Canada and the Far Eastern Commission

By

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B.A., University of Victoria, 2001

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ABSTRACT

Canada participated in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, later the Far Eastern Commission, overseeing the occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952. In the face of resistance from the United States government generally, and from General MacArthur specifically, Canada and the Far Eastern Commission achieved little success in moderating United States policy. Because Canada’s position was always influenced by its concern for future multilateral bodies and its overwhelming need to maintain good relations with the United States, it displayed little independence on the Far Eastern Commission.
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Dedicated to Ruth, Charlotte and Calvin.
Chapter 1: Historiography

A few weeks after the defeat of Japan, the Canadian government was startled by the receipt of an invitation from the United States to participate in a consultative body on the occupation of Japan, The Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC). This Commission, soon replaced by the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), did not champion the principles for which the western governments claimed to be fighting, nor would it be remembered as an effective yet realist body guiding an occupation that, while effective in meeting American goals, was a mixed legacy for the Japanese people. Only occasionally did the Far Eastern Commission, with Canadian support and neglect in turns, affect the occupation of Japan whereas the great powers, most notably the United States, affected the FEC at every turn. For the Canadian government the Far Eastern Commission was significant as its first post-war participation in a multilateral body outside the United Nations. Therefore, examining the actions of Canadian representatives in the Commission provides a unique glimpse at the development of post-war Canadian foreign policy.

Despite the end of Canadian historians’ neglect of Asia suggested by a developing body of monographs and articles, an Atlantic bias has kept Canada’s history in the Pacific out of the national narrative. Before World War Two, Canada’s interest in Asia was largely confined to the regulation of immigration, the possibilities of trade and the potential for Christian missionary activities. These limited interests surely informed the views of External Affairs officials who guided Canada’s participation in post-war commissions involved in the protracted de-colonization of East Asia. If Canadian involvement in East Asia has seemed to pale in comparison to its involvement in Europe, its impact might not be seen that way by the East Asian states affected by Canada’s post-
war policies. Canada’s role in the post-war international bodies at work in Indochina, Korea and Japan placed it in the middle of efforts to manage Japan’s defeat, and the decolonization that this produced. In spite of this, conventional scholarship on Canadian foreign relations rarely addressed activities in East Asia. This story of the Far Eastern Commission and Canada’s continuing presence in East Asia is an endeavour to fill in one of those gaps.

In contrast to Canadian academics and reflecting the greater interests of their respective homelands in the issues, American and Japanese scholars have published monographs treating the surrender of Japan, the occupation of Japan, and the development of its post-war constitution. The narratives provided by these works range from Theodore Cohen’s realist, though at times romanticized, account of Douglas MacArthur and his policies and interaction with Japanese elites, to John Dower’s description of Japanese agency in the occupation. Takamae Eiji’s translated history of the occupation, though more thoroughly researched than the other two books, overwhelms the reader with its detail. Each of these volumes provides an inside glimpse of the occupation and the goals of the individuals and groups that sought to influence it. In contrast with these works, Michael Schaller’s The American Occupation of Japan focuses on how the occupation shaped the post-war development of all East Asia.2

In all but one of the afore-mentioned books Canada is mentioned, if at all, in a standard list of countries who signed the document of Japanese surrender, joined the

FEAC, or provided staff for the prosecution of war crimes. The one exception is Takemae Eiji who in *Inside GHQ* notes Canadian desire to ensure that the new constitution required that all cabinet members be civilians but he erroneously states Canada agreed in October 1945 to contribute forces to the occupation of Japan. While these books scarcely mention Canada, they do allow us to situate Canada’s participation in the FEC in the context of early great power goals in Japan and of the strategies that Japanese elites used achieve their goals during the occupation. It is also important to consider how the occupation has been described to this point. New writing on the occupation forces the consideration of self interest on the part of the victors in World War Two as well as the impact of minor players in affecting the policies of the United States.

Theodore Cohen, who, during the war was a military government planner specializing in labour policy for Japan, was politically aligned with the ‘New-Deal’ Democrats, and had a Master’s degree in Japanese Labour history. Thus, he was well placed to assist MacArthur in developing a liberal labour environment. In his book, Cohen argues that although many specific policy initiatives had Japanese proponents, only a strong and deeply involved occupation enabled the new Japan to emerge since otherwise Japan’s “old line would have remained intact, the old mold as constricting as ever.” Perhaps because he worked so closely with him, Cohen’s MacArthur is, if not always benevolent, at least benign. With few exceptions he describes the early years of the occupation as an attempt to achieve the best (though he leaves this goal undefined) set of policies and institutions for Japan within, and sometimes without, the political

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3 Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 131, 291-292; the mistaken suggestion by Britain that Canada would participate in a Commonwealth Occupation Force for Japan was rebuked by Mackenzie King in mid-August, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, Telegram 189, 15 August 1945, *Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1945* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1987), 979.

4 Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 464.
constraints imposed. Cohen was eventually the target of red-baiting accusations. MacArthur’s support in the face of this attack solidified Cohen’s respect for the Commander that persisted despite the eventual divergence between occupation policies and Cohen’s political views.⁵

In *Embracing Defeat* John Dower sees in Japan a pattern similar to that observed by other revisionist historians (historians that have argued against the original narrative that only superpower actions influenced the Cold War), who show how allies and client states of the United States and of the Soviet Union achieved their own goals by playing on the insecurity of their patron in relation to the local situation.⁶ Specifically relating to the Occupation, Dower asserts that various Japanese elites exploited the Cold War to extract concessions and implement policies most pleasing to a more traditional liberal educated elite.⁷ He describes post-occupation Japan as a product of the interactions between the occupation forces and the Japanese people who were re-inventing themselves and re-writing their national mythology to support a new direction for Japanese society.

A well researched volume, Takemae Eiji’s *Inside GHQ* presents a fairly orthodox view of the occupation. Conceding that the atomic bombings and the occupation regime were inevitable results of Japanese aggression, Takemae recognizes the wider political motives that guided American policy in Japan but does not expand upon the possibility that these same geopolitical motives might have outweighed the reform motives for

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⁶ For example see John Gillingham, "Turning Weakness into Strength: France’s Post-World War II Diplomacy" *Diplomatic History* 24 (Summer 2000), 543-546.
⁷ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*. 
occupation policies. While not pushing the boundaries of contemporary analysis in relation to the occupation of Japan, Takemae’s book is extremely detailed and methodical, an irreplaceable documentary resource for any scholarship on occupation-era Japan.

Michael Schaller’s *The American Occupation of Japan* describes an occupation that was directed by a vain and self-serving MacArthur, later by Washington directly, but which Japanese elites exploited in order to modify or thwart some reforms. Schaller does not consciously place initial American policy decisions for Japan in a Cold War framework but, the image of a potentially adversarial Soviet Union is evident in even the earliest planning of the occupation. Thus, the link between the occupation of Japan and the Cold War becomes Schaller’s major theme as he integrates such events as the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War into his work.

Placing the defeat of Japan (and by extension the subsequent occupation) within the power struggles that bridged World War Two and the Cold War, Marc Gallicchio’s *The Cold War Begins in Asia* positions the beginning of the Cold War as the American response to the breakdown of the Asian Potsdam system (the spheres of influence envisioned by the allies at their meeting in Potsdam, Germany), immediately after World War Two. While Gallicchio emphasizes the breakdown of an initial agreement about the future of East Asia, one of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s major themes is the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for advantage in the vacuum left by the collapse of Japan. Hasegawa’s *Racing the Enemy* examines the competition both between

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8 Takemae, *Inside GHQ*.
9 Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*.
America and the Soviet Union to force Japan’s surrender and between the peace party and war party within the leading institutions of Japanese society to achieve the most favourable peace terms.\textsuperscript{11}

**Writing on Canada and Japan**

Canada became independent in foreign policy between the wars but, with rare exceptions such as missionary accounts, scholars did not write about Canada in East Asia at that time.\textsuperscript{12} As East Asia became the scene of conflict in the 1930s, a few monographs on Canada and Asia were produced. In the years since World War Two a few monographs and articles have explored Canada’s interest in Japan in the late 1940s.

As an early example of Canadian interest in East Asian affairs, the Washington Agreements of 1921 display a glimpse of Canadian diplomatic tactics to come, though the writing on them fails to confront the continued Imperial project they represented. This project endured in the way Canada continued to accept Britain speaking for it (though with Canadian input), and in the way the agreements continued to impose the will of the British Empire on East Asia. In 1921 when Britain considered the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 the Canadian government sought to alter or end it. Canadian officials feared that growing Japanese influence in East Asia would bring Canada, and its ally Britain, into conflict with the United States, a worst-case scenario for Canada’s neglected Pacific coast. Canadian officials urged that the alliance be dropped in favour of

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\textsuperscript{12} For example see A. Hamish Ion, “Ambassadors of the Cross: Canadian Missionaries in Japan,” in *Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century.* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991).
a conference representing all the major powers. In the introduction to *The Dominion and the Rising Sun*, John Meehan describes the outcome at the Washington Conference of 1921 where Britain, the United States, France and Japan pledged to maintain the open-door policy in China, resulting in a peace in East Asia he compares to that established for Europe at Versailles. Both Pringsheim and Meehan credit Arthur Meighen with suggesting to Britain the idea of widening the treaty, but Canada’s role is not mentioned beyond that. Any treaty rights Canada enjoyed in China were as part of the Empire. Meehan and Pringsheim both describe the agreement in terms of preserving peace in East Asia, not as legitimating the dominance of three Western powers and one Asian power over China.

Canada participated in the Washington Conference as part of the British Empire but in 1929, reflecting its new independence, opened a legation in Tokyo which had responsibility for Canadian interests in China as well as Japan. The fact of Canada’s practical preference for Japan over China as a base for expanding commercial interests coloured the perceptions of Canadian staff posted to Tokyo and left a lingering perception of Canadian bias after the war. It also flew in the face of public opinion at home. While Canadians did not generally pay much attention to Asia outside of specific incidents or within a Commonwealth context, Japanese aggression in China eventually led to pro-China sympathies. Meehan’s account of Canadian interests in Japan serve as a primer for understanding the re-awakening of Canadian interest in Japan that membership

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in the FEC may have engaged.

Commissioned by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and writing in the opening months of World War Two in Europe, the historian A.R.M. Lower described Canada’s growing problem as one of managing its increasingly comprehensive relationship with the United States during a period of growing tension with Japan and in the event of war with Japan. If Britain went to war with Japan, Lower expected Canada would likely follow and, largely safe from attack due to geography, would play a minor role in hostilities in the Pacific. The limited Japanese threat to Canada’s West coast would have to be countered with Canadian resources or else American forces would be deployed to prevent any Japanese strike on the American continent. In the event of war between America and Japan, Lower considered it likely that Canada would, at least initially, remain neutral but would have to dedicate considerable resources to preventing Japanese use of Canadian territory to attack the United States. An escalating conflict in this case would eventually lead to Canadian belligerency alongside the Americans, following on from Canadian economic support to the United States.

Writing on Canada and Japan in the post-war era is limited to general works or articles and collections of essays, on specific topics; none of them is devoted specifically to Canada and the Far Eastern Commission. Biographies exist for many of the key

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16 A.R.M. Lower, Canada and the Far East – 1940 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 109-111; another work from this period is Charles J. Woodsworth, Canada and the Orient: A Study of International Relations (Toronto: MacMillan Company of Canada, 1941), Woodsworth wrote under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1941. This volume mirrored the priorities of most Canadians in that its first five chapters were about Asian immigration or Asians living in Canada. The last three chapters treated international relations, trade and missionaries respectively.

players in the Department of External Affairs during this period but references to the occupation of Japan are minimal and those to the FEC are almost non-existent. John Hilliker’s two volume history of External Affairs mentions participation in the FEC only once.\(^\text{18}\) Not surprisingly, general surveys of post-war Canadian history totally ignore it.

Yet Canadian scholars of the immediate post-war period did not completely ignore East Asia. In an article, “Canada’s Far Eastern Policy,” in *Pacific Affairs* in 1946, W.L. Morton, a historian at the University of Manitoba, argued that “Canada cannot properly be said to have a positive Far Eastern policy.”\(^\text{19}\) He contrasted Canada’s European focus with America’s Western focus all the while failing to recognize any popular basis for Canada’s own Southern focus. Morton described the Southern focus as something important within government, especially, dominant in the sphere of security, but did not allow that Canadians had developed a cultural Southern focus of their own. Morton accurately observed that Mackenzie King’s commitment to long-term objectives instead of current issues would provide solace only until it was recognized that each issue contributed (or not) towards his long-term goals. Writing specifically on the occupation of Japan, Morton was misinformed when he stated that Canada was represented on the Allied Council for Japan. His argument that Canada was “underwriting the policies of the United States” in the occupation of Japan by not expressing distinct Canadian positions

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may at the time have represented public perception but could not account for developments within External Affairs and the FEC to which he did not have access.\textsuperscript{20}

In his survey of Canadian-Japanese relations from the Meiji restoration and Confederation to recent times, Karl Pringsheim briefly deals with the FEC but does not mention the Canadian issues that complicated membership in it. He accurately portrays the varying (mostly declining) influence that Herbert Norman carried with MacArthur and other occupation officials in Japan, but oversells Norman’s influence on Canadian policy when he said that “Norman’s views of Japanese society became Canadian policy, as manifested in the positions taken by the Canadian representative in the consultations of the FEC.”\textsuperscript{21} Certainly Norman’s positions were sought and highly regarded, but Canadian positions presented at the FEC were the result of diplomatic compromise with heavy doses of realism and deference to American interests. In particular, Pringsheim fails to present the consternation in External Affairs over the progress of Japan’s new constitution.

Also addressing Canadian policy on Japan’s new constitution, Michael Fry spoke at a conference at the MacArthur Memorial in 1983 on the international aspect of the occupation of Japan. Fry presented a paper on Canada’s role in the occupation, its participation in the FEC and the establishment of Norman’s mission to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Fry suggests that because of the Cold War, External Affairs emphasized the need to bring democracy and peace to East Asia.\textsuperscript{22} He explains that Canada supported the American project to bring Japan into the Cold War

\textsuperscript{20} Morton, “Canada’s Far Eastern Policy,” 246-247.
\textsuperscript{21} Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, 96.
\textsuperscript{22} Fry, “Canada and the Occupation of Japan,” 134, 139, 144.
but Fry does not identify a point where Canada made the transition from a wartime approach to Japan to a Cold War approach. He does not address the matter of how Canadian officials squared the transition from preventing future Japanese aggression to building up Japan to resist Soviet pressure and aid the western cause even though this required the modification or abandonment of other postwar aims in Japan. Fry identifies several structural clashes at which Canada opposed American subordination of the FEC to its interests, calling these instances a beginning of ‘quiet diplomacy’. 23 He describes the battle over the development of Japan’s new constitution in more detail here than Pringsheim, but, like Pringsheim, argues that both the Canadian government and Herbert Norman were satisfied that the constitution was more liberal than one the Japanese might have devised for themselves. They acknowledged that an alien document was more likely to be revised after the Occupation ended. 24 Fry observes, however, that External Affairs noted the debilitation of the FEC’s legitimacy in the wake of the constitution’s development. In contrast to Fry who proposes that Norman and External Affairs were generally satisfied with the constitution the FEC prepared for Japan, John Price stressed Norman’s belief that the Japanese people themselves must develop a constitution within the restrictions imposed by the Potsdam Declaration, and not just accept the imposition of a specific allied constitutional template. 25

Price closely analyses the FEC’s failure to assert its prerogative in relation to Japan’s constitution and Canada’s hot and cold advocacy on behalf of the FEC in “E.H. Norman, Canada and the Japanese Constitution”. 26 The description shows the FEC at a

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23 Fry, “Canada and the Occupation of Japan,” 138-139.
24 Fry, “Canada and the Occupation of Japan,” 140-141.
moment at which it could have had the most relevance, but which instead became the
tipping point for its slide into decreasing practical impact. The account details Herbert
Norman’s intimate involvement in this issue, both as a participant acting as chairman of
the FEC committee responsible for the constitution and later as Canadian envoy to SCAP
in occupied Japan, but also as the core of Canada’s intellectual engagement with Japanese
society and politics.27

**Canadian Foreign Policy**

At the end of World War Two Canada possessed military power out of all
proportion to its population, and an economy that was the envy of all except the United
States. The relatively powerful position of Canada at the close of the war owed just as
much to the destruction, in most cases temporary, of other power centres in the war.
Despite the impressive statistics, Canadian officials already had significant experience
with the difficulties in obtaining a voice in the councils of the new world order. The
deference to great power decision making that was accepted for war time convenience
appeared to be turning into common post-war practice and the Canadian government
needed a policy to guide where it would attempt to influence world affairs, and an
argument to convince the great powers to allow Canada this influence.

Writing on Canadian foreign relations can take many different forms, each
revealing as much about the assumed nature of the world as about the subject matter at
hand. Narrative frameworks for Canadian foreign relations have attempted to encapsulate
the structure by which Canada has attempted in theory or practice to assert a significant

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27 Herbert Norman had academic training suiting him to advise on the Japanese constitution and served in
positions with responsibility for enacting Canadian decisions on the Japan and its constitution. As he held
each of these positions and even as he was in transit between them External Affairs sought his advise on
role in world affairs. Other narrative frameworks have attempted to describe Canadian foreign relations within the Cold War conflict.

During the war, Canadian diplomats evolved the concept of *functionalism* to give Canada relevance on the world stage. According to this theory, states should influence world affairs on matters where they were most involved and where they had the capacity to contribute to the matter at hand.\(^{28}\) Wartime manoeuvring around the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and post-war decisions about the occupation of Germany had already demonstrated that significant Canadian contribution to the defeat of Germany and to the relief of people devastated by war did not translate into a Canadian seat at the table of power. In the immediate post-war environment Canadian troops in occupied Germany did not give Canada a greater window on the decisions being made for the future of Europe than would have been possible in their absence.

The United States invited Canada to join the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC) because it had been at war with Japan. That this invitation stood when the FEAC was converted into the more powerful FEC seemed to fly in the face of recent functional disappointments. Canada had supplied troops for the defence of Hong Kong and a few Canadian Navy ships operated in the Pacific, but these commitments were a small fraction of the Canadian effort in Europe where Canada was largely shut out of the peace settlements. If functionalism were to eventually define the ability of states to be involved in world affairs, then Canadian officials certainly hoped that it would be applied with

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some sense of scale and less capriciousness. While functionalism may have played a role within the bureaucratic institutions of the United Nations, in matters of importance to the great powers Canada could not expect to gain admission based only on the assets it brought to the table.

A more promising narrative within which to assert standing was the argument that Canada was a *middle power*. While clearly not a great power in the sense of Britain or France with empires, large populations and a comprehensive manufacturing economy, Canada could argue that it was not comparable to states like El Salvador or Liberia and that its significant economic and military contributions to the past conflict should admit it to a second tier of states that deliberated world affairs. The great powers, beset by internal divisions, were not sympathetic to bringing more players to the table. Just as importantly, if Canada were to make a grab for power using such a construct, how would it establish that such a thing as a middle power actually existed?

As Adam Chapnick convincingly argues, there is no satisfactory criterion by which to differentiate Canada from any other state that was not a great power. The only states that received consideration by the emerging Soviet and American superpowers were the declining great powers France and Britain, eventually China, and upon restoration, Germany and Japan. The great powers were unwilling as a group, to accede to the Canadian argument, and Canada could not risk the great power disarray that might result from its continuing to tilt at windmills. Ignored abroad, however, Canada as a middle power was still a winning narrative at home.

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31 Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project*, 150.
In another effort to gain a voice for Canada, Canadian officials who realized that the scale of American dominance was so great that only in the company of a group of states could Canada hope to affect world events and protect its interests, now emphasized *multilateralism*. In addition to sharing responsibility or seeking consensus, multilateral bodies would also encourage certain standards of behaviour in international relations.\(^{32}\) Canada frequently supported multilateral bodies and expounded their virtues in the management of various aspects of international affairs. But was multilateralism an ideal format for the expression of Canadian views, or was it the best lever to apply against the immovable objects of post-war diplomacy? To the degree that Canadian officials made abstract claims that multilateralism was an inherently good process it was elevated to the role of principle instead of specific interest. Canada might have preferred a functional ability to be heard on its own, when its interests were at stake or its resources were sought. While multilateralism put Canada at the table, it was a crowded table that included states Canada considered minor. As became evident, the large and diverse nature of multilateral bodies may have been a factor in their practical irrelevance in the face of physical control by a single Great Power in any one issue. They could not be counted on to limit their advice to tactical adjustments that followed the great power’s strategic goal. Canada may have had more influence as a trusted ally, with a functional stake in a matter, which could be relied upon to approach matters with similar goals and ideological boundaries.

Functionalism, middle power status, and multilateralism have been put forth separately or in combination as a fundamental truth that, once asserted, would grant

Canada access to whatever political problem was at hand. The practical pursuit of national objectives may not have permitted principled devotion to a single criterion for international relevance. Yet for this reason the FEC provides an interesting test case for the use of these arguments as they were marshalled or ignored in support of broad Canadian principles or immediate Canadian interests. That these objectives were so often abandoned regardless of their supporting narrative establishes that another factor had much greater sway over Canadian positions.

The elephant in the room of Canadian foreign policy in this period is Canada’s relationship with the United States. Bilateralism is an explanatory device, that while not exclusive of other concepts, can overwhelm other factors in discussing any particular issue, and for many it is the prime explanatory factor. The management of the bilateral relationship can become a priority in any venue. To the degree that Canada did not see itself with a functional claim on East Asia, or was unwilling to maintain a devotion to multilateralism, the FEC can be examined to judge the relative strength of bilateral concerns in comparison to other professed goals. How far was Canada willing to go in the defence of its own interests, in defence of patterns of international relations like multilateralism that it felt held future promise, or in the defence of other principles like democracy, when faced with obvious and enunciated American opposition? Or is an evaluation of American opposition sufficient to rethinking what was in the Canadian

interest? What is at stake is the notion of bilateral relations as acquisition and expenditure of goodwill “currency” – if Canada presses its case on one issue it will not have standing to press its case on another. An alternate view would be that most American concessions to Canada were also in the benefactor’s best interest. It may be that a more genuine Canadian foreign policy, one that placed more emphasis on Canadian interests over American expectations, would not have resulted in significant difference in American response.

Canada’s participation in the FEC presents a unique possibility for examining foreign policy through the lens of the Cold War. The early occupation of Japan spans the period from the end of World War Two to the beginning of the Cold War (no matter when you place its start). Does Canada’s participation in the FEC lend itself to being explained as a Cold War story? And if so, in what tradition might this story be told?

Cold War historiography has traditionally been referred to as orthodox, revisionist or post-revisionist. The original explanations of the Cold War emerged as the phrase was coined and the world was realizing that the peace of 1945 was becoming something between peace and war. George Kennan’s famous ‘X’ article in *Foreign Affairs* set the orthodox tone, placing blame for the deterioration in international relations squarely on the shoulders of Stalin, his pursuit of power, and the communist ideology that guided this pursuit.³⁴

Immediate alternatives to this view included former Vice-President Henry Wallace who blamed both sides for the crisis on his 1946 speaking tour, and historians like William Appleman Williams and Gar Alperovitz who emphasized respectively the economic imperative of the multilateral capitalist system, and the American use of atomic

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weapons as the trump behind bullish diplomacy.\textsuperscript{35} Eventually a post-revisionist synthesis evolved which accepted blame for both sides in the Cold War and sought to explain the projects, conflicts and turning points of this campaign usually, though not always, through the lens of power politics.\textsuperscript{36}

**Canada’s Cold War**

Accounts of the Canadian state’s entry into the Cold War range from orthodox to revisionist without reaching the extreme limit of either. Canadian historians, diplomats and pundits were less willing to use extreme language in describing the Soviet Union or communism in general, and those who wrote about post-World War Two developments could summon at least some sympathy for Soviet motives. This does not mean that most chronicles of Canada and the Cold War place equal blame on the United States and USSR in the immediate post-war period; the west was, more often than not, described as being guilty only of misinterpretation or over-zealousness.

Of course arguments about Canada’s role in the Cold War necessarily hinge on the relative responsibility of the Soviet Union or the United States for the wider conflict. An argument that Canada entered the Cold War in an effort to contain or roll-back communism, or in reaction to a perceived threat can be maintained regardless of which superpower is blamed for starting the Cold War. Canada might not have needed to enter a bilateral or multilateral alliance until it became convinced that one power or both were likely to precipitate a conflict. Alternatively Canada could have sought out all possible economic and political advantage available from the altruistic policies of the United States.


States. The degree to which Canada and/or the United States can be argued to have acted aggressively or defensively in their pursuit of the Cold War varies widely from study to study.

The transplantation of the traditional American orthodox/revisionist dichotomy onto Canadian Cold War histories is difficult because so few Canadian studies follow the “orthodox” school. Instead the labels, when they are used in the Canadian context at all, appear to point more to politically conservative accounts (orthodox) and politically radical (revisionist) accounts. In the years between the development of the Cold War and the present orthodox accounts of Canada in the Cold War have become more nuanced about the motivations and policies of the West while retaining a central argument that the Soviet Union was primarily responsible for this conflict. Over this same period accounts that could be described as revisionist have expanded from economic, ideological or geopolitical narratives of Western or shared responsibility to focus on client states, non-state actors and cultural factors to describe or explain the Cold War in Canada.

What is the old Canadian Orthodoxy? Canadian orthodoxy started with Arnold Smith, of the Ministry of External Affairs, who anonymously denounced Soviet actions in the form of a review of two books under the pseudonym A.H.C. Smith asserted that the Soviets had lost any progressive legitimacy, and he worried that Western governments were not ready to counter this communist threat. Similarly, C.P. Stacey, who had been the official historian of the Canadian Army, argued that Canadian attempts

to guide a basically sound American policy were doomed by Soviet intransigence.\textsuperscript{38}

Other orthodox scholars like John English explicitly rejected revisionist works and argued that Canada and the United States were justifiably defensive.

Although these orthodox writers did not agree with all American tactics towards the Soviets, they saw the Americans as essentially altruistic and shared their general position on the desired future for the world as the better choice between two competing superpowers. According to these orthodox scholars, Canada’s allegiance to the Cold War project only required it to moderate American views where it had influence, utilizing quiet diplomacy within a bilateral relationship.

What is the old Canadian Revisionism? In 1954, at the Couchiching Conference on Public Affairs, Donald Creighton, a renowned Canadian historian and a staunch Conservative, unleashed an account of Canada’s participation in the Cold War that did not bring comfort just one year after the cessation of hostilities in Korea. Creighton debunked the idea that the West subscribed to a single ideology. He argued that the states so grouped shared no principle such as ideology, religion or economic system. The pursuit of such a justification for the conflict could only lead to a disturbing absolutist narrative.\textsuperscript{39} This view of the Cold War, he claimed, was predicated on a North American readiness to violence, a belief in technology as the method of accomplishing these aims, and an elevation of a cult of ‘toughness’ in international relations.\textsuperscript{40} John Diefenbaker, the Honorary chair of the conference and a Progressive Conservative Member of


\textsuperscript{39} Donald Creighton, \textit{Towards the Discovery of Canada: Selected Essays} (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972), 246-247.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 247-248.
Parliament, saw an advance copy of the speech, and warned Creighton that his proposed talk “was a very extraordinary statement for a ‘Conservative historian’ to make.”  

By the evening’s end Creighton had been repudiated by Diefenbaker and rebuked by Professor Marcus Long, a professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto.

Other revisionist accounts of the Cold War portrayed Canada as a willing assistant in aggressively confronting the Soviet Union or as an agnostic opportunist, seeking opportunities to alter American policies to its benefit. Others describe the struggle as a capitalist crusade for markets, with Canada eagerly taking its place at America’s side.

The Canadian description of the Cold War in this context is typically about Canada and the United States. Authors writing in the revisionist frame did not claim that Mackenzie King did not understand Stalin; they argued that Canadian leaders made choices in accommodating the American Cold War project that were harmful to specific Canadian interests. When Canadian leaders were cited for having used the discourse of the Soviet threat, they frequently were not judged as being purposely duplicitous; rather they were shown to be fulfilling their role within the managed American production.

What is the Modern Canadian Orthodoxy? Orthodox views of the Cold War have become more nuanced over the decades. New revelations and sources have been mined and integrated. Where revisionists found smoking guns, others found the exception that proves the rule, or information that dirtied but did not devastate their original assertions. The world might not be black and white anymore, but it could still be described as either

41 Ibid., 9.
off-white or dark grey.  

The typical Canadian orthodox narrative today describes specific challenges faced in Canada’s alignment with the United States, but does not accept any argument for the interpretation of Soviet actions as defensive. While some have taken their perception that the West won the Cold War as cause to discount theories critical of the West during that conflict, the post-revisionist synthesis, prominent from the 1980s until now, accepts and incorporates revisionist arguments into a narrative that discards white and black hats in favour of grey.

Modern orthodox views of the Canadian Cold War can read like post-revisionist histories but they include an essential claim that, despite faults and shady motives, the aims of the United States and Canada were the best possible at each stage of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has prompted a premature closure on the evidence of unintended consequences and malicious intent that required serious refutation for the development of the orthodox argument.

What is the Modern Canadian Revisionism? Just a few recent works challenge the orthodox view of the Cold War but they provide interesting themes for future research. Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse’s Cold War Canada argues that what was significant in the early Cold War is not that Canada and the United States pursued policies of self-

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44 In addition to Kristmanson, and Whitaker and Marcuse, Denis Smith’s Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948 (Toronto University of Toronto Press, 1988) is another modern revisionist text.
interest to the detriment of world peace, but the degree to which Canada’s Cold War was largely an internal affair, determined by a set of circumstances under which national interests could seize control of the political agenda using “the false choices apparently imposed by the rigidities of the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{45} The Cold War in Canada was not fought exclusively (or predominantly) against the Soviet menace; it was fought against enemies real and imagined, and constructed at home.

In a series of arguments connecting the emerging post-war conflict with the federal government’s desire to continue security practices of the war, Mark Kristmanson’s \textit{Plateaus of Freedom} describes the security challenge presented by “others” within an imperial setting.\textsuperscript{46} The need to be secure from the threat of those different from the imperial ideal, English speaking Canadians of Loyalist or British heritage, resulted in the management of the nationalities issue during World War Two, and the development of multiculturalism after. Culture, both strange and familiar, thus required government institutions for its proper management and security.\textsuperscript{47} The result Kristmanson says is that “the consequences of domestic censorship, intelligence, and propaganda activities on Canada’s historiography and its cultural development during the Cold War are known only to the small extent that a few commendable independent scholars have succeeded in penetrating the veil of secrecy.”\textsuperscript{48} Whitaker and Marcuse, along with Kristmanson argue that external conflict took on an independent national utility, requiring the maintenance of tension in order to support national goals.

\textsuperscript{47} Kristmanson, \textit{Plateaus of Freedom}, xvi-xvii.
\textsuperscript{48} Kristmanson, \textit{Plateaus of Freedom}, 232.
The FEC in Canada’s Cold War?

How then might a narrative of Canada’s tenure at the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) fit within a tradition of describing Canada’s conversion from World War to Cold War? Was joining it a simple matter of Canada doing what it could until it accepted that the Soviet threat trumped all other considerations in East Asia and elsewhere? Was Canada early to adopt a perception of bipolar struggle in its policy on Japan or did it persist in attempting to facilitate a world order where consensus, even across ideologies, mattered – even if only in limited instances. That East Asia played a role in Canada’s internal security struggle is clearly evident. Even as Norman and others at External Affairs debated the relative merits of a potential new Japanese constitution, Japanese-Canadians, many of them Canadian born, were being shipped across the Pacific, some to a devastated land they had never seen. But how far did this domestic fear translate into foreign policy?

The FEC operated over several years (though with varying levels of effectiveness), and through a period where both the guiding principles of Canadian foreign policy, and the means by which it could be pursued, were changing. An awareness of these ways of explaining the process and trajectory of Canadian foreign policy are important in examining the multiple opportunities given in the FEC that conform or diverge from them.
Chapter 2: Canada and the Far Eastern Commission

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission

Allied allegiance to the Atlantic Charter, and American popular opinion pointed to the need to avoid the re-imposition of colonial systems at the close of the war, or at least to avoid the perception of such. Early in the Pacific war the American government’s plan was that Britain, France and the Netherlands would not return to their East Asian colonies as imperial powers. By war’s end it had changed its mind because it realized that sending in American troops to replace the Japanese forces would create a serious diplomatic crisis with the former colonial powers. Moreover, indigenous independence movements, supported to varying extents by the allies during the war, threatened to become too independent for American post-war plans. The Europeans planned to return to the colonial pattern that had been problematic before the war and would become unsustainable after. The United States kept several Pacific islands formerly administered by Japan, and it assisted the European powers in re-asserting control over their colonies, but neither of these events caused the Americans to recognize any deviation from the spirit of the Atlantic Charter.¹

Allied intentions for the peace were most clearly set out in the Yalta Agreement of February 1945. In language that paid lip service to the Atlantic Charter, Britain would dominate in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union would increase its presence in Northeast Asia as well as receive the southern half of Sakhalin Island and several smaller islands from Japan; both the Soviet Union and the United States would accommodate an

independent China while the Americans would occupy Japan and administer a new trusteeship over the mandate Pacific islands.\textsuperscript{2} This system complemented arrangements made for Europe and the Middle East at the same time and eventually reflected the facts on the ground.

Whereas the Americans shared the occupation of Germany with the British French, and Russians their intentions for the occupation of Japan were different. In part this was because America had done the majority of the fighting in the Pacific theatre. The desire to exclude Soviet troops from the occupation of Japan solidified at the same time as the American leadership began to conclude that they could defeat Japan without Soviet troops landing on the main Japanese islands.\textsuperscript{3} There were to be no zones of occupation and no shared control. This orientation was part of a larger policy whereby the United States would not draw back to its previous Pacific interests in Hawaii and the Philippines. In the Pacific the destruction of Japanese power was to be replaced, largely, with American power represented in Japan by the person of General Doulas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP a term that was used interchangeably to denote the commander or his military occupation structure (GHQ), in an almost vice-regal way.

\textbf{Development of the FEAC}

Despite the intention that the United States would be the sole power occupying Japan, the American Department of State began planning a multi-nation commission for


\textsuperscript{3} Akira Iriye, \textit{The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction} (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 68.
East Asia in March 1944.\(^4\) This proposal was debated and refined until, in the spring of 1945, the Far Eastern sub-committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) proposed a Far Eastern Advisory Committee (FEAC), made up of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union (assuming the latter’s entry into the war against Japan), to provide advice on the occupation and reformation of Japan. Neither the State Department nor the Pentagon envisioned a body that would make any operational decisions, or thwart the United States on important issues. While Britain agreed in principle but disputed the terms of reference, China and the Soviet Union initially accepted this proposal for a weak “advisory”.\(^5\) The Soviet Union soon reversed its support for the FEAC and demanded that, as Britain had requested, a more powerful control commission be established for Japan.

During and immediately after World War Two Britain had forwarded much of its diplomatic communications to Ottawa, in part to encourage a sense of Commonwealth cohesion, and in part to ameliorate Canadian unhappiness about to being left out of most deliberations. On October 5, 1945 the United States invited Canada, Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Philippines to join the FEAC in Washington. Forewarned of the coming invitation by Britain in late August, Canadian officials considered participation to be almost required given their previous lobbying for inclusion in various wartime and post-war institutions. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, however, feared that membership would assume military participation in the occupation, something opposed by the government, and recently rejected in the form of a British proposal for a


Commonwealth occupation force. Mackenzie King, who was visiting Britain, approved Canadian membership in the FEAC with initial representation by the Canadian Ambassador in Washington. Consideration was given within External Affairs to recalling E. Herbert Norman from Tokyo for the commission, but his service with SCAP intelligence was sorely needed, and his presence in Tokyo was considered advantageous to Canadian interests.

The Far Eastern Advisory Commission met for the first time on October 30, 1945 at the State Department Building in Washington with Canada represented by its Ambassador to the United States, Lester Pearson. His instructions indicated that while, “as a nation facing the Pacific,” Canada had interests in Japan, Canada’s minor role in the East Asian War and its decision not to send occupation troops to Japan required a corresponding low profile on the FEAC. In briefing Pearson, Hume Wrong, Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, went into considerable detail about the lack of power vested in the FEAC and the resulting British disappointment and Soviet boycott. Wrong told Pearson to support the British proposal, already accepted by Washington, to alter the proposed terms of reference but to insist on preserving American military command in order to avoid duplicating the deteriorating situation in Germany where the harsh conditions imposed by France and especially by the Soviet Union were leading to tension between them and Britain and the United States over attempts to introduce a common occupation structure. Pearson was also instructed to increase the multilateral

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6 Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary, Telegram 189, 15 August 1945, Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1944-1945 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1987), 979; Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 25 August 1945, DCER, 1944-1945, 980-981.
7 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 25 August 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 980-981.
nature of policy development for the occupation. Functionalism, which had little logical application to Japan, had failed as an argument for gaining input on post-war Europe, and assertions of middle power status had earned no concessions at the United Nations, so multilateralism became the strongest path an international voice for Canada. No illusions were maintained about Canadian importance to American occupation policy. Canada, without territorial claims in East Asia, brought legitimacy to the FEAC but did not offer personnel or resources to the occupation. If Canadian interests in security, trade and missionary activities in Japan were to be met, it would be as part of American responsiveness to a group of interested states. While Wrong stressed the need for Canada to be sympathetic to recognizing American aims in East Asia, he urged Pearson to take steps to ensure eventual Soviet participation in the FEAC. The Canadian government hoped that Britain’s plan, communicated to External Affairs, to present modifications to the FEAC along with the creation of an Allied Military Council, would suit British needs and might induce Soviet participation.

In November 1945 the FEAC began planning a fact-finding trip to Japan, a fortuitous development for Canada as information had been limited to British telegrams and occasional updates from Herbert Norman, a Canadian working with SCAP. Canadian attitudes towards the FEAC continued to be tempered by a desire to ensure Soviet participation, and thereby continue the wartime alliance. There was a short supply of qualified diplomatic personnel to go on the FEAC trip to Japan. Lester Pearson could

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9 Ambassador in United States to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, 3 November 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 992.
10 Memorandum by Head, Third Political Division, 23 November 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 995-996.
not be spared and Hugh Keenleyside, who had served at the embassy in Japan before the war was now Ambassador to Mexico, and had several pressing events there. Herbert Norman was selected to fill this role, his relative youth in comparison to other FEAC representatives was balanced by his expertise on Japan. Sent to oversee the repatriation of Canadian refugees and prisoners of war from East Asia, Norman was already in Tokyo where his expert knowledge of Japanese politics and society largely directed MacArthur’s initial vetting of the elite levels of Japanese society.¹¹

Ottawa subdued its opposition to several elements of the FEAC’s initial terms of reference in deference to maintaining allied cooperation. The eventual establishment of the Allied Military Council, on the other hand, called for a Commonwealth representative, implying a collective operational role for the Commonwealth that Canada strongly opposed.¹² Such a formula threatened to diminish the pre-war and wartime efforts Ottawa had made to ensure that Washington treated Canada as a sovereign state, and it also played into Soviet tendencies to object to or doubt Canadian independence.¹³ Britain, drained by the war, was not seeking to renegotiate dominion independence, a principle that was widely accepted before the war. Instead it sought to retain as close a relationship with the dominions as possible, so that their grouped resources might sustain

¹¹ Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 28 November 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 996-997; John Price, “E.H. Norman, Canada and Japan’s Postwar Constitution,” Pacific Affairs (Fall 2001), 302.
¹² Ambassador in United States to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, 3 November 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 992; Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 5 November 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 992; Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 7 December 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 1000; Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain, 8 December 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 1003; High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 11 December 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 1003-1004.
the structure of the Empire. In East Asia the assistance and interests of Australia and New Zealand were important to Britain’s continued colonial position. Australia could not win a place on the Allied Military Council, so Britain proposed to allow an Australian to represent the Commonwealth.

Between its formation and the trip to Japan, the FEAC held ten meetings, set up a system of committees, and considered a basic post-surrender policy modeled on one issued by the United States in September. Though SCAP operated under the surrender policy issued in September, the FEAC intended to promulgate its own policy. One point of disagreement in the drafting of the FEAC post-surrender policy concerned multilateral versus great power decision-making. For example, Australia and New Zealand were apprehensive about leaving the allocation of minor islands to the Cairo powers (named for the meeting in Cairo of the three major non-Soviet allies, the United States, Britain and China), as they felt doing so could set a precedent for future decision-making in the as-yet undocumented body. The economic future of Japan caused even greater dissent. China wished to ensure that, as a belligerent, Japan’s standard of living could never again rise above that of its former adversaries. Despite possible conflict with the Potsdam Declaration, the United States wanted to protect its ability to limit reparations and shape economic policy in the rehabilitation of Japan in order to avoid it becoming a financial burden.

Lester Pearson was concerned that Australia’s desire to eliminate industries that

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14 Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 November 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 993-994; Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 15 November 1945, DCER, 1944-45, 994-995; Blakeslee, The Far Eastern Commission, 8-11.
would allow Japan to prepare for war went too far and was closer to accepting the American plan to dismantle only the industries whose “chief value” was war production.\(^{17}\) He also took exception to draft FEAC language that called for peaceful and responsible government with “eventual” democracy instead of early democratic reform. Ottawa was less concerned than Pearson. It reminded him of his instructions to support the American post-surrender policy. It viewed the difference between the Potsdam Declaration and the proposed American language over the elimination of war industries as insignificant and advised that observation on the ground should guide that policy.\(^{18}\)

Because the Americans were anxious to have allied consensus they agreed on the wording of the FEAC post-surrender policy, but lacking formal instructions from some governments, the FEAC was unable to push forward this first policy before it dissolved to become the FEC, nor was the FEC successful at this for over a year after that.\(^{19}\)

**The FEAC Becomes the FEC**

The FEC that replaced the FEAC resulted from British pressure on the Americans for a more effective commission for the supervision of Japan and Soviet desire for an Allied Control Council, similar to the one in Germany instead of an ‘advisory’ commission.\(^{20}\) At the December 1945 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain agreed to create the Allied Council for Japan and to replace the Far Eastern Advisory Commission with a Far

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\(^{17}\) Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 November 1945, *DCER, 1944-45*, 993-994.

\(^{18}\) Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 15 November 1945, *DCER, 1944-45*, 994-995.


Eastern Commission (FEC) with specific supervisory and policy creation powers. The Soviets acknowledged that they would essentially play only a nominal role in Japan through participating in the FEC while the Americans made similar concessions regarding Bulgaria and Romania.\(^\text{21}\) The Council of Foreign Ministers conference in Moscow set out an effective supervisory role for the FEC. In practical terms the Great Power veto, combined with the provision for American interim directives to MacArthur, meant that boots on the ground would be the true determining factor in post-war development in Japan, just as the Russians would direct affairs in Bulgaria and Romania. The effectiveness of the FEC would thus be determined by the political persuasion of America’s allies, not by its emerging opponent.

The terms of reference of the FEC seemed to promise much more effective involvement in the occupation and rehabilitation of Japan. The FEC was to formulate policies to implement the terms of surrender, review directives issued to MacArthur, and consider other matters as agreed by the members. The FEC had a great power veto similar to that in the United Nations Security Council, but in this regional institution the United States could issue interim directives on “urgent” issues when the FEC had not reached a decision.

Moving into the former Japanese Embassy in Washington in February 1946, the FEC organized itself into the Commission proper, a committee of the whole; a steering committee that organized the business of the FEC; and seven standing committees, each charged with a specific policy area to consider.\(^\text{22}\) Committee No. 1 (Reparations) was

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responsible for organizing the return of looted property and the program of Japanese reparations. Committee No. 2 (Economic and Financial Affairs) covered economic, agricultural and industrial matters including foreign trade, the zaibatsu, raw materials and relief for the Japanese people. Committee No. 3 (Constitutional and Legal Reform) was active in the development of a new constitution, provisions for the institution of the Emperor, electoral and judicial reform, and the re-development of the police system. Committee No. 4 (Strengthening of Democratic Tendencies) was responsible for the democratization of Japanese society and the purge of militarist and totalitarian elements in government. This committee also sought reform of the education system, popular culture and media. Committee No. 5 (War Criminals) set policy on the identifying, capturing and trying of suspected war criminals, and punishing those convicted of war crimes. Committee No. 6 (Aliens in Japan) dealt with the status of non-Japanese people and their property in Japan. Lastly, Committee No. 7 (Disarmament of Japan) sought to create policy regarding the demobilization of Japanese armed forces, the disposal of their arms, and the control of weapons necessary for policing.

At the end of 1945 Canada had been invited to join the newly evolved FEC. Canadian officials preferred the multi-national FEC to the four-power regime in Germany as it gave it a limited independent voice in the occupation but it also appreciated the unitary American control on the ground in Japan because it recognized the dangers of the emerging conflict among occupying powers in Germany. Canada was represented on the FEAC and later the FEC by the Canadian Ambassador to Washington, Lester Pearson.

until October 1946, and by Hume Wrong after that. Herbert Norman, having joined the FEAC tour of Japan onsite, returned with the FEAC to Washington and briefly represented Canada at the newly established FEC as Canada’s alternate representative. Norman became Canada’s Head of Mission at the Civilian Liaison to the occupation in Japan in the late spring of 1946, leaving for Ottawa to prepare for this new posting. The mission to Japan was intended to serve Canadian interests in Japan in the absence of a military mission similar to those maintained by Britain and Australia. The enforcement of racial immigration quotas had resulted before the war in the establishment of Canada’s third overseas legation opening in Tokyo; concerns about America developing a monopoly on Japanese trade prompted a mission there after the war (though this office would soon be dealing with the plight of Japanese-Canadians sent from Canada).

With Norman’s departure, Ralph Collins took up his place at the FEC as alternate Canadian delegate, in actual fact the senior officer personally representing Canada.

Canadian faith in the efficacy of the FEC was challenged early because according to Pearson the Americans limited its authority in order to protect MacArthur from embarrassment. This early analysis was over simplified. The intramural struggle between the Department of State and the Pentagon, along with MacArthur’s political popularity that prevented his censure, complicated the American approach to the FEC.

24 Memorandum from Third Political Division to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 10 May 1946, DCER, 1946, 280-282.
26 American representatives on the FEC feared that there was no political will to rebuke MacArthur should he ignore an FEC policy. Pearson felt that these representatives opposed FEC policies that had the potential of instigating a conflict with SCAP, regardless of how they might fit with U.S. interests. Ambassador in Washington to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 4 Jun 46, DCER, 1946, 283-285.
Eventually Canadian contacts with members of the United States FEC delegation, as well as other sources, gave Ottawa a clearer image of this conflict.

**Japan’s New Constitution**

Canadian goals for the constitutional framework of post-war Japan emerged early and took the form of general principles. The Canadian government sought a truly democratic Japan while straddling the fence on sensitive issues like maintaining legitimacy through maintaining authentic indigenous institutions and safeguarding against any possible reactionary resurgence. The qualified commitment to democracy in the proposal by India and Australia to only achieve democracy “eventually” or “as closely as may be” possible, as discussed earlier, had created disagreement at External Affairs as Wrong overruled Pearson’s concerns. In the absence of the Indian delegate, Herbert Norman, and later Ralph Collins, frequently chaired Committee 3 in its constitutional policy work. This placed Canada’s FEC delegation at the centre of an emerging interest, the preservation of the FEC’s legitimacy, as it attempted to enact policy on constitutional reform.

Conflict within the FEC, particularly between the majority of FEC members and the United States, evolved around how the new Japanese Constitution was to be developed and adopted, and the role of the FEC in approving it. The Americans had initially accepted the Potsdam Declaration which called for a democratic Japan, establishing “in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a

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peacefully inclined and responsible government.”

Thus when General MacArthur met with Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro in October 1945, he ordered the Japanese government to initiate the “liberalization” of the constitution.

In January 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC-228), called for a new constitution that would “express the free will of the Japanese people” but controversially distinguished between mandatory and desired aims. These inherent contradictions were noted at the time and have been acknowledged ever since, but this did not prevent the occupation forces from pushing forward with their own views.

The FEC, MacArthur and the occupation forces all realized that the Potsdam Declaration could only be interpreted as requiring the Japanese people to develop a constitution acceptable to the allies. Neither the Potsdam Declaration nor the surrender policy had addressed the degree to which the “free will” of the Japanese people might be affected by the potential duration of the occupation, by the powers of SCAP over Japanese government and society and by the residual conservative and militarist elites.

Ultimately, the FEC took responsibility for developing policy on the eventual post-war Japanese Constitution. MacArthur said as much to the visiting FEAC delegation in January 1946. General MacArthur was in a unique position as both the American commander of Army Forces in the Pacific and as Supreme Commander for the Allied

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Powers (SCAP), commanding all allied forces in Japan.\textsuperscript{32} His headquarters (GHQ) combined both these roles and he was not above emphasizing the American or international nature of his position as proved convenient. Concerned about Soviet review of a Japanese Constitution, and wary of a constitution developed by the FEC or constrained by explicit FEC policy, especially as it might abolish the emperor system, MacArthur ordered his staff to draft a constitution for presentation to the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{33} He believed that once the FEC produced a constitutional policy, his authority to direct the Japanese government on the development of a constitution would expire.\textsuperscript{34} Certainly if MacArthur’s actions had been taken in the face of an existing FEC directive they would have been illegitimate. But coming as they did days after his meeting with the FEAC, and in full knowledge of the explicit authority over constitutional issues set out in the FEC terms of reference, the decision to develop a constitution within GHQ demonstrated a deliberate attempt to thwart external oversight. The Japanese Government’s response to MacArthur’s earlier direction to develop a new constitution, the Matsumoto Committee, was so weak and slow in their revisions that MacArthur decided that a complete text, drafted by his staff and presented to the Japanese government would be needed to produce a suitable “indigenous” version that could preempt independent FEC action on the subject. MacArthur insisted that the new constitution include three principles: that the emperor was to become a constitutional monarch; that the feudal system was to be eliminated; and that war and the maintenance

\textsuperscript{32} Takemae, \textit{Inside GHQ}, 138.
\textsuperscript{34} Takemae, \textit{Inside GHQ}, 276.
of armed forces were to be renounced. A group of senior and junior members of MacArthur’s staff, from the Public Administration Division, spent just seven days working out of the ballroom of the Dai-Ichi Insurance building to produce an acceptable document.

Upon receiving the SCAP constitutional draft, members of the Shidehara government were stunned by its far-reaching reforms. SCAP’s determination to have this text adopted was impressed upon the Japanese government however, and with few minor alterations, the SCAP constitutional draft was presented to the public as a Japanese product on March 6, 1946. It was tabled in the Japanese Diet on June 20, having been publicly praised by MacArthur. Neither MacArthur, nor the Japanese government, would admit the American origin of the new constitution. MacArthur informed neither his superiors in Washington, nor staff members not already involved. He also ordered the censorship of Japanese media claims that the constitution was written by occupation staff. Only a few Japanese legislators knew of the constitution’s composition within SCAP, and of the occasional directives for amendment that followed, but the language used in the document departed from traditional legalistic forms, leaving little doubt among educated Japanese.

The FEC rightly regarded MacArthur’s action as an attempt to usurp its jurisdiction over perhaps the most important post-war policy decision regarding Japan.

35 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 276; Blakeslee, The Far Eastern Commission, 45-46.
38 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 371, 386; Takemae, Inside GHQ, 287.
39 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 385-386; Takemae, Inside GHQ, 280, 287.
MacArthur’s endorsement of what was publicly referred to as a Japanese proposal required a response. Canada supported the unanimous FEC response, passed on March 20, 1946, calling for MacArthur to publicly endorse consideration of other possible constitutions and to acknowledge that the FEC must be allowed “to pass upon” any final constitutional draft. In a multi-page diatribe where he referred to himself in the third person, MacArthur, whose hostility towards the FEC bordered on paranoia, asserted the indigenous provenance of the draft constitution. Moreover, he argued that the FEC’s message went against the spirit of Potsdam and the letter of SWNCC 228 (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 228 setting out U.S. policy on a constitution for Japan). He further asserted that his own praise of the SCAP draft lent support to the struggling liberals of Japan. MacArthur accused the FEC of usurping the authority of the Allied Council for Japan and of “a planned and concerted attack to break [American control] down.” In language loaded with implication, MacArthur warned Major-General McCoy, the United States representative and Chair of the FEC, about allowing the FEC any influence on the constitution:

Appeasements, small as they may seem, rapidly become accumulative to the point of danger. If we lose control of this sphere of influence under this policy of aggressive action, we will not only jeopardize the occupation but hazard the future safety of the United States.


41 Mr. Max W. Bishop, of the Office of the Political Advisor in Japan, to the Secretary of State, 15 April 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1971), 201-205.

42 Ibid., 204.

43 Ibid., 204.
MacArthur did endorse the consideration of other possible constitutions, but public discussion of the alternatives did not blossom as the FEC had hoped.

In these circumstances, the FEC’s Constitutional Revision Committee began drafting a set of criteria to guide the approval of a post-war constitution for Japan. The FEC initially argued that a new constitution must be approved by a constituent assembly or by a Diet elected specifically for this purpose.44 The American representative argued against this principle saying that it was undemocratic to dictate to the Japanese the method of adopting a constitution, and that such language would embarrass MacArthur, who clearly expected the sitting Diet to approve the constitution. The hypocrisy of the American delegation in denouncing FEC policy and endorsing the GHQ plan undoubtedly underlay the growing annoyance of other FEC members at American deference to MacArthur. The eventual consensus document, forwarded to MacArthur as a US government directive, stated only that the constitution was to be adopted in “a manner as to demonstrate that it affirmatively expresses the free will of the Japanese people.”45

Following instructions from External Affairs, the Canadian delegation initially supported a policy that precluded having the sitting Diet approve the draft constitution because it had not been elected for this purpose. While External Affairs believed that a body elected at least in part for constitutional reform should consider this document, it also urged that the Canadian representative mitigate any conflict by taking heed of the “degree of

“concern” expressed by the American delegate.⁴⁶ The instructions transmitted to Washington complied with this position.

At the same time that the Diet was debating the draft constitution, the FEC was arguing over the meaning of “pass upon,” – contesting the degree and timing of FEC direction of the procedure of accepting Japan’s future constitution. Some states, including the Soviet Union, Australia and New Zealand, wanted to require the final constitution to include detailed principles, while others such as the United States and the United Kingdom wanted only a few broad principles.⁴⁷ News that the Diet might soon enact the new constitution set an urgent pace to the development of a Canadian position on the FEC policy. In the end, despite his earlier arguments for a more independent position, External Affairs officer J.R. Maybee advised Hume Wrong that Canada should endorse the American view that the FEC policy should specify only broad principles.⁴⁸ Realizing that American interest in Japan was vastly greater than Canadian interest, and lamenting that the documents creating the FEC and guiding its work were unclear, the Canadian government acquiesced in a decision that they acknowledged could de-legitimize future FEC input. At External Affairs Herbert Norman (delayed in his posting to Tokyo), G.S. Patterson and J.R. Maybee felt it was impossible to provide an insightful review of the

constitution before it was enacted; the FEC should instead examine the document in light of FEC policy at its own pace.49

In the remaining weeks before the Japanese constitution was enacted, the FEC argued for several changes, including a proviso that cabinet members be drawn from the Diet. The Canadian representative supported most of these initiatives but could not persuade the Americans to adopt them. In any case, he was hampered in these efforts by his instructions not to push where little Canadian interest was perceived. In October 1946 the FEC issued its last major policy decision on the constitution, setting out a process for review. This process, while communicated to the Japanese government, was kept from the general population until March 1948.50 Revelation of the requirement for constitutional review prompted proposals for reform from outside the government, but the conservative Yoshida government never conducted a review.51 Two years later, when Committee No. 3 of the FEC undertook a review of the constitution, MacArthur was dismissive.52 MacArthur argued that the constitution was working well and that any further requirement for formal review would de-legitimize the document. Committee No. 3 eventually composed a paper listing only the three items supported by majority vote for attention: the position of aliens under the constitution, the constitutional powers of the Supreme Court, and dissolution of the House of Representatives.53 The paper was transmitted to MacArthur for his information only.

51 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 292.
53 Ibid., 65.
Canada’s failure to press for a strong FEC course on Japan’s constitution played a part in the diminution of the FEC’s prestige. The points on which the FEC sought to assert its authority were similar to those held by individuals within the American State Department. If Canada and the FEC had been able to require adoption by a constituent assembly or a specially elected Diet, the resulting document might have been less liberal but may have had more popular support in the face of reactionary assault. Japanese politicians argued then and since that disarmament and the renunciation of war are alien elements inserted by the occupation and have denigrated the pacifist orientation of the Japanese Constitution, a development that Canadian officials were warned of at the time.\(^{54}\) Canadian officials had reports from Herbert Norman in Tokyo and contacts in the United States indicating that conservative Japanese politicians intended to support the constitution in the hope of shortening the occupation, intending either to subvert or amend it once the occupation was over.\(^{55}\) The American decision to block FEC involvement with the Japanese Constitution arose mostly from a fear of embarrassing their commander in Japan, General MacArthur.

In “E.H. Norman, Canada and Japan,” John Price argues that the Canadian government’s decision not to press for FEC authority over the constitution displayed its willingness to allow the interests of the Japanese people (in an effective constitution), and its own interest (in the effectiveness of the FEC), to be trumped by a desire to maintain


continental solidarity.\textsuperscript{56} Foreign service officers, like Herbert Norman, who debated the relative merits and risks of taking principled action played a role that is well documented. But Canada was led by a Prime Minister who had taken solace in the notion that “the use of the [atomic] bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather than upon the white races of Europe”, and by a cabinet that had directed the internment and eventual deportation of thousands of Japanese Canadians.\textsuperscript{57} The Canadian government perceived the risk of another war, something that motivated Mackenzie King like nothing else, as coming from Europe. The Canadian government’s concern for the Cold War erupting in Europe held through the beginning of the Korean War. At the highest levels of government in Ottawa the principle of allowing the Japanese to develop their own constitution may have been negated by racism, while the Canadian interest in the long term stability offered by an indigenous constitution for Japan was negated by Eurocentrism. Despite their own convictions, Canada’s foreign service officers knew when they had to adopt the voice of their political masters.\textsuperscript{58} For senior members of Canada’s government, the legitimacy of the FEC and other multilateral institutions formed the best argument for supporting FEC’s role in the Japanese constitution.\textsuperscript{59} In the end, the perception that compliance and deviation from American intentions were like credits and debits on a bank account created a miserly attitude towards bucking American preferences. Given the social and political environment of the day it is not surprising that

\textsuperscript{56} Price, “E.H. Norman, Canada and Japan,” 401.
the Canadian government would not expend its political currency on Japan.

Reparations

Just as the political gravity of the constitution problem would have a lasting impact on Japan, the economic choices that lay behind reparations would have lasting impacts for Japan and its former adversaries in East Asia. Despite extensive discussions, the FEC made uneven progress on matters pertaining to the size and distribution of reparations. In the end, great power vetoes precluded agreement on the key elements needed to effect substantial deliveries of reparations to most allies. The Canadian government supported US initiatives except in situations that could diminish the future viability of the FEC or other international organizations. Canada also pursued its own limited interest in securing reparations, despite being the FEC state that suffered the least at Japanese hands.

Britain sought to initiate a Commonwealth conference to discuss reparations collectively in advance of the FEC. External Affairs opposed holding such a meeting lest it potentially signal a Commonwealth block and undermine Canada’s independent status in the councils of the world.\textsuperscript{60} The Department of External Affairs told its representative to the FEC to state that “Canada’s long term interest is in the peaceful economic recovery of Japan and that payments for essential imports should be the first charge on Japanese industries and production.”\textsuperscript{61} The Dominion Bureau of Statistics estimated that the

\textsuperscript{60} Minutes of a Meeting, 18 March 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 303-304.
Pacific War had cost Canada $842 million and 964 fatalities.\(^6^2\) By the summer of 1946 Canada had assembled a small list of desired reparations from Japan that included aluminum mills and an electrolytic caustic soda plant for Aluminum Limited and fishing equipment.\(^6^3\) Not included on this list were the estimated $3 million in Japanese government assets held in Canada.\(^6^4\) Un-mindful of the economic devastation that had visited Japan, Canadian officials saw no contradiction between their desire for Japanese recovery and their preparations to claim a share of the reparations. Canada’s eventual claim was small, but its existence gave credibility to the more substantial claims of others who had likewise experienced no Japanese occupation.

Three issues frustrated the Reparations Committee of the FEC: deciding the level of economy that Japan should possess, adjudicating the division of shares of the reparations to be extracted, and judging on the inclusion of Japanese assets outside of Japan in calculations of the resources available for reparations.

The accepted level of the Japanese economy would affect both the perceived security of the Pacific states in the FEC and the amount of productive plants and domestic production that would be available for reparations. Canadian diplomats initially supported Britain’s view that Japan be allowed more industry in order to revive its economy over the initial American position supporting extensive reparations. Canadian officials, however, would not support the British view if doing so meant opposing the US

\(^6^3\) Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 8 August 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 312-313.
\(^6^4\) Minutes of a Meeting, 18 March 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 303-304.
or delaying the completion of initial reparations.\footnote{Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 23 May 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 307.}

In allocating shares of Japanese reparations, Canada’s claim was so small that it was accepted by all other FEC members, but the wider range of claims by other states were mutually irreconcilable. G.S. Patterson, in consultation with several other External Affairs officers, initially sought a statistical division of reparations based on evidence of losses and expenditures. Eventually, External Affairs abandoned this position and J.R. Maybee drafted instructions to accept a political division of shares as the only way to find agreement as well as the best strategy to maximize Canada’s minor claim.\footnote{Memorandum by Third Political Division, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with R.E. Collins, July 9, 1946, 9 July 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 310-311; Memorandum from Third Political Division to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Far Eastern Commission: Reparations Conference, 5 November 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 318-319.}

The Soviet representative contested the jurisdiction of the FEC to consider Japanese assets located outside Japan because bringing Soviet removals in Manchuria into consideration would lessen their claim on domestic Japanese assets. At first the Canadian government had no opinion on this issue but, in the face of an American interim directive, later favoured referring it to the Council of Foreign Ministers rather than risk a Soviet walkout.\footnote{Memorandum by Third Political Division, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with R.E. Collins, July 9, 1946, 9 July 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 310-311; Memorandum from Third Political Division to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Far Eastern Commission: Reparations Conference, 5 November 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 318-319; Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 3 December 1946, \textit{DCER, 1946}, 320-322.} Canada hoped that the Soviet Union would either be satisfied by a decision by the Council or be more likely to accept a decision against its interests from this body. In this instance, as in others, the Canadian government sought to promote an alternate view, but would not push in the face of stiff American opposition. In an aide memoir sent to the American Secretary of State Canadian officials argued that the
reparations issue was not sufficiently urgent to warrant an American interim directive which would be sent without FEC consent. The Canadians warned that such a directive would harm the future effectiveness of the FEC and other international bodies and might alienate the Soviet Union if external assets were included in the calculations. Nevertheless, Canada would support the interim directive, as long as it did not affect the final reparations settlement and the countries receiving these interim reparations put them to use immediately. Canadian officials, however, did not appreciate the urgency of the economic situation in China or other previously occupied areas. Insisting on continued FEC negotiations, Canada’s representative argued that China could not properly utilize industrial plants due to poor infrastructure and “that the most urgent aspect of the reparations problem is the stabilization of the Japanese economy at peacetime levels.”

The refusal of China, Britain, France and the Soviet Union to consider lesser shares of Japanese reparations and Soviet insistence on the exclusion of overseas assets from discussions, prevented the FEC from moving on the most important reparations issues. After failing to win Soviet agreement to a separate conference to resolve reparations issues, the American government proposed a scheme by which each FEC member would be consulted individually before the United States Department of State sent an interim directive to SCAP authorizing limited reparations shipments.

After the FEC discussed it the interim directive was forwarded to SCAP on April 2, 1947 but six months passed before reparations began leaving to formerly occupied

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68 Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in Washington, 28 January 1947, DCER, 1947, 249-250.
69 Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in Washington, 3 December 1946, DCER, 1946, 320-321.
countries in East and Southeast Asia. The flow of reparations continued for two years, and SCAP estimated their total value at $40 million, a small fraction of Japan’s industrial base. In comparison, the Pauley Report (a report on reparations for Japan given to the FEC in April 1946), estimated that by the end of 1945 the Soviet Union had extracted $800 million in industrial plants from Manchuria.\(^71\) As a result China did not have a post-war economic boost from Japanese reparations and in fact suffered further losses as the Soviet Union removed industrial equipment from Soviet-occupied territories that were eventually returned to China.

On April 8, 1947, Washington issued a policy that started a recurring reduction in the anticipated total reparations to be removed from Japan. Initial American studies of the Japanese economy and of the impact of reparations on it had led to a recommendation for harsh measures, but further investigation indicated that reparations of anything but war production plants would jeopardize the goal of restoring Japan’s economy to pre-war levels.\(^72\) Among themselves, many American officials called for an end to Japanese reparations but the American FEC representative, General McCoy, unsuccessfully argued that such an action would infringe upon the jurisdiction of the FEC and agitate its member states. On May 12, 1948 the United States announced the reversal of its interim reparations directive and ended Japanese reparations.\(^73\) Canadian officials had recognized the difficulty of making progress on reparations, but just two days before the unilateral American announcement Escott Reid, Assistant-Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, advised Louis St. Laurent of the desirability of retaining the FEC as a forum for

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discussion even if unanimous policy declarations were no longer possible. Interim directives from the American government, it was argued, should arise only on issues where two-thirds agreement could be reached.\textsuperscript{74}

**Peace Settlement (1947)**

The eventual peace treaty with Japan loomed behind FEC discussions, but was rarely considered by the FEC in session. MacArthur’s seemingly sudden declaration in March 1947, that a peace treaty was appropriate, jump-started consideration of its form and of the body that would be competent to compose such a document. Canada’s desire to be heard on the treaty, the most important final act of the war, was a strong motive for joining and continuing to support the FEC. For Canadian officials this episode was potentially a repeat of the most obnoxious snub Canada had faced since the end of the war, its exclusion from the development of treaties with the Axis-satellite states in Europe.

In the winter of 1946/47 influential American journalists were increasingly criticizing the reforms in Japan and their architect, General MacArthur. At the same time the Department of the Army was being folded, along with the other services, into a new Department of Defence, placing new layers of military and civilian authority over MacArthur. The Supreme Commander saw criticism at home, and the imminent creation of an integrated Department of Defence, as challenges both to his independence in Japan and to his presidential ambitions. In an effort to take the initiative away from his critics, MacArthur followed the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 (a

\textsuperscript{74} Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Recent Developments in United States and Soviet Policy in the Far Eastern Commission, 10 May 1948, *DCER*, 1948, 77-81.
declaration that the United States would assist any state resisting Soviet expansion) with his own declaration that the occupation of Japan had been a success and that any further progress required a peace treaty. MacArthur proposed a de-militarized and neutral Japan protected by the UN and surrounded by American bases.  

In addition to MacArthur’s dramatic proposal for a peace treaty, others were devising plans for Japan’s future. At the American State Department a group, somewhat isolated from the developing attitudes at the senior levels in the State Department and the Pentagon, had been developing principles for a treaty with Japan since late 1946. Led by Hugh Borton, this group had developed a set of principles quite different from that of MacArthur. They proposed that the FEC states supervise Japan over a period of twenty-five years to ensure its compliance with limits on military and industrial potential. No residual occupation force was called for in Borton’s plan. The discrepancy between MacArthur’s proposed treaty and the principles under development by Borton did not reflect competing factions within the U.S. government (given that MacArthur had always acted independently), but rather a vacuum left by the lack of a defined policy. Once this matter came under the scrutiny of senior officials in the American administration, a single policy was eventually adopted.

In the meantime, after learning of MacArthur’s plan, the United Kingdom feared that the Americans would soon produce a unilateral set of principles for a peace treaty with Japan. To prepare for such an eventuality, they suggested that the Commonwealth Nations meet to exchange preliminary views on the subject. Australia’s Prime Minister, Dr. H.V. Evatt seized this opportunity to push for Australia’s interests by inviting

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Commonwealth representatives to Canberra. Lester Pearson feared that such a meeting might lead to Australia pushing a single “Commonwealth” representative for the treaty drafting process, as it had done regarding the Allied Council for Japan. Not only might this lead the Americans to believe they were being ganged up on by a “Commonwealth block”, but it could also negate Canadian efforts to assert both its independent status generally and its right as a significant ally in the recent war, to independent participation in the councils of the world. Hume Wrong felt that the British would prefer not to allow Australia to speak for the Commonwealth, but that Canada had better political cover at home to play the role of spoiler. Nevertheless, despite British and Canadian suspicions that Australia hoped to produce a joint Commonwealth policy on a Japanese treaty, the Commonwealth governments agreed to attend a meeting in Canberra in late August. Canada was not following a British lead, but Canada found that British proposals were often more practical and less ideological than American ones. Yet, Canada did not want to upset the United States and so its Ambassador in Washington both soothed American concerns about the Canberra meeting and sounded out the Americans on their views regarding treaty principles.

Meanwhile, in Washington the senior leadership of the State Department refused to adopt the approaches of either MacArthur or Borton for a Japanese peace treaty. On July 11, 1947 the State Department invited the states represented on the FEC to come to San Francisco in mid-August to attend a preliminary peace conference. The proposed

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76 Assistant under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 6 May 1947, DCER, 1947, 200-202.
77 Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 6 May 1947, DCER, 1947, 203.
78 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 23 May 1947, DCER, 1947, 204-205; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Prime Minister, 4 June 1947, DCER, 1947, 205-206; Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 4 July 1947, DCER, 1947, 207-208.
process that would see the FEC states prepare a draft treaty using a two-thirds majority rule for decisions would effectively give the Commonwealth states a veto, provided they voted as a block.\footnote{Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 15 July 1947, \textit{DCER}, 1947, 208-209; Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States, 21 July 1947, \textit{DCER}, 1947, 210.} Pearson described the timing of the meeting as “almost gratuitously offensive to the Australians,” coming just prior to the planned Canberra conference and covering the same ground without any of the advantages the Australian Prime Minister expected at home as the host of the conference.\footnote{Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 15 July 1947, \textit{DCER}, 1947, 208-209.} A conference in Australia would also provide Evatt with opportunities to exert pressure on delegates. External Affairs had never been happy with the Canberra Conference and would have preferred to attend San Francisco with its FEC guest list, but the prior invitation had been accepted so Canadian officials praised the American initiative in principle while declining to attend on the proposed dates.

Canada sent Brooke Claxton, the Minister of Defence, to Canberra after External Affairs thoroughly briefed him. The briefing did not include an initial recommendation from the Joint Planning Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, that represented the Army, Navy and Air Force, that in order to prevent Soviet influence in Japan Canada should support either continued American occupation or the development of Japanese military institutions.\footnote{Report of Joint Planning Committee of Chiefs of Staff Committee, 29 July 1947, \textit{DCER}, 1947, 210-212.} Rather, External Affairs adopted a more traditional, cautious tone informed by its determination to restrict possible Japanese military resurgence. While acknowledging the value of “United States military power in the Pacific as a stabilizing influence”, it did not comment on continued American occupation or proposed permanent
bases. Staff members of the Canada’s Joint Services Committee were developing a Cold War frame for the rehabilitation of Japan, a process that was also underway in Washington. Fears of resurgent Japanese militarism were giving way to fears of Soviet domination in the North Pacific should the USSR ever achieve hegemony over Japan.

The other Commonwealth nations also declined the American invitation to a preliminary peace conference in order to attend the Canberra Conference, however, they approved of the FEC membership and the proposed two-thirds majority procedure. The Soviet Union and China did not approve of this process. The Soviets wanted the treaty set by the Council of Foreign Ministers while the Chinese proposed that it be drawn up collectively by the FEC states, with a veto for each major power, as was established in the FEC’s own terms of reference.

By mid-August the United States State Department had developed a set of principles for a peace treaty that squared with the developing Cold War orientation of George Kennan in which the focus shifted from preventing future aggression by Japan to preventing Soviet aggression against Japan and the rest of East Asia. This document, prepared by John Davies of the State Department, called for a Japan that was internally stable, within the American sphere of leadership, and economically reconstructed through the rebuilding of capacity for the production of consumer and capital goods. In order to achieve these goals and prevent Soviet aggression, Davies expected that the United States would use a unilateral control system, as opposed to the multilateral control symbolized by the FEC, and that Japan would enter into a bilateral defence treaty with the United

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82 Acting Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 7 August 1947, DCER, 1947, 212-213.
States. This position was later released as the “US Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan” in mid-September 1947.

Brooke Claxton arrived in Canberra with a pre-Cold War set of instructions from External Affairs on obtaining a desirable peace in Japan. The Canadian government was concerned especially with securing an acceptable process that would avoid the narrowness of input that characterized the drawing up of the European treaties. The specific principles that Canadian officials supported for peace with Japan could best be described as a demilitarization of the economy and the establishment of safeguards to prevent militarism and protect human rights. In a letter sent August 13, 1947, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent explained to Claxton that Canadian policies toward a peace treaty with Japan had developed as a result of membership in the FEC. While these policies could change in the future, they should guide his positions in Canberra.

At the Canberra Conference, Claxton learned that Australia had softened its position towards a peace treaty with Japan. The conference agreed on a treaty that included abolition of Japan’s military forces and strict controls on industries. Furthermore, the conference endorsed a two-thirds voting provision for the drafting and adoption of an eventual collective treaty with Japan. Australia had not pushed for an Australian led Commonwealth position, or for Australia to act on behalf of the Commonwealth nations, in the event that the peace treaty was to be drafted by the great

powers or the Council of Foreign Ministers. For Canada the Conference had gone well. Herbert Norman, who had accompanied the Canadian delegation as an expert on Japanese affairs, gave several insightful and well-received presentations. Controversy at home had been avoided, a forced-choice between Commonwealth and American allegiance did not arise, and conflict with the United States had been avoided in the adoption of procedural principles that matched those announced by the Americans.\(^{87}\)

Over the following months, the outcomes of the Canberra Conference were rendered irrelevant however, first by the “US Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan” and then by the decision of the American State Department that any peace with Japan must await its economic rebuilding and military arrangements for its security.\(^{88}\) The Department of External Affairs also came around to this view. About seven months after the Canberra Conference Arthur Menzies of the American and Far Eastern Division observed that while there was no official change in Canadian policy towards a peace treaty with Japan, Canada was, in comparison to other nations at Canberra, more “apprehensive concerning Soviet aggressive intentions than it was concerning possibilities of the revival of Japanese militarism.”\(^{89}\) He considered it likely that the United States was glad that progress towards a treaty had stalled as they were now engaged in rebuilding Japan, adding that “[I]f the United States felt that it was desirable to build up the Japanese economy to a point where it would be better able to assist in

\(^{87}\) Resistance to participation in ‘Commonwealth’ foreign policy was the norm within the Cabinet and External Affairs but it was feared that public refutations of such ‘Commonwealth’ policies would still be controversial at home, Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 6 May 1947, DCER, 1947, 203; Extract from Letter from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of National Defence, 13 August 1947, DCER, 1947, 213-214; James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 41.

\(^{88}\) Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 105-106.

\(^{89}\) American and Far Eastern Division to High Commissioner in New Zealand, 31 March 1948, DCER, 1948, 69.
resisting Soviet expansionism in Northeast Asia than [sic] we were hardly in a position to argue over this policy.” This shift to a Cold War orientation resulted in what Menzies himself would later describe as an occupation that lasted far too long.90

In the end, what was most significant to Canadian interests relating to the proposed peace treaty with Japan in 1947 was the procedure to be adopted in its drafting and ratification.91 Canada did not have sufficient interest in the nature of the treaty’s contents to envision a public confrontation with the United States on the degree of its Cold War turn, but it did fear affirming a possible precedent of smaller powers like Canada being left voiceless in matters where they had cause to assert standing. In 1948, as the Americans stalled the development of a peace settlement in order to promote their reverse course in Japan (the wide-ranging shift in policy from ensuring Asia was safe from Japan to ensuring Japan was safe from the Soviet Union), Canada would have much to say, but would say it in private.

**FEC and the International Military Tribunal**

One of the Canadian government’s interests in Japan after the war included the prosecution of war criminals, particularly those with Canadians victims. While Canadian military courts tried Germans accused of committing crimes against Canadian personnel, Canada had no units in the Eastern Pacific at the close of the war, and no commander under whose authority such courts might be formed. Instead, Canadian prosecutors, investigators, court members and support personnel served on British and American courts in the Pacific outside of Japan, and a Canadian judge and prosecutor served on the

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International Military Tribunal in Japan.\textsuperscript{92}

The United States government directed General MacArthur in late 1945 to establish a system of war crimes tribunals to try suspects in his jurisdiction. This matter was also simultaneously under consideration by the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (and later by the FEC), and so MacArthur’s initial directive of January 1946 was amended in April to account for the published FEC policy. War criminals were to be classified as either ‘A’ (those responsible for making decisions and planning for aggressive war), or ‘B’ and ‘C’ (those who violated the rules of war in carrying out their duties). Specific Canadian interest lay with the more conventional variety of war crimes, but the FEC would later become more directly involved with the International Military Tribunal.\textsuperscript{93}

As the trial of class ‘A’ war criminals drew to a close in late November 1948, attorneys for two of the defendants sought leave with the United States Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the International Military Tribunal, having been initially created by SCAP under direction from Washington, was in fact a United States court, not an international court.\textsuperscript{94} As a result of this appeal the American Department of Justice asked the Secretary of State to seek an opinion from the FEC as to whether the International Military Tribunal was in fact an international court and whether the actions of SCAP in support of that tribunal had been in accordance with the court’s international

\textsuperscript{92} Draft Memorandum from Department of External Affairs to Cabinet, 27 December 1945, \textit{DCER}, 1944-1945, 1040-1043; Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain, 20 April 1946, \textit{DCER}, 1946, 296-297; Chris Madsen, \textit{Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation to Somalia} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 90-93.

\textsuperscript{93} Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 12 January 1946, \textit{DCER}, 1946, 290-291.

stature.

FEC Committee No. 5 (War Criminals) met on December 10, 1948 to discuss this request and drafted a positive response for consideration by the Steering Committee. Canada’s ambassador in Washington, Hume Wrong, sought Ottawa’s advice about the draft response before he voted on it. 95 Britain had already told Canada that it thought that such a statement of opinion would become evidence that the International Military Tribunal had not fully followed the FEC’s policy of April 3, 1946. 96 Canadian instructions to the FEC representative were quick to follow. Officially, Arthur Menzies asked Ralph Collins to state that Canada “does not consider it appropriate that the FEC should in a matter of this kind render an opinion to the United States Department of Justice which was to be used in a domestic court of the United States.” 97

The reasoning that led to this order was both deeper and more revealing of Canadian motives than the instructions to Ralph Collins revealed. After consulting with Departmental legal advisor, E.R. Hopkins, Arthur Menzies was concerned that any opinion rendered by the FEC would have the effect of an FEC directive. As the opinion requested by the State Department was on the status of the International Military Tribunal and SCAP’s actions in support of it, a response finding fault with SCAP’s handling of the Tribunal would be a public rebuke requiring correction. If, on the other hand, the FEC found that SCAP’s creation and support of the Tribunal was correct, such a directive

97 LAC, DEAR, RG25, Vol. 6196, File 4060-C-40 Pt. 4.1, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian Ambassador, Washington, For attention of Mr. Collins first thing Wednesday morning, 14 December 1948.
would prevent MacArthur from complying with a court decision that found otherwise. Potentially this could place SCAP in a non-resolvable conflict. Menzies worried that any opinion rendered by the FEC could lead to an instance of SCAP’s noncompliance. In this event greater harm to the prestige and effectiveness of the FEC would result.\(^{98}\)

In the end Britain reversed its early opposition to the FEC offering such an opinion and the FEC voted nine to zero with two abstentions to forward the draft opinion to the American Department of Justice. Canada abstained after Ralph Collins cited the reasons given above, and India did not feel it had adequate time to evaluate its position on the matter. The United States Supreme Court heard the argument for habeas corpus, deciding in favour of the United States government. A few months later, on February 24, 1949, the FEC voted nine to zero (with two abstentions) to cease the prosecution of class ‘A’ war criminals in order to prevent “a reaction in Japan adverse to the Allied cause.”\(^{99}\)

This time Canada voted with the majority.

The FEC continued meeting, deliberating on less contentious issues, rarely reaching consensus, but occasionally seeing its position papers adopted by SCAP regardless.\(^{100}\) The topics that resulted in policy papers included those on agricultural reform and intellectual property as well as the cessation of the trial of war criminals.\(^{101}\)

On January 19, 1950 the Soviet Union proposed a motion to change the Chinese


representation from the nationalist regime to the new communist government.\textsuperscript{102} When this motion failed the Soviet delegation ceased attendance at FEC meetings. By the spring of 1950, having few topics left to discuss, FEC meetings were reduced to being held once every two weeks, the last being held September 20, 1951. The FEC states, except the Soviet Union, agreed that the FEC should cease to function upon the Peace Treaty with Japan coming into effect.\textsuperscript{103} The Secretary General of the FEC announced the disbandment of the FEC on April 28, 1952.


\textsuperscript{103} Blakeslee, \textit{The Far Eastern Commission}, 234.
Chapter 3: Analyzing Canada’s FEC Role

How did Canadian interests and principles interact with attempts to maintain a foreign policy based on functionalism, bilateralism or multilateralism? Is there evidence of an attempt to promote Canadian middle power status at the FEC? Does the story of Canada’s role in the FEC fit within an established Cold War narrative?

Canadian interests can be defined as issues in which Canadian officials identified an objective that improved Canadian political, economic and security standing etc. Principles involved broader issues with more distant outcomes, without a necessary immediate effect and tended to be applications of concepts or ideals that were widely held by Canadian bureaucrats. The desire to maintain the legitimacy of the FEC in order to preserve Canadian influence was an interest; the abstract claim that multilateralism was a good structure for the conduct of international relations was a principle.

On many of the issues that were before the FEC, Canada pursued objectives that at least in part, related to a certain type of foreign policy structure such as multilateralism, or to the expression of Canadian national legitimacy through exercising influence as in functionalism. In striving to attain many of their objectives at the FEC, however, Canadian officials were forced to combine friendly bilateral relations with the United States with support for desirable integrated structures or the pursuit of Canadian interests or principles.

**Functionalism**

Canadian ministers and bureaucrats had an early affinity towards stressing Canada’s functional importance during the war, having spent two years as the second
largest ally alongside Britain after the fall of France and before the entry of the Soviet Union and the United States into the Second World War late in 1941. Even after that, Canadian contributions of manpower within certain theatres and of resources generally to the war effort made a sound argument for its inclusion at the decision-making table. Functionalism would attribute decision-making power on specific issues to states that had the resources to carry out these decisions. The big three, however, wanted to limit the complexity of discussion and of course, Canada had not been and was not a world power. Despite its major contribution, Britain perceived Canada only as the most prominent among a second tier of allies; others perhaps did not even see that.¹

The Canadian reaction toward being allotted a voice in the occupation of Japan was at first incredulous. Canada had recently failed to achieve standing in the occupation of Germany, where Canadian forces played a significant role in victory and formed part of the occupying force and where Canadian relief aid was expected. Yet a few months later, the United States, which provided the vast majority of occupation forces in Japan, freely offered Canada and other allies a role in the occupation of Japan. The United States could placate allies and garner international good will in the Japanese occupation, despite growing concern over deadlock in the German occupation, because it did not share physical control with any potential adversaries.²

² States other than Canada actively sought representation in establishing occupation policy for Japan but, while the inclusion of other states gave the occupation an international flavor, the United States did not want to significantly mold its wishes to allied input, Blakeslee, The Far Eastern Commission, 2; Acting
Britain, which did have a major claim to participation in the making of policy for postwar Japan, sought to increase the powers of the FEAC, and invited Canadian comments on this. The Canadian government declined to comment on the grounds that there was no functional basis to lend legitimacy to a Canadian point of view. Canada had devoted few forces to the victory in the Pacific, and had no regular troops occupying Japan or other territories in the Far East. In fact Hume Wrong wrote that “it would, of course, be rather absurd for us to have top level representation on an important body concerned with the application of surrender in Japan, against which country our forces have done little fighting, when we have no corresponding standing with respect to Germany.” Canadian officials still had a Euro-centric orientation that matched their perception of Canada’s functional contributions.

Nevertheless, Canada had opinions on how much power the FEAC should have and its representative to the FEAC had instructions to promote this. More than Britain, Canada was happy to let the United States maintain control of Japan. While Britain did not desire spheres of occupation such as those that had already become problematic in Germany, it did want a substantial say in the conduct of the occupation, something that was not provided in the proposed FEAC terms of reference. The initial draft of instructions for Canada’s FEAC representative noted the undesirability of Canada playing

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3 LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 4729, File 50061-40 Pt. 1, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 20 August 1945.
4 LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 4729, File 50061-40 Pt. 1, Memorandum for Mr. Robertson, 1 September 1945.
“a very vigorous role in the early stages of the commission…”.  

A notation in the margin specifically cited the lack of Canadian occupation troops in Japan. The draft also set out the conflicting goals of preventing any “narrowing” of American control in Japan while at the same time strengthening the role of the Commission in the occupation.

An official in External Affairs commented on the draft, shifting the focus from functionalism to multilateralism. Through two drafts and several commentaries Canada developed a position that supported British calls for a strong FEAC role in supervising an American-led occupation while defending a single United States Command structure in Japan. As mentioned in Chapter 2, an additional benefit of promoting multilateralism in this instance was the increased likelihood of obtaining Soviet participation. Canada feared that, if denied an avenue for pursuing its interests diplomatically in the FEAC, the Soviets could easily assert their will in less constructive ways on the ground. Charles Ritchie, First Secretary at External Affairs, also considered it hypocritical that the Soviet Union might be denied a say in Japan while the United States was demanding similar rights in the Balkans.  

Canada had advance notice of the British proposal, secretly accepted by the United States, to give the FEAC policy-setting authority over Japan, and intended to support this proposal if it came up at the commission. Hume Wrong, head of the European and Commonwealth Division at External Affairs, along with Charles Ritchie and George Ignatieff, of the International Organizations Division, all supported altering the draft to give more emphasis to the desire for a multilateral body with authority over non-military policy in Japan. They favoured giving the Canadian

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representative more flexibility to support proposals that might give effect to this desire. If multilateral supervision of Japan were denied, Ignatieff argued Canada should support Australia’s claim to representation in a smaller body “as an appropriate application of the functional principle.”

The initial instructions to Lester Pearson, Canadian Ambassador in Washington and representative on the FEAC, presented both a functional justification for Canada’s place within the body as one of “certain other states … which have actively participated in the war against Japan and which are principally interested in the area of the Western Pacific”, and multilateral aspirations to situate policy approval within an international body. The balance of American control and multilateral advice was seen as particularly advantageous. The initial instructions regarded the United States as a power “with a reasonable degree of willingness to cooperate with smaller nations”; previous drafts had expanded on this to note that Canada had been more successful in bending America’s ear than in its recent attempts to gain influence with “any group of Great Powers attempting to act collectively.”

**Multilateralism**

Canada gravitated toward a multilateral approach to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission and its successor the Far Eastern Commission. Canada acknowledged that

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its few specific interests in Japan or the Far East were minor in comparison with those of other commission members. Canada had nothing to offer to the occupation of Japan other than advice, so its functional claim to a seat at the table was not as legitimate as absent (though less than sovereign) nations like Korea or Indonesia. As a member of a multilateral body charged with oversight, Canada’s lack of baggage in the Far East provided a perception of neutrality that would later propel it to membership in other supervisory bodies. For External Affairs, if the Herculean efforts of the war could not earn Canada a functional window on world councils, then a seat at a larger multilateral table would have to suffice. If functionalism was a lost cause in these fora and the concept of the middle power was not recognized by any great power, then the next best rationale for Canadian influence was direct management of important aspects of international relations by, or at least in consultation with, bodies representing many interested nations operating in a democratic fashion. The FEC went some way to filling these criteria despite its great-power veto. Multilateral bodies offered Canada a chance either to dilute the influence of the United States, as it later expected to do in NATO, or a chance to influence events in a way not merited on its own standing.

While Canadian officials were struck by the apparent reversal in fortune signaled by the offer to join the FEAC, they acknowledged that the offered role was not analogous to the role they had sought in Europe. The United States had invited several “smaller countries” in addition to the great powers. Canada felt that given its past arguments for

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11 Multiculturalism is rarely discussed in historical writing other than assertions that a particular case was representative of it. Writing from an international relations position, Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), 10, 12-13 provides a comprehensive study while political scientist Steven Kendal Holloway provides a definition in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest*, (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006), 237.
inclusion in international bodies it must accept a seat on the FEAC.\textsuperscript{12} In the future
Canadian strategy would frequently focus on preserving the legitimacy and perception of
effectiveness of both the FEC and other multilateral bodies. On various issues, especially
where open conflict between the FEC and MacArthur was feared, Canada’s concrete
interests were even sometimes abandoned in favour of preserving multilateral viability
(also an interest) on the world stage.

The most important issue considered by the FEC, and the occasion of its greatest
loss of credibility, was Japan’s new constitution.\textsuperscript{13} As a test case, the dispute over
constitutional policy demonstrates the FEC’s inability to be effective in the face of
American opposition, and the Canadian government’s unwillingness to support the strong
and expert advice of its diplomats.

In the fight over FEC policy on the legitimacy of the sitting parliament adopting a
new constitution, the American delegation argued that any directive so specific as to
detail the method of adoption would impose on MacArthur’s authority. Pearson described
the Indian delegate’s response:

>[s]peaking with his customary eloquence and restrained bitterness, the
Indian representative (who is chairman of Committee No. 3) replied that
the history of consultative communications with SCAP had not been
happy; that hitherto SCAP had not deigned to answer any enquiry on the
constitutional issue, a silence which while perhaps not contemptuous
might be described as at least imperious; that cooperation could not be
unilateral; that hitherto the Commission had expressed its confidence in

\textsuperscript{12} LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 4729, File 50061-40 Pt. 1, Memorandum to Prime Minister from Hume Wrong,
25 August 1945.
\textsuperscript{13} John Price, “E.H. Norman, Canada and Japan’s Postwar Constitution,” \textit{Pacific Affairs}, (Fall, 2001), 401.
and appreciation of the supreme Commander, and had been only too anxious to give full consideration to his prestige, with no desire to obstruct or humiliate him; but that in this instance there was a clear case of the F.E.C.’s duty to issue a directive on the Constitution and on constitutional procedure and that if the United States were continually to raise the jurisdictional question of policy versus implementation and to interpret any real policy decision as interfering in the authority of SCAP, the Commission itself might as well disband.  

Pearson argued that, despite the reservations the American delegate had with paragraph two of the FEC policy, requiring any constitution to be adopted by a constituent assembly or similar body, Canada should support this language. If the Commission should be unable to agree on this version, he suggested that they agree to change it so that the sitting Diet could not adopt a constitution until receiving further direction from the FEC. A draft reply, never sent, to Pearson’s dispatch is illustrative of the Canadian sensitivity to American policy. Special note was made of the desirability of maintaining the prestige of SCAP, without defining whether this was in Canada’s interest because a prestigious commander could better lead the occupation of Japan, or because Canada needed the goodwill of MacArthur or the United States in other matters. It also set a strategy for judging American resistance against the FEC policy: the Canadian delegate should gauge American arguments by the “degree of concern rather than by their inherent soundness.”

In exploring possible compromise on the issue of constitutional approval by the sitting Diet, the Canadian delegate observed the growing tendency of the great powers to

refrain from discussions but to use their veto to negate any disagreeable decisions. The United States representative suggested not requiring the Japanese to hold a referendum or to elect a constituent assembly to adopt their constitution, but not to discourage them from doing so either. The New Zealand delegate countered that this should be amended to indicate that the Japanese were encouraged to find a mechanism other than the Diet to adopt their constitution. The Indian delegate offered the phrase “given every opportunity”, a proposal supported by the Americans. When the Canadian delegate argued in favour of the term “encouraged”, however the Soviets attempted to move that wording to a vote. When the Indian wording finally came to a vote, the Soviets exercised their veto and only the first paragraph (requiring that the constitution is “a free expression of the will of the Japanese people”), of the policy received a consensus of support.16

Having failed to adopt a policy that would prevent the sitting Diet from adopting a new constitution, the FEC turned to a policy document setting out the principles that would be used to indicate the FEC’s approval of a constitution. During discussion of opposing sets of principles – a short general list supported by the United States, India and Britain, and a longer detailed list supported by the rest of the FEC – a proposal was made to lessen the urgency of the deliberations by requiring a reappraisal of the Japanese Constitution one to two years after promulgation.17 This proposal, while giving the FEC a later window to rule on the new constitution, also allowed the Japanese people to vote on a revised constitution in a referendum, resulting in a constituent assembly if required. The

American delegation opposed any direction to the Japanese government for a referendum. In a draft memorandum for the Prime Minister in Ottawa, J.R. Maybee proposed that Canada support the proposal for a referendum but not at the expense of voting against the Americans. If the Americans voted against the policy, Canada should abstain. The United States argued that the FEC in fact had only the power to disapprove of a constitution and had no power to prescribe specific procedures or content. The Canadian delegate sought instructions on this limiting interpretation. A memorandum to Hume Wrong, drafted by J.R. Maybee of the Third Political Division (U.S., Latin America, Asia), acknowledged Canada’s interest in maintaining the effectiveness of the FEC specifically and multilateral institutions generally, but stated that, as American interests in Japanese internal affairs were greater than Canada’s, Canada could not oppose the United States. The official reply regretted that the “Commission’s authority will be somewhat reduced.” Not stated but implicit in this message was the consideration that avoiding the potential rift in U.S.-Canada relations that would accompany Canadian resistance on this issue outweighed the potential weakening of the FEC and multilateral bodies. Canada’s interest in bilateral relations with the United States was more important than its interest in multilateral institutions.

In debate about the FEC’s modified role of “passing upon” the Japanese Constitution, several proposed changes were discussed, one of which caused a dispute between Britain and the United States. Britain proposed an amendment that would

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require that the majority of cabinet members be elected members of the Diet. Canada’s representative felt that Britain would use its veto to support this position and assumed that Canada should support the U.K. in this position. In the margin of this teletype Ronald MacDonnell, head of the U.S., Latin America and Asia Division at External Affairs, wrote “General support, yes. But do we want to vote against U.S. if they treat this as a major issue? I doubt it.” SCAP believed that this policy would needlessly restrict a Japanese government’s choice of members and that it was “an unusual and arbitrary restriction upon Government which I doubt can be found in any governmental system in the world.”

In a Memorandum to Macdonnell, Maybee noted that while generally “it is not expedient for Canada to oppose the United States in matters which are not of great immediate importance to us,” in this instance Canada must stand with Britain against the United States for several reasons. Maybee argued that: changing sides would cause Canada to lose respect, the American refutation of Britain’s proposal was uninformed, Japan needed an additional democratic safeguard, and the “unusual and arbitrary” principle was also found in Canada’s own constitution. In addition, the United States had already agreed to this principle in “Basic Principles for a New Constitution”, passed by the FEC on July 2: Maybee speculated that the Americans were attempting to defer to MacArthur. MacDonnell agreed and added his comments as the memorandum passed to

Hume Wrong. Canada was preparing instructions to support Britain when a revised version of the draft constitution communicated to the FEC contained the desired change. The American delegation, facing strong support for the British policy at the FEC, had apparently won this concession from MacArthur. Maybee forwarded a memorandum confirming instructions to support the British position while noting its apparent acceptance in Japan and Wrong commented at the bottom that the FEC “need not feel that its efforts have been wholly in vain.”

A teletype the following day set out instructions that conformed to the American interpretation of the FEC’s role: Canada could not support a resolution that the draft constitution was unsatisfactory but regretted “that the Commission has not been given ample time to formulate a considered judgement on the draft constitution before its final adoption by the Diet.” Along with these documents Maybee sent Wrong a memorandum that he had prepared for St. Laurent but not sent. In this document Maybee concluded:

This situation could undoubtedly have been avoided if the Supreme Commander had been more inclined to accept the guidance of the Far Eastern Commission in constitutional matters. The expected attempt of the United States to curtail further discussion of the Japanese constitution will be a severe blow to the morale of the Commission, since it indicates that little value is placed on the Commission’s deliberations as an aid to the Japanese people in establishing a democratic form of Government. Since it is in Canada’s interest that international bodies such as the Far Eastern Commission should be maintained and supported, it is recommended that

our representative express this Government’s regret that greater value is not placed on the work of the Commission in its efforts to foster the growth of democratic institutions in Japan.\textsuperscript{26}

The Department of External Affairs instructed Canada’s representative to the FEC to express only the milder of the rebukes, but it is obvious that for Maybee, and to a lesser degree for MacDonnell and Wrong, this episode left a bitter taste regarding the true utility of multilateral organizations in dealing with great powers. However, a few days later Maybee more optimistically wrote on an American proposal that FEC nations informally attend the meetings of the Allied Council for Japan that perhaps this indicated a “willingness on the part of the United States to listen more attentively to outside counsel in the conduct of Japanese affairs and to spread more widely the responsibility for the establishment of peace and security in the Far East.” MacDonnell noted in the margin that this was “doubtful – U.S. want moral support without further sharing of responsibility.”\textsuperscript{27}

Sometimes, as has already been mentioned, Canadian officials gave priority to increasing the prestige or authority of the FEC in addition to, or even more than, Canadian interests. In the wake of eighteen Soviet proposals for alterations to the basic policy for the FEC, Patterson confided to Wrong that it was disappointing that FEC members had been unsuccessful in using the constitution debate to increase the FEC’s prestige. He felt that while several of the Soviet proposals would improve the FEC in accordance with Canada’s interest, the British were unlikely to support a Soviet proposal

\textsuperscript{27} LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 4729, File 50061-40 Pt. 3, Memorandum for Mr. Wrong. Allied Council for Japan, 30 August 1946.
since they had not even supported non-Soviet proposals on the constitutional debate.\textsuperscript{28}

Britain was occasionally at odds with Canada on other policies and, no longer at the center of Canada’s diplomatic orbit. Indeed, Canada did not always support Britain, as was the case in the proposed disarmament treaty of 1946.

**Disarmament**

A disarmament treaty for Japan proposed by the United States in the spring of 1946 had raised concerns about the negation of multilateral bodies. The treaty purported to resolve a significant area of FEC policy, under discussion by Committee No. 7. Louis St. Laurent and Hume Wrong were concerned that it usurped the United Nations charter by extending control over a belligerent for twenty-five years.\textsuperscript{29} St. Laurent saw in the proposed treaty a lack of confidence in the United Nations by the Americans.\textsuperscript{30} The disarmament treaty was never adopted but the following September the United States introduced a motion in the FEC’s Committee No. 7 (Disarmament) to drop the policy paper it was working on, arguing that the work of disarming the Japanese had been completed. This motion was defeated, but reintroduced a few weeks later with British support as well.\textsuperscript{31} In the face of continued opposition in the FEC, the United States argued instead that the policy paper on disarmament be sent back to committee for amendment, later offering an alternative paper in its place.\textsuperscript{32} Ottawa instructed Canada’s

\textsuperscript{28} LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 4729, File 50061-40 Pt. 3, Memorandum for Mr. Wrong, 20 May 1946.
\textsuperscript{30} LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 4729, File 50061-40 Pt. 3, Louis St. Laurent to Hume Wrong, 21 May 1946.
\textsuperscript{31} LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 3803, File 8364-M-40 Pt. 1, Canadian Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 20 September 1946.
\textsuperscript{32} LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 3803, File 8364-M-40 Pt. 1, Canadian Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 September 1946; LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 3803, File 8364-M-40 Pt. 1, Canadian Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 October 1946;
representative to support retaining the original policy paper, as the FEC could not accept MacArthur’s report (claiming the completion Japanese disarmament) as absolving it from developing its own policy statement.\textsuperscript{33} Regardless of the disarmament activities undertaken by SCAP, most FEC members wanted to explicitly detail what Japanese disarmament was to mean.

The United States delegate next proposed the adoption of the original FEC policy paper, but with a preamble that explained that most of the disarmament of Japan had been completed. No decision on this option was taken as the FEC split down the middle on this.\textsuperscript{34} The British explained to the Canadian delegation that they had originally sought to amend the paragraphs of the policy document that dealt with the demobilization of Japanese troops. When that amendment had failed they supported the American policy paper as it did not mention demobilization of Japanese prisoners of war. Britain intended to continue to use 82,000 Japanese soldiers for forced labour in Southeast Asia. Now that the United States had switched its support to the original paper with a preamble, Britain faced public condemnation from the Soviet Union (who had repatriated none of their Japanese prisoners) over their flagrant defiance of an FEC directive.\textsuperscript{35}

Canada declined to support Britain in this problem. Arthur Menzies had previously asked the Canadian delegate to inquire privately into both the United States

\begin{footnotes}
\item[33] LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 3803, File 8364-M-40 Pt. 1, Canadian Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 11 October 1946.
\item[34] LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 3803, File 8364-M-40 Pt. 1, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian Ambassador in Washington, 16 October 1946.
\item[35] LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 3803, File 8364-M-40 Pt. 1, Canadian Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 November 1946; LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 3803, File 8364-M-40 Pt. 1, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, 6 November 1946.
\end{footnotes}
and British reasons for opposing the original policy paper, and Britain had not revealed its true motives. Menzies felt that reversing the Canadian vote or abstaining, after having supported the policy for so long, would be detrimental to Canadian standing, despite an underlying desire to help the British with their problem. The New Zealand delegation, which had also been recently apprised of the reasons for Britain’s opposition to the original disarmament policy, proposed returning both documents to committee for discussion and production of a consensus document. An amended version of the truncated American policy was developed but the FEC was still split. The Canadian delegation supported the modified new policy while expressing support for the original policy in principle. Canada would support British tactics to avoid any proposal that included a statement regarding the timely return of prisoners of war but would support such a proposal if it were actually tabled. The Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship had developed to such a degree that strong British interests were now treated as those of an important yet equal ally. The fact that Britain had not explained its position earlier, and that a late reversal would hurt Canadian legitimacy (though not as much as it could hurt British interests) prevented Canada from giving Britain its full support. If such a situation had involved the United States, the outcome would likely have been different. The FEC policy on disarmament was eventually passed in February 1948, without


mention of prisoner of war repatriation.38

**Bilateralism**

Multilateralism and Functionalism represented the dreams of foreign service officers in Canada for unprecedented relevance in a post-war world. Bilateralism in relation to the United States was key as they mapped the contours of a world where their gigantic neighbor had interests on every shore they reached. If the decades between World Wars One and Two saw the growth of Canadian independence and the lessening of Imperial ties, then World War Two and the following years established the acceptance of the primacy of the bilateral relationship with the United States. From references to the Monroe Doctrine of the early nineteenth century and the Ogdensburg agreement early in the War, it had become clear that Canada’s future course would stay within the watershed of economic and security possibilities established by its proximity to the United States. 39

In this regard it is important to look at issues on which Canada perceived a different interest or principle than the United States (as occurred over the method of adoption of the constitution), saw a better method of reaching a common goal (such as asking the Council of Foreign Ministers to resolve the accounting of external Japanese assets), or thought that the United States had not adequately considered possible negative consequences of their actions (such as their reluctance to ensure Soviet participation in

the FEAC). In many cases in which differences were noted, Canadian interests were deemed insufficient to act on, American interest was seen as so strong as to preclude independent Canadian action, or American insistence would have resulted in a penalty for acting in opposition. A second area of importance concerns instances when this difference actually led to action, even if the action was not sustained to the issue’s resolution.

The government of Canada’s original instructions to Lester Pearson, and the drafts and notes developing these instructions, laid out the importance of Japan to the Americans and the importance of the Canada/United States relationship to Canada. This pattern repeatedly recurred when Canada, after supporting a position because it would work, was a matter of principle, or was in the Canadian interest, abandoned the position in deference to the United States. In these instances there is a sense that the United States did not see Canada’s interests or claims to principle as legitimate. In reaction, Canada rarely opposed strongly held American positions and treated doing so as expending a special type of currency. The perception was that opposition to American policy used up goodwill that could only be gathered over time.

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40 LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 4729, File 50061-40 Pt. 1, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian Ambassador in Washington, 27 October 1945. Also see the drafts, memoranda and marginal notes, within the same file, that lead to the development of this document.


42 Personal Interview, Arthur Menzies, 1 February 2007.
One way in which an edge was sought in the bilateral relationship was in the cultivation of personal relationships. External Affairs considered personal contacts between Canadian and American representatives on the FEAC and FEC valuable in securing the most favorable hearing possible for Canadian positions and for understanding the intramural politics that complicated the American position on many FEC issues. During deliberations concerning the principles for the adoption of a new Japanese constitution, Norman was in Washington representing Canada at the FEC; Ottawa praised him for maintaining personal contacts with the American delegation in order to gauge their level of concern over the prestige of MacArthur in this issue.43 Perhaps the best example of the utility of personal contacts was recognized early in the post-war period when, in considering a Canadian representative for the FEAC, Hume Wrong ruled out Herbert Norman because he had been given a key role with SCAP in Japan and his presence there was “useful from several points of view.”44 Canada had no forces in the occupation of Japan and no sources of information. Norman’s extensive knowledge of modern Japanese society made him valuable for SCAP and his work at the centre of power there made his observations and insight valuable to Ottawa. Norman’s expertise in Japan meant that he was sought out more than a Canadian liaison might expect. The personal relationships with MacArthur’s staff, and with Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and academics meant that he could provide External Affairs with information that no other representative in Japan could hope to gather.

Norman was not the only Canadian for whom personal contacts were important.

44 LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 4729, File 50061-40 Pt. 1, Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner in Great Britain, 8 October 1945.
When, embarrassed over the need to cater to MacArthur’s public position in Tokyo, General McCoy privately explained to Canadian representative Ralph Collins his difficulty in both chairing the Commission and dealing with that “steamroller in Tokyo”. McCoy’s consistent defence of MacArthur at the FEC was not reciprocated. Some months earlier, Pearson described McCoy’s outburst at the Soviet delegate as “the most dramatic and embarrassing since [the FEC’s] revival, owing largely to the ineptitude of the chairman.”

Trouble within the American delegation grew as cabinet members and MacArthur developed their own agendas. This was first observed in the summer of 1945 when Britain disclosed to Canada’s High Commissioner that details of the occupation regime would await the outcome of a conflict between the American President and State Department both of which favoured a multilateral control regime, and the War and Navy Departments, which favoured retaining unilateral control with only token oversight. In the midst of debate in the FEC on Japan’s new constitution Pearson observed that “the United States delegate appeared to be much more apprehensive of any infringement upon the authority of SCAP than any specific manoeuvres of the USSR.” He described the rift as existing between the State Department, which would support the consensus FEC position on evaluating the constitution, and the War Department, which appeared to be safeguarding the prestige of MacArthur. Pearson judged that the War Department, with General McCoy as its representative, had the final say within the American FEC.

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46 LAC, DEAR, Mackenzie-King Papers, MG26 J1 Vol. 411, Reel C-9175, Canadian Ambassador in the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 March 1946.
47 LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 4729, File 5061-40 Pt. 1, Canadian High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 15 August 1945.
The conflict between these points of view on occupation policy could only exist in the absence of a comprehensive positive policy from the top. As American foreign policy was consolidated under a single Cold War paradigm, and containment became the Truman foreign policy, the implication for Japan was that the direction of reform was about to change.

At the end of the Spring of 1948 representatives of the American Department of State communicated the underlying principles of what would become “the reverse course” of the United States and its allies in Japan to Canadian officials. The main element of this policy was that the primary objective of American policy in Japan switched from preventing the resurgence of a Japanese threat to the Far East to preventing Soviet influence in Japan by developing Japan as a pro-Western resource. As part of this policy the United States intended to substantially increase the level of Japan’s economy, move towards the establishment of a central police force and coast guard in Japan, continue to base American troops in Japan and significantly extend the duration of the occupation.

The re-evaluation of American policy in Japan began following MacArthur’s announcement that no further progress could be made in the rehabilitation of Japan without a peace treaty. This not only set Britain and Canada to considering the principles they would seek in such a treaty, but also served as a trigger for the senior levels of the American State Department to seek a review of Japanese occupation policy in the process of developing their own plan for peace with Japan. As explained in Chapter 2, a small delegation.⁴⁸

working group at the State Department in Washington had been preparing a framework for a Japanese peace treaty for some time. When neither this framework nor MacArthur’s outline were deemed suitable, George Kennan, architect of America’s Cold War containment policy, ordered a new approach. Incorporating new economic reviews, and following a trip to Japan in March 1948, Kennan described the American project in Japan from a Cold War point of view: the rehabilitation of Japan was playing into Soviet hands. He did not believe that the occupation reforms would have a lasting effect because they were imposed from without.\(^4^9\) Kennan believed that the only durable force that could lead Japan in support of America’s strategy toward the Soviets was the traditional conservative political class. This view was foreshadowed by the peace treaty principles developed for Kennan in 1947. Coincidentally, as described in Chapter 2, the preliminary paper provided independently by the Joint Planning Committee of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had reached a similar conclusion.

To test the reception of this new policy, George Kennan visited Ottawa and London. On June 1 1948 Kennan laid out his case to Canadian officials, and responded to concerns. He argued that many of the reforms in Japan had been misguided and that the future American course would leave no place for reparations or any limit to a peaceful level of industry.\(^5^0\) Canadian objections to this initial view of the new policy were based on tactics not objectives. Ralph Collins asked why the security guarantees and economic assistance the United States intended to extend to Japan could not be implemented in parallel with a peace treaty. Arthur Menzies argued that it would be a mistake to let the


\(^{50}\) LAC, W.L.M. King Papers, Vol. 283, File 2963, United States Policy for Japan: Memorandum of a Conversation with Mr. George E. Kennan, 3 June 1948.
Japanese people think that the Western allies were abandoning the reforms established so far. He further cautioned that the introduction of these controversial changes at the FEC must follow consultation with allies. Citing the recent decision to create a Japanese Coast Guard while the FEC was still discussing the issue, Menzies explained that Canada could not support the United States on matters in which it was blindsided at the FEC. Unbeknownst to the Canadian officials, Kennan had previously told MacArthur that he could effectively ignore the FEC, something that the Commander appreciated greatly.\footnote{Schaller, \textit{The American Occupation of Japan}, 125.}

In a memorandum to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Menzies noted that the Canadian public was not ready to accept a reversal of the reforms in Japan; they had fought a war to end militarism in Japan.\footnote{LAC, W.L.M. King Papers, Vol. 283, File 2963, Memorandum for the Secretary of State for External Affairs: U.S. Policy in Japan, 15 June 1948.}

Surviving the transition from the post-war demilitarization of Japan to the Cold War utilization of Japan as an ally in a conflict with the Soviet Union was the Canadian desire for consultation and input in fora where it would be expected to lend support and on issues in which it had an interest. No Canadian official challenged Kennan on the need for the reverse course in Japan or the validity of the Soviet threat to Japan. Concern with Canadian public opinion in part informed the desire not to roll back existing reforms, but also indicated a domestic task as yet incomplete in the Cold War on the home front.

Britain opposed expanding Japan’s industry to the level it suspected the United States desired, since a resurgent Japan could threaten its interests in Southeast Asia. The FEC had for some time been discussing a policy paper to determine the authorized level of Japan’s economy. Britain proposed a higher level of economy for Japan than they had
so far argued would be acceptable in the hope that if this was accepted it would prevent the United States from proposing an even higher level. In memoranda to the Prime Minister, Lester Pearson understood Britain’s caution but warned that he was “not at all sure that Canadian interests would be served or our influence exercised to the best effect by associating ourselves with such a submission by the United Kingdom.” Pearson noted that China would fear a resurgent Japan and stand to lose any outstanding reparations. As the Americans strongly supported a higher economic level for Japan, Pearson thought that the British approach was more likely to win general acceptance within the FEC and therefore continue securing American respect for the organization. Canada’s prime interest in this issue, given what Pearson described as unilateral American responsibility for potential fall-out in the North Pacific, was limited to the continued functioning of the FEC. Even so Pearson did not see any advantage in Canada being closely associated with the introduction of the British plan.

The Reverse Course – Canada’s Cold War in Asia

Is Canada’s engagement with the reverse course in Japan a Cold War story? Can this label be applied to Canada’s entire tenure at the FEC? It is clear that Canada supported the American objectives in the Far East, both before and after the reverse course, but what did Canadian officials consider to be the prime threat to peaceful development in East Asia – the Soviet Union, resurgent Japanese militarism, indigenous nationalisms or retrenched colonialism? What did Canada believe would be the impact of the reverse course on Japan and the rest of East Asia? Did Canadian officials believe that

this Cold War orientation would benefit Asian peoples as much as they expected it to benefit Western states?

Canadian officials, by 1948, certainly had several reasons to perceive that the Soviet Union would preserve the advantages it had obtained at great cost during World War Two, and that unsavory practices, like spying on an ally (as the Soviets had in Ottawa), would have to be assumed. While evidence of early and consistent Canadian support for American Cold War strategy in Asia and elsewhere can be found, there is little to indicate that Canadian officials thought that Soviet invasion or subversion was a threat to Japan. Looking at this from another perspective, Canada may have hoped that Cold War policies in the Far East would benefit the peoples affected, but the first object of these policies was the pursuit of Canadian interests. Less than other states on the FEC, Canada believed that discord or turmoil in the Far East would not affect it directly because American primacy in the region meant the United States would have to deal with the results of their own missteps or those by former colonial powers.

While Canadian policy acknowledged Canada’s place at America’s side in any conflict, Canada did not necessarily see conflict as pre-ordained in institutions such as the FEC. Canada sought Soviet participation in multilateral organizations in order to minimize the likelihood of the Soviets acting outside these bodies, in a way similar to its reasoning for seeking to constrain American actions this way, if qualitatively different. This initial policy of engagement with the Soviet Union gradually gave way to one of containment in 1948 as Canada participated in negotiations to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and supported American implementation of the reverse course in Japan. Canada did not start its FEC tenure with a Cold War outlook. The change in
perception was not accepted at the time of the Canberra Conference, as a hawkish briefing paper from National Defence was softened to match the External Affairs outlook.\textsuperscript{54} Within the narrow context of the occupation of Japan, Canada’s acceptance of the reverse course is difficult to explain as a defensive action in the face of Soviet aggression. In their meeting with Kennan, Canadian officials doubted the risks Kennan argued the Soviet Union posed to Japan.\textsuperscript{55} A less flattering argument could be made that Canadian officials accepted that the Japanese people would face limits on their reforms, and that the states that had suffered Japanese occupation would receive only token restitution, because they recognized that an economically strong Japan was required to anchor East Asia within the emerging Western block.

In a North Pacific venue, Pearson had transplanted the contemporary Canadian view regarding security and the United States. Pearson acknowledged that the American proposal to build up Japan had the potential to risk renewed Japanese aggression and that a prolonged occupation risked anti-western sentiment. He also explained that such a policy would make negotiating Chinese acceptance of Japan more difficult and risked a new sphere of Soviet intransigence. These were all risks largely to American interests and so, Pearson concluded, Canada should not press the United States unduly.\textsuperscript{56} Recognizing hegemonic power in the region, Pearson recommended following the best course in trying to shape it, but not at the expense annoying the hegemon, or of discrediting the multilateral body that best allowed for shaping this power. Canadian officials were not convinced of the Soviet threat to Japan, but supported the reverse course even though

\textsuperscript{55} LAC, W.L.M. King Papers, Vol. 283, File 2963, United States Policy for Japan: Memorandum of a Conversation with Mr. George E. Kennan, 3 June 1948.
\textsuperscript{56} LAC, W.L.M. King Papers, Vol. 283, File 2963, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Japan, 23 July 1948.
they perceived risks to the reformation of Japanese society, and to the recovery of East Asia as possible results. External Affairs experts recognized the benefit to the United States of the reverse course, though mostly in aid of what they considered a dubious branch of the Cold War. By extension Canada served its own interests in supporting the United States.

As a limiting factor in relation to Canada’s multilateral engagements, or as a factor determining Canadian actions outside multilateral institutions, Canada-U.S. bilateralism, – the desire to maintain a positive relationship with the United States – was Canada’s guiding foreign policy orientation immediately after World War Two. That this is not actively perceived today has as much to do with the way that Canadians perceived themselves as sharing American interests and principles as with the national mythologies that have developed in the post-war era.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

Common Threads

Three points can be concluded from this study of Canada’s participation in the FEC. They all relate to Canada’s relationship with the wider world more than to Canadian relations with Japan. First, Canadian officials were interested in process more than principle, especially in promoting multilateralism. Second, the Canadian government initially sought to keep the Soviet Union engaged in the FEC before signing on to the reverse course initiated by the United States. Third, while Canada supported reforms in Japanese society and industry, it must also share responsibility for the way that these reforms were rolled back in order to enlist Japan in the Cold War which was behind the reverse course.

In numerous instances Canada was most likely to consider alternatives to American direction in the FEC when it felt that the legitimacy of the FEC, multilateralism generally, or the future ability of Canada to influence world affairs was at risk. The Canada/U.S. conflict at the FEC may have resulted from the Americans being the only power willing to contemplate delegitimizing (though not destroying) the FEC. For all other states the FEC was their sole window of direct influence on the occupation of Japan.

In the great contest between most FEC members and the United States over the adoption of a new Japanese constitution, Canada refused to engage in a showdown with the United States. While supporting a constituent assembly or the election of a new Diet explicitly designated to serve as such, Canada allowed its commitment to the bilateral relationship to trump both constitutional principle and its interest in FEC legitimacy. Just
as Ottawa wanted the bilateral relationship to survive for future benefit, Canadian officials thought that, having bent to the American will on this issue, the FEC could usefully assert itself later. Arguments in support of a review referendum were unsuccessful, but significant changes, including provisions that Cabinet members be civilians and be drawn from the Diet were indeed incorporated. The constitutional debates brought both frustration at the low regard the Americans had for the FEC, and regret that the constitutional debate had not been used to improve FEC prestige. The argument that Canadian policy in the FEC was most likely to deviate from American policy when issues of multilateral legitimacy were at stake cannot rely just upon instances where Canadian officials maintained a separate position to the very end. The strength of opposition to the American position, as External Affairs officials debated the adoption of a position, can be found in cases like the constitutional debate.

Canadian efforts to maintain and promote the status of multilateral institutions appeared to bear fruit when the American State Department proposed that FEC member states draft a peace treaty for Japan. Ignoring the Soviet and Chinese calls for the Council of Foreign Ministers or the great powers to produce a treaty, the Americans offered a process that Canada had argued for in settling the European conflict. The offer was premature. An American re-orientation of Japanese policy brought this region into a Cold War paradigm that included Japan as a bulwark against communism. A peace treaty, and the end of the occupation, could not come, the Americans argued, until Japan had sufficient economic, political and military strength to resist Soviet pressure. Canada accepted this, having realized for some time that the United States would guarantee its
security on the Pacific coast, regardless of who posed the threat.\(^1\) The fact that the proposal to draft a treaty had been given a multilateral basis gave Canadian diplomats expectations that this approach might be extended to other arenas.

In addition to seeing multilateralism as a route to influence for Canada, officials in External Affairs saw the Soviet Union’s exclusion as dangerous to Western and Canadian interests. Even before the FEC was formed, Canada maintained a positive outlook on Soviet involvement, remaining patient with the Soviet delegate’s strict instructions from Moscow. In order to keep the Soviets in the FEC, Canada supported the Soviet position that the Council of Foreign Ministers should decide on reparations assets outside of the main Japanese islands. This did not mean that Canadian attitudes towards the Soviets remained constant or that they did not marginalize the Soviets when it suited Ottawa. In the later years of the FEC, when the reverse course was already underway in Japan, Canada supported interim directives that embodied the wishes of two thirds of the body. In effect, a commission within a commission could thus carry on with FEC business while the Canadian government was able to assert that it was maintaining some cooperative links with its former ally. This approach supported Canadian interests in maintaining some utility for the FEC, not as a response to growing tensions in Europe.

Canada found its own way to the reverse course and supported the replacement of Potsdam ideals with Cold War realism. In the summer of 1947, in preparation for the Canberra Conference, Canada’s defence chiefs produced a report that called for either the new development of Japanese defense capabilities or the permanent stationing of United States forces in Japan specifically to counter a Soviet threat. This arrangement may have

been premature for the senior staff at External Affairs as it did not feature in Claxton’s briefing package for the conference but it did match designs being developed south of the border. While it is possible that the close working relationship between the Canadian and American military establishments may have promoted the transfer of this new outlook, it may also be the case that the idea was developed twice among like-minded individuals. A few months later in the wake of the American release of its new position on Japan, Arthur Menzies confided to the Canadian High Commissioner to New Zealand that the Canadian government was more concerned about Soviet intentions than about the revival of Japanese militarism.² Pearson supported Britain’s cautious approach to increasing the economic viability of the Japanese state in service of the reverse course; but, secure in the knowledge that the United States would have to deal with any negative consequences of its more ambitious program, Canada was not prepared to pursue Britain’s approach too resolutely.³

The two most significant issues that received substantial attention from the FEC were the question of a new Japanese constitution and reparations. In each instance the outcome would seem to have a dramatic effect on Japanese society. In the case of the constitution, the draft text was liberal, but the conflict was over the preemption of public participation in the creation, ratification and review of this document. MacArthur’s initial intervention set the boundaries of what might later be considered possible in a constitution and distracted attention from what was no longer on the table – elimination of the emperor institution. Conservative Japanese politicians recognized that the

² American and Far Eastern Division to High Commissioner in New Zealand, 31 March 1948, DCER, 1948, 69.
constitution, which they argued would lack the legitimacy of an indigenous document, would be easier to amend or ignore later. The pacifist nature of this document did not prevent the redevelopment of significant Japanese armed forces – labeled a “defence force” – after the Korean War. It is doubtful that Canadian attention or objections to the subtle language changes that justified later rearmament would have made a difference, as those favouring rearmament could claim the constitution was illegitimate, or opt to use the option of amendment that had been provided.

The issues that determined the reparations available for extraction from Japan had a significant impact on the economic relationships that would drive future Japanese interactions with the other states of East Asia. The orientation of Japan’s former markets had just as much to do with Japan’s economic revival as did the level of economic activity Japan was to be permitted. Britain understood that, as the only industrial centre in East Asia, Japan was both a competitor and a vital component of any economic rebound in the rest of East Asia. Reparations to other states in East Asia could hurt Japanese industrial potential and diminish the overall level of economic activity in the region, but East Asian states hoped that reparations would at least modestly even the economic playing field. The different levels of reparations proposed by the British and Americans reflect their differing calculations of how Japanese poverty could significantly affect British trade, the American taxpayer, and ultimately, the ability to turn Japan into a Cold War ally. The fact that so little in the way of reparations ever left Japan made the reverse course all the more effective. When called upon to support the Korean War effort, Japan had more industrial capability than the initial interim directive on reparations had set out.

On both of these issues, Canada objected to attempts to circumvent the FEC’s
relevance, arguing that the relevance of the FEC must be preserved, first through
reserving to it constitutional policy, a topic set out in its terms of reference, and second
by avoiding the premature use of the interim directive in initiating reparations. In a
practical sense, the ineffectiveness of the FEC on both issues made adopting the reverse
course easier because conservative politicians sensed that the constitution was malleable
enough for them to undertake later what it currently denied, and the industrial potential
that had made Japan such a successful imperial power just a few years previously,
remained largely intact.

The Impact of FEC Structure

The United States had originally proposed the Far Eastern Advisory Commission,
with significant powers to advise but no control over occupation policy in Japan. The
Soviet Union declined to be associated with a body they felt did not dignify their
contribution to the East Asian theatre in World War Two, and the Americans did not
appear inclined to make changes to ensure Soviet participation. While British pressure
and a Soviet boycott conveyed the necessity of multilateral supervision, Washington
thought that the least disturbance to American intentions could be achieved by limiting
the power of the multilateral body and limiting its membership to states least likely to
stray from American intentions. Fixing the first parameter delivered the second, the
Soviet Union (considered most likely to frustrate The Commission), had no intention of
joining such a weak body. British insistence on an effective commission, supported by
Canada, brought the Soviet Union into The Commission. It also opened the door for
delay and obfuscation that would complicate the administration of Japan. Canadian
representatives blamed the United States, not the USSR for problems within the FEC
during the early years.\textsuperscript{4} Conflicting positions on occupation policies for Japan and on its commander pushed the American government and its FEC delegation occasionally to reverse their positions and needlessly oppose minor, beneficial suggestions from their allies. The unique historical circumstance of MacArthur’s obstinate character and popular following complicated any American attempt to resolve policy conflicts around him at home.

For the Soviets demilitarization and plentiful reparations were welcome intersections of interest. The Soviet Union certainly did not share the ultimate goals of the other FEC members for Japan yet the Soviets made no attempt to frustrate the FEC during this period. It may be that, as had been set out at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviets accepted their minimal role in Japan, just as they expected to face no serious challenge to their dominance in Bulgaria and Romania. Alternatively, the successful deliberations of the FEC did not directly challenge Soviet interests, and on such issues as the inclusion of external assets for calculating reparations shares, the Soviet veto preserved its interests without leading it to resort to more destructive behaviour.

Once the FEC was in session, the United States re-interpreted FEC responsibilities in the most restricted manner possible, acting preemptively before the FEC could rule on an issue, and sending interim directives that infringed on FEC prerogatives. Having set the terms of reference for the Far Eastern Commission at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and winning the participation of Britain and the Soviet Union in this body, the United States had little to lose by

\textsuperscript{4} LAC, W.L.M. King Papers, Vol. 283, File 2963, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 8 July 1946.
tightening the interpretation of the FEC’s powers. Whatever the FEC was deemed incapable of doing fell either to the American occupation or the Japanese government to control, within which confidential advice from SCAP ensured American interests were satisfied. No confrontation or ultimatum arose from the American interpretation of the FEC terms of reference. The departure of a FEC member, most likely to be the Soviet Union, on an issue of mandate interpretation, would seem like a technicality and, lacking the relevancy of a significant issue, would be a poor vehicle for propaganda. The American propensity to act before the FEC could define policy reflected the American advantage in having political control machinery on the ground as well as the inability of most other FEC members to gather any information on what was happening in Japan except through American sources. Interim directives allowed the Americans to bypass a sluggish or deadlocked FEC.

When the United States initially attempted to use interim directives to circumvent a deadlock on reparations in the FEC, Canada argued that to do so would harm the future effectiveness of the FEC and other international bodies. For Canada, of course, reparations were not an urgent issue. Eventually Canada proposed that the FEC continue to debate issues such as reparations, and that the United States issue interim directives only if two thirds of the FEC were in agreement. Effectiveness in the multilateral realm did not, for Canada, have to mean adherence to the letter of the organization’s terms of reference, nor did it have to include the support of the Soviet Union on all issues. Canada believed that a consensus view of the imperial powers and their Anglo-Saxon progeny on occupation policy was sufficient to maintain the status of the FEC and future multilateral bodies. The use of interim directives was limited in the same way that allied political
pressure could have limited American policy in Japan because the little political pressure that was exerted was by states that hoped their friendly relations with the United States would make them heard.

The Cold War Model and Other Paradigms

Canada’s participation in the FEC would be comprehensible as a story told in many styles, but the possibilities can be compared to inform a judgement of which is more suitable. A modern orthodox view of Canada in the FEC as a Cold War story would require the acceptance that both Canadian and American motives were essentially positive and that Canada hoped to alter American policy only in tactics so as to better reach a common strategic goal. American objectives in East Asia were not primarily aimed at the rapid de-colonization of the subjected territories, or at the economic relief of their people. To the degree that the United States provided aid in quantities to benefit an entire society, it was to prevent social unrest in Japan or to support the KMT in China. American intentions sought to develop Japan as a state within its sphere of influence, and later as an industrial and military bulwark against Soviet influence in Northeast Asia. This had positive effects for the Japanese, as their welfare became a concern of American officials in ways that were never considered for the people of China or Southeast Asia. Japan was able to rebuild and its people enjoyed a higher standard of living than other East Asians. On the obverse of this coin, the Japanese did not have full autonomy in many issues and suffered from the dominance of politicians who inspired the confidence of SCAP more than the imagination of the Japanese people.

The Canadian government’s interests at the FEC, aside from supporting its limited interests in the region, were devoted to making it work. As has been shown, Canadian
interest, even in facilitating the operation of the FEC, was rooted in the desire to promote multilateral organizations as a vehicle for foreign policy. When difficult choices had to be made, Japanese interests were sacrificed to the Canadian imperative of maintaining good bilateral relations with the United States. Canada’s role at the FEC always had the benefit of appearing as part of its civic duty. Membership in the FEC helped to legitimate American actions that ensured Japan’s allegiance to the West during the Cold War. Canadian officials, recognizing the development of a Cold War purpose behind the occupation of Japan, retained interest primarily in opportunities to advance Canadian standing for future influence. Canada was willing to provide sincere and well informed input on serving the interests of the Japanese in reconstructing their country. If the United States didn’t want to hear how its policies were at odds with Japanese interests, then, on most issues, there was a very limited range in which expert voices at External Affairs would continue to speak.

This thesis looks at an international issue from the point of view of a smaller state, what was called ‘Pericentric’ by Tony Smith. A more interesting approach is to consider the Cold War and any other systems of state relations that may be in play as merely the environment in which one state seeks to achieve the best advantage it can. According to this approach Canadian officials, recognizing Canada’s status within an emerging bipolar conflict, took advantage of America’s need for legitimacy in Asia by participating in the FEC while at the same time establishing a pattern to assert diplomatic relevance on other issues. At the same time the Japanese government, recognizing its limited room for maneuver, used American fears to push favourable changes in occupation policy. In each

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case, the smaller state was free from the perceptual and ideological constraints of the Cold War and could weigh its options for maximum domestic benefit. This is a history of empire that gives agency to the people and states that are normally dismissed as the subjugated. As a narrative framework it has promise for describing both traditional and emerging areas of Cold War inquiry.

**Did Canadian FEC Membership Matter?**

Aside from the specific findings of this investigation, a broader question that might be raised in connection to the study of Canada in East Asia is: did Canadian participation in the FEC matter, and if so, how? On the surface the membership of one state in an organization that rarely rates an index entry in histories can seem inconsequential. However, the FEC as a body, and Canada’s participation in it, contributed to the emerging world system, to Canadian participation in this system, and to Canadian self-perception.

The United States did not invite other nations to join the FEC because it doubted its own ability to develop successful occupation policies; rather it extended invitations because it resolved a great power dispute about the supervision of the occupation of Japan. In the months and years immediately after the war, as China protested the concessions made to the Soviet Union, and as most of the rest of East Asia was handed back to its former colonial masters, the FEC was an opportunity for the United States to claim that lesser powers, (though only a few from East Asia), were pertinent to the evolving Pacific peace. On the international stage, Canada’s participation in the FEC was important because it lent credibility to American denials that it was acting unilaterally in East Asia. Canada, alone among the developed nations represented on the FEC, was not
widely perceived as having security or territorial ambitions in East Asia. Had Canada not joined the FEC the new body would have had less legitimacy. Had Canada withdrawn from the FEC on a matter of principle, the impact in Asia might have been considerable as it would have dented the American narrative about its objectives in East Asia.

The emerging orthodox view of the Cold War places blame for most if not all post-war conflict on a belligerent and dangerous Soviet Union led by Stalin. Canadian representatives at the FEC often commented that deadlock arose from American refusal to compromise or to move an issue forward. The conflict between the American Departments of State and Defense, and especially the desire to protect MacArthur, meant that the United States was often the cause of FEC immobility. Though this was a minor story in the emerging Cold War conflict, it suggests a narrative that runs counter to the standard narrative (that the Soviet Union was obstructionist in international bodies), for at least twenty years in the West. If the story of how and why the United States was compelled to stifle the FEC in the first five years after the war had been examined earlier, it would have opened up a more complex narrative that placed more emphasis on power politics and domestic considerations in the United States, and less on ideology. An explanation of the impact of the American political system on its conduct of foreign affairs might have arisen as pundits described how the need to retain support in Congress could prevent the replacement of a problematic commander.

The absence of an authoritative alternative voice during the constitutional debate precluded any meaningful public discussion of options other than MacArthur’s draft constitution. If the FEC had publicly aired its discussions on the constitution, various sections of Japanese society might have felt that they had the public space to criticize
MacArthur’s draft. Herbert Norman quoted a GHQ counter-intelligence officer as stating that the disclosure of FEC debate would encourage both the left and right in Japan to enter into serious debate, leading to a more legitimate, indigenous document.\(^6\) This possibility conflicted directly with the position of MacArthur, who argued that there must be no publicity of the FEC constitutional debate lest it affect the review and adoption of the proposed constitution before the Diet.\(^7\) A constituent assembly, the desired option of most of the FEC members, may have received vital public support had the FEC position become widely known. Disclosing such a divergence of opinion among FEC members would have earned the enmity of the United States, but might have achieved a democratically rendered constitution without the need to sustain high levels of political pressure in Washington.

Sometimes the FEC succeeded in altering occupation policy as in securing American acquiescence to the provision that cabinet members come from the Diet. Concerted opposition on some matters could have had an impact; that such opposition actually arose only rarely is as much Canada’s fault as that of anyone else. In matters of process or in relative degrees of adoption of a policy, the United States had some room to compromise with other FEC nations. The less controversial committees of the FEC completed significant work in areas like land reform and education that had lasting impacts on Japanese society.\(^8\)

Canada spent too much time worrying about preserving its bilateral “currency”

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\(^7\) LAC, DEAR, RG25 Vol. 3649, File 4606-A-40 Pt. 1, Remarks of Professor Kenneth Colgrove at a Meeting of Committee No. 3 – Constitutional and Legal Reform, 31 July 1946.
with the United States and too little time considering what type of post-war relationship it was developing with the American government. Canadian diplomacy seemed to ignore the principle that the United States would not do something that was not in its own best interest. American actions in the post-war period established an informal empire. States were drawn into this because American inducements appealed to the elites in control. When the Americans opened Marshall Plan money to purchases from Canada, it was not done to please the Canadian government or as a reward for good behaviour, but because an economically healthy Canada was good for American interests while an economically depressed Canada was bad for American interests. If Canada had opposed the United States on an issue in the FEC without backing down, it is doubtful that the United States would have retaliated in a lasting fashion. Such a stance may have changed the dynamic between the two states. Instead of a model where Canada used diplomatic “currency” to buy its way out of trouble from time to time, a relationship that acknowledged the shared interests of the two states while expecting tactical differences could have developed.

The FEC mattered because even though the Americans intended to do what they wanted in Japan, the quiet compliance usually delivered by states like Canada meant that they could maintain an image of multilateralism in discussions with the non-aligned world, and with opponents at home and with allied nations. In some instances, and to a limited degree, the FEC operated as a multilateral body placing a check on American power in the occupation of Japan. The degree to which the FEC was increasingly sidelined after 1947, but continued to function without complaint, was a conscious decision by FEC members to support the authority of the United States in Japan. The narrative of multilateral decision-making, even in the absence of actual multilateralism,
served the interests of the member states of the FEC. Member states could claim, even if on close examination this turned out to be superficial, that they were playing some role in the rehabilitation of Japan.

The FEC was the one of the first multilateral bodies outside the UN in which Canada discovered that the multilateral idea could be suitable for projecting the perception of power but not necessarily for exercising it. As was revealed in Eastern Europe, boots on the ground trumped eloquent arguments. Quickly after World War Two, Canada found that deference in the interest of wartime expediency had become an expected practice. America no longer needed to ask that a certain position be taken; Canada sought out the best position within the accepted norms. Despite the difficulty in finding the political will to regularly take positions based on principle or interest, the FEC was effective enough on paper to be used to promote Canadian international relevance to the domestic audience.

Canadian membership in the FEC forced the Canadian government and its diplomatic service to think about East Asia, and to develop positions on many issues that would otherwise have passed by out of Canadian sight. There was continuity with the pre-war era in Canadian concerns about trade but as trade stagnated in the early post-war years, issues of security and post-colonial governance emerged to become more important. After the decision to join the FEC, membership in the United Nations

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9 In an interview Arthur Menzies makes this point about Canadian membership in the FEC. He also made this point as a discussant to Michael Fry’s paper at a conference on the international context of the occupation. Coming so soon after what was largely a European war for Canada, the requirement to place votes on issues affected by the occupation of Japan forced Canadian consideration of the entire region at a time when External Affairs could easily have remained distracted by the conversion from war to peace. Personal Interview, Arthur Menzies, 1 February 2007. Arthur Menzies quoted in Michael G. Fry, “Canada and the Occupation of Japan: The MacArthur – Norman Years,” in The Occupation of Japan: The International Context ed. Thomas W. Burkman, (Norfolk, VA.: MacArthur Memorial foundation, 1984), 153.
Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) and later the International Control
Commissions in Indochina would embroil Canada more deeply in the resolution of the
international system fractured by World War Two. The FEC was very different from the
two later bodies. While the FEC stayed in Washington (with the exception of the FEAC’s
brief visit to Japan), UNTCOK traveled within Korea, and the International Control
Commission required its representatives to travel throughout the three Indochina states.
Canada’s experience on the three agencies shared a desire to be mindful of American
interests while taking care to avoid political pitfalls on both the international and
domestic stage. The ability to accomplish something useful varied with each body,
perhaps in correlation with the risks undertaken.

Canada and the FEC made marks upon the post-war world that persist to this day,
such as the restrictions on cabinet membership in the government of Japan. The
superpowers of the Cold War did not create the post-war world through sheer domestic
will. States in alliance and states on the periphery were involved, and they all attempted
to make the best for themselves of what was often a bad deal. The agency of states like
Canada created the variability that is the subject of recent ambitious studies of the Cold
War while the FEC, often maligned as irrelevant to Japanese society, was intertwined in
the constitutional debate that extends to this day as Japan considers a more overt adoption
of strategic military power.10 Few Canadian commentators can describe Canada’s role in

10 Studies that explore the agency of non-superpowers in the Cold War were first produced on the European
allies of the United States and the Soviet Union, and have more recently included Asian, African and Latin
Cold War Studies* 9 (Spring, 2007), 95-126; Dennis Deletant, “Taunting the Bear: Romania and the
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and the Soviet Union During the Cold War: Enemies or Ambiguous Friends?,” *Cold War History* 5
(February, 2005), 75-86; Mark Philip Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of
Harrison, “Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: A Super-Ally, A Superpower and the Building of the Berlin
the origin of Japan’s constitution but most of their Japanese colleagues could describe in detail the controversial origin of this document. Canadian liability for its creation, though Canada had only a supporting role, is an important episode in the earliest stage of post-war Canadian history. Like its participation in other multilateral bodies, Canadian participation in the FEC is an example of a commitment to the western side in the Cold War intending to, at best, better achieve the common western goals and, at worst, to support the United States in the face of a deteriorating situation. Canada’s involvement in the FEC provides further evidence of extensive, if unheralded, involvement in East Asia following World War Two. In each case a domestic narrative of global citizenship can more accurately be labeled as a supporting role in the defining conflict of the second half of the twentieth century.

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