A STUDY OF THE RELEVANCE OF MAX WEBER'S WORK TO EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION THEORY

by

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Max Weber is generally regarded as a major authority in the fields of organizational, administrative and educational administration theory, whose contributions are most often understood to be a theory of bureaucracy, with a lesser influence in theories of authority and rationality of the bureaucratic and charismatic kinds. As a writer in the classical sociological tradition, his theoretical orientation is most often identified as structural-functionalist, systems theoretical, or scientific management. However, during the last twenty-five years a growing body of scholarship in contemporary European academic history and Weberian studies in particular, have challenged this dominant English-speaking view of Weber's work.

The results of this attention have brought to the fore a number of dimensions of his works which do not fit easily into any of the paradigms with which he has been most often associated: his historicist methodology and programme of studies; the verstehende or interpretive methodological paradigm including a non-positivist conception of ideal type, value-freedom (objectivity), value relevance, elective affinity, and cross-cultural and cross-historical comparative techniques; and a his complete system of typologies clearly outlined in Economy and Society which
includes a comprehensive mapping of levels of social action and relationship extending from the individual unit of analysis through types of group interaction to types of institutional social behaviour. Based upon a world-historical body of evidence, Weber details in the typologies the possible substantive types of social organization—economic, legal, religious, political, and familial—constructed in a heuristic and interpretive manner, intended to mediate between subjective and objective levels of social reality.

The central purpose of this study is to recapture the full import and scope of a Weberian problematic for educational administration theory. This is undertaken by: describing the German intellectual climate in which Weber worked in order to establish the epistemological foundations influencing his work in contrast to the Anglo-American and French traditions; reconstructing a comprehensive model of his verstehende method and identifying his major contributions to political analysis, conflict theory, administrative theory (including a critique of bureaucracy), and educational organization; and demonstrating through an inventory of organizational, administrative, and educational administration texts, the degree to which his various contributions have, until recently, been lost to sociocultural studies in the English-speaking world. The results of these studies are used to extend Weber's
verstehende approach to the construction of an outline of educational organization and administration analogous to his study of religious groups and organizations in *Economy and Society* as a framework for future research in educational administration.

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Appendix J: Weberian Concepts in Educational Administration Writings
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of a number of individuals who have contributed to the completion of this study. First, the initial spiritual and intellectual inspiration for a study of Max Weber generously provided by Dr. Thomas Greenfield at a time when his own energies were taxed, and whose guiding presence survived the passing of his death. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Christopher Hodgkinson, whose relentless and consistent demands for scholarly clarity, coherence, and sense, not only ensured an improved dissertation but have deepened my understanding and appreciation of true mentorship, a gift of inestimable value.

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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL PROLEGOMENA

It is both inevitable and right that someone who is himself the offspring of modern European civilisation should approach problems in world history with the following question in mind: through what concatenation of circumstances did it come about that precisely, and only, in the Western world certain cultural phenomena emerged which, as at least we like to think, represent a direction of development of universal significance and validity? (Weber 1978a: 331)

Introduction

During the last twenty years the social sciences have been undergoing a radical transformation in theory and methodology. The ascendancy of experimental-empirical models and methods of research in the 1950s, particularly in the English-speaking world, has increasingly come under attack, particularly from the phenomenological and ethnomethodological traditions (Frisby xlii-xliii) which have involved a search for research and critical approaches which take into account non-quantifiable dimensions of human experience such as values, beliefs, and will, as well as spiritual and aesthetic phenomena. Exemplary of this is the Greenfield-Griffiths debate in educational administration which erupted in the mid-1970s, perceived by authors such as Kendall and Byrnes to be a polarization of a phenomenological challenge spearheaded by Greenfield to the "theory-based movement" which attained hegemony in the discipline in the 1950s, a view based say Kendall and Byrne on "hypothetico-deductive research rooted in theory and based in the concept of the educational institution as a social system" (7-8).
A narrowing of focus in sociology has in some respects allowed the study and solution of short term problems, but has also resulted in impoverishments: a cleavage between empirical inquiries and sociological theory, and an inability to deal with long term processes (Elias 1987: 150). This is compounded by two additional problems in recent developments in sociology: the "narrowing of the sociologists' focus of attention and interest to the immediate present," referred to by Elias as a "retreat into the present," and a politicization of sociology into Parsonian and neo-Marxist camps representing conservative and liberal orthodoxists dispositioned against socialist and communist theorists (Elias 1987: 150-151).

The decline of history as a foundational discipline, primarily in the Anglo-American academic world, can be traced back to the late 19th century when a preoccupation with science and technology developed. This is illustrated by the reactions of Henry Adams to the Chicago Exhibitions of 1893 and 1900 to whom it appeared that a point of view informed by history was incompatible with one informed by science:

All mocked the slow-paced, regular accounting that had shaped his historical thinking and shattered his neat categories of history. 'Satisfied that the sequence of men led to nothing and that the sequence of their society could lead no further, while the mere sequence of time as artificial, and the sequence of thought was chaos, he turned at last to the sequence of force; and thus it happened that, after ten years' pursuit, he found himself lying in the Gallery of Machines at the Great Exhibition of 1900, his historical neck broken by the sudden irruption of forces totally new.' Henry Adams has left us with a dual image of his response to technology—a courageous man learning to ride a bicycle and an elderly scholar lying on the ground with his historical neck broken. (Kern 93)
Theories that were once grounded in social relatedness, such as the normative emphasis of traditional political philosophy, socially-minded and policy-oriented economics, historically and normatively inclined philosophy, and literary historicism, gave way in the 1950s to a-historical, mathematically-oriented, behaviourist, and logically formal trends in scholarship:

In one professional academic field after another, then, the diachronic line, the cord of consciousness that linked the present pursuits of each to its past concerns, was either cut or fraying. At the same time as they asserted their independence of the past, the academic disciplines became increasingly independent of each other as well. Far from providing any unifying premises or principles of coherence for comprehending the multiplicity of contemporary culture, the autonomous disciplines reinforced the culture’s pluralism with an academic specialization that was its analytic parallel. (Schorske xx)

The need for an epistemological reevaluation throughout the natural and social sciences became apparent to philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, and Paul Feyerabend, and a recent generation of methodologists in qualitative and naturalistic approaches who questioned fundamental presuppositions inherent in any paradigm:

A paradigm is a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world. As such, paradigms are deeply imbedded in the socialization of adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell them what is important, legitimate, and reasonable. Paradigms are also normative, telling the practitioner what to do without the necessity of long existential or epistemological consideration. But it is this aspect of paradigms that constitutes both their strength and their weakness--their strength in that it makes action possible, their weakness in that the very reason for action is hidden in the unquestioned assumptions of the paradigm. (Patton 203)
Problems with scientific approaches in modern scholarship (i.e. from the mid-1900s) have appeared from two main directions: axiological concerns about hidden values or improper value bases leading to problematic implications; and epistemological concerns about false, or at least restricted, grounds for knowledge claims.

The axiological problem first was an issue in the social sciences in Germany in the Werturteilstreit (value controversy) at the turn of the century in which the relativism and pessimism of positivism was critiqued (Käsler 184-185), and it reemerged in the late 1950s and 1960s in discussions by such authors as Karl Popper and the critical theorists Herbert Marcuse (1968), Theodore Adorno (1969; 1973; 1976) and Jürgen Habermas (1988) (Bubner 124).

Epistemological concerns, particularly of scientific method and analysis, were earlier disputed in the Methodenstreit (methodological controversy) in Germany in the 1880s as a conflict between positivist and anti-positivist theoretical tendencies in political economy (Käsler 180, 186) and were participated in by Weber. These issues were reintroduced with broader disciplinary implications by critics of positivism such as N. R. Hanson (1958; 1967), Karl Popper (1959; 1963; 1968), Thomas Kuhn (1962), Paul K. Feyerabend (1962; 1964; 1965; 1975), Joseph Agassi (1963), Imré Lakatos (1963/64; 1970; 1976), Winch (1958), Louch (1966), and Jean-Paul Sartre (1960; 1967) who developed his own peculiar dialectical method derived from humanistic Marxism and phenomenological existential theorists. All of these authors have in various ways explored placing values at the centre of social research as an alternative to positivist, 'value-free' sociology. Or, in the case of Morris Berman, it is a return to normative and metaphysical principles of thought and perception preceding the scientific worldview which has dominated the
West since the 17th Century, the last time when, in Berman's view, hermeticist thinking in the form of alchemy was the last great coherent expression of participating consciousness (16).

For both historians and sociologists this shift in the understanding of the nature of social reality is actually a revisitation of 18th and early 19th century questions and analyses originating in the work of Immanuel Kant, particularly the Preface to *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* ("Critique of Pure Reason," 1787), and those philosophical figures engaged in dispute with his method and conclusions—Nietzsche, Hegel\(^1\), Husserl, and Heidegger (Kaufmann 4). Goethe, too, reflected on scientific method as early as 1832. In "Faust II" Mephistopheles replies to the Chancellor:

> What you can't touch, is miles away to you;
> What you can't grasp, is totally lacking in you;
> What you can't calculate, you believe cannot be true;
> What you can’t weigh, has no weight for you;
> What you can't cost, has no value for you.\(^2\)

Intellectual fashion, particularly in North America, has its dialectical variants in the current postmodern panoply of post-structural, deconstructionist, and radical "phenomenological/ hermeneutic" efforts of the recently de rigueur texts of the French modernist critics Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault (particularly in later publications, 1970 and 1972), and

1 Especially in the Preface to *Phänomenologie des Geistes* ("Phenomenology of Spirit"), 1807.

2 Was ihr nicht tastet, steht euch meilenfern;
was ihr nicht faßt, das fehlt euch ganz und gar;
was ihr nicht rechnet, glaubt ihr, sei nicht wahr;
was ihr nicht wägt, hat für euch kein Gewicht;
was ihr nicht münzt, das, meint ihr, gelte nicht.
(author's translation from 1955: 12)
Paul de Man, all of whom have radicalized perspectives on human knowledge and values to a previously unanticipated level of subjectivism and relativism, in effect, academic Dadaism. Thus, explanatory models shifted from the quantitatively simplistic and reductionistic to the most extreme forms of subjective particularism and to a denial of any categories of objective knowledge or foundation upon which values can rest. Jean Beaufret prophetically termed this the "haemorrhage of subjectivity" as early as 1947 (Descombes 186). More recently Dinesh D'Souza, in *Illiberal Education*, criticized the relativist methodology of post-structuralist proponents such as Stanley Fish at Duke University and spokesmen for the American Council on Learned Societies, who have argued that postmodern perspectives do not allow one to determine that democracy has an inherent superior quality to totalitarianism (159). Even though epistemologically opposed to positivism, postmodernism has landed in the same ethical quandry by dislocating value into a ethically groundless stratum of human speculation: their positions do not allow one to judge even genocide.

Interestingly, Goethe noted many of the same characteristics of French theory during travels in 1811: "In Strasbourg, on the French border, we were at once freed from the spirit of the French. We found their way of life much too ordered and too aristocratic, their poetry cold, their criticism destructive, their philosophy abstruse and unsatisfying" (1962: 539). Goethe's observation derived largely from a recognition of Cartesian rationalist and British empirical influences on the French philosophical tradition (Hamlyn 136, 206). These characteristics lead to the positivist methodology of Auguste Comte's social science (Hamlyn 275), and are those which distinguish much of French philosophy from German metaphysical preoccupations, which have recently been replaced by the tyranny of subjectivism.
Similarly, Anglo-American social sciences evolved into a largely materialist empiricism, distinctively different from German social empiricism, which developed within a political and intellectual milieu predominantly historicist, linguistic, and phenomenological, and given to numerous epistemological and methodological debates over the tools of empirical research (Oberschall 2-3, 137-141).

As the postmodern movement begins to fragment, its bankruptcy becomes apparent—Paul de Man and Heidegger's influence waning due to their Nazi affiliations as well as philosophical problems—providing additional impetus to attempts to cultivate the middle ground between a debate which has been polarized between epistemological positivism and relativism. Even though much of the French postmodernist method was derived from German phenomenology and hermeneutics, via Heidegger and Gadamer respectively, and from Nietzschean and Freudian texts, their works bear little epistemological and axiological relation to their professed German antecedents, producing a deeper separation from the German academic tradition of which Weber is an exemplar. The German intelligentsia's metaphysical and historicist ethos has traditionally provided a prophylaxis against epistemological extremes like positivism and nihilism, and can still provide a basis from which to build a comprehensive and coherent epistemology and methodological frame. In the speech "Science as a Vocation"\(^3\) Weber recognized the value of objective forms of knowledge and analysis in containing subjective excesses which were

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\(^3\) The commonly translated title of "Wissenschaft als Beruf" as "Science as a Vocation" is misleading if not incorrect. Wissenschaft in this context means "scholarship" and is not meant to denote only intellectual activities conducted according to natural science principles.
fashionable among the decadents and were later pathologically cultivated in the aesthetics of Nazism:

Those idols are "personality" and "personal experience" (*Erleben*). Both are closely linked, and the idea prevails that the latter amounts to the former and belongs to it. One tortures oneself with efforts to "experience," because this belongs to the proper style of life of a "personality," and if it does not succeed one must at least pretend to have this gift of grace. Formerly this was called mere "experience" (*Erlebnis*) or, in plain German, "sensation." And people had, I think, a more accurate understanding of what "personality" is and means. (11)

The result of these mid- to late 20th century approaches involves, for sociologists, a different conception of change, occurring not simply from exogenous factors, but from endogenous factors developing within social systems. On the other hand, for historians, changes in content and objective have required the mastery and utilization of previously sociological categories such as social groups, kinship, and social class (Brand 97). Consequently, any historical event is infused with complexities of multi-dimensional levels of social analysis, and the sociological monolith of "social change" is expanded into detailed analyses of particularities, profoundly affecting the manner in which time is used as an organizing principle. Such a redefined interdisciplinary project requires the combined analyses and information sociology and history provide, bringing us back to Weber’s complex formulation of social studies, and a reexamination of its appropriate methodology (Eliaeson 21). There, in fact, has been a recent change in perspective among students of sociocultural studies who are more receptive to Weber as a progenitor of comparative historical sociology (Wrong 1984: 72). The only question left for some to debate is whether this interrelational nexus is historical sociology or
sociological history, or even a semi-differentiated complex of human or cultural studies.

Transcendental Developments

Another way to make sense of this development in the history of ideas is to examine the implications of more fundamental philosophical shifts underlying the traditional disciplines at the turn of the century. These conceptual and categorical redefinitions are transcendental in the sense that they question traditional grounds of knowledge and posit new a priori foundations upon which disciplinary innovations can rest (Körner 35).

The fin de siècle period, variously defined in scope and duration as a cultural phenomenon between 1860 and the 1920s (Kern; Eksteins; Janik and Toulmin; Schorske), not only embraced social, political, and economic transformations for the West, but radically new metaphysical conceptions of time and space which underlay changing values and conceptions (Hughes 64). The period serves as a watershed between the Enlightenment and modern times (Kern 4-5). Changing conceptions contributed to cultural development and criticism in both intellectual and artistic fields, reflecting and accentuating the divergence between the German academic tradition and the Anglo-American and French. Differing attitudes towards the integrity of objective forms of knowledge and subjective perceptions of participants in social phenomena, and their possible combination or complementarity, was an underlying concern in all forms of cultural study and expression, and are the very philosophical and methodological questions addressed by Weber. Some discussion, therefore, of how temporality and spatiality were being redefined as phenomena, particularly as many of these concepts challenged the Kantian mental
categories upon which traditional German scholarship rested and underlie current debates about disciplinary boundaries, limitations, and methodologies, is relevant to a study of Weber’s work.

1. Time

During this period a number of interpretations of time became prominent. These derived partially from the anthropology of Emile Durkheim (1903; 1912) who redefined time as socially relative and cyclical; in philosophy by Karl Jaspers who explored individually relative time through phenomenological psychiatry (1913), and Henri Bergson (1903), from a phenomenological perspective, who described the flow of personal time which he called durée (duration); and in psychology by William James (1890) who explored the fluidity of personal time as stream of consciousness. These forms of time were also represented in literature, most effectively by James Joyce in Ulysses (1922). More experimental treatment of time’s apparent uniformity and direction was conducted in film by George Méliès, who reversed and elipsed time in The Vanishing Lady (1876), and by Edwin S. Porter and David Griffiths, who constructed parallel sequences and arrested time, influencing early 19th century dramatists’ treatment of time (Kern 29-30).

Simultaneously, time was being technologically rationalized through the introduction of standard time at the end of the 19th century, and its establishment and its reinforcement through railroad timetabling and telegraphic services. This contributed to the rationalization of public and organizational time in the military, workplace, and, consequently, home. The consequences of time rationalization produced a heterogeneity in time perception between private and public, the latter often viewed as technological. Such a discontinuity in time experience for
the individual was explored in its horrific implications by Franz Kafka in *The Trial* (written 1914-1915, published 1925) and *Metamorphosis* (1912), and by the Cubists Giorgio de Chirico, Pablo Picasso, and Jean Metzinger. The most violent rejection of public time was symbolically recorded by Joseph Conrad in *The Secret Agent* (1907) whose protagonist attempted to blow up the Greenwich Observatory. At the other end of the disciplinary spectrum the Newtonian concepts of absolute time and space were challenged by physicists like Ernst Mach (1883), whose speculations on relative time were later described in Einstein’s special theory of relativity in 1905 and general theory of relativity in 1916. Thus time, as a uniform, unidirectional, linear progression which is susceptible to measured analysis of equal incremental units had been trifurcated: a scientific model of relative time originating in the radically new physics and mathematics, traditional absolute time, and time of human experience (on both individual and socio-cultural levels). Two of these, the first and last, are not by nature amenable to positivist social studies research. In fact, the second, traditional time, upon which most scientific work is based, including that of the social "sciences," eliminates human categories of time (past and future, and a meaningful present) by reducing experience to a determinism. The temporal implications of positivistic science Kern describes having been explored by the French physicist Emile Meyerson with deprecatory effect:

> the tendency of modern science to eliminate time by the identification of cause and effect [is] symbolized in the equal sign of an equation. This operation is based on the principle of conservation of matter and energy— that in any phenomenon nothing is created, nothing lost— and the postulate of reversibility— that in any causal action "the integral effect may reproduce the
entire cause or its equal."

Natural phenomena such as aging or burning wood are irreversible. Chemical reactions are also irreversible, but "chemical equations are the expression of the tendency to identify things in time; one can say 'to eliminate' time." If science succeeded in describing everything with an equation, in identifying antecedent and consequent, nothing would change, time would be refined out of science, and the future would become a necessary consequence instead of a promise of surprise. It would be "the confusion of past, present, and future—a universe eternally immutable." (Kern 101-102)

While science sought to eliminate time, technology has caused a speeding up of experiential time, described by Robert Musil in *The Man Without Qualities*:

For some time now such a social idée fixe has been a kind of super-American city where everyone rushes about, or stands still, with a stop-watch in his hand . . . Overhead-trains, overground-trains, underground-trains, pneumatic express-mails carrying consignments of human beings, chains of motor-vehicles all racing along horizontally, express lifts vertically pumping crowds from one traffic-level to another . . . At the junction one leaps from one means of transport to another, is instantly sucked in and snatched away by the rhythm of it, which makes a syncope, a pause, a little gap of twenty seconds between two roaring outbursts of speed, and in these intervals in the general rhythm one hastily exchanges a few words with others. Questions and answers click into each other like cogs of a machine . . . One eats while in motion. (30)

This literary expression is exemplary of Weber's concept of *Entzauberung*, or disenchantment, borrowed from the poet Schiller. Weber recognized it to be produced by a bureaucratized society through the effort to fully rationalize time and space, and to establish such rationalized time and space as the standards by which human experience and contemplation are recognized as existent and measured. This constitutes, for critics of positivism, the fallacy of reification: "the moment in the process of
alienation in which the characteristic of thing-hood becomes the standard of objective reality" (Berger and Pullberg 2000). In addition, his analysis of social action into typologies was partially based upon temporal forms (e.g. the Chinese literati attitude toward society as static versus the Calvinist attitude toward societal change), although to less radical effect than the work of Husserl, William James, Bergson, and G. H. Mead whose influence on social studies has also been profound (Salomon 612).

2. Space

In the same manner that traditional categories of time were transcended, traditional categories of space, largely based on Platonic solids and perceived through Cartesian rationalism, were challenged by perspectivism, first articulated in modern form by Friedrich Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals in 1887:

Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject"; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as "pure reason," "absolute spirituality," "knowledge in itself"; these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this--what would that mean but to castrate the intellect? (1967: 119)

Space, as an absolute public category, was dispersed into subjective multiplicities, bolstered by the
perspectivist philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset, by Durkheim's theory of social relativity, by Spengler's appreciation of differing cultural achievements based upon a range of cultural notions of space, and by Einstein's general theory of relativity (Kern 151-152), whose theory not only introduced new ways of looking at spatial dimensions but regarded time and space as four equivalent dimensions--collapsing the traditional distinction between time and space. These explorations into variable spatial concepts were also developed into distinctive spatial attitudes in the aesthetic realm of discourse by the Cubists, Georges Braque and Picasso, by Van Gogh, Edvard Munch, Cézanne, and by the Futurists (Kern 161-162).

Dadaism, an artistic response to the First World War, was based upon a rejection of "cause and effect, past and future, and all meaning except the roll of the Dice" (interestingly in direct opposition to Einstein who refused to allow that God would play dice with the universe)--war accepted as the essence of meaning (Eksteins 210), whose most nihilistic expressions in art only palely represented the true horror and absurdity of trench life. Existence in war, on a more fundamental level than in cultural and social upheaval, demonstrated changing values based upon oppositions of tragic and comic, nothingness and existence, order and chaos, knowledge and ignorance, space and void, time and temporal suspension, which had provided rationales for traditional political and administrative authority.

These speculative, aesthetic, and philosophical explorations of space were in some part reactions to fundamental social change, including altered class distributions, organizational configurations, political design, industrial growth and development, and a dramatic reconfiguration and perception of geography. And, from a Weberian point of view, all of these were interrelational
and interdependent, just as the rise of modern capitalism stood in a position of elective affinity to the Protestant ethos.

3. Interdisciplinary Effects

The academic result of these changes in spatio-temporal attitudes was a change in disciplinary boundaries, subjects, method, and scope. Phrenology, operating with classical notions of space by defining the mind as separable into precisely located anatomically derived functions, was challenged by Henri Bergson and William James, who developed integrational models of mental life.

Sociology expanded its examination of spatial distribution of social forms during the fin du siècle period to include analysis of urbanization, class reconfiguration, imperialism, increasing population, nationalism (particularly in Germany and Italy), and industrialization. In effect, the topics of crowding, cities, mass society, the state, and geopolitics (Kern 221-229) became the new topography of the discipline.

History reflected many of the same concerns, shifting its focus from diplomatic, state, and essentially aristocratic studies, to social and cultural history, archeology and ancient history, ethnomethodology, and comparative world history.

These conceptual shifts resulted in a search for paradigms which were comprehensive enough to incorporate work derived through empirical means as well as subjective experience, and which are also able to integrate information and analyses from philosophical, historical and other fields of study for illumination of the human condition. One of the last figures of the classical age of social theory who provided a foundation for such a comprehensive enterprise was Max Weber. More than any other theorist in the social
sciences, Weber's work has retained relevance and substantiality for the renewed interest in methodological concerns that originated in 18th century scholarship and came to maturity in fin de siècle speculation.

**Justification of the Study**

A study of one of the "Great Dead," such as Max Weber, as a means of contributing knowledge to and addressing current problems in the philosophy and methodology of educational administration, may be perceived as questionable, particularly since much of social science and administrative theory in the English-speaking world relegates the writings of the Great Dead to a definitive place in social science history. Their insights are often reduced to bytes of knowledge arranged in incremental fashion which are then catalogued as organizational terms and laws describing and explaining social experience, a practice reminiscent of 19th century progressivist ideology, a genre Richard Rorty refers to as doxography "which inspires boredom and despair" (62) and Berman refers to as "digital knowledge" producing a contraction in knowledge of the world (268). Certainly Weber's contributions to social studies have been reduced most often to liturgical citations of the "bureaucratic model" and the three types of authority, charismatic, traditional and legal-rational, accompanied occasionally by titillating references to his "nervous breakdown" and "schizophrenia" as a result of an Oedipal struggle with his father, and his platonic relationship to his wife Marianne. Rarely are these conceptual constructs qualified as "ideal typical" devices as Weber understood them to be, or their methodological purpose and relationship to the massive cross-cultural and

4 Randall Collins, 1986, for example.
world historical studies Weber conducted. The high selectivity practised on Weber's texts is indicative of an intellectual paradigm predominantly structuralist and formalist, determining, as discussed above by Patton (page 3), what portion of Weber's work can be legitimately recorded and perpetuated, relieving itself of the existential and epistemological complexities which do not coincide with paradigmatic assumptions and intentions, and which, most notably, neglect historical study and rigour.

C. Wright Mills noted in 1960 that few students in sociology, particularly, study the history of their discipline and are not required to do so in their training (5). Mills does not mean by "the history of the discipline" cursory readings of introductory survey chapters, but an in-depth grounding in and constant reference to the foundational thought and historical context of classic authors. Habermas' analysis in *On the Logic of the Social Sciences* is even more incisive. The human studies have developed into two uncompromising and distinct frames of reference, the empirical-analytic, or positivist, and the cultural, historical, and hermeneutic studies. The consequence of intellectual dualism in an empirical-analytic sociology, and for any other discipline such as administration which can be grounded in sociology, is an elimination of time in the form of history:

Sociology . . . is indifferent to history. It processes its data without regard to any specific context; the historical standing of the data is thus neutralized from the outset. For sociology, all history is made present, but not in the sense of a reflective appropriation of an irreversible and unrepeatable process. Rather, history is projected onto a screen of universal simultaneity and is thus robbed of its authentic spirit. (16)

More importantly for social practices, such as educational administration, is an ahistorical
professionalism based upon social sciences turned technologies. Techniques for the regulation of social action are generated, and technologically exploitable knowledge is produced, conditions upon which a modern industrial and scientific society rely, undisturbed by, or as Habermas argues, suppressive of incompatible ideas or historical analyses of political and social activity (18-20). The practice of the social sciences have generally succumbed to the standardization of professionalism and specialization, a condition recognized by Weber as a symptom of rationalization in the modern world which reduces free will, produces disenchantment, and ultimately discourages metaphysical reflection on values issues, in fact, often denigrating "metaphysical" speculation as fantasy.

Why, indeed, study one of the Great Dead? One of the most pressing reasons is that Weber’s project was never carried to fruition. For largely political reasons Weber’s work was partitioned, by Talcott Parsons into structural-functionalism, by Marxists into bourgeois apology, by guilt-ridden post-Third Reich Germanists into an untouchable project tainted by an argument for charismatic authority. What would have been a thorough investigation and extension of his work was interrupted by the turmoil of the Weimar Republic. The consequences of that political failure, and the intellectual politics of Anglo-American positivism which dominated social science theory from the 1940s to the late 1970s transforming social studies scholarship into cadres of specialization (Wrong 1962: 14), that is, the period in which some of Weber’s works were being introduced to and interpreted for an English-speaking audience, deformed Weber’s project as it was received in the Anglo-Saxon world: "Contemporary American sociologists, who often picture Weber as a detached, impersonal scientist, chiefly concerned with building a scientific sociology comparable to physics in its
power of precise observation and abstract generalization, hold a distorted and one-sided view of both the man and his intellectual milieu" (Wrong 1962: 15). Far from actively or intentionally performing the role of an architect of modern rationalized thinking, Weber bent his knowledge and skills to an analysis and critique of a culture thoroughly rationalized yet "stripped of its religious and ethical meaning" at the end of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism:

No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved. (Weber 1930: 182)

In response to the question regarding continual regard and renewed preoccupation with Weber's work, Raymond Aron argues that not only do Weber's writings raise substantive questions which have yet to be resolved (To what degree and extent do religious belief and world views influence economic behaviour? What are the true typologies of social action? What are the relationships among religious, economic, political, and social systems?) but that Weber set for himself a task which "far surpasses what the sociologists of today believe themselves capable of accomplishing" (296), that is, defining the character of the modern world and determining why it is as it is, and how it has come to be. Methodologically, Weber remains the primary classical social theorist who transcended disciplinary dualism in social studies by providing a mediation between empirical explanation (Erklären) and hermeneutic
understanding (Verstehen) (Habermas 10, 188), explicitly presented in the opening paragraphs of *Economy and Society*:

Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here) is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences. . . . "Meaning" may be of two kinds. The term may refer first to the actual existing meaning in the given concrete case of a particular actor, or to the average or approximate meaning attributable to a given plurality of actors; or secondly to the theoretically conceived pure type of subjective meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor or actors in a given type of action. In no case does it refer to an objectively "correct" meaning or one which is "true" in some metaphysical sense. (4)

Furthermore, philosophical and methodological questions about the presuppositions, aims, and techniques of social studies pursued by Weber in his early methodological writings are still contentious in the social sciences, and have not changed in character for those theorists engaged in epistemological, axiological, and metaphysical analysis. Concepts central to Weber's research, the ideal type, the historical individual, value relevance, and value neutrality (Oakes 1988: 5) are still seen to be problematic by the many critics of Weber's methodology, yet have retained both a philosophical attraction and theoretical integrity for sociocultural studies, and are still at the centre of epistemological debates in these disciplines.

Weber, himself, recognized in his essay "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" that classical works have insights and ideas which are recognized only after a period of specialization has necessarily run its course, and will continue to serve a critical purpose:

All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization, once it is oriented towards a given subject matter through particular settings
of problems and has established its methodological principles, will consider the analysis of the data as an end in itself. It will discontinue assessing the value of the individual facts in terms of their relationships to ultimate value ideas. Indeed, it will lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value-ideas in general. (1949: 112)

Social science theory is again grappling with the relationships among the various social studies, in particular with questions and debates relating to the sociology/history nexus. However, this has yet to be fully translated into methodological practice. Daniel Chirot provides a partial survey of those debates well-developed by 1976: the role of historical demography, sociology and history of science, nature of social history, debates surrounding the role of ideas (and ideologies) as opposed to material and technological factors, quantitative possibilities, and evolutionary theory (1976: 232-241). These topics are not new to Weberian scholarship, and the test of the validity of these questions could well do with some revisition of Weber's formulations.

Since the mid-1950s, according to Robert Nisbet, social theorists have been returning to an interdisciplinary attitude and practice (91), for which Weber serves at the very least as a preliminary model: "virtually all the criticism leveled by postempiricist philosophers of science [Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Hanson and Gödel] against logical positivism can be found in Weber's early methodological writings (those published during 1903-07)" (Huff 8). Weber was one of the major figures of the fin de siècle period, along with such thinkers as Freud, Croce, and Pareto, who built inclusive, yet open-ended, theoretic systems from which an "Epigonentum" issued. By this term is meant an era of specialists concentrating on "discrete, finite problems" (Hughes 14-15), a term which is common in German discussions of theoretic schools. The difference
between the major theorists and their successors, according to Hughes, is that the former were humanists who "combined a philosophical with a scientific education, and [who] drew no clear line of demarcation between literature and social science" (15). They left a legacy for non-humanistic activity, as did people like Hegel, Marx, and Kant before them.

Even though all contemporary organizational study is post-Weberian, sociological and administrative treatment of Weber has largely fallen into two of the pitfalls H. Stuart Hughes identifies as characteristic of some historical scholarship: simple cataloguing of material resulting in a combined superficiality and overtechnical presentation; and the imposition of an alien framework (6-7) which in the case of sociology and administrative theory is the product of structural-functionalism, systems theory, and logical positivism. Weber's writings have suffered from both: much administrative literature reducing and oversimplifying comprehensive treatments of social phenomena to mechanistic and experimental "models" of "bureaucracy" and "technical rationality;" and complex methodological work to disfigureations of analytic concepts like "ideal type" (Oberschall v). This resulted in a virtually positivist stranglehold on American Weberian studies from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s (Oakes 1988: 156n).

It is this which makes him worthy of academic revisitation and which ensures his relevance to administrative theory and educational administration.

1. Relevance for Educational Administration

It is only more recently, since the late 1960s, that approaches traditionally outside sociology have played some role in modifying the paradigms and methods used in the study of educational administration, producing by the mid
1970s a fundamental debate and transformation (Evers and Lakomski 1) in epistemology and methodological strategies. There are two major sources of this change. One is the reformulation of sociology as the boundaries between it and history, philosophy, anthropology, and phenomenological psychologies, and to some extent literary analysis, have become permeable, filtering through administrative theory to educational administration in the form of qualitative research conducted according to what Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba refer to as the naturalistic collection of anti-positivist methodologies: "postpositivistic, ethnographic, phenomenological, subjective, case study, qualitative, hermeneutic, humanistic" (7). This directional line of influence is particularly important for not only general discussion within educational administration, which has traditionally taken its cues from parent disciplines, such as organizational theory (Griffiths 1979: 43) and other social and cultural theories (Evers and Lakomski 1), but for the study of an author like Max Weber whose works are being revisited and reevaluated in history, sociology, philosophy, economics, religious studies, and political theory, however, not yet within the discipline of educational administration. And secondly, direct challenges posed within educational administration by theorists who have drawn directly from philosophy and psychology, such as C. Hodgkinson (value and language theory, especially Wittgenstein), Thomas Greenfield (existentialism and phenomenology), R. J. Bates (critical theory) (Gronn 9), and most recently Colin Evers and Gabriele Lakomski (the philosophy of scientific realism or coherentism) to challenge the traditional parameters of subject and explanation in educational administration.

The epistemological state of the art at the present time is certainly in turmoil, encompassing a polydoxy of methodological camps and factions which Lakomski has
identified as three major alignments: foundationalism, based on various scientific paradigms; complementary non-foundationalism, based upon scientific and non-scientific paradigms; and oppositional non-foundationalism, based upon various subjectivist approaches (1991: 2-4).

Two aspects of a study of Weber’s writings pertain to an upheaval in an implied orthodoxy of educational administration epistemology. A reexamination of the foundations of educational administration begs the study of a figure who has been authoritatively present in any study of bureaucratic features of educational organization. If the non-foundational challenge in educational administration raises fundamental questions about boundaries and types of knowledge, there is implicit in this a question about the interpretation and use of classical texts, particularly of an author whose writings derive from a scholarly tradition different from that of the administrative orthodoxy. Accuracy and completeness of Weber’s work on administrative processes and educational analysis as they have been presented in educational administration can be brought into question. Furthermore, do Weber’s methodological essays and approach to substantive studies on a major social institution, religion, suggest a research paradigm for education which has not been employed? A construction of what this paradigm would consist of may both bear on the epistemological debates in educational administration and contribute in a substantive way to an examination of educational organization in its historical character and in its interrelationships with other social institutions and factors.

2. Purpose and Method of the Study

Exploration of Weber’s thought in reference to educational administration is not simply that of identifying
what Weber did say about educational administration which has not yet come to light in the discipline, but that of adopting his general research perspective and asking questions like: What would Weber have said about the character of educational administration in the modern world? How did contemporary educational organizations arrive at their current form? What roles do educational organizations play in relation to other social systems (legal, economic, political, religious)? What are the dominant values which inform current educational organizations, and what are their sources? How have certain rational and affectual elements in social activities come to have priority over traditional ones? Even though Weber's interests were directly primarily at rationalizing forces which dominated social activities and developments at the turn of the century, it is possible to utilize the same fundamental Weberian methodology to explore social factors affecting education which were not evident at his time and in his culture.

The objective is not simply to describe Weber's thought, what Alan Shuttleworth calls adopting "a merely historical approach" to major figures by "pointing out their particular merits, arguing how good they were in their time. Nor should we be concerned just with a rescue operation, thanking God for their rhetoric, taking out what is valuable, focusing on the idea of culture in its various meanings which they did maintain against much opposition" (1). Instead, the objective is to extend his approach to the study of educational administration by answering the question: How can the study of educational administration be advanced by using the research approach outlined and used by Max Weber to study the relationships among religion, politics, law, economics, and education?

Even though Weber's name is well known in administrative studies, the full scope of his interpretive
method and seminal insights into social organization and behaviour, including commentary on educational issues, particularly extensive discussions on strata of literati who have had profound influence on socio-political developments in a number of historical epochs, are not fully reflected in the literature. Generally, educational administration literature does not explicitly or directly draw on Weber's writings, but relies on organizational and administrative theorists whose works have perpetuated a partial and distorted view of his work such as Talcott Parsons and Alvin Gouldner, who have generally ignored the historical and philosophical dimensions of his work, and have yet to reflect the renewed interest in Weberian studies in English since the 1970s which has provided a greater range of his work in translation and more holistic treatment of his contributions to social studies research.

In order to establish Weber's potential contribution to educational administration, a comprehension of the full scope and characteristics of his approach to studying social organization is necessary. The method of this project is to engage in a *Gedankenexperiment*, an imaginary or thought experiment, by extending Weber's approach to the study of religious organization as it is developed in Chapter VI of *Economy and Society*, "Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion)," to the construction of an analogous framework for educational organization. This will be done by first reconstructing the full scope and depth of his work as a purpose, style, and method as an approach to the study of social organization and behaviour in its full and comprehensive form in order to determine both its complete methodology and to define what a sufficient explanation of a sociocultural phenomenon is in authentic Weberian terms. This will also involve identifying the ways in which those contributions, potential or otherwise, have been neglected
or corrupted. The second purpose is to establish from this the implications of Weber's approach to educational administration by developing a framework for an interpretive analysis of educational organization using the Verstehende paradigm, that is, the construction of an educational analogy to "Religious Groups" in Economy and Society through an analysis of the categories Weber used in "Religious Groups."

To assist in this latter purpose, Weber's observations on educational organization and its administration will be explored, especially his commentary on educational roles and purposes as they relate to the state, politics, power relations, professional ethics, and the relationship between religious ethos and education. Of particular importance to "Educational Groups" is a chapter in The Religion of China, "The Typological Position of Confucian Education," in which Weber indicates that it is possible to construct "a sociological typology of pedagogical ends and means" (119) as an instrument in historical and cross-cultural comparison and analysis.

Since Weber's approach to social organization includes sociological, economic, political, social psychological, and administrative dimensions, as well as historical development and cross-cultural analyses, a Weberian approach to educational administration is, in general terms, a project in historical sociology and administrative philosophy. This is, therefore, a conceptual-analytical study assisted by socio-historical empiricism, rather than an empirical-experimental study. The research approach conforms to the methods of historical sociology, intellectual history, and philosophy of knowledge as it applies to human action, that is, a research paradigm extensive enough to embrace both sociological and historical types of study, as well as applied philosophical work on the justification of what
Weber called "technical tools," the analytical and typological concepts necessary to sociocultural studies, and assumptions of social psychology which are necessary to relate the individual to societal forces.

This interdisciplinary approach views philosophy, sociology, history, and social psychology as interdependent disciplines, each providing knowledge necessary to understanding the social world. This involves adopting Weber's own perspective on the role of contributing disciplines, which avoided disciplinary reductionisms such as sociologism and psychologism (Szacki 360). Philosophy provides the underlying logic and conceptual categories necessary to evaluation, analysis and synthesis of a sociocultural framework, that is, a theory and outline of knowledge of human action in history, which in Weber's case gave rise to the typologies directing the selection of relevant information and their analysis. Sociology, as an historical sociology rather than a positivist sociology, provides the analytical, structural, and functional social categories designed for cross-cultural and historical comparison with regard for an underlying psychology, "to formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process" (Weber 1978b: 19). History provides the detailed description of events and experience in their historical context, describing what did and does happen, "oriented to the causal analysis and explanation of individual actions, structures, and personalities possessing cultural significance" (Weber 1978b: 19). And psychology provides insight into motivation and explanations of interpersonal relations, particularly "in explaining the irrationalities of action sociologically, that form of psychology which employs the method of subjective understanding undoubtedly can make decisively important contributions" (Weber 1978b: 19). Weber's interests in
psychology had a close affinity to the emerging psychoanalytic models of the turn of the century, which are best able to record man's understanding of himself especially as it relates to "the behavior of individuals subjected to the very severe group pressure of political passions," and other long-lasting group-psychological phenomena (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich xv-xvi).

A further assumption, stressed by Weber in his methodological essays, is that social reality cannot be grasped as an objective whole, but will, instead, be partial, limited to the research perspective adopted by the observer. The meaning of a study is a function of the research values which guide the observer in selection and analysis of empirical information, in this case of social activity of educational purpose. Objectivity, therefore, is limited and heuristic, dependent upon the research assumptions and values as well as what appears to be of historical and cultural significance to the observer, himself a product of historical and cultural forces. According to such a research perspective, all social studies are value oriented and value relevant, yet value-free in the empirical sense that statements about historical influence and cause can be validated.

3. Significance

The major aspect of significance in this research project involves reintroducing the Weberian research paradigm in full sociological, historical and philosophical scope as it can be reconstructed from all available published writings and asking Weberian questions of educational administration and pursuing them in a historical sociological manner. Such a study would extend Weber's approach and methodology to social behaviour in educational life providing a complex and comprehensive...
framework for investigation into educational administration. This permits kinds of explanation which are otherwise not possible, for example, identifying the historical origins and socially causal factors of organizational phenomena. The purpose of such explanations is to identify the sufficient conditions which made possible an event or state of affairs, rather than demonstrating that a social phenomenon was necessitated as a predictable consequence of a set of conditions. The purpose is also to determine the interrelational and interdependent aspects of economic, political, social, religious, and other forms of educational social action which can only be studied longitudinally. Through cross-cultural and cross-historical comparison one can more clearly define the characteristics of social organizations unique to a particular point in time and place. Finally, it may partially meet Thomas Greenfield's argument for a new paradigm for studies in educational organization and administration.

Synopsis

This chapter introduces recent and current epistemological and methodological debates in socio-cultural studies which have implications for the value of Weber's writings in the study of educational administration. It is argued that Weber's approach to socio-cultural studies avoided both positivistic and subjectivist extremes which have lead to epistemological and axiological problems by retaining a strong historical and philosophical character. Through an examination of underlying philosophical concepts which have been challenged and promoted during the 19th and early 20th centuries it is argued that Weber's
research paradigm still has currency in both the theory of knowledge and methodological debates in socio-cultural studies, and offers a comprehensive model for the study of educational organization which has yet to be explored fully. This research project will seek to examine the full character of a Weberian research paradigm and the contributions such a paradigm could provide to a study of educational organization.
CHAPTER TWO:
MAX WEBER: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT

One can measure the honesty of a contemporary scholar, and above all, of a contemporary philosopher, in his posture toward Nietzsche and Marx. Whoever does not admit that he could not perform the most important parts of his own work without the work that those two have done swindles himself and others. Our intellectual world has to a great extent been shaped by Marx and Nietzsche. (Weber in Baumgarten: 554-555)

Introduction

It can be argued that Weber’s mistreatment in administrative theory derives from a selective transplantation of Weberian concepts and theories from the German cultural framework, from which he drew and for which he wrote, to an alien intellectual framework dominated by Anglo-American empiricism and instrumentality. Because the characters of these two scholarly traditions are radically different, and often regarded as opposed, divergent interpretations of Weber’s work are produced by differing understandings of the explanatory criteria that constitute sufficient explanation in social and cultural studies. One is a scholarly tradition in which the integrity and complexity of Weber’s thought is largely retained, and by which his work is judged to be historically and philosophically meaningful and significant. The other is one in which it has been much reduced in explanatory power through the selective partitioning of his works to fit the requirements of empirical-analytic research and processes of specialization in socio-cultural studies. This is particularly evident in sociology: "hence it is that methodologists discuss his conception of ideal types; advocates of modern humanistic sociology, the idea of
interpretative sociology; theorists of modernization, his analysis of the process of traditionalism being driven out by rationality; theorists of organization, the concept of bureaucracy; sociologists of political relations, his theory of authority and power; and so on" (Szacki 369).

Weber can be said to be part of an academic misalignment between the English and German speaking worlds which has similarly affected transmission of other significant German thinkers such as Sigmund Freud and Leopold von Ranke:

The misinterpretation of Ranke can be considered part of a more general phenomenon. "One of the greatest misfortunes that can affect a writer of great intellectual seriousness and strong ethical passions," write Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, "is to have his ideas 'naturalized' by the English." Ranke's epistemology was 'naturalized' into an English empiricist idiom. His 'wie es eigentlich gewesen' was read as meaning that truth was accurate representation—the merest common sense in the English-speaking world, but a view not held in Germany since Kant. His desire to 'empty himself' meant to Americans that he proposed turning himself into a Lockean 'blank slate.' German Wissenschaft became Anglo-American 'science.' (Novick 31)

The "wie es eigentlich gewesen ist" ("as it really/actually was") dictum in historiography for which von Ranke is renowned, has been interpreted in North American historiography generally to mean a virtual materialistic empirical treatment of historical documentation. However, Ranke meant "as it essentially was," connoting the Idealist purpose to his meticulous and exhaustive technical specialties involved in historical work such as paleography, numismatics, epigraphy, and sphragistics, from which one could derive a meaningful interpretation of the historical world.

An additional problem lies with translation. Apart from the problem of translators who simply lack technical
expertise in an activity which is far more exacting and complex than is generally understood, there are the problems of preconception and isolation. Max Weber’s writings have suffered a fate similar to that of Sigmund Freud’s with regard to theoretical preconception. Freud’s writings were first systematically translated into English by Strachey as the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, argued by writers such as Bruno Bettelheim (1984) and Erich Fromm (1980) to have been cast into a mechanistic, positivistic mode, and which has stood as an authoritative, but misguided, source of Freud’s thought in English. Many translations of Weber’s works are misleading because translators do not understand his perspective, or, at least are committed to an incompatible one (Andreski 1983: 2-3).

The second problem of translation is the treatment of an author’s text in isolation from its intellectual and cultural context. Administrative theory has generally not sought influence from historical, literary and theological authors who have adopted a more generous and comprehensive view of Weber. Instead, a high selectivity of passages has been used which appear to contribute to narrow sociological concerns resulting in translation which has been done "in bits and pieces in such a way that the total aspect of his work has been obscured" (Cahnman 103). Administrative criticism in English has focussed primarily on a selection of the available writings, primarily *The Protestant Ethic*, the section of *Economy and Society* on bureaucracy translated by Parsons as *The Theory of Economic and Social Organization*, (corrected by G. Roth’s revised 1968 translation in *Economy and Society*) skewing the import and meaning of these selections. General sociological interpretations of Weber have been affected previous to 1968 by *Economy and Society* being translated into five separate
books, each emphasizing different aspects of the text used as support for one of two positions regarding Weber's philosophical and metasociological orientation: whether Weber was a neo-idealist sociologist of rationalization or a materialist conflict theorist (Collins 1986: 125). In this case, there is not only confusion regarding concepts and terminology, but a "talking past one another" produced by an "incommensurability of theories" as outlined by Feyerabend in *Against Method* (1975), both between types of sociological adherents, and between any specialized view in sociology and Weber's comprehensive world historical sociology. Even Gerth and Mills, ostensibly to simplify and clarify Weber's texts, excised many of the numerous qualifications Weber had included in his writing in the collection of excerpts presented in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*.

Making sense of Weber requires an understanding of an intellectual milieu resonating not only with influences conditioned primarily by Luther, Goethe, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, but with a regard for cultural achievements seen to be in direct line from Greco-Roman thought in virtual apostolic succession, resulting in scholarly training and activity conducted in their language, concepts and critical frameworks (Ringer 90-91). All of this was reinforced through the curriculum of the German Gymnasium. This intellectual orientation is still evident in the highly influential writings of such writers as Heidegger and Gadamer, and critical theorists like Jürgen Habermas, who persistently use Platonic and Aristotelian writings as touchstones in studies of recent and contemporary socio-political and intellectual developments. This has resulted in a world-view explicitly and uniquely Germanic, and largely at odds with the aims and methods of the pragmatic and positivistic spirit more familiar to the Anglo-Saxon intellectual context.
Defining the character of German scholarship inherited and displayed by Weber involves terminology and conceptual constructs which defy absolute definition, a problem inherent to all intellectual history Novick terms "Nailing jelly to the wall" (7). While it is unlikely that one can reconstruct Weber’s texts exactly as he understood them, and while one cannot relive the period in which he wrote and the role his writings played in German scholarship from 1890 on, it is possible to interpret his writings so as to achieve a contemporary understanding which retains the original and essential complexity, comprehensiveness, and meaning intended. Despite the barriers of language, culture, and history, there exists a universal substratum:

The accidental, historically moulded differences between tongues are, no doubt, formidable. But underlying these there are principles of unity, of invariance, of organized form, which determine the specific genius of human speech. Amid immense diversities of exterior shape, all languages are "cut from the same pattern." (Steiner 94)

Interpretation, or translation as Steiner terms all forms of reading and understanding, requires that texts be "located in a context of verbal recognition and placement before they assume real presence" (29). Correlative to linguistic translation, which has "recourse to lexica, historical grammars, glossaries of particular periods, professions, or social milieux, dictionaries of argot, manuals of technical terminology" (28), the reconstruction of Weber’s research approach requires the resurrection of the cultural and academic context within which he wrote. To read Weber, as to read Shakespeare and Hölderlin, Steiner’s examples, is "literally to prepare to read them," a process which requires not only knowledge and familiarity, but re-creative intuition (25, 28). This view is argued also by H. P. Rickman who believes understanding in human studies can be obtained if three epistemological conditions are met:
"familiarity with human nature, knowledge of the cultural background and awareness of context" (1967: 47). This is particularly the case with the terminology of 19th century German political theory which can not easily be translated into the language of Anglo-French political theory since it was based on different notions of cultivation, culture and the state (Ringer 119-120). Theoretical characterization of and norms for the ideal state were predominantly idealistic and apolitical in German, stated in moral and spiritual terms (Ringer 120-121). As well, there has been a contemporary cultural distancing and negation of fin-de-siècle ideals including methodological and social concepts in use at that time, the most important being Verstehen, "science" or scholarship (Wissenschaft), objectivity, values, elective affinity, and individualism (the meaning of the last term must be understood in contrast to pragmatic American individuality and post-modern individuality).

Valid intellectual history requires that the author be understood within the cultural context of his times in order that the reader understand the analytic terms he used and the methodological approach he articulated, define and determine the value of his thought, and distinguish what is historically transferrable and what is relevant to the author’s contemporaries (Siebel-Achenbach). Weber’s observations on social activity are unquestionably the product not only of intellect, research, and theorizing, but also of direct and personal involvement in politics and the cultural life of Germany at the turn of the century. The presentations of Weber in most administrative and organizational writings excise a number of qualitative dimensions necessary to understanding his work as a consequence of strong experimental-empirical grounding and the reporting criteria demanded by this approach. These include personal, cultural, and historical dimensions which
provide a texture and full meaning to his contributions to social analysis. Von Rintelen regards this approach as inimical to understanding: "[the author] conceives philosophical thinking as an aspect of personal expression, and therefore he would not detach a philosophy from its philosopher any more than he would study a poem without the poet" (Von Rintelen: Foreword, n.p.). Reconstructing Weber’s interpretive or verstehende approach to the study of social organization requires that the language, concepts, critical frameworks, and academic values underlying his methodology be identified and described, in the same way that H. Stuart Hughes uses the connections among an individual’s historical milieu, personality, and work to more accurately and fully capture the meaning of his contributions and its value to scholarship in Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930 (1977).

Political/Economic Climate (1880-1920)

Max Weber’s life span, 1864-1920, coincided with a tumultuous period in Germany history which saw the birth of a nation overcoming centuries of political multiformity and undergoing fundamental political and social transformation. Despite, and perhaps largely because of, the political, social, and economic turmoil of 19th and early 20th century, one of the greatest periods of German cultural and artistic achievement took place.

Germany as a unified nation only began to take shape under Napoleonic rule when the German Empire, consisting of 1,789 territories, was condensed into 36 states by 1815 (Mann 93). Under Napoleon’s administration German political, legal, religious, and administrative organisations were reformed under new ideas of politics, the
state, power, the military, and secularisation. The impetus of these reforms provided an opportunity for the Prussian state to later install enduring models of military organization and training, parliamentary government, and a universally accessible educational system which included the design of the modern university under the direction of Wilhelm von Humboldt, later in the 19th century serving internationally as a model for the modern university.

The role of the intelligentsia, in the period of the Aufklärung, or German Enlightenment, was not one of political protest. Many served as senior civil servants and ministers of state concerned primarily with improving state administration. Others, including poets, writers, journal publishers, and professors, were engaged primarily in scientific and philosophical studies (Mann 39). After Napoleonic occupation of German territories, German scholars, poets, and writers became politicized in the sense that much of their work was developed as an evaluative response to the political ideals and events of revolutionary France (Mann 48-49). In dialectic relation to political and social change Hegel’s philosophy of history was developed, and German philosophy, embodied in the writings of Hegel, Kant, Goethe, Schiller and the German Romantics, came to be regarded generally by the French as paradigmatic after Napoleon’s fall from power (Mann 129). This politicization was later reinforced by the influences of Heinrich Heine, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Due also to Napoleon and the German poets, German nationalism arose in the mid-19th century, understood, however, as an idealist, romantic, and liberal conception, formed as an attempt to free German literature and scholarship from French neo-classicism (Iggers 1969: 7).

Weber’s early years coincided with Bismarck’s domination of the European stage, 1861-1871, during which
time Bismarck forced the partial unification of Germany after the failures of the revolutions of 1848, in the establishment of the North German Confederation which lasted until 1918, and largely determined the configuration of the Weimar Republic in the nineteen twenties (Mann 303). It is primarily due to Bismarck's efforts at creating social and political stability under a strong state, Prussian though it was, that Germany underwent its late 19th century economic, industrial, and urbanizational ascendency. Topics and issues related to these changes, such as class relations, absorbed German scholarship and account to some degree for its strong historicist character, and various philosophical attitudes, such as neo-Kantianism, Nietzschean critique, Hegelian dialectic, and Marxist criticism, the value orientation and analytic methodology of which were suited to social and political evaluation.

Three concepts receiving consistent and rigorous formulation in German historiography (Wilhelm von Humboldt, Leopold von Ranke, Jacob Burckhardt, Wilhelm Dilthey, Friedrich Meinecke, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Johann Gustav Droysen) and philosophy (Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel) account for the German scholarly tradition's unique character. The first, the concept of state, both as Machtstaat as an end in itself, or Obrigkeitsstaat (state based upon authority), is distinctively different from French and English conceptions, and was an idealistic notion embodying aristocratic and bureaucratic authority, based upon cultural and property values (Iggers 1969: 8), and as a spiritual and rational concept occupying much the same level of existence as a Platonic form. The second is a concept of value embodying two attitudes. In historical description and explanation, individuals, social institutions, and events must be
reconstituted with reference to values inherent to the culture in which they reside. Alongside this historical relativism operated a moral principle inherent in the strong state, which was believed to be the only political, economic, and social condition under which freedom, law and cultural creativity can be ensured (Igers 1969: 9). A third principle was the predominant theory of knowledge stressing intuition and a contemplation of the individual character of historical subjects, combined with rigorous procedures of professionalism in historical research and canons of critical scholarship leading to objective knowledge. This marriage of empiricism and idealism was developed intentionally and deliberately to contrast with scientific models based upon universal concepts and generalizations leading to an explanation of the historical process as natural law (Igers 1969: 10).

Largely because of a centralized and powerful state administration, an academic educated class (Bildungsbürgertum) arose, which Fritz Ringer described as the German Mandarins (1990). The educated and cultured elite occupied a social stratum in advisory position to government, controlling academic standards in the school systems and serving as "gatekeepers" to bureaucratic certification during the late 19th century. Because of the socio-political experience and the social and political power of the Mandarins, German scholarship became preoccupied with questions of power, authority, the relationships among economic development and form, the character and etiology of social institutions, knowledge theory and ethics (professional and public), and the role of the individual. This accounts to a large degree for the historicist and idealistic character of German academic writing with its emphasis on social process and relations, and applies with full force to Max Weber.
Of particular relevance to German scholarship at the turn of the century, to the development of German sociology as a distinctive tradition, and to Weber's studies on society and social conduct, were three concerns which dominated a number of intense debates in social studies, in which Weber participated. A general revolt against monumental systems of determinism (Hegelian idealism and Marxist materialism), recognition of the constraints on the individual of an expanding system of rational institutions composing the societies of advanced industrialization, and concerns about increasing alienation of the individual in the face of collective action produced a "sociology of liberalism in despair" (Salomon 587-588) in Germany unlike the more optimistic attitudes expressed in France and England. This influenced the type of economics which was taught in Germany, particularly by Roscher and Knies whom Weber studied. Economics was conceived of as a discipline which "embraced virtually the whole field of social science and that was energetically committed to ethical judgments and practical applications . . . For in Germany the study of economics was intimately involved in social reform, and the professors who were facetiously called 'socialists of the academic chair' [Kathedersozialisten] devoted their talents to the problems of the relations between capital and labor in their newly industrialized nation" (Hughes 294). Weber's early studies on farm workers in East Prussia was typical of this approach. Weber was particularly vociferous about the political health of Germany as it influenced economic welfare in "Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany":

What then was Bismarck's legacy . . . He left behind him a nation without any political sophistication, far below the level which in this regard it had reached twenty years before [in 1870]. Above all, he left behind him a nation
without any political will of its own, accustomed to the idea that the great statesman at the helm would make the necessary political decisions . . . The great statesman did not leave behind any political tradition . . . A completely powerless parliament was the purely negative result of his tremendous prestige. (1978b: 1392)

Cultural Influences

Intellectual movements, more so in Germany than in many other countries, found philosophical expression in a variety of modes, both academic and non-academic, and therefore include intellectual reflection and investigation explored through the arts, including literature, film, painting, theatre, music, and the journalistic products of writers like Karl Kraus in Vienna during the fin de siècle period and the general influence of artistic and academic debates published in newspapers like The Frankfurter Zeitung (which even though a mass publication, comparable to North American newspapers in distribution, had an academic and scholarly level of writing--such newspapers have been since Weber’s time a primary vehicle for academic debate carried out in a far more public forum than North American scholarship which confines its controversies to academic journals).

Philosophical preoccupations dominated the writings of such literary figures as Goethe, Schiller, Heine, and Rilke, allowing them to provide antecedent roots to academic schools of thought of Wilhelmian and Weimar Germany (Gay, Chap I & Appen.). Artistic movements such as Bauhaus, Dadaism, Expressionism (more a German artistic phenomenon than of other national traditions), and Impressionism both reflected intellectual concerns and contributed to the development of modern academic theory. The purpose of art in these movements was generally understood to be that which met the Austrian architect Adolf Loos’ injunction to the
artist "to shake us out of our complacency and comfort (Bequemlichkeit)" (Schorske 344), which in the case of Germany meant the academic as well as general public. The challenge to cultural conservatism presented particularly by the Modernist movements of Symbolism, Jugendstil, and Impressionism was strong enough to cause governmental attempts at suppression (Liebersohn 6).

An example of an artistic group which met this injunction, with which Weber had some personal contact and fascination, was the George Kreis (George Circle) founded in Heidelberg in 1892 around the poet Stefan George. The purpose of this group was to perpetuate certain cultural values, to renew an aristocratic sense of life, and to preside over a transvaluation of values, based largely (and to some extent mistakenly) on the writings of Goethe, Nietzsche, Shakespeare, Hölderlin, Dante, Baudelaire, Mallarmé, and the philosophy of Herder. It is from George’s sensibility that the principles of biography were derived and developed by which Ernst Katorowicz wrote the biography Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite, "history as political poetry."

A more direct influence on Weber’s articulation of mystical and aesthetic concepts in opposition to rationalistic categories exemplified in the bureaucratic ethos is argued by Mitzman (269) as well as a correspondence between Nietzsche’s Apollonian and Dionysian dichotomy with Weber’s distinction between ascetic rationalism and mystical charisma (Mitzman 301) and his emphasis on a Faustian will (Mitzman 8).

Other writers who rose to cultural dominance during this period were Rainer Maria Rilke (the "Dichter"), Heinrich Heine, Hugo von Hofmannsthall, and Thomas Mann. Dramatists also had a significant impact on cultural movements: the Hölderlin, Büchner, and Kleist revivals, and the popularity of Walter Hasenclever’s Der Sohn (1914)
embodied metaphysical concerns fundamental to social and political criticism and captured the ideological and social changes inherited from 19th century German history, particularly those resulting from industrialization, urbanization, and political unity. Idealistic and romantic cultural movements, however, also included the feminist movement, Bohemianism among artists and intellectuals, and the youth movement or Wandervogel groups (Mitzman 304) (the last later adumbrated by the Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth) and Bund deutscher Mädchen (Association of German Girls)). These groups all expressed a form of Lebensphilosophie, a liberation of Eros reflected in Weber's "celebration of charisma as an 'emotional life-force' antagonistic to the dreary construction of the 'iron cage'" (Mitzman 304) produced by rationalization and its most evident organizational form, bureaucracy.

In the other arts Schönberg's twelve-tone system of composition, expressionist film classics like Robert Wiene's The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Kabinett des Dr. Caligari) and Fritz Lang's Metropolis, the architecture of Bauhaus largely driven by the ideas of Gropius, the Der blaue Reiter expressionists in painting, and Grosz's cartoons all challenged traditional cultural and academic values. It was through these vehicles, to a much greater extent in Germany than in North America, that the ideas of psychoanalysis, history, science, politics, and other academic theories were tested out and formed a complementary intellectual development to academic activity.

The General Character of German Scholarship

For many authors of intellectual history the fin de siècle period in Europe, 1890-1933—respectively, the dates of the dismissal of Bismarck, and both the fall of the
Weimar Republic and the installation of Hitler—is regarded as a golden age which produced a "cluster' of genius" in all forms of human intellectual expression with which Weber is characteristically associated (Hughes 17). Weber was one of the great individuals (grands individues) of this period of European scholarship, attaining a virtual encyclopaedic knowledge in sociocultural studies and level of critique which continued to exert intellectual force among German scholars such as Karl Jaspers and Hans-Georg Gadamer:

One can easily grasp that for a man [Jaspers] of his many interests, the demonic figure of Max Weber, the world's most recent polymath in the cultural sciences, was the great model he admired and tried to emulate. In Weber he came face-to-face with the iron self-discipline of a researcher who productively drove his will to universal knowledge in all directions up to the limits forced upon him by his scientific asceticism and methodical integrity. (Gadamer 1985: 160)

It was both Weber's personal inclinations and his training in the German intellectual tradition which enabled him to understand the place an observation or conclusion had in the global sense, and what an economic "fact" meant in historical, sociological and philosophical terms. Weber's scholarly purpose was that of understanding social action: the "understanding [which] involves the interpretive grasp of the meaning present in one of the following contexts: (a) as in the historical approach, the actually intended meaning for concrete individual action; or (b) as in cases of sociological mass phenomena, the average of, or an approximation to, the actually intended meaning; or (c) the meaning appropriate to a scientifically formulated pure type (an ideal type) of a common phenomenon" (Weber 1978b: 9). He was, therefore, not a research technician, and did not believe that understanding could be derived solely from technical analysis, but as a theoretician in the tradition of great systems builders like Kant and Hegel used
quantitative and qualitative analysis in the pursuit of an interdisciplinary system of knowledge encompassing world history.

The German academic tradition at this time was broadly based—scholarly training, both in the German academic highschool (Gymnasium) and the university, was multi-disciplinary, of cultural depth, and, in all fields, tended toward a philosophical and historical presentation (Gerth and Mills 23), typified in the manner in which economics was generally understood by German scholars, including Weber, to be a study of historical and political economy (similar to the Scottish tradition of political economy, in contrast to the English and French schools of economics based upon scientific principles such as laws of supply and demand (Collins 1986: 39). Even in such technical fields as law, in which Weber earned his first academic degree, classical, historical and philosophical study were predominant (MacRae 1974: 33-34). His law examination therefore, represented him being well-equipped as an economist, historian and philosopher (Gerth and Mills 23).

Weber’s thought evidences a seemingly contradictory Kantian and Nietzschean "flavour" characteristic of a cultured perspective of that time:

The intellectual traditions and the accumulated scholarship of Germany, especially in history, the classics, psychology, theology, comparative literature, philology, and philosophy, gave the late-nineteenth-century German scholar a pre-eminent base upon which to build his work. And the clash of two bodies of intellectual work, the conservative interpretation of ideas by academicians in the tradition of Hegel and Ranke, and the radical intellectual production of non-academic socialists, Kautsky, Bernstein, and Mehring, formed a unique and challenging intellectual dimension. (Gerth and Mills 24)

Weber’s intellectual grasp extended to that of psychologist as well as "lawyer, historian, economist, philosopher,
political scientist as well as sociologist" (MacRae 1974: 33). Since the German academic community was not pressured to produce either annually, or in a 'practical' or 'useful' manner because of a generally "humanistic atmosphere," academics were released for considerable time to contemplative, innovative and long-term studies (Gerth and Mills 24).

The multi-disciplinary nature of German scholarship not only conditioned 19th century approaches to socio-cultural studies, but continues to influence the divergent way in which Weber is received. As in other countries early German sociologists came from departments of philosophy, economics, history or jurisprudence, however unlike in other countries German sociology continued to be taught under the aegis of other disciplines, philosophy of history, Wirtschaftswissenschaft (economic studies) or Staatswissenschaft (government studies), legal studies, theory of social classes, and studied in conjunction with other disciplines such as philosophy, social psychology, history, cultural anthropology, and religion (Horkheimer 1952: 1-5) until the 1950s, and still retains a relatively multi-disciplinary treatment. As a professional responsibility indicative of the German expansive notion of professionalism, "the cult of specialization (Spezialistentum) is deplored as an intellectual and moral aberration from a more broadly based cultural and social awareness, the growing intellectual division of labor is regarded as a violation of a more principled commitment to the theoretical and critical comprehension of the society as a whole, a task which cannot be accomplished by sociology alone" (Meja et al 1987: 5).

Multi-disciplinary practice of German scholarship is evident in the manner that German academics are able to move from discipline to related discipline in their academic
appointments. Weber moved from his first appointment as Professor (Ausserordentlicherprofessor) in Roman and Commercial Law at Berlin, to the Chair in Political Economy in Freiburg, to the Chair in Political Economy in Heidelberg, to the Chair of Political Economy in Vienna, and, finally, to the Chair in Sociology in Munich. This mobility is still commonplace in German scholarship; after interdisciplinary study in subjects like philosophy, economics, history, sociology, political science, and literature, sometimes psychology, and music, academics like Jürgen Habermas, Jürgen Kocka, Rainer Maria Lepsius, and Friedrich H. Tenbruck, are able to move from Chair to Chair among the social sciences and philosophy (Meja et al 1987: 451-460).

A characteristic distinguishing German scholarship from the Anglo-American is its general orientation to past thought. Individual contributions such as Max Weber's are understood to be in dialectic relation to a long and dynamic tradition in continuous, subsumatory, and interrelated development. German academics, unlike French (analytical) and Anglo-American (empirical), were also of a strong metaphysical inclination (Szacki 339)--questions about the nature of disciplines and values inherent in them were the focus of study and investigation, attesting to the continued strong influence of Kant's transcendental analyses, that is, determining the conditions which must be satisfied in order that any system of statements of reality can be considered to be true. In fact, modern Western philosophical analysis, both metaphysical and empirical, has been developed in relation to the basic Kantian a priori categories of mind and the Kantian understanding of knowledge claims (Stegmüller 2-6).

During the period 1831 to 1933 the Humboldt university system was established, predicated upon the notion of
Bildung, that is, self-cultivation, the cultural development of the individual. The concept of Kultur was opposed to the French term civilisation. Kultur meant both intellectual and moral cultivation, derived originally from theological and mystical roots originating in German idealism—the ideas of Kant, Friedrich Schlegel, G. E. Lessing and J. G. Herder. Bildung was understood to mean the general process of individual enculturation, not specialist technical accomplishments. This notion is Kantian in the sense that Kant believed that the individual must submit to and strive for a set of idealistic principles and standards, and not succumb to the kind of self-indulgence and egomania later described by Weber in the essay "Science as a Vocation," in which he attacked academics who used their teaching role as a political platform, abused personal power, and engaged in cult-activity, all of which compromised academic standards. Civilisation, on the other hand, was associated generally in German with superficial manners, and the etiquette and courtesy practised in court life based upon French practice. Whereas Kultur is achieved through a personal, authentic, and profound striving for values, civilization is attained through customary, artificial, and fashionable striving for compliance and fine manners necessary in courtly life for achieving ingratiation leading to social success.

On the one hand, superficiality, ceremony, formal conversation; on the other, inwardness, depth of feeling, immersion in books, development of the individual personality. It is the same contrast which is expressed by Kant in the antithesis between Kultur and civilization, relating to a very specific social situation. (Elias 1978: 19)

The underlying distinction corresponds to Plato's discrimination between knowledge and opinion, artistry and pandering, morality (statesmanship) and crass politics in the Gorgias. These themes were explored in depth in Goethe's The Sorrows of Young Werther (first published in
1774), a text which served as an archetypal motif for preoccupations in German thought through the 18th and 19th centuries regarding educational and cultural ideals, and the dualities of rationality and passions, authenticity and custom, and individuality and collectivity, underlying both intellectual and personal dilemmas of its seminal writings, including Weber.

Originating as an intellectual, artistic, and social antithesis, an ideological cleavage in Germany between the educated bourgeoisie and an aristocracy still informed by French courtly etiquette developed into a national antithesis evident to the writer Theodor Fontane in 1852:

England and Germany are related in the same way as form and content, appearance and reality. Unlike things, which in no other country in the world exhibit the same solidity as in England, people are distinguished by form, their most outward packing. You need not be a gentleman, you must only have the means to appear one, and you are one. You need not be right, you must only find yourself within the forms of rightness, and you are right . . . Everywhere appearance. Nowhere is one more inclined to abandon oneself blindly to the mere lustre of a name. The German lives in order to live, the Englishman to represent. The German lives for his own sake, the Englishman for the sake of others. (Elias 1978: 33)

Among the concepts informing Weber’s writing is one which derives from religious sources, rather than the stereotypic Prussian military ethic with which it is usually associated. Weber inherited from the spirit of Martin Luther’s writings, Goethe’s literary reflections (Kaufmann 17-25), and Kant’s philosophical formulations an underlying notion of the "autonomous personality," which was not simply an analytical concept but an educational goal and the purpose of social and political institutions: "rejecting authority, affirming the individual and a faith based on
reason, accepting duty and rejecting feeling where it endangered reason and duty" (Albrow 1990: 22).

The notion of the "autonomous individual" is central to the philosophies of Dilthey, Nietzsche, Freud and Weber, and lies at the heart of the German notion of Kultur. Each of these authors, however, understood this concept in a different way. To Dilthey, it meant emancipation from immediacy, from inner and outer constraints in order to live a free and spiritual life (Bulhof 156). To Nietzsche, it was freedom from historical, social, and individual custom which he designated "slave ethics," culminating in the supreme moral condition, an apotheosis in which the autonomous individual, in typical existential fashion, "has developed his own, independent, long-range will, which dares to make promises" (1956: 191) and acts as a "sovereign individual, equal only to himself, all moral custom left far behind" (1956: 191) Freud's understanding of the autonomous individual, or strong ego, was both biological and psychological involving the self-mastery of aggressive and sexual instincts, the elimination of symptom-formation caused by repression enabling independent decision-making and the development of appropriate sublimatory avenues.

Weber's understanding of "autonomous individual," subsuming aspects of all three, was the ability to accept responsibility to act in full consciousness of the consequences of one's actions. Weber was concerned not only with the ability to act responsibility in one's everyday life, but also responsibility in academic activities outlined in "Science as a Vocation," particularly as it related to the conditions requisite in teacher-student relationships to student autonomy, in this text relevant to university education: "I consider it irresponsible for the lecturer to exploit the fact that students must attend a teacher's course for the sake of their careers and that
nobody present can criticize him, in order to stamp them with his personal political opinions instead of being useful to his students with his knowledge and scientific experiences, as is his duty" (21). Weber's conception of the autonomous individual is a semi-successful integration of the two dominant models in German thought: the Kantian, acting in accordance with universal rationalistic laws; and the Goethian, expression of personality by directing passions, feelings, intelligence, perception, reason, and will creatively (Kaufmann 17-24).

It is partly for ethical reasons then, as well as methodological, that Weber insisted upon the individual unit of analysis, even in his characterization of bureaucracy. As will be seen, this sense has generally been lost in most administrative presentations of Weber's work as it is transmitted through Talcott Parsons.

Religious faith, while not affirmed by Weber in his personal life, professing to be "unmusical" with respect to religion (Baumgarten 670), did provide a focus for his investigations into cultural studies and the roles that values play in all spheres of life:

What is my attitude toward these incomprehensible things [religious matters]? What value did they have for people in the past and what value do they have for me? Or do they perhaps have no meaning for me whatever, because of their very incomprehensibility? To my way of thinking, this last question should definitely not be answered in the affirmative, but an individual will not find an instant answer to the question about their meaning. (Marianne Weber 103)

Weber's emphasis on the determining characteristics of values in human activities coincides with Schnädelbach's description of Humboldt's conception of the purpose of the university as a fulfillment of Kultur:

As soon as one ceases to pursue science in the proper manner, or fancies that it does not need to
be created from the depths of the spirit, but is the product of extensive accumulation, then everything is lost, irretrievably and for ever: lost for science, which, if this process continues for long, escapes to such an extent that it even leaves behind language like an empty husk, and lost for the state. For only that science which stems from the inner and can take root in the inner also transforms the character, and the state has as little concern as does humanity in general with knowledge and talk: its concern is with character and action. (Schnädelbach 27)

The Humboldt university, designed by Humboldt between 1807 and 1810, was conceived of as a new institution believed to correct for the excesses of the English and French models. Oxford and Cambridge at this time were operated as medieval guild-universities serving primarily an aristocratic elite, dominated by High Church government with no principled recognition of academic freedom, and kept separate from research and practical considerations, a set of conditions which deterred American professional graduate students from enrolling in British universities in the 19th century but attracted them in large numbers to Berlin, Göttingen, Heidelberg, and Halle (Herbst 11-12). The French universities had been reduced by 1806 to technical schools devoted to recruiting and producing officials for the state (Schnädelbach 22-23). In contrast, Wilhelm von Humboldt, drawing from the programmatic writings of Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and others, established a university system predicated on the principles of both academic freedom and the unity of research and teaching. This produced a system which ensured the security and freedom for the kind of work which Weber undertook. Even though it had by Weber's time devolved into the "bourgeois career goal" and state-capitalist industrial university system, it had established a set of values, roles, and levels of academic achievement which still governed academic life in Weber's time:
German university scholarship is 'bureaucratic scholarship,' that is, the state guarantees the leisure which, according to Aristotle, alone makes knowledge possible by making the scholars into bureaucrats, while the scholars, for their part, form a 'republic of learning' in the faculties within the general framework of their duties as state officials. 'Academic freedom,' in this context, means the right to self-government under the legal supervision of the state; keeping one's own house in order; the right of the faculties to fill their own vacancies, limited by the minister's right of appointment (above all, by means of the institution of proposals of appointment and the 'habilitation,' associated with the granting of the venia legendi, or permission to lecture, which led to the system of Privatdozenten, teachers independent of the state administration); the separation of state examinations from the academic examinations independent of the state; freedom of teaching for the Professors and Dozenten and freedom of access for the students, limited only in a formal sense through the requirement of the Abitur, or school-leaving certificate. The 'unity of research and teaching' was to be secured by means of the principle that the university teacher must also engage in research and the freedom of students to attend any lectures they chose, in explicit contrast to the Gymnasiens; through the institution and form of teaching of the seminars (the 'seedbeds' of scholarship); through the close links established between the universities and the continuing academies and other research-institutions which soon arose within the framework of the universities themselves. (Schnädelbach 23-24)

In only a system such as this was Weber able to remain a solitary scholar, directed for little of his life by academic institutions, and by none of his life by industrial or governmental interests, notwithstanding the fact that he was a Beamter, or state official.

The German Philosophic Tradition
There are two reasons for defining the nature of German philosophy in the late 19th century in order to establish Weber's perspective. First, it was the nature of the German philosophical orientation which conditioned the character of his social and cultural studies. Secondly, German thought in all fields has historically differed significantly from Anglo-American and French intellectualism resulting in a radically different view of Weber from that of the German. Iggers attributes the separation of German intellectualism from other Western developments to the rise of historicism (from the late 18th through the 19th century). This replaced static natural-law philosophy by the "idea of the inimitable, unique individuality which develops according to its own vital laws and which cannot be comprehended by means of logical thinking, let alone through the mechanistic law of causation, but rather has to be grasped, viewed, and experienced or re-experienced with the totality of all spiritual powers" (1962-3: 34).

Contrastingly, the English and French traditions, particularly in the 19th century, generally adopted positivistic and naturalistic orientations, primarily from the British empiricists Locke, Hume, and Berkeley, which viewed change as "causal-genetic" and part of a complete system. The underlying metaphor for a number of disciplines, including philosophy and history, was mechanics and its consequent determinism and method of objectivity:

his [the positivist's] object is always to analyze a given configuration down to its basic constituents, which may then be recomposed in accordance with inductively established laws of interaction. The positivist suspects that association psychology will eventually come up with a kind of atomic theory of mental life. At bottom, he sees history as applied sociology." (Ringer 342; also Outhwaite 1975: 11-12)

It is this view which regards history as composed of constituent units which interact like balls on a billiard
table, and expressible through historical laws modelled on and meeting the criteria of natural, scientific laws describing causal chains.

It is as a consequence of the positivistic character of American historical thinking throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries which H. Stuart Hughes claims causes the historian to be "squeamish" about dealing with conscious choice, and to "suffer from an uneasy conscience when he chooses to write of the 'higher' things--of ethical aspiration and the freely speculating mind" (Hughes 5), a purpose which is central to traditional German scholarship. Instead American historians prefer through social science training to write of individuals and their deeds as products of material and psychological conditioning, and view the idealist tradition in history, exemplified by Dilthey, Collingwood, and Croce, as historiography's triumvirate who have ruined the historical pursuit with Idealistic philosophy (Skinner 7). It is also this positivistic form of empiricism which distorted the work of German scholars like von Ranke, whose idealism was lost in translation (both linguistic and philosophic):

Unable to understand the philosophic context of Ranke's historical thought, American historians detached Ranke's critical analysis of documents, which they understood and which suited their need to give to history scientific respectability, from his idealistic philosophy, which was alien to them. (Iggers 1962-3: 18)

This resulted in Ranke's role as "intellectual ancestor of an essentially positivist approach" (Iggers 1962-3: 18).

In contrast German thought is metaphysical, and preoccupied with transcendental question in the Kantian sense:

Philosophical problems and methods derived from Kant, an attitude to the data of history descended from Herder and Hegel, a dispute over the task and
nature of economics found nowhere else in so extreme a form, and a continuing debate with Marx and Marxism, all combined to give classical German sociology its particular and separate character. (MacRae 1964: vii-viii)

In addition, "the philosophy and methodology of historicism permeated all the German humanistic and cultural sciences, so that linguistics, philology, economics, art, law, philosophy, and theology became historically oriented studies" (Iggers 1969: 4), and continue to be so. The incomparable influence of Immanuel Kant served as a fountain-head for German historical and political thinking by assimilating and reinterpreting into a unitary system of thinking the multiplicity of intellectual strands current in his time (Reiss 10-11), resulting in "more continuity in the German developments of philosophical thought than there is in the traditions of the great majority of nations and cultures" (Von Rintelen, Foreword, n.p.). It was through a Kantian revival between 1890 and 1914 that German liberal democracy was developed. And it was through the Neo-Kantians, a broad cultural movement centered primarily in Marburg (Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp) and Freiburg (Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Wirdelband), that the foundations for a critique of positivism, naturalism, and materialism, as well as the objective idealism of Hegel and the religious historicism of the Rankean school of historians was developed (Seidman 204).

German philosophy has a unique form and character with conceptual roots still Classical in character, particularly Platonic and Aristotelian. The general objective of German philosophy has been to achieve Theoria in the Aristotelian sense, that is, not complete abstraction, but one connected to, or infused with concrete life and regarded primarily as a quest for meaning (Von Rintelen 1-3). This is exemplified by the readoption of the Aristotelian term praxis. It is evident in the German approach to anthropology as a
philosophical exploration of human nature rather than as a scientific study. Two aspects of German social and cultural studies, and of German intellectualism in general, is a strong metaphysical orientation and a domination by the heritage of Kantian and Hegelian texts. This form of neo-Idealism produced a different understanding of history in which the past, including persons, periods and states, is a unique and meaningful synthesis which is able to live in one's consciousness through the combined force of higher cognitive functions, empathy and "sympathetic understanding," represented in Goethe's Young Werther and Faust as well as the synthesis in music and poetry of the Schiller's "Ode to Joy" set to music by Beethoven in the Ninth Symphony, by any standards of aesthetics a sublime and apothecial statement of German idealism, nationalism, and Kultur:

Joy, bright spark of divinity,
Daughter of Elysium,
Fire-inspired we tread
Thy sanctuary.
Thy magic power re-unites
All that custom has divided,
All men become brothers
Under the sway of thy gentle wings. (Deutsche Grammophon)

The strong metaphysical inclination and intensity of self-reflection of German academics, unlike French (analytical) and Anglo-American (empirical), resulted in questions of the nature of the disciplines and their inherent values as the focus of a manner of study and investigation in a milieu which lead them to both integrational and far-reaching scopes of analysis (Andreski 1964: 2-3). In contrast, Anglo-American and French historians and sociologists emphasized an abstract analytic procedure and preference for examining psycho-physical and associative states (Ringer 342). The goal for German
philosophy, on the other hand, is that of understanding the meanings and values of other times, change as transforming tendencies, ideas, and values, and, most importantly, persons as individuals and as community participants, acting as volitional subjects, characterized by a constrained measure of free will. Social studies to Weber, therefore, did not form a chain of material causalities, but was a tissue of significance and sense composed through an interpretive grasp of the meaning social action has for its participants (Weber 1978b: 8-9).

The view of German philosophy, and in particular German Idealism, as a solely metaphysical, mystical and mental aberration, is primarily generated by those whose positions are radically positivistic, and which by default, force figures like Weber into an empiricist camp. It is only in contrast to a radical empiricism that Idealism appears illusory. An alternative way to interpret much of Idealistic literature, for example the writings of Kant, on whom Weber relied for part of his theory of human experience, is the understanding of the individual self as an active principle rather than a "divine creator" (Rockmore 7). This false dichotomy which presents Idealism as a way of thinking absolutely opposed to any form of empiricism, and Realism as a system of thought absolutely opposed to any of the features of Idealism, has resulted in a false characterization of Continental thinkers like Leopold von Ranke (Igers 1962-63: 19), Max Weber, Sigmund Freud, and Wilhelm Dilthey. The emphasis in this approach has resulted in a presentation of the writings of such figures in reductive and oppositional terms. A careful examination of historians on both sides of the divide reveals that this dualism simply does not exist in exclusive terms in historiographical practice, but functions in a dialectical
fashion as applied to facticity and causality (Gilliam 231-232).

There are a number of other typical tendencies in German philosophy which have significant implications for social and cultural studies and which relate directly to Weber. One characteristic which German academics are stereotypically regarded for is an unequalled thoroughness (Gründlichkeit), to perform everything exactly and thoroughly to the very last. This has led to two extremes: abstract rational philosophical constructions and systems, and to extreme individualism (Von Rintelen 4). This attribute also accounts for the development of critical historiography first articulated as principles of historiographic practice by Barthold Niebuhr in his Roman History (1812) for "evaluating, analyzing, and collating documentary sources in order to make a rigorous judgment of their impartiality and trustworthiness," later applied by Leopold von Ranke in an elaborate appendix, On the Criticism of Writers of Modern History, to his first work History of the Latin and Germanic Peoples (1824) (Gilliam 234). This cautious and comprehensive approach to the treatment of documentary sources was inherited by Weber, however, he extended the approach to include an even greater range of types of sources such as literary texts (it was largely from Tolstoy that Weber identified the concept of mystical attitudes as opposed to ascetic, which formed the basis of his religious typologies), and the greatest possible range of disciplines, yielding an unwieldy and complex interrelational field of study which defies a solely scientific methodology. Even for non-empiricists, Weber's writings cover an extensive and apparently all-inclusive range resisting a systematic integrity. This is a consequence not so much of the inability to conform to rigorous disciplinary practice, but of the German tendency
to create inclusive, complex systems of thought such as those of Kant, Hegel, and Freud, who inherited partially from German historicism as established by von Ranke interest in the examination of great movements and universal history (Iggers 1962-3: 29). This goal is evident in the scope of Weber's work and his preoccupation with the complexity of a topic like modernism.

German philosophy has also demonstrated a preference for the active and dynamic, which includes achievement, devotion, energy and transcendentalism on the part of the individual. This was described as the priority of "becoming" in German Idealism and Romanticism where everything is seen in development and often seen in eternal, infinite and dialectical process. This has been expressed not only in scholarly work, but in art as evidenced in the Symphonies of Beethoven which evoke romantic transcendentalism, Goethe's Faust, the novels of Thomas Mann, and the popularity of Tieck and Schlegel's translations of Shakespeare (more often performed in Germany than in any of the English-speaking countries). This characteristic is not only a feature of formal thought, but lies at the heart of German 19th century culture and social psychology. As Nietzsche observed, "the Germans would always give priority to 'becoming' (Werden), even if a Hegel had not existed" (Von Rintelen 4). This concept also underlies Weber's view of the nature of the historical individual.

The aim of German philosophy, one could argue the final aim of all philosophy, is to discover the relationship of all beings to Logos (reason). For pre-Socratic and classical philosophy, and integral to European philosophy, this has meant an interpretation of the world as a harmonious cosmos. This "holistic" concept is central to German philosophy and expressed in the term Weltanschauung,
which means much more than simply a point of view, but is a comprehensive term referring to how one regards the world on all levels of its manifestation, and at the same time referring to the many levels on which one apprehends (spiritual, emotional, intellectual and physical). The philosophical consequences for Weltanschauung was a rejection of diachronic history which promised a progressivist ideology and ethical certainties.

It is because of these features of German thought that positivistic philosophy, largely as it was defined by the Vienna Circle (in particular Schlick and Carnap) did not have much influence in Germany, since positivism limits knowledge to that which is empirically given, and materialistically described and analyzed: "It puts the emphasis on laws and functions, which as far as possible must be defined in terms of numbers and quantities, as demanded in natural science; or it tries in logistics to develop a language of mathematical concepts" (Von Rintelen 2). In addition, it is a tenet of positivism that factual statements can be separated from the nonfactual, allowing one to argue that philosophical and metaphysical issues are non-sensical. Theoretical disputes, therefore, "must be decided by reference to crucial empirical experiments alone, that methodological techniques of verification or falsification are of critical and ultimate importance" (Alexander xiv). This is contrary to non-empirical approaches which attempt to interpret the world and resolve metaphysical problems (ethics, meaning, and fulfilment in life) more inclusively. The latter is the central focus for neo-Kantians, hermeneuticians, and phenomenologists, particularly Martin Heidegger. It is regarded as the task of philosophy as a responsible discipline to deal with these issues on a broad experiential level.
The consequence of positivistic influence for social and cultural studies became a central preoccupation for Weber, as well as the neo-Kantians Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband, who with some collaboration attempted to create an autonomous epistemological and methodological foundation to support the distinction they believed existed between the natural sciences and the human or social sciences and humanities which are contained within the German term Geisteswissenschaften. This term does not simply offer an alternative organization of academic disciplines, but implies a different understanding of the nature of those studies which are called the human or social studies.

There has been considerable confusion over the term Wissenschaft, which is central to academic debates in Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in two of which Weber took an active part. Wissenschaft is usually translated into English by the term "science." In German, however, Die Wissenschaft means "scholarship" or "learning," and eine Wissenschaft simply means "a discipline," a broader term in German than the English term "science," meaning research carried out by systematic study of any type, including natural science methods of investigation and systematic study in the liberal arts. It is necessary in German to specify the type of discipline with a prefix, such as Naturwissenschaft for "natural science," or Geisteswissenschaft for "humanistic discipline" (Novick 24; Ringer 102-3), or in terms of Canadian university disciplinary distinctions, the Arts, as opposed to the Sciences. All of the disciplines in which Weber worked, philosophy, political science, history, and sociology, are Geisteswissenschaften.

The Wissenschaften, therefore, can be of different natures, requiring different philosophical foundations and
different methodologies. Because the human world is one of freedom, and the role of intentions, purposes, goals, and values is that of shaping human life, the various methods of the Naturwissenschafiten (natural sciences), counting, measuring, finding of regularities and formulation of these in laws (Breisack 280), are inadequate to understanding the human world, although they may go some distance in describing and explaining it. Only those studies whose means are designed to address those features of human life which extend beyond that of the natural world are adequate to history since human experience is more than a physical fact. For Weber, as for Nietzsche, positivism promised only "idolatry of the actual for which we have now discovered the characteristic phrase, 'to adapt ourselves to circumstances'" (Nietzsche 1957: 52). The ideal of historical progress can be conveyed in the concept of will, which Weber regarded as the realization of values and a human facility which is asserted over the mechanical necessity of external nature.

There are therefore two kinds of knowledge: that which is available to us through the natural sciences, and that which is available through history and other Geisteswissenschafiten. The latter, understood as a distinct form, was inherited by Weber from thinkers like Vico (and his contemporary Rickert) who argued that it is possible for knowledge such as this to exist because we are part of it:

"there then emerged the idea that 'we' can understand our past because we have made it: we can imaginatively reconstruct the process of its creation—a kind of knowledge which we cannot have of natural entities, though God can because he made them" (Outhwaite, 1983: 55). This became a 'species' of knowing, and therefore a distinguishable category of knowledge which developed into the German historicist understanding of the concept Verstehen.
An additional characteristic of German philosophy which extends to other disciplines is its *ab ovo* premise: starting everything over again from the beginning. In historicist terms, "all opinions grew out of historical causes and are constantly changing," resulting in both an attitude of noncommitment and relativity, as well as the phenomenological quest for unconditional validity of ethical demands and normative standards (Von Rintelen 5). This can be seen in German philosophy's dual historical character: a dependence upon traditional thought, and at the same time, its imbeddedness in contemporaneous social and political events and problems (Von Rintelen 1). Following the rapid and profound cultural changes brought about through unification under Bismarck, the Wilhelmine period, the Weimar Republic, the result in the German cultural world was an intense interest in social and political philosophy. By the mid-nineteenth Century, "the interweaving of the intellectual and the political in Germany is more profound than most Anglo-Saxon readers can imagine; and the threads of that interweaving, at least until 1945, were mainly religious" evident in the struggles of the Wilhelmine state supported by Jewish and Lutheran theologians, Hermann Cohen and Adolf von Harnack, against the Catholic-backed resistance of the newly annexed Bavaria (Roberts 127).

German philosophy is also highly subjective in a self-critical manner causing authors to constantly question what has been accomplished already and the reacceptance of older ideas in modified form (Von Rintelen 5). It is necessary, therefore, to recognize an evolution, and occasionally a reversal, in thinking by seminal authors. This is typical also of a number of Weber's essays which underwent revisions to the time of his death, and which has caused some difficulty in producing a standard edition. This also results in a tendency to highly value individuality and
subjectivity. In historicism and in ethics of situation (Situationsethik), expressions such as "historicity" and "that what is individually my own" in existentialism, are related to the idea that the highest duty is to develop personality within the framework of society (Von Rintelen 5). Individuality is not determined only rationally, though, but metarationally, including emotionally established inner experience especially in philosophy of value. This attitude is evident in Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life) which meant that "life in its immediacy is man's primary reality," derived largely from Friedrich Nietzsche and Bergson, implying a definition of life based upon freedom, creativity and "wholeness" in experience (Ringer 337). Subjectivity in the Germanic tradition was not understood in the post-modern sense of excessive feeling, but of a subjectivity regulated by rationality and scholarship, evident in the traditional hermeneutics of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer as opposed to the radical hermeneutics of post-modern deconstructionism. Exploration by German traditional phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics aspired to the expansion of knowledge, whereas post-modern studies have aspired in their most extreme form to a denial of any meaningful categories of knowledge and consequently value.

Three pivotal individuals in German thought, Kant, Marx, and Nietzsche, were not viewed by Weber simply as "great dead" whose critiques are relegated to intellectual history, but whose challenges and categories of thought were vital and recreated in each successive enterprise in his intellectual progress. From Kant Weber adopted a concept of a general character of knowledge, types of rationality, and the use of conceptual constructs which were developed into the Weberian "ideal types" or typologies; from Nietzsche Weber accepted concepts of will, irrationality, ideology,
charismatic leadership, and creativity, however as polarities to Kantian precepts which presented a challenge for mediation and integration. Using Marx as a foundation, Weber extended his examination of social behaviour to more complex and comprehensive theories of social stratification, social conflict, and economic analysis than Marx had first envisioned. As Martin Albrow has argued in *Max Weber's Construction of Social Theory*, and as demonstrated in Fritz Ringer's *Decline of the German Mandarins*, Kantian theory has and continues to dominate German philosophy and social theory and is profoundly challenged by Nietzsche to a degree unparalleled by any single author in the English-speaking world.

Kant's works, especially, have had an influence on German scholarship unknown to the English-speaking world; and Kant remains a figure with whom even contemporary German scholars are in perpetual dialogue. As much as Martin Luther, Kant provided the language, concepts, and metaphysical framework in which most German scholars think, speak, and write. Kantian influence on Weber's thinking came from two sources, from Kant's own works, and from the Baden or Southwest School of Neo-Kantianism, particularly the writings of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, who developed Kant's general concepts of meaning and understanding for application to socio-cultural studies. Kant's influence is apparent throughout Weber's writings in the same manner that it is evident generally in German scholarship, playing a strong role in Weber's construction of sociological categories, and the manner in which they are used in organizing and evaluating historical evidence.

Kant's value to the development of philosophy is twofold. First in knowledge claims, Kant's view was that there is no such thing as a pure empirical science but that all empirical sciences have a non-empirical foundation,
presupposing a metaphysics of experience including intuition and the phenomenal resulting in considerable doubt about law-like statements attributable to a study of human experience (Stegmüller 6). Kant's second contribution to German scholarship was an examination of the foundation of ethics. He argued that ethics grounded in the "good" or in "ends" leads to relativism. The philosophical consequence was a demonstration that ethics could only be established on formal grounds (Stegmüller 21-22), leading to his formulation of the primary value of duty as an expression of formal ethical categories, a philosophical position which has not survived without considerable controversy and opposition. Kant's characterization of various grounds of value and identification of value types are apparent in Weber's four-part typology of value as historical individuals have understood them and which orient social action: the first two, ethics of goods based upon affectual and traditional grounds, which lead to ethical relativism, and two rational categories of value, instrumentality and intrinsic or absolute value, which lead to formal principles (Weber 1978b: 24-25; Stegmüller 21-22). It is predominantly upon a Kantian foundation that Weber's attitudes towards educational ethics as they pertain to the university professorship are derived.

Weber's understanding of the kind of process which is historical derives from Kant's argument in an essay entitled "The Contest of Faculties," the last work published in his lifetime. In this essay Kant argues that a natural or divine law deterministically driving history cannot be demonstrated formally to be impossible: the "terroristic conception," in which there is a necessary process of deterioration in history; the "eudaemonistic conception," in which a there is a necessary process of improvement in history; and "abderitism," in which there is a necessary
stagnation (Kant 177-190). The only fourth possibility is that rationality as it is expressed in ethics, and therefore the capacity for valuation, creates an historical reality which is not deterministic, but can account for improvement in the human condition in history (182).

The neo-Kantians defined philosophy as value-theory, the aim of which was to comprehend and provide foundations for all domains of value: economic, cultural, aesthetic, moral, theoretical, and truth values (Schnädelbach 161). These were subjects begging questions which could only be addressed through philosophic, not scientific, means, a view adopted by Weber and explored in the speech "Science as a Vocation."

From Heinrich Rickert Weber borrowed concepts of the historical individual, value-relevance, the distinction between values and value judgments (Oakes 1987: 434). For historical purposes Weber determined the limits of concept formation to lie where Rickert established them, "precisely at the point where individual events are not subsumed under general laws but grasped in their unmistakable individuality and particularity. Rickert called this the understanding of meaning" (Bubner 4).

In one of the two academic debates dominating German social studies and philosophical scholarship at the turn of the century, the Methodenstreit (Controversy over Method) centred on the methods of sociocultural disciplines and their possible difference from natural sciences (Segady 41), law-formation versus individuating representation, the nomothetic-idiographic dichotomy familiar to administrative studies. Wilhelm Windelband established the distinction between "idiographic" studies which described individual events and "nomothetic" studies which discover laws, that is, the natural sciences (Segady 46), an insight usually attributed to Jacob Getzels (1957 or 1958) in administrative
literature. During the decades preceding 1914, the
evaluation of each and the relationship between the two
occupied much of the discussion concerning the nature of
history and the social sciences in Germany, spurred on by
the disturbing spectre of relativism, and ultimately
nihilism (a problem revisited by postmodernism), which had
been released by the development of positivism as its method
moved through the natural into the human disciplines. The
debate as it was interpreted by Dilthey, Windelband, and by
Weber, is that there were only two possible ways to study
human experience: the nomothetic approach adapted from
natural science method aimed at producing general insights;
and the idiographic approach typical of the humanities aimed
at understanding unique individual events (Breisack 282-
283).

From the Neo-Kantian positions in the Methodenstreit
Weber adopted four Kantian propositions: a transcendental
rather than empirical or psychological approach, that is,
determining the conditions under which knowledge in history
is possible; a view regarding rational concepts as
indispensable for understanding the world; the assumption
that direct knowledge of an object is not directly
apprehended but represents primacy of practical over pure
reason; and the intention to establish the objectivity of
social studies in conjunction with the concept of value
(Segady 42-43; Oakes 1987: 436). Kantian transcendentalism
was modified by Weber to a quasi-transcendental theory of
ideal types which required the knowledge of historical
sociology. Ideal types, therefore, are not just a
methodological tool, but a metaphysical affirmation of
knowledge claims about meaningful dimensions of cultural
experience. Weber understood two ethical and one
epistemological implication to follow from ideal types:
their use to expose the complexities which make up reality
imposes an intellectual honesty on the researcher (Wright's reply to the question of what all his learning meant to him and why he did it: "I want to see how much I can bear"); it is a means for the researcher to determine where he is situated historically in order to identify value presuppositions (discussed at the end of "Politics as a Vocation"); and the necessity of using rational categories to order, compare and analyze socio-cultural knowledge.

**German Historicism**

One striking difference between the Anglo-American and German perspectives is exemplified in the difference in meaning between the German term *Historismus* (historicism) and the Anglo-American term "historical relativism." They are often confused in the manner in which "false friends" in linguistics occurs. "Historical relativism" usually means a systematic bias which reduces the objectivity of an historian and in turn becomes an obstacle to historical certainty and the ability to reconstruct an objective account of the past.

*Historismus*, on the other hand, means more generally an "historical approach" and "past-mindedness" as Ranke defined it. The consequence for historiography is that statements and value judgements are viewed historically, as part of an every-changing historical reality, and a process which can not by its very nature be regarded as a complete system as in materialist empirical approaches. *Historismus* is a consequence of philosophical assumptions and related political concepts, traceable to the profound influence of Immanuel Kant and a historical reaction of German thinkers to the French Revolution and Napoleon's domination of Germany which resulted in "a philosophy of value, a theory of knowledge, and a conception of politics" (Igers 1967:
383) which included a shift from the traditional Idealist belief in the existence of universal norms to that of values existent in concrete historical contexts. In the essay "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" Kant established a number of basic precepts about historical reality and its relation to human rationality which conditioned to a large extent the development of Historismus: historical process is not driven by natural law; one must resort to an Idea such as there is purpose in history without losing sight of the facts of history; and that human rationality and its moral activity in apprehending principles is realised in historical actions such as legal arrangements and institutions (Reiss 36-37).

This signalled a shift towards defining reality in individual terms, requiring that "each individual [entity] . . . be judged in terms of his or its own laws of development and the unique values it represented" (Iggers 1967: 383). The term individual is a categorical one which does not refer only to human individuals, but can be extended to apply to events, political states and eras. The human individual was regarded by Weber as the smallest structural unit, and as a model provided a way of defining other structural units such as social organizations. Weber also recognized two parts to social systems: the "outer organization" which is composed of social, political, economic, military, religious and technological organizations; and the "culture system" which includes the meanings, values, goals, "ideal unities" and cultural objects which are formulated in language, religion, philosophy, science and art and cohere with the outer forms. Structure in this context, did not mean a natural structure in the scientific sense, but coherences of the contents of the "culture system" and their outward expressions which have a character unique to themselves and different from
those of other historical periods. This view of culture in German historicism owes much to the movement of Romantic hermeneutics in the late 18th and early 19th century historicism which emphasized the study of language (philology, linguistics, and symbology), particularly in the mythic, artistic, and literary heritage of an epoch (Kelley 8-11).

While individuals were regarded by Weber as fundamentally endowed with free will, exercised through creativity, they were also embedded in a cultural and historical attitudinal context which limited the form and extent of that freedom. It is in this manner that Historismus was born and intended to be understood and utilized as an intellectual tool, and is considered, at least by some scholars as a precursor to functionalism in cultural anthropology (Bulnoff 24).

The school of German historicism was also symptomatic of an increasing historicization of Western thought, originating largely as an independent force in intellectualism with Hegel, Savigny and Marx (Gillespie 24). Friedrich Nietzsche played a significant role in this development, his historicist view clearly evident in the essay "The Use and Abuse of History":

"Consider the herds that are feeding yonder: they know not the meaning of yesterday or today; they graze and ruminate, move or rest, from morning to night, from day to day, taken up with their little loves and hates and the mercy of the moment, feeling neither melancholy nor satiety . . . the beast lives unhistorically; for it "goes into" the present, like a number, without leaving any curious remainder . . . but man is always resisting the great and continually increasing weight of the past; it presses him down and bows his shoulders." (Nietzsche 1957: 5)

Not only are questions about the nature, use and value of history explored, but the historical is presented as a
defining characteristic of human experience, distinguishing man from the natural world. This perspective also traces back to Kantian concepts of reality, in which the laws of nature (expressions of time and space categories) are not inherent in nature but constructions of the human mind used to order and understand the phenomenal. History, as a function of time, is a human creation, a product of mind, and a necessary dimension of all experience (Kant 17). (Interestingly, German Idealist thinking does not preclude scientific expertise, as evidenced by both Kant and Goethe’s substantial contributions to the natural sciences.) This change in attitude resulted in a profound historicization of all the human disciplines (Schnädelbach 36-37).

The problem then for Historismus, is in finding continuity, "the timeless truths and values from the flux of history" (Ringer 340). Weber played an important role in addressing this problem of the existence of enduring values, which had become a stumbling block to Idealism culminating around the turn of the century in what has become known as the Lamprecht controversy (Karl Lamprecht being a vigorous positivist) (Iggers 1962-1963: 18). Verstehen was intended to bring the historical observer and his subject closer together. It became necessary to find a theoretic means of linking a universal level of continuity, a "universally valid synthetic judgment" (Mandelbaum 58) (which, after all, is necessary to the historian who must achieve "past mindedness") with the belief that the "real" is to be found "in the concrete actuality of life and life-experience" which exists in "the agglomeration of life-experiences that characterize historical humanity" (Gillespie 121) and are fundamentally relative. Instead it resulted in a perspective of radical individuality from which point of view Weltanschauungen appeared as products of specific
historical and psychological contexts, and therefore irreproducible by the historian (Ringer 341).

It is not surprising that Weber thought and wrote from within an historical framework; this was a dominant historical approach in German scholarship: "Everything was viewed from the standpoint of history and it was believed that the central meaning of understanding was historical and developmental" (MacRae 1974: 45). This use of history was typical of the German academic tradition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (generally dated from 1890 to 1933 spanning part of the Wilhelmina Period, 1871-1918, and the years of the Weimar Republic, 1918-1933). In Germany, therefore, sociology did not develop predominantly from the models of Comte and Spencer, but through the work of Simmel and Weber, with a primarily historical and philosophical orientation, developing as a cultural study using the procedures of verstehen, a view explicitly developed in the opening section of Economy and Society. This approach remained dominant in Germany until the Anglo-Saxon conception of empirical social inquiry became influential in the 1950s and 1960s (Schnädelbach 238n).

Since German philosophy is concerned with the constructions of comprehensive Weltanschauungen (originating with romanticism), involving how individuals interpret the world, identifying underlying metaphysical and value issues, determining the nature of man and his being, questions of meaning (Sinn), and fulfillment in life (Lebenserfüllung), all common to a number of schools in German thought, neo-Kantians, existentialists, and phenomenologists, history operates as an adjunct discipline to philosophy. It demonstrates that human behaviour is fundamentally influenced by the quest for meaning and value, and it is the
task of philosophy as a consequence of historicism to find answers to these questions and confirm them.

The social science debates by which Weber was influenced and to which he contributed are numerous, yet are related in that all (Marxism, Positivism, Historicism) revolved around questions about the character and possibility of knowledge in social studies, particularly the problem of objectivity and how values are related to it. Weber was involved in the reaction to both the heritage of Rankean historicism, and to the historical-materialism of Marx (Gerth and Mills 34). Weber wrestled with the purposive aspect of history throughout his career. To some degree he was an opponent of Ranke's "scientific" history sharing the view of Schlosser who regarded that no history 'could be free from value-judgements and preconceptions arising out of non-historical considerations. The historian has the moral duty to judge men and events. History teaches not only itself but is also an ethical activity which forms the character of its students and of their public life" (MacRae 1974: 19). Weber was one of many social theorists who questioned the historicist tendency towards ethical relativism, such as Dilthey, Rickert, and Troeltsch (Iggers 1967: 384). However, he retained the historicist emphasis on empirical research, and an avoidance of abstract conceptual constructions which bear no relation to the particularity of historical events (Eliaeson 24). The challenge for Weber lay in developing conceptual categories which grow out of empirical reality, and remain tentative, refinable, and at the same time functional.

One of the central controversies in history relating to this position of Weber's on methodology was the Methodenstreit between Gustav Schmoller and Carl Menger in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Schmoller, representing an historicist position, argued for an
inductive-empirical approach to economics, and Menger, occupying a positivist position, argued for a deductive-rationalist approach: essential history and theory were pitted against each other (Eliaeson 25). An argument which began over the merits of "marginal utility theory" extended to one of the most significant debates in the social sciences over scientific principles and method for social studies in general, and the possibility of "laws" in history in particular (Cahnman 113). Weber attempted to create a mediational position between what he regarded as polarized and reductionistic positions by insisting on the application of firm empirical methodology modulated through conceptual constructs and categories like "ideal types" (Collins 1986: 40-41).

The recent and continuing positivism debate is simply a resumption or continuation, of the Methodenstreit. Current arguments over the possibility of positivism adequately addressing academic problems have only new technical dimensions, the fundamental questions have not changed. Bottomore traces the controversy through Winch from Wittgenstein, Popper, Isaiah Berlin, Sartre, and the dominant members of the Frankfurt School, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse (40-42). (The intricacies of the positivist debate, which reached its height in the mid-1970s and for which Weber was a central topic of discussion, is chronicled in Adorno 1976). Weber's approach has been returned to by those for whom positivism has proved inadequate: "empirical reality often seems to be dissolved by the social sciences to such an extent that the data compiled and analyzed . . . fail to add up to concrete historical events" (Sprinzak 295).1

1 Also Roderick: 32-41, who examines Weber's influence on the Frankfurt School's dominant Marxist figures.
German Sociology

Just as the German historical and philosophical tradition is different from that of the French, American, and English, German sociology, particularly during the time Weber was working, demonstrated certain tendencies which were not shared as dominant traits by them. One of its characteristics is a high degree of self-reflection on the subject matter and methodology of social science which does not have a comparable development in the other traditions (Frisby xv). It is necessary to describe the nature of German sociology and its preoccupations, as Weber played a determining role in its inception and development to a greater extent than in other disciplines by co-founding the German Society for Sociology (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie) as an organization devoted to scholarly research based on value freedom (objectivity) and independent of social policy agendas (Stölting 112).

German approaches to sociology as a discipline determines both an alternative theory of knowledge, with an accompanying methodology, and assumes a different set of cultural values. German social theory is generally conducted as a study of the history of social thought oriented toward a "world of ideas, concepts and theories" provided by philosophers and social theorists dating from the late 18th and early 19th centuries, especially Kant, Hegel and Marx (Münch 326). Much of German social theory during Weber's time was oriented toward reconciling the contradictions between reason and reality, and freedom and necessity, often in dialectic form. In contrast, American social theory developed toward a dominant paradigm and methodology after World War II, structural functionalism, absed upon an America-centric view and set of political and social values, aided by American professionalization of the
discipline of sociology (Münch 315-316); British sociology is oriented primarily toward studies of social class (Münch 321); and French social theory has become shaped by structuralism since World War II, replacing a conception of society as "an organic, hierarchically organized whole" (Münch 323).

German sociology was a disciplinary system founded by primarily by Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936), Georg Simmel (1858-1918), and Max Weber, who adopted a humanistic perspective partly in reaction to both positivism and absolute historicism (Szacki 337), but also radical idealism. As a humanistic study many of the central concepts and methods particular to sociology were derived from other disciplines. From philosophy, German sociology drew on Hegel's distinction between state (Staat), an artificial and conventional creation, and society (Gesellschaft), an organic reality (Freund 1978: 150). From psychology, Völkerpsychologie, which was the original German term for sociology, sociology demonstrated an emphasis on collective and spiritual psychology composed of studies of customs, languages, myths, and religions (Freund 1978: 151). And from historicism, as it was practiced by the historical economists Roscher and Knies who believed that an understanding of economic facts required attention to other social phenomena, German sociology was not conceived of as a discipline independent of historical study (Freund 1978: 150-151). Sociology, in fact, during Weber's time was not generally understood as a separate discipline, but was synonymous in German academia variously as "social science, social philosophy, social psychology, social history, or social reform" (Stölting 113). It is precisely this attitude which lead Weber to regard economics as political economy:
The science of national economic policy is a political science. It is a servant of politics; not of the daily politics of the momentary power holders and classes, but of the permanent, power-political interests of the nation... Our descendents will make us responsible before history not primarily for the kind of economic organization we bequeath them, but for the amount of elbow room we achieve and leave for them" (Weber in Mitzman 83).

The major features of humanistic sociology conform closely to the social studies point of view Weber developed in his methodological writings and which he generally practiced in substantive works. These include the premise that human subjects cannot be investigated as in the natural sciences, that human interactions as a subject matter are not reducible to sociologism and psychologism, that the subjective dimension of social interaction must be taken account of, that interpretation of social interactions is a Verstehen operation, and that the value of social knowledge can only be the self-knowledge it provides or wisdom, never technical effectiveness or social engineering (Szacki 338-339). These programmatic ideals can be met only through a form of sociology which has a metasociological character and intention, and which draws heavily on psychology, philosophy, and history to achieve its purposes, and which explains the German sociological tradition's disillusionment with and skepticism of positivism.

Tönnies, whose work was philosophically oriented, produced an "eclectic synthesis" (Szacki 339) attempting to integrate empirical and theoretical ideas in sociology, speculative and positivist aspects, and historical and analytical. As a foundation for Simmel and Weber, Tönnies brought together elements he regarded as complementary which are often viewed as opposed or exclusive, traits for which Weber has been criticized and which has caused controversy in Weberian studies (Collins 1986: 10). Most of the
features of Tönnies' sociological method, purpose, and subject are consistent with Weber's conception of the discipline.

Tönnies' commitment to a concept of social reality as that composed of the interrelationships of individuals, and his belief in a Verstehen purpose to sociology, conditioned his definitions of social constructions as forms of bonds derived from the two aspects of human nature: rational and irrational (Szacki 342-343). Society (Gesellschaft) is that which arises from arbitrary or rational will (Kürwille), and community (Gemeinschaft) is organization founded upon organic or natural will (Wesenwille). These two concepts were understood by Tönnies as ideal typical, and are therefore imagined states or collections of attributes, whose purpose is historiographical.

Georg Simmel, typical of many early German sociologists, was essentially a philosopher, concerning himself with metasociological questions, theory of value (his approach was aligned with the same neo-Kantian school in Baden—Windelband and Rickert—who influenced Weber), investigations into the theory of aesthetics practiced by Rodin, Rembrandt, and Goethe, later adopting a Lebensphilosophie concern with culture à la Bergson. Simmel made two important contributions to sociology which profoundly influenced Weber through Die Philosophie des Geldes ("The Philosophy of Money"). The first was an interactionist approach, focussing on individuals rather than characteristics of abstracted social entities and structures. For this reason he used the active, process oriented term Vergesellschaftung (sociation) rather than Gesellschaft, a conceptual preference adopted by Weber in much of his writing with the frequent use of Vergesellschaftung and Vergemeinschaftung (communalization). Secondly, Simmel founded a formal sociology based upon the
notion that human activity and relationships develop into typical forms according to purpose such as State, Church, school, or imitation, competition, hierarchicai structures, and so on (Freund 1978: 158). Simmel’s influence on Weber is evident most clearly in the Table of Contents of Economy and Society, as Weber originally published it in the prospectus for an economic encyclopaedia for which it was to constitute a significant proportion (Collins 1986: 126-127):

DEFINITIONS AND OVERVIEW
(1) Categories of the Various Forms of Social Order (gesellschaftlicher Ordnung).
The Most General Relationships Between Economy and Society
The Economic Relationships of Organized Groups

SOCIAL GROUPS
(2) Household, Oikos, and Enterprise
(3) Neighborhood, Kin Group, and Local Community
(4) Ethnic Group Relationships
(5) Religious Groups
The Class Basis of the Religions; Complex Religions and Economic Orientation

THE ECONOMY
(6) The Market

POLITICS
(7) The Political Association
The Social Determinants of Legal Development
Status Groups, Classes, Parties
The Nation
(8) Domination
(a) The Three Types of Legitimate Domination
(b) Political and Hierocratic Domination
(c) Nonlegitimate Domination; the Typology of Cities
(d) The Development of the Modern State
(e) The Modern Political Parties (Collins 1986: 128)

Indicative, also, of Weber’s attention to forms of social relationship as interactive, and active processes rather than acceptance of "society" as a real entity, is the original title Weber used for the volume, later changed by editors after his death: Die Wirtschaft und die
The Economy and the Social Orders and Powers) (Collins 1986: 127). Even in its later form as Economy and Society, the unique characteristics of Weber's ideas of society studied through structural plurality and a contradiction between formal and substantive rationality yielding the peculiar social institutions of modernity, are retained.

As a practitioner of a Geisteswissenschaft, Weber's conception of sociology is that of a theoretical edifice of "Soziologische Grundbegriffe" ("Basic Concepts of Sociology"), including history, economics, politics, law, art, literature, and religion, which represents "the complex and varied system of relations between the various human activities" (Freund 1978: 165), most of which he handled masterfully and applied in a number of substantive volumes. German sociology, in its most developed form early in the 20th century at the hands of Max Weber, had an all-encompassing character which simply could not be accommodated by a sociological tradition based upon systems theory, structural-functionalism, or Marxism. Collins notes that Jonathan Turner's attitude to Weber's work is indicative of a sociologist whose practice is that of a social scientist rather than a Geisteswissenschaftler: "Its very strengths—rich and detailed empirical/historical description—had always overwhelmed and, all too frequently, rather bored me" (Weber in Collins 1986: 7). In contrast, Weber regarded sociological work, in the "abstract character of the concepts," compared to history "relatively lacking in fullness of concrete content" (1978b: 20). Derived from historical (contemporary and more remotely past) knowledge and in turn intended to be applied to historical knowledge, sociological constructions are humunculi "that may only be animated by reimplanting the features of actors and action..."
known through the commonsense reasoning of everyday life" (Weber in Misgeld 91).

A metatheoretical emphasis in German sociology did not, however, mean that empirical research was neglected. Many of the research techniques associated with American empirical studies were developed and practiced by German social theorists, including Weber and Tönnies (Oberschall v, 1), who used descriptive statistics (which in the German tradition included geography, administrative law, and political theory, through descriptive accounts of states, both people and government, customs, and industry) (Oberschall 4), social surveys employing questionnaires, examinations of institutional records, ecological studies of voting, and attitude surveys. One of the most thorough pieces of empirical research of the pre-war period was Weber's survey of industrial workers in 1909 to 1911 which included dimensions of industrial psychology (Oberschall 8, 111). Weber's modification of the original design and scope of the survey from descriptive study to a theoretically oriented and explanatory study is indicative of the general German approach to empirical study, its purposes and goals:

The present survey aims to establish the following; on the one hand, what influences the large scale industrial establishment exerts upon the individual character, the occupational fate and the style of life of its working force, what physical and psychical qualities it helps develop in it, and how these (qualities) become manifest in the conduct of the daily life of the workers; on the other hand, how the development and the potential future development of large scale industry is limited by those characteristics of the workers which are a result of their ethnic, social and cultural origin, of their traditions and standards of life. (1924: 114)

It is apparent that the subject of sociological research and analysis is defined in the broadest cultural sense, and is understood to contribute to addressing
historical questions. Weber further stated that not a
morphology of factory work, a description of the division of
labour, process of production, and role of worker in this
process, but an identification of the "determinants of
production, occupational mobility, and the life cycle of the
factory workers" was the aim (Oberschall 114).

The Influence of Psychology

Weber's work in social studies coincided with the
development of psychology as an independent discipline,
largely beginning in German with the philosophical writings
of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche more than any other
author represents the antipode to Kantian philosophy.
Nietzsche's provocative slogan, "revaluation of all values,"
contributed to a period of value analysis in philosophy,
intensified by value-theoretical interpretation of cultural
sciences in Rickert and Weber and the debate about value-
judgments in the social sciences (Schnädelbach 161). The
influence of Nietzsche on Weber was both positive, in the
sense that Weber adopted some aspects of Nietzschean
psychology and its relation to an analysis of ethics and
modernity, and negative, in that Weber reacted against
Nietzsche's nihilistic proclivities. Most notably, Weber
adopted from Nietzsche a concern with the psychological
influence on ethics, and an insight into group psychology,
"slave" and "master" ethics.

Weber's interest was extended, although cautiously, to
the insights psychoanalysis may offer to historical analysis
through his reading of Sigmund Freud, particularly as it
related to the role of irrationality. Weber readily
acknowledged unconscious motivation in much of his writing:

The theories of S. Freud, with which I am now
familiar from his major writings as well, have
admittedly changed greatly over the years, and it is my impression as a layman that they have by no means been given definitive form even now. . . . Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Freud's thought can become a very significant source for the interpretation of whole series of phenomena in cultural history, particularly in the history of religion and of manners and morals—although from the viewpoint of a cultural historian its significance is by no means as universal as is assumed by Freud and his disciples in their very understandable zeal and joy of discovery. The prerequisite would be the creation of an exact casuistry of a scope and a certainty that does not exist today—despite all assertions—but may exist in two or three decades. (Marianne Weber 376)

Weber's appreciation of the role psychology can play in understanding social phenomena was evident in the 1890s when he revised the research programme of the Verein für Sozialpolitik's investigation of agricultural workers by expanding the purpose of study from that of only economic factors to identification of psychological processes "partly as contributory causes, partly as symptoms or as consequences" of developmental trends in rural labour relations (Aldenhoff 198). Economic and psychological factors were seen as a means to provide insight into ethnic, social, and cultural backgrounds and their interrelation with social relations. The complementary role of psychology to the analysis of social institutions and economics, particularly social psychology, was detailed in the essay "Objectivity" (Weber 1949: 88-89).

Weber's general attitude toward the role of psychology as a complementary discipline echoes a declaration by Georg Simmel in Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie that psychology receive overt treatment in sociological and historical writings:

... all external events, political and social, economic and religious, legal and technical, would be neither interesting nor comprehensible to us if they did not derive from and engender
psychological processes (Seelenbewegungen). If history is not to be a puppet-show it must be the history of psychic processes, and all external events which it describes are nothing but the bridges between impulses and acts of will on the one hand, and on the other the emotional reactions (Gefühlreflexe) which are released by these external events. (Szacki 349)

Weber was also strongly influenced by a number of features of Wilhelm Dilthey's work which were adopted, and modified to some extent. Weber accepted the basic principles which underlie a theory of personality typologies as cultural products. First, the purpose of sociocultural studies is to achieve understanding of the subjective meaning or intention of people's actions. From Dilthey Weber also adopted a general attitude towards disciplines, that the natural sciences and human studies are related, share some methods of investigation, but the human studies also use other methods and arrive at different kinds of explanations (Bottomore 1987: 41).

Weber's "ideal types" are partly progeny of Dilthey's typological work in human studies, as well as Kantian categories, believed by Dilthey to be the only possible methodology available to disciplines which do not lend themselves to natural science generalizations and laws. Part of the belief of Dilthey's descriptive psychology for the sociocultural studies is the understanding that personality is not only the product of "physiological urges, biological endowments or even the interaction within the family group" but is "also shaped by tradition, cultural ideals and beliefs" (Rickman 1979: 171). This approach allowed for the development of a system of personality typologies, such as the scholar, hero, man of the world, saint, Casanova, statesman, rake, and pimp. This aspect of Dilthey's typological approach to personality in terms of culturally determined ideals was first pioneered by E. Spranger and later used by members of the Frankfurt School,

Related to Verstehen and "type" is Dilthey's concept of rules which functions as a methodological tool referring to a "regularity of behavior," "in the sense of what can meaningfully or normally be expected to occur in a typical circumstance" and is understood to be that of a purposive kind involving conscious choices on the part of the subjects of study (Tuttle 129). It is the "typical, regular, and meaningful action of individuals without resorting to the law-like explanation of the natural sciences." They are "the rules of expectation which constitute the type," so that for Dilthey, there are "no laws of human behaviour but only rules or typical expectations to be found in the context of various typifications" (Tuttle 129).

There were a number of reasons, which lie at the heart of philosophical, historiographical, and sociological controversy, for accepting an epistemological distinction between the natural and human worlds: history for the Idealists, as well as philosophical approaches like existentialism and phenomenology, is composed of a subject matter which is not simply material, and even if it is "past," is of the kind which is still meaningful since it is of the same nature as the historian himself. It can therefore be re-experienced by the historian, allowing for forms of analysis which are not scientifically derived in the natural science or positivist sense. Because of these features the methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften can interpret the remains of the past through inferences which reveal, or disclose, motives, intentions, feelings and meanings (Tuttle 126-7):

Every single human expression represents something which is common to many and therefore part of the
realm of objective mind. Every word or sentence, every gesture or form of politeness, every work of art and every historical deed are only understandable because the person expressing himself and the person who understands him are connected by something they have in common; the individual always experiences, thinks, acts, and also understands, in this common sphere. (Dilthey 1976: 146)

This procedure is dependent upon a type of projection not unlike that described in psychoanalytic literature. It is necessary for the hermeneutic concept of understanding, which requires that the subject practice an openness of mind, and ability to put oneself in the place of an historical author or the role of participants of a way of life. It has been misunderstood by the Anglo-American positivist tradition as a mysterious form of empathy. It was, however, for theorists like Weber the ability to reflect on and re-constitute the ‗storical based upon a common realm of experience:

The basis for certainty in understanding can be either rational, which can be further subdivided into logical and mathematical, or it can be of an emotionally empathetic or artistically appreciative quality. Action is rationally evident chiefly when we attain a completely clear intellectual grasp of the action-elements in their intended context of meaning. Empathic or appreciative accuracy is attained when, through sympathetic participation, we can adequately grasp the emotional context in which the action took place. (Weber 1978b: 5)

Conclusion

Weber's contributions to socio-cultural studies are of two kinds. First, his methodological writings, embedded in the German philosophical tradition of epistemology and value theory and in extended controversies at the turn of the century, advanced our understanding regarding the nature of the human subject and how best to study it. Secondly, Weber
produced substantive historical sociological works that demonstrate the interdependence of the Geisteswissenschaften in achieving a verstehende programme of research. Determining Weber's place in German scholarship generally, and how he was situated in its central debates in the Geisteswissenschaften, not only clarify the terminology and meaning of his texts, but explain why certain methodological and thematic choices were made by him. The pursuit of socio-cultural studies as distinctive from the natural sciences, and social sciences modelled on natural sciences such as systems theory and Marxism, resulted in Weber's refinement of a verstehende historical sociology:

In the case of social collectivities, precisely as distinguished from organisms, we are in a position to go beyond merely demonstrating functional relationships and uniformities. We can accomplish something which is never attainable in the natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of the action of the component individuals. The natural sciences on the other hand cannot do this, being limited to the formulation of causal uniformities in objects and events and the explanation of individual facts by applying them. We do not "understand" the behavior of cells, but can only observe the relevant functional relationships and generalize on the basis of these observations. This additional achievement of explanation by interpretive understanding, as distinguished from external observation, is of course attained only at a price—the more hypothetical and fragmentary character of its results. Nevertheless, subjective understanding is the specific characteristic of sociological knowledge. (Weber 1978b: 15)

A detailed description of Weber's contributions and an evaluation of their reception in administrative studies is the subject of the next chapter.

Synopsis
This chapter identifies significant features of the German scholarly tradition as it influenced and conditioned Weber’s thought. It is argued that many features of his work must be examined within this cultural framework for their full significance to be understood. This applies to German philosophy, history, sociology, and psychology as they relate to Weber’s position on methodological issues, his understanding of the scope of the socio-cultural studies, and the interdependence of disciplines in researching social behaviour. It is within this context that Weber’s approach to verstehende administrative and educational administration studies can be developed.
CHAPTER THREE:
THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF WEBER'S WORK (I):
HISTORICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL

An unprecedented situation exists when a large number of officially accredited prophets do not do their preaching on the streets, or in churches or other public places or in sectarian conventicles, but rather feel themselves competent to enunciate their evaluations on ultimate questions 'in the name of science' [scholarship] in governmentally privileged lecture halls in which they are neither controlled, checked by discussion, nor subject to contradiction. (Weber in Käser 192)

There is little question that Max Weber is a major presence in Western scholarship. He has been regarded as a formidable figure by writers of intellectual history, such as H. Stuart Hughes, who views his insight and influence as fundamental as that of Darwin and Freud (19), as a "towering figure" in the social sciences by Ferraroti (1), and by Abel as one who "has penetrated more deeply into the methodological problems of the social sciences" than any other (1965: 116). This view is generally shared, even by those authors who take a critical approach to Weber's analyses (Aron; Bogart; Merton; Shils). However, there is considerable criticism in Weberian studies, and even by some authors in administrative theory, to the effect that Weber has been both underrepresented and misrepresented. This suggests that a corrective to the evaluation of his administrative writings and an exploration of possible further contributions to educational administration is overdue.

In order to evaluate Weber's reception in administrative studies, it is necessary to identify the scope, depth and importance of his contributions. Only in comparison with a full description of his writings is it
possible to determine how and to what degree administrative and educational administration writings have acknowledged and made use of his work. This requires a survey of all his scholarly writings, the character and quality of insights achieved in them, including historical contributions, methodological principles and "tools," and especially his system of ideal typologies. It is also important that those biographical details which affect an interpretation of his writings to correct the "distorted and one-sided view" of him as a "detached, impersonal scientist" constructing a mechanics of social behaviour (Wrong 1962: 15), be identified. This includes his political and administrative activities, as well as the humour, sarcasm, and passion which characterize his style of scholarship.

A renaissance in Weberian studies has taken place since 1968 creating a large body of literature devoted to exploring the entire scope of his writings, interpreting the importance and value of his substantive and methodological contributions, and settling debates about his place in the theoretical firmament of social studies. Twelve monographs were published in English from 1968 to 1972 and a greater number since 1979 (Sica 3), and from 1970 to 1975 "about one hundred publications a year dealt with Weber, articles as well as chapters and sections in books, not counting major monographs and ignoring textbook summaries or ritual references" (Roth and Schluchter 1). Over 2,300 titles of books and journal articles were published by 1986 (Segady 1). It is fair to claim that a cottage industry of Weberian studies exists. Publication and controversy regarding his methodology, substantive writings, politics and formative development have accelerated, appearing in fields as diverse as philosophy, history, sociology, religious studies, political science and anthropology, making him one of the
most intensively debated figures of the Twentieth Century in any discipline.

A survey of recent bibliographic sources on Weber (Gerth and Gerth; Käsler; Murvar; Nordquist; Riesebrödt; Seyfarth and Schmidt) reveals that his work has provided analytic means to evaluate the insights of Marxism, Kantianism, Freudian theory, Nietzschean philosophy, the development of the Annales School of historians, a critique of Hegelian dialectics, phenomenology, and a multitude of minor figures in economic, social, religious and political theory. For many his work has served as a benchmark against which to critically evaluate monocausal and deterministic explanations. This is because his view of social reality, particularly evident in *Economy and Society* and the volumes on world religions, have been generally regarded as comprehensive, complex and inclusive of all disciplines relating to sociocultural studies. In particular, his verstehende methodology is seen as a possible means of bridging and integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches to describing and interpreting human experience. As such, his work provides an alternative approach to a number of other classical writers in social studies whose work has been regarded as paradigmatic to the study of society, particularly Marx, Durkheim and Malinowski (Yang xliii). The validity of his approach is generally considered to be the accuracy of his insights into cultural transformation brought about by industrialization and technologization, the subsequent dehumanizing heritage of socialism, and his concerns about the immaturity of German political parties in the post-Bismarck era.

The recent availability in English of important texts as well as retranslations of many selections of Weber's work in the first complete version of *Economy and Society* by
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (1968)\(^1\) and the essay "Science as a Vocation" (1989), has provided a greater proportion of Weber's work and has corrected some translation problems in a long and complex history of Weber publication, translations, republications and retranslations. This has contributed to the difficulty in examining Weber's evolution as a thinker as well as grasping the overall character of his work. Even so, only 48% of Weber's writings were in English translation in 1981, representing 3,726 of a total of 7,738 pages of writing excluding some correspondence (Sica 16).

One of the difficulties in describing and defining a Weberian perspective is that many of his writings were not completed, but in draft form when his wife, Marianne Weber, posthumously collected and published them. Even though MacRae argues that it is difficult to know if Weber was engaged in a synthesis of his work when he died of influenza in 1920 at the age of fifty-six (1974: 11), it is clear that he was attempting a monumental effort in this direction with *Economy and Society* and the studies on religions which remained in partial form when he died. He did leave a trail of preparatory works evolving toward a comprehensive and incisive system of analysis and insight into human experience, individual and social, straddling not only the epochs of Western civilization, but that of East and West. It is the breadth and scope of his interdisciplinary project which tends to inspire awe in students of his opus, in contrast to the more limited subjects and methodology of other classic authors, with the exception of Kant, Darwin and Freud.

\(^1\) The English text of *Economy and Society* replaces Ephraim Fischoff (1963: 1-274), portions of Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (1946: 159-244, 253-262), Ferdinand Kolegar (1961), Talcott Parsons (1947), and Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein (1954: 11-348)
Much of the published discussion of his writings has been brought into question—his being "more used than understood" (Ferraroti 1) by those who use excerpts of his works for ideological purposes (Collins 1974: 149), that is, to fit into preconceived notions and projects on the part of those who are blinkered both by a desire for simplistic and definitive explanations and by disciplinary ignorance outside their chosen fields of study. It is the very fact that there is an American sociology, with institutional and doctrinal boundaries, which has constructed a distinct perspective on Weber as it did of Tönnies:

We owe exemplary works of translation to this tradition as well as studies that, originally inspired by German sociology, became important contributions in their own right to social theory. Yet any one perspective has the danger of skewing its subject when it claims to present the whole truth about it, as the scientistic tradition has often done. The American translation of *Gemeinschaft und G=sellschaft* suffers most blatantly from this kind of distortion, but other translations and commentaries also obscure their authors' intentions, bowdlerizing their writings in order to provide American readers with clean, unproblematic social science. (Liebersohn 9; also Hennis 1983: 135-136)

To some extent a division between European approaches to Weber, grounded more in historical and philosophical considerations, and American scholars, who have focused on Weber as a structural-functionalist, still exists (Hage 1980: 23). This state of affairs has led Ferraroti to conclude that there is "no guarantee that those who extol him have an understanding of his deep purpose and method of working" (1). This has resulted in much of the controversy over what he intended and accomplished, and a reexamination of those early English translators and commentators who dominated the field, such as Talcott Parsons (Antonio 155). The latter's structural-functionalist interpretation of
Weber has come under significant critique since the mid-1970s and this has partially fuelled the systematic reconstruction of Weber's ideas on social organization and methodology. This state of affairs has also led Collins to conclude: "some of the most important parts of Weber's advanced work have been overlooked, underused, or drastically misunderstood" (1986: 1). Collins notes, in particular, Weber's view of politics, especially as it appears in *Economy and Society*, where it includes theories of domination, legitimacy, bureaucracy, patrimonialism, feudalism, conflict, charisma, hierocracy, etc., all pieces which Collins maintains have been taken out of a context of a general comparative study of politics (1986: 2). Weber also discussed sexual stratification in studies of family, the role of women as an economy of sexuality, studies of economics in a world geo-political context, and world historical comparisons.

A number of authors have observed that Weber did not spawn a school or movement (Ferraroti 1) (although there was a Weber Kreis including such figures as Karl Jaspers, Georg von Lukács, Ernst Bloch, Emil Lask, during his lifetime). This was partly due to his early death, a lack of disciples who could have readily taken up and developed his research program, and the rapidly increasing attraction in the 1920s for materialist, Social-Darwinist, and idealist philosophies which seemed to provide explanations for Germany's devastation after the First World War (Lepsius 39). Instead, Weber's works enjoy a long history of controversy beginning with the sociology of knowledge dispute (*Streit um die Wissenssoziologie*) in Germany in the 1920s. This had to do with Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge thesis, later continued in the positivist dispute (*Positivismusstreit*) in the 1960s between Karl Popper and a number of the critical theorists (Meja et al 35-36). In addition there was Weber's
"long and intense debate with the ghost of Karl Marx" (Salomon 596).

Controversies

So fundamental are Weber's contributions that the various controversies and debates regarding the nature of the social sciences and related methodological issues which are constant features of theoretical history and sociology, have occasionally evolved into debates in which Weber, himself, has become the subject. There are four debates of importance in Weberian studies: the Parsons debate, the dispute over Weber's political attitudes and activities, the Protestant Ethic debate, and the Marxist debate. These debates rarely, if ever, appear in administrative literature, and this attests to the lack of familiarity with the complexities and overall scope of his writings.

1. Talcott Parsons

In North America, the most pointed and personal controversy has surrounded Talcott Parsons's translations, interpretations, and use of Weber's writings in his structural-functionalist theory of social action. Beginning as one of the few Weber "disciples" in American scholarship in the 1940s, he has since been accused of "fulfilling the interrupted work of Weber" by attempting to erect a universal system which stripped away the historical dimension of Weber's work and simplified its philosophical complexity and rigour (Ferraroti 3). Parsons has become regarded generally in Weberian scholarship as a devoted, yet misguided, "Weberian" who had a profound effect upon Weber's reception in North America, creating the standard interpretation of his contributions to social studies for
the generation of scholarship preceding 1970 in sociology, political science, and administrative studies.

The first debate with Parsons was carried out by Alfred Schütz who reviewed Parsons' first work, *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), objecting to the positivistic elements in it that underpinned Parsons' functionalist systems theory (Bubner 41). Criticism appeared again in the 1960s (Duncan; Luhmann), culminating in a debate in the mid-seventies with a series of papers by Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope, with replies by Talcott Parsons (Pope et al 1975; Parsons 1975; Cohen et al 1975; Parsons 1976). This exchange has continued unabated (Butts 1977; Lee 1979; Zaret 1980; Parsons 1981; Andreski 1983). Many authors since this time have added a ritualistic "Parsons-bashing" to the ritualistic obeisance shown to Weber's stature in the social sciences. By the early 1980s it was possible to dismiss Parsons in academic journals with virtual ad hominem abandon. Soltan's summation of Parsons is characteristic of this onslaught, prompted partly by a recognition of the consequences to Weber's reputation and comprehensive project:

> What happened to Parsons after [his] promising beginning is hard to explain and unsettling to contemplate. His writings became increasingly vague and pretentious, concerned with the development of "general conceptual schemes" of uncertain purpose . . . Parsons's thinking was often vague and unrigorous, the meaning of what he wrote elusive. The analogies he developed were frequently wild, the goals he set himself difficult to appreciate or endorse . . . The contrast between a highly promising early career and a subsequent intellectual deterioration, the paradox of a sloppy thinker enjoying the reputation of a master theorist, the tragedy of a man of great intellectual powers (and considerable teaching skill) incapable of producing anything more substantial in his later life, all this makes Parsons a fascinating puzzle for the historian of ideas. (769)
Criticism of Parsons' treatment of Weber is characteristic of the limitations and problems inherent in structural-functionalism. Parsons has argued that Weber had intended to create a universal general theory of social action, ignoring the heuristic, tentative nature of Weber's more sociological works, especially *Economy and Society*, by characterizing them as complete (Casanova 142), and by exaggerating the differences between Weber's and Marx's works to the point of presenting Weber in opposition to Marx (Wrong 1984: 69). Parsons transformed the analytical classification of social structures and forms of social interaction, concepts which serve as a "means to the end of recognizing significant relations of an individual-concrete character" (Cahnman 120; also Andreski 1983: 4-5), and elevated them to a systematic theory of social action of universal and law-like status, thereby reducing human relations to "a limited measure of voluntarism in human behavior" (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 85). This involved a rounding off of Weber's "fragmentary ideal-types" into a unified theoretical whole—the General Theory of Action—a universalistic and organological approach to the study of social reality, which Weber explicitly criticized in the methodological essays, by confusing the "factual regularities" Weber observed with "normative validity" (Cohen-Hazelrigg-Pope 229). Habermas more incisively defines the difference between Weber's methodology and Parsons': "Parsons's work has been criticized as exhausting itself in conceptual fetishism. And if one takes Parsons's intention seriously, there is in fact in his work a ridiculous imbalance between the towering heap of empty categorical containers and the slight empirical content housed in them" (188). Parsons ignored the emphasis Weber placed on historical particularity and the relation theory has to situation by reducing his methodology to
ahistoricity—using the same conceptual, theoretical and explanatory framework for divergent societies, even though Weber had denied the possibility of universalistic laws in historical explanation—and sought instead to identify the 'adequate causes' for historically specific configurations or events (Weber 1949: 164-188).

In addition, Parsons presented Weber's views on the modern Western world as evolutionary (Parsons 1964: lx), but Parsons' "system" of evolutionary universals are consistent only with American institutional structures and ideological orientations (Ferraroti 3). Similar censure has been placed on other scholars who have been perceived to have equally distorted Weber's writings, such as Leo Strauss and Alvin Gouldner (Roth 1975b: 367). At the present time one must work with Weber's texts in an intense debate with the ghost of Talcott Parsons, whose structural-functionalist program conditioned Weber's reception in the American sociological orthodoxy and thereby in administrative theory and educational administration.

2. Weber and Political Theory

Another problematic aspect of Weber's work is his political theory. One centre of controversy regarding Weber's possible complicity with proto-Nazi ideology is Wolfgang Mommsen's Max Weber and German Politics (1984) which first appeared in German in 1959 causing a flurry of denial and castigation, and leading to a renewal of a discussion which has persisted in German academia since 1945, namely, intellectual responsibility in the ideological "machinery" of Nazism. Mommsen raised concerns about the validity of a theory which contributed both to expedience in politics and to a justification of charismatic leadership producing "a sociology of power more cheerless than anything written since Machiavelli and Hobbes" (Czerny 59). However,
in contrast to Mommsen's view, Collins argues that Max Weber is a descendant of Machiavelli's development of conflict theory: "Parallel developments were made by the realism of modern historiography, by the German theorists of realpolitik and of the conquest theory of the state. A sophisticated synthesis of these lines of thought with elements of Marxian sociology was accomplished by Max Weber" (1974: 148). Arun Sahay has also explored correspondences between Weber and Machiavelli's theories of power in "Virtù, Fortuna and Charisma: An Essay on Machiavelli and Weber." Although it is clear that Weber was, like many other academics during the Weimar Period (Ernst Troeltsch and Max Scheler), committed to national German traditions and culture (Meja et al 1), some critics seem to have great difficulty distinguishing between nationalists and Nazis.

The debate erupted in 1964 in Heidelberg at the centenary Symposium on Weber held to examine his legacy and attended by a number of the "doyens" of Weber scholarship from the United States and Germany. Divergence of opinion on Weber’s role in the social sciences exemplified the opposition of perspectives between dominant North American sociological usage of Weber, and that of German post-Nazi social theorists preoccupied by the relationship between politics and scholarship and immersed in critical self-evaluation concerning sociology’s past complicity as "an instrument of political and administrative domination" with Nazi technocrats (Meja 3). Aside from the more humorous and absurd statements and accusations hurled at what must have been an invigorating and vitriolic conference (Czerny 59), the intensity of polemic, temper, wit, passion, and politics illustrated the sensitivity of a number of the scholarly issues Weber addressed. One was the possibility of objectivity in social study, the degree of contamination in scholarly work by the social conditions in which they are
examined (that is, whether Weber was able to practice value-freedom from contemporary political and cultural climate necessary to scholarship). Secondly, the dangers inherent in social analysis from predetermined and committed ideological perspectives: like Marxism, evident in Marcuse's "execution" of Weber (Roth 1975b: 369); the structural-functionalism of Talcott Parsons evident in Parsons' presentation of Weber as a sociological realist without ideologies (Gerth 29); and Mommsen's presentation of Weber as a theoretician of "national" and "power" politics (Gerth 30). Interestingly, this political debate over Weber's relationship with "the German catastrophe" (a euphemism for Nazism) became for a number of American and German sociologists and historians a controversy which "broadened into the political warfare that engulfed American and European universities from 1964 on" (Roth 1975b: 369). This is strongly suggestive that Weber's areas of study cut close to subjects of universal, recurrent and contentious issues relating to social life, such as power politics, leadership, the rise of bureaucratic power, role of religion and other ideologies, etc., as well as issues of continuous scholarly concern: rationality, objectivity, and ideology. It goes without saying that these issues bear directly upon administration in all its forms.

The implications of these political debates cut close to the heart of the value of history, indeed that of any scholarly pursuit: its instructive nature and purpose. If, as Weber demonstrated in historical-sociological analysis, a political democracy required a strong charismatic leader, then how does one reconcile individuals like Hitler, Mussolini, and their tyrannical predecessors with democratic aspirations? Weber's answer to this question, was the erection of a strong constitutional government. It is in
this context that Weber has been accused of bowing to political necessity à la Machiavelli.

3. The Protestant Ethic

One textual debate has centred on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Many authors have examined this essay in isolation from methodological writings and the companion volumes of comparative religious systems, and have assumed that Weber regarded Protestantism as the single cause of capitalism, when he in fact explored all major historical conditions, including political, religious, cultural, and economic (Andreski 1983: 3; Roth 1975b: 368). Weber presents such an historical development as being dependent upon a number of necessary but not solely sufficient factors (Bottomore 18; Freund 1978: 169; Kolko 1959: 21).

The literature of this debate is too extensive for a detailed analysis here, the sheer volume of publications comprising an entire chapter in Murvar's 1983 bibliography. Sprinzak has surveyed the multitude of attacks, categorizing them according to the various logical and historical grounds of argument: "the mislocated capitalism, the misinterpreted Protestantism, the misunderstood Catholicism, and the misplaced causality" (297), evident in Regis A. Factor and Stephen P. Turner (1977). All four types of criticism are demonstrated by Sprinzak to have misapprehended Weber's methodology, to have practised a highly selective analysis, and to be simplistic and reductionistic. Weber's intent, and methodological approach, is clearly recorded by Marianne Weber's biography:

Unprejudiced investigation had taught Weber early on that every phenomenon of cultural life is also economically determined, but that none is only so determined. As early as 1892-93, when as a young scholar he inquired into reasons for the flight of
farmers from rural regions in eastern Germany, he was struck by the insight that ideological impulses were just as decisive as the "bread-and-butter question." And when he undertook his second inquiry into the situation of farm workers, together with the theologian Göhre, it was from the outset his intention to investigate, in addition to the economic situation of the rural population, the moral and religious situation as well as the interaction of the various factors. Evidently he concerned himself at an early age with the question of the world-shaping significance of ideal forces. Perhaps this tendency of his quest for knowledge—a permanent concern with religion—was the form in which the genuine religiosity of his maternal family lived on in him. (335)

Two aspects of Weber's historical methodology were simply not grasped by many of the opponents of The Protestant Ethic (and of many other texts of Weber's, notably the essays on bureaucracy): (1) empirical reality is composed of an infinity of facts and factors from which one selects aspects for analysis, without losing sight of the true complexity of empirical reality; and (2) each historical event is only one of a multitude of possibilities which could have recurred, for which one can determine adequate causal explanations without resorting to determinism, evolutionary or otherwise. Authors like Carlo Antoni have accused Weber of positivistic demands for causal or scientific explanations, denying the heuristic nature of the methodological tools like the "ideal type" (Mazlish 1959: 222) and disregarding his notion of "objective possibilities" which describes the manner in which circumstances give rise to historical events (Mazlish 1959: 222; Aron 1961: 161).

The controversy over Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis, "the academic 'Thirty Years War'" (White 1969), is characterized by Marshall as an ideological battle paralleling the treatment of Weber's work in sociological and administrative writings:
We might see the whole "Protestant ethic controversy" to have been dogged from the outset by the grinding of particular religious, political, or theoretical axes; by a widespread tendency to oversimplify Weber's argument through increasing reliance on inaccurate secondary expositions of it; and by the routine employment of certain rhetorical devices (mere assertion, unsubstantiated generalization, setting up and demolishing of 'straw-men' alternatives to dogmatically held positions, and the polemical use of violent and powerful language itself) in order to disguise intellectual and empirical weaknesses in some of the arguments being proposed and defended. (169)

The two most prevalent methodological flaws in scholarship dealing with Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis are "aggressive and uninformed empiricism and a wholesale retreat into epistemological disputation" (Marshall 168). Marshall argues that on one hand the historians practised an atheoretical, or crudely empirical criticism of Weber neglecting "that aspects of reality become significant and worth knowing only in terms of a specific problem, issue, or framework of meaning . . . the role of self-conscious and articulate theorizing in history" (170). On the other hand, sociologists "retreated into the realm of the empirical" and defended Weber on exclusive "methodological and epistemological grounds and in terms of his larger theoretical framework" while at the same time utilizing historical materials in the "most crude forms of positivism" ("the uncritical deployment of historical 'facts'") (171).

4. Weber and Marx

The Marxist debate surrounding Weber, extensive as the Protestant Ethic debate, has involved attacks by what Roth refers to as the Marxist "luminaries" Herbert Marcuse (1968), Wolfgang Lefèvre (1971), and Goeran Therborn (1974) (1975b: 370-371). The major objection to Marxist
interpreters has been their rejection of Weber's methodological distinction between factual and valuational content and purpose on epistemological grounds. This had earned for Weber a reputation among Marxists for an "insufficiency of method" resting on a "naive and optimistic research liberalism" (Roth 1975b: 371). This vituperative attitude may also be explained by Weber's regarding The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as "a factual refutation of the materialist conception of history" (MacRae 1974: 58).

Because Weber, although utilizing portions of Marx's analyses, would not subscribe wholeheartedly to Marxist ideology, particularly vulgar Marxism of the orthodox school of Marxists, and because his work was competitively formational in sociology to Marxist theory, he has been savaged as a bourgeois apologist. Marxists generally have earned on all counts the excesses which Sprinzak believes Weber transcended: "he freed historical and social analysis from some of the greatest competing fetishes of modern social theory--idealism, reductionist materialism, and abstract scientism--without losing the positive contributions of these approaches to a healthy modern social science" (319; also Birnbaum). Weber's anti-materialist position, implicit throughout his writing, was made explicit in the essay "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy":

... the so-called 'materialist conception of history' with the crude elements of genius of the early form which appeared, for instance, in the Communist Manifesto still prevails only in the minds of laymen and dilettantes. In these circles one still finds the peculiar condition that their need for a causal explanation of an historical event is never satisfied until somewhere or somehow economic causes are shown (or seem) to be operative. Where this however is the case, they content themselves with the most threadbare
hypotheses and the most general phrases since they have then satisfied their dogmatic need to believe that the economic 'factor' is the 'real' one, the only 'true' one, and the one which 'in the last instance is everywhere decisive.' (1949: 68-69)

Weber's solution to methodological excess was an integrational approach which encompassed both materialist and idealist explanations: "it is, of course, not my aim to substitute for one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and history. Each is equally possible, but each ... accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth" (1930: 183). Based partly on Weber's more extensive ideas about motivation and comprehensive interactions of social forces, Weber's theory of stratification is more complex that Marx and Engels' economic categories or groupings (see Social Groups in Chapter Four), allowing for a less limited method of historical comparison and analysis. Weber had also rejected revolutionary means as a goal or means on both scholarly and pragmatic grounds, was well as utopian ends (Wrong 1984: 71).

Biographical Aspects

Weber's life has proved fascinating even to theorists of social science who generally preface their analytic writing with a brief biography of Weber (e.g. Andreski 1984; Collins 1986). What is missing most in organizational and administrative literatures is any sense of the passion, outrage, wit, and iconoclasm of a man who had a "volcanic nature" (Mommsen 1984: 35), yet one considered by many who knew him to be exemplary of the rational and ethical man, an intellectual who brought the rigours of reflection to his personal, political, and administrative, as well as scholarly activities (Jaspers 1964), personal traits which
drove his Herculean efforts in scholarship, and his selection of research topics.

What is most evident in Weber's biography, and of most importance to his academic and scholarly attitude is the degree to which he fulfilled the ideal of Bildung. His childhood is characterized by a traditional Gymnasium education supplemented by a household in which notable politicians and academics (some with familial association) were regular guests, and an inclination for mastering classics: Machiavelli, Greek and Roman literature and history, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Kant, a forty volume edition of Goethe (Mitzman 20). When interest led him to a curiosity about developments in Russia, he mastered Russian sufficiently to write insightful analyses of political developments based on Russian sources, and Italian sufficient to examine primary documentation necessary to completing his dissertations. And when curiosity about psychological, musical, political, military, historical, and "sociological" topics was engaged, Weber mastered these fields quickly and comprehensively.

Missing, too, in administrative and organizational literature, is the degree to which he was an active and public figure in party, academic, and national politics, all of which contributed to his understanding of social processes and organization. Of the many crusades Weber took on were the discriminatory hiring practices of German faculties against Social Democrats (one being Weber's own student, Robert Michels); anti-Semitism and Darwinist racist interpretations becoming current at this time; and Lukács' deportation to Hungary and certain execution (Whimster 293). Weber conducted his assaults on the German professoriate through the Frankfurter Zeitung. Even though contemptuous of Social Democratic pretentions and organizational ineptitude, he championed their right to freedom of
scholarship and higher education: "The nationalist press accuses me of wishing to raise the Social Democrats to the heights of professorial chairs. What I say is this: Let the Social Democrats try to win chairs at German universities and then we will see the disgrace that results. They do not have the resources to offer what German scholarship as a whole can offer" (Weber in Mommsen 1984: 113).

As were many German academics, Weber was active in reform movements, at times involved in "left-liberal" organizations (such as the Evangelisch-soziale Kongreß) "seeking democratization of the existing political system and acceptance of working-class organizations for the sake of greater national unity" (Liebersohn 5), at other times arguing for more conservative and monarchist social stability. Politically, Weber exerted considerable influence, recognized as one of the leaders of the democratic and liberal party (Abel 1965: 116). His influence was most notable in the reaction to his inaugural speech (Antrittsrede) for his academic appointment at Freiburg University in 1895, "Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik" ("The national state and national political economy"):

The Freiburg inaugural address became the spark that set off liberal imperialism in Wilhelmian Germany. Only the liberal imperialists . . . made imperialism "socially acceptable" in Germany. Only with them was a broad imperialist movement formed, whereas the nationalists of the Pan-German League had found only a limited following. (Mitzman 144)

The inaugural lecture also shocked the audience because Weber "bluntly and unrestrainedly depicted the political sphere as a relentless power struggle" (Mommsen 1984: 40) and, as Weber wrote to his brother afterward, "I aroused general consternation about the brutality of my opinions."
The Catholics were just about the happiest, since I dealt a firm blow to "ethical culture'" (Weber in Mommsen 1984: 37).

However, Weber also recognized the social and political dangers of an uncritical admiration of power politics (Realpolitik). For example, he accused a group, for whom he usually had contempt, the German literati, of idolizing Bismarck: "not because of the nobility of his commanding intellect, but exclusively because of the impact of the violence and artfulness in his methods as a statesman: his apparent or real ruthlessness" (Weber in Mommsen 1984: 42). His criticism extended to the monarchy and political figures' handling of foreign affairs, social policy, party politics, military policy, and constitutional debates, appearing in articles in the Frankfurter Zeitung and in a number of political essays later published in the collection Gesammelte politische Schriften (1921), discussed at length by Mommsen (1984). Weber's contempt for Wilhelm II and his advisors was vitriolic: "Max Weber often used to say privately that it was Germany's national misfortune that no Hohenzollern had ever been beheaded" (Weber in Lukác's 16).

Weber held a liberal imperialist view which was based on the belief that Germany had the right to hold an equal political and economic status to that of England and Russia, that in fact Germany's stability and security was dependent upon this so that it would not succumb to Russian domination in a world that faced being divided up between the "Reglements of Russian bureaucrats on the one hand, and the conventions of Anglo-Saxon 'society' on the other" (Weber in Factor and Turner 1984: 42). Since Germany was a major political presence it had to struggle against both of these forces, the alternative for Weber that Germany become "Swissified": "Pacificism, after the fashion of American Ladies (of both sexes!) is truly the most fatal cant" (Weber in Factor and Turner 1984: 42). It was also necessary to
ensure that Germany achieved sufficient national cohesion when political aspirations within the various separate states of Germany threatened to dismember the nation. Weber argued that this required an office of President strong enough to preserve the newly formed democratic constitution (Gerth 34), based partly on the British parliamentary model which he felt could provide "useful techniques and institutions" (1978b: 1383) if adapted to the German context.

Rather than hindering theoretical analysis, his political involvement contributed to recognizing questions suitable for social analysis: "Selection consists not so much in discarding certain data as in establishing the object, analyzing the values, defining the ideal types; in a word, in organizing the world of history in accordance with certain concretely defined questions" (Aron 1961: 131). Weber's extended involvement in political affairs and in social reform, which he studied with considerable historical depth, demonstrated his appreciation for the complexities of these subjects in identifying meaningful questions and approaches to social processes and organization, and, in opposition to the character of structural-functionalist analysis, included an appreciation for the particularity of an organization in its cultural and historical context, as well as the various motivations, conflicts, and influences which condition the nature of human interaction.

Weber joined organizations only reluctantly and temporarily, for political or academic purpose, and was consistently and persistently critical and outspoken, abandoning affiliation whenever appropriate goals or means were compromised. This pattern, originating with Weber's early opposition as Gymnasium and university student to the dominant trend of National Liberal politics practiced by his father (Mitzman 25), continued throughout his life as he
affiliated himself only temporarily with organizations such as the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) and the Evangelisch-soziale Kongreß (Evangelical-Social Congress). His lecture, characterized in tone as "heroic pessimism" (Mommsen 1984: 32), on the results of the conditions of peasants in East Prussia caused a violent reaction during its presentation, ultimately leading to a split of the Christian-Social movement producing two wings, progressive and conservative--Weber joined the former.

The Humanistic Imperative

Weber's work falls into the mainstream of Western 20th century thought, evidencing the "distinctive symptoms" and preoccupations of social science, literature, art and philosophy with "the consciousness of life's increasing depreciation" (Heller xiv) and earning for him the epithet "heroic pessimism" (Mommsen 1984: 32):

Weber took from the poet Schiller a phrase that is usually translated as 'the disenchantment of the world.' The German, in fact, means something more precise: the driving out of magic from things. The magus Weber is the last magician, a Prospero who must bury his staff under the grey sky of everyday rationality. He was himself an unspecialised man: the world of reason is a world in which men lose their manifold natures in the specialised division of labour, devoting themselves to unambiguously defined tasks. Weber's life was a struggle against such a destiny--the destiny of the bureaucrat, the office-holder in big government or big business or big political parties. It is, he wrote, 'the dictatorship of the officials, not of the proletariat, that is marching on.' He did not love this fact. (MacRae 1974: 86-87)

Far from advocating rationalization at the expense of other values, Weber had set himself in opposition to any organization or system which sacrificed the individual, instead emphasizing the ideal of Persönlichkeit, which in
German implies the individual's "ascendancy over the
givenness of nature and society" and indicates a
"distinction by virtue of ethical, cultural or leadership
qualities" (Whimster 293):

Max Weber vowed a struggle unto death against
every Institution, State, Church, Party, Trust,
School, i.e., against every super-individual
structure, of whatever kind, that claimed
metaphysical reality or general validity. He
loved every man, even a Don Quixote, who sought,
against the unjustified claim of an institution,
to assert himself and the individual as
such...Gradually, such men came to him
automatically; indeed, the "last human hero" drew
them with positively magical power into his circle
... In those days this archetype of all
archheretics gathered a whole horde of men around
him, whose best features, perhaps without their
knowing it, lay in the fact that they were all
somehow at least outsiders, if not quite a bit
more. (Honigsheim 271-272, translation Mitzman 5)

Although these features of his life may not appear to
have immediate theoretic significance, they do lend his work
an experiential legitimacy, precluding charges of "ivory-
towerism." Certainly his four years serving as a junior
barrister (1887-1891), tours of duty as a reserve officer
(1887, 1888), investigations of agricultural labourers in
Germany, studies of the stock exchange, administration of
army hospitals in Heidelberg during the First World War,
service on the German delegation negotiating the peace
treaty in Versailles (Andreski 1984: 2-4), and acting as a
member of the committee under Hugo Preuss which drafted the
new German Constitution of 1919, all contributed to the
formulation of the questions he pursued in his academic
writings regarding the formation and nature of modern
Western society, as well as providing opportunities for
direct observation of the very phenomena which were the
subject of his intellectual analysis.
Another aspect of his writings, which one would not suspect from the interpretation of his bureaucratic typology in most administrative analyses, is a strong ethical tone expressed as an unflagging regard for personal responsibility and autonomy. He exhibited a lack of what would now be called politically correct inhibitions. This is evident in his frequent expressions of outrage and disgust regarding examples of exploitation and demagogy, derived directly from his neo-Kantian "commitment to a critical and formal rationalism, moral individualism, and liberal-democratic values" (Seidman 205). It did not preclude a vigorous attack on German liberals who, in Weber's view, had failed to address serious economic, political, and social problems (Seidman 207-212).

These ethical standards were applied by Weber to a criticism of university teachers who abused their authority in the classroom by unashamedly indoctrinating according to their ideological bias (e.g. the Treitschkes, who Weber described as indulging in political propaganda) (Gerth and Mills 25). These strong positions are clearly evident in a collection of short articles on the subject collected and translated by Edward Shils in Max Weber on Universities (1974). In these and the two essays, "Politics as a Vocation" and "Science as a Vocation," Weber transposed the ideal of a right to academic freedom inherent in the Humboldt university model to a moral principle of academic duty towards objectivity and disinterestedness, especially as they pertained to freedom from political suasion. Weber exhibited little hesitation in sharply criticising colleagues, politicians, generals, and civil servants. (See "Politics as a Vocation" in which Weber evaluates ethical responsibility, or ultimate ends, as a pragmatic compromise. 1946: 77-128) He also became an unapologetic critic of the historian's political effectiveness at the lectern: "Of all
the kinds of prophecy, professorial prophecy [is] the only one that [is] completely inadmissible" (Mommsen 1984: 37). In "Science as a Vocation" he held that "in the lecture rooms of the university no other virtue holds but plain intellectual integrity" (1946: 155). This may explain his relative objectivity, in spite of deeply held ethical precepts, in handling historical and cross-cultural materials, and the extent to which he developed associations and interconnections not characteristic of other authors (Bendix and Roth 37-39). Weber distinguished between the kind of value-freedom one practiced as a "man of science/scholarship" and those contexts in which one was obliged as a "human being" to make value judgements (Mitzman 170), refusing to reduce the latter to the former, as implied by authors like Lakomski (1987).

Some authors, such as Gerth and Mills (28-29), have taken excursions into Oedipal struggles, anxiety and guilt analyses, implications of Weber's childlessness, training as a Prussian officer, his apparently Platonic marriage to Marianne Weber (which did not prevent him from engaging in two long-term sexually active affairs), and other "psychic disturbances," to explain various aspects of his scholarly writings, or rather to explain away aspects which are some matter of concern. A most flagrantly ill-informed judgement of Weber is found in an article on administrative philosophy by Hannah: "Because he believed in the rightness of a rigid system in satisfying structural needs, he could accept the subordination of individuals to a legal-rational system" (122), based upon a simple-minded attribution of Weber's preference for bureaucratization to a dominating father as an example of the dominance of intellect over conscience. However true any neurotic evidence may be, it may only explain his personal motivation to accomplish prodigious amounts of work, not the substance of it, and is more likely
to provide a psychoanalytic commentary on the critics than on Max Weber.

There are two psychological studies of his biography which are important in Weberian studies. One is Arthur Mitzman's examination of the evolution of his academic and scholarly development as it related to his personal life in *The Iron Cage* (1969). While providing some insight into the development of his method, it does, however, reduce discussion of Weber's political and scholarly attitudes to a psychoanalytic determinism. The second study, Lawrence A. Scaff's *Fleeing the Iron Cage* (1989), takes issue with Mitzman by offering more intellectual motivations for Weber's intellectual development through influences from Marx and Nietzsche. These considerations, while interesting, do not directly relate to the purpose of this study, however, must be addressed insofar as a corrective to simplistic and reductionistic psychoanalytic commentary is required.

**Scope of Weber's Work**

Attempting to manage the overall body of his contributions is an almost impossible task. In Freund's words,

The broad scope of his writings, too, is awe-inspiring: Most sociologists have based, or base, their fame on the fact that they are specialists in a well-defined problem area: organizations or music, action or social class, Judaism or Islam, sexuality or domination, etc. Weber analyzed all these questions in a masterly—if debatable—way, so that even today no specialist can avoid referring to his political sociology, his economic sociology, his religious sociology, his sociology of law, of art, of technology, etc. Furthermore, it can be said that he pioneered new studies on such fundamental notions as bureaucracy, urban affairs, legitimacy, patrimonialism, charisma,
etc., and these analyses are still authoritative. However, sociologists like him, who have been able to build theoretical edifices representing the complex and varied system of relations between the various human activities are especially rare, even very rare. Indeed, he wrote fundamental statements on the relations between politics and morality, politics and religion, politics and science, religion and economics, law and economics, politics, and religion, art and technology, science and art, art and morality, etc. Here his work was really prodigious. Not content to approach merely one type of these relations, he embraced them all. (1978: 165)

One could add to this list the relations between all of these and education, his methodological writings, and historical and philosophical contributions. To some extent Weber’s grand tour of socio-cultural studies is a consequence of the fact that there was no school of sociology in Germany at Weber’s time, instead sociological analysis was contributed to by academics from a range of fields who respected no "institutional or doctrinal boundaries" (Liebersohn 9). This scope—politics, economics, religion, morals, the family, organization of work, law—is, as Wardell and Turner describe, typical of the broad range of social phenomena necessary to theoretical purpose of the classical sociological project of which Weber was a proponent (12-13).

The sheer scope of his interests accounts to a large degree for the partitioning of his work, many writers championing some aspects to the exclusion of others, some removing aspects of his work from their context, particularly sociological ideal typologies from their historical grounding. Even though many authors have addressed various individual aspects of Weber’s writings, particularly the "ideal type," charisma, the concept of "Verstehen," and the Protestant Ethic thesis, few have outlined the entire methodology developed by Weber or related it to his actual research practice in order to
provide the basis for a study consistent with and extending from his analytic or substantive works (Segady 3-4; Roth and Schluchter 1981: 2).

One common form this takes is the application of a "Weberian paradigm" in a mechanistic manner to explain administrative phenomena in a bureaucratic setting, or establish a relationship between religious and economic behaviour (modelled on a monocausal treatment of the "Protestant Ethic thesis"). In addition, there are many critics who have pursued monocausal influences on Weber's genesis as a scholar, feats which have argued for Weber as a disciple variously of Kant, Nietzsche, and Heinrich Rickert (Brand 1979: 6). The secondary literature on Weber is largely composed of the proverbial Hindu blind philosophers touching the elephant: now they touch a tusk, now the tuft of its tail, now an ear, and make declarations based upon partial knowledge and myopic exactitude. The result is "that Weber has sometimes become little more than a useful quarry for concepts and ideal types" (Mommsen 1974: 18): "It is remarkable that the reviews of the Weberian bureaucratic ideal type are usually limited to only a few of the descriptive features of this model of organization; apparently, the presumption is that one can yank a small piece out of a larger theoretical framework and utilize it as a systematic statement. In fact, Weber's conceptualization of formal organization is only partially intelligible when this limited treatment occurs" (Kirkhart 145). Kirkhart advocates an examination of some features of the general framework, an understanding of the ideal type, and a complete description of the bureaucratic ideal type, to correct the kind of view demonstrated by Champion: "Weber (1946: 215) has simplified the concept by narrowing what it denotes. He claims that 'bureaucratization primarily means discharge of business according to calculable rules and
without regard for persons'" (90). This example illustrates the problem of lifting a concept from its place in the constellation of ideal types within which its definition has a particular meaning and relation to historical and cultural conditions, and is evidence also of "protracted dissection, fragmentation and reduction of the work [of Weber] to a few canonical masterpieces and key texts" (Hennis 1983: 137).

Weber attempted to provide an understanding of the nature of the modern Western world by determining its characteristics, the genesis of its industrialized societies, and related issues of values, power, and social action, in contrast with earlier periods and non-Western traditions. It is this preoccupation which caused him to ask questions which provided the "germ-seed" (a favourite Weberianism) for many of his most famous texts. The manner in which Weber cast his questions were expansive and articulated in historical form: "There arises thus the historical question: why were the districts of highest economic development at the same time particularly favourable to a revolution in the Church?" (1930: 36). "How did Jewry develop into a pariah people with highly specific peculiarities?" (1952a: 5). "Through what concatenation of circumstances did it come about that precisely, and only, in the Western world certain cultural phenomena emerged which, as at least we like to think, represent a direction of development of universal significance and validity?" ("The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in Europe," 1978b: 331)

Ferraroti has collected a number of other germinal questions: "Where is Western civilization going? What is the rationale of life and of bureaucratization? Why do men obey? What are the effects of ethics, seen as a 'lived ethic,' on economic behavior? In what sense can one reconcile standardized impersonal procedures of administrative routine with political decision-making and
technological innovation? What is to be the future of capitalism and its peculiar 'spirit'? What will happen to the realm of ideas, to the great values of the liberal tradition . . . the heart of Western civilization?" (1-2). To this one can add: What is the effect of economics on law, politics, religion? (Aron 1961: 201) and even, "What is distinctive about Western music?"

Determining what Weber's main problematic or focus was is not straight-forward, and has been the subject of a separate debate in Weberian studies (Hennis 1983). To many authors in Weberian studies it is the problem of modernity, what it is, how it was historically arrived at, what were the combination of forces and factors that brought it about, and what were the implications and consequences for those who constitute modern societies. To others, Weber's main preoccupation was the problem of the development of rationality in Western civilization (e.g. Bendix 1962: 9; Freund 1968; Glassman and Murvar). To some authors the thematic foci were analyses of the interrelations (both tensions and correspondences) between class and status, and ideas and interests found in the studies on religion and politics (Bendix 1962: 85-87). All of these topics in more recent writings in Weberian studies have superseded the earlier topics emphasized in Weber's writings, such as the Protestant Ethic thesis, bureaucracy, and domination or authority (Herrschaft). Marshall argues that each of the disciplines has examines Weber's work, and then proceeds according to its own interest ignoring disciplinary aspects, for example, history often proceeded empirically and sociology remained ignorant of historical context; one side "in possession of the data while the other purports to hold the theory" (11):

... the past cannot be viewed as 'just one damn thing after another'. Historians who see their
ask to be the accumulation and reporting, in strict chronological sequence, of the 'facts' of the past 'as it really happened,' simply theorize implicitly and informally and, therefore, obscurely and naively. But in recognizing that histories are interpretations of the world couched in terms of particular frames of reference, we ought not to be misled into suggesting that historians can turn to sociology for their theoretical salvation, as if the latter discipline were an 'already constituted' and 'theoretically mature' science. Sociological theories, models, or concepts cannot be collected and pasted--like stamps--on to complex historical realities, since these theories and concepts are themselves problematic... Historians, in other words, must do their own theorizing. (172)

In a more general sense, Weber’s overall goal was to characterize, determine the origins of, and grasp the implications of the "total modern culture" for modern man as an individual and society member. In "The Logic of the Cultural Sciences" Weber provides some clues as to what conception lay behind the scope of his various studies: "However inclusive this primary object might be [valued objects of our interest]--it might be, for example, the total 'modern culture,' i.e., the present-day Christian capitalistic constitutional (rechtsstaatliche) culture which 'radiates' from Europe and which is a phantastic tangle of 'cultural values' which may be considered from the most diverse standpoints" (1949: 155). Questions of forms of organization, authority, domination, legitimation, power, values, etc., are subsidiary to, and derive meaning only within, total cultural study.

1. Requirements of a Sociocultural Methodology

Weber’s methodological intent was certainly to understand the pattern of relationships which exists among all these various factors in given contexts (Collins 1986: 34). He used a multi-disciplinary approach in exploring and answering these questions which he termed "verstehende." A
verstehende sociocultural studies consisted of: outlining the requirements for establishing a foundation for knowledge in these disciplines, developing necessary conceptual constructs for comparing social phenomena, analyzing historical reality using these constructs, developing an objective perspective from which the researcher is able to assess social action in terms of meanings, and to explicate the causes of these meanings (Segady 21).

Weber's methodological understanding and intent was explicitly defined in numerous places throughout his writings, albeit often imbedded in substantive works. Much is contained also in less mysterious places such as the essay "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy." The relevant passage requires a full presentation to demonstrate Weber's views:

The type of social science in which we are interested is an empirical science of concrete reality (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft). Our aim is the understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of individual events in their contemporary manifestations and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise. No, as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way in which life confronts us in immediate concrete situations, it presents an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both "within" and "outside" ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our attention is focused on a single "object," for instance, a concrete act of exchange, as soon as we seriously attempt an exhaustive description of all the individual components of this "individual phenomena," to say nothing of explaining it casually. All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation, and that only it is "important" in
the sense of being "worthy of being known." (1949: 72)

Weber’s questions arose from an extra-academic motivation—a need to address specific and real problems of Germany, a value relevance denying any positivistic, especially a logical positivistic, metaphysic. Weber was acutely aware of the social and political conditions in which he lived. His work on social organization was informed by an understanding of the social, political and economic context of such issues as national unification, industrialization, and imperialism, all of which provided a rationale and conditions for large scale bureaucratization, capitalization, and pervasive use of high technology (Miller 4-7). These factors Weber regarded as a distinctive change in the overall character of modern society which he defined generally as rationalization, with important consequences for subjective experience at the individual level: notably, "disenchantment" (Entzauberung). It was perceived by him as a cause for concern about the development of Menschentum (Hennis 1983: 138, 148-149), a term which in German evokes a tradition of scholarly investigation in cultural studies into qualitative and value problems in the history of Humanity (Hennis 1983: 156), a programme of study which he knew he had only partially completed (Hennis 1983: 153). That is, what the consequences of societal changes were for individual autonomy, liberty, responsibility, and meaning, for influences on Lebensführung (everyday life), ethical Lebensstil (lifestyle), and Berufsethik (professional ethics) (Hennis 1983: 143). This is evident in his contrasting attitude toward history vis-à-vis Marx. Weber regarded changes in people’s minds as the driving forces of historical change, and as a combination of psychological and economic motives. This is evident in his attitude towards economics as a discipline which should be subordinated to politics, described in his Freiburger Antrittsrede.
(inaugural speech): "The science of national economic policy is a political science. It is a servant of politics: not of the daily politics of the momentary power holders and classes, but of the permanent, power-political interests of the nation."

These kinds of questions require more than a sociology to answer, and more than a label of "sociologist" is required to convey Weber's approach to these questions, an identification from which Weber repeatedly distanced himself (Hennis 1988: 111-113). In fact, authors such as Hennis argue that it is impossible to grasp Weber's writings in an accurate and comprehensive fashion from the point of view of sociology, a perspective requiring that significant aspects of Weber's work be excluded. Tenbruck goes to far as to argue that an accurate understanding of Weber's methodological writings cannot be achieved without a knowledge of the requirements of historical research to which his work is oriented (238). Instead, they classify him as a political philosopher in the classical sense of the term, or in Weber's words, "a student of the 'Historical School of German Political Economy'" (1988: 113) for which sociological method served as a handmaiden. Weber's own understanding of his work was clearly developed in his Freiburg Address:

The economic life of a people is so closely interwoven with other areas of its life that any particular observation can only be made if one keeps in view its relation with the whole, existing as a truth in the complexity of empirical reality; just as a divination of the future development of the economy can only be made on the basis of the entire development of the life of a people. If political economy were to limit itself to the elaboration of laws in a world of material goods, or seek only to establish a technico-economic theory of enterprises, it would have to give up the title of economics and make way for a new independent discipline. If, however,
political economy genuinely bases its observations and deductions on the real facts of people and state, if it seeks to solve the problems arising in the life of people and state, then it should not detach its domain and task from that of life in its entirety, but must rather treat both as a living member of a living body. . . . Since political economy has to respect this context, and in its own concerns contributes to the solution of the moral-political problems of the whole, it is therefore enjoined to take its place with the moral and political sciences. Only then does it effect a proper connection to real life, for in fact the individual as well as entire peoples and states seek to realize the objectives of their whole life through economic endeavour and economic success. In this way economic concern for material goods attains the level of political and ethical activity. (Hennis 1988: 119-120)

Weber’s early methodological writings established the grounds for differentiating the sociocultural studies from the natural sciences. Weber argued that a sociocultural theory could never be systematic or complete because of the nature of human reality: "Life with its irrational reality and its store of possible meanings is inexhaustible" (1949: 111), and by irrational Weber also had in mind erotic, religious, and aesthetic motivations. While the aims of natural sciences are systems of empirically confirmed laws of an ideal generality and validity, the aims of sociocultural studies are to describe, explain, and interpret the unique properties of specific people, social institutions, and social processes (including social, cultural, political, economic, and religious experiences). This means that sociocultural laws, generalizations, and correlations do not have explanatory value (Oakes 1977: 26-27), and to assume so is to commit a naturalistic "prejudice," or fallacy (1949: 85-87, 94).

The general purpose of social "sciences" or human studies through a verstehende approach and purpose is not limited to observation of uniformities of behaviour. "In
the case of social collectivities we can accomplish something which is never attainable in the natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of the action of the component individuals" (1968: 15), to wit, "the interpretation of action in terms of its subjective meaning" where action is all human behaviour when and "insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior" (1968: 8, 4).

Weber belongs to a tradition in historiography which avoided either end of a continuum of order and genesis in the historical process, the exercise of mechanical laws or teleological patterns of development. His aim was not "to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one­sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and history. Each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the preparation, but is the conclusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth" (1930: 183). He therefore yielded to neither sin for which history and sociology are notorious: historians for being "date and fact grubbers, their total enterprise resembling nothing so much as ant-hill industry, worship of uniqueness, and dedication to narration as one of God’s means of revelation"; and sociologists for engaging in a "science of Never-Never Land, what with its bland disregard of particularity and its preoccupation with universalist schemes of development that seemingly could never be precisely located in time or space" (Nisbet 93).

Weber did not present social development as a linear trend towards ever-increasing rationality, and he did not propose an evolutionary theory of social development based upon a model of natural selection with evolutionary stages. This general view was shared by Oswald Spengler, Johan Huizinga, Frederick J. Teggart, and Michel Foucault, who to varying degrees saw history as a series of formations,
transformations (Spengler), "cluster of circles" (Huizinga), lack of coherences (Teggart), or discontinuities (Foucault). Weber avoided language which suggested an inherent causal and directional genesis, using terms such as Weltgeschehen (world-happening) or innerweltliches Geschehen (innerworldly happening) instead of Geschichte (history) (Bulhoff 184). History, therefore, is created by the observer, its meaning the result of interpretation constructed on a fundamental level out of Kantian types of categories: ideal types.

In Weber's unit of analysis (the individual) and through his interpretive methodology, the distinction between sociology and history is collapsed into a classical comparative-historical methodology (Kiser and Hechter 3) and substantial body of work, a view which Keith Tribe supports on methodological and theoretical grounds (1983). Sociological theory both derives from historical instances, and in turn, as handmaiden, is able to facilitate the classification and comparison of historical realities. Methodological qualities which are often used to distinguish history from sociology, description versus analysis, the unique versus the general (idiographic versus nomothetic), freedom versus necessity, and causation versus law, are, according to Cahnman and Boskoff, misleading oppositions since both history and sociology partake of all these aspects in explanation in complementary fashion (2-9). Instead, for them, the historian's task is dissociated from the sociologist's by virtue of the problems they set out to solve: for the historian it is the "sequences and concatenations of action and interaction, with the acting individual as the symbolic point of convergence"; for the sociologist it is "the institutionalization and transformation of patterns of interaction, whereby society is visualized as consisting of individuals and the individual as the product of social forces" (2). Weber's
complex and multi-level framework for sociocultural analysis spans all of these methods and attempts to integrate both problematics: his problematics—cultural development and comparative societal studies—demand the skills of an historian, sociologist, and philosopher. Accurately representing and understanding Weber's theories and substantive contributions, therefore, cannot simply be attributable to sociological knowledge. The project Weber set out to complete was to bring together social science and history, "to combine the Germanic sense for history and philosophy with the Anglo-French and positivist notion of scientific rigor" (Hughes 286-287). This was intended to be done without losing sight of the individual unit of analysis he believed necessary to understanding human behaviour, or the imaginative, creative, and intuitive dimensions to scholarly work.

2. Historiography

While Max Weber is generally regarded as a sociologist, he is singled out with almost predictive regularity in sociology texts as a more formidable and complex theorist and practitioner of sociological analysis. Part of this complexity, and problem for many sociologists, is that the bulk of his writings are historical, and at the same time, contain philosophical insights into types of rationality as well as a number of other conceptual constructs necessary to his critical approach. While his attention toward the end of his life turned more explicitly towards developing sociological "tools" for sociocultural studies, the historical dimension of his work is explicitly apparent and a crucial feature of his conception of doing sociology (MacRae 1974: 63). His value to historiography, apart from his contributions of an intellectual-historical character during the formative years of sociology as an independent
discipline, persists, but as yet has not received much critical attention apart from preliminary studies by Wolfgang Schluchter (1981), Guenther Roth (1975a; 1975b; 1976), Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter (1979), Wilhelm Hennis (1987), and Bryan S. Turner (1974).

Weber both considered himself an historian, referring to himself as a disciple of the historical school (Szacki 354), and many of his works as histories. Historical writings provided the grounding of his sociological studies and the ultimate purpose for sociological methodology, which he often described as an auxiliary historical discipline (Szacki 354):

> For the knowledge of historical phenomena in their concreteness, the most general laws, because they are devoid of content, are also the least valuable. The more comprehensive the validity—or scope—of a term, the more it leads us away from the richness of reality since in order to include the common elements of the largest possible number of phenomena, it must necessarily be as abstract as possible and hence devoid of content. (Weber 1949: 80)

The historical portion of Weber's thought is probably best determined by first categorizing his writings in terms of the type of historical work contained in them (although these are not exclusive traits of the writings, as methodological insights are included in the substantive works and vice versa). While Weber's eclectic pursuits produced substantial historical studies in economics, law and social organization, including significant work in agrarian, military and political history, for the purposes of this study it is the level of historical knowledge which is more relevant. Historical content takes four forms in his writings: substantive historical studies, historical content in sociological studies, historical methodology, and a historical dimension underlying, or providing a framework for, his sociological analysis.
The substantive historical studies Weber conducted include the two dissertations he wrote in completion of his academic requirements for university teaching (Appendix A: 1 and 2) in which he studied legal and economic history through the process of bureaucratization and democratization, their implications for incipient capitalism, its import for the family, and the impact of German law on capitalistic enterprises (Segady 26), as well as the development of capitalism and its impact on agricultural practice and various classes of individuals such as slaves and serfs in which he first developed the ideal types "patrimonialism" and "charismatic leadership" (Segady 27).

Weber's interest in European history (which in the Germanic academic tradition of the 19th Century was viewed as continuous from and conditioned by classical history) was continued in four additional works (Appendix A: 3-6). In these, three aspects of his methodology which are generally associated with his later work were employed: historical comparison of social institutions, "disharmonious development" between contemporaneous social institutions, and patterns of social differentiation allowing for the development of different types of social institutions (for example economic) (Segady 27-28), based on multi-dimensional and ideal typical analysis to separate out sociological, economic, political, administrative, and legal perspectives and their interactions (Käsler 42-43, 48-49).

The other major collection of historical works include a number of essays (book length) on world religions devoted to a project which Weber undertook to examine the relationships among religion, economy and society in a world-historical perspective, which still generally hold up to criticism and are considered by many authors to be a fundamental contribution to the history and sociology of
religion (Appendix A: 7-12). They were intended to form a unified set exploring the effect of religious ideas on economic action in order to determine why modern capitalism developed in Western Europe by exploring the role of "value spheres, of inner-worldly normative structures" (Weber's own "genealogy of morals") as well as social classes and status groups for the elective affinity between social form and individual spirit, as well as define the unique character of occidental culture and to determine why certain cultural characteristics only developed in occidental societies (Schluchter 1979: 18-21). These were to be followed by a master work which would examine religion and other social institutions and historical conditions which would comprehensively determine the origins of Western capitalism (Collins 1986: 106). The kind of questions he pursued in the volumes on religion were, for example, Why did the caste system and orthodox Hinduism become dominant in India preventing the development of rational capitalism, in China the mandarin system, Confucianism and family cults? One of the main products and methods of these studies was an historical-sociological analysis of the conditions under which various religious ideas and their manifestations in social practice develop, providing a conceptual basis to the understanding and analysis of social phenomena and demonstrating the role ideas and values play in other aspects of social life. These have not yet been translated into English as a complete set contributing to the confusion over the role and meaning of the Protestant Ethic essays.

Most of these writings, although properly called histories, display a preoccupation with analyses of an economic, sociologic, political and juridical nature which, curiously, have resulted in Weber's disciplinary classification as a sociologist (Käsler 31). Weber himself regarded *The Protestant Ethic* text as an "essay in cultural
history (on Protestantism as the basis of the modern Berufskultur), a sort of 'spiritualist' construction of the modern economy" in a letter to Heinrich Rickert (Roth 1975b: 368). Weber did not undertake historical study purely for ends which are traditionally and generally regarded as historical, the description of past life, but as a means, complemented by analyses which later became identified as sociological, to understanding the meaning historical knowledge provided, and to explain subsequent historical developments.

His larger works, especially the comprehensive The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, if published now, would be called social history, attested to at the time by Alfred Heuss: "In its content it is the most original, daring and penetrating description that the economic and social development of antiquity has ever undergone. The concept of 'agrarian history' has thus been vastly exceeded. It is, rather, a sketch of the entire economic and social history of Antiquity" (Heuss in Käsler 1988: 36). In retrospect, a number of these writings also have features which would qualify as ethnomethodology in the style of Clifford Geertz and have, in fact, contributed to the development of this approach (Lloyd 194). In addition, Weber was one of the pioneers of detailed demographic and other quantitative analyses. For his Roman Agrarian History, he utilized data from Roman public surveyors, tax and property records, and other economic measures (Momigliano 29).

His major sociological works, Economy and Society and the three major collections of methodological, political, and sociological essays, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (1917), Gesammelte Politische Schriften (1919), and Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (1916), are permeated with historical content,
such as descriptions of power and governance in early societies, the ancient origins and development of Western capitalism, and charismatic authority in the early Arab and European worlds. Most important for this study is Chapter VI of *Economy and Society*, "Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion)," an essay of some 235 pages, in which Weber investigates the origin of religious phenomena, that is, an anthropology and ancient history of religion; a polemical treatment of Nietzschean and Marxian theses about the interrelationships of ideas, psychology and material interests; a world-historical comparison of religious activities from the East and West; and the development and application of ascetic and mystical ideal religious types to provide analytic coherence to the study (Mitzman 192-193).

In addition, Weber published a number of studies on agricultural and industrial workers (Appendix A: 13-20). Some were conducted in collaboration with other scholars from 1892 to 1899 for the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) and the Evangelisch-soziale Kongreß (Evangelical-Social Congress) which commissioned members to conduct a number of studies on various social conditions. During this period Weber also wrote two booklets for the Göttinger Arbeiterbibliothek on the stock exchange (Appendix A: 21 and 22). For a number of these Weber was engaged in what would be considered advanced field work at the time, conducting substantial surveys, the analysis of the results utilized historical frameworks to produce explanations of processes of social change and historical development. In these studies he demonstrated an emerging interest in both the examination of material conditions of subjects of study as well as the subjective states which he regarded as equally important, the interrelationship of cultural values and economic motivations. The importance of these two studies for his
later academic writings is that he viewed the situation in the German East as part of an historical process which he characterized as a movement from traditional patriarchy to rational capitalism, and that the psychological motives on the part of both the workers and the Junker landowners rather than changing forms of production were the key forces which brought about this change, departing from Marx (Mitzman 79).

The writings on historical methodology are generally sections of other works, written primarily as essays (Appendix A: 23-30), or digressions in substantive works (many of which appear in the previously mentioned titles). This is not surprising since his methodology is essentially an heuristic one. The most important methodological "product" of Weber's historiographical work is the definition of the nature and purpose of the ideal type, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It is apparent in these essays that the purpose of history and the character of historical analysis are not solely of intrinsic value, but provide assistance in understanding the present. The role of the historian, as of that of any scholar of the human studies in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Germany was instrumental: "an historical approach to the social world, a scientific-critical method in studying the past, and a recognition of the duty of the state to direct social life and economic affairs" (Gilbert 219). Weber fell well within the boundaries of this tradition, however, he prepared an exhaustive methodological program for retaining the disinterested integrity of scholarship which would otherwise slip into partisanship and prejudice.

The last category of historical dimension to Weber's work is the underlying substantive and methodological perspective: history as a necessary dimension and complement
to other disciplines, sometimes referred to as his "pluralistic approach." It is clear from an overall reading of Weber's main sociological texts that sociology, even if distinguishable and separate from history, cannot be developed without reference to an historical context and has no meaning outside of historical application. The way in which he cast his sociological questions about the many aspects of social life which he saw as part of the overall rationalization of the modern world convey an inherent historical character, implying that a sufficient investigation of any social phenomenon requires historical study. This applies equally to a study of the origins and development of Western capitalism, the relationship between religious and economic phenomena, forms of political domination, the spread of bureaucratic administration, the rationalization of law, and the nature of modern political parties in relation to classes and status groups (Bottomore 10). History, however, does not serve as a handmaiden to, or repository of raw material for, sociological analysis. Nor is sociological insight subservient to history. There appears in his writings to be a dynamic, interdependent relationship between the two, a symbiotic requirement which is also not separable from philosophical analysis and foundations as it pertains to substantive issues in sociocultural studies.

This view is partly due to economics and sociology being in their infancy as disciplines: that is, as branches of philosophy and history at the time Weber wrote. The German academic system still does not distinguish these disciplines in an exclusive manner, or observe the same disciplinary boundaries as in British and North American universities (Andreski 1983: 11), instead regarding them much more as complementary or overlapping. Because of the advances in methodology made by the German Historicist
school, history was the framework within which other disciplines were studied, especially law and economics (MacRae 1974: 45). Weber, utilized this approach clarifying its role methodologically in his legal, economic, and political studies by defining modern phenomena in terms of a long historical development, and by using the principle of contrast, comparing modern with classical social phenomena to better delineate the inherent character of each.

Collectively, Weber's works provide a model for relational and integrational nature of sociocultural studies. This involves not only understanding how the various disciplines relate to and complement one another, but forces a consideration of how these disciplines can be distinguished from one another without collapsing into one multi-dimensional, multi-methodological study.

The general English-speaking sociological attitude which regards Weber as a theorist who turned from history to sociology belies a prejudice towards sociologically superiority, that Weber abandoned other disciplinary modes in favour of a truer, more substantial pursuit through sociology. This is largely explained by Weber's role in legitimizing sociology at a time that it was only just being recognized as a legitimate discipline (MacRae 1974: 44-45) and viewed suspiciously as subversive, associated with programmes of reform, and connected with socialism. Mommsen has taken issue with the sociological claim staked on Weber's opera:

He always paid the utmost attention to the historical dimension of all social phenomena, for it was only in this way, in his opinion, that their cultural significance could be ascertained at all. It was not so much the goals of his scholarly work, but rather the approaches which were subjected to substantial change after 1913. Henceforth Weber analyzed social phenomena . . . in the light of a truly universal historical perspective, in a more elevated level and in a
much more systematic manner, yet his fundamental concerns were still much the same. (1974: 11)

Synopsis

This chapter outlines the scope, depth and importance of Weber’s historical and philosophical contributions to sociocultural studies. To this end, a number of controversies over his work, significant biographical information relevant to the character of his scholarship, Weber’s writings on the purpose and general nature of sociocultural studies, and the role history played in his research are examined. An examination of the controversies and biographical information significant to his development as a scholar as they relate to a framework for sociocultural studies implicit in his work highlights the historicist character of his writings, conflict theory arising from his analysis of politics, the interdependence of historical factors (elective affinity), the multiplicity of factors influencing societal organization and change, and sociocultural explanation as a multi-disciplinary explanation leading to verstehen.
CHAPTER FOUR:
THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF WEBER'S WORK (II):
SOCIOLOGICAL-ORGANIZATIONAL

The history of the sciences of social life is and remains a continual fluctuation between the attempt to order facts ideationally through the formation of concepts ... and the formation of concepts from scratch ... It is not the incorrectness of the attempt to form conceptual systems in the first place which is expressed here, but the fact that in the sciences of human culture the formation of concepts depends on the posing of the problems, and that the latter is altered alongside the content of culture itself. The relationship of concept and conceptualized in the cultural sciences make the transitoriness of every such synthesis unavoidable. (Weber in Käsler 196)

Weber wrote a number of methodological essays (Appendix B: 1-4), most of which have been available in English since 1949, addressing problems in social studies still at issue today: What is a sociocultural fact, and what are the criteria for identifying them? What is the domain of sociocultural problems as an area of knowledge, and what are their distinguishing characteristics? What is the theoretical purpose of sociocultural studies, and what criteria must be met? and What are the logic, principles, rules, and criteria of sociocultural research? (Oakes 1977: 18).

The most important of the methodological essays for organizational and administrative theory are: "Roscher and Knies and the Logical Problems of Historical Economics" (1975); "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" (1949: 49-112); "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences" (1949: 113-188); and "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics" (1949: 1-47). In addition, the two essays "Scholarship as a
Vocation," translated as "Science as a Vocation" (1946: 129-156; 1989: 3-31), and "Politics as a Vocation" (1946: 77-128) contain pertinent methodological discussion.

The history of these essays in English translation and publication has been selective and unsystematic, and, according to Roth (1978: ci) and Sica (4-5), poor. Gerth and Mills’ translations are criticized for radically restructuring Weber’s sentences in English and for almost entirely excluding Weber’s copious footnotes (Segady 15). Oakes has been particularly critical of the translation of "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" whose intelligibility "is compromised by deletions, grammatical lapses, and editorial and translation errors that render certain passages incomprehensible and make it impossible to decipher some of the most important ideas of the essay" (1977: 19). As many authors have complained, since translation of the entire series took some thirty years Weber’s methodological thought has appeared fragmentary and incomplete, however this is much more a function of scholarly irregularity on the part of English translators than of the true character of Weber’s writing (Huff 17).

Most of the methodological writings were completed partly in reaction to contemporaries, "to diagnose the 'sickness' or the 'disease' of the sociocultural sciences: the Methodenstreit, the methodological pestilence which in his generation had reached the proportion of a crisis" (Oakes 1977: 15). Weber was skeptical about the value of methodological work for three reasons: (1) social scientists were often so specialized that they did not have sufficient training in logic and methodology of science; (2) a continually expanding body of methodological writings producing generations of voluminous methodologies (which he regarded as the above mentioned pestilence); and (3) methodological work was often pursued as an end in itself
rather than as a precondition for research in the sociocultural studies (Oakes 1977: 11). For Weber, methodology was valuable only when something has gone wrong in research, engaging in it as it applied to substantive studies on various kinds of social behaviour dealing with "actual questions of social life" (Frisbey xxv).

Weber's conception of sociocultural studies and methodology departs from standard empiricism by extending beyond factual description and analysis in four important speculative and analytic ways: (1) in the construction of ideal types which are not isomorphic; (2) in analyses which do not restrict themselves to what happened, either historically or sociologically; (3) empathetic understanding of the historical subject; and (4) in a selection of facts and information according to value-relevance:

The cultural problems which move men form themselves ever anew and in different colors, and the boundaries of that area in the infinite stream of concrete events which acquires meaning and significance for us, i.e., which becomes an "historical individual," are constantly subject to change. The intellectual contexts from which it is viewed and scientifically analyzed shift. The points of departure of the cultural sciences remain changeable throughout the limitless future as long as a Chinese ossification of intellectual life does not render mankind incapable of setting new questions to the eternally inexhaustible flow of life. A systematic science of culture, even only in the sense of a definitive, objectively valid, systematic fixation of the problems which it should treat would be senseless in itself. (1949: 84)

Weber's approach resembles more a cultural art than a science, however this does not mean that Weber's method nor his findings are non-empirical. It is a humanistic scholarship (Geisteswissenschaft) informed by empiricism, characterized by methodological individualism and the
comparative analysis of social structures and cultural systems.

**Theory of Knowledge**

Weber without doubt was an empiricist in the general sense of the term, but not a positivist (Bruun; Giedymin; Huff), defining instead "an intermediate position in terms of the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical scheme" of metatheoretical assumptions (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 15). He viewed sociocultural studies as a set of disciplines which impose an order of relationships on reality, but do not exhaust it, due to its infiniteness, and a complexity which constantly changes. Social behaviour and organization are understood through ideas, in Weber's case, ideal typologies that the world approximates. Knowledge, therefore, is dependent upon the categories one applies. However, it is necessary to retain the distinction between analytical concepts and concrete historical situations which are nonreducible in their specificity.

Weber was, therefore, opposed to any system which claimed that it could deduce reality from its network of concepts and methods (Freund 1968: 8-9), in the manner that scientific management, for example assumes. From this point of view economics, history, and sociology are idiographic disciplines whose task is to provide the ideal typologies necessary to understanding or interpreting individual cases as types of social relations, rather than nomothetic disciplines whose purpose is to generate general laws or principles (Burger 1977b: 127) amenable to experimental verification in the manner of empirical hypotheses, and which have characteristics of simplicity, predictability, and completeness. Weber's attitude toward concepts does not
conform to the requirements of "concept" demanded in positivistic social science, as specified by Herbert Simon:

The first task of administrative theory is to develop a set of concepts that will permit the description, in terms relevant to the theory, of administrative situations. The concepts, to be scientifically useful, must be operational; that is, their meanings must correspond to empirically observable facts or situations. (37)

This definition has been used by educational administration theorists such as Getzels (1967) as a standard, both for interpreting Weber’s work, and in the use of concepts in educational administration field work (see Chapter Five). Getzels adds a further requirement by which to determine the value of concepts: "Concepts provide the building blocks of theory, and a theory can be no stronger than its concepts" (121).

In contrast to the aims of natural sciences, composed of a system of empirically confirmed laws of an ideal generality and validity capable of yielding prediction, Weber’s aims in sociocultural study are to describe, explain, and especially to interpret the unique properties of specific people, social institutions, and social processes (Burger 1987: 59; Oakes 1977: 26-27) which, he argued, could never be systematic or complete because the nature of human reality is fundamentally different from that of the natural world. Knowledge is not attainable unless one studies the relations among levels of experience: "just as the individual cannot understand the meaning of his vocational role without thinking about the institutional context, so the meaning of the institutions cannot be understood unless their general social context is taken into account [over time]" (Schluchter 1979: 71).

Weber’s attitude towards verifiability in social and cultural studies was ambivalent. Positivistic verifiability is possible only in "very few special cases susceptible of
psychological experimentation" and a "limited number of cases of mass phenomena which can be statistically described and unambiguously interpreted." Most cases of action in the real world are verifiable only by the methods of comparative sociology and history in which the "imaginary experiment" can be carried out, "which consists in thinking away certain elements of a chain of motivation and working out the course of action which would then probably ensue, thus arriving at a causal judgment" (1978b: 10). Because social explanation for Weber was not just an interest in quantitative aspects of situations, but also qualitative, statistical methods had limited but necessary value for some research projects. Statistical methods he regarded as effective only where the factors of the situation under study can be expressed numerically, and when one is interested in only quantitative aspects of a research subject. However, sociology (and one could add administration as a corresponding discipline in this respect) is interested in the qualitative dimensions of social reality as well as correlations and averages (Abel 1965: 138).

Weber adopted three Kantian precepts which underlie dominant thinking in German sociocultural studies. First, that a priori categories of a logical character exist which give our experience an organized, objective quality. These categories are not inherent in physical reality (such as "ideal types" which are a form of logical analysis, and are therefore a philosophical job not a factual one). Secondly, one must not, therefore, equate ideas with things, and relationships between ideas with relationships between things, a condition characteristic of Weber’s methodology, especially the use of the "ideal type" (Ringer 192-93). And thirdly, it was assumed that an appropriate role for sociocultural disciplines is in providing possible
contributions to "societal rationality" by addressing contemporary social issues and problems (Meja et al 3).

The role of history in knowledge of the social world is also critical: "Weber's theory of concepts presupposes a comparative mastery of history because it is not derived from major terms or principles, as speculative systems are, but is directly evolved from the concrete factual material and *composed inductively* and are intended for use as penetranda of historical processes (Marianne Weber 676).

The ideal types which comprise his sociological contributions, including all organizational theory, are constructed heuristically from historical knowledge, and are in turn used to investigate in more detail and with more analytic rigour historical information, and are consequently revised as necessary. In effect, it is history which makes sociology feasible (Tenbruck 235).

Weber's understanding of historical knowledge corresponds most closely with Mandelbaum's definition of interpretive history. Mandelbaum identifies three types of structure in historical accounts, or forms of historiography: sequential, explanatory, and interpretive. The first, sequential, which is commonly referred to as narrative history, follows events in their order of occurrence as they relate to the subject with which the study is concerned, and is primarily descriptive in purpose. The second, explanatory structure, is intended to seek a causal explanation for an event which is established in descriptive character. This form of structure traces back the causes from the present ('determined by the date(s) of the subject event) to the past, determining what diverse and independent factors are responsible for the subject event happening. The third, interpretive structure, is used to identify the most significant aspects of a particular state of affairs in order to trace their enduring features over
time. Interpretive histories, subsuming the other two categories, characteristically examine the interplay of institutional, individual, and social elements of a given culture, such as power relations, in order not only to depict or reveal them but to understand them as they change (1977: 25-29), using sociological categories to define and describe the subject in terms of social institutions and relations (for example, power, domination, and political, economic, literary, or religious spheres of human activity) in order to define cultural forms, or patterns of life, which differ from other times and places (1977: 39-40).

Guenther Roth delineates three logical levels to Weber’s historical analysis. The first is "configurational" which consists of socio-historical concepts providing a "frame" for historical investigation, such as "Western rationality." The second, "developmental," encompasses descriptions of courses of events and the explanation of the genesis and consequences of particular historical phenomena. The third, "situational," is composed of a more detailed explanation of the timing and causes of an event (1976: 310).

Watkins (83) summarizes Weber’s understanding of the process of sociocultural study in contrast to natural sciences as it was outlined in "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy": Weber’s approach to history was to decide from what point of view to approach events, such as economic, then select some unique configuration of activities and institutions, such as the "rise of capitalism," and then pin down and describe its components. The final task is to draw in causal lines between these components, imputing "concrete effects to concrete causes" (Weber 1949: 79). An understanding of this methodology requires knowing what is meant by a number of terms central to this kind of research: verstehen, erklären, elective
affinity, value freedom, value relevance, value judgment, and ideal type.

1. Verstehen

The verstehen objective in Weber's work—drawing on participants of an intellectual controversy in Germany at the turn of the century over the division between the natural sciences and the human studies, especially Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert (Käser 181)—is to understand social behaviour by discovering the meanings social action have for the participants in order to arrive at an interpretation of the intrinsic and subjective meaningful aspects of human conduct as socio-historical phenomena. This involves determining why particular actions take place according to complex subjective elements of meaning, intention or purpose, a causal explanation in terms of motives, and verification through comparison with "typical courses of action" (Fulbrook 72). This requires viewing understanding as that which links causal knowledge of a social phenomenon and a value relevant interpretation of social phenomena (Frisby xxv). In other words, verstehen was the way in which "we might catch sight of intention, motive—of the entire gamut of symbolic behavior—and thus get at the heart of human behavior sui generis" (Braude 232).

Verstehen is defined by Weber in an illustrative manner, by identifying the kinds of questions and solutions which constitute a verstehende approach to sociocultural studies as it can be distinguished from the natural sciences, rather than by providing a systematic and definitive account of the conditions which a sociocultural method must meet. To this purpose Weber considers a number of questions throughout the methodological essays:
"Under what conditions does a disease—Weber considers syphilis and the bubonic plague—qualify as a cultural phenomenon? Under what conditions can a given text be identified as a military command? Under what conditions can the policies of Friedrich Wilhelm IV be identified? . . . Under what conditions can 'cultural meaning' be ascribed to a given fact—an act of exchange, the money economy, religion, money, and prostitution? . . . Weber poses the constitutive problem by considering the conditions under which the 'cultural' or 'historical meaning' of a given object—Faust, for example—can be 'interpreted.' . . . The example of the bookmark and the problem of the conditions under which a slip of paper can be identified as a bookmark; the example of Robinson Crusoe an... the problem of the conditions under which his conduct can be identified as an attempt to follow an economic maxim." (Oakes 1977: 19)

Verstehen consists of a number of methodological elements: definitions of understanding, explanation, causality, comparative techniques, and the ideal typical device, which is developed into a multitude of typologies (like those in Economy and Society), as well as a search for meaning, the ascription of value, and the posing of interpretive questions of primarily qualitative rather than quantitative character. It is "based upon the application of personal experience to observed behavior" (Abel 1948: 216), and directed against behavioristic sociology and psychological reductionism (Burger 1977a: 165).

Understanding can be arrived at through two different means according to Weber: intellectually, if the behaviour is rational; empathetically (experiencing the emotional context—Gefühlzusammenhang—by projecting oneself into a situation), if the behaviour is irrational. The observer is able to establish a relationship between motive and behaviour (a meaningful connection—Sinnzusammenhang) which is adequate in the sense that the behaviour is instrumental in realizing a motive. This is done by the researcher projecting himself into the situation through intellect or
emotion (1978b: 8-9) without embracing intuitionism or succumbing to the psychologism of Wilhelm Dilthey (Käsler 178). The validity of the projection is tested through a study of documentary and other empirical evidence.

The two levels of Erklären (explanation) Weber believed necessary to achieve Verstehen are aktuelles and verstehendes Erklären. Aktuelles Verstehen (actual understanding) is direct observational understanding of the meaning of the overt aspect of an action, or intrinsic meaning of the action. Verstehendes Erklären or erklärendes Verstehen (explanatory or motivational understanding, sometimes referred to as Motivationsverstehen) identifies the explanation of the manifest action in terms of the motivation, reason or purpose, of an action, what he regarded as the extrinsic meaning of the action. Therefore, it is possible to understand what a person is doing, in terms of its meaning in a social context, without understanding why, in a motivational, possibly unconscious, sense (Munch 62).

2. **Causality**

Weber accepted neither a mechanical causality nor an utter relativity of human experience based upon a completely irrational human nature. Instead, in his researches and analyses he chose a model of human "personality," "[one] who is characterised by a continuous and constant motivation, a constant relation to a value... which, when fully known, makes the personality and his actions the most understandable phenomenon of social life" (Brand 1977: 7-8). Because human beings are both intelligible and empirical for Weber, they are both free and unfree at the same time, allowing for them to be historical, and, in fact, providing the possibility for history (Brand 1977: 8-9).
Weber’s verstehende approach involves the principle of causal pluralism, based upon his conception of this view of human intentionality leading to social action, a concatenation of causes leading to a result. Causal analysis is therefore inclusive of "a thousand and one senseless events, decision, ideas and subjective intentions" and the concept of "unanticipated totality" (the idea of the structural whole) is necessary in examining a society (Gerth 1984: 30-31). This would involve examining, in the case of education, contributory influences from other cultural and social activities, such as economic, political, religious, technological, juridical, and the manner in which educational activity would be seen to relate to these other activities, in addition to the internal forms of social behaviour and the forces which act on it. Causal imputation (kausale Zurechnung) however, is limited. Since a social phenomenon is the consequence of many causes one cannot absolutely evaluate the importance of each; direct, necessary, and indisputable connection between causes and effects cannot be achieved. In short, action is overdetermined.

Causality for Weber was comprised of two forms: ratio essendi, that is understanding causally the real influence on a particular subject consisting of an individualizing method, and ratio cognoscendi, a means of understanding a type of person, or type of culture, requiring a generalizing method (Freund 1968: 49).

Because of this complex view of causality, the researcher must rely on judgment which retains some degree of uncertainty:

an exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete phenomenon in its full reality is not only practically impossible—it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to be imputed in the individual case, the "essential"
feature of an event. Where the individuality of a phenomenon is concerned, the question of causality is not a question of laws but of concrete causal relationships. (Weber 1949: 78)

Elective affinity was a term which Weber preferred to positivistic causal laws as a more appropriate means of describing complementary relations among social factors, for example, the Calvinistic ethic and modern capitalism.

Causality, too, is historical; a present-oriented study cannot determine causes which have diminished over time, such as the original causes of capitalistic values, which were religious, since the direct relationship has faded: "Victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty to one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs" (1930: 182).

Determining causality involves the principle of objective possibility, which is a thought-experiment involving imagining a chain of events excluding a causal factor and asking what would have happened without it. The ideal type is the cornerstone of adequacy in historical development for Weber. By constructing a possible course of events which does not include the factor under examination from the "Constellation" of complex causes, one can determine if the events would have taken place: "In order to untangle real causal relations, we construct unreal ones" (1917: 287), and by comparison determine the actual. One can then determine the significance and importance of a cause for historical development. An educational example would be removing Dewey (and his direct adherents) from the history of American education: would conditions as they were have still proceeded if he had not existed? Or, more a propos, would educational administration be the discipline
it is today if Thomas Greenfield had not existed? Or Talcott Parsons? One could argue that historians of education have always operated implicitly on this level, however, in making the process explicit, one can more accurately control the analysis.

General Principles

Weber adopted a number of general scholarly principles which were intended to be universally true for all sociocultural studies. Together they constituted for him professional ethics. They are "value freedom" or "value neutrality" (often translated as objectivity), value relevance, and value judgment.

1. Value Freedom (Wertfreiheit)

Weber’s ideas on value freedom were formulated during an intellectual "crisis of historicism" culminating in the Methodenstreit in political economy occasioned by the critiques of positivism of figures like Freud, Nietzsche, Gergson, Baudelaire, Dostoevsky, and Proust. Along with Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert, Meinecke, and Troeltsch, Weber tried to establish a non-realist grounding for historical knowledge (Käsler 185). "Value Freedom," "value" or "ethical neutrality," or "objectivity," was understood by Weber as freedom from certain classes of values which constitute prejudice, that is, instead adhering to the values of research:

the intrinsically simple demand that the investigator and teacher should keep unconditionally separate the establishment of empirical facts (including the ‘value oriented’ conduct of the empirical individual whom he is investigating) and his own practical evaluations, i.e. his evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or unsatisfactory . . . These two things are
logically different and to deal with them as though they were the same represents a confusion of entirely heterogeneous problems. (1949: 11)

What was repugnant to Weber were academics who contaminated their work by a "cult of the personality" (1949: 6), political evaluations (carrying "the marshal's baton of the statesman or reformer") (1949: 5), or any other means by which one allowed one's personal opinions to intervene in research. His position corresponded closely to the two levels of prejudice which Walsh expects that the scholar is able to overcome, personal likes and dislikes for certain individuals or classes of individuals, and group prejudice located in the scholar's national, race or social class membership. Two other levels of bias which are inherent to any disciplinary position less likely to be overcome: adherence to particular theories of interpretation (differing views on the roles and importance of social factors), and philosophical (metaphysical and moral) commitments (1949: 99). Weber's "precept of intellectual honesty" was developed by him into guidelines for determining an appropriate role in the classroom:

Today the student should obtain, from his teacher in the lecture hall, the capacity: (1) to fulfill a given task in a workmanlike fashion; (2) definitely to recognize facts, even those which may be personally uncomfortable, and to distinguish them from his own evaluations; (3) to subordinate himself to his task and to repress the impulse to exhibit his personal tastes or other sentiments unnecessarily. (1949: 5)

Some critics have leapt to an interpretation that Weber advocated value-freedom, or a lack of values in one's personal life. Many of Weber's writings on politics, particularly in the two essays "Science as a Vocation" and "Politics as a Vocation," and his outspokenness regarding academic ethics, indicated that one's obligation as a social animal is to move through the world value-laden, that man
must be *homo : thicus* (Bottomore 77). "Value-free" for Weber did not mean relativism or moral indifference, or that science was absolutely free from value, but meant that one could maintain in research and analysis an operational objectivity by subscribing to the values of critical investigation: "[it] is no naive shutting of the eyes to the sources of hidden value-bias. It is, on the contrary, a deliberate choice in favour of a difficult form of self-discipline, a continual effort to rise above political factions and towards the maximally powerful line of scholarly explanation" (Collins 1974: 150). One is not free from the concepts by which one operates (Andreski 1965: 78). For example, in the use of terms to describe human behaviour, "legitimate" means exemplary or binding to those engaged in it, but does not make it "legitimate" in a universally ethical sense (Outhwaite 1983: 129).

One must keep in mind that Weber's formulation of value-freedom was specifically developed to respond to what was to Weber a repugnant transgression: ideology. "Value neutrality of scholarship" was advocated by Weber within the context of academics who abused the privilege of academic positions and authority to promulgate political and worldview ideologies. Value freedom was Weber's mediationsal methodological position between positivism and relativism.

2. Value Relevance (*Wertbeziehung*)

Rejecting any unicausal explanation of social events, either materialist or idealist, Weber's position on values as a component of social behaviour is clearly stated in "The Social Psychology of the World Religions":

It is not our thesis that the specific nature of a religion is a simple 'function' of the social situation of the stratum which appears as its characteristic bearer, or that it represents the stratum's 'ideology,' or that it is a 'reflection'
of a stratum's material or ideal interest-situation. On the contrary, a more basic misunderstanding of the standpoint of these discussions would hardly be possible . . . In various ways people have sought to interpret the connection between religious ethics and interest-situations in such a way that the former appear as mere 'functions' of the latter. Such interpretation occurs in so-called historical materialism—which we shall not here discuss—as well as in a purely psychological sense. (1946: 269-270)

In the Werturteilstreit (Value Controversy), dominated by Marxist and Nietzschean polarities, the Marxist representing a denial of value as a historical force, and the Nietzschean, an analysis based on will, power, the irrational, and a transcendental role and nature of values (MacRae 52-53), Weber occupied a mediating position. For Weber both Marx and Nietzsche were rich quarries of ideas and facts in which he found some measure of corroboration of his ideas. That human life seeks meaning, and society is made possible by meaning and value or the search for them, is an existential aspect of Weber's work:

Thus in a sense Weber's end is his beginning. We are back with the unavoidability of valuation, of choice where there is incompatibility and contradiction and no transcendent order. The world of man in society is a world of unit social acts, ordered by the need to make choices for an always uncertain future in terms of some principle of choice which we call a value. It has been objected that existence and value-choice cannot be conceptually separated from each other: I do not see that this is a criticism of Weber, but rather an affirmation of his position. (MacRae 1956: 71)

Sociocultural studies, according to Weber, require an estimation of value relevance or value-orientation (Wertbeziehung) as a principle of selecting significant information for study and organizing it. Information is related to values (Aron 1967: 231). In his view, therefore, scholars use a basis of value in a number of ways: to select
the subject of study; to guide in sifting the essential from the secondary; to supply the reason for establishing relationships among various elements and meanings assigned to them; to indicate causal relationships and how far causal regression should be carried; to eliminate personal experience and vague emotionality, since it is not a value judgment (Freund 1968: 55-56). This is a legitimate subjective factor in scholarly work which determines what is significant or important for analysis, such as women's issues, ethnicity, or pursuing Weber's approach as it relates to education as a societal equivalent to economy or religion. As such, value relevance constantly changes as social conditions change.

In this sense, social studies can be value-free, while also being value-dependent and value-related. This position presupposes a value-grounding of objectivity, consistency, relatedness, verification, and meaning. In contrast to Diltheyan phenomenological and discursive subjectivism, Weber argues that values are generally accessible to empirical study.

3. Value Judgment (Werturteile)

Weber addressed the issue of the appropriate role of value judgments in scholarship and teaching in the essay "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics." "Value judgment" he defines as "practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence" based upon "ethical principles, cultural ideals or a philosophical outlook," which he emphasizes is not a question accessible through science, but only through "practical valuation" (1949: 1). Such practical valuation is necessary to two of three levels of interpretation possible: (1) preparatory philological interpretation necessary to determining the literal meaning
of a text; (2) evaluative or ethical interpretation which involves assigning a value to the subject and making a favorable or unfavorable judgement (includes emotional, aesthetic, and moral); and (3) rational interpretation through identifying causes or comprehending the meaningful relationships among phenomena or elements of a phenomenon (Freund 1968: 57). The first and last are scholarly, the second is personal when one is acting politically or morally, and according to Weber is only permissible in teaching "when the teacher sets as his unconditional duty, in every single case, even to the point where it involves the danger of making his lecture less lively or attractive, to make relentlessly clear to his audience, and especially to himself, which of his statements are statements of logically deduced or empirically observed facts and which are statement of practical evaluations" (1949: 2). The same principle was to obtain in scholarship.

Weber identified four functions of scholarly use of value judgments as methodological devices necessary to constructing ideal types:

. . . . the elaboration and explication of the ultimate, internally 'consistent' value axioms, from which the divergent attitudes are derived; . . the deduction of 'implications' . . . which follow from certain irreducible value-axioms, when the practical evaluation of factual situations is based on these axioms alone; . . . the determination of the factual consequences which the realization of a certain practical evaluation must have; . . . [and] the uncovering of new axioms . . . which the proponent of a practical postulate did not take into consideration. (1949: 20-21)

Ideal Type

Weber's methodology depends upon the use of ideal type constructions in sorting and analysing information, and
generating the analytic typologies and comparative schemes necessary for an understanding the interrelationships of social categories and forces. They were understood to be of a tentative and heuristic nature since the subject of sociocultural research changes over time, and the researcher himself is historically and traditionally bound causing him to adopt interpretive and philosophical orientations which also change over time.

The ideal type was a hypothetical conceptual tool for organizing a virtual chaos of data and information: the basis of producing a conceptual system (Gedankensystem) into the field circumscribed by scholarly interest. It was also a tool for comparative analysis (1949: 90) similar to the models used in economics (Watkins 84). It is traceable to classifications used by Aristotle (Andreski 1965: 79). The ideal type was developed to deal with concerns about value relevance, to form a basis for establishing historical equivalents for comparative analysis, and to provide a logical foundation for causal explanation in sociocultural studies (Segady 1987: 78). Ideal type concepts were never to be confused with the reality which they represented: "An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia" (Weber 1949: 90). And: "This conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system. Substantively, this construct in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived
at by the ana-lytical accentuation of certain elements of reality" (1949: 90).

The purpose of the ideal type is to create an analytic standard from which one can determine "factors of deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action" (1978b: 6). Ideal types were, therefore, not experimental models or hypotheses, but analytical devices informed by historical-cultural evidence. There is some criticism of Weber’s ideal type approach, based upon corrections made to historical information he used which has since been revised (e.g. Kolko 1961). However, advances in historical knowledge have not undermined the ideal type as a device, only particular uses of it which require reformulation or adjustment, and of these Weber was well aware.

It is necessary to itemize what ideal types are not, since they have rarely been understood in the sense in which Weber defined and used them, and frequently confused with other constructions and techniques. They were "not an attempt to grasp the reality of things classified in a hierarchy of species or genera, whether within a system of natural laws or within an assemblage of general components faithfully reflecting such a system," nor were they "goals of cognition, summing up or containing reality or constituting a complete scientific system" (Freund 1968: 64). They were, instead, heuristic instruments of establishing the meaning of the subject being investigated (Freund 1968: 66). Nor, may one add, were they normative or ethical, promotional or prescriptive models for organization or behaviour. This misunderstanding is prevalent, as we shall see, in bureaucratic theory.

Ideal types do not have clear boundaries of the type that functions in deductive theories, nor can isomorphy between an ideal type and reality be assumed. They are not of the deductively pure naturalist explanatory theory in
social sciences. Ideal types are characterized by stylization (Steigerung) based on a purposive over-stressing of typical elements to produce a theoretical abstraction, making them over-explicit for analytic purposes (Eliaeson 23). An ideal type, in Weber's words, "recommends itself not as an end but as a means" (1949: 92):

Indeed, it is just because the content of historical concepts is necessarily subject to change that they must be formulated precisely and clearly on all occasions. In their application, their character as ideal analytical constructs should be carefully kept in mind, and the ideal type and historical reality should not be confused with each other. It should be understood that, since really definitive historical concepts are not in general to be thought of as an ultimate, and in view of the inevitable shift of the guiding value-ideas, the construction of sharp and unambiguous concepts relevant to the concrete individual viewpoint which directs our interest at any given time affords the possibility of clearly realizing the limits of their validity. (1949: 107)

They did, however, have to be consistent with the canons of understanding. The pattern or configuration produced as the ideal type must be objectively possible; it must not contradict known laws of nature or facts of concrete situations, and must sustain the test of causal adequacy used to compare different empirical situations. In addition, ideal types had to meet three criteria: (1) they should not be too general or abstract or they will become too limited in application to actual phenomena; (2) they must be precise and clear, and will therefore have to be "one-sided," that is, "represent certain specific aspects" of the infinitely complex nature of actual occurrences; and (3) they must be genetic, that is, composed of the typical conditions of an aspect of reality formulated into an ideal type, for comparative and analytic purpose (Abel 1965: 149-150).
They were understood by Weber to be heuristic devices based on the traditional use of analytic concepts in history, such as "feudal," "romantic," "medieval," and "charismatic." However, as Breisack pointed out, Weber advocated a more rigorous derivation and use of what he regarded as a technical device for organizing information:

... when historians talked of states, nations, societies, Protestantism, Capitalism, and the like, they must always remember that these terms connoted hypothetical concepts which were constructed by scholars as tools for analysis but do not refer to real entities outside of the historian's mind. Only individuals and their actions exist, and therefore the historian and the social scientist must analyze the motives, purposes, and results of individual actions. For that analysis of causal connections Weber suggested his best-known contribution to methodology: the "ideal types." (Breisach 283)

They are, therefore, not real or true essences, but are of the form "rarely found in reality. But they can appear thus in reality and in historically important ways, and they have. Such constructions make it possible to determine the typological locus of an historical phenomenon. They enable us to see if, in particular traits or in their total character, the phenomena approximate one of our constructions" (Weber 1946: 323-324).

Nothing, however is more dangerous than the confusion of theory and history stemming from naturalistic prejudices. This confusion expresses itself firstly in the belief that the "true" content and the essence of historical reality is portrayed in such theoretical constructs or secondly, in the use of these constructs as a procrustean bed into which history is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization of such "ideas" as real "forces" and as a "true" reality which operates behind the passage of events and which works itself out in history. (1949: 94)

Ideal types were expected to be understood in a provisional sense—as a constantly redefined and
reinterpreted category, dependent upon the information at hand, and the mode of research engaged in (Mazlish 1959: 225-226). As such, they are in part arbitrary and their value conditional on the research in which they are used, determined by helpfulness or effectiveness in explanation, retained in the literature as long as they continue to assist in organizing and analyzing information, discarded as soon as they no longer serve this purpose.

Since they are interpretive, not isomorphic, one can construct different ideal types of the same phenomenon for different research purposes. For example, Christianity can be conceived of as primitive, medieval, Jesuitical, Gallican, Catholic, Protestant, etc. (Freund 1968: 67). In the same manner education can be conceived of as Idealist, Socratic, Platonic, Religious, secular, etc. This heuristic nature allows for judgments involving causal imputation, to construct hypotheses, determine what is unique about a course of events, or an event, allow flexibility for historically or culturally comparison, or determine how reality departs from the ideal type.

The method of constructing ideal types consists in creating the logical range of human possibilities (or schemas of human behaviour) within which to characterize an historical particular (the penetration of the possible into the actual). This allows one to move beyond mere description by adding an evaluative dimension to the characterization of the event/action in order to uncover causal connections (Stegmüller 142). This is apparent in Weber's instructions on constructing *homo oeconomicus* in the 1898 Heidelberg *Grundriss*:

To ascertain the most elementary life conditions of economically mature human subjects it [theory] proposes a constructed 'economic subject,' in respect of which, by contrast with empirical man, it
(a) ignores and treats as non-existent all those motives influencing empirical man which are not specifically economic, i.e. not specifically concerned with the fulfilment of material needs;

(b) assumes as existent qualities that empirical man does not possess, or possesses only incompletely, i.e.

(i) complete insight into a given situation—economic omniscience;

(ii) unfailing choice of the most appropriate means for a given end—absolute economic rationality;

(iii) complete dedication of one’s powers to the purpose of acquiring economic goods—'utilizing acquisitional drive.'

It thus postulates an unrealistic person, analogous to a mathematical ideal model. (Weber in Hennis 1988: 121)

Weber uses a number of kinds of ideal types which can be classified into two general categories, described by Watkins as holistic and individualistic, or methodological individualism and methodological holism (88). Holistic types identify the broad characteristics of an entire social situation, for example, Italian renaissance, medieval Christianity, or feudalism. They provide a starting point for a more detailed analysis of "dispositions, information, and relationships of the peoples concerned" (86). Individualistic types are abstractions from the situations of actual individuals including "(a) general schemes of personal preferences; (b) the different kinds of knowledge of his own situation which the individual may possess; and (c) the various typical relationships between individuals and between the individual and his resources" (84) and are of causal importance. Examples of these are types of social action, domination, and authority. Abel refers to the "holistic" category as historical because they refer to individual occurrences, and the "methodological" as recurrent or prevalent because they identify phenomena which can appear as constituent elements of any historical occurrence.
Rogers further distinguishes a type which he calls "relative historical concepts," such as Calvinistic theology, or Brahmanic philosophy of karma, which are intended for an analysis and comparison of tendencies of thought, as opposed to concrete historical events (1969: 89). It is clear from Watkins' summary that the types are complementary, as indeed Weber intended typologies to be.

Weber began using comparative techniques, in addition to ideal typing, to isolate individual characteristics of historical events and processes early in his career, as is evident in The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations:

So one might take these anomalies and exceptions as yet another demonstration that "there is nothing new under the sun," and that all or nearly all distinctions are simply matters of degree. The latter is true enough, of course; but the former notion annuls any historical study. One must instead focus upon what is of central importance in a society, despite all analogies, and use the similarities of two societies to highlight the specific individuality of each. (in Roth 1976: 314)

Weber adds later that on the basis of this kind of identification one is then able to determine the historical causes which lead to such differences (Roth 1976: 385-386).

A compilation of the types of comparative devices used by Weber to arrive at causal explanations was presented by Roth in his introduction to Economy and Society. They include: (1) identification of historical similarities such as comparative aspects of feudal and modern organizations to identify crucial differences; (2) the employment of the negative comparison of social events and processes to highlight causal factors in social change; (3) the use of the illustrative analogy, comparing an equivalent contemporary social experience with an historical one, in order to make more understandable the nature of an historical event; and (4) the use of metaphorical analogy to
comparing two historical examples of the same social role or institution in order to identify points of difference (1978b: xxxiii).

The Ideal Typologies

Most of the contributions to administrative and organizational theory, and educational administration made by Weber are results of a system of typologies he constructed and used heuristically in historical and cross-cultural studies. It is important to note, in contrast to prevailing notions in organizational literatures, that the primary level of analysis describes social behaviour not structure. It results in as "interpretive understanding" of social action "insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior—be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence" (Weber 1978b: 4).

The system of typologies must be taken as a whole since his emphasis on the basic individual unit of analysis and value orientations in social behavior are subsumed in the other typologies, such as legitimate authority types and organizational typologies. Not to do so results in reification of forms of collective behaviour, as has been done in bureaucratic theory. Partitioning his work necessarily excludes other aspects of Weber's formulations, such as force, politics, and conflict, and precludes their collective application in using the ideal typologies to understand historical reality in its diverse and infinitely complex character. Estimating the value of Weber's verstehende approach requires outlining the entire scope and nature of the corpus of his work (Hennis 1983: 137), that is, all the major typologies in Economy and Society.

The integrated system of typologies has horizontal and vertical extension. Vertical extension includes individual
levels of social behaviour, group levels, and societal levels (social institutions). The system extends horizontally across a classification of types of social behaviour derived from origins of motivation. Weber used all of these categories in comparisons of historical periods and cultures in substantive studies. It is important to note that composite social behaviours, that is group and societal forms, subsume individual levels. For example, all individual categories of behaviour are inherent in economic and political organizations, and all types of social behaviour within these categories can become manifest, at the same time.
### Weber's System of Typologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Ascription of Meaning Valuational</th>
<th>Affective</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Instrumental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- rationality principle</td>
<td>emotional,</td>
<td>usage</td>
<td>law,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>erotic</td>
<td></td>
<td>procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>- social action duty</td>
<td>reactive</td>
<td>habituated</td>
<td>calculated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- social relation obligation</td>
<td>feelings</td>
<td>custom</td>
<td>interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- legitimate order sacred</td>
<td>self-interest</td>
<td>convention</td>
<td>formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- type of social relationship associative</td>
<td>communal</td>
<td>communal</td>
<td>associative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- conflict sacrificial</td>
<td>blood lust</td>
<td>conventional</td>
<td>regulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(revenge)</td>
<td>(chivalric)</td>
<td>competition</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Traditions</th>
<th>Societal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate Charismatic</td>
<td>Affectual</td>
<td>Legal-Rational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charismatic Dominant</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Value-Rational</td>
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<tr>
<td>- familial order (e.g. religious)</td>
<td>household</td>
<td>neighbourhhood</td>
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<tr>
<td>- classes elect</td>
<td>social class</td>
<td>property class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(economic class order)</td>
<td></td>
<td>commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- parties sanctity</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>loyalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>(power)</td>
<td>attributes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- status groups</td>
<td>attraction</td>
<td>heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>caste (social order)</td>
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<td>appropriation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative Style</td>
<td>Discipleship</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discipleship</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- economic ideology</td>
<td>instinctive-</td>
<td>inherited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reactive action</td>
<td>techniques</td>
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<tr>
<td>- political theocracy,</td>
<td>cult</td>
<td>patriarchal,</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>caesaropapacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>- legal ecclesiastical</td>
<td>household</td>
<td>common law</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- religious monasticism</td>
<td>prophet,</td>
<td>church,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>magician</td>
<td>guild</td>
</tr>
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</table>
1. Individual Level of Analysis

Weber did not engage in nomothetic analysis at the expense of the idiographic: "subjective interpretation of action must take account of a fundamentally important fact. These concepts of collective entities which are found both in common sense and juristic and other technical forms of thought, have a meaning in the minds of individual persons, partly as of something actually existing, partly as something with normative authority" (1978b: 14). This requires that three levels of activity in which meaning is ascribed to behaviour must be accounted for to ensure that the individual is not lost sight of in structural or functional analysis:

1) the individual takes part in a context of institutions, that is behaving in relation to custom, rule, and law, which are human constructions and are therefore created with ends in mind;  
2) social behaviour is oriented toward goals or ends which justify activity; and  
3) values, aspirations and ideals act as motivations for social activity (Freund 1978: 167).

Weber’s types, therefore, are based upon types of social relation, social action, rationality, and meaning ascription, in descending order.

The four possible types of social action are based upon the four kinds of meaning which individuals can ascribe, which Weber defined as the four types of rationality: affectual, traditional, end-attaining or calculated (Zweckrational), and valuational or absolute (Wertrational). A social action can therefore be of four types:

1) Affective action is "determined by the actor’s specific affects and feeling states" including uncontrolled reactions to exceptional stimulus and sublimated behaviour (1978b: 25), such as eroticism.
2) Traditional action is "determined by ingrained habituation" (1978b: 25) whose meaning is derived from the sacredness of custom and an understanding of the past, and describes most everyday action.

3) Instrumentally rational (Zweckrational) action is "determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends" (1978b: 24). It involves a consideration of primary and secondary results, of alternative means, of the relations among consequences, and an evaluation of relative importance of the possible ends (1978b: 26).

4) Value-rational (Wertrational) action is "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success" (1978b: 24-25). It is distinguished from affectual by a self-conscious formulation of values which govern the associated action and a consistently planned orientation of behavior (1978b: 25). Such a conviction or sense of duty to principle or transcendent value Weber demands of the professoriat throughout his criticism of university politics.

All of these pure types, in application to actual events, shade into one another (1978b: 25) and most often coexist and therefore must be used collectively in studying actual events and organizations.

Based upon these categories, Weber identifies various forms of social relationships (friendship, love, loyalty, patriotism, etc.), types of action orientation (usage, custom, and self-interest), the concept of legitimate order
governing social relationship (derived from the four types of social behaviour), modes (conflict, competition, and selection), and associative and communal relationships (using the terms Vergesellschaftung (associative relationship) and Vergemeinschaftung (communal relationship) instead of Gesellschaft (society) and Gemeinschaft (community)). The varicus forms of socially-oriented behaviour are concluded in Economy and Society with a consideration of open and closed forms, representation and mutual responsibility, and a number of aspects of "organization," such as consensual and imposed order, administrative and regulative order, compulsory and voluntary forms of association within organizations, the distinction between power and domination, and the differences between political and hierocratic organization.

All of these aspects Weber intended be drawn upon in examining individual behaviour as it is socially oriented, in contrast, as we shall see, to the dominant view of Weber's bureaucratic concept in administrative writings. Apart from the apparent emphasis on values, subjectivism, and motivations other than rational, Weber devotes a considerable body of text to conflict, politics, and coercion, as well as many forms of social behaviour which are usually classified as irrational or non-rational.

2. Group Level of Analyses

Weber outlines many types of groups, such as household, neighbourhood, and kin groups. In this discussion he considers forms of marriage, regulation of sexual relations, the impact of economic, military, political and legal factors, succession. In a section in Economy and Society on ethnic groups, Weber discusses race membership, custom, tribal organization and affiliation, and nationality.
A discussion of domination properly belongs at this level since Weber defines domination as "the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (1978b: 212) and legitimacy as a claim made to domination (1978b: 213) which receives inner justification by those who comply by virtue of four possible kinds of ascription: traditional, affectual, value-rational, or legal (1978b: 36). It is important to note that Weber describes in interdependent fashion the ascription of legitimacy, "the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority" (1978b: 213). And it is clear that Weber did not intend that forms of organization be reduced from subjective foundations to a purely structuralist model. The three pure types of authority, or legitimate domination (Herrschaft) are based on validity of claim: legal, traditional, and charismatic (1978b: 215). Weber further considers the effect of legal authority with a bureaucratic staff, patrimonial and extra-patrimonial recruitment in traditional authority as well as three forms of traditional authority (gerontocratic, patriarchal, and patrimonial), the establishment of charismatic community on the basis of charismatic authority, charismatic staff, various types of feudalism, the transformation of charisma to democracy, and collegiality. Of most importance to administrative theory is an additional section on authority, "Combinations of the Different Types of Authority," which Weber prefaces with the comment: "The above discussion [212-262] makes it quite evident that 'ruling organizations' which belong only to one or another of these pure types are very exceptional" (1978b: 262). Weber's consideration of legitimate domination is finished with essays on the definition and characteristics of
parties, direct democracy, types of representation within organizations, and interest groups.

Weber described three kinds of social stratification: classes, status groups, and parties. Weber accepts as types of class, various forms of property, commercial and social classes. Status groups include privilege based on lifestyle, education, and other forms of qualification.

3. Societal Level of Analysis

Throughout substantive studies, and delineated in ideal typical form in Economy and Society, Weber examined a number of social institutions which together produce the complex composition of society. Each of them he examined in terms of the possible constituent historical components (referred to as sociologies) which presuppose the preceding categories of social behaviour. The first that appears in Economy and Society is economic. Economic action is composed of any form of behaviour oriented towards satisfying a desire for utilities (1978b: 63), thereby including all means: peaceful, cooperative, violent, coercive, or otherwise. Weber includes in economic action considerations of types of rationality involved, types of organization, means of exchange and payment, types of markets, formal (calculation) and substantive (ends) rationality of economic action, types of profit-making, the role of substantive conditions (such as technology in the form of accounting practices), types of divisions of labour (including managerial considerations), types of occupation structure (includes degree of specialization), forms of appropriation (e.g. land use), forms of trade, modes of capitalism and communism, types of economic groups (open, closed, monopolistic), and kinds of money. Additionally he examines the effect of political action on economic behaviour, and in turn the influence of
economic factors on the formation of organizations as well as the relations between law and economy.

Religion was approached by Weber in much the same way that economy and all other social institutions are logically analyzed, that is, according to the kinds of groups, concepts, and orientation typologies that inhere in them (e.g. groups—cult; concepts—salvation, orgy; typology—ascetic, mystical). The sociology of religion chapter of Economy and Society begins with a section on origins of religious behaviour, or an anthropology of religion which includes various kinds of beliefs, organizations, and authorities. The balance of the chapter on religion (totalling 220 pages) involves the identification of a complex system of typologies including kinds of magical or religious behaviour (supplication, prayer, prophecy, and sacrifice), roles (priests, monks, magicians, prophets, lawgivers, mystagogues, teachers of ethics), forms of taboo, ethics (conscience, sin, salvation), types of organization, forms of codification (dogma, scripture, canonical writing), religious propensities of various social classes, literati groups (intellectuals, secular salvation ideologies) and their various types of behaviour, differentiation of various religious traditions (Christian, Judaic, Islamic, etc.), various means of salvation, and various forms of charity. The chapter is concluded with a consideration of the interrelationship between other kinds of behaviours and religious, such as political, economic, sexual (orgiastic, chaste) and artistic.

Weber devoted a considerable portion of Economy and Society to a similar detailed 260 page analysis of law. In the prefatory section called "Fields of Substantive Law" he established distinctions among public and private law, government and administration, criminal and private law, and tort and crime, as well as an examination of limitation and
separation of legal powers, procedures, and identifying various kinds of legal thought (or philosophies). The balance of the chapter considers various typologies: contracts, freedoms and coercions, and legal norms (or customary law) and judge-made law; groups, such as effects of parties, various roles (law prophets and law specialists), legal training (as craft, as science), and various historical forms of legal systems (sacred law, Indian, Chinese, Islamic, Persian, and Jewish law, and canon law). The chapter is concluded with a consideration of forms and origins of codification, and the qualities and development of modern law.

The last social institution which receives detailed attention is politics. The chapter includes a definition of "political community" and an examination of stages in the formation of political association, and the concept of power prestige and its use by "Great Powers." This is followed by an examination of the economic foundations of imperialism, nation as a political entity, and the distribution of power within forms of political community, such as class, status and party groups.

There is a logic inherent in these exhaustive examinations of social institutions which can be extended to education, even though Weber did not write a separate analytical essay on educational organization. It is important to recognize that he did not preclude this possibility, but rather emphasized a number of times in his writings that the logic of his approach could be extended to topics he did not cover, and specifically refers to the possibility of examining education in this manner in *The Religion of China* (110-118). Instead Weber included within each of the other systems of typology sections on education, as well as commentary on bureaucratic and charismatic education.
4. Historico-Cultural Level of Analysis

Without delineating the various types of cultural and historical comparative analyses in detail, it is important in understanding the scope of Weber's writings to note that a number of studies were conducted on what could be called historical categories. These include lengthy analyses on the nature, origins, and development of patriarchal and patrimonial organization and states (which includes consideration of military and administrative topics) as they existed in ancient Egypt, China, ancient Greece, and Europe; a similar treatment of charismatic organization and states; feudalism as a special case; the nature, forms, and development of the city; and an analysis of forms of democracy, ancient and medieval.

Selected Substantive Contributions

Weber wrote extensively on a number of topics which are relevant to this study, namely: politics, administration, education, conflict, and critiques of bureaucracy. Much of the discussion on these topics is contained within other studies, such as the volumes on world religions, scattered throughout Economy and Society, in the methodological essays, and in miscellaneous speeches, articles, and lengthy editorial pieces for the public press, most of which were collected by Marianne Weber in the volumes which appeared in German in the 1920s.

1. Political Theory

One of the most important consequences of Weber's presentation as the architect of a structuralist bureaucratic model is that a considerable proportion of his writings devoted to political analysis is underplayed, or
even excluded. Three levels of his political analysis suffer: (1) politics inevitable to intraorganizational relationships; (2) the "concatenation" of influences external to an organization; and (3) the essays and articles Weber devoted to international politics, most of which were collected in the *Gesammeunte Politische Schriften* (1921) volume. The characterization of Weber as a semi-Machiavellian apologist for Realpolitik based upon his political activities and writings is difficult to reconcile with the general organizational and administrative theory view of Weber as one who simply considered architectonics.

Intraorganizational relationships are understood by Weber to be inherently political, as a close reading of the first chapter of *Economy and Society*, "Basic Sociological Terms," reveals. Not only the categories he constructs which identify the logically possible forms of social relationship, but the additional dimensions of conflict, competition, power, and domination speak to a view of organization and its composite relational nature as fundamentally political. These concepts are reinforced in Weber's studies on religions and his writings on academia, in which close attention is paid to the change of and struggle for status and power within and among the organizations examined. If anything, Weber's studies on religion are among the most politically conceptualized.

Among Weber's considerations of politics on an intraorganizational level of current interest in administration was his study of three forms of political leadership, power leadership, administrative leadership, and charismatic leadership (Glassman 1984: 217), the last of which many regard as one of his most significant contributions to organizational theory, that is the effect of a charismatic individu: on social relationships, especially in relation to bureaucratic organization.
"According to Max Weber, the very specific talent of the so-called "charismatic" leader is that he addresses himself to whatever ideals of his followers have been most painfully wounded by some present crisis and holds out relief to them. Moreover, he does so with an assurance that bespeaks his irresistible strength" (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 57). Weber's analysis of charisma and its routinization serve as a foundation for examining dramaturgy in organizational behaviour. Also, his analysis of modernity reveals an ongoing centralization of power in all fields of human activity including war, education, economics, religion and politics:

The relative independence of the artisan or cottage outworker, of the landowning peasant, of the holder of a benefice, of the knight and the vassal depended on the fact that he himself owned the tools, supplies, financial means, or weapons with whose help he pursued his economic, military, or political function and from which he lived during his performance. Contrariwise, the hierarchical dependence of the worker, salesman, technician, academic assistant, and state official and soldier rests on the fact that those tools, supplies, and financial means which are indispensable for organization and economic existence are concentrated in the hands of either the entrepreneur or the political lord . . . The "separation" of the worker from the material means to his activity takes many forms; he is separated from the means of production in the economy, from the means of war in the army, from the material means of administration in public administration, from the means of research in the university institute and laboratory, from the financial means in all of them. It is the decisive foundation common to the capitalist private enterprise and to the cultural, political, and military activities of the modern power state. (1919: 309)

Interorganizational relationships are also presented as inherently political in two basic ways: the influences of social action within one sociological sphere on another, for example, economic action on religious; and the relationship
between state organization, such as parliament, government administration, or kingship on other spheres of social action.

An example of such political action is how Weber characterizes relations between violence and the State. The rationalization of the modern State consists in confiscating the right of violence from individuals and subordinate groups for its own benefit, the modern state being "a human community which, within the limits of a specified territory . . . successfully claims for itself the monopoly of legitimate physical violence" (1919: 494). Weber's criticism of contemporary political parties was based upon a grasp of Realpolitik: the Social Democrats he considered to be politically immature because they were unable to understand the function of violence in the development of historical forces and to understand and take over the logic of power (Ferraroti 70). In part his analysis is related to the distinction Weber draws between an ethic of responsibility, calculating the consequences and costs of attaining a goal, and an ethic of intention, based on principle.

Weber's analysis of politics on an international level included studies on imperialism, military theory, and the driving force of world status for a nation being legitimacy and power prestige (Collins 1986: 146). *Nation* he defined not as racial, ethnic, or language-based in *Economy and Society*, by presenting a number of historical examples to this effect (922-923), but as cohesive political sentiments based on international prestige in power relations with others (Collins 1986: 146). Therefore imperialism and nationalism he regarded as interrelated, composed of internal and external political factors which may include "ethnic" elements, but whose defining characteristic is "a common political destiny" (1978b: 923).
Weber’s merit lies in recognizing the phenomenon of power as an underlying political force in relationships between groups, between the governors and the governed, among classes, status groups and parties, and among individuals within various kinds of organization which takes place in a defined historical economic system and political structure. The measure of power is, according to Weber, the degree to which an individual or organization within society has the ability to effect change. Ferraroti opposes Weber’s historical sociological approach to that of social psychology in which "the psychological dilution of its terms, although seeming to facilitate scientific research, in reality completely drain it of meaning (1987: 58).

2. Administrative Theory

Administration is defined by Weber as "a special group which can normally be trusted to execute the general policy as well as the specific commands" of the rule of a person or group over others, referred to throughout his writings as an administrative staff (1978b: 212). What distinguishes Weber’s definitions and descriptions of administrative activity from the common view of his bureaucratic theory is that he acknowledged many types of administration, traditional, legal-rational (bureaucratic), and charismatic, based upon the type of obedience which binds an administrative staff to its superior(s): custom, affectual ties, purely material complex of interests, and ideal (wertrationale) motives (1978b: 212-213). He differentiated administration, and its staff, from organization. Organization, as "a social relationship which is either closed or limits the admission of outsiders . . . when its regulations are enforced by specific individuals" (1978: 48), may or may not require an administrative staff (1978b: 48).
Weber further distinguished between an administrative organization and regulative organization. The former is one solely oriented to "Rules which govern organized action constituting an administrative order (Verwaltungsordnung)," the latter oriented to "rules which govern other kinds of social action and thereby protect the actors' enjoyment of the resulting benefits . . . called a regulative order (Regulierungsordnung)" (1978b: 51). A purely regulative organization he describes as "a theoretically conceivable state based purely on the upholding of public order (Rechtsstaat) and committed to absolute laissez-faire" (1978b: 52) governing the functions of judges, police, soldiers, and jurors. Administrative order governs the actions of administrative staff and other members' organizational relationships. A purely administrative organization Weber associated with communism (1978b: 52).

Since these distinctions are analytic, most organizations would be composed of both characteristics, exhibiting administrative behaviour which is not only legal-rational, but charismatically and traditionally motivated and oriented. Administrative staff and styles, therefore, exist within non-rationalized or bureaucratically dominated organizations: traditional organizations (patrimonial) and charismatic communities (e.g. religious and military). Administration, therefore, exists in any of these forms in economic, hierocratic (organizations which distribute or deny religious benefits), legal, political and educational contexts:

"Administration" is not a concept of public law exclusively. For we must recognize the existence of private administration, as in the case of a household or a business enterprise, alongside the kind of administration carried on either by the state or by other public institutions (i.e., either institutional organs of the state itself,
or heteronomous institutions deriving their powers from the state). (1978b: 644)

Administration necessarily requires power ("the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance") and domination ("the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons") (1978b: 53). The methodological repertoire of administrative staff, Weber reminds the reader, has historically included coercion, actual or threatened use of physical force (1978b: 55), and any other means which produces compliance.

3. Educational Theory

Weber's interest in education was two-fold: critiquing contemporary educational practice, especially at the university level, and analyzing educational organization, classes (literati), and activities as they related to other topics. The former was an exercise in value judgment, the latter in value-freedom. In other words, his personal values as a scholar were brought to bear fully on his educational political activity, and scholarly values were brought to bear on the study of the historical role of educational organization in the development of economic, legal, religious, and political behaviour.

One of Weber's main personal concerns was that modern educational activity would succumb to bureaucratic irons. His inimical attitude was evident when discussing his colleagues' equanimity before bureaucratization:

As terrible as the idea seems that the world might be full of nothing but professors—we would flee to the desert if that should happen—so much the more terrible is the idea that the world should be filled with nothing but those cogs who cling to a little post and strive for a somewhat greater one—a condition which, as in the papyrii, you rediscover increasingly in the spirit of
contemporary officialdom and above all of its next generation, our present students. This passion for bureaucratization, such as we have heard expressed here, is enough to drive one to despair. It is . . . as though we knowingly and willingly were supposed to become men who need "order" and nothing but order, who become nervous and cowardly if this order shakes for a moment and helpless when they are torn from their exclusive adaptation to this order. That the world knows nothing more than such men of order—we are in any case caught up in this development, and the central question is not how we further and accelerate it but what we have to set against this machinery, in order to preserve a remnant of humanity from this parcelling-out of the soul, from this exclusive rule of bureaucratic life ideals. (Weber in Mitzman 177-178)

An additional set of short writings particularly relevant to educational administration have been collected and translated as On Universities: The Power of the State and the Dignity of the Academic Calling in Imperial Germany. This volume contains a number of articles and addresses published in the Frankfurter Zeitung and other prominent public and academic journals from 1908 to 1917, as well as a portion of the text of "Science as a Vocation," in which Weber criticized German academics for exchanging their proper academic role for bowing "before the prestige and power of the imperial monarchy" (1974: 2). Weber argued in this lecture that many academics had allowed themselves to become corrupted, seduced, and manipulated by senior officials of German Ministries of Education. In addition to these critiques, Weber did make a number of important observations about the role of teachers, the administration of universities, the relationship of both individual teachers and universities to politics, and the concept of vocation [Beruf].

Even though in his investigation of modernity through various levels and types of human activity, he did not pursue education as a distinctive field he did investigate
educational aspects of each of these. As mentioned above, Weber included in *Economy and Society* sections on bureaucratic and charismatic education. In addition to these there are a number of other sections of educational relevance: "The Concept of Occupation [Beruf] and Occupational Structure"; several sections in the chapter on Religion relating to literati classes, the role of intelligentsia in religious development and education, and the role of philosophies in the development of religious practice; and sections on legal training. Commentary in sections on Legitimate Domination, as well as Class, Status and Party, identifies education as either a possible source or means of establishing these kinds of influence.

The substantive studies on religion contain detailed analysis of: educational activity as it manifests itself in social classes and status groups (literati), the origins of educated classes, the influence of economic and political activity on the development of education and in turn how various kinds of educated groups and educational theory and philosophy have played a role in the development of economic and political activity. Implicit in his treatment of these topics is an understanding that all levels and forms of individual and group analysis, as well as historical and cultural comparison, apply to an examination of educational organization and administration. How Weber proceeded, and how he indicated educational organization could be further studied is of a wholly different nature from Griffiths' pronouncement in *Administrative Theory* that the aim of science as theory in administrative studies is "description, explanation, and prediction" (1959: 22) and the construction of a "set of assumptions from which a set of empirical laws (principles) may be derived" (1959: 28).

4. Conflict Theory
Contrary to the opinion of many administrative and organizational authors, Weber did provide the basis of a systematic conflict theory. This is argued by Collins, who presents Weber primarily as a conflict theorist in the tradition of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* (4th century B.C. India), Machiavelli's *The Prince*, and Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* (1974: 148, 153-154), oriented toward a "cold-blooded understanding of the role of violent conflict in world history" (1974: 168), and influenced by Hegelian dialectics, Marxist conflict theory, and Bismarck's fostering of Machiavellian realism in a combined understanding of Realpolitik. Weber understood as did Hegel that history moves by conflict: "History [is] the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized" (Hegel 21).

Conflict resides in, or is potential between, any combination of types and levels of Weber's system of typologies (that is, both inter- and intrapersonally). The source of conflict originates in both value orientation, in ideas, and becomes manifest in an infinite possibility of material and social conditions in which the actors find themselves. The antagonism of values Weber saw as irreconcilable; it is impossible to harmonize economics, politics, morality, art, religion, and science, because no harmony exists among power, need, knowledge, and interest (Freund 1968: 28). Therefore, ideological differences, tension in authority relationships, and conflict of power through class, status group, and party formations, inhere in any actual situation, and any number of these may, and usually do, coexist. A number of Weber's analyses of conflict derive, as Collins argues, from Marxian "fundamentals": "the primacy of self-interested conflict, the importance of material conditions, the effects of
interests on ideology, the existence of economic class struggle" (1974: 169). To these Weber adds conflict in administrative organization and other internal conflict in organizations as a whole (Collins 1974: 169-170), the role of military force in history, and conflict in political organization especially with respect to coercion. Organizations to Weber "are sites of conflict" and bureaucracy is seen as one type of strategy used in a struggle for control of power.

An especially important part of Weber's discussion on conflict is the notion of "asymmetry" of meaning attribution and values in a number of sections of Economy and Society: "Types of Social Action," "The Concept of Social Relationship," and "Types of Action Orientation: Usage, Custom, Self-Interest" (24-31); and "Conflict, Competition, Selection" (38-40). Weber's concept of charisma is also important in his theory of conflict, since the charismatic can serve as a way of reconciling means and ends, by providing a world-view brought by a charismatic individual which helps overcome differences of opinion about the expression of and action issuing from value orientations: the justification and pursuit of means and ends.

Conflict was also recognized to be an unavoidable feature of scholarly activity. Primarily through the influence of Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and Stefan George, Weber realized that the limitations of all scholarship is partly a consequence of underlying value conflict and an underlying irrationality in human experience and aspirations which expresses itself in the irreconcilability of science with religion, morality with art, economics with politics (Freund: 179). Value neutrality is achieved by the scholar by taking into account the values which a topic contains, as well as resisting the
inclination to impose a hierarchy of values on the subject of research through self-awareness.

5. Bureaucratic Theory

Even though the ideal type bureaucracy represents only a small portion of his entire writings, it has received inordinate attention in organizational and administrative writings. It is therefore necessary to examine Weber’s attitudes toward bureaucracy in some detail. It is important to note that his typology of bureaucracy is a part of his analysis of an overall rationalization of life in the modern industrialized capitalized world, evident in social changes involved in law, economics (exchange relations in the market and theory and use of money), technology and bureaucratization of military activities, the establishment of factories in industrial activity, monasticism in religion, the bureaucratization of political parties, the administration of charity, and educational organization. Weber’s formulation of bureaucracy, sometimes referred to as the invention of, follows from a well-established tradition of social philosophy in which bureaucracy had been identified, defined, and evaluated by Hegel, Marx, Saint-Simon, Gogol, Balzac, Dickens, and Kafka, although Weber did, in contrast, extend it from the realm of government into all other areas of social organization in modern society (Wrong 1984: 73).

Rationalization as a process which increased historically in modern European societies through the "concatenation" of a multitude of influences and factors (rather than a deterministic evolution), a dynamic force in history in dialectical relation to charismatic irrationalism, producing characteristic sciences, theodicies, and world views (Casanova 148). Rationalization, therefore is not solely of the external
world, of techniques, organizations, conduct, structures, but of mental processes and products, and therefore becomes a precipitating value in societal change. The source of rationalization is both internal and external to organization, for Weber, the result of social processes and values which are found in as diverse political orientations as socialism, liberal democratic and conservative organizations and administrations.

Rationalization is more widespread than simply the phenomenon of bureaucratic organization, involving the specialization of individual activities as well as organizations. Techniques of calculation, eradication or suppression of traditional and charismatic forms of value and authority through legal-rational regulation (evident in professionalization), increasing technical and pragmatic bases of education, scientized research, changes in family organization, roles and relation to industrial development, forms of urbanization, replacement of traditional and/or community values with contractual and economic norms and values, all are the consequence of the means and ends of activities subjected increasingly to rational calculation.

Weber's attitude to an increasing and pervasive rationalization of life was ambivalent. On a personal level he had faith in the rationality of individual judgement. There was for him no alternative to liberal civilization. However, he was critical of, and cynical about, rationalized life evident in the bureaucratization of social activities associated with "modernization" which would, he believed, lead ultimately to a loss of freedom (Freiheitsverlust) and a loss of meaning (Sinnverlust) (Roderick 34). These symptoms represented to Weber a spread of formal rationality (the degree to which action is oriented by rational calculability) to substantive rationality (the application of rational calculation to goals and values) (Roderick 34)—
an ends/means inversion. He valued the rational, not the rationalized life; functions, not functionaries:

The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do not, therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. (1946: 139)

Contrary to many presentations of Weber’s theory, he did not approve of, promote, or advocate bureaucratization; he simply recognized it as technically the most highly developed form of rule. As did many modern German writers in a critical tradition extending from Goethe to Kafka [Burckhardt, Nietzsche, Rilke, Spengler] which viewed societal changes as an increasing depreciation of life (Heller xiv), Weber saw bureaucratization as a form of reification:

A lifeless machine is the materialization of mind. This fact alone gives it the power to force men into its service and to determine so coercively their everyday life in the factory . . . Also a materialization of mind is that living machine which bureaucratic organization represents, with its trained, specialized labor, its delimitation of areas of competence, its regulations and its hierarchically stratified relations of obedience. In union with the dead machine, it is laboring to produce the cage of that bondage of the future to which one day powerless men will be forced to submit like the fellaheen of ancient Egypt. This will certainly be true if a purely technically good (i.e., rational) bureaucratic administration and welfare system is the ultimate and unique value, which is to decide the way their affairs are run . . . a bureaucracy that has reached this advanced state [is among] the most difficult social creations to destroy. (Weber in 'mnmsen 1984: 166-167)
A further consequence he noted was that as rationalization increased so did irrationality, in the form of eroticism (hedonism) and charismatic susceptibility (Freund 1968: 25):

The fate of our age, with its characteristic rationalization and intellectualization and above all the disenchantment of the world, is that the ultimate, most sublime values have withdrawn from public life, either into the transcendental realm of mystical life or into the brotherhood of immediate personal relationships between individuals. It is no accident that our greatest art is intimate rather than monumental, nor is it fortuitous that today only in the smallest groups, between individuals, something pulsates in pianissimo which corresponds to the prophetic pneuma which formerly swept through great communities like fire and welded them together... (Weber 1989: 30)

His concern about bureaucracy was one reason he was cynical about developments in Russia—that the dictatorship of the proletariat would most probably lead to a dictatorship of the bureaucrats (1916: 508). Socialism would degenerate into bureaucratic despotism since it requires more planning. By fusing economic and political power he believed it would establish the administrative bureaucracy of the state as the dominant force in society with the potential to be the most insidious form of societal order if it becomes fused with a politico-military might of the state (Glassman and Murvar 3, 5). He therefore believed that democracy could only be preserved if certain conditions would exist or be attained: the separation of economic power from political power (Glassman and Murvar 5).

Parliamentary democracy by itself, he regarded as not a match for rationalized bureaucracy, and could only maintain dominance if united with an institutionalized, legally circumscribed charismatic authority. Only charismatic leadership, because of its psychological nature and process,
had the power to rouse individuals out of withdrawal and hedonism and bring them back into social participation (Glassman and Murvar 7).

Even though Weber did describe, in evocative terms, the degree to which the bureaucrat is "a small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march" (1978b: 987-988), he did discuss the ability of the technical expert in bureaucratic organization to make a secret of knowledge resulting in a technique of bureaucratic abuse (Bendix 1984: 23) and a tool of power (1978b: 992-993). The intent and ability of members of a bureaucracy to protect their power received cynical adulation from Weber: "In facing a parliament, the bureaucracy fights, out of a sure power instinct, every one of that institution's attempts to gain through its own means . . . expert knowledge from the interested parties. Bureaucracy naturally prefers a poorly informed, and hence powerless, parliament--at least insofar as this ignorance is compatible with the bureaucracy's own interests" (1978b: 992-993). Types of rulership he believed fared differentially. While absolute monarchy is "powerless" due to dependence solely upon the bureaucracy (Frederick the Great's irate decrees derailed "because the official mechanism simply ignored them as the occasional ideas of a dilettante" and "the Russian Tsar of the ancien régime . . . rarely able to put across permanently anything that displeased his bureaucracy"), constitutional monarchy has a better chance since there is relatively greater public criticism (1978b: 993). For these reasons he argued that mass democracy must be a resolute enemy of bureaucracy, because bureaucracy would defend its power against any kind of rival, parliamentarian, monarchical, or charismatic (Mommsen 1984: 169).
However, at the same time, Weber did not see an alternative to bureaucratic administrations, even in professional bureaucracies, because of the growth of mass society—it made bureaucratization inescapable because bureaucracy had the technical superiority under these conditions (Mitzman 185). "Only by reversion in every field—political, religious, economic, etc.—to small-scale organization would it be possible to any considerable extent to escape its influence" (Weber 1947: 338) under the impetus of charismatic authority, the only strong form of humanistic force able to combat the dehumanizing consequences of bureaucracy:

[bureaucracy] revolutionizes with technical means . . . "from without": It first changes the material and social orders, and through them the people, by changing the conditions of adaptation, and perhaps the opportunities of means and ends. By contrast, the power of charisma rests upon the belief in revelation and heroes, upon the conviction that certain manifestations . . . are important and valuable . . . Charismatic belief revolutionizes man "from within" and shapes material and social conditions according to its revolutionary will. (1978b: 1115-1116)

An example of how Weber believed the liberal ideals of individual responsibility and the exercise of political judgement could be enacted is contained in the memorandum he sent to the participants of the Verein für Sozialpolitik meeting in Leipzig in November of 1912 which summarizes his views on social policy:

There is no doubt a basic presumption for us in the area of the workers' question: We reject, partly in principle and partly as inadequate, the point of view of master rule or patriarchalism, the bonds of welfare institutions and those who would treat the worker as an object for bureaucratic regulation, and insurance legislation that merely creates dependency. We affirm the equal participation of the workers in the collective determination of working conditions,
and to this end we also affirm the strengthening of their organizations, which spearhead this effort; we see the comradeliness and class dignity that develops in this way as a positive cultural value—whether or not solidarity expresses itself merely in pressure by the organization on the individual, which is somewhat that case within every social grouping based on honor and comradeship. We look upon the growing fruitlessness of orderly strikes as an evil caused by the increasing superiority of employers' organizations, legal and police chicanery, and the systematic creation of subsidized employer protection troops among the workers. We resist, without compromise, the conditions of capital hegemony, with government cooperation, according to the Pittsburgh pattern, in the Saar region and the heavy industry in Westphalia and Silesia, because we want to live in a land of citizens, not of subjects. (Weber in Mommsen 1984: 120)

**Conclusion**

Even though there is a considerable body of criticism concerning the fragmentary state of Weber's theoretical system, its systematic character lies mid-way between fragmentation and a completely unified statement due to Weber's continual modifying and refining of his methodology as he expanded the scope of his investigations until his death. To some authors this scope is an indication of the failure of coherence, to others a promising beginning of a total cultural and global study, in which Weber demonstrated the possibility of coordinating and integrating disparate disciplines, exploring the basis for a unification theory for social and cultural studies.

The most valuable aspects of his complex and open-ended approach are: a dual regard for the individual and social organization and for forms of irrationality and rationality, the refinement and application of analytical constructs in sociocultural studies, and the insights provided by comparative historical and cultural analysis. Andreski
regards as the most important lesson we can learn from Weber is "that comparative study of history (including, of course, very recent history) must remain the main method of substantiating any theory which claims to explain large-scale social processes" (1984: 147).

Perhaps of most value is the way in which he framed questions, the "germ seeds" of his research. Essentially, all of his scholarly work was guided by an attempt to identify, explain, and evaluate in causal relation, the role of values in human social behaviour. Such a project, Weber attempted to demonstrate and argue, and as indicated in Economy and Society, is a complex, comprehensive, complicated affair. Examining educational organization and administration from a Weberian perspective, involves research conducted in accordance with the complete system of typologies, thereby integrating historical, philosophical, and sociological technique and purpose.

Synopsis

This chapter outlines the scope, depth and importance of Weber's sociological and organizational contributions to sociocultural studies. To this end, significant aspects, concepts, and techniques of his methodology are examined, as well as the complete system of typologies he used in research and theories of particularly relevant topics to administrative and educational studies. Topics included in the description of his methodology are: theory of knowledge, particularly verstehen and Weber's understanding of causality in the sociocultural studies; the concepts of value freedom, relevance, and judgment; the technique of ideal type
construction; and the framework of Weber's system of typologies used in Economy and Society. In addition, five topics investigated by Weber, relevant to administrative studies, are discussed: political theory, administrative theory, educational theory, conflict theory, and bureaucratic theory.
CHAPTER FIVE:
THE RECEIVED VIEW OF WEBER IN ADMINISTRATIVE
AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws (Gesetzesbegriffen), however perfect it may be, since the significance of cultural events presupposes a value-orientation towards these events. The concept of culture is a value-concept. Empirical reality becomes "culture" to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes those segments and only those segments of reality which have become significant to us because of this value-relevance. Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to us due to their connection with our values. (Weber 1949: 76)

Sources

Käser argues that no comprehensive account of the reception and effect of Weber's work has been presented as of 1979, hindering an evaluation of his contributions to sociocultural studies. One of the aims of a systematic investigation would be the identification of "patterns of reception and groups of recipients" necessary to the analysis of "Weber images" for a formulation of "a kind of infrastructure of reception" (197). To this end, the intent of this chapter is to determine to what extent and how accurately Weber's major contributions to social behaviour are reflected in administrative and educational administration literature and to assess the use these fields have made of Weber's administrative and educational theory. This has been undertaken through an inventory of Weberian
thought in the relevant literatures. Such an inventory requires that influential authors and representative texts in the two fields be examined.

The universe of monographs in educational administration is small enough to permit an heuristic examination of the universe rather than resorting to sampling procedures relative to administrative and organizational theory. The universe of educational administration theory in periodical literature is not as easy to delimit, therefore, those theorists who are regarded as major influences by the educational monographs and those identified as such in the 1988 Handbook of Research on Educational Administration, edited by N. J. Boyan, were included in the survey. In addition, Educational Administration Quarterly and Journal of Educational Administration were surveyed from 1965 to the present. All articles referred to by these sources which explored Weberian concepts or applied them to educational administration were examined (Appendix D).

Even though articles on educational administration appeared in educational research publications as early as 1931, educational administration as a distinctive discipline with a theoretical foundation is dated from the 1950s (Gibson 1979: 31-32; Walker et al 1973: ix-x; Rizvi 1991). The brief history of educational administration accounts to some extent for the manageable size of the literature universe in this survey.

The domain of administrative and organizational theory is much larger, and therefore more difficult to define. The first source used to supply a list for the survey was March's "Introduction" to Handbook of Organizations (ix-xvi). In addition, texts and articles identified as seminal in administrative and organizational theory through library subject and title indices which were readily available were
included. All administrative or organizational sources of Weber's work and ideas, identified by these authors and in surveyed literature were also included. This was supplemented by references which the authors of recent organizational and administrative texts considered to be foundational or highly regarded. The survey, therefore, is self-referent and skewed towards those who do make reference to Weber's works (Appendix C).

Although these realms of discourse might appear at first glance to be large and unmanageable, there is considerable redundancy and repetition. Authoritative administrative and organizational sources thus reduce to a small number those whose reputations in the field have been established as foundational and relevant commentary on Weber's work. There is, in fact, a predictive monotony of authoritative sources on Weber (e.g. Bendix, Blau, Gerth and Mills, Gouldner, Merton, and Parsons) most predating the 1968 explosion of interest in Weberian studies, with the exception of Bates, Collins, and Greenfield who employ a greater range of primary sources and writings by Weberian scholars (e.g. Mommsen, Roth, and Schuchter). The first conclusion one can arrive at is that educational administration is with few exceptions highly derivative from the larger universe of administration and organizational theory in its treatment of Weber. This reinforced by Greenfield's confirmation of this practice in "Theory about What?: Some More Thoughts about Theory in Educational Administration" (1976). In turn, administrative and organizational literature rarely draws on Weberian commentary outside its own universe.

While the resultant representation of the two fields derived for the purpose of this study is incomplete, coverage is clearly sufficient to determine the dominant view of Weber, what portion of his work is generally
reflected, and how accurately it is presented. This cannot be determined absolutely, since the fields are too large and extensive, but determination can be made sufficient to the principle of preponderance of evidence.

The inventory was constructed by first identifying which primary sources, if any, were noted in the selections (Appendices E and H). Secondly, a record was made of which secondary sources were relied upon, often instead of primary sources (Appendices F and I). Thirdly, an inventory of those aspects of Weber's writings presented in the writings were recorded in an abbreviated manner (Appendices G and J). And fourthly, ambiguities and misrepresentations were collected and analyzed thematically, according to topic (e.g. history, values) and type (e.g. conceptual conflation). In many cases, characterization of an author's treatment of Weber's work is based upon circumstantial evidence. That is, it is assumed that if primary sources are not noted and if few and questionable secondary sources were relied upon, the passage in question has been written without reference to any substantial source of Weber's thought, particularly if misrepresentation of his work is evident.

Administrative Writings

What is most noticeable in organizational and administrative theory is an underrepresentation of Weber's works, particularly those of predominantly historical (Benson 1977: 5-6) and cross-cultural content, such as the studies on religious organization and indeed most sections of *Economy and Society*. For example, Hage asserted that only two English translations of his work (1946 and 1947) were available (1980: 26). Nevertheless, assuming that Hage's text was in publication as early as 1978, there were
many primary sources extant in English, notably The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism which had been available since 1930, Economy and Society, which was available in full by 1968, as well as most methodological essays, and the studies on religion. March's "Introduction" to the Handbook of Organizations demonstrated that in the references of 12 of the most highly regarded volumes on organizational behaviour since 1959, Henderson and Parsons' translation of a section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society), entitled The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947), is the most often used source for Weberian ideas, and is one of the most "fashionable" sources in the sample (1965: x-xii). What they fail to note is that only the section defining bureaucratic authority and selected passages from charismatic authority are used. This selectivity has not substantially changed since 1965.

Greenfield noted that the presentation of Weber's views in organization theory is such "that he is more frequently quoted than read" (1976: 6). This is particularly true in reference to Weber’s attention to the subjective (value, habit, and belief dimensions), especially the non-rational, which comprise the verstehen approach to the study of human enterprise. This view is also held by Bacharach and Lawler: "Sociologists have spent a disproportionate amount of time trying to prove or disprove the plausibility of Weber’s ideal construct of bureaucracy. It is safe to say that Weber remains the most cited organizational theorist; however, the narrowness of his impact is best exemplified by the fact that the pages of his work most frequently cited by organizational researchers are those few where he presents his ideal typical model of the organization" (1980: 2). These views were borne out by the inventory. Weber's work has been both underrepresented and misrepresented to his English audience. He is most often identified as a
sociologist, which creates an exclusionary impression of the nature of his research approach and scholarly contributions, particularly his historical work, and is most often referred to as the architect of the bureaucratic model. Wrong attributes this practice to "American sociologists [who] have often regarded sociology as a kind of intellectual short-cut providing nomological formulae under which historical particulars can be subsumed, thus eliminating the necessity of understanding them directly in their complex particularity" (1984: 77). The exception to the generalization is a few organizational theorists who utilize a broader range and greater depth of Weber's analyses. Examples are: Stinchcombe, who includes discussion of concepts of alienation and power (1965); Collins, who employs Weber's typologies for conflict theory (1975); Mouzelis, who presents the historical and societal levels of Weber's analyses (1968); and Giddens, who explores in some depth and complexity Weber's work on methodology, all the ideal typologies, value theory, and the relationship between value orientations and economic behaviour (1971).

There is also a general difference between the American reception of Weber in organizational theory and the European interest in his works, as indicated by Hage (1980: 23). Europeans have demonstrated more interest in Weber's historical work, the derivation of ideal types from historical studies, and Weber's concept of power (Crozier 1964; Mayntz 1964; Pugh 1969). The American exceptions to this are Collins (1975), Perrow (1967), and Albrow (1964). American theorists have generally stressed the imputed structural-functionalist character of his work with its emphasis on efficiency (Blau 1955; Gouldner 1956; Hage 1965; March and Simon 1958; Merton 1957; Perrow 1967; and Price 1968). This was pointed out by Nigro and Nigro in their
observation that Weber is most often associated with scientific management:

Weber's work did not inspire these movements [scientific management and administrative principles], which developed independently, but there has been a tendency for later students of organization to lump his writings together with those of the other traditionalists. Actually, it is probably more accurate to say that in their efforts to rationalize industrial and administrative processes, the advocates of scientific management and administrative principles were following trends described and predicted by Weber. (1980: 125)

The general difference between German sociological interest in Weber before 1959 was an interest in his theoretical work and sociology of religion before the Second World War and a celebration of his "value-free sociology" after the war. The shift in debate after 1959 to political dimensions of Weber's thought was caused largely by the publication of Mommsen's Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920. In contrast, American and English sociology concentrated on the Protestant Ethic thesis, organizational theory as interpreted by Talcott Parsons in The Structure of Social Action (1937), and his translation of the first section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft as the Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Mitzman 1965: 310-311).

Organizational and administrative theory uses two levels of authoritative source on Max Weber. As noted above, the primary interpreters are Bendix, Blau, Merton, and Parsons, who are relied upon by Gouldner, et al. These in turn are relied upon by many other authors, frequently without reference to primary sources. The "model" of bureaucracy, the most frequently used of Weber's contributions, is generally described by reliance upon an interpreter's summary, in cascading succession. For example, Gouldner (1954) relies upon Merton's summary
(1949), and Peabody (1964: 12) reports Blau's definition of bureaucracy as "specialization, a hierarchy of authority, a system of rules, and impersonality" (1956: 17-19), instead of drawing directly from Weber, even though the primary sources (1946 and 1947) are cited in Peabody's text. Not only do authors rely upon interpreters for the sense of Weber's constructs, but they allow interpreters to create the boundaries of selective reading of Weber's texts. It is quite clear in sections of both the 1946 and 1947 Weber texts that the ideal types are not empirical, that they are the product of historical study, and that the primary categories for the series of typologies are based upon individual value orientations, however apart from the sections relevant to bureaucracy, and occasionally the concept of charisma, these sections are not used. It is primarily in this manner that misrepresentation of Weber's methodology and conceptual constructs is perpetuated.

Misrepresentation of Weber's writings takes a number of forms. As noted above, underrepresentation of the substantive historical dimension of his studies, methodology, and system of concepts, primarily the full range of ideal typologies, not only limits the value of his work, but contributes to misrepresentation. This has been pointed out by Burrell and Morgan in their discussion on radical structuralists' criticism of conventional organization theory: "Weber should be read in more depth and with greater understanding. Most functionalist organization theorists completely misrepresent his views on bureaucracy, and misuse his concept of the 'ideal type'" (1975: 366). Because the bureaucratic model is taken out of this context a number of conceptual conflations are produced: equating bureaucracy and organization, legal-rational authority with authority in general, instrumental rationality with rationality per se, and organization of individual social
behaviour with systemic or structural description of organization. All of these have conspired to eliminate from most presentations of Weber's work in administrative and organizational theory the subjective elements of analysis, the individual unit of analysis, and Weber's well-demonstrated appreciation that actual social behaviour exists in a non-reducible, particularist, variable, and inconsistent realm of power relations, politics, conflict, and irrationality.

Misrepresentation is also caused by a transmutation of Weber's analyses from a verstehen approach to social theory into an experimental-empirical approach which reifies and universalizes the ideal typologies (Warwick 61) so that they appear as empirical descriptions, resulting in a loss of historical and cultural specificity and of the individual as a unit of analysis. This has resulted in a presentation of ideal types as experimental hypotheses, and of their characteristics as experimental variables. It has also produced a confusion of descriptive and analytic processes with prescriptive intent.

The bureaucratic "model" in particular has been transformed from an analytic construct for the purpose of cultural and historical comparison and analysis to a "blueprint" for administrative training and management principles throughout much of administrative and organizational literature. The confusion of ideal type constructs with empirical models has provided the basis for a number of criticisms of the limitations of the bureaucratic type. Predominant among these are criticisms of Weber's neglect of variation in practice in existing organizations, and a perceived over-reliance on the Prussian government bureaucracy as a model for the bureaucratic typology instead of industrial practice (Gouldner 1954: 20). This last criticism demonstrates the limited familiarity of
organizational theorists with Weber's works and biography: Weber did have intimate familiarity with industrial practice within his own family, and, as documented in the previous chapter, wrote extensively on historical and contemporary business practice.

1. History

There are two major problems related to Weber's historical work. The first is that he is rarely identified as an historian, or that he grounded his sociological typologies in historical study, most of the authors examined categorized Weber as a sociologist, or a father of sociology. They present his work exclusively as a product of modern sociological practice, or as Benson noted: "emphasis on historical contexts and trends were removed. The core idea--the bounded, rational organization--was retained" (1977: 6). Implicit in this exclusionary practice, which denies the strong historicist orientation of Weber, is an underlying assumption that disciplinary and scholarly status and practice are specialist. Exceptions are Collins (1975), Giddens (1971), and Turner (1990: 83-84). Goldman (1977: 111n), Hage (1980: 15), Heydebrand (1977), Hodgkinson (1983: 139, 191), Mouzelis (1968: 176-177), Nisbet (1965), and Wolpert (1965) also recognize this, making brief reference to historical study underlying Weber's organizational theory.

Characteristic of this problem in organizational theory is the presentation of Weber in Structures, Symbols, and Systems (1971), edited by Meyer. Reference to Weber is included in his introduction to the section entitled "Two Authority Structures of Bureaucratic Organizations," but is excluded from the introduction to "Organizations and Society" (257-259). Attribution of structuralist bureaucratic description but not interrelations of social
institutions over time are made, and noted by Wright: "Analysts in the Weberian tradition in contrast [to Marxists], have continued to treat organizations in isolation from the social contradictions in which they are embedded" (1974: 103). This is seen most clearly in Gouldner, who argues that an ideological function of the ideal type minimizes the differences between capitalism and socialism to the degree that "both are subsumed under a single concept, bureaucracy" (1965a: 59). An ahistorical purpose to ideal types is reinforced by Gouldner, who adds that a single type of bureaucracy is not adequate to an examination of actual organizations, citing Reissman's (1949) four-fold typology of bureaucrats, and charismatic leadership type (1965a: 59-63), in contrast to Wolpert, who more accurately presents the bureaucratic typology as a collection of characteristics, or "instruments which take on the color of the ends to which they are put" (1965: 689-690), that is, a configuration which must be analytically applied to historical events. Gouldner has more explicitly denied any historical perspective in Weber's work on bureaucracy by describing it as "indifferent to (a) variations in bureaucratic forms, and (b) the manner in which the common characteristics designated as bureaucratic are interrelated with historically specific social structures" (1952: 48), a conclusion which can only be arrived at if one studiously ignores most of Weber's writings.

The second problem is that reference made to the historical dimension of Weber's work is often presented in deterministic or evolutionary terms. Presthus expresses Weber's view as an historical determinism of the "expansion of bureaucracy at the expense of human values" (1978: 252). Thompson relates Weber's work in more positivistic evolutionary terms: "Weber sought to explain bureaucracy by
means of a perhaps dubious historical law of increasing rationality" (1961: 12). Other authors reflect an evolutionary "bias" on Weber’s part toward bureaucratic organization: Hage (1980: 23, 29, 45-46), Hodgkinson, who presents Weber’s theory of organizations as one which regards the bureaucratic as a more evolved form than traditional and charismatic types of organization (1983: 100, 191), and Gouldner, who suggests an underlying teleology: "Insofar as Weber had a theory of historical change, his major analytical categories posited an alternation of charismatic and bureaucratic or traditional modes of authority. These rotations were conceived of as cyclical fluctuations within a trend which moved toward increasing rationalization of social action" (1965b: 645).

2. Values

Of all the ways in which Weber analyzed and employed values and value theory, as a subject of historical study and sociological analysis, as an issue in methodological writings, and as a major issue in his attitudes towards politics and the professorship, very little explicit reference is made in administrative and organizational theory to the problem of values. The exceptions are Hodgkinson, who concentrates primarily on those values associated with technical rationality, or Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität (1983: 168-169); and Merton, who discusses Weber’s Paradoxie der Folgen, the displacement of goal in the form of instrumental values which become terminal values (1957: 199).

Implicit presentation of Weber’s value theory (see Chapter Four) in the literature surveyed are, however, common, but reduced to only one form: those values associated with technical-rationality such as efficiency and effectiveness, impartiality, and impersonality. Most
authors either state explicitly or imply that Weber promoted or approved of these, ironically, a scholarly Paradoxie der Folgen. A consequence is that Weber's methodological approach of describing, defining, and analysing, as it is applied to technical rationality and the values inherent in it (particularly in bureaucratic organizations), is often confused with his personal values. This transmogrification is quite clear in Frederickson (1980: 37).

3. Methodology

Presentation of Weber's methodological approach and devices are underrepresented, confused, and generally inaccurate. Frequently his methodological approach is described as experimental or scientistic, as in Meyer and Rowan (1981: 537), who characterize his theory as overly-generalized explanation, rather than historical empirical and analytic, often coinciding with a reference to positivistic historical laws of social organization and behavior, complemented, as noted above by evolutionist historical determinism. This is apparent in Feldman and Kanter who describe Weber's perception of the "goal [of an organizational as] an independent variable which determines behavior not a dependent variable which is determined within the system" (1965: 636). Weber has also been linked with Fayol and Taylor as contributing to a rationalizing or scientizing movement in administrative thought (Hodgkinson 1978: 10). These practices are symptomatic of an underlying specialist character to organizational and sociological theory which categorizes according to restrictive and reductionistic taxonomies (Wrong 1984: 77), especially relevant in the case of Weber whose work is so extensive as to necessarily require a misrepresentation if forced into a functionalist, structuralist, conflict theory, or any other rubric classification.
It is this general perception which underlies the association of Weber with scientific management (e.g. Hrebiniak 1978: 93; March and Simon 1958: 36-37; and Scott and Mitchell 1972: 26-27). Rice and Bishoprick's attitude is an exemplar of this misattribution of Weber: "principles of management of Fayol, and bureaucracy as laid out by Max Weber have provided a number of simple, relatively easy-to-apply concepts around which an organization structure could be designed" (1971: 163) and "In organization theory the question might be asked, 'Are models intended to describe actual, existing organizations, or are organizations built according to the model designs?' The answer is, both. It seems likely that Max Weber developed his model of bureaucracy by examining existing organizations, and thereby proposing a theoretical model which would overcome characteristics which he considered undesirable in the existing organizations. His model then became a blueprint, or plan, to designers of subsequent organizations" (1971: 194).

A number of other attributions which are positivist in nature are ascribed to Weber. Most frequently Weber's organizational and bureaucratic theory are described or presented as structuralist: Etzioni (1961b: 1; 1964: 41, 50, 106); Frederickson (1980: 36); Hage (1980: 15, 25); Hall (1982: 310); Henderson (1971: 239); Hopkins (1961: 83); Kast (1970: 108); March and Simon (1958: 36-37); Meyer (1971a: 155-156); Perrow (1979); Pusey (1976: 16); Scott (1987: 49); and White (1969: 12, 17). Gouldner implies that Weber is a structural-functionalist because this "school" has grown directly out of Weber and others (1961: 75; also Blau 1981: 123). There is also a suggestive remark by Hodgkinson which implies that Weber was part of the development of modern systems approach (1983: 30). Bacharach and Lawler are among the few who explicitly differentiate Weber's position from
that of structuralism: "While it is true that Weber specified some of the primary dimensions of organizational structure, it is also true that he viewed organizational structure as emerging from the conscious political decisions of interest groups" (1980: 2-3).

The only commentator of those surveyed who presents Weber's methodology in its comprehensive, complex and fundamental form and who demonstrated an appreciation of its place in turn of the century discussions in German scholarship is Merton:

From Dilthey, Rickert, Troeltsch and especially Max Weber, he [Mannheim] derived much that is fundamental to his thought: the emphases on affective-volitional elements in the direction and formation of thought; a dualism, explicitly repudiated by Mannheim yet persisting in numerous formulations, in the theory of knowledge which draws a distinction between the role of value-elements in the development of the exact sciences and of the Geisteswissenschaften; the distinction between Erkennen and Erklären on the one hand and Erleben and Verstehen on the other; value-relevance of thought as not involving a fundamental invalidity of empirical judgements. (1957: 491)

Reference to verstehen or the interpretive method is rare in administrative and organizational theory. Weber is notably absent from contemporary writings such as Gareth Morgan's discussion on interpretive contributions in his survey of approaches in "Paradigm Diversity in Organizational Research" (1990: 18-21), however in Burrell and Morgan's Sociological Paradigms and Organizational analysis (1979) Weber's influence is traced to a number of sociological and organizational approaches: action theory (69, 122); functionalism (46); existential phenomenology (243-247); critical theory (292); the radical structuralism of Marcuse (332-333); Dahrendorf's conflict theory (349-353); and radical Weberianism practiced by Rex (353-354).
Those authors in the sociological field who do present Weber's complex approach to social studies methodology in accurate and comprehensive form generally lie outside organizational and administrative theory. Examples are Jeffrey Alexander, Raymond Aron, Thomas Burger, Anthony Ciddens, and Weberian scholars who occupy a distinctive tradition associated with sociology and intellectual history: Dirk Käsler, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Wolfgang Schluchter, and other authors noted in the previous chapter.

3.1 Ideal type

Of all Weber's methodological practices, the ideal type is most often referred to and misunderstood in administrative and organizational theory. This is noted by Willower:

work on bureaucratic theory is frequently interwoven with structural-functional analysis and social system theory. Max Weber presented bureaucracy as an ideal type or hypothetical type, not as an existential one. The best of the innumerable speculations and studies stemming from Weber's seminal work have examined the consequences of bureaucratization, usually in structural-functional or social system terms. The worst have incorrectly acted as if Weber's ideal type depicted reality and proclaimed what we already know, that neither organizations nor people can be adequately described as purely rational. (1980: 3)

Clegg criticizes those who view the ideal type of bureaucracy as a guide for practice as an erroneous understanding of Weber's work (1990: 41). Bacharach and Lawler, also, have criticized the structuralist view of Weber's typology:

For Weber, organizations are not simply rationally determined systems of interdependent structures; they are also systems in which political tension among interest groups can emerge and reemerge.
Weber viewed organizations as 'imperatively coordinated' systems. The comparative sociological studies of organizations have, for the most part, chosen to concentrate on the theme of coordination, with little or no emphasis on Weber's imperative dimension. That is, they have been preoccupied with the formal mechanisms of coordination without recognizing the power and the political negotiations that buttress these mechanisms. The work of Blau and Schoenherr (1971) best exemplifies this one-sided view of Weber. (1980: 3)

Many authors have assumed that the ideal types are empirically real and have therefore tested them empirically, or used the categories to define and describe in actual terms our social experience as if they are treating them the way Weber had intended. Those who have presented the ideal type as an empirical construction include: Blau (1970b); Blau and Scott (1962: 206); Etzioni (1964: 56-57, 75-76); Frederickson (1980: 36); Hrebinia (1978: 296); Janowitz (1961: 210); Scott (1987: 64); Thompson (1961: 60n); and Presthus, who describes ideal types as empirical composites (1978: 10). These sources refer primarily to the section on bureaucracy in Parsons' translation (1947) in the manner observed by Willower above. As noted by Burger in a detailed study of Weber's concept formation, the secondary literature has grasped the nature of Weber's methodology poorly, especially the ideal type, due to a general lack of familiarity with the tradition in which he was working (1987: xiii-xiv).

Meyer, also employing Weber's ideal types as empirical, criticizes Weber on the ground that the ideal types of authority and social "structure" are exaggerated and do not account for mixed types, such as semi-traditional and semi-bureaucratic structures, and for charisma showing up in lower ranks (1971c: 236; and Etzioni 1964: 106). Udy criticizes ideal types because they cannot be directly applied to empirical data (1972: 17-18). He suggests
reformulating the Weberian bureaucratic typology into a system of interrelated variables. In his discussion of the limitations of the formal bureaucratic typology to describe and analyze informal characteristics, he ignores the fact that Weber did identify and promote the use of other logical typologies with which to study an actual case. Udy attributes the study of informal aspects and types of organization to Blau (1956), Moore (1951), March and Simon (1958), the last of whom in turn attribute some insights into motivational devices to Merton, Selznick, and Gouldner. Those who have treated the types as empirical constructions which provide variables that can be tested experimentally include Hage (1980: 36, 42, 256), La Porte (1971: 40), and Price (1968: 185). Criteria of simplicity, predictability, and completeness—all characteristics of scientific laws—are thereby imposed upon Weber’s concepts.

The above approach has resulted in the creation of other typologies to account for the empirical deviation from Weber’s ideal types, all of which were understood by Weber to exist in a utilization of ideal typologies as historical and cross-cultural comparative devices for studying actual organizations. This misattribution of epistemological status and misuse of the ideal type is apparent in Stinchcombe’s differentiation between bureaucracies and craft organizations and among "rational organizations." What Stinchcombe has found in criticism of Weber is that many actual organizations are semi-bureaucratic (1971: 179-180). He has also neglected to recognize the purpose of the typologies other than those which relate to technically-rationalized and bureaucratic organizations. Blau and Scott present Weber’s bureaucratic model as the only form of formal organizational model he presents. They then offer an alternative classification approach to organizations, listing mutual-benefit associations, business organizations,
service organizations, and commonweal organizations (1962: 224) ignoring the fact that Weber also accounted for such historical types as these in *Economy and Society*. Gouldner criticizes Weber's bureaucratic typology because it cannot differentiate among types of bureaucratic patterns (1954: 182). He confuses ideal typology with empirical descriptions and proposes Mock Bureaucracy (non-enforced rules due to resistance), Representative Bureaucracy (in which workers rather than management initiates bureaucratic forms), and Punishment-Centred Bureaucracy as explanations account for empirical variations. Gouldner goes on to argue that Weber "neglects systematic examination of the manner in which status differences within an organization affects its mode of administration" (195n). Willmott associates methods of enquiry which account for "conflicting purposes and perceptions held by individuals and groups within organizations" with neo-Weberians (Selznick 1949; Gouldner 1954; Perrow 1979) and those which restore the link between organizational and social theory partly through historical study with the neo-Weberian McNeil (1978). He implies that Weber's own work not sufficiently developed to account for these organizational factors, requiring the refinements of these later authors (1990: 45, 47) to improve Weber's bureaucratic typology. He thereby neglects most aspects of the system of typologies (Chapter Four).

The result of this reification and an accompanying exclusive focus on the bureaucratic model is that the comprehensive explanatory power of the system of typologies is reduced. That Weber did recognize that actual organizations will have some features of traditional organizations, and evidence of forms of authority other than legal-rational, is acknowledge by Haberstroh: a categorization scheme to patterns of organizational authority by Weber produced typologies of feudalism,
patriarchalism, traditional bureaucracy, rational-legal bureaucracy, collegiate and prebendal, "methods by which the sentiments of legitimacy held by the membership of the social unit could be legitimately manipulated" (1965: 1202). Silverman, also, is an exception in that he characterizes Weber's ideal type as an analytical construct (1971: 139).

There exists, therefore, in administrative literature a prevalent corrective tradition based upon a misunderstanding of Weber's methodology: "Administrators everywhere . . . espouse the concepts that Weber formulated; and a whole genre of social science literature is given over to the attempt to reconcile the purity of Weberian theory with the imperfections of reality and praxis" (Hodgkinson 1983: 99). Underlying these conceptions is a conflation of formal and substantive types of classification or categorization.

3.2 The Idiographic

Few authors surveyed make reference to, or allow for, Weber's concern about individual socially oriented behaviour. Nor do they recognize that his typologies are based upon individual units of analysis. Most authors simply leave consideration of the individual out, presenting Weber as a structuralist and his bureaucratic typology as a structuralist or formalist model. They criticize him for not including informal relationships, individual variance, and irrationality (e.g. Blau and Scott 1962: 35; Hassard 1990: 104; and Selznick 1961). Weber's theory of bureaucracy is presented as excluding the individual from a central place in organizational theory, and is often contrasted with Barnard for this reason (Perrow 1979: 139). Barnard is noted for his examination of individual behaviour in The Functions of the Executive. Concern with motivation and other aspects of individualism is attributed to other authors (this is the practice of Etzioni 1961b: 1).
The underlying problem with this view is that individual behavior has been conflated with a reified conception of organization, resulting in a neglect of the non-structuralist, formalist aspects of Weber's work (the individual, attribution of meaning as part of value theory), especially Weber's discussion on "asymmetry" of meaning attribution and values held (1978b: sections on "Types of Social Action," "The Concept of Social Relationship," and "Types of Action Orientation: Usage, Custom, Self-Interest" (24-31)). These sections nevertheless appeared in Parsons' translation (1947) attesting to the fact that selective reading has been practiced to fit preconceived notions. Exceptions are Silverman, who discusses Weber's emphasis on the individual and members' attribution of meaning (1971: 1), and Bacharach and Lawler: "Sociologists of organizations, have, to date, failed to recognize that the Weberian perspective is based on a primary concern with group and individual action" (1980: 2). The consequence of this practice is that most of his typologies, types of value orientation, types of social action, even aspects of the types of authority, are ignored, and the types of organization are presented in isolation lending them a character of structuralist formalism.

3.3 Bureaucracy

The ideal typology of bureaucracy requires separate attention because it is the most frequently, and often the only, portion of Weber's work presented in the literature. This very limited use of his writings has resulted in views such as those presented by Gouldner who regards Weber's model as problematic because it does not seem to take into account values and goals, differing interpretations of participants, the cultural context of a particular organization, conflict (1954: 20, 26-27) or other "inner-
organizational sources" of tensions (176), going so far as to imply that Weber's form of analysis cannot distinguish between moral enterprise and that of Nazi exterminators (23). The underlying problem is that Gouldner, as noted above, treats the bureaucratic concept not as ideal typical, but as an isolated empirical description, as if it were intended to fully account for all organizational behaviour.

That the model of bureaucracy appears as Weber's central concern, and often as the only contribution he made to organizational theory, is clear from the inventory (Blau 1981; Blau and Scott 1962: 206, 165; and Kast 1970: 108). Even an author like Mouzelis who appreciated Weber's complex model in relation to societal change, still presents "bureaucracy" as the central concept (1968: 33). This is a consequence both of a conflation of bureaucratic theory with organizational theory and poor use of primary sources. It is apparent in most sources surveyed that the bureaucratic typology is regarded as an independent construction rather than as an analytic typology dependent for its relevance and meaning upon the entire system of social behaviour typologies which he developed. The bureaucratic typology can only be regarded as a functional concept in independent form if it is seen as an empirical construct.

Among those authors who equate "bureaucratic" with "administrative" or "organizational" explicitly are: Etzioni (1961c: 83); Hopkins (1961: 83); Hoyle (1969: 39); Hrebiniaik (1978: 86); Litwak and Meyer (1965); Parsons (1961: 32-33); Peabody (1964: 22); Rice and Bishoprick (1971: 163, 194); Scott and Mitchell (1972: 6-7); Scott (1987: 64, 75); and Thompson (1969: 15-16). Some conflate bureaucracy and organization implicitly by presenting Weber's views on administration only in bureaucratic form: Blau (1981); Cartwright (1965: 1-2); Feldman and Kanter (1965: 636); Perrow (1965: 958); Zelditch and Hopkins (1961: 472-473);
and Creasy, who presents Weber's prescription for management as: "the choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration" (1965: 1036). Mouzelis lists a number of misconceptions about Weber's model, such as Udy (1959, 1972 repr) who regarded any organization with hierarchical structure as bureaucratic (1968: 40), when in fact all organizations, bureaucratic, traditional, and charismatic, have hierarchy. Parsons (1947), Gouldner (1954), and Stinchcombe (1971) criticize Weber's model for an implied complementarity thereby not allowing for the conflict of professional competence and other administrative positions in organizational hierarchy, when in fact Weber does address these issues in a number of places, most notably in the chapter "Collegiality and the Division of Powers" in *Economy and Society* (1978b: 271-288), in which potential sources of conflict such as these are identified.

Bureaucracy like all other ideal types is presented and evaluated as an empirical model by such authors as Frederickson (1980: 36), Hassard (1990: 103-104), Perrow (1965: 958), White (1969: 6-7), and Feldman and Kanter, the last of whom criticizes the bureaucratic model on the grounds that it does not display isomorphy (1965: 636). Assuming the ideal type to be an empirical description leads to such statements by Feldman and Kanter as: "Weber assumed mechanism for the ideal bureaucracy which he asserted would eliminate behavior not contributing to the goals of the organization" (1965: 636). However, even though Hrebiniax presents Weber's definition of ideal type accurately (1978: 124) he does not use the type correctly in discussing Weber's observations on expertise and hierarchical ranking, which Hrebiniax presents as an empirical "perfect" correlation (102).

Confusing the ideal type with an empirical model leads to the practice of treating the characteristics of
bureaucracy as dependent variables and the bureaucratic typology as an empirical set of hypotheses. Weber's bureaucratic type is criticized for the fact that empirical studies do not validate levels of significance: Blau (1981: 123-125); Blau and Scott (1962: 56, 32-34); and Gouldner (1954). Stinchcombe criticizes the bureaucratic type because not all variables correlate highly in empirical testing (1971: 179). Udy reformulated the concept of bureaucracy as seven variables and propositions and tested them in cross-cultural studies of 150 nonindustrial societies (1959a; 1959b), demanding isomorphic accuracy of the typology. Weick summarizes the conclusions arrived at by those who have tried to test the bureaucratic model in this manner: "Because many of the propositions found in these theories [of organizations] are abstract and only vaguely tied to empirical events, it is difficult to test them" (1965: 206). Meyer presents an implicit criticism of Weber's bureaucratic theory, that it cannot elicit predictable behaviour from its members (1971a: 69) and that it must have an empirical coherence, that if formal aspects of organizations change, all aspects which change must do so in a unitary fashion (158). Meyer, although making reference to Weber's methodological essays in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (1949), argues that Weber's concept of bureaucracy "does not allow for the different patterns of bureaucratic authority found in large organizations" (1971a: 184), in other words that variation in the type, degree, and location of authority can vary in an existing "bureaucratic" organization.

This misreading has lead to frequent criticism of the bureaucratic model because it does not account for characteristics of actual organizations which deviate from the pure type. This is the case with Perrow (1965) who, drawing on Goss's (1963) analysis, demonstrates that Weber's
model fails because hospital organizations which have professionals in them do not observe the same degree of "hierarchy, authority, or bureaucracy" but, instead, emphasize self-government and autonomy. This point is discussed as well by Blau (1981: 125-126) and Blau and Scott (1962: 244), who not only ignore the ideal typical nature of Weber’s concept of bureaucracy, but exclude much of Weber’s substantive scholarship dealing with other forms of organization and authority. Recognition of forms of organizational behavior other than the strictly bureaucratic is often attributed to Gouldner (1952). Perrow criticizes Weber’s bureaucratic model for "formal properties" which does not accommodate a study of organizational goals and conflicts (1979: 160), attributing recognition of group conflict to March (1962) and Cyert and March (1963) (1979: 172). Hage writes that Weber did not recognize internal contradictions in legal-rational bureaucratic organizations (1980: 29).

A notable exception is Heydebrand who reports on Weber’s discussion about two major sub-types: the private corporate bureaucracies which attended the development of industrial capitalism, and the post-feudal public bureaucracies which accompanied the rise of modern nation-states and their technocratic state governing apparatus (1977: 94). One of the most pervasive and misrepresentational aspects in organizational literature is the view that Weber promoted or prescribed bureaucratic practice. This is evident in one of the most common sources of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy in administrative literature, Gouldner’s Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (1954). While Gouldner does recognize that Weber’s concept of bureaucracy is based on a form of authority (18n), and that the bureaucratic is not confined to government organizations but is a form of
administration which pervades modern society (19), he does imply that Weber promoted bureaucratic practices because Weber does define the bureaucratic as efficient and effective and regarded it as historically superior to other forms of administration (25). Gouldner transforms Weber's statements about bureaucracy being an organizational form superior with respect to certain activities, such as instrumental procedures (1978: 223), to being an overall superior form (25). He confuses description and analysis with promotion and prescription (e.g. 1965a: 57), a common problem in administrative writings on Weber. Of the many authors who present Weber's bureaucratic typology as promotional are Blau and Scott, who accuse him of "presenting an idealized conception of bureaucracy" of prescriptive intent while ignoring dysfunctions and organizational conflict (1962: 33-35). This attitude is evident also in Gouldner (1965a: 57); Kast (1970: 108); Merton (1961: 51); Meyer (1971a: 7, 15); Peabody (1964: 19-20); Selznick (1961: 19n); Scott and Mitchell (1972: 12); and Argyris, the last of whom states that the: "rosy picture that Weber painted about bureaucracy" leaves it to Merton to "balance" the view of bureaucracy in organizational theory (1957: 71-72).

Many authors present a promotional view implicitly, usually by attributing criticism of bureaucratic organization to other authors: Bello (1980: 14); Hodgkinson (1978: 45-46); Kanter (1981: 404-405); Peabody and Rourke (1965: 812, attributed to Merton 1957); Presthus (1978: 43); and Silverman (1971: 74). Others leave themselves open to the implication that Weber's theory of bureaucracy was prescriptive: Hodgkinson (1978: 90); Perrow (1979: 56); and Sage: "For the organizational sociologist raised in the tradition of Weber, it is the adaptive process--correcting the imbalance between structure and
performance—that is most relevant. The quintessential sociological problem is how best to design a team to achieve a particular utility" (1980: 250).

Another major and frequent misrepresentation in the literature is that Weber did not recognize dysfunctional or bureaucrathological consequences to technical-rational organization. Kast explicitly states that Weber recognized no dysfunctions (1970: 108). Kast and Rosenzweig go so far as to say that the classical theorists lived in a society in which there was no criticism of rational organizational forms (1978: 71). Most authors simply attribute dysfunctional characteristics to other authors immediately following an exposition of Weber's theory of bureaucracy, such as Haberstroh (1965: 1203); Merton (1961: 51); Nigro and Nigro (1980: 124); Perrow (1979: 56); Thompson (1961); Udy (1972: 22); and March and Simon, who attribute recognition of dysfunctions of bureaucratic organizations to Merton (1940), Gouldner (1954), and Selznick (1949), and individual considerations to Merton (1940) and Gouldner (1957) (1958: 36-37).

An exception in the literature is Hrebiniak, who acknowledges Weber's concerns about implications for individual freedom, responsibility, creativity, and significance; privileges for some social classes; societal effects (thereby recognizing that Weber analyses operated on a number of levels, from individual to societal) (1978: 100-101). Another is Presthus, who acknowledges Weber's pessimistic attitude toward the implications of bureaucratization for human values (1978: 254), spontaneity, and subjectivity (263). Hage does attribute to Weber concerns about the excesses of bureaucracy such as formality and impersonality (1980: 27, 490), however, insight into many dysfunctional and dehumanizing aspects of technical rationality, particularly in a bureaucratic setting, Hage

Another interesting misrepresentation of Weber's discussion about rational-legal organization, is made by Argyris. He writes that because Weber saw "formal" organization as a common form for socialism and capitalism, he therefore "saw no difference between socialism and capitalism, since the fundamental characteristic of both was (a particular kind of) formal organization" (1957: 72).

3.4 Rationality

There is little discussion in administrative and organizational literature about Weber's treatment of rationality, except insofar as it relates to the technical-rationality or instrumental reason associated with bureaucracy. One of the main problems in dealing with Weber's concepts of rationality is that there is much terminological confusion, and many levels of conflation. Most authors do not distinguish among the types of rationality Weber identified and defined, such as \textit{Wertrationalität} and \textit{Zweckrationalität}, or simply do not understand how he defined them. Hage, for example, defines the former as altruistic and the latter as "self-interest" (1980: 48). In addition, no mention is made of the difference Weber recognized between formal and substantive rationality.

Conflation of rationalities with technical rationality or instrumental reason, reduces the complexities of human interaction that Weber recognized, and reduce his theories' potential for explaining conflict to a prescriptive, structuralist emphasis on a bureaucratic or monocratic organization of human activities. Those who most explicitly present Weber's concept of rationality in this way include Blau and Scott (1962: 31); Hopkins (1961: 82);
Meyer (1971a: 15); Peabody and Rourke (1965: 814); and Scott and Mitchell (1972: 4). As a consequence, bureaucracy is often defined simply as a "rational" organization, without specifying the particular form of rationality implied. This is evident in the work of Stinchcombe (1971: 182), Meyer (1971b: 195-196), and Udy (1972: 20). Hage attributes primarily Zweckrationalität to the bureaucratic model, allowing that Weber had identified Wertrationalität in some cases, but that he did not recognize that other motives play a role (1980: 235). The underlying problem with this treatment of rationality is a misunderstanding of ideal typologies.

Related to a reductionism of rationality is a conflation of increasing rationalization to increasing bureaucratization of modern society, by authors such as Mouzelis (1968: 18, 33-34). An exception is Presthus (1978) who recognizes that Weber was concerned about an overall rationalization of social activity which included a tendency towards bureaucratizing organizations.

Etzioni states that Weber viewed traditional and charismatic authority and organizational structure as non-rational, and legal-rational is the only form of rational element in human social relations, and at the same time argues that Weber focuses on the rational "structures" (1961b: 1). He further attributes the study of non-rational and irrational aspects of organizations to other authors, Parsons (1956) and Hopkins (1961) (1961c). Also, in viewing Weber and Barnard as complementary authors, Etzioni attributes theories of power, hierarchy, and legitimacy to Weber, but decision making, communication, and rational self-interest to Barnard (1961c: 83). Hopkins states that Weber's focus is "on the internal structure and operation of units--their organization--not on their particular goals or
social contexts" (1961: 85), a view which is a consequence primarily of an overly selective use of Weber texts.

3.5 Authority (and Leadership)

Problems with the Weberian concepts of authority and their use in analysis mirror the problems associated with types of rationality. The most common problem is the conflation of all the types of authority with the legal-rational type, as in Peabody in a chapter sub-section entitled "The Conventional Approach: Organizations without People" (1964: 22). French and Raven conflate power and authority with the traditional (1968: 265). Dibble criticizes Weber for including a number of different types of authorities under the "traditional authority" category, not understanding that it is the primary level of logical differentiation (ideal typical, not empirical) in the three-fold typology (1965: 906).

Many authors assume, as with other typologies, that types of authority are empirical descriptions and therefore criticize them because actual incidences do not correlate, as in Dibble (1965: 906), Peabody (1964: 22), and Thompson (1969: 15-16). Hopkins presents Weber's view as a "tendency" to associate all authority with a bureaucratic setting, and as the only form of institutionalized authority (1961: 89), excluding traditional and charismatic forms. This is evident in theorists who engage in a "monocratic" definition, such as Meyer: "Authority relationships in bureaucratic organizations are not only of the monocratic type which Weber's notions would have us believe" (1971b: 185). This comment is partly a product of the perception of Weber's work as structural in contrast with organizational theory which examines decision-making processes, such as Herbert Simon's. This is also a misapprehension of Weber's logical typologies.
Kast and Rosenzweig contrast Barnard's concern for "acceptance" theory of authority with Weber's "legitimate positional authority" (1979: 81), ignoring the fact that Weber discussed this in detail in defining legitimacy of authority. Gouldner, also oversimplifying Weber work, argues that Weber's triadic theory of authority (charismatic, traditional, and legal-rational) instead of the classical trichotomy of oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, has eliminated democracy (1965a: 222-223). Gouldner confuses two different typologies, one based on political system, the other on bases of authority from which they may be derived. Gouldner also maintains that Weber did not examine the "actual social processes which generated or thwarted the emergence of consent" (1965a: 223), ignoring some 2,000 pages of Weberian text dealing with the complexity of social processes influencing consent.

There is, in addition, an implied promotion of legal-rational authority as it appears in bureaucratic organizations, particularly of an autocratic sort. Thompson perpetuates this view: "The right to obedience is only another aspect of the right to command. It should be noted that this is the right to command autocratically and arbitrarily, as Weber indicated" in the modern bureaucracy" (1961: 63), rather than in traditional and charismatic as Weber argued. Gouldner supports this when he states that Weber did not identify negative aspects of bureaucratic leadership and underemphasized the positive aspects of charismatic leadership (1965a: 62-63).

There are a number of problems with the notion of charisma in the literature surveyed, most of which are caused by a misunderstanding of the nature of the ideal type. Dibble argues that Weber's charismatic type of authority has fallen by the wayside in social science (1965: 906). Kast and Rosenzweig make a false distinction between
power and authority when discussing charismatic authority, arguing that the charismatic is a form of power rather than authority, in contrast to authority inherent in position in an organization (1979: 319). Thompson defines charisma as "presumed unusual, generally magical powers," assuming in his discussion that it only takes religious form, rather than charisma being a form of authority which may appear most often, but not exclusively, in religious settings (1961: 10). Etzioni, however, is the author surveyed with whom there are the most problems related to charisma. Etzioni criticizes Weber because his model prevents one from recognizing that charismatic leaders can emerge from within an organization to rejuvenate it (1964: 56), that Weber exclusively locates charisma at the top of an organization (1961a: 232), and that Weber emphasized dysfunctions of charisma (1961a: 210), presumably in absolute contrast to a preference for legal-rational authority. Referring to Parsons (1937: 716), Etzioni also implies that Weber's ideal types were intended to be analyzed in such a way that the elements are treated as variables (1961a: 207). Etzioni proposes three types: "T-structure," in which charisma, such as Henry Ford's is confined to top position; "L-structure," in which charisma, such as hierarchy of Roman Catholic Church, is found in all line positions; and "R-structure," in which charisma, such as doctors in hospitals, is found in ranks other than the top (1961a: 208). This is a proposed refinement of Weber's model which presupposes an empirical nature to ideal types.

A further misunderstanding of Weber's theory of authority, relying on Talcott Parsons, is that Weber did not distinguish between "authority which rests on 'incumbency of a legally defined office' and that which is based on 'technical competence'" (1937: 59). This view is based partly upon a misapprehension of ideal types and a selective
reading which ignores the chapter "Collegiality and the Division of Powers" in *Economy and Society*. The illustration Parsons and Gouldner (1965a) present is that of the relationship between patient and doctor, in which the patient may not allow the doctor to treat if the patient suspects other than professional motivations, but not the technical competence of the doctor. Weber's theories of authority, rationality, and organization do not exclude this coincidence of competence and other factors, but assume that real life cases are combinations of various logically identifiable characteristics.

4. Other

Discussion about conflict elements in Weber's writings are rare, the most extensive treatment occurring in Collins' *Conflict Sociology* (1975). Those authors who present Weber's only organizational contribution as a structuralist bureaucratic model which excludes individualism, value orientations, and other aspects of Weber's typological system which provide the means of identifying levels and sources of conflict, exclude any possibility for a discussion of conflict theory in Weber's writings. Hage, in particular, states that conflict was not a part of Weber's bureaucratic model, attributing a theory of conflict to "organic-professional" and "mixed mechanical-organic" forms of organizational modelling of Burns and Stalker (1961) (1980: 491). This view is held also by Pusey (1976: 18).

The bureaucratic model is criticized for its failure to account for conflict between hierarchical levels on the basis of its bureaucratic concept of discipline and obedience (Blau and Scott 1962: 35; Gouldner 1954: 58-60), a view resulting from a demand for isomorphy from an analytic type. Excluding Weber's other typologies enables authors to impute a normative bias of the bureaucratic type. An
example is Blau and Scott: "he [Weber] implicitly assumes that in every disagreement between superior and subordinate, the superior's judgement is also the better judgment in terms of technical expertise" (1962: 35).

In contrast with Michels' work on political parties, Meyer presents Weber's work on organizations as not interested in understanding the negative effect bureaucratization would have on values and goals of political parties (1971a), in particular Weber's definition of democracy as a "leveling" which "renders all equally powerless against the bureaucratic apparatus of the state" rejecting "widespread participation in the governance of large organizations" (15).

Administrative and organizational literature, as a foundation and source for a presentation of Max Weber's contributions to social behaviour, is at best limited, in many cases, simplistic and misrepresentational.

Educational Administration

In contrast to general administrative and organizational literature there is a paucity of reference to Weber, in the specific educational administrative literature. Exceptions are Greenfield and Bates, who treat him in some depth and accuracy, and Campbell et al (1987), Hodgkinson, Lakomski (who, however mistakenly considers Weber as a positivist), Scotford Archer, Vaughan (1971), and Halsey (1971) (who present Weber's approach briefly, but characterize it in a more comprehensive, historical, and ideal typical form). The lack of reference to Weber in the 1967 article by Rawlinson, "Some Significant Research in Educational Administration," and the reference solely to Weber, 1947 in Van Meter's compilation of texts which have contributed to theory development in educational
administration up to 1974, is indicative of Weber's stature as a marginal figure in educational administration research. An example of Weber's marginalization to the barely perceptible penumbra of social theory is R. B. Campbell's 1964 article on "The Professorship in Educational Administration" in which he advocates a strong theoretical background for professors of educational administration in economic, sociological, and organizational theory in order to understand "such concepts as formal organization, organizational roles and statuses, individuals in organizations, and organizational change and innovation" and the relationship of organizations to the larger world (22-23), yet prescribes Blau, Presthus, Merton, Argyris, and Goffman, with no mention of Weber. This state of affairs in the educational administration use and presentation of Weber was so until the recent authors cited here began to draw upon the extra-bureaucratic model dimensions of Weber's writings.

As Greenfield noted in 1976, most educational administration literature is a derivative of administrative and organizational theory. With few exceptions, educational administrative theorists, since they rely upon summaries by secondary authors in organizational and administrative theory (many of which have proven to be inadequate or inaccurate), simply perpetuate under- and misrepresentation of Weber's work. For example, Willower discusses the model of ideal type bureaucracy through secondary authors who relied heavily on a structural-functionalist interpretation, such as Bidwell, Corwin, Gouldner, Anderson, and Punch (1975: 81). Weber's works are less frequently used by educational administration writers than in administrative and organizational literature. Few authors other than Greenfield and Bates draw upon Weberian scholars, like Mommsen, Roth and Wittich, Schluchter, Brubaker. With few
exceptions, the primary sources which are drawn upon are highly selective, usually Gerth and Mills (1946) and Parsons (1947), which most often comprise only those few pages on the bureaucratic typology which have become the orthodox organizational view of Weber’s writings.

Just as the debate about philosophy of science which had raged during the 1960s and 1970s did not enter educational administration theory until Thomas Greenfield raised objections in 1974 to the main positivistic tenets of educational administration, "the theory-observation distinction, the fact-value separation, the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation and the emphasis upon quantification, systematisation and integration" (Rizvi 1991: 45), the impact of Weberian studies is only now evident in administrative and organizational literature. It has just begun to "trickle down" to educational administration through the writings of Thomas Greenfield and Richard Bates.

1. History

A major misrepresentation is lack of historical depth attributed to Weber’s work as a consequence of Parsons’ influence. Exceptions are Scotford Archer, who acknowledges the scope of Weber’s analyses as a micro level of analysis of subjective meaning combined with macro studies of comparative social systems (1979: 41-42) and historical studies (57), and Bates (1989), who presents Weber’s work in historical scope. This is not surprising since Bates grounds much of his discussion in Habermas’ critical theory, which has always treated Weber’s work in its multidisciplinary, historical scope. Best et al (1983), Greenfield, Hodgkinson, and Anderson (1968) have also made reference to historical surveys, but this aspect of Weber’s writing has not been developed to any degree due partly to
Greenfield’s emphasis on subjective, and arguably phenomenological, studies. The most important consequence for organizational theory is that types of organizations, particularly, and usually, the bureaucratic, is presented as a static rather than historically derived model. This view is characteristic of all of Weber’s typologies when presented in the literature.

2. Values

There is little explicit reference to the value theory given by Weber. An exception is Scotford Archer’s analysis of educational ideology as it exerts an influence on educational social relations by paralleling group conflict, as a dimension of educational politics, and as necessary to understanding educational change, such as changes in means and ends, methods and goals (1979: 91). Greenfield also has made many brief references to the role values play in the subjective dimensions of social behaviour, and has made reference to value issues in Weber’s methodology. Hodgkinson, in a brief reference, characterizes the Protestant ethic in its relation to capitalism as a cluster of values resulting in a discrete value orientation (1991: 121) and identifies value orientations as a substructure of authority typologies (1981: 142). Lakomski refers to Weber’s characterization of values as "affective and nonempirical" (1978: 71) disregarding both the full set of value types. By labelling Weber a logical positivist, she disregards his verstehende approach to value description and analysis. Lakomski develops this further by presenting Weber’s concept of "value-freedom" in social studies as a positivistic model (1987: 72).

3. Methodology
Very few authors in educational administration discuss Weber's verstehende methodology, with the exception of Hodgkinson (1981), Bates and especially Greenfield, who draws heavily upon Weber in articulating his critique of positivistic approaches and formulating an interpretive paradigm. By implication Weber, through the presentation of experimental-empirical treatment of the bureaucratic method, and its association with structuralist, functionalist, and systems methods, and scientific management approaches, is most often characterized as firmly situated in the positivist firmament. Hills more explicitly defines his approach by quoting Parsons' presentation of Weber's position (1937: 581-582) which denied that social studies are different from natural sciences on the grounds that historical reality is of infinite diversity that scientific laws about human action can be formulated (1980: 22). Lakomski refers to Weber, with Simon, as a logical positivist (1987: 71), characterizing Weber's use of value-freedom, value judgement, and value-relevance as tools in the positivistic armament (1987: 72-77), and thereby reducing Weber's methodological principles to the construction of a factual model of human experience by excluding the subjective. In contrast to Greenfield (1987: 77), Lakomski further conflates all Weber's value categories with the affective or preferential, and excludes all but scientifically verifiable value issues in human activity. Lakomski's position confuses epistemology and axiology, rendering all decisions Zweckrational, and all motivation affective.

3.1 Ideal Type

Discussion of ideal types in educational administration is rare and often misunderstood. The exceptions are Greenfield, Hodgkinson, Allison, and Lane et al, the last
two of whom briefly, but correctly, define it as an abstraction from, not a description of, empirical reality (1980: 23-24; 1967: 187-188). Among those who most explicitly treat the ideal type as an empirical model are Benson, who regards the ideal type as a "unitary concept," existing in absolute terms in reality, not in degrees (1983; which he attributes to Hall 1963). Campbell et al present each of the three types of organization as self-contained, exclusive, empirical or historical organizations, rather than typologies which describe only parts of actual organizations (1983: 57). Dimock, who, even though defining "ideal type" as not meaning "best," still treats it as an empirical construction (1970: 90). Getzels et al present an ambiguous view: "The fact that none of these [types of authority] is likely to be operating in completely pure form in actuality does not prohibit their use as "ideal types" or limiting categories. Indeed, their very nonpurity permits them to serve as relatively unambiguous concepts for ordering empirical observations and for systematic analysis" (1968: 134, my italics).

Little reference is made, again with the exception of Bates and Greenfield, to the entire system of typologies, or discussion of the methodological theory which underlies their use in comparative and analytical study.

3.2 The Idiographic

The implication in many presentations of Weber, usually through the bureaucratic model, is that he contributed nothing to, or was even inimical to, considerations of human relations, the influence of individual personality, and conflict within organizations. Organizations, from a Weberian point of view are often described as if they have a life apart from individual interaction, a consequence of how the bureaucratic model and its attendant concepts are
employed (e.g. Griffiths (1971: 100) and Knezevich (1969: 90)). The underlying problem, complicated through a structuralist or functionalist presentation, is that isomorphy can be demanded of all Weber's ideal typical constructions, abetted by a lack of primary source familiarity, particularly the historical and political writings in which Weber demonstrates an acute awareness of individual motivation and variable interrelations. This is evident in Hodgkinson, who refers to Weber's bureaucrats appearing impartially benevolent in his discussion of psychological complexes of attitude and value orientations, leaving himself open to the charge that empirical and ideal typical constructions are conflated (1991: 131-132).

The exception is Greenfield who quotes Weber's approach to the method of understanding based upon individuals: "there is no such thing as a collective personality which 'acts'" (1975: 81; from Bendix and Roth 1971: 286-97). Another exception is Ribbins who represents ideal types as well as Weber's theory of social action as subjective interpretation of actors (1985: 242-245). However, in associating Weber with the "action approach" and then criticizing work written from this approach as "highly theoretical and abstract" (1985: 248), he implies that Weber's approach is such, disregarding the historical and cultural studies used to produce the typologies. Also, Weber is dissociated from other approaches covered in the chapter, namely, "consensus-based" (which include structural-functional and systems dimensions) and "conflict-based" (includes power, contradiction, crisis, dialectic, and class stratification dimensions) approaches, both of which contain elements which are part of Weber's overall theory of social behaviour and organization.

3.3 Bureaucracy
Weber's ideal typology of bureaucracy suffers the same misrepresentation and exaggerated attention in educational administration as it does in administrative and organizational theory, however in reduced form, since there is an overall relative underutilization of Weberian theory in educational administration. One exception to this is Campbell et al (1987) who devote a significant portion of a chapter to Weber and his bureaucratic model, and includes some biographical information to provide an historical, cultural, and, scholarly context to Weber's writings.

The following authors conflate organization with bureaucracy: Benson (1983); Hoy et al (1983); Knezevich (1969: 90-91); Rizvi (1989: 212-213); Sergiovanni et al who write: "Max Weber proposed a pure form, or idealization of an organization, which he called bureaucracy" (1987: 155); and Williams, who states that Weber's theory of organizations assumed "that organizations generally are typically bureaucratic (1981: 157). Some credit Weber with only the bureaucratic model, crediting "less rigid neo-Weberian formations" of organizations to others (Owens 1981; also Hartley, 1969: 279). Discussion of other societal factors is usually attributed to other authors, implying that Weber's bureaucratic model is his sole contribution to social analysis (Anderson 1968: 38).

Most often the bureaucratic model is presented as an empirical rather than analytic construct, as is often used for, or subjected to, experimental verification, for example by Hoy et al (1983), Lane et al (1967), and Thomas (1968). It is often presented as if it were intended to be isomorphic (Anderson 1968: 17; Crane 1973; Howell 1973; Kimbrough and Nunnery 1983; and Tronc 1973). Anderson uses the bureaucratic "paradigm" for empirical-experimental analysis to examine the degree of bureaucratization as a function of size of student body and students' socioeconomic
status (1968: 83), reducing bureaucratic characteristics to experimental variables. Lane et al attribute a scientific approach to Weber "whose scientific orientation led him to accurately and coherently record what he observed and deduce events from these observations" (1967: 10). Scotford Archer refers to Weber's analysis as positivism (1979: 8) the product of which are "laws" (1979: 7). King, although purporting to use Weber's verstehen methodology, reduces his findings of change in secondary schools to statistical significance (1982; 1983: 166). The same approach is adopted in Punch's use of bureaucratic characteristics as experimental variables (1970: 134n). Rizvi describes Weber as a positivist whose approach provides "no clear-cut standards of judgment" of efficiency and effectiveness in a value sense" (1989: 212-213).

The consequence of isomorphic demands upon ideal typical constructions is a criticism of them not accounting for actual experiences, evident in Harman who claims that "the bureaucratic model does not explain adequately where the locus of power and authority lie in universities" while "it may account for the way a university administration is structured" (1989: 31). This is true, also, for Griffiths, who assumes that the bureaucratic model is empirical and cites Riemann's criticism that it does not account for "different forms in different settings" (1979: 53).

A number of authors identify Weber as a "structuralist": Anderson (1974); Benson (1983: 138); Bogue (1971: 271); Campbell et al (1983: 57); Howell (1973); Hoyle (1960; 1969: 39; 1975: 36); Hartley (1969: 49); Kimbrough and Nunnery (1983); Lane et al (1967); Sergiovanni et al (1987); and Griffiths and Lutz, who state: "Weber employed ideal type constructs to account for the structural aspects of bureaucratic organizations. He saw behavior in these modern organizations as rational in that the members engaged
in activities coordinated toward specific goals their organizations seek to accomplish" (1969: 254). Weber’s analysis of organizations is thereby reduced down to "the internal differentiation of authority in a clearly defined hierarchy of roles or offices suggest[ing] that any analysis of organizations must be concerned with authority as manifested in rules at each level of their structure" (Anderson 1968: 17). An exception in those sources surveyed was King, who distinguishes Parsons’ structural-functionalism from Weber’s approach to organizational classification (1983: 18-19).

Weber is also variously referred to as a functionalist by Rizvi (1989: 212), a behavioral scientist by Griffiths and Lutz (1969: 253), the model of bureaucracy as mechanistic by Hoyle (1975: 31), Knezevich (1969: 90) and Sergiovanni et al (1987), and Weber as a proponent of scientific management by Kimbrough and Nunnery (1983), Owens (1981: 12), and Bogue for whom the bureaucratic model provides "a blue print in action" (1969: 174). A clear example of the latter is Sergiovanni et al, who present Weber as one who prescribed bureaucracy as an ideal form for organizational design (1987: 105-106):

Weber saw bureaucracy as a sort of ideal type of organization and placed a great deal of importance on written policies and regulations . . . Weber was not as sensitive to some of the more vexing aspects of modern bureaucratic organization as we are today, but he had a point: Organizations, like people, should strive to be as rational as possible . . . First, get your objectives clearly in mind, then calmly determine what policies would be most likely to achieve them. (186-187)

Also, Knezevich presents Weber’s view as one which saw the bureaucratic model as universally applicable to a wide variety of organizations (1969: 90). As noted above representations such as this confuse the ideal type with
empirical description, description and analysis with prescription, and ignores Weber's criticism of bureaucracy.

There are occasional presentations of the bureaucratic model which even though not referencing Weber, are obviously drawing upon the orthodox presentation of Weber and reinforcing the misrepresentation of his work as structural-functionalist. Getzels (1967, 151) is typical. He also conflates administration with bureaucracy:

Let me say then that we may conceive of administration structurally as the hierarchy of subordinate-superordinate relationships within a social system. Functionally, this hierarchy of relationships is the locus for allocating and integrating roles and facilities in order to achieve the goals of the social system. It is here, in these relationships, that the assignment of statuses, the provision of facilities, the organization of procedures, the regulation of activity, and the evaluation of performance takes place. (1967, 151)

As in administrative and organizational theory, and as a consequence of their use in educational administrative theory, Weber is often presented as promoting bureaucracy: Boyan (1969: 201); Bush (1986: 31); Dimock (1970: 85); Griffiths (1957: 374); Lane et al (1967: 10 "espoused"); Morphet et al (1967); Howell (1973: 59-60); and Kimbrough and Nunnery, who characterize the bureaucratic model as a "design" (1983: 249): "Throughout the transitional era, and continuing even today, there was considerable focus on the nature and place of authority in the organization. In reality, this was a response to the strong executive concept advocated by the traditionalists, at the heart of which was Weber's legal-rational impersonal hierarchy of authority" (1983: 276). This implies a prescriptive intent.
Sergiovanni et al claim that "Max Weber saw bureaucracy as a sort of ideal type of organization and placed a great deal of importance on written policies and regulations" (1987:}
186), despite the fact that Weber had an ambivalent attitude towards the "characteristically Prussian concept of 'cursed duty and obligation'" (Mommsen 1984: 31), and was particularly critical of the future of socialism because it would create even firmer formal rules that a capitalistic order, bringing people closer to an iron cage than ever (Mommsen 1984: 106). Hannah, who presumably has read no detailed biographical information or essays on Weber's political attitudes, states that Weber's preference for bureaucracy was the consequence of the domination of intellect over conscience (1980: 122). Likewise, Thomas presents Weber's view of bureaucracy as: "an ideal form of organization, Weber exalts its mechanical efficiency, its rationality and its adaptability" (1968: 121). The prescriptive rather than descriptive purpose of the bureaucratic type is apparent in Owens who characterizes bureaucracy as that which will produce efficiency, rationality, fairness, impartiality, and predictability, that under "ideal circumstances" all the positive attributes would be achieved (1981: 10-11). This places the cart before the horse: these characteristics, when they exist, allow one to classify the organization as bureaucratic.

As in organizational and administrative literature, Weber is often presented as promoting bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness and specialist decision-making, by authors such as Rizvi (1989: 212-213) and Campbell et al, who present Weber's view of the bureaucratic as "ideal organizational type . . . the superior form because it provided for rational decision making and a high level of efficiency" in contrast to charismatic and traditional types of organizations (1983: 57). Following this passage a number of problems with and weaknesses of, the bureaucratic type of organization are introduced as insights provided by other theorists (1983: 58).
Frequently Weber is presented as making no reference (Anderson 1968: 23-24; Benson 1983; Dimock 1970: 85, 86; Hoy et al 1983) or only limited reference to his concerns about and criticism of bureaucratic organization. The identification of dysfunctional aspects of bureaucratic organizations is frequently associated with later authors as in Banks who cites Merton and Gouldner (1976: 191-192). Thomas attributes concerns about bureaucracy to a number of other authors, such as inhibiting change in social systems and a displacement of goals through a preoccupation with application of rules to Merton (1957) and La Pierre (1965), encouragement of conformity to Blau (1956) and Presthus (1962), and rigidity and lack of adaptability inherent in bureaucracy to Bensman (1963), Michels (1949), and von Mises (1946). Griffiths and Lutz attribute identification of dysfunctions as well as "unanticipated consequences of rational and nonrational behavior" to Merton (1969: 254) (1968: 121-122).

Historical research into the development of bureaucracy in the West and the East are attributed by Anderson primarily to Eisenstadt (1958 and 1959), further reinforcing the notion that Weber's work was primarily structural, generic, and "scientific" in the nomothetic/law-like sense, whose studies suggest that (1) institutions develop bureaucratic forms of administration when there evolve many functionally specific organizations extensively differentiated in terms of institutional roles and spheres of influence; (2) social roles are achieved and not ascribed through caste, class, or lineage; (3) numerous institutions arise to implement social, political, and economic goals which could not otherwise be achieved by the society; (4) the complexities and needs of the society create interdependence among its members for goods and services; and (5) resources (manpower, money, materials, power, and
influence) are mobile and available to competing institutions. (1968: 79)

3.4 Rationality

There is very little in educational administration literature on either Weber's rationality typologies or on irrationality. Most often, as in other administrative literatures, all forms of rationality are conflated to Zweckrationalität, as in Rizvi who serves as an interesting example of the general attitude toward Weber in educational, as well as general, administrative writing: "This account [pragmatic] of the tasks of educational administration is perfectly consistent with Weber’s account of practical deliberation. It is concerned with educational means for bringing about those outcomes. It is not concerned with judging or prescribing any particular set of educational ends or outcomes. It seeks to be compatible with any set of educational ends" (1991: 61). Rizvi further confuses fact/value and rationality categories: "This view of rationality centred on the positivist claim that statements of fact and judgments of value are logically distinct, and that only facts can be rationally assessed. Values are outside the province of rationality and the only practical rationality that is possible is the rationality of matching means to ends efficiently and effectively. Modern administration theory is fundamentally embedded within this 'bureaucratic' view of rationality. It systematically eschews making judgments on the morality of organizational ends, for it rests on the assumption that needs cannot be subjected to the scrutiny of reason. The task of the administrator is seen as one that is concerned with formulating rationally designed means for the explicit realization of given ends. Bureaucracy itself is viewed as an instrument of efficiency, neutral with respect to the goals it has been created to serve. Efficiency, then, is
viewed as a morally neutral value, concerned with the realization of whatever goals which have been set" (1989: 212-213). Here Rizvi confuses the ideal type with empirical, description, analysis and explanation with prescription, and has confused scientific determination of fact with Wertrationalität.

3.5 Authority

The most often represented form of authority described by Weber is implicitly legal-rational. This follows from an emphasis in the literature on bureaucratic organization. Some more explicitly identify it as the only form, as in Williams who asserts that Weber's theory of organizations assumes "that formalized authority is the representative form in the typical organization," attributing an identification of non-legal and non-rational forms of authority to others, for example Blau (1962) (1981: 157). Tronc treats legal-rational authority as an empirical construction, ignoring other forms (1973: 74). In an unusual case, Griffiths presents the Weberian types of authority, but attributes them to Dubin (1951) not Weber (1956: 126-127).

Scotford Archer appears as a rare exception in the survey, using Weber's definition of "domination" as "the opportunity to have a command concerning education obeyed by a given group of persons." She discusses how this varies cross-culturally and cross-status, those with educational control may be a ruling class, a political elite, military leaders, etc. (1979: 90), indicating the massive historical and cultural work which lay behind the typologies, as well as their intended use.

Scott focuses on Weber's concept of charisma and its attendant authority, however attributes its application outside religious contexts to Parsons (1937), and the
recognition and obedience of others to charismatic authority as a possibly subconscious phenomenon to Parsons (1937) and Shils (1965) (1978: 49). In addition Scott subjects Weber's concept of charismatic authority to an experimental study similar to those which have been used to verify the bureaucratic model.

3.6 Educational Organization

It is evident from the preceding sections in the Educational Administration inventory that the primary use of Weber is made in relation to his bureaucratic typology, which is usually referred to only generally or turned to experimental effect in order to determine to what degree the characteristics of bureaucracy are evident as experimental variables.

Few examples of an application outside general references to bureaucracy exist in educational administration. However, Best et al extend Weber's theory of social action as subjective meaning and interpretation to examine dimensions of individual perspective (1980: 253); to identify five perspectives (child-centred, pupil-centred, discipline-centred, administrator-centred, and subject-centred) employed by teachers (1983: 56-82); and in an interpretation of formal roles (1983: 82-110). In addition, they use the three types of authority to characterize the various ways in which headteachers can "rule" and indicate that the same can be applied to classroom teachers (1983: 220-221).

Conclusion

Weber's work is generally treated as received wisdom in organizational, administrative, and educational
administration theory. Even though Taylor notes that Weber is a familiar theoretical author to professors of educational administration (1975: 216), and presumably administrative theorists, Greenfield is cynical about the level of understanding demonstrated in the field: "Weber is much quoted by organization theorists— at least in their prefaces, or in perfunctory references to his concept of bureaucracy. These theorists ignore the methods of historical and legal analysis that Weber brought to his work and they disregard entirely Weber's subjectivist assumptions (Bendix and Roth 1971) that allow him to consider values and that connect him firmly with the tradition of subjectivist philosophy and to the modern tradition of interpretive social science (Giddens 1979; Rabinow and Sullivan 1979)" (1934: 17). This survey has found nothing to contradict this observation.

It is apparent at even a cursory glance that educational administration texts, and administration texts in general, rely upon a very small portion of Weber's work, Talcott Parsons' translation of a chapter of Economy and Society entitled The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947) and selections collected by Gerth and Mills (1946). Occasionally reference is made also to the essay "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" (1930). Even though many authors have addressed various individual aspects of Weber's writings, legal-rational authority, characteristics of bureaucracy, and to a lesser degree charis, a, few authors in administrative studies have outlined the entire methodology developed by Weber or related it to his actual research practice in order to provide the basis for a study consistent with and extending from his analytic or substantive works. This has been noted in sociology by Segady (3-4) and Roth and Schluchter (2) and organizational theory by Warwick (61). Abbott and Caracheo
have concluded recently (in agreement with Coser and Rosenberg) that "the error that most of Weber's interpreters have made is that they have 'mistakenly assumed that he provided a description of concrete bureaucracies rather than an abstract conceptual scheme'" (255). The extent of Weber's writings which have played little role in organizational and administrative theory is vast and comprises many of his most important contributions to explanations of social behaviour. Since most of his individual scholarly writings were conceived of as portions of larger projects, and are defined within a larger system of thinking, it is possible to judge that the distortionary effect of overselection and decontextualized concepts.

**Synopsis**

This chapter examines to what extent and how accurately Weber's work on social behaviour relevant to administration theory has been reflected in selected administrative, organizational, and educational administration literature. The selections were evaluated according to their presentation of fundamental features of Weber's method and administrative concepts: historical study, value theory, ideal type, the idiographical dimension, the bureaucratic typology, and concepts of rationality and authority. The results of this analytic inventory confirm the criticism of a number of authors who have argued that Weber's work is underrepresented or inaccurately presented.
CHAPTER SIX:
TOWARDS A WEBERIAN EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION:
A WORKED EXAMPLE

THE TYPOLOGICAL POSITION OF CONFUCIAN EDUCATION:
We shall now discuss the position of this educational system among the great types of education. To be sure, we cannot here, in passing, give a sociological typology of pedagogical ends and means, but perhaps some comments may be in place. Historically, the two polar opposites in the field of educational ends are: to awaken charisma, that is, heroic qualities or magical gifts; and, to impart specialized expert training. The first type corresponds to the charismatic structure of domination; the latter type corresponds to the rational and bureaucratic (modern) structure of domination. The two types do not stand opposed, with no connections or transitions between them. (Weber 1946: 426)

According to Käsler, simply citing Weber as an authoritative reference, as is done much sociology and most administrative writings, is no more than "ritualized obeisance" to legitimize scholarly undertakings, reducing his writings to a purely "antiquarian 'preservation of historical monuments,' which prevents a living exchange with Weber's work and method" (213). A possible application of Weber's sociological historical methodology to educational administration is suggested by the sociologies contained in Economy and Society, the substantive studies on world religions, and his programmatic commentary on what he had achieved in the Protestant Ethic essays regarding the development of a Menschentum and the "history of modern Lebensführung" (Hennis 1983: 156), in other words, "the manner in which Menschentum could develop under the influence of specific formative and substantive factors" (Hennis 1983: 156) of which educational organization and its administration is clearly a topic. Weber defined
"administration" as "a special group which can normally be trusted to execute the general policy as well as the specific commands" of the rule of a person or group over others (1978b: 212). This means that educational administration would not be treated in isolation from the ends to which administration is directed and the values and form of authority upon which it is based. What distinguishes Weber’s definitions and descriptions of administrative activity is that he acknowledged many types of administration and forms of obedience based upon what can possibly bind administrative subordinates and other organizational members to the superior(s): custom, affectual ties, purely material complex of interests, and ideal (weltzionale) motives (1978b: 212-213) within a world-historical and comprehensive societal context. This comprehensive approach was apparent in his work as early as 1908 in which the effect of various economic, social, and political influences on the belief systems and vocational aspirations of industrial workers (Hennis 1983: 164-165).

Weber’s approach was to decide from what point of view to approach historical experience, e.g. economic. Then to select some unique configuration of activities and institutions, such as the "rise of capitalism," to identify and describe its components based upon the construction of sociological ideal types (the typologies outlined in Chapter Four). The final task is to draw in causal lines between these components, imputing "concrete effects to concrete causes" (1949: 79). The configuration of activities and institutions Weber examined in economic activity were: financial techniques and methods of business management; an investigation into the manner in which economic activity is influenced by other social behaviour and institutions, such as religion, politics, etc.; and an investigation into how economic activity influences these social activities, e.g.
political policy and religious organization (Freund 1968: 166).

Correspondingly, education would be examined according to these types of activities and influences. A framework for educational administration study would begin with the construction of a "Sociology of Education" based upon historical reality at a societal level of analysis employing all of the typologies outlined in Chapter Four at individual, group, societal, and historico-cultural levels: types of value orientation and motivation, types of social action and social relationship, types of authority, types of organization, status, class, and party aspects, conflict and power relations, and interrelationships with other societal organizations.

Educational Groups: A Sociology of Education and Its Administration

The intent of this section is to engage in a thought experiment (Gedankenexperiment) by employing Weber's system of ideal typologies in the construction of an educational analogy to his "Religious Groups (Sociology of Religion)." This will be done by summarizing the typologies contained in it and outlining the correlative components of educational groups and orientations. Religion is used as an analogue because it has similarities to education in human affairs, having similar qualities, characteristics and categories, and plays a similar role in the formation and functioning of societies. It is therefore treated as an historical and sociological cognate. The educational analogue is intended to be illustrative and suggestive, not definitive, of a Weberian treatment of educational organization and its administration.
Such typologies are intended to identify the internal forces of educational groups, describing the quality of social relations which can exist, as well as identifying informative influences on and causal relations between other forms of social conduct and educational organization. It is possible in this way to construct typologies of educational organizations in which distinctive forms of administrative behaviour can be identified and defined.

1. The Origins of Education

The first section of Weber’s chapter, "The Origins of Religion," is an anthropology of religion, derived in large part from the existing archeological record (which in early periods is based predominantly on a science of potsherd and tool flake interpretation). The section examines the original orientation of religious and magical activity as "this-worldly" since elementary forms of religious and magical behaviour were engaged in for purposes which cannot be separated from the everyday range of purposive conduct. Acts from human sacrifice to magical evocation of rain from the heavens are in this economic sense, rational. Weber attributes charisma in religious behaviour to those objects and people who have extraordinary power in magical acts, a quality which can either exist in nuce (primary charisma) or can be produced artificially by extraordinary means (secondary charisma). Occasional charismatic experience is accessible to lay people as ecstatic occurrences (as opposed to professionals with vocation such as magicians and necromancers in whom the charismatic is permanent) through sex in orgiastic practice, intoxication by drug use (alcohol, tobacco, and other narcotics), or ritual use of music producing an altered state such as trance.

Abstraction in primitive religious experience produces beings concealed behind charismatically endowed objects and
persons: spirits, demons, and souls (daemons). Abstraction also displaces naturalistic things or events with symbolic acts and objects which Weber calls "mythological thinking," a "pattern of thought that is the basis of the fully developed realm of symbolic concepts" (1978b: 406).

Abstraction from the naturalistic to the symbolic is evident in the attitudinal shift from recognizing a fire as a god, for example, to a god who possesses or is manifest in all fires.

A further level of abstraction exists in the transformation of the "unordered miscellany of accidental entities" to a pantheon produced by systematic thinking oriented to religious activity which "entails the specialization and characterization of the various gods as well as the allocation of constant attributes and the differentiation of their jurisdictions"—functional specialization (1978b: 407). This is evidence of early forms of rationalization and proto-bureaucratic organization, reflecting changes in social organization. Concomitantly, sacred jurisprudence develops. Related to this phenomenon is the evolution of ancestor cults from a regard for spirits of ancestors and the hearth fire, which has under some historical conditions strongly influenced patriarchal structure in families and kin groups and in patrimonial rule of a royal household in which priesthood is conferred upon the family head. In the political realm deities of political alliance (the political confederation and contractual relationship governed by Yahweh) and the polis, guarantee success of political action (1978b: 412-413) (or military—politics by other means). Political (and military) conflict, therefore is not solely a human interaction but a divine interaction.

Universalism and monotheism is viewed by Weber as a further evolution in abstraction, the formation of hierarchy
in a pantheon by the emergence of a dominant god, and a concomitant propagation of systematized sacred ordinances by a priesthood "assisted by a rationalized system of regulated subordination of subjects to their overlords, such as we find in the bureaucratic states of China and Babylonia" (1978b: 417).

A corresponding analytic description of education would view the original orientation of educational and learning activity as "this-worldly" since elementary forms of educational and learning behaviour were engaged in for purposes which also cannot be separated from the everyday range of purposive conduct. According to Veyne, educationally oriented activity finds its origins in social groups seeking "to adopt distinctive style [which] influences the behaviour of its members" and must be distinguished from schools or other institutions since they are effects rather than causes (413). Acts from the regulation of sexual behaviour (both traditional practices and the attempted rationalized practice of the Nazi Lebensborn programme), divination, abortion and the exposing or drowning of new-born infants to control occupational development are in this sense rational. Charisma in educational behaviour would inhere in those who have extraordinary ability to learn, a quality which can exist in nuce as a "gift" or can be produced by intensive and long-term training. Occasional ability could, as in religious ecstasy, be assisted by drug use which may allow the actor to endure hardship or pain and heighten the senses or temporarily increase strength.

Abstraction in primitive educational activity produces styles or common forms of the products of training, and provides the basis of cultural identity in the earliest of documented human history. Analogous to the displacement of religious naturalism by religious symbolism, would be an
attitudinal shift from mimicry to deliberate self-cultivation, believed to originate during the paleolithic period, when emergent "self-consciousness and the power to group all kinds of mental images was [sic] transforming the human psyche" (Hawkes 143). The record of paleolithic cultures is constructed from the earliest of artefacts, jewelry, art (e.g. female statuettes in bone), and tools, which are evidence of learned arts passed down through training. The early differentiation of styles and forms allow the identification of distinctive cultures such as the "flake culture" (flake tools) of the Clactonian from Asiatic chopper tool and African hand-axe cultures in Paleolithic times (Hawkes 137). The emergence of blade cultures during this period is a measure of the evolution to higher cultural forms (Hawkes 128) when artists "had maintained a tradition, variable certainly, but continuous enough to imply the handing on of ideas and technical methods from one culture to the next" (Hawkes 143), essentially an educative act.

There is at the same time an indication of specialization and more complex technique which can arguably be regarded as an indication of functional selection, systematization in teaching, and the emergence of occupation. In this way the state of technology becomes a measure of cultural and educational development. In addition, the increased level of concentrated visual attention and manipulative skill may be a contributing factor in the development of language (Hawkes 155), necessary for the development of education.

A further level of abstraction exists in the transformation of unordered and accidental procedures to a system of training entailing specialization of activity, functional specialization (vocations, jobs), and the allocation of jurisdiction (masters of craft). Related to this phenomenon is the evolution of divine patronage of occupations and crafts (deities or saints, as Weber noted--
1978b: 415) as well as quasi- and fully religious ritual accompanying craft training and regulation (as in the Medieval guild), and ranking of various occupations within societal classes, status groups, and parties. Weber noted in discussing the relationship existing between divine patronage and political office, that in classical Athens a man could not hold office if he did not possess a household god (1978b: 414). Political power is partly the consequence of esoteric knowledge and skill which can be withheld in situations of political conflict. This was a "bargaining chip" utilized by many craft guilds in medieval Germany to assert their independence from ruling aristocracy, as was the case in Nuremburg during this period.

Technological innovation also plays a role in the development of societal complexity. In the earliest of hunting societies there would exist a small number of distinct occupational roles engaged in part-time, but with the introduction of more sophisticated and specialized technologies (e.g. for metallurgy, agriculture, weapons, transportation vehicles, weaving, pottery, ornamentation, mining, trade, and culinary arts), as well as increasing population and the formation of urban communities (Hawkes 358) during the neolithic period, increased numbers of specialized functions arose. More complex manufacture requiring longer-term training, more systematic selection of trainees, and more specialized knowledge and expertise, is evident in the existence of full-time craftsmen and a demand for written communication and records and techniques of numeracy, creating a new occupation, that of the scribe (Nissen 137). Evidence of a clear concept of hierarchy is contained in the hierarchical arrangement of figures on friezes from 3rd millenium Uruk: "the intellectual roots of the conversion of all areas of life into a hierarchy are
most visible" (Nissen 105) as well as early depictions of individualism in realistic portraiture at this time.

Philosophy and theory of educational activity would be, according to Weberian logic, a still further evolution in abstraction, a higher stage in the expansion of consciousness. Educational activities evidencing greater hierarchical differentiation (internal to a craft in the distinctive stages of apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastery; external to a craft in a regulated hierarchy of trades and occupations), systematic theory, procedures, and regulations, and the differentiation of education from other activities in the establishment of schools (teaching as a profession independent from other social roles), in contrast to integrated societies in which educational activity is practised within other societal institutions, such as churches, guilds, armies, and family. In integrative cultures like the early Germanic tribes and Merovingian society, educational and learning activity took place within one's military, religious, political, or other occupational role (Rouche 420, 426). Architectural evidence from neolithic urban sites up to the medieval period support this observation. It is apparent that much of what could be termed educationally oriented activity is located within the familial or kingroup dwelling.

2. Practice and Education

In his section "Magic and Religion," Weber first examines the ways by which the power of the divine and the human can service each other. Magical coercion of a god to the service of man is accomplished by magical formulae consisting of "entreaty, gifts, service, tributes, cajolery, and bribes" (1978b: 422). In contrast, prayer and sacrifice are modes of worship: prayer is composed of varying degrees of magical formulae and supplication; and sacrifice provides
for gods and man (e.g. deflecting the god’s wrath to a scapegoat) as well as producing through communio a sacred connexion between sacrificers and god. Evolution in these relationships has been from a primitive rationalism oriented toward economic success to an increasing irrationalization towards "otherworldly non-economic goals" (1978b: 424). Prayer and sacrifice are characteristic of cults and religions, and magical coercion is characteristic of sorcery.

Weber differentiates priests from magicians (a "fluid" distinction as all of these categories are in actual historical experience). Priests are functionaries "of a regularly organized and permanent enterprise," acting as employees or "organs operating in the interests of the organization’s members," and are prepared by systematic, rational training and discipline. Magicians, on the other hand act as individuals, are self-employed, and are prepared by a characteristic "awakening" and a training in lore. Weber questions a distinction based upon special knowledge and fixed doctrine, since "the sorcerer may sometimes be very learned, while deep learning need not always characterize priests" (1978b: 425).

Concerning the reactions to success or failure in relating to a god, magicians may pay with their life, in contrast to priests who can deflect the blame for failure onto the god or worshippers. Goodness and malevolence on the part of gods is usually judged by usefulness to man’s enterprises, however, relative power among gods is not based upon this criterion as evidenced by the Hindu god of pestilence, Rudra, who is endowed with "tremendous power potential" (1978b: 429). Increasing ethical demands upon gods, in effect subjecting them to a moral order, came about, according to Weber, by divination for military, economic, or other social purpose in social worlds with
increasing orderly judicial powers, increasing rational comprehension of "an enduring and orderly cosmos,"
increasing regulation in human relationships, and increasing importance of reliability on transactions (1978b: 430).
Such religious ethics evolved out of magical norms of conduct and taboo (composed of totemism, a symbol of brotherhood, and the institution of commensality, food restrictions).

Norms of taboo which become associated with social class and status, "caste taboo," become strong regulatory influences in all types of social intercourse, determining occupational opportunities. This evolves into a vocational ethic of a caste system, based on traditionalism rather than rationality. Weber argues in this section that economic rationalization (modern capitalism) is unlikely to develop in a society in which this kind of taboo achieves a dominant power in social relations. Accompanying these historical and organizational developments was a transformation of magical ethics (based on a belief in spirits) into concepts of conscience, sin and salvation (based upon the transgression of laws which incur the displeasure and wrath of gods). Thus magicians operate by an undifferentiated collection of ethical observances, and priests and prophets become the bearers of systematized, rationalized, and ranked ethical precepts.

A corresponding analysis of "Practice and Education" would include identifying the ways in which the abilities of the practitioner and a learner could service each other. The passing on of knowledge and skill could occur coercively through the same means employed in magical coercion. In contrast, instruction and cultivation are modes of deference: instruction would be composed of a coercive element (e.g. payment) and submission; cultivation implies a relational bonding involving inspiration, similar in nature
to communion. Evolution in these relationships would have to be demonstrated from a rationalism oriented toward productivity or performance to an increasing irrationalization towards otherworldly non-economic goals such as enlightenment or edification. Instruction and cultivation are characteristic of schools and educational theories or philosophies, and the simple passing on of a skill or item of knowledge is characteristic of the independent endeavour of practising.

Teachers and practitioners can be differentiated organizationally. Teachers in this sense would be functionaries of regularly organized and relatively permanent school enterprises, prepared by a systematic, rational training and disciplinary programme. Practitioners, on the other hand, act individually and independently, and are prepared in an idiosyncratic manner. These roles, as defined above, could not be distinguished by special knowledge and fixed doctrine, since, as the case with sorcerers and priests, an independent practitioner may be more learned than a teacher.

Reactions to success and failure on the part of these two educational roles can be seen to correspond to the religious. An independent practitioner takes on full responsibility for failure, whereas teachers may deflect blame to others. Goodness and malevolence on the part of a learned activity is usually judged by usefulness to various enterprises, however, relative value is not based upon this criterion, evidenced by the development of weapons (e.g. nerve gas) and torture equipment and techniques. Increasing ethical demands upon occupational activity, if consistent with Weber's discussion with regard to religion, would come about as a result of judicial and philosophic theory based upon concepts of human rights and sanctity, as well as increase regulation necessary in governing social
relationships in mass societies and large cities. Educational ethics could be seen to evolve out of the earliest communal norms of social conduct and taboo.

Norms of taboo have existed as totemic forms as mascots (e.g. the snake as a totemic symbol of medicine derived from phallic fertility attributes of Demeter and various earlier snake goddesses) and commensality (e.g. ritual feasting in medieval guilds). Norms of taboo in educationally oriented activity have become associated with social class and status. Throughout most cultures, educationally-oriented activity, that is training for various occupations and professions has been restricted to groups of particular social class and status, based predominantly on traditional rather than rational grounds. A transformation of practitioner ethics into concepts of conscience, competence, codes of professional ethics (in craft guilds as well as those activities designated as professions such as medicine, law, the military). Thus practitioners operate by a collection of idiosyncratic observances, and teachers and educators become the bearers of systematized, rationalized, and ranked ethical precepts.

In addition, high status groups and aristocratic classes have been able to patronize artistry and craftsmanship spurring on the development of extreme specialization (involving high levels of training and selection) as early as 2nd millennium Ur and Kish, as evidenced by filigree work in precious metals, inlaid work with precious stones and metals, and sophisticated relief and sculptured objects produced for aristocratic families and individuals (Nissen 153-154).

3. The Educational Philosopher

Weber's third section, "The Prophet," is an exploration of the interaction of various religious roles, types of
religious ethics, and the manner in which designated religious roles influence the laity. He first distinguishes among prophets, priests, and magicians. Prophet is defined as an "individual bearer of charisma, who by virtue of his mission proclaims a religious doctrine or divine commandment" whether renewing a religion or founding one (1978b: 439). The prophet is distinguished from the magician by a mission of doctrine or commandment received through revelation, without remuneration. The priest in contrast lays claim to authority by service to an established tradition and thereby dispenses salvation, deriving an economic benefit in exchange. Weber identifies two types of prophets: the ethical prophet (e.g. Zoroaster and Mohammed), who preaches the proclamations of a god; and the exemplary prophet, who by personal example demonstrates the way to salvation (e.g. Buddha). Both types of prophets provide for themselves and others "a unified view of the world derived from a consciously integrated meaningful attitude toward life" in which "the life of man and the world, both social and cosmic events, have a certain systematic and coherent meaning, to which man's conduct must be oriented if it is to bring salvation, and after which it must be patterned in an integrally meaningful manner" (1978b: 450), in other words, administered.

Prophets are distinguished from lawgivers in that the latter are simply purveyors of salvation whose task is to codify or reconstitute a law, often when social tensions erupt. Prophets do not receive their mission from a human agency, lawgivers do. Prophets are further differentiated by Weber from Teachers of Ethics. The former preaches, the latter mentors. Teachers of Ethics are characterized by a strong bond of loyalty formed with disciples subject to authoritarian rule by the teacher of ethics. The relationship is characterized by master-discipleship, based
upon personal selection, obligations of obedience, and roles approaching the familial. The mystagogue is distinguished from the prophet by performing magical acts granting salvation for remuneration, and whose arts were hereditarily transmitted (e.g. the hereditary incumbents of Eleusinian mysteries). The mystagogue is distinguished from the magician by having a congregation.

Corresponding roles in educational activity to prophets, lawgivers, mystagogues, and teachers of ethics are: educational philosophers, pedagogues (theorists of all types of educational activities—curriculum, administration, etc.), educational evangelists (e.g. Sophists), and mentors. Examples of educational philosophers who provided a comprehensive view of reality, knowledge and values are those associated with the founding of educational philosophical systems: Plato, Aristotle, Comenius, Pestalozzi, and Froebel, most of whose activities were undertaken not because of remuneration, and often at the personal cost of a livelihood (in the case of Socrates, his life), exile or other forms of resistance. Socrates, Comenius, Pestalozzi and Froebel were educational philosophers who demonstrated by example.

Pedagogues are those who have carried out educational reform or theoretical elaboration of a programme established within a philosophical tradition. This category would apply to any theorist in education, curriculum, administration, educational psychology, etc. (e.g. Rousseau and John Dewey), as well as in any form of educationally-oriented organization, political, military, governmental, legal, artistic, academic, religious, or vocational. Educational evangelists, on the other hand, are those whose livelihoods are derived from providing programmes for achievement, about whom a followership assembles. Characteristic of
evangelism, the role of leadership is passed down through conferment.

Mentors in educational activity have all the characteristics of mentorship evident in the traits and attitudes of religious teachers of ethics. This form of educational authority was incorporated in part into the educational activities of medieval guilds, but existed in purer form in alchemical training, and exists in the modern world more often in elite sports and artistic training as well as any form of Buddhist training. Mentorship in Weber’s sense as a personal relationship consisting of obedience, loyalty, and authoritarianism, oriented essentially toward the overall being of an individual, not essentially toward the transmission of knowledge or skills, must be distinguished from common usage which refers to anyone who provides information, guidance, or advice. It is fundamentally anti-democratic and elitist in the administration of its activities and relationships. Mentors, like educational philosophers and educational evangelists, have charismatic qualities.

4. The Congregation Between Educational Philosopher and Teacher

The fourth section of Weber’s chapter on religious groups, "The Congregation Between Prophet and Priest," examines the various forms of relationship between prophets, priests, and laity. Each of the leadership roles in religious activity identified in the previous section are distinguished by types of followerships with characteristic organizational and authority forms. A prophet’s congregation is composed of personal devotees in permanent association with the prophet, often assisted by co-workers possessing charismatic qualifications of their own. Such organizations exist only when a prophetic movement arises
and some level of routinization obtains. As noted in the previous section, mystagogues are characterized by a congregation, however its composition is open and is temporary, having a continually changing membership. The magician either has no congregation, practicing independently, or serves a geographic, social or political area, not a religious congregation.

Routinization, the establishment of a permanent congregation of laymen, or institution, on the basis of prophetic revelation, transforms the roles of personal devotees into mystagogues, priests, and teachers. Such groups may also be formed by priests whose function has evolved from that of magician (e.g. court magicians who organize into a status group) (1978b: 454), or the transformation of a political association, whose membership shared religious association, into a purely religious congregation upon destruction of the political purpose (e.g. Judaism under Persian rule) (1978b: 455).

Associated with these kinds of developments are the establishment of religious administrations in synods, cultic communities, parishes (ecclesiastical tax units), churches, monasteries, denominations, sects, and societal status. Administrative relations between priests and the laity, that is the authority of priests, is complicated by managing, satisfying, and recruiting laity, and taking into account three forces Weber identified as operating within the laity: prophecy, traditionalism of the laity, and lay intellectualism (1978b: 456). (It is evident in this section of the chapter that Weber did allow for charismatic individuals arising within the lower echelons of an organization, individuals inclined toward challenging organizational authority and producing conflict.) It is important to note that both the prophet and his followers are laypeople; professionalism does not exist until a
permanent organization is established with a lay congregation and their administrators, priests, often experiencing a struggle for power with prophets and their followers.

Administration, interpretation, and socialization of a religious organization, as well as fulfilling preaching and pastoral functions (two sources of power), is accomplished by a priesthood through codifying canonical writings, establishing dogma, and preparing scripture, the last of which has a special role in priestly education. These means also secure the authority of a priesthood and create hierarchy within the organization, however the process of codification presents opportunity for internal conflict and schism. They also assist in a religious organization differentiation itself from others, and in differentiating religious motivation from other types of motivation.

Finally in this section, Weber identifies a regressive process afflicting permanent congregations, and an administrative problem for a priesthood, a regression through popularization into magical practices: wizardry and sacramental ritualism (1978b: 466). This phenomenon occurs presumably because the attraction of a laity for a prophetic individual is essentially charismatic, a characteristic which is excluded from overly rationalized, bureaucratized organization. The prophet will be perceived as a person with magical properties or powers (such as rising from the dead, or raising others from the dead), and even though strenuously resisted by a prophetic individual, he will become the object of cult activity, or the incarnation of a god.

Educationally-oriented followings can be delineated in a similar fashion. Educational philosophers characteristically had followerships composed of personal devotees assisted by charismatically distinguished co-
workers. The most famous example in the Western world is the congregation of devotees surrounding Socrates, many of whom assisted him during his trial and death. His most gifted student, Plato, by all accounts had extraordinary personal qualities. Educational evangelists like John Bradshaw have a followership of loosely organized adherents, a fluctuating and ever-changing membership attending conferences and seminars. Practitioners (the equivalent of magicians) are those individuals who practice an art or craft outside an established educational programme or institution, such as various forms of self-help advocates.

Routinization, the establishment of an educational organization or school, on the basis of philosophical erudition, transforms the roles of personal devotees of an educational philosopher to that of evangelists, administrators, and teaching staff: from a personal association to that of an employee role. Such groups may also be formed by administrators and teachers whose function has evolved from that of practitioner (e.g. art therapists who organize into a distinct profession), or the transformation of a political association whose membership shared an educational association, into a purely educational organization upon the dissolution of the political purpose (e.g. the school of Critical Theory).

Associated with these developments are the administrative forms of colleges, schools, fellowships, universities, school systems, and studios. Administrative relations between administrative and teaching staff is complicated by managing, satisfying, and recruiting students. This applies to providing an acceptable or attractive curriculum, as well as the establishment of policy and its attendant rules and regulations which are tolerable to the students (and in the case of the education of minors in some political and legal settings, to the
parents). The three forces originating with the client body which can be sources of conflict and power struggle are: students with philosophical vocation who can through charismatic qualities become the germ-seed of group activity, traditionalism in student attitudes and expectations, and student criticism (theoretical/methodological).

The administration, interpretation, and socialization of an educational organization, is accomplished by an administrative and teaching staff through the codification of philosophical writings, establishing texts of principles and methodology, and the preparation of various kinds of research, analytic, and substantive writings, which together constitute over time the traditional body of literature of a school of educational thought. As in the religious realm, this literature plays an important role in the training of administrative and teaching staff, and provides the means for authority and creating hierarchy (by certification). Just as schism occurs within religious organizations, internal conflict and schism occur within educational organizations (in the contemporary university this is illustrated by a division between proponents of political correctness and the defenders of scholarly activities predicated on the Western liberal arts tradition). Such a body of literature assists in the creation of educational organizations as distinct and separate creations from other kinds of social organizations, and in the development of a conception of scholarly or professional pursuit as a motivation separable from other motivations. Regressive phenomena would consist of the popularization of method and theory producing fads and fashion with an affective appeal, psychologically a compensation for overly routinized, that is, overly rationalized administration that produces disenchantment.
5. **The Educational Propensities of Peasantry, Nobility, and Bourgeoisie**

"The Religious Propensities of Peasantry, Nobility, and Bourgeoisie" section examines the characteristic religious attitudes and practices of these three social classes. Peasantry are distinguished by a naturalistic orientation. Consequently, they are not inclined toward rational, systematized economic attitudes, and are only religiously oriented during periods of social, economic, or political threat. According to Weber, the prototype of the pious peasant is a modern phenomenon; for most of the historical record they have been regarded as the heathen (*paganus*) (1978b: 471). In Christian history, until late, the site of piety was urban, and the peasant was accorded a lower rank and little esteem.

Generally, warrior nobles are not readily carriers of a rational religious ethic, their underlying values of martial honour not being consistent with concepts of sin, salvation, and religious humility. Survival in an occupation oriented toward the violent irrational has produced a preference for magical rites promising protection or an honourable death ensuring admittance to a "hero's heaven" (e.g. Mithraism) they have been more frequently influenced by and adopted prophetic ethical religions reaffirming their status exclusivity and association with charisma (allowing them to view adversaries as morally depraved). This social class can be distinguished from the religious orientation of a standing, bureaucratically organized army, by its negative attitude toward salvation and congregational religion.

Weber treats bourgeois attitudes in two forms: bureaucratic and economic (merchant or other commercial). The typical values of bureaucratic officials ("sober rationalism") (1978b: 476) are not consistent with religious
irrationalism, however such kinds of religious organizations can be regarded by civilian and military bureaucracy as a device for social management. Weber defines their religious attitude as "bureaucratic irreligion" (1978b: 476). Commercial classes (whose social status ranges from the lowest to the highest echelons of societal stratification) engage in a this-worldly non-prophetic, that is magical or charismatic, practice which has generally been rational and congregational.

Educational propensities of social classes can also be distinguished in the above manner. Peasant education is characterized by basic economic and practical attitudes, familially directed and inherited, with little differentiation or specialization. It is characterized by an oral rather than written tradition, by folklore than by science, by practice than by theory.

Aristocratic education can be separated into two types: militaristic, governmental-legal, and politics. The occupationally relevant training was, until modern times, received in military and legislative (political), governmental, or judicial settings, as on-the-job training (Veyne 22), levels of competence demonstrated through promotion. Militaristic, governmental-legal, and political traditions are distinguished by schooling, by an established school or by tutor, in a classical literary and philosophical tradition which confers prestige and cultivation (e.g. Roman aristocratic schooling) (Veyne 20). During the medieval period this was transferred to monastery and cathedral schools thus adding a religious sanction (Rouche 485). Philosophy and literary study are pursued characteristically by this class as a leisure activity, albeit a most meaningful one. The architectural evidence from Roman Africa includes a typical style of house with a room suitable for discussions, lectures, decorated by
mosaics representing the Muses, theatrical masks and portraits of tragic poets (Thébert 375). Such practices carried through historically to present times. Militaristic education, in a chivalric tradition includes an early phase ideally at court in which service and comportment are learned. Early and medieval military education included sports training administered by the family (Rouche 485). Usury in ancient Rome was accepted as a noble occupation for men, along with farming, obtaining dowries, and receiving legacies. Acquiring the skills for such means of livelihood (e.g. courting women or wealthy old men) (Veyne 149), would have been, upon speculation, an informal learning process, informed by folklore and custom. Courtesanship and marriage are the correlate female occupations, however, women have had the advantage in some societies of having access to finishing schools and "coming out" ceremonies, and in the early European Middle Ages, a small industry of manuals and advice manuscripts were prepared to instruct women on sex and love and accompanied by a medical technology of preparations (Rouche 480-482). A male activity which, while not regarded as a means of livelihood, but as a vocation, was that of the libertine whose purpose included transgressing social taboo (Veyne 203).

The bourgeois class is composed of professional groups (artisan and academically certified), merchant or business groups, administrative groups (in government and other large organizations), and lately sports groups (in social class, if not in social status). Artisan or craft (trades) groups, as well as merchant and other business groups, educated through apprenticeship. Schooling, until modern times, was rarely a feature of this process. A feature of many of these groups was confraternity, a guild association so strong that its power was feared in Imperial Rome (Veyne 189). Literacy is not tied to social status, scribes (as an
artisan group, or even slave group) were employed in Egypt and from early to medieval European times by an aristocratic elite who were illiterate (Veyne 18). Civil service training is characterized by not only schooling, but an on-the-job training, levels of competence demonstrated through promotion, a practice originating in ancient Babylon (cursus honorum) (Nissen 194). An interesting development in the social standing of intellectual activities, is the social devolution of the participants from the most privileged social strata in classical times to bourgeois in the modern, related to the increasing differentiation and specialization of these activities, and their routinization in rationalized, bureaucratic organizations, for whom they take on employee roles.

6. The Education of Non-Privileged Strata

Weber identifies, in the section "The Religion of Non-Privileged Strata," four groups: craftsmen; a composite group composed of slaves, day-labourers, and modern proletariat; women in disprivileged strata; and pariah groups. Non-privileged strata display a greater diversity of religious attitude than other strata. Among artisan groups (petty-bourgeois) religious orientation has ranged from magical, mystagogic (both sacramental and orgiastic), idolatrous, and prophetic (ancient Christianity originating among artisans), congregational, rational, and monastic. This, Weber argues, suggests that an economic determinism of religion cannot exist, however there is a tendency toward congregational, salvation, and rational religious forms. The development from magical to rationalized forms of religion proceeds with increasing occupational differentiation and specialization.

Slaves and free day-labourers tend toward sect religion (e.g. Mithraism and Delphic Apollo), often unofficial. The
modern proletariat shares the same rational attitude as the modern bourgeoisie, depending on their own achievement and viewing the world as a combination of social, market, and legally-regulation power relationship forces. The more unstable strata of proletariat become susceptible, however, to missionary enterprises bearing magical or magical-orgiastic characteristics (e.g. soteriological orgies of Methodism) (1978b: 486).

Disprivileged strata confer greater equality of religious activity to women in relation to aristocratic cults of martial nobles, this equality varying with the degree of pacification or militarization (e.g. excluded from Mithraic cults). Often the concept of equality held on principle is not carried over into practice, evident usually in women being barred from selection and training for priesthood (authority roles in religious organizations). However, women have occupied authoritative roles in these strata as priestesses, soothsayers, oracles, "witches" (adepts), all of which have been charismatic and often orgiastic as in Dionysiac and Cybelean cults (1978b: 490).

Pariah groups, Weber defines as "a distinctive hereditary social group lacking autonomous political organization and characterized by internal prohibitions against commensality and intermarriage originally founded upon magical, tabooistic, and ritual injunctions . . . [accompanied by] political and social disfravilge and a far-reaching distinctiveness in economic functioning" (1978b: 493). Their religious orientation is characterized by salvation hopes. This is accompanied by resentment (in the Nietzschean psychological sense) (1978b: 494) turned to a theology of compensation teaching "that the unequal distribution of mundane goods is caused by the sinfulness and the illegality of the privileged, and that sooner or later God's wrath will overtake them" (1978b: 494). In
Hinduism and Buddhism, the theodicy of rebirth provides an alternative to a theodicy of resentment.

Weber also identifies the phenomenon of devolution of a prophetic salvation religion originating in socially privileged groups and associated with intellectual cultivation, transformed into a non-intellectual religion based upon a personal, divine or human-divine saviour bearing salvation upon reaching lay groups who do not have access to or value the cultivation of intellectualism (e.g. Buddha transformed into a popular focus of devotion) (1978b: 487). Weber identifies the importance of salvation religion for disprivileged social groups as a promise of some function, mission, or vocation from which esteem will derive, in contrast to privileged groups whose esteem is viewed as inherent. It is a contrast of becoming versus being.

In contrast to Weber’s assembly of four groups in non-privileged strata, as indicated in the previous section, discussion of the education of craftsmen has been moved to the privileged strata. Non-privileged strata therefore includes: slaves, day-labourers, and proletariat; women in disprivileged strata; and pariah groups. As in a study of religious orientation, there exists among these groups a great diversity of educational attitude, activity, and status. Slaves, in fact, can be distinguished educationally from the others, in that intellectually educated, and occupationally sophisticated, individuals can be appropriated to serve in positions of iradically, great status and power. Greek slaves functioned as physicians and administrators of empire in Imperial Rome, and black eunuchs as imperial administrators and treasurers in the Turkish Sultanate. Slaves are distinguished from non-slaves by their legal status, not educational or occupational status. Free day-labourers and proletariat education is
distinguished by occupations which are differentiated, exist organizationally at the lower levels of hierarchy, and unlike peasantry have been differentiated from familial activity and values.

Educationally-oriented activities of disprivileged women covers an array of service activities, from waitressing (even in Imperial Rome) to prostitution. Disprivileged women would include those born into a disprivileged class or discarded from a higher social class, usually by transgression of sexual custom and taboo (e.g. rape, incest, or adultery), which may or may not be preferable to execution (Rouche 475, 478).

The educational activities of pariah groups is distinguished by learning trades and occupying positions which other societal groups are unwilling to perform. They are often jobs which are viewed as "unclean" or demeaning, notably sanitation, unskilled manual labour, service jobs (e.g. domestics), and animal butchery. Monasteries became the educational refuge of the disprivileged including pariah, as well as a vocational option for other social classes, during the early Middle Ages in Europe.

An educational devolution corresponding to the religious evolution from socially privileged to disprivileged, would include educational activities and curriculum designed originally as cultivation for the privileged transformed into occupational training for livelihood as it moves down the social scale (e.g. changing social purpose of the university). In effect, it becomes commercialized and professionalized, and if regulated by an educational institution of rational-bureaucratic character is transformed from an art into a science, from philosophy to methodology. This applies to all the "fine arts."

7. Intellectualism, Intellectuals, and Achievement in
Education

This section, "Intellectualism, Intellectuals, and Salvation Religion," examines the forms, roles, and influences of intellectual figures and groups in religious organizations. Weber first identifies the role of the priesthood as a literary guild whose purpose is to interpret scripture and teach its content, meaning, and proper application (e.g. religions of India, Egypt, Babylonia, Islam, and ancient and medieval Christianity), and the cognate role of monks and monastic groups (e.g. in Buddhism, Islam, and ancient and medieval Christianity). These groups exert a decisive formative influence, in other words, an authoritative administrative role.

Such power is also evident in lay intelligentsia who bring innovation and reform to religious organizations (e.g. Confucianism, Hinduism, Manicheanism, and Gnosticism) (1978b: 502-503). Such intellectual strata are characteristically high on the social scale, possess philosophical training, and are bearers of an ethic or salvation doctrine. Salvation religions of this origin emerge in social conditions in which the political and military power of ruling strata are lost to a bureaucratic-militaristic unitary state. Once a salvation religion has become a mass religion, transformed into a doctrine of a popular magical saviour and thereby meeting the needs of non-intellectual strata, it loses the characteristics which satisfy intellectual demands for addressing an intellectualized view of the "world" as a problem of meaning. The result for the intellectual is disenchantment, and flight from the world into "absolute loneliness," a Rousseauean escape to "nature unspoiled by human institutions," or world-fleeing romanticism to the "people" untouched by social conventions (1978b: 506). The two
underlying orientations are contemplative or revolutionary transformation of the world to conform to an ethical ideal.

The religious impact of proletarian, petty-bourgeois, and pariah intellectualism (e.g. petty officials, scribes, elementary school teachers, wandering poets, narrators, reciters, and proletaroid practitioners) (1978b: 507) is original and often intensely ethical or emotional since these groups are not as bound by social convention and not as impeded by material considerations. One consequence of this influence can be anti-intellectualism, evident in the Christian doctrine that "exemplary Christians were endowed with pneuma, the poor in spirit, rather than the scholars" (1978b: 512) and the resultant struggle for power within a religious organization.

Elite intellectualism also can find itself in conflict with religious authority, as was the case in the struggle with the papacy for monopoly over universities and benefices during the Gregorian reform movement. An economic and nationalistic conflict evolved into an ideological conflict and schism. Modern intellectual groups are contrastingly described as either anti-religious, scientistic, Buddhist influenced, or engaged in constructing a secular salvation ideology (Marxism), all differentiating themselves from religious orientation. Weber condemns literary, academic and café intellectuals for an effete attempt to include religious "feelings" in their inventories of sources of impressions and sensations, the underlying motivation of which is publication and publicity rather than religion.

The roles, types, and influences of intellectual figures and groups in educational activity and organization, corresponds to that in the religious realm. Those who exert a formative influence in education through a scholarly guild by interpreting philosophy as educational theory and teaching its content, meaning, and proper application
through curricula, consists of disciplinary professionals (faculty in non-professional programmes) and teachers of educational theory and method (professional programme faculty). Non-institutional figures would include independent intellectuals operating outside the authority and certification of an organization.

The power of non-institutional intellectuals is evident in those lay thinkers who brought innovation and reform to educational organizations (e.g. Montaigne, Rousseau, Condorcet) (Moehlman 19) (Herbart and Locke) (Power 11, 53). As in religion, they have a high social status, possess philosophical training, and are bearers of an ethic or achievement educational doctrine (e.g. Humanism). Once an educational philosophy or theory has become transformed into a popular educational method, procedure, or formula, and has become popularized or commercialized, it loses the characteristics which satisfy intellectual demands for viewing the world as an intellectualized problem of meaning, as in religion. Intellectual reaction takes two possible forms: flight from the world into contemplation, intellectual monasticism; or an attempt at a revolutionary transformation of the world to conform to an educational ideal (Reconstructionist educational philosophers like Plato, Neill, Freire).

The educational impact of lower status or class intellectualism (e.g. government officials, school boards, school teachers, organizationally unattached--free-lance--practitioners) is original and often intensely ethical or emotional since these types are not as bound by social convention (the demands and constraints of organization) and not as impeded by material considerations. One consequence of this influence can be anti-intellectualism, evident in the educational doctrine of non-grading or laissez-faire curricula (certain types of child-centredness) and the
resultant struggle for power within an educational organization (e.g. school).

Elite intellectualism also can find itself in conflict with educational authority, as is the case of the struggle for control over university curricula and other administrative issues based on radical and deconstructionist feminism. Modern intellectual groups, correlative to Weber's identification of anti-religious groups, would include the French post-structuralist, deconstructionist movement typified by Derrida which eliminates the foundation of epistemology and ethics (Ferry and Renaut 4-12), and is essentially anti-intellectual.

8. Knowledge, Achievement, and Social Advance

In the eighth section, "Theodicy, Salvation, and Rebirth," Weber examines the problem of theodicy, the ways in which one can reconcile the power of a transcendent entity (god), particularly as its conception approaches that of universality and unity (omnipotence, omniscience, and Oneness), with the imperfections of the world. In religious groups this involves "exerting practical influences when there has arisen out of religious motivations, a systematization of practical conduct resulting from an orientation to certain integral values" (1978b: 528). Theodicy, through messianic eschatology, can provide a rationale and conception of revolution in this world, thereby guiding a political and social transformation. This kind of theodicy is accompanied by the belief in a hero or god who would assist qualified followers in achieving deserved social status. Alternatively, and if this-worldly transformation is unduly delayed, otherworldly hopes are entertained, for which suffering often becomes a qualifying experience.
In theodicies characterized by predestination, ethical behavior serves not to improve one's chances for, or earning of, salvation, but in a more absolute sense serves as an indicator of grace. Belief in providence is an affirmation of a god's dynamic and personal providential rule over the world. A conception of a god's discretionary conferring of grace and man's need of it avoids the problem of theodicy.

Alternative views on resolving the imperfections of the world include dualism (e.g. Manicheism) (1978b: 524), the conflict of powers of light and darkness from which man, by being participant in the realm of light, derives a feeling of prestige. Another is a belief in the transmigration of souls (e.g. doctrine of karma) based, according to Weber, on a rationalization of animistic views, through ethical principles, dependent not upon ethical dualism (good and evil), but an ontological dualism of the transitory world and the transcendent (as in Platonic idealism).

Salvation religions address the theodicy problem by either rewarding ethical behavior in this world, or by freeing one from the sufferings of terrestrial life by providing for a consequent otherworldly existence.

Analogous to theodicy in religion is knowledge doctrine or curriculum philosophy in education. The problem of knowledge doctrine would correspondingly be the ways in which one reconciles an ideal conception of knowledge and curriculum with the imperfections inherent in worldly observance and practice. In educational groups this involves, as in religion, exerting practical influences when there has arisen out of educational motivations, a systematization of practical conduct resulting from an orientation to certain integral values (the organization and administration of educationally-oriented conduct based upon a school of thought). Epistemology and its accompanying
curriculum theory, through liberationist ideology, can provide a rationale and conception of revolution in this world, thereby guiding activities oriented toward political and social transformation. This kind of knowledge theory is accompanied by the belief in heroic figures who would assist qualified followers in achieving deserved social status (e.g. Freire's establishment of a school based upon his educational theory). Alternatively, and if a this-worldly transformation (e.g. a transformation of the social order) is delayed, subverted, or prevented, that is, hopes are entertained and acted upon for the establishment of a detached organization, operating outside the confines of social authority, essentially an educational monasticism (e.g. free schools which attempt to operate independent of convention and external regulation). Sacrifice of material wealth and social status (standard salaries and rank provided by conventional organizations), in this context, becomes a qualifying experience, and an intra-organizational status in its own right.

In knowledge theories characterized by a belief in talent or gift, ethical behaviour serves not to improve one's chances for, or earning of, achievement, but in a more absolute sense serves as an indicator of educational status (e.g. prodigies). Belief in inherent qualities can be an affirmation of an idealistic or realistic teleology—that a cosmic discretion operates in the world, some inheriting superior qualities, and others not.

Alternative views addressing the imperfections of worldly experience could include bisexual dualism (e.g. yin-yang; animus-anima explanations of human development in Jungian theory) and transcendent idealism (e.g. Kierkegaardian-style ethics) as ways of understanding the inability to meet educational goals.
Educational orientations directed toward achievement resolve the imperfection problem by either rewarding ethical and developmental behaviour as it occurs (e.g. a Progressivist belief in training and education), or by freeing oneself through transcendentally oriented activities from an imperfect educational world.

9. Achievement Through the Learner's Efforts

"Salvation Through the Believer's Efforts" identifies the various means by which a systematization of ethics, as a route to salvation, is achieved by the believer. One means is through ritualized behaviour. Ritual may be dependent or independent of a god (e.g. Buddhism) (1978b: 530); an occasional or comprehensive ritualistic regimentation of life; engaged in by individuals either as a spectator or central performer; practised ceremonially or through everyday activity; may be sacramental or secular; and occur through special schooling, or occur spontaneously and intuitively.

Achievement through good works varies from seeking death in battle (political or religious) to works performed out of a motivation of brotherhood. Systematization of good works can be interpreted either as a credit (accounting methods) or as a symptom of an underlying ethical personality.

Achievement through self-perfection, a charismatic rebirth or sanctification, is an alternative means. Ecstasy is characteristically accompanied by removal of inhibitions through drugs, music, dance, sexuality, all of which are orgiastic and which produce only transitory states. Enduring ecstasy is produced by other means, mystical illumination or ethical conversion.

The assurance of grace (religious acquirement) can be engendered by "methodical procedures of sanctification"
(e.g. Yoga) (1978b: 538), a systematic regulation of life producing a foundation for life conduct. Religious virtuosi are those possessing requisite charisma for sanctification, as long as it can be demonstrated. These individuals constitute the members of monastic orders (e.g. dervishes, Sufis, Protestant ascetic sects) (1978b: 540).

Achievement through the learner's own efforts can be made by various kinds of systematization of ethics. Ritual behaviour exists in educationally oriented activity as it does in religious activity. A set of logically distinct ritual categories corresponding to Weber's have been developed by Skorupski to order and evaluate implicit rites (1976). His typologies are: Beginning and Ending Demarcations (e.g. convocation ceremonies, weekly school assemblies, installations of administrative personnel); Backward-looking or Calendrical ceremonies (e.g. commemorative activities, school-year openings); Outward Sign, that is, the formal markings of social states or events (e.g. the wearing of robes on special occasions and school uniforms); Interaction ceremonies, that is, actions which provide structure and meaning to the interactions of those involved in educational roles (e.g. students standing at attention, and formal greetings, introductions and acknowledgements); Operative ceremonies, those which establish, modify, enforce or cancel rules of behaviour (e.g. regulated school discipline, awards, and classroom contracts).

Achievement through good performance varies from hiring competitions through high grades to demonstrating approved social conduct. A systematization of good performance can be interpreted either as the accumulation of credits (e.g. a curriculum of courses) or as symptomatic evaluation of an underlying educational ethical personality (e.g. 
characteristic of mentorship relationships in the fine arts).

Achievement through self-perfection, a charismatic rebirth as in religion, is an alternative means. Vocational ecstasy is characteristically accompanied by the enhancement of insight and skill through drugs, music, and sexuality (e.g. common to practitioners in the fine arts), all of which are orgiastic and, as above, produce only transitory states. Enduring vocational ecstasy is produced by other means, notably religious or other transcendental attitudes (e.g. Tolstoy).

The assurance of educational status can be engendered by methodical procedures of attaining excellence, a systematic regulation of educational life producing a foundation for general life conduct. Educational virtuosi are those possessing requisite charisma for excellence, as long as it can be demonstrated (e.g. may be lost through artistic burn-out). These individuals constitute the members of special associations whose organization lies beyond conventional regulation and are therefore self-governing (e.g. Group of Seven).

10. Rationalism, Transcendentalism, and Achievement

In "Asceticism, Mysticism and Salvation" Weber examines two different ways in which salvation is viewed, and how practical conduct is related to them, especially on the part of religious virtuosi: asceticism and mysticism. An ascetic attitude toward salvation is characterized by conduct based on methodical procedure. Salvation is thereby viewed as a consequence of active ethical behaviour, when one performs as an instrument of god. The two forms asceticism can take, according to Weber, are: world-rejecting asceticism (from all material, social, psychological, and physical interests); and inner-worldly asceticism (participation
within, but in opposition to, societal institutions on the basis of piety and qualifications of the elect) (1978b: 542). Groups of ascetics form religiously aristocratic organizations, in other words, a class. The inner-worldly ascetic is characterized by Weber as rationally systematized conduct and a rejection of the irrational and the aesthetic.

Salvation, however, may also be a subjective condition oriented toward contemplation rather than active conduct: mystic illumination (1978b: 544), entailing inactivity in the world's affairs. This is achieved either by "flight from the world" (monasticism or hermeticism) or minimal activity in the world (humility). Influence on others is psychological rather than rational. Mysticism is transcendent rather than rational although rational conduct and techniques are means to dissociating oneself from worldly influences. Weber views the predominant Oriental and Occidental orientations as mystical and ascetic respectively, in the sense in which he has defined these terms.

The two different attitudes on the part of educational virtuosi toward achievement and how practical conduct is related to them are: rationalism and transcendentalism. A rational attitude toward achievement is characterized by conduct based on methodical procedure. Achievement is thereby viewed as a consequence of active ethical behaviour when performed as an instrument of reason. The two forms this takes are: world-rejecting rationalism (secular idealism and Kierkegaardian existentialism in which ethical determinations are made free from material, social, psychological and physical interests); and inner-worldly rationalism (empirically verified or derived as in logical positivism and behaviourism). Groups of rationalists form educationally aristocratic organization, in other words a social class. The inner-worldly rationalist is
characterized by rationally systematized conduct and a rejection of the irrational and the aesthetic.

Achievement, however, may also be a subjective condition oriented toward contemplation and transcendence rather than active conduct: freedom from the world characterized by private and unconventional study. This is achieved either by flight—dissociation from educational organizations (educational hermeticism) or minimal activity in the world (as an organizational member) based upon ironic distance. Influence on others is psychological rather than rational, which may entail rational conduct and techniques as a means to dissociating oneself from worldly influence (e.g. Buddhism techniques of concentration). The predominant Oriental and Occidental orientations are transcendental and rationalist respectively.

11. Educational Status or Achievement from the Outside

In "Soteriology or Salvation from Outside," Weber explores three forms of attainment which are not based on the individual's own efforts. Salvation is accessible through the achievement of a charismatic figure, a hero or saviour (e.g. who kills dragons, defeats demons, or undergoes a sacrificial death) (1978b: 558). Resultant grace can be distributed through sacramental (magical) ingestion (individualistic grace), or ritual means requiring priests or mystagogues, who are representatives of an institutional organization which administers grace (institutional grace). Institutional grace also demands membership as a precondition for grace. Priests' authority is institutional, not based on personal charismatic qualification; and a personal religious qualification of the individual member is a matter of indifference to the institution—it is dependent upon institutional power (e.g. Catholic church) (1978b: 560). Institutional obedience,
therefore, is a prerequisite to obtaining grace, and vocation is emphasized over good works.

The two other ways of attaining grace are by faith alone, and by belief in predestination. The former, when outside an institution, is individually administered, when inside an institution, is transformed by intellectualism into theological faith (official, rationalized dogma) (1978b: 564) administered by officials who are institutionally qualified (have status) and exhibit expertise, a characteristic of any kind of bureaucracy. Predestination, because it is not based upon the powers of an individual, is characterized by an authoritarian deity. The behaviour of an individual is orientated toward the reading of symptoms which indicate grace, resulting in a high degree of consistency and discipline of behaviour.

Three forms of educational achievement based upon external conferment exist. Achievement is accessible through the achievement of a virtuoso (e.g. film director, conductor, artist who works with apprentices). Resultant status can thereby be distributed individualistically or institutionally by those in the institution designated to the administration of conferment. Institutionally granted status requires membership as a precondition. Authority is institutionally derived, and obedience is a prerequisite to obtaining status.

The two other possible ways of attaining educational status are by acquired (inculcated or trained) qualities and by belief in inherited qualities. The former, when occurring outside an organization are self-administered; when inside an organization is intellectualized into a theory and method, administered by educational officials. Belief in inherited qualities (which may be class or status derived) is oriented toward the interpretation of symptoms which confirm these qualities.
12. Educational Ethics and the World: Economics

This first of a concluding series of sections on the relationship between religious and other kinds of activities, "Religious Ethics and the World: Economics," examines the effect of types of religious orientation on the economic realm. The systematization of religious obligations in the direction of an ethic based on institutional regularity will bring a stereotypic effect to all legal institutions and social conventions including the limitation of economic rationalization. This effect is not deterministic, but can only influence if requisite economic conditions, relationships, and constellations of interests and drives already exist.

Economic needs can influence religious interpretation and directions (e.g. elimination of prohibition against usury in the Catholic church) (1978b: 577-578), but equally, religious attitudes and values influence economic behaviour (the requirement to propagate). The more, however, religious faith becomes systematized and social relationships are regulated religiously, the greater the conflict between religious and economic demands.

Weber identifies economically oriented social behaviour which is regulated religiously as familial piety, just retaliation, fraternal assistance to neighbours (especially in congregational religion), and an ethic of compensation (reciprocity in relationships of assistance). Economically oriented behaviour characteristic of religious motivation includes alms-giving, charity, and protection of the weak.

In relating this to educational administration, one would begin with economics, examining the effect of types of educational orientation on the economic realm, as well as the effect of economics on educational orientations. The systematization of educational obligations in the direction
of an ethic based on institutional regularity would bring a stereotypic effect to economic rationalization (e.g. economics treated as an experimental-empirical discipline rather than as political economy, predisposing economists to treat economic planning, policy, and related activities in a technical-rational manner). This effect is not deterministic, but can only influence, as in religion, if requisite economic conditions, relationships, and constellations of interests and drives already exist (e.g. consumer education reinforcing modern free market conditions).

Economic needs can influence educational interpretation and orientation (e.g. shift in the role of universities from scholarship to job preparation), but equally, educational attitudes and values can influence economic behaviour (e.g. the inculcation of vocational attitudes and codes of professional ethics). The more, however, educational values become systematized and social relationships are regulated educationally, the greater the conflict between educational and economic demands.

Economically oriented social behaviour which is regulated educationally would be identified as salary scales, job stratification, job selection, economic planning and policy, and personnel resource planning. Economically oriented behaviour characteristic of educational motivation includes bestowing funds or other gifts, investing in educational development, purchase of educationally oriented materials, patronage, and volunteering labour to educational enterprises.

13. Educational Ethics and the World: Politics

"Religious Ethics and the World: Politics" outlines the types of relationship which can exist between the political and religious realms. As in economic relationships, there
is an inherent tension between religiously oriented behavior and politically oriented behavior. Religion can occupy any position relative to the political from subordination to rejection.

In subordinate roles, religion can be called upon to aid in political activities (e.g. sanction war) or be dependent upon political organization and power (e.g. priests as enfeoffed lords exercising secular power) (1978b: 590). Establishing independence from political authority necessitates an increasingly rationalized ethic. As a religion becomes more congregational, the more political circumstances contribute to the development of a religious ethic of the subjugated (e.g. Jewish prophecy preaching resignation to political domination) (1978b: 591). Bureaucratization of political domination (e.g. in Imperial Rome) contributed, in contrast to an antipolitical rejection of the world—favoring the development of an ethic of brotherhood.

Inner-worldly asceticism is able to compromise with political power structures if they can be interpreted to assist in a rationalized ethical transformation of the world. Tension and compromise between religion and politics varies from Confucian accommodation to Realpolitik (e.g. Islamic identification of religion and politics), through martyrdom and passive anti-political sufferance (e.g. Quakers) (1978b: 595), to complete withdrawal from the realm of politics (e.g. hermeticism).

The types of relationship which can exist between the political and educational realms have an inherent tension. Educationally oriented behaviour can occupy a number of positions relative to the political from subordination to rejection.

In subordinate roles, education can be called upon to aid in political activities (e.g. the American emphasis on
science curriculum after Sputnik), assist in general national political goals (e.g. purpose of national educational systems in France, Germany, and Great Britain) (Power 58), or serve to bring prestige and political security (e.g. value of poetry to Arabic clans) (Lapidus 14). It can also become dependent upon political organizations and power (e.g. in Fascist or totalitarian states). Establishing independence from political authority necessitates an increasingly independent educationally rationalized ethic. As educational activity becomes more organized, the more political circumstances contribute to the development of an educational ethic of the subjugated (e.g. dependence upon political forces within and outside the organization). Education can also occupy a superordinate role in relation to politics (e.g. academies of learning providing political cohesion to Jewish communities) (Lapidus 9).

Inner-worldly oriented education is able to compromise with the political if educational purpose is seen to include the preparation for citizenship, the socialization toward and management of political processes. This orientation can vary from pragmatic accommodation (e.g. Deweyan reform, National Film Board), through realist identification of education and politics (e.g. Machiavellianism and Marxism), to martyrdom (e.g. Socratic idealism) and passive anti-political sufferance (e.g. pacifist religious education), to complete withdrawal from the realm of politics (e.g. Buddhist).

14. Educational Ethics and the World: Religion

There is not a corresponding section in "Sociology of Religion" for education and religion, however the types of relationships which can exist between the religious and educational realms are similar to those which may exist
between religion and any other form of social behaviour: from subordinate to superordinate positions.

These can briefly be illustrated by the relationships existing between classical literature and religiously oriented behaviour. Classical literature can be seen as a means to religious salvation (e.g. Clement) (Power 42). A compromise of religious and literary worlds can be achieved through censorship and emendation to bring the literary into conformity with religious principle (e.g. Augustine) (Power 43). Literary and philosophical traditions may be seen as a means of transforming the religious into an extra-organizational personal responsibility (e.g. existential authors Buber, Tillich, Marcel, Kierkegaard). Lastly, classical literature may be seen as a means of liberation from religion altogether (e.g. Sartrean existentialism).

Religion may also serve to assist in and reinforce educational ends (e.g. Islamic view of education as a religious duty) (Lapidus 35) and cause a change in educational custom and curriculum (e.g. as a result of Islamic conversion, Arabic became the standard language of administration, literature and religion) (Lapidus 52). It is partly because of religious values and practice that educational heritage can be preserved in times of political stress and fragmentation (e.g. ancient Greek thought preserved in Islam, and classical literature in Christian monasteries during the European medieval period) (Lapidus 93)

15. Educational Ethics and the World: Sexuality and Art

In "Religious Ethics and the World: Sexuality and Art" Weber explores the intimate relationship between the erotic and aesthetic and the religious. Two basic attitudes toward sexuality exist in religion: orgiastic and chaste. The orgiastic provides an intoxicatory effect of religious value
produced through sexual activity, dance, music, and drugs. It may also have symbolic value such as in phallic cults and rites in fertility traditions. Sexual activities performed according to ritual or sanction have religious significance and are thereby regulated. Anti-erotic religiosity, of both ascetic and mystical forms, institute cultic chastity since abstinence is usually viewed as a symptom of charismatic quality and an instrument 'for the magical control of the god" (1978b: 603). These usually provide a substitute for sex to satisfy physiological erotic needs. Two other reasons for enforcement of chastity on the part of priests were: status relation to ascetic virtuosos, the monks; and economic control of priests' estates (e.g. Occidental Christianity).

These attitudes affected the status of marriage and women. Marriage is viewed by priestly prophetic ethics as an economic institution (for producing and rearing children) and carrier of ancestor worship rather than having erotic value. In religious asceticism reproduction is a rational goal, thereby allowing marriage to be considered a legitimate sin (1978b: 606). Attitudes toward women vary from great importance placed on their participation in sectarian spiritualist cults (e.g. China) (1978b: 605), through a temporary emancipation, to exclusion of women from religious status.

Religion's relationship with art (the aesthetic) is similar to that of eroticism. Religion has served as the inspiration for artistic expression and has in turn been served by art as a means of arousing religious ecstasy and affirming religious values (e.g. architecturally in cathedrals and churches).

The relationship between the erotic and aesthetic and education is as intimate as it is with religion. One could, therefore, postulate three basic attitudes toward sexuality
which exist in education: a cultivation of the sexual, a naturalistic attitude, and an ethic of chastity. The orgiastic provides either a complementary development of educational value (e.g. Existential education) or for some occupations the primary objective of education (e.g. courtesans, prostitution, the training of tribades, or libertine traditions). A naturalistic attitude would be characteristic of those educational attitudes which have been rationalized and regulated (e.g. Pragmatism, and those traditions of female education where it is regarded as a natural function). It may also have symbolic value such as in art education. Sexual activities performed according to custom or science have educational significance and are thereby regulated (e.g. "safe sex"). Anti-erotic education, of both rational and transcendent forms, institute chastity since abstinence is usually viewed as a symptom of intellectual charismatic quality and an instrument for control (sublimation) of psychic states. They usually provide a substitute for sex to satisfy physiological erotic needs (e.g. sports).

These attitudes affect the status of marriage and women. Marriage is viewed by priestly prophetic ethics as a female vocation (for producing and rearing children and providing support to males in the pursuit of educational ends) and carrier of ancestor worship rather than having erotic value. In educational rationalism reproduction is a rational goal, thereby allowing marriage to be considered a legitimate sin. Attitudes toward women vary from great importance placed on their participation in sectarian spiritualist cults, through a temporary emancipation, to exclusion of women from educational status. This is based primarily on the view of woman as affectively driven. In educational activities derived from or oriented toward the affective, female participation has been encouraged (e.g.  ...
creative writing) or tolerated (e.g. music). Otherwise, women have been barred or excluded on the basis of affective qualities, particularly those activities employing high degrees of rationality (e.g. the belief that women cannot philosophize).

Education's relationship with the aesthetic varies from serving aesthetic purpose (e.g. Royal Conservatory of Music), providing a means for sensitizing the cultivated to the aesthetic as a necessary prerequisite to educational status, excluding aesthetic development from primary goals thereby confining its value to leisure, and excluding aesthetics altogether as an unnecessary or diversionary activity.

16. The Great Educational Philosophies and the World

In the section "The Great Religions and the World," Weber identifies the general attitude toward the world of the major religious traditions. Judaism is described as being accommodated to the world as such, rejecting only "prevailing social rank order in the world" (1978b: 611). He examines attitudes toward economics and sexuality relative to other religious systems in terms of intellectualist organization, sacred law, type of rationalism, and concept of salvation. Islam's accommodation to the world is identified, by contrast with Judaism, according to the same categories. Both are defined as inner-worldly. Buddhism is defined in its economic, sexual, rational, and salvational, form as other-worldly. Reference is made to Hindu and Taoist attitudes as they illuminate Buddhism. The last part of this section is devoted to Christianity, another religion of world-rejection, "in [Weber's] special sense of the term" (1978b: 630). Weber examines the attitudes of early Christianity in the same manner as the other four world religions.
The general attitude toward the world of major educational philosophies can be characterized in a similar manner. Educational idealism, both religious and non-religious, occupies an ambivalent attitude by both recognizing the imperfections inherent in the non-transcendental level of reality, but by cultivating in the individual an emulation of action based on higher principles. Educational realism is oriented towards either a submission to natural forces or, through science and technology, towards mastering natural and social forces. Educational pragmatism accommodates the world by a combination of submissive and active attitudes which result in management. Educational existentialism, as an idiosyncratic orientation, when combined with Marxist ideology is reconstructionist, when the religious or humanistic is transformatory. Traditional oriental educational philosophy varies from Confucian accommodation to Buddhist transcendence. Recent changes in oriental education have evidenced rationalized realist orientations.

Conclusion

The final example of applying Weber's historical sociological approach to education and its administration shows how his analytic framework can be used for investigation into modern education and its organization. It also allows one to identify and evaluate the reciprocal influences of other social dimensions (economic, cultural, legal, religious) on education, as well as the influences educational organization has on them. In addition, the historical origins and social factors which operate as sufficient conditions legitimizing the current forms of educational organization can be examined. Through cross-cultural and cross-historical comparison the characteristics
of social organizations unique to particular points in time and space can be identified. In the spirit of Weber's pursuits, such an analytic framework permits not only the description of organizational features, but also an understanding or verstehen of the condition of human life as it is experienced within organizational structures and functions through the belief systems which cohere in organizations, in reference to a world historical model of prior and extant possibilities. Through this approach it is possible to investigate various classes and status groups (e.g. teachers, professors of education) as influences on, and as products of, social formation composed of economic, political, cultural, and moral factors.

It is apparent from the above framework that the scope of this model is extensive and comprehensive, involving the examination of educationally oriented activity lying outside formal educational organizations and extending to organizations which are formally non-educational. An analytic model of this scope provides the basis for a number of different types and levels of substantive study. It becomes possible to explore a question about degrees of moral and intellectual freedom in an educational setting, as Weber did in the realms of politics, economics, and religion. Questions about the range of conscious, rational, and intentional action in administrative behaviour, its motivations (value orientation), the influences on it which have affected its development, and the forms it takes under certain conditions can be treated in a like integrational manner. The assumption underlying this approach is that educational administration cannot be treated in isolation from the complete nature of the organization and society in which it resides and that an appreciation of a world historical framework allows one to identify unique characteristics inherent in a particular instance.
Weber was concerned not only about state interference in educational administration but with all sorts of ideological forces which determined academic appointments and effectively denied academic freedom to scholars. The "increasing manipulation of younger scholars by the ministries through often secret preferment [which] would breed academic place-hunters and operators, at the same time that . . . the growing tendency of bourgeois students to look upon academic patents and fraternity membership as qualifications for joining the 'feudal' establishment" (Roth 1975b: 370). Such a phenomenon is not peculiar to German universities in the early 1900s. From the Weberian perspective adopted in the framework described above, vested interests and ideological excesses are simply historically recurrent conditions. An examination of its contemporary form, in comparison with this case, would assist in identifying what necessary causal factors obtain, and which factors are contingent: a view shared by Ira Lapidus in his recent study of the history of Islamic societies (xxiv).

One can also examine the "school" in the same way that Weber analyzed the "city"—as a way to unite political, economic and administrative theories in a collective entity. The school, just like the city, can be viewed in its role in the origin of civilization and of continuous social institutions. It can be regarded as a vehicle for the organization of social peace and of legality, as well as military activity and the conflict of Realpolitik.

Weberian analysis can serve as a basis for substantive studies on the development of any number of other systems of education and administration.

Synopsis
This chapter constructs a Weberian framework for education derived from Weber's framework for religious organization in *Economy and Society*. It is based upon the system of typologies of social behaviour described in Chapter Four. Its purpose is to provide a framework for the study of educational administration within organizational and societal context by identifying and evaluating the influences of other social dimensions on educational activity, as well as the influences educational organization has on them. It is also intended as a means of examining the historical origins and development of educational administration, as well as cross-cultural and cross-historical comparison. Such an analytic framework allows one not only to describe organizational features, but to evaluate the condition of human life as it is experienced within organizational structures and functions, and the belief systems which cohere in organization in reference to a world historical model. This has not been done by students of educational administration theory generally, as attested to in the previous chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONCLUSION

EXCURSUS ON THE "CULTIVATED MAN": Social prestige based upon the advantage of schooling and education as such is by no means specific to bureaucracy. On the contrary. But educational prestige in other structures of domination rests upon substantially different foundations with respect to content. Expressed in slogans, the "cultivated man," rather than the "specialist," was the end sought by education and the basis of social esteem in the feudal, theocratic, and patrimonial structures of domination, the English administration by notables, in the old Chinese patrimonial bureaucracy, as well as under the rule of demagogues in the Greek states during the so-called Democracy. (Weber 1978b: 1001)

The history of Weber's transmission in the social sciences illustrates a principle of intellectual practice which Gabriel Tarde called the Law of Imitation: the transmission of ideas from person to person and generation to generation by imitative diffusion. This process was accelerated in Tarde's time by the "lessening of distances through more rapid means of locomotion" and an "increasing density of the population" (1903: 370). One may now add computerization, and the increasing use of data banks, which contributes to an even stronger iron-clad law of intellectual oligarchy. Jules Romains' philosophy of unanisimisme (in the poems of La Vie unanime, 1908)--which he describes as "a world of shared sensations in which the territorial integrity of people and objects was dissolved in 'unanisimisme' . . . the entire world is as unified as a modern theatre audience, inhabiting the same proximate space, breathing the same air, responding to the same noises and gestures, attending to the same words" (Kern 223)--can equally describe the fate of Weber's work. There is, in essence, a discordance in the overall view presented in
administrative writings, and the actual state of affairs, noted by Waldo in 1984: that there is a significant difference between British studies on administration and American. The former are "distinguished by historical, philosophical, and analytical qualities almost entirely missing from American writings on administration . . . for example, Friedrich [1932] endeavors to discover or elaborate a "systematic concept" of bureaucracy. American students have been no more interested in "systematic concepts" than in Buddhist theology" (46 n44), a state of affairs which is now showing some signs of changing.

This state of affairs in administrative writings was symptomatic of a difference in approach between American and European historical sociology, noted by Eberhard in 1965, particularly as it applied to the general concept of social systems in comparative sociology, which in American studies became a functionalist analytical tool defined in such a way that it was not applicable to non-Western societies (Eberhard 16) suggesting that any of Weber's categories derived from world historical studies inclusive of non-Western societies had been altered to fit into American functionalist preconceptions. In public administration, and arguably in other administrations, it is because the bureaucratic typology appeared to reflect values of technical-rationality, efficiency, and pragmatic effectiveness, that it became a goal or normative theory rather than retained its original Weberian character as a methodological tool (Kirkhart 1971: 150). Administrative texts tend to take a technocratic view of Weber by focusing on those portions of Weber's writings which most comfortably fit into the positivistic, systems theory, or structural-functionalist paradigms, which until recently have dominated social theory as it has been incorporated into administrative theory, largely due to the authoritative
position Talcott Parsons held (Butts 1977: 227). Greenfield has commented on the effect of this in educational administration:

In the study of organizations in general and of the schools in particular, Weber is usually quoted in the section on 'theoretical framework' and ignored thereafter in the methodology of the study. Some empirical work on schools using other than social systems or reductionist theories are beginning to come forward . . . Part of our difficulty in this respect comes from an ideological blind spot in recognizing research. We have so schooled ourselves to see statistically sophisticated but—in Weber's terms—meaningless studies as research that we are willing, and even eager, to accept their tiny but neatly packaged 'findings' as knowledge." (1979: 105)

Weber's contributions have consequently become reduced to the bureaucratic "model" of social organization, sometimes simply the "Weberian" model. As a result, many have confused description and analysis with prescription and reduced his writings on objectivity in concept formation to a mere verifiability of explanations according to experimental criteria of verification and to mathematical consistency and representation:

In so far as this traditional conception of theory shows a tendency, it is towards a purely mathematical system of symbols. As elements of the theory, as components of the propositions and conclusions, there are ever fewer names of experiential objects and ever more numerous mathematical symbols. Even the logical operations themselves have already been so rationalized that, in large areas of natural science at least, theory formation has become a master of mathematical construction. (Horkheimer 1989: 190)

Without evaluating the accuracy of Riffel's characterization of two important theoretical traditions in the social sciences, the structuralist-functionalist style derived from Parsons and the voluntarist-phenomenological style derived from Mills and Habermas (1978b: 147), Weber by reputation in
administrative writings would most closely resemble the structural-functionalist, by his own characterization of his writings the voluntarist-phenomenological. This has resulted in a tradition in educational administration theory which has neglected Weber's commentary on educational organization, cultural content (values, knowledge theory), and educational systems' relationships with other socio-historical factors.

Max Weber's contributions to sociocultural studies fall into a number of categories: methodological, historical, sociological, philosophical, and ethical. His methodology, verstehen, provides a means of pursuing integrated societal research, a means of bridging the subjective/objective or phenomenological and empirical gap, and a model for the study of world history. His historical contributions extend from ancient to modern history (Bolshevik revolution in Russia), and, through research in religious organizations, from the Oriental to Occidental worlds. His sociological contribution is a system of typologies; while heuristic, they also provide a comprehensive model for the identification and analysis of societal factors. His philosophical work dealt with problems in the nature of knowledge in the natural sciences and sociocultural studies as well as providing insights in value theory. His ethical contribution is vocational: primarily the ethical constraints, freedoms, obligations, and duties in the realms of politics, administration, and scholarship.

The relevance of this work in its comprehensive form to educational administration has not yet been appreciated in the literature of the field. That his contributions have current value is not disputed by a number of Weberian scholars in social studies. Guenther Roth, an advocate of Weber's contemporary value, particularly of Weber's methodological essays which he regards as "worthwhile
reading because of their modernity and their programmatic aspects" (1975b: 367), is supported in this view by Wolfgang Schluchter who regards Weber's concepts of formal and substantive rationality as the best model for analyzing and understanding modern society (Schluchter 135). John Love argues for the value of Weber's work on the basis of the necessary role history has in developing theories about modern phenomena (152-153). These authors do not refer to educational administration directly, but their work implies that the organization and role of educational activity in society be included in any truly Weberian approach.

Weber's methodological work is relevant to educational administration in that it provides an integrated research paradigm relevant to current controversies in educational administration theory. Donald Willower has recently identified six trends of contention in the study of educational administration which, to a large extent, have grown out of the Greenfield-Griffiths debate about the opposition of qualitative-subjectivist and experimental-empiricist paradigms. The six issues are:

1. diversity and fragmentation in the field producing "different interests and dissimilar theoretical vocabularies" (730);
2. an orientation toward studying people in real-life settings using qualitative methods (731);
3. a recognition of an instrumental purpose to educational administration theory "as a means to the attainment of organizational and societal purposes" (733);
4. a greater concern with values, in particular equity (735);
5. an increased awareness of the complexity of educational administration subject matter, both in
the diversity of subspecialities and the educational enterprise itself (737); and

6. a trend toward more fundamental philosophical issues concerning epistemology, including phenomenology, critical theory, and a materialist-pragmatist perspective (which Willower characterizes as "to be generous, philosophically uninformed") (741).

Weber's body of work considers all of these features of educational administration theory by implication, through his participation in contemporary controversies over the very same issues raised in other areas of sociocultural studies, and explicitly in those passages in Economy and Society which have been identified in Chapter Four.

Weber's historical contributions are of two kinds: the foundational role history plays in methodology and his characterization of modern life as an historical phenomenon. As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, Weber's methodology is dependent upon historical study. Identification and interpretation of present phenomena are elucidated through historical comparison and historical development. The study of educational administration is served, also, by an understanding of the administrative styles which have been historically possible, and an examination of concomitant factors which are found through historical comparison to be either causally connected or contingent. Weber was disinclined to separate history from sociological and philosophical analysis of any subject, in the manner which Norris believes has infected modern social study: "theory has served as an escape-route from pressing political questions and a pretext for avoiding any serious engagement with real-world historical events" (44).

The modern world is viewed by Weber as the culmination of historical processes, and understanding what its nature is, is an historical project. The modern world is one of
total calculability, passing through two phases, 'disenchantment' and the laicization and routinization of Beruf [vocation] which becomes mundane as a specific bureaucratic-methodical competence. This occurs within the historical change from a Weltanschauung which was transcendent (magico-religious) to one which recognizes only the binding force of the internal correctness of its own proceedings: "As intellectualism suppresses belief in magic, the world's processes become disenchanted, lose their magical significance, and henceforth simply 'are' and 'happen' but no longer signify anything" (1978b: 506).

For Weber bureaucracy was the leprosy of modern times, and rationalization the iron cage--the tyranny of impersonal, repetitive, anonymous and omnipresent mechanism, an invincible tyranny from which the only emergency exit was narcissistic (erotic) gratification or submission to charismatic leadership, the only two primal forces powerful enough to subvert rationalization (Scaff 108):

A glance at Charles de Gaulle with outstretched arms provoking and returning the acclamation of the crowd apprises us of his intention to celebrate a political authority bordering on the religious. If here gloire and rationality remain conjoined, the effect of leaders such as Hitler, Nasser, and other like them, rests on a regression to demonology, that is, to fantasies of omnipotence that turn away from rationality. What is common to all of them is that, in Max Weber's terms, they see themselves as political priests, as charismatic leaders of their countries. For the psychologist it is interesting to observe how such a vocation to authority can come about. The priest-politician stands publicly by his grandiose fantasies and projects them onto the cosmic level; he knows that God is with him. This is the most ancient justification of political authority. It is frankly and openly expressed in all forms of rule by the grace of God, such as Augustus's claim that his rule was founded on a "higher legitimacy," on the consensus universorum. (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 258-259)
Weber focused on the consequent inversion of means and ends, as it pertained to all aspects of social behaviour including educational administration and scholarly activity, which he regarded as a permanent and tragic attribute of modern life.

Werner Cahnman claims that Weber's sociological contributions can play an important role in an evaluation of the relations between history and sociology: "Max Weber's (and, to some degree, Ferdinand Tönnies') brand of sociology, that is, sociology as a generalized conception of socio-cultural reality, emerges as one of the answers, perhaps as the answer, to problems which agitated many of the best minds for a considerable period of time" (103).

Collins maintains that there is some question as to whether social studies have developed beyond Weber in any fundamental sense (1974: 147). The relevance of his sociology to educational administration is found in the comprehensive scope of the system of typologies which grasps both the subjective creation of meaning and the objective levels of social reality. All the issues which Willower identifies in the current trends in educational administration theory are included in the Weberian system, in coordinate and integrated form: diversity of subject, studying people in real-life, that is historical, settings, identifying instrumental purpose, value orientations, complexity, and inherent in its construction an accounting of philosophical problems associated with knowledge.

Philosophical contributions provide arguments for and demonstrate the value of regarding sociocultural studies as an enterprise distinct from the natural sciences: it cannot be a positivistic study, even though it may use positivistic methods (e.g. statistical procedures) in accumulating information: "We can accomplish something which is never attainable in the natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of the action of the component individuals."
The natural sciences on the other hand cannot do this, being limited to the formulation of causal uniformities in objects and events and the explanation of individual facts by applying them" (Weber 1978b: 15). Nor can it be a purely phenomenological exercise: the study of social relations is fundamentally an empirical pursuit. Meaning and values not only can be studied, but are the raison d'etre of the student of educational administration.

Weber's ethical contributions relate primarily to his discussions about scholarly vocation, both at the level of the individual scholar, and on a societal level. "What was unpardonable in his eyes was that a man should present his personal, subjective convictions as scientific truths by cleverly confusing, supposedly in good faith, empirically ascertainable and scientifically verifiable observations with attitudes and value judgments having no other justification than belief in questionable and arbitrarily selected final goals" (Freund 1968: 80). The vested interests and ideological excesses Weber identified in scholars in his own period can easily be extended to current academic controversies surrounding feminism, ethnicity, deconstructionism, or any other scholarly activity insofar as these groups conduct their professional activities on political grounds and according to an ideological agenda which directly influences educational policy and administration. In opposition (conflict) are those whose values are dissociated from economic gain: "As soon as intellectual and esthetic education has become a profession, its representatives are bound by an inner affinity to all the carriers of ancient social culture . . . They look distrustfully upon the abolition of traditional conditions of the community and upon the annihilation of all the innumerable ethical and esthetic values which cling to them" (Weber 1946: 371-372).
An additional concern for professional ethics was the increase of rationalization at the societal level, the normative consequence being that the source of human freedom is excised from all activities. He objected to the effect governments, churches and other interest groups were having on academic freedom and standards, including the imposition of bureaucratic and technological values: "Religious, economic, social and political parties would then all possess the right to have separate universities or professorships provided for them, in which instruction in accordance with their own ideals would be given" (1974: 22). Weber was concerned not only about state interference but all sorts of ideological forces which determined academic appointments and effectively denied academic freedom to scholars. The "increasing manipulation of younger scholars by the ministries through often secret preferment [which] would breed academic place-hunters and operators, at the same time that . . . the growing tendency of bourgeois students to look upon academic patents and fraternity membership as qualifications for joining the 'feudal' establishment" (Roth 1975b: 370) is not by any means a phenomenon peculiar to German universities in the early 1900s.

Griffiths has argued that a new research paradigm is required in educational administration. He identified the following components as necessary to the development of a paradigm which reflected the existing balance among "people, organizations, and environment" (1979: 57). In other words, encompassing the nomothetic and idiographic dimensions as they exist in actual administrative behaviour would entail:

1. The end of the idée fixe in modern life. Just as in modern art the artist pictures life . . . nonrepresentational ways, so too will the social theorist recognize that his work should
produce theories that encompass the essence of modern life.
2. Theories will have to develop new approaches to the concept of authority and acknowledge the fact that people do not want to be governed.
3. Because of the change in authority relationships, the key administrative process in organization is very likely to be bargaining and not necessarily collective bargaining. It could very well be that the Barnard-Simon theory, which is essentially a bargaining theory, will be prominent in the new paradigm.
4. New theories are likely to be highly specific and focused on particular types of organization. The search for a general theory of administration will be long delayed.
5. There will be numerous efforts to build theories using ideology and values for axioms, with propositions predicting behavior dependent on the axioms. It is doubtful that these efforts will succeed.
6. Emerging theories will likely use situations and situational variables as axioms.
7. Methodologically, emerging theories will be far more complex than present theories.
8. New concepts entirely different from ones with which we are familiar will be used (for example, coupling). (Griffiths 1979: 58)

Weber’s writings on methodology and substantive topics relevant to the study of educational administration meet requirements 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8. They permit requirements 3 and 5 (insofar as Weber rejected prediction, not because he disregarded ideology and values as fundamental causal factors), but remain in philosophical opposition to requirement 6.

In contrast, Weber’s writings pertaining to the study of educational administration are philosophically sympathetic to a number of propositions Thomas Greenfield had advanced in a critique of the profession of educational administration and which constitute an alternative paradigm to that of Griffiths’:

2. Organizations are not objects in nature; an organization is a moral order invented and maintained by human choice and will . . .
7. Values are made or chosen. To understand that making and that choosing requires not a calculation, but an insight into life and human affairs . . .

9. In the world of action, fact and value are inevitably intertwined. It is for this reason that science cannot guide the administrator's hand or make decisions for him.

10. Conceptually fact and values are separable. Both theorists and practitioners should make that separation, at least as they analyze the world of action. Otherwise they condemn themselves to a world without freedom, driven either by fact on the one hand or value on the other . . .

14. Law, history, and philosophy constitute promising but now largely neglected sources from which administration can be understood within a context of values. (Greenfield 19-20)

It follows from the above that the general implication for future research is that study of Weber's works and the application of his methodology will contribute to the resolution of current issues and problems in the general field of administrative and organizational theory and the special field of educational administration.
Notes

Works by Weber


Secondary Sources on Weber


MacRae, Donald G. "Some Sociological Prospects," Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology.


**Organizational and Administrative Sources**


Other


Adorno, Theodor W. "On the Logic of the Social Sciences." In *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, Theodor W.


Lakatos, Imre, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs." In *Criticism and the*


Mach, Ernst. Die Mechanik in Ihrer Entwicklung Historisch-Kritisch Dargestellt. 1883.


APPENDIX A:
WEBER’S HISTORICAL WRITINGS

1. "Development of the principle of joint liability and the separate fund in the public trading company from the household and trade communities in the Italian cities" (1889). This became Chapter Three of "On the History of Medieval Trading Companies" (Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter, 1889).

2. "Roman Agrarian History and its Importance for Constitutional and Civil Law" (Die römische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für das Staats- und Privatrecht, 1891).


5. "The City" (Die Stadt. Eine soziologische Untersuchung, written 1911-1913, published 1921, and later incorporated into Economy and Society under the title "Non-legitimate domination (typology of cities)."

6. The original German edition of General Economic History, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, was published in 1923 by Marianne Weber and Melchior Palyi, and revised in 1958 by Johannes Winckelmann when more student notes were discovered (Käsler 48). It was originally compiled from his own and student notes of lectures entitled "Wirtschaftsgeschichte" von Max Weber. Abriss der universalen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte ("Outlines of Universal Social and Economic History"), delivered at Munich University during the 1919-1920 winter term.

7. The following essays on religion were individually published in preliminary form in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik as a series of studies which Weber began collating and revising for publication in German under the title Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie ("Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religions," 1919-20). The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism (Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus, 1905).
8. The Protestant Sects and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism (Die protestantische Sekten und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus, 1906).


11. "The Economic Ethic of the World Religions" (Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen). This latter part includes the following studies of world religions: "Konfuzianismus und Taoismus" ("Confucianism and Taoism" which has been translated as The Religion of China), "Hinduismus und Buddhismus" ("Hinduism and Buddhism," translated as The Religion of India), "Das antike Judentum" ("Classical Judaism," translated as Ancient Judaism), and an essay on Pharisaism. Weber had also intended on extending this overall study on the "sociology" of religion to an examination of "the Psalms and the Book of Job, Talmudic Judaism, early Christianity, Medieval orders and sects in pre-Reformation times and--extensively--Islam" (Käsler 137).

12. Weber also published two essays in 1906 on the first Russian revolution, "The Situation of Bourgeois Democracy in Russia," and "Russia's Transition to Sham Constitutionalism," which he regarded as "daily history" (Gerth & Mills 19).

13. "The Conditions of Agricultural Workers in East Elbian Germany" (1892).

14. "Investigation into the Situation of Agricultural Workers by the Verein für Sozialpolitik" (1893).

15. "How Can we Conduct Incontestable Investigations into the Situation of Agricultural Workers?" (1893).


17. "Developmental Tendencies in the Situation of East Elbian Agricultural Workers" (1894).

18. "'Private Enquiries' into the Situation of Agricultural Workers" (1892).
19. "An Investigation by the Evangelischsoziale Kongreß into The Conditions of German Agricultural Workers" (1894).

20. "Report on German Agricultural Workers" (1894).


24. "The Logic of Historical Explanation" (1906).

25. "A Positive Critique of the Materialist Conception of History" (the essay published from a 1918 lecture delivered at the University of Vienna).

26. "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy" (1904).

27. "Value Judgements in Social Science" (1917).

28. "The Concept of 'Following a Rule'" (1907).

29. "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology" (1913).

APPENDIX B: WEBER’S METHODOLOGICAL WRITINGS

1. "Roscher and Knies and the Logical Problems of Historical Economics" (Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie" which was originally published in two parts, the first being Roscher’s ‘historische’ Methode" ("Roscher’s Historical Method" in 1903).

2. "‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy" (Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozial politischer Erkenntnis, 1904).

3. "Knies and the Problem of Irrationality" (Knies und das Irrationalitätsproblem, 1905, the second part of essay No. 1 above).


5. "Rudolf Stammler’s Surmounting of the Materialist Conception of History" (R. Stammlers Überwindung der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, 1907).


7. "Methodological Introduction for the Survey of the Verein für Sozialpolitik on the Selecton and Adaptation (Occupational Choice and Occupational Fate) of the Workers in Large Industries" (Erhebungen über Anpassung und Auslese (Berufswahl und Berufsschicksal) der Arbeisterschaft der geschlossenen Grossindustrie, 1909, as yet untranslated in its entirety).

8. "On Some Categories of Interpretative Sociology" (Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie, 1913). This essay served as the basis for his methodological introduction to Economy and Society, "Basic Sociological Terms," but is a more simplified version intended for popular presentation thereby losing some of the complexity and distinctions contained in this original version (Segady 63). The latter, however, contains additions, therefore both should be used as a continous piece of methodological exegesis. The original version was translated by Edith Graber, Sociological Quarterly 22 (1981): 151-180.

10. "Scholarship as a Vocation" (Wissenschaft als Beruf, 1919).

11. "Politics as a Vocation" (Politik als Beruf, 1919).
APPENDIX C:
SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL WRITINGS


Kast, Fremont E. "Planning the Strategies in Complex Organizations." In *Education, Administration, and*


APPENDIX D:
SELECTED EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION WRITINGS


Arikado, Margorie S. "Status Congruence as It Relates to Team Teacher Satisfaction." Journal of Educational Administration 14, 1 (1976).


Scotford-Archer, Margaret, and Michalina Vaughan. "Domination and Assertion in Educational Systems." In *Readings in the Theory of Educational Systems*, E.


Willower, Donald J. and Jack Culbertson, eds. The Professorship in Educational Administration. Columbus, Ohio: University Council for Educational Administration, 1964.


APPENDIX E:

PRIMARY SOURCES IN ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL WRITINGS

Argyris (1957) 1947
Argyris (1960) no primary source
Bacharach/Lawler (1980) 1947
Barnard (1968) no ref. to Weber
Bell (1965) no primary source
Bellone (1980) no primary source
Bendix (1952) no primary source
Bennis (1966) no primary source
Bennis (1987) no primary source
Bensman/Rosenberg (1963) 1923; 1946
Benson (1977) 1946; 1947
Blau (1970) 1946; 1947
Blau (1981) 1946; 1947
Blau/Scott (1962) 1946; 1947
Burin (1952) 1922; 1946
Burns (1978) 1946; 1947
Burrell/Morgan (1979) 1947; 1949
Caplow (1964) 1946; 1947
Cartwright (1965) 1947
Champion (1975) 1946; 1947
Clegg (1979) 1946; 1947; 1964
Clegg (1990) 1920; 1923; 1930; 1946; 1947; 1949; 1958; 1968
Collins (1975) 1923; 1946; 1950; 1958a; 1968
Collins (1988) 1930; 1947; 1950; 1958a; 1968; 1976
Cooper (1990) no primary source
Creasy (1965) 1946; 1947
Crozier (1964) 1968
Davis (1952) 1946; 1947
Dibble (1965) 1946; 1947
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Lipset et al (1981)  1930; 1949; 1950; 1952a
March/Simon (1958)  1930; 1946; 1947
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Meyer/Rowan (1981)  1930; 1946; 1947
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Meyer (1971a)  1946; 1949
Meyer (1971b)  1947; 1949
Meyer (1971c)  "Bureaucracy," 1946
Meyer (1978)  1946
Meyer/Brown (1968)  1946
Miller/Rice (1967)  no ref. to Weber
Mouzelis (1968)  1946; 1947; 1949; 1954
Nigro/Nigro (1980)  1946; 1947
Nisbet (1965)  1946
Ouchi/Jae (1968)  1947
Parsons (1964)  1947
Peabody (1964)  1946; 1947
Peabody/Rourke (1965)  1946; 1947
Perrow (1965)  1946; 1947
Perrow (1979)  1946; 1947; 1968
Pfeffer (1978)  1946
Pfeffer (1981)  1947
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Presthus (1978)  1930; 1946; 1947; 1958b; 1964; 1968
Price (1968)  1946; 1947
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APPENDIX F:
SECONDARY SOURCES IN ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL WRITINGS

Argyris (1957)  Merton 1950; Merton et al 1952
Argyris (1960)  Urwick 1953
Bacharach/Lawler (1980)  no ref.
Bell (1965)  no ref.
Bendix (1952)  no sources
Bennis (1966)  Bendix 1960; Hall 1963
Bennis (1987)  no ref.
Bensman/Rosenberg (1963)  no ref.
Benson (1977)  no ref.
Blau (1970)  no ref.
Blau (1981)  no ref.
Blau/Scott (1962)  Bendix 1960; Constas 1958;
Francis/Stone 1956; Gouldner 1954;
Lipset 1960; Litwak 1961; Parsons 1947; Udy 1959
Burns (1978)  Blau 1963; Dahl 1968; Friedrich
1961; Merton 1952
Burrell/Morgan (1979)  Bittner 1974; Giddens 1976; Schutz 1967
Caplow (1964)  Gouldner 1954
Cartwright (1965)  Merton 1957
Champion (1975)  no ref.
Clegg (1979)  no ref.
Collins (1975)  no ref.
Collins (1988)  no ref.
Cooper (1990)  Marcuse 1968
Creasy (1965)  no ref.
Crozier (1964)  Bendix 1960; Mayer 1956
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White (1969)          Gerth/Mills 1946;  
                      Rubenstein/Haberstroh 1966: 70-81 
Wilensky (1961)       no ref.  
Willmott (1990)       no ref.  
Wolpert (1965)        no ref.  
APPENDIX G:
WEBERIAN CONCEPTS IN ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL WRITINGS

Argyris (1957) bureaucratic model (formal organization);

Argyris (1960) bureaucratic model

Bacharach/Lawler (1980) ideal type; bureaucratic model;
ref. to concepts of authority, power, charisma, & legitimacy of authority; group & individual action

Bell (1955) charismatic leadership

Bellone (1980) brief ref. to value freedom in social sciences (Werturteilstreit); bureaucratic chars.

Bendix (1952) bureaucracy as ideal type;
historical origins and development; relationship between chars. of bureaucracy and governmental power

Bennis (1966) chars. & dysfunctions of bureaucracy;

Bennis (1987) bureaucracy as social machine, machine model (implies Weber's criticism of bureaucratic organization)

Bensman/Rosenberg modernization, routinization, bureaucratization; values; chars. of bureaucracy; historical studies on religion

Benson (1977) model of bureaucracy (rational);
historical context of model

Blau (1970) bureaucratic model
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<td>bureaucracy as part of theory of political order &amp; authority; chars. of bureaucracy; state having monopoly over use of force;</td>
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<td>concept &amp; types of authority; theory &amp; chars. of bureaucracy; routinization of charisma; &quot;ideal type&quot;</td>
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<td>theory of public bureaucracies</td>
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<td>Burns (1978)</td>
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<td>concept of power; types of authority; concept of conflict; ethics of responsibility and of ultimate ends; political organization; history and theory of bureaucracy; living off versus for politics; political education of citizenry</td>
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<td>Burrell/Morgan (1979)</td>
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<td>interpretive methodology (German neo-idealism) and verstehen; ideal types; types of social action; sociology of organizations; theory of bureaucracy &amp; bureaucratic dysfunctions; conflict theory; irrational; influence on critical theory; critique of Marx; historical studies on bureaucracy and capitalism; theoretical &amp; methodological relationship with action theory, existential phenomenology, functionalism, critical theory, &amp; radical Weberianism</td>
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<td>Caplow (1964)</td>
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<td>Collins</td>
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<td>types of legitimacy; value neutrality; historicism; ideal type; types of organizations; theory of stratification; conflict theory; historical study of religious propensities of social classes; types of administration; verstehen; types of societies (simple to complex); historical development of bureaucracy, households, military organizations, &amp; sciences; philosophical &amp; religious typologies</td>
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<td>Collins</td>
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<td>social stratification; theories of politics &amp; the state; conflict theory; historical comparison &amp; studies of religion &amp; economics; study of values in religions; organizational theory; routinization of charisma; individual as unit of analysis; pessimistic view of bureaucracy</td>
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Cooper (1990) concept of rationalization
(disinstrumental reason); framework of
domination in social structures

Creasy (1965) ref. to bureaucracy; rank authority
in bureaucracy

Crozier (1964) theory, dysfunctions & historical
development of bureaucracy; ideal
type

Davis (1952) chars. of bureaucracy; "ideal type"

Dibble (1965) types of authority, patrimonial autho.
cy; bureaucratic ref.;
charisma

Eaton (1965) concept of charismatic leadership;
authority; advantage of free wage
labour over slave labour in
rational economy; chars. of
bureaucracy; ref. to "specific" vs
"charismatic" education; religious
values related to industrial
values; routinization of charisma;
location in organization &
dysfunctions of charisma; pure vs
routinized charisma; power

Etzioni (1961b) ref. to types of authority &
bureaucracy

Etzioni (1961c) theory of bureaucracy ref.; ref. to
relationship between economic
organizations & society
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administration; ref. to historical research; Wertrationalität & Zweckrationalität; Protestant ethos;

Hopkins (1961) chars of bureaucracy; power; legitimacy; authority; values underlying compliance to authority

Hrebinjak (1978) chars of bureaucracy; concepts of power, authority, domination, charisma versus routine; types of authority; "ideal type"; interrelation of societal factors & bureaucracy

Janowitz (1961) ref. to bureaucratic chars.
Kanter (1981) patrimonial rule; bureaucratic chars.

Kast/Rosenzweig (1979) attributes similar values of capitalism & Protestantism to Merton, 1968; ref. to bureaucratic model as scientific management, mechanistic, & structuralist, chars of bureaucracy; total social theory incl. economic, political, religious; effect of industrialization on org. structure; types of authority

Kirkhart (1971) influence on Schutz 1967; verstehen; nature of social studies; types of social action, social relations, & organizations; ideal type; bureaucratic ideal type;

La Porte (1971) ref. to bureaucratic model
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Perrow (1979)  rationalization of life; chars of bureaucracy; traditional & legal-rational authority; organizational forms rooted in social structure

Pfeffer (1978)  bureaucratic theory
Pfeffer (1981)  control of behavior through rules, evaluation & structure (bureaucratic)

Power (1990)  increasing instrumental reason in organizing social life (rationalization)

Presthus (1972)  ref. to charismatic and bureaucratic leadership concepts; ideal types; bureaucratic chars. & dysfunctions; origins & process of rationalization; relationship of capitalism, rationality, & bureaucracy; influence of Nietzsche

Price (1968)  bureaucratic chars.
Pusey (1976)  chars. & model of bureaucracy; "ideal type"; types of authority

Rice/Bihoprick (1971)  bureaucratic model & chars.; legitimate bases of authority; bureaucratic dysfunction: patterned behavior which discourages innovation or other forms of deviation

Scott (1987)  chars. of bureaucracy; disenchantment; types of authority & relationship to types of organization and administrative systems; ideal type; social action and subjective meaning; historical
study; misuse of power in organizations; power of bureaucrats
bureaucratic model & chars;
rationality concept; "ideal type";
Protestant ethic as value base of capitalism; types of authority;
notes dehumanizing potential identified by Weber

Selznick (1961)  
chars. of formal organizations

Silverman (1971)  
types of organizational structure;
chars. of bureaucracies; ref. to types of authority; historical study of organizational forms ref.; ideal type; importance of informal behavior in bureaucracy; individual meaning orientation in orgs; criticism of reified concepts, 'state' & organic model; purpose of social 'sciences' is interpretation & understanding

Stinchcombe (1965)  
changes in class relations on east German farms; bureaucracy; social effects of money economy; social sources of consent; entrepreneurship; chars. of industrial enterprises; formally free labour as condition for capitalism; Protest. Ethic & industrial capitalism connection; technical rationality (Zweckrationalität)

Stinchcombe (1971)  
bureaucratic chars.

Thompson (1961)  
bureaucratic chars.; charisma; routinization of charisma
Thompson (1969) institutionalization of charisma; bureaucratic model & chars.

Turner (1952) chars. of bureaucracy; rational type of authority & its relation to conflict between rules and right of officials to issues orders; concept of class

Turner (1990) legal-rational ethos; historical and cultural comparison; iron cage of rationality; cultural value orientations (rationality, capitalism, efficiency) as ideology

Udy (1959a) bureaucratic chars.

Udy (1959b) bureaucratic chars.

Udy (1972) "ideal type"; chars of bureaucracy; historical study of bureaucracy; routinization of charisma ref.;

Waldo (1984) concept of bureaucracy

Warwick (1974) value neutrality; types of social action; ideal types; power; types of organization & domination; theory, chars. & dysfunctions of bureaucracy; alienation; concept of charisma

Weick (1965) abstract theory of organization

White (1969) chars. of bureaucratic model as "ideal type"; charismatic leader

Wilensky (1961) bureaucratic chars.


Wolpert (1965) chars. of bureaucratic & charismatic authority; rationalization & bureaucratic
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Zelditch/Hopkins (1961) bureaucratic chars.
APPENDIX H: 
PRIMARY SOURCES IN EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION WRITINGS

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### APPENDIX I:
SECONDARY SOURCES IN EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION WRITINGS

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<td>Brubaker 1984</td>
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<td>Griffiths (1956)</td>
<td>Dubin 1951: 196-197</td>
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<td>Lakomski (1987)</td>
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Lane et al (1967) Blau 1956; Francis/Stone 1956; Gerth/Mills 1946; Gouldner 1959
Lipham (1988) Parsons 1951
MacKay (1969b) MacKay 1964
Moehlman (1951) no ref.
Morris (1985) no ref.
Nirenberg (1977) no ref.
Owens (1981) Hall 1963; Mayer 1943
Parelius/Parelius (1978) Bidwell 1965; Collins 1971 article
Parscns (1967) no ref.
Punch (1969) Blau 1956; Crozier 1964; Presthus 1962
Ribbins (1985) no ref.
Rizvi (1991) no ref.
Rogers (1986) no ref.
Scotford Archer (1979) Rex 1971
Scott (1978) Parsons 1937; Shils 1965
Scribner (1966) no ref.
Sousa/Hoy (1981) no ref.
Sturman (1986) no ref.
Taylor (1975) no ref.
Thomas (1968) no ref.
Thomas (1969) no ref.
Thornton (1971) Etzioni 1964; Gouldner 1954; Parsons 1947
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<td>Anderson 1968; Bidwell 1965; Corwin 1974; Gouldner 1954; Punch 1969</td>
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<td>Wise (1983)</td>
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<td>Young (1971)</td>
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APPENDIX J:
WEBERIAN CONCEPTS IN EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION WRITINGS

Abbott/Caracheo (1988) concepts of power, authority, domination, leadership; historical studies; types of domination; theory of bureaucracy; ideal type concept

Allison (1980) ideal type concept; chars. of bureaucracy

Allison (1983) ideal type

Anderson (1974) ref. to bureaucratic structural chars.

Anderson (1966) chars. of bureaucracy; types of authority

Anderson (1967) chars. of bureaucracy; bureaucratic authority

Anderson (1968) formal chars of bureaucracy; types of authority

Anderson (1971) concepts of legitimate authority; types of authority (esp. bureaucratic authority)

Baldridge (1983) chars. of bureaucracy

Ballantine (1989) lists: conflict theory; bureaucracy; status group relations; domination; power; ref. to historical & cross-cultural studies; educational analysis of above

Banks (1976) brief ref. to concepts of authority, bureaucracy, status groups, chars. of bureaucracy

Bates (1983) bureaucracy chars.; dehumanization of bureaucracy
Bates (1989)  
Bates (1989)  
dehumanization of bureaucracy;  
historical studies;  
rationalization; charisma;  
"emotivist" theory of values

Ben-Baruch (1983)  
Ben-Baruch (1983)  
brief ref. to assoc. with Parsons  
1960, Blau/Scott '96; concepts of  
authority, power, control, goals,  
functions in formal organizations

Benson (1983)  
Benson (1983)  
chars. of bureaucratic organization  
from Weber 1947; misrepresentation  
of ideal type as empirical  
isomorphism; attributes "degrees"  
of bureaucratization to Hall 1963

Best et al (1983)  
Best et al (1983)  
ideal types of authority

BiJwell (1965)  
BiJwell (1965)  
ref. to concept "bureaucracy"  
without Weber

Bishop/George (1973)  
Bishop/George (1973)  
chars. of bureaucracy

Bogue (1973)  
Bogue (1973)  
bureaucratic characteristics

Boyan (1969)  
Boyan (1969)  
ref. to concepts of legitimate  
power, authority; theory of "ideal  
type" bureaucracy

Bridges (1965)  
Bridges (1965)  
chars. of bureaucracy

Briner (1971)  
Briner (1971)  
bureaucratic char. of promotions  
based upon seniority and/or  
achievement

Brumbaugh (1969)  
Brumbaugh (1969)  
bureaucratic structure

Bush (1986)  
Bush (1986)  
ref. to bureaucratic model

Campbell et al (1983)  
Campbell et al (1983)  
sources of authority, not  
attributed to Weber in text,  
Etzioni used as fn source.; types  
of organization; chars. of  
bureaucracy
Campbell et al (1987) historical study; types of authority & leadership; theory & dysfunctions of bureaucracy
Carey (1971) bureaucratic model; types of authority
Clark (1983) self-defined interests motivate action
Collins (1971) varying educational requirements according to conflict theory of stratification; status groups & conflict
Corwin (1965) brief ref. to similarities in Protestant Ethic & capitalist value systems; rationalization of work "versus individual difference & of work as social process
Corwin/Borman (1988) ref. to bureaucratic model as ideal type, chars as "variables," & as comparative device
Cosin (1972) ref. to Weber's commentary on the uses to which societal groups put education
Coughlan (1969) chars. and values of bureaucracy
Crane (1973) chars. of bureaucracy
Davies (1971) nature of origins of influence of religious beliefs on capitalistic values
Dimock (1970) bureaucracy; "ideal type"
Firestone (1990) bureaucratic theory
Firestone/Herriott (1982) rational bureaucratic model; ideal type
Forsyth/Hoy (1978) alienation
Getzels et al (1968) types of authority
Gibson (1979) bureaucratic model in ed. admin.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Gibson/King</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>protestant ethic &amp; relationship to work ethic; interpretive methodology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>method of &quot;understanding&quot;; assoc. with phenomenological cultural study; role of values &amp; ideas in organizational behaviour; historical dimension</td>
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<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>verstehen; value-free social science; non-rational value range; bureaucracy chars and dysfunctions ref.</td>
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<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>1979a</td>
<td>gen. ref to Weber's distinction between natural &amp; social sciences (a subjective dimension) &amp; various perspectives &amp; value relevance</td>
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<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>1979b</td>
<td>individual as unit of analysis; interpretive approach; presuppositions, value-relevance of social science; understanding &amp; explanation</td>
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<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>presuppositions of science; interpretive studies of subjective; distinction between Verstehen (understanding) &amp; Erklären (explanation); Geisteswissenschaften versus Naturwissenschaften</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>historical &amp; legal analyses; subjectivist assumptions; values; interpretive method</td>
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<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>1991a</td>
<td>value commitment separate from rationality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>1991b</td>
<td>verstehen method; combination of quantitative &amp; qualitative methods;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title and Contributions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Griffiths (1956)</td>
<td>types of rationality; value-free social science; value judgements; fact/value distinction; distinction between natural &amp; social sciences (epistemology); relationship of values &amp; rationality; disenchantedment</td>
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<td>Griffiths (1957)</td>
<td>types of authority (Dubin, 1951)</td>
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<td>Griffiths (1971)</td>
<td>chars. of bureaucracy</td>
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<td>bureaucratic model</td>
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<td>Goldhammer et al (1967)</td>
<td>bureaucratic model; &quot;ideal type&quot;</td>
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<td>Gronn (1983)</td>
<td>verstehen</td>
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<td>Gue (1977)</td>
<td>bureaucratic structure &amp; &quot;dimensions&quot;; ideal type as way of categorizing real organizations</td>
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<td>Halsey (1961)</td>
<td>universities as differentiating agency to provide status rather than class position</td>
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<td>Halsey (1971)</td>
<td>typology of educational systems; charisma &amp; bureaucracy in Chinese literati; social personalities (charismatic, cultivated, &amp; expert); types of power &amp; authority</td>
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<td>Hannah (1980)</td>
<td>ref. to &quot;Science as a Vocation&quot; through Schuman</td>
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<td>Hanson (1975)</td>
<td>chars. of bureaucracy; types of authority</td>
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<td>Harman (1989)</td>
<td>model of bureaucracy</td>
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<td>Hartley (1969)</td>
<td>chars. of bureaucracy; &quot;ideal type&quot;</td>
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Hill (1969) theory & chars. of bureaucracy; "ideally typical" conception; sources of authority
Hills (1967) ref. to concept of rationalization through bureaucratic impersonal rules & standards of performance
Hills (1980) nature of human studies as theory; bureaucracy studies
Hodgkinson (1981) verstehen methodology; rationalization; authority types based on value orientations
Hodgkinson (1991) bureaucratic model; Protestant value orientation
Hopper (1971) extended use of typologies with attribution to Turner, 1971
Howell (1973) bureaucratic model
Hoy et al (1983) bureaucratic model
Hoy/Miskel (1987) bureaucratic model; types of authority; ref. to historical & comparative vision; power concept; "ideal type"
Hoyle (1969) Weber's "structuralist" approach of formulation of ideal-type bureaucracy;
Hoyle (1975) brief ref. to chars of bureaucracy
Hughes (1988) allusion to Weber's "concept of understanding" influence on Greenfield
Kimbrough/Nunnery (1983) chars. of bureaucracy
King (1983) bureaucratic authority; social structure is pattern of social relationships; concept of social action as subjectively intended
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<td>Knezevich (1969)</td>
<td>Meaning of behavior; refs. to power, status, conflict concepts; &quot;verstehen methodology&quot;</td>
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<td>Lakomski (1987)</td>
<td>Concepts of authority and power; chars. of bureaucracy; cameralist approach to administration</td>
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<td>Lane et al (1967)</td>
<td>Value-freedom, value judgement, value-relevance in methodology</td>
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<td>Lipham (1988)</td>
<td>Rational model (bureaucratic model &amp; chars); ref. to power (sources trad., charism., &quot;codified social order&quot;)</td>
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<td>MacKay (1969b)</td>
<td>Ref. to Getzels' 1952 model derived from Weber</td>
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<td>Mitchell/Spady (1983)</td>
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<td>Moehlman (1951)</td>
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<td>Owens (1981)</td>
<td>Char. &amp; dysfunctions of bureaucracy</td>
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<td>Parelius/Parelius (1978)</td>
<td>Classical curriculum for elite for cultivation rather than training; use of ed. requirements by dominant status groups to maintain hegemony within certain occupations; ideal type used for historical comparison of educ. institutions; bureaucratic organization most compatible with social modernization: science, planning, rationality, &amp; efficiency</td>
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Parsons (1967) unattributed ref. to bureaucracy & structuralist chars.

Punch (1969) chars. and structure of bureaucracy

Punch (1970) bureaucratic theory; macroscopic analysis of forces influencing bureaucratization

Ribbins (1985) social action (subjective interpretation of actors); interpretive (action) approach; ideal type

Rizvi (1989) bureaucratic model & rationality

Rizvi (1991) "rationality" [zweckrationalität]

Scotford Archer (1979) ref. to relationships among social institutions; cross-cultural differences in social structure & value systems; concepts of domination & status; macroscopic theory of social change; study of religions; ideology & conflict

Scotford-Archer/Vaughan (1971) bureaucracy, religion & status concepts; Confucianism: classification of educational types; authority; domination; ideal typical character of types; interrelation of social institutions; ideology

Scott (1978) concepts of authority, power, charisma; types of authority; routinization of charisma; ideal type

Scribner (1966) legitimate force and political systems
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<td>chars. of bureaucracy; concept of charisma; brief ref. to types of organization based on types of authority; ref. to studies on law, religion, &amp; capitalism</td>
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Young (1971) patrimonial bureaucracy; expert & cultivated educational ideal types; Chinese literati; comparative religion; bureaucratization of education