Shinzo Abe’s Version of History and the “Rise of China”

by

Kong Yeung Ronald Lai
B.A., University of Southern California, 2011

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Pacific and Asian Studies

© Kong Yeung Ronald Lai, 2018
University of Victoria

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author.
Supervisory Committee

Shinzo Abe’s Version of History and the “Rise of China”

by

Kong Yeung Ronald Lai
B.A. University of Southern California, 2015

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Katsuhiko Endo, Department of Pacific and Asian Studies
Supervisor

Dr. Richard King, Department of Pacific and Asian Studies
Departmental Member
Abstract

This thesis examines how Shinzo Abe’s historical perspectives on “comfort women” and the Nanjing Massacre are influenced by global demands. Abe’s official account on these issues have been affected by pressures to reconcile with South Korea and to face China’s rise for strategic reasons. This originates from sources including think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies and media. Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power will provide the theoretical background to analyze Abe’s views on both issues. The existence and method through which these pressures are applied will be detailed and explored. This research will hope to contribute to the understanding of historical memory in the Asia-Pacific and how it remains an issue that undergoes changes in the current political climate.
# Table of Contents

Supervisory Committee ii

Abstract iii

Table of Contents iv

Acknowledgements v

Chapter One
Shinzo Abe’s Historical Account and Soft Power 1
  Literary and Theory Review 6
  Chapter Summaries 15

Chapter Two
Japan and South Korea: “Comfort Women” 18
  Abe’s First Term as Prime Minister 19
  Abe’s Second Term as Prime Minister 25
  Election of Park Geun-hye and Further Controversy 30
  Media Commentary on Abe’s Historical Account 35
  Conclusion 44

Chapter Three
The “Rise of China” 46
  The Armitage-Nye Reports and New York Times 47
  One Belt, One Road Initiative 52
  Trans-Pacific Partnership 55
  Toward an Alliance of Hope 61
  Conclusion 63

Chapter Four
China and Japan: “the Nanjing Massacre” 65
  China’s Position 66
  Japan’s Position 77
  Conclusion 84

Conclusion 86

Bibliography 92
Acknowledgements

This study would not have been possible without the continual guidance from Dr. Katsuhiko Endo, who has been essential in shaping and aiding with my research and writing. I thank Dr. Richard King and Dr. Robert Stolz for reading and providing feedback for my thesis. As well, I thank all the professors and classmates that I have interacted with throughout my time at the University of Victoria. Lastly, I am grateful towards Dr. Douglas Becker for introducing me to the concept of historical memory.
Chapter One

Shinzo Abe’s Historical Narrative and Soft Power

This thesis will analyze the ongoing controversy over Japan’s historical account with China and South Korea. The goal is to argue that the historical grievances between Japan and its neighbours should be explained through competing global and local demands on Abe’s administration. Abe’s current historical account is the reflection of his attempt to fulfill these pressures, which include the need to face China’s increasing role in the Asia Pacific. In addition to military coercion and payments, countries can now wage power through altering the perception of their own ideals, culture, and national memory; labeled as the concept of soft power by Joseph S. Nye.¹ Under this assumption, Japan’s historical debate will be treated as this method of soft power. This introductory chapter seeks to explain how Nye’s theory is instrumental in articulating Abe’s respective stances on “comfort women”, the prostitution of women into Japanese wartime brothels during the Second World War.² In relation to “comfort women”, Abe’s historical narrative has undergone profound changes since his first term as Prime Minister, which manifested in the December 2013 “comfort women” deal. However, Japan con-

continues to be in a conflict with China over another historical debate, over the Nanjing Massacre. Why this is the case will be examined throughout this thesis.

The state of the controversy will first be detailed, in order to explore the significance of different pressures directed towards Abe. The debate primarily concerns the commemoration of Japanese wartime history; the war-crimes committed by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Second World War. This thesis will focus on Abe’s position on “comfort women” with South Korea and the Nanjing Massacre with China. During his first term as Prime Minister of Japan, his perspective on “comfort women” was criticized as displaying a lack of remorse for past victims and/or minimizing Japanese responsibility.³

Before his change of perspective on “comfort women”, which primarily occurred during his second term as Prime Minister, Abe had maintained that “...there is no evidence for the coercion...” of “comfort women”.⁴ He criticized the Asahi Shimbun, a popular Japanese newspaper, for inaccurate reporting on “comfort women” based on claims by Seiji Yoshida, an author who wrote about his involvement in the “comfort women’s” prostitution.⁵ Abe explained that the press plays a large role in helping

---


Japan to “recover Japanese honour”, which adds to the perception that Abe’s lack of compassion for “comfort women” revealed his pursuit of Japanese nationalism.\(^6\) He had also visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates some Japanese class-A war criminals. Such statements and actions have added to the narrative that Abe is altering Japanese wartime memory, to dissociate Japan from its past wartime transgressions.\(^7\)

In reaction to Abe’s stance, former South Korean President Park Geun-hye declared that “…if Japan continues to stick to the same historical perceptions and repeat its past comments…”, she would refuse to meet with him.\(^8\) Abe’s reforms in overseas military legislation further led to damaged relations.\(^9\) In October 2015, Japan’s parliament passed a bill that allowed Japanese Self-Defense Forces to once again engage in collective self-defense overseas.\(^10\) Some critics, such as the Student’s Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy, view this legislation as a clear violation of Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, which was created to prevent Japan from rearming itself.\(^11\)

\(^6\) Ibid.


\(^9\) Ibid.


Despite this predicament, it is essential to emphasize that Abe’s stance has undergone moderations since his first term as the Prime Minister of Japan. The governments of Japan and South Korea agreed on a deal over the “comfort women” issue in December 2015.\textsuperscript{12} Abe offered an apology and one billion yen as part of a compensation fund to aid the surviving “comfort women”.\textsuperscript{13} This was an unanticipated agreement, given his previous statements about “comfort women”. Despite the severity of the grievance, Park and Abe expressed their intentions to move beyond this conflict.\textsuperscript{14} Before the deal, Abe had addressed “comfort women” through the 70th Anniversary Statement, which marked 70 years after the end of the Second World War. He claimed:

> We [the Japanese people] will engrave in our hearts the past, when the dignity and honour of many women were severely injured during wars in the 20th century. Upon this reflection, Japan wishes to be a country always at the side of such women’s injured hearts. Japan will lead the world in making the 21st century an era in which women’s human rights are not infringed upon.\textsuperscript{15}

As well, he stated that “We must never forget that there were women behind the battlefields whose honour and dignity were severely injured”.\textsuperscript{16} Despite progress on settlement between both nations, it is important to note that some surviving “comfort women” still reject the deal, viewing the agreement as an effort to silence their voices, as

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
it was agreed upon without any suggestions or input from the actual “comfort women”. Also, others still perceive the deal as an insufficient apology.

The deal regained attention in late 2017, with the election of current President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, who had been openly critical of the “comfort women” deal as negotiated by Park. He acknowledged that “…the majority of the country’s public [did] not approve of the comfort women agreement sentimentally”, which caused speculation that he would want to renegotiate with Abe’s government over the deal. In response, on December 27, 2017, the Japanese government reaffirmed the 2015 deal as “…a ‘final and irreversible’ agreement” and that any change to the agreement will cause “…the Japan-ROK relationship [to] become unmanageable…”. Facing these tensions, on January 9, South Korea officially announced that they will stand by the agreement.

---


18 Ibid.


While Japan has reached an agreement with South Korea over “comfort women”, Japan remains in contention with China over another historical debate. Primarily, the memory of the Nanjing Massacre, Imperial Japan’s invasion of Nanjing in late 1937, remains a point of heated debate. While the current Chinese government and media refer to the number of 300,000 casualties, Abe’s government persists that the severity of the massacre is difficult to determine. The goal of this thesis is to propose why Japan and South Korea have been able to reach a generally amicable resolution, whereas Abe does not appear to be as willing to modify his stance on the Nanjing Massacre.

Literary and Theory Review

Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power will be the key source utilized to provide the theoretical background in interpreting Abe’s historical narrative. To support the use of his theory, the nature of the theory will be first be expanded upon. In his article, “The Information Revolution and Soft Power”, Nye outlines how he conceives power is wielded in the current age of globalization:

Power over information is much more widely distributed today than even a few decades ago. Information can often provide a key power resource, and more people have access to more information than ever before. As I describe in The Future of Power, this has lead to a diffusion of power away from governments to non-state actors ranging from large corporations to non-profit to informal ad hoc groups. This does not mean the end of the nation-state. Governments will remain the most powerful actors on the global stage, but the stage will become more crowded. And many of those other actors will compete effectively in the realm of

soft power. The increasingly important cyber domain provides a good example. A powerful navy is important in controlling sea lanes; it does not provide much help on the internet. The historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote that in 19th century Europe, the mark of a great power was the ability to prevail in war, but as John Arquilla notes, in today’s global information age, victory may sometimes depend not on whose army wins, but on whose story wins.²⁴

This quote is critical to explain why analysis beyond governmental sources is essential, as power has shifted from the nation on the international stage. In the current environment, information delivered by key actors such as think tanks play a vital role in shaping a nation’s image and “story”. As according to Nye, beyond the use of military coercion, “…the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.)”²⁵

Assuming Nye’s theory, Abe’s modification of his historical perspective can be perceived as a method of soft power, as Japan benefits from an improved image of its own culture, political values, and foreign policy. On the other hand, China is also using this approach, by competing with the U.S. to improve its national image.²⁶ As a result, Japan’s image as a country that abides by global norms, one that does not deny responsibility for past war crimes, significantly enhances its reception on the international

---

²⁵ Ibid, 21.
²⁶ Ibid, 22.
stage. In reaction to the “comfort women” deal, the U.S. applauded both Japan and South Korea “…for having the courage and vision to forge a lasting settlement to this difficult issue”.27 This is one key explanation of why Abe has shifted his stance on “comfort women”.

Another source of pressure is applied by the U.S., a key ally of Japan. According to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Commonwealth, the U.S. failure in the “war on terror”, the unsuccessful invasion of Iraq in 2003, was “…the defeat of its military strategy and the collapse of its moral and political authority”.28 This resulted in a realization that it “…can no longer function as a paradigm for the promotion of rights and law, freedom, and democracy”.29

More on this development, Nye discusses in an article titled “US Power and Strategy after Iraq”, how the U.S. is unable “…to resolve conflicts that are internal to other societies and to monitor and control transnational developments that threaten Americans at home”.30 Instead, it “…must [now] mobilize international coalitions to address these shared threats and challenges”, which helps to describe Japan’s role in the

---

29 Ibid.
U.S.-Japan alliance. From a systematic perspective, Japan is expected to abide by international norms as a member of the trilateral alliance with the U.S. and South Korea. In the face of China’s rise and North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, the U.S. requires Japan to resolve its historical disputes with South Korea to enhance regional stability.

According to Nye, in his article called “Only China can Contain China”, it is essential to mention that this strategy is unlike containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This is the case as China is the U.S.’ primary goods trading partner. Containment was the “…long-term, patient but firm and vigilant [prevention] of Russian expansive tendencies…” Nye argues that the U.S. “…can reinforce the natural balancing reactions of regional states and help to shape the environment in a way that encourages responsible Chinese behaviour.” Facing China’s rise is not simply about containing China’s military. In the 21st century, power involves seeing “…who has more high-quality friends” around the world.

The global system in which this function of power is occurring within can be perceived as “Empire”, as termed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri:

31 Ibid, 73.
33 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
We describe the emerging Empire, drawing somewhat ironically on Polybius’ eulogy to ancient Rome, as having a mixed constitution defined by a pyramidal structure, combining a single monarch, a limited aristocracy, and a broader (pseudo-) democratic base. Joseph Nye presents the same pyramidal image of mixed Empire with a more modern analogy. “The agenda of world politics has become like a three-dimensional chess game…” “In which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally. On the top board of classical interstate military issues, the U.S. is likely to remain the only superpower for years to come, and it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony. However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is already multipolar. The U.S. cannot obtain the outcomes it wants on trade, antitrust, or financial regulation issues without the agreement of the European Union (EU), Japan, and others. It makes little sense to call this distribution ‘American hegemony’.

It is essential to emphasize that “Empire” not does equal to an American empire. Instead, it should be conceived as the operation of an array of nations and non-governmental organizations. At the top of this “pyramid of power” is the “superpower” of the U.S., and on the second level, there are nation-states, multinational corporations, the United Nations, think tanks and humanitarian organizations. The U.S. remains the global leader, but now it requires the cooperation of different actors, including Japan. As a result, this is why the U.S. places pressures on Japan to help enforce global order. “Empire” is not necessarily concerned with historical conflicts in the Asia-Pacific, but they become a point of focus when they affect the established order in the region.

---

38 Ibid.
This development increases the range of these pressures, as influence can now originate from non-traditional actors such as think tanks and the media. In relation to Abe’s historical account, one key source that demonstrates this shift of power away from nations is a think tank named the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). CSIS’ Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye wrote three reports on the U.S.-Japan alliance under the aforementioned context, promptly called the Armitage-Nye reports.

The CSIS is a bipartisan international policy institution, whose mission is “...dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity.” It has associations with the American government, as it “...is regularly called upon by [U.S.] Congress, the executive branch, and the media to explain the day’s events and offer bipartisan recommendations to improve U.S. strategy”. As established on CSIS’ website, along with government and foundation partners, “...fresh ideas and novel solutions are generated, all of which contribute effectively to the common good”. It thereby claims to hold authority in establishing U.S. foreign policy in the name of “global stability”.

It is important to consider that in all three of the Armitage-Nye reports from 2000, 2007 and 2012, the authors contend that these documents are not necessarily the opinions of any government agency. But upon examination of the individuals involved

---

39 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
in the compilation of the reports, the overall theme is the assertion of U.S.-led values in the Asia Pacific. The *New York Times* conducted an investigative study on foreign countries buying influence into organizations like CSIS. Think tanks are incentivized to provide recommendations and information beneficial to foreign governments and corporations who provide funding. This potential overlapping of interests between governments, corporations, and research institutes brings CSIS’ assertion of objectivity into question; one which claims to provide a “neutral platform” and “unbiased information” for members of the public and private sectors to converse and negotiate freely. Overall, the list of donors supporting CSIS’ function involves many actors with global connections, which include different governments, large corporations, universities, and organizations.

Firstly, Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye are important individuals who have links to both the U.S. government and CSIS. Joseph Nye “…served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, as chair of the National Intelligence Council, and as deputy undersecretary of state.” On a similar note, Richard Armitage also

---

45 Ibid.
“...served as deputy secretary of state, and was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on March 23, 2001.” As well, many of the study group participants for the Armitage-Nye reports are from Richard Armitage’s own company, Armitage International.

Furthermore, large corporations such as the Carnegie Corporation of New York have donated in excess of $500,000 to aid CSIS’ research. CSIS is supported by transnational corporations like Boeing, the Lockheed Martin Corporation, the Bank of America, and the Chevron Corporation. Trustee donors include influential individuals such as Kazuo Inamori, Japan Airlines’ former chairman, along with other CEOs of large corporations, including the Coca-Cola company, AIG, and Boeing. Governments that make donations involve nations like the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy and the European Union. But most importantly, two of the three largest donors are the Japanese and U.S. governments, who happen to be the two main countries the Armitage-Nye reports are addressed towards.

50 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
Overall, CSIS’ mission in “chartering a better world” is aligned with U.S. strategies of spreading global ethics of freedom and equality. Based on these revelations, the think tank has a global web of relations, including various governments, large organizations and prominent individuals, that help to fund its research and function. This is significant as although CSIS claims it provides neutral opinions, the support behind the organization may suggest otherwise.

In specific relation to Abe’s perspective on “comfort women”, the Armitage-Nye reports serve as a method of “imperial intervention”, as they place pressures on Abe to modify his historical account for the benefit of U.S.-led stability in the Asia-Pacific. It is essential for Japan and South Korea to resolve their regional dispute over “comfort women”, as it would assist the U.S. to function effectively as the leader of global governance in the Asia-Pacific. Hardt and Negri argue that the U.S. has been “…pretending to put forward a project of universal citizenship and toward this end intensifying the effectiveness of its intervention…” by “…dissolving identity and history…”.

---

59 Ibid, 34.
Overall, this opening chapter has attempted to define the conflict over Abe’s historical narrative as a use of Joseph Nye’s soft power. Abe is urged by the U.S. to comply with global norms of “rule of law” and democracy. By taking steps towards reconciliation with South Korea, Abe is utilizing soft power to enhance Japan’s image and power on the international stage. However, Abe has not made similar changes in his perspective on the Nanjing Massacre, although the event is also a historical grievance. Ultimately, he does not face similar pressure to modify his stance on the massacre. This is because China has been a force that the international community has to contend with, as China challenges the U.S.’ influence in the Asia Pacific both in the military and economy. Since power has shifted away from the state, this pressure now originates from sources like CSIS and media. The way it influences Abe’s historical account with both Japan and China, as in the Armitage-Nye reports, will be discussed in depth in the next chapters.

Chapter Summaries

The second chapter of this thesis will discuss Japan’s debate with South Korea on the “comfort women” issue. Abe’s stance on the debate will be traced from his first term as Prime Minister of Japan, up to the December 2015 agreement with South Korea. The second and third Armitage-Nye reports from CSIS will be analyzed as a source of pressure that has faced Abe in the shaping of his historical account. Different media sources including the New York Times, Nikkei, and Asahi Shimbun will be utilized to depict how
Abe’s account is challenged on different levels. This chapter will find that many of the suggestions from the Armitage-Nye reports can be located in these newspaper sources. This fact will suggest a link in function between these two different sectors. Abe’s gradual change and eventual deal in 2015 with South Korea will be framed as a reaction to these pressures as a method of “soft power”.

In the third chapter, the Armitage-Nye reports and media commentary will once again be examined to view how the “Rise of China” is perceived as an international concern for the U.S.-Japan alliance. China’s One Belt, One Road initiative (OBOR), along with China’s activity in the South China Sea, will then be discussed as evidence for this theme regarding China’s behaviour. The discussion will then shift towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and how it is seen as an alternative to China’s OBOR. Statements by influential individuals such as George W. Bush’s previous military advisors, Hillary Clinton, and Abe will be cited as evidence. It will be theorized that there is an underlying connection between these individuals, media, and think tanks like CSIS, who view China’s rise as a force facing the U.S.

In the fourth chapter, the analysis will shift to Japan’s debate with China over the Nanjing Massacre. Both China and Japan’s position on the massacre will be outlined. To support China’s position, evidence will include Xi’s official statements and articles from Chinese media that is critical of Abe’s position. For Japan’s opinion, sources will consist of statements by Abe and individuals who have links to the Prime Minister, including
Naoki Hyakuta, Nariaki Nakayama, Toru Toida, and Toshio Motoya. This chapter will detail the controversy about the Yasukuni Shrine, “Documents of Nanjing”, and Toshio Motoya’s book, *Theoretical Modern History II - The Real History of Japan*. It will be found that Abe’s perspective on the massacre is based on differing international pressures.
Chapter Two

Japan and South Korea: “Comfort Women”

The goal of this chapter is to elaborate on forces that Japan is faced with in the construction of its historical narrative with South Korea. Specifically, these demands will be identified to help explain how they shape Shinzo Abe’s perspective on the “comfort women” debate. Although the majority of “comfort women” were Korean, many others were from neighbouring countries including China, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines.\(^{60}\) The international system has often criticized Abe’s attitude and statements on “comfort women”; ones that South Korea perceive as distortions of Japan’s wartime past.\(^{61}\) As China’s rapid growth and North Korea’s nuclear program are causing apprehension, Japan and South Korea’s cooperation, as two of the U.S.’ primary allies, is perceived as vital in facing this development. However, strained bilateral relations over the “comfort women” issue have been detrimental to this process. In recent years, Abe had made statements about “comfort women” that have been criticized as demonstrating a lack of contrition.\(^{62}\) However, Abe eventually shifted from a critical perspective to one which allowed Japan and South Korea to agree on in December 2015.

---


\(^{62}\) Ibid.
It will be important in this chapter to locate the pressures placed on Abe to modify his opinion, to aid relations with South Korea.

This chapter will present a timeline of Abe’s stance. It will start from Abe’s first term as Prime Minister from September 6, 2006, to September 26, 2007. Next, the analysis will shift to his second term, from December 26, 2012, until the present. Key documents will include the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) Armitage-Nye Reports, and the Japanese government’s official statements. Furthermore, a range of media sources, ranging from the New York Times, Asahi Shimbun, Financial Times, and Nikkei Asian Review, will be used to examine other sources of commentary on Abe’s historical account. Ultimately, this chapter will conclude that commentary from prominent think tanks like CSIS and media sources have pressured Abe to alter his historical perspective on “comfort women” in response.

Abe’s First Term as Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe became the 57th Prime Minister of Japan on September 24, 2006. In his inaugural address, he stated:

I believe we, Japanese people, have the ability to realize a 21st century Japan, which retains the Japanese virtues, and is filled with charm and vitality. Together with the people of Japan, I will put all my body and soul in leading the challenge to create "a beautiful country, Japan," a country admired and respected by people

---

in the world, a country our children’s generation can have self-confidence and pride in.\textsuperscript{64}

Abe’s goal to reclaim Japanese honour is relevant, as some critics believe he “...seeks to restore national pride and strength” from the guilt Japanese war crimes have brought about.\textsuperscript{65} His intention to recreate “...a country admired and respected by people in the world”, supports the need to view his perspective as motivated by soft power, as a method to restore Japan’s image.\textsuperscript{66} After his inauguration, on October 9, 2006, Abe made his first visit to South Korea. In a speech, he recognized that “In the past Japan [has] caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Asian nations, and left deep scars”.\textsuperscript{67} He also claimed that he will continue to express “serious remorse”, and that this “…feeling is shared by all the people who have lived these 60 postwar years...”.\textsuperscript{68} Lastly, he acknowledged that “Both sides need to strive to overcome political difficulties related to…” their historical grievances, and that he will “…strive to build a future-oriented relationship between [both] countries”.\textsuperscript{69} These quotes displayed his initial accep-
tance of damage caused by the Imperial Japanese Army and his view that there will be difficulties in the reconciliation process.

Shortly after in February 2007, CSIS released the second Armitage-Nye report, named “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020”. The report addressed the historical debate between Japan, South Korea, and China:

The past remains an unresolved issue in the domestic politics of Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea. Over the past five years, much of the debate over history has revolved around the visits made to the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Since 2004, China had conditioned high-level bilateral interactions on the proper handling of the history issue and the ending of visits to the shrine by Japan’s leaders. Public opinion polls in Japan suggest a consensus is forming toward a democratic resolution of the issue. This is vital, as any sustainable outcome must reflect the will and support of the Japanese people. We are confident that Japan, as a democracy, has the strength to deal with its past and to shape a cooperative future with its neighbors. That future, however, must be a two-way street with regard to dealing objectively with the past.70

The report urged Japan to demonstrate responsibility for its past transgressions. By stating that it must be a “two-way street” and done in an “objective manner”, it implicitly criticized Japan for not doing so already. As well, the writers were cognizant that historical tensions remained, as this thesis argues. In clarifying the motive of the report for the U.S.-Japan alliance, Armitage and Nye noted:

Getting Asia right in this regard does not mean the imposition of U.S. values on the region, but rather encouraging an environment in which the region’s leaders define their own national success in terms that are consonant with U.S. political

and economic objectives. That means economic prosperity based on market principles, free and open trade, and protection of intellectual property rights, labor rights, and the environment. It means greater political freedom with liberal institutions to reinforce the economic successes the region now enjoys. It means transparency in the military field and greater application of national assets to the common good in areas of humanitarian relief and reconstruction. It means a region where the major powers cooperate to focus on transnational threats such as avian influenza or terrorism. It means a region where leaders choose to address the internal and external problems arising from troubled states, like Burma, rather than turning a blind eye based on an outdated concept of “noninterference in internal affairs.” It means a region where nationalism and patriotism are channeled into efforts to solve regional problems for the greater common good.71

This quote is essential as it enforces the notion that the U.S. cannot establish regional stability alone. Therefore, Japan’s cooperation, due to its compliance in protecting international norms, is labeled as vital for the international system and “common good”.72

As the report came after Abe’s election, it can be understood as an address to Abe’s administration. Despite the call for Japan to deal “…objectively with the past”, Abe declared his most controversial stance on “comfort women” after this report.73

One month following the release of the second Armitage-Nye Report, on March 5, 2007, Abe claimed that” There was no evidence to prove there was coercion as initially suggested. That largely changes what constitutes the definition of coercion, and we have to take it from there…”.74 Through this quote, he insinuated that “comfort

71 Ibid, 1.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid, 13.
women” were not forced into prostitution.\textsuperscript{75} This deviated from the previous stance by Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time, Yohei Kono, on August 4, 1993.\textsuperscript{76} Kono had “…acknowledged the involvement of Imperial Japanese Army in the establishment of ‘comfort women’ stations”.\textsuperscript{77} He found that the “…recruitment, transfer, control, etc., [of “comfort women”] were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.”\textsuperscript{78} Kono further expressed his apologies:

The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment. We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.\textsuperscript{79}

Abe’s departure from the Kono Statement therefore caused a backlash from neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{80} Then South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun proclaimed that “...no

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{75} Ibid.
\bibitem{76} Ibid.
\bibitem{79} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
matter how hard the Japanese try to cover the whole sky with their hand, there is no way that the international community would condone the atrocities committed during Japanese colonial rule.”81 To South Korea, this statement again demonstrated Abe’s lack of remorse.82 Facing such widespread criticism, on March 26, 2007, Abe indicated he would like to “…apologize for the situation [“comfort women”] found themselves in”.83 In a joint press conference with President George W. Bush on April 27, 2007, Abe clarified his previous statements:

I, as Prime Minister of Japan, expressed my apologies, and also expressed my apologies for the fact that they were placed in that sort of circumstance. The 20th century was a century that human rights were violated in many parts of the world. So we have to make the 21st century a century -- a wonderful century in which no human rights are violated. And I, myself, and Japan wish to make significant contributions to that end.84

Abe appears to have suggested that similar wartime crimes had occurred at the time, and therefore, there should not be specific attention placed on Japan’s need to apologize. This view was contradicted when, on July 30, 2007, the U.S. House of Representa-

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
tives passed a resolution demanding a complete apology from Abe.\textsuperscript{85} In Congress, Tom Lantos declared:

\begin{quote}
I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 121) expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Force's coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as "comfort women", during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II, as amended.\textsuperscript{86}
\end{quote}

When questioned about Lantos' statement, Abe conceded that it was "regrettable" and cited how previous cabinets have expressed apologies beforehand.\textsuperscript{87} Shortly, after in September 2007, he resigned as Prime Minister, marking an end to his initial tenure.\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{Abe's Second Term as Prime Minister}

From February 2011 to August 2012, a series of events occurred which would have lasting effects on the nation. In February 2011, China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy, which signalled China’s monumental rise on a global scale. In March 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants erupted and in August 2012, the Dokdo or Takeshima Island disputes heightened with South Korea, which exacer-


\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.


bated damage to bilateral ties.\textsuperscript{89} Amidst this unrest, on December 2012, Abe was again elected as Prime Minister. A few months later in August 2012, CSIS released the third Armitage-Nye report, which recommended that Japan and the U.S. need each other to be a “strong and active partner” in the Asia-Pacific.\textsuperscript{90} It further argued that “For Japan to remain standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S., she will need to move forward with us”.\textsuperscript{91} “Us” in this case can refer to the U.S., but it is also all of the nations, organizations, and leading individuals who act in collaboration to maintain regional order. Despite this “mutually benefiting relationship”, the tone was hierarchical since Japan was the nation that needed to comply with the demands of the U.S., as the international leader.

The report labeled North Korea’s nuclear proliferation and China’s rise as two key developments that can affect this regional order. To contend with these forces, Armitage and Nye urged Japan to redefine its role, as an extension of U.S. power.\textsuperscript{92} It then emphasized the importance of amicable relations between Japan, South Korea, and the U.S., who share “…common values and strategic interests”.\textsuperscript{93} Consequently, this notion


\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, 2.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, 7.
detached the alliance from nations which may not practice the same norms, like China and North Korea. In a specific discussion of the historical debate, the report asserted:

For the alliance to realize its full potential, it is essential for Japan to confront the historical issues that continue to complicate relations with ROK (Republic of Korea). While we [from the perspective of the U.S.] understand the complex emotional and domestic-political dynamics of such issues, political acts like the recent ROK Supreme Court decision allowing individual reparation cases to be heard, or efforts by the government of Japan to lobby local U.S. officials not to erect comfort women monuments, only inflame sentiments and distract South Korean and Japanese leaders and their respective publics from the broader strategic priorities they share and must act upon.\(^\text{94}\)

The authors clarified the urgency for Abe to refrain from antagonizing South Korea over “comfort women”. They explained that although both nations hold this “historical animosity”, “The two democracies will not go to war over these issues, given the economic, political, and security equities both have in the relationship.”\(^\text{95}\) Instead, they proposed that North Korea and China lead to greater strategic problems.\(^\text{96}\) This is clear evidence of a demand for Abe to modify his historical perspective. Notably, Japan’s historical debate with China was not mentioned in a direct manner.

Despite these pressures, Abe sent an offering to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in October 2014. This caused much fervour in South Korea, who views offerings


\(^{95}\) Ibid.

\(^{96}\) Ibid.
to the shrine as “…a reminder of Japan’s 20th century aggression”. Although he did not visit the shrine himself, his offering was again perceived as a lack of respect for the victims. South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested that “Japan should move forward to a bright future based on serious reflection on the past, not locking itself in the dark past.” Abe answered that he had no intention of causing any discord and that he only wanted to reaffirm his attention to never allow such war crimes to happen again. In reaction to Abe’s visit, Chuck Hagel, U.S. Defense Secretary at the time, “…underscored the importance of Japan taking steps to improve relations with its neighbours, and to promote cooperation in advancing the shared goals of regional peace and stability”. Hagel’s statement draws parallels to the strategies proposed in the second and third Armitage-Nye reports, which argue Japan should focus more towards security issues.

Some Japanese politicians, such as Taro Yamamoto, observe how the Japanese government has acted in accordance with many of the Armitage and Nye reports’ rec-

---


99 Ibid.

Yamamoto noted that the Japanese government had adhered to suggestions to restart nuclear power plants, participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, and to implement national security bills. However, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani retorted that it was merely a coincidence. Such criticisms suggest that the CSIS reports may exert more influence than they appear on the surface.

Amongst this criticism, Abe responded to the Armitage-Nye reports in a visit to CSIS on February 22, 2013. In his speech, titled “Japan is Back”, he insisted that Japan will not deviate from its role as a “tier-one nation”, which corresponds directly to the third Armitage-Nye report’s questioning of Japan’s role as a leading nation. The authors had warned that if Japan had the desire to maintain its “tier-one” status, it would "...depend on Japan being a full partner on the world stage where she has much to contribute". Furthermore, in apparent response to this question, Abe confirmed that Japan must fulfill its role as “...an effective ally and partner to the U.S. and other democracies...” He proposed that Japan needs to be a stronger nation in both its mili-

---

102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 “'Japan is Back,' Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, February 22, 2013, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201302/22speech_e.html.
tary and economy to support the U.S.-Japan alliance. Overall, Abe’s proclamations in his speech at CSIS is aligned with recommendations made in the third Armitage-Nye report. However, as he had not resolved the “comfort women” issue with South Korea, he had yet to comply with that demand.

**Election of Park Geun-hye and Further Controversy**

On February 25, 2013, Park Geun-hye assumed office as the first female President of South Korea, during this time of frosty relations between South Korea and Japan. Park initially refused to meet with Abe, asserting the need for both nations to first resolve their historical issues. This time represented a freeze in bilateral relations, which would last until 2015. Despite Abe’s pledge that Japan would comply as “…an effective ally and partner to the U.S and other democracies…”, more controversy would ensue through a series of events. On May 13, 2013, former Osaka mayor, Toru Hashimoto, caused controversy when he stated that “comfort women” “…were necessary at the time to maintain discipline in the army…”. Later that year on December 26, 2013, Abe himself caused an uproar in South Korea and China when he visited the Yasukuni

---

107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
Shrine. This was Abe’s first visit to the shrine, while serving as the Prime Minister of Japan. Although he maintained that he did not have a malicious intent, he was predictably condemned for a lack of sensitivity.

One month after Abe’s visit, Katsuhito Momii, the chairman of Japan’s largest broadcasting organization named the Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK), made controversial remarks about “comfort women”. Like Hashimoto, he justified the use of “comfort women” as a common wartime practice, and said that ”...such women could be found in any nation that was at war, including France and Germany”. Momii’s statement was especially controversial, as NHK had been criticized for its image as the “Abe Channel,” through its insistence on “political neutrality”. According to Ellis Krauss, professor of international relations at the University of California, San Diego, NHK’s ”political neutrality” causes it to not criticize the government, which in contrast ”...adds up to a cautious, noninterpretive indirect bias toward the government”. Momii perpetuated this opinion when he declared that it would be in NHK’s best interest to not go against the

---


111 Ibid.


113 Ibid.


Japanese government’s intentions.\textsuperscript{116} He stated that “It would not do for us to say ‘left’ when the government is saying ‘right’.”\textsuperscript{117}

These events, in general, further deteriorated the South Korea-Japan relationship. However, U.S. President at the time, Barack Obama, attempted “…to thaw chilly relations between two of Washington’s closest Asian allies”.\textsuperscript{118} On March 25, 2014, Obama held a trilateral meeting with Park and Abe in The Hague, famed home to many international negotiations and tribunals.\textsuperscript{119} At the meeting, Obama shifted focus onto North Korea’s nuclear program and how “…trilateral cooperation has sent a strong signal to Pyongyang that its provocations and threats will be met with a unified response”.\textsuperscript{120} The priority towards a cooperative effort versus North Korea represented an opportunity for Obama to increase dialogue between Abe and Park.\textsuperscript{121} This meeting demonstrated the U.S.’ interest in Japan and South Korea to better relations. Abe later addressed the “comfort women” issue on March 26, 2015:

On the question of comfort women, when my thought goes to these people, who have been victimized by human trafficking and gone through immeasurable pain and suffering beyond description, my heart aches. And on this point, my thought has not changed at all from previous prime ministers. Hitherto in history, many wars have

\textsuperscript{116} Jonathan Soble, “Abe’s interference blurs the picture at Japan’s NHK broadcaster,” \textit{Financial Times}, February 4, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/33e00cbe-8d72-11e3-9dbb-00144feab7de.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
been waged. In this context, women’s human rights were violated. My hope is that the 21st century will be the first century where there will be no violation of human rights, and to that end, Japan would like to do our outmost.122

In the interview, Abe essentially acknowledged “comfort women” as “human trafficking”. This represented a grand development from his previous view that there was a lack of evidence for “comfort women”, during his first term as Prime Minister.123 On his apparent changing stance, on April 29, 2015, Abe made a speech at Capitol Hill in a joint-session with U.S. Congress.124 Alluding to “comfort women”, he established that “Armed conflicts have always made women suffer the most” and that “In our age, we must realize the kind of world where finally women are free from human rights abuses”.125

Abe was expected to address the “comfort women” issue in the 70th Anniversary Statement on August 20, 2015. This was a golden opportunity, under heavy scrutiny from neighbouring countries, for Abe to clarify his view on the issue. Speaking about “comfort women”, he affirmed:


124 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “‘Toward an Alliance of Hope’ - Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, April 29, 2015, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201504/uscongress.html.

125 Ibid.
We will engrave in our hearts the past, when the dignity and honour of many women were severely injured during wars in the 20th century. Upon this reflection, Japan wishes to be a country always at the side of such women’s injured hearts. Japan will lead the world in making the 21st century an era in which women’s human rights are not infringed upon.  

Abe acknowledged the damage caused to “comfort women”, which alluded to his increased acknowledgement of Japanese responsibility for their suffering. On Japan’s role as an international actor, he reiterated:

“We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan ended up becoming a challenger to the international order. Upon this reflection, Japan will firmly uphold basic values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights as unyielding values and, by working hand in hand with countries that share such values, hoist the flag of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world more than ever before.”

Although he stopped short of an outright apology, Abe confirmed his adherence to global norms and values. Observing the 70th Anniversary Statement, compliance to the “common values” mentioned in the 2007 and 2012 Armitage-Nye Reports are explicit.

Shortly later that year on November 2, 2015, South Korea and Japan resumed bilateral talks after three and a half years of frozen relations. And on December 29, 2015,

127 Ibid.
Abe and Park reached a monumental agreement over “comfort women”. Yukari Easton, a writer for the Diplomat, noted the three main stipulations of the deal:

First, Japan would sincerely apologize for its wartime conduct relating to the comfort women. Second, Japan would pay ¥1 billion to a foundation to be established by South Korea to benefit former comfort women. And third, South Korea would strive to resolve the issue of a comfort women statue erected in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.

Some critics insist that “…the opinions of former ‘comfort women’ were not ‘sufficiently reflected’ in the negotiation process…”. The realization of this deal has specifically faced obstacles as it was arranged by the previous Prime Minister of South Korea, Park Geun-hye, who has since been impeached. However, Abe has maintained that the agreement is “final and irreversible” and that “It is a promise between the two countries…”. In light of the ongoing controversy surrounding the deal, its completion nevertheless marks a great change from Abe’s previous opinion on the issue.

---


132 Ibid.

Media Commentary on Abe’s Historical Account

With the above timeline established, discussion will now shift towards another source of influence that may have pressured Abe’s shift in opinion. One main area in which this commentary can be found is in the form of media, which can readily shape the opinions of individuals in the present international system. Media is a worthwhile source to analyze, as there is also often a connection between media and think tanks the creation of narratives. Importantly, CSIS has connections and joint symposiums with the Nikkei, Japan’s largest newspaper organization. As well, opinion articles by Joseph Nye are found in publications such as the New York Times and the Huffington Post.134 Such relationships point to a connection between the media and think tanks.

Between 2013 and 2016, harsh criticisms of Abe’s policies can be observed in newspaper sources, such as through New York Times’ Editorial Board. These opinions represent influence that has shifted away from the governmental level. In an article titled “Opportunity and Risk in Japan”, from July 2013, the authors criticized Abe’s “…disturbingly right-wing foreign-policy views, which include a nationalistic revision of World War II history, overheated rhetoric toward China and attempts to rewrite Japan’s Constitution to permit more assertive military actions.”135 Furthermore, “To

---


keep commerce going with China, Japan’s most important Asian trading partner, Mr. Abe has to stop rubbing raw the wounds of World War II.”  

This article provided a judgement on Abe’s historical stance, and painted it in one perspective through expressions like “nationalistic revision” and “rubbing raw wounds”.

In another article from March 2014 titled, "Mr. Abe’s Dangerous Revisionism", the Editorial Board of the New York Times explicitly criticized Abe’s historical stance, labeling it as "...an ever more serious threat...” to the U.S.-Japan alliance’s stability. It further alleged that Abe "...whitewashes the history of the [Second World] war” and that this "...is a dangerous provocation for the region...". By claiming that Abe is “oblivious” to the interests of the U.S., the article draws comparisons to the Armitage-Nye reports’ questioning of Japan’s status as a responsible and “tier-one nation”. Like the previous article, through the use of wording such as “whitewash”, “provocation”, and “serious threat”, the authors depicted a one-sided image of Abe’s historical account.

In December 2014, another article, titled “Whitewashing History in Japan”, argued that “Right-wing political forces in Japan, encouraged by the government of Prime

---

136 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
Minister Shinzo Abe, are waging a ‘campaign of intimidation’ to deny the disgraceful chapter in World War II when the Japanese military forced thousands of women to serve in wartime brothels.”

It concluded that “This is where the “historical truth” stands, despite [Abe’s] revisionist scheming.”

As the article claimed one truth, it again only portrayed Abe from one perspective, as a leader who lacks remorse through his apparent “historical revisionism”.

Moreover, in an article named “The Comfort Women and Japan’s War on Truth”, from November 2014, Mindy Kotler wrote:

> The U.S., in particular, has a responsibility to remind Japan, its ally, that human rights and women’s rights are pillars of American foreign policy. If we [the U.S.] do not speak out, we will be complicit not only in Japanese denialism but also in undermining today’s international efforts to end war crimes involving sexual violence.

She hoped for the United Nations Security Council to "...make clear their objection to Abe government’s perverse denial of the historical record of human trafficking and sexual servitude". Kotler’s article provides more evidence on how Abe’s stance on “comfort women” was framed in a particular light. Despite providing critical opinions, the overall goal of these New York Times depict Abe’s position on “comfort women” in a dis-

---


142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.


145 Ibid.
distinct manner. Ultimately, both of these sources work in conjunction to lean on Abe’s foreign policy.

The focus will now shift to another media source, the *Nikkei Asian Review*, which in like manner, provided similar opinions on Abe’s stance. As mentioned previously, the *Nikkei* has associations with CSIS and the *Financial Times*, a newspaper group based in London. Significantly, on July 23, 2015, the *Nikkei* bought the *Financial Times* for a monumental sum of $1.3 billion, which is “…the biggest acquisition by a Japanese media organization…” ever.146 The *Nikkei* and CSIS also hold annual joint symposiums to discuss international issues.147 Such a network, as established by the *Nikkei*, CSIS, and *Financial Times*, can be perceived as a microcosm of the operation of pressures upon Abe. Observing the *Nikkei Asian Review*‘s articles on “comfort women”, it is evident that they are written in a manner that is addressed towards the Japanese government. This is comparable to the *New York Times* articles and the Armitage-Nye Reports.

In an article by Kiyoyuki Uchiyama, he detailed an interview from April 24, 2014, with Park Jin, who is *Foreign Affairs*’ former chairman. *Foreign Affairs* is published by the Council on Foreign Affairs, a think tank like CSIS that is concerned with U.S.’ issues

---


abroad. In the interview, Park examined how Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine had given South Korea a reason to protest, causing unrest. He underlined the trilateral alliance’s importance in not only “…dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions but also for maintaining a power balance with an ascendant China”. These statements mirror the messages from the second and third Armitage-Nye reports to “…try to nudge China toward acting as a responsible power” in the region.

Another Nikkei article from April 3, 2014, titled “Abe, Park still have divides to bridge”, noted Obama’s role as a mediator between Abe and Park at their first official meeting on March 25, 2015. This article recognized that “…Japan and South Korea [must] mend their strained relations as soon as possible” in order to increased cooperation. As in the Armitage-Nye reports, it concluded that “…both Abe and Park must not forget that they have security, economic and many other agendas to tackle in addition to the two countries' views on history”. Again, South Korea’s and Japan’s historical tensions was seen as an obstacle.

150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
Furthermore, an article titled “History holds Asia hostage”, from March 5, 2015, reported on a visit by Abe to Washington. The author, Brahma Chellaney, wrote that achieving reconciliation between “...the two East Asian neighbours would require Japan to more clearly and fully express regret and remorse over its militaristic past and South Korea to agree not to keep dredging up historical grievances”. He contended that both nations need to move beyond the past, and instead focus on the future. As seen in these Nikkei works, the focus is on the need for both Japan and South Korea to make initiatives to solve their “comfort women” debate. This is in contrast to the New York Times articles which place more emphasis on Abe’s “revisionist” tendencies. Such commentary can be found in another source such as the Financial Times. In an article titled “Abe’s interference blurs the picture at Japan’s NHK broadcaster”, from February 4, 2014, it questioned Abe’s connection to the media and how Abe allegedly censored parts of a “comfort women” documentary.

Although other newspaper sources like the Asahi Shimbun are not explicitly linked with think tanks, like the relationship between the Nikkei and CSIS, Asahi Shimbun articles likewise provide opinions on Abe’s historical perspective. In an editorial ar-

155 Ibid.
157 Jonathan Soble, “Abe’s interference blurs the picture at Japan’s NHK broadcaster,” Financial Times, February 4, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/33e00cbe-8d72-11e3-9dbb-00144feab7de
article titled “Moon should stay committed to cooperating with Japan, U.S.”, from June 13, 2017, it stated that it wishes “…Moon will continue to place the foundation of South Korea’s foreign relations on cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, which share the basic values of freedom and democracy”.158 This quote is significant as it again stressed the importance of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship.

Another article named “Moon should respect past joint efforts toward war reparations”, from August 18, 2017, stated that the “comfort women” conflict “…cannot be solved only through efforts by one side.”159 The author explained that handling this “thorny issue” involves “South Korea”…preventing these touchy issues from flaring up in a way that damages bilateral ties.”160 As well, it requires “…prudence and appropriate behavior by…” both Moon and Abe.161

In a third Asahi Shimbun article from April 4, 2017, titled "With envoy back in Seoul, Tokyo can lose no time in mending ties", it criticized Japan's recalling of two diplomats in response to South Korea’s installation of "comfort women" statues.162 The article also advocated for South Korea to reinforce the December 2015 “comfort women” deal and to “…build healthy, mutually beneficial relations between the two

160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
countries”.

Like the 2012 Armitage-Nye report, it underscored North Korea’s nuclear threat and how “…neither Japan nor South Korea can afford to allow their friction over history-related issues to reduce their diplomatic options”.

This theme was especially stressed before Moon’s inauguration, in an article called “Japan-S. Korea solidarity vital in unpredictable Northeast Asia”, from September 8, 2016. It mentioned how “Japan and South Korea should realize that they, as neighbours, share common interests…”, and therefore should push for the “…steady implementation of their [“comfort women”] agreement…”. It called for the U.S., Japan, and South Korea alliance to “…step up their efforts to enhance their solidarity” in the face of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. What’s more, this article labeled China’s behaviour as “unpredictable” as they have been “…acting in a way that raises concerns among neighbouring countries”. In conclusion, it recommended South Korea and Japan to “…take necessary steps to enhance bilateral cooperation” to “…confront this reality…”.

This view of China’s rise is clearly supported by the three Armitage-Nye reports.

163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
Ultimately, these *Asahi Shimbun* articles recognize that South Korea’s government plays a key role in mending bilateral ties with Japan. This is unlike the previous general narratives from primarily *New York Times*, which places more of an onus on Abe’s administration to express apologies. As a result, these *Asahi Shimbun* articles display a different point of emphasis on the “comfort women” debate between Japan and South Korea. Nevertheless, despite containing varying degrees of criticism, the fundamental goal to mend relations over “comfort women” is clearly a point of emphasis within these various newspaper sources.

**Conclusion**

The goal of this chapter was to chronicle, in depth, Abe’s perspective on “comfort women” from his first term as Prime Minister until the “comfort women” agreement on December 28, 2016 during his second term as Prime Minister. It has emphasized how the connection between different sectors, of think tanks and media, functions to provide narratives on Abe’s historical account on “comfort women”. As a result, it can be considered as a form of pressure, through the utilization of information. Abe’s stance has indeed changed to accommodate the definition of “comfort women” as human trafficking. In addition, he has confirmed Japan’s role as a country that will abide by international norms. His adaptation to pressures can be perceived as Japan’s use of soft power, through adhering to its role as a “tier-one nation”, as recommended in the third
Armitage-Nye report.\textsuperscript{170} The recommendations by CSIS’ second and third Armitage-Nye reports and media sources represent the diffusion of power from the government level. Both sectors share the theme of providing pressures on Abe to establish closer ties with South Korea due to both nations' relative importance as main allies of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. Resolving the “comfort women” debate is a key step that has been preventing this from realization. Despite varying degrees of criticism, these recommendations to reconcile are clearly found in various newspaper sources including, the \textit{New York Times}, \textit{Financial Times}, \textit{Nikkei Asian Review} and \textit{Asahi Shimbun}. The similar themes found in CSIS and media reports show the fluidity of influence in the modern age of globalization. Abe’s eventual negotiation of the “comfort women” deal with South Korea is arguably a direct reaction to these global demands.

Chapter Three

The “Rise of China”

China’s growing power in the Asia Pacific is a significant development that has been causing unrest in neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{171} As China challenges the U.S.’ influence in the region, the “rise of China” may lead to a potential clash between China and the U.S.\textsuperscript{172} This issue has led to increased pressures placed upon South Korea and Japan to resolve their differences over the “comfort women” issue; a barrier which has hampered cooperative efforts to face China’s increasing prominence. This chapter will locate and detail the perception of China’s rise as a concern in various non-governmental and media sources; which will include documents from think tanks, national media, and political figures. The controversy surrounding Abe’s historical account is affected and occurs within this political environment. This includes the conflict between China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. To outline China’s rise, this chapter will utilize materials that include the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) Armitage-Nye reports, \textit{New York Times} commentary, Wikileaks’ release of Hillary Clinton’s closed speeches, and Abe and previous U.S. military advisors’ speeches made to U.S. Congress. The “Rise of China” is one of


the main causes that has influenced Japan’s historical debates with both South Korea and China.

**The Armitage-Nye Reports and The New York Times**

Key sources that emphasize China’s role are documents from think tanks like CSIS; a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization...” dedicated to maintaining the U.S.’ standing in the Asia-Pacific. In a CSIS interview with former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Graham Allison, he proposed that in order to “cope with” China’s rise, the U.S. would benefit from increased cooperation with allied nations. He reasoned that China will be forced to “…adapt to [this] correlation of forces...” He compared China and the U.S.’ growth:

[In many areas,] China has already overtaken the U.S. So it has the fastest supercomputers. It has the largest economy in the world. Again, most people in the U.S. have missed this fact. But by the single best yardstick for comparing national economies, the yardstick that both CIA and the IMF recommend, China in 2014 came to have a larger economy than the U.S. And on the current trajectory, if it keeps growing at its rate, which is about 6 percent-plus, and we keep growing at our rate, which is about 2 percent and a little bit, by 2024 it’ll be half-again larger than we are.

These worries can also be traced in CSIS’ three Armitage-Nye reports; key documents which provide strategic recommendations for the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the first report

---

175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
from 2000, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership”, the authors acknowledged that China is facing “...momentous social and economic changes, [although] the consequences..." remain unclear. The report urged the alliance to "...encourage [China] to become a positive force in regional political and economic affairs". However, China was not the focal point of the report, despite its mention.

The following report from February 2007, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020” increased attention on this issue. Armitage and Nye continue to observe how “...factoring in the possibility of disruption, China will continue to be an engine of regional growth and global dynamism”. The report emphasized the differences in foreign policy and values between China and the international system, as led by the U.S.:

Among China’s leaders, nationalism is likely viewed as a useful tool to muster support for the Communist Party, particularly should economic growth falter. Although reliance on nationalism poses risks for the regime, Chinese leaders will likely continue to tap into nationalist sentiment to bolster their own legitimacy. This may place limitations on the quality of interactions the United States and Japan can expect with China for the foreseeable future. Also limiting the quality of interactions are differences in values. The most profound of these relate to differences over human rights, religious freedoms, and political systems. The values gap matters in the most consequential form because it gives rise to a “trust deficit.” In the case of China, there is a growing body of evi-

178 Ibid.
dence suggesting that the nexus between values and foreign policy could negatively affect U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{180}

What’s more, due to China’s escalating demand for global resources, “China’s conduct could be marked by mercantilism, with illiberal institutions, chauvinistic nationalism, and corruption that distort international norms and threaten neighbours”.\textsuperscript{181} In projection of future China-U.S. relations, the report suspected that closer relations are unlikely “…as long as the United States and China have different value systems and absent a clear understanding…” of each others’ strategic interests.\textsuperscript{182}

These excerpts from the report summarized the barrier in values depicted between China and the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance. Regarding the historical debate with China on the Yasukuni Shrine, it acknowledged that it remains an unresolved issue and how “…any sustainable outcome must reflect the will and support of the Japanese people”.\textsuperscript{183} The shrine is controversial as it memorializes Imperial Japan’s key wartime criminals, which include individuals responsible for the Nanjing Massacre and “comfort women”.\textsuperscript{184} The authors push for Japan to face its historical conflicts in an “objective

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid, 3 and 4.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid, 14.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid, 13.
manner”. It is important to note that a resolution to the Yasukuni Shrine debate would benefit relations with both China and South Korea.

China’s rise is again stressed in the third Armitage-Nye report, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia”, from August 2012. Although it discussed North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, China’s surging power was once again depicted as “...an area of growing concern”. They explained that the nation faces “...at least six demons: energy constraints, calamitous environmental degradation, daunting demographic realities, widening income inequality among people and provinces, restive ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet, and endemic official corruption”.

In order to “...promote a regional environment best suited to...” handle these dangers, it urged the U.S.-Japan alliance to “...develop capabilities and policies adaptable to China’s changing trajectory...”. Based on this assertion, China’s rise is considered to be a situation that demands attention. Both CSIS reports increasingly highlighted this narrative about China, which may have heightened due to China’s surging growth during this period of time.

This need to contend with China is also a central topic in media commentary, through sources like the New York Times. As discussed in the first chapter, the media

185 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid, 8-9.
plays a vital role in shaping narratives and therefore holds tremendous power. Charles Glaser, in a *New York Times* article from December 16, 2016, suggested that U.S. foreign policy “...must effectively deter attacks against U.S. vital interests while at the same time not [pose] a serious threat to China’s security”. Furthermore, he predicted that China’s rise may lead to conflict, which acts as a “major challenge” to the U.S.’ regional “dominance”. Another opinion article from June 6, 2017, titled “China on the Rise, While American Pulls back”, described how China’s development can cause the U.S. to resign its “...global stature, influence and participation in the economic advantages of a developing world”.

In recent years, China has consistently made territorial claims in the South China Sea, clashing with the U.S. Navy and its allied nations. On August 11, 2017, China issued a warning to a U.S. Navy destroyer which passed through a disputed region. The Chinese Foreign Ministry urged the U.S. to stop “...illegal provocations in the name of so-called freedom of navigation...”. The U.S., on the other hand, believed that Chi-

---


190 Ibid.


193 Ibid.
na was “...inflaming tensions in the South China Sea by expanding islands and reefs into military installations...”, and in the process, failed to recognize maritime laws.\textsuperscript{194}

Another \textit{New York Times} article titled ”Wooing Trump, Xi Jinping seeks Great power status for China”, from November 6, 2017, detailed Xi's meeting with current U.S. President Donald Trump. The authors expected Xi to urge a new type of relationship; “...the idea that China and the U.S. should share global leadership...” and that Xi is now on equal grounds to negotiate with Trump, as opposed to previous U.S. leaders.\textsuperscript{195} They observed how Trump has chosen to focus more on North Korea’s nuclear program, meanwhile understating China’s human rights abuses and its “...crack-down on civil society”.\textsuperscript{196}

\textbf{One Belt, One Road Initiative}

The uncertainty about China posed by the Armitage-Nye reports and \textit{New York Times} materialized in the form of Xi’s OBOR.\textsuperscript{197} China announced the plan in September 2013, after Xi became China’s President on November 15, 2012. According to Nye, OBOR is Xi’s ultimate goal “…to integrate Eurasia through a trillion dollars of invest-
ment in infrastructure stretching from China to Europe, with extensions to Southeast Asia and East Africa...” Some critics perceive this strategy as a “...non-military catalyst that accelerates the relative decline of U.S. hegemony over the Persian Gulf and engenders a more balanced distribution of geopolitical influence in...” the area. It is important to consider that a “non-military catalyst” can be understood as a method of Joseph Nye’s soft power, through China’s vision of a “peaceful rise”. This contrasts with China’s claims in the South China Sea; the military side of China’s foreign policy. Besides, OBOR provides many benefits to China’s goal to increase its global stature.

Shuaihua Cheng, Managing Director of China’s International Center, explained, in depth, the strategic advantages for China to pursue OBOR:

The circle opens diversified export markets for China. China’s traditional markets in the US and Western Europe, while big in scale, are sluggish. More importantly, in some sectors such as solar panel, machinery, or telecommunication and construction services, these traditional markets are either already saturated or riddled with protectionist trade and investment measures. Developing countries along the proposed Silk Road are far from fully tapped. China’s bilateral trade with countries along the Silk Road represent 26 percent of China’s total in the first quarter of 2015, according to Chinese Ministry of Commerce. China will have better access to energy and food, becoming less dependent on transportation routes controlled by the US military. So far, about 80 percent of China’s oil imports go through the Strait of Malacca, crowded and under the control of the US military and non-Chinese commercial entities. Going through Gwadar Deep Water Port in Pakistan will shorten by 85 percent the


distance between China and Europe, Middle East and Africa, rather than going through Malacca. Gwadar is part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, for which China has signed an investment agreement of US $46 billion, about one fifth of Pakistan’s annual GDP and 10 times US investment in Pakistan, to connect the two nations by rail, road, pipelines, and optical cables. In April, China’s state Xinhua news agency reported that the nation will invest in the Thai Canal, also known as Kra Canal, cutting through southern Thailand to save up to 48 hours to shipping companies transiting routes between Asia and Europe, a route also circumventing the Strait of Malacca.

OBOR would allow China to exert its authority in areas not controlled by the U.S. As a result, it would increase China’s influence on the world stage. Cheng further outlined the economic reasons for China to pursue OBOR:

The China Circle has a potential to be a renminbi circle, allowing China to optimize use of its foreign reserves and accelerate internationalization of the currency. China has around US$4 trillion in foreign reserves; so far more than 60 percent of the foreign reserves are used to buy US government bonds. The return on these bonds is low, with China’s foreign reserves constantly losing value due to appreciation of Chinese yuan. Instead of lending money to US government, China is investing some reserves in infrastructure and productions along the routes to gain better financial returns and build political friendship. Besides a couple of bilateral arrangements, China has also set up two major multilateral institutions, namely, the AIIB with US$100 billion initial equity, and the New Development Bank with US$50 billion equity proposed by BRICS countries, headquartered in Beijing and Shanghai respectively. China also established the Silk Road Fund, starting discussions about a financing mechanism for Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As announced in its belt-road action plan, China envisions “more capital convergence and currency integration” accompanied by lessening dependence on the US dollar. The renminbi is widely used for trade in countries including Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Thailand. By the end of 2014, offshore renminbi deposits amounted to ¥1.6 trillion and offshore renminbi bonds reached ¥350 billion – a trend supported by the belt-road initiative. Moreover, this initiative calls for establishing a renminbi-nominated Asian bond market.
Overall, the initiative is vital in China’s vision to create an autonomous zone, as “China aspires to play a larger role in East Asia...”. It is the embodiment of the “Rise of China” as it arguably “…seeks to expel the U.S. from the Western Pacific”.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership

Barack Obama presented the main alternative to OBOR as TPP, which was integral in his policy to “pivot” to Asia. Some critics, however, believe this focus on security towards Asia worsened relations with China. According to John Ford, “…the Obama administration inadvertently made the entire enterprise seem to Beijing like an effort to contain China militarily”, which “… led China to respond by becoming more aggressive…”.

In 2015, Obama declared that TPP would allow the U.S. to “…write the rules of the road in the 21st century…”, instead of ”...countries like China...”. TPP is a “…multinational trade agreement that threatened to extend restrictive intellectual prop-

202 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
erty (IP) laws across the globe and rewrite international rules on its enforcement”. 207
Like OBOR, TPP is a far-reaching deal that includes members of the world economy: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. 208 But notably, China is not a participant. Experts believe OBOR is Xi’s “grand strategy” “…to fill the vacuum left by Donald Trump’s abandonment of....” TPP. 209 During Obama’s presidency, the deal faced opposition within the U.S. from many factions and individuals like Bernie Sanders and Trump. 210 They believed the deal would allow “…corporations to shut down more factories in the U.S. and ship more jobs...” abroad, which would affect American workers. 211

In August 2016, a former top official of George W. Bush’s administration, Paul Wolfowitz, voiced his support for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. 212 He explained that he believes Trump is a “security risk”, pertaining to views on China and Russia. 213 Former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, originally declared in

209 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
2012 that “The TPP sets the gold standard in trade agreements to open free, transparent, fair trade, [for] the kind of environment that has the rule of law and a level playing field…” But on October 8, 2015, she reversed her opinion, reasoning that TPP’s negotiations had not reached a “high standard”.

A Financial Times article labeled Clinton as the “China Hawk”, as she would have adopted a “harsher stance” on China. Clinton’s insights are therefore invaluable to detail the U.S.’ view of China’s rise. In October 2016, Wikileaks released Clinton’s closed speeches made to employees of Goldman Sachs, a leading global investment bank. These speeches were opportunities for Clinton to speak freely on political and international issues. When questioned about advice for the Wall Street community, Clinton admitted ties to the banks. She replied that she “…represented all of [them] for eight years” and that she had “great relations” “…and a lot of respect for…” them.

She also believed that Wall Street’s function has “…broad consequences not just for the domestic but the global economy, so more thought…” should be given to “…the brain-

215 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
power and the financial power that exists…” there.219 These statements added to criticism that Clinton is “dependent” on Wall Street and “big interests”, as Bernie Sanders argued during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign.220 This suggests that Clinton’s political views, such as foreign policy, can be impacted by individuals of power.

In the speech, she labeled China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as the “biggest supporters” of North Korea through their “…deep connections between the military leadership…”.221 North Korea is another country that has provided challenges to the Asia-Pacific’s stability, as outlined in CSIS’ third Armitage-Nye report.222 She warned that the U.S. will “…ring China with missile defense”, if China does not “control” North Korea.223

Pertaining to conflict in the South China Sea, she said that China has “…the right to assert themselves over their apparent territory…”, areas which China believes they rightfully own.224 However, she added that the U.S. has to “…push back to create a balance…” so that the China does not “…have a chokehold on the sea lanes and also on the

219 Ibid, 25.
countries that border the South China Sea”. 225 Through this quote, Clinton confirmed her view of the U.S.’ role in contending with China’s power. She argued that if China’s claims were “legitimate”, the U.S. “…should [then] claim all of the Pacific” and “…call it the American Sea…”. 226

In another leaked speech from May 2013 at Sanford Bernstein, an investment-management firm, Clinton recognized that “…it was a good sign when Prime Minister Abe said that Japan would negotiate on the Transpacific partnership…”. 227 In fact, many recognized U.S. advisors and military individuals have voiced support for TPP. On May 15, 2015, previous military advisors of George W. Bush’s administration, including Donald Rumsfeld and Chuck Hagel, former U.S. Secretaries of Defense, co-authored a letter to the U.S. Senate. The letter outlined the urgency to implement TPP because of a “compelling strategic rationale”, besides economic benefits. 228 They voiced that it would “…encourage [other nations] to undertake political and economic reforms”, resulting in “…deeper regional economic integration, increased political cooperation, and ultimately greater stability…”. 229 Most importantly, they warned that if “…we fail to move forward with TPP, Asian economies will almost certainly develop along a Chinacentric

225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
model...”. Most significantly, they recognized that “…China is already pursuing an alternative regional free trade initiative.” This "alternative regional free trade initiative" is precisely OBOR.

Trump’s victory is the outcome of anti-“Empire” sentiment in the U.S., against the world constitution in which the U.S. now requires other nations and organizations’ contributions to reach its goals. One of his first actions as President was to withdraw the U.S. from TPP, which was “…part of [this] global backlash against the drive toward greater internationalization”. Some critics argue Trump’s decision was detrimental to the U.S., as it “…leaves other Pacific-rim countries less dependent on the U.S. for their trade and more dependent on China…” Consequently, the other countries have continued negotiations and renamed it as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Even Trump appears to be reassessing his action, as on January 25, 2018, he admitted that he would rejoin "...TPP if [the countries] were able to

---

230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
make a substantially better deal”.”236 This points to his realization that TPP is integral in contending with China’s OBOR, through creating an environment that “shapes” Chinese decisions.237 These overall views on the “rise of China” by Clinton and Bush’s previous military advisors are likewise found in the previously discussed Armitage-Nye reports and New York Times editorial articles. This finding strengthens the suggestion that these sources are part of “Empire’s” operation against China.

Toward an Alliance of Hope

Approximately two weeks prior to the letter by George W. Bush’s previous military advisors, on April 29, 2015, Abe also addressed his views to U.S. Congress. In a speech titled “Towards an Alliance of Hope”, he spoke of the U.S. and Japan’s “…mature history together…” and how they are now “…friends bonded in spirit”.238 With this relationship, he advocated the need to spread “…shared values [between Japan and the U.S.] around the world and [to] have them take root: the rule of law, democracy, and


238 “'Toward an Alliance of Hope' - Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet,” August 29, 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201504/uscongress.html.
freedom. Most importantly, he reiterated the need to conclude TPP negotiations, as previously endorsed by Hillary Clinton. Abe discussed TPP:

Prosperity was fostered first by the U.S., and second by Japan. And prosperity is nothing less than the seedbed for peace. Involving countries in Asia-Pacific whose backgrounds vary, the U.S. and Japan must take the lead. We must take the lead to build a market that is fair, dynamic, sustainable, and is also free from the arbitrary intentions of any nation. In the Pacific market, we cannot overlook sweat shops or burdens on the environment. Nor can we simply allow free riders on intellectual property. No. Instead, we can spread our shared values around the world and have them take root: the rule of law, democracy, and freedom. That is exactly what the TPP is all about. Furthermore, the TPP goes far beyond just economic benefits. It is also about our security. Long-term, its strategic value is awesome. We should never forget that. The TPP covers an area that accounts for 40 per cent of the world economy, and one third of global trade. We must turn the area into a region for lasting peace and prosperity. That is for the sake of our children and our children’s children. As for U.S. - Japan negotiations, the goal is near. Let us bring the TPP to a successful conclusion through our joint leadership.

This directly mirrors the message of the aforementioned letter by Bush’s previous military advisors. As well, he expressed similar concerns about China’s soaring presence in the region:

Involving countries in Asia-Pacific whose backgrounds vary, the U.S. and Japan must take the lead. We must take the lead to build a market that is fair, dynamic, sustainable, and is also free from the arbitrary intentions of any nation. In the Pacific market, we cannot overlook sweatshops or burdens on the environment. Nor can we simply allow free riders on intellectual property.

---

239 Ibid.
241 “‘Toward an Alliance of Hope’ - Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet,” August 29. 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201504/uscongress.html.
242 “‘Toward an Alliance of Hope’ - Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet,” August 29. 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201504/uscongress.html.
243 Ibid.
Abe is precisely speaking about China’s rise, by mentioning abuses of human rights and intellectual property. About skirmishes over Asian waters, he emphasized that territorial demands must be “…based on international law”, “…not use force or coercion…”, and settled in a peaceful manner.\textsuperscript{244} Again, this commentary about China’s activity in Asian waters is comparable to comments made by Clinton in her leaked speeches. Moreover, on the morning of Abe’s speech, Nye disclosed on Twitter that he had “…Attended [the] White House dinner for [Prime Minister] Abe last night [and that] Obama paid elegant tribute to [the] alliance.”\textsuperscript{245} Abe’s shared opinions with such influential individuals add to the view that they are more interlinked than they may appear.

\section*{Conclusion}

This chapter’s goal was to outline the underlying relationship between an array of sources that provide a similar opinion on China’s rise, as a force that needs to be faced with or at the least be wary about. CSIS’ Armitage-Nye reports, \textit{New York Times}, Clinton’s leaked speeches from Wikileaks, former military advisor’s letter and Abe’s speech to U.S. Congress all function together to provide a similar narrative. In general, China’s behaviour is perceived to be a factor facing U.S.-led regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. China’s creation of OBOR is the exact realization of this development. On

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
the other hand, TPP has been regarded as a deal which can compete with OBOR. However, Trump’s withdrawal at first appeared to have affected the deal. But in reality, negotiations with the remaining countries have continued. The TPP is expected to be signed without the U.S.’ participation. In conclusion, these conflicts over the “Rise of China” have been directed upon Japan and China’s historical debate. The next chapter will detail China and Japan’s conflict over the Nanjing Massacre, and how it is affected by forces detailed in this chapter.

---

Chapter Four

China and Japan: the Nanjing Massacre

This chapter strives to detail Japan’s grievance with China over the Nanjing Massacre and note how it has not undergone the same progress as Japan’s historical conflict with South Korea. Japan and South Korea have similarly clashed over Japan’s wartime past, about the Imperial Japanese Army’s prostitution of “comfort women” during the Second World War. However, in December 2015, Japan was able to reach an agreement with South Korea. Conversely, the Nanjing Massacre remains a conflict between Japan and China. As explained in the second chapter, Abe’s change in perspective on “comfort women” is a result of pressures from sources such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Richard Armitage-Joseph Nye reports. However, it appears that these sources have not urged Abe, in the same manner, to modify his account on the massacre and to reconcile its relationship with China. It is proposed that the perception of China’s growth as an obstacle for international stability is the primary reason for this development. This chapter will first describe the controversy surrounding the event and provide both countries’ positions on the matter. These perspectives will then be supported by official statements of Abe and Xi, various Japanese and Chinese critics, and media commentary on the Nanjing Massacre.

China’s Position

A renowned book titled, *The Rape of Nanking: the Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, provides an overview of the Chinese government’s point of view on the massacre. The author, Iris Chang, wrote that “In December 1937 Japanese troops entered the city [of Nanjing], which until shortly before the invasion had been the Chinese capital”, and “In less than two months they murdered more than 300,000 civilians and raped more than 80,000 women.” Chang’s book played a critical role in restoring the massacre into international spotlight in 1997, before she committed suicide in 2004. From interviews with remaining survivors and archival research, she detailed the massacre:

Fathers were forced to rape their daughters, and sons their mothers, as other family members watched. Not only did live burials, castration, the carving of organs and the roasting of people become routine, but more diabolical tortures were practiced, such as hanging people by their tongues on iron hooks or burying people to their waists and watching them torn apart by German shepherds. So sickening was the spectacle that even Nazis in the city were horrified.

She further believed that Japan’s “forgetting” of the massacre is equivalent to a figurative “second rape” of the victims. Despite the passage of time, the recognized

---


249 Ibid.

250 Ibid.

death-toll, as cited in *The Rape of Nanjing*, remains a heated debate between the Chinese and Japanese governments.

According to Chinese critics such as China Daily’s Zhao Luoxi, Abe’s administration attempts "...to whitewash Japan’s history of wartime aggression and atrocities". A particular point of debate between both countries has been the official death toll of the Nanjing Massacre. The Chinese government has held a consistent stance on the number of casualties, as “300,000 deaths” is engraved into granite blocks at the entrance of the Memorial Hall of the Victims for the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders. Although it often refers to this estimate, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East’s calculations from November 4, 1948, concluded that “The total number of civilians and prisoners of war ordered in Nanking and its vicinity during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation was over 200,000”. However, this number did not “…account [for] those persons whose bodies were destroyed by burning or by throwing them into the Yangtze River ...”.

To many Chinese critics, “...this figure [of 300,000] has come to symbolize the justice, legality, and authority of the postwar trials that condemned Japan as the aggressor”

---

255 Ibid.
of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{256} While for some individuals in Japan, in contrast, it symbolizes "...victor’s justice' at the postwar tribunals, where Japan was condemned as the sole aggressor".\textsuperscript{257} The symbolic meaning behind the number explains the fixation from both sides. China and Japan have continued to struggle over the massacre, which has prevented a closer relationship. Xi Jinping’s statements, as China’s President, are critical in detailing China’s official perspective.

On December 13, 2014, the Nanjing Memorial Day, Xi announced his opinion on the massacre. He made an address at the memorial:

The state ceremony for [the] Nanjing Massacre victims is held to rouse all peace-loving people to yearn for and work towards peace rather than to incite hatred. Chinese and Japanese people should keep their friendship from generation to generation, learn from history and look forward to a future where they can contribute towards peace for all mankind. After eight years’ arduous fight, the Chinese people paid a painful price with 35 million people sacrificing their lives. They have beaten the Japanese invaders with their lives and blood to win the glorious victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, and made great contributions in the World War against Fascism. History will not tolerate anyone who wants to deny the fact of the Nanjing Massacre, nor will the 300,000 Nanjing Massacre victims, the 1.3 billion Chinese people, and all the peace-loving people in the world. It was moving that our compatriots helped and supported each other during the bloody days of the massacre. Many international friends also took risks to protect Nanjing people in various ways, and recorded the brutality of the Japanese invaders. The Chinese people will remember. The Japanese army invaded Nanjing on Dec 13, 1937, and committed the atrocious crimes of the Nanjing massacre. A total of 300,000 compatriots were killed. The massacre was


\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
one of the most heinous crimes against humanity during World War II and a very black day in human history.258

The main takeaways from Xi’s account are his proclamation of 300,000 victims and his assertion that the massacre has caused trauma on China. Commentary over Abe’s stance from China’s official government website and national newspaper sources, such as Xinhua News and People’s Daily, further supports Xi’s notions. The former is the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) official press agency and the latter is China’s largest daily newspaper. Due to the CCP’s control over state media, opinions expressed within can be considered as government-endorsed.259 On February 26, Xi confirmed the media’s role in establishing political stability by articulating that: "All the work by the party’s media must reflect the party’s will, safeguard the party’s authority, and safeguard the party’s unity".260

An article on the Chinese government website from December 12, 2014, titled "Memories of blood and terror — revisiting Nanjing", described the massacre from the perspective of an 86 year old survivor, Chang Zhiqiang.261 He recalled how Nanjing was a peaceful and prosperous city before the Japanese invasion. He further proclaimed that

---

260 Ibid.
"...tens of thousands of bodies were thrown into the Yangtze River, never to be found", which backs up Xi’s claim of a larger death toll than some have calculated.\textsuperscript{262} He also recalled a Japanese soldier, who brutally bayoneted his mother and baby brother. As well, the author mentioned the story of Wu Zhenxi, whose brother was taken from college and murdered, and his aunt who committed suicide after Japanese soldiers raped her. Chang declared his desire “...to let more people know about what really happened 77 years ago, which [he believed] every generation should remember”.\textsuperscript{263} In particular, this attitude differs from Abe’s belief that future Japanese generations should not have to answer for the deceased’s war crimes, and that it is difficult to determine the massacre’s severity.\textsuperscript{264}

An important site which has contributed to this dissension is the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine which commemorates Japan’s war dead.\textsuperscript{265} Controversy involves its enshrinement of Imperial Japan’s 14 Class A war criminals, who “...cannot be removed”, according to the leaders of the shrine.\textsuperscript{266} Visitors who honour these war criminals at the shrine have added to China’s grievance with Japan, as many critics in China

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.
regard the shrine as a symbol of “Japanese militarism”. During Abe’s first term as Prime Minister, he had not visited the shrine. However, he made his first official visit in December 2013, resuming visits as the first serving Prime Minister since Junichiro Koizumi in 2006 to visit the shrine. Abe maintained that he only wanted to “...honour the spirit of the war dead who gave their lives for...” Japan and therefore, it should not be regarded as an “anti-war” gesture. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang, in reaction, protested that the visit presented “…a major political obstacle in the improvement of bilateral relations”, which “…Japan must take responsibility for...”.

The next year, Abe instead sent a ritual offering. Still, the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed how China is “…resolutely opposed to the negative tendencies which have appeared in Japan...”.

In spite of China's criticism, during the next three years, Abe would continue to send ritual offerings. In 2015, the Chinese government reacted to a

_____________________

267 Ibid.


visit by Abe’s wife, Akie Abe. Based on past criticisms, China’s Foreign Ministry voiced concern about her visit, which they argued display Japan’s lack of reflection on its "aggressive past". Abe’s reluctance to visit the shrine after 2013 can be explained by the adverse reactions that he faced from China, South Korea, and the U.S. in 2013.

A Xinhua commentary piece, titled “Time to abandon militarism, Japan” from August 16, 2017, reacted to Abe’s offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine. The author, Yang Yi, contended that Abe’s visit reminds China of "...the heartlessness and cruelty which inspired the atrocities in the first place". Yang wrote that "Though Japan spares no efforts to become a 'normal' country, as Abe often suggests, Tokyo must understand that a country built on a history of lies can never be 'normal'". A “normal country” presumably means one that has not committed war crimes. This notion supplies insight into the Chinese perspective that Japan needs to avoid actions which downplay the massacre, adding to Xi’s notion that the Chinese people will not tolerate any attitudes that deny the massacre.

---

274 Ibid.
276 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
Another Xinhua article titled “What if Nazi war criminals were worshiped in Germany?”, from August 15, 2017, compared “…Tokyo’s ambiguity on its war crimes versus the sincerity of Germany’s reflection”. The author noted how in Germany, Nazi symbols such as "...straight-arm salutes, swastikas, and any rhetoric denying its WWII war crimes and Holocaust…", are outlawed. He invited Japan to learn from Germany and maintained that "...Japan's half-hearted reflection on its past evil not only hinders it from becoming a trustful and responsible member of the international community but also affects its relations with China...". This supports the previous article’s message that Japan can not behave as a “normal country” and needs to avoid the Yasukuni Shrine.

On a similar note, in a China Daily article titled “Japan can’t buy pride by fabricating its history of war crimes”, the author Cai Hong likewise lamented Japan’s stance on the massacre. Cai noted that “...every year on August 15…”, “...right-wingers are free to march in Imperial Japanese Army uniforms at Yasukuni Shrine, where a museum presents [a] revisionist depiction of Japan's "Pacific war"...” which “...downplays Japanese aggression and war crimes.”.

---

281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
Lastly, an article from February 07, 2014, titled "Commentary: Kamikaze letters’ bid for world memory disgraces Japan itself", criticized a Japanese city’s bid to submit 300 kamikaze pilot letters to the UNESCO Memory of the World Register. The authors indicated how "All the ridiculous moves trying to cover up its crimes by Japanese rightists will no doubt result in disgracing Japan itself and twists its national image in the international community". This attempt can be considered as controversial because it contrasts with Japan’s criticism of the “Documents of Nanjing”, which will be explained later in this chapter. Nevertheless, the Chiran Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots’ curator, Mutsuo Kuwashiro, thinks the Kamikaze letters should be accepted as they provide "...an invaluable record of the horror of war".

These Chinese government and media articles illustrate China’s distaste for Japanese attitudes about the massacre. However, other media sources such as the Telegraph conclude that it is China who is instead utilizing the massacre to build state nationalism. In an article from February 26, 2015, titled "China steps up propaganda war on Japan", the author surmised that China's National Nanjing Memorial Day is a "propaganda campaign" to "...embarrass Japan on the world stage...". He quoted Rana

---

285 Ibid.
Mitter, a professor at Oxford University, who believed that Chinese authorities are convinced they are “…owed certain concessions…” “…by Japan in particular”.288 He explained that “…from the wider region’s point of view the argument that Chinese is entitled to further concessions…” “…[is not] something that is necessarily evident.”289

Another article from the Guardian, from January 13, 2017, detailed Xi’s efforts to extend the Sino-Japanese war by six years, from the conventional 1937 back to 1931.290 The author believed that China’s president is on a campaign to emphasize the CCP’s efforts to resist Japan during the Sino-Japanese War.291 The article quoted a Chinese historian, Zhang Lifan, who asserted that China is trying”...to conjure up imaginary enemies in the world”.292

A China Policy Institute article from December 15, 2014, titled "Xi Jinping’s Nanjing Massacre Commemoration and China’s Anti-Japanese Calendar”, criticized Xi’s speech at the first Nanjing Massacre Memorial. The China Policy Institute is a think tank of the University of Nottingham. To the author, Adam Cathcart, the memorial day

---

288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
represents China “...doubling down on the wartime victimization discourse”.293 He described Xi’s speech as "choreographed", "...fittingly emotive and pictorial"; which enforces China’s goal "...to embrace the national humiliation narrative".294

Moreover, a South China Morning Post article from March 5, 2014, commented on how during Xi ’s tour of Europe in 2014, he had requested official visits to Holocaust memorial sites.295 The writer, Patrick Boehler, insisted that this was “...an effort to contrast Germany’s atonement for war crimes with Japan’s ambivalent stance”.296 However, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, declined Xi because “...Germany did not want to get dragged into the dispute between China and Japan, and dislikes China constantly bringing up Germany’s painful past.”297 In summary, these articles from the Guardian, and China Policy Institute pose that China is the one evoking wartime emotions to build anti-Japanese sentiment. This is opposed to the above Chinese media sources which are more concerned with Japan’s alleged lack of contrite. With China’s position

294 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
established, the Japanese government’s position will now be discussed in the following section.

**Japan’s Position**

On the Prime Minister of Japan and his Administration’s official website, statements about the Nanjing Massacre are found in the “History Issues Q&A” section. In response to a question about Japan’s view on the massacre, three points are provided:

1. The Government of Japan believes that it cannot be denied that following the entrance of the Japanese Army into Nanjing in 1937, the killing of a large number of noncombatants, looting and other acts occurred. However, there are numerous theories as to the actual number of victims, and the Government of Japan believes it is difficult to determine which the correct number is.

2. The feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for the actions during the war have been upheld consistently by the post-war Cabinets. Such feelings were expressed in the form of the Murayama Statement on the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, and those feelings of remorse and apology were also carried forth via the Koizumi Statement issued to commemorate the 60th anniversary.

3. Such feelings of remorse and apology articulated by previous Cabinets will be upheld as unshakable, which was made clear in the Statement by the Prime Minister issued on 14 August, 2015.\(^{298}\)

Clearly, Abe’s government acknowledges that “…there were killings of noncombatants and plundering after the Japanese Army entered Nanjing in 1937”.\(^{299}\) The government


instead argues that the perception of the massacre’s severity may be inaccurate.\textsuperscript{300} As well, these points illustrate why he has been hesitant to make a clear apology because he believes previous cabinets have done so already. The government further declared that Japan “...must not let the future generations, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize”.\textsuperscript{301} They explain why reparations for the actions of the Imperial Japanese Army should not be compared to ones made by Nazi Germany post-Second World War:

The historical backgrounds of Germany and Japan differ completely, in terms of what happened during the Second World War and under what kind of postwar situation they engaged in postwar settlement. For example, Japan dealt collectively with the issue of reparations with the countries concerned in a manner that was generally accepted by the international community at the time, pursuant to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, treaties and instruments. On the other hand, the Government of Japan is aware that Germany took the approach of personal compensation as it could not deal collectively with countries concerning various issues including reparations as Japan did, since Germany was divided into East and West following the war. In this way, Japan and Germany have dealt with postwar settlement by different approaches.\textsuperscript{302}

Because China and Japan continued to dispute the massacre, the international community expected Abe to address the event on August 21, 2015, marking 70 years after the Second World War. This provided an opportunity for Abe to modify or articulate a new position on the massacre. Although Abe did not overtly mention the massacre in his speech, he addressed the damage Japan had caused:

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{302} Ibid.
Upon the innocent people did our country inflict immeasurable damage and suffering. History is harsh. What is done cannot be undone. Each and every one of them had his or her life, dream, and beloved family. When I squarely contemplate this obvious fact, even now, I find myself speechless and my heart is rent with the utmost grief. The peace we enjoy today exists only upon such precious sacrifices. And therein lies the origin of postwar Japan. We must never again repeat the devastation of war. Incident, aggression, war -- we shall never again resort to any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. We shall abandon colonial rule forever and respect the right of self-determination of all peoples throughout the world. With deep repentance for the war, Japan made that pledge. Upon it, we have created a free and democratic country, abided by the rule of law, and consistently upheld that pledge never to wage a war again. While taking silent pride in the path we have walked as a peace-loving nation for as long as seventy years, we remain determined never to deviate from this steadfast course.303

He stated that "Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war..." and that Japan has "...engraved in our hearts..." the "...suffering of the people in Asia as our neighbours...".304 As well, he re-stated that Japan will devote itself “...to the peace and prosperity of the region...”, as declared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.305 However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was critical of Abe’s statement, and protested that:

Japan should have made an explicit statement on the nature of the war of militarism and aggression and its responsibility on the wars, made sincere apology to the peo-

---

304 Ibid.
ple of victim countries, and made a clean break with the past of militarist aggression, rather than being evasive on this major issue of principle.\textsuperscript{306}

Other Chinese critics called Abe’s speech as "An impressive play of words" and was disappointed in Abe for only reiterating previous cabinets’ feelings of remorse.\textsuperscript{307}

On the other hand, the U.S. government applauded the statement, as it was “…a clear invocation of shared values, without – as some had originally feared – a watering-down of Japan’s existing apologies”.\textsuperscript{308}

As opposed to Abe himself, it has been particular Japanese scholars and politicians who have on occasions questioned the massacre’s legitimacy. In June 2007, Nariaki Nakayama and Toru Toida, members of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, disputed Chinese estimates of 300,000 casualties. They concluded that “Japan’s occupation of Nanjing was nothing more nor less than an ordinary battlefield”.\textsuperscript{309} Toida also stated that they “…are absolutely positive that there was no massacre in Nanking”.\textsuperscript{310} The group urged China to remove the sign at China’s Nanjing Memorial Hall of 300,000 victims.\textsuperscript{311}

\textsuperscript{311} Ibid.
And in February 2014, a Japanese author named Naoki Hyakuta insisted that "In 1938, Chiang Kai-shek tried to publicize Japan's responsibility for the Nanking Massacre, but the nations of the world ignored him. Why? Because it never happened.". He suggested that the U.S. military attempted to deflect attention from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings with the Nanjing Massacre. His stance, in particular, sparked criticism from Chinese critics because, in 2013, Hyakuta was allegedly “handpicked” and appointed to Japan’s Broadcasting Corporation’s board of governors. Hyakuta is perceived to be Abe’s acquaintance, which fuelled suspicions that Hyakuta was “…falling meekly into line with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's aggressively nationalist agenda…”

In late-2015, the Japanese government again stirred national controversy when Japan criticized the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO's) decision to verify the “Documents of Nanjing”. China submitted the documents and it was inscribed into UNESCO's "Memory of the World" Register, an ini-

---

314 Ibid.
tiative which reveals itself as “...a symbol of the collective memory of humanity”. The “Documents of Nanjing” stated that “...Chinese civilians were [gathered], bound with their hands behind their backs, and marched outside the walls of the city where they were killed in groups by machine gun fire and with bayonets”. They also found that “…the total number of civilians and prisoners of war murdered in Nanking and its vicinity during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation was over 200,000”, which does not include bodies destroyed by the Japanese Army. Furthermore, the report claimed that “The German Government was informed by its representative about ‘atrocities and criminal acts...’ by the Japanese Army, which “...was qualified as a ‘bestial machinery’”. Lastly, it concluded that it has “…indisputable authority and authenticity...” and that the “…Nanjing Massacre [is] a historical fact. UNESCO’s recognition of the documents, therefore, legitimized Chinese assertions about the massacre on the international level. In reaction, Japan refused to pay its annual funding of 3.85 billion yen in the apparent discontent of UNESCO’s decision. However, the Japanese gov-

319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
ernment reversed its decision eventually after their initial protest. According to a Japanese government official, if Japan did not make its obligatory payment to UNESCO, “Other member states could turn their backs on Japan...” Japan’s withdrawal of funds would damage its international perception and diminish its role in the organization as the second largest donor. Meanwhile, it would increase China’s influence because China is the third largest donor in the organization. This concern substantiates the narrative for Japan to contend with China’s rising influence, which was elaborated upon in the second chapter.

Controversy surrounding the massacre would continue into 2017. In February 2017, books written by APA Group’s president, Toshio Motoya, caused dissent on Chinese and Japanese social media. Discovered in its hotel rooms and purchasable in its lobbies, a book titled *Theoretical Modern History II - The Real History of Japan*, claims that the “…300,000 people slaughtered in Nanking as ‘falsehood’ and untruths”. Motoya is “the deputy director of an Abe support group called the “Anshin-Kai”, once again link-

---

323 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
ing Abe to such statements.\textsuperscript{328} China demonstrated its aversion to the situation when China’s National Tourism Administration urged a boycott on APA’s hotels.\textsuperscript{329} They asked Chinese tourists “...to resist APA’s wrong approach and avoid spending money at [their] hotel”.\textsuperscript{330} In response, the APA Group stated that it would not withdraw the book in the face of criticism.\textsuperscript{331} Motoya justified his book by reasoning that “...Japan constitutionally guarantees freedom of speech and no one-sided pressures could force any assertion [to be] repealed.”\textsuperscript{332} He minimized the boycott, as “...Chinese tourists only made up 5 percent of the chain’s customers in Japan...”.\textsuperscript{333} To some critics, Motoya’s attitude provides evidence that there still remain individuals in Japan who completely deny the occurrence of the massacre.\textsuperscript{334} This controversy over Motoya’s book increases the need to continue to analyze this historical grievance, as it clearly remains an ongoing dispute.

\textbf{Conclusion}


\textsuperscript{329} “China tourism body backs boycott of hotel chain APA Group,” \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, January 24, 2017, \url{http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701240057.html}.

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{333} “China tourism body backs boycott of hotel chain APA Group,” \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, January 24, 2017, \url{http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701240057.html}.

This chapter has described the state of conflict between China and Japan over the Nanjing Massacre. Abe’s perspective was shown through official governmental statements such as the 70th Anniversary Statement and visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. On the other hand, China’s view of the massacre was examined through Xi’s statements and its media. The specific goal of this chapter was to explain why Japan and China have not undergone the same reconciliation as observed from the December 2015 “comfort women” deal. Whereas South Korea is perceived to be a key ally of the trilateral alliance between Japan, South Korea, and the U.S., China’s rise is seen as a concern in the Asia-Pacific, as discussed in the third chapter. By arguably adhering to demands as outlined in the CSIS reports, Abe attempts to position Japan as a cooperative member of the international order in the Asia Pacific.335

---

Conclusion

The goal of this thesis was to analyze how Abe’s perspectives on the “comfort women” issue and the Nanjing Massacre are indications of his reactions to global demands. Utilizing Joseph Nye’s soft power, Abe’s struggle with China over the massacre is explained through pressures placed by the international environment, as led by the U.S., to face China’s meteoric rise. China’s increasing power, as evidenced by the One Belt, One Road initiative (OBOR), conflicts with the ongoing stability established by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. This is contrasted with South Korea’s alliance with the U.S. However, as the method of power in the current state of globalization has been decentralized, think tanks and media have increased power in establishing narratives and spreading information. The U.S. can no longer maintain order in the Asia-Pacific alone. Therefore, viewing China’s growth and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities as regional issues, the U.S., as in the Armitage-Nye reports and media, has stressed the need for closer ties between Japan and South Korea. On the other hand, similar pressures on Abe to reconcile with China is not a theme in these sources. While Abe reached an agreement with South Korea on “comfort women” in December 2015, Abe has not displayed the same urgency to resolve its historical dispute with China on the massacre.

This thesis’ first chapter introduced the conflict over Abe’s historical debates with South Korea and China. The theory of Joseph Nye’s soft power was then introduced to express how in the present information age, power is not only about military strength.
Instead, it is about power over information, which is the struggle over historical narrative in the case of this thesis. The concept of “Empire” was explained to show how this power has been diffused from the state to think tanks, media, and non-governmental organizations. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was examined as an illustration of this development, due to the relations and funding it receives from influential corporations, individuals, and nations. Therefore, CSIS’ Armitage-Nye reports were chosen as key sources for this thesis.

The second chapter focused on the “comfort women” debate between South Korea and Japan. Abe’s perspective was traced from his first term as President to his second term in 2018. It was observed that Abe has altered his view as shown by his readiness to negotiate the 2015 “comfort women” deal. This changed from his statement in 2007 that there was insufficient evidence for the “coercion of ‘comfort women’”\(^{336}\). CSIS’ second and third Armitage-Nye reports were first analyzed to illustrate this change. Next, various newspapers sources, which include the *New York Times*, the *Nikkei*, and *Asahi Shimbun*, were utilized to reveal an overall narrative of Abe’s historical perspective on “comfort women”. It was surmised that parallel themes found in the Armitage-Nye reports and media commentary acted in conjunction to demand Abe’s shift his

opinion on “comfort women”. This was perceived as a utilization of Nye’s soft power, as the “comfort women” deal benefits Japan’s image on the international stage.

The third chapter expanded on the theme of the “Rise of China”. It was discovered that in the same sources of CSIS’ Armitage-Nye reports and New York Times commentary, China’s growth is depicted as an international concern. Furthermore, there is not the same insistence on Japan to modify their stance on the Nanjing Massacre. These concerns about China were exemplified in the analysis of OBOR, which was explained to be the antithesis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Next, Hillary Clinton’s leaked speeches from Wikileaks were analyzed. Her speeches to Wall Street about the U.S.’ role against China’s rise was used to verify her support for TPP at the time. In addition, a letter by George W. Bush’s former military advisors to U.S. Congress showed how these influential individuals view China’s rise as detrimental to U.S. power in the region. Abe’s speech to U.S. Congress from April 29, 2015, confirmed these notions. Due to the similar view on China’s rise and TPP between these prominent individuals, this chapter speculated that these individuals act as a force to push for the challenge of China’s rise. This theme was reinforced in the previous chapter by the Armitage-Nye reports and media.

The fourth chapter analyzed China’s conflict with Japan over the Nanjing Massacre. China’s position was first presented through the discussion of Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanjing, Chinese media’s disapproval of Abe’s perspective, and Xi Jinping’s
claim of 300,000 victims. Conversely, Japan’s perspective is defined through statements made on the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet website, Abe’s 70th anniversary statement, and controversial claims made by key Japanese scholars and politicians. Other key events discussed include Japan’s reaction to UNESCO’s verification of the “Documents of Nanjing” and controversy in 2017 over a hotel chain’s book which denied the massacre. Ultimately, although Japan similarity holds a historical grievance with China, international pressures to resolve the debate is not as evident in comparison to the “comfort women” issue. The perception of China’s rise is the key explanation provided to explain why Abe has not made the same steps to reconcile with China over the Nanjing Massacre.

This thesis has aimed to express how the ongoing debate over historical memory between China, Japan, and South Korea, is not only a conflict over ideology. Rather, it is a complex matter that is continually shaped by the ongoing political climate. Although in the present, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation is an area of priority, there also needs to be a continual focus on the Asia-Pacific’s historical debates, in order to monitor any changes. A key question that faces China and Japan is whether the dispute over the Nanjing Massacre is truly solvable. Observing the status of the debate as of early 2018, Xi’s government appears to be softening its stance on the Nanjing Massacre. The President of China marked his second appearance at the 2017 Nanjing Memorial. However, he “…kept a low profile and left the main public remarks to another senior official”, Yu
Zhengsheng. Yu urged Japan and China to “…correctly grasp the broad direction of peaceful and friendly cooperation, take history as a mirror, face the future and pass on friendship down the generations...”. This is in comparison to the 2014 Nanjing Memorial, during which officials, including Xi, emphasized how China will never forget the pain caused onto its victims. Yu asserted that “…China will never seek hegemony and never go in for expansion and never impose our tragic experiences on other nations...”. According to this statement, China does not wish to be perceived as a country of concern as outlined in the Armitage-Nye reports and various media commentary. On the other hand, Yu claimed that China will strive to “…deepen its relationships with neighbouring countries, including Japan...”. As a result, it appears that China too is becoming more open to any reconciliation efforts over the massacre with Japan. Above all, this process has and will require more time, in comparison to the “comfort women” issue, due to pressures placed on Abe about China’s status in the Asia-Pacific.

---


338 Ibid.


342 Ibid.
strategic reasons, a resolution to the historical conflict between China and Japan will require efforts from both the Chinese and Japanese governments. If a resolution is truly wanted from both sides, China will have to clearly define what they deem as a sufficient apology from Japan. However, it may be extremely difficult for Japan give into China’s requests under Abe’s administration. Abe and many of his cabinet belong to Nippon Kaigi, a political organization which has claimed that the Nanjing Massacre did not occur. The following Prime Minister of Japan, with different supporters and affiliations, may be more willing to accept the demands from China about reparations for the Nanjing Massacre. With this realization, an eventual agreement over this issue is not impossible.

Bibliography


Tatsumi, Yuki. “The Japan-South Korea ‘Comfort Women’ Agreement Survives ( Barely)


