“We Are All Jordan”: The Dynamic Definition of “We” in the Hashemite Kingdom (The Effects of Identity Precariousness on the Participation of Palestinian-Jordanians)

by

Ezra Karmel
BA, University of Victoria, 2009

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of History

© Ezra Karmel, 2014
University of Victoria

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author.
Supervisory Committee

“We Are All Jordan”: The Dynamic Definition of “We” in the Hashemite Kingdom
(The Effects of Identity Precariousness on the Participation of Palestinian-Jordanians)

by

Ezra Karmel
BA, University of Victoria, 2009

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Martin Bunton, Department of History
Supervisor

Dr. Gregory Blue, Department of History
Departmental Member
Abstract

This thesis analyses the *hirak* movements that emerged in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 2011. Amalgamating literature from studies of identity and defensive democratization, the thesis places two central questions into historical context: why did the *hirak* movements emerge in the rural tribal strongholds of the Hashemite monarchy before spreading into urban centers? And why did the founders of more urban and demographically heterogeneous *hirak* collectively agree in the nascent stages of their movements’ geneses to underrepresent the presence of Palestinian-Jordanians?
# Table of Contents

*Supervisory Committee* ........................................................................................................ ii  
*Abstract* ................................................................................................................................... iii  
*Table of Contents* ....................................................................................................................... iv  
*List of Illustrations* ...................................................................................................................... vi  
*Acknowledgements* ..................................................................................................................... vii  
*Note on Transliterations* ............................................................................................................ viii  
*Note on Sources* .......................................................................................................................... ix  

## Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1  
  Purpose of Study .............................................................................................................................. 1  
The Arc of Palestinian-Jordanian Participation: From Inclusion to Exclusion .................. 5  
Literature Review ............................................................................................................................. 8  
Using the Literature in the Post-Democratization, Post-Disengagement Context ........ 14  
Structure of Thesis ......................................................................................................................... 19  

### Chapter 1: The Hashemite Balancing Act Part I: Transjordan (1920-1948) ............ 21  
  Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 21  
Britain Searches for a Means of Indirectly Ruling Transjordan ........................................... 23  
Co-Opting the Tribes: The Politics of the Notables ................................................................. 28  
Developing the State before the Nation .................................................................................... 34  
Nation Building as a Byproduct of State Building ................................................................. 39  
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 45  

### Chapter 2: The Hashemite Balancing Act Part II: Jordan on the Two Banks (1948-1988) ................................................................................................................................................. 50  
  Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 50  
Expanding the Balancing Act ................................................................................................. 52  
Learning from Past Successes: “Creeping Annexation” ...................................................... 55  
Jordan: Between Iraq, a Hard Place, and Its Inhabitants ..................................................... 58  
Juridical Jordanization, Not Transjordanization ................................................................. 62  
Integration, But Not Representation ...................................................................................... 69  
The Shortcomings of Partial Integration .............................................................................. 72  
Hashemite Priorities: Downsizing the Balancing Act ........................................................... 76  
Al-Aks: Inverting Policies, Cutting the Kingdom in Half ..................................................... 80  
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 86  

### Chapter 3: From Rentierism to Defensive Democratization (1989-2012) ................. 87  
  Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 87  
The Crisis of Jordan’s Rentier Economy ............................................................................. 89  
Defensive Democratization ...................................................................................................... 97  
Controlling the Legislature ....................................................................................................... 100  
Reining in the Façade ............................................................................................................. 103  
2011: The Conflicts of Defensive Democratization ............................................................ 109  
The Power of the Rentier Elite ............................................................................................... 116  
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 118  

### Chapter 4: The Growing Precariousness of Palestinian-Jordanians ....................... 120
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 120
Latent East Bank Nationalism .................................................................................. 120
Divergent Interpretations of Disengagement .......................................................... 126
The Extension of “East Bank First” into Civil Society ........................................... 134
Fractured Frames .................................................................................................... 137
Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................... 144
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 148
## List of Illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illustration 1</td>
<td>Map of Transjordan</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustration 2</td>
<td>Map of North Tribes</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustration 3</td>
<td>Map of Center Tribes</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustration 4</td>
<td>Map of South Tribes</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Martin Bunton, who has not only guided me through the production of this thesis and shaped every single one of my thoughts on Middle East history, but has also endured my constant questions since I was an undergrad.

I would also like to thank Dr. Gregory Blue for his comments on the thesis and for having prepared me historiographically to write it. In addition, I want to thank Dr. Kristin Semmens, whose encouragement motivated me to start studying history and to stick with it.

Of course, I also have to thank the history department secretaries, particularly Heather Waterlander, without whom I, like the department, would be completely lost.

Throughout the writing process, I was also blessed by my fellowship at the Centre for Global Studies. Aside from furnishing me with solitude in which to write, the centre also provided me with a forum through which to learn what to write from my much more experienced colleagues. So, Jodie Walsh, J.P. Sapinski, and Astrid Pérez Piñán, thank you!
Note on Transliterations

Arabic used within this thesis has been transliterated according to a modified form of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (IJMES) system. *Ain* is marked by ‘, and *hamza* by ’. In contrast to the IJMES system, I omit under-dots and special diacritical marks for long vowels. For instance, this thesis uses “*hirak*” instead of “ʕirak”, and “*Ma’an*” instead of “Ma‘ān.” Moreover, in referring to names and places commonly used in English, I have used the standard English spellings. This is most conspicuous in my use of “*Hussein,*” “*Abdullah,*” and “*Feisal,*” for the Hashemite rulers rather than “*Hussayn,*” “*‘Abdullah,*” and “*Faisal.*” Similarly, I have not changed the transliterations that Arabic authors have chosen to use for their own names.
Note on Sources

In the spring of 2013 I went to Jordan to both begin research for this thesis and work for a Jordan-based civil society organization, Identity Center (*Merkaz Huwiyyah*). I had chosen Jordan because I intended to study Palestinian-Jordanian involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood. While researching the Brotherhood, however, my attention was diverted by *hirak*, a group of grassroots movements that emerged in 2011 in opposition to the Jordanian government. I serendipitously encountered new information about the movements while working at the Identity Center. As my research interests shifted towards *hirak*, I was encouraged to focus my attention on these movements by colleagues who were involved in the launch of *hirak*.

While I was working with the center, it produced the first detailed overview of the individual *hirak* movements. Access to this document, my colleagues, and the center’s archives provided me with invaluable resources for studying the movements. At the same time, my position with the center allowed me to talk not only with the center’s connections within the *hirak* movements, but also with a number of prominent Jordanian scholars and politicians, each of whom offered unique insights into many of the processes discussed within this thesis. Especially useful was a connection at the *Jordan Times/al Rai* who afforded me access to the newspapers’ archival materials, which proved essential for the construction of parts of the narrative within this thesis.

For both the documents I encountered in the archives of the Identity Center and *Jordan Times/al Rai*, I have attempted where possible to provide supplementary references that are both in English and digitally accessible. The few instances in which I
have had to cite primary sources that are unavailable either in English or digital versions are almost without exception derived from these two collections.
Introduction

Purpose of Study

As the events of the recent “Arab Awakening” swept across the Middle East and North Africa, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan witnessed its own phase of instability in the spring of 2011. Protests became commonplace in cities across the country, and demands for political reform tested the limits of the monarchy’s tolerance. The protests attracted substantial commentary and scholarly analysis, as numerous Jordanian and western observers posited that the kingdom might follow a trajectory similar to those of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen where the incumbent regimes were toppled. Most scholarly analysis of Jordan’s protest movements correctly noted that the Muslim Brotherhood (the most significant and long-standing opposition movement in the country) was not the instigator of the protests.¹ The better-informed analyses highlighted the role of the grassroots opposition movements that emerged in 2011, commonly referred to as hirak. The definition of “hirak” has not yet been solidified. It is used both to refer to the independent groups that formed, as well as to the movements as an amorphous collective. Despite the fact that various movements coalesced into a more or less united front at the peak of the protests in March 2011, it is largely incorrect to speak of a singular hirak opposition. To acknowledge the dynamic interconnection of hirak, as well as each group’s autonomy, this thesis will use “hirak movements,” despite its redundancy in Arabic, to refer to plural hirak.

Authors who acknowledged the central role of *hirak* movements in 2011 described the many constituent movements as being almost exclusively East Bank Jordanian. They emphasized that Jordanians of East Bank descent – those whose ancestors lived in the East Bank of Jordan at the time of the creation of the Transjordan Mandate following the First World War – were the movements’ prime movers. These authors argued that even though East Bankers have traditionally constituted the monarchy’s key pillar of support, economic marginalization during the last quarter century of neoliberal reforms has weakened their sense of loyalty to the monarchy.

Analyses of the 2011 protests also noted the relatively lower participation of Palestinian-Jordanians. This dearth of Palestinian-Jordanian involvement is conspicuous because Palestinian-Jordanians are widely regarded as the key oppositional demographic in the kingdom and they also account for more than half of Jordan’s citizens. The first substantial wave of Palestinians relocated east of the River Jordan as refugees of the 1948 War in Palestine. Since that time, Jordan’s territorial expansions and contractions have resulted in corresponding oscillations of the definition of Palestinian-Jordanians. Yet, despite its definitional dynamism, the term can usefully be employed to refer to legal residents of Jordan at any given point who either were born in Palestine or are of Palestinian descent.

---

The prevalent depiction of *hirak* as being East Bank movements devoid of Palestinian-Jordanian involvement is understandable because little attention has hitherto been given to a crucial dynamic within the movements: *Palestinian-Jordanians who participated in hirak movements were careful to minimize their role within them, even going so far as to purposefully represent the movements in which they participated as East Bank initiatives.*³ Scholarly publications have hitherto failed to bring attention to the fact that the founding members of several *hirak* movements (both East Bank and Palestinian-Jordanian members) decided that they would present their movements as East Bank Jordanian initiatives, so that the monarchy could not easily dismiss them as the machinations of traitorous Palestinian-Jordanians. The closest academic recognition of this phenomenon was made by Sarah Tobin, who interestingly notes that Palestinian-Jordanians only became active when “ethnic [East Bank] Jordanians were already protesting.”⁴

The failure to note the concealed participation of Palestinian-Jordanians is, in itself, not that significant because the movements’ members were, nonetheless, predominately East Bank Jordanian. However, by not acknowledging the clandestine participation of Palestinian-Jordanians, previous works have (quite logically) only focused on why East Bank Jordanians participated, not on why Palestinian-Jordanians could not explicitly do so. As a result, these studies have limited their analytical possibilities and obscured the role played by Palestinian-Jordanians.

---
³ In a recent study conducted by a Jordanian research centre, focus groups and interviews conducted with *hirak* participants revealed, “many of the Palestinian-Jordanian members of Hirak [movements], while struggling hand in hand with their East Bank brethren, agreed that they should try to present the Hirak [movements] as being East Bank movements.” See Identity Center, “Policy Paper: The 1988 Disengagement Regulations and Their Effects on Identity and Participation in Jordan,” February 2014. <<http://www.identity-center.org/en/node/273>>
Recognizing the way in which hirak movement founders intentionally chose to (mis)represent their movements, on the other hand, provides a more beneficial framework from which to work. Using it as a starting point allows not just the participation of East Bankers to be examined, but also the growing precariousness of Palestinian-Jordanian existence in the kingdom. Exploiting this information as a novel vantage point, this thesis seeks not so much to provide a more accurate examination of the hirak movements or the 2011 protests per se, but to expand upon previous works that examine the multilayered and changing avenues of political participation of Palestinian-Jordanians in the last quarter century.

In examining the historical processes that converged to necessitate hirak movements’ self-representation as being exclusively East Bank Jordanian, this thesis presents two key arguments. Firstly, and more intuitively, I argue that the difficulty for Palestinian-Jordanians to explicitly engage in any public forum of political activity in Jordan is a consequence of the increasingly precarious political landscape upon which Palestinian-Jordanians find themselves. Secondly, I maintain that this precariousness is a result of three factors: the monarchy’s identity policies, its tactics of defensive democratization, and the revoking of Palestinian-Jordanian citizenship. Together, these three factors have rendered Palestinian-Jordanians increasingly unable and unwilling to engage in political movements. The few Palestinian-Jordanians who do participate largely choose to be subsumed within movements that outwardly pursue East Bank Jordanian objectives.

Using this intentional self-(mis)representation as a point of departure, the demographic dynamics of the 2011 protests can be situated within larger processes of
structural change in Jordan. By peeling back the requisite layers of historical context, this thesis will show that both the anger that pushed East Bankers into the streets in 2011, together with the growing Palestinian-Jordanian unwillingness to participate alongside their East Bank brethren in the protests are functions of monarchical attempts to balance domestic and international challenges to its legitimacy. This difficult balancing act has forced the monarchy to make decisions that have provoked East Bank anger and marginalized Palestinian-Jordanians.

The Arc of Palestinian-Jordanian Participation: From Inclusion to Exclusion

Since its colonial genesis, Jordan has constituted a resource-barren and demographically heterogeneous kingdom located, as many have noted, “between Iraq and a hard place.”5 To survive its colonial foundations and develop as an independent nation despite its geographic and economic handicaps, Jordan’s Hashemite Monarchy has made decisions and concessions that have prioritized the state over the nation and external relations over internal concerns. These decisions have often been contrary to public opinion and negatively impacted specific demographics within the kingdom. The monarchy’s survival tactics have had a profoundly negative impact upon the Palestinian-Jordanian community and, in particular, its capacity to engage in political activity. Since the mass integration of Palestinians into Jordan in the late 1940s, their ability to

participate politically has continued to decline and their position as Jordanian citizens has
grown ever more tenuous. Despite the fact that Palestinians were initially incorporated
into the kingdom as equal citizens, their status since that time continued to decline,
reaching a low point in the last quarter century.

Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Transjordan were first granted legal
rights in Jordan in 1949, just before Transjordan’s annexation of the West Bank (which it
had seized during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War). In an attempt to consolidate its new
territorial acquisition and lay the foundation for integration between the two banks,
Jordan granted citizenship to Palestinians indigenous to the West Bank, Palestinians who
had fled what is now Israel to the West Bank, and Palestinians who moved directly to the
East Bank. While the economic situation of many Palestinians obliged them to remain
within refugee camps (although some also chose to do so out of fear that steps toward
assimilation would lead to the permanent loss of Palestine), others integrated themselves
into the fabric of Jordan’s socio-economic and political life. Integration was encouraged
by the Hashemite monarchy, which hoped to create a national identity and ethos that was
tied to being neither East Bank Jordanian nor Bedouin, but that emphasized a
synthesized, Arab identity.

Attempts to foster a unified Jordanian identity, however, failed to prevent the rise
of Palestinian antipathy toward Hashemite control of the West Bank; in fact, integration
efforts reinforced this antagonism and led to the emergence of a Palestinian-Jordanian

---

identity predicated upon opposition to Hashemite control of Palestine. Yearning to return to their homes, Palestinians resented Jordan’s attempts to create an expanded Jordanian state at the expense of a Palestinian state. This antipathy led to the rise of a number of Palestinian guerilla movements within Jordan that challenged the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy to speak on behalf of Palestinians living within the kingdom’s borders. The Palestinian-Jordanian resentment of the Hashemites grew significantly following the 1967 War; the wartime failure of the Arab armies of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt as well as Jordan’s loss of the West Bank to Israel severely exacerbated Palestinian discontent with the Hashemites (and Arab national leaders more generally).

With the loss of the West Bank to Israel, approximately 200,000 Palestinians from both the West Bank and present day Israel fled east across the Jordan. The migration of these refugees (some of them now twice refugees) was followed by the similar migration of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), whose resistance network in the West Bank had been destroyed by the war. Much to Hashemite chagrin, the PLO soon began to function as a virtual state within a state. Tensions between the Hashemites and the PLO soon emerged, exploding into a civil war in 1970 (commonly referred to by Palestinians as “Black September”) that engulfed the kingdom. The 1970 conflict proved to be a decisive turning point; it altered the relationship between Palestinian-Jordanians and East Bank Jordanians, damaged the Palestinian-Jordanians’ sense of belonging within the kingdom, and decreased their ability to engage in Jordanian political life.

---

Since 1970, Palestinian-Jordanians have witnessed a precipitous decline in their political and civil rights within the kingdom, no longer enjoying the rights to which they received legal and constitutional access in 1950. As a result, they no longer feel sufficiently secure to challenge the government, or even protest their declining position.

The degeneration of rights has consequently resulted in a deterioration of the political participation of Palestinian-Jordanians.

**Literature Review**

This decline in political participation has received significant academic attention, but existing research has largely focused on a single contributing factor: the monarchy’s exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from the public sector. The studies concerning Palestinian-Jordanian political participation have largely focused on the 1970 civil war as a turning point in intercommunal relations in the Hashemite Kingdom.\(^{13}\) Of the plethora of scholars who have examined this watershed event, Laurie Brand produced the most influential work on this subject with her 1995 essay entitled, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity.”\(^ {14}\) Brand argues that despite the fact that not all Palestinian-Jordanians supported the guerilla movements, (nor were East Bank Jordanians universally supportive of the monarchy), East Bank Jordanians began to


\(^{14}\) Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity.”
believe that Palestinian-Jordanians were not merely ungrateful for the refuge with which Jordan had provided them, but that they also represented potential traitors within the kingdom.

Brand argues that, at the same time as popular perception regarding Palestinian-Jordanians began to change dramatically, the Jordanian state abandoned its former hope of fostering a hybrid Jordanian nation. Before 1970, the monarchy focused on integrating both the Palestinian and Jordanian communities. This was done through an emphasis on four ideas: a universal connection with the monarchy, the kingdom’s commitment to “Arabism,” Jordan’s sacrifices for and continued commitment to Palestine, and the idea of Jordanians and Palestinians as members of the same family. However, after 1970, the monarchy began to focus on the development of an “East Bank first” trend. Brand posits that “[w]hether to placate [East Bank Jordanians], punish Palestinians, improve security, or some combination of the three, the government began to implement a policy of preferential recruitment of [East Bank Jordanians] into the bureaucracy.”

Expanding upon the growing demographic divide that Brand notes, a number of authors focus on the socio-economic consequences of this “East Bank first” policy, highlighting the subsequent dominance of East Bank Jordanians in the public sector and the consequent perception of a Palestinian-Jordanian monopolization of the private sector. An examination of this nature was most succinctly done by Yitzhak Reiter in his 2004 article, “The Palestinian-Jordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in

Jordan.” While Reiter questions the assertion that Palestinian-Jordanians control the private sector, he highlights, more importantly, the negative way in which Palestinian-Jordanians are viewed as a result of their economic dominance (real or otherwise). The widely-held East Bank Jordanian belief that an “immigrant” population has taken control of a significant part of the kingdom’s economy, whilst shouldering none of the country’s political and military burdens has, Reiter states, exacerbated inter-communal divides.

The literature on Palestinian-Jordanian exclusion from the public sector, of which Brand’s and Reiter’s works are representative, is important for understanding the inability of Palestinian-Jordanians to effectively engage in the political life of the kingdom. However, this literature generally considers only one contributing factor: the state’s explicit exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from employment in the public sector and the immediate effects of this ostracism. Examining only this systematic exclusion, however, is insufficient to fully explain the lack of Palestinian-Jordanian political participation, particularly within civil society.

Before examining Palestinian-Jordanian inactivity in civil society, it is first necessary to elucidate on the meaning of civil society itself and how it will be employed in this thesis. Civil society literature has exponentially expanded in the last two decades; yet an exact definition of the term remains elusive. This elusiveness, however, does not

---

18 Reiter also added to the discussion of Palestinian-Jordanian exclusion from the public sector with his 2002 article “Higher Education and Sociopolitical Transformation in Jordan,” in which he demonstrates the drastic transformation that occurred in Jordanian universities after 1970. While academic institutions in the kingdom had been dominated by Palestinian-Jordanians, preferential hiring and admissions procedures, Reiter argues, have since ensured that both the faculty and student body are increasingly being dominated by East Bank Jordanians. In fact, he shows that between the 1970s and the time of publication, the student population in universities consisting of Palestinian-Jordanians fell from 95% to less than 50%. Just as Palestinian-Jordanians have been forced into the private sector, Reiter notes that their exclusion from public universities has increasingly forced Palestinian-Jordanians to depend on costly private universities. See Reiter, “Higher Education and Sociopolitical Transformation in Jordan.”
represent an impediment, but rather a useful heuristic framework. In this, I agree with Gordon White’s assertion that “it may make more practical sense to adopt an approach [to civil society] that tries to come to terms with this breadth [of approaches to the concept] rather than defining it away.”

Appreciating the amorphous nature of hirak, it is beneficial to rely on a broad definition of civil society, which can then be used in contrast with other spheres of socio-politico activity, bearing in mind that (particularly within the Jordanian context) there is necessarily overlap between them.

This thesis will use the term civil society in the most inclusive manifestation possible, defining it as the associational space that mediates between the state and the family, inhabited by voluntary organizations that are (at least partially) independent from the state and work to ensure their rights or interests. The state, by contrast, is defined in this thesis as “the apparatus of administrative, judicial, legislative, and military organizations.” Lastly, political society will refer to the “groups and actors that mediate and channel the relationships between civil society and the state.” Using these working definitions, it becomes clear that the above mentioned works, which focus on the exclusion of Palestinians from the public sector, have addressed the Palestinian-Jordanian exclusion from the latter two spheres, but not the first. Expanding the analysis to include

---

22 White, “Civil Society, Democratization, and Development,” 12.
Palestinian-Jordanian inactivity in civil society (where hirak are located) requires the incorporation of another body of literature, which focuses on identity policies.

When the monarchy introduced exclusionary policies in the public sector following the 1970 civil war, it concurrently moved away from its previous focus on synthesized identity. Instead it sought to forge a new national identity rooted in invented East Bank Jordanian customs and traditions. The subsequent nation building campaigns that were launched were as influential as the exclusionary policies and have similarly retarded Palestinian-Jordanian participation. Yet, only a handful of works have thus far highlighted the importance of the reconstruction of national identity and its implications for the participation of Palestinian-Jordanians. Two works in particular require inclusion in this study, as they provide a beneficial foundation for understanding the relevance of transformed identity policies for issues of political participation.

In his 1999 *Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*, Adnan Abu-Odeh, a Jordanian politician and historian, argues that the exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from political life in the kingdom was a function of the creation of a new “Transjordanian” (East Bank) identity after 1970.\(^{24}\) Abu-Odeh notes that after the 1970 Civil War a latent East Bank nationalism emerged because of the government’s attempts to forge a new national identity that focused on the tribal heritage of Bedouins native to the East Bank. As a result, the relationship between Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians shifted greatly; the latter group increasingly considered themselves to be “genuine” Jordanians, whilst conceptualizing the former as mere guests within the kingdom.\(^{25}\)

\(^{24}\) Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom*, 74.

\(^{25}\) Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom*, 228.
The discussion of the process of “Bedouinization” of identity was expanded upon by Joseph Massad in his 2001 *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*. Like Abu-Odeh, Massad contends that the presence of Palestinian-Jordanians in the kingdom was central to the post-1970 emergence of a “Transjordanian” identity, because it provided an “other” against which a concept of being “Jordanian” could be formulated. However, locating commonality among the non-Palestinian-Jordanian segment of the population, Massad shows, was problematic. As Massad observes, Jordan was not founded upon a homogenous community. With the absence of unifying frames, such as shared histories or traditions, the Jordanian state was forced to utilize colonial generalizations for the genesis of a national identity.

The incorporation of Massad’s and Abu-Odeh’s ideas into discussions of Palestinian-Jordanians participation yields a more comprehensive view of the way in which the Palestinian-Jordanian population has been ostracized within Jordanian society. Massad and Abu-Odeh demonstrate that identity campaigns, along with the more blatant exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from the public sector, have led to a situation in which a newly manifested conception of Jordanian identity has increasingly defined what it is to be a “Jordanian.” However, Massad and Abu-Odeh do not discuss the importance of their conclusions within the political context that has emerged in Jordan in the past quarter century. By foregoing this contextualization, these works do not fully highlight the importance of identity in contemporary Jordanian politics. This exclusion prevents identity from being situated within the contemporary political milieu, and it is consequently unable to explain why identity has become so fundamental to political

---

rights and participation in Jordan. This is a crucial omission, for it is this context that explains why identity has replaced citizenship as the marker of one’s being “Jordanian.”

*Using the Literature in the Post-Democratization, Post-Disengagement Context*

In the same period as identity grew in importance, the monarchy pursued a much-applauded program of democratization and liberalization. This reform process has received extensive academic attention, much of which has focused on explaining the paradoxical decline in political rights that has occurred since the genesis of democratization. The most crucial of these works is Glenn E. Robinson’s succinct 1998 article “Defensive Democratization in Jordan” (which draws upon a number of preceding works, including Beverly Milton-Edwards, Samuel Huntington, Laurie Brand, Leonard C. Robinson, Betty Anderson, and Robert Springborg).27 Robinson examines the insecurity of Jordan’s continued existence as a rentier state (examined in chapters two and three) that resulted from regional economic changes in the late 1980s.

As a result of these shifts, Jordan was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The consequent compliance with subsidy cuts that obtaining IMF assistance required, led to the eruption of “Habbit Nisan,” or “the April Outburst” in 1989. While preceding studies suggested that these demonstrations pushed Jordan toward democratization, Robinson argues that “democratization” was merely a tactic that the

---

monarchy used to quell unrest and pre-empt further challenges to its legitimacy. Thus, rather than representing a process of genuine democratic concession, democratization programs were used by King Hussein to buttress his own position and those of prevailing power structures. The process (which is the focus of chapter three), reinforced the status quo by ensuring that long-standing patron-client relationships would endure through new mechanisms – such as elections – which have the appearance of being democratic.

The duplicity of the “democratization” process has left the entire Jordanian population vulnerable to the unchecked power of the state. Its repercussions, however, have had the most profound impact on Palestinian-Jordanians, who now feel marginalized. The state’s actions have convinced many Palestinian-Jordanians that their legal rights are no longer secure. This belief has been reinforced by actual citizenship revocations, a process which emerged as a result of Jordan’s decision to disengage from the West Bank in 1988.

In the midst of the first Palestinian Intifadah (uprising), which broke out in 1987, Jordan acted to secure its position within the East Bank. In July and August of 1988, Jordan severed all administrative and legal ties with the West Bank (of which it had already lost control more than two decades earlier in the 1967 War). In cutting ties with the West Bank, Jordan also revoked the citizenship of West Bank Jordanians. On July 31, 1.5 million Palestinian-Jordanians went from being Jordanian citizens to being stateless overnight. Despite having been assured by King Hussein that their citizenship was secure,

---

Palestinian-Jordanian inhabitants have continued to face seemingly random citizenship revocations.\(^30\)

As a result of the 1988 disengagement and continued sporadic revocations, Palestinian-Jordanians no longer believe that the possession of Jordanian citizenship is a guarantee of rights within the kingdom. In lieu of citizenship as the determiner of who is Jordanian, identity has dramatically grown in importance. The loyalty of Palestinian-Jordanians who have not appropriated the cultural customs and habits of Jordan – such as the local dialect and diet – is being questioned, regardless of their holding Jordanian passports. The ability of a Jordanian citizen to demonstrate an affinity with the cultural symbols that both Abu-Odeh and Massad discuss has become more important than their possession of a passport. As a result of the inversely increasing and decreasing importance of identity and citizenship respectively, the ability of Palestinian-Jordanians to engage in oppositional political activity has become limited. It is increasingly difficult for Palestinian-Jordanians to participate, as their participation could result in their being labeled traitors and their losing citizenship and rights within the kingdom.

Very little work has thus far drawn on the combined contributions of literature borrowed from studies of identity and defensive democratization within the context of weakening citizenship security. To some degree, the combined effects of these diverse influences were highlighted (though not explicitly) in Jillian Schwedler’s 2005 article,

“Cop Rock: Protest, Identity, and Dancing Riot Police in Jordan.” In her examination of a single political protest, Schwedler anecdotally shows how, in the absence of a secure basis for citizenship, manufactured traditions and imagined communities have become increasingly critical for defining Jordanianness.

Schwedler describes a protest that was provoked by the holding of the first Israeli trade fair in Jordan. When protestors congregated at the fair and questioned the loyalty of the security forces, accusing them of betraying Jordan to Israel, the forces responded by performing traditional Jordanian dances in an attempt to question just how Jordanian the mixed-ethnicity protesters were themselves. Schwedler’s narrative emphasizes that being Jordanian is no longer predicated upon citizenship or residence, but on a connection to the customs of a small segment of Jordanian society. In doing this, she highlights the problems faced by Palestinian-Jordanians in framing their own political movements. These issues of framing have become central to Palestinian-Jordanian participation in civil society and serve as an interesting means of examining the unique demographic composition of the 2011 protests.

The discussion of framing has become key for social movement theorists. Over the past thirty years theorists have become increasingly interested in how individuals within collective-action movements conceptualize themselves and their position within movements, the means by which they were seduced by the movement, and how those tools of seduction are created. A movement’s ability to project seductive self-representations, or frames, is fundamental to their ability to mobilize a mass movement. In their groundbreaking 1988 work on framing, Robert Benford and David Snow lay out

---

the three central tasks of framing: “diagnostic framing,” “prognostic framing,” and “motivation framing.” In order to attract supporters, a movement must be able to first identify a problem and apportion blame for it (diagnostic framing). The movement must then provide a means of addressing that problem (prognostic framing), and then also of motivating potential participants to support its program (motivational framing). To accomplish this, a movement must formulate a clear, straightforward “bumper sticker” formulation of its platform in a way that resonates with its potential supporters.

Schwedler’s examination of the dancing riot police very successfully demonstrates the growing importance of East Bank orientated “bumper stickers.” Yet, while Schwedler highlights the growing power disparity between East Bank and Palestinian-Jordanian frames, she does not situate this dynamic within its historical context. Due to the brevity of her article, Schwedler does not explain why Palestinian-Jordanians are increasingly unable to formulate effective frames. Such an explanation will require a much more extensive examination. It entails sifting through many decades of historical context, as any explanation must anchor the current situation within the instability that the Jordanian state inherited from its colonial gestation period.

Accordingly, this thesis seeks to provide the requisite background to explain the development of the political atmosphere Schwedler describes. It works to facilitate a better understanding of Palestinian-Jordanian participation in civil society (or lack thereof) by amalgamating literature from studies of identity and defensive

---


democratization within a framework of weakening citizenship security in Jordan.

Structure of Thesis

Chapter one focuses on two concurrent and interrelated mandate period processes that will provide a wider context for the thesis’s focus on post-1970 Jordan. It examines the precarious origins of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (1920-1948), emphasizing the monarchy’s consequent prioritization of state building over nation building. Subsequently, it highlights two key developments: 1) the foundations of the neopatrimonial structures which continue to influence modern power structures in the kingdom, and 2) the absence of concerted nation building programs in the mandate period. This foothold in the mandate context will help clarify later Hashemite endeavours to build a Jordanian identity.

Chapter two examines the Hashemite relationship with Palestinian-Jordanians throughout the era of the monarchy’s direct control over the West Bank (1948-1988). It demonstrates that throughout this forty-year period, the monarchy’s policies consistently sought to balance international and domestic concerns to achieve irredentist ambitions in Palestine, but continued to prioritize the East Bank and its inhabitants. To illustrate this prioritization, the chapter begins by highlighting the monarchy’s initial attempts to juridically integrate Palestinians into Jordanian society via a hybrid Jordanian identity, whilst simultaneously ensuring that they remained politically marginalized. It then examines the effects of the 1970 civil war and the 1987 Intifadah and the subsequent monarchical focus on consolidating its position east of the Jordan River and asserting an identity explicitly distinct from Palestine.
Chapter three assesses the much-heralded process of democratization that Jordan launched in 1989. I argue that despite apparent democratization efforts, the political position of most Palestinian-Jordanians has, in fact, declined since 1989. It also examines how the duplicitous democratization process has inadvertently resulted in a growing divide between East Bank Jordanians, the rentier elite, and the monarchy. This increasing polarity, it shows, is crucial for understanding why East Bank Jordanians took to the streets against the monarchy in 2011.

The fourth and final chapter examines the effects of both disengagement and the growth of East Bank and Palestinian-Jordanian identities since the civil war. It brings together discussions from the previous chapters to demonstrate that the convergence of defensive democratization, disengagement, and monarchical nation building programs has placed Palestinian-Jordanians in such a precarious position within the kingdom that they no longer feel sufficiently secure to engage publically in political activity.
Chapter 1: The Hashemite Balancing Act Part I: Transjordan (1920-1948)

Introduction

Between 1920 and 1946 Britain oversaw the political development of the mandate of Transjordan. As per the mandate system, which was laid out in Article 22 of the League of Nation’s Covenant, “advanced nations” were given tutelary responsibility for states “inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves.”\(^1\) Within this system – a handy veil for colonial ambitions in the Wilsonian era – the European powers took “responsibility” for their respective spheres of interest and influence within the Middle East region. As such, the territory of Transjordan, which lay between Britain’s main interests in the region, was first included in the Palestine Mandate.\(^2\) However, despite being administered under the terms of the Palestine Mandate, of which it technically remained a part, Transjordan developed very differently than the territory west of the River Jordan. The unique track along which Transjordan proceeded was largely a function of the influence of the Sharif of Mecca’s second son, Abdullah bin al-Hussein, through whom the British indirectly ruled the territory east of the River Jordan. More interested in using Transjordan as a launching pad for expansionist ambitions than he was in the territory itself, Abdullah concentrated on forging tribal alliances rather than Transjordanian nationalism.

---


\(^2\) Transjordan was officially included in the Palestine Mandate in 1921, but it was excluded from a number of the mandate’s conditions, particularly those relating to Zionism. See The League of Nations, “Mandate for Palestine, Together with a Note by the Secretary-General Relating to its Application to the Territory Known as Trans-Jordan Under the Provision of Article 25,” December 1922, in *Palestine and Transjordan Administration Reports 1918-1948, Vol. 1 1918-1924*, ed. Robert L. Jarman, (Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Group, 1995), 494-495.
Ever the pragmatist, Abdullah prioritized enhancing the capacities of state institutions (state building) over the development or structuring of a national identity (nation building). This prioritization resulted in two critical and interrelated consequences. Firstly, eager to reinforce his position in Transjordan and thereby satisfy his own and British interests in the country, Abdullah secured patron-client relationships with a number of powerful tribal leaders enclosed within the new boundaries. Abdullah chose to focus on the tribes – best defined in the (Trans)Jordanian context as a “group of people distinguished from other groups by notions of shared descent” – because they represented the key extant form of political organization in the territory. The relationships that Abdullah formed with tribal leaders became the structures upon which later state building developments were constructed, and are still reflected in the current political system.

Secondly, because Abdullah was always more interested in a greater Arab entity (first a union with Syria, and later with any neighbour that was willing) than he was in Transjordan itself, he did not seek to foster unity within the tribally divided territory. As with many national identities, a Transjordanian identity only emerged as a byproduct of his state building projects. Accordingly, the national consciousness that emerged was closely tied to the state’s key expressions of sovereignty and membership: law, government, and the military.

---

Britain Searches for a Means of Indirectly Ruling Transjordan

At the 1920 San Remo Conference, the Allied powers worked to formalize a new map of the post-Ottoman Middle East. Reflecting the precepts that were established in the British-French Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, France assumed responsibility for Lebanon and Syria, and Britain claimed Iraq and Palestine. No explicit mention of the land between Britain’s two claims was made, but the territory that came to be known as Transjordan was included in the 1922 Palestine Mandate and officially sanctioned by the League of Nations in 1923. While Britain had vital interests in its new holdings in Iraq and Palestine, the importance Britain vested in Transjordan was solely related to its strategic location between those bordering interests. Transjordan served as both a land link between the Red Sea and oil resources in Iraq and Britain’s eastern colonies, as well as a buffer for protecting the Suez Canal.

Although it was not directly interested in Transjordan, Britain refused to allow the development of a power vacuum, as that would have left the territory vulnerable to French influence from the north and Wahhabi expansionism from the Arabian Peninsula in the south. Both possibilities were equally unacceptable to Britain, as it was unwilling to tolerate a geographic division between its newly acquired holdings in Iraq and Palestine. At the same time, British officials also feared that without consolidated rule in Transjordan, the postwar unrest still prevalent in the territory could spread west across the River Jordan into Palestine. Yet, even though these concerns were vital to securing British interests, Britain preferred to rely upon an especially loose form of indirect rule.

---

Owing to its purely strategic interest in the territory and the strained condition of its post-war coffers, Britain was unable – and equally unwilling – to develop a more direct form of administration.\(^8\)

Between 1918 and 1920, Abdullah’s younger brother, Feisal bin al-Hussein, had administered the territory of Transjordan from Damascus. Feisal, the Sharif of Mecca’s third son, had played a key role in the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. After the British Army and Arab forces entered Damascus in 1918, Feisal established an Arab administration as part of General Edmund Allenby’s Occupied Enemy Territory Administration-East.\(^9\) Feisal’s influence extended from Damascus into Transjordan, where he was able to establish limited administrative control.

According to historian Yoav Alon, the Feisali period in Transjordan was quite successful in bringing order to the territory and laying the foundations for state development.\(^10\) Indeed, through the distribution of patronage, Feisal was even able to pacify several key tribes and secure the allegiance of their leaders.\(^11\) However, with France’s assumption of Mandatory control of Syria in 1920 and the subsequent ejection of Feisal, Damascene control over Transjordan declined.\(^12\) With the disappearance of Feisal, inter-tribal warfare and raiding in Transjordan quickly resumed. As a result,

---


British officials faced a dilemma in 1920, unsure of how best to safeguard British interests at minimal cost.¹³

In the wake of Feisal’s departure, Britain initially attempted to introduce a “system of local self-government” with the assistance of a few British officers.¹⁴ This brief experiment, which saw the establishment of local councils, proved unsuccessful. The British failed to secure the earnest cooperation of the major tribes and the administrative power of the local councils remained extremely confined.¹⁵ The limitations of the endeavor quickly convinced Britain that the requisite “raw materials of statehood” were absent in Transjordan.¹⁶

In November 1920, as Britain cast out for an alternative solution to Feisal and local councils, Abdullah fortuitously arrived in Ma’an in the south of Transjordan with a small Hijazi army. However, Abdullah expressed no desire to remain in Transjordan; instead Abdullah made it clear to the British that he planned to continue on to Damascus, which he intended to conquer and place under Hashemite rule once again.¹⁷ Although apprehensive of the British response to this mission, Abdullah declared himself to be a British ally and maintained that he had no intention of interfering in its administration.¹⁸

Despite Abdullah’s initial claims of disinterest in Transjordan, after he arrived in Ma’an he worked to reinforce his position by setting up his *diwan* (royal court).

---

Assuming the role of Hashemite prince, Abdullah brokered relations with local *shaykhs* (tribal leaders) over the course of the succeeding four months. In that time, he managed to secure the support of a number of key tribes, including the powerful and opposing Huwaytat and Bani Sakhr. Even though Britain remained critical of Abdullah’s establishment in Ma’an, it did not consider Abdullah and his small force’s incursion into this southern region to be a serious threat to Britain’s own positions in Karak and farther north. As a result, the British response to Abdullah’s encroachment was limited to diplomatic censures. Sensing no opposition to his preparations to move farther north, Abdullah proceeded to Amman, entering the city on March 2, 1921, and subsequently presented the British with a “slow motion *fait accompli*.”

Britain, hoping to avoid a forceful removal of Abdullah, decided that his seizure of power could be used to British advantage. For this, the timing of Abdullah’s move to Amman could not have been more perfect. Ten days after his *fait accompli*, the Cairo Conference was convened in order to review regional policy. At the conference, Winston Churchill – who chaired the meeting as Secretary of State for the Colonies – abandoned the previous focus on local councils and chose a new tack. It was decided that rather than fostering indirect rule though local councils, authority would instead be vested in a single ruler.

---

19 The creator the Arab Legion, Frederick Peake (also know as “Peake Pasha”) wrote an extensive overview of the history of the tribes of Transjordan, in which he explains many of the causes of inter-tribal relationships. *See* Frederick G. Peake, *A History of Transjordan and Its Tribes* (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1958).
After extensive negotiations regarding the terms of his appointment, Abdullah was given a six-month trial period in which to establish administrative authority over Transjordan. Churchill clearly hoped that Abdullah’s local prestige would enable him to forge stability in the uncharted territory. Abdullah reluctantly accepted Churchill’s offer after his own proposal that the Transjordanian territory be linked to Iraq or Palestine was rejected. With no other options and unwilling to return to the Hijaz, Abdullah agreed. His decision, however, was not solely based on desperation; it was also encouraged by promises that Churchill made during their negotiations. Churchill told Abdullah that his task was to make the territory “governable” and curtail anti-French activity along the Syrian border, the prevalence of which had hitherto been a major source of embarrassment for Britain. Churchill stated that if Abdullah succeeded in weakening anti-French sentiments in that period his chances of being appointed amir (ruler, lit. prince) in Damascus would be dramatically improved.

Political scientist Naseer Aruri argues that Abdullah did not correctly understand what Churchill was promising. Aruri maintains that Churchill merely meant that he would use his position to pressure France to resurrect an Arab government in Damascus under Abdullah’s authority. Abdullah, on the other hand, believed that Churchill had promised him control of Syria following six successful months in Transjordan. Based on the belief that his expansion into Syria was imminent, Abdullah accepted. It was

---

subsequently agreed that he would be provided with a monthly subsidy of £5,000, the assistance of a Palestine government representative, and a promise of British protection.

Perhaps because Abdullah’s rule of Transjordan represented his and Britain’s only viable options, Aruri argues that the arrangement was “mutually satisfactory.”\textsuperscript{29} For the British it both offered a good alternative to the failures of the previous local councils, and it presented (they believed) a means of fulfilling their wartime debt to the Sharif of Mecca. For Abdullah, it provided British protection for his position in Transjordan and a stable foundation for his desired advances into Syria. Abdullah was painfully aware of the tenuous foundation of his appointment.\textsuperscript{30} His eagerness to satisfy British interests, and thereby demonstrate to Britain his ability to rule Transjordan (and Syria), meant the ad hoc pragmatism that had led to his appointment was reflected in how he attempted to administer the territory.

\textit{Coopting the Tribes: The Politics of the Notables}

Appreciating the conditions under which he was granted authority, but not neglecting his own expansionist ambitions, Abdullah attempted to establish a system of governance that he believed most conducive to the fulfillment of these requirements. Consequently, Abdullah sought to build tribal alliances, as he considered the securing of their loyalty to be a crucial first step. This belief was predicated upon his own lack of a military force capable of coercion and the weakness of the administrative systems that he

\textsuperscript{29} Aruri, \textit{Jordan: A Study in Political Development}, 20; and Paris, \textit{Britain, the Hashemites, and Arab Rule 1920-1925}, 176.

had inherited. Delving into tribal politics, Abdullah fought to establish close personal ties with the *shaykhs*, particularly those of the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes (the Bedouin).

Of the approximate 225,000 inhabitants of Transjordan at the time of Abdullah’s arrival, forty-six percent, according to Mary Wilson, were nomadic, while the settled population (*hadari*) accounted for the other fifty-four percent. Even though the population was split almost evenly between the settled and nomadic segments of the population, Abdullah chose to focus almost exclusively on fostering relations with the latter. In this endeavour he proved very successful; exploiting his talents of interpersonal communication as well as his familiarity and comfort with Bedouin customs, Abdullah was able to forge connections with the Bedouin where British officials had hitherto proved unable.

Despite his own interpersonal abilities, Abdullah’s cooption of the tribes also depended on his provision of material incentives to tribal leaders. His British-financed civil list was used as a means of lavishing rewards upon the *shaykhs*. Abdullah’s purse alone, however, proved insufficient to secure adequate support, especially as his limited

---


32 Bedouin is derived from the Arabic word *badawi*, meaning nomad or wanderer. The term is related to *badiyyah*, which denotes a plain or desert. This paper will use term interchangeably with “nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes” to refer to the non-urban inhabitants of the desert. This is not, however, to suggest that there was a clear distinction between settled and nomadic populations in the territory. Indeed, despite the nomadic character of the Bedouin, many of them also cultivated areas that were “more or less fixed, during certain seasons of the year.” See Great Britain, “An Interim Report on the Civil Administration of Palestine During the Period 1st July, 1920-30th June, 1921,” 189.

33 Mary Wilson’s demographic characterization of Transjordan excludes the populations of Aqaba and Ma’an (which would bring the total population to approximately 300,000). She also necessarily points out that the division between the settled and nomadic populations “is not absolute.” See Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, 55.
finances were also being directed north to establish alliances in Syria.\textsuperscript{34} His funds, moreover, did not remain static, as they were subject to changing British interests and strategy in the colony (and the region).\textsuperscript{35} Forced to rely on other means of enticing the Transjordanian tribes to cooperate, Abdullah secured their loyalty with tax exemptions, land grants, and favourable outcomes in inter-tribal disputes.\textsuperscript{36} Through his distribution of these incentives and financial grants, he was able to build strong patron-client relationships with key \textit{shaykhs}, and thereby give them a stake in the maintenance of his rule in Transjordan.\textsuperscript{37}

Abdullah’s extensive concentration on the Bedouin tribes allowed him to succeed where the British had previously failed. In very short order, he managed, much to the satisfaction of the British, to establish order on Transjordan’s borders and protect eastern Palestine from raids. In effect, Abdullah relied on the tribes for the indirect rule that he was himself providing Britain; he used his bestowal of favours to make the Bedouin \textit{shaykhs} responsible for the actions of their own tribes. Because of his patronage of the \textit{shaykhs}, Abdullah was able to rely on their military force to maintain order among their own tribes. With the introduction of this tribal “collective responsibility,” Abdullah was able to further improve security and curtail raiding in the tribal areas.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{34} Robins, \textit{A History of Jordan}, 26.
\textsuperscript{35} The funds with which Abdullah was provided changed dramatically during the mandate period. Due to both political tensions between Abdullah and Britain, as well as administrative shortcomings, his subsidies and civil lists were frequently affected. The original sum of £5,000 per month was increased to £100,000 per annum by the mid-1920s and reached £2,000,000 per annum by the mid-1940s. The extent to which Abdullah controlled this sum had, however, declined by the latter period. See Great Britain, “Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the Administration Under Mandate of Palestine and Transjordan for the Year 1924,” 1925, in \textit{Palestine and Transjordan Administration Reports 1918-1948, Vol. 1 1918-1924}, ed. Robert L. Jarman, (Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Group, 1995), 494-495; and See Warwick Knowles, \textit{Jordan Since 1989: A Study in Political Economy} (London: I.B. Taurus, 2005), 24.
\textsuperscript{36} Aruri, \textit{Jordan: A Study in Political Development}, 28.
\textsuperscript{37} Musa Budeiri, “Poor Kid on the Bloc: The Importance of Being Jordan,” \textit{Die Welt des Islams} Vol. 36, No. 2 (July 1996): 244.
As the *shaykhs* began to rely upon Abdullah for the protection of their interests vis-à-vis the other tribes, they perpetuated a cycle that led to an ever growing concentration of power in Abdullah’s hands. Eventually the *shaykhs* were convinced of the need to “defer to [his] princely authority,” as those who resisted Abdullah’s authority were withheld favours.\(^{39}\) Consequently, the eventual need to secure such favours to maintain parity with rival tribes forced them to seek both *rapprochement* with Abdullah and integration into his patron-client system.

Similarly, in dealing with tribes that caused problems, Abdullah coopted their support by pardoning them, rather than imposing extensive punishments.\(^ {40}\) Instead of relying on coercive power, he preferred to neutralize and coopt the opposition. Although Abdullah was sometimes forced to depend on British military power to suppress larger tribal disturbances, it was he who, in the aftermath of these disturbances, mended relations and secured tribal allegiance.\(^ {41}\) Ultimately, Abdullah was able to transform his staunchest enemies into Hashemite loyalists.

Whilst Abdullah gained the loyalty of the tribes, he also managed to foster their participation in the state administration. As the state’s power continued to expand throughout the mandate period, Abdullah ensured that the *shaykhs* played an ever-growing role in its burgeoning institutions. Despite the growth of the state’s power in relation to the tribes’, and the state’s eventual monopolization of coercive power, Abdullah deemed indirect rule through the *shaykhs* expedient. He used them to help administer their respective tribal regions, not only helping to collect taxes, but also

maintaining law and order and the safety of agricultural communities. In fact, security became the primary means of tribal incorporation into the state.

Issues of security became particularly salient by the mid 1920s. Not only were there continued concerns regarding internal raiding, but there were increased complaints of cross border raiding to and from Palestine and the Arabian Peninsula. In response, the government formed the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF) in 1926 to assert greater control in the desert and border regions. In 1930, John Bagot Glubb, commonly known as “Glubb Pasha,” a British officer with experience dealing with the Iraqi Bedouin, was given command of the TJFF. Departing from his predecessor’s policies of using the settled population to police the Bedouin, Glubb set about enlisting the Bedouin into the ranks of the TJFF. His success in recruiting the Bedouin was aided by both the sense of honour that the Bedouin associated with the militaristic disposition of the TJFF, as well as the economic plight that had recently emerged among the Bedouin. Most importantly, however, the Bedouin were willing to join the force because they considered it preferable to police themselves than to be supervised by outsiders.

Glubb recruited from different tribes in Transjordan as well as from Bedouin tribes located outside its borders. He did this to make it abundantly clear that the force would undertake its work with or without each tribe’s participation; he told the resistant

---

tribes that if they did not enlist, he “would get the men from somewhere or other.” Consequently, a large number of the Transjordanian tribes sent prominent figures, including the sons of shaykhs, to join the force’s ranks. With such extensive Bedouin participation, the TJFF was able to put an end to raiding. Moreover, through his method of recruitment, Glubb further drew the tribes into the state.

Through Abdullah’s and Britain’s endeavours, state expansion in the mandate years proceeded quickly, and the incorporation of the Bedouin tribes advanced smoothly. Instead of bypassing the shaykhs, Abdullah transformed them from relatively autonomous leaders to state-society go-betweens. This process of incorporating the Bedouin into the state had begun during the latter years of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, while the Ottomans had managed to levy taxes as far south as Ma’an by the early twentieth century, the Bedouin shaykhs had retained significant autonomy. Under Abdullah, the process of integration continued, and the authority of shaykhs was further curtailed. However, the position of shaykhs as community leaders endured. In fact, their positions were reinforced by the regime’s efforts toward state building. For instance, the vast amount of land that the shaykhs informally held was secured (and further expanded) as a result of the state’s land reform initiatives. Thus, the shaykhs’ positions were entrenched in the new system, and the shaykhs were given yet further stake in the stability of the state – this time a fixed one.

49 Eugene L. Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 54-55, 187-217.
Abdullah’s rewarding the *shaykhs* and demonstrating lenience towards those that moved against him became the Hashemite *modus operandi*. Since Abdullah, the Hashemites have largely eschewed relying on coercive strategies to ensure support and stability, preferring instead to coopt their opponents through their extensive network of neopatrimonial relationships. ⁵¹ Indeed, the relationships that were formed with the *shaykhs* in this period not only outlived Abdullah, but they have also had profound implications for today’s current political system. As Alon notes, “[t]he mandate period laid solid foundations for the development of the Jordanian state and is one of the keys to understanding the state’s resilience ever since.” ⁵²

The state-tribe interdependence that was born in the mandate was reinforced in subsequent decades, growing so strong that it has since served to impede reform (as will be discussed in chapter three). ⁵³ During periods when the continued existence of these neopatrimonial relationships has been put in peril, the state has faced fierce attacks against its legitimacy from Jordanians still dependent on those relationships. ⁵⁴

*Developing the State before the Nation*

Abdullah’s focus on relations with nomadic tribal leaders helped him to quickly secure his authority in Transjordan, but it did little to forge national unity. Given the importance of tribe, clan, and family links amongst both the settled and nomadic populations of Transjordan, considerable attention was necessary if an integrated

---


Transjordanian identity was to be fostered. Abdullah, however, was largely uninterested in this development. Because Abdullah sought to realize a greater Arab entity, he saw no need to foster integration within the limited borders of Transjordan. This indifference toward a Transjordanian national identity became instantly evident with the creation of his first government.

Immediately following Abdullah’s agreement in 1921 to his first six months of authority in Transjordan, he removed the local councils that had been set up by Britain and formed a central government. Yet, as soon as Abdullah established the new government, he left its daily duties in the hands of its officials, as he was consumed with the buttressing of his position with the tribes. That Abdullah was more interested in building a tribal alliance (closely resembling the force raised during the Arab Revolt) than he was with the political development of Transjordan as an independent entity, highlighted his continued focus on expansion. Abdullah’s conception of Transjordan as the mere nucleus of an expanded domain was further underscored by the composition of his government.

Abdullah’s first “cabinet” was largely comprised of Arab nationalists who had come from Damascus, where they had worked in his brother’s administration. According to Wilson, the inclusion of these foreign Arab nationalists in Abdullah’s new government rendered his “ambitions to move on to Damascus” overtly manifest. The nationalists, drawn primarily from the Arab Istaqlal (Independence) party, were, like Abdullah, more interested in realizing their long-term Arab nationalist goals, than they

were in the daily administration of Transjordan. Both unconcerned with Transjordan as well as incapable of overcoming their urban (largely Damascene) backgrounds to understand local needs, the nationalists constituted an extremely ineffectual government authority.

The unchecked negligence of these nationalists inflicted its greatest negative impact on the settled population, as they had no intermediary to look out for their interests. The Bedouin, on the other hand, were spared the brunt of the nationalists’ ineptitude because Abdullah continually intervened on their behalf. In essence, Abdullah began to administer the Bedouin population directly to ensure that they were not angered by the actions of the new government. Thus, two almost separate systems of government emerged; Abdullah oversaw relations with the Bedouin tribes, whereas the central government controlled the settled population.\(^{59}\)

Despite the fact that Britain had given Abdullah widespread authority over internal affairs, and a substantial budget with which to conduct them, his and the nationalists’ disinterest in Transjordan itself yielded very little of the state development for which Britain hoped. Both Abdullah’s almost exclusive focus on building a tribal alliance and the nationalists’ pan-Arab focus were incompatible with the British desire to consolidate a stable state in Transjordan based on what Philip Robins refers to as a “classical Western, European model.”\(^{60}\) The disparity in aspirations for Transjordan created increasing friction that climaxed in 1924. Thereafter, the nationalists were forced out of the Transjordanian government, and Abdullah subsequently acquiesced to greater


British influence vis-à-vis the development of Transjordan. Accordingly, the participation of British officials in Transjordan became much more direct and comprehensive.

The 1924 crisis led to the departure of the non-Transjordanian Istaqlalists, but it did not curtail foreign Arab involvement in the Transjordan government. As Abdullah became increasingly involved in national politics after 1924, he presided over a government that was dominated by personalities rather than ideologies. These politicians were divided into two groups: shaykhs, whom, as mentioned above, Abdullah labored to bring into the administration and, more crucially, an external Arab elite drawn primarily from the British bureaucracy in Palestine. The latter group was brought over because of the relative lack of local administrative capacity. As such, this external elite filled the upper echelons of the more “technical departments of state.” Indeed, in the first three decades of Transjordan’s existence, not one prime minister was native; they instead came from the Hijaz, Syria, and Palestine. Owing to the inroads that these skilled outsiders began to lay in Transjordan, they secured deep roots within Transjordan’s state apparatus. In fact, many of the dominant families in contemporary Jordanian politics came to the country during this early period.

Adnan Abu-Odeh suggests that the predominance of foreigners in the upper echelons of government was a result of an intentional monarchical policy of

---

61 Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East*, 226.
marginalization. He asserts that Abdullah purposefully excluded Transjordanians from the highest posts in the government as a means of circumventing serious threats from “existing social subgroups.” While this fear likely played into his decision, Abdullah’s reliance on an external elite was also a further manifestation of his disinterest in Tranjordan itself. Seeking to expand his domain further across the Arab world, Abdullah saw no contradiction in his government’s officials being drawn from outside Transjordan. Indeed, he merely considered the educated, urbanite Arabs who had experience governing under the rule of law elsewhere in the region to be the most qualified candidates for the successful realization of the state development that he hoped to achieve.

With Abdullah’s post-1924 push toward state development and his reliance on extraterritorial technocrats, institutions the British considered fundamental to the development of a modern state began to emerge. After 1924, Transjordan started to witness the development of western political institutions, a steady migration to the capital, and the consolidation of borders. The latter was achieved through both border policing as well as the creation of passage and extradition treaties with neighbouring states. As a result of these developments, Abdullah was able to reduce illegal migration, smuggling, and raiding. While there continued to be extensive cross-border nomadic movement, the borders nonetheless constituted an important step in reinforcing the authority and legitimacy of the central state.

---

68 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom, 20.
69 Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development, 34.
70 Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, 94.
Abdullah, however, chose to not supplement his state building efforts with a simultaneous emphasis on nation building, as he was disinterested in Transjordan as an autonomous entity.\(^72\) In fact, he did not even want the name “Transjordan” to become associated with the institutions that emerged in the territory, for he did not want the development of a local identity to impede his use of Transjordan as the nucleus for his expanded Arab state.\(^73\) Thus, rather than referring to the territory as “Transjordan,” Abdullah preferred to call it the Arab East (al-Sharq al-‘Arabi). When a Transjordanian security force was created in 1923, its name did not include the word “Transjordan,” but was instead called the Arab Legion (al-Jaysh al-‘Arabi).

**Nation Building as a Byproduct of State Building**

When the borders of Transjordan were haphazardly drawn in the wake of the First World War, they did not reflect a preexisting political or administrative entity. Moreover, they enclosed populations that did not have a history of interconnection. While the northern, more settled and sedentary populations had previously looked further north to Damascus, the predominately Bedouin populations of the south was more closely connected to the Arabian peninsula.\(^74\) Yet, during the mandate period, no appreciable effort was devoted to overcoming these divides and forging a “Transjordanian” identity.

In lieu of a concerted effort to foster a national identity, a national consciousness instead emerged as an unintentional byproduct of state building in this period. This process is not unique; as Eric Hobsbawn argues, “nations do not make states and

---


nationalism, but the other way around.”  

Indeed, the institutions that Abdullah introduced to both solidify his position for the realization of a greater Arab state as well as pacify British concerns in Transjordan inadvertently yielded a structural foundation for defining what it meant to be “Transjordanian.” It was, in fact, the administrative institutions which, to paraphrase Benedict Anderson, allowed a new communal meaning to be imagined.76

As Transjordan solidified its borders (a protracted process) and codified its parameters for citizenship, definitions of “us” and “them” began to reflect legal formulations.77 This identity binary was informed by a new state-based “epistemology of space,” which increasingly replaced previous conceptions of territory.78 The introduction of British derived systems of spatial organization forced those living inside of the legally designated territory to function through its reorganized socio-economic and political landscape. Most crucially, inhabitants of Transjordan started to use the state’s newly defined boundaries to define their own identities. A communal consciousness consequently coalesced around both the state’s new boundaries as well as its definitions of membership. The introduction of citizenship laws forced a “dialectic of inclusion and exclusion” that transformed previous ideas of communal membership.79 As a result, these

77 In the late 1920s, Transjordan consolidated a definition of citizenship that was predicated upon both residence within the territory and descendance. See “Trans-Jordan Nationality Law of 1928,” United Nations, Laws Concerning Nationality (New York: 1954), 274. For an examination of the lengthy and complex process of solidifying Transjordan’s Syrian border, see V. M. Amadouny, “The Formation of the Transjordan-Syria Boundary, 1915-32,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 31, No. 3 (July 1995): 553-549.
juridical classifications elicited an additional conceptualization of community – one that was capable of traversing tribal divides.\(^80\)

This is not to say that the imposition of these laws and institutions erased previous identities or hitherto pervasive inter-tribal antagonism. On the contrary, rivalry between the tribes remained rampant; however, it started to be contested within a state-defined “political arena.”\(^81\) Much to Abdullah’s satisfaction, the tribes began to compete between one another for positions of importance in his embryonic state.\(^82\) The tribes realized that it was becoming difficult to function independently of Abdullah’s administration (and thus his goodwill and patronage) and still maintain parity with the other tribes.\(^83\) Therefore, as Abdullah’s position grew more established, and Transjordanians began to witness the material benefits of their country’s state building, a communal consciousness coalesced around the state’s new boundaries, its definitions of membership, and its institutions.\(^84\) Appreciating the growing importance and usefulness of the state, each tribe strove to secure key positions in its institutions because none was willing to be eclipsed by another tribe.\(^85\)

Just as inter-tribal rivalries began to be framed within a state delineated political space, so too did the platforms of political parties that emerged in the mandate period. Even parties that emerged with specifically anti-colonial programs pursued their goals through the colonially designated spatial limits of the nation state.\(^86\) Sami Zubaida notes

\(^{80}\) Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 58.
\(^{83}\) Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 68.
\(^{84}\) Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom*, 30.
\(^{86}\) Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 32.
that the most “national” of all socio-economic groups in a nascent nation-state are the politicians; their futures are tied to the development of the nation.  

Again, other identities did not dissipate, but they were negotiated and imagined through the nation-state. Consequently, the desire to compete for and protect state resources intensified. The increasing focus on the Transjordanian nation-state as the accepted political arena was highlighted by the growing popularity among the political parties of a new nationalist slogan, “Transjordan for the Transjordanians.” As conflicts between subgroups in the territory began to be contested through a state framework, resentment against both external administrative elite in the Transjordanian government as well as expatriates in its military also became pronounced. Ultimately, the government and military became the primary fora in which a new Transjordanian nationality could be expressed.

In *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*, the political scientist Joseph Massad expands upon the idea that military and legal structures played a key role in forming Jordanian identity. Yet, while Massad devotes considerable space to underscoring that this idea is unprecedented, he is merely highlighting the inherent interconnection between state and nation building. Massad is certainly correct in suggesting that the law and military exerted a key role in the development of nationalism in the mandate period; however, these institutions became important not because of a concerted effort by the regime as Massad suggests, but because they embodied key expressions of state sovereignty and membership. These institutions represented natural foci of identity development in Transjordan (as elsewhere), given both the lack of explicit

---

87 Zubaida, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation,” 211.
89 See Massad, *Colonial Effects*.
90 Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 145, 149, 162, 217.
nation building programs as well as the previously divided tribal society. In this way, Massad’s argument can be criticized in the same manner as Anderson critiques Ernest Gellner.\textsuperscript{91} Both Gellner and Massad focus so much on the malicious and self-conscious creation of identity that they imply that there are “true” nations that have not been imagined, and that are not the product of larger socio-cultural structures.\textsuperscript{92}

Abdullah did not seek to use membership in his government as a tool of national integration, but only of state development. Consequently, he filled the government’s offices with capable politicians from across the region. Ironically, the lack of Transjordanian representation in the government facilitated the development of a Transjordanian political consciousness; resentment materialized out of their exclusion from the government and the dominance of outside officials.\textsuperscript{93} This opposition first arose in response to the short-lived predominance of the Istaqlalists in the government. However, following their British-forced expulsion in the mid 1920s, the target of the demands shifted to the continued prevalence of Palestinian Arab administrators in the government (most of whom were borrowed from Britain’s colonial bureaucracy).\textsuperscript{94}

The increasing prevalence of anti-intervention sentiments proved to be a powerful stimulus for the development of a Transjordanian national awareness. Continued opposition to the Palestinian presence in the government led to an identification of Palestinians as the “other” against which Transjordanian nationalism could be defined.\textsuperscript{95} This dichotomy was reinforced by comparisons Transjordanians began to make in the 1920s between the quick development of their own country and the retardation of a

\textsuperscript{91} Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 15-19.
\textsuperscript{93} Abu-Odeh, \textit{Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom}, 22.
\textsuperscript{94} Robins, \textit{A History of Jordan}, 39.
\textsuperscript{95} Abu-Odeh, \textit{Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom}, 22-24.
similar process in Palestine. Witnessing the more impeded progress of state development next door, Transjordanians simultaneously sympathized with their Palestinian neighbours, but also sought to reinforce a legal and communal separation between the two populations. Indeed, the antithetical representation of Transjordanian and Palestinian that would become so crucial after 1970 (as discussed in the next chapter) traces its roots to this early development of a juridically based Transjordanian national consciousness in the late 1920s.

As with the government, the military proved to be a potent but unintended source of national identity formation in the mandate years. When Glubb Pasha brought the Bedouin into the TJFF and encouraged their dominance of the force’s ranks, he succeeded in imbuing them with a sense of duty to the nation. This he accomplished by discouraging specific tribal identities in his force. In his autobiography, Glubb writes, “[i]t was impossible to enlist and train any force in which tribal sentiment is permitted.” As such, he made “the renunciation of all tribal prejudice and devotion to the government service alone” a prerequisite for enlistment. In cobbling together the force, therefore, Glubb instilled the Bedouin with a national identity that they adopted in tandem with their extant tribal identities.

Massad argues that in this process of creating a unified, national identity within the force’s ranks, Glubb intentionally projected on to his soldiers a new conception of what it was to be Bedouin. Massad maintains that Glubb, informed by his own Western understanding of the Bedouin, replaced the hitherto heterogeneous Bedouin identities

---

96 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom, 30.
100 Massad, Colonial Effects, 145-150.
with an invented and homogenous “Bedouin” identity.\(^{101}\) However, while Massad depicts Glubb’s actions as a deliberate destruction of Bedouin customs for the creation of a new national identity, the homogenization (or, perhaps, reinvention) of Bedouin culture in this period, it instead represents an outcome of Glubb’s efforts to ensure discipline in his ranks. While a calculated process of “debedouinization” may have occurred in the post independence period (when the expanded Arab Legion first became “the main tool for national socialization”), an intentional scheme of this nature was not formulated during the mandate period.\(^{102}\) At this stage, Glubb sought to impose a unified identity in the force solely because he believed it to be a necessary component for building an effective and loyal force.

\textit{Conclusion}

Abdullah was allowed to take authority over Transjordan as an indirect way of ensuring the satisfaction of Britain’s desire to maintain stability in the important geostrategic territory. Believing that Transjordan represented a possible stepping-stone toward putting Damascus back under Hashemite rule, Abdullah agreed to govern the territory under British tutelage. He appreciated the need to assuage British concerns in Transjordan and, therefore, set out to consolidate control of the territory as efficiently as possible, whilst not negating his own interest in moving on to Damascus. For that reason, Abdullah sought first to pacify the tribes and establish a system of indirect, neopatrimonial rule that depended on the powerful nomadic \textit{shaykhs}. This strategy

\(^{101}\) For further analysis of the process by which western-informed ideas of local “tradition” were universally transposed upon heterogeneous indigenous populations, see James C. Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have failed} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); and David Washbrook, “Economic Depression and the Making of ‘Traditional’ Society in Colonial India 1820-1855,” in \textit{Transactions of the Royal Historical Society} \textit{6}\textsuperscript{th} ser., 3 (1993): 237-263.

allowed him to achieve stability in the hinterlands where the British had previously failed as well as to cobble together a tribal alliance capable of facilitating his expansionist ambitions. As the administration expanded under British-encouraged state building programs, Abdullah was able to bring the tribes into the Transjordanian state and provide them with a growing stake in his rule. In so doing, he founded a system of patron-client relationships that has remained intact into the present.

At the same time as Abdullah solidified the state and entrenched extant power structures, he did not devote equivalent focus to fostering a sense of nationalism or Transjordanian identity. Interested only in Transjordan as a piece of his greater Arab state, Abdullah emphasized a pan-Arab rather than a Transjordanian nationalism. With an absence of nation building endeavours, a Transjordanian consciousness only emerged as an unintended byproduct of Abdullah’s impressive state building achievements. Nationalism materialized in spaces where a Transjordanian community was provided with a means of defining itself. Transjordan’s laws were seized upon as they provided a formalization of Transjordan as an independent entity. That is, the laws provided a means of identifying the “them” or the “other” as those people who were not legally defined as “Transjordanians.” Needing to express such definitions, the main fora available for vocalizing these formulations of sovereignty and membership became focal points of national identity. Thus, the government and the army became fundamental symbols of Transjordan and Transjordanians – symbols that have endured and continue to act as means of exclusion in present day Jordan.

The favouring of state building over nation building has led Alon to argue that Transjordan lacked a nation as it entered independence in the mid twentieth century:
On the eve of independence, Transjordan had acquired many of the traits of a modern nation (although notably without a ‘nation’) while retaining many aspects of the tribal polity that existed before.

Yet, Jordan was not born as a nation state without a nation. Limited national consciousness was already emerging. However, because it was not molded by intentional nation building initiatives, a national identity only formed in two ways: firstly, as an effect of a growing conformity with the legal system, and thus, legal definitions of Transjordan and Transjordanians, and secondly as a consequence of the Bedouin identity that Glubb forged within the TJFF to maintain discipline. While the former proved central to formulations of identity in the immediate post-colonial era and the latter lay dormant, the importance of the two slowly began to reverse following the 1970 Civil War.

Illustration 1 (Transjordan)\textsuperscript{104}

Illustration 2 (North Tribes)

\textsuperscript{104} Map 1 from Alon, \textit{The Making of Jordan}, XIII. Maps 2, 3, 4 from Peake, \textit{A History of Transjordan and Its Tribes}, 251-253. Please note that the scales of maps are incorrect due their being resized.
Illustration 3 (Center Tribes)

Illustration 4 (South Tribes)

Introduction

[Internally] the Transjordanian house had been put in order, to produce what remained until 1948 a cosy ‘happy, little country’, as it was described in those days. All but Abdullah’s harshest critics were prepared to concede that it was largely the influence of the emir’s personality that had made it so.¹

Although Kamal Salibi’s epitaph for the Transjordan Mandate may be hyperbolic, the position in which Abdullah placed the country through the acquisition of Palestinian territory across the River Jordan in 1948 would complicate its situation immensely. Laying aside the inherent and immediate challenges of integrating a new, more educated, urban, and politically conscious population that was twice as numerous as the Transjordanian population, Abdullah’s war-time expansion also placed him at the epicenter of regional confrontation.² In this particular context, Abdullah had to carefully tiptoe around regional and international concerns in his attempts to incorporate the Palestinian population into his expanded kingdom.

Despite Abdullah’s desire to convert his post-war, de facto control of the new land into a permanent Hashemite territorial holding, regional pressure prevented him from explicitly engaging in the resettlement or assimilation of the occupied population. As a result, his initial attempts to integrate the Palestinian population into the socio-economic fabric of Jordanian³ society had to proceed behind a visage of ephemerality.

---

³ The country’s change in name to “the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan” was implemented incrementally in the late 1940s. Because of the gradual and inexact nature of the name change, this chapter heuristically uses
Subsequent relations with the Palestinian population were guided by similar constraints. These limitations slowed Hashemite endeavours first to integrate the West Bank Palestinians and then later to eliminate Palestinian nationalist movements.

Following his advances into Palestine, Abdullah attempted to win the loyalty of the occupied territory’s population by extending legal and political rights to them. Abdullah hoped that with these bestowals he could gain internal support for a union between the east and west banks of the Jordan and also unite the two populations through a single national identity derived from Hashemite, Islamic, and pan-Arab referents. However, his efforts were impeded by the constraints of the numerous international interests vis-à-vis the Palestinian question. Consequently, Abdullah was unable to effectively reorient the identities of all of Jordan’s inhabitants. As such, he also failed to prevent the growth of Palestinian nationalist movements in the kingdom. When tension with these movements led to a civil war in 1970, the monarchy reassessed Jordan’s relationship with the West Bank. Just as the Hashemites had pragmatically settled for Transjordan at the cost of their greater Arab aspirations, so too did they now signal their willingness to abdicate their dynastic ambition of a united kingdom on both banks of the Jordan River for the sake of stability in the East Bank. Thus, when instability in the West Bank threatened Hashemite control of the East Bank in 1987, the monarchy retreated back across the Jordan, severing ties to safeguard the core of its kingdom.

“Jordan” to refer to the country after it seized the West Bank of the Jordan River in 1948, as it only entered standard use at that time. The evolution of the name, as well as the reasons for it, is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.
Expanding the Balancing Act

By the end of the Second World War, Transjordan was one of Britain’s closest regional allies. Abdullah had not only proven his and Transjordan’s stability and loyalty by the war’s outbreak, but the Arab Legion had also performed admirably during the war itself.4 While Britain retained some reservations that Transjordanian independence could lead to similar demands in neighbouring Palestine, Transjordan’s continued status as a colony was becoming a regional anomaly.5 Indeed, with growing regional pressure for decolonization, Britain’s continued hold over Transjordan was, as Philip Robins argues, inadvertently hindering the development of an important British ally.6 With these considerations in mind, and the dawning realization that it no longer possessed the power to remain a hegemonic power in the Middle East, Britain granted Transjordan independence in 1946.

Transjordan’s independence, therefore, was a testament not only to changing international power relations, but also to Abdullah’s personal success in navigating through competing demands during the mandate to secure his position with both Britain and the indigenous population of the nascent Transjordanian state. By the time of independence, Abdullah had successfully garnered widespread support (or at least acceptance) amongst the indigenous population whilst maintaining strong relations with the United Kingdom.7 But having succeeded in maintaining this balancing act and

---

4 During the Second World War, the Arab Legion under Glubb’s command was expanded and assigned guard duties throughout the Middle East for important British installations in the theatre, particularly oil pipelines, communication centers, and transport hubs. See Panayiotis Jerasimof Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957 (London: Frank Cass, 1967), 73.
consolidating his position in Transjordan, Abdullah immediately placed himself in a situation that required a new, more intricate balancing act.

Within a year of the Second World War’s conclusion, Abdullah was confronted by the increasing likelihood of the genesis of a Jewish state. While he feared the implications of the new state’s establishment, Abdullah was more concerned with its leading to the birth of a parallel Palestinian Arab state. Throughout the mandate period, Abdullah had remained ever mindful that the creation of a Palestinian state would not only inhibit his own irredentist ambitions, but also threaten his existing position east of the River Jordan. Abdullah concluded that the preclusion of Palestinian statehood could best be accomplished by cooperating with the emerging Israeli state, as both Israel and Transjordan considered the creation of a Palestinian state to be an existential threat. As the Jews in Palestine inched toward the establishment of a new state in 1947, therefore, Abdullah entered into negotiations with the Zionist leadership. He did so with two aims in mind: firstly, to apportion between him and the Jews the land that the United Nations had allotted to the Palestinian Arabs, and, secondly, to avoid Transjordanian-Israeli clashes in the event of a regional war following Israeli independence.

Despite these negotiations and his desire to avoid hostilities with Israel, Abdullah was also cognizant of the consequences of his being labeled a Zionist supporter. Were the Arab leaders or people to consider him a friend of the Jews, his regional and domestic

---

10 For a more comprehensive discussion of King Abdullah’s negotiations with Israel, see Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
legitimacy would be destroyed. Accordingly, as tensions began to rise in the Middle East in 1947 and 1948, Abdullah felt obliged to join the united Arab front against the burgeoning Israeli state. While Abdullah swore to Israel that he was sincere in his earlier promises to not enter the war against it, he told the Israeli leaders that the new situation had put him in an impossible situation. He lamented, “I am one among five. I have no alternative [but to declare war against Israel], and I cannot act otherwise.”

Israel implicitly understood Abdullah’s dilemma; he did not want war, but he had little alternative to publicly declaring it. This tacit understanding guided the course of the subsequent conflict in 1948. Transjordan largely limited itself to a defensive war in the areas west of the River Jordan adjacent to its borders, which had been allotted to the Palestinian Arabs in the United Nation’s partition plan. Even with Abdullah’s limited aggression with Israel, however, his maneuvers west of the Jordan put him in control of a large piece of the eastern Palestinian territory (what would become known as the West Bank).

Abdullah’s simultaneous pre-war negotiations with Israel and contradictory alliance with the Arab states against Israel personifies a Hashemite survival tactic that would remain critical to its legitimacy until 1970. The Hashemites approached their relationship with Israel via what Clinton Bailey has termed “moderate hostility.” That is, Jordan restrained its aggression against Israel to prevent being destroyed by the Jewish state but it remained hostile to Israel to prevent further Palestinian and Arab attacks.

12 Melman and Raviv, Behind the Uprising, 36-37.
15 Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 4-5.
against its own legitimacy. In this way, Transjordan pursued equilibrium between its internal legitimacy and external viability. Moderate hostility with Israel, however, represented but one aspect of the Hashemites’ post-expansion balancing act.

The steps that King Abdullah subsequently took to consolidate his position west of the Jordan were overwhelmingly guided by his attempts to reconcile the divergent demands of the East Bank population, the West Bank population, the Arab states, the Western powers, and Israel itself. As a result, the domestic policies of Abdullah were constrained not only by public opinion in Jordan, but also by the dynamic atmosphere of international politics. The same constraints limited King Hussein, who ascended the Hashemite throne in 1953 (following Abdullah’s death in 1951, a brief reign by Hussein’s father Talal, and a short interregnum period). Despite the fact that historians endlessly remind readers that Hussein was a more brazen and impulsive leader than his grandfather, he was nonetheless bound by the same domestic-international tug of war. It was this persistent balancing act that largely accounts for the seemingly contradictory policies that the Hashemites introduced throughout their period of rule in the West Bank. An inability to maintain this balancing act eventually forced Hussein to retreat from the West Bank in 1988.

*Learning from Past Successes: “Creeping Annexation”*

Abdullah’s advances during the 1948 War placed Transjordan in so precarious a situation that his primary concern following expansion was not the welfare or interests of his citizens (Transjordanian or Palestinian), but the continued existence of his state.\(^\text{16}\) Abdullah was more concerned with securing international legitimacy for his territorial

\(^{16}\) Bailey, *Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge*, 18.
advances than his legitimacy in the eyes of the occupied population. For this very reason, the Arab world was suspicious of his motivations in the territory, believing him willing to martyr Palestinian nationalism and statehood for the sake of his expanded state.\footnote{Haddad and Hardy, “Jordan’s Alliance with Israel,” 38.}

Accordingly, at the same time as Abdullah started to push for Palestinian and European acceptance of his position in the West Bank, the Arab League – with monarchical Egypt at its helm – created the Gaza-based All Palestine Government (APG) to oppose Abdullah’s expansionary efforts.\footnote{Shaul Mishal, The PLO under Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 27.}

With the objections of the Arab states preventing him from annexing the West Bank outright (as he had previously arranged with Israel), Abdullah employed his tried and tested approach to territorial consolidation. Just as he had presented Britain with his 1921 \textit{fait accompli} in Amman and then slowly reinforced his position through a piecemeal process of internal cooption and external diplomacy, he now followed a very similar course west of the Jordan. Pursuing what Avi Plascov calls “creeping annexation,” Abdullah embarked on a gradual politico-economic transformation of the West Bank, attempting to secure internal support and further reinforce his position.\footnote{Avi Plascov, The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948-1957 (London: Frank Cass, 1981), ch. 1.} As with the Transjordanian tribes in the mandate period, Abdullah buttressed his position in the West Bank and undercut that of the APG by strategically empowering his limited supporters and either coopting or marginalizing the opposition.

Whilst the Arab leaders attempted to use the APG to contest Abdullah’s claim in the West Bank, Abdullah sought to bypass the Arab League’s objections by demonstrating to the international community that he enjoyed the uncoerced support of
the West Bank population. To accomplish this, he concentrated on bolstering his position west of the Jordan and instilling a local belief in the inevitability of his annexation and control.\textsuperscript{20} In this enterprise he was quite effective, convincing much of the local population to support his control of the territory.\textsuperscript{21} This backing, however, was in large part a function of the dearth of extant political and economic structures in the territory following Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine.\textsuperscript{22} The Arab Palestinians, unlike their Jewish counterparts, did not have their own developed administrative mechanisms. Moreover, what the Arabs had established was largely destroyed as a result of the 1936-1939 revolt and the 1947-1948 civil war. Consequently, they did not possess the requisite economic or political power to provide a viable alternative to Abdullah.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, Abdullah seemed to be the only willing personality capable of protecting the West Bank from Jewish occupation.\textsuperscript{24} As a result, the West Bank population began to accept, albeit unenthusiastically, that Abdullah represented their only practical choice.\textsuperscript{25}

In particular, Abdullah successfully gained the support of many of the West Bank’s notables. As with his cooption of the Transjordanian tribes in the mandate period, Abdullah provided incentives to the West Bank notables. Through his endowment of material rewards and positions in the embryonic West Bank administration, Abdullah was able to both secure the support of his local followers as well as coopt many of his opponents.\textsuperscript{26} While Abdullah’s rivals, such as Hajj Amin al-Husseini, frightened the West

\textsuperscript{20} Mary C. Wilson, \textit{King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 190.
\textsuperscript{21} Plascov, \textit{The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan}, 26.
\textsuperscript{22} Faddah, \textit{The Middle East in Transition}, 20.
\textsuperscript{23} Mishal, \textit{West Bank/East Bank}, 18-22.
\textsuperscript{24} Faddah, \textit{The Middle East in Transition}, 20.
\textsuperscript{25} Plascov, \textit{The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan}, 13.
\textsuperscript{26} In this manner, Abdullah even attempted, albeit fruitlessly, to buy the support of his archrival, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem. See Salibi, \textit{The Modern History of Jordan}, 164.
Bank elite with threatened inversions of extant power structures, Abdullah garnered elite support by ensuring the entrenchment of elite privilege.\(^{27}\)

Amongst both the West Bank’s general population and elite, therefore, Abdullah succeeded in garnering widespread support not because he was considered the ideal candidate, but because he represented the best of the few available options. While many West Bankers may not have liked the situation, they realized the expedience of Abdullah’s continued presence west of the Jordan. With growing West Banker acceptance of Abdullah’s authority, and near unanimous Western endorsements for his expanded position, the Arab League eventually compromised, extending *de facto*, but not *de jure*, recognition of his annexation in the spring of 1950.\(^{28}\)

*Jordan: Between Iraq, a Hard Place, and Its Inhabitants*

Having secured at least *de facto* recognition for his expansion, Abdullah faced an even greater obstacle: integrating the newly annexed population into Transjordanian society. While Abdullah recognized that the survival and stability of his expanded kingdom depended on the success of his being able to integrate the West Bank population, he was also aware that there was little Palestinian or international support for protracted Jordanian rule west of the River Jordan. Indeed, both the Arab states and most of the West Bank population insisted that Hashemite control could only be temporary.\(^{29}\) Accordingly, in the post-annexation period Abdullah strove to demonstrate that he was attempting neither to permanently resettle Palestinians, nor to strip them of their rights of

---


\(^{28}\) This concession, however, was also a *quid quo pro* for Abdullah’s suspension of peace negotiations with Israel. In return for Abdullah’s suspension of negotiation, the League “in an unusual display of collective restraint,” decided to ease up pressure on Abdullah’s annexation. See Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan*, 552-556.

\(^{29}\) Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank*, 27.
return or statehood. As such, Abdullah endeavoured to perpetuate the international refugee status for the kingdom’s new Palestinian residents, as this both helped to pacify the Palestinian population and Arab states.

This outward demonstration of support for a Palestinian state also afforded Transjordan greater access to international funds in the name of refugee relief aid. Aid was a particularly pressing issue for Abdullah, as Transjordan’s economy was highly dependent upon international support. Since Abdullah’s entrance into Amman, his legitimacy had depended upon external financial assistance. Because Britain had been primarily interested in Transjordan for its strategic importance, it had not paid significant attention to its economic development.30 This, in conjunction with the weakness of the central state apparatus and the dearth of natural resources, meant that economic assistance from Britain remained vital throughout the mandate period. The sum of this support, as mentioned in chapter one, continued to grow throughout the period. Consequently, by the time of its independence, Transjordan had developed into what Warwick Knowles terms an “induced rentier state.”31

Because Jordan’s position as an induced rentier state has played a crucial role in the country’s political development, it is necessary to clearly define what this entails. To do this, it is helpful to first define a “pure rentier state” (often referred to simply as a “rentier state”).32 A pure rentier state is one characterized by an economy that is more dependent on external forms of revenue than domestic taxation. Its economy is state dominated, owing to the state’s control over income from natural resources, or rent,

---

which in the Middle Eastern context is almost exclusively derived from oil.\textsuperscript{33} The state ensures both the continued profitability of its rents and their use for the provision of welfare to its citizens. As such, the holding of citizenship provides one with access to economic benefits, but in turn requires obedience to the state without representation.\textsuperscript{34}

Contrastingly, the power of the state in an induced rentier state is diluted, as it is dependent upon an external third party for rents in the form of aid. While the state exclusively controls the flow of rents in a pure rentier state, in an induced rentier state the donor also influences the ebb and flow of rent. This leaves the induced rentier state’s economic and thus political stability vulnerable to changes in the international atmosphere.\textsuperscript{35} At the same time, it also results in a high level of imports (leading to a serious trade imbalance) and high state expenditures, often resulting in large fiscal deficits.\textsuperscript{36} These characteristics were all present in Transjordan on the eve of its expansion into Palestine.

The 1948 War and the seizure of the West Bank significantly altered the economic situation in Transjordan, but reinforced the country’s status as an induced rentier state. With the inclusion of the West Bank and its people, Transjordan’s population jumped from around 375,000 to approximately 1,185,000. About 460,000 of the new inhabitants resided in the West Bank, of which between 100,000 and 160,000 had been cut off from their employment and productive lands west of the new border with Israel.\textsuperscript{37} Another 350,000 refugees moved directly to the East Bank as a result of the conflict, largely leaving behind their livelihoods. Consequently, nearly half of the total

\textsuperscript{33} Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World,” 71.
\textsuperscript{34} Knowles, \textit{Jordan Since 1989}, 12.
\textsuperscript{35} Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World,” 70.
\textsuperscript{37} Knowles, \textit{Jordan Since 1989}, 27.
population of the newly combined territory was cut off from their former sources of income. In this situation, Transjordan found itself in need of significantly greater amounts of aid to support its new population and maintain eudemonic legitimacy. While Britain, which had constituted the exclusive patron of Transjordan before the 1948 War, provided some of the requisite funds, new donors also stepped in to ease the situation.

To provide for the massive displaced population in Transjordan, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was created in 1949. UNRWA’s role has since been critical for the welfare of Palestinians in the kingdom. It has represented, as Laurie Brand states, a “lifeline for Jordan,” providing support to one third of the country’s population.38 Along with the introduction of refugee specific aid (such as UNRWA’s), funds for Jordan as a whole also increased, provided in large part by the entrance of the United States. Aid to Jordan expanded immediately following the war, but really ballooned in the mid-1950s.39 With the onset of the Cold War, Jordan’s strategic and political position had rendered it a central component of both Britain’s and the United States’ regional and international strategies, and Jordan consequently received increasing amounts of aid from both powers. However, along with its increasing importance to Britain and the United States, the growing centrality of Jordan’s role in regional politics placed the Hashemite monarchy at the center of an even more complex balancing act.

To balance competing demands upon him, Abdullah pursued a two-pronged strategy.40 Fully appreciating the aid benefits of Jordan’s reputation as a generous host to

---

a temporary refugee population, Abdullah attempted to demonstrate his outward support for the Palestinian rights of return and statehood.\textsuperscript{41} However, because the genesis of a Palestinian state was contrary to his desire to maintain his position east of the River Jordan, he simultaneously fought to stealthily integrate West Bankers into Jordanian life so as to marginalize separatist and anti-Hashemite sentiments. In effect, Abdullah struggled to maintain the refugee status of the West Bank population on the international stage, whilst internally he sought to administratively dissolve distinctions between the populations of two banks.

\textit{Juridical Jordanization, Not Transjordanization}

Historians have characterized Hashemite attempts to integrate West Bankers into Jordan in a number of ways. Many have suggested that through a process of Jordanization, the Hashemites sought to eliminate (or prevent the emergence of) Palestinian identity and assimilate the new population.\textsuperscript{42} Yet, the evidence does not especially support this argument. Abdullah certainly used Jordanization to forge a new national identity, but the goal of these programs was not to assimilate West Bankers, but to prevent the Palestinization of Jordan. Abdullah strove to undercut the emergence of a Palestinian nationalist movement and even an independent Palestinian-Jordanian identity,

\textsuperscript{41} Such overtures were greatly aided by UNRWA’s presence in the Kingdom. Because of UNRWA’s continued involvement with the refugee issue, it was more difficult for the Arab states and refugees to accuse Jordan of settlement efforts, as it was only indirectly involved in UNRWA’s work. Plascov, \textit{The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan}, 71.

but no attempt to impose a Transjordanian identity upon the West Bank Palestinian populations was made until 1970.

Rather than pursuing the assimilation of West Bankers, Abdullah intended his Jordanization efforts to instill what Brand calls a “hybrid Jordanian identity.” (In affirming and clarifying Brand, Adnan Abu-Odeh usefully refers to this as a “pan-Jordanian” identity.) Abdullah’s attempts to foster an identity synthesis were highlighted by his attempts to, as Mary Wilson states, legislate a “linguistic uniformity of identity.” Most crucially, this involved solidifying the “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan” as the exclusive name for the new political entity. The new name first appeared in 1946, and for the next couple years remained interchangeable with “Transjordan.”

Following annexation in 1948, however, the elimination of any reference to “Transjordan” became a monarchical priority. Moving away from Transjordanian referents – which would have allowed exclusion through a reassertion of “Transjordan for the Transjordanians” – the kingdom’s new name highlighted the unity of the two peoples

---

45 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom, 239.
46 Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, 190.
47 The Transjordanian parliament officially christened the country the “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan” when it declared independence on May 25, 1946. See “Public Notice No. 2 Concerning the Name of the Kingdom,” June 1, 1949, in The Arab State and the Arab League: A Documentary Record, Vol. I Constitutional Developments, ed. Muhammed Khalil (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), 53-54; and The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “Jordanian National Charter of 1991,” United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The new name was subsequently recognized by Britain in the second Anglo-Jordanian treaty, which was completed on June 17, 1946. However, it did not immediately replace “Transjordan” as the sole name of the country. Indeed, the 1946 Constitution, which was passed less than two months after the new name was made official, was enacted under the name, “The Constitution of Transjordan.” See “The Constitution of Transjordan,” July 12, 1946, in The Arab State and the Arab League: A Documentary Record, Vol. I Constitutional Developments, ed. Muhammed Khalil (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), 43-53.
48 See “Public Notice No. 2 Concerning the Name of the Kingdom;” and Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, 190.
of the Jordan. This idea was underscored by Abdullah’s speech from the throne on the occasion of unification:

The Jordan [River] is like a bird whose wings are its east and west banks […] The unity of the two banks is an indisputable fact which evolved from the establishment of strong ties ever since 1922.49

Examining the concrete steps that were involved in Jordanization both reinforces the argument that the process sought to foster a hybrid identity and demonstrates that the monarchy attempted to realize this hybridity through the use of juridical integration. Indeed, Abdullah’s key instrument of post-annexation nation building was the extension of citizenship privileges to Palestinians. In 1949, Abdullah provided all Palestinians residing in his expanded kingdom with the right to a Jordanian passport through the ratification of the Passport Amendment Ordinance No. 11 (1949).50 He then exempted Palestinian residents in the kingdom from the restrictive provisions of the Foreigners Law (1927).

The exemption was followed by a move toward full citizenship for Palestinian residents via the Additional Law No. 56 (December 1949), through which they were given the same citizenship rights as East Bank Jordanians.51 This law amended the Transjordanian Citizenship Ordinance (1928), which had previously limited citizenship to those who resided in Transjordan on August 6, 1924 (the day the Treaty of Lausanne was ratified by Britain).52 By the end of 1949, therefore, Palestinian residents of Jordan enjoyed ipso facto Jordanian nationality, and throughout the following year, the

49 Quoted in Faddah, *The Middle East in Transition*, 195.
Jordanian government made a series of declarations, assuring Palestinians (both refugees and non-refugees) of their legal equality with all Jordanians.\footnote{Plascov, \textit{The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan}, 45; and Abidi, \textit{Jordan: A Political Study}, 66-67. Palestinian citizenship was reinforced by Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality, which expanded citizenship privileges. The Law extended citizenship rights to “Any Arab person born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or in the occupied part of Palestine and emigrated from the country or left – including the children of this emigrant wherever they were born.” See Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality,” January 1, 1954. \texttt{<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea13.html>}}

With the granting of citizenship to Palestinian residents in the kingdom and, therefore, their technical politico-juridical equality with East Bank Jordanians, the monarchy began to reform its institutions of administration to reflect its new jurisdictional requirements. In March 1949, Abdullah replaced the military government in the West Bank with a civilian government that included Palestinian-Jordanian representatives. He subsequently removed customs and travel controls between the two banks. By the end of the year, Abdullah issued a new law granting himself administrative power over the West Bank.\footnote{Wilson, \textit{King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan}, 194.} In 1950, Jordan held elections on both banks and formed a united parliament. Immediately after the new parliament assembled, it passed the Act of Union (1950), officially recognizing the unification of the East and West Banks. This merger was reinforced by Jordan’s 1952 Constitution, which recognized Jordan’s territory on both banks as “indivisible and inalienable,” forbidding any part to be “ceded.”\footnote{See “Resolution Adopted by the Jordanian Parliament, Providing for the Unification of the Two Banks of the Jordan River,” April 24, 1950, in \textit{The Arab State and the Arab League: A Documentary Record, Vol. I Constitutional Developments}, ed. Muhammed Khalil (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), 54-55; and Article 1 of the Jordanian constitution. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” January 1, 1952. \texttt{<http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html>}}

To emphasize that Jordan represented an inseparable whole, the kingdom’s lexicon was forcibly changed to underscore this permanence. Just as “Transjordan” was ejected from the national diction, so too were any references to “Palestine.” On March 1, 1950, a
royal decree was promulgated which prohibited the use of the word “Palestine” in official documents. Therefore, “West Bank” (al-Dafah al-Gharbiyyah) replaced “Palestine” for all administrative purposes. By banning the word “Palestine” and distancing the kingdom from its Transjordanian past, Abdullah attempted to forge a new identity that corresponded to the expanded political arena. Rather than emphasizing the Transjordanian (or Palestinian) people as the key referent for national identity, he instead emphasized the centrality of the Hashemite monarchy in the new kingdom.

By focusing on the kingdom’s Hashemite leadership for the creation of identity, Abdullah attempted to use his family’s own pan-Arab and Islamic prestige as a means of national unification. Such linkages were possible because the Hashemites are direct descendants of Mohammed and were also crucial players in the Arab Revolt of the First World War. As such, Abdullah emphasized his family’s commitment to a wider Arab identity, linking pan-Arabism not only to (supposedly homogenous) Arab values, but also to Jordan’s self-defined status as a home to all Arabs. Exploiting his familial credentials, Abdullah strove to project himself as the father of a united Jordanian family. He hoped that by reorienting identity around his family, he could eliminate the

---

56 Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 162.
57 Because the phrase “East Bank” has not been used with great frequency, the West Bank began to be referred to commonly in Arabic as “al Dafah” (the Bank).
59 Riad Nasser’s study focused on the presentation of Jordanian identity in contemporary textbooks. While I am, therefore, using his ideas anachronistically, it is from his work that I developed this idea. See Riad Nasser, *Recovered Histories and Contested Identities: Jordan, Israel, and Palestine* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011), 129-141.
Palestinian-Transjordanian binary and forge a Jordanized national identity that embodied the two peoples.62

Through the extension of Jordanian citizenship and the subsequent creation and consolidation of a new political arena, Abdullah attempted to formulate an identity synthesis (neither Palestinian nor Transjordanian). Following the establishment of this new political arena, Abdullah developed new institutions that similarly encouraged identity hybridity. In formulating the political and legal systems that were required to deal with the newly enlarged territory and population, Abdullah did not impose an expanded Transjordanian administration on its Palestinian subjects; instead, he fused together aspects from the extant structures and customs of both banks.

After the union, a concerted effort was made to merge the Palestinian and Transjordanian legal systems.63 This was an extensive undertaking, as there were clear disparities between the two. In the West Bank, British colonial law had begun to replace Ottoman law during the Palestine Mandate. In Transjordan, by contrast, Ottoman law had been maintained to a much greater extent. Indeed, much of the Ottoman legal system had been recognized and codified via Jordan’s 1928 Organic Law.64 To reconcile the discrepancies between the systems, the government appointed a legal commission of judges and lawyers headed by the Palestinian-born Ibrahim Hashem.65 Its task was to review the two legal systems and suggest compromises for an integrated system.

62 Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, 190.
63 For a more comprehensive review of post-annexation efforts to realize legal integration, see Theodore E. Mogannam, “Developments in the Legal System of Jordan,” Middle East Journal Vol. 6 No. 2 (Spring 1952), 194-206.
65 Mishal, West Bank/East Bank, 6.
number of the commission’s recommendations were subsequently heeded, resulting in the declaration of a number of new laws for the Hashemite Kingdom.

The Hashemite monarchy also allowed the cross-Jordan migration of a number of Palestinian institutions. Along with the integration of the more politically conscious and better-educated Palestinian population, the monarchy permitted the introduction of a number of political and educational institutions that had been hitherto non-existent east of the river. For example, trade unions, which were previously absent in Transjordan but prevalent in Palestine, reemerged under Jordanian governance. A new regulatory framework was created, under which the Workers’ Union Law (1953) was passed, allowing groups of seven or more workers to form unions provided that their work did not prove contrary to Jordan’s economic interests.⁶⁶

Efforts were similarly made to find a compromise between the two existing education systems. While education had thus far remained limited in Transjordan, provided largely by Christian missions, much more westernized educational institutions had emerged in Palestine. Following annexation, however, the Jordanian monarchy attempted to introduce aspects of the Palestinian education system across the kingdom.⁶⁷ Working from the Palestinian system, for instance, the 1952 Jordanian Constitution introduced compulsory primary education into the territory.⁶⁸

As with the new hybrid laws and institutions that the government created, the procedures of the government itself also attempted to find a balance between the Palestinian and Transjordanian systems. Not only was the West Bank given equal

---

⁶⁶ Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study, 172.
⁶⁷ Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study, 172-173.
representation (by bank) in the legislature, but the actual mechanisms of legislation also integrated aspects of the Palestinian political process. Such integration was, for instance, demonstrated by the introduction and consolidation of a political opposition in the parliament – a practice that was previously lacking in the Transjordanian system and was thus spearheaded by Palestinian representatives in the newly constituted legislature. 69

Integration, But Not Representation

Aqil Abidi argues that after the union “the parliament began to reflect the interaction of political ideas upheld by the two groups of the population.” 70 However, even though the creation of new national institutions – and indeed a new national identity – was in part predicated on a process of amalgamation, the actual reciprocity that was involved in this process should not be exaggerated. While Abdullah created a unified political system, giving it a representative façade by holding elections and instituting equal representation in the House of Representatives, he ensured that the demographic power of the Palestinian-Jordanians could not be translated into a political majority. 71

This was accomplished through a number of bureaucratic restrictions. For instance, the monarchy allocated seats in the new parliament by bank rather than population. As a result, each bank was given 20 seats to contest. 72 This regional division reduced the political strength of the larger population of the West Bank, devaluing each West Banker’s voting power. Similarly, Palestinian refugees, despite their continued

69 Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study, 172-173.
70 Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study, 186.
71 Susser, On Both Banks of the Jordan, 80.
72 The “Amended Electoral Law, No. 54” extended the franchise to Palestinians by decree on December 12, 1949. The same day, the “Annexe to the Electoral Law, No. 55” established that 20 seats would be allotted to the “western region.” Both of these amendments were published in The Official Gazette on December 20, 1949. Equal representation was given to the West Bank for the Chamber of Deputies only. No such law was passed for the Chamber of Notables.
requests, were not allowed to elect candidates from their places of origin in what had become Israel.\textsuperscript{73} Instead, refugees were incorporated into mixed districts; this diluted their electoral influence, prevented their being treated distinctly in parliament, and blunted their connection to their former homes.

The monarchy similarly attempted to mask the inequality of its ministerial appointments. To achieve this, it selected loyalists from notable Palestinian-Jordanian families, such as the Nashashibis, to provide an aura of equality in the cabinet.\textsuperscript{74} Yet, even though these ministers were loyalists, they were, nonetheless, prevented from wielding real power.\textsuperscript{75} They were largely restricted to purely economic portfolios, which were subject to the approval of the royal court for important decisions. Palestinian-Jordanian politicians were eventually given charge of more important ministries following protestations of political marginalization; however, the monarchy only offered them to the most loyal of its Palestinian-Jordanian subjects, so that the offices could not be transformed into platforms of power independent of the court.\textsuperscript{76}

The exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from top military posts was even more acute. The Arab Legion remained a volunteer-based force, and thus the monarchy was free to accept and decline applicants as it saw fit.\textsuperscript{77} Because Abdullah considered any Palestinization of the Legion’s ranks a threat to his own interests as well as a potential source of discontent within the otherwise loyal ranks, most Palestinian-Jordanian applicants were rejected.\textsuperscript{78} The few Palestinian-Jordanians who were permitted to join the

\textsuperscript{73} Plascov, \textit{The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan}, 105.
\textsuperscript{74} Brand, \textit{Palestinians in the Arab World}, 162.
\textsuperscript{75} Mishal, \textit{West Bank/East Bank}, 42.
\textsuperscript{76} Mishal, \textit{West Bank/East Bank}, 42.
\textsuperscript{77} Its exclusionary recruitment policy aside, few Palestinian-Jordanians applied to the force. \textit{See} Plascov, \textit{The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan}, 100.
\textsuperscript{78} Plascov, \textit{The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan}, 97.
Legion primarily filled its more technical posts, for which there were fewer qualified East Bank Jordanian candidates. As in the government, Palestinian-Jordanians were barred from positions within the upper echelons of the Legion. These positions (as with most of the Legion’s ranks) were largely reserved for Bedouin soldiers – the demographic the monarchy believed to be most loyal.

The simultaneous efforts to integrate the Palestinian-Jordanian population and also marginalize it within the kingdom’s centers of power seem to present contradictions in the monarchy’s Jordanization policies. Yet, this incongruity is consistent with the Hashemite desire to both foster an integrated nation for the kingdom and simultaneously safeguard the kingdom from Palestinization. The Hashemites strove to incorporate Palestinian customs, institutions, culture, and personalities into the new system; yet they also ensured that Palestinian-Jordanians could not significantly alter extant power structures. These conflicting policies both highlight the continued Hashemite prioritization of the East Bank. They also help explain why Jordanization was only able to secure reluctant Palestinian-Jordanian acceptance of Hashemite control of the West Bank, but not a full reorientation of their identity.

---

80 Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World, 146.
81 Because the monarchy remained so hesitant to allow Palestinian enlistment in the Arab Legion, and thus the Palestinization of its ranks, it instead used the Palestinians to build up a separate wing of Jordan’s armed forces, the National Guard (al-Haras al-Watani). The raison d’être of the National Guard was to establish a defensive force for the frontier villages, but it did not really constitute an effective fighting force. Instead, it served largely as a means of providing the West Bank population with a sense of being in charge of their own fate, and of preventing cross border raids. Because these raids were most frequently perpetrated from Jordan into Israel, the National Guard largely policed its own population (as indirect collective responsibility of the tribes had accomplished in the mandate period). The National Guard was eventually incorporated into the Arab Legion in 1965. See Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 146; and Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan, 80-81.
82 Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World, 162.
The Shortcomings of Partial Integration

Because Jordan continued to attempt to balance its suppression of Palestinian nationalism and political power with efforts to maintain regional legitimacy under the auspices of being a protector of Palestinian rights, the creation of a hybrid identity proved unfeasible. The need to maintain international legitimacy prevented the Hashemites from fully curtailing the continued presence – and further development – of a Palestinian communal consciousness. Indeed, even though King Hussein possessed the coercive strength to suppress the movements, it was politically unviable for him to do so, as they enjoyed the support of various Arab states, and Nasser’s in particular.83 Thus, just as the Hashemite balance of domestic and international relations had provoked the rise of Palestinian nationalist movements, this balance also dictated the kingdom’s relationship with these movements.84 As a result of these conditions, King Hussein was unable to effectively deal with the movements until their regional support – including Nasser’s – declined in the late 1960s.85 Before this time, the king was forced to give tacit support to the Palestinian nationalists and even their raids into Israel.86

The growth of Palestinian nationalist movements – as well as Hussein’s reliance on coercive force to suppress them – does not, however, indicate that Jordanization was an unreserved failure. The nationalist movements did not enjoy the universal support of Palestinian-Jordanians. No binary division between the Palestinian and East Bank

83 Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, ch. 9
84 I am using “Palestinian nationalist movements” to refer to a heterogeneous group of movements that include a number of oppositional organization as well as both pan-Arab movements (such as the Arab Nationalist Movement) as well as Palestinian nationalist movements (such as Fatah). For more nuanced explanations of the parties and approaches involved, see and Hussein Sirriyeh, “Jordan and the Legacies of the Civil War of 1970-71,” Civil Wars, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 2007): 74-86; Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); and Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge.
85 Bailey, Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge, 53-59.
Jordanian populations existed before, during, or even after the 1970 civil war. While many Palestinian-Jordanians fully supported the Hashemite monarchy, some East Bankers supported his regional rivals. In fact, by the time the civil war broke out, many Palestinian-Jordanians had even begun to fully identify themselves as Jordanians.

For most Palestinian-Jordanians, however, Jordanization had rendered their identities much more ambiguous. Palestinian-Jordanians allowed themselves to be administratively included in Jordanian life, but refused to entirely sacrifice their separate Palestinian identity. They accepted Jordanian passports and legal rights and enjoyed their relatively comfortable situation in the kingdom, but remained ambivalent to both Jordan and being Jordanian. It is this ambivalence, which lasted until the late 1960s, that accounts for the more or less apathetic position of many Palestinian-Jordanians toward the Hashemites.

The equivocal position of Palestinian-Jordanians has been most succinctly described by Shaul Mishal. He suggests that Palestinian-Jordanians adopted a “floating identity,” which allowed them to view their situation in Jordan as temporary, as they focused instead on extra-Jordanian, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic issues. Rather than looking to Amman for political leadership, Palestinian-Jordanians concentrated on the programs of Palestinian organizations, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Some Palestinian-Jordanians allowed themselves to be integrated into the administrative and legal institutions in the country, but very few began to identify

88 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom, 111.
90 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom, 57.
91 Mishal, West Bank/East Bank, 77-91.
themselves as being simply “Jordanians.” Most continued to consider themselves “Palestinians” or “Palestinian-Jordanians,” and remained focused on regional developments beyond Jordan.

With their concentration on trans-state Palestinian issues, many Palestinian-Jordanians shifted back and forth between supporting and opposing the Hashemites according to the monarchy’s international positioning. In this way, the Palestinian-Jordanians partially dictated Jordan’s foreign policy, just as foreign relations partly directed the Hashemite relationship with its Palestinian-Jordanian population. For instance, Jordan’s flirtation with joining the British-backed Baghdad Pact, as well as its refusal to join the pan-Arab United Arab Republic, caused its standing with its Palestinian-Jordanian population to temporarily decline.92 Conversely, when Jordan dismissed Glubb Pasha – the symbol of British colonialism in the kingdom – in 1956, the monarchy enjoyed a fleeting spike in its domestic popularity.93

The importance that Palestinian-Jordanians vested in trans-state Palestinian issues prevented much of the population from becoming fully integrated in Jordan. This is certainly not to suggest that there was a binary or primordial division between Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians. Indeed, even as Jordan inched toward a civil war in the 1960s, loyalty was not universally determined by ethnic or cultural designations. However, the momentum of growing hostility between the monarchy and the Palestinian nationalist resistance throughout the 1960s incited a self-perpetuating divide between the Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians, as each group increasingly defined itself based on their

92 For a more comprehensive overview of the implications of Jordan’s potential entry into the Baghdad Pact, see Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, 28, 32. For its refusal to enter the UAR, see Bailey, *Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge*, 14-15.
93 Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*, 33.
respective loyalties. As such, even before the growing tension between the Hashemites and the Palestinian nationalists erupted into an open conflict in the late 1960s the Jordanian population had begun to polarize.\textsuperscript{94}

This growing divide was encouraged by the failures of the Arab armies in the 1967 War. With Israel’s seizure of the West Bank during the conflict, there was a widespread feeling amongst Palestinian-Jordanians that they had been let down by the Arab states. After the war, Palestinians began to look to themselves to end their plight, increasingly supporting Palestinian-led resistance movements like the PLO. The war, therefore, seriously impeded Hashemite efforts to “Jordanize” its Palestinian population.

The war also resulted in another exodus of West Bank Palestinians, with the eastward migration of approximately 200,000 Palestinians as well as the PLO leadership.\textsuperscript{95} While King Hussein did little to inhibit PLO activities, their growing numbers in his kingdom and their activity against Israel made him increasingly uncomfortable.\textsuperscript{96} As the PLO increasingly fortified itself as a state within the Hashemite state, Jordan declined into anarchy, forcing a rift within the country – one that increasingly traced the dividing lines of the Palestinian and East Bank Jordanian communities. The Palestinian-East Bank Jordanian polarization not only intensified with the onslaught of the 1970-1971 civil war, but was also reinforced by the monarchy’s post-war policies.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{94} Abu-Odeh, \textit{Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom}, 174; Salibi, \textit{The Modern History of Jordan}, 231; and Brand, \textit{Palestinians in the Arab World}, 170.
\textsuperscript{96} Ashton, \textit{King Hussein of Jordan}, 137.
\textsuperscript{97} In focusing on the effects that 1970 had on the identity of Jordanians and the growing ability of Palestinian-Jordanians to participate in political life, this thesis does not provide substantive detail regarding the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan. This is a subject that has been covered extensively in previous works. See, e.g., Mishal, \textit{The PLO under Arafat}; Susser, “In Through the Out Door;” Bailey,
Hashemite Priorities: Downsizing the Balancing Act

During the civil war, the government started to crack down on members and supporters of the Palestinian resistance (both Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians). After the war, this initiative continued and increasingly divided the population. Encouraged by growing anti-Palestinian-Jordanian sentiment as well as a Palestinian-Jordanian sense of guilt for recent events, the monarchy began to purge members of the military, government, and bureaucracy who maintained any affiliation with the resistance.98 While Palestinian-Jordanians were not the process’s exclusive target, they accounted for the overwhelming number of dismissals. Moreover, Palestinian-Jordanians who were dismissed were almost exclusively replaced with East Bankers.

The effects this purge had on the socio-economic constitution of the kingdom intensified the demographic divide between Palestinian-Jordanians and East Bankers.99 The monarchy, meanwhile, was restricted in its ability to control the situation. Having just purged the public sector of resistance members, almost all of whom were Palestinian-Jordanians, King Hussein could no longer convince the Palestinian-Jordanians of his benevolence toward them; consequently, he was increasingly forced to rely on East Banker support.100 From the other side, the Palestinian-Jordanian population – treated as traitors – increasingly began to act the part, rallying around anti-Hashemite sentiments.

By the mid-1970s, a clear “East Banker-first” policy had emerged, in which East Bank Jordanians were given priority over their Palestinian-Jordanian counterparts in the

98 Robins, A History of Jordan, 131-132; and Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom, 190.
99 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom, 198.
state bureaucracy. Consequently, the previous exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from the upper echelons of the military – which was now enforced at its lower ranks as well – also extended into the government and bureaucracy. The marginalization of Palestinian-Jordanians was similarly extended out into other state controlled institutions, such as public universities. After 1970, therefore, East Bank Jordanians increasingly dominated the now largely Palestinian-Jordanian-free public sector, whilst Palestinian-Jordanians were forced to find employment within the private sector.

King Hussein’s increasing focus on East Bankers and the East Bank was also manifest in his attempts to reorganize Jordan’s relationship with the West Bank. Concerned with the post-civil war loyalty of Palestinian-Jordanians west of the River Jordan, as well as with the implications of Israel’s announced intention to hold municipal elections in the territory and the growing fear that the international community would sacrifice Jordan in the peace process, the king began to suggest a more indirect union between the two banks. Appealing to his oft-invoked idea that Palestinians and Jordanians are different branches of the same Arab family – although now as a somewhat more distant family – Hussein proposed the creation of a federal “United Arab Kingdom,” which would encompass two regions, one on each side of the Jordan. Inherent in the king’s proposal was a de facto recognition of the distinctiveness of the two banks

---

102 For example, the near monopoly of universities that Palestinian students and teachers once enjoined inverted after the civil war. See Yitzhak Reiter, “Higher Education and Sociopolitical Transformation,” 137-164.
and their peoples, an admission that the kingdom’s former hybrid identity had long denied.¹⁰⁵

The proposal was not only an admission to the failure of a synthesized Jordanian identity, it was also recognition of Jordan’s inability to return to the pre-1967 unitary and centralized system. The plan did not, however, signal Hussein’s willingness to accept permanent withdrawal from the West Bank; instead, it highlighted his desire both to maintain Hashemite dominance in the territory and, as Asher Susser argues, to “preserve East Bank supremacy in the Jordanian-Palestinian equation.”¹⁰⁶ In effect, Hussein hoped to retain his influence in the West Bank whilst safeguarding his own, separate East Bank territory. The proposal, however, was rejected by the PLO, Israel, and the Arab states, rendering Jordan’s continued position on the West Bank increasingly tenuous.¹⁰⁷

This tenuousness of Jordan’s position became more acute as a result of the Seventh Arab League Summit in Rabat in October 1974, at which the Palestinian right to self-determination without the interference of Arab states was recognized, and the PLO was declared “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”¹⁰⁸ While Jordan officially accepted the resolution, King Hussein was keenly aware of its negative implications for his position – especially after the UN endorsed the resolution the following month. Not only did the resolution infringe on Jordan’s ability to make any legal claim to the West Bank, but King Hussein also feared its implications for his position on the East Bank. The declaration of the PLO as the soul legitimate

<<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/63d9a930e2b428df852572c0006d06b8?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,rabat>>
representative of the Palestinian people extended, at least theoretically, to the large population of Palestinian-Jordanians on the East Bank.\textsuperscript{109}

King Hussein officially recognized, albeit reluctantly, the Rabat resolution, as he felt that he could not fly in the face of Arab consensus.\textsuperscript{110} Yet, he did not earnestly accept the changes, and he thus attempted to undermine them. As the back and forth mêlée between Hussein and the PLO continued, views in Jordan regarding the kingdom’s relationship with Palestinians began to change.\textsuperscript{111} Indeed the summit, as Avi Shlaim argues, proved to be a turning point, “open[ing] the door to a ‘Jordan first’ policy.”\textsuperscript{112}

Following Rabat, East Bank nationalist voices within the court began to suggest that Jordan cut its ties with the West Bank and instead focus intensely on the East Bank and its people. With the summit’s resolution and the consequent swell of East Bank nationalism, Hussein could have exploited the situation and moved toward legal separation. But, he was not yet prepared to abandon the West Bank or the Hashemite position as the guardian of Jerusalem’s holy places – a central component in his notion of Hashemite destiny and regional centrality.\textsuperscript{113} When Hussein finally disengaged from the West Bank more than a decade later, “East Bank first” was no longer merely an argument, but an existential necessity for the Hashemite monarchy.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{109} Nevo, “Changing Identities in Jordan,” 196; and Susser, “In Through the Out Door,” 3.
\textsuperscript{112} Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 391
\textsuperscript{113} Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan, 183.
\end{flushright}
Al-Aks: Inverting Policies, Cutting the Kingdom in Half

On July 31, 1988, King Hussein announced that Jordan would surrender its claim to the West Bank to the PLO. In the announcement’s immediate aftermath, one journalist noted, “[d]iplomats and Jordanians, particularly the Palestinians, were stunned today as they began to add up the implications of the king’s announcement.” Yet, while the details of disengagement may have been a surprise, Hussein had preceded his announcement with numerous indications that a drastic adjustment in policy was imminent.

Leaving aside the changes to the West Bank administration that King Hussein began to implement in the days immediately prior to his announcement, Hussein had prepared the ground for such a change both in his Ramadan iftar speeches in May and June 1988 and at an emergency summit meeting in Algiers in the following month. While the iftar speeches contained contradictory signals, it is clear in retrospect that his rhetorical tack vis-à-vis the West Bank and the PLO had changed. In contrast to his previous attempts to subordinate the PLO and assert his claim of West Bank-East Bank indivisibility, he now emphasized the potential for partnership, stressing that Jordan’s continued involvement in the Palestine question was a matter of duty rather than desire. The king’s new bearing was reinforced in his speech at Algiers. He stressed that the situation in Palestine had been thrust upon his kingdom, and that if the


“representatives of the Palestinian people [PLO]” wished to separate, Jordan would “respect” their wishes.\textsuperscript{117} The same themes were again carried into his official announcement to the kingdom on July 31.

In his formal disengagement speech – in part a rehash of his long-winded address in Algiers – King Hussein reaffirmed his commitment to the “Palestinian cause.”\textsuperscript{118} He stressed that the Hashemites had sacrificed greatly for their travails in support of the Palestinians, and that the only reason they were only now transforming their relationship with the West Bank was a result of the PLO:

We also need to recall considerations that led to the debate over the slogan-objective which the PLO raised and worked to gain Arab and international support for. Namely, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. This meant, in addition to the PLO's ambition to embody the Palestinian identity on Palestinian national soil, the separation of the West Bank from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

King Hussein unequivocally placed the onus for disengagement upon the PLO, presenting the organization and its growing influence as the sole motivation for the kingdom’s declaration of withdrawal from the West Bank. Hussein had little choice but to blame disengagement on external pressure, as his prior efforts to legally integrate Palestinians and the West Bank into the kingdom now meant that disengagement was both illegal and unconstitutional. The inability to separate the Hashemite Kingdom as well as the conditions upon which its citizen’s rights could be revoked were respectively outlined in the constitution and legal system.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117} An English version of King Hussein’s speech was reprinted in English in the \textit{Jordan Times}. See \textit{Jordan Times}, June 9, 1988.


\textsuperscript{119} Article 1 of the constitution states, “The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an independent sovereign Arab State. It is indivisible and inalienable and no part of it may be ceded. The people of Jordan form a part of the Arab Nation, and its system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy” See Kingdom of Jordan, “The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.” See also The Hashemite
Despite Hussein’s disengagement speech and the subsequent works of sympathetic scholars, Jordan did not disengage simply out of respect for the PLO or Arab consensus.\textsuperscript{120} The withdrawal was also not a result of his being outplayed by the PLO. Instead Hussein’s cutting the kingdom in two was an extension of his, as well as Abdullah’s, prioritization of the East Bank over the West Bank. The same thinking that had guided Hashemite endeavours to ensure that the Palestinians could not wield significant power in Jordan, provided the rationale for disengagement. While the West Bank was a prized jewel in the Hashemite crown, Abdullah and Hussein were both willing to sacrifice it for a secure position in the East Bank.

Whereas the implications of the Rabat conference were largely limited to the West Bank, the 1987 Palestinian \textit{Intifadah} threatened to spread into the East Bank. At the outset of the \textit{Intifadah}, the Jordanian regime, underestimating the uprising’s strength and misunderstanding its direction, attempted to present it as a function of the Palestinian people’s “total frustration” with the PLO.\textsuperscript{121} Nonetheless, the regime remained cautious, appreciating the \textit{Intifadah}’s potential to buttress the PLO’s position.\textsuperscript{122} These concerns soon proved justified, as it became increasingly clear that not only was the PLO benefiting from the \textit{Intifadah} at Jordan’s expense, but that the uprising was assuming a

---


\textsuperscript{122} Kifner, “Jordan Is Wary of P.L.O.’s Influence.”
clearly anti-Hashemite flavour. Indeed, the uprising not only reinforced the idea that there would be no going back to a pre-1967 situation in Jordan, it also demonstrated that the discontentment with the Hashemites in the West Bank was beginning to creep east across the river. As resistance sentiments made their way into Amman, manifesting themselves in the media, mosque and church sermons, and intellectual debates, Hussein grew concerned that an *intifadah* in the East Bank was a distinct possibility.

While the spread of the *Intifadah* was itself a source of significant trepidation for the regime, it also collided with simultaneous (and interconnected) structural changes in regional power structures, exacerbating the volatility of Jordan’s position on both banks. Following Rabat, most of the Arab states had subsequently expressed their support for the PLO. By the time the *Intifadah* broke out, the effects of this change on Jordan’s rentier economy were palpable. Many of the kingdom’s former sponsors for development programs in the West Bank had pulled out, preferring to invest in the territory through alternative channels. Saudi Arabia, in particular, refused to fund Jordan’s 1987 Development Plan for the occupied territories. The marginalization of Jordan in Palestinian affairs was made even clearer at the above-mentioned 1988 Algiers summit. The resolution adopted during the meeting reaffirmed Arab commitment to the PLO’s

---

role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, deeming it the appropriate institution for both negotiations and channeling support to the uprising.\textsuperscript{127}

At the same time as Jordan faced Arab censure for its continued involvement in the West Bank, Israel and the United States were placing increased pressure on Jordan to play a larger role in achieving peace in the midst of the \textit{Intifadah}. This pressure from the United States was most clearly manifested in Secretary of State George Shultz’s peace initiative, which accentuated Jordan’s centrality to the exclusion of the PLO.\textsuperscript{128} Hussein, however, was extremely wary of any plan that would make it seem as if Jordan was attempting to “contain” or put the brakes on the \textit{Intifadah}.\textsuperscript{129}

At the same time, Hussein was even more concerned about the Israeli approach. The idea that Jordan represented an “alternative homeland” (\textit{al-watan al-badil}) for Palestinians had become increasingly prevalent within Israeli policy circles since the rise of the Likud in the late 1970s (discussed in greater detail in chapter four). With the onset of the \textit{Intifadah}, some Israelis had begun to reconsider its position regarding the situation in Palestine and concluded that a viable solution was a transfer of Arabs from the West Bank to the East Bank.\textsuperscript{130} The viability of this option, Israel argued, was reinforced by

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{127} Susser, “In Through the Out Door,” 19-20.
\bibitem{130} Friedman, “The King’s Move; Hussein Cuts Off West Bank, Spites Arafat.”
\end{thebibliography}
Jordan having maintained links with the West Bank after 1967, and the fact that the East Bank already contained a Palestinian demographic majority.\footnote{After Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel in the 1967 War, the kingdom maintained an administrative presence west of the River Jordan. Not only did West Bank Palestinians retain citizenship, but Jordan continued to pay the salaries and pensions of public sector employees in the territory. Likewise, half of the kingdom’s MPs continued to be drawn from the West Bank, and Jordan’s Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs acted as a crucial means of dispersing resources in the occupied land. See Robins, “Shedding Half a Kingdom.”}

With Jordan therefore facing increased and conflicting pressure from the Arabs, Israel, and United States, King Hussein had little choice but to drastically reexamine his position in the West Bank or face increased threats to his position on the East Bank. The Intifadah dealt Jordan a very bad hand. Characteristically, however, King Hussein played it well. Through Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank, Hussein responded to Arab critiques that he was subverting the Palestinian will, presenting the move as a surrender to the will of Palestinians and their leadership.\footnote{Youssef Ibrahim, “Arafat Says Jordan Didn’t Consult Him on West Bank Move,” New York Times, August 10, 1988 <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/10/world/arafat-says-jordan-didn-t-consult-him-on-west-bank-move.html>; and Kifner, “Hussein’s Slap at P.L.O.”} He simultaneously rebuffed the United States, emphasizing that his difficult position in a critical region could not be taken for granted or viewed as secondary to American concerns over Israel.\footnote{Kifner, “Hussein’s Slap at P.L.O.”; and Sciolino, “Shultz Is Making Little Headway on Mideast Plan.”} To Israel, he disassociated the East Bank from the West Bank, clearly stating that Jordan was not \textit{not} Palestine. Finally, at home Hussein won East Banker approval by removing himself and the Jordanian state from the precarious situation in the West Bank and by highlighting his primary commitment to the Jordanian people.\footnote{Robins, “Shedding Half a Kingdom,” 171; Lawrence Tal, “Is Jordan Doomed?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November – December 1993): 50; and Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians,” 54.}
Conclusion

In 1965, Ahmed Shuqeiri, the first chairman of the PLO, responded to King Hussein’s oft-employed affirmation of unity between the banks, “Jordan is Palestine, Palestine is Jordan,” by sarcastically retorting that in 1948 the West Bank had in fact annexed the East Bank to Palestine.\(^\text{135}\) This cheeky, but biting, reply very concisely summed up the limits to King Hussein’s commitment to Palestinian-Jordanians. Like his grandfather, Hussein hoped to achieve unity on both banks of the Jordan, but he was not willing to forge that unity at the cost of his control over his East Bank stronghold. The East Bank remained his first priority. When both the 1970 civil war and then the 1987 Intifadah threatened his position on the East Bank, King Hussein pragmatically adjusted Hashemite policy. Using the same political acuteness that had allowed the Hashemites to expand their balancing act into Palestine, King Hussein reluctantly retreated back across the Jordan to preserve his kingdom. To put the East Bank house back in order after the four decade Hashemite entanglement with the West Bank, however, required drastic changes to Jordan’s post-disengagement domestic policies.

Chapter 3: From Rentierism to Defensive Democratization (1989-2012)

Introduction

A year after his disengagement from the West Bank, King Hussein launched a wide-ranging process of political liberalization and democratization. While Jordanians had enjoyed the presence of some democratic institutions since the 1920s, the country had then witnessed a slow, incremental disappearance of those bodies. Following the 1956 elections, for instance, political parties were banned, though elections continued to be contested until 1967. Two months after the April 1967 election, Israel captured and annexed the West Bank, and with the loss of half its kingdom the monarchy indefinitely postponed subsequent elections. The situation further deteriorated as a result of the 1974 Rabat Summit and the subsequent recognition of the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” The summit’s decision provoked King Hussein to dissolve parliament in November of that year, for half of the members of the House of Representatives represented the West Bank. By the mid-1970s, therefore, the political atmosphere in Jordan was stagnant. While it is debatable that Jordanian political institutions (even in the 1950s) had ever served as anything more than a democratic

---


façade for a system of governance revolving around the royal court, even such pretenses had been abandoned by the mid-1970s.\(^4\)  

With disengagement, however, the monarchy’s previous justification that elections had been postponed due to the Israeli occupation was rendered void. Emerging in the shadow of Jordan’s rapid withdrawal from the West Bank, the process seemed to offer both an answer to the ambiguity surrounding the post-disengagement position of Palestinian-Jordanians residing on the East Bank as well as a solution to the kingdom’s prolonged political stagnation. As such, Hussein’s move toward democratization was greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm.\(^5\) And, in the immediate wake of his announcement, Jordanians were not disappointed. Between 1989 and 1992, Jordan made a number of important reforms, for which the country was heralded as a model for other states in the tumultuous region.\(^6\) While the praise was not completely unwarranted, it soon became clear that there was a very large disparity between the monarchy’s rhetoric and the reform that it was actually willing to allow. This chapter explores the profound impacts of this discrepancy to show how political reforms have in fact been used to

reinforce dominant power structures and further exclude Palestinian-Jordanians from positions of authority in the Hashemite Kingdom. In doing this, the chapter also helps clarify why it was East Bank Jordanians, and not their Palestinian-Jordanian brethren, who took to the streets in 2011 to push for greater political reform.

The Crisis of Jordan’s Rentier Economy

As preceding chapters have sought to demonstrate, the monarchy’s legitimacy has depended on its ability to maintain patron-client relationships. The capacity to purchase loyalty has been central to Hashemite longevity. The establishment of strong neopatrimonial relationships allowed the Hashemites to largely circumvent the need to rely on coercion. More importantly, before the late 1980s these relationships also spared the monarchy from any significant domestic pressure to democratize. Indeed, because the monarchy did not demand substantial taxation, there was little public pressure for greater political participation. As Rex Brynen notes, the American Revolution slogan “no taxation without representation” was reversed in the Jordanian context, where the system propagated “no taxation, no representation.” The continued ability of the Hashemites to finance their neopatrimonial system, therefore, depended on the continued flow of rents (see previous chapter) into royal coffers.

King Abdullah I funded his clientelistic relationships with the tribal shaykhs through an ever-expanding, British-supplied civil list. After the annexation of the West

---

Bank in 1949, the financial importance of rents was reinforced by the introduction of aid from international organizations and the United States. Following Jordan’s forfeiture of the West Bank in the 1967 War, and the consequent loss of nearly one third of its economy, foreign aid began to constitute an even larger proportion of Jordan’s economy.\(^9\) Furthermore, while the importance of rents was already steadily rising, the oil boom in the mid-1970s expanded their significance exponentially, leading to a large economic explosion in the Hashemite Kingdom. Jordan’s economy increased six fold between 1973 and 1983, largely as a result of increased aid from Gulf countries and remittances from Jordanians working there.\(^10\)

As the previous chapter discussed, the pure rentier states in the Gulf transformed Jordan into an induced rentier state by extending their domestic neopatrimonial policies onto the international stage and thereby treating the kingdom as they did internal clients. The Gulf rentier states were willing to provide Jordan with aid because of the importance of the kingdom for Gulf security. Jordan was positioned as a front line state against Israel, was crucial to controlling the PLO, and represented a potential asset for the containment of Iran.\(^11\)

The monarchy’s growing reliance on the continued flow of rents for the financing of its neopatrimonial relationships and the state’s enormous public sector placed the kingdom in an extremely vulnerable position. The dynamic nature of international politics and economics constantly endangered the continue flow of funds, thereby


jeopardizing the monarchy’s financial ability to distribute patronage. This global dynamism proved especially problematic for Jordan in the early 1980s, when the “fat years” of the Arab petroleum industry rapidly came to an end. The slashed earnings of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) member countries negatively impacted both the oil states’ capacities to provide Jordan with economic assistance, as well as the incomes of Jordanian workers in OPEC countries and their opportunities for employment.12

The effects of the decline in oil revenues on Jordan’s economic, and thus political, position were exacerbated by the launch and longevity of the Iran-Iraq War. When the war began in 1980, Iraq was in the process of becoming Jordan’s closest ally. Eight years of subsequent conflict served to solidify an alliance and encourage greater co-dependence.13 Jordan initially profited from this close connection and therefore allowed itself to be drawn into an interdependent bilateral relationship with its eastern neighbor.14 Iraq’s war with Iran, however, soon began to take its toll on the Iraqi economy. Baghdad was forced to implement austerity measures by 1982, and Jordan consequently had to shoulder some of Iraq’s economic burden, supplying Iraq with credit to enable its continued purchase of Jordanian goods and debt repayment.15 As a result, Iraq owed Jordan no less than $835 million by 1989.16

---

12 The decline in remittances damaged the private sector. According to Warwick Knowles, it forced 15,000 Jordanian workers to return home between 1982 and 1984. See Knowles, Jordan Since 1989, 64.
Jordan reached its financial breaking point with the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifadah in 1987. The kingdom’s consequent legal and administrative disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 may have spared it the financial burden of bankrolling West Bank salaries and economic development projects; however, insecurity regarding both the dinar in the West Bank as well as the position of Palestinian-Jordanians in the East Bank resulted in a capital outflow of US$250 million. With the effects of disengagement stacked upon the oil crisis and the Iran-Iraq War, Jordan’s continued status as a rentier state, and thus its continued ability to maintain its neopatrimonial-based legitimacy, seemed beyond saving. Even before the 1991 Gulf War, therefore, the continued Hashemite reliance on rents and neopatrimonialism appeared untenable.

The acute decline in externally-derived government income rendered both the legitimacy and the stability of the Hashemite monarchy unstable. By the mid-1980s, Jordan was increasingly financing its budget through domestic, syndicate, and development loans. As its debt continued to rise, Jordan was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The kingdom, however, was appealing to the donor community at a time when growing importance was being placed upon economic aid conditionality. With the end of the Cold War in sight, international donors were less willing to pump aid into hitherto geostrategically important states.

---

21 Knowles, *Jordan Since 1989*, 64.
Countries such as Jordan found themselves less able to attract aid and consequently more obliged to acquiesce to the demands of the international donor community. Most of the donors’ (and lenders’) conditions were economically rather than politically focused. While some pressure was leveled against Jordan to democratize, partly motivating Jordan’s push toward political reform, this pressure should not be overstated. Throughout the post-1989 period, levels of international aid have corresponded not to Jordan’s democratization efforts, but rather to its strategic positionality and its compliance with demands for economic reform.

When Jordan sought international assistance from the World Bank and IMF in the late 1980s, it, like all applicants at the time, was forced to comply with the IMF’s neoliberal economic conditions (which were pushed by other important donors such as the World Bank and the United States). Ultimately, Jordan’s 1989 request for US$275 million in credit from the IMF was only granted on the condition that the kingdom would rearrange its economic policies, emphasizing private sector development and the monarchy’s reduction of its economic presence to a more regulatory role.

In its deal with the IMF, Jordan agreed to a five-year stabilization program, which included a pledge to reform its taxation system and reduce the budget deficit. To accomplish this, the monarchy had to increase taxation and drastically slash public expenditures. The latter resulted in price increases for basic commodities that had hitherto been subsidized, as well as in cuts to Hashemite patronage, which was primarily

---

24 Levels of aid declined during Jordan’s greatest period of democratization (1989-1993) in part because of the kingdom’s decision to not join the US in its fight against Iraq. Aid subsequently increased after Jordan made peace with Israel, even though Jordan simultaneously began to retract its previous reforms.
25 Knowles, Jordan Since 1989, 90.
27 Knowles, Jordan Since 1989, ch. 7.
directed to southern, non-Palestinian parts of the country.\(^{28}\) East Bankers, therefore, were disproportionately affected by the monarchy’s cuts to public expenditure and employment because of their overwhelming dominance in the public sector and their reliance on state patronage.\(^{29}\) At the same time, East Bankers feared both that the neoliberal reforms were being pushed through by Palestinian-Jordanians in the government, and that these reforms would, consequently, benefit Palestinian-Jordanians at their expense because of Palestinian-Jordanian supremacy in the private sector.\(^{30}\) Outraged, but lacking formal political avenues for expressing discontent (as the parliament was still suspended), East Bankers stormed into the streets to protest the government’s new policies.\(^{31}\) Riots broke out in the southern city of Ma’an in April 1989, quickly spreading to other towns in the south and as far north as al-Salt.\(^{32}\)


\(^{29}\) Brynen argues that three quarters of East Bank Jordanians were employed in the public sector. See Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World,” 82.


That the protests emerged in rural southern towns that were predominately inhabited by East Bank tribes frightened the monarchy because it was this segment of the population upon which it had previously relied in times of crisis.33 The protestors initially mobilized around demands for the reversal of price increases, but their requests soon grew into calls for an end to corruption and inequality, and then to appeals for greater political freedom and participation.34 Throughout the process, however, the protestors continued to affirm their loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy.35 Indeed, Hussein Sirriyeh has correctly noted that the protests did not signal a deterioration of the East Banker-Hashemite solidarity that had emerged in the wake of the 1970 civil war as Lamis Andoni had conversely argued.36 Instead, the protests were primarily motivated by, and centered on, economic interests.37 While the monarchy faced pressure to reform its institutions, the pressure was primarily focused on addressing economic concerns.

Despite the absence of significant pressure for political change, King Hussein announced the launch of a series of political reforms aimed at democratizing Jordan. According to Brynen, this democratic opening was the monarchy’s reaction to the decline of its rentier system. Unable to rely on long-term international funding and facing domestic economic instability, the monarchy was forced to abandon its former “no

33 Wiktorowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East,” 608.
35 Schmemann, “In Jordan, Bread-Price Riots Signal Deep Anger.”
taxation, no representation” deal with its people and to forge a “new social contract.” The latter, Brynen argues, involved a “quid pro quo whereby a real democratic opening would be offered for acceptance of continued economic austerity.”

In the immediate aftermath of the protests and the initial launch of democratization, Brynen’s assessment appeared to be correct. To the monarchy’s credit, it implemented some tangible, albeit tightly controlled, changes to the political system. Six months after the outbreak of the April 1989 protests, Jordan held full parliamentary elections for the first time in over twenty years. The reform momentum that the elections encouraged led to the monarchy’s easing of government control of the media, and in 1990 the king commissioned a group of diverse representatives to draft a National Charter (al-Mithaq al-Watani), which was ratified in 1991.

The charter was presented as a Hashemite seal of approval for democratization, promising that the current political progress would constitute the foundation of political life in the kingdom. The next year, the last provisions of martial law were lifted and a new political parties law was introduced, allowing political pluralism to expand. With this rapid progress, many Jordanians began to believe that the monarchy was earnestly

38 Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World,” 92.
pursing democratization.42 Despite these early reforms and optimism, however, it soon became evident that there were limitations on how far the monarchy was willing to proceed in the direction of democracy.

Defensive Democratization

While the monarchy was prepared to pass a number of reforms to open up the political system and allow greater, yet still limited, participation and free speech, it was unwilling to allow a significant devolution of its extant powers.43 As per the constitution, the king held the power to call elections, appoint senators and cabinet members, and choose the prime minister.44 Furthermore, while the king was politically unaccountable, all other political institutions were accountable to him. Due to this monarchical monopolization of power in the kingdom, Samuel Finer had defined Jordan in 1970 as a “façade democracy”: “a system where liberal-democratic institutions, processes and safeguards are established by law, but are in practice so manipulated or violated by a historic oligarchy as to stay in office.” 45

The reforms that the kingdom undertook in the immediate aftermath of the 1989 protests did little to transform Jordan into a genuine democracy.46 Even though the monarchy enacted a plethora of changes after the 1989 riots, it ensured that they would affect neither its own political power nor that of the executive wing of the government. The long-absent parliamentary process was reintroduced in 1989, but the monarchy

retained all of its pre-election powers, continuing to pull the political strings behind a façade of parliamentary democracy.\(^{47}\)

Power remained centralized despite significant reforms; thus Jordan underwent a process best described by Glenn E. Robinson as “defensive democratization.”\(^{48}\) In an attempt to pre-empt further opposition – and to a lesser extent appease the donor community – the monarchy undertook limited reforms that were sufficient to weather the crisis, but not to alter the kingdom’s key power structures. Facing both international and domestic pressure for political and economic restructuring, King Hussein, like other oligarchs, used democratization “as a means of prolonging [his] own rule, achieving international legitimacy, and minimizing domestic opposition.”\(^{49}\)

King Hussein’s defensive tactics were necessary because the neoliberal economic reforms upon which Jordan’s donors made aid to the kingdom conditional placed the monarchy in a difficult position. Jordan’s initial compliance with IMF conditions had already pushed traditional Hashemite loyalists into the streets. Continued compliance with the IMF’s demands would further antagonize the monarchy’s two key bases of support: the East Bankers and the rentier elite. The monarchy was obliged to continue adhering to its IMF-dictated restructuring plan, but it also wanted to avoid losing the support of these two important demographics through the restructuring. Consequently, the monarchy attempted to pacify its key constituencies during the process of economic reform by simultaneously constructing a democratic façade for the East Bankers, whilst maintaining nepatrimonial relationships with the elite.

\(^{48}\) Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan.”
King Hussein presented the reopened parliament to discontented East Bankers as a platform through which they could exert greater influence on Jordanian policy. Yet, lacking any significant power, the seemingly democratic, but actually toothless, institution served instead as a monarchical “safety-valve” which the king used to provide a space for the expression of East Banker anger, while limiting its potential to actually affect policy. At the same time, he also used the parliament as a means of maintaining a continued democratic façade to camouflage the perpetuation of the status quo in the midst of the disruptive effects of neoliberal reform. Through a powerless parliament, he created a new channel through which Hashemite support could continue to be directly funneled to key groups and personalities under the guise of democracy. In this way, King Hussein used the same institution to establish a life support system for the neopatrimonial relationships that were being threatened by the economic crisis, whilst appeasing East Banker (and to a lesser extent, international) demands for political reform.

While Brynen is thus correct in asserting that the crisis of its rentier economy forced Jordan to find a new means of ensuring legitimacy, the monarchy did not, as he suggests, obtain renewed legitimacy through a political opening up; Jordan’s “new social contract” was not predicated upon a “quid pro quo” for “real” democratic reform. Instead, the monarchy formulated a new means of perpetuating “no taxation, no representation” through the use of seemingly democratic institutions. In effect, the new social contract involved two different deals: the East Bankers agreed to Jordan’s neoliberal economic reform in exchange for the promise of greater influence on policy,

---

51 Moore, “The Newest Jordan: Free Trade, Peace and an Ace in the Hole.”
while the elite agreed to tolerate limited politico-economic liberalization so long as the changes did not affect existing power structures.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{Controlling the Legislature}

To use the parliament as a new vehicle of patronage dispersal to the elite, the monarchy had to ensure that it could control which candidates would be elected. The monarchy, however, did not rely on election-day fixing or tampering to maintain this control. Instead, the monarchy guaranteed that sympathetic candidates were elected by depriving the parliament of even limited influence over policy, thereby transforming legislative elections into nepotistic battles for access to state resources.\textsuperscript{53} Elections have been rigorously contested since 1989, yet candidates have vied not for the ability to influence policy, but rather for increased access to state resources.\textsuperscript{54} Within this electoral framework, a candidate’s ideology, political experience, and competence are subordinate to his or her relationship to the monarchy.\textsuperscript{55} Electoral success is more dependent on a candidate’s ability to access state resources than on his or her ideology, campaign, or party. By framing legislative competition in this manner, candidates are technically

---


\textsuperscript{54} Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism,” 459.

\textsuperscript{55} In a phone survey conducted by the Identity Center, participants were asked, “Do you think that MPs as individuals have political experience?” In response, a seemingly unbelievable 100% answered in the negative. \textit{See} Identity Center, “Policy Paper: Policy Paper: Fostering a Parliamentary Democracy in Jordan through Electoral Reform,” March 2014. <<http://www.identity-center.org/en/node/286>>
elected, but only from a pool of potential candidates whom the monarchy has pre-selected.56

The number of potential candidates in this system is further reduced by an interrelated factor. The electorate judges a candidate’s attractiveness based not only on the candidate’s potential capacity to access state resources within this system, but also on his or her ability and willingness to directly funnel resources to individuals in his or her respective constituency. As such, the importance of tribal affiliations is multiplied, as these connections represent the single most secure means of guaranteeing the direct diffusion of resources.57

In Jordan, this legislative dynamic has resulted in popular reinforcement of neopatrimonial relationships; candidates who have a good relationship with the state – and are consequently more likely to gain access to resources – are also more attractive to the electorate than their more oppositional counterparts.58 Thus, Jordanian voters cast their ballots for candidates who possess the greatest potential ability to access resources and distribute wastah (connections), and, in the process, willingly reinforce dominant power structures.

The implications of an electoral system in which candidates compete for access to state resources are particularly pertinent for Palestinian-Jordanian electoral participation, as Palestinian-Jordanian candidates are generally less well connected to state authorities.

than their East Bank rivals. As a result, Palestinian-Jordanian candidates are less likely to be elected and, consequently, their electorates have little incentive to vote. Even if their candidate were to get elected, he or she would prove largely unable to affect policy or deliver wasalah.\textsuperscript{59} This dynamic has, in turn, affected voter turnout. Districts with multiple Palestinian-Jordanian candidates have experienced substantially lower voter turnout numbers, as Palestinian-Jordanians increasingly feel as if their participation in the process is meaningless.\textsuperscript{60}

The Palestinian-Jordanian belief in the pointlessness of engaging electorally has been reinforced by the monarchy’s successful endeavours to construct other, even more overt mechanisms of reducing the voting power of the Palestinian-Jordanians’ demographic majority. In tandem with an electoral system that privileges East Bankers and the loyalist elite, the monarchy has, for instance, also relied on disproportionate electoral districts to ensure that the opposition is unsuccessful. Through intensive gerrymandering, the monarchy has underrepresented urban areas, in which Palestinian-Jordanians primarily reside, whilst over-representing rural regions, which are predominately inhabited by East Bank Jordanians.\textsuperscript{61} In effect, the monarchy has used all of these built-in mechanisms of Palestinian-Jordanian marginalization in the electoral system to extend its “East Bank first” policy into legislative politics.

\textsuperscript{59} Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism,” 462.
\textsuperscript{60} Khaled Hroub, “Jordan: Possibility of Transition from Electoral Rut to a ‘Constitutional Democratic Monarchy’,” Arab Reform Brief No. 18, Arab Reform Initiative, December 2007. \textlangle\textlangle http://www.arab-reform.net/jordan-possibility-transition-electoral-rut-constitutional-democratic-monarchy\textrangle\rangle
Reining in the Façade

Having deprived not just Palestinian-Jordanians, but also the national legislature, of real political power, the monarchy was censorious, but not overly concerned, about the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1989 elections. The Brotherhood won twenty-two of the eighty seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and independent Islamists took another twelve. The extent of the Brotherhood’s success was surprising in an electoral system that so severely privileged loyalist candidates, but it was also understandable given the historical context in which the elections were contested.

When Jordan went to the polls in 1989, political parties were illegal in the kingdom. Yet, even though candidates could not officially stand on party platforms, party members could still run in the election, and in effect most party organizations were allowed to operate openly. With these conditions, the Muslim Brotherhood was placed in a strong position because it had been the only party legally permitted to organize and expand over the past two decades. The monarchy, appreciating both the Brotherhood’s inherent advantage and the weakness of the potential power of the parliament, initially did little to address the success of the Brotherhood. In fact, the monarchy even rewarded


64 In amending the 1986 Electoral Law, the government had decided not to remove Article 18, paragraph E, which prevented the participation of illegal parties, or parties that had anti-monarchical aims. Because political parties had been illegal since 1957, paragraph E essentially prevented communists and other leftists from running under a party banner. See Linda Shull Adams, “Political Liberalization in Jordan: An Analysis of the State’s Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood,” Journal of Church and State Vol. 38, No. 3 (Summer 1996): 510-511.

65 Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World,” 93.

the Brotherhood, as the kingdom’s long-standing “loyal opposition,” with positions in the cabinet following the election.\(^\text{67}\)

However, in the early 1990s the Brotherhood began to voice opposition to Jordan’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the Gulf War. With Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, the United States had assembled a coalition of states in opposition to the Iraqi invasion. While a large number of Arab countries – including Egypt and Syria – joined the US-led coalition, Jordan, then considered one of America’s firmest allies in the Middle East, remained conspicuously absent. Jordan chose to pursue a more neutral path, opting neither to join the coalition nor to send troops to reinforce Baghdad. Instead, Jordan condemned Saddam Hussein’s invasion, and then more forcefully condemned the United States’ intervention in the conflict.\(^\text{68}\)

This decision represents one of a small handful of examples (though perhaps the most important) in which Jordan overlooked its geostrategic, budget security interests and allowed popular Jordanian opinion to guide the kingdom’s foreign policy.\(^\text{69}\) While the loss of Iraq as an ally implied severe implications for the Jordanian economy, the consequences of remaining an Iraqi ally threatened even more serious repercussions.\(^\text{70}\) Amman’s ability to pursue purely strategic and economic interests was, however, confined by the potency of Jordanian popular opinion. A reverence for Saddam Hussein had emerged in the kingdom, as Jordanians, liberated by recent press freedoms, were


\(^{69}\) Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations, 288.

\(^{70}\) Curtis R. Ryan, “‘Jordan First’: Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations and Foreign Policy Under King Abdullah II,” Arab Studies Quarterly Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2004): 52.
drawn into a mania for the “new Saladin.” King Hussein consequently bowed to his people, pursuing a policy that stressed Arab solidarity and minimized Jordan’s connection to the West. As a result of this stance, Hashemite popularity reached an unprecedented level, one that has perhaps never been equaled.

Jordan’s fence-sitting-Iraq-leaning wartime disposition satisfied the Jordanian people and boosted King Hussein’s domestic popularity, but it alienated all of his international partners. Jordan’s position in the war resulted in the loss of its beneficial ties to the United States, Britain, and the Gulf monarchies, the latter of which further impaired the kingdom’s economy by cutting off oil and aid and expelling more than 300,000 Jordanian and Palestinian expatriate workers.

Grasping the politico-economic price that the kingdom had paid for its wartime alignment, the monarchy sought to move itself back toward its previous Western and Gulf allies. This he accomplished by entering into the 1991 Madrid Conference, positioning himself as a key player and Western ally. With the Madrid process and rapprochement with Israel, Jordan slowly drifted away from its close association with Iraq toward the rising regional strength of the United States-Israel-Turkey bloc. In effect, Jordan bandwagoned with the growing power of the United States axis in order to access the economic and political benefits of a Western alliance.

---

75 Barari and Satkowski, “The Arab Spring: The Case of Jordan,” 45.
76 Sasley, “Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign Policy,” 39.
Fearing that the wartime blockade against Iraq would never be lifted, Jordan recognized the potential advantages of partaking in the peace process and moving toward the United States and Israel.\textsuperscript{77} Resultant benefits materialized very quickly: in 1994, Jordan’s major creditors cancelled $833 million of the kingdom’s debt, and in 1997 Jordan signed an agreement with the European Union that established the groundwork for a free trade agreement.\textsuperscript{78} In 1996, the United States declared that Jordan would be considered a “non-NATO ally,” providing the kingdom with increased access to American arms.\textsuperscript{79}

The détente with Israel, however, proved a widely unpopular policy domestically, and the Brotherhood rallied other opposition parties around its cause. Taking advantage of the limited political opening that had emerged since 1989, diverse parties coalesced around an anti-normalization campaign.\textsuperscript{80} In the volatile, post-Gulf War context, the monarchy was unwilling to tolerate opposition to its foreign policy. Realizing that even the limited “democratization” that it had thus far allowed had provided the parliament with more influence than it had originally intended, the monarchy revised its electoral policies before the country went to the polls again in November, 1993.\textsuperscript{81} Despite the fact that the row over normalization with Israel showed that the parliament was too ineffectual to affect the government’s policy direction, the monarchy, nonetheless, further restricted the parliament’s influence.\textsuperscript{82}

The introduction of the 1993 Election Law exemplified a general loss of

\textsuperscript{77} Lynch, “Abandoning Iraq: Jordan's Alliances and the Politics of State Identity,” 373.
\textsuperscript{78} Sasley, “Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign Policy,” 40.
\textsuperscript{79} Ryan, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place,” 41.
\textsuperscript{81} Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” 391.
democratization momentum (which had emerged, even if the monarchy had not intended it to); along with other measures intended to reverse the growing freedom of the press and civil society, the law was formulated to stymy the limited gains that had recently been made.\textsuperscript{83} The extant 1986 Election Law, which allowed multiple votes and encouraged candidate alliances (thus benefiting larger parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood), was replaced with a single non-transferable vote system (SNTV: commonly referred to as “one person, one vote”).\textsuperscript{84} Previously, many Jordanians had based their first vote on tribal commitments, but had then used their remaining votes to support parties. The new SNTV system, however, combined multi-member districts with the ability to only vote for a single candidate. By limiting voters to a single vote in a society where tribal links remain paramount, the monarchy ensured that ballots would be determined by tribal affiliation, leaving no additional votes to support ideological sympathies.\textsuperscript{85}

As a result of the new 1993 Election Law, the monarchy further confined the parliament’s political potential. The position of tribal loyalist candidates was reinforced and that of the opposition was further weakened. Consequently, parties fared much worse in the 1993 elections. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, lost half of its seats.\textsuperscript{86} While this loss may have partly been a function of popular dissatisfaction with the Brotherhood’s poor performance and lack of clear policy objectives in the previous


parliament, the Brotherhood, nonetheless, blamed its poorer performance on the newly imposed electoral system.\textsuperscript{87}

Accordingly, the 1993 Election Law has become one of the central focuses of the opposition in Jordan. Since the 1993 elections, the Brotherhood and a number of other opposition parties have continued to demand an end to “one person, one vote.” Yet, even though almost all of the political parties and movements oppose the SNTV system, none has provided a comprehensive alternative to it.\textsuperscript{88} Because opposition parties and movements have continually requested the elimination of SNTV, the monarchy has accompanied almost every election since 1993 with the introduction of a new election law. Each has been enacted with a promise that it will help to democratize the system, but none has responded to the demands of the opposition.

Each new election law since 1993 merely reformulated the process around SNTV, whilst leaving its fundamentals intact. The government has initiated countless reforms, but none that carry the potential to allow the development of a more representative parliamentary system.\textsuperscript{89} Each change to electoral and political parties laws has consequently represented yet another manifestation of defensive democratization through which the monarchy has sought to prevent its loss of East Bank and elite support. With every change, the monarchy has bought itself breathing room during intermittent spikes in opposition fervor. But with each shallow reform, the monarchy has only secured temporary respite.

2011: The Conflicts of Defensive Democratization

Because every series of Hashemite reforms has amounted to little more than one more wave of defensive democratization, each package has further angered East Bankers while further entrenching the position of the rentier elite. As a result, the East Bankers have become more insistent on political reform, demanding a greater say in a process that they believe is disadvantaging them, while the elite has become increasingly resistant to any political or economic reforms that will affect the status quo. Defensive democratization, therefore, has forced the monarchy’s two traditional support bases in divergent directions. This divergence has become particularly overt since the ascension of King Abdullah ibn al-Hussein in 1999.

While many Jordanians believed that with Abdullah II’s assumption of the Hashemite throne Jordan would enter a new phase of democratization, neoliberal economic development combined with continued corruption personified Abdullah II’s reign by the time the “Arab Spring” broke out in North Africa. After more than a decade of stalled reform under the new king, many East Bankers began, as Sean Yom argues, to see the “monarchy, not the Palestinians as the greatest threat to their livelihoods.” Encouraged by the overthrow of corrupt, despotic regimes elsewhere in the region, East Bank Jordanians rose up across the kingdom in 2011.

The protests in Jordan occurred on a much more modest scale than what transpired in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. Nonetheless, the uprisings in Jordan were more

---

90 Ryan, “‘Jordan First’,” 47; and Barari and Schenker, “Jordan’s Evolving Strategy Toward the Pressures of the Arab Spring.”
than spontaneous movements incited by regional momentum. Well-structured opposition movements had begun to mobilize long before the revolution in Tunisia broke out. Indeed, growing unrest within the public sector was already evident by the mid-2000s, at which point workers from the industries most negatively impacted by economic reform (those, for example, working in the phosphate industry, in ports, and as public sector day labourers) began to mobilize sit-ins and strikes.

These manifestations of discontent were clearly linked to the dire financial situation in which these workers have been placed by rising fuel and utilities prices, depreciating wages, and increasing unemployment. By 2010, public sector opposition movements had already expanded greatly. In that year alone, the Jordan-based Phenix Center for Economics and Informatics Studies recorded more than 140 labour actions. Fueled by events elsewhere in the region, labour actions occurred on an almost daily basis in 2011, with the Phenix Center recording 829 worker protests throughout the year.

Stimulated by both the labour movements in Jordan and events elsewhere in the region, more explicitly political movements began to materialize in 2011. As in 1989, the protests first emerged in rural, agriculturally unproductive, East Banker-dominated areas of the kingdom where dependence on public employment was the strongest. With the continued implementation of neoliberal economic reform, growing concern over

---

92 Barari and Satkowski, “The Arab Spring: The Case of Jordan,” 49.
<<http://www.merip.org/mer/mer264/emergence-new-labor-movement-jordan#_4_>>
94 Adely, “The Emergence of a New Labor Movement in Jordan.”
96 “Labor Protests in Jordan in First Half of 2011.”
corruption, and continued political marginalization, East Bankers were restless.\textsuperscript{98} It was increasingly apparent that the new social contract, under which they had traded acceptance of neoliberal reform for continued neopatrimonial benefits, was only benefitting the monarchy and the rentier elite. In other words, East Bankers had agreed to economic reforms contrary to their own interests, lost their former state patronage, and simultaneously allowed the monarchy to forge just the façade of a democracy. By the early 2010s, Jordan was a powder keg of pent up anger. East Bankers were outraged by their declining economic position and frustrated by the absence of a political forum in which to express their discontent.\textsuperscript{99}

Owing to the weakness of the parliament and political parties, discontented Jordanians organized into \textit{hirak} movements (as discussed above in the introduction). The first \textit{hirak} protest was held on January 7, 2011 in the town of Dhiban in Madaba by the Dhiban Youth Movement.\textsuperscript{100} The protests, however, did not remain confined to Dhiban for long. By the following Friday, similar protests were held in Karak, Amman, and Irbid. These protests ignited the powder keg of simmering discontent within the kingdom. Opposition quickly spread outwards in the kingdom, as calls for genuine democratization and an end to corruption struck a chord that spanned regional and ethnic cleavages.\textsuperscript{101} Within a matter of weeks, the political parties had become involved, and both they and


\textsuperscript{100} See “Map of Political Parties and Movements in Jordan, 2013-2014,” 18, 65.

the movements merged into coalitions with structured, but vague, demands on the monarchy.\textsuperscript{102}

The protests presented the Hashemites with a challenge the magnitude of which it had not encountered since 1989. More frightening for the monarchy, the new movements and their demonstrations could not be dismissed as the work of Islamists and Palestinian-Jordanian activists (what Ryan terms the “usual suspects”), since they were dominated by the monarchy’s bedrock East Bank Jordanian constituency.\textsuperscript{103} Sensing a profound challenge to his legitimacy, King Abdullah II reacted quickly (true to Hashemite form) by announcing a new series of political reforms.\textsuperscript{104}

In February, the king brought together a coalition of political party leaders, lawmakers, journalists, and activists into the National Dialogue Committee, which he charged with examining possible changes to both the political parties law and electoral law.\textsuperscript{105} The work of the committee, however, came to an abrupt standstill in late March when the state violently suppressed protests that occurred on March 24 and 25. During these two days, the climax of the 2011 protests, a vastly enlarged congregation of protesters descended upon Jamal Abdul Nasser Square (commonly referred to as “\textit{Duwwar Dakhaliyya}”) – a busy traffic circle in the center of Amman.\textsuperscript{106} When security forces entered the circle on the night of the second day, killing one person and injuring

\textsuperscript{103} Ryan, “Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan,” 368. Also see Susser, “Jordan 2011: Uneasy Lies the Head, Middle East Brief,” 2.
\textsuperscript{106} Kheeten, “Hundreds Rally for Reforms, Eradicating Corruption.”
scores more, the protesters disbanded and the members of the National Dialogue Committee refused to continue their work. King Abdullah II beseeched the committee to resume its work. They complied after a six-day absence, and the committee presented its final report two months later. Responding to the recommendations that were suggested by the committee, the government passed a new Election Law in 2012, eliminating, albeit not entirely, “one person, one vote” after its nearly twenty year imposition.

In late April 2012, the king launched the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review, which was tasked with reviewing the Jordanian constitution and proposing amendments to both enhance civil liberties and promote political democratization. Out of this review, the committee recommended a number of proposals for constitutional amendments, many of which were actually enacted later in the year. Among other important reforms, restricted the power and the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, instituted a Constitutional Court, and established the Independent Election Commission (IEC). The founding of the IEC allowed the subsequent 2013 Parliamentary Election to be monitored independently for the first time in Jordanian history (previous elections had

---


The enormity of the 2011 protests pushed King Abdullah II to make greater political concessions than the Hashemites had allowed since 1989. Along with a number of other key reforms, the SNTV system, as mentioned above, was finally eliminated with the passing of the 2012 Election Law. The new election law finally complied with protestors’ demands for proportional representation; however, it only did so nominally.\footnote{Ryan, “The Implications of Jordan’s New Electoral Law.”} Leaving aside the continued failure to address gerrymandered electoral boundaries, the new law designates only twenty-seven out of the assembly’s one hundred and fifty to be contested through a proportional national list; the remaining seats are occupied by independent candidates who are elected based on a system that very closely reflects the 1993 SNTV system.\footnote{There is no official English version of the 2012 Election Law. See Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan “Qanun Raqam (25) li-Sanat 2012: Qanun al-Intkhab li-Majlis al-Nuwab wa Ta’dilatih [Law Number 25 for the Year 2012: Election Law for the House of Representatives and Its Amendments],” 2012 \(<\text{http://www.lob.gov.jo/ui/laws/search_no.jsp?no=25\&year=2012}\>>; and Kao, “Jordan’s Ongoing Election Law Battle.”} As a result of this mixed electoral system, political parties are now confined to contesting a mere twenty-seven seats. Hence, even though the protests of 2011 technically led to reform and the removal of the hated “one person, one vote” system, its key precepts remain the method of determining the composition of the overwhelming majority of the parliament.

Perhaps sensing that the new election law was insufficient to placate the opposition by itself, King Abdullah II announced that it represented but the first step...
toward realizing his “vision” of a parliamentary democracy. The next step in the process, he argued, was a rectification of the means by which governments are selected. Immediately before the 2013 parliamentary elections he declared:

After the upcoming elections, we will start piloting a parliamentary government system, including how our Prime Ministers and Cabinets are selected. […] Historically, the Prime Minister and Ministers have been chosen for their leadership qualities and expertise, and approved by a vote of confidence in Parliament. […] However, it is important that we start building our system of parliamentary government. As a first step, we will change how the Prime Minister is designated after this upcoming election.

1. The new prime minister, while not necessarily an MP, will be designated based on consultation with the majority coalition of parliamentary blocs.
2. If no clear majority emerges initially, then the designation will be based upon consultation with all parliamentary blocs.
3. The Prime Minister-designate will then consult with the parliamentary blocs to form the new parliamentary government and agree on its program, which will still have to obtain and maintain the Lower House’s vote of confidence.

While King Abdullah II’s plan was supposed to put Jordan on the path toward parliamentary government, the requisite legislative capacities for greater parliamentary involvement in the government had not yet been established. The reforms moved the electoral system in the right direction, but their effect was still limited. Because they did not address the problems in the legislative electoral process, the parliament was unable to exploit its expanded role. As such, the reforms were insufficient to act as a basis to allow the gradual creation of a parliamentary democracy.

Because of these shortcomings, the parliament proved incapable of performing the newly designated responsibilities King Abdullah II had set out for it. In the two months

---


following the parliamentary election the deputies were unable to agree upon a new prime minister. They subsequently succumbed to pressure from the royal court to extend the mandate of the incumbent head of the monarchically appointed, short-term government, Abdullah Ensour. Ensour subsequently held consultations with deputies regarding the composition of his cabinet, but later proceeded to disregard their recommendations and formed the government himself.

In a recent interview, Hamzeh Mansour, General Secretary of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) and former MP, argued that because the monarchy has not encouraged the expansion of political parties in the parliament, the process has been caught in a vicious cycle; King Abdullah II continues to argue that parties need to play a greater role in the government, but, at the same time, he has not allowed parliament to engage with a system that encourages (or even allows) the development of political parties. Parties are discouraged and marginalized at the parliamentary level, thereby preventing their ability to influence the government.

**The Power of the Rentier Elite**

Reflecting on the gross disconnect between the monarchy’s rhetoric and reality, Curtis Ryan and Jillian Schwedler argue that Jordan represents a new type of “hybrid” regime, wherein the monarchy “continues to proclaim its commitment to democratization while elected parliaments are made increasingly irrelevant to governance.” This hybridity seems to be personified by the failure of the 2012 reform package. Its


120 Hamzeh Mansour, interview with the Identity Center, November 4, 2013. See Identity Center, “Fostering a Parliamentary Democracy in Jordan through Electoral Reform.”

121 Ryan and Schwedler, “Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?” 138-151.
shortcomings allow the monarchy to present itself as a team of committed reformists whose endeavours to achieve a more democratic system are thwarted by other political actors. King Abdullah II has himself explicitly blamed the lack of movement on internal opposition. He claims that his attempts to achieve greater reform and transform the kingdom into a constitutional monarchy (which would purportedly reflect the British system) have been impaired by the Jordanian elite.\textsuperscript{122}

In particular, Abdullah II blames the failures of his democratization efforts on the “old dinosaurs” with whom he has to contend.\textsuperscript{123} The “dinosaurs” to whom he refers encompass a wide array of personalities who have a stake in the perpetuation of the status quo. They include: tribal leaders who have long benefited from a privileged connection to the monarchy, military retirees who have benefitted from nepotistic appointments, the business class that has profited from neoliberal reform, the political elite, and the state’s security forces. The entrenched power of these groups was chiefly amassed as a result of the monarchy’s long-standing reliance on neopatrimonial relationships with them as a result of the monarchy’s continued protection of those connections through defensive democratization. In his discussion of the “resilience of the rentier system,” Marwan Muasher (who served under the king as both foreign minister and deputy prime minister) argues that the king and elite are not always in opposition, but that “the rentier system has, over time and through entrenchment, created monsters who will only acquiesce as long as the system perpetuates the old policy of favors.”\textsuperscript{124}

Exasperated by the political deadlock that contradictory ambitions within the


\textsuperscript{123} Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring.”

\textsuperscript{124} See Muasher, “A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan,” 4.
kingdom have produced, King Abdullah II casually stated recently that he felt as if he wanted to abdicate.\textsuperscript{125} Of course, his expressed desire for reform and the devolution of power has to be viewed with a fair amount of skepticism. His blaming the elite for stalled reform may simply represent but the newest manifestation of Hashemite defensive democratization. Nonetheless, even if Abdullah II were willing to commit himself to authentic democratization efforts, he is correct in asserting that he would have to contend with a number of powerful groups unwilling to embrace such changes.

\textit{Conclusion}

The monarchy’s use of defensive democratization to perpetuate extant neopatrimonial relationships and placate the economic grievances of East Bank Jordanians has placed its two key support bases on opposite sides of the reform issue. The monarchy’s façade institutions have, on the one hand, served to reinforce the Hashemites’ neopatrimonial relations, producing a diverse group of Jordanians with a large stake in the status quo. On the other hand, most East Bank Jordanians have not received the fruits of neoliberal economic reforms, but solely experienced the negative effects of façade democracy. Formerly dependent on the state for subsidies and employment, they witnessed a precipitous decline in their socio-economic status from the late 1980s. That the elite has benefited under defensive democratization while most East Bankers have suffered explains the two groups’ disparate responses to reform. It clarifies why the elite have attempted to stall reform and ensure their political and financial privilege, while most East Bank Jordanians have repeatedly flooded into the kingdom’s streets to demand a political voice and an end to corruption.

\textsuperscript{125} Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring.”
The monarchy’s long-term reliance on defensive democratization as a cover for unpopular economic liberalization illustrates why the East Bankers and elite mobilized in opposite directions in 2011. It also elucidates the process by which Palestinian-Jordanians have been marginalized not only from the bureaucracy and military, but also from the legislature. An examination of defensive democratization simultaneously helps to clarify why a handful of Palestinian-Jordanians in the business community benefitted from the neoliberal economic reform and transformed into Hashemite supporters.126

What defensive democratization does not explain, however, is why Palestinian-Jordanians, who have been most disadvantaged by the process, did not take to the streets in 2011 alongside the East Bank protestors. Defensive democratization has denied Palestinian-Jordanians a voice in the kingdom’s political institutions. It has forced them to be absent from the kingdom’s political institutions. But is that enough to explain the absence of Palestinian-Jordanians in grassroots political opposition? The following chapter will examine the effects of defensive democratization in the context of other, longer term processes to help explain why Palestinian-Jordanians did not rise up in significant numbers in 2011, and why the few who did participate chose to conceal their identities.

126 Ryan, “Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan,” 385.
Chapter 4: The Growing Precariousness of Palestinian-Jordanians

Introduction

Defensive democratization, as the preceding chapter illustrated, did little to improve the position of Palestinian-Jordanians in the wake of King Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank. Palestinian-Jordanians gained neither a greater political voice in Jordanian politics, nor any reason to believe that their civil rights were any better protected. Instead, the process served solely to reinforce neopatrimonial relationships and extend the exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians into the legislative sphere. At the same time, the limited opening up that did occur in the immediate aftermath of the 1989 protests allowed hitherto suppressed sentiments regarding intercommunal relations within the kingdom to surface. East Bank nationalists, who had been growing in number since the 1960s, and especially in the wake of the 1970 civil war, were provided with new freedom and new fora to express their respective concerns. With Jordan’s recent withdrawal from the West Bank, fierce debates regarding the future of Palestinian-Jordanians emerged. Palestinian-Jordanians residing in the East Bank became the focus of these discussions because their position was left ambiguous in the disengagement process. Were they Jordanians or Palestinians? Could they maintain both identities? What would be their role in the kingdom?

Latent East Bank Nationalism

The seeds of East Bank nationalism were sown during the mandate period in opposition to foreign – largely Palestinian – encroachments (discussed in chapter one). These seeds, however, remained dormant for several decades because the monarchy’s
efforts to instill a hybrid Jordanian identity hindered the growth of an exclusively East Bank identity. With the rise of Palestinian-Jordanian nationalism in the mid-1960s, however, a contrasting and uniquely East Bank identity sprouted.\(^1\) These sentiments solidified as a result of the 1967 War. For East Bankers, Israel’s seizure of the West Bank during the war changed everything. They did not just view Israel’s capture of the West Bank as a loss of Jordanian land, but as the disappearance of the uniquely Palestinian-Jordanian territorial contribution to the kingdom.\(^2\) As such, some East Bankers began to view Palestinian-Jordanians – particularly those residing in the East Bank – as guests within a kingdom to which they had no claim.\(^3\)

If the 1967 War had encouraged East Bank nationalism to bud, the 1970 civil war provoked a full bloom. The civil war left many East Bankers feeling as if they had been betrayed by those for whom they had graciously provided since the 1948 War.\(^4\) This resulted not only in a rise of anti-Palestinian sentiments, but also in both a reinforcement of East Bank support for the Hashemite monarchy and a bridging of some of the extant intertribal divides.\(^5\) This fruition of East Bank nationalism (and, indeed, an East Bank-Palestinian-Jordanian divide) was inadvertently encouraged by the monarchy in the wake of the civil war.

---

As the dust settled after the 1967 war, the monarchy (as explained in chapter two) established an “East Bank first” policy within the public sector and was forced to redefine Jordan’s relationship with the West Bank. The monarchy’s privileging of East Bankers was, as Adnan Abu-Odeh argues, “tantamount to a declaration that Transjordanians [East Bankers] were the favored, trusted community.” This favouritism was particularly salient within the security institutions. By privileging East Bankers over Palestinian-Jordanians in sensitive institutions, the monarchy made it clear which demographic it considered loyal and which it did not. Such an overt distinction prompted a self-perpetuating exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians, as it encouraged the East Bank dominated institutions to treat Palestinian-Jordanians with suspicion. In recent years, institutional discrimination against Palestinian-Jordanians reached such extremes that many Palestinian-Jordanian businesses now employ prominent East Bank Jordanian front men whose job it is to ensure that the organizations’ transactions make it through the East Bank-dominated bureaucracy.

Along with the increasing entrenchment of “East Bank first,” East Bank Jordanians erroneously believed that the monarchy was also encouraging the discrimination of Palestinian-Jordanians through its attempts to formulate a new, culturally defined national identity. After the civil war, the monarchy shifted from defining Jordanian identity through a dual focus on juridical inclusion and Hashemite Islamic and Arab nationalist credentials toward endorsing an identity centered around a prescribed East Bank culture. Abandoning its former focus on hybridity, which had previously been necessary for the integration of the West Bank, the monarchy sought to

---

unify all Jordanians residing on the East Bank into “one Jordanian family” (*al-usrah al-Urdaniyyah al-wahidah*). This shift was formulated with two goals in mind: firstly, to temper the growing polarity between Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians by stressing Jordanian cohesion and, secondly, to ease the mounting pressure from Israel via its “alternative homeland” schemes by asserting Jordan’s cultural uniqueness.

In its efforts to bring Jordanians together into a cohesive family, the monarchy completely reinvented what it meant to be Jordanian. Increasingly focused on ensuring a consolidated position in the East Bank after the civil war, the monarchy attempted to formulate a national identity that accentuated a uniquely East Bank character. However, because a uniform East Bank culture was not extant, Hussein’s assertion of a new cultural identity involved first homogenizing and redefining East Bank culture; only then could the invented result be projected as a representation of “authentic Jordanianness.” As with any process of nation building, traditions had to be created and then homogenously projected across a heterogeneous demographic. In this process of invention, the monarchy borrowed heavily from the fictitious representation of the Bedouin that John Bagot Glubb had formulated within the ranks of the Arab Legion during his command of the force between 1939 and 1956.

The most visible manifestation of the monarchy’s new prescriptive national identity – as well as its borrowing from Glubb’s Bedouin ideals – was King Hussein’s

---

11 Massad, Colonial Effects, 250.
adoption of the red and white kufiyah after the civil war. According to Joseph Massad, that specific piece of headwear had been “coined as exclusively Jordanian” as a result of Glubb’s introducing it to the Arab Legion in the early 1930s. With pictures of Hussein clad in a red and white kufiyah hanging on walls across the kingdom after 1970, the headscarf became a symbol of affinity with the (invented) history and culture of Jordan as well as a sign of loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy.

In effect, the red and white kufiyah served as a sartorial embodiment of the monarchy’s newly formulated national identity. Citizens could either adopt it or face exclusion. The scarves, like the identity, did not inherently denote whether the wearer was Palestinian or East Bank Jordanian, but rather his or her loyalty or opposition to the Hashemites. As such, just as East Bankers began to wear the red and white kufiyah with increasing prevalence, so too did more assimilated Palestinian-Jordanians residing in the East Bank.

King Hussein accompanied his red and white kufiyah with the invention and introduction of an entire corpus of supposedly traditional Bedouin folk culture. Manifestations of this invented culture were disseminated across Jordan via television and radio. Programs focusing on the Jordanian army, the Bedouin, and the monarchy

---

12 The post-civil war adoption of the red and white headscarf is easily identifiable through pictorial evidence. The pre-1970 absence of the scarf can be observed in the pictures King Hussein included in his autobiography. See King Hussein bin Talal, Uneasy Lies the Head: The Autobiography of His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (New York: Bernard Geis and Random House, 1962). For the overt introduction of the scarf after 1970, see Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan; and James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989). The continued pervasiveness and importance of the headscarf can be seen in the photos King Abdullah II included in his new book. See King Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril (London: Penguin, 2011). More importantly, photos of King Abdullah II clad in a red and white kufiyah continue to hang on walls in public spaces across the country, just as photos of his son in the scarf are increasingly being erected.

13 Massad, Colonial Effects, 250.

14 Massad, Colonial Effects, 250.

15 Massad, Colonial Effects, ch 2.
became increasingly popular. The programs were also accompanied by the monarchy’s introduction of what were purported to be traditional Bedouin songs. Played on the state-controlled Jordanian radio, these songs, which were created with the help of an in-studio lyricist and composer, were projected as traditional folk songs.\textsuperscript{16}

With the monarchy’s focus on culturally defining what it meant to be Jordanian, both hadari (settled) East Bankers as well as Palestinian-Jordanians living in the East Bank began to read, watch, and listen to Bedouin stories, folklore, dancing, and poetry on an almost daily basis lives.\textsuperscript{17} Becoming key platforms for expressing loyalty, these cultural expressions of “Jordanianness” became a litmus test for defining inclusion and exclusion.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, while Hashemite sympathizers explicitly accepted the new identity, opponents of the monarchy articulated their opposing identities by refusing to adopt the prescribed “Jordanian” customs. Some Palestinian-Jordanian opponents of the monarchy, for example, embraced the contrasting black and white kufiyyah: an article of clothing that had become a symbol of Palestinian nationalism because of the frequency with which it was worn by Yassir Arafat.

In placing growing importance on its conception of primordial (and, indeed, pre-Palestinian) “Jordanians,” the monarchy unintentionally undermined the importance of other means of asserting Jordanianness. It replaced juridical definitions with cultural ones as the prime determiners of citizenship. The new “Jordanian” identity was predicated on a cultural affiliation that explicitly defined Jordanians as being separate from Palestinians. Juridical definitions of being Jordanian grew progressively less important. Citizenship no longer seemed sufficient to guarantee rights.

\textsuperscript{16} Massad, Colonial Effects, 250.
\textsuperscript{17} Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom, 244.
\textsuperscript{18} Massad, Colonial Effects, 250.
Divergent Interpretations of Disengagement

As the monarchy increasingly focused on the East Bank throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it continued to concentrate on fostering unity between all of the East Bank inhabitants. Eager to ensure that disengagement would not be misinterpreted as support for discrimination against Palestinian-Jordanians in the East Bank, King Hussein was very explicit about the role of Palestinian-Jordanians during his speech on July 31, 1988:

[I]t has to be understood with all clarity, and without any ambiguity, that the measures regarding the West Bank, concern only the occupied Palestinian land and its people. They naturally do not relate in any way to Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. They all have the full rights of citizenship and all its obligations, the same as any other citizen irrespective of his origin.19

Hence, whereas West Bank Palestinian-Jordanians were to immediately lose their citizenship, the position of Palestinian-Jordanians on the East Bank would technically remain unchanged. Realizing that the disengagement would likely exacerbate existing internal conflicts in the East Bank, however, the monarchy intensified its assertions of East Bank togetherness throughout the disengagement process.

Immediately before and after disengagement, the monarchy undertook a wide-ranging process of “Jordanization,” which emphasized the solidarity of all East Bankers.20 This message was also underscored in the disengagement speech:

If national unity in any country is dear and precious, it is for us in Jordan more than that. It is the basis of our stability and the cause of our development and prosperity, as well as the foundation of our national security and the source of our faith in the future. It is also a living embodiment of the principles of the Great Arab Revolt which we inherited and whose banner we are proudly carrying. It is also a living example of constructive plurality and a sound nucleus of wider Arab unity.

19 All quotes from the disengagement speech are taken from the English translation of the speech, which is available on King Abdullah II’s official website. King Hussein bin Talal, “Address to the Nation,” Amman, July 31, 1988. <<http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/speeches_letters.html>>
Based on that, safeguarding national unity is a sacred duty that will not be compromised. Any attempt to undermine it, under any pretext, would only help the enemy carry out his policy of expansion at the expense of Palestine and Jordan alike. Consequently, true nationalism lies in bolstering and fortifying national unity. Moreover, the responsibility to safeguard it falls on every one of you, leaving no place in our midst for sedition or treachery. With God's help, we shall be, as always, a united cohesive family, whose members are joined by bonds of brotherhood, affection, awareness, and common national objectives.21

The monarchy’s attempts to accompany disengagement with “Jordanization,” and thereby prevent growing intercommunal polarity, backfired. Contrary to the monarchy’s intention, Palestinian-Jordanians were alienated by the campaign’s focus on eliminating dual loyalties, while East Bank nationalists understood it to be tacit approval of their subordination of Palestinian-Jordanians.22

Believing the East Bank tribes to be the sole members of the “one Jordanian family,” East Bank nationalists misinterpreted disengagement. They saw the withdrawal and the accompanying expressions of familial unity as monarchical approval for growing discrimination against Palestinian-Jordanians and a green light to start pushing for “institutionalization of Transjordanian [East Banker] domination” over Palestinian-Jordanians.23 For East Bank nationalists, disengagement ended, rather than began, Jordan’s matrimonial experiment; according to the nationalists, East Bank Jordanians were, consequently, entitled to their contribution (the East Bank), and Palestinian-Jordanians to their’s (the West Bank). In this formulation, disengagement helped to clarify Jordan’s relationship with Palestinian-Jordanians in the West Bank. Its relationship with Palestinian-Jordanians in the East Bank, however, was left uncertain.24

---

21 King Hussein bin Talal, “Address to the Nation.”
22 Brynen, “Palestine and the Arab State System,” 618.
23 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom, 228.
Disengagement reframed the Jordanian-Palestinian debate, shifting the focus away from Jordan’s relationship with the West Bank to the future of Palestinian-Jordanians living in the East Bank. With the limited opening up that “democratization” permitted, hitherto unexpressed sentiments started to be articulated.\textsuperscript{25} As voices across the political spectrum began to debate what it meant to be “Jordanian,” East Bank nationalists increasingly argued that Palestinian-Jordanians were but temporary guests within the kingdom.\textsuperscript{26} This ephemerality justified viewing Palestinian-Jordanians as lesser citizens in the kingdom. In fact, Abu-Odeh says it was at this point that the phrase, “\textit{ana ibn al-balad},” which he (loosely) translates as “I am a genuine Jordanian” became prevalent.\textsuperscript{27}

The demotion of Palestinian-Jordanians was not only a function of growing East Bank nationalism, but also a result of the persistence of “alternative homeland” debates. Israeli assertions that Jordan could serve as the Palestinian homeland had managed to survive through disengagement. While refuting “alternative homeland” formulations was not a central motivating factor for Jordan’s disengagement, it had contributed to King Hussein’s calculations, and he had certainly hoped that disengagement would finally end the debate.\textsuperscript{28} The scheme outlasted not only disengagement, but also the declaration of


\textsuperscript{26} Abu-Odeh, \textit{Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom}, 239.

\textsuperscript{27} Abu-Odeh, \textit{Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom}, 228.

intent to declare Palestinian statehood in 1988 by the PLO chairman Yassir Arafat and Washington’s subsequent decision to open a dialogue with the PLO.\textsuperscript{29} For East Bank nationalists, the limbo in which Jordan was placed by the Israel’s continual references to an “alternative homeland” facilitated the requisite atmosphere of temporariness necessary to cast Palestinian-Jordanians as guests.\textsuperscript{30}

Palestinian-Jordanians interpreted disengagement and the monarchy’s simultaneous focus on “Jordanization” as an attempt to suppress their identity. They too were affected by the continued threat of “alternative homeland” schemes and by the apparent transient ambiguity of their position in Jordan. Some Palestinian-Jordanians did view their position within the kingdom as a temporary situation pending the genesis of a Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{31} This disposition made it possible for many of them to tolerate growing discrimination and political exclusion.\textsuperscript{32}

In fact, many Palestinian-Jordanians themselves were not keen on participation within Jordan political life. The PLO leadership as well as many within the Palestinian-Jordanian community itself maintained that Palestinian-Jordanians should not engage in political life in the kingdom. To do so, they argued, would undermine their refugee status


\textsuperscript{30} Lamis el Muhtaseb, “Jordan’s East Banker Palestinian Schism,” \textit{Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF)}, April 2013, 2. <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/74689aacedd3e8fcb1f7f7370a77fb67.pdf>>


\textsuperscript{32} Abu-Odeh, \textit{Jordanians, Palestinians, & the Hashemite Kingdom}, 228.
and reinforce Israeli assertions that Jordan was the alternative Palestinian home.\footnote{Brand, “The Intifadah and the Arab World,” 511; and Mishal, West Bank/East Bank, 27.}

However, more threatening than political exclusion for most Palestinian-Jordanians were the implications that disengagement and growing prejudice could reap on their civil rights within the kingdom. Indeed, it already appeared as if disengagement was rendering Palestinian-Jordanians second-class citizens.

Along with stripping the 1.5 million inhabitants in the West Bank of their Jordanian citizenship, the 1988 disengagement also served to stratify the legal status of Palestinian-Jordanians who remained on the East Bank. A system of bridge cards, which had been introduced in 1983 to facilitate expedient travel between the East and West Banks, became the key determiner of Palestinian-Jordanian citizenship within the kingdom after 1988. The monarchy had initially installed the system to allow the Jordanian authorities to monitor the movement of West Bank Palestinian-Jordanians within the kingdom to ensure that they actually returned to the West Bank.\footnote{Hazem Jamjoun, “Palestinian Refugees in Jordan and the Revocation of Citizenship: An Interview with Anis F. Kassim,” Jadaliyya, January 28, 2013, 2.} Accordingly, different groups of Palestinian-Jordanians were assigned colour-differentiated cards. Palestinian-Jordanians who habitually lived on the West Bank were issued green cards. Palestinian-Jordanians who habitually lived on the East Bank (or abroad) but had material or familial connections on the other side, were issued yellow cards. Likewise, those that held an Israeli identity number prior to the introduction of the cards were also issued yellow cards. Lastly, Gazan refugees who resided in Jordan were issued blue cards.\footnote{Oroub al-Abed, “Palestinians Refugees in Jordan,” Forced Migration Online (February 2004): 12.}
This card-based system of statistical accountability became the basis of determining citizenship after 1988. Green card holders were designated as Palestinians and yellow card holders were recognized as Jordanians. Consequently, the 1.5 million Palestinian-Jordanians who resided in the West Bank, and therefore held green cards, lost their Jordanian citizenship overnight as a result of the 1988 disengagement. The yellow card holding East Bankers, on the other hand, retained theirs. However, there were also a handful of green card holders who had been living for long durations either in the East Bank or abroad. They too lost their citizenship, despite King Hussein’s assurances that disengagement would not affect Palestinian-Jordanians residing in the East Bank. The revocation of citizenship from those residing in the East Bank was not extensive, but the growing fear that citizenship was no longer secure was pervasive.\textsuperscript{36}

Already weakened by disengagement, the legal position of Palestinian-Jordanians further deteriorated as a result of subsequent citizenship revocations. After 1988, the Follow-Up and Inspection Department of the Ministry of the Interior began to push the limits of its role vis-à-vis the 1988 disengagement regulations and asserted its ability to revoke citizenship.\textsuperscript{37} Without warning, the Follow-Up and Inspection Department started to revoke yellow cards from Palestinian-Jordanians, and replace them with green cards. The exchange of a yellow card for a green card involved the removal of one’s national identification number from the document. The removal was significant, as nationality numbers became the determiner of Jordanian citizenship in 1992; thereafter, the Jordanian government ceased to recognize Jordanians without this number as nationals.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} Brand, “The Intifadah and the Arab World,” 507.
\textsuperscript{38} Human Rights Watch, “Stateless Again,” 5.
The extent of post-1988 citizenship revocations is unclear, as official numbers have never been released. However, estimates regarding the number of revocations that have thus far occurred range from the hundreds to the tens of thousands.\textsuperscript{39}

As with the removal of West Bank citizenships in 1988, these subsequent revocations were not predicated on legal or constitutional changes. Instead, citizenship was (and continues to be) stripped based on the department’s own tenuous interpretation of the 1988 disengagement regulations. Even though they lack a legal or constitutional basis, the regulations have, nonetheless, been used to supersede Jordanian law. Within Jordan’s legal framework, however, the terms of citizenship entitlement and revocation are clearly defined.

Article 5 of the Jordanian constitution states that citizenship in the kingdom “shall be defined by law.”\textsuperscript{40} Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality functions as the kingdom’s current determiner of citizenship rights in the kingdom.\textsuperscript{41} Palestinian-Jordanians (in both the East Bank and the West Bank) are clearly included within the law’s definition of a Jordanian citizen; Article 3 (i) of the 1954 law grants citizenship to “[a]ny person who, not being Jewish, possessed Palestinian nationality before 15 May 1948 and was a regular

\textsuperscript{39} The most often cited figure was produced in a Human Rights Watch report. It claims that over 2,700 Jordanians of Palestinian origin lost their citizenship between 2004 and 2008. See Human Rights Watch, “Stateless Again,” 5. In 2009, a Jordan Times article refuted the claims that the process of citizenship revocations was taking place. It maintained that the authorities were legitimately regulating the distribution of bridge cards as per the disengagement regulations. The article stated that authorities had “replaced 190 yellow cards with green ones and 5,130 green cards with yellow ones in the period between March 1 and June 30, 2009, and replaced 204 yellow cards with green and 4,139 green with yellow in the same period in 2008.” See K. Malkawi, “House Panel Backs Ministry Procedures on ‘Citizenship Revocation’,” Jordan Times, July 17, 2009. <<http://jordantimes.com/house-panel-backs-ministry-procedures-on-citizenship-revocation>>


\textsuperscript{41} Within Jordan’s laws, “nationality” and “citizenship” are used interchangeably. Because I am referring purely to Jordanians’ legal status within the country, I have chosen to use “citizenship” for the sake of clarity. When quoting from texts that use “nationality,” however, I have not changed the original diction.
resident in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan between 20 December 1949 and 16 February 1954.\textsuperscript{42}

Article 18 of the 1954 law also identifies \textit{all} of the circumstances in which a Jordanian’s citizenship can be revoked:

1) Any person who enters the military service of a foreign State without the prior permission or leave of the Jordanian Council of Ministers and refuses to leave the same when so directed by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan shall lose his nationality.

2) The Council of Ministers may, with the approval of His Majesty, declare that a Jordanian has lost Jordanian nationality if:
   a) He enters the civil service of a foreign State and refuses to leave the same when so directed by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan;
   b) He enters the service of an enemy State;
   c) He commits or attempts to commit an act deemed to endanger the peace and security of the State.\textsuperscript{43}

Because citizenship has not been revoked on the grounds of specific legal conditions, legal redress is difficult. In 1990, the High Court of Justice ruled that disengagement was an “act of sovereignty” and was thus outside of the court’s jurisdiction; it quixotically maintained that “[i]t is a well recognized principle that issues of nationality fall within the very domestic jurisdiction of the state.”\textsuperscript{44}

Even though the exact number of people who have lost their rights as a result of citizenship revocations remains unclear, the arbitrary and unexpected nature with which the Follow-Up Department has approached its task has left the entire population of Jordanian-Palestinians unsure of their position within Jordanian society. Many within the kingdom began to feel as if they were “mere passers-by or second-class citizens in their

\textsuperscript{43} Kingdom of Jordan, “Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality.”
\textsuperscript{44} Kingdom of Jordan, “High Court of Justice, Decision 164/90,” \textit{Palestine Yearbook of International Law 1990-1991}, 70.
country.”45 The Jordanian Initiative for Equal Citizenship, for instance, maintains that “[m]any people now believe that the principle of equality, for which the Constitution calls, is a worn-out concept and a remnant of the past.”46 As a result of both citizenship revocations and intensifying East Bank nationalism, Palestinian-Jordanians have begun to fear undertaking any action that might be deemed disloyal. They have grown decreasingly willing to engage in any oppositional activity, or even to risk participation in civil society.

The Extension of “East Bank First” into Civil Society

The ability to engage in civil society ostensibly improved in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Charitable organizations and professional associations had existed in the kingdom before 1989, but they subsequently proliferated. Between 1989 and 1994, the number of Jordanian-based non-governmental organizations, for instance, grew by sixty-seven percent (from 477 to 796).47 However, as with the advent of parliamentary life in 1989, allowing for the expansion of civil society was not simply a benevolent monarchical response to grassroots pressure.48 On the contrary, the monarchy used civil society as a tool of defensive democracy in the midst of politico-economic instability. As with the reopened legislature, increased associational freedom was designed to act as a monarchical safety valve for discontent.

46 The Jordanian Initiative for Equal Citizenship, “Citizenship Letter to King Abdullah II.”
Although the monarchy allowed civil society organizations to emerge, it made sure that they remained firmly within monarchical control. This was accomplished, as Quintan Wiktorowicz argues, by establishing mandatory bureaucratic processes that enabled the monarchy to regulate civil society organizations. The monarchy permitted civil society organizations to multiply, but it ensured that each maintained a connection with the government. In effect, it challenged their very definition as civil society organizations, pulling them more towards the state and political society (as outlined in the introduction).

The monarchy set stringent limits on financing and assembly, which are enforced through lengthy bureaucratic processes, to ensure that organizations do not engage in unfavourable political activity. For instance, all NGOs are required to register with the General Union for Voluntary Societies (GUVS). Moreover, for every public event, each organization must apply for a permit. Organizations that are most likely to be granted permission to either form or to hold events are those that maintain warm relations with the monarchy and steer clear of contentious political issues.

As a result of these restrictions, most of the organizations that have been given permission to participate are purely social and explicitly loyal. In fact, a large number of the organization that supposedly operate within the realm of “civil society” are directly affiliated with the monarchy, constituting “Royal” or “governmental” NGOs (RONGOs, GONGOs). The paradoxical description of a “government non-governmental organization” personifies how the monarchy has used its supposed opening up of civil

49 Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control,” 52.
society to further control Jordanians. With such close connections to the bureaucracy and government, a space independent of the state scarcely exists in Jordan.\textsuperscript{52} When movements like \textit{hirak} try to exploit this space, they are quickly suppressed.

The monarchy has thus established clearly defined operational limits for all civil society organizations. It forces all organizations to operate within its panopticon gaze, threatening severe repercussions for those who stray beyond its limits.\textsuperscript{53} Organizations that infringe on the system’s regulations, such as the \textit{hirak}, are dissolved and their members persecuted. Because of widespread paranoia regarding the reach of the state’s security institutions, and thus the inevitability of being caught, few are willing to test these boundaries.\textsuperscript{54}

Threatened by the potential implications of stepping outside of the monarchical-defined parameters of civil society activity, most organizations practice stringent self-regulation, toeing the monarchy’s line to mitigate risk.\textsuperscript{55} Consequently, these supposed fora of independent socio-political expression serve instead as a means of further monitoring the population. They allow grassroots participation, but also control it. The effects of the bureaucratic regulation of civil society and the watchful scrutiny of the \textit{mukhabarat} (intelligence agency) has restricted the participation of all Jordanians. However, as is the case with the legislature, the monarchy’s dominance over civil society has, in particular, had acute implications for Palestinian-Jordanians.

\textsuperscript{53} Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control,” 48
\textsuperscript{54} Wiktorowicz “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East.”
\textsuperscript{55} Wiktorowicz “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East,” 615.
Palestinian-Jordanian exclusion from state institutions reached a new zenith in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Through disengagement and defensive democratization, the post-1970 “East Bank first” policy was further entrenched within the government, bureaucracy, and military, and was also extended into the newly reopened legislature. Excluded from the state, Palestinian-Jordanians began to feel as if their rights were subject to the goodwill of East Bankers, the latter having attained a near monopoly of the country’s bureaucratic and security institutions.\textsuperscript{56}

Concerned that even a low ranking official in the Follow-Up and Inspection Department had the power to remove one’s citizenship, many Palestinian-Jordanians started to dread, and even eschew, any contact with the Jordanian bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{57} Amid growing East Bank nationalism and accusations of dual loyalties directed against Palestinian-Jordanians, these anxieties led to a rise in Palestinian-Jordanian unwillingness to engage in any activity that might be interpreted as being “unpatriotic.”\textsuperscript{58} Believing their legal rights to be hanging by a thread, whilst East Banker intelligence officers and bureaucrats continually questioned their loyalty, Palestinian-Jordanians grew increasingly reluctant to risk their positions in Jordanian society by participating in civil society organizations.

\textit{Fractured Frames}

In the 2000s, the monarchy gave new voice to the unity rhetoric that had emerged during disengagement. It launched several successive campaigns articulating various


\textsuperscript{57} El Muhtaseb, “Jordan’s East Banker Palestinian Schism,” 2; and Human Rights Watch, “Stateless Again,” 28.

reformulations of national unity. The monarchy’s “Jordan First” (*al-Urdan Awalan*) and “We Are All Jordan” (*Kullina al-Urdan*), which were launched in 2002 and 2006 respectively, both reaffirmed the same unity rhetoric that was expressed in 1988.\(^{59}\) The two massive public relations campaigns not only contained a strong economic component and robust nationalist approach, they also implicitly reminded Jordanians that their first priority was to the kingdom. While stressing solidarity, therefore, the programs also clearly, if implicitly, warned Jordanians that anyone who did not put Jordan “first” would be considered disloyal and, thus, un-Jordanian.\(^{60}\)

While these Hashemite programs may have constituted endeavours to once again foster unity, they, like the “Jordanization” programs surrounding disengagement, have only encouraged East Bank Jordanian nationalism and further alienated Palestinian-Jordanians. With such intense focus on Jordanian unity and loyalty, Palestinian-Jordanians fear engaging in any activity that would suggest they harbour mixed loyalties or dual identities. Consequently, Palestinian-Jordanians are hesitant to participate in any political movement that is framed as being exclusively Palestinian-Jordanian. They fear that to do so would render them vulnerable to the loss of rights and citizenship revocations.\(^{61}\)

\(^{59}\) A brief outline of both can be found on the Arabic version of King Abdullah II’s official website. \(<\text{http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/ar_JO/initiatives/view/id/33.html}>; \text{ and} \ <\text{http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/ar_JO/initiatives/view/id/34.html}>\)


The reluctance to engage in any movement that is framed around Palestinian-Jordanian issues has been reinforced by the entrenched problems with constructing a frame that appeals to broad cross-sections of the Palestinian-Jordanian people. Finding common ground upon which Palestinian-Jordanians can agree has proven extremely difficult. The arduousness of this process is in large part a result of the continued ambiguity and transience surrounding the position of Palestinian-Jordanians in the kingdom. Excluded by the monarchy and encouraged by the PLO to focus on trans-state Palestinian issues, Palestinian-Jordanians adopted floating identities in the decades after Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank in 1948 (discussed in chapter two). This disposition has allowed many to endure, and even accept, their political marginalization because they have simultaneously enjoyed the benefits of guaranteed legal rights in the kingdom.

Throughout the decades of political marginalization, floating identities have remained prevalent, for they do not require political empowerment, only legal protection. In this sense, the position of Palestinian-Jordanians in the kingdom has represented an acceptable solution for what many Palestinian-Jordanians view as a transient limbo period pending their return to Palestine. The situation in Jordan has also provided significant benefits for Palestinian-Jordanians, regardless of their divergent social and economic positions.

Palestinian-Jordanians who continue to reside in refugee camps rely on state services. To maintain continued access to desperately needed resources, these

---

Palestinian-Jordanians have to retain their rights as citizens. Involvement in oppositional activity would jeopardize this relationship with the state. For Palestinian-Jordanians who have managed to leave the refugee camps, or sidestep them altogether, the situation has been very different, but the dynamic is quite similar. Because Palestinian-Jordanians were barred from the public sector (especially after 1970), those who left the camps primarily established themselves within the private sector in urban centers. Consisting largely of small business owners, these Palestinian-Jordanians benefitted economically from Jordan’s growing focus on neoliberal reforms, particularly privatization. As a result of the reforms, some Palestinian-Jordanians even joined the small cadre of Jordanian elites that profit from direct state patronage. Like the refugee camp inhabitants, the middle and upper classes are largely unwilling to risk their economic and legal relationship with the state for the sake of an enhanced political position. Although the exact stakes are different for each socio-economic group, all Palestinian-Jordanians face a similar dilemma: continue to work within the system and maintain what they have, or push its limits and face potential negative repercussions.

Palestinian-Jordanians are simultaneously presented with a further, albeit interrelated, predicament: were they to try frame an oppositional movement, who would be the target of their opposition? Many of the camp-dwelling Palestinian-Jordanians see

---

63 A loss of citizenship carries significant consequences, especially because Jordan does not have a refugee law. For instance, whereas Jordanian citizens are entitled to a substantial number of free or low cost medical services at government facilities, users who do not have citizenship are forced to pay substantially higher service fees. Likewise, residents without citizenship are forced to pay much higher education fees, and they do not have equal rights to land ownership. Equally importantly, families with fathers that have faced citizenship revocations also face the loss of theirs.

64 Reiter, “The Palestinian-Jordanian Rift,” 74; Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians,” 49.


the Hashemites as their sole guarantor of continued rights.\(^{68}\) They believe that East Bankers would further strip Palestinian-Jordanians of rights, were the monarchy not there to protect them. Similarly, Palestinian-Jordanians who have benefitted from economic reform and achieved greater financial stability see the monarchy as their benefactor.\(^{69}\) It was the monarchy that originally granted them citizenship and provided them with economic opportunities.

Most Palestinian-Jordanians, regardless of their socio-economic position, do not believe the monarchy to be their main source of hardship. Instead, many believe that East Bank nationalist forces within the government and bureaucracy have, unbeknownst to the Hashemites, manipulated the kingdom’s laws and subverted the monarchy’s good intentions.\(^{70}\) Appreciating the hard conditions of other Palestinian diaspora communities, many Palestinian-Jordanians believe that the monarchy has provided them with a comparatively good situation.\(^{71}\) Thus, able to focus their opposition only on a vague, amorphous group of corrupt members of the Royal Court and bureaucracy, Palestinian-Jordanians lack a clear antagonist around which they can forge a powerful frame.

Within the Palestinian-Jordanian community, moreover, there is little consensus regarding how best to rectify the situation. While some are willing to push for a Palestinian state at the cost of accusations of mixed loyalties, others would prefer to adopt a wait-and-see approach, enduring a transient existence in Jordan until a Palestinian state

\(^{68}\) See Identity Center, “The 1988 Disengagement Regulations and Their Effects on Identity and Participation in Jordan.”

\(^{69}\) Ryan, “Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan,” 367.


\(^{71}\) Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring,” 106; and Identity Center, “The 1988 Disengagement Regulations and Their Effects on Identity and Participation in Jordan.”
is born.72 In fact, Palestinian-Jordanians are not even unanimous in their desire to return to a Palestinian state, were one to be established; some would rather push for consolidated rights in Jordan, even to the detriment of their being allowed to return to Palestine.73 Thus, unable to agree on an end goal, Palestinian-Jordanians have remained socially and politically fractured. Lacking frames capable of bridging these divides, and scared that if they do develop a cohesive frame they risk losing more, Palestinian-Jordanians have not coalesced into grassroots opposition movements. Instead, Palestinian-Jordanians have chosen to engage in civil society movements that employ other, non-Palestinian-Jordanian specific frames.

The absence of Palestinian-Jordanian frames was especially manifest during the 2011 protests. Of the multitude of hirak movements that emerged, none were framed as being exclusively Palestinian-Jordanian nor pushed specifically Palestinian-Jordanian agendas.74 Instead hirak movements were established first in rural, East Bank dominated communities before spreading into urban centers. The rural movements were almost exclusively made up of East Bank Jordanians. Those that emerged in cities contained mixed demographics, but were, nonetheless, predominately East Bank Jordanian movements.75 The exact composition of hirak movements, however, is hard to quantify because of their amorphous structures as well as their purposefully overstating their East Bank Jordanian character.

That is, the *hirak* movements pragmatically chose to frame themselves as being purely East Banker. This self-representation allowed them to clearly state that, unlike protest movements raging elsewhere in the region, they were not calling for the fall of the regime. Instead, *hirak* platforms focused on select policies as well as enduring corruption.\(^76\) To allow the movements to focus on such specific grievances whilst maintaining a loyalist character, Palestinian-Jordanian participation was understated. Together the Palestinian-Jordanians and East Bank Jordanians who were involved decided that this devaluation of the Palestinian aspect of the *hirak* would allow the movements to appear supportive to the monarchy and thus simultaneously spare both the movements as well as their Palestinian-Jordanian participants in particular from accusations of disloyalty.\(^77\)

---


\(^{77}\) Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring,” 98.
Concluding Remarks

Although the concerted effort by hirak to frame themselves as exclusively East Banker movements has not yet been widely noted, it provides a crucial vantage point for understanding Palestinian-Jordanian participation in the 2011 movements, and in Jordanian civil society more generally. Recognition of the intentional downplaying of Palestinian-Jordanian participation in hirak is not vital because it reveals a vastly different demographic composition of the movements than has thus far been suggested; the majority of hirak participants were indeed East Bankers. However, acknowledging that the handful of Palestinian-Jordanians who did participate in the movements had to do so clandestinely is analytically beneficial. Appreciating this dynamic within hirak movements allows analyses to look beyond a mere discussion of why these supposedly East Bank Jordanian movements arose.

Treating hirak as East Bank phenomena, most works on the movements have hitherto worked back from this depiction, concentrating on the growing economic hardship of East Bank Jordanians and their unmet demands from 1989.78 Tracing the origin of the movements in this way is important for understanding East Bank participation, but it is also misleading because it sidelines Palestinian-Jordanians; this narrative implicitly suggests that Palestinian-Jordanians were not active because neoliberal reform did not deal them the same economic hardships as East Bankers. As a

result, this approach limits itself to an explanation of why East Bankers were active: it
does not explain why Palestinian-Jordanians were not.

Starting with the *hirak* movements’ decisions to frame themselves as being
exclusively East Banker, on the other hand, facilitates a more comprehensive analysis.
Using this self-representation as a point of departure permits one to consider not only the
event, but also the non-event. That is, it allows one not only to ask why East Bankers
participated, but also why Palestinian-Jordanians were unwilling or unable to overtly do
so. Answering the latter question is much more complex. It has required the unfolding of
layer upon layer of historical context. Yet, only by understanding the longer-term
historical processes of transforming identity politics and growing Palestinian-Jordanian
precariousness can the implications of the demographic composition of the 2011 protests
be sufficiently understood.

Examining the 2011 protests through this wider contextual lens clarifies the
relationship between participation in these recent events and the protracted process of
Hashemite statecraft. It demonstrates that the current precariousness of Palestinian-
Jordanians and the rising discontent among East Bank Jordanians are both functions of
the same Hashemite balancing act: both are results of the monarchy’s continuous efforts
to ensure the stability of its own rule.

After almost one hundred years of balancing internal and external political demands
to ensure the financial perpetuation of its rentier and neopatrimonial systems, and in turn,
its eudemonic legitimacy, the monarchy has drawn itself into a Gordian knot. The
monarchy is trying to free itself, but its continual effort to puppeteer stability has pulled
the entanglement in too many opposing directions. Monarchical balancing efforts have
entrenched an elite that it can no longer control; it has angered the myriad East Bankers who previously depended on state employment and placed Palestinian-Jordanians in an ever more ambiguous situation. The elite want to perpetuate the status quo, ordinary East Bankers desperately want reform, and Palestinian-Jordanians want political enfranchisement. Both Palestinian-Jordanians and East Bank Jordanians want an end the corruption inherent in the neopatrimonial system. Yet, neither the East Bankers nor the elite want to see Palestinian-Jordanians gain greater political rights, and Palestinian-Jordanians are unwilling to openly demand change.

These dynamics were all manifest in the 2011 protests. East Bank Jordanians flooded into the streets to demand reform; the elite vocalized their opposition to change, and Palestinian-Jordanians largely remained on the sidelines or participated covertly. While the contribution of Palestinian-Jordanians in this whole process might seem apathetic, or even altogether absent, their ability to participate was severely constrained by their current politico-juridical ambiguity. Their uncertainty has left them without direction or leadership. Most Palestinian-Jordanians want greater political rights and legal security in Jordan, but few are willing to risk their current situation to achieve it. Indeed, the majority fear engaging in any activity that would expose them to accusations of disloyalty and potentially render them stateless like other members of the Palestinian diaspora.

For Palestinian-Jordanians, the potential benefits of participation have not hitherto justified the risks. However, if their progressive loss of rights continues, Palestinian-Jordanians may increasingly come to believe that their position in Jordan is not so good that they are unwilling to endanger it to improve it. If Palestinian-Jordanians cease to see
the monarchy as the protector of their rights, resistance to it could serve as a powerful tool for fostering cohesion. A well-articulated, anti-regime frame could prove capable of bridging not only divides within the Palestinian-Jordanian community itself, but also the rift between Palestinian-Jordanians and East Bank Jordanians. If the Hashemites cling to the wreckage of their extant balancing act, the demographic composition of another wave of hirak movements could prove strong enough to force its collapse.
Bibliography

Primary Sources


Newspapers


**Secondary Sources**


Ryan, Curtis R. “‘Jordan First’: Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations and Foreign Policy Under King Abdullah II.” *Arab Studies Quarterly* Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2004): 43-62.


