of Rome without being occupied or annexed to the Roman Empire (Schörner 2011: 115). Since we do not have any concrete facts on the status of the Marcomannic tribal regions, we cannot tell if it was a client-kingdom or not. No literary confirmation, no epigraphical evidence exists to support the assertion. The only way to find out how it could have worked in practice is to consult other Roman judiciary processes in relation to formation of alliances or treaties, and to examine the process of two parties coming together with embassies and petitions. It is necessary to ask who was representing the Roman government, and who was sent to speak and act for the foreign states or groups.

There is little information on the formal structures of the Marcomannic kingdom in relation to the Roman Empire. We do have visual proof from the “Rex Quadis Datus” coin of Antoninus Pius depicting a Roman-backed king, appointed by the emperor to rule the Quadi, neighbours of the Marcomanni. When Rome granted a king to a people, the implication of that gesture was the power of limited authority, sanctioned by Rome. The arrangement was understood by both sides, and sometimes the non-Roman peoples used their own stratagems to subvert the will of Rome. Cassius Dio writes on the treaty between Domitian and the king of the Dacians, Decebalus.

ὅτι ὁ Δομιτιανὸς ἠττηθεὶς ὑπὸ Μαρκομάνων καὶ φυγῶν ἔπεμψε διὰ ταχέων πρὸς τὸν Δεκέβαλον τὸν Δακῶν βασιλέα, καὶ ἐς σπονδὰς αὐτὸν ὑπηγάγετο, ὃς πολλάκις αἰτήσαντι αὐτῷ πρότερον οὐκ ἔδεδώκει. καὶ ὃς ἐδέξατο μὲν τὴν σύμβασιν ἰδρινῶς γὰρ ἐτεταλαιπώρητο, οὐ μέντοι καὶ αὐτὸς ἠθέλησεν ἐς λόγους αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἔπεμψε τὸν Διήγιν μετὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, τὰ τε ὄπλα καὶ αἰχμαλώτους τινάς, ὡς καὶ μόνους ἐκείνους ἔχων, δώσοντα. γενομένου δὲ τούτου ὁ Δομιτιανὸς τῷ Διήγιδι διάδημα ἐπέθηκε καθάπερ ὡς ἀληθεῶς κεκρατηκῶς καὶ βασιλέα τινὰ τοῖς Δακοῖς δοῦναι δυνάμενος (67.7.2).

Domitian, having been defeated by the Marcomanni, took to flight, and hastily sending messages to Decebalus, king of the Dacians, induced him to make a truce, though he himself had hitherto refused to grant one in response to the frequent requests of Decebalus. And so Decebalus accepted his overtures, for he had suffered grievous hardships; yet he did not wish to hold a conference with Domitian personally, but instead sent Diegis with the men, to give him the arms and a few captives, who, he pretended, were the only ones that he had. When this had been done, Domitian placed a diadem on the head of Diegis, just as if he had truly conquered and could give the Dacians anyone he pleased to be their king.

From Dio we learn that Decebalus sent his brother Diegis as a substitute of himself to treat with the emperor. Domitian seemingly followed the usual treaty conventions even though the recipient of the diadem/crown representing the authority of Rome was not the king of the Dacians himself. Did Decebalus then not treat with Rome in good faith? Since we customarily read reports from the Roman point of view, surely in reality the *externae gentes* always employed various strategies to avoid complete subjugation by Rome.

Cassius Dio continues on the treaty of Domitian with Decebalus:

καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀργύριον ἐχαρίσατο, καὶ ἐς τὴν Ῥώμην ὡς νενικηκῶς ἐπέστειλε τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ πρέσβεις παρὰ τοῦ Δεκεβάλου ἐπιστολήν τε, ὡς γε ἔφασκεν, ἦν ἐλέγετο πεπλακέναι. καὶ πολλοῖς τὴν ἐορτὴν πομπεῖοις

ἐκόσμησεν οὐκ ἐξ ὧν εἶλε ἑπᾶν γὰρ τούναντίον καὶ προσανάλωσε ταῖς σπονδαῖς, συχνὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτίκα χρήματα καὶ δημιουργοὺς παντοίας τέχνης καὶ εἰρηνικῆς καὶ πολεμικῆς τῶν Δεκεβάλωδους, συχνὰ δὲ καὶ ἄει δώσειν ὑποσχόμενος ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἐπίπλων: τούτοις γὰρ ὡς καὶ αἰχμαλώτοις ἄει ποτε ἐχρήτο, ἅτε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτὴν δεδουλωμένος (Dio 67.3-4).

To the soldiers he granted honours and money. And, just as if he had won a victory, he sent to Rome, among other things, envoys from Decebalus and also a letter from the king, as he claimed, though rumour declared that he had forged it. He graced the festival that followed with many exhibits appropriate to a triumph, though they came from no booty that he had captured; on the contrary, the truce had cost him something besides his losses, for he had given large sums of money to Decebalus on the spot as well as artisans of every trade pertaining to both peace and war, and had promised to keep on giving large sums in the future. The exhibits which he displayed really came from the store of imperial furniture, which he at all times treated as captured spoils, inasmuch as he had enslaved even the empire himself.

Serious trouble was threatening on the Danube, among the Germanic tribes of the Marcomanni, Quadi and Yazyges. In order not to have to fight on two fronts, Domitian chose not to follow up his victory over Decebalus and agreed to accept the king's proposals (Grant 1985: 62). Huge sums of money were paid to Decebalus as Cassius Dio writes, and ancient writers were extremely critical of Domitian's Dacian treaty conditions. (Chapter 3 contains detailed description of the treaty.) Since we have no primary sources to present the essential facts of the treaties with the Marcomanni, their political ties to Rome can be construed only from the size of Roman settlements and fortifications on their territory that seem to reveal a formation of Roman governance. Perhaps patterns of similar Roman interactions with other kingdoms help to interpret the arrangements.

The frontiers of the empire, extending over thousands of miles, brought Rome into contact with a vast number of peoples of different languages and stages of political development (Millar 1988: 347). Foreign emissaries appeared with their petitions before the Senate, as reception of embassies was one of the Senate's most important functions. This function presented the petitioners with the impression that the Senate represented the government of Rome (Millar 1988: 348). During the second century the embassies from outside and inside the empire stopped appearing before the Senate, and appealed to the

Emperor directly in person. The emperor was effectively the head of state and government, and the diplomatic and foreign relations became his sole domain (Millar 1988: 349). The Emperor was not always residing in Rome, and the leaders of peoples beyond the frontiers recognized that on diplomatic business they had to approach the emperor wherever he happened to be (Millar 1988: 351). Millar writes that there was no clear concept of the *limes*. Permanent defensive lines were formed in some areas, such as the line of fortifications along the Danube, or Hadrian's Wall. But it is uncertain if these physical barriers represented legal borders. The empire slowly incorporated a variety of regions governed by allied kings, (whom Millar calls 'client kings') creating client-kingdoms in the process. The absorption of the client-kingdoms was a slow, but essential, progression for the nature of the empire (Millar 1988: 352). It is valuable to note that even before Augustus' reign, embassies from allied and provincial communities presented themselves not only to the Senate, but to individual commanders in the field (Millar 1988: 354). So in the case of the Marcomanni, they could have approached the Roman diplomatic system directly through the commanders in the Moravian military settlements, and particularly in Mušov. Roman law depended on verbal statements made by parties in legal matters, rather than on written documents.

Millar (1988: 358) sees, in accordance with fundamental character of Roman law and political life, oral or verbal pronouncements as primary, and their written materializations as secondary. The emperors heard emissaries from provincial societies in person, and made provisional responses verbally immediately. A final reply was entrusted subsequently to a letter. Some of these letters became permanent inscriptions recorded by the provincial societies; unfortunately none exist from the Marcomannic territories.

Active conduct of diplomacy lay completely with the emperor and his advisors. A question arises about the mechanics of the interaction between the Roman representatives and the foreign ambassadors. The Romans did not retain resident legations or embassies in the client-kingdoms. The closest to a Roman delegate were the officers of the military units stationed in the allied kingdoms (Millar 1988: 368). Marcus Aurelius may have relied on his military commanders to treat with the Marcomanni directly. However, it is not correct to assume that occupation of the client states by the Roman military was the

standard norm. On the contrary, it was more common for the frontier barbarian tribes to provide auxiliary units for the Roman military, usually as a result of specific provisions of a peace treaty (Millar 1988: 369).

Some barbarian embassies were also received by the emperor while he was away from Rome, during campaigns. It is not certain what procedures were used to communicate between the two parties. It could be by a letter, as attested by Suetonius:

Praenomen quoque imperatoris cognomenque patris patriae et ciuicam in uestibulo coronam recusauit; ac ne Augusti quidem nomen, quanquam hereditarium, nullis nisi ad reges ac dynastas epistulis addidit (*Tib.* 26.2)

He also declined the forename *Imperator*, the surname of *Father of his Country*, and placing the civic crown at his door; he did not even use the title of *Augustus* in any letters except those to kings and potentates, although it was his inheritance.

It is apparent that writing to kings and their representatives was an imperial function (Millar 1988: 371). Millar mentions an instance of diplomatic practice regulating exchanges between a city and the emperor. The custom of local ambassadors carrying the official letters between Rome and Aphrodisias in both directions continued until the third century. The bulk of the evidence of diplomatic exchanges comes from the Greek speaking parts of the empire. It is not possible to find out if the smaller number of these documents from the Latin West is a result of a fewer instances of diplomatic interchange or a less developed epigraphic habit (Millar 1988: 353-4). The only literary evidence of a high ranking ambassador performing the role of a negotiator beyond the *limes* comes from a report by Cassius Dio:

καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ἔπραξαν τι ὧν ὑπέσχοντο, Κοτινοὶ δὲ ἐπηγγείλαντο μὲν αὐτοῖς ὅμοια, Ταρρουτήνιον δὲ Πάτερνον τὸν τὰς ἐπιστολὰς αὐτοῦ τὰς Λατίνας διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντα παραλαβόντες ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦς Μαρκομάνους αὐτῶ συστρατεύσοντες οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἐποίησαν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον δεινῶς ἐκάκωσαν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀπώλοντο (*HR* 72.13.3).

Now this tribe really did fulfill some of its promises; whereas the Cotini, though they made similar offers, nevertheless, upon receiving Tarrutenius Paternus, the secretary in charge of the emperor's Latin correspondence, on the pretext they wished to make a campaign with him against the Marcomanni, not only failed to do so, but even treated Paternus himself shamefully, thereby bringing about their own destruction later.

So it appears that Paternus' function was linked to internal correspondence normally, but on the occasion mentioned by Cassius Dio, Paternus was sent to negotiate (Millar 1988: 371). The question of diverse languages, knowledge of Latin, or the lack of it, and of interpreters needs to be examined. Chapter 2 mentions an inscription from Slovakia, honouring the interpreter of the *legio XV Apollinaris* (AE 1988, 938). A similar situation is attested in Tacitus:

cernebatur contra minitabundus Arminius proeliumque denuntians; nam pleraque Latino sermone interiaciebat, ut qui Romanis in castris ductor popularium meruisset (*Ann.* 2.10).

On the other side Arminius was visible, shouting threats and challenging to battle: for he kept interjecting much in Latin, as he had seen service in the Roman camp as captain of native auxiliaries.

The primary sources suggest that interpreters were available to translate during major negotiations.

After the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius all major conflicts were directed by an emperor. Marcus Aurelius conducted the Marcomannic Wars on the Danube in person from the late 160's to 180. Cassius Dio describes Marcus negotiating with delegations of barbarians coming to him from north of the Danube (Millar 1988: 375).

ὅτι ὁ Μάρκος Ἀντωνῖνος ἐν τῇ Παννονίᾳ κατέμεινεν, ἵνα καὶ ταῖς τῶν βαρβάρων πρεσβείαις χρηματίζη. πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ τότε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἦλθον. (Dio Cass. *HR* 71-2.11.1).

Marcus Antoninus remained in Pannonia in order to give audience to the embassies of the barbarians; for many came to him at this time also.

οὗτοί τε οὖν πρὸς τὸν Μάρκον ἀφίκοντο, καὶ ἕτεροι συχνοὶ παραδύσοντες ἑαυτοὺς οἱ μὲν κατὰ γένη οἱ δὲ καὶ κατὰ ἔθνη ἐπρεσβεύσαντο. (Dio Cass. *HR* 71-2.11.4)

Besides these that came to Marcus, many others sent envoys, some by tribe and some by nations, and offered surrender.

Cassius Dio continues his account of Commodus' dealings with the barbarians:

ὅτι οἱ Μαρκομάνοι οὔτε τροφὴν οὔτ' ἄνδρας συχνοὺς ὑπὸ τε τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀπολλυμένων καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς αἰεὶ τῶν χωρίων κακώσεως ἔτι εἶχον: δύο γοῦν μόνους τῶν πρώτων καὶ δύο ἄλλους τῶν καταδεεστέρων πρέσβεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰρήνης ἔπεμψαν (*HR* 73.2).

The Marcomanni by reason of the multitude of their people that were perishing and the constant ravaging of their lands no longer had an abundance of either food or men. At any rate they sent only two of their chief men and two others of inferior rank as envoys to sue for peace.

The Column of Marcus Aurelius portrays the emperor receiving the conquered barbarians.



Figure 4.1 Column of Marcus Aurelius, the emperor receives barbarian prisoners and emissaries.

Nowhere do any of the sources clarify the political status of the Marcomannic lands after the treaties. Still, we cannot eradicate the possibility that a client kingdom relationship was in place between Rome and the Marcomanni. Some type of a treaty binding both parties could have been signed by either the emperor or his representatives. Millar (1988: 373) points out, that the inclination to hand over all major external functions to the Emperor himself is one of the most important developments in imperial history. Consequently, later Roman emperors were the official heads of Roman government, and in a position to treat with foreign embassies. If the emperor was not available, the officers of his military units fulfilled the role of ambassadors. As far as can be discovered from the primary evidence, embassies were sent to Marcus Aurelius and treaties were proposed and accepted.

C. The role of the military on the frontiers

I. General description of the Roman military along the Danube river.

Any discussion of the character of Roman military interaction with the barbarian peoples needs to consider the establishment of the diverse military installations on the frontiers. The main purpose of establishing frontiers was to avoid having to fight an expensive war. The system permitted the Romans to control the peoples outside the empire, and included subsidies to the native tribes beyond the frontier, the granting of privileges in alliances with Rome, and awards of trading rights (Southern 2007:182).

The basis of any Roman military campaigns into enemy territory had always been the organization of military installations to support military advance (Tejral 1998:111). The establishment of legionary forts and auxiliary forts was a result of early imperial military policy. When the frontier was created, the forts and fortresses became part of the defensive system (Southern 2007:178). The forts in the vicinity of the frontiers gave the Romans bases, where the army could be assembled in cases of diplomatic failures. If peaceful means did not succeed, war provided the alternative solution (Southern 2007:186).

As the army moved into a new territory, living quarters in the form of temporary camps had to be established for the troops. From an archaeological point of view, little remains of Roman marching camps except the surrounding defensive ditches. These camps are best known from aerial photographic surveys (Webster 1998:172). Temporary military camps emerged in the course of remarkable historical events, which were generally recorded by ancient writers. The camps are also material evidence of the goals of Roman aggression and solutions during times of crisis when the customary diplomatic solutions failed. The information gathered from the study of the camps enables us to rate the range of the Roman military operations and the strength of their barbarian opposition. The short passages of ancient authors on the camps (recorded in Chapter 2), and their interpretation, are supported by archaeological evidence. Examination of the camps provides opportunities for investigations of the relationships between Rome and the barbarians (Šedo 2001:102).

Eventually the greater portion of the army settlements became forts and fortresses in locations with strategic benefit. All the forts have the same basic pattern (Webster

1998:184). The Mušov site reads as an exemplary model of a fort: it was set on a high site with tactical advantage, surrounded by defensive ditches and ramparts. Usually Roman forts had four entrances, one on each side of the fort. Legionary camps were on an immense scale, capable of holding an entire legion: Mušov's size was 40 hectares, while the entire protected area stood at 400 hectares. The Danubian fortresses at Carnuntum and Brigetio are much larger than Mušov, both of them able to accommodate up to 50,000 inhabitants. They are still not entirely interpreted, and it is difficult to use them as comparisons to the Mušov establishment, though there are striking similarities. The types of buildings inside the fortresses follow the usual pattern in all three. The *principia* held the administration, the *praetorium* housed the commander, and there were houses for the tribunes. Barrack blocks for the men took the majority of the space in the fort and the arrangements of the blocks vary very little from fort to fort (Webster 1998:199). Each legionary camp had its own *valetudinarium*, and the recent find of one at the Mušov fort confirms the camp's legionary status. The ground plans of other Roman hospitals correspond to the one found at Mušov. The bath house found at Mušov was yet another required element of a well designed Roman fort. Auxiliary forts included all the main features of great legionary camps. The structures were built on a smaller scale and there are more variations in the plans. It is possible that the site in Mušov could be interpreted in the future as an auxiliary camp.

Marcus Aurelius fought for years to gain stability beyond the Danube *limes* (Southern 2007: 186). The emperor established his command in 171-73 in Carnuntum. Pushing with his armies deep into *barbaricum*, he was determined to win submission from all the peoples on the Danube frontier, and to bring them under direct control, and not rely on treaties. More campaigns were fought in 177-78, but the emperor's death interrupted the progression of the war (Webster 1998:84). Marcus Aurelius' military strategy was no longer solely a question of restoring the frontiers and the defenses on them, but preventing other incursions into Roman territory. The existing garrisons were not adequate to serve this specific purpose; the turf and timber structures were not strong enough, and new ones had to be built in stone. If there were any plans for future permanent stone-constructed military installations on the frontier, Commodus abandoned them rapidly after his succession (Webster 1998: 85). The Mušov site's development

stands at this moment in history: we are unable to ascertain what Marcus Aurelius' designs for the entire area were. We are left with the archaeological evidence that marks the end of the emperor's reign, and material evidence must help to supplement literary sources to show what the intended design for the site was.

During the second century, the frontiers became more settled. Development of defensive walls such as Hadrian's Wall, or individual fortifications, did not imply solely a defensive strategy or limits to Roman expansion. The fortifications were also bases for offensive engagements since Roman power was upheld beyond the *limes* by both diplomatic and military processes (Pollard 2006: 209).

The legionary forces were also a powerful political tool. Even based far away from Rome their authority was so dominant that they could promote, and enforce, an election of an emperor, as was in the case of Galba, Vespasian and Trajan (Pollard 2006: 218). Tacitus analyses Galba's election outside Rome:

finis Neronis ut laetus primo gaudentium impetu fuerat, ita varios motus animorum non modo in urbe apud patres aut populum aut urbanum militem, sed omnis legiones ducesque conciverat, evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri (*Hist.* 1.4).

Although Nero's death had at first been welcomed with outbursts of joy, it roused varying emotions, not only in the city among the senators and people and the city soldiery, but also among all the legions and generals; for the secret of empire was now disclosed, that an emperor could be made elsewhere than at Rome.

Rome's legions were superbly organized, trained and equipped. From Tacitus' quote it is clear that their strength was significant in Rome's political and military affairs. When a legion arrived in an area, was housed permanently, and settled, its influence on the surrounding inhabitants must have been immediate. Even in a territory not yet annexed or occupied, the force of the Roman military was felt, and its mere presence was a confirmation of Roman domination.

Along the northern borders, military units were formed to serve the expanding Roman Empire. Roman river fleets supplemented the military supply lines with water transportation. In the relationship between Rome and the *barbaricum*, the rivers Rhine and Danube performed a vital role for both transportation and defense. The fleets that plied the Rhine were established early. Cassius Dio (*HR* 14.32) mentions the fleet of

Drusus the Elder in 12 B.C. (Webster 1998: 160). The *classis Pannonica* (mentioned in Chapter 3), and the *classis Moesia*, were based on the Danube. Vespasian, in his drive to reinforce the Danube frontier, reorganized the second fleet, and named it the *classis Flavia*. Tiles stamped with *Cl(assis)F(laviae)P(annonicae)* were found on the Danube at Brigetio and Carnuntum. The fleet was essential for Domitian's Dacian wars in 86-88, and in the following campaigns of Trajan, the annexation of Dacia placed great demands on the fleet to bring supplies and transport troops to the conflict. The column of Trajan records in its reliefs the fleet, the loading of the ships, harbour scenes and repairing of the ships (Webster 1998: 164).




Figure 4.2 Column of Trajan, the emperor's fleet leaves a port, scene 58.

Ships of different types are depicted, warships, transport and freight ships are clearly characterized in the various reliefs (Southern 2007: 207). The column of Marcus Aurelius is equally descriptive in the images of the Danubian fleet, bridges and installations along the river:



Figure 4.3 Column of Marcus Aurelius, the Roman army crossing the Danube into *barbaricum*.

Since ships with provisions for the camp were able to reach the Mušov location, as is documented by the import of legionary bricks, then it is reasonable to assume that military transports were available, providing the site with a flow of fresh troops and supplies. No major center could operate without connection to the road and river transport systems.

Comparisons with other archaeological sites of forts can be helpful to establish the ‘normal’ pattern for a fort, and draw some conclusions about the Mušov installation and its role. The few structures on the site corroborate the intentions of housing a whole legion at the site, and we have the archaeological evidence to support conclusions of its role. The powerful Roman army has left its military presence in material finds, and in literary sources. The river fleets are documented by primary sources as well, and there is visual confirmation of the crucial role of the fleets on the rivers, in the carvings on both the columns of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius.

II. A case of Tiberius Claudius Maximus

Detailed information on the structure and function of the Roman army in the provinces comes to us from a monument with two reliefs and an inscription found in Philippi in 1965. The upper relief on the monument shows Maximus galloping toward the enemy, who is likely the king Decebalus himself. The king’s main features are recognizable from the Column of Trajan, even if we take into account the heavily

standardized portrayals of Dacian chieftains on the column (Speidel 1970: 149). The artist on the column dramatized the event by showing Maximus capturing the king still alive, though it is recorded by Cassius Dio (68.14) that Decebalus committed suicide in order to prevent being captured.



Figure 4.4 Tiberius Claudius Maximus' monument.

The text of the Philippi inscription:

Ti(berius) Claudius / Maximus vet(eranus) / [s(e)] v(ivo) f(aciendum) c(uravit)
 militavit / eque(s) in leg(ione) VII C(laudia) P(ia) F(ideli) fac/ tus qu(a)estor
 equit(um) / singularis legati le/ gionis eiusdem vexil/ larius equitum item / bello
 Dacico ob virtu/ te(m) donis donatus ab Im/ p(eratore) Domitiano factus
 dupli(carius) / a divo Troiano(!) in ala secu(n)d(a) / Pannoniorum a quo et fa/tus
 explorator in bello Da/ cico et ob virtute(m) bis donis / donatus bello Dacico et /
 Parthico et ab eode(m) factus / decurio in ala eade(m) quod / cepisset
 Decebalu(m) et caput / eius pertulisset ei Ranissto/ ro missus voluntarius ho/ nesta
 missione a Terent[io Scau]/ riano consulare [exerci]/ tus provinciae nov[ae
 Mes]/[opotamiae....

Tiberius Claudius Maximus, veteran, took care of setting this up while he was alive. He served as trooper in *legio VII Claudia Pia Fidelis*, was made *quaestor equitum*, then *singularis* of the *legatus legionis* of the same legion, then *vexillarius* of the of troopers of that unit, received awards from Emperor Domitian for bravery in the Dacian War, was made *duplicarius* in the Ala II Pannoniorum by the Emperor Trajan and was made *explorator* in the Dacian War and twice

received awards for bravery in the Dacian and the Parthian War and was made *decurio* in the same *ala* by him because he had captured Decebalus and bore his head to him in *Ranisstorum*. He got his honorary discharge as a *voluntarius* from the consular commander Terentius Scaurianus, of the army of the *Provincia Mesopotamia Nova* (translation Campbell 1994: 32).

The inscription represents a comprehensive description of the career of a Roman soldier. Tiberius Claudius Maximus served with the *legio VII Claudia* in the Dacian Wars during the reigns of both Domitian and Trajan (Speidel 1970: 142). He became a cavalry officer and a standard bearer and was decorated for bravery by Domitian. The existence of a legionary cavalry during the reign of Domitian is confirmed for the first time, as are other important facts about the legionary cavalry. Maximus was a treasurer of the cavalry, as well as the *singulares* of the *legatus legionis* (ex-praetor given the command of a legion). It was previously believed that only a commander-in-chief of a provincial army was given the privilege of *singulares*. The Philippi inscription also confirms that presence of the *legio VII Claudia* in the Dacian Wars, and the presence of Trajan himself with his troops: Maximus was granted a promotion by the emperor himself. Maximus was also a scout for the Roman army, and Speidel (1970: 148) considers him the leader of the reconnoitering party that captured the Dacian king Decebalus. Speidel argues (1970: 150) that the Maximus monument with the inscription lends support to the much disputed question of historical accuracy of the reliefs on the Column of Trajan.



Figure 4.5 Column of Trajan, the suicide/capture of Decebalus.

The inscription also records the discharging of the soldiers by the Emperor, through the agency of the provincial governor. The name of the governor is documented as Decimus Terentius Scaurianus, who was the first governor of the newly conquered Dacia. Speidel (1970: 151) writes that the task of organizing the province was a significant one, because the province was to be made an essential safeguard against the peoples beyond the borders. Another detail emerges from the inscription. The governor's title includes a military designation of a *consularis exercitus provinciae*, not *consularis provinciae* as expected. Speidel (1970: 152) maintains that while the new province was not yet fully established but the garrison was formed already, and the command was given to the future governor.

The Philippi monument provides information on a Roman soldier's distinguished career, helps to support a claim of historical accuracy for at least one relief on the Column of Trajan, and sheds light on organization of a new province. As it could have been in the case of Mušov, the garrison in Dacia was set up before the province was formed, and the future governor of the province was given the garrison's command.

D. Commercial interaction: local and long distance

The traditional Roman frontier of either a river or a wall system was an important area of Roman and barbarian interaction, although by no means the only area of mutual interaction. Romans and barbarians met inside the empire as well (Burns 2003: 28). Roman power incorporated barbarians within the provinces and influenced the evolution of barbarian communities outside the provincial boundaries. When Rome incorporated a new territory, it was customarily done swiftly, and with the exception of *Germania*, successfully. Barbarians within the new provinces or allied territories continued their life-long living patterns, and their personal habits and relationships supported the trade and cultural interactions. Commerce was maintained with peoples far removed from Rome (Burns 2003: 29).

The Roman army consumed enormous resources and represented equally enormous economic power (Burns 2003: 18). From the time of Augustan campaigns on the Rhine, systematically managed goods flowed from the Mediterranean to the garrisons on the *limes*. The supply of goods allowed for the legions to overwinter in the frontier regions, and offered a base for further expansions if they were needed. The military administration operated the stocking of the camps with provisions. Together with provisioning the camps with necessary commodities, each legionary was paid his earnings in cash, though some of the pay was withheld for expenses such as food, clothing and camp celebrations. While the supplies in the field were delivered for the soldiers by the army, they had to be bought or traded from some source. Some stock was made by the army itself, but some had to be purchased from civilian production. A large number of military personnel required large quantities of goods; the local economy prospered through the trade with the army (Pollard 2006: 221). The resulting cycling of cash taxes and army pay between Rome and the frontier provinces was essential in promoting production and trade (Pollard 2006: 219).

Archeologists find Roman wares and artefacts spread out widely on the non-Roman European continent. The Roman goods were also distributed beyond the *limes* as a result of indirect connections, such as circulation of goods, and of direct contacts such as the movement of people, in both cases as the result of exchange or political events (Bursche 1996: 41). Most recent chronologies show the largest number of Roman imports

reached the territories north of the Danube after the Marcomannic Wars. Two hundred hoards of denarii have been found in the eastern and northern parts of *barbaricum*, and together with single coin finds, these constitute more than 70,000 coins found. The denarii, second only to beads, are the most commonly imported Roman items. The chronology of these finds points to a specific time of import, from the beginning of the reign of Marcus Aurelius to the first years of Septimus Severus. The most accepted interpretation of these coin finds is that the silver denarii were tribute strengthening political contacts, and payments for the auxiliary troops drafted from the various Germanic tribes (Bursche 1996: 36). Written sources confirm this practice:

ὅτι Ἄστιγγοι, ὧν Ῥαός τε καὶ Ῥαπτος ἠγοῦντο, ἦλθον μὲν ἐς τὴν Δακίαν οἱ κῆσαι ἐλπίδι τοῦ καὶ χρήματα καὶ χώραν ἐπὶ συμμαχίᾳ λήψεσθαι. (Dio Cass. *HR* 72.12.1)

The Astingi, lead by their chieftain Raus, and Raptus, came into Dacia with their entire households, hoping to secure both money and land in return for their alliance.

βαρβάρους γοῦν τινὰς χρυσίον παρ' αὐτοῦ πολὺ ἐπ' εἰ ρηνῆ εἰ ληφότας μεταπεμψάμενος. (Dio Cass. *HR* 74.6.1)

For instance, he sent after some barbarians who had received a large sum of gold from Commodus.

There could have been payments, in coins or precious metals, made by the Romans during the Marcomannic Wars, to various factions in the conflict for alliances and services rendered, and as payment of ransom for captives. The hoards and the single finds are concentrated to the north of the Carpathian Mountains.

Very few of these finds are actually from the Moravian territory. Possibly the coin hoards are yet to be discovered or the coins were payment to the Marcomanni and the Quadi, and were later distributed north and east from their area of influence. The flow of silver coins was drastically interrupted during the first years of the reign of Septimus Severus, when the barbarians were no longer considered a threat to the empire (Bursche 1996:36-7). Brass sestertii are another important group of Roman imports, most commonly found on the southern coast of the Baltic. Most of the coins originated from northern Italy or the Rhineland: the chronology of the coins implies that they were associated with the amber trade.




Figure 4.6 Distribution of 201 coin hoards of denarii north of the imperial Roman frontier.

From an archaeological point of view, the trade on the *limes* appears almost completely one-directional. All the evidence of trade comes from *barbaricum* because it is the Roman artifacts that survive. Except for amber, all the goods arriving from the north of the frontier were perishable. Wood, furs, hair and most importantly, slaves, were the exports to the Roman Empire (James 2009: 144). After the wars, the Marcomanni were eager to have access to trading within the empire; this was one of the conditions of the peace treaty. The trade in the immediate zone of the frontier was the most active, since the treaty specified tribute to be paid to Rome. Maybe the Marcomanni supplied the Roman garrisons along the frontier with grain, and with the other commodities mentioned (James 2009: 145). The archaeological evidence of trade that survives includes bronze vessels, glass, silver, and sometimes, gold items of Roman manufacture (James 2009: 147).

Evidence of an intensive development of Romano-barbaric trade north of the middle Danube, during and after the Marcomannic Wars, is corroborated also by Tejral (1970: 390-411) by the finds of Roman bronze vessels. Numerous fragments of vessels were found in non-Roman Germania, but the majority of finds comes from the coastal regions of Poland, rich in amber. The concentration of the bronze vessels at the end of the

trade route is explained by normal mercantile practices. The transitory trade along the route carried the richer goods to the more distant, wealthy trading centers. Bronze vessels and other rich Roman goods were traded for amber.



Figure 4.7 Amber trade route.

Military installations such as the forts, and the numerous marching and temporary camps north of the middle Danube, contain material evidence that documents the Roman army presence in the area. The reuse of some of the locations indicates that the Roman military used recognized roads along the rivers in their expansion into the enemy territory (Tejral 1997: 130-1). In addition, the military roads served as trade routes. The rivers that many of the camps guarded were navigable, and were used as supply lanes for the garrisons and for any trade moving further north (Tejral 1998: 131). Austrian and Czech archaeologists have come to a conclusion that the most important road north from Pannonia ran from Carnuntum along the river Morava to its confluence to the river Dyje/Thaya following it upstream to Mušov and then continued north along the rivers Svatka and Jihlava (Tejral 1998:132).



Figure 4.8 Route from Carnuntum to Mušov along the rivers Morava and Dyje/Thaya.

The key position of the Mušov-Burgstall fort emphasises its function not only as military fort but also as a supply center. Komoróczy (personal communication 2013) pointed out that the Mušov fort was located at two confluences of three navigable rivers. Flat-bottomed Roman boats were able to float north on the rivers to Mušov, carting loads of bricks from Carnuntum. Other Roman goods were delivered north, most likely by the same river route, as the numerous archaeological finds from Mušov attest.

E. Roman relationship with the *externae gentes*

This part of the chapter charts the progress of Roman interaction with the *externae gentes* - from an early system based on international law to a later system fundamentally based on intimidation. The transfer of power was sometime accomplished without military means by the system of *deditio*. *Deditio in potestatem* was a nominally voluntary surrender of an autonomous state to the sovereignty of Rome. It represented a pre-condition for a peaceful end of war, and in peace securing the protection of Rome. The consequences of *deditio* varied from the exceptional destruction or enslavement of the community to the return of freedom, property and re-instating of the community, sometimes followed by a treaty (BNP s.v. ‘deditio’).

Later Emperors used the practice of *deditio*, and binding treaties with punishing conditions, either to keep peace on the Roman frontiers, or to annex a troublesome territory. The purpose of this archaeological study is the examination of the Roman presence in previously un-occupied territory north of the Danube, and the Roman expansion into these lands, and their annexations. In the study of the process, the formal juridical aspects of Rome's relationship with the *externae gentes* must be taken into account. The juridical relations are important elements of understanding the process of the Roman cultural and political actions during the expansions. The model of an annexation, specifically the formation of the province of Dacia, was discussed in Chapter 3. In Dacia, the relations developed during the late Republic and early Principate (Lica 2000: 25).

During the Early Republic Rome practiced an actual functioning system based on international law, and had real partners in the process. The military and political circumstances that later enabled Rome to become what Lica calls *domina mundi*, eliminated any kind of a legitimate partner/equal that was essential for practicing genuine international law (Lica 2000: 26). The full understanding of the process which led to the disappearance of international relations is only possible if we understand the changes in Rome's perception of other peoples. Primary sources help with information about the Romans' relations with the Hellenistic world, but are not very constructive about the barbarian one. In the historiography of the late Republic (Livy 42.47), a vital moment of Roman imperialism is represented by the early negotiations during the war with Perseus, king of Macedonia in 171-68 B.C. (Lica 2000: 27).

Marcius et Atilius Romam cum uenissent, legationem in Capitolio ita renuntiarunt, ut nulla re magis gloriarentur quam decepto per indutias et spem pacis rege (Livy 42.47.1)

When Marcius and Atilius had arrived in Rome, in the Capitol they reported about their embassy, emphasizing nothing as a greater achievement than the deception of the king by the truce and the hope of peace.

haec ut summa ratione acta magna pars senatus adprobabat; ueteres et moris antiqui memores negabant se in ea legatione Romanas agnoscere artes (Livy 42.47.4)

These actions a large part of the senate approved as having been done with great wisdom; the older men and those mindful of ancient custom said they did not recognize in this embassy the ways of Rome.

Lica (2000: 28) recognizes this action as an important moment in the long development of evaluating Rome's approach to the *externae gentes*. The origins of the progression are linked to the famous negotiations between Rome and the Aetolian League in 191-189 B.C., when the institution and concept of *fides* gained the most humiliating and restraining interpretations for Rome's enemies (Polybius 36.9.9.sq.). The concept of *fides* was originally a relationship between two men, or parties/states that was based on trust and reciprocity. Lica (2000: 29) continues to explain that it becomes clear during the negotiations with the Aetolians that the Romans were restructuring the juridical and political ideology of their expansions. As early as Pompey's time, the Romans equated the *orbis terrarum* with the *imperium populi Romani*. The sentiment was amply expressed in the following passages:

Etenim si Pompeius abhinc annos quingentos fuisset, is vir a quo senatus adulescentulo atque equite Romano saepe communi saluti auxilium expetisset, cuius res gestae omnis gentis cum clarissima victoria terra marique peragrassent, cuius tres triumphus testes essent totum orbem terrarum nostro imperio teneri (Cic. *Pro Balbo* 16.5).

For if Pompeius had lived five hundred years ago, a man from whom the Senate, when he was a mere youth and a Roman knight, had often sought help for the safety of the State, whose exploits, crowned by glorious victory on land and sea had compassed all peoples, whose three triumphs were a witness that the whole world was subject to our Roman Empire.

In the time period which this paper studies Rome actually used only the institution of *deditio* in its dealing with both the Hellenistic and the barbarian worlds. The *deditio* was a prominent feature of Roman diplomatic culture. After an unconditional surrender, the conquered people were granted practical terms, which prevented the terrible consequences of being defeated militarily by Rome. The *deditio* had to be accepted before the Roman siege started (Mattern 1999: 217). In a characteristic pattern, Rome awarded a favour to the foreign people, sometimes providing military aid, to ensure the loyalty of the ally. As the benefactor, Rome gained superior status (Mattern 1999: 218). Fear was used as an important policy instrument. Caesar made an example of the Veneti

tribe when they declined the *deditio* he offered them, and then attempted to rise against him. They were crushed and punished.

quibus amissis reliqui neque quo se reciperent neque quem ad modum oppida defenderent habebant. Itaque se suaque omnia Caesari dederunt. In quos eo gravius Caesar vindicandum statuit quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a barbaris ius legatorum conservaretur. Itaque omni senatu necato reliquos sub corona vendidit (Caes. *BG* 3.16).

After such losses the rest of their men had no point to retire to, no means of defending the towns. Accordingly they surrendered themselves and all they had to Caesar. He decided that their punishment must be the more severe in order that the privilege of deputies might be more carefully preserved by the natives in the future. He therefore put the whole of their senate to the sword, and sold the rest of the men as slaves.

There were similar actions by other Roman generals, and they all illustrate that vengeance was important as a tool of intimidation from early times (Mattern 1999: 219). The Romans were defeated in battles of course, but defeat was invariably punished by brutal reprisals: conquest and annihilation of the population. Rome kept winning its wars by asserting repeatedly its terrifying image (Mattern 1999: 222).

How exactly the Romans dealt with the peoples north of the Danube is more difficult to ascertain. The ancient writers either completely ignored the issues, or documented them infrequently. From the insufficient literary record or epigraphy, it appears that the *deditio* was practiced even in case of the peoples who were not defeated, and who accepted *amicitia*. *Amicitia* in its social-political aspect outside Rome was an alliance, *foedus*, that established the *amicitia* between Rome and states or kings who wished to secure their rule with the title of *amicus (populi Romani)*. The connection was seen at the beginning as between equals, and later as Roman power increased, more like a client-patron relationship in which more demands were made upon the client, while Rome as the patron was not obligated to anything (BNP 2007:s.v. ‘amicita’). In the passage below, the Ubii tribe, having accepted *amicitia*, understood, that offering hostages represented the *deditio*.

Ubii autem, qui uni ex Transrhenanis ad Caesarem legatos miserant, amicitiam fecerant, obsides dederant, magnopere orabant ut sibi auxilium ferret, quod graviter ab Suebis premerentur (Caes. *BG* 4.16.5).

The Ubii on the other hand, the only tribe beyond the Rhine which had sent deputies to Caesar, made friendly terms, and given hostages, earnestly besought him to assist them, as they were grievously hard pressed by the Suebi.

Modern scholars do not agree on the interpretation of the *deditio* functioning as a treaty. It must be assumed then, that the system worked as the foundation on which Rome's relationship with the barbarian *gentes* was built. But without explicit evidence, how can we clarify the relations with the barbarians? Rome needed the tribes to supply aid with its military policies on its borders and in barbarian territories. In order to protect the frontiers and to provide auxiliary personnel, the tribes were compelled to become *socii*. Pauly (s.v. 'amicus populi Romani') explains who the *socii* represented. A state, or king, in the relationship of an *amicus* could also be a *socius*, but no-one could be *socius* without first having the privileges of an *amicus*. The friendship bound the parties to peace and to not assisting a third party against the allied friend. The *amicus* was not obliged to supply arms to Rome, but the *socius* was. So, the peoples who accepted the *deditio* subsequently became *socii* (Lica 2000: 33), with all the duties the title stood for.

Since the annexation of the Dacian territory is providing a formula for a probable annexation of Moravia, it will be useful to look into the process under the Flavians. Up to this age, the Rhine was the most important border line in the empire, where the greatest number of military was placed. Under Domitian, the focus moved from the Rhine to the Danube, and additional measures were implemented to protect the *limes*. The defining feature of the Flavian frontier policy was the change of distribution of the legions, and required steps were taken with the help of the governors of Moesia and Pannonia. Domitian reorganized Moesia into two provinces, giving each consular rank. This status gave them five legions, thereby ensuring sufficient reserves of military units in case of unexpected incursions from the tribes north of the Danube frontier (Lica 2000: 169).




Figure 4.9 Roman legions A.D. 100.

The most significant conflict of Domitian's reign was the armed confrontation with the Dacians. Similar to the conflicts that must have existed among the tribes of Southern Moravia, of which the Romans had little understanding, the Dacians may have had internal disagreements that caused the revival of Dacian power. Dacia at this stage was the most advanced state in Europe, outside the Mediterranean area, and a kingdom with vast military potential (Williams 1996:56). Domitian repelled the Dacian invasions into Moesia and Pannonia. Some diplomatic means were used at the time, but we do not have adequate primary evidence from ancient writers (Lica 2000: 171). Rome signed peace with the Dacians in 89, a diplomatic end to the savage conflict. Ancient primary sources are hostile to Domitian, and the peace treaty was considered disgraceful. (For specific examples, both Tacitus in *Agricola* 45.1. and Cassius Dio in *Epitomes of Book 67 and 68*, write with great hostility against Domitian). A new approach to the peace of Domitian is cautious, allowing for reconsideration of the treaty. Was the peace a victory for Decebalus and a grievous defeat for Rome (Lica 2000: 176)? At best, the verdict is that Domitian signed the peace to free himself for the conflict with the Marcomanni and the Quadi (Grant 1985: 64). Goodman (2012: 74) remains neutral on the role of the emperor but does say that Trajan embarked on the Dacian Wars because Rome was not secure with the treaties signed by Domitian. Lica (2000: 178) reminds the readers that most often the treaty has been analysed in modern times from the Dacian perspective, and

that there is no clear indication from ancient writers on the nature of the events surrounding the signing of the peace.

ὅτι ὁ Δομιτιανὸς ἠττηθεὶς ὑπὸ Μαρκομάνων καὶ φυγῶν ἔπεμψε διὰ ταχέων πρὸς τὸν Δεκέβαλον τὸν Δακῶν βασιλέα, καὶ ἐς σπονδὰς αὐτὸν ὑπηγάγετο, ὃς πολλάκις αἱ τήσαντι αὐτῷ πρότερον οὐκ ἔδεδώκει. (Dio Cass.: *HR* 7.7.2).

Domitian, having been defeated by the Marcomanni, took to flight, and hastily sending messages to Decebalus, king of the Dacians, induced him to make a truce, though he himself had hitherto refused to grant one in response to the frequent requests of Decebalus.

From the text it appears that Decebalus made several requests for peace but the details are not known. For comparisons we do know the feature of the Aetolian treaty with Rome, concluded in 189 B.C.

imperium maiestatemque populi Romani gens Aetolorum conseruato sine dolo malo; ne quem exercitum, qui aduersus socios amicosque eorum ducetur, per fines suos transire sinito, neue ulla ope iuuato; hostis eosdem habeto quos populus Romanus, armaque in eos fertto, bellumque pariter gerito; (Livy 38.11)

After long agitation the Aetolians finally succeeded in obtaining an agreement on the terms of peace. These were the conditions: “The people of the Aetolians shall uphold the sovereignty and dignity of the Roman people without fraud; they shall permit no army which is being led against the allies and friends of the Romans to cross their borders and shall aid such an army in no way; they shall regard as enemies the same persons who the Romans so regard, shall take up arms against them and make war upon them in company with the Romans;”

The three main points of the treaty were likewise imposed on the Dacians (Lica 2000: 185). The settlement of the frontiers of Dacia is not recorded by primary sources, and modern scholars still argue whether the kingdom was annexed by Domitian or not. Lica (2000: 188) maintains that in any case, the territory between the Danube and Carpathian mountains was under Roman control. The treaty conditions placed on the Dacians after the *deditio* forced the king to integrate his kingdom into the political and legal system of Rome, as one of the countless *reges socii* (Lica 2000: 190).

Trajan was determined to go further than Domitian’s compromise with Decebalus. He rejected the peaceful solution and restarted the war against the Dacians in two separate campaigns. By annexing Dacia, he achieved the last major Roman conquest

and added the province of Dacia to the empire (Grant 1985: 72). In the end of the grueling campaigns, Decebalus had to sue Trajan for peace.

τηνικαῦτα ὁ Δεκέβαλος πρέσβεις πέμψας τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν πιλοφόρων καὶ δι' αὐτῶν τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος δεηθείς, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐχ ἑτοίμως τῶν προσταχθέντων ἔσχε συνθέσθαι (Dio Cass. *HR* 68.8.)

Then Decebalus sent as envoys the noblest of the cap-wearers and through them besought the emperor; he was ready to agree without exception to every demand that had been made.

Scholars who study the peace of 102 analyse the treaty conditions with the view of the subsequent events that led to the transformation of Dacia into a Roman province. The most grievous of the conditions was the destruction of the cities and the loss of vast areas of the kingdom, which Trajan had already started to transform into a province. The installation of a Roman garrison at Sarmizegetusa, and Decebalus' lost control of his own foreign policy were major blows to the Dacian state (Lica 2000: 203). The exact legal definition of the peace treaty is difficult to define since Cassius Dio's account does not provide the complete text of the treaty and mentions only some of the provisions. The harsh conditions imposed by Trajan resemble the traditional manner in which *deditio* was presented and accepted. If this is taken as a basis, then Decebalus' legal status was that of a *socius* of Rome. In between the wars, Cassius Dio reports Decebalus acting in contravention to the treaty (Lica 2000: 208-10).

ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ Δεκέβαλος πολλὰ παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας ἀπηγγέλλετο αὐτῶπιοῦν, καὶ ὄπλα τε κατεσκευάζετο, καὶ τοὺς αὐτομολοῦντας ἐδέχετο, τὰ τε ἐρύματα ἐπεσκεύαζε, παρὰ τε τοὺς ἀστυγεῖτονας ἐπρεσβεύετο, καὶ τοῖς τάναντία οἱ φρονήσασι πρότερον ἔλυμαίνετο, καὶ τῶν Ἰαζύγων καὶ χώραν τινὰ ἀπετέμετο ἥν μετὰ ταῦτα ἀπαιτήσασιν αὐτοῖς Τραϊανὸς οὐκ ἀπέδωκεν' (68.10.3-4).

Inasmuch as Decebalus was reported to him to be acting contrary to the treaty in many ways, was collecting arms, receiving those who deserted, repairing the forts, sending envoys to his neighbours and injuring those who had previously differed with him, even going so far as to annex a portion of the territory of the Iazyges (which Trajan later would not give back to them when they asked for it).

The way Decebalus was treated after he accepted the *deditio* was a typical legal manifestation of the way the Romans treated the *externae gentes*, but there were significant features that reflected the importance of the peoples on the Danube frontier.

The massive numbers of captives taken by the Romans was recorded as 500,000 armed men, the kingdom was destroyed, and if the written evidence is taken literally, the situation in Dacia after the wars was what Lica (2000: 212) calls a ‘demographic catastrophe’. Initially it did not look as if Rome was embarking on a campaign of extermination, but Dacia’s case was exceptional. No other Roman emperors before Trajan attempted to cross the Danube to create a province beyond the natural frontier of the Danube. Only Trajan crossed the great river, and his *Provincia Dacia* lasted 165 years.

The lack of extensive literary sources for the Marcomannic territory prevents any research on the political aspects of the creation of the new province. But Dacia provided Marcus Aurelius with a legal precedent for annexation of the Marcomannic territory, a political and military model to duplicate. It has not been determined conclusively as yet if the emperor was in the process of creating a province out of the territories of the Marcomanni. Much scholarship has been devoted to this topic. For example Droberjar (2005: 18), Komoróczy (2008: 428) and (2009: 125), Kehne (2001: 298), Lica (2000: 213), Tejral (1993: 447) and (1994: 137), all consider the creation of the *Marcomannia* province a strong possibility.

The stage was set for putting in place binding treaties with the Germanic tribes. The negotiations could be carried out with either the emperor himself, or by his military representatives. The Mušov-Burgstall area with its large defense force was in the first stages of acting as the new political center for the new province.

F. The aftermath of the Marcomannic Wars

In 175 Avidius Cassius rebelled against Marcus Aurelius and proclaimed himself Roman emperor. Marcus Aurelius was recalled from the Danube frontier to the war in the east, and there he found ‘a more unruly people’ (quoted by Ammianus Marcellinus 72.6.5) than the Germani he fought in the first Marcomannic War. The emperor soon found out that the conflict in the east was short-lived, and his real concern were the Germani on his northern borders (Dobiáš 1964:211). The Roman troops were moved into their old garrisons on the Danube. Later, after the second Marcomannic War and three years of heavy fighting, Marcus Aurelius surely doubted if his controls of the restless

neighbours to the north were sufficient. Indeed, the answer seemed to be the annexation of the dangerous border lands to end the constant Germanic insurrections against Rome.

Commodus relinquished his father's desire to subdue the barbarians either by war or by annexation. Even today it is difficult to understand Commodus' motivation for the peace treaty or why, when the Romans won the Marcomannic Wars, they wished to stop their advance into the central Danube frontier (Oliva 1962: 300). One of the conditions of Commodus' peace treaty was returning the captives and the deserters. This fact surely means that during the last years of the wars the Marcomanni were not only defending their land, but were making some military advances against the Romans. Other treaty conditions mentioned in Chapter 2 were the supplies of grain, later excused, and a ban on assemblies except in the presence of a Roman representative (Oliva 1962: 302). The conditions and restrictions imposed on the tribes were grave, but in reality the conditions meant that the tribes returned to the same dependence on Rome as existed before the wars. It is not necessary to consider that the Germani tribes were utterly defeated. After all, the Romans withdrew from the territory after signing the treaty, and the restrictions were obviously not rigorously controlled. The Marcomanni were similarly defeated but not subjugated (Dobiáš 1964: 218).

The Marcomannic Wars were a crucial turning point in the long history of Romano-barbarian contact. Oliva writes (1962: 305) that the wars marked the start of an endless movement among the barbarian peoples, a movement that affected not only the area north of the frontier, but also within the empire. The economic situation of the empire deteriorated during the wars. Also, Oliva points out that the period of the wars was the **first** serious decline in Roman economic and social standing. The movement among the provincial populations and the vast invasions of the barbarian peoples brought in new powers and influences which in the end overthrew the Roman Empire itself (Oliva 1962: 306).

The Marcomannic Wars did not end the fighting on the frontier. Armed conflicts continued, and by the middle of the third century, the barbarians were invading the provinces south of the Danube and even Spain and Italy. In "the crisis of the third century", Rome was troubled internally, by barbarian and Persian invasions, and to compound the situation there was another serious economic crisis. The combination of

problems besetting Rome allowed the barbarians a better opportunity for incursions into Roman territories (James 2009: 33). The repercussions of the crisis were dire for ordinary Romans. The military had to be increased to protect the frontiers, and the taxes that supported the army rose accordingly. Roman citizens may have realized for the first time that their *imperium sine fine* was vulnerable after all. The empire was not expanding any longer, and Roman attitude to the barbarians on the borders had to change. The northern peoples were a threat to Rome.

Barbarian invasions continued in the fourth century. The invasions culminated in the sack of Rome in 410. In late fifth century there were vast disruptions in the internal structures of the empire, and the northern peoples started to settle on Roman territories after the Romans themselves evacuated it. The year 476 ended the Roman Empire in the west (James 2009: 35-76).

Chapter summary

In all parts of the empire, the Roman political motives for annexation were foremost the protection of the frontiers, removal of the threat of hostile populations, and acquisition of the territory's wealth. There is no proof that a client-kingdom relationship existed between Rome and the Marcomanni, but it is possible that a treaty had been signed to clarify the Marcomannic lands' status. The powerful Roman military machine sent its troops to the edges of the empire, to protect the borders and to set up camps for campaigns and incursions into enemy territory. The Mušov archaeology contains strong evidence of Roman military presence, the extent of trade across the frontier, and shows the Roman influence on the buildings of the Germani elite. The interaction between the two cultural groups was later profoundly affected by trade. This chapter has investigated the character of Roman interaction with its barbarian neighbours. Having examined the established Roman treatment of the *externae gentes*, the methods and treaties, it is possible to propose that Marcus Aurelius was in a position to annex the Marcomannic territory, and even to create a new province. The Roman administration required appropriate facilities to rule a region: the Mušov site presents a location suitable not only for a military center but also for a center to manage and administer a province. The continuous unrest on the *limes* after the Marcomannic Wars reveals that safeguarding the

frontier, and annexing the Germani, was a useful plan to protect the Roman Empire in the future.

Conclusion

When Marcus Aurelius was recalled to the war in the east in the 160s, he was not able to put aside the worries of the troublesome tribes in the north (Kovácz 2009: 239).

This fact was confirmed during his visit to Palestine, as recorded by Ammianus Marcellinus 72.6.5:

O Marcomanni, O Quadi, O Sarmatae, tandem alios vobis inquietores inveni;

O Marcomanni, O Quadi, O Sarmatians, at last I have found a people more unruly than you!

Marcus Aurelius' lament (even if it may be fictional, since it was recorded later by Ammianus in the fourth century) surely represents the contemporary Roman sentiment regarding the peoples north of the Danube. After years of heavy fighting during the first Marcomannic war, the existing controls put in place did not seem adequate. The problem could be solved only by annexation of the dangerous border lands, to put an end of constant insurrections on the frontier (Dobiáš 1964: 214).

In this work I have proposed that Marcus Aurelius was planning to create a new province in the land of the Marcomanni. As discussed in the above chapters, due to the losses of personnel during the Marcomannic Wars and as a result the simultaneous plague, Marcus Aurelius could not control the vast area settled by the Germanic tribes on his frontier. At the same time it was not possible to leave the northern bank of the Danube river without any Roman safeguard if Rome wished to repulse future Germanic invasions from *barbaricum*. The river proved a minor hindrance for the barbarian warriors. In order to consolidate the Roman conquests in the territories, peaceful relationships with the barbarians were of the most importance to the Romans. The numerous Roman installations and the evidence of the process of Romanisation on the Marcomanni territory support the thesis that the Romans intended to annex the region into the Roman Empire and create a new province called *Marcomannia*, as is attested by the primary sources (*SHA* Marc. 24.5 and 27.9).

As this thesis demonstrated, the Mušov site in Moravia was well suited to develop into a center to administer and orchestrate the occupation of the Marcomanni lands. In the research for the topic I have consulted Roman primary sources, modern scholarship on

the subject, and relied heavily on archaeological evidence. The verification of the annexation of the region, however, is still contentious. As mentioned in the introduction, the scholarship on the topic is polarized. For some academics, the question remains unanswered until archaeology, or some new literary find, confirms the facts. The creation of *Marcomannia* is not the only divisive topic in the field of frontier studies. Recently new research has been completed (Eck 2003) suggesting that there has been another pacified province bordering on the Danube river: the Augustan province *Germania*. Much remains to be learned about both of these provinces, and the confirmation of their actual existence is problematic, since the primary sources remain mostly silent on the matter.

In Chapter 1 I have examined the ancient sources that provide a historical background to the situation in the *barbaricum* in the second century. The information gathered explains the Roman reasons for choosing the Mušov installation as the military and administrative center of the region.

Chapter 2 presented the archaeological evidence of the structures and artifacts excavated in the Mušov area. Roman troops constructed military camps in Mušov, lived there, traded with the local population, and left permanent evidence of their presence. The size of the encampment, and the character of the structures built there support the thesis that the Romans successfully planned and executed their strategy: Mušov was to become the major center of the region.

Chapter 3 compared the various models for creation of a new province in the Danubian territories. The motivations compelling the annexations were always the same, and include frontier security, wealth acquisition, and trade and economic expansion. In the case of the lands of the Marcomanni, the prime motivation for annexation was the security of the Danubian frontier and the safeguarding of the trade routes. From all the examples considered, it is plausible that Mušov was at the first stage of the annexation and Romanisation process, and was designed to fulfill its role as an administrative base for the new province.

Chapter 4 investigated the Roman political motives for annexation, the character of the Roman dominance over the Germanic tribes, and commercial and military interactions and relationships with its barbarian neighbours. From the materials

assembled, it is possible to propose that the Mušov site presented a suitable location for the Roman military and civil administration of a new province.

Chapters 1, 3 and 4 provide historical background and comparisons to other territorial annexations, and Chapter 2 focuses on the Mušov archaeology. All the information gathered in the four chapters indicates that there was a pattern to the annexation of a non-Roman territory, and that the Romans followed predictable patterns in its implementation. No ancient primary sources give clear account of the creation of *Marcomannia*. The foundation of the argument of this work is the archaeology of the Mušov site. The material evidence from the Mušov site indicates that the settlement was a part of well-designed Roman plan integrating the Roman military and civilian administration. For a short period of three or four years, Mušov was of a great importance to the Roman Empire as a centre of a planned new province. The Roman military actions in Mušov were part of well prepared campaigns, which could put into effect military and political objectives with importance for the entire empire. Important political or catastrophic military events that occurred in other regions of the Roman Empire always resulted in abandonment of previous plans for the northern borders, due to rearrangement of financial or military resources. The Mušov site brings to light the steps taken to enforce Roman foreign policy in *barbaricum*, while at the same time it is possible to observe that Marcus Aurelius' intention to create the province were abandoned after his death due to the next emperor's (Commodus') change of policy for the region (Šedo 2000: 202).

The Romans placed their army units in all the provinces, but the greatest concentration was in the border provinces that divided the Romans from the barbarians. The real center of military and administrative power was around the emperor, but that was not the only one. There were other regional political centers in the provinces, where a large contingent of the Roman military was stationed, governed by senatorial governors (Eck 2012: 103). The role of the governor in the border provinces was above all to supervise the armies stationed in the province. Each representative of Rome had his own official residence, and as a representative of Rome, the structure had to be architecturally impressive and on a grand scale. The residences, *praetoria*, housed the governor and his entourage but also held the administrative offices (Eck 2012:189-93). The apsidal

building at Mušov displays all the marks of a high prestige structure and it is possible that the building was grand enough for the purpose of housing a governor and his retinue. Thus Mušov was distinguished by the style of the apsidal building as an important center.

The army was the foundation of the emperor's strength and had to be treated on all its levels with care and wisdom (Eck 2012: 104). The provision of appropriate housing was necessary. In Mušov the residential building with the *balneum* marked the residence as significant in the eyes of the inhabitants as well as visitors. The large foundation area of the *valetudinarium* is astonishing if it were not in a site designed to be permanent settlement. The placing of the workshops *intra muros* (Komoróczy, personal communication 2013), the substantial defensive system deployed in Mušov, and the material finds that are either Roman or showing strong Roman influence also support the thesis of an important administrative center.

According to the ancient sources, 40,000 men overwintered on the Marcomannic and Quadic territory. In the last phases of the war, the entire Mušov-Burgstall-Pasohlávky area of four square kilometers would have been able to hold a substantial number of the Roman military personnel. It is consequently feasible that some, or most, of the Roman troops were stationed at Mušov. If this is the case, there is a positive archaeological proof in Mušov that the Roman army stationed there was upholding Roman power on the territory of the intended new province (Šedo 2000: 194). Mušov was protected by defense ditches that ensured an undisturbed residence for military units but also possibly provided room for hostages and prisoners. The area may have protected a civilian population, merchants and tradesmen, along with all the animals necessary for the base. So the site's role could have been a military base as well as a substitute for a city, with all the civilian structure for public enterprise. (Šedo 2000:202).

I have proposed that Marcus Aurelius did intend to create *Marcomannia*. I have read the primary sources relevant to the subject and examined the forces that compelled the Roman Empire to annex territories on the frontier. I have studied the political and administrative structures of other provinces, and wealth of archaeological evidence from the site at Mušov. From the body of evidence assembled I have come to the conclusion that the site at Mušov was the most significant Roman military installation, of this time period, in the region. The strategic location on the three rivers granted the site access to

provisions and trade along the rivers, both south into the Roman Empire and north to the Baltic. All the facets of the area point to the ability of the Mušov site to house sufficient personnel to administer a long term Roman settlement. The site was designed to serve as a traditional military camp, and also had all the amenities to function as a civilian and administrative center for a new province. When Marcus Aurelius died, the plans for the annexation were not implemented. Commodus signed a peace treaty with the Germanic tribes and returned to Rome. The duration of the Roman presence in Mušov is very difficult to establish; it could be three or four years. The camp was abandoned at its early stages (Komoróczy, personal communication 2013), and the only time frame we have is the numismatic record which ends with coins from 180. In Mušov, we are privileged to witness the planning stages of a Roman occupation, the beginning process of construction of buildings suitable for a major center, and the abandonment of the greater plan of annexation.

This investigation of the Roman presence in southern Moravia brings together facts of the Roman process of previous annexation and occupation of non-Roman territories. Having contemplated all the information it is possible to come to a better understanding of what motivated the Romans to expand their empire and how the process was accomplished.

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Appendix A

Conversation with Mgs. Balász Komoróczy PhD
The Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
Detašované Pracoviště
Dolní Dunajovice, Czech Republic
March 20, 2013

Points raised, questions asked by Eva Bullard; conversation carried out in Czech, translation by EB.

Answers by Dr. Komoróczy in italics

1. Tejral/Šedo claim that the Mušov camp dates from the campaign against Maroboduus.

Tejral, Šedo, Bálek: the answer is more complicated. Tejral now doubts the former statement in view of more recent excavations and finds. 10 years ago the scholars thought that it was an Augustan camp; no direct details for dating were found. Today the opinion leans to no Augustan camp directly confirmed, but they do NOT rule out that they may find Augustan artefacts in the future.

At Mušov there are three archaeological stratigraphical layers, so really no exact dating is possible. The whole question of dating is more complex than previously thought- literary sources mention camps, but not precisely the one at Mušov.

Moroboduus 2006: Salač -Kehne, literary sources cannot be followed. Look up Kehne.

Dr. Komoróczy's opinion is that the camp is not Augustan, that the latest research points to the stratigraphy dating Mušov to the Marcomanni Wars.

2. Residential houses: no masonry found- post-hole structures only so far.

Anything new found?

Two phases of construction, enclosed unit

Masonry found in both buildings

3. Workshops OK, EB had no questions.

Workshops are most important for the thesis: on the limes workshops are NEVER within the camps, always extra muros! Inside, it is always in wartime.

Mušov not a classical camp, and had the possibility to grow into a base. The Romans were present only for 3-4 years. Be very careful with the phrasing, don't know how many years exactly! Because it is such a short time, there are no identifications. The camp is at the early, start phase, and very small.

4. Valetudinarium: excavation report published?

There is a poster from a limes conference on the Valetudinarium, but nothing is published. Not particular material finds, only the remains of the foundation of the walls: so nothing to publish. The entire area is now under the parking lot of the new Aqua Park.

Why was there no paper with the results published?

No exact dates for the hospital were available; the team did C14 dating, but there is too much intrusion in the sediments that interferes with the dating process, so precise dating not possible. Also the base was disturbed by earlier constructions in recent past.

5. Komoróczy 2008: 404: “the camp fortifications were not expressly of a short-term character”. Is this as far as you can commit for the status of the permanent camp for the legion?

“Temporary” expresses an idea only, not the structures! The camp was at this stage temporary, the structures were not meant to be. Unbaked bricks used, the camp and its structures are only in the first phase.

6. Komoróczy (2006). Was the gate built into the rampart?

Yes

7. Harbour. Nothing has been published on the harbour, but its location is marked on all the new maps of Mušov.

The area of the harbour is identified only by the presence of the gate on the east side of the fort: immediately beside the existing river bank. The modern river has slightly retreated, but its channels are still there. The gate stands on a very steep bank to the water. There is no other explanation to the position of the gate, it must be an entrance into the fort. Do not expect a permanent stone structure (as it is carved into both the column of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius), but possibly just few wooden posts and a pier for unloading cargo. The entry into the camp through the harbour is the only feasible explanation; the river was very navigable, accesible with flat bottom boats. Connections to trade: the bricks had to be brought from Carnuntum by water only, no other transportation mode makes sense.

8. Dating: terra sigillata, coins: nothing new?

Dating by these OK

9. Komoróczy 2006: 438: “Testimonies of the object of the internal buildings at Mušov, but also the fortifications and the collection of finds show that the Roman installation occurring here has been the most important in barbaricum at the time of MW. Conspicuously it was not conceived as a classical camp for the accommodation of large

military contingents, albeit a discovery of buildings serving such purpose cannot be ruled out in the future”.

Is Mušov not a camp for a legion?

Not a base to rule Marcomannia from?

There are unusual structures found at Mušov, and the fort could possibly be destined to be the base for the whole province. There is non-standard architecture found, Mušov is not just any ordinary military camp, the architecture exceeds simply a legionary camp. The camp could be interpreted as a camp to support traders and ‘scouts’/ reconnoiter personnel.

10. The case of Dacia, and the fact that the Romans did not occupy any previous indigenous settlements, but built on new ground, why was not the case in Moravia as well?

Tejral 1998: Roman camps were placed on existing Germanic settlements, but not always. Tejral considers it not ethnic cleansing but using strategic locations for Roman camps.

Appendix B

Romanisation

One of the recurring themes of research in the Roman provinces has centered on the processes of acculturation. Some questions connected to the topic concern the potential effects on economic and social life Roman conquest brought to the indigenous populations, the extent a central government in Rome influenced the settlements, the speed with which settlements equipped themselves with public buildings, and what impact was marked in area further away from the frontiers (Wilson and Creighton JRA 1999: 11). Acculturation or Romanisation is a term increasingly generating scholarly discussion. Romanisation is a term concerning all processes by which indigenous peoples were either aligned with, or incorporated into the Roman Empire (Mattingly JRA 1997: 8).

During the past decades, a shift has occurred in regarding the question of which of the two, the Romans or the indigenous people, was the greater force behind the Romanisation process. Originally, the active role was ascribed to the Roman authorities and the native people were thought to be passive receptors of the Roman cultural standards (Roymans 1996: 10).

Nineteenth century scholars interpreted Roman history through a theory of 'Defensive Imperialism'. Theodor Mommsen promoted this approach in his scholarly output. Mommsen did not invent Romanisation as a concept, the origins of the concept came as early as the Renaissance, but Mommsen and his contemporaries focused on the potential of other forms of data influencing the field of Roman history. They combined traditional literary evidence with material from numismatics and epigraphic sources. Other scholars, such as Francis J. Haverfield, followed Mommsen's principal approach, and introduced wider ranging ideas of archaeology into the study of the Roman Empire. Haverfield's research is considered by modern scholars to be based on poorly defined concepts of Roman imperialism, and its lasting relevance is being questioned (Freeman JRA 1997: 29-47).

Most accounts which examine Romanisation accept the idea of two relatively independent systems, one Roman and one indigenous. The accounts also accept that we understand the two systems separately, and that we can follow simply the transformation

of indigenous into Roman, as the indigenous society came into contact with the Roman culture (Barrett JRA 1997: 51).

Since the 1980s there is an increasing emphasis on the active role of the indigenous groups in the Romanisation process. An active interest is growing in research of the way non-Roman individuals and native groups interpreted Roman influences from the own cultural backgrounds, and how they used them to construct new identities (Roymans 1996:10).

Freeman (JRA 1997: 27-28) writes that as a manifestation of our times and post-imperial perspectives, the issue of Roman imperialism and the Romanisation of the non-Roman inhabitants of the empire have become crucial for historians and archaeologists. In modern scholarship two divergent opinions emerge. Some scholars work within the traditional vocabulary of imperialism and Romanisation, and some challenge the legitimacy of almost all aspects of Romanisation research. This opinion questions all the indications used to measure and characterise Romanisation.

The aim of this paper is not to scrutinize the debate of post-imperialist studies concerning Romanisation, or to question the idea of the Roman Empire as a construct, but simply to reflect on the influence of Roman culture on one society that came into contact with it.