Three Times Betrayed:
The Sudeten Germans of Tomslake, BC

by

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ABSTRACT

Members of the German Social Democratic Party escaped prewar Czechoslovakia, ultimately finding themselves confined to a frozen farmstead in northeastern British Columbia. Wherever and to whomever the Social Democrats had turned they were betrayed, first by the international community, then by their own countrymen and finally by the Canadian government which abdicated its responsibility for the refugees to the Canadian Colonization Association (CCA), the colonization branch of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR). Rigidly adhering to legislation introduced during the Depression, the Canadian government refused to amend its immigration law to allow the predominantly urban, industrial Sudeten Germans to settle in areas where factory work was readily available. Instead, politicians allowed the CCA to dictate the terms of the Sudetens' enforced stay as 'enemy aliens' in a co-operative farming operation at Tomslake, BC. This small group of dissidents, however, overcame all obstacles to build a viable community. This paper details this small group of immigrants' transformation from European dissidents in 1938 to farmers in northeastern British Columbia, using interviews, primary documents and secondary sources.

Supervisor: Dr. Ian MacPherson (Department of History)

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To My Patron of the Arts,

Greg

Table of Contents

APPENDICES

FIGURES

PHOTOS

Introduction

Stepping off the train in Tupper, British Columbia, between April and August 1939, was a contingent of Czechoslovakian German Social Democrats. Few people equate the hamlet of Tupper (now Tomslake), a small community in the Peace River district of northeastern British Columbia, with international events that plunged the twentieth century headlong into a second devastating war.[1] Betrayed by the international community, abandoned by the Czechoslovakian government, a small group of German Social Democrats escaped pre-war Europe only to be confined to a northern wilderness. Despite their ignoble beginnings and limited assistance from the Canadian government and being trapped by petty bureaucrats in miserable conditions, the new inhabitants of Tupper worked hard to build a viable community. While the emergence of Tomslake was the direct result of events that transpired on the world stage, the community survived due solely to the hard work and persistence of its residents.

Originally, the goal of this paper was simply to record the story of Sudeten immigrants' survival on the frozen prairie. How did a group of urban Europeans find their way to the rural, isolated reaches of northern British Columbia? It soon became apparent, however, that the experience of these refugees was more complicated than it first appeared. This was not simply a group of European peasants taking advantage of the opportunity to come to Canada to farm, as had so many immigrants before them. Nor were they innocent bystanders unwittingly caught in the line of fire but rather they were a highly political and organized group of dissenters who knowingly placed themselves in danger; they were ethnic Germans, who as members of the German Social Democratic Party (DSAP), vehemently opposed Nazism and were specifically targeted for arrest and/or extermination by the Gestapo.

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[1] The original rail siding was named Tupper after Tupper Creek, but when the post office moved, residents elected to change the name of the community to Tomslake in reference to Tom's Lake situated on settlement property.

The signing of the Munich Pact on 29 September 1938 by Neville Chamberlain, Edouard Daladier, Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler has at various times and by various authors, been referred to as a 'watershed,'[2] a 'harbinger,'[3] or simply as 'tragic.'[4] In an attempt to comprehend the circumstances that resulted in the Munich Crisis of 1938, historians have researched and written at length on the complexity of foreign relations, the ambitions of Hitler and his Nazi Party, the demand for autonomy by ethnic minorities, and the ill-conceived doctrine of appeasement touted by Neville Chamberlain to maintain the balance of power in Western Europe. The Munich Pact, a peace that never was, is a historical anomaly that holds great significance in the history of the twentieth century, and yet the pact's overriding import is its failure. Historians have produced a surfeit of material on the involvement of the Four Powers in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, but have paid scant attention to the people who the pact immediately and irrevocably affected.[5]

This paper argues that the Social Democrats who arrived in British Columbia between April and August of 1939 were not once, not twice, but three times betrayed. The first betrayal was by the international community. For the citizens of Czechoslovakia, the Munich Pact signaled not only the dissolution of their nation, but a betrayal by the international community of all democratic principles. For members of the DSAP, trade unionists, those of Jewish descent and other Czechoslovakian anti-fascists, the signing of the Pact was a death knell; a betrayal immediately endangering a small minority of Sudeten-Germans. Labeled 'enemies of the Reich' for their opposition to Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland, members of the German Social Democratic Party were forced to flee the Nazi occupation of their homeland.

Under pressure from the Four Powers, the small nation of Czechoslovakia was forced to cede to Germany a portion of the country in an attempt to appease the aggressors and forestall yet

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[2] Alan L. Paley, *Munich and the Sudeten Crisis*, (Charlottesville: Samhar Press, 1973), 3.
[3] Telford Taylor, *Munich: the Price of Peace*, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1979), xv.
[4] Wenzel Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, (London: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), 299.
[5] Four Powers refers to England, France, Italy and Germany, the major power brokers in Western Europe at the time of the signing of the Munich Pact.

another world war. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain ostensibly orchestrated the transfer. While some may argue that Hitler created the political situation and therefore must bear sole responsibility for its outcome, I would argue that Social Democrats, anticipating Hitler's plans to dominate continental Europe, saw his conduct as logical behavior for an autocratic dictator. Chamberlain's active participation in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, however, was not expected, and therefore, constitutes the ultimate betrayal.[6]

The Czechoslovakian government perpetrated the second betrayal when Social Democrats, forced to converge on hastily constructed refugee camps in Czech-held territory, were turned over to the Gestapo *en masse*. Restrained by the terms of the Munich Agreement and threatened with military action, the Czechoslovak government crumbled, throwing the country into disarray. Defenseless and surrounded, those left to oversee the final surrender of Czechoslovakia and its conversion into a German protectorate were powerless to defy Nazi orders to extradite fleeing Social Democrats back to German-held territory. Refusing to stand against Nazi insurgence, rejecting military action, and ultimately, handing Social Democrats and other 'traitors' over to the Gestapo for confinement, torture or liquidation, the government of Czechoslovakia was complicit in sending thousands of exiles back into the hands of the Nazis. Of approximately 300,000-400,000 Social Democrats, 100,000 fearing arrest fled to Central Bohemia.[7] The Gestapo, armed with a 'black list,'[8] interned roughly 20,000 German Social Democrats deemed to be 'of interest'; of this group, 7,000 to 8,000 were tortured and killed, while only 3,000 escaped from the country. Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark volunteered

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[6] Donald Cameron Watt, *How War Came, The Immediate Origins of the Second World War,* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1989), 77. 'In 1937 he [Chamberlain] had roundly denounced Germany as the main disturber of European peace in a letter to Henry Morgenthau, the US Secretary of the Treasury. His closest adviser during these years was Sir Warren Fisher, a man as virulently opposed to Nazi Germany as any in Britain.'

[7] Fritz Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, (Toronto: The Toronto Sudeten Club, 1982), 47. See also. Wenzel Jaksch and Walter Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans: The Story of a Rescue*, (London: Lincolns-Praeger (Publishers) Ltd., 1941), 26-36, 56-57. Johann W. Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The Minority Problem and British Appeasement Policy*. (Cambridge: University Press., 1973), 124.

[8] Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 28.

a small number of visas. Belgium and England provided temporary refuge, while Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Canada offered permanent residency to a larger number of 'qualified' exiles.[9]

Social Democrats were forced to accept sanctuary wherever it was offered, under any terms. The Canadian government carried out the third act of perfidy, along with its agents, the colonization branches of two Railways, turning a humanitarian operation into a 'for profit' enterprise. The Canadian government contracted the Canadian Colonization Association (CCA), the colonization branch of the Canadian Pacific, and the Department of Colonization and Agriculture of the Canadian National Railway to settle 1024 Sudeten refugees, assigning 148 families and 34 single men to the CNR, while the CPR took responsibility for 152 families and 34 single men.[10] The CNR purchased already established farms near St. Walburg, Saskatchewan, whereas the CPR utilized its own holdings, and purchased a large tract of land, at Tupper, in northeastern British Columbia, to establish a co-operative settlement.

The system of bloc settlement established by the Canadian Colonization Association at Tupper was not sympathetic to political exiles but promoted the economic interests of the railways. The railways decided 'to settle refugees in small groups where suitable land [was] available, in order to make supervision for the first few years less expensive than if they were scattered over wider areas.'[11] Almost from the first instant, settlers charged supervisors and the CCA with mismanagement, shortsightedness and tight-fisted control of both money and goods. Neither the CCA nor the government ever gave the settlers an accounting of the funds that the Czechoslovakian government had provided as a 'gift' to Canada in exchange for settling its

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[9]Numbers vary according to source. Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 58-59. See also. Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 56-57. Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich*, 301. Hanns F. Skoutajan, *Uprooted and Transplanted: A Sudeten Odyssey from Tragedy to Freedom, 1938-1958*, (Owen Sound: The Ginger Press Inc., 2000), 99, the author contends that 8,000 Social Democrats were killed in Dachau alone. If this is in fact the case then the death toll among Social Democrats may be seriously underestimated.

[10] Jonathan Wagner, 'Saskatchewan's Sudetendeutsche: The Anti-Nazi Germans of St. Walburg', *Saskatchewan History*, Volume XXXIII, No. 3 (Autumn 1980), 92.

[11]T.A. Crerar, House of Commons, *Debates*, 9 March 1939, 1840-1841.

exiles. The settlers assumed that as these funds were meant for their needs, they would have some say in their distribution. The Sudetens tried to communicate their dissatisfaction with officials but were shrugged off as ignorant or troublemakers.

There is much confusion over exactly who or what a Sudeten German is. In fact, there is no such ethnic group. 'Sudeten-German' was a term coined to distinguish German speakers who lived in the Sudeten Mountain region, located in the northeastern extremes of Bohemia, from other German-speaking Europeans. With the formation of Czechoslovakia under the Versailles Treaty, the term Sudeten-German was extended, erroneously, to include all German speakers within Czechoslovakia. Their presence there was entirely due to fate, politics, security and economics. To complicate matters even further, Germany had never held the areas in question, nor were its residents German nationals. Until the end of World War I, the residents of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian-Silesia were Austrian subjects.[12] The Canadian government added a further complication when it listed the new refugees in official documents as 'German Czechs' in a bid to stave off controversy and distinguish between Sudeten-Germans who supported Hitler and those who were anti-Nazi, and to hide the fact that among those granted entry were a number of Jewish Social Democrats.[13] Social Democrat is the most specific moniker that distinguishes this group from their Sudeten-German counterparts. The Social Democrats were part of an exclusive collective that evolved from the 'Trade Union Movement,' and the 'Co-operative Movement.' Czechoslovakia's Social Democratic Party supported the 'reconstitution of Czechoslovakia' as a 'federal republic of free people' and was comprised of unwavering anti-

[12]Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 4.

[13] Library and National Archives of Canada (hereafter LNAC), RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels No. C10436-C10437, Department of Mines and Resources, Memorandum from the office of F.C. Blair, Ottawa, 2 February 1939, 'The Railways advise that they intend to abandon the term 'refugee' for this movement in order to avoid the misunderstanding common in Canada, that 'refugee' refers mainly if not only to Jewish people. They intend to use the term 'German Czech families.'

fascists,[14] but they were divided by ethnicity. The people of what is now Tomslake, however, adopted the term 'Sudeten' when referring to themselves.

Of the 1024 Sudeten German refugees Canada accepted, 518 'souls' were delivered to northeastern British Columbia to the small hamlet of Tupper, a community that in 1939 was little more than a rail siding situated adjacent to a large frost plain.[15] Sixty-five years later, few of the original settlers are living and the majority of those who were interviewed arrived as small children or young adults. Among them were: Hedwig Baudisch, 92, who arrived in Tupper as a young bride; John Neubauer, 85, a young man of nineteen when he arrived in Canada with his parents and siblings; Max Lorenz, 81, a teenage boy looking forward to his 'adventure', to 'see cowboys and Indians;' Anne Marie Pohl (Anna Wiesner), 75, arrived at age 8; Werner Tschiedel, 80, who presented me with numerous documents and original invoices issued by the CCA; and Walter Schoen, 75. Schoen recently published his autobiography *The Tupper Boys'* but was willing to sit through an interview expanding on much of what is covered in his book.

Memories are sometimes elusive, partial, or alternatively, markedly clear, and while some historians continue to favour official reports, or what they deem 'fact,' others, like myself, take the middle ground, evaluating and weighing the official record and incorporating eyewitness testimony. Despite a filter of sixty years, interviewees expounded vividly on their experiences, ruminated through hazy impressions, while honestly expressing their failure to recall particular events. War, or in this case, the events leading up to war, are traumatic, and as such are likely to leave a psychological stain. This is what psychologists call 'episodic' or 'flashbulb' memories, intense experience resulting in the retention of specific memories due to overwhelming loss or

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[14] Wilhelm Wanka, *Twice Victims of Munich: The Tragedy of the Democratic Sudeten Germans*, (Tupper Creek, 1946), 11, this is the only definition of Social Democracy put forward, all other authors detail the history of the party but not the foundation of its beliefs. Most avoid defining the Party's ideologies.

[15] Andrew Amstatter, *Tomslake: History of the Sudeten Germans in Canada* (Saanichton: Hancock House Publishers Ltd., 1978), 71.
A frost plain is a large flat area surrounded by hills where cold air accumulates. Temperatures are colder if land is untilled and boggy. Settlement land was a large plain, which was predominantly muskeg situated at the bottom of a series of rolling hills.

traumatic events.[16] It is also important to bear in mind that many of these survivors were children, with a child's view of the world, despite the gravity of their situations. Parents attempted to minimize the danger but by the time the Sudetens were forced to evacuate, most children had already observed or encountered many frightening situations due to their parents' involvement with the German Social Democratic Party.

In addition to the interviews, I was able to use the extensive documentation formerly held by the Canadian Colonization Association, now housed at the Glenbow Archive in Calgary, the Willi Wanka Collection, held, in part, by the University of Winnipeg, immigration records stored at the National Archives, as well as newspaper clippings, articles, and books, including several local histories. I regret that this account lacks German source material, as I do not speak the language, nor do my resources allow for the translation of the extensive collection of German correspondence in my possession.[17]

This is not a major problem since this paper concentrates on the Sudetens' experience in Canada. My main interest is in the role of the Canadian government, particularly its Department of Mines and Resources, in establishing the Canadian Colonization Association, the willingness of the two railways to subordinate their interests to that of the government, and the tacit agreement of all those involved to put the success of the settlement before the health and welfare its of residents. My first chapter, *Enemies of the Reich* concentrates on how the Social Democrats became targets of the Nazis, focusing particularly on Hitler's hatred of this group who opposed his ambition in the Sudetenland. More importantly, it chronicles Neville Chamberlain's willingness to sacrifice Czechoslovakian citizens and appease Hitler rather than go to war. The second chapter, *Undesirable Aliens* illustrates the distinction the Czechoslovakian government drew between Czechs, Slovaks and Germans. Despite assertions by its leaders that the republic

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[16] David B. Pillemer, *Momentous Events, Vivid Memories*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 6-7, Roger Brown and James Kulik coined the phrase 'flashbulb memories' in 1977 signifying the retention of vivid memory around a singular, event.

[17] Collection of German documents is part of the Wanka Collection and personal letters given to me by Werner Tschiedel.

would adhere to the democratic principles on which it was founded, Czechoslovakian President Edvard Beneš abandoned the Republic, leaving a pro-German government, which refused to protect its most endangered citizens from the Gestapo. Highlighting the role of the Canadian Immigration Department, *A Chosen Few*, the third chapter, serves to show how the selection process itself was mired in racial and ethnic prejudice, and how the Canadian government hid behind a system whereby corporations took on the task of settling immigrants, setting up a profitable enterprise for those parties interested in advancing the ideals of the established bureaucracy. Choosing only those it deemed suitable for agriculture, the Canadian government was inflexible and irresponsible in responding to an international crisis where many more lives could have been saved, had it reacted more quickly. *The Settlement Scheme,* the fourth chapter, describes the unworkable system imposed on the settlement and the intransigence of its supervisors. Concentrating on the bottom line, management and supervisors set the stage for the settlement's failure. Ignoring and deriding its residents, the CCA and the CPR exercised their power with unwarranted zeal despite the obvious failings of the entire scheme. In the greatest twist of irony, the Canadian government, ignoring its own evidence and that of the international community, registered the Social Democrats under the War Measures Act as *Enemy Aliens.* Rescued from the Reich, these opponents of Nazism were forced to register and report weekly to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as potential enemies of Canada.

Although this study has a single focus, it is an important addition to the historiography of twentieth century Canadian immigration, specifically the study of bloc settlement. Encapsulated within a narrow period, the Sudetens' transformation from European dissidents in 1938 to farmers in northeastern British Columbia by 1939 is unique. My intention is to document the effect of dislocation and relocation brought about by a series of political betrayals perpetrated on this group of political refugees. Victimized by international, national and corporate politics, the Social Democrats did not remain victims. With each crisis, the Sudetens rallied, organizing supporters in the international community, pleading their case to the press, remaining outspoken and

unyielding in the face of overwhelming odds. And while it is important to document the effects of this high drama had the lives of the Sudetens, it is equally important to detail their effect on their adopted community, for as much as the Sudetens were changed by their experience of Canadian farm life, so too was the political and social landscape of this community forever altered by their presence.

Chapter I

Enemies of the Reich

> *...soon, among the chorus of jubilation, critical voices were heard. Very wide sections of opinion were conscious that their underlying feeling was one of shame, as they realized that at Munich no genuine peace had been made—only a sham peace at the cost of others. Suddenly the cruel fate of those who had to pay with their homes and their lives for the policy of appeasement came into the field of vision.*[1]
>
> *Wenzel Jaksch,*
> *Leader of the German Social Democratic Party*

'Running the gauntlet' is how Max Lorenz described his daily trek to school as a young boy. As tensions rose in the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia, politics trickled down to the schoolyard. In order to protect themselves, children no longer traveled to school alone but in groups and though Max denies that teachers were involved in any political retribution in the classroom, he does admit that 'you certainly knew what [their political affiliation was] outside the classroom.'[2] Max may have been lucky; Anton Kunzl tells a much different story of his school experience, having been expelled, then thrown down the front stairs of the schoolhouse by the pro-Nazi headmaster.[3] Children may not have been fully aware of their parents' involvement with the Social Democrats, but most were certainly mindful of the rising tension within their communities, as they too were often victims of violence because of their parents' political beliefs.

It was not just in the schoolyard that such incidents took place; every aspect of a Social Democrat's life became affected. Max Lorenz noted that 1937 marked a rise in incidents; until then 'it didn't seem to be that bad but then those Nazis start pushing this propaganda, like you're being treated badly by the Czechs and all those sort of things that didn't really help any. At that time the problems started and they went after the Jewish people.'[4] Official records support Max's

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[1] Jaksch, Wenzel and Walter Kolarz. *England and the Last Free Germans: The Story of A Rescue.* (London: Lincolns-Prager (Publishers) Ltd., 1941), 26.
[2] Max Lorenz. Interview by author. 3 June 2004.
[3] B.A. Gow, 'A Home for Free Germans in the Wilderness of Canada: The Sudeten German Settlers of Tupper Creek, British Columbia', *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1978), 63.
[4] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004

observation as 1937 did indeed mark a breaking point for Sudeten Germans.[5] Ethnicity, religion and party affiliation became determining factors in employment, home rental, education, and friendships.[6] As a teenager, John Neubauer knew his involvement in the Social Democrats would restrict his choice of occupation:

> I was always interested in mechanics but our problem was that most of the places that you could apprentice were inclined to be Nationalist...if they asked you first of all what is your religion, that was the first qualification to be an apprentice anywhere, and the second thing was what party did you belong to, so if you were anywhere else except in their camp, you didn't get a job or anything....[7]

Grievances included discrimination of language, shortage of German schools, and unequal economic opportunity.[8] 'Every job in the state-owned tobacco factories, in the postal service and on the railways, and each civil service appointment became a political issue.'[9] German-speaking citizens believed that institutionalized 'ethnic injustice[s]' were perpetrated by the Prague government, and they refused to tolerate these conditions any longer.[10]

While most observers agree that some disparities did exist, they also agree that compared to other nations with large ethnic minorities, Czechoslovakia was one of the few that sought to address all grievances in some manner. The differences were not, nor were they ever, at a level as disparate as indicated by opponents of the central government. Historians argue that most of the disparity was not the result of a discriminatory national policy but rather a worldwide

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[5] Věra Olivovà, *The Doomed Democracy: Czechoslovakia in a Disrupted Europe, 1914-1938,* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), 200-212. The author cites a series of incidents in 1936 but the average citizen did not feel the effects of these policies and campaigns until 1937. According to Olivovà, by the fall of 1937 Hitler judged conditions' sufficiently ripe for his direct assault.'

[6] John Neubauer. Interview by author. 27 May 2004. When asked if he associated with persons outside the party, John Neubauer replied, 'my friends all were from the same color [Socialist] because we didn't associate with any other.'

[7] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

[8] Ronald M. Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem, 1933-1938,* (Middleton: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), 9.

[9] Wenzel Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 250.

[10] Johann W.Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The Minority Problem and British Appeasement Policy,* (Cambridge, Mass.: University Press, 1973), 147. See also. Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1938), 253. Wiskemann argues that Hungarians had a legitimate claim of discrimination.

depression that struck hardest at industrial regions.[11] Some, like Max Lorenz, putting the situation in contemporary terms, saw the situation in a more practical light:

> ...there didn't seem to be any problem until this Nazi business started up. When they started getting their association going, and then they had meetings and then they kept pushing this you're German, the Czechs are treating you bad. Maybe the jobs weren't that easy, like you go to Quebec and it might not be easier for a guy who doesn't speak French to get a job, but most of the people had learned enough Czech, in school, we learned Czech.[12]

Real or imagined, however, Sudeten nationalists exploited inequalities.[13]

After World War I, a wave of radicalism swept through central Europe, giving rise to a variety of political concepts.[14] Ideologies once considered fringe or confined to a specific geographical region became mainstream. For example, Communism and Social Democracy both sprang from Marxism, but Social Democrats split from their Communist brethren on the implementation of Marx's tenets. Social Democrats believed in the democratic process, convinced that social change was evolutionary, whereas Communists presumed that all change was the result of revolution. This resulted in two movements rising at about the same time, the Social Democrats on the Left and Communists on the far Left. The result was that Czechoslovakia, a country consisting of a large number of ethnic minorities, manifested a multitude of minor political parties, from the far Right to the far Left.

In Germany, the German Social Democratic Party, the SdP, (not to be confused with Henlein's *Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront,* also the SdP) was an established political party prior to World War I. According to C.E. Black and E.C. Helmreich in *Twentieth Century Europe,* the

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[11]Radomir Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962.* (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 111. See also. Alan Paley, *Munich and the Sudeten Crisis,* (Charlotteville: SamHar Press, 1973), 5. Paley contends that unlike Poland, Hungary and Romania Czechoslovakians was tolerant of its minority populations. Willson Woodside, in 'The Sudeten Problem,' *Saturday Night,* 53 (21 May 1938), 3, points out that unlike other European nations with minorities, Czechoslovakia had actually legislated the Minority Code in 1937 which was 'expected to raise German to the full status of a state language alongside Czechoslovak (i.e., the status which French enjoys in Canada).'

[12] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004

[13] Franz Koegler, *Oppressed Minority?* (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1943), 3-5. See also. Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 9-11.

[14] Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam,* 196.

existing parties where incapable of dealing with the problems arising in postwar Germany. Claiming, for example, that the Social Democrats were 'more democrats than socialists and refused to take any major steps without the support of the majority', while Communism was never able to capture the popular vote. The apparent inertia of all the existing political parties allowed a second movement, that of National Socialism, to gain momentum.[15] This movement was not new but a resurgence and revitalization of a concept based on Pan-Germanism.[16] Under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, the ideology of National Socialism became secondary to the ambitions of its leader, who used the tenets of the ideology as a propaganda tool. Fanaticized and bastardized by the Nazis, National Socialism simply became an excuse to justify its claims for expansion, or redress, as Hitler claimed, of infringements upon German historical lands. Extolling German superiority, National Socialists privileged the rights of ethnic Germans, while persecuting those thought to be enemies to the formation of a German National State. As a result, pacifists, liberals, socialists, Catholics and Jews became the targets of violence by radical nationalists. In an effort to keep this type of ideology from permeating the Czechoslovakian German minority, the central government outlawed the National Socialist Party (DNSAP), officially dissolving the Party in 1933.[17]

Elections in 1935 heralded the appearance of a new Party. Officially formed 1 October 1934, the Sudeten German Party led by Konrad Henlein was the only German Nationalist Party remaining when the DNSAP dispersed, sending many former members of the DNSAP into the SdP. While officials protested the newly formed party's agenda and its harbouring of former Nazis, the SdP simply pointed out that its leadership had not been involved in the DNSAP, or in any other organized political group and therefore charges of collaboration with the Nazi Party

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[15] C.E. Black and E.C. Helmreich, *Twentieth Century Europe: A History,* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 446-447.
[16] R.W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Czechs and Slovaks,* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), 227. Georg von Schönerer was the originator of the Pan-German theory.
[17] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 198-199. See also. Seton-Watson, *History of the Czechs and Slovaks,* 351. 'The National Socialist Party forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation.' Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam,* 248. The German National Party also disbanded.

were scurrilous. Despite charges linking the SdP to the German Nazi Party, the SdP answered its critics lacked any evidence and despite these claims, the SdP was able to capture the popular vote of the Sudeten German population (Fig. 1).[18]

Emerging at the height of the Depression, the SdP magnified Sudeten German grievances. Using their economic circumstances as a platform, the Sudeten German Party infiltrated the Czech government from 1933 to 1938, steering the populace toward National Socialism.[19] Pointing out the discrepancies in employment figures in Bohemia and Moravia versus that of the rest of Czechoslovakia and Germany's 'Nazi', or false economy based on rearmament rather than any 'real' financial recovery, Henlein was able to convince a majority of Sudeten Germans that the central government manipulated the national economy in favour of Czech citizens.[20] By exaggerating the plight of the German population and deflecting logical arguments that the highly industrialized region was simply a victim of worldwide conditions and not some ulterior plan by the central government to make German-speaking citizens second-class citizens, Henlein convinced a majority of Sudeten Germans to support his platform. Charging the Activist Parties with colluding with the Republic to maintain the *status quo*, the SdP presented itself as the sole champion of the downtrodden German minority.

By 1935, the German Social Democratic Party's position was tenuous, having lost its popularity to the well-funded and politically shrewd Sudeten German Party. Calling for democratic reforms based on ethnic co-operation, Social Democrats were willing to negotiate with the Beneš government, whereas, the Sudeten German Party called for immediate autonomy for all Sudeten Germans. Putting ideological concerns aside, Henlein's solution to the dilemma appeared simple but the reality was that the independence of the Sudeten Germans was

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[18]Donald Cameron Watt, *How War Came*: *The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939.* (London: William Heineman Ltd., 1989), 26. Henlein was 'on the German payroll since 1935.'
[19]Fritz Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, (Toronto: The Toronto Sudeten Club, 1982), 24. The Sudetendeutsche Partei was originally called the Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront (Sudeten German Home Front) but was compelled by Czechoslovakian authorities to change the name.
[20] Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 250.

Fig. 1

Election Results

Party	1920	1925	1929	1935	1938
Activists (Combined)	1,249,341	1,297,568	1,252,281	2,151,367	
Agrarians				1,116,593	Dissolved
German Social Democratic				1,034,774	10%
German Christian Socialist				162,781	Dissolved
Federation of Farmers				142,399	Dissolved
Sudeten German Party	Officially formed 1 October 1934.			1,249,530	90% *

Sudeten German Parties Only

Activists were those Parties who opposed the Sudeten German Party (National Socialists), a group that included the Agrarian Party, the German Christian Socialists and the German Social Democratic Party until 1938, when some members of those parties chose to support the SdP.
The only official party to oppose the SdP in 1938 was the German Social Democrats.
Despite gaps in information, the support of the newly formed SdP is overwhelming.

*No figures are given but Sudeten German Party received 90% of the popular vote, by September, however, the Czechoslovakian Parliament outlawed the party when it was proven Henlein was collaborating with the German Nazi Party.

Source of Statistics:
Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich*, 124.
Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 25.
Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 291.

virtually impossible considering Germans were not the only inhabitants of the Sudeten region.[21] Declaring independence from the central government would (or should) have involved a great deal of negotiation regarding the rights of those Sudeten citizens who were not German ethnics and the transfer of those who wished to remain citizens of Czechoslovakia. The issue of compensation also should have been discussed. Of course, none of these concessions applied once the territory was ceded to Germany. Nor would the central government agree to turn over land that was the industrial base of the country and contained the country's most important defenses. Using the grievances of German Czechs, however, Henlein was able to deflect any practical questions of how his plan would be implemented by using a form of pseudo-social justice as his platform. Hard pressed to deny many of the allegations, though exaggerated or manufactured many of the complaints were nevertheless true, Social Democrats were unable to combat the volume of propaganda produced by the SdP. Jaksch, however, maintained that despite the SdP's success at the polls in 1935, the 'activity and militancy of the Sudeten German democracy remained equal to that of the SdP until after the fall of Austria.'[22]

Standing in opposition to National Socialism, a group of Sudeten German political parties, referred to collectively as the 'Activist' parties, was interested in maintaining existing borders. These parties included the Federation of Farmers, the Agrarian Party,[23] the German Christian Socialists and the German Social Democratic Party.[24] These parties rejected totalitarianism and the influence of National Socialism in Czechoslovakia. Activist parties included those political parties that advocated equal rights within a democratic framework. From both ends of the political spectrum, the 'Activists' agreed to put aside their differences and support the Agreement of 1937. They called for immediate revision to national policy to legislate

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[21] Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, 118-139.
[22] Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 267.
[23] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, 238. Wiskemann contends that the Agrarian Party supported the Sudetendeutsche Partei behind the scenes, seeing the new party as a welcome addition to consolidate the power of the Right against those on the Left.
[24] Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 262-265.

proportionality of government service and equality of language and culture. While some attempt was made to implement the Agreement, substantial changes were not made in time or in sufficient quantity to demonstrate the central government's willingness to respond to Sudeten German complaints. Without substantial changes the Activist Parties appeared powerless and inept against the central government.

Secretly financed and directed by Berlin, Hitler instructed elected members of the SdP to 'remain in parliamentary opposition and refrain from participation in the Government.'[25] This effectively shut down any attempts by the central government to legislate changes that would satisfy the majority of Sudeten Germans. Konrad Henlein, leader of the SdP, created a series of national crises in order to cause a rift between the Prague Government and the Sudeten Germans, while Hitler strove to inflame the political situation from outside the country.[26] The Sudeten German Party, consistently denying any link to the German Nazi Party, proclaimed that its major concern was 'the equality and self-determination of the German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia.'[27]

In *Munich: The Price of Peace,* Telford Taylor concludes that 'the Sudetenland and the grievances of its German-speaking inhabitants were the excuse but not the reason for the crisis

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[25] Telford Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace,* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1979), 377-380. Henlein's party maintained an office in Berlin and traveled there frequently for consultation. From May 1935, the party received 180,000 marks from the German Foreign Ministry. See also. Watt, *How War Came*, 26.

[26] Callum MacDonald, *The Killing of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich,* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 59. Hitler, in a tour of the Sudetenland, explained to senior military advisors: 'we don't need the army to take over Bohemia and Moravia...all the prepatory work will be done by political means.' See also. Willson Woodside, 'The Sudeten Problem,' *Saturday Night*, 21 May 1938. Agitation may have included economic measures as Woodside quotes the Reich Nazi paper *Voelkischer Beobachter* that claims: 'that unemployment was due entirely to the withdrawal of German orders from Sudeten industry.' Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, 256-257. Contrarily Wiskemann states that some industries, specifically the glove making industry, were flourishing because Jewish retailers were boycotting German manufacturers.

[27] Andrew Amstatter, *Tomslake: History of the Sudeten Germans in Canada.* (Saanichton: Hancock House Publishers Ltd., 1978), 33. See. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, 246-247. The Czechoslovak National Bank was aware that Henlein's 1935 election campaign and his trips to Berlin and London were 'financed from abroad.'

[Hitler] provoked.'[28] Hitler was a political opportunist and Czechoslovakia a highly industrialized nation with rich, natural resources and a large ethnic German population, who were readily swayed by promises of political autonomy from the Czech Republic.[29] Nazi Germany's main objective was to gain resources and expand its sphere of influence. By installing agitators within the government to heighten tensions between ethnic Germans and Czechs, Hitler adapted a strategy that had already proven successful in Austria.

Social Democrats, apprised of Hitler's gambit in Austria, were convinced that he would employ the same tactics against Czechoslovakia. Watching Hitler's rise to power, the DSAP realized that mounting tensions within their own country could be traced back to pro-Nazi plants. Even a young man such as John Neubauer recognized that

> as soon as he came to power you could see, well even before he came to power or when he was just the leader of the Nazi Party or the National Socialist Party or whatever it was called, you could see that he was an aggressive...but he was a good orator and he could rile up the people. What he did first he riled up the people against the Jews; they were his first...then came the rest of the opposition. Anything that was against or in any way opposite was targeted.[30]

With the excuse of creating a homogeneous nation, the Nazis manipulated, cajoled and threatened Austria until 11 March 1938, when they annexed it. Already restricting work permits and movement of foreigners in an effort to protect Austrian jobs during the Depression, the Anschluss completely isolated the inhabitants of Austria from other nations. John Neubauer's father found himself unemployed when Austria shut its borders to outsiders:

> because we lived right on the border...about a half-mile or so away from the border of Austria, he had worked in a factory in Austria for most of that I can remember, but then when things got tricky and Hitler...started to cancel all the work permits of the people that lived in Czechoslovakia, so then he didn't have a job, he had to do anything that he could just to keep us, keep the family going.[31]

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[28] Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace*, xv.
[29] Lillian York, ed. *The Lure of the South Peace: Tales of the Early Pioneers to 1945.* (Dawson Creek: Historical Book Committee, 1981), 942.
[30] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004
[31] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004. Johann Neubauer worked as a pipefitter in an Austrian factory until the Anschluss closed the border to all foreigners.

The *Anschluss* was a hard blow to the Neubauer family economically but more importantly, it signaled the true intent of Nazi ambitions.

In reaction to the German takeover of Austria, in what Wenzel Jaksch calls the 'bandwagon effect,' the Sudeten Activist parties collapsed, 'the remaining adherents of the Christian Social Party and the Farmers' Federation were swept en masse into Henlein's Sudeten German Party, now controlled by its extremist Nazi element.'[32] As each party dissolved and the SdP absorbed their members, the SdP claimed to be the sole voice of the Sudeten German people and their cry was for autonomy. The majority of Sudeten Germans saw only the pomp and ceremony of the Austrian takeover; in a fit of ethnic pride, many Sudeten Germans who until the Anschluss had opposed Henlein, now threw their support behind the SdP. The DSAP, however, saw the mass arrests, the deportation of Austrian Jews and the tightening grip of German fascism cloaked in the guise of German nationalism.[33] More importantly, Social Democrats recognized the new danger to Czechoslovakian security in the 'lengthening of the Czechoslovak-German border.'[34]

Resistance to encroachment was not a new concept to the Czechoslovakian government. By 1937 President Beneš had already set in motion plans to minimize risk to his country's autonomy. Threatened by Hungary, Germany and Poland, Beneš sought protection through alliances with France and Russia. In 1934, he advised the Russian government, which had just agreed to sign the Franco-Soviet Protocol, that he was willing to abide by the terms of the agreement. 'This daring diplomatic maneuver changed a bilateral arrangement to a de facto trilateral one,' guaranteeing protection and laying the foundation for the signing of the Franco-

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[32] Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 284.

[33] Nancy Merriwether Wingfield. *Minority Politics in a Multinational State: The German Social Democrats in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938*, (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1989), 166, 'some 70,000 had been sent to Dachau.'

[34] Wingfield, *Minority Politics in a Multinational State*, 155.

Czechoslovak-Soviet Mutual Security Pact and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1935.[35] The pact with France brought more than was first evident as Beneš' agreement guaranteed that should France go to war, Britain would be duty bound to back its ally. At the same time, Beneš refortified his support of Czechoslovakia's 'Little Entente' with Yugoslavia and Romania.[36] As conditions in the disputed regions deteriorated, DSAP members put their faith in the international community, relying on Czech treaties with Poland, France, Russia, and members of the Little Entente to forestall an attack by Germany.

Hitler's plans for Czechoslovakia, however, hinged on his conviction that France and England did not want to be embroiled in a continental war. On 20 February 1938, in a speech to the Reichstag, Hitler openly proclaimed his support of a protectorate for 'those fellow Germans who live beyond our frontiers and are unable to ensure for themselves the right to a general freedom personal, political and ideological.'[37] At the same time, Henleinists plotted, organized and coordinated a campaign of propaganda, politics and backroom bullying to achieve their objectives. Taking Hitler's advice, Henlein 'demand[ed] so much from the Czechs that [they could] never be satisfied,' creating the impression that the Czech government was unreasonable.[38] On 24 April 1938, in an attempt to discredit Beneš' government, Henlein proposed the Karlsbad Manifesto. Two of its eight demands called for Sudeten German autonomy from Czechoslovakia:

> 2. Recognition of the Sudeten German national group as a legal personality in guarantee of this equality of status in the State.
> 4. Setting up of a German autonomous administration in the German-inhabited territory for all departments of public life insofar as the interests and affairs of the German national group are concerned.[39]

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[35]Igor Lukes, *Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 44.
[36] Keith Middlemas, *Diplomacy of Illusion: The British Government and Germany, 1937-1939*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), 20. See also. Watt, *How War Came*, 62. The 'Little Entente' formed with Yugoslavia and Romania was established in 1919. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, 235.
[37] Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1948), 280.
[38]Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 287. See Leonard Mosley, *On Borrowed Time: How World War II Began*, (New York: Random House, 1969), 31.
[39] Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 287.

Henlein, believing that he had pushed the central government beyond any point of agreement, was surprised when the Prague government conceded much in a conciliatory gesture.[40] Refusing to respond to Beneš, Henlein continued to bait the public with stories of horrific abuse to Sudeten German citizens. The result was an increase in riots and beatings. Confrontations between Henleinists and anti-Nazi protesters continued largely unabated, Max Lorenz remembers one instance when his stepfather was arrested:

> Dad had a pretty rough time over there, there were so many clashes between the Social Democratic Party and the Nazis...he even ended up in jail for a week, just because he was in that riot and they took everybody close by it and threw them in. Every time he walked down the street, there was this friction....[41]

Taking the brunt of the violence, Social Democrats increasingly became targets, sometimes with fatal results, as John Neubauer recalls: 'we were just living in a little town and some of the local people that were in the Nazi party, they actually beat one man to death, an older man that couldn't escape.'[42]

In May 1938, Czechoslovakia called up its military in response to reports of German troop movement along the Czech border.[43] Contrary to the German high command's belief that the Czechs had been sufficiently handicapped, the Czech military accomplished the procedure with surprising efficiency, proving that German obstruction had no effect. In fact, the Czechs benefited from the opportunity to deal with any organizational problems or delays in mustering troops.[44] Even in areas where Sudeten Germans voted 90% in favour of the SdP, an 'overwhelming majority' of young men, when called up for military service, reported for duty. Jaksch contends that this indicates that 'most Sudeten Germans who supported Henlein were not

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[40] Alan Paley, *Munich and the Sudeten Crisis*, 6. See also. Weisskopf, *The Agony of Czechoslovakia*, 90. Weisskopf claims that 'Late in August negotiations between the government and the Sudeten German Party continued to be conducted in an atmosphere of hypocrisy, mendacity and irrelevancy.' Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 287.

[41] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.

[42] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

[43] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich*, 187. Opinion is split as to whether this response by Czech troops was legitimate as there is no evidence that substantiates a German attack, or intention of an attack on this date.

[44] Keith Eubanks, 'Munich' in *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, 1918-1948, edited by Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luža, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 244-245.

voting for separation but believed – rightly or wrongly - that the Sudeten German Party offered the best prospect for autonomy within the Czechoslovakian state.'[45] Jaksch, however, ignores the fact that many Sudeten Germans who supported Hitler had already crossed the border to take advantage of what appeared to be a runaway economy in Germany.

Hoping to circumvent direct confrontation with the Czech military, Hitler chose to wait out his political opponents, fueling discontent within the Sudetenland, while plying the international community with falsified reports of hardship and torment manufactured by National Socialist agitators. Had Hitler challenged Czech fortifications he undoubtedly would have lost, as Albert Speer testified in his memoir, 'to the surprise of experts a test bombardment showed that our weapons would not have prevailed against them.' Hitler himself was impressed, noting the defensive line was 'laid out with extraordinary skill and echeloned, making prime use of the terrain.'[46]

The partial mobilization in May revealed a number of interesting facts: Germany was willing to test the response of Czechoslovakia to an attack on its border regardless of international opinion, and although the British government, via its consulates in Berlin and Dresden, was aware of imminent attack and had relayed the news to Prague, it chose to do nothing.[47] The crisis was averted but confirmed the probability of war in central Europe, a war that Chamberlain, in particular, was determined to avoid. In a show of public support for Czechoslovakia, Britain and France remonstrated with Germany; privately, however, the two governments insisted that Beneš 'go immediately and unconditionally to the utmost limit of concession.'[48]

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[45] Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 291.
[46] Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich.* (New York: The McMillan Company, 1970), 133-134. See Black and Helmreich, *Twentieth Century Europe*, 523. 'Not only did Czechoslovakia have a strong line of fortifications in the Sudeten mountains defended by some thirty-five well-equipped divisions, but it also had binding commitments from France and Russia.' See Kurt Weisskopf, *The Agony of Czechoslovakia*, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1968), 140. 'The Sudetenland was ceded to Hitler, the strongest belt of fortification in Europe was given away and the German border was brought within one day's march of Prague.'
[47] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich*, 187-188.
[48] Hubert Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 28. See also. Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 31.

Hitler sought to test both the reaction of Czechoslovakia's military and the reaction of its allies. Chamberlain, knowing that neither France nor Britain was prepared for war, chose to appease Hitler, ignoring the fact that among the countries involved in the dispute, only Czechoslovakia was prepared for war.[49] Chamberlain, in his ignorance, considered Czechoslovakia indefensible, not worth a war.[50] Czechoslovakia, however, maintained a well-trained military, an organized militia, and well-fortified border defenses. The Czechoslovakian army and its members were loyal to the central government and the Republic. Hitler overestimated his ability to hamper the military and so turned to aggravating the political situation.

As the international community watched with increasing alarm, hostilities in the Sudeten region appeared to escalate. So when rumours of a second troop mobilization in July reached the British government,[51] Chamberlain established the Runciman Mission ostensibly to investigate the true opinions and conditions of the Sudeten people, but also to weigh the chances of negotiating a lasting peace between the Sudeten-German people and the Beneš government. Chamberlain, however, immediately undermined the mission that was instituted to inject an impartial negotiator into the situation by announcing that Runciman would investigate 'independent of all governments' and 'would act only in his personal capacity.' This effectively eliminated any authority Runciman's pronouncements may have had.[52]

Lord Walter Runciman, characterized as 'a faintly comic figure,' was not qualified to investigate an international incident.[53] He had never held a diplomatic position but was a Liberal stalwart and shipping magnate thrust into an international dispute without any experience in

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[49] Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, 387. Within two weeks of ceasing the Sudetenland the Germans had seized and transported from the country '48,000 machine guns (heavy and light), 1,500,000 rifles; 600,000,000 rounds of ammunition; 2,500 guns (of different calibers); 4,500,000 rounds of ammunition or the artillery: as well as 600 tanks and 1000 aeroplanes.'
[50] Eubanks, 'Munich,' 244.
[51] Wingfield. *Minority Politics in a Multinational State*, 174.
[52] Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace*, 658.
[53] Watt, *How War Came*, 27-28.

international politics. In a move that stunned the DSAP, Runciman repeatedly negotiated with Konrad Henlein, not the Czech government.[54] When informed that there were four other Sudeten German Parties besides the SdP Runciman and the other members of the mission were stunned.[55] When Runciman finally agreed to meet with DSAP officials, Germany protested.[56] Any mediation in favour of a united Czechoslovakia was squashed, as it became apparent that Runciman had determined that the solution to the problem lay in self-determination. Unaware or unconcerned that a concerted effort had already been made by the central government to negotiate with the SdP, Runciman insisted Prague negotiate with the pro-Nazi faction.[57] Hubert Ripka, a member of the Beneš government during the crisis, states categorically that, had negotiations been undertaken with the democrats of the region, 'co-operation would have been possible at once...and, sooner or later, also with the Henleinist elements who decided to dissociate themselves from their extremists.'[58] This plan, however, depended on the united support of the European Powers against Nazi Germany. Dominated by Chamberlain, the European nations instead used Czechoslovakia as a bargaining chip in a high stakes game of political chance and traded the small nation for a promise of peace. England held that the Sudeten problem was an internal issue to be solved by the Czech government, while Germany regarded the Sudeten crisis as an ethnic crime perpetrated by the signers of the Versailles Treaty. The issue would be determined by force or diplomacy between the two nations but Germany was resolved to reclaim its ethnic cousins. At the same time, the Czech government tried to convince its allies that the

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[54] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich*, 231. See A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, (London: Penguin Group, 1964), 210, Taylor refers to the Runciman Mission as a melancholy attempt to solve a situation that was insolvable.

[55] John Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy*, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), 82.

[56] Wingfield, *Minority Politics in a Multinational State*, 175. See also. Christopher Thorne, *The Approach of War, 1938-9*, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), 73-74. At the height of the refugee crisis in Czechoslovakia Runciman was approached by a representative of the Social Democrat Party for assistance in acquiring visas. Runciman responded by assuring the representative that he had already contributed to the Lord Mayor's Fund established for raising money for the refugees.

[57] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans*, 136. A quote from correspondence by the British contingent the DGFP, II, 592-593, 616, on August 23 which states: 'The population lined the street and we were received with Nazi salutations and Heils and Sieg Heils. As I told Henlein next day, I had never felt so like Henlein before...I like him [Henlein]. He is, I am sure, an absolutely honest fellow.'

[58] Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, 31.

Sudetens were merely a distraction and that Hitler's goal was to seize the Sudeten region, expand eastward and dominate continental Europe. The Social Democrats' role was to convince the international community that the central government was not the enemy and that Sudeten Germans were not the victims Hitler purported them to be.

By September 1938, conditions on the German-Czech border were deteriorating and prominent members of the DSAP, under attack by Nazi *Ordner* gangs, were forced to move their families to safety.[59] The Schoen family was one such family harassed by the *Ordners* as Walter's father, Willi, was the local DSAP manager and a member of the *Republikanische Wehr* (Republican Defense), a paramilitary civil defense corps attached to the Czech army. As Walter recalls,

> we woke to the sound of gunfire. We lived in an upstairs apartment in row housing at the edge of the town near a partly wooded hill. My father assumed it must be the army having maneuvers till we heard bullets hitting around our window. Amazingly, no shots hit any glass. We immediately got down on the floor against the wall on the window side. As the houses were built of brick, we were in no danger there for the time being. We could hear sporadic fire for a while, then it stopped as suddenly as it had begun.[60]

Attacks on the family continued, until one night a hand grenade was thrown into their backyard. Mr. Schoen evacuated his family to Valasske Mezirici to the home of a Czech family who were sympathetic to the DSAP cause. He was only able to visit occasionally but on each trip brought items from their home. Nazi occupation of the ceded area marked the family's final eviction. On

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[59] Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 13. Organized in the tradition of the *Freicorps* of World War 1, *Ordner* gangs initiated situations with Czech citizens then claimed harassment. The authors simply identify *Ordners* as 'special terrorist formations.' See James Taylor and Warren Shaw, *The Third Reich Almanac*, (New York: World Almanac, 1987), 121. *Freicorps* members were ex-soldiers who served in World War 1. Recruited and paid privately by German or ex-German officers, most fought against communism from 1918 to 1921 when they were officially disbanded. Most members of the *Freicorps* found refuge in Munich where the SA again recruited them or their descendents prior to World War II. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 244. It is more likely that the *Ordners* were a group of Reich German Nazis who banded together too carry out 'piratical' raids into Czechoslovakia kidnapping political enemies, spying and harassing Czechs, Jews and other anti-Nazis.

[60] Walter Schoen, *The Tupper Boys: A History of the Sudeten Settlement at Tomslake, B.C.* (Victoria: Trafford, 2004), 8.

his last trip, Mr. Schoen fled on his motorcycle, armed with a backpack of belongings including Walter's teddy bear.[61]

While ordinary citizens battled for their lives in the disputed districts, Chamberlain met Hitler on three separate occasions in Berchtesgaden, Bad Godesberg, and finally, Munich, in an effort to appease the German leader. Why Chamberlain thought Hitler had any claim on the region is still a mystery, unless the British Prime Minister equated all Germans with Nazism, making no separation between culture and ideology. Wenzel Jaksch argues that the Western Powers refused to see the dispute as ideological, fixating on cultural homogeneity rather than the fact that German culture contained very diverse political and social ideologies.[62] In fact, Chamberlain had little reason to get involved in the dispute at all. First, in spite of Czechoslovakian expectations, Britain was in no way obligated to aid France should France back Czechoslovakia, but was committed by the Locarno Pact to assist France and Belgium only against 'flagrant' and 'unprovoked aggression.'[63] In fact, the Locarno Pact had so many loopholes that Britain could very well have avoided ever being called to act regardless of the provocation.[64] Second, Chamberlain was determined not to engage Britain in another continental war. Eliminating German resentment and thereby restoring the balance of power in Europe, Chamberlain was convinced, would halt the aggressors.[65] Third, Britain was in no way prepared for a military engagement, having cut its military expenditures drastically after World War I. Fourth, Britain, still reeling from the economic aftermath of World War I and a devastating worldwide depression, saw appeasement as a way to avoid the expense of immediate rearmament. In *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, William R. Rock contends that as former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chamberlain 'devised a thesis that defence, diplomacy, and economic vitality were all

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[61] Walter Schoen. Interview by author. 28 May 2004.
[62] Jaksch, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 7.
[63] Ian Colvin, *The Chamberlain Cabinet*, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1971), 114.
[64] Middlemas, *Diplomacy of Illusion*, 20.
[65] William R. Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, (New York: Norton, 1977), 7.

part of a single question.'[66] Fifth, Britain lacked a cohesive foreign policy and chose not to formulate a policy in relation to the Czech crisis; rather, Chamberlain took on the role of sole policy-maker.[67] Sixth, Britain was facing a crisis in its foreign policy. Facing Japan's Far East expansion, Italy's Mediterranean ambitions and Germany's continental objectives, Britain sought to limit conflict in order to strengthen its position against the remaining aggressors.[68] Finally, Chamberlain felt no compunction to salvage Czechoslovakia, a nation constructed in the name of political expediency by the Versailles Treaty and populated by an ethnic minority revolting under the terms of an agreement that even by the 1930s was seen as a diplomatic blunder. Perhaps most telling are remarks made by Chamberlain in a radio address on 27 September 1938 as he lamented 'how horrible, fantastic, incredible, it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.'[69]

While many factors suggest why Chamberlain did not feel obliged to involve Britain in the politics of Czechoslovakia, one reason in particular explains why he embroiled himself in a series of negotiations over its fate. Motivated by a fear of Russian involvement in Western European politics, Chamberlain believed that war would upset the balance of power, revolutionize continental politics, and broaden the influence of the left.[70] Igor Lukes, author of *Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler* concludes that Chamberlain continued to appease Hitler 'to avoid the outbreak of war because he feared its socialist consequences.'[71] The simple fact is that Britain was more in concert ideologically with Germany than with Soviet Union.

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[66] Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, 2, Chamberlain was 'especially concerned about the growing expense of rearmament and its impact on the domestic economy and social programme of the government.'
[67] Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1948), 298.
[68] Watt, *How War Came*, 27.
[69] Kenneth Harris, *Attlee*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1982), 154.
[70] Graham Stewart, *Burying Caesar: Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party*, (London: Orion Books Ltd., 2000), 314.
[71] Lukes, *Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler*, 199.

Britain and Germany were capitalist states; both nations abhorred communism and Marxism and vehemently opposed Soviet policy and ideology.[72]

While fear of Bolshevism was at the heart of Western alienation from the East, it is also likely that Chamberlain hoped to avoid admitting any military or diplomatic weakness. Rather than risk his position as principal negotiator by requesting Russian cooperation, Chamberlain continued to negotiate, undeterred by the fact that Russian involvement would put the Allies in a position of strength to dictate terms to Germany.

Despite assurances that they intended to fulfill all treaties, the Soviets at the time of the Munich crisis were being pressured by Japan in the Far East and had, in 1937, purged their High Command. To Britain, the Russians must have appeared unstable and hard-pressed to honour their military obligations. On a practical level, Chamberlain may have simply dismissed the Russian offer of assistance as inconsequential as, in order to aid its Czech allies, the Soviets had to cross Polish or Romanian territory and had made no request to do so. A further complication was the movement of military vehicles and troops by rail, but the Soviet railroad gauge was incompatible with that of Poland and Romania. Troop movement through either nation was therefore impractical.[73]

While Britain and Germany continued to negotiate a diplomatic resolution to the crisis, on 7 September Beneš, responding to Sudeten German complaints, including grievances about language laws, put forward his Fourth Plan. The plan went so far as to concede a 'state within a state,' granting the SdP so much latitude one member was said to exclaim, 'My God he's given us everything!'[74] DSAP members, recognizing the far-reaching effects of the plan, sent emissaries

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[72] Gene H. Ben-Villada, 'No more Munichs! What the media won't tell –German industry and the Munich Pact' in *Monthly Review*, April 1988.
www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1132/is__n11v39/ai_6323522print. Ben-Villada contends that 'two fundamental and interrelated facts must be plainly stated at the outset: (1) Nazi Germany was a capitalist state, and (2) European fascism was stridently and violently anticommunist, anti-Marxist, and anti-Soviet.'
[73] George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West: Under Lenin and Stalin*, (London: Little, Brown & Company, 1961), 322-333.
[74] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich*, 249.

to France to convince French officials that the ill advised proposal was the first step towards the dissolution of the state. Henlein requested a few days' reprieve to present the plan to his party but Beneš' offer was so generous that to refuse was out of the question. With no way to exacerbate the situation, Henlein quit the country.[75] At the same time, Hitler addressed a rally at Nuremberg, inciting German reaction along the German-Czech border. On the Sudeten side of the border, however, reaction was constrained. Only in a minority of Sudeten districts did Hitler's hysterical ravings provoke any reaction.[76] Hanging swastika banners in plain sight, armed gangs of Nazis took over local police stations and other municipal buildings, 'arresting' political opponents, and taking them over the border for punishment.[77] The Czech government retaliated by declaring martial law.[78] The Social Democrats countered Hitler's call to arms by producing a quarter million pamphlets and ten thousand posters appealing to all Sudeten Germans to choose 'equality through peace' rather than 'destruction through war' (Fig. 2). Failing to cause the uprising he had envisioned, Hitler once again threatened military action.

On 23 September 1938, the Czechs mobilized in response to the German proposal at Bad Godesberg. Beneš thought that he had secured the support of France, Britain, Russia, Romania and Yugoslavia.[79] Hubert Ripka charged that 'British policy throughout the Czechoslovak crisis was necessarily disunited and confused' but that support for Czechoslovakia, never materialized due to the machinations of Chamberlain.[80] Despite the dissent of a number of prominent members of parliament including Duff Cooper, Oliver Stanley, Anthony Eden and Winston

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[75] Wingfield, *Minority Politics in a Multinational State*, 176.
[76] Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 296. Only in 16 of 49 districts was there a reaction to Hitler's speech. See also. Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 13. Jaksch claims that Hitler gave the order to 'special terrorist formations' to incite armed revolt. 'Fighting broke out in Asch and Eger, in Elbogen, Plan, Pürstein, Böhmisch Krumau, Teplitz-Schöau, Schönpriesen and Warnsdorf.
[77] Weisskopf, *The Agony of Czechoslovakia, '33/'38*, 99.
[78] Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1948), 297.
[79] Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, 145-146.
[80] Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, 67.

Fig. 2

Statement sent out by German Social Democratic Party
in Reaction to Hitler's Nuremberg Address, 12 September 1938.

Fellow-Citizens!

Everything is at Stake!

The Sudeten Germans are faced by a historic decision. The life and death of our people are at stake. The door is open to a peaceful settlement which will assure the vital interests of our people.

National equality, far-reaching self government, economic reconstruction and social progress can be achieved without war. The alternative is the deadly danger that our people will be used as a tool in schemes for imperialist domination, and will be plunged into an abyss of destruction.

To-day we are given an opportunity, such as is granted once in a century, of concluding a lasting and honourable peace with our Slavonic neighbours.

It lies in our hands to create peace in the hotly contested territory of Bohemia and Moravia, and to make a great contribution to a peaceful New Order in Europe.

But a Germanism which chooses again the fateful way of imperialist power politics, which refuses national equality and strives for domination over other races, will sooner or later become involved in a bloody conflict with the rising Slavonic world and with the young nations of the South-east.

In that moment, a world in arms will rise against Germany.

The Sudeten Germans will be the first victims of the conflict. Your home will be destroyed in the collision of the Great Powers, your future extinguished!

Fellow-Citizens! Sudeten Germans!

Think in this hour of destiny: the young fanatics, who demand a solution by force, have no idea what cruelty and destruction the word "world war" really means. They have not stood under fire, they do not know how poison gas destroys the lungs, they have never seen peaceful villages and towns going up in flames. The misery of homeless refugees, the death of innocent children, the grief of wives and mothers—all is unknown to them.

But you, men and women of the Sudetenland, have learnt to know the hell of war. You have shed your blood on the sandy soil of Galicia, you have survived the horrors of a war winter in the Carpathians, you have borne the brunt of the Isonzo battle, you have eaten your hearts out in longing for home in the internment camps. You experienced the lash of war discipline in the war factories, you starved in the home country, and you gave your lives at the front, as much and more than any other people in Europe.

The very dead should rise from the mass graves and warn you: "Never again let yourselves be led to the slaughter, as victims of the ambitions of inhuman power politics."

We German Social Democrats must stand with a clear conscience before the bar of history.

In moments in which the existence of a people is at stake, all party barriers must fall.

Sudeten Germans!

Your choice now lies between equality through peace, or destruction through war.

Consumed by burning anxiety as to the peace of Europe and the future of our homeland we appeal to you:

Choose the way of peace!

We appeal to all our fellow citizens, without distinction of faith or political party, to workers, peasants, officials, industrialists, trades-people—to unite in action to save our people by the creation of a Front of Peace and Construction.

We call upon you to form a Union of all forces for peace and freedom, for a better future in the Sudetenland, for a new Europe of United Peoples.

For the German Social Democratic Party
President: Wenzel Jaksch

Source: Wenzel Jaksch and Walter Kolarz. *England and the Last Free Germans: The Story of a Rescue.* (London: Lincolns-Prager (Publishers) Ltd., 1941.

Churchill, Chamberlain refused to be dissuaded.[81] He discouraged any support by the French, while assuring Hitler that a settlement was imminent, which in turn convinced the smaller nations to step back, eliminating the only chance Beneš had of retaining Czechoslovakia's borders. Russia, shut out of negotiations by France and Britain, refused to commit its support.

Ignorant of the political, military and social conditions of Czechoslovakia, Britain and France chose a course of action which was ultimately contrary to their goals. Hitler insisted upon the surrender of the Sudetenland to the Reich, concluding that Germany was willing to embark on full-scale war in order to end the dispute. In response, Britain and France delivered the Anglo-French Proposal to Prague on 19 September 1938 stating that the 'maintenance of peace and the safety of Czechoslovakia's vital interests cannot effectively be assured unless these [Sudeten] areas are now transferred to the Reich.'[82] The Czech government rejected the proposal immediately, but British and French representatives intimated that, in light of Czech intransigence, it could not count on help from either country if attacked by Germany.[83] The betrayal by France meant the loss of British support. It also meant Russia would not commit its support, as according to the trilateral agreement, Russia would only intercede after France became involved. Meanwhile, Poland and Hungary pushed forward their own territorial claims. Pressed into agreeing to the proposal on 21 September 1938, the Czech government opened the door for France and Britain to negotiate the terms of the Munich Pact. The terms set down were those put forth in the ultimatum delivered to Czechoslovakia by France, dictated by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.[84]

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[81] Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace,* 825. In a note to Halifax, Chamberlain wrote: 'what D.C. [Duff Cooper] and O.S. [Oliver Stanley] want us to do is to encourage French and Czechs to resist and promise them our help. That I will not myself consent to.'
[82] Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, 69.
[83] Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, 78.
[84] Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, 89-113.

On 30 September 1938, the Four Powers signed the Munich Pact. Social Democrats, not fooled by Hitler's apparent satisfaction over the pact, insisted that this would only be the beginning of his demands. John Neubauer recalled:

> we knew he was not going to be happy with just Sudetenland and I am sure that England and France knew it also but they couldn't do a darn thing about it that was their problem, they talked big about stopping him. We were naïve; we believe...that England and France would do something about him, stopping his advances...then when they came on the press...[85]

Having placed their faith in the co-operation of Czechoslovakia's allies to halt Hitler's advance, the Social Democrats were betrayed when Neville Chamberlain, who had no stake in the continued existence of Czechoslovakia, intervened. Not only did the Four Powers negotiate without benefit of Czech presence, but they insisted that the government agree to the arrangement set before them with no form of redress or restitution. 'The conference at Munich stripped Czechoslovakia of her fortified frontier areas and broke the Czechoslovakian state into its federal components –Czechia, Slovakia, and a minuscule appendix on the curve of the Carpathian mountains known alternatively as Ruthenia or the Carpatho-Ukraine.'[86] The economic ruin wrought by the agreement was devastating. Newspapers worldwide itemized the extent of the damage inflicted on what remained of the country. In northern British Columbia, the *Peace River Block News* reported:

> the Czechs will lose from 75 to 100 per cent of Czechoslovakia's textile industry, and a quarter of her forests...about 90 per cent of the porcelain and mineral oil industry...glass, 86 per cent; lignite, paper and cement, 80 per cent; ore smelting and electro-technical goods, 70; coal 66; chemicals, 60, and sawmills, 55...four world-famous spas...Prague will have to build a new electricity plant, ...as well as factories and their equipment, railroads and their equipment, including rolling stock; post offices with their telephone; telegraph and radio equipment, school buildings, club houses and churches and their equipment, bridges... [87]

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[85] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.
[86] Watt, *How War Came*, 28.
[87] *Peace River Block News*, 'What the Czechs Lose', 6 October 1938. See Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy*, 195.

Britain refused the Czechoslovak government's request for a £30 million loan on 3 October 1938. One minister responded: 'it was not the case that Czechoslovakia had any legitimate grievance against us. A world war had been averted and thereby Czechoslovakia had been saved.'[88]

Even as Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, the British and French Prime Ministers respectively, were congratulating themselves for hammering out an agreement with Hitler, the Slovaks were demanding autonomy, while Poland and Hungary demanded a portion of lands inhabited by people of Polish and Hungarian background. The republic lay in ruins, so much so, that when Hitler demanded the submission of Czechoslovakia as a protectorate on 15 March 1939, not a word of protest was heard from the guarantors.[89] Members of the German Social Democratic Party, however, were fleeing deep into the heart of Czechoslovakia, scrambling for safe haven along with Jews and Czechs, who were also forced from their homes. With sadness and resignation, Max Lorenz underlined the loss felt by Social Democrats, stating that 'the English gave away that part of the country that we lived in, so there was nothing....'[90]

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[88] Colvin, *The Chamberlain Cabinet*, 170.
[89] Seizure of Czechoslovakia as a German protectorate was proof positive for Cooper and his allies that their opposition to Hitler had been justified.
[90] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.

Chapter II

Undesirable Aliens

'Our Dunkirk'[1]

'England and the Last Free Germans'
Wenzel Jaksch and Walter Kolarz, 1941.

Within days of the Munich Pact's signing, Hitler moved to claim the Sudeten region, contrary to the terms of the agreement. 'Already the Sudeten Legion and the Henleinist Storm Troops were going from house to house with lists, arresting their former political enemies and working off old scores on the spot.'[2] The deal was to give the Czechs ten days to evacuate. The agreement also called for a plebiscite by the German people living in the contested area, but Hitler, eager to consolidate his hold, claimed the district on 1 October 1938, sending 100,000 Social Democrats fleeing into a 'neutral zone.'[3] Refusing to allow refugees beyond a pre-determined line of demarcation, Czech officials insisted that

> It is the business of those who made these people refugees, Britain and France, to save them, not ours. We appeal to their representatives on the Berlin commission, we appeal direct to London and Paris for something to be done in the way of providing an asylum for these people, and we get no reply...It is not our job to play philanthropist to the victims of Franco-British dictation.[4]

The incensed Czechoslovakian government, shut out of negotiations, insisted that the international community take responsibility for the decisions made at Munich.

The Munich Agreement was served up to the Czech government as a *fait accompli.* While the Four Powers continued to negotiate details of the plan, including territorial claims by Poland and Hungary, Beneš, hoping to normalize relations with Germany and forestall further

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[1] Wenzel Jaksch and Walter Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans: The Story of a Rescue*, (London: Lincolns-Prager (Publishers) Ltd.,1941), 42.
[2] John Wheeler-Bennett. *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy*, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1963), 198.
[3]Telford Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace*, (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1979), 910, 912-913, 'the evacuation rules envisaged a three kilometer-wide "neutral" zone between the retiring Czechs and advancing Germans.' Taylor goes on to say that this zone was often ignored or could not be established as Czech officers were often detained by Henleinists.
[4] G.E.R. Gedye, *Betrayal in Central Europe*, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1939), 478. This book was published in Britain as *Fallen Bastions.* Gedye is considered an anti-Nazi.

dismemberment of the state, reshuffled his cabinet, replaced his foreign minister Dr. Kamil Krofta, with Frantisek Chalkovsky, a member of parliament known for his 'pro-German' stance, such individuals, considered sympathetic to Germany, would supposedly normalize relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany and forestall further dismemberment of the State. Beneš then resigned and left the country.[5] With disturbing insight, he predicted that the Munich Pact would fail:

> Here [in Western Europe] they may still believe that peace was saved at Munich. But soon they will know that war has already begun.
> Munich made war inevitable. I do not know when it will break out but personally, I doubt that it will take more than a year.
> The first to suffer the blow will be Poland. Beck has helped and still helps Hitler against us, but actually he is helping Hitler against Poland and the rest. France will pay horribly for her betrayal of us. And Chamberlain – he will live to see the results of his appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini. Hitler will attack all – in the West and even Russia – and in the end the United States, too, will be in it.[6]

Asserting that the Munich Pact had failed and foretelling the consequences of its failure, Beneš still refused to consider mobilizing his troops and forcing his allies to abide by earlier agreements to defend the small nation. Instead, the exhausted Czech leader went to bed for two weeks before retiring to a cottage in England to take up gardening.[7]

For political and ethnic minorities attempting to find refuge within the newly drawn borders, the placement of pro-German sympathizers in the Czech parliament did not bode well.[8] In *Europe's Road to Potsdam,* Wenzel Jaksch, leader of the German Social Democratic Party, points to Beneš' premature departure as just one more betrayal in a series of failures and missteps by the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister. Blaming Beneš and the international community for the plight of the Sudeten refugees, Jaksch states that Beneš' failure to deal with minority grievances, in particular economic inequalities, gave Henlein's National Socialists a persuasive platform on

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[5] Theodor Prochazka, 'The Second Republic, 1938-1939', in *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948*, edited by Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luža, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 255.
[6] Edvard Beneš, *Edvard Beneš: In His Own Words*, (New York: Czech-American National Alliance, 1944), 37.
[7] Glorney Bolton, *Czech Tragedy*, (London: W*atts & Co, 1955), 149.*
[8] Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace*, 910, Beneš resigned and left Czechoslovakia 5 October 1938.

which to advance the SdP's agenda. In addition, Jaksch criticizes Beneš' agreement to the Anglo-French Plan proposal on 19 September 1938, claiming that this tentative acceptance opened the door to further demands by Hitler and the perception by France and Britain that Czechoslovakia had agreed, in principle, to the plan. Jaksch also intimates that as Beneš and his ministers were unable to include themselves in the negotiations, they should have, at the very least vehemently opposed its outcome. Moreover, by refusing to call parliament when the deal was announced, thus initiating 'the war party,' Beneš categorically refused any military defense of his country.[9] That move embittered a large segment of the population; Czechs, Slovaks and minorities. Beneš' failure to take defensive measures resulted in a mass exodus from the Sudetenlands.

Germany claimed approximately 11,600 square miles of Bohemia and Moravia, encompassing 3,869,000 inhabitants, 2,806,000 German-speaking and 720,000-750,000 Czechs, who automatically became German citizens without the right of refusal. Those on the German side of the new demarcation line were ordered to remain regardless of ethnicity or citizenship. Among those trapped in German territory were Jews, many of whom had already fled Germany or Austria, and political opponents of the Nazi regime. The most vocal of the latter were members of the DSAP who were particularly despised by pro-Nazis and often referred to as 'traitors' or 'Bohemian swine;'[10] 'the concentration camp or the firing squad, the Nazis insisted, were the just desserts for the leaders of such an infamous movement.'[11] 'There was no doubt that many of the most active party members would become hunted men once the occupation of

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[9]Wenzel Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 232-251, deals with minority grievances. Pages 315-327 lay out Jaksch's arguments against Beneš handling of the crisis. 'The war party' was a meeting of government, military and civilian authorities, any department or organization essential to the defense of the country.

[10] Wanka, *Twice Victims of Munich Munich: The Tragedy of the Democratic Sudeten Germans.* (Tupper Creek, 1946), 11. Jewish prisoners were encouraged to refer to members of the DSAP as 'traitors' or 'Bohemian swine' while interned.

[11]Jonathon Wagner, 'Saskatchewan's Sudetendeutsche: The Anti-Nazi Germans of St. Walburg,' *Saskatchewan History*, 33 (Autumn 1980), 90.

Sudetenland by the German Army was complete.'[12] Herr Kohlbeck, Czech head of the police registration bureau,[13] compiled a master list which singled out anyone who held a position with the DSAP, particularly German Social Democratic deputies and senators.[14] One method Henleinists used to collect names was to stand outside co-operative stores and photograph their patrons 'so that they may be marked down for punishment at a later date.'[15] In an effort to protect its members, Social Democrat leaders released members from their obligations to the Party, publishing a proclamation:

> The Great Powers have decided on the transfer of the Sudeten German districts. We have become the victims of this decision. There is no point in remonstrating against these events which have overwhelmed us with the elemental force of fate. *It may be that this fate will also overtake those who have sacrificed us.* Our conduct and theirs will be judged by history....
> With admiration we do homage in this hour to the small Czech nation which has to bear the same blows of fate as we do. May it, when this ordeal is over, go forward to happier days. The task of collaboration between the nationalities will remain vital in Central Europe. From the depths of our hearts we wish that it may yet be crowned by a successful conclusion.[16]

As Czechoslovakia disintegrated, so too did Czech-German relations. According to John Neubauer, 'the more the Germans became nationalist so did the Czechs and we were kind of caught in between, in no man's land.'[17] Once seen as good and loyal citizens, Social Democrats came to be viewed as a danger to the autonomy of the republic and the safety of its citizens. Despite the new boundaries guaranteed by the Munich Pact, Czechs saw little reason to continue to put their faith in the international community. Betrayed by France and England, the Czechs had

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[12] Lillian York, ed. *The Lure of the South Peace: Tales of the Early Pioneers to 1945.* (Dawson Creek: Historical Book Committee, 1981), 946, 'During the weeks leading up to the Munich Agreement, preparations had been made to receive up to 20,000 anti-Nazis from the Sudeten areas in the concentration camps of the Third Reich.'

[13] Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 28.

[14] Also referred to as the 'Black List' or 'A List'. See also. Walter Schoen, *The Tupper Boys: A History of the Sudeten Settlement at Tomslake, B.C.* (Victoria: Trafford, 2004), 10.

[15] Wanka, *Twice Victims of Munich*, 10. See also. 'A Czech Co-operative Joins the Co-operative Union,' *The Canadian Co-operator*, Vol. 32 (February 1941), 16-17. Among the Tupper refugees was Karl Jelinck who for many years was involved in Co-operatives in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Jelinck acted as an 'organizer and auditor of ...affiliated co-operatives, industrial adviser and secretary of the Consultative Department.'

[16] Johann W. Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich The Minority Problem and British Appeasement Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: University Press, 1973), 300.

[17] John Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

no reason to believe that the Munich Agreement would be enforced so they opted to co-operate with Germany in hopes that their borders could be stabilized and their nation left in peace. Betrayal by the Four Powers resulted in a resurgence of Czech nationalism that excluded German Social Democrats, Jews and Slovaks. Social Democrats who had supported the state were disappointed to find that ethnic nationalism took precedence over ideology and that their vision of an independent nation founded on democratic principles had dissolved.

As a member of the *Republikanische Wehr* (Republican Defense Corps), William Schoen assumed that his name would be found on the list; he later discovered that 'a reward had been offered by the Nazis for information about his whereabouts.'[18] Herbert Wiesner's youngest brother turned him in to officials. Herbert's daughter Anna recalled: 'the youngest brother was in the army for Hitler...my Dad and his brother did not get along at all...I guess the youngest brother was ready to turn my dad over.'[19] Despite the dangers of remaining in the occupied territory, many refused to leave. John Neubauer observed the dilemma of many: 'a lot of people [were] tied to their little few belongings that they [had] and they [wouldn't] leave no matter what.'[20] Once brought to the attention of the Gestapo, however, those Social Democrats who refused to flee invariably ended up in concentration camps or they were killed.[21]

As the German army seized the Sudetenland, those Democrats, Czechs and Jews residing closest to the border had only minutes to gather a few possessions before running out into the night. Max Lorenz's stepfather, a dispatcher at the front with access to a motorcycle, was able to reach his family and warn them as German soldiers crossed into Czechoslovakia.

> It happened around midnight and 1 o'clock in the morning when he came in and said, 'you gotta get out'. Well you throw in a few shirts, pants, some underwear, socks and stuff like that in my case... I was just learning to play the drums and I

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[18] Nancy Merriwether Wingfield, *Minority Politics in a Multinational State: The German Social Democrats in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938.* Boulder: East European Monographs, 1989), 181.
[19] Anne Marie Pohl (Anna Wiesner). Interview by author. 28 May 2004.
[20] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.
[21] Fritz Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, (Toronto: The Toronto Sudeten Club, 1982), 47. 'Many refused to leave their homeland then because they believed, like every other eventual victim of Hitler's terror, that things would in the long run sort themselves out and that no great harm would come to them.'

> didn't take the whole drum set but I took the snare drum, the small one, for some reason I took that thing along and carried it for miles till along the way the fellow that was teaching me, was somehow beside me and I said to him I don't think I can take this with me, do you want it and I gave it to him. I don't know what he did with it...there were a lot of things that had to be left that would have been important, especially some of the pictures, my dad used to play the bugle and I wish I had taken that instead of that stupid drum... I just didn't think.[22]

A stream of refugees took to the road, some fleeing with little more than the clothes on their backs, while others carried whatever they could manage. The crowding of the roads with military vehicles, pedestrians, and all manner of conveyance added to the chaos. Max, his mother and sister Christa, were able to board a train headed away from the occupied zone, but troop trains moving to the front hampered any hope of a quick escape. Confusion and frenzy resulted in at least one near tragedy, but Max's mother, separated from her children on one leg of the journey, coerced the owner of a truck to help reunite her with her children:

> We had to stop to let the troop train go by, so everybody took a break to go to the bathroom, because we were in the boxcars, it was really rough because some of the kids had to go, and there was a corner designated for this type of thing, and so when they cleaned it up and people went out to go to the bathroom, she [Mom] sent us first, then we came back and we looked after the two or three suitcases we had and the purse and she went to the bathroom and maybe pick up some fruit or something. Well, the darn train left but she caught a van or something, and the truck was faster than the train and she got back on at the next stop.[23]

In another part of the Sudetenland, eight-year-old Anna Wiesner was awakened in the middle of the night, partially dressed, and told that she would be visiting an uncle. The trip meant traveling to Konigenhoff and staying with one family until being forced on to Prague. Most fled with few possessions. Others, like the Wiesners, were able to carry a variety of objects, as Anna remembers: '...my doll carriage. I wouldn't leave without it. That's a fact. They had to bring that. We had feather beds, my doll carriage; we took clothes, that was about it. But we did take quite a lot.'[24]

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[22] Max Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.
[23] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.
[24] Pohl, Interview, 28 May 2004. See also. Borderline History Committee, ed. *From Tears to Triumph: The Pioneers' Journeys*, Altona: Friesens, 2003), 4.

The Wiesner family was extremely fortunate. Others, like John Neubauer, escaped from Moravia with his father and several others, just ahead of occupation forces, with nothing but the bicycles they rode. Meeting up with the rest of their family in Brünn, the Neubauers moved on to Zoatoborice with 150 other political refugees to wait out the crisis there in intolerable conditions:

> [It was] ridiculous, like a jail with an eight foot fence around it and the little funds that we brought with us were gone in about two weeks just on food because the breakfast was rye bread and coffee, that was your breakfast, for lunch we had beans, rye bread and coffee and for supper rye bread and coffee. Those were the meals and maybe on Sunday with the beans we had a few pieces of wieners chopped up.... It's disgusting anyways...people used the few funds they had and sold everything we owned still, the bicycles and everything else just to keep subsidizing the foods.[25]

Abandoned buildings, castles and schoolhouses all served to house political refugees. Hedwig Baudisch remembers the refugee camp she was assigned to:

> It was an old school where we slept...there was a big hall all downstairs and upstairs they put some beds and there was the [indicates kitchen] was there and they were cooking for us, in the morning we got some coffee and bread...and at noon we got a soup, in the evening too we got a soup and a slice of bread.[26]

Interviewees who stayed in housing in or near Prague, however, found better conditions than those in outlying areas, possibly because the DSAP helped finance them or because they were close to the nation's capital and therefore had access to the international press (Photos 1 and 2).

Refugees seeking sanctuary within the Czechoslovakian interior found little support from officials as 'Czech authorities clearly feared retaliation by the Nazis for harbouring their foes.'[27] Czech citizens, however, attempted to aid the refugees in whatever ways they were able. When diphtheria broke out in one refugee camp near Prague, civilians opened their homes to take in children; Max Lorenz, for example, 'ended up with a Jewish family.'[28] Refusing to interrupt his education, Mr. and Mrs. Schoen sent seven-year-old Walter to the local Czech school where,

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[25] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.
[26] Hedwig Baudisch, Interview by author. 1 June 2004.
[27] York, *The Lure of the South Peace*, 946.
[28] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.

Photos 1 and 2 – Refugee Camp outside of Prague. 1938-1939. Private Collection of Werner Tschiedel.

despite the political tension, he found 'no hostility against me in school or [from] people where we were. As a matter of fact, when we left, the class came to our home and sang a song to me and gave me a book.'[29]

Czech police, however, actively searched for Socialist refugees among the hordes of people flooding into the area, using registration for work in labour camps as one method to surreptitiously identify and deliver Socialists to the Gestapo.[30] On 11 October 1938, the Prague police attempted to force political refugees back to the occupied territory by issuing citations demanding that offenders 'leave [the] area immediately, at the latest within forty-eight hours after receipt of this order, and [to] return without delay to your former residence.' Failure to comply meant fines, imprisonment or both. While denying the mass transport of refugees to the world press, the Czechoslovak government made every effort to pressure or eject evacuees back to territories now held by Germany. One reporter from the *Daily Telegraph* wrote that, contrary to government reports, refugees were 'being ruthlessly driven back to a terrible fate...From innumerable cases within my personal knowledge I can confidently assert that it is quite untrue that the right of political asylum is being generally observed.'[31] Corroborating this report, Tomslake settler Anton Kuenzl witnessed Czech police 'lur[ing] a number of Social Democrats to a train station with promises of food and then inform[ing] them that they were now to be deported en masse to the Sudeten German city of Mies.' Realizing the gravity of the situation, the refugees refused to board, but police forced them on while army personnel looked on and refused to take part. As the train prepared to depart,

> Anton's father, a reservist in the army, happened to pass his son's carriage and was recognized by the family. The father insisted that if his family were to be shipped to Germany (the final destination) then he too would have to go. The police finally relented and the Kuenzls were the only family permitted to remain

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[29]Walter Schoen, Interview, 28 May 2004.
[30] Kurt Weisskopf, *The Agony of Czechoslovakia, 38/'68.* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1968), 144.
[31] Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 35.

> behind, though some refugees later jumped from the train as it traveled towards Nazi-occupied territory, and returned to the city.[32]

In fact, in some cases, whole trainloads of refugees were rerouted across the border directly into German concentration camps, Dachau and Oranienburg, which had been emptied prior to the signing of the Munich Pact specifically to house the incoming Socialists.[33]

To the Nazis, the Socialists were 'enemies of the Reich,' while to the Czechoslovakian government, they were 'undesirable aliens.' They had nowhere to run and nowhere to hide as they were surrounded by Nazi-controlled territory and were required to register in Czech-held territory.[34] By mid-October 1938, the position of the Social Democrats had become critical, options were quickly running out, and money was becoming an issue as hundreds of thousands of refugees required food, clothing and lodging. Championing their cause and demanding the British government act on behalf of the Social Democrats, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *News Chronicle*, and the *Daily Herald* continued to report on the fate of the political exiles. Response was immediate as institutions and individuals pledging their support called on the government to do the same.[35] In co-operation with the *News Chronicle,* the mayor of London, Sir Harry Twyford, instituted a 'Lord Mayor's Fund' and collected a staggering $225,000 in aid.[36]

Ignoring the plight of the Jews and the Social Democrats, Czech leaders concentrated on relocating displaced Czechs. Two simultaneous events, however, altered the stance taken by some Czech officials: *Kristallnacht,* and the promise of a loan and a gift totaling £10 million

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[32]Bonar Gow, 'A Home for Free Germans in the Wilderness of Canada: The Sudeten German Settlers of Tupper Creek, British Columbia.' *Canadian Ethnic Studies.* Volume 10, 1 (1978), 63.

[33] York, The Lure of the South Peace, 946. See also. Jaksch, *Europe's Road to Potsdam*, 330.

[34] Weisskopf, *The Agony of Czechoslovakia*, 144-45.

[35] Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 31- 34. The National Council of the Labour Party passed a resolution to help the victims of France and England's failed diplomacy, and the University of Manchester called for the 'immediate admission of these refugees into England and France, pending a permanent arrangement for their future.'

[36] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 66. See also. Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 30. Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 14-15.

made to Prague from British and French governments.[37] Ironically, the nations that Czechoslovakians held most responsible for their country's demise financed the outlawed DSAP members' flight through private and public donations. While *Kristallnacht* demonstrated to the world the serious Nazi threat to Jews and other minorities, the money contributed by the British government allowed Czechoslovakia to provide for ethnic minorities displaced from the Sudetenland and helped to finance the relocation and care of Czech citizens. According to the settlement, the monies were to be 'allocated to refugees...no refugees will be forced to leave Czecho-Slovakia if they would thereby run the risk of danger to health, liberty, or life.'[38]

With Hitler turning his attention temporarily to other matters, the DSAP gained time to develop a course of action. For those Sudeten Germans who had avoided transport back to German-held territory, the only viable course was to escape to the West. The priority was to remove the upper echelons of the Social Democratic Party to safety (Fig. 3). Transportation out of Czechoslovakia was the first step of the rescue operation, but with Hitler tightening his stranglehold on the country, moving families became more problematic. Czech officials, bitter and enraged, often sabotaged efforts by the Sudeten Germans to receive documentation.[39] Pointing out that all former residents of the Sudetenland were now citizens of Germany, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr. Cěrny, refused to provide passports or visas to political refugees. Brokering a compromise, DSAP members negotiated interim passports, rose-colored documents,

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[37] Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace*, 913. See also. Donald Cameron Watt, *How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939.* (London: William Heineman Ltd., 1989), 88-89. The assassination of Ernst von Rath, a young secretary in the German embassy in Paris, by Herschel Grynzspan, a Polish Jew, touched off a night of rioting ostensibly carried out by the SA against Jewish persons and property. Twenty thousand Jews were arrested, the Jewish community fined, while many were beaten. The violence of this act shocked the world.

[38] Treaty Series No. 9 (1939), 'Financial Assistance to Czecho-Slovakia', London, January 27, 1939.

[39] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 63. Wieden claims that there were many instances of willful obstruction on the part of Czech officials.

Fig. 3

Subject	Relationship	Job and/or Trade	Involvement In DSAP
Max Lorenz	Mother	Factory Worker/Skoda	Member
	Stepfather	Factory Worker/Skoda	Member Dispatcher at the Front
Walter Schoen	Mother	Cotton Mill Worker	Member
	Father	Secretary of the local DSAP Head of the Republikanische Wehr (Republican Defense Corp.)	Employed by the DSAP
Anna Wiesner (Anne Marie Pohl)	Mother	Factory Worker/Weaving	Member
	Father	Receiver for a Grocery Store	Position Unknown Characterized as Heavily Involved
John Neubauer	Mother		Member
	Father	Pipefitter	President of Athletic Club and other activities
Hedwig Baudisch	She	Factory Work	Member
	Husband	Carpenter	Member Secretary/Manager
Werner Tschiedel	Mother	Factory Work	Member
	Father	Textile Worker/Trade Union	Spokesman for the DSAP in Friedland/Union Functionary/Worked for the State police, military and Sopade (militia?)

Chart indicating involvement of subjects or their parents in the DSAP
Chart indicates a high incidence of employment or involvement in union jobs and/or party activities.
Positions both paid and/or voluntary denote management or organizational involvement.

Source: Interviews by author.

referred to as 'Nansen passports' that authorized emigration but did not allow re-entry.[40] Social Democrats had no choice but to accept these documents, as passports were necessary to obtain visas.[41]

Aid workers from a variety of relief organizations were among the first to realize the severity of the political dissidents' position. While bureaucrats negotiated, workers hid those most wanted by the Gestapo, fed women and children, raised money and in some cases forged necessary documents. Among those most active in the transfer of Social Democrats were Doreen Warriner, a Left-wing academic, and two friends, Margaret Dougan and Canadian Beatrice Wellington (who had left her job in Geneva to assist Warriner). Writing of her experience Warriner recalled,

> I had in my care 170 women and children who were accommodated in six hotels: three groups in Chucle, two in Prague, and one group in the small Hotel Stern in Beroun. The longer their stay lasted, the more dangerous it became for the women, among them many who were known as anti-Henlein (Nazi) activists. Had we had permission for travel out of the country, it would have been much simpler, and the chances of being found out by the Gestapo would have been much less.[42]

Jean Rowntree, a Quaker aid worker, found herself trading sterling on the black market to finance her work with Sudeten refugees, delivering supplies to internment camps, castles and abandoned buildings and interviewing refugees desperately seeking visas to escape the country. Recruited by her cousin Tessa Rowntree and Mary Penman, sister of Labour MP Philip Noel-Baker, Rowntree arrived to find her cousin leading a group of refugees to the Russian and Polish borders. Immersing herself in the work, Rowntree persuaded a minister of the Irish government

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[40] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 62. See also. Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill, 'Rejecting "Misfits:" Canada and the Nansen Passport' *International Migration Review.* Volume 28 (2) 1994, 282-285. The Nansen Passport was proposed by a committee headed by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, an Arctic explorer and scientist of Norwegian birth who became the High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations. The passport was an international travel document replacing the loss of documents or the refusal of citizenship papers by a country to a group or individual during times of upheaval. Once issued the document, however, the holder was not allowed to return to the country that issued the document. By accepting the Nansen Passport, Social Democrats acknowledged that they could not return to their homeland.

[41] Andrew Amstatter, *Tomslake: History of the Sudeten Germans in Canada.* (Saanichton: Hancock House Publishers Ltd., 1978), 46.

[42] Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 54-55. Miss Dougan and Miss Wellington were both taken into custody by the Gestapo for questioning regarding their involvement with smuggling refugees.

to accept 500 glassworkers, with the proviso however, that none could be Jewish. Upon returning to England, she carried jewelry of Jewish families who had made arrangements to escape.[43]

By November 1938, despite what appeared to be an indifferent reaction to the Sudeten crisis, the British government had made enquiries throughout the Dominions and among Western European nations about the admission of an unspecified number of political refugees. Among those who responded were Sweden, which agreed to accept 230; Denmark 100; Norway, 60; Finland, 50; Belgium 300, all granted temporary visas, while Canada, New Zealand, Argentina and Australia continued to negotiate the terms on which new immigrants would be accepted. When Miss Eleanor Rathbone, Independent Member for Combined English Universities, questioned why the British government offered visas to only 350 men,[44] Chamberlain responded that 'permission to enter was given only to the actual individual in danger and not to his family, but the Government are willing to admit the families of those individuals, if similar undertakings about their maintenance are provided.'[45] The British government limited its liability to those directly endangered by the Nazis. Not only were these numbers wholly inadequate in light of the severity of the situation, but a permanent solution was necessary as the likelihood of the Socialists returning to their homeland was negligible.

With the delivery of visas, DSAP members converged on Wilson Station in Prague throughout December and January, stepping onto trains that would take them through Poland and on to their assigned destinations.[46] For some, it was only the first step on a long journey, for those granted visas to Belgium, Norway, and Denmark; it proved a temporary respite, as Germany's invasion of those countries in 1940 signaled a new hunt for DSAP members. Of 128 Socialists granted temporary visas in Belgium, eighty-two reached Britain when British soldiers

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[43] 'Jean Rowntree'. *News.Telegraph.* 28 December 2004. <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/03/05/db051.xml>
[44] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 59-60.
[45] Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 39, quoted from a session of Parliament 1 November 1938. See Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 49.
[46] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 61. See Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 52.

and seamen aboard a Norwegian ship saved them from drowning and picked them up as prisoners. Thirty were interned 'by mistake' for over six months in Great Britain.[47] Those who had immigrated to Finland were also forced to flee when the German army entered Finland to attack Russia.[48] Of those evacuees who found refuge in the Scandinavian countries, no report has been found of any surviving their second encounter with the Nazis.

With the question of financing solved, the questions of who, and how many, could be addressed. Although it is not clear how the selection process worked, a letter written on behalf of Rudolf Tschiedel offers some clue. It details Tschiedel's involvement in party matters, specifically his prominence within the district that would indicate the likelihood of his arrest had he remained in the country. The selection process appears to have given precedence to members with the highest rank and/or visibility within the DSAP, and thus most subject to arrest. The evidence suggests that in certain circumstances, proof of stature within the party was required[49] (Fig. 4).

According to Wenzel Jaksch and Walter Kolarz, at the beginning of March 1939 approximately 800 family members remained in Czechoslovakia, unable to obtain documentation allowing them to leave.[50] While relief agencies and the British Consulate in Prague worked to get the Social Democrats out of Czechoslovakia, another branch of the British government was seeking permanent homes for them. The British public demanded government assistance for the refugees; it in turn, requested assistance from the Dominion. While Prime Minister King felt no compunction in refusing Britain's request, Vincent Massey, Canada's High Commissioner to London (1935-1946), was a staunch monarchist and more inclined to consider the appeal. Fritz

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[47] Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 57.
[48] Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 50.
[49] Werner Tschiedel, Interview, 27 May 2004. Letter dated 2 January 1939, written in German regarding Rudolf Tschiedel. Signature is illegible.
[50] Jaksch and Kolarz, *England and the Last Free Germans*, 52.

Fig. 4

January 2, 1939

Mr.

Rudolf Tschiedel,

Prague – Vysočány 501

Dear Comrade!

In response to your inquiry, I am happy to attest that you were local spokesman [Lokalvertrauensmann] for one of the strongest local organizations of the district of Friedland – for the local organization of Weigsdorf. After that, you were functionary of the district organization [Bezirksorganisation] and member of the county directorate [Kreisleitung]. In addition you were active as a correspondent of the "Freigeist" [lit. "free spirit" – probably journal or paper of the party], in the intelligence service of the party, and also as union functionary [Gewerkschaftsfunktionär]. As far as I know, you also worked for the state police, for the military, and finally for the *Sopade* [? Might be a paramilitary unit of the socialist party]. In good consciousness, I can confirm that you always and everywhere stood in the front line and have worked harder for our cause than about any other comrade.

I hope that I served you well with this confirmation and remain with the best regards,

Yours,

[Signature]

Source: Document obtained from Werner Tschiedel. Interview by author. 27 May 2004. Translation by Christian Lieb, B.A., M.A. Letter was produced to prove Rudolf Tschiedel's involvement in the party and determine the likelihood of his arrest if not removed from Czechoslovakia. Priority was given to those most active in the German Social Democratic Party.

Wieden in *Sudeten Canadians*, however, attributes Canada's generosity not to Massey but his aide, Lester B. Pearson.[51]

Working in conjunction with Canadian High Commission, the British government announced in late November 1938 that Canada would indeed accept '5000 German social democrats,' although this was tempered by the proviso that these immigrants would be 'in good health and had to be suited to farm work, whether or not they had previously engaged in agricultural work.' They would also be required to provide a 'starting capital of $1500. per family'.[52] Having escaped from their homes with little more than the clothes on their backs, spending months in refugee camps bartering whatever they could for food, clothing and lodging, and being predominantly urban dwellers, these requirements demonstrate the Canadian government's naiveté or ignorance of the Sudeten Germans' situation. Nonetheless, the Social Democrats met the requirements with funds from the Czecho-Slovak Refugee Institute,[53] which had allotted a gift of £4 million specifically for emigration.[54]

Through cables and memorandums, officials continued to hammer out a deal that would transfer the refugees to Canada. Canada's offer to accept 5000, already inexplicably pared down to 3500, was limited to 1024, as 'the Nazi occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March

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[51] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 53-54.

[52]House of Commons, *Debates*, Thursday, March 9, 1939, 1841, Hon. T.A. Crerar (Minister of Mines and Resources) notes that although 3000 has been reported, in fact no specific number has been agreed upon. Note the date, negotiations were ongoing despite the fact that Canada had agreed in principle in November 1938. See Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 53, Vincent Massey turned the arrangements over to his aide, Lester B. Pearson, who negotiated the terms of the agreement.

[53]LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, C.R. Price, Dominion Office, to L.B. Pearson, 7 February 1939. The Czecho-Slovak Refugee Institute was headed by Dr. Zavrel. Monies made available for refugee settlement was the result of negotiations between Mr. Stopford, United Kingdom Liaison Officer with the Czecho-Slovak Refugee Institute and formerly a member of the Runciman Mission and Dr. Vilem Pospisil, of the Czecho-Slovak Refugee Institute. Few details exist about this organization.

[54]Treaty Series No. 9 (1939), 'Financial Assistance to Czecho-Slovakia', London, January 27, 1939. See Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians,* 67.Financial arrangements for Czechoslovakia included a loan of £8,000,000 guaranteed by the French and British government and a grant of £4,000,000 for refugee settlement. The money allocated for resettlement was to be held in trust in Britain and administered from there.

1939 prevented the emigration of the additional 2500 persons that Ottawa had agreed to take.'[55] Delays in negotiation and Hitler's abrupt occupation of the truncated country left thousands of Social Democrats, desperate to emigrate, trapped behind enemy lines.[56]

With the arrival of visas and the evacuation of 'at risk' men, reuniting families became the next priority in the Social Democratic exodus, as men would not be granted permission for permanent emigration without their families. Max Lorenz, his mother and sister, were finally granted papers to leave Czechoslovakia in mid-March 1939. With 'German tanks coming in, as we were going out,' a train filled with families of active Social Democrats left the station to cross the Polish border. According to Max, after a long delay due to some questionable documents, a Nazi officer who came late upon the scene demanded to know what the hold-up was. A quick-thinking relief organizer stated that it was a train transporting Jews out of the country. As this occurred prior to the inception of the 'Final Solution' during a period when Jews were still being hastily transported out of German territory, the official demanded that the train depart. Almost immediately, however, Nazi troops were sent ahead to stop the train. As troops reached the border, the quick thinking engineer, realizing the danger that lay ahead, sent word back advising his passengers that

> we should lay flat on the floor because the train is not going to stop, some of the German troops had gotten ahead of us to the border and they were trying to stop the train, and so we were told to lie flat on the floor, lights out and the engineer would go across the border. And that's how we got across, there were a few shots fired, yeah, but I mean machine guns and stuff. But it didn't get anybody; everybody was down on the floor.[57]

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[55] Wagner, 'Saskatchewan's Sudetendeutsche' 92. The numbers quoted were gleaned from official documents but reasons for these specific numbers are never given, nor are there any explanations given for the sudden decrease in numbers.

[56] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 78. See also. LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels No. C10436-C10437, Vincent Massey to an unidentified recipient, No. A.20, 2 February 1939, letter suggests that the transfer of 5000 persons or 2000 families to Canada would be favourable. Crerar, House of Commons *Debates*, 9 March 1939, 1841, Crerar states that 'we have agreed to take 3,000 souls, as the London report suggests, or 800 families as the Prague reports suggests, is pure guess work. We have not agreed to take any specified number.'

[57] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.

Max reached freedom with his face pressed against the floor of a wooden boxcar, aboard a speeding train, under enemy fire.[58] When asked what happened to those who could not get on that last train out of the region, Max sadly indicated with his hands that they just disappeared 'into the night.'[59]

The interviewees followed circuitous routes from Czechoslovakia to Canadian shores. Anne Marie Pohl (Anna Wiesner), then eight years old, remembers vividly her stay in England, arriving in London by airplane, moving to Byfleet and then on to Troutbeck. Joining his family in England, Anne Marie's father made it just in time to travel with his family to Canada, with the first group of settlers landing in Tupper on 26 April 1939. John Neubauer's family, first went to Belgium:

> our interim stay was in Belgium and Antwerp and I forgot how many weeks and then we went to the coast and the town of Heist...Heist on the Sea and we stayed there...everybody that came in the ship from Poland, we went through the Polish Corridor and embarked [on the] *Athenia* and then came down to Antwerp and disembarked there, and there I don't know how long we stayed there, maybe four or six weeks while all the rest of the immigration discussions and whatever and visas was gathered up by Mr. Wanka and his wife....[60]

Arriving in Liverpool, the Neubauers then boarded the *Duchess of York*, becoming part of the third group of Sudeten Germans to arrive in Tupper. Hedwig Baudisch left Czechoslovakia by train, after spending time in a refugee camp, while her husband Johann was transported out of the country immediately after the occupation. Hedwig was able to join her husband in England in February 1939, where they remained until they too joined the third group. Walter Schoen remembers traveling through the Danzig Corridor to Gydnia where his family boarded the luxury liner, the *Pilsudsky*; the family stayed for a week in Copenhagen before moving to the small island of Fyn, where they remained until they departed for Canada, by way of Liverpool, in June

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[58] Numerous reports of trains filled with Jewish refugees and others have been documented but nowhere to my knowledge has there been reference to any of these early transports being fired on. Perhaps Allied authorities chose not to publicize this occurrence in order to facilitate the transfer of more refugees.
[59] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.
[60] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

1939.[61] Werner Tschiedel's father, Rudolf was evacuated to England in February after spending two months with his family in a refugee camp two hours outside of Prague. The rest of the family waited for their papers until mid-March, when they departed on the last train to leave Czechoslovakia (Photo 3). They joined Rudolf in England, then moved to Canada with the fifth group aboard the *S.S. Duchess of York*.[62]

Photo 3 – Sudeten refugees aboard *S.S. Baltrover* from Poland to England. March 1939. Private Collection of Werner Tschiedel.

Fleeing for their lives, the German Social Democrats left behind their homeland, loved ones, and some, like John Neubauer, their idealism,

> we were right along, with them [the Czechs]; we would have fought along with them. But when afterward, when it came to the crunch they blamed, well they put all the Germans in the same bag…you were a German, you were a…[gesturing with his hands unable to say 'Nazi'].[63]

[61] Walter Schoen, Interview, 28 May 2004. See Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 15-17.
[62] Werner Tschiedel, Interview, 27 May 2004.
[63] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

Beleaguered by years of upheaval, mentally and physically exhausted, the exiles sought sanctuary for their families far from the Nazis. At the same time, the Sudeten Germans could not forget the plight of family and friends left behind, many stopping only to see to the safety of their families before attempting to return to Europe as Canadian soldiers. Others tired and dejected, feeling betrayed by the international community, and by their homeland, sought nothing more than to forget the turbulence of pre-war Europe and to establish new lives.

Chapter III

The Chosen Few

> *I'm afraid most of our Sudeten-Germans will never reach [Canada]. Some of them are out of the country but those who are still there will probably be in concentration camps. I have some pretty pathetic interviews these days with refugees who want to go to Canada. I wish we were a little more generous to them. It's distressing having to tell so many of them you can do nothing for them.*[1]
>
> *Lester B. Pearson,*
> *March 17, 1939*

According to Canadian immigration law, as amended in 1930, only 'farmers with sufficient means to establish themselves' were eligible for entry, and government officials chose to adhere to the letter of the law, at least publicly.[2] Given that the refugees were comprised almost exclusively of industrial and trades workers or professionals, the offer for sanctuary was seemingly worthless. Desperate to escape, however, the Sudetens, in collaboration with British and Canadian officials, misrepresented their farming experience to establish grounds for entry into Canada.[3] All told, 1024 Social Democrats made their way to refuge in Canada.

The second requirement was that immigrants be in good health. Since the German Czechs had no country to which to return to, Canadian immigration officials agreed that to ensure that 'defective immigrants' would not gain admission, all those seeking entry would have to undergo thorough examinations by 'trained Canadian doctors' or civilian authorities employed in Europe.[4] Civil examination would also be held overseas and, like the medical examinations,

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[1] John English. *Shadows of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson, Volume I: 1897-1948.* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989), 205. Quoted from a letter Pearson wrote to his mother and younger brother Vaughn, 17 March 1939.
[2] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Memorandum, Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa, 2 February 1939. See also. LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, F.C. Blair to J.N.K. Macalister refers to the general order allowing for agriculturalists as P.C. 695.
[3] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, High Commission to Secretary of State, Ottawa, 28 October 1938. 'About half of these are peasants and farmers and other half specially skilled workers mainly in glass, porcelain and special textiles mainly small factory workers who would also have some acquaintance with agriculture.'
[4] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Department of Mines and Resources, Memorandum, Ottawa, 2 February 1939.

regarded as final.[5] Interpretation of the phrase 'defective immigrants' appears to have resulted in a concentration on 'young refugees,' rather than 'healthy' persons.[6] Originally turned down due to his age, forty-six John Neubauer's father, Konrad, was admitted only after he pointed out that his three teenage children were willing to fulfill the family's obligations in the settlement.[7] Of the 518 Sudetens transported to Tupper, only nineteen men were older than forty-five; the oldest was fifty-one and almost without exception they had sons between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four.[8] Scrolling through the long list of settlers' names and ages, it is apparent that the government concentrated its sights on young, healthy families in an attempt to disqualify 'defective' persons from emigrating (Appendix A).[9]

Deportation, used routinely as a tool by the Immigration Branch to weed out the physically and mentally ill as well as the indigent and those deemed political subversives, had steadily climbed during the early part of the twentieth century, until reaching its zenith during the Depression.[10] An immigrant could be deported 'for cause arising within five years after admission: in the case of those who come in illegally, deportation extends over a longer period.'[11] In the case of the Czech refugees, the Immigration Branch and the two colonization companies had agreed in writing 'that when we take these families it is recognized that we keep them for

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[5] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, F.C. Blair to Rene Pelletier, M.P. for Peace River, Ottawa, 10 May 1939. The letter goes on to say that 'the political changes that have occurred in continental Europe in recent years have increased the difficulties of deportation but still it is possible to deport people to most countries.' See James B. Hedges, *Building the Canadian West: The Land and Colonization Policies of the Canadian Pacific Railway*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939), 369, the examination of potential immigrants by Canadian physicians and civil examiners was proposed in 1922 when a group of Russian Mennonites seeking refuge applied for admission to Canada, the proposal was almost abandoned when Russia refused to allow Canadian examiners into the country.

[6] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Blair to Pelletier, 10 March 1939.

[7] John Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

[8] Fritz Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, (Toronto: The Toronto Sudeten Club, 1982), 79, 'of the 1,042 persons going to farm, 387 were not yet 22 and the youngest settler was six weeks old on arrival.'

[9] *The Sudeten Story*, n.d., 24-44.

[10] Ninette Kelley, and Michael Trebilcock, *The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 227.

[11] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Blair to Pelletier, 18 March 1939.

good; in other words that deportation will not be possible.'[12] In a letter dated 10 May 1939, Frederick Charles Blair, Director of Immigration, assured Rene Pelletier, Social Credit Member of Parliament for the Peace River District of Alberta, that everything possible was being done to 'prevent the admission to Canada of defective immigrants and hence the deportation of this class of settler is now infrequent.'[13] When pressed in a second letter, however, Blair pledged that 'if in the case of these German Czechs a difficulty arises which calls for deportation, we will endeavor to bring that about.'[14] Blair intimated that it was well within the rights of the Department to nullify the contract made by the British, Czech and Canadian governments if the refugees failed to provide for themselves and their families.

With the selection process complete, one final hurdle remained: the question of who would finance this undertaking. Given the lingering effects of the Depression, few countries were willing to accept financial responsibility for refugees. Most countries, including Canada, had shut their borders to new immigrants during the Depression and remained unwilling to increase their intake even though financial indicators were predicting renewed prosperity.[15] In the House of Commons on 9 March 1939, T.A. Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources, enumerated the ways in which the government and the railways would benefit from the transfer of the German Czechs to Canada. Accepting Sudeten refugees was, for the Canadian government, a public relations coup. Crerar emphasized that everything was being done 'without...disturbing conditions here [in Canada and] while at the same time responding to the 'criticism...that since Canada has vast areas either thinly settled or not settled at all,...we should adopt a more generous attitude in the matter of immigration.' The Minister also pointed out that the Canadian government, having undertaken no 'obligation or expenditure' in connection with the emigration of the Sudetens, had

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[12] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Memorandum, Immigration Branch, Department of Mines and Resources, 2 February 1939. This point is reiterated in the agreement stating that 'we accept the families for permanent residence without any possibility of sending any of them home.'
[13] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Blair to Pelletier, 10 March 1939.
[14] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Blair to Pelletier, 18 March 1939.
[15] R. W. Baldwin, 'Czech's May Crash Our Gates,' *Saturday Night*, 54 12 November 1938: 5.

turned the entire project over to 'the colonization branches of the two railways,' while funding for the movement 'had been secured from abroad.'[16] Canada, in a grand gesture, accepted the political exiles, thereby avoiding mounting pressure to accept more immigrants, particularly Jewish refugees, and then promptly abandoned them to the two colonization agencies.[17]

The most central issue to the settlement and development of Canada is its immigration policy. From its inception, a small minority of politicians and civil servants have controlled that policy. Historically, immigration policy has been discriminatory and contradictory while immigration law has been vague and exclusionary. Ambiguous enough to be controlled by petty bureaucrats, official only when applied under its narrowest terms, Canada's immigration policy was buffeted by the whims of politicians, civil servants and the business sector. Blair, named director of Canada's Immigration Branch in 1938, was one of those individuals determined to restrict entry to all but Western European applicants or Americans who could claim ancestry from any of these 'preferred' nations.[18] 'Non-preferred' countries included Austria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Adamantly opposed to Jewish immigration, Blair advised officers in his department to deny applications by Jews from any country. Those who could not be denied based on policy were refused without explanation.

According to Irving Abella and Harold Troper in *None is Too Many,* Blair adhered to the regulation that only agriculturalists would be accepted in order to impede an influx of Jewish immigrants. As most European Jews were urban, that automatically reduced their eligibility for entry and the Immigration Department simply rejected those who did qualify. Convinced that the Sudetens were 'Social Democrats and Catholics' with only a few Jews among them, Prime

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[16] Crerar, House of Commons, *Debates*, 9 March 1939, 1840-1.
[17] Irving Abella and Harold Troper, *None is Too Many, Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948.* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Limited, 1982), 49.
[18] Kelley and Trebilcock, *The Making of the Mosaic*, 201, 259.

Minister Mackenzie King agreed to accept them. The Sudetens were characterized as 'non-Aryan Christians...in fact [they had] very little Jewish blood...and ...would make excellent settlers.'[19]

After 1906, immigration regulations became progressively more selective, the goal being to promote immigration to those who would seamlessly assimilate into Canadian society. By 1923, by order-in-council immigration guidelines stated that immigrants must be:

> (1) A bona fide agriculturalist... [with] sufficient means....
> (2) A bona fide farm labourer entering Canada to follow that occupation and has reasonable assurance of employment.
> (3) A United States citizen entering Canada from the United States provided it is shown to the satisfaction of Immigration Officer in Charge, that his labour is required in Canada.
> (4) Any British subject entering Canada directly or indirectly from Great Britain, or Ireland, Newfoundland, the United States of America, New Zealand, Australia or the Union of South Africa who shall satisfy the Immigration Officer in Charge at the port of entry that he has sufficient means to maintain himself until employment is secured.[20]

By 1925, however, the government, which had previously left the administration of immigration policy to the Minister of the Interior and its officials, collaborated with the CPR and the CNR to promote immigration and colonization. Prime Minister Mackenzie King signed the Railway Agreement on 1 September 1925 after the two railways threatened to close down their colonization departments. Officials in the Department of Immigration and Colonization had become so stringent in enforcing the guidelines that the Railways warned the government that without expanding immigration, millions of acres accessible by rail would remain vacant and valueless.[21] In exchange for allowing the Railways to recruit immigrants from 'non-preferred' countries, the government demanded that they 'invite only persons of the specified classes, and to transport to the countries of origin all those who, refusing to engage in agriculture or domestic service, became public charges within one year from their admission to Canada.' On 1 October 1927, the agreement was renewed for a period of three years, albeit with some revision.

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[19] Abella and Troper, *None is Too Many*, 49, quoting Lord Winterton, chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees to Prime Minister King, 6 December 1938.
[20] Donald Avery, *'Dangerous Foreigners': European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932,* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1983), 94.
[21] Avery, *Dangerous Foreigners'*, 98.

Sponsorship was required from an established agriculturalist; specific documents were required from the Department of Immigration, allowing for no substitutions or temporary passes, and immigration during seasons where individuals or families could not transfer directly onto the land was prohibited.[22] While there were few changes in official policy, other amendments and agreements limited immigration substantially. The Empire Settlement Act, the Railway Agreement and the permit system worked collectively to discriminate against Jews, Asians and peoples of colour while facilitating the transfer of British subjects and a few others from selected European countries and the United States.[23]

In 1925, the CPR amended its policy at the same time as the government introduced a policy favouring selective immigration. Eschewing land sales for land settlement, the railway entered a new stage of giving precedence to colonization on privately owned lands over the sale of its own lands.[24] The CPR bought abandoned or cheap property, often in isolated areas, and through its colonization department contracted the settlement of individuals or groups of immigrants. In exchange for assuming responsibility for their successful settlement, the CPR realized an income in addition to their fares and cartage, and further ingratiated itself with government officials. The railways were compelled to co-operate with the government to maintain viable routes and advantageous freight rates, but were also obligated to their investors, many of whom held positions in government or could influence government policy in some way.

Land settlement issues were complicated by the fact that the CCA was a land colonization company, originally comprised of two large landholders, the CPR and the CNR, as well as the Canadian government. Their interests, although not always consistent, became indistinguishable. For example, the CCA's profits depended upon agricultural settlement but the government's determination to admit only those deemed 'acceptable' undermined its goals.

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[22] Hedges, *Building the Canadian West*, 362.
[23] Avery, *'Dangerous Foreigners'*, 97. According to Avery, British farmers, although 'desired,' were doing too well to consider emigration, so the Empire Settlement Act was enacted in 1922 providing 'reduced transportation fares, agricultural training, and placement on Canadian farms.'
[24] Hedges, *Building the Canadian West*, 353.

Immigration policy was a reflection not only of business interests *per se*, but also of the moral and social preference of a powerful few. The Railways earned revenues not only from fares or cartage but also from the land grants bestowed on them by the Dominion government. This benevolence, James B. Hedges argues, compelled the parties to 'justify themselves by promoting immigration and settlement.'[25] The CCA devised a program of settlement whereby the railways would profit through land sales and increased traffic.

Founded in 1920 by Colonel J.S. Dennis, the Canadian Colonization Association was a semi-private organization promoting and assisting land settlement along the extensive railway networks of the West. It was especially active among the many religious and ethnic settlement groups that maintained ties to Europe and the United States and provided information regarding Canadian emigration opportunities.[26] The groups recruited settlers from their home countries and supplied information and in some cases monetary assistance to potential immigrants. These colonization societies, which were often volunteer organizations, worked closely with the railways to facilitate advantageous rates and land settlement opportunities.

Supporting specific colonization organizations guaranteed that those 'unfit' for life in Canada would be barred entry. In 1923, the CPR and the CNR acquired fifty per cent of the operation, while the federal government assumed the other half. In 1924, the government abandoned the association creating the Department of Colonization and Development, leaving the two railways in partnership until 1 January 1925, when the CNR withdrew to form its own Land

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[25]James B. Hedges, *Federal Railway Land Subsidy Policy of Canada*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 136. See Hedges, *Building the Canadian West*, 360, the Railways Agreement, entered into by the government via the Department of Immigration and Colonization and the Railways on 1 September 1925, laid out the goals of the government in relation to immigration and settlement and specified the objectives of the Railways as it pertained to settlement and colonization. The incentive for the Railways to sign the agreement was the promise of a two-year moratorium, lifting immigration restrictions, increasing the number of potential agriculturalists, as long as the Railways agreed to accept only those in agriculture or domestics.

[26]Hedges, *Building the Canadian West*, 364. Hedges lists six of the most active colonization organizations: the Scottish Immigrant Aid Society, the Lutheran Immigration Board, the Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization, the German Catholic Board, the Danish Immigrant Aid Society, and the Atlantis Hungarian Board.

Settlement Association, later referred to as the Department of Colonization and Agriculture.[27] After careful consideration, the CPR decided to maintain its colonization branch, operating as a 'subsidiary to the [government's] Department of Immigration and Colonization,' reorganizing with J.S. Dennis as president and hiring T.O.F. Herzer as manager.[28]

From 1925 to 1930, the CCA, not satisfied with confining its role to land settlement, refocused on financing and supervising settlers. Seeking the involvement of a variety of financial institutions, it named representatives of banks, mortgage companies and insurance agencies to its Board. Developing a farm management program, the CCA strove to limit its liabilities. So, at the same time as the CPR was forced to reorganize its colonization branch, assuming full responsibility of the CCA, the Railway Agreement created more opportunity for profit but at a higher risk. The CPR attempted to limit its liability by collaborating with a variety of financial organizations. The CCA was obliged to show a profit while continuing to maintain the gratitude and goodwill of the government.

In 1931, in response to the deepening Depression the government modified its policy again and severely restricted who it would accept, namely farmers with a 'bona fide' record in agriculture and sufficient capital.[29] Cancellation of the Railway Agreement placed the colonization companies in the precarious position of relying on the government to allow enough immigration to fulfill the companies' obligations to its shareholders. It also underlined the ties between the Railways, the Department of Immigration and the Canadian government.

By 1938, industrialists were pressuring the government for a more relaxed admissions policy. Despite evidence that immigration would enlarge the country's consumer base, increase

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[27]T.O.F. Herzer, *Some Recent Developments in Land Settlement.* (Winnipeg, 1930), 3. Dates are taken from an address given by Herzer to the Regina Board of Trade 15 January 1930 and the Calgary Board of Trade on 7 February 1930. Part of the presentation is authored by W.M. Neal, General Manager, Western Lines, Canadian Pacific Railway. See Hedges, *Building the Canadian West,* 365-367. Dates given by Hedges contradict those of Herzer but as the address was given in 1930 by members of the association, it is likely that the dates given in the address are correct.

[28] Hedges, *Building the Canadian West*, 365-367.

[29]Avery, *'Dangerous Foreigners'*, 91.

the demand for goods and services, expand employment opportunities and inject much needed capital into infrastructures, the restrictive policy remained in place. Immigration historians Kelley and Trebilcock charge that this was to ensure that the admission of Jews and other displaced persons would continue to be restricted.

Thus, the transfer of German Czechs to Canada is exceptional. The Sudetens were admitted at the end of a period of an extremely selective admissions policy and mass deportations, and at a time when agriculture was still economically depressed.[30] Not only were the Sudetens from a 'non-preferred' country, but given their leftist politics, their lack of religious conviction and non-agricultural trades, they were among the least likely to be considered acceptable citizens.

While Canadian immigration officials were willing to overlook the Sudetens' inexperience as farmers and the presence of a small minority of Jews among them, they were not willing to take on the expense of resettling a large group of European refugees. The Czechoslovakian government, however, financed the resettlement of the Social Democrats with money donated by England and France.[31]

On 14 December 1938, seven men met in the office of F.C. Blair of the Department of Immigration to negotiate the terms and conditions by which Canada would accept the Sudeten refugees. They were: Dr. Kamil Slapák, a Social Welfare official from Prague; Father Emmanuel Reichenberger, a Sudeten German Roman Catholic Priest; Franz Rehwald, a representative of the German Social Democrats; Dr. František Pavlásek, the Czechoslovak Consul-General in Montreal; Mr. J.K.N. Macalister, representing the CPR; and Mr. J.S. McGowan, of the CNR. The key points agreed upon at this meeting were:

> 1. The settlers would have to be in good health and had to be suited for farm work, whether or not they had previously engaged in agricultural work;
> 2. A starting capital of $1,500. per family would be required. This amount exceeded the usual requirement by 50%, since it was thought that a two-year

[30] Kelley and Trebilcock. *The Making of the Mosaic*, 217.
[31] Treaty Series No. 9 (1939), 'Financial Assistance to Czecho-Slovakia', London, January 27, 1939.

> training period, the need for erecting farm buildings, the clearing of land, and expert guidance would be required, resulting in additional costs. For single persons, who could join families $1,000. each would be needed.[32]

By 2 February 1939, the Canadian, British, French and Czech governments had agreed upon final terms. The British and French governments provided the funds for resettlement. The Czecho-Slovak Refugee Institute handled the administration of the funds. A limited number of single men attached to the group were to receive £200 or $886 plus transportation costs.[33] With the transfer of $260,000.00 to the Bank of Canada, the Social Democrats were deemed acceptable.[34]

Recognizing that the German Czechs were inexperienced farmers, the railways demanded that settlers be physically fit and with this condition met, the Sudetens automatically qualified as 'farmers'. The immigration department could then accept these 'farmers' while at the same time the colonization companies could demand a higher fee and more control over the settlement because of their inexperience, $1500 instead of the standard $1000.[35] Despite the fact that no changes were made to official immigration policy, the CCA and the Department of Colonization and Agriculture agreed to accept this group but 'recognize[d] that owing to the limited farm experience of many of these families, it [would] be necessary to obtain the services of a man who can live amongst a group and give special oversight and direction from day to day.' The contract also pointedly stated that 'the above arrangement does not apply to any industrial or other non-

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[32] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 56-59. Wieden points out that in official documents the positions and intentions of the foreign representatives was largely misstated. Contained in the document produced in these talks and subsequent documents was a statement regarding the need for secrecy concerning these negotiations so that they could not be compromised with adverse publicity.

[33] Jonathon Wagner, 'Saskatchewan's Sudetendeutsche: The Anti-Nazi Germans of St. Walburg,' *Saskatchewan History*, 33 (Autumn 1980), 91. See also. Lillian York, ed. *The Lure of the South Peace: Tales of the Early Pioneers to 1945*. (Dawson Creek: Historical Book Committee, 1981), 948.

[34] Andrew Amstatter, *Tomslake: History of the Sudeten Germans in Canada*. (Saanichton: Hancock House Publishers Ltd., 1978), 84.

[35] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Memorandum. Department of Mines and Resources. Ottawa. 1 March 1940, memorandum is stamped 'Vincent Massey'. See Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 57-58.

agricultural group.'[36] The contract was not ratified by members of the Social Democratic Party, nor were its terms clearly spelled out to the refugees. The money and the wording of the agreement between the Canadian government, the two railways, and the Czecho Slovak Refugee Institute became a major issue later when the Sudetens realized that they would have no say in financial decisions.

Comparing documents produced by supervisors and officials of the CPR with personal accounts of the Sudeten settlers reveals completely differing opinions and expectations on behalf of the two parties. Matters concerning finances were the most contentious issues and most of the controversy centers on the original agreement between the Czechoslovakian and Canadian governments. First, the settlers were under the impression that the $1500 per family 'gifted' to the Canadian Government represented monies held in trust for each family. Anne Marie Pohl remembers how in England, the men sat discussing ways of stretching their share of the fund (Photos 4 and 5).[37] Believing that the money would somewhat assure their futures, the settlers, with some judicious planning, hoped they would find safety and security in their new homes. Notified of their impending emigration to Canada, the Social Democrats elected a committee. This committee was to represent the interests of the group and to act as an intermediary between the settlers and officials in all financial and organizational matters. When the Canadian government turned matters over to the CCA, however, it placed no restrictions or guidelines on money disbursement as the contract stated that the 'Czechoslovak Government and the British Government is [sic] mainly interested in getting these families away from their present distress, they will not be so particular about a detailed accounting for the money.'[38] The refugees were bitterly disappointed when their opinions and suggestions were ignored.

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[36] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Memorandum. Department of Mines and Resources. Ottawa. 2 February 1939.
[37] Anne Marie Pohl. Interview by author. 28 May 2004.
[38] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437 Memorandum, Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch, 2 February 193.

Photo 4 – Sudeten refugees in Troutbeck, Britain. 1938 – 1939.

Photo 5 – Sudeten refugees in Troutbeck, England. Anne Marie Pohl is the little girl seated in the front row of picture. Spring 1939. Private Collection of Anne Marie (Anna Wiesner) Pohl.

The first group of German Czechs arrived in Tupper in April 1939; the eighth and final transport landed in August. As Hitler's troops marched into Prague on 15 March 1939, the thousands of Social Democrats remaining in Czechoslovakia were trapped. An inordinate amount of time spent debating the financial aspects of the transfer resulted in Canada accepting only 1024 Sudetens, far fewer than the 5000 immigrants it had originally promised to accept.

The settlers were anomalies to both the Canadian government and the Canadian Colonization Association.[39] Other ethnic groups such as the Doukhobors, the Hutterites and the Barr Colonists had settled in Canada, but these groups were more homogeneous, sharing religion, language, ideology and culture, whereas the Sudetens were a heterogeneous group sharing only language and politics. Moreover, these other settlers had specifically chosen Canada because it provided an opportunity for farming, whereas the Sudetens' sole purpose for emigrating was to avoid immediate detention or death at the hands of the Nazis. Immigration to Canada was not a choice but an escape. The Doukhobors and Hutterites chose Canada to avoid religious persecution and the Barr Colonists sought a better standard of living. The Sudetens, however, were refugees purely due to their political involvement in the Social Democratic Party.

In *The Making of the Mosaic,* Kelley and Trebilcock state that most of the Sudeten refugees were Roman Catholic and/or social democrats; this, however, is not strictly true. Almost all the Sudetens were social democrats, but few were religious. In many cases, Jews in the group listed their faith as Roman Catholic after advisors indicated that Jewish immigration was almost negligible. Of the many who were nominally Catholic, most, like the Schoen and Neubauer families, had severed their ties with the church. When called upon to recite scripture in school, John could do so easily but the family had refused to attend the local church.[40] It was obvious to Social Democrats where the clergy's sympathies lay because polling stations where priests and

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[39] Bonar Gow, 'A Home for Free Germans in the Wilderness of Canada: The Sudeten German Settlers of Tupper Creek, British Columbia.' *Canadian Ethnic Studies.* Volume 10, 1 (1978), 65.
[40] John Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

nuns voted showed one hundred percent support for the SdP.[41] Not confining their enmity to the Catholic Church; the Sudetens invariably eschewed organized religion. In McConnell's 1940 report to the CCA, he wrote:

> A resident priest holds service each Sunday in the Roman Catholic Church in the center of the settlement. Attendance is rather limited.
> Anglican services are being held in various houses and in the community hall, and recently a number of settlers were confirmed, several of these of part Jewish extraction.
> There appears to be little religion of any kind among the settlers.[42]

The small number of German-speaking Jews among the Tupper group had frequently been involved in leftist politics in Central Europe and had often been alienated from their religion, exchanging 'religious beliefs for the tenets of socialism or communism.' In fact, a majority of DSAP intellectuals were Jewish.[43] According to the terms of the agreement, the Canadian government could not reject refugees based on religion, political opinion or ethnic background, but pre-screening ensured that only a handful of Jews were included in the group.[44]

Almost all occupations were represented, including factory workers, trades people, office workers, journalists, doctors and executives. In fact, J.S. McGowan, the CNR official in charge of the Saskatchewan settlement, told Blair that 'the only profession missing appears to be that of lawyer.'[45] It was much the same in the Tupper settlement. Among the exiles were: Dr. Arnold

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[41]Walter Schoen, *The Tupper Boys: A History of the Sudeten Settlement at Tomslake, B.C.* (Victoria: Trafford, 2004), 6.

[42] Glenbow Archives, '*The Sudeten Settlement, Tupper, BC,*' Report of second year's operations by F.B. McConnell. Tupper, 1940, the Sudetens were most concerned with providing adequate housing to those arriving but the CCA insisted the church be completed taking labourers away from the task of house construction.

[43] Nancy Merriwether Wingfield, *Minority Politics in a Multinational State, The German Social Democrats in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938.* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1989), 24, 139.

[44] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Treaty Series No. 9 (1939). Financial Assistance to Czecho-Slovakia. London. 27 January 1939, 10. The document reads 'without any discrimination against any person on account of his religious belief, political opinions or racial origin'. See also. Eric Koch, *Deemed Suspect*, (Toronto: Methuen, 1980), x, Koch states that 'the 4,000 Jewish refugees who were admitted to Canada during the Hitler years either had to demonstrate that they had capital, or access to capital, or that they could be employed in agriculture. A few got in because they had connections or could make a special case.'

[45]LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Canadian National Railways. Department of Colonization and Agriculture. J.S. McGowan to F.C. Blair. 5 November 1940.

Glass, a surgeon, unable to practice in Canada without a license;[46] Alfred Rei, master carpenter; Harald Schwarz, a medical student, forced to escape to England through Switzerland; his soon-to-be-wife, Elsa Kauer, an Olympian at the Workers' Olympiade in Antwerp and the Executive Secretary to the President of the Union of Construction Workers;[47] and Willi Wanka, chairman of the youth wing of the National Executive of the Social Democratic Party.[48]

Most of the women had worked in factories and offices. Some of them lacked basic homemaking skills; the majority had no idea of how to bake bread or make butter since in Czechoslovakia these products were cheaper to buy than to make.[49] In fact, according to Werner Tschiedel only three or four women had any previous experience in agriculture.[50]

It was obvious that the Sudetens were ill prepared for life in the north. The railways, however, were eager to go ahead with the experiment in hopes that is success would create a new category of settlement prospects. Now committed to the programme, the railways were determined that the operation would not fail. The Sudetens simply became a part of an experiment, the first of its kind -- a settlement scheme of a magnitude never before attempted. The whole project was a gamble with an uncertain outcome, but the CCA was determined to implement the programme, regardless of the fact that it was in no way prepared to accept 518 European industrial workers and turn them into farmers within a two-year period.

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[46]Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 101. Dr. Glass later took night classes, received his license and practiced medicine in Hythe, Alberta.

[47]Borderline History Committee, *From Tears to Triumph*, 180. Elsa Kauer took part in the Workers Olympiade in Antwerpen as a gymnast. The Workers Olympiade was staged in protest of the Berlin Olympics. Elsa both individually and as a member of the Czechoslovakian contingent placed second to the Russian professional team.

[48]William Wanka, *The Sudeten Story*, (n.p., n.d.), 11. Wanka was the youngest member of the National Executive at 28 and acted as a translator for Wenzel Jaksch, leader of the German Social Democratic Party, during negotiations in England.

[49] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 101.

[50] Werner Tschiedel. Interview by author. 27 May 2004.

Chapter IV

The Settlement Scheme

> *Now when I move to my quarter-section in the spring this does not mean that I will have anything to say there. As before, the land is still owned by the CCA and the crop will be considered as a community crop... The settler is asked to look after himself but they refuse him the right to do with his land what he wants. It is impossible for one to receive a reply here since nobody seems to know how to get the wagon out of the mud in which it has been driven.*[1]
>
> *Frank Reilach, Tupper, to his brother Gustav and family*
> *26 January 1941.*

Among the fifth group arriving in Tupper, was Max Lorenz, a boy of fourteen, looking forward to seeing cowboys and Indians in the Wild West; for him the journey to Canada was a great adventure. Arriving in Tupper at midnight, Max and the rest of the group woke early to walk across the tracks to survey the town (Photo 6). 'In the morning everybody was anxious to see the town. Well, there wasn't such a thing. There was a grocery store with a gas bar...everybody came back from across the tracks.'[2] After dispatching the "German Czechs" by rail across the continent, the CCA managers set the refugees to work, dividing them into work parties to construct shacks or clear land. Organized on a co-operative basis, everyone in the settlement was expected to pull his or her weight. Never before had a colonization scheme been attempted on such a scale, with participants who had no experience in agriculture. The CCA was determined to succeed in this new endeavour but in its eagerness forgot that it was dealing with traumatized human beings who needed time and assistance in acclimatizing to a new country and a new way of life.

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[1]LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437.

[2]Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004. Max turned fourteen as the ship came into Canadian waters. See Borderline History Committee, *From Tears to Triumph*, (Altona: Friesens Corporation, 2003), 12. According to Emma Koecher 'when the conductor of the train said "Next Stop: Tupper!" all the ladies got ready and fixed their hair and put on makeup. When the train stopped, they asked why they were stopping in the middle of the bush and not town. They were told, "this is Tupper!'
Although excited to encounter the Native populations, the nearest Aboriginals were located about forty to fifty miles east of the Sudeten settlement (Horse Lake). The refugees rarely saw them.

From industrial Europe, the settlers found themselves transplanted four hundred miles northwest of Edmonton, Alberta. Having no idea of the vast distance between communities compared to their European home, the Sudetens were stunned to find snow on the ground in April, and a community that housed only a few souls surrounded by miles of bush. The area, chosen by the CPR, was a block of land called Tate Creek Ranch, known locally as the Gundy Ranch, a derelict ranch abandoned after a proposed veterans' settlement scheme failed.[3] In 1935, the land in question was described as being 'one-third open prairie, one-third bushy and one-third timber.' In fact, the vegetation could only be described as muskeg, the timber, predominantly poplar, and the rest brush.[4] Perhaps Mrs. Baudisch described it best in her halting English as 'bush, everything was bush...bush, poplars, all poplars.'[5] What land that was cultivated required extensive work to bring it to 'fair' condition.[6] Comprising approximately 16,000 acres, of which only 650 acres were under cultivation, the Ranch expanded with subsequent purchases by the CCA, until it included a total of 23,626 acres. The CPR paid $1.25 per acre for the original Tate Creek Ranch and optioned other properties at an average cost of $3.00 per acre, bringing the total overall average cost to $1.71 per acre. It intended to subdivide the land into quarter sections and so purchased enough land to supply a quarter section to each family.[7] By locating the Sudetens in the Peace River district, the CPR hoped to settle large groups of refugees and to develop valueless

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[3] Andrew Amstatter, *Tomslake: History of the Sudeten Germans in Canada.* (Saanichton: Hancock House Publishers Ltd., 1978), 83. 'The Canadian Colonization Association was the settlement branch of the Canadian Pacific Railway, given the task of disposing of the company's land.'

[4] Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, Mr. P.J. Tooley to Mr. A. Reid. Grande Prairie. 6 March 1935. See also. Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, James McCaig, Solicitor Province of Alberta to George Walker, General Solicitor, Law Department, CPR. Calgary, AB, 22 July 1939. 'When the site was selected it was expected that should land come available the CCA would also buy land on the Alberta side of the border but were subsequently advised that 'the Alberta Social Credit Government, when approached about this matter, apparently decided the Canada Colonization Association [should] confine its activities, in the meantime at any rate, to British Columbia.'

[5] Hedwig Baudisch. Interview by author. 28 May 2004.

[6] Soil quality is generally rated poor, fair to good.

[7] Jonathon Wagner, 'British Columbia's Anti-Nazi Germans: The Tupper Creek Refugees,' *BC Studies*, 39 (Autumn 1978), 7 and Lillian York, ed. *The Lure of the South Peace: Tales of the Early Pioneers to 1945.* (Dawson Creek: Historical Book Committee, 1981), 950.



Photo 6 – Sudetens arrive at Tupper. 17 June 1939. Private Collection of Werner Tschiedel.

Photo 7 - Picture taken from behind Ranch barn. Note the Bell tents off to the right. 1939. Private Collection of Werner Tschiedel.

land. Charging the settlers $3.55 per acre at the end of the company's supervision of the settlement, it was also able to post a tidy profit.[8] The site chosen for the Sudetens' settlement was virtually at the end of a CPR tributary, the Northern Alberta Railway.[9]

There were few buildings on the property when the first settlers arrived. Scrambling to provide some type of housing, the CPR constructed crude log shells sixteen or twenty-two feet square but left the insulation and finishing to the residents. Only eight houses were finished when the first twenty-five families arrived. If a structure was not available when they arrived, the settlers slept in a boxcar or moved to bell tents on loan from the army until enough houses were finished (Photo 7).[10] As more refugees arrived, the CPR had more tarpaper shanties built, but two or three families had to share them until more houses were available.

The shacks caused much consternation among the Sudetens. Referred to as granaries or woodsheds, the structures were constructed of shiplap with tarpaper on the outside. Described by Walter Schoen:

> The roof was two layers of shiplap with tarpaper between. Each house had two single pane windows 16 inches square and one 16 X 32 inches consisting of two sliding windows. A tin-pipe chimney nailed on the peak near one end of the roof had no rain cover. Each house had a four-burner kitchen stove and enough tin pipes to reach the roof.[11]

As Max Lorenz commented, 'over time the tarpaper tears off and the shiplap dries leaving large knotholes.'[12] The structures were not conducive to a climate registering temperatures of -30°F to -55°F in the winter and terrain that was a breeding ground for mosquitoes in the summer. The CCA charged the Tschiedel family on 7 March 1940 $113.50 for their home, even though it had

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[8] Walter Schoen, The Tupper Boys: A History of the Sudeten Settlement at Tomslake, B.C. (Victoria: Trafford, 2004), 96.
[9] The end of the line was Dawson Creek, BC.
[10] Fritz Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, (Toronto: The Toronto Sudeten Club, 1982), 79. The Sudetens arrived in small groups at different intervals.
[11] Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 56.
[12] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.

cost the CCA less than $50 for materials and labour to build it. In fact, settlers performed eighty percent of the work on the houses (Appendix B).[13]

Not only was housing primitive but so too were living conditions. When offered for sale, the property was said to be 'well watered by creeks and lakes and water can be obtained by boring at a depth of fifty feet.'[14] That water supply sufficed in 1939 but by 1940 despite four wells on the property 'the water level dropped and the streams dried up' forcing the residents to find alternate sources for their domestic supply.[15] Water, settler Frank Reilich notes, continued to be problematic even into 1941:

> in the Fall there was no water in Tate Creek. The Creek froze over without there having been any water in it since July. Our water supply when we do not use melted snow comes from Pouce Coupe River. In spite of the fact that this river has not carried any flowing water for a long time now, there are some deep spots, which are not frozen right through. It is true that we have to bore holes two feet deep and deeper to get water. However, it cannot be used for cooking purposes as it stinks like cow urine. For the kitchen, I have brought some ice over from Swan Lake. In addition, we use melted snow.[16]

Purchased without surveying for source water, most of the water in the several lakes and streams was not potable. Every interviewee spoke of hauling water, sometimes for as far as nine miles.

Making the situation more difficult was the presence of Supervisor Major Fraser B. McConnell. A litany of complaints against him failed to remove him from the CPR's employ. 'Da Konnel,' as the refugees referred to McConnell, was a petty dictator, with no empathy for the exiles or their plight. Sent to Tupper to manage the property, he treated the Sudetens like European 'peasants.' With much left to his discretion, McConnell was stingy with supplies,

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[13]Tschiedel, Interview, 27 May 2004. Original invoice provided by Mr. Tschiedel. See also. Glenbow Archives. Canadian Colonization Association. Memorandum – Re: Progress Report. 5 July 1939 that reads 'the cost of the houses is slightly less than $50.00 per house, including material, labour, paper and windows, hardware.'

[14]Glenbow Archives. Canadian Colonization Association, Tooley to Reid, 8 March 1935.

[15]Glenbow Archives. Canadian Colonization Association, Operation Reports for 1939 and 1940 produced by F.B. McConnell.

[16] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Frank Reilach to Gustav and family. Tupper. 26 January 1941. This letter was intercepted by postal authorities and translated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police before being sent on to F.C. Blair, Director of Immigration, Department of Mines and Resources. Letters were routinely intercepted and translated, several are included in the file.

made no arrangements for the distribution of personal money for the settlers, and, when asked about the arrangements, replied that he was responsible to the company and not to them.[17] Unfortunately, McConnell was not only autocratic but also inexperienced. When the settlers arrived they received inadequate foodstuffs'[18] No meat was available, milk for the children was in limited supply, and there were no storage facilities for what supplies were on hand. Cooking utensils, buckets and winter clothing were also in short supply.[19] The Major may have had experience dealing with military recruits but obviously had no idea of how to deal with families that included women and children. The site was unprepared and disorganized from its inception and things did not improve until McConnell's removal in 1941.

Perhaps the best example of McConnell's ignorance of the settlers is in an incident regarding the ordering of winter clothing. Unprepared for the coming winter, the settlers required boots, coats, and gloves and compiled a list of their clothing needs. When McConnell reviewed their requisition, he cut the order in half and took the list to Edmonton with him. McConnell ordered $6500.00 in outerwear, the clothing arrived but 'the men's shorts turned out to be boys' size while all the shirts were oversized.'[20] Most upsetting to the settlers, however, was that all the clothing that arrived was brown in colour, an unwanted reminder of their recent escape.[21]

McConnell knew nothing of agriculture. He bought used equipment that was broken or ill-suited for the settlers' requirements and acquired livestock that was past its prime or temperamental. Needing a second horse to balance the rigging on a wagon, Werner Tschiedel's father purchased a horse of dubious age. The only horse available was twenty-eight years old,

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[17] Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 52.
[18] Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 35. Upon arrival each family was given '1 50 lb. bag of flour, 1 25 lb. sack of rice, 1 10 lb. bag rolled oats, 1 10 lb. tin of lard, 1 5 lb. package dried prunes, 1 5lb. pack dried apple slices, ½ sack of potatoes, 1/3 bag of carrots, 1 5 lb. bag cream of wheat, 1 10 lb. tin of syrup, 1 doz. eggs, 1 5 lb. marmalade, 20 lb. beans, and 1 tin of tomatoes per family.'
[19] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 104, McConnell refused to buy raisins or chocolate as he considered them luxuries. Only one bucket was provided to each family to be used for drinking water, dishwater, and milk, and he only allowed a second cooking pot when it was discovered that he had 60 in storage.
[20] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 105.
[21] Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 68.

which he bought for $20.00.[22] Other settlers told similar stories. When a horse injured Walter Schoen's father by ramming him into the side of a stall, Walter found out 'quite by accident' that was why the animal had been sold in the first place.[23] Local farmers soon realized that the settlement was a profitable dumping ground for old machinery and difficult farm animals and took advantage of the settlers' ignorance.

Arranged in clusters of 15 or 20 families to facilitate co-operative farming, the settlers were organized into groups to clear land, learn farming techniques and build homes or barns. Each small colony shared buildings, livestock, machinery and equipment, while two schools and the church were centrally located in relation to all the groups.[24] The plan was to start the settlers off on a co-operative basis until enough land was cleared and experience gained to set each family on its own. The CCA had developed this form of farm management in the 1920s when it determined that property sales alone did not provide sufficient returns to maintain its lines. Investing in settlement was determined to be the most cost efficient way for the railways to turn a profit but to attract willing agriculturalists and to keep them on the land they needed to provide assistance with farm management. Few farmers had enough capital to maintain their operations during times of poor crops or if unexpected expenses arose. The CCA began to finance these farmers through crop repayment plans. Based on communal living, the Mennonite community set a precedent in size and formula that the CCA eventually implemented in Tupper. The success of this farm management plan with a Mennonite colony near Winnipeg provided the blueprint for the Tupper settlement.[25] The CCA, however, forgot that the Mennonites were experienced agriculturalists and the Sudetens were not.

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[22]Tschiedel, Interview, 27 May 2004.
[23] Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 146-147.
[24] Wanka, *The Sudeten Story*, 12. Each group was given a name – West End, Riverside, Parkdale, North Group, South Group, East Group, Springhill and North-West Group.
[25] 'This colony of 3,000 acres would not have survived the first year without actual direction. After three years we believe it is safely established, this year's net returns after paying operating and living expenses being in the neighborhood of $25,000.00.' T.O.F. Herzer, *Some Recent Developments in Land Settlement,* Winnipeg,, January 1930.

The co-operative plan was flawed from its inception. The CCA assumed that it was 'compatible with the social democratic principles of these people' and they would have no qualms with sharing land, tools and equipment.[26] The assumption appears to have been that for Socialists, collective living was the norm. Although the Neubauer family, for example, supported the Social Democratic Party, the idea of sharing land was not part of their ideology. John Neubauer states:

> that was another mistake...we thought that here every household was going to be individual but when we got here it was to be a commune like, the whole thing, so we were kind of in the wrong place for some reason because we wanted to be in the individual, like in Saskatchewan there were no co-operatives, everyone got their own little place....[27]

In northern Saskatchewan, the CNR had bought up individual farms cheaply and turned them over to families as they learned basic farming techniques. This plan fared no better than the CPR scheme, as the farms had been previously abandoned due to poor soil and low yields.[28]

The CCA organized the settlement in what they deemed a co-operative scheme. The plan, however, had very little in common with established co-operatives. First, the basic tenets of co-operative ideology require 'co-operation,' an agreement by its residents to work, and/or live collectively. Some co-operatives are insular whereas others collaborate solely on the administration of land, equipment or simply in purchasing. The Social Democrats were not questioned about their willingness to establish or participate in the Tupper Co-operative. Without resident approval or willing involvement, the settlement was neither technically nor ideologically a co-op. Secondly, establishing what it determined to be a co-operative, the CCA disallowed any resident input. The settlers had no say in any part of the colony's administration. When the settlers protested, they were admonished and sent back to work. Third, once the settlement was

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[26] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, 'Report of the Tupper Creek, BC, Sudeten Settlement Scheme, Tupper, BC, 11 September 1941.
[27] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.
[28] Rita Schilling, *Sudeten in Saskatchewan: A Way to Be Free*, (Saskatoon: St. Walburg Sudeten German Club, 1989), 105-106, much of the land was bought from disillusioned farmers who were returning to Germany.

established, the CCA instituted a program of individualization. The process was haphazard and piecemeal; the CCA had no plan or goal other than to divide the land and depart. The management chose to use co-operative devices such as grouping the houses to promote co-operation but in other areas fostered conflict and discontent among the residents, conditions that were at odds with co-operative living.

The settlement did nothing to establish an atmosphere conducive to co-operative living, but manifested an atmosphere of mistrust among the inhabitants. Incompatibility contributed to the languishing of the co-operative farming idea, but a greater cause was the Sudetens' ignorance, apart from co-operative stores, with the tenets of co-operative or communal living that the CPR seemed to expect them to adopt. John Neubauer cites human nature as the most likely culprit for the co-operative's failure:

> How are you going to do anything unless you partner up with your neighbour and you know how long that lasts, that doesn't last very long because one guy is more energetic than the other,...maybe he was smarter and thought, hey this is never going to amount to anything and why should I go even and work myself for something that is not going to fly.
> ...[It] doesn't work no matter how, even between relatives because everybody has a different mind and everybody [sic]are differently ambitious. Somebody wants to go ahead and doesn't mind the work twenty hours or as long as its daylight...the other guy he is not used to it, he never did it before, he worked eight hours and he still [works the same way] and that's when things fall down right there.[29]

Individualization became the priority for those who wished to remain in the community.

Management decisions and work ethic became two points of contention between CCA managers and the Sudetens. Part of the Sudetens' argument was that the colonization company scheme did not provide them with even the basics to survive. Devising a modest financial formula giving each adult $5.00 per month and each child up to the age of fourteen $2.50 per month, to a maximum of $25.00 per family per month, the elected settlement committee wanted residents to have more control over their personal finances. Couples without children were to receive an extra $1.00 per month bringing their total to $11.00, and single men $6.00 per month.

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[29] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

This plan called for the CCA to turn cash over to the settlers allowing them to purchase items at their discretion rather than having to buy from the company store 'on account.'[30] According to official documents, the maximum a family could receive a month was $25.00 but most families received only $15.00 per month no matter how large the family. The Tschiedel family, for example, received only $15.00 per month for a family of five.[31] Settlers received $2.50 hard currency; the rest of their monthly stipend was 'on account' at the company store but no accounts existed to substantiate McConnell's figuring.[32] The settlers' wanted less than official documentation indicated was their monthly allotment, but McConnell refused to adopt the plan. Accounting irregularities included the hiring of McConnell's son to work in the office for $50.00 per month and the absence of documentation for the purchase of items such as tools. Without accounting records, the settlers had no idea what items were charged to their individual accounts. Even after adopting an invoice system, the settlers were routinely overcharged for basic items (Fig.5). Residents were told that they were being charged wholesale prices at the company store, but a sampling of original invoices compared to items advertised in the Eaton's catalogue, reveals that settlers were charged retail or more for most items (Appendix B). The colony had no system of distribution and inadequately stored food spoiled. Those who lived closest to the general stores often received items while those living in outlying areas often went without.

Mismanagement of both skills and resources was common. McConnell often hired outside workers to perform tasks that the Sudetens could do, such as driving farm equipment. The company also refused to listen when settlers demanded that the construction of the church be delayed until homes for new arrivals were complete.[33] No medical facilities or supplies were

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[30] University of Winnipeg, Special Collections, Wanka Collection. Wanka to McConnell, Tupper, BC, 18 December 1939. According to Wanka 'this scheme keeps the monthly cash-allowance...for January 1940 at $2323.00, i.e. below the limit which had been agreed with Mr. Herzer during his last visit to the settlement.'

[31] Tschiedel, Interview, 27 May 2004.

[32] Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 52.

[33] Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 99-103.

Fig. 5



CCA 2-8A

CANADA COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION

ORDER NO. 6076

TO: (VENDOR) Erich Hein

ADDRESS:

PLEASE ENTER OUR ORDER FOR THE FOLLOWING, TO BE DELIVERED OR SHIPPED TO:—

(CONSIGNEE) Inventory

AT: SHIP VIA

COMPANY OR CLIENT — OUR FILE NUMBER 509

LEGAL DESCRIPTION

DATE June 30/41 SUPERVISOR G Lawatsky

QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION	PRICE	AMOUNT
	House, ord. & 3,217		113 50
	Double saw		2 25
	Fork		98
	Shovel		90
	Rake		48
	Scythe		2 45
	Hoe		64
	~~Stove, pipes~~		~~18 76~~
	Axe		1 20
	Heater, pipes		8 74
	Lamps		86
	Lantern		99
			$146 75

to be debited
Authority for Expenditure: Johanna Hein

INSTRUCTIONS: Upon delivery of the goods described, the signature of the Farmer must be secured to the yellow copy of this order, acknowledging receipt of the goods. Mail the yellow copy, together with your invoice IN DUPLICATE, for approval and payment to:—

CONDITIONS: 1. Prices to include delivery to address, or nearest railway station of consignee, unless otherwise provided. 2. The Vendor undertakes to deliver the goods or chattels covered by this order clear of all liens and encumbrances and in the case of livestock, to guarantee such livestock to be free from vice and disease. 3. No goods will be paid for unless regularly ordered by the Canada Colonization Association.

Please show our order number and reference number on invoice.

Original: To be retained by Payee.

Original invoice from the CCA. Although told that residents would be charged wholesale prices, most were charged regular retail. Private Collection of Werner Tschiedel. Invoice belonged to his brother-in-law, Erich Hein.

available and, despite the presence of an eminent surgeon, Dr. Glass, the CPR insisted that he work as a labourer rather than study for his licensing exams. Tools were often lost or destroyed as work groups who had been assigned specific areas to clear, left their tools only to return to the next day only to be assigned to a different area.[34]

Supervisor McConnell and the CCA refused to acknowledge the Sudetens' elected committee, accusing it of being overly concerned with the business of the CPR and neglecting their roles as farmers. Branding the committee as troublemakers and interlopers, McConnell attempted to discredit them when they criticized his decisions. The supervisor routinely targeted Willi Wanka, his most ardent critic. Wanka was not originally an elected member of the Sudeten Committee but a representative of the German Social Democratic Party. His duty was to keep exiled DSAP leader Wenzel Jaksch apprised of the Sudetens' situation in their new home.[35] Formerly a translator for the German Social Democratic Party, Wanka held a trusted position as a party insider and former leader of the DSAP's youth movement. Keeping in close contact with the exiled leadership in London, Wanka reported directly to Jaksch, who maintained contact with Vincent Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner in Britain, advocating when he could for the rights of the settlers.

Assisting Jaksch in the transfer of Social Democratic members to Canada, Wanka was in the last group of refugees to arrive in Tupper. In an obvious misunderstanding between the immigrants and the CCA, Wanka informed McConnell that he was the duly elected leader of the settlers and would take responsibility in overseeing the operation, including the division of work and monies. Wanka proceeded to make changes and demanded an accounting for each man. Clashes between the two men came to a head and while Wanka complained directly to F.C. Blair, complaining of the supervisor's treatment of his charges, McConnell contacted CPR Commissioner J.N.K. Macalister who in turn reported to Blair. An unsympathetic Blair informed

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[34] Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 57.
[35] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 109.

Macalister that Wanka 'came here...just like any other settler and he will have to accept direction or get out altogether.' Blair described Wanka as 'a gentleman [who] knows nothing at all about farming or settlement but apparently wants to make himself a little Hitler amongst his people and his next move will be to demand payment for his activities.'[36] Reprimanding Wanka directly, Blair advised him 'that it would be to the advantage of the settlers and to their general welfare in this country, if they left their European politics in Europe along with the money and other effects they were compelled to abandon when they came here with little more than they wore except the financial help supplied by the British Government out of the Czech loan.'[37] This statement implies much about Blair's opinion of the Social Democrats' politics. Blair saw the committee simply as an extension of the settlers' Leftist tendencies and discredited any complaints simply as political posturing. Did the Sudetens have a political agenda of their own? Of course, the goal of the refugees was to establish themselves in their new homes without giving up their Social Democratic principles, for which they had fought long and hard, beliefs that had endangered their lives and the lives of their families. Blair's ignorance of this fact only exacerbated an already tense situation.

Charges of mismanagement and highhandedness continued unabated, with Wanka sharply accusing McConnell of acting as though he were 'dealing with internees rather than settlers.'[38] Having delivered a list of recommendations compiled by the settlers' committee to the CCA, Wanka was incensed when T.O.F. Herzer, General Manager of the CCA, refused to compromise on even one of the settlers' points, including a revision of the division and administration of crops, accelerated individualization, transfer of title and equipment to the settlers, the removal of McConnell from the settlement, and the recognition by the CCA of the

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[36]LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Memorandum, Office of Director, F.C. Blair, Ottawa, 17 October 1939.
[37]LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Office of Immigration, Mines and Resources to Supt. E. W. Bavin, Intelligence Officer, R.C.M.P., 5 September 1940.
[38] Wagner, 'Tupper Creek Refugees', 12. Wanka in a memorandum dated October 1940 accused McConnell and his abrasive attitude for causing 'at least 50% of the difficulties on the settlement.'

settlers' committee. Herzer responded that the CCA's responsibility was to the Canadian government 'and not to the settlers themselves,' so it was unwilling to address the issues that the refugees had requested. The most emphatic portion of the requests dealt with McConnell, Wanka charged him with defaming the 'starters,' degrading the committee at every opportunity, and attempting to bribe a committee member in order to create disunity in the administration of the settlement. Claiming the removal of McConnell 'would automatically solve a large portion of the internal difficulties of the settlement,' Wanka demanded his immediate dismissal. The settlers who demanded his removal, however, were unwilling to 'absolve Mr. McConnell of the responsibility for the mistakes of which he is guilty and which in future may become serious problems in the settlement.'[39] Much to the consternation of the settlers, Herzer defended McConnell and suggested that only because of the supervisor's 'energy and driving ability' had the settlers succeeded to the extent they had. As for the settlers' committee, Herzer indicated that it should confine itself to 'cultural development, the co-operative' and 'disciplinary matters, such as theft, wrongful division of crop, etc. and other disorders in the settlement.'[40]

Matters finally came to a head in December 1940, when Wanka resigned as chair of the settlers' committee. Upon hearing the news, Wenzel Jaksch immediately contacted another member of the board, Hubert Leinsmer, by telegram, for more information. Intercepted, translated and forwarded to the RCMP in Pouce Coupe for investigation, Jaksch's telegram created much confusion among those monitoring the situation. The news of Wanka's resignation created a stir among CCA and government officials. Macalister heralded the dispute as just one more example of the 'determination of the Social Democratic Party to control affairs in the Tupper Settlement.'[41] The news found its way to Vincent Massey. In a tactfully worded letter, Jaksch appealed to Massey to look into matters in Tupper, pointing out that 'the worst difficulties

[39] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, 'Memorandum about the Sudeten Settlement at Tupper, BC,' 1940.
[40] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Memorandum to the Settlers at Tupper, Tupper, BC, 20 November 1940.
[41] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Macalister to Blair, 21 January 1941.

result from the fact that collaboration between the settlers and the two Companies was not based on a written agreement from the very start.' He argued that 'the CPR and the CNR should be submitted to the normal procedure of rendering accounts about [land] prices, about their expenditure on livestock and fixtures and the cost of supervision.' Jaksch proposed an agreement 'covering all economic, financial and legal issues.'[42] In several communiqués, he suggested that he would be willing to come to Canada to look into the dispute and help find a resolution, but the railways and government officials continually conspired to keep him out of the country, citing transportation and accommodation problems.[43] The two railways simply ignored Jaksch's recommendations and continued with their own agenda; fortuitously McConnell chose this time to quit his job in Tupper and rejoin the Army.[44]

Henry J. Siemens, who replaced McConnell in January 1941, was a vast improvement. Siemens brought two attributes to the management of the settlement that McConnell lacked: he spoke German and he was a knowledgeable agriculturalist.[45] In his '*Report of Third Year Operations*', while careful not to accuse his employers of incompetence, Siemens clearly pointed out the limits of settlement due to a difference in objectives:

> A considerable difference of opinion existed between the so-called settlers' leaders and the Settlement officials. Certain misunderstandings for which neither party were responsible were present and showing their effects. Furthermore, the leaders of the settlers were their former political leaders and their interest continued to be primarily from a political standpoint, while the supervisors of the Settlement are solely concerned with the agricultural and colonization viewpoint, vitally concerned with making the settlement successful and self-supporting. Each is naturally efficient in his own field, and inefficient in the other's.[46]

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[42] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Wenzel Jaksch to Vincent Massey, 6 March 1941.

[43] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, W.R. Little, Commissioner, Department of Immigration to Massey, Canada Consul. 24 March 1941. 'Now as to Jaksch going to Canada...Colonization officials of both Companies in Montreal have evidently been discouraging his visit upon the ground of difficulty of accommodation, and you will notice by the cable of the 31st January that Ottawa supports this view.'

[44] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 129.

[45] Gow, 'A Home for Free Germans in the Wilderness of Canada,' 66. See also. Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, H.J. Siemens, '*Report of Third Year's Operations*'. 1941. McConnell stayed on as advisor to Siemens until February 1941.

[46] Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, H.J. Siemens, 'Report of Third Year's Operations'. 1941.

Siemens was one of the few management officials not to place responsibility for all of the settlement's failures squarely upon the refugees. Yet, he was not laudatory in assessing the morale of the Social Democrats, characterizing them as 'quarrelsome, illogical and their actions and re-actions towards their neighbours do not differentiate clearly between what is mine and thine.' A Mennonite, Siemens blamed their lack of religious conviction for their lack of morale, in general concluding that 'one does not receive a favorable impression of these people.'[47]

The managers of the settlement singled out the work ethic of the refugees as being continually problematic. Siemens wrote: 'its hell to get settlers to the machine, and heaven nor hell will keep them after 6 P.M. (underlining is Siemens).'[48] Predominantly union workers, and unused to the long hours necessary for farm work, the Sudetens often refused to work longer than eight hours and few of the professionals had experience with hard physical labour. John Neubauer, noting the difference in attitude between the Sudetens' union mentality and the CPR's expectations of them, observed that 'at the beginning you have to allow that so many people were factory workers and they thought well you start and work your eight hours a day, no matter if it is going to rain or not, they don't go out there to bring in the hay [after] you have already worked your eight hours.'[49] Continuing with co-operative farming while at the same time assigning individuals to their own land, however, was just one more sign to the immigrants of disorganization and poor planning on the part of the CPR. There was no incentive for the refugees to support the co-operative settlement (Appendix C).

Contrary to the expectations of settlement officials that clearing and breaking land would become more efficient as the Sudetens learned basic farming practices, the Tupper settlers who cleared approximately 1000 acres in the first year, cleared and broke only 902 acres in the second

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[47] All of the above. Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, H.J. Siemens, '*Report of Third Year's Operations*'. 1941.

[48] Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, H.J. Siemans to T.O.F. Herzer. Tupper Creek. 20 October 1941.

[49] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004. John contends that after the settlers received their own land this attitude changed drastically.

year. The decline was largely due, not to inefficient clearing but to the determination of many settlers to concentrate on their own property rather than on community land. John Neubauer contends that was simply human nature,

> we cleared the land on one quarter thinking it is all everybody's...well the guy that's there and he's got the land cleared and you worked and cleared it, but when it comes to you're part of the [deal], your doing it yourself and you have to work all over, start all over again you clear your own land although your land was cheaper, it was assessed at a lesser price so you got it cheaper, but when you are working...with pick and axe, it takes you a long time.[50]

All the machinery, livestock and equipment bought by the CPR became the sole property of the Tate Creek Development Company (TCDC); the new farmers had none of their own equipment and no hope of possessing any until they owned their farm.

Established in 1939 as a holding company, the TCDC consisted entirely of CPR officials. While the CCA continued to oversee the operation and its finances including payments to settlers the primary function of the TCDC was to purchase and distribute goods and equipment required to operate the settlement. It was also responsible for business and managerial decisions that related directly to questions of farming and land distribution. When the Sudetens heard of the formation of the Company, they assumed they would have a voice in decisions made on their behalf but until 1942, no Sudeten was allowed to sit on its board, have access to financial records, or express an opinion on the colony's operation. Outraged, the settlers protested their lack of input, making them targets of ridicule by settlement managers sitting on the TCDC board. In his first report, McConnell had written:

> A high standard of intelligence prevails, but it is frequently apparent, and since the outbreak of war to a greater degree, that there are strong under currents in this colony of which we know very little...the people are highly temperamental and easily influenced. They have a legacy from central Europe of deep distrust in each other....The work output per man is low, even after making generous allowance for inexperience....thrift is not generally apparent to any degree....the writer has, nevertheless, a deep seated uncertainty as to the sincerity of quite a

[50]Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

> large number of these families in their desire to establish themselves on the land.[51]

McConnell was right in concluding that some of the settlers had no wish in establishing themselves as farmers but the report also illustrates his disdain for the Sudetens and his complete ignorance of exactly what the refugees were fleeing. The supervisor was completely unaware or indifferent to the fact that many still had friends and relatives at risk. Most disturbing are McConnell's remarks about thrift. With so little money and the settlement's general store as the only source of consumer goods, the manager's remarks are ludicrous.

The settlers understood that part of the agreement involved the CPR helping to transfer them to their own land, specifically twenty acres ready for crop production as soon as possible. They believed that the agreement also included a home on the property, equipment and a monthly stipend to provide an income until the land could turn a profit. In 1940, settlement managers decided that only 40 families would move on to their own property. Even those farmers already on their own quarter section would continue to share equipment while the TCDC would withhold title to the quarter-sections until such time as the CPR judged the settlers competent.

In 1941, the CCA began to transfer the remaining settlers onto their own quarter sections. The information regarding the assignment of property is contradictory and confusing, probably because there was no system in place to determine who would receive what land and when or even if families would gain access to property. In some cases it was simply a case of first come, first serve, until it was determined that the cost of land would have to be based upon the amount of available arable land. That meant that the land had to be surveyed, a price derived in relation to amount of land cleared by the community, and access to clean water. The Neubauer family received two quarter sections at Tom's Lake 'because there was not enough land on the both quarter sections to feed you, most of it was swamp and most of the lake was in there, in fact, all

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[51] Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, '*The German Czech Settlement at Tupper, BC, Report of first year's operations*,' F.B. McConnell, 1939.

of it was in there.'[52] When a family agreed to pay the price assigned to the land, their home would be skidded onto the quarter section. Inaccurate surveys and misplaced markers often meant that homes were moved to the wrong location and had to be moved a second or third time.[53] Settlers often inadvertently found themselves encroaching on their neighbor's property or vice versa. It also became blatantly clear once the preliminary survey work had been completed that there was not enough property to satisfy the needs of all the settlers.

The move from the co-operative scheme to individual farms caused a variety of problems. Families who moved onto their own property had little time to assist in communal clearing or other duties demanded by the co-operative. Instead, 'starters' needed to concentrate on their own land. If land was not maintained, the CCA could simply remove a family and turn it over to another and, once moved, few individual farmers had the time or the energy to devote to the co-operative. This resulted in a great deal of resentment from those not yet settled on their own quarter section as a lack of manpower increased the workload of those still in the colony.[54]

To subsidize the settlement, McConnell proposed that residents take on outside work. In one instance, Chisholm Saw Mills Limited at Mitsue, Alberta hired the men to assist in roadwork. Employment lasted one day. When the Sudetens arrived at the job site, they insisted that they remain together despite the superintendent's insistence that this was hazardous and, of course, they spoke German among themselves. The superintendent wrote:

> Very few could speak or understand English except for a few words and as conditions are at present a gang of men that don't mix with others and speak German at all times does not tend to promote harmony in a logging camp.
> So I decided the best place, all things considered, was for the men to go home. And until such time as they learn to speak another language other than German, or world conditions change, I would not want them in camp again under any consideration.[55]

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[52] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.
[53] Pohl, Interview, 28 May 2004.
[54] Wanka, *The Sudeten Story*, 12.
[55] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Logging Superintendent, C.H. MacDonald to F.B. McConnell, 27 December 1940.

Most settlers worked on neighbouring farms during harvest time to supplement their income or on the Alaska Highway when work started in 1942. While working outside the settlement there were many episodes of Peace area residents calling the police complaining of 'those' Germans.

To expand their farms, many settlers inquired about the possibility of homesteading. Herzer advised them that the British Columbia government had 'refused to accept applications for homesteads to the Sudeten settlers,' but suggested that 'considerable government land can be made available for settlement by lease or otherwise.'[56] Herzer, however, did not indicate from whom the government land could be leased (one can assume that land would be made available through the CCA), and no other evidence of the provincial government refusing a homestead request from the Sudetens.

Herzer attempted to ameliorate the problem by reducing the number of settlers. He divided the settlers into four classes:

a. Those who may already be regarded as successfully established in agriculture;
b. Those who are well along but need further training;
c. Those who are not likely to succeed in agriculture, but who would succeed in industry, or insofar as the single men are concerned who would likely make suitable material for the Canadian Army;
d. The problem cases and misfits whose future must be carefully considered.

In the 'a' and 'b' class Herzer determined that 86 families and single men were sufficiently capable and interested in farming to continue in the settlement, and in the 'c' class, 39 families were neither interested nor capable of adapting to a rural lifestyle, but did have a trade that was in demand in Canada's wartime economy. The 'd' class, of which there were 12 families, Herzer referred to as 'misfits,' they did not have a marketable skill or trade, had no interest in remaining in Tupper, and were 'problem cases in the Old Country, and [would] continue to be problem cases in [Canada].'[57] Arrangements were made for those who wished to leave to do so. Those

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[56] Glenbow Archives, Canada Colonization Association, Memorandum from T.O.F. Herzer to the Settlers at Tupper Creek. 20 November 1940.
[57] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Memorandum for Mr. J.N.K. Macalister from T.O.F. Herzer. Canadian Colonization Association, Winnipeg. 3 December 1940. See also. Wieden,

who had worked on the colony for eighteen months and who wanted to work in industry were offered a one-way ticket to any destination in Canada and $20.00, but forfeited all claim to land and monies despite the $1500 per family and $866 per single man paid to the CCA by the Czechoslovakian government. Fifty-nine families and twelve single men left Tate Creek before 1943.[58] The rating system served to rid the CCA of its problem cases, solved land availability issues, and by forfeiting their share, the departees provided more funds to the CPR to carry on its work with approximately one-third fewer individuals than originally had arrived. For those who wanted to remain there was a promise of land, complete with three cows, one horse and one pregnant sow for each family; a wagon and a half share in each of a plow or horse drawn binder, and a sleigh.[59]

In *Tomslake*, Andrew Amstatter claims that regardless of promises most settlers received neither livestock nor equipment, but purchased them with money earned outside the colony. Amstatter charges that the inventory claimed by the TCDC included 102 horses bought by individuals that were not settlement stock. When settlers were finally granted control of the TCDC in 1942, they thought they would have a better understanding of operations. The CCA, however, denied them access to past company financial records and monthly reports.[60]

During the early years settlers had to supplement their agricultural incomes with other work. Management advised individuals to find outside work but also sought alternative employment within the co-operative. A small lumber operation started on the property in the winter of 1940, expanded and provided a much needed boost to the co-operative's bottom line. Cutting and delivering 5,000 ties in 1940, the refugees were ready to expand in 1940 and asked

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Sudeten Canadians, 107. Among those classified 'd' was Adolf Sternschein, a Sudeten Jew, who was among the first to protest his confinement to the settlement. When finally allowed to leave, Sternschein, who later changed his name to A.A. Sterne, became a manager of a New Brunswick sawmill, was hired as the Chief Administrator of the Audit Services Division in Ottawa and became a lecturer at Carleton University.

[58] Werner Tschiedel. Interview by author. 27 May 2004, invoice issued by CCA for train ticket one-way to Toronto from Pouce Coupe for $63.50 for Mr. Tschiedel's brother-in-law. See also Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 83, 86, claims that not all settlers received a ticket.

[59] Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 85. See also. Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 105.

[60] Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 87.

the CCA to help them find an expert supervisor. In November 1941, settlement officials informed CCA management that they had obtained a timber license and lease to a timber stand fourteen miles from the settlement and had signed a deal with the Northern Alberta Railways to produce 15,000 ties and 75,000 to 100,000 feet of rough lumber.[61] Earning $1.00 a day and board during the winter months was a boon as it supplemented seasonal income from agriculture (Photo 8).[62]

Photo 8 – Tomslake Logging Camp. The building on the left was the kitchen and dining hall, the building on the right was the bunkhouse which housed 25-30 men. It was located 30 miles southwest of Tomslake. 1942-1943. Private Collection of Werner Tschiedel.

The most consistent income in the settlement was received from dairying. Both management and the male settlers took for granted that milking was women's work and so, despite their lack of experience, the women took sole responsibility for this chore. Beyond building crude stools and sometimes holding the tails of particularly recalcitrant livestock,

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[61] Tomslake Reunion Committee. *Tomslake Reunion Homecoming: Golden Memories, 1939-1989.* The Reunion Committee claims that over 22 sawmills were in operation over the years. At one point 'Tupper Creek siding was the largest tie terminal north of Edmonton.'

[62] Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, Memorandum, Siemens to Herzer, Lumber Camp, Tupper, BC, 15 April 1941. See also Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, Memorandum, Sommerfeld, Farm Manager to Herzer, Winnipeg, 20 October 1941. Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, Memorandum, Herzer to Mr. S.G. Porter, CPR, Winnipeg, 11 November 1941.

husbands rarely assisted with the milking. The women took care of the cattle, milked them, cleaned the equipment and the barns, and managed the shipment of cream to Grande Prairie, Alberta. By the time American troops arrived to work on the Alaska Highway in 1942, the women of Tupper were supplying most of the raw milk to the Northern Alberta Dairy Pool for pasteurization.[63]

Deriving a small source of income from dividends on their purchases at the local Co-operative store was also a way for the settlers to gain some control over their finances. The settlers convinced management to allow them to establish the Tate Creek Co-operative Society and take over the distribution of goods in the colony.[64] The CPR, after some debate, turned $4,270.00 in inventory over to the fledgling operation and, by selling shares to residents; the Co-op Store raised enough capital to open its doors. Within one year, it had paid back what it owed to the CPR and had become the centre of the community with a secondary postal outlet and shipping depot for livestock. In his 1941 report, Siemens noted the success of the community store. Despite a population decline, its sales increased due to the betterment of the community in general. Increased buying power and better selection of merchandise resulted in its continued success.[65] In 1943 the Tate Creek Co-op grossed $37,263.00; in 1945 the gross was $43,201.89 and within a few years it outstripped the larger Dawson Creek Co-op in gross sales.[66]

In 1943, a full two years after its intended withdrawal, the CCA management of the Sudeten settlement came to an end. The crop failure of 1941, the inexperience of the settlers and

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[63] Schoen, *The Tupper Boys*, 44-46. See also. Amstatter, *Tomslake,* 139.
[64] H.J. Siemens and A. W. McArton, 'The Sudeten Settlement at Tupper, BC,' *C.S.T.A. Review*, No. 37(June 1941), 18. The authors state that 'the settlers themselves were encouraged to organize into a co-operative society which took over the stock and management.' This statement is untrue as the settlers initiated the Co-op store on the settlement contrary to the wishes of the management.
[65] Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, H.J. Siemens, '*Report of Third Year's Operations,*' 1941.
[66] Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, W. Wanka. '*The Sudeten Settlement of Tupper Creek, BC,*' 1943. See also Wanka, '*The Sudeten Settlement of Tupper, BC in 1945.*'

the pioneer nature of the settlement, made it necessary for the CCA to remain.[67] Its final withdrawal was without fanfare: a small article in the CPR staff newsletter was the only outside recognition of it. Reviewing the achievements of the colony, the bulletin summarized:

> Each family is in possession of a farm with equipment and livestock to operate successfully. The entire settlement covers an area of about 24,000 acres. The settlers possess a total of approximately 600 cattle, 1,500 hogs, 200 horses and 3,000 poultry.
> A complete set of power equipment including two tractors, breaking plows and a threshing outfit, remains the property of the settlers jointly, and will be administered by the settlers' own organization, The Tate Creek Development Company. They are operating a sawmill and lumber camp on the same basis. They have also organized their own co-operative store which supplies the requirements of the Settlement, in addition to handling all livestock.[68]

When all the numbers were tallied and the records finally in the hands of the Sudeten settlers nothing appeared out of place. Without a full accounting the refugees were unaware in December 1942 that while an unexpected $3500.00 was turned over to the TCDC another $5000.00 of 'which the Czechs know nothing' remained in the hands of CPR.[69] Macalister and Herzer met to discuss the disposition of these funds on 7 January 1942 but there is no further mention of what happened to this money in the government or CCA files.

Despite the hard work of Supervisor Siemens to repair the relationship between the settlers and the corporation, the Sudetens were happy to be free of the machinations of the CCA and to be responsible for their own financial decisions. Within two years, the community had paid off its outstanding land debts and was profiting in all areas of agricultural endeavour. As a community, the Sudetens had invested in good breeding livestock and farm machinery while individuals bought more land, purchased modern farm machinery, invested in better farm buildings and made other necessary improvements.[70]

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[67] Siemens and McArton, '*The Sudeten Settlement at Tupper, BC*,' 24.
[68] Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, 'Tupper Settlement Is Now on Its Own,' *Canadian Pacific Staff Bulletin*, 5 January 1953.
[69] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Memorandum, Blair, 29 December 1942.
[70] Glenbow Archives. Canadian Colonization Association, Wanka, '*The Economic Progress of the Sudeten-Settlement at Tupper Creek*'.

The Tate Creek Development Company was finally phased out in 1954 because there was no longer a need for it. Through attrition and the purchase of property, settlers had increased the size of their farms, thereby making it inefficient to share equipment or land. It may also have been due, in part, to the fact that many of the settlers had shifted their mindsets from the politics and ideology of their social democratic roots to capitalist principles. Although the Sudetens remained ardently political, not all continued to subscribe to socialist beliefs. This, complicated by personality clashes, ultimately caused a severe split in the community.

Granted citizenship in 1944, many of the Sudetens once more became involved in politics. Federal and provincial elections held in June 1949 re-ignited old animosities and unexpressed resentments. Split along party lines, some of the Sudetens supported the CCF as the party which most represented the ideals of social democracy, while others supported the Liberal candidate for his party's support of refugees during the postwar period.[71] Tempers became so inflamed that the two factions could no longer socialize. When the old Tomslake Community Hall burned down in 1950, a new hall was built. In 1955, however, when political and personal grievances had become inflamed beyond reason, Liberal supporters used the Tomslake Community Hall while CCF supporters adjourned to the newly founded CCF Hall. Only now as a new generation comes to the fore is this old division receding.

The Tupper Creek settlement was the CPR's largest and last colonization scheme.[72] Along the lines of an ambitious experiment, its early success may have been more attributable to the willingness of the CCA to remove a third of the Europeans from the settlement than to any organizational ability on the part of the management. By overcoming the problem of poor land

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[71]Schoen, Interview, 28 May 2004. While attending the University of British Columbia Schoen was president of the university's CCF Club. See also Schoen, *The Tupper Boys,* 176. On 15 June 1949, the Provincial incumbent was Joe Corsbie, CCF; running against Coalition (Liberal-Conservative) Glen Braden. Braden won the Provincial seat. See also. 'Senators and Members – Historical Information.' Library of Parliament. Ottawa, 21 February 2005.
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/people/key/bio.asp> In the Federal election on 27 June 1949 the incumbent James Turgeon was defeated by CCF candidate Bill Irvine.

[72] Gow, 'A Home for Free Germans in the Wilderness of Canada', 70.

quality by concentrating on raising livestock rather than grain farming, by supplementing incomes with outside work and by skillfully managing the settlement as a whole, the settlers produced a viable community.[73]

[73] Wagner, 'The Tupper Creek Refugees,' 18.

Chapter V

Enemy Aliens

> *The people in the Sudeten Colony at Tupper Creek are giving rise to a certain amount of concern with respect to their activities. While they have not actually engaged in anti-British activities, their attitude is not altogether satisfactory and, on occasion, would almost verge on the point of defiance with respect to their "rights."*
>
> *E.W. Bavin, RCMP Superintendent*
> *26 July 1940*

When war broke out in September 1939, the RCMP arrived to inform the disbelieving immigrants that they were now 'enemy aliens'. The refugees were fingerprinted, told to carry a white 'alien' card and their landed immigrants' card with them at all times and report to the authorities once a week. In the settlement office, CCA officials watched the proceedings without protest. Bewildered and humiliated, the Sudetens called a meeting in the small blacksmith shop to 'formulate and sign a petition, which was sent to Ottawa, to refresh its memory.'[1]

Under the terms of the War Measures Act of 1914, the Canadian government retains the right to 'confer certain powers upon the Governor in Council in the event of war, invasion or insurrection.' These powers include the right to arrest, detain or deport anyone considered an 'enemy alien.' It also allows the government to restrict or prohibit the movement of persons or goods as deemed necessary. In fact, the government's powers are so far-reaching that without intervention by Parliament, the cabinet can act largely without impunity.[2]

Although labeled 'enemy aliens', the Sudetens were not interned, as was the case with other detainees. While most enemy aliens were sent to Kananaskis, Alberta or Petawawa, Ontario, there simply was no need to remove the refugees from the settlement.[3] Language and

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[1] Andrew Amstatter, *Tomslake; History of the Sudeten Germans in Canada.* (Saanichton: Hancock House Publishers Ltd., 1978), 66.
[2] Doug Sprague, Documents Pertaining to the Fundamental Law of Canada: War Measures Act, 1914. http://home.cc.umanitoba.ca/~sprague/wma.htm, 4 February 2005.
[3] St. Walburg History Book Committee. *Footprints of Yesterday and Today.* (St. Walburg: St. Walburg History Book Committee, 1988), 1122. One supervisor hired by the CNR was interned in Kananaskis, Alberta and later Petawawa, Ontario for his involvement in the pro-Nazi *Bund.* See also. William Repka

finances served to isolate the refugees, while reporting to the RCMP once a week reinforced their containment. Other restrictions included a ban on firearms and rejection from service in the Canadian military.

Conflicting responses to the restrictions imposed by 'enemy alien' status show that enforcement was somewhat haphazard. While at least one Sudeten claims to have walked five to seven miles to report once a week, another claims he never reported.[4] As for banning ownership and use of firearms, one refugee claimed that few settlers owned guns as there was no game in the area to hunt, while Walter Schoen claims that many simply hid their .22s.[5] When contacted by the RCMP, Immigration Director F.C. Blair responded: 'I do not think they are Communistic and it would be strange indeed after what they suffered at the hands of Germany if they were pro-Nazi', but Blair did not advise lifting the registration; rather, he questioned whether the settlers had as yet been registered under the Act.[6] Enemy alien status was lifted in June 1940 and yet on 5 September 1940 Blair asked RCMP Superintendent Bavin:

> I wonder if the settlers in these two colonies were registered under the Defense of Canada regulations at any time. I recall that when the war broke out I had some talk with Inspector Saul about them and suggested the possibility of our having officers go through and register them. I do not think this was ever done. I presume they have all registered under the National Registration scheme last month, but whether they have been registered otherwise I do not know. We have been so busy here with other refugees and the child business, that we have not had time to do much with the settlers already in Canada.[7]

If the immigration department was not responsible for the registration of the Sudetens, then who was? Did some other government department take the initiative, requesting the registration of the Sudetens as enemy aliens? If the department of immigration was not involved, did the railways play a more active role in the registration than first thought? Regardless of who was responsible

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and Kathleen Repka. *Dangerous Patriots: Canada's Unknown Prisoners of War*, (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1982), 12-14, many anti-fascists were sent to these two internment camps.

[4] Laurel David. Interview by author. 27 October 2001.

[5] Schoen, Interview, 28 May 2004.

[6] Rita Schilling, *Sudeten in Saskatchewan: A Way to be Free.* (Saskatoon: St. Walburg Sudeten German Club, 1989), 94.

[7] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Blair to RCMP Superintendent E.W. Bavin, 5 September 1940.

for the registration, both railway and government officials were fully aware of the hostility between the Sudetens and the Nazis, and at any time the railways, the CCA or the Immigration Department could have stepped in and formally objected to the registration.

The government and the CCA were not alone in treating the Sudetens as 'enemy aliens.' The Dawson Creek branch of the Canadian Legion, a veterans' organization, passed a motion demanding 'authorities keep these [Sudetens] on their present location and that they be subject to the closest police supervision during hostilities.'[8] The second part of the motion demanded that Tupper residents be prohibited from using or acquiring ammunition and firearms. McConnell, who reportedly attended the meeting, did not offer one word of protest.

In June 1940, however, the Dominion government reversed the status of the Sudetens as 'enemy aliens.'[9] Without explanation, the RCMP returned to the settlement to pick up the offensive white cards and offer an apology.[10] The RCMP continued its close monitoring of the movements of the Sudetens and intercepting their mail, Max Lorenz notes, 'they were always driving through, checking.'[11] On 26 July 1940, in a document marked 'Secret,' Superintendent E.W. Bavin advised the Immigration Branch of his concerns about the colonists' behaviour and suggested that the Department 'take a little firmer stand with respect to these people,' threatening that 'if they do not demonstrate a better feeling towards this country which is giving them refuge, we shall have to intern some of them.' In fact, not until 3 April 1941 did the Parliamentary committee investigating defence regulations recommend that Czechoslovakia be considered a country overrun by Nazism rather than one collaborating with Hitler (Fig. 5)[12]. This gave

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[8] Peace River Block News, 23 May 1940. See also. Walter Schoen, *The Tupper Boys: A History of the Sudeten Settlement at Tomslake, B.C.* (Victoria: Trafford, 2004),109.
[9] Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 107, date of June 1940 is from Amstatter who admits he is not positive about the date.
[10] Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 104. See Schilling, *Sudeten in Saskatchewan*, 96.
[11] Lorenz, Interview, 1 June 2004.
[12] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Royal Canadian Mounted Police to the Commissioner, Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, 26 July 1940.

Fig. 6



ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO BE ADDRESSED—
THE COMMISSIONER,
R. C. MOUNTED POLICE,
OTTAWA

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
HEADQUARTERS "C" DEPARTMENT

SECRET

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

FILE NO. D.945-1-Q-113

OTTAWA, CANADA
July 26th, 1940.

Dear Sir:

The attention of this Department has recently been drawn to the rather peculiar behaviour of the Sudeten settlers at Tupper Creek, British Columbia. A complaint was received to the effect that, on May 1st several houses were flying a red flag from a flag-pole. The incident was investigated by one of our Constables who embodied his findings in a report, copy of which is attached for your information.

2. The people in the Sudeten Colony at Tupper Creek are giving rise to a certain amount of concern with respect to their activities. While they have not actually engaged in anti-British activities, their attitude is not altogether satisfactory and, on occasion, would almost verge on the point of defiance with respect to their "rights".

3. It occurred to us that a little firmer stand with respect to these people may have some beneficial results and it is suggested that a responsible official who understands the problem, should talk to them, pointing out that they are living in a democratic country and it is expected of them to not only respect and obey the laws of our country, but also try to live up to the democratic traditions inherent in our system.

4. It is feared that, unless a firmer stand is taken, the population may pass out of control and if they do not demonstrate a better feeling towards the country which is now giving them refuge, we shall have to intern some of them.

Yours very truly,

(E. W. Bavin), Supt.
Intelligence Officer.

The Commissioner,
Immigration Branch,
Department of Mines & Resources,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

Source: LNAC. RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, E.W. Bavin, Superintendent, Intelligence Officer to the Commissioner of the Immigration Department. 26 July 1940.

Czechs the same status as the 'Poles, French and other nationals [whose] countries [were] under German control [who were] not considered enemy aliens.'[13]

For the Sudetens the biggest disappointment of enemy alien status was being precluded from enlisting in the Canadian Armed Forces. As early as September 1939, some settlers applied to enlist through the two colonization departments to the Department of Immigration, which in turn contacted the Department of Defense. Military officials responded that:

> there is no likelihood that these men would be accepted. As a matter of fact there is no active recruiting of people of that sort going on at all and I am advised that as far as these German Czech settlers are concerned, they are not likely to be accepted at the present time, even if they individually offered their services.[14]

There is no clarification as to who or what 'people of that sort' are. The reference probably concerns the refugees' ethnicity but cannot rule out the fact that to the Canadian government and Railway officials the Sudetens were still 'enemy aliens.' Officials of the CCA and the Department of Colonization and Agriculture passed along the military's response, emphasizing that 'Canada's greatest contribution is in maintaining an ample supply of food...and their success in that undertaking [would] directly benefit the Dominion in its war effort.'[15] Once again, the Sudetens were relegated to the role of farmers.

The lifting of enemy alien status in June 1940 theoretically entitled Sudeten men to serve in the Canadian Forces and by so doing revised 'the rule that they must remain in Canada for five consecutive years before obtaining citizenship.'[16] Service in the Canadian Armed Services provided several benefits, including greater security as they could finally prove their loyalty to their adopted home, and for some, it gave them the opportunity to exact revenge against Nazi Germany for the murder and imprisonment of friends and family.

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[13] 'Help for Czechs Urged,' *Montreal Gazette*, 4 April 1941.
[14] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Macalister to J.S. McGowan, Montreal, 1 February 1941.
[15] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Blair to McGowan and Macalister, Ottawa, 29 September 1939.
[16] Schilling, *Sudeten in Saskatchewan*, 96.

success of the settlement.'[19] In light of the intransigence of the CCA to this point, this statement is a huge departure from company policy.

Wanka pressed Macalister again on 6 January 1941. Macalister agreed that should this plan be implemented the Sudetens would be treated, as far as their relationship to the settlement was concerned, in the same way as those who had enlisted in the Canadian Active Army. While the question is somewhat ambiguous, Wanka was seeking a written guarantee that settlers who enlisted would not forfeit their rights within the settlement. Although Macalister assured Wanka that settlers who enlisted would have the same rights as other Canadians, he pointed out that the scheme was suspect as 'we have seen a considerable movement of people towards Canada for military training here but very little movement of civilians from Canada for military training in Britain.'[20] While no further mention of this special force was forthcoming, it is interesting to note that restriction on enlistment was lifted and the Immigration Department and the CCA dealt with the temporary reassignment of land and livestock.

While Jaksch worked in England to facilitate the refugees' enlistment, Wanka approached members of the Edmonton Refugee Committee, which became involved when settlers began arriving in Edmonton without resources or assistance from the CCA for resettlement. Alarmed at the information it had received regarding conditions on the settlement, the Edmonton Refugee Committee threatened the CCA with a public inquiry into its affairs. In an effort to forestall any negative publicity Herzer, McConnell and Siemens agreed to meet with its executive. One way in which to supplement the settlers' income was to allow them to enlist. Executive member D.E. Cameron wrote directly to Macalister asking him to intercede on behalf of the settlers to bypass official channels and send any relevant information regarding enlistment directly to the refugees. Cameron also requested Macalister make arrangements for men who

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[19] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Memorandum, H.C.P. Cresswell from Macalister. Montreal. 6 January 1941.
[20] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Macalister to Wanka, 20 October 1941.

enlisted to 'explain what stake he has in the community, and holding it for him against his return or resettlement elsewhere.'[21]

Though officials continued to debate the right of the Social Democrats to enlist throughout the spring and summer of 1941, by the fall of 1940 the refugees were already joining up. Who authorized the Sudetens' enlistment is unknown, as is how the colony was informed of this abrupt change in policy but as the first few Sudetens enlisted with no backlash, more men volunteered. RCMP clearance took a few weeks but no volunteer was turned down.[22] As the Sudetens were not yet naturalized citizens, their service was restricted to the Home Defence Force until the summer of 1941, when all volunteers were given the right to enlist along with Canadian citizens in the Canadian Armed Forces. Once permission to enlist was given, forty-six men from Tomslake served overseas.[23]

Enlistment also heralded a new set of complications: would the refugees be able to serve without losing their land? What of their livestock and equipment, ostensibly owned by the Tate Creek Development Company? Settlers had reason to be wary, as the case of Ernst Adler, a single man from St. Walburg, illustrates. In the fall of 1939, Adler left Saskatchewan to enlist in Winnipeg. Refused by the military, Adler applied to the CNR for assistance. The CNR denied him any aid, telling him 'he had forfeited any right for support the moment he left the farm.'[24] Not until October 1941 did the management of the CPR, CCA and the Department of Immigration attempt to answer any of the questions posed by the refugees. Ultimately, Herzer and Blair decided that, as military service was temporary, men who enlisted could arrange care for their livestock within the settlement or sell it and place the money in trust until they returned.

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[21] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, D.E. Cameron to Macalister, 8 January 1941.
[22] Fritz Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*,(Toronto: The Toronto Sudeten Club, 1982), 156, these details are taken from the personal recollections of Ludwig Lowit and Ernest Schreiber.
[23] Wanka, *The Sudeten Story*, 19. See Pohl, Interview, 28 May 2004. John Pohl enlisted on 4 July 1941 in Grande Prairie, AB. He served with the Royal Canadian Artillery, 5th Armor Division but did not speak about his military service.
[24] Jonathon Wagner, 'Saskatchewan's Sudetendeutsche: The Anti-Nazi Germans of St. Walburg,' *Saskatchewan History*, 33 (Autumn 1980), footnote 68, 101.

A settler who sold his livestock and kept the money would forfeit his share in the settlement. Property rented out while an individual was serving required a written contract that had to be filed with the TCDC.[25]

Still speaking only halting English, the Sudeten volunteers reported for duty. While their language deficit continued to be a problem, they provided invaluable service as many had had years of military training in the Czechoslovak Army and with the DSAP's paramilitary branch. Assigned duties as instructors and translators, the Sudetens used their language skills and their military training. Perhaps their most valuable service, however, was to remind their fellow soldiers that not all Germans were the enemy:

> I heard the men discussing that things weren't so good in Europe for the Canadian and Allied armies.... We should be getting tough, we shouldn't be taking any German prisoners, we should shoot them on sight. They are all Nazis, those Germans. Well, I let them talk for a while, and when I was tired of that kind of talk I went out to those men and said: 'Do you really believe that all those Germans should be shot? Did you ever hear about all those Germans in the concentration camps there?' No, they only had heard about Jews being persecuted...They insisted that we...should shoot them all. 'Then get our rifles and I'll get you the live ammunition...You can take me behind the hut...and you can shoot your first German.... I am your corporal and I am training you to use those weapons...and I am prepared to go overseas with you, to the front...not to shoot every German, but to help wrestle down that Nazi regime in Germany, restore democratic government in Germany, and free those hundreds of thousands of people that are in those concentration camps. Germans, and Jews, and others. That is why I joined the Canadian Army...and I still do not speak good English.... That, of course, shocked them, and they stood there with their mouths open....
>
> I forgot all about it...but a few days later, I was told to see the commanding officer. He said: 'Amstatter, I hear you are well versed in the political situation....' Then he sent me over to the Intelligence Officer, a Major...who said the same thing.... 'Would you be willing to give to the NCO's in the camp a lecture about it?'.... So It came that two weeks later I had to give that lecture...When I stepped up on the platform and looked down, I saw not only the NCO's of the camp – I don't know how many hundreds...and even the commander of the camp, a colonel, was there. You can imagine the feeling...stepping out there for a lecture with my poor English.[26]

Max Lorenz attempted to hide his ability to speak German lest it cause dissension among his

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[25] LNAC, RG76, Vol. 616, File 910207, Reels C10436-C10437, Blair and Herzer to H.J. Siemens, 25 July 1941.

[26] Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 159-160, recordings of Andrew Amstatter regarding his experience in the Canadian military.



Photo 9 – Max Lorenz, June 1944.
Private Collection of Max Lorenz.

fellow soldiers (Photo 9). Despite being eligible for citizenship before leaving Canada, he did not become a citizen until serving in Germany with the Occupation Forces in 1945:

> I didn't speak German at the time...any time somebody spoke German they looked at you as if you were one of those Nazi guys, so I tried as little as possible to mix with other people that I knew spoke German. I was always with a group of guys that spoke nothing but English...one day in Europe like when we're in Germany at the occupation thing they were always looking for SS people and Nazis...so one morning about 3 o'clock or 3:30 in the morning they got out of the barracks on to the trucks to go up to a village, to surround it, because there was supposed to be some SS people there. As we were driving along the road, some poor old man tried to get between the convoy on his bicycle, he got hit and it just happened right in front of our truck. Everybody jumped out to see what was happening and at that moment, automatically I asked the guy in German if he was hurt. The lieutenant beside me looked at me and says 'Oh, you speak German.' I said 'yes', and thought I'm in for it. But it wasn't so, they took me [on] those night patrol things and they put me on as a sort of interpreter at the railway station and people come off the train and they wanted somebody specific to interrogate so told them to come into this room. I didn't become a British subject ...until I was in Germany and I always thought it was because they finally found out I spoke German and they didn't think a German with no Canadian [citizenship]...and so they made me a British subject, a Canadian citizen in Germany.[27]

[27] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.

Military service provided greater economic security for those families who had a male serving in the military as the settlement in BC could not provide them with an adequate living.[28] The war also created opportunities for those who remained at home. Work on the Alaska Highway or for other farmers in the area provided much needed cash to many families at Tomslake. Every interviewee claimed at least one male family member who worked for a period on the highway.[29] This, however, also created problems. When it transferred property deeds in 1942, the CPR included a caveat giving the TCDC the right to reclaim land that was not developed or livestock that was not tended.[30] The CPR imposed restrictions on families whose male head of household was working out; its inspectors warned that work had to be 'kept up.' The women milked the cows, looked after other livestock, hauled water, and cleared brush. As Max Lorenz notes, 'a lot of men left and the women stayed behind with the kids and looked after the one horse, one pig and one cow, whatever they had.'[31] Many women earned secondary incomes by selling milk and poultry products to American troops and highway workers.[32]

Not all men joined the forces or worked on the highway. With the lifting of enemy alien status, the Sudetens could freely move to larger centres where work in factories was readily available. And because Tupper was a co-operative, this meant forfeiting their share in the community.[33] Leaving the settlement, however, was hard when one had invested time and effort.

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[28]Jonathon Wagner, 'British Columbia's Anti-Nazi Germans: The Tupper Creek Refugees,' *BC Studies*, 39 (Autumn 1978), 17-18, 'from the beginning, discerning members of the community realized that the CPR had not purchased enough land to provide adequately for all the settlers.'

[29] Philip Godsell, *Romance of the Alaska Highway*, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1944), 152-153. Godsell reports the effects of the Highways' construction as this 'unexpected eruption furnished a cash market at boom prices for all their beef and produce; employment for themselves and their teams at unheard of figures, and work along the line for everyone, down to teen-aged water-boys, who'd rarely seen the colour of a dollar bill, at seventy-five dollars a month and board...Within a miraculously short time the hamlet of Dawson Creek with its three hundred population became a rip-snorting frontier town of ten thousand, with a floating population ever passing to and fro.'

[30] Amstatter, *Tomslake*, 85-86.

[31] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004.

[32] Baudisch, Interview, 28 May 2004.

[33] Tschiedel, Interview, 27 May 2004, supplied original invoice. See also. Schilling, *Sudeten in Saskatchewan*, 110. Wieden, *Sudeten Canadians*, 132, 'in British Columbia the Tate Creek Development

As Mrs. Baudisch pointed out, it was easier when one got a paycheck every two weeks in the factory but when one waited for something to grow and then had to sell it, waiting a long time just meant you invested more.[34] By 1941, however, many 'farmers' had decided that rural life was not for them. Even those who may have wished to continue as farmers were convinced that the settlement was not working in their best interests. The Lorenz family was among the first to move from the settlement,

> We didn't stay on the farm very long. By '41 we [had] already left, mind you we went to another farm, and we were running that farm for an Englishman. [Later when] that Englishman got hurt in that explosion [Dawson Creek]....he was trying to sell [the farm] to Dad, but Dad wasn't interested.... He went to work as soon as he could, for the army on the Alaska Highway.[35]

Most Tupper residents who moved off the settlement moved to the industrial centres of Hamilton, Ontario or Montreal, Quebec where war work was easily obtainable, particularly for those with previous experience in manufacturing. John Neubauer moved to Prescott, Ontario, to work in a glove factory for two years until work on the Alaska Highway lured him back with the offer of good wages and the chance to be close to his family.[36] Of the original 152 families and 37 single men who arrived in Tupper, BC, in the spring and summer of 1939, only 97 families and 12 single men remained in 1942. Forty-nine families and 10 single men had moved east to find work in the factories. Fifteen men enlisted, four of them married men, three single men and eight sons of settlers.[37] Most of those who had left to find work, left for good; a few made their way back to the settlement but the majority were happy to be free of the settlement, its poverty, backbreaking

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Company required all those wishing to leave their farms to forfeit all their shares, assets, and interests in exchange for a train ticket to their chosen Canadian destination, plus twenty dollars in subsistence money.'

[34] Baudisch, Interview, 28 May 2004.

[35] Lorenz, Interview, 3 June 2004. The Dawson Creek explosion occurred on 13 February 1943 as a result of dynamite intended for use on the Alaska Highway accidentally detonating, and destroying almost all of downtown Dawson Creek. The explosion could be heard and felt a hundred miles away.

[36] Neubauer, Interview, 27 May 2004.

[37] Glenbow Archives, Canadian Colonization Association, H.J. Siemens, '*Report of Third Year's Operations: 1941.*'

work and long, cold winters. Once the CCA moved out of their lives, those who remained were able to make decisions for themselves and their needs. The Sudeten community flourished.

Conclusion

Chamberlain's 'peace in our time' signaled the finale for any direct political opposition within the Sudetenland. With Czechoslovakia's refusal to mount a defense against German invasion, it became imperative for anti-Nazi Sudetens to escape their own country. Czechoslovakia was a nation constructed through diplomacy and crushed by Hitler's political opportunism. Adopting the ideals of the republic, members of the German Social Democratic Party stood valiantly against Nazi insurgence into their homeland but were betrayed by the international community's refusal to come to their aid.

Dominating negotiations, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Great Britain adopted a policy of appeasement in a bid to forestall a continental war. Determined to maintain an advantage in the fight for control of Europe, Chamberlain exchanged the lives of his allies for a promise of peace from an autocratic despot and proven liar. Trading the Sudetenland for the promise of peace, Chamberlain ultimately provided the labour and industrial capabilities to an enemy bent on the subordinating a continent. Placating Hitler only served to convince him that the British were too weak or too disinterested in Czechoslovakia's continued existence to be a threat. The result was that Chamberlain gave away the very land where Czechoslovakian defenses lined the bordering mountain region. Surrendering this line of defense opened the floodgates for German domination of the Danubian Basin, giving Hitler access to all of continental Europe.

The German takeover of the Sudetenland initiated the flight of over 100,000 Social Democrats into the heart of Czechoslovakia. Fearful of reprisals, Czech officials worked feverishly to induce the Sudetenlanders to return to their homes. When threats and fines failed authorities used force, loading or returning trains with Social Democrats and Jews to the waiting Gestapo. Aware of the danger to this segment of the population, Chamberlain chose to sacrifice a portion of the Czechoslovakian citizenry in hopes of appeasing Hitler. That decision resulted in

the deaths of 7,000-8,000 Social Democrats within months of the Pact's signing. DSAP members who refused to flee were tortured or killed.

While Chamberlain played at international diplomacy, Czechoslovakian President Edvard Beneš fought to maintain his nation. When frantic negotiations failed to draw his allies back into the fight, Beneš did the one thing he should have refused to do; he left. Failing to fight, Beneš gave up the last bastion of defence separating central Europe from the Nazi onslaught. Vacating the presidency and installing persons in sympathy with German ambitions increased the danger to fleeing Social Democrats. Left with no options, and convinced that Hitler would not be happy until he had annexed all of Czechoslovakia, many Social Democrats knew their only hope for survival was to leave the country.

Putting ideology over ethnicity, Social Democrats were caught between their German Czech counterparts and ethnic Czechs. Loyalty to the Republic and abhorrence of Hitler's ambitions marked DSAP members as 'enemies of the Reich,' while their German ethnicity created suspicion among Czechs and Slovaks. Fleeing from the oncoming Nazis into the heart of Czechoslovakia, Social Democrats became 'undesirable aliens.' With no choice but to evade capture by escaping their homeland, a small group of these political dissidents were able to convince western nations that capture and perhaps death was imminent and so were granted visas.

In a bid to find peace and security, 1024 Sudetens accepted Canada's offer of permanent asylum. Sanctuary, however, was not without cost. Rigidly adhering to legislation introduced in the interwar period, the Canadian government refused to amend its immigration law to permit the predominantly urban, industrial Sudetens to settle in areas where factory work was readily available but transported them to a frozen farmstead in the Canadian north. Abdicating any responsibility for the new immigrants, politicians turned management of them over to the CCA and the Department of Colonization and Agriculture, land settlement agencies financed by monies provided to Czechoslovakia by the British and French governments. The CCA denied the Sudetens a say in how, or on what, the money was spent. Despite the monies paid out on their

behalf, the settlers had no voice in where they would be located and upon arriving in the remote wilderness, were discouraged from leaving.

The Sudeten Germans, who immigrated to Canada at the height of political tensions in Europe in 1939, did so to escape the terror of Hitler's Nazi regime only to serve a term of penury on the Canadian prairie. This term was imposed not by Hitler but by the Canadian government and enforced by corporations focused solely on economic gain. The RCMP was merely a vehicle assigned to impose the will of the government and the railways on a group of political refugees desperate for safety. There is no justification for the government ignoring the living conditions forced upon the settlers as the refugees wrote and petitioned the government to take a more active interest in their situation. There is no justification for the railways to have been so stringent and unbending in their treatment of the Sudetens. Neither institution can claim ignorance; the circumstances of the Sudetens were well documented. The public was also well informed of whom the Sudetens were and how they had come to Canada. The national publication *Saturday Night* documented the story from early 1938 and local newspapers followed up with information regarding the anti-Nazi stance of the new immigrants. Paranoia and racism cannot always be fought with logic but local officials could have minimized the effects they had they been more vocal in their support of the Sudetens.

It was not equipment failure, lack of experience or the need for hard physical labour, however, which caused the greatest resentment among the refugees but the inflexibility of the entire colonization scheme and the intractable personage of supervisor Major Fraser B. McConnell. The CPR's part in this debacle was to insist that all settlers become farmers and so relieve it of large tracts of poor farmland. The government's abdication of responsibility to the CCA meant the interests of the railways took precedence over the needs of the settlers. Admitting to the House of Commons that requesting a special order-in-council could have exempted the Sudetens from the agricultural requirement, T.A. Crerar, the Minister of Mines and Resources, relinquished his responsibility to the CCA. Immigration to Canada could have offered

a wonderful opportunity for those who wanted to take up agriculture as a career, if the railways had provided better farm land, rather than second rate, uncultivated land in an isolated part of the country. For those unable or unwilling to take up farming, however, the immigration department clearly could have lifted this restriction.

Officials in the government, the CCA and the RCMP imposed a mode of behavior that was alien to the refugees, demanding that they adopt a way of life that was foreign to their democratic principles and in many ways irreconcilable to their cultural precepts. Officials saw the Sudetens as ignorant peasants who should be grateful for being rescued from their fate, never mind that they were paying for the privilege. Benefiting most from the arrangement was the CCA, the agent of the CPR, which exploited the desperation of the settlers. The CPR profited through the funds bestowed on the Social Democrats for the settlement of the refugees, earning transportation fees, and later cartage for transporting the settlement's crops to market. The government, with no investment on its part, expanded its tax base, and populated a region without having to invest in infrastructure or services, while relieving international pressure to admit more refugees.

The settlement scheme imposed on the Sudeten refugees by the CCA, the CPR and the Canadian government can only be likened to a crude social experiment. Confining a large urban group of political refugees to a rural existence, forcing them to assimilate to that rural environment while at the same time separating them from other rural peoples made the whole scheme unconscionable. Transporting this group to an expanse of unbroken and uncivilized land far from civilization, any amenities or avenues of assistance indicates the CCA's determination to carry out this experiment without interference. Management of the settlement, however, underestimated the intelligence, the determination and organizational skills of these 'peasants.' Foolishly, the organizers of the Tupper settlement ignored all the signs that would mark these refugees as atypical. First, this was not a group of uneducated farmers. The Social Democrats, if not formally educated had been immersed in a political ideology which drew a high degree of

intellectuals, and prided itself on its ability to effectively communicate its convictions. Social Democracy claimed a worldview of politics and as such, its leadership was well versed in international events and among those who escaped Czechoslovakia, were its leaders. Secondly, this group was not only the movement's leaders but also its most determined supporters. Even facing imprisonment or death, the Social Democrats refused to conceal their involvement in the Party, fleeing only when their families were threatened. Third, this was the upper echelon of the Social Democratic Party, some were Jews, and therefore faced a double threat by the encroaching Nazis. Deeply involved in Party organization, these refugees were used to coordinating large groups of people, and were incensed by the CCA's inability to direct operations with any efficiency. The Sudetens did not have any moral or philosophical objections to the organization of the settlement as a co-operative, but took exception to the CCA's ill-conceived and shortsighted attempt to implement a plan that was unfocused and unworkable. It was a plan that, from its inception, was indifferent to the needs of the residents. Finally, the CCA refused to recognize that these immigrants were refugees of conscience. Refusing to be dictated to by Hitler, the Social Democrats were equally determined not to be dictated to by petty government officials, particularly McConnell, who seemed bent on breaking the will and spirit of the people through hard physical labour and poverty. Having refused to abandon their democratic principles in a face off against Hitler, the Social Democrats were unlikely to yield to the petty dictatorship McConnell attempted to carry out.

The settlement scheme, or what the CCA called a co-operative, was simply a plan to produce instant farmers. Drawing on its previous experience, the CCA simply attempted to transplant the practices of the communal Mennonites to the Social Democrats. Believing that all Socialists were alike in their beliefs, the management at Tupper simply slotted the Social Democrats into their preconceived notions of central Europeans with Left-wing political leanings. What they failed to take into account was that agriculture is not simply a profession but a lifestyle. In truth, it was a lifestyle with which the Social Democrats had no familiarity, not even

on a rudimentary level, as property ownership for this particular group was extremely uncommon. The Mennonites were connected by ethnicity, religion and lifestyle, whereas the Social Democrats shared only politics. Officials made no attempt to discover the differences.

Having breathed a collective sigh of relief at their good luck in escaping and being given permanent asylum in Canada, it was in Canada, ironically, where Social Democrats were registered as 'enemy aliens', simply because they spoke German. It is ironic, as for a time only the Social Democrats and Communists stood in opposition to Nazism. Forced to flee from the German occupation of the Sudeten regions in 1938, these Sudetens found what they thought was safe haven in Canada only to be branded 'enemies' by the very government hired to resettle them.

Few of the original settlers continue to live in Tomslake. Many moved away when the opportunity presented itself, a few moved into neighbouring communities, while the vast majority of the original settlers have passed away. Overcoming the early years is a distant memory, yet a vivid one. In the intervening years, those who remained built up their farms. Some held shares in the Tate Creek Development Company until its closure in 1955. The settlers learned agricultural techniques, became proficient farmers, and many diversified to raise cattle. The Sudeten families grew and, despite some internal controversy over politics, the community remains strong. In some cases, second and third generations are farming the land, but the Sudetens have assimilated with the surrounding community.

Among those I interviewed, Mrs. Baudisch, at 92, remains on her farm in a small house built next to the original tarpaper shanty which still stands in her farmyard; Mr. Neubauer lives with his wife, Marian, in a tiny house across from the Tomslake town site; Anne Marie Pohl lives on a farm in Tomslake surrounded by her large family; Mr. Tschiedel lives in Dawson Creek, retired as a mechanic, but maintaining the farm; Max Lorenz, retired from the school district lives in Grande Prairie with his wife; Mr. Schoen and his wife continue to reside in Dawson Creek, retired from his position as teacher and principal of the local high school for over thirty years.

Betrayed by the international community, their own nation and ultimately the Canadian government, the Czechoslovakian German Social Democrats' experience is unique. Despite their long and arduous journey, the Sudetens have become proud Canadian citizens. Few have any complaints over how or why they landed on these shores, although they truly wish others would understand whom and what they, their parents and their friends endured to claim the right to be citizens of this country. Now that a generation has passed, those I interviewed are anxious to tell their stories before they too pass and the story is lost. The next generation living in the community works hard to commemorate the story of the Sudetens, maintaining a museum, a provincial park and a small cairn. The most moving symbol of the community, however, is situated beside the cemetery. One monument is inscribed with the names of all those who arrived that spring and summer of 1939; a second supports a bronze statue of three figures, mother, father and child standing poignantly, with a battered suitcase at their feet (Photo 10).

Photo 10 – Bronze statue erected to commemorate the arrival of the Sudeten Germans to Tomslake, BC in the spring and summer of 1939. The plaque reads: "This monument stands in honour of the Sudeten German Social Democratic refugees who came to Canada in 1939. In their homeland they kept their faith in freedom and democracy against truly overwhelming odds. Abandoned by the signatories of the infamous Munich Agreement – September 29, 1938 to a fate of persecution, imprisonment, torture and possible death in the Nazi concentration camps of the Third Reich, they were among the fortunate who escaped and found asylum in Canada. Since that arrival they have worked with their fellow Canadians in building a greater and better land. They have earned acceptance and respect." (Private Collection of Werner Tschiedel).

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Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Augsten	Anton	36	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Augsten	Frida	32	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Brumlik	Arnold	38	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Brumlik	Ida	38	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Brumlik	Josef Paul	9	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
David	Alfred	33	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
David	Marie	31	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
David	Edeltraud	10	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
David	Horst	7	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Dittrich	Valentin	41	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Dittrich	Barbara	43	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Dittrich	Anna	19	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Dittrich	Eleonora	18	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Haeckl	Wilhelm	37	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Haeckl	Marianne	36	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Haeckl	Hidegard	13	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Kreuzer	Ernst	30	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Kreuzer	Margarete	32	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Kreuzer	Edeltraud	3	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Kreuzer	Anna	2	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Leinsmer	Hubert	42	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Leinsmer	Berta	33	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Leinsmer	Herta	5	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Mader	Rudolf	33	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Mader	Maria	29	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Mader	Ingrid	7	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Mazanek	Heinrich	36	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Mazanek	Anna	35	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Mazanek	Heinrich	4	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Mueller	Alois	45	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Mueller	Rosa	40	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Mueller	Alois	18	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Mueller	Edith	17	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Nodes	Josef	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Nodes	Wilhelmine	35	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Nodes	Hidegard	8	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Nodes	Herbert	4	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Reilich	Franz	41	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Reilich	Else	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Reilich	Helmut	13	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Reilich	Bruno	9	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Reinelt	Fridolin	40	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Reinelt	Emma	40	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Reinelt	Erhard	17	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Reinelt	Frieda	15	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Reinelt	Anna	12	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Schaffer	Eduard	47	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Schaffer	Auguste	48	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Schaffer	Ernst	11	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Seidl	Karl	48	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Seidl	Wilhelmine	46	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Seidl	Kurt	17	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Seidl	Ingeborg	10	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Seidl	Hermann	43	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Seidl	Hildegard	47	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Seidl	Gertrude	19	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Siegert	Max Otto	42	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Siegert	Marie	40	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Siegert	Elfriede	14	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Sommert	Nicu	31	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Sommert	Frida	30	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Suttner	Franz	44	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Suttner	Marie	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Suttner	Anna	20	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Suttner	Herta	17	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Suttner	Kurt	17	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Suttner	Franz	15	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Suttner (Low)	Margaret	25	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Tamm	Franz	37	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Tamm	Theresia	37	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Tillner	Josef	42	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Tillner	Wilhelmine	30	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Tillner	Peter	2	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Watzl	Anton	41	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Watzl (Tochter)	Marie	16	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Watzl	Stefanie	14	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Watzl	Rosalie	12	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Weisbach	Heinrich	29	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Weisbach	Hermine	27	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Weisbach	Ingeborg	5	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Wiesner	Herbert	35	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Wiesner	Anna	34	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Wiesner	Anna	8	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Zapf	Franz	46	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Zapf	Hermine	35	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Zapf	Henriette	11	Great Britain	S.S. Montcalm	8 September 1939		
Dostal	Hermann	27	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Dostal	Ida	26	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Dostal	Ingeborg	4	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Dostal	Brigitte	3	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Fister	Karl	43	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Fister	Anna	38	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Fister	Karl	19	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Goldbach	Ernst	34	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Goldbach	Adelheld	29	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Goldbach	Heinz	9	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Grundl	Alfred	51	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Grundl	Hermine	41	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Grundl	Gertrude	12	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Herold	Adolf	27	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Herold	Henriette	24	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Herold	Isolde	2	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Klimpl	Wenzel	31	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Klimpl	Amalie	23	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Koblizek	Franz	32	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Koblizek	Anna	28	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Koblizek	Brunhilde	7	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Koblizek	Berta	8	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Krassa	Friedrich	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Krassa	Emilie	40	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Krassa	Doris	6	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Marek	Karl	32	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Marek	Sidonia	27	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Marek	Erika	4	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Rei	Alfred	36	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Rei	Irma	34	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Schindler	Anton	29	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Schindler	Elisabeth	27	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Schroedl	Rudolf	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Schroedl	Emma	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Schroedl	Anna	16	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Seidl	Carl	30	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Seidl	Else	30	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Wedrich	Franz	46	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Wedrich	Anna	37	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Wedrich	Theresia	16	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Vodermayer	Eduard	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Vodermayer	Elisabeth	29	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Ziglarsch	Johann	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Ziglarsch	Anna	30	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Ziglarsch	Helmut	10	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Ziglarsch	Walter	11	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Ziglarsch (Matzer)	Elfriede	22	Great Britain	S.S. Montclair	20 April 1939		
Baudisch	Johan	32	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Baudisch	Hedwig	26	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Burdak	Karl	32	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Burdak	Aloisia	33	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Fischer	Alois	50	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Fischer	Appolonia	50	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Fischer	Walter	23	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Glas	Arnold	35	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Glas	Marie	27	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Harles	Norbert	35	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Harles	Marie	32	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Hegenbart	Franz	27	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Hegenbart	Waltraud	27	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Kopp	Anton	35	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Kopp	Theresia	32	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Kopp	Anton	8	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Landsfried	Rudolf	45	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Landsfried	Franziska	43	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Landsfried	Rudolf	18	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Langer	Edmund	35	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Langer	Anna	35	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Langer	Anneliese	13	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Langer	Horst	10	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Lorenz	Willi	33	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Lorenz	Martha	35	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Lorenz (Wosatka)	Max	13	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Lorenz (Wosatka)	Christa	12	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Mahrhofer	Franz	35	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Mahrhofer	Rosalia	29	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Mahrohofer	Rosa	11	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Mahrohofer	Frieda	5	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Mahrohofer (Teufel)	Klara	57	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Mayer	Hugo	43	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Mayer	Anna	37	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Mayer	Herta	11	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Mayer	Trude	9	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Neubauer	Konrad	46	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Neubauer	Juliana	43	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Neubauer	Johann	19	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Neubauer	Agathe	22	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Neubauer	Franz	12	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Oesterreich	August	34	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Oesterreich	Elfriede	25	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Richter	Franz	32	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Richter	Emma	28	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Riedl	Florian	38	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Riedl	Rosa	38	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Riedl	Franz	13	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Schindler	Ivo	42	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Schindler	Marie	49	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Schindler	Herta	19	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Schindler	Pauline	14	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Schlosser	Eduard	31	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Schlosser	Marie	27	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Schlosser	Leopold	2	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Schneider	August	31	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Schneider	Marie	25	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Scholz	Alois	40	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Scholz	Marie	45	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Scholz	Johann (nephew)	16	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Sternschein	Adolf	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Sternschein	Salomea	36	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Sternschein	Ernst	6	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Weigel	Ernst	42	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Weigel	Selma	36	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Weigel	Alfred	16	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Weigel	Ernst	18	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Zamburek	Leopold	30	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Zamburek	Rosa	27	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Zamburek	Leopoldine	7	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of York	5 May 1939		
Andersch	Artur	36	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Andersch	Stephanie	38	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Andersch	Helmut	6	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Andersch	Oswin	5	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Frank	Heinrich	37	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Frank	Albina	39	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Frank	Marie	14	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Heyne	Arthur	40	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Heyne	Liddy	30	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Hillebrand	Frederich	26	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Hillebrand	Milda Anna	29	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Kuttig	Franz	29	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Kuttig	Stefanie	27	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Mann	Otto	21	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Mann	Aloisia	24	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Scherbaum	Georg	26	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Scherbaum	Albine	29	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Schneider	Walter	33	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Schneider	Elisabeth	34	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Schoenpflug	Richard	27	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Schoenpflug	Hermine	27	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Wagner	Heinz Kurt	26	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Wagner	Marie	23	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Wagner (Dudkovic)	Karl	1	Belgium	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Weinhart	Josef	42	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Weinhart	Emma	47	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Weinhart	Josef	16	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Weinhart	Ernst	13	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Woerl	Michel	37	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Woerl	Eva	38	Great Britain	S.S. Monclair	18 May 1939		
Arbter	Karl	28	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Arbter	Elisabeth	26	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Arbter	Egon	6	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Dietl	Wilhelm	26	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Dietl	Gertrude	21	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Eckert	Hubert	28	France	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Eckert	Christine	21	France	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Gebauer	Johann	39	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Gebauer	Berta	36	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Gebauer	Margarete	17	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Gebauer	Johann	12	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Heinrich	Josef	38	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Heinrich	Marie	39	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Heinrich	Eleonore	11	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Heinrich	Anton	9	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Heller	Herbert	22	France	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Heller	Edeltraud	23	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Hilbert	Alois	31	France	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Hilbert	Dora	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Hirsch	Max Karl	36	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Hirsch	Marie	34	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Hirsch	Olga	10	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Hirsch	Josef	5	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Hirsch	John	1 mos.	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Klemmer	Franz	45	France	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Klemmer	Else	46	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Korbay	Alois	52	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Korbay	Berta	45	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Korbay	Egon	22	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Korbay	Vera	19	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Korbay	Marie	17	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kraus	Rudolf	22	France	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kraus	Elizabeth	17	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kreuzinger	Josef	47	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kreuzinger	Franziska	47	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kreuzinger	Walter	24	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kreuzinger	Arno	13	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kuempfel	Reinhold	39	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kuempfel	Martha	43	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kuenzl	Franz	40	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kuenzl	Agnes	43	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kuenzl	Willibald	20	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Kuenzl	Anton	12	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Lorenz	Eduard	41	France	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Lorenz	Theresia	39	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Lutz	Wilhelm	21	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Lutz	Charlotte	21	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Mueller	Franz	45	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Mueller	Theresia	43	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Mueller	Anton	19	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Mueller	Rudolf	16	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Mueller	Hildegard	10	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Poehlmann	Albin	40	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Poehlmann	Barbara	39	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Poehlmann	Irene	16	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Poehlmann	Heinz	14	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Poehlmann	Berthold	9	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Poehlmann	Roland	5	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Pohl	Wilhelm	51	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Pohl	Anna	45	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Pohl	Johann	19	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Pohl	Anna	17	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Pohl	Franz	16	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Pohl	Marie	12	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Pohl	Bruno	6	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Pohl	Max	3	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Schoen	Willi	29	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Schoen	Hedwig	26	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Schoen	Walter	8	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Schroefel	Oskar	30	France	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Schroefel	Josefine	21	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Seitner	Alois	42	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Seitner	Ida	44	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Seitner	Erika	17	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Seitner	Erwin	16	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Singer	Karl	48	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Singer	Amalia	44	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Singer	Franz	17	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Singer	Walburga	15	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Singer	Rudolf	22	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Snehotta	Franz	42	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Snehotta	Valerie	41	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Tschiedel	Rudolf	48	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Tschiedel	Anna	40	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Tschiedel	Hanna	17	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Tschiedel	Heinz	15	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Tschiedel	Werner	13	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Ullmann	Josef	26	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Ullmann	Margarete	21	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Ullmann	Franz	25	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Ullmann	Berta	23	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Wagner	Johann	58	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Wagner	Marie	52	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Wagner	Johann	29	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Wagner	Eduard	27	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Wagner	Alois	17	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Wagner	Karl	49	France	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Wagner	Elisabeth	46	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Wagner	Elisabeth	26	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Waller	Georg	32	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Waller	Frida	32	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Waller	Elisabeth	1 mos.	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	2 June 1939		
Englisch	Johann	31	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Englisch	Frida	27	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Englisch	Paul	33	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Englisch	Pauline	29	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Hopp	Alois	38	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Hopp	Anna	27	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Knappe	Franz	25	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Knappe	Hedwig	23	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Konrad	Josef	47	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Konrad	Emilie	43	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Konrad (Zengler)	Marie	27	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Kutschker	Alois	32	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Kutschker	Ida	33	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Kutschker	Marianne	12	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Kutschker	Ida	11	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Kutschker	Gertrude	9	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Kutschker	Gerhard	7	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Kutschker	Regina	6	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Langer	Adolf	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Langer	Margarete	26	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Richter	Leo	33	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Richter	Theresia	35	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Roth	Wenzel	50	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Roth	Anna	44	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Roth	Anna	25	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Roth	Alfred	18	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Stoehr	Joseph	37	Belgium	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Stoehr	Marie	31	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Stoehr	Gerhard	10	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Weider	Josef	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Weider	Helene	32	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Weider	Juza	1	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Weniger	Georg	40	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Weniger	Marie	28	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Wetzler	Konrad	39	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Wetzler	Elsa	38	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Wetzler	Sophie	14	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Wetzler	Paul	10	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Athol	9 June 1939		
Gebhart	Franz	31	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Gebhart	Charlotte	33	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Hampel	Richard	39	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Hampel	Emma	37	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Hampel	Elfriede	17	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Hampel	Erna	16	Denmark	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Hanke	Driedrich	47	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Hanke	Berta	41	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Hanke	Erna	18	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Hanke	Ilse	15	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Hanke	Friedrich	7	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Netek	Josef	46	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Netek	Emilie	43	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Netek	Hilde	18	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Netek	Bruno	16	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Netek	Rudolf	15	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Netek	Marie	20	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Papousek	Rudolf	23	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Papousek	Theresia	23	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Papousek	Marie	2	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Papousek	Anna	1	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Poppe	Alois	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Poppe	Berta	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Poppe	Alois	9	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Poppe	Gertraud	4	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Poppe	Ingeborg	3	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Poppe	Herta	2	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Saliger	Emil	36	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Saliger	Anna	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Saliger	Else	10	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Scharnagl	Friedrich	22	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Scharnagl	Hildegard	32	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Schneider	Franz	20	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Schneider	Marianne	23	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Schneider(Kirschner)	Franz	54	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Schneider(Kirschner)	Barbara	54	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Steinl	Walter	31	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Steinl	Hermine	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Stoehr	Albert	25	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Stoehr	Anna	22	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Stoehr	Doreen	1 mos.	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of Bedford	20 June 1939		
Amstaetter	Andreas	33	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Amstaetter	Hermine	39	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Amstaetter	Ingrid	7	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Aust	Richard	45	Denmark	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Aust	Marie	42	Denmark	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Aust	Elfriede	17	Denmark	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Aust	Berta	16	Denmark	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Aust	Richard	15	Denmark	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Aust	Edeltraud	8	Denmark	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Bartel	Berthold	44	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Bartel	Sophie	31	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Bartel	Ethel	6 wks.	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Barth	Josef	35	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Barth	Marie	29	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Jelinek	Karl	42	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Jelinek	Helene	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Jelinek	Egon	16	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Koecher	Josef	38	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Koecher	Emma	39	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Koecher	Josef	16	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Koecher	Herbert	14	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Koecher	Kurt	9	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Koutnik	Ernst	38	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Koutnik	Anna	32	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Koutnik	Armand	10	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Koutnik	Ernst	8	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Lexa	Herbert	34	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Lexa	Lisa	28	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Priegert	Gottfried	42	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Priegert	Leopoldine	37	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Priegert	Albert	18	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Priegert	Rudolf	16	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Rabas	Anton	29	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Rabas	Margarete	27	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Scharing	Julius	52	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Scharing	Else	35	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Scharing	Julius	24	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Schoeder	Franz	33	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Schoeder	Rosa	21	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Stoehr	Erich	27	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Stoehr	Hilde	25	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Wettengel	Ernst	27	Norway	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Wettengel	Gerda	28	Norway	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Winter	Josef	35	Sweden	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Winter	Marie	36	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Winter	Else	11	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Winter	Josef	14	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Winter	Christa	1	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Winter	Sibylle	1	Great Britain	S.S. Montrose	12 July 1939		
Dill	Johann	51	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Dill	Sophie	50	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Dill	Sophie	17	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Dill	Erhard	29	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Dill	Hanna	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Dittrich	Karl	36	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Dittrich	Frieda	28	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Mollik	Alois	35	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Mollik	Marie	31	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Mollik	Dagmar	1	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Schoenstein	Karl	51	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Schoenstein	Margarete	46	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Schoenstein	Josef	14	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Schwarz	Harald	23	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Schwarz	Else	27	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Wanka	Wilhelm	29	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Wanka	Maria Julia	30	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Wanka	Marie (sister)	37	Great Britain	S.S. Duchess of York	28 July 1939		
Linay	Josef	38	Great Britain			Single man	Sommert
Voit	Rudolf	41	Great Britain			Single man	Rei
Wurst	Otto	32	Great Britain			Single man	Schrodl
Hoidn	Robert	31	Great Britain			Single man	Wiesner
Wolfinger	Franz	21	Great Britain			Single man	Burdak
Ritschel	Karl	31	Great Britain			Single man	Harles
Gabriel	Franz	18	Belgium			Single man	Langer
Bartusek	Ernst	19	Belgium			Single man	Scholz
Bauernfeind	Robert	25	Belgium			Single man	Seidl
Langhammer	Franz	29	Belgium			Single man	Vodermayer
Englisch	Friedrich	37	Belgium			Single man	Andersch
Hein	Erich	33	Belgium			Single man	Hillebrand
Etzler	Rudolf	22	Great Britain			Single man	Kuttig
Cepa	Alfred	18	Belgium			Single man	Mann
Jilg	Eduard	20	Denmark			Single man	Arbter
Forster	Wilhelm	26	Great Britain			Single man	Dietl
Eckert	Erwin	27	Great Britain			Single man	Eckert
Kohlenz	Josef	17	France			Single man	Heller
Hackel	Rudolf	19	France			Single man	Klemmer
Schwertner	Willibald	27	Great Britain			Single man	Korbay
Hocke	Rudolf	18	France			Single man	Kraus
Woerl	Ignaz	32	Great Britain			Single man	Kreuzinger
Dotzauer	Roman	32	Great Britain			Single man	Kunzl

Appendix A
Passenger List
Refugees arriving between April and August 1939

Family Name	Given Name	Age	Country of Asylum	Ship	Date of Sailing	Status	Attached To
Loeffler	Franz	26	France			Single man	Lorenz
Brenner	Wilhelm	36	France			Single man	Schrofel
Hirschmann	Hermann	19	France			Single man	Wagner
Scholz	Ferdinand	26	Great Britain			Single man	Richter
Stoehr	Adolf	31	Great Britain			Single man	Stohr
Dworsky	Rudolf	19	Belgium			Single man	Hampel
Wawerzin	Johann	19	Great Britain			Single man	Hanke
Erhard	Franz	19	France			Single man	Bartel
Neubauer	Anton	24	Great Britain			Single man	Kocher
Gebhart	Richard	20	Norway			Single man	Gebhart
Pickert	Ernst	36	Sweden			Single man	Schoder
Przeczek	Reinhold	20	Great Britain			Single man	Langer
Wanka	Franz	41	Great Britain			Single man	Wanka
Wagner	Karl	26	Sweden			Single man	Rabas

Listed above is all those who arrived in Tupper between April and August of 1939. Single women could be included as part of a family unit but single men over the age of sixteen not immediate family members, ie. Father or son had to be listed as a single man and attached or sponsored by a family unit.

Item	Date	Order No.	Cost	Comparable	Difference	Source	Notes
House - standard	7-Mar-40	1423	$113.50	$50.00	$63.50	Glenbow Archive, CCA	July 5 1939 Supervisor McConnell reports that houses cost less than $50.00 to build. This invoice was for Erich Hein's home, brother-in-law to Mr. Tschiedel.
Logging Chain	23-Jun-41	4927	$ 3.50	$3.65	($0.15)	Eaton's 1937-38	Chain advertised in Eaton's is fourteen feet long with swivel in centre. Links are 3/8".
Cross cut saw	23-Jun-41	4927	$ 7.00	$4.25-$5.00	$.2.00-$2.75	Eaton's 1937-38	
Post maul handle	30-Jun-41	5154	$ 0.40	$.49-$.50	($0.09)	Eaton's 1937-38	
Grindstone	30-Jun-41	5154	$ 2.60	$2.10-$5.25	$0.50	Eaton's 1937-38	Square grindstone was $2.10, round stones to mount for turning were hirer in price.
House	30-Jun-41	6076	$113.50	$50.00	$63.50		July 5 1939 Supervisor McConnell reports that houses cost less than $50.00 to build. This invoice was for the Tschiedel home.
Swede saw	30-Jun-41	6076	$ 2.25	$2.39	$0.14	Eaton's 1937-38	
Fork	30-Jun-41	6076	$ 0.98	$1.00-$1.50	$0.02	Eaton's 1937-38	
Shovel	30-Jun-41	6076	$ 0.90	$.59-$.79	($0.11)	Eaton's 1937-38	
Hoe	30-Jun-41	6076	$ 0.64	$0.90	$0.26	Eaton's 1937-38	
Stove, pipes	30-Jun-41	6076	$ 18.76	$.40 per 30" length		Eaton's 1937-38	Mr. Schoen states in his book that each settler was given 4' of stove pipe, even with connectors and bends the total would not equal the amount charged.
Axe	30-Jun-41	6076	$ 1.20	$.98-$2.00	($0.22)	Eaton's 1937-38	
Lamp	30-Jun-41	6076	$ 0.86	$0.85	($0.01)	Eaton's 1937-38	
Lantern	30-Jun-41	6076	$ 0.99	$0.95	($0.04)	Eaton's 1937-38	
One-way ticket from Pouce Coupe to Toronto	30-Jun-41	6068	$ 63.50			Private Collection of Werner Tschiedel	This invoice is marked repayable which proves Amstatter's contention that not all settlers were provided with one-way tickets as promised by the CCA.
Metal heater tank	1-Oct-41	6231	$ 10.00	$6.25	($3.75)	Eaton's 1937-38	
Stove, pipes	8-Jun-42	6771	$ 10.00	$.40 per 30" length		Eaton's 1937-38	

Original invoices provided by Werner Tschiedel - invoices do not indicate condition, whether items were new or used. Invoices originated from the Canadian Colonization Association issued to Rudolf Tschiedel and Erich Hein. Settlers were told that they were charged wholesale prices. Eaton's prices were full retail and included shipping. Parentheses indicates those items which settlers paid less than Eaton's retail price. The difference was usually only a few cents difference, not wholesale prices.

Appendix C

Tupper, January 26, 1941

Dear Gustav and Family:

Let us start with the weather. The summer has been very fine and there was scarcely any rain in the fall there was no water in Tate Creek. The Creek froze over without there having been any water in it since July. Our water supply when we do not use melted snow comes from Pouce-Coupe River. In spite of the fact that this river has not carried any flowing water for a long time now, there are some deep spots which are not frozen right through. It is true that we have to bore holes two feet deep and deeper to get water. However, it cannot be used for cooking purposes, as it stinks like cow urine. For the kitchen I have brought some ice over from Swan Lake. In addition, we use melted snow. At the end of October winter started with an abundant fall of snow and since then we have had a real Canadian winter. We have had snow ever since and now since our thermometer is scaled down to only 50 below, we cannot find out anything about the temperature. To-day we were told that they had 56°below at Dawson Creek. This morning the thermometer registered -46. With such a temperature you have to feed the fire all day and you cannot go out. In the morning when we arise the contents of all the dishes and pans, even those on the stove, are frozen. Of course, this happens only if you have not kept up the fire all night. There are people who set their alarm clock so as to get up at regular intervals so that the fire would not go out. It is not surprising, therefore, that with such temperatures there are quite a few cases of frozen noses and cheeks and even hands. Until now, however, we have not suffered from the cold. This is the third time this week that the thermometer has sunk to 40 or less. In general, however, the temperature fluctuates around 0 Fahrenheit (this means approximately 18 to 20 below, Centigrade). But this temperature is quite bearable. When the thermometer is around 30 below, we still can go to get wood in the bush without the moccasins freezing to our feet. And if your feet are not cold, then your body is warm, too. The forecasts made by Canadians (see our letter of July 20) seem to have been realized in regard to this winter.

In one of my earlier letters I spoke to you about a visit by Herzer, who is the General Manager of the CCA, and we expected certain decisions to be taken as a result of that. But these decisions were not taken then (in May). During the whole of Herzer's stay here he had to deal almost continuously with a so-called 'opposition' consisting of a number of people who were not working any longer because they claimed the Chief had promised them something or other. It is, of course, impossible to find out if the purpose was not to take certain decisions because they were unpleasant for the CCA. Thus, the decisions were to be delayed until Herzer's fall visit and now I will come to the nucleus of the matter.

The colonization fund rapidly goes to its end, which means no more money will be available for settlement purposes. This applies particularly to living expenses, since the rest of the fund must be used for equipping the settlers who have not yet settled down. On September 30 the books were closed for the purpose of paying out the so-callled "limit." Since, of course, not one single settler would have been able to live on the yield of his crops, advances were paid on pigs kept and to be kept in the future. In my case I am receiving $15 per month for the time being. It has been calculated on the basis of the value of our share in the crop of oats, barley and wheat, that we can live on that for only six months, but drawing pigs into the calculations as well, it should be possible for us to get along until the next crop, because of the calculation in which the pigs have been included.

At harvest time many settlers, both married and single, were told to do harvest work elsewhere in order to save limit payments. A record was kept of the money earned and the party concerned would receive no limit payments for the months he had earned wages in that manner. Herzer personally visited each settler in his home in order to gain a firsthand impression. I must add that, according to the organization anybody has an individual claim to amounts of $1500 or $1000. $500 had been deducted right at the beginning to cover general expenses. If this is so, it means that the organization may decide to spend $1200 on one settlement and $700 or $800 on another one. In addition, and this is contrary to what was assured us in London, Herzer said that none of these who had money of their own could have a personal claim of their own funds, but that this money belonged to the fund and would be administered without consideration of their personal wishes. In practice, this means that I am unable to buy even a nail without the consent of the organization in spite of the fact that I have $750. Moreover, although I have not spent any of my money yet, I have no funds available for my own livelihood but must accept advances. This means that the CCA lends me my own money which I must repay from the proceeds of the sale of my pigs. Ideal conditions, are they not! But this is not all. Herzer went from house to house asking the people how they expected to live after payment of the limits was to be stopped on September 30. When he asked me I told him that I was justified in putting that question exactly to the CCA and to him and that since I arrived here nobody had ever asked me for my opinion about the organization of the settlement scheme. After having acted in such an arbitrary manner for one and three-quarter years, those gentlemen worry themselves about how we are expected to live. The final result in my case was that I have to settle down on my quarter-section in the spring to build a stable there and use my share of the crop (I have a so-called full share) to breed pigs, since I shall have had no time to cultivate the soil. Others were told to seek employment in the bush in order to earn a living. Later on the settlers were subdivided into three and even four groups. A and B were suitable for farms, B requiring some training; C unsuitable for farming but employable in industries where there is a labour shortage because of the war. These men are now to be transferred to industries but for this the permission of the Government is required. This has been already done. Then there is the fourth group which includes those who are unemployable either on farms or in industry because they are too old or are useless for some reason. These people constitute the problem for the settlement and or the Government. The demands of the settlers to be made independent, to be given land owned by the colonization scheme, for an equal participation of each settler in the fund, for the control over the expenditures, for the dismissal of the Director, were refused point blank, and this resulted in the resignation of all the members of the Settlement Committee. They claim that they are responsible only to the Government. Now when I move to my quarter-section in the spring this does not mean that I will have anything to say there. As before, the land is still owned by the CCA and the crop will be considered as a community crop. I have also asked Herzer what he thinks is going to happen at the end and whether he thinks that these conditions can last forever. The settler is asked to look after himself but they refuse him the right to do with his land what he wants. It is impossible for one to receive a reply here since nobody seems to know how to get the wagon out of the mud in which it has been driven. Conditions here are quite different from those in Saskatchewan, where each settler has become the owner of his farm right from the beginning, as you will see from an article of the "Neue Volkszeitung" herewith enclosed. Essentially, however, those people are not better off than we are, even though we do not need to agree with all the polemical statements of the writer. There large areas were ploughed up and now they do not even know how to subdivide the settlement into sections. Operations in the form of a large community farm are of course contrary to the wishes of the settlers, who simply want to know, once and for all, what is to become of them. The settlers, in addition, are not interested in increasing their indebtedness to the CCA and the CPR. This, as you see is quite a dilemma; I, and of course other settlers, have 80,100 acres and more of ploughed land on the quarter, while others are supposed to move to a quarter where not even one acre has been ploughed or broken. Can those people

expect any help from the Committee, or will they be let go to get along by themselves. When the limit payments have stopped and each settler will have to look out for himself, I wonder who could compel him to plough a quarter section for which he will obtain no equivalent value. He is compelled to take over high ploughing costs for the land which has already ploughed and will probably have to wait for a few years before being able to make use of his crops. In my case I must add that until September 30 I have worked very hard for the community and have used some of my own money. This has been going on for a year and a half and I ask myself to what purpose. Of course, I have acquired some experience in farming but I think that I could have obtained that at a much lower cost.

It is understandable, therefore, that because of these unsettled conditions many have expressed a desire to get out of here as quickly as possible in order to get away from the claws of the CPR. This has become an expression that you hear around here every day. Quite a number of settlers have abandoned all their claims to the fund and have moved away either to Edmonton or Grande Prairie to other farms or to certain trades (glove makers, tailors, saddlers, etc.). Now the exodus to the war industries has started. They are looking now for 25 fitters, turners, etc., to go to Montreal or to the Vancouver shipyards. A friend of mine, the former Secretary Hugo Mayer, left on Friday for Montreal. He is a turner by profession but has not exercised his trade for the last twenty years. The family remains here for the time being until his time of probation is over. Quite a few have already had their families join them or have left with them. All the young men, particularly single men, have been asked by Herzer whether they did not want to enlist. I may mention, in addition, that between 30 and 40 men have registered their names with the Czechoslovakian Consul in Montreal for the purpose of joining the Czechoslovakian army. The Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia has been recognized in Canada, as you know. Negotiations for the organization of a Czechoslovakian army group in Canada are not completed yet, so that enlistment has not yet taken place.

All in all, the means applied here to people who, in spite of any deficiencies which should not be passed under silence, were certainly decided at the start, at least 90% of them, to do their duty and even more, were, to say the least, not very well chosen. As you will see from a small item, it is apparent that the CCA has found this out, even though somewhat belatedly; the Director is to be replaced, but the prestige is preserved, as the demand made by the Committee shows.

But even to-day it is quite clear that the greatest defect of the colonization scheme is that nothing at all is done to preserve, even in a small way, the rights of the settlers. In a communication of the competent Department to the police authorities in Grande Prairie, where the settlers had filed complaints about the Director, it is stated that no agreement exists and that the demands made by the delegation (Rehwald-Pater Reichenberger and a representative of the Czechoslovakian Ministry for Social Welfare) were limited to the request to provide the refugees with a "possibility to start life anew." This is not very much when we consider the fate of 300 families, but we often hear around here "Who is speaking now of the Sudeten Germans?" This was also stated in the Staatszeitung in regard to refugee problems. The upheaval taking place now has no doubt made people forget that we once stood on the defence posts of Europe.

I have not had the opportunity for a long time to write about conditions here. In any case there was nothing very favourable to report, which would have encouraged me to write.

Our party has again split recently and the battlecry is "Jaksch or Kogler." The dispute going on in London now was also taken up by the local directorate and they thought that they would reach a decision but the interest of the large mass of the party members was not very great and therefore the matter was not settled in the way it was hoped. So far as I am concerned that dispute is somewhat distant, and many other comrades, in addition to myself, have other worries that are closer to home.

This is now probably all that I have to say. After what has been said, you will probably be able to have an idea of what is going on in the settlement. There is nothing of which we may

be sure. Among those who had started in the spring or in the fall, namely, those who had moved to their quarter section, a certain number returned to the group. If differences arose in one group they simply moved to another, sometimes by way of exchange, sometimes carrying their home along with them, which is after all no problem in view of the fact that those houses are movable.

What the end of all this is going to be is in the lap of the gods. The new director has already arrived and his predecessor has remained here to introduce him. The problem now is how to start the spring work. There is nobody willing to do anything except for remuneration. They all think "Why should I work in the settlement when others do not do anything, accept employment outside and earn their livelihood and the ones remaining here must look after the families and the livestock free of charge and, in addition, live on advances which must be paid back some time later on.

It certainly is a great mixup, but the best thing is not to think of it but to live from day to day.

Best regards.

Source: LNAC, File 916207, Vol. 616, Reels C10436-C10437. Frank Reilich to his brother Gustav and family, letter intercepted by postal service and translated by Royal Canadian Mounted Police, January 26, 1941.