Co-management re-conceptualized: Human-land relations in the Stein Valley, British Columbia

by

Madeline Wilson

B.A., University of Victoria, 2011

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the School of Environmental Studies

© Madeline Wilson, 2015
University of Victoria

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author.
Supervisory Committee

Co-management re-conceptualized: Human-land relations

in the Stein Valley, British Columbia

by

Madeline Wilson

B.A., University of Victoria, 2011

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Wendy Wickwire, (School of Environmental Studies, Department of History)
Supervisor

Dr. Michael M’Gonigle, (School of Environmental Studies, Faculty of Law)
Departmental Member

Dr. Jessica Dempsey, (School of Environmental Studies)
Departmental Member
Abstract

Across Canada, and in many places around the world, cooperative management arrangements have become commonplace in land and resource governance. The Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park, located in south-central Interior British Columbia, is one such example. An unlogged, undammed watershed, the Stein Valley became the site and subject of protests over proposed logging between the 1970s and 1990s. It lies within the territories of the Nlaka’pamux Nation and, since its park designation in 1995, has been jointly managed by the Lytton First Nation and the Provincial Government through a Cooperative Management Agreement.

This thesis traces human-land relations throughout the history of the Stein Valley in order to theorize an expanded conception of co-management. The central goal is to understand how various co-management arrangements are formed, contested, and enacted through particular land-use practices, social and institutional interactions, and socio-ecological relationships. Through a detailed reading of the socio-ecological history of the Stein Valley, drawn from semi-structured interviews and a literature survey, this thesis adds to existing scholarship on B.C. environmental politics. In this project, I locate various co-management practices at work in the Stein Valley region—including but not limited to practices of use, stewardship, and governance compelled by legalistic co-
management arrangements. Ultimately, this thesis calls for a closer examination of the myriad of practices and relations embedded within land and resource management regimes. In doing so, it resituates the agency of various actors, and their ecological interactions, in producing, governing, and shaping the socio-ecological landscapes we both inhabit and actively create.
# Table of Contents

**Supervisory Committee** ........................................................................................................... ii  
**Abstract** ....................................................................................................................................... iii 

**Table of Contents** ....................................................................................................................... v 

**List of Figures** ............................................................................................................................... vi 

**Acknowledgments** ....................................................................................................................... vii 

**Chapter 1: Introduction** .............................................................................................................. 1  
1.0 Setting the scene .......................................................................................................................... 2  
1.1 Critical context ............................................................................................................................ 5  
1.2 Main arguments and contributions ............................................................................................. 14  
1.3 Research methods ....................................................................................................................... 17  
1.4 My project and thesis structure ................................................................................................. 20 

**Chapter 2: An early history of the Stein Valley** .......................................................................... 23  
2.0 Sustenance co-management ....................................................................................................... 23  
2.1 Early relationships with the Stein Valley .................................................................................. 23  
2.2 European land-based fur trade .................................................................................................. 28  
2.3 Establishing colonial authority .................................................................................................. 31  
2.4 Confederation and cross-continental connection .................................................................... 33 

**Chapter 3: The industrial eye turns towards the Stein** .............................................................. 41 
3.0 Colonial-industrial co-management ......................................................................................... 41  
3.1 A portrait of a regional economy ............................................................................................... 42  
3.2 The emergence of B.C.’s environmental movement ................................................................. 45  
3.3 Shifting political actors ............................................................................................................. 48  
3.4 A campaign to protect the Stein develops .............................................................................. 51  
3.5 Mobilizing opposition .............................................................................................................. 57  
3.6 Voices for the Stein grow louder ............................................................................................. 62 

**Chapter 4: Growing voices, collaborative activism** ................................................................ 68  
4.0 Activist co-management ........................................................................................................... 68  
4.1 A campaign for the hearts and minds of British Columbians .................................................. 69  
4.2 Rediscovering the Stein Valley ................................................................................................. 71  
4.3 Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations Stein Declaration ............................................................. 74  
4.4 “Share it” versus “Save it” ........................................................................................................ 77  
4.5 The rise of an empowered public ............................................................................................... 79  
4.6 The politics of preservation ...................................................................................................... 82  
4.7 Negotiating the future of the Stein Valley ............................................................................... 85 

**Chapter 5: The Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park eighteen years later** ................. 89  
5.0 From there to here ...................................................................................................................... 89  
5.1 People and places ....................................................................................................................... 91  
5.2 Resistance and empowerment .................................................................................................. 97  
5.3 The Cooperative Management Agreement ............................................................................ 105  
5.4 The Stein Valley: imagining, producing, and safeguarding its future .................................... 114 

**Chapter 6: Looking back, looking forward** ............................................................................... 119 

**Bibliography** ............................................................................................................................... 122
List of Figures

Figure 1. The Stein River Valley. .............................................................. 5
Acknowledgments

I have been fortunate enough to cross paths with some wonderful folks in these last few years— instructors, colleagues, collaborators, friends, family, and many others—with big ideas and endless ears.

Thank you to my thesis committee members, Wendy Wickwire, Michael M’Gonigle, and Jessica Dempsey, for their generosity in helping me turn a jumble of thoughts, ideas, and, mostly, questions about the Stein Valley into a thesis project.

Thank you to all those who shared with me their thoughts on the Stein Valley; through your knowledge and experience, this project has attained its significance. In particular, John Haugen and Ruby Dunstan made this project both possible and, for me, truly meaningful.

A million thanks to my friend-ly editors, Megan Sullivan and Lisa Dumoulin.

And, lastly, a lifetime of memories and gratitude for all the people who helped me laugh it off, every step of the way.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In one of my first discussions of potential thesis topics with my MA supervisory committee members, Wendy Wickwire and Michael M’Gonigle, they suggested a project on the Stein Valley, British Columbia (B.C.). It was a fitting and timely case-study, they said, that would allow me to analyze the intersections between environmental politics, social justice, ecological justice, and social movements. Both M’Gonigle and Wickwire knew the subject well as they had been actively involved in the anti-logging campaign in the 1980s and 90s. As we discussed the possibilities, they noted the lack of research on the valley since the signing in 1995 of a formal co-management agreement. They wondered how the park designation and co-management arrangement had affected the community. Had it changed things? In these questions, I could see the seeds of a compelling thesis project that addressed a largely neglected chapter of B.C.’s ecopolitical history. It also offered an opportunity to work with academic supervisors who had participated in making that history, with essential contacts, knowledge, experience, and their own relationships with the Stein Valley. Through Wickwire and M’Gonigle’s connections with other people who had participated directly in the Stein campaign, I also saw a unique opportunity to pursue a lively ethnographic project in Lytton, B.C.

1 Wickwire knew the region well through her work with the Nlaka’pamux Elders at Lytton, including two major Stein ethnographic projects funded by the Lytton First Nation (LFN) and Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal Council (NNTC). M’Gonigle was a major figure in the Stein campaign, beginning in the early 1980s. He founded two major organizations, Living Alternatives and the Stein Wilderness Alliance, to mobilize efforts to fight the Stein logging proposal. M’Gonigle also spent two summers running hiking programs to engage local youth in the Stein Valley. Wickwire and M’Gonigle spent a year living near the mouth of the Stein in 1982-83, raising awareness throughout the community and region about the impending logging. Several years later, as the conflict came to a head, they hoped to consolidate a public connection to the valley by publishing Stein: The Way of the River (1988).
A few phone calls organized through Wickwire connected me to the Lytton First Nation (LFN) where I gauged community interest in participating in this project. The response was immediate: Ruby Dunstan, LFN Chief Emeritus and member of the Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park (SVNHP) Management Board, offered to host me at her family farm on the west side, while John Haugen, who works with the Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal Council and serves as a member of the SVNHP Management Board, offered to assist me in making contacts within the community. With these invitations, I knew I had a thesis topic worth pursuing.

1.0 Setting the scene

Rushing east from coastal glaciers one hundred kilometres north of the metropolis of Vancouver, the clear waters of the Stein River are swallowed by the surging Fraser River just north of Lytton, B.C. From there, the turbid waters trundle south to their final oceanic destination. On its journey to the Fraser, the Stein River travels through the traditional territory of the Nlaka’pamux and through six different biogeoclimatic zones (BC Parks 2000). Approximately one thousand kilometres square, the Stein River Valley, known locally as “Sti’yen, Stagyn” (meaning “hidden place,” according to Nlaka’pamux elder, Annie York) is the largest intact (unlogged, undammed) watershed in southwestern B.C.² Bordering the territories of the adjacent Lil’wat and St’at’imc peoples, the valley has been shaped by a myriad of ecological, cultural, spiritual, subsistence, political, economic, recreational, and scientific practices and processes throughout its history.

² The Nlaka’pamux name for the Stein Valley, Sti’yen or Stagyn, appears on a storyboard panel at the east end trailhead of the SVNHP, near Lytton.
In Haripriya Rangan’s theory of regionality, she contends that a “region” is a spatial unit within which social practices and activities combine with the biogeophysical landscape to produce “relational spaces” (2000, 177–78). These practices and activities may come from within or beyond the region, creating it in as much as changing it. “Seen in this way,” says Rangan, “regions are not just ‘spatial settings’, but geographical histories that carry both the sense and sensibility of the lived dimensions of social life” (Ibid., 178). The Stein Valley is one such relational space; it has been co-produced by people, institutions, and the biogeophysical landscape. Rather than a fixed or passive geographic entity, it has been formed and reformed through a mess of human interactions with the natures it inhabits.

Stories of the Stein Valley and the human-land relations that have shaped and characterized its history, fill the following chapters. I use the concept of ‘human-land relations,’ to describe various assemblages of land use practices, understandings, interactions, and engagements between human inhabitants and the natural world. Such relations continually “…come into being in and through action” and, concurrently, form and reform socio-ecological landscapes (Sundberg 2006, 242). In paying close attention to the ways in which regions, in their specificity, are co-produced through particular practices and interactions, I examine how individuals and collectives have formed,
disrupted, and reconfigured the socio-ecological landscape of the Stein Valley. Such processes are perhaps most clear, as Rangan suggests, in examining the contested terrain of “regions in protest” (2000, 177).

“The Stein Wilderness is in Danger of Immediate Destruction!”

In May 1976, British Columbia’s Minister of Forests, Tom Waterland, announced that the Stein River Valley would be managed according to an “integrated resource management plan,” with forestry as the major use. With this decision, Waterland characterized the Stein’s timber resources as the ‘property’ of industry giant British Columbia Forest Products (BCFP). In the years following Waterland’s announcement, a contentious debate ensued over the future of the Stein Valley; environmentalists, Indigenous communities, local residents, and various public sectors faced off with the government-backed forest industry. On November 22, 1995, after over two decades of protest, with widespread public support, NDP Premier Michael Harcourt announced the 107,000-hectare Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park. The Stein Valley’s forests would not be cut, but the valley was nonetheless changed. This thesis explores the social, political, economic, and ecological history from which this conflict emerged and unfolded. It also interrogates the final designation for the Stein Valley—a Class A Provincial Park jointly managed by the Lytton First Nation and the provincial government under a Cooperative Management Agreement.

---

5 This headline appears in the Western Canada Wilderness Committee’s 1985 newsletter, published to draw awareness to the proposed logging in the Stein Valley (WC2 1985).
Figure 1. The steeply sided Stein River Valley straddles two climatic regions—the wet Coastal rainforests (predominantly spruce, cedar, hemlock, and fir), and the dry Interior plateau (characterized by ponderosa pine forests) (Photo by author).

1.1 Critical context

Cooperative management

Co-management was not a new concept in 1995 when the LFN and B.C. Government entered into the SVNHP Cooperative Management Agreement. Since the 1970s, cooperative management, joint management, and joint-stewardship arrangements have become common in resource management practice in Canada, especially where the interests, needs, and rights of Indigenous and non-Indigenous managers are conflicting
According to Claudia Notzke, whose research focuses on renewable resource co-management, co-management refers broadly to various levels of integration of local and state level management systems, where power and responsibility is shared between a government-entity and local resource users (1995, 188). The level of power-sharing between “co-managers” varies greatly between co-management arrangements, Notzke explains, ranging from local participation and consultation in government decision-making, to extensive jurisdiction over a territory, species, or specific natural asset (Ibid.).

The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement marked the enactment of the first co-management agreement in Canada (Rusnak 1997). Signed in 1975, this land claim settlement was spurred by—and indeed worked to spur—a number of key events that prompted the emergence of co-management arrangements more broadly across Canada. In Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1973] the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) ruled that “Aboriginal Title” existed prior to the colonization of the continent. Further, as adopted in 1982, section 35 of the Canadian Constitution Act made clear that “Aboriginal entitlement” referred to exclusive use and occupation of land

---

6 Following Sundberg, I use the term “Indigenous” to describe “…groups with ancestral ties/claims to particular lands prior to colonization by outside powers and ‘whose nations remain submerged within the states created by those powers’” (Shaw, Herman and Dobbs 2006 as cited by Sundberg 2014, 34). I also intermittently use the terms “Aboriginal,” “First Nations,” and “Indian” to describe communities I understand as Indigenous to the territories now known as British Columbia.

7 This discussion reflects a few key events identified by Notzke (1995). For a more complete discussion of the history and particularity of co-management in Canada see Notzke (1995), Rusnak (1997), or Townsend (2009).

8 “Aboriginal Title” describes distinctive rights to lands and resources held by Indigenous people in Canada, by virtue of traditional occupancy and use. While these rights have been recognized in legal documents since British colonial times, a very narrow interpretation of Aboriginal title has dominated. In practice, this has meant that Indigenous people have the right to use traditional resources for subsistence purposes, but there is no onus on other resource users not to infringe upon those rights (Usher 1986 as cited by Rusnak 1997, 4).
(Townsend 2009, 73). Now entrenched in the Constitution, both federal and provincial
governments focused more attention on what Aboriginal title meant in practice and how
it pertained to renewable resource management (Rusnak 1997).

In 1990, the SCC’s ruling on *Sparrow* (R. v. *Sparrow* [1990] 3 C.N.L.R.)
confirmed that First Nations held rights to fish for food. The Court concluded that these
rights could not be extinguished by unilateral government fiat, and should be given
priority over other users’ rights.⁹ Discussions surrounding access to, and control over,
natural resources were a primary focus in negotiating several comprehensive land claims
settlements in Northern Canada throughout the 1980s and 90s; and in 1990, following
*Sparrow*, the B.C. government formally acknowledged the validity of outstanding
comprehensive land claims within the province (Notzke 1995, 200). In the landmark
*Delgamuukw v. R* [1997] case, the SCC ruled that something called “Aboriginal Title”
existed; it did not, however, ‘find’ it in any particular place (Townsend 2009).¹⁰

In the aftermath of the *Delgamuukw* ruling, the B.C. government purportedly
placed increased emphasis on the need to consult with First Nations prior to resource
development in traditional territories (Dacks 2002). Additionally, in response to the
constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights and title, the federal government began an
extensive treaty-making process with the B.C. government in the early 1990s to resolve

---

⁹ One of the implications of *R. v. Sparrow* [1990] is that it defined procedures for determining whether
specific regulations affecting Aboriginal rights are justified. This case set an important precedent of the
amount to which the Canadian government can limit Indigenous rights (Notzke 1995).

¹⁰ The *Delgamuukw* decision, Townsend explains, was “…not Nation specific” (2009, 73). This means that,
although the existence of Aboriginal title was acknowledged within legal institutions, these rights were not
recognized as existing in particular places. *Delgamuukw* stipulated that Aboriginal title must be proven in
courts, where the burden of proof lies with First Nations to show “…that their Title pre-existed that of the
Crown’s in demonstrable areas” (Ibid., 72-73).
outstanding uncertainty around land and resource ownership, usage, management, and regulation (Fact Sheet-Treaty Negotiations 2009). Treaty negotiations have been slow and costly, and require a Nation to surrender claims of Aboriginal title to their territories in exchange for whatever is granted by the treaty. This has compelled many Indigenous communities to forego participation (Victoria: Queens Printer 1996, 2, as cited by M’Gonigle 1998b, 169).

Most recently, adding to the complex legal matrix defining—or constraining—Indigenous rights in B.C., the SCC granted its first declaration of Aboriginal title on June 26, 2014. In Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia [2014], the SCC concluded that Aboriginal title “…confers possession and ownership rights including: the right to decide how the land will be used; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and, the right to proactively use and manage the land” (Mandell Pinder 2014). For the first time, it recognized this title over a large tract of land and, as a result, significantly increased the obligations of the provincial and federal governments to ‘consult’ with and ‘accommodate’ First Nations. Shortly thereafter, in October 2014, the Tsilhqot’in National Government (TNG) announced the creation of the Dasiqox Tribal Park in their territories in Interior B.C. 11

Alongside the shifting juridical-political terrain of Indigenous/Crown land rights in Canada, co-management arrangements have been negotiated and implemented as one attempt to account for Indigenous rights within land and resource management regimes.

---

11 The Dasiqox Tribal Park website defines a “Tribal Park” as “…an assertion of physical space on the basis of Indigenous Land, established throughout Canada as a reaction to the Crown’s assumed authority” (Dasiqox Tribal Park 2014). Although it is not the focus of this thesis, it should be noted that there are many Indigenous scholars and activists who reject seeking “rights recognition” from a colonial Canadian Government (Corntassel (2007; 2012) and Coulthard (2007)). In doing so, as this argumentation goes, Indigenous people continue to affirm the legitimacy and authority of the Canadian state over Indigenous territories.
However, as I discuss in the following section, the level to which such arrangements are able to redistribute power and decision-making authority in practice remains contested within co-management discourse (Mabee and Hoberg 2006; Goetze 2005; Castro and Nielsen 2001; Takeda and Røpke 2010).

*Co-management in the literature*

The celebration and perceived success of co-management arrangements vary extensively. In his writing on co-management, Fikret Berkes asserts there is a normative assumption within co-management literature that direct involvement of people and communities in resource management decisions automatically equates with more inclusive governance and a broader distribution of power in decision-making (2009). Berkes notes that the allocation of power and responsibility within co-management arrangements is never uniform or static, as neither communities nor governments are monolithic and relations amongst stakeholders inevitably evolve (Ibid.). Based on his research on the politics of co-management, Paul Nadasdy argues that the very concept of “management” is based in the political and economic context of capitalist resource extraction (2005). Rather than re-distributing a centralist management regime, Nadasdy argues, co-management arrangements have the potential to reify state power by absorbing indigenous participation within bureaucratic management processes, while failing to challenge ultimate decision-making authority (Ibid.) Along the same vein, Berkes cautions that:

…co-management, and decentralization in general, often leads to reinforcement of local elite power or to strengthening of state control…It can be used as a pretext to co-opt community-based management and extend the power of the state. (2009, 1693)
With such cautions in mind, Lars Carlsson and Berkes contend that co-management arrangements should be considered “knowledge partnerships” (Carlsson and Berkes 2005, 65). Rather than a fixed state, these partnerships must be “…a continuous problem-solving process…involving extensive deliberation, negotiation and joint learning within problem-solving networks” (Ibid.). In this way, they argue, co-management should be understood as an approach to people-centred governance where management responsibility is shared among partners (2005, 66; Berkes 2009).

Despite advancing an understanding of co-management arrangements as relational, adaptive, and geographically particular, the reformed approach of Berkes (2009) and Carlsson and Berkes (2005), as Nadasdy cautions, remains entrenched within “…existing structures of state resource management” in which the state is one, if not the primary, co-manager (Nadasdy 2003, 369). As such, their prescriptions assume the notion of the sovereign state as the singular authority over a given territory. Indeed, both the approaches to, and critiques of, co-management I have described preclude an understanding of the ways in which dominant relations of power operate and gain legitimacy through reiterative land use practices and relations, including but not limited to those practices compelled by formal co-management arrangements.

In his examination of B.C. forest management policy and legislation, Michael M’Gonigle suggests the need to situate co-management within a larger conception of economic and ecological relations (M’Gonigle 1998a, 112). In doing so, M’Gonigle distinguishes between two models of resource management: ecosystem management (EsM) and ecosystem-based management (EsBM) (Ibid.). He asserts that reform-based EsM models are designed to function within status quo forest management regimes,
which maximize economic growth at the expense of ecosystem values. By contrast, a structurally-oriented EsBM model challenges the centrality of economic objectives within forest management. As per an EsBM system, economic objectives are modified to fit within landscape practices that first maintain the structure, function, and composition of the ecosystem.

Implementing an EsBM philosophy, M’Gonigle states, requires fundamental “…structural change that reconstructs [state and corporate] hierarchies to whatever is dictated by the primary goal of maintaining ecosystem health” (M’Gonigle 1998a, 104). Within this model, maintaining particular ecosystem values directly informs the character of forest management and thus shapes human and community relationships with the forest landscape. EsBM systems, as Lynch and Talbot conceive, “…draw their legitimacy from the community in which they operate rather than from the nation-state in which they are located” (1995, 24-25, as cited by M’Gonigle 1998b, 168).

Along a similar vein, in this thesis I propose a significantly expanded conception of co-management that departs from an understanding of land and resource management as dictated solely by state bodies and centralized institutions. “It is necessary to understand management and use of natural resources not merely as outcomes of legal ownership or property status,” Rangan points out, “but by looking at how various social groups and institutions both within and beyond the region exercise control over a wide array of regional resources” (2000, 179). Land use practices and activities, I argue, produce, define, and regulate the socio-ecological landscapes we inhabit outside of formal regimes of land and resource management. To mark the socio-ecologically constitutive effects of such interactions, I suggest that land use practices, understandings,
and engagements—human-land relations—be considered informal co-management arrangements. More than a legalistic structure between the state and a local entity, ‘co-management’, conceived in this way, provides a framework to help name, extricate, and identify the practices and activities that co-produce the socio-ecological landscapes we inhabit on a daily basis.

This analysis serves to emphasize the complexity within which co-management arrangements emerge. As such, the distinction between formal and informal co-management practices is somewhat blurred. My intention is not to posit one ‘category’ against the other, as both formal and informal co-management arrangements require particular land use practices, understandings, and relations to gain authority, legitimacy, and stability. Rather, the expanded interpretation of co-management I propose includes formal and informal co-management practices, and considers the complex social, political, economic, and ecological processes through which the world, or in this case the Stein Valley, is continually co-produced, ordered, and governed.

At the heart of my argument is an understanding that co-management arrangements exist in the Stein Valley beyond those that involve a formal legal arrangement with the state. Reconsidering co-management in this way reflects a primary argument of Green Legal Theory (GLT). GLT addresses the many social interactions, institutional dynamics, and power relations that exist beyond those of a formal (i.e. legal) character, with socio-ecologically constitutive effects (M’Gonigle 2008). In the next

---

12 Throughout this thesis, I use the term “socio-ecological” to refer to the sociocultural and ecological features of a particular landscape. “Socio-ecologically constitutive,” then, refers to land use practices and interactions that shape the social, economic, political, and ecological history of a landscape—what I describe as formal and informal co-management practices.
section, I discuss the ways in which GLT has informed my thinking around the regulatory effects of reiterative land use practices and activities.

*Green legal theory*

GLT begins by recognizing that the state occupies a deep conflict of interest: it establishes the context and substantive rules of environmental law, yet also drives environmentally destructive resource industries. Thus, GLT takes a critical approach to environmental law by examining the limitations of ‘legal law’ to instead identify broader forms of social regulation—the logics and dynamics of material and cultural processes—that underpin both the state and the economy (M’Gonigle, forthcoming). In doing so, GLT invokes the Foucauldian concept of *governmentality* to study the systemic political, economic, and cultural conditions that regulate social and environmental relations outside of formal regimes of legislation and policy (M’Gonigle 2008).

In considering these processes of social regulation, we get a more complex understanding of how society is constructed, regulated, and governed through day-to-day practices and processes (M’Gonigle and Takeda 2013; M’Gonigle, forthcoming). GLT elucidates the diffuse ways in which socio-ecological landscapes are produced and managed through reiterative practices, outside of formal modes of governance (i.e. formal legislation pertaining to land and resource management). In this thesis, I consider such ‘extra-legal’ processes of socio-ecological regulation as they occur in, and through, various co-management practices in the Stein Valley region.
1.2 Main arguments and contributions

This thesis encourages a new kind of thinking about co-management that includes human and nonhuman worlds and relations. It considers how co-management—in different forms, at different times, and in different places—has shaped the Stein Valley over its history. When we engage these perspectives, the idea that co-management was first introduced to the Stein with the 1995 Cooperative Management Agreement breaks down. Instead, these perspectives draw attention to the ways in which various actors have managed, and continue to manage, the Stein Valley through reiterative practices of use, stewardship, governance, etc., both within, and outside of, state-centric co-management arrangements, across highly asymmetric relations of power.¹³

The primary question that occupies this thesis is: How are co-management arrangements formed and contested through particular land use practices, interactions, and relationships? The objectives of my research are threefold. First, I hope to prompt a rethinking of co-management, beyond definitions that limit it to a practice embedded within state structures, institutions, and bodies. Second, I will explore the socio-ecological history of the Stein Valley. Third, I will consider the practices and processes through which co-management arrangements have emerged on the ground in the Stein Valley region.

¹³This approach is inspired by geographer Juanita Sundberg’s scholarship on the cultural politics of conservation in Latin America (2006). Sundberg examines conservation projects in the Maya Biosphere Reserve as zones of encounter and contact or, “social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination” (Pratt 1992, 4, 7 as cited by Sundberg 2006, 240). While Sundberg frames these encounters as performative processes, in which the subject is “…constituted through discursive and material practices” (Sundberg 2006, 242), her writing also emphasizes the dominant social, geographical, structural, and institutional constraints in which these exchanges occur (Ibid., 239). Gilbert Joseph’s (1998) conception of “encounter” marks such interactions, explains Sundberg, as “…fraught with contestation and conflict, but also connection, empathy, and contact” (Sundberg 2006, 239).
Through a careful reading of the Stein’s socio-ecological history, this approach moves beyond an understanding of the state (and state-local partnerships) as the singular, or even primary, agent of authority over a region, to attend to the broader formations of power at work in land and resource management regimes. In doing so, I argue that reiterative land use practices and interactions have powerful effects in producing and enacting particular regimes of land and resource management, and should thus be considered part of the co-management process.

Research contributions

This thesis offers a close reading of the socio-ecological history of the Stein Valley, with a particular focus on conflict surrounding logging proposals in the 1970s to 90s, and their 1995 resolution in the form of the SVNHP and Cooperative Management Agreement. As such, this analysis adds to existing literature on B.C. environmental politics (for example, Braun (1997; 2002), Rossiter (2004; 2008), and Wilson (1998)) by considering how regions in conflict are produced, contested, and reconfigured, across historical geographies of power and legacies of colonialism. In attending specifically to the Stein, this thesis offers an in-depth account of the ways in which land use practices and relations shape land and resource governance regimes. In doing so, I propose an expanded conception of co-management that accounts for the diverse and diffuse practices through which land and resource management regimes emerge and unfold on the ground.

Similarly, by looking at the ways in which processes of colonial dispossession disrupted Nlaka’pamux use and control of their territories, as I discuss in Chapter Two,
this thesis contributes geographical specificity to existing discussions on the colonial making of what is now known as “British Columbia” (for example, Harris 2004; Harris 2002; Furniss 1999). I consider how colonial state formation compelled, and indeed required, reiterative land-use practices, understandings, and relations, drawing both European settlers and, increasingly, Nlaka’pamux people, into human-land relations that served the interests of an emerging capitalist economy. The human-land relations enacted through this process—what I refer to as colonial-industrial co-management (see Chapter Three)—significantly shaped the context in which conflict over the Stein erupted almost a century later.

Indeed, this frame could be applied to future research looking at B.C. environmental politics. I use the Stein to look carefully at a site of social-environmental friction (Tsing 2005), in which various actors have collided—and continue to collide—in particular historical junctures. What kinds of effects do these interactions have on individuals and communities? What kinds of effects do these interactions have on the ecological landscapes around them? In other words, how are socio-ecological landscapes formed and changed through contentious land use conflicts? In order to understand such conflicts and their outcomes (e.g. co-management arrangements, protected areas, etc.), future researchers would be well served to consider the ways in which land use conflicts are inevitably shaped by individual, community, and collective histories of human-land engagement.
1.3 Research methods

The town of Lytton straddles the Trans Canada highway on the east side of the Fraser River. The opposite side of the Fraser—referred to locally as the “west side”—is mainly “Indian Reserve” land.\textsuperscript{14} It provides the primary access point to the Stein Valley, and SVNHP. To get to the Fraser’s west side requires taking either the two-car “reaction” ferry across the river, located just north of the town, or walking along a narrow footbridge that runs alongside the Canadian National Railway bridge directly below the town.\textsuperscript{15}

In mid-August, 2013, I drove from Victoria to Lytton, B.C. After taking the ferry across the Fraser to the west side, I turned sharp left and drove a few kilometres along the narrow and twisty gravel road to Ruby and Spud Dunstan’s home. Fringed halfway around by a wide, shaded deck and surrounded on all sides by hay fields, delineated by a post-and-rail fence, the Dunstan household became the source of much of my education about the Stein Valley. On the first evening of my stay, Ruby’s daughter, Karen, invited me to join the family for dinner. With sockeye salmon running in full force up the Fraser


\textsuperscript{15} One of two reactions ferries still in operation in B.C. today, the Lytton ferry is propelled by the flow of the river itself. Working in shifts of two, the captain and crew skilfully navigate the ferry back and forth across the river throughout the day. It is interesting to note how the geographic position of the Stein Valley in relation to the Fraser River shaped the industrial history of the Stein Valley. Unlike much of southern B.C., the Stein remained comparatively isolated from colonial settlement and industrial expansion into the twentieth century. While other factors were also undoubtedly at play, an explanation of this must consider the physical geography of the Stein Valley. The rugged Coast Mountains form its western border while the Fraser River delineates its eastern edge. The Cariboo Wagon Road, the Canadian Pacific Railway and, eventually, the Trans Canada highway—major veins of inter-provincial traffic and travel—all sit on the east side of the Fraser. In fact, throughout the campaign to protect the Stein, the economics of transporting equipment into, and logs out of, the valley became one of the most contentious aspects of the debate around logging.
River, they served plates of freshly caught salmon fillets, salmon roe, with deer ribs, and beets and potatoes from the Dunstan’s garden on the side. To the surprise of everyone at the table, I sheepishly admitted I had never tried salmon roe or deer meat of any kind.

After dinner, we sat out on the front porch, enjoying the cool breeze after sweltering in temperatures above forty degrees earlier in the day. I pitched my tent on the north side of Ruby’s house, opposite the front porch. Tired from the day’s events, introductions, and conversations, my brightly coloured tent provided a familiar space to clear my head. I used an adjacent picnic table as my office and each morning I would rise early to steal a few moments to write before the heat of day settled in full force.

Ethnographic research

Ethnographer Karen O’Reilly defines ethnographic research as “a practice that evolves in design as the study progresses; involves direct and sustained contact with human beings, in the context of their daily lives, over a prolonged period of time; draws on a family of methods, usually including participant observation and conversation; respects the complexity of the social world; and therefore tells rich, sensitive and credible stories” (2012, 11). Indeed, drawing on ethnographic research methods has allowed me to formulate a more complex understanding of the ways in which community relationships with the valley have shaped this region’s history. This approach has also encouraged me to consider how those experiences speak to broader socio-political realities (O’Reilly 2012). Thus, this project considers how individual experiences of the Stein Valley, particularly through the Stein campaign, emerged within particular social, economic, and political contexts.
I spent most of my two weeks in Lytton interviewing people who were either directly involved with the campaign to protect the Stein, or are currently involved in the SVNHP Management Board. In total, I conducted eleven semi-structured interviews. While in Lytton in August 2013, I conducted seven interviews. Two additional interviews were conducted in the fall of 2013 (one by telephone and the other, in person in Vancouver), and two later interviews in Lytton in July 2014 (one by phone and the other, in person).

Archival and literature research

I supplemented my interviews with archival research. To determine the chronology of the events that occurred surrounding potential logging plans in the Stein Valley between the 1970s and 1990s, I studied a long line of correspondence, meeting minutes, newspaper articles, newsletters, posters, brochures, government documents, and reports. To determine a timeline of events related to the Stein’s more recent history, I

---

16 These interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, thus I encouraged each person I interviewed to direct our conversation as much as they felt comfortable. I initiated gently where it seemed appropriated, drawing loosely on a series of questions pertaining to the following topics: personal knowledge of the Stein Valley; personal involvement in the campaign; important and pivotal events throughout this time period; people and organizations involved in the campaign; Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations before/during/after the campaign; how the Stein issue was situated amongst environmental politics at the time; informal co-management of the Stein Valley; formal co-management of the Stein; and the legacy of the campaign for the town of Lytton and the Lytton First Nation.

17 In analyzing my interview transcripts and fieldnotes, I drew heavily on the anthropological methodology as presented in *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes* (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). Distinct from other forms of qualitative analytic coding, frequency and representativeness are not necessarily the most important factors in qualifying a core theme according to an ethnographic approach. Rather, Emerson et al. present qualitative analytic coding as a rigorous line-by-line analysis of all interview transcripts, notes, and field journals in order to identify specific ideas, themes, patterns, and relationships “…in the way [interviewees] understand and respond to conditions and contingencies in the social setting” (Ibid. 193). Thematic decision-making continues throughout data analysis and on into the writing process, as questions, ideas, anomalies, patterns, and so on, continually evolve. Such research and writing is simultaneously inductive and deductive, observational and intuitive, individual and relational (Ibid.).

18 I studied a wide variety of reports produced throughout the Stein campaign. For example: ethnographic (Wickwire 1988); anthropological (Wickwire and Lepofsky 1986); archaeological (Wilson 1985); ecological (Thompson 1975); and, economic (Jones (1983; 1987); Taylor (1984); INE (1985); Government

Of all of my lines of research, I found my time with the Dunstan family the most formative. Sitting around the kitchen table, watching salmon being filleted on the rocky shores of the Fraser River, and walking the proposed logging road in the lower Stein Valley significantly shaped my own understanding of the Stein Valley, inevitably influencing—and enlivening—the story I tell.

1.4 My project and thesis structure

Understanding co-management as an evolving product of various human-land relations requires that land use practices and engagements be considered as part of the co-management process, actively and continually co-producing socio-ecological landscapes. An official co-management agreement for the Stein Valley came into effect in 1995. From my research, however, it is clear that a more expansive history of co-management in the region is needed. In the Stein Valley, various co-management arrangements of British Columbia (1976; 1986)).
emerged through particular practices and interactions, within shifting social, political, economic, and ecological contexts. Moving beyond an assessment of the apparent functioning of the current co-management structure in the Stein Valley (i.e. the park status and Cooperative Management Agreement), this thesis attends to the complex ways in which diverse actors engage in formal and informal co-management practices, stemming from particular understandings and relationships with the Stein Valley itself.

Ultimately, I assert that understanding how formal co-management arrangements function in specific places—whether local actors experience co-management arrangements as tools for power-sharing, as a guise to strengthen state-control, or as something else altogether—requires a careful study of the social, political, economic, and ecological histories of human-land relations from which both formal and informal co-management arrangements have emerged.

In the chapters that follow, I examine the historical junctures in which particular co-management arrangements were forged in the Stein Valley region. In order to better illustrate the various co-management practices at work in the history of the Stein Valley, I identify three distinctive “informal co-management arrangements.” Chapter Two examines the colonial processes of dispossession through which Nlaka’pamux people were physically displaced from their territories in the south-central Interior of British Columbia to facilitate the establishment and growth of settler society. I explore the ways in which Nlaka’pamux land use practices and relations—what I describe as sustenance co-management—were violently disrupted through this process of de- and re-territorialization. In Chapter Three, I look at the ways in which settlers and Indigenous communities in my study area were increasingly drawn into a capitalist economy based
on resource extraction and export. The labour-based human-land relations produced through this process, *colonial-industrial co-management*, were integral to colonial state formation in the territories of British Columbia. In Chapters Three and Four, I cover the events that punctuated the campaign to protect the Stein Valley from the threat of industrial logging, culminating in the designation of the Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park in 1995. In Chapter Four, I suggest that the emergence of *activist co-management* throughout the Stein campaign disrupted the dominant culture of resource extraction in the region. By doing so, environmentalists and Indigenous communities challenged state-industry authority and control over the Stein Valley region. Chapter Five gives close attention to the post-1995 socio-ecological landscape of the Stein Valley region. Particularly, this chapter explores the legacy of the Stein campaign within the community of Lytton. I consider the ways in which the current co-management arrangement (including the provincial park status and Cooperative Management Agreement) has been enacted and experienced on the ground, evident in stewardship practices, patterns of use, and daily interactions that shape the community’s identity in important ways. In Chapter Six, I conclude with a discussion of the generative possibilities offered by this re-conception of co-management—the opportunity to collectively re-imagine, re-define, and co-produce radically different kinds of socio-ecological landscapes.
Chapter 2: An early history of the Stein Valley

2.0 Sustenance co-management

When European explorers arrived in the region that we now call “British Columbia” (B.C.) in the late eighteenth century, they encountered resident Indigenous communities with deep roots. Indeed, Ruby Dunstan referred to the Nlaka’pamux people’s deep connection to their territory in one of our first interviews. “We’ve lived here,” she described, “since ‘time immemorial’” (Dunstan, pers. comm., 2013). Through thousands of years of occupation, the Nlaka’pamux peoples and their neighbours, the Lil’wat and St’at’imc, developed land-use practices, beliefs, ceremonies, and rituals that relied on all of the mountains and watersheds within their territories (Lytton 1995). With its position in the heart of Nlaka’pamux territory, the Stein River Valley was a primary agent in the process of socio-ecological production I describe as sustenance co-management.

2.1 Early relationships with the Stein Valley

Ruby Dunstan’s comment about the cultural-geographic longevity of the Nlaka’pamux is confirmed in the archaeological and ethnographic record (Wickwire 1988). Based on decades of surveys and excavations, archaeologists have dated human habitation in the south-central Interior at approximately twelve thousand years (Furniss 1999). The Indigenous oral tradition recorded over the past century by ethnographers presents a colourful account of how Coyote, Old One, and three brothers (collectively
referred to as Qoā’qLqaL) transformed an inhospitable landscape into one that would support human occupation (Teit 1898, 11). Concrete evidence of these ancient peoples’ travels in and around the Stein exists in the form of a small footprint embedded in a rock on the upper bank of the north Stein River.

The contemporary stories of long-term Indigenous occupation are well supported by the ethnographic work of James A. Teit (1864-1922). Teit travelled to Spences Bridge (thirty-five kilometres north of Lytton on the Thompson River) from Shetland, U.K. in 1884 to work for his uncle, John Murray. Within three years he was living with a Nlaka’pamux woman, Lucy Antko, and building close ties to her relatives and other local Nlaka’pamux peoples in and around the village. A meeting with New York-based anthropologist Franz Boas in 1894 engaged Teit in a long-term research project that led to close to forty years of field research and multiple published monographs on the plateau peoples: “Thompson” (Nlaka’pamux) (1900), “Shuswap” (Secwepemc) (1909), “Lillooet” (St’at’imc) (1906), and Okanagan peoples (1930) (Wickwire 1998).

Based on his interviews with elderly nineteenth century Nlaka’pamux men and women, Teit explained the boundaries of the Nlaka’pamux land-base as follows:

The Thompson tribe [Nlaka’pamux] point to the mouth of the Thompson River at Lytton as the early seat of the tribe from whence they have spread up and down the Fraser River, up the Thompson and Nicola Rivers, and over to the Upper

---

1 Other Nlaka’pamux creation stories explain how “Old One” (also referred to as “the Old Man”, “Chief”, the “Great Chief,” and the “Big Mystery”) created the world by transforming a woman into the earth. The woman then gave birth to all the human inhabitants of the earth, and Old One travelled around teaching her children how to survive. When Teit recorded Nlaka’pamux oral narratives, missionaries had been among the among the local Indigenous communities for about thirty years (Teit 1912, 320, as cited by INE 1985, App. I, 212).

2 Teit lived with Antko for twelve years until her death in 1899. Through Antko, Teit established ties with the Indigenous communities around Spences Bridge (Wickwire 1998).

3 Teit used the terms Thompson, Shuswap, Lillooet, and Okanagan in his publications. The Nlaka’pamux became known amongst settlers as the Thompson River Indians throughout the early years of colonial settlement (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988, 29). These names are no longer used, except in the case of Okanagan (Wickwire 1998, 202).
In 1859 the head chief of the tribe claimed the east side of the Fraser River up to the old boundary of the Shuswap, La Fountain. In the Nicola Similkameen country the Thompson spread and occupied the region by settling among and absorbing the “stuwix” country down to Hedley. On the Thompson River from Spence’s Bridge east they spread in the same way among the Shuswap. Also probably at an earlier date they pushed down the canyon of the Fraser River and displaced or absorbed “Stalo” (Coast Salish) in the lower part of the canyon to near Yale. The Lower Thompson say that long ago Stalo speaking people occupied the canyon as far up as almost to Boston Bar…The Thompson were still expanding in all directions when the first traders came. (Teit n.d. as cited in INE, 1985, 206, App. I, 206).

This account underscores the importance of the large land-base to the life-worlds of the Nlaka’pamux. Indirectly, it also points to the importance of the Stein Valley. In addition to presenting the Nlaka’pamux village at the junction of the Fraser and Thompson Rivers (where the town of Lytton sits today) as the centre of the world, it situates the Stein River and adjacent mountains in the heart of Nlaka’pamux territory.

Teit explained how the Nlaka’pamux traversed their full territory during spring, summer, and fall in search of deer, elk, caribou, hare, grouse, fish, berries, roots, and other plant food. Salmon was a key food resource. The Nlaka’pamux caught vast quantities of salmon each summer, which they dried and stored in underground pits for winter use. Having a surplus of salmon allowed communities along the Fraser and other salmon-spawning rivers to participate in the extensive food trade-networks that linked the Interior plateau to the Rocky Mountains and the northern plains (Furniss 1999).

Based on his interviews with Nlaka’pamux elders, Teit depicted a world imbued with a pervasive spiritual power—a world in which humans and non-humans not only had much in common but were expected to forge special bonds. Humans looked on animals, trees, birds, flowers, insects, rivers, and rocks, for example, as “people” with their own languages, thought-patterns and souls (Teit 1900, 357). In order to survive,
humans had to access the powers of these non-human peoples. It required a rigorous “training” process during late childhood and adolescence (Ibid.).

In his 1900 monograph on the Nlaka’pamux, Teit highlighted the importance of the Stein Valley as a site of subsistence and spiritual training. He not only included sketches of the images located on a series of pictograph panels along the lower Stein River trail; he also tracked down and interviewed Nlaka’pamux elders who could interpret them for him (Teit 1900). In their explanations, he found evidence of puberty training rituals and beliefs. He also found records of deer, goat, and grizzly bear hunting habitat. Some of the rock paintings suggested travel into the upper valleys and beyond. A fellow ethnographer, Charles Hill-Tout, interviewed a Nlaka’pamux community member in the 1890s, who described the Stein as a special training place for Indian doctors.4 Wendy Wickwire summarized some of Teit’s findings about Nlaka’pamux pictography in a 1988 report on the Stein:

> Early documentation on the pictographs indicates that they were painted at places believed to be sacred or spiritually powerful. They were also painted by youths undergoing their training or by Indian doctors as testimonies of the visionary or power experiences…The people today hold similar beliefs about the paintings in the Stein which are found all the way upriver almost to Cottonwood Creek, a distance of approximately 20 miles. (Wickwire 1988, 5)

In his interviews with late nineteenth century Nlaka’pamux elders, Teit inquired about their forms of traditional social organization. His findings challenged the settler-colonial view of Indigenous societies as lacking formal governance structures. The elders described a socio-political system grounded in principles of equality and consensus with minimal formal hierarchy. People told him about highly skilled individuals who were

---

4 Anthropologist Charles Hill-Tout noted that the Stein Valley was a key site used by the Nlaka’pamux for power training (Hill-Tout 1899, 48 as cited by Wickwire 1988, 27).
appointed by the group to take the lead in certain tasks and activities. For instance, they appointed a skilled hunter to serve as the “chief” of hunting, fishing, healing, and foraging parties; a skilled forager to serve as the “chief” of the berrypicking grounds, and so on. They appointed a skilled speaker to serve as the chief orator and assist with group decision-making. People characterized the land-base as communal property within which there were small pockets of family-maintained areas such as fishing stations, eagle nests, and tobacco patches. Overall, he painted a picture of the large Nlaka’pamux territory as a communal entity, managed by extended family units through lateral systems of decision-making. In this way, human-land relations were guided by protocols regarding individual and community use.

The food-gathering, cultural, spiritual, and other land-use practices associated with sustenance co-management suggest a reciprocal relationship between the Nlaka’pamux peoples and the Stein Valley itself. Produced over thousands of years of occupation, use, and mutual dependence, such practices and relations gave the Nlaka’pamux authority in the valley. The contemporary Nlaka’pamux and their neighbours drew on this relationship to make their case against the logging proposal: “As the direct descendants of those aboriginal peoples who have inhabited, shared, sustained, and been sustained by the Stein Valley for tens-of-thousands of years down to the present, our authority in this watershed is inescapable” (Lytton 1995, App. A).

The patterns of land-use that came with Euroamerican colonization in the early nineteenth century systematically disrupted sustenance co-management practices through

---

5 Teit’s use of the word “chief” to describe these leaders was not the same as that of the Department of Indian Affairs’ use of the term (Wickwire forthcoming; Indigenous Foundations 2009).
physical violence, driven by imperialist self-interest. To gain a fuller understanding of the ways in which processes of colonial dispossession shaped co-management practices in the south-central Interior of B.C., the next section establishes the social, political, economic, and cultural context that shaped the colonial site itself. In so doing, it highlights the historical juncture in which Indigenous communities encountered these newcomers. As historical geographer Cole Harris asserts, “…industrial capitalism introduced new relationships between people and with land… these relationships created total misunderstandings and powerful new axes of power that quickly detached native people from former lands” (2004, 172). Drawing on Harris and other scholars of settler colonialism, I examine the ways in which land use practices associated with sustenance co-management were de- and reconstructed through intersecting colonial processes, and the emergence of an Indigenous protest movement in response.

2.2 European land-based fur trade

The expansion of the maritime fur trade into the Interior in the early nineteenth century was a major catalyst of change for the Nlaka’pamux peoples. After establishing a series of small posts in the northern regions, the Montreal-based Northwest Company established a permanent post in the heart of Secwepemc territory (adjacent to Nlaka’pamux territory) on the Thompson River, at the present site of Kamloops, in 1811. This post transformed the south-central Interior into an active trade zone (Furniss 1999).

Numerous historians have speculated on the nature of interactions between Indigenous communities and European traders throughout this period. Drawing on the work of historian Robin Fisher (1992), anthropologist Elizabeth Furniss contends that,
“...European traders became incorporated into the preexisting Aboriginal trading system,” with Indigenous communities dictating fairly collegial trade relations (1999, 31). Cole Harris disputes this position, presenting this period as a regime of terror. In the Interior, Harris argues, European possession of gun power, amongst other factors, made for violent trade relations (2004). No doubt exists that the European fur trade significantly altered the lives of the Interior people by introducing foreign diseases, new technologies, new religious ideas, and most importantly, taking time away from subsistence and cultural practices by drawing full communities into trading. The spread of diseases—measles, flu typhoid, syphilis and, especially, smallpox—drastically impacted social relations amongst Indigenous people in the Interior. According to historian Robert Boyd, smallpox epidemics swept the Interior plateau in the late 1770s, and again in the early 1800s (1994). Late in the fur-trade era, between 1862-63, a massive smallpox outbreak reduced Indigenous populations by sixty-two percent (Ibid.).

The discovery of gold along the Fraser and Thompson Rivers in the summer of 1856 marked the beginning of a palpable shift in Indigenous-settler relations in B.C. When word leaked out two summers later, twenty to thirty thousand miners ascended the Fraser River hoping to make it rich. For Nlaka’pamux families living along the Fraser, there was no avoiding the surge of newcomers. Some arrived from California via Victoria; others arrived from the west via the old inland brigade trails. The sudden influx of miners created a trail of boomtowns as entrepreneurial settlers flocked to the Interior to supply miners with provisions, services, and entertainment, each looking to claim their own piece of this new frontier. As Britain solidified its hold on the region, the local
Nlaka’pamux peoples suddenly became obstacles to the settlement of the colony and advancement of the economy (Furniss 1999).

The mouth of the Stein River became a major node in the 1858 Fraser River gold rush as miners by the hundreds sifted through its silt-laden banks at its junction with the Fraser in search of gold. The large Nlaka’pamux village site on the opposite bank of the Fraser turned into a new settler town—complete with hotels, bars, and brothels, and re-named “Lytton” after the British Colonial Secretary Edward Bulwer-Lytton.

In 1860, one of the town’s key residents, Gold Commissioner Henry Ball ordered a survey of the full length of the Stein River in search of gold deposits. His survey came to an abrupt halt when the Indigenous guides declared, partway up the river, that the trail had ended and that no one had ever ventured further. Given Teit’s depiction of the trail as a quick and easy Nlaka’pamux travel route to the Coast, the guides may have decided to keep that detail hidden from view. Whatever the case, Ball was undeterred. He was now pre-occupied with another natural resource with even more powerful commercial value than gold. Having surveyed the surrounding countryside, he had decided that the benchlands adjacent to the Stein’s mouth had huge potential for commercial food-production due to their access to the Stein River (Harris 2002). Ball and an independent miner, Thomas Earl, staked large land-holdings on these arable parcels of land and diverted water from Stein’s tributary, Stryen Creek, to grow vegetables, alfalfa, and fruit. Because of the creek’s location above the farm, the two entrepreneurs knew that they would never have to worry about water for irrigation.6

---

6 In 1860, settlers could pre-empt up to 160 acres of “unoccupied” land for cultivation for a small fee (Harris 2002). The tracts of land pre-empted by Earlscourt and Ball became some of the province’s largest agricultural estates. Earlscourt Farm consisted of over one hundred acres along the Fraser River (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988).
2.3 Establishing colonial authority

In order to bring B.C.’s vast physical geography under Crown control, with London, England as the centre of power, colonial officials imposed a regime of land management upon the territory. To accomplish this project, Harris explains, “sketchy information about a distant corner of North America was processed thousands of miles from its source, within complex calculi of diplomatic ambition, ideology, cultural stereotypes, and geopolitical power” (2004, 169). In British Columbia’s south-central Interior, these projects worked discursively to separate nature (the biophysical landscape) from culture (Indigenous use and occupation), and thereby represent the territory as empty of social and cultural context. “Projects of natural history, topographical survey, and cartography,” writes geographer Derek Gregory, “made visible a colonial ‘order of thing’ by means of a thoroughgoing spatialization of knowledge that brought various non-European natures within the sovereign grid of European scientific culture” (2001, 95). The resultant colonial ‘natures’, Gregory argues, appeared as a “space of order and organization… available for calculation and commodification” (Ibid., 93).

Such “cartographic abstractions” (Braun 1997, 13) worked to bring Nlaka’pamux territories within a colonial system of property rights. As it had centuries earlier in Britain, the introduction of the concept of ‘private property’ marked a foundational transformation in communal relations, both at the social and socio-ecological levels. Both by its own nature, and its application by colonial authorities, the concept provided the basis for a profound disruption of existing systems of land use and resource management (Harris 2002, 18). Land surveys and complementary legislation enabled settlers to
preempt (i.e. seize) large areas of land for agriculture and record water rights, and also unilaterally stake mineral claims, all in the name of the Queen of England. By alienating communities from their resource base, these de- and re-territorializing processes significantly impacted Nlaka’pamux land use practices.

At a state level, the enactment of a land management regime in the colony of British Columbia encountered two problems. The first was the Indian “Land Question”—whether or not the Crown’s sovereignty over territorialized lands was burdened by existing Indigenous claims of rights and title. The second problem was more straightforward, but would remain unresolved for the next two decades, as government officials debated about what to do with the resident peoples of these territories (Harris 2002). Sir James Douglas had set a precedent in 1850, in his role as Chief Factor of the Hudson’s Bay Company and later as Governor of the Colony of Vancouver Island, by negotiating fourteen land-agreements with Indigenous Nations on Vancouver Island. These agreements, however, formed less than three percent of the land-base. Except for one treaty in northeastern British Columbia, no further treaties were negotiated (Ibid.).

On Douglas’ retirement in 1864, Land Commissioner Joseph Trutch assumed authority for facilitating the expeditious settlement of the mainland colony. Trutch’s colonial policies reflected his view of Indigenous people as a primitive, savage, inferior race, with no capacity for advancement and no inherent right to the land (Furniss 1999). The best agricultural lands in the Interior were quickly seized after Trutch amended the Land Ordinance in 1866 to allow settlers to preempt 320 acres of ‘unoccupied’ land. This

---

7 Although it remains unclear precisely what was understood or promised in negotiating these agreements, the “Douglas Treaties” clearly demonstrate early colonial recognition of Aboriginal title. The treaty process initiated by Douglas was discontinued when the Colonial Office in London refused to provide the funds necessary to negotiate treaties with peoples on the mainland (Harris 2002).
same amendment made it impossible for Indigenous people to preempt land without special written permission from the governor. Trutch laid out the Stryen Reserve at the mouth of the Stein River in July 1870 following roughly a series of reserve designations that the early Royal Engineers had laid out in the 1860s (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988, 69). Local Nlaka’pamux people cleared the land of rocks and established gardens (mainly crops of potatoes, hay, and beans), but perpetual water shortage would plague their agricultural initiatives for years (Ibid.).

In addition to dealing with new sets of colonial rules and regulations, the Nlaka’pamux dealt with Christian missionization. Reverend John Butler Good arrived in Lytton in June 1864 and proceeded to serve as the Anglican missionary to the Nlaka’pamux for the next sixteen years. According to a population count in 1867, there were four hundred and fifty Nlaka’pamux Christian baptisms; within three short years two thousand Nlaka’pamux were followers of Good (Christophers 1999, 99). From all sides, this was a period of intense cultural collision and change.

2.4 Confederation and cross-continental connection

The terms of Confederation in 1871 promised British Columbia a transcontinental rail line connecting the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean. Its construction in the 1880s generated a major economic and population boom along the Fraser and Thompson Rivers, as thousands of foreign engineers and labourers brought to the region required housing and food. (Many of the foreign workers were Chinese from mainland China.)

---

8 Relationships with Christian missionaries varied. As missionary to the Nlaka’pamux peoples at Lytton, Anglican missionary J.B. Good also acted as an advocate and mediator in their dealings with the colonial authorities (although it is uncertain whether his involvement had the desired effect). For a detailed discussion of Good’s mission in Lytton, see Positioning the Missionary (Christophers 1999).
Confederation also initiated talks that led to the federal Indian Act of 1876, which imposed extreme restrictions on Indigenous people and gave government officials expansive authority over every aspect of their lives.

As Indigenous people faced the reality of living as wards of the government on small reserves, they rose in protest. Lytton became a major site of protest activity. In the summer of 1878, Indian Reserve Commissioner Gilbert Sproat arrived in the town to find “five hundred and ninety people of the Lytton band [complaining they] had been allocated two reserves of just twelve and fourteen acres” (Christophers 1999, 45). Sproat noted the exclusion of local Nlaka’pamux village sites and the lack of water (Harris 2002). He tried to improve these conditions by surveying new reserves with a tolerable water supply in Lytton. His superiors, however, rejected most of his recommendations and appointed Peter O’Reilly (Trutch’s brother in law) to be the final judge of the matter.

When O’Reilly arrived in Lytton in 1881 he too was confronted by Indigenous peoples complaining about small reserves with rocky, unproductive land and no water. But he, like the majority of settler-Canadians, was unsympathetic. James Teit was one of

---

9 Gilbert Malcolm Sproat served as a reserve commissioner in the 1870s, and, in this capacity, became a critic of the methods and policies employed in surveying reserves in B.C. Sproat tried, to no avail, to attain some measure of justice for the Indigenous communities he encountered (Christophers 1999).

10 Around Lytton the first reserves were either set-aside by Captain Henry M. Ball in 1862 or possibly earlier when the Royal Engineers surveyed the town site in 1860 (Christophers 1999). Ball, the assistant land commissioner at Lytton, was instructed by Douglas in 1859 to reserve Indigenous village sites and lands around them. Instead, in December 1860 Ball himself purchased a swath of agricultural land and recorded water rights north of No.ho.mēēn creek (Sproat’s spelling, Harris 2002, 141). Several preemptions were also made south of No.ho.mēēn creek, so the only land available for reserves around Lytton was a rocky boulder field unsuitable for agriculture, sandwiched between these preemptions (Ibid.).

11 In 1879 one thousand Nlaka’pamux attended a meeting held in Lytton. Initiated by a ceremonial display including a cannon and twelve shot salute, Nlaka’pamux representatives proposed a structure of local government to colonial officials. The proposed government would include an elected chief who would preside over a council made up of thirteen councillors (who would serve three year terms), the hereditary tribal chiefs (not to be replaced when they died), and the Queen’s Indian Agent. The council would have the authority to tax, punish, and make rules and regulations about school, medicine, fishing, hunting, subdivision of reserve land, maintenance of public order, and matters of personal conduct; potlatching, gambling, and drunkenness were banned (Harris 2002, 157; Christophers 1999, 149).
the few settlers to challenge the reserve process. His writings at the turn-of-the-century made clear that the Nlaka’pamux never agreed to the reserve system. Teit stressed that because title to the land had never been officially ceded, the area was entirely Nlaka’pamux land (Wickwire 1991; Christophers 1999). Thus, in the superimposed geopolitical space of British Columbia, questions of Indigenous rights and title would continue to impede the Canadian government’s claims of sovereignty (Harris 2002).

For Indigenous Nations, the transformation of the physical and social geography of the province had wide-ranging impacts. Throughout the province, communities faced settler-encroachment on their territories, “…loss of access to resources, economic marginalization, and institutionalized racism” (Galois 1992, 1; Wickwire 1998). Tension over land in B.C. exploded in the pre-World War I years. In 1881 Indigenous people comprised a slight majority of the provincial population. After the completion of the CPR railway in 1886, however, settlers arrived by the thousands every month. By 1911, Indigenous people represented less than five percent of the population (Galois 1992, 2).

The Indian Act had further entrenched their situation in 1894 by empowering Indian agents to remove all school-age children from their homes and forcibly send them to residential school, thus stripping reserves of their children over the age of six (Furniss 1999, 43). Indigenous chiefs were quick to respond to the oppressive conditions they faced (Galois 1992; Wickwire 1998). By 1909, they had organized themselves into three

---

12 St. George’s Anglican residential school opened as an Indian boys’ industrial school in Lytton in 1902. Girls attended the Anglican All Hallows School for Girls in Yale until it closed in 1917 at which point they were moved to St. Georges (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988; Anglican Church of Canada 2008).
major political bodies: the Interior Tribes of British Columbia (ITBC), the Indian Rights Association (IRA), and the Nisga’a Land Committee (Galois 1992).\footnote{The ITBC emerged in 1909 out of a gathering of Nlaka’pamux, Secwepemc, and Okanagan chiefs in Spences Bridge. Teit served as the secretary of the ITBC until his death in 1922. The IRA evolved from an earlier loose coalition of Lower Mainland, Northern Coastal, and Vancouver Island groups working to have the issue of Aboriginal title heard in provincial court. The Nisga’a Land Committee was formed in 1907, comprised of members of the Nisga’a Nation (Galois 1992; Wickwire 1998).}

In an attempt to resolve the persistent federal-provincial impasse over how to resolve the “Indian issue,” Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier visited B.C. in August 1910. A delegation of Nlaka’pamux, Secwepemc, and Okanagan chiefs intercepted him at Kamloops and presented him with a “Declaration” as well as a “Memorial.” Laurier was sympathetic to the delegation’s plight. Unfortunately, however, before he could act on his concerns, Laurier called an election and lost. Robert Borden’s Conservative Government now held the power and Borden had no interest in the Indigenous land issue. (Galois 1992).

\textit{McKenna-McBride Commission}

A deputation of Interior chiefs, accompanied by Teit, travelled to Ottawa in 1912 to meet with Prime Minister Borden. With pressure from Premier Richard McBride, Borden agreed to appoint long-time Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) employee J.A.J. McKenna to investigate the situation facing Indigenous communities across B.C. (Galois 1992). The result was the 1912 McKenna-McBride Agreement, a joint federal-provincial Royal Commission on Indian Affairs delegated to hold public hearings with Indigenous communities across B.C. to consider the size, number, and location of reserves. The

\footnote{These documents presented the history of colonialism from the chiefs’ perspective (Wickwire 1998).}
Indigenous leaders looked on the Commission as a complete failure because of its refusal to address the question of Indigenous rights and title (Ibid.).

The commissioners arrived in Lytton on November 14, 1914 and heard testimony from several representatives from the surrounding communities. Sub-Chief Fred Leelah highlighted the inequities that came with the arrival of “the Whites:”

Years ago the Indians lived there. Indians were born here, and have lived on that Reserve till the white men came, and now things have been changed. The whites went around taking up lands, and taking up water, and the Indians were poor, and had to take what was left on the edge of the river. In the later years, one of the officials, I think he was a Government Agent, came along and said that they would mark off lands and give the Indian Reserves. He then marked off an Indian Reserve, and told the Indians that they were to put in crops, and that they would have men to show them how to grow things, and this was done on Queen Victoria’s Birthday, when the Reserves was given to the Indians. Since the Indians have been given Reserves, we have worked our lands, and work at them every year. We were given Reserves—very large Reserves in some parts—but there was very little of that land that was fit for cultivation. The rest was rocky, and sidehills. Then, we have other Reserves where the land is very good, but we haven’t any water with which to irrigate them. The Indians are not lazy. We are willing to work, and we would work these lands, provided we have water on them. (Our Homes are Bleeding 2013)

As political scientist Paul Tennant explains, “the decade commencing in 1916 [was] a fateful one for the Indian land question and for Indian political activity” (1990, 96). In the spring of 1916 before the commission concluded its provincial tour, a group representing the ITBC and the Nisga’a spent six weeks in Ottawa lobbying the federal government regarding the McKenna-McBride Commission and its obvious limitations.15

Strategic differences emerged between the IRA, ITBC, and the Nisga’a on how best to confront the commission’s work. To address these varying approaches, a June conference was held in Vancouver, from which emerged the Allied Tribes of B.C. (ATBC). The

---

15 This delegation asked the federal government to delay the implementation of the Royal Commission’s final report until the Nisga’a Petition had been “decided by the Judicial Committee” (Galois 1992, 22). According to Galois, “this represented a clear rejection of the various orders-in-council pertaining to the Royal Commission and the conditions for any judicial decision” (Ibid.).
ATBC was comprised of all the Indigenous communities in B.C. who opposed the work of the commission, with the explicit goal of having the question of Aboriginal title heard in court (Galois 1992; Wickwire 1998).

When the McKenna-McBride Commission completed its final report in June 1916 it offered little to Chief Leelah and the Stein Village chiefs beyond a provision that their lands would not be seized without band consent. For various political reasons, the changes to reserve boundaries were delayed. In 1919, Premier John Oliver asked the Allied Tribes for its views on the commission’s report. In response, the ATBC held a general assembly at Spences Bridge in June 1919 and there authorized a committee to prepare a statement summarizing its members’ views. This statement included a comprehensive claim to Aboriginal title and a detailed rejection of the report. Despite extensive criticism, Bill 13 (the provincial bill implementing the McKenna-McBride report recommendations) was signed into law on Dominion Day 1920, as the British Columbia Indian Lands Settlement Act (Tennant 1990).

The Allied Tribes continued to lobby the federal government into the 1920s to strike a special committee to hear Aboriginal claims before the Judicial Committee (the highest court to which Indigenous people could appeal), but federal officials were determined to prevent their case from entering the court system (Furniss 1999). In 1927, when their claims were finally heard by a joint Senate-House of Commons Committee, they were rejected as “irrelevant issues” (Ibid., 41). Further, it suppressed Indigenous protest by making it illegal for any individual to raise money or accept fees for any land claims activity. This law made it essentially impossible for Indigenous Nations to pursue a legal ruling on the issue of Aboriginal title until it was lifted in 1951 (Furniss 1999).
Conclusion

Within this period of rapid and violent change, the settler state imposed a new geography on the Nlaka'pamux, “both on the ground and in the imagination” (Harris 2002, xvii). Despite the web of oppressive legislation and coercive government policies designed to repress Indigenous freedoms and political activity, the colonial regime was not complete. Throughout this period of “resettlement,” concerted actions taken by the Indigenous protest movement occurred alongside a “…virtually constant micropolitics of resistance: moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties” (Harris 2004, 179). Yet, however widespread and organized, this resistance could not contain the “juggernaut of colonial powers” facing Indigenous people in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Ibid.).

As an economy based on natural resource extraction and export enveloped the province, co-management practices were increasingly dictated by a centralized resource management regime, whereby natural resources (land) were exploited by human practices (labour) to support perpetual economic growth. By imposing land-use, spiritual, and cultural practices intended to assimilate Indigenous communities into settler society, processes of dispossession, and de- and re-territorialization, reconfigured the human-land relations that characterized sustenance co-management. Through this process—involving the production of geological surveys, the introduction of agricultural practices, the demarcation of the Indian Reserve system, the establishment of a capitalist economy, the disruption of Indigenous modes of governance, and the enforcement of a myriad of racist legislative policies that made it difficult, if not illegal, for Indigenous communities to continue to carry out cultural and subsistence practices—the colonial state both asserted,
and instantiated, its authority, producing a vastly different socio-ecological landscape in B.C. The systematic imposition of particular co-management practices in the Stein Valley region and across B.C. was an integral part of constructing, asserting, and solidifying this juggernaut of colonial power.
Chapter 3: The industrial eye turns towards the Stein

3.0 Colonial-industrial co-management

The implementation of a settler state in present day-British Columbia required that a London-based colonial government bring the ‘wild and uninhabited’ landscape under British control. As an integral part of colonial state formation, both incoming settlers and Indigenous peoples were drawn into the developing capitalist economy (Harris 2002). In imposing an extractivist regime of land and resource management across B.C.’s vast geography, the colonial (later provincial and federal) government ordered the landscape according to the needs of settler society. The logics and materialities of these two systems of power—capitalism and colonialism—require their own analyses to fully understand the ways they functioned within specific temporal-spatial contexts. For the purposes of this thesis, I will highlight the ways in which these two systems worked together to produce colonial space in the Stein Valley region—a process I describe as colonial-industrial co-management.

In this chapter, I describe the process by which a capitalist economic regime materialized in the Stein Valley region, imposing the land use practices associated with colonial-industrial co-management. This discussion will establish the historical juncture in which, beginning in the 1970s, environmental activists, Indigenous communities, logging companies, and government bureaucracies would collide in response to proposed logging in the Stein Valley. I then describe the ways in which the development of a
campaign to protect the Stein from industrial logging challenged, and disrupted, colonial-industrial co-management in the region.

3.1 A portrait of a regional economy

Beginning with the Fraser River gold rush in 1858, an economic cycle based on resource extraction and export began to emerge in the region around the Stein Valley. This pattern of natural resource use became more entrenched in the 1910s and 20s, prompted by the discovery of the arable benchlands adjacent to the mouth of the Stein River. The process began in the 1860s, as mentioned, when Thomas Earl and Henry Ball pre-empted large swaths of land for farming. With two rail lines connecting the region to both coasts, it emerged as a potentially rich commercial zone. When a wealthy Vancouver-based businessman, R.V. Winch, purchased Thomas Earl’s large property (“Earlscourt”) in 1912, he took this process a step further. With an endless water supply from the Stein’s tributary, Stryen Creek, and a rail line at his doorstep, Winch knew he had what was needed to establish a commercially successful apple orchard (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988). Winch’s son-in-law, Colonel Victor Spencer took over the farm in the 1920s with hopes of using it to supply his family’s expanding department stores in Vancouver and Victoria. He added cattle production to the apple business. These commercial ventures required a large labour force which Winch and Spencer knew was available in the local Indigenous communities. Both men and women in the communities adjacent to Earlscourt Farm worked on the farm’s irrigation systems and canning operations, while also performing garden and lawn, swimming pool, and tennis court maintenance. Local women also worked as domestics.
The upper reaches of the Stein also became sites of commercial venture as prospectors and others surveyed it for minerals and furs. Placer mining and dredging operations had been in operation along the banks of the Fraser near the Stein from the 1860s onwards. By the 1920s, Nlaka’pamux prospector, Jimmie Johnson, found a gold deposit in the upper reaches of Stryen Creek. It became the Lytton Gold Mine, and operated for two years (Freeman and Thompson 1979). In 1927, Urban Easter Hicks, a local trapper, prospected for minerals and discovered silver in the alpine meadows of Cottonwood Creek. Silver Queen Mine was in operation until 1930 (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988). Commercial fur-trappers (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous) established traplines all through the Stein in the 1920s until the fur market crashed in 1938 (Ibid., 117).

The growing provincial transportation network facilitated these economic initiatives. Built in the 1860s, the Cariboo Road ran right through Lytton, spawning horse-packing, stage coach travel, and hotels along its main street. The Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and Canadian National Railway (CNR), opened in 1886 and 1913, respectively, increased economic opportunities by quickening the rate of shipments of people and products to all points east and west. (R. V. Winch negotiated an independent CPR spur to connect his westside EarlsCourt apples to the main CPR line.)

Improvements to the old Cariboo Road in 1927 allowed for automobile travel through Lytton (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988). With the opening of the Fraser Canyon highway to automobile travel in 1964, the Stein Valley was suddenly vulnerable to big business interests. Agriculture was still prominent in the region, but more expansive ranches and alfalfa fields replaced many small acreages and orchards. These farming
operations were less labour-intensive, thus requiring fewer workers while also competing with small family-owned farms that were challenged to stay afloat. With industrialization, the local economy became increasingly controlled by outside interests (Ibid., 121).

The growth of industrial forestry

The timber potential of the Stein Valley was first assessed in the 1920s, but due to the high costs of road access into the valley, logging was not considered economically viable. The post-World War II economic boom, however, had set a new era of industrial growth in motion. The Social Credit Government, elected in 1952 under Premier W.A.C. Bennett, resolved to develop the province’s forests, rivers, and mineral resources (Wilson 1998). The expansion and development of B.C’s forest industry drew many rural communities and towns into an economy based on resource extraction and dictated by global flows of supply and demand. Annual timber production in the province increased from 22 million cubic metres in 1950 to 54.7 million cubic metres by 1970; provincial pulp production increased more than eightfold over this same period.

As the industry expanded and easy-to-access timber stands along the coast dwindled, forestry operators began to move into the Interior Plateau and the more remote valleys of southern B.C. Technological improvements in logging and milling technology increased the productivity of large companies that possessed the capital to invest in new equipment. These innovations, combined with provincial land management policies, squeezed many small bush mills out of operation and resulted in the concentration of Interior timber rights in the hands of a few large companies (Furniss 1999; M’Gonigle
and Wickwire 1988). With the rise in provincial economic dependency upon forestry, community livelihoods became tightly coupled with the logging industry in many regions around the province.

By 1961, twenty-two lumber mills were in operation in the Lillooet-region north of Lytton. Up until the 1960s, mills in the area had been small-scale owner-operator businesses, supplying lumber for local markets. Spatsum Lumber (later Lytton Lumber) opened in Lytton in 1964. Employing twenty-five people, it soon became the town’s primary employer. With the industry focus shifting from coastal forests to the Interior, the character of forestry in this region began to change. South of Lytton in Boston Bar, British Columbia Forest Products (BCFP) bought out the Hampton Mill in 1975 and quickly increased its output by twenty five percent (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988). In the region around the Stein Valley (including Lytton and Lillooet), about one quarter of employment was forestry-related (Government of British Columbia 1980).

Increasingly, logging roads dissected the major watersheds that bordered the Stein Valley. Despite being deemed uneconomical in the 1920s, fuelled by a now-industrialized forest industry, the Stein’s timber stands became more appealing. In their 1972 logging feasibility study, the Forest Service concluded that logging in the Stein would, in fact, be profitable (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988).

3.2 The emergence of B.C.’s environmental movement

By the mid 1970s, public concern regarding the visible aftermath of resource development upon the landscape was growing in some parts of the province (Clayton

---

Backcountry recreation began to spark the interest of people wanting to see and experience landscapes free from visible industrial development or human incursion before it was too late. Hikers who traversed the old trails through the Stein and elsewhere worried about the impending loss of such ‘pristine’ or ‘untouched’ wilderness landscapes. These factors, along with growing concerns about air and water pollution and the loss of environmental ‘amenities’, combined to promote the rise of a new social movement dedicated to environmental values.

Although most of the early advocates for environmental control were based in urban centres, such as Vancouver and Victoria, some also came from the more rural and outlying areas. Members of ‘back-to-the-land’ communities scattered throughout southwestern B.C. were particularly active and vocal on the subject of environmental degradation. Initially focused on the ecological and social devastation wrought by large-scale hydroelectric projects in the province (specifically, projects on the Peace and Columbia watersheds), environmentalists drew attention to the scars left by clear-cut logging practices and began advocating for the preservation of old growth forests. Forest and wilderness issues became the major locus of environmentalists’ energy, and would remain so for the next decade (Wilson 1998).

In the late 1960s, a small cohort of backcountry enthusiasts began advocating for the preservation and protection of the Stein Valley’s high alpine peaks, glaciers, lakes,

Within the growing environmental movement in southwestern B.C. in the 1960s and 70s, historian Jenny Clayton notes, wilderness was envisioned as a “…place where humans were visitors not residents, where evidence of industrial activities and machines was removed, and where recreationists could enjoy solitary contemplation of areas shaped by nature alone” (2011, 97). This conception of “pristine wilderness,” although fairly ubiquitous, is not itself unproblematic. It has been critiqued as a concept that “…appeals to urban populations, employs a neocolonial representation of First Nations people and the natures within which they are situated, and finds authority and legitimacy in ecosystem discourse” (Rossiter 2004, 142). For an in-depth discussion of the ways in which dominant western conceptions of nature perpetuate patriarchal and colonial tropes, see the work of eco-philosopher, Val Plumwood (2001)
diversity of wildlife, assortment of rare plants, and expansive ridgelines. One member of this group, Chris Adam—the only landholder in the Stein—was particularly vocal. Concerned that the province was considering logging options in the Stein, Adam approached the B.C. Wildlife Federation in 1968, and later, the B.C. Mountaineering Club, to mount a lobby against logging in the Stein Valley.

Roy Mason of the B.C. Mountaineering Club responded to Adam’s appeal. In December 1973, he submitted a private brief to the newly elected NDP government led by Premier Dave Barrett on behalf of the B.C. Mountaineering Club, endorsed by the B.C. Wildlife Federation, asking that the watershed be set aside for recreation and conservation (Freeman and Thompson 1979). “There is only one major valley within 100 miles of Vancouver that has not been logged, flooded, or both. Only one,” wrote Mason, “It is the valley of the Stein River. It’s just that simple” (Mason 1973 as cited by M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988, 124).

Mason’s brief, along with a recommendation from the regional Fish & Wildlife officer to research options for preserving the Stein, prompted Dave Barrett’s NDP government to announce a two-year moratorium on logging. Barrett assembled a Stein Basin Moratorium Committee, comprised of representatives from the provincial Forest Service, Parks Branch, and Fish & Wildlife Branch, to undertake a comprehensive ecological study of the valley (Wilson 1998). Distrusting the government process, the Federation of Mountain Clubs of B.C. simultaneously undertook its own environmental investigation.

---

3 Chris Adam’s twenty-five acre private plot is located approximately ten kilometres west of the first cable crossing in the lower Stein Valley (Urquhart 2010). According to Lytton-resident Ross Urquhart, a religious group first staked out this piece of land in the early twentieth century. The group applied for a land grant and established several semi-permanent structures, but abandoned the valley after their first winter. Many years later, Chris Adam stumbled across the corner pins and applied for the land title. Adam built a cabin and lived with his family in the Stein for one winter but rarely uses the cabin or property (Ibid.).
survey. In 1975, they submitted a comprehensive two-volume study of the Stein’s ecology to the provincial government (Thompson 1975; Freeman and Thompson 1979).

### 3.3 Shifting political actors

With the defeat of Dave Barrett’s NDP government in December 1975, any gains the Stein issue appeared to have made within bureaucratic circles disappeared. Led by Premier Bill Bennett, the reinstated Social Credit Government set about implementing “integrated resource management policies” throughout the province (Wilson 1998, 149). When the NDP’s Stein development moratorium expired in February 1976, Minister of Forests Tom Waterland (who represented the riding in which the Stein Valley was located) announced that the Stein Valley would be managed for logging. As part of an “ecosystem management” plan, he explained, the valley would be ‘managed’ to optimize its economic value (Ibid.). Environmental concerns would be considered only when they did not negatively affect potential economic interests (M’Gonigle 1998a).

With this move, the Stein was drawn into the rhetoric of resource management: a site of “timber potential,” “annual allowable cuts,” and “logging tenures.” Seven months later, the Stein Basin Moratorium Committee released its report to the public. Although the bulk of the report offered little in the way of environmental recommendations it concluded that, based on 1975 market prices and the projected costs of constructing either a bridge or an upgraded ferry to transport felled logs out of the valley and across the Fraser, logging in the Stein Valley was not economically feasible (Wilson 1998).⁴

---
⁴ Overall, the Stein Basin Moratorium Committee’s report recommended that the entire valley, except the headwaters of the Stein River and Cottonwood Creek, be developed under an “intensive planned forest folio system.” The report stipulated that the headwaters be given special protection. It also concluded that existing data on the Stein Valley was lacking or inadequate in many areas (Freeman and Thompson 1979).
Reaction to the delayed report was immediate. A group of B.C. environmental and recreational organizations met and together founded the Save the Stein Coalition on March 11, 1977. Chaired by Lytton-resident Ross Urquhart, the coalition attracted more than forty-five thousand members within two years (Freeman and Thompson 1979). Against this backdrop, the Forest Service mobilized its case: that access to the Stein was so difficult only a recreational elite of fit hikers and climbers would use the valley; that logging would cover only nine percent of the entire area (the valley bottom and side slopes); that prime high country zones (which were devoid of commercial timber) would be ‘set aside’ for recreation; and, that too many jobs would be lost were the area to be preserved (Ibid.). Through public newsletters, letters to political representatives, and participation in government meetings, coalition members worked to refute the pro-logging arguments posed by the Forest Service.

Responding to persistent pressure from the Stein Coalition, in the spring of 1978 Forests Minister Tom Waterland announced the creation of a Stein River Public Liaison Committee, and invited interested members of the coalition to participate. With the hope that this invitation signalled more open planning and decision-making, many coalition-members agreed to support the process. From the beginning, however, the committee’s work was constrained by its limited Terms of Reference. Based on the premise that logging in the valley would go ahead regardless of public input, the Ministry of Forests reserved all real decision-making power for government officials (M’Gonigle and

---

5 The Save the Stein Coalition was made up of the following member organizations: B.C. Horse Owner’s Association; B.C. Wildlife Federation; Canoe Sport British Columbia; Citizen’s Association for Predator Conservation; Federation of Mountain Clubs of B.C.; Four Wheel Drive Association of B.C.; Golden Rods and Reels; International Wildlife Protection Association; People for the Stein (Lytton); River Outfitters’ Association of B.C.; Save Our Parkland Association; Shuswap-Thompson River Research and Development Association; Sierra Club of Western Canada; Society for Pollution and Environmental Control; and the Steelhead Society of B.C. (Freeman and Thompson 1979).
Wickwire 1988). Nevertheless, participation in this government process established the context from which more direct, participatory strategies of environmental activism emerged to resist state power.

Despite the Stein Coalition’s broad membership, the Stein Valley was still fairly unknown around the province. Neither was it the focus of the local community where, on the one hand, its economy was based on logging and, on the other hand, ‘traditional’ uses of the Stein had declined since earlier decades. Concerned about the Stein’s lack of public presence, coalition members David Thompson and Roger Freeman undertook two years of research to compile the first-ever hiking guide for the Stein Valley, *Exploring the Stein River Valley* (1979). More than hiking trails, the guide also addressed the valley’s ecology and history. In the concluding paragraphs of this book, Thompson and Freeman urged readers to “…go and see the Stein for themselves. Then, each person should ask the question, ‘What is this worth, to me and to those who come after me?’” (Ibid., 156). Helping to bring the issue to the attention of a wider public, this book became an important tool in Stein advocates’ artillery.

The 1970s logging opposition focused on convincing the provincial government that the Stein Valley was more valuable in its intact state than as a timber source. While the future of the Stein was still unclear, by the end of the decade, this early opposition had achieved some key victories for the Stein movement. Their actions delayed logging by prompting a moratorium from the NDP government and signalled to both government and industry that logging in the Stein would not go ahead unimpeded. In order to challenge the entrenched regional culture around forestry, in which forests were largely
perceived as resource areas, Stein supporters turned their attention to bringing the Stein Valley into the public domain.

3.4 A campaign to protect the Stein develops

Throughout the 1980s, the small contingent of Stein lobbyists coalesced as a collaborative grassroots movement (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988). “Preservation” became the explicit goal of Stein supporters and, as M’Gonigle and Wickwire explain, the task at hand was now to justify and build support for this uncompromising stance (Ibid., 132). The authority and stability of colonial-industrial co-management was situated both in a government-backed industry and, as I emphasize throughout the next sections, a region dependent on the ‘health’ of the logging industry. In order to transform human-land relations in the Stein Valley region, the Stein movement would confront both over the next decade.

Signalling a shift in the Stein campaign’s focus, the frustrations of the government’s Stein River Public Liaison Committee reached a tipping point in 1982. When the Regional Forest Service Manager unilaterally announced that a logging road would be built through the lower valley—the route most adamantly opposed by the coalition—disenchanted coalition members withdrew from the process (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988).^6

^6 After the Stein River Public Liaison Committee disintegrated, the BC Forest Service reconstituted a Public Advisory Committee. This committee began compiling a catalogue of the Stein’s natural environment and resources. Three former members of the Public Liaison Committee reluctantly agreed to join the Public Advisory Committee. But similar to the Public Liaison Committee, the process was limited in scope and influence. Two years and many meetings later, the Public Advisory Committee completed a Stein River Resource Folio Plan (Wilson 1998).
It was at this point that Wendy Wickwire and Michael M’Gonigle (my thesis supervisors) entered the scene. They moved to Lytton in 1982 and created a new organization, Living Alternatives, to take local community members, especially youth, high into the Stein backcountry. While this activity would challenge the government’s claim that no one was ‘using’ the valley, above all, it helped build local knowledge of, and appreciation for, the valley’s unique values.

Throughout the decade that followed, a coalition of key actors—environmental activists, local back-to-the-landers and activists, Indigenous leaders and communities—emerged in many of B.C.’s anti-logging campaigns. These actors, and their associated ideologies, collided—often productively, but not without tensions of their own—for example, in Haida Gwaii (Dean 2009), Clayoquot Sound (Braun 1997; Braun 2002), and the West Kootenays (Clayton 2011). The anti-industrial, anti-governmental, and environmental values driving the back-to-the-land movement found some ideological resonance with essentialised notions of Indigenous people as the original environmental stewards (Braun 2002). With the involvement and leadership of local Indigenous communities asserting ongoing rights and authority over their territories, conflicts that initially stemmed from environmentalists’ concerns with preserving wilderness areas and old growth forests, at least on paper, took on an explicit stance in support of Indigenous rights.

---

7 Wickwire and M’Gonigle established Living Alternatives through grants from the Vancouver and Bronfman Foundations (M’Gonigle, pers. comm., 2013). Grants from the Bronfman and Vancouver Foundations also funded the hiking program run by Living Alternatives. As reported in the Bridge-River Lillooet News, thirty participants took part in the “Stein Valley Wilderness Program in 1983,” its first summer of operation. The Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations co-sponsored these trips (Living Alternatives 1983; M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988).
While the ‘alternatives movement’ gaining force in B.C. throughout the 1970s failed to achieve its objective of fostering a broad, community-based, socio-ecological transition away from the dominant industrial paradigm driving capitalist resource extraction, some specific victories were achieved, especially in the creation of community forest tenures in some parts of the province. As well, anti-colonial movements led by Indigenous communities would continue to challenge, and disrupt, the ongoing colonial-industrial relations that shape contemporary environmental politics in B.C., in particular through the assertion of land title claims.

Such alliances emerged early in defense of the Stein Valley. In addition to Living Alternatives, M’Gonigle and Wickwire established a non-profit research institute in Vancouver, the Institute for New Economics (INE), to develop alternative economic initiatives for rural communities (like Lytton) that would provide long-term benefits and economic stability based on local control and economic diversification (Wilson 1998). Meanwhile, groups such as the Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WC2) worked to facilitate enhanced public access to wilderness areas (including the Stein) by building hiking trails and bridges. Through these and other initiatives, the environmental resistance that had hitherto been based in the urban, largely middle class world of Vancouver hikers and behind the closed doors of the Ministry of Forests bureaucracy began to come to the communities around the Stein Valley.

*Reporting nature/the nature of reports*

Economics lay at the centre of the Stein logging debate throughout the 1980s, yet translating the biophysical features of the Stein Valley—its forested slopes, narrow river
valley, and proximity to the Fraser River—into neatly displayed economic reports was not a straightforward process. Such single-value analyses are, however, a key part of the larger hegemonic discursive project of modernity, through which monetary valuation displaces ‘illegitimate’ or ‘anecdotal’ knowledge (Mitchell 2002). The many iterations of these analyses discursively represented, and produced, vastly different physical and economic landscapes. These analyses concealed the human agency involved in processes of economic valuation, as well as the complex networks of knowledge and power in which these calculations inevitably occurred. Such studies are undertaken by an economic ‘expert’ and thus are purported to be ‘facts’ while, concurrently, they make invisible all the ultimately unquantifiable (and non-economic) values that are constitutive of socio-ecological values and communal meanings.

In response to the Bennett government’s stated plans to manage the Stein for logging, Trevor Jones, a member of the Federation of Mountain Clubs of B.C., released the first in a series of dedicated economic studies in 1983. Jones concluded that due to steep slopes, inaccessibility, and diseased wood, logging in the Stein would require taxpayer subsidies of several million dollars. In addition, his report stated that building a bridge over the Fraser to transport felled logs to the sawmill in Boston Bar was not economically feasible without massive governmental support (Jones 1983). Meanwhile, the INE produced a parallel report that considered how new forms of community development were possible with similar levels of support (INE 1985). Several conflicting economic analyses followed in the wake of Jones’ damning report, presenting government decision-makers and public spectators with an array of contradictory
information in support of both pro- and anti-logging arguments (Taylor 1984; Government of British Columbia 1986; Jones 1987).

Despite public objections and conflicting economic assessments, BCFP moved forward with its logging plans. In February 1985, Minister of Forests Waterland publicly confirmed Cabinet’s earlier decision to undertake forestry operations in the Stein Valley (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988). BCFP representatives visited Earls court Farm to survey a planned logging road through part of the property near the mouth of the Stein River. With legal assistance from M’Gonigle, the proprietors of Earls court, the Mundall family, began preparing to go to court to block the proposed logging right-of-way (Mundall, pers. comm., 2013).

On March 21, 1985 at a town hall meeting sponsored by the Lytton Chamber of Commerce, BCFP presented Stein logging plans. Some people in attendance were shocked to learn of such plans for the first time and adamantly opposed any resource development in the valley (Lightfoot, pers. comm., 2013). The previous chief and council of the Lytton First Nation had supported Living Alternatives earlier hiking program, and now the newly elected Chief Ruby Dunstan addressed the roomful of people and described the centrality of the Stein Valley to Nlaka’pamux culture and the irreversible effects logging would have on the Nlaka’pamux people (Dunstan, pers. comm., 2013).

Decades earlier, Chief Dunstan’s own father, Andrew Johnny, had spent many winters trapping in the Stein (M’Gonigle and Wickwire, 1988) and her father-in-law, Raymond Dunstan, had trapped there between 1935 and 1942 (Freeman and Thompson 1979, 21). Nevertheless, Chief Dunstan’s anti-logging stance was controversial, as a
significant number of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in the area were employed by the local forest company, Lytton Lumber (Dunstan, pers. comm., 2013).

Lytton band member Raymond Phillips elaborated: “Probably 80 percent of the employees at Lytton Lumber were Aboriginal and local from Lytton, and a lot of families depended on [the sawmill]. Most people were so strongly for or against logging, but it was mostly about economics and the push for jobs. All the businesses need it and everybody’s life depended on it. There was a lot of that propaganda going around at the time” (pers. comm., 2013). According to the dominant narrative, the forests of the Stein Valley were a resource, a ‘working’ landscape, upon which community livelihoods depended (Parfitt 1989).

The position of the forest industry in the regional economy compelled particular land use practices and relations in much of south-central B.C., while forest ecosystems themselves were transformed by human labour. Forged through entangled processes of labour, knowledge, dependency, and responsibility, the labour-based human-land relations at play worked to legitimate state-industry power and authority across the province. In the Stein Valley region, as Ross Urquhart, Lytton-resident and former chair of the Save the Stein Coalition, explained, “we were totally imbued with the logging culture” (pers. comm., 2014). Throughout the Stein campaign, Urquhart remarked, Stein supporters constantly confronted the power of the regional logging industry. In doing so, he said, “…we proved the economics were bad, we proved the science was bad, we proved the history was bad, we proved, you know, from fisheries to the cost of the trees

---

8 This analysis draws on Jake Kosek’s careful study of human-land relationships in northern New Mexico (2006). In New Mexico, Kosek writes, “the forest industry radically transformed the region’s landscape and people” by bringing “people into contact with the forests in a complex way” (Ibid., 16, 18).
to the cost of the road—to everything—it was a bad deal” (Ibid.). But, Urquhart emphasized,

you can bring in science and come up with one hundred percent solid arguments—they’ll log it anyway, just because we’ve got this cultural thing about logging. We were so committed to logging, whether it made any sense or not. [The Province] was backed against a wall. They couldn’t say no to the logging companies. They were too powerful. They’d start screaming ‘we’ll lay off workers.’ It was just, the culture was such that the companies were all-powerful; B.C.’s number one industry. To go head-to-head with that—it didn’t matter. There was no rational argument that would make sense. It’s irrational, ‘don’t mess with loggers.’ That [culture] went on for so long” (Urquhart, pers. comm., 2014).

How to challenge an “all-powerful” industry and transform a regional culture, in which one in four people were employed within forestry (Government of British Columbia 1980)? This task would ultimately underpin the strategy and actions taken by antilogging advocates in defense of the Stein, “the last major unlogged wilderness watershed in southern B.C.,” over the next decade (WC2 1985).

3.5 Mobilizing opposition

Despite solid support from environmental groups, and growing community involvement, including First Nations, road building in the valley was now imminent. Stein supporters mobilized to make the Stein Valley an issue of provincial concern. In doing so, the Stein movement brought particular representations of the Stein Valley into the public realm. In the fall of 1985, for instance, the Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WC2) launched a Stein “Adopt-a-Tree” campaign. For a twenty, fifty, or one hundred dollar donation, campaign flyers advertised, you could “adopt” a tree in the Stein Valley: “Your adopted tree lives in a beautiful old growth forest in Southern British Columbia’s last remaining major wilderness watershed. It grows on the route of a
proposed logging road into the heart of the rugged Stein” (WC2 1985). With every adoption, a ribbon bearing the donor’s name was attached to a tree. For their contribution, each donor received a photo of their adopted tree and a map of the tree’s exact location. The adopt-a-tree campaign materialized a sense of personal investment in the preservation of the Stein Valley. No longer a resource landscape, or a far off place, donors now had a picture of a real Stein tree with their name on it. Without even setting foot in the Stein, campaign initiatives such as the adopt-a-tree campaign cultivated a sense of intimacy between wide-ranging networks of people and the ecological values embedded in the valley.

While circulating particular discursive representations of the Stein Valley, Stein supporters simultaneously took strides to facilitate direct involvement in the Stein campaign amongst the local communities of Lytton and Lillooet, and more broadly, especially amongst environmentally-conscious urban populations. Over the summer of 1985, a group of non-Indigenous Lytton and Lillooet residents formed the Stein Action Committee. At the same time the WC2 continued its Stein campaign, which focused on trail-building in the valley to enhance public access, and publishing regular newspapers to distribute information about the area. In addition, M’Gonigle and Wickwire returned to Vancouver and, in September 1985, following the success of the first Stein “Voices for the Wilderness” festival (see below), they organized the founding meeting of the Stein Wilderness Alliance to build a base of support throughout the Lower Mainland. These organizations, as well as numerous individuals on their own initiative, produced a steady stream of newsletters, pamphlets, and posters, while holding slideshows, public events, and debates in Vancouver.
While interest in the Stein Valley continued to grow in urban centres, in the aftermath of Waterland’s February announcement confirming Stein logging would go ahead, the Lilooet Tribal Council formally proclaimed its opposition to extractive resource development in the Stein Valley (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988). They hired a local farmer, John McCandless, in an environmental researcher position. McCandless travelled to Lytton to meet with Lytton First Nation Chief Ruby Dunstan and discuss her stance on logging in the Stein (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013). Dunstan, only two years into her job as LFN Chief, was faced with the task of leading her community through a period of intense internal division and incessant external pressure. Much like tensions arising in other anti-logging struggles in the province at the time, some LFN community members were justifiably wary of being used in order to propel environmentalists’ agenda in challenging area-specific resource development proposals. The Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in *Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General)* [1973] and the entrenchment of Aboriginal title in s.35 of the 1982 Canadian Constitution Act focused attention on what recognition of these rights would mean in practice (Rusnak 1997). With this ambiguity, the door was open for Aboriginal title to pose a challenge to land and resource development projects across B.C.

Dunstan elaborated on tensions between environmentalists and Indigenous communities in the early years of the Stein campaign. In the early 1980s, she explained, some of the mostly-White environmentalists working to protect the Stein felt like they had the authority to “speak for the Stein” (pers. comm., 2013). Dunstan was firm in her position that, without first consulting the LFN and especially the Nlaka’pamux Elders, “outsiders” had no right to speak authoritatively about the Stein’s future. However, it
became clear that in order to effectively resist the government’s imperative to log the Stein, there could be no “sides” within the Stein movement (Ibid.). Collaboration amongst Stein supporters solidified, according to Dunstan, because those involved realized that they would have to work together in order to successfully oppose government and industry (Dunstan, pers. comm., 2013). In the earlier years of the campaign, former-LFN Chief Byron Spinks corroborated, “we were very cautious with the environmental groups because they had a tendency to try and overtake and overpower the cause” (Spinks, pers. comm., 2013). He went on, “it took them a while to realize that they had to step back and play more of a supporting role instead of a leadership role” (Ibid.).

Despite increasing collaboration amongst the emerging Stein movement throughout the 1980s, John McCandless, former “Stein Coordinator” for the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations, described the alliance between environmentalists and First Nations communities as “uneasy” at points (pers. comm., 2013). “No one wants to get used by someone else, and there was a lot of questioning [by First Nations]: ‘Are we getting used’” (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013)? Without confronting B.C.’s coloniality or addressing Nlaka’pamux rights and title in the Stein Valley, the campaign to protect the Stein Valley risked failing to disentangle itself from the ongoing physical and discursive erasure of Indigenous people from B.C.’s landscape (Braun 1997).

*Environmental movements as neocolonial processes*

Scholars such as Bruce Braun (1997; 2002) and David Rossiter (2004; 2008) have examined the ways in which environmental movements risk becoming agents of
neocolonial processes. Using the high-profile battle over logging activities in Clayoquot Sound, located within Nuu-chah-nulth territories on Vancouver Island, B.C., as a case study, Braun explores the marginalization of First Nations within environment and resource conflicts in Canada, popularly depicted as ideological struggles between forest managers, politicians, economic planners, and environmentalists (2002). He presents a critical framework to consider the ways in which various actors engage and perpetuate neocolonial representations of ‘nature’, and First Nations place within such ‘threatened’ landscapes, within B.C. wilderness conflicts. How are particular forest identities (i.e. pristine nature, resource landscape) perpetuated and stabilized by environmentalists, industry, government, and forestry companies, Braun asks, within the rhetorics and practices of both extractive capitalism and environmentalism (Braun 1997, 25)?

Following Braun, I understand the forests of the Stein Valley as a critical site of identity formation. As a key part of the campaign to protect the Stein, both pro- and anti-logging advocates mobilized discursive representations of the value of the Stein’s forested slopes. With increasing leadership from the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations, anti-logging advocates represented the Stein Valley as a highly important cultural and spiritual area, in which the Nlaka’pamux and St’at’imc Nations were authoritative voices. Contrary to Braun’s identification of the neocolonial underpinnings in environmentalists’ representations of Clayoquot Sound, within the many images circulated by Stein supporters, the Stein Valley appeared as an intact watershed comprised of unique

---

9 Braun argues that “concepts of the forest, indigeneity, the nation, and so on are not given once and for all, but are themselves critical sites of political struggle” (Braun 2002, 33). By this logic, forest identities are performed. Rather than static or pre-given once and for all, Braun argues that forest identities “must be continuously reenacted and stabilized within the discursive practices that give them their legibility if they are to retain their political and ideological force” (Ibid.).
ecosystems and a cultural landscape shaped through thousands of years of Indigenous use and occupation. Such representations significantly shaped the B.C. public’s understanding of the Stein Valley and, as I continue to explore, compelled divergent land use practices amongst Stein supporters.

3.6 Voices for the Stein grow louder

In late August, as BCFP geared up to begin road construction, the Lilooet Tribal Council and the IENE organized the first Stein “Voices for the Wilderness” festival. This was a unique and bold initiative—holding a public music festival at Brimful Lake, high amongst the northern ridges of the Stein Valley. A significant challenge, nevertheless more than five hundred people—settler-Canadians from around the province, members of local Indigenous communities, and local performers—climbed up and into the Stein alpine to participate in the festival. Nlaka’pamux and St’at’imc elders were flown in to speak to the crowd gathered about the centrality of the Stein Valley within both Nations’ histories and cultures. For many settler-Canadian attendees, the Stein festival was an intense period of learning about the colonial making of B.C., and outstanding questions of Aboriginal rights and title in the province (Foy, pers. comm., 2013).

LFN-member John Haugen expanded on the ways in which the Stein festival cultivated a sense of alliance amongst Stein supporters. Haugen attributed the Stein festival with helping to alleviate First Nations wariness of environmentalists, by creating

---

10 Representations of the Stein Valley as valuable in its intact state due to its social and natural features and history are evident in, for example, a series of newsletters produced by the Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WC2) throughout the 1980s (1985; 1987; 1988).
a platform to build relationships amongst logging opponents (pers. comm., 2013). At the festival, “when people got up to express their concerns,” Haugen said, “then people would really feel that this was a good person, coming from the heart” (Ibid.). McCandless, too, recognized that the Stein festival helped to build trust and support amongst Stein supporters and, significantly, increased festival attendees commitment to centering Indigenous rights struggles within conflict over the Stein Valley (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013).

Chief Ruby Dunstan and Leonard Andrew insisted the Stein festival wouldn’t be a rally for the Stein, McCandless said. Rather, the festival was about people coming together and learning about one another, and learning to value one another, and to recognize one another, and to begin to understand one another. And that’s what the Chiefs insisted it should be...All of our policies and our ways of living together have been about isolating ourselves from Aboriginal people, isolating Aboriginal people from the rest of society. So when you put together a festival that involved Aboriginal people speaking and telling stories about their culture—it was totally uncovered ground, it was brand new. So many of the people that came to the festival were middle-class people from Vancouver who had never experienced anything like that, and through the festivals they did. (pers. comm., 2013)

Featured on the front-page news of The Vancouver Sun, the Stein festival marked a turning point in the Stein campaign. Within a month of the festival, organizers held the first meeting of the Vancouver-based Stein Wilderness Alliance in Vancouver. Also in September 1985, the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations issued a press release formally stating their opposition to road building and logging in the Stein Valley (WC2 1985). They hired John McCandless to help organize their Stein campaign (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013). By the second half of the decade, the Stein campaign began to more explicitly address the issue of unrecognized and ongoing Nlaka’pamux and St’at’imc authority in the watershed. With
the leadership of the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations, environmental groups began to take on a more supportive role in the Stein campaign (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013).

In an act that deepened local divisions, however, the Ministry of Forests contacted Lytton Lumber late in the summer of 1985. In an effort to appease the local community, rather than transport Stein-timber fifty kilometres south to BCFP’s mill in Boston Bar, the Ministry offered Lytton Lumber thirty percent of the timber, thereby supporting jobs and economic security, if temporarily, for some in the immediate region (M’Gonigle 1988; M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988). By October, Stein supporters were ready for a standoff. Road contractors bidding to construct the logging haul road walked the proposed right-of-way through the Stein Valley bottom flanked by protestors.

By the mid-1980s, a myriad of forestry-related conflicts had surfaced across the province. Newspapers reported threats of a blockade in the Stein, while members of the Haida Nation were blockading a logging road on Lyell Island. Images appeared in households across the country of Haida Elders, dressed in traditional ceremonial attire, being escorted by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers into waiting Government of Canada helicopters.¹¹

In response to the growing number of forestry-related conflicts, Minister of Environment Pelton announced the creation of a Special Advisory Committee on Wilderness Preservation (which became known as the Wilderness Advisory Committee), charged with undertaking a province-wide examination of sixteen proposed wilderness areas in B.C., including the Stein Valley (Wilson 1998, 249). But even with the WAC-process underway, BCFP moved forward with logging preparations, hiring archaeologist

¹¹ For a comprehensive historical review of these events, see Paradise Won: The Struggle for South Moresby (May 1990).
Ian Wilson in August 1985 to undertake its compulsory heritage resources impact assessment of the proposed logging roadway through the valley (INE 1985, 20). Much to BCFP’s favour, Wilson’s report concluded that road construction would not significantly impact the Stein’s “heritage resources,” as most of the identified “historically-significant sites” could be avoided by exercising care during construction (Wickwire 1991, 61; Wilson 1985). Wilson noted that the sites that would be unavoidably damaged or destroyed (including culturally modified trees) during road construction and logging were of “low heritage significance” (Wickwire 1991, 61).

In another flurry of conflicting reports, the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations responded to the BCFP heritage impact assessment by hiring Wendy Wickwire and Dana Lepofsky to review the situation. Released in January 1986, Wickwire and Lepofsky’s report presented a vastly different assessment of the Stein’s historical and cultural significance (1986). This report “…challenged the assumption that a pictograph was a physical artefact…suggesting instead that the definition be expanded to include the images within their environmental context” (Wickwire 1991, 63). If an appropriate understanding were to be applied, the expansive network of pictographs would indicate the Stein Valley’s “… complete network of geographical and spiritual meaning” (Ibid).  

Throughout the campaign to protect the Stein, Indigenous communities and environmentalists stressed that the importance of the Stein Valley lay in its ecological, and especially, cultural significance. Stein supporters mobilized representations of the Stein as a socio-ecological landscape, shaped through thousands of years, and ongoing,

---

12 Over the next five years, several more archaeological and ethnographic reports were undertaken supporting both the pro- and anti-logging positions. For a more detailed discussion of these various reports, their conclusions and implications, see “Ethnography and archaeology as ideology: the case of the Stein River Valley” (Wickwire 1991).
human use and occupation. Rather than silencing Indigenous voices within environmental rhetoric—Braun’s critique of environmentalists’ actions in Clayoquot Sound (2002)—the campaign to protect the Stein was increasingly led by Chiefs Ruby Dunstan and Leonard Andrew in the latter half of the 1980s. Their guidance, and collaboration amongst Stein supporters, significantly shaped the human-land relations that emerged within this site of political struggle.

Conclusion

While extensive trapping and limited mining took place within the Stein Valley throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, as we have seen, the Stein itself remained relatively separate from the more extensive and intensive industrial activity occurring elsewhere in B.C. Apart from the Silver Queen mine site inside the northern boundary of the Stein watershed, the 1970s road building and logging proposal represented the first major resource development project that threatened to fundamentally alter the valley’s ecosystems. But while the landscape itself had not drastically changed, the human-land relations that directly engaged the Stein Valley had. The colonial and industrial transformation of the landscape required—and produced—labour-based human-land relations, dictated by a centralized governance regime and entangled within global flows of supply and demand.13 These practices and processes ordered the landscape according to state-industry needs.

After half a century of industrial development in B.C., resistance to the devastating ecological effects of resource extraction took shape throughout the 1970s and

13 As Harris articulates, a capitalist economy requires “…access to land conceived as resources and freed from the constraints of custom, and to labour conceived as ordered, time-disciplined, abundant, and also unencumbered by custom” (2002, 53).
80s. The emergence of the campaign to protect the Stein collectively challenged the power of the provincial government in the Stein Valley region by disrupting the deeply embedded extractivist culture. In a province built by a colonial state, however, the emergence of B.C.’s environmental movement was not without its own complexities and complications, from which particular tensions and alliances emerged. Nonetheless, with increasing leadership from the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations, collaboration amongst Stein supporters would continue to build in communities around the Stein Valley and across the province (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988).
Chapter 4: Growing voices, collaborative activism

4.0 Activist co-management

The collaborative grassroots activism that emerged in the mid-1980s continued to build in the latter half of the decade, stimulating awareness and concern about the future of the Stein Valley across the province (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988). The Stein movement popularized representations of the valley as an ecologically and culturally significant area, materializing and broadening networks of support for the preservation of the Stein Valley. These representations circulated through the popular media via organizations such as the Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WC2), the Save the Stein Coalition, and the Stein Action Committee, supported by a breadth of well-researched reports (economic, ecological, archaeological, ethnographic). Combined with growing public criticism of provincial land and resource management regimes, activists produced divergent networks of knowledge and power in the Stein Valley region, reworking the contested political terrain on which the Stein debate unfolded.

At the same time, conceptions of the Stein as an ecological, recreational, and cultural landscape compelled divergent land-use practices in relation to the Stein Valley. Such iterative practices occurred both in the Stein itself, such as in hiking and camping throughout the watershed, documenting the pictograph sites in the lower valley, building trails and publishing trail guides, painting images of the Stein’s landscape for circulation, and also more broadly, such as in picketing outside the provincial legislature in Victoria, organizing public meetings in Vancouver, and holding slideshows around the province to
exhibit photos of the Stein’s intact ecosystems, contrasted with images of clear cuts. Through these and other practices and interactions, activist co-management, first emerging in the late 1970s and early 1980s, consolidated in the Stein Valley over the second half of the decade.

The emergence of activist co-management disrupted the hegemony embodied within the regional logging culture and, in doing so, challenged configurations of authority in the Stein Valley region. In this chapter, I describe the events through which the Stein issue grew as a public relations battle on all sides, ultimately resolving into the designation of the Stein Valley as a Class A provincial park in 1995. To accomplish this, Stein supporters continued to create opportunities for people around the province to engage with the Stein in particular ways—both on the ground and in the public imagination. Provincial environmental politics increasingly clashed with labour politics over this period, illustrating urban-rural divisions and persistent local tensions around the economic health of the forest industry (Wilson 1998). This chapter explores the ways in which Stein supporters negotiated, and shaped, such shifting social, political, economic, and ecological contexts, producing new agents, alliances, and co-management arrangements in the process.

4.1 A campaign for the hearts and minds of British Columbians

Across the province, alongside conflict over the future of the Stein Valley, tensions between the Forest Service, logging companies, environmentalists, and Indigenous communities were becoming increasingly volatile (Wilson 1998). Bill Bennett’s Social Credit government worked to contain growing forest preservation
demands, while simultaneously strengthening Forest Service-industry control over the land base (Ibid.). But public support for the government’s resource management policies was diminishing and by the time Bill Vander Zalm took over as party leader in 1986, Bennett’s “containment approach” had proven to be ineffective (Ibid., 149).

Concurrently, between 1985 and 1986, the Wilderness Advisory Committee (WAC) held a six-month period of meetings to assess management options in sixteen wilderness areas across the province. Under the sympathetic chairmanship of Vancouver lawyer, Brian Williams, members of the public—including environmental groups, religious groups, hunting and fishing clubs, academics, business groups, and First Nations—were given the opportunity to give presentations to the WAC panel (Wilson 1998). In her statement to the panel, Chief Ruby Dunstan described how current government-industry actions in the Stein Valley were an extension of the colonial occupation of Nlaka’pamux territories:

The valley is Indian land. We have been in continuous occupancy and use since time immemorial. We have never ceded, sold nor lost this land in conflict...we will no doubt seek a just and fair share of our traditional lands, of what was ours before settlement, it should be land we value, that we have used and which has not been exploited nor occupied by others. It should include the Stein Valley. (Wilson 1998, 227)

Released in March 1986, the WAC’s final report gave Stein supporters an indirect victory. Although it recommended that portions of the lower Stein Valley and the upper alpine be designated as wilderness areas, it concluded that an integrated resource management plan should be implemented in the middle valley. The report, however, contained an important stipulation: “a road should not be constructed through the Stein

---

1 For more detailed review of B.C. environmental politics throughout this era, see Talk and log: wilderness politics in British Columbia, 1965-1996 (Wilson 1998).
River Canyon without a formal agreement between the Lytton Indian Band and the Provincial Government” (Wilderness Advisory Committee 1986).

Six months later—with no word from the provincial government regarding the WAC report—the LFN invited Premier Vander Zalm to Lytton. Vander Zalm declined their invitation (Across Canada 1986). Silence from the Social Credit Government regarding the WAC recommendations affirmed Stein supporters’ earlier cynicism over the value of participating in this non-binding process (Wilson 1998). Rather than relying on the provincial government to follow through with the WAC’s recommendations, Stein supporters focused on getting more British Columbians engaged and on side.

4.2 Rediscovering the Stein Valley

Developments during the summer of 1986 were formative. With the approval of the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations, the WC2 recruited trail maintenance volunteers to upgrade the Stein Trail (Foy, pers. comm., 2013). The ninety-kilometre Stein Trail traverses the valley bottom, from the mouth of the river at Lytton to its headwaters near Lizzie Creek. Historically, this trail served as a travel route between the Nlaka’pamux communities around Lytton and St’at’imc communities around Mt. Currie, and also as a route from the Interior to the Coast (M’Gonigle and Wickwire 1988).

Moreover, with the help of Thom Henley, who previously developed the Haida Rediscovery Program, Stein supporters launched the Stein Rediscovery program. As the Stein Hiking program had done in the early 80s, Stein Rediscovery offered youth the opportunity to participate in seven-ten day hiking trips into remote areas of the Stein Valley. While the program was primarily geared towards residents of Lytton, Lillooet,
and Mt. Currie, as part of the larger Rediscovery network, the new program extended its reach to youth from around the province and beyond. The stated aim of this program was: “…to bring together native and non-native youth to help them discover the world within themselves, the cultural worlds between them, and the wonders of the natural world around them” (Stein Natural and Cultural Heritage Rediscovery Society 1986).

The program received an immensely positive response (Lightfoot, pers. comm., 2013). With the construction of a base camp in the heart of the valley at Cottonwood Creek, Rediscovery activities emphasized outdoor survival skills and Nlaka’pamux culture, traditional foods, language, and spiritual practices. Through these means, Rediscovery instructed youth participants in particular land use practices and activities, anchored in an understanding of the Stein’s ecology and cultural history transmitted through hands on experiences. Rediscovery became a means through which the Stein campaign extended its influence to another demographic, building a multi-generational support base by instilling youth participants with a sense of responsibility for the long-term preservation of the Stein Valley (Ibid.).

The summer culminated in the second Stein Voices for the Wilderness festival. Held at an old Nlaka’pamux village site near the mouth of the Stein River, event attendance—over one thousand people—more than doubled that of the inaugural Stein festival. The Stein Valley was now firmly situated as one of the decade’s most controversial environmental conflicts.
The battle for South Moresby

Conflict around logging in the Stein Valley did not occur in isolation. On July 11, 1987, after more than a decade of protest over provincial forestry operations in Haida Gwaii, Haida resistance successfully resulted in all logging activities coming to a halt in the area surrounding South Moresby Island in the southern end of the archipelago (Dean 2009). The provincial and federal governments and, later, the Council of Haida Nations (CHN), had finally reached an agreement to create a National Park and Reserve in South Moresby, which included the controversial Lyell Island (Ibid.).

In his reading of the battle for South Moresby, historian Michael Dean argues that protests over logging on Haida territory should be understood as an anti-colonial political movement that resulted from a history of colonial occupation, of which contemporary resource extraction is intrinsically linked (2009). This can be similarly argued for the Stein. With no movement from the federal or provincial government in considering the Nlaka’pamux Nation’s land claim, the campaign to protect the Stein Valley can also be taken as a means through which the Nlaka’pamux leadership asserted the authority of their Nation outside of the strictly limited political or legal channels available to them.

The environmental and anti-colonial aspects of the Stein campaign were connected, in that both posed a challenge to the resourcist core at the heart of colonial

---

2 Conflict surrounding logging in the South Moresby Island area of Haida Gwaii came to a head in November 1985, when members of the Haida Nation blockaded logging trucks on Lyell Island (Dean 2009). In 1987, the role of the Haida Nation in managing the National Park and Reserve remained unclear, as the Gwaii Hanaas Agreement was not signed between the Government of Canada and the CHN until 1993. On signing this co-management agreement, the National Park and Reserve became Gwaii Haanas National Park and Haida Heritage Site. This Agreement stipulated that the National Park be jointly managed by the CHN and the Government of Canada (Ibid.).

3 In 1984, the Nlaka’pamux filed an official land claim with the federal Department of Indian Affairs over their traditional territories, including the Stein Valley. In a letter to NNCT Chairman Robert Pascoe dated November 28, 1986, Minister of Indian Affairs Bill McKnight stated that the federal government had officially received the Nlaka’pamux Nation Comprehensive Claim.
occupation of the land. Indeed, both facets came to comprise the ‘Stein issue’. As the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations maintained their responsibility to protect the Stein from industrial development, environmentalists continued to mobilize public support; create opportunities to foster particular human-land relations in the Stein Valley; and pressure the government for parks protection. Although this claim cannot be extended unilaterally when considering B.C.’s ecopolitical history (Rossiter 2004; Braun 1997; Dean 2009), collaboration between environmentalists and Indigenous communities meant that the Stein campaign rejected industrial activity in the Stein Valley on the basis of both ecosystem protection and unrecognized Nlaka’pamux and St’at’imc authority over the Stein Valley. Compared to other wilderness conflicts around the province, LFN community member Raymond Phillips speculated, the Stein campaign became the “…pinnacle of that type of activity, that type of protection, that type of collective coming together for a singular purpose across all lines—racial, economic, political. That’s rarely been achieved in the history of the province” (pers. comm., 2013).

Stein supporters watched the events unfold in Haida Gwaii, wondering whether the province would follow suit in resolving the logging controversy in the Stein Valley.

4.3 Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations Stein Declaration

In August 1987, Stein supporters once again hiked up to Brimful Lake in the Stein alpine, this time to attend the third Voices for the Wilderness festival. Despite the more-than two thousand in attendance, the next month, Forest Minister Parker unilaterally announced that road building would begin as soon as possible without the consent of, or
negotiation with, the Lytton First Nation. Because the province had accepted the WAC’s recommendation that two wilderness areas be designated in the upper and lower parts of the Stein, in his statement to the public, Parker defended this decision as a win-win situation: “This decision means the preservation of large areas of one of the most spectacular wilderness areas in our province,” Parker declared, “and, at the same time, it recognizes our need to create jobs and economic activity” (Mason and Flather 1987).

In October 1987, with contractors readying to commence road building, the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations jointly issued a “Stein Declaration.” This articulation stated that: “…under the cooperative authority of our two bands we will maintain the Stein Valley as a wilderness in perpetuity for the enjoyment and enlightenment of all peoples and the enhancement of the slender life thread on this planet” (Lytton 1995, App. A). For the Nlaka’pamux, John Haugen explained, the power of this action came from declaring the value of the Stein Valley to the world—declaring that “…if it’s disrupted then there is basically not too much left of either your homeland or your territory, or places that you consider sacred” (pers. comm., 2013).

This assertion speaks to the relationship the Nlaka’pamux have had with the Stein Valley for a very long time, co-produced through land use, cultural, and spiritual practices based on reciprocity. As Phillips explained, the Nlaka’pamux have always assumed a stewardship responsibility in the Stein Valley: “[the] Nlaka’pamux defended that valley for a long time…[it’s] always been managed and it’s always been managed

---

4 Minister of Forests Tom Waterland resigned in January 1986, just before the release of the WAC report (Wilson 1998). Over the next year a series of three interim Forest Ministers were appointed before Dave Parker became the new Social Credit Minister of Forests on March 31, 1987 (British Columbia Forest Service 2013).
largely by the Lytton band” (Phillips, pers. comm., 2013). Phillips likened this relationship to a “social contract” between a group of people and a particular place:

…when an area is important to the people, it becomes the responsibility of all people to preserve it. It’s like a social contract that we all have to a place. So that if someone is abusing that thing or that place, the community speaks up against that person and they are corrected. (Phillips, pers. comm., 2013)

The campaign to protect the Stein became a platform through which the Nlaka’pamux and St’at’imc asserted their unextinguished authority in the Stein Valley. Within the 1987 Stein Declaration, importantly, these communities do not cite colonial law in either establishing or abolishing such ‘rights’. Rather, the Stein Declaration refers to the history of occupation, use, and relationship as bestowing the authority and responsibility to maintain the Stein Valley on the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations. Existing outside of, and in resistance to, state-industry power, the Stein Declaration was a powerful challenge to the legitimacy of state authority in the Stein Valley.

Newspapers across the province reported daily on the threat of a blockade in the Stein, while criticism of Parker’s lack of negotiation with the LFN surfaced in unexpected circles. In a November meeting organized by the Official Opposition Leader Mike Harcourt (NDP), the International Woodworkers of America (IWA), the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, BC Federation of Labour, Pulp and Paper Workers of Canada, and the provincial NDP party formally stated their position that no road should be built into the Stein Valley without a formal agreement between the provincial government and the Lytton First Nation (Bula 1987).
A local issue gains global attention

Exemplifying the global forces of production at play, early in 1987 the New Zealand-based multinational corporation, Fletcher Challenge, bought BCFP, transferring logging rights in the Stein Valley to its Canadian subsidiary, Fletcher Challenge Canada Limited (Noble 1987). The save-the-Stein campaign concurrently expanded to include an international audience. In January 1988 Chiefs Dunstan and Andrew announced they would request a United Nations investigation into the B.C. Government’s actions (and inactions) in the Stein Valley. They argued that logging in the Stein would violate rights guaranteed under the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights—of which Canada is a signatory—by irreparably damaging an area important to Nlaka’pamux spirituality.

Their actions prompted Minister Parker to schedule a February meeting with the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations. With this meeting, logging was suspended until March 15, 1988 in order to explore alternative economic opportunities in the valley. In spite of his previous statements, Parker promised no road would be built into the Stein without a formal agreement with the two communities (Logging in Stein 1988). Regardless of these public commitments, however, Parker quietly ended talks with the LFN in June 1988. He alleged that Dunstan had engaged in “stalling tactics,” preventing negotiations from moving forward (Glavin 1988).

4.4 "Share it" versus "Save it"

While the Stein issue became implicated within international networks and governing bodies, at a regional level it remained no less controversial. In 1988 the
Lytton-based Share the Stein Coalition was established to cultivate a positive image of forestry practices in B.C. (Wickwire 1991). One of the first such organizations in the province, it was funded by a $200,000 grant from the corporate-backed Council of Forest Industries of BC, BCFP, and the Cariboo Lumber Manufacturers’ Association, indicating escalating industry anxieties regarding the impact environmental campaigns were having upon public opinion (Wickwire 1991; Wilson 1998). As Wilson notes, such industry-funded support groups highlighted, and indeed exacerbated, the class dimensions of the logging debate, in which resource workers feared that calls to set-aside contested ecosystems would lead to job loss in forest-dependent communities (1998, 38).

Two vocal lobby groups—the “share-the-stein” group on one hand, the “save-the-stein” group on the other—simultaneously worked out of Lytton to get their opposing messages out (Wilson 1998). In the face of the established presence of industry-backed groups, efforts to save the Stein continued to focus on building public support for protecting the valley. According to a BCTV poll released on the eve of the 1988 Stein festival, sixty-two percent of British Columbians supported the Stein movement’s efforts to stop logging in the Stein Valley (Looking Back 2013). Held on the former site of St. George’s Anglican Indian residential school, the festival was a powerful act of resistance to ongoing colonial violence. Following this, in October, a group of chiefs and elders walked the proposed logging road removing survey tape as an assertion of their continued presence in the valley, and their staunch rejection of its proposed industrial future.

As Wilson describes, “by 1990, a loose network of groups such as Share the Stein...[were] pushing the argument that multiple use would allow for the preservation of industry jobs as well as recreational opportunities” (1998, 37).
In the fall of 1988, M’Gonigle and Wickwire produced a coffee table book, *Stein: The Way of the River* (M’Gonigle, pers. comm., 2013). With sales in the thousands in its first months, it brought images of the Stein Valley into households around the province, serving as an important political tool. Meanwhile, in an effort to bring the issue into corporate headquarters, and with provincial government negotiations failing, Chief Dunstan, Chief Andrew, and John McCandless travelled to New Zealand in November 1988 to attend the Fletcher Challenge annual shareholder meeting. In one of the barn-burning speeches Dunstan had become known for, she addressed the five hundred stakeholders in attendance, demanding that Fletcher Challenge refrain from any logging-related activity in the Stein Valley until the provincial government had reached a formal agreement with the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013; Glavin 1988b).

4.5 The rise of an empowered public

In his history of forestry-related conflicts in British Columbia, political scientist Jeremy Wilson argues that B.C.’s environmental movement evolved and matured throughout the 1980s (1998, 258). With strong roots established in many communities, it regularly demonstrated its “…diversity, resilience, and resourcefulness” (Ibid.). Public scrutiny of provincial forest management policies now came in the form of robust, well-researched reports. These critiques were accompanied by viable alternative regional

---

6 The Stein Wilderness Alliance purchased a share in Fletcher Challenge in order to gain access to the shareholders meeting.
economic proposals—“sustainable economies”—to be achieved by devolving local resource management to communities of resource users (Ibid.).

Calls to increase the number and size of protected areas in the province were bolstered by the 1987 release of the World Commission on Environment and Development report (also known as the Brundtland report) (Wilson 1998). Based in part on principles developed in the Brundtland report, environmental organizations began to popularize the notion that B.C.’s network of protected areas should comprise at least twelve percent of the provincial land base, and that this twelve percent should represent diverse ecosystems in order to preserve biodiversity (Ibid.).

In their final years in office the Social Credit government grappled to respond to resounding calls for policy change. They appeared to reconcile themselves to the fact that an integrated resource management system would have to include preserving certain tracts of land. The newly appointed Forest Minister Claude Richmond indicated some

---

7 See for example, Slocan Valley Community Forest Management Project (1974).
8 The Brundtland report significantly increased the average British Columbian’s familiarity with concepts such as “sustainable development” and “biodiversity.” With the release of the Brundtland report, according to Wilson, “politicians, industry leaders, and interest group spokespersons recalibrated their vocabularies; colleges and universities revised curricula and established centres for the study of sustainable development; academics organized conferences and retooled their research grant applications; and people across the province examined the impacts of their day-to-day activities” (Wilson 1998, 244).
9 Also in the late 1980s, the Valhalla Wilderness Society (VWS) compiled and widely circulated “British Columbia’s endangered wilderness: a proposal for an adequate system of totally protected lands” (1988). This report included a B.C map displaying more than ninety proposed protected areas, including the Stein Valley. If the areas denoted in the VWS report were set aside, it would bring the total protected area landmass in the province to just over thirteen percent (Wilson 1998). Michael M’Gonigle and Tom Gunton, colleagues at Simon Fraser University, later used this map to evaluate the impacts on projected cut levels and employment if the suggested areas were protected. Based on detailed area-by-area assessments, the report demonstrated that the impact was minimal (M’Gonigle and Gunton 1990). These report provided a policy justification for the NDP’s 1990 adoption of an election platform committed to increasing the percentage of protected areas to twelve percent of B.C.’s land base.
10 During the Social Credit’s last five years in power, while parks administration moved in and out of four different ministerial configurations, nearly 550,000 hectares of land was added to the park system. In mid-1990, as part of the “Parks and Wilderness for the ‘90’s” process, the government produced a list of 200
willingness to amend existing forest management policies and the Forest Service began to look critically at some of the foundational tenets of forest management. Long a cozy relationship, government and industry increasingly disagreed about what combination of offensive measures, substantive concessions, and symbolic offerings might best neutralize environmental demands without significantly impacting the provincial forest industry (Wilson 1998). The NDP capitalized on the appetite for change amongst voters. When Michael Harcourt became the NDP leader in 1987, he pushed the party to hash out a consolidated set of environmental policies.

In April 1989, six months after Dunstan and Andrew travelled to New Zealand, Fletcher Challenge president Ian Donald declared a one-year moratorium on all activities related to logging in the Stein (including all road survey work and the construction of helicopter bases). In a public statement, Bob Porter, the company’s vice president of public affairs, confirmed that this moratorium was meant to give the provincial government and Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations “breathing space” in their efforts to conclude negotiations over the fate of the valley (Glavin 1989). Despite international pressure and attention, in July 1989 Minister Parker told reporters that, under B.C. law, “there's no call for an agreement with the natives on the Stein” (Parfitt 1989b). A month later, a staggering twenty thousand people attended the fifth Stein Voices for the Wilderness festival held at the Mt. Currie rodeo grounds. The media reported a massive traffic jam on the highway from Vancouver to Whistler, and on to Mt. Currie.

---

wilderness study areas to consider for protection, including the middle-Stein. This process petered out in the Social Credit’s final months in office (Wilson 1998).
4.6 The politics of preservation

By the turn of the decade both the Social Credit government—grasping, at this point, to hang on to voters—and industry seemed to have conceded that logging in the Stein Valley could not go ahead without a widely publicized confrontation. But, in order to avoid putting downward pressure on allowable cut levels in the region and as a “consolation prize” for industry, the government was resistant to declaring a park in the middle valley, the location of most of the valuable timber (Wilson 1998, 229). Moreover, any amount of logging would have required blasting a logging road through the narrow, steep-sided canyon in the lower valley. For the many people involved in the Stein campaign, after two decades of activism, it was important to see the Stein Valley formally protected in legislation. To achieve this in the Stein, and in many other contested landscapes across the province, the preservation movement would require a new level of coordination and organization. This materialized with the creation of BC Wild in 1992. With funding from large American foundations committed to resolving a host of environmental conflicts, BC Wild became a pivot point for pressure on the provincial government.  

---

11 BC Wild is a “non-membership group,” Wilson explains, run by a board of directors made up of some of the environmental movement’s most well known figures (1998, 60). It was established following a meeting in September 1992 between several large American foundations sympathetic to the preservation of B.C.’s temperate rainforest, and a group of prominent environmentalists. The American foundations, such as the Bullitt Foundation and the Wilberforce Foundation, offered to provide funding for the B.C.-based movement, so long as their actions were coordinated and concerted. BC Wild was established to facilitate coordinated action and lobbying (Wilson 1998, 60).
The rise of the NDP

Rising in popularity amongst B.C. voters, in the lead up to the 1991 provincial election the NDP grappled with how to bridge the polarization of its support base, which included both union workers employed within resource industries and an environmentally-conscious, largely urban contingent. Illustrating this divide, in August 1990 a group of loggers from Pemberton threatened to blockade road access to the now-annual Stein festival. Less than a week before the event, organizers were forced to relocate the festival to the Tsawwassen Indian Reserve (Bell and Glavin 1990). This action was in line with industry depictions of the environmental movement as seeking to disenfranchise local resource workers in their quest to sterilize tracts of productive land by setting areas aside for the singular purpose of conservation (Wilson 1998).

The NDP tried to satisfy both facets of its support base in its please-all election platform. Along with a promise to “end the war in the woods” without significantly impacting the forest industry, A Better Way for B.C. included a comprehensive array of proposals to reform land and resource management policy (Wilson 1998). With Michael Harcourt at the helm, the New Democrats were elected to power in October 1991 in a landslide vote. Once in office, however, the new government focused on the more moderate features of their election platform. The more radical aspects, including

---

12 As described in “A Better Way for B.C.,” if elected, an “NDP government would double parks and wilderness areas, provide for greater community control of local forests, put the secretariat back in business, implement the Environment and Jobs Accord, bring in a Forest Practices Act, stimulate job creation by encouraging value-added processing, reverse cuts to the Forest Service, negotiate fair settlement of the Native land question, and establish a Royal Commission on forestry to move recommendations on tenure changes” (Wilson 1998, 264). The NDP also promised to implement a Protected Areas Strategy through a province-wide consensus planning process aimed to identify areas that should be preserved in order to achieve a goal of protecting twelve percent of the provincial terrestrial land-base by 2000 (Jackson and Curry 2004).
reforming the forest tenure system and devolving resource control to the community level, were back benched in order to pacify industry interests.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{The Clayoquot Summer}

Over the summer of 1993, as Harcourt approached his third year in office, thousands of people from around the world (including prominent figures and celebrities) headed to Vancouver Island to participate in growing protests against MacMillan Bloedel’s logging operations in Clayoquot Sound—the newest flashpoint of B.C.’s “war in the woods” (Braun 1997, 7). Protesters gathered daily to greet the incoming logging trucks and, each day, the RCMP forcibly removed and transported protesters to the nearby town of Ucluelet where they were charged and released. This blockade stretched on for three months. By September, more than nine hundred protesters were arrested in one of the largest collective acts of civil disobedience in Canada’s history (Ibid.).

While the NDP scrambled to contain the situation and save face throughout the highly mediatized conflict, the explosiveness of the battle over Clayoquot Sound, writes Wilson, “…reverberated outwards” (1998, 272). Although NDP policy reforms had failed to challenge the centralist character of both market and state structures, the face of B.C. environmental politics had profoundly changed. The debate was now truly international in scope. Moreover, land and resource management regimes, and thereby state power, were being challenged on the ground through direct action. With new actors, alliances,

\textsuperscript{13} Harcourt appointed Dan Miller to serve as the Minister of Forests, thereby Miller inherited the brunt of responsibility in making good on the NDP campaign promise to end the war in the woods, and implement participatory land use and resource management processes in B.C.’s Crown lands. The moderate course of the new government was also likely influenced by the fact that Harcourt and Miller were some of the more risk-averse members of Cabinet (Wilson 1998).
and networks, the environmental movement now wielded a significant amount of political power and influence.

Not unlike the South Moresby conflict of the 1980s, the summer in Clayoquot Sound occurred in parallel to ongoing campaigns in the Stein. Where this shifting political terrain left the Stein Valley—and the many different relationships to its past, present, and future—however, remained unclear. One thing was certain: the commitment of Indigenous communities to asserting their long suppressed land title and the sustained pressure from environmentalists to protect the ‘last places left’ together formed a powerful presence shaping B.C.’s ecopolitical terrain. The alliances—and tensions—that emerged between Indigenous communities, environmentalists, and local communities in anti-logging struggles have become a fixture of provincial eco-politics, expressed today in, for instance, anti-pipeline resistance (Hoerkstra et al. 2014).

4.7 Negotiating the future of the Stein Valley

In addition to the Protected Areas Strategy initiated by the NDP, certain areas were also protected through stand-alone decisions and independent processes. These protected-area candidates were often the “pet projects” of bureaucrats, who then became issue-specific “policy brokers” (Wilson 1998, 52). Harcourt appointed Tom Gunton, an active member of the NDP, Deputy Minister of Environment in 1991. Gunton, a professor in the School of Resource and Environmental Management at Simon Fraser University, was familiar with the Stein Valley and with members of the Stein campaign,

---

14 The majority of the protected area designations made during the NDP’s first term in office were either part of the NDP’s Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) process, or in response to the Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) recommendations. Several other important areas, including the Stein Valley, Wilson explains, were protected through stand-alone decisions or processes (1998, 295).
and was strongly committed to furthering the parks agenda. So too were other members of Harcourt’s Cabinet, including Andrew Petter, then Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, and Moe Sihota, then Minister of Environment. Meanwhile, BC Wild kept the Stein issue on the political front burner with repeated consultations with the government.

Park negotiations between the provincial government and the Lytton First Nation began in earnest over the spring of 1995. Facing accusations from their support base that they had fallen short on their campaign promises, the NDP was anxious to settle the details of the park designation before the upcoming election in the spring of 1996. Dunstan scrupulously negotiated the terms of agreement on behalf of the LFN, while government negotiators tried to ensure that whatever arrangement emerged governing the Stein did not set a precedent in the rest of the province (Dunstan, pers. comm., 2013).

By November, frustrations were building on all sides of the negotiating table. After most of the particulars had been decided, disagreement over what to name the park threatened to derail the entire process. Dunstan fought to have “Nlaka’pamux” included in the official title, while government negotiators pushed to have the park named the “Stein Valley Heritage Park.” Dunstan’s insistence upon including Nlaka’pamux in the park name reflected the ongoing struggle for power and authority in the Stein Valley. Geographer Garth Myers contends that, “place names mark the spatiality of power relationships” embedded in the landscape (1996). As Reuben Rose-Redwood, et al. explain, “the discursive act of assigning a name to a given location does much more than merely denote an already-existing ‘place’” (2010, 454). The act of naming is a

---

“performative practice,” through which “…people seek to control, negotiate, and contest…as they engage in wider struggles for legitimacy and visibility” (Ibid., 457).

At literally the final hour of negotiation, the government ceded and the park was declared the Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park (SVNHP). On November 22, 1995—after over two decades of resistance, extensive negotiations between the provincial government and the LFN, and with a spring election looming—Premier Mike Harcourt declared the entire 107,000-hectare Stein River watershed a Class A provincial park. A Cooperative Management Agreement followed, placing all management and use decisions under the jurisdiction of a Management Board comprised of three representatives from the Lytton First Nation and three representatives from the B.C. government.

**Conclusion**

By 1995, the Stein Valley had gained a new kind of political agency, forged across shifting zones of contact in which environmentalists, Indigenous communities, political actors, a globalized forest industry, and, increasingly, the B.C. public grappled with one another, and their conflicting understandings and relationships to the Stein Valley. Up until the late 1980s, WC2 National Director Joe Foy recalled, the campaign to protect the Stein felt like David versus Goliath. There was an assumption that industry and government had all the power but, he continued, the power of the Stein movement came from many people having few resources, driven perpetually by optimism (Foy, pers. comm., 2013). While making the Stein an issue of popular politics, this agency

---

16 The Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park was established through Order-in-council 1411 under the Park Act (BC Parks 2000).
extended beyond party platforms and Victoria meeting rooms. Indeed, the Stein movement successfully resisted the dominant culture of resource extraction in the Stein Valley region.

People from around the province increasingly understood the Stein Valley as a cultural, spiritual, recreational, and ecological landscape, and as a site of ongoing colonialism and resistance. Moreover, alongside land-use conflicts in many parts of the province, forest and wilderness issues had come to define B.C. ecopolitics in the 1980s and 90s. Within this socio-ecological terrain, Stein supporters challenged the structures and institutions governing land and resource management in the Stein Valley, instead supporting the authority of the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations. The Stein Valley region became a site of political struggle from which alternative co-management arrangements emerged.

The ways in which the park status and Cooperative Management Agreement—emerging from these power-laden processes and practices—would impact human-land relations in the Stein Valley region remained to be seen as this era of the Stein’s history drew to a close. Nonetheless, speaking to a crowd of three hundred gathered at the University of British Columbia on the day of the announcement, Premier Harcourt spoke the words on many peoples minds’: “It took a lot of people and a lot of dedication…this is the resolution of a long and difficult struggle” (Pynn 1995).
Chapter 5: The Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park eighteen years later

5.0 From there to here

Along the Trans Canada highway above Lytton, no sign alerts travellers to the existence of the adjacent Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park (SVNHP). Driving through Lytton eighteen years after Premier Harcourt declared the Stein Valley a Class A provincial park, the tree-lined streets are quiet. It is at first difficult to imagine the small town at the centre of more than two decades of struggle. Within the community of Lytton, the SVNHP is advertised little more than on the highway. On leaving the village, one follows local signage to the reaction ferry that crosses the Fraser River. On the west side, a sign points to the Stein Valley, five kilometres north. On my first trip along the gravel road, a Volkswagen van topped with river kayaks trundled towards me in a cloud of dust. As we passed each other, the middle-aged couple in the front seat waved enthusiastically, giving me the “thumbs up.” The excitement, I assume, stemmed from their anticipation of what awaited me a little ways ahead.

The preceding chapters explored the shifting social, political, economic, and ecological history of the Stein Valley region—the historical junctures that spawned, and have inevitably shaped, contemporary co-management practices in the Stein Valley. This chapter pieces together the history of the Stein Valley from its designation as a provincially protected area, to the summer of 2013 when I conducted my thesis research. Here, I weave together information, impressions, and insights of places and people, their stories and perspectives, in order to explore the socio-ecological legacy of the campaign to protect the Stein. Drawing on a series of semi-structured interviews, I discuss the
effects of the Stein campaign on human-land relations in the Stein Valley region.

While I consider the ways in which the formal co-management arrangement has impacted the community living around the Stein Valley, particularly the LFN, my intention is not to evaluate whether the Cooperative Management Agreement is achieving its stated or implied objectives, per se. Such an assessment is fraught with complexity. In Chapter One, I reviewed critical co-management literature, which highlights the potential for such arrangements to co-opt community participation within bureaucratic management regimes. In the Stein Valley, however, members of the LFN and the provincial government made clear that the Cooperative Management Agreement and Management Board have been successful, and provided mutual benefits. Rather than critiquing the actual functioning of this legislative arrangement, I consider how human-land relations have affected formal co-management in the Stein Valley, in as much as these understandings shape informal co-management practices.

To begin I introduce the people I interviewed who informed my compilation of the post-1995 socio-ecological history. Following these introductions, I describe key interview themes related to the long-term effects of the campaign to protect the Stein Valley, namely, a sense of empowerment in the community’s ability to challenge dominant structures, institutions, and policies through collective action. In addition, I argue that the authoritative role of the LFN in the Stein Valley was produced first and foremost in the longstanding relationship between the LFN and the Stein Valley.

This assertion begets the question: if the development of a collaborative campaign in defense of the Stein challenged state-industry power in the Stein Valley region, what is the importance of having the area protected formally through legislation? Is it the park
legislation, or a community empowered in its collective authority, that ultimately ‘protects’ the Stein Valley? I consider these questions throughout this section, and return to them in the chapter conclusion.

To explore the ways in which the legalistic co-management arrangement has affected human-land relations in the Stein Valley region, I take a close look at how the current co-management arrangement is being practiced on the ground. I include a series of excerpts from the Cooperative Management Agreement to give a sense of the spirit with which both parties entered into this legislative arrangement.

In the final section of this chapter, I consider the future of co-management, and human-land relations, in the Stein Valley region. I suggest that, in the future, these relations will continue to change. I briefly discuss current, and potential, initiatives geared towards bringing people into particular kinds of human-land relations with the Stein Valley. This discussion highlights the importance of continued community engagement in the Stein Valley, through which particular, powerful human-land relations may be continually co-produced.

5.1 People and places

Ruby Dunstan

Elected chief of the Lytton First Nation in 1983, Ruby Dunstan served in this capacity until 1991. As LFN Chief throughout the most contentious years of the Stein conflict, Dunstan opposed resource development within the Stein Valley. She had a personal connection to the valley. Her father, Andrew Johnny, trapped throughout the watershed for years and, growing up, her family lived adjacent to the mouth of the Stein
River. She negotiated the park designation and the Cooperative Management Agreement on behalf of the LFN, and has sat on the SVNHP Management Board since its inception in 1995. Now retired from her role as chief, Dunstan continues to be a strong voice and leader in the Nlaka’pamux community. In addition to her role on the SVNHP Management Board, Dunstan is the chair of the Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux School Board. Ruby Dunstan will be receiving a honourary doctorate from the University of Victoria in the spring of 2015.

*Jessa Lightfoot*

Jessa Lightfoot is the current mayor of Lytton, a position she has held since 2008. She first travelled to Vancouver from Ontario in 1970, and shortly thereafter moved to the Lytton area. During her first summer, Lightfoot lived with a group of back-to-the-landers in an abandoned miner’s cabin near the mouth of the Stein River and, later, further down river in an empty cabin on the Stryen Reserve. “[The Stein River] was just always there,” Lightfoot recalled, “when we lived at the mouth of the Stein in the spring time… you could hear these great big rocks tumbling down the river. It was really powerful” (pers. comm., 2013). Lightfoot got involved in the Stein campaign in the mid-80s and played a key role in running Stein Rediscovery, a youth outdoor education and cultural learning program, between its launch in 1986 until its final summer in 1991.

*Byron Spinks*

Byron Spinks was LFN Chief in 1995 when the Stein Valley first became a provincial park (he also held this role prior to Ruby Dunstan’s election in 1983). Spinks’ grandfather introduced him to the Stein Valley when he was a child. He hiked the valley regularly throughout the 1960s, completing the Stein traverse when he was eighteen. The
community “never realized [the Stein] would become such an issue,” Spinks commented. “We always thought it was ours until logging became a threat” (pers. comm., 2013).

Because of his previous experiences and knowledge of the Stein Valley, Spinks was strongly motivated to fight for the Stein’s long-term preservation.

*John Haugen*

When logging plans for the Stein were first announced in the 1980s, John Haugen was in his early twenties. While growing up, his grandmother taught him about the importance of the Stein Valley to the Nlaka’pamux, and he currently does work related to Nlaka’pamux culture and language (Haugen, pers. comm., 2013). Currently, Haugen is one of the three representatives of the LFN on the SVNHP Management Board. He also works as the Fisheries Restorative Justice Coordinator for the Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal Council and is a LFN council member.

*Nita Walkem*

Nita Walkem worked as Chief Ruby Dunstan’s assistant during the Stein campaign. Throughout this period, Walkem accompanied Dunstan all over the Lower Mainland to attend Stein-related meetings and events. In reflecting upon the Stein campaign, Walkem said that she tried to focus on the positive moments and long-term benefits of this period, though it was also a time marked by difficulty. In hindsight, she said, it had been worth it. Although it had not always been easy for her, Dunstan, or for the community as a whole, protecting the Stein had been the right thing to do (Walkem, pers. comm., 2013).
Raymond Phillips

Raymond Phillips currently works as a lawyer in the town of Lytton. When logging was first proposed in the Stein Valley, Phillips had a summer job at Lytton Lumber. Despite his ties to the mill, “his heart was always in the Stein” (Phillips, pers. comm., 2013). Phillips has spent a lot of time exploring, hunting, fishing, and mushroom gathering in the Stein with his family. When logging threatened the future of the Stein Valley it made people realize what was in their own backyard, he explained (Ibid.). As Phillips described, he knew about the pictographs and the ways the Stein had been used for healing and power training but “the meaning of it all kind of got triggered by…the possibility of losing it. It really allowed me to see it in a different way” (Ibid.).

Joe Foy

National Campaign Director for the Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WC2), Joe Foy, described himself as a “young greenhorn” during the campaign to protect the Stein (Foy, pers. comm., 2013). A newspaper article featuring the ninety-kilometre Stein Valley traverse initially piqued Foy’s interest in the area. He and a friend completed the traverse in the early 1980s. Foy described this ten-day trek as a “transformative” experience, from which he never quite recovered (Foy, pers. comm., 2013). The traverse drew Foy into WC2-led campaign efforts. In retrospect, Foy mused, conflict over the Stein was a window into the intersection between nature, politics, and Indigenous rights that now characterizes B.C. environmental politics (Ibid.).

John McCandless

Originally from Colorado, John McCandless first became involved with the Stein campaign after taking a position as an environmental researcher with the Lilooet Tribal...
Council in the early 1980s (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013). Before this job, McCandless explained that he knew very little about colonialism in Canada. After the Lillooet Tribal Council formally declared its opposition to logging in the Stein Valley, McCandless went to Lytton to meet with LFN Chief Ruby Dunstan “about the Stein issue” (Ibid.). Soon after, he took on the role of “Stein Coordinator” for the Lytton and Mt. Currie First Nations. McCandless played a crucial role throughout the Stein campaign. In addition to working on the 1987 Stein Declaration, he helped negotiate and articulate the Cooperative Management Agreement and, later, at the request of the SVNHP Management Board, drafted the SVNHP Management Plan (Ibid.).

Michael M’Gonigle

A Vancouverite, Michael M’Gonigle helped found the environmental organization, Greenpeace International, in 1979. (Greenpeace established its international headquarters in Washington, DC in 1980, while M’Gonigle was working there as an international environmental lawyer.) After camping at the mouth of the Stein River in the summer of 1981, he learned about the government’s plans to log the valley. In 1982, M’Gonigle and his partner, Wendy Wickwire, returned to B.C. and moved to Lytton to try and galvanize local resistance. At the time, he explained, opposition to the Stein logging proposal was centred in Vancouver, aside from a few local members of the Save the Stein Coalition (M’Gonigle, pers. comm., 2013). They founded the Lytton-based Living Alternatives to help in this regard. M’Gonigle also founded the Vancouver-based Institute for New Economics and, in the summers of 1983 and 1984, M’Gonigle ran a youth hiking program in the Stein Valley.
Alan Hobler

Alan Hobler is the current BC Parks and Protected Areas Section Head for the Thompson Region, which includes the SVNHP. Hobler is one of the three government representatives on the SVNHP Management Board. After three years spent in this role, he is currently the senior-most parks representative. Based on his time spent on the Management Board, as well as his experience with other park co-management boards in the province, Hobler reflected that the co-management arrangement in the Stein Valley has been effective, providing benefits for both parties (Hobler, pers. comm., 2014).

Ross Urquhart

Ross Urquhart served as the inaugural chairperson of the Save the Stein Coalition, and was a key player in the Stein campaign from then on. Originally from Nova Scotia, he moved to Lytton with his wife, Judith, in 1974. The Urquhart’s hiked, hunted, fished, and camped in the lower Stein Valley. On hearing of resource development plans for the Stein, Urquhart joined a local group of townspeople concerned about the impacts of logging in the valley. At a meeting with representatives from conservation and recreation groups from around the province in 1977, despite shared concern with Stein logging plans, no one offered to chair the proposed coalition. Hence, Urquhart volunteered to take on this role (Urquhart, pers. comm., 2014).
5.2 Resistance and empowerment

“The Stein is only one place. Look at all our river systems in Nlaka’pamux territory... [The Stein River] is the only river that remains untouched. Goes beyond that, how many rivers up and down the Fraser remain untouched? That may be the only one...it may be the only one, and it was a struggle.” (Raymond Phillips, pers. comm., 2013)

The campaign to protect the Stein Valley created a sense of empowerment within the Lytton First Nation. It highlighted not only their authority over the Stein Valley, but their collective ability to challenge the powerful structures and institutions that govern land and resource management in B.C. Now in the town of Lytton, as LFN-member Raymond Phillips expressed, “to get at the Stein is not just changing laws; it’s running over people” (Phillips, pers. comm., 2013). In this section, I draw out key themes from my interviews to illustrate the ways in which people in the community of Lytton understand the Stein’s park status and formal co-management arrangement in relation to both the Stein campaign and historical relationships with the Stein Valley. Based on interviews with key participants in the campaign, as well as individuals closely involved with the SVNHP Management Board, I argue that the authority of the LFN in the Stein Valley preceded the imposition of the formal co-management structure. As such, the Stein’s long-term protection lies in the powerful human-land relations that emerged throughout the campaign in as much as the official parks legislation.

Reflecting on conflict over the Stein Valley, Raymond Phillips explained, “…there’s an assumption that people have come around to appreciate that [protecting the Stein] was the right thing to do” (pers. comm., 2013). The Stein Valley became a line in the sand for many people, he continued, an issue that represented industrial development occurring throughout Nlaka’pamux territories (pers. comm., 2013). Phillips was torn
about working at Lytton Lumber in the 1980s. It felt like a divided loyalty, he described, “but you got to set limits and the Stein was one of those limits” (pers. comm., 2013). Many of his friends and relatives were also working for Lytton Lumber. “They needed that job, they depended on that job, but I don’t know if that job depended on the Stein. The lesson we’ve learned today is that it didn’t” (Ibid.).

After struggling to remain afloat for several years, Lytton Lumber filed for bankruptcy in 2007. This was devastating for many people in the community, Phillips recalled, but “…they will always have the Stein. They can go up to the Stein—children, grandchildren, many generations from now will continue to use it” (Phillips, pers. comm., 2013). With the Stein intact, he remarked, we have a different kind of wealth than that channelled through the complex networks of B.C.’s industrial logging industry. In contrast, it is the

…wealth of looking after a place, and having a place continually provide for you, year after year, generation after generation. That is the wealth that is there today and it stayed there and it is unimaginable wealth…Tough to balance those needs with what you have to do to survive these days. Today, the forest industry is dead, mills gone, nobody in Lytton works for the logging industry. What is available is concentrated in the hands of a few, and the Stein is still there. It is still just as wealthy. We are still just as wealthy because of it. In hindsight, the right thing to do was to save it. (Phillips, pers. comm., 2013)

Looking back on the Stein campaign, Lytton Mayor Jessoa Lightfoot explained that from her perspective, it had instilled the community with a sense that it had the right and ability to make a change (pers. comm., 2013). Throughout the campaign, members of the LFN were empowered in their authority to have a say in what kinds of decisions were

---

1 Phillips estimated that, in the 1980s, approximately eighty percent of Lytton Lumber employees were Indigenous (pers. comm., 2013).

2 In its 2007 bankruptcy sale, Lytton Lumber’s assets—its annual 33,000 cubic metres of beetle-killed wood—were purchased by the company Aspen Planers (Fortems 2007).
being made governing land use in the Stein Valley. Beyond protecting the Stein Valley, the transformative effects of the campaign continue to be felt in the community:

…since the Stein has come through, and that cause was successful, there have been other instances in our community…people would say ‘yeah but that’s what they said about the Stein.’ This might be the greatest benefit. Of course having the valley intact is very beneficial, but on a higher level and on a spiritual, emotional, mental level, I think it really gave this community some hope that they would be heard. (Lightfoot, pers. comm. 2013)

Former LFN Chief Byron Spinks echoed Lightfoot’s perspective on the long-term effects of the battle over the Stein:

I don’t think there are any physical impacts, I mean, a lot of it is spiritual, and a lot of it is having a sense of ownership, I think that is a key thing. But as far as physical impacts, there are a lot of people that come into the community...but they’ve all been pretty respectful… not formalized in the sense that [the SVNHP] is a tourist attraction. We don’t advertise it. (pers. comm., 2013)

The community feels a “sense of ownership” over the Stein Valley, Spinks explained, such that if any other conflict were to come up in the future, “…the community will come together strongly again, probably stronger than before” (pers. comm., 2013).

Ross Urquhart, former chair of the Save the Stein Coalition, reiterated that in the community of Lytton, the impacts of the park designation have been subtle, yet not unimportant:

People here hardly notice that it is a park, other than a few signs over there. That’s not to say that’s a bad thing, or they’re angry about it…it’s one of those things that you carry around with you. It’s satisfying to know there is a place there that’s not going to be logged. You don’t have festivals about it, you don’t jump for joy, but it’s nice to know that that part of the world will be like it is forever. (Urquhart, pers. comm., 2014)

Urquhart explained that many of the ways in which people in Lytton use and understand the Stein Valley have not changed since the Province designated the SVNHP. This is not negative, he made clear, and does not mean that the Stein Valley does not occupy an
important place in the community and regional identity. Rather, people have interpreted the formal park status in ways that reflect their history with the Stein Valley (Urquhart, pers. comm., 2014).

Community histories of engagement with the Stein Valley also shape the ways in which ‘co-management’ is understood and practiced. Raymond Phillips explained how, in his conception of co-management, a community is empowered to act collectively in defense of an area important to them (pers. comm., 2013). With co-management, John Haugen agreed, “people have that opportunity to do things in the best interest of the area.” He continued,

if people were going to try and destroy something I think individuals would step up and say that’s not right…previous to logging aspirations there was mining, trapping done in the Stein, some economic opportunities but it was not at risk of annihilation or destruction of certain areas that you would never see again. (Haugen, pers. comm., 2013)

Co-management, as they put forward, is akin to a social contract held between people and a place. Although the current co-management arrangement is partially expressed through the SVNHP Cooperative Management Agreement, the LFN has had a long-standing co-management relationship with the Stein Valley. In as much as the LFN’s authority over the Stein is now represented by their ‘official’ role as co-managers of the SVNHP, their strong sense of responsibility was first produced in and through a history of Nlaka’pamux use and relationship with the Stein Valley. This long-held co-management relationship was reaffirmed throughout the community’s experience in the campaign itself, in which Nlaka’pamux people actively fought for, and asserted, authority over their territories.
Although the people I interviewed explained that the long-term preservation of the Stein Valley exists outside of, and preceded, the formal parks legislation and co-management agreement, John McCandless, former Lytton and Mt. Currie “Stein Coordinator” said that, after two decades of activism and resistance, “…it was really important to get somewhere, where all of that was actually recognized and actually culminated in something” (pers. comm., 2013). After many months of negotiation with the Province, this “something” took the form of the valley’s Class A provincial park status and the Cooperative Management Agreement. My intention here is not to diminish this feat, which, McCandless stressed, was no small accomplishment:

We had a certain amount of time to get [the Cooperative Management Agreement] done…I’m sure if we had more time we could have done better, but we tried to do the best we could, Ruby and I basically, interfacing with the others to put something together, something that was ground breaking, that would lead us forward, not just in the Stein but everywhere…we didn’t get everything we wanted but we got a lot into it…so much has happened since then that it might look stupid now…but at that time it was, I think, ground breaking and really took us a long way towards Aboriginal title and rights in the Stein Valley. (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013)

People who actively fought for formal parks legislation protecting the Stein Valley, however, also identified the paradoxical features of the formal co-management arrangement. Amongst language of recognition, respect, and acknowledgement of the LFN’s traditional use of the valley, the Cooperative Management Agreement states: “this Agreement and, any agreement concluded pursuant to this Agreement, or any combination of them, is without prejudice to the position either Party may take in any treaty negotiations” (Lytton 1995, Sec 4.1). In addition, as per the B.C. Parks Act, the provincial government maintains its statutory authority over Crown Land despite the
management role and responsibilities of the SVNHP Management Board. These contradictions negate a simple assessment of both the basis, and guarantee, of the LFN’s authoritative role in governing the Stein Valley.

Along the same vein, Urquhart remarked that he has not followed the workings of the SVNHP Management Board. The reason, he explained, is

…no matter what they come up with some politician could say, ‘yes or no, I want to do it this way.’ You know almost all these boards make recommendations, hardly any of them make decisions. The recommendations go to political people who make the decisions. They have other agendas. If the recommendation fits their agenda, fine, let’s pat them on the head and say, ‘well done.’ If it doesn’t they say, ‘no, we’ll do it our way’…that’s just reality to me. (Urquhart, pers. comm., 2014)

From his experience working on both the Cooperative Management Agreement and Management Plan (as well as the 1987 Stein Declaration), McCandless worried that the interpretation of the Cooperative Management Agreement may be shifting to reduce the power of the LFN:

…two things are happening I’m leery of. One, [the Management Board] in some of their writing, they act as though the Cooperative Management Agreement is with Parks and I think that’s different than being with the government…and therefore diminish it a little bit. (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013)

The Cooperative Management Agreement, he explained, should remain central in guiding the work of the Management Board:

…it’s a historic document, it’s precious, and I think it’s being diminished…if you can diminish it so it doesn’t seem very important, and change the language…I worry about this politically, because [with] new people coming into the Stein discussion, the opening is there to do that kind of thing…when the old war horses are gone, people like Ruby, there won’t be people like that, and if the Cooperative

---

3 Section 4.2 of the SVNHP Cooperative Management Agreement states that “The Lytton First Nation acknowledges, for the purposes of this Agreement, that the Park will be managed and administered under the Park Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.309, and accompanying regulations.” Section 3.1 of the Park Act reads as follows: “Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the minister has jurisdiction over, and shall manage and administer, all matters concerning parks and recreation areas and public and private use and conduct in and on them” (Lytton 1995).
Management Agreement is not held up as important then maybe it won’t be there forever, because people will lose the full meaning of what it was...important to teach the next generation how to fight for the Stein. (McCandless, pers. comm., 2013)

Although no current threats exist, Ruby Dunstan expressed a similar uncertainty about the power of the parks legislation independent of the LFN in ensuring the preservation of the Stein Valley should the government’s position on the Stein change (Dunstan, pers. comm., 2013).

In explaining her understanding of who, and what, would ensure the long term protection of the Stein, Dunstan recalled her father’s advice to her after first being elected as chief: the day she would make the whole Band happy would be the day she retired (Dunstan, pers. comm. 2013). His words rang true. Immediately after being elected, Dunstan was faced with the difficult task of leading the divided community through, as she put it, “what to do about the Stein?” She asked the Nlaka’pamux Elders for guidance. They were firm in their belief that, no matter what, the Stein must be protected. For many years, Dunstan said, the honoured position of the Elders within the community had been forgotten or dismissed. When she was tired and wanted to give up, she continually looked to the Elders, who would advise her to go into the Stein. Each time she did this, it helped her get through the next few days. For Dunstan, one of the most important impacts of the Stein campaign is that it re-affirmed the honoured position of the Elders within the community. Through their leadership and unwavering conviction, “…the Elders got us the Stein” (Dunstan, pers. comm., 2013).

If the government position on the Stein were to change for some reason, Dunstan was clear that the LFN would continue to protect their traditional territories in the valley. She continues to place trust in her community, the Nlaka’pamux ancestors, and the Stein
itself, to ensure the long-term protection of the valley. Dunstan emphasized that the community needs to teach its children and grandchildren about the Stein so that, if need be, they can continue the fight (pers. comm., 2013). At the same time, she remained strong in her conviction that nothing has ever happened, or will ever happen, if the Nlaka’pamux ancestors—and the Stein itself—don’t want it too. The Stein Valley, she reiterated, is too powerful (Ibid.).

Urquhart, McCandless, and Dunstan illustrate the ways in which the power and authority of the LFN is expressed and enacted through reiterative practices and processes, compelled by, and grounded in, particular relationships and understandings of the Stein Valley. Importantly, the current co-management structure emerged in resistance to the ongoing colonial occupation of Nlaka’pamux territories. The socio-ecological landscape of south-central Interior B.C., and the practices and processes through which formal co-management is expressed in the Stein Valley, inevitably occur across an uneven terrain of power shaped by a history of de- and re-territorialization, alongside resistance to colonial violence.

With these perspectives on the effects of the Stein campaign on the community of Lytton in mind, the next section reviews key sections of the Cooperative Management Agreement and describes some of the ways in which the formal co-management structure has been practiced and enacted.
5.3 The Cooperative Management Agreement

The concept and theme of the Park is carried by and embodied in its full name: “Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park, A Living Museum of Cultural and Natural Heritage.” Management and development of the Park will be guided by this concept and will be designed to complement and highlight the historical and cultural presence of the Lytton Nlaka’pamux in the Stein watershed, as well as to preserve and maintain traditional Lytton Nlaka’pamux sustenance, cultural and ceremonial activities in the area. (Lytton 1995, Sec. 5.1)

On November 23, 1995, the Lytton First Nation (to be represented by a quorum of its Chief and Council) and the Province of British Columbia (to be represented by the Premier, the Minister of Environment, Lands & Parks, the Minister of Forests, and the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs) ratified the SVNHP Cooperative Management Agreement. Members of the public, government officials, and Indigenous leaders from around the province gathered in both Lytton and Vancouver to witness the signing of this historic document. The Agreement—signed by Premier Michael Harcourt; Minister of Environment, Lands and Parks Moe Sihota; Minister of Forests Andrew Petter; Minister of Aboriginal Affairs John Cashore; Lytton First Nation Chief Byron Spinks; and Lytton First Nation Chief Emeritus Ruby Dunstan, as well as the forty-some witnesses in attendance—articulated the sentiment, legal requirements, and managerial responsibilities and considerations agreed to by both parties.

The Cooperative Management Agreement, sixteen pages in length, describes the purpose, objective, and concept of the SVNHP. The Park should henceforth be maintained and used for the education and enjoyment of all peoples, it makes clear, while protecting and conserving the Stein watershed. “The Lytton Nlaka’pamux welcome others to share Lytton Nlaka’pamux traditional territory, culture, tradition and history in the Stein watershed,” it states, but “this invitation cannot be extended lightly” (Lytton
In this way, the Agreement articulates the ways in which park visitors are invited to interact with the Stein Valley, based on an understanding of the area as Nlaka’pamux territories.

As dictated by the Cooperative Management Agreement, the SVNHP Management Board governs park management and operations. The six-person board consists of three representatives of the LFN and three representatives of the B.C. government. (The Agreement makes clear that both parties can appoint alternate representatives to the board, as required.) Currently, the board is co-chaired by Ruby Dunstan (representing the LFN) and Alan Hobler (representing BC Parks).

The three government representatives on the Management Board were appointed based on their job position with the Kamloops Division of BC Parks (which represents the Government of B.C. in managing the SVNHP). John Haugen provided some history on how the LFN appointed representatives to the Management Board. When the Agreement was first created, he explained, the LFN held a “mini-election” in which various members’ names were put forward to sit on the Management Board (Haugen, pers. comm. 2013). Haugen noted that both he and Dunstan have sat on the board since its creation in 1995. The LFN has seen only one change in representation since this time, with the appointment of Bernadine Paul as the third LFN representative.⁴

Overall, Alan Hobler expressed that the board is functioning extremely well. The reason for this, he explained, could be attributed to the fact that the LFN was “...pivotal in getting the park protected...it was their interest in seeing it protected where as a lot of other parks I’ve been involved in, some of the First Nations weren’t even consulted”

⁴ Earl Sinclair held the government co-chair position from 1995, up until his recent retirement. Dunstan, chuckling, explained to me that she expected to sit on the board until she died (Dunstan, pers. comm., 2013. Haugen agreed that, upon being appointed, there was no specified end date (Haugen, pers. comm., 2013).
(pers. comm., 2014). The Management Board meets quarterly.\(^5\) Early on there was a need to meet more often in order to establish general operating principles for the park and negotiate a management framework. Besides the initial Cooperative Management Agreement, the Board spent time drafting Sub-Agreements on Fish and Wildlife, Cultural Heritage, and Tourism. It finalized the SVNHP Management Plan in 2000. The stated purpose of this “strategic level plan” was to: “…guide protection, conservation and interpretation of the rich and important cultural heritage, ecological and scenic values of the Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park while allowing for appropriate recreational activities” (BC Parks 2000, 2).

The Provincial Government provides the park-operating budget but, where available (and as stipulated in the Cooperative Management Agreement), “the board itself does try and apply for grants” (Haugen, pers. comm., 2013).\(^6\) Management Board activities are at times constrained by funding availability. A large portion of the guaranteed annual funding is often allocated, for liability reasons, towards ensuring the safety of park users. For example, in April 2013 a rockslide destroyed the suspension bridge located thirteen kilometres up the Stein River from the main access road. The Stein Heritage Trail was closed for several months until the bridge was repaired. The Management Board had to hire professional engineers and contractors to assist with rebuilding the bridge, and also cover the costs of transporting materials into the valley (Haugen, pers. comm., 2013).

---

\(^{\text{5}}\) The Management Board will meet in between regular meetings if an important or time-sensitive issue needs to be discussed (for example, if the board needed to make a decision regarding how to manage a forest fire).

\(^{\text{6}}\) The Cooperative Management Agreement states that: “the Management Board will identify and vigorously pursue funding necessary for management, operation, maintenance and infrastructure of the Park in accordance with Article 14” (Lytton 1995, Sec 7.12).
The Parties wish hereby to encourage and facilitate assumption of management, maintenance and operation of the Park by the Lytton First Nation under the direction of a Management Board. (Lytton 1995, “L”)

The Management Board has implemented and managed a Stein Wardens program. The wardens—members of the LFN—are the primary park caretakers who, with the help of BC Parks Wardens, perform the bulk of maintenance and monitoring activities. In recent years, two Stein Wardens have been hired to perform necessary trail monitoring and maintenance, maintain a general presence within the park, provide park users with trail information, and enforce park regulations, trail closures, fire bans, and so on.\(^7\) The Management Board determines the Wardens’ work plan on a yearly basis (Hobler, pers. comm., 2014). Should an issue arise (such as the suspension bridge collapse), the Board collectively discusses options and decides on the best management plan. In many ways, the Stein Wardens program embodies the stewardship role of the LFN in relation to the Stein Valley.

One of the benefits of the formal co-management structure, Raymond Phillips noted, was that it has generated some opportunities for engagement, employment, and training for youth in the community, such as those generated by the Stein Wardens program (pers. comm., 2013). Currently, Wardens receive training in things like wilderness first aid and bear awareness, and receive financial compensation for their work.\(^8\) In the future, Haugen said that the Board plans to expand program training to include cultural and ecological training, and shift the Warden’s role to focus more on enhancing visitor experience (pers. comm., 2014).

\(^7\) The number of Stein Warden’s hired each year may fluctuate based on funding availability (Lytton 1995, Cultural Heritage Sub Agreement).

\(^8\) Funding for the Stein Wardens program comes from the provincial government.
The Parties agree that the Park shall be maintained and made use of so as to protect and conserve the area for the benefit, education and enjoyment of all peoples. The planning, operation and management of the Park shall respect the protection and preservation of the natural environment, culture, and traditions of the Lytton First Nation while maintaining the Park’s natural resources for science and human understanding and biological diversity. (Lytton 1995, 5.4)

Since the creation of the SVNHP, the Stein’s unique ecological diversity, ‘undisturbed’ state, and multitude of “cultural features,” have made it a compelling area for ecological, archaeological, anthropological, and, in the case of my own research, socio-political, studies.¹⁰ Such research opportunities are authorized, facilitated, and determined by the Management Board, thus producing new networks of power and knowledge in the Stein Valley region.

Before commencing any research-related activity in the Stein Valley, the researcher, or research team, must submit a project proposal to the SVNHP Management Board. They may be asked for additional information and in some cases to modify and adapt certain aspects of the research plan. Past studies have looked at fire regimes and management, grizzly bear and spotted owl habitat, aquatic systems, pictographs, petroglyphs, culturally modified trees, and other cultural features. Currently, the Management Board is considering partnering with glacier researchers at the University of British Columbia and the University of Northern British Columbia to undertake glacier-monitoring research in the Stein Valley (John Haugen, pers. comm., 2013; Climate Change and BC’s Glaciers 2014).

---

⁹ I use the term “cultural features” as it is used throughout the Cooperative Management Agreement, as well as subsequent SVNHP management documents, to refer to Nlaka'pamux cultural, spiritual, or historical sites within the Stein Valley (Lytton 1995).
¹⁰ See, for example York, Daly, and Arnett 1993; Cameron 2008; Klassen 2013.
Ken Lertzman, a professor in the School of Resource and Environmental Management at Simon Fraser University, has produced extensive research on the Stein’s ecology in relation to past and current fire regimes. A founding member of the Stein Wilderness Alliance in Vancouver in the 1980s, he conducted fieldwork in the Stein Valley between 1996-2002, and has since published several scientific articles based on this research (Lepofsky and Lertzman 2008; Wong and Lertzman 2001; Heyerdahl, Lertzman, and Karpuk 2007; Heyerdahl, Lertzman, and Wong 2012; Jordan, Fortin, and Lertzman 2008; Jordan, Fortin, and Lertzman 2005). Before beginning his study, Lertzman approached the LFN for permission to undertake fieldwork in the Stein Valley (this occurred before the management structure of the new park had been formalized). Since this time, Lertzman has had several formal interactions with the SVNHP Management Board, including presenting his research at board meetings, and distributing copies of any theses or published papers related to his Stein fieldwork to the Management Board and the LFN. In the parks’ early years, the Management Board hired Lertzman to script the text for interpretive signage about forest ecology and fire to be placed at the east-end trailhead (Lertzman, pers. comm., 2014). In this way, Lertzman’s research has helped spread awareness of the Stein Valley to a broader audience, while also assisting with the ongoing management of the park.

Chris Arnett, a PhD candidate in Anthropology at the University of British Columbia, has also undertaken research in the Stein Valley. A researcher in the production of the book *Stein: The Way of the River* (1988), Arnett did limited field excavations and photographic recording in 2009 at EbRk-2 (the largest pictograph site in the Stein Valley, located at the “Devils staircase”). In preparation for this fieldwork,
Arnett gave a research proposal presentation to the Management Board. He has since presented his preliminary findings to the board, and produced reports for the LFN, BC Parks, and for the Archaeology Branch of the BC Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operators. Arnett has since made several research presentations to the LFN, as well as other bodies.\textsuperscript{11} Indeed, Haugen likened the role of the SVNHP to an “outdoor university:”

There have been so many people that have been able to use the landscape and different features in either research or scientific study...[the Management Board] always looks at people’s requests to do research and other things. We think the Stein has been able to provide those opportunities to become more knowledgeable in certain areas whether it has to do with animals or the landscape itself. (Haugen, pers. corr., 2013)

Through their involvement in the Management Board, the LFN has played an active role in determining the kinds of knowledge being constructed and circulated about the Stein Valley, by whom, and with what purpose. In contrast to conceptions of nature legitimated by colonial officials (collected through geological surveys, for example (Braun 1997)), the SVNHP Management Board has provided a framework to create alternative relations of power and knowledge in the Stein Valley region.

\textit{It is by name of the Park, and this name’s relevance in the marketing, advertising and display of the Park, that the Lytton Nlaka’pamux welcomes others to share Lytton Nlaka’pamux traditional territory, culture, tradition and history in the Stein watershed. It is recognized by the Parties to this Agreement that this invitation cannot be extended lightly and, consequently, that the Park name is of special, personal import to the Lytton First Nation. (Lytton 1995, Sec. 5.3)}

In the early stages of the campaign to protect the Stein, logging opposition came from a small group of people (mostly non-local) who valued the Stein primarily as a

\textsuperscript{11} The final results of Chris Arnett’s Stein Valley research will be included in his dissertation.
wilderness recreation area. Today, the SVNHP attracts recreational users from all over the world. The park contains 150 kilometres of hiking trails, including four cable crossings (to cross the Stein River at various points), and a suspension bridge. The mid and upper sections of the valley are limited to people with more backcountry travel experience, but feature exceptional alpine peaks, tarns, meadows, and glaciers. The lower valley offers more day use options, with hiking and walking trails, fishing areas, and campsites within a short distance of the east-end trailhead. To facilitate backcountry use of the area, there are eleven well-maintained campsites within the lower and mid valley. Although rustic, each site is equipped with metal food caches and pit/backcountry toilets. These sites are maintained by the Stein Wardens. The upper Stein Valley is a user-maintained backcountry area, also featuring toilets and metal food caches (Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park 2014).

Along with self-propelled trips, a number of commercial tourism operators have led backpacking and kayaking trips into the park. In order to run trips into the Stein, commercial operators must apply to the Management Board for a Park Use Permit; they can move forward only with prior approval from the Management Board. Hobler explained that many visitors to the park seek out the Stein to experience its human history as well as the valley’s ecological features (pers. comm., 2014). Furthermore, Hobler continued, the Management Board tries to facilitate activities that complement the sentiment of the park in order to introduce the Stein Valley to a wider group of people (Ibid.).
Park promotional materials, advertising, signage and infrastructure will be designed, when practical, to underscore, incorporate and build upon the above name and Lytton Nlaka’pamux legends, myths, histories and teachings associated with the watershed such as the Stein Heritage Trail as a trade route between coastal and Interior Aboriginal nations, chiefs’ burials, vision questing, puberty rites, pictograph sites, spirit caves, power places, power questing, bark stripping, root digging, berry gathering, medicine gathering, trapping, hunting, fishing, and other traditional uses. (Lytton 1995, Sec 5.2)

The Management Board has installed interpretive signage throughout the lower Stein Valley explaining the significance of particular Nlaka’pamux cultural features. In 2012, they oversaw the construction of a wooden arbour at the parking lot near the trailhead. Storyboard panels describing the Stein’s ecology, and the history and significance of the Stein Valley to the Nlaka’pamux are fixed to the walls of the arbour. The following words appear on one such storyboard:

For the Nlaka’pamux, the Stein Valley is the reason why, we are the way we are. It provides for our every need.
    It is our pantry.
    It is our Church.
    It is our Medicine Cabinet

The storyboard instructs visitors as to respectful use of the valley: “knowing that, you should treat the ground you tread on with the same respect you show when in a graveyard.” A large, three-panel facsimile of the 1987 Stein Declaration sits at the entrance to the trailhead—the beginning of the Stein traverse.

The Board has also implemented signage near several pictograph sites throughout the lower valley. For example, just past Stryen Creek, there is a sign explaining the significance of “Asking Rock.” Asking Rock, it states, is:

a place of great historical and spiritual significance to the Nlaka’pamux people. When they pass by, they stop and say a short prayer before continuing their journey. Visitors are invited to experience the peace and spirituality of the Asking Rock, and are welcome to pray according to their own faith.

As stated in the Cooperative Management Agreement and the 1987 Stein Declaration,
although visitors to the SVNHP are welcome, only particular land use practices and interactions are permitted. These kinds of instructions serve to emphasize the kinds of relationship people are invited to enter into with the Stein Valley, actively shaping the human-land relations that may emerge from park visitors’ engagements with the landscape.

5.4 The Stein Valley: imagining, producing, and safeguarding its future

Throughout this thesis I have argued that alternative human-land relations were forged throughout the campaign to protect the Stein. Within this process of co-production, repeated land use practices and relations challenged the authority of the provincial government as the sole, or even primary, land manager in the Stein Valley region. In so doing, Stein supporters challenged state-industry power in the Stein Valley.

This process of co-production is ongoing, as particular land use practices, understandings, and interactions continue to shape and define co-management in the Stein Valley region. In the final section of this chapter, I briefly discuss three examples of current and potential initiatives in order to illustrate the opportunities to interact—intimately, intentionally, powerfully—with the Stein Valley.

1) Beginning the summer of 1986, the activities, teachings, and philosophy underlying the Stein Rediscovery program became an important avenue to foster relationships between the Stein Valley and Rediscovery participants. Through backpacking trips, interactive activities, and full-on immersion, Rediscovery participants learnt about plant and animal identification, wild food sources, backcountry camping, and wilderness survival skills. According to former program director Jessoa Lightfoot,
program organizers hired as many local guides to run the program as possible. Nlaka’pamux Elders were flown in to various campsites to teach participants about Nlaka’pamux history, Nlaka’pamuchin (the Nlaka’pamux language), and the centrality of the Stein Valley to Nlaka’pamux cultural and spiritual practices. Through these interactions, the Stein Rediscovery program fostered a relational understanding of the Stein Valley amongst participants.

The Stein Rediscovery program ran its last summer of camps in 1991. Since that time, there has been some talk amongst the Management Board of starting the program up again, but onerous financial and volunteer requirements have thus far prevented this from happening. Despite these barriers, programs like Rediscovery provide youth the opportunity to experience and engage with the Stein Valley. In the future, Rediscovery could become a key site for youth to learn about colonization and Indigenous resistance, the history of the campaign to protect the Stein, the ways in which state-industry interests in the Stein were challenged throughout this period, and thereby participate in the ongoing management of the SVNHP.

2) The Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux School is also a site with potential to foster particular human-land relations amongst Nlaka’pamux youth. When it first opened its doors in 2009, the new school was named through a school-wide contest. Gazing into the valley from across the Fraser River, the students’ collectively voted for the name “Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux School.” Byron Spinks explained that the school board is trying to instil the value of the Stein Valley into the learning process itself: “we believe that if we, I hate to use the word cultivate, but if we plant the seed at a young age…by the time they reach grade 12 they’ll be able to speak the language, know where the valley is, know who
they are” (pers. comm., 2013). In a place that explicitly integrates Nlaka’pamux cultural education with the Stein Valley, the Stein school is an important site of cultural and historical teaching.

3) In 2013, the LFN organized guided tours of the Stein Valley as part of the annual Lytton River Days festival held on Labour Day weekend. Led by LFN guides, these trips focused on teaching participants about the cultural and historical features of the Stein Valley. After receiving positive feedback from all participants, this program was run again as part of the 2014 River Days festival. Board members John Haugen and Alan Hobler both expressed their interest in expanding this kind of programming in the future. These kinds of initiatives create opportunities for local and non-local people to learn about the Stein, while providing employment opportunities for local guides.

Conclusion

Within this chapter, I have emphasized that current human-land relations in the Stein Valley region—particularly in the town of Lytton—have been influenced by the community’s experience in the campaign to protect the Stein, in as much as the official parks legislation and Cooperative Management Agreement. The transformative effects of this time period have significantly shaped the post-1995 socio-ecological landscape of the Stein Valley. Alongside a sense of empowerment and authority amongst the LFN, I consider the formal park designation and the Cooperative Management Agreement some of many effects of the Stein preservation campaign.

In addition, I have argued that the co-management arrangements that emerged throughout this period of friction evolved from a long history of engagement and
interaction with the Stein Valley. The authoritative position of the Nlaka’pamux in
governing the Stein Valley, although represented in the LFN’s ‘official’ role in co-
managing the SVNHP, was first produced through historical land use, cultural, and
spiritual practices in the Stein Valley. Throughout the campaign to protect the Stein, the
LFN continually asserted their responsibility and authority in the area, contesting the
ongoing colonial occupation of Nlaka’pamux territories (of which contemporary
 provincial land and resource management policies are an extension). Thus, within this
reconfigured socio-political terrain, the SVNHP and Cooperative Management
Agreement have been interpreted and practiced according to a complex history of human-
land relations.

Although the SVNHP Management Board has provided a more formalized
framework with which to bring people from within and beyond the region into particular
relationships with the Stein Valley; provides employment, volunteer, and training
opportunities for members of the LFN; and facilitates learning and research opportunities
in the area, I argue that the Stein’s long term protection lies in a community committed to
maintaining its intact state in as much as a legalistic co-management structure. With this
assertion, my intention is not to take away from the benefits and success of the SVNHP
and Cooperative Management Agreement. Rather, I locate the place of particular human-
land relations in shaping current management and governance of the Stein Valley region.

In discussing the ways in which particular human-land relations have been, or can
be, instilled within a generation, it is clear these relationships will not remain the same.
Influenced by social, political, economic, and ecological contexts, they will be
continually redefined. In Lytton, and around B.C. more broadly, there exists a generation
of people who remember the Stein controversy well—who, possibly, actively participated in the Stein campaign, worked for Lytton Lumber, attended Stein Voices for the Wilderness festivals, or remember their friends and families being divided over the Stein Valley. There is also a generation of people who will inherit the SVNHP, the responsibilities of the co-management board, and the stories of the parks’ making. In the following excerpt, Raymond Phillips, speaks to the heart of this process:

you have to connect with land, you can’t, you know if you really want to protect it, you have to walk it, you have to feel it physically and spiritually. And if you’ve done that then it will never leave you, it will always be there (Phillips, pers. comm., 2013).
Chapter 6: Looking back, looking forward

“So there has been, ever since I could remember, when I was a child- it seemed to me the old people when they were still alive... They used to use the Stein for the same reasons I’m using it... Maybe I’m the only one yet that thinks of the Stein like that... Like for myself, there’s many reasons why I go in there. It’s like my Dad, every time I go in there, there’s certain trees that we sometimes will stand there, we say, he says to me, “Look at this tree, oh it’s nice and straight. If we could only get a stud-mill of some kind, a little one, we’d cut that and we’d make a darn good boat. You know, I could show you trees, I could show you places that bring back memories to me... So, as far as I’m concerned, I was born and raised there. You may as well say, so close to the Stein that if anything happens to the Stein it seems to me as if somebody is just chopping away at me.” - Rosie (Adams) Vandrich, 1988 (Wickwire 1988, 163)

I spent one August afternoon on Ruby Dunstan’s porch swatting wasps and watching cedar smoke from the adjacent smoker, stocked with salmon, wafting around us, while Ruby and I talked about the Stein Valley. Engulfed by the intense mid-day heat, our conversation continued for the next three hours. Ruby shared stories; I listened intently. Ruby recounted, circled, and traversed the history of a landscape: a river that spans alpine glaciers and silt-laden benchlands; Nlaka’pamux understandings of the Stein Valley; memories of growing up near the mouth of the Stein River; stories about her father, Andrew Johnny, who trapped in the valley for years; her time spent at St. George’s residential school; the support she drew from the Nlaka’pamux Elders and ancestors in leading her community through the Stein campaign; the final hours of negotiating the Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park; and the ways she has taught her children and grandchildren about the Stein Valley. From this conversation, and many like it, I have come to understand the Stein Valley as a deeply entangled landscape—a product of a long history of relationships between people and the natural world around them. Throughout this thesis I have attempted to piece together a document that melds
and represents the complex and lively intersections of people, nature, history, politics, economics, and power evident in the socio-ecological history of the Stein Valley.

As I have demonstrated in the preceding chapters of this thesis, various co-management arrangements can be identified throughout the history of the Stein Valley. Co-management arrangements, conceived in this way, are continually co-produced through reiterative practices of use, governance, stewardship, and so on. Such practices and activities regulate, manage, and govern socio-ecological landscapes both outside of, and as compelled by, state bodies and institutions. Indeed, within this thesis I have argued that reiterative land use practices and relations—human-land relations—should be considered as part of land and resource management regimes.

This intervention calls for a new kind of thinking about co-management. It suggests that both formal and informal co-management arrangements require particular land use practices and engagements in order to gain legitimacy, stability, and authority on the ground. Rather than simply critiquing state-centric conceptions of co-management, thereby disregarding the positive impacts facilitated by the formal co-management structure in the Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park, this thesis instead asks: can we understand co-management in a way that offers generative possibilities to inhabit, and coexist with, the nonhuman world differently—as neither a resource landscape or a pristine wilderness, but as something altogether open for negotiation? And if we did, how might this affect environmental politics in British Columbia?

The re-conception of co-management I propose offers a lens to reconsider and reinvigorate the nodes of possibility that exist between individuals, communities, and the biogeophysical landscapes we inhabit. Co-management, as I here conceive it, speaks not
to entering into a prescribed relationship with either the state or with a particular landscape. Rather, it speaks to a variety of human-land relations, where there is ultimately space to produce, govern, disrupt, entangle, and embed oneself within the complexity of the landscapes we inhabit. This analysis is not a naive underestimation of the relations of power and domination that seek to order, fix, and constrain the ways in which people engage and operate in the world. Rather, it is a call to recognize and create, possibilities for action, resistance, and transformation. There is possibility here, and it is worth considering.

We are left then, with an understanding of the Stein Valley as the product of a multitude of human interactions with the natural world. As Jake Kosek concludes in the final chapter of his exploration of the socio-ecological history of northern New Mexico, and as I conclude here,

What we are left with is a nature that is an inextricably entangled knot, a stubborn yet unstable social and material form that doggedly reminds us that it is not entirely of our own making. (2006, 285)
Bibliography


130


WC2 (Western Canada Wilderness Committee). 1985. The Stein Wilderness is in Danger of Immediate Destruction! Vancouver: WCWC.


———. forthcoming. [book manuscript].


