The Potato and the Nail: Reading The Fort Langley Post Journals and Europeanization on the Banks of the Fraser River 1827-1830

by

Ezekiel Hart Gow
Bachelor of Arts, University of Alberta, 2014

A thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of History

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University of Victoria

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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This thesis examines through a micro-historical lens the establishment of the Hudson’s Bay Company’s Fort Langley and its early period (1827-1830) covered by the surviving post journals. Through a close reading and analysis of the journal entries, I will argue that the establishment of Fort Langley was part of a process of Europeanization, which was in turn expressed through the physical construction, the labour of the Langley contingent, and the ways that the H.B.C. servants interacted with new and existing foodways. I will argue that, although the journal entries provide only a limited window into the historical reality of Fort Langley’s early years, they are a useful source for understanding complex social, class, and racial relationships that permeated life and labour at Fort Langley. I demonstrate that even the crafting of a nail is a critical part of contextualizing the complex processes which would eventually form a distinctly European system of control on the banks of the Fraser River.
Table of Contents

Supervisory Committee ........................................................................................................ ii
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ iv
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................... v
Dedication .......................................................................................................................... vi
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
  Europeanization .................................................................................................................. 2
  My Method: Close Reading and Microhistory ................................................................. 4
  From Europe to the Fraser River ..................................................................................... 9
  The Journal ....................................................................................................................... 11
  The Often Nameless ........................................................................................................ 14
  Historiography ............................................................................................................... 16
Chapter 1: “A New Fort On the Banks of the Fraser River” ............................................ 23
  From Fort Vancouver to the Fraser River ....................................................................... 24
  The Fraser in Context ...................................................................................................... 29
  From the Mouth of the Fraser to Fort Langley ............................................................... 38
  Burning Bramble, Building Langley .............................................................................. 41
Chapter 2: “Crafting Life and Labour” ........................................................................... 50
  Section One: Labourers and their Labour ................................................................. 53
  Section Two: Locating Mobility, Agency and Resistance .......................................... 65
Chapter 3: “Meat and Potatoes: Foodways at Fort Langley” ........................................ 86
  Trade ............................................................................................................................... 91
  Farming ........................................................................................................................... 93
  Hunting ........................................................................................................................... 96
  Fishing ............................................................................................................................. 105
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 112
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 114
  Songs: ........................................................................................................................... 114
  Dissertations: ................................................................................................................. 114
  Websites: ....................................................................................................................... 114
  Primary Sources: .......................................................................................................... 114
  Secondary Sources: ....................................................................................................... 114
Acknowledgments

This thesis was written on the traditional territory of the Songhees, Esquimalt, WSÅNEĆ, Coast Salish peoples and territory covered by the Douglas Treaties. It was inspired by public history work done in Treaty 6 territory, in and around Amiskwaciwâskahikan. I want to acknowledge that this thesis examines a very small part of the history of the Stó:lô people and their land.

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Elizabeth Vibert for her always insightful and detailed comments on every draft.

I would also like to recognize professors who have guided me and helped form the way I think about the past: Dr. Sarah Carter, Dr. Beverly Lemire, Dr. James Muir and Dr. Francis Landy. I am also indebted to Dr. Jean Barman who encouraged me and allowed me to read an advance copy of her Abanaki Daring manuscript.

My family, who collects history degrees, needs thanking in magnitudes that are not possible for their support, love and tolerance of the complicated relationship between historians and the past.
Dedication

To My Parents
Introduction

In 1827 a group of some twenty men was dispatched from the Hudson’s Bay Company’s Fort Vancouver on the Columbia River to travel north and establish a new fur trading post on or near the Fraser River. Although the Fraser River and its environs had been previously explored, the area had never been the site of a permanent European outpost. The HBC, under Governor George Simpson, wanted to secure its presence in the Pacific Northwest and beyond to ensure the same monopoly the company had enjoyed in Rupert’s Land.¹ Fort Langley was to be one of the new posts in Simpson’s trans-Pacific strategy which would have connected the inland HBC empire with markets in Asia. Simpson’s grand plans would never come to fruition. The rush of settlement to the Columbia District beginning in the 1830s would dramatically change the district’s cultural and economic landscape.² However, these larger themes of historical change are not the purview of this thesis. Rather, I limit my study to the years 1827 to 1830, the critical founding years of the Fort Langley post, and the only surviving years of the post journal. This thesis is an analysis of the stories of a small contingent of HBC servants and officers who attempted to insert themselves and their company into a landscape and cultural context that was shaped by, and also shaped, the Langley party. Through a micro-historical analysis that relies on a close reading of the 1827-1830 Fort Langley post journals, I will unravel some of the possible strategies and processes, such as

¹ Much of what is now Alberta, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories, and Manitoba.
² For detailed histories and descriptions of the commercial, political and social changes brought by companies like the HBC in the early nineteenth-century Pacific Northwest, see Morag Machlaclan, The Fort Langley Journals, Richard Mackie, Trading Beyond the Mountains, Cole Harris, The Resettlement of British Columbia, Daniel Clayton, The Imperial Refashioning of Vancouver Island, Jean Barman, French Canadian Furs and Elizabeth Vibert, Traders’ Tales.
Europeanization, deployed by the Langley party to shape their lives and labour on the banks of the Fraser River.

**Europeanization**

Throughout this thesis I refer to Europeanization. I use the term in the sense that it was used by Cole Harris in *The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographic Change*, especially in the second essay, “Strategies of Power in the Cordilleran Fur Trade.” Indeed, this thesis is partly intended as a response to and further exploration of Harris’s work in that essay. I am responding to, and expanding his argument, in which he wrote,

> The first problem for European fur traders in the northern Cordillera was to create familiar, safe spaces for themselves. To do so, they had to Europeanize and defend small patches of land and, almost from the beginning of the North American fur trade, they did so by establishing forts. Usually palisaded, the forts were islands of relative security amid unfamiliar, potentially hostile people inhabiting territories that Europeans did not control.

While Harris expertly explores the implications of this argument and the modes by which these new fur traders deployed, in his words, “strategies of power,” he does so in the context of a macro history—extrapolating from numerous examples. This is an appropriate way to support such an argument. However, I wondered what a microhistory – a fine-

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3 This term is often used in other contexts in ways that I do not want to imply. Such other definitions refer mainly to the political implications of joining the European Union, or becoming European in political-policy or geography. See Part I, in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

grained analysis – of just one of the many fur trade forts of this period and region would reveal about the Europeanization of “small patches of land” in the midst of Indigenous space. In short, I ask: what precisely did the Europeanization of these “small patches of land” look like? And what did it mean to Europeanize? The answer can be found in the complex cultural currents which were both brought by the Langley traders and created through in their daily interactions with both local Indigenous people and the landscape around them.

To explore these questions and expand on Harris’s argument, I turned to Fort Langley as a case study to shape my inquiry into the processes of Europeanization. Adopting Harris’s definition—the creation of familiar, safe space—as the ground work for my own use, I started to think about the implications of this obviously Eurocentric term. Could I use it when the people doing the work were not really European in the strict sense of the word? The men of the Fort Langley contingent were composed of the classic fur trade multi-ethnic workforce. The officers were mainly of Scottish background and the men were French-Canadian, Indigenous (Iroquois and Abenaki) or Hawaiian. Were such diverse ethnicities capable of creating Europeanized space? Even if they built and lived in a classic fort as described by Harris, was this Europeanized space? The answer to this question rests in the complicated pre-modern hierarchical labour and cultural relationships within the operations of the HBC fur trade.

The men who travelled from Fort Vancouver to establish Fort Langley were servants of the HBC. As I argue in my second chapter, servants in the pre-modern Britain zeitgeist were understood as an extension of their master’s arm, and therefore I argue that
we may see the actions of a servant as the actions of the master. However, this relationship needs another layer of nuance. The actions of contracted servants, acting for their master, need to be differentiated from the actions of an individual who acts with agency; of course, the men at Langley were often acting in both roles at the same time. It is in this distinction that the processes of Europeanization at Fort Langley became complicated. I argue that the labouring men of the Fort Langley contingent were both acting as an arm of their master (and therefore became ‘Europeans’ performing Europeanizing rituals, like building palisades or planting fields), and also individuals who were most certainly not European (negotiating their working conditions and exercising what agency they could within the confines of fur-trade hierarchies and demands).

My definition of Europeanization therefore does not need ‘real’ Europeans to execute it, but rather rests on the overwhelming and imposing nature of the process of Europeanization. Both the small patches of land around Fort Langley and the men of the post had Europeanization imposed upon them. It was a complex system that wove webs of control into the land and lives of everything and everyone it touched.

My Method: Close Reading and Microhistory

I am interested in the micro-historical observations available via a careful and close reading of a single source, the Fort Langley journal, which produces a very contextually specific set of understandings about a time and place. My goal in this thesis does not rest on building a broad and definitive understanding of wider trends of Europeanization or HBC expansion strategies. This thesis is guided by the ideas of Carlo

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Ginzburg and Natalie Zemon Davis, who both advocate an explicitly interpretive approach to historical inquiry and the way in which we as historians engage with our sources.

This thesis is in part a thought experiment concerning the relationship between historical evidence and the historian who reads it. It follows Carlo Ginzburg’s dictum that “every hypothesis is a leap in the dark; and the experiment generated by a hypothesis implies, as all experiments must, a selection (impoverishment) of the available data.” Therefore the interpretation of the lives, the resistance, and even the Europeanization I suggest was inherent among the men of Fort Langley is much like the study of sorcery in Ginzburg’s *The Night Battles*, his study of the *benandanti*, an early-modern Friulian agrarian witch cult. That is, it is something that can be apprehended only through limited, or filtered, evidence. In Ginzburg’s case, this evidence was the records of the Inquisitors, in my work, the post journals. Ginzburg clearly argues that even vague and indirect evidence can sometimes be put to fruitful use by the historian, especially in cases where direct and clear evidence may not exist. Ginzburg provides a critical observation about the nature of (his style of) the historian’s experiment: “what is anomalous in the situation to the eyes of the observer sheds light on the ‘normal phenomenon.’” Since each observer has different eyes, the same evidence will often present different anomalies, which correspond with different “normal phenomen[a].”

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7 Ginzburg argues that there is enough evidence to surmise that there was a complex of beliefs (which was constructed as witchcraft or diabolism by the Catholic Church, practiced by local people, but otherwise unrecorded); see *The Night Battles*, 3-4.

Without direct evidence of resistance, agency, or even the extent to which Europeanization shaped existence at Fort Langley, I am left, like Ginzburg, to extrapolate based on what I find anomalous in the record and to make rigorous arguments about things regarding which we have little evidence. Like Ginzburg and Davis, I accept that this approach will have its detractors. However, I argue that extrapolations based on rigorous supposition as Elizabeth Vibert suggested allows us to understand narratives constructed by European traders, as lenses through which reality was refracted “rather than faithful reconstructions” they can “bring into focus aspects of . . . the initial encounter . . . that might otherwise be lost from view.” In that spirit suggested by Vibert and informed by Ginzburg I wish to interpret the anomalies (refractions) that I see and to shed light on the surrounding “normal phenomena” or the things unseen.

Natalie Zemon Davis wrote in the introduction to Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth Century France that when she was a student, “we were ordinarily taught as scientific historians to peel away the fictive elements in our documents so we could get to the real facts.” While most historians are no longer being trained in this way (nor was I trained in this way), this passage left a lasting impression on me. Indeed, it deeply impacted the way I approached the Fort Langley post journal. Instead of using the journal as a direct link to the reality of life for the men of the Langley contingent, I tried to read it via a very open and interpretive process. Instead of trying to find and neutralize the fictive or crafted elements of the Langley journal, I took Davis’ suggestion that remission letters—which, like the post journal, were crafted for a specific

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audience and with a specific purpose—could be mined for much more than factual data about the nature of the past. In both sets of sources, potential narratives and interpretations can be drawn out. Davis was looking for evidence of “how sixteenth-century people told stories . . . and how through narrative they made sense of the unexpected and built coherence into immediate experience.”  

11 I have co-opted and adapted Davis’ method and applied it to the Langley journals. However, I am looking for evidence of how the men of the Langley contingent interacted with their employer and their environment, Europeanized, and were Europeanized; I then seek to tell rigorous and evidence-based stories about them. Davis was also interested in the structures that “exist[ed] prior to that event in the minds and lives of the sixteenth-century participants.”  

12 Recognizing the pre-existing cultural understandings of the Langley party is crucial to understanding the context in which the Langley men were living and working.  

13 More importantly, determining which pre-existing cultural understandings may have influenced the Langley men allows me to create a far more convincing historian’s narrative about the Langley contingent than if I were to read the journal merely for ‘facts’. However, like Davis, I was hampered by the fact that our primary sources (her letters and my post journal) rarely, if ever, directly mention a genealogy of how and where certain ideas arose and influenced protagonists. Instead, we are left with the most fictive element of our work, attempting to make a “leap in the dark” informed by knowledge and evidence about what pre-existing ideas may have been at play.

11 Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 4.
12 Ibid.
13 Examples which are explored in all three chapters are: “Lazy Indians,” ideas about cultivation of food, proper methods of hunting, even the commercial value of fur.
To perform the type of fictive and interpretive reading of evidence suggested by Ginzburg and Davis, I also will follow a micro-historical approach. There are two levels in my approach to microhistory. The first is an attempt to access (incomplete) historical reality, which is, according to John Brewer, practiced by Ginzberg and Davis in a complicated and open-ended search for historical realism, informed, especially for Ginzberg, by post-war Italian neo-realism. As Brewer suggested, “the hypotheses, the doubts, the uncertainties became part of the narration; the search for truth became part of the exposition of the (necessarily incomplete) truth attained.” Therefore, Ginzberg and Davis’ micro-historical work is a meditation on the relationship between the historical reality of lived experience, the archive, and the historian in a complicated literary and historical dance. Secondly my micro-historical approach allows me to use an inductive model to access the process of Europeanization through a specific and focused time and place. In this way, I follow John Lutz’s definition of microhistory: “The idea behind microhistory is that close observation reveals insights that are often missed at more general, or macro, level. Microhistory locates (often unique) local circumstances in relation to more general historical questions.” Therefore, I argue that a micro-historical approach offers two interconnected avenues of analysis. First, it offers the ability to interpretively question the specificities of past places and people. And second,

16 As Brewer went on to write: “This position both invites and refuses the literary. Invites because it directly addresses the question of narrative strategy; refuses because, as Ginzburg points out, historical realism with its incomplete and conjectural analysis differs from fictional realism which can, if it so wishes, offer a coherence and closure not available in an honest historical investigation. To pretend otherwise – as is often the case in historical writing – is at best misleading and at worst mendacious.” Brewer, “Microhistory,” 102.
microhistory also allows us to ascertain (incomplete) historical reality, and the ability, through the local, to interrogate broader processes with an eye to anomalies and specificities often missed in broader studies.

This thesis uses the small window most accessible at the first moments and years of contact, and available in the Langley journal, to examine the process of Europeanization. The Europeanization at Fort Langley was an early stage of colonialism, helping to lay an foundation for settler power structures. Therefore, the first years of Fort Langley offer a useful case study and microhistory, performed by closely reading, with interpretive latitude, evidence of Europeanization on the banks of the Fraser River.

**From Europe to the Fraser River**

I came to this study of Langley imagining myself not as a historian of the fur trade or of the geographic area now called Canada. As an undergraduate, I was more interested in early modern European material culture. I came to the history of the people who worked and lived in the area now called Canada later in my undergraduate studies. I was, and still am, interested primarily in the ways in which early modern Europeans (including the British) interacted with and thought about the world outside of Europe (the proverbial area of “here be dragons.”) As an undergraduate I matured in my thinking about the interactions of Europe with the rest of world under the guidance of two professors at the University of Alberta: Beverly Lemire, a scholar of the history of consumption and fashion, who showed me the global nature of the transmission of culture and goods, a critical component of the fur trade; and Sarah Carter, whose work on fur trade marriages and culture helped me to understand that the fur trade was far more than economic or political history. It was in their classes that I first started to think about the fur trade as a
place of complicated webs of European cultures and power interacting with Indigenous cultures and power.

However, I needed a final push towards the fur trade. I spent my summers during my undergraduate years as a Costumed Historical Interpreter at a living history museum, Fort Edmonton Park. It was here that I cemented my interest in the fur trade as a Europeanizing process. Playing the role of a fur trader and interacting with the public was illuminating. The fur trade remains a formative part of the Canadian national mythos, especially in the minds of the visitors with whom I shared fur trade history. Anecdotally, many visitors wanted to see the fur trade as a place of common ground or middle ground, where the realities of the harshness of colonialism were tempered by friendly business dealings. I wanted to complicate the roles of fur traders, and show how their lives were shaped by, and how they shaped, the environment and the Indigenous peoples around them.

I became interested in Fort Langley after a conversation with historian Richard Mackie, who suggested that Langley, with its published journals, would serve as a good case study for the type of close reading of the processes of fur trade power that I wanted to explore. While I initially wanted to write about moments of contact and the rituals associated with fur trading ceremonies and negotiations, my particular mode of closely reading the text of the journal, informed by Elizabeth Vibert’s detailed study of the narratives traders tell about the world around them, resulted in questions about the processes of control, Europeanization and negotiation visible through the lens of the journal.
The Journal
There are not many sources about Fort Langley in the late 1820s. While letters from Chief Trader Archibald McDonald and diary entries from Governor George Simpson’s 1828 visit do survive, they do not offer the same type of daily, logistical information about the labour and lives of the Langley party. Therefore this thesis relies almost exclusively on the post journal as its source. HBC post journals are some of the most useful written sources available for the study of the fur trade. However, they are a particular type of document, which was never meant to be published or read outside of the company.18 As Joan Sangster argues, “the journals were written by white traders, anxious to justify their output of daily work for their employers.”19 Therefore, as I discuss later in this section, the journals do not allow for a complete reconstruction of daily routines, but are nonetheless a critical source for understanding how those “white traders” constructed and reported their labour efforts to the HBC.

My approach of tight textual focus on a single HBC post journal offers a unique opportunity to perform a close reading, an exegesis, of the text, to uncover details that other historians, who may use the journal as evidence for larger arguments, might miss. My version of close reading is both literary and historical. I question cultural meanings and usage of certain phrases and words and unpack the small details of the historical/cultural context of everyday life. This includes subjects, narratives, and objects that might not be an obvious or clear avenue of analysis. For example I argue that a nail made by the fort’s blacksmith is a tool of Europeanization on a micro level, and then

trace the production activities of the smithy, reading the interpretive possibility even in mundane objects like hinges or nails. Attention to such small details would be difficult to maintain in a project which used a broader range of primary sources to build a wider history. A small nail and its interpretive potential may be lost in the myriad of other small moments, artefacts and stories, all of which compete for the historian’s attention and demand exacting interpretation. A tight focus on a single source allows me to illuminate even a nail. However, the journal, like all official documents, is limited in its usefulness when used exclusively. The scope of a Master’s thesis offers a suitable sandbox for a close reading of a single source covering only a few years.

The written records left by the HBC are inherently problematic as sources for historical inquiry. As Elizabeth Vibert explored in Traders’ Tales: Narratives of Cultural Encounters in The Columbia Plateau 1807-1846, the class, social, cultural and linguistic zeitgeist of the many hands who wrote the journals and documents created to report to and appease superiors, deeply influenced the handwritten construction of the events, peoples and places encountered by HBC clerks. Vibert asked “is it possible to ‘read through’ the thicket of contradictory meanings and ambiguous images to get some historically accurate picture of people and events over a century ago?” In answering her question Vibert critically distinguished between construction (an act of culturally informed creation of a certain narrative of people and place) and “faithful reconstruction”

20 History is a discipline which has traditionally relied on the written archive to act as a conduit to the past. The progenitor of archive-based history as a discipline, Leopold von Ranke, guided historians into the ‘archival turn’ trusting that the accumulated and preserved writings of the past could offer empirical evidence of the past. Although historians have been disputing and problematizing this essential question about the nature and goal of historical enquiry ever since, traces of the desire for truthfulness derived from the sanctity of the archive remain. See Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen “Leopold Ranke’s Archival Turn: Location and Evidence in Modern Historiography” Modern Intellectual History, 5, 3 (2008), pp.425–453.

(objective verisimilitude) of the traders’ world. As she suggested, I treat the Langley journal as a construction formed by a particular cultural context. Like Vibert, I argue that sources such as the Langley post journal should not be taken as direct reproduction of the past. Rather, they are an evidential construction of past people and events, and, for historians trained in textual analysis, often our only path to the past.

The published edition of the Fort Langley journal I use was transcribed by Morag Maclachlan from one of the surviving original copies held by the British Columbia Archives in Victoria. This makes it an accessible source for historians working on the HBC, on life at a fur trade post, or on the history of early British Columbia. This thesis is based on her transcription, and the quotations I use are cited from her published work. Maclachlan’s volume includes an ethnographic essay by Wayne Suttles on the Indigenous peoples encountered by the authors of the Langley journal. Suttles’ work provided invaluable ethnographic context to the HBC narrative. Suttles’ observations and Maclachlan’s own detailed commentary allow me to perform a much closer reading of this source. I benefit from their legwork. Maclachlan’s detailed commentary and research contextualizing the journal permits me the freedom to find small details and to consider potential arguments that I might otherwise overlook if building a broader contextual history. It is because of Maclachlan and Suttles’ careful research that this thesis can undertake an exploration of the (micro-) techniques of Europeanization.

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22 Vibert, *Traders’ Tales*, xiii.

23 Morag Maclachlan *The Fort Langley Journals: 1827-30* (Vancouver, UBC Press: 1998). In my judgement the transcription is faithful, I compared sections of the original text and the published version and found no obvious errors.
As a result, this thesis it is intended to present interpretive possibilities based on the Langley journals. It is not a traditional history of the establishment of Fort Langley.\textsuperscript{24} Instead, I am creating a rigorous evidentiary, interpretive micro-historical analysis of the small details (observable by relying on the contextual work of Maclachlan and Suttles). As a historian, I am very much present in this thesis, and like Ginzberg and Davis, I seek to read the written to find the unwritten.

**The Often Nameless**

Social historians like E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm have tried to uncover the historical experiences of unnamed labourers and workers: the ordinary people of European history. Thompson and Hobsbawm attempted to shed new historical light on the unnamed, and these became for lack of better names, the mass, the mob, the crowd. As a result, these unknowables became slightly more knowable characters, but many of the ordinary people who crowded the common greens of England remained nameless, although present. In the Fort Langley journal, the tendency of social and labour superiors to treat workers as an undifferentiated group is a perennial problem. As I will explore in the second chapter, the labouring men of Fort Langley, as recorded in the Langley journal by Archibald McDonald, were often but not always unnamed, unrecognized, and untraceable. In later life, some, especially the French-Canadians, would become settlers in British Columbia. What little we know about many of these men is traced by Jean Barman in her recent book *French Canadians, Furs, and Indigenous Women in the Making of the Pacific Northwest*. When they were represented in the Fort Langley journals, they became part of the mass of often unnamed labourers. I commit the same

\textsuperscript{24} See Morag Maclachlan’s *The Establishment of Fort Langley* for a very careful, and broader history of the establishment.
problematic analytic sins as Hobsbawm and Thompson: I group the men together. I lack the scope or evidence to unearth their individual agency in detail, although there are some events which I read as individual acts of agency, such as a liaison with a local woman, or reporting for sick list. Instead, I mainly consider them as the journal represented them, servants who took on some element of their master’s identity. To locate their agency or presence as individuals I often strip them of their individuality and conceptualize them as members of a group; servants bound by duty to aid in the micro-techniques of Europeanization and dispossession mandated by their HBC masters. I try to balance this injustice by attempting to create possible interpretive historical narratives allowing us to envision the ways in which the men may have exercised their own agency. Natalie Davis wrote in reference to speculative arguments, especially from texts that may not transmit the whole story, that “we can speculate . . . only from internal evidence in the text.” In that vein I argue that the sick list was a place of resistance, used by the men to shape their labour conditions. Due to the limitations of the journal as a source, the voice of the men has not been preserved and the available internal evidence does allow me to speculate. However, it is likely many of them were actually sick or injured and I would therefore be using their very real illnesses in place of their actual agency—a false agency. In an effort to avoid such false agency I am suggesting that the struggle to find the agency of the labourers needs to have the flexibility afforded by speculative and evidentiary analysis. We may never know the reality of the Langley men’s agency, but that doesn’t mean we should not look for it.

**Historiography**

My first chapter grew out of an interest in the ways in which the Langley party interacted with, shaped, were shaped by, and imposed themselves on the physical environment around them as they travelled to and arrived at the site of the fort. I am guided by Simon Schama’s book *Landscape and Memory*, which explored the deep cultural roots of European ideas about nature. He wrote, “A curious excavator of traditions stumbles over something protruding above the surface . . . He scratches away, discovering bits and pieces of a cultural design that seems to elude coherent reconstruction but which leads him deeper into the past.” I want to scratch at the surface of the Langley journals. I surmise that the entries had, in plain sight, a “cultural design” that could help illuminate the processes by which the attempt was made to inculcate Europeanizing values into Hudson’s Bay Company servants, Indigenous peoples, and the banks of the Fraser River. The Langley contingent which set out from Fort Vancouver in 1827 used, as Richard White theorized in *The Organic Machine*, an exchange of energy with the river and ocean systems which brought them to the Fraser River. Once the party arrived and started to clear the brambles and brush from the river banks, the men formed relationships with both the peoples and the environment onto which they sought to impose themselves. The river was a player in the exchange of culturally informed episodes of anxiety and control experienced by the Langley party.27

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27 This mode of understanding the cultural impact of geological features is inspired by Julie Cruikshank She wrote that colonial encounters: “[A]re full of complexity and contradiction on all sides. Inevitably they involve exchanges – of substance and of symbols whether objects or ideas. Characteristically, exchanges involve struggles over conflicting meanings that are often sharpest on the frontiers of empire where matters of locality collide with global practices.” Julie Cruikshank, *Do Glaciers Listen: Local Knowledge, Colonial Encounters & Social Imagination* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 20.
While the Langley journals are not the best source for trying to understand conflicting cultural meanings, as they offer only one limited perspective, I will show that the processes by which the Langley contingent imposed themselves onto their new fort site were informed by pre-existing cultural understandings and misunderstandings. The Fraser River and its banks on which Fort Langley was built provided both the raw material for construction as well as a daunting and unfamiliar space. A form of colonial anxiety combined with the contractual duty of being a Hudson’s Bay Company servant pushed the men of the Fort Langley contingent to begin to Europeanize the Fraser River and its banks to make it a properly shaped space for the fur trade.

After building an understanding of the process by which the Langley contingent attempted to impose and exert control over their new locale, I turn to the activities inside the walls. The first chapter is an exploration of the relationship of the party to what was outside the perimeter of the fort pickets; the second chapter is an examination of the relationship among the men, their labour, the products of their labour and their masters. The tight temporal focus of the first chapter on the initial period of establishment in 1827 and early 1828 is succeeded by a broader chronological lens which will take into account much of the period 1827-1830. Michel de Certeau’s book *The Practice of Everyday Life* inspired me to think about the practical implications of the effect of the material produced by the labourers of Fort Langley. As I will demonstrate, simple items produced at Fort Langley, like a hand-forged nail, became part of a system of power and control. The ramifications of this system impacted the labourers, whose labour helped to reinforce the hierarchical fur trade world, and the function of the fort. However, the process of production required two parts, the engine (here the labouring men of Fort Langley) and
the artefact (the nail). Therefore, this chapter examines the process and effects of both products of labour, and the labourers themselves. Two levels of secondary sources guide me in my understanding of the labourers. The first level is contextual fur trade literature on the working conditions of labourers, and the associated changes through the Company’s history. The second level guides my understanding of the nature of collective or group labour.

Edith Burley’s *Servants of the Honourable Company: Work, Discipline, and Conflict in the Hudson’s Bay Company 1770-1870* is particularly useful in untangling the complex (pre-modern) labour relationship in the HBC. Her broad studies of labour negotiation and conflict inspired my exploration of the parameters within which the Langley men were able to negotiate their living and working conditions. As I argue in chapter two, the formal negotiations between Archibald McDonald and the men resulted in reduced wages, yet the men of Fort Langley often tried to operate outside the confines of the established system of compensation and privileges. Private vegetable gardens, possible private trade with Aboriginal neighbours, and even sick lists provided opportunities for the men to exert a measure of agency over their working and living conditions. Other works, such as Jean Barman’s *Leaving Paradise: Indigenous Hawaiians in the Pacific Northwest*, her *French Canadians, Furs, and Indigenous Women in the Making of the Pacific Northwest*, and her recent *Abenaki Daring: The Life and Writings of Noel Annance 1792-1869*, are invaluable in situating my analysis and understanding of fur trade life and labour. Barman’s works also aid me with biographical details of the carpenter and blacksmith, whose work I analyse. Most importantly, Barman’s *Abenaki Daring* contextualizes and greatly enhances my work on François
Annance (otherwise known as Noel Annance) and I am greatly in her debt for letting me read a copy of her manuscript before it was published. I am in agreement with Barman when I argue that a study of Annance provides a lens to peer into the complex role of race and social class structure in the Hudson’s Bay Company. The cultural, social, gendered and racial elements of life at Fort Langley complicated working conditions with pre-established meanings and rituals. Elizabeth Vibert’s *Traders’ Tales: Narratives of Cultural Encounters in the Columbia Plateau 1807-1846* is extremely useful in building my arguments about the hardening social and class distinctions in HBC posts. Vibert’s detailed unpacking of social and gender roles in the fur trade provides the foundation for much of my understanding of the construction, by the labouring men, of hierarchical space, such as *gentlemen’s* lavatories.

The second level of secondary sources guiding me are those with which I build an understanding of the group dynamics of labour at Fort Langley. As I will argue in the second chapter, the labouring men individually were racially and culturally distinct. However, when they came together as a group their individual identities were subsumed by the collective and contractual nature of their labour. E.P. Thompson’s work on finding the presence of English working peoples at their own making in *The Making of The English Working Class* is a critical inspiration for my unpacking of the Langley labourers’ own agency. The attempt to find the agency of those who left almost no records, whose voices have been lost in the maelstrom of history, is always fraught with historical quandaries. It is never possible to accurately reconstruct that which has left no evidence. Thompson’s methods of finding power in group mentalities, in the agency of the individual expressed as a member of the group, offers one of the most useful methods
that I can use to access the often nameless labouring men at Fort Langley. This method is not without flaws: the individual becomes too easily subsumed into the group. Indeed, my own method imposes a certain identity onto people, like the Hawaiian labourers Como and Peopeoh, who had no racial or cultural ties to Europe. To find agency among the Langley labourers, at times I reluctantly subsume the agency of the individual into that of a larger group agency due to the limits of the Langley journal, which often only contains records of their name and activities and at times, not even that. However, as Natalie Zemon Davis has argued, it is sometimes necessary to compromise in order to access histories which might otherwise be inaccessible. That compromise can serve to open our eyes to a multitude of interpretations, a critical task when we are presented with limited evidence. She wrote, “I am willing to settle, until I can get something better, for conjectural knowledge and possible truth; I make ethical judgments as an assay of pros and cons.” Davis framed the potential of not being able to objectively know or argue something as an analytic avenue to be explored. Much of what I know about the agency of the Fort Langley labourers is based on rigorous interpretation of limited evidence which produces a truth based on interpretive possibility rather than dead certainty.

Chapter three is a close reading of the foodways into which Fort Langley inserted itself, and the ones it created, on the banks of the Fraser River. Langley officers and labourers responded to the need to produce their own food in both distinctly European and fur trade fashions. In this chapter I rely on both Elizabeth Vibert’s exploration of the cultural context of fur trade food habits and Paige Raibmon’s explanation of the micro-

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The chapter examines three food sources which the Fort Langley contingent created or relied upon for comestibles: hunted meat, fish, and farmed goods. This chapter is a further exploration of the concepts of Europeanization and micro-techniques of dispossession that were introduced in chapter one. While chapter one examines the initial tactics of Europeanization of space in 1827 and 1828, chapter three more broadly explores the ongoing and insidious effects of the Langley contingent’s insertion into and creation of foodways between 1827 and 1830. The cultivation of managed crops by Indigenous peoples was not uncommon in the Pacific Northwest. Ethnobotanist Nancy Turner argues that much of the evidence of such large-scale agriculture was either not recognized as such, or deliberately hidden by racist colonial authorities. As John Lutz, in *Makuk* reminded us, Victoria B.C.’s Beacon Hill Park was once a major site of camas bulb production. These insights allow me to nuance my argument regarding the establishment of a potato crop at Fort Langley. I do not see the potato as a new type of food production for the area; rather I argue that the evidence in the journal shows a distinctly European mode of cultivation. Hunting was also an activity which for the Langley party was laden with cultural baggage. While Indigenous people in the Fraser River area did hunt, they did so in a very different manner than the HBC hunters. Wayne Suttles reminded us that Salish bird hunters used nets to capture a large number of fowl at once, while almost certainly the HBC hunters, in a replication of a very British hunting style, would have taken birds one shot a time. When the Langley party arrived in the Fraser River they found pre-established and complicated foodways. Fishing, as I argue, required skill and knowledge which in the early years of Fort Langley the labourers did not have. Keith Carlson’s exploration of the cultural web that was
formed around fishing showed that the Langley party was trying to insert itself into currents of both knowledge and familial and social relations that were highly complicated and not necessarily immediately open to outsiders. Due to the limits of the Langley journal and the scope of a Master’s thesis, I do not examine in depth these Indigenous foodways. Rather I explore the ways in which the post journal showed the Langley party shaping and being shaped by the food environment in which they found themselves.

The three chapters serve as a type of micro-historical triptych, three interrelated but separate renderings of the same subject: the early years of Fort Langley (1827-1830). The post journal allows a limited view of the lives and labour of the men who worked and lived at Fort Langley. I draw out the micro-techniques of Europeanization deployed, both intentionally and unintentionally, by the Langley party and recorded by their clerks and officers. Europeanization at Fort Langley functioned in both obvious and subtle ways, from the raising of a flag pole to a hoe striking the ground and the nail driven into a plank. The establishment of Fort Langley was marked by a distinctly Europeanizing mode of controlling and interacting with local people and environments. As Leonard Cohen wrote, “There is a crack in everything / That’s how the light gets in.”

These cracks in the process of Europeanization, including the written and unwritten, show there were attempts to thwart that inescapable process through tactics of cultural, social and labour resistance. Ultimately the rushing current of Europeanization became intertwined into the daily lives and labour of the men of Fort Langley and rooted deep in the banks of the Fraser River.

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Chapter 1: “A New Fort On the Banks of the Fraser River”

A curious excavator of traditions stumbles over something protruding above the surface. . . He [sic] scratches away, discovering bits and pieces of a cultural design that seems to elude coherent reconstruction but which leads him deeper into the past.

--Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory

The light of early morning illuminated their trek up the Cowlitz River as twenty-five servants of the Hudson’s Bay Company left the relative familiarity of Fort Vancouver on June 27, 1827. They had orders to establish a new fur trading fort to the north and to harness the potential of the Fraser River.31 That same day, in a first brief entry in the Langley journal, Clerk George Barnston recorded “Our Party left Fort Vancouver early in the morning in two Boats, and encamped at ½ past six in the evening, about 15 miles up the Cowlitz River.”32 These men cleared the bank of the Fraser River and erected Fort Langley, an event which would mark the beginning of a permanent non-Indigenous presence on the Fraser River. They created Europeanized space within the walls of Fort Langley, pushed by their own anxiety and entanglement in their duty as servants of the Hudson’s Bay Company.

What follows is an exploration of the role that Europeanization, anxiety, and the relationship between people and place played in the establishment of Fort Langley. Paige Raibmon wrote “We need to zoom in to map the microtechniques of dispossession on the ground, and we then need to stand back to view the constellation of these techniques as

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31 The contingent sent to establish Fort Langley included the (educated) officers, Iroquois, Abenaki, two Sandwich Islanders (Hawaiians), (French) Canadians, Orkneymen and at least one ‘Half-breed’ (Metis). See the company manifest in Morag Maclachlan and Wayne P. Suttles, The Fort Langley Journals, 1827-30. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), 15.

32 Maclachlan ed. The Fort Langley Journals, 23.
the product of colonialism.” 33 This chapter is a response to Raibmon’s call to “zoom in” through trying to find, as Schama put it, “bits and pieces of a cultural design” (Europeanization) even if it does sometimes elude coherent reconstruction. It is in stories found in the Fort Langley journal of paddling a canoe, portaging a hill, setting camp, labouring to clear land or felling trees to shape into walls and buildings that we can map microtechniques of dispossession used by the Langley contingent in their initial attempts to Europeanize the banks of the Fraser River.

**From Fort Vancouver to the Fraser River**

I argue that it is critical that we understand that the establishment of Fort Langley begins not with the cutting of the first tree, but with the journey from Fort Vancouver. The Langley party began their relationship with their new fort before they even had picked the exact location. Through an exchange of energy, as theorized by Richard White, the Langley contingent was already connected with the Fraser River as soon as they dipped their paddles into the Cowlitz. As they travelled north, the Langley party created temporary Europeanized space in their tents and canoes, as if practising their skills for the task ahead.

The Langley party was “on the water by sunrise” the morning of their second day. 34 The camp had to be broken in the dark. They worked until they “arrived at the Cowlitz portage at 2 PM.” 35 The boats they had set out with from Fort Vancouver seem to have been abandoned at the portage and no mention of their fate was recorded. The

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party would later buy local canoes. However, the portage required horses to haul the heavy cargo. “Mr. Annance was immediately dispatched to find Horses, he returned in the evening with two, he says we will get two more from the Indians on the morrow.”

With two “nag” horses laden with supplies, the men of the expedition still had a burden of eighty pounds each; this weight was not unusual during portages. They may have considered themselves lucky they did not have to carry the two boats as well. Even so, it appears that not all the men portaged at an even pace. That day the party stopped at one o’clock -- “that the People might have time to come up with their loads.” This was not a flat portage either. Clerk George Barnston, who was tasked with writing the journal, notes that breakfast was taken on the last day of the portage only after the “last hill of any consequence.” These may seem like small challenges for an experienced company of traders; however, it is critical to note that the party overcame their physical environment. The hills of consequence presented no recorded challenge, even for men carrying eighty pounds each. This was a party that did not allow physical geography to stop them. Rather, these hills are one of the first of many times when the Langley party both physically and culturally narrativized their physical environment.

The next two days both began at sunrise as the party pushed for Puget Sound. It was not until around 2:00 in the afternoon on July 1, 1827 that the Fort Langley contingent arrived at the south end of Puget Sound. The portage was over. However, the oar of the Cowlitz river boats was soon to be replaced by the paddle of a canoe.

36 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
riverine paddling and portages would be replaced by winds and tides buffeting the party as they pushed north.

The canoes that had been expected and previously negotiated for were not provided on the morning of July 2. Barnston notes “the Indians of the Sound [are] not accommodating us with Canoes this morning as promised.” Several of the officers were sent to the village of the “Indians of the Sound” to purchase canoes. Paddling Puget Sound with locally built canoes would provide them with some advantage in the choppy waters. At first, the party was successful only in bringing two canoes back to the encampment. It was not until an enterprising member of the village arrived later in the evening with a third canoe, “which he disposed of to us at the same price as the others,” that there were deemed enough to continue the journey. If we unpack the purchase of these canoes, we see two elements: the macro and the local. From a macro view, the purchase of the canoes shows an already fraught relationship emerging between the Langley party and their trading partners. The canoes became, in the hands of the Langley party, an Aboriginal-made tool of Europeanization. While the two parties seem to have come to mutually agreeable terms, in the traders’ eyes the assumed inherent power of the Langley party meant that the canoes became vessels of commercial expansion. The Langley party had turned their newly acquired canoes against their makers. A more local

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reading of this episode might suggest that the canoe seller was a skilled negotiator and opportunist who profited in ways he found to be meaningful.\textsuperscript{42}

On July 4, four days after finishing the portage, the Langley party reached Port Orchard, where they were to wait for the arrival of the Hudson’s Bay Company schooner \textit{Cadboro}. Here they visited with local chiefs, both at their villages and at the Langley party’s encampment. After a little over a week of hard travel through rivers, portages, and Puget Sound, the men had a little time to rest and a hunting party was organized. Mr. Annance was successful and returned with a “red deer.”\textsuperscript{43} Even in encampments, which constituted a temporarily Europeanized space, the Langley party was wary of Aboriginal peoples. A visit of thirty local Indigenous people and their chief set the party on edge. Even though the Langley party purchased eight deer, the HBC men were vigilant. Barnston wrote “we were all on the alert all day to prevent them [local First Nation People] from pilfering, and felt considerable relief when they withdrew in the evening.”\textsuperscript{44} No thefts occurred and the encampment was visited two or three more times with no recorded incident. It may have been the sheer number of visitors that caused the alarm, followed by relief when the camp was clear of visitors. However, this is the first of many

\textsuperscript{42} Three loaded canoes set out into Puget Sound “as soon as the tide permitted.” However, for the men of one of the three canoes, the journey was not as smooth as for the others. Their canoe, Barnston notes, was “very round and narrow, and likely to upset in rough weather.” It was decided to “put on shore at a few Indian tents and exchanged [sic] it for another.” So much for the advantage of locally made canoes! Given that there is no indication any of the men had difficulty paddling a canoe, we may safely assume, given the previous service of the men, that they had canoed before. Indeed, the party seemed to know enough to realize the shape of the canoe was not appropriate for the waters of Puget Sound. It is possible that Scanawa\textsuperscript{*} or members of his family advised the party about the unseaworthiness of the canoe.

\textsuperscript{*} Scanawa, or, as Morag Maclachlan noted, Scanewah (for how his descendants spell the name, see note 19, \textit{Fort Langley Journals}), was a character who was part of the extended entourage of the Fort Langley contingent. He and his family would continue to live around Fort Langley until June of 1828 when he was killed, or so it is recorded in the journal, by relations of a man he apparently maltreated and who died on the ice of the river. Scanewah often provided advice or mediation to the Langley men.

\textsuperscript{43} Maclachlan suggest in her notes that this was an elk. This would have provided much more meat than a mere deer. See Maclachlan, \textit{Fort Langley Journals}, n15, 24.

\textsuperscript{44} Maclachlan, \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 24.
incidents in which the Langley officers were distrustful of Indigenous people who visited both on this journey and later at the fort, especially during construction -- a period of vulnerability. From the early days of the Fort Langley party anxiety regarding Aboriginal people informed their interactions. The Langley party had to wait, guarded and anxious, for the arrival of the *Cadboro* to carry them further north.45

On July 9, 1827, Barnston records with disappointment, “There is a breeze from the north west, but it brings no schooner.” The *Cadboro* would not come for another two days. On July 10, “The Sound of a Great Gun was heard at our encampment which we conclude of course to have been fired by the Cadboro.”46 By July 11, the *Cadboro* had arrived. However, most of the party, save Mr. McMillan who slept aboard, “encamped not far from Point Partridge on Whidbey Island.”47 The rest of the party embarked after breakfast the morning of July 12 and, for the first time since Fort Vancouver, entered a space totally controlled by Europeans.48 The rhythms of European shipboard life provided a floating sanctuary from the unpredictability and otherness of the temporary camps and long days of travel. However, as Maclachlan noted, the party did not escape their wariness of local Indigenous people as they worried that the seventy-tonne *Cadboro*...
might be under threat of being boarded. The core of their worry was that their ‘safe’
Europeanized space might be violated. Not only did they worry about boarding, they
worried about the winds, shoals, and tides, which had the potential to sink the ship and
the expedition.

The wind started in the Cadboro’s favour when she heaved anchor at ten in the
morning of July 12, “but as the wind failed at 2 PM and the flood tide began to set
strongly up in the inlet, it was with some difficulty that she regained her anchorage of last
night.” The next day, Barnston wrote that the Cadboro had more success: “the ebb tide
being favourable, but the wind against us . . . & came to anchor in Point Roberts Bay
about 10 at night.” The party had arrived in the area where they were charged with
building a new trading post. As it became apparent that Point Roberts was unsuitable for
construction of the new fort, the party swung towards the Fraser River’s strangeness and
power.

The Fraser in Context
James McMillan had led an expedition to the Fraser River a few years previous,
but did little more than survey the mouth. The inner reaches of the river had been little
explored by Europeans since Simon Fraser’s expedition in the first decade of the
nineteenth century. As a result, the Cadboro had little navigational data on which to rely.
Morag Maclachlan notes that Captain Aemilius Simpson of the Cadboro did not want to
enter the mouth due to lack of detailed charts. Simpson was sailing with George

49 Morag Maclachlan “Founding Fort Langley,” in The Company on the Coast. ed. E. Blanche Norcross
50 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 25.
51 Ibid.
52 See T.C. ed. 1912 Journal of John Work, Washington Historical Quarterly 3 (October):198-228 or for
original see BC A A/B/40/W89.2
Vancouver’s chart. Vancouver had never entered the mouth of the Fraser River.

Maclachlan asserts that Simpson only entered the river due to Macmillan’s insistence.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore many sounding parties were sent out to chart potential routes for the seventy-tonne \textit{Cadboro}. Some, such as the one lead by Simpson and Annance, revealed little new information. “Captain Simpson and Mr. Annance were off twice in the boat during the day to sound for a channel, but returned after 9 O’clock at night without having discovered one.”\textsuperscript{54} The Fraser River proved resistant to entry, especially to a large schooner. The party was on the doorstep of a mighty geographical and cultural enigma of which they had little knowledge.

The Fraser River starts its meandering course close to Mt. Robson and works its way through the valleys and canyons of the Rocky and Coastal Mountains before emptying into the Pacific Ocean at the site of the present-day city of Vancouver. The river gathers water from a massive drainage basin of 250,000 km\textsuperscript{2}, thus making it a major natural feature of the Cordillera.\textsuperscript{55} The Fraser River has shaped and been shaped by human presence for thousands of years. The river provided salmon and sturgeon, and in turn Indigenous families traded specific fishing sites in a complicated economic system that valued social obligation.\textsuperscript{56} Dense networks of trade existed within the watershed of the river connecting and nourishing military and social connections.\textsuperscript{57} The Fraser River

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\textsuperscript{53} See Maclachlan, \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, n15, 245. And A. Simpson HBCA 1827a:10d.
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\textsuperscript{54} Maclachlan, \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 26.
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\textsuperscript{55} Matthew Dominic Evenden, \textit{Fish versus Power: An Environmental History of the Fraser River} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5.
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\textsuperscript{56} Keith Thor Carlson \textit{You Are Asked to Witness: the Stó:lō in Canada's Pacific Coast History}. (Chilliwack, B.C.: Stó:lō Heritage Trust, 1997), 44.
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\textsuperscript{57} See Map 6 in Keith Thor Carlson and Albert Jules McHalsie. \textit{The Power of Place, the Problem of Time: Aboriginal Identity and Historical Consciousness in the Cauldron of Colonialism}. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 43.
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provided a sense of unifying identity; those who lived on, around and off the river, and their extended family and social connections were part of an identity revolving around the river.

We must be careful when thinking about the physicality and geography of the Fraser River. I argue that we need to understand it in both a distinctly Indigenous context and within European riverine concepts. Keith Thor Carlson reminds us that the Fraser River acts “as connector to no less than twenty-four separate watersheds.” According to Wayne Suttles, the social interconnectedness of Indigenous peoples in and around the Fraser River needs to be understood in social and linguistic terms that have meaning within Coast Salish culture. The social and economic interconnectedness of the Salish people, especially ‘pre-contact,’ must not be underestimated. Conceptualizing the Fraser River as only a geographical feature, separating people and places, reproduces Eurocentric spatial assumptions that undermine the critical task of understanding the Fraser as place entwined with cultural, social and linguistic meaning. As Cole Harris has argued, “immigrant British Columbians fall back on simple categories of knowing and the exclusions they entail, they assume that British Columbia was a wilderness and that they are the bearers of civilization.” Resisting this simplistic narrative requires understanding that familiar places such as the Fraser River existed and exist within multiple frameworks of understanding.

58 Carlson, The Power of Place, the Problem of Time, 40.
60 Carlson, The Power of Place, the Problem of Time, 7-9 and Map 6.
For the Langley party, the task of choosing a building site and thus creating a longer term Europeanized and ‘safe place’ on the Fraser River was fraught with the common colonial anxiety of generating knowledge about physical features, or as Mary Louis Pratt wrote a “systematizing of nature . . . that created a new kind of Eurocentered planetary consciousness.”\(^6^2\) The Langley party was, therefore, a small part of this global project to control through measurement and physical knowledge of place.

Rivers are often full of cultural meaning, power, and history. They shape culture and history by regulating cycles of life. They are characters in Greek myth and hold cleansing power in Christian belief.\(^6^3\) However, in his journal entries, Barnston did not wax poetic; early references to the Fraser River are mainly short and logistical, referring to tides, shoals or navigation. For example, “Captain Simpson went down at 12 O’clock, to the north Point of Entry which he named Point Garry, and by meridian observation made the latitude about 49˚ 5’ 30”. This observation however was but an indifferent one on the account of the Shoals that extended themselves to a great distance along the horizon.”\(^6^4\) A moment of christening that could have been emplotted with triumphalist fervour was dryly recorded, perhaps showing that this was nothing more than dry and routine duty. Although lacking in poetic narrative, this moment was part of the complex system of Eurocentric control which had been happing across the globe, especially in the


\(^{6^3}\) River mythoi are central to religious beliefs, as, for example, the River Jordan. Rivers are subjects of artists, such as Monet. Christopher Armstrong, Matthew Evenden and H.V. Nelles argue in their history of the Bow River that “to write of rivers, then, is to join, in however small a way, in this cultural conversation between writers and artists across the centuries.” Christopher Armstrong, H. V. Nelles, and Matthew Dominic Evenden. *The River Returns: An Environmental History of the Bow*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 8.

18th century, mapping and locating oneself was an aggressive technique of control.\textsuperscript{65} However, it is possible that the Fraser River had much more meaning than what was recorded. Rivers have held a special place in the narratives Europeans have told about people and place, and it is possible that this cultural context influenced the importance that the Fraser River held for the Langley party.

European narratives about nature and rivers draw on a framework of controlling and taming nature. Ancient myths, contemporary art and nationalism informed nineteenth century understandings of rivers, all part of what historian Simon Schama called the ‘fluvial myth.’ This myth is created within art that produces and reproduces understandings of rivers as powerful historical actors, the appearance and character of which are shaped by cultural understandings of the time and place. According to Schama, the ‘river myth’ holds that rivers were an “arterial bloodstream of a people.”\textsuperscript{66} The Danube, wrote Schama, acted as an imperial ribbon, pretending to hold together the multi-ethnic and multilingual Habsburg Empire. The power of rivers in both cultural stories and myths of nationalism was also expressed in the creation of an American national mythos. The Lewis and Clark expedition lent fervour to American dreams of transcontinental riverine empires.\textsuperscript{67} Rivers have been a powerful presence in western European culture and are seen in art, legends and political myths. On the surface, the river was only a commercial tool for transporting trade material. However, there was an undercurrent of deep cultural meaning and a European desire to control their riverine

\textsuperscript{65} See Mary Louise Pratt, \textit{Imperial Eyes}, 30.


\textsuperscript{67} Schama, \textit{Landscape and Memory}, 364.
environments which may have added a cultural nuance to something that the HBC saw as a riverine highway.\footnote{The commercial importance of rivers to the HBC is well established. From the North Saskatchewan River to the Columbia River, the HBC has always moved its people and goods along the rivers. They were the highways of the fur trade. However, beyond the clear logistical benefits of using a river, the HBC may have seen rivers as key to creating empire, much as the Danube was key to the identity of the Hapsburg empire.}

A riverine empire, like a Lewis-and-Clark-style American dream of a transcontinental river route, was envisioned by the Hudson’s Bay Company. The rivers of the west served as a commercial lifeblood, transporting and supplying the material and labourers of the fur trade. These are abstract notions of continental-scale power in which empires exert control in the abstract; whereas the reality of controlling a river rests much more on the minutiae of tides, floods, seasons, shoals and the people who actually live along its shores. The people who shape and are shaped by nature are key to understanding the minutiae of Fort Langley’s relationship with the Fraser River.

Europeanization functioned by directly and indirectly undermining Coast Salish ideas about the Fraser River and supplanting them with a distinctly European sense of ordered control over the power of the river. The Fraser River existed within differing conceptualizations of space for the Coast Salish and the Langley party. Keith Thor Carlson pointed out that the Fraser River is “distinct from all other Coast Salish river systems in that, symbolically, it represents for Aboriginal people an extension of the ocean—or perhaps it is more accurate to say that the ocean represents an extension of the lower Fraser River.”\footnote{Carlson, \textit{The Power of Place, the Problem of Time}, 53.} For the Langley party the Fraser River, while also an extension of an ocean-bound empire, was at the same time another inland waterway to be conquered and its potential energy harnessed for harvest and transport.\footnote{Maclachlan, “Founding Fort Langley,” 11.} The Fort Langley
contingent had to control their environment by Europeanizing not only the physical space they inhabited on the banks, but by overcoming, using and controlling the Fraser River. As Captain Simpson’s meridian observations show, the Fraser was a geographical feature, to be cataloged and placed precisely on a map. It was not enough to Europeanize space within the walls of the fort—the river itself needed to be Europeanized by superimposing HBC ideas of a riverine commercial empire and taming it by Eurocentric mathematical observations. Mary Louise Pratt wrote that the “systematizing of nature as a European knowledge building project” created a “totalizing order of European making.” Through acts of imperialistic scientific observation and pre-existing cultural conceptions, the Langley party started to try to confine and control and exploit the Fraser River.

The location of a fort, especially on a river, creates a powerful local statement and provides the building blocks for control of new trading areas. Edmonton House, later Fort Edmonton, established by the HBC in 1795, was an aggressive response to the North West Company’s establishment of nearby Fort Augustus, but it also expressed hopes of expanding trade west to Rocky Mountains and northward. While the general location was important in overarching commercial and imperial strategy, the specific location was important for far more mundane reasons of daily existence. The location dictated the relationships formed with the specific Aboriginal peoples and groups who had access to that location and might exclude others who did not have access. The location of a fort

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71 Mary Louise Pratt Imperial Eyes : Travel Writing and Transculturalization (Routledge, 2003), 38.
73 These might include reasons like access to building material, food, transportation (rivers, anchorages) and access to trading partners.
also shaped the inhabitants’ relationship with their environment and climate. For example, Edmonton House had to deal with rough snowy winters and Fort Langley had to contend with dreary rain.\textsuperscript{74} Because of the importance of specific location, the Langley party surveyed at least three sites before settling on the final location. The first on Point Roberts was deemed to not have enough fuel or water.\textsuperscript{75} The second did not have a useful anchorage. It was not until the party entered the Fraser River that they found a site with fuel, water and anchorage.\textsuperscript{76}

The Langley party had to shape its own relationship with local Aboriginal people and with the Fraser River. The relationship with the Fraser River began before the party even arrived. As previously discussed, Coast Salish spatial conceptions widened what newcomers called ‘the Fraser River’ to include related social networks and many tributary rivers. In that sense, the Langley party arrived at the Fraser River soon after they left Fort Vancouver. The Langley party was, perhaps unknowingly, building a relationship with the Fraser River in its widest sense. This required a framework beyond geography to understand. Instead we must understand the Fraser River as place of intertwined meanings. Julie Cruikshank’s work on the Mount Saint Elias glaciers constructs them as such a place, in which “[n]atural and cultural histories . . . are . . . entangled.”\textsuperscript{77} I argue that we need to see the Fraser River in a similar light, acknowledging the entangled multiple forms of understandings. Only then can we

\textsuperscript{74} Maclachlan, \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 36.
\textsuperscript{75} Maclachlan, \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 25 n14.
\textsuperscript{76} As with many HBC forts, the location would later move. Fort Langley moved four kilometers upriver (to the current site of the Fort Langley National Historic Site) in 1839 to be closer to the expanding farms. See Harris, \textit{Resettlement of British Columbia}, 78.
understand that the Langley party was creating their own understanding of the Fraser River based on their commercial and cultural need to control.

I argue that, in this expanded sense of the ‘Fraser River,’ the early travel labour of the party constituted the beginning of the exchange of cultural and economic energy between the Langley party and the Fraser River. In Richard White’s influential book on the Columbia River, *The Organic Machine: Remaking of the Columbia River*, he postulated the relationship between humans and rivers as based on an exchange of energy. Under White’s guidance, we see the Columbia River or “organic machine” become an engine of work and energy. The Columbia is capable of both producing work and energy through hydro-dams, fish stocks and transportation, and requires human work and energy to be put into it for economic and cultural ‘energy’ to be returned. The Langley party created a relationship based on the exchange of multiple types of energy with the Fraser River. The exchange started with the labour energy required to get to the Fraser River, which in turn required forming temporary relationships with other natural features. The Cowlitz River, which carried the party on the first few days of the journey, became a cog in the cultural-economic relationship between Fort Langley and the Fraser River. The Cowlitz’s energy, harnessed through the riverine skills of the party, propelled the movement of the Langley party towards their goal. In a small way, the Cowlitz River became part of the Fraser River. Geologically and geographically the two rivers remained separate, yet through the journey of the Langley party, a small sinew of energy connected them. Even once the Langley party arrived in the Fraser River, they made demands of the river, and it was to become a source of food and transport. Yet the river also made

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demands of the party. For example when Mr. Annance and a party made an attempt to paddle up river in December 1828, Archibald McDonald wrote “they could not mount the Current beyond the distance of 10 miles.” The energy and effort needed to sustain the relationship between the river and the Langley party’s desire to use it, especially for transport, was not trivial. In this exchange of energy the Fraser river receives the physical exertion of the party and in return the Langley men would attempt to harness the energy of the river for transport.

**From the Mouth of the Fraser to Fort Langley**

After embarking on July 12 in Puget Sound and sailing North, the Langley party and the *Cadboro* successfully entered the Fraser River on July 23, 1827. After several failed attempts to enter, including getting “aground upon the shoal . . . but luckily no damage was done,” the multiple fingers of the river also proved confusing. Barnston wrote “but as it was still uncertain how the Channel led, and the wrong side of the River being unluckily taken, we got into Shoal Water.” The party had to await the arrival of a higher tide and the next day “at 3 PM sail was set on a Breeze springing up from the South west.” After passing three “Cowitchen [sic] villages,” estimates in the *Journal* indicated that the combined population would be around 1,500 “souls.” The HBC had an interest in local population -- after all, these villages would become Fort Langley’s

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79 Maclachlan, *Fort Langley Journals*, 89.
80 Maclachlan, *Fort Langley Journals*, 27.
81 *Ibid*.
82 *Ibid*.
83 Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals* 27. The journal admits that this might be a rough guess. With the effects of smallpox still being felt among the populations of the Fraser River and much movement between Vancouver Island and the mainland, this number should be used with caution. No doubt it was made by observations taken from the deck of the *Cadboro* and would only include those people currently present in the villages and visible from the river.
customer base. Knowing the number of locals had implications beyond the economic. The journals do not state an explicit need or desire to directly control the daily lives of local peoples. However, knowing approximate numbers allowed the Langley party to understand the local context. How many Aboriginal people were there? Where did they live? And where did they live in relation to potential fort locations? Answering these questions would have provided important economic information and was part of a practical yet distinctly Europeanizing undercurrent of subtle attempts to control the space surrounding the new fort.

On July 25, Barnston again recorded numbers of villagers in a “Nanimooch” (Snuneymuxw) village. Four hundred were reported, with another 150 in canoes in the river. These canoes were not recorded as being orderly; rather, they caused the party annoyance by attempting to come alongside and board the Cadboro. It is not explicitly indicated if their intentions were hostile or merely inquisitive, although the journal indicated that the canoe parties were “urged forward by an elderly man who gave his orders with a loud Voice.”84 The crew and Langley party felt compelled to assert their presence by putting the canoes under arms. “They occasioned us some annoyance by repeatedly and obstinately attempting to come on board, and it was not till all were under arms they desisted from their purpose.”85 Unlike recording population numbers and other observations, this was a direct and aggressive display of military might. Before the Langley party met the Cadboro, they were wary of a group of thirty Aboriginal people who visited their camp. Control of space, especially HBC spaces like the Cadboro or the

84 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals 27.
85 Ibid.
temporary camp in Puget Sound, was an important priority for the Langley party. Entry onto the ship was a closely guarded privilege, certainly by direct invitation only.\footnote{86}

These episodes of attempted spatial control confirm Cole Harris’ argument that “the first problem for European fur traders . . . was to create familiar, safe spaces for themselves.”\footnote{87} The Langley party may have thought themselves lucky to have the security of the Cadboro for their initial foray into the Fraser River.\footnote{88} The decks of the ship provided a higher vantage point for collecting demographic observations, and more importantly created a distinct separation of space – European (HBC) and Aboriginal. Creation of European space on a ship was an easy task: the height provided clear physical distinctions, reinforced by an armed crew of a dozen men, four shipboard guns and the twenty-five members of the Langley party. The Cadboro, especially in the Fraser, provided a mobile maritime safe haven.\footnote{89}

Coll Thrush called late eighteenth-century ships of exploration “tiny wooden fragments of Europe.”\footnote{90} This conceptualization is useful when thinking about the Cadboro floating in the Fraser River. The familiar space, indeed the extraterritorial presence of the ship, provided a powerful visual statement of the HBC’s power. Barnston does not directly invoke this image. However, when we consider the previous episode in

\footnote{86}{The same day, in the morning, “Whittlakainum a Quotile [Kwantlen] chief” came aboard the Cadboro and traded. Barnston records that the chief was “kindly received.” It was not unimaginable to invite guests on the ship. However, it was always in small numbers, usually a chief, and always an offered invitation. The large groups Barnston claims demanded to come aboard would have not been kindly received. Instead they were a threat.}

\footnote{87}{The Resettlement of British Columbia, 34.}

\footnote{88}{Maneuverability and draft proved to be drawbacks to having such a large ship in ‘uncharted’ riverine environments. These are sure signs of the limits of European knowledge and skill in Fraser River.}

\footnote{89}{Although the ship’s logs and Captain Simpson’s logs are available in the HBC archives, I have not referenced them because of my tight focus on the Langley Journal. This thesis is a meditation on the extent to which historians can reconstruct through tight textual focus on a single primary source.}

\footnote{90}{Coll Thrush, “Vancouver The Cannibal: Cuisine, Encounter, and the Dilemma of Difference on the Northwest Coast, 1774-1808.” Ethnohistory 58, no. 1 (January 2011), 4.}
which the crew put Aboriginal people ‘under arms’, we can conjure an image of an armed trading schooner, standing ready to defend herself and the HBC. Yet there is an irony, since the canoes observed in the journal transported far more people with much more ease than the bulky seventy-tonne Cadboro. It was not well suited for the Fraser River, but due to its size and armament still provided a certain security. The tiny fragment of Europe and the HBC provided nothing more than a sense of protection and familiarity for the Langley party. It was a fragmentary figment of HBC power and European familiarity.

The Langley party had to locate a site suitable for both the establishment of a fort and to allow the Cadboro to come close enough to shore to unload supplies and “cover the operations of the Land Party.”91 Again, they encountered challenges presented by the river; the ship grounded “for some time” at the first choice of location. After what must have been an amusing sight of the ship fast aground in the middle of the river for the audience inevitably gathered around the lumbering Cadboro, it was decided to return to a previous anchorage and try again.

**Burning Bramble, Building Langley**

On July 28, 1827, after three days of surveying sites, the Langley party found a site that provided “6 or 7 fathoms within a few yards of shore.”92 With the location of their familiar and ‘safe’ space secured in the river, the Langley party could begin to disembark and create what Harris has called an “island of relative security amid unfamiliar, potentially hostile people.”93 The small workforce of twenty-five men would have to clear the brambly banks of the Fraser, harvest and process lumber and erect walls

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93 Harris, *Resettling British Columbia*, 34.
– all while in an uncontrolled, as yet un-Europeanized space surrounded by curious neighbours and the anxiety of cultural encounter. The watchful gaze of the Cadboro and her familiar berthings would have provided only temporary respite from the unfamiliarity of the building site.

Creating an outpost on the banks of the Fraser involved far more than simply erecting a structure. The structure and site had to be imbued with meaning, safety and familiarity. On July 30, the material and men were offloaded to begin work. Among the first to disembark were the horses. In uncharacteristically colourful language Barnston wrote “The Horses were landed by slinging them off to the Bank. The Poor animals appeared to rejoice heartily in their liberation.”94 Following the jubilant horses, the men put ashore to begin clearing the land -- symbolically and practically beginning the process of creating ‘safe’ Europeanized space. It was no easy task to clear the site as it was covered in brambles, briar and underwood. Barnston wrote that “At noon our men were all busily employed in clearing ground for an establishment.”95 The ‘disorder’ of “brambles and briar” would eventually give way to the orderly fort rising above its cleared and conquered surroundings. The land was shaped by the controlling hand of the labourers, who stripped it bare under the watchful eyes of their superiors.

The shaping of the land resulted in a distinct physical space being formed, intended to convey a message of confident control. Work to clear the site began immediately. The day after the jubilant horses had been swung ashore, Barnston recorded that “at 5 in the morning the Fort Langley men were put on Shore to go on with their operations, which are of a very laborious description, the Timber being strong and the

94 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 28.
95 Ibid.
ground completely covered with thick underwood, which is closely interwoven with Brambles & Briars.” 96 The building site would have presented a dramatic image -- the banks of the Fraser at Fort Langley had been stripped of their vegetation and the wilderness had been beaten back in a very British fashion.97 This clearing ensured that the fort’s walls and bastions would rise up from clean and clear land, creating a powerful visual distinction between the disorder of the brambles, briars and surrounding forests and the orderly right angles formed by the walls meeting the ground. Langley, like many fur trade forts, was not only a shelter and storeroom, it was a symbol and tool of control. Elizabeth Vibert wrote that the intention of the massive North West Company fort at Walla Walla was to subdue the locals and prove the masculinity of its inhabitants.98 Fort Langley was certainly constructed along the lines of many other fur trade forts as a visual symbol of control: a potential strategic fortress and a habitation to protect the inhabitants from the unfamiliar otherness of nature and local people.

Work on the fort continued at a slow pace. Much of the early labour was focused on harvesting and then squaring timber for the bastions. On August 6, Barnston wrote that “All Hands busily employed – Como and Peopeoh [Hawaiian labourers] erecting a saw pit. Of the Rest – some are felling and squaring Timber.” However, the next entry contained a notation that “Sauvé & Cornoyer also attempting to the Same [sawing], but

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97 In the 18th century, the English garden become very fashionable, especially around great country houses. In these landscaped follies, nature was deeply controlled. The woods and brambles were pushed back from the houses, replaced by great sweeping expanses of lawn. Nature was something to be enjoyed in a controlled fashion, with plenty of separation between one’s home and the wilder elements of the woods. See Simon Schama, *Landscape and Memory* 519-525, for an in-depth discussion of these trends.

theirs can be called only an attempt for they are making little progress.” During the day the men were deployed cutting timber, burning underbrush and branches but for the first nights they still returned to the ship to sleep. The unfamiliar site was deemed to be unready to inhabit overnight; from July 31 to August 4, Barnston ended his entries with variations of “Everyone as usual slept on board.” The poor horses seemed to have been left ashore, perhaps under watch from the ship. Indeed, the men and the horses were not ready or strong enough to deal with the task of clearing that land properly. Barnston noted “Pierrault sawing & eight men supplying them with Logs, which is very weighty work, but the ground is as yet too rough and the Horses too weak to haul heavy timber.” The changes being imposed on the banks of the Fraser required heavy effort. The land did not yield readily to the HBC’s desire to erect an establishment. Attempted control of the very land on which the Langley men were to work and sleep was slow and laborious. However, the Langley party soon hacked and sawed their way through the “Brambles & Briars” and started to create a new space, a Europeanized space, on the banks of the Fraser.

On August 4, 1827, after several days’ labour, “Seven or Eight of our men remained on Shore to sleep, and Mr. Annance [Clerk] along with them.” The space had been sufficiently Europeanized that it was deemed ‘safe’ and familiar enough to allow HBC men to sleep ashore, albeit in a rough cedar bark shack within sight of the Cadboro’s watch. The following nights more and more men slept ashore. Entries in the journal continued to report on shore sleepers until August 7 when Barnston reported

100 Ibid., 30.
102 Ibid., 30.
“Most of the People slept on Shore.” The land was sufficiently cleared and the site was beginning to be Europeanized.

The start of daily occupation of the land also marks the beginning of a new type of Europeanization revolving around the daily minutiae of life, as opposed to the hustle and uncertainty of travel. However, without the enclosing and protecting picket walls complete, the fort remained transitory. It could not yet offer the protection and grandeur wanted by the HBC. Instead, the liminal fort offered a strange sight, such as on August 4, when – “The Fires which were Kindled to consume the Branches & Cuttings of the Felled Timber, communicating with the surrounding woods occasioned us much inconvenience & Trouble; at one time we were completely enveloped in Flame & clouds of smoke.” Barnston dryly noted on this occasion that “it was with great difficulty that the People succeeded in getting the conflagration checked.”

The sight of the smoke-shrouded bastion rising out of the river bank and the air filled with the multilingual shouts of French-Canadian, Iroquois and Hawaiian labourers may have been an amusing and worrying sight for local Indigenous peoples. Such seemingly calamitous occurrences did not later prevent Barnston from proudly noting in his journal entry of September 8 that the “Tout ensemble must make a formidable enough appearance in the eyes of Indians especially those here who have seen nothing of the kind before.” While the emerging fort may have been an odd spectacle of smoke, fire, bark and scrubbed land, we must wonder if it was actually a formidable sight. The Langley party wanted to present themselves as mighty traders ensconced in their fortress, but there is another narrative

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104 Ibid., 30. Even with such commotion, or maybe because of it, this was the first night that members of the Langley party slept onshore.
105 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 36-37.
found between the lines of Barnston’s triumphant declaration, a narrative of “Flame & clouds of smoke.”

The completion of the fort walls and gates on September 8, 1827 marked, for the Langley party, the end of a liminal period of construction and entry into a more permanent space. With the walls and gates erected, the Langley party controlled a section of land measuring forty by forty-five yards. Somewhat ironically, this tiny section of land, now supposedly a Europeanized symbol of grandeur and security, was barren and rough. There was little within the ‘grand’ walls but unused building supplies and a small bark shed. It is hard to see this space as a grand fortress of the fur trade. For all its intended grandeur, the “tout ensemble” of Fort Langley was a temporary structure, borrowed from the timber and hacked from the bush. It was an isolated space, set apart from its surroundings. Instead of creating a beacon of the fur trade empire, the Langley party was mired in their own anxiety. Ann Laura Stoler uses the phrase “blueprints of distress” when referring to colonial officials plans to respond to perceived breaches in, and enforce colonial social, racial and space divides. The physicality of Fort Langley’s walls was a fur trade expression of those type of “blueprints” and responded to the same type of colonial anxieties. The walls served as a talismanic safety blanket separating the inhabitants from all else. Those walls seem to have provided some sense of security. Shortly after their completion the Cadboro offloaded the last of the Langley supplies and trade goods and made sail for the ocean. The ship left Fort Langley shrouded in its inhabitants’ paradox of anxiety and a sense of superiority.

106 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 36.

The new fort served as a symbol of the Langley party’s energy and relationship with nature. Energy was expended into the rivers and portages on the voyage and into the land by cutting timber and burning brush. The result was creation of a space—however confined—that separated the traders both from Indigenous people and nature.108 Again we find a paradox. The things which the traders needed—Indigenous trading partners and their fur- and salmon-producing environments—were the very things from which the Langley party tried to separate themselves. The paradoxical relationship existed within a partially controlled environment; for as much as the Langley party shaped, they were shaped by both people and place. The rivers dictated travel time and routes, and the brambles and dense undergrowth passively resisted building attempts. Deep in the forest smoldered the ever-present threat of fire.109

Before the walls of the fort were completed, the men were forced once more to halt work on August 8 due to a massive forest fire, quite separate from and larger than the bush piles which created so much smoke and inconvenience on four days before. Barnston wrote “The men employed cutting pickets were obliged to abandon their work on account of a fire in the woods, we have every reason to suppose was kindled by Indians with the malicious intention of forcing us to relinquish our purpose of establishing.”110 We should be careful to note that there is no corroborating evidence that this was a malicious fire. It is equally possible it was a ‘natural’ occurrence or an intentional burn to encourage and manage forest growth. The Langley party were predisposed to be wary of local Indigenous people. The party may well have attributed

108 Vibert, Traders Tales, 107.
109 Fire was of particular concern to all wood fur trade forts. Careful watch was kept of surrounding forests. See Harris, Resettlement of British Columbia, 37.
the fire to local peoples in an attempt to confirm or justify their own anxieties. What is certain is that the Langley party automatically placed themselves at the center of the narrative. They assumed that all actions of local Indigenous peoples were directed at and related to them, when such actions might actually have been unrelated. The next day Barnston noted, with a hint of anxiety, that “The fire which had raged with so much violence yesterday broke out again today which redoubled in fury on the setting in of the Breeze from Sea. It swept part of the little open meadow on our flank, and was arrested in its progress on that side only by the small Rivulet that runs through the plain.”

Ultimately the fire petered out and attention returned to the minutiae of labour with no more mention of maliciously set fires. The construction moved along slowly, with many of the men on the sick list due to injury or venereal disease – the reasons for which will be further examined in Chapter Two. With a reduced workforce, the fort still slowly took shape over the next three months.

On November 26, 1827, Barnston wrote “This morning a Flag Staff was cut in the woods, and prepared, and in the afternoon erected in the South east corner of the Fort. The usual forms were gone through – Mr. Annance officiated in baptizing the establishment, and the men were regaled in celebration of the event.” This was an auspicious moment, when the fort became ‘official.’ The flagpole erection needed to be marked as something beyond the daily routine. The transformative symbolic power of the pole created a Europeanized space, at least ceremonially. However, this entry rang hollow. The flagpole served as a symbol and nothing more. The Langley party remained captives of their own anxiety: “The firing which took place on the occasion was heard by

111 Ibid.
112 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 47.
our hunters who were not far distant and they came home very much alarmed.⁠¹¹³ Instead of reading this episode as a triumphant event, as many might, we should instead read it as a somber reflection of the wariness which was entwined in this powerful act of Europeanization. The story of Fort Langley’s establishment is one of anxious HBC servants who initially struggled to create Europeanizing control of their new Fort.

¹¹³ Ibid.
Chapter 2: “Crafting Life and Labour”

This goal will be achieved if everyday practices, “ways of operating” or doing things no longer appear as merely the obscure background. —Michel de Certeau

The daily minutiae of labourers, their labour and the items they produced, from a nail to a picket, were critical elements of the process of imposing Europeanization on the banks of the Fraser River. The stories of the daily work and “everyday practice” of the labouring men of the Fort Langley contingent are as important as more momentous occasions, such as the baptism of the Fort. Unfortunately, the Fort Langley post journals give us little access to the lives of the often unnamed HBC labourers who lived there. Instead, we have glimpses through lenses imposed by clerks and chief traders such as George Barnston or George McMillan, who kept the journal from 1827-1828, or Archibald McDonald, from 1828 on. Reading closely between the lines of these gentlemen’s post journals provides access to how HBC labourers expressed agency through resistance and mobility. In this chapter I will conduct a micro-study of labourers, the Europeanizing effect of the products of their labour, and their agency, resistance, and negotiation at Fort Langley between 1827 and 1830.

This chapter is organized into two sections. The first section explores the labourers, such as blacksmith Etienne Pepin, or François pettie dis Faniant [sic] (sometimes Faneant or Faniant – it is worth noting that fainéant means “do-nothing”), the post carpenter. They were more visible as their work would often merit mention in the Post journal. This section critically unpacks the results of their labour to build an understanding of the relationship between the products of their work and the continuing

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attempt of the Langley party to ‘Europeanize’ or impose themselves culturally and physically onto the banks of the Fraser River. It also explores the complex pre-modern social and labour hierarchies that governed their lives. The second section examines episodes of mobility, agency, and resistance -- from drinking, to theft and other criminal acts, to contract negotiations. These episodes are some of the only evidence available through the Fort Langley journal that allows us to locate the agency of the labouring men -- if only as seen by their superiors. Through an exploration of skilled labourers and their products and episodes of agency and resistance, I propose to unpack the men’s dual identity as agents and actors of Europeanization, and their individual identity as French Canadians, Metis, Hawaiians, or Aboriginals. Only close counter-readings of narratives produced by their ‘bourgeois’ can yield such insights.

Some of the labouring men who are easiest to trace were skilled craftspeople. However, like most of the men at Fort Langley, they were not ‘European’; rather, they were French-Canadians. Pepin was born in Maskinongé and Faniant in Terrebonne near L’Assomption.\(^{115}\) Given their ethnicity, they had advanced as far as possible within the company, becoming skilled artisans. Pepin arrived at Fort Langley on Monday 24 December, 1827, with a party from Fort Vancouver; a few days later on 2 January, 1828, he was assigned to Fort Langley: “two of the men from Vancouver . . . and Etienne Pepin to remain here.”\(^{116}\) Fort Langley would become his home for the next twenty-six years.\(^{117}\) After his service to the HBC, Pepin retired in the area of Fort Langley. Faniant the carpenter was among the original twenty-five men sent to establish Fort Langley. He had


\(^{117}\) HBCA B.239/g/32, fo. 91; B.239/I/8-10
previous experience in the Pacific Northwest, dating from 1817, as both a steersman and trapper. At Langley he was the lead carpenter and later an apparently ineffective cooper, who worked on construction projects from chairs to buildings.

The lives of the often unnamed labouring men, the servants, were governed by a strict social and legal contract that created a working environment more closely resembling a premodern English household than an industrial workplace. Life was lived according to a very British sense of social hierarchy and morality. The men of Fort Langley slept, ate, and used the toilet in physically separate spaces from their gentlemen masters. The gentlemen’s role was to give orders and perform trade, whereas the men were mandated to do almost everything else. Within this strict hierarchy it can be difficult to distinguish the men as individuals from their identity as servants of the Hudson’s Bay Company. Attempting to do so through the pages of a post journal is complicated. In order to find some sense of the men as capable individuals who attempted to negotiate their own mobility we must read beyond the lenses imposed by the journal authors instead of letting the authors of the post journal guide our interpretation. This kind of reading exposes narratives that might otherwise not be readily apparent. We must be open to multiple interpretations of the events recorded. For example, reported crimes committed by both HBC men and Aboriginal people should not be seen as strictly criminal, but rather as possible sites of negotiation, or as an index of (albeit limited) social and economic mobility. I define agency and the inherent mobility, and resistance as the methods used by these HBC servants to exercise control over themselves, instead of being controlled entirely by the company, whether in their contract negotiations, their time off, crimes committed, or potential off-the-books trade. Mobility, agency, and
resistance, therefore, appear in these attempts to adapt and use a system of servitude for one’s own means.\textsuperscript{118}

**Section One: Labourers and their Labour**

I argue that the products Pepin and Faniant produced (nails, axes, hinges, chairs, tables, crates, and boats), were part of a process of ‘micro-Europeanization’ – that is, cogs in the machinery of Europeanization explored in the first chapter. While actions such as landing a party on the banks of the Fraser were part of a macro-process of Europeanization, the production of a nail is much less grand, but nevertheless important. That nail would bind the fort together, hold fur crates together, and marked a distinctly European way of creating a built environment.

Creating a nail is a simple task for a blacksmith, resulting in an important tool of the fur trade. However at Fort Langley Chief Trader Archibald McDonald was not complimentary towards his blacksmith, writing in 1828 “The Blksmith [sic] bad as he is was for some days making Hdles [Handles].”\textsuperscript{119} Handles might be somewhat more complicated, but the simple nail requires a combination of the basic elements of blacksmithing: tapering, hammering to a point and using a cutting hardy (a tool inserted into the anvil for cutting). These steps produced a small and, on the surface,

\textsuperscript{118} Many scholars have worked extensively on agency and resistance, including E.P. Thompson, who I turn to later in this chapter, and Eric Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm helpfully points out in the Preface to his book *Uncommon People: Resistance, Rebellion and Jazz* that many people whose names are only known to their neighbors or their family are important historical actors. Not as individuals, but as a collective. Together these unnamed people, much like unnamed HBC labourers, resist controlling powers and try to shape their own lives. It is in this Hobsbawman spirit of resistance that I attempt to trace the mobility, agency and resistance of Fort Langley’s often unnamed servants. In tracing the agency of the unnamed workers of Fort Langley am working in the mould of Natalie Zemon Davis, who wrote in her 1988 article “On the Lame” that while she was writing *The Return of Martin Guerre* she was working “as a detective, assessing my sources . . . putting together clues from many places, establishing a conjectural argument that made the best sense, the most plausible sense.” This approach she argued, produced “distinctive fruits: the recreation of complexity in historical experience.” In that sense, like Zemon Davis, I am also straddling the line between reconstruction and imagination. Without this careful intellectual dance it might be impossible to find the ordinary labouring people.

\textsuperscript{119} Maclachlan, ed., *The Fort Langley Journals*, 85.
unremarkable item. Yet when a cooled nail was ready to use it became part of the machinery of everyday life and a cog in the process of control at Fort Langley. Such a nail was an engine and an artifact of Europeanization and the blacksmith was taking part in a process of micro-Europeanization. The unassuming nail was both construction material and a tool of Europeanization. If the nail possessed a duality of identity and purpose, then what of the men who crafted and used the nail? Europeanization here functions in several ways. First, as explored in the first chapter, a system of physical control was exerted over the landscape and the resources expropriated by newly arrived ‘Europeans’ imposing themselves. There is a second way that I propose Europeanization functioned; this is through the actions and products of an individual, like Pepin, who as part of a collective produced a nail which was an artefact of Europeanization. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker in their book The Many Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, remind us of the collective nature of labour and production. They argue that the “grand power” displayed in European style commercial construction “was the power of cooperation among numerous carters and diggers.”\textsuperscript{120} The labourers, both skilled and unskilled, at Fort Langley were not particularly European in origin or identity but through the “power of cooperation” produced the tools and materiel of Europeanization.

Pepin and Faniant were contracted employees of the Hudson’s Bay Company, and as Edith I. Burley noted in her Servants of the Honourable Company: Work, Discipline, and Conflict in the Hudson’s Bay Company 1770-1879, “the relationship between the

HBC and its workers was constantly subject to negotiation.” Jennifer S. H. Brown argued that the men contracted to work for the company existed as a “fragment” of their home society. Therefore, while the social and legal contexts which the men and officers brought with them were critically important in the constant negotiation between company and labourers, the realities of a specific time and place often created situations in which both the men and the officers had to adapt. Brown wrote “the trader found himself in a complex and ambiguous position . . . although he could play the role of independent and authoritative patron to the Indians [sic] and to his men in the isolation of his own post, he was obliged to show loyalty, deference, and respect to ‘Their Honours’ in London.” The contract between company and officer and their labourers bound both parties in a premodern legal and social dance which created a contractual sinew stretching from London to posts across Rupert’s Land and finally to Fort Langley. However, we must not assume that the contract ensured labourers’ loyalty to the Company. The model of premodern domestic hierarchical servitude used by the HBC could possibly lead us astray if we assumed that the men were devoted and bound to the Company. Instead, we must think of them in two roles: firstly, if not devoted, at least as contractually obligated servants of the HBC and agents of Europeanization; and secondly, as individuals who could act with a certain mobility, produce contingencies and resist the control of the Company (both intentionally and unintentionally). Pepin and Faniant existed within a dual identity and role: they were servants of the Company and therefore


123 Brown, Strangers In Blood, xvii-xviii
agents of micro-Europeanization as well as individual actors, who created and maintained their own identities through strategies of negotiation and mobility. An individual may make a nail, and it becomes an everyday tool of construction; the nail made by a servant of the Company becomes a tool of micro-Europeanization.

Ironically, even though they were actors in a process of Europeanizing control, Pepin and Faniant themselves were controlled by their premodern contracts. The working environment of a HBC post was very much like the pre-industrial households of 17th century England. The Chief Trader of a trade post became the master of the house, with the clerks and officers occupying subservient, but still privileged roles. Under them were the servants of the company, bound by contracts to their duty.

The HBC had a strict social and labour hierarchy. Informed by class, religion and ‘race,’ HBC posts were, at least in theory, highly segmented societies. Indeed, Elizabeth Vibert wrote that the early 19th century was “a time of hardening social distinctions in housing at Hudson’s Bay Company Posts.” The Gentlemen of the posts lived and ate within separate social spheres from their men, unlike in the earlier days of the HBC or the socially looser Northwest Company. This British social morality was enforced even in distant posts such as Fort Langley. On October 4th 1827, it was noted by Clerk George Barnston in the Langley Post journal that “Our [gentlemen’s] Dwelling House is now nearly completed, and the men beginning to put one up for themselves.” As would be expected in the strict moral and social hierarchy, the quarters of the gentlemen were given priority. Separation of space at Langley, which was already enclosed from the

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outside world, became even more pronounced. Separated space became segregated space. “Our Dwelling House” ensured HBC social divisions were reinforced by distinct physical spaces. The labourers, tradesmen and gentlemen lived in separate spaces, all enclosed from the outside by the same walls.

The Gentlemen of a HBC post were almost always English or Scottish. However at Fort Langley, François Noel Annance, an Abenaki, occupied a position as “Indian Trader and Clerk.” Educated at Dartmouth College between 1810 and 1813, Annance left and served as a British officer in the War of 1812. He came to the Pacific Northwest in 1818 on a three-year contract with the Northwest Company as a clerk and hunter. He was one of the original twenty-five men sent to establish Fort Langley where he served as Clerk and Indian Trader. Sadly this would be the highest position he would earn.

Although he was both educated and experienced in the Pacific Northwest he remained, in the eyes of the Company, an ‘Indian.’ Later in life Annance would write, “I feel ashamed to be among gentlemen – tho I have been called a gentleman – an officer – a teacher of languages – but alas! To have scanned Homer, Virgil, and Horace, to have traced Euclid through abstruse regions of mathematics has not expiated the crime of being called an Indian.”

Jean Barman notes in her book *Abenaki Daring: The Life and Writings of Noel Annance 1792-1869* that despite such “shame” Annance did not try to hide his Abenaki heritage–rather he seemed to embrace it. His loyalty to his heritage meant that although he was a decorated officer and educated gentleman, he was not allowed to rise

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127 Annance’s Father Francis Joseph Annance also attended Moor’s Indian Charity School and Dartmouth. They were both descended from white captives of the Abenaki. Barman suggests that Francois Noel Annance gained entry to Dartmouth on merit in the entrance exam. No doubt having an educated father helped him with his studies. See Barman, *Abenaki Daring*, 57.

to Chief Trader and command his own post. The HBC social hierarchy may have had some flexibility ‘in the field’ to allow Annance to serve, but it did not stretch to allowing him into the elite echelons of command. We can see in the names of the Chief Traders the racial and social discrimination rampant in the HBC. Langley was commanded first by James McMillan and later by Archibald McDonald; to have a Chief Trader Annance of Abenaki (or French) heritage would have been almost unthinkable. François Noel Annance was an Aboriginal gentleman, officer and Clerk of the HBC. Yet he was still under the yoke of a racist and hierarchical pre-modern social system.

Although Fort Langley had exceptions like Annance, who rose in the ranks (if only so far), the post was socially stratified. Most of the gentlemen were British, and below them the craft-artisans, and finally the labourers. At Fort Langley, the HBC linguistic and social hierarchy, which had served on the banks of Hudson Bay and Rupert’s Land, was complicated by two Sandwich Islanders, Como and Peopeoh. Hawaiians had been granted pay equal to French Canadian or European servants, which meant they had a certain status within the labour hierarchy. Their language differences, according to Jean Barman, meant that they were “very often assigned repetitive tasks.”

At Fort Langley, Como and Peopeoh were assigned to the saw pit. Barman dryly notes that “in effect the two Hawaiians sawed the wood that built Fort Langley.” Como and Peopeoh seemed to be ‘good’ workers, at least there is never any mention of trouble. Yet while they may have been dependable sawyers, they were still separated, in the saw pit,


from the rest of the contingent. Their pay may have been equal, but they remained the new racial group, not yet fully integrated into the social and labour machinery.

Blacksmith was an important position within an HBC post. The blacksmith was responsible for maintaining and making tools, creating the hardware necessary to construct ‘European’ structures such as the bolts to hold together new boats, and possibly most importantly to early Fort Langley, the nails needed for outgoing crates of furs.

Etienne Pepin struggled (or at least Archibald MacDonald portrayed him as struggling) to forge simple axes and nails. However, we cannot read McDonald’s criticisms without the proper context. I am unsure of how much McDonald knew of blacksmithing. It is a trade that requires skill and control. However, even a skilled blacksmith can be limited by the quality of the available material. When one shipment arrived at Fort Langley in July of 1829, Archibald McDonald remarked in the Post journal, “Rod iron from its smallness literally good for nothing – no small disappointment as without nails we cannot get cases made for our furs.”

Although McDonald questioned the skill of Pepin, the products produced were still desperately needed within the fur trade machinery of Fort Langley, which like any post depended on blacksmiths. Normally this meant blacksmiths became highly regarded by the gentlemen and hierarchy of the Company. Jean Barman notes that while many English-speaking artisans stayed for only one contract, many of the most highly regarded artisans were French Canadian. One blacksmith noted by Barman was granted a retirement ‘pension’ of six months’ wages. Although other blacksmiths may...

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133 Barman, *French Canadian Furs*, 72.
have been highly regarded, Pepin (according to McDonald) was not one of them. Nevertheless, his work was vital to the operation of the Fort.

Pepin made, among other things, nails, axes, sickles, “handles & hinges,” fishing hooks and parts for boats, as well as repairing and sharpening tools. These items were used by the Langley contingent for their own use, and for trade. On one occasion McDonald notes in the journal, “traded an otter and small beaver skin for one of our very inferior Sm. Axes made by Pepin.”\(^{134}\) Although McDonald considered the axe to be “inferior,” it is critical to note that it was produced at Fort Langley, and not shipped in. The blacksmith had a dual role, both as a producer of trade goods and as manufacturer of hardware needed to create European-style structures.

Hardware like handles and hinges for store houses and living quarters helped to create a ‘space apart’. With hinges and handles, rooms or cupboards that before might have been considered rough, could become more ‘civilized.’ McDonald’s description in the journal suggests that such fixtures were needed for the houses to be truly complete: “A neat little House here of two rooms 20 by 15 feet each is now finished, & and the Blksmith bad as he is was for some days making Hdles – Hinges etc. etc. for the doors and Cupboards.”\(^{135}\) Although McDonald criticizes Pepin’s work, it is clear that these “neat little Houses” needed the hardware to become complete and fully useable. The creation of new houses, finished with hardware, seemed to have pleased McDonald, who noted earlier in the same entry, “the present buildings too confined.” Pepin’s work became part of the machinery of sawyers, labourers, and carpenters which created the physical structures of Fort Langley. Instead of cutting and processing lumber or erecting

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walls, Pepin’s work provided some of the finishing ‘domestic’ touches, without which the new houses may not have been truly complete. This “neat” house was not to be a rough cabin, but rather a finished home.

Pepin’s work was often focused on making nails. Nails are one of the first things a blacksmith learns to make. The process is simple, yet uses many techniques needed in more complicated work. Iron rod is hammered to a point and sized according to need. The rod is cut while hot and placed through a nail header (normally made by the blacksmith) which creates the flat head through ‘upsetting’ the top of the rod until flat.\(^{136}\) It is a repetitive process, yet should be simple enough to master. Yet McDonald wrote, “The Blksmith has a chap with him making nails, which I believe is the *ne plus ultra* of the chaps [*sic*] pretensions to the trade of which he will be a member.”\(^{137}\) The poor chap working with Pepin seemed unable to master the simple process of nail making, much to the displeasure of McDonald, who needed the nails for the crates in which he was to ship furs away from the fort. Nails ruined by a novice cost time, but more importantly iron rod, which was in short supply.\(^{138}\)

Notwithstanding McDonald’s cruel comments, an important process was happening here. Pepin was training an ‘apprentice.’ In the pre-modern labour world of the HBC, skills were not taught in central company schools, but rather learned from accomplished tradesmen who passed on critical and complicated skills such as blacksmithing. Within this mode of training there is a difference between knowledge and

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practice. The apprentice may ask questions, thereby gaining knowledge. However, it is not until that knowledge is combined with learned skills or “behaviours performed in the production of an artifact” that it becomes ‘practice.’ This transmission of knowledge into practice through apprenticeships was an essential survival tactic for both the wider Company and for specific posts. Not only does the post gain another skilled labourer in the process; work might go faster. If the ‘master,’ here Pepin, was injured or killed, the work of the blacksmith’s shop could continue to some extent. The transmission of knowledge which in turn becomes practice must be seen as a crucial strategy for the survival of the HBC labour hierarchy. The pre-modern labour structure needed to reproduce itself internally. Through Pepin’s training of the man known only as the “chap,” nails would continue to be hammered out, both binding crates of fur and ensuring the passage of knowledge and the learning of practice.

The blacksmith was not the only skilled labourer at Fort Langley. François Pettiet Faniant, a member of the original contingent, was assigned to work as carpenter. Unlike his response to Pepin, McDonald seemed to take more kindly to Faniant in journal entries. It may be a matter of personality, or perhaps Faniant was a better carpenter than Pepin a blacksmith. However, it is also possible that because Faniant was already the carpenter when McDonald arrived at Fort Langley, a pre-existing dynamic ensured a more respectful relationship. As carpenter, Faniant oversaw the construction of buildings, boats and furniture. His work was crucial to creating ‘Europeanized’ space on the banks of the Fraser River. Like Pepin the blacksmith, the products created by Faniant tied him into a network of hierarchy and control. For example, Barnston notes that the “

has finished us a couple of tables and four chairs.” ¹⁴⁰ As Elizabeth Vibert has noted, “not only did gentlemen ‘mess’ separately, they messed more graciously than servants.” Fаниант created the set pieces by which he and fellow servants would be separated, and ruled, by the officers of the company. Vibert further notes that these social displays, in our case partly facilitated by Faniant, were essential to the “regulation of the fur trade labour force.” ¹⁴¹ The separation facilitated by Faniant extended beyond dining arrangements to lavatory arrangements. Barnston wrote with some relief, “the Carpenter and two of them commenced places of convenience in the Fort for both men and master – improvement that is very desirable.” ¹⁴² Separation of class-based space extended to all realms of daily routine. Barnston’s happiness at the prospect of separate lavatory arrangements is particularly indicative of the British sensibilities and moralities prevalent in the HBC. Faniant became the agent who, through his labour, helped to produce the physical barriers which enforced social and class distinctions in Fort Langley.

Faniant the carpenter also participated with the boat builder and blacksmith in the construction of new boats. In the early days of Fort Langley this was to be a critical task. The boats were meant to allow the brigades, so common in Rupert’s Land, to journey up the Fraser River and onwards to York Factory. However, as Governor Simpson noted when he came to Fort Langley via the upper Fraser River:

¹⁴⁰ Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 91.
¹⁴¹ Vibert, Traders’ Tales, 111.
¹⁴² Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 83.
Frazers River, Can no longer be thought of as a practicable communication with the interior; it was never wholly passed by water before, and in all probability never will again ... I shall therefore no longer talk of it as a navigable stream.143

This was not to be the new highway from coast to interior. Nevertheless, Faniant is noted in the Post journal as working with the other skilled labourers on boats: “Carpenter, Blacksmith and Delinais making some preparations inside the Fort to begin building a Boat.”144 These boats would remain useful for sending parties to trap, fish, or travel to Fort Vancouver. Even though Fort Langley was turning into something quite different from the traditional fur trading forts of Rupert’s Land and starting to focus on food production and salmon exports, it was controlled by the same institutional structure and rhythms. The boats and crates, made by Faniant with nails supplied by Pepin the blacksmith, were part of the fur trade mandate which was still maintained by Fort Langley in the late 1820s.145

Pepin and Faniant operated within a system of pre-modern master-servant relationships and were bound by contractual obligation to the HBC. They lived in a social environment of masters and servants, eating, sleeping and even relieving themselves in strict separation. The omnipresent control of daily life was similar to, although somewhat less harsh than eighteenth-century ships. As Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker point out the harsh “and often murderous” total control on both merchant and naval ships often “caused thousands of sailors to turn pirate.”146 At HBC posts like Langley the control was more nuanced and normally relied not on physical violence but a strictly enforced social

144 Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 93.
145 See Barman, “West Beyond the West, 42-43, And Mackie, “Trading Beyond the Mountains” 244-245
and class hierarchy. As contracted servants, Faniant and Pepin had a nominal ‘duty’ to the Company and their masters. They become, when working, agents of the HBC, creating, framing and forging spaces of social and economic control. Indeed, in 18th and early 19th century English conceptualizations, a servant was an extension of their masters’ arms. Historian of British domestic servitude Carolyn Steedman wrote “Throughout the eighteenth century the servant cutting turf, the boy cleaning the knives, the kitchen maid milking the house cow, were conceived of as aspects of their master's capacities and abilities.” Although Steedman was primarily concerned with domestic servitude in England, I argue that the master-servant environment in the HBC may have operated under a similar conceptualization. However, this leaves us in a rather politically uncomfortable quandary. While the labour, actions and products of a HBC worker can surely be seen as extensions of Company control, we are left with Company servants who had little agency. Therefore, locating episodes of mobility and resistance allows us to read beyond the hegemonic narratives of Master and Servant that often left little room for servant agency or humanity.\footnote{See Carolyn Steedman, \textit{Master and Servant: Love and Labour in the English Industrial Age} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 223 for the role of experience as an analytical lens for studying working people and the Master-Servant relationship within wider industrial contexts.}

**Section Two: Locating Mobility, Agency and Resistance**

Locating episodes of mobility, agency and resistance in the lives of HBC labourers is a complicated task, especially in the early days of Fort Langley. Without diaries, memoirs or letters, we know very little about their experiences or thoughts. Our vision of Pepin and Faniant is clouded by Barnston, McMillan and McDonald, who, as we saw, took a harsh tone with Pepin. As a result we are faced with a question; how do

we find the men’s agency, mobility and resistance through the lens of the Fort Langley Journals?\textsuperscript{149}

I cannot find evidence in the Fort Langley journals of any widespread resistance among the men to labour or social control. Revolutionary mentality and tendencies that shaped much of ‘labouring’ Europe in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries did not seem to extend to Fort Langley in the 1820s. However, understanding the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century context of the formation of labour resistance is critical for finding and understanding episodes of resistance to social order and labour hierarchy.

In his \textit{The Making of The English Working Class}, E.P. Thompson wrote “In the years between 1780 and 1832 most English working people came to feel an identity of interests as between themselves and as against their rulers and employers.”\textsuperscript{150} To deploy Thompsonian theories in the Pacific Northwest, we must first acknowledge seeming discordances between the experience of the working people in England and the mixed-culture labourers of the HBC. While they worked for an English company which used the hierarchy and labour arrangements which had held captive English working people, the labourers were not English, nor were they in England. Therefore we expect, and find, that the situation on the banks of the Fraser was rather different from that on the common greens of England. This does not mean that Thompson’s ideas about the formation of a class of labouring people cannot be used in the Langley context. Instead of a direct

\textsuperscript{149} Burley found episodes of resistance, unrest, and negotiation through surveying wide swaths of the HBC, correlating events such as refusal to follow orders to find some form of macro-resistance. Burley’s study, although thorough and wide ranging, sometimes lacks a tight enough focus on the specifics of time and place. My tight focus on Fort Langley, mostly through its Post journals, means I must read between the lines and at times make suppositions in order to locate episodes of mobility, negotiation and individual identity. To perform this task we must continually remind ourselves that the Post journals were created by the men’s superiors for their superiors. See

importation of his method, we can be inspired by Thompson. Instead of finding a new social class, created by its members, we can seek out the nuances of episodes when the often unnamed men of Fort Langley intentionally and unintentionally negotiated their role as servants within the ‘Honorable Company.’

The first job is to locate HBC labourers, a task complicated by a lack of clear names in journal entries. For example, Faniant and Pepin were skilled craftsmen; their work was noted and commented on in more detail than others’. However, many of the other men of the fort appeared less often in the Post journal. Usually they appear on lists of men assigned to work. For example, on the 27th of August, 1827, Barnston recorded:

Bouchard, Ettue [sic] Antoine Pierrault and another are the men getting up the second Bastion. Tarihonga, Dubois, Cornoyer, and Arquoiitte are preparing pickets, Jacques Pierrault busy in supplying the Saw Pit with wood and in doing other little jobs about the place.151

Whereas Barnston would often identify men by name, McDonald would as often as not refer to numbers of unnamed men and their work:

Eight men Commenced breaking new ground with the Hoe and turning up roots – work that Can advance but slowly. We have also a Couple of men not far off breaking up beaver dams that overflow. . .152

In Barnston’s entries we are more able to track the activities of a specific labourer; in a sense we are able to track the person and not only their labour. McDonald’s entries often mean that we can only track the labour of ‘the men.’ The identities of the individuals become difficult to locate in McDonald’s entries. Those who had no voice in the Journals during Barnston’s tenure lost even their name under the pen of McDonald.153

151 Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 35.
153 Trying to trace and unpack narratives which are not directly recorded borders on the imaginative realm of speculation. However, when we are presented with a lack of evidence it doesn’t mean that nothing happened, rather we must make informed suppositions guided by critically unpacking the available
Even a skilled labourer like Faniant, who was often referred to by name by Barnston, was generally referred to as “carpenter” by McDonald. This small change in the format of the Post journal dehumanized the men, taking their names and reducing their recorded presence to the product of their labour. Historians such as Maclachlan have noted the difference between Fort Langley under James McMillan and Archibald McDonald. Maclachlan wrote, “There appears to have been a sense of camaraderie between James McMillan and the men that is less evident under McDonald.” The named men performing specific tasks under McMillan, and as recorded by Barnston, are much fuller characters than the nameless labouring mass under McDonald. The October 1828 arrival of Governor George Simpson and the resulting change of command between McMillan and McDonald resulted in many changes, both in the style of the journal and the relationship between the men and their bourgeois.

The post journal entry for 11th October, 1828 reads, “About 8 O’clock last night we had a sudden Call from the man on watch of Canoes & singing down the river and in a few moments had the agreeable Surprise of taking our Governor in Chief by the hand.” After several days of consultation George Simpson left on the 16th October, taking with him James McMillan, on furlough, and leaving Archibald McDonald, who had arrived with the Governor’s party, in charge of Fort Langley. This departure resulted in such a disruption to the daily routine of work that the men were authorized to partake of liquor. McDonald wrote, “To remove their Chagrin after parting with some of their old Companions and Changing Bourgeois our men where each allowed a pint of Liquor this evidence. This type of work doesn’t provide us with the objective ‘truth,’ nor is it meant to. Rather it helps us locate the labouring men who often are relegated to the sideline of the record.

154 Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 16.
155 Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 80.
evening and Certainly had the effects of drowning all cares of this world.”

No doubt celebrations, singing, smoking and other joyous activities provided a respite from the day-to-day work of the Fort. The men indulged themselves to the extent that the new Chief Trader, McDonald, notes in the Post journal on Friday the 17th October, “Nothing particular going on – {Our men indulging themselves after the debauch of last night & doing nothing}.” Although the debauch was authorized by the Fort’s bourgeois it is still an example of the men resisting the order of daily activity. Their activities of the previous night resulted in the disruption of work and a non-religious and unusual day of rest. It is unclear in the journal entry if McDonald had granted them the day to do nothing, or whether he was forced by the condition of the men, as a group, to allow them to take the day. Archibald McDonald was not known for his gentle or favourable treatment of the men. Nor were such debauches an uncommon problem at HBC posts. Even at eighteenth century HBC posts on James Bay the lack of sobriety of the men was often criticised by their officers.

Under McDonald’s command of the Fort, the morale of the men was eroded and many determined to leave. McDonald wrote in a letter to John McLoughlin in September of 1829:

> With respect to the people, as many of them as are not personally connected with the place [they] are not yet wholly reconciled to it. Faneant [Faniant] and Pepin ... are bent on being off, [wanting to leave] and those of them whose equipments we obtained last season think themselves specially required at Fort Vancouver. From some impression of the same kind I think that Mr. Annance also is getting indifferent of Fort Langley and Plamondon and Pierre Charles will be following

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his example. At this rate Fraser River cannot be supported.\textsuperscript{159} Although the men may have been favourably disposed to McDonald and the officers during the visit of Governor Simpson, the working conditions, lack of trade in furs and McDonald’s treatment of the men resulted in crashing morale.\textsuperscript{160} We cannot know if the day off work on 17 October, 1828, was the result of the men taking advantage of the change of command and presence of company officials or whether it was a clever strategy of control on McDonald’s part to try to earn the loyalty of the men, especially to show the good order of the post to Governor Simpson.\textsuperscript{161} Given the declining morale, I lean towards the former explanation. Some of the last entries before the arrival of Governor Simpson read “Incessant rain” or “mornings always foggy” and the men were employed at tedious physical tasks such as clearing and burning land around the fort.\textsuperscript{162} There had been little break since the Cadboro had unloaded them onto the banks of the Fraser. The men of Fort Langley took advantage of the arrival of the Governor’s party, change of command and sharing of the liquor ration to drink and party to excess, resulting in a break from the sawing, clearing, rain, and fog of their daily existence. But the mundane routine inevitably resumed.

Order was normally maintained at the Fort. At least the Post journals rarely report indiscretions or breaking down of labour order. Early in the morning of New Year’s Day 1829 this order was broken by a criminal act by one of the men.

\textsuperscript{159} Jean Murray Cole ed. \textit{This Blessed Wilderness: Archibald McDonald’s Letters from The Columbia 1822-44} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 69-70.

\textsuperscript{160} Morale was an issue across the Columbia district. By the 1830s the declining fur returns and Aboriginal depopulation of the area caused a fall in morale. see Mackie, “\textit{Trading Beyond The Mountains}” 249.

\textsuperscript{161} We must also allow that McDonald might have exaggerated the condition of the men to show their sloth and his own efficacy in managing difficult men. Officers were known to do this. For more on Drunkenness at HBC posts see Daniel Francis and Toby Morantz, \textit{Partners in Furs}, 88-89.

\textsuperscript{162} See Maclachlan, ed., \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 75-76.
The watch was mounted, who discovered early in the night that the drunken Sot Delannis had Contrived to haule [sic.] one of the Quaitline [Kwantlen] damsels up by a port hole in one of the Bastions – At first we apprehended there were more than one in the complo [sic] [plot]. But no. And even him there being no irons here at the place am at a loss of what to do with him.163

This crime happened during one of the most festive days of the fur trade calendar and therefore when social barriers and regulations would have been most lax. McDonald had secured the Fort after the revelries -- “The watch was mounted.” His intent was to re-establish control after New Year’s Day when the men were given extra rations and drink and rest from work. The watch mounted that night may have been as much about observing the exterior of the Fort, as it was about maintaining control within. As McDonald wrote, Delannis was surely a “sot” – not because he violated the good order of the company as McDonald thought, but rather because he was trapped in an institutional environment, surrounded by walls of watchful eyes. Delannis was attempting to enjoy some of the only comforts available to the men of Fort Langley. Unfortunately, instead of replicating the normative models of marriage imposed by the HBC, he attempted to liaise on his own terms. Wayne Suttles reminds us that “the relationship between Native women and the men of the fort is sometimes unclear and ambiguous.”164 The controlling nature of McDonald’s administration would not allow Delannis to develop relationships or take actions outside of the terms set by the Company. Indeed, when the “damsel” was discovered, McDonald was worried that “there were more than one in the complo [plot].”

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163 Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 91.
164 Wayne Suttles “The Ethnographic Significance of the Fort Langley Journals” In Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 189. We don’t know about the nature of Delannis’ relationship with the ‘Quaitline’ woman. It may have been an ongoing consensual relationship, or an encounter of opportunity enabled by the joie de vivre of New Years. We must also consider the possibility that this was not a consensual encounter, perhaps fueled by alcohol. We don’t know, and therefore we need to be open to all possibilities.
The walls of the Fort created a separation from the outside world, but also functioned as a raised observation post for the watch, who could observe the river, surrounding environs and the interior of the fort. Thus an attempt at control could have been exerted by a very small number over a large area. Foucault’s theory on the design of panoptical prisons applies here. Foucault observed, “Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?”165 Although the shape of the Fort, which can be conceptualized as a barracks, is different from Jeremy Bentham’s infamous prison, the disciplinary control asserted by the observers functioned in much the same way. The HBC men were voluntarily confined to a structure which through its walls, gate and social order imposed a prison-like existence with limited opportunity to exercise their own agency; indeed the men even constructed the very walls which held and separated them. In August 1827 “four men commenced opening a trench three feet deep in which to sink the pickets.”166 Maclachlan notes that the pickets were at least four inches in thickness and stretched fifteen feet high.167 HBC post masters also had a long history of attempting to control and restrain the lives and actions of the men around them. Fort Langley may have had panoptical features, but by comparison with earlier HBC posts such as Eastmain House on James Bay, which banned interaction between the men and local Aboriginal people or periodically searched ‘private’ possessions, the discipline was at times lax.168 McDonald was at times more indirect in his control of the men. He deployed contracts and alcohol rations as tools of control.

166 Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 33.
167 Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, note 33, 246.
168 Morantz, Partners in Furs, 92.
When that failed, such as in Delannis’ case, McDonald wielded his semi-judicial power swiftly and harshly. The men were not only bound by semi-judicial order, but by their own signatures and the walls they themselves had built. Delannis was a victim of a panoptical control supported by the very structure he called home.

Delannis was not denied some semblance of due process. McDonald claims to have used two “credible” witnesses from among the men to establish Delannis’ guilt.

McDonald wrote:

He was told that had there been Irons he Should have felt the weight of them for Some time, but now that one half his years wages – Eleven Pounds – Should be the forfeiture of so Unpardonable a crime and to take no liquor during the present year of our lord – he did not seem to think his Sentence hard – said not a word in justification and with all appeared penitent.169

The last sentence recorded on this matter is critical to understanding both the perspective of the officers of the Fort and the position of the men. McDonald ends with a cautionary, almost worried tone: “Situated as we are tis highly necessary to take this formal notice of these indiscretions.”170 The potential of a breakdown in the Company’s control of the men, even an isolated incident, was a matter of great concern. McDonald’s strongest (legal) disciplinary tool was the deduction of pay. A stinging punishment, but not the same as time in irons. McDonald needed to establish that his control could not be broken. Indeed, I suspect that McDonald felt this to be such a serious crime because it was a crime against the good order of the fort. For the men this episode may have served as a reminder of their limited ability to resist. Their lives were controlled by the company, from their work to the cut of their trousers. Delannis was bold, or maybe very drunk, to


attempt to usurp the control of the company. In his actions and the resulting consequences we find the limits to the mobility of the labouring men of Fort Langley.

During the first years of Fort Langley, among the half dozen recorded thefts, two occurrences may raise questions about the devotion of the labouring men to the Company: thefts by local First Nations people of a crowbar, and of a capot and trousers.\textsuperscript{171} Although we have no direct evidence of the intentions, plans or thoughts of the men involved in these incidents, my analysis of these thefts rests on an assumption that the men of Fort Langley had a certain amount of mobility to create their own actions and relationships. Therefore, we must consider this evidence for all its possible meanings. Read in a straightforward and linear way, these two thefts were nothing more than that: thefts by local Aboriginal people from the HBC. However, the Post journals, with their aura of anxiety, combined with the officers’ sense of superiority, colour our reading.

On 1\textsuperscript{st} September, 1827, work on the galleries of Fort Langley was underway. The men were deployed around the building site. Barnston wrote,

\begin{quote}
An Indian this morning stole a Crow Bar, which had been left out by the men while they were at breakfast. Every Exertion was made to recover it, but without success. All Natives were in consequence prohibited from landing for the remainder of the day in order to evince to them our disapprobation of so Knaveish a behaviour.\textsuperscript{172}
\end{quote}

Leaving the crowbar out and unprotected may indicate a disregard for the Company – as represented by its property – that led the men to drop tools the moment they had a break from work. More seriously, the crowbar may have been left out deliberately as part of a prearranged trade between an HBC man and a local Aboriginal person. In the first interpretation, the men may be seen acting as hourly employees, not doing a moment of

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{171} For “Thefts From Fort Langley” see Maclachlan, ed., \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}; 35, 68, 75, 82, 86, 88.
\textsuperscript{172} Maclachlan, ed., \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 35.
\end{footnotes}
extra work -- in which case, as yearly contracted and residential employees, they would have been exercising powerful resistance to their contractual duty. The ‘Crow Bar,’ being Company property, may not have been valued by the men, as they knew replacements would eventually be made or sent. This might indicate that the men dissociated themselves from the Company, identifying themselves as external to its goals. What we do know about this episode is that it was taken seriously by the officers of the Fort. The landing ban was the most powerful and symbolic tool the officers could wield against local Aboriginal people; not only would they see it as punishing Aboriginal people, it could have also been a punishment for the men, who would no longer have access to private trade and personal relationships with visiting Aboriginal people. However, the landing ban was not sustainable, as Barnston reported the next day:

No Indians were allowed to land on account of the Theft committed yesterday, but the want of fresh provisions will soon compel us to concede a little in regard to this restriction, and indulge them with the same familiarity & freedom of intercourse that they before enjoyed.

Fort Langley was dependent on the supplies provided through trade, so the impact of the continued ban on the Fort and the company would have been too great. However, Barnston had to save face in light of the ill-advised ban. He continued, “As it is they [Aboriginals] appear already to feel the deprivation of our good will friendly disposition towards them as severely as we had any reason to expect they would, which so far is satisfactory.”¹⁷³ While the officers seemed interested in enforcing their control through discipline, there is no mention of the men reacting to the theft. Therefore we have no way of knowing the context of the theft of the ‘Crow Bar.’

The theft of a capot (a long hooded coat often made from HBC point blankets) and a pair of trousers must be examined in a similar fashion to that of the crowbar. We simply do not know if this was a theft or a trade. One key difference is that unlike the crowbar, which was a company tool, the capot and trousers were the personal property of one of the men. This means that it is equally as likely that this was a theft as a deliberate trade. McDonald certainly took a dim view of the ‘theft’; his entry reads as a tirade:

The vagabond Indians we indulged with their own breadth of the beach last night decamped before day light with a Capot & pair trousers one of the men had the Sillyness to leave out to dry in the Fort Pickets and which they could easily effect without the notice of the watch {they were also at small patch of potatoes belonging to one of the men.}174

The Capot and trousers reappeared ten days later when Mr. Annance and Mr. Yale crossed the Fraser to intimidate the camp there in response to their “insolence” of having fired shots when leaving the Fort. “They [Aboriginals] were remonstrated with for the theft committed ten days ago, which very unexpectedly produced a delivery of the Capot.”175 Perhaps the return of the clothing was a strategic move to distract Yale and Annance from their original mission to remonstrate with the camp for having fired shots. Ultimately we cannot know if this was a theft or a trade; the evidence can be marshalled either way. The men were working in their private potato patch and drying their clothes, which could be read as an unguarded moment which resulted in theft. On the other hand, the private moment might have been an opportunity for a deliberate action taken outside the Company’s control – a trade between HBC men and local First Nations. As with the theft of the ‘Crow Bar’, we have no way of knowing the full story. The straightforward

174 Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 88. It is possible that this patch belonged to Pierre Charles, a few entries later it is noted that a small patch belonging to him is taken up “secured in our own cellar”. (see December Saturday 6th 1828.)
175 Maclachlan, ed., The Fort Langley Journals, 89.
analysis of a simple theft could result in a reading which paints the HBC (including the men) as victims and local Aboriginal peoples as, to use McDonald’s word, “vagabonds.” An alternative reading produces the potential of HBC men and Aboriginal people acting with mobility and agency to engage in relationships outside the control of the Company. Either way, the officers would have needed to respond by asserting control.

The one opportunity the men of Fort Langley had to exercise significant control over their situation was in the renegotiation of their contracts, however, the men at Langley were often manipulated into disadvantageous re-signing of contracts by the officers of the fort -- thus losing their one clear opportunity to control their own labour. HBC contracts ensured that the social divides within the company were reinforced by labour divides. Burley wrote, “those who were classed as servants did work that no gentleman would be required to do … although many officers did perform some manual labour around the posts. But they were still gentlemen and their main functions were to give orders and conduct the trade.”

The contracts governed the relationships between the London committee and its employees. The first iteration of the HBC contract included lines such as a promise to defend the company “with the utmost Hazard and Peril to my Life, in my Station with Courage and Fidelity.” In return the salaries were fairly generous compared to British wages – by the 1820s the minimum salary was £15-18 a year, whereas an unmarried farmhand in Scotland made around £11 yearly.

Contracts often expired while the men were posted; they then needed to re-sign or resign.

This was an opportunity for the men to negotiate the terms of their servitude. Typically if the man wanted to retire he had to give a year’s notice, especially before the 1821 merger, when many HBC men in Rupert’s Land wanted to return to the British Isles. The French-Canadian men of Fort Langley tended to retire and remain close to their last posting, perhaps partially because of the decline of the fur trade, increased emphasis on settlement in the mid to late-nineteenth century, and most importantly to be close to their Aboriginal families.

To usher in the new year of 1830, McDonald allowed the men to “debauch” themselves for three days, no doubt knowing that the contracts were up for renewal. This type of power manipulation was not untypical for McDonald. He wrote in the journal entry for 4 January:

{After a debauch of three days we tried the peoples dispositions to renew their Contracts…} Our people being still disposed to Keep up the spirit of the day, we seized the opportunity of calling them to renew their Engagements; & having made a good beginning all has ended well – as many as we require are engaged for two, and some for three years; several of them at reduced wages – to wit – the Blksmith [sic] and a couple of Bouts.\textsuperscript{180}

McDonald used the joviality of the new year to induce the men to sign contracts which they may or may not have been of sound judgement to sign. Their opportunity to negotiate better wages or higher position was reduced, as the no-doubt sober gentlemen convinced a few to take lower wages. While McDonald may have been praised by superiors for his ‘clever’ manipulations, the men may well have been less than happy. Because McDonald wrote the Post journals, we will never know the thoughts of the men as sobriety returned. In what was one of the most generous remarks made by McDonald, he notes on 14 January that Pepin “now that he is engaged for two years is allowed to

\textsuperscript{180} Maclachlan, ed., \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 136.
take a woman.” Poor Pepin took a cut in pay from £25 to £20, but he may have been motivated to do so by this privilege. It is clear that under McDonald the men of Fort Langley had little labour mobility.

Even under more normal circumstances the opportunities at Fort Langley to negotiate labour contracts or positions were limited. The previous summer Faniant the carpenter attempted to address his working conditions with McDonald. The journal entry for the day records a cool reception.

Had a few words altercation with our Carpenter to day, which led to an explanation of his Contract – Being Engaged as a *bout de Canot* he thought he was not strictly bound to work as a Tradesman – of course he found his mistake.182

McDonald was uncompromising in his exegesis of Faniant’s contract. Instead of entering into a negotiation, which was not unheard of, McDonald used the terms of the contract as a “legal weapon.”183 In a rather Machiavellian fashion McDonald framed the conflict as the fault of his employee -- “of course he found his mistake” – and not, potentially, as his and his fellow gentleman’s failure to manage the men and maintain morale. Faniant tried to assert his mobility, and was rebuffed by McDonald.

McDonald faced a greater challenge to his authority when his almost certainly unnamed “gentleman,” apparently referring to a house servant, demanded better conditions:

*Today my Gentleman presented himself before me for Something Better than ordinary to feast on while he should keep the house – His tone and insolence not*

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at all uncommon with him, provoked me to lay the Ruler across his skull, & I dare say he will continue Some days Still off Duty.\textsuperscript{184}

McDonald progressed beyond the violence of legal and social manipulation to outright physical violence to maintain his control of his work force. Under McDonald any hope of negotiating must have seemed beyond reach. Ridged labour hierarchy resulted in low morale and little chance for change from the daily rhythm of work at Fort Langley. One of the only respites was the sick list.

Building and maintaining a wooden structure in the rain, wind, snow and brambles of the banks of the Fraser must have been a difficult task. Even the experienced men of the fur trade hurt themselves attempting to create and maintain Fort Langley. The sick lists in the Post journals record everything from sprained backs and overeating to venereal disease. While many if not most of these entries can be read as the results of a rough and hazardous working environment, some may be subtle evidence of the men taking unassigned days of rest, or recovering from indulgences which rendered them unable to perform their duty.\textsuperscript{185}

Among the work-related injuries, there are two reasons for being on the sick list that may be read as occasions when the men removed themselves from work due to non-work related injuries or illness. Venereal disease affected many of the Fort Langley men and undoubtedly, though it was not recorded, local Aboriginal women. The other reason was often due to stomach complaints after eating too much food.

Venereal disease, like smallpox, was carried by and ahead of European and Europeanized explorers and traders to the Pacific Northwest. Histories of fur trading are

\textsuperscript{184} Maclachlan, ed., \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 148. We don’t actually know who McDonald is referring to in this entry. It is possible he is being ironic in his use of “gentleman.” It’s also possible that he is referring to an Aboriginal servant, not one of the contracted HBC men.

\textsuperscript{185} Selected examples of work related injuries can be found in Maclachlan, ed., \textit{The Fort Langley Journals} 35, 36, 44
linked with the prevalence of venereal disease, which in turn reveals the sexual
dimensions of fur traders’ interactions with Aboriginal peoples. Evan Lampe in his Work, 
*Class, and Power in the Borderlands of the Early American Pacific: The Labours of 
Empire* notes that “western sailors certainly spread venereal disease across the 
Pacific.” 186 He further notes that at Astoria in September 1812 the disease was so 
prevalent that almost every day a significant number of men were on the sick list. As 
Lampe notes, this presented a constant threat to the lives of the people but also to the 
availability of labour. However, not all scholars were convinced by the threat of venereal 
disease. Robin Fisher notes that we do not know whether Aboriginal peoples had 
venereal disease before the arrival of Europeans or how problematic and fatal it was. 
Fisher argues that smallpox, as an epidemic and mass transmission disease, was far more 
problematic than venereal disease. 187 Sylvia Van Kirk, writing about “Indian Country,” 
states that “prostitution with its attendant horror, venereal disease … should not be 
exaggerated.” 188 On a macro level we should agree with Van Kirk; the social and family 
structures born of the fur trade helped stabilize such problems. However, in the first few 
years of Fort Langley, before country marriages were common, the Post journals often 
record men bedded by the disease.

Venereal disease was an ongoing problem at Fort Langley, unlike smallpox, 
which had ravaged the Fraser River area twenty years before. Even before the first 
buildings of the Fort had been finished, Barnston noted, “Vincent is confined to his bed

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with Venereal.” The next day his situation appeared to be no better and Barnston further wrote “Vincent confined and likely to be so for months to come.” Thirteen days later Vincent began a course of mercury treatment which lasted for almost a month. Barnston noted on one occasion that “Vincent is salivating.” Almost a month later he is noted as “recovering.”

The effects of both the illness and the treatment resulted in Vincent being on the sick list for over a month, entirely removed from the work force. Even though his illness was certainly no holiday, it may be read as indicative of a form of labour agency available to the men at Fort Langley, something which they availed themselves of frequently. The size and endurance of the sick list led Barnston to comment “It seems to be ordained that we shall have at least one individual always on the Sick List.”

One entry records Pepin the Blacksmith being unable to work. “Today our Blacksmith from eating to excess of the small Ullachans …did not feel disposed to work today.” Considering McDonald’s well recorded disdain for Pepin, he seems to have been allowed to take the day. If this had been a regular occurrence, action might have been taken. The greater point is that Pepin was able to manipulate the work schedule to take a day from work because of his own (silly) actions, not an injury sustained while at work. Here we find a certain mobility; the men could and sometimes did use food poisoning as a reason to break from work. This analysis stretches what we might normally identify as agency. I have taken a great deal of interpretive latitude in reading what some may argue as uncontrolled illness as an expression of agency. I have explored

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enough evidence to know that the labouring men of Langley deployed their own agency to shape their lives and labour, and have extended my analysis to the sick list to show the potential of a broad interpretive license combined with close reading around and through the textual and factual limits inherent in post journals. The journals do not state explicitly that the men are resisting through the sick list, rather I suggest that sometimes we can find, and need to look for, agency in unlikely situations. There is a certain amount of dilution of the men’s agency in my approach; men often had no control of their own sickness. Therefore, it is critical to note that the men often were on the sick list due to situations that they could not control. For example undoubtedly Pepin was in pain, but he used that pain to intentionally or unintentionally negotiate the terms of his labour, for that day. While not a victory of labour rights, it still shows the possibility that the sick list could be a position used by the men for some small amount of control over their own lives. Possibly because of this the gentlemen watched and frequently commented on the list.

The sick list and resultant loss of labour was of great concern to the officers of the Fort. On September 7 1827, as the Fort was being built, Barnston gloomily recorded the numbers of men on the sick list. He blamed lack of housing, weather, and food supply, although we may also add venereal diseases to that list. He wrote “Sickness at present prevails among them at an alarming extent.” One man was noted to have “several ugly and obstinate sores about his lower extremities.” The diseases and sores of the “lower extremities,” which is almost certainly a reference to the sexual organs, spread through physical and sexual contact. Thus we can surmise that there was sexual contact between

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the men and local populations. Indeed, Maclachlan noted that venereal disease seemed to disappear when McDonald locked the gates and banned ‘prostitution’, insisting on country marriages soon after his arrival. The labour disruption caused by venereal diseases was not a deliberate act of labour unrest, but was the result of the HBC men engaging in (sexual) activities outside the requirements and terms of their contracts. The men, through their sexual relationships, were practicing a mobility, which resulted in considerable labour issues at early Fort Langley—another way in which the HBC men circumvented and subverted company demands.

When we examine the lives of the men of Fort Langley we find complicated individuals, who were most of the time co-opted by their own contracts to produce the products of Europeanization. Pepin and Faniant were French-Canadians who became, through their contracts, agents of micro-Europeanization. The chairs and tables made by Faniant enabled his superiors to produce a complicated theater of power and position, maintaining complex social hierarchies on the banks of the Fraser. The premodern social environment meant that the men of Fort Langley were limited by their contractual obligations, not only in their labour but in their daily lives, to maintain the social hierarchies of a master-servant relationship.

In this chapter I have unpacked two aspects of the life and duty of the labouring men of Fort Langley between 1827 and 1830. Firstly, I have argued that there was a difference between the men of Fort Langley as private persons and as servants of the company. As servants of the company, their own cultural identity was subordinated and

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193 Although there is no evidence, it is possible that some of the sex and resulting transmission was a result of sex between the HBC men.

the labouring men, French-Canadian, Hawaiian and Abenaki, became, in a sense, Europeans whose labour produced the material needed to impose Europeanization onto the banks of the Fraser River. These men served in a pre-modern master-servant relationship. And as Carolyn Steedman reminds us, the servant was seen as the legal extension of their master’s arm. The servants of Fort Langley had the European cultural identity of their masters temporarily imposed on them by their contractual duty. While the men may have become, willingly or not, Europeanized while performing their contracts, they still resisted and negotiated their own existence and identity. Finding these episodes in the post journals requires reading closely between the lines—reading beyond the stories crafted by clerks and officers of the Hudson’s Bay Company and designed to report to and please their own superiors. This kind of reading allows us glimpses into the agency of the labourers who, through contract negotiations, sick lists and even crime, resisted the company and negotiated their own lives while bounded by physical, social and legal controls. The labouring men of Fort Langley were both duty-bound servants and negotiators of their own labouring and lived worlds.
Chapter 3: “Meat and Potatoes: Foodways at Fort Langley”

*Look at that moon, will you! Tsk-tsk-tsk. Potato weather, for sure.*

--Thornton Wilder, *Our Town.*

Sending supplies and furs through the treacherous canyons of the upper Fraser River was not going to work to create a new riverine empire. In the earliest years (1827-1830) of Fort Langley’s operation it quickly became apparent to traders that models of the HBC fur trade which had worked for so long needed to be adapted for the new fort on the Fraser. To survive and prosper in their attempts to control the Fraser River and its trade, the Fort Langley contingent needed a secure supply of food. The supply lines of York boats that could still connect posts like Fort Vancouver could not reach Fort Langley. The only way for Langley to receive any outside food in these early years of 1827 and 1828 was through the HBC schooners coming up the Fraser. Therefore, early on, the post had to rely heavily on other methods of food production—trade, cultivation, fishing or hunted meat. These three food sources were intertwined in complex social, cultural and economic considerations. The Langley traders, not wanting to be totally reliant on local trade, needed to have their own local and reliable sources of food. Methods of food production, from new potato fields to seine fishing in the Fraser, left a mark on the landscape around Fort Langley. The Langley contingent’s consumption of food was distinctly *Europeanized* and informed by existing fur trade contexts.

The processes that I explore and analyze in this chapter are what Paige Raibmon has called “micro-techniques of dispossession.”\(^{195}\) These insidious acts, from planting a

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potato to killing a deer, were small, but critical and incremental, steps in the formation of the practice and rhetoric which would impose settler cultural activities and actively dispossess Indigenous people of their land and homes. Often these “micro-techniques” are overlooked. Indeed, part of the genesis of this chapter was to find small events or actions related to food production and understand them as being part of a “choreography of dispossession”.

While no single one of the methods of food production I explore would alone totally dispossess Indigenous people, when woven together and generalized they became part of a dark colonialist fabric.

The first crop cultivated at Fort Langley was potatoes, hoed into the land around the new Fort, an attempt to provide food for the HBC men. Scholars used to consider this small potato field planted in 1828 on the banks of the Fraser the arrival of the potato on the coast of what is now British Columbia. However, current genetic work suggests that there was a multi-vectored arrival. Indeed, starchy and tubular crops, such as camas or the ‘Indian’ potato, were crucial food crops among coastal First Nations long before the arrival of Europeans. Regardless, the potato marked for the newcomers a Europeanized narrative of progress and industrious agricultural labour. The early potato crops at Langley acted not only as a secure food source and potential barter good, but as a powerful symbol of European-style agriculture and permanence. The potato field was perhaps the first sign that Langley would never function exclusively as a fur trade post only attempting to grow food for self-sustenance. Like other posts of the early nineteenth century, it would need to diversify to survive. The potato, a food of South American provenance, became at Langley an ominous foundation of the coming colonial

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settlement. The potato, itself a colonised food, became through the Columbian Exchange a deeply European food. After crossing the Atlantic and being appropriated by the metropole, the potato re-crossed the Atlantic; the colonized was now the colonizer.

Part of the ongoing legacy of colonialism is the belief that Coast Salish peoples did not engage in systematic, complex and planned cultivation of food stuffs. Nancy Turner et al. wrote that “there is considerable evidence the reasons [for the discrediting of Aboriginal agriculture] were rooted in both ethnocentric notions of what constitutes ‘cultivation’ and in territorial agendas and acquisitive ambitions of the nineteenth-century colonial project.”\(^\text{197}\) Perhaps as an early part of that colonial process, the communities encountered by the Langley contingent were not recorded or recognized as cultivating food. Wayne Suttles does note that camas, one of the primary cultivated food sources, “was rare in the Fraser Valley.”\(^\text{198}\) However, we know that Sto:lo people of the Fraser Valley were “experienced traders,”\(^\text{199}\) and thus the broader agricultural products of Coast Salish peoples were often integrated into complicated networks of trade.\(^\text{200}\) We must acknowledge that even if there is limited evidence in the post journal, Coast Salish people were cultivating crops and managing food sources. Even the Vancouver expeditions in the 1790s recognized that gardens were being tended, especially by women.\(^\text{201}\) In Victoria, the land of what is now Beacon Hill Park was an important site of managed

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\(^{199}\) Keith Thor Carlson, ed., _You are asked to Witness: The Sto:lo in Canada’s Pacific Coast History_, (Chilliwack: Sto:lo Heritage Trust, 1997), 44.

\(^{200}\) Suttles reminds us that Simon Fraser’s party were fed a diverse meal of Sturgeon, berries, roots (camas?) and dried oysters (clams). See Suttles, _Ethnographic Significance_, 177.

camas bulb cultivation. John Lutz critically reminded us that Coast Salish “had altered their environment to ensure regular and reliable crops of camas.” This was not always recognized by early traders, settlers or later scholars; a result of a dangerous myth of laziness which was deployed to counter the clearly present food management and cultivation. By the mid-19th century ongoing efforts by colonial authorities to discredit or ignore Aboriginal agriculture to suit racist narratives had solidified, the legacy of which we must still fight against. As a result we must constantly acknowledge the foodways that the Langley party and other Europeanized settlers encountered and entered into were, as John Lutz wrote, a “style of agriculture, silviculture, and ownership” that newcomers did not understand. I have tried to read between the lines of the journal with the understanding that while Fort Langley’s cultivation of food through agricultural techniques was not a new practice in the area, the manner in which Langley practiced agriculture and food production imposed itself onto the surrounding peoples and lands was distinctly Eurocentric.

Beyond the field on the banks of the Fraser, the Langley party ventured out into the woods and along smaller streams looking for both beaver for trade, and red meat like deer and elk for their tables. Hunting in Europeanized cultures was a deeply gendered activity that provided gentlemanly sport and a source of culturally significant and desirable red meat for the status-obsessed HBC. Hunting parties set out regularly from Fort Langley to find elk and deer and scout the potential for beaver. Indeed, Elizabeth

205 Lutz, Makuk, 68.
Vibert reminds us that British traders operated under a hierarchy that graded the types of meat and fish, which also placed hunting above fishing. The cultural, gender and social meanings of the hunting and fishing activities of the Langley men refracted the lens through which they saw the food-gathering methods of their new Aboriginal neighbours. Journal entries regarding hunting allow a reader to infer, by subtle signs, the initial difficulties of the HBC contingent at Langley in adapting to their new environment. The men of Langley were trying to create the rhythms of a prairie (or interior) post where hunted meat was readily available, either as a trade good or self-obtained. Indeed, the Edmonton House journals record one of many instances when a significant quantity of bison meat was hunted: “Our Men of the 3rd returned with the meat of seven bulls [bison].”206 The older posts were used to having a large and ready supply of meat but this was not the case at Langley. The hunting activities of the Langley traders show both the cultural value of hunted meat and the partial misunderstanding of coastal people’s foodways that were centred around the sea.

While the Langley party did attempt to fish, they were not very successful. A combination of nets being poorly designed as well as constructed by unskilled labourers resulted in Archibald McDonald reaching the conclusion in 1829 that trading for fish would be more efficient and profitable. Traders’ response to fishing also contained a racially-tinged narrative. As we will see, James McMillan was more than happy to perpetuate the myth of the ‘lazy Indian’ who lived off the supposed abundance of food provided freely by nature. In reality, the Langley party were entering into a complicated

206 Ted Binnema and Gerhard J. Ens, eds., The Hudson’s Bay Company Edmonton House Journals, Correspondence, and Reports 1806-1821 (Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 2012), 89.
foodway that they did not understand. Isolated from the rest of the HBC network of forts, the men of Fort Langley needed to negotiate their own food production.

**Trade**

Trading for foodstuffs with First Nations neighbors was clearly a necessary survival strategy, especially during the construction of the Fort. However, as Elizabeth Vibert notes, “food is saturated with beliefs about cultural identity and vigour.”

Fish such as salmon, while a desirable and at times expensive meal in the twenty-first century, occupied a very different cultural space within food hierarchies in the early nineteenth-century fur trade. Vibert shows that many early traders in the Columbia complained about their fish diets. As much as traders were culturally disposed to denigrate fish relative to meat, Vibert argues that the act of fishing for sustenance, relative to hunting for meat, was also seen as a less desirable activity. She wrote, “The flesh of animals has long occupied the paramount position in the hierarchy of foods in Western culture, and in many other traditions.”

In comparison to the distasteful overabundance of fish in fur trade diets of the coast, the buffalo hunters of the plains “were said to be brave, manly and industrious.” While early traders and explorers such as Simon Fraser complained about the monotony and overwhelming volume of fish rations, the Langley party (at least as revealed in the Post Journal) actively tried to acquire traded fish. Trading for food with

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210 Vibert, *Traders’ Tales*, 126.
local First Nations happened both on the northward trip from Fort Vancouver and later during the construction and inhabitation of Fort Langley. Trading with First Nations was a strategic business arrangement in which the men of Fort Langley, similar to other HBC posts, created networks between the Company and local peoples. Inserting the Company into local trade networks and food valuation hierarchies was key in developing the kind of trade success enjoyed by the HBC in Rupert’s Land. There was no reliable connection to other forts, nor to York Factory. Trade therefore took on a different set of priorities. Especially in the early period of Fort Langley’s establishment the men (and later families) were dependent on traded fish to feed themselves. During fort construction, when the men were creating a physical embodiment of HBC power, George Barnston records a rather telling observation: “A Number of Cowitchens passed with their families and moveables [sic] on their way up to kill Salmon at the Rapids, where they are to remain some time collecting a Stock of Dried Provisions for the winter.”211 The local food rhythms, as interpreted by Barnston, dictated preparation for winter and stockpiling of food. The Langley contingent was content to trade for fish, with no way of knowing how secure the supply might be.212 Maybe unsurprisingly, there is no evidence that McMillan or his successor McDonald attempted to learn from local First Nations about fishing techniques or seasons. A few days later Barnston noted that “Indians still supply us with fish in the greatest abundance.”213 Luckily for Barnston and the men of Fort Langley, the Fraser River was capable of providing abundant food. Maintaining relations with local Aboriginal fishermen proved critical for a steady supply of fish.

212 Fishing rhythms on the Fraser varied from season to season. However, the Langley journal eventually records fishing throughout the year.
Farming

The supply of food at Fort Langley came from a number of sources. Under James McMillan food production was intended to be self-sustaining. However, under Archibald McDonald, a new emphasis on production of surplus food emerged because he realized that Langley would never be the fur trade post and the connection to the interior that had previously been imagined. The flagship crop was the potato.214

The potato originated in the Andes Mountains of South America. From there it spread through global trade networks to be become an important global food. Perhaps the potato is best known for its role in the Irish famine, when a combination of blight and gross mismanagement of food supply by English and Irish landlords led to mass hunger.215 Europeans began their relationship with the tuber in 1532, when Pizarro came across it in the Andes. The potato began its journey across the Atlantic slowly. The potato arrived in Spain in the 1570s and spread through Western Europe.216 Folkloric stories would have us believe that the potato was introduced to England by Sir Francis Drake. However, it is doubtful any specimens would have survived his journey. By the eighteenth century, the potato had evolved from an herbal oddity to a European food crop. In 1776, Adam Smith, in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, would estimate that land planted with potatoes could produce three times the volume of food as land planted with wheat.217

By the nineteenth century the potato had

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214 Although Langley would in the 1830s become a major salmon trading and production center and would supply fish to the Hawaii islands. See Barman, *Leaving Paradise*


spread through European colonies; it was a hearty and easy-to-cultivate crop that had been Europeanized.

Initial attempts at cultivating food pale in comparison to Langley’s later farm, which by the 1830s would become a major source of grain, butter and meat. Under an unpleasant March drizzle in 1828, the men of Fort Langley were recorded to be “Clearing the ground for potatoes.” This may be one of the first times that ground was cleared in a European fashion in the Fraser River area. Potatoes were a choice crop for the HBC in the Pacific Northwest because they are relatively easy to grow. When choosing the site for Fort Colvile a decade later in the 1840s, George Simpson wrote that he thought “Fort Colvile [to be] well adapted for a Farming Establishment. . . . Potatoes in any quantity may be raised.” McDonald happily wrote in July of 1829 that “of the potatoes there is yet an abundance & will be eatable for a month to Come from the Care we take of them.” Establishing a useable crop meant that although the Langley men were still reliant on trade, fishing and hunting, they could, in some regard, see themselves as industrious producers and preservers of their own food.

The potatoes seeded at Fort Langley were not an unusual crop for traders to plant at posts and forts. Wayne Suttles postulates that Russian and Spanish explorers and traders may have been among the first to introduce potatoes to both Vancouver Island and

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221 Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals*, 121
the Pacific Northwest. By the early nineteenth century, forts such as Astoria and Vancouver had successful potato fields. Fort Langley may have been the site of the first large-scale and permanent cultivation of Solanum tuberosum. However, we no longer can be as sure of Fort Langley’s role as Suttles was when he wrote “Potatoes may have come up the coast from the mouth of the Columbia to the Strait, but the Hudson's Bay Company's Fort Langley, founded on the Fraser in 1827, looks like the most probable source of potatoes for the Strait and northern Sound people.” Genetic studies of potatoes show a varied lineage, diverging from the expected Europeanised varieties.

The Cadboro left the newly established Fort Langley in 1827; by the time it returned in 1828 the Langley men had begun clearing ground. Early in the spring of 1828, men were tasked with “Clearing Ground for Potatoes.” A task undertaken as soon as the weather permitted the thought of planting crops (a few weeks after days recorded as having “frosty mornings”), repeated entries show that McMillian was prioritizing hoeing soil for potatoes. However, the introduction of a new crop required a careful level of control. The seed potatoes delivered by the Cadboro were not planted immediately. Instead they were taken into the fort and the men were recorded as “putting the Potatoes in the cellar and measuring them” -- an act of both managerial control and the first act of cultivation. Knowledge, even simple knowledge about the number and size of seed potatoes received, creates a form of control where every salient detail is known –

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223 Ibid., 274.
225 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 56.
226 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 55.
227 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 60.
although far from Foucault’s panopticon, there is a trace of the same controlling impulses. After the enumeration of the potatoes, there was still work to be done to prepare for their planting: the land mainly cleared, “the men began to hoe ground for the Potatoes.”

Over the next week, the Langley men would continue to prepare the ground until Tuesday 20 May, when the journal entry reads, “Planted five kegs [sic] of potatoes in the morning.”

This section of land, which had been worked consistently for over a month, was now *Europeanized*. Fort Langley was now not only a fur trading post, but in an emerging sense an agricultural settlement which was created through, in Raibmon’s terms, micro-acts of power and control.

While Fort Langley would eventually become a settlement and farming community, in the 1820s it was a liminal entity: it was not a traditional fur trading post, due to the depressing fur returns, but also not planned as a settlement. By the 1830s, Fort Langley’s location would be moved to be closer to its farm and to its identity as a colonial settlement.

The fur trade alone could not sustain a post on the Fraser River, so instead the fur traders turned into salmon traders and farmers. The Langley potatoes were the beginning of a distinctly Eurocentric fashion of using, controlling and cultivating the land around the Fraser River.

**Hunting**

Hunting was a source of food from the early days of the Fort Langley expedition. On the ninth day out of Fort Vancouver, Mr. Annance is recorded as having “killed a Red

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228 Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals*, 62.
Deer, the meat of which was brought to the camp.”²³¹ That same day two of the men, Pierre Charles and Louis Satakara dit Rabaska, went out to hunt “but returned unsuccessful.”²³² Although Clerk Annance also would hunt, the Langley party had several designated hunters. Pierre Charles, an Abenaki, was one of the primary hunters. Charles had also been a member of the first expedition to the Fraser River in the mid-1820s; Morag Maclachlan notes that Charles was recruited “because of his skill as a hunter.”²³³ Having skilled hunters on the expedition was critical to attaining desirable red meat, although the Langley party did also trade for meat occasionally.²³⁴

Hunting and hunters traditionally have been cloaked in cultural meanings and purposes, from the English country gentleman riding out after foxes, to the North American sportsman taking trophies, to an individual hunting merely for sustenance.²³⁵ Vibert has argued that traders’ views were not as “hardened” as later Victorian colonial hunters who constructed the Indian hunter as masculine, but nevertheless savage.²³⁶ Hunting was a source of food, a display of masculinity, a means of exploring beyond the walls of the fort, and a labour priority. Indeed, as noted, one of the men, Pierre Charles, was employed primarily as a hunter. In February of 1828, Pierre Charles and twelve men were sent out on a hunting trip. Barnston wrote, “Twelve men accompanied him to bring home the meat should he have the chance to kill animals. Of this we have every hope, as

numbers of red deer were seen." The hunters would return with 360 pounds of meat, and a few days later, another trip would result in 320 pounds. These amounts probably refer to the dressed weight, after simple field butchering. However, this still may not be an accurate representation of the total usable weight which may have only been around 30 percent of the recorded weight. This provides a critical insight into the labour, effort, and priority the Langley traders put into obtaining red meat. Hunting represented a significant investment of time and labour, from tracking and successfully shooting deer, to field dressing them, to hauling the meat back to Langley for further butchering. Even if the return was not overwhelming on these trips, hunting was an established mode of food supply for the HBC traders. Hunting was always an important part of fur trade culture. The HBC, with its networks of supply spreading across Rupert’s Land and west of the Rockies, was perhaps somewhat less dependent on hunted food than the Northwest Company, which had a looser network of posts and traders.

However, not all hunting activities were food based. The post journals show that Pierre Charles was responsible for setting and maintaining traps, presumably for hunting.

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238 A 2003 University of Wyoming study found that from a (small) 142 lb. dead weight mule deer, the field dressed weight was 100 lbs and only 42 lbs, or 29 percent, of that were edible meat. While we might assume that the ratio of meat used by the Langley traders was higher than modern safety standards would allow, the British Columbia Ministry of Environment estimates that an average mule deer in 2016 weighs around 100 kilograms or 220 pounds. Being fully aware of the historical incongruities inherent in this data, we can attempt to estimate how many deer the Langley party killed on these hunting trips. If we assume that the hunters took 70 percent of the average mule deer weight of 220 lbs or 154 lbs per deer, the total deer hunted over those two trips was four. See R.A. Field et al. “The Mule Deer Carcass” University of Wyoming, 2003. [http://www.wyomingextension.org/agpubs/pubs/B589R.pdf](http://www.wyomingextension.org/agpubs/pubs/B589R.pdf) accessed February 10th 2017. Table 2. And British Columbia Ministry of Environment, “Mule Deer Information Pamphlet” [http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/wld/documents/muledeer.pdf](http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/wld/documents/muledeer.pdf) accessed August 2, 2016

239 As referenced earlier, Edmonton House journals record hunters returning with several bison bulls, which would provide far more meat than the Fraser River deer. Hunting was part of fur trade culture.
Charles was not alone in his hunting activities. While his duties mandated more hunting than the other men, many of the other (nameless) men were also sent on hunting parties, or allowed to hunt for sport. Due to lack of direct evidence, we might also guess that officers of the fort engaged in sport hunting. This would not have been discordant with their social standing in fur trade hierarchies, indeed, the pre-modern role of gentleman master of the establishment would suggest that sport hunting was an important part of the theater of social control.

We do not know what Charles was trapping, it is possible that he was taking rabbits or other small food mammals. Often Charles was excused from other work to focus on his hunting duties; for example in April 1828 McMillian recorded, “Pierre Charles arranging his traps . . . all others preparing ground for potatoes.” Obviously, hunting was considered by the officers of Fort Langley to be as important as construction, which was the only other task that day which diverted men away from potato field work. While the specialization of labour was not unusual, as I show in my previous chapter, the focus on hunting for both food and furs is noteworthy. I argue that neither hunting for food nor hunting for furs were particularly successful activities at early Fort Langley. Fur returns show limited success and heavy reliance on locally traded fish. Rather, we might guess that a socially and culturally appropriate culture of hunting, derived from a

240 There is no clear indication of the products of Charles’ hunting trips. We know that he was trapping fur animals, but it is not a stretch to imagine that he might have trapped animals which would have provided him, or the fort, with extra meat rations.

241 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 60.

very British desire for red meat, was part of the Fort Langley trader’s daily life, from the Indigenous Charles, to the clerks who partook in hunting for sport.

There are many explanations for the deep-rooted meaning and value of meat in British and European cultures, from the difficulty and ritual of obtaining it, to a desire to control the natural world through the consumption of flesh. Hunting at Fort Langley was an attempt to provision the fort. Although the post journals do not directly suggest this, we must consider the possibility that Langley’s hunting activities were also an attempt to demonstrate ‘proper’ fur trade and economic roles to local First Nations. Richard Mackie suggests that the abundance especially of fur-bearing land mammals observed by traders “demanded attention through resource development and they could not respect cultures that let such opportunities pass.” While not all North American Aboriginal communities responded to the fur trade’s demand for European-style hunting and resource exploitation, Michael Witgen does note rather broadly that “Native peoples in the western interior of North America easily adapted the practice of hunting and processing furs for exchange into their existing political economies.” We might question Witgen’s assertion that “Native peoples . . . easily adapted”; rather we might wonder if Eurocentric hunting practices were slowly adapted and changed in an ongoing (and often fraught) cultural dialogue by generations of Indigenous peoples and traders. In the HBC’s Rupert’s Land forts, traders encountered First Nation peoples who not only depended on hunting for a primary source of food, but also had been affected by the generations of contact which had imposed the value of commercialized hunting for profit,

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243 Vibert, *Traders’ Tales*, 73.
245 Michael Witgen, “The Native New World and Western North America”, *Western Historical Quarterly* Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2012), 292-299.
a distinctly fur trade and Eurocentric mode of hunting.\textsuperscript{246} The arrival of the Fort Langley contingent in the Fraser River area marked the beginning of a process which would, after 1858, disrupt not only traditional foodways, but also have a profound impact on the relationship between local First Nations and the natural world. For example, Maclachlan notes for local chief Sashia’s older wives, “there must have been a loss of prestige” when they were sent to gather beaver instead of engaging in their normal and accepted social roles.\textsuperscript{247} She further notes that the “relationship with the animal world must also have undergone profound change as gradually and reluctantly, men accepted traps, an act which bound them to the fort.”\textsuperscript{248} However, especially in the 1820s, the effects of both culture and commercial trade, and the “profound changes” Maclachlan notes, might have been reversed. Sto:lo, themselves experienced traders, seemed to have adapted traded European goods and rhythms, which they viewed as “neither indispensable nor necessary.”\textsuperscript{249} Indeed, Keith Carlson suggests that “the Sto:lo likely saw Fort Langley as a resource similar to a family-owned fishing rock.” Carlson shows that fishing rocks were accessed and protected by complex social rituals and relationships, such as marriage or gift giving. HBC employees at the fort were likely viewed as representatives of the families who controlled the fort’s resources.\textsuperscript{250} The Langley party might have been trying to demonstrate a fur trade model of Aboriginal hunters bringing furs to trade posts, which had been standardized elsewhere. In the earliest period of Fort Langley in the late 1820s it seemed that instead of local peoples adopting HBC rhythms of fur trading, they simply

\textsuperscript{246} Mackie, Trading beyond the Mountains, 89.
\textsuperscript{247} Maclachlan, “Founding Fort Langley,” 27.
\textsuperscript{248} \textit{Ibid}, 27.
\textsuperscript{249} Carlson, ed., \textit{You are Asked to Witness}, 46
\textsuperscript{250} Carlson, ed., \textit{You are Asked to Witness}, 50.
placed Fort Langley and its trading mandate into a pre-existing Aboriginal trade culture. However, from the 1830s onwards, hunting and food gathering practices would be deeply changed by the presence of the new fort and the following colonization on the banks of the Fraser. As Cole Harris reminds us, “The fur trade introduced a regime of non-native power that expanded in the colonial period.”

The peoples encountered by the Langley party, while not without contact with traders and explorers, had their own foodways which mainly revolved around the ocean and river systems, not hunted meat. Richard Mackie notes the marine food abundance described by early fur traders. Indeed, in the 1990s, Mackie noted that archeological theory, now confirmed by more recent studies, suggests that North America was peopled in part via the west coast, as the new inhabitants followed the rich marine food sources down the coast. Mackie wrote that local First Nations “lived in a mild region noted not for fur-bearing land mammals but for an abundant marine and land provision base, most notably salmon, shellfish and camas.” While First Nations of the region did hunt, it was not in the manner expected by traders. McDonald wrote, “Four or five of the Indians of the neighborhood Came in with a few Geese and Ducks they now take by means of net.” The taking of game birds in such a manner would have hardly been in line with the methods employed by HBC hunters. Pierre Charles may have used traps, presumably mainly for fur-bearing animals, but the meat animals such as deer or fowl were taken

253 Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains*, 79.
with a gun. By taking a single animal at a time Pierre Charles, and other Langley hunters, were, to some extent, copying a British ritual of sportsmanship. The aristocratic hunter need not have been concerned with securing a food supply, but the Langley men were, which would no doubt limit the extent to which British hunting codes would have been followed. The British gentleman hunted for the intellectual thrill of the chase and a deep love of nature. British ideals of ‘sportsmanship’ in hunting, presumably present at Fort Langley (although there are only a few mentions of personal sport hunting undertaken by the Langley contingent), influenced hunting activities, if mainly for officers and educated men like Annance. This no doubt contributed to their impressions of the non-sporting nature of Indigenous hunting methods. Taking fowl with a net would not satisfy the British desire that the hunt be challenging and require personal and manly skill.

Archibald MacDonald provided opportunity for sportsmanly hunting activities, recording that “1/2 our men allowed to go out with their Guns to day by way of recreation.” Although most of the hunting trips recorded in the journal were for the general supplies of the post, we may suppose that the men hunted on their own time and engaged in a version of sport hunting, tempered by their fur trade context.

While official and personal hunting trips often provided meat and sport for Fort Langley, there were times when meat was in short supply. After a long spell without either hunted or traded venison, McDonald mournfully recorded, “we get not a mouthful

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256 Ibid., 110.

257 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 89.
from the Natives.” 258 Clearly local Aboriginals were not interested in hunting in large enough (commercial) scale to provide for the meat-hungry fort. Mr. Annance and another party that same day were recorded as “preparing for the Elk hunt.” 259 The lack of venison and other red meats was an ongoing issue for Fort Langley. Priority was often given to the hunting parties to secure a steady supply. In another incident, the lack of meat and grain and its substitution by a diet of only salmon was blamed for the sickness of the men, as I explored in a previous chapter. Hunting provided recreation which was imbued with racial and cultural status, and culturally significant food which was thought to ensure vitality and health for the inhabitants of Fort Langley.

Hunting provided sport and meat, which was socially and culturally valued. However, the geography surrounding Fort Langley was not ideal for hunting. One journal entry exemplifies one of the logistical challenges of a riverine and coastal environment:

Our Hunters are back, with the greater part of the meat of 5 Elk, which they with difficulty Contrived to collect to the water Side, out of as much more they left behind – After leaving this, they discovered the band [of elk] on Point Roberts, but immediately made to the South-ward – next day they rounded the point and again Started them on the borders of the bay – and followed them across the neck of the neck of land to the “H.B.C.” Tree – The Gentlemen give a horrid account of the face of the Country they traversed in this Chase – Here & there, there are a few high ridges with Strong wood but in general extensive quagmires interspersed with patches of overgrown Chalaal [salal] & deep water holes.

258 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 95.
259 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 95.
Even though there were at times readily available sources of hunted meat, the task of moving the meat back to the fort could be onerous. Elk, deer, bear or beaver hunted on the other side of the Fraser River had to be carried by small boat across the river. Meat was often left where the animal had been killed and parties of men were sent to retrieve it.\textsuperscript{260} Indeed the elements offered challenges as well. Barnston wrote, “Cloudy weather and snow. Pierre Charles and Faniant making Snow Shoes, which are required by the People to bring to the Fort the meat which was left out. They will be wanted again if the winter holds on as severely as the present weather seems to indicate.”\textsuperscript{261} The task of bringing meat back to the Fort required many man hours, brute force, and bodies hardened by heavy work to trudge through snow. Clearly bringing the meat home was a priority. When the elk hunting party ventured southwest to Point Roberts they came across a landscape of “quagmires” -- difficult to traverse, let alone transport meat. This was not to be fertile hunting grounds. The effort put into producing hunted meat reflects its cultural value and established nature of hunting as a fur trade foodway used by the HBC, learned by generations of traders in the rich hunting grounds east of the Rocky Mountains. However, it was not the most efficient source of food on the banks of the Fraser River.

**Fishing**

Fishing had been a traditional foodway, and fish a critical source of protein, for generations of the Sto:lo and other peoples on the Fraser River. Indeed, much of the early food trade was in dried or smoked fish. Fishing, for the Langley contingent, was a complicated and culturally loaded practice. During the building of the fort in 1827 and

\textsuperscript{260} For examples, see Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals*, 25, 43, 44, 49, 50, 51.

\textsuperscript{261} Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals*, 49.
1828, post journal entries show an almost total dependence on fish traded from First Nations. However, this was an act of necessity – a situation that through cultivation and hunting the Langley party hoped to eliminate.

In his report on the successful establishment of Fort Langley, James McMillan blames the abundance of fish for the supposed ‘laziness’ displayed by local First Nations and their lack of interest in hunting beaver. “That there are Beaver is a thing that can be hardly doubted, but when our lazy naked Indians will be brought to hunt them time can only determine: The Rivers in Summer are swarming with Salmon and Sturgeon and when they [Aboriginal peoples] retire to the Gulf and Islands: they are equally plentifully supplied during the Winter: Their wants in other respects are so trifling that but little exertion is required of them.” Wayne Suttles debunks this simplistic understanding of the complex cycles and rhythms of food production. “It cannot have been that simple. . . these [abundances] were limited in time and space and varied from year to year. There were good times but also hungry times.” The Fort Langley contingent fundamentally misunderstood the foodways they encountered.

The racist myth of the ‘lazy Indian’ was deployed by early explorers, perpetuated by fur traders, and used as part of a strategy of dispossession by later colonial actors. It was an element of a broader narrative of superiority. Vibert pointed out that early explorers, like David Thompson, felt that fishing activities were because local Aboriginal peoples he encountered did not have the “where-withal” to hunt. Vibert correctly argued that the perception of laziness, which led George Simpson to call Indigenous people of Columbia River “indolent and lazy to an extreme,” was fueled by disappointing fur

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262 Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 217, Appendix B.
returns and a warped idea of Aboriginal foodways informed by buffalo hunting cultures east of the Rocky Mountains.\textsuperscript{264} The pre-existing racist narrative of laziness was further entrenched by what John Lutz reminded us was a game of otherness. He writes, “defining race is about making boundaries, drawing lines, erecting fences and then declaring what is on the other side to be ‘beyond the pale.’”\textsuperscript{265} James McMillian literally “erected fences”; his actions, informed by existing tropes, perpetuated the myth of the ‘lazy Indian.’ McMillian’s report created an implicit comparison between the supposedly ‘industrious’ men of the Fort Langley contingent (who carved forts from the wilderness and properly hunted beaver and red meat), and the ‘Indians’ (who supposedly relied on a natural abundance of [albeit lower-order] food). McMillian was not alone in the HBC in perpetuating these stereotypes, which were deeply embedded in fur trader’s conceptions of Indigenous peoples. Vibert argued that traders who first encountered fishing peoples tried to explain a lack of interest in hunting furs as indolence. Hunting was equated with exertion and fishing with laziness.\textsuperscript{266} As Lutz points out, terms like lazy, or indolent, could also mean that although ‘work’ was being done, it wasn’t useful to the Company. Therefore the ‘lazy’ reliance on fishing “the Rivers . . . swarming with Salmon and Sturgeon”\textsuperscript{267} must be read in a doubled sense. The abundance of fish produced a lesser form of food, and it directly hampered the HBC’s goal of turning the First Nations into prolific beaver hunters.

At posts on the prairies there were pre-established understandings of both trade expectations and the types of food both parties ate; relatively little of the culture arising

\begin{footnotes}
\item[264] Vibert, Traders’ Tales, 120-122.
\item[265] Lutz, Makúk, 36.
\item[266] Vibert, Traders’ Tales, 121.
\item[267] Maclachlan, The Fort Langley Journals, 217.
\end{footnotes}
from those generations of exchange existed at Fort Langley. Therefore, while the Langley contingent may have wanted to eat red meat and baked goods, as I discussed in my second chapter, they ended up having to fish, both to adapt to new foodways and to supply themselves.

Just as the men began to clear the brambles from the building site of Fort Langley, the party acquired fish for the first time. “We procured from the Indians today for the first time a supply of fresh sturgeon.”\(^{268}\) Included in this entry is a description of the local spears, which could reach “fifty feet long.” At first the Langley contingent relied on trade to acquire its fish. However, they soon tried to ply the river themselves, in an attempt to manufacture a new good for export, and to ensure that they were not exclusively reliant on traded food.\(^{269}\)

In late February 1828 McMillan notes, perhaps skeptically, that “Ossin & Perrault [were] making a net to try and catch Sturgeon.”\(^ {270}\) Over the next few days the two are noted as “Busy at the net – which was set in 12 fms. water.”\(^{271}\) The next day the men “visited the net but got nothing.” Finally on 5 March: defeat. “A Sturgeon went through our net. The twine is too weak.”\(^ {272}\) However they were not to be deterred. Securing a viable means of fishing was critical to becoming independent from local First Nations.

Other attempts at catching fish included the construction of fishing spears. “Pierre Charles is making a spear handle of 72 feet long – to try and kill sturgeon Cowitchen


\(^{269}\) McDonald’s 1830 report to Governor and Company states that their fishing trials “by no means proved that we could do without Indian Trade.” See Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals*, 227.

\(^{270}\) Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals*, 55.

\(^{271}\) Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals*, 55.

\(^{272}\) Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals*, 55.
fashion.”\textsuperscript{273} Maybe unsurprisingly, the journal contains no further record of this experimental spear. We may surmise that it did not work. Lack of technical fishing skill didn’t stop the traders. Indeed, a few days later yet another method was employed. “Trial was made of the Seine this Evening. But from the men knowing nothing of the management of it, two Sturgeon that were taken in it escaped.”\textsuperscript{274} Even though their fishing efforts had been futile, McMillan added, “I am in hopes that it [the seine] will prove useful.”\textsuperscript{275} The Fort Langley contingent needed both a supply of food, but also new lines of revenue for the company.\textsuperscript{276} In these early days sturgeon didn’t seem a good candidate to replace beaver.

As the summer of 1829 ended, and a small crop of grain was being threshed, another attempt at the seine was made on August 14. By this time Fort Langley was generating large salmon trade returns; the next day they traded for 600 salmon, soon after that 1000 salmon.\textsuperscript{277} It was becoming clear that trade resulted in far more fish than the poorly constructed seine. Although Europeanizing, this demand for fish resulted in the expansion of Indigenous foodways and created new trade opportunities for the Stó:lō. McDonald, who took over the seine experiments from McMillan, did not have the skilled workforce or materials needed to operate such a system. He wrote, “The net itself is far from being the thing – it is both short and narrow – this arises from the want of Twine & the necessity of tacking pieces of old Indian nets received from the Columbia to what we

\textsuperscript{273} Maclachlan, \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 64.
\textsuperscript{274} Maclachlan, \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 64.
\textsuperscript{275} Maclachlan, \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 64.
\textsuperscript{276} The fur trade returns were not high in the early establishment, as previously discussed Fort Langley would turn to other trade goods in the 1830s.
\textsuperscript{277} Maclachlan, \textit{The Fort Langley Journals}, 124
make ourselves.”

The net deployed by the Langley party was a strange hybrid of HBC-made twine nets (no doubt those deteriorating “old Indian” nets from the Columbia) and total inexperience. What is particularly striking is the seeming lack of either offered help or paid labour from local First Nations. It is not surprising they didn’t offer help. Fishing practices and fishing locations were socially complex entities, passed from generation to generation, as I explored in my first chapter. The HBC men simply were not part of the fishing rhythms or world of the Fraser River. However, the Langley contingent did hire help for other tasks, or use the labour of country wives, but this did not seem to be the case in fishing, nor was advice offered.

Ultimately McDonald seemed to decide that the seine could not produce salmon at a rate similar to those for which they traded. In addition, he recognized that the cost of the twine and equipment would be similar to the cost of the barter goods. Thus the Langley experiment in fishing seemed to come to an end. Fishing was beyond the skills of the HBC labourers. Langley men couldn’t control the fish in the river. Their patchwork nets and spears were not enough to enter into the complicated currents of highly skilled fishing on the Fraser.

Cultivation, hunting and fishing formed a complicated triad of attempts to produce food, not only to feed the inhabitants of Fort Langley, but to demonstrate the permanence and utility of the outpost. Hunting reproduced cultural understandings of appropriate food hierarchy. Red meat allowed the men of the Langley contingent to pretend to be gentlemen of the wilderness, dining in a manly and virtuous fashion on elk and deer. The sowing of a potato field created Europeanized space where the HBC could

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278 Maclachlan, *The Fort Langley Journals*, 123.
be secure in their supply of food. Fishing proved to be a complicated mixture of economic and food-based necessity. They also needed to manufacture a viable alternative to beaver which was present in the Fraser River, but due to lack of interest in wide scale trapping by First Nation peoples was not a real source of substantial fur returns. They also had to provide fish, for both trade and food stuffs (as undesirable as a fish-heavy diet may have been). While McMillan saw the fishing activities of the local First Nations as ‘lazy’, he didn’t hesitate to try to replicate them, which proved to be more challenging and complicated than he expected. This produced a paradox in which the Europeanized newcomers couldn’t match the skill of ‘lazy Indians’ and therefore become highly dependent on the product of ‘lazy’ local fishers. Ultimately the men of Langley couldn’t justify their fishing attempts.

The production of food, although hampered at times by lack of skill, at Fort Langley would ultimately create newly Europeanized foodways, especially on the Langley fields, on which settlers would begin to create a Europeanized and colonised British Columbia. These acts of cultivation, attempted fishing, and hunting form part of the densely woven “micro-techniques of dispossession,” which acted in at times subtle ways to alienate Indigenous people from their own land, piece by piece. The piecemeal establishment of Europeanized food production on the banks of the Fraser River through micro-techniques of dispossession hints at the coming destruction and brings to mind Cole Harris’s call “that those of us who comprise this settler society need to acknowledge not only the remarkable achievement of creating modern British Columbia, but also the destruction that has accompanied it.”

Conclusion

From 1827 to 1830, the men of the Fort Langley contingent shaped and were shaped by their small plot of land on the banks of the Fraser River. What we know of this period has been informed by a single source, the Langley journal, written by officers for their superiors. Historians trained in (and limited by) archival documents often have limited paths into the past. Therefore I have read the journal with interpretive latitude, always using the available evidence as a foundation for my interpretation.

As Cole Harris posited, Europeanization of the small patches of land on which fur traders built their forts was the first step toward longer term and ultimately much more insidious effects of settlement and colonization. The Langley party cut back the brambles and formed the land into a place suitable for building the palisades, bastions, trade stores and houses which formed the physical infrastructure of the fur trade. At Langley, this was part of the process of Europeanization, which co-opted both the land and the men.

The men of Fort Langley were not, strictly speaking, Europeans. The officers were predominantly of Scottish background, save Annance, and the men were French-Canadian, Hawaiian, or Iroquois. Their actions, as servants of the Hudson’s Bay Company, resulted in the Europeanization of the banks of the Fraser River.

Although we have no direct evidence written by the men from this time period, I have read between the lines of the journal to locate episodes of possible acts of agency. The men of Langley may have negotiated and resisted the control of the Company, if only in micro-acts. I have used these episodes in an attempt to clear this lens and use it to explore the interpretive possibilities inherent in this limited evidence.
Through construction of buildings, clearing land, labouring, hunting, fishing and farming in a distinctly European fashion, the Langley contingent created a small sliver of Europeanized space on the banks of the Fraser River.

This micro-history of Fort Langley performed within the scope of a Master’s thesis allowed a critical engagement with a specific source, place, and period. I have been able to draw out subtle acts of micro-Europeanization and agency that in a larger or broader study might have been overlooked. However, there are disadvantages to this approach. This thesis is one-sided. I have deliberately not performed a detailed study of the interactions and negotiations of the Stó:lō and other coastal people with the Langley contingent. To take this work further, a critical understanding of the oral, ethnographical and archeological histories of these peoples would need to be developed and integrated. Therefore, this thesis is only half the work that the larger topic ideally requires. In a comparative micro-history, Stó:lō daily life between 1827 and 1830 would be paired with my work on Langley. In that more complete work, the negotiation, contact zones, and cultural exchange would receive adequate attention.

This thesis has opened a micro-historical window into the life and labour of the men at Fort Langley from 1827 to 1830. What we see through that window is a hard life full of challenges, negotiation, and anxiety. However, this window allows us to see only half the story. What I have written is an analysis of how a distinctly European process of control formed and functioned – even in the action of a hammer striking a nail. As Cole Harris wrote, “non-native British Columbians need to understand, as now they hardly do, how non-Native power took root in this province.”

280 Harris, The Resettlement of British Columbia, 67.
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