Slowing Senses of Aesthetics, Science and the Study of Politics
Through Plato, Kant and Nietzsche

by

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BA, University of Victoria, 2009

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Political Science

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University of Victoria

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

Since the post-positivist turn in critical political theory, many scholars of political science have tried to reimagine the discipline through feminist, Marxist, and postcolonial critiques. However, even critical scholars often overlook that all forms of critique are aesthetic- as is the mainstream of political science that they criticize. Despite these proliferating critiques, much of political science is still shaped by a robust epistemological orientation towards scientific aspirations, which I describe as a scientific epistemic mode. The argument of this thesis is that the dominance of a scientific epistemic mode in political science orients this discipline erroneously against aesthetic receptivity and production. The relationship between political science and aesthetics is often characterized by affects of discomfort and shame, so that aesthetic qualities in research are associated with unscientific, and therefore illegitimate outcomes. The claim that aesthetics is not suited to the study of politics is longstanding, but not necessarily legitimate. Rather than conceive of aesthetics and science as essentially opposed, this thesis considers how this dualism can be understood as a discursive formation. The notion of aesthetics as a threat to science exists as far back as Plato’s Republic, where poetry is banished for the sake of philosophy. Contra Plato, Kant acknowledges aesthetics as a relevant epistemic mode in The Critique of Judgment, but determines aesthetics to be irreconcilable with a reason-based, scientific epistemology. Finally, in The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche’s reading of Attic Tragedy suggests that, like the figures of Dionysus and Apollo, aesthetics and science can be thought of as two forces in a relation of productive antagonism rather than mutual exclusion or domination. In response to the naturalized, scientific epistemic mode in political science, an aesthetic epistemic mode acknowledges the fusion of aesthetics and science in the production of political analysis. Following Isabelle Stengers, this thesis tries to slow down the sense that aesthetics is inferior, excluded and dominated by science, suggesting that political science begin to cultivate a receptive awareness of its own aesthetic value. In making aesthetics a legitimate focus in political science, an aesthetic epistemic mode is practised by seeking out relevant questions rather than demanding immediate, “scientific” answers.
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Acknowledgments

I would first like to acknowledge my supervisor Dr. Warren Magnusson, whose vision and insight still remain invaluable even years after I first began studying politics in his classroom in 2007. I would like to also acknowledge a handful of other professors whose guidance and inspiration have shaped my sense of politics, namely R.B.J Walker, Nicole Shukin, Simon Glezos, Feng Xu, James Tully, Avigail Eisenberg, Rita Dhamoon, Stephen Ross, Ron Dart, Jacqueline Nolte, Arthur Kroker, Brad Bryan and Andrew Wender.

My work on this project has also benefitted from much help and encouragement from fellow students, family and friends. Thank you to Laticia Chapman, Marta Bashovski, and Jeanette Parker for shamelessly haunting local cafes and eateries while talking theory and working through tough ideas. Thank you to Anita Girvan, Marta Bashovski and Rita Dhamoon for being willing to read and discuss early drafts; your feedback has been most helpful.

The formal institutions of education and the informal city spaces that have taught me from the underground both deserve recognition for the formative role they have played in this work. The Department of Political Science, the Department of English, and most notably the invaluable interdisciplinary experience that I have gained through the Cultural, Social and Political Thought program at UVic have all contributed to this work. The local businesses and public spaces of Victoria that have provided a haven in which to think, learn and work have also been critically important to the writing of this work. In particular I owe a great thanks to the place and people of Discovery Coffee, for providing a space in which I could pour endless hours of writing and then take a break to pour endless numbers of lattes, which has also given me a means to support myself while in school; and also to Body In Motion Aerial Arts for giving me a space where I could take a break from learning how to think and learn how to fly instead.

Finally, the biggest thanks of all goes to my family and to my partner, Christopher, for your encouragement, your tireless support and your enduring love, even to the bitter end.
Dedication

For my Dad, who said to look far,
And for my Mom, who taught me to follow my nose.

And for Mark, who hated school.
Preface

The first time I began to fathom the immediacy of the climate change issue- the first time I really grasped the significance of vast environmental degradation and the irrevocable situation of precarity it signified- it wasn’t in school. In my experience environmental issues seemed to hold a mild importance for most people, but beyond this placid consensus (a generalized expectation), society seemed to be relatively unconcerned about the rapidly morphing ideations of ‘climate change’ in circulation. It wasn’t until my second year of university, during an unrelated visit to the Vancouver Art Gallery, when I stumbled unknowingly into Bruce Mau’s striking exhibition, *Massive Change: The Future of Global Design* (October 2, 2004-January 3, 2005), that the penny on environmental consciousness finally dropped- hard. Taking in the sublime aesthetics of massive design failures and their environmental consequences, it became increasingly clear during the exhibit that the delicate interrelation of environmental systems and human innovation is a relation in which every person is complicit, and one that demanded my full attention. The exhibit showed images of massive technological failures, vast quantities of debris transforming landscapes and the sprawling reach of urban infrastructure. In taking in and comprehending the impact of environmental degradation, I finally learned, deeply, about sustainability. By apprehending and attending to the exhibit with all my faculties, and by putting myself physically in the exhibit space, my encounter with Mau’s work awakened me to the political question of my relationship to environmental conditions, and taught me far more about sustainability in an afternoon than any other pedagogical tool made for this task ever could.

That afternoon at the Vancouver Art Gallery I had undergone a profound intellectual shift; I had taken in and apprehended deeply; I had learned in a most effectual manner. Most
significantly, what occurred as a result of this learning experience was a political change in my thinking about climate change issues. It was through the aesthetic, embodied experience of Mau’s exhibition that a powerful awareness of my political relationship to climate change was realized. By extension, a burgeoning understanding of the collective power of societal opinions about climate change— and the potential repercussions these positions could have for the future of the environment—began to come into focus. As the magnitude of what I had undergone began to sink in, it was clear that I had learned, significantly, about politics; however, what also became clear was that this lesson about politics had come through art.

It was in reflecting on intensely formative experiences such as these that I began to wonder about what it means to learn about politics, and to think about how transformative learning experiences like this, outside the classroom, could ever be validated in an academic setting given their profound impact. It seemed clear to me that many of the most significant lessons I had acquired on politics had occurred through art, literature, music or theatre, or had taken place in everyday contexts like the street, the workplace, the home, or the bus stop. But what pedagogical lexicon or methodology has been developed to validate this kind of learning? What systems of evaluation have been established not only to accredit but also to critique, refine and pursue an eclectic learning experience such as one that takes into account aesthetic, emotional, spatial, and other perceptions and affects alongside rational, intellectual, logical, and other reason-based cognitive faculties? After visiting the Mau exhibit, one thing seemed clear to me: I had learned, deeply, about politics through art. Given the impact of this experience for my perception of environmental issues, in my mind it seemed self-evident that this experience, however multifaceted and interdisciplinary, would prove invaluable for my understanding of all academic work on sustainability that would follow. But how could this pivotal experience ever
be legitimized or evaluated, let alone replicated in some form through academic means? What would constitute a scholarly account of this significant event of learning, or give academic credence to the pedagogical encounter I had undergone? These questions have led me to wonder why aesthetic encounters such as these face so much resistance in a discipline like political science as sites from which to glean valid, relevant and important political analyses. What unspoken rules have disciplined aesthetics within political science, and what might it look like to begin to imagine this relationship differently?
Chapter 1

Introduction

Aesthetics play a role in the study of politics, but how has the discipline of political science come to interpret this role within its scope of practice? Aesthetics is commonly thought of as the non-scientific judgment of works of art. The academic discipline of aesthetics has concerned itself with the study of beauty, but has grown through critical shifts into areas like philosophy, the fine arts, and language studies. However, I suggest that underlying these day-to-day applications of aesthetics there is a latent epistemological orientation with much wider applications than its common uses for the study of beauty. In this thesis I begin to explore the philosophical significance of using an aesthetic analytic framework in this broader sense for the practice of political science. Under this wider paradigm this thesis starts from the premise that aesthetics is a conditional element of politics and its perception affects the practice of political science. This paper then asks what has been done to explore and make sense of this relation, and how has it come to be commonly understood in the discipline of political science? This work studies how the discursive relationship between the concepts of “aesthetics” and “science” may have developed, with the aim of clarifying how this discursive division continues to be performed within the discipline of political science. One of the primary aims of this piece is to trace certain formative notions of aesthetics that have separated it from and defined it against notions of science, creating the impression of an entrenched dualism between the two. A secondary aim of this piece is to ruminate on the nature of this binary division and question the accuracy, efficacy and possible consequences of this approach for political science. A third aim is to wonder whether it is possible to engage a study of politics that is also ostensibly conscious
of its aesthetic and affective value, and if so, to question how this might contribute to social scientific research. By advocating for what I will call an *aesthetic epistemic mode*, I suggest that the cultivation of aesthetic awareness within political science can augment the current complement of social scientific methodologies. In this way, I argue that through the aesthetic epistemic mode the goals of political science to further knowledge and expand its analytic capacities can be supplemented. Whether I support this project of political science to endlessly expand its reach of knowledge is another matter; regardless, I still maintain that the aesthetic epistemic mode would service the purposes of political science, however problematic I may find them to be.

Academia has conventionally been divided in a binary of arts versus sciences, suggesting that this is the natural division of knowledge for academic study. Because of this history, a dualistic view of epistemology continues to be replicated by disciplines on either side of this division. But is it possible to learn about politics through aesthetics, or to study political science through art? The orientation of this question is highly instructive because it illuminates what has been understood in the past as the ideological center of this discipline, namely, its “scientific” mandate.¹ Implicit in this distinction is the idea that the opposite of this mandate would be an aesthetic one, despite the fact that political science falls on the humanities or “arts” side of the larger, academic arts/sciences divide. So why has it come to be assumed that a non-aesthetic epistemology is the most appropriate for the study of politics? Why must the analysis of political processes take place solely in the theatre of the scientific method? Indeed, the exploration of this

² Tobin continues to explain her distinction, saying, “Reduction is prohibited by the empirical hypothesis that special science kinds are multiply realisable in physical kinds, known as the multiple realisability thesis (henceforth MRT)… MRT claims that it is an open empirical possibility that the kind predicate(s) of a reduced science (i.e. a special science) may correspond to a widely disjunctive and heterogeneous set of kind predicate(s) in a reducing science (i.e. physics) and hence that there is no one-to-one correlation between the predicates of physics and
question over the past half century by much of French continental philosophy has ultimately brought about a series of reflexive “turns” in political theory, for example, the discursive turn, the feminist turn, the cultural turn, the aesthetic turn and the affective turn (Stoker 2010). However, despite the explosion of post-positivist critical reflection in political science, the performance of the divide between aesthetics and science is still predominant, with scholars segregating into camps such as “positivist” versus “critical”, showing that it is possible for a single discipline to house a series of vastly different, often competing epistemologies (Stoker 2010, 11-12). Thus, we arrive at a quintessential political question, that of legitimacy: what constitutes a valid study of politics, and what does not? Moreover, is it possible to have plural epistemologies within a single discipline, and if so, then how are they regulated, executed and evaluated according to uniform academic standards? To give an example of what types of questions this kind of discussion could generate, one might ask, “how can we study politics through aesthetics?” or, “is it possible to produce political science through aesthetics?”

I like to begin with this question because it is misguided, revealing the assumption that we can somehow do political science without aesthetics. To the question, “how can we do political science through aesthetics?” I would offer, “political science is done only through aesthetics!” This response emerges from the recognition that all political scholarship, purportedly scientific or otherwise, is necessarily mediated by the condition of aesthetics, meaning that the question can now transform to become, “how do we propose to account for the condition of aesthetics in our analyses of politics?” As political scientists, we can begin to ask: what is our understanding of aesthetics and how do we deal with the recognition that aesthetics mediates our every encounter with the political and with our analysis of it, be it ostensibly scientific or otherwise? Put as a question to the supposedly critical camps of political theorists
who purport to accept the claims of the discursive turn, how then has this incorporation materialized in the practices of political science and more specifically in critical political theory?

In order to better understand the relatively recent emergence of the discursive turn in the social sciences towards aesthetic registers, this paper will begin by highlighting a few instances of when and how aesthetics became constructed as a form of cognition distinct from logical reason. After recounting three select moments in this history of western philosophy from Plato, then Kant and finally Nietzsche, this paper will offer some critical reflections on the functions this distinction continues to perform. Looking at how the division of aesthetics and science presently operates in the discipline of political science, this piece will begin to imagine how to disturb entrenched conceptions of the role of aesthetics for this discipline. By involving the affective role of aesthetics in this political study, I want to invite a series of questions concerning the relationship between aesthetics and science as it is currently imagined in political science and to think about how this relationship might be disputed, resisted and shifted. By attending to some of the discourses surrounding distinctions between aesthetics and politics, aesthetics and philosophy, aesthetics and science, and aesthetics and reason, I want to think through the question, “Are aesthetics of value to political science, and if so, how?” It is my contention that despite the proliferation of literatures in favour of the value of aesthetics within the social sciences, the practical incorporation of these critiques is difficult, unstudied and rare. This thesis will attempt to track portions of this debate in philosophy and extract some major themes that this contention has produced, finally posing some questions to the discipline of political science.

Why have I chosen to present a study of politics in this way? Why do I find that this problem informs modes of analysis and carries methodological significance for political science and social scientific pedagogy more broadly? These questions usher in the primary set of
phenomena that I would like to explore, namely, what I see to be the performance of a division between what constitutes the practice of “science,” and what constitutes the practice of “aesthetics.” In working to disturb the settled dualism of this discursive formation in my own mind, I wonder if these concepts could also be received and evaluated differently in both political science pedagogy and methodology. I contend that not only is the distinction between aesthetics and science primarily discursive, but that it also produces a particular form of political science that continues to operate within the discourse of this division. My aim is to critically engage the operative modes of this division as I experience it in the production of a political study, and thereby try to perform a disruption of some of its current manifestations circulating in popular academic discourse. In order to understand how the process of evaluating aesthetics is currently undertaken in political science, and to put into practice some of the critiques being made, I will attempt to reflexively engage with this process as it occurs in my own project. Beginning from the premise that this divide is not a line drawn, but rather a line walked, I hope to explore how it is that political science walks this line, and wonder what it might mean to walk it differently. Thus, by foregrounding and highlighting what I find to be the necessarily aesthetic conditions for the practice of political science, I hope to engage a few of the many other thinkers who have taken up this problem, and then enact my contention for the purpose of once again taking up “that old quarrel between poetry and philosophy,” (Plato 1968, 608).

In the final part of this work, I offer some suggestions and alternatives to the discursive division between what I have schematized as scientific and aesthetic epistemic approaches, as well as some examples of works that I think engage an aesthetic epistemic mode. I question the stability of claims to authority made in the scientific epistemic mode and suggest the validation of aesthetic receptivity in political science. Following Isabelle Stengers (2005), I explore the
possibilities of slowing methodology down, critically questioning the projected intentions embodied in political science and actively resisting the dominance of hegemonic methodological forms. Finally, like Stengers, I make an appeal in the form of a question, asking if it may be allowable for the pursuit of knowledge in political science to be directed not towards the establishment of sound truths in the spirit of a scientific epistemic mode, but rather towards the conception of relevant questions, in the spirit of an aesthetic epistemic mode.

Terms, Senses and Voice/s

Before offering a selection of historical ideas that I think have influenced the discursive partition of aesthetics and science, I would like to give my sense of some of the terms I use and talk about why I have chosen them. But first, in order to begin to enact some of the aesthetic practices that I’m curious about exploring from within the domain of political science, I want to speak about the voice/s in this piece. First, “voice/s”: this word-experiment is not justified within the laws of modern grammar, nor is it absolved of its abnormality by some linguistic precedent. In its betrayal of right grammar, this word-form is forced up into view like a work in relief, erupting through a surface tension of conforming parts of speech and becoming an obstruction. It demands attention and causes affects in general, maybe of confusion or curiosity, perhaps annoyance, delight or loathing. The abnormality of this form is pronounced through its aesthetics, which serve as a reminder that the normalized words framing it in obedient syntax stand themselves as forms that are no less aesthetic. In the social scientific context as it stands today, a strange ideation like “voice/s” cannot be accounted for or legitimized until it is rendered intelligible, a process that gives the illusion of completion or control over a concept. However, explanation is a strategy used to produce an affect of satisfaction; ultimately, however,
explanation is never full and never over. With one foot on either side of this debate, I want to attempt to straddle the boundary of grammatical in-law/out-law here by continuing to use this form, "voice/s" while consenting to explain this choice, fulfilling my social-scientific duty to "make intelligible," though continuing to doubt the efficacy of this project to grasp this term in its full meaning. I will not assure that this explanation of voice/s is complete, nor can I convey a mastery of the ideas it is meant to represent.

The voice/s I mean to call attention to here are at once both the "voice," in the singular, that is associated with an enduring, individual sense of my subjectivity in continuity, and the various different "voices," in the plural, animated through the highly discontinuous, varied and pluralized sense of my subjectivity in its different mutations over time. The plural sense of voice/s is also meant to conjure the interplay of voices of influence that have influenced my perspectives and that I have taken up in one way or another unconsciously or consciously, and yet whose ideas are rendered uniquely in my own tone. By thinking of voice/s in this multifaceted sense, I give myself permission in this text to disagree with myself; to show myself to be in a struggle of understanding rather than in a state of conclusion; to argue a point that I can also refute in other places by other means; to show myself in the process of learning, rather than having already learned and brought knowledge under my possession; to sustain conflicting ideas simultaneously, whose only relation is paradox; in short, to think of voice/s as an expression similar to that which Donna Haraway has called a fractured identity, with all its plural indications and open ends (2004, 13). The idea of understanding voice/s in conjunction with the constellation of influences in relation to them has been held by many before Haraway; she, however, was one of the first who dared to create a practice of acknowledging this (common) sense by working to openly portray a sense of fractured identity in her academic projects.
follow Haraway by fashioning this crude, makeshift tool, “voice/s,” out of necessity for the purpose of capturing a sense I cannot otherwise portray, seeking, like Haraway, to find ways to acknowledge and situate myself when the means to achieve this don’t always exist.

Although I am impelled to claim a kind of ownership over a singular ‘voice’ that resonates in this piece and offers a clear representation of my perspective, this approach works to silence other voices that have contributed to the formation of thoughts here, erasing traces of their influence and working to homogenize circulating ideas into what I might claim as “my” voice. For these reasons, I offer one possible explanation for the term “voice/s” as an idea that can call to mind ways in which a voice can seem to exhibit a sense of continuity and a sense of plurality or discontinuity, perhaps simultaneously. The purpose of the explanation of “voice/s” here is in accord with the social-scientific imperative to render content acceptable by making it intelligible. The purpose of offering the term “voice/s” at all is to give a way of showing and thinking through how the voice (my voice) that comes through in this piece is at once affected and affecting, in continuity and discontinuity with itself, and comes from a particular, subjective standpoint, rather than a place of (feigned) objectivity that claims to inform without any voice at all.

While contemporary academic practices discipline the separation of identities and the reinforcement of boundaries between voices through practices like citation of text and strict notation of which ideas are attributed to whom, even this disciplinary strategy has its limits in attributing circulating ideas to a single origin emanating from a unitary subjectivity. While citation is a useful academic tool, the function of its premise gives the impression of evenly separated voices that can each lay singular claims over ownership of particular ideas. However, rather than condemning the practice of referencing, I am curious to observe how the aesthetic
practice of acknowledging voice/s alongside conventional practices of citation could amplify and also shift notions of origins, while working in conjunction with them. In the same spirit of compromise, rather than engage the practice of acknowledging voice/s without discussion in this piece, I have instead offered here an explanation of voice/s that can appease the demand for intelligibility held by accepted social scientific frameworks. At the same time, the practice of acknowledging the voice/s of a work is in accord with what I am also advocating as an aesthetic epistemic mode existing within the social sciences. In this way, through a focus on aesthetics, I am attempting to sustain a tension between traditional methodologies in the social sciences and potential areas of exploration and experimentation emerging within it.

What are the voice/s to which I want to call attention in this piece and in what ways do I work to discipline and separate each voice from others while failing to do this, inevitably? I can begin by acknowledging the voice/s that open this piece. In order to situate this project as a thought experiment located in the body (which includes, but is not limited to the mind,) I chose to narrate an embodied, pedagogical encounter I had experienced. The tone of narration is arguably somewhat different from the tone of analysis, and differences in genre such as these signal a shift in the voice/s that produce them. This narration paid particular attention to my historical context surrounding the events I recalled, gave a sense of the dynamic change I had undergone intellectually, recounted some of the affective states I was engaged in during the events I recalled, and openly made use of literary devices such as simile and metaphor to describe them. As the narration continues and I begin to connect the story of my experience at the Mau exhibit with the analytical questions I hope to engage theoretically, I do not abandon my use of the pronoun “I” to identify myself, but continue to connect my subjective experience and its affects to the objective political questions I hope to animate through them. In this way, by
locating and situating myself in orientation to my questions, the audience is not likely to forget the condition of my aesthetic presence in the piece I have constructed, compelling them to consider how they in turn are also oriented in relation to both my person and this piece.

As I begin the formal introduction to this piece, the change in voice/s is marked. In homage to the structure of social scientific writing style, I begin my opening paragraph with a pointed, analytical question that leads to a paragraph outlining my thesis statement and its goals in context. The academic tone in this section of my paper is produced through disciplined formality, aiming to guide the reader towards the overall themes to which I hope to call their attention. After giving this introduction I turn to a more historical tone to offer more context and in this mode, it is evident that narrative tone underlies histories almost inevitably, since the recounting of history comes very naturally through story, as oral history traditions show. Throughout my piece the collection of voice/s that emerge are punctuated with questions, which is not always common in social science literature. This stylistic insistence is meant to reiterate and underscore the epistemological bases that my ideas stem from, and more importantly to enact the small shift in epistemological orientation that I am curious to explore. The numerous expressions of my voice/s give different affective senses and trigger varied pedagogical processes in the reader accordingly. Although it is beyond the scope of this work to give an exhaustive, personal account of how I perceive that I have rendered my own voice/s in this thesis, I am nonetheless beginning the rough work of parsing out some things that a praxis of political science in an aesthetic epistemic mode might consider. In doing the analytical work of thinking through how I might possibly describe my various voice/s in a few instances, and how they might affect my reader, or how this process in itself enacts small differences of practice in
the social sciences, I am already working out an awkward, rudimentary start of a series of potential methodological shifts.

I draw attention to the play of voice/s in this early stage of my thesis because I think that in focusing on the varying aesthetic levels of voice/s, readers may have greater access to an awareness of their affective responses to works such as these. Although I may not offer a taxonomy of my different voice/s here, by merely choosing to focus on the aesthetic element of ‘voice,’ readers are oriented to think about this aspect of the work, and thereby invited to expand the field of information they take in when engaging with this piece. In bringing aesthetics to the forefront of this work, readers are directed towards contemplation of aesthetic components such as the play of voice/s and its affective production in their analyses. By raising the notion of voice/s at the beginning, I offer an invitation to readers to engage this piece as an aesthetic work of social science while also acknowledging their own awareness as aesthetically sensible analysts. If the cultivation of an aesthetic receptivity to voice/s became a common practice in social scientific methodology, how might that change the way social scientific analysis is produced? Having touched on the voice/s that animate this particular piece, and having attempted to generate some basic ideas of how and why the practice of acknowledging voice/s have the potential to shift analytical production in the social sciences, I will now continue with a discussion of the terms my voice/s deploy in this piece. However, doing the work of describing “voice/s” beforehand has slowed my own senses of self as fixed or singular, as well as slowed my readers, disrupting this academic project as a whole in order to offer a practice of political science rendered in an aesthetic epistemic mode.

The move of defining and explaining terms is no uncomplicated task, especially because this piece focuses on discursive formations that arise from practices of defining and demarcating
concepts. However, with this in mind, I aim here to clarify my particular use of certain specific, more common concepts. As Foucault writes in *The Archeology of Knowledge*,

The history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient, but that of its various fields of constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured. (1969, 5)

So, what am I gesturing towards when I deploy the term *aesthetics*? In the past, and in many present instantiations, aesthetics has been broadly used to describe sense-based knowledge, and has become synonymous with the study of beauty. However, it has since evolved to refer more specifically to the philosophy of art, the judgment of taste, and the study of phenomenal, sensory perception. The etymology of the word ‘aesthetic’ is Greek, deriving from the words *aisthetikos*, which means, ‘of sense perception’, *aisthanesthai*, ‘to perceive’, and *aistheta*, meaning ‘things perceptible’ (Porteous 1996, 19). The term ‘aesthetics’ was first used in the eighteenth century by the philosopher Alexander Baumgarten to refer to cognition by means of the senses, sensuous knowledge (Goldman 2005, 255). Alan Goldman writes that in its modern day application, the term aesthetics “now qualifies not only judgments or evaluations, but properties, attitudes, experience and pleasure or value as well, and its application is no longer restricted to beauty alone” (2005, 255). The sense that I mean to evoke in my use of the term “aesthetics” is in line with Goldman’s supplements to its original definition. In his book *Environmental Aesthetics* J. Douglas Porteous makes a note that the Greek term *aistheta*, meaning ‘things perceptible’ is thought of in contrast to “things immaterial” (1996, 19). In defining “aesthetics” here, I encounter again the problem at the heart of this paper, namely, what is “aesthetics” defined against?
For Aristotle, and later for Baumgarten, the Greek *aisthesis* is contrasted with *noesis* which describes cognitive, rational thought that *regards* what the senses perceive through *aisthesis*. In the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy *noesis* is defined as follows:

> Ancient Greek philosophy, modern European philosophy, philosophy of mind [Greek, variously translated as intellection, intelligence, and understanding; it is cognate with the verb noein and its object to noeton]. In a wider sense noesis is thought, in contrast to perception (Greek aisthesis)... it is dialectical or philosophical reason. (Noesis, 2004)

Thus, *noesis* is thought to be the rational, deductive cognition that makes sense of perception, and this schematization of thought is what scientific inquiry is predicated upon. The opposition of *noesis* and *aisthesis* is an intentional configuration that establishes sense perception as distinct from philosophical or rational contemplation of perception. The definition and conceptual sense of *aisthesis*, and subsequently what has become the definition of *aesthetics*, has therefore necessarily been constructed in relation to the idea of *noesis*. While not necessarily explicit, the inference that follows is that these forms of thought are mutually exclusive. If we take this dualistic distinction to be accurate (which I may not), it then might be important to ask: where is the line that demarcates what counts as thought that is pure *noesis*, versus thought tainted through the affected perception of *aisthesis*, and who governs this line?

In a collection of essays entitled *Noesis: essays in the history and philosophy of science, philosophy of language, epistemology and political philosophy*, Emma Tobin struggles with this same question, but from an unexpected position. From within the sciences, she asks, “what makes the special sciences special?” by which she means the softer of the natural sciences such as “geology, biology, psychology and the various medical sciences” (Tobin 2005). It turns out that this political question figures as a problem not only for those concerned with the constituted outside of “science” but also for those who need to defend the bounds of its discursive inside as
well. By “special sciences” Tobin refers to what are sometimes called the softer of the hard sciences, but are still far less “soft” than social sciences, which would not factor into a debate on the sciences at all for many scholars of the natural sciences. And yet, the political question of what counts as “science” still remains pertinent, both from within and without the traditionally demarcated bounds of this faculty. In exploring this question in relation to her own field, Tobin writes,

The disunity of the sciences hypothesis introduces a distinction between the physical sciences like physics and chemistry and the special sciences such as geology, biology, psychology and the various medical sciences. These later special sciences are considered ‘special’ in so far as they cannot be straightforwardly reduced to physics… I will be arguing for the view that there is a basic difference between the kinds of the special and physical sciences. As a result, the criteria used to assess the scientific legitimacy of the special sciences ought to be toto coelo different from those that we use to assess the hard physical sciences.2 (2005, 1-2)

As Tobin works hard to create a clear line between what constitutes a hard science and what constitutes a special science, one obvious but unspoken dimension modifying whether a science is “hard” or “special” is the aesthetic dimension. This is because, while Tobin’s criteria for the preservation of a hard science based in pure physics may be compelling, those who would dispute her distinction with their own criteria pose a problem for consensus on this point. Given that scientific opinions on the category of what constitutes a “hard” science are competing and constantly in flux, the mechanism of this decision requires other means for its justification. If scientific opinion is not in universal accord it is because the decision on which understanding

2 Tobin continues to explain her distinction, saying, “Reduction is prohibited by the empirical hypothesis that special science kinds are multiply realisable in physical kinds, known as the multiple realisability thesis (henceforth MRT)... MRT claims that it is an open empirical possibility that the kind predicate(s) of a reduced science (i.e. a special science) may correspond to a widely disjunctive and heterogeneous set of kind predicate(s) in a reducing science (i.e. physics) and hence that there is no one-to-one correlation between the predicates of physics and those of the special sciences.”
gains privilege must pass through aesthetics, and must be rendered at least in part, on aesthetic terms. If, as political scientists, we only allow ourselves to make decisions on what is the most correct, most scientifically valid, and most true, then we have rendered ourselves ineffectual in the political event of conflicting, equally substantiated information upon which a decision must be made. If several possible explanations for a problem are in competition for validity but a decision is imminent, receptivity to aesthetics becomes invaluable, since all that remains is to choose the option that seems the best— the option that appeals most. For this reason we can say that the aesthetic reception of competing, equally plausible ideas does not “hinder” science, but enables the political response of choice where scientific inquiry bumps up against its limits.

Rather than conceiving of aesthetic conditions as elements that confuse or complicate decision-making, the capacity for aesthetic receptivity can contribute to forming more fulsome decision-making practices. It is the sense of ‘aesthetics’ as a capacity for receptivity that I mean to convey in my use of the term aesthetics, and that underlies my sense of the possibility for an aesthetic epistemic mode. Moreover, in acknowledging the presence of aesthetics and its affective potential in decision-making strategies, it becomes possible to mobilize the ability to generate an affected response of attraction in the face of a decision that other faculties fail to facilitate. To be able to identify which option is most attractive or most appealing shows that the aesthetics of a problem can enable an otherwise impossible or halted decision. The explanation given here that we might consider making decisions in this fashion is, of course, an almost satirical performance. This is because I would argue that every decision already involves recourse to the affected state of attraction that is finalized in consensus on a best option for a particular time and place. However, to suggest aloud, in a discipline such as political science, that decisions are made consciously or unconsciously, at least in part as a result of aesthetics, is
to level an insult of the gravest kind to any study that would call itself a science. The fear associated with the suggestion that in the face of an impossible decision we might simply choose the most aesthetically appealing option (thereby elevating aesthetic value to the level of science) is what predicates the exclusion of aesthetics from political science. Rather than finding value in the faculty of aesthetic receptivity for decision-making, traditional political science would rather reduce aesthetics to an inferior form of analysis, thinking of aesthetically-based decision-making as a very last resort, and hoping to get along as best it can without aesthetics altogether.

In the instance of Tobin and the relegation of the ‘special sciences’ from the ‘hard sciences’, the same logic that believes in the possibility of the exclusion of aesthetics is at work. The hardness of the hard science is determined by its ability to do away with “multiple realisability,” and the specialness of the special science is determined in part by its admittance of multiple realisability (Tobin, 2005). For Tobin, the fact that the special sciences are multiply realisable means that “there is no one-to-one correlation between the predicates of physics and those of the special sciences,” showing that it is possible to make a firm distinction between the “harder”, physical sciences and “softer”, special sciences. The distinction between a physical and a special science in this case is arguably an aesthetic distinction, where an aesthetic state of multiple realisability is divided from an aesthetic state of “pure physics”, uncomplicated by multiple realisability. In this way, in the container of “pure physics,” hard science can be defined against soft science through a premise of exclusion, leaving nothing but a pristine instance of noesis that escapes affectation from aisthesis. Tobin’s distinction is a case study of the logic that the defining line that demarcates the strata of noesis arises at the exclusion of aisthesis, and therein, the definition of each is born.
It is through discursive practices of inter-relating concepts such as these that the work of defining terms like ‘aesthetics’ is enacted. My use of the term aesthetics must operate within current discourses such as these, but does not strive to hold to them indefinitely, and indeed, tries to contemplate the term ‘aesthetics’ in its transitional state, attending to its transformation and imagining possible future inflections. The purpose of calling attention to the framing of aesthetics within the oppositional schematic of its relationship to science is to recognize the discursive history that this term has undergone in this relation. While understanding the idea of aesthetics as couched within a genealogy impacted by successive discursive events developing alongside its corollaries, I want to explore the edges of the definition of aesthetics just as much as I want to push the boundaries of the term ‘science’ for political science. In questioning the relation of noesis/aisthesis I want to also ponder the function that this split performs for political science specifically, and consider some of the external consequences of this formation. In my use of the idea of aesthetics, I want to think about how it might benefit the social sciences to embrace aesthetics as an approach and an epistemological starting point, rather than an external quality given to objects, or a kind of cognitive faculty such as “perception.” It is from this sense of the term aesthetics that I want to begin to think about how evaluation of social scientific research might appear differently.

In thinking about how to recognize and evaluate the kind of knowledge produced through a capacity for aesthetic receptivity, I propose that it might be useful to approach this knowledge through an epistemology informed by aesthetic sensibility. I am calling this approach an “aesthetic epistemic mode,” by which I mean analysis that works to actively acknowledge awareness of its aesthetic receptivity in its production. An epistemic mode, in my view, is the formative, epistemological paradigm through which particular methodologies are envisioned and
created. The reason for naming an ‘epistemic approach’ in this way is to call attention to the fact that particular epistemic modes undergird political science methodology, and to recall and recognize that these modes are taken for granted, assumed to be the most appropriate, and often go unquestioned. However, the notion that epistemological paradigms can be neutral and therefore produce objective methodologies is an assumption that misses the affected nature of epistemology and its formation. Following Michel Foucault, I suggest that the epistemology and subsequent epistemic modes that have traditionally informed political science methodology are not only affected and subjective, but have consistently covered over the ways in which they are informed and affected by aesthetic experience. Thus, without explicitly claiming a rejection of aesthetics, epistemologies based in enlightenment reason and scientific exploration have worked to hide the roles that aesthetics play and have denied the possibility of an aesthetic epistemic mode for the study of politics.

In order to explain the nature of the relationship between the concepts of “aesthetics” and “science” I rely heavily on the analytical tool identified by Michael Foucault (1969) as the concept of “discursive formation.” For Foucault, discursive formation signifies the solidification of concepts over time through the development of a genealogy of ideas that contribute to its recognition within the contexts that it has currency. In his text, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault discusses the consolidation of ‘unities of discourse’ that typically signify one author’s work, such as a book or a work of art (23). For Foucault, the idea of discursive formation contests the fixed and contained concept projected by a discursive unity. Rather, a discursive formation signifies an event, a series of systemic connections that are fluid but established and identifiable, despite their nebulous configuration. As opposed to a discursive unity thought to be solidified in an object or closed temporal or material field, discursive formations are understood
to inform the materialities they affect, rather than being formed, enclosed and bounded by them. In this way, Foucault reminds his audience that the discourse/material relationship involves a two-way exchange, exposing the problems of separating and privileging material reality over linguistic, conceptual and discursive realities. Of the materiality of ‘the book’, for instance, Foucault writes,

The book is not simply the object that one holds in one’s hands; and it cannot remain within the little parallelepiped that contains it: its unity is variable and relative. As soon as one questions that unity, it loses its self-evidence; it indicates itself, constructs itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse. (1969, 26)

Foucault describes the field of discourse within which unities of discourse appear as a system of dispersion that is able to sustain logically compatible themes alongside competing, heterogeneous and incoherent themes that can be in “simultaneous and successive emergence,” (1969, 38). The links that uphold discursive formations are not necessarily causal interlocutors, logical consequences or determining patterns, but rather the distance between concepts, the rules of their division, and their interrelation with one another- even their incompatibility. It is for these reasons that Foucault’s methodology seeks not to “individualize groups of statements” to better grasp the hidden meaning or secret, adhesive center of a unity of discourse, but rather to “analyze the interplay of their appearance and dispersion… dispersion of the points of choice, and define, prior to any option, to any thematic preference, a field of strategic possibilities…” (39-40). Thus, in order to describe phenomena of relations that are not self-evident, permanent, or even necessarily referential but are nonetheless recognizable and identifiable, Foucault writes,

Concerning those large groups of statements… What appeared to me were rather series full of gaps, intertwined with one another, interplays of differences, distances, substitutions, transformation… Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever,
between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation. (1969, 40-41)

In the introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Foucault himself throws out the question to his audience, “what is a science?” by which he means to provoke a critique not only of the singular nature of this particular unity, but also to question how content of this discourse is determined, and upon what grounds (6). I begin to take up the spirit of Foucault’s question in this piece by using his methodology of analyzing some aspects of how the notions of both “science” and “aesthetics” have developed with in a larger body of ideas, relations, themes and events that we can call (for the sake of convenience, Foucault says) discursive formation.

Finally, in what sense do I think of “politics” and “the political,” in relation to “science” and in turn, how do these ideas relate to my understanding of political science as a discipline? Since the partition of the academic system in the late nineteenth century (Magnusson 2010, 41), the practice of politics and the study of its contents have traditionally been conceptualized through what I am calling a scientific epistemic mode. In my view, a scientific epistemic mode is just that- a mode of understanding that is oriented epistemologically towards scientific aspirations, but that may have very little to do with the actual state of the natural sciences or, in Tobin’s language, the hard sciences. While “science” can be defined in discrete terms, such as Tobin describes, ideas about what “science” is conjure many affects- hope, fervour, stress, greed, relief, alienation, satisfaction… and in this way, fantasies about the purposes and possibilities of science colour our senses of what it is. In this way, political science and other social sciences have aspired to scientific standards but in the process, misconceptions about scientific practice have been married with fantasies about the possible results that science can provide. The central misconception that I am focusing on here is that scientific practice is not also aesthetic practice,
and a related notion, that the results of scientific practice need not acknowledge aesthetic influences or components. I think of the scientific epistemic mode as an epistemological orientation haunted by fantasies of what science may or could be that may have no bearing on the actual pursuits of contemporary science. In this way, the term “science” in this paper is an aptly amorphous stand-in that is meant to signal circulating popular notions of science, rather than accurately describing the practices of modern science.

My broad sense of the term “science” is influenced by Nietzsche and his concerns with uncritical modern science (Babich 2010, 234), but also by Max Weber’s broad conception of science in relation to politics in his Vocation Lectures (2004). In his lecture, Science as a Vocation Weber uses the German word Wissenschaft to mean “science” in a sense that “carries with it a far broader reference than does the contemporary Anglo-Saxon term ‘science’… Wissenschaft describes any organized body of knowledge the pursuit of which is social in the sense that it can be learned” (xx-i). In this sense, science becomes far more than a circumscribed enclave in academia, but rather animates an ideal that becomes naturalized in an epistemological outlook or what I’ve called an “epistemic mode.” The organization of a body of knowledge in pursuit of its mastery for the goal of making it reproducible over time- this is the general sense I mean to infer in my use of the term “science.” In their introduction to Max Weber’s work, David Owen and Tracy B. Strong suggest that the German sense of Wissenschaft “is best conveyed perhaps in an English expression like ‘she has it down to a science’,” meaning the studied expansion of mastery over a particular area of knowledge, or a carefully disciplined virtuosity over a subject (xx). Underlying this notion of science are the implications of knowledge production as organized, empirically grounded, and replicable, while working progressively towards universal understanding through the consolidation of information. Weber discusses the
ceaseless striving of science as a mode that can never be fulfilled and yet, ethically, must continue a perpetual search for fulfillment, despite its unending search for truth. “Science is not art and can never endure: to live for science means never to accomplish anything of lasting value,” which interestingly is a notion Weber is said to have gleaned from Nietzsche’s attitude towards science in The Birth of the Tragedy (xxix). Instead, art is thought to have achieved fulfillment because, in its genius, a work of art that stands the test of time will never be surpassed by another.³ Weber articulated the difference he perceived in epistemic modes as the difference between “facts” and “values” and equated science with facts and interestingly, not art, but politics with values. Thus, it is not only for a portion of my understanding of science, but also for a portion of my understanding of politics that I am indebted to Weber.

In these texts, Weber’s central questions are, “What is the relationship between science and politics?” and “What is the meaning and value of science?” both of which explore whether science can “serve as a foundation for politics or any human action and, hence, whether scientific authority can underwrite political authority” (xix). Interestingly, Weber came to the conclusion (following Kant’s assertion that even reason is limited, and that this limitation actually makes the existence of rationality possible) that the limits of science prevent it from acting as an authoritative foundation for politics (xx). However, this finding does not nullify the use of science for Weber in politics, but only specifies the tenacity of the type of individual Weber sees as suitable to pursue a scientific vocation that must endure such a limited promise of eventual success. Finally, while the first lecture on science can be said to ask, “How is knowledge

³ This is an instance of what I would argue is a reading of “art” through a scientific epistemic mode that doesn’t make sense in its application because it assumes the goal of succession to be universal, even for art. Rather, art works may not necessarily operate in this kind of scientific trajectory of evolutionary succession towards the common goal of fulfillment at all. This example articulates just one of the differences between an aesthetic and a scientific epistemic mode of analysis.
possible,” Weber’s second lecture that is on politics can be said to ask, “What (if anything) is to be done?” (xlvi). In contrast to Weber’s broad conception of science, he offers a markedly narrow view of politics as the state-centric management of power through “the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory”- a definition of politics that is now considered standard (33).

Weber’s conception of politics has indeed been formative in the articulation of an understanding of political science following the division of the academic system in the late nineteenth century. Warren Magnusson recounts,

> In a crucial move, the new social sciences were separated from the natural sciences and humanities… Each social science was to have its particular mandate…and political science, “the state.” The presumption was that this division of labour would facilitate the scientific study of the world, and there is no doubt that it has done so to a considerable degree. Nevertheless, it also has interfered with other forms of study, which have less legitimacy and institutional support because of their interdisciplinary character. (2010, 41)

As concepts of politics and “the political” have evolved, so the discipline of political science has had to adapt its methods of analysis to suit its field of inquiry as it continually shifts. In 1961, figures like Robert Dahl famously redefined Weber’s political question concerning the “what” of politics by asking about the “whom” of politics in his pivotal piece, *Who Governs* (1961). In his work, *Politics of urbanism: Seeing like a city*, Magnusson outlines how in its evolution the discipline of political science has had to work hard to keep up with its amorphous subject as new ways of thinking about politics have emerged raising “the possibility of a new politics, no longer centered on the state but instead on everyday life” (1). Magnusson makes clear that although this re-envisioning of politics beyond the formal institutions of government is not at all unheard-of, radically transforming the given order of things is not so readily achieved. Practices of
decentering statist conceptions of politics have been in full swing for over half a century through several veins of dissidents, and yet old ontological habits of orientating political analysis in obedience to sovereign perspectives still seem pervasive. As Michael J. Shapiro notes, even as more and more radical standpoints continue to emerge on the issue of what constitutes politics, “the struggle of marginalized people to manage their life worlds and the rhythms of moving bodies (often those that are politically disenfranchised) in, through, and out of urban spaces fail to gain disciplinary recognition as aspects of politically-relevant problematics” (2010, 4).

So, where does that leave my conception of politics and what I perceive to be the scope of political science today? Some ways to think about politics that I have found interesting flow from thinkers like Michael J. Shapiro and Jacques Rancière who seek to explore how politics might be thought of most helpfully in relation to art and to aesthetics. Shapiro’s approach to the intersection of aesthetics and politics is to “juxtapos[e] novels, films, and “the arts” in general to the political/social science genre… offering an alternative approach to the power-city relationship” (2010, 4). By this, Shapiro suggests that in paying attention to the arts, we gain access to understanding the political through a different genre. Put quite lucidly, Shapiro writes, “In effect, the arts often render thinkable aspects of politics that have been ignored” (4). According to Shapiro, in paying attention to the arts, our analysis of politics is channelled through a relationality that is not state-centric, but demobilizes power in order to think through instances of “the political” that are otherwise than sovereign.

Jacques Rancière’s conception of the political presses the aesthetic aspect of political analysis even further by suggesting that it is only by means of particular aesthetic-political regimes that what is visible and audible can be defined within the distribution of the sensible. For Rancière, the political “revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around
who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (2004, 13). Politics therefore is only possible in its rendered state through the mediation of aesthetics within the distribution of the sensible. The aesthetic stands as “a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience” (13). As Rancière works out the relationship between aesthetics and politics as discrete domains “each with its own principle of realization,” he also asserts that “art and politics can be understood such that their specificity is seen to reside in their contingent suspension of the rules governing normal experience” (2010, 1). Because of this, for Rancière, both politics and aesthetics constitute practices of dissensus that cause a redistribution of the sensible in an “innovative leap from the logic that ordinarily governs human situations…that tear bodies from their assigned places and free speech and expression from all reduction to functionality” (1). Dissensus challenges societal consensus on the idea of the proper, making it at once an aesthetic and a political endeavour that “works to introduce new subjects and heterogeneous objects into the field of perception” (2). Finally, I follow Rancière’s notion of the activity of politics; that is to say that, Politics is a process…that simultaneously denies every foundation on which it might come to form the positivity of a sphere or a purity….A always consists in blurring the boundaries between A and non-A. Politics, then, instead of consisting in an activity whose principle separates its domain out from the social, is an activity that consists only in blurring the boundaries between what is considered political and what is considered proper to the domain of social or private life. (2010, 3)

From these thinkers, I constellate a mottled sense of politics that acknowledges its history as the subject of a state-centric discipline, while remaining interested and hopeful of the possibilities of thinking the political in more plural and urban forms as they appear in various distributions of the sensible. In engaging new ways of thinking the political and political science following these
theorists, I nevertheless maintain a state of dissensus with the proper premises of conventional
political science, and continue to work towards the configuration of a political science that has
room for the acknowledgment of its receptivity to aesthetics.

Aesthetics, science and the study of politics

Now that more context has been given for the concepts I am engaging, I want to highlight
the significance of the discursive division of aesthetics and science for political science
specifically. Rather than assuming that the scientific epistemic mode that has remained at the
center of political science for many decades is the most-well suited to this discipline, I argue that
an aesthetic premise is possibly more closely related to politics than it would seem, and arguably
just as well suited to the study of politics as a scientific one. How then has the justification of a
scientific epistemic mode of inquiry come to be considered more legitimate and more
appropriate for the study of politics than an aesthetic epistemic mode, and why? The relation of
power at play between aesthetic and scientific epistemic premises appears to be one of
domination and exclusion where the mode that lays claim to knowledge also lays claim to power
over the other. The discursive division of aesthetics and science can be identified as a product of
the power dynamic created by a universal legitimation of pure reason, which favours a scientific
epistemology over an aesthetic one. One aim of this piece is not necessarily to question the
legitimacy of reason, but rather to question whether or not the notion of a pure reason, free from
the affect of aesthetics, has ever existed to begin with.

It is the aim of political science to be equipped to analyze relations such as these. In
addition to this, the ways in which conventions around these practices become selected and
petrified are also entirely contingent upon the relations they mean to understand. Thus, studying
power can be primarily about studying the layers of power present in a given relation; however, how we engage in these studies must also be subject to continual critique. In order to perform such a reflexive critique, I would suggest that there are potentially plural ways of understanding relations of power, and the exploration of this question is meant not only to further the goals of political science in producing resilient methodologies, but also to potentially shift relations of power already in place. Political science involves the study of power relations, but is also complicit in creating performative, unintended externalities in the process. How can methods of understanding power relations be pluralized to incorporate the affective, embodied repercussions of aesthetic conditions that occur in the process of administering traditional methodological forms of political science? What might it look like, and how could it be accounted for? Moreover, how might an inclusion of these kinds of pluralized analyses contribute to a performative shift in the relation of domination that a scientific epistemic mode currently holds over aesthetically sensitive approaches within political science?

Another major concern of political science is to understand representation, as modern political systems and institutions are founded on the premise that the needs of multiple individuals can be *represented* within the formal institutions of power that govern them. A large part of political science then, is comprised of adjudicating how well these systems and political figures achieve the goal of representation, and critiquing failures of representation accordingly. To judge representation is a fundamentally political enterprise, given that it bestows or withholds power, while simultaneously enacting the authority of the adjudicator. However, the domain of representation is aesthetic, making the judgment of representation a matter of taste, just as it also enacts political affects. To judge representation of the political then, is both in itself a political exercise as well as an aesthetic one, both rendering political and aesthetic affective results. In
this way, a scientific approach simply suffers being overwhelmed as a methodology attempting to trace the accuracy of representation.

Another purpose of political science is to study how power is wielded. The German philosopher Carl Schmitt was made famous by his claim that power is wielded when she/he that is sovereign “decides on the exception” (1985, 5). They that make the decision hold the power, and thus, political science has also been said to study ‘who decides’. The power to make the decision, or the unique ability of the sovereign to choose the exception to the rule- this makes up the meta-theoretical core of what the discipline of political science is intended to examine. One might therefore argue that the central concern of political science is the study of decision-making, choice- or judgment. However, when Kant spoke of the critique of judgment, or what he also called the critique of taste, he understood this epistemic mode to be quite different from that of the critique of pure reason, which for Kant was a determined science. The critique of judgment was reserved especially for those matters for which science could only give an incomplete account, those matters of an aesthetic nature- matters of taste. For Kant, judgment fell most clearly into the realm of the aesthetic, since he had already satisfactorily established that a self-contained system of pure reason was possible without the need for judgment in the realm of scientific inquiry. Pure reason, for Kant, became a science that could potentially be deduced by any “capable” mind; but aesthetics on the other hand, required judgment, something that could not be deduced but only inferred, posited, and confirmed through universal consensus. Unlike deductions of pure reason, judgments of taste could not be made alone, in the isolation of a solitary mind, but could only be confirmed through the “universal subjective validity” of the community- thus, a necessarily political context. The critique of judgment then, is arguably more akin to the study of politics, since both disciplines concern themselves with the action of
choosing, with the nature of decision-making and with political community. Wouldn’t the study of politics then benefit from an epistemic approach that incorporates a sensibility of judgment, rather than an approach that denies the need for judgment which Kant calls pure reason, or science?

I have argued here that an aesthetic epistemic mode, in which analysis is informed by the inclusion of judgment, is just as crucial to understanding politics as an epistemology informed by scientific reason (which appears to have less and less to do with human subjects implicated in complex inter-subjective, inter-affective, political relationships). However, an aesthetic approach to the study of politics remains not only ignored but also staunchly denied, de-legitimized and even forbidden by several members of the scholarly community in political science research.⁴ The reason for the rejection of an aesthetically aware approach is because in theory, this approach represents an impossibility to the discipline of political science as well as the academic context in general. How might an aesthetically sensitive study of political subjects possibly be conducted, and more importantly (for the production of scholarship), how might it possibly be evaluated, critiqued, and judged? The project of academic knowledge consolidation as well as the university system as a whole is to evaluate and judge works based on predetermined criteria. The idea of allowing works to be conducted without pre-determined criteria and more ominously, without pre-established outcomes or hypotheses would seem out of place under the current stipulations of the academic structure. It is these attributes of an “aesthetic” approach that make it challenging to conceptualize for many scholars of political science.

⁴ In their famous article, “International organizations and world politics” Kratzenstein, Keohane and Krasner declare that not just aesthetics but the entire camp of “postmodernism falls clearly outside of the social science enterprise…” (Kratzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998, 678).
However, one of the central purposes of this piece is to turn a critical gaze towards the structure of academia itself, and point out a few problems this structure may be sustaining. For all of its efforts to cut out and avoid “aesthetic” conditions that would require the subjective judgment of a work rather than the scientific evaluation of a work according to pre-set criteria, since the ability to sense is ubiquitous, I would argue that all scholarly works are necessarily already rendered through a medium affected by aesthetic conditions. Therefore, despite itself, academia has always operated in full compliance with an aesthetic epistemic mode, and is always employing the use of judgment alongside the calculations that evaluate works according to pre-determined criteria. I think it’s safe to say that many scholars would agree with the necessity of both approaches to a fulsome critique and adjudication of a work. However, there remains one marked difference in the expression of these two varied adjudication practices: one is seen as necessary, valid and legitimate within the academic ethos, while the other is denied, concealed and avoided as a factor that will inevitably harm the ability to offer unbiased evaluation. For this reason I ask, is it appropriate to require of scholars the impossible task of providing pristinely unbiased evaluations, or is it more realistic and practical to begin to recognize the role of bias and explore how to account for and include this recognition, rather than having to falsely deny its influence? This contention has formed the basis of most post-positivist literature over the past half century. However, the employment of practices that have arisen in response still remains on the very margins of the discipline, and few political scientists would openly declare their research to be aesthetic work. Even in the larger academic context, this meta-theoretical question continues to resound: although scientific evaluation appears to be the most consistent and appropriate method of testing for some subjects, it can never fully eclipse the condition of aesthetics and its reception; how then do we account for the aesthetic and
affective components of works, and what is the methodology for applying and acknowledging aesthetic judgment alongside scientific evaluation?

Why might it be so difficult for an institution such as a university to open up its traditional forms of critique to include aesthetic judgment alongside its usual scientific methods of evaluation? As I have alluded to, the separation of aesthetic judgment from scientific evaluation in the critique of scholarly works is magnified here to unrealistic proportions so as to show how it operates just as effectively on more nuanced registers. Scholars of political science, for instance, would not deny that much of critical analysis requires aesthetic judgment, since complex social dynamics are not easily conformed to the controls of a scientific test. However, when political scientists are questioned about the method of critique they use to adjudicate works of their students or peers, they are loathe to admit that their practice is a work of aesthetics or based at all in an epistemology of Kantian judgment. Rather, there seems to be a tenacious rejection of the use of “aesthetics” as a relevant epistemic mode for political science at all, and many scholars would argue that to include an aesthetic component in their work would relegate it to the utmost, extremist fringes of the discipline (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998, 678).

An aesthetic methodology first comes under the attack of illegitimacy within the discipline of political science on the grounds that it is challenging to validate. I would first like to qualify the notion of validation at stake in this argument, and suggest that perhaps it is only a specific genre of validation currently particular to the discipline of political science that arbitrates this illegitimacy. The current standard of validation that demarcates the parameters of social scientific study is rooted in an epistemological history that is invested in the distinction between science and the arts. What is it about scientific methods that is insufficient for political science or detracts from a more fulsome analysis that incorporates aesthetic methodological
components? Features inherited from the natural sciences that still shape much of political science are stipulations such as: the necessity of hypotheses; repeatable experiments; the imperative to control studies for the purpose of predicting future events; the (presumption of the) ability to control and account for all factors involved; the necessity of objectivity, and the burden of proof. These requirements have come to undergird the scientific epistemic mode, giving rise to approaches like behavioralism, rational choice theory and positivism, that are designed to guard against the contingent and unpredictable qualities of aesthetic factors. Seen as something to be eradicated, the aesthetic aspects of political studies are seen as a hindrance to the production of a controlled product, one that is verifiable and repeatable, and free from bias. However, from a perspective that is sensitive to aesthetic considerations, it becomes quickly apparent that no such eradication of aesthetics has occurred just through the scientific will for it to occur; all that has occurred is the creative (aesthetic) production of yet another set of aesthetic conditions with their specific phenomenal qualities, affective repercussions and unintended externalities.

I would argue that the reason for the reluctance of political scientists to call their work a kind of “aesthetic” production is a political one, even though upon closer examination, aesthetics seems to be an accurate description of what political scientists do. Indeed, I would argue that for many scholars of social science in general, the description of their work as “aesthetic” would be considered pejorative, taking away from the legitimacy of their work as “science”. Moreover, the categorization of the study of politics as aesthetics is read, I would argue, as particularly stinging, because it suggests the failure of this discipline to achieve the aims of its mandate, namely, to make a science out of the study of society and its politics. For this reason, the nature of this problem is markedly political since it demonstrates the dynamic of power under which the
discursive formations of “aesthetic” and “scientific” are caught. An aesthetic epistemic mode is viewed as an inferior methodological and pedagogical premise to a scientific one under the current mandate of the social sciences. A methodology that arises from, recognizes, and incorporates aesthetic considerations is excluded as an illegitimate methodological form because it fails to provide the necessary pre-determined criteria for a controlled evaluation, deeming it “unscientific” and therefore invalid in a discipline that must produce consistency. For these reasons, aesthetics has been delegitimized as a relevant epistemic mode for political science, despite the undeniable necessity of its presence as a part of the adjudication process in this discipline. However, the age-old quarrel mirrored within the modern-day difficulties that this power dynamic presents is not so easily silenced. I will now turn to look at some instantiations of this debate in the history of western philosophy in order to shed light on the evolution of this discursive formation over time, and to begin to trace how the dynamic of power between aesthetics and science came to take the particular form of balance it currently holds for political science.
Plato, poetry and philosophy

“...If you admit the sweetened muse in lyrics or epics, pleasure and pain will jointly be kings in your city instead of law and that argument which in each instance is best in the opinion of the community... since we brought up the subject of poetry again, let it be our apology that it was then fitting for us to send it away from the city on account of its character. The argument determined us. Let us further say to it, lest it convict us for a certain harshness and rusticity, that there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry.”

- Section 607a-b, Book X of the Republic (290).

What is the “quarrel” between poetry and philosophy that Plato alludes to in this famous passage from the Republic? For Plato, the pursuit of philosophy represents the highest attainable good in society as the search for ultimate, transcendent truth. Poetry on the other hand, represents a remove from the truth to the third degree. Poetry is neither truth in its transcendent form, nor the presence of truth, once removed in an immanent instantiation, but a mere representation of an immanent presence already once removed from pure truth. “…The imitator knows nothing worth mentioning about what he imitates; imitation is a kind of play and not serious…then, isn’t this imitating concerned with something that is third from the truth?” (Plato 1968, 602b). Plato’s sentiment towards artistic representations of any kind is that they impede and pollute the truth of the pure form they seek to represent, and therefore, citizens should be
wary of the seduction of such representative forms. For Plato, the societal demand that philosophy must fulfill, which is the search for transcendent truth, is hindered by aesthetic representations of truth that only serve to distort it, making aesthetic projects not only false, but unethical. In Book X of the republic, he writes, “…poetry mustn’t be taken seriously as a serious thing laying hold of truth, but that the man who hears it must be careful, fearing for the regime in himself…” (608, a-b).

Plato seems to say that the only legitimacy offered to poetry as a societal good is given by “the many” who claim that it has the potential to serve pleasure. Plato writes that as long as the argument is given “without meter” - in other words, without imitation or poetic mimesis of any kind- he will stand to hear an apology on behalf of poetry, “showing that it is not only pleasant but also beneficial to regimes and human life,” (607d). But it quickly becomes clear that no argument for the benefit of aesthetic works will persuade Plato that their merits could outweigh the threat of misinformation for which he finds them culpable. The dispute for Plato is that transcendental truth is marred by its capture in earthly presence, but when it is subjected to representation by the arts it is not only displaced, but utterly wronged. Thus, in his ideal city, Plato advocates eradicating the arts altogether, and calls for the censorship of artistic practice as a civic responsibility. This sovereign act is where the debate between the aesthetic practice of “poetry” and the science of reason as “philosophy” begins: but where does one end and the other begin? More importantly, who is authorized to arbitrate this distinction and upon what grounds are these judgments made? Although Plato would wish to rid the city of all instances of “representation,” this problematic project would only end unsuccessfully in an on-going, age-old quarrel. In this way, Plato stands as the first major philosopher to articulate the relationship of

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an aesthetic practice to a scientific practice as highly antagonistic, and his perception has come to sculpt the way this genuinely perennial contention has unfolded in western philosophy. Plato asserts that aesthetics are groundless because they require “no grasp of the truth” to be carried out- and it has been a struggle to reclaim a sense of legitimate value in aesthetics ever since (600e). Plato does not concern himself with the arbitration of what true presence is, or what representation is, but is content to sidestep this problem, whole-heartedly accepting that the distinction between these two is self-evident.

Although this is the popular reading of Plato’s views on aesthetics and has been the mainstream interpretation of his position on the role of philosophy’s epistemological project, I would like to contemplate other possible readings of these works. It seems a somewhat obvious contradiction that Plato so adamantly banishes representative forms with such ease, while also praising beauty and well-crafted poetry in other instances, as well as advocating the transcendent good of The Beautiful. Plato assures us that he is sensitive to the aesthetic pleasure that comes of fine things, but asserts that the danger of misguidance afforded by aesthetic forms requires good citizens to “keep away from it even if they have to do violence to themselves…” (607e). The glaring omission here is the method with which Plato arbitrates what constitutes the second versus the third order of representation of the pure forms. Moreover, the stark contradiction inherent in the use of poetic language, metaphors and parables by Plato himself, suggests that he enacts more of a tension in his own writings than he would himself allow in his ideal city. The fact of the conspicuousness of this “oversight” and the fact of its over-simplified reduction prompts me to wonder about other levels of interpretation at play in Plato’s work, namely, lessons given not in the register preferred by rational philosophy in the scientific epistemic mode, but rather at an affective register, in the aesthetic epistemic mode.
In “playing the part” of Socrates, Plato’s banishment of artists produces affective responses in readers, some of which might be awe, sympathy, vindication, agreement or confusion. These affects could be experienced at the idea of censorship, or at Plato’s rendering of ideas through arguably poetic means. Is it possible that the pedagogical aim of Plato’s choice of censorship was not necessarily to condone and uphold it indefinitely, but for him to perform and demonstrate the very real difficulty posed by the arbitration of what distinguishes the aesthetic from the “real” or the “true”? Could the purpose of the ban on art in the Republic be to inspire affects of repulsion to censorship in some readers, revealing the potential tyranny inherent in judging categories of legitimate craft from useless imitation? In this way, could Plato perhaps be giving his readers the impetus and the ability to question the legitimacy of the philosopher kings while enlightening readers to the processes of thought that enable and establish authoritarian sovereignty? These questions stray significantly from dominant interpretations of Plato’s intentions in this section of The Republic. They are also made possible by attending to affective responses that arise upon encountering Plato’s text, and then, incorporating those experiences as a part of the pedagogical process of interpretation, rather than leaving them outside of formal analysis. Doing this work constitutes a validation of the aesthetic affects that occur during interpretation and offers an analysis rendered in an aesthetic epistemic mode that can supplement more conventional readings of this passage.

It would seem that Plato would surely recognize the weakness of his essentialization of poetry given his quick deconstruction of other such essentializations (such as a similar deconstruction of holiness he offers in the dialogue Euthyphro) (2003, 14). Given that Plato has demonstrated the difficulty with pinning down essences, this open essentialism and censorship of poetry is possibly an affective pedagogy. Perhaps by inflaming various responses Plato is
“teaching us a lesson” through an affective register rather than a determining register that reads the text literally. Or perhaps, could it be that Plato experiences the tension of this quarrel unfolding at once in himself and is thereby performing it through an authoritarian censorship of arts that is nevertheless rendered aesthetically in order to clearly demonstrate this paradox as something of an impossible necessity. As Plato scholar, Christopher Janaway writes, “That the quarrel between philosophy and poetry plays itself out within Plato is one source of the belief that he himself provides the material for a defense of art…” (Janaway 2005, 73). I would suggest that the “tools” Plato provides for a defense of art are rendered on an affective register, and that sensitization to an affective analytic enables the detection of such tools through methods that a positivist analytic would be incapable of perceiving.

In offering this alternative analysis to traditional interpretations of Plato’s views on aesthetics I aim to accomplish two things. The first is to put into practice what I have been advocating, that is to offer an analysis that is receptive to aesthetically rendered, affective responses to subjects of study- to engage an aesthetic epistemic mode. Note, this is not the rejection of intellectual analysis, nor the advocacy of a simply aesthetic analysis that would imply the (pseudo) separation of intellectual versus aesthetic study. Rather, the aesthetic epistemic form of analysis comes about through a fusion of cognitive understanding and aesthetic receptivity in exactly the same manner as a more traditional, positivistic form of analysis might have been formed. The difference proposed in an aesthetic epistemic mode is how this fusion is then acknowledged and rendered openly in the mind and on the page. By consciously permitting my analysis to incorporate and take stock of affective components and aesthetic features of my experience of Plato’s works, and then by choosing to validate those thoughts and responses in a fusion of scientific and aesthetic analysis, I offer a very different study than a strictly deterministic
reading of this text might enable. The combination of analytical faculties in this way also allows several, multifaceted and competing readings of Plato’s works to appear, opening up new avenues for exploration, thereby also questioning hegemonic interpretations of these works.

The second aim of this analysis is to further explore the possibilities of what the aesthetic epistemic mode might offer in areas like pedagogical practices. In the area of pedagogy, an aesthetic epistemic mode would contest some of the formal, traditional modes of delivering education that are haunted by a scientific imperative. The mandate of the scientific epistemic mode is guided by a dualistic pedagogical logic that distinguishes between the correct and the incorrect, where answers must be one or the other, but cannot be both. The accumulation of right answers builds a linear trajectory towards the progressive accumulation of knowledge that can be eventually learned, known and mastered. Incorrect answers are a step backwards in the pursuit of knowledge, and thus, linearity is the only possible direction of progress for the logic of dualism, since the notion of lateral movement through a plurality of answers would fall outside the bounds of this logic. The prospect of a plurality of answers would surely undo the meaning of the correct/incorrect dualism, and such a branch could only be permitted to exist if it remained separated and excluded. A scientific epistemic mode inherits the compulsion to determine all knowledge through a two-dimensional, linear trajectory from the central impulse towards unidirectional linearity found in the correct/incorrect dualism. It seems to make a comfortable kind of sense that each question in the pursuit of knowledge should have a respective, singular answer that corresponds to it, which only needs discovering. I would argue that this kind of scientific determinism is precisely what demarcates a large part of the discursive boundary between what I am calling an aesthetic epistemic mode and a scientific one.
In contrast to the correct/incorrect dualism of a scientific epistemic mode, consider how the process of signification for an ostensibly aesthetic work might be rendered differently. Rather than a singular line of signification between question and corresponding answer, the “questions” posed by a work that calls itself a work of art do not offer the prospect of a singular response. Very simply, there is a plurality of possible questions that arise in response to works of art that conjure an endless series of possible answers, which are themselves open to an infinite regress of possible, varying formulations. In pedagogy this means that just as the prospect of plurality of signification seems to misunderstand the meaning of the correct/incorrect dualism, so does the idea of singular lines of signification seem to misread meanings in art. These differing approaches subsequently become ingrained in the epistemologies they inform (and are thus informed by). From the perspective of an aesthetic epistemic mode then, knowledge is not necessarily created and consolidated through a linear process of determining answers to fixed equations or hypotheses, but through a plurality of potential trajectories that arise within a given piece, rendering several questions, which may in turn yield diverse responses. In the scientific epistemic mode, however, meaning is allocated to concepts through a singular line of signification for which questions have answers that are either correct or incorrect, but always one or the other.

According to this account of what I am describing as two epistemic modes, social scientific pedagogy informed by a scientific epistemic mode would stipulate that the questions posed by social science ought to have corresponding answers that can be shown to be correct (or incorrect). In an exercise such as the analysis of a political text such as Plato’s republic, a scientific epistemic mode would determine that an unaffected, objective reading of this text should produce a single interpretation with clearly determined meanings. For example, it seems apparent that the meaning of Plato’s text is to advocate the censorship of art within society in order to ensure the safe
consolidation of unthreatened power. However, if social science pedagogy incorporates an aesthetic epistemic mode, the premise of this approach is that subjects approach a text with various given affective orientations and aesthetic sensibilities, and upon encountering the text, they are thrown into an exchange of possible ideas, questions and interpretations regarding the text that may correspond to any number of possible responses. To continue with the example of Plato’s text, rather than assume the intentions of Plato, or of the text, it becomes possible to imagine that perhaps choosing to write in favour of the censorship of art is itself a pedagogical tool. From an aesthetic epistemic mode, Plato’s text can be read as a tool that exposes the reader to herself in that the various responses produced reflect the various affected orientations from which each reader is situated. For example, while one reader may react with gratefulness when reading Plato’s views on the censorship of art as the imparting of knowledge as to how to run a good city, other readers may feel incensed at the prospect of censorship, and from this affect may understand this text as a demonstration of the effect that centralizing power can have on artistic freedom. Pedagogy itself becomes pluralized under the aesthetic epistemic mode because the student is not a universal subject but a particular subject, and therefore the “lesson” is particular too. The aesthetic epistemic mode concedes that the lesson is rendered through the learning.

For this reason, just as the aesthetic epistemic mode questions the academic project of consolidating knowledge along a singular, linear trajectory, it also contests the hierarchy of the “lesson-learner” relation as well as the “teacher-student” relation. This is because just as the lesson “gets away from the teacher” and becomes pluralized in an aesthetic epistemic mode, so the student’s learning becomes a more autonomous endeavour whereby texts and teachers are mere facilitators of learning, rather than prescriptive agents who govern pedagogical practices and discipline learning. Just as a text “gets away from the author” through the encounter with the
reader, so the lesson “gets away from the teacher” when students are enabled and encouraged to autonomously undertake their own lessons from a given instruction, rather than stipulating a single lesson or pedagogical trajectory that must be learned for educational development. For an example like mathematics, it becomes imperative that young students learn precise lessons in order to build and consolidate their knowledge, and for this reason, the impulse to encompass and transfer universal knowledge comes from pedagogy that is steeped in the scientific epistemic mode. When this epistemic approach is imported into disciplines with much more complex subjects, however, the role of interpretation is much greater, and thus merits more attention. For this reason, the notion of encouraging learning to occur through plural, subjective and autonomous lesson-forming alerts social scientists to the ways in which these processes may be already occurring in their analysis without any awareness, let alone recognition of them. Pedagogical practices more informed by an aesthetic epistemic mode would understand education as inherently interpretive and therefore particular, moving it forward by beginning to acknowledge this factor.

Through this brief look at Plato’s general remarks on aesthetics and how these have been interpreted and continue to contribute to the separation of aesthetics and science, I have also tried to offer what a scientific epistemic analysis might look like and then perform a different analysis offered through an aesthetic epistemic mode. I have also tried to show what the implications of an aesthetic epistemic mode might signify for pedagogical practice, and have tried to use Plato’s text as an example of how these differing orientations to pedagogy create varying results. It is important to note here that while I have offered some unique possible readings of Plato’s position on aesthetics, the dominant interpretation in political science of the passage on censorship in The Republic remains literal. For this reason, Plato is often taken up in light of this more common reading of The Republic, and responses to Plato most often have this interpretation in mind. It is in
this sense that over time, more mainstream interpretations of *The Republic* have contributed to the discursive split between aesthetics and science. Whether or not Plato had this division in mind, his stark and arguably violent separation of poetry and philosophy has solidified into the notion of a fundamental division between aesthetics and science, as well as the epistemic modes this division works to inform. Plato’s distinction may be one of the decisive moments in the discursive division of these two epistemic modes, and in the following sections it becomes apparent that the analyses offered by Kant and Nietzsche are both indebted to Plato’s formative role in articulating the relationship between aesthetics and science.

At this point, an important distinction must be made: while the separation of science and aesthetics into two epistemic modes operates here to highlight their historical, discursive division, in the forefront of my mind is always the superficial nature of this division. The point of exaggerating and emphasizing the operative divide between scientific and aesthetic epistemic modes here is to expose and analyze the rule and function of their separation. However, this is not to suggest that the rule of their division is fixed, real, true or permanent; nor it is certain that the notions “science” and “aesthetics” respectively are the most accurate terms to describe the dynamic I have intuited to exist in political science practices. Indeed, just as Plato saw this debate unfolding along the axis of poetry and philosophy, so others have used terms that they see fit to describe dynamics that I would argue differ only in small degrees from the one I describe here. The hyperbole that is the striking division of science and aesthetics is performed here with the intention of spurring its undoing and exposing its weakness as an effective division. In calling attention to the gross generalizations of “science” and “aesthetics”, the more nuanced ways in which this polarization operates in the everyday become more easily perceived, and thus more effectively analyzed. Although the practical division of science from aesthetics is arguably a fiction, the idea
of their division is salient and operative, made clear by the lack of analysis showcasing their integration. Cultivating awareness of this dynamic enables the possibility of an aesthetically attuned consciousness that can be sensitive to the ways in which aesthetics play a role in analyses, as well as perceiving how aesthetics are covered over and pushed to the outside of allowable scholarly discourses. While many scholars would reject a de facto division of aesthetics and science, I would argue that these scholars would nevertheless still struggle to articulate how they practice or recognize aesthetic elements in their work. This ostensible norm demonstrates that the quarrel over the legitimacy of aesthetics cannot easily be put to rest.

Kant, judgment and reason

“Beautiful arts and sciences, which by means of a universally communicable pleasure and an elegance and refinement make human beings, if not morally better, at least better mannered for society, very much reduce the tyranny of sensible tendencies, and prepare humans for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power;”

- Section 83 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (301).

Among the many trajectories this metaphoric quarrel takes hereafter, I’d like to continue its history with Kant’s attempts over two millennia later to investigate this same division between aesthetics and science. The fundamental elements of the discursive formation that I want to trace from Plato to Kant is the exclusion of an aesthetic epistemic orientation from the “inside” of legitimate knowledge which has instead been configured as intellectual, logical and ultimately
reason-based. Plato seems not only to reject the idea that aesthetics are a necessary element in the formation of epistemology, but also that pure, well-reasoned thought should be in any way affected by aesthetic conditions (even an apology for aesthetics itself can only be rendered “without meter” for it to be acceptable for Plato). Furthermore, Plato finds it plausible to separate what he sees as aesthetic production from non-aesthetic production as “true” or “real”. Finally, because he finds this separation to be possible, he moves to make it exigent, ultimately carrying out a segregation of epistemologies in which aesthetics and philosophy (as the science of logical and correct thought) are essentialized as mutually exclusive epistemologies, thereby making it possible to eliminate and ban aesthetic conditions.

Plato’s segregation of logical versus aesthetic epistemologies no doubt had influence on Kant’s categorization of pure, reasoned cognition against aesthetic judgment. Kant writes, “The judgment of taste is therefore not a cognitive judgment, hence not a logical one, but is rather aesthetic, by which is understood one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective.” (Kant 2000, 89). However, rather than ban aesthetics, Kant attempted, through pure reason, to see if the systematicity he had found in his ability to discover knowledge through cognition could be applied to the discovery of a system of aesthetic judgment. Kant began his exploration by hypothesizing that, since a priori principles for pure reason could be discovered, they might also exist for the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. However, as Paul Guyer traces in his introduction to the Cambridge edition of Critique of the Power of Judgment, throughout Kant’s work, up until the writing of the third Critique, he had held to the view that matters of taste had no a priori grounds for critique but were purely empirical and therefore below the reason-based principles of science.
Kant writes that using the term ‘aesthetics’ to mean “bringing the critical judging of the beautiful under principles of reason, and elevating its rules to a science” is a “failed hope” since “the putative rules or criteria are merely empirical as far as their sources are concerned, and can therefore never serve as a priori rules according to which our judgments of taste must be directed,” (xix). For Kant, judgments of taste are no more than mere “touchstones of correctness” for the science of pure reason, which is based on a priori principles (xix). So what does Kant substitute for a priori principles in order to establish some kind of grounds for the judgment of taste in his final Critique? In section 20 of the critique, Kant expresses his idea of what an a priori principle for the power of judgment would look like most clearly as the supposition of a principle of underlying universalism through a “common sense” of pleasure that can stand as a foundation for consensus, albeit subjectively.

If judgments of taste… had a determinate objective principle, then someone who made them in accordance with the latter would lay claim to the unconditioned necessity of his judgment. If they had no principle at all, like those of mere sensory taste, then one would never even have a thought of their necessity. They must thus have a subjective principle, which determines what pleases or displeases only through feeling and not through concepts, but yet with universal validity. Such a principle, however, could only be regarded as a common sense, which is essentially different from the common understanding that is sometimes also called common sense (sensus communis), since the latter judges not by feeling, but always by concepts, although commonly only in the form of obscurely represented principles. Thus, only under the presupposition that there is a common sense (by which, however, we do not mean any external sense but rather the effect of the free play of our cognitive powers)… can the judgment of taste be made. (122)

Essentially, Kant concludes that while no determinate principles for the judgment of taste can be established, there can still be consensus on what constitutes the beautiful through the assumption
of a universal ability to comprehend beauty and feel pleasure and displeasure, which will prompt Kant to suggest a teleological purposiveness in all of nature that can act as a stand-in for a kind of *a priori* principle. Above all, Kant wants to establish that “taste is thus the faculty for judging *a priori* the communicability of the feelings that are combined with a given representation (without the mediation of a concept)” (176), but in order to determine this, he must resign himself to being content with the somewhat indeterminate *a priori* principle of universal subjective validity.

Kant’s first move in the orchestration of this conclusion is to establish the power of judgment as a transitory link between what he had established in the other two critiques as “understanding” and “reason”. The power of judgment holds a very particular and peculiar place in Kant’s system of the powers of mind because it connects forms of cognition, but is itself discounted as a form of cognition, and even shamed in some instances for failing to provide a self-evident *a priori* principle that might entitle it to the right of being deemed “cognition” in Kant’s formal sense.

…[G]reat difficulties must be involved in finding a special principle for [the power of judgment]…It therefore has to provide a concept itself, through which no thing is actually cognized, but which only serves as a rule for it, but not as an objective rule to which it can conform its judgment, since for that yet another power of judgment would be required in order to be able to decide whether it is a case of the rule or not. This embarrassment about a principle (whether it be subjective or objective) is found chiefly in those judgings that are called aesthetic, which concern the beautiful and the sublime in nature or in art. And likewise the critical investigation of a principle of the power of judgment in these cases is the most important part of a critique of this faculty. (57)

In his drive to determine the *a priori* principle that would make a science out of aesthetic judgment, Kant’s frustration is palpable as he expresses the “embarrassment” of having found no
immediate proof for the existence of a self-evident principle for aesthetic judgment.  Kant is nevertheless convinced of the relevance of the power of judgment as an “intermediary between the understanding and reason… that makes the transition from the pure faculty of cognition, i.e., from the domain of concepts of nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom,” (64) which exists in the faculty of desire for Kant. As Kant schematizes his grand system of the powers of mind and how theoretical and practical philosophy correspond to each part respectively, the branch of “aesthetics” (which is a term Kant hesitates to use precisely because it has the connotation of a kind of science of which Kant knows it is incapable) becomes an odd addition that Kant finds useful in the end for only one particular reason: its ability to connect the rational, cognitive forms of philosophy to nature and thus to the grand unifying teleology found therein that circles back to give meaning to the practice of philosophy in the first place.

Kant’s understanding of judgment is anchored in the fundamental belief that reality has a noumenal substructure, eliciting the principle of phenomenal experience that is enacted through the powers of the mind working upon cognizable forms that exist in reality. From this (acknowledged) presupposition regarding the nature of reality, Kant derives a split understanding of judgment distinguished as either determining judgment or reflecting judgment. Determining judgment is meant to correctly determine an “underlying concept through a given empirical representation,” whereas reflecting judgment is meant “to compare and hold together given representations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible,” (15). This is a good example of how Kant understands the division of the universal and the particular. For Kant, a determining judgment is made by extrapolating the particular from the universal; for example, from the universal laws of mathematics in place at the time of Kant’s writing, a determining judgment would be able to correctly judge the right
solution for a particular problem. By contrast, Kant posits that a reflecting judgment is an extrapolation of the universal from a particular; thus, by reflecting on one particular instance of beauty, a universal idea of beauty can be found. The conception of noumenal reality as concentric, whereby the particular is subsumed under a universal is still a presupposition that Kant has come to be comfortable with, deciding that this must be the most likely system through which noumena can be comprehended- but this assumption by Kant is often the starting ground for critiques of Kant’s thought. For Kant, the principle of noumenal reality upon which judgments are formed through cognition is key because without it, no way of proving judgments to be “sound” exists. Kant writes,

The principle of reflection on given objects of nature is that for all things in nature empirically determinate concepts can be found, which is to say the same as that in all of its products one can always presuppose a form that is possible for general laws cognizable by us. For if we could not presuppose this and did not ground our treatment of empirical representations on this principle, then all reflection would become arbitrary and blind, and hence would be undertaken without any well-grounded expectation of its agreement with nature. (15-16)

Bound up in the notion of an infallible, foundational principle of knowable reality is the idea of a nature in and through which reality is manifest. The idea of nature here is multi-layered, carrying with it notions of the natural, understood as correct conduct and progression, as well as the idea that nature moves with intention towards an end. Kant introduces the idea of a purposiveness in nature that carries a teleology of intention within it, both of which do not prove, but work to justify Kant’s insistence on the principle of a presupposed noumenal reality.

The entire orchestration of Kant’s arguments is based on a highly systematized understanding of the powers of mind, and it has been noted that in both his writing and his philosophy, Kant’s determination to reproduce his systems is not always favourable or beneficial
for his ultimate goals, but are markedly laboured, requiring a great effort to produce systemized conformity.\textsuperscript{6} The affective agency of this purposed aesthetic choice is not arbitrary, since one of Kant’s goals is to create a possible justification for proof of this same kind of reproducible systematicity in nature, one that can be extrapolated from Kant’s systematicity of thought. A visualization of Kant’s entire system, taken from the schema he sets out in both the first and the published introductions and expanded in the critiques, might look like Table A.

Table A. Kant’s Systems of Philosophy and the Powers of Mind

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part of Philosophy</th>
<th>Faculty of Mind</th>
<th>Higher Power of Cognition</th>
<th>A Priori principle</th>
<th>Application Products</th>
<th>Validity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical</td>
<td>Faculty of cognition</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Lawfulness</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic</td>
<td>Feeling of pleasure and displeasure</td>
<td>Power of Judgment</td>
<td>Purposiveness</td>
<td>Art</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical</td>
<td>Faculty of desire</td>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>Obligation (Final End)</td>
<td>Morals (as a product of Freedom)</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Determining
- Determines a particular from a universal, and applies universal laws correctly.

Reflecting
- Infers, reflects a universal from a particular, can only be validated subjectively.
- 3 kinds of Reflecting Judgment:
  1. Systematicity (Law of Heautonomy)
  2. Aesthetic Judgment - based on the \textit{a priori} principle that we all share the universal feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Thus, we can claim authority on judgments of beauty because of this shared, common sense called \textit{universal subjective validity}.
  i. The beautiful (based on form alone)
     a. Quality > Disinterest

\textsuperscript{6} In his introduction, Guyer discusses the somewhat arbitrary imposition of Kant’s previous systems into his present works, pg.xxxv.
b. Quantity > Universal Subjective Validity
   c. Relation > Pleasure in purposiveness (free vs. adherent beauty)
   d. Modality > Consensus (mandatory moral obligation)

ii. The sublime (based on form with concept)
   a. Quality
   b. Quantity > Mathematical: Sublime frustration that yields to pleasure in reason.
   c. Relation
   d. Modality > Dynamical: Sublime fear that yields to pleasure in reason.

Universal subjective validity is expected, cultivated and actively pursued in the sublime.

3. Teleological Power of Judgment – based on the \textit{a priori} principle that nature has a teleological, rational purpose that culminates in the ideal of correct human morality.
   i. Internal purposiveness > parts are both cause and effect
   ii. External/Relative purposiveness > one exists for another
       Purposiveness > designer > final end > human morality/happiness.

Conclusion: Connection between the aesthetic and the teleological is that they both support human morality as the ultimate goal of nature.

After parsing out the division of the powers of mind, Kant delves into the power of judgment as one of the three powers that consists not of a faculty (of cognition) but of a \textit{feeling}. After further dividing the power of judgment into a rather lopsided schematization of determining versus reflecting judgment, Kant goes on to outline the three types of reflecting judgment, only two of which make up most of \textit{The Critique of the Power of Judgment}. The second form of reflecting judgment is aesthetic judgment, and here is where Kant offers most of his analysis and where he works out his main ideas on judging the beautiful and the sublime in art and nature, and the final form of reflecting judgment is the teleological power of judgment that judges the purposiveness of nature through the purposiveness of organisms, where Kant synthesizes the impetus for his previous arguments into a cohesive, universal purpose of life. The treatment of the first type of reflecting judgment however, is perhaps the most interesting.
The first type of reflecting judgment is called “systematicity” and by this, Kant means how we judge the legitimacy of the body of scientific laws and concepts themselves. That Kant sees this as the first of the forms of reflecting judgment, and that he mentions it, and almost as quickly dismisses it, is arguably a starkly aesthetic intervention against which the entire rest of his piece is contextualized. For a fleeting moment Kant gestures towards the possibility of ambiguity, daring to entertain questions on the validity of systems of science, logic in general and even his own philosophical system. In the power of judgment that is the judgment of systematicity, Kant essentially asks how can we be sure that we know what we know. How are we certain that our systems of organization are legitimate and what assures us that we can confidently and consistently assume that our logical and scientific systems will continue to produce the same results? Kant’s explanation is that it is nature that gives us systems of organization because nature itself is systematized, which explains why we explore knowledge in an organized fashion-as a science. Kant then goes further to argue that nature is actually organized on behalf of judgment, and this is what Kant names “The Law of Heautonomy of Judgment,” which states that we (to which one must ask who?) are authorized to seek for systematicity in concepts and laws of nature, because nature organizes itself in this manner for its discovery by us (again, who?). Therefore, according to the Law of Heautonomy, we can judge that our scientific systems are legitimate because nature’s general laws translate into empirical ones, and nature’s innate form of organization authorizes the judgment that systematicity is legitimate.

Kant’s analysis that the judgment of systematicity is justified through the empirical proof of nature’s predisposition to organization becomes the major cornerstone of his broader argument for the connection of the other two forms of reflecting judgment, teleological and
aesthetic judgment. For Kant, the Law of Heautonomy stands in as a kind of *a priori* principle for reflecting judgment, and it is upon the basis of this assumption that Kant builds his argument for a teleological purpose that drives the feeling of pleasure in beauty, even if that purpose is imperceptible and indecipherable. Inductively, pleasure from beauty comes from some unknown usefulness that beauty serves, and therefore, according to Kant, beauty must have an intrinsic end that its purpose works to attain. The fact that we experience “pleasure” when we encounter beauty is what grounds this argument, since for Kant, the feeling of pleasure occurs at the attainment of an end, making pleasure in beauty a universally valid pleasure occurring because of the achievement of a universally valid (but unknowable) objective in beauty. For Kant, the analytic of the Beautiful culminates in the assertion that response to beauty is the free and harmonious play of imagination that produces understanding, and it is this cognitive process that produces the feeling of pleasure in beauty (107). Since the assertion of beauty is not established upon a concept, but is made only as a disinterested judgment, pleasure in beauty arises as a response to the relation of the concept with its *object*, what Kant calls its *purposiveness*. Kant states, “That is **beautiful** which pleases universally without a concept,” and then, “…an end is the object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a *concept* with regard to its *object* is purposiveness (*forma finalis*),” (104-105).

While aesthetic judgment serves to establish, based on the principle of universal subjective validity, that which is **beautiful** and that which is **sublime** according to its form, teleological judgment asks whether the form of an object corresponds to its innate rational purpose, and in this way teleological judgment serves to establish *internal* and *external purposiveness*. The final implication that Kant offers as the reason behind the link between
aesthetic and teleological judgment is that both of these forms of judgment lead to the human ideal of morality. Kant begins by showing that judgment itself is the bridge between legislations in the domain of theoretical knowledge and freedom through reason and practical knowledge. In this way, Kant asserts that pleasure in beauty fosters morality inherently because in the same way that this pleasure is nonetheless a disinterested affection for beauty, it instructs us in the kind of disinterested, unconditional love for all mankind that forms the basis for Kant’s understanding of human morality. From this argument, Kant extrapolates the idea that the fact that beauty exists for this purpose clearly indicates that nature itself supports human morality, and that upon reflecting on the purposiveness of organisms through teleological judgment, it becomes apparent that human moral development is thus the ultimate end of nature. Finally, if morality can be introduced as the intended, intrinsic end that aesthetic and teleological judgment serves, the stipulation of obligation that stands as the guiding principle of morality comes into play. Drawing on this moral implication, Kant is then able to assert that consensus on the beautiful afforded by universal subjective validity is no longer only something we can expect from others, but, in accordance with the stipulations of moral obligation, it becomes something we can expect of others. Consensus on judgments of taste is no longer a goal but a moral duty and giving assent to consensus on judgments of taste becomes a mandatory, civilizing project that should in theory propel man ever further towards the ideal end of nature, which is the perfect happiness of a truly moral humanity.

Kant calls this discovery the “crowning phase” of his philosophy because it connects the ability to make judgments of taste, nature’s intrinsic purposiveness, and an ultimate, teleological end to nature found in the ideal of human morality. Kant argues that in order to make nature’s purpose determinate, its end must have unconditional value, the only candidate of which could
be humanity as a moral species (as opposed to other, only natural species). Thus for Kant, human happiness is the ultimate end of nature and arises as the product of human virtue (297). Kant asserts that this conclusion is not scientific, but stands as a regulative or general principle; what begins as the science of observing organisms in nature eventually leads to the idea of purposiveness in nature which can only be fulfilled by human morality. It is through the purposiveness in nature that humans are obligated to establish an order in which the final end of human happiness can be achieved, the end under which “the whole of nature is teleologically subordinated,” (303). Kant’s final speculations on the existence of God as the only possible designer of the intricately organized mechanisms that make up natural forms act as the seal of natural hierarchy that circle round to substantiate and validate notions of innate principles that guide judgment, regardless of their (lack of) verification through science. In the end, aesthetic judgments of all kinds must lean on scientific deduction and moral obligation in order to stand as legitimate on any grounds in Kant’s system.

In review, Kant frames his project on the premise of a cognitive orientation since he begins from the same assumption as Plato, namely, that epistemology is split between aesthetic and rational, logical or otherwise scientific forms. Donald W. Crawford writes, “Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics are based on a division between Sensibility and Understanding,” where sense is the passive reception of stimuli without forming meaning, and understanding is the non-sensible, “active faculty of producing thoughts,” (2005, 56). For Kant, experience is formed through the use of both of these faculties, and “judgment” is a claim or assertion made regarding experience. Even the judgment of satisfaction is an entirely disinterested, cognitive judgment for Kant, since the presence of pleasure can be an empirically observed fact (56). Kant contrasts “pleasure in the beauty of objects with a moral interest in their existence based in pure
practical reason,” when he writes in section 9 of the *Critique* that the key to the critique of taste is that our pleasure in beauty is caused by the free play of imagination and understanding, thus producing pleasure for a different reason than the good or the agreeable would produce pleasure (Guyer 2000, xxix). Kant separates “pleasure” in beauty as an experience that is universally known but experienced subjectively from the judgment of something that is essentially beautiful, which Kant claims to be a disinterested and objective claim. Beauty can only be claimed if it is universally agreed upon, and to say something is beautiful is to call others into agreement upon this judgment as a fact. Paul Guyer sums up Kant’s final conclusions regarding the possibility of establishing a system for the judgment of taste, saying:

…The central thought of the analysis of aesthetic judgment in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, [is] the idea that in a judgment of taste a person can claim intersubjective validity for the feeling of pleasure that she experiences in response to a beautiful object because that pleasure is produced, in an attitude of disinterested contemplation, not by a practical concern for utility or advantage in the possession of the object, but by the free and harmonious play of the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding that the beautiful object induces, and that she can rightly claim such validity for her feeling because we all share these cognitive faculties and they must work pretty much the same way in all of us… (xvii)

The political imperative that gets slipped in with Kant’s model for the practice of judgment is crucial to his overall ideological project. For Kant, as for Plato, subjective judgment is not an autonomous exercise, but a communal one, which demands a particular kind of politics. Kant’s idea is that no formation of judgment can be made in isolation because, since truth about judgment cannot be proven *de facto* through the science of reason, confirmation on the correctness of our judgments can only come from an interlocution of consensus with the judgments of others. Kant still holds that “the beautiful” as an essential characteristic can be
established, but not on scientific grounds—only upon the ground of agreement between members of the community. Thus, the fact of our agreement, based on our universal subjective validity is as close to a scientific guarantor of an a priori principle as Kant can find for the power of judgment.

I find this to be one of Kant’s most interesting political formulations because it is clear that he has had to deviate significantly from his original system of deduction in order to allow this representation of epistemology. Above all, Kant wants his epistemological systems to abide in sovereignty. The aesthetic of Kant’s systems is hierarchical, top heavy, clearly demarcated, and meticulously schematized. The organization of the components of his systems—the orchestration and composition of his philosophical oeuvres—bear in their rendering sovereign affects of governmentality, subjugation, domination, and above all, conformity to the rule. However, establishing a regime of sovereignty within the power of judgment proves more difficult for Kant. Admitting that judgment cannot operate within the scientific model, but still being willing to assess its purpose and place as an important human faculty is a significant concession for Kant. But almost as soon as Kant makes this deviation from his original paradigm, he recoils and tries to drag judgment back into the fold of science and back under the sovereignty of his systematicity. The result is peculiar: instead of imagining an analysis of aesthetics unto itself that is appropriate for its subject (as systematicity is for the study of scientific reason), Kant tries instead to superimpose the analytical mode of systematicity onto judgment, importing a system that is perhaps ill-suited for the subject it means to study.

The reason behind this choice for Kant may be moral, theoretical, aesthetic or a combination of these; but ultimately, in conjunction with these reasons, Kant’s choice is political. Kant is committed, above all, to a model of analysis that espouses an aesthetic of
sovereignty. The scientific epistemic mode mirrors the political model of sovereignty first by projecting the unquestioned condition of hierarchy through the scientific idea of singular correctness. The model of correctness establishes order, and the process of ordering produces the system of hierarchy. Hierarchy is not suggested as a means here, hierarchy is presumed as inherent to systematicity. This assumption of hierarchy implies a condition of sovereignty under which the rule of law is ultimate. The scientific epistemic mode emulates the political model of sovereignty by consolidating knowledge through the systematic deduction of correct forms, subjugating epistemology under this mandate. This epistemic approach is only possible under the rule of law that orders information hierarchically and distinguishes correct from incorrect deductions. A second emulation of sovereignty that comes through the scientific epistemic mode is the compulsory consensus of universalism. In order for Kant’s system to carry weight, the rule of its law must be enforced through universal adherence. This universalism reifies sovereignty by prohibiting non-conformity, making consensus on the rule of law mandatory.

The final product of these two actions is ultimately to “un-question”. The posture of the question is counter to sovereign order and is anathema to universal consensus. The posture of the question is ultimately the spirit of the first form of reflecting judgment, the judgment on systematicity that allows, for a moment, the governed subject to reflect on the system as a whole, and to ask, reflexively. The problem with Kant’s formulation is that after initially inviting the mode of the question, he performs the ultimate sovereign move: he banishes the validity and the necessity of the reflexive question by offering an answer that is meant to both solve the question and fix its answer indefinitely, thereby nullifying the place of the question. This action mirrors Plato’s prohibition on art in the city, a sovereign act that is meant to finalize the question on truth and end the need for reflection or questioning at all. The mode of the question represents the
possibility of deviation from a system, a break in the uniformity of universalism and ultimately the prospect of autonomy that questions the legitimacy of sovereign rule. The final, political implication of the question is that, although seemingly innocuous, when applied to the foundation of a system, such as the questioning of the consensus, the question has the ability to topple sovereign hegemony and breed political alternatives of autonomy or anarchy that are lethal to sovereign order. For this reason, the only option for Plato, and for Kant, is to admit that the question exists, but to rule it out of the place of legitimacy. For Plato the answer is to censor works of art that question the singular truth of the republic as they pose alternative stories that deviate from sovereign meta-narratives. For Kant, rather than deny the presence of the question, he begins by acknowledging that the question is necessary and indeed crucial for the initiation of the scientific mode. But rather than holding the question, and allowing the tension of the question to always hover over the work of the science, for Kant the question hinders and stalls thought, and in order for the scientific mode to succeed, the question must be dealt with, and dismissed.

How does the posture of the question relate specifically to the aesthetic epistemic mode? The point of connection here is at the problem of intention. The linearity of intention in the scientific epistemic mode does not allow for deviation or the plurality of other, potentially competing or cancelling intentions. Returning to the example of linearity in the correct/incorrect dualism, the questioning of a correct answer would be what Kant would call a reflection in line with the judgment of systematicity. Maintaining the question of systematicity is non-sensical in the scientific epistemic mode because posing the possibility of alternative solutions nullifies the meaning of what is correct, undoing the ordered hierarchy of the correct answer that ought to be sovereign over other answers, which are, by their difference, made incorrect de facto. The line
of intention in this logic is singular and unidirectional: any other possible formulation would render the dualistic system of correctness defunct. For these reasons, the permanent instantiation of the question is not permitted in a scientific epistemic mode, as it works only to confuse and trouble the sovereignty of singular correctness, creating a state of literal anarchy, where no principle is dominant.

Conversely, the feature of intention is handled very differently in an aesthetic epistemic mode. Returning to the example of the art work, the singular intention of the scientific epistemic mode would understand the work of art to have a correct meaning and interpretation, whereas the possibility of multiple lines of intention that potentially overlap or contradict one another, or even lines that fissure and fork or branch away from their original direction are all plausible as interpretive analyses of art works in an aesthetic epistemic mode. No singular line of intention can stand in proclamation of self-evidence in the aesthetic epistemic mode. In this way, the question is not answered and not banished, but is invited, sustained and even enacted as it continues to critique the various possible lines that present themselves, doing away with sustained hegemony. Meaning is not lost through the allowance of multiple lines of intention because meaning need not be singular in works of art. The aesthetic epistemic mode is not troubled by plurality of intention because at the forefront of aesthetic works is the necessity of interpretation. Interpretation takes precedence as the primary mode of engagement with the aesthetic work, rather than the premise of study and deduction through objectivity. As a politics, then, the aesthetic epistemic mode is not troubled by a state of anarchic pluralism because it does not elevate a singular line of intention to begin with. Without a sovereign order of correct deduction to enforce, the aesthetic epistemic mode does not interpret multiple lines of intention.
as a threat to its order, but rather embraces and encourages the production of multiple views to assess.

The scientific epistemic mode upholds one, singular line of intention that remains sovereign over all others, and works to suppress, censor and eradicate competing alternatives, denying the inevitable transformations that the passage of time decrees. The aesthetic epistemic mode cannot harbour intentions of ultimate sovereignty because in this mode, lines of intention rise to power for a time, but then are expected to wane and be replaced in a process of evolution. The evolutionary process of interpretation (in analysis or otherwise) does not detract from meaning in the aesthetic epistemic mode, but in the scientific epistemic mode, the notion of evolution is akin to the posture of the question: that truth could be transient is a point of fear and of threat to the consolidation of fixed knowledge. Because of this variation between the scientific and aesthetic epistemic modes, they each produce unique perspectives on time, the place and purpose of time, and the manner in which it passes. The scientific epistemic mode is committed to producing a state of stasis in which the passage of time is meant to maintain, augment and strengthen past and present analysis. It is precisely for this reason that knowledge in this mode is meant to be confirmed and consolidated, rather than rethought or transformed, as this would indicate a flaw or fault in current understanding. In an Orwellian gesture, the scientific epistemic mode seeks to maintain the present status of knowledge through techniques of erasure and amnesia, presenting knowledge as fixed and therefore correct. For the aesthetic epistemic mode, time is construed and understood quite differently. The passage of time is

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7 It must be reiterated here that this statement is not a commentary on science itself, since, as Thomas Kuhn has shown in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, major paradigm-shifts that occur as a result of the transformation of scientific knowledge are not a threat to science but indeed, enable science to move forward. The idea that the question, posed in the manner that Kant calls the judgment on systematicity, threatens the consolidation of knowledge is a conception held in orientation to a scientific epistemic mode, which again, does not represent contemporary science.
understood to produce effects and in this way, transformation is not interpreted as a mark of past
failure but as an inevitable condition that fans away the illusion of an unbroken, unaffected state
of sovereignty. Rather than view a correct line of intentionality as an impervious sovereign, or
an impenetrable state of sovereignty that appears to rise above and beyond the effects of time, the
aesthetic epistemic mode views lines of intentionality as regulated by contingency, always at the
whim of time’s passage, rising to power, and perhaps even garnering sovereignty for a moment,
since it must transform even as it remains in its sovereign state, and must eventually be replaced
or rethought as time ravages any essential notion of its form.

The way that Kant deals with time in the critique of judgment is characteristic of his
classic approach, which is to acknowledge the possibility of a tension that might trouble his self-
contained system, and then to provide a solution that is meant to alleviate the tension, doing
away with the need to consider it in the future. For Kant, the passage of time is crucial to
understanding judgment, but rather than thinking about time through an aesthetic epistemic
mode, Kant operates in the scientific epistemic mode, using the notion of teleology to describe
how correct judgment establishes the movement of nature through time towards a teleological
end. For Kant, teleological judgment asks if the parts of a system contribute to its overall
purpose or to the purpose of another system altogether to which it lends itself. In this way, Kant
reaffirms the demand of a universal consensus on intention that must exist in order for a system
or an organism to be judged as having internal or external purposiveness. The intentionality of
the object rules sovereign over the other possible uses or formations that the object (or its parts)
may have. A multiplication of formations or plurality of uses is nothing but superfluous in
Kant’s teleological paradigm of purposiveness guided by singular intentionality, since these
variations would detract from purposiveness by deviating from the object’s teleological end. For
Kant, as the object and its parts achieve greater purposiveness, they move forward on their journey (along with all of nature) on the path towards the final goal of perfected human happiness in morality. Time should not transform an object’s purposiveness, but should only further augment, consolidate and maintain it as it grows towards its teleological end.

According to the aesthetic epistemic mode, teleology is not a phenomenal reality, but an imposed paradigm that works to secure the sovereignty of a line of intention in a subject, object or project. Teleology reinforces consensus around a universal goal and thus works to eliminate anything more than a singular purpose for a given object. The limitation presented by teleology is counter to the aesthetic epistemic mode because it determines and fixes, disallowing varying or counter-interpretations. A teleological perspective does not allow for transformation through evolution over time, but only acknowledges development as a growth of the same over time. Moreover, the occurrence of transformation is marked as a mutation away from an object’s original purposiveness, compromising its integrity and ultimately questioning its innate meaning and purpose within the grander teleological project. In being determined through the retrospective gaze of the over-arching teleological project, meaning becomes possible only as an inscription within the context of the final end, rather than meaning being transient and temporally bound to the object in a specific context that will be expected to morph. Rather than the deduction of a purpose that can only exist in relief upon a metanarrative of teleological meaning, the aesthetic epistemic mode rejects the teleological premise, and expects autonomous interpretations of meaning that may conflict, but exist as an anarchy of competing ideas, presenting themselves in shifting configurations according only to the contingency of time’s passage.
Nietzsche, Dionysus and Apollo

But perhaps such readers will find it offensive that an aesthetic problem should be taken so seriously—assuming they are unable to consider art more than a pleasant side-line, a readily dispensable tinkling of bells that accompanies the “seriousness of life,” just as if nobody knew what was involved in such a contrast with the “seriousness of life.” Let such “serious” readers learn something from the fact that I am convinced that art represents the highest task and the truly metaphysical activity of this life...

- Preface to Richard Wagner, in The Birth of Tragedy (31-32).

In the Attempt at a Self-Criticism that Nietzsche offers sixteen years after the publication of his first work, The Birth of Tragedy, he writes that this book got hold of a problem “frightful and dangerous… a new problem...it was the problem of science itself...” (1967, 18). This book was a study of science, but Nietzsche writes,

...[S]cience considered for the first time as problematic, as questionable. But the book in which my youthful courage and suspicion found an outlet- what an impossible book had to result from a task so uncongenial to youth! Constructed from a lot of immature, overgreen personal experiences, all of them close to the limits of communication, presented in the context of art- for the problem of science cannot be recognized in the context of science- a book perhaps for artists who also have an analytical and retrospective penchant… a book full of psychological innovations and artists’ secrets, with an artists’ metaphysics in the background; a youthful work full of the intrepid mood of youth, the moodiness of youth, independent, defiantly self-reliant even where it seems to bow before an authority and personal reverence; in sum, a first book, also in every bad sense of that label. (18-19)
As a quite critical summation of his first work, this passage nevertheless reveals the perennial struggle Nietzsche endured, even as he continued to wrestle with it in an attempted, new kind of scientific objectivity in his “self-criticism”. The effort to know while maintaining the impossibility of knowing, and in this way to reject his notion of the “scientific” while at once embodying its mandate - this was the struggle being so openly waged in Nietzsche’s work. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s intuitive mockery of rhetorical recourse to a “seriousness” that presents a façade of legitimacy becomes itself the subject of mockery in the Attempt at a Self-Criticism. In so doing, Nietzsche assumes a voice of seasoned authority on his subject, commanding the reverence he criticizes himself for betraying in The Birth, and in this way the ceaseless desire, the relentless will to grasp the ultimate truth of the matter is made clear: ‘then I did not know, but now I know; I know now that then I did not know’. The unique and defining feature of Nietzsche’s approach is that unlike Plato, unlike Kant, the war for authority, the struggle for legitimacy is not settled; it stands unending and above all, disclosed.

Nietzsche sums up his project accurately when he writes of The Birth of Tragedy, “what an impossible book,” as his main, self-proclaimed task is to consider science “for the first time problematic, as questionable”. But what would be an apt approach to this topic? Nietzsche’s choice of methodological approach is instructive as it marks one of the first ostensible attempts to practice a critique of “science” as the spread of a cultural impulse over time and space- almost a prototype of Foucault’s concept of discursive formation. However, the performative, poetic style of Nietzsche’s approach does not set up the division of science and aesthetics in an obvious dualism, but rather, attempts to change the dynamic of this framework as an oppositional structure. As a scholar of classical thought and literature, Nietzsche turns to the mythological characters of ancient Greece for insight, and through his study of ancient art forms, he arrives at
the form of Hellenic tragedy as the pinnacle of Greek art (1986, x). However, the work that Nietzsche offers is not simply a theory couched in an analogy of mythos or the form of Greek tragedy. Nietzsche finds that the nature of existence itself is most clearly rendered and perceptible in the form of Attic tragedy. In this sense, for Nietzsche, the art of tragedy is not a mere copy or mirror image of existence for an audience to take in and apply, but stands as a labour of existence that works to produce the condition of existence on its own. In this way, Nietzsche’s foremost and crucial praxis is to validate art as a reality that stands alone and is able to testify to the nature of existence on its own terms, as the content of phenomena, rather than as a copy of phenomena.

Nietzsche begins by spending time illuminating the nature of art itself as his primary, most important task in his questions concerning the nature of existence. He offers a schema of two forces that exist as complementary artistic impulses, both necessary for the production of that great form of art, tragedy, which makes equal use of them both. One he calls the Apollonian impulse, which is the nature of appearances, dreams, illusions and sobriety; the other, the Dionysian impulse, which is that which is not disclosed by veneers, but rather reveals the horrific reality and repulsive truth of existence, while being caught up in ecstasy, self-forgetfulness, incoherence and intoxication. This duality of artistic energies “burst forth from nature herself, without the mediation of the human artist- energies in which nature’s art impulses are satisfied in the most immediate and direct way…” (38). Nietzsche describes his project as the search to understand the “Dionysian-Apollonian genius and its art product” that, in Attic tragedy, exists in a “mystery of union,” forming a productive antagonism whereby each force propels the other forward, rendering new creation in the process (48, 33).
Nietzsche’s first priority is again to validate that art is not merely a by-product of human efforts, but rather precedes human action, springing first from what he calls ‘nature’. Nietzsche remarks that for the “aesthetically sensitive man”, the whole experience of all of life’s myriad affects, “in short, the whole divine comedy of life, including the inferno, also pass before him, not like mere shadows on a wall- for he lives and suffers with these scenes- and yet not without that fleeting sensation of illusion” (35). In this simple aside, it is possible to read Nietzsche upturning the entire philosophic history of dualism between noumenal reality and perceptible phenomena, (along with the mind/body split) by suggesting that Plato’s metaphor of the cave misses the experience of the dancing shadows felt by the spectators as a part of noumenal reality, while still recognizing that even in the thrust of intense, affectively charged reality, the sensation of Apollonian illusion can never quite be fully lifted. Nietzsche is indicating here what he calls the “joyous necessity of the dream experience,” as it comes through the Apollonian impulse in art. For Nietzsche, the Apollonian impulse is able to maintain an island of calm in a sea of wild affect by producing measures and circumscribing spaces and subjects, where the unruly impulse of the Dionysian would see all of existence melting seamlessly into a great oneness, entering into a mystery of union with nature.

The reason that Nietzsche goes into such detail describing the nature of art is that he is convinced of the sheer necessity of art for the possibility of existence. As Nietzsche recounts, in his perception at the base of existence is a primordial unity, a great oneness that is at once beautiful, awful and terrible; indeed if humanity could fathom the weight of its hideous reality, it would be crushed. Following Schopenhauer, Nietzsche discusses the equally disturbing affects of horror experienced by consciousness that stumbles upon the limits of logic where “man…is suddenly dumbfounded by the cognitive form of phenomena because the principle of sufficient
reason… seems to suffer an exception” (36). For Nietzsche, this confounding of reason occurs because by the Dionysian impulse, the veil of illusion has been swept aside temporarily, and nature in (her) purest instantiation reveals herself, and is no longer estranged from humanity. This ecstatic and awesome state is what Nietzsche describes as the “mysterious primordial unity,” where all of humanity is united, and the boundaries of subjectivity disintegrate.

In song and in dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community; he has forgotten how to walk and speak and is on the way toward flying into the air, dancing…he feels himself a god, he himself now walks about enchanted, in ecstasy…He is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art: in these paroxysms of intoxication the artistic power of all nature reveals itself to the highest gratification of the primordial unity. (37)

The overwhelming flood of experience felt in the Dionysian state is so intense and profound that its intoxication becomes heightened to a point of unsustainability. For this reason, the Apollonian impulse is a crucial force that can temper the reality of sprawling infinitude. The Apollonian force is the soothing catalyst that grants peace amid the fevered deliriums of Dionysian reality by drawing a curtain of appearance over the terrible face of the primordial unity that destroys individuality. Quoting Schopenhauer, Nietzsche recounts that just as a “sailor sits in a boat and trusts in his frail bark: so in the midst of a world of torments the individual human being sits quietly, supported by and trusting in the principium individuationis” (36). Apollo gives to humanity a tranquilizer of powerful illusion that is able to cover over and make comprehensible the immeasurable formidability of existence. Together, Dionysus and Apollo form a double-mind of artistic genius, and by their paradoxical and “mysterious union” they enable the experience of reality for humanity.

Thus art, for Nietzsche, is the gift by which nature permits humanity to endure the weight of its terrible existence. It is through art, and art alone that we can stare into the “Dionysian
abyss” and not be swallowed by its depths or engulfed in its darkness. Again, the origin of art is affirmed as something that arises from nature, not as a synthetic, creative effort because it is through art that humanity is able to endure and comprehend the boundless suffering of existence. In section 5 Nietzsche outlines the basis of this metaphysical notion when he writes,

The entire comedy of art is neither performed for our betterment or education, nor are we the true authors of this art world. On the contrary, we may assume that we are merely images and artistic projections for the true author, and that we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of art-for it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified. (52)

Nietzsche describes the creation of Olympus and all the figures of the gods as artistic productions that served this very purpose for the ancient Greeks: “The Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence. That he might endure this terror at all, he had to interpose between himself and life the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians… It was in order to be able to live that the Greeks had to create these gods from a most profound need” (42).

The unutterable dread of Dionysian reality is summed up in the negation of the will as it gets portrayed through the “wisdom of Silenus” who exposes the uniquely human talent for suffering. When finally captured by King Midas and asked what was best and most desirable for man, Silenus mockingly replies: “What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is- to die soon” (42). In contrast to this, Nietzsche portrays how the Apollonian impulse to survive in Homeric proportions- as it were, despite all odds- exemplifies the spirit of the Hellenic “will”. Nietzsche follows Schiller’s terminology regarding this paradigm, which he names naïveté, and by which he means to indicate a oneness of man with nature that encourages his will to continue living, even in the face of dire circumstances. It is noted that this state is not an inevitable condition but a cultivated illusion through the calculated efforts of Apollonian culture. These efforts work to suppress and
conceal the predilection for death that lurks in the heart of Dionysian revelry and threatens to overcome the drive of naïveté. In this way, Nietzsche rationalizes that nature, in an effort to achieve her own ends (which is her reproduction), creates art with its pleasurable, Apollonian appearances; her “true goal is veiled by a phantasm: and while we stretch out our hands for the latter, nature attains the former by means of our illusion” (44). Nietzsche even goes so far as to express this generosity of art as possessing the power to redeem, making a counter-intuitive preference for illusion over reality as he writes, “…the truly existent primal unity, eternally suffering and contradictory, also needs the rapturous vision, the pleasurable illusion, for its continuous redemption… The Apollonian world of beauty and its substratum, the terrible wisdom of Silenus… intuitively we comprehend their necessary interdependence” (45).

Here then, is how Nietzsche comes to his conception of the nature of existence, “how necessary is the entire world of suffering, that by means of it the individual may be impelled to realize the redeeming vision…” (45). In this way, unlike Plato, and unlike Kant, Nietzsche does not schematize the Dionysian energy of chaos, contradiction and suffering against the Apollonian impulse to control and order, but sees them as vital counterparts, propelling one another forward. However, Nietzsche is clear that these forces are antagonistic, showing how they compete with one another, and in this competition sharpen one another, producing the epic oeuvre of tragedy in the process. Regardless of their struggle, Nietzsche makes clear that each part is nevertheless vital to the other in the context of human existence. For Nietzsche, the spirit of Apollo demands that the principium individuationis is “imperative and mandatory… individuation knows but one law- the individual, i.e., the delimiting of the boundaries of the individual, measure in the Hellenic sense. Apollo as ethical deity demands measure of his disciples, and to be able to maintain measure, they must acquire self-knowledge. And so… occur the demands, ‘know
thyself’ and ‘nothing in excess’…” (46). Nietzsche’s classification of Apollo is distinctive precisely because he maintains that the imperative of individuation still falls under the category of art, and its function is to render the content of art intelligible. The Dionysian, therefore, is not banished or effaced by the Apollonian, nor does it threaten the Apollonian:

The effects wrought by the Dionysian also seem “titanic” and “barbaric” to the Apollonian Greek; while at the same time he could not conceal from himself that he, too, was inwardly related to these overthrown Titans and heroes. Indeed, he had to recognize even more than this: despite all its beauty and moderation, his entire existence rested on a hidden substratum of suffering and of knowledge, revealed to him by the Dionysian. And behold: Apollo could not live without Dionysus! The “titanic” and the “barbaric” were in the last analysis as necessary as the Apollonian.

The Apollonian force gives shape to a formless, Dionysian cacophony, making it possible to make intelligible, or form a way to know the unknown. In so doing, the Apollonian dispels fear of the unknown, offering a haven of ease for the conscious mind in its perpetual struggle to form understanding.

For this reason, Nietzsche likens Apollo to a sculptor, the artist who gives line and shape to formless matter, thus “freeing” the concept from its prison, locked within mass. Through measurement and separation, Apollo is able to grant identity, and to individuate the particular from the universal, and to define subject from object. Dionysus however, is called the god of music, and by this Nietzsche indicates a state of productive creativity that is altogether at odds with the Apollonian methodology of individuation. At this point, Nietzsche sees fit to confront a question that remained of primary importance for Plato and for Kant, but that Nietzsche will show is inconsequential in the light of his shifted paradigm of aesthetics that sees art as the justification for existence, rather than its by-product. After laying out his schema of the two forces of artistic production, the Apollonian and the Dionysian, Nietzsche senses that the
question most pressing at this point is the determination of what constitutes the common factor that distinguishes art from non-art.

Nietzsche begins by interrogating the prerequisites of art, asking what forms of art can be deemed legitimate, and inadvertently responds to Kant’s summation that true artistic beauty can be deemed so only through disinterested judgment. Nietzsche makes the statement that his “aesthetics must first solve the problem of how the “lyrist” is possible as an artist- he who is continually saying “I” and running through the entire chromatic scale of his passions and desires” (48). Nietzsche’s question addresses several issues; first, Nietzsche is asking how it is possible to allow the essence of the artist to enter the work of art itself, and in so asking, he reveals that he is only capable of asking such a question because of the history of distinguishing art that precedes him, which has since only deemed objective art as true art. Nietzsche discusses that “throughout the entire range of art we demand first of all the conquest of the subjective, redemption from the “ego,” and the silencing of the individual will and desire; indeed, we find it impossible to believe in any truly artistic production, however insignificant, if it is without objectivity, without pure contemplation devoid of interest” (48). In this sense, art that openly acknowledges its complicit subjectivity is, in the formal sense that Nietzsche describes, not fit to be called ‘art’ at all. This problem is connected to a second issue that Nietzsche illuminates, which is the role of affect in the production of works of art, and how it changes the legitimacy of the artwork. That the essence of the artist, in the subjective form of art, might be mixed in with the artistic product indicates by proxy that the affects embodied by this subject must also surely pass into the artwork as a part of the artist’s essence, marking it. Nietzsche states that throughout the entire range of art, ‘we’ have sought to eradicate the presence of affect through a series of
repressions, in order to create the illusion of objectivity (48). Artistic works that refuse to maintain this illusion are thus stripped of their validation as legitimate works of art.

Finally, Nietzsche broaches the question in the negative by asking what constitutes non-art, or how it should be conceived. Using an example of an objective artist versus a subjective artist, Nietzsche begins by comparing Homer, the archetypical Apollonian poet with Archilochus, a more obscure Greek poet whose pieces were known for their unbridled, Dionysian passion. Nietzsche writes,

Compared with Homer, Archilochus appalls us by his cries of hatred and scorn, by his drunken outbursts of desire. Therefore, is not he, who has been called the first subjective artist, essentially the non-artist? But in this case, how explain the reverence which was shown to him- the poet- in very remarkable utterances by the Delphic oracle itself, the center of ‘objective’ art?” (48-49)

Nietzsche’s question here asks how it is that despite the open subjectivity of Archilochus’ delirious writings, he was still lauded as an important poet and his pieces deemed legitimate artistic works, even by such critics as the most staunch protectors of objective art. The implications of this question are significant because through this comparison Nietzsche is endeavouring to probe how the nature of art itself is determined: *i.e.*, what counts as art that is pre-meditated, legitimate and thereby designated, even *individuated* as such. It seemed clear that the sober poetry of Homer was a planned and executed *composition*; but could the raving, a-tonal “cries of hatred and scorn” or “drunken outbursts of desire” be qualified to receive the same title? Surely something must distinguish art from nonsense, music from noise; to this question, Nietzsche offers the crux of what he calls the mysterious union of lyric genius in tragedy, the waking vision that accompanies eternal being, expressing itself as song. Nietzsche finally concludes, “scholarly research has discovered that [Archilochus] introduced the *folk song* into literature and on account of this deserved…his unique position beside Homer. But what is the
folk song in contrast to the wholly Apollonian epos? What else but the *perpetuum vestigium* of a union of the Apollonian and the Dionysian?” (53).

Enter Nietzsche’s pivotal conception of *music* and the *musical mood* as the perceptible instantiation of the Dionysian that arises as a “repetition” and “recast” of the primordial unity for which Dionysus is the mascot (49). Nietzsche confirms that it was Schiller’s analysis of the poetic process that guided his insight on the nature of lyric poetry and ultimately brought about his conception of music as the purest expression of existence. In an insightful remark on Schiller’s thought, Nietzsche notes that Schiller’s conclusion about the poetic process came about through a “psychological observation, inexplicable but unproblematic to his own mind” (49). Herein lies the methodological difference between the Dionysian approach of music and the Apollonian method of sculpture: though the content of Schiller’s conclusion could not be rendered in Apollonian clarity, he nonetheless had the ability to affirm value in his findings, even though the basis of this value was incalculable. Moreover, that clarity was not present in his conclusion, and that he was nonetheless able to validate his conclusion despite its inexplicability remained unproblematic to his own mind. In this simple note, Nietzsche means that there can be sober judgment of validity that stands despite the limits of reason expressed in language. The Dionysian essence of music is Nietzsche’s example of art’s legitimacy: it is a recognized form of value that is yet incalculable or inexplicable as such. As Nietzsche goes on to recount Schiller’s experience he notes that Schiller writes with an affect of hesitation and apprehension as he “confessed [italics mine] that before the act of creation he did not have before him or within him any series of images in a causal arrangement, but rather a *musical mood*” (49). In Schiller’s own words he recalls, “with me the perception has at first no clear and definite object; this is formed later. A certain musical mood comes first, and the poetical idea only follows later” (49). In this
way Nietzsche begins to expose what he sees as the break of the causal imperative that emanates from the Apollonian impulse, and what becomes the impetus behind a scientific epistemic mode. Nietzsche expands this vision of music by explaining “the most important phenomenon of all ancient lyric poetry: [that] they took for granted the union, indeed the identity, of the lyrist with the musician. Compared with this, our modern lyric poetry seems like the statue of a god without a head” (49).

In giving this last clue about the meaning of music, Nietzsche tries to show the commensurate nature of ancient tragedy in which lyrist and musician, Apollonian and Dionysian were not caught in a master-slave dialectic where the Apollonian force found its own meaning in the domination of the Dionysian impulse, nor did one precede the other in a causal relationship. Rather, their relationship was one of union, and even of identity with one another, whereby each force seemed inseparably bound up in the constitution and propulsion of the other. Nietzsche is also quick to show that this relation of equality is something petrified in the past of ancient Greek lyric poetry, since to compare this ideation of the poetic process with modern lyric poetry would make it appear to be “like the statue of a god without a head”—in other words— an impossible and defunct deity with no authoritative power. Thus Nietzsche imparts that he is aware of the transformation that has taken place in the production of artistic works, but that the foundations of his “aesthetical metaphysics” are in place as the identity of music with lyric poetry; the union of the Dionysian with the Apollonian where the “Dionysian-musical enchantment of the sleeper seems to emit image sparks, lyrical poems, which in their highest development are called tragedies and dramatic dithyrambs” (50). By the production of this art form,

The artist has already surrendered his subjectivity in the Dionysian process. The image that now shows him his identity with the heart of the world is a dream scene that embodies the primordial contradiction and primordial pain, together with the primordial pleasure, of mere appearance. The “I”
of the lyrist therefore sounds from the depth of his being: its “subjectivity,” in the sense of modern aestheticians is a fiction. (49)

In this sweeping analysis, Nietzsche single-handedly collapses the project of the separation of art and science, demonstrating that modern subjectivity itself is fiction, leaving the possibility of scientific objectivity out of the question.

This significant shift must not be misread as Nietzsche’s abandonment of science, or the Apollonian impulse in art; in fact, it is the separation and exclusion of one force from the other that Nietzsche finds abhorrent. The esteem that Nietzsche carries for both the Apollonian energy and for science can be seen in his high estimation of the role of illusion. Nietzsche describes the peril of becoming conscious of one’s layers of subjectivity, given his (arguably post-modern) assertion that the boundary between artist and artwork is, at best, unclear. Being mindful of the weight of this comprehension, he suggests that,

…by the mirror of illusion, [one] is protected against becoming one and fused with his figures. In direct contrast to this, the images of the lyrist are nothing but his very self and, as it were, only different projections of himself, so he, as the moving center of this world, may say “I”: of course, this self is not the same as that of the waking, empirically real man, but the only truly existent and eternal self resting at the basis of things, through whose images the lyric genius sees this very basis. (50)

In this sense, the use of Apollonian illusion is crucial to the maintenance of individuated consciousness that can commune and converse through universal, though imprecise languages. Nietzsche hints that the alternative to Apollonian individuation is vulnerability to the smooth surface of disassociation, seamlessly opening out onto the wide plain of Dionysian oblivion. In this light, the prospect of science holds a very different significance than as a threat of domination and exclusionary power for aesthetics. Rather, according to Nietzsche’s schema, in the balance of scientific with aesthetic practice, science becomes a refuge of protection through
individuation and language that allows subjects to bear the realization of their existence by having their eyes shielded from its searing reality. Moreover, the practice of science acts as a tonic for the subject as it struggles to confront the morbid chaos of reality, and suffer the nausea of an absurd existence. In this way, the practice of science finds its place as a kind of care of the self that allows the subject to continue existing and to share in life with other subjects. Out of the chaos of primordial unity, in all its pain and contradiction, the subject can reach for the practice of science as a shelter and moment of repose from the overwhelming awareness of existence as aesthetic. By practicing science, the subject’s intellect can rest, finding relief from the anxiety of music’s formlessness. In this way, rather than arising from the ground of the scientific epistemic mode, the aesthetic epistemic mode sees the work of science as a necessary tool for the maintenance of healthy and interdependent consciousness. In the aesthetic epistemic mode, by practicing science amid the deluge of aesthetics the subject cares for its consciousness, providing a space where strength can be regained to face again the horror of aesthetic existence, even in ever more profound encounters.

Thus Nietzsche offers a vision of lyric poetry with its Apollonian and Dionysian counterparts, as the ideal of the condition of the “aesthetic” that is at once an expression of the primordial horror of existence, along with the antidote for this horror which is the veil of appearance that covers it, making it bearable. For Nietzsche, this aesthetic condition is guided by nature and forms the metaphysical backdrop for all phenomena, but there is another force that gives agency to this passive, natural condition, which is the unaesthetic element of the will. Nietzsche takes his conception of the will from Schopenhauer, and understands its relation to the aesthetic as its product, but utterly separated and opposite in nature. In regards to this relation, Nietzsche asks:
As what does music appear in the mirror of images and concepts? It appears as will… as the opposite of the aesthetic, purely contemplative, and passive frame of mind. Here, however, we must make as sharp a distinction as possible between the concepts of essence and phenomenon; for music, according to its essence, cannot possibly be will. To be will it would have to be wholly banished from the realm of art- for the will is the unaesthetic-in-itself; but it appears as will. (55)

The concept of the will for Nietzsche is complex: Nietzsche uses the figure of the lyrist to show how the Dionysian form of music seeks its expression in Apollonian images and symbols of passion. This portrayal of nature, music and the lyrist himself implies that a will drives them forwards towards their perfected expression. However, Nietzsche writes, “But insofar as he interprets music by means of images, he himself rests in the calm sea of Apollonian contemplation, though everything around him that he beholds through the medium of music is in urgent and active motion” (55). According to Nietzsche, the expressed passions of the lyrist that indicate the presence of a will, are actually only Apollonian symbols through which the lyrist is able to give voice to music through its interpretation in images. In this way, Nietzsche lauds the gift of the Apollonian protection of illusion since it allows the lyrist, “as Apollonian genius [to] interpret music through the image of the will, while he himself, completely released from the greed of the will, is the pure, undimmed eye of the sun” (55).

In this manner, Nietzsche affirms what he calls the ‘sovereignty’ of music in the order of existence as it “does not need the image and the concept, but merely endures them as accompaniments” (55). This bold statement on the authority of music once again serves to overthrow what has hitherto been understood as a relation of domination in which the aesthetic, (namely music in Nietzsche’s sense), is subjugated under the objective power of the non-aesthetic. Nietzsche recalls that throughout the range of art, the exclusion of the subjective was prized as the mark of true art, untainted by the affects of the subjective artist. In the same way,
the history of science has striven to exclude the aesthetic, or at least to minimize its effects to try to achieve a pure, unaffected state through which to reason. Aesthetics in this sense have always been seen as a necessary evil that must be controlled and *endured* by science, which can offer concrete images and intelligible rationales; but here, Nietzsche uproots this notion and stands it on its head when he suggests that it is the aesthetic form of *music* that must endure the overbearing and superfluous condition of imagery and symbol, the tools of reason.

Through these mounting affirmations that the aesthetic condition as *music* is the primary ground of existence, Nietzsche begins to perform his assertion in his own work that it is, “only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* that existence and the world are eternally justified,” (52). In the beginning of section 7 Nietzsche enacts a performance of the methodology he prescribes as he writes, “we must now avail ourselves of all the principles of art considered so far, in order to find our way through the labyrinth… of the *origin of Greek tragedy*” (56). In impelling his audience to “avail [themselves] of the principles of art,” in their study of tragedy, Nietzsche could imply several meanings but that he offers to include this practice at all constitutes a significant break from the historically rational method, the ground of the scientific epistemic mode, that would seek to eradicate the presence of the artist within the artwork. Nietzsche gives us a clue as to how he means to achieve this approach as he continues his analysis of Greek tragedy. In contemplating the role of the chorus in Greek tragedy, Nietzsche ruminates on several past commentaries on the position the chorus serves, and arrives at A.W. Schlegel’s summation of the chorus as the most concise representation of spectators taking in the tragedy. Indeed, Schlegel proclaims that the chorus stands as the *ideal spectator* of Greek tragedy, and out of his astonishment at this claim, Nietzsche meditates on the idea of the ideal spectator as the one who is able to see the characters that appear on stage as the real characters that they perform. In this
sense for Schlegel, like the chorus, the ideal spectator’s position to the tragedy is located physically within the drama, playing its own part in the production of the tragedy. Nietzsche affirms that the perspective of the chorus embodies the true form of spectating, and differentiates this from what has been the historical position of the spectator as one perceiving the drama from without, always maintaining the veil of illusion between audience member and the purported fiction of the drama. Nietzsche writes,

For we had always believed that the right spectator, whoever he might be, must always remain conscious that he was viewing a work of art and not an empirical reality. But the tragic chorus of the Oceanides really believes that it sees before it the Titan Prometheus, and considers itself as real as the god of the scene. But could the highest and purest type of spectator regard Prometheus as bodily present and real, as the Oceanides do? (57)

Nietzsche throws out this question without announcing a wholehearted conviction of Schlegel’s analysis; indeed he states that Schlegel’s ideas cause the confusion of what it means to understand art as art, namely, to think aesthetics in its traditional sense. However, Nietzsche notes that Schlegel’s conception of the spectator nevertheless serves to usher in more probing questions on the nature of the relationship between “spectator and spectacle” (57), a question that, only on the horizon of theory at this point, becomes a pivotal theme for artists and philosophers alike in the twentieth century.

But in the end Nietzsche finds Schlegel’s conception of the chorus less compelling than Schiller’s who instead sees “the chorus as a living wall that tragedy constructs around itself in order to close itself off from the world of reality and to preserve its ideal domain and its poetical freedom” (58). For Schiller, the Greek chorus, made up of the mythical figures of Satyrs, is the ideal realm where the essence of poetry finds embodiment. Although the effects of tragic drama (the stage, the language) are artificial or symbolic, Schiller sees the chorus as the one component
of tragedy that pierces through “naturalism in art” (58). Nietzsche writes that the notion of tragedy as a production that exists as fantasy, totally separated from reality, is the “ordinary conception of the natural, the illusion usually demanded in dramatic poetry,” that Schiller wants to contest. Nietzsche takes up Schiller’s vision, stating that within this ideal domain, the Dionysian chorus of satyrs occupies a kind of transcendent ultra-reality where the birth of tragedy, as “the essence of poetry” finds expression.

For this chorus the Greek built up the scaffolding of a fictitious natural state and on it placed fictitious natural beings. On this foundation tragedy developed and so, of course, it could dispense from the beginning with a painstaking portrayal of reality. Yet it is no arbitrary world placed by whim between heaven and earth; rather it is a world with the same reality and credibility that Olympus with its inhabitants possessed for the believing Hellene. The satyr, as the Dionysian chorist, lives in a religiously acknowledged reality under the sanction of myth and cult. That tragedy should begin with him, that he should be the voice of the Dionysian wisdom of tragedy, is just as strange a phenomenon for us as the general derivation of tragedy from the chorus. (58)

From this view of the chorus, a transformation in the understanding of tragedy occurs where it moves from the realm of the fictitious to the realm of the actual. However, for Nietzsche, this actual state exists as such because it occupies a kind of essential, poetic reality akin to the transcendent, “a world with the same reality and credibility” as the realm of the gods had for the religious Hellene. The birth of tragedy, Nietzsche states, comes from the voice of the satyr, as he sings in the chorus of satyrs, giving voice to the “Dionysian wisdom of tragedy” (58-9).

It is only by taking in the ‘wisdom of tragedy’ in this way that Nietzsche says we can have access to metaphysical comfort, which is the assurance “that life is, at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable…” (59). Nietzsche says that the common Greek, the “man of culture” is nullified by the presence of the
chorus of satyrs; but Nietzsche asserts that this nullification occurs because the “most immediate effect of the Dionysian tragedy [is] that the state and society and, quite generally, the gulfs between man and man give way to an overwhelming feeling of unity leading back to the very heart of nature” (59). If this relation is magnified, Nietzsche says we can see the same dynamic of nullification playing out for Greek civilization as it encounters music, in its Dionysian sense. In this way, Nietzsche indicates that the only access we have to relief that is not a tranquilizer of delusion comes from the overwhelming presence of the satyr over that of the cultured man, and the overwhelming force of *music* over the illusions of civilization. As one overwhelms and assimilates the other, a sense of “oneness” arises and a provision of metaphysical comfort “appears in incarnate clarity in the chorus of satyrs, a chorus of natural beings who live ineradicably, as it were, behind all civilization and remain eternally the same, despite the changes of generations and of the history of nations” (59). Thus, it is the artistic mechanism of the chorus that justifies the life of the cultured man and civilization, and it is through the satyric chorus’ reflection of pure Dionysian wisdom that “the profound Hellene, uniquely susceptible to the tenderest and deepest suffering, comforts himself, having looked boldly right into the terrible destructiveness of so-called world history as well as the cruelty of nature… Art saves him, and through art-life” (59).

For Nietzsche the figure of the satyr is the archetype of what man has the potential to become, both “sublime and divine” (61). The satyr is at once what man’s purest form could be: “not a mere ape,” but a transcendent hybrid of divine and natural being—“one who proclaims wisdom from the very heart of nature” (61). The satyr exists as an intermediary almost between the worlds of man and the gods, and because of this, the satyr, as a member of the chorus, has a
kind of exclusive access to reality for Nietzsche. Agreeing with Schiller’s ideas about the origins of tragedy, Nietzsche restates that,

…The chorus is a living wall against the assaults of reality because it- the Satyr chorus- represents existence more truthfully, really, and completely than the man of culture does who ordinarily considers himself as the only reality. The sphere of poetry does not lie outside the world as a fantastic impossibility spawned by a poet’s brain: it desires to be just the opposite, the unvarnished expression of the truth, and must precisely for that reason discard the mendacious finery of that alleged reality of the man of culture. (61)

However, although the satyr has a privileged vantage point into reality, Nietzsche affirms that the common Greek has access to the satyr. As he describes the tradition of Attic tragedy, Nietzsche recalls, “…we must keep in mind that the public at an Attic tragedy found itself in the chorus of the orchestra and there was at bottom no opposition between public and chorus: everything is merely a great sublime chorus of dancing and singing satyrs or of those who permit themselves to be represented by such satyrs” (62).

Here, Nietzsche establishes his vision of a method that holds the potential to retain both objective and subjective standpoints in a unity of paradox, a method performed by the “ideal spectator,” the figure of the satyr, surrounded by a great chorus of satyrs. In this way, Nietzsche brings play to the boundaries that divide audience and drama, artist and artwork, poet and metaphor. “For a genuine poet, metaphor is not a rhetorical figure but a vicarious image that he actually beholds in place of a concept” (63). To experience metaphor beyond the enclave of its role to simply replace a concept, and rather as the content of meaning, is to enact the position of the satyr. With striking clarity, Nietzsche defines this position as the key to what it means to exist in a state of mind that is in continuous recognition of the aesthetic.
At bottom, the aesthetic phenomenon is simple: let anyone have the ability to behold continually a vivid play and to live constantly surrounded by hosts of spirits, and he will be a poet; let anyone feel the urge to transform himself and to speak out of other bodies and souls, and he will be a dramatist.

(64)

Just like the position of the satyr, the aesthetic position is not a place of restricted privilege accessible only to those with some kind of special talent for experiencing the aesthetic or beholding the reality of Attic tragedy that is existence. Here, Nietzsche is overwhelmingly democratic as he openly extends an invitation to what he calls the *dramatic proto-phenomenon*, the state in which one can “see oneself transformed before one’s own eyes and to begin to act as if one had actually entered into another body, another character…In this magic transformation the Dionysian reveller sees himself as a satyr, *and as a satyr, in turn, he sees the god*, which means that in his metamorphosis he beholds another vision outside himself, as the Apollinian complement of his own state” (64). For Nietzsche, this transformation also entails “the shattering of the individual and his fusion with primal being,” and in this way, not only the music being made, but also the entire excited throng of the chorus itself becomes the reality that “generates the vision” (65). Nietzsche goes even farther to describe the reality generated by the chorus, stating that when the drama ensued, with Dionysus, the tragic hero playing the lead role, “they did not see the awkwardly masked human being but rather a visionary figure, born as it were from their own rapture… dissolv[ing] its reality into the unreality of spirits” (66).

However, although Nietzsche portrays the excitement of the chorus in its celebration of Dionysus, he is not unwary of this force unbridled, explaining that Dionysian wisdom, as the dissolution of the individual, also constitutes an abomination of nature. In a cryptic aphorism Nietzsche writes, “…he who by means of his knowledge plunges nature into the abyss of destruction must also suffer the dissolution of nature in his own person… ‘The edge of wisdom
turns against the wise: wisdom is a crime against nature’” (69). How are we to think about this paradox that arises at the site of “knowledge”? Nietzsche takes this opportunity to set up a contrast between what he calls “the glory of activity” embodied by Aeschylus’ *Prometheus* and “the glory of passivity,” which is meant to describe how humanity can relate to divinity. “Knowledge” for Nietzsche, is something that was stolen from the divine, through a glorious and defiant act of sacrilege that will be forever paid for through the suffering of individuation, experienced by both mortals and gods. As the target of his analysis, Nietzsche singles out Euripides as the playwright who came after the great writers of Greek tragedy and killed the form of Attic tragedy with the dramatic genre of *New Attic Comedy* (76). For Nietzsche, the figure of Euripides stands as the symbol of hyper-individuation where, rather than singing together in a chorus, “one could even learn from Euripides how to speak oneself” (77). Nietzsche is careful to show however, that while the predecessors of Euripides (Aeschylus, Sophocles) truly held the favour of the public of spectators, Euripides conversely “despised his public,” considering only two people worthy to pass judgment on his work, the first being Euripides himself, and the second- none other than the figure responsible for what Nietzsche comes to call ‘the death of tragedy’- the figure of Socrates (80).

Euripides, as the handmaiden of Socrates, represents for Nietzsche the tendency “to separate the Dionysian element from tragedy, and to reconstruct tragedy purely on the basis of an un-Dionysian art…” (81). Nietzsche’s contempt is almost palpable as he recounts Euripides’ question, “Is the Dionysian entitled to exist at all?” (81). It is the spirit of this question, and Euripides’ dramatic method that follows of *New Attic Comedy*, that Nietzsche claims as the cause of the death of Greek tragedy, a death that was not natural but a suicide (76). Even though, Nietzsche recounts, Euripides realized his mistake and recanted his position,
Dionysus had already been scared from the tragic stage, by a demonic power speaking through Euripides. Even Euripides was, in a sense, only a mask: the deity that spoke through him was neither Dionysus nor Apollo, but an altogether newborn demon, called Socrates. This is the new opposition: the Dionysian and the Socratic- and the art of Greek tragedy was wrecked on this. (82)

What Nietzsche identifies here as, “the new opposition” between the Dionysian and the Socratic, could in essence be located as one of the major instances of the split between the aesthetic and scientific epistemic modes. In this way, Nietzsche makes clear that it is not the Apollonian impulse that is responsible for the inability to produce tragedy, but rather it is the Socratic tendency to separate the Dionysian from the Apollonian. Nietzsche asks, “what could be the aim of the Euripidean design, which, in its most ideal form, would wish to base drama exclusively on the un-Dionysian? …only the dramatized epos- but in this Apollonian domain of art the tragic effect is certainly unattainable…” (82). In this Euripidean design of mere dramatization, the magic of the chorus of satyrs united mysteriously with their artwork is destroyed: “The poet of the dramatized epos cannot blend completely with his images…the actor…is never wholly an actor” (83). In these statements, Nietzsche laments the loss of Attic tragedy as the closest experience of reality that he knows. For Nietzsche, the production of an un-Dionysian dramatization is nothing more than a show of empty illusion in which the unity of the artist with the artwork is impossible. What, for Nietzsche, represented the loss of Greek tragedy and thus the estrangement of humanity from the reality of its existence, became translated as the ‘aspiration to objectivity’ that I am suggesting stands as a foundation for a scientific epistemic mode.

For Nietzsche then, Euripides is a puppet that merely executes Socrates’ will of dramatization as a rejection of the Dionysian, and Nietzsche states that this enables us to assess “the character of aesthetic Socratism, whose supreme law reads roughly as follows, ‘To be
beautiful everything must be intelligible,’ as the counterpart to the Socratic dictum, ‘Knowledge is virtue’” (83-84). Deploring this orienting principle of Socrates, Nietzsche writes,

With this canon in his hands, Euripides measured all the separate elements of the drama- language, characters, dramaturgic structure, and choric music- and corrected them according to this principle. The poetic deficiency and degeneration, which are so often imputed to Euripides… are for the most part products of this penetrating critical process, this audacious reasonableness (84).

Nietzsche continues to tell of how Euripides’ method involved explaining the entire play to his audience in the prologue before it even began, and using the voice of a divine character to deliver the prologue in order to weight it with authority. These two ideals, the necessity for intelligibility and authority underscore the priorities of a scientific epistemic mode that must be able to withstand the pressure of critical reason. Nietzsche, on the other hand, recalls that Aeschylus was said by Sophocles to have “done what was right, though he did it unconsciously” (85). In contrast to this easy relinquishment of intelligibility, Nietzsche writes, “Like Plato, Euripides undertook to show to the world the reverse of the ‘unintelligent’ poet; his aesthetic principle that ‘to be beautiful everything must be conscious’ is… the parallel to the Socratic, ‘to be good everything must be conscious’” (86). It is for these reasons that Nietzsche “recognize[s] in Socrates the opponent of Dionysus” (86).

Reaching the pinnacle of his argument in The Birth of the Tragedy Nietzsche begins to identify the problem of what he calls “aesthetic Socratism” (similar to what I have called a scientific epistemic mode), and his reflections lead him to locate this difficulty in the individuated will towards mastery of knowledge. Bound up in notions of Socratic ‘knowledge’ are ideas like the domination of the body by the mind, the suppression of affect and instinct, and the hegemony of the principium individuationis- the necessity to determine through distinction. Nietzsche finds the pretension of Socrates’ self-proclaimed knowledge arrogant, and takes issue
with Socrates when he announces that all other great minds are without proper insight into knowledge, and practice their professions more by instinct than anything else. To this assertion Nietzsche replies with the crux of his argument against Socratism, “‘Only by instinct’: with this phrase we touch upon the heart and core of the Socratic tendency, [w]ith it Socratism condemns existing art as well as existing ethics… Basing himself on this point, Socrates conceives it to be his duty to correct existence…” (87). In Nietzsche’s view, Socrates had never had an encounter with the “Dionysian abyss,” nor did he understand the meaning of any poetry unless, like one of Aesop’s fables, it contained some kind of moral implication. Nietzsche understood well that for Socrates, tragedy did not “tell the truth,” but “portrayed only the agreeable, not the useful…” (90). After an in-depth analysis of Plato’s tormented struggle with aesthetics in his own works, Nietzsche alights on the innovation that the method of writing taken up by Plato as “the dialogue” did not follow linguistic unity, but yielded a mash-up of narrative, lyric, drama, prose and poetry. It was because of Plato’s writings that, as Nietzsche puts it so well, poetry has become the ‘ancilla’, or handmaiden of dialectical philosophy. Through this dialectic an optimism of right thought is cultivated, “which celebrates with every conclusion and can breathe only in cool clarity and consciousness- the optimistic element which, having once penetrated tragedy must gradually overgrow its Dionysian regions and impel it necessarily to self-destruction- to the death-leap into the bourgeois drama… there must be a necessary, visible connection between virtue and knowledge, faith and morality…” (91). Finally, Nietzsche laments the degeneration of the Dionysian from what he knew as the basis of Greek tragedy to something “accidental, a dispensable vestige of the origin of tragedy…” (92).

Thus, Nietzsche tracks what he sees as the beginning of the repression of aesthetics in the anti-Dionysian tendencies of Socrates. But even so, Nietzsche continues to examine the purity of
Socrates’ claim and finds that the Dionysian could never be entirely eradicated, even by the one who banished it in the first place.

For with respect to art that despotic logician occasionally had the feeling of a gap, a void, half a reproach, a possibly neglected duty. As he tells his friends in prison, there often came to him one and the same dream apparition, which always said the same thing to him: Socrates, practice music”… The voice of the Socratic dream vision is the only sign of any misgivings about the limits of logic: Perhaps, -thus he must have asked himself- what is not intelligible to me is not necessarily unintelligent? Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from which the logician is exiled? Perhaps art is even a necessary correlative of, and supplement for science? (92-93)

In what was originally the final chapter of *The Birth of Tragedy* and what still stands as the climax of the work, Nietzsche brings the question of the relationship of art and science into context in the present. Nietzsche asks how “the influence of Socrates, down to the present moment and even into all future time, has spread over posterity like a shadow that keeps growing in the evening sun, and how it again and again prompts a regeneration of art- of art in the metaphysical, broadest and profoundest sense- and how its own infinity also guarantees the infinity of art” (93). Nietzsche takes a moment here to suppose that, as the different epistemic modes are employed, they get taken up by what he calls the artistic versus the theoretical man. Here Nietzsche explains with the example that for an artistic man, pleasure in the search for knowledge comes from pursuing the unknown, as “the artist will always cling with rapt gaze to what still remains covering,” while for the theoretical man, pleasure in the search for knowledge comes about through the satisfaction of “an ever happy uncovering that succeeds through his own efforts” (94). From this point, Nietzsche suggests that the affective pleasure associated with the discovery of science is quite possibly the powerful force driving the illusion of mastery of knowledge. Nietzsche pinpoints this illusion in its expression through Socrates who exhibits
“the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of causality, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it” (95). Nietzsche then makes an insightful point that the “sublime metaphysical illusion [that] accompanies science as an instinct… leads science again and again to its limits at which it must turn into art- which is really the aim of this mechanism” (96).

By this, Nietzsche may be suggesting that despite its illusory goals to achieve a mastery of knowledge, the goal that the mechanism of science ends up working to achieve is actually the process of art. Nietzsche calls this art myth when he says of Socrates, (as a person who lived and died by the mission of science) “namely, to make existence appear comprehensible and thus justified,” myth came to the aid of reason that could not suffice- myth, that Nietzsche says is “the necessary consequence, indeed the purpose, of science” (96). From this understanding of the interrelation of art (most broadly conceived) and science, Nietzsche discusses how the spread of rationalism after Socrates affected the universal pursuit of knowledge and continues, since “to fathom the depths and to separate true knowledge from appearance and error, seemed to Socratic man the noblest, even the only truly human vocation… since Socrates, this mechanism of concepts, judgments and inferences has been esteemed as the highest occupation and the most admirable gift of nature, above all other capacities” (97). For Nietzsche, the central point concerning the search for knowledge is that it is unending while pursued to be ended. Nietzsche finds there to be no other “stimulus towards existence more violent than the craving to complete this conquest and to weave the net impenetrably tight” (97). Nietzsche surveys the danger in this insatiable greed for knowledge, explaining that the pursuit of a pure science of knowledge can only bring people back to the point of art and myth, “when they see, to their horror, how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally bites its own tail- suddenly the new form of insight
breaks through, *tragic insight* which, merely to be endured, needs art as a protection and remedy” (98). Nietzsche muses that since the spread of the Socratic demand for ‘optimistic knowledge’ that seeks to engulf the unknown, what has been produced has been a “tragic resignation and destitute need for art, while… on its lower levels can express itself in hostility to art and must particularly detest Dionysian-tragic art” (98). In his final statements on the matter, Nietzsche wonders what kinds of amalgamated thinking we might expect in the future, if recognition of the necessity of both aesthetic and scientific epistemic modes is to be acknowledged. Daring to think art and science together, Nietzsche asks, “here we knock, deeply moved, at the gates of present and future: will this “turning” lead to ever-new configurations of genius and especially of the *Socrates who practices music?*” (98).

Nietzsche’s approach to science, and his place in the conceptual split of science from aesthetics are very different from that of Plato, and of Kant. The main tenets of Nietzsche’s thoughts on science that distinguish it from earlier accounts are characterized by a rejection of the rational impulse to suppress and dominate aesthetics under the control of a scientific epistemic mode. Rather than deny the presence of aesthetics or attempt to hide it in some way, Nietzsche not only acknowledges, but also encourages and performs the inclusion of aesthetic elements in his work. Nietzsche’s main theoretical departure from traditional philosophical conceptions of reality is to show how Attic tragedy incorporates the complicit role of the subject with the work they produce. For the discipline of political science, this assertion changes the manner in which political analysis can be produced, requiring the acknowledgment of the affective influence that political scientists incur in the production of their analyses. In this way, Nietzsche sets up the theoretical justification for analytical practices such as acknowledging ‘voice/s’ that openly address the condition of aesthetic affectation. It is important to note here
that this methodological permission does not promote a rejection or suppression of science in any way, but works rather to couple aesthetic considerations with the quantitative, data-centric processes that we commonly think of as ‘science’. It is not the *Apollonian* that Nietzsche rejects, but the ‘Socratic aesthetic’ that attempts the division of the Apollonian from the Dionysian in an impossible omission that is meant to cover over the Dionysian. Nietzsche says that it is this attempt that ushers in the death of tragedy, which can be understood as an estrangement of the spectator, in his/her ideal relationship to the drama or work, ultimately resulting in the product of *dramatization* which for Nietzsche, lacks a kind of essential reality and can only be certified as a mere copy or inauthentic reproduction of the truest instantiation of reality found in tragedy.

Nietzsche runs into a problem here, suggesting that competing registers of reality can be compared and some shown to be more essentially real than others or rather that some realities are more preferable because of their greater access to ‘truth’. Several questions in the spirit of the aesthetic epistemic mode could be posed to Nietzsche on this point; for instance, one might question how Nietzsche can account for his judgment that one form of reality, namely the form of Attic tragedy, is more preferable than Euripides’ dramatization, since although Nietzsche condemns Euripides’ method for its perpetuation of delusion, he also praises the dream-like state of clear, sober-minded order that the Apollonian affords in other instances. How does Nietzsche decide that the intoxicated state of Attic tragedy with Dionysus at the center is any more desirable, or any more “real” than the dream-like sobriety of Euripides’ Apollonian dramatic facsimiles? Clearly, Nietzsche is appealing to an aesthetic of his own here in which he decidedly prefers the tangibility of the Dionysian experience in Attic tragedy, and finds Euripidean dramatization unappealing. The claim to the greater *reality* of one form above the other, however, regardless of which is more appealing to him, seems to be an enduring problem.
However, we can perhaps read Nietzsche’s silence on this problem as another instance of where the aesthetic epistemic mode can showcase its value.

The problem that Nietzsche runs into in claiming that Attic tragedy is a kind of state of ultimate reality, is that this claim comes across as a kind of truth claim about the nature of existence. Truth claims such as these are at the center of the search for mastery over knowledge that characterizes the scientific epistemic mode, because they foreclose on the possibility of contingency, even if only for a moment. How then should Nietzsche approach the problem of needing to respond to the nihilism of saying *nothing* by advocating *something*, while yet somehow managing to avoid the pitfall of making a definitive truth claim? This is where a reading of Nietzsche in the aesthetic epistemic mode can offer another possible analysis of his work. Where one can call Nietzsche’s view on tragedy an asserted truth claim that staunchly sits over and above the lesser truth of Euripides’ works as meagre copies of tragedy, it is also possible to read Nietzsche’s idea as not a truth claim at all, but simply as a decision, with no claim to truth behind it. This possibility embodies the spirit of the aesthetic epistemic mode, and it emphasizes how this mode of analysis is inherently a political act. We may acknowledge that we do not have access to truth, nor do we have the authority to make such claims or assure them; but, despite this deficiency, we still maintain the ability to *choose*, which begets the *necessity* to choose. Choice- the act of the decision- is therefore, at its core an *aesthetic* act, since it cannot be based on an ultimate truth that can be known, and yet choice(s) must be made, despite this deficiency. Choice is therefore also an entirely *political* act, because it involves acting on a decision with the pretext that our worlds will forever be changed afterwards in consequence. When Nietzsche claims that the Greek form of Attic tragedy is the most authentic case of reality that has ever existed, his claim can be read as a statement of truth, or as a choice- an aesthetic
claim on what Nietzsche decided to know, rather than a truth claim on what Nietzsche thought should be universally known. Rather than default to the static, depoliticized form of knowledge that is ‘fact’ then, Nietzsche can be seen to be enacting an intentionally political performance of aesthetic choice by deciding that, because it appeals to him more, because it seems more evident to him, Attic tragedy is (decidedly) the most authentic case of reality, and not the dramatizations of Euripides. In this way, Nietzsche does not get caught in the stagnant apathy of nihilism where every meaning also has every other meaning and choice is impossible, but he escapes this net by acting out a choice, while remaining unbound to prove its validity or truth under a scientific mandate. The results of this political action are forever in deferral, always yet-to-be-determined, and yet an aesthetic formation has taken place, without having to make recourse to shaky claims of scientific legitimacy.

Nietzsche’s work exhibits many ways in which the aesthetic epistemic mode, as an orientation of analysis that houses both scientific and aesthetic elements, can be of value. But more than that, Nietzsche discloses that even the ability to evaluate in itself requires the use of an aesthetic epistemic mode because interpretation is necessary for evaluation. The question of method still remains, however: how does Nietzsche achieve what he might call “availing himself” of artistic or aesthetic mediums and principles in the actual practice of his study of tragedy? He would surely mean by this that he would seek to include a union of both Apollonian and Dionysian elements in his work, in this way embracing an aesthetic epistemic mode. In his introduction to The Birth of Tragedy, Walter Kaufman ponders the same question around the relationship of Dionysus and Socrates, and comes up with the concept that, even as he called himself ‘Dionysus’ near the end of his life,

The “artistic Socrates” is Nietzsche himself. He looks forward to a philosophy that admits the tragic aspect of life, as the Greek poets did, but does not sacrifice the critical intellect; a philosophy that
denies Socrates’ optimistic faith that knowledge and virtue and happiness are, as it were, Siamese triplets; a philosophy as sharply critical as Socrates’ but able and willing to avail itself of the visions and resources of art. (Kaufman 1967, 12)

Can we say of political science that it is guided by a philosophy of reason critical enough for Socrates (or even Kant), and yet “able and willing to avail itself of the visions and resources of art”? Practically speaking, how is the study of politics to begin this incorporation of an aesthetic epistemic mode, namely, one that retains its critical reason, but is also able to remain politically engaged through aesthetic decisions?

A scientific epistemic mode may facilitate the consolidation of knowledge in the discipline of political science, but it lacks the capacity to then reflexively politicize that knowledge by questioning it. If part of the ontology of political science is to be political, then I am suggesting that an aesthetic epistemic mode can readily facilitate that aspiration by offering the possibility of calling the knowledge produced by political science continually into question. Through the effect of the aesthetic epistemic mode that is to slow down knowledge, the discipline of political science can continue to achieve its purpose of knowledge production while still having permission to politicize its own findings. By attending to aesthetics as a valuable part of political science, and by incorporating creative methodological practices that question the way aesthetics are currently disciplined in political science, the study of politics can become politicized in new and different ways.
Chapter 3

Slowing senses of aesthetics and science for political science

To begin enacting what I have advocated as an aesthetic epistemic mode in political science, the first gesture is to slow the scientific epistemic mode by immersing oneself in receptivity to aesthetics, developing a taste for what needs to be detected. The purpose of this piece has been to illuminate, through a fusion of traditional social science methods as well as some drastically experimental endeavours, the ubiquitous presence of aesthetics and the affective repercussions it begets. By drawing attention to ostensibly aesthetic features, I have tried to raise an awareness of the aesthetic quality of even the most seemingly un-aesthetic works. By slowly attuning towards the presence of aesthetics, the literal bodies of political scientists can begin to change and develop with a more calibrated receptivity to the aesthetics of the world around them. As aesthetic receptivity is cultivated and heightened to new awareness of aesthetic conditions, consciousness of these conditions can begin to become sharpened and incorporated into conventional practices. Once it seems less obvious that the experience of say, tasting is so different from the experiences of reading, marking, producing research, consulting or conducting affairs, in that they all harbour aesthetic components that necessitate decisions, the perspective of an aesthetic epistemic mode will perhaps no longer seem foreign, but simply another lens to incorporate and refer to in the production of political science.

It is possible to augment one’s capacity for aesthetic receptivity, just as the perception of intellectual ideas continually develops over time in an ever-growing process. A few points must be made at this juncture. The suggestion that the practice of developing aesthetic sensitivity
becomes a focus in political science is not to suggest that political science be produced in a kind of universal, ostensibly ‘aesthetic’ manner. Rather, I mean to highlight in a kind of Foucaultian spirit that the call to an aesthetic epistemic mode is not mainly productive but receptive. By this I mean that the ability to form aesthetic notions is already in existence and already at play all the time in the work of political scientists. What is lacking is a concentrated awareness or acknowledgement of this aspect, as well as developed methods that can influence practice and pedagogy to account for aesthetics. It is my intuition that before theorists even begin to worry about how to produce political science that has more variance of aesthetic qualities (including works that are commonly and erroneously considered ‘more’ aesthetic such as film, sculpture, performance, etc.), the first priority should be sensitization to the aesthetics that already pervade social scientific work. How then can we facilitate increased sensitization to aesthetics in political science? In an aesthetic epistemic spirit, I refuse to produce a fixed answer with discrete formulae, but in exchange I will offer a series of educated intuitions, the first of which would be to perform the cultivation of receptivity I advocate, which I have attempted to begin to do in this paper in various ways. Whether or not I have succeeded in sensitizing my readers ever so slightly by rendering them more attuned to the play of aesthetics in the work they encounter and produce remains to be seen.

This thesis has intended to explore the signification of conceiving of the work we do in political science as aesthetic practice. As an initial perspective, this does not actually require any immediate transformation of methodology or practice; it merely exchanges the current rational-scientific lens through which “political science” as a discipline is viewed with an aesthetic lens that sees science and aesthetics in fused, productive antagonism rather than as a division. I am suggesting that even this slight epistemological shift would incur a parallax affect, rendering the
discipline of political science something other than it has traditionally been conceived. Moving then from a shift in epistemic lens to a shift in practice, can political science be pursued as a form of aesthetics? I doubt that contemporary academics have any interest in what would appear to include a vast programmatic overhaul of the discipline of political science. I hope to suggest that rather than a “vast overhaul” of this system, the slight paradigm shift in question would serve in the end only to further the primary goals of political science, and the larger academic system. The addition of an aesthetic epistemic mode is meant only to complement and augment the spectrum of methodological tools already at the disposal of political analysts. Although the condition of aesthetics is ubiquitous, it is not therefore the only condition that can be analysed. Indeed, the work of critical theory over the past half century has raised political consciousness in the areas of gender, race, ethnicity, class, post-human subjectivity, etc.; but each of these conditions is still also affected by the condition of aesthetics, and it is this subtle difference in critiques that I mean to highlight.

This work has sought to prompt questions such as, “does it appear obvious that the analysis of political processes rendered aesthetically would be less useful to this discipline? If so, then first, to whom is this fact apparent; and second, why are political analysts so convinced of this claim and upon what grounds?” Through the works of Plato, Kant and Nietzsche, it is possible to trace a series of notional distinctions that have contributed to the discursive division of science and aesthetics that invalidates aesthetics. In a literal reading of Plato’s account, aesthetics (indicated through poetry) is not only inferior to science (indicated by philosophy), but poses a threat to science and must therefore be “banished.” Kant’s approach to aesthetics differs from Plato’s in that Kant affirms the validity of aesthetic judgment as a power of mind that warrants philosophical investigation, but confirms in the end that aesthetics cannot be called a
form of cognition in Kant’s traditional sense because it cannot be proven through reason. Finally Nietzsche offers a perspective that slows the productive division of aesthetics and science by showing them to be caught up in a productive antagonism that is itself art. In exploring the works of these thinkers, it becomes clear that the relationship of science and aesthetics has been a point of perennial contention. By reflecting on how this discursive division and suppression of aesthetics is still at play, political scientists can begin to attempt to include an aesthetic receptivity in their final accounts without being invalidated under academic or scholarly standards. In unpacking how aesthetics have been discounted as “useful” for the discipline of political science in the past, and thinking through the claim that political analyses conducted outside the scientific method have no relevance within this discipline, my aim has been to elucidate the groundless foundation upon which such claims have been made. In considering the logic of the scientific epistemic mode that disregards an aesthetic rendering of political analyses, I have come to see what I would argue is a superficial and arbitrary distinction between aesthetics and science, showing them to be just as legitimately read as discursive formations. Finally, I have explored some ways in which epistemological shifts would make space for the kind of aesthetic epistemic mode being envisioned, and begun to work through what this might mean for the discipline of political science as it is currently practiced.

Is there a different way to think about the practice of political science as the teleological pursuit of mastery over knowledge? In her article, *The Cosmopolitical Proposal*, Isabelle Stengers offers an inventive option, daring to ask about the possibility of “slowing down” methodology in order to obstruct the sovereignty of knowledge. Stengers asks,

How can we present a proposal intended not to say what is, or what ought to be, but to provoke thought, a proposal that requires no other verification than the way in which it is able to “slow down” reasoning and create an opportunity to arouse a slightly different awareness of the
problems and situations mobilizing us? How can this proposal be distinguished from issues of authority and generality currently articulated to the notion of “theory”? (Stengers 2005, 994)

In a beautifully articulated thought, Stengers embodies the spirit of the aesthetic epistemic mode by asking if she can ask, and in this way, she has already begun to work against the intentionality of mastery over knowledge by making her question an obstruction. In this way, she does not support the indefinite pursuit of fulfilled knowledge, but she does not give up in nihilistic refusal to form the connections necessary for the production of knowledge. Rather, she finds a niche as an intermediary, as a voice that, while refraining from participating in the mastery of knowledge, will nevertheless remain engaged and critically aware of knowledge in production, perhaps tripping it up at times, and perhaps pointing it in a different or new direction at times, all through the aesthetic epistemic tool of the question. One might even say that the form of the question can be seen as close to Nietzsche’s vision of the mysterious union of Apollo and Dionysus in Attic tragedy, since the stance of the question at once announces the beginning of science, in its most Apollonian sense, as well as the modus operandi of the aesthetic, since it does not lead to a singular end as the final point in a line of intentionality, but offers a Dionysian cacophony of plural possibilities.

Finally, as I have made several points regarding the possibility for an aesthetic epistemic mode for political science, I want to end with some examples of other scholars who, I would argue, produce works that are steeped in an aesthetic epistemic mode. These works have had the effect of sensitizing me to the importance of the presence of aesthetics in my work and in my reading of the works of others, just as the Mau exhibit was able to heighten my consciousness to the immensely formative power that aesthetics hold. My first example presents itself as a work that is immediately abnormal in its aesthetic production, demanding an attention to aesthetics instantaneously. This work is called *The body multiple* by Annemarie Mol and it is the first work
of its kind I have encountered. This work produces a piece of plural genres where narrative is overlaid with sociological and political analysis through the separation of various texts that share the same page simultaneously. In offering her thoughts in clearly bounded aesthetic areas in this way, Mol focuses her readers’ eye on the fact of her aesthetic performance, and demands that her reader encounter her voice/s in their plural instantiations by necessity of the text and its physical rendition. A second work, more subtle in its deployment of genre, is Kathleen Stewart’s *Ordinary affects*. In this work, Stewart uses narrative alongside stylistic elements to convey political processes at an affective register for her readers. In recounting stories of events that involved her or that she may have observed and then including the pedagogical effects she felt in response to these encounters, Stewart offers a lucid picture of the ways in which we learn deeply about power through everyday experiences, often absorbed in the context of the city. Stewart does not attempt to moralize or give lessons through the accounts she offers, but rather works to convey senses, and allows her readers to learn from her own work what they will, with no strict pedagogical agenda in tow. Finally, as an outlaw in his own genre, J.M. Coetzee is an example of a novelist who seems able to instruct his readers on the nature of biopolitical conditions in a manner that (dare I suggest) is almost, if not more effective than Foucault himself could provide. In his work, *The Life and Times of Michael K*, Coetzee uses the literary genre to transpose the affective responses of subjects caught in biopolitical processes, and the effect of this work on readers is enduring as they come to comprehend a more profound sense of what “the biopolitical condition” really means for bodies caught in these states.

Each of these thinkers work towards offering a greater variety of ways to expand understanding on topics that have often been relegated to social scientific or other academic material thought to exist in pristine freedom from aesthetic conditions. However, as these
writers show, rather than give answers to social scientific questions, profoundly pedagogical experiences are possible through the incorporation of aesthetics and a sensitivity to its affective production in the works themselves. Leaving room for haunting questions to remain central in their works, each of these thinkers offers a very different version of the goal of knowledge creation than that of political science and its highly universalized and homogeneous formats. By creating works that cause knowledge production to falter and stumble for a moment in its progress-driven track towards consensus on conclusive evidence, these thinkers have initiated several processes of denaturalization that question the order of things as they currently stand in disciplines like political science. As an area of academia that strives to critically assess claims as well as spur on new innovations, the inclusion of the aesthetic epistemic mode in political science in the ways these writers have demonstrated shows the beauty of works that are critical in the spirit of a science while still remaining receptive to the play of aesthetics.
References


