THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

Σοφία AND Φρήν

IN THE BACCHAE OF EURIPIDES

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is twofold: first, it examines the occurrences of σοφία and φρήν and their cognates in the Bacchae in order to determine their relationship and significance for the play; secondly, it demonstrates how Euripides has used these terms to portray his characters in respect of the play's principal themes. After outlining some of the general issues in recent criticism of the Bacchae, Chapter One defines the particular issues addressed in this thesis: the characters' attitudes towards such terms as σοφός and σώφρων; the difference between σοφία and τὸ σοφόν; and the bearing the use or misuse of the φρένες has on each character's σοφία or lack of it.

Chapters Two and Three begin with a history of the usages of σοφία and its cognates and of φρήν and its cognates respectively from Homer to Euripides, thereby providing the necessary background for the study of these terms in the Bacchae. Chapter Two reviews the occurrences of σοφία and its cognates episode by episode. Σοφία is found to refer to practical, useful wisdom, primarily manifested in the acceptance of Dionysus as a god; τὸ σοφόν is rejected by both Teiresias and the Chorus as impractical, intellectual wisdom used by those who attempt to overrule νόμος and the gods whose worship νόμος sanctions.

Because Chapter Two takes account of the plot of the play, the linear approach is unnecessary in Chapter Three; the significant terms are examined separately: namely, φρήν, φρονεῖν, σωφρονεῖν. The φρένες, which can be affected by contact with certain people or ideas, can also be withheld from or applied to certain people. However, a person has no control over his φρένες in madness, which is found to result from the impairment or temporary loss of the φρένες.

Chapter Four brings together elements from Chapters Two and Three and concentrates on the relationship between σοφία and φρήν and their cognates. Although the φρένες can acquire τὸ σοφόν, the good temper that results from "sound" φρένες is one characteristic of the man who is practically σοφός. Thus Dionysus whose ἡσυχία implies his σωφροσύνη is σοφός, whereas Pentheus, the man of ὀργή, is ἀμαθής.

The use of the φρένες is found to be a significant factor in the acquisition of σοφία. When a person is confronted with a problem, he uses his φρένες to acquire an understanding of the situation. This understanding may be good or bad, but it is the proper use of the φρένες that leads to σοφία. Dionysus and Teiresias use their φρένες properly, and acquire σοφία, the former in his patient handling of Pentheus, the latter in his acceptance of Dionysus as a god. On the other hand, Pentheus' lack of σοφία is the result of his improper use of his φρένες. By relying on overconfidence

and his authority as a king he misuses his φρένες in two ways: he has contempt for νόμος and is inclined to ponder issues that are not fit for mortals. When Pentheus is confronted with the problems which Dionysianism poses to Thebes, he uses his φρένες to come to an understanding of the situation, but the application of his φρένες is wrong and he acquires and uses τὸ σοφόν to reject Dionysus.

Chapter Five summarises the conclusions made in each of the preceding chapters and emphasises the various characters' thoughts on σοφία and their use of their φρένες.

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Abbreviations

All references to ancient authors are based on Oxford Classical Texts unless otherwise noted.

Conacher	D.J. Conacher. *Euripidean Drama. Myth, Theme and Structure*. Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1967.
Denniston	J.D. Denniston. *The Greek Particles*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954.
Dodds	E.R. Dodds, ed. *Euripides: Bacchae*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.
Kirk	Geoffrey S. Kirk, tr. *The Bacchae*. Prentice-Hall Greek Drama Series. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
Merkelbach-West	R. Merkelbach and M.L. West, eds. *Fragmenta Hesiodea*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.
North	Helen North. *Sophrosyne. Self-knowledge and Self-restraint in Greek Literature*. Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, 35. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966.
Page	Denys L. Page, ed. *Poetae Melici Graeci*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
Paley	F.A. Paley, ed. *Euripides*. 3 vols. 2nd ed. London: Whittaker and Co., 1872-1880.
Roux	J. Roux, ed. *Les Bacchantes*. 2 vols. Paris: Bibliothèque de la Faculté des Lettres de Lyon, 1970 and 1972.
Sandys	John Edwin Sandys, ed. *The Bacchae of Euripides*. 4th ed. Cambridge: The University Press, 1900.

Snell	Bruno Snell. Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der Vorplatonischen Philosophie. Untersuchungen No. 29. Berlin, 1924.
Tyrrell	Robert Yelverton Tyrrell, ed. The Bacchae of Euripides. London: Macmillan, 1892.
Webster	T.B.L. Webster. "Some Psychological Terms in Greek Tragedy," JHS 77 (1957), 149-154.
West	M.L. West, ed. Iambi et Elegi Graeci. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
Willink	C. Willink. "Some Problems of Text and Interpretation in the Bacchae," CQ 16 (1966), 27-50 and 220-242.
Winnington-Ingram	R.P. Winnington-Ingram. Euripides and Dionysus. An Interpretation of the Bacchae. Cambridge: The University Press, 1948.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

After Euripides' death in the winter of 407-406 B.C. in Macedonia, where he had gone in the spring of 408 at the invitation of King Archelaus, the Bacchae together with the Alcmaeon at Corinth and the Iphigeneia at Aulis was produced in Athens by Euripides the younger, the poet's son or nephew, and won first prize. The complexity of the play itself has prompted various interpretations which cannot essentially be reconciled. Most critics focus on one or more of three aspects of the play: the meaning of Dionysus and his worship; the play's attitude towards Dionysus; and the play's treatment of Pentheus. In this introduction each of these general issues will be examined briefly, and the particular issues which the thesis addresses will be described.

In the Bacchae Dionysus is primarily a nature god who is manifest in the growth of vegetation and of animals, especially the bull. His special gift to mortals is wine, which grants solace from pain, sleep and forgetfulness of evils.[1] In the rites of his worship his maenads, or Bacchants, go to the mountains in sacred bands (θίασοι); each wears a fawn-skin (νεβρίς) and holds a θύρσος, a fennel rod wreathed in ivy with a pine cone at the top. One element of Dionysiac worship, the ὀρειβασία or mountain-dancing, is described in the parodos. "What the πάροδος of the

Bacchae depicts is hysteria subdued to the service of religion; the deeds done on Cithaeron were manifestations of hysteria in the raw, the compulsive mania which attacks the unbeliever."[2] In the traditional rites of σπαραγμός and ὠμοφαγία the victim, usually a bull, is thought to embody the vital powers of Dionysus himself: by rending and eating the victim the Bacchants acquire this vital power and become ἔνθεοι. In the play the first messenger describes the σπαραγμός of the cattle (734-47), and the second messenger recounts with gruesome detail Pentheus' σπαραγμός at the hands of his mother and her sisters (1125-36); the ὠμοφαγία, a detailed description of which Dodds feels "would perhaps have been too much for the stomachs even of an Athenian audience,"[3] is mentioned only once, by the Chorus in the parodos, as ὠμοφάγον χάριν (138).

Critics have offered various interpretations of the play's attitude towards Dionysus. Because the Bacchae represents the triumph of Dionysus and the misfortune of the θεομάχος, some critics, noting also Euripides' sympathetic view of Dionysianism as presented in many of the choral odes, see Dionysus as a positive force and the play as a palinode, Euripides' recantation of the atheism of which he had been accused by Aristophanes.[4] Yet gods do triumph in other plays, for example, the Hippolytus,[5] and Dionysus is not praised as a positive force throughout the play, for, as Cadmus laments, the god has destroyed them justly but

excessively (1249). Moreover, Euripides' sympathetic understanding of an orgiastic religion like Dionysianism is not new: "it appears already in the chant of the initiates in the Cretans (fr. 472), the ode on the mysteries of the Mountain Mother in the Helena (1301ff.), and the remains of an ode in the Hypsipyle (frs. 57, 58 Arnim = 31, 32 Hunt)."[6]

On the other hand some critics, most notably Norwood and Verrall, see Dionysus as a negative force because of his excessive cruelty not only to Pentheus and Agaue, his opponents, but to Cadmus, his supporter; they conclude that the Bacchae is another in a long series of attacks upon the gods and religion in general. For these critics the real moral of the play is "tantum religio potuit suadere malorum".[7]

Recent critics tend to accept parts of each of the two previous interpretations. The play presents Dionysus first as the object of a religion of ecstasy and joy, as the ἥσυχος giver of wine and τὰ ἀγαθά (285) to mortals. Yet in the end Dionysus confirms his own description of his dual nature (δεινότατος ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἡπιώτατος, 861) by his cruelty towards Pentheus' family and, secondarily, towards Thebes, which undoubtedly shared in the disaster. In Dodds' words, "the poet has neither belittled the joyful release of vitality which Dionysiac experience brings nor softened the animal horror of 'black' maenadism; deliberately he leads his audience through the whole gamut of emotions, from

sympathy with the persecuted god ... to share in the end the revulsion of Cadmus against that inhuman justice."[8]

The possible reactions of the Athenian audience to Dionysus' actions in the play have been clearly described by Winnington-Ingram.[9] To summarise his conclusions: because the play deals with the familiar idea of a tyrant opposing a god, the audience would not be surprised to see the god take ruthless vengeance. Although they might consider the excessiveness of the vengeance shocking, they would remember that the gods claim the right to determine how they shall act and must not be judged by human standards. Yet an Athenian who had seen earlier plays of Euripides might not be satisfied with such uncritical acceptance, since in those plays Euripides had indeed urged his audience to judge the gods by human standards. In this case he would conclude that the Dionysus who is represented in the play as a malignant figure had no right to claim respect by mortals.

The play's treatment of Pentheus produced nearly as many interpretations as the play's attitude towards Dionysus had. Some critics believe that the new, young king is portrayed as a "rational man of decision and action, a Greek general who believes, like all good Greek rulers, that he is the sole salvation of his city."[10] He is thought to be a confident and conscientious young man, who is conspicuously loyal to his grandfather and, who loathes hypocrisy and hates effeminacy and vice.[11] Some of these critics

view his downfall as the product of external force;[12] others explain his fate as a result of either the ὕβρις he shows in his rational self-confidence towards Dionysus or the lack of σωφροσύνη in his youthful statecraft.[13] On the other hand, some critics see Pentheus as "the typical atheist and blasphemer, whose fate, if pitiable, is a salutary example."[14] They do not hesitate to describe him as possessing "the traits of a typical tragedy tyrant: absence of self-control; willingness to believe the worst on hearsay evidence, or on none; brutality towards the helpless; and a stupid reliance on physical force as a means of settling spiritual problems."[15] What the Bacchae does in fact portray is a shift in sympathy from the persecuted god Dionysus in the early parts of the play to the pitiable Pentheus in the later parts. Of Pentheus Winnington-Ingram writes: "He is--he puts himself--in the wrong, with his intolerance and his high-handed impatience (to quote only defects which not even his advocates can disregard). As his grim fate overtakes him, feeling is gradually turned in his favour, till finally the lament of Cadmus over his heir reveals a more sympathetic aspect of Pentheus than has yet appeared in the play."[16]

Opinion is divided also on the matter of whether Pentheus is justified in trying to repress Dionysianism. Since he is a king, his first responsibility is his city's safety, and he sees the risks and dangers presented by the new cult:

"... here was a movement likely to destroy its [the State's] harmony, a movement which defied his control, fraught though it was with grave social significance .... It was quite reasonable, therefore, that Pentheus should seek to repress the religious revival which confronted him in Thebes."[17] Nevertheless, Pentheus does not recognise that, although he is a king, he is also a mortal and must therefore subordinate himself to the will of the gods. Moreover, the worship he attempts to repress is sanctioned by νόμος.

The practical problem presented by the Bacchae has been described as "how to deal with the forces of emotion, particularly as they are generated in the associations of human beings."[18] These emotions are the deep passions, released by wine, Dionysus' gift to mortals, which "must be recognised as the essence of life ... and the source of all joy and loveliness. But if man fights against them instead of with them, if he tries to deny them altogether, they will conquer him in the end, and tear him limb from limb, themselves becoming ugly and fiendish in the process."[19] Here we see Pentheus' tragedy: while attempting to repress not only the emotional worship of Dionysus but his own latent emotionalism, he fails to understand that Dionysus and the irrational emotions that he represents are essential to human life and cannot be repressed without disaster.

The following chapters attempt to offer interpreta-

tions of some aspects of the general issues that have been outlined above by focusing on the way in which the characters of the Bacchae are portrayed in respect of the terms σοφία and φρήν and their cognates. For example, if a character is described or describes himself as σοφός or σώφρων, the ways in which the terms are applied will be investigated in order to determine each character's criteria for the terms. A study of the occurrences of σοφία and τὸ σοφόν will attempt to define the differences they imply. Finally, the way in which the characters use their φρένες will be examined in order to understand what bearing this use or misuse of the φρένες has on the characters' σοφία or lack of it.

A study of recurrent words is one effective means of clarifying and defining the ideas and issues which a play presents. Because the Greek theatre by virtue of its scale and conventions placed great weight on the words that were spoken, one of the principal aims of a critic should be to examine those words which recur frequently. Such studies have been undertaken and have furthered our understanding of individual plays.[20] The need to examine the words of a play is emphasised by Taplin:[21]

> When a Greek tragedian means something to be important or significant, then he draws his audience's attention to it. Whether it be a silence, a theme, a stage action, an image, a religious or intellectual problem, he will put it in the foreground, and spend time and words on it.

> Only that man who sets himself up as more knowing than the playwright can look for the significance of the work in the background, or between the lines, or in what is neglected and not said. What is meant to be significant is there in the words in the foreground.

Thus in his frequent use of σοφία and φρήν and their cognates[22] Euripides directs the audience's attention to his desire to make the terms a significant theme of the play. In explaining that Euripides' choice of σοφία as a theme was natural Winnington-Ingram writes: "Euripides wrote for an age preoccupied with the idea of sophia; for over a generation sophists had been claiming to teach it in every department of life, and we may believe that the word σοφός ... was as constantly upon the lips of intelligent Athenians as it is on those of Euripidean characters."[23] Yet Euripides does not choose to examine σοφία alone, for he emphasises the quality of his characters' σοφία as a result of their use or misuse of their φρένες. What is basic to the meaning of the tragedy, according to Conacher, is "the tension which is dramatically developed between the right and wrong kinds of understanding [that is, in the use of sophos, sophia and various other terms connoting intelligence, wisdom and knowledge]."[24]

The following chapters will review the occurrences of σοφία and φρήν and their cognates and then an attempt will be made to define their relationship. The discussion of

these terms in Chapters Two and Three will be prefaced by an examination of the history of σοφία and its cognates and of φρήν and its cognates respectively in order to set the background for the study of the terms in the Bacchae. Chapter Four will bring together elements from these two chapters and concentrate on the relationship between the two sets of terms. Chapter Five will summarise the conclusions drawn in the preceding chapters.

CHAPTER ONE: NOTES

1. For the benefits of wine see 280-3, 771-4.

2. Dodds, p.xvi.

3. Dodds, p.xvii.

4. Ar. Th. 450f.

5. G.M.A. Grube, The Drama of Euripides, 2nd ed. (London, 1961), p.398.

6. Dodds, p.xlii.

7. Dodds, p.xli.

8. Dodds, pp.xlvi-xlvii.

9. Winnington-Ingram, pp.6-7.

10. R.R. Dyer, "Image and Symbol: The link between the two worlds of the Bacchae," AUMLA 21 (1964), p.15.

11. E.M. Blaiklock, The Male Characters of Euripides. A Study in Realism (Wellington, 1952), p.228.

12. Winnington-Ingram, p.44.

13. Dyer (supra, note 10), p.15; Blaiklock (supra, note 11), p.215.

14. Winnington-Ingram, p.44.

15. Dodds, p.xliii.

16. Winnington-Ingram, p.10.

17. Blaiklock (supra, note 11), pp.216-17.

18. Winnington-Ingram, p.168.

19. Grube (supra, note 5), p.419.

20. For such studies of words, see the following works. For Sophocles in general: Bernard M.W. Knox, The Heroic Temper. Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964); for σωτηρία and χάρις in the Oedipus Coloneus: Peter Burian, "Suppliant and Savior: Oedipus at Colonus," Phoenix 28 (1974), pp.408-29; for

φύσις in the Philoctetes: Harry C. Avery, "Heracles, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus," Hermes 93 (1965), pp.279-97; for φιλία in the Heracles: Conacher, pp.83-8; for σοφία and σωφροσύνη in the Andromache: P.N. Boulter, "Sophia and sophrosyne in Euripides' Andromache," Phoenix 20 (1966), pp.51-8.

21. Oliver Taplin, "Aeschylean Silences and Silence in Aeschylus," HSCP 76 (1972), p.97.

22. The terms found in the Bacchae are σοφία, σοφός, τὸ σοφόν, σόφισμα, σοφίζεσθαι; φρήν, φρονεῖν, σωφρονεῖν, σώφρων, καταφρονεῖν, ὑπερφρονεῖν, ἀφροσύνη, εὐφροσύνη, φροντίζειν, φρενοῦν.

23. Winnington-Ingram, p.167.

24. Conacher, p.73.

CHAPTER TWO

Σοφία and Cognates

In the first part of this chapter the usages of σοφία and its cognates are examined in order to outline the ways in which the terms are used by writers other than Euripides. Then Euripides' own additions to the usages are outlined. In the second part of the chapter all occurrences of words of the stem σοφ- in the Bacchae are studied. Because of the importance of studying the terms in the contexts in which they occur, a linear approach with some plot-summary has been adopted.

The History of σοφία and cognates before the "Bacchae"

The usages of the word σοφία and its cognates from Homer to Sophocles[1] can be divided into two major classifications.[2] The first occurrence of the word σοφία in extant Greek literature clearly shows that it denoted a person's "skill" in relation to crafts. In the sole instance of any word related to σοφία in Homer we read at Iliad 15.412 of the τέκτων who had skilfully mastered the craft of carpentry with Athena's counsel:

... ὃς ῥά τε πάσης
εὖ εἰδῇ σοφίης ὑποθημοσύνῃσιν Ἀθήνης.

The second classification, found only after Homer and Hesiod, still involves the idea of the "practical" wisdom that is useful and results in some benefit or success but in this

case the person to whom σοφία is attributed is "skilled", but no longer in any specific craft or occupation. Although these two usages appear side by side in writers after Homer and Hesiod, it is necessary to keep in mind that in the literature available to Euripides and his audience σοφία originally denoted "skill in a craft".

The clearest example of σοφία or a cognate with the meaning "skilled in a craft" is a quotation from the Margites, preserved by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VI. 7.1141:

> τὸν δ' οὔτ' ἄρ' σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα
> οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν· πάσης δ' ἡμάρτανε τέχνης.
> The gods made him neither a digger nor a plougher,
> nor skilled in any other respect, but he lacked
> every art.

Here, as in Iliad 15.412, σοφία is regarded as coming from the gods and denotes "skill" in relation to crafts or arts.[3]

Σοφία is used of many skills in addition to that of the τέκτων of the Iliad. Hesiod tells Perses:

> δείξω δή τοι μέτρα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης,
> οὔτε τι ναυτιλίης σεσοφισμένος οὔτε τι νηῶν.
> I shall show you the measures of the loud-roaring
> sea,
> although I am skilled neither in seamanship nor
> in ships.[4]

Also in reference to nautical skill, Archilochus and Aeschy-

lus both call a helmsman of a ship σοφός; Pindar speaks of a σοφός charioteer, and Sophocles and Pindar of medical σοφία.[5] Frequently in Aeschylus, Sophocles and Herodotus a seer is called a σοφός μάντις or οἰωνοθέτης.[6] Herodotus, as one might expect, uses σοφία of skill in fighting or in military tactics.[7]

Σοφία can also denote skill in music or poetry. It is used of the cithara-player, of the Muses as the givers of the inspiration for poetry and of Apollo as the god of music and of the lyre in particular, but it is not until Pindar that σοφία is used with any regularity to denote a poet's special skill in composing poetry.[8] He uses σοφία to refer to his own poetic skill and frequently in general to poets and their art.[9]

The development of σοφία from the usage "skill in a craft" to "practical wisdom" was natural because the term had always implied usefulness. Certainly the skill possessed by the carpenter is useful as is the skill of the sailor, the charioteer or the doctor. In these examples of the first classification, however, the emphasis is placed on the skill itself, not on the practicality or usefulness of that skill.

On the other hand, the examples of the second classification do not emphasise skill but the usefulness of the wisdom:

> ὁ χρήσιμ' εἰδώς, οὐχ ὁ πόλλ' εἰδώς, σοφός
> the man who knows useful things, not many things,

is wise.[10]

Σοφία can help a person understand the true nature of a man[11] and a person can be called σοφός because he speaks wise words, which have a practical benefit if obeyed:

> ἦν Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων σοφός, ὃς τάδ' ἔλεξε·
> "μηδὲν ἄγαν· καιρῷ πάντα πρόσεστι καλά."
>
> There was a Spartan, Chilon, a wise man, who said,
> "Nothing in excess: all good things belong to measure."[12]

Herodotus relates what he considers the two wisest νόμοι of the Babylonians.[13] The σοφώτατος is the custom of having an auction of the most beautiful, marriageable girls to provide dowries for the ugliest. Second to this custom in σοφία is their method of treating illness. Both are "wise" customs because they are useful and profitable.[14]

The practicality of the σοφία that solves problems is also clear:

> Νέστωρ, ὁ Πύλιος, ἔστιν; οὗτος γὰρ τά γε
> κείνων κάκ' ἐξήρυκε, βουλεύων σοφά.
>
> The Pylian Nestor, does he live? For he used to ward off their evil doings with his wise counsel.[15]
>
> φανερὰ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πτερόεσσ' ἦλθε κόρα
> ποτέ, καὶ σοφὸς ὤφθη βασάνῳ θ'ἁδύπολις·
>
> Once the winged maiden came visibly against Oedipus and upon trial he was seen to be wise and dear to the city.[16]

The counsel Nestor provided was wise because it was successful in what it attempted to accomplish; Oedipus' practical

wisdom in solving the riddle of the Sphinx (whereupon she killed herself) brought a great benefit to Thebes.

Often the sensible, beneficial action of a person is attributed to practical σοφία. Herodotus' Xerxes claims that the Thessalians were σοφοί because they realised that their land could be conquered easily and quickly and therefore surrendered to him. As the Chorus of the Prometheus Vinctus listen to Prometheus' boasts that Zeus will be overthrown and that Prometheus alone can save him, they come to the conclusion that those who worship Nemesis are σοφοί.[17] In the opinion of the Chorus it can only be sensible and beneficial to be on good terms with a power that punishes presumptuous and insolent behaviour.

Occasionally σοφία is linked with αἰσχρόν and καλόν in gnomic statements. Here the emphasis is on how a sensible, practically wise man should or should not act:

> ἀλλ' ἄνδρα, κεἴ τις ᾖ σοφός, τὸ μανθάνειν
> πόλλ' αἰσχρὸν οὐδὲν καὶ τὸ μὴ τείνειν ἄγαν.
> But for man, even if he is someone wise, it is not shameful to learn many things and to resist struggling too much.[18]
>
> πιθοῦ, σοφῷ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν ἐξαμαρτάνειν.
> Obey, for it is shameful for a wise man to persist in error.[19]

There are a number of examples of practical wisdom that must be treated separately. These are the cases that charac-

terise practical wisdom as "cunning" or "sly". Before Cambyses invaded Egypt, Phanes deserted from the Egyptian king's army and was caught; he was not, however, brought back to Egypt because he outwitted his captors with his cunning (σοφίῃ γάρ μιν περιῆλθε ὁ Φάνης) and got the guards drunk, thereby obtaining his escape.[20] In this case, as in most, the author gives no definite hint whether the σοφία is condemned or condoned.

However, in the Philoctetes, the last play containing cognates of σοφία that Sophocles wrote, there are two instances where the morally negative idea expressed by σοφία is evident. In the prologue Odysseus plans with Neoptolemus how to use their σοφία (σοφισθῆναι) to obtain Philoctetes' arms and they plan a trick that is characterised as morally κακός.[21] Later, after Neoptolemus has obtained the arms, Philoctetes tells Odysseus that he successfully taught Neoptolemus to be a σοφός.[22] In both cases the negative moral quality of cunning wisdom is strongly implied if not condemned.

Euripides' usage of σοφία and cognates closely follows that of his predecessors and contemporaries.[23] He uses σοφία sparingly to denote "skill in a particular craft or occupation": sculptors have skilful hands, Calchas, the seer, is skilled in interpreting omens and Apollo is σοφός with his lyre.[24] Medea, the enchantress, is naturally very skilful

with drugs and poisons and a person can be described as skilled at speaking.[25]

Much more common, however, is σοφία as practical wisdom. It can describe an action that is useful and beneficial, a sensible course of action, or a person who is successful.[26] General, practical wisdom is meant when in the Heraclidae Macaria asks Demophon to teach the children to be σοφοί in all respects.[27]

Also found in Euripides is the practical wisdom that is characterised as "cunning" or "clever". Hermione calls Andromache clever at arguing; when Hippolytus wishes that his house could speak and tell if he is truly κακός, Theseus replies that Hippolytus "cleverly" takes refuge in voiceless witnesses.[28] Occasionally a clever trick is called σοφός: Helen's plan to announce that Menelaus is dead is "clever" and she bewails her supposedly dead husband "in a very clever manner".[29]

Usually, like other writers, Euripides does not condemn or condone such instances of cunning or clever practical wisdom. There are a few cases, however, where the implication of morally negative σοφία is made by association with other such terms:

> σοφὴ πέφυκας καὶ κακῶν πολλῶν ἴδρις.
>
> You are clever by nature and experienced in many evils.[30]
>
> γυναῖκες, ἐς μὲν ἔσθλ' ἀμηχανώταται,

κακῶν δὲ πάντων τέκτονες σοφώταται.

... women, utterly useless for good things,

but most clever devisers of every evil.[31]

Euripides places more emphasis on two usages of σοφία and cognates than any of the authors studied. The first usage is his habit of referring to the gods as σοφοί (in various practical ways).[32] In two plays, however, he questions the moral wisdom of Apollo.[33]

The second usage, most important to the Bacchae, is Euripides' frequent condemnation of excessive σοφία:

χρὴ δ' οὔποθ' ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ

παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.

Whoever is naturally sound of mind should never

have his children taught to be excessively wise.[34]

As Medea explains, this type of σοφία is not useful or beneficial but incurs envy and makes one appear useless and not σοφός.[35]

Σοφία and cognates in the "Bacchae"

The Bacchae is concerned with the arrival in Thebes of Dionysus, the son of Zeus and Semele, a daughter of Cadmus, the former king of Thebes. Dionysus has come from Lydia with his band of Bacchants, acquainting each land he visits with his worship; now he has come to Thebes, his mother's home, to reveal himself as a god to the Thebans because they reject his claims to divinity.

Of all of Euripides' plays the Bacchae contains the greatest number of occurrences of σοφία and its cognates: with its 24 occurrences it has one more than the Medea and far more than the other extant plays. 20 of the 24 occurrences are forms of the adjective σοφός and there are only two cases where the exact form of the cognate is unclear because of textual problems (200 and 427). The study of these 24 occurrences in the Bacchae will be dealt with by an examination of each traditional division of the play and the usages of σοφία and its cognates found in each. In this way the play's development of the concept of "wisdom" and each character's thoughts on σοφία will be clear.[36]

πρόλογος 1-63.

Dionysus, the divine son of Zeus and Semele, has come to Thebes but will appear as a mortal (1-5). After praising Cadmus for keeping the precincts of his mother's shrine ἄβατος (10-11), he describes his journey, undertaken to establish his rites and to reveal himself as a god,[37] from Lydia and Phrygia to Thebes, the first Greek land to which he comes (13-22).[38] When he arrived in Thebes, Dionysus drove his mother's sisters (and all the women of Thebes) mad because they refused to believe that he was truly a god (23-38). They preferred to think that Semele was seduced by a mortal and placed the blame on Zeus, a sly plan invented by Cadmus: Κάδμου σοφίσμαθ' (30).

Here, in the first instance in the Bacchae of a cognate of σοφία, the negative side of σοφία is evident. The word σόφισμα can have various shades of meanings from the frequent, innocuous ideas of "invention" and "plan of action" to the pejorative sense of "trick" or "sly scheme".[39] In the opinion of Semele's sisters Zeus killed her because the supposed σοφίσματα by which she and Cadmus explained her pregnancy amounted to nothing less than a lie. Thus, the σοφία supposedly used in the formulation of Cadmus' alleged σοφίσματα was neither successful nor beneficial but brought about her death. Within the first 30 lines of the play, then, a word of the stem σοφ- denotes a negative type of σοφία, a cleverness or slyness, which may be morally negative and which certainly leads to trouble.

After a description of why he has driven the Theban women from their homes in madness, Dionysus states the purpose of his visit. There are two things that Thebes must learn thoroughly, even if it is unwilling: first, it is uninitiated in his Bacchic rites and, secondly, he has come to speak in defence of his mother by appearing to mortals as the god she bore to Zeus (39-42).

Not only do Semele's sisters reject Dionysus as a god but another of Cadmus' grandsons, Pentheus, who now rules Thebes, fights against the god and his rites, giving him no place in his libations or prayers (43-46). In spite of this behaviour Dionysus is willing to establish his worship and

leave peacefully, provided that he does not meet with violent opposition, in which case he and his Bacchants will fight (48-52). Stressing once again that he will appear in the form of a mortal, he calls upon his Lydian Bacchants, who make up the Chorus of the play (53-63).

πάροδος 64-169.

While the Chorus enter the orchestra (prelude: 64-71), they sing that they have come from Asia and characterise the ambiguous nature of Dionysianism with their comment on "their sweet toil for Bromius, their labour which is no labour" (66-7). Now they will sing for Dionysus the traditional songs. First they reflect on their happy life in service to the god and relate the myth of his double birth (first strophe and antistrophe). Their thoughts then turn to his mother and they urge the people of her land to join in the Bacchic rites (second strophe). In relating the origin of the τύμπανον they link it with Crete, the birthplace of Zeus, Dionysus' father (second antistrophe). The parodos ends with a long epode describing Bacchic rites and phenomena.

First ἐπεισόδιον 170-396.

Until this point in the play only the representatives of Dionysianism and the views of those representatives have been presented. Now we meet Cadmus and Teiresias, who appears only at this point in the play. For the first time in the

play, significantly, there is a concentration of cognates of σοφία; Cadmus, moreover, uses these terms nowhere else in the play. Thus, it is to be expected that basic statements will be made about their usages and their significance for the remainder of the play.

Teiresias calls Cadmus from the palace, explaining that they have agreed to dress as Bacchants (173-7) and, as Cadmus will later relate, to honour Dionysus as a god (181-3). Cadmus comes from the palace, having heard the σοφός voice of the σοφός Teiresias (178-9). Soon he asks the seer to explain where they will perform their Bacchic rites because he is σοφός (184-6). Two conceptions of σοφία are present in Cadmus' mind. At 179 he refers to Teiresias as σοφός, a seer skilled in a seer's art, who in addition shows practical wisdom in accepting Dionysus.[40] At 186 Teiresias is again called wise because Cadmus knows him to be acquainted with Dionysiac ritual; he is skilled, "expert en la matière".[41] Since this is the only place in the play where Cadmus uses any of the σοφ- terms, it is important to note that he associates σοφία with the worship of a god. Thus, the first usage of a cognate of σοφία by a Theban links wisdom with Dionysianism.[42]

After the short discussion by Teiresias and Cadmus about how they are to go to the mountains, there follows a passage of extreme importance to the wisdom-theme of the play:

Κα. οὐ καταφρονῶ 'γω τῶν θεῶν θνητὸς γεγώς.

Τε. οὐδ' ἐνσοφιζόμεσθα[43] τοῖσι δαίμοσιν.
πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἅς θ'ὁμήλικας χρόνῳ
κεκτήμεθ', οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ[44] καταβαλεῖ λόγος,
οὐδ' εἰ δι' ἄκρων τὸ σοφὸν ηὕρηται φρενῶν.

C: I do not despise the gods, being born a mortal.

T: Nor do we use wisdom on the gods.
Ancestral customs, which we have acquired
coeval
with time, no reasoning will overcome (them),
not even if τὸ σοφόν is acquired by the
highest minds. (199-203)

Cadmus' position is clear: he is a god-fearing old man who knows his place as a mortal in respect to the gods. His view of σοφία was exemplified by Teiresias in his skill as a seer and in the practical wisdom he showed in accepting Dionysus.

Teiresias' position is more complicated and much more crucial than that of Cadmus to the wisdom-theme of the play. His train of thought can be explained thus: Cadmus is right, we mortals cannot hate the gods, nor can we use wisdom on them. Any attempt to do so would be to "rationalise" about them, to explain them away, to provide reason to hate or to reject them. Furthermore, our ancestral customs and traditions, which have taught us, among other things, a respect for the gods and things divine, cannot be overcome by any reasoning, even if it is aided by τὸ σοφόν. Thus 201-3 expands and explains 200. The sceptics[45] can use their wisdom

to attempt to reject tradition and, by implication, the gods, but they will not succeed, because τὸ σοφόν does not work in the religious area and cannot thus be considered beneficial or practical wisdom.

Thus the important phrase τὸ σοφόν is used here by Teiresias to denote the wisdom of those who would seek to undermine tradition; it is the impractical, intellectual wisdom of the sceptics. In his use of the verb ἐνσοφίζομαι at line 200, Teiresias is thinking of τὸ σοφόν: mortals cannot use intellectual wisdom on the gods. By contrast σοφία[46] characterises for Teiresias the acceptance of the gods and tradition by the man who knows his place as a mortal and understands that he cannot use τὸ σοφόν with any success to reject those gods or traditions.

Teiresias proceeds to explain how Dionysus likes to be honoured by young and old alike (204-9) and Cadmus announces the hasty, excited arrival of Pentheus (212-14). The king of Thebes is characterised as a typical tyrant whose one redeeming feature is his implied concern that Dionysianism may harm his city. Yet the rash young man will believe the worst he is told without asking for evidence (215-25, 233-8)[47] and like Semele's sisters he does not believe in Dionysus' divinity (242-5). Moreover, he threatens to hunt out the Theban Bacchants, his own mother and aunts included, and to jail them; the Stranger, if caught within the walls, Pentheus will kill. When he sees his grandfather and Teiresias dres-

sed as Bacchants, he is ashamed of them and accuses Teiresias of importing a new god so that he can "take more pay for reading the signs in the burnt offerings" of sacrifice.[48]

The Chorus are horrified by Pentheus' impiety, but Teiresias calmly sets about answering each of his charges. In his προοίμιον[49] he explains the reason for Pentheus' outburst. Referring to the "clever rhetorician",[50] he says that when a σοφός has an honest case to argue,[51] it is no great undertaking for him to make a successful speech (266-7), but when this able speaker depends on overconfidence (θράσει),[52] he proves to be a bad citizen because of his lack of sense (270-1). Although Pentheus seems to have the speaking ability of a sensible man, there is in fact no sense in his words (268-9). Pentheus has the σοφία, the cleverness or "dexterity"[53] of a clever speaker but misapplies it through overconfidence.[54] Hence, the term σοφός in this passage is used of the skill and practical, useful wisdom of the orator. Unlike the previous occurrences of σοφ- terms it has no real implication of the practical wisdom of acceptance of the god and can be considered an instance of general wisdom which can be used in the wrong way and thus is impractical and unbeneficial for its possessor.

Teiresias then replies to Pentheus' charges. Dionysus is a god whose gift to mortals is wine, which gives solace from pain, sleep and forgetfulness of evils (272-85). The double birth, which Pentheus does not believe, is explained

as a result of an error made by mortals: they confused the word ὅμηρος (hostage) with μηρός (thigh) (286-97). In addition, Dionysus inspires prophecy, is linked with Ares (298-305) and does not make women unchaste, as Pentheus thinks, for that depends on their own nature (314-18). In all of these explanations Teiresias does not contradict his own statement that mortals should not use wisdom on the gods, as has been suggested,[55] for at line 200 he is thinking of τὸ σοφόν, the intellectual wisdom of sceptics who seek to undermine tradition and the gods. In his reply to Pentheus, Teiresias uses his σοφία, his practical wisdom, to find more acceptable explanations for this god of the irrational. At no time does he seek to reject Dionysus as Pentheus would, but tries to give the young king reasons and an opportunity to change his mind about Dionysus. Teiresias concludes his speech by saying that Dionysus wants only to be honoured, just as Pentheus does (319-21). In his opinion Pentheus is mad (326-7).

Cadmus pleads with his grandson to accept Dionysus as a god and relates as a warning the fate of another grandson, Actaeon, who was torn apart by his own dogs because he boasted that he was a better hunter than Artemis (330-42). Nevertheless, Pentheus is even more determined and gives orders that Teiresias' seat of augury be destroyed and that the stranger be caught and stoned (343-57). In resignation Teiresias sets off with Cadmus to pray that Dionysus will not do anything

sinister (νέον, 362) to Pentheus and the city (360-9).

First στάσιμον 370-433.

The first stasimon relates directly to the preceding episode. The Chorus has already expressed its distaste for Pentheus' attitude towards Dionysianism (263-5) and they now ask Ὁσία (Reverence) if she has heard his οὐχ ὁσίαν ὕβριν,[56] his unholy insolence in attacking the god's divine status (373-5). Thus the mood is set in the first strophe for the rest of the stasimon: Pentheus displays an irreverent, insolent attitude towards Dionysus, who presides over the happy life of joyous banquets, foremost among the gods, and whose gifts of dancing, laughter along with the flute and the cessation of trouble are provided by his wine (376-85).[57]

In the universalising antistrophe the Chorus begin with the first of a series of gnomic statements:

ἀχαλίνων στομάτων 386
ἀνόμου τ'ἀφροσύνας
τὸ τέλος δυστυχία·
Of unbridled mouths
and lawless lack of sense
the end is misfortune. (386-8)

They are thinking of Pentheus, whose eloquent tongue and inability to see what impact his words will have Teiresias has already described (268, 358). Moreover, Cadmus has begged Pentheus to forsake his lawlessness (331) and both Cadmus

and Teiresias have commented on his lack of sense (332; 268-9, 311-12). In these first three lines of the antistrophe the Chorus foreshadow Pentheus' fate and echo what Cadmus and Teiresias said at 337-41 and 367-8 respectively: Cadmus hoped that Pentheus would not come to the same end as Actaeon, Teiresias that he would not bring grief upon Cadmus' house. Whereas they hope that misfortune will not befall Pentheus, the Chorus state that such misfortune does befall the man of an unbridled tongue and a lawless lack of sense.

The remainder of the antistrophe is expressed in more general terms. The Chorus praise the life of quietness and good sense (τὸ φρονεῖν) as remaining steady and holding one's house together. The gods, though they live far away in the heavens, watch over mortals' affairs. Then occur seven lines of extreme importance to the wisdom-theme of the play:

τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία,[58] 395
τό τε μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν
βραχὺς αἰών· ἐπὶ τούτῳ
δέ τις ἂν μεγάλα διώκων
τὰ παρόντ' οὐχὶ φέροι. μαι-
νομένων οἵδε τρόποι καὶ
κακοβούλων παρ' ἔμοι- 400
γε φωτῶν.

τὸ σοφόν is not wisdom,
and thinking thoughts that are not mortal

means a short life. Because of this[59]
the man who pursues great things
would not gain[60] the things that are at hand,
These are the characteristic ways of men who are mad
and of evil counsel, at least in my opinion.
(395-401)

The Chorus may be thinking in general terms here but they give a backward glance at Pentheus. He is the man who does not know a life of quietness (212, 214, 361) and cannot by any means be described as possèssing τὸ φρονεῖν (268-9, 311-12, 332). Although Cadmus will say later in the play that Pentheus held together his house (1308), it is his lack of σοφία, his lack of understanding[61] of the situation that is causing the problems now.

The Chorus then offer their puzzling paradox τὸ σοφόν is not σοφία. They reject τὸ σοφόν[62] as the impractical, intellectual wisdom that Teiresias described as being unable to aid reasoning (λόγος) in the overthrow of tradition (201-3). They reject τὸ σοφόν, but do not immediately give their thoughts on σοφία. Again they have Pentheus in mind:[63] his unbridled tongue and lawless lack of sense, his inability to lead a life of quietness are all signs of impractical wisdom. They predict that his habit of thinking thoughts that are not mortal will result in a short life and that while he pursues his high thoughts and plans to drive the new god and his worship from Thebes, he will miss the benefits provided by

Dionysus. They further characterise him as one of those mad men, and we remember that Teiresias has twice called him mad (326, 359).

The Chorus do not state explicitly what they themselves consider to be σοφία but it is clear that their idea of σοφία has no room for τὸ σοφόν. Thus σοφία for the Chorus could include two things: the life of quietness and the virtue of τὸ φρονεῖν or, more specifically, τὸ θνητὰ φρονεῖν, thinking mortal thoughts.

In the second strophe the Chorus sing a prayer of escape. They wish to flee to Cyprus, Paphos and Pieria, where they may celebrate their Bacchic rites lawfully, without persecution.

In the second antistrophe the Chorus turn from their thoughts of escape to praise of Dionysus. He rejoices in festivities, loves Peace and gives to both rich and poor the pleasure of wine. Two of these attributes are recalled from the first strophe: his delight in festivities (376-7, 384) and his gift of wine (382-3); the third, his love of Peace, is parallel to the life of quietness of the first antistrophe (389-90). Then in the closing lines of the antistrophe, made difficult by the textual problem of 427, the Chorus give their thoughts on σοφία:

μισεῖ δ' ᾧ μὴ ταῦτα μέλει,
κατὰ φάος νύκτας τε φίλας
εὐαίωνα διαζῆν.

σοφὰ[64] δ' ἀπέχειν πραπίδα φρένα τε
περισσῶν παρὰ φωτῶν·
τὸ πλῆθος ὅ τι 430
τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνόμισε χρῆ-
ταί τε, τόδ' ἂν δεχοίμαν.

He hates the man who cares not for this,
by day and pleasant night
to live to the full a happy life.
It is wise to withhold the mind and understanding
from men of excess;
whatever the masses,
the common people, have taken as their custom and
usage, that I would accept. (424-33)

The whole stasimon has been an ode to the peaceful, joyful life of Dionysus and his worshipers. The two strophes tell of the beautifully-crowned festivities over which Dionysus presides (376-85) and the places where his Bacchants may celebrate his rites in peace. Even the moralising first antistrophe tells of the benefits of the life of quietness. Now in the second antistrophe, after a description of the god's love of festivities and Peace and his gift of wine, the Chorus turn to the theme of the peaceful, happy life (424-6). Their thoughts on wisdom as withholding the mind and understanding from men of excess (427-9) are entirely consistent with this desire for a happy life. They are thinking again of Pentheus and his threats of violence to-

wards the Stranger and the Bacchants, and his inability to be calm and reasonable.[65] He is the man whose more than mortal thoughts mean a short life (396-7), not a happy life. Yet the Chorus do not end their thoughts on σοφία on that note, for they conclude that they would accept as wisdom[66] whatever the common people take as their custom and usage.[67]

Thus the Chorus add in the second antistrophe to their thoughts on wisdom which could only be implied in the first antistrophe. There σοφία could include the quiet life and thinking mortal thoughts. Now in the second antistrophe they characterise σοφία as the avoidance of men of excess, who have no chance to lead a life of happiness, and as the simple, practical wisdom of the common people. The sceptics and their intellectual wisdom, τὸ σοφόν (201-3), had attempted to overthrow the very traditions on which the common people base their practical σοφία. Moreover, it is clear that the common people and their σοφία at the end of the second antistrophe are to be contrasted with the mad men of evil counsel of the end of the first antistrophe whose τὸ σοφόν the Chorus reject.

Second ἐπεισόδιον 434-518.

After the concentration of σοφ- terms in the first episode and the Chorus' thoughts on τὸ σοφόν and σοφία in the first stasimon there are only two instances of a σοφ- term in the second episode, only one of which is a new usage. These

two occurrences will be studied after a brief description of the second episode as a whole.

A servant enters leading Dionysus (dressed as the Lydian Stranger), who had put up no resistance when caught, and relates that the Bacchants have escaped from the jail where they had been bound in chains (434-50). That the servant is one of the common people whose wisdom the Chorus accept in the first stasimon (430-3) is suggested by the shame he felt at having to act upon Pentheus' orders to bring the Stranger to him (441-2) and by his demonstration of a very human reaction, when the Bacchants are mysteriously set free, in his conclusion that the Stranger is full of miracles (449-50). Pentheus then remarks on the Stranger's effeminate appearance, and they embark on a long section of stichomythia which takes them from the introductory questions about the Stranger's homeland, to Dionysiac ritual and Pentheus' description of what he plans to do with the Stranger. Pentheus is warned not to bind him, but will not listen, for he says with a complete misunderstanding of the situation that he is more powerful than his opponent. As the Stranger is led off the stage he warns that Dionysus will punish Pentheus for his insolent behaviour (516-17).

In the portion of the stichomythia containing the first of the two occurrences of a σοφ- term, the Stranger, in response to Pentheus' question about what nature Dionysus has, says that the god has whatever nature he wants. Pentheus

retorts that he diverts the question well, although his words have no meaning. That statement, replies the Stranger, is open to dispute: the man who speaks wise words (σοφά) to a person who lacks understanding will seem not to make sense (480). Pentheus lacks the ability to recognise the truth when he hears it. The Stranger replies truthfully and wisely to the question posed by Pentheus: Dionysus appears, as in the present case, in whatever form he chooses. His words are true but it is the σοφία, the practical wisdom, of the Stranger that is emphasised.

The second σοφ- term in the second episode is found in Pentheus' remark that the Stranger will pay for his clever answers to his questions (489).[68] The term used, σόφισμα, has the same negative implication as in its first occurrence in the prologue, where it was used of Cadmus' clever plan to explain his daughter's pregnancy. Although it is the Stranger's supposed cleverness, or slyness in answering the questions that is emphasised in this line, there is also the implication of Dionysus' wisdom as opposed to Pentheus' lack of understanding (480, 490).

Second στάσιμον 519-75.

In the strophe of the second stasimon the Chorus' thoughts are of Dionysus and his birthplace, Thebes. They sing in an abbreviated form of the double birth of Dionysus, adding that the waters of Dirce were used to bathe the god upon his birth.

They conclude the strophe by reproaching Dirce for rejecting Dionysus.

With the antistrophe their thoughts turn to Pentheus' behaviour in the preceding episode. Contrasting his descent from the earth-born Echion with Dionysus' divine birth as described in the strophe, they denounce Pentheus' rage and call him a monster, not a mortal man, but similar to the murderous giant who fights the gods. With Pentheus' threats of 511-14 in mind they sing that he will soon fasten them in chains as he has already done with their leader. After calling upon Dionysus to restrain Pentheus, a prayer that will be answered in the third episode, they enumerate in the epode the many places where Dionysus might be leading his bands of Bacchants.

Third ἐπεισόδιον 576-861.

After the second stasimon, in which no mention was made of σοφία, the third episode has a concentration of σοφ- terms. Spread out over the longest episode of the play are seven occurrences of σοφός in five individual lines. The third episode proves to be of importance to the wisdom-theme because in it Dionysus gives his thoughts on σοφία in three separate contexts and Pentheus calls the Stranger σοφός with two entirely different meanings.

Following the earthquake scene the Stranger explains to the Chorus what happened when he was taken to be bound in

the stables. Thinking that he was binding the Stranger, Pentheus bound a bull, while his opponent sat in peace watching. Then Dionysus shook the palace and kindled a flame on his mother's tomb. Pentheus, imagining that the palace was on fire, tried to put it out but abandoned that task when he saw that his prisoner had escaped. Thereupon he rushed into the palace, where he was met by a phantom, which the Stranger presumes Dionysus made. Pentheus fights the phantom, taking it for the Stranger, but in the end gives up in exhaustion and the Stranger walks away in peace (616-37).

Outside the palace the Stranger hears Pentheus approaching and wonders what he could possibly say after what has happened within. At any rate he will bear him easily, even if he comes breathing arrogance. For it is characteristic of "a wise man" to practise a self-controlled good temper (638-41). Dionysus, as the Stranger, speaks for himself and the representative of his worship: the σοφός, the man who possesses the practical σοφία which accepts the god, is characterised by good temper.

No one in the Bacchae displays this σώφρων εὐοργησία more clearly than the Stranger. In the second episode the messenger leads him in, describing him as a gentle beast who did not try to escape; he surrendered willingly, not pale from fright, but smiling (436-9). In the present scene the Stranger describes himself as ἥσυχος (quiet, peaceful) twice

(622, 636) and says that he will bear Pentheus easily (640). By contrast Pentheus has been characterised as a man of ὀργή (rage, temper) by the Chorus in the second stasimon (537) and in this scene he rushes about impetuously (620-1, 625, 628, 630-1, 640).

Thus for Dionysus the man of a self-controlled good temper is σοφός, practically wise. His thoughts on σοφία are similar to one aspect of the Chorus' wisdom in the first stasimon: the happy, quiet life (389-90, 425-6). Dionysus will have more to say about σοφία in this episode but for the moment he is in full agreement with the Chorus in their characterisation of wisdom as ὁ τᾶς ἡσυχίας βίοτος.

Pentheus comes out of the palace to find that his prisoner is waiting for him. After the lacuna in the text after 651, Pentheus gives orders that the gates of the city's wall be locked so that the god cannot leave.[69] The Stranger replies with what is in effect a shrug of the shoulders (τί δ', 654) and asks if gods do not surmount even walls (653-4). Then:

Πε. σοφὸς σοφὸς σύ, πλὴν ἃ δεῖ σ' εἶναι σοφόν.
Δι. ἃ δεῖ μάλιστα, ταῦτ' ἔγωγ' ἔφυν σοφός.
P: You are clever, quite clever, except in that in which you should be clever.
D: In what I should most be (clever), in that I am by nature clever. (655-6).

Here we find four occurrences of the adjective σοφός in two

lines. To paraphrase: Pentheus: You are clever in your answer, indeed gods do surmount walls. However, you know that I do not believe that Dionysus is a god. Therefore, you may be clever in answering me with what is really an irrelevant question, but you are not clever in that in which you should be, namely in rejecting Dionysus as I do. Dionysus: in that in which it is most important for me to be clever, namely my ability to deal with sceptics like you and "my" acceptance of Dionysus, I am by my very nature clever (because I am Dionysus).

Here Pentheus uses a σοφ- term in basically the same way he did in his only previous mention of one, when he said that the Stranger would pay for his clever answers (489). Now Pentheus again condemns the Stranger's cleverness. The Stranger, however, declines to comment on Pentheus' cleverness and again speaks what are really "wise words to the man who does not understand" as he did at 480, using the same terms as Pentheus. But of course Pentheus misses the true meaning of the Stranger's remark: what he considers his opponent's "cleverness" is in fact Dionysus' σοφία.

A long speech by the messenger interrupts the battle of wits between Pentheus and the Stranger and serves to give Pentheus even more reason to oppose Dionysianism. The messenger gives a detailed account of the doings of the Theban Bacchants, the miracles, the σπαραγμός of the cattle and the sack of the two Theban villages by the Bacchants when they

thought they were in danger of being attacked and caught.

Pentheus is furious at the contents of the messenger's speech and orders that preparations be made to fight the Bacchants (778-86), threatening, in addition, to murder them (796). When the Stranger tries to save the situation by making a genuine offer[70] to bring the Bacchants to him in peace, Pentheus thinks it is a trick and the Stranger asks if he would like to see the Bacchants in the mountains (802-11). Thus begins the tempting of Pentheus.

After they decide that Pentheus must go to the mountains openly, not in stealth, the Stranger tells him to put on a linen dress so that the Bacchants will not kill him when they see him there as a man (816-23). Pentheus thinks that it is a good suggestion and remarks that the Stranger has been σοφός all along (824). Whereas Pentheus' two previous usages of σοφ- terms were sneers at his opponent (489, 655), he now uses the term as a compliment: he thinks that the Stranger is wise because he has provided a practical solution to the problem of letting him see the Bacchants without being killed by them. Yet Pentheus fails to see the ironic truth of his statement, that the Stranger has used his σοφία to trap Pentheus and to lead him to his ruin.

When Pentheus balks at putting on a woman's dress, the Stranger points out that the alternative, fighting with the Bacchants, will cause bloodshed.[71] Pentheus agrees and resolves to go to a lookout first. That, says the Stranger,

is "wiser" than to hunt evil with evil (836-9), meaning to ask for trouble in the form of bloodshed by going where he has no right to go. Thus to Pentheus it would seem that the Stranger deems wise his plan to avoid bloodshed, whereas we know that this is another of Dionysus' clever answers designed to lead Pentheus farther into the trap.

The third episode ends with a description by the Stranger of the maddening of Pentheus and the prediction of his murder at his mother's hands. He will recognise Dionysus, the son of Zeus, a god most terrible and most gentle to men. (860-1).

Third στάσιμον 862-911.

As a result of the turn of events in the latter half of the third episode the Chorus allow themselves some hope of freedom from their oppression by Pentheus. In the strophe of the third stasimon they ask if they will dance barefoot in nightlong dances,[72] like a fawn who plays in the green pleasures of a meadow after she escapes the frightening hunt, while the huntsman shouts encouragement at his dogs; like the fawn who races over the plain by the river, delighting in the places deserted by men and in the branches of the forest whose leaves provide shade.

The simile of the fawn illustrates the Chorus' own situation. As in the second strophe of the first stasimon they wish to escape, but now they have more hope of fulfil-

ling that wish. As the fawn escapes her huntsman, the Chorus see themselves escaping their hunter, Pentheus. Yet, just as the huntsman continues to pursue the fawn, Pentheus is still in pursuit of the Bacchants, not to catch or to kill them but to spy on them.[73] With these thoughts of escape from Pentheus in mind, the Chorus sing the refrain:

τί τὸ σοφόν; ἢ τί[τὸ][74] κάλλιον
παρὰ θεῶν γέρας ἐν βροτοῖς
ἢ χεῖρ' ὑπὲρ κορυφᾶς
τῶν ἐχθρῶν κρείσσω κατέχειν;
ὅ τι καλὸν φίλον ἀεί.

What is τὸ σοφόν? or what privilege
from the gods is fairer among mortals
than to hold one's hand in power
over the head of one's enemies?
What is fair is always dear. (877-81)

Because the Chorus has condemned τὸ σοφόν in the first stasimon as impractical, intellectual wisdom, as excluding what they consider σοφία, the life of quietness and the thinking of mortal thoughts, they cannot here mean "What is (practical) wisdom?", but "What is intellectual wisdom?", that is, what benefit has τὸ σοφόν and the rejection of Dionysus brought to Pentheus, whose murder at his mother's hands the Stranger has just now predicted.

The relationship between the two questions of the refrain has been subject to much dispute: the problem is

whether or not the second question provides an answer to the first and describes σοφία, as opposed to τὸ σοφόν. In the first question the Chorus cannot be casting about in the dark in an attempt to understand τὸ σοφόν. On the contrary, they think of the impending fate of Pentheus and conclude that such is the benefit of this intellectual wisdom. It is not necessary to assume that they reject τὸ σοφόν here:[75] they have already done so (395) and need no reassurance after what they have seen happen. The first question, then, is a reflection by the Chorus on the impracticality of τὸ σοφόν.

The remainder of the refrain contains two occurrences of καλόν, "fair", "honourable", an adjective that suggests benefit or advantage. The Chorus ask, "Or what is fairer than vengeance? Whatever is fair is always dear." The implication of the proverb (881) is that "one finds 'fair' or attractive, and so pursues, what is to one's own advantage".[76] Vengeance is clearly advantageous for the Chorus because it removes their opponent Pentheus. Dodds, followed by Kirk, assumes that the first question is answered indirectly and, for the moment, sufficiently by the second; Winnington-Ingram concludes, "... the true wisdom (the σοφία of 395) will include the traditional valuation of revenge, which will be not only καλόν (and νόμιμον) but also σοφόν."[77] Thus, these critics believe that if the first question is concerned with τὸ σοφόν, the second is concerned with σοφία and that in

it the Chorus are offering their thoughts on σοφία. One should avoid, however, the conclusion that the Chorus believe that vengeance must be a part of σοφία;[78] they state merely that vengeance is καλόν, to their advantage.

In the universalising antistrophe the Chorus turn their thoughts to divine power. "It may come late, but it will come with certainty in setting on the right path those mortals who honour folly and who in mad judgement do not respect things divine. The gods hide in subtle ways the long foot of time and hunt out the impious man. One should not know or care for anything that is better than custom, for it is the divine that has power and that which is held as custom over a long period of time is grounded in nature." Their thoughts are again of Pentheus, the impious man who will not put his faith in tradition and accept Dionysus as a god. The antistrophe expands the idea presented in the last lines of the first stasimon: their acceptance of the customs and traditions of the common people.

Coming after the antistrophe the refrain is even more appropriate to the situation than it was after the strophe. Because Pentheus' folly has been recalled in vivid terms and revenge described as an inevitable recompense for the impious man, the Chorus can naturally question the benefit of his intellectual wisdom.

In the epode the Chorus return to the same thoughts as are found in the strophe: escape and the happy life. Happy

is the man, they sing, who escapes a storm at sea and reaches shore; happy is he who is above his labours. One man may surpass another in prosperity and power, yet countless men have countless hopes, some of which result in prosperity, others in failure. The Chorus count blessed the man whose life is happy day by day.

Fourth ἐπεισόδιον 912-976.

The very brief fourth episode serves to give proof of the changes Pentheus has undergone as a result of the god's entrance into him;[79] he is now truly a Bacchant with no desire to hunt down the women but only to spy on them. When told to come out of the house by the Stranger, Pentheus in Bacchic attire shows that he is completely possessed by Dionysus: he sees two suns, a double Thebes and two seven-gated walls and perceives the Stranger as a bull with horns on his head. Because the god accompanies him, the Stranger replies, Pentheus now sees what he should (918-24). Thereupon, when he wants to know how he looks in his Bacchic dress, the Stranger puts the finishing touches on his costume, showing him how to hold his thyrsus (925-44). As they set off through the middle of Thebes to Cithaeron, he predicts that he will be brought home in his mother's arms, in luxury, while the Stranger calls upon Agaue and her sisters to stretch out their hands to receive the youth he is bringing to them. He and Bromius will be victorious;

the rest the event itself will show (961-76).

Fourth στάσιμον 977-1023.

In the third stasimon the Chorus had hopes that Dionysus would take vengeance on Pentheus and that thereby they would escape persecution and be able to lead a happy, quiet life. Now in the strophe of the fourth stasimon, because they have been virtually assured of Pentheus' ruin in the fourth episode, they sing of revenge, urging the hounds of Lyssa (Madness) to goad Cadmus' daughters against the mad man in woman's dress who comes to spy on the Bacchants. They predict that his mother will see him first and will not believe that he was born of a mortal mother but of a lioness or Libyan gorgons. In the refrain the Chorus continue the revenge-theme, praying that Dikē (Justice) come openly, carrying a sword, and kill by stabbing through the throat the godless, lawless, unjust earthborn offspring of Echion.

The antistrophe contains an extremely important usage of a σοφ- term but the textual problems are numerous and crucial to the meaning of the stasimon. I offer the text as Dodds emends it:

ὃς[80] ἀδίκῳ γνώμᾳ παρανόμῳ τ' ὀργᾷ
περὶ <σά>, Βάκχι', ὄργια ματρός τε σᾶς
μανείσᾳ παραπίδι
παρακόπῳ τε λήματι στέλλεται,
τάνίκατον ὡς κρατήσων βίᾳ,

γνωμᾶν σωφρόν<ισμ>α θάνατος· ἀπροφασί-
στως <δ'> ἐς τὰ θεῶν ἔφυ
βροτείως τ' ἔχειν ἄλυπος βίος.[81]
τὸ σοφὸν οὐ φθονῶ·[82]
χαίρω θηρεύουσα τάδ' ἕτερα μέγαλα
φανερά τ' ὄντ'· ἄ<γ>ει <δ'> ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ βίον,
ἦμαρ ἐς νύκτα τ' εὐ-
αγοῦντ' εὐσεβεῖν, τὰ δ' ἔξω νόμιμα
δίκας ἐκβαλόντα τιμᾶν θεούς.

Whoever with unjust purpose and lawless rage
concerning your worship, Bacchus, and your
mother's worship
sets forth with maddened mind
and frenzied spirit
to subdue by force that which cannot be sub-
dued,
for him death is the chastisement of his
purposes;
but to accept unhesitatingly the things
that are of the gods,
to behave as a mortal, naturally results in
a painless life.
I do not begrudge τὸ σοφόν;
I rejoice in hunting these other things that
are great
and manifest, for they lead one's life to the

good,
namely during the day and through the
night
to be reverent and pious, and by rejecting
those customs
that are outside justice, to honour the gods.
(997-1010)

In this antistrophe certain elements from all the Chorus' preceding songs are combined. From the parodos comes the happy life of the man who is acquainted with the rites of the gods (72-82). The first stasimon adds two different elements: first, the happy, quiet life (376-85, 389-90, 417-26) but also the lawless lack of sense shown by Pentheus; secondly, that the thinking of thoughts that are not mortal results in a short life (387; 396-7). From the second stasimon comes a comment of the rage shown by Pentheus (537-44) and the third stasimon contributes more thoughts about the happy life (strophe, epode) and new comments on the power of the gods to take vengeance on the impious man (antistrophe).

Thus, again the Chorus are thinking of Pentheus but they do not grudge him τὸ σοφόν. Here their tone is much the same as in the refrain of the third stasimon where they ask what is the benefit of τὸ σοφόν. They have seen in the fate of Pentheus the result of τὸ σοφόν and do not care for it. They are happy to pursue other things that lead to τὰ

καλά, namely to be pious and to honour the gods. Because τὸ σοφόν and τὰ καλὰ are clearly antithetical it can be concluded that the Chorus may consider piety and reverence of the gods as characteristic of σοφία.

As in the third stasimon the refrain (991-6, 1011-6) is now more apt because the Chorus have set out in most vivid terms the character of Pentheus and the inevitability of Dionysus' revenge. In the epode they call upon Dionysus to reveal himself as a bull, a many-headed snake or a fire-breathing lion and with a smile to throw a net of death around the one who hunts out the Bacchants.

Fifth ἐπεισόδιον 1024-1152.

The Chorus do not have to wait long for their hopes of revenge to be accomplished, for the second messenger enters and sorrowfully announces that Pentheus is dead. When the Chorus rejoice because they are now free from fear of imprisonment, he reproaches them, saying that it is not καλόν to rejoice over the accomplishment of evil. In their excitement they ignore his remark and ask for details of the manner of death of the unjust man who did unjust things (1024-42).

Pentheus and the messenger had gone to Cithaeron where they sat in a grassy glen in silence watching the Bacchants (1043-57). Because Pentheus could not see the immoral conduct which he expected of the Bacchants, he suggested that

he go up onto a cliff by climbing a fir tree; the Stranger obliged him by bending down to the earth the top of the tree, seating Pentheus on it and carefully letting it resume its upright position (1058-74). As Pentheus was just becoming visible, the Stranger disappeared and a voice from the sky (which the Messenger guessed was Dionysus') called upon his Bacchants to take vengeance upon the man who mocked them and their rites (1075-84). As soon as the Bacchants recognised the order, they threw rocks, branches of fir and their thyrsi at him and attempted to tear up the roots of the tree (1088-1104). When that attempt proved unsuccessful, they took hold of the tree, at Agaue's suggestion, and dragged it out of the ground. As Agaue fell upon Pentheus, he threw off his wig so that she would recognise him and begged her not to kill her own son because of his errors (1105-21). In her madness she wrenched out his shoulder and the other Bacchants completed the σπαραγμός (1122-36).

With this vivid description the messenger returns to the present situation. The lesson he has learned from witnessing the fate of Pentheus is expressed in 1150-2: the finest (κάλλιστον) and wisest usage[83] for a mortal is prudence (τὸ σωφρονεῖν) and reverence of things divine.[84] The moral recalls various comments the Chorus has made on these themes. In the first stasimon they called wise (σοφά) the withholding of one's mind from men of excess and decided to accept what the common people take as their custom and

usage (427-33). Later they praised the acceptance of things divine and behaviour as a mortal and concluded that piety and reverence of the gods by the rejection of those customs that are outside justice leads one's life to τὰ καλά (1003-10).

Fifth στάσιμον 1153-1164.

In the fifth stasimon the Chorus respond in joy to the Messenger's description of Pentheus' death with a short ode of victory over the descendant of the snake, who took female clothing and the fennel-stalk made into a thyrsus, who had a bull to lead him to misfortune. Their joy soon turns to grief when they think of Agaue whose "fine" contest (καλὸς ἀγών) it has been to kill her own son.[85]

Ἔξοδος 1165-1392.

Agaue enters with what she thinks is a lion's head in her arms. Upon questioning by the Chorus she reveals that it was her privilege to strike the first blow and then Cadmus' other daughters joined in (1168-89). She explains that it was the σοφός huntsman Bacchus who turned his Bacchants upon the beast in a σοφός manner (1190-1). To Agaue Dionysus is σοφός because he had brought the beast to his worshipers and, by placing it in an inescapable position in the tree, virtually assured the success of the hunt. Thus σοφός not only characterises the skill of Dionysus as a

huntsman but the practical, useful nature of his actions. Moreover, the secondary implication of these lines is evident: the god has cleverly used his σοφία to lead Pentheus to his ruin. This instance is very similar to 824 where Pentheus in the beginnings of his delusion says that the Stranger has been σοφός all along: to Pentheus the Stranger is wise because he found a practical way to let him see the Bacchants without being killed, yet he failed to see that the Stranger has used his σοφία to trap him.

Cadmus then enters with the remains of Pentheus' body which he had gathered together on Cithaeron (1200-32). Still not realising what she has done, Agaue rejoices in her hunt; Cadmus in turn laments the misfortune of his house and complains that the god, their own relative, has ruined them, justly, but in excess (1233-50). Thereupon Cadmus brings his daughter to her senses, slowly and painfully, until she recognises her son's head, and explains to her that she and her sisters murdered him (1259-1301). He concludes that if anyone thinks himself better than the gods, he should regard the death of Pentheus and believe in those gods (1302-28).

After a lacuna of perhaps fifty lines, in which Dionysus appears as the god he is, he predicts that Cadmus and his wife Harmonia will be turned into snakes and, after leading a band of barbarians in the sacking of many cities, will be rescued by Harmonia's father, Ares, and sent to the

land of the blessed (1330-43). As Cadmus and Agaue lament their fate and set off for exile, the Chorus comment on the uncertainty of things when the gods are involved (1350-92).

The study of the occurrences of σοφία and its cognates is thus completed. The terms in their relationship with φρήν and its cognates will be examined in Chapter Four.

CHAPTER TWO: NOTES

1. The authors consulted for the usages of σοφία are Homer, Hesiod, Lyric and Elegiac poets, Pindar, Aeschylus, Herodotus, Sophocles and Thucydides.

2. The major works on the history of σοφία are Burkhard Gladigow, Sophia und Kosmos. Untersuchungen zur Frühgeschichte von σοφός und σοφία. Spudasmata Band I (Hildesheim, 1965) and Bruno Snell, Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der Vorplatonischen Philosophie. Untersuchungen No. 29 (Berlin, 1924.) For the unknown etymology of the root σοφ- and the principal speculation about it see George B. Kerferd, "The Image of the Wise Man in Greece in the Period before Plato," in Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought: Symbolae I, ed. C. Laga et al. (Louvain, 1976), p.17.

3. Compare to this Theognis 901-2: ἔστιν ὁ μὲν χείρων, ὁ δ' ἀμείνων· ἔργον ἑκάστου· / οὐδεὶς δ' ἀνθρώπων αὐτὸς ἅπαντα σοφός. Although the adjectives χείρων and ἀμείνων could imply a moral sense, the idea that no one man is skilled in everything is clear.

4. Hes. Op. 648-9.

5. Archil. 211 West; Aesch. Supp. 770. Pi. P.5.115. Soph. Aj. 581; Pi. P.3.54.

6. Aesch. Septem 382, Ag. 1295; Soph. O.T. 484, 563, 568, Ant. 1059, Aj. 783; Hdt. 2.49.2.

7. Hdt. 9.62.3 and 8.110.3.

8. Homeric Hymn to Hermes IV 482-3; Hes. fr. 306 Merkelbach-West. Pi. P.1.12, N.4.2; Ibyc. 282. 23 Page. Before Pindar the examples of the poet's skill in composing poetry are few: Xenoph. 2.11-12 West; Thgn. 790, 942, 995; Homeric Hymn to Hermes IV 511; Solon 13.52 West.

9. Pi. O.1.116, P.4.248. Pi. O.1.9, 2.86, 14.7; P.1.42, 3.113, 6.49, 10.22; N.7.23; I.1.45, 8.52.

10. Aesch. fr. 390. In an apparent contradiction to this fragment Pindar says σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ (O.2.94) and Snell p.13 writes: Die σοφία ist angeborenes Gut des adligen Herrn und läßt sich nicht erlernen, connecting σοφία with ἀρετή and nobility. Gildersleeve, I think rightly, in his commentary ad loc. takes σοφός to refer to poetic art. For σοφ- words used of intellectual wisdom, see e.g. Hdt. 4.95, Heraclit. fr. 35, Th.2.40.

11. Euenus 3 West. Compare also Thgn. 1059-62.

12. Critias 7 West. Compare also Soph. Ant. 620-5; Pi. P.4.263-9.

13. Hdt. 1.196.1 and 197.1. Compare also 4.46.2. For "those who wish to appear wiser than νόμοι" see Th. 3.37.4.

14. Occasionally κέρδος is mentioned with σοφία: Thgn. 563-6; Pi. N.5.16-18.

15. Soph. Ph. 422-3. For the idea of "wise good counsel" see also Aesch. Pr. 1038.

16. Soph. O.T. 508-9. For the idea of σοφία used to solve problems see Hdt. 7.23.3.

17. Hdt. 7.130.1. Aesch. Pr. 936. For σοφία as sensible action see also Pi. O.3.44.

18. Soph. Ant. 710-11. See also Aesch. fr. 396.

19. Aesch. Pr. 1039.

20. Hdt. 3.4.2 and 3. See also 1.197.1, 3.85.1 and 127.2, 5.21.2; Soph. Ph. 119, 431, 438-40.

21. Soph. Ph. 77-8. Note the morally negative words running through the passage: κλοπεύς, 77; τεχνᾶσθαι κακά, 80; εἰς ἀναιδὲς ἡμέρας μέρος βραχύ, 83; ἐκ τέχνης πράσσειν κακῆς, 88; νικᾶν κακῶς, 95.

22. Soph. Ph. 1013-15.

23. The Bacchae is excluded from this survey.

24. Eur. Alc. 348. I.T. 662-3. I.T. 1238; for σοφός expressing musical skill see also Med. 190-8, which contains an example of Euripides' frequent use of the antithesis between σκαιός and σοφός: in general: El. 972, Med. 298; with moral element implicit: Heracl. 458-9, H.F. 299-300.

25. Eur. Med. 384-5. Hipp. 986-7, Med. 580-1.

26. Eur. Andr. 957-8; often of punishing enemies: H.F. 201-2, Heracl. 881-2. Hel. 811, Hec.1007, Ph. 460. Hipp. 700.

27. Eur. Heracl. 574-6.

28. Eur. Andr. 245. Hipp. 1074-6.

29. Eur. Hel. 1049-50 and 1528-9.

30. Eur. Med. 285. For the usages of morally negative usages of σοφία and cognates in Euripides, see B. Gladigow, "Zum Makarismos des Weisen," Hermes 95 (1967), pp.430-2.

31. Eur. Med. 408-9. See also Ion 834-6.

32. Of Zeus: Eur. Hel. 1441; of gods in general: Hel. 851, Hipp. 120. Hitherto only Apollo and the Muses are described as σοφός and then only as skilled in music: Ibyc. 282.23 Page; Pi. P. 1.12, N. 4.2; Eur. I.T. 1238. On Zeus' σοφία see Soph. fr. 524 J-P.

33. Eur. Andr. 1165, El. 1246.

34. Eur. Med. 294-5. See also Med. 305, 583, El. 294-6, Hipp. 518.

35. Eur. Med. 297 and 299.

36. Recent works containing commentary on σοφία and cognates in the Bacchae are: Winnington-Ingram, Select Index, s.v. "wisdom"; W. Arrowsmith, tr., "The Bacchae" in The Complete Greek Tragedies, Euripides, volume V, edited by D. Grene and R. Lattimore (Chicago, 1959) pp. 144-6; R.R. Dyer, "Image and Symbol: The link between the two worlds of the Bacchae," AUMLA 21 (1964), pp.23-4; Dodds, pp.xliv, 92, 121, 204; Conacher, p.72 and Appendix; G.S. Kirk, tr., The "Bacchae" (Englewood-Cliffs, 1970), pp.45, 58, 96-7; Roux, pp.10, 50-5, 305, 307, 384-6, 510-11, 516; Arthur, p.164 and Appendix B.

37. Dionysus stressed his true divinity, especially in the prologue: 1, 22, 42, 47.

38. I follow Dodds' preferred reading of placing line 20 after 22, with χθόνα for πόλιν.

39. σόφισμα is not found in Homer or Hesiod. For σόφισμα as "invention" or "plan of action", see Pi. O.13.17; Aesch. Pr. 459, 470-1; Hdt. 3.85.2, 3.152; Eur. Ph. 65, 871, I.T. 380, 1031. σόφισμα denoting a morally negative idea is less frequent: Soph. Ph. 14; Th. 6. 77; Eur. Hec. 258.

40. For Cadmus' own less than "wise" reason for accepting Dionysus, see 181-3 and 333-6.

41. Roux ad loc.; see also Tyrrell and Dodds ad loc.

42. Conacher, p.61.

43. Dodds ad loc. prefers the reading οὐδ' ἐνσοφιζόμεσθα to Murray's οὐδὲν σοφιζόμεσθα and gives the line to Cadmus because the connective οὐδ' is out of place in Teiresias' mouth. Winnington-Ingram, p.43 note 2, however, holds that the stichomythia is not broken until 201. If 200 caps 199, the connective is then in place.

44. Dodds ad loc. thinks that the beginning of the sentence was lost because of the unusually close placement of the redundant αὐτά to its feminine noun. Roux ad loc. explains αὐτά by removing the period in 200 and placing it after παραδοχάς, which becomes the object of ἐνσοφιζόμεσθα. Because it is common for Greek to use a neuter pronoun to refer to an abstract word of another gender in a different sentence, she feels that this punctuation eliminates the problem presented by αὐτά. Verdenius, Mnem. series iv.15 (1962), p.342 compares Soph. O.T. 269-70.

45. Dodds, p.95.

46. The form σοφία is found only once in the play, at 395, but henceforth to distinguish between the two ideas I shall use σοφία of practical wisdom, τὸ σοφόν of impractical, intellectual wisdom where there is such a distinction made.

47. Pentheus gives the impression that he does so almost gladly. Compare line 815 and Winnington-Ingram p.46.

48. Dodds' translation of 257.

49. Dodds ad loc. notes the formal rhetorical form of Teiresias' speech: προοίμιον (introduction), 266-71, a series of πίστεις (pleas), 272-318, and ἐπίλογος (conclusion), 319-27. My paraphrase of 266-71 is based on Roux and Dodds ad loc., Conacher, p.74.

50. The term is Conacher's, p.74. For examples of Euripides' frequent use of the theme of the eloquent orator who misguides his citizens, see Roux ad loc.

51. Winnington-Ingram, p.48 thinks that Teiresias is referring to himself in 269-70. If this were the case, it would be reasonable to expect a μέν ... δέ antithesis in 269 and 271. "An honest case to argue" is Dodds' translation ad loc.

52. At 270 the manuscript reading is θρασύς, an adjective which, if correct, lacks the coordinating conjunction that δυνατός and οἷος τ' have. Madvig thus proposed the noun θράσει, dependent upon δυνατός (supported by Eur. Or. 903), a reading accepted by Dodds ad loc., Conacher, p.74 and Winnington-Ingram, p.48. Roux ad loc. retains θρασύς and cites Denniston, p.290 for examples of series of words which have only the last two members coordinated by καί.

53. Dodds ad loc.

54. Conacher, p.74.

55. Winnington-Ingram, p.48 comments on Teiresias' sophistry; see also pp.49 and 50 and "Euripides. Poiêtês sophos," Arethusa 2 (1969), p.127.

56. For ὕβρις see N.R.E. Fisher, "Hybris and Dishonour," G & R 23 (1976), pp.177-93 and 26 (1979), pp.32-47 and p.36 with note 14 for the ὕβρις of which Pentheus accuses the Stranger at 247: there his actions threaten the standards of the community.

57. In these lines the Chorus echo Teiresias at 272-85.

58. I read with Dodds ad loc. and Winnington-Ingram, p.63 and note 1, who follow the Aldine in placing a comma at the end of 395 and deleting the period in 396.

59. Dodds ad loc. With the punctuation of the Aldine reading ἐπὶ τούτῳ means ἐπὶ τῷ βραχὺν εἶναι αἰῶνα τὸ μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν.

60. Dodds ad loc. argues for the active meaning of φέρου, "put up with", and reads the line as a question. Winnington-Ingram, p.63 note 1 reads φέροι with a middle sense because "the context (and particularly the following stanza) demands a more positive sense, the winning of actual advantage in the present." He concludes that to read the line as a question is unacceptable.

61. Dodds, p.121 calls it his lack of φρόνησις.

62. For the view that they do not reject τὸ σοφόν, see the Appendix.

63. It is true that no one has called Pentheus "wise" but he seems to claim it for himself by accusing Teiresias of μωρία and ἀνοία at 344-5. Winnington-Ingram, pp.62-3

claims that it was Teiresias who was associated with wisdom in the previous episode and concludes that the Chorus unconsciously reject the "calculating rationality of Teiresias no less than the unrestraint which with Pentheus passes for sound judgement." Yet Teiresias' "calculating rationality", that is, in 272-305, is in no way linked with τὸ σοφόν. On the contrary, 272-305 is only an expression of his σοφία, his practical wisdom, in attempting a more acceptable explanation of Dionysus for Pentheus' benefit.

64. Manuscript tradition has σοφὰν δ' ἀπέχειν. Dodds ad loc. on metrical grounds prefers σοφὰ δ' ἀπέχειν with Dindorf because the idiomatic neuter plural (for examples of which see Roux ad loc.) would be particularly vulnerable to corruption to σοφάν. Winnington-Ingram, p.65 and note 3 reads either σοφὰ δ' ἀπέχειν or σοφὸν ἀπέχειν with Wilamowitz after the Aldine. With the reading σοφάν 427-9 adhere closely to the preceding lines because ἀπέχειν is dependent upon μέλει (424); with σοφά (or σοφόν) they belong with the following lines.

65. Pentheus has been characterised in several places as the man of excess: he is hasty and excitable (212, 214) and relies on overconfidence (270); Teiresias likens him to a wild animal by calling him "fierce" (ἄγριος, 361). His threats of violence towards the Bacchants (226-32), the Stranger (239-41, 246-7, 355-7) and Teiresias (345-50) are evidence of his lack of control. Moreover, the first messenger will perceptively speak of his quick temper and excessively royal disposition (671).

66. Winnington-Ingram, p.66: "Whatever the mass of ordinary men believes and practises, that they will accept--that they will count wisdom."

67. "The antithesis in the present passage [430-3] is substantially the same as that which Teiresias drew between τὸ σοφόν and the πάτριοι παραδοχαί (201-3)," Dodds, p.129. Νόμος and its cognates are frequent in the play: see Winnington-Ingram, Select Index, s.v. "law".

68. Pentheus and the Stranger are talking about the nocturnal rites of Dionysianism. Pentheus' suspicions of them, which were widespread in contemporary Athens (for references see Dodds, pp.97 and 138), are not allayed by the Stranger's clever answers.

69. See Dodds ad loc. on the difficulties of this passage.

70. Dodds on 804.

71. See Dodds ad loc. for his discussion of αἷμα θήσεις (837).

72. That this is a question, not a statement, see Dodds on 862-5.

73. See 837-8 and Dodds on 821-38.

74. The manuscript tradition reads ἢ τί τὸ κάλλιον... at 877. Paley ad loc. deleted τὸ and is followed by Dodds on the grounds that the deletion improves the metre and that the Greek for "What right is more honourable than ...?" is not τί γέρας τὸ κάλλιον ἤ ...; but τί γέρας κάλλιον ἤ...;. Winnington-Ingram, however, in BICS 13 (1966), pp.34-5 questions the metrical appropriateness of ἢ τί κάλλιον, citing A.M. Dale's study of the lines. He concludes, "The traditional text is thus more satisfactory metrically than the text as emended. Rhetorically, the presence of the article gives an epanaphora (τί τὸ ... τί τὸ ...) which is prima facie convincing. While one cannot deny the bare possibility that a corruption in P (or in some predecessor) has improved the metre and the rhetoric, it would seem that this particular emendation should only be used in the last resort." Willink, p.230 objects to ἢ ("or") because the second question is in no sense an alternative to the first. He reads ἦ τι κάλλιον ..., What is τὸ σοφόν? Is there anything more καλόν than revenge? This reading, he believes, shows that the questioner has concluded that revenge is more καλόν than τὸ σοφόν.

75. Winnington-Ingram, BICS 13 (1966), pp.35-6 believes that both questions reject their contents.

76. Kirk ad loc.

77. Dodds and Kirk ad loc.; Winnington-Ingram, BICS 13 (1966), p.36, where he compares Eur. Heracl. 881; see also Winnington-Ingram (Euripides and Dionysus), pp. 69, 108.

78. Conacher, p.70, "Thus the violent joy of vengeance replaces, for a moment, the old distinctions between true and false wisdom [that is, between σοφία and τὸ σοφόν] which the Chorus had picked up from Teiresias."

79. Dodds, p.192.

80. The type of clause introduced by ὅς is in dispute. Dodds ad loc., Willink, p.233 and Winnington-Ingram,

p.124 and note 1, where he cites the analogy of 386ff., follow Murray's text: ὃς ... στέλλεται is a generic clause dependent upon 1002 (sc. ἐκείνῳ) necessitating a period after 996 and a comma after 1001. Roux, citing 88, reads the clause as relative with the antecedent γόνον (966) and a comma after 996, a period after 1001.

81. For a detailed discussion of 1002-4, in addition to Dodds' ad loc., see Willink, pp.233-5.

82. Although φθονῶ is normally used with the genitive and is not found elsewhere with accusative rei, this reading is generally accepted: Dodds, Roux, Kirk ad loc., Winnington-Ingram, p.124. For the reading φθόνῳ, see Willink, pp.35-7.

83. Dodds, Roux, Kirk ad loc., Conacher, p.71 prefer χρῆμα to Murray's κτῆμα.

84. Dodds, Kirk, Roux ad loc. suggest that the messenger answers the Chorus' questions at 877-81. His moral certainly does not describe the impractical, intellectual wisdom that τὸ σοφόν characterises in the play but the practical, beneficial σοφία which the Chorus praise at 395. Whereas the Chorus have found that vengeance is καλόν, the messenger here concludes that prudence and reverence of things divine is κάλλιστον as well as σοφώτατον.

85. In the refrain of the third stasimon the Chorus described vengeance as καλόν, to their advantage; here they use the same adjective ironically of Agaue's murder of Pentheus. To the Chorus her ἀγών is advantageous in that it removes their opponent, to Agaue, who thinks that she has killed a wild beast in Dionysiac ritual, it is also καλόν, but in reality, of course, it is far from beneficial for her. In several late plays, most notably the Orestes, καλός and its cognates are ambivalent words which serve to emphasise the moral ambiguity of human actions.

CHAPTER THREE

φρήν and Cognates

Chapter Three, like the preceding chapter, is divided into two parts. In its study of the history of φρήν and its cognates, the first part examines the usages of these terms from Homer to Euripides. Because Chapter Two contains an outline of the play, the second part of this chapter does not take a linear approach to the occurrences of φρήν and its cognates in the Bacchae but studies each set of terms: φρήν, φρονεῖν and σωφροσύνη.

The History of φρήν and its cognates before the "Bacchae".

Φρήν[1] from Homer to Euripides has a wide range of usages: it can signify the part of the body (the diaphragm), the psychological agent in which the rational element is dominant (the mind), the psychological process (thinking) and the result of the psychological process (thought).[2] These divisions are not always exact and often overlap but they serve to illustrate the enormous range in the ideas presented by φρήν.[3] It should be noted that early Greek literature tended to link physical, psychological and mental terminology: it was common for the term for a physical organ to denote that organ's function. Although there was a tendency for thought in Homer and early Greek literature to be emotional, with φρήν the rational element is dominant.

The plural of φρήν, φρένες is normally used to denote the diaphragm,[4] the muscular wall separating the thorax from the abdomen. A man can be wounded in the chest where the φρένες hold the liver, which is itself described elsewhere as beneath the πραπίδες.[5] The heart is said to be surrounded by or located in the φρένες.[6]

The singular or plural of φρήν is used to denote the psychological agent, the mind, primarily as the seat of emotions or of the mental faculties. Although it can be the seat of positive emotions such as pleasure and gladness, a large number of occurrences deal with φρήν as the seat of grief, anger or fear, and in some cases φρήν is modified by the adjective "black" or "dark".[7]

Φρήν is both a location of and an agent in intellectual, deliberative and volitional activities: a person can know or recognise something by means of his φρήν as well as ponder advice or a course of action in his φρήν.[8] In its relation to the body, the φρήν is normally unhealthy if the body is diseased and although the φρένες grow as the body grows and age as it ages, Creon can accuse Oedipus of not having grown φρένες in old age.[9] Φρήν is occasionally linked with other senses: a seer ponders omens in his ears and φρένες, and Creon asks if Oedipus made his accusation with straight eyes and a straight φρήν.[10]

As a psychological agent the φρήν can be affected in many ways. Although it can be damaged or subdued by wine

and soothed by music, it is primarily affected by emotions which can disturb it temporarily and throw it into confusion and anguish.[11]

As a psychological process φρήν basically means "thinking", but commonly implies "way of thinking" and "the right way of thinking". It goes beyond the idea of the psychological agent in that it implies not the "mind" itself but the process of using one's mind in a certain way. Electra wishes that Clytemnestra had better φρένες, Hyllus that Deianira could have better φρένες than those she has now, and Andromache fears one thing in Menelaus' φρήν.[12] "The right way of thinking" or "good sense" is implied when the Chorus answer Alcestis' plea that Admetus not remarry after her death by saying that he will follow her wishes if he does not lack φρένες.[13] It should be noted that in the meaning "thinking" and "right way of thinking" νοῦς and φρήν are identical.[14]

Φρήν as the result of the psychological process denotes the result of "thinking" as "thought", "plan" or "will". Its range of usages is illustrated by the following examples: in general there is φρήν as "idea", "counsel" as when the Chorus of Phoenician women sing of Eteocles and Polyneices as coming to the φρήν of single combat; Teiresias speaks of Creon's thoughts put into action when he says that Thebes is diseased because of his φρήν; and Creon notes that he has not before rejected Teiresias' φρήν, his thoughts as

advice.[15] Φρήν as a "plan of action" is less common: Atossa exclaims that a δαίμων has deprived the Persians of their φρένες and Phaedra asks if she did not know beforehand the nurse's φρήν.[16] The most common usage of φρήν as the result of the psychological process, especially before Tragedy, is primarily concerned with the will of the gods.[17]

The usage of the cognate verb of φρήν, φρονεῖν, can be divided into three categories, the first of which accounts for the majority of examples. The use of one's φρήν results in understanding, and φρονεῖν comes to denote "having understanding", "using reason" and "thinking". In general cases "understanding" is implied: Zeus is said to lead mortals to φρονεῖν.[18] More commonly the idea of "ponder" or "think over" is implicit: Chrysothemis scolds Electra for not heeding her advice, for she appears to φρονεῖν none of the things she has said.[19] Nevertheless, the vast majority of the examples in this category contain the construction of φρονεῖν with an adverb, meaning "to think in a certain way". Three adverbs are used with approximately the same implication, εὖ, καλῶς, ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν, "to think rightly", κακῶς φρονεῖν, "to think wrongly".[20]

The second category into which the usages of φρονεῖν can be divided involves the use of the verb with neuter adjectives, adverbs and adverbial phrases. In each case the idea expressed is of "being disposed in a certain way" or

"having certain thoughts". A person can be either well- or ill-disposed towards someone (εὖ or ἀγαθὰ φρονεῖν, κακὰ φρονεῖν) or be friendly (φιλὰ φρονεῖν).[21] μέγα φρονεῖν, "to think great thoughts", often implies courageous spirit, primarily in Homer, and boastfulness in later authors.[22] The person who is said to θνητὰ φρονεῖν thinks and acts like the mortal he is. Like θνητὰ φρονεῖν is οὐ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονεῖν, "to think thoughts unfit for a mortal" and φρονεῖν μεῖζον ἢ κατ' ἄνδρα, "to think thoughts too great for a mortal.[23]

The third category of uses of φρονεῖν is the least common and denotes the idea of "being in one's senses". First, it can be approximately synonymous with ζῆν, "to be alive": Priam asks his son Hector not to fight Achilles but to pity his unfortunate father who is still "alive".[24] Secondly, φρονεῖν can mean "being in one's senses" as the opposite of "mad": when Athena asks Odysseus if he shrinks from facing Ajax in his madness, he replies that he would not if Ajax were in his senses.[25]

The noun σωφροσύνη, the adjective σώφρων and the verb σωφρονέω are formed from the stem of φρήν and the adjective σῶς (Homeric σάος), "healthy", "sound", "safe".[26] Σωφροσύνη, thus, means "sound φρένες",[27] that part of the person which participates in and can control his judgements, emotions and even character. The quality it denotes is intellectual in

origin but predominantly moral in its application and effect, that is, it serves to control and moderate the passions and to temper and regulate behaviour in general. There follows a brief survey of the variety of situations in which σωφροσύνη is found. To the modern reader these examples seem to fall into four categories (prudence, chastity or modesty of women, self-control in regard to the emotions and self-knowledge) but it should be noted that the Greeks found a significant resemblance between these qualities and their moral application, a resemblance which permitted them to use a single term to describe them all.

Σωφροσύνη implying "prudence" is common: the gods can make a fool of an intelligent man and bring the lightminded man to σαοφροσύνη; Telemachus in his σαοφροσύνη kept secret the fact that he knew the stranger was Odysseus.[28] Σωφροσύνη is occasionally used as the opposite of ἀφροσύνη, "foolishness".[29] Σωφροσύνη can be used of the chastity or modesty of women: Macaria believes that the best thing for a woman is silence and τὸ σωφρονεῖν.[30]

There is σωφροσύνη as self-control in regard to the emotions: Menelaus admits that it was self-control that prevented him from killing Helen when he saw her and the Chorus tell Andromache that she has said more than a woman should say to a man: the self-control of her mind (τὸ σῶφρον φρενός) has no resources left.[31] Σωφροσύνη can also denote the idea of self-knowledge, most frequently as the

ability of a mortal to understand and accept the limitations imposed by the gods and, subsequently, his relation to them: after Odysseus has witnessed Ajax's arrogance and boastfulness in his delusion, Athena warns him never to make any boasts against the gods or to be prideful if he should be more powerful or wealthy than another man, for the gods love those who know their place (τοὺς σώφρονας) and hate the evil.[32]

Φρήν and its cognates in the Bacchae.

Of the eleven occurrences of φρήν or πραπίς in the Bacchae none denotes the most basic idea presented by the terms, the diaphragm as the part of the body. Nevertheless φρήν as a psychological agent remains linked to the physical diaphragm as a seat of emotions and a mental organ, but in this case it is an abstract term as it is when it denotes a psychological process.

The first reference to φρήν as a psychological agent, the "mind" as a seat of emotions,[33] occurs in the speech by the first messenger when he arrives from Cithaeron ready to relate the strange things he saw the Bacchants doing there. First, however, he would like to learn from Pentheus if he should speak frankly of what he saw or if he should recount only what is agreeable to the king, for he fears the quickness of Pentheus' φρένες,[34] as well as his quick temper and excessively royal disposition (666-71). The phrase "the

quickness of one's φρένες" could refer to the φρήν as the seat of the mental faculties with the meaning "the nimbleness of one's mind", but by linking it to the emotional qualities of quick temper and an excessively royal disposition the messenger must refer to the emotional characteristics that Pentheus has previously displayed. He is hasty and excitable (212, 214), is characterised by Teiresias as "fierce" (361), and shows a definite lack of control in his threats of violence to the Bacchants (226-32), the Stranger (239-41, 246-7, 355-7) and Teiresias (345-50). The Chorus and Dionysus have both referred to his ὀργή, his rage or anger (537, 647) and Pentheus himself in his reply justifies the messenger's fear: although he is at first calm and assures the messenger of his safety, his indignation at the Stranger quickly returns and he explains that the punishment inflicted upon the man who introduced these arts to the women will be in direct proportion to the strangeness of the events the messenger relates.

In a passage of similar implication occurs the only other reference to φρήν (in its synonym πραπίς) as a seat of emotions. In the fourth stasimon the Chorus tell of the end that awaits the man who sets forth with maddened mind and frenzied spirit to overcome by force that which cannot be overcome (997-1003). Whereas the messenger spoke of the emotional quickness of Pentheus' φρένες, the Chorus now describe his φρένες as emotionally maddened.[35]

Φρήν denoting the psychological agent as a mental organ has been shown to be the agent by which a person knows or recognises something intellectually. It is Teiresias who first uses φρήν in this specific capacity: he explains the importance of age-old ancestral customs which no reasoning will overcome, not even if τὸ σοφόν, intellectual wisdom, is acquired by the highest φρένες (201-3). Thus the φρένες can acquire, presumably by experience and learning, an intellectual concept. Later, in the first stasimon, the Chorus sing of the wisdom in withholding the πραπίς and the φρήν from men of excess (427-9). Two points are made here about the characteristics of the φρήν as a seat of thought: first, a person has control over his φρήν in that he can apply it to and withhold it from certain situations; secondly, the φρήν can be affected by the contact with certain people because otherwise there would be no wisdom in withholding it from them.

The three remaining instances of φρήν as a mental organ are concerned with the idea of madness. In the prologue Dionysus explains that he has driven Semele's sisters from their homes in madness to the mountains where they live frenzied in their φρένες (32-3).[36] Their φρένες, as the seat of their thought and understanding, have been affected by frenzy and the women's ability for rational thought, which would prevent them from leaving their homes and going to the mountains, is impaired.

In the first episode after Pentheus' final outburst against the cult the Stranger introduced to Thebes Teiresias tells him that he is mad now whereas before he had temporarily lost his φρένες (359). The same verb[37] is used by the Stranger after he has led Pentheus into his trap: he calls upon Dionysus to drive Pentheus out of his φρένες (850). All three instances convey the idea that one characteristic of madness is the impairment or temporary loss of one's φρένες.

In addition to referring to the psychological agent φρήν denotes the actual psychological process, the thinking or the way of thinking that is carried out by the mind. In the three instances in the play that refer to "the way of thinking", the idea of a change is emphasised. After Pentheus is led from the palace happily dressed as a Bacchant, Dionysus can praise him for having changed his φρένες (944). The reference here is not only to the meaning of the English idiom "to change one's mind", for Dionysus had been called upon previously to drive Pentheus out of his mind (850), but also to the idea that the impairment or temporary loss of the mind as the agent of thought affects the thought process itself. Thus Pentheus has changed, or had changed for him, his way of thinking, which Dionysus will soon describe further.

As Pentheus is caught up in his Bacchic inspiration he asks Dionysus if he could carry the peaks of Cithaeron along

with the Bacchants on his shoulders. The god replies that he could do so if he wished. The φρένες he had before were not sound but now he has the kind he should have (945-8). Before Dionysus drove him out of his mind, he was violently opposed to Dionysiac worship, and although he was considering Dionysus' suggestion to dress as a Bacchant in order to spy on the women on Cithaeron, we are told that unless he was driven out of his mind he would abandon the plan (850-3). Thus Pentheus' unsound way of thinking was his inability to see that he must accept Dionysus and his worship. Now, however, his way of thinking is as it should be: he may not truly accept Dionysianism but he gladly plays the part of a Bacchant and enables the god to exact his punishment.

The third instance of φρήν as "the way of thinking" is very similar to the first instance when Pentheus is described by Dionysus as having changed his φρένες. After the σπαραγμός of Pentheus on Cithaeron, Agaue arrives with his head in her arms. Her φρένες, like Pentheus', had been impaired by Dionysus for she was among the women he drove in madness from their homes to the mountains, frenzied in their φρένες (32-3). Now, as Cadmus sadly begins to bring her out of her madness, she says that she is becoming somehow sensible, changed from her former φρένες (1269-70), that is, changed from her former way of thinking, from the state in which she could look upon Pentheus and see a lion.

Φρήν as a psychological process implies not only "the

way of thinking" but "the right way of thinking" or "good sense". Teiresias interrupts his dialogue on the clever rhetorician to say that although Pentheus seems to have the speaking ability of a sensible man, there are no φρένες in his words[38] (268-9). The fact that the φρένες can be described as "in" words implies that the term stands for an abstract quality,[39] the right way of thinking or good sense. Thus Teiresias is able to explain Pentheus' initial outburst against Dionysianism and Dionysus himself as a lack of good sense on Pentheus' part.

Similarly the Chorus comment on Pentheus' lack of good sense in the first stasimon: unbridled mouths and a lawless lack of sense end in misfortune (386-8). The word they use is ἀφροσύνη, formed from the stem of φρήν with the alpha-privative and the nominal suffix -συνη. After Agaue is brought back to her senses and sees that she has killed her own son, she asks what share of her ἀφροσύνη Pentheus had (1301). In this case, Agaue uses the term to describe not only her maddened state when she killed Pentheus, that is, her lack of φρένες as a psychological agent, but also her lack of good sense in rejecting Dionysus, for Cadmus answers her question immediately by saying that Pentheus was like her in not honouring the god.

The verb φρονεῖν refers basically to the use of the φρήν as the mental organ that deliberates and considers pos-

sible actions. When a problem is presented, a person uses his φρήν in an attempt to come to a decision and the process of φρονεῖν results in a certain understanding, whether right or wrong, of that problem or situation. Of the seven instances of the verb used with the sense "have understanding" or "use reason" five refer directly or indirectly to Pentheus.

Pentheus has been absent from Thebes but upon his return he is confronted with the news that the women of Thebes have left for the mountains in order to honour with dances a new divinity named Dionysus. Undoubtedly as a king Pentheus is responsible for preserving the order and the safety of his city, yet he is all too willing to believe whatever he is told without specific proof or investigation (216-25, 233-8) and immediately concludes that this new cult and its human leader, the Lydian Stranger, will cause only harm for Thebes. The fact that Dionysus claims to be a god should affect Pentheus' response to the situation, for he does respect and honour the established gods,[40] but he readily believes the story told by his mother and her sisters that Semele and her son were burned by Zeus' thunderbolt because she had lied that he was her son's father. Moreover, even the sight of his grandfather Cadmus and the seer Teiresias dressed as Bacchants and prepared to participate in the rites does not make him question his own thoughts on Dionysianism. Thus Pentheus' use of his φρήν results in an understanding that is really no understanding, as Teiresias and Cadmus will

soon agree. The seer accuses Pentheus of having the speaking ability of a sensible man, literally "as if he had understanding" (ὡς φρονῶν) whereas there is no sense (φρένες) in his words (268-9); Cadmus tells him to heed Teiresias' advice because he has no real understanding of the situation: φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς, "you use your φρήν but have no understanding" (332). Similarly Teiresias can warn Pentheus not to think that he has a great amount of understanding (φρονεῖν τι)[41] if he has an opinion but that opinion is sick (311-12). The emphasis in these three cases is upon the fact that it is possible to φρονεῖν wrongly, to have a certain understanding of a situation that is wrong. As Conacher says, it is the way in which one uses one's intelligence, in the objects of phronein, that the danger lies.[42]

In the first antistrophe of the first stasimon the Chorus give their thoughts on φρονεῖν and refer to Pentheus indirectly: they sing that the life of quietness and τὸ φρονεῖν remain steady and hold together one's house (389-92). Here τὸ φρονεῖν is in direct contrast to the ἀφροσύνη (387) of which they accuse Pentheus. Thus they feel that the lack of good sense he shows will end in misfortune whereas good sense resulting from a proper understanding of a situation will mean good fortune.

Similarly Dionysus uses the phrase τὸ φρονεῖν to describe Pentheus' state of mind before he is maddened: it is

only if Pentheus is deprived of τὸ φρονεῖν that he will follow through with the plan to dress as a Bacchant in order to spy on the women on Cithaeron (853). It is extremely ironic that Pentheus is described here as possessing "good sense" because in all four of the previously mentioned instances his good sense or understanding of the situation is questioned and found lacking. Yet Pentheus does have enough good sense to be suspicious of the Stranger's plan (805) and thus Dionysus must draw him away from this τὸ φρονεῖν and into madness if the plan is to be successful.

Late in the play there are two instances of the verb φρονεῖν used to describe Agaue, first in her madness, secondly with reference to the moment when she will regain her sanity. In the messenger's speech of the fifth episode Pentheus is described as attempting to make his mother recognise him as she and the other Bacchants fall upon him, yet he is not able to persuade her because she is possessed by Dionysus and in her madness is described as foaming at the mouth, rolling her eyes about and not understanding what she should understand: οὐ φρονοῦσ' ἃ χρὴ φρονεῖν (1122-4). Because she is maddened and frenzied in her φρένες (33), she is not able to use reasoning in order to obtain a clear picture of what is happening: in this state she imagines that Pentheus is a wild beast (1108), although Dionysus' voice has been heard to say that he has brought to his worshipers merely the one who has ridiculed them,

the god and his rites (1080-1), and even when Pentheus rips off his disguise she still cannot recognise him as her son. Later when Agaue arrives in triumph with her prey, Cadmus sadly considers what will happen when she regains her senses: when you women understand (φρονήσασαι) what you have done, you will suffer a great grief (1259-60). Thus madness for Agaue, as it was for Pentheus (853), comprises a lack of φρονεῖν: understanding and good sense are abandoned, to return only with sanity.

In the above instances the use of the verb φρονεῖν absolutely or with a neuter object implies the right or proper understanding of the situation: Teiresias rebukes Pentheus as having the speaking ability of a man who appears to think rightly (268); the Chorus praise τὸ φρονεῖν, good sense or understanding (390). It is obvious that when a person applies his φρήν to a problem or situation the resulting understanding (φρονεῖν) must necessarily be right to that person and either right or wrong to other people according to their own understanding. Thus if the meaning is "to understand rightly" the verb is used absolutely, except in cases where specific contrast or emphasis is needed; for the meaning "to understand wrongly" a negative or similarly negative adverb is used.[43]

Of the four instances where the verb φρονεῖν is qualified by an adverb to imply good or bad,[44] the first gives a direct antithesis between the two types of φρονεῖν. In

the first episode when Cadmus and Teiresias decide to go to the mountains to participate in the dances, Cadmus asks the seer if they alone in the city will dance for Dionysus. Teiresias replies, "Yes, for we alone think rightly (εὖ), whereas the others think wrongly (κακῶς)"(195-6). Thus Cadmus and Teiresias, who have made the decision to honour Dionysus, each for his own reason, can refer to anyone who does not do so as having, in their opinion, a wrong understanding of the situation.

At the end of the third episode the Stranger calls upon Dionysus to drive Pentheus from his φρένες because he will not dress as a Bacchant if he is thinking rightly (φρονῶν εὖ) as opposed to being deprived of his good sense (τὸ φρονεῖν), in which case he will dress as a Bacchant and thus ensure the plan's success (850-3). In this case the antithesis is between εὖ φρονεῖν and the equivalent of μὴ φρονεῖν.

In the stichomythia of the second episode there are two instances of φρονεῖν used with adverbs to refer to the idea "to think wrongly". As Pentheus questions the Stranger about Dionysus and his worship and wishes to know what nature the god has, he is unable to recognise as truth the reply that Dionysus has whatever nature he desires, because, as the Stranger explains, the man who speaks wise words to a person who lacks understanding (ἀμαθής) will seem not to have the right understanding of the situation. Οὐκ εὖ is the

equivalent of the κακῶς that is used in the comparative form three lines later when the Stranger explains that all barbarian lands dance in Bacchic rites. That, replies Pentheus, is because they have a much worse understanding (φρονοῦσι κάκιον) than Greeks. The Stranger, however, disagrees: in this case, rather, they have a good understanding (εὖ) but their customs are different (482-4).

There is only one instance in the play of the second category of φρονεῖν, the use of the verb with a neuter adjective to mean "have certain thoughts". After witnessing Pentheus' insolent behaviour towards Dionysus in the first episode, the Chorus comment on his lack of understanding and good sense (387, 390) and conclude that thinking thoughts that are not mortal (τὸ μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν) means a short life (396-7). A mortal must know his place in respect to the gods and refrain from any action or thought that does not befit his humble nature.

Although there are other verbs of the same stem as φρονεῖν in the Bacchae, their occurrences are infrequent, only one being used more than once. The verb φροντίζω, generally "to think" or "to consider", is used by Euripides with the genitive to mean "to take thought for".[45] In the third episode in the Stranger's description of what happened in the stable where he was taken to be bound, Pentheus fights a phantom that he imagines is his opponent but gives up in exhaustion and the Stranger walks away in peace, having

no thought for Pentheus (635-7).

Later in the third episode Pentheus responds to the Stranger's advice not to take up arms against Dionysus with a sharp "don't lecture me", οὐ μὴ φρενώσεις μ' (792). Although the general meaning of the verb φρενόω is "to teach" or "instruct", an instance in the Antigone shows clearly how the verb is connected with φρήν. Creon tells his son: "To your sorrow will you instruct me, you who are without φρένες: κλαίων φρενώσεις, ὢν φρενῶν αὐτὸς κενός (754)." Creon feels that Haemon is trying to impose on him his own way of thinking, although he lacks good sense. Thus in the Bacchae the Stranger is warned not to impose his way of thinking on Pentheus.

There are three instances of verbs compounded from φρονέω that have the basic meaning of "to think slightly of". As Cadmus and Teiresias are about to set off for the mountains to participate in the rites for Dionysus, Cadmus remarks that he, as a mortal, does not despise (καταφρονῶ) the gods (199). Later Pentheus will use the same verb in his first confrontation with the Stranger: Dionysus despises Pentheus and Thebes (503). Towards the end of the play Cadmus returns to his thoughts of line 199: he ponders his family's suffering and concludes that the gods exist. Anyone who has high thoughts and thinks slightly of the gods (ὑπερφρονεῖ) has only to consider the death of Pentheus (1325-6).[46]

Of the ideas presented by words of the stem σωφρον-, the most common in the Bacchae is the moral idea of the chastity of women. Pentheus believes that Dionysianism represents immorality for women and accuses the Bacchants early in his first speech of being unchaste: he has been told that in the worship of this new god wine flows freely and the women creep off separately into deserted places to serve the lust of men; it is said that they are Maenads making sacrifice but they rank Aphrodite before Dionysus (221-5). The Stranger flatly denies this charge in the fourth episode by predicting that Pentheus will see the Bacchants σώφρονας contrary to what he expected (940). In his reply to Pentheus' first speech, however, Teiresias does not reject the accusation totally but attributes chaste or unchaste behaviour to the woman herself: "it is not Dionysus who will compel women to be chaste (σωφρονεῖν) in respect to Cypris, but if chastity (τὸ σωφρονεῖν) in all respects is always present in their nature, this is what one must consider, for even in Bacchic rites the woman who is chaste (σώφρων) will not be corrupted" (314-8).[47] It is here that terms of the stem σωφρον- first occur in the play. Although they could refer merely to the self-control of the women, especially in reference to the ideas present in "τὸ σωφρονεῖν in all respects" and "even in Bacchic rites", which both imply something more general than "chastity", Teiresias' mention of the women in his point by point refutation of the

previous speech should refer directly to Pentheus' charge against them. Thus for Teiresias the chastity of women is a virtue dependent upon their nature or character and not, as Pentheus believes, something that can be influenced by the rites of a new god.

While these instances of words of the stem σωφρον- can be thought of as examples of moral soundness of mind that involves a certain amount of control of the emotions, there is one instance in the play where the idea of self control is predominant. When the Stranger relates what happened in the stable during the earthquake scene, he concludes by praising the man who practises a self-controlled good temper (σώφρον' εὐοργησίαν, 641). The Stranger himself has given evidence of this self-control continuously since being led in by a messenger who describes him as a gentle beast: he did not attempt to escape but surrendered willingly (436-7). By his own admission he was calm (ἥσυχος, 622 and 636) throughout the earthquake scene while Pentheus rushed about impetuously binding a bull and later fighting a phantom.

Similarly, in the first messenger's report of what he saw in the mountains, he describes the Bacchants at rest with their heads thrown on the ground carelessly but σωφρόνως (685-6). The reference in the following lines (686-8) to their chastity, which Pentheus previously questioned, suggests that σωφρόνως should mean "chastely", yet the use of such an adverb so close to "carelessly" (εἰκῇ) points to

a conscious effort on the part of the messenger to balance the idea of the lack of self-control already conveyed by εἰκῇ.

The remaining four instances[48] of words of the stem σωφρον- refer to the soundness of the mind or prudence that is revealed in a person's self-knowledge and, to a lesser degree, in one's self-control. Whereas the previous examples of such terms were associated primarily with the conduct of the Bacchants, it is now the relationship between gods and men that is predominant in the idea presented by σωφροσύνη. After listening to Pentheus' initial outburst against Dionysus and his worship and Teiresias' point by point refutation of his accusations, the Chorus offer their opinion of the speakers: they accuse Pentheus of impiety in his lack of respect for the gods and Cadmus and of dishonouring his family (263-5); Teiresias' speech, however, merits praise: Teiresias did not dishonour Apollo whose priest he is, but in honouring Dionysus, a great god, he showed prudence, σωφρονεῖς (328-9). Teiresias' σωφροσύνη, in direct contrast to Pentheus' δυσσέβεια, is demonstrated in his good sense in accepting Dionysus as the god he proclaims to be. It is also his own self-knowledge and realisation that in the relationship between mortals and gods man must subordinate himself to them.

Towards the end of the first meeting between the Stranger and Pentheus the Stranger warns him against binding him

again: I who am σωφρονῶν tell you who are not σώφρονες not to bind me (504). The two cognates, the first a participle, the second an adjective, in themselves have no significant difference in meaning in the play. They do, however, represent slightly different ideas of σωφροσύνη. In his use of the term to describe himself the Stranger is referring primarily to the self-control he has shown since his arrival in his calm, self-assured answers to Pentheus' questions and in his grace in face of his captor's impatience. In calling Pentheus "not σώφρων" he is undoubtedly thinking of the king's lack of self-control but the following lines offer a second reference, Pentheus' lack of self-knowledge. The king affirms that he will indeed bind the Stranger but relies solely on his authority (505), a mistake about which Teiresias has already warned him (310). The Stranger, however, knows that a mortal's self-knowledge in his relationship with the gods is more important than regal authority, for he tells Pentheus that he does not know what life he lives, nor what he does, nor who he is[49] (506). Pentheus immediately proves him correct by misunderstanding the import of the statement, namely that he is a mortal with no right to question things pertaining to the gods, and retorts that he is Pentheus, the son of Agaue and Echion (507).

The idea of moral soundness of mind or prudence is again linked closely to the acceptance and worship of the gods by the second messenger. He had gone with Pentheus and the

Stranger to Cithaeron where he witnessed the king's σπαραγμός at the hands of the Bacchants. When he returns to Thebes he recounts what happened and draws a moral from his experience: the most fair and wise thing for a mortal is τὸ σωφρονεῖν and the reverence of things divine (1150-2). The second part of the definition obviously refers to Pentheus' refusal to respect or worship Dionysus as a god but the meaning of τὸ σωφρονεῖν is at first unclear. Because the messenger does not use any word of the stem σωφρον- in the speech and only once uses a cognate of φρήν (to describe Agaue in her madness, 1123), there is nothing on which to base his idea of σωφροσύνη. An examination of the messenger's speech reveals nothing more subjective than his feeling of pity for his master as shown by his description of him as "wretched" (τλήμων, 1058 and 1102) and "ill-fate" (δυσδαίμων, 1126). There is, however, one clue to the messenger's thoughts on σωφροσύνη in his own realisation that they are dealing with a god. When Pentheus is unable to see what he expects and suggests that he climb a tree for a better view, the Stranger takes hold of a topmost branch of a fir tree and bends it down to the ground (1059-65), an action perceptively described by the messenger as "not mortal" (1069). Pentheus, however, does not perceive the implication of this action, nor did he ever recognise that he was dealing with a god despite the warnings offered by the Chorus, Cadmus and Teiresias. Moreover, he heard of or experienced many things

that should have made him consider the possibility that he was opposing something more than mortal: the freeing of the Bacchants from the chains in which he had bound them (443-50); the escape of the Stranger from the stable (643-6); his own experience in the stable (616-36); the miracles performed by the Bacchants in the first messenger's speech (704-13), their supernatural strength as demonstrated by their σπαραγμός of the cattle (735-47) and their attack on the villagers of Hysiae and Erythrae (751-64). Thus the messenger's τὸ σωφρονεῖν is the good sense shown by the man who is able to recognise and accept divinity as well as the self-knowledge in one's relationship to the gods which leads naturally to their reverence and worship by mortals.

This idea of good sense in accepting and honouring the gods is again evident in Dionysus' explanation of the misfortune of Cadmus' family. He tells of the fate of Cadmus and his wife and concludes: "I make these predictions, Dionysus, the son of no mortal father but of Zeus. If you had known how to σωφρονεῖν when you were unwilling, you would now be happy, having acquired Zeus' son as your ally" (1340-3). The content of σωφρονεῖν must be sought in the attitudes of Agaue and Cadmus, whom Dionysus is addressing. Agaue, and her sisters, refused to believe that Dionysus was the son of Zeus (26-31); Cadmus accepted Dionysus as a god but for the wrong reason, so that Semele would be thought to have borne a god and the family as a whole would

have prestige (333-6). Although self-knowledge is clearly involved here in their knowledge, from a mortal perspective, that Dionysus is a god, it is important to note that σωφρονεῖν has intellectual and moral implications: if Cadmus and Agaue had known how to achieve proper understanding, they would have had "sound φρένες" and been able to act properly towards Dionysus.

With this study of φρήν and its cognates we turn now to the relationship between σοφία and φρήν in Chapter Four.

CHAPTER THREE: NOTES

1. For the most part πραπίς is considered a synonym of φρήν.

2. Webster, p.149.

3. For the general background on φρήν see: Webster, pp. 149-54; R.B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought (Cambridge, 1951), pp.23-40; B. Meissner, Mythisches und Rationales in der Psychologie der euripideischen Tragödie, Diss. (Göttingen, 1951), pp.42-6, 76-100; E.L. Harrison, "Notes on Homeric Psychology," Phoenix 14 (1960), pp.63-80; David Sansone, Aeschylean Metaphors for Intellectual Activity. Hermes: Zeitschrift Für Klassiche Philologie (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp.13, 21-33, 44-5, 50-3, 56-7, 74-6.

4. Onians (supra, note 3), pp.24ff. argues for the meaning "lungs". For φρήν in the singular denoting "diaphragm": Aesch. Pr. 881.

5. Hom. Od. 9.301; Il. 11.578.

6. Hom. Il. 16.481; Thgn. 122.

7. φρήν as seat of pleasure, gladness: Hom. Il. 9.186, 13.493; Od. 8.131, 368; Hes. Th. 173; Soph. Ant. 319; of fear: Hom. Il. 10.10; Aesch. Supp. 379, Pers. 115; Soph. O.T. 153; Eur. Ph. 1285, Or. 153, Hec. 85; black φρήν: Hom. Il. 17.83, 573; Aesch. Pers. 115.

8. γιγνώσκω (with the dative or ἐνί): Hom. Il. 22.296, Od. 1.420; νοέω (with dative, ἐν or μετά): Hom. Il. 9.600, h.Aphr. 223, Semonides 7.27 West; οἶδα (with ἐνί or κατά): Hom. Il. 2.301, Thgn. 135, Od. 15.211. μερμηρίζω (with μετά or κατά): Hom. Od. 10.438, 20.10; ὁρμαίνω (with κατά): Hom. Il. 17.106; βάλλω (with μετά or ἐνί): Hom. Il. 9.434, Od. 11.454, Thgn. 1050.

9. Hdt. 3.33; 3.134.3; Soph. O.C. 804-5.

10. Aesch. Septem 25; Soph. O.T. 528. See also Aesch. Ch. 56, 452; Soph. Aj. 447.

11. Wine: Hom. Od. 9.454, 18.331, 19.122, 21.297; Archil. 120.2 West. Music: Pi. P. 1.12. Emotions: Aesch. Ch. 211, 233, 1024; Soph. O.T. 727; Eur. Tr. 992.

12. Eur. El. 1061; Soph. Tr. 736-7; Eur. Andr. 361-2.

13. Eur. Alc. 327. See also Aesch. Ag. 175; Soph. Ant. 683; Hdt. 3.155.3.

14. Webster, p.153 and note 44.

15. Eur. Ph. 1299-1300; Soph. Ant. 1015, Ant. 993.

16. Aesch. Pers. 472; Eur. Hipp. 685.

17. Hom. Il. 15.194; Solon 4.2 West; Pi. I. 8.30; Aesch. Supp. 1049; Eur. H.F. 212.

18. Aesch. Ag. 176. See also Soph. El. 890, Ant. 727, 1353.

19. Soph. El. 1048. See also Hom. Il. 2.36, 18.4; Soph. Ant. 1023, Tr. 1145.

20. εὖ φρονεῖν: Hdt. 2.16; Soph. O.T. 552, Ant. 904, Aj. 371, 1252. καλῶς φρονεῖν: Aesch. Pers. 725; Soph. Ant. 557, Tr. 442. ὀρφῶς φρονεῖν: Aesch. Pr. 1000; Soph. O.T. 550. κακῶς φρονεῖν: Aesch. Ag. 927, Eu. 850, Pr. 1012; Soph. El. 345, 550.

21. εὖ φρονεῖν: Hom. Od. 7.74; Thgn. 27; Aesch. Ag. 1436, Ch. 774; Soph. O.T. 1066, Ant. 1031. ἀγαθὰ φρονεῖν: Hom. Il. 6.162, 24.173. κακὰ φρονεῖν: Hom. Il. 7.70, 22.264, Od. 10.317, 20.5; Pi. P. 8.82. φιλὰ φρονεῖν: Hom. Il. 5.116, Od. 7.75.

22. Hom. Il. 8.553, 16.758; Hdt. 7.10e; Th. 6.16.4; Aesch. Ag. 1088, 1125; Soph. Ant. 479.

23. θνητὰ φρονεῖν: Soph. Tr. 473; Eur. Alc. 799. οὐ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονεῖν: Aesch. Septem 425; Soph. Aj. 761, 777. φρονεῖν μεῖζον ἢ κατ' ἄνδρα: Soph. Ant. 768.

24. Hom. Il. 22.59. See also Aesch. Ch. 517.

25. Soph. Aj. 82. See also Soph. Aj. 344, O.C. 1665-6, Med. 1129.

26. The principal works on σωφροσύνη are H.F. North, Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and self-restraint in Greek Literature. Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 35 (New York, 1966); G.J. de Vries, "Σωφροσύνη en grec classique," Mnem. Series iii, 11 (1943), pp.81-101; A. Kollmann, "Sophrosyne", Wiener Studien 59 (1941), pp.12-34.

27. There is no reason why all Greeks should have agreed on what constitutes "sound φρένες", nor do they. Citing the Hippolytus and Bacchae as primary examples North,

p.70 stresses the idea that by Euripides "the greatest importance is attached to the multiplicity of meanings in those tragedies that illustrate the danger of taking a one-sided view of the virtue."

28. Hom. Od. 23. 12-13, 30. See also Hom. Il. 21.462; Pi. Paean 9.45-6; Hdt. 3.64.5; Aesch. Ag. 351; Eur. I.A. 1024, Ph. 304.

29. Thgn. 430-1, 497.

30. Eur. Heracl. 476-7. See also Semonides 7.108 West; Aesch. Supp. 1013, Septem 645, Ch. 140; Eur. Alc. 182, 615, El. 923.

31. Eur. Andr. 685-6, 365. See also Aesch. Supp. 724; Soph. Aj. 1264; Eur. Andr. 235.

32. Soph. Aj. 132-3. See also Aj. 677.

33. The adjective θελξίφρονες, from θέλγω ("to soothe") and φρήν, at 404 also expresses the idea of φρήν as a seat of emotions. The Chorus wish to go to Cyprus "where dwell the Loves who soothe the minds of mortals." For the same idea see Pi. P. 1.12.

34. τὸ τάχος σου τῶν φρενῶν. For the use of φρένες with constituents expressed by the article and neuter adjective see Eur. Andr. 365, Or. 297, Hipp. 1390, Alc. 797.

35. For the use of the verb μαίνομαι with φρήν see Pi. P. 2.26-7; Aesch. Septem 484; Eur. H.F. 1122.

36. παράκοποι φρενῶν. Compare Eur. Hipp. 237-8.

37. The verb is ἐξίστημι, used at 359 in the second aorist, at 850 in the first aorist. In the former case the perfect μέμηνας conveying the idea of permanent madness emphasises the aorist ἐξέστης as a temporary state. For the same phrase see Eur. Or. 1021.

38. For λόγοι and φρένες compare Eur. Hipp. 935.

39. Dodds ad loc.

40. At 45-6 Dionysus complains that Pentheus thrusts him away from his libations and does not remember him at any point in his prayers, thus implying that he does worship other gods.

41. For the litotes of φρονεῖν τι, see Dodds and Roux ad loc.

and Th. 5.7.3 and 7.89.3.

42. Conacher, p.75. Compare Soph. Ph. 357, Ant. 1261.

43. The adverbs used in this play are εὖ (rightly) and κακῶς (wrongly). The noun εὐφροσύνη at 377 is described by Dodds ad loc. as "the gladness which is also good sense."

44. The two instances of a negative word used without another adverb were treated above: φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς, 332 and οὐ φρονοῦσ' ἃ χρὴ φρονεῖν, 1123.

45. See, for example, Eur. Cyc. 163, Andr. 82, Or. 801, Heracl. 242.

46. "To think slightly of the gods" is akin to the ὕβρις of τὸ μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν; for examples see North p.78.

47. Read with Dodds after Porson ἀλλ' εἰ (315) and a comma after ἀεί (316). For καὶ γάρ see Denniston, p.108. For the thought of this passage see North, p.75.

48. The occurrence of a word of the stem σωφρον- at 1002 is not included in these examples. Murray's text reads σωφρόνα, the Doric nominative feminine singular of the noun σωφρόνη. Dodds ad loc. questions the status of σωφρόνη as a tragic word and, because it cannot have the meaning "castigatrix", he emends the line to γνωμᾶν σωφρόν<ισμ>α θάνατος·, "death is the chastisement of his purposes."

49. Dodds ad loc. stresses the implication of ὅστις εἶ as "'what your position is (in relation to me)': the man mistakes himself for the god's master."

CHAPTER FOUR

Σοφία, Φρήν and their Cognates

The relationship between σοφία and φρήν and their cognates can be observed not only where the two terms occur in the same line or passage[1] but also where one term occurs in a context that implies the other. The intent of this chapter is to study the related occurrences of σοφία and φρήν to determine the way in which the use of one's φρήν determines one's σοφία or lack of it.[2]

A basic feature of the relationship between σοφία and φρήν in the Bacchae is observed by Teiresias: the highest (ἄκρων) φρένες can acquire, most likely by experience and learning, τὸ σοφόν, a quality that is presented in the play as intellectual, impractical wisdom (203). On the other hand, the people who possess these "first-rate" or "superior"[3] minds are the men of excess from whom the Chorus think that it is wise (σοφά) to withhold the mind and understanding (παπίδα φρένα τε). For their part, the Chorus accept as σοφία, practical wisdom, what the common people take as their custom and usage (427-33). Thus, those who would attempt to overthrow tradition, the sceptics, use their φρένες to acquire τὸ σοφόν, while the common people keep their φρένες away from such men and rely on custom: they are the σοφοί, the practically wise, according to the Chorus, for their wisdom proves to be useful and beneficial.

Lines 427-9 reveal a relationship between σοφία and φρήν more subtle than the one explained above. They suggest that a person has control over his φρήν in that he can withhold it from or apply it to certain people and that the φρήν can be affected by contact with certain people or situations. Moreover, the idea presented in the play that madness is a result of the impairment or the temporary loss of one's φρήν is a significant aspect of the dramatic action. First, there is true, god-inspired madness, as when the women of Thebes are driven from their homes in madness, frenzied in their φρένες (32-3) and when the Stranger calls upon Dionysus to drive Pentheus out of his φρένες (850-3). Secondly, Teiresias responds to Pentheus' outburst against Dionysianism with two references to his state of mind: "you are grievously mad" (326) and "you are mad now, whereas before you had temporarily lost your φρένες" (359). In the case of the god-inspired madness, the person affected does not have control over his φρένες, which are manipulated entirely in the way that the god desires. The madness of which Teiresias accuses Pentheus is a result of the way in which the king's φρήν is affected by the problem presented by the arrival of Dionysianism in Thebes. It is clear in all four instances that in madness, viewed as the impairment of the φρένες, there is no place for σοφία, primarily because practical wisdom was never truly present in respect of the situation for which the person is described as "mad". The

women of Thebes, especially Semele's sisters, showed their lack of σοφία in refusing to believe that Dionysus was the son of Zeus; Pentheus attempted to solve the problem presented by Dionysianism not by using σοφία, the practical, beneficial wisdom, but by using τὸ σοφόν, the intellectual wisdom that rejects custom. It should be noted, however, that once their divinely caused madness ceases, Pentheus and Agaue come to a certain understanding of what has happened. As Agaue is about to fall upon him, Pentheus, now in possession of his φρένες, begs her not to kill her own son because of his mistakes[4] (1118-21) and Agaue, who was frequently described as mad,[5] realises that it was Dionysus who ruined the family (1296, 1374-6) and that she acted in ἀφροσύνη (1301). Cadmus speaks for himself, his daughter and his grandson when he admits that they have done wrong (1344).

Dionysus, as the Stranger, twice links cognates of σοφία and φρήν. The presence of σοφία cannot affect the judgement of the man who lacks understanding (ἀμαθής) for he will think that the speaker of wise words (σοφά) himself lacks understanding (οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν, 480). More significant for the characterisation of Dionysus and Pentheus is the god's comment that a σώφρων good temper is the mark of a σοφός (641): that is, the good temper that results from sound φρένες is one characteristic of a wise man. Dionysus, whose σωφροσύνη is evident in his ἡσυχία, is σοφός, whereas

Pentheus, the man of ὀργή, the quickness of whose φρένες the first messenger fears, is not σοφός but ἀμαθής.

There are three occurrences of σοφία and φρήν in the Bacchae which illustrate the idea that the proper use of one's φρήν results in σοφία. As Teiresias and Cadmus set off for the mountains to participate in the rites for Dionysus, Cadmus asks if they alone will dance for the god. Teiresias replies that they will, for they alone use their φρένες rightly, the rest wrongly (195-6).[6] Now Cadmus has just called Teiresias σοφός, as a seer who is skilled in a seer's art and is acquainted with Dionysiac ritual; he shows as well practical wisdom in accepting Dionysus (179, 186). Teiresias has used his φρένες rightly, as he says, in recognising the benefits this god brings to mortals (278-85); he also understands that ancestral customs, which teach the worship of the gods, are not to be tampered with (201-3). Most significantly he understands Dionysus' natural desire for τιμή (192, 208, 321): just as Pentheus likes to have his name exalted by his people (319-20), so Dionysus enjoys being honoured (321, 209). Thus by using his φρένες properly when confronted with a situation in which a definite conclusion had to be drawn Teiresias shows practical σοφία in his acceptance and worship of Dionysus.

Although little is said in the play about Dionysus' φρένες, we do know that he considers himself σωφρονῶν (504): he has sound φρένες as is shown by his self-control in face

of Pentheus' rude and impatient questions and behaviour. He will later describe this σώφρων good temper as being characteristic of the σοφός (641). Both Agaue and Pentheus call Dionysus σοφός, although the terms are used ironically: to Agaue in her madness Dionysus is a skilful hunter whose actions are practical and useful (1190); to Pentheus the god is clever in his answers (489, 655) and practically wise in his plan to allow Pentheus to see the Bacchants without being killed (824). Just as Dionysus calls himself σωφρονῶν, he also considers himself σοφός by nature in what he should most be σοφός (656), namely, in his ability to deal with sceptics like Pentheus and in his realisation that acceptance and honour are due to him as a god. In sum, it is clear from these examples that Dionysus' ability to handle Pentheus by means of his sound φρένες is at least one aspect of his σοφία.

The second messenger offers what is perhaps the clearest example of the idea that the proper use of the φρήν leads to σοφία. After witnessing and relating to the Chorus the fate of Pentheus on Cithaeron, he concludes his speech with a moral:

> τὸ σωφρονεῖν δὲ καὶ σέβειν τὰ τῶν θεῶν
> κάλλιστον· οἶμαι δ' αὐτὸ καὶ σοφώτατον
> θνητοῖσιν εἶναι χρῆμα τοῖσι χρωμένοις.
> τὸ σωφρονεῖν and the reverence of things divine
> is fairest and, I think, also a very wise usage

for those mortals who use it. (1150-3).

The general idea involved in the term τὸ σωφρονεῖν is that the proper use of one's φρένες in a certain situation renders them "sound". In this passage τὸ σωφρονεῖν has been shown to refer to the prudence of the man who recognises and accepts a god's divinity and who demonstrates self-knowledge in his relationship with the gods, a man quite unlike Pentheus, whom Teiresias describes as sounding sensible (ὡς φρονῶν, 268) but whose words lack φρένες (269). Thus in the messenger's opinion the proper use of the φρένες, with the result that one displays τὸ σωφρονεῖν, is not only the fairest usage for a mortal but the wisest, for the man who will actually put into use his σωφροσύνη will be practically wise. Dionysus at the end of the play speaks to the same effect: if Cadmus and Agaue had known how to σωφρονεῖν, that is, if they had used their φρένες properly and thereby displayed "sound φρένες", they would have acted properly towards Dionysus and would now be happy (1341-3).

While Dionysus is σοφός and uses his φρένες properly and is thus σώφρων, it is clear that Pentheus' lack of σοφία is the result of the improper use of his φρένες. Although by accusing Cadmus of μωρία (344) Pentheus claims for himself its opposite, σοφία, it is clear from his fate that any wisdom he might claim is not practical and beneficial. Moreover, Teiresias calls him μῶρος (369), and Dionysus refers twice to his ἀμαθία (480, 490). Teiresias gives the first

verbal hint that Pentheus does not use his φρένες properly: the skilled and practically wise (σοφός) orator can make a successful speech if he has an honest case to argue (266-7); Pentheus, however, has the speaking ability of a sensible man (ὡς φρονῶν) but his words contain no φρένες (268-9). Cadmus picks up the same idea at 332 by telling his grandson that he uses his φρένες (φρονῶν) but has no understanding (οὐδὲν φρονεῖς). Teiresias again evokes the notion that Pentheus does not use his φρένες properly in his warning that he should not think that he has a great amount of understanding (φρονεῖν τι) if he has an opinion and that opinion is sick (311-12). The Chorus use the same term, δόξα ("opinion", "judgement"), to describe people who wrongly use their understanding[7]: divine power eventually deals with those mortals who honour folly and who in mad judgement do not respect things divine (884-7).

Pentheus may show a lack of σοφία in his misuse of his φρένες, but he fits the description offered by Teiresias and the Chorus of the men who possess τὸ σοφόν. Teiresias first uses the term to describe the impractical, intellectual wisdom of those people who, like Pentheus, try to disregard custom and reject the acceptance and worship of the gods (201-3). The Chorus agree with this description (395, 877, 1005) and prefer the practical σοφία of the common people (427-33).

As a representative of those people who use their

φρένες wrongly and possess τὸ σοφόν as opposed to σοφία, Pentheus inevitably misuses his φρένες in certain crucial situations. Throughout the play it is suggested that there are two related ways in which Pentheus misuses his understanding. Conacher notes that the danger lies "in the objects of φρονεῖν"[8]: the thought that one knows more than νόμος (custom, tradition, law) allows and the inclination to ponder issues not fit for mortals.

Although Teiresias speaks of the inviolability of custom (201-3), it is the Chorus who explain the relationship between mortals and νόμος: "one should not know or care for anything that is better than νόμος, for it is the divine that has power, and that which is held as custom (νόμιμον) over a long period of time is grounded in nature" (890-6). Later they will qualify this statement by noting that not all customs are to be accepted: while they do not begrudge Pentheus τὸ σοφόν, they are happy to pursue the things that lead to τὰ καλά, namely to be pious and to honour the gods by rejecting those customs (νόμιμα) that are outside justice (1005-10). They accept whatever the common people take as their custom (ἐνόμισε) and usage (431-3). The respect for νόμος, then, is seen as an important element of the play. Pentheus, however, is conspicuous in his contempt for custom. Cadmus warns him to accept Teiresias' good advice and dwell with them, not outside νόμος (330-1). When he fails to do so, the Chorus say that such ἀφροσύνη which disregards cus-

tom (ἀνόμου) ends in misfortune (387-8). Finally, they call him ἄνομος, as well as ἄδικος, (995) and describe him opposing Dionysianism with unjust purpose and a rage that is contrary to νόμος (997).

Just as Pentheus misuses his φρένες in thinking that he knows more than custom allows, he misuses them also in that he does not realise his place as a mortal: he believes that he can make decisions in matters in which he has no right to interfere because of his mortal status. References to this second theme are frequent in the play. The most obvious is the statement by the Chorus that thinking thoughts that are not mortal means a short life (395-7), an idea they repeat later as they contemplate the fate of Pentheus: "to accept unhesitatingly things divine, to behave as a mortal, naturally results in a painless life" (1002-4). It is not only the Chorus who put such emphasis on the necessity for mortals to act like mortals. Cadmus early in the play shows that he knows his place, for he says that he, as a mortal, does not despise the gods (199). The moral that he draws at the end of the play from what he has seen happen demonstrates more fully his knowledge of how a mortal should behave towards a god: "if there is anyone who has high thoughts and thinks slightly (ὑπερφρονεῖ) of the gods, let him observe the death of Pentheus and believe in those gods" (1325-6).[9] Teiresias also knows his place as a mortal for he says that no λόγος aided by τὸ σοφόν can overcome ances-

tral customs (201-3). Because they are coeval with time, those customs are like the gods themselves, everlasting and inviolate. Any attempt by a mortal to reject them would be tantamount to an attack on the gods. By acting not as a mortal should Pentheus earns the Chorus' reproach that he is not a mortal man but a fierce-eyed monster, like a murderous giant who fights the gods (542-4). Pentheus does in fact dare to fight the gods and Dionysus emphasises the fact (45, 635-6, 789).

Thus Pentheus has been shown to misuse his φρένες in respect of the two most important requirements of σοφία set forth in the play: that a person should not think that he knows, or can know, more than νόμος, and that he must recognise that as a mortal he has no right to think that he knows more than the gods. Pentheus was confronted with the problem posed by Dionysianism to his city, and, after using his φρένες to come to a decision, he chose to apply τὸ σοφόν, the intellectual wisdom that attempts to reject custom. The wrong choice proved to be not only fatal to himself but caused untold misfortune for his family.

CHAPTER FOUR: NOTES

1. There are seven passages where cognates of σοφία and φρήν are found together: 203, 266-71, 390-7, 427, 480, 641 and 1150-2.

2. It is obvious that one's "mind" has direct bearing on one's "wisdom". It has been emphasised, however, especially by Conacher in his Appendix that it is the way in which one uses one's intelligence that is important.

3. The terms can be found respectively in Paley and Roux ad loc.

4. Although Euripides does not make clear what Pentheus considers his ἁμαρτίαι to be, Dodds ad loc. is convinced that his repentance is sincere. Winnington-Ingram, p.131 notes that the imminence of death convinced Pentheus of the divinity of Dionysus.

5. For Agaue's madness, see 33, 1123, 1269-70, 1295.

6. It should be noted that while Cadmus' statement that he will accept Dionysus is sincere, his reason for doing so (to bring honour to the family, 333-6) sharply qualifies the nature of his acceptance.

7. Conacher, p.75.

8. Ibid.

9. For the same idea compare Eur. Supp. 216-18.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion

In this chapter I shall review the major points made in Chapters Two, Three and Four about σοφία and φρήν and their cognates in order to illustrate more fully the relationship between the two sets of terms. Emphasis will be placed on the characters' thoughts on σοφία and their use of their φρένες.

Although σοφία and its cognates are first used to denote "skill" in crafts, especially poetry, the terms soon come to denote a more general practical wisdom which results in some benefit or success for its possessor. This practical σοφία may connote "cunning" or "slyness" in a morally negative sense. Euripides follows earlier and contemporary authors in these usages, although he expands the use of these terms to characterise the gods and condemns excessive σοφία.

In the Bacchae there are three instances where σοφός is used of "skill". Cadmus describes Teiresias as σοφός, a seer skilled in a seer's art (179, 186); Teiresias speaks of a skilled orator (266); and Agaue praises Bacchus as a skilled huntsman (1190).[1] In all other instances the emphasis is placed on the practical (or impractical) nature of wisdom. While σοφία denotes practical, useful wisdom, primarily in the acceptance of Dionysus as a god, τὸ σοφόν

is used of the impractical, intellectual wisdom of the sceptics who would seek to undermine the very traditions on which the common people base their σοφία (430-3).

While Cadmus' only thought on σοφία is that Teiresias is σοφός as a seer and in his acceptance of Dionysus, Teiresias frequently warns in his short time on stage that wisdom, if misused, can be impractical. Mortals, he says, should not use τὸ σοφόν on the gods in an attempt to reject them, for no λόγος aided by τὸ σοφόν can overcome traditions, which teach the acceptance and worship of the gods (200-3). His example of the σοφός orator (266) also illustrates how wisdom is no longer beneficial when it is used in the wrong way.

Pentheus' thoughts on σοφία are as brief as one would expect. Twice he refers to the Stranger's "cleverness" or "trickery" in answering his questions (489, 655), and even when he praises what he thinks is the Stranger's σοφία in allowing him to see the Bacchants without being killed (824), it is in fact impractical wisdom from Pentheus' point of view because it is his opponent's means of trapping him.

Dionysus, as the Stranger, repeatedly associates himself with σοφία. Not only does he speak wise words (σοφά) to Pentheus who has no capacity for understanding them (480), but he is σοφός himself in his σώφρων good temper, which he describes later as characteristic of a wise man (641). Moreover, in reply to Pentheus' taunts that he is σοφός

only in what is not important, he explains that he is by nature σοφός in what he should most be σοφός (655-6), that is, in his practical ability to deal with sceptics like Pentheus and in "his" acceptance of Dionysus as a god.

Although Cadmus, Teiresias, Dionysus and even Pentheus offer some thoughts on σοφία, it is the Chorus who present specific ideas on its nature. For the Chorus practical σοφία can include the life of quietness and τὸ θνητὰ φρονεῖν; they deem wise the withholding of the φρήν from men of excess and accept as σοφία whatever the common people take as their custom and usage (first stasimon). In the fourth stasimon they characterise as σοφία the things that lead one's life to τὰ καλά: piety and the reverence of the gods. The vengeance that they praise in the third stasimon may also be a part of their idea of σοφία, although there is much dispute on this point.

On the other hand there is the Chorus' attitude to τὸ σοφόν, which Teiresias described as impractical, intellectual wisdom. Although the Chorus use the term three of the four times it occurs in the play, they have little to say about it once they have firmly rejected it in the first stasimon. There they are thinking of Pentheus' οὐχ ὁσίαν ὕβριν towards Dionysus and his ἀφροσύνη; he displays τὸ σοφόν not σοφία, and his inclination to ponder thoughts that are not mortal means a short life. When they return to the term in the third stasimon, they ask, "What is τὸ σοφόν?"

The question has been shown to reflect their thoughts on the impracticality of τὸ σοφόν which has led Pentheus to his death. In the fourth stasimon, when the Chorus are virtually assured of Pentheus' death, they make only passing mention of the term: they do not care for τὸ σοφόν, but if someone should want to use it, they would not object.

The term φρήν has a wide range of usages; it can denote the "diaphragm", the "mind" as a seat of emotions and the mental faculties, "thinking" or "way of thinking" and "thought". Its cognate verb φρονεῖν signifies that the use of one's φρήν results in understanding. It is used absolutely or with neuter adjectives ("to have certain thoughts") or with adverbs ("to think in a certain way"). The quality denoted by σωφροσύνη, sound φρένες, is intellectual in origin but predominantly moral in its application and effect. Its wide range of usages is demonstrated by the many English terms that are needed to translate it: prudence, good sense, chastity, self-control, self-knowledge.

In the Bacchae φρήν is used as a mental organ that can acquire an intellectual concept (203) and can be withheld from certain people (427).[2] It is used twice to describe Pentheus' emotionalism: the first messenger comments on the quickness of the king's φρένες (670), and the Chorus reproach him for his attack on Dionysianism with a maddened πραπίς (999). More frequent, however, are the instances that denote a change in one's φρένες.[3] In these cases the

impairment or the temporary loss of the φρένες as an agent of thought affects the thought process itself.

Madness, an important aspect of the dramatic action of the Bacchae, is characterised as the impairment of the φρένες or the lack of φρονεῖν. Pentheus is described by Teiresias as having lost his φρένες (359); later the Stranger calls upon Dionysus to drive him out of his φρένες, for only when he is driven out of τὸ φρονεῖν will he dress as a woman (850, 853). Agaue in her madness is described as frenzied in her φρένες (33) and not understanding what she should be understanding (οὐ φρονοῦσ' ἃ χρὴ φρονεῖν, 1123). The understanding or good sense which is abandoned in madness returns only with sanity, although it is then too late: just as Agaue is about to kill him, Pentheus realises what has happened (1120-1), and Agaue realises in the end that Dionysus has destroyed her family (1296).

Although words of the stem σωφρον- are used of Dionysus to denote his self-control in face of Pentheus (504, 641), the majority of the terms signify a mortal's self-knowledge in his relationship with the gods. The second messenger explains the idea clearly in the moral he draws at the end of his speech after witnessing the σπαραγμός of Pentheus: the fairest and wisest usage for a mortal is τὸ σωφρονεῖν and the reverence of things divine (1150-3). Τὸ σωφρονεῖν here has been shown to refer to the good sense of the man who can recognise and accept divinity; his φρένες are

sound because he understands his place as a mortal. Once he has accepted the gods' divinity, his reverence of them follows naturally. Thus the messenger indirectly accuses Pentheus of a lack of σωφροσύνη. Dionysus, however, bluntly tells Pentheus that he is not σώφρων (504): he depends solely on his authority as a king when he should realise that he is first and foremost a mortal and must subordinate himself to the gods. Likewise, Dionysus explains Cadmus' and Agaue's lack of σωφροσύνη: if they had known how to σωφρονεῖν, that is, how to achieve proper understanding, they would have been happy in the end and would have had the god as their benefactor, not their opponent (1341-3). Only Teiresias possesses σωφροσύνη: after his refutation of Pentheus' charges against Dionysus and his worship and his own defence of the new god, the Chorus say that he shows "sound" φρένες in honouring Dionysus (329).

While certain characters in the Bacchae are characterised as σοφός or not σοφός (ἀμαθής), it is the way in which they use their φρένες that determines their σοφία or lack of it. When a person is confronted with a problem, he uses his φρένες to solve it. Although the mere use of the φρένες results in understanding, either good or bad, only the proper application of the φρένες to a problem results in σοφία. Of the principal characters Dionysus and Teiresias use their φρένες properly and thus possess σοφία; Cadmus' φρένες give him an understanding that is partly right and

partly wrong; and Pentheus misuses his φρένες, and acquires and uses τὸ σοφόν.

The play itself illustrates the practical σοφία of Dionysus, since at its conclusion the god achieves the object of his visit to Thebes: to reveal himself as a god (22, 47-8). Nevertheless, Dionysus validates his own description of himself as being σοφός by nature (656), as having one of the characteristics of a σοφός (641) and as speaking σοφά (480). For in approaching the problem of how to punish Pentheus for his refusal to accept him as a god, Dionysus uses his φρένες to gain an understanding of one of the flaws in Pentheus' character, his great desire to see the Bacchants' αἰσχρουργία (810-13 and 1062). Thus Dionysus' practical σοφία is a result of the "sound" use of his φρένες (504), first, in his realisation that acceptance and honour are due to him as a god and, secondly, in his ability to deal with Pentheus and to obtain reverence from Thebes.

Teiresias also shows that he possesses the σοφία that Cadmus claims for him (179, 186), for he repeatedly demonstrates a proper use of his φρένες. Teiresias himself explains that in dancing for Dionysus he and Cadmus use their φρένες rightly (196); after his defence of the new god and his worship, the Chorus comment on the "sound" φρένες he shows in honouring Dionysus. Teiresias' proper use of his φρένες is also evident in his understanding of both Dionysus and a mortal's relationship with the gods. Not only

does he recognise the many benefits provided for mortals by Dionysus and, more importantly, the god's need of τιμή (192, 208-9, 321), but he knows that mortals should not use τὸ σοφόν on the gods in an attempt to reject them (200-3). Speaking for himself as a mortal, Teiresias concludes that he will not be persuaded by Pentheus' words and fight the gods (325).

Unlike Teiresias, Cadmus cannot be said to use his φρένες properly in every instance. The seer says that Cadmus uses his φρένες properly in dancing for Dionysus (196), and Cadmus can claim "sound" φρένες in his realisation that he, a mortal, cannot despise the gods (199). Yet at the end of the play Dionysus says that Cadmus (and Agaue) did not know how to σωφρονεῖν (1341-3). Thus it can be concluded that Cadmus uses his φρένες properly in honouring Dionysus by taking part in his rites; he does not, however, have a proper understanding of why he must honour him: by virtue of being a god Dionysus demands acceptance and reverence.

Cadmus' desire for τιμή appears to hinder his φρένες in achieving a proper understanding of why he must honour Dionysus. Whereas Teiresias knows that Dionysus needs τιμή (208-9, 321) and although Cadmus himself is willing to grant him such honour (342), his actions are based on his desire to acquire τιμή for himself and his family. His reason for honouring Dionysus is straightforward: the god is his daughter's son (181, 183). Cadmus' concern that Dionysus

is a god (182)[4] is secondary in importance, for he can tell Pentheus to call Dionysus a god whether or not he is truly divine, so that Semele may be thought to have borne a god and thus the family would have τιμή (333-6). At the end of the play Cadmus' thoughts return to his desire for τιμή: now he will be exiled from his home without honour (ἄτιμος, 1313).

While Dionysus and Teiresias, and Cadmus in some respects, use their φρένες properly and thus possess σοφία, Pentheus cannot in any way be described as practically σοφός: his actions are neither beneficial nor successful for himself, his family and his city. Dionysus twice comments on Pentheus' ἀμαθία (480, 490), and Teiresias in disgust calls him and his words μῶρος (369). Teiresias is the first to note that Pentheus does not use his φρένες correctly, because he, like the rest of the people of Thebes, does not participate in the rites for Dionysus (196). According to Cadmus, however, Pentheus does use his φρένες, but he has no understanding (332). In other words, when he is confronted with the problem presented by Dionysianism, he uses his φρένες to find a solution, but his application is faulty, and he lacks understanding.

In his misuse of his φρένες Pentheus relies on overconfidence and his royal authority, both characteristics of the typical tyrant of tragedy. Like Teiresias' clever orator he relies on overconfidence and becomes a bad citi-

zen because of his lack of sense (270-1). Teiresias perceptively recognises Pentheus' reliance on his royal authority, for he warns him not to boast that force has any authority for mortals, nor to think that he has a great amount of understanding, if he has an opinion which happens to be sick (310-12). Thus the opinion that Pentheus forms by relying on his authority as a king interferes with the proper use of his φρένες. After Dionysus tells him that his φρένες are not sound (504), Pentheus again returns to his authority instead of using his φρένες properly and recognising "what life he leads, what he does and who he is" (505).

By relying on overconfidence and royal authority Pentheus misuses his φρένες in two specific, related ways. First, he does not recognise his humble place as a mortal but thinks solely in terms of his position as a king. He feels that his own opinion of the situation and his decision of how to solve the problem presented by Dionysianism must be accepted without question since he is the king. Moreover, he refuses to consider the advice offered by the seer Teiresias and by the former king, his grandfather Cadmus. The Chorus are perceptive in their understanding of Pentheus' attitude for they praise τὸ φρονεῖν and equate τὸ μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν with a short life (389-91, 396-7). Pentheus misuses his φρένες, thereby arriving at a wrong understanding, and presumes to ponder things not fit for a

mortal. Not only does he feel that he can make the decision to reject the new god, but he is frequently described as fighting the god.[5] Secondly, Pentheus misuses his φρένες in his belief that he can reject νόμος. He is the ἄνομος (995) who opposes Dionysianism with a rage that is contrary to νόμος (997) and whose ἀφροσύνη, which disregards custom, ends in misfortune (387-8). Thus Pentheus misuses his φρένες and thereby denies himself any claim to σοφία, and acquires and uses τὸ σοφόν, impractical, intellectual wisdom, to reject Dionysus.

Although this study of σοφία and φρήν and their cognates implies a very strong condemnation of Pentheus because of his misuse of his φρένες and use of τὸ σοφόν, the portrayal of his character is not of course restricted to these factors. We know, for example, that he is an inexperienced and insecure young man who has recently become king of Thebes. Although the audience might well understand that as king he is responsible for the safety of his city and so must respond to the threat which Dionysus poses to the social order, he nevertheless gains little of their sympathy early in the play. When Dionysus' cruelty and desire for vengeance become evident, sympathy gradually begins to shift from the god to Pentheus until finally Cadmus sadly recalls the piety Pentheus showed towards him. While the play ultimately finds sympathy for Pentheus in the excessive cruelty of Dionysus towards him, the study of

his misuse of his φρένες and use of τὸ σοφόν seeks to define very precisely a crucial aspect of Pentheus' character.

This thesis has sought to define the distinctions drawn in the Bacchae between σοφία and τὸ σοφόν and also the ways in which the characters use or misuse their φρένες, issues with which the treatment, and even at times the defence of Dionysus and his worship in this play seem so closely linked. If the analysis appears to rely on fine and subtle distinctions, one must also recognise Euripides' own insistence on the variations on these words and the subtle explorations of the ideas which he offers in his play. The Bacchae is a complex and in many respects puzzling play. This thesis has attempted to show that a close scrutiny of its language can clarify and define very precisely some of the ideas and issues which the play explores.

CHAPTER FIVE: NOTES

1. In each of these cases, however, the idea of practical wisdom is also evident. Teiresias shows his σοφία in accepting Dionysus; the orator can use his σοφία in the wrong way and it thus ceases to be beneficial; and Bacchus' σοφία also characterises the practical, useful nature of his actions.

2. In madness, however, a person has no control over his φρένες: see, for example, 33, 850.

3. For the change in Pentheus' φρένες, see 850, 944, 947-8; in Agaue's φρένες, 1269-70.

4. Although 182 is often rejected on the grounds of its resemblance to 860 and its superfluity here, Dodds ad loc. notes that "it is natural that Cadmus, having hinted at the real reason for his devotion (ὄντα παῖδα θυγατρὸς ἐξ ἐμῆς), should enlarge on the official one--there has been a revelation."

5. For the characterisation of Pentheus as a θεομάχος, see 45, 544, 635-6, 789, 1255-6.

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APPENDIX: τὸ σοφόν

Marylin Arthur in "The Choral Odes of the Bacchae of Euripides," YClS 22 (1972), pp.145-79 (Appendix B) disagrees with the commonly held opinion that τὸ σοφόν is used in the play to refer to "false" (impractical, intellectual) wisdom and σοφία to "true" (practical, beneficial) wisdom. She maintains that σοφία is "false" or "excessive" wisdom; τὸ σοφόν is accepted as "prudence". The main points of her argument are as follows.

(a) "The problem of τὸ σοφόν in the Bacchae is primarily one of establishing for the Chorus an attitude toward this idea which remains consistent throughout the play. Since the Chorus invoke τὸ σοφόν in contexts which seem to imply different attitudes, one or another passage has usually had to be twisted in order to yield the desired consistency of viewpoint (p.176)." As I have shown in Chapter Two, τὸ σοφόν is used consistently to refer to the idea of impractical, intellectual wisdom. Teiresias first speaks of τὸ σοφόν as the wisdom that the sceptics use in their attempt to reject tradition (201-3): it is unsuccessful and unbeneficial. The Chorus use the term three times: first they reject it outright (395) and then wonder what benefit it brings to a man like Pentheus (877); finally as Pentheus is led to the mountains where he will be murdered, the Chorus say that they do not grudge him τὸ σοφόν: he may pursue it if he wishes but they are happy to pursue other

things that lead to τὰ καλά (1005). In all cases the reference is to the intellectual wisdom of Pentheus, wisdom which is unsuccessful and unbeneficial.

(b) Arthur believes "that there is no compelling reason to assume that τὸ σοφόν is rejected at 395 (ibid.)." The main reason for doing so, she suggest, has been Teiresias' use of the term at 203: no reasoning, even if aided by τὸ σοφόν, will overcome ancestral customs. Arthur hesitates to accept "Teiresias' opinion:" Teiresias' position in this play is far from unambiguous, and the attitudes that he assumes are difficult to define with any clarity or consistency. ... [in 201-3], for example, he seems to advise the acceptance of a new god on grounds of the inviolability of age-old tradition; and if line 203 refers to the practice of rationalizing about the gods, then Teiresias' speech to Pentheus in lines 272ff. is a superb example of it (ibid.)." To Arthur's first objection it can be pointed out that "ancestral customs" would necessarily teach that gods, whether new or old, are to be accepted. Dodds ad loc. explains that "Euripides has made Teiresias speak as a man of the fifth century, I think deliberately: the glaring anachronism is a warning to the audience that the debate which follows will represent a fifth-century controversy transposed into the mythical past." In 272ff. Teiresias is attempting to show that Dionysus is a god by finding more acceptable explanations for him. The seer does not reject the god as Pentheus

does but tries to give Pentheus face-saving reasons to change his mind about him.

"Even if Teiresias' position were not so far from clear, we should still be better advised to define the Chorus' attitude toward the wise from what they themselves say about it, and not to make the questionable assumption of continuity of their vocabulary with Teiresias, particularly, when line 395 points up a linguistic paradox (pp.176-7)." Thus Arthur rejects Dodds' emphasis upon the thematic relationship between a choral ode and the preceding or following action. It is difficult to believe that the Chorus, who rebuke Pentheus (clearly a representative of the sceptics who use τὸ σοφόν) for his impiety (263-5) and praise Teiresias' defence of Dionysus (328-9), do not base their reference to τὸ σοφόν on Teiresias' use of it at 203. Although Arthur feels that it is not possible to attribute either type of wisdom to σοφία or τὸ σοφόν, for the Chorus τὸ σοφόν, based on Teiresias' idea of it at 203, is the intellectual, impractical wisdom of the men who attempt to reject Dionysus. (c) On the refrain of the third stasimon (877-81) Arthur writes: "The usual interpretation of these lines, when it is innocent of any attempt to evolve a consistent attitude toward τὸ σοφόν, assumes that it is such a doctrine [of retaliation upon one's enemy] which the chorus is celebrating, but that the wisdom of revenge is in fact expressed in the question τί τὸ σοφόν; (p.178)." She believes that the an-

swer to both questions is the doctrine of revenge and can thus equate revenge with "true" wisdom (τὸ σοφόν). It does seem strange, however, that the Chorus would not make some remark about Pentheus after they have just seen him led to his death and have offered in the first strophe the metaphor of the fawn (the Chorus) escaping the hunter (Pentheus). It seems logical that in the refrain there should be some contrast between the two types of wisdom.

(d) At 1005 Arthur reads τὸ σοφὸν οὐ φθόνῳ χαίρω θηρεύουσα· τά θ' ἕτερα..., "I rejoice in the unhesitating pursuit of wisdom / and in those other great and outstanding quests." While this reading solves the problem presented by φθονῶ with the accusative and is consistent with her previous explanations of the meaning of τὸ σοφόν, it is based on Arthur's assumption that the Chorus do not reject τὸ σοφόν, just as Dodds feels that they cannot pursue something that they have rejected, and thus reads τὸ σοφὸν οὐ φθονῶ· χαίρω. κτλ.

In brief, I see no reason to believe that Arthur has proven her unorthodox view that τὸ σοφόν is "prudence" and σοφία is "false" or "excessive" wisdom.

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Title of Thesis

The Relationship between Σοφία and Φρήν

in the *Bacchae* of Euripides

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